

The Politics of Multinational Crisis Management: The European Union's Response to Darfur

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Jeppe Plenge Trautner*
SPIRIT, European Studies, Aalborg University

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Abstract

The response of the European Union towards Sudan and the ongoing crisis in Darfur is a tangle of power politics, oil, and humanitarian concerns at the state, regional and international levels, as well as the result of differing perceptions of the causes and workings of the armed conflicts in Sudan. The key conflicts are untangled, and it is explained how Sudan's 'warfare state' political structures perpetuate the warfare in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan. It is discussed how external powers could respond to humanitarian emergencies, and a scenario that could lead to a military intervention in Darfur is explored.¹

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*Jeppe Plenge Trautner (b. 1968) is a PhD-candidate with the European Research Unit at Aalborg University specialising in democratic control aspects of the military integration of the European Union. He holds a MA in political science, and headed the Department of Defence Management at the Baltic Defence College 1998–2001. As an army captain he served with the UN in Kashmir, and has travelled extensively in the conflict zones of Asia, the Middle East and Africa. (*Comments are invited – trautner@ihis.aau.dk*)

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1 International Responses to Darfur

Based on extensive fact-finding in Darfur the U.S. Congress unanimously adopted a resolution in July 2004 labelling the conflict in Darfur “a genocide”.² The Americans hoped to create international momentum to force the Government of Sudan (GOS) to stop the atrocities, but quite the opposite happened. Based on the observations of EU’s factfinder Pieter Feith, who spent five days in Darfur hosted by GOS, the EU concluded in August 2004 that “We are not in the situation of genocide there,”³ and in January 2005 the UN concurred.⁴ Had the intentional killing of, by then, at least 100.000 civilians by murder and starvation, and the ethnic cleansing of a million within less than one year been termed a genocide UN’s 1948 Genocide Convention would have been invoked, and the UN and EU would have been forced to sanction GOS. Three of the five UN veto holders are disinclined to confront GOS: China has invested in oil infrastructure owned by GOS. The French support to GOS is motivated by strategic and business concerns (as discussed in section 3.3 below), and Russia is — with China — the key arms suppliers of GOS.⁵ The subdued response of the EU, and the UN Security Council’s refusal to blame the Sudanese government in Khartoum was reinforced by the Arab League and by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference expressing support for GOS, which is a member of both.⁶ Late in 2004 the majority of non-democratic regimes that dominate the UN General Assembly and UN’s Human Rights Committee defeated motions that criticised GOS.

The United States is militarily over-extended in Iraq, and cannot act against GOS on its own, so the U.S. sought to initiate international sanctions and judicial action against the perpetrators. The European Union member states disagreed to sanctions, and effectively delayed judicial actions by declaring that such would require the U.S. to accept the International Criminal Court, which the U.S. will not. A compromise was reached in March 2005, and a UN Security Council resolution mildly rebuked GOS, and threatened potential legal action against some perpetrators of war crimes.⁷

By September 2004 China, France, Russia and the EU had called the bluff of the U.S. Congress, which was neither willing to nor capable of imposing its will on GOS when

²The fact-finding report documented widespread atrocities along ethnic lines, and includes analyses of interviews with 1.136 recently arrived refugees of the Zaghawa (46%), Fur (8%) and Massalit (30%) tribes U.S. State Department (2004).

³Feith spent August 5–9, 2004 in Darfur. <http://www.sudanembassy.org/default.asp?page=viewstory&id=304>.

⁴Acting on a Security Council request from Sept. 18, 2004, the UN Secretary General established a five-member Commission of Inquiry for Darfur three weeks later. The report was ready by January 31, 2005, and critical towards GOS: “most attacks were deliberately and indiscriminately directed against civilians.”, and “In particular, the commission found that government forces and militias conducted indiscriminate attacks, including killing of civilians, torture, enforced disappearances, destruction of villages, rape and other forms of sexual violence, pillaging and forced displacement, throughout Darfur.” Cassese, Antonio (2005).

⁵It is probable that Russian nationals are directly involved in the maintenance and piloting of the advanced MiG-29 fighter jets sold to the Sudan in 2004, as well as of the powerful Russian made MI-24 combat helicopters that bomb the villages of Darfur (Figure 1). For an informed discussion of GOS air force capabilities Cooper, Tom (2003).

The ongoing use of Sudanese air assets in Darfur is discussed in U.S. State Department (2004). According to Human Rights Watch, (2003, p. 457) Chinese state companies have delivered all types of arms from Scud missiles and tanks to artillery and small arms, much of it financed by long-term low-interest Chinese state credits.

⁶See Organization of the Islamic Conference (2004) and Arab League (2004).

⁷Resolution 1591 dated March 29. Its provisions for implementing sanctions against persons — not governments — suspected of complicity in war crimes were to be initiated within 30 days, but by August 2005 such nothing had been implemented.

faced with broad international support for the regime in Khartoum, and since then a host of low-impact Security Council Resolutions have left GOS free to operate as it pleases.⁸. The U.S. Administration initially took Darfur to heart, but as their tough policies faced international defeat the Bush Administration swung around to a pro-GOS stance, and by May 2005 it followed the lead of the EU, China, France and Russia in seeking to influence GOS in a non-confrontational manner, requesting the U.S. Congress not to force sanctions upon GOS.⁹

For the European Union, committed to the highest ethical principles in its external policies,¹⁰ and seeing Africa as within its political sphere of interest Darfur has become a headache. Attempts by the French, British, and German foreign ministers, the British PM, and the French President, and a number of EU officials visiting Khartoum to apply ‘soft power’, and by moral arguments and economic incentives to persuade the ‘hard-power’ men in Khartoum to be kinder only provided GOS’ leadership with an opportunity for self-aggrandisement.¹¹ In October 2004 an embarrassed EU had to pre-empt further calls for EU action by donating 80 million € to the African Union (AU), meant to cover a good part of the cost of dispatching 3.500 African soldiers to Darfur. The limited mandate of the AU Force allows for monitoring the situation, not for protecting the civilians, and that only if GOS eventually will allow more than a few hundred of AU’s troops to enter and operate in Darfur. In January 2005 the EU added a carrot to the stick by delivering 50 million € in aid to GOS, with another 400 million € to be delivered depending on “improvement of the situation in the Darfur” European Commission (2005). A positive effect remains to be seen.

This sequence of events raise a number of questions related to the unwillingness of GOS to change its policies in face of international pressure (dealt with in Section 2), to the international response (Section 3), to EU’s external policies, hereunder the role of France (Section 4), as well as to the usability of military power in cases such as Darfur (Section 5).

1.1 Interpreting Armed Conflict

The two world wars, and the fall of the Soviet empire prompted changes in the European public and political perception of warfare away from militarist, fascist and communist perceptions of war as having essentially positive effects for the states and populations. Instead a ‘Liberal’ perception of war as undesirable and essentially destructive has risen to dominate European public debate and policy¹². Whereas non-Liberal perceptions of



Figure 1: Russian-made Mi-24 combat helicopter over burning village in Darfur. (Photo by AU observer B. Steidle, Sept. 2004).

⁸The following resolutions relates to Darfur: 1547 of 11 June 2004, 1556 of 30 July, 1574 of 19 November, 1585 dated 10 March 2005, 1588 dated 17 March, 1590 dated 24 March, 1591 dated 29 March, and 1593 dated 31 March 2005.

⁹On the reversal of U.S. policies towards GOS, see Dinmore, Guy (2005) and Kristof, Nicholas D. (2005b).

¹⁰The Amsterdam Treaty (in force since 1999) lays down fundamental objectives of the CFSP, hereunder the promotion of human rights, democracy etc.

¹¹Among the visitors were Joschka Fischer (Jul. 12, 2004), Tony Blair (Oct. 6, 2004), Javier Solana (Oct. 8, 2004), and Pres. Jacques Chirac (Oct. 27, 2004).

¹²‘Liberal’ as in ‘liberal democracy’, not denoting any specific political persuasion. Political conservatives as well as socialists may adhere to the Liberal view of warfare. For the development and spreading of the Liberal view, see Gat, Azar (2001).

warfare are prone to see some design behind the outbreak of wars, and possibly significant possibilities for rational direction of wars, the Liberal view is that wars start largely by accident and serve no purpose, and that wars, once started, have their own destructive logic that capture and rush along politicians, the military and populations.

The Liberal interpretation of war often clashes with that of a substantial minority of European policy makers and political analysts, who perceives warfare as a largely rational activity carried out purposively by the warring parties. This ‘Clausewitzian’ view of wars and warfare perceives wars as largely driven by politics in cause, flow, and outcome, and thus highly susceptible to rational analysis and political direction.¹³ Although adherents to the Clausewitzian view of warfare occasionally are in government, the Liberal view overwhelmingly shapes the European responses to armed conflicts, and certainly shaped the European reaction to the Balkan wars of the 1990s. To illustrate the significance and real-world implications of the differing perceptions, below a quote where two writers adhering to the Clausewitzian view commented on the failed efforts of the European peace mediators (Lord Carrington, David Owen, Thorvald Stoltenberg and others) who attempted to halt the Balkan wars:

When international mediators entered the fray, they behaved as though war were self-evidently futile and irrational, as though all that they needed to do was to persuade the warring parties of this truism and, once the scales had fallen from their eyes, the guns would fall silent. What the diplomats often failed to realize is that despite the appearance of chaos, the wars have been prosecuted with terrifying rationality by protagonists playing long-term power games. (...) Yugoslavia did not die a natural death, rather, it was deliberately and systematically killed off by men who had nothing to gain and everything to lose from a peaceful transition from state socialism to free-market democracy.

(Silber, Laura and Little, Allan, 1997, p. 25, 27)

As was the case on the Balkans in the 1990s, in relation to Darfur the pre-conceptions of the external decision makers are essential for their analysis of the armed conflict, and thus for their actions or lack thereof. When wars are analysed from a Liberal point-of-view, the warring political and military leaders are often to some degree absolved from responsibility for the actions of themselves and their soldiers as emotions and a pathological ‘logic of war’, not interests and acts of will, are seen as shaping the course of war. From the Liberal point-of-view the parties to a war tend to be seen as ‘equals’ in the sense that since all are victims of the war, and equally trapped in the destructive logic of war, all are responsible for ongoing calamity. Although rarely pacifist, the Liberal view is akin to a post-modern view of armed force as a dangerous and unsuitable policy instrument which is as likely to generate even more suffering as to change the situation to the better.¹⁴

¹³By using only two concepts, the Liberal and the Clausewitzian (with the Communist, Militarist, and Fascist concepts of warfare relegated to a historical place) I collapsed a multidimensional wealth of basic ideas of ‘what war is and how it works’ into two strains of thinking. While this is practical for the analytical purpose of this paper, it hardly does justice to the individual adherents to either view. For discussions of the interpretation of wars and warfare see Julian Lider (1977) and Gat, Azar (2001).

¹⁴An illustration: In a letter to The Washington Post Aug, 2, 2004, the German Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Kerstin Müller refers to the *Janjaweed* militia and their victims as “the parties to the conflict”, and stress that Germany “will support all efforts to find a political solution to the underlying problems.” One may infer that Germany thus sees the killers and their victims as equal “parties”; will address only the “underlying problems”, not the atrocities caused by GOS’ forces, and rejects the usability of military means. While an ungenerous observer would see such views as at best cynical, I see deep-seated Liberal persuasions at the root of Germany’s position.

In this analysis of Darfur, its causes, and the international response I adopt the ‘Clausewitzian’ view that wars are started and fought for rational reasons, and that warfare is not primarily an expression of emotions such as hate, fear and anger, but of interests: Wars are directed by thinking (if often immoral) men aiming at achieving political ends by military (and often criminal) means. This is neither to deny the relevance of emotions or ideological motives for warfare; such motives may prompt the acts of individuals and the feelings of populations, nor to negate the impact of friction and coincidence in warfare. Obviously, wars are rife with emotions, uncertainty, and unintended consequences, especially in brutal all-out ‘identity wars’ where the parties are fighting for their very survival rather than for lesser economic or political interests. In spite of this, the parties to a war, for whom so much is at risk, strive to control their environment and destiny by being rational, by concerting their efforts, and by managing emotions to minimise uncertainty.

2 Sudan – a ‘Warfare State’

Although at civil war for more than 40 years Sudan has not collapsed into an anarchic ‘failed state’. On the contrary, the regime in Khartoum has most of the trappings of state such as ministers and ministries, diplomats and embassies, police and armed forces. And to some extent GOS controls most of the huge, ethnically and linguistically diverse, and impoverished country. However, behind the façade of modern statehood, GOS is better understood as a semi-stable coalition of warlords, tribal nationalists, security officials, military officers, and religious ideologues, whose two shared qualities are, firstly, the will to use the state apparatus for the good of themselves and their clients, and secondly, absolute callousness towards their countrymen. While Sudan is not failed, it is a ‘warfare state’ in the sense that the political, business, military and security services’ elites are prone to create war to satisfy their personal and business interests. Only by perpetuating warfare by means of propaganda and economic incentives they are able to retain their hold on the Sudanese state structures.¹⁵

Although it is clear that GOS is a conglomerate of primarily Northern Sudanese and Arab-Sudanese interests its internal workings are obscure and centred on shifting alliances. One main line of confrontation inside GOS came to attract international attention: The regime’s party, the *National Islamic Front* (NIF), which captured power in a coup in 1989 is built on Islamist ideology.¹⁶ The National Islamic Front’s leading ideologue Hasan Al-Turabi was highly influential in shaping GOS’ confrontational foreign policies, which included inviting Osama Bin Laden to operate out of Khartoum 1990–96, co-operating with Iranian radicals on terrorism against U.S. and Israeli targets, and logistic support by Sudanese officials to the attempted assassination of the Egyptian president in 1995. Al-Turabi’s policies became a nuisance to the other GOS leaders, whose personal well-being was threatened due to the response of Sudan’s neighbours, the U.S. and the U.N., and Al-Turabi was set aside in 1999. Faced with considerable external pressure that included armed action inside Sudan, the Islamist ideological zeal gave way to self-preservation, and while as little concerned with humanitarian values as ever GOS has proven responsive to challenges to its survival and to the well-being of the policy elite.

¹⁵The term ‘warfare state’ was popularised by Cook, Fred J. (1962). Note that a Warfare State is not necessarily also what Lasswell, Harold D. (1941) labelled a “Garrison State”, for him a democracy in which martial values dominate the political and public spheres.

¹⁶The Islamic Front’s capture of power in spite of poor electoral showings (gaining 5–10% of the vote in the 1986 elections) was due to its use of Leninist methods, e.g. enforced ideological cohesion, cellular structure, secrecy, long-term positioning of cadre in state institutions, and violence.¹⁷.

2.1 Drivers of War in Sudan

Since independence in 1956 Sudan has been ruled by various unelected groupings (except for a semi-democratic interlude 1986–89), and suffered armed conflict with only brief interruptions. From 1983 until 2004 a civil war raged between the predominantly Arab and Muslim North, and the largely Animist and Christian South populated mostly by non-Arab Africans.



Figure 2: Area controlled by GOS, SPLA and other factions by June 30, 2001.

means is the deliberate creation of mass famine by ethnic cleansing of geographically isolated societies relying on subsistence farming.

As illustrated by Figure 2, the war in the South was geographically and politically complex. GOS and the insurgent Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the two major parties to the conflict, created and armed numerous militias in areas that they were not able to dominate themselves, or did so to achieve goals or use methods that they politically needed to distance themselves from. Their leverage on the militias vary, and in many cases the allegiance of the militias is doubtful. GOS' claim that the *Janjaweed* is not under its control is correct only in a very formal sense as the subordination is based on shared interests not on a formal command relationship. In the view of an American officer who served with the African Union monitoring force in Darfur in 2004, the violence is "a full-scale government-sponsored military operation that, with the support of Arab militias known as the *Janjaweed*, was aimed at annihilating the African tribes in the region".¹⁸ As long as GOS encourages the militias politically, and the Sudanese Air Force and regular Army co-ordinate with and support their operations the lack of formal subordination cannot absolve GOS of its responsibility for what happens in Darfur.

The recent atrocities in Darfur were sparked in 2003 by two rebel groups who challenged the political monopoly and economic dominance of GOS in Western Darfur. What makes Darfur unusual even in a Sudanese context is the ferocity with which GOS and its local allies reacted.²⁰ The history of independent Sudan is one of near-continuous war, and it is useful to consider the conflict themes.

¹⁸Sudan's recent history and armed conflicts are well described in i.e. Johnson, Douglas Hamilton (2003), International Crisis Group, (2003), and Collins, Robert O. (2004). Of particular value is de Waal, Alex (2004a).

¹⁹Steidle, Brian (Capt., USMC) (2005). Further evidence on the closeness of the co-operation between GOS and the Darfur militias in Human Rights Watch (2005).

²⁰The harshness of GOS' reaction is explored in de Waal, Alex (2004a). The late-2005 casualty estimates are in the range 200,000 to 360,000 killed, while most sources agree on 2 million refugees. See for example www.sudanrevels.com

This North–South conflict came to the fore in the 1960s over the North's attempts to reduce Southern local rule by appointing Northerners to public key positions. It was further fuelled by Northern attempts to Islamicise the legal system from the 1970s onwards, by conflicts over land ownership caused by adverse economic, social and ecological developments, by foreign intervention, and by the discovery of and attempts to extract oil from the 1980s onwards.¹⁸ The armed conflicts have been fought most brutally, and the proportion of civilian victims is very high as a favourite war-fighting

2.1.1 Ethnicity, Religion and Ideology as Conflict Themes

Within the borders of the former British–Egyptian condominium of *The Sudan*, five times the area of France, more than 40 million people speaking more than 100 native languages populate one of the most remote and least fertile regions of Africa. The vastness and inaccessibility provided for cultural, religious and ethnic diversity, and for a relatively limited role of the colonial rulers, and later of the central government, in relation to local government that was delegated to local worthies in Sudan’s peripheral regions. Advances in transportation and communication allowed the central government to challenge local government, and governors appointed by Khartoum took over, while often sparking anarchy as they lacked the authority, local knowledge, and resources to rule effectively. At the same time ecological degradation, foreign interference, ideological rivalry, and violent political action, as well as disinterest and dislike between ethnic groups led to confrontations that descended into widespread armed violence and caused famine. While few would dispute that the cultural, linguistic and religious differences between the Sudanese population groups further the callousness that makes the warfare so deadly to civilian non-combatants, neither ethnicity nor religion can be interpreted as the prime drivers of violence. The recent campaign against the Muslim inhabitants of Darfur are committed by fellow Muslims, and examples of political and economic co-operation between diverse ethnic groups are legio even if the object of that co-operation is to the detriment of other Sudanese groups. The campaigns of the (mainly) Arab *Janjaweed* militias against the (mainly) African tribes of Darfur does have racist motivations, and Alex de Waal (2004) points to the pan-Arab supremacist indoctrination, military training, and arm that Libya provided to Arabs from Darfur now part of the *Janjaweed*.

2.1.2 Economy and Land Ownership as Conflict Themes

As a result of mismanagement, population growth, and prolonged conflict Sudan is miserably poor, and its GDP per capita (shown in Figure 3) has been stagnant or declining for most of the independence period.




Figure 3: Real GDP Per capita 1960–99 in 1985 U.S. \$. (Source: Penn World Table v. 5.6, 2003)

While a majority of the Sudanese earn their living by subsistence agriculture, some are semi-nomadic pastoralists, and in Darfur the interests of the two groups are increasingly at odds due to demographic, economic, and ecological changes.²¹ The lack of authoritative land ownership registration in Sudan and of independent courts to settle disputes made it attractive for GOS to use its powers to change land ownership to the benefit of its clients, and to use the state’s coercive powers to enforce land thefts.²²

2.1.3 Oil as Conflict Theme

The only significant natural resource not deriving from agriculture is oil, discovered in extractable quantities only in the 1970s. As can be seen from the oil concessions (Figure

²¹See de Waal, Alex (2004a).

²²On Sudanese land ownership, judiciary, conflict and theft see (Runger 1987, p. 516) quoted in Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn (1988).

4)²³ the major interested external parties are China and France, while firms from a number of other countries explore lesser concessions. Oil exports started only in 1998, but soon became the dominant source of revenue for GOS allowing for a doubling of the state defence expenditure from 170 million\$ in 1998 to 340 million \$ in 2000.²⁴




Figure 4: Oil concessions in Sudan 2003

Since the 1970s GOS has cleansed large swathes of the oil land (notably concession areas 3 (Gulf Oil, Qatar), 5A (Lundin Oil, Sweden), and 5 Central (TotalFinaElf of France) of their native Nuer and Dinka populations (Human Rights Watch,, 2003, p. 39). While the oil spoils have motivated atrocities, the North–South armed conflict predates the discovery of oil, and the potential oil revenue seems to be the key factor allowing for the current peaceful resolution as the parties must co-operate to harvest the gains. While the westernmost oil concessions, explored by a Chinese state company, is in the region of Southern Darfur, the prospect for oil production there is still remote, and oil seems only indirectly to contribute to the conflict there.²⁵ On the other hand, the rhetoric by the two Darfur militias, notably the *Justice and Equality Movement* (JEM), indicates a general concern for a political say in Khartoum as well as for economic gain.²⁶

In 2003 the analysts of the International Crisis Group interpreted the Darfur conflict as mainly caused by GOS' attempts to secure the oil for itself (International Crisis Group,, 2003, pp. 93, 107), but found in later assessments that GOS' refusal to allow for a degree of regional autonomy was the key motive.²⁷

2.1.4 Loot as Regime Resource

The constellation of Northern clan leaders, state security and military officers, clerics and traders that comprise GOS have historically secured GOS' power and earned their money through a combination of trade and warfare. The numerous GOS-affiliated militias, including the *Janjaweed*, earn their living plundering towns and villages, and from extortion and loot from the hapless civilians trapped in refugee camps.²⁸ These bands of irregulars are commanded by a number of lesser warlords whose wealth derive from a share of the loot, and notably from stolen land and water-rights granted to them by their regional and GOS-level masters. Whenever the GOS-affiliated militia cannot overcome the resistance of armed civilians and rival militia whose interests are not represented in GOS, the 'National'

²³ Map by Miller, Michael S. (2003).

²⁴ See Reeves, Eric (2005). By 2001 oil sales accounted for 42% of the official state budget, and had become a major foreign currency earner (Human Rights Watch,, 2003, p. 59).

²⁵ GOS claimed on April 16, 2005 that oil had been found in extractable quantities in Southern Darfur http://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=9106.)

²⁶ JEM's policy declarations, suitable adapted to an international audience, are accessible at its website www.sudanjem.com.

²⁷ The International Crisis Group follows events in Sudan, and has published more than 20 well documented reports and briefings since 2002, accessible from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/>.

²⁸ See Power, Samantha (2004). For a critical assessment of aid and refugee camps, see Barber, Ben (1997).

Sudanese army and air force is called in to secure the supremacy of GOS, as it happens today in Darfur. Tellingly, before the international pressure forced GOS to distance itself the Sudanese president Omar Al-Bashir personally cheered the Janjaweed with a “Long live the Mujahedin” at a political rally in Nyala in May 2004.²⁹ The atrocities in Darfur are primarily caused by the internal workings of the Sudanese government, although tribal hatreds, racism and greed may motivate the individual soldiers and militiamen. Those ethnic groups left outside the power-sharing of the Mafia-like structures in Khartoum are either neglected or targeted for plundering, and tend to respond by forming their own militias, and possibly by drawing external support. The militias sustain themselves in no small measure by commandeering and extorting from their own populations, from ‘harvesting’ humanitarian aid, and from looting GOS’ assets.³⁰ Armed factions fighting GOS may eventually acquire sufficient military strength for a ‘hurting stalemate’ to arise; a situation where neither GOS nor the faction are able to change the military situation, but agree that they are blocking each others profitability. When such a stalemate occurs the parties to a conflict are prone to negotiate a political solution, and the rebels may join the GOS structures in order to share into the spoils of the ‘warfare state’ as did the main Southern rebel movement (the SPLM) in 2004.

2.1.5 Aid as Regime Resource

Plundering the destitute regions of southern Sudan and Darfur does not secure the hard currency needed to pay for arms procurement and the luxury goods required by GOS and its affiliates. Before oil exports started this need was largely met by the UN and international humanitarian aid agencies, which since 1988 have routed most aid to the Sudanese through a structure called *Operation Lifeline Sudan* (OLS).³¹ The functioning of OLS mirrors UN’s now defunct Iraqi *Oil-for-Food* programme, but whereas the Iraqi programme was partly subjected to corrupt and ineffective UN oversight OLS is not, and thus to an even greater extent controlled by the receiving regime. (OLS maintains a lesser operation in Southern Sudan, where the SPLM is the main benefactor of aid delivered primarily through Kenya.) GOS (and in the South, the SPLM leadership) has the final say over ‘who gets what and when’ through OLS, and although practically undocumented³² I estimate that that between a third and half of the value of the aid is re-routed to GOS and its factions through theft, corruption, extortion, and over-pricing of goods and services in connection with the operation of OLS (while another fifth to a third of the value of the aid

²⁹Reported by BBC’s korrespondent Koert Lindijer, see <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3594520.stm>.

³⁰For a perceptive account of the continuous warfare in Southern Sudan and Somalia, see for example Peterson, Scott (2000). A study of the war economy of Somalia sheds light on the mechanisms that perpetuate armed conflict Grosse-Kettler, Sabrina (2004)

³¹OLS is a consortium of the UN agencies UNICEF and WFP, and about 35 NGOs.

³²Evidence is circumstantial but not scarce, see e.g.: The Humanitarianism and War project, Tufts University: “A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Report to the Aid Agencies” (1990) <http://hwproject.tufts.edu/publications/abstracts/croo.html>; Bonner, Raymond (1998); The Hansard, 2 Mar 1999 : Column WA178 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldhansrd/vo990302/text/90302w02.htm>; Afrol News: “Continued critics against *Operation Lifeline Sudan*” (2000) (http://www.afrol.com/News/sud009_ols_critics.htm; and The Global IDP Database Project: “Operation Lifeline Sudan: a mechanism to negotiate access for humanitarian agencies (1989-2003)” (2003) <http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/1446C0EDD0EEF81BC1256840003B3070>. On the environment that makes for the abuse of aid money: Righter, Rosemary (1995), Barber, Ben (1997), Peterson, Scott (2000), and Grosse-Kettler, Sabrina (2004). A morsel to be picked by the entrepid journalist ...

covers administrative costs of the delivering agencies³³). If the UN or the humanitarian organisations object too strongly to the share of the aid being mis-appropriated GOS may shut down delivery, and within days refugees at the end of the line die from disease and starvation. To keep its Lifeline from running dry GOS has an interest in creating a permanent and visible need for foreign aid, and the warfare, looting and ethnic cleansing in this ‘warfare state’ serves this need as well.

2.2 The 2004 North–South Peace

The major North–South war has ended for now with the 2004 peace agreement between GOS and SPLM, which had SPLM’s political and military leader Mr. John Garang installed as the vice-president of Sudan. While the SPLM is not the first armed faction to fight its way into GOS to enjoy the spoils, the agreement is notable as it hinges on sharing the oil wealth that the parties must co-operate to exploit, and allows for a de-facto partition of Sudan into a Northern part ruled by GOS and the Southern ‘New Sudan’ by SPLM.³⁴

The peace came about through a combination of regional and international political developments. The SPLM had fared badly in the early 1990s, but gained strength as the neighbouring states of Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea increasingly supported the organisation, and especially as the SPLM and Mr. Garang received political recognition and material support from the U.S.³⁵ The increased military and political strength of the SPLM made a decisive military victory of GOS improbable, and as the SPLM effectively restricted oil exploration and extraction in Southern Sudan elements within GOS were willing to compromise from the late 1990s, and France, the U.S., the European Union, and China, as well as several of Sudan’s regional neighbours, sought to strengthen the hand of ‘their’ Sudanese ally during the peace negotiations.

3 International Responses to Darfur

3.1 Sudan’s Neighbours

GOS have alienated four of its nine neighbouring states to the point of armed confrontation: In the early 1990s victorious guerilla leaders took over the rule in Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda, Sudan’s neighbours to the West and South.³⁶ These African revolutionaries are adverse to GOS’ Arab supremacism, and to GOS’ export of revolutionary Islamism, and they willingly use armed force in support of their policies. GOS’ attempt to assassinate the Egyptian ruler President Hosni Mubarak in 1995 prompted hostility from Egypt. Libya, ruled by Colonel Muammar Ghadafi, propagates eccentric pan-Arab and pan-African ideologies that are at odds with Khartoum, and has at times trained, armed and supported various Sudanese insurrections against GOS.

³³An under-researched issue, see S. Karthick Ramakrishnan (2004) and Kasper Krogh and Lars Fogt (2004) for indicative assessments.

³⁴The death of Mr. Garang shortly after he became vice-president in July 2005 lead to sporadic violence, and opponents of the peace agreement within SPLM and especially GOS may effectively terminate the agreement. A recent analysis is available with International Crisis Group (2005a).

³⁵While U.S. political support and humanitarian aid for the SPLM from the mid-1990s onwards is well documented, military aid was either given clandestinely, or more likely, indirectly through support to the neighbour states hostile to GOS. See for example Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (1999) and Wama, Barnabas L ŠSSŠ (Lt.Col.) (1997).

³⁶Yoweni Museweni took over Uganda in 1989, Meles Zenawi took power in Ethiopia in 1991, and Afworki Isaias in Eritrea in 1993. In the view of Connell (1998) these statesmen are more able, less corrupt, and more keen on state building than most of their predecessors.

Kenya did not openly challenge GOS, but provided support to the SPLM by allowing the transit of humanitarian aid to land controlled by SPLM, whose leader John Garang was a friend of the Kenyan president Arab Moi. To the South-West Sudan borders to the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) and the democratic Republic of Congo, both impoverished, and plagued by lawlessness and civil war, and too weak to be of use for either GOS or its challengers. To the West Sudan has one friendly neighbour: Chad is unstable and utterly poor, and dominated by a minority that balances its power between Libyan threats and French support, and in part is secured by a thousand French troops stationed there.

The Chadian regime led by general Idriss Deby is ethnically close to the non-Arab Zaghawa Muslims of Darfur³⁷. Until the end of 2005 Chad chose to be politically benevolent towards Sudan, presumably as GOS has the potential to support the numerous factions in Chad that could challenge Deby's regime, and the two had a shared interest in stability.³⁸

GOS have had conflicts with most of its neighbours or their allies, and is not liked in the region, yet, the adversaries of GOS are too politically and militarily weak to threaten the rule of GOS. Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda are directly hostile to GOS, but consumed with their own problems and unable to co-ordinate their foreign policies, and thus a nuisance rather than a serious challenge to Khartoum. Egypt and Libya have the potential to pressure GOS but choose not to, while Chad, C.A.R. and D.R. Congo are too weak to affect the behaviour of GOS.

It is noteworthy that on October 17, 2004, when Western pressure on Sudan was at a high, Libya's leader Ghadaffi held a "mini summit" in Tripoli on Darfur, bringing together the leaders of Libya, Nigeria, Chad, and Egypt with President Al-Bashir of Sudan. While the meeting nominally was held under the auspices of the African Union, its message was a strong rejection of foreign interference, effectively displaying support for GOS. While none of the neighbours are comfortable with GOS African governments tend to agree that foreign interference is even more disagreeable.




Figure 5: Sudan and Neighbouring States. (French and U.S. flags indicate political preferences of the regime.)

3.2 The African Union

In 2002 the nearly defunct *Organisation of African Unity* (OAU) was replaced with the *African Union*, which from its inception has been given far more ambitious aims and greater powers by its 53 member states.³⁹ The AU is specifically and ambitiously modelled on the European Union, having a Council, a Peace and Security Council, a Pan-African Parliament, and a permanent EU Commission-like structure. The European Union strongly supports the efforts to make the AU a fully functional institution, and provides financial support as well as training of the AU's staff, and support its military staff and its operation

³⁷ According to Mans, Ulrich (2004)

³⁸ Following a cross-border attack on Dec. 23, 2005 the regime of Idriss Deby declared Chad to be "in a state of war" with Sudan. The Arab League, UN, U.S., African Union and several other international actors sided with Sudan, and on Feb. 8, 2006 an agreement was signed in Tripoli thus ending this war. (Wikipedia entry *Chadian-Sudanese War*, accessed Feb. 9, 2006).

³⁹ Namely all African states but Morocco. On the political background for AU, see Tieku, Thomas Kwasi (2004), for an brief overview of its formal powers Jakkie Cilliers and Kathryn Sturman (2004).

in Darfur. Still, the AU is in its infancy, and as African states are on average politically and economically very weak (as indicated by the rough measures in Figure 6), so is the AU. In relation to Darfur the African Union is controlled by GOS as Sudan has a determining influence on AU's policies and military operations, not least through Sudan's seat in AU's Peace and Security Council. The political strength of Sudan in relation to AU was illustrated during the Unions Summit January 16–24, 2006 in Khartoum at which the African states decided to hand the Chairmanship of the Union to Sudan in 2007.




Figure 6: 50 Member States of the African Union – GDP Per Capita (PP adjusted) in 2004 U.S. \$, and Political/Civic Freedoms Index. Sudan and its neighbours are labelled, as are some of the wealthier states. (Sources: IMF, CIA Factbook, and Freedom House 2002–2004).

the UN Security Council in effect gave the newly formed AU the leadership role in the matter of Darfur. Parting with political direction is an unusual wish of the Council's members, and may be intended partly to empower Africans and the AU, partly as a device to absolve the UN and its leading member states of responsibility for Darfur. While some AU statements have been somewhat critical of GOS, it did not challenge GOS, and within some months the AU succeeded in raising and inserting troops into Darfur, largely funded by the European Union, U.S. and Canada. The mandate of AU's military mission, by mid-2005 comprising about 2,000 soldiers and 120 monitors (about ten of the latter are Westerners), is very limited, and the force and monitors are dependent on logistical and administrative support from GOS, for example helicopter transport which is nearly indispensable in Darfur. Thus the AU force, even if its soldiers were all up to the highest international standards, would be unable to protect the civilians of Darfur without GOS' commitment, and indeed, during the period from November 2004 till August 2005 the number of killed may have tripled from about 100,000 to more than 300,000, and the number of displaced doubled to 2 million.

The African Union has adamantly defended its near-monopoly on political and military action in relation to Darfur, and together with France rejected any role for non-African soldiers in Darfur. Still, AU is keen to receive monetary and logistical assistance from the West, and with France in a key role in NATO and in the EU help is forthcoming with no political strings attached.⁴¹

⁴⁰For an overview of African led peacekeeping operations in Africa, and problems associated with their performance, see Nowrojee, Binaifer (2004). On the concern that the undisciplined AU troops are likely to infect the Darfur refugees with HIV see Sarah Martin and Sayre Nyce (2005).

⁴¹The U.S. Administration and a Congress majority refuse to support the AU's mission into Darfur.

At a NATO Foreign Ministers meeting April 20–21, 2005, the U.S. explored whether NATO could be involved in Darfur. The French Foreign Minister Michel Barnier felt compelled to stress: “We didn’t talk about Sudan. As regards the idea I’ve been hearing of the possibility of various and varied NATO operations, I repeated—several of my colleagues confirmed that this was also their view—that it isn’t NATO’s job to be the world’s policeman.”⁴² The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice claimed that Sudan had been discussed, and that NATO would help if requested, and indeed, on April 26 the AU requested NATO’s assistance. The modalities were agreed, and NATO started to supply the AU inside Darfur from July 2005, and in spite of French misgivings NATO has a presence in Darfur, however limited.

3.3 French Interests in Africa

France de-colonised Africa from the late 1950s along with the other colonial powers, but effectively replaced its rule with a series of political and military agreements and measures ensuring a variable but often significant degree of control over 17 African countries.⁴³ This arrangement did not only benefit the local Francophone elites chosen to exercise power, but may have brought a measure of growth and stability. The U.S. and the Soviet Union accepted the French domination that left the French zone of influence as a partly neutral area between them. To satisfy her interests France felt compelled to intervene militarily in Africa at least 19 times since the 1960s, most recently in 2004 in Côte d’Ivoire.⁴⁴

As French great power ambitions mellowed through a combination of her relative decline, increasing European orientation, and reduced need for inexpensive raw materials, and as economic growth and a proper return of French investments in Africa did not materialise, the French involvement in Africa was dwindling in the 1980s and early 1990s. When the Soviet Union collapsed, and France found herself in what she sees as a competition over Africa with the United States, French interest in Africa were revived under the presidency of Jacques Chirac who sought to regain lost French influence. French policies in Africa under Chirac has been controversial, and prone to embarrassing failure. Neither the French military training of the Hutu forces that committed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and subsequent protection of the *genocidaires*, nor the failed attempt to keep the Zairean kleptocrat Mobutu Sese Seko in power (until he fled to one of his mansions in France) advanced French interests, and are seen as problematic in France as well.⁴⁵

While French interests in Africa are so obvious that France is widely referred to as “*gendarme de l’Afrique*”, the wide African acceptance of the French presence is tied to the mirror image of her gendarme role; she acts as the protector of an African *status quo*, hereunder by protecting regimes against undue external influences. Her 1980s rescue of Chad from Libyan conquest, and her many interventions in favour of the regimes, no matter their merits, are popular with African elites whose main interest is self-preservation. France will openly counter the U.S. and others who challenge the African *status quo*. This is

⁴²Michel Barnier in a press briefing following the informal meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Vilnius, April 21, 2005. Source: Embassy of France in the U.S., http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2005/_ministers042105.asp

⁴³Fourteen of the former colonies continue to be bound to France through monetary co-operation: Eight in the *West African CFA franc* zone (Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo), six in the *Central African CFA franc* zone (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon). Madagascar and Mauritania achieved independence in 1960, Djibouti in 1977.

⁴⁴The French interventions are discussed in Gregory, Shaun (2000), Pederson, Nicholas (2000), and Utey, Rachel (2002).

⁴⁵For a discussion of French failed policies in Africa Huliaras, Asteris C. (1998).

seldom seen as clearly as in the French President's decision to use the *22e Sommet France-Afrique* held in Paris on February 19–21, 2003 (Figure 7), attended by an exceptional 52 of 53 African heads of states, that sent an unanimous declaration against a U.S. intervention in Iraq.⁴⁶



Figure 7: President Jacques Chirac with the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and 52 African Heads of State at the Africa–France Summit, February 19–21, 2003. (Picture courtesy of Quai d’Orsay).

In a well-publicised breach of EU’s British inspired embargo France invited the Zimbabwean autocrat Mugabe to the *Sommet*, demonstrating to all that her political strength and independence in Africa is second to none, and that she is willing to let African considerations trump her support for EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Inside the EU, French Commissioners are believed to be more “pro-African than their colleagues”;⁴⁷ France is a conduit for African interests in e.g. trade, aid and foreign policy inside the EU system, which earns her

credit among the African leaders.

France’s influence is not built on soft policy instruments alone. France maintains a standing force deployed in a handful of African states, even though the cost necessitated a reduction from about 8.500 troops in the early 1990s to about 5.500 in 2003. Of direct interest in relation to Darfur is the French military presence in Chad, a presence that includes 300 French soldiers dispatched to the border to Darfur, and control of the air strips in Eastern Chad that are used for aid delivery by, amongst others, the European Union.⁴⁸

3.4 French Co-operation with GOS

Wherever calamity is caused by inept and criminal governments a paradox faces outsiders with a humanitarian intent: Supporting the erring government may increase its ability to create further suffering, while degrading and bypassing the government and state structures may lead to anarchy and more suffering. The preference for upholding the sanctity of existing states and borders no matter the internal consequences is practically universal in the post-1945 international relations.⁴⁹ The majority of all foreign aid given, whether bilaterally, through NGOs, or through the international inter-governmental organisations such as the UN is received through or with the acceptance of the government of the receiving state, and thus strengthens the ability of the regime to continue its rule. While GOS at present is among the most vicious governments in Africa, the long-standing French decision to support GOS cannot be said to be unjustifiable or exceptional. As the French-imposed above-average stability of ‘Francophone’ Africa shows, stability, also when upheld by foreigners with military means, might be the lesser evil.

The French foreign policy decision making process is constitutionally centred on the President, and significantly influenced by officials with a shared educational background⁵⁰

⁴⁶The declaration is available at <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=32572>.

⁴⁷Alden, Chris and Daloz, Jean-Pascal (Eds.) (1996) cited in Croft, Stuart (1997).

⁴⁸Utle, Rachel (2002). Le ministère de la défense, *Rapport d'activité 2003*, accessible at <http://www.defense.gouv.fr>. More recent figures at [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/deploy.htm)

⁴⁹The international response to the decline of the post-colonial African states, hereunder the propensity to respect the borders and regimes, is discussed by Clapham, Cristopher (1996).

⁵⁰Bell, David S. (2004, p. 537).

Although the French oil conglomerate TotalFinaElf was closely connected with the French foreign policy elite (and a number of corruption scandals herein), and even as the Sudanese oil provides France with an obvious motive for maintaining a friendly relationship with GOS it must be kept in mind that GOS also has dealt with U.S., British, Canadian, Swedish, Austrian, Italian, Malaysian, Qatar, Chinese and many other oil interests.⁵¹ In other cases France has 'played by the book' and avoided breaking international sanctions Marcel, Valerie (2003), and it is probable that French oil interests does not contradict international agreements and norms. While the French foreign policy leadership surely will prefer France to benefit from Sudan's—relatively limited—oil wealth, it is implausible that the prospect of a share of the economic gain alone shapes her positive attitude towards GOS. It is highly implausible that the French attitude is built on heartfelt sympathy with the Sudanese regime, and I am inclined to see French strategic deliberations behind her support for GOS. Still, judging from the numerous visits by GOS ministers in France and by French ministers and state secretaries in Khartoum, the French–Sudanese relationship at the governmental level is close and covers several policy areas.⁵²

3.5 U.S. Interests in Africa

American post-Cold War policies towards Africa were initially characterised by benign disinterest, but since the mid-1990s oil interests have come to the fore, and after 9/11 counter-terrorism. Since 1997 a number of African states, some of them traditionally within France's *Francophone* domain, have received U.S. military training aiming at creating an African peacekeeping capability.⁵³ While the list of African states receiving some U.S. military assistance is long, the sums involved have not been large (5.3 million U.S. \$ in 2003, which probably is less than one percent of the French military spending devoted to Africa), and consequently the effect and U.S. leverage in this particular field is limited.⁵⁴ Since the mid-1990s U.S. interests in a steady and diversified supply of oil has led to increased interest in Western and Central Africa, where states such as Nigeria, Angola, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea supplies 14% of U.S. oil imports, expected to rise to 25% in a decade. These states are receiving U.S. investments, coupled with political, economic, and to a lesser degree military support, but in reality the U.S. has little leverage over the regimes as their oil wealth makes them somewhat resistant to foreign pressure.⁵⁵ The North–South war in Sudan and the Darfur crisis have prompted relatively strong interest in the U.S., also among mainly Christian NGOs that have a strong voice in the U.S. The

⁵¹An analysis of oil interests in Sudan in relation to warfare and human rights violations, see International Crisis Group, (2003).

⁵²From January 2004 until July 2005 the presidents of Sudan and France met once, and the French ministers of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Interior met their Sudanese counterparts at least seven times. Out of custom or cordiality, during that period a number of French politicians and civil servants accepted decorations from GOS.

⁵³Troops from Senegal, Uganda, Malawi, Mali, Ghana, Benin and Cote d'Ivoire are trained by the U.S. through the *African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance* programme; troops from Botswana, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa through the *Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities* programme; since 2002 also troops from Mali, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad through the *Pan Sahel Initiative*, which was expanded in 2004 to include Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria in the *Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative* (TSCTI) aimed at countering the Algerian Islamist bands that roams the Sahara region Fisher-Thompson, Jim (2004) and Globalsecurity.org (2005).

⁵⁴The figure is based on overt spending, and one may suspect that covert spending occurs. A database listing U.S. Foreign Military Assistance to Africa year-by-year is accessible at http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid_db.htm. U.S. military spending is set to rise considerably from 2005 onwards Globalsecurity.org (2005).

⁵⁵A succinct discussion of U.S. interests and leverage in West and Central Africa Goldwyn, David L. and Morrison, J. Stephen (2004), for a critical view Goldstein, Ritt (2004).

support for SPLM and now for the victims in Darfur is strong, and the Darfur crisis is seemingly relatively better covered in U.S. than in European media.⁵⁶

3.6 The Impact of U.S. Democratic Activism

In 2002 the U.S. adopted a revisionist and unilateral foreign policy agenda prompted by three near-simultaneous events: Firstly, the demise of Soviet power and the decline of Russia left the U.S. in a dominant position where its political, economic and military might is formidable, although—as is seen in the rivalry with France in Africa—not strong enough always to be decisive. Secondly, the ‘order-based’ policies previously pursued by the U.S. in tacit or direct support of a host of repressive Middle East regimes in return for (an expectation of) oil market stability, exploration rights, and support to U.S. policies have contributed to making the Arab world politically, economically, and, not the least, culturally severely deprived, and inadvertently contributed to the Islamist radicalisation that brought catastrophic terrorism to the U.S. in 2001. Thirdly, the previously dominant Western academic ‘empathising’ academic school (promoted by scholars such as Edward Said and Francois Burgat), which explained the decline and current ills of the Arab world primarily as being the result of colonial exploitation and sinister external influences lost favour academically and politically. Its near-monopoly on interpreting policy issues such as the Middle East conflicts and Islamism has been superseded by the influence of the ‘diagnostic’ school, exemplified by Olivier Roy and Bernard Lewis (the latter widely known for his 2001 book “What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Responses”), suggesting that internal cultural and political forces might be at play.⁵⁷ This academic, political and increasingly public transformation is sudden and powerful. One unexpected result is the publication of a series of previously unthinkable frank reports written by Arab academics who discusses the deficiencies of the Arab World along ‘diagnostic’ lines.⁵⁸ Fourthly, as the order-based U.S. foreign policies failed to generate neither the political nor the economic stability sought in the Middle East (hereunder Arab acceptance of Israel’s existence), this gave impetus to idealist neo-conservative beliefs in U.S. foreign policy, seeing democratisation as a precondition for long-term internal justice and order, and thus for economic growth, political stability, and peace. While few — if any — key U.S. decision makers are neo-conservatives, the neo-conservative impact is undeniable:

“For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East – and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.”

U.S. Foreign Secretary Condoleezza Rice. Cairo, June 20, 2005.

France, Germany and most other Western European countries have reacted to this policy re-orientation with alarm, fearing that U.S. bellicosity, unilateralism, and lack of long-term commitment to post-war reconstruction will cause chaos in the afflicted regions, as well as damage the the system of international law seen by most Europeans as stabilising and desirable. Instead, Europeans generally support slow-paced reform of the non-democratic states, especially where beneficial economic relationships hinges on the regimes, as in Sudan. Such conservative preferences are also favoured by the Russian and Chinese regimes,

⁵⁶On the U.S. media coverage of Darfur, which is fairly limited, see Kristof, Nicholas D. (2005a).

⁵⁷The categorisation into empathising and diagnostic schools of thought suggested by Benthall, Jonathan (2003).

⁵⁸Namely UNDP’s “Arab Human Development Report 2002–04” .

which are indirectly threatened by the impetus to democratisation, and surely please the host of more directly targeted lesser non-democracies. Still, the Western European political elites and populations are divided over U.S. policies. Tony Blair’s humanitarian interventionist government and — initially — the British population largely supported the removal by force of the Iraqi dictator, as did several Eastern European governments (and the Danish government, at times supported by 57% of the Danish population).⁵⁹ In 2002–2003 this disagreement became so intense that cherished policies and institutions such as EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, NATO’s cohesion, and German–U.S. amity were deliberately and publicly ruined in an attempt to stop the U.S. and the UK from going to war to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The disruptive effects of the intra-Western crisis over Iraq were worsened by confrontational policies and personal misgivings, as detailed by Baker, Gerald and Dempsey, Judy and Graham, Robert and Peel, Quentin and Turner, Mark (2003). Still, at the root of the Western European popular and political outcry against the U.S. threat of war against Saddam Hussein lies neither affinity for the dictator, nor the corruption spoils that the *Oil for Food* programme bestowed upon, among others, French banks, firms and politicians. What convinced so many Europeans that the upcoming war should be avoided was the widespread Liberal perception that war always must be the last option, and that the use of military means in support of foreign policy goals is to be avoided, almost no matter how noble the goals might be.⁶⁰fa extern

The international response to the change in U.S. policies contributed to shaping the response towards GOS’ crimes in Darfur. The initial tough stance of the U.S. prompted a reaction where nearly all non-democratic regimes with a stake in Sudan, especially Russia and China, actively supported GOS and sought to derail U.S. initiatives, while many European states did the same, although not out of fear of democracy as due to the Liberal disgust with war. France is probably different in this respect, as she as the only Western democracy sees herself as being locked into a global strategic competition with the U.S. (and particularly so in Africa), and maintains her prominent position in the international system through a confrontational stance without which she would be yet another middle-sized European power.

4 The European Union Responding

4.1 EU and Africa

Most African states gained their independence from their colonial masters due to an international consensus that their freedom should not be conditional on proving a minimum of political, social or administrative capabilities, and many states were born with severe shortcomings. As observed by Clapham, subsequently all too many African states went through similar developments: Within the first years of statehood the leading party neutralised the opposition, and came to dominate the state. Soon the party leader or party elite centred all powers around themselves, and the governing party lost its mobilising functions and withered. Effectively, most African states became what Clapham label “monopoly

⁵⁹See Eurobarometer Flash 151, Oct. 2003.

⁶⁰Kagan (2002) sees *strategic cultures* at the root of US–European differences, and writes “On the all-important question of power—the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power—American and European perspectives are diverging.” For Kagan European strategic culture is characterised by “the emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism” (p.1). Kagan’s observations are not true for all Europeans (or all Americans), but his description of European strategic culture comprises the Liberal perception of war and some of its policy consequences.

states”, where in the absence of political parties, trade unions, organisations and powerful bureaucracies, state leaders could use the entire state apparatus to co-opt or destroy their rivals (thus the entry of the military into politics, and the subsequent spate of military regimes).⁶¹ While in retrospect this is all too clear, over the years the Africa policies of the former European colonial powers, the trade partners, and indeed, the European Economic Community were largely based on the assumption that the African states were essentially like any other states, although poor, and should be dealt with as such, and that economic development could be induced through technical assistance and trade.

Prompted by France, and taken to heart by the European Commission that sees trade as an external policy instrument over which it has some control, the EEC established a series of trade agreements that have come to include practically all of sub-Saharan Africa. International trade is essential for regimes such as GOS, as duties and levies provides for hard-currency revenue, while restrictive and cumbersome trade mechanisms create ample opportunities for corruption and nepotism that sustains the regime. EU’s trade agreements represents what Busse (2000) terms a ‘hub and spoke’ approach where the EEC (later EC, now the EU) facilitated trade to and from Europe, but not between the ACP countries. This has made trade a potentially powerful policy tool that the EU, based on the monumental economic and political asymmetry in its favour, may wield towards its African ACP-partners. To what extent and for which purposes the EU has actually employed its trade and aid leverage over the African states is beyond the scope here. I shall just note that the academic interest in the importance of “good governance” for development arose in the early 1990s; that “political conditionality” appeared with the EU in the mid-1990s, and that the EU–ACP Cotonou Agreement from 2000 includes some options for such conditionality.⁶²

The aid and trade policies pursued by the EU may inadvertently have accelerated the decay of some African states by strengthening the monopolising rulers and elites at the expense of their populations.⁶³ As positive results too often failed to materialise, the European Union and others revised their policies, to the point that, as Olsen (2004) remarks, the policies would appear to be in a state of flux. By the late 1990s EU apparently had reached a state of “cynicism and disillusion” in relation to development aid to and trade with Africa (Olsen, Gorm Rye, 2002, p. 322).

4.2 The European Union Responding to Darfur

The EC suspended its aid to Sudan in 1990 in response to the violence that the National Islamic Front’s take-over of GOS in 1989 brought about, and re-instated its aid in 2002 seeking to encourage GOS’ initial peace negotiations with SPLM. The timing of the resumption of European aid conflicted with an American led mediation between GOS and SPLM, and was seen by NGOs and U.S. politicians as rewarding GOS’ refusal to halt bombings in the South.⁶⁴ This was not the only instance where the EU and the U.S. worked at cross-purposes, as the EU was prone to side with GOS at times where the US sought to prompt concessions, thus delaying the compromises that led to the 2004 peace agreement. As the peace materialised in 2003, the EU donated 400 million € to be spent

⁶¹(Clapham, Cristopher, 1996, pp. 56).

⁶²The academic discussion of good governance appears to start with Boeninger, Edgardo and Nelson, Joan M. and Lateef, K. Sarwar (1991). For an assessment of the Cotonou Agreement, see Udombana, Nsongurua J (2004).

⁶³The dilemmas inherent in emergency relief and development aid are succinctly described by de Waal, Alex (2004b) who states that “aid’s problems are structural: it systematically defeats its own objectives”.

⁶⁴See Lobe, Jim (2002).

on reconstruction in the South, and a similar sum to the North. As the Darfur crisis arose in 2003, EU delivered humanitarian aid to the refugees, and by July 2004 the Union had delivered aid at a cost of 88 million €. The Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid, Poul Nielson emphasised that “The EU has already provided more aid to help the victims of this tragic situation than any of the other international donors”, and planned to spend even more.⁶⁵ While the EU was and is keen to spend money to ameliorate the suffering of refugees, political initiatives towards ending the atrocities were in short supply. Meeting in the European Council on July 26, 2004 at a time when the media covered Darfur intensively, EU’s foreign ministers expressed “extreme concern”, and committed the EU to unspecified “appropriate further steps” towards GOS if peace talks were not resumed. Seemingly, sanctions were too controversial among the ministers to be threatened. EU then dispatched the five-day fact-finder Mr. Pieter Feith (see Section 1), who returned with his “not genocide” assessment on August 10.

By September 13, EU’s foreign ministers had digested Feith’s and the UN fact finder Mr. Jan Pronk’s reports, and concluded that GOS had made progress (in a meeting led by the Dutch Foreign Minister Mr. Bot, and with Commissioners Nielson and Patten, and the High Representative for CFSP Mr. Solana present). On behalf of the ministers, and the Dutch EU Presidency Mr. Bot stated that the “EU calls on all parties to put an immediate halt to all military operations.”, and hoped that “As far as Darfur is concerned, talks in the region should lead to a cessation of violence.” The ministers would support the AU economically, contemplated participation in a police mission to Darfur, and threatened “...further measures, including sanctions”.⁶⁶ Also on September 13, 2004 the European Parliament, which has steadily gained influence on EU’s external policies, debated Darfur and tried to affect the stance of EU’s foreign ministers. On September 16 the Parliament found the actions of the Sudanese government to be “tantamount to genocide”, and called for sanctions, but opted explicitly for using peaceful means only.⁶⁷ The Dutch EU Presidency reiterated EU’s support for the AU on September 22, and on October 11 the foreign ministers “Noting that the European Union had already committed € 300 million” again threatened “appropriate measures”. On November 11 the Presidency found the situation in Darfur deteriorating, and sanctions were mentioned, although GOS was not singled out to the targeted: “The European Union does not exclude the use of sanctions against all conflict parties”. At the November 2 and 22–23 meetings the foreign ministers once again found the situation deteriorating and threatened sanctions, and on November 26–29 Louis Michel, replacing Poul Nielson as Development and Aid Commissioner, traveled to Sudan “to gauge the political situation and its humanitarian consequences in view of the armed rebellions and clashes threatening regional stability.” He found that “the humanitarian situation remained worrying in Darfur as there was no security for the food convoys”. At a time where GOS and its militias killed civilians and destroyed villages *en masse* Commissioner Michel’s concerns over regional stability and the security of food convoys seems odd, but may either reflect his sincere trust in the positive intentions of GOS or be intended to deflect calls for action against GOS.

From the end of November 2004 till mid-June 2005 the European Council and the Presidencies did not take up the matter of Darfur; one may infer that the repeated and

⁶⁵Nielson, Poul (2004).

⁶⁶The Dutch Foreign Minister Dr. Bernard Rudolf Bot on discussions of EU foreign ministers about Sudan, quoted at <http://www.europa-web.de/europa/03euinf/01GASP/sudandis.htm>. For the speeches of Dr. Bot and Commissioner Nielson to the European Parliament on September 14, 2004, see <http://www.europarl.eu.int>.

⁶⁷EP resolution on the Humanitarian Situation in Sudan (European Parliament, 2004, par. 17.). The debates on September 14–16 are accessible from <http://www.europarl.eu.int>.

repeatedly ignored calls to “the parties” and the exclamations of grave concern had become an embarrassment to the Union and its member states. NATO took over where the EU stepped back, and since then the European political response to Darfur has been generated in the NATO framework, which does basically the same as the EU did, namely nothing of consequence for GOS, but abstains from issuing declarations.

4.3 Explaining the European Union’s Stance on Darfur

In comparison with the hard stance with which U.S. policy makers sought to force GOS to halt its ethnic cleansing in Darfur, EU’s response is remarkably mellow, vacillating between concern, hope, and support to the AU, while conspicuously toning down the threat of sanctions. Two explanations could be offered: Firstly, the language and actions the EU foreign ministers (notably of Mr. Bot and Aid Commissioner Nielson) reveals the influence of the Liberal perception of warfare as irrational and incomprehensible, and of the belief that all involved in a conflict are victims. Both GOS and the Darfur militias are therefore called upon to cease their use of violence, ignoring the fact that practically all violence was — and still is — committed by GOS and its affiliates against unarmed civilians, and accordingly the EU explicitly discounted the use of force. Secondly, a case could be constructed for seeing the EU as more concerned with the economic gains of continued co-operation with GOS, especially as French, British, Italian and Swedish oil interests, and Swedish and German industrial contracts would be threatened.

A commonly used interpretation of EU’s policies makes use of the theory of *Liberal Intergovernmentalism* Moravcsik, Andrew (1999), which states that EU member states negotiate and bargain their national policy preferences at home, then meet in the EU forum to settle for a common policy. The common policy can be expected to reflect the relative bargaining power of each member, determined by its political weight in the Union, the strength of the national preferences in the issue at hand, as well as by opportunities for bartering with other issues.⁶⁸ At the national level the European political leaders assess the willingness of their populations to pay, to use armed force, and to see their soldiers killed for Darfur, while affected national interests position themselves in relation to the issue: Humanitarian NGOs will plead for funds or for military intervention depending on whether their leaderships believe in Liberal or Clausewitzian views of the use of armed force, as will media and academics; industries potentially affected by sanctions will seek to avoid such, and the military and its employees will have organisational interests in going to Darfur or — more likely — staying safely at home. All these inputs are digested through the national political process, and brought to the EU.

The Union’s subsequent position on Darfur may reflect a mix of genuine humanitarian concerns, preferences for continuous economic engagement with Sudan, as well as national strategic imperatives, for example of France seeing an interest in stealing a march on the Americans. One may assume that ministers and decision makers holding a Liberal view of warfare, and thus less prone to interpret the conflict as a result of conscious actions on the side of GOS, and abhorring confrontational policies, would easily find common ground with ministers representing strategic and business interests that favoured a friendly approach towards GOS.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism as approach leaves little room for the policy interests and influence of EU’s institutions, and is criticised for this as at least the European Commission is widely assumed to be powerful. I have not come across evidence that the Commission

⁶⁸(The theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism is only related to the Liberal conception of war in name, except in the sense that both theories are applicable mostly to the politics of liberal democracies.)

have sought to play a role on Darfur, and the calls for action by the Parliament followed the same Liberal line of reasoning that was seen among the ministers, and indicated that there is broad agreement on the Union's Darfur policy. EU's handling of Darfur presents one peculiarity: Germany has absconded itself from the political scene, no trace of German political presence is to be found. Whether this is caused by the German leadership's Liberal perception of military power as destructive, possibly combined with a conviction that EU's policies are sound, or by other factors, is unexplained.

5 Foreign Military Options in Darfur

5.1 Options and Costs

The Western Democracies are the only societies likely to care enough about the mass-killings of destitute, illiterate black Moslem subsistence farmers in one of the most remote regions of Africa to do something about it, but only within limits. Few Westerners feel committed to invest lots of money, much less one of the most risky and expensive foreign policy tools, the military, in sorting out Darfur, and opinions vary over what type of interventions that are feasible, and what their cost might be. Among those who have seriously considered the military option is the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, and from the Summer 2004 onwards military intervention was a relevant policy option to the extent that NATO's planning staffs had drawn up plans, and were ready to initiate military action.⁶⁹

Once again, the issue of Liberal and Clausewitzian views of warfare makes for fundamental differences. For adherents to the Liberal view, of which few—if any—are pacifists, war is surely acceptable in cases where some crucial value is at play, *and* all peaceful means are exhausted. However, according to the Liberal view the internal logic of war is such that involuntary escalation leading to a conflagration is a very serious risk. Thus, the idea of 'limited war', employing less than the full force of the state, is seen as a mirage that easily shows itself to be a nightmare. Seen from the Liberal view an intervention into Darfur, for example by NATO, is highly likely to suck the West into a confrontation not only with all the local militias and GOS, but with the Arab or even the Islamic world. Still, few adherents to the Liberal view would doubt that, in the short term, the full-scale application of Western military power could alleviate the suffering of Darfur's populations, but the cost is considered to be too high and the long-term prospects too bleak to seriously consider an intervention.

5.2 Military Options Seen from a Clausewitzian Perspective

Analysing the military options from a Clausewitzian perspective, many intermediate options for applying military power are open. Looking at recent experience with GOS it is clear that the regime responds to external pressure, and even if for example China and Russia would shield GOS from international sanctions military force could be brought to bear on GOS by interested states, overtly or covertly. The obvious choice would be to increase the strength of GOS' opponents, the two minute Darfur militias, other groupings fighting or opposed to GOS, as well as the neighbouring states hostile to GOS. This would increase the strains on GOS, and Khartoum would have to balance the benefits of its campaign in Darfur with the costs. A key player to influence would be the SPLM, which is now a part of GOS. The mere threat of building up the strength of the SPLM would increase

⁶⁹For an assessment of Blair's motives and the limited unilateral British options in July 2004, see MacAskill, Ewen (2004).

the insecurity of the anti-SPLM majority of GOS' leadership, and from their view halting the destruction of Darfur would seem the lesser evil.

The least demanding military option would be the imposition of a no-fly zone over Darfur. According to a retired U.S. Air Force general:⁷⁰

...enforcing a no-flight zone in Darfur would take one squadron of 12 to 18 fighter aircraft, backed up by four AWACS planes and other support aircraft. This would represent a small fraction of NATO's capability; France alone could provide the necessary fighter aircraft. Sudan's limited air force and air defense system would offer little resistance.

A no-fly zone would appear to be the obvious, low cost, high impact choice that the European could support. It would impose a risk on GOS' forces and militias and thus protect the civilians somewhat, while weakening GOS to an extent that the National Islamic Front leadership might be threatened from within and sue for a negotiated solution rather than humiliation. (To explain why the European leaders have not considered a no-fly zone, one has to allow for the dominance of the Liberal view of warfare and its inherent objection that more weapons would lead to more violence, plus the French disinclination to confront GOS.)

A more ambitious application of air power could seek to increase the strains on GOS would, as in Kosovo in 1999, seek to hinder the operation of GOS' regular forces and the *Janjaweed* to an extent that GOS called off its ethnic cleansing. For much the same reasons as in Kosovo this strategy is risky. It may hurt too little to make GOS sue for peace, it may hurt the wrong people, it may allow GOS to intensify the ethnic cleansing, and, even if succeeding, the air campaign may not lead to a lasting resolution. Airpower applied without ground forces seems historically to be politically ineffective, and chances are good that GOS could circumvent the impact of any air campaign without a concurrent military element on the ground, and an intervention into Darfur must be considered.⁷¹

5.2.1 EU's Military Capability

The U.S. has committed its military capabilities elsewhere, and European troops will have to be a part of any solution in Darfur. Unfortunately, most European military forces are patently unsuited to an intervention in Darfur. Of about 1.7 million European soldiers an estimated 170,000 have the health, age and training that makes them useful for a high-intensity intervention. Atop of that logistical shortcomings, a lack of advanced communications and other key equipment, and national differences that prevents the troops from co-operating reduces the number of deployable European soldiers to 40–50,000, of which practically all already are committed in Iraq, or to UN and NATO missions.⁷² The limited capacity for foreign deployment makes it difficult for example for Germany to keep 7,500 soldiers abroad of a total *Bundeswehr* manning of 350,000 soldiers and civilians (a deployment rate of 2%), and for the Danish Defence Forces to keep 1,000 soldiers of 29,000 employees abroad (3%), and the picture around Continental Europe (but for France with a deployment rate of around 10%) is much the same. In comparison the U.S. and UK continuously deploys more than 15% of their total manning, and for shorter periods above 25%.

⁷⁰Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, quoted in an editorial in the *The Washington Post*, p. A20, March 10, 2005.

⁷¹The International Crisis Group International Crisis Group, (2005b) estimate is that a force of 10–15,000 soldiers will be needed to improve security in Darfur to a degree that the ethnic cleansing could be reversed. A good part of this force, up to 7,000 troops judging from the latest discussions of AU's capabilities, might be provided by African states through the AU.

⁷²This estimate by Dr. Julian Lindley-French of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy was given at the NATO School in Oberammergau on Oct. 22, 2004.

An added barrier to achieving efficiency among the troops when deployed, whether U.S. or European, is that they are organised, equipped, trained, and led in ways that are well suited to conventional warfare, and ill suited for the low-intensity non-conventional type of war that third-world opponents like GOS and its militia are capable of. If the European Union should decide to create a deployable force of a meaningful size that could endure long-term deployments a transformation of its armed forces appears to be a precondition.

5.3 A Scenario Leading to an EU-led Military Intervention

While European action in Darfur will not happen as long as the consensus is that “all parties” are equally to blame, and that nothing can be done at a reasonable cost. However, these perceptions may change if the media attention intensifies, and GOS’ complicity in the atrocities is exposed for the wider European public. Given that four terms are met France could then be expected to support a limited humanitarian intervention into Darfur: Firstly, she must be able to assure China and Russia that GOS and its hold over the Sudanese oil and oil infrastructure will not be challenged. Secondly, the U.S. must not be seen as the initiator or leader of the intervention. Thirdly, France must be assigned a highly visible role in the intervention, thus guaranteeing the two first terms while enhancing her standing Africa. And fourthly, the intervention should be brought about as inoffensively as possible, for example by masking the intervention as a reinforcement of AU’s troops in Darfur, assigning U.S. military elements to roles invisible to the broader public, and, not the least, continue to pretend that GOS is a friendly host rather than the root of the problem. GOS’ leadership would have to be compensated for its acceptance of the intervention by increasing GOS’ revenue from aid delivered by the EU and through Operation Lifeline Sudan to enable it to buy the acquiescence of local opponents to the intervention. The threat of French support to UN sanctions will help GOS to accept the intervention, and China and Russia are unlikely to block such a threat faced with European–American unity, and a French guarantee that their interests are not seriously challenged.

5.3.1 Political and Military Leadership of Multinational Interventions

Any multinational military intervention needs a political (strategic) and military (operational) framework to formulate, negotiate and co-ordinate policies and actions, and a number of international institutions may serve as such. The UN carries a high degree of political legitimacy, but is notoriously incapable of reaching clear and timely decisions, and of directing large-scale military operations. NATO has a functioning strategic–political forum in its North Atlantic Council, and an multinational operational military capability second to none, but its political performance during the 1999 Kosovo Air War cast doubts on the ability of the 25 NATO states to direct high-intensity warfare.⁷³ The European Union has political decision making structures that surpasses those of NATO in many respects, but the Union’s tiny Military Staff (the *EUMS*) cannot direct major operations. The AU has a military staff in Addis Abeba, partly staffed by Europeans, but neither the political cohesion nor the military proficiency of the nascent AU seem sufficient for a leadership role in Darfur if an intervention is to come about. In political terms the African Union is too divided and immature to assume any leadership role but the most symbolic, and too NATO tainted by the decisive role the U.S. plays in the Alliance, so neither NATO nor the AU can act as the political framework for an intervention. The political leadership of an intervention could be assigned to the UN, or, as this may serve French interests and

⁷³The 1999 Kosovo air campaign revealed severe problems in NATO’s mechanisms for political direction, see e.g. Kaufman, Joyce P. (2002).

be preferable to the European troop contributing states that are keen to see their troops better led than the UN can do, to the European Union.

No matter whether the UN or the EU is given the strategic leadership, only NATO or a major NATO Headquarters have the ability to integrate and lead the complex military and logistical assets that the intervention requires. However, to secure that U.S. influence is minimised a French military staff (or a multinational staff with French key components) could be deployed to Darfur to lead the intervention.

5.3.2 Strategic Direction of a Multinational Force in Darfur

Experience shows that multinational forces are slow to deploy, and suffer from numerous deficiencies such as internal disagreements, conflicting doctrines, weak and partly incompatible logistics and communications, and, not the least, from nationally imposed “caveats”, that is restrictions on the use of the troops. This prevents a concerted military effort, and may preclude an early and decisive defeat of the GOS-affiliated troops. There are two approaches to minimise the multinational confusion: Either appointing one major national contingent to act as ‘lead’ with the others in support (as France led EU’s *Operation Artemis* in D.R. Congo in 2003), or handing the task to a reasonably well integrated multinational military institution such as NATO.⁷⁴

Except in the unlikely event that the Security Council is bypassed entirely, the mandate of the intervening force would be vague and ambiguous as it must be acceptable to GOS and its supporters, for example by muddling the key questions of how many refugees that should be allowed to return and where to, and of how the multinational troops should relate to GOS’ forces and GOS’ civil administration.

As soon as a military force is being inserted into Darfur the wrangling will begin on the ground and at the strategic level. GOS and the militias will demand a higher share of the aid in return for accepting the resettlement of only some of the refugees, knowing well that the troop-contributing states neither will commit themselves to an open-ended mission, nor suffer more than a very limited number of casualties. The Darfur Force will have to deal with a strategic dilemma: If GOS and its militias are not challenged the refugees cannot return, and the mission will fail while serving as a ‘milking cow’ for GOS and its militias, whereas taking on the militia will help the refugees but increase the threat to the intervening soldiers. The decision whether to challenge GOS and its militias when entering Darfur should be taken early on, and will be highly controversial, especially in relation to the French commitment to GOS, and the decision will in no small part hinge on the perception of the military options.

The Sudanese militias are ferocious killers of unarmed civilians, but judging from other African debacles such militias are no match for Western trained and equipped soldiers in the short term.⁷⁵ Furthermore, a NATO-type force intervening in Darfur will be aided by the majority of Darfur’s returning population, and by the geography as large swathes of terrain allows for a dispersed, yet effective deployment of highly mobile troops and high-tech surveillance means. However, unless politically defeated soon after the intervention GOS and the militias will adapt themselves, and adopt increasingly effective counter-tactics that soon may inflict casualties unacceptable to the intervening force. The time that the militias and GOS needs to find effective responses leaves a window of opportunity where

⁷⁴A NATO-lead may be delegated to a tested multinational staff such as the French–German Eurocorps, that uses NATO procedures and is interoperable with troop contingents from the NATO states.

⁷⁵Though numerically inferior, French and French trained Chadian troops routed Libyan forces and Libyan-trained Arab militias in Chad in 1983–87, and British troops intervening in Sierra Leone in 2000 ended militia anarchy with minimal losses.

the intervenors may impose military defeat and a political solution effectively terminating the rein of GOS in Darfur.

5.3.3 Strategic Conflict over the Future of Darfur

A dilemma follows from the warfare state logic: Unless the political structures in Darfur (and ideally in Sudan) are fundamentally altered, the atrocities will resume as the military intervenor leaves. A conflict is likely to arise among the contributing states over the direction of the intervention, as some intervenors, quite likely led by the U.S., may want the limited French-directed agenda to be substituted with an effort that reverses the ethnic cleansing and makes Darfur safe. The 2004 cease-fire and peace agreement between SPLM and GOS in effect created an autonomous state in Southern Sudan, and some of the intervening states may opt for a similar resolution providing for a semi-autonomous state in Darfur. The obvious choice is to build up Darfur's native militias, and withdraw leaving behind an OLS-like system to sustain Darfur, and possibly to protect Darfur against GOS' forces with U.S. or NATO air power. This solution worked very well in Northern Iraq, where an autonomous, self-sustaining, and surprisingly democratic Kurdistan was created under a protective 'no-fly, and no heavy weapons'-zone enforced by the UK, U.S. and France. Moving towards an autonomus Darfur will have the additional benefit of creating friendly native military forces out of at least one of the two rebel groups that appeared in Darfur in 2003, while the simultaneous demise of OLS will reduce GOS' capacity to wage war. Still, few African and Western political leaders are keen to see African states break up, even if they have shown themselves to as unworkable and destructive as Sudan, Congo and Nigeria.

5.4 Ending Predatory Warfare by Encouraging Warlordism

In the case of Darfur it is apparent that the marauding militias are organised, directed and supervised by local sheiks, who are responding to their masters in Khartoum de Waal, Alex (2004a). Still, this subordination is based on access to loot, bribery, and protection rather than on ethnic, religious or ideological imperatives. UN's attempt to indict a number of the worst offenders before the Haagse Court may worsen the situation as the indicted marauders and sheiks will have an interest in cutting their ties to Khartoum, creating an even more anarchic situation that could descend into anarchic predatory warfare.



Figure 8: Failed and Endangered States in Africa.

late entire regions. In Congo an estimated 4 million lives have been lost since 1998 due to such predatory warfare.⁷⁶

In places affected by predatory warfare the emergence of warlordism would benefit the populations as a degree of subordination, and thus rationality, would be imposed on the armed gangs. Cut lose from all social obligations such warriors have no choice but to

⁷⁶The International Rescue Committee's *Mortality Survey 2004*, available at <http://www.theirc.org>.

continue marauding, the only skill they may possess, to keep themselves alive. Were such warriors part of a paid militia owned by a Warlord, they would settle and reconnect with society. Warlords are per definition attached to an geographical place, that serve as their economic base, and they are dependent on trading goods for arms and supplies and thus partly susceptible to external economic incentives and military pressure. External parties with a humanitarian concern could support the creation of fiefdoms ruled by warlords in the most anarchic places in Africa, arming and paying the militia until the warlords can pay through taxation. Assisted wisely, the emerging warlords could to some extent be encouraged to adhere to minimal humanitarian standards by their foreign paymasters, although brutality and injustice would have to be tolerated until central and just power structures are ripe to take on the warlords.

6 Conclusions

Sudan – a Warfare State

Sudan is a warfare state where the power, security, and prosperity of the state elite depends on the continuation of internal armed conflict. While regional and international factors are at play, today's atrocities in Darfur are caused primarily by the internal workings of the Sudanese state, and by political interests within Sudan rather than by tribal hatreds, local conflicts over land and water, or by religion and ideology.

As the effect of the collective actions of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda, supported by the U.S. and effected by SPLM has shown, while Sudan is a warfare state, the regime is susceptible to coercion. GOS has diverse and international interests caused by its need for imports of technology, arms and luxury goods, and its export of oil, as well as GOS' dependence on income generated by humanitarian aid, notably through *Operation Lifeline Sudan*. If activated in a co-ordinated manner these interests constitute levers that could compel GOS to end the destruction of Darfur that it is sponsoring. It is necessary to understand the internal workings of the warfare state, hereunder acknowledge the political nature of humanitarian aid, to be able to apply the mix of pressure and incentives that could move the regime to lessen its pressure on Darfur, and to manipulate GOS and its militias if an intervention takes place. The increasing oil revenue renders GOS less dependent on the hard currency generated by aid, and more able to withstand foreign pressure. Still, the sheer number and influence of Sudanese and international leaders, officials and employees involved in and personally benefiting from the aid programs is substantial, and the threat of dismantling OLS is likely to create considerable pressure on GOS that could be used to achieve any policy goal.

The International Framework

Thanks to the Security Council's relegation of responsibility for Darfur and the generosity of the European Union and other donors, the African Union has been able to establish itself in a key position in relation to Darfur. It is maximising its organisational benefits from the Darfur tragedy, while not committing itself to help the victims, partly because several member states sees a political benefit in shielding GOS (including, of course, Sudan itself, soon to take over the Chairmanship of the Union), partly because its political options are undercut by the inadequate military competence and cohesion of its forces.

The Unites States consistently worked to end the atrocities in Darfur, and initially attempted to strong-arm GOS into submission with the support of the British Prime Minister. Faced with French, Russian, Chinese, and EU obstruction the U.S. had to reverse its policies, and accept that success depends either on being strong enough to go it

alone, which the U.S. is not, or on co-opting at the least a majority of the UN veto holders. The U.S. might be the sole superpower, but a ‘hyperpower’ free to act at will it is not.

The rulers of three of Sudan’s neighbours and former foes Egypt, Chad, and Libya, as well as the Nigerian President who leads the African Union, all of them personally threatened by the recent democratic revisionism of the U.S., and most probably encouraged by the support of the Russia, France and China, made up their differences and met in Libya with the Sudanese president in a show of solidarity with the Sudanese regime.

The Centrality of France

France holds the key to any political and military action in relation to Darfur. It is difficult to imagine Russia and China wielding their veto in the Security Council over Darfur if France came to forcefully support the U.S.’ and the UK’s wish to apply pressure on GOS. The French anti-U.S. response in relation to Sudan hinges on the geo-strategic thinking of the French policy-elite, which sees France as locked in a struggle with the American ‘hyperpower’, and facing a U.S. take-over of ‘her’ Africa if she does not resist. In relation to Darfur this perception goes well with major French oil and business interests. France pursues three essential and interrelated policy goals: Keeping the U.S. out of Africa, enhancing French political and commercial influence in Africa (in part by strengthening the African Union), and resolving the Darfur conflict in co-operation with GOS.

The French commitment to GOS is unlikely to be deep, and France may change its position provided, firstly, that the French and the European public opinion, and notably the French public, demand serious action in Darfur, secondly, that her geo-strategic aims are not severely compromised, and thirdly, that she is duly compensated for a policy change. France cannot confront the U.S. single-handedly, or side blatantly with the Russian and Chinese regimes, but needs to operate in concert with other major European democracies, notably Germany.

Exit the European Union

In the case of Darfur the policies of European Union has been in full support of France’s wishes. The Union’s member states, except France and the UK, overwhelmingly adhere to the Liberal perception of the military instrument as irrational and dangerous, and thus irrelevant as a policy instrument. France probably found it easy to reinforce the view among the European foreign ministers that the atrocities in Darfur are caused by an emotional conflagration between rival local and equally bestial militia consumed by the logic of war, and that GOS is acting in reasonably good faith. Thus, the EU’s persistent calls for the “parties” to negotiate, the EU’s unwillingness to confront GOS, the reluctance to threaten oil sanctions, and EU’s active resistance to the confrontational policies of the U.S.

EU’s preference for using the nascent African Union’s ineffective African troops for ‘peacekeeping by proxy’ are motivated by a wish to be seen doing ‘something’, a preference for not committing the EU member states own troops into a conflict, perceived in line with the Liberal perception of war as intractable, and by a genuine wish for Africa to develop effective multinational institutions (and, no doubt, a degree of delight in seeing the Africans using the EU as the model for their Union).

Multinational Crisis Management in Darfur

The international political response to Darfur effectively undercut the confrontational Anglo–U.S. policy intended to force GOS to call off its repression of Darfur, and left EU’s attempts to shame GOS into accepting humanitarian ideals as the only policy instrument.

The inherently weak African Union has been given a lead position on Darfur, and cannot affect the crisis in any meaningful way. International sanctions against the GOS' elite is off the table, as is oil export sanctions as China, Russia and France for various reasons will not accept such. All internationally sanctioned policy instruments, bar the most symbolic, are out of the question, and in the process EU's credibility in relation to the crisis was worn out to an extent that the Union ceded the issue to NATO.

France is the key to reducing the suffering of the civilians of Darfur. But the French wish to win what its leading politicians see as a geo-political strategic confrontation with the U.S. over Africa, as well as French oil and business interests, made France protect GOS when the U.S. sought to make Khartoum relent in Darfur in 2004. The dominance of the Liberal perception of warfare as madness and Darfur as intractable made it easy for France to ensure that GOS was not sanctioned for its atrocities. It is plausible that a younger generation of French politicians will think differently about France and its confrontation with the U.S., and perhaps one day European policy-makers will tire of the Liberal view of war that blocks for meaningful analysis and action as soon as armed force is involved. This may take a long time, but still, one well-publicised atrocity may reintroduce Darfur on the international agenda, and as the U.S. potentially may return to its confrontational stance against GOS, and as NATO already has its 'foot in the door' in Darfur, it cannot be ruled out that some form of multinational military intervention will eventually occur.

Jeppe Plenge Trautner

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