

Tracking Zimbabwe's political history: The Zimbabwe Defence Force from 1980–2005


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INTRODUCTION

Zimbabwe suffered protracted conflict even before the collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia(s) and Nyasaland—made up of Nyasaland (now Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe); creating an environment of peace and stability in the independent Zimbabwe of 1980 therefore meant surmounting several major challenges. The process was expected to overcome entrenched and inherited socio-political legacies and the regional geo-strategic security dynamics that had developed, as well as to overcome the deep divisions that had grown between the nationalists during the period of armed struggle. It is against this backdrop that the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) was established and evolved from the independence elections of February/March 1980.

HISTORIC OVERVIEW

While decolonisation and African majority rule had become a reality in Malawi and Zambia in 1964, the minority white settler regime under the Rhodesian Front (RF) in then Rhodesia issued a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965. It then set about creating a formidable military machine aimed at crushing African aspirations for independence—with assistance from the neighbouring imperial and colonial-dominated states of Portuguese East Africa and South Africa. Military reorganisation included creating the Joint Operations

Figure 1: Rhodesia military structure, 1977–1979

Command (JOC) to formally integrate the operations of the police, army and air force (*see Figure 1*).

The minority regime in Rhodesia then continued policies that perpetuated the colonial status quo. Stated briefly, the territory was occupied in September 1890 by the British South Africa Company, a commercial company armed with a royal charter, which was owned and financed by former Cape province Premier Cecil John Rhodes. From the time of military occupation, interaction with the local people was characterised by the violent dispossession of fertile land, cattle theft and other domestic assets. Able-bodied Africans were coerced into offering their labour for no payment, and were politically marginalised based on race and property ownership in the new cash economy. Meanwhile, the colonials' conduct drew vociferous protests from victims—that is, the African majority population. Significantly, UDI in Rhodesia enjoyed the support of the United States (US)¹ and Great Britain.² Nationalist armed struggle against the Rhodesian Front therefore had domestic, regional and international dimensions.

During the late 1950s a major umbrella political party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), had emerged in Rhodesia as part of the federation-wide African and labour unions, based on political


consciousness and formal organisation. The NDP was banned by 1960, but soon re-emerged as the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU).

However, in May 1963 ZAPU split on regional, ethnic and strategic differences over the execution of civil disobedience and later armed struggle against the RF government—this division was to remain in place for the next 24 years.³ The new splinter movement, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), drew its supporters from Mashonaland and Manicaland.

Both ZAPU and ZANU drew recruits from the emerging military faction that was already evolving in Zambia and Tanzania.⁴ Based on the post-1963 nationalist political divisions, ZAPU formed the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), while ZANU created the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). Each liberation movement established elaborate political and military hierarchies, responsible for managing the armed struggle.


The institutional evolution of ZAPU—including codifying the relationship between the party's political leadership and its armed wing (ZIPRA), as well as establishing a coherent grand strategy with a clear and achievable military-political goal—was influenced by ZAPU Vice President J Z Moyo's 'Our path to liberation', a strategy paper that Moyo presented to the party in 1976.

Figure 2: ZAPU political structure



Source: ZAPU documentation, no date (in authors' possession)

Figure 3: ZIPRA command structure




Source: ZAPU documentation, no date (in authors' possession)

In the late 1970s ZAPU created the Revolutionary Council—a representative body of party officials and military commandos (see figures 2 and 3). The War Council was the executive body that would take decisions emanating from Revolutionary Council discussions, and was linked directly to the ZIPRA High Command. Although the proliferation of councils was often bureaucratic, it did address a fundamental issue raised by ZIPRA rank-and-file in the late 1960s—namely, that ZAPU and the army leaders were out of touch with the political and military ‘foot soldiers’.

ZANU’s military strategy evolved through the various phases, in parallel with the often traumatic political evolution of the party. By the end of 1979, ZANLA had a total force of over 40,000, a third of whom were active in Zimbabwe at any given time.


ZANLA had evolved from comprising gangs, to groups, to being an army with a military hierarchy with ranks (albeit different from the Rhodesian Security Force [RSF]), a disciplinary code of conduct, an Intelligence Directorate, logistics and education departments and motivated personnel (see figures 4 and 5).

Figure 4: ZANU political organisation, 1977–1980



Source: ZANU documentation, no date (in authors' possession)

Figure 5: ZANLA High Command



Source: ZAPU documentation, no date (in authors' possession)

Initially, each liberation movement engaged in war employing different strategies. In 1966, ZANLA launched its first military action in Chinoyi—an act that has since become symbolic. For its part, ZIPRA during 1969 engaged in a phase of joint military operations with Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military arm of the South African liberation movement's African National Congress. ZANLA's strategy was based mostly on classic Maoist guerrilla warfare, but was tempered by the realities of local conditions and experiences, and enhanced with guidance from Mozambique's Frelimo veterans. As ZIPRA's institutional professionalism improved, the army's capability grew from 'pure' guerrilla tactics with relatively small units, to include forces trained and armed with heavier calibre weapons aimed at not merely attacking territory but also seizing and holding it.

Later, after the mid-1970s, the fighting strategy was co-ordinated under the banner of the Patriotic Front (PF), encouraged by the Front Line States (FLS). The Armed Forces coup in Lisbon in April 1974 resulted in the speedy independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975. As part of the FLS, both countries threw their support behind Zimbabwe's liberation movements, offering bases, material support, military training and political support at international forums.

The combined military activity from the Zambian and Mozambican borders, as well as tacit political support from Botswana, soon had Rhodesia under siege. As a result, by late 1978 a military stalemate existed on the battlefield, creating conditions for political negotiations.⁵

The FLS pressured the Commonwealth to act, resulting in the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference held in London from September to December 1979. A ceasefire was signed, to become effective on 21 December 1979.⁶ The protracted war had already claimed over 30,000 casualties.⁷

CEASEFIRE AND THE FORMATION OF THE ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY

The Lancaster House conference and the formal agreements of 21 December 1979 charted the course for transition from minority rule Rhodesia to majority rule Zimbabwe. However, the Lancaster House constitutional talks did not prescribe the way forward on the military question: it simply provided for a constitution, ceasefire, the installation of a transitional authority, the temporary cantonment of fighting forces and the holding of supervised elections—this despite ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo's desperate attempts to convince the Chair, Lord Carrington, to address the military issue.⁸

In December 1979, Lord Soames took up governorship duties in Salisbury, marking the beginning of the transitional phase that led to elections during the first quarter of 1980.⁹ Governor Soames was accompanied by an advance party of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) under 'Operation Agila'. The CMF's mandate was to: monitor the ceasefire; maintain contact with command structures of the PF and the RSF; and address violations. An eight-man Ceasefire Commission made up of two military representatives from each party—Britain, the RSF, ZIPRA and ZANLA—worked closely with the CMF during the ceasefire period.¹⁰ The specific duties of the Ceasefire Commission were to:

- ensure compliance with the ceasefire;
- investigate violations; and
- assist the governor with security-related tasks.

When the CMF terminated its mandate in early March 1980, a total of 1,548 men and women drawn from the Commonwealth countries of Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Fiji had been deployed as part of the monitoring entity.¹¹

Despite the presence of a few thousand guerrillas outside the assembly points (APs), the ceasefire was sufficiently monitored to allow for the conduct of the independence elections.

The elections were held on schedule. The white political party, RF, won all 20 'white' seats available on a separate voters' roll, while of the 80 African seats available, ZANU-PF secured 57, ZAPU 20, and the smaller United African National Council (UANC) three. The elections therefore symbolised a decisive paradigm shift to legitimacy, with power moving from whites organised under the RF banner to blacks under ZANU. Consequently, the struggle between the polarised races continued in a different form.

In military terms, the three armies remained in place, each with its own intelligence and command-and-control structures still intact. This constituted real potential for civil war if the political environment was not handled correctly.

The stakes were high: political and socio-economic transformation would be worthless in the absence of meaningful military integration. The national reconciliation policy would falter, and so would nation building. The creation of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) was thus a prerequisite for the creation of the post-colonial Zimbabwe and for

nation building. Failure would mean civil war; success—as former President Rev Canaan Banana would later describe it—would be a “miracle”.


OPERATION MERGER:¹² FORMATION OF THE ZNA, 1980–1982

The organisers of the Lancaster House Conference had refused to engage in talks aimed at creating a new army for the new state. The majority preferred this to be the prerogative of the new government that would emerge from the elections.

Against the political background of the coalition government, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Robert Mugabe, announced the state's intention to establish a national integrated army of 35,000-strong by end-December 1980. This would be made up of two specialist units (commando and parachute regiment), four infantry brigades and supporting corps of signals, engineers, pay and administration, medical and logistics. Cadres for the new army were to be drawn from the three military factions in the bases and APs: the new army was to be made up of three equal proportions of three battalions or brigade strength from the former Rhodesian army units, and nine battalions or three brigades from former ZANLA and ZIPRA units.

One of the critical issues that had to be dealt with under the highly technical military integration exercise was that of command-and-control, the specific tasks being that of ‘equitable integration’ of the military High Command of each army. As such, several elements were transformed to constitute the chain of command-and-control. A new Minister of State Security, Emmerson Mnangagwa, had been appointed, and it was announced that part of his duties included heading the new Joint High Command (JHC).

Figure 6: Transitional period



Source: Compiled by authors

The JHC was in fact the old Ceasefire Commission that had now been reappointed in a new role. RSF Commander Lt Gen Peter Walls, was appointed commander of the JHC. He was charged with the responsibility of implementing the new defence policy, and managing the integration and conventional training that was to follow, while preparing to defend the state, the people and the country.¹³ Walls's colleagues (and subordinates) in the JHC were the senior commanders of the Rhodesian Air Force, ZANLA and ZIPRA. The idea was that it was essential to demonstrate unity in the top echelons of military command in order to facilitate the same process in the middle levels of the military hierarchy, as well as among the rank-and-file.

A key component of the integration process was the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) whose role was to mediate between the three forces, as well as to train the officer corps of the fledgling ZNA. BMATT, together with the most competent and experienced officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and field commanders, taught a series of comprehensive courses including commanding officer, company commander, NCO, drill instructor, administrator and tactical courses. Courses, duties and the daily routine of military life were shared by all former combatants, and emphasis was placed on making the officer selection process merit-based as well as on ensuring that the Officer Selection Board was a non-political department.

A short exercise designed to bond the officers who were going to be responsible for the integration was undertaken prior to their deployment. On 2 July 1980, 12 members from each of the three factions (ZANLA, ZIPRA and the RSF) were invited to a two-week get-together before flying off to Camberley in Britain for a special course and familiarisation tour of a functioning conventional army. This was significant as it quickly broke down the stovepipe political arrangements that had emerged during the armed struggle period.

More than 65,000 soldiers from the three factions were available for integration. The remaining 30,000 former combatants were to be processed through demobilisation or resettled in food and production enterprises that would continue to service the standing army. A fundamental conceptual tension was evident here between BMATT and Prime Minister and Minister of Defence on the future role of the armed forces. While the former sought to create a military professional force, the latter espoused the Chinese style of soldiers who also contributed through engaging in food and equipment production, organised more on militia and cadre lines than the purely military professionals.¹⁴

Several important developments occurred between 1980 and 1986 before the army, as it exists now, settled into a definite organisational pattern. After November 1986, the armed forces consisted of the following: special units of the commando, artillery, air defence, parachute regiment and mechanised infantry battalion; six infantry brigades and a presidential guard, as well as supporting corps of signals, engineers, education, pay and administration, directorate of army training and logistics/service corps. The force totalled 46,000 troops.¹⁵ This was/is complemented by a 4,000-strong air force. At the same time the country's boat squadron was reorganised.

The first element to change in the implementation stage was the RSF. Having lost their political influence, most former RSF senior officers soon lost interest in the military, whose purpose (maintaining the colonial status quo) was now fundamentally different to that which had obtained when they joined. In June, Lt Gen Peter Walls tendered his resignation to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence citing personal reasons, but admitting privately that his decision to leave had to do with frustration at the slow and difficult integration process. More generally, it had been widely believed that with a new political dispensation in place, the former white Rhodesian officers and soldiers were unlikely to fit in. Walls's departure, described by James McManus as "spiteful behaviour",¹⁶ was soon emulated by senior Air Force Commander Alexander McIntyre, leading to an exodus of middle- and lower-ranking white soldiers.

The departure of Walls removed one of the pillars of the JHC and weakened the command-and-control structure of the RSF. After June 1980 the RSF was no longer as important in negotiating aspects of integration, and the remaining cadres were confined to matters purely military. ZANLA Commander Lt Gen Rex Nhongo was then appointed overall Commander of the Armed Forces, while his deputy was former ZIPRA military chief, Lookout Masuku.

The second development involved the traditional nationalist adversaries, ZANU and ZAPU, who had remained divided for 24 years. In August/September 1980, the country prepared to go to the polls to vote for local government representatives. Meanwhile, due to the slow and difficult integration process and the looming onset of summer rains, a decision had been taken to provide suitable accommodation for combatants who were still living in open-air APs. Combatants had entered the makeshift camps in January 1980 and several months later were still waiting to be integrated or demobilised. Some 17,000 ex-

combatants were therefore bussed in from the camps and settled into brand new council houses in the dormitory towns of Chitungwiza in Harare and Entumbane in Bulawayo.

Once political campaigning began, the fierce competition that had characterised the nationalist era of the 1960s soon erupted into open warfare. Party activists from both sides then marshalled forces from the thousands of armed ex-combatants either still in waiting areas or in the newly integrated battalions. In a statement, Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Mugabe, announced that: "A pattern has emerged, overnight, revealing the sinister undertone and definite [political] party organisation."¹⁷ After this comment, the country was thrown into near civil war.

Two related developments are important for our discussion. First was the immediate arrest of the top military leadership of ZIPRA, beginning with the Ceasefire Commission and later JHC representatives, Masuku, Dabengwa and eight other high-ranking ex-ZIPRA officers. In February 1982, ZAPU officials were removed from Cabinet and other influential government posts. By March 1983, senior ZAPU officials, including ZAPU leader Dr Joshua Nkomo, experienced unrelenting harassment and assassination attempts, forcing them to flee into exile. Second, some ZIPRA combatants already integrated in the army deserted and were struck off the rolls.

This meant that of the original tripartite military power-sharing arrangement mooted in April 1980, only ZANLA senior cadres remained. Much more significantly, from henceforth there was little to stop the full implementation of a factionally based security policy in the country. A number of units then emerged that can be best explained in this context.

The first unit emerged from a meeting held between BMATT and ZNA senior officers in February 1981. This followed an abortive drive-past assassination attempt on Mugabe at the Prime Minister's residence. It was suggested that a dedicated presidential guard unit be established, replacing the existing ad hoc arrangement of rotational units. The third unit of the second brigade (2:3 Infantry Battalion) was carrying out protection duties at that time. This was followed by a visit by the Prime Minister to North Korea in October 1981, where he was offered weapons, equipment and training worth £12.5 million. These assets, together with a contingent of 1,065 North Korean instructors led by Brig Sim Hyon Dok, established the 5th Brigade (an armoured regiment) and the Zimbabwe People's Militia (ZPM).

Before reviewing the fate of the ZPM, we must note that most of the units trained by the Korean contingent were ready for deployment by the beginning of 1983. The 5th Brigade was then deployed in the internal security role with disastrous results,¹⁸ as all have come to agree.¹⁹

Against the backdrop of this national tragedy, a heated ZAPU Central Committee crisis meeting called for the establishment of a National Security Council. After deliberations, the meeting resolved that a supreme body be established, "headed, jointly by Nkomo and Mugabe". If this was not accepted, ZAPU threatened to pull out of the coalition government.²⁰

The ZPM emerged during the local government election campaign period in late 1980 in the Midlands, Gokwe area. This area is adjacent to the Zambian border and is home to bilingual Ndebele- and Shona-speakers. During the liberation struggle, this area had been the farthest ZANLA cadres could go from the eastern border with Mozambique. After independence, ex-ZIPRA combatants merged easily with the locals, making them difficult to distinguish.

A local ZANU-PF activist, Ndemera, then appealed to the party to deploy village defence militia. Initially these were referred to as the para-military, aimed at providing protection against the prevalence of 'dissidents' in the area who were targeting political opponents. Three camps were established in Gokwe, at Charamba, Mavhirimi and Nembudziya, where the para-military established operational bases. In October 1982 the ruling party responded by taking the first recruits to Bindura for training, marking the official start of the ZPM. Speaking on 4 October 1982, Minister of State (Defence) in the Prime Minister's Office, Dr Sydney Sekeremayi, said that ZPM was:

... to be the eyes and ears of government and the people ... key installations to be guarded by those loyal to government. The attack on Thornhill Air Force and disappearance of arms at Cranborne Barracks were all 'inside jobs'.²¹

Once the weaponry largesse and training capacity from Korea was in the country, Korean instructors were employed to train the ZPM.

While local dynamics in the Gokwe constituency had given rise to the ZPM, the subsequent increase in military operations by the counter-revolutionary Mozambique National Resistance Movement (Renamo) ensured that the unit quickly became an established entity.

Soon, a deputy minister (Defence) responsible for the militia was appointed, and senior and middle level officers were seconded from the army to command, train and manage the ZPM. An active ZPM unit of about 1,000 was always available, drawn from those who had just completed their four-month training and were in their second six-month active service phase.

Candidature for the ZPM was open to anyone between the ages of 18 and 60, with those undergoing training required to be below 36. Those engaged were paid only allowances. By 1985 when regulations were passed, the ZPM totalled over 20,000 troops.²²

The ZPM, however, appeared to be tasked primarily with rooting out local political competition presented by ZAPU, and was therefore viewed as an appendage of the ruling ZANU-PF party and not necessarily as a national institution.

At this time, increased pressure on Zimbabwe from South African-backed proxy forces threatened the road and rail infrastructure and transport links to the sea, as well as communities residing along the border areas with Mozambique. The insecure conditions along the border drove thousands of villagers to military posts further inland, and government responded by creating village-based self-defence units organised under the ZPM.

Following the Unity Accord reached between ZANU and ZAPU in December 1987, the role of the ZPM within Zimbabwe became marginal. This eclipse was to continue with the release of Nelson Mandela in South Africa in February 1990, and with the first Rome Treaty protocols of 1991 reached between Renamo and the Frelimo government of Mozambique. With peace returning to Southern Africa in the 1990s, Zimbabwe embarked on far-reaching economic austerity measures, and one of the casualties of that process, launched in 1991, was the closure of the ZPM. Its demise was without much fanfare.

THE AIR FORCE

After assisting the CMF, the Zimbabwe Air Force appeared to shrink from the limelight. In 1981 the Zimbabwe government bought US\$45 million worth of air-to-ground aircraft from Britain to replace the ageing inventory inherited from Rhodesia, which largely represented Second World War cast-offs. The planes were received from 16 September 1981.

The more modern helicopters had been on loan from South Africa, and returned to base once the political situation changed. A small

number of pilots from Zambia, Nigeria and even Mozambique had been dispatched to the air force and were finding integration difficult. Many were required to take basic conversion courses and raised numerous complaints about the slow pace of integration.

In July 1982, suspected South African-backed elements sneaked into Thornhill Airbase in the small town of Gweru and placed explosive devices on the planes: eight machines were destroyed, delivering a blow to the capacity of the nascent army.²³ An urgent board of inquiry was established but little evidence was found. There was, however, immediate reaction from the government and emerging army.

Deputy Army Commander Josiah Tungamirai and a score of more senior officers were redeployed to the air force with a view to take command after familiarisation in the shortest possible time. A temporary Air Marshall, Daudi Porta from Pakistan, was installed, and the root and branch integration of the air force was under way by late 1982.

The Chinese also stepped in by providing air defence capacity and field artillery; components that improved security at the air bases and strengthened their ability to defend the skies. Nigeria and Tanzania also assisted during the early period by providing assistance in the area of signals and motor maintenance and mechanics, respectively.

THE NAVY—LAKE KARIBA

There was also on-going reorganisation of the Boat Squadron: a sub-unit of the Engineer Corps established to police the 5,000 km² lake that provides a 330 km border between Zambia and Zimbabwe. The 1980 restructuring established five sub-units:

- A Troop, equipped with interceptor craft;
- B Troop maintained assault boats able to ferry troops ashore;
- C Troop, with a large transporter, the *Ubique*—a 72 tonne landing craft capable of carrying 30 tonnes of men and equipment including armoured cars. *Ubique* was also armed with 12.7 and 7.62 mm machine guns for self-protection and covering fire purposes;
- D Troop—this support group was trained for protecting beach-heads and making assault landings for non-specialised units, employing mortar and support weapons.

- E Troop was deployed for the purposes of guarding the harbours on Lake Kariba and around the rest of the squadron, as required.

A diving school, equipped with a decompression chamber, operated in conjunction with the commandos.

DEMOBILISATION

With thousands of ex-combatants still hosted in the volatile urban areas, it appears that a decision was taken to change the previous slow pace of integration and to accelerate this, introducing urgent disarmament and then return to demobilisation and resettlement.

OPERATION SOLDIERS EMPLOYED IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

‘Operation SEED’ ran parallel to the events of late 1980 and early 1981. As mentioned earlier, the operation employed the military in a wider sense, as expressed by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.²⁴

The idea was, however, alien to the broader military, as espoused by the British advisers, and this attitude towards the operation was not entirely confined to external actors; similar thinking was prevalent among the combatants themselves and their commanders. Both saw themselves as gallant fighters not worthy to be troubled with engaging in agricultural production.

An early survey of preferred options by BMATT carried out on the 17,000 ex-combatants who were eventually housed in the urban areas revealed that less than 10% supported the idea of self-reliance work, crop-growing schemes and irrigation farming. However, the combatants would not publicly express preferences that ran contrary to the political leadership.

Conceptually, Operation SEED sought to create units of 700 soldiers drawn from ZANLA, ZIPRA and the RSF, and to allocate to each unit a government farm, complete with agricultural equipment. It would also facilitate marketing contracts for the produce with local government departments and parastatals. Soldiers would not have their weapons taken away; ostensibly to perpetuate the idea that those involved were still soldiers, but soldiers involved in economic development. A basic salary would be offered to each soldier, just under the amount for demobilisation pay as it was expected that these units would share in the profits made at the end of each season or cropping cycle. Farms were

acquired for this purpose in Sabi, Esigodini near Bulawayo and also near Harare. But soldiers involved in Operation SEED were affected when fighting broke out during campaigning for the local government elections; factional groups competed to get to the armouries from the fields in order to destroy each other. As a consequence, the majority simply abandoned the remote and isolated farms to return to the safety of the urban environments. This effectively destroyed any potential that was beginning to emerge in Operation SEED, shutting out one more alternative for the large army to reduce its size in a productive manner.

A reason for the rapid collapse must surely have been the fact that the troops had not worked together for long enough to build mutual confidence and trust, and to overcome the factional political diet that had informed their relations during the liberation period.

FURTHER DEMOBILISATION

A second attempt at demobilisation was launched in August 1981, soon after the security situation had stabilised and following the rapid induction of ex-combatants into the armed forces. The Ministry of Social Services, Labour and Welfare was provided with a budget of Z\$116 million, aimed at reducing the ZNA to about 30,000 troops. A mere Z\$43 million had been provided in 1980 and this had not made a significant impact.

A Demobilisation Directorate was created within the Ministry, and former Deputy High Commissioner to the United Kingdom (UK), John Shonhiwa, was recalled and appointed as director of the programme. Three options were to be followed:

- An involuntary option, under which lapsing contracts of RSF personnel would not be renewed.
- A voluntary package of four months' salary plus a monthly stipend of Z\$185 for two years would be offered, with persons encouraged to pool resources as co-operatives and to present viable business plans for which funding could be advanced.
- A disabled rehabilitation centre would be established for special cases.

The exercise also received outside financial and planning support from Norway (agricultural training) and other donors through the Zimbabwe

Reconstruction and Development Conference (ZIMCORD). ZIMCORD secured Z\$6.7 million towards the establishment of a rehabilitation centre in Ruwa, just east of Harare, which opened its doors in April 1983.

An information pamphlet was published, encouraging former combatants to rejoin schools, universities and other tertiary skills training centres. Demobilised personnel, once processed centrally, would continue to pick up their redundancy packages in the decentralised offices conveniently established countrywide.

By March 1983 the Demobilisation Directorate was closed, satisfied that it had completed its mandate. In reality, however, demobilisation had been an exercise in statistics and semantics that failed to address the core difficulties faced by demobilised personnel.

For a variety of reasons—ranging from ill-prepared combatants unable to manage large amounts of cash, to the limited availability of training colleges, and to a harsh, capitalist economy requiring sustained support and entrepreneur commitment—the majority of demobilised soldiers were within five years destitute and began asking for further state assistance.

Following years of demonstrations and appeals, in 1991 about 19,000 ex-combatants came together and established the War Veterans' Welfare Organisation that then formally entered into talks with the government for better support. Many still required the basics: skills training; accommodation; education; health care; employment; and general security. Owing to the missed opportunity in 1981, Zimbabwe is still trying to find an effective and permanent solution to its demobilisation problem, even as we write.

ZDF INSTITUTIONAL DEFENCE POLICY AND COMMAND-AND-CONTROL FRAMEWORK

The revised National Defence Policy that was published in 1997 enshrines an elaborate hierarchy of governance, command and control of the military. The president is the commander-in-chief of the ZDF, chairing the State Defence Council. This is the highest body responsible for national security affairs. The Council is normally attended by the ministers of defence, home affairs, foreign affairs and finance, as well as the commander defence forces and the secretary for defence—as Council members.

Below the State Defence Council is the Defence Policy Council, chaired by the minister of defence. Among its members are the

commander/chief of defence forces, the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Defence and commanders of the army and air force. The minister of finance is an ex-officio member of the Defence Policy Council.

Next is the Defence Command Council, chaired by the commander defence forces. The commanders of army, air force, chief of staff operations and plans, and chief of staff logistics and support services serve as members. The Zimbabwe Staff College commandant serves as a member when required.

Below this is the Programming and Planning Council, chaired by the secretary for defence. The commander defence forces, chief of staff operations and plans, chief of staff logistics and support services, the deputy secretary for finance, and the deputy secretary for policy and procurement serve as members.

The official position, as stated, is also quite clear on the role of the minister of defence, who is described as the political head; the permanent secretary, who is cast as the principal accounting officer; with the commander defence forces as the “professional head of all Defence Forces”.²⁵

CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS

The legal framework providing for the ZDF is the Lancaster House Constitution that provided for the defence policies formulated in the post-independence period and promulgated partly as the Defence Act by Parliament. The Zimbabwe Constitution and the organisational structure of the government provide mechanisms that facilitate civilian control and public accountability of the military.

The National Defence Policy resonates with these provisions. It acknowledges the primacy of the Constitution, elected civilian authority and Parliament when it points out that:


Civil Military Relations refers to the hierarchy of authority between the Executive, Parliament and the Defence Forces. A cardinal principle is that the Defence Forces are subordinate to the civilian authority.²⁶

To this end, the document acknowledges that civilians formulate defence policy and remain responsible for the political dimensions of defence, while the military executes that policy. In this specialised effort, military officers assist civilians on a collaborative basis on the formulation of

defence policy.²⁷ It also respects military autonomy by asserting that government and politicians must not interfere with the operational chain of command and the application of the code of military discipline.

Chapter X, Paragraph 96 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe states that the president as commander-in-chief is empowered to determine the operational use of the defence forces and execution of military action. He is authorised to declare war or make peace, proclaim or terminate martial law as well as to confer honours. The president appoints the

Figure 7: Management of defence in Zimbabwe



Source: National Defence Policy, Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Government Printers, Harare, 1997

commander of the defence forces, and every commander of a branch of the defence forces, after consultation with a person or authority prescribed by or under an act of Parliament. The president's authority regarding the military is limited as he has to act on the advice of stipulated persons or bodies. The elected president appoints a minister of defence to manage the political daily functions of the military to whom the commanders report, except directly to the president in cases of emergency.

Parliament provides an important military management mechanism. First, the ZDF branches are established by acts of Parliament; second, Parliament makes provision for the organisation, administration and discipline of the defence forces; and third, the ZDF is subject to the security and administration of regulatory parliamentary and security committees. These include Budget, Public Accounts and Security committees which censor the defence budget, scrutinise defence expenditure and monitor the activities of the defence, respectively. The judiciary, the third arm of government, also plays its role where judgment on criminal cases and civil suits against the military are concerned.

Military personnel are prohibited from active participation in politics. They can exercise their democratic right to vote and are not permitted to hold office in any political party or political organisation.²⁸ In practice, however, several generals are represented in the Politburo, Central Committee or other ruling party structures. As we write, there are several cases pending in the courts involving military members for alleged participation in opposition party politics.²⁹

Notwithstanding the legal and constitutional provisions for civilian control, Zimbabwe's liberation era civil-military relations have had a profound impact on the country's body politic, reflecting a much more integrated and party based politico-military structure than what appears in the texts.

The ideology that political power comes from the barrel of the gun and that the gun is subordinate to the former, is a notion that has since been transferred to the present governmental machinery without fundamental reorientation. Thus, the principles and practices of liberation period civil-military relations constitute a major explanation for the general absence of coups and military indiscipline in Zimbabwe. However, this historical legacy also makes for paradoxical outcomes: on the one hand accounting for firmly entrenched modalities of civilian control, but on the other hand responsible for the incestuous and non-

transparent nature of civil–security relations that represent resistance to the introduction and evolution of mature civil–military relations in post-liberation Zimbabwe.

ZIMBABWE'S DEFENCE POLICY

Zimbabwe's defence policy has been shaped by national, regional and global military, political and economic dynamics. Defence Minister, Dr Sekeramayi, explained the formulation of the national defence policy:

It develops on the basis of [the] economic foundation of our society and evolves from the overall national security and foreign policy. It is [a] symbiotic and harmonious linkage with the economy and political developments within which it is formulated.³⁰

The basic premise of the country's defence policy, as outlined in the Constitution and in policy presentations and documents, is to preserve Zimbabwe's national and territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to protect the nation's citizens against internal and external threats. This means that the nation's overall defence sector must continually provide real time and projected threat and capability assessments. Decisions can then be made on the capabilities and resources of the armed forces to deal with that threat.

Zimbabwe's defence policy has evolved over more than two decades. In the 1980s it essentially comprised a triad of objectives: first, to secure the nation's political and military unity (as far as possible) to buttress the 'national reconciliation' policy; second, to counter the threat of dissidents and to prevent the possible secession of Matabeleland or the partition of the nation into two ethnic enclaves (Shona and Ndebele); and third, to counter South African destabilisation and provide a political and military counterweight as leader of the FLS against South Africa's hegemonic ambitions.

In the 1990s, the defence policy concentrated more on regional collaborative security, with the ZNA being deployed in peace support operations, and Zimbabwe being prominent in regional military-political security organisations.

The new millennium has witnessed another shift in Zimbabwe's defence policy dynamics. The post-2000 national crisis has resulted in national defence policy essentially being defined as the preservation of the ZANU-PF party and government, with the party and the state/nation

often being perceived as one and the same. This was clearly shown in the March 2002 presidential elections when Maj Gen Vitalis Zvinvashe and Air Marshal Perence Shiri—the respective heads of the ZDF and Air Force—categorically announced that the Zimbabwean armed forces would not support any leader who had not fought in the liberation war.


This praetorian proclamation, designed to prevent any support for the opposition, clearly illustrates that Zimbabwe has essentially become a military enclosure. It introduced a new and disturbing theme into domestic politics because it was essentially a pre-emptive coup not to remove the old order, but to preserve it by toppling the opposition.

Simultaneously, with the broadening of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to include the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), it is seen that national security is also dependent on the armed forces' capability to perform effectively in distant military operations (e.g. the DRC). A constraint of Zimbabwe's defence policy, however, is that the ZDF must have at the very least a two-front war military capacity: as shown in the 1980s and in the post-new millennium environments—the ZDF has to be able to buttress national defence policy by being able to engage simultaneously in internal and external operations.

ZIMBABWE'S DEFENCE BUDGET

Military expenditure in Zimbabwe has always taken second place to education, although the government was determined to implement a


Figure 8: Zimbabwe defence estimates of expenditure, 1980–1990



Source: Parliament of Zimbabwe, Hansard, Parliamentary debates, Government Printers, Harare, 1980-90


levelling off socialist policy from the beginning (*the statistical expenditure appears in Figure 8*). However, no development could take place in the conflict-ridden environment of the 1980s, and this partly explains the seemingly untoward allocation on military expenditure. Justifying expenditure during the first period of 1980–1993, then Defence Minister, Richard Hove, pointed out that: “... our expenditure levels in defence were dictated to us by the Pretoria regime’s threatening posture.”³¹

Figure 9: Zimbabwe defence estimates of expenditure, 1991–2002




Source: Debates Parliament of Zimbabwe, Hansard, Government Printers, Harare, 1991–2002.

Figure 10: Expenditure on Ministry of Defence as percentage of total budget 1980–1990 (using estimates of expenditure)



Source: Debates Parliament of Zimbabwe, Hansard, Government Printers, Harare, 1980–90.

Figure 11: Expenditure on Ministry of Defence as percentage of total budget 1991–2001 (using estimates of expenditure)



Source: *Debates Parliament of Zimbabwe, Hansard, Government Printers, Harare, 1991–2001*

The security imperatives of military expenditure were emphasised by current Defence Minister Dr Sekeramayi, who said that the country's defence forces were the guarantors of peace, tranquillity and stability; a fact that makes expenditure on them absolutely vital.³²

ZIMBABWE NATIONAL ARMY (ZNA) MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS: 1980–2003

THE ZIMBABWE DEFENCE FORCES (ZDF) IN MOZAMBIQUE 1982–1991

While involved in the war against dissidents in Matabeleland, the ZNA was from 1982–1991 deployed in Mozambique as an ally of Frelimo and its army, the Popular Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique. The ZDF deployed in Mozambique early in 1981, convinced that the Rhodesian-created Renamo could be easily defeated.

Renamo, sponsored by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), emerged after 1974 as a spoiler to ZANLA rear bases' security in Mozambique. Just when it was beginning to be effective, the ceasefire of 1979 was reached and the movement was hastily shipped out to Pretoria. The subsequent inheritance of Renamo by the South African Defence Force and the generous resources, training and other support rendered, soon witnessed an expanding war on Zimbabwe's border early in its independence. By then Renamo had emerged as a major threat to Frelimo.

The ZDF deployment was precipitated by a number of factors. Economically (and for landlocked Zimbabwe in particular), the FLS needed to loosen the noose of South African dominance.

Zimbabwe, acknowledged as the economic power house of the FLS, had a major role to play; the country needed to maintain trade routes comprising road, rail and other communications routes for exports and imports to and from ports in Mozambique and Malawi. By 1981 it was clear that Frelimo could not secure the vital transport routes, especially the Beira Corridor road and rail transport route. The ZNA would have to perform that task.

Using the alternative South African port route was an unacceptable political and financial burden on Zimbabwe, making it hostage to South African destabilisation. For Zimbabwe, reeling from the international fuel crisis, internal conflict and South African-sponsored proxy insurgents, naked self-preservation was as much a factor in deploying the ZNA as was assisting a troubled neighbour.

Politically, Zimbabwean involvement was a continuation of the liberation war era ZANLA-Frelimo alliance; this time against South African regional destabilisation, specifically that of Mozambique. Zimbabwe was also trying to assert its 'great power' status within the FLS, as a counterweight to South Africa's regional domination.

Zimbabwe's war to maintain the trade routes involved: mounting static sites along the threatened routes at intervals; convoy duties for road and rail services; protecting communities along the border areas; protecting railway lines along the Beira and Limpopo routes; and dominating known base areas in Mozambique's Tete, Sofala, Manica and Gorongosa areas. Zimbabwe deployed most of the conventional units, including the mechanised infantry and air force elements, used in the conflict.

During the mid-1980s, other FLS countries became involved in the war, including Tanzania, Botswana and Zambia; this was at a time when the security situation facing Frelimo was dire as Renamo intensified its increasingly sophisticated operational activities. Crisis point was reached in 1984, with the two warring factions eventually compelled to sign the Nkomati Accord, and again in October 1996 (the 1984 ceasefire did not hold) when President Samora Machel was killed in an as yet unexplained plane crash.

The Zimbabwean forces were stretched to the limit but a decision was made to raise a 6th Brigade, destined to provide fresh troops to the Mozambican operation and under the command of Col Lionel Dyke.

The ZDF deployments only began to reduce with political developments in South Africa during 1989-90, and following the Rome Treaty protocols signed between Frelimo, Renamo and other stakeholders in 1991 and finally in 1992.

Zimbabwean forces withdrew from Mozambique in April 1993, making way for the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ). Zimbabwe's 13-year involvement in the Mozambican war had provided valuable conventional battlefield experience throughout the army as almost all units had been rotated during that period.

In a remarkable presidential speech during the withdrawal, it was learnt that by December 1990, out of the eight battalions (nearly 70% of the ZDF) only one battalion was operating outside the limits set along the road and rail routes. This was targeted at retaining control of the Gorongosa–Cassa Banana Mountain, located some 100 km northeast of Chimoio. The reason for the revelation was to counter numerous Renamo claims that Zimbabwe was violating the terms of the Rome Treaty protocol and ceasefire.

ZDF-BMATT AND MOZAMBIQUE *FORCES ARMADAS DE MOZAMBIQUE* (FAM) MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The complete involvement of the ZDF in Mozambique took a surprising turn during the early 1990s when the ZDF joined BMATT in offering training, initially to the *Forces Armadas de Mozambique* (FAM) and later to the combined integrating military that included Renamo after the signing of the Rome Treaty in 1992.

The above deployment began with BMATT providing pre-deployment retraining for the ZDF battalions that were going on operations on the Beira, Nyamapanda and Limpopo corridors. This then graduated to retraining units that were being rotated during the 13-year deployment.

In 1986, the UK then reached an agreement with Mozambique on military assistance. Mozambique had begun to turn to the Commonwealth, an organisation it eventually joined; however, due to colonial sensibilities Britain did not wish to be seen to be undermining Portugal and therefore requested facilities in Zimbabwe to carry out this task. The Nyanga Border Camp was availed for the purpose, and Mozambican officers and troops came over the border for training. Soon, however, BMATT found that it made sense to reach an all round agreement that would involve some ZDF instructors assisting with FAM training.

Hence, when the Rome Agreement was reached—an accord that provided a military agreement—the ZDF found itself training some of the first elements for the new army in reconciled Mozambique. This

involvement closed the chapter on Zimbabwe's military deployment in Mozambique, with troops finally returning to Zimbabwe amid much pomp and ceremony on 14 April 1993, and with words of gratitude from President Chissano and the Mozambican people.

ZIMBABWE'S CONTRIBUTION TO UN PEACEKEEPING

In line with its defence policy that provides for meeting legal international obligations, the military in Zimbabwe on 2 July 1991 deployed its first peacekeeping mission to Angola. At the time, participation was bound by the tenets of traditional and consensus-building peacekeeping principles in which the parties in conflict were first consulted on the participation of particular countries before they could be invited. Consequently, the invitation from both the Angolan government and UNITA represented a milestone in the country's foreign policy realm. As then Foreign Minister Nathan Shamuyarira was to assert: "The invitation represents the greatest historical significance."³³

Col Nyambuya led a contingent that included policemen and women to the peacekeeping mission, UNAVEM II, opening a new chapter in the history of the ZDF. Thereafter, the country participated in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Rwanda and Eritrea, in the process exposing its troops to international norms and standards.

With the advent of new-found peace in the early 1990s, the FLS members gathered in Windhoek in 1992 and proposed a new security structure informed by the rapidly improving military environment in the region. Zimbabwe, through its defence force, engaged in the second step of consolidating its independence by strengthening regional military co-operation.

Through the establishment of the Regional Peacekeeping and Training Centre, and before that the Zimbabwe Staff College and Military Academy—both institutions that were made available to regional and continental forces—the ZDF positioned itself to play a decisive regional security role. Signs of this had been witnessed in the military co-operation with Mozambique just before and after the end of the conflict in that country.

THE ZDF AND THE DRC WAR

In August 1998 President Mugabe decided to send ZDF troops to the DRC to save President Laurent Kabila, who had succeeded President

Mobutu as head of state, from 'rebel' forces that were advancing from eastern Congo. This deployment—based on Mugabe's personal initiative—began with the ZDF deploying 3,000 troops, but by 2001 that figure had increased to approximately 13,000—Zimbabwe's largest military deployment since the ZNA had been sent to Mozambique.

This controversial deployment was supposedly a SADC initiative, since Angola and Namibia also sent forces in support of Kabila. Other SADC members, in particular South Africa, denied that this was a SADC initiative and that the ZDF had entered the DRC not for security or geo-strategy, but for power and plunder.

The war was unpopular even within Zimbabwe and the rebels initially mauled the ZNA in 1998, although the ZNA later regrouped and was able to take and hold 'rebel' positions. The besieged President Kabila held on to power, but the DRC conflict increasingly became a political and military morass, characterised by a constant shifting of military and political alliances, internal feuds, mercenaries and appallingly high civilian casualties. Although the ZNA has decreased its forces in the ongoing DRC conflict, they remain there to support President Joseph Kabila who came to power after his father's assassination in 2002.

THE ZDF AND INTERNAL ENGAGEMENTS

THE BATTLE FOR BULAWAYO AND THE DISSIDENT WAR, 1980–1987

The first major internal engagement of the ZNA was the deployment of the Korean-trained 5th Brigade to crush the insurgency in Matebeleland and parts of Midlands. The resultant Battle for Bulawayo and the 5th Brigade's notorious Gukurahundi campaign (which ended in 1987 with the Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU), were intertwined with the politics surrounding the establishment of the ZNA, discussed earlier. Suffice to say here that ultimately approximately 20,000 ZNA regular and other forces were deployed against the dissidents (who never numbered more than 2,000) in a classic counter-insurgency war that entailed the use of force in both rapid deployment search-and-destroy operations and garrison duties in 'pacifying' villages and districts.

THE THIRD CHIMURENGA

After the boom years of the 1980s, Zimbabwe's economy began to decline in the 1990s, due mainly to endemic corruption, the flight of

skilled professionals, declining foreign investment, and the government's increasingly authoritarian stance.

From 1997 to 2000, two events precipitated a socio-political and socio-economic crisis, namely: the state 'payout' of approximately Z\$4 billion to 'war veterans' (that is, guerrilla ex-combatants who had been marginalised by the state since independence); and the land redistribution exercise. In 2000, the previously sporadic and spontaneous grassroots farm invasions by landless peasants became a state-sponsored exercise in coercive land redistribution.

The resounding 'no' vote in the February 2000 referendum on the new constitution (which would have considerably strengthened presidential powers), the scheduled general elections in June 2000, and growing support for the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) opposition party, led ZANU-PF to declare that it was now fighting the 'Third Chimurenga'.

The Third Chimurenga was essentially ZANU-PF's version of the 'Total Strategy' which the South African apartheid state had used as a socio-political grand strategy. Believing that it faced a 'total onslaught' from internal and external opponents who wished to hijack the gains of the liberation war in modern Zimbabwe, the state responded with its own 'total offensive' (legal, political, cultural, economic and military) to ensure state survival and to preserve the gains of the land redistribution exercise.

In essence, ZANU-PF's struggle for survival became a military operation, and Zimbabwe was turned into an 'operational zone'. Zimbabwe's politics was militarised, and military coercion became the currency of politics. From March 2000, the state began Operation Tsuro, in which military means were used for political ends.

Operation Tsuro had three main facets. The first was that of command-and-control. In an ironic continuity with the RSF, the state recreated the JOC; this time combining the Ministry of Defence (ZDF), Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), CIO and the Zimbabwe National War Veterans' Association. There were regular joint briefings and action plans to resolve the 'crisis'.

Second, operational zones were established. The task was to identify 'loyal' and 'opposition' communities and individuals. The former would be rewarded and the latter punished. The ultimate aim was that the rural areas in Mashonaland and Manicaland would be 'liberated'—that is, become pro-ZANU areas and 'no-go' areas for the opposition (Matabeleland was recognised as an opposition stronghold).

Third, the methodology of operations included persuasion and violence. At first, the ground troops were landless villagers led by both genuine and nominal 'war veterans', with the state and ZNA operating as armourer, provider of logistics and enforcer. Attacks were initially on white farms, which were invaded or repossessed; however, as the June 2000 elections neared, the scale of violence increased, with auxiliary forces attacking known and suspected pro-MDC groups.

Simultaneously, a system of mass politicisation began in rural areas, with villagers obliged to attend rallies and political indoctrination sessions known as *pungwes*. (The *pungwes* were also used by guerrillas in the Second Chimurenga as a politicisation technique.) This resulted in groups of internally displaced people, black and white, fleeing to the cities.

After ZANU-PF's narrow and controversial victory in the June 2000 elections, the state now formalised its coercive alliance with the war veterans and villagers, and also began to indoctrinate the youth in the tenets of coercive nationalism. Militia brigades and training schools were established at the Border Gezi National Training Centre in Mt Darwin and Mazowe (national conscription was also mooted), and the opposition continued to be attacked.

A corollary sub-text to the militarisation of politics has been the civilianisation of the ZNA High Command. Many of the highest ranking officers, when nominally retiring from active service, have received a horizontal transfer to directorships of civilian institutions in, for example, the banking sector. Top generals have also been appointed to run the CIO and as executive power brokers of the ZRP, to ensure the 'political reliability' of these organisations. The Third Chimurenga shows no sign of abating.

THE ZDF AND HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS continues to pose a significant debilitating threat to the ZDF. According to the 2003 *Zimbabwe Human Development Report*:

A study in seven countries, including Zimbabwe, found that 75% of soldiers were dying of AIDS within one year of discharge.³⁴

A host of factors explains the high HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in the ZDF, which exceeds the general population infection rate of 24.6%. These include: that the sector thrives on engaging the young and socially

inexperienced who transfer their militaristic fearless and aggressive traits into their private lives, including their sexual interactions; the nature of military operations, involving deployment on missions or for training in remote and poor areas; the attractiveness of military camps as high-income areas to these poor communities, in particular among commercial sex workers; and sexual favours with vendors and traders in return for their free passage at national border controls.

The ZNA component of the ZDF has developed an HIV/AIDS policy that encourages, among other strategies, safe sex, the provision of drugs to treat opportunistic infections, the provision of anti-retroviral drugs, and the opening of voluntary counselling and testing centres.³⁵ In line with this policy the ZNA in December 2004 held its first training seminar for HIV/AIDS peer educators, who would then disseminate awareness, prevention and care education within the army.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

Future challenges facing the ZDF including:

- implementing a coherent and sustainable HIV/AIDS management programme; and
- training military personnel, not only in order to sharpen their professional skills but to prepare them for productive civilian life when they retire from active military service.

CONCLUSION

The history of the ZDF from 1980 to the present follows the history of the country's political events. Emerging from three politically diverse factions, the ZDF project traversed the tortuous route that saw the departure of the former colonial military architects in 1980, and over the next four years nearly degenerated into civil war based on traditional party political, ethnic, regional and linguistic differences. The response to the regional challenge presented by South Africa early in the ZDF's formation, by default contributed to its national character around which the nation rallied to repel the aggressors.

While the structure, equipment and human resource composition of the ZDF was established by 1986, the problem still remained of reducing the force to a manageable level. Furthermore, strained

civil–military relations that appeared from late 2000 and 2002 also need attention if the project is to retain its national character. The tension is manifest in the ZPM and ZNS elements, appendages of the ZDF that seem to find life when there is internal political disharmony, but which are quickly marginalised when this ebbs. For example, the ZPM emerged after confrontations around the 1980 local government elections, while the current ZNS suffers from an equally partisan perception.

The role played by the ZDF in peacekeeping missions, both UN and SADC sponsored, has put Zimbabwe firmly in the Pan Africanist foreign policy camp. Finally, the Zimbabwe Constitution clearly outlines the role of the military in that country. There is also a deep understanding of participation in legal international duties, which makes the country an important player in regional security co-operation and integration.

NOTES

- 1 G Horne, *From the barrel of a gun: The United States and the war against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980*, University of Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2001, p 6.
- 2 When the FLS—comprising Nigeria, Zambia and Tanzania—at the time moved for the UN to censure Rhodesia in a resolution before the UN Security Council, Britain for the first time used its veto powers to thwart the move.
- 3 Actual reunion, following a temporary, externally generated flirtation, as members of the Patriotic Front during the war as demanded by the FLS, only occurred after independence on 22 December 1987.
- 4 Zimbabwe's major liberation movements have the unique history of having initially trained together before the political split occurred.
- 5 J Davidow, *A peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979*, Westview Special Studies on Africa, Westview Press, Boulder, 1984, p 15.
- 6 Ibid, p 14.
- 7 D Martin & P Johnson, *The struggle for Zimbabwe*, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1981, p 70.
- 8 J Nkomo, *The story of my life*, Methuen, London, 1984, p 198. See also PF's opening address at the Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House, London, September–December 1979.
- 9 Davidow, op cit, p 15.
- 10 Auckland and Adam Gourdon, UK; Rex Nhongo and Josiah Tungamirai, ZANLA; Lookout Masuku and Dumiso Dabengwa, ZIPRA; and Slatter and Barnard from the RSF.
- 11 J H B Auckland, The Rhodesian operation, *The Guards Magazine Journal of the Household Division*, Summer, 1980, p 46.
- 12 These were the official designations of the exercises.

- 13 *Debates in Parliament, First Session, First Parliament, 19 August to 19 September 1980*, 17 September 1980, p 964.
- 14 *Debates in Parliament, First Session, First Parliament, 20 January to 18 February 1980*, 17 September 1980, p 1392.
- 15 President's Speech to Parliament, 13 August 1990.
- 16 The balance sheet of independent Zimbabwe, *The Guardian*, UK, 29 August 1980.
- 17 *Debates in Parliament, Statement by the MoD, 13 February 1981*, pp 1923-1926; PM promises firm line on army unrest, *The Chronicle*, 12 February 1981.
- 18 This was the perpetration of the Matebeleland massacres where some 20,000 villagers died in the civil strife.
- 19 See *Breaking the silence: Building true peace: A report on the disturbances in Matebeleland and the Midlands, 1980-89*, Legal Resources Foundation & Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace; *The Justice Chihambakwe Report, 10-14 January 1984*; and *The Justice Enoch Dumutshena Inquiry, 1983*. The findings of the last two, although commissioned by government, have never been released to the public.
- 20 *The Chronicle*, 21 January 1981.
- 21 Similar comments were later expressed by the Prime Minister while addressing the group in Bindura on 7 July 1983; Be alert to enemy threat, *The Chronicle*.
- 22 *Statutory Instrument No. 141 of 1985, Defence (ZPM) (Non-Commissioned Members) (General) Regulations*.
- 23 New jets for Air Force, *The Chronicle*, 27 January 1982.
- 24 *Debates in Parliament, First Session, First Parliament, 14 May to 26 June and 23 July to 15 August 1980*, Vol. 1, 1980, p 403.
- 25 *National Defence Policy*, 1997, p 20.
- 26 *National Defence Policy*, Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Government Printers, Harare, 1997.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Ibid, para 25, p 20.
- 29 There appeared to be a cleansing of likely opposition members in the defence and security forces. However, members affected have taken up their cases in the courts, against the Army Commander, the Police Commissioner and the Prison Service head.
- 30 *The Herald*, 4 February 2005.
- 31 *Zimbabwe Defence Forces Magazine* 7(2), p 12.
- 32 *The Herald*, 4 February 2005.
- 33 *The Herald*, 9 October 1991.
- 34 Zimbabwe's army, prisons hit hard by AIDS, <<http://uniformservices.unaids.org/country/Africa%20and%20the%20Middle%20East/Zimbabwe/Articles/2004-06-14%20Zimbabwe's%20Army%20Hit%20Hard%20By%20AIDS.doc>> (3 March 2005).
- 35 *The Herald*, 15 December 2004.