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Ethnic
Politics in Nigeria: The Realities of Regionalism
By Nicole Lancia
In Africa, colonial administrations and
imperial occupations carved up boundaries that divided territories
inhabited by indigenous societies and brought together a diversity
of ethnic communities within unitary administrative structures.
In Nigeria, between 1914 and 1915, British colonial administrators
created three regional territories that explain ethno-genesis and
later ethnic tensions: the Northern region occupied by Hausa/Fulani,
the Eastern region inhabited by the Ibo, and the Western region
of the Yoruba. Within this divisive colonial structure, ethnic tensions
emerged between these unequally developed groups primarily in the
1950s. The colonial tripartite division of Nigeria prevented a Nigerian
nationalistic movement, manipulating geographical boundaries to
reinforce separation between ethnic groups and transforming ethnicity
into an identity by which to gain political power; this structure
along with other administrative decisions emphasized ethnic nationalism
and regional politics, resulting from significant uneven development
within each region. The colonial division of Nigeria that reinforced
ethnic groups, the rise of ethno-political consciousness, and the
development of ethnic/regional political parties demonstrated that
the British administration intentionally prevented the rise and
success of Nigerian nationalism, instead promoting regionalism as
a means to gain political power.
The hyper-federalism of the Nigerian state by British colonial officials
highlighted ethno-genesis and the tensions between majority and
minority ethnic groups; furthermore, it reinforced ethnic/ regional
boundaries and marginalized minority ethnic groups, encouraging
groups to compete as interest groups vying for political power.
The Nigerian State is composed of various ethnicities, but the existence
of multiple nationalities does not by itself constitute a political
problem; in the process of modernization, the interests of ethnic
groups elevate to the political realm (Ethnicity and the Nigerian
State). In “Ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa,” Welsh
asserts that “the precipitation of ethnic identities becomes
incomprehensible if it is divorced from colonial rule” (479);
similarly, ethnicity is not a “natural cultural residue but
a consciously crafted ideological creation” (480). These two
statements directly apply to colonial Nigeria as they discuss the
relevant connection between colonialism and ethnic or cultural identity,
the former creating and manipulating the latter. British colonial
administrators implemented policies through this tripartite structure
with the intention of producing a Nigerian federation presiding
over three regional governments with legislative power (Cooper 69).
This tripartite division perpetuated ethnic divisions between the
Northern Hausa/Fulani, Eastern Ibo, and Western Yoruba and between
the majority and minority ethnic groups; it strengthened these ethnic
identities as interest groups fighting for political representation
and power. In support of this point, Cooper states that “instead
of allowing a wide-variety of interest groups to make claims on
the Nigerian state, the federal system focused power on the three
regions,” ignoring the concerns of unrepresented minority
ethnic groups (70). The existence of these three politically-dominant
ethnic groups conveyed the contribution of colonialism to ethno-genesis
and its effect on the individual ethnic identities of the various
peoples within Nigeria.
Colonial structures ignored and marginalized minority ethnic groups
within Nigeria, as they were not recognized as one of the three
main peoples. Osaghae states that ethnic minorities are usually
defined in contradistinction to major groups with whom they co-exist
in political systems (3). The terms “majority” and “minority”
evolved only after the creation of the three regions in the 1940s,
which mobilized the main regions to unify and push the minorities
to the periphery (5). This rise of hegemonic nationalism and use
of exclusionary politics by the majority groups inhibited the minorities
from demonstrating political participation beginning in the 1950s.
The majority versus minority conflict as a subset within the larger
ethnic divisions between the Hausa/Fulani, Ibo, and Yoruba indicated
that British colonial administrators desired to exclude certain
ethnic groups from political participation and maintain ethnic tensions
to prevent a rise of Nigerian nationalism.
The growth of ethnic nationalism among the Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa/Fulani
illustrated that Britain’s vision of a Nigerian federation
sparked uneven sociopolitical and economic development in each region
and introduced competitive politics, which preserved ethnic conflicts.
Nigeria emerged in 1914 as a composite political unit and, as a
result, westernizing influences impinged unevenly upon the people
of Nigeria; as Cooper points out, the three regions were not equivalent:
“the north was the most populous, but had the weakest educational
system,” ruled by a Muslim elite; the west was the wealthiest
as the capital city Lagos lay within its borders; the east possessed
the best educated population (69). Coleman describes two manifestations
of regional tension arising from uneven development: the struggle
between the Yoruba and the Ibo and the rivalry between the north
and southern provinces (331).
Because of the early advantages of the Yoruba in “educational
and professional attainments,” the group’s monopoly
over political activity centered in Lagos. Until the 1930s when
the Ibo-led National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC)
emerged, the Yoruba held an overwhelming majority of higher positions
in the African civil service (Coleman 331). Because of the densely
populated, infertile rural area where the Ibo resided, the Ibo expanded
territorially and migrated to urban centers for work. By the end
of World War II, Ibo clerks and laborers constituted a sizable minority
group in every urban center of Nigeria and the Cameroons (Coleman
332). As a consequence of the comparative lack of opportunity in
the east, the Ibo embraced Western education and Christian missions;
by 1945 the educational difference between the Yoruba and the Ibo
had been closed. However, the Ibo strove to assert themselves politically,
which incited Yoruba-Ibo competition and tension. The tensions between
the Muslim north and the Christian south deepened with the north’s
growing recognition of the division. More importantly, rigid structures
in the north produced a delayed movement toward nationalism due
to the prevalence of Islam, the lack of an uprooted Western-educated
class, and the 1922 Clifford and 1946 Richards Constitutions (Coleman
354; Nmoma 315). Since the Muslim community was linked with an authoritarian
political structure, the Muslim elite, or Filanin gida,
were anti-nationalist and opposed to sociopolitical reform. The
most striking feature of the northern situation involved the inactivity
and silence of the Western-educated class, or ma’aikata;
in other areas, this group had been responsible for leading nationalist
activity, but the ma’aikata were recruited into the
native administrations and thus, did not experience the abuse and
prejudice characteristic of some European officials in the African
civil service (355). Furthermore, the Hausa/Fulani never developed
a revolutionary mindset against inequality; from the lack of exposure
to abusive behavior and unequal treatment, they became “accommodationist
rather than revolutionary,” delaying any rise of nationalism
in the north (357).
The fact that Nigeria had not one but two constitutions also exacerbated
ethnic conflict. The Clifford Constitution (1922) created a legislative
council, from which the north was excluded, with the first-ever
African elected members in British Africa. From 1922-1939, the British
did not involve Northern Nigeria in political affairs, which enabled
Southern Nigeria to become, for a temporary period, more politically
advanced (Nmoma 315). The Richards Constitution (1946) stated the
Nigeria must allow for “unity in diversity” within separate
regions and legislatures; this separation of powers served to prevent
single ethnic group domination and present territorial politics
as the only viable option for political advancement, with each region
united by a history of advantages and disadvantages.
As ethnic consciousness resulting from colonialism motivated the
majority ethnic groups to develop regional political parties which
stimulated inter-ethnic tensions, ethnic politics inevitably became
the main deterrent to Nigerian nationalism. In each region, a party
dominated by members of the majority ethnic group obtained office
and provided services and patronage for the group (Cooper 69). The
Hausa/Fulani led the Northern Political Congress (NPC) and the Northern
Elements’ Progressive Union (NEPU); in the east, the Ibo formed
the NCNC, a party for Nigerian unity; the Yoruba developed the Action
Group (AG), a regional political party dedicated to strengthening
ethnic organizations in the west and cooperating with other organizations
for self-government for Nigeria (Coleman 364; Cooper 69). The NPC,
formed in the 1950s, desired to designate power to a conservative
coalition of young educated elements and moderate elements (360).
Its motto became “one north, one people,” which illustrated
its regional objective. NEPU, on the other hand, rejected the notion
of regional separation and assumed the reputation as the “radical
wing” of northern politics (Coleman 364). The NPC ultimately
won the northern 1951 elections since the unifying element among
northerners was common opposition to the NEPU due to its working
alliance with the NCNC, the symbol of potential southern domination
(Coleman 359).
The NCNC based its foundation on anti-British nationalism and its
powerful urge for self-transformation motivated it to initiate Nigerian
nationalism. Coleman states that poor soil and overpopulation were
also factors in Ibo gravitation toward a Pan-Nigerian objective;
the wide dispersion of clerks and laborers fostered among the Ibo
a consciousness of the potentialities of Nigerian unity and the
strength of unification around nationality (338). After the formation
of organizations such as the Egba Society (1918) and the Yoruba
Language Society (1942), the Yoruba created the Action Group (1951)
whose goals included: “encouragement of all ethnical organizations
in the Western Region” and “cooperation with all other
nationalists…as a united team toward the realization of self-government
for Nigeria” (Coleman 350). The Action Group leaders demonstrated
that the only avenue to power, given the situation within Nigeria
at that time, was a regional political party who opposed the threat
of Ibo domination (350). In response, the NCNC employed tribalism
among the non-Yoruba to undermine the predominantly Yoruba Action
Group, however, “the victory of the Action Group over the
NCNC in the 1951 elections in the west was the triumph of regional
nationalism” (351). It is clear that while organizations such
as NEPU and NCNC aimed at Pan-Nigerian unity, the success of the
AG and NPC exemplified the inevitable necessity for regional politics
as the ultimate structure of government in Nigeria.
Examining the impact of the British tripartite division of Nigeria,
from ethno-genesis to its effects on uneven development to the failure
of Nigerian nationalism and success of regionalism, illustrates
that within such a diverse nation-state, regionalism was intended,
supported, and necessary in order to advance politically and socially.
Due to ethnic and regional tensions resulting from uneven socioeconomic
development in the Hausa/Fulani north, Ibo east, and Yoruba west,
ethnic consciousness influenced the formation of regional political
parties and was the main deterrent to Nigerian unity. Hyper-federalism
in diverse Nigeria cut across territorial and ethnic boundaries
only to allow the majority ethnic group of each region to dominate
and minority groups to become marginalized, excluded from the political
realm. Most importantly, British colonialism shaped the way the
ethnic groups developed and acted upon their ethnic consciousness;
each region employed ethnic politics, idealistically striving for
Nigerian unity while realistically forming regional political parties:
a successful means to gaining political control over a situation
imposed on them as well as paving a path toward success
in a system determined for them.
Works Cited:
Coleman, James S. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Berkley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960.
Cooper, Frederick. Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
“Ethnicity and the Nigerian State.” 05 April 2005. http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com.
Glickman, Harvey. “Issues in the Analysis of Ethnic Conflict
and Democratization Processes in Africa Today” in Ethnic
Conflict and Democratization in Africa. Ed. Harvey Glickman.
Atlanta: African Studies Association Press, 1995.
Nmoma, Veronica. “Ethnic Conflict, Constitutional Engineering
and Democracy in Nigeria” in Ethnic Conflict and Democratization
in Africa. Ed. Harvey Glickman. Atlanta: African Studies Association
Press, 1995. 311-316.
Osaghae, Eghosa E. “Managing Multiple Minority Problems in
a Divided Society: the Nigerian Experience” in The Journal
of Modern African Studies, vol. 36, no.1, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998.
Welsh, David. “Ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa” in International
Affairs, vol. 72, no.3, 1996.
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