ROBERT D. TOLLISON

Biographical Data:

Born 1942, Spartanburg, South Carolina

Education:

Wofford College, B.A. 1964

University of Alabama, M.A. 1965

University of Virginia, Ph.D. 1969

Career Data:

Woodrow Wilson Fellow, Economics, University of Alabama 1964-65

Instructor of Economics 1965‑66

Longwood College

National Science Foundation Fellow, Economics, University of Virginia 1966-69

Assistant Professor of Economics 1969‑73

Graduate School of Business and Public Administration

Cornell University

Senior Staff Economist 1972‑73

Council of Economic Advisers

Associate Professor of Economics 1973‑74

Professor and Department Head 1974‑77

Texas A&M University

Visiting Professor 1976-77

Law and Economics Center

University of Miami Law School

Professor of Economics and Executive Director 1977‑81

Center for Study of Public Choice

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Acting Director, Office of Policy Planning 1981‑82

Federal Trade Commission

Director, Bureau of Economics 1981‑83

Federal Trade Commission

Abney Professor of Economics 1983‑84

Clemson University

Professor of Economics and Director 1984-88

Center for Study of Public Choice

George Mason University

Duncan Black Professor of Economics and General Director 1988-98

Center for Study of Public Choice

George Mason University

Robert M. Hearin Professor of Economics 1998-

University of Mississippi

Visiting Professor 1989

Department of Economics

Arizona State University

Visiting Professor 1989-90

Policy Sciences Program

Florida State University

Bradley Visiting Professor 1994

Economics Department

Clemson University

Adjunct Research Associate 1999-

Center for Study of Public Choice

George Mason University

Kirby Distinquished Visiting Professor 2001

Private Enterprise Research Center

Texas A&M University

Professional Affiliations and Awards:

Member: Southern Economic Association

Public Choice Society

Phi Beta Kappa

Pi Gamma Mu

Associate Economics Editor, Public Policy 1971‑72

Board of Editors, Public Finance Quarterly 1975‑81

Book Review Editor, Public Choice 1978-82

Executive Committee, Southern Economic Association 1979-81

President‑Elect Reagan's Task Force on the Environment 1980

President‑Elect Reagan's Task Force on the Federal Trade Commission 1980

Research Advisory Committee, Center for Study of 1980‑86

Government Regulation, American Enterprise Institute

Teaching Excellence Award, Virginia Polytechnic 1981

Institute and State University

National Advisory Board, Center for Education and 1982‑86

Research in Free Enterprise, Texas A&M University

1984-85

President‑Elect and President, Southern Economic Association

Executive Committee, Southern Economic Association 1984-88 -

Distinguished Faculty Award, George Mason University 1986

Board of Advisors, The Independent Institute 1986-

Board of Directors, Citizens for a Sound Economy 1986‑00

Academic Advisory Committee, Institute for 1987-90

Research on the Economics of Taxation

Academic Advisory Board, FUNDEMOS, La Paz, Bolivia 1988‑90

Economic Policy Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce 1988‑89

Board of Directors, Center for Study of Market Processes 1989‑94

Editorial Board, Constitutional Political Economy 1988‑

Editor, Public Choice 1990‑

International Committee for the Study of Art Economics 1991‑94

and Cultural Goods, University of Venice

Virginia Social Science Association Scholar Award in Economics 1991‑92

President, Public Choice Society 1994‑96

Board of Editors, Economic Series, Texas A&M University Press 1995‑

Special Director, Japanese Public Choice Society 1996‑

Board of Directors and Adjunct Scholar, Progress and Freedom Foundation 1997-2000

Editorial Board, Journal of Sports Economics 1999-

Researcher of the Year, School of Business, University of Mississippi 2000

Advisory Board for the Encyclopedia of Public Choice 2000-

Researcher of the Year, Department of Economics, University of Mississippi 2001

Researcher of the Year, School of Business, University of Mississippi 2001

Best Paper of the Year, School of Business, University of Mississippi 2002

Consulting Affiliations:

Aero‑Go, Inc., Amber Air International, Ltd., American Association of Blood Banks, American Health Advisors, Inc., American Service Corporation, Anheuser‑Busch, Inc., Ashland Oil and Chemical Co., Central Auto Radiator, Inc., Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Coca‑Cola Bottling Company of Ogden, Inc., Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld, and Toll, Columbia Hospital System, Cotkin and Collins, Cellular Systems Supply, Inc., Comdata, Inc., Dentsply International, Inc., Digital Development Corporation, Dougherty Oil and Stone, Inc., Durango Coca‑Cola Bottling Co., Dyno Nobel Inc., Easton Sports, Inc., ESPN, Exxon, Inc., Farm Fresh, Inc., Federal Trade Commission, Florida State University, Gas Appliance Manufacturers' Association, G. Heileman Brewing Co., General Cinema, Inc., General Mills, Inc., Heatherstone Development, Inc., H.J. Heinz, Inc., Keller Rohrback, Kilgore and Kilgore, L'Air Liquide, Inc., Lawton and Cates, Marine Matrix NW, Inc., Markovits and Grieve, Marva Maid, McCrory Corporation, McWane, Inc., Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, and Lerach, Morrison and Hecker, National Basketball Association, National Beer Wholesalers' Association, National Football League, National Selected Morticians, Neal and Harwell, Nestle's, Inc., North American Rockwell, Inc., PepsiCo, Inc., Philip Morris, Inc., PRC Realty Systems, Inc., Raytheon, Inc., Schering Corporation, Siemens, Inc., Society of Manufacturing Engineers, Tobacco Institute, U.S. Banknote Company, U.S. Council on Wage and Price Stability, U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, University of Southern California, Virginia Commonwealth University, and Volvo Penta of the Americas, Inc.

Presentations:

American Association of Law Schools, American Bar Association (Antitrust Section, conference), American Economic Association (various), American Enterprise Institute (various), American Political Science Association (various), Appalachian State University, Arizona State University, Association of Private Enterprise Education, Atlantic Economic Association, Auburn University, Australian National University, British‑American Tobacco Company (conference), Carleton College, Carnegie‑Mellon University (conference), Catholic University (La Paz, Bolivia), CATO Institute (conference), Center for Independent Studies (Sydney, Australia), Claremont College (conference), Clemson University, College of William and Mary, Cornell University, Duke University, Eastern Economic Association, Emory University (Law School), Federal Trade Commission, Federalist Society (panel), Florida State University, General Motors Corporation, George Mason University (various), George Washington University, Gettysburg College, Heritage Foundation (conference), Hoover Institution (conference), Independent Institute (conference), Indiana University, International Institute of Management (Berlin), International Tobacco Information Center (conference), Kent State University, Liberty Fund (various), Longwood College, Mid‑South Academy of Economics and Finance, Middlebury College (conference), Missouri Valley Economic Association, National Economists Club, New York Academy of Sciences (conference), Oklahoma State University, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association, Philip Morris Corporation, Potomac Foundation, Progress and Freedom Foundation (conference), Public Choice Society (various), Purdue University, Saint Vincent College, Shawnee State University, Solomon Brothers, Southern Economic Association (various), Southwestern Social Science Association, Stanford University, State University of New York at Binghamton, Texas A&M University, Tax Foundation (conference), Tobacco Institute (conference), University of Alabama, University of Arizona (conference), University of California at Berkeley (Law School), University of California at Los Angeles, University of Chicago, University of Cincinnati, University of Connecticut, University of Dallas, University of Georgia, University of Houston, University of Kansas (Economics Institute for State Judges), University of Kentucky, University of Maryland, University of Miami (Law School), University of Michigan (Business School), University of Mississippi, University of Oklahoma, University of Pennsylvania, University of Rochester, University of Rome, University of Saarbrucken (conference), University of Texas, University of Utah, University of Western Ontario, University of Venice, University of Virginia, U.S. Department of Commerce (Census Bureau, National Bureau of Standards, conference), U.S. Department of Justice (Antitrust Division), U.S. Department of the Treasury (OASIA Research, conference), U.S. House of Representatives (various), U.S. Senate (various), Vanderbilt University, Virginia Association of Economists (Sandrige Lecture), Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Wabash College, Wayne State University, Western Economic Association, Wofford College, and the World Bank.

Publications:

Books:

Balanced Budgets, Fiscal Responsibility, and the Constitution (with R. Wagner) (San Francisco, CA: The CATO Institute, 1980).

Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy: An Inquiry into the Interest‑Group Theory of Government (with R. McCormick) (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).

Balanced Budgets, Fiscal Responsibility, and the Constitution (with R.Wagner, A. Rabushka, and J. Noonan) (Washington, D.C.: The CATO Institute, 1982).

Mercantilism as a Rent‑Seeking Society (with R. Ekelund) (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1982).

El Analisis Economico De Lo Politico (with James M. Buchanan and R.E. McCormick) (Madrid, Spain: Instituto de Estudios Economicos, 1984).

Smoking and the State (with R. Wagner) (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1988).

Concentration and Competition: The Economics of the Carbonated Soft Drink Industry (with D. Kaplan and R. Higgins) (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1990).

The Economics of Smoking: Getting It Right (with R. Wagner) (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).

The National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Study in Cartel Behavior (with A. Fleisher and B. Goff) (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm (with R. Ekelund, R. Hebert, G. Anderson, and A. Davis) (London, England: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Politized Economies: Monarchy, Monopolies, and Mercantilism (with R. Ekelund) (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1997).

Pamphlets:

The Economics of the Military Draft (with R. Amacher, J. Miller, M. Pauly, and T. Willett) (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1973).

Graduate Students in Virginia Political Economy: 1957‑1991, Occasional Paper on Virginia Political Economy, Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University (1991),1‑22.

Visitors to the Center for Study of Public Choice: 1957‑1992, Occasional Paper on Virginia Political Economy, Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University (1992), 1‑10.

WHO: No Rx for a Healthier World (with R. Wagner), The Social Affairs Unit, Research Report 18, 1993.

Externalities and Internalities, Economic Directions, Alex McKenna Economic Education Series, Saint Vincent College, Latrobe, PA, Volume 5, Number 2, January 1995.

Economics and the Medieval Church, Virginia Political Economy Lecture, James M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, George Mason University, 2001.

Edited Collections:

Theory of Public Choice: Political Applications of Economics (edited with James M. Buchanan) (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1972).

The Economic Approach to Public Policy: Selected Readings (edited with R. Amacher and T. Willett) (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976).

What Should Economist Do? by James M. Buchanan (compiled and edited with G. Brennan)(Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1979).

The Political Economy of Antitrust (editor) (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1980).

Towards a Theory of the Rent‑Seeking Society (edited with James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock) (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980).

Theory of Public Choice‑II (edited with James M. Buchanan) (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1984).

Smoking and Society: Toward a Balanced Assessment (Editor) (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1986) (Japanese translation, 1987).

Deficits (edited with James M. Buchanan and Charles Rowley) (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1987) (Japanese translation, 1990).

Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy by James M. Buchanan (compiled and edited with V. Vanberg)(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1987).

Clearing the Air: Perspectives on Environmental Tobacco Smoke (Editor) (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1988) (Spanish translation, 1989).

The Political Economy of Rent Seeking (edited with C. Rowley and G. Tullock) (Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1988).

Explorations into Constitutional Economics by James M. Buchanan (compiled and edited with V. Vanberg)(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1989).

Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Public Choice (edited with M. Crain) (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990).

Sportometrics (edited with B. Goff) (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990).

The Next Twenty‑Five Years of Public Choice (edited with C. Rowley and F. Schneider) (Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1993).

On the Trail of Homo Economicus by Gordon Tullock (compiled and edited with G. Brady)(Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1994).

The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking (edited with R. Congleton) (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1995) ( Japnanese translation, 2002).

Thirty Year Index: 1966‑1995 (edited with C. Rowley), Public Choice (September 1995), iii‑387.

The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan (compiled and edited with G. Brennan and H. Kliemt) (20 volumes) (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1999-2002).

Electronic Festschrift for James M. Buchanan (edited with G. Brennan and H. Kliemt), http://www.uni-duisburg.de/FB1/PHILO/Buchanan, October 1999.

Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics: Essays in Honor of James M. Buchanan (edited with G. Brennan and H. Kliemt) ( Berlin, Germany: Springer- Verlag, 2002).

The Economics of Budget Deficits (edited with W. Shughart and C. Rowley) (London, England: Elgar, forthcoming).

Textbooks:

Economics (with R. Ekelund) (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1986).

Microeconomics (with R. Ekelund) (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1986).

Macroeconomics (with R. Ekelund) (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1986).

Economics (with R. Ekelund) (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, Second Edition, 1988).

Microeconomics (with R. Ekelund) (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, Second Edition, 1988).

Macroeconomics (with R. Ekelund) (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman and Company, Second Edition, 1988).

Economics (with R. Ekelund) (New York, NY: Harper Collins, Third Edition, 1990).

Microeconomics (with R. Ekelund) (New York, NY: Harper Collins, Third Edition, 1990).

Macroeconomics (with R. Ekelund) (New York, NY: Harper Collins, Third Edition, 1990).

Economics (with R. Ekelund) (New York, NY: Harper Collins, Fourth Edition, 1994).

Microeconomics (with R. Ekelund) (New York, NY: Harper Collins, Fourth Edition, 1994).

Macroeconomics (with R. Ekelund) (New York, NY: Harper Collins, Fourth Edition, 1994).

Economics: Private Markets and Public Choice (with R. Ekelund) (Boston, MA: Addison‑Wesley, Fifth Edition, 1996).

Microeconomics: Private Markets and Public Choice (with R. Ekelund) Boston, MA: Addison‑Wesley, Fifth Edition, 1996).

Macroeconomics: Private Markets and Public Choice (with R. Ekelund) (Boston, MA: Addison‑Wesley, Fifth Edition, 1996).

Economics: Private Markets and Public Choice (with R. Ekelund) (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, Sixth Edition, 2000).

Microeconomics: Private Markets and Public Choice (with R. Ekelund) (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, Sixth Edition, 2000).

Macroeconomics: Private Markets and Public Choice (with R. Ekelund) (Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, Sixth Edition, 2000).

Papers in Books:

“Racial Balance and the Volunteer Army,” in J.C. Miller III (ed.), Why the Draft? The Case for the Volunteer Army (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1968),149‑165.

“An Army of Mercenaries?,” in J.C. Miller III (ed.), Why the Draft? The Case for the Volunteer Army (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1968),159‑165.

“Involved Social Analysis,” in J.M. Buchanan and R.D. Tollison (eds.), The Theory of Public Choice (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 3‑7.

“A Normative Theory of Representative Democracy” (with D. Mueller and T.D. Willett), in L. Papayanopoulos (ed.), Democratic Representation and Appointment: Quantitative Methods, Measures, and Criteria, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 219, November 1973, 5‑19.

“Economic Objections to the Present Approach to Public Policy Toward Surface Freight Transportation,” in J.C. Miller III (ed.), Perspectives on Federal Transportation Policy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), 444‑473.

“An Economist Looks at the Patent System,” in F. Essers and J. Rabinow (eds.), The Public Need and the Role of the Inventor, Office of Invention and Innovation, National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, May 1975,11‑15.

“Solving the Intensity Problem in Representative Democracy” (with D. Mueller and T.D. Willett), in R.D. Leiter and G. Sirkin (eds.), Economics of Public Choice (New York: Cyro Press, 1975), 54‑94.

“Risk Avoidance and Political Advertising: A Neglected Issue in the Literature on Budget Size in a Democracy” (with R. Amacher and T. Willett), in Amacher, Tollison, and Willett (eds.), The Economic Approach to Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 405‑433.

“A Menu of Distributional Considerations” (with R. Amacher and T. Willett), in Amacher, Tollison, and Willett (eds.) The Economic Approach to Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 246‑275.

“The Economic Approach to Social Policy Questions: Some Methodological Perspectives” (with R. Amacher and T. Willett), in Amacher, Tollison, and Willett (eds.), The Economic Approach to Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976),18‑37.

“Institutional Mechanisms for Dealing with International Externalities: A Public Choice Perspective on the Law of the Sea” (with T. Willett), in R. Sweeney and R. Amacher (eds.), The Law of the Sea: U.S. Interests and Alternatives (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976), 77‑101.

“The Impact of the Smithsonian and February 1973 Devaluation on Imports: A Case Study of Steel: Comment,” in P.B. Clark, D.E. Logue, R.J. Sweeney (eds.), The Effects of Exchange Rate Adjustments (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Treasury, 1977), 435‑436.

“Do Corporations Set Prices Arbitrarily High?,” in M. Bruce Johnson (ed.), Corporate Issues Sourcebook (New York, NY: McGraw‑Hill, 1978),178‑181.

“Is Industrial Concentration the Cause of Inflation?,” in M. Bruce Johnson (ed.) Corporate Issues Sourcebook (New York, NY: McGraw‑Hill, 1978),194‑197.

“Can Corporations Limit New Entry?,” in M. Bruce Johnson (ed.), Corporate Issues Sourcebook (New York, NY: McGraw‑Hill, 1978), 211‑214.

“Does Antitrust Activity Increase Economic Welfare?,” in M. Bruce Johnson (ed.), Corporate Issues Sourcebook (New York, NY: McGraw‑Hill, 1978), 294‑298.

“The Prospect for Liberal Democracy: Comment,” in J. Buchanan and R. Wagner (eds.), Fiscal Responsibility and Constitutional Democracy (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978),177‑180.

“Analyzing International Externalities: The Case of the Law of the Sea Negotiations” (with R. Amacher), in William Loehr and Todd Sandler (eds.), Public Goods and Public Policy (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1978), 191‑205.

“The Divergence Between International Trade Theory and Practice: A Public Choice Interpretation” (with R. Amacher and T. Willett), Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism (San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1979), 55‑66.

“Foreign Investment and the Multinational Corporation: Should the Government Keep American Capital at

Home?” (with T. Willett), Tariffs, Quotas, and Trade: The Politics of Protectionism (San Francisco, CA: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1979),109‑121.

“Toward a Theory of Government Advertising” (with K. Clarkson), in Richard Zerbe (ed.), Research in Law and Economics (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1979),131‑143.

“Preface” (with G. Brennan), in Brennan and Tollison (eds.) What Should Economists Do? by James M. Buchanan (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1979), 9‑11.

“Countervailing Policies Against Foreign Use of Monopoly Power: Comment,” in Ryan Amacher, Gottfried Haberler, and Thomas Willett, (eds.), Challenges to a Liberal International Economic Order (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), 353‑357.

“Mercantilism as a Rent‑Seeking Society” (with B. Baysinger and R. Ekelund), in Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (eds.), Towards a Theory of the Rent‑Seeking Society (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), 233‑267.

“Wealth Transfers in a Representative Democracy: Theory and Evidence” (with R. McCormick), in Buchanan Tollison, and Tullock (eds.), Towards a Theory of the Rent‑Seeking Society (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), 293‑313.

“Rent Seeking in Academia” (with G. Brennan), in Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock (eds.), Towards a Theory of the Rent‑Seeking Society (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1980), 344‑356.

“Introduction,” in Analysis of Consumer Policy (Philadelphia, PA: Wharton Applied Research Center, 1981), 1‑4.

“Power, Politics, and Prosperity: Alternative Views of Economic Interdependence” (with T. Willett), in The Internationalization of the American Economy, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 460 (March 1982), 21‑28.

“The All‑Volunteer Military: Viewpoints, Issues, and Prospects: Comment,” in M. Anderson (ed.), Registration and the Draft (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1982), 28‑31.

''Difficulties Facing Regulatory Reform: Comment,” in W.C. Stubblebine and T.D. Willett (eds.), Reaganomics: A Midterm Report (San Francisco, CA: ICS Press, 1983),174‑176.

“The Economic Constitution in Historical Perspective: Comment,” in Richard B. McKenzie (ed.), Constitutional Economics: Containing the Economic Powers of Government (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1984), 55‑60.

“Public Choice: 1972‑1982,” in J.M. Buchanan and R.D. Tollison (eds.), Theory of Public Choice II (Ann Arbor MI: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 3‑8.

“A Rent‑Seeking Theory of French Mercantilism” (with R. Ekelund), in Buchanan and Tollison (eds.), Theory of Public Choice‑II (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 206‑223.

“A Rent‑Seeking Interpretation of the British Factory Acts” (with G. Anderson), in David Colander (ed.), Neoclassical Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984),187‑201.

“Preface,” in R. Rogowsky and B. Yandle (eds.), The Political Economy of Regulation: Private Interests in the Regulatory Process (Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission, March 1984),1‑2.

“Smoking: Toward a More Balanced Assessment,” in R.D. Tollison (ed.), Smoking and Society: Toward a More Balanced Assessment (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1986), 3‑14.

“Concluding Remarks,” in R.D. Tollison (ed.), Smoking and Society: Toward a More Balanced Assessment (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1986), 343-345.

“Smokers Versus Non‑Smokers” (with W. Shughart), in R.D. Tollison (ed.), Smoking and Society: Toward a More Balanced Assessment (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1986), 217‑224.

“Commentary,” in S.M. Butler and William J. Dennis, Jr. (eds.), Entrepreneurship (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1986), 57‑60.

“Government by Red Ink” (with J. Buchanan and C. Rowley), in J. Buchanan, C. Rowley, and R. Tollison (eds.) Deficits (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 3‑8.

“Balanced Budgets and Beyond” (with R. Wagner), in J. Buchanan, C. Rowley, and R. Tollison (eds.), Deficits (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 374‑390.

“The Vote Motive and the Deficit: A Contingent Liability Approach” (with W. Shughart), in Buchanan, Rowley, and Tollison (eds.), Deficits (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 218‑235.

“Interest Groups and the Deficit” (with C.Rowley and W.Shughart), in Buchanan, Rowley, and Tollison (eds.),

Deficits (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 263‑280.

“Introduction,” in James C. Miller III, Spending and Deficits (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1987),1‑2.

“Preface” (with V. Vanberg), in Tollison and Vanberg (eds.), Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy by James M. Buchanan (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), ix‑xii.

“Dual Antitrust Enforcement” (with R. Higgins and W. Shughart), in R. Mackay, J. Miller, and B. Yandle (eds.), Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1987),154‑180.

“Antitrust Recidivism in Federal Trade Commission Data: 1914‑1982" (with W. Shughart), in Mackay, Miller and Yandle (eds.), Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1987), 255‑280.

“Is the Theory of Rent Seeking Here to Stay?,” in C. Rowley (ed.), Public Choice and Liberty (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1987),143‑157.

“Life among the Triangles and Trapezoids” (with R. Higgins), in C.K. Rowley, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Boston, MA: Kluwer‑Nijhoff, 1988),147‑157.

“Voters as Investors: A Rent‑Seeking Resolution of the Paradox of Voting” (with M. Crain and W. Shughart), in C.K. Rowley, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Boston, MA: Kluwer‑Nijhoff, 1988), 241‑249.

“Optimal Taxation in a Rent‑Seeking Environment” (with D. Lee), in C.K. Rowley, R.D. Tollison and G. Tullock (eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Boston, MA: Kluwer‑Nijhoff, 1988), 339‑350.

“Preface” (with V. Vanberg), in Tollison and Vanberg (eds.), Explorations into Constitutional Economics by James M. Buchanan (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), vii‑x.

“Empirical Public Choice” (with M. Crain), in M. Crain and R. Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 3‑13.

“Pork Barrel Paradox” (with M. Crain and D. Leavens), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 59‑78.

“Behind the Veil: The Political Economy of Constitutional Change” (with G. Anderson, D. Martin, and W. Shughart), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 89‑100.

“An Economic Theory of Redistricting” (with M. Crain and M. Davis), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 183‑196.

“The Political Economy of Merger between Regulated Firms” (with R. Higgins and W. Shughart), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI University of Michigan Press, 1990), 211‑228.

“Expressive versus Economic Voting” (with R. Faith), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 231‑244.

“Constitutional Constraints and the Size of the Legislature” (with G. Anderson), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 271‑284.

“Democracy in the Marketplace” (with G. Anderson), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 285‑303.

“Sports As Economics” (with B. Goff), in B. Goff and R. Tollison (eds.), Sportometrics (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 3‑11.

“Economics at the Track” (with R. Higgins), in Goff and Tollison (eds.), Sportometrics (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990),15‑34.

“Homo Basketballus” (with B. Goff and W. Shughart), in Goff and Tollison (eds.), Sportometrics (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990),121‑131.

“Voting on Academic Requirements in the NCAA: Public or Private Interest?” (with A. Fleisher and B. Goff), in Goff and Tollison (eds.), Sportometrics (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 173-178.

“Proposals for Future Research” (with B. Goff), in Goff and Tollison (eds.), Sportometrics (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 311‑313.

“Rent Seeking and Tax Earmarking” (with D. Lee), in R.E. Wagner (ed.), Charging Beneficiaries for Public Services: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and Practice (London, England: Routledge, 1991), 125‑140.

“Tax Earmarking and the Optimal Lobbying Strategy” (with M. Kimenyi and D. Lee), in R.E. Wagner (ed.) Charging Beneficiaries for Public Services: User Charges and Earmarked Taxes in Principle and Practice (London, England: Routledge, 1991),141‑151.

“Regulation and Interest Groups,” in J. High (ed.), Regulation: Theory and History (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 59‑76. Japanese translation in Public Choice Studies (Autumn 1993),1‑14.

“The Rationality of Crime in a Basketball Economy” (with B. Goff), in G. Scully (ed.), Advances in the Economics of Sports (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1992), 37‑52.

“Sportometrics,” in D. Henderson (ed.), Fortune Encyclopedia of Economics (New York: Time, Inc., 1993), 713-715.

“The Next Twenty‑Five Years of Public Choice” (with C. Rowley and F. Schneider), in Rowley, Schneider, and Tollison (eds.), The Next 25 Years of Public Choice (Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1993), 1‑7.

“Gordon Tullock: Creative Maverick of Public Choice” (with G. Brady), in Brady and Tollison (eds.), On the Trail of Homo Economicus: Essays by Gordon Tullock (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1994), 16.

“Creative Contributions to Knowledge” (with G. Brady), in Brady and Tollison (eds.), On the Trail of Homo Economicus: Essays by Gordon Tullock (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1994), 7‑14.

“Archival Memorandum” (with G. Brady), in Brady and Tollison (eds.), On the Trail of Homo Economicus: Essays by Gordon Tullock (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1994), 215‑243.

“Antitrust Enforcement and Foreign Competition” (with W. Shughart and J. Silverman), in F. McChesney and W. Shughart (eds.), The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995),179‑187.

“Interest Groups and the Clayton Act” (with R. Ekelund and M. McDonald), in F. McChesney and W. Shughart (eds.), The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 271‑286.

“Introduction” (with R. Congleton), in Tollison and Congleton (eds.), The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1995), xi‑xix.

“Introduction” (with C. Rowley and F. Schneider), Thirty‑Year Index: 1966‑1995, Public Choice, (September 1995), iii‑iv.

“The Economic Analysis of Political Activity,” in J. Brauer, R. Friesen, and E. Tower (eds.), Public Economics III: Public Choice, Political Economy, Peace and War, Economics Reading Lists, Course Outlines, Exams, Puzzles and Problems (Durham, NC: Eno River Press, 1995), 132-136.

“Institutional Alternatives for the Regulation of Drugs and Medical Devices,” in Advancing Medical Innovation: Health, Safety, and the Role of Government in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Progress and Freedom Foundation, 1996), 17‑40.

“Rent Seeking,” in D. Mueller (ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 506‑525.

“Comment,” in J.D. Foster (ed.), Tax Reform and Excise Tax Policy Fundamentals (Washington, D.C.: Tax Foundation, 1997), 48‑49.

“Breakfast at the Federal Trade Commission” (with E. Reed and W. Shughart), in F. McChesney (ed.), Economic Inputs, Legal Outputs: The Role of Economists in Modern Antitrust (Chichester, England: Wiley, 1998), 85-92.

“Rent Seeking, Institutions, and Economic Growth” (with S. Kimenyi), in M.S. Kimenyi and J.M. Mbaku (eds.), Institutions and Collective Choice in Developing Countries: Applications of the Theory of Public Choice (Brookfield, VT: Avebury Press, 1999), 199-222.

“The Theory of Rent Seeking,” in P. Newman (ed.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law: Volume 3 (London, England: Macmillan Press, 1999), 315-322.

“A Creative Theorist in His Workshop: James M. Buchanan as a Positive Economist” ( with W. Shughart), in G. Brennan, H. Kliemt, and R.Tollison( eds,), Electronic Festschrift for James M. Buchanan, http://www.uni-duisburg.de/FB1/PHILO/Buchanan , October 1999. Also in Brennan, Kliemt, and Tollison (eds.), Method and Morals in Constitutional Economics: Essays in Honor of James M. Buchanan ( Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 2002), 66-77.

“The Rent-Seeking Insight,” in P. Fishback, G. Libecap, E. Zajac (eds.), Essays in Honor of a Maverick Scholar: Gordon Tullock ( Boston, MA: Kluwer, 2000), 13-28.

“The Interest Group Theory of Government” (with R. Ekelund), in William F. Shughart II and Laura Razzolini (eds.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice (London, England: Edward Elgar, 2001), 357-378.

“Club Goods: The Middle Ground between Private Goods and Public Goods” (with G. Anderson and W. Shughart), in William F. Shughart II and Laura Razzolini (eds.), The Elgar Comparion to Public Choice (London, England: Edward Elgar, 2001), 337-353.

“Foreward” (with G. Brennan and H. Kliemt), in Brennan, Kliemt, and Tollison (eds.), The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1999), xi-xxiv.

“Foreward,” in Brennan, Kliemt, and Tollison (eds.), The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (with Gordon Tullock) (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1999), ix-xi.

“Foreward,” in Brennan, Kliemt, and Tollison (eds.), The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 8: Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes (with Richard E. Wagner) (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2000), xi-xiii.

“Foreward,” in Brennan, Kliemt, and Tollison (eds.), The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 10: The Reason of Rules: Constitutional Political Economy (with Geoffrey Brennan) (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2000), xi-xii.

“Foreward,” in Brennan, Kliemt, and Tollison (eds.), The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2000), xi-xii.

“Foreward,” in Brennan, Kliemt, and Tollison (eds.), The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2000), xi-xiii.

“Foreward,” in Brennan, Kliemt, and Tollison (eds.), The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 16: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2001), xi-xiii.

“ Preface,” in G. Brennan, H. Kliemt, and R. Tollison(eds.), Methods and Morals in Constitutional Economics: Essays in Honor of James M. Buchanan ( Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 2002), v-vi.

“ Public Choice from the Perspective of Economics,” in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice ( Boston, MA: Kluwer, forthcoming).

“ Rent Seeking,” in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice ( Boston, MA: Kluwer, forthcoming).

“Economic Regulation,” in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice ( Boston, MA: Kluwer, forthcoming).

“Chicago Political Economy,” in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice ( Boston, MA: Kluwer, forthcoming.

“Homo Economicus,” in C.Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice ( Boston,MA: Kluwer,forthcoming).

“Voting in Presidential Elections,” in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice (Boston., MA: Kluwer, forthcoming).

“Legislators,” in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice ( Boston,MA: Kluwer, forthcoming).

“The Economic Theory of Clubs” ( with G. Anderson and W. Shughart), in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice ( Boston,MA: forthcoming).

“James M. Buchanan,” in C. Rowley and F. Schneider (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Public Choice ( Boston, MA: Kluwer, forthcoming).

“ The Economics of Budget Deficits” (with C. Rowley and W. Shughart), in C.Rowley, W. Shughart, and R.Tollison( eds.), The Economics of Budget Deficits ( London, England: Elgar, forthcoming).

Main Papers:

“The Political Economy of the Military Draft,” Public Choice (Fall 1970), 67‑78.

“Monopoly Rent Capitalization and Antitrust Policy” (with Harold Bierman, Jr.), Western Economic Journal (December 1970), 385‑389.

“The Implicit Tax on Reluctant Military Recruits (with James C. Miller III), Social Science Quarterly (March 1971),924‑931.

“Public Policy Toward Oligopoly” (with Roger Sherman), Antitrust Law and Economics Review (Summer 1971), 77‑90.

“Advertising and Profitability” (with Roger Sherman), Review of Economics and Statistics (November 1971), 397‑407.

“Representative Democracy Via Random Selection” (with Dennis Mueller and Thomas D. Willett), Public Choice (Spring 1972), 59‑68.

''Profit Risk, Technology, and Assessment of Market Performance” (with Roger Sherman), Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1972), 448‑462.

“Consumption Sharing and Non‑Exclusion Rules,” Economica (August 1972), 276‑291.

“The Economics of Fatal Mistakes: Fiscal Mechanisms for Preserving Endangered Predators” (with R.C. Amacher and T.D. Willett), Public Policy (Summer 1972), 411‑441.

“A Proposal for Marginal Cost Financing of Higher Education” (with T.D. Willett), Public Finance (September 1972),375‑379.

“International Integration and the Interdependence of Economic Variables” (with T.D. Willett), International Organization (Spring 1973), 255‑271.

“The University and the Price System” (with T.D. Willett), Journal of Economics and Business (Spring‑Summer 1973),191‑197.

“The Economic Determinants of Antitrust Activity” (with W. Long and R. Schramm), Journal of Law and Economics (October 1973), 351‑364.

“Some Notes on the Simple Economics of Voting and Not Voting” (with T.D. Willett), Public Choice (Fall 1973), 59‑71.

“On Equalizing the Distribution of Political Income” (with D. Mueller and T. Willett), Journal of Political Economy (March/April 1974), 414‑422.

“Market Failure, the Common Pool Problem, and Ocean Resource Exploitation” (with R. Sweeney and T. Willett), Journal of Law and Economics (April 1974), 179‑192.

“An Economic Model of Performance Contracting in Education” (with John Hiller), Public Finance, No. 1(1974), 36‑48.

“A Note on Consumption Sharing and Non‑Exclusion Rules” (with Yew‑Kwang Ng), Economica (November 1974),446‑450.

“The Utilitarian Contract: A Generalization of Rawls' Theory of Justice” (with Dennis Mueller and T.D. Willett), Theory and Decision, Vol. IV/3 (1974), 345‑369.

“The Economic Theory of Clubs: A Geometric Exposition” (with L. Allen and R. Amacher), Public Finance, No. 34(1974),386‑391.

“Budget Size in a Democracy: A Review of the Arguments” (with R. Amacher and T. Willett), Public Finance Quarterly (April 1975), 99‑122.

“Demand Changes in the Theory of Limit Pricing: A Pedagogical Note” (with T. Deaton), Industrial Organization Review, No. 1(1975), 56‑60.

“Oil Tanker Pollution Control: Design Criteria Versus Effective Liability Assignment” (with P. Cummins, D. Logue, and T. Willett), Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce (October 1975), 169‑206.

“Information and Voting: An Empirical Note” (with M. Crain and P. Pautler), Public Choice (Winter 1975), 43-50.

“Campaign Expenditures and Political Competition” (with M. Crain), Journal of Law and Economics (April 1976),43‑50.

“Property Rights Within Government and Devices to Increase Government Efficiency” (with R. Amacher), Public Finance Quarterly (April 1976),151‑158.

“The New Political Economy of J.S. Mill: The Means to Social Justice” (with R.B. Ekelund), Canadian Journal of Economics (May 1976), 214‑231. German translation in Der soziale Liberalismus John Stuart Mill, edited by Gregory Claeys (Nomos Verlag: Baden‑Baden, West Germany, 1987).

“A Note on the Theory of Black Markets Under Price Controls” (with S. Crafton and T. Deaton), Economic Inquiry (June 1976), 300‑304.

“A Modern Interpretation of Aristotle on Legislative and Constitutional Rules” (with T. Deaton and R. Ekelund), Southern Economic Journal (July 1976), 903‑911.

“State Budget Sizes and the Marginal Productivity of Governors” (with M. Crain), Public Choice (Fall 1976), 91--96.

“On the Survival of Corporate Executives” (with T. Deaton and M. Crain), Southern Economic Journal (January 1977),1372‑1375.

“Demerit in Merit Regulation” (with James Mofsky), Marquette Law Review (Winter 1977), 367‑378.

“Legislative Size and Voting Rules” (with M. Crain), Journal of Legal Studies (January 1977), 234‑240.

“Legislators as Taxicabs: On the Value of Seats in the U.S. House of Representatives” (with M. Crain and T. Deaton), Economic Inquiry (April 1977), 298‑302.

“Optimum Legislative Sizes and Voting Rules,” Policy Studies Journal (Spring 1977), 340‑345.

“Attenuated Property Rights and the Market for Governors” (with M. Crain), Journal of Law and Economics (April 1977), 205‑211.

“Rational Choice and the Taxation of Sin” (with M. Crain, T. Deaton, and R. Holcombe), Journal of Public Economics, 8 (1977), 239‑245.

“The Influence of Representation on Public Policy (with M. Crain), Journal of Legal Studies (June 1977), 355-361.

“Learning and Earning in Law Firms” (with Arleen Leibowitz), Journal of Legal Studies (January 1978), 65‑81.

“Legislatures as Unions” (with Robert McCormick), Journal of Political Economy (February 1978), 63‑78.

“Incentive Versus Cost‑Plus Contracts in the Defense Industry” (with John Hiller), Journal of Industrial Economics (March 1978), 239‑248.

“The Economic Determinants of Tenure in the U.S. House of Representatives” (with Mark Crain and Thomas Deaton), Atlantic Economic Journal (July 1978), 79‑83.

“A Note on the Webb‑Pomerene Law and the Webb‑Cartels” (with R. Amacher and R. Sweeney), Antitrust Bulletin (Summer 1978), 371‑387.

“A Voting System for Fiscal Federalism Where Spillovers Taper Off Spatially” (with Thomas Willett), Public Finance Quarterly (July 1978), 327‑342.

“J.S. Mill's New Political Economy: Another View” (with R. Ekelund), Economic Inquiry (October 1978), 587592.

“Macroeconomic Determinants of the Vote in Presidential Elections (with M. Crain and T. Deaton), Public Finance Quarterly (October 1978), 427‑438.

“Some Evidence on the Sufficient Conditions for Wealth‑Maximizing Conduct” (with M. Crain), Kyklos (fasc. 3, 1978),500‑503.

“Constitutional Change in an Interest‑Group Perspective” (with M. Crain), Journal of Legal Studies (January 1979),54‑58.

“Rent‑Seeking Competition Within Political Parties” (with R. McCormick), Public Choice (January 1979), 5‑14.

“Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability” (with Roger Meiners and James Mofsky), Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (April 1979), 351‑367.

“Labor, Business, and Antitrust Asymmetry,” CATO Policy Report, 1 (April 1979),1‑7.

“The Executive Branch in the Interest‑Group Theory of Government” (with M. Crain), Journal of Legal Studies (June 1979), 555‑567.

“Monopoly Aspects of Political Parties” (with M. Crain and Randall Holcombe), Atlantic Economic Journal (July 1979),54‑58.

“Achieving Cartel Profits Through Unionization” (with M. Maloney and R. McCormick), Southern Economic Journal (October 1979), 628‑634.

“An Economic Theory of Issue Linkages in International Negotiations” (with T. Willett), International Organization (Autumn 1979), 425‑449.

“The Political Business Cycle: A Review of Theoretical and Empirical Evidence” (with R. Amacher, T. Deaton and W. Boyes), Association for Comparative Economics Studies Bulletin (Fall‑Winter 1979), 1‑42.

“Lindahl Pricing of the Law” (with R. Holcombe), Rivista Internazionale Di Scienze Economiche E. Commerciali 26, No. 11(1979),1044‑1054.

“The Sizes of Majorities” (with M. Crain), Southern Economic Journal (January 1980), 726‑734.

“A Theory of Legislative Organization: Making the Most of Your Majority” (with Arleen Leibowitz), Quarterly Journal of Economics (March 1980), 261‑277.

“Free Riding, Shirking, and Team Production in Legal Partnerships” (with Arleen Leibowitz), Economic Inquiry (July 1980), 380‑394.

“Limiting Leviathan: The Case of Gladstonian Finance” (with Barry Baysinger), History of Political Economy (Summer 1980), 206‑213.

“Economic Regulation in Mercantile England: Heckscher Revisited” (with R. Ekelund), Economic Inquiry (October 1980), 567‑599.

“Mercantilist Origins of the Corporation” (with R. Ekelund), Bell Journal of Economics (Autumn 1980), 715‑720.

“Evaluating the Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation” (with Barry Baysinger), Atlantic Economic Journal (December 1980), 22‑26.

“The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs” (with J.M. Buchanan), American Economic Review (March 1981), 23‑28.

“A Note on the Equivalence of Contracting and Regulation” (with R. Faith), Atlantic Economic Journal (July 1981), 57‑59.

“Contractual Exchange and the Timing of Payment” (with R. Faith), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (December 1981), 325‑342.

“Economics and Metrology: Give'em an Inch and They'll Take a Kilometer” (with R. Faith and R. McCormick), International Review of Law and Economics (1981), 207‑221.

“Antitrust Pork Barrel” (with R. Faith and D. Leavens), Journal of Law and Economics (October 1982), 329‑342.

“Team Production in Political Majorities” (with M. Crain), Micropolitics (1982),111‑121.

“Adam Smith's Analysis of Joint‑Stock Companies” (with G. Anderson), Journal of Political Economy (December 1982),1237‑1256.

“Rent Seeking: A Survey,” Kyklos (fasc. 4,1982), 575‑602.

“Antitrust in the Reagan Administration: A Report from the Belly of the Beast,” International Journal of Industrial Organization (1,1983), 211‑221.

“The Supply of Occupational Regulation” (with R. Faith), Economic Inquiry (April 1983), 232‑240.

“Preliminary Evidence on the Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve System” (with W. Shughart), American Economic Review (June 1983), 291‑304.

“The Pricing of Surrogate Crime and Law Enforcement” (with R. Faith), Journal of Legal Studies (June 1983), 401‑411.

“Voter Search for Efficient Representation” (with R. Faith), Research in Law and Economics (vol. 5, 1983), 211-224.

“Apologiae for Chartered Monopolies in Foreign Trade, 1600‑ 1800" (with G. Anderson), History of Political Economy (Winter 1983), 549‑566.

“The Economic Organization of the English East India Company” (with G. Anderson and R. McCormick), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (December 1983), 221‑238.

“The Myth of the Corporation as a Creation of the State” (with G. Anderson), International Review of Law and Economics (1983), 107‑120.

“A Note on Centralizing Regulatory Review” (with J. Miller and W.Shughart), Public Choice (No. 1, 1984), 83-88.

“Crime on the Court” (with R. McCormick), Journal of Political Economy (April 1984), 223‑235.

“Managerial Rents and Outside Recruitment in the Coasian Firm” (with R. Faith and R. Higgins), American Economic Review (September 1984), 660‑672.

“Economic Regulation, Competitive Governments, and Specialized Resources” (with M. Maloney and R. McCormick), Journal of Law and Economics (October 1984), 329‑338.

“Sir James Steuart as the Apotheosis of Mercantilism and His Relation to Adam Smith” (with G. Anderson), Southern Economic Journal (October 1984), 456‑468.

“The Disinterest in Deregulation” (with R. McCormick and W. Shughart), American Economic Review (December 1984), 1075‑1079.

“The Random Character of Merger Activity” (with W. Shughart), Rand Journal of Economics (Winter 1984), 500‑509.

“The Convergence of Satisficing to Marginalism” (with M. Crain and W. Shughart), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (1984), 375‑385.

“The Behavior of Regulatory Activity Over the Business Cycle: An Empirical Test” (with R. Amacher, R. Higgins, and W. Shughart), Economic Inquiry (January 1985), 7‑20. Mentioned in “ Readings of Particular Interest,” Regulation ( Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,1986).

“The Cyclical Character of Regulatory Activity” (with W. Shughart), Public Choice (No. 3,1985), 303‑311.

“The Positive Economics of Antitrust: A Review Article” (with W. Shughart), International Review of Law and Economics (June 1985), 39‑57.

“Adam Smith in the Custom House” (with G. Anderson and W. Shughart), Journal of Political Economy (August 1985),740‑759.

“Legislation and Political Business Cycles” (with W. Shughart), Kyklos (fasc. 1,1985), 43‑59.

“Free Entry and Efficient Rent Seeking” (with R. Higgins and W. Shughart), Public Choice (No. 3, 1985), 247-258.

“Life in the Gulag: A Property Rights Perspective” (with G. Anderson), CATO Journal (Spring/Summer 1985), 295‑304.

“Legislator Specialization and the Size of Government” (with M. Crain, B. Goff, and D. Carlson), Public Choice (No.3,1985), 311‑316.

“A Welfare Defense of the 'Failing Company' Doctrine” (with W. Shughart), Antitrust Bulletin (Summer 1985), 357‑364.

“Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws” (with G. Anderson), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (June 1985), 197‑212.

“Litigation, the Business Cycle, and Government Growth” (with M. Crain and S. Kimenyi), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (September 1985), 435‑443.

“Corporate Chartering: An Exploration in the Economics of Legal Change” (with W. Shughart), Economic Inquiry (October 1985), 585‑599.

“Public Choice and Antitrust,” The CATO Journal (Winter 1985), 905‑916.

“What Do Judges Maximize?” (with S. Kimenyi and W. Shughart), Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice (March 1986), 181‑188.

“Economists as the Subject of Economic Inquiry,” Southern Economic Journal (April 1986), 909‑922, Presidential Address.

“Bureaucratic Structure and Congressional Control” (with W. Shughart and B. Goff), Southern Economic Journal (April 1986), 962‑972.

“Pigskins and Publications” (with W. Shughart and B. Goff), Atlantic Economic Journal (July 1986), 46‑50.

“Crime and Income Distribution in a Basketball Economy” (with R. McCormick), International Review of Law and Economics (July 1986), 115‑124.

“Rent Seeking and Trade Protection” (with C. Rowley), The Swiss Review of International Economic Relations (1986),141‑166.

“The Table of Contents of Economics Journals as Forecasts of Scientific Relevance” (with D. Carlson), History of Economics Society Bulletin (Summer 1986), 42‑43.

“The Rise and (Recent) Decline of Mathematical Economics” (with G. Anderson and Brian Goff), History of Economics Society Bulletin (Summer 1986), 44‑48.

“Dead Men Tell No Tales” (with G. Anderson), History of Economics Society Bulletin (Summer 1986), 59‑68.

“Ricardo on the Public Debt: Principle Versus Practice” (with G. Anderson), History of Economics Society Bulletin (Summer 1986), 49‑58.

“On the Growth of Government and the Political Economy of Legislation” (with W. Shughart), Research in Law and Economics (1986), 111‑127.

“A Theory of Truth in Autobiography” (with J. Buchanan), Kyklos (fasc. 4,1986), 507‑517.

“Citation Practices in Economics and Physics” (with B. Goff), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (September 1986), 581‑587.

“Final Voting in Legislatures” (with M. Crain and D. Leavens), American Economic Review (September 1986), 833‑841.

“The Political Economy of Immigration Restrictions” (with W. Shughart and S. Kimenyi), Yale Journal on Regulation (Fall 1986), 79‑98.

“Luddism as Cartel Enforcement” (with G. Anderson), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (December 1986), 727‑738.

“Do Tax Loopholes Increase or Decrease Tax Revenue?” (with G. Anderson and D. Martin), Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice (March 1987), 83‑95.

“Rational Self‑Taxation: Complementary Inputs and Excise Taxation” (with W. Shughart and R. Higgins), Canadian Journal of Economics (August 1987), 527‑532.

“The Incentive to Cite” (with B. Goff, W. Shughart, and S. Pociask), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (September 1987), 467‑476.

“The Allocation of Death in the Vietnam War: A Public Choice Perspective” (with B. Goff), Southern Economic Journal (October 1987), 316‑321.

“The Pope and the Price of Meat: A Public Choice Perspective” (with R. Ault and R. Ekelund), Kyklos (fasc. 3, 1987), 399‑413.

“The Role of Rent Seeking in Restricting Human Exchange” (with G. Anderson and C. Rowley), Journal of Legal Studies (January 1988), 83‑100.

“Legislative Monopoly and the Size of Government,” (with G. Anderson), Southern Economic Journal (January 1988), 529‑545.

“Public Choice and Legislation,” Virginia Law Review (March 1988), 339‑371.

“Laissez Faire in Campaign Finance” (with M. Crain and D. Leavens), Public Choice (No. 3,1988), 201‑212.

“Democracy, Interest Groups, and the Price of Votes” (with G. Anderson), CATO Journal (Spring/Summer 1988), 53‑70. Mentioned in B. Saffran, “Recommendations for Further Reading,” Journal of Economic Perspectives (Spring 1989), 177.

“Disqualification by Decree: Amateur Rules as Barriers to Entry” (with B. Goff and W. Shughart), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (June 1988), 515‑523.

“Legislative Majorities as Nonsalvageable Assets” (with M. Crain and W. Shughart), Southern Economic Journal (October 1988), 303‑314.

“Crime or Punishment?: Enforcement of the NCAA Cartel” (with A. Fleisher, B. Goff, and W. Shughart), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (December 1988), 433‑451.

“A Public Choice Theory of the Great Contraction” (with G. Anderson and W. Shughart), Public Choice (1988), 323.

“An Interest‑Group Theory of Population Growth” (with S. Kimenyi and W. Shughart), Journal of Population Economics (1988), 131‑139.

“Affirmative Action and Unemployment” (with S. Kimenyi and W. Shughart), European Journal of Political Economy (1988), 479‑490.

“Nassau Senior as Economic Consultant: The Factory Acts Reconsidered” (with G. Anderson and R. Ekelund), Economica (February 1989), 71‑82.

“The Half‑Life of Dead Economists” (with G. Anderson and D. Levy), Canadian Journal of Economics (February 1989),174‑183.

“Superdissipation,” Public Choice (1989), 97‑98.

“On the Incentive of Judges to Enforce Legislative Wealth Transfers” (with G. Anderson and W. Shughart), Journal of Law and Economics (April 1989), 215‑228.

“Smoking and the Problem of Social Cost: A Survey” (with R. Wagner), Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice (September 1989), 171‑186.

“Price Leadership with Incomplete Information” (with R. Higgins and W. Shughart), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (1989), 423‑429.

“Political Entry Barriers and Tax Incidence: The Political Economy of Sales and Excise Taxes (with G. Anderson and W. Shughart), Public Finance (1989), 8‑18.

“Ownership Structure in Professional Sports” (with A. Fleisher and W. Shughart), Research in Law and Economics (vol. 12,1989), 71‑75.

“An Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking” (with R. Ekelund and R. Hebert), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (Fall 1989), 307‑331.

“Why Is the Media So Liberal?” (with B. Goff), Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice (January 1990),1321.

''Efficient Lobbying and Earmarked Taxes” (with D. Lee and S. Kimenyi), Public Finance Quarterly (January 1990),104‑113.

“Is National Defense a Pure Public Good?” (with B. Goff), Defence Economics, Number 2 (1990), 141‑147.

“Arbitrage in a Basketball Economy” (with K. Grier), Kyklos (fasc. 4,1990), 611‑624.

“Economists and the Economy” (with D. Laband and W. Shughart), Review of Economics and Statistics (November 1990), 707‑711.

“Regulatory Finance in Alternative Models of Regulation: General Fund Financing Versus Earmarked Taxation” (with M. Kimenyi and R. Wagner), European Journal of Political Economy (1990), 519‑529.

“Romance, Reality, and Economic Reform” (with R. Wagner), Kyklos (fasc. 1,1991), 57‑70.

“Self Interest, Public Interest, and Public Health” (with R. Wagner), Public Choice (1991), 323‑343.

“Why Does the Federal Revenue Expand the Monetary Base during a Period of Price and Wage Controls” (with B. Goff), Public Choice (1991), 1‑10.

“Educational Achievement and the Cost of Bureaucracy” (with G. Anderson and W. Shughart), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (1991), 29‑45.

“The War on Drugs as Antitrust Regulation” (with G. Anderson), CATO Journal (Winter 1991), 691‑701.

“The Employment Consequences of the Sherman and Clayton Acts” (with W. Shughart), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (March 1991), 38‑52.

“Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933‑1939" (with G. Anderson), Journal of Law and Economics (April 1991), 161‑175.

“Fiscal Federalism and the Laffer Curve” (with W. Shughart), Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice (April 1991), 21‑28.

“Political Influence on Civil War Mortality Rates: The Electoral College as a Battlefield” (with G. Anderson), Defence Economics, Number 3 (1991), 219‑233.

“A Theory of Rational Childhood” (with G. Anderson), European Journal of Political Economy (1991),199‑213.

“The Price of Influence in an Interest‑Group Economy” (with M. Crain and T. Deaton), Rationality and Society (October 1991), 437‑449.

“Gordon Tullock: Creative Maverick of Public Choice” (with G. Brady), Public Choice (1991),141‑148.

“The Shadow Price of Sunshine” (with A. Fleisher), Public Finance (1991), 405‑414.

“The Logic of Natural Monopoly Regulation” (with R. Wagner), Eastern Economic Journal (October 1991), 483-490.

“The Economics of Sin and Redemption: Purgatory as a Market‑Pull Innovation” (with R. Ekelund and R. Herbert), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (September 1992), 1‑15. Mentioned in B. Saffran,

“Recommendations for Further Reading,” Journal of Economic Perspectives (Winter 1993),195.

“Methodenstreit: The Economics of Competing Methodologies” (with G. Anderson and R. Ekelund), European Journal of Political Economy (1992), 401‑418.

“The Medieval Crusades: A Public Choice Perspective” (with G. Anderson, R. Ekelund, and R. Herbert), European Journal of Economic History (Fall 1992), 349‑363.

“Morality and Monopoly: The Constitutional Political Economy of Religious Rules” (with G. Anderson), CATO Journal (Fall 1992), 373‑392.

“Using (Im)perfect Markets to Capture Criminals” (with B. Goff), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (1993), 31‑41.

“Going for the Gold: The Athletic Consequences of the Transitional Economies” (with W. Shughart), Kyklos (fasc. 2, 1993), 263‑272. Written up in G. Schwarz, B. Brenner, and B. Gygi, “Olympia Medaillen Als Spiegel der Eigentumsrechte,” Neue Burcher Beitung, May 29/30,1993, 41.

“Competition, Monopoly, and Religion,” Papers and Proceedings of the Virginia Association of Economists, William A. Sandrige Lecture (May 1993), 1‑4.

“Testing Political Theories of Fiscal Policy” (with M. Crain), Journal of Public Economics, 51(1993),153‑159.

“Preaching Matters” (with J. Lipford and R. McCormick), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 21 (1993),235‑250.

“The Next Twenty‑Five Years of Public Choice” (with C. Rowley and F. Schneider), Public Choice (September 1993),1‑7.

“Barristers and Barriers: Sir Edward Coke and the Regulation of Trade” (with G. Anderson), CATO Journal (Spring/Summer 1993), 49‑67.

“Political Influence and the Ratification of the Income Tax Amendment” (with G. Anderson), International Review of Law and Economics (1993), 259‑270.

“The Probability of Being President” (with M. Crain and H. Messenheimer), Review of Economics and Statistics (1993),683‑689.

“The Rookie Draft and Competitive Balance: The Case of Professional Football” (with K. Grier), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (1994), 293‑298.

“The Length of Legislative Sessions and the Growth of Government” (with S. Kimenyi), Rationality and Society (April 1995), 151‑155.

“The Contributions of Gordon Tullock to Public Choice,” Economic Inquiry (July 1995), 355‑364.

“Electoral Politics and the Executive Veto” (with K. Grier and M. McDonald), Economic Inquiry (July 1995), 427‑440.

“Residual Demand Analysis of the Carbonated Soft Drink Market” (with R. Higgins, D. Kaplan, and M. MacDonald), Empirica (1995), 115‑126.

“Drafting the Competition: Labor Unions and Military Conscription” (with G. Anderson and D. Halcoussis), Defence and Peace Economics, 7 (1996),189‑202.

“Constitutional Job Creation” (with G. Anderson), Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice (2‑3, 1996), 139152.

“Economics and the Architecture of Popular Music” (with M. Crain), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (February 1997), 185‑205.

“Batter Up: Moral Hazard and the Effects of the DH Rule on Hit Batsmen” (with B. Goff and W. Shughart), Economic Inquiry (July 1997), 555‑561. Written up in G. Koretz, “Economic Trends,” Business Week, August 25, 1997, 32. Mentioned in B. Saffran, “Recommendations for Further Readings,” Journal of Economic Perspectives (Winter 1998), 233.

“Rent Seeking and Property Rights Assignments as a Process: The Mesta Cartel of Medieval‑Mercantile Spain” (with R. Ekelund and D. Street), The Journal of European Economic History (Spring 1997), 9‑35.

“Smoking, Insurance, and Social Cost” (with R. McCormick and R. Wagner), Regulation (Summer 1997), 33‑37.

“On Neoinstitutional Theory and Preclassical Economies: Mercantilism Revisited” (with R. Ekelund), The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought (Autumn 1997), 375-399.

“Interests Groups and the Courts” (with W. Shughart), George Mason University Law Review (Summer 1998), 953-961.

“Collusion, Profits, and Rational Antitrust” (with W. Shughart), Antitrust Bulletin (Summer 1998), 365-374.

“Celestial Marriage and Earthly Rents: Interests and the Prohibition of Polygamy” (with G. Anderson), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (1998), 169-181.

“The Market for Addiction-Control Services” (with B. Goff), Public Finance Review (March 1999), 115-137.

“The Stability Inducing Propensities of Very Unstable Coalitions: Avoiding the Downward Spiral of Majoritarian Rent-Seeking” (with R. Congleton), European Journal of Political Economy (1999), 193-205.

“Understanding the Antituust Economics of Sports Leagues,” Antitrust (Spring 2000), 21-24.

“Intellectual Collaboration” ( with D. Laband), Journal of Political Economy (June 2000), 632-662.

“On Secondhandism and Scientific Appraisal” ( with D. Laband), Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics (Spring 2000), 43-48.

“Why Do Black Basketball Players Work More for Less Money?” (with R. McCormick), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2001), 201-219.

“ The Interest-Group Theory of Government: Problems and Prospects,” Kyklos ( 2001), 457-464.

“Racial Integration as an Innovation: Empirical Evidence from Sports Leagues” ( with B. Goff and R. McCormick), American Economic Review( March 2002), 16-26.

“An Economic Analysis of the Protestant Reformation” ( with R. Ekelund and R. Hebert), Journal of Political Economy ( June 2002), 646-671.

“Consumer Choice and the Popular Music Industry: A Test of the Superstar Theory” ( with M. Crain), Empiirca

( 2002), 1-9.

“Explaining U.S. Federal Deficits: 1889-1998” ( with B.Goff), Economic Inquiry (July 2002), 457-469.

“Religious Participation and Income” ( with J. Lipford), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ( forthcoming).

“ Quality Control in Economics” ( with D. Laband and G. Karahan), Kyklos ( forthcoming).

“Good Colleagues” ( with D. Laband), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization ( forthcoming).

“The Monopsony Power of the Median Voter” ( with B. Goff), Public Finance Review ( fortcoming) .

“On the Third Law of Demand” ( with L. Razzolini and W. Shughart), Economic Inquiry ( forthcoming).

Notes, Comments, Replies:

“Marginal Criteria and Draft Deferment Policy” (with James C. Miller III and Thomas D. Willett), Quarterly Review of Economics and Business (Summer 1968), 69‑73.

“Notes on the Color of the Volunteer Army” (with William F. Ford), Social Science Quarterly (December 1969), 544‑547.

“Reply to Eatherly” (with William F. Ford), Social Science Quarterly (September 1970),178‑180.

“Styling Changes and the Prisoner's Dilemma” (with Harold Bierman, Jr.), Antitrust Law and Economics Review (Fall 1970), 95‑100.

“Monopoly Rent Capitalization and Antitrust Policy: Reply” (with Harold Bierman, Jr.), Western Economic Journal (September 1971), 308‑309.

“Import Controls on Foreign Oil: Comment” (with R. Amacher and T.D. Willett), American Economic Review (December 1973), 1031‑1034.

“Fiscal Preference and Balanced Budget Fiscal Policy” (with R. Amacher), Public Choice (Fall 1974),107‑110.

“A Defense of the CEA as an Instrument for Giving Economic Policy Advice: A Comment on Tullock” (with T.D. Willett), Journal of Money, Credit and Banking (February 1975),113‑116.

“Rates of Publication Per Faculty Member in Forty‑Five 'Rated' Economics Departments” (with James C. Miller III), Economic Inquiry (March 1975), 122‑123.

“The Coase Theorem and Quasi‑Rents: Correcting the Record” (with M. Crain and D. Saurman), Public Finance Quarterly (April 1978), 259‑262.

“Government Output and National Income Estimates: A Comment,” in Brunner and Meltzer (eds.), Public

Policies in Open Economies, Carnegie‑Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, a supplementary series to the Journal of Monetary Economics (New York, NY: North‑Holland, 1978), 267‑273.

“An Historical Note on Regulatory Reform,” Regulation (November/December 1978), 46‑49.

“Toenote to a Footnote” (with M. Crain and T. Deaton), Economic Inquiry (April 1979), 307‑309.

“Representation and Influence: Reply” (with M. Crain), Journal of Legal Studies (January 1981), 215‑219.

“Achieving Cartel Profits Through Unionization: Reply” (with M. Maloney and R. McCormick), Southern Economic Journal (April 1981), 1162‑1164.

“Rational Choice and the Taxation of Sin: Reply” (with M. Crain, T. Deaton, and R. Holcombe), Journal of Public Economics (October 1981), 261‑263.

“Tradeable Shares and the Supply Side of Corporate Development: Reply” (with R. Ekelund), Bell Journal of Economics (Spring 1983), 298‑300.

“Adam Smith as a Regulator,” History of Economics Society Bulletin (Summer 1984), 38‑39.

“The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs: Reply” (with J. Buchanan), American Economic Review (September 1984), 808.

“The Fed's Use of Inputs: Reply” (with W. Shughart), American Economic Review (December 1984),1121‑1123.

“There Is No Such Thing as a Free Tax” (with D. Lee), Finanzarchiv (1985), 451‑453.

“Smith v. Steuart: Reply” (with G. Anderson), Southern Economic Journal (January 1986), 853‑856.

“The Disinterest in Deregulation: Reply” (with R. McCormick and W. Shughart), American Economic Review (June 1986), 564‑565.

“Antitrust Policy and the Rationalization of the U.S. Steel Industry: Comment,” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (March 1986), 131‑133.

“Would Cows Vote Carnivore?” (with W. Shughart), Economic Affairs (August/September 1987), 45‑46.

“The Disinterest in Deregulation Revisited” (with R. McCormick and W. Shughart), American Economic Review (March 1988), 284.

“The Allocation of Death in the Vietnam War: A Public Choice Perspective: Reply” (with B. Goff), Southern Economic Journal (April 1989), 1034‑1035.

“Chicago Political Economy,” Public Choice (1989), 293‑297.

“The Exercise of Market Power in Experimental Markets: Comment,” Journal of Law and Economics (October 1989),S131‑S133.

“A Public Choice Theory of the Great Contraction: Further Evidence” (with G. Anderson and W. Shughart), Public Choice (1990), 277‑283.

“Legislative Majorities as Nonsalvageable Assets: Reply” (with M. Crain and W. Shughart), Southern Economic Journal (January 1991), 857‑859.

“Economists and the Environment” (with A. Fleisher), European Journal of Political Economy (1990),159‑163.

“George J. Stigler, 1911‑1991: Chicago Political Economist,” Public Choice (1992), iii‑iv.

“Economic Analysis and Just Compensation: Commentary,” International Review of Law and Economics (June 1992),139‑140.

“Panel Discussion: The Legislative Role in the American Republic,” Federalist Society Symposium, 1992, in Cumberland Law Review (1992‑1993), 27‑29.

“Peacock and Wiseman on the Growth of Public Expenditure” (with C. Rowley), Public Choice (February 1994), 125‑128.

“Correspondence” (with D. Laband, M. Piette, and S. Ralston), Journal of Economic Perspectives (Winter 1994), 201‑203.

“The Shadow Price of Sunshine: Reply” (with A. Fleisher), Public Finance (1994),145‑146.

“The Economics of Science: Comment,” Knowledge and Policy (Summer/Fall 1996),125.

“Speeding Drug Approvals, Safely, Privately,” Consumers' Research Magazine (January 1998), 14‑16.

“Moral Hazard and the Effects of the Designated Hitter Rule Revisited” (with B. Goff and W. Shughart), Economic Inquiry (October 1998), 688-692. Written up in G. Koretz, “Economic Trends,” Business Week, November 23, 1998, 27.

“The Interest‑Group Theory of Government,” The Locke Luminary, vol. I, No. 1 (Summer 1998), 13-17.

Articles Reprinted (complete original references appear above):

“Notes on the Color of the Volunteer Army” (with William F. Ford), in Charles M. Bonjean and Louis A. Zurcher (eds.), Planned Social Intervention (San Francisco, CA: Chandler Publishing Company, 1970); and The Selective Service System: Its Operations, Practices, and Procedures, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Committee of Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 953‑954. From Social Science Quarterly, 1969.

“Racial Balance and the Volunteer Army,” in The Selective Service System: Its Operations, Practices, and Procedures, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Committee on Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, 1st Session, 943‑952. From Miller (ed.), Why the Draft? Penquin Books, 1968.

“Advertising and Profitability'' (with R. Sherman), in Roger Sherman, Oligopoly (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1972),139‑162. From Review of Economics and Statistics, 1971.

“Profit Risk, Technology, and Assessment of Market Performance” (with Roger Sherman), in Roger Sherman, Oligopoly (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1972), 163‑176. From Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1972.

“The Political Economy of the Military Draft,” in J. Buchanan and R. Tollison (eds.), The Theory of Public Choice (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1972), 302‑314. From Public Choice, 1970.

“Solving the Intensity Problem in Representative Democracy” (with D. Mueller and T.D. Willett), in R. Amacher, R. Tollison, and T. Willett (eds.), The Economic Approach to Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 444‑473; and in D. Mueller (ed.), The Public Choice Approach to Politics (London: Edward Elgar, 1993), 143‑183. From Leiter and Sirkin, (eds.), Economics of Public Choice, Cyro Press, 1975.

“Representative Democracy Via Random Selection” (with Dennis Mueller and Thomas D. Willett), in Amacher Tollison, and Willett (eds.), The Economic Approach to Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 381‑393; in N. R. Luttbeg (ed.), Public Opinion and Public Policy (Itasca, Illinois: Peacock Publishers, 1981), 443‑453; and in D. Mueller (ed.), The Public Choice Approach to Politics (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1993),193‑204. From Public Choice, 1972.

“The Economics of Fatal Mistakes: Fiscal Mechanisms for Preserving Endangered Predators” (with R.C. Amacher and T.D. Willett), in Amacher, Tollison, and Willett (eds.), The Economic Approach to Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 187‑213; and in T.L. Anderson and P.J. Hill (eds.), Wildlife in the Marketplace (London, England: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 43‑60. From Public Policy, 1972.

“The University and the Price System” (with T.D. Willett), in Amacher, Tollison, and Willett (eds.), The Economic Approach to Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 153‑166. From Journal of Economics and Business, 1973.

“Some Notes on the Simple Economics of Voting and Not Voting” (with T.D. Willett), in Amacher, Tollison, and Willett (eds.), The Economic Approach to Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 393‑405; and in Antoni Casahuga (ed.), Democracia y Economia Politica (Madrid, Spain: Instituo de Estudios Ficales, 1980), 375‑394. From Public Choice, 1973.

“The Utilitarian Contract: A Generalization of Rawls' Theory of Justice” (with Dennis Mueller and T.D. Willett), in Amacher, Tollison, and Willett (eds.), The Economic Approach to Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 313‑333; and in D. Mueller (ed.), The Public Choice Approach to Politics (London: Edward Elgar, 1993), 25‑47. From Theory and Decision, 1974.

“A Defense of the CEA as an Instrument for Giving Economic Policy Advice: A Comment on Tullock” (with T.D. Willett), in Amacher, Tollison, and Willett (eds.), The Economic Approach to Public Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976), 520‑523. From Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 1975.

The Economics of the Military Draft ( with R. Amacher, J. Miller, M. Pauley, and T. Willett), in M. Anderson(ed.), The Military Draft: Selected Readings on Conscription ( Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Press,1982). From Amacher, Miller, Pauley, Tollison, and Willett, The Economics of the Military Draft, General Learning Press, 1973.

“On Equalizing the Distribution of Political Income” (with D. Mueller and T. Willett), in Buchanan and Tollison (eds.), The Theory of Public Choice‑II (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 413‑421; and in D. Mueller (ed.), The Public Choice Approach to Politics (London: Edward Elgar, 1993), 184‑192. From Journal of Political Economy, 1974.

“Legislatures as Unions” (with Robert McCormick), in Buchanan and Tollison (eds.), The Theory of Public Choice‑II (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 323‑337. From Journal of Political Economy, 1978.

“An Economic Theory of Issue Linkages in International Negotiations” (with T. Willett), in Buchanan and Tollison (eds.), The Theory of Public Choice‑II (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 134‑155. From International Organization, 1979.

“Preliminary Evidence on the Use of Inputs by the Federal Reserve System” (with W. Shughart), in Toma and Toma (eds.), Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy (Boston, MA: Kluwer, 1986),67‑90. From American Economic Review, 1983.

“The New Political Economy of J.S. Mill: The Means to Social Justice” (with R.B. Ekelund), in John Stuart Mill: Critical Assessments, vol. 3, edited by J.C. Wood (Croom Helm: London, 1986), 106-123. From Canadian Journal of Economics, 1976.

“J.S. Mill's New Political Economy: Another View” (with R. Ekelund), in John Stuart Mill: Critical Assessments vol. 3, edited by J.C. Wood (London, England: Croom Helm, 1986), 124‑129. From Economic Inquiry, 1978.

“Rent Seeking and Trade Protection” (with C. Rowley), in H. Hauser (ed.), Protectionism and Structural Adjustment (Grusch, West Germany: Verlag Ruegger, 1986), 141‑166; and in Rowley, Tollison and Tullock (eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Boston, MA: Kluwer‑Nijhoff, 1988), 217‑237. From Swiss Review of International Economic Relations, 1986.

Balanced Budgets, Fiscal Responsibility, and the Constitution (with R. Wagner), in R. Fink and J. High (eds.), A Nation in Debt: Economists Debate the Federal Budget Deficit (Frederick, MD: University Publications, 1987),181‑211. From Tollison and Wagner, Balanced Budgets, Fiscal Responsibility and The Constitution, CATO Institute, 1980.

“Antitrust Pork Barrel” (with R. Faith and D. Leavens), in R. Mackay, J. Miller, and B. Yandle (eds.), Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1987), 15‑29; in F. McChesney and W. Shughart (eds.), The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 201‑212; and C.W. Crews (ed.), Antitrust Reader (Washington, D.C.: Competitive Enterprise Institute, 1997), 59‑72. From Journal of Law and Economics, 1982.

“The Behavior of Regulatory Activity Over the Business Cycle: An Empirical Test” (with R. Amacher, R. Higgins, and W. Shughart), in Mackay, Miller and Yandle (eds.), Public Choice and Regulation: A View from Inside the Federal Trade Commission (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1987), 145‑153. From Economic Inquiry, 1985.

“Public Choice and Antitrust,” in Dorn and Manne (eds.), Economic Liberties and the Judiciary (Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University Press, 1987), 289‑300; in J. High and W. Gable (eds.), A Century of the Sherman Act: American Economic Opinion, 1890‑1990 (Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University Press, 1992), 281‑291; and in C.W. Crews (ed.), Antitrust Reader (Washington, D.C.: Competitive Enterprise Institute, 1997), 93‑104. From Cato Journal, 1985.

“Managerial Rents and Outside Recruitment in the Coasian Firm” (with R. Faith and R. Higgins), in C. Rowley, R. Tollison, and G. Tullock (eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Boston, MA: Kluwer‑Nijhoff, 1988), 315‑335. From American Economic Review, 1984.

“Free Entry and Efficient Rent Seeking” (with R. Higgins and W. Shughart), in Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock (eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Boston, MA: Kluwer‑Nijhoff, 1988), 127‑139; and in Congleton and Tollison (eds.), The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1995),153‑164. From Public Choice, 1985.

“Ideology, Interest Groups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws” (with G. Anderson), in Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock (eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Boston, MA: Kluwer‑Nijhoff, 1988), 199‑215. From Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1985.

“Corporate Chartering: An Exploration in the Economics of Legal Change” (with W. Shughart), in Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock (eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking (Boston, MA: Kluwer‑Nijhoff, 1988), 391‑407. From Economic Inquiry, 1985.

“The Executive Branch in the Interest‑Group Theory of Government” (with M. Crain), in M. Crain and R. Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 101‑114; and in C. Rowley (ed.), Public Choice Theory, Volume III (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1993), 3‑15. From Journal of Legal Studies, 1979.

“A Theory of Legislative Organization: Making the Most of Your Majority” (with Arleen Leibowitz), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990),133‑148. From Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980.

“Bureaucratic Structure and Congressional Control” (with W. Shughart and B. Goff), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 199‑210. From Southern Economic Journal, 1986.

“Final Voting in Legislatures” (with M. Crain and D. Leavens), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 45‑57. From American Economic Review 1986.

“Public Choice and Legislation,” in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 15‑42; and in C. Rowley (ed.), Public Choice Theory, Volume II (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1993), 289‑321. From Virginia Law Review, 1988.

“Laissez Faire in Campaign Finance” (with M. Crain and D. Leavens), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 257‑268.

From Public Choice, 1988.

“Legislative Majorities as Nonsalvageable Assets” (with M. Crain and W. Shughart), in Crain and Tollison (eds.), Predicting Politics: Essays in Empirical Political Economy (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990),115‑129. From Southern Economic Journal, 1988.

“Crime and Income Distribution in a Basketball Economy” (with R. McCormick), in B. Goff and R. Tollison (eds.), Sportometrics (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 295‑307. From International Review of Law and Economics, 1986.

“Crime or Punishment?: Enforcement of the NCAA Cartel” (with A. Fleisher, B. Goff, and W. Shughart), in B. Goff and R. Tollison (eds.), Sportometrics (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 153‑171. From Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1988.

“Crime on the Court” (with R. McCormick), in B. Goff and R. Tollison (eds.), Sportometrics (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 59‑72. From Journal of Political Economy 1984.

“Rent Seeking: A Survey,” in S.H. Baker and C.S. Elliot ( eds.) Readings in Public Sector Economics (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1990), 389-396.; in A. Levine (ed.), The State and its Critics, Volume I (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 305‑332; in C. Rowley (ed.), Public Choice Theory, Volume II (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1993), 68‑94; and in Congleton and Tollison (eds.), The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1995), 74‑100. From Kyklos, 1982.

“Economic Regulation in Mercantile England: Heckscher Revisited” (with R. Ekelund), in Mark Blaug (ed.), The Early Mercantilists: Thomas Mun, Edward Misselden, Gerard de Malyes (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1991), 212-244. From Economic Inquiry, 1980.

“Adam Smith in the Custom House” (with G. Anderson and W. Shughart), in M. Blaug (ed.), Adam Smith (17231790), Volume I, (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1991),126‑145. From Journal of Political Economy, 1985.

“Adam Smith's Analysis of Joint‑Stock Companies” (with G. Anderson), in M. Blaug (ed.), Adam Smith (17231790), Volume I (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1991), 57‑76. From Journal of Political Economy, 1982.

“Dead Men Tell No Tales” (with G. Anderson), in Mark Blaug (ed.), The Historiography of Economics (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1991),171‑180. From History of Economics Society Bulletin, 1986.

“Nassau Senior as Economic Consultant: The Factory Acts Reconsidered” (with G. Anderson and R. Ekelund), in M. Blaug (ed.), Ramsay McCulloch (1789‑1864), Nassau Senior (1790‑1864), Robert Torrens (1789‑1864) (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1992), 276‑286. From Economica, 1989.

“What Do Judges Maximize?” (with S. Kimenyi and W. Shughart), in C. Rowley (ed.), Public Choice Theory, Volume III (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1993), 139‑146. From Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, 1986.

“The Vote Motive and the Deficit: A Contingent Liability Approach” (with W. Shughart), in G. Eusepi (ed.), Rassegna di Lauori Dell'isco (Rome, Italy: Instituto Nazionale per lo Studio della Conquintura, 1993), 263‑281.

From Buchanan, Rowley, and Tollison (eds.), Deficits, Blackwell, 1987.

“Balanced Budgets and Beyond” (with R. Wagner), in G. Eusepi (ed.), Rassegna di Lauori Dell'isco (Rome, Italy: Instituto Nazionale per lo studio della Conquintura, 1993), 435‑452. From Buchanan, Rowley, and Tollison (eds.), Deficits, Blackwell, 1987.

“Regulation and Interest Groups,” in Public Choice Studies (Autumn 1993),1‑14 (lead article); and in R.Ekelund (ed.), Foundations of Regulatory Economics: Volume III: Regulation and Deregulation: Industries and Issues (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1998), 195-212. From High (ed.), Regulation, Michigan, 1991.

“Life Among the Triangles and Trapezoids” (with R. Higgins), in Congleton and Tollison (eds.), The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1995), 354‑364. From Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock (eds.), The Political Economy of Rent Seeking, Kluwer, 1988.

“Romance, Reality, and Economic Reform” (with R. Wagner), in Congleton and Tollison (eds.), The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1995), 380‑393. From Kyklos, 1991.

“The Employment Consequences of the Sherman and Clayton Acts” (with W. Shughart), in F. McChesney and W. Shughart (eds.), The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995),165‑177. From Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1991.

“The Economic Determinants of Antitrust Activity” (with W. Long and R. Schramm), in McChesney and Shughart (eds.), The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: A Public Choice Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 95‑105; and in C.W. Crews (ed.), Antitrust Reader (Washington D.C.: Competitive Enterprise Institute, 1997), 45‑58. From Journal of Law and Economics, 1973.

“The Economic Organization of the English East India Company” (with G. Anderson and R. McCormick), in Irwin (ed.), Trade in the Pre‑Modern Era, 1400‑1700 (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1996) , 466-483.From Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1983.

“A Rent-Seeking Theory of French Mercantilism” (with R. Ekelund), in D. Irwin (ed.), Trade in the Pre-Modern Era, 1400-1700 (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1996), 389-406. From Buchanan and Tollison (eds.), Theory of Public Choice-II, Michigan, 1984.

“Economic Regulation, Competitive Governments, and Specialized Resources” (with M. Maloney and R. McCormick), in R. Ekelund (ed.), Foundations of Regulatory Economics: Volume III: Regulation and Deregulation: Industries and Issues (London, England: Edward Elgar, 1998), 114-123. From Journal of Law and Economics, 1984.

“The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs” (with J. Buchanan), in G. Brennan, H. Kliemt, and R. Tollison (eds.), The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2000) , 260-277. From American Economic Review, 1981.

“Free Entry and Efficient Rent Seeking” ( with R. Higgins and W. Shugharrt), in A. Lockhart and G. Tullock ( eds.), Efficient Rent Seeking: The Intellectual History of an Intellectual Quagmire( Boston, MA: Kluwer, 2001), 49-57. From Public Choice, 1985.

“ The Rookie Draft and Competitive Balance: The Case of Professional Football” ( with K. Grier), in A. Zimbalist ( ed.), The Economics of Sports: Volume I ( London, England : Edward Elgar, 2001), 488-493. From Journaal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 1994.

“Batter Up! Moral Hazard and the Effects of the Designated Hitter Rule on Batsmen” ( with B. Goff and W. Shughart ), in A. Zimbalist ( ed.), The Economics of Sport: Volume II (London, England: Edward Elgar, 2001), 576-582. From Economic Inquiry, 1997.

“Moral Hazard and the Effects of the Designated Hitter Rule Revisited” ( with B. Goff and W. Shughart), in A. Zimbalist ( ed.) , The Economics of Sport: Volume II ( London, England: Edward Elgar, 2001), 589-593. From Economic Inquiry, 1998.

“A Theory of Truth in Autobiography” (with J. Buchanan), in G. Brennan, H. Kliemt, and R. Tollison (eds.), The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Volume 19: Ideas, Persons, and Events (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2001), 64-73. From Kyklos, 1986.

“The Economics of Sin and Redemption: Purgatory as a Market‑Pull Innovation” (with R. Ekelund and R. Herbert), in M. Casson (ed.), Culture, Social Norms and Economic Behaviour (London, England: Edward Elgar, 2001); and in P. Orlington (ed.), Economics and Religion ( London, England: Edward Elgar, forthcoming). From Journal of Economic Behavioral Organization, 1992,

“Monasteries as Agents of the Corporate Church” ( with R. Ekelund, R. Hebert, G. Anderson, and A. Davidson), in S. Pejovich(ed.), The Economics of Property Rights ( London, England: Edward Elgar, 2001). From Ekelund, Herbert, Tollison, Anderson, and Davidson, Sacred Trust, Oxford, 1996.

The War on Drugs as Antitrust Regulation” (with G. Anderson), in N. South (ed.), Drugs, Crime and Criminal Justice (Hampshire, England: Dartmouth Publishing, forthcoming). From Cato Journal, 1991.

“Time Inconsistency and Fiscal Policy: Empirical Analysis of U.S. States,1969-89”(with M. Crain), in C.Rowley, W. Shughart, and R.Tollison, The Economics of Budget Deficits(London, England: Edward Elgar, forthcoming). From Journal of Public Economics, 1993.

“Balanced Budgets and Beyond” (with R. Wagner), in C. Rowley, W. Shughart, and R. Tollison(eds.), The Economics of Budget Deficits( London, England: Edward Elgar, forthcoming). From Buchanan,Rowley, and Tollison(eds.), Deficits, Blackwell, 1986.

“An Economic Model of the Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking” ( with R. Ekelund and R. Hebert), in P. Oslington( ed.), Economics and Religion ( London, England: forhcoming). From Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1989.

Public Documents and Testimony:

Improving Railroad Productivity: Final Report of the Task Force on Railroad Productivity, A Report of the National Commission on Productivity and the Council of Economic Advisers, Washington, D.C., November 1973.

Member of Review Panel, Alternative Approaches to the Federal Funding of Rail Rehabilation, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, September 1975.

Member of Review Panel, The Financial Viability of Conrail, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, September 1975.

“Testimony and Prepared Statement,” as Director of the Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, on H.R 4374, Shipping Act of 1982, Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, May 6,1982.

Benefits and Costs of the FTC's Line of Business Program: Recommendations (with R. Higgins and W. Shughart), Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, January 1983.

“Testimony and Prepared Statement,” on S. 1440, Non‑Smokers Rights Act of 1985, Before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Civil Service, Post Office, and General Services, September 30, 1985.

“Testimony and Prepared Statement,” on H.R. 4488 and H.R. 4546, Legislation to Require the Designation of Smoking and Nonsmoking Areas in Federal Buildings, Before the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, June 27,1986.

“Testimony and Prepared Statement,” on S.567, The Malt Beverage Interbrand Competition Act, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Antitrust Monopolies and Business Rights, August 4, 1987.

“Testimony and Prepared Statement,” Hearings on Costs and Effects of Smoking, Including Effects on Children, Before the Senate Finance Committee, May 24,1990.

“Testimony and Prepared Statement,” Hearings on Proposed Constitutional Amendments to Balance the Budget, Before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, July 10, 1990.

“Testimony and Prepared Statement,” Hearings on Tax Treatment of Organizations Providing Health Care Services, and Excise Taxes on Tobacco, Guns and Ammunition, Before the Senate Finance Committee, April 28, 1994.

“Prepared Statement,” Hearing on Environmental Protection Agency's Cost‑Benefit Analysis of H.R. 3434 and S. 1680, Before the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Regulation, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, May 11,1994.

“Testimony And Prepared Statement,” Hearings on the Tobacco Industry, Before the Industry Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, May 20, 1994.

“The Funeral Rule After 15 Years: Expand or Sunset?,” Comment on the Trade Regulation Rule on Funeral Industry Practices, Federal Trade Commission, August 11,1999.

Editorials and Interviews:

“Interview,” Bureau of National Affairs, Daily Report for Executives, September 30, 1982, C‑1‑ C‑11.

“Economic Analysis of the FTC: Interview,” Antitrust Law and Economics Review, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1982, 45‑90.

“It's True! Adam Smith was a Bureaucrat” (with G. Anderson and W. Shughart), Wall Street Journal, August 26, 1985, 16.

“What Bush Must Do After His Deadline” (with others), Wall Street Journal, March 20, 1992, 16.

“Revenues Down in Smoke?,” Washington Times, September 28,1993, A16.

“Method and Practice of Economic Science,” Video, The Idea Channel, 1995.

“Democracy on the Rise” ( with R. McCormick and W. Shughart), independent.org/tii/news/shughart, June 8, 1999.___

Reviews:

Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969). Public Policy (Winter 1971), 213‑215.

The All‑Volunteer Army: An Analysis of Demand and Supply, by K.H. Kim, Susan Farrel, and E. Claque (New York: Praeger, 1971); and The Case Against a Volunteer Army, by Harry A. Marmion (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1971). American Political Science Review (June 1974), 787. With R. Amacher.

The Economic Theory of Representative Government, by Albert Breton (Chicago, IL: Aldine, 1974). Journal of Economic Literature (June 1975), 516‑517.

Steel Production, by C.S. Russell and William J. Vaughan (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1976). Southern Economic Journal (April 1978),1049‑1051.

Economics As a Coordination Problem: the Contributions of F.A. Hayek, by G.P. O'Driscoll, Jr. (Kansas City, MO: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1977). Public Choice (1978),129‑131.

The State as a Firm: Economic Forces in Political Development, by R.A. Auster and Morris Silver (Hingham, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979). Public Choice (1981), 197‑199.

The Federal Trade Commission Since 1970: Economic Regulation and Bureaucratic Behavior, by K.W. Clarkson and T.J. Muris (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Public Choice (1982), 223-224.

The Rise and Decline of Nations, by Mancur Olson (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982). Southern Economic Journal (April 1983), 1214‑1215.

Instead of Regulation: Alternatives to Federal Regulatory Agencies, ed. by R.W. Poole, Jr. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1982). Public Choice (No. 1,1984), 103.

Antitrust Laws and Employee Relations, by E.G. Miller (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, 1984). Journal of Labor Research (Spring 1985), 221‑222.

International Political Economics, by Bruno S. Frey (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1984). Public Choice (1986), 199‑200.

Public Choice, Public Finance and Public Policy, edited by D. Greenway and G.K. Shaw (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1985). Public Choice (1987), 193.

Law and Economics and the Economics of Legal Regulation, editedby J.M. Schulenburg and G. Skogh (Boston,MA: Kluwer,1986). Southern Economic Journal ( October 1988), 536-537.

Private Interests, Public Policy, and American Agriculture, by W.P. Browne (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1988). Public Choice (1989), 298.

Current Controversies in Economics, edited by H. Vane and T. Caslin (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1987). Southern Economic Journal (April 1989), 1085.

The Political Theory of Conservative Economists, by Conrad P. Waliqorski (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1990). Constitutional Political Economy (Fall 1990), 109‑111.

Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory, by Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, and Leslie Young (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1989). CATO Journal (Fall 1990), 615‑617.

A Critical Evaluation of the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, by I.L.O. Schmidt and J.B. Rittaler (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Publishers, 1989). Public Choice (1991), 119‑120.

Antitrust Economics, by Oliver E. Williamson (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1989). Kyklos (fasc. 1, 1991), 147‑148.

The Litigation Explosion: What Happened When America Unleashed the Lawsuit, by Walter K. Olson (New York, NY: Truman Talley Books, 1991). Regulation (Fall 1991), 101‑102.

The Political Economy of International Organizations: A Public Choice Approach, edited by R. Vaubel and T. Willett (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). Southern Economic Journal (October 1992), 349‑350.

Public Choice Analysis in Historical Perspective, by Alan Peacock (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Public Choice (October 1993), 455‑456.

Strategy, Structure, and Antitrust in the Carbonated Soft Drink Industry, by T. Muris, D. Scheffman, and P. Spiller (Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1993). Business History Review (Winter 1993), 668‑669.

Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector?, edited by Charles T. Clotfelter (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Journal of Cultural Economics (1994), 323‑324.

Taxing Choice: The Predatory Politics of Fiscal Discrimination, edited by William F. Shughart II (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997). Public Choice (October 1998), 212-214.

Unpaid Professionals: Commercialism and Conflict in Big Time College Sports, by A. Zimbalist (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). Managerial and Decision Economics (September 1999), 349-351.

Major League Losers: The Real Costs of Sports and Who’s Paying for It, by M.S. Rosentraub( New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999). Journal of Sports Economics( May 2001), 206-207.

Industrializing British Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organization,1770-1844, by Ron Harris( Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Journal of Economic Literature ( June 2001), 605-606.

Analytic Narratives, by R.H. Bates, A. Greif, M. Levi, J. L. Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). Public Choice ( forthcoming). With R. Ekelund..

Economics as Religion, by R.H. Nelson ( Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001). EH.net , April 15, 2002.

How Economics Became a Mathematical Science, by E. Roy Weintraub ( Duke University Press,2002). EH.Net, August 7, 2002.

Research Submitted for Publication:

“The Political Economy of Crime Waves” (with Roger Congleton).

“Titan Agonistes: The Wealth Effects of the Standard Oil (N.J.) Case,” (with A. Basu and W. Shughart).

“Capital Punishment, Tragic Choices, and Samaritan's Dilemmas” (with G. Anderson and R. Wagner).

“Stigler on Regulation and Antitrust.”

“Scientific Rent Seeking: The Market for Economists and the Progress of Economics” (with G. Anderson).

“ Inheritance,Equal Division, and Rent Seeking” ( with R.Faith).

“Alphabetized Coauthorship” ( with D. Laband).

“Dry Holes in Economic Research” ( with D. Laband).

“Economics and English: Language Growth in Economic Perspective”( with M. Resulak and W. Shughart).

“A Theory of Commodity Bundling” ( with R. McCormick and W. Shughart).

“Rent Seeking into the Distribution of Income” ( with W.Shughart and Z.Yan).

Dissertation Director:

W. Mark Crain, Ph.D. Texas A&M University 1976. Empirical essays in public choice.

Thomas H. Deaton, Ph.D. Texas A&M University 1976. An economic model of the demand and supply of votes: Some tentative empirical results.

Robert E. McCormick, Ph.D. Texas A&M University 1977. On the wage pay and outside earnings of politicians.

Barry D. Baysinger, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1978. A theory of the efficiency of jurisdictional choice: The case of corporate federalism.

John L. Dobra, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1980. Economic aspects of legislative and bureaucratic organizations.

David A. Reese, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1980. Alienation and economics in Karl Marx.

John D. Shoenhair, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1981. An empirical analysis of the campaign contribution behavior of U. S. manufacturing firms.

Henry N. Butler, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1982. Legal change in an interest‑group perspective: The demise of special corporate chartering.

Harold Elder, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1982. Economic analysis of courts.

Paul Lawrence, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1983. The intercollegiate athletic cartel: The economics, history, institutions, and legal arrangements of the National Collegiate Athletic Association.

Margaret N. Davis, Ph.D. George Mason University 1986. Legislative reapportionment in a public choice perspective.

Brian L. Goff, Ph.D. George Mason University 1986. An economic analysis of televised legislatures.

Gary M. Anderson, Ph.D. George Mason University 1987. Toward a neoclassical reassessment of the economics of Adam Smith.

Wayne E. Gable, Jr., Ph.D. George Mason University 1987. Cooperative marketing agreements, agricultural marketing orders, and the market for California citrus fruit.

Arthur A. Fliesher III, Ph.D. George Mason University 1987. An output-monitoring theory of cartel enforcement: The case of the National Collegiate Ayhletic Association.

Susan Manning, Ph.D. George Mason University 1988. The political economy of the electric utility ratemaking process.

Pamela J. Brown, Ph.D. George Mason University 1988. Surplus wars: Toward a positive theory of rent seeking.

Gerald M. Miller, II, Ph.D. George Mason University 1990. The impacts of antitrust enforcement on industry performance.

David W. Skully, Ph.D. George Mason University 1990. The international wheat market in a public choice perspective.

Nguyen X. Nguyen, Ph.D. George Mason University 1990. Industrial economics of the hospital industry: The relationship of market structure and market share to hospital performance.

Frederick J. Oerther, Ph.D. George Mason University 1990. Local macroeconomic conditions and election returns in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Larry J. McQuillan, Ph.D. George Mason University 1991. The political economy of labor unit determinations.

Shigeto Naka, Ph.D. George Mason University 1991. Toward a public choice analysis of the political economy of postwar Japan.

Carl D. Shapiro, Ph.D. George Mason University 1991. An examination of campaign finance regulation from an interest‑group perspective.

David J. Zorn, Ph.D. George Mason University 1992. Transaction costs in an agency theory of collusion.

Michael J. McDonald, Ph.D. George Mason University 1993. The political economy of the U.S. presidency.

Laura J. Thompson, Ph.D. George Mason University 1993. An investigation into superfund management.

Danny A. Bring, Ph.D. George Mason University 1993. The origins of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A public choice approach.

Joseph P. McGarrity, Ph.D. George Mason University 1993. The effect of macroeconomic conditions on House elections.

Barbara A. Ryan, Ph.D. George Mason University 1994. An economic analysis of Federal hospital policy.

John T. Sullivan, Ph.D. George Mason University 1994. Deregulation and the political economy of institutional change.

Lisa K. Oakley, Ph.D. George Mason University 1995. An empirical examination of direct democracy.

Jon D. Silverman, Ph.D. George Mason University 1995. An examination of branch banking deregulation: An application of the economic theory of regulation and the interest group theory of government.

Nicole Verrier, D.A. George Mason University 1995. An economic analysis of baseline budgeting.

Wayne A. Leighton, Ph.D. George Mason University 1996. Consumers and cross‑subsidies: An interest group theory of telecommunications regulation.

Michael J. Toma, Ph.D. George Mason University 1996. Three essays on the Federal Reserve System.

Edward J. Lopez, Ph.D. George Mason University 1997. The political economy of Congressional term limits.

Mark R.A. Palim, Ph.D. George Mason University 1997. The growth of competition law in the global economy.

Brett A. Margolin, Ph.D. George Mason University 1998. An economic theory of the brokerage contract.

Thesis Director

Jennie H. Best, M.A. George Mason University 1993. Cost‑effectiveness analysis of kidney retransplantation.

Dissertation Reader:

Margaret O'Donnell, Ph.D. Texas A&M University 1976. Externalities and the emergence of the new conception of laissez‑faire.

Elynor Davis, Ph.D. Texas A&M University 1977. Three essays on unsettled questions in the economics of John Stuart Mill.

Eugenia L. Toma, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1977. Economic organization of public education in the United States.

Janet Landa, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1978. The economics of the ethnically homogeneous Chinese middleman group: A property rights ‑ public choice approach.

George A. Uhimchuk, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1980. Constitutional tax limits at the state level: An overview and selected case studies.

Robert Cook, Ph.D. Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1982. The organization of government: A bureau specific account of the consolidation issue.

Samson M. Kimenyi, Ph.D. George Mason University 1986. Antitrust policy and the use of non‑standard contracts and practices: The case of best‑price policies.

Wayne T. Brough, Ph.D. George Mason University 1987. Justice, transaction costs and efficient adjudication: An empirical test of Posner's hypothesis.

Jerome R. Ellig, Ph.D. George Mason University 1987. Law, economics, and organized baseball: An

analysis of a cooperative venture.

Richard J. Grant, Ph.D. George Mason University 1987. Influence, innovation, and legislative organization.

Lydia D. Ortega, Ph.D. George Mason University 1987. Congressional conference committees.

Deborah L. Walker, Ph.D. George Mason University 1987. Horizontal territorial restrictions, resale price maintenance, and the theory of the firm: The Seafy Case.

Harold Messenheimer, Ph.D. Goerge Mason University 1989. The risk of losing: Economics of representation and voter volatility.

Ademola Aiyegora, Ph.D. George Mason University 1990. Toward a theory of international bureaus.

Christopher Lee, Ph.D. George Mason University 1990. Differences between government contracting and

commercial contracting: A relative price explanation.

David Stallings, Ph.D. George Mason University 1990. Flexible exchange rates and administered protection.

Lee M. Cohen, Ph.D. George Mason University 1991. Gerrymandering and the cube law of elections.

Ola A. Oyefusi, Ph.D. George Mason University 1991. The political economy of electric utilities.

Mark Lynner, Ph.D. George Mason University 1993. Regional studies of the political economy of economic growth.

Margaret Brinig, Ph.D. George Mason University 1994. Essays on the law and economics of the family.

Fletcher Magnum, Ph.D. George Mason University 1994. The institutional architecture of American state legislatures.

Jane Mulvey, Ph.D. George Mason University 1994. Paying physicians under medicare: An empirical application of the interest group theory of government.

Marilyn Pugh, Ph.D. George Mason University 1994. Capital budgeting processes and the productivity of public investments.

Radwan Saade, Ph.D. George Mason University 1994. Rules versus discretion in tax policy.

Robin M. Grier, Ph.D. George Mason University 1995. The effect of colonialism on economic growth: A cross national study of 63 colonial states from 1960‑1990.

Mark A. Calabria, Ph.D. George Mason University 1995. On the origins of Federal food and drug regulation.

William K. Stockman, Ph.D. George Mason University 1996. The crash of general aviation: A public‑choice perspective.

John M. Cobin, Ph.D. George Mason University 1996. Building regulation, market alternatives, and allodial policy.

Gustavo V. Arteta, Ph.D. George Mason University 1996. Central bank credit allocation: An interest group model of central bank independence.

Noel D. Campbell, Ph.D. George Mason University 1997. There goes the neighborhood: White settlement in the unassigned district.

David K. Rehr, Ph.D. George Mason University 1997. The political economy of the malt beverage industry.

William C. Miller, Ph.D. George Mason University 1998. Foreign subsidies and injury to domestic firms under dynamic scale and scope economies: An analysis of the jet aircraft industry.

Peter C. Melvin, Ph.D. Clemson University 2000. Golf course market analysis: Structural hedonic demand and supply estimates.

Gorkan R. Karahan, Ph.D. University of Mississippi 2001. The political economy of case bringing activity and jury selection procedures in federal district courts.

Robert E. Trimm, Ph.D. University of Mississippi 2002. Interest- group politics and the seventeenth amendment.

Michaek Reksulak, Ph.D. University of Mississippi 2002. Cost-Sharing Rules: An Experimental Comparsion of Three Mechanisms.