BUILDING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

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BUILDING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

MONDAY, MARCH 14, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:10 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Turner, and Kucinich.

Also present: Representative Waxman.

Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., senior policy advisor; Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Robert A Briggs, clerk; Hagar Hajjar, intern; Jeff Baran and David Rapallo, minority counsels; Andrew Su, minority professional staff member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled, "Building Iraqi Security Forces," is called to order.

Election day in Iraq saw less violence than most days before or since. Why? Broad travel restrictions certainly helped, but more significantly, Iraqi security forces, knowing crowded polling places made attractive targets, stepped forward to protect their emerging democracy; at times they did so heroically. In Iraq that day, we heard reports of police sacrificing themselves to tackle a would-be suicide bomber so voting could continue.

Building on that loyalty, pride and sense of ownership evident that day and every day is the key to security in the new Iraq. Current U.S. strategy seeks to bring Iraqi forces forward in the counterinsurgency fight as quickly as possible while transitioning coalition forces to an embedded advisory role; but as we and the Iraqis learned last year, too abrupt a transfer of front line security to minimally trained, weakly motivated and poorly led Iraqi forces risks defeats and defections and emboldens the terrorists.

The fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriation bill contained $5.7 billion to train and equip Iraqi security forces, adding to the $5 billion provided last year. The fundamental question behind these numbers; how will we and the Iraqis know with the right number of forces with the right skills and equipment are ready to assume the difficult, evolving security mission there? The answer is not just numbers, capabilities matter as much as quantities. Decisions about the strategist roles, doctrines, tactics and command

structures of Iraqi security forces will have profound implications on their ability to confront a violent insurgency while nurturing a democratic one. But numbers do matter. We need to know how many have been trained, how many will be trained, and how many will be deployed by the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior to secure their nation.

The effort faces daunting challenges. To fill the vacuum created by the abrupt dissolution of the entire army and police force after the fall of Hussein's regime, Iraqi security personnel must learn to fight while they fight. Uneven vetting of recruits and limited offsite training has left local police units undermanned, under-motivated and vulnerable to infiltration by the very insurgents they're meant to fight. Some in the new predominantly Shiite Iraqi government have proposed a re-deBa'athification of security forces, a move which others fear could further destabilize rather than help secure Iraq. But all these efforts should be guided and inspired by individual and collective examples of Iraqi determination to seize a safer future.

Mithal a-Alusi is a Sunni and the first Iraqi political official to travel to Israel to address an antiterrorism conference. For his courage, he was removed from his position on the De-Ba'athification Commission and he lost his personal security protection. On February 8th, his two sons were gunned down in Baghdad, and he still remains a target. When I met him here 2 weeks ago and offered to help him move to the United States for his own protection, all he wanted was to go back to Iraq and help his nation become a democracy.

As a recent article on a-Alusi observed, when you hear it asked whether Iraqis will fight for their own freedom, ask yourself whether it is possible to fight harder than Mithal a-Alusi.

In the January 30th election, his and more than 8 million other purple index fingers pointed the way to a peaceful and democratic future for the nation. Today we ask how we can best help them fulfill that destiny.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS,
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Christopher Shays, Connecticut
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Statement of Rep. Christopher Shays
March 14, 2005

Election Day in Iraq saw less violence than most days before or since. Why? Broad travel restrictions certainly helped. But more significantly, Iraqi security forces, knowing crowded polling places made attractive targets, stepped forward to protect their emerging democracy. At times, they did so heroically. In Iraq that day, we heard reports of police sacrificing themselves to tackle a would-be suicide bomber so voting could continue.

Building on the loyalty, pride and sense of ownership evident that day, and every day, is the key to security in the new Iraq. Current U.S. strategy seeks to bring Iraqi forces forward in the counterinsurgency fight as quickly as possible while transitioning Coalition forces to an embedded advisory role. But as we and the Iraqis learned last year, too abrupt a transfer of front line security to minimally-trained, weakly-motivated and poorly-lead Iraqi forces risks defeats and defections, and emboldens the terrorists.

The fiscal year 2005 supplemental appropriation bill contains 5.7 billion dollars to train and equip Iraqi security forces, adding to the five billion dollars provided last year. The fundamental question behind these numbers: How will we and the Iraqis know when the right number of forces, with the right skills and equipment, are ready to assume the difficult, evolving internal security mission there?

The answer is not just numbers. Capabilities matter as much as quantities. Decisions about the strategic roles, doctrines, tactics and command structures of Iraq security forces will have profound implications on their ability to confront a violent insurgency while nurturing a democratic one. But numbers do matter. We need to know how many have been trained, how many will be trained, and how they will be deployed by the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior to secure their nation.

The effort faces daunting challenges. To fill the vacuum created by the abrupt dissolution of the entire Army and police force after the fall of the Hussein regime, Iraqi security personnel must learn to fight while they fight. Uneven vetting of recruits and limited off-site training has left local police units undermanned, under-motivated and vulnerable to infiltration by the very insurgents they're meant to fight. Some in the new predominantly Shiite Iraqi government have proposed a re-deBa'athification of security forces, a move which others fear could further destabilize rather than help secure Iraq.

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Mr. SHAYS. The Chair at this time recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

To the witnesses, I understand that shortly we're going to have the honor of having our ranking member, Mr. Waxman, here, and I look forward to his presence as well.

I want to first begin by thanking the men and women who wear the uniform of this country and who serve in the Armed Forces and who serve valiantly and bravely in Iraq and around the world. I want to thank their families for giving their sons and daughters, their husbands and wives to this Nation for service. Their service is honorable, and no matter what our position happens to be with respect to this administration's policy, we can all agree that the men and women who serve ought to be honored.

I want to thank the chairman for holding the hearing, and I want to welcome the witnesses.

As the key investigative and oversight committee in Congress, we're the ones who must shine the light of truth on the security situation in Iraq. The truth, however, is elusive. This Congress has been misled time and time again about this war by this administration. This Congress has been told that we needed to strike Iraq preemptively in order to find weapons of mass destruction. We have not found a single WMD. In fact, the administration has given up to not even looking for WMDs anymore. We were also told that the United States would be greeted as liberators, yet 1,500 brave American soldiers have died so far, and the number increases daily, whether it is by suicide attacks or improvised explosive devices. Many Iraqi security forces and innocent civilians have also died needlessly. And there are thousands upon thousands of our soldiers who have been injured, as well as innocent civilians injured as well.

We were told that the administration had a plan for the occupation of Iraq and for reconstruction. We were told contracts would be openly bid, and that the process would be transparent; yet the Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority recently reported that the Coalition Provisional Authority could not properly account for a single penny of some $9 billion in funds turned over by the U.S.-led authority to the interim Iraqi government. Congress has spent $5.8 billion already on building Iraqi security forces, and now we're being asked to foot another $82 billion in costs for Iraq, including $5.7 billion to build Iraqi security forces. Is there a plan for spending this money wisely, or is the plan to keep throwing good money after bad? Will this $11.5 billion be properly accounted for as opposed to the $9 billion in funds that have not been properly accounted for?

Mr. Chairman, the current course we are on in Iraq is absolutely unacceptable. This administration seems to be blinded by and ignorant to the realities in Iraq. It is determined to see its policies through no matter how many wounded and how many casualties there may be, no matter how foolish and wrong-headed those policies may be.

We're told that these security forces need more time and more funds for training and for leaders to emerge to assume chains of command. Mr. Chairman, this administration has had enough time

and more than enough funds already. There is nothing more than a money pit that drains funds from our Nation's coffers.

The real problem is the administration has refused to admit it has made any mistakes. Violence, particularly that aimed specifically against these Iraqi security forces, has escalated in recent weeks despite the presence of these forces at polling places during the holding of the national elections in January. 125 Iraqi National Guard and police recruits died at a medical clinic recently at the hands of a suicide car bomber. Nearly every day other Iraqi security forces are killed by the improvised explosive devices or by suicide bombers. Insurgents remain in control over numerous areas of the country, and we are sending out security forces who are lightly armed, have only a few weeks or months of training, have limited mobility and continue to incur problems of recruitment and retention.

Most of these security forces have never even handled or shot an AK–47. Most are being used in support roles, not in fighting the insurgents who are hardened and hell bent on making sure that our mission there fails. We are sending these security forces into situations against an enemy who, it is well understood, they cannot possibly defeat. How do we honestly expect them to be ready by the end of this year or next?

None of these problems are a secret, yet this administration continues to mislead the American people and the Congress, its only solution to ask for more and more money and more time in the hopes the situation will improve, while their stubbornness is costing lives.

And more importantly, we also want to see our soldiers return home. We all want to see democracy succeed and flourish in Iraq, but there are lives here at stake, both American and Iraqi, and we still have no exit strategy. And Mr. Chairman, without an exit strategy, I don't see how in the world we can expect the American people to approve spending another dime in Iraq. Without an exit strategy, I don't understand how we can expect the American people to continue to approve of the sacrifice of their sons and daughters and mothers and fathers. What are we supposed to tell our constituents whose loved ones are missing from home, wounded or killed in service to their country? When will our soldiers be coming home?

It seems to me these deadlines for completing training and for rebuilding Iraqi security forces are completely artificial. Nobody knows how long the process will take. And we cannot support the Iraqis indefinitely financially or at a cost to our own Nation's military readiness. That is why I believe the United Nations should step in and shoulder the burden for training these security forces. They have the experience, long-term resolve, and the multi-national support to finish the job, and I urge Secretary Rice to work with Secretary General Kofi Annan to find a role for U.N. peacekeepers in Iraq. These are the real questions, the tough questions which need to be asked by the Congress about the long-term stability and security of Iraq. We need real answers before we can agree to new funding requests, we cannot cover our eyes and pretend problems will go away if we just sink more money into them.

Mr. Chairman, I hope all of our witnesses are forthcoming and candid in their testimonies. It's in everyone's interest that they speak honestly to the problems in building Iraqi security forces. We want equality troops in place and ready to take over, not just a quantitative figure that looks good on paper.

I led the effort in this House in challenging that war. It was a wrong war, and it was wrong to send our troops there, and we need to bring them home. And I hope this hearing is going to be the beginning of that step. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

Statement of Rep. Dennis Kucinich
Ranking Minority Member
House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives

Hearing on "Building Iraqi Security Forces"

March 14, 2005

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon to all of the witnesses here today. Thank you for holding this hearing.

As the key investigative and oversight committee in Congress, we must shine the light of truth on the security situation in Iraq. The truth, however, is elusive.

We have been misled time and time again about this war by this Administration. We were told we needed to strike Iraq pre-emptively in order to find weapons of mass destruction. We have not found a single WMD. In fact, we've given up, and we're not even looking for WMDs anymore.

We were also told we would be greeted as liberators. Yet, 1,500 brave American soldiers have died so far and the number

increases daily, whether it is by suicide attacks or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Many Iraqi security forces, and innocent civilians have also died needlessly as well.

We were told that the Administration had a plan for the occupation of Iraq and for reconstruction. We were told contracts would be openly bid and that the process would be transparent. Yet, the Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority recently reported that the CPA could not properly account for a single penny of some $9 billion in funds turned over by the U.S. led Authority to the interim Iraqi government.

Congress has spent $5.8 billion already on building Iraq's security forces, and now we are being asked to foot another $82 billion in costs for Iraq, including $5.7 billion to build Iraq's security forces. Is there a plan to spend this money wisely? Or is the plan to keep throwing away good money after bad? Will this $11.5 billion be properly accounted for?

The current course we are on in Iraq is simply unacceptable. This Administration seems to be blinded by and ignorant to the

realities in Iraq. It is determined to see its policies through, no matter how many wounded and casualties there may be, no matter how foolish and wrong those policies may be.

We are told that these security forces need more time and more funds for training and for leaders to emerge to assume chains of command. Mr. Chairman, this Administration has had enough time, and more than enough funds already. This is nothing more than a money pit that drains funds from our nation's coffers.

The real problem is that the Administration has refused to admit it has made any mistakes. Violence, particularly that aimed specifically against these Iraqi security forces, has escalated in recent weeks, despite the successful presence of these forces at polling stations during the holding of national elections in January. 125 Iraqi National Guard and police recruits died at a medical clinic recently at the hands of a suicide car bomber. Nearly every day, other Iraqi security forces are killed by IEDs (improvised explosive devices) or by suicide bombers.

Insurgents remain in control over numerous areas of the country, and we are sending out security forces who are lightly armed, have only weeks or months of training, have limited mobility, and continue to incur problems of recruitment and retention.

Most of these security forces have never even handled or shot an AK-47. Most are being used in support roles, not in fighting the insurgents who are hardened and hell-bent on making sure the U.S. fails. We are sending these security forces into situations against an enemy whom we know they cannot possibly defeat. Do we honestly expect them to be ready by the end of this year or next?

None of these problems are a secret, yet this Administration continues to mislead the American people and the Congress. Its only solution is to ask for more money and more time, in the hopes that the situation will improve. Their stubbornness is costing lives.

Most importantly, we all want to see our soldiers return home. We all want to see democracy succeed and to flourish in Iraq. But there are lives at stake here, both American and Iraqi,

and we still have no exit strategy. What are we supposed to tell our constituents, whose loved ones are missing from home, wounded, or killed in service to their country. When will our soldiers be coming home?

It seems to me that these deadlines for completing training and for rebuilding Iraqi security forces are completely artificial. Nobody knows how long the process will take, and we cannot support the Iraqis indefinitely financially or at a cost to our own nation's military readiness.

That is why I believe the United Nations should step in, and shoulder the burden for training these security forces. They have the experience, the long-term resolve, and the multinational support needed to finish the job. I urge Secretary Rice to work with Secretary General Kofi Annan, to find a role for U.N. peacekeepers in Iraq.

These are the real questions, the tough questions, which need to be asked by the Congress about the long-term stability and security of Iraq. We need real answers before we can agree to new

funding requests. We cannot cover over eyes and pretend problems will go away if we just sink more money into them.

Mr. Chairman, I hope all of our witnesses are forthcoming and candid in their testimonies today. It is in everyone's interest that they honestly speak to the problems in building Iraqi security forces. We want quality troops in place and ready to take over, not just a quantitative figure that looks good merely on paper.

Thank you, and I look forward to hearing our witnesses today.

Mr. SHAYS. The chairman recognizes Mr. Turner, the former vice chairman of the committee.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your efforts to continue our review of the operations occurring in Iraq and how we can improve them, both to make the country safer and more stable for our men and women in uniform, and for the Iraqi citizens.

I have had two opportunities to travel to Iraq, once in October 2003, and again this January, 2 weeks prior to the elections. During the last trip we had the opportunity to review some of the training opportunities for the Iraqi soldiers, and also an opportunity to look at some of the exercises that they were conducting, and it certainly is incredibly important work, not only for transition from a U.S.-led to an Iraqi-led security effort, but obviously for any hope of independence for Iraq as a nation.

It is certainly welcome that we had the announcement by NATO of their commitment to assist in this process. I know there are a number of issues that each of you will want to tell us today, and we will have a number of questions concerning how we can be effective, and but there is no question this is very important work.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time, the chairman will announce our panel before swearing them in. Mr. Joseph Christoff, Director International Affairs and Trade, U.S. Government Accountability Office, the Honorable Peter R. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense, accompanied by Rear Admiral William D. Sullivan, Vice-Director of Strategic Plans and Policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as Ambassador Richard A. Jones, Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq, U.S. Department of State, accompanied by Mr. Bill Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

I just want to state that I know that some of you had plans to be elsewhere, and maybe your testimony has been prepared a little late, and I understand that you fully tried to accommodate the subcommittee, and the subcommittee sincerely appreciates it.

Whether people supported the war or opposed the war, ultimately we want success, and we know that each and every one of you are working—your responsibilities to work toward that ultimate goal of success. So at this time, if I could just take care of business first in terms of asking unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for the period of 3 days for that purpose, and without objection, so orders.

I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statements in the record, and without objection, so ordered.

And at this time if you would stand, we will swear you in as we do. There is only one person who has never been sworn in in my 8 years of chairing the subcommittee, and that was—or 10 years, and that was the Senator from West Virginia; I chickened out.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. I note for the record our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

I think that we're going to start with Mr. Christoff, I believe that's the case, and then Mr. Rodman, you will be going. Secretary. And then we will proceed down the line.

Thank you, Mr. Christoff.

STATEMENTS OF JOSEPH CHRISTOFF, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; PETER R. RODMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. SULLIVAN, VICE-DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND AMBASSADOR RICHARD A. JONES, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY AND COORDINATOR FOR IRAQ, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY BILL TODD, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT, SECRETARY FOR THE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH CHRISTOFF

Mr. CHRISTOFF. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting GAO to this important hearing.

My statement today is based on GAO's ongoing work reviewing the security situation in Iraqi. In summary, we found the following: Data on the status of Iraqi security forces is unreliable and provides limited information on their capabilities. And the coalition must fight a growing insurgency while overcoming problems in the force structure, readiness and leadership of Iraqi troops.

Let me first describe the multi-national forces plan for transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqis. Under an October 2003 plan, Iraqi forces would assume increasing responsibility for security, first in local and regional areas, and then throughout the country. As the Iraqis assume more control coalition forces could begin to draw down.

In the summer of 2004, MNF–I developed a classified campaign plan based on this transition concept. As part of that plan, MNF–I intends to train and equip 271,000 Iraqi security forces by July 2006. As of late February 2005, the State Department reports that about 82,000 Iraqi police and about 60,000 military forces have been trained and equipped. However, these data do not provide reliable information on the status of Iraqi forces. For example, the number of trained police includes those who are absent without leave, which DOD estimates to be in the tens of thousands. Further, State no longer reports on the extent to which Iraqi security forces have their required weapons, vehicles and equipment. Accordingly, it is difficult to assess the status of efforts to train and equip Iraqi security forces.

It is equally difficult to judge the capabilities of Iraqi security forces because MNF–I is now developing a system to assess unit readiness. This system will help to assess the extent to which Iraqi forces can operate independently of U.S. assistance. However, this system will take time to implement.

MNF–I faces additional challenges. First, the Iraqi force structure is changing, making it difficult for the coalition to adequately train, equip and sustain Iraqi force. For example, the required number of police and border patrol forces has increased, the National Guard was merged into the Army, and special counterinsurgency units were formed.

The second challenge is developing strong Iraqi leadership and loyalty throughout the chain of command. Over the past year, coalition forces have observed questionable loyalty some Iraqi forces, poor leadership in the Iraqi units, and the destabilizing influence of militias. To address some of these problems, MNF–I plans to expand its use of military and police advisor teams within Iraqi units.

The third challenge is developing a police structure that upholds the rule of law while operating in a hostile environment. Most police were trained and equipped to conduct law enforcement functions in a peaceful environment, they were not trained to fight the insurgency. In December 2004, MNF–I was adding paramilitary skills to the training of the some police units. But in addition, the State Department has found that police in some areas have committed human rights abuses.

The coalition faces these collective challenges while confronting a growing insurgency. DIA data shows that incidents against the coalition, Iraqi forces and civilians increased significantly from June 2003 to February 2005. As shown in figure 1 of my statement, each monthly peak in the number of violent incidents is followed by a higher average number of attacks in subsequent months. In January 2005, General Casey stated that the insurgency has sufficient resources to maintain about 50 to 60 attacks per day in Sunni areas. He concluded that only a combination of political, military, economic and communications efforts would defeat the insurgency.

Since April 2003, Congress has provided about $5.8 billion to develop Iraqi security forces. Last month the President, an additional appropriation of $5.7 billion. However, without reliable information, Congress may find it difficult to judge how Federal funds are achieving the goal of transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqis.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer the subcommittee's questions.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Christoff follows:]

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Testimony

Before the Committee on Government Reform; Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at 12:00 p.m. EST
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REBUILDING IRAQ

Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police

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International Affairs and Trade

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Highlights

Highlights of GAO-05-431T, a testimony before the Committee on Government Reform; Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations; House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

Since the fall of the former Iraq regime in April 2003, the multinational force has been working to develop Iraqi military and police forces capable of maintaining security. To support this effort, the United States provided about $5.8 billion in 2003-04 to develop Iraq's security capability. In February 2005, the president requested a supplemental appropriation with an additional $5.7 billion to accelerate the development of Iraqi military and police forces.

GAO provides preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces; (2) the data on the status of forces, and (3) challenges that the Multi-National Force in Iraq faces in transferring security missions to these forces.

To prepare this statement, GAO used unclassified reports, status updates, security plans, and other documents from the Departments of Defense and State. GAO also used testimonies and other statements for the record from officials such as the Secretary of Defense. In addition, GAO visited the Iraqi police training facility in Jordan.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-431T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov.

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What GAO Found

The Multinational Force in Iraq has developed and begun to implement a strategy to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and police forces. This strategy would allow a gradual drawdown of its forces based on the multinational force neutralizing the insurgency and developing Iraqi military and police services that can independently maintain security.

U.S. government agencies do not report reliable data on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped. As of late February 2005, the State Department reported that about 82,000 police forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and almost 60,000 military forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have been trained and equipped. However, the reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable because the Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from the police forces around the country. The data does not exclude police absent from duty. Further, the departments of State and Defense no longer report on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are equipped with their required weapons, vehicles, communications equipment, and body armor.

The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. From that time through January 2005, insurgent attacks grew in number, complexity, and intensity. At the same time, the multinational force has faced four key challenges in increasing the capability of Iraqi forces: (1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2) developing a system for measuring the readiness and capability of Iraqi forces; (3) building loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing a police force that upholds the rule of law in a hostile environment.

The multinational force is taking steps to address these challenges, such as developing a system to assess unit readiness and embedding US forces within Iraqi units. However, without reliable reporting data, a more capable Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, the Department of Defense faces difficulties in implementing its strategy to draw down U.S. forces from Iraq.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges in transferring security responsibilities from the multinational force to the Iraqi military and police forces. In April 2005, we will issue a classified report to the Congress that provides additional analysis on this subject.

The former Iraqi regime fell in April 2003, and the United Nations recognized an interim administration—the Coalition Provisional Authority. On May 23, 2003, the Authority dissolved the military and paramilitary organizations of the former Iraqi regime and announced plans to create a new national self-defense capability for Iraq. In June 2004, the Authority transferred sovereignty to an interim government. At the time of Iraq's January 2005 elections, more than 159,000 U.S. forces and 24,500 coalition forces were operating throughout Iraq.

As of March 2005, the United States has made available about $5.8 billion to develop Iraq's security capability. In February 2005, the President requested a supplemental appropriation for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other purposes that included an additional $5.7 billion to accelerate the development of Iraqi security forces.

Today, I will provide preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces, (2) data on the status of Iraqi forces, and (3) challenges the Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) faces in transferring security missions to these forces.

This statement only includes unclassified information. (See appendix I for details on our scope and methodology.) We conducted work for this statement in February and March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary

Since fall 2003, MNF-I has developed and refined a plan to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and police forces.[1] The plan's objective was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction with the neutralization of Iraq's insurgency and second with

[1]GAO, *Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues*, GAO-04-902R (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004).

the development of Iraqi forces capable of securing their country. In summer 2004, MNF-I developed and began implementing a comprehensive campaign plan with this transition concept. The campaign plan is classified. As of March 2005, the Commander, U.S. Central Command, stated that Iraqi security forces were growing in capability but were not ready to take on the insurgency without the presence, help, mentoring, and assistance of MNF-I.

U.S. government data do not provide reliable information on the status of Iraqi military and police forces. The goal of the multinational force is to train and equip about 271,000 Iraqi security forces by July 2006. As of late February 2005, the State Department reported that about 82,000 police forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and almost 60,000 military forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have been trained and equipped. However, the reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable because the Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from the police forces around the country. The data also include police absent from duty. Further, State no longer reports on the extent to which Iraqi security forces have their required weapons, vehicles, communication equipment, and body armor.

The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it difficult to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. According to Department of Defense officials and documents, the insurgency has grown in intensity and sophistication. Attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi forces have increased in number over time, with the highest peaks of attacks occurring in August and November 2004 and in January 2005. At the same time, MNF-I faces four challenges in building an Iraqi security force capable of combating the insurgency. First, the Iraqi force structure for the military and police is changing with the creation of new units by MNF-I and the Iraqi ministries. This makes it difficult to provide effective support—the training, equipment, and sustaining of Iraqi forces. Second, MNF-I is still developing a system to assess the readiness of Iraqi military and police forces so they can identify weaknesses and provide them with effective support. Third, developing strong Iraqi leadership and ensuring the loyalty of all personnel throughout the chain of command has proven difficult. Fourth, MNF-I and the Iraqi ministries find it difficult to train a national police force that abides by the rule of law while operating in a hostile environment.

MNF-I is aware of these challenges and is working to address them. For example, MNF-I is developing a system to measure the readiness of the

Iraqi military and police and is moving to expand a system of embedded U.S. trainers to help develop strong Iraqi leadership.

Background

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established in May 2003, was the U.N.-recognized coalition authority led by the United States and the United Kingdom that was responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq. In May 2003, the CPA dissolved the military organizations of the former regime and began the process of creating or reestablishing new Iraqi security forces, including the police and new Iraqi army. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed responsibility for recruiting and training some Iraqi defense and police forces in their areas of responsibility.[2] On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to a sovereign Iraqi interim government, the CPA officially dissolved, and Iraq's transitional period began. Under Iraq's transitional law,[3] the transitional period covers the interim government phase and the transitional government period, which is scheduled to end by December 31, 2005.[4]

The multinational force (MNF-I) has the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to security and stability in Iraq during this process, working in partnership with the Iraqi government to reach agreement on security and policy issues. A May 2004 national security presidential directive required the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to direct all U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security forces. The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, which operates under MNF-I, now leads coalition efforts to train, equip, and organize Iraqi security forces.

MNF-I Plan for Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Forces

In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces. The four phases were (1) mutual support, where the multinational force establishes conditions for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces; (2) transition to local control, where Iraqi forces in a local area assume responsibility for security; (3) transition to regional control, where Iraqi forces are responsible for larger regions; and (4) transition to strategic

[2]The CPA was responsible for police training at the Baghdad and Jordan academies. The Iraqi army units were trained by the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.

[3]*Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period*, March 2004.

[4]See *Iraq's Transitional Law*, GAO-04-746R, May 25, 2004, for more information on key events during Iraq's transitional period.

over watch, where Iraqi forces on a national level are capable of maintaining a secure environment against internal and external threats, with broad monitoring from the multinational force. The plan's objective was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction with the neutralization of Iraq's insurgency and second with the development of Iraqi forces capable of securing their country.[5]

Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, MNF-I attempted to quickly shift responsibilities to them in February 2004 but did not succeed in this effort. In March 2004, Iraqi security forces numbered about 203,000, including about 76,000 police, 78,000 facilities protection officers,[6] and about 38,000 in the civilian defense corps. Police and military units performed poorly during an escalation of insurgent attacks against the coalition in April 2004. According to a July 2004 executive branch report to Congress, many Iraqi security forces around the country collapsed during this uprising. Some Iraqi forces fought alongside coalition forces. Other units abandoned their posts and responsibilities and in some cases assisted the insurgency.

A number of problems contributed to the collapse of Iraqi security forces. MNF-I identified problems in training and equipping them as among the reasons for their poor performance. Training of police and some defense forces was not uniform and varied widely across Iraq. MNF-I's commanders had the leeway to institute their own versions of the transitional police curriculum, and the training for some defense forces did not prepare them to fight against well-armed insurgents. Further, according to the CPA Director of Police, when Iraqi police voluntarily returned to duty in May 2003, CPA initially provided limited training and did not thoroughly vet the personnel to get them on the streets quickly. Many police who were hired remain untrained and unvetted, according to Department of Defense (DOD) officials.

[5]For more information on the security transition concept, see GAO-04-902R.

[6]The Departments of State and Defense stopped counting the Facilities Protection Service as part of the Iraqi security force structure in September 2004. The mission of the Facilities Protection Service is to guard and secure individual ministry and municipal buildings against vandalism and theft.

MNF-I completed a campaign plan[7] during summer 2004 that elaborated and refined the original strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces at the local, regional, and then national levels. Further details on this campaign plan are classified.

On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Iraqi security forces were growing in capability but were not yet ready to take on the insurgency without the presence, help, mentoring, and assistance of MNF-I. He cited a mixed performance record for the Iraqi security forces during the previous 11 months. The commander further testified that focused training and mentoring of Iraqi Intervention Forces, Iraqi Special Operations Forces, and National Guard forces contributed to successful coalition operations in places such as Najaf and Kufa during August 2004 and Fallujah during November 2004, and during the January 2005 elections. On the other hand, he also cited instances of poor performance by the police in western Baghdad from August through October 2004 and Mosul during November 2004.

Data on Iraqi Security Forces Has Limitations

U.S. government data does not provide reliable information on the status of Iraqi military and police forces. According to a March 2005 State Department report, as of February 28, 2005, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense had 59,695 operational troops, or roughly two thirds of the total required. The Ministry of Interior had 82,072 trained and equipped officers on duty, or almost half of the total required. Table 1 shows status of Iraqi forces under the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

[7]According to *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (JP 1-02; Nov. 30, 2004), a campaign plan is a plan for a series of related military operations to accomplish a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space.

Table 1: Status of Iraqi Security Forces as Reported by the Department of State

Ministry	Component	Required[a]	Operational/ Trained and Equipped[b]	Percentage of Required
Defense	Iraq Army • Regular Army • National Guard • Intervention Force • Special Operations	94,656	58,992	**62**
	Air Force	453	186	**41**
	Navy	582	517	**89**
	Sub-total	**95,691**	**59,695[c]**	**62**
Interior	**Iraqi Police Service**	135,000	55,274	**39**
	Highway Patrol	6,300		
	Other forces • Civil Intervention • Special Police • Emergency Response • Border Enforcement • Dignitary Protection	34,050	26,798	**79**
	Sub-total	**175,350**	**82,072[d]**	**47**
	Total	**271,041**	**141,761**	**52**

Source: State Department reports.

[a]Required numbers are from 1/19/05 Iraq Weekly Status Report.

[b]The term "operational" refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The term "trained and equipped" refers to Ministry of Interior forces. Numbers are from 3/2/05 Iraq Weekly Status Report.

[c]Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of Defense numbers.

[d]Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior numbers.

MNF-I's goal is to train and equip a total of about 271,000 Iraqi security forces by July 2006. However, the numbers of security forces, as reported in table 1, are limited in providing accurate and complete information on the status of Iraqi forces. Specifically:

- The reported number of security forces overstates the number actually serving. Ministry of Interior reports, for example, include police who are absent without leave in its totals. Ministry of Defense reports exclude the absent military personnel from its totals. According to DOD officials, the number of absentees is probably in the tens of thousands.

- The reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable. According to a senior official from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, MNF-I does not know how many Iraqi police are on duty at any given point because the Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting from police stations across Iraq.

- The Departments of Defense and State do not provide additional information on the extent to which trained Iraqi security forces have their necessary equipment. As recently as September 2004, State issued unclassified reports with detailed information on the number of weapons, vehicles, communication equipment, and body amour required by each security force compared to the amount received. State had also provided weekly unclassified updates on the number of personnel trained in each unit.

In addition, the total number of Iraqi security forces includes forces with varying missions and training levels. Not all units are designed to be capable of fighting the insurgency. For example, the police service, which numbers about 55,000 of Iraq's 141,000 personnel who have received training, has a civilian law enforcement function. As of mid-December 2004, paramilitary training for a high-threat hostile environment was not part of the curriculum for new recruits. The missions of other units, such as the Ministry of Defense's commando battalion and the Ministry of Interior's Emergency Response Unit, focus on combating terrorism. Required training for both forces includes counterterrorism. Table 2 provides information on the types of military and police units, their missions, and their training.

Table 2: Missions and Training of Iraqi Security Forces

Ministry	Unit	Mission	Training
Defense	Iraqi Army		
	• Regular Army	Defend Iraq against external threats. When directed, assist in providing defense against internal threats.	Eight weeks of basic training. Before deployment units receive follow-on operational training.
	• National Guard	Conduct stability operations to support internal security. Conduct constabulary duties in support of internal security.	Abbreviated 3-week basic training. Follow-on training similar to that given the regular army.
	• Intervention Force	Conduct operations to defeat anti-Iraqi forces, with primary focus on urban areas. Assist in the restoration of a secure and stable environment.	Four weeks of cadre training (for officers and noncommissioned officers); 13 weeks basic and urban operations training.
	• Commando Battalion	Support the Iraqi Counter-Terrorist Force. Similar in organization, training, and mission to the U.S. Army Ranger Battalion.	Regular army basic training. Instruction includes counter terrorism and unconventional warfare.
	• Counter-Terrorist Task Force	Direct action counter-terrorism similar mission, and training to U.S. Special Forces with counter-terrorist function.	Regular Army basic training; specialized 13-week course.
	Air Force	Provide aerial reconnaissance and rotary and fixed-wing transport for Iraqi Security Forces and authorities.	Training consists of 1 to 4 month familiarization instruction.
	Navy	Conduct security operations on Iraqi territorial waters, including gas and oil platforms, and, in conjunction with Department of Border Enforcement, conduct police operations on Iraq's coastline and territorial waters to counter piracy, smuggling, and other unlawful actions.	Regular Army basic training; follow-on training for land- and sea-based troops, advanced seamanship training.
Interior	**Police**	Provide law enforcement, public safety and internal security.	New officers: 8-week academy training. Serving officers: 3-week course.
	Highway Patrol	Provide law enforcement, internal security, and convoy security along Iraq's highways.	N/A
	Other forces		
	• Civil Intervention Force	Provide a national level, high end, rapid response police capability to counter large-scale disobedience and insurgents.	N/A
	• Special Police Commando	Provide a direct action, special operations, and counter insurgency capability in support of Ministry of Interior.	N/A
	• Emergency Response Unit	Provide a special operations police capability in support of the Iraqi Police Service.	Standard regular police training; 8-week specialized training focusing on terrorist incidents, high-risk searches, and weapons of mass destruction.

Ministry	Unit	Mission	Training
	• Department of Border Enforcement	Protect the integrity of Iraq's border and monitor and control the movement of persons and goods.	4-week academy training.
	• Bureau of Dignitary Protection	Provide close protection, convoy security, and fixed-site security for Iraqi key political leaders.	N/A

Source: MNF-I documents and DOD testimonies before Congress.

Note: N/A = Not available from an unclassified source.

Challenges to Transferring Security Missions to Iraqi Control

The multinational force's security transition plan depends on neutralizing the insurgent threat and increasing Iraqi security capability. The insurgent threat has increased since June 2003, as insurgent attacks have grown in number, sophistication, and complexity. At the same time, MNF-I and the Iraqi government confront difficulties to building Iraqi security forces that are capable of effectively combating the insurgency. These include programming effective support for a changing force structure, assessing progress in developing capable forces without a system for measuring their readiness, developing leadership and loyalty throughout the Iraqi chain of command, and developing police who abide by the rule of law in a hostile environment.

The Insurgency Has Intensified

According to senior military officials, the insurgency in Iraq—particularly the Sunni insurgency—has grown in number, complexity, and intensity over the past 18 months. On February 3, 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the insurgency in Iraq had built up slowly during the first year, then became very intense from summer 2004 through January 2005. Figure 1 provides Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data showing these trends in enemy initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure. Overall attacks peaked in August 2004 due to a rise in violence in Sunni-dominated regions and an uprising by the Mahdi Army, a Shi'a insurgent group led by radical Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Although the November 2004 and January 2005 numbers were slightly lower than those for August, it is significant that almost all of the attacks in these 2 months took place in Sunni-majority areas, whereas the August attacks took place countrywide. MNF-I is the primary target of the attacks, but the number of attacks against Iraqi civilians and security forces increased significantly during January 2005. On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that more Iraqi security forces than Americans have died in action against insurgents since June 2004.

Figure 1: Violent Incidents Against the Coalition and Its Partners, by Month, June 2003 Through February 2005



Source: MNC-I SigActs, 050000CMAR05

*According to DIA officials, June 2003 data are incomplete.

Insurgents have demonstrated their ability to increase attacks around key events, according to the DIA Director's February 2005 statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. For example, attacks spiked in April and May 2004, the months before the transfer of power to the Iraqi interim government; in November 2004 due to a rise in violence in Sunni-dominated areas during Ramadan and MNF-I's operation against insurgents in Fallujah; and in January 2005 before the Iraqi elections. The DIA Director testified that attacks on Iraq's election day reached about 300, double the previous 1 day high of about 150 during last year's Ramadan. About 80 percent of all attacks occurred in Sunni-dominated central Iraq, with the Kurdish north and Shia south remaining relatively calm.

In February and March 2004, the DIA Director and CENTCOM Commander presented their views of the nature of the insurgency to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee, respectively. According to these officials, the core of the insurgency consists of Sunni Arabs, dominated by Ba'athist and former regime elements. Shi'a militant groups, such as those associated with the radical Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, remain a threat to the political process. Following the latest round of fighting last August and September, DIA concluded that al-Sadr's forces were re-arming, re-organizing, and training, with al-Sadr keeping his options open to employ his forces. Jihadists have been responsible for many high-profile attacks that have a disproportionate impact, although their activity accounts for only a fraction of the overall violence. Foreign fighters comprise a small component of the insurgency and a very small percentage of all detainees. DIA believes that insurgents' infiltration and subversion of emerging government institutions, security, and intelligence services will be a major problem for the new government.

In late October 2004, according to a CENTCOM document, MNF-I estimated the overall size of active enemy forces at about 20,000. The estimate consisted of about 10,000 former regime members; about 3,000 members of al Sadr's forces;[8] about 1,000 in the al-Zarqawi terrorist network; and about 5,000 criminals, religious extremists, and their supporters. In February and March 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that it is difficult to develop an accurate estimate of the number of insurgents. The CENTCOM commander explained that the number of insurgent fighters, supporters, and sympathizers can rise and fall depending on the politics, problems, and major offensive operations in a given area. He also acknowledged that gaps exist in the intelligence concerning the broader insurgency, particularly in the area of human intelligence.

The CENTCOM commander and MNF-I commanding general recently cited Iraq's January 2005 elections as an important step toward Iraqi sovereignty and security but cautioned against possible violence in the future. In March 2005, the MNF-I commanding general stated that the insurgency has sufficient ammunition, weapons, money, and people to maintain about 50 to 60 attacks per day in the Sunni areas. The CENTCOM

[8]MNF-I refers to the al-Sadr's forces as Muqtada Militia.

Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the upcoming processes of writing an Iraqi constitution and forming a new government could trigger more violence, as the former regime elements in the insurgency seek a return to power. The MNF-I commanding general stated that a combination of political, military, economic, and communications efforts will ultimately defeat the insurgency.

Challenges to Increasing the Capability of Iraqi Security Forces

On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to take on the insurgency without the presence, help, mentoring, and assistance of MNF-I. MNF-I has faced four key challenges in helping Iraq develop security forces capable of combating the insurgency or conducting law enforcement duties in a hostile environment. These key challenges are (1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; (2) determining progress in developing capable forces without a system for measuring their readiness; (3) developing loyalty and leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing police capable of democratic law enforcement in a hostile environment.

Iraqi Security Force Structure Is Constantly Changing

The Iraqi security force structure has constantly changed in response to the growing insurgency. This makes it difficult to provide effective support—the training, equipping, and sustaining of Iraqi forces. DOD defines force structure as the numbers, size, and composition of units that comprise defense forces.[9] Some changes to the Iraqi force structure have resulted from a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq analysis of needed Iraqi security capabilities during summer 2004 and reported in October 2004.[10] The Iraqi government has made other changes to forces under the Ministries of Defense and Interior to allow them to better respond to the increased threat. According to a February 2005 DOD budget document, MNF-I and the Iraqi government plan to increase the force structure over the next year.

According to the October report, a number of enhancements in Iraqi force capabilities and infrastructure were critically needed to meet the current threat environment. Based on this review, the MNF-I Commander decided to increase the size of the Iraqi Police Service from 90,000 to 135,000 personnel; the Iraqi National Guard by 20 battalions to 62 battalions; and

[9] *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*

[10] Office of Management and Budget, *Quarterly Update to Congress, Section 2207 Report*, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2004).

the Department of Border Enforcement from 16,000 to 32,000 border officers. The review also supported in the creation of the Civil Intervention Force, which consists of nine specialized Public Order Battalions and two Special Police Regiments under the Ministry of Interior. This force is designed to provide a national level, high-end, rapid response capability to counter large-scale civil disobedience and insurgency activities.

Over the past year, the Iraqi government has created, merged, and expanded Iraqi security forces under the Ministries of Defense and Interior. For example, according to a DOD official, the Iraqi Army Chief of Staff created the Iraqi Intervention Force in April 2004 in response to the unwillingness of a regular Army battalion to fight Iraqi insurgents in Fallujah. This intervention force will be comprised of nine battalions and is the counter-insurgency wing of the Iraqi Army. According to Iraq's national security strategy,[11] the Iraqi government decided to increase the Iraqi Army from 100,000 soldiers to 150,000 personnel by the end of this year and extend the time required to complete their training from July 2005 to December 2005. The government planned to form this larger army by including the Iraqi National Guard and accelerating the training and recruitment of new troops. In addition, in late 2004, the Ministry of Interior added the Mechanized Police Brigade, a paramilitary, counter-insurgency unit that will consist of three battalions that will deploy to high-risk areas. It also created the paramilitary, army-type Special Police Commando brigades.

According to DOD document supporting the February 2005 supplemental request, the Iraqi government planned to add a number of additional military elements, primarily support units, to the force structure over the next year. These include logistics units at the division level and below, a mechanized division, and a brigade each for signals, military police, engineering, and logistics.

System for Measuring Iraqi Readiness Has Not Been Developed

MNF-I officials stated that, as of March 2005, MNF-I and the Iraqi government do not yet have a system in place to assess the readiness of Iraq's various security forces to accomplish their assigned missions and

[11] *Strategy for National Security and the Role of the Army and Internal Security Forces*, January 2005.

tasks.[12] However, in early 2005, the commanding general of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq said that MNF-I had begun work on a system to assess Iraqi capabilities. MNF-I plans to develop a rating system along the lines of the U.S. military readiness reporting system. According to the commanding general of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, this system most likely would have Iraqi brigade commanders evaluating such things as the training readiness of their units, their personnel field, and their equipping levels. They also would provide a subjective judgment of the units' readiness. The commanding general said that this rating system would take time to implement.

It is unclear at this time whether the system under development would provide adequate measures for determining the capability of Iraqi police. Because the police have a civilian law enforcement function rather than a military or paramilitary role in combating the insurgency, MNF-I may have to develop a separate system for determining police readiness.

Developing an Effective Iraqi Chain of Command

On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the establishment of an effective Iraqi chain of command is a critical factor in determining when Iraqi security forces will be capable of taking the lead in fighting the counterinsurgency. The CENTCOM Commander added that the Iraqi chain of command must be loyal and capable, take orders from the Iraqi head of state through the lawful chain of command, and fight to serve the Iraqi people. MNF-I faces several challenges in helping to develop an effective chain of command, including questionable loyalty among some Iraqi security forces, poor leadership in Iraqi units, and the destabilizing influence of militias outside the control of the Iraqi government.

The executive branch reported in July 2004 that some Iraqi security forces had turned to fight with insurgents during the spring uprising.[13] In October 2004, in response to questions we submitted, CENTCOM officials indicated that it is difficult to determine with any certainty the true level of insurgent

[12] *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines readiness as the synthesis of two distinct but interrelated levels: (1) unit readiness, which is the ability to provide capabilities required by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions; this is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was assigned; and (2) joint readiness, which is the combatant commander's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions.

[13] *Section 2207 report.*

infiltration within Iraqi security forces. Recent reports indicate that some Iraqi security personnel continue to cooperate with insurgents. For example, a February 2005 report cited instances of insurgent infiltration of Iraqi police forces. Police manning a checkpoint in one area were reporting convoy movements by mobile telephone to local terrorists. Police in another area were infiltrated by former regime elements.

In February 2005 press briefings, the Secretary of Defense and the commanding general of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq cited the leadership of Iraqi security forces as a critical element in developing Iraqi forces capable of combating insurgents. MNF-I officials indicated that they plan to expand the use of military transition teams to support Iraqi units. These teams would help train the units and headquarters and accompany them into combat. On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that there is broad, general agreement that MNF-I must do more to train, advise, mentor, and help Iraqi security forces. CENTCOM has requested an additional 1,487 troops to support these efforts and must have the continued support of the new Iraqi government.

The continued existence of militias outside the control of Iraq's central government also presents a major challenge to developing an effective chain of command. In late May 2004, the CPA developed a transition and reintegration strategy for disbanding or controlling militias that existed prior to the transfer of power to the Iraqi interim government.[14] Detailed information on the current status of militias in Iraq is classified. However, the CENTCOM Commander acknowledged the continued existence of older militias and the recent creation of new militias. He said that their presence will ultimately be destabilizing unless they are strictly controlled, come under government supervision, and are not allowed to operate independently.

Developing a Police Force in a Hostile Environment

MNF-I's efforts to develop a police force that abides by and upholds the rule of law while operating in a hostile environment have been difficult. U.S. police trainers in Jordan told us in mid-December 2004 that Iraqi police were trained and equipped to do community policing in a permissive security environment. Thus, Iraqi police were not prepared to

[14]Nine militias accepted the transition plans, but others either had not agreed or decided to continue hostile operations against the coalition rather than take part in the transition and reintegration process. See GAO-04-902R for more information on Iraq's militias and earlier efforts to disband them.

withstand the insurgent attacks that they have faced over the past year and a half. According to the State Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2004, more than 1,500 Iraqi police have been killed between April 2003 and December 2004. To address this weakness, MNF-I and the Iraqi government report taking steps to better prepare some police to operate during an insurgency. In a December 2004 press briefing, the MNF-I Commander stated that MNF-I was moving to add paramilitary-type skills to the police training program to improve some units' ability to operate in a counterinsurgency environment. U.S. police trainers in Jordan told us that the curriculum was being revised to provide police paramilitary capabilities. In addition, according to the Iraq's national security strategy, the Iraqi government is in the process of upgrading security measures at police stations throughout the country.

According to State's 2004 human rights report, police have operated in a hostile environment. Attacks by insurgents and foreign terrorists have resulted in killings, kidnappings, violence, and torture. Bombings, executions, killings of government officials, shootings, and intimidation were a daily occurrence throughout all regions and sectors of society. The report also states that members of the Ministry of Interior's security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses. For example, in early December 2004, the Basrah police reported that the Internal Affairs Unit was involved in the killings of 10 members of the Baath Party and the killings of a mother and daughter accused of prostitution. The report further states that, according to Human Rights Watch, torture and ill treatment of detainees by the police was commonplace. Additionally, the report states that corruption continued to be a problem. The Iraq Commission for Public Integrity was investigating cases of police abuse involving unlawful arrests, beatings, and theft of valuables from the homes of persons detained.

Conclusion

The multinational force has been working to transfer full security responsibilities for the country to the Iraqi military and police. However, the multinational force and Iraq face the challenges of an intense insurgency, a changing Iraqi force structure, the lack of a system to measure military and police readiness, an Iraqi leadership and chain of command in its infancy, and a police force that finds it difficult to uphold the rule of law in a hostile environment. MNF-I recognizes these challenges and is moving to address them so it can begin to reduce its presence in Iraq and draw down its troops. Of particular note is MNF-I's effort to develop a system to assess unit readiness and to embed MNFI-I transition teams into units to mentor Iraqis.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you or the other Subcommittee members may have.

Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202) 512-8979. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony were Lynn Cothern, Mattias Fenton, Laura Helm, Judy McCloskey, Tet Miyabara, Michael Rohrback, and Audrey Solis.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We provided preliminary observations on 1) the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces, 2) the data on the status of the forces, and 3) challenges the Multi. National Force in Iraq (MNF-I) faces in transferring security missions to these forces. We conducted our review for this statement during February and March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We used only unclassified information for this statement

To examine the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces, we focused on the 2003 security transition concept plan. We obtained and reviewed the transition plan and related documents and interviewed officials from the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Departments of State and Defense. Our work on this issue is described in June 2004 GAO report entitled *Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues* (GAO-04-902R). To update information on the transition concept, we reviewed statements for the record from the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander and the MNF-I commanding general on the campaign plan and on the capability and recent performance of Iraqi security forces. These statements focused on Iraqi security forces' ability to perform against the insurgency, as well as the training and mentoring of forces that contributed to successful operations.

To determine the data on Iraqi security forces, we reviewed unclassified Department of State status reports from June 2004 to March 2005 that provided information about the number of troops by the Ministries of Defense and Interior. We interviewed State and Department of Defense (DOD) officials about the number of Iraqi police on duty and the structure of the Iraqi police forces. To identify the type of training the Iraqi security forces receive, we reviewed and organized data and information from the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. We also visited the Jordan International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan to determine the training security forces receive. This approach allowed us to verify that Iraqi security forces have varying missions and training levels and not all are designed to be capable of fighting the insurgency.

To discuss the insurgency in Iraq, we reviewed statements for the record from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the CENTCOM Commander on the status of the insurgency. We obtained data and reports from DIA on the number of reported incidents from June 2003 through February 2005. We obtained written responses from CENTCOM on the strength and composition of the insurgency. To address the challenges to increasing the capability of Iraqi

security forces, we reviewed statements for the record by the CENTCOM Commander, the MNF-I commanding general, and DOD officials. We also examined the Iraqi National Security Strategy, funding documents from the Office of Management and Budget and State Department, and the fiscal year 2005 Supplemental Request of the President. We obtained and reviewed further breakdowns of briefings on the supplemental request. To identify challenges in developing the Iraqi police force, we interviewed police trainers in Jordan and reviewed the State Department's Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2004.

We obtained comments on a draft of this statement from State and DOD, including CENTCOM. All generally agreed with our statement and provided technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate.

Mr. SHAYS. Secretary Rodman, we will be going to you, and then to you Ambassador Jones. And then Admiral Sullivan, will you have testimony that you would like to share as well, a statement?

Admiral SULLIVAN. I do, yes.

Mr. SHAYS. And Mr. Todd? OK. So we will proceed that way.

Assistant Secretary.

STATEMENT OF PETER R. RODMAN

Mr. RODMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your courtesy. I do not have a prepared statement, but I would like to make a few introductory remarks, if I may, to set the context of what my colleagues will share with the rest of the committee.

Our strategy in Iraq is political as much as it is military, that's why you have before you a panel representing the Department of State as well as the Department of Defense.

In a nutshell, our strategy is to help Iraqis build new institutions, to fill the vacuum left by the removal of the old regime, political institutions, economic institutions, security institutions. So, by these political means, we are helping empower the moderate Iraqis who represent the overwhelming majority of the country. We help empower the moderates, and we help further isolate the extremists even while we continue, we and the coalition and the Iraqi forces continue to hunt down the enemy by military means.

The political strategy is exemplified most dramatically by the elections we saw on January 30th. As you know, this is the beginning of a process that we hope, we expect to unfold through the remainder of the year. On Wednesday, this transitional national assembly that was elected by those elections will have its first session, we expect a transitional government to be formed very quickly. This summer, a constitution will be drafted, which will be submitted to popular referendum, and by the end of the year, new elections will be held under the new permanent constitution.

On the military side, the focus is now on training, training Iraqis military and police to take on increasing responsibility for their own security. That's the subject that Admiral Sullivan will speak to.

Ambassador Jones, as you know, has served in Baghdad, and he is, I think, very qualified to speak about some of the political issues, as well an as some of the police training issues which the Department of State is involved in. But with that, let me turn it over to my colleagues.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Ambassador Jones. Great to have you here, and thank you for your service in Iraq.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD JONES

Ambassador JONES. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. My name is Richard H. Jones; I am the Secretary of State Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq policy.

As has been pointed out, prior to assuming these duties I served as the American ambassador in Kuwait, and during that period I spent 7½ months as the Chief Policy Officer and Deputy Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority. That experience, I be-

lieve, has given me unique perspectives on many of the issues that you will be discussing today.

I have a longer statement for the record, Mr. Chairman, but if you would allow me to summarize it briefly.

Mr. Chairman, you said that the ultimate goal in Iraq is success; I couldn't agree more. The question is, what does success mean? Well, for Iraq, success means a country that is capable of defending its democracy from enemies, domestic and foreign, who take up arms against it.

Ultimately, only Iraq can successfully defend Iraq. Right now, of course, the United States is bearing much of the brunt of the fighting of the insurgency, but Iraqis are taking on an increasing role. My colleagues from the Department of Defense are here to discuss our efforts to develop Iraqi security forces that can take the leading role in combating these insurgents. That is, if you will, the inner most circle of security, but there are other circles. One of several outer circles involves the development of civilian police and judicial correction systems that can enforce the rule of law and guard against the type of criminality that goes hand in hand with the insurgency—kidnapping, hostage taking, narcotics smuggling and so on. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement takes the lead in that effort. My colleague, Bill Todd, is here to take questions on specifics in that area.

But we must consider other circles, for example, we should consider a circle outside the security area, for example, a reconstruction and economic policy efforts, to root out any economic basis for the insurgency by creating the infrastructure and policy tools necessary for sustainable development of a sound market economy. Such an economy will inevitably create meaningful employment opportunities that allow people to lead normal lives and lessen the attraction of taking up arms.

There is another outer circle, the efforts to create a Democratic political system, which Assistant Secretary Rodman mentioned. A system for which the security forces will willingly fight, a system which keeps the police and justice systems working and which ensures that the fruits of reconstruction and economic development are available to all Iraqis. All of these circles are necessary for security and they all reinforce one another. We view each of them as essential to success in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, during Saddam Hussein's 35-year reign Iraq's police force and criminal justice system were institutions of public repression, intelligence gathering and arbitrary violence; they were state agencies to be feared.

Our programs must totally rebuild and reorient both a civilian police institution and a criminal justice system to reflect democratic values, respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law. Achieving these objectives requires intense effort and a long-term commitment. Our police development efforts have made an important start in meeting the challenges, and they will continue to do so.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much, Ambassador.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jones follows:]

Statement Of
The Department of State
To The
House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
And International Relations
March 14, 2005

Mr. Chairman, success for Iraq means a country that is capable of defending its democracy from enemies, domestic and foreign, who take up arms against it. Ultimately, only Iraq can defend Iraq. Right now, the United States bears much of the brunt of fighting the insurgency, but Iraqis are taking on an increasing role. My colleagues from the Department of Defense are here to discuss our efforts to develop Iraqi Security Forces that can take the leading role in combating the insurgents. That is the innermost circle of security, but there are others. One of several outer circles involves the development of civilian police and judicial corrections systems that can enforce the rule of law and guard against the type of criminality that goes hand in hand with the insurgency – kidnapping, narcotics, smuggling, trafficking. The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement takes the lead in that effort, and my colleague Bill Todd is here to take questions on that. We must also consider a circle outside that one: our reconstruction and economic policy efforts, to root out any

economic basis for the insurgency by creating the infrastructure and policy tools necessary for sustainable development of a sound market economy . Such an economy will inevitably create meaningful employment opportunities that allow people to lead normal lives and lessen the attraction of taking up arms. And there is another outer circle: the effort to create a democratic political system for which the security forces can fight, which keeps the police and justice system working, and which ensures that the fruits of reconstruction and economic development are available to all. All of these circles are necessary for security, and we view each of them as essential to success in Iraq.

The Department of State develops security policy and supports security initiatives of the Department of Defense (DOD) in Iraq. NSPD-36 assigns DOD/CENTCOM the authority and responsibility to develop all security forces in Iraq, including police. The Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), in coordination with the Government of Iraq, determines all aspects of police training, including recruiting, subject matter, duration of training, and the make-up and functions of special police units. Since April 2003, the Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has supported efforts in Iraq to reestablish police, justice, and prison systems.

The MNSTC-I goal is to train and equip 135,000 "regular" Iraqi police, plus approximately 15,000 personnel assigned to special units, and approximately 28,000 personnel for border enforcement. In order to provide the Iraq Police Service with the capacity to establish and maintain reasonable levels of public order, approximately 50,000 new police must be recruited, selected, and trained by December 2005. This plan will require more than 450 international police trainers in Jordan and Iraq. In addition, 500 international police liaison officers will supplement classroom instruction by providing field mentoring and technical assistance to the civilian police at all levels of the police structure and across all police functional specialties.

The definition of a trained police officer in Iraq is a relative term. It is based on the amount of training that can be reasonably administered and absorbed prior to the officer's deployment, considering the current security situation. The effort in Iraq focuses on rapid introduction of basic skills for new police recruits and an orientation to principles of democratic policing for existing police.

Comprehensive police capacity building is a long-term project, however, and development efforts need to be sustained and continuous. Developing a professional police officer normally takes years of training

coupled with experience, but the current security situation in Iraq does not afford us the luxury of that much time. Nevertheless, we are moving forward in conjunction with DOD.

INL is on track to provide basic police training to 77,300 new Iraqi Police by mid-calendar-year 2006. New recruits receive an eight-week basic skills course taught by International Police Trainers. This entry-level training course is conducted at the Jordan International Police Training Center (JIPTC) in Amman, the Baghdad Police College (formerly the Baghdad Public Service Academy), and eventually at eight regional police academies in Iraq. Of the eight planned regional centers, five are currently operating. As of March 9, 2005, 25,025 police have graduated from this training. As the police organization develops and the need for large numbers of recruits subsides, we plan to extend the time allowed for basic skills training.

Existing, experienced police officers attended a three-week Transition Integration Program (TIP) focusing on public service, human rights, and contemporary policing techniques. INL supplied the curriculum for this course, but DOD conducted the actual training. TIP training was conducted in Jordan and at various sites throughout Iraq. The TIP program has concluded, with a total of 34,801 having graduated from the program.

Specialized and advanced police training programs are being delivered by U.S. law enforcement agencies (e.g., FBI, ATF, DEA, USMS, DHS, DOJ/ICITAP) at the Adnan Palace Complex in Baghdad. The focus of this training is on management and development of advanced and specialized police skills. The management development program builds executive, mid-level management, and supervisory capacity, while the advanced skills development program imparts sophisticated, technical policing and investigative abilities. Courses cover such topics as basic criminal investigations, organized crime investigations, kidnapping investigation, civil disorder management, counter-terrorism investigations, and criminal intelligence gathering and analysis. As of March 9, 2005, 9,940 persons have participated in one of these training courses.

Currently, 228 police trainers from the U.S. and 279 police trainers from sixteen different countries are providing training to Iraqi police. Those countries are the United Kingdom, Jordan, Iraq, Canada, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, Austria, Finland, Czech Republic, Singapore, Poland, Australia, Hungary, Belgium, and Estonia. While most non-U.S. trainers are assigned to the JIPTC in Amman, four trainers from the United Kingdom provide instruction at the Baghdad Police College.

General Casey has stated that the Coalition will focus more effort on advising and assisting Iraq's Security Forces to improve their capabilities. Under this initiative, Coalition Forces will begin working more closely with police. In some areas, such as Baghdad, this effort has already started and should increase the amount of time International Police Advisors can spend with Iraqis in their work environment. While these advisors will not be able to provide field training as it is traditionally known, they will have more potential in contested areas to improve police effectiveness than they have up to this point.

IRRF supplemental funding supports costs associated with training and equipping the Iraqi Police, special units, and border enforcement personnel. To date, over $2.3 billion in total supplemental funding has been allocated to support the range of law enforcement training programs (not including justice programs and corrections facilities). The FY 2005 supplemental requests $5.7 billion for DOD for developing, training and equipping all security forces, including the Iraq civilian police. If the request is approved, DOD will provide funding to INL for continuation and expansion of its police training programs.

In addition, the Administration is requesting $26.5 million for INL Iraq programs in its FY 2006 budget request. The funds will provide

technical assistance and training to support institutional development and reform programs focused on the remainder of the Iraq criminal justice system, including prosecutors, courts, and correctional institutions.

During Saddam Hussein's thirty-five-year reign, Iraq's police force and criminal justice system were institutions of public repression, intelligence gathering, and arbitrary violence--they were state agencies to be feared. Our programs must totally rebuild and reorient both a civilian police institution and a criminal justice system to reflect democratic values, respect for human rights, and adherence to the rule of law. Achieving those objectives requires intense effort and a long-term commitment. Our police development efforts have made an important start in meeting the challenges.

Mr. SHAYS. Admiral Sullivan.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congressman Kucinich, thank you for the invitation to be here today to discuss our plans to develop Iraqi security forces.

I do not have a prepared statement or an opening statement. What I have done, however, is brought a couple of slides which are on the story boards off to your left which, if you think it will help facilitate the discussion, I would be happy——

Mr. SHAYS. That would be helpful, thank you.

Admiral SULLIVAN. I would be happy to walk you through those slides and then I will take your questions.

The first slide you see tracks the history of how we have been accounting for Iraqi security forces, and I hope will go along way toward explaining how these numbers have changed overtime. At the far left side of the slide is the beginning in October 2003, and the red line represents how security forces were tracked up until approximately April 2004.

Mr. SHAYS. Excuse me, 1 second. I am going to try to—because I think this is important. I have no objection if anyone from the press wants to just sit in the corner over there if they would like to see these. So if anybody would like to, they could do that. If we can turn it just a little more this way. Anybody else is welcome to as well.

Maybe what you could do, since the press has moved over, why don't you move this closer to us, OK. Just bring this board right there, right there is good.

David, why don't you—folks, seriously, just come on right up there.

And why don't you turn it more on an angle so the panel can see it as well. Keep going, keep going, keep going, no, I'm sorry, there is too much I'm forgetting for these folks there. Can you see it over there, David? OK, that's good.

Do you mind starting over again, and just give us——

Admiral SULLIVAN. Not at all, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. And give us what the axis means as well; kind of introduce this slide.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

As you look down the left side of the axis you see raw numbers of Iraqi security forces. And along the right side you see a calendar with dates running from October 2003 through the present—actually, through January 2005.

Beginning with the red lines, when we began accounting for and tracking Iraqi security forces, we were essentially tracking those that were simply on the payroll, and as we did self-assessments and took a look at what that really meant, we found that was not a very accurate way to count. In many cases, individuals who were not actually performing any security duties were being counted because they were held on the payroll.

Statement, we sent General Eichenberry, who had served in Afghanistan and had been involved in the buildup of the Afghan National Army, to Iraq to do an independent assessment at the request of General Abizaid to look at how we were measuring the growth of Iraqi security forces.

Shortly after that were the events in Fallujah in April 2004 when we found when under fire many of the Iraqi security forces did not perform up to standards; they either didn't show up, or they ran—not all of them——

Mr. SHAYS. Where would that be in your graph?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Just to the right of where Eichenberry assessment, the first star at the high point——

Mr. SHAYS. I'm still on the red line.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Admiral SULLIVAN. So as a result of both the assessments that had been done in theater as well as the experiences of April 2004, it was determined that we would only start counting and reporting those Iraqi security forces that had actually been through the training programs that were being sponsored by the Coalition. What that did to your numbers, as you see the dotted line drop from April 2004 to May 2004 was took us from about 206,000 total Iraqi security forces to about 132,000 Iraqi security forces.

We continued to report in that manner until approximately August 2004. In the meantime, General Petraeus had come on in July and stood up the multinational security training command in Iraq and done his own assessment and realized that for various reasons, not all of the graduates of the various security courses were being equipped as they came out of school for various supply reasons and whatnot. At the same time, we looked at something called the Facilities Protection Services, which was services that were hired by the various ministries to provide night watchman-type security to those ministries. Because those individuals were not performing duties that were directly responsible for security in the country or fighting the insurgency, we tried to stop counting the Facilities Protection Service at the same time that we changed our own standard to only counting those Iraqi security forces that had been through the MNF-TCI training and were equipped to the level that they were required to be equipped for the duties that they were to perform.

So you saw a drop between August 2004, where we were at about 160,000 to September 2004, where the number dropped to 90,000. So that drop was accounted for by only including those that were trained and equipped, and dropping the Facilities Protection Services off the roles.

We have continued to use that same standard through today. We are just now beginning, and they are developing the metrics in country, to begin a qualitative assessment of how the various Iraqi security forces are doing, modelling it after the kinds of systems we use for our own military to measure unit readiness.

I think it is important to point out that we have continually assessed the way that we are developing security forces and the way that we're measuring the progress of those security forces, and we have adjusted our plan and our reporting as we go through that.

I will be happy to take any questions you might have on this particular chart——

Mr. SHAYS. We will come back to that. Do you have another chart?

Admiral SULLIVAN. I do have another chart, if we can swap them, please.

This second chart provides you the numbers as of our latest report from theatre of what we are considering trained and equipped forces in both Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense. Now these numbers will change this week as we get this week's report in from Baghdad.

Now I have divided it up into administrative interior forces, which as correctly stated by Mr. Christoff, roughly 82,000 MOI security forces. And in the administrative defense, which includes the Army, the National Guard, the intervention and special operations forces, as well as the Air Force and Navy, were just over 60,000 trained and equipped.

I draw your attention to the two asterisks. The numbers per Ministry of Interior forces include people who might be AWOL, as Representative Kucinich described, because we aren't able to accurately track the police and Ministry of Interior forces the way we are the Ministry of Defense forces, and I will explain that. So if you look at the double asterisk under Ministry of Defense, you will see that number reflects anybody who is AWOL or on leave or otherwise not on duty.

The reason we can track the Ministry of Defense is for the most part these forces live in Garrison, they get up every morning and there is a head count so the unit commanders know how many people they have and whether they are there for duty or not. The administrative interior forces are different. Like other police forces they operate on a shift-type cycle, and there is a very significant cultural difference here. And this existed prior to the fall of the Hussein regime and exists today, and that is that they don't have a central banking system and automatic deposit system for the people in Iraq like we do in our country.

When I get my paycheck, I don't have to do anything, it goes right into my bank account. These people get paid in person. If they are living away from their families, the way they get that pay home is by going home and dolling out the money to their families. And this has been a cultural thing with the Iraqis throughout time.

Under the Saddam regime, when they went home—and maybe they stayed home and helped bring in a crop and didn't report back for duty when they were supposed to, they weren't punished like we would punish our own people for failing to report for duty. Their enlistment was extended for the number of days that they were absent without leave. So that's one of the things that we're dealing with on the AWOL side is a cultural as well as a logistical problem for these people to get money to their families or to help their families in their hometowns.

So with those two slides as backdrop, I'm prepared to answer your questions.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Historical Perspective on ISF Reporting



UNCLASSIFIED

Current Status of Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces

Ministry of Interior Forces

COMPONENT	TRAINED & EQUIPPED
POLICE	55,015
HIGHWAY PATROL	
OTHER MOI FORCES	26,874
TOTAL	81,889*

Ministry of Defense Forces

COMPONENT	OPERATIONAL
ARMY	59,880
AIR FORCE	186
NAVY	517
TOTAL	60,583**

Total Trained & Equipped ISF:

142,472

* Ministry of Interior Forces: Unauthorized absences personnel are included in these numbers

** Ministry of Defense Forces: Unauthorized absences personnel are not included in these numbers

Data as of 7 Mar 05

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much. We were given this slide here—so we have a sheet——

Admiral SULLIVAN. That should be the same.

Mr. SHAYS. 142, I think it is the exact same. It says dated as of March 7th.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. So we have that one to refer to, so maybe we should put the other board up. And it would be helpful to get this, just for the record, in paper size if you are able to do that.

Mr. Waxman has walked in and I would like to let him start out because he hasn't yet spoken. Is there any comments before any—Mr. Secretary, do you have any additional comment before we start the questions? Well, let me just say that you are giving us something to which we can work with and it is very appreciated, and obviously there will be a number of questions.

What I would like to do is leave 10 minutes to pursue the questions, and that way we can get into it more.

So Mr. Waxman, you have the floor.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to ask Ambassador Jones some questions.

This morning I sent a letter to President Bush revealing that the Pentagon's own auditors determined that Halliburton overcharged by at least $100 million under its no-bid Iraqi oil contract. Most of the overcharges were for petroleum brought in from Kuwait during the time you were Ambassador. For months Halliburton's subcontractor in Kuwait was a company called Altanmia, a commercial marketing corporation, and they charged inflated prices to import fuel. In late 2003, the Army Corps of Engineers sought out lower-priced alternatives to Altanmia.

However, based on documents this committee obtained from the State Department, it appears that you personally intervened to halt this effort and keep the Kuwait company. On December 2, 2003 you sent on an e-mail saying, "Tell KBR, Halliburton's subsidiary, to get off their butts and conclude deals with Kuwait now. Tell them we want a deal done with Altanmia within 24 hours, and don't take any excuses. If Ambassador Bremer hears that KBR is still dragging its feet, he will be livid."

You wrote that e-mail, didn't you? Is that correct?

[The information referred to follows:]

"Tell KBR to get off their butts and conclude deals with Kuwait NOW! Tell them we want a deal done with Altanmia within 24 hours and don't take any excuses. If Ambassador Bremer hears that KBR is still dragging its feet, he will be livid."

E-mail from Ambassador Richard Jones (December 2, 2003).

Ambassador JONES. That is an excerpt from an e-mail I sent, yes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Why did you write it?

Ambassador JONES. Why did I write it?

Mr. WAXMAN. Yes.

Ambassador JONES. Congressman, I wrote that e-mail in my capacity as the Chief Policy Officer and the Deputy Administrator of Iraq, duties that I assumed on November 17th of that year, about 2 weeks prior to the writing of that e-mail.

When I assumed those duties, one of the first jobs Ambassador Bremer gave me was to increase the supply of humanitarian fuels for the Iraqi people. Now they had gas lines of considerable length in the summer, and we had a very difficult time in arranging fuel supplies for the Iraqi people at that time. The situation in November was trending along lines similar to what Ambassador Bremer had seen in the summer. He was very anxious to increase the supply of fuel for the Iraqi people, and so he asked me to undertake this, even though this was actually not in my area of normal responsibility, because my counterpart had not yet arrived in country——

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me ask you this; there was an emergency in May 2003 right after the hostilities ended, and the auditors took that into account, they said these high prices might have been reasonable for 1 to 3 months, but this was going on for almost a year.

They also said the Defense Department refused to show that they exhausted cheaper fuel sources from Jordan and Turkey. If the Army was looking for a cheaper way to do the job, why would you tell them not to look for a cheaper way but to sign another contract with Altanmia?

Ambassador JONES. Mr. Representative, I never spoke to the Army about this contract; I never asked them to ignore lower cost suppliers. If you allow me to continue, I can explain the complete story to you.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, the problem is that we only have a limited time, so why don't you directly answer the question.

Ambassador JONES. OK. One of my first duties was to obtain more fuel supplies. The first thing I did was travel to Ankara, where I met with Turkish authorities in order to clear up congestion on the borders which was inhibiting our supply of fuel from Turkey——

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Jones, I'm going to have to interrupt you. Let me just ask you the next question. You're a political appointee of the Bush administration, why did you exert such extreme pressure on civil service contracting officials to get them to sign their——

Ambassador JONES. I never exerted any pressure on any contracting officials. I never spoke to KBR about its contract, I never spoke with anyone about KBR's contract. If you allow me to continue, Congressman——

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, you did send them an e-mail.

Ambassador JONES. That e-mail relates to lifting deliveries of fuel for the month of December under a contract which KBR had already agreed to several months before with Altanmia. The only reason that I would mention a specific company is because KBR already had a contract with that company. And we were looking to get as much fuel as we could from all sources. We had started by

checking with Turkey, and we determined after my trip that it would be impossible to increase the amount of fuel that was coming in through Turkey.

I don't know anything about Jordan, I'm not privy to any such contracts——

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Ambassador, there is a woman named Mary Robertson, she was the contracting officer responsible for this contract. She was so troubled by your e-mail that she wrote it up in a letter saying, I will not succumb to political pressures from the U.S. Embassy to go against my integrity and pay a higher price for fuel than necessary. So she clearly felt it was pressure. Were you aware of this, or have you become aware of this?

Ambassador JONES. I have heard that she circulated such a letter; however, I do not know this person, I have never met her, I have never spoken with her, I don't know on what basis she made that claim.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, when she made the basis for that claim, she was a career contracting officer, and she wanted to get Kuwaiti approval of another company to import the fuel. Did you make any attempt to persuade the Kuwaitis to approve another company?

Ambassador JONES. I did not intervene in any way in the contracting process.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, let me ask you, have you ever met Waleed al-Humaidhi, the general manager of Altanmia?

Ambassador JONES. Not to my recollection, sir.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me make sure that you are saying that you did not meet with him, for the record.

Ambassador JONES. I don't recall meeting with him. It's possible he could have been in a meeting that I had with the Kuwaiti Minister of Oil on one occasion.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, we were informed that you had met with Mr. al-Humaidhi in Kuwait.

Halliburton, a U.S. company, the U.S. Government was paying hundreds of millions of dollars to this company, Altanmia, and now Pentagon auditors have concluded they were overcharged. Did you ever have any cause to doubt Mr. Waleed al-Humaidhi's trustworthiness in his business dealings with the U.S. Government or Halliburton.

Ambassador JONES. No, because I wasn't privy to those dealings.

Mr. WAXMAN. Have you ever heard of Mr. al-Humaidhi?

Ambassador JONES. I have heard of him, certainly. And there were people in my staff who may have had contact with him, but personally, no, I never did, other than the possibility that he may have been in presence in one meeting I had with the Minister of Oil.

Mr. WAXMAN. You had no reason to believe that he was not a credible person.

Ambassador JONES. No, I do not.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, according to internal embassy documents obtained by this committee Mr. al-Humaidhi multiple repeated allegations to embassy officials at your embassy that Halliburton executives demanded kickbacks. He said it was, "common knowledge that Halliburton officials were on the take, that they solicit bribes openly, that anybody visiting their seaside villas at the Kuwaiti

Hilton with offers to provide services would be asked for a bribe." That's what Mr. al-Humaidhi said. Did you ever investigate these allegations?

[The information referred to follows:]

Al-Humaidhi asserts that he and his employees were pressured to provide unnamed KBR executives with "kickbacks" on the humanitarian fuel contract.

It is "common knowledge" in Kuwait that … KBR officers are on the take; that they solicit bribes openly; that anyone visiting their seaside villas at the Kuwaiti Hilton who offers to provide services will be asked for a bribe.

Kuwaiti Firm Altanmia Alleges Kellogg, Brown & Root Contract Improprieties, **Memorandum by Economic Advisor, U.S. Embassy Kuwait (June 29, 2003).**

Ambassador JONES. The U.S. Embassy is not an investigative body, we have no such authority. However, we did refer all of those allegations to their proper investigating authority, which is the Defense Contract Audit Agency. So we took the appropriate steps that we could as U.S. Government officials.

Mr. WAXMAN. Let me go back to the first question. Why did you, as a political appointee Ambassador in Kuwait, send an e-mail, from which I take an excerpt, to tell KBR, the Halliburton subsidiary, to get off their butts and conclude deals with Kuwait, now tell them we want to deal with Altanmia within 24 hours, and don't take any excuses. Why single out Altanmia if they were——

Ambassador JONES. Sir, Altanmia was the company that had the contract with KBR already to provide the fuel, and we were looking for fuel from every source available to us. I had already been to Turkey and had determined that there was not going to be any capability of increasing fuel supplies from Turkey in the short run. We had one source where there was a contract that was not being fully utilized, and that was the KBR contract with Altanmia. We had already had contact with KBR—not me personally, but officials of the Coalition Provisional Authority had already been urging KBR to increase the amount of fuel that it was purchasing. They had been involved in discussions. We had been led to believe those discussions were almost complete, and then I received a report that they had broken down. And so that's when I—that was the context in which I sent that e-mail, but this was lifting under a contract that had already been agreed to between KBR and——

Mr. WAXMAN. Mary Robertson, a civil service contracting officer, said there were other companies that could bid and get a lower price than Altanmia. As a result of Altanmia's charges, we paid over $100 million, and later, when we finally figured out how much we were being overcharged, the U.S. Government told KBR we won't deal with you anymore, they put out a competitive bid. Altanmia came in and they are charging a third of the price to the desk operation for petroleum than what they were charging when you and others pushed Halliburton into this——

Ambassador JONES. I did not push Halliburton into anything.

Mr. SHAYS. The gentleman's time is up.

No, Ambassador Jones, I think it's clear that you didn't, but——

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, rather than reach a conclusion, I think this e-mail stands for itself.

Mr. SHAYS. No. I purposely didn't interrupt the gentleman because he has rightfully wanted to get at this issue, and I understand it; and this committee is helping him get the documents that he's getting. I just apologize to you, Mr. Jones, because I didn't tell you, nor did I know, that you would be asked these questions, and they're almost an attack on your integrity and you haven't had time to review them. So I apologize for that.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. SHAYS. No, I have the floor.

I want to explain to you, Mr. Waxman, I understand your motivation because this committee, and has not and the full Congress has not had the kind of hearings on this that you rightfully requested, and I hope to resolve that. I think the solution is to have

a hearing on this issue where the witness is told about it and warned about it and so on.

I just to want say to you, Ambassador Jones, I have been to Iraq seven times, and I would have written the same memo. We're in the first 6 months of the rebuilding of Iraq, and we need that fuel out there. I would have been the first to do it. And I would stand by that statement any day.

Ambassador JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it.

Mr. SHAYS. Now if there were issues about what contracts were let out in the future, that's another issue, and I understand. And I also agree with you, Mr. Waxman, in that Halliburton was overpaid.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, would you yield to me?

Mr. SHAYS. Briefly I will yield to you.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you. You've been a fair chairman to allow the questions to be asked.

I was not taking any liberty in asking something that Mr. Jones needed to review because he was the Ambassador, he wrote the e-mail; I wanted to ask about that.

And I don't believe, Mr. Chairman, had you been in this position, if the civil service contracting officer said that there was a chance to get the oil at a cheaper price, you would have said no, go with the company that's going to charge the higher price because you've already overpaying them, let's continue to overpay them.

Mr. SHAYS. Reclaiming my time.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you for the courtesy of the questions.

Ambassador JONES. If I could just follow up after that last comment, Representative Waxman. I wouldn't either, and I never did. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. And I think the point that I just want to put on the record is 6 months into the rebuilding of Iraq and we were starting to encounter some huge problems at this time, I just would have wanted to resolve each of those problems and then sort out the dollar amounts in the future.

But I would like to say that I was very grateful to you, Ambassador Jones, that you came to this hearing to help us understand what is also an issue that I know Mr. Waxman cares deeply about, and that is, you know, how are we doing? What are we doing to ultimately be able to transfer the power and the responsibility?

I was a strong supporter of our seeing an Iraqi government take over in June of last year, I thought that was a huge moment in time. And one of the things that I have lost in my 7 visits in Iraq is that the Iraqis are a very proud people; you embarrass an Iraqi in front of his wife, you might as well put a dagger in his belly and twist it.

In the case now, what we're trying to get a handle on, and it's so important that we do this because ultimately success means that the Iraqis have the capability to defend their democracy, something, first, they didn't have a democracy before, and they are now. But it also means that ultimately our role becomes a different role. It means that American solders aren't having to patrol streets, it means American soldiers can come into the background, and it means that ultimately they will be called upon to take on particu-

lar actions, and not do the everyday responsibilities that they are being asked to do today.

Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out that $100 billion could have been used to train Iraqi security forces, that was money that could have been used for our troops; that was money that was wasted by the overpaying for the petroleum. That was the point. I don't think it's irrelevant to what we're talking about here, and I just wanted to point that out——

Mr. SHAYS. I would like the gentleman not to be too sensitive here because I'm trying to restrain myself as well.

The point is that I understand——

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, are we going to hear the testimony from the witnesses or——

Mr. SHAYS. I am reclaiming my time.

Mr. WAXMAN. May I inquire——

Mr. SHAYS. No, absolutely not.

Mr. WAXMAN. No, I don't want to inquire. Go ahead.

Mr. SHAYS. Come on, Henry, this is silly. This committee will end up with no role if we're not going to do the role that we have when we have this hearing, and this is an important hearing.

I would like, if you would, Mr. Rodman, to just tell me again so I can get refocused; what I think I'm hearing you say is that your on-duty account of over 200,000 Iraqi security forces—excuse me, Admiral Sullivan, what I'm hearing from this is, as you went through it, that we on paper had this number, but we began to realize that they were really people receiving in a sense paychecks, but we had no sense of their capabilities; is that an accurate statement?

Admiral SULLIVAN. I think that's exactly right, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. So DOD is attempting to fully appreciate what we had, so then we began with a number that we thought were trained. When that number drops down, that dotted line number drops down, it's a figure, I guess—is that 150,000?

Admiral SULLIVAN. It's is actually a drop, let me just check.

Mr. SHAYS. Is it 132?

Admiral SULLIVAN. The figure at the beginning of the green line is 90,000. So we rent from roughly 160 in August 2004 to 90,000 in September 2004. Are you on the red line, sir?

Mr. SHAYS. I'm going from the red line down to the——

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. 132 is the number at the beginning—the left hand edge of the blue line.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, is that military, police and border patrol?

Admiral SULLIVAN. It's all of the Iraqi security forces, it's police, border security, Army, National Guard, to the extent that they exist, an air force, and maybe—all of the Iraqi security forces to include the border, or the Facilities Protections Service.

Mr. SHAYS. Then explain, did we think at that point that we had 132,000 that were actually trained, or did we——

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. That is the number that had been through the coalition training programs for each of the various categories that were in existence at the time.

Mr. SHAYS. And that's May 2004?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir, that is May 2004.

Mr. SHAYS. And so then we increased that number, then it started to level off, and then I'm seeing another drop. Explain that next drop. And that number, if you could, that peek of the train represents—what was that number?

Admiral SULLIVAN. About 160,000.

Mr. SHAYS. And so at 160,000 you dropped it down. Explain that now.

Admiral SULLIVAN. We dropped it down to about 90,000, and we did two things at that point. First of all, we eliminated the Facilities Protection Service, which was not a part of the Iraqi security forces——

Mr. SHAYS. Explain the Facilities Protection Service.

Admiral SULLIVAN. These are like night watchman, these are people who were hired by the various ministries to stand guard over their——

Mr. SHAYS. And they were hired by the Iraqi government?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. And in many cases, each ministry had their own pool of these types of people. I equate them to, if you go to Pentagon City Mall and you see the guards walking around the mall, the Arlington County Police doesn't count them as part of their county security forces.

The facility protection folks——

Mr. SHAYS. Does that account for the whole drop, or were there some other reasons for that drop?

Admiral SULLIVAN. The second reason, and probably the most significant reason from the standpoint of measuring our progress, is that unless the people that were trained were also fully equipped for whatever role they were playing, we did not count them. So, for example, a soldier comes out but we don't have a weapon to give him, we don't count him on that green line; or if he doesn't have a radio that he needs to perform the function.

Mr. SHAYS. So if he's trained but minus equipment, you're not going to call him trained and equipped?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. That is the standard we're using today, trained and equipped by the various programs that are in existence.

Mr. SHAYS. And so under that first drop of trained, if we had then done trained and equipped, it would have clearly been well below that.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. Because at that point in time, we were pumping out the graduates of the various courses faster than the equipment was arriving, so they weren't all equipped.

Mr. SHAYS. In one of the contacts that I had with General Petraeus, and then interacting with the Iraqis, what I was being told was that Iraqis at one point were fighting next to our own soldiers, but they did not feel that they had the same equipment that our own forces had. So you could understand their reluctance sometimes to engage in battles which were sometimes—the implication was that they did not have the courage and so on. They might not have had the experience, but it was—as we began to understand this more in terms of equipment and, in some cases, training, it became very understandable.

And so, should I have some confidence that this trained and equipped number we are at right now—at what number now?

Admiral SULLIVAN. We are 142,000. That is both ministries. That is that chart that you have in front of you there, the total trained and equipped.

Mr. SHAYS. So what you are doing now to help divide this up for us is that you are telling us police and highway patrol, 55,000, the—what is the other?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Well, there are a number of forces that have been established under the ministry of interior in addition to your basic police and your highway patrol. They include something called the civil intervention force, an emergency response unit, the division of border enforcement—that is your border police. There are special police commando battalions, then there is dignitary protection services.

So all of those fall under the other ministry of the interior forces.

Mr. SHAYS. Are you prepared to tell us which groups here are the better trained? I mean, is the army better trained than the police?

I mean, I realize their missions are different, but can you tell us where you have a little bit more confidence?

Admiral SULLIVAN. What I would do and the way I would answer that, sir, is first of all, like you said, it is comparing apples and oranges, because their missions are very different. So I wouldn't want to say——

Mr. SHAYS. So we won't compare then. But I guess what I want to understand is, do we have more confidence in the training of the army than we do with the police, or do we have more confidence in the vetting with the army than we do with the police? Can you speak to that issue?

Admiral SULLIVAN. I would have to maybe take that one for the record. But my off-the-cuff response is, I think we have pretty equal confidence in both forces as they come through the training programs that have been set up.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Mr. Christoff, would you respond to what you are seeing here? How do you react to this when you see it? And tell me how you react to it.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. First of all, I have found this chart very helpful, because we have been, in some sense, struggling to try to understand definitions, trying to understand what is trained and equipped. There were prior terms that were used—"full operational capability," "limited operational capability."

The one question I am still unclear about is that in trained and equipped, are all of those forces fully equipped in terms of having the body armor, the communications equipment, the vehicles and the weapons that they need?

The reason why I am still unclear about that is because September 2004 is the last time that there was really any published information that went into the different categories about the extent to which these different forces had all of the equipment that they needed.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. And I do want to say parenthetically, just reacting to my esteemed ranking member, I am eager to see us spend money on training and equipment for Iraqis—so that they do have the capability. That is one of my lessons learned from my visits to

Iraq, that they, one, need the training; and two, they need the equipment.

Now, how we spend that money and so on, you know, that is an obvious issue of whether we are spending it in the best ways possible. But I want to say, this has helped me for first time kind of sort out exactly, Mr. Christoff, your challenge.

So your point to me, though, is a better definition of equipment would be helpful?

Mr. CHRISTOFF. To do the type of reporting that I last saw in September 2004, in which you would break out the different units and the percentage of weapons that they had available, etc.

Mr. SHAYS. Admiral.

Admiral SULLIVAN. OK. I think I understand where Mr. Christoff is going here, and that is really the next phase of this effort. That is to develop the metrics for each of the units, not only some measure what was just described in terms of equipment, but also a qualitative assessment of their ability to conduct their missions.

In our Army, it is called the "unit status report," and it takes into consideration a large number of things. At the individual level, it takes into consideration, has the individual been through the training that is required for him to perform the job that he is assigned?

Does he have the equipment that he needs to perform that job? Has he—at the unit level, that is, is that equipment, whether it be vehicles, weapons, aircraft or whatever, is it—has it met a certain minimum standard of operational readiness? If they are required to have 1,000 sets of body armor for a particular unit, does that unit have 1,000 sets of body armor? Has the unit gone through unit training so that they know how to operate together?

So that is a separate and distinct category from individual training, where you teach the individual how to operate his own weapon, now you teach him how to operate as a unit. So all of that goes into a unit status report which is the means by which we in our own military measure our own unit readiness.

There is a little bit of subjectivity in it, but most of it is pretty well laid out in the governing directives, as to what you have to rate yourself. If, for example, you have 100 trucks and only 60 of them are operating up to standard, then you have to drop your readiness rating in that particular category. And that results in an overall readiness rating.

The subjectivity part includes, has this unit been in combat? Has it been tested in combat with the enemy; and if so, how did it do? Another unit perhaps has not engaged with the enemy, so there is more uncertainty as to their readiness. So that is the next step in this process in how do we begin assessing the Iraqi units in a similar way that we assess our own military forces across all of the services.

Mr. SHAYS. One of the things I am struck by is that you can train them extensively and have confidence, but if they have not engaged in encounters with the enemy, you really can't have the kind of assessment that——

Admiral SULLIVAN. Even in our own military, not every unit gets engaged with the enemy. But we still are required to assess our unit readiness. So that is the subjective part.

Mr. SHAYS. Right.

Admiral SULLIVAN. I mean, a commander who has seen a particular battalion in the fight, and they have acquitted themselves well, is going to have a higher personal assessment of what that unit's readiness is than he will of a unit that hasn't been tested.

Mr. SHAYS. I just conferred with Mr. Kucinich who—really his time is now in use, so he has agreed that I can just continue here a bit. That is the advantage when we have fewer members, we can get into this a little bit more.

Can you explain to me, and then what I will tell you, Ambassador Jones, I would be interested, given your experience being in Iraq, how you react to all of this, and if you can add a little color and tone to this.

But let me first ask you, Admiral, how about the police? The same readiness standards?

Admiral SULLIVAN. They are developing the same kind of standards. I probably am better off deferring to INL to answer that question, because there are different categories and different standards that apply to the police services than there are to military forces.

Mr. TODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Basically, I&L is a subordinate to the command of General Petraeus and Munson in general in Iraq, as well as we run the Jordan facility. We develop the curriculum in Jordan for training we do in Jordan as well as in Iraq.

We have been working on the readiness of our police force, as you know, over the last 18 months. A big part of the readiness, to be quite frank with you, is the FTO program. Our training is broken down into two parts. One part is the 8-week training course, and then the next part is the on-the-job training that takes place supposedly over the next 6 to 8 months.

Over the last 18 months, because of the security situation, General Petraeus with, of course, General Casey's blessings has morphed the FTO program into being less rather than more. So the readiness is in a constant state of play. It is getting better; the FTO program is improving.

We are improving basically the IPLOs, which are the advisors that go into the field with the actual police officers. We have right now over 300 outside of Baghdad, we have approximately 200 in Baghdad; and we think the force is getting better.

Mr. SHAYS. Ambassador, do you care to add any comment, just in general about the questions that I've asked?

Ambassador JONES. No. I am glad you mentioned the police, because the comment that I have been wanting to make while listening to this is that the problem is that the equipment and training standards are rightfully different for the police than for the armed forces. Even within the armed forces, different units get different equipment and training, of course.

But particularly on the police side, what we saw in April, there were a lot of problems in the south at that time with the police coming under attack and leaving their police stations, leaving their posts. And when we went back and looked at the situation, it was exactly what you were alluding to, they were basically outgunned by their opponents.

At that time, at least, we were training and equipping the police for police functions. And they were equipped as you would expect

police to normally be equipped. But, in fact, they were attacked by forces that were equipped more like an army. And it is very hard for light police forces to stand up to an army.

I mean, for example, they were coming under mortar and RPG fire in their police stations. And, you know, we put it all into perspective at that point, and realized that, well, yes, these people cut and run, but it is probably better that they did so to preserve their lives so they can be used at some point in the future.

And it did, I think, cause us to reassess how we were training and equipping people. We realized that we had to plus-up the equipment that we were giving to the police, because the problem is, they couldn't choose who their opponents were. Their opponents chose the fight. If they were only equipped as sort of a normal police force, they would have a very difficult time standing up to some of the opponents they were going to face on the ground in Iraq.

So we had to upgrade that. I think that process has been ongoing since that time.

Mr. RODMAN. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to broaden the point that Ambassador Jones just made. The chart on historical perspective shows us doing a number of things. It shows us learning some lessons from experience, it shows us adapting to changes and circumstances.

At the very beginning, when we got there, there was a premium on numbers. The Iraqi army and police had evaporated. So there was a premium on getting people out there, establishing a governmental presence—police on the beat, people protecting facilities—and we knew they were not trained to do heavy duty functions, but we needed to establish an Iraqi presence.

Mr. SHAYS. I understand, because I was asking you to do that, and so were other Members of Congress. So we were all playing a role in this. I am not saying that as a compliment, I am saying in some ways that we were asking you to do something that was very difficult.

Mr. RODMAN. Well, that is correct. But then in April 2004, you remember, there was a surge in violence and these people were tested, police and army units, and we realized that a lot of them did not meet the test, so we gave ourselves a more rigorous measure of who really was trained to do a mission.

And the second dotted line—again as Admiral Sullivan has explained, after General Petraeus arrived, we dropped the facilities protection people out because that was a lesser—not as important as the police and combat function. And, in addition, we started looking toward the Iraqi—the Iraqis themselves taking on greater responsibility. And so we again gave ourselves a harder metric of people who were trained and equipped up to a higher standard, such that we could begin to look toward an Iraqi force that could take on real responsibility.

So that is really the story that this chart tells.

Mr. SHAYS. I am not going to spend a lot more time questioning this panel when Mr. Kucinich is done. He may then have a few more questions.

But the question I would like you to think about is what are those numbers ultimately going to be in each area, where we have

a comfort level that they should have at least the opportunity, a fair shot, to be able to realize "success."

So, Mr. Kucinich, thank you for your patience.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Thank you for holding this hearing and providing the opportunity for the Congress to ask some necessary questions.

Mr. Rodman began by saying that the strategy is political as much as it is military. I would respectfully suggest to the witnesses that the report that you just brought to this Congress with this slide show, as you call it, or side show as I would call it, is unfortunately political.

Let me be specific, and the people in the media who are seated in the corner might want to follow this discussion. If you look from the peak of involvement, 206,000 troops, and you go to 90,000, and you see—what you see is a drop-off of about 53 percent in one-half year. And in the latest—of the latest figures, GAO says the number of Iraqi police is unreliable.

Now, let us take this chart and the GAO report together and add to it the second chart that the witnesses provided about the current status of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces. You start to develop a totally different picture.

First of all, the GAO says that the numbers are unreliable with respect to both the data from the ministry of interior forces and the ministry of defense forces. I take it they are talking about all of the numbers.

Second, the GAO points out there is no consistent, accurate reporting, which frankly makes these numbers fiction, especially the ones of the ministry of interior forces.

Third, the GAO says, and this—one of the witnesses admitted, that with respect to the ministry of interior forces, the unauthorized absences of personnel are included in these numbers, which is a polite way of saying that these books are cooked.

And the fourth point is, the GAO says that the Department of Defense and State no longer report on the extent to which Iraqi security forces are equipped with their required weapons, vehicles, communications equipment and body armor. So much for security forces.

On the fifth point, GAO has pointed out that there is no means in place to even measure the success of the Iraqi security forces.

You should be embarrassed to be here. I mean, this is like fantasyland. This is as fictive as the weapons of mass destruction are.

I mean, I am embarrassed for you that you would come to a congressional committee with this kind of a phony report. Just look at the numbers. And I sat down there so I could take a careful look at the chart. Not reliable data. That is the best that can be said of what you are presenting to this committee, the best.

Now, speaking of not reliable data, Ambassador Jones, I just want to reiterate what Mr. Waxman said about the $100 million that was overpaid, that could have been used for training the Iraqi security forces or for equipping our troops.

But let me for a moment go into another part of your illustrious background, which is quite impressive. You served from November 17, 2003, until June 28, 2004, concurrently, as the chief policy offi-

cer and deputy administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. That is from your biography here.

It also says something that I think is very interesting, that you have a proficiency in a number of languages, including Arabic; is that correct? Well, then would you be so kind as to enlighten me as to how in the world the Coalition Provisional Authority, during the time that you were one of the officials, lost track of $90 billion?

It certainly wasn't because, according to an audit that was done that this committee is familiar with, they lost track of how the Iraqi Government was spending $90 billion, that the Coalition Provisional Authority had the responsibility for oversight. Hello?

Do you want to give some accounting here, to be the first person in the administration to offer a guess as to where the money is?

Mr. SHAYS. Will the gentleman just yield a second? Do you want them to first answer your first part and you will have time to ask this.

Mr. KUCINICH. I am asking the Ambassador a question. We can get back to the other witnesses so they can engage.

Mr. SHAYS. I just wanted to know.

Mr. KUCINICH. I did not ask, Mr. Chairman, a specific question. I made a statement. I want an answer from Ambassador Jones.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador JONES. Representative Kucinich, I haven't seen the report that you are talking about. So you have me at a disadvantage. But I believe that the figure you mentioned, $90 billion, could not possibly be accurate.

Mr. KUCINICH. Excuse me. I misspoke. It was $9 billion. I misspoke.

Ambassador JONES. Whatever the figure is——

Mr. KUCINICH. It was $9 billion. Thank you.

Ambassador JONES. I see.

Mr. KUCINICH. I am glad you see. It was $9 billion.

Ambassador JONES. I do not know what it was. I haven't seen the report. I just knew that $90 billion could not possibly be right.

Mr. KUCINICH. I just corrected the record.

Ambassador JONES. You have me at a disadvantage. I haven't read the report. But I can assure you that all of those who worked at the Coalition Provisional Authority felt that they had a fiduciary interest on the behalf of the Iraqi people to use Iraqi funds in the best manner possible, for those Iraqi funds that we had under our jurisdiction.

And I can assure you that any American funds were also treated with the same high standards. Whether or not the standards——

Mr. KUCINICH. Let me cite the record. On January 30, 2005, the same day as national elections were held in Iraq, the Special Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority noted in a report that the Coalition Provisional Authority could not account for $9 billion in funds transferred from the CPA to the interim Iraqi Government.

Now, Ambassador Jones, you have not read that report?

Ambassador JONES. It hasn't been provided to me, no.

Mr. KUCINICH. Do you have any interest in the report?

Ambassador JONES. It doesn't—it does not relate to my current responsibilities.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Rodman, have you read the report?

Mr. RODMAN. I have not read it. I have seen that figure published.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Rodman and Ambassador Jones, who is investigating the IG's findings that $9 billion is missing in Iraq? Mr. Rodman.

Mr. RODMAN. I can get you that answer for the record, Congressman.

Mr. KUCINICH. Ambassador Jones.

Ambassador JONES. I think Assistant Secretary Rodman has given a good answer.

Mr. KUCINICH. The inspector general of the Coalition Provisional Authority—Mr. Chairman, I sent you a letter on it asking for a hearing on it. I did not know that we were going to have two gentlemen who, you would assume, would have some interest in the fact that $9 billion, which went—which the Coalition Provisional Authority had responsibility for accounting for, in funds that were transferred from the CPA to the interim Iraqi Government, that they can't give any answer at all.

No clue? I mean, is this possible, that they could have been in a position of responsibility, that a report has been issued and you haven't read that report about $9 billion missing? I find that incredible.

You want to give it a try again, Ambassador? Are you really—you took an oath here.

Ambassador JONES. I am waiting for you to finish speaking, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. That is kind of you, but I just asked you a question.

Ambassador JONES. I told you I have not read the report. I have not read the report because I was not in my current assignment when it was released, and I have other duties. I do not spend my time going over an inspector general's report. An inspector general is an investigation. That is what he is trying to find out.

Now, because I haven't read the report, I cannot answer you to the extent that I would like.

Mr. KUCINICH. You have no knowledge of the inspector general's report?

Ambassador JONES. I saw the press reports. But as I said, it is not part of my current duties from——

Mr. KUCINICH. Did anyone from the IG's office contact you to———

Ambassador JONES. No. No. It was not my responsibility when I was in Iraq, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. You were the chief policy officer and deputy administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority?

Ambassador JONES. There were two deputies to Ambassador Bremer. There was an operational deputy. That is where the money was.

Mr. KUCINICH. What was his name?

Ambassador JONES. I was the policy director.

Mr. KUCINICH. Who was the operational deputy where the money was?

Ambassador JONES. There were three during my tenure. The names are in the public record.

Mr. KUCINICH. You never heard any discussion about them losing control of the money?

Ambassador JONES. From what you have described, it is very difficult for me to understand which period you are even talking about, sir.

You said transferred by CPA to the IIG. The IIG did not exist until June 28th, which is when CPA disappeared, and we all left Iraq.

Mr. KUCINICH. This was during the time that CPA was in charge, and it was during the time that you, sir, were a member of that organization. That——

Ambassador JONES. You are speaking about Iraqi funds.

Mr. KUCINICH. Listen, are you saying those funds aren't as interesting to this committee?

Ambassador JONES. No, I am trying to clarify.

Mr. KUCINICH. That is exactly what I am saying.

Ambassador JONES. I am not aware that we transferred any money to the control of Iraqi officials during CPA's tenure.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, the inspector general seems to think that you had control of $9 billion that you did transfer, and now you are saying——

Ambassador JONES. CPA had fiduciary responsibility to administer the development fund for Iraq, DFI. We used those moneys for the benefit of the Iraqi people in a number of ways.

And CPA kept very detailed records, and that is why I am perplexed to hear your description of the report. I would have to read the report to respond effectively. And that is what Assistant Secretary Rodman has suggested we will do, and we will do so.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, I have a copy of the audit report here, the oversight of funds provided to Iraqi ministries, to the national budget process, from the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, dated on the date that I said.

And I have an executive summary here which points out the scope of the audit, points out that,

> The Coalition Provisional Authority provided less than adequate controls for approximately $8.8 billion in DFI funds provided to Iraqi ministries during the national budget process; did not establish or implement sufficient managerial, financial or contractual controls to ensure the funds were being used in a transparent manner. Consequently, there is no assurance that the funds were used for the purposes mandated by Resolution 14–83.
>
> With respect to managerial controls, they did not implement adequate managerial controls over DFI funds provided to Iraqi ministries to the national budget process; specifically, authorities and responsibilities over DFI funds were not clearly assigned, and CPA regulations, orders and memoranda did not contain clear guidance regarding the procedures and controls for disbursing funds in a national budget.
>
> With respect to financial controls, they did not implement adequate financial controls to ensure DFI funds were properly used. With respect to contract controls, the CPA did not adequately control the DFI contracting actions.
>
> While acknowledging the extraordinarily challenging threat environment that confronted the CPA throughout its existence, we believe the CPA's management of Iraq's national budget process and oversight of Iraqi funds was burdened by severe inefficiencies and poor management.

And then it goes on and on and on.

Now, I want to include this in the record, if I may, Mr. Chairman, and once again express my astonishment that someone who was in any kind of a policy role with respect to the CPA wouldn't

be literate about the content of this record, and would tell this committee that they just do not know anything about it.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, if the gentleman would yield. Like my time was up, his time is up. And I would be happy to let him proceed on this.

But I just have to say that there is only one witness who would have a tangential responsibility, but his issue was policy, not operations of the budget. And the one thing I—someone said, if you are a workaholic, there is one place to go to; that is Iraq.

I don't have any doubt at all that Ambassador Jones, spent every waking hour in Iraq working. But he was doing the areas and responsibilities that he was tasked. If there is a fault here, then put it on my shoulders for not responding to your January 31st letter, in general. But this is an issue to which I have tasked my staff to decide how we are going to allocate our hearings.

This is an important issue. I don't want to discount it. I think it is very unfair to Ambassador Jones to put the weight of this on him. It should really be more directed at me. And I would just like to say that I appreciate the gentleman's patience.

Could I ask if there is any point in which the Democratic side of the aisle is going to deal with the hearing that we are undertaking, or is it going to be about an issue that is not part of the hearing? That is what I am wrestling with.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, Mr. Chairman, then let me be of assistance to you in that regard.

This panel is trying to make a case about the effective transition toward the handling of the security of Iraq by the Iraqi security forces. I pointed out that by the very information that they have presented, they have not made their case. In fact, they have made a good case that they failed.

Furthermore, the connection is this, Mr. Chairman: We have to vote this week on $82 billion—something in the area of that—for a supplemental appropriation for Iraq. And it is relevant if the people who are coming before us, who are tasked with responsibility in that area, cannot give us a straight story on anything—on what happened to $9 billion, on what the status is of the Iraqi security force.

I mean, as far as I am concerned—and you did the right thing in calling this hearing, and I am grateful for it—but this is central to why we are here.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, the problem is that I will be discouraged from having a hearing on a topic, because I do not know if one side of the aisle or the other is going to address the issue.

Ambassador Jones was scheduled to go to Iraq. He is here today to answer questions about the whole training issue to which he has tremendous expertise and knowledge. And I just want to say to you that you made points in the beginning that I think, if they were true and you feel they are true, they should have the opportunity to respond to them.

And that is, the essence was, your point was that these numbers are somehow inaccurate and bogus. And what I felt from this hearing is——

Mr. KUCINICH. The GAO said that.

Mr. SHAYS. No, what they said was they are numbers, and I think their numbers were unclear, and what they have done is

come in to try to help us understand. And I think Mr. Christoff's response was, now I am able to put into perspective these various issues.

For me, the reason why I was eager to have this hearing was to begin to understand how we are doing, and what it is going to take to have success. I do not even feel—and correct me if I'm wrong, gentlemen of the panel; I do not feel like you are making a great claim that we have success here.

You are trying to have us understand, as this war proceeded, how you have tried to sort out what it will take to have success, and to give us accurate numbers about what you think that will be. That is what I was getting from this hearing.

But I am not, again, discounting the issue of concern that my colleague has. I just didn't give him the panel and the people who have the expertise to answer his question. And the reason why I haven't made a bigger deal out of this issue is, I think you have a legitimate right to be frustrated that we in Congress haven't come to address the money issue better.

But this is an extraordinarily important hearing about how well trained the police are, how well trained the border patrol are, how well trained the army is, what are the numbers that we can get a handle on. We are starting to get them for the first time since I have been in Congress. I really appreciate it.

The gentleman has the floor to proceed to this question. But I hope they can—this panel can address your first point.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, I would like each of the witnesses to answer the question, yes or no, whether you believe that this administration underestimated the levels and abilities of insurgents in Iraq.

Mr. Christoff.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. I do not think I have enough information to address that.

Mr. KUCINICH. I accept that.

Mr. RODMAN. The situation changed. I think the regime had a preexisting plan to resort to guerilla warfare when the regime collapsed, and they gradually put this plan into effect. And we have adapted to the changes in circumstances as we have encountered them.

Mr. KUCINICH. So you are saying that this is Saddam Hussein's doing, this insurgency?

Mr. RODMAN. We know for a fact that this was a plan set up by the Iraqi security services to resort to this kind of warfare after the regime.

Mr. KUCINICH. Is Saddam directing this from his cell?

Mr. RODMAN. No. But the direction of the insurgency is hardcore, former regime elements.

Mr. KUCINICH. This plan was in motion—and do you know for a fact? Have you seen such a plan?

Mr. RODMAN. We have information that is a specific plan by the old regime, and they gradually regrouped and started to put it into effect, and we have adapted to that.

Mr. KUCINICH. So is your answer yes or no that they underestimated the level in abilities of the insurgents in Iraq?

Mr. RODMAN. We did not anticipate the kind of insurgency as it evolved; and we have adapted to it, and we are responding to it to defeat it.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you.

Admiral SULLIVAN. Before I address that question, I would like to address the first comment.

Mr. KUCINICH. Why not address my question? Answer my question, if you would, please; then I would like to hear from you about anything else.

Admiral SULLIVAN. I would be happy to respond, sir. I think Mr. Rodman said it exactly right. We did not anticipate the level of insurgency that we saw, especially as it built through the year 2004.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK. You had something else you wanted to say, Admiral.

Admiral SULLIVAN. I do.

First of all, I am not embarrassed to be here in front of this committee, and I stand by the numbers that are on that chart that I showed you. If you will allow me to explain why I say that, I will.

These numbers are verified every week by General Petraeus and by General Casey. We trust their judgment. The numbers on the ministry of defense forces absolutely represent those personnel that have been trained and equipped through our training system.

The number under the ministry of interior forces likewise represents the numbers of personnel that have been trained and equipped through our system.

And I would submit to you, it would be more "cooking the books" if we took this asterisk off the chart and tried to represent that all 81,889 of these people were on duty. Instead, we have tried to be up front with you and admit that there are gaps in our knowledge as to who is on duty on a given day.

Thank you.

Mr. KUCINICH. May I ask you, Admiral, when you say unauthorized-absence personnel are included in these numbers under ministry of interior forces, do you want to explain what you mean by that?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir. As I explained at the beginning, the accounting for the ministry of interior personnel is less precise than it is for the ministry of defense. They do shift work. At any given time, whatever kind of shifts they are on, so many of those people are not on duty, only the personnel whose shift is on duty are on duty.

Second, they do not have the—because they live at home, they do not have the same kind of requirements for a morning muster that the military forces do. So there is less certainty. If patrolman so-and-so goes home to see his family for the weekend and doesn't come back, they may not know that right away. So it is just a less precise accounting, and it is the nature of the business that they are in.

Mr. KUCINICH. So there would tend to be an agreement with the GAO, then, on your part?

Admiral SULLIVAN. The numbers that I presented to you represent the numbers of personnel that have been trained and equipped. It doesn't say they are all standing the beat right now.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK.

To Ambassador Jones, do you believe that this administration underestimated the level and abilities of insurgents in Iraq?

Ambassador JONES. I think that the answers that the previous two witnesses have given are accurate.

I think that in the beginning—and you must recall that Saddam Hussein was at large for 8 months after the liberation; that is a long time to try and organize an insurgency, and I do believe that he played a leading role in rallying his forces. Obviously, since his capture, he hasn't been able to do that; but in the 8 months prior to that, he was very active doing so, and I think a plan that he set in motion continues.

But, as Admiral Sullivan mentioned, we have also seen a growth in the insurgency. And so I think at any given time, we probably had a relatively good handle on the size of the insurgency, but the insurgency has been growing over time. It goes down sometimes, but it also goes up.

I don't think that there have been wildly inaccurate estimates of the insurgency at any given time, but rather that the nature and the size of the insurgency has evolved, and we have been trying to track that.

Mr. KUCINICH. So are you saying that this insurgency does or doesn't have something to do with Saddam Hussein?

Ambassador JONES. No. I think it definitely does; certainly its origins do.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Todd.

Mr. TODD. I think prior to the war the size of the insurgency was not contemplated at this level.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, it is also possible that the war created a level of insurgency, is it not, Mr. Todd?

Mr. TODD. That is above my pay grade, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. OK.

Mr. Rodman.

Mr. RODMAN. I don't believe that. I believe this was the hard core of the old regime, the diehards who had a plan in advance to organize themselves to do this kind of resistance.

Mr. KUCINICH. Why is the hard core of the old regime growing then?

Mr. RODMAN. It is hard to estimate the numbers. It may be that the political process will start to diminish the numbers of insurgents, because I think a lot of the Sunni leadership is opting now to join the political process rather than oppose it.

Mr. KUCINICH. Are you going to—may I ask you, Mr. Rodman, is the State Department going to utilize the experiences and support of the U.N. and its peacekeeping operations to support those forces?

Mr. RODMAN. Well, first of all, I represent the Defense Department. But, my understanding is, we have been trying for a while to bring the United Nations into the process. I mean, the—the multinational force, as it exists now, has a U.N. mandate.

There are several U.N. resolutions since the war that have given, as I say, a mandate to the multinational force. The main role the U.N. has played most recently has been in helping the political process in its earlier stages. But I think now—I am not sure the

United Nation's involvement would induce a lot of other countries to join.

Mr. KUCINICH. What would Secretary Rumsfeld's position be then? Could you speak for him on that?

Mr. RODMAN. We are very happy to have a coalition; in fact, we have 20 to 30 countries in the coalition.

Mr. KUCINICH. Has he considered turning operations over to the U.N. at any point?

Mr. RODMAN. I do not think the United Nations would be willing to undertake this mission, so I think it is an academic question.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Let me, before moving on to the next panel, understand. Do you think it is possible, Admiral, that we will have another drop as we redefine—or when I say "redefine," when we qualify what we really need?

I mean, we went from training to trained and equipped. Do you think that we are looking at kind of the last drop, and we are pretty comfortable with this base to work on?

Admiral SULLIVAN. In terms of the trained and equipped, we will not see a drop. I mean, that will continue to climb as we execute.

Mr. SHAYS. But will there be some other——

Admiral SULLIVAN. I take your point. I think if we are able to refine this unit status report metric that I described——

Mr. SHAYS. Which gets us on the sense of readiness?

Admiral SULLIVAN. Yes, sir; in other words, a way to look at a particular Iraqi unit, for example, and assess whether they are fully combat ready, marginally combat ready, not combat ready, whatever kind of metrics we apply to it. What you may see is a new set of metrics that would be available to present to you, which describes how we assess the overall readiness of the Iraqi army.

We are not ready to do that yet because we are still developing that system.

Mr. SHAYS. One, it is important that you do develop that system. We will be eager to have a sense of it. And I think Mr. Christoff will agree. I am seeing him nod his head.

The other area that I am trying to—the subcommittee is wrestling with, Ambassador, is, as you come here to speak about—the reason why you were here to speak about the police, we know the police have an extraordinarily difficult time responding to attacks from people who are armed like they were in the military.

But is it feasible that we would be making the police capable to fight military? I am wrestling with what you make police and what kind of capabilities you give police.

Ambassador JONES. No, in fact, we are developing special police units which would be much more of a paramilitary force than a traditional police force.

And I think Admiral Sullivan may have something to add on that, as well as Mr. Todd.

Mr. TODD. Admiral Sullivan can speak to this better than I. But DOD has a special mechanized brigade that is being created in Iraq that will help with fairly high-intensity, mid-intensity conflict situations.

We also have a special commando unit.

Mr. SHAYS. That is within the police?

Mr. TODD. Yes. In terms of the civilian side, we think that civilian police are civilian police and most of the guys are not being trained in paramilitary type things.

What we are doing, though, is morphing the training in both Baghdad and in Jordan to teach them how to deal with the insurgency, and how to deal with their survival. We teach them everything from combat survival skills to more hand-to-hand combat.

Our gun of choice is a 9 millimeter. We are going to be teaching them in Jordan, as well as Iraq, on the AKs so they will be better prepared.

Mr. SHAYS. In my experience in Iraq, I have encountered so many, because I have gone outside of the umbrella of the military and stayed in Basra and Al Kut and other places, and when I would speak with everyday Iraqis, they were eager to take on the responsibilities.

I mean, I had a number who—parents or brothers, uncles, fathers—were in the military, concerned that they had lost their jobs and saying, You know, these are good people; my dad is a good man. Or some in the police force and so on.

What I would want to be part of this record is, I am in awe of the number of Iraqis who are willing to stand in line and in the course of standing in line, lose their lives. I am in awe of the number of Iraqis who would come home only to be threatened that they were helping this new Iraqi Government, and their lives were being threatened and they still persist.

And then I am also understanding that there are some who simply had to say, they could not continue if there was no way to protect them, if their families were being threatened. I mean, the logical thing would be—and I would be one of them if I could not protect my family. If I was still participating with this new government, and there was no way to protect them, I am not going to have them have to suffer and risk their lives for it.

But what I think is happening, and what I saw when I was in Iraq during the voting, was the incredible number of Iraqis who came to vote, who dressed up, who brought their children, and were so proud that 165,000 Iraqis had actually taken the responsibility of conducting this election. And frankly they did it better that we do in the United States. I was in awe of it.

There was one point where I was watching these Iraqis vote, and I went up to the person who had taken the ballots and put them on top of each of the three ballot boxes—the national, the regional, and local. Before the person could put it in the box, they had to dip their finger in, and I wanted to do the same thing. I wanted to feel a part of this. And I went and asked this person who was in charge if I could stick my hand in the ink jar. She looked up at me and then looked around and looked up at me and said, "No." She said, "You are not an Iraqi." And I felt a little embarrassed as everyone looked at me.

And then I thought, you know, they are proud. And there is this identity, and we are going to win. They are going to win. I believe that with all of my heart and soul.

I also want to say for the record, since I just believe it with all of my heart and soul, you should be proud to do what you are doing.

We are proud, so many of us are proud of what you are doing. I am grateful that you came to this hearing today, and I am grateful that you are helping us start to sort out an issue that we have not gotten a handle on. And I believe, mixed in this dialog of two different issues, if people are paying attention, you have given us very, very important advice.

You have honored this committee, you have honored this Congress by your presence. I am very grateful to each and every one of you.

Do you have any closing comment or should we get to the next panel?

Mr. KUCINICH. Go for it.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Before I end, what I do—I would like this: Is there any question we should have asked? Is there any point that you choose to make that needs to be made? Any closing comments?

Mr. Christoff.

Mr. CHRISTOFF. No.

Mr. RODMAN. I just want to add and second what the chairman just said, but point out also on election day, it was the Iraqis that took the responsibility for security, to protect 5,300 polling places around the country. And the insurgents threw everything they had at the election process, double or triple the number of attacks around the country, and not one of these polling places had its perimeter breached by the insurgents. So that is an indicator.

We are struggling here to find ways of measuring quality, and one of them is how these Iraqis are performing under the pressure of battle. And January 30th was an important omen in many respects.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Ambassador JONES. Thank you very much for having us today.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for your patience.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman, before we move on, just a little bit of committee business. I wanted to, without—with unanimous consent——

Mr. SHAYS. Gentlemen, you are set to go.

Mr. KUCINICH [continuing]. With unanimous consent, include the full report of the Office of Inspector General for the Iraq Reconstruction.

Mr. SHAYS. That will be included.

[NOTE.—The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction report entitled, "Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries Through the National Budget Process," may be found in subcommittee files.]

Mr. KUCINICH. By unanimous consent, the Congressional Research Service report on the International Training for Iraqi Security Forces.

Mr. SHAYS. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

for the record

3/14/05
2154 RHOB
12 Noon
Nat'l Security

Congressional Research Service

Memorandum January 5, 2005

TO: Honorable C.A. "Dutch" Ruppersberger
Attention: Sheilah Mirmiran

FROM: Christopher M. Blanchard
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

SUBJECT: International Training for Iraqi Security Forces

On January 4, you requested background information regarding current international efforts to train Iraqi security forces and expressions of willingness on the part of countries other than the United States to contribute to future training efforts. The following memorandum briefly describes ongoing international training operations and reviews recent developments and announcements regarding future non-U.S. contributions to the training of Iraq's security and police forces. If you have any questions or require any further information, please contact me at extension 7-0428.

Overview

Efforts to train and equip Iraqi security forces have received significant public attention in recent weeks. Insurgents have launched a renewed series of attacks directly targeting Iraqi security forces, and Administration officials have argued that the attacks are part of a coordinated effort to delay or disrupt Iraq's upcoming national election, which is scheduled to take place on January 30, 2005. On December 20, 2004, President Bush publicly characterized the results of existing efforts to train and equip Iraq's security forces as "mixed," criticizing some Iraqi units for desertion while praising others for performing admirably in recent counterinsurgent operations. U.S. military commanders in Iraq are reportedly reviewing proposals to add hundreds of U.S. military advisors to Iraqi units and training efforts in order to improve the morale and performance of security forces.[1] Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in April 2003, several coalition, non-coalition, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries have contributed personnel, equipment, and facilities to the training of Iraqi security and police forces. Some have expressed their willingness to contribute to future training operations within or outside of Iraq. Others have declined to participate in ongoing or planned training operations. Bush

[1] Eric Schmitt, "U.S. May Add Advisers to Aid Iraq's Military," *New York Times*, January 4, 2005.

Administration officials have announced their intent to continue seeking international support for training and stability operations in Iraq in the coming months.

Coalition Member Support for Training Efforts

Since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, members of the U.S. led Multinational Force (MNF)[2] in Iraq have made contributions to efforts to train and equip Iraqi security and police forces under the auspices of the Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC).[3] The MNSTC is divided into two sections: the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT), which has primary responsibility for the training of Iraq's police, border, and non military security services, and the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), which has primary responsibility for training members of Iraq's military.[4] U.S. Lieutenant General David Petraeus is the commanding officer for the MNSTC. His deputy is British Brigadier General David Clements.

A variety of training initiatives have been undertaken by the MNSTC that have involved various coalition partners working in concert with U.S. forces, Iraqi officials, and trainees. The training initiatives with the largest international components are those designed to train Iraqi police at locations in Jordan, United Arab Emirates, and Iraq (see below). Police instructors from Jordan, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Sweden, Poland, the United Arab Emirates, Denmark, Austria, Iraq, Finland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, Singapore, and Belgium participate in various aspects of the police training programs. Other initiatives have been undertaken between individual coalition members and Iraqi personnel, such as the Royal Australian Navy's recently completed efforts to train Iraq's Coastal Defense Force. The Netherlands and the Czech Republic have also directed training programs for Iraqi security personnel. Poland signed a bilateral agreement with the Interim Iraqi Government in October 2004 to provide training services and equipment for the Iraqi military.

NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I)[5]

Efforts to enlist NATO support for the training of Iraqi security forces coalesced over the summer and fall of 2004. At the request of the Iraqi Interim Government, NATO

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[2] As of December 22, 2004, the following countries had forces deployed in Iraq as part of the U.S. led coalition/Multinational Force: Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Tonga, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. (Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report, December 22, 2004.) Some of these countries have announced that they will withdraw from the multinational force in the near term, but will remain involved in training operations.

[3] Background information on the MNSTC is available on the Command's website at: http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/.

[4] Background information on the CPATT and CMATT is available on the Teams' websites at: http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/sections/cpatt/index.htm, and http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/sections/cmatt/index.htm.

[5] Fact sheets describing the NATO Training Implementation Mission and Training Mission-Iraq are available from the NATO Allied Joint Force Command website at: http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/NTIMI/FactSheet_on_NTIMI_en.htm, and http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Missions/NTM-I/Factsheets/NTM-I.htm

member countries approved the creation of a security force training mission at the Istanbul summit in June 2004. The first personnel of the NATO Training Implementation Mission (NTIM) arrived in Baghdad in early August 2004 and have worked since then to identify training opportunities for Iraqi security officials, to train individuals and support staff at the headquarters of Iraq's security forces, and to develop an action plan for a full NATO supported training program within and outside of Iraq to be implemented in 2005. Under the auspices of the NTIM program, a small number of Iraqi military officers have undergone training at a NATO facility in Stavanger, Norway. Roughly 60 military personnel from Canada, Hungary, Norway, the Netherlands, and Italy participated in the initial NATO Training Implementation Mission and remain in Iraq under NATO command.

Based on the recommendations of the initial NATO mission staff, plans to expand the training program were considered and approved by NATO leaders in the fall of 2004. Although some NATO members have declined to participate in the expanded initiative, the North Atlantic Council approved the expansion of NATO's Training Implementation Mission in Iraq on November 17, 2004, and issued a directive authorizing the expansion on December 9. The activation order implementing the expansion and renaming the effort as the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) was issued on December 16. U.S. Lt. Gen. David Petraeus was named commander of the new NTM-I effort, and now serves as the commander of both the NTM-I program and the coalition MNSTC training programs.

Under the approved expansion, the size of the NATO training mission in Iraq will grow from 60 to 300 personnel that will train mid and senior level Iraqi security officers at a planned Training Education and Doctrine Center (TEDC), which is scheduled to be constructed east of Baghdad by mid-2005. The trainers will provide specific management and leadership training for the Iraqi security officials at the facility with the support and protection of a sizeable staff and security contingent. According to NATO officials, new NATO support staff and trainers for the mission are currently being recruited and prepared. On December 20, President Bush identified training of mid and senior level commanders as a top priority for training efforts in Iraq.

The following NATO member contributions have been announced in relation to the planned expansion:

- **Hungary** - Hungary plans to supply 150 troops to provide security for the TEDC once it is established in mid-2005. The nominal deployment period for the Hungarian troops has been tentatively set for June 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006.

- **Czech Republic** - The Czech parliament recently approved a deployment extension for 100 Czech military police, who currently are training Iraqi officers near Basra. The group's deployment orders were scheduled to expire on December 31, 2004, but were extended until February 28, 2005. The Czech government also announced plans recently to train up to 100 Iraqi military policemen in the Czech Republic during 2005.

- **The Netherlands** - The Dutch cabinet recently announced its willingness to contribute some forces to the NTM-I initiative, although its larger military force will be withdrawn from Iraq in March 2005.

France, Belgium, Greece, Spain, Luxembourg, and Germany have declined to send troops or personnel into Iraq to participate in the NTM-I effort, and refuse to allow their

military officers serving under NATO command to be deployed in support of the program. Other NATO members have not yet publicly specified if or how they will support the NTM-I initiative. U.S. officials reportedly expect that the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria will contribute military training officers and force protection personnel. Some NATO members have agreed to provide training and support to Iraqi forces outside of the NATO/NTM-I framework (see below).

Other Training Contributions

Other NATO and non-coalition countries such as Japan, Germany, Jordan, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates have committed funding, personnel, and facilities for the training of Iraqi police and security forces on a bilateral or multilateral basis.

- **Germany/Japan/United Arab Emirates** - Although Germany has declined to send training personnel to Iraq in support of the NTM-I program, Iraqi security officers receive training under the auspices of NTM-I at a NATO military training facility in Oberammergau, Germany. The German government also has trained 420 Iraqi police officers in crime scene exploitation and police methodology in cooperation with Japan and the United Arab Emirates since late 2003. Officials from Japan, the Emirates' police forces, and Germany's Bundeskriminalamt, or federal criminal investigation office, have jointly administered the training program, which aims to train 2,000 Iraqi police by the end of 2005. In December 2004, German officials announced that they would expand another UAE-based program that has trained 122 Iraqi military drivers and mechanics to use and service surplus German military trucks. Germany also reportedly plans to host, train, and equip new Iraqi engineering and explosive disposal personnel, as well as provide the Iraqi security services with ambulances and military hospital equipment in 2005.

- **Egypt** - In late 2004 an Iraqi infantry company was invited to Egypt to participate in a joint training program with the Egyptian army. According to the Egyptian government, 134 soldiers from Iraq's 5th Infantry Division trained alongside Egypt's 3rd Infantry Division at the Mubarak Military City in northern Egypt. No plans for future joint Iraqi-Egyptian training exercises have been publicly announced.

- **Jordan**[6] - Jordan has hosted the largest effort to train Iraqi police officers at its International Police Training Center in Muwaqqar, east of Amman. The U.S.-funded and Jordanian-hosted program has produced 11 classes of Iraqi police officers since training began in November 2003. Over 30,000 troops will be trained by the end of 2005 under the terms of an agreement reached by Jordan and the former Coalition Provisional Authority. As of mid-December 2004, over 8,000 Iraqi police officers had graduated from the firearms, self defense, and crowd control training programs offered at the center. The Jordanian military has also trained over 1,500 Iraqi army officers forces at its Zarqa Military College, along with a small group of Iraqi air force pilots and engineers.

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[6] *Associated Press*, "Group of Iraqi Police Recruits Ends Training in Jordan," December 16, 2004.

Relevant Announcements and Statements of Intent

As negotiations between U.S., Iraqi, and foreign officials have unfolded, leaders of a number of countries publicly have stated their intent to contribute to the training of Iraqi security forces. Leaders of some countries have cited their constituent populations' opposition to direct troop contributions and concerns about operational security as the basis for their decision to contribute to training efforts rather than ongoing military operations. Others have stated their objection to sending training staff into Iraq for similar reasons, while expressing their willingness to contribute to training efforts outside of the country. The following announcements have received significant public attention in recent months:

- **France** - In July 2004, French President Jacques Chirac offered unspecified French support for efforts to train Iraqi security personnel outside of Iraq and identified NATO training facilities in Rome, Italy as a possible viable location. In December Chirac and other French officials publicly resisted U.S. calls to send training teams to support the new NATO NTM-I initiative and to staff the planned TEDC near Baghdad. French officials cited concerns for the security and safety of their troops while posted in Iraq.

- **Iran** - In November 2004, Iranian officials announced their willingness to train Iraqi border security personnel in cooperation with coalition authorities. Some experts have speculated that Iranian officials may view the opportunity to train Iraqi border security forces as a means to prevent future infiltration of Iranian territory by smugglers and terrorists from Iraq or as a means to influence or coopt members of Iraq's border security services for other purposes, including the spread of Iranian influence in Iraq.

Figure 1: Coalition and NATO Training Operations in Iraq



Table 1: Current Training Status of Iraq's Security Forces

Iraqi Security Forces	Trained/ On Hand	Required
Police	51,712	135,000
Civil Intervention Force	1,091	3,720
Emergency Response Unit	143	270
Border Enforcement	14,267	28,360
Highway Patrol	141	6,300
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	484	500
Army	4,444	24,425
National Guard	40,115	61,904
Intervention Force	4,287	9,159
Special Operations Force	674	1,967
Air Force	167	502
Coastal Defense Force	484	582
Total	**118,009**[7]	**272,689**

Source: Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report, December 22, 2004. The issue date of the training data was December 13, 2004.

[7] "The military forces continue to receive advanced unit training." Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report, December 22, 2004.

Mr. KUCINICH. And then the letter, too. And Mr. Waxman's letter also by unanimous consent.

[The information referred to follows:]

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

February 16, 2005

The Honorable Alberto Gonzales
Attorney General
Department Of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

Dear Attorney General Gonzales:

We are writing to respectfully request a grand jury investigation into the Administration's mismanagement of funds that was detailed in the report of the Office of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction released January 30, 2005.[1]

Not a single penny of the nearly $9 billion in monies allocated by the CPA-controlled DFI to the Iraqi Interim Government during this period could be properly accounted for by the Special Inspector General. The IG found that the CPA neither established nor implemented "sufficient managerial, financial, and contractual controls to ensure DFI funds were used in a transparent manner." Furthermore, they neglected to do so willfully. Examples of this mismanagement include the following:

- The CPA did not clearly assign authorities and responsibilities for DFI funds, and did not provide clear guidance for procedures and controls for disbursing funds through CPA regulations, orders, and memoranda. Specifically, the Inspector General found that, "7 of 9 CPA senior advisors and staffs provided inadequate oversight of their respective Iraqi ministries' financial operations. Further, senior advisors and staff were not provided orientation or training on financial or contract duties and responsibilities."

- The CPA did not exercise adequate financial controls over DFI funds disbursed to the Iraqi government ministries through the national budget process, and the disbursements were not transparent enough to indicate what the funds were actually used for. In a sample review of ten disbursements made by the CPA Comptroller's office, the IG found that none of the disbursements, ranging between $120 million and $900 million in value, included basic budget spending plans. Six disbursements were made without supporting documentation, and two others, worth $616 million, were not supported by required disbursement vouchers.

[1] Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process* (Report No. 05-004) (Jan. 30, 2005).

- The CPA did not implement adequate controls for salaries of Iraqi employees, and there was no assurance that the funds were not used for salaries of "ghost employees." CPA officials authorized salary payments for 74,000 Iraqi protective guards. However, at one ministry, while 8,026 guards were on the payroll, only 602 guards could be validated. At another, 1,471 guards were on the payroll, only 642 guards could be validated.

- The CPA contracting office did not review contracting procedures, did not provide oversight of Iraqi ministry procurements or contracting operations, had little to no internal controls, and did not provide data of executed contracts. At one Iraqi ministry, over 250 contracts valued at $430 million were executed without CPA ministry advisors visibility over the contracts.

- The CPA willfully neglected its oversight abilities. When the CPA staff recommended that the Iraqi Ministry of Finance require certified payrolls prior to salary payments, CPA Ministry of Finance personnel stated that the CPA would rather overpay salaries than risk not paying employees and inciting violence.

The incriminating findings of the Office of Special Inspector General's report merit a federal grand jury investigation into the Administration's mismanagement of funds in Iraq. The public has a right to know where the money went, who possibly benefited from those funds, and if U.S. officials made false statements regarding oversight activity of the CPA. The United States takes pride in its high standards of government transparency, and we cannot let this blatant and appalling waste and abuse go without investigation and accountability. We look forward to an answer to our request.

Sincerely,





Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

January 31, 2005

The Honorable Christopher Shays
Chairman
Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations
B-372 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to respectfully request that the Subcommittee hold an investigative hearing on the appalling mismanagement of funds by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), detailed in the report of the Office of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction released yesterday.[1] The IG's findings should be of particular concern to this subcommittee, since the CPA's multiple oversight failures recall the UN's failure to adequately oversee the Oil for Food program.

As you are aware, Special Inspector General Stuart Bowen's audit made the deeply disturbing discovery that the CPA exercised "less than adequate controls" on the totality of the funds – amounting to nearly $9 billion – disbursed by the United States in Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) funds to Interim Iraq Government ministries during the occupation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq from October 2003 through June 2004.

Not a single penny of the nearly $9 billion in monies allocated by the Administration to the DFI during this period could be properly accounted for by the Special Inspector General. The IG found that the CPA neither established nor implemented "sufficient managerial, financial, and contractual controls to ensure that DFI funds were used in a transparent manner." Consequently, the Inspector General concluded that the CPA's mismanagement resulted in there being "no assurance the funds were used for the purposes mandated by Resolution 1483."

There is considerable reason to be concerned about how the Iraqi government used the funds they received from CPA. As the report states, "external assessments and allegations of corruption in Iraq's ministries under the Oil-for Food program should have raised concerns about the Iraqi government's ability to manage DFI Funds." In light of the Subcommittee's own investigative work on waste, fraud, and abuse in administration of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program in Iraq, we should also hold the current Administration to the same rigorous standards of financial management and accountability.

The critical and comprehensive audit report of the Inspector General pointed to severe deficiencies by the Bush Administration in basic management and financial oversight of the DFI. These include:

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[1] Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, *Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process* (Report No. 05-004) (Jan. 30, 2005).

Managerial Controls

The CPA did not clearly assign authorities and responsibilities for DFI funds, and did not provide clear guidance for procedures and controls for disbursing funds through CPA regulations, orders, and memoranda. The Inspector General found that:

> "7 of 9 CPA senior advisors and staffs provided inadequate oversight of their respective Iraqi ministries' financial operations. Further, senior advisors and staff were not provided orientation or training on financial or contract duties and responsibilities."

Financial Controls

The CPA did not exercise adequate responsibility over DFI funds provided to the Iraqi government ministries through the national budget process, and budgets and funds disbursed to the Iraqi ministries were not transparent enough to indicate what the funds were actually used for.

A sample review of ten disbursements made by the CPA Comptroller's office by the Inspector General found that none of the disbursements, ranging between $120 million and $900 million in value, included basic budget spending plans. Six disbursements were made without any supporting documentation and two others, worth some $616 million in value, were not supported by required disbursement vouchers.

In addition, CPA did not implement adequate controls for salaries of Iraqi employees, and no assurance the funds were used for salaries of "ghost employees." For example, CPA officials authorized salary payments for 74,000 Iraqi protective guards. However, at one ministry, while 8,026 guards were on the payroll, only 602 guards could be validated. At another, 1,471 guards were on the payroll, yet only 642 guards could be validated.

Contract Controls

The CPA contracting office did not review contracting procedures, did not provide oversight of Iraqi ministry procurements or contracting operations, had little to no internal controls, and did not provide data of executed contracts. At one Iraqi ministry, the Inspector General found that over 250 contracts valued at $430 million were executed without CPA ministry advisors visibility over the contracts.

The Subcommittee should look immediately into the findings of this important report, and determine if U.S. managerial and financial controls failed or were missing in

Iraq. I hope that we can work together to shed some light on our own government's policies in Iraq. I look forward to an answer to my request.

Sincerely,

Dennis J. Kucinich

Dennis J. Kucinich
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations

for the record
03/14/05.
Nat'l Security
12 Nov. 2154 RHOS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

March 14, 2005

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

For nearly two years, we have been raising questions about Halliburton's no-bid contract to operate Iraq's oil infrastructure. As part of this investigation, we have now obtained a report by Defense Department auditors concluding that Halliburton overcharged by more than $100 million for a single task order under this contract. We would like to know why this audit report — and audit reports on nine additional task orders — are being withheld from Congress. We also want to know what steps you are taking to recover these funds from Halliburton.

Under the Restore Iraqi Oil (RIO) contract, the Defense Department issued ten task orders to Halliburton for oil-related work, including the importation of fuel, the preparation of damage assessments, and the repair of oil facilities. Halliburton charged over $2.5 billion for this work, which is now complete. The Defense Department paid Halliburton approximately $875 million from U.S. taxpayer funds and $1.64 billion from Iraqi oil proceeds in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).

In December 2003, auditors from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) raised initial concerns about Halliburton's prices under the RIO contract. DCAA reported that Halliburton overcharged by up to $61 million to import fuel into Iraq. This DCAA audit was preliminary, however, and covered only the period through September 2003.

Between August and October 2004, DCAA auditors completed their work and issued final audits on each of Halliburton's ten task orders. However, the Defense Department refused to release these audits to members of Congress or the public. Over five months ago, on October 5, 2004, Rep. Waxman joined with Rep. Chris Shays, Chairman of the National Security Subcommittee, to request the audits from Secretary Rumsfeld. Notwithstanding 12 separate followup requests from congressional staff, the Defense Department refused to turn over unredacted copies of the audits.

Despite the Pentagon's refusal to comply with these requests, we have now obtained an unredacted copy of DCAA's audit for Task Order 5, under which Halliburton charged $875 million to import fuel into Iraq. Task Order 5 is one of five task orders relating to fuel importation. DCAA found overcharges and questioned other costs of $108.4 million under this task order alone.

DCAA criticized Halliburton's charges in nearly every area, including labor, material, subcontracts, overhead, and general and administrative expenses. DCAA found that these inadequacies were "significant," and it concluded that Halliburton's charges were not "a fair and reasonable price."

DCAA also detailed numerous specific problems with Halliburton's charges, including the following:

- Halliburton failed to demonstrate that its prices for Kuwaiti fuel were "fair and reasonable" and failed to negotiate better prices with its Kuwaiti subcontractor.

- Citing market price increases, Halliburton made millions of dollars in retroactive payments to Turkish fuel subcontractors, even though Halliburton had negotiated fixed price subcontracts that contained no escalation provisions.

- In one case, Halliburton claimed that it paid over $27,000,000 to transport $82,000 worth of fuel from Kuwait to Iraq.

- Halliburton repeatedly refused to provide information requested by Pentagon auditors, including its actual costs for fuel from Turkey and Jordan and the process it used to choose its Kuwaiti subcontractor.

When DCAA first raised concerns about Halliburton's prices in December 2003, you were asked what action you planned to take if the overcharges were confirmed. In response, you promised that DCAA's investigation would "lay the facts out for everybody to see." You also stated: "if there's an overcharge, like we think there is, we expect that money to be repaid."

Contrary to your assertions, however, the Administration has withheld these audits from Congress for months, and Halliburton has repaid nothing under this contract. We would like to know when and how you plan to recover the overcharges from Halliburton and restore them to U.S. taxpayers and the Iraqi people. We also ask you to explain why this audit — and the nine other completed audits — have not been released to Congress and the public.

Background

On March 8, 2003, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded Halliburton subsidiary KBR a no-bid monopoly contract to restore and operate Iraq's oil infrastructure. The contract

was awarded in secret, and other qualified companies, like Bechtel, which did most of the oilfield work after the first Gulf War, were precluded from bidding.[1]

To date, Halliburton has charged approximately $2.5 billion under the RIO contract, which had a potential value of $7 billion.[2] The contract is a "cost-plus" contract, meaning that Halliburton's costs are fully reimbursed, and the company receives an additional award of 2% to 7% of these costs. Under this arrangement, Halliburton is paid a higher base fee when it bills the government for higher underlying costs.

The Corps of Engineers issued ten different task orders under the RIO contract. The most recent public description of Halliburton's charges under each task order was provided by the Corps of Engineers in October 2004. The Corps reports that work has now concluded on all ten task orders. These charges are set forth in Table A.

Table A: Purpose and Value of Task Orders Under RIO Contract

Task Order	Purpose	Amount (millions)
1	Train and advise for safe shut-down, oil spill equipment pre-positioning and damage assessment	$10.7
2	Design for quick repair of oil facilities	$1.5
3	Damage assessment, fire fighting and repairs	$744.3
4	Base camp facilities and life support	$46.3
5	Preserve distribution capability and fuel distribution support[1]	$887.4
6	Restoration of Essential Infrastructure[2]	$222.0
7	Preserve distribution capability and fuel distribution support[2]	$325.0
8	Preserve distribution capability and fuel distribution support[2]	$180.0
9	Preserve distribution capability and fuel distribution support[2]	$64.8
10	Preserve distribution capability and fuel distribution support[2]	$30.0
Total		**$2,512.0**

[1] Of this amount $90 million is Disbursed Seized Iraqi Assets, and $725 million is Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) established by UN Security Council Resolution 1483.
[2] This amount is all DFI Funds.

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Frequently Asked Questions: Engineer Support to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Oct. 7, 2004) (online at http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/CEPA/Iraq/March03-table.htm).

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[1] *Halliburton's Gasoline Overcharges*, Special Investigations Division, Minority Staff, House Committee on Government Reform (July 21, 2004) (online at www.democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20040817115902-43717.pdf).

[2] U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Frequently Asked Questions: Engineer Support to Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Oct. 7, 2004) (online at http://www.hq.usace.army.mil/CEPA/Iraq/March03-table.htm).

As Table A indicates, Halliburton's work was split generally between oil infrastructure projects and fuel importation tasks: Task Orders 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 related to various infrastructure projects, while Task Orders 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 involved the importation of fuel from Kuwait, Turkey, and Jordan. The majority of Halliburton's charges under this contract were for fuel importation and distribution. Halliburton charged approximately $1.5 billion for fuel work and $1 billion for infrastructure work. Table A also shows that there were two sources of funding for this work: approximately $875 million came from U.S. taxpayer funds and $1.64 billion came from Iraqi oil proceeds and other funds in the U.S.-controlled Development Fund for Iraq.

We began to raise questions about the Halliburton contract in March 2003.[3] In more than a dozen letters between October 15, 2003, and February 17, 2005, we presented evidence that Halliburton was overcharging the U.S. taxpayer and Iraqis for fuel importation.[4] In particular, we raised concerns about the exorbitant prices of Halliburton's imports from Kuwait, as well as concerns about Halliburton's Kuwaiti subcontractor, the obscure and inexperienced Altanmia Commercial Marketing Company.

Independent experts also expressed grave doubts about the reasonableness of Halliburton's price. Phil Verleger, a California oil economist and the president of a consulting firm, said of the price: "It's as if they've put the gasoline on the Queen Mary and taken it around

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[3] Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Lt. Gen. Robert Flowers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Mar. 26, 2003).

[4] Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell to OMB Director Joshua Bolten (Oct. 15, 2003); Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell to Lt. Gen. Robert Flowers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Oct. 21, 2003); Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (Oct. 29, 2003); Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell to Lt. Gen. Robert Flowers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Nov. 5, 2003); Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell and Sen. Joseph Lieberman to Defense Department Inspector General Joseph E. Schmitz (Nov. 25, 2003); Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (Dec. 10, 2003); Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell to Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld (Dec. 19, 2003); Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell to Lt. Gen. Robert Flowers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Jan. 6, 2004); Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (Jan. 15, 2004); Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell and Sen. Joseph Lieberman to Defense Department Inspector General Joseph E. Schmitz (Jan. 16, 2004); Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell to Defense Department Inspector General Joseph E. Schmitz (Feb. 24, 2004); Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Rep. Tom Davis, Chairman, Government Reform Committee (Nov. 10, 2004); Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (Feb. 17, 2005).

the globe before they deliver it."[5] Jeffrey Jones, the former Director of the Defense Energy Support Center, stated: "I can't construct a price that high."[6] Another expert, who asked that his identity not be disclosed, characterized Halliburton's prices as "highway robbery."[7]

In December 2003, the Defense Contract Audit Agency announced at a press conference that it had completed a preliminary draft audit of Halliburton's fuel importation work. DCAA auditors found that Halliburton had overcharged the U.S. government by as much as $61 million for gasoline imported from Kuwait into Iraq.[8] DCAA concluded that Halliburton "has not demonstrated ... that they did an adequate subcontract pricing evaluation prior to award" of the Altanmia subcontract.[9] This audit was preliminary, however, and covered only the period until September 30, 2003.

In July 2004, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provided fuel cost figures for the entire period that Halliburton imported fuel under the contract (May 2003 though March 2004), reporting that Halliburton's average price for gasoline imported from Kuwait was $2.68 per gallon. According to these figures, Halliburton paid Altanmia $1.14 per gallon to purchase the gasoline from the Kuwait Petroleum Company and $1.30 per gallon to transport the gasoline from Kuwait to Iraq by truck. Halliburton then charged $0.24 per gallon in overhead and administrative markups and fees.[10]

DCAA Audit of Task Order 5

Nearly two years after Halliburton began its work under the contract to operate Iraq's oil infrastructure, we now have the first official Defense Department conclusions as to the extent of Halliburton's overcharges. Defense Department auditors at DCAA have conducted comprehensive audits of each of Halliburton's ten task orders under the RIO contract. We

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[5] *The Price of Victory: Unusually High Costs for Gasoline Being Brought into Iraq for US-Led Rebuilding*, NBC News (Nov. 5, 2003).

[6] *Army Eyes Halliburton Import Role in Iraq*, Associated Press (Nov. 5, 2003).

[7] *See* Letter from Reps. Henry A. Waxman and John D. Dingell to OMB Director Joshua Bolten (Oct. 15, 2003).

[8] U.S. Department of Defense, *News Briefing* (Dec. 11, 2003).

[9] *Id.*

[10] E-mail from U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, transmitted to minority staff of the Committee on Government Reform by the Department of Defense (June 20, 2004) (stating that Halliburton imported a total of 131,181,054 gallons of gasoline from Kuwait into Iraq, charging the Corps of Engineers $351,691,346).

obtained an unredacted copy of one of these audits, an analysis of Task Order 5, the largest of the ten task orders.[11] This audit questioned more than $100 million of Halliburton's charges.

According to the audit, Halliburton charged approximately $875.3 million to import fuel into Iraq under Task Order 5.[12] DCAA concluded that overcharges and other questioned costs under this task order were $108.4 million.[13] DCAA criticized Halliburton's charges in nearly every area, including labor, material, subcontracts, overhead, and general and administrative expenses. DCAA found that these "noncompliances and inadequacies" were "significant" and concluded that "we do not believe the proposal is an acceptable basis for negotiation of a fair and reasonable price."[14]

DCAA found that Halliburton's cost and pricing submissions were "not adequate" because they were not prepared "in accordance with applicable Cost Accounting Standards and appropriate provisions of FAR," the Federal Acquisition Regulation.[15] According to DCAA, Halliburton "was unable to demonstrate the proposal was based on actual costs."[16]

DCAA's audit reviewed the propriety of the costs submitted by Halliburton for reimbursement under the cost-plus contract. They did not, however, take into account Halliburton's base and award fees of 2% to 7% of these costs. Since DCAA identified overcharges in Halliburton's underlying costs, Halliburton's fees are also overstated, meaning that the total amount of Halliburton's overcharges is even greater than $108.4 million.

Fuel Imports from Kuwait

Within Task Order 5, the largest area of overcharges related to Halliburton's fuel imports from Kuwait. DCAA questioned a total of $89 million in Kuwaiti fuel charges. Of this amount, $27 million represented charges that were not included in Halliburton's schedule of "actual" costs. As DCAA stated, Halliburton "was unable to reconcile the proposed costs to its accounting records."[17]

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[11] Defense Contract Audit Agency, *Report on Audit of Proposal for Restore Iraqi Oil Task Order No. 5* (Oct. 8, 2004) (Audit Report No. 3311-2004K17900055).

[12] *Id.* at 1.

[13] *Id.*

[14] *Id.* at 5.

[15] *Id.*

[16] *Id.* at 18.

[17] *Id.* at 11.

DCAA found that the remaining $62 million in overcharges relating to fuel imported from Kuwait represented "unreasonable costs."[18] In repeated criticisms, DCAA found that Halliburton "did not demonstrate the prices for Kuwaiti fuel and transportation were fair and reasonable."[19] Although Halliburton objected to this conclusion, DCAA reported that Halliburton "did not provide adequate data to demonstrate the reasonableness of proposed fuel prices for the Kuwait supplier, Altanmia."[20]

DCAA concluded that Halliburton "failed to demonstrate adequate competition in its procurement decision."[21] Halliburton has repeatedly said that its fuel prices were reasonable because it had conducted a competition before awarding the lucrative fuel importation subcontract to Altanmia. According to David Lesar, Halliburton's president, "KBR awarded fuel acquisition contracts through an open and competitive bid process."[22] But DCAA concluded just the opposite. According to DCAA, the subcontract awarded to Altanmia was not "a competitive award," but instead "must be considered a sole source procurement."[23]

DCAA also found that Halliburton was not truthful about its efforts to verify the reasonableness of its fuel prices. In justifying its prices from Kuwait, Halliburton claimed to DCAA that "it consulted the Brown & Root Worldwide Suppliers Listing before it negotiated with its fuel subcontractors."[24] DCAA later discovered, however, that Halliburton "does not currently maintain a Brown & Root Worldwide Suppliers Listing."[25] DCAA criticized Halliburton for failing to "provide accurate information."[26]

DCAA's major criticism of Halliburton concerned the company's failure to negotiate better pricing for the fuel and transportation costs. Although DCAA "recogniz[ed] the challenges faced by KBR during the early stages of the war," the audit found that these circumstances should not have prevented action for months:

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[18] *Id.* at 10.

[19] *Id.*

[20] *Id.* at 22.

[21] *Id.* at 16.

[22] *Halliburton Defends Price of Iraqi Fuel,* Platts Oilgram News (Oct. 20, 2003); *see also* Halliburton, *Press Release: Halliburton Provides Update on Fuel Delivery Mission in Iraq* (Oct. 21, 2003) (stating that "[t]hrough an open and competitive bid process, KBR awarded the fuel acquisition contracts").

[23] DCAA, *supra* note 11, at 16.

[24] *Id.* at 12.

[25] *Id.*

[26] *Id.*

> It is not reasonable to use prices negotiated in only a few days, under extremely difficult circumstances, for the entire period of performance which extends for almost a year (229 days). Effective subcontract administration ... requires ongoing (e.g., monthly) documented reviews of the continued reasonableness of the Kuwait fuel prices and efforts to renegotiate these prices if such reviews indicated unreasonable prices.[27]

Taking into account early obstacles, DCAA concluded that Halliburton "should have pursued negotiating lower prices after the 'urgent and compelling' circumstances subsided, 30–90 days after the start of the contract."[28]

DCAA auditors also revealed that the Administration improperly waived Halliburton's obligation to provide cost and pricing data for fuel. Because Halliburton's subcontractor, Altanmia, was not selected in an open, competitive process, DCAA auditors sought cost and pricing data to assess whether their costs were fair and reasonable. On December 19, 2003, the Corps of Engineers gave Halliburton a waiver from this requirement and unilaterally declared Halliburton's fuel prices to be "fair and reasonable."[29] When DCAA auditors requested support for this conclusion, the Corps replied that it needed DCAA's assistance "in determining if KBR's proposed prices for Altanmia are fair and reasonable."[30] In other words, the Corps granted the waiver without any support for its own assertion that Halliburton's prices met this standard.

Finally, DCAA found a number of specific problems with Halliburton's charges for fuel from Kuwait. In one case, Halliburton charged over $27 million to transport $82,000 worth of fuel. According to DCAA, "It is illogical that it would cost $27,514,833 to deliver $82,100 in LPG fuel."[31]

Fuel Imports from Turkey

DCAA also found that Halliburton charged $16.8 million in unreasonable costs for fuel imports from Turkey under Task Order 5. DCAA noted that Halliburton had negotiated "fixed-unit-rate" and "firm-fixed-price" subcontracts with various Turkish subcontractors to import fuel into Iraq. During the term of these subcontracts, the market price of the fuel increased. DCAA reported that the Turkish companies asked Halliburton "to increase the unit price of the fuel to

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[27] *Id.* at 11 and 2.

[28] *Id.* at 12.

[29] U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, *Waiver for Submission of Cost and Pricing Data* (Dec. 19, 2003).

[30] DCAA, *supra* note 11, at 15.

[31] *Id.* at 17.

compensate for losses due to market increases."[32] According to DCAA, Halliburton "agreed to pay the higher prices retroactively."[33]

Halliburton argued that these retroactive increases were acceptable "because the subcontract fixed rates were lower than rates paid to the Kuwaiti subcontractor."[34] Halliburton also argued that "it wanted to definitize the TO [task order] with all of the costs proposed in order to obtain fee for the costs it may incur in the future for subcontractor claims."[35] But DCAA rejected these arguments and criticized Halliburton's retroactive increase in pre-negotiated subcontract prices. As DCAA stated: "We do not believe it was appropriate to retroactively adjust the fuel unit prices of KBR's fixed-unit-rate and firm-fixed-price subcontracts when there are no provisions in the subcontracts to do so."[36] DCAA found that Halliburton "did not comply with the stated terms and conditions of its own subcontract."[37]

Refusals to Provide Information Requested by Auditors

DCAA found numerous instances in which Halliburton refused to provide information requested by Pentagon auditors. For example, Halliburton refused to provide requested information about the process by which it chose Altanmia as its Kuwaiti subcontractor. According to DCAA, "Throughout our audit of TO 5, we requested data from KBR supporting its analysis of the competitive bids and/or price analysis for the Kuwait fuel and transportation costs."[38] As DCAA reported, "We did not receive the requested data."[39]

Halliburton also refused to provide a schedule of its "actual costs" for fuel from Turkey and Jordan. As DCAA stated, "we have requested a schedule of actual costs for the procurement of fuels from Turkey and Jordan."[40] According to DCAA, this information was "essential" to

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[32] *Id.* at 18.

[33] *Id.* at 2.

[34] *Id.* at 20.

[35] *Id.*

[36] *Id.* at 2–3.

[37] *Id.* at 18.

[38] *Id.* at 11.

[39] *Id.*

[40] *Id.* at 4.

reconcile Halliburton's charges to its accounting records.[41] But DCAA reported that Halliburton "has not provided the requested data."[42]

The Corps of Engineers also refused to provide information requested by DCAA auditors. For example, on June 4, 2004, DCAA requested that the Corps provide a "determination if there was or was not a sufficient supply of fuel from Turkey and Jordan to justify the need for procuring fuel from Kuwait."[43] DCAA reported that such a determination was "essential for our results."[44] Yet DCAA reported that its auditors were specifically told that the information "would not be provided."[45]

Continued Problems with Halliburton's Business Systems

DCAA also found unresolved systemic problems with Halliburton's business systems. For example, DCAA reported that Halliburton's system for estimating costs was "inadequate."[46] As DCAA stated:

> Our examination of the estimating system disclosed the following five significant deficiencies in KBR's estimating system that result in proposed costs that are not current, accurate, and complete.
>
> Inadequate Cost Estimating Development
> Lack of Management Reviews;
> Lack of System Description and Integration;
> Insufficient Training, Experience and Guidance to Estimators; and
> Inadequate Policies, Procedures, and Practices for Providing Updates to the Government.[47]

Although Halliburton provided a corrective action plan for its estimating system, DCAA concluded that Halliburton's plan "is not adequate to ensure the identified actions correct deficiencies noted in our audit report."[48]

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[41] *Id.* at 5.

[42] *Id.* at 4.

[43] *Id.*

[44] *Id.* at 5.

[45] *Id.* at 9.

[46] *Id.* at 26.

[47] *Id.* at 4.

[48] *Id.* at 27.

DCAA also found significant deficiencies with Halliburton's purchasing system. As DCAA concluded, Halliburton "does not adequately maintain file documentation on subcontractor selection or cost"; Halliburton "does not maintain an approved/preferred supplier listing"; and Halliburton "does not adequately maintain documentation as to why other than the lowest bidder is chosen."[49] DCAA attributed some of these problems to Halliburton's continued reliance on "an IBM mainframe legacy system placed into production in 1983" that contained data that "was blank, incomplete, or incorrect for most of 2003 and early 2004."[50]

Lack of Administration Action

Over the past two years, we have written to Administration officials numerous times expressing concern about Halliburton's contract to operate Iraq's oil infrastructure. In several clear statements, you and other Administration officials have publicly committed to recovering any overcharges by Halliburton. For example, at a press conference on December 13, 2003, you were asked about preliminary conclusions by DCAA auditors that Halliburton had overcharged by as much as $61 million. You answered as follows:

> We're going to make sure that as we spend money in Iraq, that it's spent well and spent wisely .... And their [DCAA's] investigation will lay the facts out for everybody to see. And if there's an overcharge, like we think there is, we expect that money to be repaid."[51]

Similarly, your National Security Advisor at the time, Condoleezza Rice, wrote to us directly on February 12, 2004, claiming that you personally expected the Pentagon to recover these funds from Halliburton. She stated: "The President expects the Pentagon to review this matter thoroughly, in accordance with its internal oversight procedures, and expects Halliburton to reimburse taxpayers for any overcharges that are proven."[52]

Despite these promises, however, your Administration has refused to provide DCAA's audits to Congress. On October 5, 2004, Rep. Waxman joined with Rep. Chris Shays, Chairman of the National Security Subcommittee, in writing to Secretary Rumsfeld for these audit reports.[53] Subsequently, their staffs made 12 followup requests for the audits, all without

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[49] *Id.*

[50] *Id.* at 24.

[51] *A Region Inflamed: Reconstruction; Bush Sees Need for Repayment If Fee Was High*, New York Times (Dec. 13, 2003).

[52] Letter from National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to Rep. Henry A. Waxman (Feb. 12, 2004).

[53] Letter from Rep. Christopher Shays, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, and Rep. Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority

success. Indeed, when Government Reform Committee staff indicated that they were considering issuing a subpoena for the audit reports, a Defense Department official replied that "issuing a subpoena will not get the material released any faster."[54]

Moreover, there is no indication that the Administration is taking meaningful action to recover Halliburton's overcharges.

Conclusion

In many ways, Halliburton has received extraordinary treatment from your Administration. The company was awarded a secret no-bid contract worth billions. Auditor recommendations to withhold payments have been ignored, as has the testimony by former employees about $45 cases of soda and $100 bags of laundry. Just last month, the company was given millions in bonuses.

Now that the Pentagon's own auditors have confirmed that Halliburton overcharged by more than $100 million under just one of Halliburton's ten task orders, this special treatment should stop. As you promised in December 2003, unredacted audits of all ten task orders should be turned over to Congress immediately, and all overcharges identified by Defense Department auditors should be repaid.

We would like to know why the DCAA audits are being withheld and what steps you will take to recover the overcharges and put the interests of the U.S. taxpayer and the Iraqi people ahead of the profits of Halliburton.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Waxman
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Government Reform

John D. Dingell
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Energy and Commerce

Member, Committee on Government Reform, to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (Oct. 5, 2004).

[54] E-mail from Matthew Horn, Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Majority and Minority Staff, House Committee on Government Reform (Feb. 28, 2005).

Mr. SHAYS. We will have a 1-minute recess. Then we will reconvene in 1 minute.

[Recess.]

Mr. SHAYS. Our second panel is Professor Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Kalev Sepp, professor of the Naval Postgraduate School, and Mr. Peter Khalil, former Coalition Provisional Authority Official, the Brookings Institution.

Gentlemen, as you know, we do swear you in; and if you would stand, I would look forward to swearing you in and hearing your testimony.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. Your testimony is of tremendous interest to this committee. Quite often, the second panel, having heard the first panel, is able to help us sort out these issues in a way that is very helpful.

So what I am going to do is allow you to go beyond your 5-minute testimony, up to 10 for each of you, if you would like, and then we can have some dialog. And with not many Members present, we can have a lot better give-and-take.

So feel free to go through your testimony, if you would like.

STATEMENTS OF PROFESSOR ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; KALEV SEPP, PROFESSOR, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL; AND PETER KHALIL, FORMER COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY OFFICIAL, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

Professor CORDESMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon. I do have a formal statement for the record, which basically attempts to summarize what Iraqi attitudes are toward the training and the level of development of their forces, and to provide some additional data in direct response to the committee's questions about numbers. And I ask that be placed in the record.

Mr. SHAYS. Without objection, it will be.

Professor CORDESMAN. But let me make a few brief remarks.

First, I think that we need to be very careful about how much attention we give to any of those numbers. We are talking about a force that is in very rapid change and where much of what we can quantify, I thought, as was well brought out in the previous panel, is largely irrelevant.

We are talking about developing warfighting capabilities, counterterrorism capabilities and counterinsurgency capabilities, and the number of heads is not a measure of capability.

Moreover, I think it is quite clear that even the plans we have today are not going to survive engagement with reality. If you look at the training methods that have been used, the training syllabus, the methods of training have changed virtually monthly since June 2004.

If you look at force levels, the army in June 2004, did not have a clear goal. It then went to three divisions. Then it went to four divisions. It recently went to nine divisions. It has just gone to 10 divisions. And that, all since the end of January.

And these are numbers in flux because the National Guard was merged into the army, as an Iraqi not an American division. Depending on what day this is, there are 13 to 14 different elements of Iraqi forces in the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense. Each serves a different purpose. Each has some value. Most are not capable of operating independently.

We know that there is a new Minister of Defense and a new Minister of the Interior coming. Papers are already being prepared for them. If we go back to what happened in the transition from the CPA to the interim government, that almost certainly means there will be still further changes in virtually every force in the overall pattern of Iraqi forces.

And the real government, in the sense of a truly elected, sovereign government is supposed to be the product of the election to be held either at the end of this year or the spring of 2006. And I can almost guarantee you, from talking to Iraqis, that with each month that goes by, they're going to impose more of their own plans and their own demands.

But, having said that—and I think the key message of what I said is this debate over tipping points is absurd. We are talking about tipping years, at a minimum, 2005–2006. And just having talked to Iraqi officials, they are talking about a continued training and advisory presence through 2010.

We are also talking about some important changes which go beyond the numbers. We have begun to recognize the realities of the insurgency. I do not agree with what was said earlier.

We did not anticipate the size of the insurgency. It is not a product of what Saddam and his forces left as a legacy. It has mutated far beyond that. There are strong Islamist and other elements, and it has considerable popular support, a point made by Iraqi officials when they talk about some 200,000 sympathizers.

But at least we understand we are fighting an insurgency, and we are fighting real terrorists. We understand Iraqi forces have to be trained and equipped and led and given unit integrity for that mission. We begin to understand at least that our original equipment plan was grossly inadequate, as was our facility plan.

We still have no clear plan to give Iraqi forces at any level the equipment they need, but people are working on the issue, and they are beginning to understand that if our troops need up-armored Humvees, Iraqis cannot go out in unprotected Toyotas. We see efforts to correct the facility problem. That has been done largely in the military. It is now going to the police and security forces.

In reality, we recognize that much of what was on the first chart presented to the committee was manpower which should never have been recruited in the first place. It wasn't properly vetted; some of it wasn't literate. Much of it was in poor physical condition or too old. And much of it, frankly, was not put through the full training process that it was to have been put through by the Coalition. That is being corrected, particularly in the police and in the National Guard.

With the Luck mission, we begin to understand one key reality: Training never can produce competent combat troops. Without leadership, without unit integrity, without experience; this is not a factory. It is the battalions who actually operate, learn in the field, sometimes from defeat, as you pointed out, who have the courage to go on, who become effective troops. No training system will ever produce those by itself.

We also are beginning to see serious force elements, and let me use some figures which are somewhat more up to date than the ones presented on the chart shown earlier, although only by a couple of weeks. We had one deployable battalion in July 2004. As of yesterday, we had claimed we had 52 deployable battalions, out of a total of some 96 in structure. We have 24 deployable regular army battalions, and that will be 27 by the end of next week.

Mr. SHAYS. I don't like to interrupt your testimony, but can you put numbers of personnel next to those?

Professor CORDESMAN. To be perfectly honest, sir, the numbers are going to be the same kind of numbers you get when they are reported on by the U.S. Army, which is to say they are nominal strengths, not real ones.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I guess what I am trying to do is—is it possible for me to hear your numbers compared to these numbers?

Professor CORDESMAN. Those numbers, as far as I know, sir, are totally accurate. But if you were to say 24 to 27 regular army battalions, that is something between 11,000 and 13,000 men. Those are part of the numbers on that chart. Now, they have just had merged into them 76 battalions from the National Guard. That would raise the figure by another 30,000 out of the 60,000. There is one mechanized battalion in that total. That is much more critical than, say, 20,000 of the men on the chart, because it means there are heavy units. You have a counterterrorism force, and you have commando battalions that are key elements there.

If you look at that total of some 82,000 men on the other side of the chart, the total numbers are largely irrelevant. But if you look within them, there are now 20 special police force battalions. Nine of those are police commandoes; nine are public-order battalions. Two are mechanized, and they have light-armored vehicles for the first time. Those are the first units who can actually go out and move, potentially, in the face of the insurgency. You have SWAT teams coming on line. There are five of them in service.

For the first time, there is actually a border battalion trained and equipped to move, as distinguished from sitting there and hoping that the bad guys come through them. There is a national emergency police force. Now, how many people is that? I haven't the faintest idea, because it's quite clear the advisory teams feel those battalions in the police force are much too large, very inefficient and need to be cut down and reorganized.

It is somewhere around 16,000 out of those 82,000 people that probably have some capability. But if you ask me, frankly, how many of these units could really stand without the U.S. Army or Marine Corps presence or the support of the U.S. Air Force or without U.S. intelligence, the answer at this point is none. They are not organized or equipped for that mission.

And, quite honestly, it is disingenuous to talk about how well the Iraqis did in protecting polling places when we have some 140,000 U.S. troops peaked and reorganized for 1 day to help protect the people protecting the polling places. That is not an indictment of what's being done. It produced a successful election.

Let me then go on, though, to point out a few things about what does have to happen. It is probably more important by far that Iraq evolve political unity and inclusiveness than it is that Iraq move forward in any given military or police dimension. It is critical for security that the economy and the distribution of income improve.

We talk a lot about the Iraqi troops, but let me note that in this latest USAID report, we talk about a vast U.S. aid program which is today only hiring about 100,000 Iraqis, and the number keeps dropping. Security is economic, not just a matter of military forces.

The numbers that you have on that chart for the police and security forces do not include local police and militias that are not trained by the United States, but at least in 10 to 12 of the provinces, security is much more a matter of day-to-day police work, putting it into the threat of criminal activity, than it is the United States or the multinational coalition's training effort.

We are just beginning to see governance move into most of the provinces, aside from the Kurdish areas. None of us know what the new elected government will be or how it will change police and security procedures. We are only beginning to know how corrupt this structure is going to be. And let me say that the chances of Iraq not having substantial corruption for at least the next 10 years are nonexistent. To demand they not be corrupt is simply absurd. It cannot happen.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me not try to cut you short, but just give me a sense of how much longer you think you will be going.

Professor CORDESMAN. Two minutes, sir, I think.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Professor CORDESMAN. Having said that, on the military side, our goal really has to be to put forces in the field that can stand on their own. A plan is being developed to do that. No plan has been stated in any unclassified forum as to how it will be done. Any plan we draft then has to be approved by the Iraqis, and at some point, the Congress is going to have to go through that plan and fund a level of military equipment, facilities and aid which it has never been requested to provide and is not part of the supplemental.

To make this work, the Congress has to be responsive quickly. It has to have trust in the nature of those requirements, and it has to accept the fact that there isn't going to be an efficient or effective accounting system in the future any more than there was in that $8.8 billion that we just heard in the first session of this hearing.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Professor Cordesman follows:]

Testimony before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations
Committee on Government Reform
United States House of Representatives

"Iraqi Force Development"

March 14, 2005

A Statement by

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My testimony today focuses on the development of Iraqi military and security forces, and their evolving capabilities, and for this hearing I would like to concentrate on how these developments are seen from an Iraqi perspective, although I have attached a detailed summary of the latest Multinational Command (MNC) reporting on Iraqi forces.

It is far too soon to claim success, or any kind of tipping point in the development of Iraqi forces. There are, however, many positive developments and this is as true from an Iraqi viewpoint as a US one.

Much of the discussion about Iraqi forces in the US comes from American observers. Iraqi officials and officers, however, present a different perspective. Recent discussions and exchanges of e-mails with a select number of Iraqi Ministry of Defense officials and officers do not act as any kind of authoritative survey or substitute for systematic and comprehensive investigations in the field. They do, however, provide enough information to show that the Iraqis who are directly involved are approaching the challenges they face with considerable realism.

I also would like to look beyond today's numbers, I am providing four tables at the end of this testimony that provide the latest unclassified data on the manning levels, training programs, and force development numbers in Iraqi forces as provide by the Multinational Coalition and its training command. Far too much of the recent discussion of Iraqi forces, however, focuses on trying to find some magic bottom line number and not on the different capabilities of different elements of Iraqi forces, forces and how these are likely to change over time.

The key policy issue is not how many mission capable Iraqis there are right at this moment, but rather is there a system in place to ensure that capable Iraqi military and security forces continue to develop over time. This testimony will try to address these questions from an Iraqi point of view.

Forces That Iraqis Feel Are "Only 10 Months Old"

The Iraqis actually involved in shaping Iraq's new forces seem to have few illusions about the magnitude of the challenges they face, but still remain optimistic and believe their capabilities are steadily improving. They are quite frank about the need for better training and experience, and better equipment.

At least in private conversation, they are equally frank about leadership problems, corruption, and a lack of experience. They understand the challenges of having to create a more inclusive government and deal with the conflicting interests of Sunni, Shi'ite, Kurd and other factions. The understand the uncertainties inherent in having to deal with two elections and a constitutional referendum in the course of 2005, and the new problems this will create for governance.

At the same time, the Iraqis actually involved in shaping Iraq's new forces are not pessimistic.. Most believe that Iraqi forces are growing steadily better with time, will acquire the experience and quality to deal with much of the insurgency during 2005, and should be able to secure much of the country by 2006.

It is worth noting in this regard that the Iraqis are by definition "survivors." Outsiders are sometimes surprised by polls that show Iraqis remain surprisingly optimistic about the future. Iraqis, however, have already been through a great a deal: Authoritarian swings ever since the Monarchy, the October War, the conflict with the Kurds in the 1970s, Saddam's first blood purge in 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, UN sanctions, the uprisings and low-level civil conflict that followed, and the Coalition invasion.

Moreover, the Iraqis who actually work in developing military, security, and police forces show no nostalgia about the "good old days" under Saddam. They know what Iraqi forces really were, the capabilities the new government actually inherited, and what Iraqi forces must now become.

Iraqis who are directly involved in shaping Iraq's new forces also have far fewer illusions about the nature of the task involved than outsiders. They know the weaknesses in the forces that existed under Saddam, and in the initial Coalition efforts to create effective Iraqi forces.

One point that senior Ministry of Defense officials made repeatedly in interviews in late February 2005 was that the Iraqi force structure were "only 10 months old." Unlike outside critics, they did not believe the primary problems in quality came from the disbandment of Iraqi forces right after the fall of Saddam Hussein. They acknowledged that the Iraqi military forces had largely disbanded themselves during the course of the fighting, that the Iraqi military had virtually disintegrated, facilities were destroyed and/or looted, and much of their major combat equipment had been destroyed or been rendered inoperable.

Failure to Foresee Insurgency, Not Postwar Disbandment, is the Key Past Problem

Iraqi defense officials and officers are far less critical of the "de-Baathification" of the military and security forces by the CPA than outside Iraqis. They acknowledge that the war, desertions, and looting left few units and facilities intact, and that most were not worth preserving.

Some did blame "Debaathification" for failing to retain key personnel or anticipate would happen to those with no political and career options. Many of the Iraqis involved did feel, however, that Shi'ite exile elements in the interim government had considerable responsibility for the pressure they put on the CPA to take a hard line stand on Debaathification – and did not simply blame US officials. Such Iraqis also felt that the Interim Government made a major error in not reaching out to Baath and Sunni elements who had had to go along with Saddam's regime, and in allocating positions in fixed shares to Shi'ite Arabs, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs, rather than trying to create national government.

In general, the Iraqi officials and officers involved in creating Iraqi forces saw the most serious problem behind the lack of effectiveness of Iraqi forces until late 2004 as the result of a failure on the part of the CPA and US military to anticipate the threat of a major insurgency, and to train and equip regular military, security, and police force for this mission.

They stressed that the initial goals in creating new Iraqi military and security forces were to avoid the abuses of the past and to avoid creating a threat to democracy. As a result, the pace and scale of the military effort was slow to the point of reaching only token levels. The military were being shaped as a light border defense force which would only emerge with anything approaching serious capabilities long after the Iraqis finished drafting a constitution and had successfully create a new democratic government.

Similarly, the development of police and security forces was placed under the Ministry of the Interior and little coordination took place with the military effort under the Ministry of Defense. Security forces were given minimal paramilitary and intelligence elements, and most were initially assigned to low-grade facility protection forces like the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) – the predecessor to the National Guard. The ICDC was recruited locally with minimal attention to manpower quality and given minimal equipment and facilities.

Iraqi military and security forces were developed and deployed by each of the five major division areas under the Multinational Coalition (MNC), and to meet the priorities and security needs of the MNC, rather than a new, sovereign Iraqi government. This led to a lack of any cohesive follow-up to the initial training efforts, and an inevitable dependence on MNC forces for equipment and all forms of serious combat, service, and logistic support.

Iraqi police forces were created and recruited with minimal coordination and seen as little more than "beat cops" that required token training and equipment. In general, they were not shaped to deal with looting and Iraq's rapidly growing crime problems, much less the problem of security.

They were created on a "helter-skelter" basis -- with little equipment and training and minimal facilities. Much of this effort occurred at local levels with little attention to manpower quality, and the Ministry of the Interior often had no serious picture of the strength of given local police forces, much less any picture of their quality and leadership.

Many police were chosen by local leaders more as a matter of patronage than as part of an effort to create effective forces, and corruption and favoritism were rampant. Vetting was little more than a "by guess and by God" effort, and little attention was paid to past training, education, and physical condition – problems that were equally serious in the ICDC/National Guard.

At a technical level, the Iraqis involved in these efforts feel that the US was far too slow to provide anything like adequate numbers of experienced personnel; to see that the police and security effort had to be coordinated with the military effort, and to understand that the mission was counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and not building conventional military and police forces. They note that most initial cadres had no knowledge of how to deal with Iraqis or a different culture, that the high levels of rotation meant that personnel did not have the necessary on the job training and personal contacts, and that US and MNC constantly changed focus and were different in each of the five major operational areas under MNC control.

Waiting Until the Spring of 2004 to Begin an Effective Program

For virtually the entire existence of the CPA, leadership positions in all of the forces were more a matter of politics than effectiveness, and inefficiency and corruption were often ignored. The transfer of sovereignty took place under conditions were there were no fully functioning ministries or governments in the governorates. The selection of new Ministers of Defense and the Interior create new problems and led to the disorganization of existing efforts – as well as the collapse of efforts to put an end to the militias that had shown considerable early promise and success.

Like many American officers and experts directly involved in this mission under the CPA, and after the transfer of power, Iraqi officials and officers feel that serious efforts to train effective forces only began in June 2004, and did not really gather serious momentum until September 2004. This is why Iraqi Ministry of Defense officials, and military and security officers, repeatedly referred to Iraqi forces as being, "only 10 months old" at a conference in late February 2005.

Iraqis Do not See the Past as the Defining Prologue to the Future

Yet, this same background helps explains why Iraqi officials and officers remain relatively optimistic about the future. Iraqi officials and officers feel, however, that progress is now certain to be made if the new Iraqi government shows suitable leadership, cohesion, and inclusiveness.

They show little belief in the kind of conspiracy theories that blame the US and MNC for deliberately keeping Iraqi forces weak and seeking a permanent occupation. If anything, they are more worried that the US and MNC will not provide the continuing support they need. While some feel Iraqi forces may be able to largely stand on their own against the insurgents by the end of 2006, they also feel that they may still need support from US armor, artillery, air, special forces, and intelligence. Some feel that a major US and MNC advisory, training, equipment, and aid effort will be needed through 2010.

More generally, Iraqi officials and officers have considerable confidence in the US, British, and other MNC officers involved in helping Iraq to train and organize Iraqi forces. There are criticisms of the US and MNC effort. Some Iraqis are critical at the level of equipment they are getting and do see Iraqi as being treated by a "dual standard" that leaves Iraqi forces much more vulnerable that US and MNC forces.

Iraqis also note that some of US and MNC combat forces they work with have inadequate training for working with foreign forces, rotate too quickly to acquire and exploit the expertise they need to work with Iraqis in the field, lack adequate indoctrination into the current strengths and weaknesses of Iraq forces, and sometimes treat them unfairly and not as partners.

At the same time, Iraqi officials and officers feel that most of the US and MNC teams they work do have Iraqi interests at heart, and they feel the training effort is getting steadily better. None expect to get Western standards of advanced equipment and technology versus the kind of equipment better suited to Iraq. They also welcomed the recommendation of the Luck mission to insert US officers and NCOs into Iraqi units to

provide leadership and unit cohesion and combat training as an essential next step in creating a transition to effective and independent Iraqi forces.

Iraqis also seem somewhat bemused by the US debate over how many Iraqi forces are properly trained and equipped and can engage the insurgents. They point out that no Iraqi forces as yet have all of the strength in terms of armor, firepower, and support to engage in main force combat without US support. They point out that Iraqi forces differ sharply in capability not only by force element, but in terms of experience, capability, and leadership at the battalion level within each different branch of the Iraqi military, security, and police forces.

At the same time, they also point out that virtually every element of the military, security, and police forces can perform some function in terms of improving security and that the situation is improving steadily as new and better trained/equipped forces come on line; Iraqi forces are organized and manpower is better selected, and Iraqi officers and other ranks gain experience. From their perspective, the issue is not whether the glass is two-thirds empty or one-third full, it is how rapidly it is filling.

Emerging Iraqi Forces

Iraqi officials and officers readily acknowledge that Iraqi forces still have a long way to go, that they still lack proper training and equipment, and that transition to two new Iraqi governments in 2005 will create turbulence under the best of circumstances. They made it clear that they cannot predict how the new government would behave or how the constitutional process and efforts at inclusion would change Iraqi security policy.

They acknowledge the limits to their ability to plan and manage Iraq's force development in any orderly way. Even if the course of the insurgency was predictable, Iraqi military and security developments are very much a matter of improvisation and uncertainty. Iraqi officials and officers also have no clear budget for force planning, no way to predict the level of US and other MNC aid.

An Iraqi briefing on current force developments did clarify some aspects of the path that Iraqi forces will follow over the coming year. At the same time, the Iraqi MOD officials giving the briefing had staff elements actively involved in preparing briefings for the new government and the possibility of a new Minister of Defense and/or Minister of the Interior.

Several also privately noted that that three changes were needed in current plans that depended more on the US and MNC than Iraqi politics and decisions:

- First, to develop and implement plans to create Iraqi forces more quickly that are equipped and deployed to stand on their own.
- Second, to develop common plans with the US and MNC to phase down the role of MNC forces according to common criteria and in ways where both sides have the same expectations, allowing Iraqis to predict the future level of MNC aid and remaining capability.
- Third, to develop mid-term plans to create forces with enough support and heavy land and air weapons to eventually replace all MNC forces other than those remaining in an advisory and training role.

Force Development Principles and Strategy

Iraqi officers stress that Iraqi forces are still being developed in ways that are compatible with the emergence of an Iraqi democracy. This means force development on the basis of the following six principles:

- Democracy
- Civilian control of the military
- Transparency
- Rule of law
- Responsibility and accountability
- Equality and justice among religions

Developing Effective Ministries and "Governance"

Iraqi officials make it clear that Iraq is still in the process of developing an effective Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, and anything approaching a coordinated national security structure at the top. The development of effective structures to manage police and internal security forces at the governorate and local level is even more of a work in progress. They estimate that it will take at least all of 2005, and much of 2006, to evolve a stable and more comprehensive overall structure for handling the "governance" aspects of Iraq's military, security, and police forces.

At the same time, they state that cooperation among the Ministries and at the national-regional-local level is slowly improving. They note that communications are better, and there is more experience in day-to-day coordination. They feel relations with the US and other MNC elements are good, and note that the Iraqi government now has a national security coordination committee that is scheduled to meet twice a week as well as a higher level Joint Coordination Group at the Minister-Deputy Minister level.

While officials and officers understand they face a 2005, in which there may well be two sets of upheavals in the Iraqi government and key ministries involved in national security, they also feel that the Ministries are gradually acquiring experience civilian personnel, adequate facilities and equipment, and adequate communications.

They also note that the Interim Government did develop the outline of a national strategy for the next 5-7 years. This strategy was based on the following elements:

- Threat analysis.
- Analysis of the interests of neighboring states, other nations, and the international community and the resulting diplomatic and security requirements.
- The strategy needed to develop armed forces and security forces, and the resulting requirements in terms of force size and equipment.
- Economic and social strategy.

At the same time, they are fully aware that nothing is stable in terms of current force plans, they have little ability to plan in terms of known budgets, and levels of aid, are still highly dependent on the US and MNC for many aspects of funding and support, and face

a situation in flux in terms of the polices and structure of their own government as well as the realities dictated by the course of the insurgency.

Iraqi Intelligence

Iraqis clearly understand that their present intelligence capabilities are very limited, and they remain dependent on the US and MNC except at the local level. They acknowledge they are deeply penetrated at every level by hostile agents and that this is likely to continue until the new government acquires far more popular legitimacy and Sunnis and Iraqi Islamists give it more support. They also acknowledge that current Iraqi counterintelligence capabilities are limited, and that vetting is often cursory and uncertain.

Iraqi officers and officials do, however, feel that Iraq is beginning to develop effective intelligence capabilities. These intelligence capabilities are divided into three major groups: Military intelligence in the Ministry of Defense, the Police Intelligence Directorate in the Ministry of the Interior, and the Iraqi National Intelligence Services in the Prime Minister's office.

Military Intelligence is being developed as a key priority, and Iraq hopes for extensive further training help from the intelligence sections of NATO countries. More broadly, both actionable operational intelligence and counterintelligence are seen as key priorities at every level, and Iraqi officers and officials make it clear that they see that "good intelligence is more important than good weapons."

The MOI has also created a special intelligence section to support "quick intervention" operations and is steadily attempting to improve intelligence and counterintelligence efforts in the field at the level of the security and police services.

Iraqi Views of the Threat

Iraqis disagree in detail regarding almost all of the issues covered in this analysis, and sometimes presented very different views of how serious they took the threat from Syria and Iran, how and whether they quantified various threat forces, and how serious they saw given extremist, terrorist, and insurgent elements as being. There was also no agreement on whether the threat was getting better or worse, although most felt the election was a major step forward and that insurgent attacks were less successful than they feared.

Like the US and MNC, they see four major threats:

- *Zarqawi and Outside Islamist Extremist Organization Fighters:* Mostly foreign Arab and from other countries. Cannot quantify, but numbers are small and probably well under 1,000. The problem is their methods of attack have great impact.
- *Former Regime Elements (FRE)s:* Large numbers, and a mix of true supporters of the Ba'ath, alienated Sunnis, paid volunteers, temporary recruits, and other Iraqis. No way to quantify, but some feel is in the 15,000 to 30,000 level depending on how estimate full time ands part time fighters.

- *Iraqi Native Islamist Extremist Organization Fighters:* Small and just emerging. Cannot quantify, but numbers are small and probably well under 500. The problem is their methods of attack can mirror image outside extremists and have great impact.
- *Organized Crime:* The major source of violence and insecurity in at least 12 of the 18 governorates. Often seem to cooperate with terrorists and insurgents. Many different levels of seriousness, but numbers are very high, as is impact.

Some Iraqis also felt elements of various militias were becoming a problem, but the details are unclear. Iraqi officials also point out that they feel MNC estimates are misleading because they seem to only include hardcore insurgents. They also feel that the Minister of Defense was generally correct in including some 200,000 sympathizers in one guess at the threat. "It does no one any good to deny the insurgents have major public support, particularly in Sunni areas. Our political problem is much more important than our military one."

Manpower Issues Affecting Force Development

Iraq officers and officials feel that the problems of Debaathification have been largely overcome and that the Ministry of Defense and armed forces are now open to all except hardliners and extremists. They feel that ex-Baathist officers and NCOs now play a critical role in every branch of the military, security, and police services; that many are Sunni, and that the MoD and MOI are now actively seeking to recruit as many experienced personnel as possible.

They indicate that a deliberate effort is being made to create a "national force" that includes Shi'ites, Sunnis, Kurds, and other minorities. They also state that Debaathification is not being applied in ways that prevent the recruitment of qualified Sunni officers and other ranks, or men from military and other forces who were not directly involved in the repressive and violent acts of Saddam Hussein's regime.

It is not clear, however, what the mix of different sects and ethnic groups really is, and how much of the Iraqi force is truly national in the sense of mixing such groups. The goal seems to be to avoid local, sectarian, and ethnic forces in the regular military and elite security forces, but some units do seem largely ethnic.

They also have to deal with serious problems in the composition of some existing forces. Recruiting and composition of National Guard and police units was local in the past, sometimes with virtually no vetting other than the support of some local chief or political figure. This has often led to politically appointed leaders with little real capability and forces lacking the will, physical condition and/or literacy to be effective.

Iraqi officials and officers clearly want this situation to change, and note that Iraq's various forces are being purged of low grade and suspect manpower, which is being retired or paid to leave. This process is still underway, however, and Iraqis note that there is still a strong tendency to politicize senior appointments and to fail to remove incompetent and corrupt officials and officers for political reasons or because of family and ethnic ties.

Some Iraqi officers also pointed out that force development is constantly affected by the lack of security and Iraq's lack of economic development. One noted that personnel from other areas did not know the ground and local condition, stood out in Iraq's highly localized society, and were vulnerable for this reason. At the same time, local personal were subject to pressure or attacks on their families and from local insurgents who almost immediately learned their functions and either attacked them or sought to use them for intelligence and infiltration. the fact that many are driven to volunteer out of economic pressure and desperation. This can produce recruits with little real motive to fight.

Pay and leave present additional problems. Bases and casernes generally do not provide housing and this leaves families vulnerable. Many personnel have to visit their families and provide their pay in cash and this means a high percentage of forces on leave. At the same time, recruits and actives that go on leave are vulnerable to pressure and intimidation. The lack of protected vehicles, uncertain discipline in taking leave, and a lack of experience make new volunteers especially vulnerable.

One Iraqi official noted that even though he was senior enough so that his family could be housed safely in a government area, he had reservations about what would happen to the rest of his extended family, left his family in place, and concealed his duties from everyone in his home town except family members and close friends.

Iraqis do, however, feel that many of these conditions may be temporary. As more and more trained and equipped Iraqi forces come on line, they will be able to establish a steadily better structure for force protection and a steadily better overall climate of security. If currently hostile Iraqi Sunnis can be included in the government, the remaining native insurgents and all outside insurgents will become more isolated, and the areas in which they can operate will become steadily more limited. In short, they are optimistic enough to feel that time is on their side, and the insurgents will be much less effective in attacking Iraqi forces once they reach the numbers, quality, and experience planned for mid-to-late 2005.

Creating an Effective Iraqi Training Structure

Iraqi officers and official acknowledge that training remains a serious problem. They again cite the fact that serious training efforts are "only 10 months old," and they note that training does not occur at the factory level. Even when trainees have advanced courses, they are still need leadership, experience, unit cohesion, and the support of experience personnel.

These conditions are only beginning to exist in the various Iraqi forces, and the need for experience cadres of leaders is one reason they welcome the idea of have experience US and MNC officers embedded in new Iraqi units until they have the leadership and experience to act on their own. (Iraqi officers do, however, express concern that US officers and personnel who lack area skills and experience in working with Iraqis are often impatient and over-demanding, and tend to bully the Iraqis they are supposed to inspire and train.)

Iraqis understand that current training periods are very short, and those involved in Iraqi force development are far less likely to talk about the competence of the men trained

under Saddam's regime than Iraqis with no practical experience. They see how serious the training problem really is.

They note, however, that Iraq simply does not have time to train its military, security, and police forces under ideal conditions, and that in-unit training can be more useful in any case. They feel that basic training is useful largely in instilling discipline and fundamentals, and that Iraqi military, security, and police forces in the field are constantly being forced to adapt to changes in insurgent and criminal behavior and find that this requires them to "learn and relearn" from field experience and to meet real-world local conditions.

One officer noted that "our tactical conditions and training needs change constantly in terms of detailed requirements, sometimes in ways that mean training has to be revised on a monthly basis. One real problem that we all have is that much of our training – under Saddam and now – is for fighting conventional forces. We are only gradually developing effective training for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency."

Facilities and equipment are also seen as continuing problems. Effective forces require training, leadership, and unit cohesion, but they also require adequate equipment, secure facilities, and facilities in the right areas. Improvements are taking place in the three latter area, but Iraqis feel they lag behind requirements, and caution that all of the elements of force quality have to be brought into balance for each element of the military, security, and police services for training efforts to be effective.

At the same time, Iraqi officials do believe that real progress has been made in creating the kind of training organization and facilities that are needed. They feel the facilities for effective basic training are now in place, and that training time and training in more advanced skills can be expanded as force levels become more adequate and the immediate demand for personnel is less critical.

Academies for more advanced training exist at the Joint Headquarters level. Past academies in Irbil and Sulaymania are back on line and have been modernized, and a new academy in Baghdad is coming on line. A former regime training center in Tikrit has been reopened, initially with MNC support, but now with Iraqi training cadres. Iraq is beginning to create the kind of high level training facilities it needs at the Ministry level, and plans to create a staff college, war college, and center for National Security Studies. Much does depend, however, on getting MNC, NATO country, and other outside support. "It will be at least several years before we have the skills to take over advanced training on our own."

Iraqi officers and officials are not currently in any rush to eliminate outside training and advisors – in fact they welcome every offer of training from new countries and every new sign of outside support. They welcome the help they have had from Egypt, the UAE, and Jordan in addition to the MNC countries, and hope for new training contributions from Germany, Italy, Norway, and France.

They feel such multinational contributions are highly useful – in spite of the potential problems in different training methods and interoperability. They do, however, recognize the need for standardization and coordination training efforts over time, and want to take over the overall leadership and organization of training as soon as possible.

While Iraqis do not use the term as such, they also note that as Iraqi forces expand to reach significant levels of capability, they will have the "critical mass" to provide a far more effective overall training and leadership structure, less pressure and more time for training, and be able to take over far more of the mission from the US and MNC. Iraqi officials and officers hope for "full capability" in 2006, but acknowledge they will need MNC aid and support in training, equipment, and other areas through 2010.

Iraqi Military Force Development

Iraqi officials and officers discuss Iraqi force developments in general terms and have not provided detailed numbers or force descriptions. They also question the US search for the exact number of "effective" Iraqi forces. They see Iraqi forces as in a constant state of development. They feel it is unfair to judge them at this time, given the history of Iraqi force development, and that many past problems are being rapidly overcome and most of the remaining problems will be overcome during the course of the coming year.

They feel that all Iraqi forces can be used effectively in some missions, but are careful to point out that fully effective Iraqi forces with enough armor to operate offensively against insurgent forces without extensive MNC support are just coming on line. As one Iraqi put it, "What do you want to count and what tasks do you want to judge it by? Why do you want to count what we are rather than what we are becoming?" (***For the sake of reference, current data provided by the Multinational Command (MNC-1) are shown as Tables One to Four in the attachments at the end of this testimony.***)

Iraqi officials and officers understand that they cannot form stable force plans at this point in time. They realize that force goals are in flux, and that equipment, deployment, and facility plans are almost certain to change. They understand the volatility of the Iraqi political climate, as well as the inability to either predict their budgets or the level of MNC aid.

Iraqis also believe that one of the major challenges they face at the Ministry, service, and unit level is to create an effective and cohesive C^4I system (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence), and particularly to create an effective intelligence system that can properly be integrated into Iraq's developing command, control, communications, and computer capabilities.

The Army

Iraqis feel that the Iraqi Army has advanced to the point where the Chief of Staff's office has an operating formal structure with Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations, Administration, and Training.

Iraqi Army forces are also currently developing according to a plan that calls for:

- Three Light Infantry Divisions of three brigades each, which each have two battalions. Two of these divisions are complete in terms of training and organization and a third is one the way. These forces lack armor and protected vehicles, and do not have heavy firepower. They do, however, have light weapons, medium machine guns, and mortars.

- A mechanized division is being created. Only one battalion of this force is as yet in service, although a second is nearly completion.
- There are now two special forces brigades with a division Headquarters, and the Iraqi Army has the goal of creating a third brigade.
- The Army units are relatively small with battalions averaging around 400-600 men. Manpower is vetted and selected with more care than in other Iraqi forces, men have more combat experience, and training is more systematic both in the formal training phase and at the unit level.

Iraqi officers see a number of major challenges for the development of the Army. One is to give it the training and equipment necessary to operate as a fully independent force and eventually replace MN C forces. A second is the need to redeploy Army units away from casernes and locations chosen for MNC convenience and security so it can meet Iraqi government priorities and needs. The third is to create a more stable plan for force expansion, and one that takes into account the problems created by the merger of the Army and National Guard.

Merging the National Guard into the Army

The National Guard is being merged into the Army and this presents some problems. The National Guard is the successor to a low-grade force called the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), which was recruited and vetted largely on a local level for glorified security guard duty. Training and equipment was very limited; leadership owed more to politics and regional needs than effectiveness, and much of its manpower lacked the necessary physical condition, education, and loyalty.

The ICDC/Guard was also created on the basis that each of the five MNC commands or regions essentially created a separate force, largely on the basis of recruiting by local leaders. Each MNC originally created National Guard companies at the MNC brigade level without any headquarters, and with very limited basic training . This produced rapid force expansion but without force quality

The National Guard has since, however, been slowly purged of some of its low quality leadership and manpower – which has been retired or paid to leave. Changes have taken place in equipment, selection, training, and organization. It was initially organized largely at the company level. This was later expanded to battalions that became very large, sometimes reaching 1,000 men; A size too large to be effective.

On paper, the National Guard that is being merged into the Army has six divisions of three brigades each, with three battalions of 3-4 companies each – most of which only have light infantry weapons. There are no mortars or heavy machine guns.

This gives the Guard a large force on paper, but most of which has serious – if not crippling -- force quality problems if it has to be used in offensive operations. It is useful, however, for a wide range of security duties like manning checkpoints and providing area security in low to medium threat areas. "It can support the army and the police, but it is not a counterinsurgency force and it cannot lead the way."

It is obvious that the Guard still needs major reorganization, more training, and better equipment. Iraqi officers could not, however, provide a clear plan for what the Guard will become as it is merged with the Army.

The Air Force

Iraq is just beginning to develop an air force. It does, however, now have a Major General in Command and a functioning headquarters and staff. It is acquiring C-130s for "strategic mobility," and helicopters for transport, support, reconnaissance, and combat support missions. Helicopter gunships will be its initial combat weapon. It does not yet have clear force plans or plans to acquire modern fixed-wing combat aircraft.

Navy/Coast Guard

The Iraqi Navy is just becoming a light coastal defense force.

Ministry of the Interior Forces

There is some obvious rivalry and tension between Iraqis serving in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of the Interior, but cooperation does seem to be improving.

In general, even Ministry of Interior officials have little praise for most of the Iraqi police, which they feel has low overall recruiting and training standards, and can do little more than passively man police stations and carry out minimal police duties in relatively secure areas. The police is seen as slowly improving in such areas, but generally ineffective in dealing with levels of crime that are a major security problem in the areas where insurgents have little capability and impact. Militias are often the de facto police in high crime areas.

The Ministry of the Interior has, however, created elite units like the SOS Police forces that are carefully selected and trained, are mobile, have adequate communications, and are directly under the Ministry of the Interior. This force now has elements in Baghdad and every governorate.

The Iraqi special forces or Quick Intervention Forces are another elite force in the Ministry of the Interior, with the training, leadership, and equipment to provide security in medium to high threat areas.

Iraqi traffic, immigration, and civil defense police are also felt to be getting better selection, leadership, training, and equipment.

The Border Police are slowly improving and now have better facilities, protection, and equipment, but Iraqis feel it may be several years before they can correct their past leadership, selection, training, and equipment problems.

"Tipping Years" versus "Tipping Points"

No Iraqi official or officer saw the elections or any other recent or planned event as a "tipping point." Instead, they saw a process that would take one to two years to complete, and where there were a host of uncertainties. Different Iraqis focused on different issues, but most showed considerable realism regardless the ongoing challenges they faced:

- Deal with increasing more aggressive insurgent and extremist attacks, and efforts to split Arab Sunni, Arab Shi'ite, Kurds, and other minorities.
- Create fully effective ministries, limit corruption, and purge low quality and passive leaders, officials, and officers.
- Implement a force development plan for the armed forces and manage the integration of Army and National Guard.
- Create effective intelligence, counterintelligence, and C^4I capabilities.
- Develop and implement plans to acquire more adequate equipment, force protection, and facilities.
- Begin a systematic transition to forces that can operate without MNC support.
- Redeploy Iraqi forces to meet Iraqi, rather than MNC, needs.
- Restructure, train/retrain, and purge the police forces to make them both effective crime fighters and an aid in counterinsurgency and counter terrorism.
- Deal with the transition to two new governments in 2005, with possibly two new sets of Ministers of Defense and Interior, plus different political leaderships and goals.
- Adapt to any new laws and mandates growing out of the creation of a new constitution.
- Cope with ethnic and religious tensions.
- Find ways to integrate militia elements into the regular forces/police forces, and have the rest go back to civilian life; implement the now largely abandon CPA plan.
- Find some way to get stable and predictable budgets and levels of aid; negotiate at least a predictable level of medium-term aid.

These are not inconsiderable challenges, but Iraqi officials and officers do not find them to be daunting ones. As has been pointed out earlier, Iraq is a nation of remarkably experienced "survivors." The Iraqis involved in developing Iraq's military, security, and police forces are more, however, than "survivors." They seem committed to their mission and they believe that – in time – it can be successful in spite of all the problems they face.

Appendix One

MNC Summary of Iraqi Manning Levels, Force Developments, and Training

Table One

US MNC-1 Summary of "Trained and Equipped" Iraqi Forces as of February 28, 2005

Force Element/Component	Operational	Trained and Equipped
Ministry of Defense		
Army	58,992	-
Air Force	186	-
Navy	517	-
Total	59,698*	-
Ministry of the Interior		
Police and Highway Patrol	-	55,274
Other MOI Forces	-	26,798
Total	-	82,072**
Total Trained and Equipped	-	141,761

*Unauthorized absences are not included in these numbers.

**Unauthorized absences are included in these numbers.

Table Two

MNSTC-1 Progress Summary as of March 12, 2005

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq continues to assist the Iraqi government in the organization, training, equipping, and advising of Iraqi Security Forces, as well as in the rebuilding of security force bases, training academies, border forts, and other facilities. While there have been setbacks, and challenges remain, there has also been enormous progress. On 1 July 2004, for example, there was one "deployable" or "national" battalion available to the Iraqi Ministries of Interior and Defense (i.e., a unit that could be moved to a trouble spot anywhere in the country). Now there are 52 such battalions and 96 battalions conducting operations in total, in addition to regular police, border guards, and other security force elements. All told, there are more than 142,000 trained and equipped Iraqi police, soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

The following list highlights some of the accomplishments in the development of Iraqi Security Forces since 1 July 2004.

Operations:

- On election day, 30 January 2005, an estimated 130,000 Iraqi Security forces provided the inner two rings of security for over 5,200 polling sites. Not a single polling site was penetrated, and several Iraqi Security Force members gave their lives while stopping suicide bombers that day.
- In the fall and winter of 2004, Iraqi forces fought alongside Coalition forces in Najaf, Samarra, Fallujah, Baghdad, North Babil, Mosul, and a host of other locations. In Fallujah alone, Iraqi forces lost eight of their members and had more than 40 wounded. More than one thousand Iraqi Security Force members have lost their lives serving their country since the transfer of sovereignty. Although Iraqi forces have endured casualties in many of their operations, have been attacked multiple times each day, and have suffered losses through brutal intimidation attacks, there remains no shortage of volunteers; in fact, basic training courses are ongoing for thousands of former soldiers to bring Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention units up to strength.

Ministry of Defense:

- Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention Forces grew from one operational battalion in June 2004 to 24 operational battalions, with three more scheduled to become operational over the next two weeks. With the incorporation of the Iraqi National Guard into the Army on Army Day, 6 January, along with the addition of battalions from the Defenders of Baghdad Brigade and the Muthana Brigade (both Iraqi initiatives) and the other battalions listed below, the total number of Army battalions conducting operations is 76.
- Iraq's 1st Mechanized Battalion became operational in mid-January, along with a tank company and a transportation battalion; the remaining elements of the 1st Mechanized Brigade will be trained and equipped by the summer.

- Iraq's Special Operations Forces now include a superb Counter-Terrorist Force and a Commando Battalion, each of which has conducted dozens of successful operations.
- Iraq's Navy is now operational, with five 100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels, and a naval infantry regiment that recently completed training.
- Iraq's Air Force has three operational squadrons equipped with nine reconnaissance aircraft that operate both day and night, and three US C-130 transport aircraft. One more squadron, comprised of four UH-1 helicopters (to be followed by 12 more and by 4 Bell Jet Rangers from the UAE), stood up at the end of January.
- Iraq's two Military Academies reopened in mid-October and each graduated a pilot course of new lieutenants, 91 total, on 6 January 2005. The new year-long military academy course has already begun. And training by the NATO Training Mission–Iraq of Iraqi Staff College instructors will begin in April.

Ministry of Interior:

- Iraq's Special Police Forces grew from zero operational battalions in June 2004 to 20 operational battalions by the end of February. Nine Police Commando battalions are now operational. Nine Public Order Battalions are operational. Additionally, the Mechanized Police Brigade, organized into two battalions, recently completed training and began operations in late January, using fifty BTR-94 wheeled, armored vehicles. It received the first two of 50 American-made armored security vehicles at the end of February. One additional Mechanized Police battalion is in training.
- The Iraqi Police Service has over 54,000 trained and equipped regular police officers, up from 26,000 six months ago. Of the nearly 30,000 police officers who have been trained in the last six months, over 13,000 were former police who underwent three-week transition course training and over 16,000 were new recruits who underwent eight-week basic training. More than 35,000 additional police are on duty and scheduled for training.
- Five basic police academies are now operational; together, they produce over 3,500 new police officers each month from the 8-week course, a course recently modified to better prepare the new police officers for the challenging environment in which some may serve. Several other regional academies are under construction.
- Iraq's National Police Emergency Response Unit is now operational and at full strength, and its elements have conducted highly successful operations in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul.
- Iraq's First Special Border Force Battalion is operating on the Syrian border in western Anbar Province; the Second Battalion completed training in February and has begun its deployments, and a third will begin training in March.
- Five provincial SWAT teams have been trained, three more are in training, and twelve more are scheduled for training over the next six months.

Other:

- Members of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq are now helping to advise and train the Iraqi staffs of the National Joint Operations Center, the Ministry of Defense Operations Center, and the Ministry of Interior Operations Center, as well as the Armed Forces Joint Headquarters and Ministry of Defense. NATO trainers are also assisting the cadre of the Iraqi Military Academy and, in 2005, NATO trainers will help Iraq reestablish its Staff College and War College. A number of NATO nations have already provided equipment for Iraqi Security Forces and a host of training opportunities in NATO countries, with many additional offers extant.
- Enormous amounts of equipment have been delivered to Iraqi Security Forces since 1 July:
  - More than 140 million rounds of ammunition, with another 100 million recently received and put into eleven ammo storage areas around the country
  - 116,000 pistols
  - 112,000 AK-47s
  - 119,000 sets of body armor
  - 6,800 vehicles
  - 67,000 helmets
  - 4,500 heavy machine guns
  - 22,000 radios
- Over $1.7 billion of the $1.91 billion appropriated for construction and reconstruction projects for Iraqi Security Forces has already been committed. Projects include four multi-brigade installations, hundreds of police stations and border forts, countless headquarters and barracks, a number of training centers, and many operating bases.

Table Three

US Department of Defense Summary of State of Iraqi Security Forces at End-2004 as of January 21, 2004

MNSTC-I continues to assist the Iraqi government in the organization, training, equipping, and advising of Iraqi Security Forces, as well as in the rebuilding of security force bases, training academies, border forts, and other facilities. While there have been setbacks, and challenges remain, there has also been enormous progress. The following list highlights accomplishments in the development of the ISF over the past year.

Operations

• In 2004, Iraqi forces fought alongside Coalition forces in Najaf, Samarra, Fallujah, Baghdad, North Babil, Mosul, and a host of other locations. In Fallujah alone, Iraqi forces lost eight of their members and had more than 40 wounded. Well over a thousand others have also lost their lives serving their country.

Although Iraqi forces have endured casualties in many of their operations, have been attacked multiple times each day, and have suffered losses through brutal intimidation attacks, there remains no shortage of volunteers; in fact, basic training courses are ongoing for more than 4,400 former soldiers to bring under strength Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention units additional forces.

Ministry of Defense

• In less than a year, Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention Forces grew from one operational battalion to 21 battalions, with six more scheduled to become operational over the next month. And with the incorporation of the Iraqi National Guard into the Army on Army Day, 6 January, the total number of battalions conducting operations is 68.

• Iraq's Muthanna Brigade, originally organized and trained by the Iraqis to provide local security, now has three battalions in operations, including one each in Baghdad, Fallujah, and North Babil, and one more in training.

• Iraq's Navy is now operational, with five 100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels, and a naval infantry regiment that recently completed training.

• Iraq's Air Force has three operational squadrons equipped with nine reconnaissance aircraft that operate both day and night, and three US C-130 transport aircraft. One more squadron, comprised of two UH-1 helicopters (to be followed by 14 more and by 4 Bell Jet Rangers from the UAE), will stand up later this month.

• Iraq's Special Operations Forces now include a superb Counter-Terrorist Force and a Commando Battalion, each of which has conducted dozens of successful operations.

• Iraq's first mechanized battalion became operational in mid-January, along with a tank company and a transportation battalion; the remaining elements of a mechanized brigade will be trained and equipped by the summer.

• Iraq's two Military Academies reopened in mid-October and each graduated a pilot course of new lieutenants, 91 total, in early January 2005. The new year-long military academy course has already begun. And the Iraqi Staff College will begin its pilot course in several months.

Ministry of Interior

• The Iraqi Police Service has over 55,000 trained and equipped police officers, up from 26,000 six months ago. Of the nearly 29,000 police officers who have been trained in the last six months, over 13,000 were former police who underwent three-week transition course training and over 15,000 were new recruits who underwent eight-week basic training. More than 38,000 additional police are on duty and scheduled for training.

• Five basic police academies are now operational; together, they produce over 3,500 new police officers from the 8-week course each month, a course recently modified to better prepare the new police officers for the challenging environment in which some may serve. Several other regional academies are under construction.

• Iraq's Mechanized Police Brigade recently completed training and will begin operations in mid-January, using fifty BTR-94 wheeled, armored vehicles.

• Seven Police Commando battalions are now operational, with one more in training and additional battalions planned.

• Six Public Order Battalions are operational, with six more planned.

• Iraq's National Police Emergency Response Unit is now operational, and its elements have conducted operations in Baghdad, Fallujah, and Mosul.

• Iraq's First Special Border Force Battalion is operating on the Syrian border in western Anbar Province; the Second Battalion begins training in early February.

• Five provincial SWAT teams have been trained and fifteen more are scheduled for training over the next six months.

Other

• Members of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq are now helping to advise the National Joint Operations Center, the Ministry of Defense Operations Center, and the Ministry of Interior Operations Center, as well as the Armed Forces Joint Headquarters. In 2005, NATO Mission members will help Iraq reestablish its Staff College and War College. A number of NATO nations have already provided equipment for Iraqi Security Forces and a host of training opportunities in NATO countries

• Enormous amounts of equipment have been delivered to Iraqi Security Forces since 1 July:

  • More than 69 million rounds of ammunition, with another 148 million recently received and put into twelve ammo storage areas around the country

  • 70,000 pistols

  • 49,000 AK-47s

- 84,000 sets of body armor
- 5,700 vehicles
- 54,000 helmets
- 1,700 PKM heavy machine guns
- 20,000 radios

- There is roughly $1.91 billion in ongoing construction and reconstruction projects for Iraqi Security Forces, and over $1.71 billion of that money has already been committed. Projects include four multi-brigade installations, hundreds of police stations and border forts, countless headquarters and barracks, a number of training centers, and many operating bases.

Table Four

Training Periods and Definitions for Each Element of Iraqi Forces

MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR FORCES

COMPONENT	TRAINING
Iraqi Police Service	Former Academy Graduates: 3 Week Transition Integration Program New Recruits: 8 Week Academy Mid-Careers: Specialized Training and Sustainment Training
Civil Intervention Force	5 Week Specialized Training
Special Police Commandos	3 Week Specialized Training
Emergency Response Unit	8 Week Specialized Training; Follow-on Mentoring by Advisors
Dept of Border Enforcement	4 Week Academy and Specialized Training
Highway Patrol	3 Week TIP Training and 8 Week Academy Training
Bureau of Dignitary Protection	3 Week Initial Training, 2-3 Week Advanced Training Follow-on Mentoring by US Contractors and Navy SEALs

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE FORCES

Iraq Regular Army	**Cadre: 4 Weeks; Basic Training: 8 Weeks**
Iraqi National Guard	**Basic Training: 3 Weeks; Collective Training: 4 Weeks**
Iraqi Intervention Force	**Cadre: 4 Weeks; Basic/Collective Training: 8 Weeks** **Urban Operations Training: 5 Weeks**
Iraqi Regular Army & Intervention Force	**Direct Recruit Replacement Training: 3 weeks for former soldiers, followed by unit training**
Iraqi Special Ops Force **- Commando Battalion** **- Counter Terrorist Task Force**	**Field Training Provided by US Special Forces (Small Unit Tactics and Ranger-type training)** **Selection and Assessment, foll'd by 13-week Special Operator Course**
Air Force	**Varies by specialty: 1-6 months**
Navy	**8 Week Basic Followed by Specialized Training at Umm Qasr**

Mr. SHAYS. Are you talking about the $9 billion reference?

Professor CORDESMAN. Yes. I thought, frankly, Congressman, with all due respect, that was to take a report totally out of context; talking about the lack of adequate accounting procedures and somehow act as if the money was missing or no one knew in broad or even, frankly, fairly detailed terms where it went. The report did not say that.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, having not read the report yet, I'm not in the position to respond to it. But just before I recognize you, Professor Sepp, the one thing that I have to agree with my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, because we haven't conducted hearings in that area, we basically provide the minority their only opportunity to kind of ambush any witness that they can try to make a statement or try to understand the issue.

So my basic view is we should just bite the bullet and have the hearings on these issues and know what is accounting issues, know what is waste, what is corruption, whatever. And until we do that, we are going to end up having these kinds of bifurcated hearings, which are regretful.

But I hear your point, and I happen to agree with it.

Professor CORDESMAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. And I appreciate your statement. I will say that, when I said 10 minutes, I did not look down and fully grasp that both of you are professors, and that was a dangerous thing to do. I think we gave you about 14. But the other part was that, unlike some professors, you were very provocative, and you have raised a number of questions.

You speak in some absolutes, which makes me wonder if it can be quite that absolute. But very helpful testimony. I thank you.

Professor Sepp.

STATEMENT OF KAVLEV I. SEPP

Professor SEPP. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to have this opportunity to discuss the training of Iraqi security forces.

Mr. SHAYS. It is an honor to have you here. Thank you.

Professor SEPP. Thank you, sir. I believe you are justified in examining the plans for the training of Iraqi security forces, as security of the lives and property of the native population is one of the most important objectives of a viable counter-insurgency strategy.

Mr. Chairman, I have provided written testimony for the record. I would now like to outline for you the salient points that I think would be most helpful to you in your deliberations.

Mr. SHAYS. That would be great.

Professor SEPP. As a trained historian, some of these will be historical in nature and known to you, but it builds to my point.

Mr. SHAYS. As an amateur historian, I'll look forward to it.

Professor SEPP. First, the situation in Iraq. There is a violent insurgency in Iraq that directly threatens U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. Depending which estimate one consults, between 10,000 and 50,000 armed combatants, supported by hundreds of thousands of auxiliaries and sympathizers, are seeking to overthrow the existing Iraqi government and expel the coalition from Iraq.

The security situation in Iraq is almost wholly dependent on the continued long-term presence of coalition forces and U.S. forces in particular. The situation is due to the near complete elimination of the old regime's armed forces and internal security apparatus by its physical destruction and its disestablishment by coalition military forces and the Coalition Provisional Authority respectively.

The failure to fill the security vacuum was due to incomplete planning by the commander and staff of U.S. Central Command, who confused fighting a war with winning a war. The absence of sufficient U.S. forces in Baghdad to establish and enforce martial law at the moment of collapse added to the degeneration of the security situation.

These failures were compounded by the posting of the chief of reconstruction, who had agreed to serve for only 90 days, inferring that a country distorted by a decades old dictatorship could be rehabilitated in only 3 months.

Mr. SHAYS. What was that, the chief of reconstruction? Because I may forget how you said that, I didn't understand what you said. The chief of reconstruction. Who was that?

Professor SEPP. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.

Mr. SHAYS. General Garner?

Professor SEPP. Lieutenant General J. Garner.

Mr. SHAYS. Oh. And he came in before Bremer?

Professor SEPP. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. He would only be there for?

Professor SEPP. Ninety days. He told me personally that was his agreement with the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes. I hear you. I just needed to make sure we were identifying the right issue.

Professor SEPP. And on that point, consider by contrast the lengthy occupation and reconstruction of the American South and the slow formation of a new army of national unity after our own Civil War.

The subsequent decision by the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority to disband the entire Iraqi armed forces rather than gradually demobilize them placed the burden on providing security for the Iraqi people entirely on the coalition occupation forces. That is the situation.

Second, the training of Iraqi security forces by U.S. military personnel. This is a problem because the U.S. military has historically not done a good job of training foreign armies. The Filipino army the U.S. trained before World War II was handily defeated by the Japanese. The South Korean army trained by the United States after World War II was initially beaten by the North Koreans. In the early 1960's, the South Vietnamese army was trained by the United States for conventional warfare, which was unsuited to the counterinsurgency. And then in 1975, they were defeated by the North Vietnamese.

Further, in the past half century, the United States has not done well at fighting insurgencies. It was defeated in Vietnam and, since then, has not taught counterinsurgency in its military schools. The striking exception to this is the success in El Salvador in the 1980's. But the military contributed only a miniscule number of

personnel to that effort, and it came mostly from the special forces, which functioned outside the mainstream military forces.

Why doesn't the U.S. military do a good job of training foreign armies? Essentially, the answer is, when it comes to combat, Americans want to do it ourselves and do it fast. But in counterinsurgency, the host nation must fight its own battles, and the timetable is one of years and not months. The British counterinsurgency in Malaya, comparable in several ways to the situation in Iraq, lasted over 10 years. The Salvadoran Civil War, which ended in a U.S. policy success, went on for 12.

All of this is to say, there is no historical evidence that the larger U.S. Armed Forces can quickly and effectively train a foreign army to fight a counterinsurgency. An example of this is the Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion, and its example is instructive. The unit is held up, justifiably, as the premier fighting unit of the Iraqi security forces. Only the Iraqi counterterrorist force is considered near its equal.

The battalion was trained and, until recently, led by U.S. Special Forces' sergeants and officers. Its recruits were chosen by the Iraqi political leadership personally to demonstrate their ability for self-defense. There were no Sunnis in its ranks. Nonetheless, it lost a quarter of its recruits just in training. Many of its leaders had to be replaced, often for issues of corruption and cowardice. There was no system for a year to replace casualties and desertions. The Iraqi troops initially went unpaid. They were initially equipped with uniforms that literally fell apart at the seams and with the poorest quality weapons.

When senior U.S. commanders deployed the battalion like an American unit around the country, they were given the wrong food and sanitation facilities. They were also too far from their homes. This matters because the Iraqis are actually day-to-day volunteers and would leave the unit if they did not receive certain basic accommodations.

So after a year of intensive training and experience and the full time and attention of half a company of embedded special forces, the 36th Battalion is competent at only one kind of mission, company level cordon and search operations. That is the best in the country after 1 year.

Finally, what can be done? A counterinsurgency strategy must be implemented, emphasizing intelligence operations and the training of police as a priority over military units. The police and military must be trained specifically to fight an insurgency.

The very best people, best Americans and units, need to do the training and advising of the police and military units. Not contractors, who have already performed poorly; not U.S. National Guard troops, who have accomplished a number of tasks admirably but are the least trained of U.S. forces and have no experience or training in counterinsurgency; and not using partnership relations, which may result in Iraqi reliance on U.S. units and leaders. Appropriate equipment and technology must be provided for the police first. This includes even simple items, like eyeglasses and handheld radios.

It would help to understand that training must extend beyond the teaching of simple skills and must include the culturalization

into the mores of service. And this addresses the point of dealing with corruption. Human rights training must be included in all programs. It currently is not.

Lots of time is essential. All historical evidence indicates this is going to be a long war. Finally, we must trust the Iraqis enough to let them learn how to fight this war for themselves, and we must have the patience to see it through. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Professor Sepp follows:]

Kalev I. Sepp
Assistant Professor of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School
Prepared Statement before House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations
Washington, D.C.
March 14, 2005

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor for me to have this opportunity to discuss the training of Iraqi Security Forces.

I recently returned from my second visit to Iraq as a member of the Office of Strategy, Plans and Assessment in the headquarters of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) in Baghdad. I want to commend to you Major General Stephen Sargeant of the United States Air Force, the Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of that office, for assembling a world-class team of strategic analysts who literally work sixteen hours a day, every single day, to discern the best courses of action for the Coalition to help build a free Iraq. In particular, the contributions of the British and Dutch military officers who serve on his staff have been invaluable.

The mission of building Iraqi security forces belongs to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), under the able leadership of Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus of the United States Army. That mission was an integral portion of the developing Coalition strategy in Iraq, and so I was familiar with its objectives and outlines. Also, during my military service as an Army Special Forces officer, I was a brigade adviser during the Salvadoran Civil War – one of the "fifty-five" – and trained soldiers in several other Latin American countries. Many of the lessons of training foreign military units in the Salvadoran Civil War in particular can be useful to our forces in Iraq.

Your committee has called for answers to several questions on the ongoing effort to build Iraqi security forces. In order to provide those answers, please let me first establish the context for the situation that brings this subject to the attention of the committee and the American people.

It is well established at this point that in planning the military operations to remove the dictator Saddam Hussein and his government from the leadership of Iraq, the then-Commander of United States Central Command and his staff misunderstood the difference between fighting a war and winning a war. Thus, they wholly neglected the actions subsequent to destruction of the Iraqi military forces – which was fighting the war -- necessary to stabilize a defeated country, provide for the security and welfare of its population, and establish a new government – that is, winning the war. These actions are referred to in the current and apparently misread U.S. Army doctrine as "Phase Four" of a military campaign.

This strategic error was compounded following the fall of the Hussein regime, when the responsible U.S. commanders did not establish and enforce martial law, particularly in Baghdad. No plans had been made for this contingency, even though there are historical examples available for study and emulation, particularly Operation ECLIPSE during World War Two. This contingency plan called for the entire 82nd Airborne Division to parachute into Berlin in the event of the sudden collapse of the Nazi German government to secure the city and establish martial law. The failure to do this in Baghdad constituted a tacit sanction of lawlessness, and resulted in the looting and destruction of the Iraqi national infrastructure and bureaucracy by the Iraqis themselves. Study of basic texts on Arab history, such as the *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* by T.E. Lawrence – the famous "Lawrence of Arabia" – reveal the possible consequences of removing governmental controls from an Arab populace.

The subsequent mismanagement of the recovery effort by the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, which is also well established, allowed time for a nascent insurgency to coalesce and develop. The Coalition Provisional Authority which followed was disjointed and uncoordinated, and contended with the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the management of affairs in Iraq. In particular, the U.S. military leadership anticipated a rapid two-thirds reduction of the number of Coalition troops in Iraq in less than a year, while the chief of the Coalition Provisional Authority simultaneously disestablished the entire Iraqi armed forces – ostensibly to eliminate members of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party. This left only traffic police and local militias to enforce law and order against a growing insurgency and organized criminal gangs. In many cases, these insurgents and outlaw elements are materially supported by Syria and Iran, who strategically prefer a weakened Iraq consumed by internal conflict.

The insurgents are not a unified single entity, but they generally share the goal of driving the foreign occupation troops out of Iraq. They are primarily Iraqis, but include foreigners, principally from other Arab states. Among the Iraqis, many of the insurgents are disaffected Sunni Muslims, a religious minority in Iraq, who enjoyed privilege and prestige during the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, himself a Sunni. There are forty to sixty major groups of insurgents of various motivations and ideals, and combined they number from thirty to forty thousand active combatants fighting as urban guerrillas. Hundreds of thousands more Iraqis provide both active and passive support to the insurgents.

To counter this insurgency, a comprehensive strategy is required. This is being prepared by the Multi-National Force-Iraq headquarters. Whatever the final form of that strategy, sizeable and effective Iraqi security forces will be a necessity. These forces will need to provide internal security against insurgents and criminals, and external security against the threat of large-scale military invasion primarily from Iran, which fought a costly war with Iraq from 1981 to 1988. With the destruction and disbandment of the Iraqi armed forces and the collapse of the former regime, no Iraqi national training facilities or staff have been available for the Iraqis to rebuild their own security forces. The now-defunct Coalition Military Assistance Training Team made an initial effort to create what was to be called the New Iraqi Army, but the team had the wrong strategic focus, emphasizing

the establishment of U.S.-style mechanized divisions to defend the territory of Iraq from invasion, instead of providing security for the Iraqi population from insurgents and criminals. Now, this critical mission is the responsibility of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq.

The United States Army trains itself better than any other army in the world, but it does not have a good record of training foreign armies. Before World War Two, the Army trained the Philippine armed forces in anticipation of their promised independence. The Filipinos were handily defeated by the invading Japanese. Some surviving elements performed fairly well as guerrilla units, but it was a U.S. field army that landed in the Philippines that drove the Japanese out. In 1947, the United States provided 250 U.S. Army advisers to the Greek National Army during their Civil War against communist rebels, but the British had already largely organized and trained the regular Greek troops. Ultimately, banishment of the rebels from their Yugoslav sanctuaries by Marshal Josip Broz Tito, diplomatic pressure on the royal Greek government by President Harry Truman, and strategic blunders by the communist commander pushed the war to its conclusion by 1949. On the other side of the globe, however, American advisers and equipment couldn't prevent the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese armies by Mao Zedong's communist forces in 1949. When Kim Il Sung's North Korean Army invaded the Republic of Korea in 1950, the U.S.-trained and equipped South Korean divisions mostly collapsed. As the war ground on, an intensive American training effort helped the South produce viable units which, with American material and firepower support, could hold their own against the Northerners and the Chinese. Ironically, it was after the war ended in 1953 and the U.S. advisory effort wound down that the South Korean army professionalized itself into what a journalist called "the Prussians of Asia."

With the French withdrawal from Indochina after their defeat at the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the division of Vietnam into North and South, the United States assumed the sponsorship of the new Republic of Vietnam as a bulwark against communist expansion in the region. Drawing on what it felt was its success in Greece, the U.S. Army conceived Operation REDLAND to create a South Vietnamese army in precisely its own image. Then-Lieutenant Colin Powell was an adviser in Vietnam in 1961, where ten thousand U.S. advisers were stationed in Vietnamese units, down to company level. After several years of this large-scale training and advisory effort, however, a Viet Cong insurgent force mauled a much larger South Vietnamese regiment at the battle of Ap Bac in 1963. One of the outcomes of this defeat was a growing sense inside the senior U.S. military leadership that regular U.S. forces might need to join the war, as they soon did. The other was a gradual improvement in the structure and operation of the advisory system that generally improved the quality and effectiveness of the Republic of Vietnam forces. However, even though the U.S. officers serving in the Vietnamese units were called "advisers," because of their rank and status, they tended to act as the co-commanders of the units. The Vietnamese officers became reliant on their American partners to make tactical and operational decisions. After the major withdrawal of U.S. forces and advisers beginning in 1972 and the "Vietnamization" of the conflict (the French had started a similar program they called *jaunissement*, the "yellowing" of the war effort) the South Vietnamese military was vulnerable. When the North Vietnamese army

invaded the South in 1975, the termination of U.S. military aid had already weakened the defense. But the South Vietnamese military leadership had not matured under exceeding U.S. supervision, and could not respond decisively to the Northern offensive.

The United States Marine Corps has only a marginally better record of training foreign armies. While they supervised the Haitian *Gendarmerie* and the Nicaraguan *Guardia Nacional* which they raised and trained between World Wars One and Two, those forces functioned effectively. After the Marines departed, though, these paramilitary units quickly succumbed to corruption and brutality. The Marines' Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program in Vietnam, modeled in part on the successful U.S. Army Special Forces concept, had mixed results. The U.S.-trained Vietnamese Marines fought as well as their counterpart Army units, like the Vietnamese Rangers and paratroopers, but their numbers were too small to avert the final defeat.

The conflict providing the most successful example of U.S. military advisers, both Army and Marines, raising an indigenous army in wartime to fight an insurgency is the Salvadoran Civil War. In 1979 when the insurgency began in earnest, the Salvadoran army consisted of some 5,000 "parade-ground" soldiers. In five years, the army grew ten times in size to over 50,000 troops, the majority of them infantrymen. A modern air force with a helicopter fleet and close-support bombers provided by the Americans helped this U.S.-trained force beat the communist guerrillas to a draw, forcing a negotiated settlement to the war. There are several important distinctions about this advisory effort – it was remarkably small, with only fifty-five permanent advisers (or "trainers" as they were officially called); the U.S. personnel were almost exclusively Army Special Forces sergeants and officers; the war was ignored by the larger Army, which denied the award of combat decorations and tax exemptions to the advisers; while paradoxically the Administration's policy was consistent, and support for the defense of El Salvador and the U.S. advisory effort never waned.

With this context established, here are responses to the committee's questions:

1. What are the different types of Iraqi security forces?

Currently, the Iraqi security forces are in a constant state of reorganization. In general, the military forces consist of the Iraqi Army (IA), concerned with defense against external threats; the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF), which is focused on internal defense – that is, the insurgency; the Iraqi National Guard (ING), which had its origins as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), which are locally-oriented, although the new Iraqi government has just declared the ING to be under the control of the national Iraqi Army, rather than local political leaders. There is also an Iraqi Counter-Terrorist Force (ICTF), a national-level unit trained by U.S. Army Special Forces. The Kurds maintain their own military units and police forces as well. An army of 57,000 regular soldiers is planned.

The Iraqi Police (IP) forces include community-based police units and paramilitary and auxiliary units, such as the "special police commandos," public order battalions, a mechanized brigade equipped with Russian BTR armored personnel carriers, and an

Emergency Response Unit (ERU), much like the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation's Hostage Rescue Team. The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (MoI) has been rapidly creating an array of new police paramilitary units with various names, many with the designation "special," although they possess no apparent quality making them so. Note: During the Saddam regime, the police fell below the armed forces in the hierarchy of influence and importance, and were divided into Traffic Police in white shirts, and the somewhat more prestigious Civil Police in blue shirts. This distinction has been removed.

Border Protection Forces are being raised to perform the role previously the responsibility of the Iraqi armed forces during the Saddam regime. Also, Facilities Protection Services (FPS) personnel guard parts of the Iraqi national infrastructure, such as oil pipelines and power stations.

At least a dozen "Irregular Units," sometimes called "pop-ups" by American military personnel, have appeared around the country. These are not considered militias, which are supposedly illegal, but are not part of the formal Iraqi security force structure. Nonetheless, they are reported to receive support and funding from the Iraqi government, and U.S. military officers have judged them to be effective in combat and policing operations against the insurgents. There may be as many as 15,000 of these irregular fighters.

2. How are Iraqi security forces recruited and vetted?

Recruiting and vetting of Iraqi security forces varies widely throughout Iraq. In one of the most conflictive zones, Al Anbar province, recruiting was most recently accomplished by asking tribal chiefs to provide members of their clan to the ISF. No vetting was done, as there is no means to conduct individual background investigations, interviews, or records searches.

3. What types of training do Iraqi security forces receive, and what is the length of their training?

Training varies from the most cursory orientations lasting only two days for police volunteers who had prior police or military service, to eight weeks for new police recruits who are designated to become commanders. The quality of the training also depends on the instructors. American observers from U.S. Central Command headquarters assessed the military basic training conducted under contract by the Vennell Corporation to be unsatisfactory, and the contract was terminated. The Iraqi 36th Commando Battalion has been trained continuously for a year by U.S. Army Special Forces teams, and is evaluated as a first-rate combat unit. Officers from MNSTC-I observing U.S. Army National Guard units training ISF judge the training to be almost wholly substandard, as a function of the limited training and experience of the National Guard soldiers themselves.

4. How many Iraqi security forces have been fully trained, and how many are considered capable of assuming security duties?

According to the unclassified U.S. Department of State "Iraq Weekly Status Report" of February 16, 2005, at total of 136,342 ISF personnel have been trained and equipped. However, that number does not include soldiers who are "absent without authorization." This term is not further defined. In the Al Anbar, Babil, Najaf, and Al Qadisyah provinces, Marine officers estimate that only 10 percent of the police personnel trained by Coalition forces and contractors are still on duty. The others have either joined or returned to insurgent bands. Thus, the exact number present and capable of combat or police duties is indeterminate, but certainly less than 136,342.

5. What is the current strategy for developing Iraqi security forces and transferring Coalition security force missions to Iraqi government control?

The plan is currently in development at MNF-I headquarters.

6. What challenges confront the Multi-National Forces-Iraq transferring its security mission to Iraqi forces?

One critical challenge is for MNF-I and MNSTC-I to take actions that are proven to produce positive results in training foreign military and police forces, and to avoid those that historically have not contributed to success. Chief among the "right choices" are assignment of the best personnel available to advisory duties. For example, Lt. Gen. Petraeus has personally selected First Lieutenant Seth Moulton, U.S. Marine Corps, to his staff. Moulton is a Harvard College graduate who led a Marine rifle platoon with distinction during the invasion of Iraq, and was among the first Americans to fight their way into Baghdad. He is the model of the exceptionally intelligent, combat-tested and culturally savvy officer to work with foreign officers and soldiers. At the unit level, U.S. Army Special Forces detachments are specifically organized and schooled, and their members carefully selected to train foreign military forces.

Conversely, U.S. Army National Guard units have none of this background or experience, and it is likely that the Iraqi units they train will perform poorly in combat. This allows impressive numbers of Iraqis "trained and equipped to be posted on charts, but the reality is that those personnel will not be able to carry out their assigned tasks, and will require more time and resources to re-train them later.

Another "right choice" is the equipping of the Iraqis with the right technologies, such as the "COIN-Judo" personnel tracking system, to enhance their intelligence operations against the insurgents. While embedded advisers are an well-established "right choice," the selection of the best possible personnel for those jobs is critical. The services have the administrative means to identify top-tier officers and sergeants for posting as advisers and trainers.

Further, the rank structure of the advisers in relation to their Iraqi counterparts is critical. Advisers must be of subordinate rank to the Iraqi commander they support, serving as a staff officer and allowing the Iraqis to make the hard decisions and take responsibility for them. Equivalency in rank, wrongly thought to be necessary to gain access and mutual

respect, actually creates the Vietnam-era "co-commander" relationship, and leaves the Iraqi soldiers wondering which officer, the American or the Iraqi, is their actual chief.

In the same way, "partnership" relations between Coalition and Iraqi units do not obviously promise beneficial results. Among first-tier militaries, such as those in NATO, these unit pairings encouraged common understanding. However, a partnership between a U.S. combat unit and a like-size Iraqi force will likely foster resentment and jealously on the part of the Iraqis, who know they will never have the resources the Americans do, while the Americans will expect the Iraqis to perform to U.S. standards. What an American commander will think of as friendly competition in training or operations, may likely be seen by his Iraqi counterpart as an opportunity to be humiliated by the lavishly-equipped and superbly trained Americans.

Choosing the right courses of action in the advisory and training effort now, rather than what is simply expedient, will actually accomplish the training of the Iraqi security forces sooner, and yield the best results.

The Iraqi 36th Battalion and U.S. Trainers

A notable example of the issues involved in training Iraqi men to be soldiers is the formation, training and employment of the 36th Battalion, labeled by some official sources as an "elite" unit.

Early in November 2003, then-JTF-7 commander Lieutenant General Carlos Sanchez permitted Iraqi political leaders to establish an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) unit of their own accord. The INA, INC, SCIRI, PUK and KDP political parties each contributed one hundred of their own militia members to this new unit, and Lt. Gen. Sanchez ordered the Coalition's Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) to train them.

The CJSOTF directed half of four U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs, commonly called A-Teams), and all of ODA 533 from the veteran 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group to conduct the training. The base for the battalion was at Baghdad International Airport. The SF trainers planned to complete the training in a single month, with the first two weeks of December dedicated to basic training – primarily shooting – and the second two weeks to the unit's integration into U.S. direct action operations.

Each of the half-teams, called "split teams," was initially responsible for one of the four companies of the Iraqi battalion. The U.S. leaders mixed all five hundred militia personnel, precisely balancing them evenly through the four companies. However, the senior Special Forces commander soon had to send the "split teams" back to reunite with their parent teams, because they lacked enough soldiers to maintain their ongoing operations. The seasoned ODA 535 joined ODA 533 to train the companies, and the understrength ODA 534 organized and ran the battalion headquarters.

The name of the new unit changed several times over the following month. It began as the "Composite ICDC Battalion," then became the "Special ICDC Battalion," then was numbered in January 2004 as the "36th Special ICDC Battalion." Eventually, the Special Forces trainers discovered that the U.S. brigade commanders who would be employing the unit's companies didn't trust their own local ICDC units to perform combat operations. To improve their image, the trainers dropped the "ICDC" designator and changed the name to simply "36th Battalion" and finally "36th Commando Battalion."

The Americans did not "vette" the recruits, and accepted all five hundred for training. The U.S. Special Forces trainers presumed the political leaders had already vetted the candidates, as it seemed to be in their best interest in terms of their relationship and status with the new Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) to provide adequate recruits for the new unit. Besides, with a deadline only a month away to produce a functioning combat unit, they had no time, let alone the means, to conduct background investigations to determine the reliability and loyalty of the recruits.

The quality of the Iraqi recruits varied. Certainly, they were not the "best men" promised by the political leaders. Most were of good quality, with combat experience gained from their militia service. Others told the Americans that their leaders said they were going to the airport to get jobs working for foreign contractors. One recruit showed up with a ping-pong paddle, having been told he was joining the Iraqi Olympic team. The U.S. Special Forces soldiers suspected the political parties retained the best men in their own militias, rather than give them up to Coalition control.

While the U.S. Special Forces trainers did not initially vette the Iraqis, they lost and discharged recruits as training progressed. Of the 130 men in First Company, the American captain in charge dismissed twenty for misconduct and counted another fifteen who didn't return from leave after their training – a 26 percent loss overall at the end of the first month. The deserters took all their equipment and uniforms with them.

Two weeks after the completion of training, the captain also relieved the Iraqi company commander, Major Mustafa Gaber Alawi, who had been given his rank and position by his political party sponsors. On payday, the trainers caught him attempting to steal payroll money by using the identification cards of deserters. The Special Forces captain had already assessed the Iraqi commander to be a weak leader – he preferred not to leave the base when his soldiers went out on raids.

The Americans informed the IGC of the desertions and dismissals, but did not know if any particular action was taken against the miscreants. The captain was told by the unit members who were sponsored by the Kurdish PUK and KDP parties that Kurdish deserters would be hunted down by their own militia, and imprisoned for six months as punishment.

Support and equipment for the battalion came slowly. The trainers scavenged the unit's weapons from captured stockpiles. Newer AK-47 rifles purchased from Jordan, distinguished by their plastic stocks and grips, were poorly machined, even by Soviet

standards. Their locally-sewn uniforms were new, but cheaply made, and constantly tore at the seams during training. Nonetheless, Iraqi morale was generally good because of the purposeful and professional training.

Pay was a major problem. Officers at JTF-7 headquarters announced that soldiers of the 36th Battalion would be paid the same as other ICDC members, but the American trainers argued that their troops served full-time, unlike the part-timers in the rest of the ICDC, and so deserved higher pay. The result was by Christmas Eve 2003, the unit's graduation day, there was still no pay for the Iraqi recruits. Duly cautious, the U.S. trainers carried loaded pistols at the ceremony against the chance of a revolt by the unpaid Iraqi troops who were carrying their weapons in the parade.

Before the U.S. Special Forces trainers could release their new graduates for two weeks' leave, CJT-7 headquarters ordered that the battalion conduct an actual operation to "certify" that it was "combat capable." The U.S. captain in charge took twenty volunteers – many more wanted to go along – to cordon and search a suspected rocket launching site in a palm grove near the Green Zone in Baghdad. At nightfall, the *ad hoc* platoon rode to their objective in a dump truck, and in darkness under a soaking winter rain they surrounded the grove and searched it. They found nothing, but the Iraqi soldiers performed their task satisfactorily and expressed a sense of accomplishment.

The battalion's first firefight three weeks later was chaotic and inconclusive. Late on January 13, 2004, about one hundred troops of First Company were finishing another nighttime cordon and search operation. The American captain in charge and the new Iraqi company commander, Captain Saad, were talking with the imam of a local mosque while the soldiers gathered to board their trucks and leave. As the American turned to speak to the commander, a single shot rang out nearby, and Captain Saad dropped to the ground screaming. The American captain's first thought was that one of the Iraqi soldiers had accidentally fired his weapon, a common mishap among new soldiers with minimal training. Then, without orders, the Iraqi troops started firing indiscriminately in all directions – described later by the Americans at the site as "the death blossom." The four U.S. Special Forces trainers found it impossible to control the company and stop or direct the shooting. In the first moments of gunfire, Captain Saad, his second-in-command, two of his three platoon leaders, both interpreters, and the U.S. medic fell wounded. Five minutes later, the shooting stopped when armed humvee trucks from the 82d Airborne Division's Quick Reaction Force, called by the American captain, drove onto the scene. As it turned out, the wounds incurred by the soldiers were minor, and all soon returned to duty. The American captain never determined for certain whether the incident was an insurgent ambush, or an intramural firefight sparked by the unintentional triggering of a clumsy soldier's rifle.

Subsequently, the companies of the battalion performed better, and became proficient at "take-down" missions aimed at capturing suspected insurgents in various Baghdad neighborhoods. The battalion's companies gained a positive reputation with the CJSOTF and with the U.S. brigades they supported. During one of these operations, the Second Company captured several insurgents red-handed. The Iraqi troops discovered the

insurgents carried identification cards allowing them full access to U.S. military bases – and even had a photograph of themselves posing with a U.S. brigade commander. The insurgents had curried favor with U.S. military personnel by occasionally turning in items from their own large stock of demolitions and artillery shells they were using to make improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Now known as the 36th Battalion, the unit experienced a setback a month later in February when the 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces left Iraq to return to the United States. The replacement unit – the same group's 2nd Battalion – received erroneous information that the 36th Battalion was about to be disestablished, and so counted the unit's continued training a low priority. Accordingly, the U.S. headquarters assigned its least-proficient and undermanned detachments to support the Iraqis. The result was debilitating, and then almost devastating. The companies of the 36th Battalion entered the first battle for Falluja in March 2003 insufficiently prepared for the hard fight there. The unit suffered heavy losses, including the death of First Company's commander, the recently-promoted Major Saad.

When the 1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces returned to Iraq in July 2004, the American commander made the training and support of 36th Battalion a top priority. The Iraqis consolidated their four dispersed companies at the same base, which improved their operations. They also welcomed back their original trainers, ODAs 533 and 535, as well as elements of 1st Battalion's "A" Company, specialists in urban combat.

Two major problems were evident at the end of the unit's first year of operations. First, since the 36th Battalion's initial formation and training, it had lost another one hundred and fifty soldiers killed and wounded, with no replacements. Only by late 2004 did the battalion headquarters begin a recruiting drive, discreetly advertising for volunteers to join a "special unit." Second, the U.S. Special Forces soldiers had become more than trainers and advisers – they were leading the 36th Battalion in combat. The Americans made the plans and tactical decisions, and then informed the Iraqi company commanders, who passed on those orders to the troops. Intelligence gathering by the Iraqis was restricted, and Iraqi troops were not allowed to wear civilian clothes to reconnoiter their targets – although the Americans could. A U.S. captain served as the full-time logistics officer for the 36th Battalion, managing their supplies and directing their motor pool. The Special Forces soldiers oversaw payroll and administrative matters as well.

The 36th Battalion's administrative and logistical dependency existed because the Iraqi security forces lacked their own support system, and connectivity to the U.S. military logistics system by any non-U.S. unit is impossible without close assistance from American logistics experts. The reluctance of U.S. trainers and advisers to turn over the leadership of the 36th Battalion to its Iraqi officers was likely due to three factors – a desire to maintain firm control over the unit and its operations, enforced by the real or perceived expectations of their headquarters; the requirement to ensure the success of the unit they were essentially responsible for; and the inherently aggressive, combative character and warrior ethos of Special Forces soldiers driving them to get into every fight

and stand with "their Iraqis" in battle. Nonetheless, the Iraqis must be allowed, or must be made, to command their own units and fight their own war.

The 36th Battalion is unique in several ways, but its example may illustrate what to expect in training the larger Iraqi army and security forces. Seventy-five percent of a group of five hundred Iraqi men, chosen and vetted by local political leaders and generally above average in motivation and intelligence, remained after a month of basic military training. For the next year, thirty U.S. Army Special Forces officers and sergeants -- who are specifically and rigorously schooled in training foreign troops -- closely developed and led the battalion in continuous small-scale combat missions, and at least two major battles. At the end of that year, the Iraqi battalion is capable of planning and conducting platoon- and company-size raids, and fighting and defeating small bands of insurgents. This is a significant achievement.

In training other Iraqi forces, variations in this formula – in the means of selection and quality of the recruit, the quality of the adviser, the training and experience of the adviser, the adviser-advised ratio (initially about 1 to 12 in the 36th Battalion, later bettering to 1 to 8), experience, equipment, pay, native leadership, *et alia* – will affect the length of time required to train a unit to a given level of actual operational capability. The long-established Kurdish *Peshmerga* organization is an exception. If the same exceptional human resources invested in the 36th Battalion by both the Iraqis and the Americans are provided to other Iraqi security force units, it might be reasonable to expect that like units could be operational in the next year. If not, expectations for the Iraqi security forces, in terms of timelines, effectiveness, and self-reliance, must be accordingly adjusted.

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Khalil.

STATEMENT OF PETER KHALIL

Mr. KHALIL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, it is also a great honor to testify. Is this working, sir?

Mr. SHAYS. It is working, but I think the lower you have it down, the better it is.

Mr. KHALIL. Yes. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is an honor.

By way of quick introduction, I was an independent civil servant sent to Iraq as part of my country's contingent to the Coalition Provisional Authority to work on specifically rebuilding the Iraqi national security forces and the institutions.

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me a little of where that accent comes from.

Mr. KHALIL. Australia. I was sent to Iraq as part of the Australian Government's contingent.

Mr. SHAYS. That is what wasn't clear to me. Having lived in Fiji, that is an accent that I have gotten very used to and love. I lived in Fiji for 2 years.

Mr. KHALIL. You won't have trouble understanding my testimony, then.

I was in Iraq as a civilian security and defense advisor for the CPA from August 2003 until May 2004. And in that capacity, I worked very closely with the Iraqi political leadership on rebuilding Iraqi security forces and institutions, including the new Iraqi civilian-led Ministry of Defense.

I would like to also say it was a great honor to serve my country and also the U.S. led coalition in Iraq.

Mr. SHAYS. Now, again, how long were you there?

Mr. KHALIL. Nine months, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for your service.

Mr. KHALIL. I hope, too, that the fine tradition of the Australian-U.S. alliance continues and that friendship continues, based not just on our shared strategic interests, but our shared values, I think.

I should note, too, that I had the opportunity to work closely with Ambassador Dick Jones. And in my experience in working with Ambassador Jones, he was an exemplary leader and an exemplary diplomat. I learned a lot from him by watching his negotiations with the Iraqi leaders.

The U.S. strategy, Mr. Chairman, concerned with security and training of Iraqi forces is, at least at the strategic level, fundamentally sound; that is training Iraq security forces and having them take over responsibility for directly dealing with the insurgents so that U.S. forces can gradually withdraw. You have heard a lot of detailed outlines about the many types of forces that exist and their numbers and their training. I would like to focus my remarks in the brief time I have specifically on the overall strategy for developing these forces and having them transferring responsibility to those particular security forces from the coalition security forces, particularly looking at which types of Iraq security forces have those capabilities to fulfill that mission.

Mr. SHAYS. Great.

Mr. KHALIL. It is the quality, not the quantity, of Iraqi security forces which is critical to a realistic transfer of security responsibility over the next 24 months. Although the CPA and U.S. military did move quickly to begin basic training of the different types of Iraqi forces that we have heard spoken about today, the army and the police and the national guard, which was earlier known as the ICDC, there was an initial emphasis on the quantity of forces; that is getting Iraqi boots on the ground. So while the vast majority of the Iraqi security forces, and I think we have heard a figure here of something like 142,000 or 144,000 said to be trained and in uniform, they do have basic security skill sets, but what they don't have are the required training or capabilities to conduct offensive or even defensive operations against the insurgency.

Now, I don't imply by this that there shouldn't be a large number of Iraqi security forces that do actually exist. It's just that they each have a role and function, as in any society, and not all of them can or should be thrown onto the front line of the insurgency. As the insurgency intensified through the summer of 20O3, the CPA did develop policies to train the high-end security forces that have been briefly discussed today.

And I will talk specifically about the nine battalions of army special forces, that's the counterinsurgency wing of the Iraqi army, and some of the Ministry of Interior special forces. I'm talking about something like six or seven battalions of special police commando units, three or so counterterrorism battalions, who grew out of the Iraq national guard and the army, SWAT teams, and also specific types of emergency response units, which are much smaller. What those types of forces do have is the specific role and mission of effectively countering the insurgency and relieving combat pressure from U.S. forces.

As far as problems with the vetting, training and recruitment of both Iraqi police services and the Iraqi national guard, which are the bulk of those 144,000 we have discussed, many of those problems can be traced back to the fact that, initially, throughout 2003 and early 2004, much of the training and vetting of recruits for these services was decentralized. So what you had was local United States and coalition military commanders having the responsibility to raise and train and equip these local forces, these units. So it led to a lack of standardization in both recruitment and training, and in very uneven vetting procedures for the recruits across the country.

I am talking here about the national guard units and also the Iraqi police, both local forces, locally utilized and locally trained. There was real immense pressure on the United States and coalition military commanders to get Iraqi boots on the ground, which led to many local police simply being reconstituted.

What I mean by that is that former police officers were basically reemployed in the town and told, you are back on the beat, without having to go through the required police academy training that was set under the Ministry of Interior. Many national guardsmen went through very minimal levels of basic training, sometimes as low as 2 weeks. So both of these forces were then expected to be the bulk of Iraq forces that were facing the insurgents.

In a sense, the training and vetting problems have actually been rectified. Particularly, the raising and equipping of the Iraqi police services and the Iraq national guard have now been centralized, first under Major General Eaton in the spring of 2004, and, now, currently, of course, under his successor, Lieutenant General David Petraeus. So, for example, the national guard training, which was very uneven across the country, is now very standardized and involves, under General Petraeus, 3 weeks basic training and 3 to 4 weeks of collective training. And you have many policemen being sent back to the police academies to actually complete the training or begin the training which they had not actually undertaken in the year before.

Many of the bad apples who slipped in through the uneven vetting that occurred in that first year and a half have been removed. So that is why you see a big dip in the numbers of police forces. I can't remember the chart myself, because I had the back of it there, but I think I remember seeing a chart like that. But there is a big dip of police numbers, I think, in mid 2004 and late 2004 because many of the police have gone back into training or have been removed because of new vetting that is being undertaken by General Petraeus.

However, and there is an important point to all of this, the national guard capabilities are still limited to basic security tasks: fixed-point security, route convoy security, joint patrolling with coalition forces. And the police, of course, are trained in local policing, basic law-and-order tasks. Neither are counterinsurgency trained forces, which is a very important point. They did perform their tasks, both the police and national guard, with great distinction during the elections, and they were charged with crowd and cordon and perimeter security. That's what they were trained to do, to protect polling centers and government buildings and so forth, yet they still require heavy U.S. logistical and combat support.

Now, in contrast to the national guard and the Iraqi police services, the Iraqi army has had a centralized vetting and training structure from its inception. So as a result, the Iraqi army, and I am separating this from the Iraqi national guard, has attracted a higher quality of recruits who have underwent, from the beginning, thorough and standardized vetting, and that included very tough psychological testing. And the training itself has been of a very high standard from its inception.

So the key, Mr. Chairman, to a realistic transfer of security responsibility from U.S. forces to Iraqi forces rests not only with the Iraqi army special forces, which are numbered at about nine battalions at the moment. And you were asking earlier of Professor Cordesman, I think, the number of each battalion is about 800 for Iraqi army battalions, and that includes the special forces battalions. But more importantly, also, on the high-end internal security forces that are being trained under the Ministry of Interior, and they are important because they have specialized training and skill sets, and they have an ability to combine intelligence gathering, and I think, much better in some ways than United States and coalition intelligence gathering, because they understand the language and the culture, but also law enforcement and light infantry paramilitary capabilities in their tasks of taking on the insurgents.

They performed well. Some of the units have performed well in operations in Fallujah and Samarra in late 2004, and even a unit of Iraqi SWAT team rescued some Iraqi hostages in Kirkuk with minimal U.S. support. At present, though, the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism forces that I am talking about are a very small percentage of the total 144,000 of Iraqi forces said to be trained and in uniform.

So as I said, you could probably estimate around nine Iraqi army special forces battalions; six special police commando units; three mechanized police battalions that were earlier discussed; the SWAT team is around 270 personnel, I think; and three counterterrorism battalions that grew out of the national guard and the army, and Professor Sepp talked about the 36th battalion, which is part of that.

The Coalition, as far as I understand it, has a goal of 33 or so battalions or 30-plus battalions of these highly trained internal security forces, including the Army special forces. So something like 25,000 men, if you want to look at numbers. But I would emphasize that numbers are not the most important thing. It is really the quality of these Iraqi forces to complete these tasks and security missions.

If they can operate at the point of the spear with the remaining bulk of those 270,000, or projected 270,000, Iraqi forces acting in a supporting role, there is a very good chance of weakening and defeating the insurgency, obviously in combination with political and economic developments, which are just as important in any counterinsurgency operation.

Just a few quick words about training. I know I am running out of time, Mr. Chairman.

The important point about training, I would say, is that accelerating training of Iraqi forces is a very big mistake, if anyone is contemplating that, or if the administration is contemplating that. Because if you cut training cycles from 8 weeks to 2 weeks, you are sending out forces that are less than capable.

Mr. SHAYS. But if you could add more numbers and do the same amount, you don't object to that?

Mr. KHALIL. That is absolutely correct, Mr. Chairman. If you have more trainers there, you can put more Iraqis through the training pipeline, and you will get more out quicker.

Mr. SHAYS. As long as you can vet them.

Mr. KHALIL. As long as you can vet them, yes.

Now, I should point out with the vetting, Mr. Chairman, that the vetting procedures, the other advantage of centralizing vetting under General Petraeus is that the Army vetting was actually quite thorough for the Iraqi army recruits. There was a Ministry of Defense starter base that was salvaged from some of the facilities which has the name of something like 400,000 Iraqi men who had undertaken military and other police type services, so you could have a look and cross-check new recruits against that.

Of course, there are many new recruits that don't have prior military service, and they are usually the young guys who are joining up in the new army.

The last comment I would make, Mr. Chairman, is on the relationship between the multinational force, Iraq and the Iraqi secu-

rity forces. You have heard that the MNF–I is mandated under UNSCR 1546 to support the besieged Iraqi Ministry of Security Forces, the internal security forces, which under this arrangement retrain primary responsibility for Iraqi internal security. And during the interim period, the Iraqi police and other internal security forces did begin coordinating very well with the coalition and Iraqi military forces through a network of local, regional and national structures.

There is some complexity in the command structures of the MNF–I, and I would refer you to the written testimony for a fuller explanation of that, Mr. Chairman.

In conclusion, though, there is an authentic Iraqi partnership with the Coalition, in the sense that the Iraqi armed forces are very much an active member of the coalition forces. There are senior Iraqi military officers throughout the MNF–I command structure, and their involvement makes them real owners of the operational tactical security objectives that the MNF–I is undergoing at the moment. I think also it is very important because it will aid a smoother transfer of full security responsibility to Iraqis post-December 2005.

Mr. Chairman, there is one last comment I would like to make in wrapping up, and it is on the issue of the insurgency. And I noted, very quickly, Professor Cordesman talked about the insurgency. The best way to look at the insurgency is to look at it in three-ring circles. The inner circle is the 15,000, 20,000 or 25,000 fighters who are involved in the insurgency. They are made up of, the 90 percent of them, rather, are made up of former regime security personnel. So the guards from the Special Republican Guard, the Mukhabarat intelligence, and so on. There is a smaller number of that insurgency that are Islamic Jihadists, both foreign and also Iraqi jihadists.

Mr. SHAYS. Within the 25 or in addition to?

Mr. KHALIL. Within the 25,000, sir, yes.

And then you also have a criminal element, if you like, of gangs and mercenaries, who are doing—who are conducting attacks on the coalition for monetary purposes. And that is part of that insurgency as well.

Then there is an element—when we talk about, why is the insurgency growing—an element of Iraqis who have joined the insurgency out of anger, anger and a need to have some sort of revenge against possibly coalition forces who have killed relatives or so on. And many of these are also possibly former military security personnel.

There was a question earlier by Representative Kucinich about why these hard-core personnel are growing. Well, there was a large number of ex-military security personnel. Not all have joined the insurgency. Some are starting to join up based on a variety of different reasons. But the question as to its popularity, I think, is very important because it is a minority within a minority.

The middle circle is approximately around 200,000 sympathizers who are supporting them, and the outer circle is really the passive population of Iraq. And not all those people are supporting the insurgents.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Khalil follows:]

WRITTEN TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

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BUILDING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

The US strategy concerned with security and training of Iraqi forces is, at least at the strategic level, fundamentally sound: to train Iraqi security forces (ISF) and have them takeover responsibility for directly dealing with the insurgency so that U.S. forces can gradually withdraw. The following written testimony will outline and assess US and coalition efforts to train and build Iraqi security forces capable of effectively taking over security responsibilities in Iraq and will focus on:

- The New Iraq Armed Forces (IAF) which includes both the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Guard (ING).
- Iraqi Interior forces including the Iraqi Police services (IPS), Border security and specially trained high-end internal security units.
- The recruitment, vetting and training of these forces and the need for an emphasis on quality over quantity and;
- the relationship of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) with the emerging ISF.

THE NEW IRAQI ARMED FORCES

The defining mission of the IAF, particularly the Iraqi Army is the external defense of Iraq. It is unlikely however that Iraq will face a conventional military threat in the foreseeable future. Both Iran and to a lesser extent Syria pose threats to Iraqi security but these are by no means or likely to be in the conventional sense. Both Syria and Iran have used different modes of asymmetric interference in Iraq's internal affairs to weaken and destabilize Iraq in this transitional period. The pervasive use of Syrian and Iranian intelligence operatives in Iraq, either actively facilitating or turning a blind eye to Baathist financing arrangements for insurgent networks within Syria, lack of cooperation on border security (not tightening borders), allowing foreign jihadists to enter into Iraq across their territory and elements of the Syrian regime facilitating funding of insurgents either unofficially or through clandestine official channels.

Despite the variety of these unconventional threats Iraq still requires a capable modern army to defend against the possibility of conventional external aggression Clearly external aggression is manifested in many internal and non-conventional ways which

poses a conundrum for the rebuilding of forces in so far as deciding on force structure and also has the effect of overemphasizing the domestic use of either Army special forces or the internal security forces.

The new IAF are a force built from scratch, it currently includes ground, air and coastal defense elements and it will grow to around 27 battalions or three divisions by mid 2005. These Iraqi Army battalions consist of Ground Forces (motorized infantry and a recently operational mechanized brigade), Air Force (limited to transport and lift capacity), Coastal Defense Force or Navy (limited to 5 coastal patrol boats, and a river boat capacity on the Shatt al Arab and a small contingent of Marines).

In addition the ING (approximately 40 light infantry battalions), is a light paramilitary force formerly known as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) which also forms part of the IAF. The ING was initially recruited and trained in a much quicker cycle than the new Army to be an auxiliary force tasked with conducting joint patrols with US and coalition forces. The ING battalions were brought under the Iraqi MoD in April 2004 and are now considered part of the IAF although its capabilities and skill sets are of a lesser standard than the regular Iraqi Army.

The long term aim for the IAF is for a modestly sized but capable and well-trained force although the final numbers for the force are a matter for the sovereign government of Iraq to determine. It certainly will not be as bloated as the former military complex was and it will be interoperable with allies and friends.

The Special forces units of the Iraqi Army are known as the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF) it is currently 9 battalions (approximately 800 men to a battalion) strong and it has been extremely effective in military operations in Fallujah and Sammara alongside US Marines in late 2004. These special forces also include the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Force (ICTF) (3 battalions) a small but highly capable CT/SOF capability which has grown out of the 36th ING/ICDC battalion which was put together by taking forces from each of the political militia groups[1]

It is envisioned that Iraq's external security will be provided by a combination of the developing and growing capabilities of the IAF, emerging regional security ties with gulf states and other friendly Arab states, alliances with members of the coalition and an involvement in global and regional multilateral organizations and groups. At some point in the (distant) future, international deployment for multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian operations may be possible and domestic use of the IAF should be a last resort and under tight control.

While UNSCR 1546 broadly outlines Iraqi security relationships, the specifics of the partnership come down to how the IAF fit into the command and control of the MNF–I, and to the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG's) involvement in military decision-making. In theory and in the future stabilized state of Iraq, even if not in ITG practice

[1] Political parties and militias that contributed troops include the Badr corps the armed wing of SCIRI, Pesh Merga from the KDP and the PUK. Iraqi National Accord and Iraqi National congress.

during 2005, command authority for the IAF issues from the PM, to the Defense Minister, to the Chief of Defense Staff, to the operating commander. At the moment, the IAF's relationship to the MNF–I makes the picture slightly different. Since the transition to sovereignty, IAF personnel have been assigned to coalition forces as Iraq's contribution to the MNF–I, making Iraq a fully fledged member of the coalition.

The manning, training, equipping of the IAF is provided by the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) and continues so long as the newly elected Iraqi government continues to seek US and coalition assistance in securing Iraq and developing the capacity of all ISF. So long as this is the case the following 24 months are critical for US policy makers to ensure that in the ongoing capacity and capability building of the new Iraqi Army specific principles and practices (many of which have been established to date) are entrenched and maintained.

Structural Reforms: Spreading the Load

A perfect example of a major structural shift is the arrangement whereby the logistics, combat support services including health and transportation and interior lines of communications and mobility of the IAF have been designed to be heavily reliant on civil infrastructure and support services. These arrangements put in place over the past two years essentially mean that the Ministries of Health, Transport and Communications are primarily responsible for providing services in their relevant areas of expertise to the Iraqi military.

These outsourcing measures effectively place limits to IAF logistics and the Iraqi military's overall ability for external force projection. The measures have the positive effect of allowing the Iraqi Army to focus on its core objective, which is to be a modern capable defense force tasked with using its military and ***warfighting*** capabilities to defend Iraq and her people. The measures prevent the Iraqi military from developing into the bloated patchwork of military industrial complexes, engineering, logistics and support services that characterized and supported the inefficient, repressive and in the realm of territorial defense and warfighting, the woefully ineffective military that existed under the Baath regime.

The IAF's future potential as a threat to its neighbors or the possibility that it may be used to attack its own people under these arrangements is exceedingly difficult. By making imperative a broad range of support from civilian ministries, the Baathist regime's predilection to using force as the primary tool of state action to achieve its goals either externally or internally is rendered obsolete. It will be very difficult to maintain such abusive military actions without support from a range of civilian ministries and a broad consensus for the use of force at the executive cabinet level by those Ministers whose ministries are responsible for providing support services for the military. This does not effect the IAF's ability for self defense in the case of external threats in the future. It does however limit its ability to sustain force projection externally or in the event that it is being used primarily to attack a particular internal population.

US policy makers must continue to encourage the even spread of assets, resources and support services amongst the civil infrastructure in support of the Iraqi military. It is imperative that moves to empower the military to regain control of these support services and become entirely self sufficient (and therefore accountable only to its own ends or those of a political elite) be resisted. This prevents the Iraqi military from once again becoming a powerful political force or tool of one Iraqi political or ethno-religious group. The IAF now requires the support of a broad consensus from a pluralistic and representative executive to function effectively. The more the Iraqi military is reliant upon a broad range of Iraqi civil ministries for support and infrastructure the more its politicization and or use by one particular political or ethno-religious group against another or for ill advised invasions of her neighbors is made an impossibility. Moreover the more these arrangements are entrenched the more capable the IAF will be to achieving its core task of providing an effective defense of the territorial integrity of the democratic state of Iraq.

Micro Reforms: a Change of Army Culture

The cultural changes in the new Army can also be seen in a broad range of reforms which have not only led to greater professionalism but also a fundamental change of culture. The new Iraqi Army is made up of ethnically mixed units both at the officer level and the enlisted. Unlike the old Army in which the officer class was predominantly Sunni and the enlisted/conscripts were largely Shia. The new Army recruits for both officer and enlisted are drawn form all sectors of Iraq's ethnic and religious backgrounds. The ethnicities represented include Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Christian, Yazidi, Assyrian and recruiting into the Army battalions reflect a remarkably accurate representation/split based on the demographic.

The plurality of the Iraqi Army enhances its standing as a national institution and this is important because it can act as a force for national unity. A common refrain from former Iraqi Army officers was the strength of the old military as a national institution and its unifying effect on the Iraqi state, they often pointed to the fact that the Iraqi military has always had kurds, sunni, shia and Christians in its ranks. However what was often left out of these historical instructions was the fact that the Sunnis dominated not only the officer class but also the divisions and units that were better equipped and paid.

Iraqi Leadership development is a key area that Major General Eaton and currently Lt. General Petraus have focused coalition assistance efforts. Officer training has largely been conducted in country and in neighboring Jordan, but there have also been important Iraqi officer exchange programs to military colleges in the US Italy, the UK, and Australia. To further enhance leadership a capable and effective Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) development has been made a priority. One of the strengths of the US military and other western militaries is leadership and the backbone of this leadership is the NCO corp. It is an understatement to point out that the Iraq much like many Arab Armies has not had a fine tradition of NCO class. In fact it has been largely neglected, compounding the terrible leadership performances of the Officer class and being one of the main reasons for leadership incompetence at the tactical level because of a lack of

innovation, initiative, motivation and independent and critical thought under pressure. These are all areas which are enhanced in western military units by the leadership of NCO's.

New practices such as recruitment of an all volunteer force, merit-based assignment and promotion and competitive pay enhance the overall professionalism and competence of the IAF. In addition the military justice system has been designed to rely heavily on the civilian justice system for serious offenses, with civilian judges acting as courts-martial. This is a measure in accord with the principle of spreading the load of military support to the civil infrastructure and as many civilian ministries as possible. In short the Iraq military can no longer be a law unto itself.

Many of these micro reforms enhance the Iraqi army's ability to be a strong and capable defense force but also to be a supporting institution to the new Iraqi democracy.

Military Aid to the Civil Authority: The Need for a Legal Framework

One of the critical aspects of the Iraqi Army being a supporting institution to Iraqi democracy was also one of the crucial tasks facing the former Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its Iraqi counterparts. To develop a policy to authorize and control the domestic use of the IAF. In Iraq, the domestic use of the IAF is an extremely sensitive issue. Iraqis, particularly the Kurds and the Shia, suffered decades of repression at the hands of the old regime, and many in the initial period of the CPA mandate argued there should be no new IAF at all. It seemed that the demons of the past might be stirred by the mere sight of an Iraqi in khaki. Many members of the now-defunct Iraqi Governing Council wanted to completely delimit the internal use of the IAF, calling for strict bans on such deployment.

However, the need for a capable, well-trained and professional army to defend Iraq against external aggression and to support interior forces during emergencies and disasters prevailed. Consequently, the Transitional Administrative Law (in force until the drafting of a new Iraqi constitution in August 2005) allows domestic use of the IAF, and endorses the assignment of the IAF to the MNF–I under UNSCR 1511/1546, but calls for the future constitution to ensure that Iraq's military is never again used to oppress the Iraqi people.

There is therefore an urgent need for a more specific legislative framework to guide the domestic use of the IAF in the future (where UNSCR 1511/1546 no longer apply). This Military Aid to the Civil Authority' must be legislated by the new Iraqi Government. The legal framework established by a 'Military Aid to the Civil Authority' legislation can delineate when and how the IAF can be called and used for by the civil authority in internal security and internal defense roles and legal guidance for its relationship with other security services. The legislation is consistent with the principle of primacy of the civil power. The objective of this legislation would be to provide a legal framework for the employment of members of the IAF in support of the civilian authorities when the resources of the normal civilian authorities (police, emergency services) are unable to cope. The concern that the Iraqi armed forces not be used to repress the population while

valid and based on a woeful track record of past abuses must be balanced with the fact that most armed forces around the world often augment civil authorities, particularly when police resources are unable to cope. This can be seen in some internal security roles such as the Olympic games, summit meetings, a host of large social, cultural and political events, and some counter terrorism, these operations have a legal foundation based on Military Aid to Civil Authority doctrine which addressees situations where force is contemplated. Other military internal operations which do not consist of the Use of Force are also conducted under a legislative framework based on the more benign Military Aid to the Civil Community doctrine for activities such as disaster relief.

Democracies around the world are characterized by having a solid legislative underpinning regulating Military Aid to the Civil Authority roles and ensuring accountability to the parliament and the people. There was no such body of law and regulation in Iraq in the past, leaving the use of the military in these roles unconstrained. Moreover because at present the IAF operates under the MNF-I – there is still no such body of law although the use of the IAF is constrained by the better judgment of MNF-I commanders taking into account IAF capabilities and the political sensitivity of their use in internal operations. However the intensive and likely continued use of the IAF in internal security operations (even well after the US and the coalition have handed over security responsibility) make the legislation particularly important element of a genuine democratic state in Iraq.

Much work was completed on a draft military aid to the civil authority legislation by CPA and Iraqi lawyers as a basis for future Iraqi government legislation., however it was not put into place as a CPA Order because the MNF-I/CENTCOM and the Pentagon feared that it would too seriously constrain the operational freedom of the IAF in the emergency period in being used against the insurgency. As the IAF grows however and there is likely to be a shift in the security arrangements after the ratification of the new constitution and elections in December 2005, it becomes ever more imperative that the Iraqi government is strongly encouraged to legislate these frameworks so that they are ready to be implemented as the US and coalition fully handover security responsibilities over the next 24 months. There will also be some need in the future for similar legal frameworks for all of the Iraqi security forces.

POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES

The Iraqi Internal security forces are made up of police, border security, and facilities protection forces which all report to Ministry of Interior. The IPS is a national force with regional and local arms. Its missions are law enforcement, public safety, and community service its mission is basic Law and Order and local policing.

There has been an enormous amount of criticism of the Iraqi police pointing to their inability to face insurgents. Much of this criticism is unfair as even the best trained Western Police forces facing RPG, small arms fire and suicide bomb attacks on their stations and officers would collapse under such pressure.

The MNF–I is mandated to operate in support of these besieged Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces, including the police, which retain primary responsibility for Iraqi internal security.[2] During the interim period Police and other internal security personnel did begin coordinating successfully with coalition and Iraqi military forces through a network of local, regional and national structures. For example, the MNF–I has been coordinating with Interior and police services at the provincial level through Joint Coordination Centers, which have provided a command and control capability until Iraqi Police Service command and control centers are gradually established. The MNF–I has continued to transfer responsibility for security to appropriate Iraqi civil authorities as they have developed their capacity and as security conditions permit.

Police capabilities and its members are being trained to handle severe internal challenges and are tiered to enable flexible threat responses: public order, SWAT, Civil Intervention Force, Emergency Response Unit. These higher-end, specialized Police forces are nationally based and are being built with the required counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) capability. These forces are in varying stages of development, but they have in the interim period had successes in the front line against the terrorist and insurgent threats to security in Iraq, and were entirely controlled and commanded by the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG). The bulk of these high-end internal security forces are commonly known as the Iraqi Civil Intervention Force (ICIF) an umbrella grouping that includes several types of the specialized police forces:

- The Iraqi Police Service Emergency Response Unit: an elite 270-man team trained to respond to national-level law enforcement emergencies—essentially a SWAT capability.
- The 8th Mechanized Police Brigade (MPB): a paramilitary, counterinsurgency Iraqi police unit. The MPB will comprise three battalions.
- The Special Police Commando Battalions provide the Ministry of Interior with its strike-force capability. The commandos—which will ultimately comprise six full battalions—are highly vetted Iraqi officers and rank-and-file servicemen largely made up of Special Forces professionals with prior service.[3]

The coalition has a goal of 33 battalions of these troops, (including Army special forces) some 25,000 men, To achieve this goal effectively over the next 18 months the US and Coalition must seriously push additional deployments of training brigades, an American training brigade (ideally including members of one of the Army's elite ranger training battalions) as well as several hundred more police trainers from local departments and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, NATO and European police trainers.

One caveat to the development of these high end internal security forces is the problem that they may become (in two years time) too powerful. This is a Catch 22 and a danger for US policy makers. Although high end internal security forces have been identified as the key to defeating the insurgency their development risks making the forces and the MoI too powerful, a possible threat to the democratic government particularly if they are

[2] UNSCR 1546
[3] http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/facts_troops.htm

controlled by exclusively by the PM or the Minister of Interior who may be tempted to utilize these forces in suppressing political opposition or turn them against a particular ethno-religious group. This was part of the reason (incompetence and corruption the other factors) in the high turnover of Interim Interior ministers over the past two years – in an effort to ensure that there was a balance of power in the interim cabinet and that the Minister of Interior was not aligned too closely with other centers of power such as the Prime Minister or the Defense Minister.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES REFORM: QUALITY OVER QUANTITY

It is the quality, not the quantity, of the Iraqi security forces which is critical to a realistic transfer of security responsibility from U.S. forces to the Iraqi security forces over the next 24 months. The CPA and the US military moved extremely quickly to begin basic training of the different Iraqi forces. At present however because of an initial emphasis on the quantity of forces, (getting Iraqi boots on the ground) the vast majority of ISF (approximately 140,000 said to be trained and in uniform)[4] do not have the required training and do not have the required capabilities to conduct offensive (or even defensive[5]) operations against the insurgents. This does not imply that there should not be the large numbers of Iraqi forces which exist. It is just that they each have a role and function, as in any society, and not all of them can or should be thrown on the front line of the insurgency. As the insurgency intensified through the summer of 2003, the CPA and the military developed policies to train the high-end internal forces, (special forces, police command units) with the specific role of effectively countering the insurgency and relieving combat pressure from US forces.

To date U.S. and coalition forces have led the counterinsurgency effort with Iraqi forces largely in support. Despite command of the world's most technologically advanced military machine, the United States is having remarkable difficulty defeating or even containing the insurgency. This is because traditional military forces even one as powerful as the US military are not geared toward the mainly urban operations needed to defeat small cells of insurgents. Iraq needs security forces that are trained specifically in CT and COIN operations. Unfortunately the scale and deadliness of the insurgency, has necessitated the fledgling Iraqi Army, ING and less than capable IPS being thrown into the frontline against the insurgents.

The key to a realistic transfer of security responsibility to Iraqi forces rests not only with the Iraqi Army special forces (such as the IIF), but more importantly with the building of the high-end internal security forces under the Ministry of Interior. A relatively small number of specially trained Iraqi internal security forces have conducted effective and independent (from the coalition) COIN operations with highly effective Iraqi-Coalition intelligence coordination and some American logistical support. Theses forces are separate from the standard military and include mobile counterterrorism units, light-infantry police battalions and SWAT teams,. They performed well alongside coalition

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[4] See http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/facts_troops.htm

[5] Mosul Police desertion November/December 2004 was a case in point.

troops in Falluja and Samarra, and pulled off a hostage rescue in Kirkuk in which the Americans provided only logistical support.

More importantly the US and Iraqi military are capable of retaking cities like Samarra, Fallujah, Ramadi and other troublesome towns in the sunni triangle but in the long term it is these high end Iraqi internal security forces specifically trained for urban centric operations which will be able to hold and eventually stabilize them.

Eventually a force of 25,000 or so of these highly trained Iraqi internal security troops, operating at the point of the spear, with the remaining bulk of Iraqi forces in a supporting role, have a reasonable chance of defeating the insurgency. This is largely due to the fact that successful and effective COIN operations are not just about raw numbers; it is the quality of the Iraqi security forces and their capability to do the job and not their quantity, which will ultimately make the difference.

These specialized Iraqi national police units are particularly important because of their specialized training and skill sets and their ability to combine intelligence, law enforcement, and light infantry capabilities. They are also important in the sense that a heavy emphasis on Army internal security operations can be limited as much as possible.

It has taken some time for the building of these internal security forces to get underway. The assumption of the Pentagon in early 2003 and the early postwar phase was that there would not be such an intense and deadly insurgency. Consequently, the initial plans to train the Iraqi security forces were broad, relying on large numbers of recruits with very basic training in policing and conventional military operations. Only in early 2004 did the Iraqi interim Governing Council and the CPA put in place a policy to begin building specialized internal security forces to fight the insurgency. Since then, the emphasis has clearly shifted to training the right type of Iraqi security forces with the capabilities to take over offensive operations from U.S. forces with only minimal support. The internal security forces, which are specifically and intensively trained in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, are the key to the transfer of security to Iraqi forces.

Most Iraqi national guardsmen have had only cursory training, and the majority of army battalions have largely been prepared for conventional military defense against external threats. Pressing the ING into counterinsurgency duties is a misuse of their training, moreover the army so long a tool for internal repression under Saddam Hussein, should not be relied upon to play a prominent internal security role in a democratic Iraq.

Problems with both the IPS and ING can be traced back to the fact that initially, throughout 2003 and early 2004, much of the training and vetting of recruits for these services was decentralized. Local U.S. and coalition military commanders were given the responsibility to raise these units, leading to a lack of standardization in their training and in uneven vetting of these recruits across the country. The pressure on the US and coalition military to get Iraqi boots on the ground led to many local police simply being "reconstituted". Former police officers were re-employed without having to go through the required police academy training. National guardsmen went through minimal levels

of basic training and then were expected to be the bulk of Iraqi forces facing the insurgents.

To a certain extent, these training and vetting problems have been rectified. The raising and equipping of IPS and ING have been centralized, first under Major General Eaton from spring 2004 until June 2004 and since then under his successor, Lt. Gen. David Petraus. Under General Petraus, ING training involves 3 weeks of basic training and 3-4 weeks of collective training. However, ING capabilities are still limited to basic tasks such as fixed-point security, route-convoy security and joint patrolling with coalition troops. The ING performed these tasks admirably during the January 30 elections, when they were charged with creating cordon and perimeter security around polling centers; yet they still require heavy US logistical and combat support.

Local Iraqi police forces currently complete 8 weeks of training (or a 3-week refresher course for former officers) in police academies around Iraq and in Jordan. Still, their capabilities are limited to local policing duties and ensuring basic law and order. Given their skill sets, they are unable to combat the insurgency effectively as a frontline force. It should be noted that even the best-trained Western police forces would have a great deal of difficulty dealing with such intense and continuous attacks with RPGs, small-arms fire, and suicide bombings on their officers and police stations.

In contrast to the ING and the IPS, the Iraqi Army has had a centralized recruiting and vetting structure from its inception. As a result, the Army has attracted a higher quality of recruits who must undergo thorough and standardized vetting, and the training itself has been of a higher standard. The basic 8-week army boot camp is supplemented by additional training for recruits moving into special forces, such as the IIF.

As has been noted the bulk of Iraqi Army capabilities are attuned to conventional military operations, especially defending Iraq from external aggression. Given the past history of the Iraqi Army, including its use as a tool of repression against the Iraqi people, and the propensity for the military to dominate Iraqi politics, the US must very careful not to overemphasize the use of the Iraqi army in internal security operations. Necessity, however, has required the building up of the IIF (9 battalions by the end of January 2005) as the Army's key COIN wing. This force has proven to be extremely capable in operations in Samarra and Fallujah in late 2004.

The IAF also has at its disposal two trained special forces battalions. The 36th Commando Battalion, is a special ING battalion put together in late 2003, to serve as an infantry-type strike force. The 36th BN was created with fighters drawn from many of the different Iraqi militias. This was somewhat controversial in that it went against the principle of individual recruitment to ISF by bringing together units of militiamen from 5 main political parties[6] More recently in mid 2004 the Iraqi Counterterrorism Battalion was formed by selecting exceptional soldiers drawn from both the ING and Army units.

[6] Iraqi National Accord (INA), Iraqi National Congress (INC), the Badr Corp – the armed wing of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Kurdish Democratic party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

Recruits from these different Iraqi forces are being trained at military bases and police academies across Iraq by coalition personnel and Iraqi officers who have undergone "train the trainer" courses. In addition, some military officers are receiving leadership instruction in military colleges in America, Britain, Italy and Australia. Police recruits are also being given intensive COIN training in neighboring states, including Jordan.

Any discussion of "accelerating" training of Iraqi security forces is misinformed and dangerous It misses the point. The coalition cannot and should not accelerate training - that would mean cutting training cycles say from 8 weeks to 2 weeks which would result in putting less than capable Iraqi forces out on the front line. This was essentially the mistake made initially with the IPS for the sake of pointing to increased numbers of Iraqi forces on the ground. To avoid the rush to failure it is imperative the OSC;

- Maintain the length of training time and the standards. Avoid the temptation of cutting training cycles to get Iraqi forces out there quicker as this only leads to disaster and;

- More importantly US and coalition forces need to specifically focus resources to training the particular types of high-end ISF that can best deal with the insurgent threat and ultimately take the pressure of coalition troops

THE MNF-I RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

How exactly will the requirement for 'unity of command' of the Multi National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) (under US command) square with the newly elected Iraqi government's exercise of sovereignty? Just how much say will the Iraqis have over the operations of the MNF–I forces on Iraq's sovereign soil? What level of command and control will the new Iraqi government have over the mushrooming Iraqi security forces as compared to the limited controls exercised by the IIG?

During the interim period Prime Minister Allawi clearly placed security as the number one priority. As former chair of the Iraqi Governing Council Security Committee, Allawi worked closely with the CPA in developing policies for building the capacity and determining the direction of the newly formed Iraqi security institutions. These included the Ministerial Council of National Security (MCNS), the reconstituted MoI and its national police and internal security forces, and the 'start from scratch' IAF and MoD.

There is a degree of confusion over the true nature of the security structures in place in Iraq. The IIG was (as is the newly elected ITG) a fully sovereign government, albeit engaged in a complex security partnership and framework with coalition forces—one that is designed to enable Iraqi power, authority and responsibility for security and the capacity and capability of its own security institutions and forces to expand over time.

The line between external and internal Iraqi security is blurred. The Iraqi Interim PM had stated publicly on several occasions that internal security threats in Iraq often stem from activities of neighboring countries–either by direct interference by their intelligence operatives, by turning a blind eye to foreign Islamic extremists crossing their borders into Iraq, or by inadequate monitoring of their borders. Coalition forces, and the IAF as a partner in the MNF–I, provide the much needed support for internal security through internal patrolling and border enforcement. The IPS and particularly the specially trained police commando units are expected to improve and develop overall ISF ability to deal with these complex threats, so that they will eventually take the lead in COIN and CT operations.

The security relationship between the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), its security forces and the MNF–I were largely defined by UNSCR 1546. The resolution noted that the MNF–I in Iraq operated and was present at the request of the IIG and reaffirmed the authorization for the MNF–I and its unity of command, which is essential to employ those military forces effectively. In calling for the resolution, Interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi asked the international community to reaffirm the mandate of the MNF–I to continue to provide both internal and external defense until the developing Iraqi security forces are capable of taking over responsibility for Iraq's security. The handover of security responsibilities to Iraqi security forces is a long way from completion and it is likely that the newly elected ITG will continue with the approach of the IIG rather than call for a formal SOFA. This may change however with the election of the permanent government in December.

While UNSCR 1546 broadly outlines Iraqi security relationships, the specifics of the partnership come down to how the IAF fit into the command and control of the MNF–I, and to the ITG's involvement in military decision-making. In theory and in the future stabilized state of Iraq, even if not in ITG practice during 2005, command authority for the IAF issues from the PM, to the Defense Minister, to the Chief of Defense Staff, to the operating commander. At the moment, the IAF's relationship to the MNF–I makes the picture slightly different. Since the transition to sovereignty, IAF personnel have been assigned to coalition forces as Iraq's contribution to the MNF–I, making Iraq a fully fledged member of the coalition.

The MNF-1 main task of supporting Iraqi security forces in internal security operations is gradually shifting to the training of the newly formed and reconstituted Iraqi units. Although the IAF is an active partner of the coalition and contributes forces to the MNF–I, the security framework underpinning the MNF–I presence and activities complicated the exercise of the IIG's sovereign power and responsibilities. The democratic credibility of the ITG has to an extent lessened these concerns.

Before the handover to sovereignty, Iraqi ministers raised the issue of Iraqi involvement in military decision-making, and the coalition looked for a way to give Iraqis a voice in the use of coalition forces, including the IAF. The Fallujah and Sadr crises in April 2004, and the creation of the extremely effective Iraqi Ministerial Council of National Security (MCNS), brought to the surface the difficult questions of control of domestic IAF

operations and Iraqi input to decisions concerning sensitive uses of force especially involving the IAF. To be able to operate effectively after 28 June, militarily and politically, coalition officials knew they had to tackle these tough but legitimate issues. They also knew that if they tried to limit Iraqi decision making on such matters, efforts to form a genuine security partnership could stall and possibly fail. They were adamant that the creation of a proper coordination link would placate Iraqi concerns, while ensuring military operational freedom and unity of command. The pivotal question in coalition planning was about how to give the Iraqis the opportunity to participate in decisions about the use of force in their own country, without affecting the unity of command and operational freedom of the MNF–I.

The CPA opted for an institutional approach. The idea that emerged was to create a force-coordinating mechanism between the MNF–I commander and key IIG officials as part of post 28 June arrangement. The chosen policy was to create a contact group consisting of essential IIG and MNF–I leadership, to be convoked by the MNF–I commander, (currently General Casey). The relationship was to be neither the MNF–I commander answering to the Iraqis, nor the commander and the Iraqis dealing with one another at arm's length.

The functions of the group were clearly expressed as responsibilities of the respective partners, in order to demonstrate by word and deed that the Iraqi political leadership are truly partners in the MNF–I. The final formula was as follows:

- The Iraqi officials are responsible for funding, staffing, training and equipping military forces. Therefore, the MNF–I commander should have the opportunity to state force requirements.
- The commander is responsible for planning and carrying out military operations. The Iraqi officials will be given timely and full information about the operations and the chance to consult about and influence them, especially sensitive ones such as IAF units being used in urban areas.
- The Iraqis will be responsible for operating the police, and the MNF–I commander for operating military forces. Therefore, both should be obliged to ensure tight coordination.

In practice, political considerations and the genuine control sought by the IIG made it imperative that in this interim period General Casey sought Iraqi consent before using the IAF in sensitive operations. The newly elected ITG and MNF–I officials continue to tackle difficult security operations, both partners have a political obligation to continue to work towards consensus and to resolve problems within the contact group. Left unsolved, such problems would hinder security operations in the face of Iraq's enemies.

Looking to the long term, the security concept for future Iraqi command structures developed with Iraqis in the interim period remains sound for 2005 and beyond:
- When the police cannot handle a threat, the Minister Interior and the PM ask the Minister of Defense to assign the required capabilities, which then operate under MoI command and control.

• When the threat is so severe and widespread that the MoI cannot provide effective command and control of the forces needed to defeat the threat, the PM asks the MoD to direct the use of military forces.

The assumption is that in the coming years, once Ministry of Interior/police forces grow in strength and capability and Iraq's security situation stabilizes, the first step would be rare and the second step even more unlikely. The MCNS has adopted this general formula. Importantly, however, the formula does not apply under the current conditions of violent insurgency and terrorism faced by the current ITG. It may well be adopted by in the next 12 months, depending on the degree of stability in Iraq and a defeat or successful containment of the insurgency but it is more likely that the future permanent Iraqi government will adopt these procedures sometime during its term of office.. Currently, the only entity with adequate operational control is the MNF–I. Neither the MoI nor the MoD can direct the use of the IAF domestically, a point admitted in the Transitional Administrative Law[7] which is effective at least until the referendum and ratification of the new Iraqi constitution in late 2005.

The continued authenticity of Iraqi partnership (and power) in the MNF–I is demonstrated by the presence of senior Iraqi military officers throughout the MNF–I command structure. The current involvement of Iraqi officers at the various levels of operational and tactical command and control makes them real partners and owners in the accomplishment of security objectives and aids a smooth transfer of full security responsibility to the permanent Iraqi government post December 2005.

[7] S 59B

Mr. SHAYS. Great. Thank you.

Let me first ask, and I am not looking for a debate, but I want an honest dialog where any of you may differ with someone else on the panel here.

So are there things you would differ in terms of emphasis or totally disagree with anything your colleagues have said? Do you want to start?

And I will preface this by saying that I read all your biographies, and this is an exceptional panel. I don't know, Professor Cordesman, if you got your crustiness from John McCain or you gave it to him, but you are an accomplished author. We could put professor and author here. Such tremendous experience you bring to the panel.

And Professor Sepp, your service to your country and your actual practical experience in the military.

And Mr. Khalil, I was intrigued that you were involved in strategic planning basically for the military in Australia. Is that correct?

Mr. KHALIL. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. So you are a gift to this subcommittee, and I am looking forward to the dialog that will take place, but where would you disagree completely or in part with something already said by one of the three of you?

Professor Cordesman.

Professor CORDESMAN. I think there are two points, Congressman. One, my experience with this goes back to Vietnam when I was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. SHAYS. Were you working for the Secretary of Defense at that time?

Professor CORDESMAN. Yes. And I was working, at that point in time, in dealing with the training of our VN forces and the assessment of the intelligence structure in Vietnam. I think the one thing I would say is that we haven't the faintest idea of what the numbers of the insurgents are or the number of insurgents——

Mr. SHAYS. Now, there is the absolute. When you say faintest idea. We have very little idea? I mean faintest idea is such a——

Professor CORDESMAN. I think we learned the hard way after the liberation of Vietnam how bad it was in terms of our estimates of sympathizers, infiltrators and activists.

Mr. SHAYS. What I'm going to ask is——

Professor CORDESMAN. Congressman, I'm going to—we could mince words. Are our intelligence estimates of the insurgents today in numbers in any way reliable? No, they are not.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, that's fair. What I just want to say to you is that I'm a pretty impressionable person. "Faintest idea" means we have no idea. But is the range so faint that it could be 200,000 to 10 million? Obviously, that's not the faintest idea.

Professor CORDESMAN. As I say, we can play games.

Mr. SHAYS. Give me a range.

Professor CORDESMAN. I won't, because I really don't think we know. I have heard people come out with estimates of Islamists. I have worked with people in the intelligence community for 40 years. I don't find intelligence officers stand behind those estimates. I don't believe that there are 50,000 Islamists, but I don't know that we know how many there are.

I heard people began with 5,000 core insurgents. Now we are talking 20,000 to 30,000. But I think perhaps we don't disagree. I just don't know what the hell a core insurgent is, and I don't believe any two people can define it the same way.

Mr. SHAYS. Fair enough.

Professor CORDESMAN. When it comes down to the sympathizers with insurgents, the public opinion polls I have seen since the summer of 2003 indicate a very large number of Iraqis, both Shiite and Sunni, supported violence against the coalition. Now, does that mean they are going to provide arms or sanctuary? None of us know. But the numbers were so high, even in embassy polls in the summer of last year, that figures like 200,000, which was a wag by the Iraqi Minister of Defense, originally, they simply don't mean anything.

Mr. SHAYS. In fairness to our own folks, they have been reluctant to give numbers when Congress presses them for it, because, in part, we really don't know.

Professor CORDESMAN. If you push the intelligence community hard enough, you will always get the number, and you get the number you deserve.

Mr. SHAYS. Well said. I love the poll that was done, a very professional poll a year after we were there, and it said two-thirds of the Iraqis want us to leave, and two-thirds want us to stay.

Professor CORDESMAN. Well, one problem we have, in all honesty, Congressman, is if you break those polls out, and you actually read all 23 pages of them, and then go into them by area, they are often extremely useful. When they are summarized nationally, and people don't read the details, then you get exactly the results you have said. But it was something like 11 percent of the Shiites surveyed and something like one-third of the Sunnis surveyed by the Oxford Analytical Poll, which was perhaps the best in late 2003, which supported violence against the coalition. How many of them would ever have lifted a finger to support this? I doubt it.

But if I may, let me just make two points about where we may disagree. First, I don't believe training is, or ever will be by itself a way of creating mission capable forces. And I think General Luck, with his emphasis on putting U.S. advisors into combat teams, creating combat units with some kind of integrity and leadership, and creating units effectively trained on the job is what is going to have to be the only way that you can create forces approximately as large as the ones we need.

The second point I would raise is, I don't believe we are there yet. I believe General Petraeus has done an outstanding job since June 2004. But remember, and I am quoting here figures from General Petraeus' office, we had one deployable battalion in June of last year; now, we have 24 to 27, according to General Petraeus, in the multinational command.

I don't believe the national guard has been vetted or that it is anything like ready. And the latest figures I have indicate that we have just put 52 new battalions into the regular army, of which perhaps nine have any kind of mild competence.

Mr. SHAYS. Is this the national guard you are making reference to?

Professor CORDESMAN. We put two other brigades in when we merged the national guard. So people talk about merging the national guard into the army, but there were six other battalions added from other units.

Mr. SHAYS. Are the units outside the army?

Professor CORDESMAN. They are outside the army. They had names. One was the Defenders of Baghdad Brigade and the other was the Muthona Brigade.

Mr. SHAYS. Kind of like what Souter set up? I mean it's their own individual private armies?

Professor CORDESMAN. Well, they were sort of, not necessarily militias, but units created for special purposes by ministers or Governors.

Mr. SHAYS. Gotcha.

Professor CORDESMAN. The problem I have with this is when I look down this, you talk about training. You don't create a soldier in 8 weeks in the U.S. Army. You can fit him in because you can put him into a unit with proven combat experience, leadership, senior NCOs and people who have proven capability. Iraqis weren't trained at that level, even if we got the right ones.

We are putting people into units created from scratch. In case after case, the leaders are still political. They are people who were appointed for the wrong reasons and aren't removed when they do not prove to be capable.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. What else do you disagree with?

Professor CORDESMAN. I think the other point is, we are not giving them the equipment they need yet.

Mr. SHAYS. But did someone here say we were?

Professor CORDESMAN. Well, when you say you have mission capable units, and I think Professor Sepp made the point quite well, if they do not have adequate communications, if they only have heavy machine guns and mortars, and they have no protective vehicles and cannot support themselves in movement, these are not mission capable counterinsurgency units. That is a description of all of the army units, except one battalion, which is mechanized, and two battalions of the elite police forces.

Mr. SHAYS. OK.

Anything that you would disagree with your colleagues on the panel, Professor Sepp? It may be an emphasis. I'm not saying completely disagree, but something they might have said, you would just disagree with them.

Professor SEPP. The vetting process is not working. In some provinces, with a majority Sunni population or in the Kurdish areas, it is functioning. But in the four provinces that the Marine Expeditionary Force currently operates in, Al Anbar, Babil, Najaf and Al Qadisyah, there is no vetting.

The senior Marine colonel in charge of liaison to the Iraqi security forces personally estimates that 75 percent of the police are insurgents or insurgent sympathizers.

Mr. SHAYS. So is this the vetting with the police in particular?

Professor SEPP. In the military forces as well, accountability in those kind of situations. He described going to three different company garrisons. Each company, again rough numbers, each com-

pany should have had about 100 people present. In total, at the three locations, there were five.

During the second battle for Fallujah in November, when I was in Baghdad on the strategy team, the Marines were almost certain that they fought and killed insurgents that they had previously trained and equipped as national guard and police members. At the same time, in that same month, there was a bank robbery, because the payroll system had been turned over with the shift of sovereignty. It had been turned over to the Iraqis. The equivalent in dinars of about 4 million U.S. dollars was moved to a bank in Ramadi.

The day after it arrived, the bank was robbed by armed insurgents wearing police uniforms issued by the United States, carrying Glock pistols issued by the United States, with knowledge of the bank that only police would have had. They didn't get away with all the money because there was so much of it; they had to leave about a quarter of it behind. They couldn't load it all in their vehicles.

But this is the degree to which, in some provinces, that vetting is meaningless and that the insurgents have infiltrated the military police forces.

Mr. SHAYS. Meaningless and not possible, or just not done well? And if you don't know, that's OK, too.

Professor SEPP. That is a very hard question to answer. Those are the sort of things that could be fixed over time, over years, with the imposition of a government of security forces, or of incorrupt security forces in a system like that. But right now, vetting is meaningless in those provinces.

Let me just add one thing. This is absolutely common to any counterinsurgency situation. I'm sure Professor Cordesman can give some very precise stories about these situations in Vietnam. When I fought in El Salvador, when Sergeant Greg Fronius was killed at El Paraiso there were 30 to 40 guerilla infiltrators that had joined the brigade that he was advising and that had started the initial attack against the cartel from the inside in a surprise attack.

So this is very common. This has to be understood that this is simply going to be part of doing business and fighting an insurgency, and that I would be very concerned with broad statements about vetting is in place and is functioning and is centralized and is standardized. The people that have been there will tell you it's simply not true.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Khalil.

Mr. KHALIL. Well, yes, I was there for 9 months, and I did point out quite clearly in the testimony that the vetting was a problem for the first year and a half, and that's because it was decentralized. As Professor Sepp was explaining, much of the vetting was conducted at a local military level. Now, as far as I understand it and even before I left, I was pushing very hard to have this centralized because of the problems with vetting in a decentralized manner.

And we have to also ask, who are we talking about? Which forces and vetting are we talking about? The police and national guard

are vetted locally, because they are locally trained and raised forces. The army was vetted, centralized in Baghdad, now under the Ministry of Defense and under General Petraeus' command. So as far as I understand it, General Petraeus has now command over police training and all national guard training. This national guard is now being put together with the Iraqi army, and there are improvements in those vetting procedures. You can only go one way, obviously, when the vetting was so bad to start off with.

The only other point I would make, Mr. Chairman, and I do agree with Professor Cordesman that it is very difficult to talk about the numbers of the insurgents and pin down a number. That's because it's completely fluctuating constantly. There is movement across borders of foreign jihadists. Some people are joining the insurgency. Some people are dropping out. Some of them are being captured or killed. So it is very difficult to pin down numbers. But what you can pin down or improve is your understanding and the nature of the insurgency. And there has been great strides made in understanding that insurgency.

I don't think 2 years ago we could be talking with as much knowledge about who makes up the insurgency as you are hearing on today's panel. And that's very important. I had a chance, for example, to sit down with the Governor of Ramadi, in Al Anbar Province and the tribal leaders, and they brought with them 15 ex-security personnel. And now, clearly, former Mukhabarat and Special Republican Guard guards who have lost their jobs and now clearly are part of the insurgency. But their main grievance was unemployment. They had lost their jobs and their status.

So you can understand the insurgency. You can even negotiate with some of the more moderate elements of the insurgency. Of course, you have to sift out those who are guilty of crimes against the Iraqi people.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Yes, Professor Cordesman.

Professor CORDESMAN. Just one point, Congressman. I think this is probably just an accident, but on the Department of Defense chart and, indeed, the one that I have provided, which is similar, a point about the police. It says there that 82,000 are trained and equipped. What there is not—but is very clear in the reporting from the multinational coalition, is 35,000 of that 82,000 is scheduled for training. It is not trained and equipped.

And this, I think, illustrates what happens when you take something this dynamic, and you try to pin your numbers down.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, my sense of some satisfaction here is that we are starting to try to understand the numbers. But I have a sense from you, Professor, that you almost feel that it is useless; that the numbers are so meaningless as to why even bother.

But you transition to the concept of capability, and there I would think we would all agree we would want those numbers.

Professor CORDESMAN. I think, Congressman, what people are trying to do now, and reference was made in the previous panel to establishing metrics, is to take the, I think it is now 13, Ministry of the Interior administrative defense forces that we, through the multinational coalition, advise or train. There are many other elements, understand, that are not on those charts, of militias, police

and other units, with either government or nongovernment support. Break them out by what we call order-of-battle analysis, which may be familiar to you, so you get by battalion what the capabilities really are, what the history of the unit is, something about its leadership, whether you really believe this unit is ready yet.

And you don't sort of reject forces because they can only man a checkpoint. You break the order of battle out so you look at the mission capabilities as well as these other factors. Now, that gives you the kind of numbers which, to some extent, you can trust. They will never be precise. You will never know whether a given battalion will break in combat. But if you go to that type of analysis, and I believe that is what the multinational coalition is doing, you will get there.

But the fact is, it didn't make sense to try to do it until you had enough forces in the field that were actually becoming operational so the criteria changed. Up till now, you have been rushing since last June simply to create basic cadres that you can begin to deploy.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. I am not looking for a long answer, but what I am hearing you basically say is that the numbers were almost meaningless before; that we can, over time, bring value to those numbers as we dissect it in ways to know who is capable and then where they are capable; that they may be capable here, not capable there; but then it becomes a bit difficult to then give these blanket overall numbers.

In other words, what I am hearing you say is, you may have 40,000 people capable, but they may only be capable in certain areas, and we are not even sure how we want them capable in every area. In other words, we are not even sure of the overall needs of capability. Or am I going off track here at the end here?

Professor CORDESMAN. You have made all the key points. We are fighting a dynamic war. We are constantly adapting. The training, organization, everything has to change. The question is, are we creating, month by month, effective combat battalions and forces for the various missions that have to be performed?

Mr. SHAYS. We do not have that chart in front of us, but what I am hearing you say is that we had first trained, and even that was questionable; we then went to those who were trained and had equipment, but even that is questionable because we don't know what kind of training and what kind of equipment as we firm that up; but the big key number is going to be, who is capable?

Professor CORDESMAN. I think that's exactly right. If you look at page 18 of the testimony I have given you, all of those figures are taken from General Petraeus' command. Those kind of numbers break out in rough terms the mission capabilities of the forces. At that point, I think you get a picture of the kind of forces that are being created, and most of them are useful.

Another way to look at it is simply to go back and break out each of these forces by actual element, for all 13 or 14 elements, and then break out the elements within them. And those numbers will begin to give you a picture of real capability. And what is really striking is the amazing increase since June 2004 and the amount

of momentum that the thing has been gathering since September 2004.

Mr. SHAYS. I've had this dialog with the administration that when you admit mistakes where you went wrong—which to me is a logical thing to do—it helps you understand where you are and where you're going, and also it helps you see that maybe you've had progress. But if you've never made mistakes, it's like, well, they don't know all the things we overcame because of the mistakes we made that gives some value to what we've been doing.

Let me have our counsel, ask a question or two.

Mr. HALLORAN. I wonder if each of you could give me your views on de-Ba'athification and this proposed re-de-Ba'athification that the emergent government is talking about and its impacts and likely impact on the security situation?

Professor CORDESMAN. I think this is a horrible term. I have been visiting Iraqi since 1973. If you wanted to survive from 1979 on, you almost had to have some kind of link to the Ba'ath or you had to go into exile or you had to stand aside from virtually all the political, social and economic life. What you don't want back in here are people from the special security services, people involved in war crimes or atrocities, people who are former regime loyalists who today are supporting the regime. That is a tiny fraction of people who were part of the Ba'ath party. And I think this whole phrase De-Ba'athification Commission—Ba'ath was originally pushed on CPA in part by people like Chalabi, who had a political agenda that had nothing to do with protecting the country or serving the national interest, but who basically were trying to minimize the opposition and create the climate through which they could acquire power.

So what we really need is not de-Ba'athification, but simply to ensure that we're not going to bring back the people who were truly abusive in the past regime which, what, could be maybe some unknown fraction of the Ba'ath, but certainly closer to 5 percent than 15.

Professor SEPP. What strikes me about this is that I don't know if it's well known or not, that immediately after World War II the U.S. Department of State had a very extensive program titled specifically the "De-Nazification Program for Germany," a very complex and sophisticated document that showed an understanding of the German political scene and German culture.

Having said that, there is nothing I can add to Professor Cordesman's comments, I think that he is exactly correct.

Mr. KHALIL. I too agree with Professor Cordesman. One thing I would add, though, is that Ba'ath party membership was, I think, about 2.5 million, or something like that, in Iraq. A third of those, as Professor Cordesman pointed out, were people who had to join the party to become a teacher or principal of the school or advance their career. Another third probably joined for positions of power, and a very, very small fraction were the real Ba'ath party ideologues, were those who really abused their power in those positions in the security sector.

The problem is in bringing back people with experience, it's very difficulty to sort out who was actually abusing their position of power and who was just joining the Ba'ath party for membership.

There are echelons of Ba'ath party membership which we're aware of as well. But I think something in the order of a truth commission or a reconciliation commission is really much needed in Iraq in the next year or two, because you will see competing pressures now from very much a Shiite government, if you would like, although with a British coalition pushing for a purging even of those former Ba'ath party members who are now part of the Government Ministry of Security Services, and then on the other side, people thinking, well, we need to bring these people back in because they have the requisite experience to help Iraq rebuild. So it's a key point of friction which will be coming to a head I think in next year, possibly once the government is formed, depending on its nature.

Mr. HALLORAN. One more?

Mr. Khalil, I think it was in your testimony you raised the prospect of training security forces and the specialized forces to be too successful, and that we re-empower some kind of police state in Iraq. How would each of you advise avoiding that pitfall?

Mr. KHALIL. Yes, that was one caveat I put to the—in terms of building up internal security forces, that you don't want to build too powerful a structure under the Ministry of the Interior that could challenge the balance of power. I think there is an important point here: There needs to be a legal framework in which it is very well understood how these forces are used in domestic security operations. Now, that's for the Army as well as for the internal security operations. At present we don't have that legal framework.

I was involved in trying to push that legislation through when I was there. I think the Pentagon shied away from it because it thought that it would hinder the use of Iraqi security forces and security personnel in carrying the insurgency—of giving them free reign, if you'd like.

But it's an important legal framework, because all democracies have it. Australia has it, you have it where we set out when and where the Armed Forces can be used in internal operations. And I think that's something that the future Iraqi government ought to seriously consider.

Professor CORDESMAN. I think the only thing I would add to that is you need security forces that can deal with terrorism and which can deal with insurgency, and as Professor Sepp points out, you're probably going to need them for years to come.

The counterbalance for this is not to create ineffective specialized forces, it is at the same time to strengthen a police force which can handle law enforcement that is bound by the rule of law. It is to strengthen the court system, it is to keep the pressure up for human rights. It is to carry out the kind of programs that IRI, or its democratic party equivalent, have started to ensure that ministers and officials and people who run for office understand that they really have human rights and legal efforts. And I think this really calls for something that we have on the books but where we simply haven't moved the money forward; and that is, you cannot simply go ahead and create effective military forces and not push all of those other aspects in our aid program designed to support the rule of law, human rights, develop governments, help educate

people in creating modern political parties and in the responsibility of democracy.

And I find it rather unfortunate that when you look at the tables on actual expenditures in those programs the spendout rate has been so low, and the spendout rate on security has been so high.

Mr. SHAYS. I think we will be out of here in about 10 minutes, but, is it your testimony that it's difficult to deal with counterinsurgency, very difficult, or impossible? In other words, should I be leaving this hearing thinking that it is almost impossible?

I will tell you how I'm leaving it right now. I am leaving it with the thought I have never believed that—when people have asked me how long we will be in Iraq, I said how long have we been in South Korea? I mean, that's kind of my answer. But I also know the Iraqis don't want us around for 4 years. I mean, I believe that. I mean, maybe some of their leaders do. But my own reading of the Iraqi culture is they are not going to want us there, and so I am wrestling with that.

I am leaving this hearing believing that we, I don't want to say have turned the corner, but at least we know what it takes to do it right, and we are in that process. But I'm leaving with the sense that there are so many things we could be doing that would make it more likely to reach success a little sooner, and we're not doing that.

But I am left with the feeling—when we started out your panel—with the thought of all the places we have failed to deal with insurgency. And let me just then also say I'm having a hard time understanding whether insurgents are under terrorists or terrorists are under insurgents. I'm not quite sure where the heading is and I'm not quite sure—are they equal, is it just another name? Or are they a part of terrorism?

So why don't we start with you, Professor Cordesman?

Professor CORDESMAN. First, I think insurgencies can be defeated. All insurgencies differ, and terms are used very, very carelessly. We weren't defeated in Vietnam by insurgents, we were defeated by main force core elements of the North Vietnamese Army. Those were units using tanks, artillery, and basically invading. They were not the insurgents. Those might have been the core of the Tet offensive, although even there there were strong NVA elements.

What we have here is a different situation, however. We're talking, at most, 20 percent of the population is Sunni; and significant numbers of Sunnis are not pro-insurgency. We're talking four to six provinces where there is a significant popular base, but those are by no means unanimous, and the one that has the strongest area, in some ways in support for the insurgencies or terrorists—whatever you want to call them—is our Anbar Province, which they have 5 to 6 percent of the entire population of Iraq.

If we can create Iraqi forces that can stand on their own and convince Iraqis that Iraqis will defeat the insurgency—not American that's one key. If the Iraqis themselves emerge out of this election showing that they can govern, compromise and create a state which will include those Sunnis who wish to be part of a govern-

ment based on democracy, or at least federalism, that would be another critical step and help bring victory.

If we can go from the aid program we have today to some coherent strategy for using that money which relies on Iraqis and meets Iraqi expectation, rather than some kind of strange plan we developed here in Washington, and we can get money to the people so they can see hope, then I think that too can defeat this insurgency.

What we talked about in terms of defeat doesn't mean that extremists vanish. There will be people who are Ba'ath loyalties angry at us, Islamist extremists, probably in Iraq almost indefinitely into the future. There will be car bombings, there will be suicide bombings, there will be assassinations, and there will be violence. That will probably counter-eliminate at least within the near term. So victory will always be relative.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, thank you.

Professor SEPP. I wanted to make another historical point, Mr. Chairman, just to reenforce what Professor Cordesman said.

In Vietnam, the Viet Cong, the insurgents, were actually defeated by the Vietnamese police and intelligence services by the late 1960's through the Wong Hong series of operations that they conducted. The point was that insurgencies are difficult, but they can be managed if it's understood how to do that.

For the U.S. Armed Forces, my point and my testimony is it will be very difficult because they don't have experience or education in it, and they're trying learn it in a very, very compressed time right now, and——

Mr. SHAYS. Are you saying the U.S. Forces?

Professor SEPP. U.S. Force, yes, sir. And a point would be the plan, the classified campaign plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom that exists, is not a counterinsurgency plan. They are writing one right now. But I am aware as briefly as 2 weeks ago that there are still debates about key points inside that plan. Until that comes together, it would be very hard to imagine that all these other components could be unified to accelerate the end of the insurgency.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Khalil.

Mr. KHALIL. Mr. Chairman, very difficult, I think, but not impossible to fight the insurgency.

And your point about whether they're terrorists or insurgents, a small element of the insurgents do carry out terrorist activity; usually the Jihadists and some of the Iraqi Wahhabists that are part of that. Often many Iraqis say to me, we don't agree with these tactics, we don't want to see the United States and Coalition forces in our country. But that doesn't necessarily translate to support of the insurgents, particularly those who are conducting terrorist attacks on civilians and others.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you happen to speak Arabic yourself?

Mr. KHALIL. I do, sir, yes.

Mr. SHAY. So you've had opportunity to speak——

Mr. KHALIL. It was very helpful in meeting—I didn't just work with the Iraqi political leadership of Allawi and Hakim and the rest of them; I met with a lot of tribal leaders across the country, heads of universities, that kind of thing. And obviously with our RDC leadership and the interim leadership as well. But I tried to get out there and meet with as many Iraqis as possible.

Mr. SHAYS. Do you see that it's likely that the Iraqis would allow American troops to be in Iraq 10 years from now?

Mr. KHALIL. The majority of the Iraqis don't want to see that, that's quite clear. The majority, probably 80 or 90 percent, would want all United States and Coalition forces out of their country in the long term.

Mr. SHAYS. And if they're experiencing a true democracy, then we won't belong.

Mr. KHALIL. That is usually the case, yes. But the point about that is, Mr. Chairman, is although most Iraqis of whatever sectarian background or ethnic background don't want to see foreign forces on their soil, they don't necessarily support what the insurgents are trying to do as far as derail the political process in the future, democratic or not. And in fact, if you look at the numbers—again we head back to numbers as a thing today—but if you look at the number of Iraqis who've joined the government ministries as civil servants, who joined the new security forces, there are hundreds and thousands of Iraqis, as you were saying earlier in your statement, putting their lives at risk and their families' lives at risk because they believe in a future democratic state in Iraq, and all those people that were working on the elections as well, so they vastly outnumber those insurgents who are trying to derail that process.

And the other important point——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just say, with a caveat that I've learned from all of you, that some of those may in fact be insurgents themselves. They want a job, they want to be paid, and if they can work for the government, nothing wrong with that.

Mr. KHALIL. I would estimate that those infiltrating security services are a very small percentage. I wouldn't go as far as saying 75 percent at all. It depends on the service, of course, but there was a level of infiltration that has been cleaned out over the last 6 months as well.

It is true, there are many Iraqis who have joined the services to get a job, but there are many of us in our countries who join the public service for a good paycheck as well; that doesn't translate into supporting the insurgency.

Mr. SHAYS. Right. No, I wasn't trying to suggest that, but I'm just suggesting folks want a job, they want to make a contribution and so on; but the implication is that we can't be certain that everyone who's doing that is doing it without an alternative motive, that they also may want to be part of the government, and they may be very sympathetic. I mean, one of my staff was in Jordan with training the police, and it was during the time of the conflict with Sadr, and they were singing a song in Arabic. And he asked them what they're singing, and it was "You kill Sadr, we kill you." this was the police in Jordan.

When I was in Iraq, we asked about that and how it could happen. And I was told, frankly, that even Mr. Bremer didn't realize the number of police people that he was seeing around the country, and it was well above what he had thought it was supposed to be.

Mr. KHALIL. I'm glad, Mr. Chairman, that you mentioned Muqtada al-Sadr, because he's a very important example. In fact, the fighting that was going on in Najaf and Sadr City had a lot

of people shaking their heads and a lot of people worried about this. What has transpired, of course, is that Sadr has been brought into the political process through pressure by Sistani, through negotiations allowing the interim Prime Minister, and so on. But the end result is that this particular group has decided that they're not going to reach their political goals by use of force; that they're going to join the political process. Now Sadr has, I think, three or four members of the National Assembly that come from——

Mr. SHAYS. He has more than that, actually.

Mr. KHALIL. Twelve, maybe, I think it might be. And that template can be used for a lot of the moderate Sunni resistance as well.

Mr. SHAYS. OK, what I would really love to do is invite you all over to my house and have dinner because I would like to continue this conversation, because I find it fascinating and extraordinarily helpful. This has been a wonderful panel, and we are blessed that all of you of such stature would come before us today with such knowledge.

Is there any closing comment that any of you would like to make? I will start with you, Mr. Khalil. Anybody?

Professor CORDESMAN. Just one comment. One of the things we lack most as a country is a sense of history and patience. If we demand too much too quickly, we will, of course, fail. I think that what we really need gradually is to teach ourselves patience. As long as the Iraqis are moving forward, as long as we can see progress, as long as the aid programs work, more people are trained, we see elements of democracy. We need to persist and to continue to support this effort.

What we cannot afford is to set deadlines or demand instant success or set standards based on U.S. expectations rather than Iraqi expectations. I think if we are patient and dedicated, we have a very good chance of giving this war real meaning; but if we demand too much too quickly we can fail, because we defeat ourselves. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Any other comment? Yes, Professor Sepp.

Professor SEPP. Mr. Chairman, I would again reinforce Professor Cordesman, saying the example is El Salvador, where U.S. policy to support a new and emerging democratic government in the face of an insurgency was sustained through three administrations to its final result where the insurgency was beaten to a draw and the insurgents came to political settlement of the war. This can be done, but it will take the patience that Professor Cordesmen is calling for.

Mr. KHALIL. One last point, Mr. Chairman. I think whatever your moral position was about the war in the first place, I think if we're going to talk about morality, it is immoral to drop any support for helping Iraqis develop their future democratic state. It's immoral to do so and it would cause a great deal of suffering right now.

So I think I agree with Professor Cordesman and Professor Sepp as well. We need to continue that effort of assistance, both at the security level, but also in the political and economic reconstruction areas, because they're just as important as security in defeating the insurgency.

Mr. SHAYS. Well, I think that we are in a very important mission in Iraq. You have my support. I even ran during the last election on that issue and said, you know, if my constituency doesn't agree with it, then on that grounds find someone else. But, you know, Nicholas Palarino has been with me on all our trips, and obviously organized them—but when you meet someone who was literally locked in her house for 10 years, literally, not allowed to go outside because her parents thought she was very beautiful and would attract the attention of Saddam's two sons, you know—and when you visit the killing fields—and, thank goodness Saddam is no longer in power.

Thank you all very, very much. With that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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