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Preface

The present issue of the African Studies in Russia, 1998–2000 proceeds with the publication of anthologies in the series of yearbooks published by the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Like previous publications the 1998–2000 miscellany contains articles, reviews, annotations, and other publications of Russian scholars on problems of Africa, which have appeared in print in the last three years of the past century. Only a list of publications (books and pamphlets) on Africa published in Russia in 1998–2000 is added.

The key goal of Russian publications on African Studies is to introduce the findings Russian researchers to their foreign colleagues in the field. The matter is that the vast majority of the Russian scholars' studies are being published in Russian only. On considering the difficulties the language barrier can pose for foreign scholars the present issue intends to outline just the general directions of the Russian students of Africa and certain of their findings. To be sure it is impossible to review all the works and all the findings for the past three years. So, the editors decided to include only some samples of such works and only some conclusions made by Russian scholars.

The book is opened by a part under the title «Articles, Papers Presented to Conferences». Here the reader will find a view of Prof. Alexei Vassiliev on the impact of globalisation on the African development. Prof. Igor Sledzevsky discusses the cultural interaction of the normative societies and criminal shadow communities. The impact of the Internet introduction on Africa is reviewed by Dr. Irina Abramova and Dr. Dmitry Polikanov. Prof. Vladimir Lopatov analyses the prospect of resumption of the economic relations between Russia and Africa. Prof. Dmitri Bondarenko addresses the problems of a statehood in the 13th – 19th centuries Benin.

The next part – «Reviews, Essays» contains articles based on chapters and books published during a period under review. Dr. Vladimir Vigand discusses the Institute for African Studies' Contribution to the African Studies in the World, Prof. Natalia Krylova investigates the relations of parents and children of Russian-African families, and Dr.

Yevgeniya Morozenskaya examines the role of state in the economy of African countries.

During a period of 1998–2000 a number of conferences, symposiums, round table discussions on Africa have been held in the Institute for African Studies and under the aegis of the Institute and the other research centres of Russia. Apparently, the Eighth All-Russia Conference of Africanists «Africa at the Threshold of the Third Millennium» (Moscow, September 28–30, 1999) shall be considered as a main event among all these undertakings. The report on it together with the reviews of three others scientific meetings can be found in a third part of the book.

The last part of the issue contains some annotations and a list of books and pamphlets published in Russia in 1998–2000. The titles of the listed literature are translated into English to enable the foreign scholars to choose the books and pamphlets in Russian according to their interests and choice.

All the readers of the book are welcome to share their opinions with the authors and editors of the publication. Our address is:

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ARTICLES, PAPERS PRESENTED TO CONFERENCES

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Africa: a Stepchild of Globalisation

(Paper presented to the 8th Conference of Africanists.

Africa at the Threshold of the Third Millennium.

Moscow, 28–30 September 1999 [5, p. 15–39])

The term «globalisation» has become a buzzword for statesmen and scholars, in mass media and programmes of social movements. Representatives of different scholarly disciplines and socio-political forces read different meanings into it.

To avoid polemics with extreme views and the play of definitions and label sticking, let us try to merely enumerate some features (not all!) of the phenomenon of globalisation. It will permit us thereafter to define the place of Africa, the subject of our study, in that phenomenon.

Undoubtedly, we are witnessing a qualitatively new convulsion of internationalisation and interdependence (though anything but symmetrical one) of the world economy. A pronounced aspect of globalisation is mobility of the world capital. Huge amounts of money, according to some data, more than one trillion dollars, shift from one land to another and from one owner to another every day. Goods, people information and ideas move from one country to another, from one continent to another with unprecedented rapidity and in unexpected ways and manners. A united system of world communications is developed using more and more perfect electronic devices; information is accumulated and spread in explosive manner. Science is becoming the society's main productive force, the decisive factor of the increase in labour productivity. The international space, early occupied almost exclusively by states, is filled more and more by new actors, especially transnational corporations (TNCs), which acquire qualitatively new characteristics, international financial conglomerations and non-government agencies. Mass media,

which have also become a variety of transnational business, are beginning to play a new role in determining people's, states' and socii's behaviour and views. The functions of states, though not of all of them, are transformed, modified and weakened.

Rapidity and large scale of the changes in the economic, social, political, spiritual life of the world community cause discomfiture. The European industrial revolution took more than hundred years. Now technical renovation occurs every two or three years in some industries. The future is becoming growingly unpredictable and the present growingly inexplicable and uncontrollable.

Globalisation is accompanied by an upsurge of the neo-liberal ideology with its standard set of postulates concerning the advantages of freedom, by which it implies, first of all, liberation of the market relations from whatever fetters, including state regulation and even state boundaries, reduction of the state to a machinery that serves private business, with the usual seasoning of talks about democracy, civil society, human rights and other attributes ascribed to the society of the Western countries. Whereas neo-liberalism is undergoing a crisis in some fields of social sciences in the West, it acquires the features of an almost authoritarian ideology, almost a religion, which leaves no room for objections and heterodoxy, when applied to non-Western countries and socii. This feature manifests itself with an especial distinctivity after the failure of the Communist experiments and collapse of the administrative command system in the economies of the USSR and Eastern Europe, disintegration of the USSR and China's turn to the market rail.

Framed and interpreted in the neo-liberal manner, globalisation looks a universal blessing, a miraculous «open sesame!», which is going to fling the doors of caves with uncountable wealth wide open before the suffering and hungry, ensuring material welfare, spiritual upsurge, health and access to education for the mankind – the whole mankind! – and protecting human rights and dignity.

Then, why is it that getting rid for a while from the narcotising impact of the media, the people of Africa and Latin America, Russia and even Europe ask themselves more and more often: is this globalisation a good or an evil? Being an unconditionally objective process, which does not depend on people's will, does not it develop in the forms and manners defined by people in favour of some groups and to the detriment of other ones? If it is an absolute good, why has the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) gone down in 80 countries within the recent decade, producing innumerable social consequences in the form of spread of pov-

erty and diseases, deterioration of the life quality, shortening of its span, increase in the number of illiterates? Why are more than 50% Africans living in the conditions of absolute poverty, why has their average life duration returned to the level of the early 1960s?

Can one speak about democracy and equality in the world where the total wealth of 200 richest people of the planet has more than doubled within the recent five years, exceeding one trillion dollars, and the three richest men of the world own the assets that amount to the annual income of 600 mln people of the least developed countries, first of all, those of Africa? Can one speak about democracy and justice when the decisions concerning the world's destinies are made not according to the principle of «one man – one vote», however imperfect may this principle be in the setting of «brainwashing» by the world media, but according to that of «one dollar – one vote»?

Maybe, that is why Pope John Paul II said in his 11th encyclical (March 1995) that the Western states «have betrayed their democratic principles and are moving towards totalitarianism, and democracy has become a mere myth and a cover for immorality». Perhaps, he meant globalisation of criminal business and the fact that the annual drug trade turnover had reached half a trillion dollars, and prostitute trade has involved half a million women in Western Europe alone, yielding an annual income of \$7 bln or, maybe, he implied nothing but people's blatant inequality in the modern globalising world, which deprives the very term of democracy of its real content.

«Globalisation of the world economy, pushed ahead by the forces which demand national boundaries be opened for trade and movement of capital and information, proved useful to some people and marginalised much more other people, augmenting inequality both within the nations and among them,» reads the Report on Human Development, included in the UNO Development Programme (July 1997). The income ratio between the one fifth of the world population who live in the richest countries and one fifth who live in the poorest ones was 74:1 in 1997, 60:1 in 1990, 30:1 in 1960 and 11:1 in 1913. In the late 1990s one fifth of the world accounted for 86% of the world GDP, 82% of the world export and 68% of direct foreign investments. At the same time, the poorest fifth accounted for just 1% of these amounts.

Uniting finances, production and international trade, the TNCs demonstrate a rapid growth of their might. According to my calculations, their sale almost quadrupled between 1980 and 1999, growing from \$2.4 trillion to almost 10 trillion. Let me note that according to the obviously

obsolete data of the mid-1990s, the branches of 37,000 parent corporations numbered 200,000 thousand. Now TNCs control about 40% of the means of production of the world, especially in the high-tech, capital-intensive and science-intensive industries. Their enterprises and servicing companies employ 5% of the world manpower. TNCs and their branches control 75% of the world trade of goods and services. However, one third of that trade is within the corporations, which is a major obstacle to governments and international trade organisations in controlling them in whatever manner.

To give an idea of the ratio between the might of the TNCs and that of individual African and other countries, it is enough to mention just few figures. The annual sale of the General Motors exceeds the GDP of Indonesia, that of the Exxon is higher than the GDP of South Africa, that of the Soni is equal to the GDP of Egypt and more than the GDP of Nigeria. The five largest corporations have an annual sale that is higher than the total GDP of all countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa.

Neo-liberal propagandists claim that strong TNCs pay a major contribution into the development of the countries where they act, ensuring employment, paying taxes that may be used to finance social programmes, spreading advanced technologies, attracting foreign currency and helping poor countries in the creation of an industrial basis of their own. These statements are partly correct in the case of certain group of countries but do not correspond even a little to the global realities.

We are going to consider later on how much do these claims apply to the African continent. Now some other features of the TNCs' activities must be noted. As a matter of fact, there are no laws in the international practice to regulate their activity. The attempts to control TNCs' branches in some countries make them flee therefrom to the countries with less burdensome taxation and other regimes, less rigid labour and environment protection legislation.

Some TNCs adopt or pretend to adopt certain behaviour codes but only in the form of genuine or imaginary self-limitation. Whatever may be argued to the contrary, the main, though not the only, motivation of the TNCs' activity is profit. Their management is required to think in economical and technological terms, i.e., in the manner that minimises the cost and maximises the profit. Social protection becomes superfluous or unnecessary in this scheme; in any case, it is forced, and this very phenomenon is the immoral aspect of the TNCs' unlimited and uncontrolled lust, especially outside the Western countries.

The attempts to elaborate some forms of the international legislative regulation of their activities made by the UN agencies were abandoned under the pressure of the Western governments. The absolute majority of the parent TNCs originates from the USA and other Western countries, and only few of them were founded in the new industrial countries. Developed states support the TNCs of their own, and their spread all over the world increases the suzerain states' weight and influence and the revenue got by their exchequers.

Shifted freely in the new economic space, transnational capital is not subject to national states' jurisdiction unless invested directly. This situation holds especially for financial capital, which has nearly lost touch with real economy. According to Harvard Business Review, each dollar circulating in the real sector corresponds to 50 dollars in the financial sector, and the annual turnover of financial deals approaches half a quadrillion dollars.

To speak about the African countries and other countries of the «South» [1], the inflow or outflow of financial capital may destroy or, on the contrary, revive the economy of any of them. The sphere of responsibility of the African and other countries of the «South» (by the way, not of the «South» alone), of their governments, elected parliaments and other state agencies is reduced considerably. They are already unable to be accountable to their voters and citizens for the condition of their finances, currency exchange rate, the level of the budget revenue and, correspondingly, of the expenses for social and other purposes.

It occurs in the conditions of the global neo-liberal ideological offensive upon statehood as such, especially that in the countries of the «South» and former socialist countries. What is interesting, the neo-liberal ideologists discuss not an enhancement of the state's efficiency but mostly its dismantling, questioning the necessity and legitimacy of the state's existence. Julius Nyerere, the former Tanzanian president, noted ironically: «Earlier it was the orthodox Marxists who spoke about the disappearance of the state, and now it is the topic of neo-liberal ideologists».

The African states have to act as if they are on the razor's edge: on the one hand, they have to ensure the interests of the TNCs, without which they already cannot exist, to fulfil the recommendations of the IMF, IBRD and World Bank and to curtail and weaken their state agencies, and, on the other hand, to ensure peace and stability in their society, progressively polarised and torn apart by contradictions.

Globalisation and the frontal offensive of the «free market» have resulted in the destruction of the state and social institutions of the countries of the «South» whose earlier function was to ensure at least a degree of, welfare and protection of humans, of social, ethnic and religious groups, of human rights. The responsibility is shifted to other institutions, which are just emerging or are known to be unable to cope with this responsibility. For instance, the patronage-clientele system ensured at least a minimum social protection of a part of have-nots in the African countries. Experiencing the impact of globalisation, the local elites are either destroyed or integrated into the international system, but lose their responsibility for the state of the socius.

The international market destroys the state from outside, and neoliberal reforms reduce the volume of its participation in the national life.

Yet, turning to the recent history, we see the enormous role of the state in the economic and social development. After the World War II the states of Western Europe regained their strength quickly and managed to ensure socio-economic stability. The strategy of long-term national development elaborated there prevailed over the momentary interests of even big capital, especially in the setting of the Cold War and competition with the Soviet Union. The state played an even more important role in the new industrial countries, enabling them to take a decisive leap in their development.

The might of the TNCs and the Western states that support them is incommensurable with that of the states of the «South», and therefore the talks on democratisation of international relations will remain all empty bubbles until any measures are taken under the impact of the forces victimised by globalisation. For the present, the de-facto authority in the economic sphere is appropriated by the IMF, IBRD, WB, G-7, World Trade Organisation, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and other formal and informal bodies, whose decisions affect the destinies of countries and continents. But these bodies are out of whatever influence of the African and other states of the «South».

Politically, the weakening of the UN influence and the NATO's transition to actions bypassing the international law also mean a degradation of the fragile elements of democracy in the international relations. The practice shows that it is possible to smash Yugoslavia to smithereens by bombing, ignoring the international law; it is not inconceivable, by the way, that one of the reasons was its delay in opening the doors for TNCs. At the same time, it is possible to remain inactive while observing genocide in Rwanda, in spite of availability of all necessary resolu-

tions and position of the UN, for there are no diamonds or oil there and the TNCs have no serious interests in that country.

Russian researcher Alexander Neklessa wrote: «A contour of the international oligarchical regime, which prefers to act mostly from the position of strength, using at the same time the means that are adequate to the epoch, is outlined in the world under the cover of democratic phraseology (a kind of the tribute the evil has to pay to the virtue). The world community is acquiring an obviously stratified nature, its strata being described as estates by some people».

The weak never managed to protect their interests. The countries of the «South» still do not get their legitimate share of the biospheric rent or the rent from exploitation of their mineral wealth. Yes, it is said a lot about self-limitation of not only the TNCs but of the most developed Western countries. Yet the problem is that the latter governments who depend on the electorate and on those who finance their election campaigns. Therefore, the logic of their behaviour is the protection of the well-off Western socii, even at the price of neglecting their moral obligations to the «South».

This is why the target rate of the aid to the developing countries of 0.7% of the Western countries' GDP, proclaimed necessary to overcome poverty and backwardness of the most part of the world, was never reached, with very rare exceptions. It might be a real target to some degree when two systems competed, when the West needed to shield the countries called the Third World then from the Soviet influence. After the Cold War ended, there was no longer any necessity to do so. Now the Western countries allocate just 0.22% of their GDP for the aid to the countries lagging behind in their development, which is less than in the early 1990s, in spite of the reduction of military expenses and release of huge resources. This is obviously insufficient to help Africa and other regions of the «South».

But if one admits that the world structure has acquired a hierarchical nature, it is the USA that is at the top of the hierarchy. It is there that the headquarters of most of the strongest corporations, including TNCs, are based. The largest capital market also is there. The USA is the most advanced country in the fields of R & D, informatics, computerisation, Internet development and application of the recent scientific achievements, which form a new stage of the scientific and technological revolution. The USA has been as if globalised and liberalised from inside. At the same time, one may speak about the curtailment of the state's role as much as he likes, but, in fact, a single decision of the US administration

on an upward or downward change in the booking rate or allocation or denial of a credit to a country immediately changes the direction of the world financial flows and affect the destinies of even large countries. (It should be noted in brackets that in the conditions of allegedly weakening role of the state and adherence to the free trade principles in words, the US administration did not delay applying discriminatory measures against the foreign producers when Russian or Brazilian steel appeared at the American market.)

Relying on their might, the US administration and corporations advocate the Open Door policy since as early as the beginning of the 20th century (once using battleships and landing forces as the arguments), and today the US entrepreneurs, financiers, politicians and scholars are the most ardent protagonists of neo-liberalism. Let us remember another historical period, the early 19th century, when industrial Britain, surrounded mostly by agrarian countries, advocated a total application of the principles of free trade or *laissez faire*. The states of continental Europe offered resistance to its policy, extending their protection to their industry and ensuring its rapid growth. In our days, too, the neo-liberal ideology is opposed not only by the leaders of the countries of the «South» or European «leftists» but by the politicians and scholars who are quite loyal to the establishment, but their loyalty is to the establishment of Europe, of their own. The Europeans had to resort more and more often to the methods of state regulation of foreign and domestic economic activities, to protectionism, to support of their native entrepreneurs through budgets and tax privileges. One can mention, at least, the successes of the European agriculture, owing its prosperity to state subsidies, which made it a strong and successful sector of the economy.

The reality demonstrates that globalisation of the world economy is a chance to take advantage of the accelerated economic development and transition to new technologies for the highly developed countries that have entered the post-industrial stage, first of all, the USA, as well as other Western countries. Yet globalisation exhausts Africa and other weaker countries and regions more and more. The advanced branches of the Western economy, which consume capital and scientific achievements, enhance their labour productivity and skills of their personnel, which widens the gap between them and African and other developing countries, whose advantage is their possession of raw materials and cheap manpower. The least developed countries or branches of the national economy become as if unnecessary to the world market. I'd like to remind that Africa's share in the world export has dropped from 2.4 to

1.9% within less than ten years, despite the absolute growth of its volume. In this situation, the TNCs and developed countries do not need territorial acquisitions or direct political domination any longer. Being incommensurably stronger in the size of their capital, labour productivity, access to information and global connections, they can attain their goals using new methods (of course, keeping the reserve of military force intact and applying it in the cases of emergency).

Then, what are the real ways of Africa's involvement into the globalised world? What are its forms and methods? What does the qualitatively new structure of the world economy and world connections mean to hundreds of millions of Africans?

First of all, one has to note that the economic and social strategy of the African countries was and is formed under the impact or with direct participation of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. It is they that prepared the reform programmes with the ideal declared purpose of overcoming the African countries' backwardness.

In the 1980s and 1990s the terms of «structural adjustment» and «structural adjustment programmes», used in various word collocations, became an *idee fixe* of the experts who advised the Africans and components of their Newspeak. «Structural adjustment» was proclaimed the condition of getting aid from the IMF, World Bank and other international organisations. It was supposed to become an instrument of the implantation of the neo-liberal models of the economic and socio-political development into the African world, burdened with debts and immersed in unsolved problems, to acquaint it with the innumerable advantages of globalisation and market economy. As a matter of fact, the governments of the African countries had practically to give up their participation in the development of their own economies, granting freedom to the play of the market forces and staking at the adherence into the world market without resorting to protectionist measures.

To attain this goal, they were told to comply with the code of quite simple rules:

- minimise the state's interference in the economy;
- considerably reduce the trade barriers and make the local producers compete with foreigners at par;
- curtail or cancel subsidies and price control;
- retrench budget expenditures;
- lift the limitations imposed on capital movement;
- privatise the state enterprises;

- lift the limitations imposed on foreign private investments, adopting the laws aimed at encouraging them.

The neo-liberal ideologists who represented the IMF and World Bank constructed in their heads an image of an ideal country with the state's minimum interference in the economic and social life, confined to ensuring the minimum of the necessary services for the efficient functioning of the private sector and protection of the weakest members of the society, where the economy is self-regulated thanks to free competition among private enterprises. There is no country like this in the world, neither in Europe nor in America. It exists only in the egg-headed IMF and World Bank experts' imagination. The economic development proved most successful in the countries of East and South-East Asia, whose models of the state machinery functioning were opposite in many respects to those recommended to Africa, namely: powerful state structures interfered regularly with the economic life and limited the sphere of the private sector's activities in many respects.

Those countries whose policy was obviously «heretic» from the neo-liberals' viewpoint were no less successful. Developing the market relations, Mexico and Chile retained whole industries and, respectively, oil and copper production in state ownership. The course of the oil exporting Gulf countries and most of the oil producing African countries was the same. By the way, Russia's present economic problems are connected to an extent with full or partial transfer of the most profitable and system-forming branches of its economy to private owners.

Yet it was Africa where the international agencies obtained the unprecedented opportunity of shaping both macroeconomic and social policy. They began to impose their recommendations, – suggested out of the top of their experts' heads, – on the states that allegedly failed to grasp their advantage, because of their thoughtlessness and underdevelopment and resisted, consciously or spontaneously, when they were required to give up the protection of their national interests or traditions.

It is a truism that the purpose of economic and social reforms should be the improvement of the standard and quality of people's life and acceleration of the economic development.

The practice of the recent decade and a half has shown that rigid adherence to the neo-liberal ideas is counterproductive and merely dangerous, especially when the neo-liberals' theory and practice ignore the social factors, not to mention the historical, civilisational and cultural features, which have to be taken into account to solve even purely economic problems.

Since 1986, the IMF urged the countries with low income and limited financial resources to carry out neo-liberal reforms. The names of its recommendations changed but not their essence. In September 1997 an IMF report summed up the results of its economic policy. The report authors admitted that the results of the implementation of the «structural adjustment» programme were less than satisfactory. The gap between the targets and results, e.g., in the accumulation level, GDP growth, reduction of the inflation rate and current payment deficit was striking. The report stated that the performance of the countries not covered by the said programmes had been much better than that of the countries that had followed the neo-liberals' advice. The annual per capita GDP growth was 0% in the second group against 1% in the first; the increase in national saving being 10% and 17% and the share of their export spent for debt servicing 26 and 16% respectively. Other figures too were unfavourable to the countries that had indulged in extreme neo-liberal transformations. Of course, their economies were rationalised to an extent. But the reforms carried out there were found to encourage the export of raw materials and semi-finished goods needed to the Western countries, foreign debt servicing and import of consumer goods for the local elites.

However, an extremely surprising conclusion was drawn from these results: the reason of the failures was not fallacy of the recommendations themselves but their insufficiently complete and consistent fulfilment. The IMF theoreticians still believed that the «structural adjustment» was going to give the African countries the only chance of macroeconomic stability and resumption of growth and insisted that their governments follow these programmes and continue carrying them out irrespective of the achieved results. Was it a fifteen-year long period of continuous failures? What of this? The plans were excellent, but the Africans' performance in their realisation was poor.

The neo-liberal models implied anti-inflation policy and curtailment of social expenses everywhere. The result was a vicious circle: development and integration into the world economy on the basis of intense intake and application of knowledge, required higher and more efficient investments into the development of human resources, first of all, into broader education of a higher quality in keeping with the African requirements. Nobody could do so but the state, while the budget expenses for education went down in most of the countries.

After gaining independence, the African countries strove for modernisation for decades, investing into education, health care, social pro-

tection programmes and creation of infrastructure. It was characteristic of the states with both «socialist» and «capitalist» orientations. Both proved inefficient economically. However, the both categories created at least a narrow stratum of highly educated specialists, of professional elite, in whose training, by the way, the Soviet Union played an important part. Now, the neo-liberals' objective requirements may be briefly formulated as the state's withdrawal from the efforts aimed at the creation or reproduction of such elites.

The Africans' access to health care has deteriorated dramatically for a number of reasons, including the transfer of medical services to private entities, which made them inaccessible to broad social groups. It happened in the time when Africa is seized by the AIDS pandemic. Of 23 mln AIDS-affected persons of the world, some two thirds live in sub-Saharan Africa. AIDS patients occupy about 50% or even more beds in the hospitals of Central and Eastern Africa. The pandemic of the terrible disease has become the main mortality factor in many African countries. As a result of AIDS proliferation, falling living standards, deterioration of the nutrition and medical services, Africa as a whole has found itself thrown back to the 1960s in life span.

Frieda Mwaile-Menenji, an African researcher, writes: «Economic growth without social and cultural justice cannot be the idea of our development. The imperative is the development measured in the parameters of life quality enhancement, which may be reflected in better education, health care and longer life span.»

The blows delivered on the social sphere undermine purely economic plans. The abilities of private business proved exaggerated, because it also was a product of certain civilisational and historical development, not of merely decrees and ordinances based on IMF experts' recommendations. Few people were able to take advantage of the chances provided by the market. Unemployment retains its mass scale, especially among the youth and women, its rate being 20 to 30% of the population in most of the countries plus underemployment of 25 to 50%. Introduction of modern technologies is a must, but, quite naturally, it leads to a further recession of the employment level. It may be reminded that even in developed Europe some 11% of the able-bodied population, or 12 mln people, are unemployed.

The surveys made by the International Labour Organisation in 28 African countries demonstrated that the real minimum wage had gone down by 20% in the recent decade, the fall being more rapid in the state sector than in the private one. In some countries, the state employees'

salary is so low that its annual amount is sufficient to maintain a family for one or two months. This gives rise to corruption, negligence, search of alternative income sources, frustration of consciousness.

When a blow was delivered upon the state and state sector, reducing the employees' salary, its natural consequence was a weakening of the said institutions' ability to function normally. The specialists or faculty, considered the germ of the middle class, were thrown down to the poverty level. It proved impossible to maintain discipline and high productivity even in the private sector when the salary was low and did not meet the life necessities. The numerical strength of the «modern» working class decreased both absolutely and relatively.

In many African countries the modernisation process is reversed in some aspects. It holds not only for economy but for other spheres of the life. Finding themselves stepchildren of globalisation, faced with the menace of unemployment, poverty and alienation from the society, losing their niches in the modern life, many people started seeking traditional or neo-traditional alternatives. The growth of the manifestations of fundamentalism, the turn towards the traditional or neo-traditional forms of social organisation, which oppose whatever modern trends, revival of the archaic mentality have become mass phenomena.

The informal sector has strengthened and expanded considerably. For instance, the surveys made in Nigeria demonstrated it to employ the absolute majority of the urban population. It may include tax-evading enterprises, criminal business or natural economy. People survive thanks to extended families, the clan-tribal structure, large ethnic and religious groups, patronage-clientele relations. But such a structure of the society confronts both the state and the market; it undermines any measures aimed at the support of the free play of market forces and makes the egg-headed orthodox neo-liberals' theoretical constructions a laughing-stock.

The polarisation and disintegration of the African society strengthened further. Along with the tiny stratum of rich people and top-ranking officials, the labour elite employed in the export-oriented industries or mining was becoming distinct within the impoverished society. The newly opened market advantages were accessible only to the entrepreneurs who possessed professional skills and capital or, which was more frequent, merged with the state bureaucracy and world of politicians. When a government distributed loans for the development of private business or foreign credits, the recipients were the persons connected with the officials who were anything but selfless. Many of the flourish-

ing businessmen were not those who had better adapted themselves to the market conditions but those who had an access to the international aid, transforming it into their own capital and shifting it abroad for the sake of safety.

As a result of the neo-liberal policy, the «structural adjustment» has succeeded in crippling and destroying the postcolonial state institutions, which had been weak before, too, but failed to create any new ones. It strengthened not only the polarisation but also fragmentation and anaemia of the society and was among the factors that made many countries lose the orientation of their development.

Calling the Africans to give up the state regulation and whatever subsidies, the neo-liberals were sly consciously or otherwise. There were and are direct and indirect subsidies and privileges in all industrial countries, e.g. for agricultural producers. One who speaks about the implantation of free market and market relations in Africa implies that, for instance, the local peasants should be open to world competition, i.e., compete with the US and French farmers, who have access to modern equipment, agricultural knowledge and skills, organisation, banking system, who sell their products cheap thanks to not only high productivity of labour but certain direct and indirect subsidies and privileges. Since the productivity of a US farmer's labour is hundred-fold of that of an Ethiopian peasant who grows same or similar crops, the latter fails to find a consumer and is ousted from the market governed by the free competition laws. Wheat production is becoming unprofitable almost everywhere in Africa. Rice import from South-East Asia has ruined rice producers in Malawi. Then, what is to be done of hundreds of millions of living people, the African peasants, who are supposed to enjoy all human rights? Maybe, they should be frozen or put to sleep using medicines until a better time comes, as it is described in somewhat terrifying fantastic novels? Maybe, they should be merely eliminated physically, and then the AIDS is a blessing? The logic of unchecked free competition leads to the cannibalic theories of exactly this sort.

Surely, some African farmers have gained from the reforms if they grew the crops that are not available in Europe or the USA. For instance, it is more profitable to produce coconuts or cocoa in Nigeria, Ghana or Cote d'Ivoire than to grow manioc there. However, the export branches employ an absolute minority of the manpower, and the production of the crops grown for African consumers becomes loss-making because of the rising prices of seed, fertilisers and fuel, which ruins the peasantry and undermines agriculture.

A similar situation forms in the industrial and handicraft sphere. The garments manufacturing factories have closed up in Zimbabwe as a result of foreign competition. The workers found themselves thrown out of the life and cannot maintain their families. The manufacturing of sisal bags by Kenyan craftsmen was upset after highly mechanised Japanese factories began making similar bags. The production of alcohol drinks, engines and textile articles in Zambia and of leather and textile articles in Tanzania is next to dead.

It was clear from the very start to objective observers: the African countries' competition «at par» with powerful TNCs or merely highly productive Western enterprises was hopeless. It was like sending an undernourished adolescent boxer to a ring to fight a heavyweight profy and require «boxing» with strict observation of the just international rules. Competitors from developed countries not only drive off African producers from the market but merely nip them in the bud.

One of the tasks of the liberalisation of the economy is to attract foreign capital, especially to the branches which the local capital cannot develop or if it is characterised by narrowness or lack of professional skills and low technological level. The attraction of foreign capital to the countries with well-developed social and economic infrastructures, high educational level, strong statehood, well-elaborated and flexible legislation is a blessing, but it requires a totality of preconditions. It is not direct that most of the investments are made into developed countries. Of \$356 bln of the investments of 1996, the developed countries, first and foremost the USA, accounted for 60%, the developing countries for 37% and Central and Eastern Europe for a little more than 3%. Of \$129 bln of direct capital investments to the developing countries, Africa attracted about 5 bln, around 4% of that inflow. It is the lowest percentage since the early 1980s. In 1985–1990, Africa accounted for some 11% of the direct foreign investments into the developing countries. Malaysia alone got \$5.3 bln in 1996, more than whole Africa did.

However, the distribution of the direct capital investments was uneven within Africa, too. Getting \$1.7 bln, Nigeria set a record, followed in Sub-Saharan Africa by Angola (290 mln) and Ghana (250 mln). Egypt secured \$740 mln, Morocco 400 mln and Tunisia a little less. Thus, 70% of the total flow of the direct investments into Africa was concentrated in the western and northern parts of the continent. With the exception of insignificant investments into electronics, vehicle assembling, hotels, banks, insurance companies, telecommunications in Northern Africa, the investments into the African economy as a whole,

especially to the south of Sahara, were directed, as it has been in the colonial epoch, too, to mining alone. Naturally, a specific situation prevailed in South Africa, which got direct investments to the amount of \$300 mln within a year after a long period of capital flight.

The total foreign debt of the African countries increased from \$340 bln to 349 bln in 1997. As a whole, the pumping out of the African resources continued. It amounted to 3.3% of the GDP annually in 1975–1984, 4.6% in 1985–1989 and 3.8% in 1990–1997. According to the IMF criteria, 31 African countries were recognised unable to carry the debt burden and granted concessions in its servicing, but the rest countries keep paying in spite of everything.

Naturally, Africa does not exist economically as an integer. Only 3 countries demonstrated a reduction of the GDP in 1997 against 12 in 1994. 15 countries recorded an annual increase of more than 5%. It is the minimum level of sustained development required for a gradual liquidation of poverty, though spread over many decades. Yet the problem is that these figures are a cover of the leaps of oil prices, which affect many countries of the continent.

The researches carried out by international organisations revealed fifteen obstacles to the successful development of business in the African countries. The most important ones include corruption, ambiguous tax legislation or too heavy taxation, poor infrastructure, high inflation rate... Terrorism ranked fifteenth. But practically all obstacles mentioned in the list required the state's participation in their elimination or perfection of the conditions of business activities.

Whereas the general situation in the African economy is anything but brilliant, there are exceptions, indeed. An example is Tunisia, at least because it has managed to considerably weaken, if not eliminate, the obstacles to the economic development, including that of private business. Within the last twenty-five years, the country has achieved a considerable progress in its economic and social development. The per capita income has almost doubled, and the annual population growth has become less than 2%. The gravity centre of the economic activity has shifted smoothly from agriculture to the non-traditional sectors of production and services. Sustained development has resulted in reduced unemployment.

The Tunisian government subsidised the food prices up to the mid-1980s. A sizeable part of the subsidies leaked to the purses of the well-off strata of the population. But it was impossible to cancel them for political and social reasons. The state machinery managed to improve its

control of the distribution of the subsidies, making them available to the have-nots, and stimuli were created for the better-off people to consume non-subsidised food articles. As a result, the subsidy amount decreased from 4% to 2% of the GDP. Tunisia has the highest and most stable per capita calorie and vitamin consumption in the continent.

The main reasons of Tunisia's success are the development and fulfilment of economic reforms, closely connected with social programmes. Firstly, the quality of the human capital has improved as a result of the development of education and health care. Secondly, capital was invested into the economic and social infrastructure. Thirdly, the reforms were aimed at improving the life standards of the poorest strata. Fourthly, the political leadership and administrative agencies strove to find a support of their programmes and actions among the population. Finally, the traditionally strong state persisted, its efficiency was improved, corruption was checked and the elements of feedback from the population to the state machinery were preserved. All this was combined with real measures aimed at the attraction of TNCs without giving up the national interests to them. The situation in Tunisia is far from an ideal. It is still incomparable with the Asian «tigers» or «dragons» but differs strikingly from most of the other countries of the continent...

The technological backbone of modern globalisation became the new information technology, the revolution in informatics and communications.

The report on the world development published by the World Bank in 1998/99 reads: «Information is becoming at least as important as land or capital ownership in the economy that is increasingly based on knowledge. In the future, the distinction between the developed and underdeveloped countries will be that between those who are able to use information quickly and those who use it slowly, between the countries covered by the world information network and those isolated therefrom». Globalisation in the field of information opens new chances for the African countries but involves new challenges and dangers.

As a matter of principle, an African who has access to Internet can see German or Japanese video films, US TV programmes, read Nigerian newspapers in Abidjan, listen to the Deutsche Welle, retrieve information in a Washington library. The question is whether an African concerned for his own problems needs this information. Even if he needs a part of it, he is its consumer, not producer. It holds for an Internet user. Then, what about the common Africans, who have to consume the spiritual food that is of little or no use to them?

The Western media impose their own problems, their own world vision, their own system of values, their own ethical and religious approaches to the Africans, to whom they are totally alien by and large. There are yet relatively few TV sets in Africa, although their number is growing rapidly. But the TV audience is not confined to the family members. Half a village may gather around a TV set in the countryside to see soap operas, local theatre shows or football matches. The inflow of show business and mass culture from the West breaks the earlier ideas, distorts the population's system of values and life orientation. It implants the consumer ideology, sexual licentiousness, violence, worship of the golden calf, and material success at whatever price.

Combined with mass culture and advertisement, the mass media dictate people's tastes and behaviour, form their political and social likes and dislikes, inculcate evaluations of events and facts. When the TV does not cover an event, however important may it be, it has as if not happened at all. And when the TV demonstrates an imaginary event, it becomes a fact that affects reality, though having happened in the virtual world. Yet the latter is the world the Africans are almost unable to affect nowadays. The folk songs may deal with the AIDS, migration, orphanhood, ill-arranged life, religious ecstasy, while the TV inspires an interest in football, Michael Jackson or Coca-Cola even where clean drinking water is not available.

This is why the discussion of the 1970s and early 1980s concerning the necessity of creating a new world information and communication order has livened up nowadays. It is a result of the strengthening domination of the developed countries over the developing ones, of the emergence of new information technologies.

The Western world bombards the developing countries with its information through powerful media empires. (It may be recalled that 82% of the world telecommunications market, which is worth \$262 bln, belong to 10 largest international corporations.) Earlier Western radio stations broadcast on the short waves. Now radio programmes are transmitted to Africa on the FM channels, too. The BBC and Radio France International dominate Africa, but one may add the Voice of America, the Deutsche Welle and the Radio Netherlands to them.

Foreigners have already occupied the most important African TV channels. The digital technology has reduced the cost of radio and TV transmission very much. Private TV programmes are packed with US movies. When three quarters of the world video and cinema production are of the US origin, when even Europe cries in muffled voices about the

suffocating impact of the US mass culture and show business, what is to be said about the Africans?

The problem of a new international information order was discussed in the UNESCO and UN lobbies and at their meetings in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Africans spoke about the wealthy North's «cultural imperialism». But when the USA and Great Britain left the UNESCO, thus bringing it to the verge of bankruptcy, the discussion was brought to naught.

The present situation is much more serious. Africa's civilisational and cultural identity is in danger at the turning point of the epoch. The socio-cultural aspect of globalisation, if it means, as it did before, the steamroller of the US mass media and show business, destroys the achievements of the world civilisation, including that of Africa, under the pretext of the claim that nobody needs them. Globalisation in its neo-liberal version leads to undermining the national and civilisational identity of millions of Africans, formation of a vacuum of values and senses in their consciousness (loss of the sense of existence) and, as a result, cultural marginalisation of their societies, increase in crimes and drug addiction.

Although globalisation develops in the setting of the West's, especially the USA's, complete domination in the information space, the «global» culture was and remains an ideological fiction of neo-liberalism rather than a social reality.

One can observe some signs of anti-systemic movements for the protection of the indigenous cultural, civilisational and ethnic features and national achievements from the levelling impact of the alien pseudo-culture. It is in the course of this struggle that the new world is going to form; its system-forming elements are already visible.

Culturally and historically, the modern world has entered the completing stage of the epoch of Eurocentrism (Americocentrism). The culmination point of its domination in the spiritual sphere indicates the beginning of its fall. Asia is already developing economically faster than the West, retaining its civilisational and cultural features. The confrontation between the «East» and the «West», in which Africa has not yet found a position of its own, is replaced by an expansion of interaction and mutual penetration of all world civilisations; perhaps, conditions are created for a kind of civilisational synthesis combined with the preservation of cultural pluralism. The wealth of the world pluralistic civilisation is expressed in the very fact of parallel existence of cultures and civilisations, their mutual enrichment, which has nothing to do with the imitation of the West, especially of the worst aspects of its spiritual life.

Anyway, the Africans are faced with the questions of how to live further and what is to be done. These questions are too familiar to Russia, and we cannot but feel their importance for the people of the faraway continent.

To speak purely theoretically, the question is how stable and long-lasting is the world system created by the current irreversible process of globalisation in its neo-liberal form, when the African socii find themselves either on the lowest level of the estate hierarchy or merely thrown out from the modern life.

Obviously, this system is unstable and unsteady; with regard for the pace of the changes, it is hardly long-lasting. An impression forms that the growing chaos is becoming a distinctive feature or even a new stage of globalisation. The scandalous and ever-widening gap between the developed and developing countries, between a handful of the super-rich and a mass of the super-poor, between the freedom of enrichment and social and national irresponsibility of those who enrich themselves, between the enormous possibilities to overcome the human troubles provided by modern science and production and inability of the main actors on the world stage to realise them, between the declared principles of the human rights and democracy and real denial of the human rights and democracy to the overwhelming part of the mankind... All these factors give rise to anti-systemic movements of various but ever-growing intensity.

A malignant tumour of anti-systemic international criminal activities has already emerged within the system and is developing according to the laws of its own (a trillion dollars of criminal incomes has been laundered within a decade!). It can paralyse the whole international organism, blow up even the western civilisation, depriving persons and institutions at the top of the hierarchy of their power and influence. But the criminal world is fed back from the non-Western world by drugs and female slaves for sexual servicing, illegal immigrants who penetrate the fortress of the Western society, dirty money earned in the countries with a torn up fabric of the society, such as Mobutu's Zaire, financial swindle, piracy. It is clear that the roots of crime cannot be pulled out and the menace of a mutation of the whole system into a monstrous totalitarian set-up, headed by heavy guys (godfathers) of a new type, cannot be deflected, unless the majority of the mankind takes part in the globalisation process.

The contradictions of the system lead to more and more slaughterous conflicts on the social, ethnic and religious grounds, emergence of fundamentalist and extremist movements, which reject the present order and

the whole system of the values of the Western world, including its highest spiritual and social achievements, which belong to the whole mankind. Mass destruction weapons are spreading over the planet, and nothing but common efforts, aimed at establishing a more just balance of the elements of the global system, can prevent their application. Degradation of the environment continues, and measures should be taken by the whole planet to arrest this process. And what seems the main element of the global system is the interest of the absolute majority of the mankind who populate the countries of both the «South» and the «West» in imposing social and national responsibility on transnational corporations and media empires. One of its purposes is to clip their wings in the interests of the whole world community and thus humanise the present globalisation process.

A historian knows the precedents of the transition of the systems earlier affected by a strong disbalance to a temporary equilibrium. I mean «wild capitalism» of the early 19th century, which gave rise to the contrasts and contradictions that were similar to the present ones, though on a lesser scale. Thanks to the social and socialist movements of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, thanks to the emergence of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries as an alternative, even though a symbolical one, to the earlier system, thanks to the anti-colonial national liberation struggle, capitalism managed to become a balanced, though anything but ideal, society of the developed countries of Western Europe, North America, Japan, combining market forces with sufficiently strong social responsibility and protection of the population masses.

As a result of a new stage of the scientific and technological revolution, of globalisation in its present form, the forces of new «wild capitalism» have broken free again after the disintegration of the USSR. Whereas in their old form they engendered the World War I, then Nazism and the World War II, the world-wide armed conflicts of today may become nothing but the mankind's suicide. But the very understanding of this fact inspires the hope for more rapid transformations of the present global system into something more stable and humane, based on the civilisational values that are common to all mankind.

As for Africa, its condition can hardly be considered hopeless. I mean not only the economic achievements of dozen and a half of its countries. To abstract oneself from the TNCs' momentary interests, both the Western states and the TNCs themselves are interested objectively in Africa's economic and social upsurge, at least for the sake of their egoistic inter-

ests, at least to escape the menace of splashing over of the African conflicts to Europe and America.

Africa cannot solve its problems without foreign aid. But that aid should be granted not on the basis of the imposition of naked predator-like behaviour of free market under the banner of neo-liberal orthodoxy but with regard for the social, civilisational, historical, environmental, psychological and other features of the African countries.

The Africans themselves cannot remain passive in the cause of saving themselves.

Yes, the African states are weak, anaemic, often alienated from their own population, corrupt. Yet nobody but the state authorities, provided they become more efficient, provided their connection with the population is revived and their responsibility to the society is strengthened, provided they are purged from corruption at least to an extent, can help the economic and social development, solution of Africa's confounded problems. It should be done together with developing regional co-operation. Surely, the international community's aid is needed to that end. But it is upon the Africans themselves to decide how should these goals be achieved.

May I reiterate the banal truth that was repeated again and again as early as the Soviet epoch: «First of all, Africa is the sphere of interests of the Africans themselves».

Note

[1] Evaluating the world economy, globalisation and regionalisation, social scientists use different terms, which often encompass interrelated notions. Some of them speak about the «West», «East», «South» and «Deep South», some others about the «North» and «South», still some others about the «Centre», «Periphery» and «Semi-periphery». Naturally, all these notions are conventional to an extent: Albania and Chechnya, which are in Europe geographically, may be rather considered as belonging to the «Deep South» or extreme «Periphery», and Mauritius in Africa as a part of «Semi-periphery» or the «East». We shall deem Africa a part of the «South» or «Deep South», though knowing that the continent is extremely heterogeneous and there are notable foci of the «West» or «Centre» in the RSA and less considerable ones in, e.g., Egypt or Tunisia, as well as there are elements of the «Deep South» in the most developed countries of the continent.

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**Normative Societies
and Criminal Shadow Communities:
Cultural Interaction**

The concepts of shadow economy and political corruption, as well as the definitions of criminal business, criminal society, criminal state, etc., which are close to them, bear an indelible imprint of normative-legal discourse, which emphasises legitimate examples of behaviour and basic values and principles of activity. The essential sign of shadow economy and politics is their exit outside the legal field. The picture of real relations between «shadow businessmen» and the official society acquires the character of fierce oppositions: legal authority vs. illegal one, law and order system vs. criminal community, law vs. utter outlawry, etc.

It is quite obvious that this is a definite model construction, which (1) is inherent to the regulative system of the society, which dualizes reality by definition; (2) is based on an axiological tradition of modern civilisation with its ideal-typical examples of civil society and civil identity, law-based state, liberal democracy, corporate business ethics and rational bureaucratic organisation as the basis of state government and state-official relations in democratic countries.

This tradition as an archetype of modern civil consciousness makes it impossible to even raise the question about connection between and, the more so, merger of official and «shadow» communities with antagonistically opposite and qualitatively different meanings of social vs. asocial or normal vs. abnormal [1].

However, contemporary transitional societies, including the post-Soviet Russian reality, absolutely do not fit this model. The relations between legal and illegal businesses, legitimate and shadow authorities, normative and criminal communities assume the form continuous and multifaceted mutual influence of opposite principles of social organisation rather than rigid confrontation. This interaction may and should be considered not merely casual informal partnership between business and

authorities, legal and criminal worlds but an integral (encompassing the whole socius) cultural situation. Its essence is relocation, elimination and merger of opposite approaches to standards and values (social vs. asocial, civilised vs. barbaric) and the senses that accompany them. To present this situation as a model (with regard for the sophisticated and non-linear character of modern market transformations in peripheral societies), the following aspects require attention. Firstly, the scope of expansion of shadow economy and corruption, their connection with neo-liberal reforms in the regions, where the reformers ignore the socio-cultural basis of the society, its civilisational features and the experience of the cultural and historical development. Secondly, relocation of and change in the social roles, which ensure rapprochement and integration of the legal and criminal shadow communities, the content and main direction of this process. Thirdly, the influence of such changes on the relations between the society and the state. Fourthly, the place of these changes in the general process of social transformation in transitional societies. Let me consider these aspects in detail.

1. Undoubtedly, the global role of the shadow alias-informal sector (first of all, in creating jobs) increases. This is an uneven process, especially from the viewpoint of the share of this sector in the GDP in different regions. Its share in world economy is estimated at 5–10% of the GDP. In Africa it reaches 30% and in Russia 40% or even more. It is clear that a society where over a third of the GDP is created outside legal economy reaches a transformation threshold beyond which legal methods of social reproduction yield to illegitimate, «shadow», partly criminal methods. If I add that «shadow» economy develops in peripheral countries in parallel with criminal communities and political corruption, it becomes clear that «asocial» behaviour far exceeds the boundaries of marginal periphery of a large socius and criminal niches and zones.

The concept of «sector of informal economic activity» does not any longer reflect social reality and conditions of its transformation, because the relations it generates become a significant factor of social development, influence socialisation of a sizeable part of the population or even of its majority, form ethno-social balances and counterbalances and define cultural semantics and value orientations at the boundary of large (normative) culture and peripheral subcultures, including criminal milieu.

In Russia this offensive of social periphery becomes avalanche-like owing to commercialisation of budget relations and mechanisms (including non-budget funds), i.e., «fraudulent rotation» of budget and non-budget assets in commercial banks, as well as non-civilised forms of monetary circulation (various surrogates of money, barter deals, mutual offset) and general crisis of civilised (formal-rational) organisation of economic and financial life. The discrepancy between official figures and data on real (shadow) economic and financial flows becomes irrational: the data of the State Committee for Statistics on gross accumulation of fixed assets are incomparable with investment reports submitted by enterprises; the interest rate in banks exceeds the profitability rate quoted in these reports several times; quotation of money surrogates sharply decreases relative to the nominal value immediately after their issuance, which makes it possible to conceal illegal financial operations; a sizeable part of salary funds is paid in hidden forms.

The scope of political corruption in many countries (especially in Africa and the post-Soviet space) also exceeds its usual boundaries, which imply bureaucracy's evasion of public control and non-observation of political neutrality; state officials derive illegal incomes from their official positions or use them to conceal illegal activities. As Yuri Boldyrev said, the logic of the functioning of Russian authorities «consists of attempts not to create anything but to transfer the «pieces» of state property that have not yet been privatised to one's «own people» on special, privileged, exceptional conditions, while other citizens live at a totally unacceptable standard... Corruption was allowed consciously or even stimulated in the lower and middle echelons of the state machinery in the recent years. On the one hand, it is a hidden mechanism of real management; on the other, it is a method of ensuring an official's security and irremovability by weakening and disintegrating of the society and moral degradation of its citizens». [2]

2. Given this scope of shadow economy and political corruption, they acquire a socius-forming function due to the objective logic of resource movement and distribution and formation and realisation of social interests. As this process gains momentum, creating an economic and political space for itself, it leads inevitably to relocation and redistribution of social positions and roles between the official society and criminal shadow communities. This transformation is facilitated by weakness or

lack of self-organisation traditions in a large socius. On the other hand, this process is impossible without general or partial recoding of senses, standards and values of a large society and culture after they struck roots during modernisations in the form of etatist models of the social set-up or peripheral versions of civil society.

Similar mechanisms of eliminating normative confrontation between the social and state structures and narrow local groups, which undermine the normative order, is observed at the opposite poles of the peripheral development in a large society, if it relies on a strong etatist tradition (Russia) or is represented by borrowed from the outside or imitative institutions of modern society (Tropical Africa).

The masses obviously perceive neo-liberal reforms attaching a distorted sense to these opposite elements or orders. The social or state elements acquire the sense of «official» and are associated with «bureaucratic» elements, deemed «alien to the people's interests» (post-Soviet Russia), or with «postcolonial», «authoritarian» and «dictatorial» elements (Tropical Africa). Narrow group interests, as well as purely vested ones, are identified in both regions with «democratic» interests of «collective importance», with «people's interests». As a result, the senses of principally different types of communities are bifurcated, which makes it possible to mutually identify and mutually convert them: a large society is equalised with a community (group, estate, caste, ethnos) of the ruling class, while a narrow group or local interests acquire the sense of «mass democratic phenomenon with collective importance». These opposite attitudes are united by cult of personality, i.e., of a hero who is supposed to work miracles in exchange to loyalty and adoration (tribal chiefs and sheikhs in Africa and eminent politicians in the post-Soviet Russia).

In their turn, mediators are divided into interrelated equivalent images: saviours vs. criminals; martyrs vs. deceivers and rogues; fighters against criminals vs. heavy guys, etc. Thus, a logic model forms, eliminating the contradiction between permissible and impermissible behaviour (e.g., the standards and practice of the functioning of state authority), between genuine and false values, between the values cherished personally and formally. Reaching a definite level, this semantic transformation of the confrontation between «social» and «asocial elements» leads to a semantic shift in the cultural space of a large socius. Imper-

sonal social roles and functions, which characterise it, begin to be evaluated in the terms of personal (archetypical in their origin) attitude to a man of one's own vs. an alien man, while the personal aspect of these roles is fading into the society's background. This shift is especially tangible when, to use an expression coined by I.G. Yakovenko, the society is affected by the «jail disease» [3]. This phenomenon with its semantic ambivalence (fear and attraction) discloses the deep subconscious motive of this rearrangement: revival of mental-cultural models of an archaic nature and with syncretic internal connections, which unite personality and its social role, an individual and a group («I» and «we»), a group and a leader, a leader and group identity symbols in an indissoluble alliance.

Naturally, the preconditions of re actualisation of mass consciousness syncretism require an unstable social position of an individual and his group and general destabilisation of the semantic sphere of social life and the system of the values the society cherishes, combined with the development of the informal milieu of interpersonal relations. However, only revival of socio-cultural syncretism lends an integral character to the fusion of formal and informal relations and permits unlimited progress of this phenomenon.

The direction of this process (replacement of rational concepts about one's own identity by archetypical models of world perception) is opposite to that of modernist trends towards the formation of depersonalised relations within market economy, civil society, law-based state, which are oriented towards an abstract human being rather than a real one. Revival of syncretism is inevitable when peripheral societies are forcedly involved in the global system of economic and financial flows, where transnational capital dominates, and anonymous authority of international financial structures and organisations replaces the state's regulative functions.

3. Re-actualisation of cultural syncretism makes a destructive impact on the relations between a large socius and modern (perfect) state. It leads to revival of the pre-capitalist type of the relations between the state and society, when political authority is an attribute of ownership of land, privileged estates and castes and ethnic origin of the society members. Degenerative archaised relations, based on the fusion between authority and ownership, an individual and a group, replace the relations

and standards of civil society. The condition and result of this fusion is privatisation of the state by oligarchic groups of politicians, topmost bureaucrats and business elite.

This conclusion is confirmed by the malfunction of the whole system of relations between the state and privatised and semi-privatised enterprises, noted by Russian scholars [4]. These relations fit neither the civilised corporative model nor the pluralist scheme of interaction between interest groups and the state, because they have neither a firm legal basis (standard rules of the game, which apply to everybody) nor a system of institutions to ensure this interaction.

The real relations form either according to the model of patronage-clientele relations, established at the personal, group and status levels [5], or within clan structures, which emerge when the interests of mutual advantage and aid not only are common to the group members but induce them to maintain insularity and seclusion of these relations. Corporatism is limited to the interaction between the state and financial oligarchy, based on co-ordination of group interests. The content of oligarchic corporatism (definition by S.P. Peregudov [6]) is not a compromise between the interests of a group and those of the state but striving of both parties to get maximum political rent, based on exceptional rights for extraction and sale of mineral or other resources, privileged tariffs, quotas, licences, privileges in pricing, financing of expensive projects and the system of state favouritism on the whole [7].

Therefore, there are all reasons to agree with I.G. Yakovenko, who concluded that, «contrary to liberal illusions», the post-Soviet society «is degenerating into a criminal bureaucratic oligarchy of the Latin American type» [8]. It may be added that patronage-clientele relations are actively used by ethnocratic regimes in the post-Soviet states. They also form in some non-Russian republics of the Russian Federation and monopolise political and economic resources of their territories. There is certain similarity between them and political clans in Africa [9].

4. From the viewpoint of regularities of the transformation of transitional societies, expansion of shadow economy and political corruption, as well as merger of business, political authority and criminal communities are multifaceted phenomena, which hardly can be reduced to versions of Oriental bureaucratic or any other capitalism. The phenomenon of social destruction must be connected with non-linearity of social evo-

lution, which can combine quite different trajectories and chronology types of social movement, as well as with fragmentation of social and world development.

Essentially, this is reproduction of archaic (archetypical) models of consciousness and culture in a modernised social milieu. Re-actualisation of these models as a very important part of socio-cultural crisis simultaneously means transformation of cultural syncretism in the modern global information milieu under influence of political and information technologies. (One can define this process as transformation of archaism into developing neo-archaism, whose bright manifestation is contemporary political mythology, conscious manipulation of images and senses of the politically unconscious milieu.)

Undoubtedly, merger of shadow economy, the state and criminal communities shows an involutinal trend, related to erosion of the civil society structures and weakening of centralised state institutions and of the role of modern law. Self-organisation of revived archaised structures takes place within the framework of this trend. Its directions and results also may vary. According to I.G. Yakovenko, «purely parasitic state spontaneous criminal activity of state officials of the Soviet epoch has got past a certain point and has given rise to the monstrous and criminal state, but it *is a state*... “self-alooftness of which from social regulation results in its transfer to mafia. This process legitimises organised criminal activity in the population's eyes, expands its social basis and pushes the society to the path towards a deadlock... A classical gang strives to occupy the place of the *structure-forming element* in the social system. The prospects of development in this direction are such that only affiliation to a criminal group will determine an individual's status and give him at least some guarantees of acceptable existence”. [10]

A.I. Neklessa notes trends towards destructive development, which underlie «a large-scale meta-regional (and potentially global) involution community». These trends rely on major deformations of the social organisation in the Deep South countries (such as Afghanistan, Somalia, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, etc.), which create «algorithms of neo-archaic and quasi-economic activity of their own», «on a network of islets of transit statehood and trans-territorial criminal consortia» and on phenomena of degradation in some regions of the industrial society [12]. Whereas I.G. Yakovenko detects a «movement towards integration into

the society» in the logic of development of new archaised communities, A.I. Neklessa attributes this development rather to the «parallel world of anti-history».

However, «destructive development» may also be interpreted as a «backward development» related to relying on imperatively preset development criteria, which is similar to inversion relations preset by the complex of superiority of the receiving culture over the society that initiates changes [13].

It is of principal importance that the archaic or neo-archaic foundation of cultural syncretism may become a basis for the development of new socio-cultural mechanisms of maintaining and transforming group identity. Archaization of spatio-temporal concepts about the environment may be combined with the formation of positive regional identity and substantiation of legitimacy of a political system or regime [14].

Thus, under current conditions the sophisticated context of relations between the «social and asocial elements» acquires a historical and cultural dynamics of its own, which may be simultaneously civilisational and anti-civilisational, evolutionary and involutional. It is related to global market transformations but independent in its cultural and mental sources and mechanisms.

Notes

1. The manifestations of asocial behaviour have a clear-cut connotation with the meaning of «barbar», «barbaric». According to I.G. Yakovenko, it «is born in the bosom of civilisation to denote qualitatively different human being, contrasted with civilisation. This meaning has become a stable image, which concentrates a specific set of acutely negative features, related to social dis-adaptation, aggressive attitude to the state, cruelty, disdain for human life and cultural values, etc.» (*И.Г. Яковенко. Цивилизация и варварство в истории России. Статья 1. Варварство: социологическая модель (Civilisation and Barbarism in History of Russia. 1. Barbarism: a Sociological Model). – Общественные науки и современность, 1995. № 4. С. 66).*

2. From Y. Boldyrev's speech at the round table discussion on Combating Corruption in Russia, organised by the Council for foreign and defence policy under the Strategy for Russia programme on October 14, 1999. See Независимая газета. 15.10.1999.

3. *И.Г. Яковенко. Цивилизация и варварство в истории России. Статья 4. Государственная власть и «блатной мир» (Civilisation and Barbarism in History of Russia. 4. State Authority and the «Flash World»). – Общественные науки и современность, 1996. № 4. С. 90).*

4. С.П. Перегудов. Новый российский корпоративизм: олигархический или демократический? (New Russian Corporatism: Oligarchic or Democratic?). – *Полития*, 1998. № 2. С. 109.
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9. Современная Африка. Итоги и перспективы развития. Эволюция политических структур (Contemporary Africa. Results and Prospects of Development. Evolution of Political Structures). М., 1990. С. 2–8.
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11. Глобальное сообщество. Новая система координат (подходы к проблеме) (Global Community. New System of Coordinates (Approaches to the Problem)). СПб., «Алетейя», 2000. С. 51–53.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Е.П. Терин. Инверсия как реактивный тип общественного развития (Inversion as a Reactive Type of Social Development). – Проблема социокультурных инверсий. Сборник научных трудов (Problem of Sociocultural Inversions. A Collection of Scholarly Works). Саратов, 1997. С. 57–65.
14. В.Д. Нечаев. Региональный миф в политической культуре современной России (Regional Myth in the Political Culture of Modern Russia). М., 1999. С. 136–137; Т.В. Евгеньева. Миф в политической культуре современной России (Myth in the Political Culture of Modern Russia). – Новая Россия: социальные и политические мифы. Материалы Российской межвузовской научной конференции, 26–27 ноября 1999 г. (New Russia: Social and Political Myths. Papers of the Intercollegiate Scholarly Conference. November 26–27, 1999). М., 1999. С. 6–8.

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**Internet and Africa:
Lagging Behind or Bridging the Gap?**

(Based on I.O. Abramova and D.V. Polikanov book:
Internet and Africa: Parallel Realities. Moscow, 2001.)

While concepts of the post-industrial world and information society are acquiring realistic outline nowadays, it is becoming increasingly important to analyse the results of the rapid and sometimes uncontrolled progress of information technologies. The development of the worldwide Internet computer network has far-reaching economic, political, and social consequences. Given free access to knowledge and experience of different nations and generations, the traditional perceptions of limits, freedom, and creative work transform, spatial limitations and cultural differences are being overcome, and this provides unprecedented opportunities for the advancement of the world (including Africa) economic development, on the one hand. But on the other hand, the development of Internet is fraught with such dangers as strengthening of the state control over personality, putting into use such practices as brainwashing, «information espionage» and «informational weapon», loss of ethnic and cultural identities as a consequence of globalisation and monopolisation of the information space by one or several states. Alongside with the potential for strengthening the planet's integrity and for increasing the level of international co-ordination for the solution of global problems, the rapid growth of information technologies threatens to insulate technologically, financially, and intellectually underdeveloped countries from the information revolution.

The development of Internet technologies is a topical problem for the countries at the periphery of the world economy and in the grip of social and economic upheavals. They have to determine promptly the priorities of their developmental strategy. This refers particularly to African countries whose experience in the field might be helpful for other transitional societies, including Russia.

What is the Africa's position in the nascent sphere of technological and informational interface?

By November 2000 all the 54 African states had had permanent porting to Internet and local providers offering the whole range of services. This marked a serious breakthrough in the spread of information technologies, as in 1996 only 11 countries had had access to the world-wide web, and in the early 2000 several countries of the continent still lacked an independent access to it.

It is worth noting, however, that in Africa Internet has basically concentrated in the capital cities, though the number of states with 'presence points' in other cities is growing (*e.g.* there are such points in more than 100 South African cities). Rural areas are less included in the world web yet, owing to both high prices for the services and the necessity to contact a provider in the capital or another big city. The total quantity of host computers (except in South Africa) is about 25,000–30,000. With the calculation procedure allowance, this is comparable to the number of host computers in Latvia populated by about two and a half million people only. Apparently, this quantity is not sufficient for the continent inhabited by the 1/7th of the world population. Great hopes are pinned on the development of Internet in Nigeria which may have the same effect as it has in China or India: under such low percentage of users, their absolute value can change the overall picture of information technologies' distribution in the region.

There are different estimations of the Internet population in Africa, with figures varying from 1 million to 3 million users. The number of African providers' clients that get access to Internet through commuted lines is the most reliable. Their number amounts to 1 million, of which 650,000 reside in South Africa, 200,000 in North Africa, and 150,000 in other states of the continent. In other words, one African out of 250 enjoys the access to Internet. This is little in comparison with the average figure for the whole world (1 user out of 35 people); and a negligibly small figure if one looks at the respective proportion in North America and Europe (1 out of 3), though the figure for Africa is higher than the one for South Asia (1 out of 2,500). Besides, the figure of active Internet users in many countries is just about a hundred of people, while only in eleven African states, namely: Ghana, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tunisia, Uganda, and South Africa over 5,000 users have providers. South Africa has the most developed Internet system in the south of the continent, while Malawi and Lesotho are at the bottom of the list, Tunisia leads in the north followed by Egypt and Morocco. In Eastern Africa Internet is most widely spread in Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania and Ethiopia and shares the second

place (the spread of Internet here is attributed to the activities and assistance of a great many of international organisations. Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon, and Gabon are leading in Western Africa while Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are lagging behind. Among insular states Mauritius and the Seychelles are ahead. The weakest spot in Africa is the central sub-region.

For the majority of users the main way of connecting Internet is an access to commuted lines, therefore the problem of telecommunications is of primary importance. By the International Union of Electric Communication's data, the average density of the network in Africa is about two telephone lines per one hundred people with the annual growth at the 8 percent level. It should also be taken into account that the geographic spread of telephones is approximately the same as that of Internet: a major part is concentrated in Southern and Northern Africa while in Tropical Africa the density hardly reaches the 0.5 percent mark.

The cost of Internet services also remains high, about \$50-60 for five hours of work in the net per month. In the countries where the calls payment is per minute, expenditures for the telephone raise up to 40 percent of the total sum an Internet user pays.

According to different estimations, by early 2000, there had been from 300 to 450 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in Africa. Seven countries: Egypt, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Tanzania, South Africa had ten or more providers each, and in twenty African states there had been only one provider for a whole country. This may be explained not only by novelty of business, scantiness of the users base, and scarcity of provider's potential income but also by state policy. For example, in Ethiopia and Mauritius the provider's monopoly is officially established, what is a current practice in other countries with small Internet services market.

At the same time, African mass media commercialise cyberspace at a brisk pace. Sites of 120 African magazines and newspapers, two thirds of which are published in Tropical Africa, are available for Internet users. Naturally, the countries represented better are those in which information technologies are advanced higher. These countries are Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Many of these editions are updated daily, have archives of back numbers for several recent years. Among all-continental news services Inter Press Service (IPS) and Pan-African Information Agency (PANA) are worth distinguishing.

Comparing the development of Internet in Africa with other parts of the world, *e.g.* in the U.S.A., one could say that Africa also rests upon Universities as a vehicle of technical progress. Unfortunately, the range of users is limited to faculty, staff and sometimes graduate students while broad undergraduate students' audience is not connected to Internet due to the high cost for the access to the net.

The use of cybercafes, setting of parked to the net computers at schools, in libraries, hospitals, police stations, telephone centres, and hotels is becoming the second specific feature of Internet in Africa. This permits sharing expenditures among many users, what makes access to the global cyberspace moderately priced for them.

The profile of a typical African user also corresponds to that all over the world: this is a young man with secondary or higher education and well off. Many Internet services are still inaccessible for population of the continent; the most popular service is electronic mail.

Though all the African states had had permanent connection to Internet by November 2000, the further expansion of the network on the continent would be very slow in the near future.

First, the problem is in the «digital divide» *i.e.* in difference in the levels of access to information technologies and communications (personal computers, host computers, fax machines, mobile telephones, telecommunications) among various groups of population within countries, regions, and the world as a whole.

Africa is one of the continents that suffer most because of the «digital divide». First of all, this refers to the development of telecommunications that are not only inaccessible in some parts of Africa but also are not reliable. Connections interrupt easily what is inadmissible at using some attachments, for example at making banking transactions or participating in online auctions. Even accounts sin against the true sums and are not always sent to proper addresses. Expenditures for laying one telephone line in Africa are about \$ 4,500 what is three times higher than an average rate and reveals low effectiveness of investments.

High rate of population growth (from 2 to 3 percent per year) also influences the state's opportunities to provide the citizens' access to the Internet and telephone connection.

Financial resources of Africans are also very limited. According to the African Development Bank statistics, by the year 2000 nearly half of the population had lived in absolute poverty and about 30 percent were classified as destitute, having not more than \$1 daily. In the countries like Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Ethiopia the price of monthly

access to Internet makes from 70 to 120 percent of annual GDP per person.

It goes without saying that high rate of illiteracy (40 percent of the adult population) also contributes to small scale of the Internet audience in Africa. Another factor of the kind is that there are few computer users in African countries (there are 15 scientists and engineers per million citizens in Nigeria, 24 in Rwanda, 55 in Central African Republic; only in South Africa and Egypt this index forms 938 and 458 people correspondingly). It would have been naive to expect that the mere setting of computers connected to Internet in every village would bring benefits. Hardly will appear many people capable to become proficient in the technique on their own having primary or secondary education only.

In the majority of African countries clear and consistent national Internet development programs are still absent. However, what is really important is not the scope of the respective projects but their eventual effectiveness and correspondence to the continent's needs. In general, the state's task is to create a favourable climate for introduction of innovations and to guarantee the population equal opportunities for access to Internet.

An African net information centre has not been established yet, though this idea has been under discussion for already several years: there have been problems with choosing a state for the centre's headquarters and an organisation that could be responsible for its operation.

There are serious grounds to suppose that cyberspace and accompanying technical means may be used for the sake of making access to African intellectual and material resources easier and for providing ideological dominance of developed countries. Internet can give a powerful impetus to all the aspects of globalisation and to perpetuate the position of Africa as a periphery of the world development. In these terms the necessity of decentralising management in the telecommunications sphere and of encouraging private initiative are debated quite often. All this can result in strengthening competition, making the range of the offered services wider, and in putting prices down for the eventual user. The necessity of regional integration is worth taking into consideration as well, for bigger markets, for example, will be more attractive for competing investors. The attraction of major international financial organisations like World Bank, UNESCO, ECA, African Development Bank is also possible. For example, it is suggested that Development banks could apportion 1 or 2 percent of their annual net profit for financing innovation programs in the African countries.

Thus, it is too early to speak about full and equal integration of Africa into the system of international information exchange. This continent still is on the level of mentality characteristic of the industrial society, and is a passive consumer, rather than producer of information within the proper information space, what makes Africa especially vulnerable under the globalisation conditions.

Eventually the question arises: is it really necessary for Africa to develop Internet technologies if the majority of population will not be able to derive benefit from their use in the next decade? In our opinion, a radical «Internet pessimism» with regards to Africa could be unneeded extremes. Online access to information about markets, standards and terms, prices and potential buyers, participation in electronic trade will allow the African continent to play a more deserving part in the international division of labour. Internet promotes the reform of financial system, perfection of bank accounts, makes tax collection and public security control easier, increases the effectiveness of medical services, forms preconditions for lifetime training by means of extramural courses available through the world web. Thanks to electronic means of communication, Africans' professional services can be rendered irrespective of distances. Qualified personnel from African countries that can fulfil work through Internet increases its chances for hunting jobs and considerable raise in salaries. Information technologies contribute to environment protection, *e.g.* by organising permanent monitoring of the state of atmosphere and water resources. Internet opens new opportunities in the sphere of interface between different peoples and cultures, transforms the role of the state enhancing its capabilities to mobilise resources and to use actively new economic and political technologies. At the same time the limpidity of proper power structures is increasing in the course of states' inclusion into the cyberspace, because the public is being better informed about discussions and decision-making mechanism which undermines the foundations of corruption.

Naturally, connection to Internet is fraught with such dangers as reinforcement of competition, which not all African companies can withstand, as the threat of «informational dependence» up to losing of national property and social achievements of the period of independence, in the result of unreasoned renunciation of state regulation in the sphere of communications and economy on the whole. However, all these problems are solvable at rational use of the means received and well thought-out informational policy of the state. Such factors as fast reduction of prices on computer software and a high percent of young people in Af-

rica (more easily taught and more receptive to technological innovations) inspire optimism, too. International programs of support like the UN development program of connecting African countries to Internet, the project of establishing the Regional African System of Sputnik Communications (RASCOM), and the establishment of the Africa One net that will connect African countries by fiber-optic submerged cable with each other and with the rest of the world, would be exceptionally helpful for Africa in its introduction to informational space.

Thus, with purposeful and consistent efforts aimed at using technical progress achievements (reduction of prices on modern technologies and rapid depreciation of technical means growing obsolete but still in use), Africa can make a leap and partially overcome the “digital divide” in physical and financial access to Internet and information space. However, all this will not eliminate unequal conditions for information exchange, unless African states become generators of ideas rather than mere information consumers in cyberspace. Only in this case mutually profitable electronic business is possible, as well as considerable increase of educational level and corresponding cultural development on the African continent. Otherwise, a new form of dependency and a sort of «informational neo-colonialism» will be established when Internet technologies will only redouble the peripheral position of the region.

Summing up, it would be fair to say that the future of Africa is with her youth, which is more receptive to technological innovations, to Internet and can master it, having basic educational level for doing it. The new generation will have to live in informational society and just this generation is to contribute to cultural and economic development of Africa in the new century. Exactly upon it the fate of the continent, its future prosperity or stagnation depend nowadays. In the final analysis, the decision on how to make use of the benefits of communicational revolution and to minimise its negative effects, rests with the Africans.

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Is Russia in Need of Africa?

The future of Russia's economic development depends to a great extent on its integration into the world economy. However, it would be ridiculous to think that the character and scope of the integration process depend only on the co-operation with the USA and other Western partners. In the present situation we should look at this problem wider and use all available economic opportunities. One of them is related to the African market with its huge potential. According to the US expert appraisal, it is the most promising among the markets of the developing world.

In the first years of reforms our relations with the African countries were subject to sweeping negation. For some political reasons they were interpreted in a biased and subjective manner. The description of the Soviet policy in Africa as only an attribute of the Cold War is an obvious absurd. True, the USSR demonstrated solidarity with the national liberation movement and tried to involve many African countries in the sphere of its ideological influence, stressing alleged incompatibility of their interests with those of their parent states. Yes, there were too optimistic forecasts concerning our African partners' socio-economic development. These countries were recipients of Soviet aid aimed at the development of their economies. However, it also was a method of expanding our participation in the international division of labour and enhancing efficiency of our foreign trade by large-scale export of machines and equipment.

Now, when many data on the Soviet-African trade and economic relations have been partly forgotten, it seems appropriate to remind of some purposes of Russia's co-operation with Africa, while many countries have celebrated the 40th anniversary of their independence.

It is well known that fuel and power are necessary prerequisites of any national economy. Russia's co-operation with many African countries, such as Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Somalia, Zambia, Guinea etc., began with helping them in building power plants. Soviet experts took part in the construction of some 30 such plants with a total capacity of 2.9 mln kW. The largest of them was the Aswan integrated power plant,

one of the best multipurpose hydro-technical projects in the world, which still gives Egypt valuable advantages.

Given appropriate conditions, the Soviet Union helped African countries in building ferrous (with a capacity of 4.4 mln tons) and non-ferrous (166 thsd tons of aluminium) metallurgical plants, oil refineries (three plants with a total capacity of 2.6 mln tons), metal engineering and metalworking enterprises (29 projects), etc.

Since agriculture is the main branch of African economy, the Soviet Union helped Africans in building enterprises for processing and storage of agricultural and animal products (about 40 projects), creating veterinary centres, etc.

Shortage of skilled workforce is an extremely acute problem of the countries that begin independent development. To solve it, the Soviet Union took part in creating 99 various training centres in 15 African countries, training of local personnel at joint projects and Soviet enterprises. African youth also received higher and secondary special education in the USSR.

The Soviet Union co-operated with African countries, first of all, in the key industries. In addition, in the 1960s and 1970s were established close relations with them in the spheres of science, culture, health care, art, tourism and sports.

After the disintegration of the USSR in 1991 the earlier model of foreign trade underwent a cardinal demolition. The voluntarist attempts to turn foreign trade and economic co-operation to the market track overnight resulted in a sharp decrease in the trade turnover and truncation of the co-operation in investment to a negligible level. The volume of the Russian-African trade fell to \$740 mln by 1994 against 2.7 bln in 1990. It was the lowest level after the African countries attained independence. The plans of Russia's participation in 300 new projects (in addition to 300 existing ones) were cancelled.

This downfall was not caused by a single reason. It was a result of a complex of circumstances related to political and economic changes in Russia. The most important factor was the revision of the foreign policy priorities, which manifested itself in a drastic change of preferences in favour of co-operation with the West to the detriment of all relations, including economic co-operation, with the earlier allies and friends.

In the Soviet past the function of an efficient tool of foreign economic policy, which determined its geographical preferences and structure of export and import, was performed by state organisations (associations) for foreign trade, which worked under the guidance of the central party

bodies and government agencies. Demonopolisation of foreign trade and decentralisation of trade management were important factors of the changes in priorities. The markets of the Western and adjacent countries proved more attractive to Russian entrepreneurs.

Further, Russian ill-thought withdrawal from the African arms market also adversely affected its trade with this continent. Arms trade was an essential component of the USSR's relations with Africa.

Let me mention some other factors of the degradation of the Russian-African economic interaction: lack of real state support for Russian exporters; their unpreparedness for rigid competition with Western companies (partly caused by ignorance or poor knowledge of the local market, African consumers' tastes, economic situation in the partner countries, poor understanding of the role of advertisement, especially based on the demonstration of the export goods); considerable difficulties in the transportation of export and import cargoes, caused by loss of many ex-Soviet ports; underdevelopment of the banking system and difficulties in effecting payments; absence of due (in keeping with the new realities) legal basis of Russia's trade with Africa. One more adverse factor was closure of Russian embassies and trade representations in several African countries and redundancy of the employees in charge of trade and economic co-operation in the existing embassies.

Notably, Russian businessmen have not yet established firm direct contacts with their African partners. As a result, almost all trade operations are effected through international dealers, and the Russian party not only misses a part of profit but prevents its partners from demonstrating their real capacities, enhancing efficiency of trade and expanding mutually advantageous trade.

The mediatorial mechanism applied usually in deals with Russian importers is extremely primitive. A dealer with a good knowledge of the local conditions gives an African producer a credit at a high interest rate. The producer repays the advance by his products, exported by the creditor at lower prices than the proper producer can fix (since interest payment and the low wholesale prices imposed on the producer more than repay the dealer's costs). Thus, preferring trade through dealers, Russia helps them in conquering her market of consumer goods, willy-nilly creating barriers for direct trade with African producers.

The Russian businessmen who supply their products to Africa also prefer to rely on dealers, because they do not know (and seem sometimes reluctant to know) the local conditions, legislation, rules and traditions.

Ill-thought universal liberalisation of foreign trade yielded some more negative effects, which aggrieved Russia's relations with the African countries. I mean capital flight in disguise of founding joint venture; misappropriation of the state's property portrayed as debt settlement; uncontrolled speculations in pricing the goods exported by African countries against their foreign debts, etc.

In the Soviet period, stable trade and high share of industrial goods in exports were ensured by supplies of complete equipment for the projects realised under agreements on economic, scientific and technological co-operation between the USSR and African countries. Due to phasing out of the co-operation, the volume of such supplies has sharply decreased. Although the share of industrial goods in Russian export to Africa is much higher than that of to other regions, the share of raw materials and semi-finished goods tends to increase. Therefore, with the exception of arms trade, Russia is becoming a raw-materials-exporter rather than being an industrial power, even at the African market.

It would be unfair to assert that nothing at all was done in the post-Soviet period to reanimate Russian-African co-operation with regard for the changes that have occurred both in Russia and in African countries. Many of them started economic reforms somewhat earlier than Russia did. Both the federal government structures and the State Duma made (particularly in the recent years) certain attempts to preserve Russia's positions in Africa. However, they failed to take efficient measures aimed at the realisation of their undoubtedly correct intentions. It is enough to mention that whenever there was a necessity to demonstrate Russia's interest in contacts with African countries, the government agencies sent minor officials, who bore no responsibility for national affairs in that region, to negotiate and sign contracts. Up to March 2000, no Russian foreign minister found an opportunity to pay even a token visit to Africa.

Because of all these objective and (mostly) subjective reasons, the scope of Russian relations with the African countries is currently at low ebb. To restore them even on the earlier level would require putting a lot of efforts and being ready for huge costs.

The globalising world consists of two hundreds of states, a quarter of which are situated in Africa. Russia cannot maintain large-scale economic contacts with all of them. In addition, all segment of this vast market with a population rapidly approaching a billion cannot be equally interesting to Russia. 54 states of that continent form an intricate conglomeration of historically established diverse traditions, political attitudes and convictions, economic opportunities, traditional foreign trade

partners, etc. Therefore, a universal approach to all potential partners is unacceptable.

In this setting, Russia applies «selective diplomacy», trying to preserve a high level of trade and economic relations with the few priority countries. In North Africa, this group includes Egypt, Libya and Morocco, as well as Tunisia and Algeria. In sub-Saharan Africa, there are only three such countries, namely, Nigeria, Guinea and the Republic of South Africa.

This «selectivity» does not mean that all other countries are or are going to be outside the range of Russia's economic interests. For instance, Cote d'Ivoire was the most important supplier of cocoa beans to the Russian market and will, most probably, retain this capacity.

Russia strives to make its trade and economic co-operation with Africa mutually advantageous and lend more dynamism to them, thus regaining the opportunities lost after the beginning of reforms in the country. This intention became apparent in the recent years, and is manifested in the following:

1. The understanding of the importance of renewing the contractual and legal basis of trade and economic co-operation with African partners has become clearer than earlier. Various agreements on trade and co-operation have been signed with Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan, etc.

2. Intergovernmental commissions for trade and co-operation in economy, science and technology have resumed their activity.

3. The functioning of the trade representations that survived in some countries has improved.

4. The projects of the Soviet-African co-operation built earlier are considered potential consumers of Russian machines and equipment and sites of co-operation in science and technology.

5. The expenses for training African students and post-graduates in Russia have somewhat increased.

6. The idea of unilateral cessation of the military co-operation with African countries has been recognised untenable and stupid.

7. African countries have facilitated access to the continent for Russian private capital, which demonstrates interest in the African market. For instance, South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria organised business forums for Russian and African businessmen in 1995-1999.

All this made it possible to reanimate Russian-African trade. Its total turnover was \$980 mln in 1995, 1.094 mln in 1996, 1.098 mln in 1997

and 1.408 mln in 1998 (see table, based on the data of the State customs committee of the Russian Federation.

	Exports				Imports			
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1995	1996	1997	1998
Africa	718.5	767.9	762.1	1,000.3	262.0	326.3	335.5	407.7
Algeria	120.1	110.3	75.2	99.4	65.5	21.4	7.1	83.7
Angola	3.6	15.9	21.4	28.2	n.a.	n.a.
Cote d'Ivoire	...	2.2	8.3	16.0	37.8	83.7	89.0	82.8
Egypt	393.6	387.8	438.8	399.1	37.1	83.7	89.0	82.8
Ethiopia	0.9	13.4	5.0	21.4	n.a.
Guinea	0.6	1.6	4.8	0.8	34.2	76.5	41.3	50.7
Morocco	66.4	35.1	46.5	46.1	4.9	13.9	26.2	66.1
Nigeria	11.5	9.1	14.4	32.3	4.1	7.2	8.2	7.2
RSA	15.5	22.3	26.6	21.9	68.1	59.4	98.4	51.8
Tunisia	59.3	20.9	60.1	37.9	2.2	2.5	2.6	3.8

Data in 000.000 US Dollars; «0» negligible value; «...» no data

Proceeding from these data, one can note the following trends.

Firstly, Russia's main African trade partners are ten countries (18.5% of the total), which accounted for 82.9% of the average weighted export of Russian goods to Africa in 1995–1998 and 81.8% of import of African goods to Russia. Four of them (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia) accounted for 73.7% of export and 31.4% of import. In other words, the bulk of export was directed to North Africa, and the bulk of import was from Sub-Saharan Africa.

The major Sub-Saharan suppliers of goods to the Russian market are Guinea (bauxites) and Cote d'Ivoire (cocoa beans). The RSA is a relatively new partner. Russian businessmen can purchase a variety of products there, but for the time being they prefer foodstuffs and consumer goods.

Secondly, the main countries where Russian exporters earn hard currency are in North Africa. In 1995–1998 their earnings amounted to \$2,396.6 mln, of which \$418.5 mln were offset by import. These countries will continue to play the leading role in Russian-African trade. There are several objective prerequisites for this: comparatively short distance, which considerably reduces the cost of transportation; Russian businessmen's relatively vast experience in North Africa's market development; acquaintance of Arab consumers with Russian goods; old business and personal contacts between Russian and North African busi-

nessmen; relatively wide contractual and legal basis of mutual trade; positive experience of economic co-operation; necessity of maintenance of existing projects built with the Soviet Union's aid and possibility to erect new ones.

Thirdly, the leading place in trade with Russia among these countries belongs to Egypt. There are all reasons to believe that this situation will not change in the foreseeable future. Russia has signed new agreements with this country concerning trade, co-operation in science and technology, debt settlement between the Russian Federation as the legal successor of the USSR and Egypt, promotion and mutual protection of investments, co-operation in the sphere of marine transport and prevention of double taxation. The Russian party submitted a draft long-term programme of the development of trade, economic, industrial, scientific and technological co-operation and constituent documents of the Russian-Egyptian Council for business co-operation.

In addition, both countries have solved important problems of financing their mutual trade. Russian Mezhkombank has established correspondence relations with seven Egyptian banks, including the National Bank, Bank of Cairo, Egyptian-English Bank and Misr Bank.

In addition to Russian enterprises, which have received the right for independent foreign trade operations, many areas and republics of the Russian Federation demonstrate interest in the Egyptian market. Many of them take part in the annual Cairo international fair and other exhibitions and fairs held in Egypt. Russian producers are attracted by their Egyptian partners' interest in importing a variety of machines, equipment, means of transportation and other industrial equipment, as well as consumer goods.

When the Soviet-Egyptian co-operation flourished, machines and equipment accounted for at least 50% of the USSR export to Egypt. One of the features of Russia's present trade is preservation of a high share of these items (one third) in the total export. Russia supplies aircrafts, helicopters, navigation and radar equipment, VAZ cars, KAMAZ trucks, Ural dumpers and motorcycles, tractors, diesel engines for vessels, communication facilities etc. The Aviastar production association succeeded in winning the contract for supplying TU-204-120s airliners to Egypt. The Egyptian party financed installation of PB-211-535 engines (Rolls Roys, Britain) and US-made aviation equipment in those aircrafts. Egypt has already purchased three aircrafts and is going to acquire five more. In total, the contract provides for supply of 15 planes of this type

to be used on the African routes. When certified in Europe and Asia, they will fly between Egypt and these continents.

In addition to machines, equipment and means of transportation, Russian exporters supply many types of raw materials and semi-finished goods to Egypt. For instance, Russian slabs and blooms (semi-finished goods of ferrous metals) account for 55% of the Egyptian import of these goods, veneer for 43%, paper for 49%, coniferous timber for 16%, vinyl chloride polymers for 15%, etc.

In its turn, Egypt exports consumer goods to Russia, particularly foodstuffs (oranges account for 20% of this export). Egyptian businessmen are interested in expanding export of clothing, furniture, cotton fabric, perfumery, cosmetics and medicines produced in keeping with the world standards to our country.

Our economic relations with Egypt are not confined to commerce. They also include economic and technological co-operation in the reconstruction and modernisation of some projects built in the Soviet period, in particular, numerous projects in chemical industry, mining (development of methods, technical means and technologies for geophysical, geochemical and aerospace researches) and agriculture (perfection of the operation of reclamation and drainage systems).

The example of our relations with Egypt, which has become the leader in the Russian-African co-operation, is still incomparable with the character and scope of our trade and economic co-operation with other African countries. However, it convincingly demonstrates that Russia has something to offer at the African market. If our businessmen get an adequate financial and other support from the state, the results of their activity in not only Egypt but other countries will become much more tangible for Russian economy.

In 1998 Russian export to non-CIS countries amounted to \$58,951 mln and import therefrom to \$34,277 mln. Africa's respective shares in these amounts were 1.6% and 1%. This situation hardly corresponds to Russia's national interests. I think it is quite possible to gain much more notable effect by intensifying trade and economic co-operation with African countries as a result of a cardinal change in our foreign trade strategy. On the one hand, capacity of the African market is quite high to absorb our exports. In 1997 the countries of Africa imported machines and means of transportation to \$34 bln, other finished and semi-finished goods to \$25.4 bln (including rolled steel and other hardware to 5.9 bln, clothing to 2.1 bln, chemicals to 9.2 bln, mineral fuel to 5.0 bln, other raw materials to 5.3 bln, foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco to 13.8 bln).

There are also reasons to think that the economic growth whose signs are visible in Africa since the mid-1990s will generate a high demand for industrial goods. In 1998–1999 the African countries witnessed an increase in the GDP (3.6% and 3.8%) that was higher than even in Latin America (2.5% and 1.5%).

On the other hand, African countries are extremely interested in opening new markets for their goods and pin great hopes on Russia in this respect. This enables us to purchase many kinds of raw materials, foodstuff, etc. at the prices that are lower than those imposed by monopolist dealers.

Skilful use of favourable premises to expand economic co-operation with Africa is a good chance for Russia to occupy a quite promising niche in a large segment of the world market.

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Kingdom without State?

(Max Weber on Bureaucracy, and the 13th – 19th Centuries Benin)

The interregnum of the second half of the 12th century resulted not only in the Second (*Oba*) Dynasty's coming to power but also in significant «reconfiguration» of the Bini's socio-political order. That reconfiguration was determined by the fact that the *Oba* eventually managed to establish effective supreme (central) authority. With the advent of the Second Dynasty the historical search of the most appropriate for the Bini forms of social and political organisation on all the levels of their being was finally over. Benin found the socio-political «frames» in which all the changes of the subsequent centuries prior to the violent interruption of her independent existence by British colonisers took place in 1897.

In my opinion, Benin as it formed in general outline in the 13th – 15th centuries and then existed till late 19th century, differed essentially from the model of the state. It is hardly possible to count how many theories of the state there are. But Godiner is right pointing out (though a bit too toughly) that any, even the most sophisticated theory reduces the notion of the state to the «specialised institution of managing the society»¹; at least, theories centre round such an institution. In particular, Claessen in such a «summarising» of different viewpoints and reflecting the modern level of Cultural Anthropological theorising as reflected in recent edition of *Encyclopaedia of Cultural Anthropology* argues the following: «... the state is an **independent centralised socio-political organisation for the regulation of social relations in a complex, stratified society** (emphasis added. – *D.B.*) living in a specific territory, and consisting of two basic strata, the rulers and the ruled, whose relations are characterised by political dominance of the former and tax obligations of the latter, legitimised by an at least partly shared ideology, of which reciprocity is the basic principle»².

Indeed, the appearance of the bureaucracy – the category of professional managers, officials who fill this «specialised institution» is a natural criterion of state's emergence. Actually, this institution is specialised just because of the professional status of those involved into the process of its functioning. These now looking quite simple postulates are broadly

accepted in History and Cultural Anthropology and go practically without saying.

As it is also well known, it was Weber's vision of bureaucracy that has formed the background of the majority of modern theories of the state, either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, it looks quite reasonable to look through the list of the bureaucrats' characteristic features Weber singled out. Do they fit titled chiefs – administrators of the 13th – 19th centuries Benin Kingdom? Weber wrote about bureaucrats: «(1) They are personally free and subject to authority only with respect to their impersonal official obligations; (2) They are organised in a clearly defined hierarchy of offices; (3) Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense; (4) The office is filled by a free contractual relationship. Thus, in principle, there is free selection; (5) Candidates... are appointed, not elected; (6) They are remunerated by fixed salaries... (7) The office is treated as a sole, or at least the primary, occupation of the incumbent; (8) It constitutes a career... (9) The official works entirely separated from ownership of the means of administration and without appropriation of his position; (10) He is subject to strict and systematic discipline and control in the conduct of the office»³ (Weber 1947 [1922]: 333–334).

So, are there any grounds to regard Benin titled chiefs bureaucrats, *i.e.* professional officials?⁴

Any Benin chief belonged to one of the two broad categories: his title was either hereditary (what is impossible if he is really a bureaucrat – see Weber's point 9) or not. There were rather few hereditary titles in the Benin Kingdom: those of the *Uzama Nihinron* members, ranked highest among all the chiefs (from the middle of the 15th century there were seven of them), and of several other, less important dignitaries. The *Uzama Nihinron* was established in the 13th century by the first ruler of the Second Dynasty – Eweka I, and the majority of other hereditary titles appeared in the time of *Oba* Ewuare in the mid 15th century.

Non-hereditary title-holders were considered as «appointed by the *Oba*» and fell into two major groups, besides some other, secondary by their significance in the administrative mechanism. The first of those two categories was called the *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe* (the «palace chiefs»). This institution was established by the fourth supreme ruler, Ewedo within the framework of his anti-*Uzama* actions in the mid 13th century. The *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe* were divided into three «palace societies». Each of these «societies», in its turn, was also divided into three groups like traditional age-sets of the Bini.

The significance of the *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe* was great. This association members received their might due not only to their official titles and rights but also, maybe even first of all due to their closeness to the supreme ruler. One of their main tasks was to serve mediators between the *Oba* and the people⁵ (Agbontaen 1995), for the prohibition to communicate with his subjects freely seems to be among the supreme ruler's taboos already in the beginning of the 17th century. Hence, the palace chiefs could rather easily «regulate» the information flows to and from the palace in their own interests. From the European written sources of the 17th–19th centuries one can see that these chiefs really did it, and also to see, what a considerable might the *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe* under the leadership of *Uwangué* concentrated in their hands that time⁶. Eventually, in the 17th century the palace chiefs, and not the supreme ruler's lineage or the *Uzama* members furthermore, played the decisive role in the selection of the descendent to the throne⁷.

Another major category of non-hereditary title-holders, the *Eghaevbo N'Ore* (the «town chiefs») was established later, in the mid 15th century by Ewuare, already as a counterbalance to the palace chiefs though basically they were ranked lower than the *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe*. They struggled actively with the latter for the influence on the *Oba*. They also fought for power with the supreme ruler himself. And all in all, the town chiefs were a success⁸.

The *Eghaevbo N'Ore*'s struggle for power was led by the head of this category of title-holders, the *Iyase*. In the course of time, he became the most powerful and influential figure in the Benin administrative system and society. The antagonism of the *Iyase* to the *Oba*, as Kochakova remarks, «runs all through the whole space of the Benin history»⁹.

So, the *Eghaevbo N'Ogbe* and *Eghaevbo N'Ore*, whose behavior was very far from that «ordered» to them by Weber (in point 10) were the principal associations of non-hereditary chiefs in the Benin Kingdom. But the *Oba* appointed chiefs just formally, for, first, to be distinct, the supreme ruler appointed only the lineage out of which its members (officially not involved into the administrative system) selected a concrete person for receiving the title. Second, due to the strength of the tradition and the real might of the palace and town chiefs, titles were held within the same extended families for hundreds years (though officially every lawful Bini could claim for a non-hereditary title).

Thus in reality there was no free choice of administrators and their appointment by higher authorities. In practice, administrators were not appointed at all as well as there was no free selection of them on the so-

cietal level; they were elected within definite lineages, extended families (compare with Weber's points 5 and 4). It is reasonable to suppose (especially if one trusts evidence of the folk-lore¹⁰) that during the last centuries of the Benin Kingdom existence the *Oba* only blindly confirmed the candidatures proposed to him and this procedure in its essence transformed into a mere *pro forma*, the performing of an ancient ritual («anti-point 9» of Weber).

The chiefs were not simple officials at the supreme ruler's service. On the one hand, the *Oba* regularly established ties of relationship with them (what contradicts Weber's point 1) marrying the titled chiefs' daughters¹¹ (Bradbury 1957: 41) and then giving their own daughters in marriage to the chiefs¹². On the other hand, they constantly preserved close connections with the communal organisation. They participated in the central bodies' activities as representatives of their communities and titled lineages, not as individuals (hence, the Benin realities did not fit point 7 of Weber). It was unreal to dig titled chiefs up from their native social units and to send them to govern «strange» communities. Under the conditions when all the levels of socio-political complexity were penetrated by, at all of them communal in their essence ties and relations dominated, the division of the country into merely administrative units (including by means of transforming into administrative units communities and chiefdoms) was impossible.

The supreme chiefs always were first and foremost title-holders. They received all the privileges in accordance with titles and were not rewarded just for posts they held. The post was an unavoidable enclosure to the title. For example, in reality the post could demand from the holder of the «*Oba's* wardrobe keeper» title not cleaning and airing of his robes at all, but attending to certain duties no way connected with such a kind of activities. These duties were not clearly defined and separated from those of other chiefs as well as all the categories of titled chiefs comprised officials of all kinds – priests, war leaders, etc. (compare with what Weber wrote in point 3). Furthermore, a chief could be deprived from his post by the *Oba's* command, but the title, once given rested with the chief till the end of his life. The native historian, ethnographer, and courtier Jacob U. Egharevba openly wrote that the supreme ruler «...could... suspend any titled chief from his post, but the chief must still hold his title for life»¹³.

There was a general notion of higher and lower titles and more or less main duties but there was no fixed hierarchy neither within categories of supreme chiefs (most often, only their heads were definitely known) nor

within these or those spheres of activities – administrative, priestly and so on (compare with point 2 of Weber).

The material well-being of the supreme chiefs (at least prior to the period of active trade with Europeans¹⁴) was based on the receiving of a share of what had been produced in their communities. It was not founded either on the tribute once or twice a year collected from the whole population of the country or on «presents» of the *Oba* chiefs used to get from time to time. And fixed salaries have never been due to them at all (nothing in common with Weber's point 6).

As titles belonged to the same lineages and families for centuries, there was no free competition for titles in the society. Then, there were no opportunities for making the career, for chiefs held first and foremost titles. And titles, besides their lack of a well-defined hierarchy, were not subjected to their changing by a person. Having once received a title, he was not able not only to lose it by the *Oba*'s command, but to receive another one, too (see Weber's point 8).

So, none of all the Weber's ten features characteristic of bureaucracy and bureaucrats fits the Benin Kingdom supreme (titled) chiefs. Supreme (central) political institutions surmounted the society, consolidated its domination over it. But under the conditions of essentially communal Benin society, even those who governed it on the highest level were not professional officials, *i.e.* «bureaucrats». Thus, in accordance with the practically generally accepted idea of intimate connection between the state and the bureaucracy, Benin cannot and should not be considered as a state.

As I have argued not once elsewhere¹⁵, it seems reasonable and grounded to classify 13th – 19th centuries Benin as a specific type of complex hierarchical socio-political organisation. This type of organisation was alternative to the statehood, for it is also clear that from all points of view Benin was not less developed than the majority of archaic states.

¹ Godiner, E.S. Politicheskaja antropologija o proiskhozhdenii gosudarstva [Political Anthropology and the Origin of the State]. In S.Ya. Kozlov & P.I. Puchkov (eds.), *Etnologicheskaja nauka za rubezhom: problemy, poiski, reshenija* [Ethnology Abroad: Problems, Approaches, Solutions]. Moskva, 1991. S. 51.

² Claessen, H.J.M. State. In D. Levinson & M. Ember (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology*. Vol. IV. New York, 1996: 1255.

³ Weber, M. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York, 1947: 333–334.

⁴ For general descriptions and detailed analyses of the evolution of the Benin chieftaincy system from which a considerable share of the evidence analyzed and some conclusions made below are extracted, see Read, C.N. Notes on the Form of the Bini Government. *Man.* 1904. Vol. 4: 50–54; Egharevba, J.U. *Bini Titles*. Benin City, 1956; Idem. *A Short History of Benin*. Ibadan, 1960: 78–80; Bradbury, R.E. *The Benin Kingdom and the Edo-speaking Peoples of South-Western Nigeria*. London, 1957: 35–44; Eweka, E.B. *Evolution of Benin Chieftaincy Titles*. Benin City, 1992; Bondarenko, D.M. Privilegirovannye kategorii naselenija v Benine nakanune pervykh kontaktov s evropejtsami [Privileged Categories of the Benin Population on the Eve of the First Contacts with Europeans]. In V.A. Popov (ed.), *Rannie formy sotsialnoj stratifikatsii: genezis, istoricheskaja dinamika, potestarno-politicheskie funktsii* [Early Forms of Social Stratification: Genesis, Historical Dynamics, Potestal-and-Political Functions]. Moskva, 1993: 158–165; Idem. *Benin nakanune pervykh kontaktov s evropejtsami: Chelovek. Obshchestvo. Vlast'* [Benin on the Eve of the First Contacts with Europeans: Person. Society. Authority]. Moskva, 1995: 231–257; Roese, P.M. Palastbedienstete, Zünfte, Heilkundige, Priester und weitere Gruppen sowie Einzelpersonen mit spezifischen Funktionen im ehemaligen Königreich Benin (Westafrika). *Ethnographisch-Archäologische Zeitschrift*. 1993. Bd. 34: 436–461.

⁵ Agbontaen, K.A. Art, Power Politics, and the Interrelatedness of Social Classes in Pre-colonial Benin. *St. Petersburg Journal of African Studies*. 1995. Vol. 4: 118–124.

⁶ See: Ryder, A.F.C. *Benin and the Europeans. 1485–1897*. London – Harlow, 1969: 103 (the evidence cited is of 1651); Da Híjar, F. [1654]. Relazione sulla missione al Benin del 1651. In V.A. Salvadorini, *Le Missioni a Benin e Warri nel XVII secolo. La Relazione inedita di Bonaventura da Firenze*. Appendice 2. Milano, 1972: 248–249; [Anonymous] [1652]. A Short Account of the Things that Happened During the Mission to Benin, 1651–1652. In Ryder, A.F.C. *Benin and the Europeans. 1485–1897*. Appendix 2. London – Harlow, 1969: 309; Dapper, O. [1668]. *Naukeurige Beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche Gewesten*. In Hodgkin, T. *The Nigerian Perspectives. An Historical Anthology*. London etc., 1975: 503; Van Nyendael, D. Letter to William Bosman, Dated 1st September. In W. Bosman. *A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea Divided into the Gold, the Slave and the Ivory Coast*. London, 1705: 435; Smith, W. *A New Voyage to Guinea*. London, 1744: 228–230; *The Dutch and the Guinea Coast, 1674–1742: A Collection of Documents from the General State Archive at the Hague*. Accra, 1978: 334; Roth, H.L. *Great Benin: Its Customs, Art and Horrors*. Halifax, 1903: 92.

⁷ Ryder, A.F.C. *Op. cit.*: 16–18.

⁸ See, e.g.: Smith, W. *Op. cit.*: 234–236.

⁹ Kochakova, N.B. *Rozhdenie afrikanskoj tsivilizatsii (Ife, Ojo, Benin, Dagejmeja)* [The Birth of an African Civilization (Ife, Oyo, Benin, Dahomey)]. Moskva, 1986: 244; see: Egharevba, J.U. *Concise Lives of the Famous Iyases of Benin*. Lagos, 1947.

¹⁰ Sidahome, J.E. *Stories of the Benin Empire*. London – Ibadan, 1964: 163 et al.

¹¹ Bradbury, R.E. *Op. cit.*: 41.

¹² Egharevba, J.U. *Bini Titles*: 31; Idem. *Marriage of the Princesses of Benin*. Benin City, 1962.

¹³ Egharevba, J.U. *Benin Law and Custom*. Port Harcourt, 1949: 24.

¹⁴ See: Bondarenko D.M. *Benin nakanune pervykh kontaktov s evropejtsami... [Benin on the Eve of the First Contacts with Europeans...]*: 153–157.

¹⁵ See, e.g.: Bondarenko, D.M. Benin (1st Millennium BC – 19th Century AD). In D.M. Bondarenko & A.V. Korotayev (eds.), *Civilizational Models of Politogenesis*. Moscow, 2000: 87–127; Idem. *Doimperskij Benin: formirovanie i evoljutsija sistemy sotsial'no-politicheskikh institutov [Preimperial Benin: formation and Evolution of the System of Socio-political Institutions]*. Moskva, 2001.

REVIEWS, ESSAYS

Vladimir Vigand

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Institute for African Studies Contribution to the African Studies in the World

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in Economic Development / RAS. Institute for African Studies.
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Moscow: «21st Century – Concord» Publishing House, 2000)

African studies developed as a part of classical Orientalism in a historical period that differed from the present. Soviet Africanists had to solve new problems, which met the needs of the anti-colonial movement in African countries.

There were two fields of scholarly activity of the Institute for African Studies: (1) participation in classical Oriental studies in ethnography and history (first of all, history of the anti-colonial struggle); (2) contemporary problems of the African countries and the paths of overcoming their backwardness.

The first field reflected the role of the Soviet Union (Russia) as a great power in studying the features of overcoming underdevelopment of the African peoples under difficult natural and political conditions. These studies are based on the general principles of scientific approach to social progress; they changed little after the collapse of the socialist system. The most important of these changes is that now they can use achievements of world science to a greater extent than earlier.

Studies in the regional problems of world progress also benefited from the reorganisation of the Institute for African Studies and foundation of the Centre for civilisational and regional studies within it with the function of ensuring close interaction between classical Orientalism and the studies in the adaptation of peripheral countries to the new world set-up.

Studies in the second field rely on the researches of Soviet Africanists and take into account the shortcomings caused by the ideological

approach to the problems and prospects of the socio-economic development of Africa. African studies of the Soviet period defined the main task of postcolonial Africa as overcoming its backwardness and achieving economic independence to become really sovereign. This is why economy became the main topic of the researches carried out by the Institute. They were aimed at substantiating appropriateness of non-capitalist development as a path towards not only overtaking but forestalling development.

I tried to consider the results of the researches done at our institute in my *Africa: Essays in Economic Development* (2000). Studying the stages of the normative (planned) adaptation of African economy to the requirements of the international division of labour (IDL) in the 20th century, I also analysed the Soviet conceptions related to overcoming postcolonial backwardness and evaluated the «socialist orientation» theory, based on ideological considerations.

The first fundamental works published by our Institute were *Construction of National Economy in African Countries* (1968), *Economy of Independent African Countries* (1972) and *National Income in African Countries* (1983). The views and conclusions of the researchers of the institute concerning possible solutions of the socio-economic problems of the continent were summed up in the last collective monograph published in the Soviet period (*Contemporary Africa. Results and Prospects of Development*, vol. 1, *Economy*, 1989).

The first of these monographs dealt with the main problems of Africa and conceptual approach to their solution. It noted that «breaking the colonial structure of economy, overcoming economic backwardness and winning economic independence are not purely economic problems. They are equally or even more social and political problems». This conclusion was drawn by the then director of the institute V. Solodovnikov.

The second monograph described the situation in all branches of economy (agriculture, industry, transport, manpower) and analysed the role of the national state, foreign capital and foreign trade (especially co-operation with the socialist countries) in the development of the socio-economic structure of the newly liberated African countries. It paid much attention to the economic changes related to the attainment of political independence.

Noting the decisive role of the external factor in economy of all African countries, the authors concluded that «the national interests *require* (emphasis added. – *V.V.*) use of domestic economic resources to change the economic structure spontaneously imposed by the world capitalist

market; this structure strengthens African countries' economic backwardness and increases their losses in foreign trade. Therefore, the efforts of the African countries themselves are the basis of the transformation of the economic structure». This statement was followed by the fundamental thesis of the Marxist science, which postulated that, given weakness of national capital and dependence on foreign capital, these problems can be solved «only by considerably expanding the state's economic function». It was concluded that the African countries play a passive role and «depend on the situation at the world market and political relations with their parent states».

This publication laid the foundation of the further studies in African economy. Some interesting conclusions may be drawn *post factum* from the data quoted therein.

Firstly, the authors believed that the new restructuring would be not initiated by the parent states but resulted by the national state's economic policy. Could this [policy be anti-imperialist, even with the political support of the socialist system? It does not seem likely, although the 1960s and 1970s witnessed joint struggle of the Second and Third Worlds against the First World. The Second World's share in the world economy, particularly in economic relations with Africa, was too insignificant to make this situation possible.

Secondly, optimistic evaluation of the state's role in economic transformations was caused by the favourable situation in Africa's foreign trade. African raw materials were in demand in the world centres of economic development; this was the basis of rapid growth of African domestic production. However, no restructuring was needed to satisfy this demand. Thus, restructuring remained a purely domestic problem.

Thirdly, despite the above thesis about relying on domestic resources, foreign aid was the only real source of financing whatever transformations. In other words, the external factor remained decisive. Therefore, the further successes had to meet the requirements of the industrial countries, while all crisis phenomena in economy of African countries were caused by their attempts of independent planned development, based on a definite strategy. Nonetheless, many Soviet researchers drew optimistic conclusions in the 1970s and 1980s concerning the prospects of economic growth and overcoming Africa's backwardness on the basis of firm anti-imperialism and the state's regulative role.

The further studies in the economic problems of Africa encompassed the whole reproduction process, analysed on the basis of Marxist political economy with regard for special importance of foreign trade.

The aforesaid *Economy* analysed the main problems of the African countries related to overcoming their postcolonial backwardness: the features of reproduction in the setting of the development of «grass-roots capitalism»; formation of the domestic market; the role of foreign trade; domestic accumulation and the role of private capital therein; foreign aid.

The leading role of the external factors in the economic development of African countries is confirmed by other chapters of this monograph, even when they deal with the domestic aspects of the problem. For instance, the chapter *Formation of Domestic Market* testifies that the external factors provide the domestic market with commodity and monetary content, although the state's economic policy is aimed at promoting domestic production. Staking on the domestic market, which is going to «ensure a qualitative shift in the continent's relations with foreign markets and a change in the production structure», the author concludes that the inward orientation of production is just a trend, because «strengthening of the role of the domestic market in comparison with foreign trade remains doubtful. This circumstance and the fact that the African countries failed to resolve the crisis of the 1980s independently make us state that there is just a trend towards strengthening of the domestic market's role in their economic development».

The author used some analytical indices that characterise strengthening of market relations in Africa, such as rapid growth of population, which destroys subsistence economy and accelerates urbanisation, thus leading to the expansion of the use of hired labour and enhancing effective demand for foodstuffs and industrial goods. Growth of state expenditure stimulates the market of both consumer goods and investments. Diversification of local production of import-substituting goods leads to the development of the semi-finished goods market. Another index, i.e., demand for investments, «is not inward but outward», because imported equipment accounts for some 40% of gross investment. Mining as a factor of market relations is of an external origin. The author concludes that «the African countries' foreign connections and dependencies... played a more important role in economic history of African countries than their interrelations within the regional market. Hence, the penetration of foreign capitalism was more usual than the development of domestic capi-

talism»). This conclusion is particularly significant being drawn in the chapter that deals with the formation of domestic market.

It is believed that all kinds of African domestic market (those of commodities, labour and capital) were deformed by interference of the parent states (imposition of export crops to the detriment of production for the domestic market) and then of the national state (etatization of economy and preferential development of urban areas to the detriment of the countryside). Those who think so admit «qualitative difference of African domestic market from those in developed capitalist countries». The decisive importance belongs here to imbalance of production factors, i.e., «too high value of labour force and too low value of capital». State intervention makes these factors the most dynamic components of domestic market, but labour market itself is still unable to influence the structure of manpower, while the difficulties faced in mobilising domestic savings make the development of capital market depend on the African countries' ability to attract foreign investments.

At the end of his study the author draws some far-reaching conclusions on the dominant long-term trends in African economy. «The main task of manufacturing industry is to stimulate growth of domestic market by expanding inter- and intra-industry connections, which has not been accomplished finally in Africa» (in particular, because of low efficiency of investments in manufacturing in comparison with those in construction, transport and trade); «the volume of market-oriented production in African agriculture considerably exceeds that in subsistence economy»; «satisfaction of the African countries' demand for industrial goods and foodstuffs underlies changes in their foreign trade balance: the volume of import almost tripled in the 1980s in comparison with that in 1960 and permanently exceeds the export volume. This is credit consumption, based on the foreign indebtedness accrual».

Another index of expanded reproduction is «accumulation» as the most important category of political economy. Its volume and structure are studied in the chapter *Features of the Accumulation Process and Growth of Domestic sources of Development Financing*.

The author begins with stating that in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s the pace of economic growth and depth of structural transformations in African economy «proved far below the planned level», because «the development strategy chosen by the African countries was found not to correspond to the processes that took place in the world capitalist economy». This thesis means, firstly, that all authors presuppose «planned pace of growth». I reiterate that it is this approach that I

characterise as «normative development». Secondly, the author confirms direct dependence of domestic processes (accumulation) on external factors. Essentially, analysis of accumulation is reduced to definition of its sources (domestic savings or foreign aid). The ratio between them influences the structure of the material and monetary funds invested in expanded reproduction (capital investment). Their efficiency becomes the decisive factor of accelerated development.

The author holds that one of the African countries' tasks is transition of the reproduction process to a national basis. «The problem was how to make domestic accumulation sources the decisive element of the reproduction mechanism in accordance with the idea of relying on one's own abilities» (let us note the word «make» as another sign of «normative development»). The author noted the following factors that contain this transition: (1) large-scale transfer of incomes abroad; (2) dependence of the renovation of capital stock on import; (3) low rate of depreciation (around 6% against 12% in the USA); (4) difficulties in concentrating incomes and their non-productive consumption; (5) heterogeneous economy and domination of the traditional sector; (6) low per capita income, which does not exceed the subsistence level; (7) usurious character of crediting; (8) narrow domestic market, whose growth is determined (according to Lenin) by production rather than by consumption.

Supporting the Africanization policy, the author suggests arguments to confirm that foreign capital (TNCs) is not a component of reproduction of social capital in Africa. «It is rather extension of the reproduction processes taking place in the centres of imperialism to the periphery of the world capitalist economy... In addition, the strategy based on the orientation towards foreign capital cannot enhance the technological level of the African countries economy « (in my, opinion, this is wrong).

The author is of the opinion that the considerable increase in the investment rate (from 17.4% to 26% of the GDP) took place in the 1970s owing to the fact that «the countries of the continent tried to block some channels of the outflow of resources, improve investment codes, stimulate diversification of economy, increase the degree of its «modernisation» and use the mechanisms of deficit financing and taxation for mobilising incomes». However, this growth was not accompanied by an increase in the efficiency of their use because of general backwardness of national economies. The extensive increase in investments led only to idleness of the new enterprises and reduction in labour productivity. The fact that «an increase in the accumulation rate has exhausted itself as a

factor of economic growth» manifested itself in a permanent decrease in the GDP growth rate, in spite of growing investments.

The above facts concerning the African countries' intentions to «create an accumulation base of their own» were in keeping with their striving for independent development, which proved, however, absolutely impracticable later on. This is why I consider this prehistory of the accumulation problem the «golden childhood» of independent Africa. What deserves keen attention is the external accumulation base rather than the domestic sources of financing (depreciation and savings).

To evaluate Africa's further prospects, it is very important to know the limits of its countries' ability to keep pace with scientific and technological progress, which radically changes the positions of regions and countries in the IDL. Let me refer to the opinion expressed by another author of *Economy*, who believed that the earlier foundations of the African countries' inclusion in the IDL (as a source of cheap unskilled labour and raw materials) are undermined by the transition to resource-saving technologies in industrial countries and beginning of a qualitative new stage of the scientific and technological revolution (STR). Therefore, «in the last decade of the 20th century and thereafter the African countries will develop in principally new conditions, which materially differ from the situation of the earlier period of their independent development». The new phenomena include introduction of microelectronics (telecommunication systems and computers), biotechnologies (an alternative to the «green revolution»), new power sources and technologies corresponding to the local conditions, forms of social relations and economic and cultural development level. The author supplemented this analysis, made in the mid-1980s, by some new considerations and quite pessimistic conclusions: «The extremely low initial material and cultural (aprticularly, poor skills of the personnel), as well as unfavourable external conditions of Africa's development which it will face for a long period (more than two or three decades), will considerably contain the formation of the national scientific and technological potential in most of the countries of the region».

He supports this conclusion by the following arguments: the ancient African civilisation with its knowledge of the fundamentals of geometry and astronomy, metal production and irrigation methods, failed to create «science as a special sphere of social activity... Labour equipment in agriculture, the main sphere of economy, remained unchanged for millennia». One of the reasons is that handicraft did not become an independent branch of production in the countryside. Additionally, the nature it-

self, which is favourable to humans in tropical regions, ensures a stable life standard («the machine of nature» is more productive in Africa than elsewhere). Later on, fixing low wages, colonialism contained technical perfection of the means of production. Another pessimistic conclusion follows: «Most of the African countries are not ready now to adopt the technologies of the STR epoch to any considerable degree».

Africa's inability to keep pace with scientific and technological progress means under present conditions that «the burden of the global problems falls increasingly on the least developed countries». «There is, essentially, no room for Africa» in the resource-saving model formed in the centres of the world market economy. Hence, in its peripheral regions «the consequences of the global scientific and technological progress were negative rather than positive in the recent 10–15 years». These conclusions considerably differ from the earlier hopes for applying the mankind's recent achievements in Africa.

I do not completely agree with this forecast of Africa's future but do not reject the conclusion concerning «separation of the economic structures of the African periphery from those of the centre of the world economy after their close interaction in the earlier period». It is no less obvious that Africa will no longer enjoy the advantages available to an «appendage of the Western economy that supplies raw materials to it».

Quoting results of my colleagues' researches and relying on them, I cannot conceal my adherence to some of their conclusions and disagreement with some others, such as their opinions about the position and role of foreign private capital (this is the heading of a chapter in *Economy*). The authors obviously follow the Soviet scholars' trend towards considering foreign capital an alien body. African countries allegedly use foreign capital to mobilise foreign resources. I reject this approach for the simple reason that foreign capital is the main agent of the reproduction process in Africa and its active (not passive, «attracted») in foreign trade and investments.

Charging TNCs with a selfish attitude to African countries, as it was customary in Soviet economic studies, the authors claim that «exploitation is an inalienable component of the functioning of multinational capital». Its use allegedly yields only a short-term positive effect, which only strengthens currency shortage due to outflow of funds in the forms of interest, dividends and returns on investments.

The evaluations of the African countries' agricultural development are most contradictory. I think, it is a result of both the difficult nature of the issue and a biased approach to agricultural transformations.

Western scholars' researches and numerous projects of rural development did not lead to improvements in the rural population's life, while Soviet scholars' works were written under conditions of shortage of primary data. In my opinion, it is impossible to explain why the population of all African countries increases by some 3% annually, although all other macroeconomic indices deteriorate year by year. The fact of the demographic explosion in Africa is beyond any doubt. Hence, the macroeconomic statistical data are unreliable. They may be accurate but do not characterise the essence of the socio-economic changes in agriculture of the African countries. Growth of population belies all statistical data concerning the deterioration of foodstuff availability. In Ethiopia, after several crop failures and the civil war, the rural population increased from 23 mln in 1960 to 44 mln in 1990.

Let us return to the Soviet authors' studies. The peak of bias in evaluations may be dated to the late 1970s, when «development of national economy», oriented towards socialism, was relatively successful.

This is a typical formulation: «In many African countries the structure of agricultural production bears an imprint of the colonial past, when the natural process of these countries' economic development was undermined and distorted and their economy was adjusted to the interests of foreign monopolistic capital». Soon thereafter the author states: «Whereas the average annual growth of agricultural production reached 2.7% in the 1960s, the development of agriculture decelerated in 1970–1978 (i.e., in the independence period – *V.V.*), and the annual growth was just 1.6%». Then a scheme follows, which is far from the African reality: «By the early 1980s a technological shift towards the intensive type of agricultural production was just a trend in Africa... The technoeconomic changes are accompanied by social shifts there; the most important of them are deepening social stratification and emergence of new types of the relations of production... Most of African co-operatives are based on existing farms. The most widespread type of co-operation on production in newly cultivated lands are collective farms, which apply advanced agricultural technology and modern methods of farming». However, UNO experts failed to detect such facts: «Both earlier and later researches and reports of the UNO about land reforms do not pay due attention to the positive experience of the land reforms carried out as a result of national liberation movement's victories in such countries as Algeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Angola and Mozambique».

Earlier the scholars of our institute paid a lot of attention to agriculture, concentrating at its problems rather than the state of affairs in it,

but some their evaluations and forecasts may be questioned. For instance, there is a room for doubts when one says that, irrespective of development scenario, the food situation would be determined in Africa at least until 2000 by evolution within the traditional sector of agriculture with its low labour productivity. The role of the modern sector of agriculture may remain insignificant in many African countries for a long period, since the scientific, technological, economic and social premises of its development are insufficient. «In our opinion, the features of the long-term trend towards deterioration of the food situation in Africa in 1985-2010 are as follows: the African countryside will increasingly lose ability to maintain themselves», while «expansion of food import suppresses local commodity production, gives rise to counting on foreign aid and creates a probability of an additional pressure upon the countries with the most critical food situation».

My approach to Africa is based on the assertion about its modernisation, which has been completed to a considerable extent. I also believe that the participation in the IDL is always a benefit, even when food import remains an element of the national development.

Quoting my colleagues' conclusions on the results and trends of the development of this region, I did not mention differences between countries, which undoubtedly existed by the early 1990s. This is clear from their works on North Africa, which confirm my own views to an extent.

Reading collections of articles titled *Countries of North Africa* (1984–1990), one may find interesting conclusions about specific regularities of the socio-economic development of this sub-region, as well as traces of an ideological bias and signs of gradually overcoming it.

First of all, let us note that the authors advocate the African countries' participation in the IDL. «The North African states' positions in the international division of labour rely, first of all, on their fuel resource and deposits of other raw materials. Their relative techno-economic accessibility gives advantages to these countries due to higher national productivity of capital and labour cost in comparison with the international level. They also strive to use the advantages of their geographical location, natural and climatic potential and, on some occasions, favourable ratio between the cost and skills of the manpower». I share this conclusion, but it would be expedient to consider some other features of this sub-region in more detail.

The approach of the authors of the first collection (1984) was based on the ideological premise stating that social orientation of a country determines the results of its economic policy. Therefore, the foundations

of the future growth are laid in Egypt (before Sadat), Libya and Algeria, while popular masses' interests are ignored in Tunisia and Morocco. This idea was expressed in the preface, whose authors believed that liquidation of exploitation after the political liberation depends on domestic social transformations. «imperialists still retain control over economy of most of the countries of the region».

This biased approach, which was mandatory in Soviet science in that period, was overcome to a considerable degree in the next collections, dealing with the role of the state (1987) and national private sector (1990).

The authors of the collection published in 1987 (they called it a collective monograph) considered the state's socio-economic activity in the countries of North Africa in the light of the features of their historical development and availability of mineral resources. Rejecting the «so-called liberal conceptions», which deem it permissible to use direct foreign investments, these countries staked on «accelerated industrialisation». This purpose «required maximum concentration of economic resources in the state's hands; the state became the main subject of economic activity, which created a new reproduction structure in a planned manner in accordance with the development model it chose». (Let me reiterate that it is a «model» that I consider a synonym of normative development.) Further the authors suggest an interesting explanation of the Arab countries' adherence to state-controlled industrialisation. In addition to the nationalisation of foreign property in mining, which took place throughout Africa, the authors advance a new argument in favour of an «etatist» approach to development: the Muslim and French legal systems proceed from fixing «the ownership rights to mineral resources with the state, irrespective of approaches to land ownership. On the contrary, ownership rights to land surface are usually inseparable from those to mineral wealth in the Anglo-Saxon law».

The new approach to the study of African realities is most manifest in the collection of 1990. Looking back, its authors admit that «today many earlier conclusions about the economic development of the North African countries need substantial revision». The new approach permitted a balanced evaluation of the relative capacities of the state, national and foreign capital as a basis for further forecasts on the economic development of the countries of the region. Our studies in economy of Arab countries show that «all countries of the region faced the objective task of the etatization of economy as a necessary stage of the consolidation of national capital», interrupted in the colonial period. It is con-

firmed that foreign capital might become an alternative to state capital «in the countries that did not witness such a deep and relatively prolonged etatization» (Sudan and partly Morocco). As a result, all countries of the sub-region adopted «mixed economy» models.

Spreading this theoretical premise to the countries of Tropical Africa, one can say that, of three kinds of capital, either state capital (Ethiopia) or foreign capital dominates most of them. The ideal situation for whole Africa may become a synthetic economy with various degrees of predominance of state, national private or foreign capital.

The failures of the policy of economic liberalism in the first period of political independence of Tunisia (1956–1962) compelled it to «strengthen the state's intervention in economy» in order to stimulate «transition of the national bourgeoisie's capital from trade and services to production». However, as early as 1972 the authorities began readjustment of the public sector and land privatisation. In 1987 they introduced a new investment code, which was more favourable to foreign capital and encouraged production of export goods. However, limited numerical strength of the Tunisian upper class hampered achievement of the desired results in both economic and social development. The solution is «strengthening of the role of both local and foreign capital in economy of the country».

Notably, another author sees a specific feature of North Africa in the fact that its states are Oriental countries. He writes: «It is difficult to refrain from stating that dependent development of the East, whose classical examples may be found in North Africa, stand out against other historical processes due to extreme abundance of conflicts between the form and content of socio-economic phenomena and particular acuteness of these antagonisms» (monopolisation of land and modern means of production, combined with preservation of archaic methods of exploitation of producers). Probably, this is why that the authors believe that «the traditional forms of social consciousness inherited from millennia long history of North Africa and the behaviour type that is inherent to the most numerous social-class community, i.e., petty bourgeoisie, proved better adapted to state structures than to private ones».

In addition to supporting the general idea of adherence of the East to etatism, the authors seem to still believe in absence of the upper class there, thinking that it was first suppressed and then underdeveloped by the Eastern state. The question of its relations with foreign capital remained open.

Evaluating this scholarly heritage in general, it is important to note the conclusion about the role of trade with Africa for further development of bilateral relations with its countries. Some scholars' hopes for a beneficial influence of the détente of the late 1980s did not come true. For instance, it is interesting to trace the destiny of a political forecast with two scenarios, made in *Economy* (1989) on the basis of the apparent end of the Cold War. The author considered the most probable outcome not preservation of tension in international relations but «consolidation of new thinking», which might yield the following political results to African countries: a considerable increase in economic and technological aid at favourable terms; facilitation of the debt burden; acceleration of growth of world economy with a subsequent increase in the demand for raw materials and stabilisation of the export earnings of the developing countries; elimination of protectionist barriers that hamper their export.

The possibility of not considering Africa a «field of the antagonistic struggle between two systems» enables one to see «elements of co-operation and progress» in trade and economic co-operation between capitalist and African countries and objectively evaluate some steps of the USSR in Africa, many of which «were an obvious failure». One of such evaluations is the conclusion that «all reasoning about mutually complementary economies» as an objective ground for exchange of Russian equipment to African foodstuffs and raw materials will remain an «abstraction» unless Russian large-scale companies and organisations «participate in joint ventures» in Africa.

I agree with this approach to our trade and economic co-operation with Africa and share the conclusion about competition between African and Russian export goods at the world market (gas supply to Europe, export of aluminium and other non-ferrous metals, etc.). Therefore, not only mutual trade but arrangements with African countries on behaviour at the world market will be difficult but necessary.

We considered many topics dealt with by my colleagues who studied the post-war development of Africa. It would be proper to classify them on the basis of three main factors of economic theory: capital, labour and commodity.

Let me refer to the conclusions of *Economy*, the collective monograph cited in this paper on many occasions: capitalism has not yet formed in Africa (there is no duality). In Tropical Africa it is at the stage of emergence of an unconsolidated upper flow, dominated by state capi-

talism, with residual enclaves of foreign capital and grass-roots capitalism has not separated itself finally from the traditional structures.

The attitude to capital becomes clearer from the evaluations of TNCs' role, which differ in different scholars' works. Whereas some of them believe that attraction of foreign capital in the form of direct investments is preferable to loans and considered its wide attraction and use a permanent factor of economic development, others still point to the negative role of TNCs, which exhaust natural resources, deepen developing countries' scientific and technological dependence, weaken their monetary and financial positions and block their efforts to achieve independence in export, sharply reducing their export potential and proceeds.

Theoretically, the scholars of our institute advanced the thesis on grass-roots capitalism (informal sector), where «relations between labour and capital are just forming» and expansion of employment «is a peculiar form of charity». It is estimated that small-scale non-census production employs two thirds of the economically active urban population in Tropical Africa.

I remain an adherent of Lenin's approach to foreign capital as the decisive element of «capitalisation», i.e., economic development of backward countries.

The attitude to the labour factor of production also demonstrates difficulties in evaluating African realities. For instance, it seems more proper to consider that African economy is characterised by an unfavourable ratio between low productivity of labour and high remuneration for it in comparison with other regions of the Third World (see above). As I already noted, another author still considers Africa a source of cheap unskilled manpower.

Let us note in this context that all theoretical conclusions concerning exploitation of the periphery by the centre are belied by statistical data about inflow of resources to Africa. Its economic basis is higher productivity of technologically developed labour, maintaining separation of the centre from the periphery and its independent development without exploiting colonies or developing countries. This conclusion is drawn in *National Income in African Countries*.

Lastly, let us discuss the role of the «commodity» produced by Africa «for itself» and for world market.

Positive evaluation of the external factors logically leads to the negation of the exploitative essence of imperialism, which allegedly hampers development (industrialisation) of the Third World. Since export of raw

materials and import of industrial goods always were the main channels of Africa's trade with the West, the problem of commodity orientation could not be considered but ideologically. Nonetheless, analysis of African realities never permitted one to think that Africa can develop without foreign markets. Moreover, it is in this question that Soviet experts in Africa demonstrated unity of their views. The ideological concession was limited to the statement that exploitative essence of imperialism is an axiom, but it does not mean that one has to admit «non-equivalent exchange». Otherwise Africa would suffer from it more than others as the weakest participant of the IDL. Yet this topic is seldom touched in the works published by the researchers of our institute.

Recognition of the decisive role of external factors and thus of permanent commodity exchange with the West leads to the conclusion, shared by most of the scholars, about Africa's ability to retain itself as a source of raw materials and market for goods manufactured in developed countries, although even this became difficult in the 1990s.

Upheavals of the colonial rearrangement provide materials for evaluating imperialism as either a deforming factor of Africa's national development or a phenomenon that was progressive at that historical stage. I do not see yet undeniable arguments for either viewpoint. It is difficult to evaluate Africa's involvement in the IDL only as its exploitation. However, the question of benefits of the Western civilisation is no less controversial. It seems that a final answer may be found by analysing different civilisational values of the African society, by changing the attitude to such basic concepts of the Western economic theory as hired labour, profit and commodity.

I noted more than once that Soviet researchers came to different conclusions concerning the results of Africa's independent development and its dominant trends. Let me try to suggest the most logic (in my opinion) evaluation of the long-term trends that will determine further development of the African countries. These trends were detected by the researchers of the Institute for African Studies.

1. Gradual growth of domestic market on the basis of commercialisation of agriculture and inter-industry connections.

2. Necessity of a permanent inflow of foreign resources, which ensure the material content of investments and their coverage.

3. A quantitative decrease in demand for African raw materials, partly due to its relative non-competitiveness at the world market.

4. Preservation of Europe's economic interest in the African continent as a market for sale and a sphere of political influence.

The general conclusion of the earlier researches in Africa's economic problems is unanimous recognition of the fact that African countries' economic development is determined by external facts and will be so for a long period. The question of the character of this impact is solved proceeding from the ideological position of a scholar: our and radical Western researchers warn of the dangers of neo-colonialism, reminding of the troubles brought to Africa by classical colonialism. Other Western scholars and a group of my colleagues who share my views proceed from what Africa has in reality and what it really count on, i.e., raw materials, which are not yet demanded by African economy, and foreign capital's interest in preserving Euro-african regionalism.

Lastly, let us evaluate one of the main topics of the research done by Soviet experts in Africa, i.e., «socialist orientation».

A new period is beginning in African studies, because of changes both in the international situation, which promotes marginalisation of the African countries in the IDL, and in the very content of African studies as a branch of researches with its own rights in and duties to this region.

A final evaluation of socialist orientation in Africa was suggested by V.V. Pavlov in *Africa: the State and the Market* (1997). She considers this model an attempt to prevent consolidation of market relations, which allegedly contradict the «cultural-civilisational features of Africa» (or the ruling elite's interests. We agree with the author's statement: «Most of scholars hold that the destiny of democratic transformations in the former countries with 'socialist orientation' is in the hands of the political forces to whom market reforms are an ideological disguise of the genuine motives of their activity, as Marxist phraseology was to their predecessors. In the final score, their purpose is same as it was earlier: maximum economic aid from the outside».

Despite high respect for the concept of socialism or for national liberation movement in colonial Africa, one cannot but admit that the attempt to synthesise them in the conception of «socialist orientation» remained an artificial construction, which hardly will crown its authors with laurels.

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**PARENTS AND CHILDREN OF RUSSIAN-AFRICAN
FAMILIES: CONFLICT OF GENERATIONS?**

(Based on N.L. Krylova's monograph:
Children of Russian-African Marriages. Destinies. Culture.
Future. – New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2000)

Interracial marriages are well-known in human history and practised by humans from the time immemorial owing to environmental cataclysms and social events of a global importance, such as geographical discoveries, wars, colonisation, slave trade, migrations etc.

People call the children born owing to such alliances in various ways: mulattos, «mettles», «demising», «coloured» («brown») or even «niggers». The essence of all these words is same: children without a race or, to be accurate, out of race; at the same time, they combine blood, anthropological features, culture and ethics of different races.

The author of the monograph considers various aspects of the social phenomenon of a half-cast, an individual born in a biracial family and living in the modern society (African or Russian), where he or she is going to form as a personality. The limited scope of this article permits us to highlight only some aspects of the life of a racially mixed family and its children, paying special attention to the most burning (from the viewpoint of a given community) questions related to racial peculiarity of an Afro-Russian family and the community's reaction to such an alliance under conditions that prevail in Russia today.

* * *

The experience of «black-white» mixed marriages accumulated by the Russian society is not too vast, although our country is known for rich practice of interracial marriages (e.g., between Russian women and Central Asian men, as well as various types of nationally mixed marriages, which were among the specific features of the socio-demographic picture of the then Soviet Union) with subsequent integration of the children born in such families into the recipient society.

The numerical strength of the consorts who live in racially mixed families and their children is low. One of the reasons is relatively short duration of the epoch when such marriages began to be concluded in

Russia and other former republics of the USSR. Another explanation is women's fertile behaviour in interracial marriages [1]. According to approximate calculations (this procedure, being technically quite intricate, is further complicated by the statistical bodies' negligence and moral, ethical and information-related factors, which prevent a young mother from telling the genuine nationality of her child's father), there are 20 to 22 thsd people in Russia and Africa who can be described (with numerous ethno-demographic reservations) as «children of Afro-Russian marriages» [2].

Unlike the USA and other countries of the capitalist centre, which have developed many centuries old culture of relations, following the «white-black «formula of «colony vs. parent state» with a variety of socio-cultural and psychological interracial contacts (including marriages and family life), Russia's experience offers a rare opportunity to trace the growth of this trend within a historically short period.

Researchers hold unanimously that the concepts concerning the socialisation with foreigners always were contradictory in the Soviet Union and Russia as its former component. The mythological, culturo-historical, ideological and political explanation of this phenomenon have been already formulated [3]. As for people with black skin, these concepts are often called indiscriminately «racism in everyday life», although officially it had, naturally, no «socio-political and ideological roots» in the USSR. Some people from among the powers that be do not see such roots even in contemporary Russia.

We would like to begin with a general observation concerning the history of a racially mixed young family. This brief excursion is of interest for one reason: a young half-cast's first sensations and emotions caused by the features of his or her outer appearance form in the family affected by the «disease» of biraciality.

As a rule, new couples of any nation experience numerous difficulties related to the start of their independent life. When we consider a specific community formed on the basis of Russian-African marriages, the subject of our study is not confined to the general parameters of the development and organisation of a family and its reproduction on the socio-cultural level. In this case a researcher's task is complicated by the inevitable problem of interaction between the consorts belonging to different cultures. First of all, this holds for the Russian women who go to Africa for permanent residence and find themselves in a different cultural-civilisational medium. They do their best to adapt themselves to the new milieu without any support from the outside, reckoning only for

their own social skills and values of their original culture. Relying on them, successfully or otherwise, such a wife gets integrated into the everyday life of her husband's country.

As for African husbands who conclude such marriages while staying in the wife's country or choosing to stay here forever, their forced separation from the traditional family and clan milieu and prolonged or permanent stay in non-African centres of economic, social and cultural life makes some of them feel psychological indefiniteness and behave with diffidence or even in an unpredictable manner. Living abroad, they are subject to a permanent and active impact of both Eurasian (outer) and African cultures (mainly among the compatriots). Incompatibility (often total) of many values in these cultures and life in multiple socio-cultural milieux make young Africans' behaviour spontaneous, «situational», i.e., conditioned by the laws of social behaviour accepted in this milieu.

This peculiar or even unique social position of such a family determines the direction and character of the upbringing of its new generation in many respects and notably influences the level of psychological comfort in half-cast children's life.

Up to now, we considered the internal factors of half-cast children's socialisation.

To discuss external factors, such marriages are also complicated, owing to their national or racial peculiarity, by so-called «racism in everyday life», i.e., multifaceted socio-psychological impact of the milieu.

A Russian woman who decides to marry a man of a different race needs great courage and strong will to stand public censure. Even now, it is difficult to the citizens of the Russian Federation, particularly inhabitants of its remote areas, to imagine a racially mixed couple where the wife is «ours» and the husband is a «Negro». The local public opinion considers this phenomenon a social abnormality, and the woman who marries a non-white is called good-for-nothing, prostitute etc.

The author was told about the specific features of Russian racism, characterised by tactless, really barbaric curiosity by all respondents in our polls and interviews: African students who learned in Russia after staying in Europe; Russian women who are or have been Africans' brides and wives and lived in this capacity in Russia, Africa or Europe, as well as their relatives; their children who had reached the age when they can formulate their impressions verbally; managers of the Moscow children's homes, kindergarten and school teachers etc. Many of them emphasise a characteristic feature of Russian racism, which hardly can be found elsewhere. They mean shamelessness, which tires and insults

the people of the race that evokes curiosity no less than other traditional (e.g., aggressive) forms of its manifestation.

Almost all mothers of half-cast children and their African husbands mentioned various episodes (particularly at the early stages of their family life) when their consorts reacted to their «non-standard» racial features.

Analysing this «first-hand» information, we assumed that the process of mixture between African males and Russian females might be more intense and peaceful but for strong resistance of the Russian-speakers with racist psychological impulses. This hypothesis is supported by the early reactions to interracial marriages in the 1960s. Despite absence of any legislative prohibition of such marriages, such couples faced a number of concerns and trials. They were denied apartments they wanted to rent and service in shops and restaurants. Many such couples felt difficulties owing to unconcealed crudeness and public censure by people who did not even know them. Friends and neighbours ceased all contacts with them. The relations between the husband and his in-laws were anything but smooth. Lastly, there were no laws and rules to protect the mixed couples' social rights, honour and dignity. The only exception (not everywhere and not always) was the student community, where the age-mates treated a Russian girl's marriage with an African with a share of sympathy. In addition to difficulties in everyday life, such families faced specific problems in bringing up their children [4].

Although very few cases of interference with such couples' family life were recorded officially in that period, most of them had to be cautious and beware of many dangers.

The contradictory character of racism in everyday life as an archaic syndrome manifests itself in stable combinations of, at the first sight, mutually opposite and incompatible judgements, impulses and actions, which also affect the next generation of racially mixed families, i.e. half-cast children.

On the one hand, they include dislike, suspiciousness, unconcealed crudeness and even squeamishness for the people of an alien (or partly alien) race.

On the other hand, we see curiosity of an almost insulting character, demonstrated because of naivety and combined with generousness, selflessness and unconditional adherence to the existing relations. *Anton*, a Muscovite half-cast, observed in this context: «Naturally, even an attempt to protect a half-cast may be insulting. One may say: «I sympathise with the Negroes and even have friends among them».

Thus, the «Russian form of racism», mentioned by half-cast children's Russian mothers (the author collected numerous testimonies about a variety of facts within four decades), includes persecution of such women by local administration, employers and public organisations, their relatives' discontent, obstacles created by them, often consciously, in the new couples' life and other actions taken under a powerful impact of social conventionalities and social control.

Considering social geography of manifestations of racism in the Russians' everyday life, let us note that its nutritive medium remains the population of smaller towns. Even those of our respondents who remembered manifestations of racial tolerance and general social acceptability of Africans in a provincial town agreed with the above thesis. What is interesting, this happens not in remote localities but in Lubertsy and Mytishchi, satellite towns of Moscow.

As for the destinies of the half-cast generation whom we describe, their life differed somewhat in this respect, but it hardly was easier than that of their parents. The natural (biological) negative protective reaction to an alien being with a strong gender component can be, in the final score, regulated by intelligence. This is the most general conclusion we drew from our study.

At the same time, almost all informants developed a «protection system» of their own, modified to a great extent by the features of their personalities, such as temperament, communicability and other psychological characteristics and impulses. Of course, the role of micro- and macro-socia in this process is considerable, particularly at the early stages of socialisation.

Doing justice with half-cast children's individual psychological features, we noted that those of them who had been ever «tempted» by a more or less prolonged stay outside Russia were more restrained in self-protection from the outer world's reaction to their racial peculiarity; their search for appropriate protection forms was longer, more balanced and sometimes more painful.

On the contrary, the reactions of the half-castes who lived in the habitual Russian milieu were more unchained and stable, although their protection systems were not aggressive or aimed at attracting the public's attention. Perhaps, the reason was that they felt themselves at home even in negative situations: there is no place like home.

Surely, it is not easy to detect racist and proracist reactions in the whole socius and prove their existence. They may manifest themselves

with varying degrees of stability in different spheres of life, different social strata and different situations and be strongly resisted by the milieu.

At the same time, in our opinion, there are reasons to believe that the structure of the attitude to the people of other races, including Negroids, changes very slowly in our society. Recognition of democratic standards in certain spheres (training of personnel for developing countries, rules of interethnic coexistence within the country, equality in education and life conditions etc.) by the public opinion may be combined with its reluctance to accept same standards in the case of marriage and family life. Although this dual approach is not very old historically, it seems quite stable and will hardly undergo material changes in the foreseeable future.

At the same time, life brings quite tangible changes in this sphere. Different generations perceive same phenomena in different ways. This is notable even in racist sensations in the consorts and their half-cast children. Although both parents and children are directly affected by this problem, there is a quite considerable difference in their views and behaviour in everyday life.

The most tolerant attitude to the racial and national aspect of the Russian reality characterised the informants who could go to the father's country and then return to Russia without severing legal and cultural relations with the father's family. We explain this to a great degree by the fact that such a half-cast has not yet immersed himself into the Russian (resp. African) reality and imbibe its culture, which gives rise to differences in racial reactions. At the same time, all informants and respondents said unanimously that hostility and suspicion for black-skinned people and alien people's crudeness and shamelessness during everyday contacts are universal phenomena in Russia.

The half-cast children do not perceive such reactions as an element of objective reality but try to understand them and to adapt themselves to them consciously rather than by intuition, as their parents did. Most probably, biraciality as the only possible genetic state, resulted by the parents' mixed marriage, creates a sensation of a kind of social stability (or hopelessness) of this specific racial status in such a child.

Our massive entry into the world community, which lives long ago according to laws and prescriptions, including the sphere of interracial relations, formally offered racially mixed couples some advantages in the civil law and social spheres. The new laws concerning Russian citizens' travels abroad, recognition of dual citizenship and expansion of

Russian-African business contacts and trade may facilitate such families' civil and material life.

However, one cannot firmly assert today that our acquaintance with and acceptance of the rules observed in the world community has simplified the life of this group organisationally or psychologically in Russia itself.

At the same time, it is owing to small number of such families that the Russian society integrates their children without any visible social consequences, without paying them any special attention in a positive or negative form. Becoming adult, half-cast children seldom demonstrate any peculiarities in their social behaviour.

We also learnt from our study that the case of a multiracial family gives a key to understanding a more general problem: how does biraciality influence the destinies of half-castes? Is it a burden to them? How does this phenomenon influence world perception by a half-cast adolescent, his life principles, socio-psychological characteristics and emotional impulses?

The results of polls, interviews and informal talks showed that, despite differences in the styles of bringing up children by the father and the mother in a racially mixed family, the processes of socio-cultural development demonstrate internal unity, common cultural schemes and methods of socialisation within the family. This may be caused to a great extent by resemblance between the models of the Soviet/Russian (or, wider, Eurasian) upbringing system and those applied in the families of the African elite, to which most of the fathers interviewed by us belonged. Despite continuous transition from extended to nuclear family in developing countries, the contemporary small African family is characterised by a feature: it is not atomised or self-sufficient but maintains close family, regional, patronage and other contacts with the relatives. Such concepts as extended family, family solidarity, blood relation are not alien to our female compatriots either, particularly to those who lived in small towns (70% of the women who married Africans), although they are interpreted in a peculiar way in Africa [5].

At the same time, the social and psychological features of mixed families and their children in both Russia and Africa leave an imprint on them, hampering the modern trend towards considering such parents and children independent entities with the needs and legal status of their own, even when the parents consciously try to isolate their half-cast children, providing them with all formally necessary tools for governing their future lives (education, employment, welfare, etc.).

The group of young people we studied surely bears an imprint of general destandardization of social behaviour, which have affected the whole young generation. Changes take place in the ideals and standards that guide contemporary young people's behaviour in comparison with those shared by their parents when they were young. However, it is difficult to us to accept the thesis of Western experts in children's and adolescents' psychology, who believe that the parents of today cannot efficiently apply the model according to which they were upbrought to their own children [6]. The life stories of the half-castes whom we interviewed testify against it.

It is quite possible that the explanation should be looked for in the atmosphere of persisting archaic elements in a mixed family's life, which are brought inevitably by an African father. Another possible explanation may be the natural instinctive reactions that unite mixed families and their children to seek a protection from the environment. Anyway, our analysis of the influence of this factor on a half-cast adolescent's psychological and social behaviour shows that such a trend exists, but it is not uniform, possesses a fine structure and is mediated by many other factors.

Most of the half-cast children remain children of the African elite, considered «high quality children» in the setting of Africa with its limited social mobility of the bulk of the youth. On the whole, a Russian-African family, living either in Africa or in Russia and enjoying more or less real opportunities to enhance its social prestige (and welfare), is stimulated economically to limit the number of children in order to maintain their «high quality». Some of these young people enjoy definite advantages in their education, family life and career owing to their parents' monetary and intellectual investments and their legal status both in Russia and in some African countries.

At the same time, the gap between the socio-economic conditions of different strata of this community continuously widens in Russia; more and more half-cast children live below the poverty line. Russian social welfare services often register (and some charitable funds take care of) black-skinned adolescents abandoned by their African fathers. Such children have no permanent housing and make their bread in Moscow and other cities by such improper methods as theft, prostitution and drug trade. Being the most unprotected stratum of the population they are sometimes subject to aggressive attacks of their Russian compatriots with chauvinist and Nazi convictions [7].

Obviously, it would be wrong to claim that there are any ethnosocial groups in the modern world who live comfortably in an «alien» socius. The Afro-Russian community is not an exception. Their life is complicated by the very fact of their racially mixed origin.

At the same time, one cannot assert that neither Africa nor Russia is in need of these children. Both societies try to absorb them, the African societies being more successful, owing, probably, to their historical and cultural experiences of relations with white people and features of the African mentality, such as cherishing children as the main value in the life.

From the viewpoint of «social consumption», the first generations of children from Afro-Russian families may be considered the most efficient mediators between two societies, two cultures and two markets. True, their mothers are more active in this sphere, since they know and remember their parent society better than their children do.

In addition, trying to join the planetary cultural space, we must first of all be aware that this kind of adaptation cannot be but mutual: we must not only facilitate half-castes' survival in a uniracial world but learn the rules of interracial coexistence, social harmony and tolerance from and through them.

Lastly, our society will lose a lot socio-culturally if it rejects groups of «racial hybrids», who are, nonetheless, people of Russian culture, cherish many Russian values and know the African cultural, semantic, informational and behavioural codes. They can project these values to other civilisations.

Analysis of childhood and youth of the children of Afro-Russian families also showed that, subject to keen attention of the public wherever they go, they need a mechanism to control their emotions and actions in any situation. They have to develop self-control, which, apart of other qualities, is a sign of civilised behaviour.

One who discusses adaptive processes, paths and pace of adjustment of a child to the culture of one of its parents, bicultural harmony or rejection of both cultures must bear in mind that ethnocultural differences are multidimensional and variable. Taking nationally and racially mixed nuptuality as an example, Russian and Western ethnologists and demographers successfully prove that the content of ethnocultural differences between two ethnic communities may radically change within the life span of one or two generations [8]. Perhaps, the evolution will be rapid in the considered case also. This is just a question of physical and research time.

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4. According to the data of the Consular department of the Russian Ministry of foreign affairs and city Soviet of Rostov-on-Don, where we polled African students, almost each racially mixed couple had a child by the time of their departure from Russia. Some of them had even two or three children.

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6. For details see: *Бюхнер П., Г.-Г. Крюгер, М. Дюбуа.* «Современный ребенок» в Западной Европе («Modern Child» in Western Europe). – СОЦИС, 1996. № 4. P. 128.

7. In 1999 the Pushkinets Charitable Centre created METIS, the first Russian foundation for aid to children of racially mixed marriages. Its purposes include aid to the children of the African students of the Russian University of Friendship of Peoples who marry Russian women; aid in social adaptation of half-cast children; moral and material aid to the half-castes living in children's houses; aid in adoption of half-cast orphans by citizens of various countries, etc.

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**Role of State in Economy:
Some Theories**

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State ownership became the main instrument of the state's impact on economy almost in all countries the late 19th or early 20th century. The degree of this impact depended on the type of statehood. State ownership and public sector influenced economic life in capitalist and then also socialist countries. Later on, this phenomenon spread to the developing world. Many years long discussions among the economists who followed different theories and schemes did not elucidate the degree of this influence or clarify whether it is beneficial or harmful. Their interpretations of this problem, which often were quite contradictory (particularly in Marxists' and Western neo-liberals' works), differed in evaluation of the nature of the state and scope and content of its most important functions, including entrepreneurial ones. Economic researches, made by both etatists and liberals (from adherents of free competition to monetarists) bore an imprint of a researcher's social orientation (often that towards the state's needs) and, at the same time, influenced the state's economic policy.

All institutionalist and liberal economic ideas, which replaced each other for a century, were related, directly or otherwise, to the objective needs of economic development. Some people hold that the expansion of the state's influence on social life is the main line of the mankind's development. According to the interesting hypothesis advanced by D. Ivanov, a Russian sociologist, cyclic fluctuations in the size and strength of states began since the 12th century. On the one hand, empires were replaced by small states and vice versa; on the other hand, strong states were succeeded by weak ones and vice versa. «Large states» prevailed in three long periods: (1) the mid-12th to early 14th century; (2) the mid-15th to early 17th century; (3) the late 18th to mid-20th century. They were characterised by the state's large-scale intervention in the

economic and social life of the society as a result of the population's relatively weak economic activity and state institutions' close interaction with socio-economic structures and individuals. «Small states» prevailed in the intervals between the above periods. The epoch that began in the mid-20th century is characterised by a decrease in the state's intervention in the society's life, while the population's socio-economic activity is strong. Considering these fluctuations just a kind of the state's mutations and taking into account its general trend to expand its control over social life, the author believes that changes in the type of state institutions testifies to the state's intention to change the objects of «colonisation». Physico-geographical colonisation, the basis of the formation of empires in the epoch of initial capital accumulation, and social colonisation of the industrial epoch are replaced by the colonisation of the virtual space. Following the example of their predecessors, the empires of the future will use the latter kind of colonisation to mobilise and redistribute resources for strategically purposes. First and foremost, this applies to image and communication [1], while the primary resource will be information, as it is now.

As the economic role of state institutions strengthened, the ideas of institutionalism began to spread among scholars. In the early 20th century they took the shape of the institutional-evolutional theory, based on negating the fundamental principles of the classical economic doctrine. These principles imply a system of relations between independent economic subjects, who strive to maximise their profit (or usefulness). This system immanently gravitates to equilibrium. Use of information to make optimal decisions is not a problem in such a system. Rejection of the orthodox market theory in favour of a more socially oriented market approach characterises many authors' works (for details see [2], p. 42–45). The most notable among them are J. Schumpeter and particularly T. Veblen, who defined what are institutions and was first to analyse their evolution since the emergence and stabilisation of traditional social standards.

The ideas of institutionalism, actively propagated by such US scholars as J. Commons, W. Mitchell etc., were relegated to the background by «pure» economic theories in the 1930s. Monetarism is the acme of such theories. Although many eminent experts, including those in economy of developing countries (J. Galbraith, G. Myrdal, J. Kornai), widely used the institutionalist ideas in their works of the 1960s to 1980s, the genuine renaissance of institutionalism began in the 1990s. Its ideas are developed in two directions, corresponding to T. Veblen's

and J. Schumpeter's approaches. The adherents of Veblen's views still consider institutions as socio-psychological phenomena and, accordingly, concentrate at the influence of socio-cultural standards, especially traditional ones, on economic development. Unlike them, those who develop J. Schumpeter's ideas about firms' evolutionary behaviour spread their studies to larger social systems and treat institutions as a set of legal standards and informal rules rather than a psychological and cultural phenomenon. These standards and rules regulate both individuals' and collective units' economic behaviour.

On the whole, despite obvious differences in the very definition of an institution, institutionalism radically differs from the neo-classical theory. It considers economy not as a sum of mutually unrelated units but as an integral system, the functioning of which depends both on individual properties of such units as elements of a system and, first of all, on the character of relations among them. Economy is treated as an open evolutionary system, which experiences permanent impacts of Environment and reacts to them by processes with a positive feedback, thus maintaining disequilibrium in the system. This approach fundamentally differs from the classical theory, whose fundamental postulate is gravitation of economy to equilibrium.

Thus, according to Veblen, institutions are «habits and stereotypes of thinking shared by numbers of the society members» [3]. The most established and socially expedient institutions are fixed in traditions and informal standards and then also in legal standards. They are the basis of social organisations.

Then, what determines social expedience of an institution? (The term optimality is more suitable in the case of a system.) Adherents of the neo-classical theory believe that the weaker is the role of the institutions that are not based on «pure» market relations (state or self-governed structures), the more successful is the functioning of a market system. On the contrary, the followers of the evolutionary theory try to apply one of the principles of cybernetics (the «heterogeneity principle») to economy. In our case this means that the more heterogeneous is the socio-economic nature of the elements of a system, the more efficient is the system. In other words, the more dynamic, diverse and intensive are the stimulants to growth, the more important is heterogeneity of the economic system' elements functioning differently. Perhaps, this is why stable economic systems are characterised by coexistence of the dominant principle of economic activity (e.g., private ownership) and secon-

dary principles, realised through appropriate institutions, first of all, traditional ones.

Discussing the state institutions' role in the liberalisation of economic systems (first of all, in the developing countries, but not in the states with the economy which is not «purely» in transition, such as could be found in the post-Soviet republics), one has to evaluate how much traditional such institutions are. Diversity of institutions in a developing system leads one to ask how are old institutions replaced by new ones. There is a widespread opinion among scholars that economic traditions are always represented by a community, while modern economy is the state's monopoly. (As a rule, they mean state capitalism, but the question is if this social set-up dominates in African states.) Meanwhile, the state, first and foremost, the Oriental state, also is a traditional institution. Let us try to demonstrate this.

It follows from the above that institutions of whatever nature assume the form of legal standards, traditions, informal rules and cultural stereotypes in the real life. Therefore, the main differences between «old» and «new» institutionalism are related mostly to the role of institutions in people's socio-economic (to speak widely, socio-cultural) life. The former approach is based on the opinion that, assuming mainly the form of cultural standards and traditions, institutions guide, facilitate and encourage human activity rather than limit it. The latter approach, considering institutions mainly as legal and informal standards, stresses the limitations they impose on human activity. We think that community relations proper belong to the first category of institutions, and the second one consists of means the state uses for regulation of social development, including special organisations and instruments to govern and control. Both of them originate from commonly accepted practice, which makes it possible to describe them as traditional ones.

Peculiarity of the economic system of African countries is conditioned, on the one hand, by their unique position in the world economy and thus by their present and future economic status; on the other hand, it is caused by their colonial past with the entailing features and limitations of governing their economic development. This holds, first of all, for evolution of the state. In the East the state played an enormous economic role since the ancient epoch, relying mainly on coercion and violence. When the African countries were colonised by the West, there were no preconditions there for capitalist exploitation of the indigenous population. They were created by non-economic coercion (expropriation of aboriginal' land, transferred to white immigrants; imposition of

poll tax in monetary form, which was alien to local economy; alienation of indigenous manpower from the traditional spheres of its application). This was done by colonial administration, which was a developed economic institution. It played the role of an aggressive external factor, which undermined traditional compatibility and interdependence of the all local social, economic and other institutions.

As we noted above, according to the modern vision, economy is an open evolutionary system, which is subject to permanent impacts of the Environment and reacts to them. It may be said about precolonial Africa that openness of this system and its ability to resist outer impacts was not tested before the colonisation. The «test» showed that, despite certain «mutation» of the superficial stratum of life and economic relations, African societies preserved the earlier system of relations almost unchanged: personal (particularly within a family), clan, regional and paternalist relations still play an important and often decisive role in solving many quite modern problems of market development.

Let us consider the invasion of an alien structure, namely, colonial administration, into African economy: the state machinery of the parent countries underwent some changes in the colonial conditions. As a result, hybrid statehood formed in the colonies, combining state-monopolistic properties, imported from the parent states, and fundamental properties of Oriental despotic statehood.

When African countries attained independence, the socio-economic situation did not change overnight there. The features of Oriental despotism were not eradicated at once. Moreover, the state acquired the decisive role in economy for a long period. In the precapitalist society the state could impose its leadership mostly by administrative coercion. (A bright example is «ujamaaization» in Tanzania, which meant eviction of peasants from their plots and their concentration in large villages, some of which were founded in absolutely uninhabited areas.)

The features of the state-capitalist and indigenous institutions (government machinery vs. family and clan relations, the institution of presents, etc.) got entangled with national bureaucratic bourgeoisie in ex-colonies. The state's peculiar position and multifaceted economic activity led to overemployment in state agencies and strengthened social apartness of privileged bureaucracy. In the first years of postcolonial development the official privileges, first of all, in salaries, were liberated countries' quite understandable reaction to the colonial authorities' policy, which debarred Africans from leading positions for many years, and racial discrimination in remuneration for state officials' labour.

However, in the subsequent period, the African top officials salaries exceeded all reasonable limits and became a factor of bureaucratisation of the state machinery. Personified by bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the state became a kind of antagonist of the society.

In the recent period, beginning with the 1980s, when inflow of Western aid to Africa, mainly from the IMF and World Bank, strengthened, the ruling elites began to get increasingly corrupt. They misappropriated the amounts allocated by the international institutions for financial stabilisation and economic restructuring. Whereas Western corrupt officials mostly of lobby for certain producers or industries in legislative bodies, the countries of the «South» demonstrate a kind of «mutation» of the traditional government institutions. Administrative regulation is more and more replaced by economic one, which increasingly combines direct and indirect regulation. True, this phenomenon opens wide opportunities for new forms of abuses and development of non-economic methods, which are undoubtedly traditional institutions, on the basis of modern instruments of economic policy, such as taxes, duties, tariffs etc.

Different schools of economics dealt with transformation of economic institutions. The adherents of liberalism always criticised use of state institutions for personal enrichment, which, unfortunately, characterises most of the countries with the economy in transition. At the same time, they believed and believe that perfection of state institutions (first of all, of state ownership) automatically leads to their fading and replacement by market structures. Such liberal expectations seldom come true. Moreover, in the recent years the dominant economic theory has turned towards the statehood. Maybe, this is an influence of the «law of pendulum» in theory (swinging from liberalism to institutionalism), but the same law is valid in economic life, acting in an opposite direction and causing gradual liberalisation of both developing and transitional economies.

Which state institutions are most adequate to the process of economy transition of from one to another qualitative state? Researchers differ in this question. A.I. Amosov, the head of the research centre of the Institute of Economy (RAS), is of the opinion that on the macroeconomic level these institutions include the forms of state governing and general economic management, such as income distribution and ownership; the type of reproduction; centralised planning; mechanism of pricing for goods, labour and different capital entities [4]). The author is quite right when he states in accordance with the basic principles of the evolutionary theory that state and market institutions function in a kind of symbiosis,

developing in parallel and respectively increasing or decreasing their shares in the economic space. He notes that, as a result, economy either becomes developed or acquires a «trophy» character and spends national wealth for everyday purposes, as this takes place in the countries of the «deep South». In other words, evolution leads to the simultaneous strengthening of state and market institutions, including the mechanisms of both state regulation and self-regulation. Since most of the systems remain inert to transformation impulses for a long period, a national market of goods, money and labour cannot form spontaneously.

This position well agrees with the recent researches in the theory of regulation, a promising branch of modern institutionalism. Its main postulates are as follows: the strengthening of the state's role is quite legitimate in the periods of changes, especially during the modernisation of the economy. Yet such a strengthening during large-scale economic liberalisation is a paradox. (A. Madison described this phenomenon as «the paradox of liberalisation».) However, it is the state which must play the role of a «hoop» that consolidates economy.

Market cannot form by itself. Its everyday functioning presupposes a developed system of rules and judicature as guarantees of transactions' honesty. Even the exceptional case of market with perfect competition requires a specially organised social space, administrative and legal standards. The state alone can define long-term prospects and protect social relations in a society with total spread of market. As R. Boyer, one of the authors of this theory, wrote, «regulation is combination of the mechanisms that help the reproduction of an integer with regard for the existing economic structures and social forms» [5]. The theory of regulation has given up the idea that optimal organisation can guarantee sustained economic dynamics once and for ever. According to it, the methods of the regulation of economic systems differ in time and space.

R. Boyer believes that the greatest ability to react to the requirements of strengthening global competition, spread of new trends and growing indefiniteness in macroeconomics characterises not the countries where the state plays the decisive role in economy (e.g., Sweden and France) or where market forces prevail (e.g., the USA and Canada) but the countries that have developed organisational forms that occupy an intermediate position between the state and market (e.g., Japan and Germany).

Thus, the state must perform regulatory functions in economy, particularly during its liberalisation. The question is which kind of functions they are, how are they performed and what is the character of the institutions that perform them. There is a danger that the role of such in-

stitutions will be played by quite different entities, which were not meant from the very start to for a «non-market» function. Clans and even mafia groups, first of all, are meant.

For instance, according to Boyer, the developments in Russia have assumed a threatening character: «When planning bodies are totally eliminated and large production complexes are destroyed, the probability of the emergence of clans or even mafia groups is much higher than that of emergence of market with fair and perfect competition». [6] He holds that the Russian state's policy of non-interference placed the Russian version of capitalist economy under the control of other institutions, which was the reason of the crisis. Now almost a half of the GDP is produced by shadow economy. On the one hand, this makes it difficult for state institutions to regain the role of co-ordination; on the other hand, such regaining becomes a must.

We do not completely agree with Mr. Boyer. Apart from other issues, the problem of regionalisation is very acute in Russia. One of the important reasons of the increase in regions' role in the political and economic life of the country is a considerable difference in the prospect of their socio-economic development. Whereas regional differences were regulated to a considerable degree before *perestroika* by the centralised redistribution of resources, now the federal centre's power is much weaker in this respect. Regions have to rely more and more on their own resources and abilities, which sharply strengthens their differentiation in the development level and pace. On the one hand, these circumstances entail the danger of development and strengthening of non-state regulative entities (regional clans). On the other hand, this enables local authorities to detect and control elements of shadow economy, especially in small-scale business.

The approach to the state's role in creating market economy («ordoliberalism») also has something in common with the theory of regulation. One of its “fathers” is W. Eucken, who authored the theory of competitive order. In his opinion, establishment of «economic order» or «regularising structure of economy» presupposes co-existence of competition and unlimited economic power. This order must be established through state policy [7].

A question arises: what if this competitive order is another myth? Modern market systems are regulated more and more by economic groups in power; TNCs' activity is globalise; their positions strengthen. All this leads one to question this thesis. However, we think that it is not a myth. Firstly, unlike the abstract model of perfect competition, com-

plete competition includes the conditions of real economy and politics that ensure certain freedom of producers. Secondly, an important normative function of the competitive order is limitation of the concentration and monopolisation of power. Essentially, W. Eucken tried to describe the conditions that may ensure economic freedom of all parties engaged in market relations, thus rejecting the widespread technocratic ideology, according to which, market selection leads to survival of the strongest and most adapted participants of market relations.

If competitive order is established, it may undermine both spontaneity of free market and overregulation of economic processes under centralised management. «Group anarchy», maintained by rival groups in government bodies, also contradicts it. This situation is characteristic of modern Russia, other former republics of the USSR and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Bureaucratic capital, which has formed in African countries and develops in Russia, derives advantages from ambiguity of the right of ownership, lack of statutory controls and too rigid regulation. All this makes corruption an important source of regulative entities' incomes.

The opposite aspect of these processes is the development of shadow mechanisms of enrichment of regional elites. Shadow economy in Africa, consisting to a great extent of informal structures, is essentially «parallel economic authority». In Russia we see a merger of legal («white») and illegal (black) business and turnover and formation of integrated «grey» business. This means domination not of legal standards but of certain traditions in business relations, i.e., of traditional economic institutions. In this setting the state must play an increasingly important role of the organiser of the social space, administrative relations and legal standards.

The state machinery of an African country, as it is elsewhere, consists of government bodies with legal and political authority to regulate and control individual subjects of economy and market on the whole. At the same time, it is an independent subject of economy, which possesses property and instruments of policy to govern both the public sector and country's economy as a whole.

The old theories of state increasingly lose their influence in African political science and are replaced by new approaches, generalised by G. Hyden [8]. Two main evaluations of the state's role in the society's life, including economy, correspond to the approaches to the development of the society on the whole found in modern socio-economic studies. The first approach implies that the regularities of social develop-

ment (in our case, characteristics and functions of the state) are common to different countries. According to the second approach, they are determined by specific local conditions. The state may be characterised in a dual manner in either version: either as an instrument of control and authority (i.e., an institution of violence and oppression) or as an instrument for solving social problems (i.e., a tool for the regulation of conflicting interests of individual social groups).

Four theoretical paradigms, based on differences in evaluating the state in Africa as an institution of socio-economic and political development, were applied in African studies in recent 30 years. According to the first of them (the theory of modernisation), the state's role in ensuring economic growth is decisive, because national private capital cannot satisfy the requirements of economic development. This theory and the development strategies based thereon dominated up to the early 1970s. However, shortly before it the evaluation of the state drastically changed owing to the spread of neo-Marxist theories in Africa. The state came to be considered as a structural obstacle to development. The followers of this approach called to reform the state, which was, in their opinion, an instrument of domination being controlled by authorities. They called to secede from the world economy and to pursue a policy of «self-reliance».

The development strategies based on these theories did not enable African countries to overcome economic backwardness and were replaced by the theory of crisis of the state in the early 1980s. According to this theory, the rational origin as a basis of any efficient modern state did not strike roots in Africa owing to vitality and high development level of patronage-clientele relations. If the state fails as a tool of economic development, the main task of researchers and authors of development strategies is to identify the factors that determine the specific features of the state in Africa and concentrate at the long-term traditional values in social relations.

The fourth paradigm (postmodernism) is not considered in this article due to a fact that it is based on the rejection of the above three theories.

This peculiar «neo-traditionalism» may be considered a product of the structural crisis that affected economy of the developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s and their disappointment with modernisation following the Western model as a response to the fact that weakness of government institutions led to increasing rupture of interregional, inter-industrial etc. connections. Additionally, shadow economy, represented mainly by the informal sector in Africa, expands and strengthens its po-

sitions and becomes, following the counterbalance principle, the stabilising element of economy. This gave rise to the concept of «undesired modernisation». The UNCTAD report *On the Least Developed Countries* (1996) reads: «Economic activity continues, but production and markets are substantially distorted and extruded to the informal sector». [9]

This is a vicious circle: weakness or underdevelopment of state institutions leads to de-industrialisation; fired employees rush to the informal sector and ensure its rapid growth, enabling it to extrude enterprises of the modern (formal, legal) sector from market owing to lower prices of its products. Globally, integration of developing economies into the world economy is decelerated or ceased, and they are «marginalised». These processes also hamper the formation of civil society. G. Myrdal noted that there is a correlation between underdevelopment of domestic market and weakness of state institutions, on the one hand, and striving of adherents of market transformations to substitute democracy (in its Western understanding) by liberalisation of economy. As a result, the Western interpretation of democracy as availability of institutions and procedures that ensure openness and proportional representation of various groups of the population in decision-making (including economy) is brought to naught by unlimited access to power for definite clans and groups in full keeping with the patronage-clientele relations.

This may be explained from the viewpoint of the institutional theory (according to T. Veblen). In a transitional period social consciousness goes through a very difficult stage of changing all landmarks and «rules of the game» in economic and social life. In this sense, developing countries and those with economy in transition from centrally planned to market-oriented one share many properties. In either case, quite definite and predictable information in the traditional form of orders, commands and instructions, received from the centre by economic units through vertical organisations, which remained almost unchanged for many years, and elaborate feedback system are replaced by a multifactor management systems, which is anything but unidirectional. Its heterogeneity and unpredictability reflect, firstly, coexistence of multiple independent entities of economy with a variety of interests and, secondly, a peculiar system of interaction among them. Instead of the rejected management mechanisms or new skills of economic interaction, which are still alien to the forming civil society, such system is based on institutions, i.e., written and unwritten rules, tested for centuries. They structures the transforming economy on the basis of interaction between

entrepreneurial and banking capital rather than of administrative methods, relying on such organisations as the State Planning Committee in the USSR, or non-economic techniques, as it takes place in sub-Saharan Africa.

In this situation, when economy should be radically restructured within a historically short period (much shorter than that allotted by history to the Western countries), using not only modern adjustment mechanisms but traditional business relations, it is difficult to overestimate the role of state. Unfortunately, even understanding that market mechanism cannot restructure economy by its own, many governments of the post-Soviet states and African countries erroneously expected that privatisation would automatically stimulate the impact of private capital on financial restructuring and production system in the real sector of economy. Actually, restructuring of economy (especially large-scale economy in a country like Russia) requires meaningful and active structural policy.

Here the next, more concrete level of analysis begins. We proceed from the state's role in transforming economy in general to the quite definite concept of the «structural macroeconomic policy». Although this concept seems quite obvious, different countries (even highly developed ones) interpret it in different ways. In Germany the structural macroeconomic policy means incentives to investment, pursued to influence on the structure of industry. The intervention of state in France is a form of discretion policy. Such a move is more flexible than directive planning, which imposes common behaviour laws on all economic units in all the situations. The final structure-forming function of such programme is to fill «gaps» in public production, which form when private sector is unable or reluctant (mainly because of low profit or high risk) to fill them. Doing so, the state tries to create, favourable conditions for the functioning of private enterprises in the spheres that do not attract them.

It is important that neither understanding of the structural macroeconomic policy is aimed at reserving the right to define structural proportions of public production for the state and imposing the «rules of the game» on investors and producers. Nobody has cancelled and nobody can cancel the law of value, formulated by K. Marx. Neglect of the «invisible hand» of market and inevitably resulting exaggeration of the state's role (to be accurate, spread of state guidance to the spheres where it is not needed) may inflict a lot of damage on economy and society on the whole. Overestimation of the importance and

self-sufficiency of market mechanism and self-regulation is no less dangerous. The state, like any other participant of economic activity, may forecast economic development, proceeding from the current domestic and world economic situation. A forecast differs from a plan (essentially, prediction of an inevitable and pre-set result) no less than a medical diagnosis differs from a court sentence.

It seems that the most important method of keeping the state within the limits of a purely economic and sufficiently quick-operating tool of economic management is delimitation between state regulation and investment by the state on the levels of nation, region and enterprise. As it was noted in the very beginning of this paper, state ownership came to be considered not only an important but the most important tool of the state's impact on economy a hundred years ago. Since an owner always imposes his conditions on production and market, the priority task of economic liberalisation in both the developing countries (particularly in the former countries of socialist orientation) and those with transitional economy was privatisation in whatever form. Privatisation cannot be total; therefore, its purpose is to achieve a «balance of forces» that is similar to the condition of stable free-market economy, characterised by a balanced interaction among various competitive forces, none of which can become a monopolist. The state plays a dual role in this situation: on the one hand, it is an element of the single market (alongside with private companies and households), based on sustained inter-industrial and inter-regional connections; on the other hand, it regulates commodity markets legislatively and economically to combat unfair competition and monopolisation of economy. In either case, the state determines the social orientation of the economic regulators to alleviate contradictions between the rival social groupings (first of all, between employers and employees).

The state's regulative role is very important in the transitional period. A state interested in economic progress should take care not so much of its own entrepreneurial interests as of introducing certain «rules of game», forcing businessmen economically to work for the public welfare, because an entrepreneur strives for profits maximisation without thinking of the development of the economy. Unless the state modernises economic system and creates a highly competitive economy, the employers of the traditional industries (especially in farm and mining production for export) will be bound to hamper a strengthening of new kinds of business, justly fearing their competition.

By a policy of privatisation, introduction of a favourable investment climate, and support of the private sector (especially foreign investors and national small-scale business) the state directly regulates business activity. Without going deep into this vast problem, we would like to list the main institutions, mechanisms, tools and directions of the state regulation of business. The first of them is a vast complex of favourable conditions, including efficient financial and commodity markets with an adequate infrastructure and organisation of a advanced competitive environment, alongside with efficient antimonopoly mechanisms. Applied to an enterprise, this means a broad spectrum of mechanisms of banking credit and pricing, reasonable and uncompromised tax policy and various managerial, technical and information services to businessmen, especially in small-scale business.

Returning to maximal use of traditional institutions by the state for transformation of economy, we should note that although the business climate depends on the state's monetary, investment and budget policy, the society's attitude to business depends, first of all, on the ethic values and the traditions that exist in the society. These traditions materially influence not so much the content of state's economic policy as its realisation. The more backward is a society economically and legally, the more attention from the part of state should be paid to the traditional economic relations and to the population's adaptation to the new economic reality when the state takes measures to regulate economic activity.

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CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIUMS, ROUND TABLES

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Africa at the Threshold of the Third Millennium, the Eighth All-Russia Conference of Africanists (Moscow, September 28–30, 1999)

On September 28, 1999, a grand meeting was held at the Institute for African Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences) to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the institute as the main centre of African Studies in Russia. It was followed by the eighth all-Russian conference of Africanists, which continued for three days. Its subject was Africa at the Threshold of the Third Millennium. Its participants were scholars from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Ekaterinburg, Nizhni Novgorod, Kazan, Saratov, Vladimir and Donetsk, as well as representatives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African diplomats and Russian and African students and post-graduates.

Academician *V.N. Kudryavtsev*, Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, inaugurated the conference. He read out the message sent to the participants by Academician *Y.S. Osipov*, President of the Academy. *I.I. Studennikov*, director of the African department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, read out the greeting message sent by *I.S. Ivanov*, the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation. Greeting speeches were delivered by *Daniel Ona-Ondo*, minister of culture and education of Gabon, *M.L. Titarenko*, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and director of the Institute of the Far East, *A.A. Zhukov*, head of the chair of African Studies of the St. Petersburg university and *Dieudonnae Essienne*, ambassador of Cote d'Ivoire to Russia.

A.M. Vassiliev, chairman of the RAS Scientific Council on African Problems and director of the Institute for African Studies, delivered a key report *Africa: a Stepchild of Globalisation* at the first plenary meeting of the conference. Its full text was published in *Aziya i Afrika Segodnya*, 2000, No. 1, p. 2–8 and No. 2, p. 10–14.

The participants of the conference worked in 12 sections. Over 200 reports were delivered by scholars from Russia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Canada, the USA, France, Angola, Guinea, Zimbabwe, Cote d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Senegal and Ethiopia, including African students and post-graduate students. Abstracts of reports were sent to the Organising committee by Africanists from Angola, Austria, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, Sudan, Ukraine, the USA and Uzbekistan.

The purpose of the conference was to sum up the results of the African studies in Russia by the end of the 20th century and outline their main directions in the first five years of the next century. The participants set the task of considering a broad range of problems of African economy, Russian-African economic and political relations, history of the continent, international relations, politics, sociology, ethnography, philosophy, geography, law, national statehood in Africa, culture, linguistics, history of African fiction, religion and such a new issue as regionalism and federalism in a polyethnic state.

The section **Economy of Africa: the Lessons of the Past and Hopes for the Future** considered the development of world economic relations in the late 20th century, African integration, international trade and financial relations, trends of the activities of TNCs and global banks in Africa, the role of foreign investment in economic reforms and the state's role in market economy. The speakers paid special attention to the development of African countries in the transitional period, general methodological approaches to the socio-economic situation in individual branches of economy and countries and social consequences of economic transformations.

A difference arose concerning industrialisation of African countries and decrease in the importance of the production of raw materials. There was an animated discussion about how the countries of the continent can find their niche in large technological systems and develop alternative power sources and biotechnologies. The participants advocated different conceptions related to the prospects of African economy in the setting of contraction of the real sector and shift of finance flows to the sphere of services, recreation, tourism etc. (so-called economy of symbols).

Some reports dealt with the complicated financial problems of the African countries, whose foreign indebtedness is increasing, while the GDP growth remains insignificant (the data of the UNCTAD). At the

same time, owing to investment legislation reforms, the prospects of investment inflow improved in many countries in the recent years, and Russia may benefit from this experience. There was a discussion concerning *V.V. Pavlov's* (Institute for African Studies; hereinafter absence of affiliation implies that the speaker works at this institute) report on the growing influence of transnational banks (TNBs). They assume the functions earlier performed by state bodies of industrial countries, and their purpose is not crediting industry or agriculture. Their activities deprive the real sector of African economies of modern banking service, thus preventing African countries from placing their assets and purchasing equipment abroad. This causes huge costs in the public sector. At the same time, there are only 15 banks controlled by private African capital. TNBs do not allow this capital neither to foreign trade nor to the sphere of financing investment projects.

Speaking in the discussion on this report, *Daniel Ona-Ondo* emphasized that there are few really large banks in the whole world. The breakthrough of TNBs to Africa is not a new phenomenon, and the main purpose of their penetration into the franc zone is promotion of France's foreign trade. He described the essence of Gabon's policy related to creating national banks, supporting small- and medium-scale enterprises and solving the problems of narrow domestic market and large-scale initial investments.

Discussing the problems of economy orientated towards production of raw materials and semi-finished goods as the main source of the GDP, the participants concluded that the African experience may be useful to Russia, whose «development ratio» was below the level of developed nations in 1998. It was evaluated, using special matrices that African economy was at the degradation stage in the 1990s.

It was noted in many reports that the problems of interaction between the state and market are of special importance to both Africa and Russia. Numerous new theories concerning this issue are formulated and discussed. The participants concluded that a balanced approach is necessary in this field with regard for the changes in the national and international economic and political situation.

One of the burning problems discussed at the section was the situation in African agriculture. An opinion was expressed that traditional economy of the African countryside has been destroyed, while the new methods and models of economic activity have not been implanted. To do so, it is necessary to understand the features and traditions that exist

in agriculture for many centuries and to know Africans' economic philosophy in depth.

No less acute problems are employment and personnel training. Unemployment has reached 30 mln in Africa; more than a half of the population is partly unemployed, and the unemployment level among the youth is three or four times higher than among older people. The speakers noted that it is necessary to regulate the labour market because of serious social consequences of unemployment. Discussing the problem of minimising corruption in countries with transitional economy, the participants found that Russia and Africa have a lot in common in this respect.

The contradictory and sophisticated character of economic development was demonstrated using the examples of such countries as Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Uganda and Malawi. The periods of economic recovery were followed there by a deep recession, caused by internal and external factors of a subjective or objective character, as well as lack of an integral conception of economic reforms. The participants discussed search for an economic «niche» for the countries with unique resources or narrow economic specialisation. They also emphasised the necessity of balanced development of such countries.

On the whole, the discussion demonstrated that Russia and African countries face same problems in economic reforms. There are many disputable points in the development conceptions suggested for countries with transitional economy. It is necessary to pay special attention to the experience of the past and development scenarios that have not been tried but certainly have some positive features. The population's traditions and mentality must be taken into account while making economic decisions.

Reporting about Economic Development under Conditions of Globalisation, *Y.M. Osipov* summed up the results of the African countries' independent development within the recent four decades. He noted the extremely unfavourable socio-economic conditions in most of them and gloomy prospects of their development. In his opinion, despite some improvements, many sub-Saharan countries still remain untouched by the world progress. The crisis of the 1980s brought many countries to the verge of economic and financial bankruptcy, making them fight for survival. The «overtaking development» scheme proved not in keeping with the African realities, suppressing the impulses of «law-governed economic development» and its «natural stages and periods». The crisis situation strengthened the striving to «execute a volte-face». Liberal re-

forms were considered an almost universal remedy for the acute economic problems. The «demonstration effect» of economic liberalism in the West considerably increased popularity of such reforms. However, rearrangement develops in Africa not as smoothly as the ideologists of contemporary monetarism want it to. Whereas the stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes were not rejected outright at the beginning, contradictions with international financial organisations began to crop up very soon. The IMF and other Western financial bodies urged the African authorities to strictly adhere to the «readjustment prescriptions», which did not correspond to the local realities.

The role of the state at the transitional stage of the market-oriented development, especially in the social adaptation of the population to the reforms, became the subject of lively debates in Africa. The views on the privatisation of public property changed no less considerably. At the same time, different approaches were formulated concerning the strategy of international aid to African countries and the methods of adapting export and the currency legislation to structural changes in the world economy and trade. In Y.M. Osipov's opinion, the gist of the problem was not whether it is necessary to develop market relations but how to develop them and which strategy and tactics should be applied to solve this sophisticated problem.

The subjects of other reports were: Development of Global Economy and Changes in the Conditions of Africa's Integration into World Economy (*B.B. Runov*), Some Aspects of the Problem of Indebtedness of the Countries of Tropical Africa (*G.E. Roshchin*), World Trade Organization and the Problems the Least Developed African Countries (*J. Dorcha, Angola*), «Development Economy» as the Methodological Basis of Elaboration and Realisation of Development Policy (*S.A. Bessonov, State University / Higher Economic School, Moscow*), State and Market: Incompatibility or Mutual Complementation? (*Y.V. Morozenskaya*), Agricultural Transformations in Africa: Results and Prospects (*A.V. Nikiforov*), Economic Development under Conditions of Globalisation (*V.S. Baskin*), Condition and Prospects of Labour Market in Africa in the Setting of Structural Reforms (*I.B. Matsenko*), African Countries in the System of International Trade Relations (*V.P. Morozen*), Evolution of the Economy of Cote d'Ivoire: from Decay to Stabilisation and Upsurge (*Z.I. Tokareva*), etc.

The final meeting of the section considered the results of the socio-economic development of African countries in the recent years, taking into account the data quoted at the IMF session that discussed inflation

and poverty in the contemporary world. The annual economic growth was 4% in sub-Saharan Africa in 1995–1998 and just 2.9% in 1999. Inflation was accompanied by a considerable decrease in the growth rate in comparison with 1995, when it was 40.4%. In 1998 it reduced to 10.5% and in 1999 amounted to 11.4%.

The deliberations at the section **Contradictions of Socio-Political Modernisation** were concentrated on two sets of problems. One of them was the pace, character and contradictory nature of social changes in African countries and combinations and collisions of the modern and traditional components in the evolution of African societies. The speakers noted that the modernisation process, which began as early as the colonial period, has some negative consequences, i.e., disruption of integrity of traditional societies and partial destruction of the centuries-old standards of economic activity and social relations (*Yu.V. Potemkin*). This phenomenon painfully affected peasantry, who formed more than a half of the population in most of African countries.

The participants mentioned notable changes in the traditions of extended family and tribal solidarity. Attracting the upper echelons of traditional hierarchies to the government machinery, the colonial administration gave rise to the phenomenon of patronage-clientele relations. In the postcolonial period clientellism became an unalienable feature of the government machinery, which nourishes corruption, nepotism, etc., creating a bad impression about the African bureaucracy's morality and being among the main reasons of inefficiency of the socio-economic policy pursued by most of African countries.

Decolonisation of Africa was followed by an economic exhilaration. The independent states gradually created a modern social infrastructure, which improved the life quality of many strata of the population and, in the final analysis, served social modernisation. An important phenomenon was deviation from and weakening of the traditional standards of social relations. However, this progressive trend faded out by the 1980s. Two recent decades were the period of the aggravation of numerous social problems. Earlier the crisis affected only traditional relations, but in the 1980s and 1990s it spread to the social sphere.

An important element of this crisis is the recent strengthening of disintegrative trends at the levels of family, community, ethnos and nation. *Mrs. Gromova* noted that these trends are related, to a degree, to social modernisation (deepening social differentiation, division of labour, social stratification, etc.). At the same time, some aspects of this process create a real menace of weakening and disintegration of the fabric of the

society and deteriorate the socio-political atmosphere. As unemployment grows, social interaction of the working people weakens, labour and family relations are severed and personal interrelations get narrow (*N.G. Alibuzhina*). Forced emigration undermines social integration in the emigrants' homeland, which cannot be «compensated» by their striving for ethnic consolidation in the host country. The unprecedented scale of the problem of refugees also weakens social connections. Social disintegration is further strengthened by gradual erosion of the traditional system of values.

In the recent years ethno-political conflicts strengthened in the continent. On many occasions they led to protracted bloody wars. Inter-clan, interethnic and inter-religious conflicts and civil wars have acquired an extreme character (Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Angola, etc.). Ethno-religious contradictions become a powerful factor of social and sometimes national disintegration and even deetatisation (Somalia).

L.V. Geveling, deputy director of the Institute for African Studies, dealt with the problem of organised criminal activity and corruption, which has not been sufficiently studied in the case of Africa. The main institutional subjects of these activities are lutocracy (leaders of organised crime) and kleptocracy. Simultaneously, they act as social communities and secondary forms of state power. In the recent two decades the so-called negative economy (NEC) develops rapidly in Africa as the material basis of lutocracy. Unlike positive economy, the economic «underground» functions to the detriment of social standards; its purpose is quick enrichment of the social subjects who dominate it. Its main manifestations are drug trade, money-forging, large-scale financial fraud, smuggling, illegal immigration, prostitution, organised racket, etc. NEC creates prerequisites for the development of parallel and latent social structures that form a substantial part of the criminal world. These cripto-social (clandestine) groups often become power centres, which play a notable role in the functioning of African political and economic structures and international criminal activity.

The speaker paid attention to the development of Kleptocracy, based on ramified systems of political and economic corruption, which enables topmost officials to enrich themselves and strengthen their social position using their authorities. Kleptocrats and lutocrats share plutocracy as the reference group; their common features are social parasitism; the material damage they inflict on African and partly non-African societies is no less than the moral one. Formally, African states combat

organised criminal activities for several decades, but the results of anti-corruption campaigns are less than modest.

The broad spectrum of issues (politics, social relations, economy, ethnic and legal problems, etc.) covered by the reports delivered at the section enabled its participants to analyse various aspects of these problems. *J.O. Ogunkoya* (Lagos University, Nigeria) spoke about close relation between social instability and pauperisation of the population of African countries. In his opinion, nothing but depauperisation can bring peace to Africa. *K. Ogundowole* from the same university supported this statement, saying that some of the numerous problems Africa faced after attaining independence were poor management culture, corruption, high foreign indebtedness and political instability, caused, among other factors, by inadequate ethnic relations.

Andre Bourgeot (National Council for Scholarly Research, France) delivered a report on Political and Economic Anthropology of a Nomad Society, based on field studies made in Sahara and Sahel. He analysed the social structure of Tuareg nomads and political roles of the main strata of this relatively closed society, artificially divided by frontiers of several countries.

Delivering his report headed *Re-colonisation of Africa: Danger of Salvation?*, *V.I. Gusarov* considered the opinion of those who believe that many African countries are unable to survive politically without new models of colonial dependence on Western aid. The African society, he said, holds that only re-colonisation in whatever form can solve the problems of socio-economic and political development of the continent. We are going to see whether this trend will strengthen.

Considering the topic of *Democratisation: a Comparison of Crisis Trends of the Development in the Eurasian and Euro-African Spaces*, *I.V. Sledzevsky* advanced the thesis on similarity (but not identity) of crisis trends that formed in both spaces in the post-Soviet and postcolonial periods, respectively. The disintegration of the USSR expanded possibilities of comparing both worlds. According to the speaker, the conditions and pace of social evolution in these regions are quite similar. An example is crisis of national identity, replaced overtly or covertly by ethnicity and regionalism. This crisis manifests itself in revival of the traditional socio-political structures (kins, clans, communities) and upsurge of ethnic and sometimes political Islam.

The speakers who considered political issues noted that the political transformations carried out under the slogans of democratisation were often accompanied by domestic conflicts and intestine wars based on

ethnic heterogeneity of African states. *B.G. Petruk* mentioned that, in absence of stable democratic institutions, African leaders rely on their ethnoses, religious organisations, regional groups and power structures. At the same time, political modernisation was more or less evolutionary in some states.

O.M. Ogbinaka, a lecturer of the Lagos University (Nigeria), said that military rule is a form of domination and suppression, imposed on African countries by both internal and external forces. Militarism is an obstacle to self-reliance and African peoples' development. In his opinion, the «demilitarisation» is a minimal requirement aimed at arresting destructive trends, which perpetuate economic underdevelopment and political instability in the region.

This thesis was exemplified by *A.E. Ifeoma*, a Nigerian postgraduate student from the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, who noted that after Nigeria attained independence in 1960, more than ten military coups occurred there; the country was ruled by civil governments only for some ten years. Military dictatorship led to violence, ethnic contradictions and wars.

Y.G. Sumbatyan (the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia) highlighted the active role of army in political life of African states, which is attributed to the transitional character of African societies and external factors, mainly confrontation between capitalism and socialism during the Cold War. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the start of the transformation of military regimes into civil ones. In some countries (Zaire, Congo, Mali, Togo, Chad, Liberia, Ethiopia) introduction of the multi-party system was accompanied by ethnic conflicts, wars and large-scale exodus of the population. However, there are different examples in Africa. As *L.O. Nizskaya* noted, a legitimate transfer of power from one leader to another (Benin, Zambia) has become a reality, although it is not yet typical of Tropical Africa. *P.M.L. da Conceicao* (Angola) emphasised that the Angolan conflict cannot be resolved by military methods. This manifested itself in the crisis of the UNITA and split within its leadership.

Political changes in Africa are closely related to political culture of the African society. Delivering a report on Tropical Africa: Political Reforms and Political Culture, *N.I. Vysotskaya* said that this interrelation manifests itself in the features of the behaviour of topmost officials, bureaucratic bourgeoisie, middle class and urban and rural population. The specific features of the social structure of the African society and mutually contradictory interests of its strata and classes result in heterogene-

ity of political culture in Tropical Africa. According to the speaker, the differences between the subcultures of the elite, masses and the middle class are most adequate to the existing social stratification. Political culture is a derivative of the African culture on the whole and reflects the socio-economic development level. *L.M. Oonovskaya* analysed the role of a leader in uniting political forces and consolidating the society. The social significance of a political leader depends on the masses' political culture and activity.

The problem of legality and legitimacy of a political leader evoked a great interest. Most of African leaders came to power as a result of a coup d'etat or armed struggle. *Yu.N. Vinokurov* mentioned the example of Loran Desire Kabila, the self-proclaimed third president of the Democratic Republic of Congo, who established his authoritarian power in the country.

N.D. Kosukhin spoke about the ideological trends in non-Western societies, which form a «peculiar civilisational community», developing according to the «overtaking development» model. The global changes that have occurred in the world led to radical reinterpretation and transformation of socio-political theories and conceptions in non-Western countries, followed by the formation of new paradigms and basic characteristics, which influence socio-economic and political realities of the world.

The participants concluded that conflicts and contradictory interaction among the main ideological and political trends, including conservatism, liberalism, social democracy and Marxism, are the ideological background of the socio-historical development of the world.

The socialist prospect was a symbol of national unity and cohesion in some decolonised countries. Their leaders elaborated various conceptions of socialism of a national type. One of their components was reliance on traditional collectivism and religious views. However, the socialist ideas did not ensure efficient economic development of the Third World countries, which resulted in an ideological reorientation. Socialist and nationalist rhetoric was replaced in Africa by democratic phraseology. Institutionally, this resulted in the formation of political organisations with an ethno-religious basis. At the same time, traditionalist conceptions revive and become a component of official ideology. These views and attitudes are based on pragmatism and are related to the problem of African peoples' survival. African authorities look for an ideology that would serve mobilising the available resources and integrate the African societies.

A lot of attention was paid to the religious factor of political life. The participants noted that in the period of the anti-colonial struggle the oppressed peoples considered religion a symbol of their lost independence. Therefore, religion played an important role in the development of national liberation ideology. As early as the 19th century, when the anti-colonial movement began strengthening in Muslim countries, Islam became an important factor of political life. After the liberation it was proclaimed the official ideology in some countries. Their constitutions declare the authorities' loyalty to the Sharia laws, guarantee the right for religious education, recognise the judgements of Muslim theologians and jurists and provide for councils of Ulema (theologians) with consultative functions, ministries of religious affairs, etc. Considering Religious Factor of the Political Life in African Countries (the 1980s and 1990s), *V.I. Komar* noted that political evolution of the African society led to politicisation of religion, which often acts as an independent force and strongly influences behaviour and activity of both politicians and ruling groups and parties.

Discussion among the participants showed that in the 1990s the political process in African countries was characterised by considerable peculiarity and destructive phenomena. On many occasions the African elite perceived liberal-democratic ideas as an ideological tool that might bring people of an ethnic group or region to power. However, democratisation cannot be based on conceptions that are alien to African peoples; it must be carried out with regard for the political, ethnic and cultural traditions of the African society. When a leader deviates from this principle his democratic policy loses popular support.

Political changes cannot lead automatically to resolving the complex socio-economic problems of Africa. Additionally, democratic reforms often strengthen nationalism and end in conflicts and civil wars. In the final analysis, the character of political systems depends on the society's development level and political culture. There are no socio-economic or cultural preconditions to implant democracy in most of the countries of the continent. Ethnic, religious, communal, estate and caste consciousness play too a great role there. This is attributed to the underdeveloped social and class structure of the society. Traditional structure and the respective elements of social consciousness not only persist but also strongly influence social life and ideological processes and will do so in the future.

Relying on scholarly definitions of the typological features of individual Arab countries, the participants of the section **The Middle East**

and North Africa: Islam and Reforms in a Transitional Society discussed some key problems of the Arab East: ability of official Islam to block economic and social modernisation; the reasons of the crisis of statehood, including the collapse of the etatist economic and social model; bureaucratisation of socio-political life; corruption in state institutions; the degree and forms of the crisis of statehood, etc. A.A. *Tkachenko*, A.Yu. *Danshina* (the al-Hayat Centre of Middle Eastern Culture), I.I. *Orlova* (Institute of Asian and African Countries, Moscow State University), B. *Abu-Laban* (Canada), G.L. *Gukasyan* (the RAS Institute for Oriental Studies), et al. addressed these topical issues.

Some speakers dealt with methodology of analysing relations between Islam, the state and the society in the colonial and postcolonial epochs. They expressed various viewpoints concerning the factors of conflicts or co-operation between them. The participants (Yu.V. *Irkhin* from the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, I.O. *Abramova*, et al.) noted high dynamism of the evolution of the cause-and-effect relations in the recent decades.

The participants paid a lot of attention to the economic programmes of orthodox, radical-extremist and moderate Islamic trends in the Arab world on the whole and individual countries of North Africa and the Gulf. They considered important elements and structures of the «Islamic economic model» and their relation to those of market economy, whose character is Euro-centric. V.K. *Vigand*, G.I. *Smirnova* (the RAS Institute for Oriental Studies) and E.I. *Mironova* analysed these problems in their papers.

The participants scrutinised the current processes in the Arab countries, Russia and Ethiopia with Islamic civilisation as the dominant or important part. They paid special attention to the characteristics that determine its conservatism, stability, perceptively to innovations, ability for evolution, etc. (Yu.M. *Kobishchanov*, E.A. *Shauro*, I. *Al-Hassan* from Sudan, V.V. *Razumnyi* from Ukraine). They considered the influence of various strata of the Arab society and political groups and movements on the strengthening of the role of Islam, the place of Islamic values in social life, the practice and principles of some Islamic states' foreign policy, etc.

The section **Africa in the Global Community. Relations between Russia and Africa** focused the attention on: Africa's place in the modern world; priorities of Russia's foreign policy in the region; prospect of the development of international relations and Africa's place in them. The questions under discussion were divided into three sets.

The first of them included globalisation of world economy and the place of underdeveloped countries in it; polarisation of the modern world and new political realities that emerged after the disintegration of the USSR. *L.P. Kalinina* and those who took part in discussing her report noted that liberalisation and globalisation of the world economy created preconditions for more efficient economic development, but many least developed countries (LDCs) failed to benefit from this due to their weak economic potential. In spite of intense integration processes, the world is becoming more polarised economically. The number of the LDCs permanently grows (UN data). According to the speaker, the possibility of their integration into the global market space is very doubtful because of their structural difficulties, technological backwardness, strong dependence on export of raw materials, low education level of the manpower and political instability. Capital flight is becoming an unalienable aspect of the globalisation of economic systems and relations between developed and underdeveloped countries.

The report headed *The Myth about Unipolar World*, delivered by *V.G. Shubin*, deputy director of the Institute for African Studies, evoked an animated discussion. The speaker put the question whether the world was really bipolar during the Cold War and what kind of world has replaced it: is it unipolar or multipolar? The participants of the discussion noted that the world is becoming increasingly multipolar. The developments in Africa and Iraq and the NATO's aggression against Yugoslavia show that resistance to the US dictation increases and its ability to influence world developments is becoming much weaker than its ambitions. Some of the speaker's theses evoked objections. Speaking in the discussion, *V.V. Lopatov* emphasised that unipolar world is anything but a myth if one allows for financial domination of the US capital, the USA's outpacing economic development and successful attempts to act from a position of strength, without taking into account other countries' interests. *G.D. Demekssa* (Ethiopia) supported this statement.

Speaking about the future world order, *L.M. Yanchishina* mentioned that in spite of the weakening role of African countries in global economy, the importance of small- and medium-size countries, including those in Africa, for the global model of military-economic co-operation increases. African countries have piled up and continue accumulating stores of arms. After the disintegration of the USSR the geography of arms supply to the region changed. The USA leads in this field, but European arms manufacturers fight for the African market. The leading Western countries attach Africa to their military-political complex, and

although import of weapons to Africa decreases, its militarisation does not slow down. The arms race acquires new features; the structure and quality of imported weapons changes. The inflow of European and US weapons to Africa is caused not only by commercial interests but also by geo-strategical considerations of each power. They do not conceal the political background of military-economic co-operation and consider arms export a necessary component of their foreign policy.

The second set of the problems was related to Russian-African relations. I.S. Borisov, the then deputy director of the Institute for African Studies, reported about the Condition and Potential of the Russian Federation's all-round co-operation with African States. He noted a considerable reduction in the volume of Russia's relations with Africa in the period of radical reforms in the USSR and then Russia. Although the main «contribution» to this recession of co-operation was paid by Russia, one cannot but blame the African leaders for their quite passive attitude to the negative trends that appeared in our co-operation. Russian-African relations in the spheres of economy, science, technology and culture were affected most severely. Political and military co-operation suffered less, although the quality and level of the latter were much below those achieved in the Soviet period. The speaker expressed his opinion on inadequacy of the figures quoted usually to characterise the curtailment of Russia's co-operation with Africa.

Cautious efforts made by some Russian private enterprises to establish themselves at African markets yield quite modest results. Until the Russian government adopts the policy of supporting Russia's trade and co-operation with Africa by legal, contractual, financial and organisational measures and by assistance in the spheres of credit and transport, this co-operation will develop very slowly and painfully. The speaker said that Russia's relations with Africa need radical restructuring. Earlier they were based on ideology; in the new conditions it is logic to give priority to economic relations. Unfortunately, this restructuring has not taken place. Evaluating the prospects of Russia's relations with Africa, I.S. the speaker noted that, influenced by the conflicts related to Iraq, Sudan, Libya and Yugoslavia, the Russian leaders have begun to re-evaluate foreign policy priorities. African states also tend to be interested in co-operation with Russia. This is confirmed by African leaders' visits to Russia and our ministers' travels to Africa. This is a chance for activating contacts and expanding mutual co-operation.

Speaking about Post-Soviet Problems of Russian-African Relations, *V.V. Lopatov* said that the enormous efforts made earlier to develop

trade and co-operation with African countries and considerable credits allocated for their economic development, as a matter of fact, fell into oblivion. The prestige of Russia as a great power and the legal successor of the USSR sharply weakened. Elaborating new approaches to overcoming the present situation, the authorities may find additional reserves for mobilising Russian industrial and intellectual potential, thus solving the problems of economic development. Activation of co-operation with Africa is among the paths towards the solution of these problems. The speaker proposed to develop a conception of economic co-operation with individual regions of the world and define the role of each of them in Russia's foreign policy. In his opinion, the government must form a special body with responsibility for formulating Russia's foreign economic policy in Africa. It will identify the priority directions of Russian co-operation and prepare a programme of supporting and stimulating export of Russian industrial goods to Africa.

Reporting about Russia and the Strategy of Renovated Co-operation with the countries of the South in the 21st Century, *V.S. Baskin* also mentioned a reduction in Russia's economic potential and the volume of its co-operation with Africa. *V.K. Vigand* drew the audience's attention to the shortcomings of projects of Soviet-African co-operation, characterising the negative economic and environmental impact of the Aswan High Dam in Sudan and Egypt and of the metallurgical plant in Algeria.

Discussing Vision-2010, the Programme of Economic Development of Nigeria, and Russian-Nigerian Relations, *P.S. Kupriyanov* evaluated the prospects of these relations as quite favourable. In his opinion, the fact that O. Obasanjo, a leader of a progressive brand is in power, gives grounds for optimism. He actively combats corruption and has signed an agreement with Russia on joint anti-corruption struggle.

T.L. Deich (China and Russia in Africa at the Eve of the 21th Century) and *M.L. Vishnevskaya* (Russia and the USA in Africa in the 1990s: Some Results) considered Russian-African relations from the viewpoint of relations between Africa and other great powers. The former speaker made a comparative analysis of the means and results of Russian and Chinese policy in Africa. Whereas China opened the doors of the country and managed to attract investments, technologies and know-how from developed countries, thus giving a powerful impetus to its economic development and expansion of export to developing countries, the Russian policy of openness yielded opposite results: curtailment of production, dependence of the national market on the world market and capital flight. The Third World, including Africa, was rele-

gated to the background in Russian foreign policy. Being a new power centre of the multipolar world, China steadily strengthens its political and diplomatic activity in Africa, while Russian-African relations stagnate. Despite some progress in the recent period, the condition of Russia's political relations with Africa does not correspond to the parties' potentials. Shifting the gravity centre of its African policy to economy, Beijing reformed its techno-economic relation with this continent. Retaining the state's regulative role, it staked on direct co-operation between enterprises instead of agreements between the governments, combination of banking and commercial credits and joint ventures. Losing a sizeable share of the experience of techno-economic co-operation with African countries, Russia has not yet managed to establish mutually advantageous relations with them. A sharp decrease in its share in the world trade turnover and predominance of raw materials in its export are alarming symptoms. Stimulation of trade and economic co-operation with Africa is just a short step towards solving the problem. The speaker believed that the Chinese experience in this sphere might be useful. Once a backward agricultural country, China is among the leading exporters of the world. It is forecasted that its share in world trade will reach 10% by 2020, which is more than three times of the present level.

The third set of problems was related to international security in Africa and the role of international organisations and individual countries, Russia in particular, in settling conflicts in the continent. It is not without reasons that it is called a «continent of conflicts» the Fourth World, a «continent of poverty (of 48 poorest countries of the world, 33 are in Africa). The participants tried to find who is guilty of decades long bloody conflicts in Africa. They considered the methods of resolving disputes and reaching political stabilisation in the region. They also discussed efficiency of international efforts aimed at settlement of conflicts. Another subject of discussion was if Russia could help Africa in this matter, while it also experiences similar difficulties.

I.L. Lilejev deemed it advisable to create permanent information centres in the crisis-ridden parts of the continent. They would warn international organisations about imminent conflicts, so that the OAU, UNO and other international bodies ensure intervention of special forces with immediate disengagement of the parties to the conflict. *Herrit C. Olivier* (South Africa) noted that should human rights be violated in an African country, the states of the continent themselves must solve their problems together, resorting to the assistance of the OAU only in the cases

of emergency. According to *V.N. Gavrilov* (Institute of Military History), the principle of «new interventionism» (sending troops to the conflict zone instead of unarmed peace-keepers) is fraught with negative consequences, such as genocide, mass violations of human rights and a threat to local or even global peace. This approach discredits the idea of peacekeeping and results in dividing the world into influence zones.

I. Liebenberg (South Africa) appealed to find a balance between conciliation and violence. Speaking about the Prospects of Russia's Participation in Settling Conflicts in Africa, *D.V. Polikanov* noted that the number of Russia's mediatory initiatives in Africa increased in the recent period. As the member of the tripartite observation group and co-sponsor of the peace-making process in Angola, it supplies humanitarian aid to the victims of the conflict. The Russian ministry for emergency situations actively co-operates with the OAU.

Some participants spoke about conflict situations in various parts of Africa. *H. Koche* and *G.D. DeImekssa* (both from Ethiopia) told about the territorial dispute in the Horn and Ethiopian-Eritrean war. *Boubakar Barri* (Senegal) described the conflict in the province of Casamance in his country.

The section **Africa towards the End of 20th Century. Seen by Historians** considered three sets of problems: theory and practice of colonialism and anti-colonialism; traditional society and the impact of colonisation thereon; Russian Diaspora in Africa.

The most interesting reports were delivered by *V.A. Subbotin*, *M.Y. Frenkel*, *A.B. Letnev*, *E.A. Glushchenko* and *A.I. Balezin* (the RAS Institute of World History), who analysed various aspects of colonialism and decolonisation of Africa.

V.P. Khokhlova reported about Pushkin's Jubilee (1937) and the Russian Diaspora of the «First Wave» in Africa. It was the first Russian study in Africans' perception of the works by the great Russian poet and evaluation of Russian emigres' contribution to developing contacts between two cultures.

Several reports dealt with postcolonial Africa, such as African Intellectuals: Evolution of Francophone Intelligentsia in the Postcolonial period by *V.S. Mirzekhanov* (Saratov State University) and The Role and Place of the Republic of Guinea in Confrontation of Global Power Centres (the USSR, USA and PRC) in the 1960s by *A.V. Andreyev*.

African scholars delivered several reports. *M. Ogbeidi* (Nigeria) spoke on Educational Exchanges as a Medium for Promoting Accul-

turation or Global Peace: Insights into the African Experience. *O. Ture* (Gambia) considered Gambia's Position in the World Economy.

Concluding the discussion, the participants noted the need to maintain a reasonable balance between concrete historical studies and profound theoretical comprehension of their results. This holds for such historical phenomena as colonialism, anti-colonialism, traditionalism, fundamentalism, etc. They emphasised the importance of further studies in democratisation, development of civil societies, ethnic contradictions, Africa's role during the Cold War, etc.

The section **Persinality, Ethnos, and Culture at Social Turning-Points** considered the following problems: civilisational models of crisis situations (Africa, the East, Russia and the West); problems of civilisational and cultural compatibility; the role of crisis epochs in socio-cultural revolution; actualisation of ethnicity and prospects of national, multinational and transnational statehood (the reports delivered by *D.M. Bondarenko*, *A.V. Korotaeva* (from the Russian State Humanities University), *A.D. Savateev*, *I.T. Katagoshchina* and *S.B. Senyutkin* (from the Nizhni Novgorod State University).

The participants of discussions touched such disputable subjects as the content of transitional historical epochs from the viewpoint of civilisational development and relations between contemporary political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism. They noted that the content of transitional historical epochs is not limited to revolutionary transformations in the economic basis and political superstructure. It includes a large-scale and prolonged transformation of the modes of human existence and world perception models. This process manifests itself, first of all, in rearrangement of humans' existential world and is accompanied by a crisis of the values cherished by the society, weakening of historical memory and loss of well-established cultural senses. The scholars who study modern political Islam, emphasise its substantial differences from traditional Islamic fundamentalism (total violence against even co-religionists, striving to subdue the human personality and everyday life of the Muslim community to Islamic leaders' power and a trend towards all-embracing ideologisation of spiritual and social life). These are common features of politicised Islam and extremist movements; they draw the former closer to totalitarian ideology; organisationally, it becomes similar to totalitarian sects.

The participants of the section **Regionalism and Federalism in a Multi-ethnic State: Comparative Analysis of Africa and the CIS** intended to discuss the common and specific features of regionalisation

and various models of federalism in Africa and the CIS countries. Unfortunately, the African colleagues did not attend the meetings of the section. Therefore, the only report related to comparison of Russia and Africa, Influence of Traditional Structures and Institutions on Interethnic Relations and Ethno-political Situation (Some Reflections on the Situation in Africa and Russia) was delivered by *R.N. Ismagilova*. Her analysis was based on the results of field studies in 21 African countries and observations made in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, etc. The speaker found that such traditional institutions as tribal chiefs' and elders' authority, ethno-social stratification, caste seclusion, home slavery and its survivals, as well as clan hierarchy in ethnic communities, persist not only in African countries but in some regions of Russia and other CIS countries. In the setting of «ethnic renaissance» these social phenomena influence ethnic relations and political stability more and more tangibly. The speaker explained stability and high adaptability of the traditional structures by the fact that they are based on the cultural, moral and social values, customs and autochthonous beliefs and cults, transferred by one generation to the next one. Despite a variety of external influences and interaction with other cultures, ethnic culture is relatively autonomous; its traditional forms are quite stable, which enables it to perform a disintegrative or integrative function.

Considering the specific features of Russian ethnic federalism, all participants of the section held that the crisis of federal relations in Russia was caused, first of all, by the ethnic principle of the division of the state into regions. Discussing the factors that adversely influence the development of the new federation, the speakers mentioned budget voluntarism of the centre, regional elites' arbitrary approach to taxation, corruption of federal officials, separatism of some subjects of the federation, use of ethnicity in political bargaining between Moscow and republican ethnocrats and many other realities. At the same time, they admitted that federalism as a form of regional democracy may be considered an optimal model of the state set-up in Russia. The participants were sure that emphasis on the ethnic-state or administrative-territorial principles of the state set-up is determined by the political situation.

The section **Southern Africa** discussed three topics: (1) Economy of the Countries of the South of Africa and the Potential of Their Mutual Co-operation and Trade with Russia; (2) Foreign Policy: the Past and Present; (3) Social Problems. *A.V. Pritvorov* analyzed new phenomena related to the division of resources, especially in the South, among the financial groups that originate from concessionary companies of the

early 20th century. It was this division that caused aggravation of ethnic, social and economic problems, which paralysed African peoples' progress and resulted in a large-scale armed conflict, which affected the territory from Sudan to Namibia. The speaker mentioned the particular danger posed by illegal trade in diamonds in exchange to arms, recruitment of mercenaries, acts of genocide and transformation of some liberation movements (e.g., UNITA in Angola) into mercenary gangs.

Discussing the report, *V.G. Solodovnikov*, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, *V.G. Shubin* and *L.S. Pokrovsky* noted that activity of international speculative capital is not, in essence, limited legislatively in South Africa. This is fraught with uncontrolled developments. *L.A. Demkina* observed that such social phenomena as urbanization and industrialization should be considered from the viewpoint of ethnic processes as a criterion of the level of national consolidation and development of South African nations. Despite certain shifts, the social structure of the population of this sub-region still bears an imprint of the past: of 13.5 mln strong economically active population, 32% are unemployed, and most of them are black citizens of the Southern African countries. The contribution of 1.5 mln employees of the so-called informal sector to the GDP is just 6.7%. *T. Pothieter* (South Africa) emphasized that the «blacks» are dissatisfied with their poverty, while the «whites», most of which are entrepreneurs, oppose the policy of «strengthening the blacks». He said that training «black» entrepreneurs and improving the education system might solve the problem.

The problems of the development of South African countries were discussed with the participation of *S. Loev* (South Africa), *M.N. Kipensha*, Namibian ambassador to Russia, *G. Verhoef* (South Africa), *L.N. Rytov* and *I. Liebenberg* (South Africa).

The participants concluded that the processes that develop in the South Africa and other countries of the sub-region are acquiring the character of confrontation between the conflict sources (criminal activity, practice of hiring of mercenaries, orientation of economy towards production of raw materials and economic stagnation) and development sources (strengthening of states-nations, political ethics and positions of the new leaders and the forces that support them; promotion of national capital and the industrial circles that strive to develop productive forces, create new technologies and cooperate with Russia in this field). It was noted that abundance of conflicts in the region is an obstacle to expanding cooperation between Russia and the countries of South Africa, including that in the sphere of education and science.

The deliberations of the section **Men, Women, and Children in Africa: New Images and Roles** attracted a lot of interest due to novelty of the problems it considered and interdisciplinary nature of gender studies. The status of African women and their role in economic and social development began to receive attention of Russian Africanists just recently. *I.G. Rybalkina* noted that the image of an African woman increasingly attracts scholars, because her political and social profile and the features of her consciousness and behaviour have not been studied as carefully as those of other representatives of the fair sex.

Taking part in the discussion, *N.A. Ksenofontova* noted that analysis of the structure of the African societies in different epochs and civilisations shows that all forms of social relations are based on unity and confrontation between the male and female elements, which are the first antagonists in history. This polarity underlies all cultural classifications. The roles of these elements are rigidly fixed in African civilisations by customary law and moral-ethic standards, which regulate all periods of a woman's life, from the birth to the death, and imply her life hereafter.

N.B. Kochakova, *T.F. Sivertseva* (the RAS Institute for Oriental Studies) and *Z. Ogundowole* (Nigeria) discussed the Relations between women and men, which are in the centre of the archaic picture of the Universe in the traditional African society. The participants of the discussion considered some methodological problems, including some basic concepts and modern methods of gender studies related to the East and Africa.

The topic of one of the meetings was the problem of Russian-African mixed marriages, adaptation of Russian women to the life in their African husbands' countries and destinies of the children of such marriages in Russia and Africa. Humanisation of social life revived researchers' interest in the features of individuals and small groups united by common interests and destinies. One of such groups consists of more than 6,000 Russian female compatriots who married African men and settled in Africa. This problem was the topic of the report delivered by *N.L. Krylova* on Russian Women in Africa: Sociocultural Adaptation through an Interracial Marriage and by *Z. Ogundowole*, a Russian woman who spent over 20 years in Nigeria with her African husband. The reports threw light on the socio-cultural and psychological portrait of a Russian woman after her marital exodus to an alien culture and civilisation. They were supplemented by an interesting report by *E.G. Mensa*, president of the METIS foundation for aid to the children of in-

terracial marriages, who has experience of working in the USA, Africa and Russia.

The section also considered a set of problems related to the destinies of African women in their homelands and outside as they are reflected in African fiction. This culturological approach to gender problems is undoubtedly useful, since fiction possesses unique means of describing a woman's sophisticated, contradictory and multifaceted spiritual world, which cannot be studied by any other methods. Perhaps, no other research technique can reflect nuances and psychological half-tints of the human mind as finely as fiction does. This was convincingly demonstrated by *S.V. Prozhogina* (the RAS Institute for Oriental Studies), who analyzed the phenomenon of half-casteness, reflected in the novels by Nina Bouraoui. This talented writer was born in a mixed marriage between an Algerian and a Breton and experienced all sufferings of a human expelled from a community for differing from its other members. *N.Y. Ilyina* (Russian University of Friendship of Peoples) reported about the images of African women in modern English fiction of Tropical Africa, which reflects the changes that have occurred in their social, economic and psychological status in the recent decade.

Some speakers considered women's and children's civil and legal status, the problem of violence and the role of customary law in creating an African or interracial family. *M.K. Gordina* (the RAS Institute of Law) noted that there are no international agreements concerning interracial families, which complicates Russian women's life in Africa. The report on the role of customary law in family and marital relations among the Sousou (Guinea), delivered by *U. Komar*, a Guinean post-graduate student of the RAS Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, evoked an animated discussion. The speaker noted that the African legislative standards related to marriage and family vary very much. They are formed under the influence of the local historical-cultural tradition and standards of customary law related thereto, as well as of continental law. Thus, customary law and current legislation are closely interlaced in Africa.

Twelve reports delivered at the section **Literature Studies** covered poetry, stories and novels created in Tropical, South and North Africa, including fiction of the North African diaspora in France. Using the newest materials, including results of field studies, the speakers threw light on the most notable phenomena in African fiction of the early 1990s. *N.D. Lyakhovskaya*, *A.V. Koptelova*, *M.D. Gromova*, *E.L. Ryauzova* (all from the RAS Institute of World Literature) and *G. Aquaviva*

(Italy) reported about the development of prose and the trend towards the merger of the «elite» and «mass» fiction, which characterizes creative activity of West and East African writers. *S.V. Prozhogina* spoke about fiction created in France by the second generation of the North African diaspora, whose parents settled there during their countries' struggle for independence and thereafter. These young writers feel that they share the French culture and way of life. At the same time, they are unable to integrate themselves completely into the European society or identify themselves with their ethnically «own» Arab and Muslim world.

Reporting on Development of African Fiction in the 20th Century Considered from the Standpoint of Comparative Typology, *I.D. Niki-forova* (the RAS Institute of World Literature) characterized this development as a movement from local seclusion towards realizing that the contemporary problems are common to the whole mankind and African fiction is increasingly connected with the global process of fiction development. At the threshold of the third millennium African fiction is becoming an organic, unalienable and steadily developing component of world belles lettres. This is convincingly proved by the artistic achievements of African writers of the last quarter of the 20th century.

The section **Linguistics** considered numerous linguistic phenomena and processes, noting important aspects of the modern scholarly conceptions related to African languages. The reports covered a broad spectrum of problems of African linguistics, including structural description of African languages at various levels and phonetic, lexical, grammatical and other linguistic studies based on synchronous and historical comparison. Some reports were of interdisciplinary character and dealt with socio linguistic, textological and linguo-cultural issues. Notably, many speakers operated comparativist conceptions, especially while discussing evolution of African languages.

The section **The North and South at the Threshold of the New Epoch** concentrated at the changes in the global context that are indispensable for an accurate study and understanding of regional collisions, including those in Africa. The subjects of a detailed discussion were the global development trends, including the probability of a counteroffensive of Oriental civilizational models, typology of the world order that is forming nowadays and the changing character of economic, political and cultural activity in the world. The participants paid attention to methodology of social studies and search for appropriate scientific approaches to modern social processes.

E.A. Bragina (the RAS Institute of World Economy and International Relations) noted in her report on the Changing Character of World Economy that globalisation is widely recognised theoretically as an economic phenomenon of the late 20th century. However, the speaker formulated the following polemic theses: «globalisation is not global»; «globalisation offers the world both unprecedented benefits and serious menaces». The first thesis is confirmed by the fact that the hierarchical structure of world economy, where the North strengthens its positions owing to its scientific and technological superiority, presupposes further «peripherisation» (primitivisation) of many countries of the South. Substantiating the second thesis, the speaker noted that relatively weak connection of many developing countries of Africa with the globalisation process prevented a sharp deceleration of their economic growth during the «Asian financial crisis». In her opinion, a «market collapse», such as the Asian crisis may lead to another change in the state's role in the economic development of the Southern countries. Chronic institutional weakness of most of the African states makes an adverse impact on their development in the changing world, limiting the growth of the private sector.

B. Despinet-Zochowska (National Centre of Scientific Researches, France) considered historical dynamics of the conception of North vs. South. *A.L. Andreyev* (Russian Independent Institute for Social and Nationality Problems) analysed the problem of Russia's civilisational identity and the features of its socius that are common to our country and the Third World. In his opinion, the crisis transformation of the Russian society entails a change in the economic model and rearrangement of the social structure. In this setting it may become necessary to redefine Russia's civilisational orientation, whose many features are common to the Russian and African socii.

Discussing global trends of the development of the world system, the participants paid a lot of attention to the report on the Postcolonial World Economic Order, delivered by *V.M. Kollontay* (the RAS Institute of World Economy and International Relations). Historical analysis demonstrates the fundamental trends of the postcolonial development of international relations in politics and economy. It was the period when the foundation of the new world order was laid and inequality of the developing countries acquired a new dimension. The speaker analysed the stages of this process, paying main attention to its economic aspect.

Delivering his report on the World North and World South: a New Configuration, *A.I. Neklessa* described the emerging forms of the world

order, based on close interaction and sometimes even merger between the economic and political functions of the international community. A special kind of economic wealth has been created in the geo-economic West. Its developed social, administrative and industrial infrastructure ensures production of sophisticated, science-intensive and original goods and samples. A sizable part of them reaches the stage of large-scale production and is exported to other regions in the course of investment. The transitional post-Soviet world has become a new geo-strategical reality. This chaotic world has buried the earlier East, once a powerful pole of authority, under the debris of planned economy. The speaker believed that the world South, the former Third World, also had lost its unity, splitting into several autonomous spaces on the world map. The system-forming factor gradually shifts geo-economically from the North Atlantic region to Asia and the Pacific. The Greater Pacific Rim includes such a non-traditional component as the Hindustan - Latin America axis. The New East, the second industrial space of the world, is forming there. In a sense, it came to replace the Communist civilisation, filling the vacuum that emerged after its collapse. At the same time, another quite uneasy region is forming in the backwoods of civilisation, namely, the Deep South, an archipelago of territories affected by social chaos. It is becoming gradually an independent growing anti-system. In the speaker's opinion, the existence of this world underground is determined by the shadow globalisation of asocial and criminal trends with various aetiologies.

Several reports covered the topic New World Order: Methodological Aspects of Modern Social Science. This was the subject of the reports delivered by *M.A. Cheshkov* (the RAS Institute of World Economy and International Relations) and *L.I. Mefieftiv* (the RAS Institute for Oriental Studies). The problems they considered hardly can be solved once and forever because of their transformational character, which radically changes the appearance of the human universe before our eyes. Discussing the role and place of Africa in the forming global context, the participants were mostly pessimists concerning its future, despite rather successful economic development of the continent in the recent period.

The participants of the final plenary meeting of the conference paid homage to the Africanists who passed away recently: V.N. Kudryavtsev, V.M. Misyugin, N.V. Okhtina, V.I. Sharaev, I.E. Sinitsina, G.V. Smirnov and V.N. Vavilov.

The writer is grateful to the chairpersons and co-chairpersons of the sections whose records were used to prepare this review: V.T. Morozov,

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NOTES

1. For details see: Africa at the Threshold of the Third Millenium. Abstracts. VIII All-Russian Conference of Africanists. Moscow, 1999 (in English).

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Alexander Balezin

Institute of General History

**Afro-centrism and Euro-centrism at the Eve of the 21st Century:
African Studies in the World Context the International Conference
(Moscow, September 8–9, 1999)**

The conference, organized by the Centre for African Studies (the RAS Institute of General History) and the History of Africa Centre (Institute of Asian and African Studies, Moscow State University), was held at the Institute of General History (IGH) and Institute of Asian and African Studies (IAAS). In spite of absence of an official notice, it was timed to coincide with the 70th birthday of the head of both centres Prof. Apollon DAVIDSON, an eminent Russian expert in history of Africa.

Together with the scholars of these centres, the conference was attended by a dozen and a half of foreign scholars and by researchers from all major centres of African studies located in Moscow. Their reports dealt with the following problems formulated by the organizing committee to be discussed at the conference:

- Afro-centrism and Euro-centrism in African studies;
- African studies in the light of discussions about racism;
- from pan-Africanism to African renaissance;
- new sources for African studies and documents concerning Africa: their importance for studies in Afro-centrism and Euro-centrism;
- new approaches to African history in the light of the problem of Afro-centrism and Euro-centrism;
- Africa and Europe: how do they see each other in the distorting mirrors of «centrism»;
- Russia and discussions about Afro- and Euro-centrism: trends and traditions.

The conference began with congratulating A.B. Davidson on the occasion of his jubilee. The congratulations were brief and informal, because the programme did not provide for lengthy speeches. Inaugurating the conference, *A.O. Chubaryan*, the director of the IGH and corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, mentioned A.B. Davidson's immense contribution to the development of historical studies in Russia. *S.I. Shvetsova*, deputy head of the Roszarubezhtsentr (successor of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies) praised

A.B. Davidson's public activity and personal contribution to strengthening Russia's friendship and cooperation with the African peoples.

Delivering his introductory report, *A.B. Davidson* (IGH – IAAS) called attention to the necessity of a profound study of three issues.

The first of them is the transformation of the Afro centrist ideas from Edward Bliden, Henry Sylvester Williams, William Dubois, George Padmore, Leopold Cedare Senghor, Sheikh Anta Diop and Ali Mazroui to the modern trends, which emerged after the World War II, when the outer impact on African ideological trends considerably weakened. The speaker paid a special attention to the conception of African renaissance.

The second issue is the influence of Afro-centrism, as well as Ori-ento centrism, on the complicated and controversial changes in modern Euro-centrism.

The third issue is the relation between Afro- and Euro-centrism in the Comintern's slogans and practical activities and Soviet Union's foreign policy.

The topic of *M.A. Tolmacheva's* (USA) report was *Globalisation in African Studies*. She described the ongoing processes in African studies in the USA. In particular, she emphasized that the approach of American experts in African affairs is «transcontinental». Criticising Euro-centrism, they overestimate the role of African cultural values in America; this is characteristic of Afro-American authors.

The speaker also stressed a difference between African studies in the USA from those in other countries of the Western hemisphere and Europe: studies in the affairs of the Afro-American diaspora obviously prevail over regional issues. She noted that the number of the African languages taught at US universities progressively reduces. The largest US centre of African studies is the Michigan State University.

N.B. Kochakova (the RAS Institute for African Studies, further IAS) titled her report *Afro-centrism in Historical Studies: Pros and Cons*. She distinguished two stages in the development of African studies in Africa: (1) the late 1950s to 1970s and (2) the 1980s and 1990s.

The first period was that of progress in all spheres of African studies and numerous scholarly publications. Its main trend was the development of an African approach to African history, namely, elucidation of the African peoples' role as creators of African history, active opposition to colonial historiography, revision of history of the colonial period, preparation of comprehensive plans of studying history of the continent

with an emphasis on retrieving and using African verbal and nonverbal sources.

The second period was characterized by weakened interest of non-Africans in the African problems, strengthening of the Afro-American cultural influence at the expense of the European influence and complete Africanisation of scholarly community in Africa. The main factor that determined the condition of African studies in Africa became a change in the structure of sources: the old basis, which consisted mainly of written sources, had been exhausted. The data base of the African sources is formed mostly by collecting and processing materials of oral tradition and studying nonverbal sources, such as interpretation of symbols used in fine arts, rituals etc. The shortcomings of this period include an inclination for specialized studies, shortage of conceptual and generalizing studies and a trend towards mythologising African history.

The topic of *M. Tamarkin's (Israel)* report was *Ethnicity and State in Africa: a Re-evaluation*. He described the intricate interrelation between ethnicity and government structures in Africa and criticized the generally accepted viewpoints concerning these phenomena.

I.I. Filatova (RSA-Russia) headed her report *African State vs. African Renaissance? The Historical Prospects of the State in Africa*. She considered historical emanations of the state or, rather, statehood institution in Africa, as well as its contemporary features. The speaker's main thesis was that these features were determined at all stages of statehood development in Africa not by outer impacts (the «artificial» character of the contemporary African states) or the domestic «tradition» but by their synthesis, which reflected the «distortion» of the dominant world order by the local conditions. The speaker stressed that in fact not an existing ideal but this «distortion» itself is the world order, the mode of existence of the majority of the world population, including, naturally, the Africans.

I. Grau (Austria) spoke about *Afro-centrism and Euro-centrism in the Historiography of the «Female War» (1929) in the southeast of Nigeria in the colonial period*. She demonstrated that both Afro centrist and Euro centrist approaches might be traced in historical studies concerning this event.

S.Y. Berzina (the State Museum of the East) covered the topic of the *Baule World Tree: Common Features of the World Perception in Africa and Europe*. She described a monumental metal sculpture preserved at the museum and proved that this sculpture, created by a Baule before the mid-19th century, is a «world tree». Comparing it with wooden ana-

logues, the speaker found that a canonical image of the «world tree» formed in Tropical Africa. This is a basis for demonstrating this category in the traditional societies of the continent.

The speaker emphasized that the Baule «world tree» coincides with the general civilisational scheme of the structure of the Universe. As for details, the closest analogues of this phenomenon may be found in Scandinavian myths and ancient German and Scandinavian art. This testifies to similarity of world perception in Europe and Africa.

Speaking about *Ethiopo-centrism and the Ethiopian Society*, G.V. Tsypkin (IGH) considered Afro-centrism on the level of an individual country. In his opinion, such features of the historical development of Ethiopia as early formation of statehood, adoption of Christianity in the 4th century A.D., tradition of independent development, isolation from the Christian world in a Muslim milieu and some other specific features of this Christian society led the Ethiopians to view themselves and the outer world in a peculiar manner. This is what the speaker meant by Ethiopocentrism.

N.G. Shcherbakov (IAAS) considered *Ideology of Contemporary Russian Racism*. He emphasized that the features of this phenomenon originate in the firm belief that it is very easy to evade responsibility for manifestations of xenophobia and in the state agencies' surprisingly short-sighted policy, which actually encourages racist attitudes of public organizations, some mass media, creative and even clerical circles.

This line of government and parastatal structures, which fail to punish those who attack foreign students for racial reasons, overlook essentially Fascist actions of the Russian National Unity and other similar organisations, and neglect numerous manifestations of racism in everyday life (ordinary Russians sometimes even do not guess that this is nothing but racism) is obvious to foreign observers and scholars, who criticise it quite sharply.

A belief in Russia's exceptional role in the world, in a specific path of the Russians' national development and other great-power misgivings may finally lead and already lead the young generation to be infected by racist ideals and racial intolerance, the speaker said. Paradoxically, this attitude may guide the new socio-political forces that are going to overcome the consequences of the present crisis in the country.

The heading of the report delivered by S.V. Mazov (IGH) was *Racism – Russian Style? African Students in the USSR, 1960*. He noted that more than 500 African students learned in the USSR, of whom 209 lived in Moscow. They regularly experienced minor manifestations of racism in

their everyday life, although more serious excesses also took place. However, the Soviet authorities claimed that there can be no racism in the «country of proletarian internationalism» and blamed foreign intelligence agencies for such incidents. The speaker emphasised that the Africans were equalized with the people of the white and other races and divided into socially close and alien people on the basis of their class affiliation. It was then that the Soviet authorities prepared a long-term programme of attracting the young generation of Africans to socialist ideology. The speaker distinguished the pragmatic and ideological approaches to this issue. The main principles of this policy remained unchanged until the disintegration of the USSR.

E.S. Lvova (IAAS) delivered a report headed *Sheikh Anta Diop's Ideas: the Past or the Present?* She noted that the ideas concerning primacy and specificity of African culture and history, advanced by this Senegalese scholar almost five decades ago, have not been abandoned. They were brought into life by active rejection of Euro-centrism, the dominant ideology of that period, by the philosophical conception of negritude and by discoveries of the Lika family, which made Africa a part of the zone of anthropogenesis.

The speaker emphasized that Diop's works gave rise to the ideas of his successors, many of whom developed his conceptions further. At the same time, these works were subject to sharp criticism, which revealed weakness and extremely emotional nature of the author's arguments. In spite of this criticism and new materials involved in researches after the publication of these works, Sheikh Diop's ideas evoke the public's interest; his books are republished; new people, inspired by recent archaeological findings in Ethiopia, become adepts of his theory.

The second day of the conference began with a speech of *Prof. M.S. Meyer*, director of the IAAS. On behalf of his colleagues he congratulated A.B. Davidson on the occasion of his jubilee and noted that this eminent scholar works at the chair of African studies of the Institute almost since its foundation.

E. Blakely (USA) used a quotation from Bible in the heading of his report *Neither Grass Is Greener Nor Is There Any Shelter: Comparison of the Perception of the Blacks in Europe at the Middle and the End of the 20th Century*. He showed that the Africans' hopes for a better life in Europe did not come true.

A.S. Balezin (IGH-IAAS) spoke about «*Afro-Germans*» in *Germany: Their destinies in the Setting of Radical Euro-centrism*. Afro-Germans are people with both German and African blood in their vessels. They

were born in the German colonies as a result of marriages or affairs between German males and African females or (quite seldom) marriages between German women and African men. The German authorities strove to prevent such marriages.

With time, a large group of such half-castes formed in Germany. Initially they were quite well off there. Naturally, their condition deteriorated during the economic crisis of the 1920s, but some of them got financial aid from various organizations. When the Nazis came to power, the «Afro-Germans'» destiny was tragic: following the principles of militant Euro-centrism, the authorities declared them racially inferior and deprived them of German citizenship; all male «Afro-Germans» were sterilized.

F. Bonner (RSA) dedicated his report to *Afro-centrism and Euro-centrism in the Policy of the Black Elite in South Africa between the World Wars*. The black elite in South Africa was a much more complicated phenomenon in that period than it is thought usually. It was brought into life by a multifaceted synthesis of traditional and new elements. Its central idea was «Maibuye Africa!» (Regain Africa!). This implied regaining a revived continent and African renaissance, which is essentially an Afro centrist idea.

J. Harnischfeger (FRG) spoke about *African Renaissance and Sorcery in South Africa*. He reminded that the current RSA legislation about sorcery was adopted a hundred years ago. It was considered officially that sorcery is impossible, and therefore the authorities protected the people charged with it. Recently a special commission was formed to investigate murders of witches and sorcerers. It criticised this legislation, finding that most of the inhabitants of the country still believe in sorcery, and recommended to criminalize it.

This report evoked a great interest and an animated discussion.

S. Jones (USA) presented a report headed *Euro-centrism or Afro-centrism in the «Negro Question»? Comintern's Reaction in the Early 1920s*.

V.P. Gorodnov (IGH) considered the problem of *Euro-centrism and Afro-centrism as a Subjective Reaction to the Objective Process of Rapprochement of the African and European Peoples*. In his opinion, both Euro- and Afro-centrism are manifestations of a subjective socio-psychological and cultural-psychological reaction to the objective process of rapprochement of Africa and Europe in the 20th century. Euro-centrism, which manifests itself in the demonstration of imperial superiority, was most notable in the colonial period, in the first half of the 20th

century. Afro-centrism developed mostly in the postcolonial period as a negative reaction of the social forces and prominent politicians and artists who failed to find their niches in the rapprochement of both continents.

The speaker noted that the trends towards self-isolation and resistance to the convergence are visible not only in the Afro-European relations. They also manifest themselves in Russian history. For instance, a peculiar form of Russo-centrism develops in post-Soviet Russia, which may be noted in the relations with both European and CIS countries.

V.I. Evseyenko (Kirov Medical Institute) reported about the *Contemporary Policy of Totalitarianism from the Viewpoint of Euro- and Afro-centrism*. He considered various approaches to totalitarianism in Africa and outside, taking the example of African totalitarian regimes, such as Sekou Toure's regime in Guinea.

O. Hulec (Czechia) told the audience about the *Assumptions, Results and Repercussions of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in the RSA*. He emphasized that the ANC won the election owing to the idea of cooperation and peaceful coexistence of all races on the basis of the democratic principles of the Charter of Human Rights.

The main task of the commission was to uncover the dark aspects of the past of the country and prevent growth of hostility and striving for large-scale uncontrolled revenge.

Analysing the main conclusions of the commission, the speaker hoped that its work would pay a valuable contribution to achieving full reconciliation in South Africa. He wanted its recommendations concerning continuation of criminal proceedings to be valid in the 21st century, unlike what happened in Czechia.

F. Eidelberg (RSA) headed his report *Foreign Policy of the African National Congress (1979–1988): from Afro-centrism to Euro-centrism*. From 1950 to roughly 1980 the ANC's policy was based on the Freedom Charter. In the international affairs, it meant formal non-alignment, combined with sympathies for the Soviet block. When the administrative system of Apartheid weakened in the mid-1970s, the ANC decided to combine armed struggle with such political methods as participation in the activities of the United Democratic Front and local self-government bodies. However, pursuing this policy, the ANC was subject to the ideological influence of the UDF and had to give up some provisions of the Freedom Charter. This meant a deviation from Afro-centrist positions and transition to Euro-centrist ones.

The topic of V.G. Shubin's (IAS) report was *The New President of the RSA in the Mirror of Recent Publications*. Quoting numerous examples, some of which are very recent, the speaker demonstrated inaccuracy and even falseness of the information about Tabo Mbeki in some media, including Russian ones.

N. Redlingheis (RSA) stressed in her report *African Renaissance: a View from South Africa* that although this term is widespread in the RSA, this word itself was borrowed from a different historical and cultural context. The speaker was convinced that the Afrikaners were the first inhabitants of the southern part of the continent who described themselves as Africans, because this is the accurate translation of «Afrikaner».

Mrs. Redlingheis's report was followed by an animated discussion and a vigorous protest of the guests from the South African embassy.

All participants and guests of the conference noted that it was unusually interesting and had not exhausted the theme of Afro- and Eurocentrism but made the researchers pay attention to a series of new problems.

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Tatiana Deich

Institute for African Studies

**Russian-African Relations:
Present-Day Situation and the Outlook for the Future**
Round Table Discussion (Moscow, April 14, 1999)

The IAS Centre for Russian-African Relations held a round table discussion on the Russian-African relations. Reports were presented by the scholars of the RAS Institute for African Studies (hereinafter – IAS) (*V.V. Lopatov, V.I. Gusarov, T.L. Deich, V.K. Vigand, L.P. Kalinina, V.I. Vysotskaya, P.I. Kupriyanov, V.S. Baskin*), other academic institutions and research centres, representatives of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*O.N. Shcherbak*), students and post-graduates of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia and scholars from African countries (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire and Sudan).

The speakers noted that Africa is not a priority region in Russia's foreign policy. With the beginning of *perestroika*, the main trend of this policy was to look westward. Now the situation is changing, but the Third World still is not the focus of Russia's interests. The reasons of this situation include the economic crisis and related financial and other difficulties. The propaganda of the first years of *perestroika*, when Africa was blamed for many troubles of our economy, also played its negative role. Those who did so forgot that Africa was a traditional supplier of many valuable primary materials and minerals, as well as products of tropical agriculture, to the USSR and, at the same time, a vast market for our industrial products, particularly for industrial equipment.

Is it in Russia's national interests to maintain close relations with African countries? Many speakers raised this question, and most of them answered it in the affirmative. They reminded that Russia has found itself a third-class country, whose interests are seldom taken into account (the developments in Yugoslavia exemplify this). If it is interested in occupying a worthier position in the world arena, it needs a support. One should not underestimate Africa's role in this problem. Its 54 countries are UNO members; it has a status of non-permanent member of the Security Council and therefore is capable to influence decision-making in this body. Once many African countries aligned with the USSR concerning many issues of vital importance for peace and progress.

The speakers reminded that one should not neglect the decades-old contacts and advocated activation of political relations with the African countries, whose level is obviously lower than it can be.

Discussing Russia's national interests in Africa, many participants pointed to the acute problem of security in the modern world. It is topical to both Russia and Africa. Coordination of the efforts aimed at settling crises and preventing conflicts corresponds to both parties' interests.

A special attention was paid to Russia's economic interests in Africa. The speakers mentioned, in particular, that expanding economic connections with African countries, our economy gets a chance to adapt itself to the world market and international division of labour. However, whereas stable trade was ensured in the Soviet period by supplying equipment complexes for the projects covered by agreements on economic, scientific and technological cooperation, today most of the objects of bilateral trade are traditional Russian and African export goods. Russia acts in the African market as a supplier of raw materials, not as an industrial country. Meanwhile, the leading world powers admit Africa's role as a source of raw materials. They pay due attention to its mineral wealth, which accounts for 10% of the world deposits of strategic raw materials and 80% of precious metals. The development of the Russian-African trade is hampered by lack of state support for Russian exporters, Russian producers' inexperience to rigidly compete with Western companies, their insufficient knowledge of the African market, transportation problems, weak legal basis of trade and economic relations etc.

Some speakers believed that Russia's interests in Africa are not so important to consider it a «sphere of Russia's national interests», because this means a level of economic relations that justifies application of political methods for their protection. Those who opposed this term thought that the country's partners in the region must be reminded of the importance and long-term character of Russian economic relations with them. At the same time, it is a message to other countries, a warning about Russia's intention to continue its presence in the continent, which is hardly appropriate in this situation. Nevertheless, the participants agreed that having or not having national interests in Africa is not an obstacle to establishing comprehensive relations with the countries of the continent.

It was also noted that certain progress was achieved in the development of the Russian-African relations in the recent years. Agreements were signed with 12 African countries in 1998; joint commissions for

cooperation resumed their activities; the Russian-African trade turnover increased; a trend towards strengthening of military cooperation was visible. Russian-African political contacts became more intense than earlier. Exchange of opinion between the Russian and African foreign ministries continued; African diplomats in Moscow regularly met the deputy foreign minister of Russia in charge of Africa; the foreign minister also met many his African counterparts. Several ministerial and deputy-ministerial Russian delegations visited African countries to reanimate economic, military, technological and cultural cooperation. In 1998 Russian leaders received presidents of Namibia and Angola; deputy foreign minister V.V. Posuvalyuk visited Zimbabwe and South Africa. The participants of these meetings discussed the measures aimed at activating Russian-African relations in many spheres.

The speakers emphasized the necessity to activate trade and technoeconomic cooperation with Africa, first of all, with the countries that are most interested in the scientific, industrial and intellectual potential Russia may offer. They recommended long-term purchase of the products that the African producers feel it difficult to sell in Europe.

It was stressed that private business has become an important channel for developing trade and economic cooperation with Africa, while the state agencies fail to promote it; this trend must be continued. To form new approaches to economic cooperation, the speakers recommended a thorough analysis of the US, Chinese and other countries' experience. They called the state agencies to pay a keen attention to the priority spheres of cooperation with Africa and develop programmes of sponsoring and stimulating export of Russian industrial goods to that continent.

The speakers mentioned the great importance of peacemaking operations in Africa, considered it at present as a priority. Russia already takes part in peacekeeping and acts as a mediator in settling internal discords in Angola and the Horn. In many participants' opinion, playing a more active role in these efforts, Russia can not only regain its prestige in the region, lost in the recent period, but also acquire an experience to be applied in solving similar problems at home. This also will be useful in theoretical development and practical application of the preventive diplomacy conception.

Today Russia is unable to offer Africa a large-scale humanitarian aid, but it can exert a purposeful influence on the states that are especially important for Russian foreign policy by giving them aid so that they get a real advantage for the Russian-African relations. The speakers meant

Russia's potential allies and the smallest countries that cannot receive sufficient aid from other sources. In addition, peacekeeping operations are a chance to advertise Russian weapons and military hardware and demonstrate their high efficiency under extreme conditions.

The participants believed that contacts with African scholarly centres and training of African students in Russia on the contractual basis are a highly promising sphere of Russian-African relations. The Peoples' Friendship University of Russia with its numerous African students is an important tool of such cooperation.

The speakers underlined the need of a radical revision of Russia's policy in Africa. It does not claim a «niche» there, and this precludes its rigid competition with the USA, France or Britain. It does not possess much financial resources, but its technological, scientific and cultural potential may be useful to Africa.

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Lubov Prokopenko
Institute for African Studies

**Political Modernisation in Africa:
Some Results and Appraisals**

Round Table Discussion (Moscow, December 5, 2000)

The IAS Centre for Sociological and Political Studies and the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences for the Problems of Africa held a round table discussion on the problems of political modernisation in African states. Opening the meeting, *N.D. Kosukhin* mentioned the importance of the problem of liberalisation of socio-political relations in African countries. Naturally, the decade that passed after the return of most of the African states to the multiparty system is too a short period for all-round conclusions and generalisations. Nevertheless, analysis of the political processes that took place in Africa in the 1990s permits to draw some intermediate conclusions concerning both positive and negative trends in political modernisation of the African states.

Mr. *Kosukhin* analysed in his paper the internal and external factors that influenced the transition of many African countries to political pluralism. Their postcolonial development was characterized by direct borrowing of the Western state and political structures. This led to the destruction of the traditional government institutions. Many African models of social development were eclectic and unstable. Lack of democratic traditions and dependence on the former parent states hampered the modernization of economic and political structures. Poverty, inter-ethnic contradictions, political instability and permanent menace of a military coup badly aggravated political situation.

In the setting of political instability, lack of civil consent in spite of the menace of territorial disintegration as a result of struggle for power among various groupings, one-party systems formed in almost all African countries, leading to establishment of authoritarian political regimes. In the late 1980s they existed in 38 of 45 countries of Tropical Africa.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, against the background of the worldwide trend towards democratisation, changes occurred in the political, legislative and other spheres of social life of many African countries, irrespective of the political and ideological orientation and socio-

economic policy of their governments. The most important result of these transformations was emergence of multiparty regimes.

The speaker noted that the problems of political modernisation attracted keen attention of experts in the African affairs. Some optimists believed that the ongoing changes would serve economic development of the African countries, especially since some European political leaders demonstrated their interest in transplanting the Western models of democracy to Africa. As a rule, the West conditioned economic aid to African countries by democratic transformations, such as introduction of a multiparty system, protection of human rights, freedom of mass media and democratic election.

Transition to democracy is not confined to a simple replacement of the political regime, proclamation of civil rights and freedoms and introduction of a multiparty system. The experience shows that democracy is a political system that makes it possible to replace officials and possesses a social mechanism that enables the majority of the population to influence decision-making, choosing the best candidate from among rivals in election. Political modernisation takes place in most of the African countries in absence of the socio-economic, political, cultural and psychological preconditions of democracy. The question arises: how much do the Western models of democracy correspond to the African reality? These models are hardly applicable in a society with a strong influence of the traditional institutions and conceptions, as well as of religious, ethnic and psychological factors.

The speaker analysed the ruling structures in modern Africa and relations between the authorities and opposition. Political changes were accompanied there not as much by expansion of the social basis of the new regimes as strengthening of the patronage-clientele relations, growth of ethno-religious movements and emergence of «ethnic democracy». Some governments are unable to control the situation in their countries and prevent development of parallel centres of power and influence. A kind of symbiosis of individual principles and institutions of the traditional and new, «pro-bourgeois» forms of democracy, autocracy and elements of archaic rule is observed in the sphere of power relations. The statehood that emerges on such a basis seems to combine modern and archaic patrimonial features. The African socio-political structures include a strong component of ethnic-clan relations. Opposition has not formed in Tropical Africa as an organised political force that relies on certain social strata. Essentially, political struggle is waged by different fractions of the elite. In this situation the multiparty system

became a tool for institutionalisation of the opposition on the basis of ethnic, regional or denominational interests.

Concluding his report, *N.D. Kosukhin* noted that the path of democratic changes entails many difficulties; it will not be short or easy. In the final analysis, democratisation reflects search for alternative paths of development. On a number of occasions political dynamics consists not of transition from authoritarianism to democracy but in the opposite direction. S. Huntington, a political scientist from the USA, is of the opinion that democratisation develops according to the principle «two steps forward, one step backward». The speaker noted that Lenin's maxim «one step forward, two steps backward» describes the situation in some African countries much better.

Several participants of the round table analysed the general problems of political modernisation in Africa in the context of the globalisation.

E.E. Lebedeva (the RAS Institute of World Economy and International Relations) believed that political liberalisation is mostly forced and imitative in the states of Tropical Africa. The crisis of the «state-nation» model and failure of the attempts to adapt this product of certain stage of the socio-political evolution in the West to totally different formational and civilizational realities were inevitable. It was demonstrated more than once that many social, political and cultural preconditions of creating a «state-nation» are absent or already deformed in Africa.

In this situation, the international financial institutions suggested a new development strategy, objectively oriented towards the postindustrial-globalist paradigm of social evolution that is forming in the Western world. The tools of its realisation are structural readjustment programmes in the economy and political liberalisation. In their turn, they delivered a serious blow upon stability and controllability of most of the countries of the region. Divestment and political liberalisation, which took the shape of institutionalisation of tribal or ethno-regional separatism, stimulated conflicts and ended in a government collapse in some countries. All this undermined vague ideas of national identity and discredited the «state-nation» model.

The speaker emphasized that the crisis of this model of statehood is more than obvious. To the Africans, ethnic identity was and is a fundamental principle within the framework of collective identity, characterized by an intricate multilevel structure. The African political elites must admit this and look for a statehood model that is acceptable in the polyethnic and multicultural societies, unless they want to witness growing social chaos and collapse of statehood, not to mention eco-

conomic backwardness and marginal position of the African countries in world economy. This approach also is supported by the advent of the postmodernist and global epoch with such characteristic phenomena as the change in the position of national identity in the identification matrix and stake on multiculturalism.

N.I. Vysotskaya drew the audience's attention to weakening of the state, which began in the course of structural readjustment and is topical not only to the ruling circles of the African countries but to the public. This problem began to receive attention as early as the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is proven by a series of African politicians' and scholars' statements. Analysing the probable catastrophic consequences of the state's withdrawal from economy, they predicted disorganisation of the entire socio-economic life of the African society.

The speaker noted that the structural adjustment programmes implemented in the African countries bring the state's economic role almost to naught. The state has been weakened and deprived of the tools of influence. Some African leaders and knowledgeable public figures fear that structural readjustment may result in re-colonisation of Africa. Economic aid is used to put pressure on the political sphere, to restructure it, following the Western democratic model.

The problem of deetatisation was covered in the report delivered by *V.I. Gusarov*. He concentrated at the crisis of the postcolonial state, which proved on many occasions unable to control the situation within the country. The examples of Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, Rwanda etc. show that their state institutions (army, police, etc.) failed to cope with the acute political and socio-economic problems, which led to their virtual disintegration with partial or even full deetatisation. He stressed that the pandemic of AIDS, which affected the continent, was an important factor of these developments. Around 100 mln Africans are HIV-carriers. One fifth of the Zambian and a quarter of the Zimbabwean population are infected. The speaker questioned the thesis of the main report concerning «universal poverty» of Africans, giving examples of a sharp differentiation between the incomes of various social strata in Africa on the whole and in individual countries. He expressed the opinion that it is impracticable and utopian to solve the complex of the African problems by re-colonisation.

V.I. Komar noted that in spite of the economic, political, religious and other problems that hamper the establishment of democracy in Africa, the democratic process has become irreversible to an extent. Involvement of the continent in the global development process acceler-

ates the penetration of modern information technologies and new ideas to Africa. Some elements of civil society emerge there, such as legal opposition, public movements, independent press, free election and multiparty system. The Western models of democracy cannot be imposed on the African countries; they must be adjusted to the domestic cultural, psychological and political trends. However, earlier or later, Africa will perceive the principles of democratic development, retaining the African traditions or adapting them to the new conditions.

A.M. Khazanov (the RAS Institute for Oriental Studies) held that, considering political modernization in Africa in the 1990s, one should describe it as quasidemocracy. In Africa and Asia, he said, we deal mostly with traditional societies. Despotism was and is perceived there as a natural and the only possible form of government. This leads to sacralisation of a ruler or leader. Adherence to democracy is not characteristic of African leaders. The basis of an African socius is the collectivist tradition. Social harmony and consensus are the supreme purposes to an African. Therefore, looking from the standpoint of the historical prospect, transformations may be a success there only if political modernisation is combined with the traditional values of the African society.

The problem of the development and preservation of interethnic harmony in Africa in the setting of globalisation was considered by *G.B. Starushenko*, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He emphasised that the solution of the ethnic problems in the continent depends to a great degree on the official conception of the state's nationality policy. If this policy is aimed at the representation of different ethnoses in the local and central administration, if active measures are taken to develop national and cultural identity of the main ethnic groups, the role of the ethnic factor may be alleviated. This will create favourable conditions for an improvement in interethnic relations, achievement of political stability and activation of integration processes.

A.A. Obaje, a postgraduate researcher of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia), considered the choice of economic strategy by African states in the course of political modernisation. Few changes have taken place in most of these countries after four decades of independence. Some authors claim that their independence is confined to politics. Their political system is still at the initial stage of its development. The main components of the political milieu, such as the types of the state, civil society, market, institutional structures and ideology, cannot be described as developed.

Politics reflects economy in all epochs. Political development directly influences the state's economic decisions, which, in their turn, affect such macroeconomic indices as the social development model, the population's welfare, etc. The African countries may justify themselves by the fact that in the recent two or three decades their development was subject to cataclysms and impacts, which originate mainly from the outside. Yet one fact is clear: the political elites of Africa are responsible for the destinies of their peoples. As for sustained economic development, no African country has received sufficient aid from the Western countries and international financial organisations. It is obvious that the solution should be looked for within these countries themselves or the region. In the speaker's opinion, growing poverty, recession of production and strengthening social stratification are caused by an erroneous development strategy, based on false political convictions and ideals. This means that the African countries have to redeem the approaches to the functioning of the society. The continent can be rescued from the present economic abyss, but to do so, one should reckon with the traditional values of the African society and elaborate a development strategy based on the domestic resources.

The problem of political modernisation encompasses a broad circle of issues. A major concern of state leaders is preservation of territorial integrity of their states and integration of various ethnoses into a single nation in the case of multiethnic countries.

This problem is of a special importance in Nigeria, where the British colonial authorities artificially created a federation of their large colonies. *B.G. Petruk* noted in his report that the problem of integration in Nigeria is by and large the problem of peaceful coexistence of various ethnoses. Due to the features of their ethnic identity and solidness of their territories, they are able to form viable independent states. The Nigerian federation is still at the initial stage of its development. In other words, federalism is modernised in Nigeria.

Some Nigerians advance the idea of transforming the federation into a confederation. The most ardent advocates of this transformation are the inhabitants of southern Nigeria, who consider the distribution of authorities and budget allocations between the states unjust. Earlier, the military regimes suppressed such agitation. Now, after democratic civil rule was introduced in May 1999, it is launched openly.

The introduction of the Sharia legislation by ten northern states of Nigeria shows that they have unilaterally appropriated more autonomy than it is provided for by the constitution.

The opponents of introducing Sharia advance several weighty arguments. However, the attempts to legalize the application of the Sharia standards always were a problem of the Nigerian federation. The constitution recognizes the rulings of the Sharia courts in the domain of family law. At the same time, it prohibits from introduction of a state religion.

When the deliberations of the constituent assembly, convened by president Ibrahim Babangida, bogged down on the question of introducing Sharia, he threatened to dissolve the assembly unless this item was deleted from the agenda. Many people feared that religious and ethnic contradiction might sharpen during the political reform. These fears have come true. Over 2,000 people were murdered in communal and ethnic clashes within 18 months of democratic rule. The material damage inflicted by them amounts to hundreds of millions of Naira. It seems probable that the Sharia laws introduced in the northern states will remain valid, in spite of protests of the Christian communities and numerous public organisations. O. Obasanjo, the new president, temporised in this question though denounced acts of violence committed against non-Muslims in the north of the country, while vice president Abubakar Atiku supported the governors who introduced Sharia.

In this situation, the country witnessed a restoration of aggressive ethnic and religious associations, whose roots may be traced in the colonial epoch. The largest of them are: People's Congress of the Odua (the Yoruba), People's Congress of Arewa (advocates renaissance of the «indivisible North») and the Obanese Association (the Ibo).

The elite of the northern states painfully perceives the loss of their domination in the supreme government bodies. The Arewa leaders blame president Obasanjo for the alleged marginalisation of the North. At the opposite pole of the political axis, the leaders of the South demand not only to discontinue the anti-constitutional practice of introducing Sharia, punishing the organisers and participants of the clashes but to revise the whole federal structure. The speaker believed that the danger of a collapse of the federation, as it happened in the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, is quite obvious. Another question to be discussed is the problem of state leadership, which was the source of interethnic conflicts ever since Nigeria attained independence in 1960. The Nigerian leadership model must have a form that ensures peaceful coexistence of all peoples of the most populated African country.

R. Ekeoma, a postgraduate researcher of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, considered the influence of modernisation on the tra-

ditional African society, taking the institution of marriage in Nigeria as an example. The fundamentals of marriage and wedding ceremonies differ in different countries; at the same time, they are subject to evolution, retaining some traditional elements that reflect the people's spiritual life.

There were different types of marriage in the tradition of the Nigerian Ibo within the recent century. This ethnos considers family the supreme value. First of all, they include agreement match and love match. According to the tradition, a person who occupies certain position acts as a mediator between a man and a woman who have reached the nuptial age. Under the influence of the Western civilisation, some changes have occurred in the attitude to marriage in the recent decades. More and more marriages are concluded a result of love rather than of an agreement between the parents. Marriage is considered not a procreation factor but an alliance between a man and a woman. The words of family and divorce acquire new meanings under conditions of family planning. These phenomena (to use «family» in its European meaning) contradict the fundamentals of the traditional African society.

L.A. Nizskaya summed up some results of the political modernisation in Benin. In the 1990s, when the introduction of a multiparty system and liberalisation of the socio-political life in many African countries resulted in an aggravation of the internal ethnic, religious and regional conflicts, strengthening of separatism and, finally, to military coups and serious political crises, parliamentary election was held thrice (in 1991, 1995 and 1999) and presidential election twice (in 1991 and 1996) in Benin. All these procedures were not accompanied by any serious violations of law and order, which ensured succession of authority. In March 2001 the third presidential election took place in the country.

This is an especially surprising phenomenon after the country witnessed six coups d'état (four of them were military) within the first 12 years (1960-1972) of its postcolonial history and 20 governments succeeded each other in that period of acute struggle for the choice of the paths of economic and socio-political modernisation between the advocates of neo-bourgeois approaches and adherents of the «socialist orientation». Benin became an «proving ground» for testing various models of statehood: from a presidential republic with one-party system to military directorates and authoritarian one-party regime with the «socialist orientation». The citizens of Benin themselves hold that this regime totally failed in politics and economy. In 1990 the multiparty system and democratic standards of political life were restored in the country.

During the transition from an ideologically and politically motivated development model to the liberalization of economy and public life, the observers noted the most dangerous phenomena, which threatened domestic political stability in Benin. Economically, they pointed to the negative social consequences of the intense structural reforms carried out since the 1990s, which were fraught with a permanent socio-political crisis. Politically, they noted that the multiparty system became a tool of fragmentation of the politically active forces, a pseudo-multiparty system, a pseudonym of the struggle among the most ambitious representatives of the former «Latin quarter» of West Africa, as Benin was referred to in the colonial period.

Nevertheless, the experience of the recent decade, which became a serious school for the political class of Benin, and its leaders' ability to achieve compromises confirm that the democratic procedures of power transfer were observed during the third presidential election; the authorities managed to maintain stability, this important foundation of the further modernisation of the economy and society.

Taking Senegal as an example, *L.M. Sadovskaya* considered opposition as a subject of the political life of the country at the moment when it came to power. The advent of the opposition, led by A. Wad, A. Diouf's old rival, has not yet led to an expansion of democratic freedoms in the political or legislative sphere. The new ruler obviously strives to use authoritarian methods in governing the country. For instance, he has already said that after the adoption of the new constitution in 2001, he planned to introduce a «semi parliamentarian» regime with vast presidential authorities. This is done, first of all, to eliminate the former ruling parti, the Parti Socialiste du Senegal, from the political arena, in spite of its parliamentary majority. Preparing a referendum on the draft constitution, Wad hopes to get the Senegalese's consent for dissolving the lower house of the parliament and abolishing the senate, its upper house. This is the basis of his idea of the so-called semi parliamentarian regime. He promises «genuine» rights to his former rivals, who are in the opposition now, but their status will be like that provided for by the Canadian constitution.

The developments in Senegal, the speaker said, show that a transition of power to the opposition cannot solve the development problems. Objectively, the opposition groups become more and more equal to the ruling groups in political influence, and their rivalry is harmful to the development of the country and society. Stability is preserved by «transfu-

sion» of the political elites who were in power earlier into new groupings, which earlier opposed A. Diouf's regime.

V.I. Evseyenko (senior lecturer, Kirov State Medical Academy) illustrated transition from authoritarianism to democracy by the example of Guinea. Stage wise transition from the authoritarian rule of Sekou Toure's clan to multiparty democracy and civil society via an authoritarian-oligarchic system continues in this country for fifteen years. The Military committee for national renaissance, which came to power after a coup d'état, personified this system up to 1991.

The sequence of political institutions that emerged in the course of this evolution was as follows: the Military committee for national renaissance (1984) – the Transitional (on the path towards a civil regime) committee for national renaissance – issue of the Charter that permitted activity of political parties (1992) with the almost simultaneous formation of the Supreme court of justice, whose authorities included trial for the crimes committed by the head of the state and ministers, alternative presidential elections (1993 and 1995) – election of the National assembly with participation of 21 parties (1995), when the opposition won one third of the seats – restoration of the office of prime minister and appointment of a civilian to this office, election of president Lansana Conte as the honorary chairman of the pro-government Parti d'unité et progrès (1996 and 1997).

This is the façade of the democratic transformations that is a testimony to practical inculcation of the models of the Western society in Africa. It is a different question whether they can function properly in a different cultural milieu. The French senate decorated the Guinean president with the Golden medal for his contribution to building a democratic society with nationality-specific features. This means that the government of the Third republic has to take into account the traditionalist, ethno-psychological and religious factors and combine manoeuvring and containment of misuse of civil freedoms, since the post-totalitarian society has yet to learn how to apply these freedoms.

For instance, Lansana Conte promises the leftist opposition to reconcile contemporary Guinea with its predecessor of the epoch when the country attained independence. Joining the francophone movement, the government seemed to try to placate the rightist opposition. At the same time, the observers who evaluate democracy using the yardsticks of Western parliamentarianism hold that the present Guinean regime differs little from the earlier one in the methods of government.

Violations of human rights are revealed in anonymous leaflets circulated in the capital. Editors of independent periodicals are persecuted for their criticism of the authorities. The regime's most dangerous rival Alpha Conde was sentenced to imprisonment. The parliamentary election scheduled for December 26, 2000, was suspended indefinitely.

The ruling party considers its main purpose national consent, peace and stability. These priorities are extremely important in the complicated situation of the transitional period, when the government has to ensure democratic freedoms and limit the state's intervention in the modernisation process. That is why it seems appropriate to quote the observation made by S. Huntington, a US political scientist, mentioned by N.D. Kosukhin, to the effect that it is proper to support authoritarianism and sacrifice democracy for the sake of economic progress in the transforming societies, since the purpose of development is not freedom but law and order.

N.N. Rodionova considered development of a multiparty system in Madagascar. She paid special attention to the political transformations carried out there by president Didier Ratsiraka in the recent years.

N.D. Kosukhin summed up the results of the round table meeting. The discussion about political modernisation in Africa was constructive and demonstrated a happy combination of problem-based and country-based approaches.

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PUBLICATIONS ON AFRICA: ANNOTATIONS, SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander Balezin

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Under the Skies of My Africa [72]

The anthology begins with a brief preface by Prof. M.S. Meyer, director, Institute of the Asian and African Studies (Moscow State University) who noted that it had become possible to publish such a book owing to the strengthening connections between the chair for African studies of the institute, which had celebrated its 40th anniversary, and the Centre for African Studies (the RAS Institute of General History), which cooperated in the publication of the anthology.

Addressing the readers, A.S. Balezin emphasized that the experts in the African affairs who authored the new book to be published in series and wanted to give the Russian readers an idea of the history and the current problems of the Black Continent.

The first part of the anthology, *The Pages of History*, begins with *African Studies in Russia: When Did They Begin?* by A.B. Davidson. *Comintern's Emissaries* by V.P. Gorodnov for the first time describes the fates' mystery of B.I. Edelson, J. Clark and E. Dennis on the basis of documents preserved in Russian archives. *The Guinea of Dreams and Reality: the Soviet-Guinean Relations, 1958-1962* by S.V. Mazov also are based on the data collected in archives.

The second part of the anthology, *The African Peoples' Cultures and Languages*, begins with *Kirari in the Hausa Culture* by Y.G. Souetina, who describes expanded epithets used by this West African people. *Politeness: Zulu Style* by A.D. Lutskov deals with the methods of expressing polite attitude in this language, spoken in South Africa. *The Drums in the Sub-Saharan Peoples' Culture* by E.S. Lvova and *Milk Among the Fulani* by A.I. Koval are devoted to description of the role the concrete material objects play in the African peoples' life. The intricate linguistic situation that prevails in the south of Africa is illustrated by A.K. Ignatenko in *Territorial and Ethnic Varieties of Afrikaans* and by M.R. Urb in *The Linguistic Situation in Malawi: an Essay in History of Its Formation*.

The title of the third part of the anthology is *Travels and Meetings in Africa*. Two articles deal with Russians' first (*Meetings with Nyerere* by N.V. Gromova and last (*Mwalimu* by V.G. Shubin) encounters with the founder of Tanzania. A.S. Balezin (*Walking through East Africa: a Historian's Notes*) describes researchers' travels to the Black Continent.

African Folklore and Literature, the fourth part of the anthology, includes *The Swahili Detective Literature* by M.D. Gromov and *Interpretation of Swahili Proverbs* by K.W. Wamitila, a Kenyan philologist. The reader can get acquainted with the first Russian translation, made by N. Frolova from Swahili, of *So Thin and Feeble*, a short story by F. Macha with an insertion by M.D. Gromov.

The last part of the anthology is *Academic Life*. It includes *Russian Experts in African Affairs in the RSA* by A.B. Davidson and reports about scholarly conferences held by or with the participation of the Centre and Chair for African Studies of the Institute of General History.

On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Chair, the supplement to the anthology publishers attached a list of all students trained by the chair within 40 years, indicating the languages they studied. The front of the cover is decorated by a picture drawn by Nina Kibrik and the back by photos taken in Africa by A.S. Balezin and E.S. Lvova.

**African Woman:
Gender Aspect of Social Development [60]**

The monograph is the first Russian comprehensive study of the gender aspects of social development in Africa.

The main idea of the introduction is as follows: the question of women's place and roles in a society are among the eternal problems that excite the mankind since the very first centuries of its existence. Two totally opposite viewpoints coexisted in social consciousness of people in various countries and epochs. On the one hand, mythology emphasised that women are secondary and inferior to men and the male element is more powerful than the female one. On the other hand, women were deified and considered an ideal of nobility, virtue and beauty and the foundation of the whole moral and spiritual system of the society.

This dualism was also observed in the Africans' attitude to women. All researchers who write about the peoples of this continent stress that the African societies are characterised by antagonism and opposition between men and women in absolutely all spheres of life.

In the first part of the book, *Women and History*, the author concludes on the basis of numerous sources that the African history is rich in situations with women in the forefront of the political arena. They were founders of ruling clans and dynasties, sovereign queens and military chiefs, noble men's daughters, who plotted political intrigues, sorcerers and leaders of national liberation movements.

Mythology and people's fantasy often connected the origin of a clan, tribe or dynasty with female heroes, and their female ancestors were supposed to maintain close contacts with the totem from which a people's history began. Deeming a woman the ancestor of an ethnos, Africans deified the mother-progenitor, considering her the custodian of the home and family, the guarantor of welfare and moral standards, the symbol of legitimacy and sanctity of authority.

It is not by chance that political authority was inherited in the female line among many African peoples. Some societies had a tradition of joint rule of a man and his sister. Doing so, the supreme chief ensured legitimacy of his and his children's rule.

The cult of male and female ancestors, whose names became on many occasions titles of the supreme rulers, played a great role in social life. Gradually, this cult became inseparable from the cult of living chiefs and kings. Ethnologists emphasised that the cult of sacred kings and queens was among the most characteristic features of African religions.

Giving examples from the history of Ancient Egypt, Nubia and Madagascar of the 19th century, the author portrays queens and female Pharaohs, who played a great positive role in history of their states.

In the second part, *Women and Rituals*, the writer analyses the features of the relations between men and women within the system of interpersonal relations in a family, a kin and a community.

The main features of the dialogue and rivalry between the genders are considered in the light of rituals. The author stresses that unity and confrontation between the male and female elements began to occupy the central position in the archaic picture of the Universe and Africans' philosophical and religious system of world outlook.

The principles of gender relations are the base of all aspects of the Africans' life, such as family and communal relations, government, politics, economic life, rituals, moral and ethical attitudes, etc. It is most characteristic of Africa that the features of gender relations are rigidly fixed in the kinship terms, whose system reflected the scrupulously elaborated code of conduct of each member of the socius.

Gender antagonism is particularly manifest in the sphere of rituals, where the difference in their social position is visible most clearly. A male dominates ritual activities in most of the African cultures, while a woman often plays a passive or subordinate role. On many occasions, she is an object whose rights are sanctified by special rituals, which are similar to a taboo. In other words, delimitation of social roles often was not in favour of woman.

To get away from this vicious circle and occupy a worthy position in the social structure, African women resorted to various methods to liberate themselves from the "male" vision of their mission. One of the ways of winning the man's respect and overcoming women's bondage was creation of women's clandestine associations, sorcery and quackery as a path towards winning a kind of authority over the fellow-tribesmen.

To ease a social tension created by gender antagonism, many African peoples developed a ritual of status interchange, thus restoring natural and social balance and replacing real discontent, rivalry and confrontation by their jocular or fancy substitutes.

During such rituals men and women interchanged their garments and behaved like the opposite gender used to, i.e., all roles were intermixed, and all were totally free to behave and express their feelings during jocular quarrels between men and women, imitations of fighting and exchange of obscene expressions. In other words, this ritual amounted to temporarily suspending all prohibitions and establishing gender equality.

However, these rituals eased conflicts only for a short time; their affect was similar to that of anaesthesia. To establish genuine equality of men's and women's rights and duties, a revolution in the Africans' social consciousness is needed; it is possible only as a result of material changes in the mode of existence, production and socialisation within a socius. These conditions did not exist in the traditional society. They manifested themselves only in the recent years, enabling many African women to change their social status.

Sergei Mazov

Institute of General History

**Russia and Africa: Documents and Materials
(18 century –1960) [78]**

The collection of archive documents and materials in two volumes gives a lot of information about the relations between Russia and the countries of Tropical and South Africa and the concepts about Africa that existed in Russia and vice versa. Most of the documents are published for the first time. They were found mainly in Russian archives, such as the State Archives of the Russian Federation, Russian State Military Historical Archive, Russian Central State Archives of the Navy, Archives of Russian Empire's Foreign Policy, Archives of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, State Economic Archives, Russian Centre of Preservation and Study of Documents concerning Modern History, former Centre of Preservation of Modern Documents (now the Russian State Archives of Modern History), as well as several private collections of documents. The authors also collected their materials abroad, in the state archives of Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), Namibia (Windhoek), Zimbabwe (Harare), Mozambique (Maputo), Central Archives of the RSA (Pretoria), Transvaal Archives (Pretoria), Cape Province Archives (Cape town), the archives of the South African ministry of justice, Public Record Office (London) and German Federal Archives (the Potsdam branch).

The first volume covers the period between the 18th century and 1917. Russia's contacts with Africa were casual then. Its state interests in that continent were quite limited, being most notable in the south of Africa and Ethiopia.

Russia began to demonstrate interest in sub-Saharan Africa during the rule of Peter I (the early 18th century). The plans of the emperor who created a powerful army and navy were no longer confined to Europe and spread to oceanic width and ancient sea routes. Search of a land route to India via Central Asia was a failure. Therefore, in early 1723 Peter decided to send ships round Africa to reach India. The first expedition to the Indian Ocean was sent to establish Russian protectorate over the «glorious island of Madagascar». The message written by Peter to the chief of the pirates, «the king of Madagascar», did not reach its destination, because unskilfully built frigates proved unsuitable for a long voyage. The second project of rounding Africa appeared during the rule of Catherine II, in 1787, but its implementation was postponed because of a war with

Turkey. Russians appeared in the south of the continent in the late 18th century. The collection includes some excerpts from the diaries of Y.F. Lisyanskii, a navy officer, and G.S. Lebedev, a musician, who described the nature of the Cape colony, economic activities, everyday life and manners of its inhabitants.

The first Russian ships crossed the equator in the early 19th century. Then, up to the late 1860s, the route round Africa became the main sea communication between St. Petersburg and the regions of the Far East and Russian America. Dozens of ships went along this route. The collection quotes excerpts from a report of Adjutant-General E.V. Putyatin, a letter of A.V. Vysheslavtsev, an artist, little known diary of A.I. Butakov, a navy officer, and some other descriptions of South Africa. In addition to its exotic nature and aborigines' life, their attention was attracted by the rapid growth of new centres at the junction of world trade routes and such problems as the struggle against slave trade in the British colonies.

Interest in South Africa grew suddenly in Russia at the end of the century. It was because of its «second discovery», when the largest deposits of diamonds and gold in the world were found there. South Africa became one of the key regions in the western powers' struggle for the division of the world. It could not but affect Russia's policy, although it had no territorial claims in this region. The materials concerning the travels of Russian geologists to Transvaal show that Russia keenly studied the methods of mining in South Africa to apply them in Siberia and the Urals. Numerous Russians migrated to the south of Africa. Some 40,000 people shifted there between the 1880s and the World War I. Most of them were Jews who fled Russia to get rid of pogroms and discrimination. This made Russia hope for development of trade with South Africa. A document prepared by the Russian foreign ministry in 1903 read: «Being a site of lucrative earnings for Russian subjects, South Africa may also serve as a vast market for many our products» (p. 83). The collection includes a dozen of documents related to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Transvaal (whose official name was the Republic of South Africa) in 1898.

The Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, a major episode of international relations, attracted keen attention of not only official Russia but the Russian public. They unanimously supported the struggle of two small states against the British Empire. More than 200 Russian volunteers fought on Transvaal's side; two groups of doctors and nurses came from Russia. A report of the general staff characterized the volunteers, including lieutenant A.I. Guchkov, «a very brave man with an excellent reputation», who became later the leader of the Octobrist party and defence minister of the

Provisional Government. One of the most interesting documents of the section dealing with the Anglo-Boer War is a fragment from the notebook of a hero of that war and commander of an international detachment E.Y. Maximov, preserved in the archives of his successors. Russia's attitude to the war combined sympathy for the struggle of this small people, a fight between David and Goliath, with the striving to take advantage of the failures of Britain, its old adversary, and win superiority on the international arena. Detailed analysis of the influence on the Anglo-Boer War on international relations and Russia's foreign policy was made in a long report of the Russian deputy foreign minister V.N. Lamsdorf *On the Tasks of Russia's Foreign Policy in the Light of the Anglo-Boer War*.

By the late 19th century, Russia's presence was tangible not only in South Africa but in Ethiopia. Russia did not take part in the struggle for Africa. However, the colonial division of the continent influenced the relations among the European powers and could not but affect Russia's foreign policy. When the Suez Canal was opened, the routes across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden acquired a great importance as a shorter route between Europe and the Far East, which strengthened further as the Russian-Japanese relations deteriorated. Consequently, Russia strengthened its attention to the countries located along this route, particularly to Ethiopia, called then Abyssinia.

«The pioneer of Russian influence» in this country was N.I. Arshinov, a «free Cossack». In 1886-1889, leading a detachment of volunteers, mainly Cossacks, he went on expeditions to Ethiopia two times and founded a *stanitsa* (Cossack village), named Novaya Moskva, near the exit from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. It is unclear from the documents published in the collection whether his actions were a personal initiative or a screen of carefully camouflaged policy of the Russian ruling circles, who used Arshinov's expeditions as a trail balloon in order to establish themselves in Africa. Anyway, Russia was reluctant to be engaged in a conflict with France because of Novaya Moskva, admitting legitimacy of the actions of the French navy, which shelled the village in 1889.

Since the mid-1890s Russia activated its policy in Ethiopia quite officially. In the summer of 1895 the Ethiopian emperor Menelik II asked Nicholas II to help his country in rebuffing the Italian aggression. In December Russia donated 30,000 rifles and 5 mln cartridges to Menelik. The Italians near Massawa seized the Dutch ship that carried the weapons, and they were not used in the war of 1895–1896. Ethiopia was the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with Russia in 1898. Russia gave it military aid, transferring thousands of guns, sending military advisers there and training young Ethiopians at Russian military schools. A

Russian hospital was opened in Addis Ababa. This support was considered a method of troubling the potential enemies (Britain and Italy) if a conflict developed in Europe. The main task of Russian diplomacy in the southern region was, as Lamsdorf wrote in his memorandum, «realisation of Russia's cherished historical mission of establishing itself on the shores of the Bosphorus» (p. 164).

Implementing instructions of the general staff, A.K. Bulatovich, L.K. Artamonov and other Russian travellers studied the nature, population, flora and fauna of Ethiopia so carefully that the Russians' knowledge of that country was, probably, more detailed than in most of the Western European states. There were also such vivid persons among the Russians in Ethiopia as N.S. Leontiev, retired lieutenant, inclined for sweeping adventures, which became the governor of an Ethiopian province and founded the Belgian Anonymous Society for the Development of Industry and Trade in the Equatorial Provinces of Abyssinia. Numerous documents from the Russian and Ethiopian archives give a detailed and panoramic picture of the Russian-Ethiopian relations.

A brief conclusive section of the first volume, *Africans in Russia*, includes a quite interesting document, i.e., reminiscences of Salim bin Abakari from Zanzibar about his stay in Russia in 1896–1897. This is one of his first impressions: «In my opinion, the Russians are the whites who are very backward in comparison with other Europeans. Everybody in Europe can read and write, but there are more illiterates than literates in Russia, and I think that the reason of their reluctance to learn is their laziness» (p. 241).

The second volume covers the period of 1918 to 1960. The character of the documents included in it differs from those in the first volume. Both Russia and Africa underwent major changes. The contacts and relations between them changed their character. In Soviet Russia, they were under complete control of the Communist party and the state. Surely, even in the time of the Russian empire few Russians went to Africa at their own risk, as free travellers. Yet it became absolutely impossible after the October revolution. Naturally, this affected the whole character of the documents. With few exceptions, they were related to state and party bodies' activity.

In the first decades of the Soviet period the USSR's interest in sub-Saharan Africa was very limited. As it was before the revolution, they were notable in South Africa and Ethiopia. The reasons of this interest were partly inherited from the past and partly changed.

Initially, the Soviet Union's navy was not very strong, but the sea route from the western part of the USSR to the Far East attracted Kremlin's at-

tention. This was the reason of its interest in the African countries along this route, such as Ethiopia, located near the shortest route through the Suez Canal and Red Sea, and the Union of South Africa (now the Republic of South Africa), situated on a longer route round Africa, which, however, had an important superiority compared with the former route: it did not depend on the Suez Canal owners.

Between the world wars the Soviet government strove to use the old traditions of the Russian-Ethiopian cooperation to restore the diplomatic relations, severed by Ethiopia after the October revolution. As early as 1924, the people's commissariat (the term used then instead of ministry) of foreign affairs deemed it necessary to send a Soviet representative there, who would «inform the government of the USSR about all developments in Abyssinia, influence the Abyssinian policy to help the country preserve independence and be the first official propagator of the USSR's ideas in the Black continent» (p. 9). One of the USSR's tasks in Ethiopia might be taking advantage of its location as an «observation post near the great sea route to India (the Red Sea) and as a convenient base wherefrom we can spread our influence to the southern and western parts of the Arabian peninsula (Hadramawt and Yemen), not to mention the chances available in Africa itself» (pp. 9–10). In 1935–1936, during the Italia-Ethiopian War, the USSR rendered an active diplomatic support to Ethiopia.

In the mid-1920s the USSR established trade relations with the Union of South Africa. The mixed African-Russian Society of Petroleum Products, founded in 1931, was characterised, according to its employees, by quite «bourgeois» skills of the «Communist» director, combined with «bureaucratic» methods of management, which, however, was not an obstacle to earning huge profits. However, the Bolshevik government considered its main purpose in the region organisation of anti-British forces. This policy was similar to that of pre-revolutionary Russia, whose authorities sympathised with the Boer republics' struggle against the British and tried to help them, thus weakening hateful Britain. Considering it a major stronghold of imperialism, the Bolshevik government also sought to undermine the British dominance. The main tools of this policy in South Africa were the Communist party and workers' movement.

Many documents throw light on the Comintern's activity in the Union of South Africa. Relying on the Soviet aid and supported by Russian emigrants, the Communist party of that country, formed in 1921, started activities among the «coloured» workers. «From the Communist viewpoint, these aboriginals are an excellent material for a social revolution. Yet all of them are illiterate and therefore difficult of access of Communist propaganda», read a report sent to Lenin and Trotsky in the early 1920s

(p. 73). Speaking at meetings, Communist agitators said «a day will come when a huge socialist navy arrives to Cape town» (p. 60). A good supplement to the documents from Russian archives are unique materials from South Africa, such as a report of a secret agent of the British police about Communists' activities in South Africa, dated July 28, 1929, and kept in the RSA State archives.

During the World War II Ethiopia and South Africa were members of the Anti-Hitler Coalition. In mid-1942 a Soviet consulate-general was opened in Pretoria, a consular agency in Cape town and a trade-economic mission in Johannesburg. South Africans donated the Soviet Union money, food and medicines to the amount of 800,000 pounds. In 1943 the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Ethiopia.

After the war former Italian colonies Libya, Somalia and Eritrea became objects of the Soviet Realpolitik. Moscow tried to take part in the division of the Italian colonial legacy. In the autumn of 1945 Soviet minister of foreign affairs V.M. Molotov urged the allies to transfer Tripolitania, the western province of Libya, under the Soviet trusteeship. As his deputy M.N. Litvinov said, «it will be a chance to establish us firmly in the Mediterranean basin». Then the USSR curtailed its claims to a «corner in the Mediterranean», i.e., a military base. However, the Soviet leadership failed to overcome the Western powers' resistance, and the question of the former Italian colonies was referred to the UNO and solved without Moscow's participation.

A radical change occurred in the Soviet Union's eastern policy in then second half of the 1950s. N.S. Khrushchev was aware that isolation from the newly liberated countries, becoming subjects of the world politics, was incompatible with the status of a superpower the USSR was claiming. It could not advance to the East, including Africa, guided by the Stalinist and Comintern approaches. Many Western researchers believed that in the late 1950s and early 1960s Kremlin developed a strategy of the «seizure of Africa» and a sophisticated plan of «subversive activities». The documents published in the collection show that the Soviet plans, if any, were confined to the ideological and political penetration into Africa. This may apply at a stretch to two classified decrees, *On the Measures Aimed at the Expansion of Cultural and Public Contacts with the Countries of Asia and Africa* (March 24, 1958) and *On the Expansion of Cultural and Public Contacts with the Negro Peoples of Africa and Strengthening of the Soviet Union's Influence on Them* (January 20, 1960).

Practical policy was no longer rigidly bound to ideological postulates. In January 1956, during the first visit of a Soviet government delegation to sub-Saharan Africa, the Soviet Union and Liberia, a US satellite,

signed a communiqué on establishing diplomatic relations. The relations with Ghana and Guinea exist since 1958. Of 17 countries that proclaimed independence in 1960, six (Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Mali, Nigeria and Central African Republic) immediately established diplomatic relations with Moscow. These were first but important steps; although it took some time to start practical functioning of the embassies.

The documents published in the *Establishment and Development of Relations between the Soviet Union and the Countries of Tropical Africa*, the largest section of the volume, deal with the Soviet aid to these countries, the Soviet reaction to conflicts within the Third World and Soviet leaders' and diplomats' meetings with African leaders and public figures. Numerous documents throw light on the Soviet-Guinean relations. In the late 1950s and early 1960s Guinea was Kremlin's favourite in the Third World, playing the role of a demonstration model of socialist orientation and an attractive «show-window» of the Soviet policy in Tropical Africa, considered in Moscow a new promising front of the Cold War. Guinea was the first country in the region where a Soviet ambassador arrived and was first to conclude long-term agreements on trade and economic cooperation with the USSR. It was the recipient of the first huge credits given by Moscow to the south of Sahara. The Soviet Union built first industrial enterprises and other projects in Guinea. It was the first country to host numerous Soviet specialists.

Those who prepared the collection could not ignore the Congo crisis, the extremely dramatic and bloody episode of the Cold War in Africa in the 1960s. The documents they collected make it clear how and why the Soviet leadership decided to stake on Patrice Lumumba, how did the USSR help his government and what kind of difficulties the Soviet citizens faced in a far, unknown and often hostile country.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s Moscow began to attract African students to Soviet institutes and schools to help the African countries in bringing up intelligentsia of their own and strengthen the influence of Soviet ideology upon them. Some documents are related to the creation of the Peoples' Friendship University at Khrushchev's initiative, planned as a model education centre that meets the world standards. Realising this plan, the authorities had to solve a number of complicated organisational, economic and financial problems. Some of them were totally unexpected, such as selection of students with the participation of a KGB intelligence group, based at the university. African students' adaptation to the Soviet reality was difficult. Many of them sharply differed from the image of an African created by Soviet propaganda, i.e., a naive, virtuous and selfless fighter against colonialism and imperialism. Unfortunately, life among an

unknown civilisation and people with a different colour of skin without conflicting with them was not guaranteed to any African student. Racial conflicts emerged; informal student organisations disseminated «anti-Soviet attitudes». They were silenced usually in the Soviet Union, but it is known that a silenced phenomenon tends to emerge again. Therefore, the scholars who collected the documents deemed it necessary to include information on such incidents in the book.

The last section deals with African studies in the USSR. The state policy influenced or even determined the character of African studies and their role in the education system. The Comintern's enhanced attention to Africa in the late 1920s and early 1930s promoted the beginning of African studies in the USSR. The «African boom» of the late 1950s and early 1960s gave rise to a series of the government's measures (including financial ones) aimed at developing these studies. An African department was formed at the Institute for Oriental Studies in 1956. The Institute for African Studies (Academy of Sciences of the USSR) opened in late 1959. The ministry of higher education urged the leading universities to pay more attention to Africa. The chair of African studies at Leningrad State University was expanded, and enrolment of students to it increased. A similar chair was opened at Moscow State University. The topmost echelons of the authorities wanted African studies to be totally ideologised, aimed at strengthening Soviet ideological and political influence on Africa and elaborating «non-capitalist development» and «socialist orientation» conceptions for African countries. However, it was impossible to do so without general knowledge about Africa, its languages, history and culture. Therefore, pragmatic policy led to a series of scholarly achievements.

One of them is the collection of documents, created owing to many years long work of the Centre for African Studies of the Institute of General History (Russian Academy of Sciences). It is the only collection of this kind, covering the two-and-a-half centuries long history of Russia's contacts with Africa. Most of the documents were published for the first time.

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AFRICAN LINGUISTICS IN RUSSIA IN THE 1930S [24]

This book includes the materials of the first Russian conference on African linguistics held in Moscow, January 1934. Unfortunately, time didn't allow publishing these materials. Only 64 years later they were published thanks to the untiring efforts of Professor N. Gromova from Moscow State University. The book contains the Preface with the brief history of the problem and bibliographical data on scholars in African linguistics who participated in the Conference. They were G.K. Danilov (two papers: «Perspectives, tasks and methods of studies on African languages'; «Phonetical system of Swahili»), P.S. Kuznetsov (two papers: «Contemporary state and the nearest tasks of the languages of South-East Africa»), N.V. Yushmanov («Alphabets, orthography and transcription in African languages of South-East Africa»), D.A. Olderogge (two materials: «The distribution of Negro languages and the language policy of imperialism» and «The problem of noun classes in Swahili»)

This very valuable publication fills in a considerable gap in the history of African studies in Russia, showing its high level as early as the 1930s.

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[<http://www.orient.pu.ru/africa4.htm#1>]

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In Memoriam

Gleb V. Smirnov (1918–1999)

On June 15, 1999, we lost Prof. Gleb Vladimirovich Smirnov, Dr. Sci. (Econ.), a principal researcher of the Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.

G.V. Smirnov was born on December 3, 1918, in Potok, a village in Kiev province, in a state official's family. He graduated from the Moscow Aviation Institute in 1942 and from the All-Union Academy of Foreign Trade (Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR) in 1946. He became a candidate of sciences in economy, defending his dissertation *State Control over Prices in Fascist Germany and the USA*. Working at the USSR State Planning Committee from 1959 to 1968, G.V. Smirnov took part in preparing various data for planning commissions of several African states and counselled their governments when they drafted national development plans. Shifting to the Institute for African Studies in 1968, he studied the problems of planning in developing countries. In the late '70s, he guided the preparation of two collective monographs ordered by the UNITAR concerning applicability of planned development in the Third World. Thereafter, he studied development of market economy and the state's role in strengthening the market relations in African countries.

In the last period of his life, G.V. Smirnov studied the Russian-African relations in the setting of the development of transitional economy in Russia and prolonged systemic crisis in Africa. This problem is considered in his *Theory and Practice of the Transition to Market Economy: Russia and Africa*. This book was awarded a publication grant of the Russian Foundation for Humanities and published by the Nauka Publishers in 1999. Unfortunately, this happened after the author's death.

G.V. Smirnov authored more than 120 publications.

Gleb Smirnov did a lot for organising scholarly researches. He chaired economic sections of numerous international conferences.

An important component of G.V. Smirnov's activities was training of experts in African affairs. He supervised researches made by many post-graduates from Russia, CIS and African countries.

G.V. Smirnov was famous for his adherence to the principles of scholarly ethics, his kind and respectful treatment of his colleagues, his readiness to share his experience with young scholars and give them a

friendly advice. He had a mind of a young man and actively participated in the Institute's scholarly life. We, his colleagues, cannot believe that he is no longer among us.

We shall always retain the blessed memory about Gleb Vladimirovich.

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