Few international institutions have been more congenitally irrelevant than the League of Arab States. It's problems are structural: a Charter rooted in the protection of state sovereignty, an autocratic and inept membership, a façade of Arab unity hardly concealing the reality of deep political divisions. The Arab League for long decades has been little more than a punchline for sad jokes about the failed hopes of unified or effective Arab action.

Some believe that this began to change over the last year. Certainly, it was startling to see the Arab League suddenly acting on regional security issues. Its rapid, unified response to Muammar al-Qaddafi's brutal crackdown in Libya, likely tipped the balance at the United Nations in favor of NATO's military intervention. It has played an important role in the Syria crisis, from its suspension of Assad's Syria to its unprecedented (albeit failed) observer mission and (also failed) bid for to a Security Council resolution. Some of its steps were intriguingly novel, such as the unprecedented suspension of Libyan and Syrian membership over the killing of their own people. And the summit recently held in Baghdad may have finally prodded some baby steps towards Iraq's reintegration into the Arab world.

But this burst of activity was misleading. The revitalized Arab League was really a puppet show, as the GCC led by Qatar and Saudi Arabia used the conveniently empty vehicle of a moribund Arab League to pursue their agendas. The Arab League offered a more useful regional organization than the GCC for acting on Libya and Syria, especially at the United Nations. With traditional Arab powers like Egypt, Iraq and Syria flat on their backs there was nothing to block them from doing so on such issues. The focus of attention at the Security Council debate on Syria was Qatari Foreign Minster Hamed Bin Jassem, not Arab League Secretary General Nabil el-Arabi. The supposedly revitalized Arab League has shown little ability to act effectively on more contentious issues, to coordinate policies on Syria, to provide meaningful assistance to transitional member regimes, or to generate new ideas on the Palestinian issue. The GCC more often looked to non-Arab Turkey than to its Arab League partners for concrete support.

But this could change. Indeed, implausible as it sounds to long-time observers of the region, the Arab League may over the next few years emerge as a more interesting institution than it has ever before been -- and more consequential than the currently dominant GCC. The key GCC states only dominate today because of their wealth and general lack of internal problems, the unusual cooperation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia and the internal weakness of traditional Arab powers such as Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. As those states get their acts together, and the inevitable conflicts within and between Gulf states reappear, the Arab League might actually become interesting.

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On December 15, 2011, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the formal end of America's military presence in Iraq. The withdrawal came after the inability to reach agreement on a revised Status of Forces Agreement which would have allowed a limited number of troops to remain under legal conditions acceptable to the Pentagon.  While the vast majority of Iraqis and Americans supported the departure of America's military presence, some supporters of a long-term U.S. military presence warned of disaster.  Some, like Senator John McCain and the Romney campaign, continue to fume that we no longer occupy Iraq and complain that Obama has lost what Bush gained. But in fact, the American departure has hardly mattered at all -- and that's a good thing.

This isn't to say that Iraq has emerged as a peaceful, democratic paradise or an enthusiastic pro-American ally. Hardly.  That was never in the cards, after the disastrous invasion and bungled occupation led to a horrific civil war and a near-failed state.  Iraq today remains a violent, poorly institutionalized place with deep societal fissures and unresolved political tensions.  But little has happened in the months since the U.S. withdrawal which differs significantly from what had been happening while the U.S. remained. The negative trends are the same ones which plagued Iraq despite the presence of U.S. troops in 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. The U.S. presence contributed to some of those problems, helped deal with some, and  failed to resolve others.  But it had always struggled to convert its military presence into political leverage, and by 2011 it had become almost completely irrelevant. 

The real story of America's withdrawal from Iraq is how little impact it has really had on either Iraq or the region.  There are even signs that the withdrawal has helped to nudge Iraqis onto the right path, though not as quickly or directly as I might have hoped. This month's death toll was the lowest on record since the 2003 invasion, while Iraqi oil exports are at their highest level since 1980. Baghdad successfully hosted an Arab Summit meeting, which may have done little for Syria but did go further to bring Iraq back into the Arab fold than anything since 2003.  Maliki's jousting with his domestic foes and efforts to balance Iraq's ties with Tehran with improved Arab relations are what needs to happen for Iraq to regain a semblance of normality.   It isn't pretty, and probably won't be any time soon, but there's absolutely no reason to believe that it would look any better with American troops still encamped in the country.  Thus far, Obama's risky but smart gamble to end the U.S. military presence in Iraq is paying off.

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The Muslim Brotherhood resolved months of speculation this weekend by announcing its intention of nominating Deputy Supreme Guide Khairet al-Shater for Egypt's presidential election. It may not seem so surprising for a country's largest political force and the largest parliamentary faction to field a Presidential candidate. But it was. The announcement sent an earthquake through Cairo's already wildly careening political scene. I'm happy to admit that I was taken by surprise. 

What was the Brotherhood thinking? The nomination of Shater seems to have been a response to threats and opportunities a rapidly changing political arena, rather than the hatching of a long-term plan. But many Egyptians would disagree, seeing it instead as the culmination of a long-hatching conspiracy with the SCAF. I think it will reveal itself to be a strategic blunder which has placed the Brotherhood in a no-win situation. But clearly they had their reasons for making such an uncharacteristically bold move. How will it affect the endlessly turbulent and contentious Egyptian political transition? And could Khairat al-Shater really replace Hosni Mubarak as the president of Egypt?

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 I am delighted to announce the official publication of my book The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (PublicAffairs). The seeds of the book can be found in my very first response to the Tunisian protests, written on January 5, 2011, which rooted them in the "wages of Arab decay" and predicted far more unrest to come.  The Arab Uprising offers a necessarily preliminary but hopefully stimulating interpretation of the meaning of the uprisings, what they have accomplished, how they have reshaped power politics and political norms in the Middle East, and their implications for American foreign policy. 

 Why do I term the events of the last fifteen months "The Arab Uprising"?  Because that best  captures what is truly unique about this period.  I don't like the term "Arab Spring" -- a term I am embarrassed to have evidently coined -- in part because they began in the dead of winter and arguably ended in their most potent form before the turn of the season.  "Arab Revolutions" is premature, since we don't yet know whether any of the Arab countries will manage fully successful revolutionary change.  "Arab Awakening" is misleading, since Arabs were hardly sleeping -- indeed, as the book details at length, the previous decade had been consumed by popular protest, rising dissent, and ever more contentious public spheres.The term "Arab uprising" captures the two most crucial dimensions of these events:  "Arab" because of the intense identification across borders and diffusion effects throughout the region; and "uprising" because of the surge of popular protest across almost every country.  

 The Arab Uprising roots the events since December 2010 in the broader sweep of Arab political history. It looks back to the great popular mobilization and ideological conflicts of the "Arab Cold War" of the 1950s and 1960s, to economic and political protests in the early 1980s, and to the abortive democratization efforts in several Arab countries in the early 1990s.  It traces the great wave of popular protest and the structural transformation of the Arab public sphere during the decade of the 2000s.  And then it carefully traces the evolution of this wave of Arab uprisings, from the first few months of a tightly integrated and seemingly unstoppable regional protest wave to the March 2011 counter-attack by the forces of the status quo and the impact of the descent into horrific violence in Bahrain, Libya, Syria and Yemen.   

The book does more than retrace the political history of the uprisings, however.  It attempts to offer a systematic framework for understanding the new regional politics, including a reading of the new balance of power and the long-term implications of the empowerment of publics at the domestic and regional levels.  It assesses the rise of Islamist movements, the new regional struggle for Syria, the struggles of both Turkey and Iran, and the implications for Israel.  And it discusses America's options for the region, arguing that Realists, neoconservatives and liberal interventionists alike have failed to offer useful guides to the emerging regional politics. 

 I am very excited that The Arab Uprising has finally dropped.  It wasn't easy writing in the midst of rapidly developing events, trying to hit a moving analytical target while keeping up with events in so many different countries.  I could not have done it without the steady stream of high quality analysis produced by my colleagues for The Middle East Channel, upon which I rely heavily in my narrative.  I hope that you will all buy the book the book will stimulate productive debate and discussion over the coming weeks, and I look forward to your feedback!    

Exactly one year ago, I was in Doha to speak at the Al Jazeera Forum, where a remarkable group of Arab politicians, intellectuals and activists had assembled to talk about the seemingly unstoppable momentum of the changes sweeping the region. Moncef Marzouki, then a human rights dissident and now President of Tunisia, told me about his hopes for crafting a genuinely democratic constitution -- hopes which al-Nahda leader Rached Ghannouchi assured me he shared. Tareq el-Bishri gave a long speech about how Egypt's 1952 revolution gave way to despotism and military rule; the youth activists in the audience could hardly mask their boredom with the old man, but perhaps should have listened more carefully. The Libyan revolutionaries at the conference were treated like rock stars, as were the youth activists from Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries. The mood was celebratory and electric, though tinged by anxiety over the atrocities in Libya and reports of Qaddafi's forces moving towards Benghazi.

But in retrospect, the week of March 12 marked the precise turning point away from the "New Hope" of those dizzying Tahrir days towards the grimmer, darker political struggles to come. I never made my scheduled trip from Doha to Manama. That week, the Empire struck back:

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Last week, CNAS released my report "Pressure Not War," which attempted to lay out a path forward on Syria which could accelerate a political transition without a military intervention.  It's generated a great response, and a lot of hopefully productive debate.

I was surprised that the most interesting and heated arguments focused upon my recommendation to take top Syrian regime officials to the International Criminal Court if they do not immediately move towards a ceasefire and political transition. This was only one of a number of layered, interlocking proposals designed to offer a non-military alternative to protect Syrian civilians and accelerate progress towards a durable political transition. Even if it didn't materialize, the rest of the arguments about the limits of military options and the ways to advance a political solution would still apply.   So I wasn't expecting that one point to draw so much attention.

But I'm glad that it did, since I would like to see international justice at the center of the debate.  Despite all the obvious obstacles, I don't agree that the ICC and the instruments of international justice can not be brought into play against Bashar al-Assad and the top officials of the Syrian regime.  I see a real possibility that Syria could be referred if it is made a top diplomatic priority, and mounting such a diplomatic campaign would be useful even if the effort failed.  But there is a serious and ongoing discussion about whether using the ICC as a instrument of pressure is desirable, even if possible -- for Syria, or for building global norms against impunity for atrocities.

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I've been in Doha for the week, and so haven't been able to blog or produce a video blog. But since I've got wireless access for the moment, I wanted to draw attention to a few things of note which have dropped while I've been on the road.

 -  I was absolutely floored and thrilled that the Middle East Channel was named as a finalist in the "Website Department" for the 2012 National Magazine Awards for Digital Media -- the Ellies.  It's a testimony not just to the Middle East Channel's editorial team but to the community of academics, journalists and policy analysts who have contributed so much over the past year.   Thanks to everyone! 

 - The National Interest has published my response to Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev's article on Libya and the "new Wilsonianism" in American foreign policy. I argue that the Obama  administration's approach to the Middle East "may be neo-Wilsonian, but it is a careful and pragmatic example of the breed." Read it here. 

 - I contributed this comment to the Economist's debate over intervention in Syria.   You won't be surprised that I continue to regard military intervention as unwise and unlikely to either protect Syrian civilians or to hasten a political transition.  Read the full argument here. 

 - POMEPS has released a new briefing on the Syria crisis collecting recent Middle East Channel articles and analysis. You can read my introduction and download the brief here.  You can also watch a video of a recent POMEPS panel discussion on Syria here or on C-Span -- I particularly recommend the detailed and thoughtful discussion of the nature of the uprising in Damascus by Salwa Ismail of SOAS, but there's plenty of interesting material there. 

 - The Kindle edition of my book The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East is now available for pre-order.  It will be released March 22, five days before the paper version is published.    We will be officially launching the book in Washington DC on March 27 in a CNAS event and reception featuring me and Hisham Milhem -- RSVP here! 

  Back soon! 

How should the United States, and the international community, respond to the escalating bloodbath in Syria?  Over the last two months, the overwhelming weight of  editorial and op-ed commentary has been in the direction of calling for military action of some sort --- especially to arm a Free Syrian Army.  The calls for military action span the spectrum:  from John McCain and Lindsey Graham and the FPI-FDD group of conservative hawks to liberal interventionists and even... FP bloggers.  For people desperate to do something to help the Syrian people, and at the same time for people keen to deal a blow to Iran or bring down a long-hated regime in Damascus, the time seems right for some form of military intervention.  

I was a strong supporter of the intervention in Libya. But the diversion of the debate about Syria towards military options has been counterproductive.  None of the military options on offer, including arming the Free Syrian Army, are likely to significantly help the Syrian people and most risk making things far worse.  But the recent display of a broad-based international consensus, including the 137-12 vote in the United Nations General Assembly condemning the regime's violence, and the first meeting of the "Friends of Syria" group on Friday in Tunisia make this a crucial time to seriously explore non-military options which have a more realistic chance to be adopted.. and to succeed.  

In a new report released today by the Center for a New American Security, I argue that if the goal is to help the Syrian people and not just to hurt an Iranian ally then the international response to the Syrian crisis must focus less on whether to use military options than on ways to improve the prospects for a "soft landing" after the fall of the Assad regime.    The report lays out a number of concrete suggestions for mobilizing diplomatic pressure and breaking the intensifying polarization between two Syrian communities in order to push for a political transition. I can't offer any guarantees that this strategy will work quickly or cleanly... but neither can those now recklessly calling for poorly conceived military action.

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