



Working Paper No. 3

**The Regional Consequences of Russia's
Demographic Crisis**

**Jessica Griffith Prendergrast
Department of Geography, University of Leicester
Jp120@le.ac.uk
July 2004**

A New Russian Heartland?
<http://www.le.ac.uk/geography/research/RussianHeartland/index.html>

Abstract

Russia's demographic problems, as they impact on the health of Russia's population, her economy, society and security, are well known and much discussed; yet, despite Russia's unique demographic conditions, analysis in the post-Soviet years has sought, more often than not, to fit Russia's demographic heritage to the well-established demographic patterns, which are characteristic of most developed nations. This paper argues that an over-reliance on liberal demographic transition theory has tended to focus too heavily on national-level universalisable trends and as such has obscured (or ignored) regional variation and divergence in Russian demography. This paper seeks in some way to redress this imbalance, to assess Russia's demographic health in regional rather than national terms, and to consider the consequences for Russia's regional economies and societies. Not only do different demographic features occur in different regions, but also the impact of any factors will be influenced by the context within which they unfold. Regional differences, which are manifest in social, political, cultural, economic and security dimensions, all condition whether a region can and must adapt to the demographic processes underway, as well as the consequences of such processes for any one region and the cohesion of the state as a whole.

By way of introduction

Russia may be characterised as a nation 'where men have almost no chance of living to retirement, women are doomed to widowhood, and many children face the bitter fate of orphans'¹ Its demographic problems, which have been reinforced during transition, are well-documented and much-discussed, as are the consequences of such problems in terms of national economic and military power. The recently published 2002 census results revealed a total population numbering 145 million, some one million greater than anticipated by Goskomstat, which had previously estimated a decline between 1989 and 2002 of three million (in fact, the decline was around 1.84 million)². Yet despite this good news (relatively at least), which led a few commentators to disregard notions of a demographic crisis³, most scholars recognise that the overwhelming story is bad, and Russia's demographic weakness 'indisputable'⁴. The most generous projections now anticipate a total population numbering around 120 million in 2050, while the more common and arguably realistic projections anticipate a population of 100 million by mid-century⁵, taking Russia from seventh to somewhere between fourteenth and eighteenth in world population rankings⁶.

Demography pertains to population composition (size, age, gender, ethnicity etc.) and population dynamics (changes in the birth/death rates or migration flows

¹ Maleva, T., (2000), 'What sort of Russia has the new President inherited? Or Russia's key social problems', *Moscow Carnegie Center Briefing Papers*, Vol.2, No.4

² Feshbach, M., (2003), *Russia's Health and Demographic Crises: Policy Implications and Consequences*, Washington, DC, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, pp.431-2

³ See for example Nijegorodskai Pravda, (2003), 'Nas bol'she chem my dumali (There are more of us than we thought)', accessed 11 May 2004, available at <http://www.perepis2002.ru/content/173/1737-article.asp>, which argues that the census results demonstrate that apocalyptic prognoses regarding the death of the Russian population do not have serious foundation and also Gorenburg, D., (2003), 'The 2002 Russian Census and the Future of the Russian Population', Policy Memo no.319, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA which is less pessimistic than most.

⁴ Vishnevskii, A., (1999), 'The demographic potential of Russia', *Problems of Economic Transition*, Vol.41, No.9: 28-53, p.41

⁵ See for example Naryshkina, A., (2004), 'Skoro nas budet men'she 100 millionov (We will soon number less than 100 million)', accessed 3 June 2004, available at <http://www.izvestia.ru/economic/article82124>, which takes little encouragement from the census results.

⁶ Rimashevskaya has suggested the population could be as low as 55 million by 2050, see Herd, G. P., (2003), 'Russia's demographic crisis and federal instability' in *Russian Regions and Regionalism, Strength Through Weakness*, edited by G. P. Herd and A. Aldis, London & New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 41-62, p.44

etc.).⁷ In Russia these factors of demography are characterised by a number of interrelated trends with deep social and economic roots in the Soviet past, as well as in the post-Soviet transition and its attendant changes in socio-economic conditions⁸. A wide variety of environmental, social, historical, demographic, economic, and political factors have contributed to the present situation.⁹ Among them are: the ethnic, gender and age structure of the population, popular lifestyles (smoking, alcoholism, poor diets), a widespread ideologically-induced disregard for personal health, a culture of women in the workforce, inadequate housing provision, an 'abortion culture', the impact of transition on social, economic and psychological well-being, the nature of Soviet healthcare and a post-Soviet decline in provision, income inequalities and the impoverishment of the population, and the rise in TB, HIV and AIDS, related to sexual promiscuity and drug use.

Russia suffers unhappily from being the first country in the world to experience a natural population decline; it began in 1992 and shows little sign of abating. Since then Russia has experienced annual population decline, resulting from a greater number of deaths over births¹⁰, accompanied by net inward migration insufficient to counter the overall population decline. Even if sharp rises in mortality during the 1990s and death rate fluctuations in the 1980s are disregarded as short-term reversible trends (which they are more likely not) then the overall long-term pattern seems to be of gradually rising mortality and declining fertility. Fewer children are being born, regardless of how long they live. Yet Russia's uniqueness in demographic terms lies not only in its unhappy fate as the 'first country in history to experience such a sharp decline in births versus deaths for reasons other than war, famine, or disease'¹¹. Whilst 'demographers

⁷ Ibid., p.46

⁸ Ibid., p.44 and Shkolnikov, V. and G. A. Cornia, (2000), 'Population Crisis and Rising Mortality in Transitional Russia' in *The Mortality Crisis in Transitional Economies*, edited by G. A. Cornia and Panizza, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 253-79, p.271

⁹ The relative importance of factors is much debated, in particular, the causes of the 1990s mortality rise.

¹⁰ Between 1989 and 2002 natural decline numbered 7.5 million, due mostly to low birth rates, see Ryl, K., (2004), 'Pereselenie narodov', accessed June 11, available at <http://www.democope.ru/weekly/2004/0155/print.php>

¹¹ Powell, D. and M. Conway, (2002), 'Death as a Way of Life: Russia's Demographic Decline', *Current History*, Vol.101, No.657: 344-48, p.344

once thought that mortality would only improve, Russia ... [has] shown this not to be the case'¹². Neo-liberal demographic transition theory anticipates industrialisation and modernisation to engender declines in birth rates and rises in life expectancy, yet Russia has diverged from this pattern since the 1960s. While birth rates have indeed declined in Russia, mortality rates have fluctuated dramatically and overall increased substantially, causing life expectancy to decline.

The cold war era, during which Western and Soviet scholars viewed Russian demography from diametrically opposed ideological perspectives, with divergent conclusions, has given way largely to general ideological agreement and concern regarding the magnitude of the problem, if not always the detail or proposed solutions. It is arguable in fact, that too much agreement has led to an over-reliance on liberal demographic transition theory which may be inappropriate given the Russian context. For example, one of Russia's leading scholars of demography, Anatoli Vishnevskii, argues that despite the appalling demographic situation, Russia should not necessarily be regarded as exceptional, and that her demographic profile is akin to that of an advanced nation, among which the trend towards low birth rates is virtually universal. While declining birth rates may be 'natural' given the degree of urbanisation, general educational levels, status of women in society and so on, the same cannot be said of Russian mortality or life expectancy patterns.¹³

Liberal demographic theory assumes essentially that declining birth rates are positively related to economic prosperity, and so can be held up as markers of progress in Russia. However in the Russian (and formerly the Soviet) context it may be that declining birth rates reflect socio-economic degradation (for example, high levels of poverty, poor living conditions, and insufficient housing provision). The further dramatic decline in birth rates during the early transition years may then represent a reinforcement of these negative trends, and a

¹²Little, J. S. and R. K. Triest, (2001), Conference Paper: Seismic Shifts: The Economic Impact of Demographic Change. An Overview, *Seismic Shifts: The Economic Impact of Demographic Change*, Boston, USA, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, p.9

¹³ Vishnevskii, 'The demographic potential of Russia', p.33

popular lack of optimism regarding the future, rather than neo-liberal progress towards socio-economic and democratic modernisation¹⁴. An insightful anthropological critique suggests that it is 'not necessarily the case that shifts in meanings and practices surrounding reproduction occur in patterns shared across cultures' but rather that divergent trends may result from local, regional and national inequalities.¹⁵ Regional divergences in demographic trends, resulting from non-uniform circumstances and processes, and having divergent consequences depending on context will be the focus of this paper.

A prominent debate in the 1970s amongst Soviet demographers focused on the existence of regional and republican differentials in birth and death rates and, in particular, on how to address the 'problem' of faster growth rates in the Muslim Central Asian Union Republics, by comparison to the core Russian and Slavic regions. Yet the contemporary focus in demographic trends is on the temporal rather than the spatial dimension.¹⁶ National demographic trends in Russia disguise significant spatial variance.¹⁷ Russia is comprised of 89 federal subjects, which exhibit hugely divergent demographic patterns in both population composition and dynamics. The main and most likely exception to the temporal focus, given its inherently spatial nature, is migration, which has been subject to some excellent analysis regarding the 'emptying' of the northern and far-eastern regions in favour of the western, central and southern regions.¹⁸ However, analysis of regional disparities in other demographic trends (such as in age structures, birth and death rates, concentration of ecological or epidemiological concerns), as well as their impact at regional levels (in terms of economic,

¹⁴ Rivkin-Fish, M., (2003), 'Anthropology, demography, and the search for a critical analysis of fertility: Insights from Russia', *American Anthropologist*, Vol.105, No.2: 289-301, p.290

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.289

¹⁶ The pejorative undertones towards Central Asian and Islamic nationalities in the earlier discussion make the revival of such a debate difficult but other spatial factors seem to have been unduly disregarded alongside.

¹⁷ Ioffe, G., O. L. Medvedkov, et al., (2001), 'Russia's Fragmented Space' in *Fragmented Space in the Russian Federation*, edited by B. Ruble, J. Koehnet al, Washington, DC & London, John Hopkins University Press & Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 31-80, p.31

¹⁸ See in particular the work of Tim Heleniak

military, ethno-cultural stability) seems unduly disregarded in the mainstream literature¹⁹.

This paper considers demographic processes at the national level only briefly, to provide a summary of detail available elsewhere. This paper seeks instead to consider Russia's demographic processes (the mortality rate, the fertility rate, in- and out-migration, and the dynamics of each, as well as factors such as population age structure, family and societal traits etc.) as they pertain to the regional arena and are conditional upon the regional context within which they occur. Some clear and some murky trends are discernible which have crucial implications in terms of society, economy, military and social and political stability at the regional level, as well as broader ramifications in terms of the health, stability and cohesion of the Federation as a whole²⁰.

¹⁹ In Western Europe, by contrast, the issue of migration and related multi-culturalism and their social consequences is a 'hot topic', in the press at least.

²⁰ Feshbach, *Russia's Health and Demographic Crises*, p.4

Russia's Regional Demography

Regional disparities are evident in virtually all demographic variables; in migration patterns, in fertility trends, in family and household dynamics, in mortality patterns and causes of death, in age distributional patterns and sex ratio imbalances, in ethnic compositions and the mixing and un-mixing of peoples, in housing and healthcare provision; each is impacted by long-term and transition-influenced trends. To give just a few examples of the most obvious regional disparities: internal migration flows are from the north and east to the south and west of the country, ethnically Russian regions are often more impacted by high death rates and lower fertility rates, the east and south tend to have higher birth rates, due to age distributional differences and cultural differences, and rural regions tend to have higher birth rates than urban regions. Demographic factors are influenced by economic, social, political, cultural and environmental variables, each of which exhibits its own particular geography across Russia's regions.

Population Distribution


The disparity between the size of Russia's population and the size of her territory is a well-known and long-discussed issue.²¹ Russia is a huge country with very low and very uneven population densities. The disparity has been accentuated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, as a result of which Russia retained three-quarters of the Soviet territory but only around half of its population²². Even in European Russia the population density of 27 people per square kilometre cannot compare to the EU average of 119 people/ sq. km. Asian Russia, beyond the Urals, accounts for 75 percent of Russia's territory but is home to just 22 percent of its population.²³ A peculiarity of its Soviet legacy however means that

²¹ Vishnevskii, A., A. Treivish, et al., (2003), 'Perspektivy razvitiia Rossii: rol' demograficheskogo faktora (Russia's development perspectives: the role of demographic factors)', Nauchyi trudi no. 53R, *Institut ekonomiki perekhodogo perioda*, Moscow, p.20

²² Ibid., p.20

²³ Ibid., p.20

Asian Russia, despite its very low population density (just 2.5 people/ sq. km.) is nonetheless overpopulated by comparison to countries with similar geographical landscapes and climates. By comparison to Canada or China, for example, Russia in fact has a relatively even population distribution²⁴.



Another peculiarity, engendered largely by Soviet socio-economic development policies, lies in Russia's atypical settlement structure and most notably in the unusual rank size distribution of its towns and cities, such that Russia has relatively few medium-sized or large cities.²⁵ Russia has only 13 'millionaire' cities, only one of which is located in Siberia or the Far East (Novosibirsk), and of

²⁴ As Vishnevskii, Treivish & Andreev point out, the difference in density between Canada's least and most populated regions is 950x compared to China's 280x and just 145 x in Russia (based on 11/12 macro-regions not all 89). In Russia the biggest macro-regions (economic) are 5x bigger than the smallest in population terms, 37x in territorial terms and 49x in density terms, compared to 353x, 56x and 952 respectively in Canada (CHECK THIS). See Ibid., p.21

²⁵ Heleniak, T., (2003), 'The 2002 Census in Russia: Preliminary Results', *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol.44, No.6: 430-42, p.439 and World Bank, (2004), 'From Transition to Development: A Country Economic Memorandum for the Russian Federation', p.35

which only five (Moscow, Rostov-na-Donu, Volgograd, Kazan and Novosibirsk) increased in size between 1989 and 2002. The general tendency towards urban decline is perhaps surprisingly perhaps given the abnormal urban development structure, which would more expectedly give rise to urban conglomeration.²⁶ However much can be explained by the faster natural decline in urban areas resulting from urban age structures, as well as by reclassification issues.²⁷ Equally those major cities that do exist are not necessarily optimally positioned in terms of comfortable habitation with important consequences for the health of the population, birth and death rates, life expectancy, so discouraging the otherwise anticipated patterns of inward migration.²⁸

The dynamics of environmental, economic, social and political variables, which play a role in determining population distribution, have altered with the end of Soviet Union, and are having divergent impacts in regions of the Federation, such that Russia's already uneven population is shrinking (or growing) in a geographically uneven manner²⁹, and consequently has an uneven and divergent impact on the many regions into which Russia's society, economy and culture is divided.

Migration

Migratory patterns and dynamics are the easiest to trace from the spatial perspective, and often have an immediate and profound impact on the politics and cultures of destination and departure regions, their economies and societies. The impact of migration at the regional level varies widely, depending primarily on whether a region is a net donor or recipient, with the most severe consequences at the extremes. Movements of people will influence factors as

²⁶ World Bank, 'From Transition to Development', p.31

²⁷ Ibid., p.32

²⁸ For example Hill, F. and C. Gaddy, (2003), *The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, discuss the 'abnormal' number of cities in Russia that number among the coldest in the world, with obvious health consequences for their populations.

²⁹ Herd, G. P., (2002), 'Foreign and Security Policy Implications of Russia's Demographic Crisis', *Regionalisation of Russian Foreign and Security Policy*, *Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research of the ETH Zurich*, Zurich, p.4

diverse as age structures, labour forces, social services, local fiscal systems and cultural factors.³⁰ Decisions to migrate may incorporate demographic and economic differentials, and political and cultural factors. Much research in the Russian context has focused on the role of economic incentives to move, in particular, real wages³¹, varied regional labour market conditions,³² gross disparities in living conditions across regions,³³ and in levels of regional economic activity (measured for example by per capita trade turnover)³⁴. Non-economic incentives include the existence of established networks and information flows and the role of political and cultural factors, such as resettlement to ethnic homelands or to escape ethnic persecution.

The dominant trend of external migration has been repatriation from the CIS, while internally it has been the much-noted migration from northern and eastern Russia westwards and southwards, effectively undoing the system of habitation cultivated by Soviet era planners, which had left an overpopulated and overdeveloped periphery³⁵. Between 1990 and 1999 the Russian Far East lost over 900,000 people to out-migration; the European North lost more than 300,000 people; and Eastern Siberia lost some 200,000 people³⁶. Some regions have lost over 20% of their population since 1989, and the most extreme cases, Magadan and Chukotka have lost 53 percent and 67 percent of their populations respectively, mostly as a result of outward migration³⁷. Migration flows in the Far East have not been entirely outward however. Indeed one of the most prominent demographic concerns in the Russian media has been regarding the impact of

³⁰ Heleniak, T., (1997), 'Internal Migration in Russia During the Economic Transition', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol.38, No.2: 81-104, p.98

³¹ As adjusted for regional costs of living . See Heleniak, T., (2001), 'Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia', *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol.9, No.4: 531-49, p.531

³² Herd, 'Foreign and Security Policy...' p.27

³³ Nichiporuk, B., (2000), *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, p.39


³⁴ Wegren, S. K. and A. Cooper Drury, (2001), 'Patterns of Internal Migration during the Russian Transition', *Journal of communist studies and transition politics*, Vol.17, No.4: 15-42, p.35-36

³⁵ Heleniak, T., (2003), 'Geographic aspects of population aging in the Russian federation', *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol.44, No.5: 325-47, p.337

³⁶ Independent Institute for Social Policy, (2004), 'Demograficheskaia situatsiia i migratsii', accessed 12 June 2004, available at <http://www.socpol.ru/atlas/overviews/demography/index.shtml>

³⁷ Heleniak, 'Geographic aspects...' p.334. N.B. Migration results are not yet available for the 2002 census so the map here uses pre-census estimates and may not match the most up to date estimates exactly. It does however show general trends.

Chinese inward migration to the Far East. Although the claims of millions of Chinese in the Far East are most likely exaggerated and alarmist, Nyíri has estimated that between 200,000 and 400,000 Chinese live in Russia but that many of these are involved in seasonal work or the shuttle trade and are not permanent residents.³⁸



Excepting the Chinese flows to the Far East, in general, internal and external in-migrants are heading for the same destination regions, most notably to major urban centres in European Russia which seem to offer the chance of comfortable living conditions and plentiful employment opportunities (by comparison to other regions at least). Regions such as St. Petersburg, Rostov-na-Donu and Volgograd have been major recipients of internal, external and illegal migration flows, and it is estimated that as many as half of all migrants have settled in

³⁸ Nyiri, P., (2003), 'Chinese migration to eastern Europe', *International Migration*, Vol.41, No.3: 239-65, p.248

Moscow and Moscow oblast.³⁹ Many external in-migrants from the CIS states have also settled near the borders of the country they have left, in particular along Russia's southern tier, bordering the Caucasus and Kazakhstan⁴⁰. Indeed the seventeen regions along the southern border have been recipient to around half of all former SU migrants.⁴¹ In these southern regions, apparently large numbers of illegal migrants from states such as Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq (especially Kurds)⁴² may become the favoured media scapegoat (as the Chinese are in the Far East) due to a common association, not always unfairly, with criminal networks and drug trafficking⁴³, with obvious ramifications in terms of societal tolerance etc.

Few ethnic republics have experienced net out-migration, and where they have it has mostly been as a result of ethnic Russian outward migration, for example where the titular population is numerically large (for instance in Kalmykia or Tyva) or where it has constituted a powerful vocal minority (for instance in Sakha). Komi too has experienced substantial out-migration, but more as a result its inhospitable location and poor economic and environmental conditions than any cultural or ethnic concern. By contrast all the autonomous regions have experienced have net outward migration, again mostly in response to economic and geographic conditions rather than ethnic push factors.⁴⁴

In most Federal Districts either an outward or an inward migratory trend is generally dominant. However migratory patterns are particularly divergent within the Southern FD. The non-ethnic regions of Krasnodar, Rostov, Stavropol and Volgograd have all experienced very substantial in-flows, while the ethnic republics have received to fewer numbers, and authoritarian Kalmykia and Kabardino-Balkaria have seen substantial out-migration. The war in Chechnya has of course interrupted this pattern too, such that both Ingushetia and

³⁹ Herd, 'Russia's demographic crisis...' p.48 and Herd, 'Foreign and Security Policy...' p.22

⁴⁰ Heliak, 'Internal Migration in Russia...' p.90

⁴¹ Heliak, 'Migration and Restructuring...'

⁴² Perhaps as many as one million in total.

⁴³ Axmann, A., (1998), 'Eastern Europe and Community of Independent States', *International Migration*, Vol.36, No.4: 587-608, p.593

⁴⁴ Heliak, 'Internal Migration in Russia...' p.97

Dagestan have received large numbers of displaced persons as a result of the conflict.⁴⁵ Indeed between 1994 and 1999 the population of Chechnya declined by half numerically, and while many Chechen refugees are now being forced to return to the republic, many ethnic Russians have chosen to resettle elsewhere⁴⁶.

Fertility

Total fertility rates in Russia have declined remarkably during transition. In 1987 women had an average of 2.194 children over the course of their lifetime, but by 2000 this had fallen to just 1.214.⁴⁷ Both long term and transition factors played a role in discouraging childbearing. The decline reflects a historically engendered decline in the cohort of child-bearing age, as well as long-term trends of increasing urbanisation and education attainment, and also transition engendered factors such as increasing 'pauperisation', the increasing availability of contraceptives, and widespread demoralisation about future prospects.⁴⁸

Regional divergences in total fertility rates remain significant but are much less so than during the 1960s and 1970s when fertility rates ranged from an average of 1.4 children per woman in Moscow to 4.9 children in Dagestan. Fertility rates presently range from an average of one child per woman in much of central and north-west Russia to 2.1-2.3 in Dagestan and Ingushetia.⁴⁹ As the number of women aged 20-29 declines even more substantially from 2007 onwards, substantial increases in total fertility rates seem unlikely and regional disparities may have an increasingly important impact on regional population growth differentials, as certain regions suffer sharper fertility declines than others. For

⁴⁵ Of the 150,000 displaced persons in January 1997, 93% were from Chechnya, see Axmann, 'Eastern Europe and CIS', p.592. Nonetheless Dagestan records net out migration between 1993 and 2001.


⁴⁶ Herd, 'Russia's demographic crisis...' p.47

⁴⁷ Heleniak, 'Geographic aspects...' p.326

⁴⁸ Feshbach, *Russia's Health and Demographic Crises*, p.8 and pp.12-13, where Feshbach notes that a 2001 survey indicated that 30% of young women did not wish to have any children because of the economic hardships which they face.

⁴⁹ Independent Institute for Social Policy, 'Demograficheskaiia situatsiia...'

example, between 1990 and 1995 the total fertility rate fell by 29-34% in all regions except the North Caucasus where the decline was 26%⁵⁰.



Much of the regional disparity in fertility patterns seems attributable to ethnic differences. Different cultures, religions and traditions seem to have significant importance in terms of the number of children desired and thus borne, as well as impacting attitudes to related issues such as abortion, divorce and age of marriage, which indirectly affect the birth rate. In particular, non Slavic, especially Muslim ethnic groups tend to have higher birth rates and larger families than their Slavic or European counterparts. This has been commonly attributed to differential progress through the demographic transition which, it has been argued, has left some Muslim regions in Russia with fertility patterns more akin to those of developing countries than to the rest of Russia. However, even among those regions which are supposedly at a different stage in the demographic

⁵⁰ Becker, C. M. and D. D. Hemley, (1998), 'Demographic Changes in the FSU During the Transition Period', *World Development*, Vol.26, No.11: 1957-75, p.1962

transition, birth rates barely lie above replacement level. In 2001 only in Tyva, Dagestan and Ingushetia did the total fertility rate lie anywhere near replacement levels (1.9, 2.1-3, 2.1-3 respectively).⁵¹

Mortality and Life Expectancy

Russia suffers from both a long-term general trend of declining life expectancy and rising mortality rates, and from a further mortality crisis during the 1990s which has seen mortality rates increase exponentially, particularly amongst men of working age. Both long- and short-term causal factors can be identified. The former include: underlying demographic and echo effects from Soviet era catastrophes and the stresses of history; harmful lifestyles associated with soviet state paternalism and social degradation; and environmental problems.⁵² The latter include: new and re-emerging diseases and a decline in social welfare provision; the nature and pace of economic reform and changes in the labour market; transition engendered mass psychological stress and loss of identity; and inabilities to adapt to uncertainty and pauperisation, as well as to new freedoms⁵³. The extent and impact of the above factors varies as dependent upon the specific regional contexts, but certain spatial trends can be identified as regards geographic-climatic and environmental, demographic, socio-economic, lifestyle/culture, ethno-religious and military or political influences on mortality, with subsequent implications at the regional level for economic and societal health.


Geographically, areas which are harsher, more remote, with colder climates, and longer winters etc, cause associated physiological problems for inhabitants, and so tend to have lower life expectancies, for example in the Far North and Far East of Russia. Likewise the economic structure and associated environmental conditions also have an impact, for example where pollution and other environmental hazards increase morbidity from cancers etc. Traditionally

⁵¹Independent Institute for Social Policy, 'Demograficheskaiia situatsiia...'

⁵² Feshbach, Russia's Health and Demographic Crises, p.16

⁵³ Shkolnikov, V., G. A. Cornia, et al., (1998), 'Causes of the Russian Mortality Crisis: Evidence and Interpretations', *World Development*, Vol.26, No.11: 1995-2011, pp.2008-9

Russian mortality patterns have shown a clear south-west to north-east gradient, with death rates increasing towards the north and east. Mortality is higher in the European North, Urals Siberia, Far East and lower in the North Caucasus, Volga and Central Black Earth regions.⁵⁴ Although during the 1990s mortality rates increased significantly across the Federation, life expectancy became proportionately even worse for central, east-Siberian and north-western men, and better for those in the Volga-Vyatka and Urals regions.⁵⁵



56

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.2005

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.2006

⁵⁶ A number of Russia's administrative regions, despite having theoretically equal constitutional status, are nonetheless contained within another region. These form what are referred to here as 'parent' (p) and 'child' (c) regions (two regions have two children). Relationships are respectively as follows, Archangelsk (p) & Nenets (c), Tyumen (p) & Khanty-Mansi (c) and Yamal-Nenets (c), Chita (p) & Agin Buryat (c), Irkutsk (p) & Ust Orda-Buryat (c), Krasnoyarsk (p) & Evenk (c) and Taimyr (c), and Kamchatka (p) & Koryak (c). As a result Goskomstat data tends to include the statistics of the 'child' regions within the statistics for their 'parent' regions. It is often a complicated process to attempt the desegregation of such data. This results, from a mapping point of view, in some ambiguity, as effectively the 'child' data are double counted. However to simply use the 'parent' data to represent both parent and child would likewise obscure important distinctions.

In ethno-religious terms Islamic populations tend to have not only higher birth rates but also lower mortality rates.⁵⁷ It has been suggested that regional differences in mortality rates may be a proxy for ethnic differences to a significant degree, which are in turn related to differing levels of socio-economic development (education/urbanisation), although this suggestion does not seem to hold for most of the North Caucasian peoples, perhaps due to other cross-cutting factors⁵⁸. Mortality rates are highest for the Small Peoples of the North, Tyvians and other Siberian ethnic groups,⁵⁹ followed by Kalmyks, Kazakhs, Finno-Hungarians, Russians, Volga peoples, non-Russian Eastern Slavs, Germans, Armenians, Jews and finally North Caucasians.⁶⁰

Ethno-religious factors are closely related not only to levels of socio-economic development but also to lifestyle differences related to dominant cultures, which may impact mortality rates and so life expectancies. For example cross regional differences in diet and alcohol consumption, which lead to a rise in chronic illnesses and related mortality, are in part a feature of cultural difference, such that alcohol consumption is lower amongst Islamic peoples, whom also exhibit far lower levels of alcohol-related mortality.⁶¹

Rising mortality in the 1990s was particularly a product of increases in numbers of accidents, homicides and suicides, as well as increases in cardiovascular and alcohol-related diseases. Regional variations in all such factors may have been related to degrees of economic decline and disruption and the nature and pace of change, as associated with rising social stress and a lack of social cohesion. Regional variations in income and poverty levels, as well as increasing inequality,

⁵⁷ Herd, 'Russia's demographic crisis...' p.49

⁵⁸ Bogoyavlenski, D. D., (2001), 'Etnicheskii sostav naseleeniia Rossii (Ethnic composition of Russia's population)', *Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya*, No.10: 88-93, p.90

⁵⁹ For aboriginal peoples of the far north, male life expectancy is just 44.3 years and female 54.1 while infant mortality rates are twice the Russian average at 30-35 per 100,000, and are equivalent to the poorest countries in the world. See Haynes, M. and R. Husan, (2002), *A Century of State Murder? Death and Policy in 20th Century Russia*, London & Sterling, Virginia, USA, Pluto Press, p.170

⁶⁰ Bogoyavlenski, 'Etnicheskii sostav...' p.90

⁶¹ Olikier, O. and T. Charlick-Paley, (2002), 'Assessing Russia's Decline: Trends and Implications for the US and the US Air Force', *RAND*, Santa Monica, CA, p.52

have all been blamed for the mortality crisis. The geographical distribution of poverty has not, however, necessarily matched the regional pattern of mortality well, and has tended not to defend a link between mortality and impoverishment per se.⁶² In fact, in post-Soviet Russia, life expectancy has consistently been negatively related to per capita income at the oblast level. In particular, industrial regions in the north and east, and the large cities of the centre and north-west saw the steepest increase in mortality in the 1990s, while the more agricultural (and poorer) regions of the south suffered less.⁶³ Urban life expectancies fell more than rural rates. This feature has been explained by the fact that richer urban areas were hit harder by the impact of transition both, economically and socially, for example, in higher rates of labour turnover and unemployment, by increasing crime rates and by even less equal distribution of income⁶⁴. Those areas which were most impacted by the stress and anomie induced by economic and social transition were not necessarily the poorest. Another social factor with regionally variegated impact on mortality is healthcare and welfare provision. Infant mortality rates which are often used as a proxy for healthcare standards and provision vary widely between regions, from 12.8 infant deaths per thousand live births in the North West to 18.6 per thousand in the Far East, and may also reflect differences in access to clean water and sewerage etc.⁶⁵

Finally both military and political factors play a role in mortality rates. Chechnya, it is assumed, has the highest mortality rates and lowest life expectancy of all Russia's regions, but represents an exceptional case due to high war casualties in the region. Exact figures are unavailable and official figures unreliable, but it is estimated that around 160,000 civilians (plus 13,000 Chechen fighters and 17,000 Russian troops) have been killed during the two conflicts, from a population of around one million.⁶⁶ A far more abstract political influence has

⁶² Chen, L. C., F. Wittgenstein, et al., (1996), 'The Upsurge of Mortality in Russia: Causes and Policy Implications', *Population and Development Review*, Vol.22, No.3: 517-30, p.521

⁶³ Shkolnikov et al. 1997, as quoted in Becker and Hemley, 'Demographic Changes in the FSU...' p.1914

⁶⁴ Haynes and Husan, *A Century of State Murder?*, p.73

⁶⁵ Herd, 'Foreign and Security Policy...' p.23

⁶⁶ See Haynes and Husan, *A Century of State Murder?*, pp.196-201 for a discussion of the potential number of casualties.

been suggested by Eberstadt,⁶⁷ who notes that major declines in life expectancy followed the emancipation of blacks in America, taking a few decades to recover to pre-emancipation levels. Eberstadt hypothesises that the sudden acquisition of freedoms was sufficiently disorientating and dislocating as to result in a temporary crisis of mortality. Although such a suggestion in the Russian context would fit better with increases in mortality in the early glasnost, as well as transition years, his hypothesis does point to the potential negative impact of a sudden freeing up of society as well as the value perhaps in investigating whether a relationship exists in Russia between the degree of democratic freedom which pertains in a given region and mortality patterns therein, and in particular whether more authoritarian regions have suffered less from the 1990s mortality crisis.

Age Structure

Russia's population is ageing rapidly, such that between 1989 and 2002 the proportion aged below working age declined from 24.5% to 18.6% and the share aged above working age increased from 18.5% to 20.7%.⁶⁸ Major differentials already exist in the age-structures of regional populations and the regional populations are ageing differentially. The UN considers a country old if more than 7% of the population are aged over 65. In some rural regions of central Russia this figure reaches 30%⁶⁹. In both Tver and Tula more than 25% of the population is elderly, while in most other central regions this figure lies between 20% and 25%.⁷⁰ Even the Far-Eastern and Siberian natural resource regions, which have traditionally had very low levels of elderly inhabitants, have seen elderly shares increase substantially over the last decade, primarily due to the higher migratability of younger cohorts and a breakdown in the previous pattern of high labour turnover. In Yamal-Nenets, for example, the proportion of elderly


⁶⁷ As quoted in Chen, Wittgenstein, et al., 'The Upsurge of Mortality in Russia', p.528, note 16

⁶⁸ Heleniak, 'Geographic aspects...' p.326

⁶⁹ Vladimirov, D. G., (2004), 'Starshee pokolenie kak faktor ekonomicheskogo razvitiia (The older generation as a factor of economic development)', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia (sotsis)*, No.4: 57-60, p.57

⁷⁰ Heleniak, 'Geographic aspects...' pp.329-31

population has increased from 2% to 6.5% since the mid-1990s, in Khanty-Mansi from 3.5% to 8%, and in Chukotka from 3% to 10%. Likewise, those regions with the highest rates of natural increase nonetheless have significant shares of elderly population, for example, 10% in Tyva and Ingushetia, and 13% in Dagestan.⁷¹



Despite this, Russia is still characterised by 'an elderly core and youthful periphery'⁷², with younger populations in the less hospitable regions of the North, which attract young workers, and in the ethnic republics of the South with their higher rates of natural increase. Even despite programmes such as the World Bank's Northern Resettlement programme which aims to enable elderly persons to migrate from the Far North, generally migration trends see younger adults, often with young families move out, and elderly inhabitants remain, so reinforcing


⁷¹ Independent Institute for Social Policy, 'Demograficheskaiia situatsiia...'

⁷² Heleniak, 'Geographic aspects...' p.329


the ageing trends in the departure regions and helping to reduce the elderly proportions in destination regions.

Intra-regional differentials

Differentials in demographic characteristics are not confined to the inter-regional level, but rather occur within regions to a substantial degree also, differing between raions and in particular between rural and urban areas. The population density map below shows raion level densities on the same scale as those shown in the map on page 9 and clearly indicates the level of variation, which is obscured at the regional level.



A close up of the raions Southern Federal District here demonstrates both the intra-regional differences in population density in 2002 and changes in population density between 1989 and 2002, which are equally differentiated⁷³.



While the general trend has been for migrants to settle mainly around urban areas, in the Southern region (as well as in the Urals) there has been a more notable settlement of migrants in rural areas also.⁷⁴ In part this is a feature of the more complete settlement and infrastructure situation in this more densely populated area, by comparison to areas in Siberia and the Far East say.⁷⁵ This also represents a general movement down the urban hierarchy, from bigger to smaller towns. The general trend has been for movement to areas which are

⁷³ Similar maps for the other FDs are available at the project website. See <http://www.le.ac.uk/geography/research/RussianHeartland/index.html>

⁷⁴ For example during the inter-census period, the Southern Federal District registered a slight increase in urban population overall, and a 28% increase in the rural population. See World Bank, 'From Transition to Development', p.31

⁷⁵ Independent Institute for Social Policy, (2004), 'Rasselenie', accessed 22 June 2004, available at <http://www.socpol.ru/atlas/overviews/settlement/index.shtml>

within a couple of hours of significant cities, which covers a much greater proportion of the Southern FD than the less populated ones in the East or North of the country, resulting in higher population density across the board. In the more spacious regions Russia's unusual settlement distribution, with major cities being very far apart from each other by European standards, intra-regional movement towards major cities is changing the distribution of Russia's population by creating more concentrated areas within regions, but which remain nonetheless (and if anything are becoming more so) fragmented on a national scale.⁷⁶

Only a few major cities have experienced growth since the collapse of the Soviet Union; these include Moscow, Kazan, Rostov-na-Donu and Volgograd, which grew by 17%, 2%, 6% and 2% respectively between 1989 and 2002. At the other end of the scale a substantial number of settlements in the Centre, North West, Volga and Far East, have lost all their inhabitants and become 'ghost towns'. Over 13,000 villages have been entirely abandoned during the inter-census period, and some 35,000 have fewer than 10 inhabitants, largely as a result of elderly populations dying out.⁷⁷

Overall Population Change


Differential inward and outward migration rates, fertility and mortality patterns, and age profiles, all impact the overall trends of population growth or decline across Russia's regions. Russia-wide population growth has been negative but this has not been the case everywhere and different factors have fed growth or decline in different regions. For example, in many central regions the rate of in-migration has served to stem what would otherwise be population decline, while other regions have suffered quite dramatic reinforcement of the already downward trend, as a result of out-migration combined with low natural increase and an elderly population. At the Federal District level only two of seven recorded a population increase in the inter-census period. They were: the Southern FD

⁷⁶ Ioffe, Medvedkov, et al., 'Russia's Fragmented Space', p.35


⁷⁷ Heleniak, 'The 2002 Census in Russia', pp.439-40

where the population grew by 11.6% and the Central FD where it grew by 0.2%, and would have suffered a decline overall were it not for the substantial increase in Moscow's population.⁷⁸

During the 1990s some 40 regions experienced overall population growth and 49 declined. In 24 of those which grew, the growth was attributable to net in migration, which was sufficient to outweigh natural decline, rather than to natural increase. Migration rates are unlikely however to hold up to this sort of level in the longer term. Indeed by 1999 only ten regions recorded overall population growth, and all but one were ethnic homelands, most of which also experienced net out-migration during the 1990s. By 2001 only four regions experienced positive natural increase and net in-migration, while 42 suffered negative natural growth and net out-migration.




⁷⁸ Ibid., pp.434-5




During the inter-census period, only 23 regions registered overall population growth, with Dagestan topping the list with a 43% increase from 1.8 million in 1989 to 2.6 million in 2002. Six other regions experienced growth in excess of 10%: Kabardino-Balkaria (20%), Moscow (17%), Stavropol (13%), North Ossetia (12%), Khanty-Mansi (12%) and Krasnodar (11%).⁷⁹ Population decline in excess of 10% was recorded in 23 regions, including several central European regions, as well as regions in Siberia, the Far East and the European North; many of these were source regions for large-scale out-migration. Magadan and Chukotka registered 53% and 67% decline respectively.

⁷⁹ Nijegorodskai Pravda, 'Nas bol'she chem my dumali',



The above figures must be treated with some caution given discrepancies in the published census results, which result largely from the removal and reintroduction of Soviet era 'secret city' populations into the data. A recent paper by Mark Tolts⁸⁰ has investigated these discrepancies and concludes that population changes differ substantially from the figures suggested by the published census results in at least 14 regions. Most dramatically in two regions (Samara and Tomsk) the necessary adjustments actually imply a change in the dynamic of population growth, as displayed below.

⁸⁰ Tolts, M., (2004), 'Measuring Intercensal Regional Population Change in Russia, 1989 and 2002: An evaluation Based on Corrected Results of the 1989 Soviet Census', *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem*, Jerusalem, Israel



The overall pattern is one of increasingly uneven population density, with the least populated areas of the North and East becoming less so, and the already more populated areas of the south and west becoming more so, as the population adjusts to the new situation, and reverses the Soviet era pattern of overpopulation of the Far East and North. Resultantly Russia may soon see a population distribution where as many as 80% of its citizens reside in European Russia, with a notable redistribution to the North Caucasus and Volga regions, and a further decline in the Far Eastern share to as little as 3.5% by 2025.⁸¹

As well as the major redistribution of the population, demographic processes underway in Russia are effecting a significant change in the ethnic composition of the country's population. In particular higher rates of natural increase among certain ethnic groups are increasing the size of some regional populations, and

⁸¹ Andreev, E., S. Scherbov, et al., (1998), 'Population of Russia: What can we expect in the future?' *World Development*, Vol.26, No.11: 1939-55, p.1946

the titular proportions of those populations, especially in the North Caucasian ethnic republics. Although detailed census results are needed for confirmation it would also appear that there is a trend towards the increasing concentration of ethnic groups in their home republics; that is some degree of un-mixing of Russia's peoples. Overall the share of the total population made up by ethnic Russians has declined from 81.5 percent in 1989 to 79.8 percent in 2002. While this is not enough in itself to radically alter the ethnic structure of the country as a whole⁸², at the regional level more radical changes appear to be occurring in the North Caucasus and some Siberian regions as a result of factors 'including cultural and religious differences, differing levels of economic development and education, rates of urbanisation and age structure'.⁸³ By 2001 just 15 regions experienced more births than deaths and all of these were non-Russian ethnic homelands. In the ethnic Russian central core by contrast, rapid natural decline has been the norm, with deaths outweighing births by two or three times in some areas.⁸⁴

⁸² Demoscope.ru, (2004), 'Rossiiskaia perepis' v etnicheskom izmerenii', accessed 3rd June 2004, available at <http://www.polit.ru/research/demoscope/2004/04/27/demoscope155.html>

⁸³ Heleniak, T., (2002), 'The End of an Empire: Migration and the Changing Nationality Composition of the Soviet Successor States' in *Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants*, edited by R. Ohliger and R. Muenz, London, Frank Cass, p.14, note 7

⁸⁴ Heleniak, 'Geographic aspects...' pp.332-3

The Regional Consequences

Demographic changes may work to increase tensions either between states, or within a state, both by exacerbating latent stresses and generating new tensions⁸⁵. They may have consequences for a state's security by encouraging violent (especially ethnic) conflict, political instability, radicalism, terrorism and religious fundamentalism, or by threatening to destabilise national military power, economic growth, or environmental health.⁸⁶ Many of these consequences are widely discussed in the Russian context at the national level, but variations in them at the regional level have gone largely unrecorded. Regional consequences are arguably as important, particularly in a transitional and relatively unstable state such as Russia. Indeed, certain variables, which may not directly impact on the national stage, may have major implications for regional politics and economics, and the social and cultural well-being of regional populations.

Very little literature exists which considers the impact of demographic processes from a sub-national level, even outside of the Russian context, and thus in some cases inferences have had to be made from possible consequences at the national level to the regional level, particularly with regard to economic and ethnic considerations; these may not necessarily hold at the sub-national level. To this must be added, that much of the literature regarding the ramifications of demographic change even at the national level, tends to relate to changes in either developed western countries⁸⁷ or in third-world countries⁸⁸. There is a dearth of literature which focuses on countries undergoing transition, which may have a great deal of potential for internal instability, and a great deal of potential for demographic factors and processes to reinforce that instability.

⁸⁵ Herd, 'Russia's demographic crisis...' p.50

⁸⁶ Weiner, M. and S. Stanton Russell, (2001), 'Introduction' in *Demography and National Security*, edited by M. Weiner and S. Stanton Russell, New York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1-20, p.1

⁸⁷ For instance, regarding the implications of rising dependency ratios in EU countries, as a result of ageing populations and the impact of this on economic productivity.

⁸⁸ For instance, the impact of large youth cohorts in African nations in relationship to ethnic violence.

Moreover in virtually all cases the impact of demographic changes in any given region, just as in any given state, will be conditional upon the specific economic, social or cultural environment within which they arise, and in this regard inferences from national level processes in other states may be of limited value. Neither the regional conditions impacted by divergent demographic processes nor their consequences at the regional level are uniform. Russia's regions exhibit huge disparities in terms of demographic processes which are impacting them (i.e. migration-led or natural, growth or decline), as well as the already existing social, economic, political or cultural arena (i.e. differing age and ethnic structures or economic conditions), not to mention intra-regional distinctions. The consequences of demographic changes will thus likely vary widely across the country with different implications for individual regions or groups of regions. For example, a radically increasing population will have significantly different consequences in a society with low economic growth and high unemployment, than in one experiencing high economic growth and a labour shortage⁸⁹; high levels of in-migration will have a potentially less destabilising impact in society with a well established civic sense of identity; and so on. Likewise different regions within Russia will have different capacities (be they societal, economic, administrative etc.) to cope with the dynamics of population change as they impact politics, economics, security or society.⁹⁰

Nonetheless, certain kinds of population changes are particularly associated with political instability and violent conflict, at the national level at least.⁹¹ In particular demographic changes may alter the balance between population and economy. This may result, for example, in concentrations of labour supply, which exceed the demands of the local economy, or an excess of well-educated workers by comparison to demand for that type of labour. Likewise, unequal growth rates between ethnic groups may alter the political balance between groups, or rapid urbanisation may result in large economically inactive youth cohorts, with social

⁸⁹ Weiner and Stanton Russell, 'Introduction', p.3

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.3

⁹¹ Goldstone, J. A., (2001), 'Demography, Environment and Security: An Overview' in *Demography and National Security*, edited by M. Weiner and S. Stanton Russell, New York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 38-61, p.46

consequences in terms of crime rates or delinquent behaviour.⁹² All of these factors may have severe ramifications for the stability and cohesion of the state as a whole, and most, if not all, are occurring in some region or another in Russia, if not in many.

Consequences of demographic change in terms of Russia's economic potential are among the most discussed at the national level. Population size, for example, is traditionally regarded in Russia as a crucial state power resource, in terms of the military, but also labour force. Concerns regarding the dramatic and seemingly irreversible decline of the population are thus accompanied by fears of a related and inevitable economic decline, which will precipitate Russia's marginalisation on the world stage⁹³. In fact such a relationship between population and economic growth is far from well established; population growth may underpin a rise in national income, or may retard economic development by causing resource scarcities, just as population stagnation or decline may hamper growth, or may encourage innovation, adaptation and efficiency.⁹⁴ While it is likely that the disproportionate impact of Russia's mortality crisis on working-age males will have a negative impact on her economy as a whole, it is also the case that the relationship between population and development may be indeterminate outside of specific contexts⁹⁵ and that region-specific conditions, such as the structure of the economy or labour market in a given region, will determine the economic impact of specific demographic changes, be they caused by excess mortality, massive out-migration, or an influx of young skilled workers etc.⁹⁶

Population size and labour supply are not declining in all of Russia's regions, and even where the working age population is in decline, this may not be necessarily have a negative impact on the regional economy. Many northern regions of

⁹² Ibid., p.40

⁹³ Eberstadt, N., (2002), 'The future of AIDS', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.81, No.6: 22-+, p.43

⁹⁴ Clarke, J. I., Ed. (1984), *Geography and Population: Approaches and Applications*, Oxford, Pergamon, pp.45-6 and Krebs, R. R. and J. S. Levy, (2001), 'Demographic Change and the Sources of International Conflict' in *Demography and National Security*, edited by M. Weiner and S. Stanton Russell, New York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 62-105, p.69

⁹⁵ Krebs and Levy, 'Demographic Change and the Sources of International Conflict', p.73

⁹⁶ Bloom, D. E. and P. N. Maloney, (1998), 'Macroeconomic Consequences of the Russian Mortality Crisis', *World Development*, Vol.26, No.11: 2073-85, p.2074

Russia, for example, are variously seen as being too full or too empty in economic terms. Some commentators suggest that the out-flow of workers from parts of Siberia, the Far East, the North West and the Urals may leave these regions insufficiently, let alone optimally populated, in terms of exploiting Russia's economic and especially resource potential.⁹⁷ Others have suggested that these areas had been previously overpopulated, and therefore that a reduction in the labour force is both natural and healthy in economic terms, and may bring progress towards greater efficiency, as the Soviet era labour-intensive disequilibrium works its way out⁹⁸. Likewise, forsaking for the moment, national identity concerns in the Far East, the increase in Chinese labour will likely have positive consequences for these regional economies by responding to demand and indeed may prevent the stagnation, which could occur in the absence of such resources. Evidence suggests that Chinese migrants are occupying niches, which are not coveted by the local populations, especially in the consumer goods trade, agriculture and the service industry and are thus not competing for local jobs, but are instead investing in the local economy, so helping to diversify and reinvigorate it.⁹⁹

Where the regional balance of labour supply and demand fits well with the demographic processes, positive results may be expected, in the economic sphere at least. Demographic changes may have more negative consequences in regions where there is a persistent mismatch between the size and nature of the regional labour supply and the employment requirements of the regional economy¹⁰⁰. For example, in the poverty-stricken, high-unemployment regions along Russia's southern border, substantial in migration (especially external) has

⁹⁷ Vishnevskii, Treivish, et al., 'Perspectivy razvitiia Rossii', p.22 and Gerber, T., (2000), 'Russia's Population Crisis: The Migration Dimension', Policy Memo no.118, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA, p.4

⁹⁸ Sutherland, D. and P. Hanson, (2000), 'Demographic Responses to Regional Economic Change' in *Regional Economic Change in Russia*, edited by P. Hanson and M. J. Bradshaw, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 76-96, p.76

⁹⁹ Vitkovskaya, G., (1999), 'Does Chinese Migration Endanger Russian Security?' *Moscow Carnegie Center Briefing Papers*, Vol.1, No.8, and Shkurkin, A. M., (2002), 'Chinese in the labour market of the Russian Far East: Past, present and future' in *Globalizing Chinese Migration*, edited by P. Nyiri and I. Savelier, Aldershot, Hampshire, Ashgate, 74-99, p.74

¹⁰⁰ Goldstone, 'Demography, Environment and Security: An Overview', , p.47

exacerbated the poor labour market conditions, which already existed.¹⁰¹ In other regions, perhaps in the non-ethnic regions in the North Caucasus, too much inward migration, even to relatively prosperous regions (a sort of short-term over-adjustment of the labour market) may, rather than mitigating regional labour market disequilibrium, simply result in its geographic re-arrangement.¹⁰² Where the destination regions are poorly equipped to cope with the associated sudden increases in requirements for housing, welfare and healthcare services, migration in-flows may have a negative social impact. As well as increasing dependency ratios, placing more pressure on regional economies, and impacting unemployment and poverty rates etc. such in-flows may lead to tensions within regional populations, particularly between long-term residents and new arrivals, and especially where there is an ethnic dimension.

Even where substantial labour demand exists, the available work may not fit the skill or education profile of in-migrants (particularly given problems of incomplete information), who tend to be positively self-selected by age, education and skills, and may result in large concentrated groups of disgruntled and disaffected, but educated, workers. By contrast of course, regions with much in-migration tend to be recipient of richer, better-educated, higher-skilled persons¹⁰³ and provided the economy can grow fast enough to employ them this can have positive economic benefits for the regional economy and its society, by rejuvenating it or reinforcing positive growth.¹⁰⁴ In this way patterns of inter-regional migration shape as well as respond to regional economic change¹⁰⁵ by determining the location of economic activity and having positive impacts on those economies, which are able to entice employers to relocate to take advantage of demographic changes in population concentration. Unfortunately such processes will negatively impact those regions, which are deserted by employers and workers alike, and may thus be prevented from diversifying their economies. Net donor regions tend to be left with 'less skilled, less educated, elderly populations that cannot afford to leave'

¹⁰¹ Gerber, 'Russia's Population Crisis: The Migration Dimension', p.4

¹⁰² Ibid., p.4


¹⁰³ Heleniak, 'Migration and Restructuring...' p.532

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.,

¹⁰⁵ Sutherland and Hanson, 'Demographic Responses to Regional Economic Change', p.76

with obvious negative connotations in terms of economies and social problems. A myriad of possibilities exists and significantly more research is needed in order to assess the particular consequences of those regions most dramatically affected by migration shifts, as well as the areas within regions which are positively and negatively affected.

Economic and social ramifications will also result from the differential ageing of regional populations, combined with differential mortality and morbidity patterns, as they affect both the size of the working age population and dependency ratios.¹⁰⁶ Some regions will suffer much greater personnel shortage than others with social consequences, particularly where dependency ratios are highest or changing most rapidly, and where welfare capacity may therefore be insufficient.¹⁰⁷



108

¹⁰⁶ Heleniak, 'Geographic aspects...' p.326

¹⁰⁷ Herd, 'Foreign and Security Policy...' pp.29-30

¹⁰⁸ See Footnote 56

From around 2006 onwards, the ageing of the population will increase the dependency burden of the nation as a whole. This will raise the costs of social welfare provision; requiring the diversion of state funds from military or economic spending and further highlighting the need for pension reform.¹⁰⁹ Those regions which have experienced high levels of net out-migration, have generally experienced a decline in the youth dependency ratio, and an increase in the elderly ratio (as young families leave older cohorts behind), while net in-migration areas tend to experience a small increase in the youth dependency ratio and a small decrease in the elderly ratio (in relative not absolute terms). The economic impact on net in-migration areas of more dependent tends to be smaller because such areas gain working-age adults too.¹¹⁰



The structure of the dependency ratio in Russia's regions varies considerably in terms of youth dependency and elderly dependency¹¹¹. The regions in central European Russia in particular, tend to have very low youth dependency ratios but very high elderly dependency ratios, while many ethnic republics, both in the North Caucasus and in Siberia tend to exhibit the opposite pattern. Although the costs in terms of social welfare may be higher in areas with high youth dependency ratios in the short term, these regions will also likely benefit as this youthful cohort reaches working-age. The same is not true of those regions with high elderly dependency ratios. To some degree however the burden suffered by any region with high elderly dependency ratios will be dependent on the attitude adopted by regional leaders and employers towards that cohort. Equally elderly citizens can be viewed either as applying a break to reform, offering little or no economic benefit or as a significant useful and experienced human resource base.¹¹² Which of these positions turns out to be more accurate in the Russian context remains to be seen.

¹⁰⁹ Herd, 'Foreign and Security Policy...' p.41

¹¹⁰ Heleniak, 'Internal Migration in Russia...' pp.100-101

¹¹¹ The accompanying dependency ratio maps do NOT use Census data, but rather Goskomstat estimates.

¹¹² Pisarev, A. V., (2004), 'Obraz pojilyk v sovremennoi Rossii', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia (sotsis)*, No.4: 51-56, p.51 and Vladimirov, 'Starshee pokolenie...' p.58



Russia's post-transition mortality crisis as well as the general poor health of the population will have direct and indirect costs related to both economic productivity and incentives to invest in human capital.¹¹³ Death rates and health indicators are regionally differentiated and thus the costs incurred will differ from region to region. Although the overall dynamic of indirect costs from higher mortality (i.e. productivity foregone) is unclear¹¹⁴ certain regions will inevitably suffer more from direct costs of higher morbidity (i.e. medicinal care, work days lost to illness), as well as in terms of caring for those left widowed or orphaned by high male working-age mortality. Those regions that are most severely affected by high mortality and morbidity rates inevitably become less attractive in terms of investment in human capital, reinforcing negative economic trends.¹¹⁵

Regions clearly have differing socio-economic capacities to respond to the demographic changes that they face¹¹⁶. Migration flows create the need for additional social service provision in some regions, and reduce the demand for it in others, for instance in terms of schools and nursery care, or elderly and healthcare provision. Yet there exist substantial 'regional variations in health levels and the supply of health [and other] resources, reflecting differing economic development, degrees of urbanisation, population density, pollution and others'¹¹⁷ and regions may be in no position to adapt sufficiently or quickly to new challenges. The provision of social infrastructure and financial resources to fund social welfare, healthcare and pensions will be influenced to a significant degree by a region's economic strength, and so tax base, and so degree of reliance on federal transfers. For example, Heleniak notes that during the 1990s pensions' payments became increasingly tied to the regional tax base, resulting in inequalities in regions' abilities to finance social transfers and so impacting

¹¹³ The assumption is that a healthier and longer-lived population is more productive and gives greater incentives for economic investment in human capital. See Bloom and Maloney, 'Macroeconomic Consequences of the Russian Mortality Crisis', p.2078

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.2074

¹¹⁵ Eberstadt, 'The future of AIDS', p.39

¹¹⁶ Clarke, Ed. *Geography and Population: Approaches and Applications*, p.3

¹¹⁷ Fields, M., (1997), 'Health in Russia: The Regional and National Dimensions' in *Beyond the Monolith*, edited by J. Debardeleben, P. J. Stavrakiset al, Washington, DC & Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press & Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 165-82, p.167 – check quote – book at home

regional levels of poverty.¹¹⁸ Poorer regions in the south which have been recipient of much migration, and also tend to have larger youth cohorts, will likely be least able to cope with the influx of people, either in terms of providing jobs or providing social welfare. Moreover regions bordering Chechnya, such as Ingushetia and Dagestan, which are amongst the poorest, have had to cope with the additional burden of catering for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, as well as very many refugees and asylum seekers from former Soviet Union countries.¹¹⁹

In certain regions, demographic factors may combine with social problems to aggravate poverty, increase social polarisation and reduce social cohesion.¹²⁰ Relatively successful regions economically, as well as more urban areas, tend to have better infrastructures in terms of both employment and services provision, making them better equipped to deal with migrant inflows and ageing populations. Very well developed regions such as Moscow are able to provide the highest levels of support while weak and depressed regions have suffered the greatest decline in welfare services.¹²¹ As these regions have often experienced high levels of inward migration nonetheless, they then have to spend even more of their meagre resources on social and welfare provision, such that less is available for economic investment and development of infrastructure, so reinforcing the inequality between rich and poor. There is some evidence that wealthier regions have also been more successful in reforming their healthcare systems, while the more impoverished areas fall further behind.¹²² This is particularly significant when it is considered that improving levels of population health tend to aid economic productivity, which in turn can improve health and so on.¹²³ As illustrated by claims that some poorer regions

¹¹⁸ Heleniak, 'Geographic aspects...' p.339

¹¹⁹ Burke, J., (2000), 'Internal Migration: A Civil Society Challenge' in *Russia's torn safety nets : health and social welfare during the transition*, edited by M. Field and J. L. Twigg, New York, St Martin's Press, 212-27, p.214

¹²⁰ Independent Institute for Social Policy, (2002), 'Inequality and Poverty in Russia in Transition', accessed June 11 2004, available at http://www.socpol.ru/eng/research_projects/pdf/proj10a.pdf.24

¹²¹ Ibid., pp.12-13

¹²² Twigg, J. L., (2001), 'Russian health care reform at the regional level: Status and impact', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol.42, No.3: 202-19, pp.211-2

¹²³ Bloom and Maloney, 'Macroeconomic Consequences of the Russian Mortality Crisis', p.2081

may not seek actively to diagnose cancers because they cannot afford to treat them,¹²⁴ a lack of funds reinforces mortality, which reinforces the lack of funds and so on.

The incidence distribution of certain diseases, such as TB and HIV/AIDS, and cancers related to environmental hazards and degradation¹²⁵, is very uneven across Russia's regions with related disparities in associated costs and impact on regional budgets. In particular the rise of HIV/AIDS in Russia is very unevenly distributed. By comparison to many demographic trends which are adversely affecting the poorest Russian regions, patterns of drug use (and related higher crime rates), and concentrated HIV/AIDS outbreaks, tend to be associated with richer regions and so have the potential to hamper development in the most successful regional economies, as well as disproportionately affecting men of working age. The highest levels of drug addiction are found in regions such as Khanty-Mansi (with 585.3 registered addicts per 100,000 population compared to a national average of 186.6), Samara (518/100,000), Tomsk, Kemerovo, Tyumen, Irkutsk and Taimyr. These regions are characterised by high levels of monetary income or are geographically located on major drug trafficking routes.¹²⁶ HIV infection in Russia is impacted significantly by the regional distribution of drug users and as a result similarly richer regions, and particularly major urban centres, have been afflicted by the highest levels of HIV infection.


Although HIV cases are now recorded in all of Russia's 89 regions, just 10 account for more than 50%, with highest levels (cumulatively) recorded in Sverdlovsk, St. Petersburg, Moscow Oblast, Samara, Moscow, Irkutsk and Chelyabinsk. When measured in terms of the proportion of a population that is infected, the highest rates of HIV infection occur in Irkutsk (0.55%), Samara

¹²⁴ Feshbach, *Russia's Health and Demographic Crises*, p.25

¹²⁵ The numbers of Russian citizens affected by mental disorders, or alcohol and drug abuse have reached extraordinary levels by comparison to other advanced states. See *Ibid.*, p.xiii

¹²⁶ Shcherbakova, E. M., (2004), 'Narkonashestvie v Rossii (Drug Invasion in Russia)', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia (sotsis)*, No.1: 70-75, p.75

(0.51%), Khanty-Mansi (0.49%), Orenburg (0.45%), Kaliningrad (0.41%), St. Petersburg, Sverdlovsk, Ulyanovsk, Leningrad, and Chelyabinsk.¹²⁷



While the AIDS epidemic looks likely to spread more widely across Russia with national implications in terms of military power, economic growth and labour productivity, in the absence of some major policy changes, certain regions will continue to be disproportionately afflicted. The 40 or so regions with very low levels of infection to date¹²⁸ may, by contrast, be able to avoid epidemics and the associated economic and social costs, if preventative measures are introduced rapidly, and provided the low registered levels do not simply reflect inadequacies

¹²⁷ See Denissov, B. P. and V. I. Sakevitch, (2004), 'Dinamika epidemii VICH/SPID (Dynamics of the HIV/AIDS epidemic)', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia (sotsis)*, No.1: 75-85, p.81

¹²⁸ Cumulative figures to October 2002 indicated that some 42 regions had registered less than 400 cases, while 20 had registered less than 100, and 8 less than 20.

in detection.¹²⁹ The more-affected regions will suffer the brunt of the social and budgetary consequences associated with an epidemic, which may infect as many as five million people by 2010¹³⁰. Border regions with high levels of prevalence, including Buryatia, Altai Krai, Orenburg and Primorskii, will also likely suffer quickening depopulation as a result¹³¹, and may struggle more than urban centres such as Moscow and St. Petersburg to attract replacement labour. The local authorities in these regions need to consider the impact of HIV/AIDS on available funds, which will need to be diverted from elsewhere to meet medical care requirements,¹³² as well as indirect costs from reduced labour productivity - associated in particular with the high levels of premature mortality amongst men aged 15-29 - and from disincentives to invest in the local labour force.

The HIV/AIDS epidemic is just one demographic trend which has a clear and regionally differentiated impact on a regions' social and economic health. Changes in regions' socio-economic situations will in turn impact the national and regional political landscape. Changes in demographic factors, such as population age profiles, may alter the domestic political balance. The demographic profile of the electorate may play a significant role in determining political support for parties of different leanings. In turn, in theory at least, electoral support will impact the concerns which are articulated and the policies implemented. Whether a certain region is more open, reform orientated and outward looking or inward looking and protectionist, both economically and socio-culturally (in attitudes to women, multiculturalism, sexual freedoms etc.) will be to some degree a reflection of the demographic and socio-economic profile of its electorate.

¹²⁹ In Nizhniy Novgorod early intervention appeared to have successfully stabilised the local epidemic, although numbers have been increasing again recently, see UNAIDS, (2003), 'AIDS Epidemic Update', And Denissov and Sakevitch, 'Dinamika epidemii VICH/SPID', , p.80

¹³⁰ Estimate made by Vadim Pokrovsky, director of the federal AIDS centre, based on just half of the current HIV+ population passing the virus to one sexual partner. As quoted in Haynes and Husan, *A Century of State Murder?*, p.155

¹³¹ Frolov, V., (2004), 'Annex 2: The National Security Implications of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Russia' in *Reversing the Epidemic: Facts and Policy Options*, edited by T. Barnett, D. Barret al, Bratislava, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2004: 91-96, p.93

¹³² Feshbach, *Russia's Health and Demographic Crises*, p.31

Research by Clem and Craumer has illustrated the statistical correlation between certain population characteristics and voting preference, and noted resultant spatial variations in electoral support for politicians of particular persuasions¹³³. Gender, age, and ethnicity all contribute to voter preference, and affect turnout rates, party identification, issue positions and voter choices.¹³⁴ Traditionally the older, agricultural, less-educated, less-urban electorate has tended to favour the left, while urbanised, younger, and better educated have favoured reform- and centre-orientated parties. Ethnic Russians have predictably favoured Russian nationalist parties more than other ethnic groups¹³⁵ Interestingly the more conservative vote of the elderly has previously been manifested as support for the KPRF, but is increasingly being transferred to support for Putin, United Russia and the extreme right (LDPR).¹³⁶ The general ageing of the population could therefore push politics further in a right-wing nationalist direction. Equally, increasingly differentiated age and ethnicity profiles may reinforce regional political disparities, manifested for example in an older more conservative, more patriotic Russian core, and a younger, less conservative (possibly more liberal), non-nationalist (or non-Russian nationalist at least) periphery.

At the national level 'Russian elections are won and lost in the largest regional electorates'¹³⁷; around 50% of all voters live in the 20 most-populated regions. Major demographic changes in these regions could thus have significant impact for national politics over time, and indeed some of these regions i.e. Moscow and Moscow Oblast, Nizhy Novgorod, Krasnodar, have been recipient to much in migration. Thus far however, those regions which have undergone the greatest demographic turmoil, such as in the Far North and Far East, are relatively unimportant on the national political scene. Moreover, support for Unity/United Russia and directly for Putin has, increasingly, not followed traditional

¹³³ Herd, 'Foreign and Security Policy...' p.36

¹³⁴ Sperling, V., (2002), 'The Gender Gap in Russian Politics and Elections', Policy memo. no.257, PONARS, Cambridge, MA, p.1

¹³⁵ Clem, R. S. and P. R. Craumer, (2000), 'Regional patterns of political preference in Russia: The December 1999 Duma elections', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol.41, No.1: 1-29, pp.25-26

¹³⁶ Heleniak, 'Geographic aspects...' p.342

¹³⁷ Clem, R. S. and P. R. Craumer, (2000), 'Spatial Patterns of Political Choice in the Post-Yeltsin Era: The Geography of Russia's 2000 Presidential Election', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol.41, No.7: 465-82, p.469

demographic patterns, and rather has come from a more broad-based crosscutting electorate.¹³⁸ There is a danger however, that where demographic patterns are reinforcing political distinctions between the central and peripheral regions, they may serve to alienate those shares of the electorate, particularly in the North, East and South, whom are already denied influence by the nature of the electoral system¹³⁹.

At the regional level itself, changing demography, and especially the arrival of significant migrant groups with certain socio-demographic profiles (young, educated, relatively wealthy etc.) could well alter the regional balance of power, for example by bringing more progressive leaders to the fore, and in time impact on the national stage. More dramatic consequences in terms of regional cohesion or political stability may occur where demographic changes have an ethnic or very youthful dimension or in the context of a worsening social situation. In particular changes in ethnic balances or an increase in the size of the youth cohort in a given region have been traditionally de-stabilising. Given the ageing population, Russia may not need to concern herself with the connection between large youth cohorts and protest and radicalism, which have plagued African nations in particular.¹⁴⁰ However, while it is true that a youth bulge in the population is hardly likely, certain regions do have larger youth cohorts than others, and more importantly, the size of the cohort itself may be less important than the degree to which that group is alienated, disposed and disenfranchised politically, as well as socially, due to unemployment and poverty rates. Moreover, Glinksi points out the particular danger associated with the high educational levels of many of those now stricken by poverty, and highlights the risk of radicalising politics by the exclusion of a dispossessed, but highly educated, youthful cohort.¹⁴¹

¹³⁸ Clem and Craumer, 'December 1999 Duma elections', p.27

¹³⁹ In that, they already have disproportionately less impact on national politics than those in the more populated central regions.

¹⁴⁰ Weiner and Stanton Russell, 'Introduction', p.8

¹⁴¹ Glinksi, D., (2002), 'The Antagonizing of the Educated and Skilled, New Source of Security Threat in Russia', Policy Memo. no.270, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA, pp.2-3

The highest risks exist where demographic processes may reinforce societal tensions where preconditions already exist, and where changes seem to be accompanied by social decay, for example, in rising rates of crime or drug abuse, or employment and housing shortages. In this regard there may be some danger with regard to the large youthful migrations to the cities in the south of the country and particularly the North Caucasus where a lack of employment opportunities, may result in relatively large cohorts of young adults concentrated in urban areas with high unemployment rates and a high degree of poverty, who are socially dislocated, and have access to drugs, incentives for crime and so on.¹⁴² Moreover, there is some evidence of the negative impact of such a lack of social cohesion on societal health and well-being, as evidenced in positive correlations between societal cohesion and lower mortality.¹⁴³ In this regard again demographic trends may have negative social consequences in certain regions which then reinforce negative demographic trends, and so on in a cycle. This reinforces the need for adequate social welfare funding in the poorer regions and the importance of integrating new migrants into regional communities so as to reduce the alienation and isolation associated with disjointed communities.

Demographic factors with ethnic dimensions are perhaps the most likely to lead to political instability in some of Russia's regions. Russia is a multi-national state with some 160 different nationalities, of which seven number over a million and a further 23 over 400,000.¹⁴⁴ Political tensions, with security consequences, may result, for example, where migration patterns or unequal growth rates change the ethnic balance in a given region, where employment rates are differentiated by ethnicity, or where a substantial ethnic group is politically disenfranchised.¹⁴⁵ The multi-national nature of Russia's population, in ways makes internal migration flows more akin to international flows, in that they have the potential to alter the

¹⁴² Teitelbaum, M. S., (2001), 'International Migration: Predicting the Unknowable' in *Demography and National Security*, edited by M. Weiner and S. Stanton Russell, New York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 21-37, p.22

¹⁴³ Kennedy, B. P., I. Kawachi, et al., (1998), 'The Role of Social Capital in the Russian Mortality Crisis', *World Development*, Vol.26, No.11: 2029-44, p.2030

¹⁴⁴ Vremia i dengi, (2003), 'Musul'man - bolee 14 millionov', accessed 11 May 2004, available at <http://www.prepis2002.ru/content/202/2024-article.asp>

¹⁴⁵ Goldstone, 'Demography, Environment and Security: An Overview', p.40

ethnic balance in certain regions of the state. Such changes may impact conceptions of regional or national identity, and in turn popular loyalty to the federal leadership¹⁴⁶.

Initial national level census results indicate that certain ethnic groups have increased in both absolute and proportional terms while other have declined.¹⁴⁷ Most significant has been the decline in percentage terms of ethnic Russians (and other Slavic and European groups) and the increases in most other nationalities, especially the many Islamic North Caucasian ethnic groups.¹⁴⁸ In 1989 ethnic Russians represented 81.5% of the population; by 2002 this share had fallen to 79.8%. While the number of Tatars has remained stable at around 5.5 million (3.8%), the number of Bashkirs has increased by some 300,000 such that they now represent 1.2% of the total population rather than 0.9% in 1989. Likewise the number of Chechens has increased from 900,000 to 1.36 million, the number of Ingush from 215,000 to 413,000 and the number of Dargins¹⁴⁹ from 353,000 to 510,000. Other titular ethnic groups that have increased substantially in number include: Kabardinians, Ossetians, Yakutians, Kumyks and Lezgins, whilst numbers of Chuvash, Mordvians, Udmurts, and Marii have all declined. Significant increases in numbers of non-Russian nationalities have occurred amongst Armenians, Kazakhs and Azerbaijanis whilst numbers of Ukrainians and Belarusians have declined substantially (the former from 4.3 million to 2.9 million and the latter from 1.2 million to 800,000).¹⁵⁰

Some regions are becoming more mixed and some less so in ethnic terms, variously impacting the salience of ethnicity, with ramifications for national and

¹⁴⁶ Heliak, T., (2004), 'Migration of the Russian Diaspora after the Breakup of the Soviet Union', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57, No.2: 99-117, p.114

¹⁴⁷ It is important to note that increases/declines may to some degree reflect re-identification of citizens with a national identity other than Russian/Soviet, which had been previously discouraged in the Soviet period, and may thus be reporting errors rather than necessarily enumerative growth/decline. However from the political and cultural, or even security, perspective it is in fact the national identity which may be the more important.

¹⁴⁸ See Bogoyavlenski, 'Etnicheskii sostav...' for a pre-census analysis of trends which is largely backed up by preliminary results.

¹⁴⁹ Dargins, Kumyks and Lezgins are all counted as Dagestani titular nationalities.

¹⁵⁰ Goskomstat Rossii, (2003), 'Osnoovnye itogi po Rossiiskoi Federatsii', accessed 30 May 2004, available at <http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=39>

regional identity conceptions. While regional figures are not yet available from the 2002 census, it is anticipated that certain ethnic groups have become more concentrated in their own republics, as a result both of out-migration from these regions by ethnic Russians (who tend to have higher degree of 'migratability'¹⁵¹, and as a result of faster growth rates of ethnic groups. 'Insofar as ethnicity and region are correlated, and both of these coincide with ethnic disparities, the potential for ethno-regional political mobilisation increases'¹⁵² and demographic processes, in many of the ethnic republics at least, are effectively reinforcing this correlation between region and ethnicity. There is a clear danger associated with the increasing homogenisation of Russians and non-Russians into different regions, particularly in light of the importance for national politics of the more populated predominantly Russian regions, which may leave increasingly concentrated ethnic minorities feeling disenfranchised from the national political stage. In this sense demographic changes may work to disrupt the political arrangements of the state or reinforce feelings amongst titular groups that that are better represented by their regional leadership than a Russo-centric federal centre. For example, there is a major lack of central representation of the largest non-Slavic nations (for example 5.5 million Tatars, 1.7 million Bashkirs, 1.6 million Chuvash and 1.3 million Chechens¹⁵³) and the Muslim population in general which numbers at least 14 million citizens¹⁵⁴.

The religious dimension may likewise become increasingly salient politically.¹⁵⁵ Glinksi-Vassiliev argues that 'the existing asymmetry between the size of Russia's Muslim minority and its representation in the national elite breeds trouble by encouraging radicalism and the use of undemocratic means in the political struggle on the part of Russia's Muslims'¹⁵⁶. Demographic processes are

¹⁵¹ Herd, 'Foreign and Security Policy...' p.22

¹⁵² Olikier and Charlick-Paley, 'Assessing Russia's Decline', , p.59

¹⁵³ Pepepis2002.ru, (2003), 'Itogi perepisi razveivayut mify (Census results shatter the myths)', accessed 11 May 2004, available at <http://www.perepis2002.ru/content/201/2015-article.asp>

¹⁵⁴ Vremia i dengi, 'Musul'man - bolee 14 millionov',

¹⁵⁵ Bogoyavlenski estimates that three-quarters of a century ago, the ratio of Orthodox Christians to Muslims in Russia was 16 to 1 and estimates that by 1999 it was 10 to 1. See Bogoyavlenski, 'Etnicheskii sostav...' p.92

¹⁵⁶ Glinksi-Vassiliev, D., (2001), 'Islam in Russian Society and Politics: Survival and Expansion', Policy Memo no.198, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA, p.7

only exacerbating this situation as the Muslim population grows proportionally and is increasingly isolated in particular regions and groups of regions, which are often among the most depressed. Ethnic identities will likely become increasingly mobilised where the political and social needs of a particular group are not being met, or where certain groups feel under threat in security terms, or that they may be ignored or exploited by other ethnic groups. Concentration of such groups may encourage the development of ethnic over civic identities, as well as potential radicalisation of such groups, with obvious ramifications in terms of political stability of the state.

Demographic changes in ethnic composition are not only occurring in the titular ethnic republics, but also in some of Russia's most-populous and more traditional central regions. A few major urban and economically strong regions, which attract ethnic-Russian and non-Russian migrants, are developing increasingly multi-cultural populations, most obviously Moscow. This increasing diversity in major cities may have a positive societal impact in the development of more inclusive identity conceptions, and indeed research suggest that ethnic Russians living in Muslim or Buddhist republics may be more tolerant¹⁵⁷. However the reaction of ethnic Russians to non-Russian inflows into traditionally Russian areas may not mirror that of ethnic Russians living in the traditionally non-Russian ethnic republics. It is unclear how influxes of non-Russians to Russian regions will impact identity conceptions and political tensions but the Russo-centric nationalism of the central government is unlikely to help populations accept inclusive ideals.

Two migration flows in particular suggest precariously low levels of inter-ethnic tolerance on the part of ethnic Russians.¹⁵⁸ The Russian population and media in the Far East have reacted to the threat of Chinese in-migration on their sovereignty and identity in a xenophobic manner, while Russian population in European cities has reacted intolerantly to even North Caucasian, not to mention

¹⁵⁷ Olikier and Charlick-Paley, 'Assessing Russia's Decline', , p.57

¹⁵⁸ Alexseev, M., (2001), 'The Chinese Are Coming: Public Opinion and Threat Perception in the Russian Far East', Policy Memo no.184, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA, p.6

Central Asian in-migration. Neither instance suggests a great deal of hope for the development of inclusive tolerant attitudes as ethnic composition changes. Such heightened fear of a Chinese 'invasion', when the reality of the situation provides little evidence of the threat, bodes ill indeed for the level of tensions which may occur if, and more probably when, large scale semi-permanent (at least) settlements of Chinese workers do indeed become a reality in the Far East and beyond, over the next few decades. It is anticipated that by mid-century the Chinese in Russia may number as many as 20 million¹⁵⁹, and would then be expected to have a significant impact in terms Russia's societal and political life.

Demographically engendered ethnic tensions may lead not only to political and social tension but to inter-ethnic violence or even separatism, with the potential, rhetorically even if not in reality, to spill-over into international conflict or terrorism. Putin for example, has made much of a professed link between Chechen separatism and radical Islamic terrorism. Demographic changes may thus have implications for internal, national and international security and stability. The impact of demographic changes on Russia's security in terms of territorial integrity is perhaps the most discussed of all the regional consequences, particularly from the point of view of the depopulation of the Far East and the danger of Chinese annexation of the region, be it military or 'silent' demographic expansion. The demographic decline and de-population of the Far East and Siberia does 'increase the politico-military importance of sparsely populated border regions...especially as global stocks of raw hydrocarbons, drinking water and agricultural land decrease and the world population increases'.¹⁶⁰ Nonetheless talk of Chinese military expansion into the Russian Far East seems alarmist and far-fetched and demographic expansion to a degree that could threaten Russia's sovereignty of these regions is at worst many decades from being even a slight danger.

The more likely security threat would seem to stem from military manpower shortages which may threaten Russia's ability to police its borders in any

¹⁵⁹ Herd, 'Russia's demographic crisis...' p.56

¹⁶⁰ Herd, 'Foreign and Security Policy...' p.37

effective manner, or to continue with current levels of military deployment, even in terms of continuing the war in Chechnya. In security terms Russia faces a straightforward problem of manpower¹⁶¹ and therefore combat capability, due both to the declining numbers, and poor health and educational level, of conscripts. This realisation has provided impetus to military reform and the establishment of a professional rather than conscript army. At the regional level, disparities already exist in the numbers of conscripts signed up in different regions, due to health and drug use differentials, but also the susceptibility of local administrations to bribes, by which conscription can be avoided. In the longer term, the higher rates of natural increase amongst non-Russian ethnic groups may lead to a higher proportion of army conscripts of non-Russian ethnicity, with consequences in terms of loyalty, particularly in light of some regional efforts to prevent their conscripts serving in Chechnya.

¹⁶¹ By 2016 the number of men aged 17-19 will be just 1.99 million compared to 3.46 million in 2000. See *Ibid.*, p.39

By way of conclusion

Demographic processes in Russia are influencing the economic, societal, political and military health of the country at both the national and regional level. Most notably perhaps, in a multi-national country such as Russia, with a poorly established sense of civic identity, and a high degree of ethnic intolerance, migration flows and other demographic processes may have significant consequences not just for the strength or otherwise of a region's economy or the pressure on its social infrastructure, but for the very cohesion of the society and culture, for popular understandings of regional and national identity, and so for the state's stability and sovereignty. Both the dynamics and types of demographic trends, as well as their consequences at the regional (and other) levels will be conditional upon contemporary contexts and will not follow universalisable patterns. In the context of demography the strength of the nation and its regions is determined, not just by the size of its population, but by the dynamic process which that population undergoes and its ability to react and adapt to those changes. The ability of each region to react and adapt will be determined by the economic, social and cultural tools at its disposal, as well as the nature of the challenges which each faces.

In Russia, demographically engendered tensions may convey risks for the country's political stability and social and cultural cohesion.¹⁶² In particular, the decline of the politically dominant ethnic Russian population, and the growth of relatively disenfranchised non-Russian particularly Muslim ethnic groups in some republics, may encourage protectionism amongst the former and radicalisation of the latter. The migration of many Russians to republics such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, in the context of Soviet nation building may have had positive consequences for the development of an inclusive identity and helped to bind the country together. By contrast the outward migration of ethnic Russians from such regions in the context of Russo-centric nationalism and regional ethnic rebirth,

¹⁶² See in particular, Nichiporuk, *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*, pp.40-43

may serve to erode any nascent inclusive all-Russian identity. Instead, demographic processes may serve to reinforce inter-ethnic tensions, and anti-Russian or anti-Muslim feelings, within the population at large, and within specific regions. Likewise regions which are subject to substantial demographic shifts in the context of economic decline or social degradation are likely to react differently to those which have infrastructure able to cope or under-supplied labour markets.

Nichiporuk argues, that in the Yugoslavian context, the increasing Muslim population in Bosnia translated over time into greater Muslim political, economic and cultural influence, at the expense of previously dominant Orthodox Serbs.¹⁶³ When the federal government began to unravel the demographic situation may have helped to increase the receptiveness of ordinary Bosnian Serbs to the extremist rhetoric employed by their leaders and thus their willingness to mobilise against the Muslim population.¹⁶⁴ More clearly, the grievances of the minority Serb population in Kosovo, which had seen their share of the population decline from 23% to 13% between 1948 and 1981, proved a key issue in the ability of Serbian nationalists to manipulate ethnic tensions, with devastating results.¹⁶⁵ In both cases differential population growth rates encouraged feelings of persecution and insecurity among the previously dominant (politically if not numerically), now outnumbered regional population. This is not to suggest that Russia is about to follow the Yugoslavian path to war and disintegration but to emphasise the potential dangers of demographic shifts where ethnic and religious factors coincide with state weakness, unequal political representation, poor socio-economic conditions and nationalist central rhetoric, particularly in the light of the war in Chechnya and increasingly widespread xenophobia amongst the ethnic Russian population. Most significant may be the impact of Russia's demographic changes on identity conceptions, especially in peripheral and border regions, which both reflect and are shaped by political, economic and

¹⁶³ Ibid. p.43

¹⁶⁴ Ibid. p.44

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. p.44

cultural contexts, each shaped and reflective in turn of demographic processes, and each differentiated at the national, regional and even local scale.¹⁶⁶

The long-term demographic crisis and recent fluctuations in death rates, as well as new challenges thrown up by HIV/AIDS, TB and drug abuse etc, have each affected Russia's regions in different ways, making it almost impossible to determine clear consequences at the national, let alone regional, level. As a result, this paper has undoubtedly raised more questions about the challenges Russia faces, than it has provided answers. Trends are difficult to discern through periods of turmoil and turbulence. The identification of areas of concern, and the ability of regional and state governments to address them, will be more possible under a prolonged period of economic, political and social stability in Russia. Unfortunately, regional demographic disparities and processes present certain regions with major challenges in economic, social and cultural spheres. These seem more likely to reinforce turmoil than they do calm, making the required stability even more difficult to achieve.

¹⁶⁶ See an earlier paper in this series; Griffith Prendergrast, J., (2004), 'Regional Identity and Territorial Integrity in Contemporary Russia', *A New Russian Heartland?*, *University of Leicester*, Leicester

Referenced Works

Alexseev, M., (2001), 'The Chinese Are Coming: Public Opinion and Threat Perception in the Russian Far East', Policy Memo no.184, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA

Andreev, E., S. Scherbov, et al., (1998), 'Population of Russia: What can we expect in the future?' *World Development*, Vol.26, No.11: 1939-55

Axmann, A., (1998), 'Eastern Europe and Community of Independent States', *International Migration*, Vol.36, No.4: 587-608

Becker, C. M. and D. D. Hemley, (1998), 'Demographic Changes in the FSU During the Transition Period', *World Development*, Vol.26, No.11: 1957-75

Bloom, D. E. and P. N. Maloney, (1998), 'Macroeconomic Consequences of the Russian Mortality Crisis', *World Development*, Vol.26, No.11: 2073-85

Bogoyavlenski, D. D., (2001), 'Etnicheskii sostav naselenniiia Rossii (Ethnic composition of Russia's population)', *Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya*, No.10: 88-93

Burke, J., (2000), 'Internal Migration: A Civil Society Challenge' in *Russia's torn safety nets : health and social welfare during the transition*, edited by M. Field and J. L. Twigg, New York, St Martin's Press, 212-27

Chen, L. C., F. Wittgenstein, et al., (1996), 'The Upsurge of Mortality in Russia: Causes and Policy Implications', *Population and Development Review*, Vol.22, No.3: 517-30

Clarke, J. I., Ed. (1984), *Geography and Population: Approaches and Applications*, Oxford, Pergamon

Clem, R. S. and P. R. Craumer, (2000), 'Regional patterns of political preference in Russia: The December 1999 Duma elections', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol.41, No.1: 1-29

Clem, R. S. and P. R. Craumer, (2000), 'Spatial Patterns of Political Choice in the Post-Yeltsin Era: The Geography of Russia's 2000 Presidential Election', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol.41, No.7: 465-82

Demoscope.ru, (2004), 'Rossiiskaia perepis' v etnicheskom izmerenii', accessed 3rd June 2004, available at <http://www.polit.ru/research/demoscope/2004/04/27/demoscope155.html>

- Denissov, B. P. and V. I. Sakevitch, (2004), 'Dinamika epidemii VICH/SPID (Dynamics of the HIV/AIDS epidemic)', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia (sotsis)*, No.1: 75-85
- Eberstadt, N., (2002), 'The future of AIDS', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.81, No.6: 22-+
- Feshbach, M., (2003), *Russia's Health and Demographic Crises: Policy Implications and Consequences*, Washington, DC, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute
- Fields, M., (1997), 'Health in Russia: The Regional and National Dimensions' in *Beyond the Monolith*, edited by J. Debardeleben, P. J. Stavrakiset al, Washington, DC & Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press & Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 165-82
- Frolov, V., (2004), 'Annex 2: The National Security Implications of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Russia' in *Reversing the Epidemic: Facts and Policy Options*, edited by T. Barnett, D. Barret al, Bratislava, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2004: 91-96
- Gerber, T., (2000), 'Russia's Population Crisis: The Migration Dimension', Policy Memo no.118, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA
- Glinski, D., (2002), 'The Antagonizing of the Educated and Skilled, New Source of Security Threat in Russia', Policy Memo. no.270, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA
- Glinski-Vassiliev, D., (2001), 'Islam in Russian Society and Politics: Survival and Expansion', Policy Memo no.198, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA
- Goldstone, J. A., (2001), 'Demography, Environment and Security: An Overview' in *Demography and National Security*, edited by M. Weiner and S. Stanton Russell, New York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 38-61
- Gorenburg, D., (2003), 'The 2002 Russian Census and the Future of the Russian Population', Policy Memo no.319, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA
- Goskomstat Rossii, (2003), 'Osnoovnye itogi po Rossiiskoi Federatsii', accessed 30 May 2004, available at <http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=39>
- Griffith Prendergrast, J., (2004), 'Regional Identity and Territorial Integrity in Contemporary Russia', *A New Russian Heartland?*, *University of Leicester*, Leicester
- Haynes, M. and R. Husan, (2002), *A Century of State Murder? Death and Policy in 20th Century Russia*, London & Sterling, Virginia, USA, Pluto Press
- Heleniak, T., (1997), 'Internal Migration in Russia During the Economic Transition', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol.38, No.2: 81-104

- Heleniak, T., (2001), 'Migration and Restructuring in Post-Soviet Russia', *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol.9, No.4: 531-49
- Heleniak, T., (2002), 'The End of an Empire: Migration and the Changing Nationality Composition of the Soviet Successor States' in *Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants*, edited by R. Ohliger and R. Muenz, London, Frank Cass,
- Heleniak, T., (2003), 'The 2002 Census in Russia: Preliminary Results', *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol.44, No.6: 430-42
- Heleniak, T., (2003), 'Geographic aspects of population aging in the Russian federation', *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, Vol.44, No.5: 325-47
- Heleniak, T., (2004), 'Migration of the Russian Diaspora after the Breakup of the Soviet Union', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol.57, No.2: 99-117
- Herd, G. P., (2002), 'Foreign and Security Policy Implications of Russia's Demographic Crisis', *Regionalisation of Russian Foreign and Security Policy*, *Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research of the ETH Zurich*, Zurich
- Herd, G. P., (2003), 'Russia's demographic crisis and federal instability' in *Russian Regions and Regionalism, Strength Through Weakness*, edited by G. P. Herd and A. Aldis, London & New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 41-62
- Hill, F. and C. Gaddy, (2003), *The Siberian Curse: How Communist Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution
- Independent Institute for Social Policy, (2002), 'Inequality and Poverty in Russia in Transition', accessed June 11 2004, available at http://www.socpol.ru/eng/research_projects/pdf/proj10a.pdf
- Independent Institute for Social Policy, (2004), 'Demograficheskaia situatsiia i migratsii', accessed 12 June 2004, available at <http://www.socpol.ru/atlas/overviews/demography/index.shtml>
- Independent Institute for Social Policy, (2004), 'Rasselenie', accessed 22 June 2004, available at <http://www.socpol.ru/atlas/overviews/settlement/index.shtml>
- Ioffe, G., O. L. Medvedkov, et al., (2001), 'Russia's Fragmented Space' in *Fragmented Space in the Russian Federation*, edited by B. Ruble, J. Koehnet al, Washington, DC & London, John Hopkins University Press & Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 31-80
- Kennedy, B. P., I. Kawachi, et al., (1998), 'The Role of Social Capital in the Russian Mortality Crisis', *World Development*, Vol.26, No.11: 2029-44

Krebs, R. R. and J. S. Levy, (2001), 'Demographic Change and the Sources of International Conflict' in *Demography and National Security*, edited by M. Weiner and S. Stanton Russell, New York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 62-105

Little, J. S. and R. K. Triest, (2001), Conference Paper: Seismic Shifts: The Economic Impact of Demographic Change. An Overview, *Seismic Shifts: The Economic Impact of Demographic Change*, Boston, USA, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

Maleva, T., (2000), 'What sort of Russia has the new President inherited? Or Russia's key social problems', *Moscow Carnegie Center Briefing Papers*, Vol.2, No.4

Naryshkina, A., (2004), 'Skoro nas budet men'she 100 millionov (We will soon number less than 100 million)', accessed 3 June 2004, available at <http://www.izvestia.ru/economic/article82124>

Nichiporuk, B., (2000), *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*, Santa Monica, CA, RAND

Nijegorodskai Pravda, (2003), 'Nas bol'she chem my dumali (There are more of us than we thought)', accessed 11 May 2004, available at <http://www.perepis2002.ru/content/173/1737-article.asp>

Nyiri, P., (2003), 'Chinese migration to eastern Europe', *International Migration*, Vol.41, No.3: 239-65

Oliker, O. and T. Charlick-Paley, (2002), 'Assessing Russia's Decline: Trends and Implications for the US and the US Air Force', *RAND*, Santa Monica, CA

Pepepis2002.ru, (2003), 'Itogi perepisi razveivayut mify (Census results shatter the myths)', accessed 11 May 2004, available at <http://www.perepis2002.ru/content/201/2015-article.asp>

Pisarev, A. V., (2004), 'Obraz pojilyk v sovremennoi Rossii', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia (sotsis)*, No.4: 51-56

Powell, D. and M. Conway, (2002), 'Death as a Way of Life: Russia's Demographic Decline', *Current History*, Vol.101, No.657: 344-48

Rivkin-Fish, M., (2003), 'Anthropology, demography, and the search for a critical analysis of fertility: Insights from Russia', *American Anthropologist*, Vol.105, No.2: 289-301

Ryl, K., (2004), 'Pereselenie narodov', accessed June 11, available at <http://www.demcope.ru/weekly/2004/0155/print.php>

- Shcherbakova, E. M., (2004), 'Narkonashestvie v Rossii (Drug Invasion in Russia)', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia (sotsis)*, No.1: 70-75
- Shkolnikov, V. and G. A. Cornia, (2000), 'Population Crisis and Rising Mortality in Transitional Russia' in *The Mortality Crisis in Transitional Economies*, edited by G. A. Cornia and Panizza, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 253-79
- Shkolnikov, V., G. A. Cornia, et al., (1998), 'Causes of the Russian Mortality Crisis: Evidence and Interpretations', *World Development*, Vol.26, No.11: 1995-2011
- Shkurkin, A. M., (2002), 'Chinese in the labour market of the Russian Far East: Past, present and future' in *Globalizing Chinese Migration*, edited by P. Nyiri and I. Savellier, Aldershot, Hampshire, Ashgate, 74-99
- Sperling, V., (2002), 'The Gender Gap in Russian Politics and Elections', Policy memo. no.257, *PONARS*, Cambridge, MA
- Sutherland, D. and P. Hanson, (2000), 'Demographic Responses to Regional Economic Change' in *Regional Economic Change in Russia*, edited by P. Hanson and M. J. Bradshaw, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 76-96
- Teitelbaum, M. S., (2001), 'International Migration: Predicting the Unknowable' in *Demography and National Security*, edited by M. Weiner and S. Stanton Russell, New York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 21-37
- Tolts, M., (2004), 'Measuring Intercensal Regional Population Change in Russia, 1989 and 2002: An evaluation Based on Corrected Results of the 1989 Soviet Census', *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem*, Jerusalem, Israel
- Twigg, J. L., (2001), 'Russian health care reform at the regional level: Status and impact', *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics*, Vol.42, No.3: 202-19
- UNAIDS, (2003), 'AIDS Epidemic Update',
- Vishnevskii, A., (1999), 'The demographic potential of Russia', *Problems of Economic Transition*, Vol.41, No.9: 28-53
- Vishnevskii, A., A. Treivish, et al., (2003), 'Perspectivy razvitiia Rossii: rol' demograficheskogo faktora (Russia's development perspectives: the role of demographic factors)', Nauchyi trudi no. 53R, *Institut ekonomiki perekhodogo perioda*, Moscow
- Vitkovskaya, G., (1999), 'Does Chinese Migration Endanger Russian Security?' *Moscow Carnegie Center Briefing Papers*, Vol.1, No.8

Vladimirov, D. G., (2004), 'Starshee pokolenie kak faktor ekonomicheskogo razvitiia (The older generation as a factor of economic development)', *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia (sotsis)*, No.4: 57-60

Vremia i dengi, (2003), 'Musul'man - bolee 14 millionov', accessed 11 May 2004, available at <http://www.prepis2002.ru/content/202/2024-article.asp>

Wegren, S. K. and A. Cooper Drury, (2001), 'Patterns of Internal Migration during the Russian Transition', *Journal of communist studies and transition politics*, Vol.17, No.4: 15-42

Weiner, M. and S. Stanton Russell, (2001), 'Introduction' in *Demography and National Security*, edited by M. Weiner and S. Stanton Russell, New York & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1-20

World Bank, (2004), 'From Transition to Development: A Country Economic Memorandum for the Russian Federation',