Readings in the History and Theory of Teaching and Learning

These readings are taken from some of the most influential educational theorists and practitioners of the past, together with some widely-read contemporary theorists. Some of them are about the education of children, others the education of adults, but they all contain much that it worth thinking about in a modern university.

Educational theory and practice are vast fields, and no selection as small as this can hope to be representative. Readers will notice, in particular, that what follows is biased towards western writers, and that even some of the readings about other parts of the world are by western writers. This, much to the compiler's regret, reflects the limits of her expertise combined with the acquisition preferences of the Bodleian library… Many other ideas from other times, places and authors could have been included. But one must start reading somewhere, and it is hoped that this selection of material will stimulate thinking, debate and further reading. If you are interested in pursuing any of these extracts or ideas further, the Education Library (15, Norham Gardens) is a good place to start.

With apologies for any inconvenience, footnotes have usually been omitted to save space and complications in scanning. Square brackets are editorial throughout.

If you have any comments or questions, please contact assessor@proctors.ox.ac.uk.

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Hartmut Scharfe, *Education in Ancient India* (Leiden, 2002). Chapter 8: Tutorials and Acarya-kula-s, extracts.

Scharfe looks for evidence for Indian educational practices in the bronze age in the verses of the Rig Veda. The Rig Veda, one of the four primary sacred texts of Hinduism (the Vedas), was probably composed in the late bronze age (perhaps in the latter half of the second millennium BCE), making it one of the oldest surviving texts in Indo-European culture and one of the oldest religious texts in continuous use.

The first—and isolated—testimony for instruction is found in the hymn Rgveda VII 103 where the seasonal croaking of frogs is placed in correlation with the exchanges between chanting brahmins. VII 103,3: "One goes to the other, speaking in [separate] syllables like the son [speaking in syllables] to the talking father" and VII 103,5: "When one of them speaks the speech of the other, like the learner that of the master…' The father (perhaps the original poet of the hymn) teaches the son who repeats the text syllable by syllable (perhaps as the poem is being formulated, as a device to retain the just completed stanzas), the master the student. I consider it less probable that the stanza refers to a father teaching words to an infant, not only because of the context but also because the first words were taught to the infant by the other who, in a traditional Indian family, was totally in charge of an infant.

The art of Vedic poetry was carried on in priestly families where the father or a close male relative was most likely the teacher. The fruit of their work, or perhaps only a selection of it, forms the nucleus of the Rgveda, i.e. the books II to VII, the so-called "family books" where the Anukramani gives for each hymn the *gotra*-name as the name of the author - not a certain individual but a member of the family of that name. All hymns of book II are attributed to Grtsamada, all of book III to Visvamitra, etc. A Brahmana text, speaking about a certain ritual, says: "The father teaches it to his son when he is a Veda-student," and the older upanisads have several passages that assume that the father is also the teacher…. The Mahabharata berates the student who would study exclusively with his learned father: "If he, favored by birth, would conceitedly study all the Vedas in his father's house, one would consider him provincial (or: coarse). What is worse, at least in our age, is to receive the Vedas without any teacher at all. In another age, the Vedas were revealed to the revered Vedic seers; but this is no longer acceptable now, even if such insights are possible. In ChU IV 5-9 the esoteric truths were revealed to Satyakama Jabala by a bull, the fire, a goose, and a diver bird; on his return to the teacher's house he acknowledged that he was instructed by others than humans but asked the teacher to teach him, for he had learned: "The knowledge obtained directly from the teacher goes

the straightest path." And so his teacher taught him exactly what he had heard before from the bull, the fire, the goose, and the diver bird; there was no deviation… It is quite possible that the principal teacher early on was was often not the father, because there is a strong tradition in later Vedic texts that after early childhood the adolescent son was sent for further training to another family….

The teacher's house is the acarya-kulaf. The expression guru-kula that later is so common is only found, among the older texts, in the Baudhayana tradition; these texts of the Baudhaymas have been revised in later times and may thus contain late interpolations. The student lived in the teacher's house, where he sometimes was called upon to do various tasks such as tending the teacher's cows. Though the teacher was not supposed to tax the student to the extent that his studies would suffer, there are numerous anecdotes about teachers who did just that…

The student is expected to protect the teacher and his property as the teacher is expected to protect him. The term chdttra for a student (first attested in Panini IV 4 62) expresses, according to Patanjali, this same notion. He asks why chattra, formed from chattra "umbrella, parasol" with a suffix "a to connote a habit, does not refer to a royal attendant carrying the king's parasol (chattra-dhara). Pantanjali explains that we have to postulate the loss of a second word, viz. *iva* "like": "a parasol, i.e., like a parasol. The parasol is the teacher; the student should be sheltered by the teacher as by a parasol, and the teacher should be protected by the student as by a parasol.

In the epics we read about large brahminical settlements ('ashrams') in forests, e.g. the Naimisa forest, home to a number of sages where students may have been taught… These ashrams were located in a wilderness, but not necessarily far from a village… Besides references to Vedic recitals, self-study and hints at disputations, there is no unambiguous statement that young men were trained here in the way of traditional *acarya-kula-s*, but it appears likely that at least the sons of the residents were taught there. In the epic there are anecdotes about teachers giving their daughters in marriage to their favorite student, or a student respectfully declining the advances of the teacher's daughter.

Education was dealt with individually, one teacher teaching one or perhaps s few students according to most sutra texts. But there are occasional indications that at some time a teacher was in charge of a group of students. In a religious observation for the study of the Mahanamni stanza the student has to spend time in the forest; on his return "he should entertain his teacher and his retinue with food, and his fellow students who have come together." Even where there may have been larger hermitages, there is no indication of organized structures within the hermitage, let alone state imposed regulations. The goal was personal improvement, the capability to meet ones' religious and societal duties, not preparation for

government service - at least not directly. It may be that, besides Vedic lore, the student received also training on how to be a householder…

Plato, *Meno* 81e-86c

Plato (c. 429-347 BCE) was born into a wealthy and influential Athenian family torn apart by the fifth-century wars between Athens and Sparta. As a young man, he was part of a group of clever, aristocratic young men who clustered around an eccentric local thinker: the brilliant and provocative Socrates of Alopece. Plato was inspired by Socrates to reject Athenian politics and public life; he founded a school of philosophy, the Academy, and spent his life thinking, teaching and exploring the nature of ethics, epistemology, politics and metaphysics. In the Meno*, Plato considers whether virtue can be taught, and develops the idea that all knowledge is latent in us, and needs only to be brought out by strategic questioning. To support this idea he develops a theory which will become important in his most famous, work,* The Republic*, that the soul is immortal and transmigrates, and that between lives, it inhabits a metaphysical realm in which knowledge and goodness reside. When it is reborn in a new body, however, it forgets everything it has learned in the metaphysical realm until it is reminded by being taught. Like all Plato's work, the* Meno *is written in the form of a dramatic dialogue between Socrates and various interlocutors. This extract is from the Penguin translation …….*

MENO. I see, Socrates. But what do you mean when you say that we don't learn anything, but that what we call learning is recollection? Can you teach me that it is so?
SOCRATES. I have just said that you're a rascal, and now you ask me if I can teach you, when I say there is no such thing as teaching, only recollection. Evidently you want to catch me contradicting myself straight away.
MENO. No, honestly, Socrates, I wasn't thinking of that. It was just habit. If you can in any way make clear to me that what you say is true, please do.
SOCRATES. It isn't an easy thing, but still I should like to do what I can since you ask me. I see you have a large number of retainers here. Call one of them, anyone you like, and I will use him to demonstrate it to you.
MENO. Certainly. (*To a slave-boy.*) Come here.
SOCRATES. He is a Greek and speaks our language?
MENO. Indeed yes - born and bred in the house.
SOCRATES. Listen carefully then, and see whether it seems to you that he is learning from me or simply being reminded.
MENO. I will.
SOCRATES. Now boy, you know that a square is a figure like this?
(Socrates begins to draw figures in the sand at his feet. He points to the square ABCD.)
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. It has all these four sides equal?



BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. And these lines which go through the middle of it are also equal? (The lines EF, GH.)
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. Such a figure could be either larger or smaller, could it not?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. Now if this side is two feet long, and this side the same, how many feet will the whole be? Put it this way. If it were two feet in this direction and only one in that, must not the area be two feet taken once?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. But since it is two feet this way also, does it not become twice two feet?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. And how many feet is twice two? Work it out and tell me.
BOY. Four.
SOCRATES. Now could one draw another figure double the size of this, but similar, that is, with all its sides equal like this one?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. How many feet will its area be?
BOY. Eight.
SOCRATES. Now then, try to tell me how long each of its sides will be. The present figure has a side of two feet. What will be the side of the double-sized one?
BOY. It will be double, Socrates, obviously.
SOCRATES. You see, Meno, that I am not teaching him anything, only asking. Now he thinks he knows the length of the side of the eight-feet square.
MENO. Yes.
SOCRATES. But does he?
MENO. Certainly not.
MENO. Yes.
SOCRATES. Now watch how he recollects things in order - the proper way to recollect.

You say that the side of double length produces the double-sized figure? Like this I mean, not long this way and short that. It must be equal on all sides like the first figure, only twice its size, that is eight feet. Think a moment whether you still expect to get it from doubling the side.
BOY. Yes, I do.
SOCRATES. Well now, shall we have a line double the length of this (A B) if we add another the same length at this end (B J) ?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. It is on this line then, according to you, that we shall make the eight-feet square, by taking four of the same length?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. Let us draw in four equal lines (*i.e. Counting A J, and adding j K, K L, and L A made complete by drawing in its second half LD*), using the first as a base. Does this not give us what you roll the eight-feet figure?



BOY. Certainly.
SOCRATES. But does it contain these four squares, each equal to the original four-feet one?
(Socrates has drawn in the lines CM, CN to complete the squares that he wishes to point out.)
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. How big is it then? Won't it be four times as big?
BOY. Of course.
SOCRATES. And is four times the same as twice?
BOY. Of course not.
SOCRATES. So doubling the side has given us not a double but a fourfold figure?
BOY. True.
SOCRATES. And four times four are sixteen, are they not?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. Then how big is the side of the eight-feet figure? This one has given us four times the original area, hasn't it?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. And a side half the length gave us a square of four feet?
BOY. Yes.

SOCRATES. Good. And isn't a square of eight feet double this one and half that?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. Will it not have a side greater than this one but less than that?
BOY. I think it will.
SOCRATES. Right. Always answer what you think. Now tell me: was not this side two feet long, and this one four?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. Then the side of the eight-feet figure must be longer than two feet but shorter than four?
BOY. It must.
SOCRATES. Try to say how long you think it is.
BOY. Three feet.
SOCRATES. If so, shall we add half of this bit (*BO, half of B J*) and make it three feet? Here are two, and this is one, and on this side similarly we have two plus one; and here is the figure you want.
(Socrates completes the square AOPQ.)
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. If it is three feet this way and three that, will the whole area be three times three feet?
BOY. It looks like it.
SOCRATES. And that is how many?
BOY. Nine.
SOCRATES. Whereas the square double our first square had to be how many?
BOY. Eight.
SOCRATES. But we haven't yet got the square of eight feet even from a three-feet side?
BOY. No.
SOCRATES. Then what length will give it? Try to tell us exactly. If you don't want to count it up, just show us on the diagram.
BOY. It's no use, Socrates, I just don't know.
SOCRATES. Observe, Meno, the stage he has reached on the path of recollection. At the beginning he did not know the side of the square of eight feet. Nor indeed does he know it now, but then he thought he knew it and answered boldly, as was appropriate - he felt no perplexity. Now however he does feel perplexed. Not only does he not know the answer; he doesn't even think he knows.
MENO. Quite true.
SOCRATES. Isn't he in a better position now in relation to what he didn't know?
MENO. I admit that too.
SOCRATES. So in perplexing him and numbing him like the sting-ray, have we done him any harm?

MENO. I think not.
SOCRATES. In fact we have helped him to some extent towards finding out the right answer, for now not only is he ignorant of it but he will be quite glad to look for it. Up to now, he thought he could speak well and fluently, on many occasions and before large audiences, on the subject of a square double the size of a given square, maintaining that it must have a side of double the length.
MENO. No doubt.
SOCRATES. Do you suppose then that he would have attempted to look for, or learn, what he thought he knew (though he did not), before he was thrown into perplexity, became aware of his ignorance, and felt a desire to know?
MENO. No.
SOCRATES. Then the numbing process was good for him?
MENO. I agree.
SOCRATES. Now notice what, starting from this state of perplexity, he will discover by seeking the truth in company with me, though I simply ask him questions without teaching him. Be ready to catch me if I give him any instruction or explanation instead of simply interrogating him on his own opinions.
(*Socrates here rubs out the previous figures and starts again.*)
Tell me, boy, is not this our square of four feet? (A B C D.) You understand?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. Now we can add another equal to it like this (BCEF.)



BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. And a third here, equal to each of the others? (CEGH.)
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. And then we can fill in this one in the corner? (D C H J.)
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. Then here we have four equal squares?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. And how many times the size of the first square is the whole?
BOY. Four times.
SOCRATES. And we want one double the size. You remember?

BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. Now does this line going from corner to corner cut each of these squares in half?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. And these are four equal lines enclosing this area? (B E H D)
BOY. They are.
SOCRATES. Now think. How big is this area?
BOY. I don't understand.
SOCRATES. Here are four squares. Has not each line cut off the inner half of each of them?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. And how many such halves are there in this figure? (BEHO.)
BOY. Four.
SOCRATES. And how many in this one? (ABCD.)
BOY. Two.
SOCRATES. And what is the relation of four to two?
BOY. Double.
SOCRATES. How big is this figure then?
BOY. Eight feet.
SOCRATES. On what base?
BOY. This one.
SOCRATES. The line which goes from corner to corner of the square of four feet?
BOY. Yes.
SOCRATES. The technical name for it is 'diagonal'; so if we use that name, it is your personal opinion that the square on the diagonal of the original square is double its area.
BOY. That is so, Socrates.
SOCRATES. What do you think, Meno? Has he answered with any opinions that were not his own?
MENO. No, they were all his.
SOCRATES. Yet he did not know, as we agreed a few minutes ago.
MENO. True.
SOCRATES. But these opinions were somewhere in him, were they not?
MENO. Yes.
SOCRATES. So a man who does not know has in himself true opinions on a subject without having knowledge.
MENO. It would appear so.
SOCRATES. At present these opinions, being newly aroused, have a dream-like quality. But if the same questions are put to him on many occasions and in different ways, you can see that in the end he will have a knowledge on the subject as accurate as anybody's.
MENO. Probably.

SOCRATES. This knowledge will not come from teaching but from questioning. He will recover it for himself.
MENO. Yes.
SOCRATES. And the spontaneous recovery of knowledge that is in him is recollection, isn't it?
MENO. Yes.
SOCRATES. Either then he has at some time acquired the knowledge which he now has, or he has always possessed it. If he always possessed it, he must always have known; if on the other hand he acquired it at some previous time, it cannot have been in this life, unless somebody has taught him geometry. He will behave in the same way with all geometrical knowledge, and every other subject. Has anyone taught him all these? You ought to know, especially as he has been brought up in your household.
MENO. Yes, I know that no one ever taught him.
SOCRATES. And has he these opinions, or hasn't he?
MENO. It seems we can't deny it.
SOCRATES. Then if he did not acquire them in this life, isn't it immediately clear that he possessed and had learned them during some other period?
MENO. It seems so.
SOCRATES. When he was not in human shape?
MENO. Yes.
SOCRATES. If then there are going to exist in him, both while he is and while he is not a man, true opinions which can be aroused by questioning and turned into knowledge, may we say that his soul has been for ever in a state of knowledge? Clearly he always either is or is not a man.
MENO. Clearly.
SOCRATES. And if the truth about reality is always in our soul, the soul must be immortal, and one must take courage and try to discover - that is, to recollect - what one doesn't happen to know, or (more correctly) remember, at the moment.
MENO. Somehow or other I believe you are right.
SOCRATES. I think I am. I shouldn't like to take my oath on the whole story, but one thing I am ready to fight for as long as I can, in word and act: that is, that we shall be better, braver and more active men if we believe it right to look for what we don't know than if we believe there is no point in looking because what we don't know we can never discover.
MENO. There too I am sure you are right.
SOCRATES. Then since we are agreed that it is right to inquire into something that one does not know, are you ready to face with me the question: what is virtue?

One of the striking things about Plato's theory is his idea that knowledge is already latent in the pupil and needs only to be brought out, through a process in which the pupil plays an active part. The pupil doesn't play such an active part in education again until the 20th

century, when the idea develops that the pupil already knows and understands a lot which needs only to be brought out and developed by teachers. In the 20th century, though, this idea is backed by psychology rather than by metaphysics…

Images of the learning process from writers of the Roman Empire (first and second centuries CE)

Plutarch was a highly influential Greek philosopher and essayist who lived c. 40-c. 120. Quintilian lived c. 35-c. 100 and is one of the half-dozen most influential educationalists in western tradition. Born in Spain, he became an orator and teacher in Rome, and tutored, among others, Pliny the Younger and the great-nephews of the Emperor Domitian. His Training of an Orator*, which deals with every aspect of education from eugenics to the production of polished speakers and political leaders, was a standard manual of education throughout Roman and post-Roman Europe until the nineteenth century.*

These images of teaching and learning reveal a good deal about how the learning process was conceived of by Roman educationalists.

Quintilian, *The training of an orator* 2.19.1-3
I know I should consider whether nature or teaching contributes most to eloquence ... [N]ature will be able to do much without teaching, and teaching will be able to do nothing without nature ... [I]n mediocre orators I think the influence of nature is greater, but the best owe more to teaching than nature; just as the best farmer will not be able to do anything with infertile land, and from rich soil something useful springs even without cultivation: but a farmer will make a soil more fertile than its own richness can make it.

Pseudo-Plutarch *On the education of children* 2b
Nature without learning is blind, learning without nature is imperfect and practice without both is pointless. As in farming, first the land must be fertile, then the sower knowledgeable, then the seed sound, so nature is like the land, the teacher like the farmer, and his precepts and instructions like the seed.

Ps.-Plutarch, ibid. 4c
As farmers place stakes beside the young plants, so do competent teachers with great care set their precepts and exhortations beside the young, in order that their characters may grow upright.

Quintilian, ibid. 1.3.4-5
The precocious type of intellect almost never comes to fruit ... there is not real strength behind it and it depends on roots which are not deeply sunk, as seeds which are scattered on top of the ground spring up more quickly and, imitating ears of wheat with empty grains, turn gold before harvest-time.

Quint. 1.1.5
We by nature hold on most firmly to those things which we learn with unformed minds: as the flavour with which you imbue new vessels persists, and it is impossible to wash out the colours with which white wool was first dyed.

Quint. 1.2.26-8
At this stage of early youth it is more pleasant, because easier, to imitate fellow-pupils than teachers. ... [pupils] embrace what is nearest ... as vines trained on trees, by first grasping the lower branches, make their way to the tops.

Quint. 2.6.7
We see birds doing something similar [to teachers]. They feed their helpless young with food brought in their beaks, but when they seem old enough, they teach them to leave the nest and, going ahead themselves, to fly round it; then they allow them to trust their tried strength to the open sky and their own responsibility.

Plutarch, ***How the young man should listen to poetry*** **32e-f**
The bee by nature finds the smoothest and best honey in the most bitter flowers and sharpest thorns; so children, if they are properly educated in poetry, will learn somehow to extract something useful and helpful even from works which are suspected of being immoral or inappropriate [such as Homer and Greek drama].

Plutarch, ***On the right way to listen to lectures*** **37e-f**
[The educated] are like citizens newly enrolled in a state: those who were brought up elsewhere and are strangers find fault with many things and complain at the state of affairs, while resident aliens who have been brought up and habituated to the city's laws, accept their duties without difficulty and are happy.

Charter of an elementary school founded in 1054 CE in the prefecture of Ching-chao, China (whose capital coincides with the modern city of Sian). Translated in Pei-yi Wu, 'Education of children in the Sung', in W. de Bary and J. Chaffee eds., *Neo-Confucian Education: The Formative Stage* (Berkeley, 1989) 307-24: 311-12.

This school was established on the premises of a Confucian temple and its charter survives inscribed on a stone tablet.

Item. Before any student is admitted into the elementary school, he must first have an interview with a teacher, bringing along an account of his family[s circumstances] and an affidavit from the head of his family. The affidavit must declare the family head's wish to have the child attend the school. It must further state that as long as the child is in school he will observe all the school regulations. The affidavit with the school officer's signature affixed will be kept in the school file.
Item. Two to four proctors will be selected among the students. The proctors will be responsible for transmitting lessons to other students and reporting on their misdeeds.
Item. Each day the teachers will expound on two to three pages from the Classics, explain the pronunciation and meaning of the passages assigned to the students for memorization, provide calligraphical examples for the students to copy, choose topics for practice in prosody and rhymed-prose writing, decide on phrases for matching exercises, and select narratives to be committed to memory.
Item. The students are divided into three forms in terms of curriculum:
The Top Form. Each student will be daily questioned on three passages chosen at random from the Classics that have already been expounded by the teacher; the student will memorize passages running to more than one hundred characters, practice calligraphy for ten lines, and compose a poem in the style of ancient or regulated verse, with five or seven characters to each line. Every third day he will write a rhymed-prose piece with four stanzas, study a specimen of the same genre, and read three to five pages of history or biography, which must contain three anecdotes to be committed to memory.
The Middle Form. Each student will daily memorize a prose passage consisting of about one hundred characters, practice calligraphy for ten lines, compose one poem of four lines, match one phrase in a parallelism exercise, memorize two stanzas of rhymed-prose, and commit one anecdote to memory.

The Lower Form. Each student will daily memorize a prose passage consisting of about sixty characters, practice calligraphy for ten lines, and commit to memory one poem.
[In case of transgression:] Those under fifteen will be flogged according to the magnitude of their offenses, while those over fifteen will pay a cash fine that will go into the general fund of the school. In all cases the proctor will make a note in the school record and the school officer or the teacher will endorse the entry. The students are forbidden to steal, gamble, fight, or initiate litigations; leave or return to the school premises without reporting; damage or throw away books or documents; write on windows or walls; destroy school property; exchange information at tests; fail to finish exercises or examinations; or indulge in rowdiness or make loud noises.
Item. Students will be granted, in accordance with regulations of the prefectural school, a fixed number of holidays and days of leave. If a student requests leave under false pretexts or fails to return from leave on time, he will be punished in accordance with the established practice. The head of his family will be so notified.

R. P. Dore, Education in Tokugawa Japan. (paperback edn., London, 1984) Chapter 3: The Fief Schools, extracts

The Tokugawa period is dated to c. 1580-1868. In his introduction (p. 6), Dore notes: 'There was only a blurred distinction between the Tokugawa family itself and the Bakufu (literally 'camp government' or 'Shogunate' as it is often called in English), the whole complex of military formations and governmental institutions staffed by the vast body of Tokugawa retainers whose residences were grouped around the Shogun's castle in Edo (the modern Tokyo). The family as an actual descent group (in fact often perpetuated by adoption) and the public institution of government were not fully separated either conceptually or for budgetary purposes.'

AT THE BEGINNING of the Tokugawa period such samurai as received any formal book education did so at home from their parents or from tutors, in temples, or in the homes of samurai who had special talents for it and undertook to teach the children of their fellows. By the end of the period perhaps the majority of the children of samurai above foot-soldier rank were receiving formal education in one of the more than two hundred schools which had been established by fief authorities.

The idea of educating children in a special building with specialized teachers following a regular course of tuition was not, of course, a new one in Japan. There had been schools established by the Imperial Court and by aristocratic families in the Heian period, and one old foundation, the Ashikaga Gakko, was still in existence in 1600, although it was by then little more than a small seminary for priests. There may also have been short-lived schools established by the Kobayakawa family in Chikuzen and by the Chosokabe family in Tosa about the turn of the century, but no details of them have survived.

The Tokugawa schools, however, were new in kind and un-precedented in the scale of their diffusion. The motives which prompted the daimyos and their advisers to found them are implicit in what has been said concerning contemporary assumptions of the aims and functions of education, and often in the edicts of fief authorities. Bun - the literary arts - were means of keeping men in good order. Study would improve the morals of the samurai. As Kaibara Ekken wrote in a letter to an elder of the Kuroda fief urging him to establish a school, it would make them not only more conscious of their duties to their lord and more loyally co-operative in economy drives (thus helping to keep the fief solvent) but also more earnest in practising their military skills. And from the end of the eighteenth century onwards there was added the emerging idea that scholastically trained samurai would make better administrators. Hosoi Heishu (1728-1801) chooses a somewhat original metaphor to make his point in a memorial to

the daimyo of Yonezawa, but his meaning is clear enough. The daimyo is the rice and water; the common people are the fire; the samurai are the cooking-pot. However excellent the rice and however fierce the fire, a cracked pot will spoil the cooking. The daimyo should make sure he has a good pot, forged in the bellows of a good school. He does not specify who was to eat the cooked daimyo ...

The formal founding of a fief school is not, however, a full measure of the spread of samurai education. There were often private schools available both before and after the fief school was established, and indeed a good many of the fief schools themselves remained, for many years after their foundation, little more than small private schools given assistance and a building by the fief.

For in the early part of the Tokugawa period education was entirely a matter of personal contract between an individual teacher and his pupil. If one wished to study more than one subject one found more than one teacher. Those who were especially serious about the matter, and particularly those who had the intention of becoming professional scholars themselves, might board with the teacher just as an apprentice would board with a master craftsman.

Many of the fief schools were in origin simply private schools of this kind given assistance and finally adopted by the fief (the assistance not necessarily being confined to a single school-in the early stages at least). Frequently these seedling schools were run by the jusha, the Confucian scholars employed as advisers to the daimyo. The Hayashi school in Edo is a typical example. When it was first built (with a Bakufu subsidy) in 1630 it was a private school of the Hayashi family. After it was rebuilt on a more splendid scale in the 1680s it became a Bakufu establishment as far as the fabric was concerned and gave officially sponsored lectures for Bakufu retainers, but the taking of regular pupils was still a private matter for the Hayashi family. A century later it was taken over more completely by the Bakufu, which thenceforth directly appointed its teachers and controlled the curriculum.

Not all schools developed in this way from the fief's own resources. A scholar of some distinction might be invited by a daimyo to take service in his fief, given a large house and an income to allow him to take pupils. Sometimes the primary purpose of such invitations was to provide periodic lectures on the classics for the adult samurai of the fief. In such cases a lecture hall was often the first school building proper to be built, the regular instruction of full-time pupils being rather a secondary occupation which the teacher carried on in his private home. Sometimes, again, since one of the important functions of the Confucian scholars in the employment of daimyos was to act as tutors to their heirs, they were stationed at the fief residence in Edo (where daimyos had to keep their families) rather than in the fief itself. Consequently, schools were often started at the Edo

residences for the children of the samurai stationed there, as well as in the fief itself, and in some cases the Edo school came first.

Personal discipleship, rather than institutional membership, remained the dominant principle of organization of perhaps the majority of fief schools at the end of the period. The pupil was a pupil of a particular teacher, rather than of the school, though he might pass from the hands of one teacher to another as he progressed. The teacher prescribed his course of study and if he were ill his pupil would have to wait until he recovered. If fees were paid they were paid directly by pupil to teacher. But a good many schools, and most of those in the larger fiefs, had been transformed by a process of gradual rationalization. A clear distinction came to be recognized between the apprentice training of a small group of would-be professionals or dedicated amateurs on the one hand, and the provision of comprehensive instruction for large numbers of children on the other. In order to accomplish the latter task there had to be an increasing standardization of a curriculum prescribed for the school as a whole rather than by individual teachers, and a division of the school into grades through which pupils advanced in accordance with their age and ability.

The Yonezawa fief school is one of which considerable details have survived, and being fairly typical of the larger and better organized schools it will serve well enough as an example. It was in a fief of medium-to-large size (I 50,000 koku) whose ruling family, the Uesugi, was traditionally noted more for its military prowess than for its love of learning. Unlike the edicts of the Tokugawa with their insistence on the importance of `both the way of Bun and the way of Bu', the rules for the guidance of samurai issued by the early Uesugi daimyos urge them to develop their fighting skills without even a polite nod in the direction of Bun, the civil arts, It is not until 1679 that a grudging addendum to this exhortation suggests that `what time they have to spare' should be devoted to book learning and the more ceremonial and less useful military arts such as archery. A few years later, however, under the influence of Tsunayoshi's example, the fief gave its support to a private school run by its Confucian scholar. It declined as most such private schools did - sons did not always inherit the talents of their fathers - but it was ostensibly at least as a revival and enlargement of this private school that the Kojokan was built in 1776. (In a traditionally oriented society, where antiquity sanctions all, expensive ventures invite less criticism if they can claim not to be entirely new.) Like most other schools it had its ups and downs; there were times when its teachers were highly respected, its pupils numerous and financial help from the fief generous. There were other times when it had to struggle with only meagre success against hostile neglect.

In the late 18205 the school was recovering from one of these periods of neglect, in part the result of an economy drive prompted by crop failures and a crippling temple-building project imposed on the fief by the Bakufu. A new head professor had been appointed---a pupil of Koga Seiri,

one of the scholars brought into the Bakufu school to revitalize it and firmly establish the supremacy of the Sung Confucianist doctrines during the reforms of the 1790s. The system of instruction then worked out lasted with few changes until the Restoration.

The school, burned down and rebuilt several times in the course of its history, was a congeries of single-storey thatched buildings occupying an enclosure of about four acres. The main lecture hall and attached building covered about a third of an acre; in addition there were a Confucian shrine, a library, a smaller medical school, teachers' houses, offices and dormitories. The latter housed the shosei, some twenty young samurai between the ages of twenty and thirty who had shown an aptitude and a zeal for learning. They were drawn exclusively from the tour upper ranks of samurai; the two lowest ranks and the ashigaru foot-soldiers were not eligible. Their appointment as shosei was for a three-year term, which, however, could be extended by one or two years. They were boarded at fief expense, being teachers as well as students. After graduation some went for further study in Edo; most eventually became either regular teachers at the school or officials of the fief administration.

Theirs was a strict regimen - at least if the rules by which they were guided were at all conscientiously followed. Their day began at dawn when the monitor for the day rose to tour the dormitories with a pair of clappers, calling each of his fellows by name until he received an answer. After they had washed themselves and cleaned the dormitories all the shosei would repair to the lecture hall for their morning's first task - the instruction of the younger day-students, mostly between the ages of six and fourteen, in the reading of the basic Chinese classics, the Four Books. Each of the shosei had his own students - the personal relation between teacher and pupil was important here, too - and a popular teacher might have many times the number of a less popular colleague. Each in his own corner of the large lecture hall would take his students individually, or in groups of two or three, in the order in which they arrived at the school, going over the page or half page that made up that morning's lesson, giving them an interval to master it and then having them back again for a final check. If he was not feeling well a shosei could get permission to receive older students in the dormitories but not (a precaution, perhaps, against seduction ?) younger students.

The monitor for the day would not teach his students. His duties, conducted under the supervision of the two senior shosei who held the positions of Lecturer Supervisor (Tokb) and Registrar (Tenseki) were onerous. He had to stay in the office, direct the cleaning activities of the porter and the servant, and keep the log-book in which were recorded details of the weather, the phases of the moon, notes of all visitors, letters or messages coming to the school, and records of eclipses, earthquakes or other unusual happenings. He had to be particularly careful about etiquette,

wearing formal broad-shouldered kamishimo on the various festival days and being careful, when he saw visitors off the premises, to make his parting bow at a distance inside the outer gate appropriate to the visitor's rank. It was his duty to warn the more senior lecturers of the time lectures were to begin, summon the students with his clappers and then inform the lecturer when the class was assembled and ready to receive him. During lectures he had occasionally to leave the hall and make a tour of the dormitories. He had to see that the dormitory rules were obeyed-no sake-drinking (except for small medicinal doses before retiring in privileged cases), no heating apparatus, no congregation of more than three people in one room, and so on. At night it was his duty to order lightsout about an hour before midnight, to tour the dormitories to make sure that his call was obeyed, and then to tour them again at midnight when he finally locked up for the night.

After an hour or so teaching the younger pupils, the clappers would sound again to summon the shosei to their breakfast. Such summonses, the rules said, were to be obeyed immediately, but with no unseemly rush; there was to be no rude and noisy opening of doors and partitions. The quality of their meals varied according to the financial health of the fief. As a rough indication it appears that around 1800 the cost of the shosei's meals was distributed approximately in the proportions: ten parts for rice, ten parts for miso bean-paste, and three parts for vegetables.

After breakfast the shosei would return to the lecture hall, this time for their own study. They would be joined by another group of boarders, the kijukusei, who sometimes numbered as few as five, sometimes as many as thirty. These, unlike the specially selected shosei, had no duties to perform, and they were boarded at their own expense, though at some periods particularly promising students among them were given free board. Any samurai of the upper four ranks who applied could be admitted as a kijukusei if he had sufficiently progressed in his studies as a day-boy. One or two of the senior teachers would supervise these morning sessions. There were usually three or four of these, one or two Professors (Teigaku) and one or two Assistant Professors (Jokyo). They were generally from families which made a hereditary profession of scholarship or were appointed from the ranks of lower samurai. On appointment their hereditary stipends were supplemented to give them an income of 125 and 100 koku respectively, though one of the Professors was usually de facto Director with a salary made up to 200 koku. Particularly outstanding Professors were given the full title of Director … with an income of 250 koku or more. These posts were not usually filled, however. The Assistant Professors lived in the school compound, the Professors were later allowed to live outside.

In the hall the shosei and kijukusei would take their seats strictly in order of age seniority, regardless of rank. Each brought the book he was currently studying - for the most part Chinese histories and the more difficult classics. At this stage students relied chiefly on the resources of the

school library (unlike the younger students who were expected to acquire their own copies of the more elementary texts). At the time of the Restoration the library is said to have contained about 700 Chinese `works' (including nearly two hundred collections of separate works) but how many duplicate copies this included is not indicated. In these morning sessions the shosei busied themselves with private study, usually reading aloud to themselves as they went along, though during periods of mourning for members of the daimyo's family, and for the afternoon preceding and the actual day of death-anniversary rituals at the daimyo's palace, silent reading was obligatory. As they read the teachers would summon them in turn for private guidance and questioning on what they read.
On most days this continued until lunch-time, but on the three and eight days (i.e. the 3rd, 8th, 13th, 18th, etc., of each month) the latter half of the morning would be taken up with `group reading'. The students became a class rather than a group of individuals. Three would be chosen by lot to read two or three passages of a prepared text-usually one of the more difficult writers such as Hsun Tzu or Chuang Tzu, or the T'ang collection of Chinese political maxims, the Chen-kuan cheng yao.

In group reading the purpose was simply to construe the text by accurately `reading it off' in the peculiarly barbarous dialect of Japanese which was designed for this purpose. There were also `group discussions', however, held at the same time on the four and nine days, and these were concerned with the meanings and the `lessons' of the texts. Again three students were chosen by lot and expected to expound the significance of passages, usually drawn, for this purpose, from the Analects or from Mencius.

Meanwhile, a larger group of day-boys had arrived at another lecture hall soon after breakfast. At some periods there were several hundreds of them. These, as distinct from the pre-breakfast younger pupils, were known as the 'self-readers' (jidokusei), and were usually over fifteen by Japanese reckoning (that is to say at least in their thirteenth year, since the Japanese counted in ages all calendar years, through the whole or part of which one had lived, so that someone born on the last day of the year would be fifteen the day after his-Western-style thirteenth birthday. On the average the Japanese reckoning adds one and a half years to one's age.) These were students who had completed the basic reading of the Four Books and were allowed to read by themselves under supervision in much the same way as the shosei, though at a more elementary level. Three of the senior shosei with the title of Reading Assistant (jodoku) had charge of these pupils, one of them supervising the morning session each day. They were assisted by other teachers engaged ad hoc from outside the school and by five Upper-Seat Students (josekisei) chosen from the most able of the jidokusei themselves. The latter were paid no salary, but they were rewarded for their efforts at the end of the year by a meal, with sake, sent down from the

daimyo's kitchen. (The modern counterpart of this traditional and rather inexpensive way of rewarding inferiors was the practice, common until 1945, of distributing Imperial sake and Imperial cigarettes to troops before and after battles.)

For a short period after their arrival the jidokusei were allowed freely to ask questions of their teachers. From about mid-morning they settled in their seats for the formal session, being called to their teacher individually or in small groups, and otherwise reading by themselves until lunch-time. After another hour or so of free study and free questioning their school day was over, though most of them then set out for the booth of a teacher of swordsmanship, the lance, archery or horsemanship in the near-by military school. Six times a month they, too, had sessions of `group reading' or `group discussion' in place of the morning's free-reading session. For this purpose they were divided at first into two, later into three, grades, those aged by Japanese reckoning fifteen to seventeen, those aged eighteen to twenty and those aged twenty-one or more, the upper limit usually being twenty-four or twenty-five. These age limits were not rigidly fixed, however, and bright students could reach the upper grades at an earlier age. The problems of discipline in the free-reading sessions must sometimes have been considerable since there were frequent admonitions against gossiping and moving about the room.

On the two and seven days the morning sessions were preceded, immediately after breakfast, by formal lectures given by one of the Professors or Assistant Professors. These were attended by all the students, both day-boys and boarders, and sometimes by older samurai as well, though their attendance was usually limited to the more ceremonial lectures held twice a year after the pring and autumn ceremonies at the Confucian shrine. Students were expected to bring a text-usually one of the Four Books-in order to follow the lecturer's exposition.

Three times a month, on the ten days, a lecturer in etiquette came to the school and held a practice session in the latter hall of the morning-again for all students, both boarders and dayboys - demonstrating table manners, ways of giving and receiving presents, and ceremonial bows and formulae for all occasions.

Another regular event was the afternoon poetry session held on the eight days, three times a month. These were primarily for the boarding students, though senior day students could also take part if they wished. The teacher - one or more of the Professors or Assistants - set a topic and judged the grammar and style of each student's effort. This was followed by a slightly more lavish evening meal than usual, with a small allowance of sake when the fief budget could afford it …

The examinations were formal affairs. For the day-boys these were held in November, and the shosei gave up their own studies for two months beforehand to help them in their preparation. First came the `internal'

examination - in effect an eliminating contest. Each student was summoned before the examiners and given a passage from the books he had studied either simply to read, or to expound, according to the stage he had reached. Examination etiquette was precise. Students of the two upper ranks of samurai were allowed to remove their short sword after they had moved to their place before the examiner in the centre of the room. Those of the next two ranks had to remove it at the entrance before they moved to the centre of the room. The next rank, as well as removing their sword at the entrance, had to kneel not more than one mat's length within the room, and the next rank half a mat, while such luckless footsoldiers as were emboldened to enter such exalted company had to leave their sword in a waiting-room and proceed no further than the threshold of the room itself. Students (of the upper four ranks only) who proved the most able in these trial runs were selected to appear at the more formal examinations, held either in the school or at the castle, in the presence of the daimyo or his chief minister and a retinue of other officials. These followed the same pattern. It seems that all who were selected to appear on these grand occasions received a first prize of approximately a gallon of sake. According to one record for the year 1807 there were sixty-seven such students. There were two other grades of prizes for students designated 'filial, respectful and diligent in their studies'; a full meal … and a partial meal…. It is not clear whether there were students who got no prize. In later years, however, the number of prizes was drastically reduced to a dozen first prizes and about thirty full or partial meals; this, less in order to stimulate competition than as a measure of economy.

The shosei were examined in the second month of the year and were allowed to give up their teaching duties for a month beforehand. They, too, were given a similar oral examination in the presence of the daimyo or his chief minister. They, however, had no trial run and received no prizes. They were professionals …

The senior of the Professors had charge of the instruction given at the school, but he by no means had administrative autonomy. The school was for administrative purposes under the command of a number of senior samurai officials, all superior in rank to the Professors. One Minister, one Councillor, one junior Elder, and one official each from the Treasurer's department and the General Affairs section of the fief bureaucracy were appointed to oversee the school. Appointments of teachers came through this chain of command, as did more detailed regulations, such as orders to the effect that shosei were not to receive leave to attend memorial services for cousins. The school had no budget distinct from the general fief budget. All food, firewood, candles and paper were supplied in kind by the fief office which also saw to the repair of buildings and, on application, provided labourers for such tasks as the weeding of the compound. Two

low-ranking samurai with an office in the school acted as quartermasters to keep account of all these transactions and to make applications for supplies.

These rules and regulations of the Yonezawa school cannot convey a full impression of the general atmosphere which prevailed. They do, however, indicate one important constituent of that atmosphere - the heavy weight of ceremonial and of formal bureaucratic regulations. Designed though it was to heighten the student's sense of the seriousness of the business of learning, it was hardly conducive to spontaneity or intellectual adventurousness, the more so since, from the beginning of the nineteenth century onwards, all texts used were those of the flung Confzcianist school and no discussion of varying interpretations was expected or even permitted. The teachers themselves, after all, were retailers of packaged knowledge, not participants in a developing branch of inquiry, and one could hardly expect them to convey a sense of intellectual excitement. The result was a petty formalism against which only a few bold spirits reacted. One was a shosei who is supposed one morning to have packed his bags, written his resignation, and posted on the wall of the dormitory, a manifesto in which he denounced the masters and demanded their dismissal. They were, he said, more concerned with enforcing obedience to footling regulations than with education….

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Emile, or On Education* (1762). Introduction, translation and notes by Allan Bloom (London, 1979) Extract from Book 1, pp. 38, 41-2

Rousseau (1712-78) was a French political philosopher and author. He is best known for The Social Contract *(1762), which begins, 'Man is born free, but is everywhere in chains,' and in which he coined the slogan, 'Liberty, equality, fraternity'. Rousseau became one of the foundational theorists of the French Revolution and of revolutionary movements everywhere. He published* Emile*, an educational treatise in the form of a novel, in the same year as* The Social Contract.

Plants are shaped by cultivation, and men by education. If man were born big and strong, his size and strength would be useless to him until he had learned to make use of them. They would be detrimental to him in that they would keep others from thinking of aiding him. And, abandoned to himself, he would die of want before knowing his needs. And childhood is taken to be a pitiable state! It is not seen that the human race would have perished if man had not begun as a child.

We are born weak, we need strength; we are born totally unprovided, we need aid; we are born stupid, we need judgment. Everything we do not have at our birth and which we need when we are grown is given us by education.

This education comes to us from nature or from men or from things. The internal development of our faculties and our organs is the education of nature. The use that we are taught to make of this development is the education of men. And what we acquire from our own experience about the objects which affect us is the education of things.

Each of us is thus formed by three kinds of masters. The disciple in whom their various lessons are at odds with one another is badly raised and will never be in agreement with himself. He alone in whom they all coincide at the same points and tend to the same ends reaches his goal and lives consistently. He alone is well raised.

Now, of these three different educations, the one coming from nature is in no way in our control; that coming from things is in our control only in certain respects; that coming from men is the only one of which we are truly the masters. Even of it we are the masters only by hypothesis. For who can hope entirely to direct the speeches and the deeds of all those surrounding a child?

Therefore, when education becomes an art, it is almost impossible for it to succeed, since the conjunction of the elements necessary to its success is in no one's control. All that one can do by dint of care is to come more or less close to the goal, but to reach it requires luck….

Rousseau goes on to argue that an education which aimed to develop a man's [sic] *nature would be at odds with an education which aimed to make him a good citizen of a society, because by nature men are solitary and selfish, while socially they are group-minded and altruistic. He thinks, however, that ideally, a man should be brought up in accordance with his nature in such a way that he can also develop social bonds, and in the France of the 1760s he wants to believe this is possible.*

In the social order where all positions are determined, each man ought to be raised for his. If an individual formed for his position leaves it, he is no longer fit for anything. Education is useful only insofar as fortune is in agreement with the parents' vocation. In any other case it is harmful to the student, if only by virtue of the prejudices it gives him….

In the natural order, since men are all equal, their common calling is man's estate and whoever is well raised for that calling cannot fail to fulfill those callings related to it. Let my student be destined for the sword, the church, the bar. I do not care. Prior to the calling of his parents is nature's call to human life. Living is the job I want to teach…

Our true study is that of the human condition. He among us who best knows how to bear the goods and the ills of this life is to my taste the best raised: from which it follows that the true education consists less in precept than in practice. We begin to instruct ourselves when we begin to live. Our education begins with us.

John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University* (published in 1873 but based on lectures and essays written in the 1850s). 'Knowledge in relation to learning', extracts from sections 3-5, 9

Newman (1801-90) was an English theologian, famous as a leader of the reforming Anglican Oxford Movement in the 1830s, and then for converting to Roman Catholicism in 1845. In the 1850s he became Rector of Dublin Catholic University, during which time he wrote the lectures and essays which became The Idea of a University. *He became a Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church in 1879.*

I suppose the prima-facie view which the public at large would take of a University, considering it as a place of Education, is nothing more or less than a place for acquiring a great deal of knowledge on a great many subjects. Memory is one of the first developed of the mental faculties; a boy's business when he goes to school is to learn, that is, to store up things in his memory. For some years his intellect is little more than an instrument for taking in facts, or a receptacle for storing them; he welcomes them as fast as they come to him; he lives on what is without; he has his eyes ever about him; he has a lively susceptibility of impressions; he imbibes information of every kind; and little does he make his own in a true sense of the word, living rather upon his neighbours all around him. He has opinions, religious, political, and literary, and, for a boy, is very positive in them and sure about them; but he gets them from his schoolfellows, or his masters, or his parents, as the case may be. Such as he is in his other relations, such also is he in his school exercises; his mind is observant, sharp, ready, retentive; he is almost passive in the acquisition of knowledge….

Acquirements … are emphatically producible, and at a moment; they are a something to show, both for master and scholar; an audience, even though ignorant themselves of the subjects of an examination, can comprehend when questions are answered and when they are not. Here again is a reason why mental culture is in the minds of men identified with the acquisition of knowledge. The same notion possesses the public mind, when it passes on from the thought of a school to that of a University: and with the best of reasons so far as this, that there is no true culture without acquirements, and that philosophy presupposes knowledge.

Knowledge then is the indispensable condition of expansion of mind, and the instrument of attaining to it; this cannot be denied, it is ever to be insisted on; I begin with it as a first principle; however, the very truth of it carries men too far, and confirms to them the notion that it is the whole of the matter. A narrow mind is thought to be that which contains little knowledge; and an enlarged mind, that which holds a great deal; and what

seem to put the matter beyond dispute is, the fact of the great number of studies which are pursued in a University, by its very profession. Lectures are given on every kind of subject; examinations are held; prizes awarded. There are moral, metaphysical, physical Professors; Professors of languages, of history, of mathematics, of experimental science. Lists of questions are published, wonderful for their range and depth, variety and difficulty; treatises are written, which carry upon their very face the evidence of extensive reading or multifarious information; what then is wanting for mental culture to a person of large reading and scientific attainments? what is grasp of mind but acquirement? where shall philosophical repose be found, but in the consciousness and enjoyment of large intellectual possessions?

And yet this notion is, I conceive, a mistake, and my present business is to show that it is one, and that the end of a Liberal Education is not mere knowledge, or knowledge considered in its *matter*….

The enlargement consists, not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it, but in the mind's energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas, which are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a formative power, reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements; it is a making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own, or, to use a familiar word, it is a digestion of what we receive, into the substance of our previous state of thought; and without this no enlargement is said to follow. There is no enlargement, unless there be a comparison of ideas one with another, as they come before the mind, and a systematizing of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding *then*, when we not only learn, but refer what we learn to what we know already. It is not the mere addition to our knowledge that is the illumination; but the locomotion, the movement onwards, of that mental centre, to which both what we know, and what we are learning, the accumulating mass of our acquirements, gravitates….

I protest to you, Gentlemen, that if I had to choose between a so-called University, which dispensed with residence and tutorial superintendence, and gave its degrees to any person who passed an examination in a wide range of subjects, and a University which had no professors or examinations at all, but merely brought a number of young men together for three or four years, and then sent them away as the University of Oxford is said to have done some sixty years since, if I were asked which of these two methods was the better discipline of the intellect, - mind, I do not say which is morally the better, for it is plain that compulsory study must be a good and idleness an intolerable mischief, - but if I must determine which of the two courses was the more successful in training, moulding, enlarging the mind, which sent out men the more fitted for their secular duties, which produced better public men, men of the world, men whose names would descend to posterity, I have no hesitation in giving the

preference to that University which did nothing, over that which exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the sun….

How is this to be explained? I suppose as follows: When a multitude of young men, keen, open-hearted, sympathetic, and observant, as young men are, come together and freely mix with each other, they are sure to learn one from another, even if there be no one to teach them; the conversation of all is a series of lectures to each, and they gain for themselves new ideas and views, and fresh matter of thought, and distinct principles for judging and acting, day by day.

'Knowledge viewed in relation to professional skill' excerpts from sections 2, 5, 6

[Some great men] insist that Education should be confined to some particular and narrow end, and should issue in some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. They argue as if every thing, as well as every person, had its price; and that where there has been a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind. This they call making Education and Instruction "useful," and "Utility" becomes their watchword. With a fundamental principle of this nature, they very naturally go on to ask, what there is to show for the expense of a University; what is the real worth in the market of the article called 'a liberal education', on the supposition that it does not teach us definitely how to advance our manufactures, or to improve our lands, or to better our civil economy; or again, if it does not at once make this man a lawyer, that an engineer, and that a surgeon; or at least if it does not lead to discoveries in chemistry, astronomy, geology, magnetism, and science of every kind.

This question, as might have been expected, has been keenly debated in the present age….

I say, let us take "useful" to mean, not what is simply good, but what tends to good, or is the instrument of good; and in this sense also, Gentlemen, I will show you how a liberal education is truly and fully a useful, though it be not a professional, education. "Good" indeed means one thing, and "useful" means another; but I lay it down as a principle, which will save us a great deal of anxiety, that, though the useful is not always good, the good is always useful. Good is not only good, but reproductive of good; this is one of its attributes; nothing is excellent, beautiful, perfect, desirable for its own sake, but it overflows, and spreads the likeness of itself all around it. Good is prolific; it is not only good to the eye, but to the taste; it not only attracts us, but it communicates itself; it excites first our admiration and love, then our desire and our gratitude, and that, in proportion to its intenseness and fulness in particular instances. A great good will impart great good. If then the intellect is so excellent a

portion of us, and its cultivation so excellent, it is not only beautiful, perfect, admirable, and noble in itself, but in a true and high sense it must be useful to the possessor and to all around him; not useful in any low, mechanical, mercantile sense, but as diffusing good, or as a blessing, or a gift, or power, or a treasure, first to the owner, then through him to the world. I say then, if a liberal education be good, it must necessarily be useful too….

I say that a cultivated intellect, because it is a good in itself, brings with it a power and a grace to every work and occupation which it undertakes, and enables us to be more useful, and to a greater number. There is a duty we owe to human society as such, to the state to which we belong, to the sphere in which we move, to the individuals towards whom we are variously related, and whom we successively encounter in life; and that philosophical or liberal education, as I have called it, which is the proper function of a University, if it refuses the foremost place to professional interests, does but postpone them to the formation of the citizen, and, while it subserves the larger interests of philanthropy, prepares also for the successful prosecution of those merely personal objects, which at first sight it seems to disparage.

H. Kroeskamp, ***Early Schoolmasters in a Developing Country. A history of experiments in school education in 19th century Indonesia.*** **(Assen, 1974). Chapter 1: Three centuries of education for Christian Indonesians (middle 16th century to middle 19th century): The East-India Company and education, extracts**

The teachers or masters usually combined two functions in one and the same person, namely the function of teaching at the school, and, in the absence of the preacher or the "visitor of the sick", the function of minister in the parish, where they conducted the church service on Sundays, held confirmation classes and performed other church duties. Practically none of them had ever received professional training for this dual and responsible task. Anyone who had been to school was in effect a potential teacher. Occasionally the teacher selected by the preacher received a certain amount of additional training at the minister's house or sometimes also from a government official. The young men concerned were known as *murids* (= pupils). As servants they performed all kinds of but especially domestic services and by way of remuneration they received board, lodging and clothing, for which the Company paid the preacher two "rijksdaalters" per month. The training was given by the preacher himself or by the headmaster and consisted of learning to sing psalms, religious instruction and some reading. Hence, there was no question of pedagogic or didactic training and the education amounted to little more than a poor preparation for giving religious instruction. What's more, these young men were the best-trained of all: the majority of the candidates had to acquire the art of teaching on the job and on the basis of the principle that practice makes perfect. Small wonder, therefore, that the results of school education differed a great deal, and depeneded greatly on the vocation, aptitude and the character of the teacher.

The requirements which a schoolmaster had to fulfil were formulated in the School Regulations of 1684. In the first place he had to profess the true Reformed religion and furthermore he had to "read promptly all printed books and written documents, write a fair hand, sing the psalms of David with proficiency and be reasonably good at arithmetic." In the Moluccas these requirements were probably not taken all that seriously, since arithmetic at least was not taught there.

The "General Church Order" of 1643 already contained a description of the task of the schoolmasters, worded as follows: 'The duty of the schoolmasters is first and foremost to instil into the youngsters the fear of God, to teach them the fundamental principles of Christian religion to teahch them to pray, sing, to take them to church and to give them religious instruction. Secondly, to teach them to obey their parents, those placed in authority over them and the masters. Thirdly, to teach them how to read

and write, as well as arithmetic. Fourthly, to teach them all kinds of good morals and manners, and finally to ensure that no language was used in Schools other than the Dutch language."

The Company schoolmasters constituted a category in distress, their salaries being too love to guarantee them a reasonable existence. In Batavia, therefore, they were permitted to accept voluntary gifts from the parents, except from the poor and slaves, whose children had to be given tuition free of charge. In the Moluccas they will undoubtedly have augmented their income by tilling their plot of land, as they practically all did in the nineteenth century and then often with help from the oldest pupils. This did not exactly raise their prestige…

In principle, the Company education was intended for children of Christian parents, of both Netherlands and other than Netherlands descent… In effect, the Company schools were schools for the poor, where tuition was given free of charge or at a small fee to a very mixed school population, of which the majority either did not speak Dutch at all or very poorly. The Netherlands officials of the East-India Company took their children away from this school, because it was hardly to be expected that proper tuition could be given in this environment. Private schools for "European" pupils were established or else the children were taught by a private tutor. Other people again sent their children back to the Netherlands to be taught there…

The school was also open to girls but - espeically in the eastern Islands - they made little use of it…

Whereas, as mentioned before, religious instruction was regarded as the principal task of the school, it was certainly realized also in the times of the East-India Company that the school was not without social significance. Although this was not expressed in so many words, it was evidentally the same from a number of indications. In Batavia, for instance, the curriculum included arithmetic, because in this centre of commerce it might well come in useful. On the eastern islands on the other hand, with their mainly agrarian population, it was not taught. The Mardijker schoolmasters often made a special effort to teach their pupils a very neat handwriting, almost certainly with a view to their obtaining employment as a clerk at the Company's offices…

In 1778 the school regulations were revised and brought up to date. In principle, the method of individual tuition, when the teacher heard the lesson from each of the pupils separately, explained new subject matter and gave the pupil a task, was abandoned. It needs hardly be repeated how this system, together with the unsuitablility of the majority of teachers, led to chaotic conditions in schools everywhere… In 1778, however, it was laid down that the school population would be divided into three forms according to progress made. In the third or lowest form the master started with the alphabet and spelling, In the second form he taught reading,

writing, the catechism and singing; in the first or highest form arithmetic in addition to the other subjects. However a child was not removed to a next form after one year. Removes were not periodical, but took place at irregular intervals, when in the opinion of the master a pupil would, on the strength of his achievements, be able to follow the tuition in the next higher form.

According to the 1778 regulations, instruction all forms consisted mainly of learning texts by heart.

Emile Durkheim, *Education and Sociology* (Paris, 1922) transl. Talcott Parsons (Toronto: 1956) pp. 95-6

Durkheim (1858-1917) was one of the founders of sociology as an academic discipline, and from 1913 held the first chair of sociology in France. He wrote on many aspects of the organization of societies, from education to religion, politics, professional life and ethics. His influence is felt widely across disciplines, especially in anthropology and history.

Educational practices are not phenomena that are isolated from one another; rather, for a given society, they are bound up in the same system all the parts of which contribute toward the same end: it is the system of education suitable to this country and to this time. Each people has its own, as it has its own moral, religions, economic system, etc. But on the other hand, peoples of the same kind, that is to say, people who resemble one another with respect to essential characteristics of their constitution, should practice comparable systems of education. The similarities in their general organization should necessarily lead to others of equal importance in their educational organization. Consequently, by abstracting the similarities and eliminating the differences from them, one can certainly establish the generic types of education which correspond to the different types of societies. For example, under tribal conditions the essential characteristic of education is that it is diffuse; it is given to all the members of the clan indiscriminately. There are no specialized teachers, no special overseers entrusted with the training of the youth; it is all the elders, the totality of the ascending generations that play this role. At most it happens that, for certain particularly fundamental forms of instruction, certain elders are more specifically appointed, In other societies, more advanced, this diffuseness comes to an end or at least weakens. Education is concentrated in the hands of special functionaries…

Basil Yeaxlee, *Lifelong Education* (London: 1929) extracts

Yeaxlee was one of the pioneers of the growth and diversification of educational opportunities for adults in the twentieth century, which led, among other initiatives, to the Open University, the development of Polytechnics and Colleges of Further Education, and the evolution of departments of Continuing Education in universities.

Neither 'the university of the people' nor 'nightschool' is a sufficient description of what adult education really is. Both ideas may be included, but many other names will be needed as well. One man may be seeking the philosophic key to the meaning of existence: another may be concerned with political or economic questions: another may be discovering some hitherto unsuspected aptitude for using his hands artistically and skillfully. Each is attaining a new understanding of himself and enriching the values of his world. (Yeaxlee, 1929: 45)

[A]dult education must be more comprehensive than university education. It must teach many things which a university would not include … and by methods which (it) would never dream of adopting … and yet ... must maintain the ideals which we so naturally associate with university traditions. (ibid: 152)

Shall we … grow out of the need of adult education - and perhaps sooner than we anticipate? Ought we not to avoid exaggerating the importance of it, and to recognise that it is a transitory social phenomenon, a medicine for a social weakness which we are rapidly overcoming rather than a part of 'human nature's daily food'? (ibid: 26)

We discover more, and not less need of adult education as we make progress. It will not have a fair chance until better preparation is made for it during the years of adolescence. On the other hand, we are unlikely to achieve a thoroughly sound and complete system of primary and secondary education until the adult members of the community, by continuing their own education, realize how mischievous a thing it is to abbreviate or mishandle the school-education of boys and girls. But adult education, rightly interpreted, is as inseparable from normal living as food and physical exercise. (ibid: 28)

If we ask … 'When is his (a person's) education complete?' the only true answer is 'Never while he lives.' … There all the distinctive notes of lifelong education are struck. (ibid: 164)

[W]here every kind of liberal study and educative activity may be pursued, and where all sorts and conditions of men may interchange knowledge and opinions, experience and ideals … the struggle for freedom and self-government, for a social and international order which will ensure creative and joyous peace, must carried to a victorious issue in the minds and spirits of men before it can be happily resolved in their political and social organization. More than this, there must be achieved a keenness of insight … as only a constructive clash of minds and temperaments in the frankest friendship can give. (ibid: 125)

Frank Swetz, *Mathematics Education in China: Its growth and development*. (Cambridge, Mass., 1974) Chapter 4: 'The period of experimentation (The Great Leap Forward in Education): 1958-1960, pp. 155-9

The year 1958 saw a great amount of confusion on the Chinese educational scene. A series of government directives were issued with the intent of furthering politics, proletarianism, and production in education. Publicly, primary emphasis appeared to be on production; but political considerations, while not as obvious, were paramount within the new reforms. The Communist Party was to assert itself as the sole architect of educational policy. Education was swept along in the grand designs of the "Great Leap Forward," a period in which all aspects of Chinese society, industrial, economic, and cultural, were to advance greatly and narrow the develop-mental gap with the Western world.

"Redness and Expertness"
On January 31, 1958, Mao set in motion a revolution in education with his "Sixty Articles of Working Methods" directive. In this document, he stressed the importance of a "politico-ideological" basis for education: "There is no question that politics is unified with economics and technique . . . This is called red and expert." Redness was to be acquired as a result of increased political education in the schools. Expertness, while being acquired through regular academic studies, would be accelerated by assuring a closer relationship between studies and physical labor directed toward production. Mao was affirming his epistemological philosophy at a most opportune time—to coincide with the Great Leap Forward and the beginning of the state's Second Five Year Plan. All students from the primary through the university level were required to engage in productive labor, establish factories, plant crops, and in general become part of the national productive force. Student-based labor, while contributing to production quotas, also helped schools attain financial self-sufficiency and reduced a lingering burden on the state. Contact between students and teachers and workers and peasants, while performing physical labor, proletarianized the intellectuals and intellectualized the proletariat, the Ministry stipulating specific hours and quotas for productive labor. Labor was no longer a theoretical or token subject as in the past; schools now became affiliated with factories, mills) and communes. Official party policy on the matter was given by Lu Ting-yi, Director of Propaganda, in a speech entitled "Education Must it be Combined with Productive Labor." Lu advocated the principles of "diligent in work and frugal in study" and urged the establishment of secondary spare-time agricultural schools. The general slogan of "more, better, faster, and cheaper" applied to the industrial sector

of the economy was also adopted in education. Former bourgeois policy whereby "education was run by experts" and "professors must run the schools" had to be changed.

By the summer, many schools had established factories of their own. As in all government campaigns, popularized slogans were in abundance, one of which, "walking on two legs," perhaps best summarizes the prevailing attitude in the People's Republic at this time. "Walking on two legs" meant solving a problem by all available means. Thus the harnessing of student labor combined with raised industrial quotas would achieve increased production by two diverse means. Similarly, in education a leap was being realized by requiring accelerated building programs and timetables, and also by encouraging factories, mills, military garrisons, and farms to establish their own schools. Spare-time and half-study, half-work facilities were multiplied many times over due to the government's pronouncement that "every knowledgeable person could teach". These institutions varied from the usual min-pan school to "red and expert universities". Renewed emphasis on spare-time education was intended to intellectualize the proletariat, providing a psychological appeasement for the masses' desire for education. Spare-time universities were far from being universities. Evelyn Harner, in her study on Communist education, provides some statistics on the background of students in the Communist Labor University - almost 70 per cent of the students had only a primary school education. During this period of rapid reform, the Ministry of Higher Education was abolished, and its functions transferred to the Ministry of Education.

John Holt, *How Children Fail* (NY, 1964) Penguin edn. (London, 1990) pp. 175-6

John Holt, teacher and educational theorist, was one of the most influential voices in the development of child-centred learning in schools in the 1960s and 1970s. Both Holt and Yeaxlee owed much to the ideas of the late 19th-century American educationalist John Dewey, who pioneered both the idea of child-centred learning and that of lifelong intellectual growth and education.

In his important and very funny book How to Survive in Your Native Land, James Herndon has one very revealing chapter called "The Dumb Class". That class, which he taught for a few years, was made up of the dumbest kids in his junior high school, the kids who couldn't and didn't learn anything. And even among these one boy stood out as clearly the dumbest kid in the dumb class, utterly hopeless at any kind of schoolwork.

One day Jim met this boy in a bowling alley. To his utter astonishment he found that the kid had a paying job there, keeping the official score for the evening bowling leagues. He sat on a high chair between two lanes, scoring for both of them at once, keeping track of strikes, spares, etc. Jim points out that this job was not some federal program to give dumb kids something to do. The bowling alley had hired and was paying the kid to keep score because he worked quickly and accurately—no one in the highly competitive leagues would have stood for mistakes.

So, Jim thought, I'll give this kid problems about bowling in school. He couldn't do them! His answers to problems about scoring in bowling were not only wrong but absurd. The dumb kids might be smart in the world, but as soon as they stepped into the school they became dumb again. It was the school itself, boring, threatening, cut off from any real experience or serious purpose, that made them dumb.

Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. (London, 1990; originally published in French, 1970) pp. 5-31

In this highly influential work, anthropologist-turned-cultural-commentator Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron try to explicate the part education plays in the imposition and reproduction of social power.

l. THE TWOFOLD ARBITRARINESS OF PEDAGOGIC ACTION

1. All pedagogic action (PA) is, objectively, symbolic violence insofar as it is the imposition of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power.

Gloss: The propositions which follow (up to and including those of the third degree) refer to all PAs, whether exerted by all the educated members of a social formation or group (diffuse education), by the family-group members to whom the culture of a group or class allots this task (family education) or by the system of agents explicitly mandated for this purpose by an institution directly or indirectly, exclusively or partially educative in function (institutionalized education), and, unless otherwise stated, whether that PA seeks to reproduce the cultural arbitrary of the dominant or of the dominated classes. In other words, the range of these propositions is defined by the fact that they apply to any social formation, understood as a system of power relations and sense relations between groups or classes. It follows that in the first three sections, we have refrained from extensive use of examples drawn from the case of a dominant, school PA, to avoid even implicitly suggesting any restrictions on the validity of the propositions concerning all PAs. We have kept for its logical place (fourth degree propositions) specification of the forms and effects of a PA carried on within the framework of a school institution; only in the last proposition (4.3.) do we expressly characterize the school PA which reproduces the dominant culture, contributing thereby to the reproduction of the structure of the power relations with a social formation in which the dominant system of education tends to secure a monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence.

1.1. PA is, objectively, symbolic violence first insofar as the power relations between the groups or classes making up a social formation are the basis of the arbitrary power which is the precondition for the establishment of a relation of pedagogic communication, i.e. for the imposition and inculcation of a cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary mode of imposition and inculcation (education).

Gloss: Thus, the power relations which constitute patrilineal and matrilineal social formations are directly manifested in the types of PA corresponding to each successional system. In a matrilineal system, where the father has no juridical authority over his son and the son no rights over his father's goods

and privileges, the father has only affective or moral sanctions to back up his PA (although the group will grant him its support in the last instance, if his prerogatives are threatened) and cannot have recourse to the juridical assistance which he is guaranteed when, for example, he seeks to affirm his right to the sexual services of his spouse. By contrast, in a patrilineal system, in which the son, enjoying explicit, juridically sanctioned rights over his father's goods and privileges, stands in a competitive and even conflictual relation to him (as the nephew does, vis-á-vis the maternal uncle, in a matrilineal system), the father 'represents the power of society as a force in the domestic group' and so is able to make use of juridical sanctions in imposing his PA (cf. Fortes and Goody). Although there can be no question of ignoring the specifically biological dimension of the relation of pedagogic imposition, i.e. biologically conditioned childhood dependence, it is not possible to leave out of account the social determinations which specify in every case the adult-child relationship, including those cases in which the educators, are none other than the biological parents (e.g. the determinations deriving from the structure of the family or the family's position in the social structure).

1.1.1. Insofar as it is a symbolic power which, by definition, is never reducible to the imposition of force, PA can produce its own specifically symbolic effect only to the extent that it is exerted within a relation of pedagogic communication.

1.1.2. Insofar as it is symbolic violence, PA can produce its own specifically symbolic effect only when provided with the social conditions for imposition and inculcation, i.e. the power relations that are not implied in a formal definition of communication.

11.3. In any given social formation, the PA which the power relations between the groups or classes making up that social formation put into the dominant position within the system of PAs is the one which most fully, though always indirectly, corresponds to the objective interests (material, symbolic and, in the respect considered here, pedagogic) of the dominant groups or classes, both by its mode of imposition and by its delimitation of what and on whom, it imposes.

Gloss: The symbolic strength of a pedagogic agency is defined by its weight in the structure of the power relations and symbolic relations (the latter always expressing the former) between the agencies exerting an action of symbolic violence. This structure in turn expresses the power relations between the groups or classes making up the social formation in question. It is through the mediation of this effect of domination by the dominant PA that the different PAs carried on within the different groups or classes objectively and indirectly collaborate in the dominance of the dominant classes (e.g. the inculcation by the dominated PAs of knowledges or styles whose value on the economic or symbolic market is defined by the dominant PA).

1.2. PA is, objectively, symbolic violence in a second sense insofar as the delimitation objectively entailed by the fact of imposing and inculcating certain meanings, treated by selection and by the corresponding exclusion as worthy of being reproduced by PA,

reproduces (in both senses) the arbitrary selection a group or class objectively makes in and through its cultural arbitrary.
1.2.1 The selection of meanings which objectively defines a group's or a class's culture as a symbolic system is arbitrary insofar as the structure and functions of that culture cannot be deduced from any universal principle, whether physical, biological or spiritual, not being linked by any sort of internal relation to 'the nature of things' or any 'human nature.
1.2.2. The selection of meanings which objectively defines a group's or a class's culture as a symbolic system is socio-logically necessary insofar as that culture owes its existence to the social conditions of which it is the product and its intelligibility to the coherence and functions of the structure of the signifying relations which constitute it.
Gloss: The 'choices' which constitute a culture ('choices' which no one makes) appear as arbitrary when related by the comparative method to the sum total of present or past cultures or, by imaginary variation, to the universe of possible cultures; they reveal their necessity as soon as they are related to the social conditions of their emergence and perpetuation. Misunderstandings over the notion of arbitrariness (particularly confusion between arbitrariness and gratuitousness) derive, at best, from the fact that a purely synchronic grasp of cultural facts (such as anthropologists are generally condemned to) necessarily induces neglect of all that these facts owe to their social conditions of existence, i.e. the social conditions of their production and reproduction, with all the restructurings and reinterpretations connected with their perpetuation in changed social conditions (e.g. all the degrees distinguishable between the quasi-perfect reproduction of culture in a traditional society and the reinterpretative reproduction colleges' humanist culture, suited to the needs of a salon aristocracy, in and through the academic culture of the nineteenth century bourgeois *lycées*). Thus the genesis amnesia which finds expression in the naive illusion that things have always been 'as they are', as well as in the substantialist uses made of the notion of the cultural unconscious, can lead to the eternizing and thereby the 'naturalizing' of signifying relations which are the product of history.
1.2.3. In any given social formation the cultural arbitrary which the power relations between the groups or classes making up that social formation put into the dominant position within the system of cultural arbitraries is the one which most fully, though always indirectly, expresses the objective interests (material and symbolic) of the dominant groups or classes.
1.3. The objective degree of arbitrariness (in the sense of proposition 1.1.) of a PA 's power of imposition rises with the degree of arbitrariness (in the sense of proposition 1.2) of the culture imposed.
Gloss: The sociological theory of PA distinguishes between the arbitrariness of the imposition and the arbitrariness of the content imposed, only so as to bring out the sociological implications of the relationship between two logical fictions, namely a pure power relationship as the objective truth of the imposition and a totally arbitrary culture as the objective truth of the

meanings imposed. The logical construct of a power relation manifesting itself nakedly has no more sociological existence than does the logical construct of meanings that are only cultural arbitrariness. To take this twofold theoretical construction for an empirically observable reality would be to condemn oneself to naive belief either in the exclusively physical force of power, a simple reversal of idealist belief in the totally autonomus might reversal of right, or in the radical arbitrariness of all meanings, a simple idealist belief in 'the intrinsic strength of the true idea'. There is no PA which does not inculcate some meanings not deducible from a universal principle (logical reason or biological nature): authority plays part all pedagogy, even when the most universal meanings (science or technology) are to be inculcated. There is no power relation, however, mechanical and ruthless which does not additionally exert a symbolic two effect. It follows that PA, always objectively situated the between need to more unattainable poles of pure force and pure reason, resort to direct means of constraint the less the m force it biological impose themselves by their own force, i.e by nature or logical reason.

1.3.1 The PA whose arbitrary power to impose a cultural arbitrary rests in the last analysis on the power relations between the groups or classes making up the' social formation in which is carried on (by 1.1 and 12) contributes, by reproducing the cultural arbitrary which it inculcates towards reproducing the power relations which are the basis of its power of arbitrary imposition (the social reproduction function of cultural reproduction).

1.3.2. In any given social formation the different PAs, which can never be defined independently of their membership in a system of PAs subjected to the effect of domination by the dominant PA, tend to reproduce the system of cultural arbitraries characteristic of that social formation, thereby contributing to the reproduction of the power relations which put that cultural arbitrary into the dominant position.

Gloss: In traditionally defining the 'system of education' as the sum total of the institutional or customary mechanisms ensuring the transmission from one generation to another of the culture inherited from the past (i.e. the accumulated information), the classical theories tend to sever cultural reproduction from its function of social reproduction, that is, to ignore the specific effect of symbolic relations in the reproduction of power relations. Such theories which, as is seen with Durkheim, simply transpose to the case of class societies the representation of culture and cultural transmission most widespread among anthropologists, rely on the implicit premiss that the different PAs at work in a social formation collaborate harmoniously in reproducing a cultural capital conceived of as the jointly owned property of the whole 'society'. In reality, because they correspond to the material and symbolic interests of groups or classes differently situated within the power relations, these PAs always tend to reproduce the structure of the distribution of cultural capital among these groups or classes, thereby contributing to the reproduction of the social structure. The laws of the market which fixes the economic or symbolic value, i.e. the value qua

cultural capital, of the cultural arbitraries produced by the different PAs and thus of the products of those PAs (educated individuals), are one of the mechanisms - more or less determinant according to the type of social formation - through which social reproduction, defined as the reproduction of the structure of the relations of force between the classes, is accomplished.

Ivan Illich, *Deschooling Society* (NY, 1971) Chapter 1: 'Why we must disestablish school'. Penguin edition (London, 1973) pp. 9, 14, 15, 18, 20, 23-4, 26

Ivan Illich (1926-2002) was a philosopher, Catholic priest and outspoken critic of many aspects of western culture and society. Deschooling Society *established his reputation and remains one of his most controversial works.*

Many students, especially those who are poor, intuitively know what the schools do for them. They school them to confuse process and substance. Once these become blurred, a new logic is assumed: the more treatment there is, the better are the results; or, escalation leads to success. The pupil is thereby 'schooled' to confuse teaching with learning, grade advancement with education, a diploma with competence, and fluency with the ability to say something new. His imagination is 'schooled' to accept service in place of value…

In these essays, I will show that the institutionalization of values leads inevitably to physical pollution, social polarization and psychological impotence: three dimensions in a process of global degradation and modernized misery. I will explain how this process of degradation is accelerated when non-material needs are transformed into demands for commodities; when health, education, personal mobility, welfare or psychological healing are defined as the result of services or 'treatments'…

It should be obvious that even with schools of equal quality a poor child can seldom catch up with a rich one. Even if they attend equal schools and begin at the same age, poor children lack most of the educational opportunities which are casually available to the middle-class child. These advantages range from conversation and books in the home to vacation travel and a different sense of oneself, and apply, for the child who enjoys them, both in and out of school. So the poorer student will generally fall behind so long as he depends on school for advancement or learning. The poor need funds to enable them to learn, not to get certified for the treatment of their alleged disproportionate deficiencies…

Equal educational opportunity is, indeed, both a desirable and a feasible goal, but to equate this with obligatory schooling is to confuse salvation with the Church. School has become the world religion of a modernized proletariat, and makes futile promises of salvation to the poor of the technological age. The nation-state has adopted it, drafting all citizens into a graded curriculum leading to sequential diplomas not unlike the initiation rituals and hieratic promotions of former times…

A second major illusion on which the school system rests is that most learning is the result of teaching. Teaching, it is true, may contribute to

certain kinds of learning under certain circumstances. But most people acquire most of their knowledge outside school, and in school only in so far as school, in a few rich countries, has become their place of confinement during an increasing part of their lives…

But the fact that a great deal of learning even now seems to happen casually and as a by-product of some other activity defined as work or leisure does not mean that planned learning does not benefit from planned instruction and that both do not stand in need of improvement. The strongly motivated student who is faced with the task of acquiring a new and complex skill may benefit greatly from the discipline now associated with the old-fashioned schoolmaster who taught reading, Hebrew, catechism or multiplication by rote. School has by now made this kind of drill teaching rare and disreputable, yet there are many skills which a motivated student with normal aptitude can master in a matter of a few months if taught in this traditional way…

There is currently a proposal on record which seems at first to make a great deal of sense. It has been prepared by Christopher Jencks of the Center for the Study of Public Policy and is sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity. It proposes to put educational 'entitlements' or tuition grants into the hands of parents and students for expenditure in the schools of their choice. Such individual entitlements could indeed be an important step in the right direction. We need a guarantee of the right of each citizen to an equal share of tax-derived educational resources, the right to verify this share and the right to sue for it if denied. It is one form of a guarantee against regressive taxation.

The Jencks proposal, however, begins with the ominous statement that ‘conservatives, liberals and radicals have all complained at one time or another that the American educational system gives professional educators too little incentive to provide high-quality education to most children.' The proposal condemns itself by proposing tuition grants which would have to be spent on schooling.

This is like giving a lame man a pair of crutches and stipulating that he uses them only if the ends are tied together. As the proposal for tuition grants now stands, it plays into the hands not only of the professional educators but of racists, promoters of religious schools and others whose interests are socially divisive. Above all, educational entitlements restricted to use within schools play into the hands of all those who want to continue to live in a society in which social advancement is tied not to proven knowledge but to the learning pedigree by which it is supposedly acquired. This discrimination in favour of schools which dominates Jencks's discussion on refinancing education could discredit one of the most critically needed principles for educational reform: the return of the initiative and accountability for learning to the learner or his most immediate tutor.

The deschooling of society implies a recognition of the two-faced nature of learning. An insistence on skill drill alone could be a disaster; equal emphasis must be placed on other kinds of learning. But if schools are the wrong places for learning a skill, they are even worse places for getting an education. School does both tasks badly, partly because it does not distinguish between them. School is inefficient in skill instruction especially because it is curricular. In most schools a programme which is meant to improve one skill is chained always to another irrelevant task. History is tied to advancement in maths, and class attendance to the right to use the playground…

Creative, exploratory learning requires peers currently puzzled about the same terms or problems. Large universities make the futile attempt to match them by multiplying their courses, and they generally fail since they are bound to curriculum, course structure and bureaucratic administration. In schools, including universities, most resources are spent to purchase the time and motivation of a limited number of people to take up predetermined problems in a ritually defined setting. The most radical alternative to school would be a network or service which gave each man the same opportunity to share his current concern with others motivated by the same concern.

Let me give, as an example of what I mean, a description of how an intellectual match might work in New York City. Each man, at any given moment and at a minimum price, could identify himself to a computer with his address and telephone number, indicating the book, article, film or recording on which he seeks a partner for discussion. Within days he could receive by mail the list of others who recently had taken the same initiative. This list would enable him by telephone to arrange for a meeting with persons who initially would be known exclusively by the fact that they requested a dialogue about the same subject.

Chapter 3: 'Ritualization of progress'. pp. 40-1, 43

The university graduate has been schooled for selective service among the rich of the world. Whatever his or her claims of solidarity with the Third World, each American college graduate has had an education costing an amount five times greater than the median life income of half of humanity. A Latin American student is introduced to this exclusive fraternity by having at least 350 times as much public money spent on his education as on that of his fellow citizens of median income. With very rare exceptions, the university graduate from a poor country feels more comfortable with his North American and European colleagues than with his non-schooled compatriots, and all students are academically processed to be happy only in

the company of fellow consumers of the products of the educational machine.

The modern university confers the privilege of dissent on those who have been tested and classified as potential money-makers or power-holders. No one is given tax funds for the leisure in which to educate himself or the right to educate others unless at the same time he can also be certified for achievement. Schools select for each successive level those who have, at earlier stages in the game, proved themselves good risks for the established order. Having a monopoly on both the resources for learning and the investiture of social roles, the university co-opts the discoverer and the potential dissenter. A degree always leaves its indelible price tag on the curriculum of its consumer. Certified college graduates fit only into a world which puts a price tag on their heads, thereby giving them the power to define the level of expectations in their society. In each country the amount of consumption by the college graduate sets the standard for all others; if they would be civilized people on or off the job, they will aspire to the style of life of college graduates. The university thus has the effect of imposing consumer standards at work and at home, and it does so in every part of the world and under every political system…

There is no question that at present the university offers a unique combination of circumstances which allows some of its members to criticize the whole of society. It provides time, mobility, access to peers and information and a certain impunity - privileges not equally available to other segments of the population. But the university provides this freedom only to those who have already been deeply initiated into the consumer society and into the need for some kind of obligatory public schooling.

Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. (London: 1972) Chapters 2-3, extracts

Paulo Freire (1921-1997) was a Brazilian teacher and theorist whose left-wing, anti-colonial writings inspired educationalists world-wide. He saw education as an intensely political act which could either oppress or liberate the socially and economically vulnerable. He stressed, however, that for liberation to occur, elites had to be persuadable to enter dialogue with the oppressed and the oppressed had to take some responsibility for their own liberation.

A careful analysis of the teacher-student relationship at any level, inside or outside the school, reveals its fundamentally *narrative* character. This relationship involves a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the students). The contents, whether values or empirical dimensions of reality, tend in the process of being narrated to become lifeless and petrified. Education is suffering from narration sickness.

The teacher talks about reality as if it were motionless, static, compartmentalized and predictable. Or else he expounds on a topic completely alien to the existential experience of the students. His task is to 'fill' the students with the contents of his narration - contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that engendered them and could give them significance. Words are emptied of their concreteness and become a hollow, alienated and alienating verbosity.

The outstanding characteristic of this narrative education, then, is the sonority of words, not their transforming power. 'Four times four is sixteen; the capital of Para is Belem.' The student records, memorizes and repeats these phrases without perceiving what four times four really means, or realizing the true significance of 'capital' in the affirmation 'the capital of Para is Belem,' that is, what Bel6m means for Park and what Para means for Brazil.

Narration (with the teacher as narrator) leads the students to memorize mechanically the narrated content. Worse still, it turns them into 'containers', into receptacles to be filled by the teacher. The more completely he fills the receptacles, the better a teacher he is. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better students they are.

Education thus becomes an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and 'makes deposits' which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat. This is the 'banking' concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the

students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits. They do, it is true, have the opportunity to become collectors or cataloguers of the things they store. But in the last analysis, it is men themselves who are filed away through the lack of creativity, transformation, and knowledge in this (at best) misguided system. For apart from inquiry, apart from the praxis, men cannot be truly human. Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry men pursue in the world, with the world, and with each other.

In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry. The teacher presents himself to his students as their necessary opposite; by considering their ignorance absolute, he justifies his own existence. The students, alienated like the slave in the Hegelian dialectic, accept their ignorance as justifying the teacher's existence - but, unlike the slave, they never discover that they educate the teacher.

The *raison d'etre* of libertarian education, on the other hand, lies in its drive towards reconciliation. Education must begin with the solution of the teacher-student contradiction, by reconciling the poles of the contradiction so that both are simultaneously teachers *and* students.

This solution is not (nor can it be) found in the banking concept. On the contrary, banking education maintains and even stimulates the contradiction through the following attitudes and practices, which mirror oppressive society as a whole:

1. The teacher teaches and the students are taught.
2. The teacher knows everything and the students know nothing.
3. The teacher thinks and the students are thought about.
4. The teacher talks and the students listen - meekly.
5. The teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined.
6. The teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply.
7. The teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher.
8. The teacher chooses the programme content, and the students (who were not consulted) adapt to it.
9. The teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students.
10. The teacher is the subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects.

It is not surprising that the banking concept of education regards men as adaptable, manageable beings. The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop the critical

consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of that world. The more completely they accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them.

The capacity of banking education to minimize or annul the students' creative power and to stimulate their credulity serves the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed. The oppressors use their 'humanitarianism' to preserve a profitable situation. Thus they react almost instinctively against any experiment in education which stimulates the critical faculties and is not content with a partial view of reality but is always seeking out the ties which link one point to another and one problem to another.

Indeed, the interests of the oppressors lie in 'changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them' (Simone de Beauvoir in *La Pensee de Droite Aujourd'hui)* for the more the oppressed can be led to adapt to that situation, the more easily they can be dominated. To achieve this end, the oppressors use the banking concept of education in conjunction with a paternalistic social action apparatus, within which the oppressed receive the euphemistic title of 'welfare recipients'. They are treated as individual cases, as marginal men who deviate from the general configuration of a 'good, organized, and just' society. The oppressed are regarded as the pathology of the healthy society, which must therefore adjust these 'incompetent and lazy' folk to its own patterns by changing their mentality. These marginals need to be 'integrated', 'incorporated' into the healthy society that they have 'forsaken'.

The truth is, however, that the oppressed are not marginals, are not men living 'outside' society. They have always been inside - inside the structure which made them 'beings for others'. The solution is not to 'integrate' them into the structure of oppression, but to transform that structure so that they can become 'beings for themselves'. Such transformation, of course, would undermine the oppressors' purposes; hence their utilization of the banking concept of education to avoid the threat of student conscientization…

Those who use the banking approach, knowingly or unknowingly (for there are innumerable well-intentioned bankclerk teachers who do not realize that they are serving only to dehumanize), fail to perceive that the deposits themselves contain contradictions about reality. But, sooner or later, these contradictions may lead formerly passive students to turn against their domestication and the attempt to domesticate reality. They may discover through existential experience that their present way of life is irreconcilable with their vocation to become fully human. They may perceive through their relations with reality that reality is really a *process,* undergoing constant transformation. If men are searchers and their ontological vocation is humanization, sooner or later they may perceive the

contradiction in which banking education seeks to maintain them, and then engage themselves in the struggle for their liberation.

But the humanist, revolutionary educator cannot wait for this possibility to materialize. From the outset, his efforts must coincide with those of the students to engage in critical thinking and the quest for mutual humanization. His efforts must be imbued with a profound trust in men and their creative power.

To achieve this, he must be a partner of the students in his relations with them.

The banking concept does not admit to such a partnership - and necessarily so. To resolve the teacher-student contradiction, to exchange the role of depositor, prescriber, domesticator, for the role of student among students would be to undermine the power of oppression and to serve the cause of liberation.

Implicit in the banking concept is the assumption of a dichotomy between man and the world: man is merely *in* the world, not *with* the world or with others; man is spectator, not re-creator. In this view, man is not a conscious being *(corpo consciente);* he is rather the possessor of a consciousness; an empty 'mind' passively open to the reception of deposits of reality from the world outside. For example, my desk, my books, my coffee cup, all the objects before me - as bits of the world which surrounds me - would be 'inside' me, exactly as I am inside my study right now. This view makes no distinction between being accessible to consciousness and entering consciousness. The distinction, however, is essential: the objects which surround me are simply accessible to my consciousness, not located within it. I am aware of them, but they are not inside me.

It follows logically from the banking notion of consciousness that the educator's role is to regulate the way the world 'enters into' the students. His task is to organize a process which already happens spontaneously, to 'fill' the students by making deposits of information which he considers constitute true knowledge.1[1] And since men 'receive' the world as passive entities, education should make" them more passive still, and adapt them to the world. The educated man is the adapted man, because he is more 'fit' for the world. Translated into practice, this concept is well suited to the purposes of the oppressors, whose tranquillity rests on how well men fit the world the oppressors have created, and how little they question it.

The more completely the majority adapt to the purposes which the dominant minority prescribe for them (thereby depriving them of the right to their own purposes), the more easily the minority can continue to prescribe. The theory and practice of banking education serve this end quite

[1] This concept corresponds to what Sartre calls the 'digestive' or 'nutritive' concept of education, in which knowledge is 'fed' by the teacher to the students to 'fill them out'. See Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Une idee fondamentale de la phenomenologie de Husserl: l'intentionalite', *Situatlon* l.

efficiently. Verbalistic lessons, reading requirements,[2] the methods for evaluating 'knowledge', the distance between the teacher and the taught, the criteria for promotion: everything in this ready-to-wear approach serves to obviate thinking….

Unfortunately, those who espouse the cause of liberation are themselves surrounded and influenced by the climate which generates the banking concept, and often do not perceive its true significance or its dehumanizing power. Paradoxically, then, they utilize this very instrument of alienation in what they consider an effort to liberate. Indeed, some 'revolutionaries' brand as innocents, dreamers, or even reactionaries those who would challenge this educational practice. But one does not liberate men by alienating them. Authentic liberation - the process of humanization - is not another 'deposit' to be made in men. Liberation is a praxis: the action and reflection of men upon their world in order to transform it. Those truly committed to the cause of liberation can accept neither the mechanistic concept of consciousness as an empty vessel to be filled, nor the use of banking methods of domination (propaganda, slogans - deposits) in the name of liberation.

The truly committed must reject the banking concept in its entirety, adopting instead a concept of men as conscious beings, and consciousness as consciousness directed towards the world. They must abandon the educational goal of deposit-making and replace it with the posing of the problems of men in their relations with the world. 'Problem-posing' education, responding to the essence of consciousness - *intentionality* - rejects communiqués and embodies communication. It epitomizes the special characteristic of consciousness: being *conscious of*, not only as intent on objects but as turned in upon itself in a Jasperian 'split' - consciousness as consciousness *of* consciousness.

Liberating education consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of information. It is a learning situation in which the cognizable object (far from being the end of the cognitive act) intermediates the cognitive actors - teacher on the one hand and students on the other. Accordingly, the practice of problem-posing education first of all demands a resolution of the teacher-student contradiction. Dialogical relations - indispensable to the capacity of cognitive actors to cooperate in perceiving the same cognizable object - are otherwise impossible.

Indeed, problem-posing education, breaking the vertical patterns characteristic of banking education, can fulfill its function of being the practice of freedom only if it can overcome the above contradiction. Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with

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[2] For example, some teachers specify in their reading lists that a book should be read from pages 10 to 15 - and do this to 'help' their students!

students-teachers. The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students, who in their turn while being taught also teach. They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow. In this process, arguments based on 'authority' are no longer valid; in order to function, authority must be *on the side of* freedom, not *against* it. Here, no one teaches another, nor is anyone self-taught. Men teach each other, mediated by the world, by the cognizable objects which in banking education are 'owned' by the teacher…

In problem-posing education, men develop their power to perceive critically *the way they exist* in the world *with which* and *in which* they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reality, but as a reality in process, in transformation. Although the dialectical relations of men with the world exist independently of how these relations are perceived (or whether or not they are perceived at all), it is also true that the form of action men adopt is to a large extent a function of how they perceive themselves in the world. Hence, the teacher-student and the students-teachers reflect simultaneously on themselves and the world without dichotomizing this reflection from action, and thus establish an authentic form of thought and action.

Once again, the two educational concepts and practices under analysis come into conflict. Banking education (for obvious reasons) attempts, by mythicizing reality, to conceal certain facts which explain the way men exist in the world; problem-posing education sets itself the task of de-mythologizing. Banking education resists dialogue; problem-posing education regards dialogue as indispensable to the act of cognition which unveils reality. Banking education treats students as objects of assistance; problem-posing education makes them critical thinkers. Banking education inhibits creativity and domesticates (although it cannot completely destroy) the *intentionality* of consciousness by isolating consciousness from the world, thereby denying men their ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human. Problem-posing education bases itself on creativity and stimulates true reflection and action upon reality, thereby responding to the vocation of men as beings who are authentic only when engaged in inquiry and creative transformation. In sum: banking theory and practice, as immobilizing and fixating forces, fail to acknowledge men as historical beings; problem-posing theory and practice take man's historicity as their starting point.

Problem-posing education affirms men as beings in the process of *becoming* - as unfinished, uncompleted beings in and with a likewise unfinished reality. Indeed, in contrast to other animals who are unfinished, but not historical, men know themselves to be unfinished; they are aware of their incompleteness. In this incompleteness and this awareness lie the very roots of education as an exclusively human manifestation. The unfinished

character of men and the transformational character of reality necessitate that education be an ongoing activity…

Problem-posing education is revolutionary futurity. Hence it is prophetic (and, as such, hopeful), and so corresponds to the historical nature of man. Thus, it affirms men as beings who transcend themselves, who move forward and look ahead, for whom immobility represents a fatal threat, for whom looking at the past must only be a means of understanding more clearly what and who they are so that they can more wisely build the future. Hence, it identifies with the movement which engages men as beings aware of their incompleteness - an historical movement which has its point of departure, its subjects and its objective.

The point of departure of the movement lies in men themselves. But since men do not exist apart from the world, apart from reality, the movement must begin with the men-world relationship. Accordingly, the point of departure must always be with men in the 'here and now', which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from which they emerge, and in which they intervene. Only by starting from this situation - which determines their perception of it - can they begin to move. To do this authentically they must perceive their state not as fated and unalterable, but merely as limiting - and therefore challenging.

Whereas the banking method directly or indirectly reinforces men's fatalistic perception of their situation, the problem-posing method presents this very situation to them as a problem. As the situation becomes the object of their cognition, the naive or magical perception which produced their fatalism gives way to perception which is able to perceive itself even as it perceives reality, and can thus be critically objective about that reality. A deepened consciousness of their situation leads men to apprehend that situation as an historical reality susceptible of transformation. Resignation gives way to the drive for transformation and inquiry, over which men feel themselves in control. If men, as historical beings necessarily engaged with other men in a movement of inquiry, did not control that movement, it would be (and, is) a violation of men's humanity. Any situation in which some men prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence. The means used are not important; to alienate men from their own decision-making is to change them into objects…

Problem-posing education does not and cannot serve the interests of the oppressor. No oppressive order could permit the oppressed to begin to question: Why? While only a revolutionary society can carry out this education in systematic terms, the revolutionary leaders need not take full power before they can employ the method. In the revolutionary process, the leaders cannot utilize the banking method as an interim measure, justified on grounds of expediency, with the intention of *later* behaving in a genuinely revolutionary fashion. They must be revolutionary - that is to say, dialogical - from the outset.

Chapter 3

… Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world. Hence, dialogue cannot occur between those who want to name the world and those who do not want this naming - between those who deny other men the right to speak their word and those whose right to speak has been denied them. Those who have been denied their primordial right to speak their word must first reclaim this right and prevent the continuation of this dehumanizing aggression.

If it is in speaking their word that men transform the world by naming it, dialogue imposes itself as the way in which men achieve significance as men. Dialogue is thus an existential necessity. And since dialogue is the encounter in which the united reflection and action of the dialoguers are addressed to the world which is to be transformed and humanized, this dialogue cannot be reduced to the act of one person's 'depositing' ideas in another, nor can it become a simple exchange of ideas to be 'consumed' by the participants in the discussion. Nor yet is it a hostile, polemical argument between men who are committed neither to the naming of the world, nor to the search for truth, but rather to the imposition of their own truth. Because dialogue is an encounter among men who name the world, it must not be a situation where some men name on behalf of others. It is an act of creation; it must not serve as a crafty instrument for the domination of one man by another. The domination implicit in dialogue is that of the world by those who enter into dialogue, it is the conquest of the world for the liberation of men.

Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for men. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with love.[3] Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of responsible Subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination. Domination reveals the pathology of love: sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated. Because love is an act of courage, not of fear, love is commitment to other men. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause - the

[3] I am more and more convinced that true revolutionaries must perceive the revolution, because of its creative and liberating nature, as an act of love. For me the revolution, which is not possible without a theory of revolution - and therefore science -, is not irreconcilable with love. On the contrary: the revolution is made by men to achieve their humanization. What, indeed, is the deeper motive which moves men to become revolutionaries, but the dehumanization of man? The distortion imposed on the word 'love' by the capitalist world cannot prevent the revolution from being essentially loving in character, nor can it prevent the revolutionaries from affirming their love of life. Guevara (while admitting the 'risk of seeming ridiculous') was not afraid to affirm it. He is quoted in *Yenceremos*: 'Let me say, with the risk of appearing ridiculous, that the true revolutionary is guided by strong feelings of love. It is impossible to think of an authentic revolutionary without this quality.'

cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical. As an act of bravery, love cannot be sentimental; as an act of freedom, it must not serve as a pretext for manipulation. It must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise, it is not love. Only by abolishing the situation of oppression is it possible to restore the love which that situation made impossible. If I do not love the world - if I do not love life - if I do not love men - I cannot enter into dialogue.

On the other hand, dialogue cannot exist without humility. The naming of the world, through which men constantly recreate that world, cannot be an act of arrogance. Dialogue, as the encounter of men addressed to the common task of learning and acting, is broken if the parties (or one of them) lack humility. How can I enter into a dialogue if I always project ignorance onto others and never perceive my own? How can I enter into dialogue if I regard myself as a case apart from other men - mere 'its' in whom I cannot recognize other 'Is'? How can I enter into dialogue if I consider myself a member of the in-group of 'pure' men, the owners of truth and knowledge, for whom all non-members are 'these people' or 'the great unwashed'? If I start from the premise that naming the world is the task of an elite and that the presence of the people in history is a sign of deterioration which is to be avoided, how can I hold a dialogue? Or if I am closed to - and even offended by - the contribution of others; if I am tormented and weakened by the possibility of being displaced, how can there be dialogue? Self-sufficiency is incompatible with dialogue. Men who lack humility (or have lost it) cannot come to the people, cannot be their partners in naming the world. Someone who cannot acknowledge himself to be as mortal as everyone else still has a long way to go before he can reach the point of encounter. At the point of encounter there are neither utter ignoramuses nor perfect sages; there are only men who are attempting, together, to learn more than they now know.

Dialogue further requires an intense faith in man, faith in his power to make and remake, to create and re-create, faith in his vocation to be more fully human (which is not the privilege of an elite, but the birthright of all men). Faith in man is an *a priori* requirement for dialogue; the 'dialogical man' believes in other men even before he meets them face to face. His faith, however, is not naive. The' dialogical man' is critical and knows that although it is within the power of men to create and transform in a concrete situation of alienation men may be impaired in the use of that power. Far from destroying his faith in man, however, this possibility strikes him as a challenge to which he must respond. He is convinced that the power to create and transform, even when thwarted in concrete situations, tends to be reborn. And that rebirth can occur - not gratuitously, but in and through the struggle for liberation - in slave labour being superseded by emancipated labour which gives zest to life. Without this faith in man, dialogue is a farce which inevitably degenerates into paternalistic manipulation.

Founding itself upon love, humility and faith, dialogue becomes a horizontal relationship of which mutual trust between the participants is the logical consequence. It would be a contradiction in terms if dialogue - loving, humble and full of faith - did not produce a climate of mutual trust, which leads the people involved into ever closer partnership in the naming of the world. Conversely, such trust is obviously absent in the anti-dialogics of the banking method of education. Whereas faith in man is an *a priori* requirement for dialogue, trust is established by dialogue. Should it fail, it will be seen that the preconditions were lacking. False love, false humility and feeble faith in man cannot create trust. Trust is contingent on the evidence which one party provides the others of his true, concrete intentions; it cannot exist if that party's words do not coincide with his actions. To say one thing and do another - to take one's own word lightly - cannot inspire trust. To glorify democracy and to silence the people is a farce; to discourse on humanism and to negate man is a lie.

Nor yet can dialogue exist without hope. Hope is rooted in men's incompleteness, from which they move out in constant search - a search which can be carried out only in communion with other men. Hopelessness is a form of silence, of denying the world and fleeing from it. The dehumanization resulting from an unjust order is not a cause for despair but for hope, leading to the incessant pursuit of the humanity which is denied by injustice. Hope, however, does not consist in folding one's arms and waiting. As long as I fight, I am moved by hope; and if I fight with hope, then I can wait. As the encounter of men seeking to be more fully human, dialogue cannot be carried on in a climate of hopelessness. If the participants expect nothing to come of their efforts, their encounter will be empty and sterile, bureaucratic and tedious. .

Finally, true dialogue cannot exist unless it involves critical thinking - thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and men admitting of no dichotomy between them - thinking which perceives reality as process and transformation, rather than as a static entity - thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved. Critical thinking contrasts with naive thinking, which sees 'historical time as a weight, a stratification of the acquisitions and experiences of the past'[4] from which the present should emerge normalized and 'well-behaved'. For the naive thinker, the important thing is accommodation to this normalized 'today'. For the critic, the important thing is the continuing transformation of reality, for the sake of the continuing humanization of men. In the words of Pierre Furter:
The goal will no longer be to eliminate the risks of temporality by clutching to guaranteed space, but rather to temporalize space ... The universe is

[4] From the letter of a friend.

revealed to me not as space, imposing a massive presence to which I can only adapt, but as a scope, a domain which takes shape as I act upon it.

For naive thinking, the goal is precisely to hold fast to this guaranteed space and adjust to it. By thus denying temporality, it denies itself as well.

Only dialogue, which requires critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical thinking. Without dialogue there is no communication, and without communication there can be no true education. Education which is able to resolve the contradiction between teacher and student takes place in a situation in which both address their act of cognition to the object by which they are mediated. Thus, the dialogical character of education as the practice of freedom does not begin when the teacher-student meets the students-teachers in a pedagogical situation, but rather when the former first asks himself *what* his dialogue with the latter will be about. And preoccupation with the content of dialogue is really preoccupation with the programme content of education…

Authentic education is not carried on by A *for* B or by A *about* B, but rather by A *with* B, mediated by the world - a world which impresses and challenges both parties, giving rise to views or opinions about it. These views, impregnated with anxieties, doubts, hopes, or hopelessness, imply significant themes on the basis of which the programme content of education can be built. In its desire to create an ideal model of the 'good man', a naively conceived humanism often overlooks the concrete, existential, present situation of real men. Authentic humanism, in Pierre Furter's words, 'consists in permitting the emergence of the awareness of our full humanity, as a condition and as an obligation, as a situation and as a project'. We simply cannot go to the workers - urban or peasant[5] - in the banking style, to give them 'knowledge' or to impose upon them the model of the 'good man' contained in a programme Whose content we have ourselves organized. Many political and educational plans have failed because their authors designed them according to their own personal views of reality, never once taking into account (except as mere objects of their action) the men-in-a-situation towards whom their programme was ostensibly directed.

For the truly humanist educator and the authentic revolutionary, the object of action is the reality to be transformed by them together with other men - not other men themselves. The oppressors are the ones who act upon men to indoctrinate them and adjust them to a reality which must remain untouched. Unfortunately, however, in their desire to obtain the support of the people for revolutionary action, revolutionary leaders often fall for the banking line of planning a programme content from the top down. They

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[5] The latter, usually submerged in a colonial context, are almost umbilically linked to the world of nature, in relation to which they feel themselves to be component parts rather than shapers.

approach the peasant or urban masses with projects which may correspond to their own view of the world, but not to that of the people.[6] They forget that their fundamental objective is to fight alongside the people for the recovery of the people's stolen humanity, not to 'win the people over' to their side. Such a phrase does not belong in the vocabulary of revolutionary leaders, but in that of the oppressor. The revolutionary's role is to liberate, and be liberated, with the people - not to win them over.

In their political activity, the dominant elites utilize the banking concept to encourage passivity in the oppressed, corresponding with the latter's 'submerged' state of consciousness and take advantage of that passivity to 'fill' that consciousness with slogans which create even more fear of freedom. This practice is incompatible with a truly liberating course of action which, by presenting the oppressors' slogans as a problem, helps the oppressed to 'eject' those slogans from within themselves. After all, the task of the humanists is surely not that of pitting their slogans against the slogans of the oppressors, with the oppressed as the testing ground, 'housing' the slogans of first one group and then the other. On the contrary, the task of the humanists is to see that the oppressed become aware of the fact that as dual beings, 'housing' the oppressors within themselves, they cannot be truly human.

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[6] 'Our cultural workers must serve the people with great enthusiasm and devotion, and they must link themselves with the masses, not divorce themselves from the masses. In order to do so, they must act in accordance with the needs and wishes of the masses. All work done for the masses must start from their needs and not from the desire of any individual, however well-intentioned. It often happens that objectively the masses need a certain change, but subjectively they are not yet conscious of the need, not yet willing or determined to make the change. In such cases, we should wait patiently. We should not make the change until, through our work, most of the masses have become conscious of the need and are willing and determined to carry it out. Otherwise we shall isolate ourselves from the masses ... There are two principles here: one is the actual needs of the masses rather than what we fancy they need, and the other is the wishes of the masses, who must make up -their own minds instead of our making up their minds for them.' From the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*.

Philip Rieff, ***Fellow Teachers: of culture and its death.*** **(University of Chicago Press, 1972) pp. 12-14**

We scholars are gamblers against the odds; so must our best students become. Gambling takes a certain intense calm. Anyone who is possessed by the objectivity of close and personal understandings must run the risk of that possession: the risk is in destroying one's own position. Before this risk, some flee. Others violently disagree with the sheer continuity of the teaching effort, all the more violently when they discover that agreements and disagreements, in the temple of the intellect, should not matter less. Some insist that their teachers function as gurus, supplying mini-social orders and, at the same time, the intellectualized emotional dexterities with which to hop from one mini-order to another. As teachers, we must be at war with the cultic 'life style,' with the endless order-hopping of the questing young, often formatively encouraged by their still questing parents, for whom the quest is an escape from the untaught authority of their own pasts. Authority untaught is the condition in which a culture commits suicide. For the suicide we witness, the responsible generation is the elder, not younger. 'Youth' has been taught that to be witting victims of untaught authority constitutes some new freedom, surpassing any experienced before. For this freedom, the default of authority, student youth is taught only how to sacrifice the life of the mind; there are so many ways—one of the most ardently sought is being a professor. What a good deal: the professor, in principle mindless. No wonder the teaching profession is so - crowded. Any fink can think - but to act! Witness the new elite: of professing actors.

To be a scholar-teacher, neither guru nor entrepreneur, is to continue the life of study; at best, a scholar-teacher is a virtuoso student. There are alternatives: to play the virtuoso of prophetic views, plugged into Criticism; to be the friendly manager of your local data-bank, plugged into Method; both are easy roles nowadays. But the rhythms of teaching and learning are slow and unpredictable; the progress we teachers achieve is hard to couple with the advance of any social movement. Henry James offers one splendid example of complex, unprogressive teaching, unaddicted precisely to ideas. In Eliot's description of James's genius, we may take a hint of the perfect teacher: "most tellingly in his mastery over, his baffling escape from ideas; a mastery and an escape which are perhaps the last test of a superior intelligence. He had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it. . . ." Here is the trouble with us, and with the masses we educate: our minds are too easily violated by ideas. We paste ideas on our foreheads, in order to follow them. It is not simply that a little learning is a dangerous thing, or that virtue cannot be taught. The case is more desperate. In age of universal higher education, we excite minds that are never given time enough, or the inner strength, to learn how to avoid immediate violation by ideas; Weber, using

Simmers phrase, refers to the 'romanticism of the intellectually interesting.' There are students who are defenseless before any idea, or phrase, that excites their interest; they apply what they cannot understand. By this thinly intellectualized acting out, the young betray their own trained impatience with both ideas and life, as if each were a recalcitrant parent, unwilling to yield to their demands.

Resolutions from the first National Education Consultative Conference, held at the University of Witswatersrand, Johannesburg, SA, 28-29 December 1985. Quoted in Mokubung Nkomo, *Pedagogy of Domination* (Trenton, NJ, 1990) pp. 421-7

3. The role of teachers

We resolve that:
1) teachers should work actively with students towards the formation of democratically elected SRCs [Student Representative Councils]
2) teachers should work closely with parents and students in dealing with the current education crisis
3) teachers should become involved in community struggles and help to set up PTAs in all schools
4) education programs for teachers which bring out the history of progressive teachers' struggles, the role of teachers in the community, and the role of teachers' unions, should be conducted
5) teachers should work to unite all teachers into a single, progressive teachers' body
6) meetings of teachers should be called in all areas to give students and parent organizations an opportunity to address them on the education crisis.

5. On student organization

This conference notes:
1) that the banning of COSAS [the congress of South African Students] is an attack by the State on student organization, unity and mobilization
2) that the struggle for a unitary, non-racial democratic education is an integral part of the struggle for a unitary, non-racial and democratic society, free from oppression and exploitation
3) that the struggle for democratic Student Representative Councils (SRCs) is an essential part of the democratic struggle within the schools.

Therefore we resolve:
1) to intensify the campaign to unban COSAS
2) to implement democratically elected SRCs in all schools and tertiary institutions
3) to forge close links between student, worker and community organizations and to coordinate action in these different areas
4) to strive to establish regional and national coordination in the student struggle

5) to strive in coordinated campaigns to publicize the legitimate, democratic demands of students
6) to endeavour to take the struggle for a non-racial democratic South Africa into every school and hence into every home
7) to seek consciously to break down artificially created racial barriers
8) to encourage the different student organizations to unite in action.

9 On People's Education 1

This conference notes that apartheid education:
1) is totally unacceptable to the oppressed people
2) divides people into classes and ethnic groups
3) is essentially a means of control to produce subservient, docile people
4) indoctrinates and dominates
5) is intended to entrench apartheid and capitalism.

Therefore we resolve to actively strive for people's education as the new form of education for all sections of our people, declaring the people's education is education that:
1) enables the oppressed to understand the evils of the apartheid system and prepares them for participation in a non-racial democratic system.
2) eliminates illiteracy, ignorance and the exploitation of one person by another
3) eliminates capitalist norms of competition, individualism and stunted intellectual development, and replaces it with one that encourages collective input and active participation by all, as well as stimulating critical thinking and analysis
4) equips and trains all sectors of our people to participate actively and creatively in the struggle to attain people's power in order to establish a nonracial democratic South Africa.
5) allows students, parents, teachers and workers to be mobilized into appropriate organizational structures which enable them to participate actively in the initiation and management of people's education in all its forms
6) enables workers to resist exploitation and oppression at their workplace.

10 On People's Education 2

This conference notes that the implementation of programs to promote people's education is an urgent matter.

Believing that:

1) all student-teacher-parent and community-based organizations must work vigorously and energetically to promote people's education
2) all programs must enhance the organization of all sections of our people, wherever they may be
3) that the programs must encourage critical and creative thinking and working methods
4) the programs must promote the correct values of democracy, non-racialism, collective, work, and active participation

Therefore resolves:
1) that the recommendations of the commission on people's education be referred to the incoming committee for use as a guideline for the formulation of programs to promote people's education at all levels
2) that all local, regional and national structures mobilize the necessary human and material resources in the first instance from within the communities and regions and then from other sources.

Neera Desai, 'Women's education in India', in Jill Conway and Susan Bourque eds., *The Politics of Women's Education. Perspectives from Asia, Africa and Latin America.* (Ann Arbor, 1993) 23-44: 34-5

In the developing world the role of formal education as an agent of democracy and a means for upward mobility has been seriously questioned in recent decades. Because the Indian education sys-tern has been, by and large, a continuation of the one established in colonial times to suit the needs of the colonial rulers, there have been many critics of its usefulness or relevance to Indian life. The existing system serves the interests of the upper and middle classes of urban areas, who use education to achieve status and power, as a mechanism for upward social mobility, and as a means of maintaining the status quo. In terms of accessibility and content the formal system has discriminated against the rural masses and against women….

Realizing the inadequacy of the formal educational system vis-a-vis most of the poor people in such a vast country, the Indian government has made efforts to compensate. These efforts have included adult education, social education, and continuing education programs. And since 1975 more serious attention has been given to nonformal education for women. The University Grants Commission has taken this mode of delivery seriously, and universities are encouraged to organize nonformal education centers.

But it is now clear that, for those women who live in poverty, deprivation, and powerlessness, the only effective educational strategy is to bring these women together around common in issues and concerns. Dialogue and discussion are the tools needed to raise their critical consciousnesses. Existing programs do not teach women how to understand and analyze the social, political, and economic systems that govern their lives and oppress them. Nor will awareness come from merely learning the 'Three Rs"—reading, writing, and arithmetic—or from being drilled in nutrition, health, and family planning. If women are to participate in India's development, the education offered to them must equip them for the task, a task that, nevertheless, must be defined on their terms. The task for women today is to evaluate critically the nation's developmental strategy. Education ought to develop the student's faculty for raising relevant questions, debating, and discussing the efficiency of the programs. Women are not merely passive recipients of a welfare package but also active participants in development. If this goal has to be achieved, it is necessary that the poor, who are targets of nonformal education, must also be equipped with the critical skills for evaluating the programs. This is empowering women for development.

Devaki Jain, 'Healing the wounds of development', in Conway and Bourque eds., 45-58: pp. 48-9

Lakshmi Ashram, nestled in the Himalayas at Kausani, is a residential school for girls of all ages, started by an Austrian womann, an environmentalist who was an associate of Gandhi. It has an enrollment of eighty to one hundred high school girls, a dozen teachers, and another dozen teacher trainees. The ashram has always been a focal point for the three hundred scattered hamlets and households in the surrounding mountains. The only way to get from hamlet to hamlet is on foot, over pathways that thread through the mountains.

Since the school follows the Gandhian mode of pedagogy, in which there are no divisions between childhood and adulthood, manual and intellectual work, or domestic and productive labor, the girls live as they do in their homes and are aware of social and environmental issues. They wake at 5 a.m. and clean the school, cook, garden, or serve breakfast, according to the roster. They start their classes at 8 a.m. and read or work on crafts until lunch. In the afternoon they do homework, play, sing, and dance. Their creativity and respect for labor, food, and shortages are not dampened by electronic media, playing fields, or adult servers. Students have graduated from the ashram to become street vendors, nurses, and even air hostesses. Most return to live in their villages but remain agents of the ashram.

It is in the tradition of any Gandhian ashram to be a counseling shelter, a receiver. That is, the request comes to it; its members do not go out and proselytize or "provide extension services". It follows a system. If it attracts users, then it lets people "take" what they seek. Padayatra, or traveling by foot, is associated with village-to-village preaching, like the activities of Vinod Bhave. But, in fact, it is a way to make oneself accessible to others in the most humble way. The "self" who is doing this for her own salvation must be a self-developed person who is fine-tuned to receive. As a receptacle, the padayatari only reverberates. She strengthens the resolve of those she encounters and teaches by precept. She demonstrates the consistency between precept and practice….

The school has evolved a curriculum suited to the environment, the ways of life, and the aspirations of the hill people. The state has refused to certify the school, however, unless it changes its textbooks, courses, and schedule. The school is striving to give its graduates the option of entering "the rest of the world." But it does not want to sacrifice appropriate education, education that does not alienate children from their environment, their creative intelligence, or their past.

Jerome Bruner, *The Culture of Education*. (Cambridge, Mass., 1996) pp. 53-63, excerpts

There are four dominant models of learners' minds that have held sway in our times. Each emphasizes different educational goals. These models are not only conceptions of mind that determine how we teach and "educate," but are also conceptions about the relations between minds and cultures. Rethinking educational psychology requires that we examine each of these alternative conceptions of human development and re-evaluate their implications for learning and teaching:

1) Seeing children as imitative learners: The acquisition of "know-how".
2) Seeing children as learning from didactic exposure: The acquisition of propositional knowledge.
3) Seeing children as thinkers: The development of intersubjective inter-change. [In this model, teachers aim to understand how children think and model the world, in order to discuss educational material with them and collaborate in understanding it better.]
4) Children as knowledgeable: The management of "objective" knowledge. The fourth perspective holds that teaching should help children grasp the distinction between personal knowledge, on the one side, and "what is taken to be known" by the culture, on the other.

Real schooling, of course, is never confined to one model of the learner or one model of teaching. Most day-to-day education in schools is designed to cultivate skills and abilities, to impart a knowledge of facts and theories, and to cultivate understanding of the beliefs and intentions of those nearby and far away. Any choice of pedagogical practice implies a conception of the learner and may, in time, be adopted by him or her as the appropriate way of thinking about the learning process. For a choice of pedagogy inevitably communicates a conception of the learning process and the learner. Pedagogy is never innocent. It is a medium that carries its own message.

Chandra Talpade Mohanty, 'On Race and Voice: Challenges for Liberal Education in the 1990s'. From *Cultural Critique* (1990), reprinted in A. H. Halsey, Hugh Lauder, Philip Brown and Amy Stuart-Wells eds., *Education: Culture, Economy, Society*. (Oxford, 1997) 557-69

Feminism and the Language of Difference

'Isn't the whole point to have a voice?' This is the last sentence of a recent essay by Marnia Lazreg (1988) on writing as a woman on women in Algeria. Lazreg examines academic feminist scholarship on women in the Middle East and North Africa in the context of what she calls a 'Western gynocentric' notion of the difference between First and Third World women. Arguing for an understanding of 'intersubjectivity' as the basis for comparison across cultures and histories, Lazreg formulates the problem of ethnocentrism and the related question of voice in this way:

> To take intersubjectivity into consideration when studying Algerian women or other Third World women means seeing their lives as meaningful, coherent, and understandable instead of being infused 'by us' with doom and sorrow. It means that their lives like 'ours' are structured by economic, political, and cultural factors. It means that these women, like 'us,' are engaged in the process of adjusting, often shaping, at times resisting and even transforming their environment. It means that they have their own individuality; they are 'for themselves' instead of being 'for us.' An appropriation of their singular individuality to fit the generalizing categories of 'our' analyses is an assault on their integrity and on their identity. (p. 98)

In my own work I have argued in a similar way against the use of analytic categories and political positionings in feminist studies that discursively present Third World women as a homogeneous, undifferentiated group leading truncated lives, victimized by the combined weight of 'their' traditions, cultures, and beliefs, and 'our' (Eurocentric) history.' In examining particular assumptions of feminist scholarship that are uncritically grounded in Western humanism and its modes of 'disinterested scholarship,' I have tried to demonstrate that this scholarship inadvertently produces Western women as the only legitimate subjects of struggle, while Third World women are heard as fragmented, inarticulate voices in (and from) the dark. Arguing against a hastily derived notion of 'universal sisterhood' that assumes a commonality of gender experience across race and national lines, I have suggested the complexity of our historical (and positional) differences and the need for creating an analytical space for understanding Third World women as the subjects of our various struggles in history. Other scholars have made similar arguments, and the

question of what we might provisionally call 'Third World women's voices' has begun to be addressed seriously in feminist scholarship.

In the last decade there has been a blossoming of feminist discourse around questions of 'racial difference' and 'pluralism.' While this work is often an important corrective to earlier middle-class (white) characterizations of sexual difference, the goal of the analysis of difference and the challenge of race was not pluralism as the proliferation of discourse on ethnicities as discrete and separate cultures. The challenge of race resides in a fundamental reconceptualization of our categories of analysis so that differences can be historically specified and understood as part of larger political processes and systems[2] The central issue, then, is not one of merely acknowledging difference; rather, the more difficult question concerns the kind of difference that is acknowledged and engaged. Difference seen as benign variation (diversity), for instance, rather than as conflict, struggle, or the threat of disruption, bypasses power as well as history to suggest a harmonious, empty pluralism.' On the other hand, difference defined as asymmetrical and incommensurate cultural spheres situated within hierarchies of domination and resistance cannot be accommodated within a discourse of 'harmony in diversity.' A strategic critique of the contemporary language of difference, diversity, and power thus would be crucial to a feminist project concerned with revolutionary social change.

In the best, self-reflexive traditions of feminist inquiry, the production of knowledge about cultural and geographical Others is no longer seen as apolitical and disinterested. But while feminist activists and progressive scholars have made a significant dent in the colonialist and colonizing feminist scholarship of the late seventies and early eighties, this does not mean that questions of what Lazreg calls 'intersubjectivity,' or of history vis-a-vis Third World peoples, have been successfully articulated.[4] In any case, scholarship, feminist, Marxist, or Third World, is not the only site for the production of knowledge about Third World women/peoples.[5] The very same questions (as those suggested in relation to scholarship) can be raised in relation to our teaching and learning practices in the classroom, as well as the discursive and managerial practices of American colleges and universities. Feminists writing about race and racism have had a lot to say about scholarship, but perhaps our pedagogical and institutional practices and their relation to scholarship have not been examined with quite the same care and attention. Radical educators have long argued that the academy and the classroom itself are not mere sites of instruction. They are also political and cultural sites that represent accommodations and contestations over knowledge by differently empowered social constituencies.' Thus teachers and students produce, reinforce, recreate, resist, and transform ideas about race, gender, and difference in the classroom. Also, the academic institutions in which we are located create

similar paradigms, canons, and voices that embody and transcribe race and gender.

It is this frame of institutional and pedagogical practice that I examine in this essay. Specifically, I analyze the operation and management of discourses of race and difference in two educational sites: the women's studies classroom and the workshops on 'diversity' for upper-level (largely white) administrators. The links between these two educational sites lie in the (often active) creation of discourses of 'difference.' In other words, I suggest that educational practices as they are shaped and reshaped at these sites cannot be analyzed as merely transmitting already codified ideas of difference. These practices often produce, codify, and even rewrite histories of race and colonialism in the name of difference. But let me begin the analysis with a brief discussion of the academy as the site of political struggle and transformation.

Knowledge and Location in the US Academy

A number of educators, Paulo Freire among them, have argued that education represents both a struggle for meaning and a struggle over power relations. Thus, education becomes a central terrain where power and politics operate out of the lived culture of individuals and groups situated in asymmetrical social and political positions. This way of understanding the academy entails a critique of education as the mere accumulation of disciplinary knowledges that can be exchanged on the world market for upward mobility. There are much larger questions at stake in the academy these days, not the least of which are questions of self and collective knowledge of marginal peoples and the recovery of alternative, oppositional histories of domination and struggle. Here, disciplinary parameters matter less than questions of power, history, and self-identity. For knowledge, the very act of knowing, is related to the power of self-definition. This definition of knowledge is central to the pedagogical projects of fields such as women's studies, black studies, and ethnic studies. By their very location in the academy, fields such as women's studies are grounded in definitions of difference, difference that attempts to resist incorporation and appropriation by providing a space for historically silenced peoples to construct knowledge. These knowledges have always been fundamentally oppositional, while running the risk of accommodation and assimilation and the consequent depoliticization in the academy. It is only in the late twentieth century, on the heels of domestic and global oppositional political movements, that the boundaries dividing knowledge into its traditional disciplines have been shaken loose, and new, often heretical, knowledges have emerged modifying the structures of knowledge and power as we have inherited them. In other words, new analytic spaces have been opened up in the academy, spaces that make possible thinking of knowledge as praxis, of

knowledge as embodying the very seeds of transformation and change. The appropriation of these analytic spaces and the challenge of radical educational practice are thus to involve the development of critical knowledges (what women's, black, and ethnic studies attempt), and simultaneously, to critique knowledge itself.

Education for critical consciousness or critical pedagogy, as it is sometimes called, requires a reformulation of the knowledge-as-accumulated-capital model of education and focuses instead on the link between the historical configuration of social forms and the way they work subjectively. This issue of subjectivity represents a realization of the fact that who we are, how we act, what we think, and what stories we tell become more intelligible within an epistemological framework that begins by recognizing existing hegemonic histories. The issue of subjectivity and voice thus concerns the effort to understand our specific locations in the educational process and in the institutions through which we are constituted. Resistance lies in self-conscious engagement with dominant, normative discourses and representations and in the active creation of oppositional analytic and cultural spaces. Resistance that is random and isolated is clearly not as effective as that which is mobilized through systemic politicized practices of teaching and learning. Uncovering and reclaiming subjugated knowledges is one way to lay claim to alternative histories. But these knowledges need to be understood and defined pedagogically, as questions of strategy and practice as well as of scholarship, in order to transform educational institutions radically. And this, in turn, requires taking the questions of experience seriously.

To this effect, I draw on scholarship on and by Third World educators in higher education, on an analysis of the effects of my own pedagogical practices, on documents about 'affirmative action' and 'diversity in the curriculum' published by the administration of the college where I work, and on my own observations and conversations over the past three years.' I do so in order to suggest that the effect of the proliferation of ideologies of pluralism in the 1960s and 1970s, in the context of the (limited) implementation of affirmative action in institutions of higher education, has been to create what might be called the Race Industry, an industry that is responsible for the management, commodification, and domestication of race on American campuses. This commodification of race determines the politics of voice for Third World peoples, whether they/we happen to be faculty, students, administrators, or service staff. This, in turn, has long-term effects on the definitions of the identity and agency of non-white people in the academy.

There are a number of urgent reasons for undertaking such an analysis: the need to assess the material and ideological effects of affirmative action policies within liberal (rather than conservative-Bloom or Hirsch style) discourses and institutions that profess a commitment to pluralism

and social change, the need to understand this management of race in the liberal academy in relation to a larger discourse on race and discrimination within the neoconservatism of the U.S., and the need for Third World feminists to move outside the arena of (sometimes) exclusive engagement with racism in white women's movements and scholarship and to broaden the scope of our struggles to the academy as a whole.

The management of gender, race, class, and sexuality are inextricably linked in the public arena. The New Right agenda since the mid-1970s makes this explicit: busing, gun rights, and welfare are clearly linked to the issues of reproductive and sexual rights.' And the links between abortion rights (gender-based struggles) and affirmative action (struggles over race and racism) are becoming clearer in the 1990s. While the most challenging critiques of hegemonic feminism were launched in the late 1970s and the 1980s, the present historical moment necessitates taking on board institutional discourses that actively construct and maintain a discourse of difference and pluralism. This in turn calls for assuming responsibility for the politics of voice as it is institutionalized in the academy's 'liberal' response to the very questions feminism and other oppositional discourses have raised [9]

Black/Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies: Intersections and Confluences

For us, there is nothing optional about 'black experience' and/or 'black studies': we must know ourselves.

June Jordan

Unlike most academic disciplines, the origins of black, ethnic, and women's studies programs can be traced to oppositional social movements. In particular, the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and other Third World liberation struggles fueled the demands for a knowledge and history 'of our own.' June Jordan's claim that 'we must know ourselves' suggests the urgency embedded in the formation of black studies in the late 1960s. Between 1966 and 1970 most American colleges and universities added courses on Afro-American experience and history to their curriculums. This was the direct outcome of a number of sociohistorical factors, not the least of which was an increase in black student enrollment in higher education and the broad-based call for a fundamental transformation of a racist, Eurocentric curriculum. Among the earliest programs were the black and African-American studies programs at San Francisco State and Cornell, both of which came into being in 1968, on the heels of militant political organizing on the part of students and faculty at these institutions (Huggins 1985; Blassingame 1973). A symposium on black studies in early

1968 at Yale University not only inaugurated African-American studies at Yale, but also marked a watershed in the national development of black studies programs (Robinson, Foster, and Ogilvie 1969). In Spring 1969, the University of California at Berkeley instituted a department of ethnic studies, divided into Afro-American, Chicano, contemporary Asian-American, and Native American studies divisions.

A number of women's studies programs also came into being around this time. The first women's studies program was formed in 1969 at San Diego State University. Today 520 such programs exist across the United States (National Women's Studies Association Task Force 1990; Minnich et al. 1988). Women's studies programs often drew on the institutional frameworks and structures of existing interdisciplinary programs such as black and ethnic studies. In addition, besides sharing political origins, an interdisciplinary project, and foregrounding questions of social and political inequality in their knowledge base, women's, black, and ethnic studies programs increasingly share pedagogical and research methods. Such programs thus create the possibility of a counter-hegemonic discourse and oppositional analytic spaces within the institution. Of course, since these programs are most often located within the boundaries of conservative or liberal-white-male institutions, they face questions of co-optation and accommodation.

In an essay examining the relations among ethnicity, ideology, and the academy, Rosaura Sanchez (1987: 80-8) maintains that new academic programs arise out of specific interests in bodies of knowledge. Sanchez traces the origins of ethnic and women's studies programs, however, to a defensive political move: the state's institutionalization of a discourse of reform in response to the civil rights movement.

> [E]thnic studies programs were instituted at a moment when the university had to speak a particular language to quell student protests and to ensure that university research and business could be conducted as usual. The university was able to create and integrate these programs administratively under its umbrella, allowing on the one hand, for a potential firecracker to diffuse itself and, on the other, moving on to prepare the ground for future assimilation of the few surviving faculty into existing departments. (p. 86)

Sanchez identifies the pressures (assimilation and co-optation versus isolation and marginalization) that ethnic studies programs have inherited in the 1990s. In fact, it is precisely in the face of the pressure to assimilate that questions of political strategy and of pedagogical and institutional practice assume paramount importance.

For such programs, progress (measured by institutional power, number of people of color in faculty and administration, effect on the general curricula, etc.) has been slow. Since the 1970s, there have also been numerous conflicts between ethnic, black, and women's studies programs.

One example of these tensions is provided by Niara Sudarkasa. Writing in 1987 (3-6) about the effect of affirmative action on black faculty and administrators in higher education, she argues: 'As a matter of record, however, both in the corporate world and in higher education, the progress of white females as a result of affirmative action has far out-stripped that for blacks and other minorities.' Here Sudarkasa is pointing to a persistent presence of racism in the differential access and mobility of white women and people of color in higher education. She goes on to argue that charges of 'reverse discrimination' against white people are unfounded because affirmative action has had the effect of privileging white women above men and women of color. Thus, for Sudarkasa, charges of reverse discrimination leveled at minorities 'amount to a sanction of continued discrimination by insisting that inequalities resulting from privileges historically reserved for whites as a group must now be perpetuated in the name of "justice" for the individual' (p. 4). This process of individualization of histories of dominance is also characteristic of educational institutions and processes in general, where the experiences of different constituencies are defined according to the logic of cultural pluralism.

In fact, this individualization of power hierarchies and of structures of discrimination suggests the convergence of liberal and neoconservative ideas about gender and race in the academy. Individualization, in this context, is accomplished through the fundamentally class-based process of professionalization. In any case, the post-Reagan years (characterized by financial cutbacks in education, the consolidation of the New Right and the right-to-life lobby, the increasing legal challenges to affirmative action regulations, etc.) suggest that it is alliances among women's, black, and ethnic studies programs which will ensure the survival of such programs. This is not to imply that these alliances do not already exist, but, in the face of the active corrosion of the collective basis of affirmative action by the federal government in the name of 'reverse discrimination,' it is all the more urgent that our institutional self-examinations lead to concrete alliances. Those of us who teach in some of these programs know that, in this context, questions of voice-indeed, the very fact of claiming a voice and wanting to be heard are very complicated indeed.

To proceed with the first location or site, I attempt an analysis of the effect of my own pedagogical practices on students when teaching about Third World peoples in a largely white institution. I suggest that a partial (and problematic) effect of my pedagogy, the location of my courses in the curriculum and the liberal nature of the institution as a whole, is the sort of attitudinal engagement with diversity that encourages an empty cultural pluralism and domesticates the historical agency of Third World peoples.

Classroom Pedagogies of Gender and Race

How do we construct oppositional pedagogies of gender and race? Teaching about histories of sexism, racism, imperialism, and homophobia potentially poses very fundamental challenges to the academy and its traditional production of knowledge, since it has often situated Third World peoples as populations whose histories and experiences are deviant, marginal, or inessential to the acquisition of knowledge. And this has happened systematically in our disciplines as well as in our pedagogies. Thus the task at hand is to decolonize our disciplinary and pedagogical practices. The crucial question is how we teach about the West and its Others so that education becomes the practice of liberation. This question becomes all the more important in the context of the significance of education as a means of liberation and advancement for Third World and postcolonial peoples and their/our historical belief in education as a crucial form of resistance to the colonization of hearts and minds.

However, as a number of educators have argued, decolonizing educational practices requires transformations at a number of levels, both within and outside the academy. Curricula and pedagogical transformation has to be accompanied by a broad-based transformation of the culture of the academy, as well as by radical shifts in the relation of the academy to other state and civil institutions. In addition, decolonizing pedagogical practices requires taking seriously the relation between knowledge and learning, on the one hand, and student and teacher experience, on the other. In fact, the theorization and politicization of experience is imperative if pedagogical practices are to focus on more than the mere management, systematization, and consumption of disciplinary knowledge.

I teach courses on gender, race, and education, on international development, on feminist theory, and on Third World feminisms, as well as core women's studies courses such as 'Introduction to Women's Studies' and a senior seminar. All of the courses are fundamentally interdisciplinary and cross-cultural. At its most ambitious, this pedagogy is an attempt to get students to think critically about their place in relation to the knowledge they gain and to transform their worldview fundamentally by taking the politics of knowledge seriously. It is a pedagogy that attempts to link knowledge, social responsibility, and collective struggle. And it does so by emphasizing the risks that education involves, the struggles for institutional change, and the strategies for challenging forms of domination and by creating more equitable and just public spheres within and outside educational institutions.

Thus, pedagogy from the point of view of a radical teacher does not entail merely processing received knowledges (however critically one does this) but actively transforming knowledges. In addition, it involves taking responsibility for the material effects of these very pedagogical practices on

students. Teaching about 'difference' in relation to power is thus extremely complicated and involves not only rethinking questions of learning and authority but also questions of center and margin. In writing about her own pedagogical practices in teaching African-American women's history, Elsa Barkley Brown (1989: 921) formulates her intentions and method in this way:

How do our students overcome years of notions of what is normative? While trying to think about these issues in my teaching, I have come to understand that this is not merely an intellectual process. It is not merely a question of whether or not we have learned to analyze in particular kinds of way, or whether people are able to intellectualize about a variety of experiences. It is also about coming to believe in the possibility of a variety of experiences, a variety of ways of understanding the world, a variety of frameworks of operation, without imposing consciously or unconsciously a notion of the norm. What I have tried to do in my own teaching is to address both the conscious level through the material, and the unconscious level through the structure of the course, thus, perhaps, allowing my students, in Bettina Apthekar's words, to 'pivot the center: to center in another experience.'

Clearly, this process is very complicated pedagogically, for such teaching must address questions of audience, voice, power, and evaluation, while retaining a focus on the material being taught. Teaching practices must also combat the pressures of professionalization, normalization, and standardization, the very pressures of expectations that implicitly aim to manage and discipline pedagogies so that teacher behaviors are predictable (and perhaps controllable) across the board.

Barkley Brown draws attention to the centrality of experience in the classroom. While this is an issue that merits much more consideration than I can give here, a particular aspect of it ties into my general argument. Feminist pedagogy has always recognized the importance of experience in the classroom. Since women's and ethnic studies programs are fundamentally grounded in political and collective questions of power and inequality, questions of the politicization of individuals along race, gender, class, and sexual parameters are at the very center of knowledges produced in the classroom. This politicization often involves the 'authorization' of marginal experiences and the creation of spaces for multiple, dissenting voices in the classroom. The authorization of experience is thus a crucial form of empowerment for students - a way for them to enter the classroom as speaking subjects. However, this focus on the centrality of experience can also lead to exclusions - it often silences those whose 'experience' is seen to be that of the ruling-class groups. This 'more authentic-than-thou' attitude to experience also applies to the teacher. For instance, in speaking about Third World peoples, I have to watch constantly the tendency to speak for Third World peoples. For I often come to embody the 'authentic' authority

and experience for many of my students; indeed, they construct me as a native informant in the same way that left-liberal white students sometimes construct all people of color as the authentic voices of their people. This is evident in the classroom when the specific 'differences' (of personality, posture, behavior, etc.) of one woman of color stand in for the difference of the whole collective, and a collective voice is assumed in place of an individual voice. In effect, this results in the reduction or averaging of Third World peoples in terms of individual personality characteristics: complex ethical and political issues are glossed over, and an ambiguous and more easily manageable ethos of the 'personal' and the 'interpersonal' takes their place.

Thus, a particularly problematic effect of certain pedagogical codification of difference is the conceptualization of race acid gender in terms of personal or individual experience. Students often end up determining that they have to 'be more sensitive' to Third World peoples. The formulation of knowledge and politics through these individualistic, attitudinal parameters indicates an erasure of the very politics of knowledge involved in teaching and learning about difference. It also suggests an erasure of the structural and institutional parameters of what it means to understand difference in historical terms. If all conflict in the classroom is seen and understood in personal terms, it leads to a comfortable set of oppositions: people of color as the central voices and the bearers of all knowledge in class, and white people as 'observers,' with no responsibility to contribute and/or with nothing valuable to contribute. In other words, white students are constructed as marginal observers and students of color as the real 'knowers' in such a liberal or left classroom. While it may seem like people of color are thus granted voice and agency in the classroom, it is necessary to consider what particular kind of voice it is that is allowed them/us. It is a voice located in a different and separate space from the agency of white students.10 Thus, while it appears that in such a class the histories and cultures of marginalized peoples are now 'legitimate' objects of study and discussion, the fact is that this legitimation takes place purely at an attitudinal, interpersonal level rather than in terms of a fundamental challenge to hegemonic knowledge and history. Often the culture in such a class vacillates between a high level of tension and an overwhelming desire to create harmony, acceptance of 'difference,' and cordial relations in the classroom. Potentially this implicitly binary construction (Third World students versus white students) undermines the understanding of co-implication that students must take seriously in order to understand 'difference' as historical and relational. Co-implication refers to the idea that all of us (First and Third World) share certain histories as well as certain responsibilities: ideologies of race define both white and black peoples, just as gender ideologies define both women and men. Thus, while 'experience' is an enabling focus in the classroom, unless it is explicitly understood as

historical, contingent, and the result of interpretation, it can coagulate into frozen, binary, psychologistic positions.

To summarize, this effective separation of white students from Third World students in such an explicitly politicized women's studies classroom is problematic because it leads to an attitudinal engagement that bypasses the complexly situated politics of knowledge and potentially shores up a particular individual-oriented codification and commodification of race. It implicitly draws on and sustains a discourse of cultural pluralism, or what Henry Giroux (1988) calls 'the pedagogy of normative pluralism,' a pedagogy in which we all occupy separate, different, and equally valuable places and where experience is defined not in terms of individual qua individual, but in terms of an individual as representative of a cultural group. This results in a depoliticization and dehistoricization of the idea of culture and makes possible the implicit management of race in the name of cooperation and harmony.

However, cultural pluralism is an inadequate response because the academy as well as the larger social arena are constituted through hierarchical knowledges and power relations. In this context, the creation of oppositional knowledges always involves both fundamental challenges and the risk of co-optation. Creating counter-hegemonic pedagogies and combating attitudinal, pluralistic appropriations of race and difference thus involves a delicate and ever-shifting balance between the analysis of experience as lived culture and as textual and historical representations of experience. But most of all, it calls for a critical analysis of the contradictions and incommensurability of social interests as individuals experience, understand, and transform them. Decolonizing pedagogical practices requires taking seriously the different logics of cultures as they are located within asymmetrical power relations. It involves understanding that culture, especially academic culture, is a terrain of struggle (rather than an amalgam of discrete consumable entities). And finally, within the classroom, it requires that teachers and students develop a critical analysis of how experience itself is named, constructed, and legitimated in the academy. Without this analysis of culture and of experience in the classroom, there is no way to develop and nurture oppositional practices. After all, critical education concerns the production of subjectivities in relation to discourses of knowledge and power.

The Race Industry and Prejudice-Reductlon Workshops

In his incisive critique of current attempts at minority canon formation, Cornel West locates the following cultural crises as circumscribing the present historical moment: the decolonization of the Third World which signaled the end of the European Age; the repoliticization of literary studies in the 1960s; the emergence of alternative, oppositional, subaltern histories;

and the transformation of everyday life through the rise of a predominantly visual, technological culture. West (1987: 197) locates contests over Afro-American canon formation in the proliferation of discourses of pluralism in the American academy, thus launching a critique of the class interests of Afro-American critics who 'become the academic superintendents of a segment of an expanded canon or a separate canon.' A similar critique, on the basis of class interests and 'professionalization,' can be leveled against feminist scholars (First or Third World) who specialize in 'reading' the lives/ experiences of Third World women. However, what concerns me here is the predominately white upper-level administrators at our institutions and their 'reading' of the issues of racial diversity and pluralism. I agree with West's internal critique of a black managerial class but think it is important not to ignore the power of a predominantly white managerial class (men and women) who, in fact, frame and hence determine our voices, livelihoods, and sometimes even our political alliances.

Exploring a small piece of the creation and institutionalization of this Race Industry, prejudice-reduction workshops involving upper-level administrators, counselors, and students in numerous institutions of higher education-including the college where I teach-shed light on a particular aspect of this industry. Interestingly, the faculty often do not figure in these workshops at all; they are directed either at students and resident counselors or at administrators.

To make this argument, I draw upon my own institution, a college that has an impressive history of progressive and liberal policies. But my critique applies to liberal/humanistic institutions of higher education in general. While what follows is a critique of certain practices at the college, I undertake this out of a commitment and engagement with the academy. The efforts of the college to take questions of difference and diversity on board should not be minimized. However, these efforts should also be subject to rigorous examination because they have far-reaching implications for the institutionalization of multiculturalism in the academy. While multiculturalism itself is not necessarily problematic, its definition in terms of an apolitical, a historical cultural pluralism needs to be challenged.

In the last few years there has been an increase in this kind of activity-often as a response to antiracist student organization and demands, or in relation to the demand and institutionalization of 'non-Western' requirements at prestigious institutions-in a number of academic institutions nationally. More precisely, however, these issues of multiculturalism arise as a response to the recognition of changing demographics in the United States. For instance, the fact that by the year 2000 almost 42 per cent of all public school students will be minority children or other impoverished children, and that by the year 2000 women and people of color will account for nearly 75 per cent of the labor force is crucial in understanding institutional imperatives concerning 'diversity.'" As Sanchez suggests, for

the university to conduct 'research and business as usual' in the face of the overwhelming challenges posed by even the very presence of people of color, it has to enact policies and programs aimed at accommodation rather than transformation.

In response to certain racist and homophobic incidents in the spring of 1988 this college instituted a series of 'prejudice-reduction' workshops aimed at student and upper- and middle-level administrative staff. These workshops sometimes took the form of 'unlearning racism' workshops conducted by residential counselor and psychologists in dorms. Workshops such as these are valuable in 'sensitizing' students to racial conflict, behavior, and attitudes, but an analysis of the historical and ideological bases of such workshops indicates their limitations.

Briefly, prejudice-reduction workshops draw on the psychologically base 'race relations' analysis and focus on 'prejudice' rather than institutional of historical domination. The workshops draw on co-counseling and the re-evaluation counseling techniques and theory and often aim for emotional release rather than political action. The name of this approach is itself somewhat problematic, since it suggests that 'prejudice' (rather than domination, exploitation, or structural inequality) is the core problem and that we have to 'reduce' it. The language determines and shapes the ideological and political content to a large extent. In focusing on 'the healing of past wounds' this approach also equates the position of dominant and subordinate groups, erasing all power inequities and hierarchies. And finally, the location of the source of 'oppression' and 'change' in individuals suggests an elision between ideological and structural understandings of power and domination and individual, psychological understandings of power.

Here again, the implicit definition of experience is important. Experience defined as fundamentally individual and atomistic, subject to behavioral and attitudinal change. Questions of history, collective memory, and social and structural inequality as constitutive of the category of experience are inadmissible within the framework. Individuals speak as representatives of majority or minority group whose experience is predetermined within an oppressor/victim paradigm. The questions are addressed in A. Sivanandan's incisive critique of the roots of Racism Awareness Training (RAT) in the United States (associated with the work of Judy Katz et al.) and its embodiment in multiculturalism in Britain. Sivanandan draws attention to the dangers of the actual degradation and refiguration of antiracist, black political struggles as a result of the RAT focus on psychological attitudes. Thus, while these workshops can indeed be useful in addressing deep-seated psychological attitudes and thus creating a context for change, the danger resides in remaining at the level of personal support and evaluation, and thus often undermining the necessity for broad-based political organization and action around these issues. 12

Prejudice-reduction workshops have also made their way into the upper echelons of the administration at the college. However, at this level they take a very different form: presidents and their male colleagues don't go to workshops; they 'consult' about issues of diversity. Thus, this version of 'prejudice reduction' takes the form of 'managing diversity' (another semantical gem which suggests that 'diversity' [a euphemism for people of color] will be out of control unless it is managed). Consider the following passage from the publicity brochure of a recent consultant (Prindle 1988): Program in Conflict Management Alternatives: A team of applied scholars is creating alternative theoretical and practical approaches to the peaceful resolution of social conflicts. A concern for maximizing social justice, and for redressing major social inequities that underlie much social conflict, is a central organizing principle of this work. Another concern is to facilitate the implementation of negotiated settlements, and therefore contribute to long-term change in organizational and community relations. Research theory development, organizational and community change efforts, networking, consultations, curricula, workshops and training programs are all part of the Program.

This quote foregrounds the primary focus on conflict resolution, negotiated settlement, and organizational relations-all framed in a language of research, consultancy, and training. All three strategies-conflict resolution, settlement negotiation, and long-term organizational relations can be carried out between individuals and between groups. The point is to understand the moments of friction and to resolve the conflicts 'peacefully'; in other words, domesticate race and difference by formulating the problems in narrow, interpersonal terms and by rewriting historical contexts as manageable psychological ones.

As in the example of the classroom discussed earlier, the assumption here is that individuals and groups, as individual atomistic units in a social whole composed essentially of an aggregate of such units, embody difference. Thus, conflict resolution is best attempted by negotiating between individuals who are dissatisfied as individuals. One very important ideological effect of this is the standardization of behaviors and responses so as to make them predictable (and thus manageable) across a wide variety of situations and circumstances. If complex structural experiences of domination and resistance can be ideologically reformulated as individual behaviors and attitudes, they can be managed while carrying on business as usual.

Another example of this kind of a program is the approach of a company called 'Diversity Consultants': 'Diversity Consultants believe one of the most effective ways to manage multi-cultural and race awareness issues is through assessment of individual environments, planned educational programs, and management strategy sessions which assist

professionals in understanding themselves, diversity, and their options in the workplace' (Prindle 1988: 8).

The key ideas in this statement involve an awareness of race issues (the problem is assumed to be cultural misunderstanding or lack of information about other cultures), understanding yourself and people unlike you (diversity-we must respect and learn from each other; this may not address economic exploitation, but it will teach us to treat each other civilly), negotiating conflicts, altering organizational sexism and racism, and devising strategies to assess and manage the challenges of diversity (which results in an additive approach: recruiting 'diverse' people, introducing 'different' curriculum units while engaging in teaching as usual-that is, not shifting the normative culture versus subcultures paradigm). This is, then, the 'professionalization' of prejudice reduction, where culture is a supreme commodity. Culture is seen as noncontradictory, as isolated from questions of history, and as a storehouse of non-changing facts, behaviors, and practices. This particular definition of culture and of cultural difference is what sustains the individualized discourse of harmony and civility that is the hallmark of cultural pluralism. Prejudice-reduction workshops eventually aim for the creation of this discourse of civility. Again, this is not to suggest that there are no positive effects of this practice-for instance, the introduction of new cultural models can
cause a deeper evaluation of existing structures, and clearly such consultancies could set a positive tone for social change. However, the baseline is still 'maintaining the status quo'diversity is always and can only be added on.

So what does all this mean? Diversity consultants are not new. Private industry has been utilizing these highly paid management consulting firms since the civil rights movement. However, when upper-level administrators in higher education inflect discourses of education and 'academic freedom' with discourses of the management of race, the effects are significant enough to warrant close examination. There is a long history of the institutionalization of the discourse of management and control in American education. However, the management of race requires a somewhat different inflection at this historical moment. Due to historical, demographic, and educational shifts in the racial makeup of students and faculty in the last twenty years, some of us even have public voices that have to be 'managed' for the greater harmony of all. The hiring of consultants to 'sensitize educators to issues of diversity' is part of the post-sixties proliferation of discourses of pluralism. But it is also a specific and containing response to the changing social contours of the U.S. polity and to the challenges posed by Third World and feminist studies in the academy. By using the language of the corporation and the language of cognitive and affectional psychology (and thereby professionalizing questions of sexism, racism, and class conflict) new alliances are consolidated. Educators who are part of the

ruling administrative class are now managers of conflict, but they are also agents in the construction of 'race'-a word that is significantly redefined through the technical language used.

Race, Voice, and Academic Culture

The effects of this relatively new discourse in the higher levels of liberal arts colleges and universities are quite real. Affirmative action hires are now highly visible and selective; now every English department is looking for a black woman scholar to teach Toni Morrison's writings. What happens to such scholars after they are hired, and particularly when they come up for review or tenure, is another matter altogether. A number of scholars have documented the debilitating effects of affirmative action hiring policies that seek out and hire only those Third World scholars who are at the top of their fields-hence the pattern of musical chairs where selected people of color are bartered at very high prices. Our voices are carefully placed and domesticated: one in history, one in English, perhaps one in the sociology department. Clearly these hiring practices do not guarantee the retention and tenure of Third World faculty. In fact, while the highly visible bartering for Third World 'stars' serves to suggest that institutions of higher education are finally becoming responsive to feminist and Third World concerns, this particular commodification and personalization of race suggests there has been very little change since the 1970s-both in terms of a numerical increase of Third World faculty and our treatment in white institutions.

In a recent article on the racism faced by Chicano faculty in institutions of higher education, Maria de la Luz Reyes and John J. Halcon (1988: 303) characterize the effects of the 1970s policies of affirmative action:

In the mid-1970s, when minority quota systems were being implemented in many non-academic agencies, the general public was left with the impression that Chicano or minority presence in professional or academic positions was due to affirmative action, rather than to individual qualifications or merit. But that impression was inaccurate. Generally [Institutions of Higher Education] responded to the affirmative action guidelines with token positions for only a handful of minority scholars in non-academic and/or 'soft' money programs. For example, many Blacks and Hispanics were hired as directors for programs such as Upward Bound, Talent Search, and Equal Opportunity Programs. Other minority faculty were hired for bilingual programs and ethnic studies programs, but affirmative action hires did not commonly extend to tenure-track faculty positions. The new presence of minorities on college campuses, however, which occurred during the period when attention to affirmative action regulations reached its peak, left all minority professionals and academics with a legacy of tokenism-a stigma that has been difficult to dispel.

De la Luz Reyes and Halcon go on to argue that we are still living with the effects of the implementation of these policies in the 1980s. They examine the problems associated with tokenism and the ghettoization of Third World people in the academy, detailing the complex forms of racism that minority faculty face today. To this characterization, I would add that one of the results of the Reagan/Bush years has been that black, women's, and ethnic studies programs are often further marginalized, since one of the effects of the management of race is that individuals come to embody difference and diversity, while programs that have been historically constituted on the basis of collective oppositional knowledges are labeled 'political,' 'biased,' 'shrill,' and 'unrigorous.'" Any inroads made by such programs and departments in the seventies are being slowly undermined in the eighties and the nineties by the management of race through attitudinal and behavioral strategies, with their local dependence on individuals seen as appropriate representatives of 'their race' or some other equivalent political constituency. Race and gender are reformulated as individual characteristics and attitudes, and thus an individualized, ostensibly 'unmarked' discourse of difference is being put into place. This shift in the academic discourse on gender and race actually rolls back any progress made in carving institutional spaces for women's and black studies programs and departments.

Earlier, it was these institutional spaces that determined our collective voices. Our programs and departments were by definition alternative and oppositional. Now they are often merely alternative-one among many. Without being nostalgic about the good old days (and they were problematic in their own ways), I am suggesting that there has been an erosion of the politics of collectivity through the reformulation of race and difference in individualistic terms. By no means is this a conspiratorial scenario. The discussion of the effects of my own classroom practices indicates my complicity in this contest over definitions of gender and race in discursive and representational as well as personal terms. The 1960s and 1970s slogan 'The personal is political' has been recrafted in the 1980s as 'The political is personal.' In other words, all politics is collapsed into the personal, and questions of individual behaviors, attitudes, and life-style stand in for political analysis of the social. Individual political struggles are seen as the only relevant and legitimate form of political struggle.

However, there is another, more crucial reason to be concerned about (and to challenge) this management of race in the liberal academy. And the reason is that this process of the individualization of race and its effects dovetails rather neatly with the neoconservative politics and agenda of the Reagan-Bush years - an agenda that has constitutively recast the fabric of American life in a pre-1960s mold. The recent Supreme Court decisions on 'reverse discrimination' are based on precisely similar definitions of 'prejudice,' 'discrimination,' and 'race.' In an essay which argues that the U.S. Supreme Court's rulings on reverse discrimination are fundamentally

tied to the rollback of reproductive freedom, Zillah Eisenstein (1990: 5) discusses the individualist framework on which these decisions are based:

The court's recent decisions pertaining to affirmative action make quite clear that existing civil rights legislation is being newly reinterpreted. Race, or sex (gender) as a collective category is being denied and racism, and/or sexism, defined as a structural and historical reality has been erased. Statistical evidence of racial and/or sexual discrimination is no longer acceptable as proof of unfair treatment of 'black women as a group or class.' Discrimination is proved by an individual only in terms of their specific case. The assault is blatant: equality doctrine is dismantled.

Eisenstein goes on to analyze how the government's attempts to redress racism or sexism are at the core of the struggle for equality and how, in gutting the meaning of discrimination and applying it only to individual cases and not statistical categories, it has become almost impossible to prove discrimination because there are always 'other' criteria to excuse discriminatory practices. Thus, the recent Supreme Court decisions on reverse discrimination are clearly based on a particular individualist politics that domesticates race and gender. This is an example of the convergence of neoconservative and liberal agendas concerning race and gender inequalities. Those of us who are in the academy also potentially collude in this domestication of race by allowing ourselves to be positioned in ways that contribute to the construction of these images of pure and innocent diversity, to the construction of these managerial discourses. For instance, since the category of race is not static but a fluid social and historical formation, Third World peoples are often located in antagonistic relationships to each other. Those of us who are from Third World countries are often played off against Third

World peoples native to the United States. As an Indian immigrant woman in the United States, for instance, in most contexts, I am not as potentially threatening as an AfricanAmerican woman. Yes, we are both nonwhite and Other, subject to various forms of overt or disguised racism, but I do not bring with me a history of slavery-a direct and constant reminder of the racist past and present of the United States. Of course my location in the British academy would be fundamentally different because of the history of British colonization, because of patterns of immigration and labor force participation, and because of the existence of working-class, trade union, and antiracist politics-all of which define the position of Indians in Britain. An interesting parallel in the British context is the recent focus on and celebration of African-American women as the 'true' radical black feminists who have something to say, while black British feminists ('black' in contemporary Britain refers to those British citizens who are of African, Asian, or Caribbean origin) are marginalized and rendered voiceless by the publishing industry and the academy. These locations and potential

collusions thus have an impact on how our voices and agencies are constituted.

Critical Pedagogy and Cultures of Dissent

To conclude, if my argument in this essay is convincing, it suggests why we need to take on board questions of race and gender as they are being managed and commodified in the liberal U.S. academy. One mode of doing this is actively creating public cultures of dissent where these issues can be debated in terms of our pedagogies and institutionalized practices." Creating such cultures in the liberal academy is a challenge in itself, because liberalism allows and even welcomes 'plural' or even 'alternative' perspectives. However, a public culture of dissent entails creating spaces for epistemological standpoints that are grounded in the interests of people and which recognize the materiality of conflict, of privilege, and domination. Thus creating such cultures is fundamentally about making the axes of power transparent in the context of academic, disciplinary, and institutional structures as well as in the interpersonal relationships (rather than individual relations) in the academy. It is about taking the politics of everyday life seriously as teachers, students, administrators, and members of hegemonic academic cultures. Culture itself is thus redefined as incorporating individual and collective memories, dreams, and history that are contested and transformed through the political praxis of day-to-day living.

Cultures of dissent are also about seeing the academy as part of a larger sociopolitical arena which itself domesticates and manages Third World people in the name of liberal capitalist democracy. The struggle to transform our institutional practices fundamentally also involves the grounding of the analysis of exploitation and oppression in accurate history and theory, seeing ourselves as activists in the academy-drawing links between movements for social justice and our pedagogical and scholarly endeavors and expecting and demanding action from ourselves, our colleagues, and our students at numerous levels. This requires working hard to understand and to theorize questions of knowledge, power, and experience in the academy so that one effects pedagogical empowerment as well as transformation. Racism, sexism, and homophobia are very real, day-to-day practices in which we all engage. They are not reducible to mere curricular or policy decisions-that is, to management practices.

I said earlier that what is at stake is not the mere recognition of difference. The sort of difference which is acknowledged and engaged has fundamental significance for the decolonization of education practices. Similarly, the point is not simply that one should have a voice; the more crucial question concerns the sort of voice one comes to have as the result of one's location-both as an individual and as part of collectives (Mohanty, C. T. 1987). I think the important point is that it be an active, oppositional,

and collective voice which takes seriously the current commodification and domestication of Third World people in the academy. And this is a task open to all-people of color as well as progressive white people in the academy.

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Notes

1. See especially my 1988 and 1987 publications. The present essay continues the discussion of the politics of location that I began in 'Feminist Encounters' and can, in fact, be seen as a companion text to it.
2. I am referring here to a particular trajectory of feminist scholarship in the last two decades. While scholarship in the 1970s foregrounded gender as the fundamental category of analysis and thus enabled the transformation of numerous disciplinary and canonical boundaries on the basis of the recognition of sexual difference as hierarchy and inequality, scholarship in the 1980s introduced the categories of race and sexuality in the form of internal challenges to the earlier scholarship. These challenges were introduced on both political and methodological grounds by feminists who often considered themselves disenfranchised by the 1970s' feminism: lesbian and heterosexual women of color, postcolonial, Third World women, poor women, etc. While the recent feminist turn to postmodernism suggests the fragmentation of unitary assumptions of gender and enables a more differentiated analysis of inequality, this critique was prefigured in the earlier political analyses of Third World feminists. This particular historical trajectory of the political and conceptual categories of feminist analysis can be traced by analyzing developments in feminist journals such as Signs and Feminist Studies, feminist publishing houses, and curriculum 'integration' projects through the 1970s and 1980s.
3. For instance, Jessie Bernard (1987) codifies difference as the exclusive relation of men to women, and women to women: difference as variation among women and as conflict between men and women.
4. It is clear from Lazreg's reliance on a notion like intersubjectivity that her understanding of the issue I am addressing in this essay is far from simple. Claiming a voice is for her, as well as for me, a complex historical and political act that involves understanding the interrelationships of voices. However, the term intersubjectivity, drawing as it does on a phenomenological humanism, brings with it difficult political problems. For a nonhumanist, alternative account of the question of'historical agencies' and

their 'imbrication,' see Mohanty, S. P. (1989; 1990) (forthcoming), especially the introduction and ch. 6. Mohanty.

Thomas Rohlen and Gerald LeTendre eds., *Teaching and Learning in Japan*. (Cambridge, 1996) Conclusion: Themes in the Japanese culture of learning

There is no single stereotypical experience that defines the Japanese process of learning, but as we have seen, there are many themes that appear in the various contexts we have been considering. Together these make larger patterns of practice that one encounters frequently when looking closely at learning and teaching in Japan. The preceding essays have presented a rich variety and raised many questions about how such variety is to be understood. In this Conclusion, we highlight the underlying patterns that organize the diversity - the unifying themes, contradictions, complementarities, discontinuities, and challenging issues before Japan. These constitute key aspects of the temporal and spatial dimensions of a landscape of learning and teaching.

Put another way, certain expressions or models of learning or teaching in Japan evoke expectations, patterns, and associations that are identifiable across situations. Within these patterns, both teachers and learners express themselves in terms of certain ideal concepts that shape an inherent dialogue and guide attention to shared expectations.

Play

Much of Shinto ritual is about play (asobi) as entertainment for the gods, just as play is a natural avenue for growth and vitality in the teaching approach to early education. Along with the notion of just letting the child grow, there is the notion that in the early years, children should just play. Asobi has connotations of unstructured, renewing activity - activity with a creative or energizing potential. This focus on allowing natural energies to flow freely and strongly is part of very old ideas about learning as well as health. The three words that encapsulate this orientation - asobi, akarui, and genki - are three of the most, if not the three most, important themes in the adult construction of what is desirable in the way learning occurs in the early life of the child.

Group lifestyle

Across virtually the entire sequence of organized learning from school to company, one encounters an ideal of group living. Children in first grade are not the only ones to be put through a routine of ordering shoes at the entrance to a room. The same instructive experiences can be seen throughout all levels of schooling, in student clubs and athletics, in company training, and in all forms of spiritual training. Indeed, it seems that this initial

concern with socialization to the group (whatever organization the new member is joining) signals that a learning process is beginning. This model is one that appears to hold for virtually all forms of Japanese teaching and learning. Contrary to our current stereotypes, the most common mode of teaching and learning in Japan is not the impersonal lecture - rote memorization and test cramming - but rather the collective learning in elementary school experienced as group living. The continuities between grade one and year one of employment are remarkably parallel in this regard. This does more than set in place an orderly compliance, it also sends the critical message that learning will be shared, that it will be a collective experience. This "socialization model" is utilized in the various clubs, activities, and social organizations in which Japanese participate as children, adolescents, and adults.

Mutuality and imitation

In this schema, learning is pervaded by the assumption that it is a mutual process; the advancement of one's teacher or one's seniors also opens up the way for one's own advancement. Learning functions as an egalitarian principle for all members of the learning collective. This principle helps to modify or counteract the tension produced by the tact that seniority hierarchies are common and that there is much competition to succeed. Full participation of all members is encouraged and desired. Differentiation of ability is downplayed, as it is divisive. What is crucial to the group is the continued general advancement that all members can share. It follows, then, that "imitation is the highest form of praise" in the Japanese cultural logic. Whereas Americans relegate imitation to a position inferior to creativity, Japanese culture elevates imitation as a powerful road to mastery.

This concept of mutuality does not extend simply to persons. The term "mastery" has meanings far different from our Western sense of domination and rule. Mastery is a process of adapting oneself to the material rather than of controlling or subordinating the material to oneself… The advanced potter says he has learned from the clay.

Energy

The notion of vitality (genki) expressed in such things as curiosity and energetic play is central to Japanese understanding ofthe child's self and learning potential in the schooling years. This vitality should not be interfered with or inhibited if the child is to progress correctly. The main thrust of teaching is to socialize the child to group circumstances (thus weaning the child, to an extent, from its family circumstances) while not interfering with the flow of individual vitality that is understood to basically define the learning capacities of young children.

Brightness

Akarui, the flow of energy, which is a constant focus of teacher and parental concern, is also a key concern of Shinto. Shinto rituals often focus on efforts to facilitate natural vitality in all manner of living things and to undo (often through rituals of purification or consolation) whatever inhibits or clogs the paths to such expression. Second, one frequently hears teachers and parents speaking of "brightness" in both the classroom environment and the children. A lively, positive atmosphere in class, interaction is highly desirable, just as in Shinto there is a cosmological preoccupation with generating light and serving the forces of light over dark-ness for purposes of fertility and health. Renewing energy in adults is also an aspect, as is the kinds of character training in which initiates are subjected to extremes of cold and heat.

Form

Almost every kind of learning begins with a set form (katachi). Training in the form is to be repeated over and over. This is viewed as the outward embodiment of teaching that is being transmitted. "Learning starts with form" is a common phrase in the traditional arts and crafts (Hori and Hare, this volume). It is the form itself, not the teacher, that seems to be the highest authority. Forms have been perfected by generations of teachers and are therefore the essence of accumulated experience transmitted across time, transcending the individual. Almost all teaching and learning rest on various kinds of forms as crucial media of transmission. Form is, after all, the most concrete way of embodying experience, directly enjoining the learner to repeat a pattern that countless others have experienced.

If we examine this notion closely, we find two very interesting differences between our own attitudes and those of the Japanese. Initially we want explanations, and we feel we need to give much explanation to new learners. The form we tend to rely on most heavily is verbal, whereas the Japanese give greater emphasis to physical activities. Witness the seemingly endless repetition of kata (form) that would-be martial arts experts must undergo in judo, karate, and aikido. We as Americans do not like the idea of form as authority (note our preference for informality), and this is manifested in our seeking to change or ignore forms in the name of spontaneity, independence, and creativity. We feel that the Japanese treat forms with undue respect. When we think of what is learned, we tend to think that it arises from allowing the learner to exercise choice, whereas in Japan it arises first from the experience of following the form repeatedly until the wisdom or truth embodied in the form become apparent and identification occurs.

Experience

Learning is inherently a matter of experience, and this experience involves the whole person. The Anglo-American inclination to separate cognitive and emotional aspects has not taken hold in Japan. Phrases like "memorizing with one's body" indicate that there is less reliance on verbal transmission. Many forms of learning begin in less explicit ways on experience also leads to prizing experience over theory and adds authority to the ideas of one's seniors, the group's history, and the weight of the past.

Repetition of basics

How does one gain the experience of the form? … In all the learning situations we review, we see a consistent emphasis on mastery of the basics (i.e., the training forms) through repetition. Mastery of basics (kihon, moto) is the motto of every middle school math teacher, potter, and line supervisor. There is nothing more important than the basics. From geometry to the violin and Noh, until the learner masters the basic forms there can be no true progress. This is embodied in the Kumon approach as well. The quick accomplishments of a wunderkind are suspect -houses quickly built on sand that will not stand. The solid performance of one skilled in the basics - a person to whom the basics are physical responses, ingrained reactions from years of repetition - is valued.

Authority of teachers

A teacher is anyone who has the authority of experience, the mastery of basics and form. More loosely, anyone who is a senior has at least some qualities of the master (sensei), the guide (shidosha), and the elders (senpai). This is not simply a question of age but reflects the length and quality of experience. Age simply implies more time to accumulate facts, but the Japanese conception is based on a notion of the actualization of wisdom. The teacher or sensei is steeped in the forms or experience, and it is evident in his body and his actions. All persons are teachers and learners simultaneously - all travelers along a shared path of forms.

Effort

A crucial linchpin that unites the ideology of equality with com-petition is that of effort (doryoku), especially effort as exhibited in self-discipline. First, consider how Japanese notions of form and experience make more natural an acceptance of effort explanations over ability explanations for achievement in every learning sphere. In Anglo-American culture, which highlights the unique, the creative, and the individual, ability has powerful connotations. It is a distinguishing, inborn quality rather similar to a concept like self or personality and therefore is consistent with individualism in

general. In Japanese culture, ability is certainly recognized, but as with the tortoise and the hare, ability is not what wins in the end. Only by effort can one master the forms and gain the experience. Ability in itself does not initiate the learner in many of the crucial aspects of the process.

Struggle

There is no & good way to translate a set of words that one runs across with stunning frequency in learning situations, and that may be roughly approximated by English terms like "hanging in," "giving one's best" "toughing it out," "not giving up," and similar notions. Nor can we as Americans hear the Japanese term for suffering (kuro) without wondering how such a notion is so central to learning situations. We ourselves are only a generation or two removed from the educational ideal of "spare the rod and spoil the child," yet we today are thoroughly predisposed to think of learning as necessarily pleasant, if not exciting. Teachers are responsible for making their classes "interesting," "fun," and "engaging." We have embraced the notion that the inherent labor and pain i of learning are to be avoided, disguised, and denied.

Gambaruru (effort), kuro (suffering), and gaman (persistence) are words that are widely used in the spiritual or character-building contexts ubiquitous to Japanese learning. These terms are used in a specifically physical sense - we must note just how physical learning actually is - and often when endurance or exhausting repetition are involved. Exertion is necessary for progress, and to progress in the form, to gain the experience it embodies, it is crucial that one persist and not give up; and that one experience the pain of such a struggle. The new monk, the new potter, or the aspiring third-year middle school student persist through painful repetitions because they fully believe that without experiencing these hardships or trials, nothing can be achieved. Advancement in learning is not assumed to be fun or easy. Rather, it is the challenge and difficulty that provide personal growth - confidence, commitment, and character.

Perfectibiliy

Absolutes are rarely attainable in the human realm; yet in Japan, in many realms, with continual actions directed at perfection (kaizen), this is viewed as always possible. The process of learning continuously is normal. There is no final end point. Persons at any stage have the ability to progress if they study and devote their energies to it. Even among Zen adherents, a fully enlightened master is rare. There is a continual search for improvement, a looking outside oneself (hansei) or one's company for renewed dedication and insight. The increments of improvement are often minuscule, but they are real all the same. Perfectibility builds on past accomplishments. It is an

inherent property of all human activity, a slow and painstaking process of refinement. It is such a sense of perfection that led Akira Kurosawa, at seventy years of age, to remark that he still had much work to do in order to make truly great films.

This is substantially different from American ideas of change and renovation. We assume almost automatically that, to improve, we have to "break out of our old ways of doing thing sand forge a new way. We see - in our seemingly endless cycles of educational reform in this country, for example - a tremendous emphasis on finding a new and better way that makes old ways obsolete.

The Japanese themes we have just discussed form a core of expectations about learning out of which myriad learning situations are constructed. They are like old, tried-and-true methods that require only a little innovation and stand ready to be applied to any set of new circumstances, be they computer chip or maintaining the health of a rapidly aging population through social education programs. By knowing these themes, we can increase our understanding of the power their logic holds in Japanese schools, training programs, traditional arts, and so forth. They comprise a web of mutually sustaining sets of meanings that form the particularly Japanese foundation of learning as social action.

Lisa D. Delpit. 'The Silenced Dialogue: Power and Pedagogy in Educating Other People's Children', in L. Weis and M. Fine eds., *Beyond Silenced Voices: Class, Race and Gender in United States Schools* (Sunv Press, 1993) 119-39. Reprinted in Halsey et al. eds. (1997) 582-9.

A Black male graduate student who is also a special education teacher in a predominantly Black community is talking about his experiences in predominantly white university classes:

There comes a moment in every class where we have to discuss `The Black Issue' and what's appropriate education for Black children. I tell you, I'm tired of arguing with those White people, because they won't listen. Well, I don't know if they really don't listen or if they just don't believe you. It seems like if you can't quote Vygotsky or something, then you don't have any validity to speak about your *own* kids. Anyway, I'm not bothering with it anymore, now I'm just in it for a grade.

A Black woman teacher in a multicultural urban elementary school is talking about her experiences in discussions with her predominantly white fellow teachers about how they should organize reading instruction to best serve students of color:

When you're talking to White people they still want it to be their way. You can try to talk to them and give them examples, but they're so headstrong, they think they know what's best for *everybody,* for *everybody's* children. They won't listen, White folks are going to do what they want to do *anyway.*

It's really hard. They just don't listen well. No, they listen, but they don't *hear - you* know how your mama used to say you listen to the radio, but *you hear* your mother? Well they don't *hear* me.

So I just try to shut them out so I can hold my temper. You can only beat your head against a brick wall for so long before you draw blood. If I try to stop arguing with them I can't help myself from getting angry. Then I end up walking around praying all day `Please Lord, remove the bile I feel for these people so I can sleep tonight.' It's funny, but it can become a cancer, a sore.

So, I shut them out. I go back to my own little cubby, my classroom, and I try to teach the way I know will work, no matter what those folk say. And when I get Black kids, I just try to undo the damage they did.

I'm not going to let any man, woman, or child drive me crazy. White folks will try to do that to you if you let them. You just have to stop talking to them, that's what I do. I just keep smiling, but I won't talk to them.

A soft-spoken Native Alaskan woman in her forties is a student in the Education Department of the University of Alaska. One day she storms into a Black professor's office and very uncharacteristically slams the door. She plops down in a chair and, still fuming, says, `Please tell those people, just don't help us anymore! I give up. I won't talk to them again!'

And finally, a Black woman principal who is also a doctoral student at a well-known university on the West Coast is talking about her university experiences, particularly about when a professor lectures on issues concerning educating Black children:

If you try to suggest that that's not quite the way it is, they get defensive, then you get defensive, then they'll start reciting research.

I try to give them my experiences, to explain. They just look and nod. The more I try to explain, they just look and nod, just keep looking and nodding. They don't really hear me.

Then, when it's time for class to be over, the professor tells me to come to his office to talk more. So I go. He asks for more examples of what I'm talking about, and he looks and nods while I give them.
Then he says that that's just my experiences. It doesn't really apply to most Black people.

It becomes futile because they think they know everything about everybody. What you have to say about your life, your children, doesn't mean anything. They don't really want to hear what you have to say. They wear blinders and earplugs. They only want to go on research they've read that other White people have written.

It just doesn't make any sense to keep talking to them.

Thus was the first half of the title of this text born- 'The Silenced Dialogue.' One of the tragedies in the field of education is that scenarios such as these are enacted daily around the country. The saddest element is that the individuals that the Black and Native American educators speak of in these statements are seldom aware that the dialogue *has* been silenced. Most likely the white educators believe that their colleagues of color did, in the end, agree with their logic. After all, they stopped disagreeing, didn't they?

I have collected these statements since completing a recently published article. In this somewhat autobiographical account, entitled `Skills and Other Dilemmas of a Progressive Black Educator,' I discussed my perspective as a product of a skills-oriented approach to writing and as a teacher of process-oriented approaches. I described the estrangement that I and many teachers of color feel from the progressive movement when writing-process advocates dismiss us as too `skills oriented.' I ended the article suggesting that it was incumbent upon writing-process advocates - or indeed, advocates of any progressive movement-to enter into dialogue with

teachers of color, who may not share their enthusiasm about so-called new, liberal, or progressive ideas.

In response to this article, which presented no research data and did not even cite a reference, I received numerous calls and letters from teachers, professors, and even state school personnel from around the country, both Black and white. All of the white respondents, except one, have wished to talk more about the question of skills versus process approaches-to support or reject what they perceive to be my position. On the other hand, *all* of the non-white respondents have spoken passionately on being left out of the dialogue about how best to educate children of color.

How can such complete communication blocks exist when both parties truly believe they have the same aims?

How can the bitterness and resentment expressed by the educators of color be drained so that the sores can heal? What can be done?

I believe the answer to these questions lies in ethnographic analysis, that is, in identifying and giving voice to alternative world views. Thus, I will attempt to address the concerns raised by white and Black respondents to my article `Skills and Other Dilemmas'. My charge here is not to determine the best instructional methodology; I believe that the actual practice of good teachers of all colors typically incorporates a range of pedagogical orientations. Rather, I suggest that the differing perspectives on the debate over `skills' versus `process' approaches can lead to an understanding of the alienation and miscommunication, and thereby to an understanding of the `silenced dialogue.'

In thinking through these issues, I have found what I believe to be a connecting and complex theme: what I have come to call `the culture of power.' There are five aspects of power I would like to propose as given for this presentation:

1. Issues of power are enacted in classrooms.
2. There are codes or rules for participating in power; that is, there is a `culture of power.'
3. The rules of the culture of power are a reflection of the rules of the culture of those who have power.
4. If you are not already a participant in the culture of power, being told explicitly the rules of that culture makes acquiring power easier.
5. Those with power are frequently least aware of-or least willing to acknowledge-its existence. Those with less power are often most aware of its existence.

The first three are by now basic tenets in the literature of the sociology of education, but the last two have seldom been addressed. The following discussion will explicate these aspects of power and their relevance to the

schism between liberal educational movements and that of non-White, non-middleclass teachers and communities.

1. Isues of power are enacted in classrooms.
These issues include: the power of the teacher over the students; the power of the publishers of textbooks and of the developers of the curriculum to determine the view of the world presented; the power of the state in enforcing compulsory schooling; and the power of an individual or group to determine another's intelligence or `normalcy.' Finally, if schooling prepares people for jobs, and the kind of job a person has determines her or his economic status and, therefore, power, then schooling is intimately related to that power.

2. There are codes or rules for participating in power; that is, there is a 'culture of power.'
The codes or rules I'm speaking of relate to linguistic forms, communicative strategies, and presentation of self; that is, ways of talking, ways of writing, ways of dressing, and ways of interacting.

3. The rules of the culture of power area reflection of the rules of the culture of those who have power.
This means that success in institutions - schools, workplaces, and so on-is predicated upon acquisition of the culture of those who are in power. Children from middle-class homes tend to do better in school than those from non-middle-class homes because the culture of the school is based on the culture of the upper and middle classes-of those in power. The upper and middle classes send their children to school with all the accoutrements of the culture of power; children from other kinds of families operate within. perfectly wonderful and viable cultures but not cultures that carry the codes or rules of power.

4. If you are not already a participant in the culture of power, being told explicitly the rules of that culture makes acquiring power easier. In my work within and between diverse cultures, I have come to conclude that members of any culture transmit information implicitly to co-members. However, when implicit codes are attempted across cultures, communication frequently breaks down. Each cultural group is left saying, 'Why don't those people say what they mean?' as well as, 'What's wrong with them, why don't they understand?'

Anyone who has had to enter new cultures, especially to accomplish a specific task, will know of what I speak. When I lived in several Papua New Guinea villages for extended periods to collect data, and when I go to Alaskan villages for work with Alaskan Native communities, I have found it unquestionably easier-psychologically and pragmatically-when some kind soul has directly informed me about such matters as appropriate dress, interactional styles, embedded meanings, and taboo words or actions. I

contend that it is much the same for anyone seeking to learn the rules of the culture of power. Unless one has the leisure of a lifetime of `immersion' to learn them, explicit presentation makes learning immeasurably easier.

And now, to the fifth and last premise:

5. Those with power are frequently least aware of-or least willing to acknowledge-its existence. Those with less power are often most aware of its existence.

For many who consider themselves members of liberal or radical camps, acknowledging personal power and admitting participation in the culture of power is distinctly uncomfortable. On the other hand, those who are less powerful in any situation are most likely to recognize the power variable most acutely. My guess is that the white colleagues and instructors of those previously quoted did not perceive themselves to have power over the non-white speakers. However, either by virtue of their position, their numbers, or their access to that particular code of power of calling upon research to validate one's position, the white educators had the authority to establish what was to be considered 'truth' regardless of the opinions of the people of color, and the latter were well aware of that fact.

A related phenomenon is that liberals (and here I am using the term 'liberal' to refer to those whose beliefs include striving for a society based upon maximum individual freedom and autonomy) seem to act under the assumption that to make any rules or expectations explicit is to act against liberal principles, to limit the freedom and autonomy of those subjected to the explicitness.

I thank Fred Erickson for a comment that led me to look again at a tape by John Gumperz on cultural dissonance in cross-cultural interactions. One of the episodes showed an East Indian interviewing for a job with an all-white committee. The interview was a complete failure, even though several of the interviewers appeared to really want to help the applicant. As the interview rolled steadily downhill, these `helpers' became more and more indirect in their questioning, which exacerbated the problems the applicant had in performing appropriately. Operating from a different cultural perspective, he got fewer and fewer clear clues as to what was expected of him, which ultimately resulted in his failure to secure the position.

I contend that as the applicant showed less and less aptitude for handling the interview, the power differential became ever more evident to the interviewers. The 'helpful' interviewers, unwilling to acknowledge themselves as having power over the applicant, became more and more uncomfortable. Their indirectness was an attempt to lessen the power differential and their discomfort by lessening the power-revealing explicitness of their questions and comments.

When acknowledging and expressing power, one tends towards explicitness (as in yelling to your 10-year-old, 'Turn the radio down!'). When de-emphasizing power, there is a move toward indirect communication. Therefore, in the interview setting, those who sought to help, to express their egalitarianism with the East Indian applicant, became more and more indirect-and less and less helpful-in their questions and comments.

In literacy instruction, explicitness might be equated with direct instruction. Perhaps the ultimate expression of explicitness and direct instruction in the primary classroom is Distar. This reading program is based on a behaviorist model in which reading is taught through the direct instruction of phonics generalizations and blending. The teacher's role is to maintain the full attention of the group by continuous questioning, eye contact, finger snaps, hand claps, and other gestures, and by eliciting choral responses and initiating some sort of award system.

When the program was introduced, it arrived with a flurry of research data that 'proved' that all children-even those who were 'culturally deprived'-could learn to read using this method. Soon there was a strong response, first from academics and later from many classroom teachers, stating that the program was terrible. What I find particularly interesting, however, is that the primary issue of the conflict over Distar has not been over its instructional efficacy-usually the students did learn to read-but the expression of explicit power in the classroom. The liberal educators opposed the methods-the direct instruction, the explicit control exhibited by the teacher. As a matter of fact, it was not unusual (even now) to hear of the program spoken of as `fascist.'

I am not an advocate of Distar, but I will return to some of the issues that the program-and direct instruction in general-raises in understanding the differences between progressive white educators and educators of color.

To explore those differences, I would like to present several statements typical of those made with the best of intentions by middleclass liberal educators. To the surprise of the speakers, it is not unusual for such content to be met by vocal opposition or stony silence from people of color. My attempt here is to examine the underlying assumptions of both camps.

'I want the same thing for everyone else's children as I want for mine. '

To provide schooling for everyone's children that reflects liberal, middle-class values and aspirations is to ensure the maintenance of the status quo, to ensure that power, the culture of power, remains in the hands of those who already have it. Some children come to school with more accoutrements of the culture of power already in place-'cultural capital,' as some critical theorists refer to it-some with less. Many liberal educators hold that the primary goal for education is for children to become autonomous, to develop fully who they are in the classroom setting without having arbitrary, outside standards forced upon them. This is a very reasonable goal

for people whose children are already participants in the culture of power and who have already internalized its codes.

But parents who don't function within that culture often want something else. It's not that they disagree with the former aim, it's just that they want something more. They want to ensure that the school provides their children with discourse patterns, interactional styles, and spoken and written language codes that will allow them success in the larger society.

It was the lack of attention to this concern that created such a negative outcry in the Black community when well-intentioned white liberal educators introduced 'dialect readers.' These were seen as a plot to prevent the schools from teaching the linguistic aspects of the culture of power, thus dooming Black children to a permanent outsider caste. As one parent demanded, `My kids know how to be Black-you all teach them how to be successful in the white man's world.'

Several Black teachers have said to me recently that as much as they'd like to believe otherwise, they cannot help but conclude that many of the `progressive' educational strategies imposed by liberals upon Black and poor children could only be based on a desire to ensure that the liberals' children get sole access to the dwindling pool of American jobs. Some have added that the liberal educators believe themselves to be operating with good intentions, but that these good intentions are only conscious delusions about their unconscious true motives. One of Black anthropologist John Gwaltney's informants reflects this perspective with her tongue-in-cheek observation that the biggest difference between Black folks and white folks is that Black folks *know* when they're lying!

Let me try to clarify how this might work in literacy instruction. A few years ago I worked on an analysis of two popular reading programs, Distar and a progressive program that focused on higher-level critical thinking skills. In one of the first lessons of the progressive program, the children are introduced to the names of the letter *m* and *e*. In the same lesson they are then taught the sound made by each of the letters, how to write each of the letters, and that when the two are blended together they produce the word *me*.

As an experienced first-grade teacher, I am convinced that a child needs to be familiar with a significant number of these concepts to be able to assimilate so much new knowledge in one sitting. By contrast, Distar presents the same information in about forty lessons.

I would not argue for the pace of the Distar lessons; such a slow pace would only bore most kids-but what happened in the other lesson is that it merely provided an opportunity for those who already knew the content to exhibit that they knew it, or at most perhaps to build one new concept onto what was already known. This meant that the child who did not come to school already primed with what was to be presented would be labeled as needing `remedial' instruction from day one; indeed, this determination

would be made before he or she was ever taught. In fact, Distar was `successful' because it actually *taught* new information to children who had not already acquired it at home. Although the more progressive system was ideal for some children, for others it was a disaster.

I do not advocate a simplistic `basic skills' approach for children outside of the culture of power. It would be (and has been) tragic to operate as if these children were incapable of critical and higher-order thinking and reasoning. Rather, I suggest that schools must provide these children the content that other families from a different cultural orientation provide at home. This does not mean separating children according to family background, but instead, ensuring that each classroom incorporate strategies appropriate for all the children in its confines.

And I do not advocate that it is the school's job to attempt to change the homes of poor and non-white children to match the homes of those in the culture of power. That may indeed be a form of cultural genocide. I have frequently heard schools call poor parents `uncaring' when parents respond to the school's urging, that they change their home life in order to facilitate their children's learning, by saying, `But that's the school's job.' What the school personnel fail to understand is that if the parents were members of the culture of power and lived by its rules and codes, then they would transmit those codes to their children. In fact, they transmit another culture that children must learn at home in order to survive in their communities.

'Child-centered, whole language, and process approaches are needed in order to allow a democratic state of free, autonomous, empowered adults, and because research has shown that children learn best through these methods. '

People of color are, in general, skeptical of research as a determiner of our fates. Academic research has, after all, found us genetically inferior, culturally deprived, and verbally deficient. But beyond that general caveat, and despite my or others' personal preferences, there is little research data supporting the major tenets of process approaches over other forms of literacy instruction, and virtually no evidence that such approaches are more efficacious for children of color.

Although the problem is not necessarily inherent in the method, in some instances adherents of process approaches to writing create situations in which students ultimately find themselves held accountable for knowing a set of rules about which no one has ever directly informed them. Teachers do students no service to suggest, even implicitly, that `product' is not important. In this country, students will be judged on their product regardless of the process they utilized to achieve it. And that product, based as it is on the specific codes of a particular culture, is more readily produced when the directives of how to produce it are made explicit.

If such explicitness is not provided to students, what it feels like to people who are old enough to judge is that there are secrets being kept, that time is being wasted, that the teacher is abdicating his or her duty to teach. A doctoral student in my acquaintance was assigned to a writing class to hone his writing skills. The student was placed in the section led by a white professor who utilized a process approach, consisting primarily of having the students write essays and then assemble into groups to edit each others' papers. That procedure infuriated this particular student. He had many angry encounters with the teacher about what she was doing. In his words:

I didn't feel she was teaching us anything. She wanted us to correct each others' papers and we were there to learn from her. She didn't teach anything, absolutely nothing.

Maybe they're trying to learn what Black folks knew all the time. We understand how to improvise, how to express ourselves creatively. When I'm in a classroom, I'm not looking for that, I'm looking for structure, the more formal language.

Now my buddy was in [a] Black teacher's class. And that lady was very good. She went through and explained and defined each part of the structure. This [white] teacher didn't get along with that Black teacher. She said that she didn't agree with her methods. But I don't think that White teacher *had* any methods.

When I told this gentleman that what the teacher was doing was called a process method of teaching writing, his response was, `Well, at least now I know that she *thought* that she was doing *something*. *I* thought she was just a fool who couldn't teach and didn't want to try.'

This sense of being cheated can be so strong that the student may be completely turned off to the educational system. Amanda Branscombe, an accomplished white teacher, recently wrote a letter discussing her work with working-class Black and white students at a community college in Alabama. She had given these students my `Skills and Other Dilemmas' article to read and discuss, and wrote that her students really understood and identified with what I was saying. To quote her letter:

One young man said that he had dropped out of high school because he failed the exit exam. He noted that he had then passed the GED without a problem after three weeks of prep. He said that his high school English teacher claimed to use a process approach, but what she really did was hide behind fancy words to give herself permission to do nothing in the classroom.

The students I have spoken of seem to be saying that the teacher has denied them access to herself as the source of knowledge necessary to learn the forms they need to succeed. Again, I tentatively attribute the problem to

teachers' resistance to exhibiting power in the classroom. Somehow, to exhibit one's personal power as expert source is viewed as disempowering one's students.

Two qualifiers are necessary, however. The teacher cannot be the only expert in the classroom. To deny students their own expert knowledge *is* to disempower them. Amanda Branscombe, when she was working with Black high school students classified as `slow learners,' had the students analyze RAP songs to discover their underlying patterns. The students became the experts in explaining to the teacher the rules for creating a new RAP song. The teacher then used the patterns the students identified as a base to begin an explanation of the structure of grammar, and then of Shakespeare's plays. Both student and teacher are expert at what they know best.

The second qualifier is that merely adopting direct instruction is not the answer. Actual writing for real audiences and real purposes is a vital element in helping students to understand that they have an important voice in their own learning processes. Siddle examines the results of various kinds of interventions in a primarily process-oriented writing class for Black students. Based on readers' blind assessments, she found that the intervention that produced the most positive changes in the students' writing was a 'mini-lesson' consisting of direct instruction about some standard writing convention. But what produced the *second* highest number of positive changes was a subsequent student-centered conference with the teacher. (Peer conferencing in this group of Black students who were not members of the culture of power produced the least-number of changes in students' writing. However, the classroom teacher maintained-and I concur-that such activities are necessary to introduce the elements of `real audience' into the task, along with more teacher-directed strategies.)

`It's really a shame but she (that Black teacher upstairs) seems to be so authoritarian, so focused on skills and so teacher directed. Those poor kids never seem to be allowed to really express their creativity. (And she even yells at them.)'

This statement directly concerns the display of power and authority in the classroom. One way to understand the difference in perspective between Black teachers and their progressive colleagues on this issue is to explore culturally influenced oral interactions.

In *Ways With Words,* Shirley Brice Heath quotes the verbal directives given by the middle-class `townspeople' teachers:

- 'Is this where the scissors belong?'
- `You want to do your best work today.'

By contrast, many Black teachers are more likely to say:
- `Put those scissors on that shelf.'

- 'Put your name on the papers and make sure to get the right answer for each question.'

Is one oral style more authoritarian than another?

Other researchers have identified differences in middle-class and working-class speech to children. Snow *et al.,* for example, report that working-class mothers use more directives to their children than do middle- and upper-class parents. Middle-class parents are likely to give the directive to a child to take his bath as, `Isn't it time for your bath?' Even though the utterance is couched as a question, both child and adult understand it as a directive. The child may respond with 'Aw Mom, can't I wait until.. .,' but whether or not negotiation is attempted, both conversants understand the intent of the utterance.

By contrast, a Black mother, in whose house I was recently a guest, said to her eightyear-old son, `Boy, get your rusty behind in that bathtub.' Now I happen to know that this woman loves her son as much as any mother, but she would never have posed the directive to her son to take a bath in the form of a question. Were she to ask, `Would you like to take your bath now?' she would not have been issuing a directive but offering a true alternative. Consequently, as Heath suggests, upon entering school the child from such a family may not understand the indirect statement of the teacher as a direct command. Both white and Black working-class children in the communities Heath studied `had difficulty interpreting these indirect requests for adherence to an unstated set of rules'.

But those veiled commands are commands none the less, representing true power, and with true consequences for disobedience. If veiled commands are ignored, the child will be labeled a behavior problem and possibly officially classified as behavior disordered. In other words, the attempt by the teacher to reduce an exhibition of power by expressing herself in indirect terms may remove the very explicitness that the child needs to understand the rules of the new classroom culture.

A Black elementary school principal in Fairbanks, Alaska, reported to me that she has a lot of difficulty with Black children who are placed in some White teachers' classrooms. The teachers often send the children to the office for disobeying teacher directives. Their parents are frequently called in for conferences. The parents' response to the teacher is usually the same: `They do what I say; if you just *tell* them what to do, they'll do it. I tell them at home that they have to listen to what you say.' And so, does not the power still exist? Its veiled nature only makes it more difficult for some children to respond appropriately, but that in no way mitigates its existence.

I don't mean to imply, however, that the only time the Black child disobeys the teacher is when he or she misunderstands the request for certain behavior. There are other factors that may produce such behavior. Black children expect an authority figure to act with authority. When the

teacher instead acts as a `chum,' the message sent is that this adult has no authority, and the children react accordingly. One reason this is so is that Black people often view issues of power and authority differently than people from main-stream middle-class backgrounds. Many people of color expect authority to be earned by personal efforts and exhibited by personal characteristics. In other words, `the authoritative person gets to be a teacher because she is authoritative.' Some members of middle-class cultures, by contrast, expect one to achieve authority by the acquisition of an authoritative role. That is, `the teacher is the authority because she is the teacher.'

In the first instance, because authority is earned, the teacher must consistently prove the characteristics that give her authority. These characteristics may vary across cultures, but in the Black community they tend to cluster around several abilities. The authoritative teacher can control the class through exhibition of personal power; establishes meaningful interpersonal relationships that garner student respect; exhibits a strong belief that all students can learn; establishes a standard of achievement and `pushes' the students to achieve that standard; and holds the attention of the students by incorporating interactional features of Black communicative style in his or her teaching.

By contrast, the teacher whose authority is vested in the role has many more options of behavior at her disposal. For instance, she does not need to express any sense of personal power because her authority does not come from anything she herself does or says. Hence, the power she actually holds may be veiled in such questions/commands as `Would you like to sit down now?' If the children in her class understand authority as she does, it is mutually agreed upon that they are to obey her no matter how indirect, soft-spoken, or unassuming she may be. Her indirectness and soft-spokenness may indeed be, as I suggested earlier, an attempt to reduce the implication of overt power in order to establish a more egalitarian and non-authoritarian classroom atmosphere.

If the children operate under another notion of authority, however, then there is trouble. The Black child may perceive the middle-class teacher as weak, ineffectual, and incapable of taking on the role of being the teacher; therefore, there is no need to follow her directives. In her dissertation, Michelle Foster quotes one young Black man describing such a teacher:

She is boring, boring. She could do something creative. Instead she just stands there. She can't control the class, doesn't know how to control the class. She asked me what she was doing wrong. I told her she just stands there like she's meditating. I told her she could be meditating for all I know. She says that we're supposed to know what to do. I told her I don't know nothin' unless she tells me. She just can't control the class. I hope we don't have her next semester.

But of course the teacher may not view the problem as residing in herself but in the student, and the child may once again become the behavior-disordered Black boy in special education.

What characteristics do Black students attribute to the good teacher? Again, Foster's dissertation provides a quotation that supports my experience with Black students. A young Black man is discussing a former teacher with a group of friends:

We had fun in her class, but she was mean. I can remember she used to say, `Tell me what's in the story, Wayne.' She pushed, she used to get on me and push me to know. She made us learn. We had to get in the books. There was this tall guy and he tried to take her on, but she was in charge of that class and she didn't let anyone run her. I still have this book we used in her class. It's a bunch of stories in it. I just read one on Coca-Cola again the other *day.*

To clarify, this student was *proud of* the teacher's `meanness,' an attribute he seemed to describe as the ability to run the class and pushing and expecting students to learn. Now, does the liberal perspective of the negatively authoritarian Black teacher really hold up? I suggest that although all `explicit' Black teachers are not also good teachers, there are different attitudes in different cultural groups about which characteristics make for a good teacher. Thus, it is impossible to create a model for the good teacher without taking issues of culture and community context into account.

And now to the final comment I present for examination:

`Children have the right to their own language, their own culture. We must fight cultural hegemony and fight the system by insisting that children be allowed to express themselves in their own language style. It is not they, the children, who must change, but the schools. To push children to do anything else is repressive and reactionary. '

A statement such as this originally inspired me to write the `Skills and Other Dilemmas' article. It was first written as a letter to a colleague in response to a situation that had developed in our department. I was teaching a senior-level teacher education course. Students were asked to prepare a written autobiographical document for the class that would also be shared with their placement school prior to their student teaching.

One student, a talented young Native American woman, submitted a paper in which the ideas were lost because of technical problems-from spelling to sentence structure to paragraph structure. Removing her name, I duplicated the paper for a discussion with some faculty members. I had hoped to initiate a discussion about what we could do to ensure that our students did not reach the senior level without getting assistance in technical writing skills when they needed them.

I was amazed at the response. Some faculty implied that the student should never have been allowed into the teacher education program. Others,

some of the more progressive minded, suggested that I was attempting to function as gatekeeper by raising the issue and had internalized repressive and disempowering forces of the power elite to suggest that something was wrong with a Native American student just because she had another style of writing. With few exceptions, I found myself alone in arguing against both camps.

No, this student should not have been denied entry to the program. To deny her entry under the notion of upholding standards is to blame the victim for the crime. We cannot justifiably enlist exclusionary standards when the reason this student lacked the skills demanded was poor teaching at best and institutionalized racism at worst.

However, to bring this student into the program and pass her through without attending to obvious deficits in the codes needed for her to function effectively as a teacher is equally criminal-for though we may assuage our own consciences for not participating in victim blaming, she will surely be accused and convicted as soon as she leaves the university. As Native Alaskans were quick to tell me, and as I understood through my own experience in the Black community, not only would she not be hired as a teacher, but those who did not hire her would make the (false) assumption that the university was putting out only incompetent Natives and that they should stop looking seriously at any Native applicants. A white applicant who exhibits problems is an individual with problems. A person of color who exhibits problems immediately becomes a representative of her cultural group.

No, either stance is criminal. The answer is to *accept* students but also to take responsibility to *teach* them. I decided to talk to the student and found out she had recognized that she needed some assistance in the technical aspects of writing soon after she entered the university as a freshman. She had gone to various members of the education faculty and received the same two kinds of responses I met with four years later: faculty members told her either that she should not even attempt to be a teacher, or that it didn't matter and that she shouldn't worry about such trivial issues. In her desperation, she had found a helpful professor in the English Department, but he left the university when she was in her sophomore year.

We sat down together, worked out a plan for attending to specific areas of writing competence, and set up regular meetings. I stressed to her the need to use her own learning process as insight into how best to teach her future students those `skills' that her own schooling had failed to teach her. I gave her some explicit rules to follow in some areas; for others, we devised various kinds of journals that, along with readings about the structure of the language, allowed her to find her own insights into how the language worked. All that happened two years ago, and the young woman is now successfully teaching. What the experience led me to understand is that

pretending that gatekeeping points don't exist is to ensure that many students will not pass through them.

Now you may have inferred that I believe that because there is a culture of power, everyone should learn the codes to participate in it, and that is how the world should be. Actually, nothing could be further from the truth. I believe in a diversity of style, and I believe the world will be diminished if cultural diversity is ever obliterated. Further, I believe strongly, as do my liberal colleagues, that each cultural group should have the right to maintain its own language style. When I speak, therefore, of the culture of power, I don't speak of how I wish things to be but of how they are.

I further believe that to act as if power does not exist is to ensure that the power status quo remains the same. To imply to children or adults (but of course the adults won't believe you anyway) that it doesn't matter how you talk or how you write is to ensure their ultimate failure. I prefer to be honest with my students. Tell them that their language and cultural style is unique and wonderful but that there is a political power game that is also being played, and if they want to be in on that game there are certain games that they too must play.

But don't think that I let the onus of change rest entirely with the students. I am also involved in political work both inside and outside of the educational system, and that political work demands that I place myself to influence as many gatekeeping points as possible. And it is there that I agitate for changepushing gatekeepers to open their doors to a variety of styles and codes. What I'm saying, however, is that I do not believe that political change toward diversity can be effected from the bottom up, as do some of my colleagues. They seem to believe that if we accept and encourage diversity within classrooms of children, then diversity will automatically be accepted as gatekeeping points.

I believe that will never happen. What will happen is that the students who reach the gatekeeping points-like Amanda Branscombe's student who dropped out of high school because he failed his exit exam-will understand that they have been lied to and will react accordingly. No, I am certain that if we are truly to effect societal change, we cannot do so from the bottom up, but we must push and agitate from the top down. And in the meantime, we must take the responsibility to *teach,* to provide for students who do not already possess them, the additional codes of power.

But I also do not believe that we should teach students to passively adopt an alternate code. They must be encouraged to understand the value of the code they already possess as well as to understand the power realities in this country. Otherwise they will be unable to work to change these realities. And how does one do that?

Martha Demientieff, a masterly Native Alaskan teacher of Athabaskan Indian students, tells me that her students, who live in a small, isolated, rural village of less than two hundred people, are not aware that

there are different codes of English. She takes their writing and analyzes it for features of what has been referred to by Alaskan linguists as 'Village English,' and then covers half a bulletin board with words or phrases from the students' writing, which she labels `Our Heritage Language.' On the other half of the bulletin board she puts the equivalent statements in `standard English,' which she labels `Formal English.'

She and the students spend a long time on the `Heritage English' section, savoring the words, discussing the nuances. She tells the students, `That's the way we say things. Doesn't it feel good? Isn't it the absolute best way of getting that idea across?' Then she turns to the other side of the board. She tells the students that there are people, not like those in their village, who judge others by the way they talk or write.

We listen to the way people talk, not to judge them, but to tell what part of the river they come from. These other people are not like that. They think everybody needs to talk like them. Unlike us, they have a hard time hearing what people say if they don't talk exactly like them. Their *way* of talking and writing is called `Formal English.'

We have to feel a little sorry for them because they have only one way to talk. We're going to learn two ways to say things. Isn't that better? One way will be our Heritage way. The other will be Formal English. Then, when we go to get jobs, we'll be able to talk like those people who only know and can only really listen to one way. Maybe after we get the jobs we can help them to learn how it feels to have another language, like ours, that feels so good. We'll talk like them when we have to, but we'll always know our way is best.

Martha then does all sorts of activities with the notions of Formal and Heritage or informal English. She tells the students,

In the village, everyone speaks informally most of the time unless there's a potlatch or something. You don't think about it, you don't worry about following any rules-it's sort of like how you eat food at a picnic-nobody pays attention to whether you use your fingers or a fork, and it feels so good. Now, Formal English is more like a formal dinner. There are rules to follow about where the knife and fork belong, about where people sit, about how you eat. That can be really nice, too, because it's nice to dress up sometimes.

The students then prepare a formal dinner in the class, for which they dress up and set a big table with fancy tablecloths, china, and silverware. They speak only Formal English at this meal. Then they prepare a picnic where only informal English is allowed.

She also contrasts the `wordy' academic way of saying things with the metaphoric style of Athabaskan. The students discuss how book language always uses more words, but in Heritage language, the shorter way of saying something is always better. Students then write papers in the

academic way, discussing with Martha and with each other whether they believe they've said enough to sound like a book. Next, they take those papers and try to reduce the meaning to a few sentences. Finally, students further reduce the message to a `saying' brief enough to go on the front of a T-shirt, and the sayings are put on little paper T-shirts that the students cut out and hang throughout the room. Sometimes the students reduce other authors' wordy texts to their essential meanings as well.

The following transcript provides another example. It is from a conversation between a Black teacher and a Southern Black high school student named Joey, who is a speaker of Black English. The teacher believes it very important to discuss openly and honestly the issues of language diversity and power. She has begun the discussion by giving the student a children's book written in Black English to read.

Teacher: What do you think about the book?
Joey: I think it's nice.
Teacher: Why?
Joey: I don't know. It just told about a Black family, that's all.
Teacher: Was it difficult to read?
Joey: No.
Teacher: Was the text different from what you have seen in other books?
Joey: Yeah. The writing was.
Teacher: How?
Joey: It use more of a southern-like accent in this book.
Teacher: Uhm-hmm. do you think that's good or bad?
Joey: Well, uh, I don't think it's good for people down this a way, cause that's the way they grow up talking anyway. They ought to get the right way to talk.
Teacher: Oh. So you think it's wrong to talk like that?
Joey: Well ... *[Laughs]*
Teacher: Hard question, huh?
Joey: Uhm-hmm, that's a hard question. But I think they shouldn't make books like that.
Teacher: Why?
Joey: Because they not using the right way to talk and in school they take off for that and li'l chirren grow up talking like that and reading like that so they might think that's right and all the time they getting bad grades in school, talking like that and writing like that.
Teacher: Do you think they should be getting bad grades for talking like that?
Joey: [Pauses, answers very slowly] No ... No.
Teacher: So you don't think that it matters whether you talk one way or another?
Joey: No, not long as you understood.
Teacher: Uhm-hmm. Well, that's, a hard question for me to answer, too. It's,

ah, that's a question that's come up in a lot of schools now as to whether they should correct children who speak the way we speak all the time. Cause when we're talking to each other we talk like that even though we might not talk like that when we get into other situations, and who's to say whether it's-
Joey: [Interrupting] Right or wrong.
Teacher: Yeah.
Joey: Maybe they ought to come up with another kind of... maybe Black English or something. A course in Black English. Maybe Black folks would be good in that cause people talk, I mean Black people talk like that, *so* ... but I guess there's a right way and wrong way to talk, you know, not regarding what race. I don't know.
Teacher: But who decided what's right or wrong?
Joey: Well that's true ... I guess White people did.
[Laughter. End of tape.]

Notice how throughout the conversation Joey's consciousness has been raised by thinking about codes of language. This teacher further advocates having students interview various personnel officers in actual workplaces about their attitudes toward divergent styles in oral and written language. Students begin to understand how arbitrary language standards are, but also how politically charged they are. They compare various pieces written in different styles, discuss the impact of different styles on the message by making translations and back translations across styles, and discuss the history, apparent purpose, and contextual appropriateness of each of the technical writing rules presented by their teacher. *And* they practice writing different forms to different audiences based on rules appropriate for each audience. Such a program not only `teaches' standard linguistic forms, but also explores aspects of power as exhibited through linguistic forms.

Tony Burgess, in a study of secondary writing in England by Britton, Burgess, Martin, McLeod, and Rosen, suggests that we should not teach `iron conventions ... imposed without rationale or grounding in communicative intent,'.. . but `critical and ultimately cultural awarenesses'. Courtney Cazden calls for a two-pronged approach:

1. Continuous opportunities for writers to participate in some authentic bit of the unending conversation ... thereby becoming part of a vital community of talkers and writers in a particular domain, and
2. Periodic, temporary focus on conventions of form, taught as cultural conventions expected in a particular community.

Just so that there is no confusion about what Cazden means by a focus on conventions of form, or about what I mean by `skills,' let me stress that neither of us is speaking of page after page of `skill sheets' creating compound words or identifying nouns and adverbs, but rather about

helping students gain a useful knowledge of the conventions of print while engaging in real and useful communicative activities. Kay Rowe Grubis, a junior high school teacher in a multicultural school, makes lists of certain technical rules for her eighth graders' review and then gives them papers from a third grade to `correct.' The students not only have to correct other students' work, but also tell them why they have changed or questioned aspects of the writing.

A village teacher, Howard Cloud, teaches his high school students the conventions of formal letter writing and the formulation of careful questions in the context of issues surrounding the amendment of the Alaska Land Claims Settlement Act. Native Alaskan leaders hold differing views on this issue, critical to the future of local sovereignty and land rights. The students compose letters to leaders who reside in different areas of the state seeking their perspectives, set up audioconference calls for interview/debate sessions, and, finally, develop a videotape to present the differing views.

To summarize, I suggest that students must be *taught* the codes needed to participate fully in the mainstream of American life, not by being forced to attend to hollow, inane, decontextualized subskills, but rather within the context of meaningful communicative endeavors; that they must be allowed the resource of the teacher's expert knowledge, while being helped to acknowledge their own `expertness' as well; and that even while students are assisted in learning the culture of power, they must also be helped to learn about the arbitrariness of those codes and about the power relationships they represent.

I am also suggesting that appropriate education of poor children and children of color can only be devised in consultation with adults who share their culture. Black parents, teachers of color, and members of poor communities must be allowed to participate fully in the discussion of what kind of instruction is in their children's best interest. Good liberal intentions are not enough. In an insightful study entitled `Racism without Racists: Institutional Racism in Urban Schools,' Massey, Scott, and Dornbusch found that under the pressures of teaching, and with all intentions of `being nice,' teachers had essentially stopped attempting to teach Black children. In their words: `We have shown that oppression can arise out of warmth, friendliness, and concern. Paternalism and a lack of challenging standards are creating a distorted system of evaluation in the schools'." Educators must open themselves to, and allow themselves to be affected by, these alternative voices.

In conclusion, I am proposing a resolution for the skills/process debate. In short, the debate is fallacious; the dichotomy is false. The issue is really an illusion created initially not by teachers but by academics whose world view demands the creation of categorical divisions-not for the purpose of better teaching, but for the goal of easier analysis. As I have been reminded by many teachers since the publication of my article, those who

are most skillful at educating Black and poor children do not allow themselves to be placed in `skills' or `process' boxes. They understand the need for both approaches, the need to help students to establish their own voices, but to coach those voices to produce notes that will be heard clearly in the larger society.

The dilemma is not really in the debate over instructional methodology, but rather in communicating across cultures and in addressing the more fundamental issue of power, of whose voice gets to be heard in determining what is best for poor children and children of color. Will Black teachers and parents continue to be silenced by the very forces that claim to `give voice' to our children? Such an outcome would be tragic, for both groups truly have something to say to one another. As a result of careful listening to alternative points of view, I have myself come to a viable synthesis of perspectives. But both sides do need to be able to listen, and I contend that it is those with the most power, those in the majority, who must take the greater responsibility for initiating the process.

To do so takes a very special kind of listening, listening that requires not only open eyes and ears, but open hearts and minds. We do not really see through our eyes or hear through our ears, but through our beliefs. "To put our beliefs on hold is to cease to exist as ourselves for a moment-and that is not easy. It is painful as well, because it means turning yourself inside out, giving up your own sense of who you are, and being willing to see yourself in the unflattering light of another's angry gaze. It is not easy, but it is the only way to learn what it might feel like to be someone else and the only way to start the dialogue.

There are several guidelines. We must keep the perspective that people are experts on their own lives. There are certainly aspects of the outside world of which they may not be aware, but they can be the only authentic chroniclers of their own experience. We must not be too quick to deny their interpretations, or accuse them of `false consciousness.' We must believe that people are rational beings, and therefore always act rationally. We may not understand their rationales, but that in no way militates against the existence of these rationales or reduces our responsibility to attempt to apprehend them. And finally, we must learn to be vulnerable enough to allow our world to turn upside down in order to allow the realities of others to edge themselves into our consciousness. In other words, we must become ethnographers in the true sense.

Teachers are in an ideal position to play this role, to attempt to get all of the issues on the table in order to initiate true dialogue. This can only be done, however, by seeking out those whose perspectives may differ most, by learning to give their words complete attention, by understanding one's own power, even if that power stems merely from being in the majority, by being unafraid to raise questions about discrimination and voicelessness with people of color, and to listen, no, to *hear* what they say. I suggest that the

results of such interactions may be the most powerful and empowering coalescence yet seen in the educational realm-for *all* teachers and for *all* the students they teach.

Paulo Freire, *Teachers as Cultural Workers*. (Boulder/Oxford, 1998)
Sixth Letter: On the Relationship Between the Educator and the Learners

I now focus on an analysis of the relationship between educator and learners, a relationship that involves the questions of teaching, of learning, of the knowing-teaching-learning process, of authority, of freedom, of reading, of writing, of the virtues of the educator, and of the cultural identity of the learners and the respect that must be paid to it.

I consider testimony to be a coherent and permanent "discourse" of the progressive educator. I will try to think of testimony as the best way to call learners' attention to the validity that is proposed for the attainment of what is valued, for resolve in the struggle, with the goal of overcoming difficulties. An educational practice in which there is no coherent relationship between what educators say and what they do is a disaster.

What can be expected from teachers who protest against the administration's restrictions on their freedom to teach but who at the same time dishonorably restrict the freedom of the learners? Fortunately, on the human level, no mechanical explanation elucidates anything. We cannot declare that the students of such an educator will necessarily become apathetic or live in permanent rebellion. But it would be much better for them if they were not subjected to such a discrepancy between what is said and what is done. And of the testimony of saying and the testimony of doing, the stronger is doing because it has or can have immediate effects. The worst thing, however, for the training of the learner is that in the face of the contradiction between words and deeds, the learner tends not to believe what the educator says. If the educator makes a statement, the learner waits for the next action to detect the next contradiction. And this destroys the image that educators construct of themselves and reveal to the learners.

Children are extremely sensitive to teachers who do exactly the opposite of what they say The saying "Do what I say, and not what I do" is an almost Van n attempt to remedy the contradiction and the incoherence "Almost vain" because what is said and is being contradicted by what is done is not always completely oppressed. What is said has, at times, such a force in itself that it defends itself against the hypocrisy of one who while saying it does the opposite. But exactly because it is only being said and not lived, it loses much of its force. He who sees the contradiction occurring could well say to himself: "If what is being proclaimed but, at the same time, so strongly denied in practice were really a good thing, it would not only be said but lived."

One of the worst things in all this is the breakdown of the relationship between educator and learners.

And what can be said of the teachers who never assume authority in the classroom, who constantly show weakness, doubt, and insecurity in their relationship with the learners'

I remember myself as an adolescent, and how much it hurt me to see the disrespect that one of our teachers left himself open to, being the object of abuse by most of the students because he had no way of imposing order on the class. His class was the second of the morning, and, already beaten down, he came into the room where the young people with a mean streak waited to punish and mistreat him. On finishing this travesty of the class, he could not turn his back to the students and walk to the door. The boisterous jeers would fall on him, heavy and arresting, and this must have petrified him. From the corner of the room where I sat I saw him, pale, belittled, shrinking toward the door. He would open it quickly and disappear, wrapped in his unsustaining weakness.

I remember from my adolescence the image of that weak, defenseless, pale man who carried with him the fear of the boys who made his weakness a plaything, together with the fear of losing his job, in the fear generated by those kids.

While I witnessed the destruction of his authority, I, who dreamed of becoming a teacher, promised myself that I would never allow myself to be subjected to such a denial of my being, neither by the all-powerful authoritarian, the arrogant teacher who always has the last word, nor by the insecurity and complete lack of presence and power exhibited by that teacher.

Another testimony that should not be missing from our relationship with students is the testimony of our constant commitment to justice, liberty, and individual rights, of our dedication to defending the weakest when they are subjected to the exploitation of the strongest. It is important, also, in this daily task, to show students that there is beauty in the ethical struggle. Ethics and aesthetics are intimately tied together.

Do not say, however, that in areas of immense poverty, of dire need, these things cannot be accomplished. The experiences that teacher Madalena Freire Weffort lived personally for three years in a slum in Sao Paulo, in which, more than in any other context, she fully became an educator and a pedagogue (who has a political understanding of the task of teaching), were experiences in which this was possible. She is preparing a book about her experiences in a context lacking everything that our appreciation and our knowledge of class considers indispensable but full of many other elements that our knowledge of class scorns. In this text, she will certainly tell and analyze the story of little Carla, whom I quoted in one of my papers' and whose story is as follows: "Circling around the school, wandering in the streets of the neighborhood, half naked, with a face so dirty that it hid her beauty, an object of mockery by other children and

adults as well, she wandered around as a lost soul, and what was worse, she was lost from herself, a kind of nobody's little girl."

One day, Madalena said, the little girl's grandmother approached her to ask that her granddaughter be allowed into the school, saying also that they couldn't pay the almost token tuition set by the school administration. "I don't think there will be a problem about the payment. I do, however, have a requirement before accepting little Carla: that she come here to me clean, bathed, with at least some clothes. And that she come every day and not just tomorrow," said Madalena. The grandmother accepted this and promised that she would do what was asked. The next day Carla came to class completely changed. Clean, with a pretty face, her features uncovered, confident.

Cleanliness, a face free of dirt, highlighted Carla's presence in the classroom. She began to have confidence in herself. The grandmother likewise began to believe not only in Carla but in herself as well. Little Carla discovered herself; the grandmother rediscovered herself.

A naive bystander would say that the educator's intervention had been somewhat bourgeois, elitist, alienated-after all, how can one require that a child of the slums come to school bathed?

Madalena, in truth, fulfilled her duty as a progressive educator. Her intervention made it possible for the child and the grandmother to conquer a space - that of their dignity, in the respect of others. Tomorrow it will also be easier for Carla to recognize herself as a member of an entire class, as a worker, in search of a brighter future.

Without the democratic intervention of the educator, there is no progressive education.

So, just as it was possible for the teacher to intervene in the questions of hygiene that extend to the beauty of the body and of the world, from which resulted Carla's discovery and her grandmother's rediscovery, here is [n] reason why one cannot intervene in the problems that I referred to earlier. I believe that the basic question that we educators, quite lucid and ever more competent, should confront is that our relationship with the learners is one of the roads that we can take to intervene in reality over both the short and the long term. In this sense (and not only in this sense but in others as well), our relationship with the learners demands that we respect them and demands equally that we be aware of the concrete conditions of their world, the conditions that shape them. To try to know the reality that our students live is a task that the educational practice imposes on us: Without this, we have no access to the way they think, so only with great difficulty can we perceive what and how they know

It is my conviction that there are no themes or values of which one cannot speak, no areas in which one must be silent. We can talk about everything, and we can give testimony about everything. The language that we use to talk about this or that and the way we give testimony are,

nevertheless, influenced by the social, cultural, and historical conditions of the context in which we speak and testify. It should be said that they are conditioned by the culture of the class, by the reality of those with whom and to whom we speak and testify

Let us emphasize the importance of the testimony of sobriety, of discipline in doing things, of discipline in study; of the testimony in the care of the body, of the health; of the testimony in the honor with which educators carry out their work, in the hope with which they struggle for their rights, in the persistence with which they struggle against arbitrary judgment. The educators of this country have much besides content to teach to boys and girls, no matter from what social class they come. They have much to teach through the example of fighting for the fundamental changes that we need, of fighting against authoritarianism and in favor of democracy None of this is easy, but it all constitutes one of the battlefronts of the great struggle for a profound transformation of Brazilian society. Progressive educators need to convince themselves that they are not only teachers - this doesn't exist - not only teaching specialists. We are political militants because we are teachers. Our job is not exhausted in the teaching of math, geography, syntax, history. Our job implies that we teach these subjects with sobriety and competence, but it also requires our involvement in and dedication to overcoming social injustice.

It is necessary to unmask the ideology of a certain neoliberal discourse, called at times the "modernizing discourse," that, speaking about the present moment in history, tries to convince us that life is just like this: The most capable organize the world, they produce; the least capable, survive.[2] And, they say, "this conversation of dreams, of utopia, of radical change only gets in the way of the tireless hard work of those who really do produce; we should let them work in peace without the problems that our dreamy discourse causes, and one day there will be a lot left over to be distributed.

This unacceptable discourse against hope, utopia, and dreams defends the preservation of a society like ours, a society that functions for a third of its population, as if it were possible to bear an inappropriate size for a long time. It seems to me that the new age brings us the death of sectarianism but the birth of radicalism..[3] The sectarian positions in which we pretend to be the people who know the truth, a. truth that cannot be contested-positions that are still taken in the name of democracy--have less and less to do with a new age. In this sense, the progressive parties don't have much choice. Either they re-create and reinvent themselves in the radicalism of their dreams, or, dedicated to castrating sectarianisms, they perish, suffocated in Stalinist ideology. They become again, or they continue to be, old, leftist parties, without a soul, doomed to die of cold. And it's a pity that this risk exists.

Let's go back to the relationship between educators and learners, to the strength and importance in learners' preparation of educators' testimony and of the radicalism with which they act, with which they decide. In their testimony, they can and should see again, without difficulty, the position that they assumed in the face of the new elements that made them change. And their testimony will be so much more effective as they lucidly and objectively make clear to the learners

1. that changing one's position is legitimate, and
2. the reasons that made them change.

I do not think that educators need to be perfect saints. It is exactly as human beings, with their virtues and faults, that they should bear witness to the struggle for sobriety, for freedom, for the creation of the indispensable discipline of study, in which process educators must take part as auxiliaries since it is the task of learners to generate discipline in themselves.

Once educators begin the testimonial process, little by little learners begin doing it as well. This effective participation by learners is a sign that the testimony by educators is working. It is possible, however, for some learners to pretend to test educators to see if they are consistent or not. It would be a disaster if, in this case, educators reacted badly to the challenge. In reality, the majority of the learners that test teachers do so anxiously, hoping that they are not being fooled. They want educators to confirm that their testimony is true. In testing them, the learners really don't want to see them fail. But there are also those who provoke because they want educators to fail.

One of the mistakes made by educators, a mistake generated by an exorbitant self-esteem that does not make them very humble, is to feel hurt by the behavior of the learners, that is, to fail to admit that anyone could doubt them.

On the contrary, it is good to admit humbly that we are all human beings and, as such, imperfect. We are not perfect and infallible.

I remember an experience that I had, when I was recently returned from exile, with a group of graduate students from the Pontiff Catholic University of Sao Paulo.

On the first day of class, talking about how I saw the process of our meetings, I mentioned that I would like them to be open, democratic, free, that I would like our meetings to be such that we could exercise the right to our curiosity the right to ask, to disagree, to criticize.

One student said aggressively: "I would like to attend the course attentively-I will not miss a single meeting--to see if the dialogue you spoke of really will be realized."

When she finished, I made a brief comment about her right to doubt me, as well as her right to express her doubts publicly, it was my duty to prove, throughout the semester, that I was true to my discourse.

In fact, the young woman never missed a meeting. She participated in all of them, she revealed her authoritarian positions, which must have been the basis for her rejection of my past and my present antigovernment militancy. We never came to a meeting of the minds, but we maintained a climate of mutual respect until the end.

In the case of this woman, what really interested her was that I would misspeak myself the first day. I did not do so. I don't get offended if students put me to the test. I don't feel infallible, I know that I am imperfect. What irritates me is being accused of dishonesty. That is unfounded criticism, and there is a lack of ethics in the accusations.
In sum, the relationship between educators and learners is complex, fundamental, and difficult: it is a relationship about which we should think constantly. How nice it would be, nevertheless, if we tried to create the habit of evaluating it or of evaluating ourselves in it while we were educators and learners also.

How nice it would be, really, if we set, aside a regular time to work with learners, every two days, in which we would dedicate ourselves to the critical analysis of our language, of our practice, We would learn and we would teach together a tool indispensable to the act of studying: the registration of facts and of what is tied to them. The act of registering leads us to observe, compare, and select, to establish relationships between facts and things. Educators and learners would commit themselves to daily jotting down the moment: that had challenged them most positively or negatively from one meeting to the next.

I am convinced., moreover, that such a preparatory experience could be done, with a level of challenge appropriate to the age of the children, among those who do not yet write. To ask them to talk about how they experience their days in school would make it possible for them to engage in an education of the senses. It would demand that they pay attention to, observe, and select facts. With this we would also develop their verbal skills, which, since they contain the next stage, that of writing, should never be isolated. The children who speak in ordinary interpersonal situations are the children who write. If they don't write, their ability to write is impeded, and, only in exceptional cases, it becomes impossible for them.

When I was secretary of education of the city of Sao Paulo, I had an experience that I will never forget. In two city schools, I conversed for two hours mirth fifty, fifth- grade students one afternoon and again with forty the following day. The central topic of the meetings was how the young people saw their school and what kind of school they would like to have, how they saw themselves, and how they saw the teachers.

As soon as we began to work, in the first meeting, one of the young people asked me: "Paulo, what do you think of a teacher that makes a student standup, 'sniffing' the wall, as if he had done something wrong, as I admit that he did?" I responded: "I think the teacher made a mistake."

"What would you do if you found a teacher doing this?"
"I hope," I said, "that you and your colleagues do not assume that I should do the same with the teacher. This would be a foolish act, one that I would never commit. I would invite the teacher to appear the next day in my office, together with the school principal, with the teaching coordinator, and with someone else responsible for the permanent training of the teachers. In my conversation with the teacher I would ask him or her to prove that this behavior was appropriate, pedagogically, scientifically, humanly, and politically. If it couldn't be proven, which would be the greater likelihood, I would then make an appeal, first hearing the principal's opinion about the teacher who erred, with the understanding that this mistake should not be repeated."
"Very well. But if they should repeat the same process?" asked the young man.
"In that case. I would ask the judicial council of the secretary's office to study the legal means of punishing the teacher. I would rigorously apply the law," I answered.

The entire group understood, and I saw that these young people did not want an undisciplined climate but that they radically refused an arbitrary decision. They wanted a democratic relationship, one of mutual respect. They refused to submit with the blind obedience demanded by the limitless power of the authoritarian; they rejected the irresponsibility of permissiveness.

Perhaps some of them have since taken to the streets, with painted faces, shouting that it was worthwhile to dream.

The next day, with the other group, a restless young woman made the well-articulated comment: "I wanted a school, Paulo, that wasn't like my mother. A school that believed more in young people and that didn't think that some of them are just waiting around to make trouble for others."

Four hours, with ninety adolescents who reinforced in me the joy of living and the right to dream.

Duke Maskell and Ian Robinson, *The New Idea of a University*. (Thorverton, 2001). Chapter 1: Education as investment.

> In general economic success tomorrow will depend on investing in our schools today. (Gordon Brown)
>
> Society benefits from higher education to the extent that a graduate pays higher taxes, as well as earning a greater amount post-tax.... Thirdly, graduates may enhance the productivity of other people in ways not captured in their own incomes (one aspect of so-called externalities). (Dearing Report)

LIBERAL EDUCATION is not only not mentioned in either *The Charter for Higher Education, 1993* or the Dearing Report of 1997; both documents are saved from being explicitly enemies of liberal education only by their `completeness of unconsciousness' that there has ever been any such thing in the world.

Universities are supposed by the *Charter* to `deliver' a `service', namely higher education, to `customers', in two divisions, firstly students, and secondly business, which `buys' both education and the results of commissioned research. The `delivery' to students is by way of `teaching' or `effective management of... learning', in `courses', all of which have `aims and structures' clearly described in advance, and any of which includes `transferable skills like problem-solving and effective communication'. The standards of these providers of teaching are guaranteed by `quality assurance systems' which ,will be `regularly audited' and will enable applicants to discover `how well different universities and colleges are performing'.

Each of the phrases within quotation marks, and all of them cumulatively, betray a conception of higher education which is not only not that of the university, but is actively hostile to the university. They will be considered in the necessary detail below.

Education can be thought of in the modernized manner of the *Charter* because of a great discovery, made (like so much of our present civilization) during the 1960s, which has been transforming the whole `education service' ever since: education is an investment. Education is the same as training; education is useful; education will make us rich.

Historically it has been the other way round: a nation gets rich then uses some of the wealth to endow more universities not as engines of economic growth but as centres of piety, learning and thought. The `red-

brick', `provincial' universities were founded, as outposts of the spirit of Oxford and Cambridge, *after* the brass had been made out of the muck, and not to make more brass, but because, for instance, `The rise of modern Universities has accredited an ambassador of poetry to every important capital of industrialism in the country."

To give just one reminder of the dawn of the new idea in the 1960s, from a source that is a kind of anti-classic:

> First, a simple statement about [education]. There is too little of it. ... Let us be crude.
>
> I am not imagining the extreme slowness of our growth in national production. The figures are these: for 1938 let us take the national product as 100 for each case. In the United States it has since gone up to 225; in West Germany to 228; in the OEEC countries on average to 164, and here to under 150... [five more lines of figures about GDP]. There is something wrong with us. A good deal of what is wrong, though of course not all, should be put down to our educational deficiencies.'

So we needed more education to get our GDP increasing as fast as Germany's. A quarter of a century further on, Snow's policies had still not been fully applied and last year, despite the success of a great many British companies, the [average] American produced 20% more. Now one of the many reasons for that is, a lot of Americans are better trained and educated for their jobs. Nearly a decade later there was, it seemed, still a long way to go. The incoming Education Minister of the 1997 Labour Government greeted the Dearing Report with, `Our university system is in crisis. Our competitors in North America and the Far East have more young people going into higher education.' This despite the fact that `Thirty years ago, one in 20 young [British] people entered higher education. Today the figure is one in three.' [e] One in three is not enough for the economy in the competitive world of the third millennium. Forty years after the great discovery nobody would get a hearing in the Commons on education except by affirming it. If we are still not as rich as we could wish, the reason must still be under-investment and the remedy is, naturally, under the free market as it used to be under socialism, still more education, apparently without limit.

The three establishment parties unanimously turn the great discovery into policy. In the government reshuffle that followed his beating-off of a leadership challenge in 1995, Mr Major reaffirmed his belief in it by amalgamating two ministries and appointing a Minister *of Education and Employment,* an implied cause-and-effect that his Labour successors were happy to keep. Labour outbid Mr Major at its subsequent October conference by announcing its desire for a University *for* Industry, which on assuming power it made haste to found.

So when in 1997 Mr Blair declared his three priorities to be Education, Education, Education, he uttered the wisdom of the age, and was rewarded with the biggest Labour majority in history. `Invest in Education', as I was exhorted by a Liberal-Democrat poster hoisted in the marginal seat of Hereford the *day* before the 1997 general election, at which they gained the seat.

The consensus about education only leaves the parties to disagree about which can invest most. The Liberal Democrats, still at a safe distance from office, promised in the same general election campaign to put a penny on income tax to fund more education, and were rewarded by a doubling of their Commons representation; but the parties which have had the chance to Invest in Education have a very good track record that will be hard to beat. According to the latest available figures,' education in the UK costs about £38bn a year. This comes nearer to health (£46bn) than to defence, which at £24bn it comfortably exceeds. Education accounts for about 12 per cent of all government spending. Higher education costs about £6bn a year.

The investment is even greater when you take into account contributions by students and parents. In those dark days of minority elites 40 years ago we didn't have to pay a penny for our university fees or living expenses. Students from families rich enough to fail means tests now pay more than £1000 a year to fees and all their living expenses during their university years, and will graduate owing, as a matter of course, £10,000-12,000 or more.

All this could not have been achieved without the wholehearted co-operation of the university bureaucracies, which enthusiastically joined the post-1960s consensus. The `mission statement' of one university in 1996 expressed the general mood when it declared as one of its principal aims, `to facilitate regional economic growth and national wealth creation'. Philosophic academics as humane as the authors of *The Universities We Need* are in full accord: `One of the functions of higher education is to meet the needs of the economy (a point, we should say here and now, that we do not dissent from)... ." The universities' reward has been exponential expansion and the concomitant proliferation of careers and empires.

What a good job, then, that the investment, being so huge, is copper-bottomed and guaranteed by all the parties. They are so confident that none of them even needs to write into its prospectus the kind of warning which all other issuers of prospectuses are forced by law to use: the value of your investments can go down as well as up.

By education-be it in Beauty Science, Philosophy, European Food Studies, Pig Enterprise Management, Sanskrit or Early Childhood Studies with Sports Science-shall ye grow rich. But we are all prone to fears, and some of us to nightmares. What if education were not an investment? What if Mr Blair's election-winning cry of Education, Education, Education really

means Money-down-the-drain, Money-down-the-drain, Money-down-the-drain? The facts and figures we need to allay any such fear must surely be abundant and easy to find.

Let us ask about education the questions that are asked about all other investments: what risk is there? and what return on capital? What dividends *may* education be expected to pay and to quite whom? It is a testimony to the strength of our belief in education as investment that such simple questions are hardly ever asked. They do nevertheless appear, though not in a way that attracts any attention, in the Dearing Report.

The Report doesn't doubt, of course, that higher education is a very good thing but, in its main part, doesn't make it clear quite who it's a good thing for. The individual student, it says, can make it a good thing for himself we must `encourage the student to see him/herself as an investor in receipt of a service, and to seek, as an investor, value for money and a good return from the investment.'" But whether or not the tax-payer can do the same is something it (with good reason-as we shall see) can't make up its mind about. Although it does call the £6bn of taxes that goes into higher education every *year* an `investment', with a `backlog' which needs to be `addressed', it also calls it `costs', `expenditure' and `funding', and looks forward to the government's `delivering' a reduction in it.

Fortunately, the main report has attached to it two sub-reports by professional economists which do make it clear what returns graduates and tax-payers are each likely to get, no. 7 by Colin Sausman and James Steel of the Department of Education and Employment, on the `Contribution of graduates to the economy: rates of return', and no. 8 by Professor Norman Gemmell of the Department of Economics, University of Nottingham, on 'Externalities to higher education: a review of the new growth literature'. These have the authority of the best economic judgement (in the government's judgement) the government could buy. Whatever economic case these two reports make out for the expansion is officially the economic case for the expansion. And the economic case for expansion is the official case for expansion. What other case, official or unofficial, could there be?

These two reports ought to be well-known-by everyone who pays taxes and especially by those who haven't got degrees. And no-one ought to be put off by the fact that they are technical reports written by economists, for, far from it being the case that only economists can understand them, economists are the last people (the authors included) likely to understand them.

So *is* higher education a good investment? Well, for many graduates, for many years, it has been, and its value as investment is easily understood. The student's investment is what he pays in fees and what he loses in (net) earnings during the period of study; his return is the higher net wages he can expect to earn over a working lifetime as a graduate and then the higher pension." This is what the economists call the `private rate of return'. If the

graduate's.. costs are low enough, for instance because of generous subsidy by the state from taxes, and if the higher earnings are high enough, for instance in part because some jobs are reserved for graduates, it makes sound financial sense to get a degree. According to Sausman and Steel, the average yield has probably been about 12.5 per cent a year (Table 2.2).

The graduate's investment has some peculiarities. In one way it is rather like the purchase of an annuity. The capital invested in education is not retrievable and vanishes on the retirement or death of the graduate." In another way educational investment is very unlike an annuity, and indeed almost any other kind of investment, in that it only begins to pay dividends when you also in person work hard enough to earn them. It is not so with dividends on shares. The workers work and the shareholders are paid dividends. What allowance should be made for this peculiarity in thinking about the return on educational investment nobody seems to have asked. There are other questions, too, about whether the education causes the graduate's increased income or whether the relation is more problematic. And then Sausman's and Steel's calculations are based on figures ten or more years old. In the intervening years the proportion of the population doing degrees has increased very considerably and grants have been replaced by fees and loans, so the likelihood is that the economic value of a degree is less than it was. Still, let us accept the best current official figures. Given government subsidies, the return is not bad for those who get it. The question is, what about everyone else?

The financial benefit their education confers on those with degrees supplies in itself no clue as to whether or not a large higher education system sustained by subsidies makes good economic sense either for non-graduates or for the economy as a whole. Do non-graduates benefit economically from subsidizing the education of graduates? If they don't, where is the justice of the subsidy and where is the political case for continuing to expand higher education through the tax system? If they don't, can there even be *any* economic case for the expansion? Professor Gemmell says,

> If the gains from HE (in the form of higher wages) are all reaped by graduates themselves there is no immediate economic case for subsidising the HE system. State-funded education would merely be taxing some individuals (with resulting efficiency losses) in order to enhance the private gains to others. Indeed the subsidy will encourage some individuals at the margin to undertake a socially wasteful investment [1.3].

So, the semi-official (and wholly unpublicized) view seems to be that if it were only the graduates themselves who benefited from their subsidized education it would be both unjust and bad for the economy. Well, is it?

On the assumptions (which we will have more to say about later) that graduates are more productive than non-graduates, that it is their education that makes them so and that their greater productivity is measured by their higher pay, Sausman and Steel are able to calculate the `standard social rate of return' - the economic benefit society as a whole gets from graduates, which is analogous to the `private rate' which the graduates themselves get. The method of calculation is the same as that for the `private rate' but the measures are somewhat different, and the results are more problematic because some of the costs and benefits cannot be measured directly but have to be inferred from proxies. The costs are the fu l cost of tuition and the GDP lost to the economy as measured by the students' foregone earnings. The benefit is the supposed higher productivity of graduates as measured by the greater cost of employing them, i.e. higher gross wages plus employers' higher national insurance and pension contributions. The `standard social rate of return' accounts for the first two ways in which, Dearing says (see the start to the chapter), graduates benefit society as a whole, by earning more after tax and by paying more tax.

But economists also suppose that graduates are not only more productive themselves but make the non-graduates around them, both in their own and other firms, more productive too: in the phraseology of economics, there are beneficial 'externalities' or `spillovers' to higher education, what a non-economist might think of as `crumbs' (as in `from a rich man's table'). Professor Gemmell again:

> If higher education does render educated individuals more productive, the case for subsidising them rests on there being beneficial spillovers (externalities) to others. There may be spillovers both within and between firms so that gains to the economy as a whole exceed those accruing to the educated individuals [1.4].

This is Dearing's third way. These three ways in which graduates, as a class, are supposed to benefit the economy need looking at more closely. Numbered headings might be helpful.

I. WAYS ONE AND TWO-EARNING MORE AFTER TAX AND PAYING HIGHER TAXES-THE `STANDARD SOCIAL RATE OF RETURN'

From the raw results of Sausman's and Steel's calculations, it might sound to a non-economist as if everyone without a degree does quite well from their compulsory tax-investment in the education of people with them, for they share a return on the investment, apparently, of about 8 per cent (Table 2.1), which, though less than the 12.5 per cent the graduates themselves get, still sounds pretty good. But what non-economists are unlikely to guess is that this suppositious benefit to non-graduates is deduced almost entirely

from the higher pay of the graduates. Whether the higher wages and taxes do measure higher productivity is a question we shall raise below but, whether or not, it is surely startling to realize, if we are looking for the economic benefits to non-graduates, that it would make no difference at all to the so-called standard social rate of return calculation if, as Professor Gemmell suggests is possible, `the gains from HE [were] all reaped by the graduates themselves' (1.3). Even if the non-graduates got not a sniff of any benefits going, by way of taxation or otherwise, they would still be reckoned, according to the-what shall we call them?-counter-intuitive accounting procedures used by economists, to enjoy `a standard social rate of return' on their subsidy of other people's education of 8 per cent. It's as if someone else could enjoy benefits on your behalf.

It would equally make no difference to the social rate of return, of course, if the Chancellor (like the Sultan in the story below) took all the graduates' higher earnings in tax. It would still make no difference if he handed it over to the non-graduates straight away.

The economist father of a friend of my son's explained the point to me. `The *distribution* of the benefits,' he said, `has nothing to do with Economics. The "distribution problem" belongs in Ethics.' He illustrated the point. `Suppose,' he said, `there was a very poor country which, because oil was discovered there, became, in a very short time, immensely rich; but all the riches were taken by the Sultan for himself; and not only that, but the Sultan, being a cruel and tyrannical man, used his new riches to increase his own power and to rob and oppress his subjects, making everyone but himself even poorer and more wretched than they had been before. Now, is that country, as a whole, richer or poorer than before? In the eyes of us economists, the country *as a whole,* all its increased poverty and wretchedness notwithstanding, is immensely richer and has come to enjoy a marvellously high "social rate of return" on its oil investment. After all, we mustn't forget that the Sultan himself belongs to the country (even if it does seem rather as if it's the country that belongs to him). All we economists are interested is total GDP Everything after that is "the distribution problem". Nothing to do with us, old chap. You want someone in Ethics, down the road.'

Gordon Graham, ***Universities. The Recovery of an Idea.*** **(Thorverton: 2002) pp. 36-7, 47-8**

It is the conceptual difference between studying and being taught which is most worth uncovering for present purposes. Though it is not often made explicit in these terms, it is frequently evident in the practical experiences of those who cease to be pupils and become students. An important part of this practical experience is that students and colleges and universities find themselves much less subject to educational discipline than when they were pupils at school. It is true that in general the transition from school to higher education can be difficult, and this for a number of reasons, Chief among these, perhaps, is the fact that those making the transition are often leaving their parental homes for the first time. But the nature of their relation to their studies also changes in ways that can be unsettling. First, they are required to spend far less time in class. Second, their attendance is not subject to the scrutiny it was; there are (as yet) no university truant officers. Third, their work is far less directed. Of course there are great variations between institutions in this respect, and indeed between subjects and disciplines. Consequently, generalisation is fraught with risks. Nevertheless, it is broadly true that while pupils are for the most part directed by others, students are expected to be much more self-directed. There are deadlines for essays, lab reports and so on, to be met, and there are examinations to be passed. But just how these are prepared for is largely a matter for the student to decide.

The vast majority of universities now require their staff to issue questionnaires by means of which students may express their opinions of the courses of study they have taken Opinion amongst academics differs as to the value of these, but it should be recorded that though the administrative burden of processing them tends to be mildly resented, they are resisted in principle by relatively few. Yet, as it seems to me, the assumptions on which these course evaluations % rest are much more interesting and important than the mechanics of f0f their deployment.

On what is a student to base his or her opinion of a course? The answer, I think, can only be subjective preference, not an estimation of objective worth. Why this is and why it matters are topics that take us to the 1 heart of the confusions surrounding contemporary university education.

The provider of a consumer good has one main aim - to satisfy the pre-existent desire of the purchaser. Accordingly, the manufacturer of videos, the inventor of computer games, the restaurateur, the purveyor of holidays, must satisfy the desires of consumers. This is not to deny that consumer demand can be created, that consumers can be introduced to new forms of enjoyment Still, if the desire to be satisfied is mine, I am sovereign in deciding what does and does not satisfy it. There are no doubt worthy

and unworthy desires but it is not the business of the supplier of discriminate along these lines, except as a matter of personal restriction. Those who aim at successfully supplying the desires of the consumer can, for their own reasons, draw the line at being a pimp or a prostitute. Commercialism as such places no such restriction.

The point to focus on is the sovereignty of the consumer's desires and preferences. There is no place for producers setting out terms on which the goods they produce ought to be wanted or are worth wanting. Now the position is different where the relationship is one between the expert and the inexpert. This is typically the case in education….

Derek Bok, ***Universities in the Marketplace. The commercialization of higher education.*** **(Princeton: 2003) pp. 1-2, 18**

IT IS ONE OF THE UNWRITTEN, AND COMMONLY UNSPOKEN COMMONPLACES LYING AT THE ROOT OF MODERN ACADEMIC POLICY THAT THE VARIOUS UNIVERSITIES ARE COMPETITORS FOR THE TRAFFIC OF MERCHANTABLE INSTRUCTION IN MUCH THE SAME FASHION AS RIVAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE RETAIL TRADE COMPETE FOR CUSTOM. (Thorsten Veblen, 'The higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Businessmen' (1918))

Commercial practices may have become more obvious, but they are hardly a new phenomenon in American higher education. By the early 1900s, the University of Chicago was already advertising regularly to attract students, and the University of Pennsylvania had established a "Bureau of Publicity" to increase its visibility. In 1905, Harvard was concerned enough about its profitable football team to hire a 26-year-old coach at a salary equal to that of its president and twice the amount paid to its full professors. As President Andrew Draper of the University of Illinois observed, the university "is a business concern as well as a moral and intellectual instrumentality, and if business methods are not applied to its management, it will break down." What is new about today's commercial practices is not their existence but their unprecedented size and scope.

Most of Bok's book is about ways in which American universities run aspects of themselves for profit.

Harold T. Shapiro, *A Larger Sense of Purpose. Higher education and society*. (Princeton: 2005) pp. 113-5: 'Professional education'

Throughout much of the history of higher education, professional schools and their faculties dominated the university. This is no longer the case. Indeed, I want to consider the following questions: Does professional education stand on the periphery of the "real university"? How does a liberal arts education relate to a professional education? My two conclusions: Professional education does not now and never did stand on the periphery of the university, and the basic aims of professional education are startlingly similar to the aims of a liberal arts education. Indeed, the most valuable part of education for any learned profession is that aspect that teaches future professionals to think, read, compare, discriminate, analyze, form judgments, and generally enhance their mental capacity to confront the ambiguities and enigmas of the human condition. After all, a learned profession is in part a mode of cultural explanation and social understanding. Given my conclusions, I call for a closer partnership between the faculties of professional schools and the faculties of the arts and sciences.

I would like to begin by asking, in a rather rhetorical fashion, a provocative question, and then provide what some may consider equally provocative answers. My question is: Why are the faculties of so many professional schools, particularly those at research universities, anxious or uneasy about their status within the university? Another way of posing this question is: Why have the arts and sciences faculties come to believe that they are the sole definers and defenders of the soul of the university? Adopting such an attitude is possible only when one exaggerates the differences between a liberal education on the one hand and professional education on the other, or consciously or unconsciously pits them against each other. This rivalry may be a historical legacy of the fact that throughout most of the history of higher education, the professional faculties dominated the university. Only over the last century or so has the influence of the arts and science faculties grown and been productive, though in truth this influence is somewhat exaggerated.

Interestingly, among the four faculties of the medieval university, Philosophia (arts and sciences) was the poor sister of theology, medicine, and law. Indeed, preparation for the learned professions of law, theology, and medicine was the primary raison d'être of both the medieval and the Colonial university. Moreover, as I have already noted, higher education in America began quite clearly as professional education. How do we square this history with the widespread myth that the liberal arts alone occupy the

moral high ground of the university and that the arts and sciences faculty must serve as the guardian of the university's soul? This distorted image of both the history and the current reality of higher education needs to be put aside before it hinders the ongoing vitality of the entire enterprise.

Let me return, however, to the issue of why some professional schools are uneasy about their role within the university. Is it that:

1. They are anxious because Thorstein Veblen suggested that law schools had as much reason to be part of the university as dancing schools? If ancient and learned professions such as law occupy an uneasy seat, no wonder the other professional schools are anxious! On the other hand, it is hard to know whether some of Veblen's best-known assertions are meant as social criticism or social satire!
2. They are uneasy because their professional and/or scholarly claims are tenuous, or because they cannot fully establish the validity of requiring a certain knowledge and skill base before allowing entrance to the profession?
3. They are anxious because they are not sure of their professions' prerogatives to judge one another's mistakes, to charge fees independent of outcomes, and to control state licensing? Their colleagues in the arts and sciences probably share this particular anxiety.
4. They are anxious because they believe that they are indeed at the periphery of the institution, particularly if they do not teach undergraduates?
5. They are uneasy because universities in the English-speaking world remain in the thrall of Cardinal Newman's (1999, p. 51) assertion that "a university after all should be formally based and live in the faculty of Arts…"? He only grudgingly added, ".. .with a reasonable association with the learned professions of law, medicine and theology."

I believe that Cardinal Newman had it quite wrong, both as regards society's aspirations for the university and as a matter of the actual historical record. I prefer Alfred North Whitehead's (1929, p. 139) view of the university: "The justification for a university is that it preserves the connection between knowledge and the zest for life [i.e., via the necessary movement of questions, ideas, and scholarship between professional schools and center of research and teaching in the arts and sciences] and by involving the young and the old in the imaginative [i.e., speculative and reflective] consideration of learning." In a similar vein, one might recall the thoughtful remark of W E.B. DuBois (1903, p. 84): "Education ... [is] that organ of fine adjustment between real life and the growing knowledge of life."

Iran Mohammadi-Heuboeck, 'Aspects of Bilingualism in Iranian Kurdish Schoolchildren', in Colin Brock & Lila Zia Levers eds., Aspects of Education in the Middle East and North Africa (Didcot, 2007) 127-40

Introduction

Iran as a nation state is a relatively recent construction, dating back to the twentieth century, propagated by the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-79), and adapted after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Iranian state is its multiethnic and multilingual composition. The biggest ethnic groups are Persians, Azeri and Kurds; other groups comprise Balouchis, Bakhtiyaris, Ghashghaais, Lots, Arabs, Turkamens, all speaking different mother tongues. This situation of high ethnic and linguistic diversification is paralleled by a strict administrative and political centralism, where the Persian language (Farsi) dominates local ethnic languages in formal settings. This is particularly true of the educational system. Despite article XV of the Constitution, which grants ethnic minorities teaching in their languages, almost all of the teaching in Iranian schools is delivered in Persian.

It has been noted that school is one of the major contexts where construction and unification of the nation takes place (Deloye, 1994; Legrand, 1988; Payet, 2000, p. 141). The experience of bilingualism in the new Kurdish generation and the role of language is thus to be considered a significant reflection of the process of the construction of individual identity. The contact of local and national languages at school, i.e. of Persian and Kurdish in our case, is at the core of the interaction between traits of ethnic and national identities.

For a number of reasons, school seems to be a social setting of crucial importance for the study of bilingualism in the Iranian Kurdish area. Historically, it has been one of the domains of conscious linguistic and cultural centralism by Iranian governments since the early twentieth century. School is certainly the one national institution which aims at assimilating the entire (young) population by incorporating them in a rigid system of power over a long period of time …

This particular role of the school as a location for indoctrination in national identity dates back to the 1920s and is linked to efforts towards modernisation of the country under the Pahlavi dynasty and the growing domination of a central state over the country to achieve a kind of national integrity. The creation of the modem school and an educational system, imposed as `one of the major national institutions' (Paivandi, 1995, p. 1154), is one of the most important structural changes to have occurred during the period between 1920 and 1940. From the very beginning, Reza Shah (1925-

41) thus perceived the field of education as `a potential power in the country cohesion regarded as a Nation' (Menasheri, 1992, p. 94). Under his reign and afterwards in the Islamic Republic, debates took place over educational materials, content matters, and language policy. Schoolbooks in the whole country were published exclusively in Persian, and the entire content of teaching decreed by the national authorities propagated the one legitimate identity across the country (Castells, 1997, p. 18).

One side effect of this administrative and linguistic centralism imposed on an ethnically diverse country was that the official language, Persian, originally the language of the ethnic group of Persians, was put into close contact with a variety of regional languages, giving rise to politically motivated situations of bilingualism throughout the country. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the centralised structure in the educational system remains in place despite all the debates and negotiations and even the official recognition of the right of ethnic minorities to receive education in their own language.

Since the creation of the modem centralised school, the claim for linguistic decentralisation of education, i.e. the right to deliver education in the Kurdish language, has become an important part of the political programme of Kurdish autonomists. The tension between autonomist claims and the uninterrupted centralist policy of Iranian governments resulted in two periods of crisis in recent history. For eleven months, educational autonomy of the Kurdish parts of Iran was attempted during the so-called Republic of Mahabad, established as the result of a civil war between Kurdish autonomists and the Iranian government in 1946, when for the first time education was delivered in Kurdish.

After the autonomists' defeat in 1946, the issue of autonomy in education stayed on the agenda and was raised again after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The second attempt to deliver teaching in the Kurdish language was made by the Kurdish political parties, the DPIK and the Komala, between 1980 and 1984, when the conflict once more reached a military dimension (depending on one's viewpoint, the parties speak of `civil war' or `armed resistance'). In the so-called `liberated area', both the DPIK and the Komala, united in their goals, but rivals as advocates of the cause of the Kurdish minority, opened primary and secondary schools where Kurdish was the language of teaching and also published schoolbooks for the first two years of primary school in Kurdish.

Since the establishment of the centralised educational system, and in spite of an ongoing tradition of Kurdish protests against Iranian monoculturalism, the school has become an important agent in the process of socialisation of the Kurdish youth, where it takes on a particular role in the complex process of construction of the identity of Kurdish adolescents. This process is characterised by the interaction of three groups of actors - the state, present in the official institution of school; traditional Kurdish

culture, represented to Kurdish adolescents by their parents; and the peer group of the young generation of Iranian Kurds. The interplay between school and family institutions illustrates the problematic relationship between minority and majority in a dualism of local and national identification.

This chapter aims to draw attention to some basic aspects of bilingualism in Iranian Kurdish schools and proposes a preliminary analysis of the complex system in which the Persian and Kurdish languages interact in the everyday experience of Iranian Kurdish adolescents.

The data on which the present chapter is based consists of 120 interviews with schoolchildren, their parents and teachers in the two Iranian Kurdish provinces of Kermanshahan and Sannandadj, conducted in the wider context of investigating the process of construction of Kurdish adolescent identity through a range of dimensions - linguistic, political, religious and various aspects of everyday culture (Mohammadi, 2004). It turns out that school plays a crucial role in shaping the attitude of Kurdish adolescents as well as that of their parents towards Kurdish language and culture - resulting in either the abandonment of their traditional ethnic culture, or its transmission in a form adapted to the reality of institutionalised hegemony of Persian culture. I will commence by discussing those forces that lead parents to abandon the transmission of the Kurdish language within the family, followed by the effects of this rupture on the experience and identity of Persian-speaking Kurdish adolescents. Another pattern of reaction to this forced bilingualism, to be discussed in a following section, consists of the emergence of Kurdish nationalist tendencies among Kurdish schoolchildren. I will then go on to briefly discuss the question of self-image and the feeling of belonging.

Continuity and Rupture in the Transmission of Kurdish Language and Culture

To the young generation, traditional Kurdish culture is in the first place represented by their Kurdish-speaking parents and family. However, the role of families as the site of transmission of traditional ethnic culture is nowadays rivalled by school, oriented by the reference culture of Persian. Whereas formerly, Kurdish culture and language were transmitted homogeneously from one generation to the next in the private sphere, two models arise
nowadays: one of continuity, opposed to the other of discontinuity in the transmission of the ethnic culture. In the case of discontinuity, i.e. a rupture in the transmission of the Kurdish language, Kurdish is substituted with Persian as the language parents use when talking to their children. Persian thus is no longer perceived by the parents exclusively as the `language of

school' or `language of Persians' but the language of `our children', even if the command of Persian by many parents is rather poor and inadequate. Despite their attachment to Kurdish identity, these parents proceed to a 'selfelimination' (Bourdieu, 1982, p. 53) by substituting Persian for Kurdish at home. A new pattern of linguistic identity gradually emerges, as the transmission of Kurdish is on the decline and the young generation's linguistic identity shifts towards the official language.

This rupture in the transmission of the Kurdish language can be observed in three types of families: first, in young or middle-aged illiterate parents from either the lower or the middle class speaking Kurdish as their first language, but who use Persian or a mixture between Persian and Kurdish when speaking to their children. Second, in large families, Persian is often the language of only the youngest children whereas the other family members (parents and the elder children) still speak Kurdish as their first language. Thirdly, the substitution of Kurdish with Persian is practised by young parents who have themselves received education in Persian in the centralised educational system.

There are various considerations for the linguistic substitution of Kurdish as the language of the new generation. It should be pointed out, however, that this practice does not imply any negative attitude towards Kurdish culture and identity. In the first place, education in the Persian language is here perceived as giving the children better chances in a situation of stiff competition as it is faced in school. In this case, the desire for success at school motivates parents, especially mothers, to speak Persian with their children even before they start school. They thus proceed to `anticipated socialisation' (Merton, 1965, p. 84) in Persian in order to maximise their possibilities to climb the social scale.

A mother of three children, thirty-nine years old, from the city of Kermanshah says:
My husband is Kurdish, I speak to him in Kurdish, but I speak Persian with my children because it is for school, especially for the elementary level. I am concerned if they do not learn their lessons.
A mother of four children, also in Kermanshah, says:
With my elder son we used to speak Kurdish, poor child, he was completely lost at his first year at elementary school. His teacher advised us to speak to him in Persian because he had not understood anything at school. Then we spoke to him in Persian, and we saw that his marks got better and better and that he understood his lessons.

Whether advised by teachers as the representatives of state authority or undertaken by the parents at their own will, based on considerations of utility, substituting Kurdish with Persian in the family has become more and more a common phenomenon, in particular since the Islamic Republic, as the incidence of schooling is higher than before the Revolution of 1979 for

both boys and girls. The parents are more concerned about the professional future of their children, which is closely related to mastering the official language.
The cultural disapproval of Kurdish is another result of the modernisation of school, contributing significantly to the discontinuity of the transmission of Kurdish. The `hierarchy of linguistic use' (Bourdieu, 1982, p. 34), attributing Persian the valued status of the language of school and social promotion, encourages parents (whether they be illiterate or have themselves received education) to neglect the transmission of Kurdish to their children to avoid cultural and social stigma attached to speakers of Kurdish.

For instance, a mother of three children, aged forty, says:
I am Kurdish, I speak with my children both in Kurdish and in Persian, but mostly in Persian. Outside, in the street and in our area, they make fun of Kurdish speakers, that's why I prefer Persian. It is also good for their school. I thought they could learn Kurdish later.
A secondary school teacher explains why she wants to speak to her newborn child in Persian:
If we can take myself as an example, as I have spoken Kurdish from the start, in certain situations when I was in a group of speakers of Persian, I could not make myself understood as I wanted. If I had learnt Persian from the beginning of my life, I would probably be more at ease to express my opinions and
feelings.

Conflicts of Identity

Whether cultural or educational considerations cause parents to substitute Persian for Kurdish, the young generation's identity is shaped in a conflict-laden environment. The resulting dichotomous intergenerational opposition of the two languages, together with the dominance of Persian over Kurdish within the family, also entails a shift in the way in which these young Kurds perceive their relation to their ethnic group. They are simultaneously characterised by a detachment from this group and a differentiation within the complex question of ethnicity. Thus, they see themselves as distinct from both Persians and from Kurds: what separates them from Persians is the fact that their families' language is Kurdish. However, speaking Persian, they do not consider themselves as being Kurds either. Characteristically, other aspects of the Kurdish identity, such as the historical, cultural and religious, are totally obscured by the question of the language.

The experience of linguistic difference that separates these young Kurdish speakers of Persian from their parents directly leads to a

depreciation of signs of Kurdish ethnic culture, now stereotypically associated with rural areas. The relation between speakers of Kurdish and Persian is conceived in terms of a logic of exclusion, as one between `the installed and the excluded' (Elias, 1997, pp. 55-56), where the attributes `urban', `educated' and `cultivated' are associated with speakers of Persian, whereas speakers of Kurdish are perceived as `rural' and `uneducated'.

This stereotypical stigmatisation of the Kurdish language can already be seen in schoolchildren's discourse; for instance, Mahasti, aged fourteen, says:

Today, Kurdish is only spoken by the farmers, and for me who has never been to the countryside, there is no reason to speak it.

Taraneh, aged seventeen, says:

I am very happy to speak Persian, because the Kurds do not have culture. I do not like the Kurdish language. It reminds me of the countryside, the village, it is disgusting. As I see that only farmers speak it, it does not have any value for me. I do not like it.

According to Teymour, aged sixteen:

I speak Persian at home and at school. Persian is more important and more valuable. As the Kurds are not really cultured and they behave roughly. I don't like to speak that language, nor read or write it.

Cultural references are then expressed in more individualistic terms detached from any Kurdish collective identity. These young Kurds do not consider themselves as members of the Kurdish ethnic group any more, but as individuals. Individual benefits and self-image are at the focus of their attention.

The individualistic focus of youth culture contributes to widening the intergenerational gap between children and the older members of their family. The struggle for an identity defined in individualistic terms, therefore, is directed not only against the model of `rural' (as it is perceived) Kurdish culture, but also against the parents, who belong or at least belonged to this culture. This contradiction between cultures within the one family is experienced as a crisis of identity on two levels, concerning the relations within the family on the one hand, and the adolescent's presentation of self in their surrounding social environment on the other.

In the private sphere, the adolescent cultural references are not defined any more by the family culture, but emerge as the result of personal preferences. These young Kurds seize every opportunity to distance themselves from their parents' cultural references and values by introducing elements of the Persian culture in their everyday lives, which bring them closer to the dominant national culture of speakers of Persian. A cultural gap separates them from their parents: they question their families' values and opinions, associated with the Kurdish language, considering the fact that they speak Persian as a sign of modernity and social prestige that separates them even more from their parents. The cultural gap and

situations of conflict are expressed where adolescents are talking among themselves and criticising their parents' attitudes and opinions by mocking them in Kurdish. The disagreement with their parents is interpreted by these young Kurds as conflict between generations and associated directly with detachment from their ethnic community.

In public, even though these adolescents successfully present themselves as having assimilated the national identity by speaking Persian either in a local or a Tehranian accent and thus conceal their Kurdish origin, they suffer from a constant threat that this origin might be revealed to others. The feeling of discomfort and shame for their parents, or their family who master Persian only poorly, is common among them. These adolescents put much effort into concealing their parents' Kurdish identity in the social sphere, both in front of their peer group and at school. Fearing that they may `lose the facade' (Lipiansky, 1990, p. 187) of being Persian, they refuse to let their parents, their mothers in particular, come to school in person.

Demand for Self-recognition in the Educational Centralised System

In contrast to the previous group of Persian-speaking Kurds who have made the Persian culture their frame of reference and detached themselves from Kurdish for either practical or aesthetic reasons, another group of Kurdish adolescents defend their ethnic identity, demanding recognition by the same centralised school.

It is important to note that, in the case of adolescents who stick to the Kurdish language, domination of Persian is not viewed exclusively in terms of refusal and contestation but in terms of coexistence between the ethnic and local identities. They approach school in two parallel ways: on one hand, they see it as a legitimate place for the creation of a national unity, including linguistic cohesion. However, protestation against the Persian-speaking culture arises when the pupils cannot find any traces of their local and ethnic identity in the centralised system.

A fifteen year-old boy from Kermanshah writes:

There is nothing on the Kurds in our books at school. In Iran, we have many minorities, and the Kurds are one of them. It would be good if our books would speak about us, our language, culture and religion alongside the Shiites and the Persian speakers.

According to this young Kurd, the role of schoolbooks in reflecting the multiethnic reality of the people of Iran has two sides. On the one hand, by demanding that their ethnic minority with its particular history and cultural characteristics be mentioned in the schoolbooks, they express, in Lipiansky's (1990, p. 180) terms, a need for `existence and valuation' on the

local scale. On the other hand, schoolbooks are thought of as a means to achieve `social visibility' (Moscovici, 1979, pp. 223-225) on a national level.

As for the linguistic aspect of the centralised educational system, the demand to be taught in the Kurdish language reflects the desire to be recognised as Kurds as a reaction to the perceived threat to the existence of their ethnic group.

It is the wish of everybody in my class that the Kurds have some hours of classes in the Kurdish language. As the majority of us are Kurds, that would have positive effects. We like to speak Kurdish as it is our language. (Siyavash, seventeen year-old boy from Kermanshah)

We are not demanding everything in Kurdish or all of our books to be written in our language. But we would like some units of teaching in that language. Nowadays, it is planned that two hours per week be taught in Kurdish at the faculty of Sannandadj. Do you realise how proud that makes us? (Parastou, a sixteen year-old girl at secondary school in the city of Sannandadj)

The need for identifying themselves by means of school and establishing a close relationship with their place of education is grounded in the fact that the Kurdish language, as one integral part of their identity, is systematically denigrated by the central power. The fear of a loss of the Kurdish language is growing more and more, as national educational policy aims to force everybody through the same language (Persian).

All of our classes are in Farsi, the students do not see the necessity to learn Kurdish, while the government, in parallel, aims to devalue our language. Our young generation thinks that Kurdish is an accent, not knowing that Kurdish is an independent language which has its own proper writing system. They know Kurdish only as a means of oral communication. It is said that one day the Kurds will separate themselves from the rest of Iran. There is no place for linguistic minorities in the schoolbooks and in our educational system. I am being sectarian about condemning Persian, I even listen to Persian music. (Nashmine, seventeen year-old girl, from Sannandadj)

The claim for recognition of the Kurdish minority by education in general is supported by teachers concerned about the preservation of Kurdish ethni identity. While their task is to transmit the political objectives of the centralised school, and accept the centralism of Persian at school to be judged as positive for the education of the young generation, they also defend the right to be taught in Kurdish within the centralised school:

It is true that Persian is our official language and common to all Iranians; it must find its roots within every Iranian. But imperatively, we must think of other languages besides it. We must not let other languages disappear in Iran. (Teacher in Sannandadj)

The fear of the loss of the Kurdish language is only one aspect of the teachers' concern; a further aspect is that by demanding the right to have

some Kurdish courses, teachers react to what they perceive as a feeling of shame and discomfort among Kurdish-speaking pupils, caused by the official institution's intolerance towards the linguistic minority.

Besides Persian, there must be Kurdish. Kurdish children must be taught in Kurdish so that they do not think they are nothing, and that importance is given to the Persian language only. (Female teacher in Sannandadj)

The pupils like us to speak to them in Kurdish. But we insist that they learn to speak Persian. If they are strong at it, it is better for them. If they are unable to speak Persian, tomorrow in their place of work they feel inferior to others. They will be timid and will not express themselves. Therefore, it is our duty to teach them Persian. But, at the same time, it is our wish that they should not forget their Kurdish mother tongue. (Teacher in the city of Sannandadj)

The demand for recognition of Kurdish culture in the centralised school suggests a lack of balance between local and national culture and identity. This feeling of imbalance leads Kurdish adolescents to question the centralised system, in which they risk being deprived of their local identity in a number of respects. At this point, their experience becomes politically relevant. Where Kurdish pupils do not contest the educational system, it is, among other things, because of the hope that the fifteenth article of the Constitution, granting linguistic minorities the right to be taught in their own language, will be fulfilled.

Bilingualism at School as a Political Issue

The feeling of belonging to the Iranian nation, either by denying the local identity or accepting the coexistence between the ethnic and official identities, is not the only reaction engendered by linguistic centralism at school. Another, more violent reaction consists in refusing the government's claim of linguistic and cultural hegemony, perceived as a political issue. With adolescents speaking Kurdish, we have a new group who view school as a political tool employed by the central state in the interest of domination of Persian culture at school. Within the fragment of school, they oppose their own political goals, the struggle for the `Kurdish cause', to the ones of the central state. This way of politicising the institutional environment of school may be thought of as ethnic nationalism. We will see that three different patterns of behaviour and identity at school may be subsumed under this label.

The first group of pupils includes those who are most successful at school and have a positive approach towards Persian. One major aspect of their acceptance of Persian as the language of the state is that they see the Kurdish minority related to speakers of other minority languages and Persian as a means of inter-ethnic communication common to all Iranians as

a lingua franca. Most importantly, however, they believe that only by succeeding in a system dominated by Persian will Kurds have the possibility to assist the Kurdish people. They hope to achieve, in the long term, an influential professional position, which will give them the power and the opportunity to participate in developing the Kurdish area. Being schooled in another language, and in particular being successful at it, may lead to problems in their everyday lives for these adolescents, whose parents mostly do not know how to read or write, and are still illiterate, like their parents, in their own language. As a consequence, they are developing a feeling of guilt, the fear of loss and the feeling of responsibility for their ethnic language. Faroukh, a nineteen year-old student from the city of Sannandadj, says:
We are forgetting the Kurdish language. We do not know how to read or write in our language. On the oral level, this language is losing its richness. Many Farsi words have entered into it, because we did not learn their equivalent in Kurdish. If some subjects at school were taught in our language, it would be better. In any way we are going to speak Kurdish forever and with our children as well.
Parastou, sixteen years old, from Sannandadj, says:
If I have the possibility to choose between these two languages, I choose Kurdish. This is my mother tongue. I speak it with my friends. The only exception is when I speak to my teachers because it is obligatory to speak Persian with them. Our identity is Kurdish, our roots are Kurdish. It does not mean that I do not like Persian, but there should also be some subjects at school taught in the Kurdish language, for example, Kurdish literature or religious instruction.

Besides these successful students with a marked Kurdish identity, a second group of schoolchildren, unsuccessful and unable to cope with the difficulties they face at school, develop a political resistance against the ideology of the centralised school. In the first place, they view their lack of success as a personal failure. In many of our interviews, young boys and girls who have abandoned school started out by saying that they may be useless for the interview because they quit school and had no access to further education. They interpret their experience of school failure right away as a lack of motivation and effort, or of intelligence, because in the same situation other pupils from the same monolingual Kurdish area are successful at school. This often gives rise to a feeling of shame. However, as the interview goes on, they may come up with other reasons, political ones, such as their opposition to the central government, to account for their lack of success. Often, it is implied, or even said explicitly, that had they been allowed to study in their own language they might have done so with more success. They link their failure at school to the language of teaching, and this becomes the point of departure for ideological exploitation on the part of both the central government and the Kurdish resistance.

Finally, a third group of adolescents categorically oppose any presence of the state on a local scale. This third group perceive in the present centralism a reflection of historical attempts of the state - both of the Islamic Republic and Pahlavi dynasty - to dominate the Kurdish people. School as an institution is regarded as a political tool of the government to divert the new generation from their ethnic origin and thus constitute a threat to the Kurdish society. Speaking of Kurdish culture and society, they refuse all changes in Kurdish linguistic practice, whether they be imposed by the government or brought about by the new Kurdish generation's own attitudes and behaviour. Their criticism goes beyond the dominant role of Persian at school and spreads to other fields such as art or the local media. While in general it is largely believed that Kurdish language programmes on the local radio or television ease the political tension between the minority and the government, for this group of adolescents, all local programmes in the Kurdish language are seen as a strategic ploy used by the government, which plans a gradual deterioration of Kurdish by mixing Kurdish and Persian.

Whenever there seems to exist a chance to obtain some degree of autonomy or decentralisation, from the government, the political resistance of this group of actors is directed towards the Kurds who have contributed to any changes in the Kurdish society. This is because they see them as a force in the decline of Kurdish identity among the new generation.

Once more, the phenomenon of stigmatisation can be observed in the relations between Kurdish adolescents of these different groups: those who introduce Persian words into the Kurdish language or who speak Persian are stigmatised as `collaborators' or `traitors'. Such segregation within the Kurdish society is expressed in the words of Gelareh (eighteen years, from
Sannandadj):

There are Kurds who have been Kurds for several generations and who now speak Persian. They think by doing so they can gain prestige. I know a child of Kurdish parents who continues to speak Persian only because she used to live in Teheran for some time. She has lived in Sannandadj for eight years now, and there is no reason for her to speak Persian. To punish such people, we do not address one word to them in Persian. We, the Kurds, will never speak Persian with other Kurds, even if they want it.

We can thus see that the linguistic choice has important implications concerning both peer-to-peer relationships and the projection of a legitimate frame of cultural reference for social actions. On the one hand, the Kurdish language is used as a tool for discriminating young Persian-speaking Kurds, legitimated by the idea of the Kurdish ethnic community (as practised by the third group discussed above) to display political and cultural resistance. On the other hand, Persian is employed by Kurdish adolescents as a tool for

exercising social pressure on speakers of Kurdish, drawing its legitimisation from the frame of a national culture (linked to `official' political power).

Conclusion

It has been shown in the preceding discussion how the Iranian school is a crucial factor in the process of construction of a linguistic identity for young Iranian Kurds, whereby the situation has been described as one of a conflictladen contact between two cultures, represented by two languages, the local, ethnic culture of Kurdish and the national, dominating one, of Persian. Characteristic identity patterns have been illustrated emerging out of this conflict, and so we can now attempt, with a few concluding remarks, to provide a synthesis of these complex relations.

Firstly, a process of cultural detachment from the ethnic minority can be observed with young Kurds whose parents, in spite of their attachment to the ethnic identity, choose to discontinue the transmission of the traditional language by speaking Persian to their children. The adolescents from these families view this discontinuity as a sign of modernity and social prestige distinguishing themselves from their - `traditional', `outdated' - Kurdish parents. They disapprove of the Kurdish culture and community and try to conceal their ethnic origins both in their private and social lives. Thus, the Kurdish-Persian bilingualism implies an unequal relation between the local and the official language, diametrically opposing local and national identities.

In the second category, when the young Kurds' mother tongue remains Kurdish, bilingualism can lead to a feeling of discomfort, illustrated in the overwhelming feeling of shame for linguistic errors or a strong local accent when these Kurdish adolescents speak Persian. The adolescents in this second group stick to their local identity and despite the denial of a linguistic programme for the minorities at school, claim to be recognised equally in the same centralised school. Their demand to be granted the right to be taught in their own language in a centralised school demonstrates their need to identify themselves through their school, as well as the new generation's quest for a balanced relationship between their national and local identities.

Finally, the conflict-laden bilingualism caused by Persian dominance throughout school results in the growth of Kurdish self-awareness, reinforcing nationalist tendencies in young Kurds still educated in the continuity of their ethnic tradition and culture. We have distinguished three categories of pupils that defend their linguistic identity whereby their attitude towards the central government may be more or less tolerant or hostile, but who are united in considering the dominating language of school as a political tool directed against their minority.

Michael Klonsky and Susan Klonsky, *Small Schools*. (London: 2008) pp. 15-18, excerpts

The small-schools movement was probably misnamed. It was never really just about "small." Some social theorists, such as the economist E.F. Schumacher, saw great value in small things. However, what captured the vision of many urban educators as they moved into the new millennium were the traditional democratic values of Deweyan progressivism combined with Information Age notions of professional community, personalization, and safe learning environments in an unsafe society.

Many of these small-school ideas emerged from the theories and practices of the civil-rights movement of the 1960s, its Freedom Schools and Citizenship Schools and the not-unrelated explosion of alternative schools during that same decade. Among the big ideas of that period were the notions that access to a purposeful, high-quality public education for all children was a democratic right worth fighting for and that the definition of public was contested territory; that teaching- learning was and always had been organically tied to change and social justice. It was no accident that many of the new wave of school reform and urban small-school leaders during the next three decades would come from the ranks of the civil-rights movement….

The idea was not just to make schools smaller but to capture two essentials for successful learning: (1) the visibility of children and (2) the professional community of teachers. The first meant that school environments and practices would facilitate closer, stronger relationships between kids and adults; that every student would be known by a group of caring, nurturing adults; that students would be active participants and not just receptacles in the creation of knowledge; and that anonymity was enemy number one.

The second meant that smaller schools would enable collaboration among teachers, collaboration across the traditional grade and departmental lines. Faculty meetings of 150-300 teachers, with the principal and a few administrators or faculty leaders doing all the talking, would be no more. Instead, a team of teachers, small enough to lit around a good-sized table, would have the time to meet together regularly, to plan integrated lessons, to look at student work together, to observe and critically assess each other's teaching, and to initiate and mentor young teachers into the profession.

'We didn't come up with a model. We came up with a set of very simple ideas which reflected the compromises that [high school teacher] Horace had to make. We said no high school should ask a teacher to be responsible for more than 80 youngsters at once. We said kids should be promoted not because they get older, but because they exhibit real mastery of their work.

So, what counted was what the kids could show us they could do, rather then just that they had collected credits in courses that they might or might not have learned anything in. These were simple, common-sense ideas, but very counter cultural.'

Frederick Reif, ***Applying Cognitive Science to Education. Thinking and learning in scientific and other complex domains.*** **(Cambridge, Mass., 2008) Chapter 21: Producing Instruction to Foster Learning**

The preceding chapters aimed to specify an effective learning process. Although such a specification may aid the learning of some people, it alone is ordinarily insufficient to help students to learn. Hence we now turn to the second stage of the instructional development process-the problem of teaching by instruction that can help students to engage in effective learning.

Following the general development process outlined in figure 18.3, we shall explore the following questions indicated in figure 21.1: (1) How can one describe an instructional problem? (2) How can one analyze it to identify important instructional needs? (3) How can one devise useful means of facilitating students' learning? (4) How can one assess the merits of a suggested instructional approach?

21.1 DESCRIBING THE INSTRUCTIONAL PROBLEM

We assume that the prior work, needed to specify an effective learning process, has been completed so that one can address its instructional implications.

21.1.1 Specification of the problem

Situation This chapter considers the relatively simple situation where a teacher is dealing with a single student-or with a small number of similar students who can be adequately handled by a single teacher interacting with them. (If one cannot deal satisfactorily with this simple situation, it is unlikely that one will be able to deal with more numerous students.)

Although there is no sharp distinction between this situation and one where it is necessary to teach larger numbers of students the distinction is important because of the greater complexity of the latter situation. Hence we postpone until the next chapters a discussion of practically important cases where one must deal with more than about twenty diverse students, where several teachers may be involved, where the same teaching effort may often need to be repeated many times, and where it may become cost-effective to create teaching aids (such as textbooks, workbooks, or computer programs) that can be used repeatedly with different groups of students.

Instruction helping learning
- **Describe the instructional problem**
- **Analyze instructional needs**
- **Devise instructional means**
- **Instructional interactions**
  - Managing instruction
  - Learning by teaching

Figure 21.1
Instruction to promote learning.
Instructional goal The goal of the instructional problem is to *devise methods and teaching interactions that can help to ensure that students engage in effective learning.*

21.1.2 Importance of this instructional goal

Although the preceding goal seems simple and is easily stated, it is difficult to achieve. Indeed, students often fail to learn the knowledge and activities that were apparently taught. When students do *not* perform satisfactorily after some instruction, it is then difficult to know whether the instruction did not specify an effective learning process or whether the students did not actually engage in this process.

As an example, suppose that an instructor tried to teach students a useful method for solving certain kinds of problems, explicated this method in some detail, demonstrated it, led students through it in class, and then asked students to apply it in order to solve some further problems. However, when the students themselves tried to solve these problems, they did *not* follow the recommended method but reverted to an unsystematic approach previously familiar to them. Although the taught method may be effective, the instruction was then *not* adequate to ensure that students actually learned to use it.

Effective teaching must thus manage the instructional interactions sufficiently well that students actually engage in a suggested learning process. Coaches trying to train persons to become good athletes, or teachers aiming to train persons to become good musical performers, commonly supervise individual students closely enough to ensure such effective learning. They guide a student to perform in effective ways, monitor him or her carefully while practicing, and provide corrective feedback so that the student is sure to learn good skills (without acquiring bad habits that may be difficult to break or lead to injuries). The following is a somewhat amusing example of such effective supervision.

An unconventional example of effective music instruction:
When the famous violinist Jascha Heifetz was a child, he was initially taught by his father. For the reasons just mentioned, the latter thought that carefully supervised practice was so important that he was always present when Jascha practiced-and locked up the violin to prevent Jascha from practicing in his absence (Benoist, 1978). Although such thoroughly

supervised individual learning supervision may perhaps seem excessive, it is clear that it had no deleterious effects on Jascha Heifetz's subsequent career.

21.1.3 Explicating learning goals to students

It is helpful to explicate an instructional goal as a learning goal for the students. Learning can then be viewed by students as a problem-solving task (Bereiter and Scardamalia, 1989) or as a collaborative problem-solving task carried out by students jointly with a teacher. This point of view provides the following advantages: (1) The student can then have a clear goal in mind while learning. Furthermore, the learning process can follow a systematic problem-solving strategy of the kind discussed in section 12.1. (2) Both the students and the teacher have then clearer criteria for determining students' progress toward the specified learning goal. (3) Students can be actively engaged by questions inviting them to contribute to the problem-solving process. (4) The teacher becomes less of a superior omniscient person, but more like someone who may also learn from the students. (5) Even if the teacher must transmit some information and students cannot significantly participate in this process, the teacher can demonstrate problem-solving that leads to a well-specified learning goal. (6) Teachers are then also less likely to resort to unmotivated ways of learning that don't reflect the ways of thinking of real learners or problem solvers.

Examples of unmotivated or unrealistic learning

Mathematics The instructor writes a complicated algebraic expression on the blackboard and then proceeds to manipulate this expression until he arrives at a useful result. But where does this initial expression come from? Why would anyone ever think of such an expression?
The instructor has here used a *method of revelation* that is unsatisfying to the students and that does not teach them how working mathematicians really think.
Physics It is fairly common to tell students that there once was a great man, called Isaac Newton, who formulated three laws of motion that students should now use. But how would one ever discover such laws?
A teacher could, however, start with the clearly motivated problem of discovering principles useful for predicting the motions of objects. The teacher could then show how (irrespective of the actual historical development) some simple observations and plausible hypotheses lead naturally to Newton's laws. In this process, the students would learn better how scientific laws are discovered, how to express Newton's laws in modern form, how to interpret them properly, and thus also how to avoid some common misconceptions.

21.2 ANALYZING INSTRUCTIONAL NEEDS

Any task is ordinarily carried out by a series of successive steps, each of which addresses the following three essential needs: (1) deciding what to do, (2) implementing this decision, and (3) assessing whether the implementation was satisfactory (and correcting it otherwise).
For example, in the simple case where a task involves writing a sentence, one needs (1) to decide what one wants to say, (2) to implement this decision by writing appropriate prose, and (3) to assess whether the written sentence does convey the intended message.

In the particular case of a learning task, an experienced student might possibly engage in all the appropriate actions to implement the learning process independently. But most students need assistance from an outside agent (such as a teacher) who can help ensure that they engage in the appropriate actions. To address the previously listed three essential needs, the teacher should then provide the following kinds of assistance:
1. Assistance in deciding what to do can be provided *by guidance* from the teacher (who can direct a student to carry out some specific actions).
2. Assistance in carrying out the chosen actions can be provided by *support* from the teacher (who may help the student in implementing the chosen actions).
3. Assistance in assessing the student's implementation of these actions can be provided by *feedback* from the teacher (who can monitor the student's performance and provide corrective information to the student).
To facilitate learning, interactions between a student and a teacher must then provide appropriate *guidance, support,* and *feedback*. (The word *coaching is* commonly used for instruction providing these three forms of assistance.) These assistance processes may be provided either explicitly by verbal instructions or implicitly by demonstration. However, all such assistance must gradually be reduced (or *faded) so* that the student ultimately learns to perform well independently.

The preceding remarks suggest how the instructional problem may be solved by providing appropriate learning assistance. The next several sections discuss how to assist learning by helpful instructional interactions and by careful management of students' learning process.

21.3 HELPFUL INSTRUCTIONAL INTERACTIONS

As we have seen, the instructional problem can be addressed by combining the design of an effective learning process with instructional interactions ensuring that students engage in this process. The following paragraphs discuss ways of doing this by appropriate guidance, support, and feedback.

21.3.1 Guidance

Explicit guidance The guidance given to students may be both explicit and *direct*. The following are some examples: (1) A teacher may give students explicit directions or advice specifying what they should do. (2) The teacher may provide needed information. (3) The teacher may answer questions asked by the students.

The guidance given to students may also be explicit, but more *indirect*. The following are some examples: (1) A teacher may ask questions to focus the students' attention appropriately or to make them think more deeply. (2) A teacher may provide students with specific hints.
Implicit guidance The guidance given to students may also be much less explicit. For example, a teacher may demonstrate (or *model)* how to perform particular tasks, or may try to serve as a role model that students can imitate.

Implicit guidance can also be provided by appropriately structuring the learning context. For example, a teacher may select or restrict the resources (books, calculators, and other tools) available to the students. Alternatively, the teacher may provide students with special tools (for example, with special software such as outline processors that facilitate hierarchical thinking).

More generally, implicit guidance can be provided by limiting the number of options available to a student. For instance, this can be done by restricting the commands available in a computer interface (for example, by initially eliminating complex commands from a word processor that students need to learn). It can also be done by limiting what a student can possibly do next, and thus enforcing a particular sequence of steps.
Timeliness and individuality Guidance is *prompt* if it is immediately provided to a student whenever it is needed. Alternatively, guidance is delayed if it is provided only at times specified by the instructional system (for example, at the next class meeting or at the instructor's next office hour). Prompt guidance is usually more effective because it is more likely to be heeded and can prevent students from going off in inappropriate directions.
Individualized guidance is adapted to the current needs of a specific student. By contrast, generic guidance is designed for a typical student in a group or class. Individualized guidance is more useful, but can only be provided with greater difficulty or at greater costs.

21.3.2 Support

Explicit support Explicit support can be used to provide a student with direct assistance while the student is learning to perform a task. Such support can also be called *scaffolding* by analogy to the scaffolds that help support a building during construction, but are ultimately removed to leave a freestanding structure. (Another analogy is suggested by the *training wheels*

that help a child learn to ride a bicycle, but are discarded after the child has become proficient enough to ride without any outside assistance.)

Such explicit support can assist the student during learning by providing help when the student is stumbling, correcting mistakes while they occur, and preventing the student from getting stuck without knowing what to do.

Another form of explicit support can be realized if a teacher takes over the implementation of a part of a task while the student does the rest. After sufficient learning by the student, the support can then be reduced by letting the student progressively take over more of the task until he or she is able to perform the entire task independently.

Implicit support Support can also be provided more implicitly (for example, by encouragement reassuring students that they know enough to perform a task independently).

Timeliness and individuality Support is *prompt* if it is provided while a student is actually engaged in a learning task. Support is less timely if it is merely provided by advice before the student engages in a learning task, or by some retrospective comments afterward.

Individualized support, provided to a student according to his or her particular abilities and needs, can be most effective. However, in instruction dealing with numerous students, the support given to individual students is commonly much more *generic* and reflects merely the presumed needs of a typical student.

21.3.3 Feedback

Explicit feedback An instructor may give students explicit feedback by (1) observing students so as to provide them with information about their performance and about any detected deficiencies, (2) providing students information about likely reasons for their deficiencies, and (3) providing suggestions for improving the students' performance and for correcting their deficiencies. (Such suggestions can be given explicitly, or somewhat less explicitly by asking well-chosen thought-provoking questions.)

Implicit feedback Implicit feedback can be particularly effective if it is *intrinsic-that* is, if it is provided by a student's work itself (rather than by an instructor). Any performance deficiencies become then directly apparent to the student without a teacher's intervention. For example, it is very apparent to students that their computer programs don't run because of some faulty syntax, or that their laboratory experiments don't yield the desired kinds of results. A student can then not simply blame an instructor for being pedantic if the instructor gives the student a poor grade because of some missing semicolons in the student's computer program. The actual failure of a program to run is far more convincing than an instructor's red marks on a paper.

Timeliness and individuality Feedback is *prompt* if it is given to a student immediately after the student's actions. Such prompt feedback has the advantages that it is more comprehensible since the student's actions are then still fresh in his or her mind-and since the student can then immediately correct any deficiencies. By contrast, when a corrected homework assignment is returned to students a week after they turned it in, the feedback to the students is much delayed. Indeed, by that time students may have lost any interest in that homework-and may have forgotten what they did or why they did it.
Individualized feedback, based on an individual student's actions and observed ways of thinking, can clearly be more effective than more generic feedback based on the observed performance of a class of students. (Of course, well-designed generic feedback may also incorporate some adaptation to the needs of individual students.)

21.4 MANAGING INSTRUCTION

Instruction must be carefully managed to achieve the instructional goal of ensuring that students engage in an effective learning process. Such management can be achieved by using the instructional interactions discussed in the preceding section and by assisting students in some of the ways discussed in the following paragraphs.

21.4.1 Decomposition of the learning task

The most basic way of assisting students' learning is by decomposing instruction (and the corresponding learning task) into manageable segments. Each such segment (such as a section of a book or session of a class) can usefully consist of the following three phases.
Initial phase of an instructional segment This initial short phase (largely outlined by the teacher) should provide a motivating context for the contemplated learning problem. Thus it may (1) identify the students' current (and presently lacking) abilities and knowledge, (2) specify the goal of the instructional segment (the desired abilities and correspondingly needed knowledge), and (3) outline a sketchy plan indicating how this goal might usefully be pursued.
Central phase of a segment In this central phase, students need to undertake the task of attaining the specified learning goal. In collaboration with the teacher, they then need to engage in the lengthy process of identifying and elaborating newly needed knowledge, ensuring that they can interpret it properly, describing and organizing it in useful ways, applying it to solve pertinent problems, and getting enough practice to make certain that their newly acquired knowledge is effectively usable.
Final phase of a segment An instructional segment should be completed by assessing whether students have acquired the desired capabilities and

knowledge. Such an assessment can be provided by well-designed tests-and subsequent reviews needed to ensure that students have reliably acquired the desired knowledge and capabilities. (Otherwise, it is unwise to let the students go on since they would then build their subsequent work on a house of cards and be beset by cumulatively increasing learning difficulties).

21.4.2 Levels of instructional management

Instruction can be managed by providing various levels of supervision and assistance to students.

Limited feasibility of managing instruction The level of instructional management may be limited by practical considerations and available resources, particularly when there is a need to deal with many students. For example, students commonly receive very little individual guidance, support, and feedback in the large classes prevalent in many high schools and most colleges.

Students in such classes often spend much of their time listening to lectures or reading textbooks (and few attempts are made to ensure that the transmission of all this information actually leads to effective learning). Students often get more actively involved in their learning only when they work on their homework assignments. But since such homework is done at home without supervision, students can easily engage in inefficient or ineffective activities-and may thus practice poor activities or engage in fruitless floundering. Furthermore, feedback to the students is often minimal and long-delayed usually consisting of little more than some red marks on homework papers that are returned at a later time.

Under these conditions, it is difficult to teach more effective ways of thinking or better problem-solving processes. Even if such processes are explicitly explained and demonstrated, students (in the absence of good supervision) often don't use them but revert to old thinking patterns. Effective teaching may thus become difficult or impossible under these circumstances, even when using good instructional materials and methods.

Limited desirability of managing instruction Even if tight instructional management is possible, it may not always be desirable. For example, in some cases it may be preferable to give students greater freedom to pursue their own learning inclinations and thereby also to foster greater independence. However, it is illusory to believe that effective learning will occur if students are merely given free reins without appreciable guidance (Kirschner, Sweller, and Clark, 2006).

Weaning from instructional assistance Whenever students are provided with instructional assistance, it is ultimately necessary to wean them appropriately so that they are able to perform independently. This can be done by *fading* the instructional assistance-that is, by reducing it gradually so that students become progressively better able to function on their own. In addition, it is

useful to help students to acquire better skills of independent learning so that they can continue to learn without external assistance and may require less instructional support in future learning activities.

21.4.3 Individual tutoring

The highest level of instructional management can be achieved when an individual student is taught by a particular teacher or *tutor*. In this case, the tutor has a great amount of control about the timing and sequence of the information presented to the student-and also about all the activities carried out by the student with this information. Furthermore, the tutor can at all times provide the student with appropriate guidance, support, and feedback. A tutor who has a good knowledge about the subject matter to be taught (and also about the pedagogy involved in teaching and learning processes) is then in a very good position to supervise the student so as to produce successful learning. It is then not surprising that individual tutoring seems to be the most effective teaching method (Bloom, 1984) …

[When a tutor has designed] an effective learning process, he or she can help a student to learn by engaging in the following activities suggested by the needs for good performance (as discussed in chapters 3 through 15):

• The tutor can explicate the learning problem by clarifying what the student presently knows or does not know, by specifying a learning goal, and by suggesting a possible plan for attaining this goal.

• The tutor can help the student to encode new knowledge by (1) focusing the student's attention appropriately, (2) helping the student to encode pertinent declarative and procedural knowledge, (3) helping the student to specify and interpret this knowledge while ensuring important discriminations, and (4) strengthening this acquired knowledge by adequate practice.

• The tutor can help to consolidate all this knowledge by helping the student to (1) describe this knowledge in multiple ways, (2) integrate this knowledge with other preexisting knowledge, (3) organize all this knowledge in useful forms facilitating retrieval, and (4) use this knowledge to solve problems of various complexity.

• The tutor can help the student to (1) improve performance efficiency by suitable practice, (2) detect and correct any performance deficiencies, and (3) thus assess and revise newly acquired knowledge.

• The tutor can gradually reduce the instructional assistance and thus promote more independent performance by the student.

• Finally, the tutor can monitor whether the student maintains good performance over longer periods of time and can help to refresh the student's knowledge when necessary.

Such instructional assistance can be very useful to a student trying to learn scientific or other complex knowledge-or to a student trying to achieve good proficiency. This is why (as mentioned in section 21.1.2) individual coaching is used in efforts to train good athletes or musical performers.

However, it is also clear that individual tutoring can practically *not* be provided to most students because it would be prohibitively expensive to supply an individual tutor for every student-and because enough good tutors would not be available.

21.4.4 Minimalist instruction

While individual tutoring provides tight control over the instructional process, the opposite extreme of loose control may be appropriate in some other situations. This is especially the case when the skills to be learnt are not particularly demanding (such as the skills needed to use a word-processing program) and when one is dealing with students who have become fairly good independent learners. In such situations, it may be easier and less costly to avoid complex instructional management. It may also be better not to burden such learners with unnecessarily voluminous textbooks or instructions manuals (that they often don't read anyhow). Furthermore, it may be more motivating for such people if they can immediately start doing useful tasks and gradually learn more while engaged in them.

Instruction may then merely introduce students to some centrally important parts of some new knowledge, illustrate it briefly, and then let students use and elaborate this knowledge further while actually trying to perform some meaningful (and initially simplified) tasks. Additional help may then be provided only when students encounter difficulties or have further questions. This instructional approach has some of the following advantages beyond those already mentioned: (1) It can lead to effective learning, and good retention of newly acquired knowledge, since it gets students actively engaged in their own learning. (2) It makes students better prepared to learn independently in their later lives where instructors are not always readily available. (3) It ensures that the knowledge acquired by students is actually usable for performing significant tasks.

Some of these advantages can, in fact, be realized in practice. For example, *minimalist instruction* has been advocated and effectively used for teaching computer software applications like word processors (Carroll, 1990). Bulky instructions manuals are then replaced by much sparser basic instructions that users can quickly begin to apply for useful work-while also gradually learning more complex or efficient commands. When judiciously used, such minimalist instruction may sometimes also be useful for teaching some scientific knowledge.

21.5 LEARNING BY TEACHING

21.5.1 Efficacy of teaching for learning

Many people report that they really learned a subject only after they themselves had taught it. Indeed, when they were asked to teach, they

could no longer remain in the more passive roles that they had originally assumed as students. Instead, they themselves had to systematize and organize all their knowledge before they could explain and teach it to others. Hence students' learning can be fostered not only when they are being taught, but also when they themselves assume the roles of instructors engaged in teaching other people.

Benefits of teaching When students teach, they themselves need to acquire the relevant knowledge. They must also explicate this knowledge in greater detail so that they can explain it to other people. Furthermore, they need to organize this knowledge appropriately so that they can decide what is centrally important and what is more peripheral, they need to demonstrate how this knowledge can be used to implement some significant tasks, and they need to assess and correct the work of other people. As a result of all these activities, the students need to become actively engaged in dealing with the relevant knowledge and thinking-and all such active engagement leads to better learning.

The preceding considerations suggest that effective learning can be enhanced by deliberately letting students engage in teaching. The following paragraphs indicate some ways that this can usefully be done.

21.5.2 Deliberate explaining

Explaining is an important part of teaching and can, even by itself, be instructionally useful.

Self-explanations and learning from examples In real life, many of us learn from examples (for instance, by observing what other people do). It is also common in instruction to illustrate important ideas or methods by concrete examples so that students can learn from them. But what students *actually* learn from them depends greatly on what they do while studying such an example. If they merely read an example without much thought, they are likely to learn very little. But if they read it while trying to understand what it illustrates (for instance, if they try to explain to themselves what is being done and why), then they may learn a great deal.

Investigations have shown that, when some students read examples of problem solutions, they do not extract much generally applicable knowledge. Instead, they tend to deal with other problems by relying largely on remembered examples. On the other hand, when better students read an example of a problem solution, they try to explain it to themselves by identifying the basic principles that were applied, by figuring out how they were applied, by monitoring their own understanding, and by correcting their misunderstandings (Chi et al., 1989, 1994).

Observations of students studying examples can thus reveal much about their knowledge and ways of learning. Furthermore, it is apparent that students can learn significantly from examples if they are encouraged to explain these to themselves.

Difficulties of learning from examples On the other hand, learning from examples may *not* be an easy task. For instance, if the solution of a problem consists largely of a sequence of statements or equations without additional documentation, it may be difficult to figure out *what* was actually done. It may even be harder to figure out *why* this was done (how somebody *decided* what to do, what options were considered, and why a particular one was selected while others were discarded). Furthermore, inductive reasoning may be needed to extract general knowledge from a particular example-and such reasoning can easily lead to faulty generalizations and misleading knowledge. Hence it is probably better if a student does not need to learn significantly *new* knowledge from examples, but can use such examples mostly to explore or refine previously acquired knowledge.
Explaining to other people Students can also usefully learn by explaining to other people. For example, it is useful if students are asked to explain clearly *how* they solved a problem, to explain what they did and why. As pointed out in section 13.4, such a written explanation also provides the documentation needed to ensure that a solution can be understood by other people.

Finally, students can be helped to learn if they are placed in a position (such as learning cooperatively in a group) where they need to explain knowledge and methods to some other students.

21.5.3 Reciprocal teaching

Actual teaching can be more instructive than mere explaining. In particular, reciprocal teaching is a systematic method in which a teacher and a student alternately reverse roles (so that the student assumes the role of the teacher and the teacher assumes the role of the student).
Reciprocal teaching of reading skills The reciprocal-teaching method was first applied to teach seventh-grade students how to read with good comprehension (Palincsar and Brown, 1984; Brown and Palincsar, 1989). In this work, Brown and Palincsar started by formulating a model of good reading. This model, partly suggested by what good readers seem to do, specified a reading following four repeatedly used basic processes: (1) summarizing has what been been read, (2) asking relevant questions, (3) clarifying and (4) predicting what is likely to come next. (Note that these processes correspond to basic cognitive needs listed in figure 2.3. Thus process 1 involves specifying, processes 2 and 3 involve interpreting, and process 4 involves making inferences.)
Implementation of the method To implement the method, the teacher begins by pointing out the importance of these processes. Then the student and the teacher both silently read a short prose passage. After this reading, the teacher demonstrates the reading strategy by summarizing what they have read, asking some questions about it, trying to clarify it, and predicting what would come next. (Throughout all of this, the teacher invites the student to

participate as much as possible.) Afterward, the teacher and student read another passage and switch roles so that it is now up to the student to summarize, to ask questions, to clarify, and to predict. (The teacher may help the student to engage in these activities.) The role reversals are then repeated many times while the teacher gradually reduces the assistance provided to the students.

Efficacy of the method The preceding reciprocal-teaching method proved highly effective. Indeed, after about twenty such teaching ses sions, students' scores on a reading-comprehension test improved from about 15 percent to 85 percent (Palincsar and Brown, 1984). Even after a lapse of six months, the students' performance score on such a read ing test was still 60 percent (and could be restored to the 85 percent level after one day of reciprocal-teaching training).

Generalized form of reciprocal teaching A colleague and I (Reif and Scott, 1999) were interested in formulating the reciprocal-teaching method in a more general and explicit form so that it might also be implemented with the aid of a computer playing the role of the teacher. Furthermore, we wanted to apply the method to help college students deal with physics problems.

General formulation of the method As previously mentioned, the performance of a task requires repeated application of the following functions: *deciding* what to do, *implementing* the decision, and *assessing* whether the results are satisfactory. Our general formulation of the reciprocal-teaching method involves an explicit separation of these functions between a teacher and a student (as indicated in figure 21.2). The student can then repeatedly see each function demonstrated by the teacher before he or she needs to perform it. In this way, the student learns to pay attention to each of these functions and to practice each separately (but within a realistic total context).



Figure 21.2
Reciprocal teaching with alternating coaching by a teacher and student.

Application to problem solving in physics The solution of any mechanics problem requires one to draw a diagram specifying the motion (by velocity and acceleration) of every relevant object and also specifying *all* the interactions of this object (described by *all* the forces exerted on this object by other objects). Many students have remarkably much difficulty in performing this

task because they often fail to describe properly an object's motion, omit mention of some forces, or ascribe the wrong properties to them.

We were able to specify an explicit procedure leading to the correct description of an object's motion and of all forces on it. However, even when we tried to teach and demonstrate this procedure, students often failed to implement it properly. Hence we attempted to teach this procedure more effectively by using the general reciprocal-teaching method of figure 21.2. In this method the teacher describes a problem and first acts as the teacher. In this role, (1) the teacher (following the recommended procedure) tells the student which step to address; (2) the student then implements this step; (3) the teacher, assessing the student's performance, provides appropriate feedback and asks the student to correct any detected mistakes. The roles are then reversed with a different problem so that the student assumes the role of teacher. Thus (1) the student tells the teacher what to do (and the student is warned if he or she does not follow the steps of the recommended procedure); (2) the teacher then implements the specified step (but may sometimes deliberately make common kinds of mistakes); (3) the student needs to detect and correct any such mistakes. *Computer implementation of the method* \'ve "Juulil also implement this method by letting a properly programmed computer play the role of the teacher. The advantage was that such a computer (which we called a PAL, a Personal Assistant for Learning) could then provide individual instructional supervision to every student in a large class. This implementation test of the method proved fairly successful, with an efficacy approaching that which could be provided by individual human tutors (Reif and Scott, 1999). *Other forms of learning by teaching* Methods, where students assume teaching roles, can be extended to deal with more numerous students. For example, methods (like *peer teaching* and *collaborative learning) will* be discussed in the following chapters dealing with practical educational delivery.

21.5.4 Self-teaching

Self-teaching involves deliberate learning without any outside assistance. The ability to teach oneself independently is a valuable skill since people in our rapidly changing world often need to learn new knowledge and skills without the benefit of any available teachers.

This chapter's previous comments about learning and instruction are equally applicable to efforts undertaken to learn independently, but the learner must then also assume the functions of an instructor. The difficulties of independent learning are particularly pronounced if one tries to learn about an unfamiliar domain without the guidance of any textbook or other learning guides. In this case, one starts out with only vague ideas about what needs to be learned and is thus unable to plan appropriately. Hence one is forced to immerse oneself in the learning process while only progressively discovering useful sources of knowledge-and

only gradually perceiving what is more or less important, how to organize one's accumulating knowledge, and how to assess one's own performance. Independent learning is appreciably simpler if appropriate textbooks or other teaching aids are available, but the task is still demanding. It requires appreciable self-discipline to engage in active learning rather than mere reading. Even in the absence of any teacher, one must identify important new concepts, make sure that one can interpret them. properly in various situations, actually implement newly learned methods, solve problems suggested by self-posed questions, and test oneself repeatedly to check one's understanding before proceeding further.

When independent learners do not understand something or get confused, they are also unable to seek help from some readily available teacher. Such learners must thus attempt to figure things out by themselves, may possibly consult some other books, or may try to consider some simple examples that can help to clarify the issues. Independent learning (self-teaching) can thus be a difficult task. However, if it is done well, independent learning can be quite effective, especially since it requires much active individual engagement in the learning task. Indeed, it might be quite useful to teach students better skills of 'independent learning. Such skills would help students to deal with situations where externally provided instruction is poor or inadequate-and would also provide students with excellent preparation for their future lives.

21.6 ASSESSING INSTRUCTION

Any instructional effort should be suitably assessed to determine its efficacy. Such an assessment tests both the design of the learning process and the instructional means used for its implementation.

21.6.1 Kinds of assessments

Comparative student assessments Students' learning in many courses is usually assessed by giving students tests comparing their performance-and then assigning them grades on the basis of their relative standing in the course. This practice is called *grading by the curve* if some specified fractions of the students are then given appropriate grades (such as A, B, C, D, or F). This kind of assessment is of little interest unless one really wants to compare the performance of one student relative to another (for example, to decide whether one should hire one student rather than another). Such comparative assessments provide, however, little or no information about the actual competence of the students or about the effectiveness of the instruction.

For example, if you need surgery, would you rather want to know how the surgeon ranked in his class compared to other students, or how good he is at performing the pertinent kind of surgery? Might a student,

who received a grade of A in a class at one school, not have received a grade of C in a similar class at another school? Might not 20 percent of the students in a class have received grades of A-although not a single student in the class actually achieved proficient performance? As an extreme example, would an instructor ever dare to give failing grades to *all* the students in a class if none achieved an acceptable level of competence?

Performance assessments It is usually of far greater interest to assess students' actual (rather than relative) performance capabilities. Thus a *summative assessment* (one carried out at the end of an instructional effort to ascertain its instructional efficacy) may use suitable tests to answer the following questions: What performance abilities have students achieved (compared to their abilities before the instruction)? Also, how well have these abilities been achieved by various students?

Are performance improvements due to instruction?

Such assessments must rule out the possibility that students might have acquired improved abilities *without* any instruction (for example, simply because of the passage of time or because of other experiences in their lives). For this reason, one may also have to compare these students with a similar group of students who spent the same amount of time *without* experiencing the same instruction.

Even a careful summative assessment of instructional efficacy has some important limitations. In particular, it provides no information about the reasons why instruction may have been effective in some ways and less effective in some other ways-or how the instruction might be improved. For example, suppose that an instructional effort were successful in raising the fraction of students successful in passing the final performance test in a class from 60 percent to 80 percent. Although one might be pleased by this success, one would then still not know the answers to the following crucially important questions: Why were 20 percent of the students still unable to perform satisfactorily? And what would one need to do to improve the instruction?

Diagnostic performance assessments The preceding limitations can be overcome by assessments that are more diagnostic so that they can provide detailed information on what parts of the instruction work or don't work-and why. Such assessments are then more *formative* (that is, focused on understanding how instruction might he improved). Indeed, such assessments are essential to improve instructional designs and implementations.

21.6.2 Implementing diagnostic assessments

Advances in any scientific or engineering field depend crucially on detailed assessments to determine what kinds of knowledge and methods are effective

or not-and to ascertain the underlying reasons for successes or failures. Progress in educational knowledge and practice requires similarly detailed assessments. Thus it is useful to answer the following questions:

- What knowledge and capabilities have students attained as a result of some instruction? How well have these been attained?
- What .are the reasons why some kinds of knowledge and capabilities have *not* been attained?
- What learning difficulties have been experienced by the students? And what teaching difficulties have been encountered by instructors?
- How could instruction be improved?

The following paragraphs indicate some ways of obtaining such detailed information.

Detailed observations of individual students Observations of individual students provide the most effective way of ascertaining how students think and of identifying their learning difficulties. But, while such observations can be realized in one-to-one interactions between a student and an individual tutor, they are more difficult to achieve in large classes. However, they are not impossible in such settings if an instructor invites a few students to visit him or her individually so that they may receive personal help or express their reactions to the class. Under these conditions the instructor may then observe a student while he or she works on a problem or answers some questions.

Although such a situation may not be fully equivalent to a laboratory investigation of a student's thought processes, it can still yield much more detailed information than is ordinarily available to an instructor in a class. For example, it can reveal how well students can apply newly learned concepts and what misconceptions they exhibit. Furthermore, the instructor can then also informally try out some new instructional ideas.

Diagnostic tests Observations of a few individual students are not only difficult to implement and time-consuming, but may also be misleading since they may not be representative of the larger number of students in a class. Hence it is also useful to design tests and questionnaires that can easily be given to many students. However, the questions on any such test must be *diagnostic* (that is, they must be designed in such a way that an inappropriate answer clearly indicates the particular kind of knowledge deficiency exhibited by a student). Students' written answers or problem solutions may also be much more informative about students' thinking than their answers on multiple-choice tests.

Complementarity of individual observations and group tests The preceding two assessment methods can profitably be used jointly because they provide mutually supportive information.

Individual student observations can provide detailed information about students' thinking and learning difficulties, information that no group test alone can elucidate. However, this information may not be

representative of all students (although it can be useful in designing well-focused questions for use in a group test).

Conversely, students' responses on a group test may indicate confusions or difficulties exhibited by many students. But the underlying reasons for these difficulties can sometimes be revealed only by more detailed observations of individual students.

The utility of the information obtained from any such assessments must ultimately be judged by the extent to which it helps to produce more effective and efficient instruction.

21.6.3 Assessing long-term learning

Learning assessments, that are carried out at the end of a course or shortly thereafter, are rather unrealistic because they don't determine students' knowledge or capabilities retained after a longer time (when students may need these for subsequent courses or for work in real life). Hence it is useful to augment such short-term assessments with longer-term assessments carried out more than a month after the end of instruction.
Such assessments (implemented at that later time by tests somewhat similar to those given at the end of instruction) can help to determine longer-term retention of acquired knowledge and abilities. Hence they can also reveal whether knowledge exhibited at the end of instruction was solidly incorporated in a student's mind or merely the ephemeral manifestation of last-minute cramming.

The effectiveness of earlier learning can also be assessed after a much longer time, when much knowledge may seemingly have been forgotten. For example, to assess how much knowledge has been retained, one can determine how long a time of renewed learning is required to restore a student's knowledge to its earlier level.

21.6.4 Interaction between assessing and learning

Assessment methods can have a great effect on learning and teaching. 'Indeed, students commonly try to learn skills that are actually assessed or graded, but pay little attention to anything else. For example, even if an instructor in a class emphasizes problem-solving and reasoning skills, the students are unlikely to learn such skills if the instructor's examinations require predominantly the recall of factual knowledge.

The following is an important implication: *Educational innovations striving to attain different learning goals are unlikely to succeed if assessment methods are not correspondingly modified.*

21.6.5 Revising and exploiting

Efforts to assess instruction invariably reveal various deficiencies that need to be corrected by suitable revisions. In fact, *repeated* revisions may often be

necessary. Although the need for such revisions may sometimes seem discouraging, experienced teachers or instructional designers recognize that successive revisions are required for performing most complex tasks. For example, note the many successively produced versions of commercial software applications (like word processors, spreadsheets, and others)! There is no reason to expect that the development of good instruction is any simpler than that of such software programs.

Furthermore, any complex development process (such as that required to write a book or create instruction for a course) is so lengthy that a person involved in it may be changing during that time-learning new things and modifying his or her ways of thinking. Thus it can easily happen that things that seemed satisfactory at the beginning of a development process may seem flawed or misguided at the end. It is then ultimately necessary to know when to stop revising, to acknowledge that perfection is an unattainable goal, and to realize

On the other hand, life does not ordinarily end at the completion of an instructional development process. Hence it is highly useful to identify and remember the lessons learned during such a process so that they can be exploited for future instructional purposes.

21.7 SUMMARY

• After an effective learning process has been designed, it is necessary to solve the instructional problem of ensuring that students actually engage in such learning.
• This problem can be addressed by suitable interactions with an instructional system that assists students by providing appropriate guidance, support, and feedback.
• All such instructional assistance must gradually be reduced to ensure that students learn to perform independently.
• Instruction must decompose the instructional process into manageable segments leading to reliable modifications of a student's knowledge.
• Individual tutoring (which allows the highest level of control over the instructional process) is probably the most effective teaching method, but is practically available only to very few students.
• Students' learning can be significantly helped if they themselves try to explain what they know or do, or to teach other persons. In particular, reciprocal teaching is a highly successful method where students and instructors alternately assume the teaching role.
• Instruction can be improved by careful assessments of its efficacy. Such assessments should try to ascertain what capabilities students actually attained and why they experienced particular learning difficulties.

• Such assessments can be achieved by combining detailed observations of some individual students with diagnostic tests given to larger numbers of students.

Ruth Cigman, 'Enhancing Children' in Ruth Cigman and Andrew Davis eds., *New Philosophies of Learning.* (London, 2009) pp. 173-5

1 INTRODUCTION

Educational policy in the UK has taken an interesting turn. The preoccupation with standards in schools, which has been with us for many years, has given rise to a set of aims that policy-makers would hardly have recognised two decades ago. Not only should educators pursue the traditional aims of imparting knowledge, understanding and skills to children. They should set the scene for such aims by getting children into an 'appropriate condition' from which to learn. This can mean anything from eating a good breakfast to playing outdoors or developing good 'social and emotional skills'. Schools should promote these 'conditions for learning' as seriously as they have always promoted learning itself. This idea has spawned an abundance of social research, policy initiatives, business ventures and public debate. But does it make sense?

The idea emerged in the highly politicised educational climate of the 1990s, in which the alleged failures of mass education were giving rise to an obsession with standards in schools. The ills of under-achievement, disaffection and violence would dissipate, it was thought, if only standards could be raised. But a difficulty emerged. A standards agenda involves identifying and possibly shaming children and schools that fail. The social consequences of educational failure include disaffection, delinquency, violence and so on: the very problems that the standards agenda set out to address. Such an agenda may help some children, but for others, arguably, it makes matters worse by drawing attention to their failures and making them feel unworthy and exclude.

It was this concern that led to a supplementary agenda focusing on so-called non-cognitive traits like confidence, motivation, resilience, well-being and self-esteem. Such traits are thought to be possessed by individuals to a greater or lesser degree, and to play a crucial part in learning. Children with low confidence levels or poor self-esteem, for example, are seen as more easily frustrated and defeated by challenges than children who have high levels of these. The idea emerged that there are necessary *affective* conditions for successful learning, and that these can be usefully boosted, heightened or enhanced.

I shall call this the enhancement agenda in education. It may be pointed out, rightly, that educationalists sometimes talk about enhancing attainment or achievement, as though the enhancement agenda is not distinct from the standards agenda after all. But the typical use of the term 'enhancement' is not this. More frequently, its object is some sort of affective disposition, or a condition like 'well-being' that presupposes certain

affective dispositions. The enhancement agenda is not simply about getting children to perform better. It is about getting them to *feel* better-more motivated, more confident, happier-and about the idea that feeling good in these ways leads to success at school and in life generally.

The upshot of these ideas is that schools have a duty to enhance certain feelings, and recent policy documents like the Children's Plan (DCSF, 2007a,b) and the Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning (SEAL) (DfES, 2005) programme are full of exhortations to schools to fulfil this duty, and guidance about how to go about it. The former identifies as one of its 'goals for 2020': 'to enhance children and young people's well-being, particularly at transition points in their lives' (Children's Plan Executive Summary, DCSF, 2007b, p. 19). It goes on to describe the 'positive activities' that 'develop social and personal skills' and 'promote well-being' (p. 20). The SEAL Guidance goes into greater detail, and includes a section called 'Managing Feelings', in which children are taught to say things like: 'I know what makes me feel good and know how to enhance these comfortable feelings.' Another section from the SEAL Guidance called 'Going for Goals!' talks about an inspection framework that will assess outcomes like 'enjoyment', rather than focusing simply on attainment.

As with many policy ideas, much of this is laudable. The Children's Plan in particular takes a practical approach to well-being, accepting the responsibility of the government to put real money into the support of families, the provision of safe play areas, health promotion, housing, etc. (It remains to be seen whether these worthy intentions will be realised.) More problematic is the idea that schools should undertake to enhance children's feelings directly, through a variety of expertly devised strategies. It is not obvious, in the first place, that one can identify particular feelings as unconditionally good, so that more is necessarily better. In general, confidence is a beneficial feeling to have, but it can be excessive and associated with risky behaviour. Some important empirical research (Emler, 2001) has prompted questions about the benefits of feelings (and attitudes) that are assumed to be positively linked to effective learning.

There are also ethical and conceptual questions about the project of enhancing feelings. Philosopher Richard Smith (2002) has expressed concerns about the 'inward turn' in education, and Ecclestone (2004) talks about the recent 'therapeutic ethos' as emphasising 'fragile identities', turning children into victims. More fundamentally, one needs to raise the conceptual question: what exactly is it that educators and policy-makers are seeking to enhance? The Centre for the Wider Benefits of Learning at the Institute of Education in London (2008a and b) has usefully documented the bewildering variety of terms associated with the concept of enhancement in current educational policy. Many of these employ the term 'self': for example, self-esteem, self-discipline, self-awareness, self-concept, self-efficacy and self-regulation. There are several 'umbrella' terms that are

thought to embrace a variety of 'skills' or 'qualities': non-cognitive skills, socio-emotional abilities, well-being, emotional intelligence etc. And there are some familiar terms that already have a secure place in the home and classroom, like perseverance, resilience and motivation. An enhancement agenda that is worth its salt needs to rationalise this assortment of terms and clarify its basic aims.

In Section 2, I explore what I call an ordinary concept of enhancement as a component of moral education. I suggest that the primary object of enhancement in this context is feeling, emotion or passion. We try, for example, to enhance children's confidence and hope, and conversely to inhibit feelings like fear, shame and despair. We try to do this appropriately rather than indiscriminately, for the context is all-important. There are times, we feel, when children should be encouraged to experience more rather than less shame or fear. However, there are loose connections between emotion and learning that educators need to be aware of. In general, children do not learn well when they experience high levels of shame or fear.

This brief introduction to the concept of enhancement is based on the philosophy of Aristotle, and it leads to a discussion in section 3 of the enhancement agenda in current educational policy. This involves measuring and then enhancing 'something' that is believed to cause children to learn. The indeterminacy of this 'something', the concept of measurement and some empirical disagreements about causality will occupy us here. I shall question the shift from an informal enhancement agenda (in the classroom and the home) to a more formal version of this in the domain of public policy.

Finally, I explore the concept of self-esteem, and present an account of this concept that in my view deserves a place in education. Concepts go in and out of fashion, and this one has passed its peak. This is partly because outrageous claims have been made on its behalf, and partly because of an empirical study that claimed to overturn our cherished assumptions about self-esteem. When Polly Toynbee (2001) hailed this study in an article headed 'At Last We Can Abandon that Tosh about Low Self-Esteem', some of us knew that the matter deserved a closer look.

Kalwant Bhopal, ***Asian Women in Higher Education: Shared Communities.*** **(Stoke on Trent: 2010) pp. 51-60, excerpts**

Many of the women spoke about their multi-faceted identity at university through their relationship with the academy - specifically their lecturers. In particular, they described creating a particular kind of identity to counter the way they were seen by the academic staff. Neither the image of themselves they projected nor the image their lecturers held about Asian women matched how they or their families saw themselves.

'Well, I think they [lecturers] see us as different anyway, don't they? With them I have to be a professional student because I know they have a great deal of power. They are the ones who are marking my work and ultimately they are the ones who decide what grades I get. So I am a student to them. I would not speak to them about my life at home because I don't think they would understand. '

Some of the women spoke of the distance between themselves and their lecturers, which was based on their professional role as students and based also on their 'difference'.

'Some of the other girls do say that they think a few of the lecturers might have certain views of men and women and certain views of Asian women. I think that is inevitable because we all have certain views about groups of people in society. But they are different to us because they are the ones who are teaching us and we are the learners.'

These women presented a different facet of their identity to their lecturers to the one which they presented to their friends. Many spoke about their professionalism in how they presented themselves publicly in the world of the academy:

'Sometimes, it's kind of pretending to know what they're [lecturers] talking about when they tell you about some theory or method. But really you might not be sure. So you go away and you look it up or you ask your friends about it and then when they [lecturers] mention it to you again you sort of say more and show that you really do understand l You cant understand everything the first time.'

Many of the women discussed how they felt 'distanced' torn the university and the academic environment of higher education. They talked of their positioning as outsiders within the academy, as not fully belonging to the

academy and not being allowed to belong because the Academy was white, middle class and male.

'If you look at all the lecturers and professors I would say they are mainly all white and most of them are men and they are all middle class. Because we are not seen in that way, we tend to be seen as separate to them. I think it's the same wherever you go, whether it's Oxford or here. It's mainly men who are in the higher positions and they are the ones with the power. It's hard if you're Asian or black and if you're a woman.'

'The way the university system works is for people who know about it. If you look at the language and the assignments we have to do, it's ok if you're from a middle class background and understand it all. But if you're not then you're at a disadvantage. You have to work harder than other people who know the system. They may use words and language that a lot of us are not familiar with. Also some of us don't actually have people who we can ask because our parents and people they can ask are immediately advantaged compared to us.'

'A lot of us have come here as mature students and most of the people here have done access courses. We haven't left school at 18 and come here to university, we have worked and done other things and have realised that we need a degree if we want to get on in life. Our parents didn't go to university and some of our parents have no education.'

'Finding the time to sit down and read and then write an assignment is quite hard. When you have a family and you have your home, it's your responsibility to make sure that everything is in order. All that stuff has to be done first and then I can sit down and do it. Then I am too tired to do it well. You need the time as well. You can't sit down for just 15 minutes and read something or write something. You need more time and sometimes you need a whole day to get stuck into the reading and the assignment. Sometimes I just don't have that time and so have to do it in short spurts of time. Because of that I don't think I do as well as I could or as well as other people who perhaps don't have the commitments that I might have.'

Martha Nussbaum, ***Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities.*** **(Princeton, 2010) Chapter 4**

Socratic Pedagogy: The Importance of Argument

I am a sort of gadfly, given to the democracy by the gods, and the democracy is a large, noble horse who is sluggish in its motions, and requires to be stung into life.

-Socrates, in Plato, Apology, 30E

Our mind does not gain true freedom by acquiring materials for knowledge and possessing other people's ideas but by forming its own standards of judgment and producing its own thoughts.

-Rabindranath Tagore, in a syllabus for a class in his school, c. 1915

Socrates proclaimed that "the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being." In a democracy fond of impassioned rhetoric and skeptical of argument, he lost his life for his allegiance to this ideal of critical questioning. Today his example is central to the theory and practice of liberal education in the Western tradition, and related ideas have been central to ideas of liberal education in India and other non Western cultures. One of the reasons people have insisted on giving all undergraduates a set of courses in philosophy and other subjects in the humanities is that they believe such courses, through both content and pedagogy, will stimulate students to think and argue for themselves, rather than defer to tradition and authority-and they believe that the ability to argue in this Socratic way is, as Socrates proclaimed, valuable for democracy.

The Socratic ideal, however, is under severe strain in a world bent on, maximizing economic growth. The ability to think and argue for oneself looks to many people like something dispensable if what we want are marketable outputs of a quantifiable nature. Furthermore, it is difficult to measure Socratic ability through standardized tests. Only a much more nuanced qualitative assessment of classroom interactions and student writing could tell us to what extent students have learned skills of critical argument. To the extent that standardized tests become the norm by which schools are measured, then, Socratic aspects of both curriculum and pedagogy are likely to be left behind. The economic growth culture has a fondness for standardized tests, and an impatience with pedagogy and content that are not easily assessed in this way. To the extent that personal or national wealth is the focus of the curriculum, Socratic abilities are likely to be underdeveloped.

Why does this matter? Think about the Athenian democracy in which Socrates grew up. In many respects its institutions were admirable, offering all citizens the chance to debate issues of public importance and insisting on citizen participation both in voting and in the jury system. Indeed, Athens went much further toward direct democracy than any modern society in that all major offices, apart from the commander of the army, were filled by lottery. Even though participation in the Assembly was to some extent limited by labor and residence, with urban and leisured citizens playing a disproportionate role-not to mention the exclusion of noncitizens, such as women, slaves, and foreigners-it was still possible for a non-elite male to join in and offer something to the public debate. Why did Socrates think that this thriving democracy was a sluggish horse that needed to be stung into greater wakefulness by the skills of argument that he purveyed?
If we look at political debate-as portrayed, for example, in Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* - we find that people did not reason with one another very well. Rarely if ever did they examine their major policy objectives, or systematically ask how the diverse things they valued could fit together. Thus we see that the first problem with lack of self-examination is that it leads to unclarity about goals. Plato illustrates this problem vividly in the dialogue Laches, when he shows that two of Athens's leading generals, Laches and Nicias, cannot give an account of military courage, even though they think they have it. They simply are not sure whether courage requires thinking about what is worth fighting for, what is ultimately in the city's interest. When Socrates proposes this, idea, they like it, and yet their prior thinking had not incorporated it securely. Their utter confusion about one of their own central values might do no harm in a context in which decision-making is easy. With tough choices, however, it is good to be clear about what one wants and cares about, and Plato plausibly links their lack of self-scrutiny with the disastrous military and policy blunders of the subsequent Sicilian expedition, where Nicias was the chief architect of the bruising Athenian defeat. Socratic examination does not guarantee a good set of goals, but it at least guarantees that the goals pursued will be seen clearly in relation to one another, and crucial issues will not be missed by haste and inadvertence.

Another problem with people who fail to examine themselves is that they often prove all too easily influenced. When a talented demagogue addressed the Athenians with moving rhetoric but bad arguments, they were all too ready to be swayed, without ever examining the argument. Then they could easily be swayed back again to the opposite position, without ever sorting out where they really wanted to stand. Thucydides provides a vivid example of this in the debate over the fate of the rebellious colonists of Mytilene. Under the influence of the demagogue Cleon, who speaks to them of slighted honor, the Assembly votes to kill all the men of Mytilene and to enslave the women and children. The city sends out a ship with that order.

Then another orator, Diodotus, calms the people and urges mercy. Persuaded, the city votes to rescind the order, and a second ship is sent out with orders to stop the first. By sheer chance, the first ship is becalmed at sea and the second one is able to catch up to it. So, many lives, and such an important policy matter, were left to chance rather than reasoned debate. If Socrates had gotten these people to stop, reflect, and analyze Cleon's speech, and to think critically about what he was urging, at least some would likely have resisted his powerful rhetoric and dissented from his call to violence, without needing Diodotus's calming speech.

Irresolution is frequently compounded by deference to authority and peer pressure, a problem endemic to all human societies, as we have seen. When argument is not the focus, people are easily swayed by the fame or cultural prestige of the speaker, or by the fact that the peer culture is going along. Socratic critical inquiry, by contrast, is utterly unauthoritarian. The status of the speaker does not count; only the nature of the argument. (The slave boy questioned in Plato's Meno does better than famous politicians, partly because he is not arrogant.) Teachers of philosophy betray Socrates' legacy if they cast themselves as authority figures. What Socrates brought to Athens was an example of truly democratic vulnerability and humility. Class, fame, and prestige count for nothing, and the argument counts for all. Nor does the peer group count. The Socratic arguer is a confirmed dissenter because she knows that it is just each person and the argument wrestling things out. The numbers of people who think this or that make no difference. Someone trained to follow argument rather than numbers is a good person for a democracy to have, the sort of person who would stand up against the pressure to say something false or hasty that Asch's experiments demonstrate.

A further problem with people who lead the unexamined life is that they often treat one another disrespectfully. When people think that political debate is something like an athletic contest, where the aim is to score points for their own side, they are likely to see the "other side" as the enemy and to wish its defeat, or even humiliation. It would not occur to them to seek compromise or to find common ground, any more than in a hockey match the Chicago Blackhawks would seek "common ground" with their adversaries. Socrates' attitude toward his interlocutors, by contrast, is exactly the same as his attitude toward himself. Everyone needs examination, and all are equal in the face of the argument. This critical attitude uncovers the structure of each person's position, in the process uncovering shared assumptions, points of intersection that can help fellow citizens progress to a shared conclusion.

Consider the case of Billy Tucker, a nineteen-year-old student in a business college in Massachusetts who was required to take a series of "liberal arts" courses, including one in philosophy.' Interestingly, his instructor, Krishna Mallick, was an Indian American originally from

Kolkata, familiar with Tagore's educational ideal and a fine practitioner of it, so his class stood at the intersection of two highly Socratic cultures. Students in her class began by learning about the life and death of Socrates; Tucker was strangely moved by this man who would give up life itself for the pursuit of the argument. Then the students learned a little formal logic, and Tucker was delighted to find that he got a high score on a test in this subject; he had never thought he could do well in something abstract and intellectual. Next, they analyzed political speeches and editorials, looking for logical flaws. Finally, in the last phase of the course, they did research for debates on issues of the day. Tucker was surprised to discover that he was being asked to argue against the death penalty, although he actually favored it. He had never understood, he said, that one could produce arguments for a position that one does not hold oneself. He told me that this experience gave him a new attitude toward political discussion: Now he is more inclined to respect the opposing position and to be curious about the arguments on both sides, and what the two sides might share, rather than seeing the discussion as simply a way of making boasts and assertions. We can see how this humanizes the political "other," making the mind see the opposing person as a rational being who may share at least some thoughts with one's own group.

Let us now consider the relevance of this ability to the current state of modern pluralistic democracies surrounded by a powerful global marketplace. First of all, we can report that, even if we were just aiming at economic success, leading corporate executives understand very well the importance of creating a corporate culture in which critical voices are not silenced, a culture of both individuality and accountability. Leading business educators with whom I have spoken in the United States say that they trace some of our biggest disasters-the failures of certain phases of the NASA space shuttle program, the even more disastrous failures of Enron and WorldCom-to a culture of yes-people, where authority and peer pressure ruled the roost and critical ideas were never articulated. (A recent confirmation of this idea is Malcolm Gladwell's study of the culture of airline pilots, which finds that deference to authority is a major predictor of compromised safety.)[2]

A second issue in business is innovation, and there are reasons to suppose that a liberal arts education strengthens the skills of imagining and independent thinking that are crucial to maintaining a successful culture of innovation. Again, leading business educators typically urge students to pursue a broad-based program and to develop their imaginations, and many firms prefer liberal arts graduates to those with a narrower training. Although it is difficult to construct a controlled experiment on such an issue, it does seem that one of the distinctive features of American economic strength is the fact that we have relied on a general liberal arts education and, in the sciences, on basic scientific education and research,

rather than focusing more narrowly on applied skills. These issues deserve a full exploration, and it seems likely that, once fully investigated, they will yield further strong support for my recommendations.

But, we have said, the goal of democracies that want to remain stable cannot and should not be simply economic growth, so let us now return to our central topic, political culture. As we have seen, human beings are prone to be subservient to both authority and peer pressure; to prevent atrocities we need to counteract these tendencies, producing a culture of individual dissent. Asch, we recall, found that when even one person in his study group stood up for the truth, others followed, demonstrating that one critical voice can have significant consequences. By emphasizing each person's active voice, we also promote a culture of accountability. When people see their ideas as their own responsibility, they are more likely, too, to see their deeds as their own responsibility. That was essentially the point Tagore made in Nationalism when he insisted that the bureaucratization of social life and the relentless machinelike character of modern states had deadened people's moral imaginations, leading them to acquiesce in atrocities with no twinge of conscience. Independence of thought, he added, is crucial if the world is not to be led headlong toward destruction. In his lecture in Japan in 1917, he spoke of a "gradual suicide through shrinkage of the soul," observing that people more and more permitted themselves to be used as parts in a giant machine and to carry out the projects of national power. Only a robustly critical public culture could possibly stop this baneful trend.

Socratic thinking is important in any democracy. But it is particularly important in societies that need to come to grips with the presence of people who differ by ethnicity, caste, and religion. The idea that one will take responsibility for one's own reasoning, and exchange ideas with others in an atmosphere of mutual respect for reason, is essential to the peaceful resolution of differences, both within a nation and in a world increasingly polarized by ethnic and religious conflict.

Socratic thinking is a social practice. Ideally it ought to shape the functioning of a wide range of social and political institutions. Since our topic is formal education, however, we can see that it is also a discipline. It can be taught as part of a school or college curriculum. It will not be well taught, however, unless it informs the spirit of classroom pedagogy and the school's entire ethos. Each student must be treated as an individual whose powers of mind are unfolding and who is expected to make an active and creative contribution to classroom discussion. This sort of pedagogy is impossible without small classes, or, at the very least, regular meetings of small sections within larger classes.

But how, more specifically, can a liberal education teach Socratic values? At the college and university level, the answer to this question is reasonably well understood. As a starting point, critical thinking should be

infused into the pedagogy of classes of many types, as students learn to probe, to evaluate evidence, to write papers with well-structured arguments, and to analyze the arguments presented to them in other texts.
It seems likely, however, that a more focused attention to the structure of argument is essential if these relatively mature students are to get the full immersion in active Socratic thinking that a liberal arts education makes possible. For this reason, I have argued that all colleges and universities should follow the lead of America's Catholic colleges and universities, which require at least two semesters of philosophy, in addition to whatever theology or religious courses are required.' The course Tucker took at Bentley College is one good example of the way in which such a course might be constructed. Typically, some philosophical texts will provide a jumping-off point-and the dialogues of Plato are second to none for their capacity to inspire searching, active thinking, with the life and example of Socrates up front to inspire. Tucker's course also paid attention to formal logical structure, and this is very useful, because it gives students templates that they can then apply to texts of many different types, from newspaper editorials and political speeches to their own arguments about issues they care about. Finally, getting students to practice what they have learned by debating in class and writing papers-all with detailed feedback from the instructor-allows them to internalize and master what they have learned.

There is no doubt that even well-prepared college undergraduates need this type of class in order to develop more fully their capacities for citizenship and respectful political interaction. Even smart and well-prepared students do not usually learn to take apart an argument without patient training. Such teaching, still relatively common in the United States, demands a great deal from faculty, and cannot be done simply through large lectures. This sort of intensive exchange with undergraduates is difficult to find in most European and Asian countries, where students enter university to read a single subject and do not have liberal arts requirements in the first place, and where the normal mode of teaching involves large lectures with little or no active participation by students and little or no feedback on student writing, a theme to which I shall return in the final chapter.
Tucker was already a high school graduate, but it is possible, and essential, to encourage Socratic thinking from the very beginning of a child's education. Indeed, this has often been done. It is one of the hallmarks of modern progressive education.

AT THIS POINT, we need to pause and think historically, since valuable models of Socratic education have long been developed, as a reaction against passive learning, in a wide variety of countries, and these can and should inform our search. Examining this rich and continuous tradition will give us reference points for further analysis and theoretical sources to enrich it.

Starting in the eighteenth century, thinkers in Europe, North America, and, prominently, India began to break away from the model of education as rote learning and to pursue experiments in which the child was an active and critical participant. These experiments unfolded in different places to some extent independently, but eventually with a lot of mutual influence and borrowing. Socrates was an inspirational figure in all of these reform movements, but they were also inspired, and perhaps more so, by the sheer deadness of existing schools, and by educators' feeling that rote learning and student passivity could not be good for citizenship or for life. These school experiments all involved more than Socratic questioning. Much of what they proposed will concern us later, when we turn to world citizenship, and, especially, to play and the arts. In this chapter, we will need to lay out the basic ideas of each reform as a whole, in order to convey an overarching sense of each reformer's aims, giving ourselves a framework within which to investigate the idea of critical thinking. As we do this, however, we shall then focus on the Socratic component of each thinker's proposal, returning to other aspects of the education in chapters 5 and 6.
In Europe, a touchstone for all these experiments was Jean-Jacques Rousseau's great work *Emile* (1762), which describes an education aimed at rendering the young man autonomous, capable of his own independent thought and of solving practical problems on his own, without reliance on authority. Rousseau held that the ability to navigate in the world by one's own wits was a key aspect of making a child a good citizen who could live on terms of equality with others, rather than making them his servants. A great deal of Emile's education is therefore practical, and he learns by doing, a hallmark of all subsequent experiments in progressive education. The Socratic element is also prominent, however, as Emile is told nothing on authority from his teacher, but has to puzzle things out for himself, while the teacher simply probes and questions.

Rousseau did not set up a school, and *Emile* tells us little about what a good one might be like, since it depicts a single child with a tutor. In this sense, it is a profoundly nonpractical work, albeit philosophically deep. I shall therefore not dwell on the details of Rousseau's rather schematic philosophical account, preferring to focus on real educational experiments inspired by it. For Rousseau's ideas greatly influenced two European thinkers whose lives overlapped with his and who did establish schools in accordance with their views.

Swiss educator Johann Pestalozzi (1746-1827) took as his target the practice of rote learning and force-feeding, ubiquitous in schools of his day. The purpose of this sort of education, as he portrays it, was the creation of docile citizens who, as grownups, would follow authority and not ask questions. In his copious writings on education, some of them in fictional form, Pestalozzi describes, by contrast, an education aimed at rendering the child active and inquisitive through the development of his or her natural

critical capacities. He presents the Socratic type of education as engaging and enlivening, and as just plain common sense-if one's goal is to train the mind, and not to produce herdlike obedience.
Pestalozzi's was not a narrow Socratism-he also gave significance, in education, to sympathy and affection. His ideal teacher
was a maternal figure, as well as a Socratic challenger. He was ahead of his era in urging a complete ban on corporal punishment, and he emphasized the importance of play in early education. We should bear this larger context in mind as we study his Socratic proposals, although we shall investigate it further only in chapter 6.

In the influential novel *Leonard and Gertrude* (1781), Pestalozzi describes the reform of education in a small town, from an elite sort of indoctrination to a highly participatory and democratic form of mental awakening. Significantly, the agent of this radical change is a working-class woman, Gertrude, who exemplifies the maternal, the inquisitive, and the down-to-earth, all in one. In her village school she educates boys and girls from all social classes, treating them as equals and teaching them useful practical skills. ("Surely it is human beings we are educating, not brilliant mushroom growths," Pestalozzi at one point nicely observes.)
As with Emile's tutor, Gertrude gets the children to solve problems for themselves-Pestalozzi is the inventor of the concept of the "object lesson"-and she always encourages active questioning. Unlike Socrates, however, and to some extent unlike Rousseau's imaginary tutor, Gertrude is also affectionate and interested in cultivating the children's emotional capacities along with their capacity for criticism. In the 1801 book *How Gertrude Teaches Her Children*, Pestalozzi summarizes the principles of good schooling, making it clear that family love is the source and the animating principle of all true education. He suggests that young men and women should both become more maternal and loving; princes, he suggests, have made people aggressive for their own selfish ends, but human nature is in its essence maternal, and this maternal care is the "sacred source of patriotism and civic virtue." The Socratic element in Pestalozzi must always be understood in connection with this focus on emotional development.
Pestalozzi was too radical for his time and place; the various schools he started were all failures, and Napoleon, whom he approached, refused to take an interest in his ideas. Ultimately, however, he had a great influence on educational practice, as people from all over Europe came to visit and talk with him. His influence extended to the United States, and both Bronson Alcott and Horace Mann owe much to his ideas.

Slightly later, German educator Friedrich Froebel (1782-1852) conducted reforms of early education, in the spirit of Pestalozzi, that have changed the wayyoung children in virtually all the world's countries begin their schooling. For Froebel was the founder and theorist of the "kindergarten," the year before "regular" schooling begins in which children

are gently encouraged to expand their cognitive faculties in an atmosphere of play and affection, and one that, in a Socratic spirit, emphasizes children's own activity as the source of their learning. Like Pestalozzi, Froebel intensely disliked traditional models of education that viewed children as passive vessels into which the wisdom of the ages would be poured. He believed that education should focus on eliciting and cultivating the child's natural abilities through supportive play. The idea of the kindergarten is just this idea of a place where one learns and unfolds through play. Froebel has a lot of mystical views about the properties of certain physical objects, the so-called Froebel gifts: for example, the ball. By manipulating these symbolic objects, children learn to think actively and to master their environment. Modern kindergartens wisely leave Froebel's more mystical flights to one side, while retaining the core idea that children learn to unfold themselves by active thought, reciprocity, and the active manipulation of objects. Froebel believes that aggression is a reaction to natural helplessness and will drop away of its own accord when children learn to cope with the world around them, while their natural capacity for sympathy and reciprocity will be extended. In terms of our narrative of child development this is a bit too sanguine, but it goes in the right direction.

Because Froebel is concerned with extremely young children, Socratic techniques are not presented in any formal way, but their basis is firmly laid, by encouraging the child to be active, exploring and questioning rather than merely receiving. His idea that each child deserves respect, and that each (regardless of class or gender) should be an inquirer, is also thoroughly Socratic. Children all over the world today owe much to his contribution, since the idea of a type of early education through play in an environment of sympathy and love has created kindergartens more or less everywhere. This healthy idea is under pressure in our world, as children are pressed to drill at skills earlier and earlier in life, often losing opportunities to learn through relaxed playing.

Now our historical search moves to America, where European progressive reforms had a large and formative influence-perhaps explaining why the idea of liberal arts education has flourished here as it has not in Europe. Bronson Alcott (1799-1888) is best known today as the father of novelist Louisa May Alcott, and his school is lovingly depicted in her novels *Little Men* and *Jo's Boys*. Louisa depicts her father (represented as Jo's husband, Professor Bhaer) as following "the Socratic method of instruction"; he mentions that he is strongly influenced by Pestalozzi and Froebel. This appears to be an accurate characterization of Bronson Alcott's orientation, although we must add to these influences that of German idealism and the poetry of Wordsworth. At the Temple School in Boston, founded in 1834, Alcott taught thirty boys and girls, ages six to twelve. (Teachers, too, were both female and male.) In 1839 the school admitted a black pupil; many parents withdrew their children, and the school closed.

But during its brief existence, it carried on and extended the legacy of European progressive education. Alcott's methods are even more clearly Socratic than those of Pestalozzi and Froebel. Instruction always took the form of questions rather than assertions, as children were urged to examine themselves, both their thoughts and their emotions. "Education," he wrote, "is that process by which thought is opened out of the soul, and, associated with outward things, is reflected back upon itself and thus made conscious of the reality and shape [of things].... It is self-realization." This is the language of Hegel, more than of Plato, but the bottom line, in terms of pedagogy, is Socratic. Education proceeds by questioning and self-scrutiny. Like Froebel and Pestalozzi, Alcott diverged from Socrates in emphasizing emotional development and the role of poetry; classes often focused on the reading and interpretation of poems, Wordsworth being a particular favorite. Argument, however, was not slighted, and children were taught to take responsibility for defending their own ideas. For Alcott, as for his European predecessors, Socrates' approach is incomplete because it does not attend to the emotions and the imagination. Nonetheless, Socrates supplied a major part of what all sought: an emphasis on self-examination, personal accountability, and individual mental activity as antidotes to an education that formed students into pliant tools of traditional authority.

I shall pass more rapidly over a figure of considerable historical significance, Horace Mann (1796-1859). A contemporary of Alcott's, but in some respects more politically mainstream, Mann might be the most influential figure in the history of American public education, before Dewey. Beginning with his pathbreaking reforms in the Massachusetts public schools, and ending with his work at Antioch College, which he founded, Mann, an abolitionist and a leading defender of women's equality, always stood for inclusiveness: for a liberal education (not just manual training) for everyone, without cost; for free libraries all over the state; and for high standards of teaching in the schools that non-elite pupils attended. As with the figures we have considered, then, Mann was a reformer who detested mere rote learning. His reforms were closely linked to an egalitarian and inclusive conception of democracy. He held that no democracy can endure unless its citizens are educated and active. In matters of inclusion, he was a radical, insisting on equal education of all children regardless of race or sex, on a serious attempt to eradicate class distinctions in education, and even (at Antioch) on equal pay for women in faculty positions. It was under his influence that Massachusetts, in 1852, passed the first state law requiring compulsory school attendance.

In some respects, Mann also shared pedagogical ideas with our earlier reformers; he rejected ineffective and authoritarian methods of teaching, seeking understanding rather than routine. His emphasis, however, was typically on basic competence, literacy, and numeracy; and his critique of authoritarian teachers (especially dogmatic religious teachers who based

their teaching on the Bible) was therefore somewhat limited, focusing on the evident non-success of such methods in teaching reading and writing. His insistence on getting children to understand what they were reading was defended less by appeal to the intrinsic worth of questioning and reflection than by pointing to the fact that children simply cannot learn reading by imitation, without understanding.

At Antioch, toward the end of his life, his radical inclusiveness continued (Antioch was the first U.S. college to educate women and men as full equals, and one of the first to educate black students and white students as equals). Meanwhile, his Socratic commitments became clearer: Antioch was the first college to emphasize classroom discussion, and it even offered independent study under faculty guidance.

Mann, in short, was a great practical reformer and a powerful champion of democratic educaton. At least where the schools were concerned, however, he focused above all on basic skills, and his commitment to Socratic and democratic values in the classroom was less central and less reflective than that of the other figures our historical excursus has discussed. With regret, we shall therefore leave him at this point and turn to a thinker who brought Socrates into virtually every American classroom.

Undoubtedly the most influential and theoretically distinguished American practitioner of Socratic education, John Dewey (1869-1952) changed the way virtually all American schools understand their task. Whatever the defects of American primary and secondary education, it is generally understood that stuffing children full of facts and asking them to regurgitate them does not add up to an education; children need to learn to take charge of their own thinking and to engage with the world in a curious and critical spirit. Dewey was a major philosopher, so, with him as with Rousseau, it will not be possible to go deeply into the elaborate ideas underlying his educational practice, but we can at least get a general idea of the connection he made between democratic citizenship and Socratic education.

Unlike all the theorists we have previously considered, Dewey lived and taught in a thriving democracy, and the production of active, curious, critical, and mutually respectful democratic citizens was his central goal. Despite Dewey's wariness of classical "great books"-because he saw such books turned into authorities, and name-dropping substituted for real intellectual engagement-Socrates remained a source of inspiration for him, because he brought lively rational and critical engagement to democracy. Another important inspiration was Froebel-to the exposition of whose ideas Dewey, rarely fond of writing about his distinguished predecessors, devotes considerable emphasis.'

For Dewey, the central problem with conventional methods of education is the passivity it encourages in students. Schools have been

treated as places for listening and absorbing, and listening has been preferred to analyzing, sifting, and active problem-solving. Asking students to be passive listeners not only fails to develop their active critical faculties, it positively weakens them: "[T]he child approaches the book without intellectual hunger, without alertness, without a questioning attitude, and the result is the..one so deplorably common: such abject dependence upon books as weakens and cripples vigor of thought and inquiry." Such a subservient attitude, bad for life in general, is fatal for democracy, since democracies will not survive without alert and active citizens. Instead of listening, then, the child should always be doing: figuring things out, thinking about them, raising questions. The change he wanted was, he said, "the change from more or less passive and inert recipiency and restraint to one of buoyant outgoing energy."[5]

The best way of rendering young people active, Dewey believed, was to make a classroom a real-world space continuous with the world outside-a place where real problems are debated, real practical skills evoked. Thus Socratic questioning was not just an intellectual skill, it was an aspect of practical engagement, a stance toward problems in real life. It was also a way of engaging with others, and Dewey always stressed the fact that in a good school pupils learn skills of citizenship by undertaking common projects and solving them together, in a respectful and yet critical spirit. Cooperative activity had, he believed, the additional dividend of teaching respect for manual labor and other trades; conventional schools often encourage an elitist preference for sedentary occupations. So Dewey's Socratism was not a sit-at-your-desk-and-argue technique; it was a form of life carried on with other children in the pursuit of an understanding of real-world issues and immediate practical projects, under the guidance of teachers, but without imposition of authority from without.

Typically, students would begin with a specific and immediate practical task: to cook something, or weave something, or maintain a garden. In the course of solving these immediate problems, they would be led to many questions: Where do these materials come from? Who made them? By what forms of labor did they reach me? How should we think about the social organization of these forms of labor? (Why is cotton so difficult to prepare for weaving? How did these practical problems interact with slave labor? Questions might fan out in many directions.)[6]

In short, the Socratic questioning grows from a real event, as children are led to treat these events, and their own activity, as "points of departure."[7] At the same time, by learning that producing cotton thread connects to all these complicated questions, children understand the complex significance of manual labor itself, and learn a new attitude toward it. Above all, children are learning through their own (social) activity, not by passively receiving; they thus model, and learn, citizenship. Dewey's experiments have left a profound mark on early education in America, as

has his emphasis on the interconnectedness of the world, which we shall discuss in chapter 5, and his focus on the arts, which we shall discuss in chapter 6.

I have spoken so far of a Socratic method that had wide influence in Europe and North America. It would be wrong, however, to think that a Socratic approach to early education was found only there. Rabindranath Tagore in India conducted a closely related experiment, founding a school in Santiniketan, outside Kolkata, and, later, as mentioned, a liberal arts university, Visva-Bharati, to go with it. Tagore was far from being the only experimental educator in India in the early twentieth century. A similar progressive elementary school was set up in connection with Jamia Millia Islamia, a liberal university founded by Muslims who believed that their own Quranic tradition mandated Socratic learning! All these experiments are closely connected to reforms of traditional laws and customs regarding women and children, such as raising the age of consent to marriage, giving women access to higher education, and, ultimately, giving them full citizenship in the new nation. Such reform movements existed in many regions. Tagore's experiment, however, was the most widely influential of these attempts, so I shall focus on it.

Tagore, who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1913, was one of those rare people who have world-class gifts in many different areas. He won the prize for his poetry, but he was also a superb novelist, short-story writer, and playwright. More remarkable, he was a painter whose work is valued more highly with the passing years, a composer who wrote more than two thousand songs, which are immensely loved in Bengali culture today-including songs later adopted as the national anthems of both India and Bangladesh-and a choreographer whose work was studied by founders of modern dance such as Isadora Duncan (whose dance idiom also influenced his) and whose dance dramas were eagerly sought out by European and American dancers who spent time at his school. Tagore was also an impressive philosopher, whose book *Nationalism* (1917) is a major contribution to thought about the modern state, and whose *The Religion of Man* (1930) argues that humanity can make progress only by cultivating its capacity for a more inclusive sympathy, and that this capacity can be cultivated only by an education that emphasizes global learning, the arts, and Socratic self-criticism. All these aspects of Tagore's genius made their way into the plan and daily life of his school. It was, perhaps above all, the school of a poet and artist, someone who understood how central the arts all are to the whole development of the personality.' Although this aspect of the school will occupy us only later, in chapter 6, it is important to bear in mind that it established the context within which his Socratic experiment unfolded. Both the Socratic and the artistic aspects of the school were inspired by a hatred of dead and imprisoning traditions that kept both men and women, as he saw it, from realizing their full human potential.

Tagore, like many people of his social class, was learned in Western thought and literature. (He translated Shakespeare's *Macbeth* into Bengali at the age of fifteen.) His educational philosophy may well have been influenced a bit by Rousseau, and a lot of his thought shows the influence of cosmopolitan French thinker Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who also influenced John Stuart Mill, who wrote an entire book about Comte.10 Thus we could call Tagore and Mill cousins: Tagore's idea of the "religion of man" is similar to Mill's notion of a "religion of humanity," and both have their roots in Comte's idea of inclusive human sympathy. Tagore and Mill had a similar hatred of the tyranny of custom, and both were energetic proponents of individual liberty.

If Tagore was influenced by some Western thinking, however, influence went, even more clearly, in the other direction. His school was visited by countless artists, dancers, writers, and educators from Europe and North America who took his ideas home with them. He met and corresponded with Maria Montessori, who visited Santiniketan to observe his experiments. Leonard Elmhirst spent some years at Tagore's school, and then, returning to Britain, founded the progressive arts-oriented Dartington Hall, a school that is still a beacon of the type of education I am defending. Tagore may also have influenced John Dewey. Although such links are difficult to trace because Dewey rarely describes his influences, we know that Tagore spent extended periods in Illinois (visiting his son, who was studying agriculture at the University of Illinois) at just the time Dewey was establishing his Laboratory School. At any rate, whether there was influence or not, the ideas of the two men about critical thinking and the arts are closely related.

Tagore hated every school he ever attended, and he left them all as quickly as possible. What he hated was rote learning and the treatment of the pupil as a passive vessel of received cultural values. Tagore's novels, stories, and dramas are obsessed with the need to challenge the past, to be alive to a wide range of possibilities. He once expressed his views about rote learning in an allegory about traditional education called "The Parrot's Training.""

A certain Raja has a beautiful parrot, and he becomes convinced that it needs to be educated, so he summons wise people from all over his empire. They argue endlessly about methodology and especially about textbooks. "Textbooks can never be too many for our purpose!" they say. The bird gets a beautiful school building: a golden cage. The learned teachers show the Raja the impressive method of instruction they have devised. "The method was so stupendous that the bird looked ridiculously unimportant in comparison." And so, "With textbook in one hand and baton in the other, the pundits [learned teachers] gave the poor bird what may fitly be called lessons!"

One day the bird dies. Nobody notices for quite some time. The Raja's nephews come to report the fact:
The nephews said, "Sire, the bird's education has been completed." "Does it hop?" the Raja enquired.
"Never!" said the nephews.
"Does it fly?"
"No."
"Bring me the bird," said the Raja.

The bird was brought to him.... The Raja poked its body with his finger. Only its inner stuffing of book-leaves rustled.

Outside the window, the murmur of the spring breeze amongst the newly budded asoka leaves made the April morning wistful.

The students of Tagore's school at Santiniketan had no such sad fate. Their entire education nourished the ability to think for oneself and to become a dynamic participant in cultural and political choice, rather than simply a follower of tradition. And Tagore was particularly sensitive to the unequal burden dead customs imposed upon women. Indeed, most of the searching questioners in his plays and stories are women, since dissatisfaction with their lot prods them to challenge and to think. In his dance-drama *The Land of Cards*, all the inhabitants of that land act robotically, playing out two-dimensional lives in ways defined by the card-picture they wear-until the women begin to think and question. So Tagore's Socratism, like his choreography, is shaped by his passionate defense of women's empowerment, as well as by his own unhappy experience in old-fashioned schools.

The school Tagore founded was in many ways highly unconventional. Almost all classes were held outside. The arts were woven through the whole curriculum, and, as mentioned, gifted artists and writers flocked to the school to take part in the experiment. But Socratic questioning was front and center, both in the curriculum and in the pedagogy. Students were encouraged to deliberate about decisions that governed their daily life and to take the initiative in organizing meetings. Syllabi describe the school, repeatedly, as a self-governing community in which children are encouraged to seek intellectual self-reliance and freedom. In one syllabus, Tagore writes: "The mind will receive its impressions ... by full freedom given for inquiry and experience and at the same time will be stimulated to think for itself.... Our mind does not gain true freedom by acquiring materials for knowledge and possessing other people's ideas but by forming its own standards of judgment and producing its own thoughts."" Accounts of his practice report that he repeatedly put problems before the students and elicited answers from them by questioning, in Socratic fashion.

Another device Tagore used to stimulate Socratic questioning was role-playing, as children were invited to step outside their own point of view and inhabit that of another person. This gave them the freedom to

experiment with other intellectual positions and to understand them from within. Here we begin to see the close link Tagore forged between Socratic questioning and imaginative empathy: Arguing in Socratic fashion requires the ability to understand other positions from within, and this understanding often provides new incentives to challenge tradition in a Socratic way.

OUR HISTORICAL DIGRESSION has shown us a living tradition that uses Socratic values to produce a certain type of citizen: active, critical, curious, capable of resisting authority and peer pressure. These historical examples show us what has been done, but not what we should or can do here and now, in the elementary and secondary schools of today. The examples of Pestalozzi, Alcott, and Tagore are helpful, but extremely general. They do not tell today's average teacher very much about how to structure learning so that it elicits and develops the child's ability to understand the logical structure of an argument, to detect bad reasoning, to challenge ambiguity-in short, to do, at an age-appropriate level, what Tucker's teachers did in his college-level course. Indeed, one of the great defects of Tagore's experiment-shared to some degree by Pestalozzi and Alcott-was that he prescribed no method that others could carry on in his absence. Prescribing is, of course, a delicate matter when what one wants to produce is freedom from the dead hand of authority. Froebel and Dewey offer more definite guidance because they do not simply theorize, they also recommend some general procedures in early education that others in different times and places have imitated and recast with great success. Dewey, however, never addressed systematically the question of how Socratic critical reasoning might be taught to children of various ages. Thus, his proposals remain general and in need of supplementation by the actual classroom teacher who may or may not be prepared to bring this approach to life.13

But teachers who want to teach Socratically have a contemporary source of practical guidance (which, of course, must be only part of an overall program to structure a Socratic classroom in which children are, throughout the day, active and curious participants). They can find very useful and yet non-dictatorial advice about Socratic pedagogy in a series of books produced by philosopher Matthew Lipman, whose Philosophy for Children curriculum was developed at the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children at Montclair State College in New Jersey. Lipman begins from the conviction that young children are active, questioning beings whose capacity to probe and inquire ought to be respected and further developed-a starting point that he shares with the European progressive tradition. He and his colleague philosopher Gareth Matthews share, as well, the view that children are capable of interesting philosophical thought, that children do not just move in a predetermined way from stage

to stage, but actively ponder the big questions of life, and that the insights they come up with must be taken seriously by adults."

Lipman also thinks that children can profit early on from highly specific attention to the logical properties of thought, that they are naturally able to follow logical structure, but that it usually takes guidance and leading to help them develop their capacities. His series of books-in which complex ideas are always presented through engaging stories about children figuring things out for themselves-show again and again how this attention to logical structure pays off in daily life and in countering ill-informed prejudices and stereotypes. Two examples from his first book, Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery, will illustrate the basic idea. Harry (whose name, of course, alludes to Aristotle and to Aristotle's discoveryand Harry's-the syllogism) is playing around with sentences, and he makes a discovery: Some sentences cannot be "turned around." It is true that "all oaks are trees," but it is not true that "all trees are oaks." It is true that "all planets revolve about the sun," but it is not true that "all things that revolve about the sun are planets." He tells his discovery to his friend Lisa, but she points out that he is wrong when he says, "You can't turn sentences around." Sentences that start with "No" work differently. "No eagles are lions," but it is equally true that "no lions are eagles." The two friends happily embark on more language games, trying to sort out the terrain for themselves.

Meanwhile, real life obtrudes. Harry's mother is talking to her neighbor Mrs. Olson, who is trying to spread some gossip about a new neighbor, Mrs. Bates. "That Mrs. Bates," she says, ". . . every day I see her go into the liquor store. Now, you know how concerned I am about those unfortunate people who just can't stop drinking. Every day, I see them go into the liquor store. Well, that makes me wonder whether Mrs. Bates is, you know. .."

Harry has an idea. "Mrs. Olson," he says, "just because, accord ing to you, *all people who can't stop drinking are people who go to the liquor store, that doesn't mean that all people who go to the liquor store are people who can't stop drinking.*" Harry's mother reproves him for interrupting, but he can tell from the expression on her face that she is pleased with what he has said. Logic is real, and it often governs our human relations. Lots of slurs and stereotypes work in exactly this way, through fallacious inference. The ability to detect fallacy is one of the things that makes democratic life decent.

Harry and his friend Tony, with their teacher, are working out the difference between "every" and "only." "Every," like "all," introduces a sentence that cannot be turned around. Tony tells Harry that his father wants him to be an engineer like him because Tony is good in math. Tony feels that there is a problem with his father's argument, but he doesn't know quite what it is. Harry sees it: The fact that "all engineers are people who are good in math" doesn't mean that "all people who are good in math are engineers"-or, the equivalent, that "only engineers are good in math." Tony

goes home and points this out to his father, who, luckily, is impressed by his son's acuity rather than annoyed by his failure to like his career advice. He helps Tony draw a picture of the situation; a large circle represents people who are good in math. A smaller circle inside this represents engineers, who are also good in math. But there is room for something else in the large circle, clearly. "You were right," says Tony's father with a faint smile, "you were perfectly right."[15]

All this takes place in the first few pages of the first book in Lipman's series, intended for children ages ten to fourteen. The series contains books that progress in complexity, but also cover different areas: mind, ethics, and so forth. The whole sequence, its rationale, and its pedagogical use are nicely explained in a book for teachers, Philosophy in the Classroom, which also discusses teacher training and the bare bones of an M.A. degree program in this area." The series as a whole takes students to the point where they might begin to work through Plato's Socratic dialogues on their own, the point, roughly, where Billy Tucker's class begins, although it can be reached earlier by children with regular exposure to Socratic techniques.

This series is aimed at American children. Part of its appeal is familiarity, and the gentle humor that pervades it; so it will have to be rewritten as culture changes, and different versions will need to be devised in different cultures. What is important is to see that something like this is available, and that the teacher who wants to do what Socrates, Pestalozzi, and Tagore all did need not be an inventive genius like them. Some franchised methods are lifeless and excessively directive in themselves. Some become like this because of misuse. In this case, however, the humor and freshness of the books themselves, and their respect for children, are strong bulwarks against misuse. The books obviously do not constitute a complete Socratic approach to education. The whole ethos of the school and classroom has to be infused with respect for the child's active powers of mind, and for this Dewey is an especially powerful guide. They do, however, supply one component of such an education in an accessible and lively way.

The aspiration to make elementary and secondary classrooms Socratic is not utopian; nor does it require genius. It is well within the reach of any community that respects the minds of its children and the needs of a developing democracy. But what is happening today? Well, in many nations Socrates. either was never in fashion or went out of fashion long ago. India's government schools are by and large dreary places of rote learning, untouched by the achievements of Tagore and his fellow Socratic educators. The United States is somewhat better off, because Dewey and his Socratic experiments have had widespread influence. But things are rapidly changing, and my concluding chapter will show how close we are to the collapse of the Socratic ideal.

Democracies all over the world are undervaluing, and consequently neglecting, skills that we all badly need to keep democracies vital, respectful, and accountable.