

# Iran Nuclear Chronology

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*Last update: May 2011*

*This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.*

*Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.*

## 2011

### 4 January 2011

Iran extends an invitation to Russia, China and members of the European Union to tour the country's uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and the construction site for the heavy water reactor at Arak. The United States has not been invited, prompting U.S. officials to call the invitation a political ploy to divide the P5+1. The visit is scheduled to take place the weekend of January 15 and 16.

—Mark Landler, "Iran Invites Some Nations, not U.S., for Nuclear Tour, 4 January 2011"; Nasser Karimi, "Iran Invites Much of the World, but not US- to Tour its Nuclear Sites. Left out, Apparently with other Western Powers, Washington Calls Invitation 'Clever Ploy'." *Jerusalem Post*, 5 January 2011.

### 7 January 2011

In his retirement speech to the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Mossad Chief Meir Dagan states that Iran would not be able to produce a viable nuclear weapon before 2015. He elaborates that Iran is still far from being capable of producing nuclear weapons and that a series of malfunctions and failures have set the Iranian nuclear weapons program back by several years.

—Yossi Melman, "Outgoing Mossad Chief: Iran Won't Have Nuclear Capability Before 2015," *Haaretz*, 7 January 2011; "Israel's Dagan: No Iran Nukes Until 2015," UPI, 7 January 2011.

### 8 January 2011

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and acting Iranian Foreign Minister, states that Iran has completed the construction of a facility in Isfahan for the production of nuclear fuel pellets and rods. This would provide Iran with the ability to domestically produce reactor fuel for nuclear power plants and research reactors. Salehi also announces that Iran has 40 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20% U-235, up from 30 kilograms reported in October 2010.

—"Iran Increases Stockpile of Higher Enriched Uranium, Defying UN Demands," AP, 8 January 2011; "Iran: Country Capable of Producing Own Nuclear Fuel — Salehi," *Stratfor*, 8 January 2011.

### 15 January 2011

Representatives from Venezuela, Syria, the Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement begin a visit to Iran's

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uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy water reactor under construction in Arak. Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh says that the tour would provide transparency and that the diplomats invited would be allowed to see whatever they choose. Soltanieh denies that the visit was intended to create divisions among the P-5+1 countries before a new round of nuclear talks in Istanbul. The European Union, Russia and China had rejected Iran's invitation, while the United States was not invited. (See entry for 4 January 2011)

— "Russia, China Reject Iran Nuclear Tour; Many Countries Refuse to Participate in Event Seen as Ploy to Divide Big Powers," *The Toronto Star*, 15 January 2011; "Iran: Nuclear Tour For Venezuela, Syria, Arab League, NAM," *Stratfor*, 14 January 2011.

### **20 January 2011**

Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's permanent representative to the IAEA, states that Russia is Iran's preferred choice for winning a future tender to build a new nuclear power plant in the country. Speaking at a news conference in Moscow, Soltanieh also says that his country was ready to discuss a nuclear fuel exchange with the Vienna Group. Iran would provide 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium for 120 kilograms of 20 percent-enriched uranium in return. He asserts that uranium enrichment would continue at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom if Iran's primary enrichment site in Natanz was targeted in a military strike.

—Julian Borger, "Talks Resume Amid Sabre-Rattling," *The Guardian*, 21 January 2011; Steven Erlanger, "At Opening of New Talks, Iran Suggests it Could Deal," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 January 2011.

### **22 January 2011**

A new round of talks between the P5+1 and Iran in Istanbul concludes with no progress. According to reports, diplomats presented Iran with a list of practical steps to build trust in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, including a revamped version of last year's fuel swap proposal, in which France and Russia agreed to provide Iran with fuel rods for a medical research reactor in Tehran in exchange for most of its stockpile of enriched uranium. However, Iran refused to even consider the proposals, citing the lifting of all economic sanctions as a precondition for substantive discussions.

—Julia Damianova, "Nuclear Negotiations with Iran End in Failure; Iran, Meeting with Six World Powers, Says it has the Right to Continue its Work," *Los Angeles Times*, 23 January 2011; Steven Erlanger, "Talks on Iran's Nuclear Program Close with No Progress," *The New York Times*, 23 January 2011.

### **7 February 2011**

Reuters reports that Iran's uranium enrichment program has recovered from recent setbacks caused by technical difficulties, international sanctions and the Stuxnet computer worm. In November 2010, Teheran briefly suspended uranium enrichment at the Natanz nuclear facility. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the IAEA, asserts that Iran's enrichment program was "continuing steadily."

—"Iran's Uranium Enrichment Seen Regaining Momentum," *NTI Global Security Newswire*, 8 February 2010; Fredrik Dahl, "Analysis: Iran Resumes Steady Atom Enrichment after Mystery Halt," *Reuters*, 7 February 2011.

### **13 February 2011**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appoints Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani as the new chief of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Abbasi, a professor at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran, survived an assassination attempt in late November 2010 and was designated on a list of figures suspected of links to secret nuclear activities in the annex to the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007). Abbasi replaces Ali Akbar Salehi, who was appointed Foreign Minister of Iran in January 2011.

—"Iran: President Appoints New Nuclear Chief," *Stratfor*, 14 February 2011; "Iran Appoints New Nuclear Chief," AP, 13 February 2011.

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### **16 February 2011**

*Foreign Policy* magazine reports that the U.S. intelligence community has finished and started disseminating a classified update to the 2007 national intelligence estimate (NIE) on Iran's nuclear capabilities. The 2007 NIE concluded that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. The U.S. government reportedly will not release an unclassified version of the document.

—"Intel Agencies Update Report on Iranian Nuclear Work," *Global Security Newswire*, 16 February 2011.

### **23 February 2011**

The state-owned Russian nuclear company Rosatom announces that Russia and Iran are finalizing an agreement on the export of medical isotopes to Iran. Russia will supply 100 curies of molybdenum-99 and 15 curies of iodine-131 each week. The reports do not, however, specify the duration of the agreement. Iran has previously produced these isotopes in the Tehran Research Reactor, but production may have slowed down due to the lack of fresh nuclear fuel.

—"Russia to Meet Iranian Medical Needs," *World Nuclear News*, 24 February 2011; "Russia, Iran to Ink Medical Isotope Export Deal," *Global Security Newswire*, 23 February 2011.

### **25 February 2011**

The IAEA releases its latest report on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Iran, stating that the Agency has received new information regarding possible Iranian efforts to construct a nuclear warhead. Also, Iran informed the Agency that it was planning to unload fuel assemblies from the core of the Bushehr nuclear reactor. Iranian government officials cited "unspecified safety concerns" as the reason for the unloading. In defiance of the UN Security Council, Iran continues its uranium enrichment and heavy water related projects. Iran informed the Agency it was planning to install two cascades of advanced-design centrifuges for testing purposes at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant. The report concludes that Iran is not implementing a number of its obligations and that "Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation to enable the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."

—"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA, 25 February 2011; "Iran to Unload Fuel from Bushehr Nuclear Plant," AP, 26 February 2011.

### **28 February 2011**

The state-owned Russian nuclear corporation Rosatom says in a statement that a broken cooling pump necessitated the unloading of fuel assemblies from the Bushehr nuclear reactor. The statement says that the problem could delay the start-up of the reactor for up to two months.

—Fredrik Dahl, "Iran, Russia Blame Pump Flaw for Atom Fuel Removal," *Reuters*, 28 February 2011; William J. Broad and Andrew E. Kramer, "Russians Say Damaged Cooling Pump is Cause of Delay in Starting Iranian Reactor," *The New York Times*, 1 March 2011.

### **13 March 2011**

Fereydun Abbasi, head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, states at the second Iranian National Resistance and Passive Defense Festival that Iran will enter the world market in the export of nuclear materials and services. Abbasi does not specify what material and services Iran intends to export. He reportedly says that cooperation can be used as a "deterrent."

—"Iran: Nuclear Services and Materials to Enter World Market – Official," *Stratfor*, 13 March, 2011.

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#### **4 April 2011**

The April edition of Arms Control Today reports that observers have expressed doubts about Iran's ability to mass produce advanced centrifuges such as the IR-2m and IR-4. These designs are believed to have a considerably higher enrichment capacity than the IR-1 centrifuges Iran operates at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant. Iran informed the IAEA in February that it was planning to install two 164-centrifuge cascades, one with IR-2m and the other with IR-4 centrifuges, for testing purposes.

—Peter Crail, "Iran Prepares Advanced Centrifuges," Arms Control Today, April 2011; "Iran Lags on Advanced Enrichment Gear," Global Security Newswire, 5 April 2011.

#### **10 April 2011**

The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reports that a leaked diplomatic cable from the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv asserts that senior Israeli defense officials ruled out a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities as early as 2005. The article also states that Israeli officials did not think a military strike on Iran was a viable option, and admitted that Israel did not have a clear understanding of Iran's clandestine nuclear program.

—Yosssi Melman, "Haaretz Wikileaks Exclusive/Israel Ruled Out Military Option on Iran Years Ago," Haaretz, 10 April 2011.

#### **11 April 2011**

Fereydoon Abbasi Davani, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that Iran is planning to construct four to five new research reactors within the next few years for the production of radioisotopes and research and development. Davani also stresses that Iran will continue to enrich uranium up to 20% U-235, and that these activities might be expanded in the future.

—"Iran to Build '4 to 5' Nuclear Research Reactors," AFP, 11 April 2011; "Iran Plans New Research Reactors," Global Security Newswire, 12 April 2011.

#### **12 April 2011**

Iran informs the International Atomic Energy Agency that it will not grant the Agency access to the TABA centrifuge production facility, located West of Tehran. According to Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Tehran's envoy to the IAEA, the facility is not covered by Iran's safeguards agreement with the Agency. Soltanieh also says that Tehran was ready for new talks with the P5+1 group.

—"Centrifuge Parts Plant Outside IAEA Jurisdiction: Iran," Global Security Newswire, 13 April 2011; "IAEA Inspection of TABA Company Lies Outside Iran's Int'l Undertakings," Fars News Agency, 12 April 2011.

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## **2010**

#### **3 January 2010**

Iran imposes a one-month deadline for the West to accept its counterproposal to the reactor fuel deal. Iran has threatened to enrich uranium further and produce reactor fuel itself if its proposal is not accepted. Iran has demanded that the West either sell it TRR fuel directly, or swap Iran's low enriched uranium for higher enriched fuel in smaller batches.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Issues Nuclear Deadline," *Newsday*, 3 January 2010; "Tehran Sets Ultimatum to Accept Nuke Proposal," *The Toronto Star*, 3 January 2010.

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### **12 January 2010**

Tehran University nuclear physics professor Masoud Ali Mohammadi is killed outside his home in a motorcycle bomb explosion. There are conflicting reports about the professor's involvement in Iran's nuclear program and a number of questions are being raised about the real purpose of the attack. Iranian officials blame the attack on Israel and the United States. However, there is also speculation that the physics professor's death is linked to his support for Green Movement inside of Iran.

—Yaakov Katz, "Mystery Surrounds Assassination of Iranian Nuclear Scientist," *The Jerusalem Post*, 13 January 2010; Borzou Daragahi and Ramin Mostaghim, "Iran Physicist Killed in Blast Outside of his Home; Officials Blame the West, but Friends Say He Was Government Critic Assassinated by Hard Liners," *The Los Angeles Times*, 13 January 2010.

### **8 February 2010**

In a letter, Iran informs the IAEA that it would begin enriching some of its low enriched uranium to twenty percent. Iran says that the twenty percent enriched fuel will be used to power the Tehran Research Reactor. Iran blamed the international community for failing to respond to their counterproposal to the TRR reactor fuel deal.

—Howard LaFranchi, "Iran's Nuclear Program Takes Another Step up Escalation Ladder; Iran Announces Its Intentions Monday to Begin Processing Its Uranium Stockpile to a Higher Level of Enrichment," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 8 February 2010; Borzou Daragahi, "Iran to Boost Enrichment; Ahmedinejad Tells Atomic Agency to Process Uranium to a Higher Purity," *The Los Angeles Times*, 8 February 2010.

### **10 February 2010**

The United States and other Western nations offer to help Iran buy medical isotopes on the international market. The plan is part of a larger effort to persuade Iran not to indigenously enrich uranium for the Tehran Research Reactor.

—Glenn Kessler, "Iran Gets Offer on Medical Isotopes; U.S. Unveils Deal Aimed at Halting Tehran's Push to Produce Reactor Fuel," *The Washington Post*, 10 February 2010.

### **12 February 2010**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announces that Iran has produced twenty percent enriched uranium and has the ability to enrich it further if it chooses to do so. Ahmadinejad delivered the speech on the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.

—Alan Cowell and Michael Slackman, "Iran Boasts of Capacity to Make Bomb Fuel," *The New York Times*, 12 February 2010; Nasser Karimi and Brian Murphy, "Iran Claims to be Nuclear State," *Newsday*, 12 February 2010.

### **16 February 2010**

Ambassadors from France, Russia, and the United States send a letter to the IAEA Director General expressing regret over Iran's unwillingness to agree to the TRR fuel swap arrangement. The letter reiterated the P5+1's commitment to ensuring that the fuel swap arrangement would be fully implemented and also reaffirmed their belief that the IAEA proposal is the most effective way to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the Tehran Research Reactor. The letter expressed regret over Iran's decision to begin enriching uranium to twenty percent but also made clear that even if Iran were to reject the IAEA's proposal it could purchase medical isotopes on the world market.

—"France, Russia, and the United States Write to Amano on Iran," *ISIS Nuclear Iran*, 16 February 2010.

### **17 February 2010**

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that if Iran develops a nuclear weapon it could lead to a regional arms

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race. Secretary Clinton told reporters that Iran's actions do not support its assertions of no interest in nuclear weapons. At a news conference in Tehran President Ahmedinejad reiterated Iran's willingness to simultaneously swap its low enriched uranium for fuel for the TRR. The United States, France, and Russia have already said that they are not willing to agree to a simultaneous swap on Iran's territory.

—Mark Landler and Alan Cowell, "Clinton Issues Another Warning to Iran," *The New York Times*, 17 February 2010.

### **19 February 2010**

In a letter, Iran formally requested that the IAEA "make provisions for materials, services, equipment, and facilities" to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the Tehran Research Reactor. Iran also informed the IAEA that it was still seeking to purchase the required fuel for the TRR on the international market and is still willing to exchange LEU for fuel assemblies "simultaneously or in one package" provided the exchange take place inside of Iran. Iran has requested that the IAEA convey this message to the P5+1.

—"Communication Dated 19 February 2010 Received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran Concerning the Supply of Fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor," The International Atomic Energy Agency, 22 February 2010.

### **20 February 2010**

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General released a report confirming that Iran has produced small quantities of twenty percent enriched uranium. The IAEA also called upon Iran to clarify a number of outstanding issues related to possible nuclear weapons related experiments. The Agency stated that the intelligence it has received over the past several years raises concerns about the possibility of current and previous experiments relating to the construction of a nuclear warhead for a missile. Iran has maintained that the intelligence documents provided to the IAEA are forgeries and has refused to discuss these issues with IAEA inspectors. In addition, the report criticized Iran for failing to abide by IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security Council Resolutions, and its unwillingness to implement the Additional Protocol. The Agency was able to confirm the non-diversion of declared nuclear material for weapons use or research. However, the Agency called upon Iran to be more forthcoming about the origins of its nuclear program and its suspected weapons research so that the IAEA can confirm, "all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities."

—"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 18 February 2010.

### **22 February 2010**

Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, announced that Iran would continue with its plan to build ten more enrichment sites. Iran has identified "close to" twenty sites for these new facilities and told reporters that it will start building two of the new enrichment sites "within the next year." The proposed sites will be built to withstand aerial attack. Salehi says that the new enrichment plant will use a new kind of centrifuge. Iran says that it needs the additional enrichment capacity to guarantee its nuclear fuel supply in the event of an attack and to produce fuel for its future reactors. Iran says it plans to generate 20,000 megawatts of energy from nuclear power plants in future.

—Alan Cowell, "Iran to Build More Enrichment Plants," *The New York Times*, 22 February 2010; "Iran to Declare Good News on Centrifuges to be Used in New Site: AEOI," *Iranian Student News Agency*, 22 February 2010.

### **23 February 2010**

The EU is reportedly drafting new sanctions that will target Iran's energy and financial sectors. The new sanctions are planned in response to the failed TRR reactor deal. For the first time the EU is considering implementing a

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sanctions regime that targets the entire Iranian economy. This includes limiting Tehran's access to Iranian funds invested abroad and banning the "Iranian central bank from the international circulation of money and credit." The final proposal entails limiting the guarantee of investment for European companies investing in Iran. Not all of the 27 members of the EU have yet agreed to support the aggressive sanctions regime. However, the failure of the TRR reactor deal and the recent IAEA report has prompted some members of the EU to increase the diplomatic pressure on Iran.

—Hans-Jürgen Schlamp, "EU Plans Massive Sanction Against Iran," *Der Spiegel*, 23 February 2010.

#### **24 February 2010**

Iran formally responded to the proposed nuclear fuel swap arrangement. However, the terms put forth in the letter Iran sent to the IAEA had already been rejected by the United States and other members of P5+1. Iran has offered to simultaneously swap its low enriched uranium for nuclear fuel rods inside Iranian territory. The P5+1 insist that they would approve the deal only if the fuel swap takes place outside of Iranian territory.

—Alan Cowell, "Iran: Letter Repeats Terms Rejected by the West," *The New York Times*, 24 February 2010.

#### **4 March 2010**

At a meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim refused to support any new sanctions against Iran. Minister Amorim said that Brazil would not "bow down" to foreign pressure and favors a more cooperative approach to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.

—Sara Miller Llana, "Hillary Clinton fails to convince Brazil to support Iran sanctions," *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 March 2010.

#### **7 March 2010**

The *New York Times* publishes an article claiming that the "federal government has awarded more than \$107 billion in contract payments, grants and other benefits over the past decade to foreign and multinational American companies while they were doing business in Iran." The revelations cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Iran Sanctions Act, a domestic piece of legislation that empowers the President to place sanctions on foreign or domestic companies that invest more than \$20 million in Iran's oil and gas sector. Despite the legal authority, no President has placed sanctions on foreign companies investing in Iran.

—Jo Becker, Ron Nixon, and Eric Owles, "U.S. Enriches Companies Defying Its Policy on Iran," *The New York Times*, 7 March 2010.

#### **8 March 2010**

The United States is reportedly working with the Gulf Arab states and the Asian countries to set up alternative sanctions against Iran. The United States expects that new UN Security Council sanctions will be weak and ineffective because of Chinese and Russian objections. The sanctions package being discussed with the United States' Arab and Asian allies seek to limit the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps access to the smaller banks operating in the Gulf and Asia.

—Alex Spillius, "Arab States Asked to Back Alternative Iran Sanctions," *The Daily Telegraph*, 8 March 2010.

#### **28 March 2010**

The *New York Times* reports that unnamed IAEA inspectors and Western intelligence officials believe that Iran is preparing to build two additional uranium enrichment facilities. The IAEA and Western intelligence agencies are examining a number of satellite photos for evidence of a facility similar to the Fordow Enrichment Plant.

—David Sanger and William Broad, "Agency Suspects Iran is Planning New Enrichment Sites," *The New York Times*, 28 March 2010.

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### **31 March 2010**

Dr. Shahram Amiri, a senior Iranian nuclear scientist that disappeared during a Pilgrimage to Mecca in 2009, reportedly defected to the United States and is cooperating closely with the Central Intelligence Agency. The *Christian Science Monitor* reports that "Mr. Amiri's defection was 'an intelligence coup' in American attempts to damage and better understand Iran's controversial nuclear program." The CIA had allegedly been working with Amiri for a number of years to convince him to defect to the United States.

—Scott Peterson, "Iranian Scientist Defects: U.S. Covert Ops Hurt Iran's Nuclear Program," *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 March 2010.

### **2 April 2010**

China announces that it would support negotiations for new UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. Following the announcement, Iran dispatched its nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, to Beijing to meet with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiech. The details of their meeting were not disclosed.

—David Usburne, "Iran Sends Envoy to Beijing as China Agrees to Sanctions Talks," *The Independent*, 2 April 2010.

### **3 April 2010**

Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), told the Iranian Labor News Agency that the AEOI has submitted plans to President Ahmadinejad for two new nuclear facilities. Salehi said he believes that if the plans are approved construction will begin in the "first half of this year." Salehi did not specify what types of facilities were being presented for approval.

—"Iran plans construction of new nuclear installations," BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political, 3 April 2010.

### **5 April 2010**

Iran announces that it will host an international disarmament conference. Saeed Jalili told reporters that the "aim of the conference was to show that Iran wants to promote nuclear disarmament while encouraging peaceful nuclear energy production." Iran has invited 60 countries to the conference. The conference will take place the same week as the nuclear security summit in Washington, DC.

—"Iran Announces Nuclear Summit," *Al-Jazeera English*, 5 April 2010.

### **6 April 2010**

The United States releases the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. The U.S. new nuclear weapons policy narrows significantly the circumstances under which the United States would use nuclear weapons. United States now provides a negative security assurance to non-nuclear states that are party to the NPT and in good standing with their nonproliferation obligations. However, NPR names Iran, along with North Korea, as a state in breach of its nonproliferation obligations.

—Nuclear Posture Review Report, Department of Defense, April 2010; David Sanger and Peter Baker, "Obama Limits When U.S. Would Use Nuclear Arms," *The New York Times*, 5 April 2010.

### **10 April 2010**

President Ahmadinejad, in a speech to mark Iranian Nuclear Day announces that Iran has developed a new "third generation" centrifuge. He claims that the new centrifuge "has a separation power ten times that of the first generation." The new centrifuge is likely still in the testing phase and not being used to enrich Iran's uranium. Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of AEOI, told the audience that Iran's P-2 centrifuges are now being used to enrich uranium to five percent and that new nuclear sites were being "developed" in areas that made them invulnerable to enemy attack.

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—"Nuclear Head says Iran Build Third Generation Centrifuge," BBC Monitoring Middle East, 9 April 2010; Parisa Hafezi, "Iran's Nuke Path Irreversible; Thumbing his nose at the U.S., Ahmadinejad unveils centrifuge that will enrich uranium faster," *The Toronto Sun*, 10 April 2010.

#### **17 April 2010**

Iran's international conference on disarmament and nonproliferation entitled "Two Summits with Two Outlooks" began in Tehran today. Summit official announced that fourteen foreign ministers, ten deputy ministers, eight representatives from regional and international organizations, and representatives from more than 70 countries were in attendance. Iranian officials hope that conference will clarify the international community's questions about Iran's nuclear program. The Iranian newspaper *Siyasat-e Ruz* writes, "The Tehran summit should be considered as a summit that will challenge countries like the U.S. and the Zionist regime, a challenge that will elevate the awareness of global public opinion with regard to the realities of the nuclear world."

—"Tehran's Two Day Nuclear Summit 'Challenge' to U.S.," BBC Monitoring Middle East, 21 April 2010.

#### **13 April 2010**

At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, U.S. President Obama held bilateral talks with nations, particularly China, to bolster support for new U.N. Sanctions against Iran. Beijing reportedly agreed to accept a resolution that would "promote a diplomatic way out of a nuclear standoff".

—Steve Holland and Jeff Mason, "Obama Presses Iran, Gains Nuclear Summit Pledges," *Reuters*, 13 April 2010.

#### **18 April 2010**

At Iran's two-day "Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapons for None" conference, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad demanded action on Israel's nuclear weapons program and called for the suspension of the U.S. membership in the IAEA "due to its threats to use nuclear weapons against other countries" – presumably a reference to the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review that does not exclude the use of nuclear weapons against states in noncompliance with their nonproliferation obligations. Iran also criticized what it called the unfair, undemocratic nature of the IAEA Board of Governors and Security Council, remarking how both were being used as tools by powerful countries.

—"Iran Condemns U.S. As 'Nuclear Criminal,' Pushes for Global Disarmament," *Cybercast News Service*, 19 April 2010.

#### **19 April 2010**

Iran released a statement saying it will start the construction of new enrichment plants as part of the expansion of its nuclear program announced in November. Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Akbar Salehi stated that Iran would start the construction of two enrichment sites by March 2011. Iran has not informed the Agency of the location and designs of new sites, claiming it does not need to do so until six months before nuclear materials are introduced to the facility.

—Robin Pomeroy "Iran Says to Start Work on New Enrichment Plant," *Reuters*, 19 April 2010.

#### **27 April 2010**

Brazil has offered to act as a mediator and broker between Iran and the West in an attempt to prevent a further round of sanctions against Iran. The original fuel swap deal with France and Russia required Iran to ship 1,200kg of low enriched uranium - almost all of Iran's stockpile at the time - to Russia and France to make fuel for a medical research reactor in Tehran. However, the swap did not go through after Iran requested to change some of the provisions. Brazil's Foreign Minister Celso Amorim suggested that Brazil work with Turkey to formulate an agreement more acceptable to both Iran and the West. The deal will reportedly operate along the same terms but

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allow for a direct transfer of low-enriched uranium for a higher grade material.

—Robin Pomeroy "Brazil Offers to Mediate in Iran Nuclear Standoff," *Reuters*, 27 April 2010.

### **17 May 2010**

Following trilateral talks in Tehran, Iran, Turkey and Brazil sign a joint declaration, whereby Iran agrees to send 1,200 kg (2,645lb) of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey in return for 120 kg of fuel for the Tehran research reactor within one year. The declaration permits Iran to maintain ownership over the LEU in Turkey, and in the event the provisions of the declaration are not met within a year the material will promptly be returned to Iran. In the declaration Iran also agrees to notify the IAEA in writing of its deal within seven days of the declaration and it must be accepted by the Vienna Group (the United States, Russia, France and the IAEA). Upon positive response, a written agreement will be made followed by proper arrangements and commitment by the Vienna Group to deliver the fuel to Iran for its Tehran Research Reactor. It is reported that this plan could "revive a UN-backed proposal and may ward off another round of sanctions." However, correspondents note Western capitals will likely look at the deal with skepticism, especially since Iran's current stocks are thought to be much larger than the 1,200kg covered by the new agreement.

—Paul Reynolds, "Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel-Swap Deal with Turkey," BBC Monitoring, 17 May 2010; "Nuclear Fuel Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil," BBC Monitoring, 17 May 2010.

### **19 May 2010**

The United States, after consultations with Russia, China and other major powers, submitted a draft U.N. Security Council Resolution that would tighten sanctions against Iran for its failure to cooperate with the IAEA. The text of the resolution was finalized the day after Brazil and Turkey had secured a deal with Iran to ship some of its stockpile of low enriched uranium to Turkey. Brazil, a non-permanent member of the Security Council at the time, noted that it would "not engage on any draft resolution and there was still room for negotiations".

—Glenn Kessler and Colum Lynch, "U.S. Partners Agree to Sanctions on Iran," *The Washington Post*, 19 May 2010.

### **31 May 2010**

The IAEA Director General submitted to the Board of Governors a new report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran. The report confirmed Iran's continued enrichment activities and noted that a new cascade was being installed at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz. Iran stated on 7 April it had withdrawn 5.7kg of UF<sub>6</sub> from the cascades and that it had been enriched to 19.7% U-235. It is estimated that production of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> totals 2427kg. Reportedly, in January 2010, Agency inspectors were informed by the operator at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) that pyroprocessing R&D activities had been initiated at that site. —"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA Director General Report to the Board of Governors, 31 May 2010.

### **9 June 2010**

UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1929, imposing a fourth round of sanctions against Iran, including tighter financial measures and an expanded arms embargo. The new sanctions prevent Iran from buying attack helicopters or missiles, and toughen restrictions on financial transactions with Iranian banks. President Ahmadinejad responded by saying the sanctions were a "used handkerchief that should be thrown in the dustbin" and that the sanctions were "not capable of hurting Iranians".

—"UN Votes for New Sanctions On Iran Over Nuclear Issue," BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political, 9 June 2010.

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#### **7 June 2010**

On June 7 Iran sent a letter to the IAEA Director General in response to the Iran safeguards implementation report of May 31, stating that the operator at the at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) never stated that pyroprocessing research and development had started at the facility, and Iran did not launch any pyroprocessing activities. The letter further suggested that the agency inspectors had misunderstood the operator. —"Communications dated 8 June 2010 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency regarding the Director General's Report to the Board of Governors GOV/2010/28 dated 31 May 2010," International Atomic Energy Agency, 10 June, 2010.

#### **21 June 2010**

The Islamic Republic of Iran barred two IAEA inspectors from entering the country. Iran accused these two inspectors of wrongly reporting that some nuclear equipment was missing from its Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory during a past inspection. In addition, Iran also accused IAEA Director General, Yukiya Amano, of issuing a misleading report on 31 May. Iran asked that these inspectors not be sent to Iran again, but that it would still allow the IAEA to monitor its nuclear facilities with different inspectors assigned.

—Hossein Jaseb and Sylvia Westall, "Iran Bars Two U.N. Inspectors in Nuclear Dispute," *Reuters*, 21 June 2010.

#### **22 June 2010**

Israel launched Ofeq 9 satellite capable of monitoring Iran's nuclear program. This is Israel's sixth "spy" satellite in space. Israeli Defense Ministry gave no public details on the satellite.

—Nancy Atkinson, "Israel Launches Spy Satellite," *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 June 2010.

#### **24 June 2010**

Iran says it has produced 17kg (37lb) of uranium enriched to 20%, and the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization said the country could produce up to 5kg of enriched UF<sub>6</sub> every month. These numbers and stocks have yet to be verified by the IAEA.

—Jonathan Marcus, "Iran Claims Higher Enriched Uranium," BBC Monitoring Middle East – Political, 24 June 2010.

#### **24 June 2010**

U.S. Congress approved new sanctions against foreign companies that trade with Iran. The new sanctions will affect firms that supply Iran's Revolutionary Guards or contribute to the country's energy industry.

—"U.S. Congress Backs New Sanctions Against Tehran," BBC News Monitoring – Political, 24 June 2010.

#### **29 June 2010**

In response to the new sanctions imposed against it, Iran has postponed nuclear talks with major powers until late August. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said this "is a punishment for them so they will learn the protocol of talking to other nations." Additionally, the new sanctions placed on Iran by the U.N. Security Council call for searches of suspect Iranian vessels, but Iran has stated that if its vessels are searched it will be ready to retaliate.

—Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran's Ahmadinejad Faults Sanctions, Delays Nuclear Talks Until Late August," *The Washington Post*, 29 June 2010.

#### **1 July 2010**

President Obama signed into law unilateral sanctions against Iran, which aim to cut-off Iran's imports of refined petroleum products such as gasoline and jet fuel as well as limit Iran's access to the international banking system. It is reported these sanctions passed in addition to the United Nations Security Council and European sanctions, to

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strike at Iran's capacity to finance its nuclear program and deepen its isolation.

—"US Slaps Iran with Toughest Sanctions Ever," *USA Today*, 3 July 2010.

#### **6 July 2010**

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili sent a reply letter to the European Union's foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton stating that nuclear talks could be held as early as September. The letter states that before talks are held there would need to be reassurances on three issues. First, Iran wanted to know the if the "objective of the talks was cooperation or continued enmity with Iranians' rights"; second, Jalili noted the talks should aim to "engage and cooperate" and should be "committed to the logic of the talks which necessitates avoiding threats and pressures," and third, all participating parties should "adopt a clear stance over Israel's nuclear arsenal."

—"Iran Sets Conditions to Resume Talks But Has No Plans to Stop Uranium Enrichment," *Xinhua News*, 7 July 2010.

#### **11 July 2010**

The head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi announces Iran has produced 20 kilograms of 20% enriched uranium, and began work on fuel plates. Reports cite Iran's intentions to deliver the fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor by September 2011.

—"Iran Claims 44 Pounds of Higher-Enriched Uranium," *NTI Global Security Newswire*, 12 July 2010.

#### **29 July 2010**

Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi tells Press TV in an interview that Tehran is ready to rethink its uranium enrichment to 20 percent. This will only happen if Tehran receives a guarantee of fuel supplies for its research reactor.

—"Nuclear Chief Says Iran Ready to Rethink 20-per-cent Uranium Enrichment," BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit, 29 July 2010.

#### **16 August 2010**

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces the Iranian government has successfully concluded its search for 10 additional sites for uranium enrichment plants. Construction of the first of the 10 enrichment facilities, which will all be built inside mountains, should reportedly begin in early 2011.

—Ian Black "Iran Outlines Plans for New Uranium Plants," *The Guardian*, 16 August 2010.

#### **16 August 2010**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announces the enactment of the Peaceful Nuclear Achievements Protection Law, which mandates continuous production of nuclear fuel for the Tehran medical research reactor. The law, which was ratified in parliament on 18 July, bans cooperation with the IAEA beyond the minimum standards of the NPT. In addition, the law mandates retaliation for any inspections of Iranian cargo envisioned under UNSCR 1929, which was passed on 9 June 2010.

—Ali Sheikholeslami, "Iran Enacts Law Mandating Enriched-Uranium Production; More Plants Planned," *Bloomberg*, 16 August 2010.

#### **21 August 2010**

At a ceremony attended by Russian officials, Iran is scheduled to begin loading fuel into its first nuclear power station. According to Sergei Novikov, a spokesman for Russia's state nuclear corporation Rosatom, this start-up marks an "irreversible step" in the development of Iran's nuclear program. This event coincides with the arrival in Iran of Sergei Kiriyyenko, chief of Rosatom. The Bushehr plant could produce power within weeks, and Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast asserts that Iran will pursue its nuclear projects with speed and

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focus.

—"Iran to accelerate its nuclear programs - spokesman," BBC Monitoring Middle East, 21 August 2010; David Batty and Agencies, "Iran Begins Loading Fuel at Its Bushehr Nuclear Reactor," *The Guardian*, 21 August 2010; Tom A. Peter, "Iran's Bushehr Plant to Produce Nuclear Power in Weeks," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 22 August 2010.

#### **6 September 2010**

The IAEA Director General submits to the Board of Governors a new report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of U.N. Security Council resolutions in Iran. The report notes Iran's failure to meet the requirements of the Board of Governors and to comply with Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008). Also covered in the report is Iran's development of the FEP at Natanz and plans to continue enrichment activities there with eight new units containing 18 cascades each. Enrichment of uranium up to 20% U-235 at PFEP has started in two interconnected cascades since 13 July 2010. The report notes the breaking of safeguard seals at the FEP, which Iran insists were accidental, stating that "all necessary advice and instructions have been given to the operator to exercise more vigilance and control in this respect." The Agency verified that the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), located near the city of Qom, is under construction. Its projected capacity is sixteen cascades, with a total of approximately 3000 centrifuges. The report also calls attention to Iran's objection to the designation of two inspectors with experience in Iran's nuclear fuel cycle, highlighting the Agency's concern that repeated objection to the designation of experienced inspectors "hampers the inspection process and detracts from the Agency's ability to implement safeguards." "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA Director General Report to the Board of Governors, 6 September 2010.

#### **26 September 2010**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad states that Iran will consider ending higher level uranium enrichment if world powers send Tehran nuclear fuel for its research reactor. President Ahmadinejad affirms his nation's willingness to set a date for the resumption of talks with six world powers to discuss Iran's nuclear program, stating October would be the likely time for the two sides to meet. President Ahmadinejad insists Iran had no initial interest in enriching uranium from around 3.5 percent to 20 percent, contending that the refusal to provide nuclear fuel for producing medical isotopes has forced Iran to pursue higher levels of enrichment. —"Iran Out to Do a Nuclear Bargain," *Sunday Telegraph* (Australia), 26 September 2010.

#### **27 September 2010**

Iranian officials acknowledge that over 30,000 computers have been infected by the malicious Stuxnet computer virus, notably the central computer systems at the Bushehr nuclear facility and personal computers belonging to the plant's employees. Iranian officials allege that a state government is likely to have designed and released the rapidly mutating computer worm, due to the worm's complexity and huge financial resources required to write the code. The virus has been infiltrating industrial computer systems in China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and Indonesia, but there are far more cases of infection in Iran than anywhere else. It is the first known example of malware designed to target industrial control operations, specifically computer systems and networks designed by the German firm Siemens, on which Iran relies heavily for the management of the Bushehr plant. —Thomas Erdbrink and Allen Nakashima, "Iran Struggling to Contain 'Foreign-made' 'Stuxnet' Computer Virus," *The Washington Post*, 27 September, 2010.

#### **4 October 2010**

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, affirms that a small leak in a pool next to the Bushehr reactor has been curbed, a process which took several days and delayed the start-up process. Nonetheless, Salehi

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asserts that the leak has been fixed and that the reactor has resumed functioning properly. When workers began loading fuel into the Bushehr plant in August, officials affirmed that the start-up process would take two to three months. Despite widespread inquiry over whether the malicious Stuxnet computer virus has caused the delay, Iranian officials insist that it can be attributed to the small leak.

—"Iran Blames Bushehr Delay on 'Small Leak,' Not Virus," *Reuters*, 4 October, 2010; William Young, "Iran Denies Malware Connection to Nuclear Delay," *The New York Times*, 5 October 2010.

#### **9 October 2010**

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki announces a possible resumption of nuclear talks with the P5+1. "The end of October or early November is a good time for talks between Iran and five-plus-one," Minister Mottaki notes. He insists that such negotiations must be conducted within the framework of the Tehran Declaration, which Brazil, Turkey, and Iran issued in May 2010. Talks between Iran and the P5+1 have been deadlocked since the 1 October 2009 meeting in Geneva.

—"Iran 'Ready' for Nuclear Talks," *Al-Jazeera English*, 10 October 2010; "Text of the Iran Brazil Turkey Deal," *The Guardian*, 17 May 2010.

#### **11 October 2010**

Iranian Atomic Energy Organization Head Ali Akbar Salehi acknowledges that employees at Iranian nuclear facilities provided information to foreign intelligence services. Salehi affirms that in response, the Iranian government has taken preventative measures and tightened security to counter the intelligence operations. These measures include improving privileges for nuclear engineers who may be tempted by bribes from the West.

—"Iran Admits Success by Western Spies," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 October 2010.

#### **20 October 2010**

Iranian Atomic Energy Organization head Ali Akbar Salehi announces Iran has now stockpiled 30 kg, or approximately 66 pounds, of uranium enriched to 20% U-235. This amount is nearly double the 17 kilograms Iran possessed in June 2010.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran reports higher amount of enriched uranium," *Associated Press*, 20 October 2010; "Iran Claims 66 Pounds of Higher-Enriched Uranium," *NTI Global Security Newswire*, 20 October 2010.

#### **26 October 2010**

Iran announces that it has begun loading 163 uranium fuel rods into the Bushehr reactor. According to Iranian Atomic Energy Organization head Ali Akbar Salehi, after fuel injection into the heart of the reactor is complete, it will take one or two months before the plant reaches 40 to 50 percent capacity. This milestone comes after delays following the initial start-up attempt in August. Iranian officials attribute the cause to a small leak in a pool near the reactor [See *NTI Iran Nuclear Chronology* 4 October 2010].

—Kristen Chick, "Iran loads fuel rods into Bushehr nuclear power plant," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 October 2010; "Iran Starts Fueling Bushehr Reactor," *NTI Global Security Newswire*, 26 October 2010.

#### **29 October 2010**

The Iranian Supreme National Security Council sends a letter to Lady Catherine Ashton, the EU foreign policy chief, expressing Iran's willingness to engage in a new comprehensive round of talks with the P5+1 "from November 10 on, in a place and on a date convenient to both sides." Iranian officials also assert that the content of multifaceted negotiations must be clarified and such negotiations should not focus exclusively on nuclear issues.

—"Iran Accepts Invitation to Nuclear Negotiations," *NTI Global Security Newswire*, 29 October 2010; "No Indication of Iranian Nuclear Strategy Shift, Diplomat Asserts," *NTI Global Security Newswire*, 3 November 2010.

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### **23 November 2010**

The IAEA Director General submits to the Board of Governors a new report on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of UN Security Council resolutions in Iran. The report indicates that despite UN Security Council resolutions, Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment activities. The report notes that 29 out of 54 cascades at the FEP in Natanz are being fed with UF<sub>6</sub>. It further notes that a total of 3,183kg of low enriched UF<sub>6</sub> has been produced since February 2007. Out of this amount 414.5kg were further enriched at the PFEP resulting in a total of approximately 33kg of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 20% U-235 having been produced since the process began in February 2010. The report also states that in September 2010 Iran informed the Agency that the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) near the city of Qom was now to include research and development as well as the production of UF<sub>6</sub> enriched up to 5.0% U-235. Accordingly, the lay-out of the facility is being changed to a new configuration consisting of 12 cascades for production purposes and four cascades for research and development purposes.

—"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA Director General Report to the Board of Governors, 23 November 2010.

### **29 November 2010**

One Iranian nuclear scientist is killed and another one injured in a bomb explosion. Attackers on motorcycles threw the explosives or affixed them to the cars of the two men, both of whom taught at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran. The wounded scientist, Fereidoun Abbasi-Davani, was designated on a list of figures suspected of links to secret nuclear activities in the annex to the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007). Majid Shahriari, the scientist killed in the bombing, was reportedly involved in a major project with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused the U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies of being behind the assassination.

—"Bombs Strike Iranian Atomic Experts, Killing One," *NTI Global Security Newswire*, 29 November 2010; Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran blames Israel after nuclear scientist killed," Associated Press, 29 November 2010

### **1 December 2010**

Iranian Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs Ali Abdollahi announces that Iran will increase security for nuclear academics and scientists following attacks on two nuclear scientists in Tehran.

—"Iran: Security Increase for Nuclear Scientists," *Stratfor*, 1 December 2010; Saeed Kamali Dehghan, "Iran to Step Up Protection of Nuclear Scientists after Assassination," *The Guardian*, 2 December 2010.

### **5 December 2010**

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Chief Ali Akbar Salehi says Iran has become self-sufficient in the production of yellowcake, a uranium concentrate powder. The first batch of domestically produced yellowcake was shipped from the Gchine mine, close to the Southern port city Bandar Abbas, to the uranium conversion facility in Isfahan under the supervision of the IAEA. Salehi asserts that Iran will accelerate the exploration and extraction of uranium ore and its conversion into yellowcake in the near future.

—Ali Akbar Dareini and George Jahn, "On the Eve of Talks, Iran Says it's Mining Own Uranium," AP, 6 December 2010; "Iran: Self-Sufficiency Reached in Yellowcake Production," *Stratfor*, 5 December 2010; "Iran Now Self-Sufficient in Yellowcake Production," *Tehran Times*, 6 December 2010.

### **6 December 2010**

The first P5+1 talks in over a year fail to yield substantive progress on Iran's nuclear program. During two days of meetings, held in Geneva, delegations exchanged views while Iran refused to discuss a halt to its uranium

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enrichment program. Participants described the meetings as "difficult and candid." The delegations agreed to meet again in Istanbul in January 2011.

—Paul Richter, "No Clear Advance in Iran Talks; Tehran Agrees to Meet Again With Six Powers in Turkey but Rebuffs U.S. on Bilateral Talks," *Los Angeles Times*, 8 December 2010; Hilary Leila Krieger, "US, Iran Agree to Meet Again in Early 2011. Tuesday's Talks in Geneva Don't Yield Substantive Progress on Nuclear Program," *Jerusalem Post*, 8 December 2010.

### **8 December 2010**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asserts that his country is willing to discuss a potential nuclear fuel swap and other world issues during January talks in Turkey. However, the construction of new nuclear power plants and the enrichment of uranium to up to 20% U-235 remain non-negotiable.

—Ramin Mostafavi, "Ahmadinejad Sets Nuclear Red Lines for January Talks," *Reuters*, 8 December 2010; "Ahmadinejad says Iran Prepared for Nuclear Fuel Swap," *Jerusalem Post*, 8 December 2010.

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## **2009**

### **8 January 2009**

Reliance Industries Limited (RIL), an Indian oil and gas company, has suspended its gasoline shipments to Iran after unnamed U.S. congressmen protested U.S. export-import loan guarantees. The export-import bank has provided two separate loan guarantees worth \$900 million to RIL, including a \$400 million long-term loan by J.P. Morgan for oil and gas exploration. RIL was going to use the loan guarantees to purchase U.S. engineering services, field equipment, offshore platform support, and drilling and well services.

—Shailaja Nair, Vandana Hari and Irene Tang, "India's RIL Halts Gasoline Supplies to Iran," *Platts Oilgram News*, 8 January 2009; "RIL Ceases Gasoline Sale to Iran," *Business Standard*, 8 January 2009.

### **9 January 2009**

New York state and federal officials reveal that billions of dollars of Iranian funds were illegally transferred through American financial institutions "in recent years," according to a report by the *New York Times*. Authorities reportedly suspect that the money may have helped finance Iranian nuclear and missile activities, including the purchase of large amounts of tungsten, used in the construction of long-range missiles. Lloyds TSB Group, a British bank, "went to great lengths" to hide their involvement in the Iranian transactions, says Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau.

—Vikas Bajaj and John Eligon, "Iran Moved Billions via U.S. Banks," *The New York Times*, 10 January 2009; Andrew Clark, "Lloyds forfeits \$350m for disguising origin of funds from Iran and Sudan," *The Guardian*, 10 January 2009; Randall Mikkelsen and *Diane Bartz*, "Lloyds TSB forfeits money in U.S. case," *Reuters*, 11 January 2009.

### **11 January 2009**

*The New York Times* reports that President Bush denied Israel's covert request last year for bunker-busting bombs it sought for an attack against Iran's nuclear complex at Natanz. The request, according to senior American and foreign authorities, alarmed the Bush administration. The Israeli plan was subsequently abandoned, at least temporarily. The U.S. and Israel did allegedly enhance, however, their joint efforts to quietly sabotage Iran's nuclear infrastructures. The two countries sought to disrupt the supply of nuclear materials to Iran, "along with new efforts, some of them experimental, to undermine electrical systems, computer systems and other networks on which Iran relies," according to *The New York Times*. [See NTI Israel Nuclear Chronology, 10 January 2009]

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—David E. Sanger, "U.S. Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Nuclear Site," *The New York Times*, 11 January 2009; Karen De Young, "U.S. Thwarted Israeli Plan to Bomb Iranian Nuclear Facility," *The Washington Post*, 11 January 2009; "U.S. refused Israeli bid for help to bomb Iran, report says," [Canadian] *The Globe and Mail*, 12 January 2009; "Report: U.S. spurned Israel plan for attack on Iran nuke reactor," *Ha'aretz*, 11 January 2009; Anne Penketh, "Bush tried to sabotage Iran's nuclear plans," *The Independent*, 12 January 2009.

#### 11 January 2009

In an interview on the ABC news program "This Week," President-elect Barack Obama says that "Iran is going to be one of our biggest challenges," expressing concern that the Islamic republic's pursuit of nuclear technology may trigger an arms race in the Middle East. He reiterates his plan to take a "new approach" with Iran, including a "new emphasis on being willing to talk."

—Brian Knowlton, "In Interview, Obama Talks of 'New Approach' to Iran," *The New York Times*, 12 January 2009; "Obama to engage with Tehran," *The Irish Times*, 12 January 2009; Ed Pilkington and Julian Borger, "Obama promises to move swiftly in adopting new approach to Tehran: Iran offered engagement with 'certain expectations': Report reveals mission to disrupt atomic ambitions," *The Guardian*, 12 January 2009; "Door open to talks with Iran," *The Australian*, 13 January 2009.

#### 24 January 2009

Western powers believe that Iran's stockpile of yellowcake uranium may be exhausted within a few months. The United States, Britain, France and Germany have started intense diplomatic negotiations with major uranium producers to dissuade them from selling to Iran. Iran imported 600 tons of yellowcake from South Africa in the mid-1970's, but has not imported further yellowcake since. Tehran has launched a project to mine its own uranium reserves, but Iran lacks a sufficient quantity of uranium to supply its own enrichment program continuously. "You need 200 tons per year just for one 1,000 megawatt power station," an IAEA source says.

—James Bone, James Hidder and Jonathan Clayton, "Iran in Scramble for Uranium Supplies," *The London Times*, 24 January 2009; David Albright, Jacqueline Shire and Paul Brannan, "Is Iran Running out of Yellowcake," *Institute for Science and International Security*, 11 February 2009.

#### 26 January 2009

In an interview with the Dubai-based *al-Arabiyya* television network, President Obama says the U.S. will extend the hand of diplomacy to Iran if its leaders "unclench their fist." "It is very important for us to make sure we are using all the tools of U.S. power, including diplomacy, in our relationship with Iran," says Obama. American Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice stipulates, however, that the Islamic republic must suspend its uranium enrichment — in line with UN Security Council demands — before expecting talks with the United States.

—Michael D. Shear and Glenn Kessler, "Obama Voices Hope for Mideast Peace in Talk With Al-Arabiya TV," *The Washington Post*, 27 January 2009; "Obama reaffirms Tehran diplomacy," *The Australian*, 28 January 2009; "Obama reaches out to Muslim world," *BBC News*, 27 January 2009.

#### 27 January 2009

The International Institute for Strategic Studies predicts that "[t]his year, it's very likely that Iran will have produced enough low-enriched uranium which, if further enriched, could constitute enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon, if that is the route Iran so desires," according to IISS senior fellow for non-proliferation Mark Fitzpatrick. The most recent IAEA report on Iran, released last November, revealed that the Islamic republic had produced 630 kg of LEU and was constructing additional centrifuges. [See NTI Iran Nuclear Chronology 19 November 2008.]

—David Blair, Iran will amass enough low-enriched uranium this year to have the ability to build a nuclear bomb by

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the end of 2010, a respected think tank has predicted. "*The Daily Telegraph*," 28 January 2009; "Iran could have a nuclear weapons by 2010," *The National Post*, 28 January 2009; "Iran 'now closer' to N-bomb," *The West Australian*, 29 January 2009; "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of the Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, 19 November 2008.

#### **28 January 2009**

Iran rejects reports claiming that it is running out of uranium for its enrichment program. According to Mahmoud-Mehdi Soltani, "Iran is not only capable of supplying fuel for the Bushehr plant, but can also act as a major exporter." Mohammad Qannadi, deputy chief of Iran's nuclear research and technology says, "Continued exploration efforts in the country led to the discovery of three new uranium ore sites in central Iran in 2006." —"Iran Uranium Stocks Enough for Export," *Iran Press TV*, 28 January 2009; "Iran Denies Uranium Yellowcake Shortage," Global Security Newswire, 30 January 2009.

#### **4 February 2009**

Representatives for the P5 and Germany meet to discuss Iran's nuclear program. This is the first meeting since President Obama's inauguration. The diplomats, including U.S. Undersecretary of State William Burns, say that they "welcome the willingness of the U.S. administration, as expressed by President Obama, to engage in talks with Iran."

—"World Powers Confer on Iran," Global Security Newswire, 4 February 2009; Haviv Rettig Gur, Hilary Krieger, and Benjamin Weinthal, "Security Council Members Welcome U.S. Willingness for Iran Dialogue," *The Jerusalem Post*, 5 February 2009.

#### **8 February 2009**

Outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert says no Israeli government will allow Iran to produce a nuclear weapon. Olmert's statements come on the eve of a new Israeli government, more than likely led by Benjamin Netanyahu, who has hinted of a military solution to prevent Iran from producing a nuclear weapon. The consensus of Israeli officials is that a nuclear Iran is not in Israel's interests. However, debate continues over what means should be used to stop Iran from producing a weapon. Israel has used military force in the past to preempt neighbors' suspected nuclear programs, including the 1981 air strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor, and the more recent September 2007 air strike on the alleged Syrian reactor Al-Kibar.

—Dan Williams, "Olmert says no Israeli government would let Iran get nukes," Reuters, 8 February 2009; Jason Koutsoukis, "Israel ready to strike Iran: ex-envoy," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 February 2009; Alon Ben-David, "Iran will be major concern for new Israeli leadership," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 12 February 2009.

#### **9 February 2009**

The United States is considering how to overcome decades of tension with Iran in order to win Tehran's cooperation on its nuclear work. According to President Obama, "the expectation is that in the coming months we will be looking for an option that can be created where we can start sitting across the table, face to face; diplomatic overtures that will allow us to move our policy in a new direction."

—"U.S. Mulls Methods of Engaging Iran," Global Security Newswire, 10 February 2009; Thomas Erdbink, "Iran Signals Opening with the U.S.," *The Washington Post*, 11 February 2009.

#### **10 February 2009**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad takes up U.S. President Obama's invitation for direct talks between the two countries. "Our nation is ready to hold talks based on mutual respect and in a fair atmosphere," announces

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Ahmadinejad in a televised address. Iranian economist and political analyst Saeed Leylaz asserts, however, that talks could only be held with Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

—Nazila Fathi and David Sanger, "Responding to Obama Iranian Leader Offers Talks 'Based on Mutual Respect,'" *The New York Times*, 11 February 2009; "Iran is 'ready for talks' with United States, says president," *Birmingham Post*, 11 February 2009; Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran Signals Opening with U.S.," *The Washington Post*, 11 February 2009.

#### **17 February 2009**

IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei says that Iran has slowed the expansion of its uranium enrichment program, increasing its production capacity by less than 5% over the last three months. According to El-Baradei, this may have been "a political decision" on Iran's part, possibly made in response to the Obama administration's diplomatic overtures. Nevertheless, El-Baradei criticizes Tehran for its continued failure to cooperate with IAEA inspectors, saying: "Iran right now is not providing any access or any clarification with regard to [its] studies or the whole possible military dimension [of its nuclear program]."

—"Iran still not cooperating on nuclear programme: IAEA chief," *The Times of India*, 18 February 2009; Julian Borger, "IAEA: Iran, Syria must cooperate more," *The Jerusalem Post*, 17 February 2009; "U.N. Nuke Agency: Iran Slowing Expansion of Uranium Enrichment," *Fox News*, 19 February 2009.

#### **18 February 2009**

The latest IAEA report reveals that Iran underreported its enriched uranium stockpile by approximately one-third. Tehran has now amassed 2,227 pounds of low enriched uranium, which is sufficient material for a nuclear weapon if further enriched into HEU. David Albright, who heads the Institute for Science and International Security, says that Iran has reached "breakout capacity," or the theoretical capacity to produce enough HEU for a nuclear warhead. Following an inspection at the enrichment plant at Natanz, the IAEA report also updated figures for the facility's centrifuge count, which it now places at 4,000 in use and an additional 1,600 available, for a total of 5,600.

—William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Iran Has a Third More Enriched Uranium Than Thought, Inspectors Say," *The New York Times*, 20 February 2009; "Iran hoarding nuclear fuel: watchdog," Reuters, 20 February 2009; Julian Borger, "Iran has enough low-enriched uranium for bomb, IAEA says: UN claims obstacles remain to building nuclear device: Report set to raise tensions with U.S., Israel and Europe," *The Guardian*, 20 February 2009; "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Report by the IAEA Director General, 18 February 2009.

#### **21 February 2009**

In a BBC documentary, Britain's ambassador to the UN Sir John Sawers reports that Iran is offering to halt attacks on British troops in Iraq in return for British acceptance of its nuclear program. "The Iranians wanted to strike a deal whereby they stopped killing our forces in Iraq in return for them being allowed to carry on with their nuclear program," says Sawers. He also says that Britain rejected the deal. In response, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hassan Ghashghavi insists that, "Iran has [had] no role in attacks on American and British troops" during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

—Julian Borger, "Iran offered nuclear deal to end Iraq attacks, diplomat says," *The Guardian*, 21 February 2009; Bridget Kendall, "Iran in 'backroom offers' to West," *BBC News*, 20 February 2009; "Iran offered nuke deal to end Iraq attacks: BBC," *Al-Arabiya*, 21 February 2009.

#### **23 February 2009**

Iranian state radio reports that tests on the Bushehr reactor will begin in two days, in advance of full-scale

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operation later in the year. The reactor will undergo a "virtual fuel-injection test" requiring no uranium fuel. "This will be an important step towards the full launch of the Bushehr nuclear power plant," says Mohsen Delaviz, a spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.

—Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran's First Nuclear Power Plant Set for Tests Before Launch," *The Washington Post*, 23 February 2009; "Iran Plans Tests Toward Starting a Nuclear Plant," *The New York Times*, 23 February 2009; Tony Halpin, "Tehran begins test run of nuclear plant amid weapons fear over uranium hoard," *The Times*, 25 February 2009.

### **23 February 2009**

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appoints Dennis Ross as her special advisor for the Gulf and Southwest Asia, including Iran. Ambassador Ross worked as an advisor to President Obama during the campaign, and has worked in both the State Department and the Pentagon. He has supported a tough approach to Iran, and co-founded the group United Against Nuclear Iran, a non-profit advocacy group which seeks to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

—Mark Landler, "Negotiator Picked for Post at State Dept.," *The New York Times*, 24 February 2009; Glenn Kessler, "Veteran Mideast Envoy Ross Named to Advise Clinton on Iran Strategy," *The Washington Post*, 24 February 2009; "Old hand called in to advise on Iran," *The Australian*, 25 February 2009.

### **25 February 2009**

Iran performs tests at its Bushehr nuclear power plant using "dummy" fuel rods, which are loaded with lead rather than enriched uranium. Officials say the test measures "the pressure, temperature, and flow rate" of the facility, but do not specify the details of the next test or when Bushehr will commence operations. Sergei Kiriyyenko, Director General of Rosatom, observes the test, along with Iranian officials and engineers.

—Borzou Daragahi, "Iran, with Russia, tests its first nuclear reactor; The West worries that spent fuel from the joint power project at Bushehr could be used to make weapons," *Los Angeles Times*, 26 February 2009; Miriam Elder, "Iranians hail success of tests on their first nuclear reactor," *The Daily Telegraph*, 26 February 2009; Tony Halpin, "New fear as Iran tests its N-plant," *The Australian*.

### **2 March 2009**

The *New York Times* reports that President Obama, in a letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev about three weeks ago, hinted that the U.S. may ditch plans to install a missile defense system in Eastern Europe if Moscow pressures Iran against pursuing nuclear weapons. Responding, Obama says the *New York Times* "didn't accurately characterize the letter," and Medvedev denies that the letter offered any direct quid pro quo, saying that Moscow "is already working in close contact" with Washington on Iran. According to Obama, "what I said in the letter is the same thing I've said publicly, which is that the missile defense that we have talked about deploying is directed towards not Russia, but—Iran."

—Peter Baker, "Obama Offered Deal to Russia in Secret Letter," *The New York Times*, 2 March 2009; Jon Ward, "Letter to Russia misinterpreted, Obama says; European allies fear renegeing on U.S. missile-defense plans," *The Washington Times*, 4 March 2009; Alex Spillius, "Barack Obama offers to scrap US missile defence system in secret letter to Russia," *The Daily Telegraph*, 3 March 2009.

### **3 March 2009**

In a statement at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China say they "remain fully committed to a comprehensive diplomatic solution, including through direct dialogue" with Iran. They also express "serious concern" about Tehran's continued pursuit of nuclear technology and its refusal to cooperate with IAEA inspectors. Iran responds that it will participate in fair talks.

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—Mark Heinrich, "Six world powers want direct talk with Iran to defuse nuclear dispute," *The National Post*, 4 March 2009; "U.S., World Powers Urge Iran to Cease Nuke Program," Associated Press, 4 March 2009.

#### **5 March 2009**

The U.S. Government Accountability Office reports that Iran received over \$15 million between 1997 and 2007 under the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program, which promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and is partially funded by U.S. contributions to the IAEA. The GAO expresses concern that some of the money may have provided expertise useful to the development of nuclear weapons, noting that "the IAEA does not provide the United States with sufficient or timely information on TC proposals."

—Siobhan Gorman, "Iran, Syria Got Indirect U.S. Nuclear Aid," *Wall Street Journal*, 31 March 2009; "Iran, Syria Receive Millions of U.S. 'Peaceful Nuclear' Funds," *Fox News*, 31 March 2009; Government Accountability Office, "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Strengthened Oversight Needed to Address Proliferation and Management Challenges in IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program," GAO-09-275, 5 March 2009.

#### **10 March 2009**

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair says that Iran has not produced the HEU necessary to build a nuclear weapon. Blair estimates that the earliest Tehran could produce a nuclear weapon would be 2010. "The overall situation—and the Intelligence Community agrees on this—is that Iran has not decided to press forward on all three tracks [acquiring sufficient fissionable material, weaponizing it, and loading it on a capable delivery vehicle], to have a nuclear weapon on top of a ballistic missile," Blair says. Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. Gen. Michael Maples reports to Congress that Iran is "keeping open th[e] option" of pursuing nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Israel's chief of military intelligence, Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, reportedly tells Israeli cabinet ministers that Tehran is stockpiling uranium with the intent of manufacturing a bomb.

—Peter Finn, "U.S., Israel Disagree on Iran Arms Threat; Senate Panel Told Tehran Has Not Made Decision to Pursue Nuclear Weapons," *The Washington Post*, 11 March 2009; Richard Sisk, "Iran Still Years Away from Nukes, Top Spy Says," *The Daily News*, 11 March 2009; "Iran uranium 'now weapon-grade,'" *The Independent*, 11 March 2009; Dennis C. Blair, "Hearing to receive testimony on the current and future worldwide threats to the national security of the United States," Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 10 March 2009.

#### **13 March 2009**

Unnamed American officials report that the Obama administration may be preparing to open back-channel diplomacy with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader. Khamenei's approval would be required in order for Iran to suspend or freeze its nuclear program. A senior Western diplomat says: "The key issue is now to find a channel to Khamenei."

—Doyle McManus, "Reaching Iran through a 'back channel;' Obama's message: We are ready to talk. Just name a time and place," *The Los Angeles Times*, 15 March 2009; Jay Solomon, "Obama Team Plots Opening of Iran Ties," *The Wall Street Journal*, 13 March 2009.

#### **17 March 2009**

In a speech at Lancaster House in London, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown says that Iran has a right to civil nuclear power but calls its current nuclear program a "critical proliferation threat." Brown offers to help Tehran build nuclear power stations in exchange for the promise that it will not pursue nuclear weapons. "Iran has the same absolute right to a peaceful civil nuclear program as any other country," Brown says, but "Iran's current nuclear program is unacceptable."

—Torcuil Crichton, "PM offers nuclear olive branch to Iran," *The Herald [Glasgow]*, 17 March 2009; Nigel Morris,

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"PM warns Iran over nuclear ambitions," *The Independent*, 17 March 2009; Philip Webster and Tony Halpin, "Brown offers to cut British nuclear arsenal," *The Times*, 18 March 2009.

### **20 March 2009**

In a videotape released to various Middle Eastern media outlets, President Obama says: "My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties" with Iran. In the video, which coincides with the Iranian holiday Nowruz, Mr. Obama alludes to Tehran's nuclear program and emphasizes the need to pursue peace. Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a speech recorded earlier but released today, lauds the Islamic Republic's progress in its nuclear program.

—"Obama Extends to Iran an Olive Branch on Videotape, Issuing a Holiday Message of Peace," *The New York Times*, 20 March 2009; Mike Dorning, "Obama delivers holiday message of peace to Iran; His broadcast marking the Persian New Year stresses the potential for cooperation with the United States," *The Los Angeles Times*, 20 March 2009; Ewen MacAskill and Robert Tait, "TV diplomacy: Obama's video message to Iranians: 'Let's start again': Careful words praise civilisation and culture: Khamenei hails nuclear moves in new year speech," *The Guardian*, 21 March 2009.

### **31 March 2009**

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says that Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke had a "brief and cordial exchange" with Tehran's Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed Mehdi Akhundzadeh during an international conference on Afghanistan in The Hague. Clinton did not have any personal contact with the Iranian delegation. She reports that the exchange between Holbrooke and Akhundzadeh did not include "substantive" dialogue.

—"Holbrooke had brief and cordial exchange with Iranian deputy foreign minister, Clinton says," [Foreign Policy's] *The Cable*, 31 March 2009; Jay Solomon, "Senior U.S., Iranian Officials Meet at Afghanistan Conference," *The Wall Street Journal*, 1 April 2009; Mark Landler, "Obama Administration Has First Face-to-Face Contact With Iran," *The New York Times*, 31 March 2009.

### **6 April 2009**

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad endorses the idea of a global nuclear fuel bank while on a visit to Kazakhstan. "We think that Nursultan Nazarbayev's idea to host a nuclear fuel bank is a very good proposal," says Ahmadinejad, but he does not specify whether Iran would give up its uranium enrichment capabilities to participate in such a bank. A global nuclear fuel repository, depending on how it is enacted, could put uranium enrichment under strict international control.

—"Iran: Controls on Nuclear Fuel Endorsed," *The New York Times*, 7 April 2009; "Iran supports US-backed nuclear fuel bank idea," *Al-Arabiya*, 6 April 2009.

### **8 April 2009**

The Obama administration announces that it will join P5+1 negotiations with Iran as a "full participant," which the Bush administration had refused to do unless Iran ceased its uranium enrichment program. "The U.S. will join P5+1 [the U.S., the U.K., France, Russia, China, and Germany] discussions with Iran from now on," says Robert Wood, a State Department spokesman. Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responds in a speech that he would welcome "honest" talks with Washington.

—Nicholas Kralev, "U.S. drops conditions on Iran talks; Joins EU-led dialogue as 'full participant,'" *The Washington Times*, 9 April 2009; Brian Knowlton, "U.S. opens door for direct talks with Tehran; Shift on nuclear dispute comes after Ahmadinejad warms to West's overtures," *The International Herald Tribune*, 9 April 2009; Mark Landler and Nazila Fathi, "United States Plans to Join Nuclear Talks With Iran," *The New York Times*, 9 April 2009.

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### 9 April 2009

The head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, reports that Iran has increased its centrifuge count to 7,000. Aghazadeh says that Tehran has also enhanced its technology to produce more "accurate" centrifuges, according to Reuters.

—Fredrik Dahl "Iran says running 7,000 enrichment centrifuges," Reuters, 9 April 2009; Nazila Fathi, "Iran Opens First Plant to Produce Atomic Fuel," *The New York Times*, 10 April 2009; Borzou Daragahi and Ramin Mostaghim, "Iran announces advances in nuclear program," Associated Press, 9 April 2009.

### 10 April 2009

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announces the opening of a plant capable of producing uranium oxide pellets. The plant, located in Isfahan, will fuel a 40-megawatt heavy-water research reactor near Arak. Ahmadinejad says, "Iran is a country controlling the entire nuclear fuel cycle," but insists the technology will be used exclusively for civilian purposes.

—"Iran now says it controls 'entire nuclear fuel cycle.' Claim comes two days after uranium oxide plant inaugurated," *The Jerusalem Post*, 12 April 2009; Nazila Fathi, "Iran Opens First Plant To Produce Atomic Fuel," *The New York Times*, 10 April 2009; Julian Borger, "Nuclear advances bring Iran closer to bomb capability, experts warn: Ahmadinejad announces progress on centrifuges," *The Guardian*, 10 April 2009.

### 22 April 2009

Reporting to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton threatens Iran with "crippling sanctions" if it fails to cooperate with the West's diplomatic efforts. Despite Clinton's tough tone and her emphasis that it is "imperative" that Tehran be prevented from building a nuclear weapon, she reiterates that the Obama administration wishes to pursue diplomatic options and "discuss a range of issues if [the Iranians] are willing to reach back."

—Nicholas Kravev, "'Crippling sanctions' for Iran an option; Talks preferable, Clinton says," *The Washington Times*, 23 April 2009; Hilary Leila Krieger, "Clinton: Iran could face crippling sanctions," *The Jerusalem Post*, 22 April 2009; "U.S.: Iran faces 'crippling' sanctions if nuclear talks fail," Reuters, 22 April 2009.

### 17 May 2009

The *Jerusalem Post* reports that top U.S. officials have been urging Israel to adopt less inflammatory rhetoric towards Iran and to stop threatening a military strike. According to the *Post* (citing unnamed foreign diplomatic sources), this was one reason CIA Director Leon Panetta secretly visited Israel three weeks ago, meeting with Israeli intelligence officials, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and Defense Minister Barak. Barak reiterates that Israel is "not taking any option off the table" regarding Iran.

—Steve Linde, "U.S. to Israel: Tone down rhetoric on Iran," *The Jerusalem Post*, 17 May 2009.

### 18 May 2009

Following a meeting in Washington, DC with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, President Obama publicly states that Iran must demonstrate steps towards halting its nuclear program by the end of the year. "It is not in [the Iranians'] interest to pursue a nuclear weapon and...they should change course," says Obama, adding that "we're not going to have talk forever."

—Jon Ward, "Obama, Netanyahu at odds over Iran, talks; U.S. wants progress on curbing nukes," *The Washington Times*, 19 May 2009; Scott Wilson, "Emphasis Differs for Obama, Netanyahu; for Israel, Iran Supersedes Peace Effort," *The Washington Post*, 19 May 2009; Hilary Leila Krieger and Herb Keinon, "Netanyahu: US to present new plan," *The Jerusalem Post*, 18 May 2009.

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### 19 May 2009

The United States and Israel are working to evaluate the effects of President Obama's outreach on Iran and to share intelligence regarding the Islamic Republic's nuclear program, according to unnamed Israeli officials. Following one-on-one talks between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu, plans are underway to form a high-level working group with the goal of exploring contingency plans in the event that Iran pursues a nuclear weapon. According to the same unnamed officials, National Security Adviser James L. Jones or his deputy, Thomas Donilon, would represent the American side and Jones' Israeli counterpart, Uzi Arad, would represent Israel. —Eli Lake, "U.S.-Israel forming working group on Iran; Set to assess progress of outreach, share intelligence," *The Washington Times*, 20 May 2009; "U.S., Israel form working group on Iran," *Press TV*, 20 May 2009; Barak Ravid, "Despite tensions, U.S., Israel still talking about Iran," *Ha'aretz*, 2 June 2009.

### 3 June 2009

Speaking in Moscow, Israeli foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman says that Israel does not intend to bomb Iran. This is a departure from other statements by Israeli officials, who have consistently stated that all options remain on the table [See, for example, NTI Iran Nuclear Chronology 17 May 2009]. "We do not intend to bomb Iran, and nobody will solve their problems with our hands," Lieberman tells reporters. Nonetheless, Lieberman calls Tehran's nuclear ambitions "a threat to the entire world order."

—Herb Keinon, "FM in Moscow: Israel won't bomb Iran. Lieberman says Russia more favorable to Israel than many in Europe," *The Jerusalem Post*, 4 June 2009; Steve Gutterman, "Israel not going to bomb Iran: Foreign Minister," Associated Press, 3 June 2009; Conor Sweeney, "Israel gives mixed signals on any attack on Iran," Reuters, 3 June 2009.

### 5 June 2009

IAEA inspectors report that Iran has accelerated its nuclear fuel production and installed additional centrifuges, bringing its total number of centrifuges to 7,200. The Islamic Republic has now generated 2,946 pounds of low enriched uranium. "Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities," reports the IAEA, and "has neither implemented the Additional Protocol nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the remaining issues which give rise to concerns."

—William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Iran Has Centrifuge Capacity for Nuclear Arms, Report Says," *The New York Times*, 6 June 2009; Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," 5 June 2009, [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org); "Iranian Nuclear Expansion Complicates Monitoring, IAEA Report Says," Global Security Newswire, 8 June 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org).

### 11 June 2009

Diplomats tell the Associated Press that Iran recently rejected IAEA requests to install an additional camera at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei asserted at last week's Board of Governors meeting that "improvements to the containment and surveillance measures" are necessary for effective international oversight of Natanz.

—"Iran Rejects IAEA Request for New Monitoring Equipment at Enrichment Site, Diplomats Say," Global Security Newswire, 11 June 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); George Jahn, "Sources: Iran denies UN nuke agency camera request," The Associated Press, 11 June 2009; "Iran rejects IAEA surveillance cameras," *Jewish Telegraphic Agency*, 11 June 2009.

### 13 June 2009

Iran's Interior Ministry declares incumbent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad the victor of the presidential election. Reports

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that Ahmadinejad won 62.6% of the vote are hotly contested by his opponents.

—Thomas Erdbrink, "Ahmadinejad Vows New Start As Clashes Flare; U.S. Waits for 'What the . . . People Decide,'" *The Washington Post*, 13 June 2009; "Ahmadinejad 'wins second Iran term,'" *Al-Jazeera*, 13 June 2009; Ian Black, "Ahmadinejad wins surprise Iran landslide victory," *The Guardian*, 13 June 2009.

#### **14 June 2009**

Speaking at Bar Ilan, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calls Iran's pursuit of a nuclear program "the greatest danger to Israel, to the Middle East, and to all of humanity." He reiterates his unyielding efforts to "form an international front against Iran arming itself with nuclear armaments."

—"Full text of Netanyahu's foreign policy speech at Bar Ilan," *Ha'aretz*, 14 June 2009; "Full text of Netanyahu's speech," *Al-Jazeera*, 14 June 2009.

#### **15 June 2009**

IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei tells the agency's governing board that the international community should be concerned about Iran's uranium enrichment program, but indicates some optimism about the future of negotiations: "I am encouraged ... by the new initiative of the United States to engage Iran in direct dialogue, without preconditions and on the basis of mutual respect," El-Baradei says, expressing hope that Tehran will receive Washington's offer warmly.

—"ElBaradei Raises Concerns About Iranian, Syrian Nuclear Activities," Global Security Newswire, 15 June 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); Simon Morgan, "Iran in spotlight at IAEA meet," Agence France-Presse, 15 June 2009; Mohamed ElBaradei, "Introductory Statement to the Board of Governors," IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna, 15 June 2009.

#### **16 June 2009**

Mohamed El-Baradei says it is his "gut feeling" that Iranian leaders want the technology to build nuclear weapons. These remarks are "less hedged with diplomatic caveats" than previous remarks on the subject, according to the *New York Times*. Iran's message, according to El-Baradei, is "don't mess with us." The Islamic Republic wishes to be recognized as a major power in the region, he says.

—Alan Cowell, "U.N. Nuclear Chief Says Iran Wants Bomb Technology," *The New York Times*, 18 June 2009; "Iran 'would like nuclear option,'" *BBC News*, 17 June 2009; "ElBaradei Believes Iran Wants Nuclear Weapons Capability," Global Security Newswire, 17 June 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org).

#### **18 June 2009**

The United Kingdom announces that it has frozen \$1.64 billion in Iranian assets. "[T]he total assets frozen in the U.K. under the EU and UN sanctions against Iran are approximately 976,110,000 pounds," according to a written statement from British treasury official Ian Pearson.

—"Britain has frozen \$1.6 billion in Iranian assets," Reuters, 18 June 2009; "U.K. Freezes \$1.6B in Iranian Assets," Global Security Newswire, 19 June 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); "U.K.: We've frozen \$1.6b in Iranian assets under nuclear sanctions," *Ha'aretz*, 18 June 2009.

#### **24 June 2009**

*The Washington Times* reports that the Obama administration sent a letter to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei last month. The letter was submitted to the Iranian Foreign Ministry through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran between May 4th and May 10th, according to an unnamed Iranian source. In the message, the Obama administration reportedly expressed a desire to pursue "cooperation in regional and bilateral relations" and indicated a willingness to talk with Tehran about its nuclear program. Khamenei acknowledged the letter last Friday [June 19], saying that it

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expresses American "respect for the Islamic Republic and for re-establishment of ties."

—Barbara Slavin, "U.S. contacted Iran's ayatollah before election," *The Washington Times*, 24 June 2009; "Iranian Supreme Leader Received U.S. Nuclear Appeal Ahead of Election," Global Security Newswire, 24 June 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); Christiane Amanpour, "Obama sent letter to Iran leader before election, sources say," *CNN*, 24 June 2009.

### **26 June 2009**

Members of the G8 formally condemn Iran's violent crackdown on popular demonstrations following the country's contested June 12th presidential election. "We deplore post-electoral violence," says the G8 in a draft statement, urging Tehran to uphold human rights guarantees. There are concerns, however, that a sharp international response may reduce the possibility of resolving nuclear tensions with Iran peacefully. At the request of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and others, the language in the draft statement regarding Tehran's nuclear program was toned down. "We must focus on the main objectives that will allow us to move forward to resolve the problem of Iran's nuclear program," Lavrov says, discouraging the G8 from isolating Iran in the aftermath of its election.

—"Iranian Post-Election Crackdown Denounced by G-8," Global Security Newswire, 26 June 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); "G8 'deplores' Iran poll violence," *BBC News*, 26 June 2009; Daniel Flynn and Adrian Croft, "G8 deplores Iran violence, urges nuclear talks," Reuters, 26 June 2009.

### **30 June 2009**

While in Israel, where he met with Israeli President Shimon Peres, President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan denies rumors that his country is selling uranium ores to Iran. Allegations of nuclear cooperation between Iran and Kazakhstan have been frequently made in the past [For examples, see NTI Iran Nuclear Chronology 22 November 1994, 25 November 1994, 21 March 1995, 9 July 1995, 25 December 1995, 10 April 1998]. However, Nazarbayev asserts that "no nuclear material will reach Iran from our territory."

—"Kazakhstan denies selling Iran nuclear material," *Ha'aretz*, 30 June 2009; Haviv Rettig Gur, "We won't give Iran any nuke material," *The Jerusalem Post*, 30 June 2009.

### **1 July 2009**

Iranian Major-General Hassan Firouzabadi, who is the nation's military chief of staff, says that the European Union has "lost its qualification to hold nuclear talks" with Tehran because of its alleged interference in Iran's presidential elections and subsequent civil unrest.

—James Blitz, "'Interference' rules EU out of nuclear talks, says Iran," *The Financial Times*, 2 July 2009; "Iran: EU lost qualification for nuclear talks," [Iran's] *Press TV*, 1 July 2009; "Iran 'disqualifies' EU from talks," *BBC News*, 1 July 2009.

### **3 July 2009**

Incoming IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano expresses doubt that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. "I don't see any evidence in IAEA official documents about this," Amano tells reporters. His comments contrast with current IAEA Director General Mohamed El-Baradei's statement last month that he had the "gut feeling" that Iran desired nuclear arms. [See NTI Iran Nuclear Chronology 16 June 2009]. Amano promises, however, to "do [his] utmost" to implement nuclear safeguards and ensure that Iran adheres to its commitments under the NPT.

—Sylvia Westall, "No sign Iran seeks nuclear arms: new IAEA head," Reuters, 3 July 2009; Simon Morgan, "IAEA's new chief promises to unblock Iran standoff," Agence France-Presse, 3 July 2009; Herb Keinson, "Amano: 'No hard evidence Iran seeking nukes,'" *The Jerusalem Post*, 4 July 2009.

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### 5 July 2009

U.S. Vice President Biden, in an interview on the ABC News program "This Week," says that Israel has the "sovereign right" to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. "Israel can determine for itself as a sovereign nation what is in its best interest," Biden says. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman welcomes Biden's comments, calling it "logical" that Israel can make its own military and strategic decisions. Iran's Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani, however, responded negatively to the comments, saying: "We will consider the Americans responsible in any adventure launched by the Zionist entity." In the interview, Biden reaffirms the Obama administration's openness to engage diplomatically with Tehran regarding its nuclear program.

—Ryan J. Donmoyer, "Biden Says Israel Has 'Sovereign Right' to Hit Iran," *Bloomberg*, 6 July 2009; Mark Lavie, "Israeli FM praises Biden on Iran stand," Associated Press, 6 July 2009; "Iran speaker warns U.S. over Biden's Israel remarks," Agence France-Presse, 7 July 2009.

### 7 July 2009

In a CNN interview, President Obama says that his administration is "absolutely not" giving Israel the green light to attack Iran. His comments come in response to Vice President Biden's statement regarding Israel's "sovereign right" to attack Iranian nuclear sites. [See NTI Iran Nuclear Chronology 5 July 2009.] Obama says: "I think Vice President Biden stated a categorical fact which is we can't dictate to other countries what their security interests are," adding that "the United States [will] try to resolve the issue of Iran's nuclear capabilities in a peaceful way through diplomatic channels."

—Lachlan Carmichael, "U.S. denies giving Israel 'green light' to attack Iran," Agence France- Presse, 7 July 2009; Foon Rhee, "Obama clarifies Biden on Iran," *The Boston Globe*, 7 July 2009; "'Absolutely' no green light for Israel to strike Iran: Obama," Agence France-Presse, 7 July 2009, [www.news.yahoo.com](http://www.news.yahoo.com).

### 7 July 2009

The *Washington Times* reports that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not formally requested either permission or aid from the United States for possible military strikes on Iranian nuclear sites. Citing two anonymous senior Israeli officials, the *Times* states that Prime Minister Netanyahu decided not to press the issue following then-President Bush's negative response to then-Prime Minister Olmert's similar request last year. Many analysts, including journalist Yossi Melman of *Ha'aretz*, consider it unlikely that Israel would attack Iran without some degree of U.S. approval. "Coordinating its actions with America is the key factor in all Israeli crucial decisions," according to Melman.

—Eli Lake, "Israel declines to ask U.S. to OK Iran attack," *The Washington Times*, 7 July 2009; Yossi Melman, "Israel Won't Move Without U.S. Approval," *The Washington Post*, 2 July 2009.

### 7 July 2009

Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, says that the "window is closing" on opportunities to halt Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Mullen estimates that Tehran will build its first nuclear bomb in one to three years. The Islamic republic is "very focused" on developing a nuclear weapons capability, according to Mullen. He says that the U.S. has not ruled out the possibility of military action against Iran, adding that a military attack would more likely come from Israel. He notes that an attack on Iran would have "very destabilizing" effects for the region, and encourages approaching the issue diplomatically before it continues to escalate.

—"Iran Closing in on Nuclear-Weapon Capability, Mullen Warns," Global Security Newswire, 8 July 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); Yochi J. Dreazen, "U.S. Military Chief Warns of Rising Nuclear Threat," *The Wall Street Journal*, 8 July 2009; Anne Gearan, "Mullen: Strike on Iran an option, but a bad one," Associated Press, 7 July 2009.

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### 13 July 2009

Interviewed on CNN's "360 Degrees," President Obama suggests that Iran's controversial presidential elections and the subsequent unrest may adversely affect the potential for nuclear talks with the Islamic republic. Obama says: "My hope is that they continue to see [American diplomatic efforts] as an opportunity, but obviously what's happened over the past several weeks raises serious questions." According to Obama, the "outrageous violence" against protestors in Iran makes it unclear whether Iranian leaders will "walk through the door that we've left open for them to stand-down on nuclear weapons development." Obama continues to emphasize that the "diplomatic effort [with Tehran] is going to continue."

—Shlomo Shamir, "Obama: Iran protests could hinder nuclear talks," *Ha'aretz*, 15 July 2009; "U.S.: Iran's Postelection Crackdown Could Hinder Nuclear Talks — Obama" *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, 15 July 2009; Barak Obama, Interview with Anderson Cooper on "360 Degrees," CNN, 13 July 2009, [www.cnn.com](http://www.cnn.com).

### 14 July 2009

Germany's *Stern* magazine reports that an unnamed German intelligence analyst says that Iran is capable of producing an atomic bomb within six months. According to an official with the German Foreign Intelligence Service Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Iran has "mastered" the uranium enrichment process and acquired enough centrifuges to produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for a bomb. In response, a spokesman for Germany's BND intelligence agency plays down the report, saying that Iran could have a nuclear weapon within four to six years. This estimate corresponds with the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate issued in November 2007.

— Assaf Uni, "Germany believes Iran could have bomb within 6 months," *Ha'aretz*, 15 July 2009; "They can set off a bomb within six months," [Germany's] *Stern Magazine*, 15 July 2009, [www.stern.de](http://www.stern.de); Patrick Donahue, "German Spy Agency Says Iran Bomb is Years Off, Plays Down Report," *Bloomberg*, 15 July 2009; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities," National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007, [www.dni.gov](http://www.dni.gov).

### 15 July 2009

The Israeli newspaper *Yedioth Aharonoth* reports that Iran has constructed roofs over the entire nuclear facility at Arak. The report is based on information from Western intelligence agencies, which was provided to IAEA inspectors. The move will prevent satellite monitoring of the complex. IAEA inspectors express concern that Iran is attempting to hide plutonium manufactured at Arak.

—"Iran prevents nuclear site tracking," *United Press International*, 15 July 2009, [www.upi.com](http://www.upi.com).

### 16 July 2009

Iranian Students News Agency reports that Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization and Iran's vice president, has resigned from both positions. His resignation, which he submitted 20 days ago, has been accepted by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The news agency reports that Aghazadeh "confirmed reports of his resignation" but did not specify his reason for leaving the posts.

—Zahra Hosseinian and Fredrik Dahl, "Head of Iran's atomic energy body resigns: ISNA," *Reuters*, 16 July 2009; "Head of Iran's nuke agency steps down," *The Jerusalem Post*, 16 July 2009; "After 12 years, Iran's top nuclear man resigns," [Iran's] *Press TV*, 16 July 2009.

### 16 July 2009

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appoints Ali Akbar Salehi as the new chief of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Islamic Republic News Agency reports. Salehi is the former Iranian ambassador to the IAEA, received a Ph.D. in nuclear physics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and was a professor at the Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. As the ambassador to the IAEA, Salehi signed the Additional Protocol in December 2003. He

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replaces Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, whose abrupt resignation was announced the day before. [See NTI Iran Nuclear Chronology 16 July 2009.] "Salehi's appointment is a positive signal to the West. Salehi is a logical and soft spoken person who is trusted by the IAEA," said an unnamed analyst cited by Reuters.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Ahmadinejad appoints new nuclear chief," Associated Press, 17 July 2009; Zahra Hosseinian and Fredrik Dahl, "Iran names new head of atomic energy body," Reuters, 17 July 2009; "Iran names new nuclear chief," *Al Jazeera*, 17 July 2009.

### **16 July 2009**

The British newspaper the *Times* reports a possible deal between Western and Israeli leaders in which Israel would make concessions on the Israeli-Palestinian settlement in exchange for international support for an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. The report cites an unnamed British diplomat who says that Israeli concessions could make Western support for a strike realistic "within the year." On 14 July, two Sa'ar 5-class Israeli Navy ships passed through the Suez Canal, shortly after the Dolphin class submarine, apparently to send the message that "Israel will follow up on its threats," according to an unnamed Israeli defense official.

—Yaakov Ka'atz, "World may back Iran op as part of deal," *The Jerusalem Post*, 16 July 2009; Sheera Frenkel, "Israeli navy in Suez Canal prepares for potential attack on Iran," *The Times*, 16 July 2009; "Report: Iran Strike Support in Exchange for Concessions," *Arutz Sheva*, 16 July 2009, [www.israelnationalnews.com](http://www.israelnationalnews.com).

### **18 July 2009**

Ali Akbar Salehi, the new head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), calls for renewed efforts between Iran and the West to resolve tensions over the Islamic republic's nuclear activities. In his first official comment in the position, Salehi expresses the hope that "more efforts are taken to gain mutual trust." He also calls on the West to cease hostility towards Iran, saying that "legal and technical discussions about Iran's nuclear case have finished ... and there is no room left to keep this case open." He adds that AEOI will both "respect its international commitments" and "defend Iran's nuclear rights."

—Zahra Hosseinian, "Trust needed to end nuclear row — Iran atom official," Reuters, 18 July 2009; "New Iran nuclear chief seeks end to dispute," [Iran's] *Press TV*, 18 July 2009; "West must close Iran nuclear file: new atomic chief," *Agence France-Presse*, 18 July 2009.

### **21 July 2009**

Iranian Ambassador to Russia Seyed Mahmoud Reza Sajjadi announces that the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be operational by the end of 2009. Sajjadi says: "[Head of Russian State Nuclear Energy Corporation (Rosatom) Sergei] Kiriyyenko announced that the company has a plan for the launch of operation of Bushehr plant by the end of this year." In a meeting between Kiriyyenko and Deputy Head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Mohammad Saeedi, Kiriyyenko says that a group of Russian engineers and technicians will arrive in Iran to help prepare the facility for operation. Iranian and Russian engineers conducted the reactor's first test in February. [See NTI Iran Nuclear Chronology 25 February 2009.]

—"Envoy: Bushehr N. Plant to Go on Stream in Winter," Fars News Agency, 21 July 2009, "Launch of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant postponed," Xinhua News Agency, 21 July 2009.

### **2 August 2009**

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warns that the U.S. might adopt additional sanctions against Iran if it does not meet a September deadline to renew talks on its nuclear program. "We're not prepared to talk about any specific steps," Clinton says after holding a video conference with U.S. diplomats worldwide, noting that "in the absence of some positive response from the Iranian government," the international community will consider harsher sanctions against Tehran, probably focusing on petroleum products.

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—"Iran Could Face New Sanctions, U.S. Warns," Global Security Newswire, 4 August, 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); "US may seek more Iran sanctions," *Agence France-Presse*, 3 August 2009.

### **3 August 2009**

The *London Times* reports that Western intelligence sources believe Iran could build and explode a nuclear weapon within one year of supreme leader Ali Khamenei's order to do so. If Khamenei chooses to pursue a nuclear weapon, unnamed sources say, Iran would need six months to enrich uranium to weapons-grade level and another six months to build a nuclear warhead. The intelligence sources report that Iranian engineers are attempting to perfect a "multipoint initiation system" as a nuclear-weapons detonation technique. [This would mean wrapping HEU with high explosives and then detonating the device.] The sources also claim that when Tehran suspended its nuclear weapons program in 2003, it had already completed its research on producing weapons-grade uranium and building a nuclear warhead to mount on the Shahab-3 missile.

—"Iran Can Build Nuclear Warhead, Intelligence Sources Believe," Global Security Newswire, 3 August 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); James Hider, "Iran is ready to build an N-bomb - it is just waiting for the Ayatollah's order," *The London Times*, 3 August 2009; "Iran waiting for Khamenei go-ahead to build atom bomb," *Ha'aretz*, 3 August 2009; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities," National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007, [www.dni.gov](http://www.dni.gov).

### **10 August 2009**

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi announces that Tehran will not recognize a September deadline for agreeing to join talks about its nuclear program. "We are not against negotiations but we will not allow world powers to pressure us with deadlines," Qashqavi says.

—"Iran Rejects September Deadline on Nuclear Talks," Global Security Newswire, 10 August 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); "Iran will not accept pressure to meet deadline on nuclear meeting," *Deutsch Presse-Agentur*, 10 August 2009.

### **12 August 2009**

Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, urges the agency to ban military attacks on nuclear sites. Calling the proposed ban "a matter of principle," Soltanieh denies that the request is a reaction to Israeli threats against Iranian nuclear facilities. Israel attacked Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1981 and a Syrian facility at Al-Kibar in 2007. [See NTI Iraq/Israel Nuclear Chronology 7 June 1981 and Syria Nuclear Chronology 20 September 2007.] He asks that the measure be considered at the IAEA General Conference's next meeting on 14 September. IAEA member states endorsed a similar resolution in 1990 entitled "Prohibition of All Armed Attacks against Nuclear Installations Devoted to Peaceful Purposes Whether under Construction or in Operation." Soltanieh claims that a new ban is needed.

—"Iran Urges IAEA Members to Ban Attacks on Nuclear Sites," Global Security Newswire, 13 August 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); George Jahn, "Iran calls for ban on striking nuke facilities," *Associated Press* 12 August 2009; "Iran Wants Ban on Attacking Nuclear Facilities," *Arutz Sheva*, 13 August 2009, [www.israelnationalnews.com](http://www.israelnationalnews.com).

### **19 August 2009**

Israel's *Ha'aretz* reports that Israeli authorities and Western diplomats have accused the IAEA of hiding evidence on Iran's nuclear activities. The officials say that inspectors submitted certain evidence to the agency in a secret addendum, rather than in the published safeguards report on Iran. The officials contend that the agency hid evidence that the Islamic Republic was pursuing nuclear weapons research and taking other steps towards building a bomb. An unnamed Western diplomat says: "We expect the details to appear in the new report and to be made public," urging Mohamed ElBaradei to release the information at the IAEA General Conference next month.

— Barak Ravid, "Sources: UN watchdog hiding evidence on Iran nuclear program," *Ha'aretz*, 19 August 2009; "IAEA

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Accused of Withholding Iran Nuclear Evidence," Global Security Newswire, 19 August 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); John Lyons, "UN nukes chief 'hiding Iran evidence,'" *The Australian*, 19 August 2009.

#### **24 August 2009**

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hassan Qashqavi confirms that Iran is allowing IAEA inspectors to visit the heavy water reactor under construction at Arak. IAEA inspectors have not visited the facility in over a year. Tehran also announces that it will allow increased monitoring of its Natanz uranium enrichment facility, according to diplomats with ties to the IAEA. Some diplomats in the UN Security Council have met the announcement with skepticism, urging the Islamic Republic to provide more information about its nuclear work and join talks to discuss its nuclear program.

— "Iran Apparently Confirms IAEA Access to Arak Reactor," Global Security Newswire, 24 August 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); Reza Derakhshi, "Iran says cooperating with IAEA, West skeptical," Reuters, 24 August 2009; "Iran allows UN to resume nuclear inspections," *The Telegraph*, 24 August 2009.

#### **25 August 2009**

Reuters reports that Iran stopped expanding uranium enrichment at Natanz in May. The deceleration followed three years of gradual increase of the centrifuge count at the site. "There has been no increase in the number of centrifuges enriching uranium since the end of May," according to a high-level diplomat in Vienna. In June, the IAEA reported that Iran was operating about 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges at Natanz, with another 2,100 waiting in the wings. [See NTI Iran Nuclear Chronology 5 June 2009.] Since then, Tehran has installed more centrifuges but they are not currently operational. Some diplomats and experts say that the slowdown is probably due to technical obstacles.

— Sylvia Westall and Mark Heinrich, "No Iran atom expansion since May," Reuters, 25 August 2009; "Iran Pauses Enrichment Expansion, Diplomats Assert," Global Security Newswire, 25 August 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); "Diplomats: Iran's Nuclear Program Slows," The Associated Press, 25 August 2009, [www.cbsnews.com](http://www.cbsnews.com).

#### **26 August 2009**

The *New York Times* reports that the U.S., France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are pressing the IAEA to fully disclose information on Iran's nuclear activities. This includes computer files and other records that allegedly outline Iran's nuclear-weapons research, including efforts to modify the Shahab missile to carry a nuclear warhead. The IAEA shared some of the documents — which Tehran insists were falsified — with its governing board at a closed-door meeting in February 2008. "What we and all the allies are pressing for is for the full case to be laid out, in public," says a high-level American official. While the report would likely include "no bombshells" according to a senior European official, it may spark discussion about incriminating evidence that the IAEA has acquired.

—"Western Nations Push IAEA to Disclose Iran Records," Global Security Newswire, 26 August 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Atomic Agency is Pressed on Iran Records," *The New York Times*, 26 August 2009.

#### **26 August 2009**

Western diplomats tell Reuters that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei rejected an internal proposal in May to temporarily suspend Iran's uranium enrichment program. The Iranian "pragmatists" who made the suggestion hoped to settle the country's dispute with Western nations over its nuclear activities and to avoid additional sanctions. According to an unnamed Western diplomat, supporters of Mohsen Rezai (a conservative candidate in the presidential election, former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) proposed the suspension, which they said would be of "limited scope and duration." Khamenei reportedly rejected the proposal. Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, says he has not "heard such a thing."

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—"Iran Rejected Internal Call for Nuclear Freeze, Diplomats Claim," Global Security Newswire, 27 August 2009, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org); Louis Charbonneau, "Iran 'pragmatists' proposed nuclear halt-diplomats," Reuters, 26 August 2009.

### **28 August 2009**

New IAEA Director General's report indicates that Iran continues its uranium enrichment program. The report also reiterates concern over Iran's lack of cooperation with IAEA inspectors on questions about alleged weaponization activities. The report assesses that, "Iran has reduced, at least for now, the number of centrifuges it is actively using for enrichment, to 4,592 from 4,920...[but] the output of the Natanz plant appears to be fairly steady at 2.77kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) a day." U.S. and European officials will reportedly meet next week to discuss potential sanctions against Iran, including a proposal to cutoff refined gasoline exports into the country.

—William J. Broad, David E. Sange, "Nuclear agency says Iran has bolstered ability to make fuel but slowed its output," *The New York Times*, 29 August 2009; Julian Borger, "Iran is continuing nuclear activity, atomic agency says: Country 'fails to co-operate with energy inspectors': West may target foreign petroleum supplies," *The Guardian*, 29 August 2009.

### **2 September 2009**

This week, high-level government officials of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1) discussed Iran's nuclear program in Frankfurt and issued a Joint Statement. In it, they urge Iran to "enter into direct negotiations based on mutual respect [and] understand the urgent need to restore trust in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program through its full cooperation with the international community."

—Howard LaFranchi, "Officials from Germany and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council met in Frankfurt Wednesday," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 2 September 2009; Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website (in Russian), "Russia releases six powers' statement on Iran nuclear program," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, 3 September 2009.

### **9 September 2009**

Iran submits to P5+1 (United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany) its response to a package proposed by the group in April 2009. A five-page response contains proposals on starting a dialogue on broader issues of peace, security and economic cooperation, The European and American delegations are reportedly dissatisfied with the response, and U.S. State Department spokesman Philip Crowley notes that the proposal "does not really take account of our greatest concern, which is obviously the nuclear program." This proposal comes during a week-long meeting of the IAEA General Conference in Vienna.

—Dafna Linzer, "Exclusive: Read Iran's New Proposal for Nuclear Talks," *Pro Publica*, 10 September 2009, [www.propublica.org](http://www.propublica.org); "Latest Nuclear Proposal Fails to Address Concerns," *France 24*, 11 September 2009, [www.france24.com](http://www.france24.com).

### **21 September 2009**

Iran sends a letter to the IAEA informing it of a decision "to construct a new pilot fuel enrichment plant," near the holy Shi'ite city of Qom, stating that "further complementary information will be provided in an appropriate and due time."

—Christina Lamb and Uzi Mahnaimi and Michael Smith and Jon Swain, "Unlocking Iran's nuclear secrets; The latest revelations about Tehran's uranium program have raised fears that there are more hidden plants," *The London Times*, 27 September 2009; "Tehran's nuclear ambitions: A timeline," *The Washington Post*, 26 September 2009.

### **23 September 2009**

In an interview with *Newsweek* and *The Washington Post*, Iran's president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad offers up a

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meeting of Iranian nuclear scientists with their U.S. (and other countries') counterparts to "dispel any unease about Tehran's nuclear program," at international talks next week.

—Glenn Kessler, "Iranian leader offers U.S. access to the country's nuclear scientists; Ahmadinejad says talks could build trust over issue," *The Washington Post*, 24 September 2009; "Tehran scientists offered for talks," *The Australian*, 25 September 2009.

#### **24 September 2009**

*The Guardian* reports that economic sanctions imposed on Iran for defiance of UN Security Council demands to stop its nuclear program appear to have growing support in the Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]). Russian president Dmitry Medvedev also appears to be backing off Russia's former opposition to sanctions against Iran stating that, "sanctions rarely lead to productive results...but in some cases, sanctions are inevitable."

—Julian Borger, "UN Meetings: Gulf Arabs line up behind west to stop Iran's nuclear program: Economic leverage may be used on Russia and China: Officials point to change of mood on weapons," *The Guardian*, 24 September 2009; Christi Parsons, "Russia offers to help nudge Iran; Medvedev pledges to work with the U.S. to curb Tehran's nuclear program, hinting even at possible sanctions," *Los Angeles Times*, 24 September 2009.

#### **25 September 2009**

Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and Gordon Brown hold a press conference and announce the existence of a covert fuel enrichment plant in Qom. The IAEA confirms that a letter from Iran last week stated, "a new pilot fuel enrichment plant is under construction in the country." IAEA "also understands from Iran that no nuclear material has been introduced to the facility." In the letter, Iran adds that the plant would enrich uranium to 5 percent - enough for nuclear fuel, but not weapons grade fissile material. A senior Western official characterizes the facility as "excavation, tunneling, infrastructure for centrifuges." Senior intelligence officials suggest that the site could support around 3,000 centrifuges for enriching nuclear fuel - a capacity too small for civilian nuclear use, but once operational, enough to produce weapons-grade material to make approximately one weapon a year. An unnamed US counterproliferation official also tells *Newsweek* that "intelligence agencies have been tracking the construction of this...facility...for a matter of years."

—David Sanger, Helen Cooper, "Iran is warned over nuclear 'deception'", *The New York Times*, 25 September 2009; Nicholas Cecil, "Iran warns over secret n-plant", *The Evening Standard*, 25 September 2009; Mark Hosenball, "More Details on What the U.S. Knows about Iran's Secret Nuclear Site," *Newsweek*, 25 September 2009.

#### **29 September 2009**

Iran says it will offer a timetable for international inspectors to visit Qom enrichment facility "soon," but is not prepared to debate its rights to operate the previously undeclared plant.

—Alan Cowell and Nazila Fathi, "Iran Defends 'Rights' to Run Its Newly Declared Plant," *The New York Times*, 29 September 2009.

#### **1 October 2009**

Iran and P5+1 meet in Geneva to discuss Iran's nuclear program. President Barack Obama says Iran must give UN inspectors "unfettered access" to its uranium enrichment facility in Qom within two weeks. The E.U. foreign policy chief Javier Solana reports that the parties have "agreed to intensify dialogue in the coming weeks," and will hold further discussions before the end of the month. The parties also discuss a proposal for Iran to ship most of its low-enriched uranium from Natanz to a third country for further enrichment and fabrication of fuel for the reactor in Tehran that produces medical isotopes.

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—Steven Erlanger and Mark Landler, "Iran Agrees to More Nuclear Talks With U.S. and Allies," *The New York Times*, 1 October 2009; "Obama in Iran inspection demand," *BBC World News*, 1 October 2009.

#### **4 October 2009**

The IAEA reports from Tehran that the Iranian government will take part in a meeting on 19 October with the U.S., France and Russia to discuss details of an agreement to send about 80 percent of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to Russia and France for further enrichment and fuel fabrication. Iranian state-run Press TV reports that officials have "rejected reports that they had reached a deal with world powers to ship its enriched uranium abroad for processing," and that procurement of 20 percent enriched uranium will be discussed at the 19 October meeting.

—Simon Tisdall, "Iran agrees to inspection of nuclear site - but not yet: West fears delay will allow Qom data to be hidden: IAEA analysis outlines plan for nuclear missile," *The Guardian*, 5 October 2009; David E. Sanger and Nazila Fathi, "Iran agrees to allow inspectors on Oct. 25," *The New York Times*, 5 October 2009.

#### **4 October 2009**

IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei announces that Iran has agreed to open its Qom enrichment site to inspectors on 25 October.

—Parisa Hafezi, "IAEA to inspect Iran's Qom site October 25," *Reuters*, 4 October 2009; David E. Sanger and Nazila Fathi, "Iran agrees to allow inspectors on Oct. 25," *The New York Times*, 5 October 2009.

#### **6 October 2009**

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, reveals plans to use a new generation of faster centrifuges to enrich uranium at Qom. "We have put our effort on research and development of new machines in the past two or three months so that we would be able to produce machines with high efficiency and completely indigenous," Salehi tells Iranian newspaper *Kayhan*. Some experts believe the new model of centrifuge is capable of doubling or tripling the LEU output rate.

—Nasser Karimi, "Iran plans new centrifuges for 2nd enrichment site," *The Associated Press*, 6 October 2009; Hashem Kalantari, "Iran plans to use new centrifuge at nuclear plant," *Reuters*, 6 October 2009.

#### **19 October 2009**

P5+1 and Iran meet in Vienna for the first day of talks on supplying Iran with nuclear fuel in exchange for its LEU. "We're off to a good start," Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the IAEA, says of the talks. However, the spokesman for Iran's nuclear agency tells reporters that "If the Vienna talks fail to satisfy Iran, a letter will be written to the International Atomic Energy Agency to announce that Iran will take the necessary action to supply nuclear fuel to the Tehran reactor...Iran can enrich uranium at 20%, and it will do so, if needed, to provide fuel for the reactor."

— "Developments in Iranian nuclear standoff," *Agence France Presse*, 19 October 2009; Jeffrey Fleishmen, "U.S., other powers begin nuclear talks with Iran; They want Russia to enrich uranium for Tehran, which vows to step up its program if negotiations fail," *The Los Angeles Times*, 20 October 2009.

#### **21 October 2009**

The talks between P5+1 and Iran conclude in Vienna. IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei has circulated a draft agreement that reportedly envisages the shipment of Iran's low-enriched uranium to Russia for further enrichment and then to France to produce fuel for Tehran Research Reactor. In the second day of talks between P5+1 and Iran, discussions reportedly stalled over Iranian insistence that France be excluded from any participation in plans to turn the enriched material into fuel. However, ElBaradei says France is included in the draft he submitted to the parties. The sides are expected to respond by Friday, October 23.

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— "Iran Nuclear Talks End with Draft Deal," RiaNovosti, 21 October 2009, <http://en.rian.ru>; "Transcript of Director General's Remarks to Media Following Talks on Supplying Nuclear Fuel to Iran," IAEA, 21 October 2009, [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org); George Jahn, "Iran talks stalled over French role," *The Associated Press*, 20 October 2009..

### **23 October 2009**

Mr. Bahonar, deputy speaker of Iran's Parliament appears to reject an IAEA draft plan for Iran to ship its uranium abroad for re-enrichment and fuel manufacturing, deeming that the terms of the deal are "not acceptable." Instead, Tehran reportedly prefers to acquire fuel abroad without shipping out its enriched uranium, as stipulated in the plan. Iran is now expected to formally react to the IAEA plan by next week.

— Vladimir Isachenkov and Angela Doland, "Iran defers on nuclear deal, proposing alternative," *The Associated Press*, 23 October 2009; Robert F. Worth, "Iranian lawmaker dismisses uranium plan," *The New York Times*, 23 October 2009; Mark Heinrich, "Iran delays reply to UN-backed atom deal to next week," *Reuters*, 23 October 2009..

### **29 October 2009**

Iran tells IAEA it will not accept a plan negotiated several days earlier to send most of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium out of the country, according to diplomats in Europe and U.S. officials. Iran wants to send its uranium abroad in smaller batches over an undefined stretch of time rather than conduct a single transfer by year's end outlined under the proposal tabled by Mohamed ElBaradei.

— Paul Richter and Borzou Daragahi, "Iran reply on nuclear deal 'inadequate'; Tehran appears to seek to slow and reduce any export of atomic fuel," *The Los Angeles Times*, 30 October 2009; David Sanger, Steven Erlanger and Robert Worth, "Iran rejects proposal for enrichment of uranium," *The International Herald Tribune*, 31 October 2009.

### **16 November 2009**

The IAEA Board of Governors reviews a new report of the Director General on the implementation of NPT safeguards in Iran. The report indicates that the Qom/Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) was being built to contain 16 cascades with a total of approximately 3,000 centrifuges. Iran states that some of the equipment located at FFEP came from Natanz, and that Natanz continues to provide functional support to FFEP, such as centrifuge assembly and decontamination of equipment. Iran reiterates that no nuclear material had been introduced into FFEP. The FFEP is allocated to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and Iran claims that construction of FFEP started in late 2007. However, the IAEA says it has acquired commercially available satellite imagery of the FFEP site that indicates construction between 2002 and 2004, resuming in 2006 and continuing to date. According to the DG report, the IAEA still has questions about the intended purpose of the facility and its role in Iran's nuclear program. The report also stresses that Iran's declaration of a new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which have not been declared to the IAEA.

— "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA Board of Governors Report, 16 November 2009.

### **17 November 2009**

The IAEA Spokesperson Gill Tudor denies information in the *Times of London* story headlined: "UN Nuclear Chief in Secret Talks with Iran over Deal to End Sanctions." *The Times of London* asserts that IAEA and Iranian officials were secretly negotiating a deal to persuade world powers to lift sanctions and allow Tehran to retain most of its nuclear program in return for cooperation with IAEA inspectors. The *Times of London* report that "the 13-point agreement was drawn up in September by Mohamed ElBaradei, in an effort to break the stalemate over Iran's

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nuclear program before he stands down at the end of this month." The plan allegedly requires the UN Security Council to lift sanctions and revoke the resolutions ordering Iran to halt uranium enrichment in exchange for Iranian cooperation. Russia and China reportedly see value in the plan.

—Richard Beeston and Catherine Philp, "UN nuclear chief in secret talks with Iran over deal to end sanctions," *The Times of London*, 17 November 2009; Gill Tudor, "IAEA Press Release," IAEA, 17 November 2009, [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org).

#### **18 November 2009**

Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki announces that Iran will not ship its low-enriched uranium out of the country for processing, rejecting a plan proposed by Mohamed ElBaradei at the October 19-21 talks. [See NTI Iran Nuclear Chronology 21 October 2009.] Instead, Iran would prefer to have a "simultaneous fuel swap" inside the country. U.S. State Department spokesman Ian Kelly says the U.S. was waiting for Iran to submit its formal response to IAEA, but "what was said today doesn't inspire our confidence [that a deal will be reached to ship LEU abroad for enrichment.]"

— Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran brushes aside UN nuclear deal," *The Associated Press*, 18 November 2009; Helene Cooper and Martin Fackler, "Obama takes stern tone on North Korea and Iran," *The New York Times*, 18 November 2009.

#### **20 November 2009**

Major world powers meet in Brussels to discuss next steps after Iran rejects a nuclear fuel deal. The P5+1 hold closed-door discussions all day, with officials declining to state whether the six would respond to Tehran's move. The EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana's spokeswoman simply states that, "the meeting is to review the latest developments on the Iran nuclear issue."

— Lorne Cook, "Major world powers meet to discuss Iran nuclear snub," *Agence France Presse*, 20 November 2009; Slobodan Lekic, "Six world powers meet about Iran nuclear issue," *The Associate Press*, 20 November 2009.

#### **22 November 2009**

Iran's state TV announces the country has begun large-scale air defense war games, whose purpose is protecting nuclear facilities against any potential attack. The five-day drill will cover an area approximately one-third of the size of Iran. Gen. Ahmad Mighani, head of an air force unit that deals with threats to Iran's air space, says the war games will cover regions where Iran's nuclear facilities are located.

—"Iran begins war games to protect nuclear sites," *The Associated Press*, 22 November 2009; Parisa Hafezi and Michael Roddy, "Iran launches war games to protect nuclear sites," *Reuters*, 22 November 2009.

#### **25 November 2009**

Iran says that it is willing to exchange its LEU for TRR reactor fuel only if the swap takes place inside of Iran. The United States, France, and Russia, however, are unlikely to accept this condition. The IAEA has responded to these developments by offering to take custody of Iranian LEU in a neutral third country, such as Turkey. The IAEA plan is meant to provide Iran with a guarantee that the other nations will adhere to the agreement.

-Thomas Erdbrink, "Iran Says Fuel Swap Must Occur On its Soil," *The Washington Post*, 25 November 2009.

#### **27 November 2009**

IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution urging Iran to comply with the UN Security Council resolutions that demand suspension of enrichment activities, including the construction at Qom. The resolution also urges Iran to implement modified Code 3.1 that requires declaration to the IAEA of a decision to construct nuclear facilities immediately after such decision is taken. The resolution further calls on Iran to confirm that it "has not taken a decision to construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear facility" previously not declared to the

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Agency. The Board of Governors requests that IAEA Director General reports the resolution to the UN Security Council. The resolution adopted by a vote of 25-3-6, where the three states voting against are Cuba, Malaysia, and Venezuela. The six abstaining states are Afghanistan, Brazil, Egypt, Pakistan, South Africa, and Turkey.

— "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors, 27 November 2009; Ian Black, "Iran Told to Halt Work on Nuclear Plant by UN Watchdog," *The Guardian*, [www.guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk).

### **29 November 2009**

In an apparent response to the IAEA resolution, Iran approves plans to build 10 more uranium enrichment sites, AP reports. Speaker of Majlis (Iran's Parliament) Ali Larijani, in a speech broadcasted by state radio, also says Iran could further scale down its cooperation with the IAEA if Western pressure persists. IAEA spokeswoman Gillian Tudor did not comment on Tehran's announcement.

—"Iran, Defiant, Approves Plan for 10 Enrichment Sites," *The New York Times*, 29 November 2009, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com).

### **2 December 2009**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announces that Iran will begin preparations to enrich uranium to twenty percent and indigenously produce fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. The announcement appears after the earlier proposed deal on exchanging Iran's LEU for TRR fuel fails to get Iran's approval.

—William J. Broad, "President of Iran Vows to Make Higher Grade of Nuclear Fuel Without West," *The New York Times*, 3 December 2009; David E. Sanger and Jack Healy, "Tehran to Enrich Fuel at Higher Level; Threat by Ahmadinejad on Uranium Stockpiles is Likely to Worsen Tensions," *The International Herald Tribune*, 3 December 2009.

### **9 December 2009**

Iran's foreign ministry accuses the United States of abducting Dr. Shahram Amiri during his annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Amiri is reportedly linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and Iran's nuclear program. The timing of the abduction and the recent revelations about the Fordow Fuel Enrichment plant (Qom enrichment plant) have raised speculation that Dr. Amiri may have defected to the West and provided U.S. intelligence with information about the secret facility. The United States denies any involvement in the incident.

—Catherine Philp, "Tehran Accuses U.S. of Seizing Pilgrim Nuclear Scientist," *The Times of London*, 9 December 2009; Damien McElroy, "Iran Accuses U.S. of Kidnapping Scientist: Nuclear Expert Went Missing During Saudi Trip," *The National Post*, 9 December 2009.

### **13 December 2009**

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki told the IAEA today that Iran is willing to exchange 400 kg of LEU for an equivalent amount of TRR fuel, while the rest of LEU stock would be exchanged over the next "several years." The proposal contradicts the terms of the deal negotiated in October and is met with skepticism by P5+1. Mottaki's statement came only a few days before the P5+1 are scheduled to meet and discuss a new round of Iran sanctions. The details of the Iranian counter proposal remain vague and it is unclear if Iran's counter proposal contains conditions that P5+1 will find unacceptable.

—Robert F. Worth, "Iran Avows Willingness to Swap Some Uranium," *The New York Times*, 13 December 2009.

### **14 December 2009**

Western and IAEA officials are evaluating a secret memo that allegedly details Iran's clandestine tests of a neutron

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initiator, media report. If the document were proven to be authentic it would rank as one of the strongest pieces of evidence linking Iran's nuclear program with a clandestine pursuit of nuclear weapons. Reportedly, the document is not dated but Western intelligence officials believe that it was written in 2007.

—Catherine Philp, "Memo Pinpoints Mastermind of Secret Nuclear Weapons Research: Mohsen Fakhrizadeh's Signature on Document Sheds Light on What Experts Say Must be a Weapons Programme." *The Times of London*, 14 December 2009; Joby Warick, "Western, UN Officials Assess Secret Iranian Document: Paper Apparently Shows Nuclear Scientists Tested Component of Warhead," *The Washington Post*, 14 December 2000.

#### **19 December 2009**

Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says Iran will not complete the installation of the IR-2, IR-3, and IR-4 centrifuges until 2011. He added that the Arak heavy water reactor is not expected to come online for another "three or four years."

—Ramin Mostaghim, "Iran Tries to Ease West's Worries over Missile Test: Tehran Atomic Agency Chief Says Key Components of the Nuclear Program Won't be Ready for Years," *The Los Angeles Times*, 19 December 2009.

#### **23 December 2009**

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad dismisses a year-end deadline imposed by the Obama Administration and other Western nations for Iran to accept the IAEA brokered deal to swap Iran's low enriched uranium for research reactor fuel.

—Nasser Karimi, "Ahmadinejad Dismisses Deadline for Nuke Deal," *Newsday*, 23 December 2009.

#### **26 December 2009**

Iran has indicated that Turkey would be an acceptable third country to ship its low enriched uranium for storage before it is shipped to Russia and France for further enrichment and fuel fabrication. Turkey has welcomed the offer and offered to help resolve the ongoing diplomatic conflict.

—"Iran: Counter Offer Pulls in Turkey," *Times Wire Reports*, 26 December 2009.

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## **2008**

#### **25 January 2008**

Iran receives a sixth batch of nuclear fuel from Russia for its Bushehr nuclear power plant, leaving just two more to complete the total consignment. This shipment was the third in five days and comes after Iranian leaders vowed to press on with the country's nuclear program regardless of any new UN sanctions, after world powers this week agreed the outline of a new resolution. Iran, which has so far received about 66 tons of nuclear fuel out of an expected total of 82 tons, says it also wants to make its own fuel so that it will have secure supplies in the future.

—"Russia Delivers 6th Nuke Batch to Iran," *China Daily*, 25 January 2008.

#### **6 February 2008**

Iran tests a new centrifuge design to enrich uranium, according to European and American diplomats. The IR-2 is an Iranian improvement on a Pakistani design that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad boasted in an April 2006 speech would quadruple Iran's enrichment powers. A report released 7 February by the Institute for Science and International Security states that 1,200 centrifuges of the new design could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a bomb in one year. Iran would need 3,000 of the current generation of machines for the equivalent output.

**Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org).**



—"Iran is Reported to Test New Centrifuge," *The New York Times*, 8 February 2008; "Iran Testing New Centrifuges to Make Fuel," *The Weekend Australian*, 9 February 2008; David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, "Iran Installing More Advanced Centrifuge at Natanz Pilot Enrichment Plant: Factsheet on the P-2/IR-2 Centrifuge," *The Institute for Science and International Security*, 7 February 2008.

### **9 February 2008**

Construction of a "360-megawatt plant is under way at Darkhovin," according to Iran's Ambassador to Russia Gholamreza Ansari. Iran is reportedly committed to investing billions of dollars to provide fuel for this new plant if other countries are not willing to supply Iran with nuclear fuel. U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns says "The United States sees no need at all for Iran to build additional nuclear power plants."

—"Iran's nuclear program expands: ambassador claims Tehran building second power plant," *National Post (Canada)*, 9 February 2008; "U.S.: Iran has no need to build more nuclear plants," *The Jerusalem Post*, 10 February 2008.

### **15 February 2008**

The Bush administration is agreeing to provide the IAEA intelligence data that it says proves Iran worked on developing a nuclear weapon. According to American and foreign officials, information culled from a laptop, smuggled out of Iran in 2004, includes a description of the Green Salt Project. This project involved uranium reprocessing, high explosives testing and missile warhead design.

—"In a Reversal, U.S. Agrees to Produce Data Pointing to Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," *The New York Times*, 15 February 2008; "U.S. Will Release Data on Iran's Nuclear Work," *The International Herald Tribune*, 16 February 2008.

### **22 February 2008**

A new IAEA report concludes that Iran has not fully answered the international community's questions about its nuclear program and is testing new centrifuge technology to enrich uranium faster. According to the report, Iran has provided answers to most questions, but has not explained the documents pointing to undeclared efforts to weaponize nuclear materials by linking uranium enrichment with explosives testing and warhead design.

—"U.S. Seeks Support for Sanctioning Iran: Nuclear Issues Unresolved, IAEA Says," *The Washington Post*, 23 February 2008; "Iran fails to answer weapons questions - UN body," *The New Zealand Herald*, 23 February 2008.

### **26 February 2008**

European countries plan to offer a new incentives package to Iran if it agrees to halt its uranium enrichment program. While not opposed to the proposed incentives package, at this point the United States is not planning to join the proposal. The Bush administration is prodding the UN Security Council to approve a new round of sanctions against Iran.

—"Europeans Plan Incentives, as Iran Says Sanctions Won't Halt Nuclear Program," *The New York Times*, 26 February 2008; "Europeans plan new incentives for Iran; Diplomats strategize over nuclear program," *The International Herald Tribune*, 27 February 2008.

### **3 March 2008**

The UN Security Council approves a third round of economic sanctions against Iran for its failure to suspend enrichment work. The sanctions ban dual-use goods, which have both military and civilian applications, from being traded with Iran. They also provide for the inspection of shipments suspected of carrying any banned items. According to Iran's ambassador Mohammad Khazee, Iran will not comply with this "unlawful action" against its "peaceful nuclear program."

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—"UN Approves Iran Sanctions," *The Wall Street Journal*, 4 March 2008; "Security Council Approves New Sanctions against Iran," *The Independent (London)*, 4 March 2008; "Tehran defies UN on new round of nuclear sanctions," *The Australian*, 5 March 2008.

#### **9 April 2008**

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says during a visit to Natanz that Iranian engineers are installing 6,000 IR-2 centrifuges. Iran currently has 3,000 older centrifuges, and is enriching uranium to between three and four percent U-235.

—"Iran Claims to Install New, Faster Centrifuges; Machines to Go Online In a Few Months, After Testing, President Says," *The Washington Post*, 9 April 2008; "Iran says it's Installing New Centrifuges," *The New York Times*, 9 April 2008.

#### **13 April 2008**

The leader of Iran's nuclear program, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, cancels talks with IAEA Director General, Mohamed El-Baradei. The talks were intended to resolve some of the outstanding issues Iran has with the IAEA. An IAEA official tells the Associated Press that no reason has been given for the cancellation.

—"Official: Iran abruptly calls off meeting with chief of UN nuclear agency," *The International Herald Tribune*, 13 April 2008; "Iran canceled talks, UN agency says," *The Los Angeles Times*, 14 April 2008.

#### **21 April 2008**

Iran agrees to talks with the IAEA regarding allegations that it studied nuclear warhead design until 2003. The agreement "is a certain milestone, and hopefully by the end of May we'll be in position to get the explanation and clarification from Iran as to these alleged studies," Mohamed El-Baradei, director general of the IAEA, says to a group of reporters. El-Baradei's spokeswoman indicates the deal was struck in Tehran on Monday and Tuesday between Iranian leaders and Olli Heinonen, the IAEA's top investigator.

—"Iran to Discuss Alleged Studies of Atomic Arms," *The New York Times*, 24 April 2008; "Iran agrees to talk with arms inspectors," *The Los Angeles Times*, 24 April 2008.

#### **29 April 2008**

Forty-eight photos are released to the media of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 8 April 2008 tour of the Natanz enrichment facility. These pictures offer the first glimpse into the Iranian nuclear program. Most importantly they include a detailed look at the new IR-2 centrifuges. Many arms control experts are surprised to see Iran's Defense Minister, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar in the photos. His attendance strikes some analysts as odd given Iran's claim that its nuclear program is entirely peaceful. In one picture, Mr. Najjar appears to lead the presidential tour.

—"Inside an Enigma: A Tantalizing Look at Iran's Nuclear Program," *The New York Times*, 29 April 2008.

#### **1 May 2008**

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says that the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany will consider economic, technological and military options to persuade Iran to halt its enrichment program. Western diplomats indicate that the incentives offer is a slightly modified version of the 2006 EU incentives package Iran rejected. The U.S. has agreed to participate in the new incentives plan as a condition for the approval of a third set of UN Security Council sanctions on 3 March 2008. The text of the incentives package is still being worked out.

—"Iran's Nuclear Program Subject of Talks," United Press International, 16 April 2008; "Agreement reached on incentives for Iran on nuclear program," Associated Press Online, 2 May 2008; "Iran to be offered incentives; World

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powers agree to tender a deal, similar to one rejected, to help resume nuclear talks," *The Los Angeles Times*, 2 May 2008.

#### **4 May 2008**

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says that Iran will continue with its nuclear program despite Western pressure to halt enrichment: "No threat can hinder the Iranian nation from its path. We will forcefully continue on our path and will not allow the oppressors to step on our rights." Iran's Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, is quoted as saying that the new incentives package should not cross Iran's "red line." In the past Iran has indicated that the "red line" is its uranium enrichment program.

—"Iran Vows not to Halt its Nuclear Program Despite Western pressure," Associated Press Online , 5 May 2008; "Iran Seems to Reject West's Offer," *The New York Times*, 5 May 2008.

#### **14 May 2008**

Iran's ambassador to the EU presents a new package of proposals to the EU regarding Iran's nuclear program. Ambassador Ali Asghar Khaji says the package calls for an overhaul of the NPT and an end to "double standards" by the nuclear weapon states regarding their NPT requirements. Khaji also indicates in the proposal that Iran is willing to continue nuclear talks with Javier Solana without suspending its uranium enrichment.

—"Iran Puts new Proposals on its Nuclear Program to the European Union," The Associated Press, 14 May 2008; "Iran calls UN sanctions illegal, offers a proposal for talks," Associated Press Online, 15 May 2008.

#### **26 May 2008**

Iran may be withholding information needed to establish whether it has tried to make nuclear arms and remains defiant of the UN Security Council's demands to halt its enrichment, the IAEA says in a strongly worded report. "The Agency is of the view that Iran may have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile related activities," says the report. The IAEA indicates that Iran now has 3,500 centrifuges operating, and specifies that the new IR-2 centrifuges are only in a testing phase.

—"Iran may be withholding information needed in nuke probe," The Associated Press Online , 26 May 2008; "Iran Withholds Key Nuclear Documents; Program Still Peaceful, UN Agency Says," *The Washington Post*, 27 May 2008.

#### **3 June 2008**

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says that "no wise nation" would pursue nuclear weapons, but his country will continue to develop its nuclear program for peaceful purposes.

—"Ayatollah vows Iran's Nuclear Program will go on," The Associated Press, 3 June 2008; "Iranian Supreme Leader Vows to Pursue Nuclear Program," *Voice of America News*, 3 June 2008.

#### **11 June 2008**

President Bush and EU leaders embrace new financial sanctions against Iran. The new financial measures will target Iranian banks, unless Iran fully discloses any nuclear weapons work and allows the IAEA to verify that work. President Bush reiterates his stance that "all options remain on the table," when dealing with Iran's nuclear program.

—"Europeans Back Bush on Nuclear Curbs," *The New York Times* 11 June 2008; "Bush and Allies Embrace Possible Iran Sanctions," *Sentinel and Enterprise*, 11 June 2008.

#### **12 June 2008**

Responding to the latest sanctions enacted against his country, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says in a televised speech that the "West can't do anything" and singles out President Bush as a lame duck who fails at

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every attempt to hurt Iran. The increasingly tough warnings from the U.S. and the EU have had little effect on Iran's nuclear program. Iran has begun transferring its assets from European to Asian banks to protect them from tighter sanctions.

—"Iran Says Bush's Military Threat Will Not Affect Nuclear Ambitions," *Voice of America News*, 12 June 2008; "Iran Unmoved by Threats Over its Atomic Program," *The New York Times*, 12 June 2008.

### **13 June 2008**

The European Union's foreign policy leader, Javier Solana, travels to Iran to present Tehran with an incentives package aimed at halting Iran's enrichment work. Solana will meet Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Saeed Jalili during his two-day visit. Iran indicates that it will reject the deal because it requires Iran to halt its enrichment activities.

—"EU Offers Iran Incentives to end Nuke Work," United Press International , 13 June 2008; "EU Foreign Policy Chief Travels to Iran for Nuclear Talks," *Voice of America News*, 13 June 2008; "Bush Criticizes Iran Decision on Nuclear Program," The Associated Press Online , 14 June 2008.

### **14 June 2008**

The A.Q. Khan smuggling ring, which has reportedly sold illicit nuclear materials to Iran, Syria, North Korea and Iraq also managed to acquire blueprints for an advanced compact nuclear device that could be fitted onto a missile, according to a draft report by former top UN arms inspector David Albright. Albright, now president of the Institute for Science and International Security says that, "These would have been ideal for two of Khan's other major customers, Iran and North Korea. They both faced struggles in building a nuclear warhead small enough to fit atop their ballistic missiles, and these designs were for a warhead that would fit." It is unknown whether the designs were delivered to either country, or to anyone else, Albright says. The drawings were found on a Swiss businessman's computer who is known to have been a member of Khan's nuclear black market group. The Swiss government shared the documents with the IAEA and the United States. The IAEA has acknowledged that it oversaw the destruction of these electronic documents.

—"Smugglers Had Design for Advanced Warhead," *The Washington Post*, 15 June 2008; "Smugglers had Plans for a Compact Nuke," *The Star Ledger*, 15 June 2008.

### **16 June 2008**

The EU joins Great Britain in increasing sanctions against Iran. The EU will freeze assets in Bank Melli, Iran's largest bank, and is said to be considering increasing sanctions against Iran's oil and gas sector. This move is prompted by Iran's rejection of the latest incentives package offered by the EU and the United States.

—"EU to Issue Stronger Iran Sanctions," Associated Press Online , 17 June 2008; "Iran to Face new EU Sanctions, Brown Says," *The Washington Post*, 17 June 2008.

### **1 July 2008**

Iran's top diplomat indicates a readiness to negotiate a U.S.-backed proposal to end the nuclear standoff. Iran is "seriously and carefully examining it," Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says. Referring to the offer made by the world's six major powers, Mottaki indicates: "We believe that talks are a good foundation for continuing our conversation in this field ... We view the position taken by the five-plus-one as a constructive one." After EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana presented the proposal, he added, "we saw the potential for the beginning for a new round of talks." Mottaki says he will write a formal response within the next "couple of weeks." Mottaki says that, "Iran has presented its own proposal to solve the issue." Javier Solana, in Iran last month to deliver the new incentives package, proposed a six week "freeze-for-freeze," where Iran would suspend enrichment and the sanctions would be lifted. Iran had initially rejected the incentives offer but did not do so in

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face-to-face meetings with Solana. In another development, a senior adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warns that provocative Iranian statements could hurt the country's cause in its nuclear dispute.

—"Iran Appears to Warm to Diplomacy," *The Washington Post*, 2 July 2008; "Iranian FM says 'New Process; under way in Nuclear Talks,'" *Voice of America News*, 2 July 2008.

#### **5 July 2008**

Iran formally responds to the latest P5 + 1 incentives package without specifically addressing the core issue of uranium enrichment. Instead, the letter indicates that Iran is willing to have comprehensive negotiations with Javier Solana, but insists that it will not suspend enrichment during negotiations. According to Iranian officials, "Iran's stand regarding its peaceful nuclear program has not changed." Some Western officials involved in the negotiations express disappointment. "There is nothing new in the response," one says. Western officials contend that Iran is prolonging the diplomatic back-and-forth to continue its nuclear activities. Officials from Javier Solana's office say that there will be no immediate response to the letter.

—"Iran Responds Obliquely to Nuclear Plan," *The New York Times*, 5 July 2008; "Iran Indicates it has no Plans to Halt Enrichment," *The Associated Press*, 5 July 2008.

#### **8 July 2008**

In an effort to increase pressure on Iran, the Bush administration imposes financial sanctions on Iranian officials and businesses involved with the nuclear program. Any financial assets found in the United States that belong to these entities will be frozen and American businesses and individuals will be prohibited from doing business with them. The Treasury Department's action covers the TAMAS Co., for its alleged involvement in enrichment-related activities, and Shahid Sattari Industries. The U.S. also sanctions three other entities believed to be owned or controlled by Iran's Defense Industries Organization, which was put on the U.S. blacklist last year. Those entities are Seventh of Tir, Ammunition and Metallurgy Industries Group and Parchin Chemical Industries. Mohsen Fakhrazadeh-Mahabadi, a senior scientist at Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, is also among those targeted.

—"U.S. Moves Against Iranian Officials, Companies," *Associated Press Financial Wire*, 8 July 2008; "Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Purposes," *State News Service*, 8 July 2008.

#### **16 July 2008**

The Bush administration will send U.S. Undersecretary of State William Burns to Geneva to participate with his European counterparts in talks with Iran about its nuclear program. Burns will not negotiate with the Iranians directly or hold any side meetings, but will advance the Bush administration's assertions that negotiations can only start after Iran suspends enrichment. State Department officials say Burns will not participate in further discussions during the freeze-for-freeze period: "This is a one-time deal."

—"American Envoy to Join Iran Talks; Move Is Departure from Prior Policy," *The Washington Post*, 16 July 2008; "Official: U.S. envoy to meet Iranian nuke negotiator," *The Associated Press Online*, 17 July 2008.

#### **18 July 2008**

Despite the presence of U.S. Undersecretary of State William Burns, no progress is made in the Iranian nuclear negotiations. "Any kind of suspension or freeze is out of the question," an Iranian official told Reuters before the talks, rejecting the notion of a freeze-for-freeze. Javier Solana describes the day's talks as constructive but indicates that Iran has not given a clear answer on the incentives package. "We have not got a clear answer ... [W]e didn't get an answer 'yes' or 'no' and we hope that it will be given soon." Iranian Foreign Minister, Saeed Jalili, says the package contains many positive ideas and that he will give Iran's response to Solana in two weeks.

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—"Iran Nuclear Talks Wrap up in Geneva," *Radio Free Europe*, 19 July 2008; "Iran Nuclear Talks end in Deadlock," *Voice of America News*, 19 July 2008.

#### **27 July 2008**

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claims that Iran now possesses 6,000 centrifuges at the Natanz enrichment plant. [Note: A May IAEA report indicated that Iran had 3,500 centrifuges in operation. See NTI Chronology 26 May 2008.] "The West wanted us to stop," Ahmadinejad is quoted as saying, "We resisted, and now they want to resume negotiations."

—"Report: Iran now has 6,000 centrifuges for uranium," The Associated Press, 27 July 2008; "Iran Claims it has Added Enrichment Capability," *The Virginian-Pilot*, 27 July 2008.

#### **31 July 2008**

Speaking just days before a deadline set by world powers for Iran to reply to proposals to curb its nuclear ambitions, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's supreme leader, says that Iran will "continue with its path" of nuclear development. Iran is signaling that it does not intend to meet the latest deadline to respond to the U.S.-backed incentives package, aimed at achieving a temporary "freeze-for-freeze." Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says that Iran has already presented its views to the West and is awaiting its reply.

—"Iran FM Rejects Deadline for Nuclear Incentives Package," *Voice of America News*, 31 July 2008; "Despite Call to Halt Iran says it will Continue its Nuclear Program," *The New York Times*, 31 July 2008.

#### **1 August 2008**

Iran fails to win support from the non-aligned nations to remove UN Security Council sanctions. A U.S. official says the conference is deadlocked on portions of the draft statement presented by Iran, which demands the removal of sanctions, dismisses UN authority, and affirms Iran's right to possess the entire nuclear fuel cycle. Iran does receive broad endorsement to pursue a peaceful nuclear program.

—"U.S. Officials: Iran Rebuffed on Nuclear Support," The Associated Press, 2 August 2008.

#### **4 August 2008**

The United States, Great Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany agree to seek new sanctions against Iran after the country fails to respond to an incentives package aiming to resolve the nuclear dispute. "We are disappointed that we have not yet received a response from Iran," State Department spokesman Gonzalo Gallegos tells reporters. "We agreed in the absence of a clear, positive response from Iran [that] we have no choice but to pursue further measures against Iran."

—"New sanctions sought for Iran on nuke works," *Newsday*, 4 August 2008, "Iran Issues new Warning after Defying Deadline," *The New York Times*, 5 August 2008.

#### **6 August 2008**

Iranian officials send a two-page letter to the EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana saying they are "ready to provide a clear response" to the recent proposal from world powers. But the letter also says that Iran is "simultaneously expecting to receive your clear response to our questions and ambiguities as well." The letter makes no commitments on the temporary suspension of uranium enrichment. The Bush administration calls this response unacceptable and says the world powers' next step should be to increase sanctions.

—"Iran: Letter on Nuclear Program," *The New York Times*, 6 August 2008; "France: Iran Reply on Nuclear Offer Insufficient," The Associated Press, 6 August 2008.

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### **8 August 2008**

The European Union increases its trade sanctions against Iran. The new sanctions go slightly beyond the scope of the UN sanctions and are designed to deny public loans or export credits to companies trading with Iran. European governments will also monitor banks dealing with Bank Saderat (an Iranian bank with links to suspected Iranian nuclear activities), and increase inspections of ships and airplanes traveling to Iran.

—"EU Tightens Sanctions on Iran over Nuclear Program," *The Associated Press*, 8 August 2008; "Iran: EU Tightens Sanctions Due to Nuclear Program," *The Wall Street Journal*, 9 August 2008.

### **12 August 2008**

The U.S. Department of the Treasury designates five entities, the Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine (a.k.a. Karaj Nuclear Research Center), the Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center (NFRPC), Jabber Ibn Hayan, Safety Equipment Procurement Company (SEP Co.) and Joza Industrial Company, for their ties to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. "These five nuclear and missile entities have been used by Iran to hide its illicit conduct and further its dangerous nuclear ambitions," Stuart Levey, Treasury's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, says in a statement announcing the action.

—"Treasury Designates Iranian Nuclear and Missile Entities," *State News Service*, 12 August 2008; "U.S. Imposes Sanction on 5 Iranian Companies," *The Associated Press*, 12 August 2008.

### **16 August 2008**

Iran successfully launches the Safir (Messenger) rocket into space and according to Reza Taghizadeh, "the firing paved the way for placing the first Iranian satellite in orbit." Western intelligence agencies believe Iran is using its space program to test ballistic missile technology and are modifying the nose cone to carry a compact nuclear warhead.

—Islamic Republic News Agency, 17 August 2008; Lauren Gelfand and Alon Ben-David, "Iranian Two-Stage SLV Passes Test Launch," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 20 August 2008; Doug Richardson, "Safir Launch Paved Way for Placing Iranian Satellite in Space," *Jane's Missiles & Rockets*, 1 September 2008.

### **28 August 2008**

Iran offers to share its nuclear technology with Nigeria to boost electricity production. The deal is signed at the end of three days of talks between the oil producing nations. Both countries stress that the nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only.

—"Iran Offers Nuclear Technology to Nigeria," *Voice of America News*, 29 August 2008; "Iran, Nigeria Announce Peaceful Nuclear Deal," *Mobile Register*, 29 August 2008.

### **30 August 2008**

Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Reza Sheikh Attar says Iran is using 4,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium and plans to install an additional 3,000 in the future. This statement corroborates an IAEA estimate on the number of centrifuges Iran is currently using.

—"Iran Claims to have 4,000 working centrifuges," *Voice of America News*, 30 August 2008; "Iran Corroborates UN Nuclear Monitor's Estimate of Centrifuges in Operation," *The Washington Post*, 29 August 2008.

### **10 September 2008**

The United States imposes sanctions on Iran's maritime carrier, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, and eighteen affiliates for allegedly supporting Iran's nuclear and missile programs. The U.S. orders a freeze on any savings or financial assets in U.S. banks. The new sanctions restrict any business dealings between American companies and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines.

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—"U.S. Sanctions Iranian Maritime Carrier and Affiliates," *Voice of America News*, 10 September 2008; "Iranian Shipping Line Dismisses U.S. Sanctions," *The Associated Press*, 11 September 2008.

#### **16 September 2008**

The IAEA reaches an impasse with Iran over the country's refusal to account for its nuclear weapons research. "We seem to be at a dead end," says a senior agency official. Iran now operates 3,800 centrifuges and has increased their efficiency to about 80 percent (from around 50 percent), according to calculations based on the report's figures. In another revelation, the IAEA says that foreign expertise may have helped Iran with experiments on a detonator that could be used in the implosion of a nuclear weapon.

—"UN Agency at 'Dead End' as Iran Rejects Queries on Nuclear Research," *The Washington Post*, 16 September 2008; "Nuclear Agency Says Iran Has Improved Enrichment," *The New York Times*, 16 September 2008.

#### **22 September 2008**

Mohamed El-Baradei states the IAEA will "not be able to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran," unless Iran clears up questions about its previous nuclear weapons experiments. El-Baradei goes on to say that Iran "needs to give the agency substantive information," and that continued stonewalling of the IAEA is a "serious concern." Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, Ali Ashgar Soltanieh rejects the claims that his country is hiding any nuclear activities and says he believes the IAEA is being manipulated by the United States.

—"Chief inspector: Iran may be hiding secret nukes," *The Associated Press*, 23 September 2008; "Iran hasn't answered questions on nuclear program, arms control chief says," *The Los Angeles Times*, 23 September 2008.

#### **22 September 2008**

Iran will probably be ready for talks on the Additional Protocol, according to Iranian nuclear expert Mahdi Mohammadi, as long as the IAEA Board of Governors treats its case normally and Iran's right to industrial scale enrichment is fully assured.

—"Expert Calls for Conditional Talks on Additional Protocol," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 22 September 2008; "Iran to ratify Additional Protocol if its nuclear case is referred to IAEA MP," *BBC Monitoring Middle East*, 23 September 2008.

#### **23 September 2008**

Russia announces it will not participate in a meeting to discuss new economic sanctions against Iran. "We do not see any fire that requires us to toss everything aside and meet to discuss Iran's nuclear program in the middle of a packed week at the United Nations General Assembly," the Russian Foreign Ministry says in a statement. A U.S. State Department official responds, "It is clear right now that while everybody is committed to a two-track policy, at least a couple of members of the P5 + 1, the Russians and the Chinese, are not ready at this point to engage actively on another sanctions resolution." The official adds that China is "ready to engage" in discussions but Russia "does not have the same sense of urgency about the situation."

—"Iran Sanctions Scuttled when Russia Withdraws," *Global Security Newswire*, 23 September 2008; "Russia won't Meet with U.S. on Iranian Nuclear Program," *The New York Times*, 23 September 2008.

#### **24 September 2008**

Iran will soon be able to produce enough HEU to manufacture one unsophisticated nuclear device, the EU reports to the IAEA. Iran's refusal to halt its uranium enrichment program raises concerns "because it brings us closer to the moment where Iran will have fissile materials for a weapon, if it chose to increase their degree of enrichment," says a statement released by France.

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—"Iran Approaching Nuke Production Capacity," *Global Security Newswire*, 25 September 2008; "EU Warns Iran Close to Nuclear Weapons Capacity," *The Associated Press*, 25 September 2008.

#### **26 September 2008**

The UN Security Council reaffirms three earlier rounds of sanctions against Iran. No new sanctions are being imposed, but the resolution declares, "our determination to ensure that the international rules are upheld in this very important area," U.K. Foreign Secretary David Miliband says. Russia's UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin states "there were some concerns" that the P5+1 are not working together. In order to dispel those concerns "the ministers have decided to introduce this very brief draft resolution which would reaffirm the previous decisions of the Security Council."

—"U.S., Russia Reach Deal on New UN Iran Resolution," *The Associated Press*, 26 September 2008; "UN set to Reaffirm Iran Sanctions," *BBC News*, 26 September 2008.

#### **5 October 2008**

Iran says that it will not halt enrichment in exchange for a guaranteed supply of nuclear fuel. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says, "Iran's uranium enrichment policy remains unchanged. Enrichment will continue until Iran becomes self-sufficient in fuel production for nuclear plants." Mottaki indicates that Iran is willing to supply other countries with nuclear fuel after it is self-sufficient.

—"Iran: We Won't Halt Enrichment even if Nuclear Fuel Supply Guaranteed," *The Associated Press*, 5 October 2008; "Iran Refuses to Halt Enrichment for Fuel Guarantees," *Global Security Newswire*, 6 October 2008.

#### **6 October 2008**

Iran sends a letter of protest to EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana over the West's attitude toward its nuclear program. Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Said Jalili believes that the West only resorts to "levers of pressure," rather than answering Iran's questions about possible ambiguities in ongoing nuclear negotiations. According to Jalili's letter, "In the judgment of the world community, this unreasonable behavior is an indication of the lack of a clear response to the principled questions of the Islamic Republic of Iran." Copies of the letter were sent to the foreign ministers of the P5+1, who are working together to formulate a response.

—"Iran Sends Nuclear Protest to EU Foreign Policy Chief," *Agence France-Presse*, 6 October 2008; "Iran: Six Powers 'Unreasonable' in Nuclear Row," *Reuters*, 7 October 2008.

#### **9 October 2008**

The IAEA is investigating whether a Russian scientist helped Iran conduct nuclear weapons related experiments. The agency obtained a five-page document written in Farsi from undisclosed sources, detailing precision detonator experiments allegedly conducted by Iran with the Russian scientist's help. The Russian scientist appears to have been working for Iran without the sanction of the Russian government. Iranian officials are calling the charges "groundless" and claiming that the experiments were for conventional arms. In response, IAEA Chief Weapons Inspector Olli Heinonen asserts the experiments were "not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon."

—Elaine Sciolino, "Nuclear Aid by Russian to Iranians Suspected," *The New York Times*, 9 October 2008; "Russian Aided Iranian Nuke Research, IAEA Suspects," *Global Security Newswire*, 10 October 2008.

#### **11 October 2008**

The United States and its Western allies discuss imposing new financial sanctions on Iran outside of the UN Security Council. The sanctions would target oil refining products and refined petroleum. According to one Western diplomat, "The idea would be to get together a coalition of the willing ... given the difficulties we would

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have getting this past Russia and China."

—Daniel Bombay and James Blitz, "Go-it-Alone Plan on Iran Sanctions," *The Financial Times*, 12 October 2008;  
"Western Nations Consider Independent Iran Sanctions," *Global Security Newswire*, 14 October 2008.

#### **14 October 2008**

Approximately 700 Iranian nuclear engineers who received their training in Russia are ready to begin work on the Bushehr reactor. Iranian nuclear official Ahmad Fayyazbakhsh says that Bushehr will become operational in March 2009.

—"Iranian Engineers Ready to Work on Nuclear Plant," The Associated Press, 14 October 2008; "Western Nations Consider Independent Iran Sanctions," *Global Security Newswire*, 14 October 2008.

#### **14 October 2008**

Australia imposes unilateral sanctions on Iran for its refusal to suspend enrichment, placing travel and financial restrictions on twenty individuals and eighteen organizations who contribute to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. However, the government has decided not to take international legal action against President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on charges of inciting genocide.

—"Australian Iran Sanctions Target 20 Individuals, 18 Bodies," BBC Monitoring-Asia Pacific, 15 October 2008;  
"Australia Backs Iran Sanctions," *ABC News*, 15 October 2008; "Labor Gives in on Court Threat; Government Won't Pursue Ahmadinejad over Israel," *The Age*, 16 October 2008.

#### **17 October 2008**

Russia will ship nearly 1,000 tons of equipment to Iran for construction of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Iranian officials expect Bushehr to be commissioned early next year.

—"Iran: Russia to Ship Nuke Plant Supplies," United Press International, 17 October 2008; "Russia Plans Major Supply Shipment to Iran," *Global Security Newswire*, 20 October 2008.

#### **19 October 2008**

According to Mohammad Qods, managing director of Iran's Power Plant Construction Company, some Western countries are interested in cooperating with Iran on the Darkhovin reactor's design and construction. Qods indicates that the design of the 360MW light water reactor will be completed in six years and construction will begin in 2013.

—"Foreign Firms Interested to Build Darkhovin Nuclear Plant: Official," *Tehran Times*, 20 October 2008.

#### **20 October 2008**

Mohamed El-Baradei says that Iran still lacks the key components to produce nuclear weapons. According to El-Baradei, "They do not have even the nuclear material, the raw un-enriched uranium to develop one nuclear weapon if they decide to do so. Even if you decide to walk out tomorrow from the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) and you go into a lot of scenarios, we're still not going to see Iran tomorrow having nuclear weapons."

—"IAEA Chief: Iran not Close to Developing Nuclear Weapons," *Haaretz*, 21 October 2008; "Iran Far From Nuke Capability, IAEA Chief Says," *Global Security Newswire*, 21 October 2008.

#### **22 October 2008**

The United States Treasury Department freezes all U.S. controlled assets and prohibits U.S. citizens from doing business with the Export Development Bank of Iran. The sanctions also include EDBI Stock Brokerage Co., EDBI Exchange Co. and Caracas-based Banco Internacional de Desarrollo. According to Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levey, "Iran has adopted a strategy of using less prominent institutions, such as the Export Development Bank of

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Iran, to handle its illicit transactions."

—"U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Iran Bank," *Global Security Newswire*, 23 October 2008; "U.S. Targets Iranian Bank with Sanctions," *Agence France-Presse*, 23 October 2008.

#### **24 October 2008**

New U.S. sanctions against Rosoboronexport, Russia's largest state-owned arms manufacturer, will affect talks between the two powers about new sanctions against Iran. According to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov "if somebody in Washington thinks that in this way the United States will make Russia more accommodating in accepting the U.S. approach to the solution of the Iran nuclear problem, this is a mistake."

—"Russia's Foreign Ministry Slams U.S. Sanctions," *Agence France-Presse*, 25 October 2008; Chris Kaul and Sergei Loiko, "Russia Angry at Sanctions on Arms Firm," *The Los Angeles Times*, 25 October 2008.

#### **31 October 2008**

A three-page intelligence assessment by an unidentified IAEA member state alleges that Iran has recently tested ways of recovering highly enriched uranium from waste reactor fuel. The report asserts: "Procedures were evaluated for recycling fuel by dissolving fuel rods" which would be taken from the Iranian nuclear reactor and reprocessed into uranium with weapon-usable concentrations. The document also alleges that Iran's Atomic Energy Organization is in the final stages of producing a report for the Iranian leadership to consider whether or not to approve the project. The fuel would be taken from Tehran's TNRC research reactor, which is unlikely to yield enough fissile material for a nuclear warhead.

—George Jahn, "Intel says Iran Plans Secret Nuclear Experiments," *The Associated Press*, 30 October 2008; "Iran Mulling Fuel Reprocessing Study, Report says," *Global Security Newswire*, 31 October 2008.

#### **6 November 2008**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sends a congratulatory letter to President-elect Barack Obama, urging him to base his administration's foreign policy on a "lack of intervention in the affairs of others." Ahmadinejad is being criticized for his overture by Iranian conservatives and praised by reformists.

—"Ahmadinejad Applauds Obama, Calls for Policy Shifts," *Global Security Newswire*, 6 November 2008; Nazila Fathi, "Ahmadinejad's Letter to Obama Sparks Storm in Iran," *The International Herald Tribune*, 10 November 2008.

The United States Treasury Department announces that it is revoking Iran's "U-Turn" license, which has allowed transfer of Iranian money through U.S. banks. Prior to this action, U.S. financial institutions were permitted to process certain money transfers from non-Iranian and U.S offshore banks. Stuart Levey, the Treasury Department's undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence says, "Given Iran's conduct, it is necessary to close even this indirect access."

—Jeanine Aversa, "U.S. Clamps Down on Iran," *The Associated Press*, 6 November 2008; "U.S. Tightens Screws on Iran's Banks," *Agence France-Presse*, 6 November 2008.

#### **7 November 2008**

President-elect Barack Obama says that any Iranian effort to build a nuclear bomb is "unacceptable." Former Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani denounces Obama's statement saying, "This signifies a pursuit of the same erroneous policy as in the past."

—"Iran's Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons 'Unacceptable': Obama," *Agence France-Presse*, 8 November 2008; "Iranian Nuclear Weapon 'Unacceptable,' Obama Says," *Global Security Newswire*, 10 November 2008.

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### **11 November 2008**

Mohamed El-Baradei says that President-elect Barack Obama's willingness to hold direct talks with Iran may encourage it to be more cooperative with the IAEA. "If there is a direct dialogue between the United States and Iran, I think Iran will be more forthcoming with the agency," El-Baradei says.

—"Obama Openness May Help IAEA with Iran: El-Baradei," Reuters, 11 November 2008; "Obama Could Aid Nuclear Probe: El-Baradei," *Global Security Newswire*, 12 November 2008.

### **13 November 2008**

Senior officials from the P5 +1 meet in France to discuss Iran's nuclear program. There is no sign of a diplomatic breakthrough. A senior French official says that France does not expect any significant moves until President Bush leaves office.

—"World Powers Discuss Iran, no Breakthrough Seen," Reuters, 13 November 2008; "EU's Solana Says New Contacts with Iran Possible," *The Washington Post*, 14 November 2008.

### **14 November 2008**

Russia says that it opposes any new sanctions aimed at pressuring Iran to halt its atomic work. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Riabkov, "The Western countries are for the sanctions. China like Russia did not back it."

—"Russia Minister Says Moscow against new Iran Sanctions," Agence France-Presse, 14 November 2008; "Russia Opposes New Iran Sanctions," *Global Security Newswire*, 17 November 2008.

### **18 November 2008**

Mohsen Delaviz, the spokesman for Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI), announces that preparations for the Bushehr nuclear power plant inauguration have started. According to Delaviz, "The preliminary stages of the inauguration of Bushehr nuclear plant are being carried out and we hope that the power plant will be inaugurated in 2009, in accordance with the agreements reached with the Russian side."

—"Iran Says Preparations for Bushehr Nuclear Plant Inauguration Started," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 18 November 2008.

### **19 November 2008**

Iran has manufactured 630 kg of LEU and is assembling significantly more centrifuge cascades. In addition, Iran is testing a small number of more advanced IR-2 and IR-3 centrifuges at the PFEP and feeding them with UF<sub>6</sub>. IAEA environmental sampling indicates that the FEP and the PFEP are operating as declared and only enriching U-235 to five percent. Iran is still refusing to address the Agency's concerns over alleged weaponization experiments. According to the IAEA report, "regrettably, as a result of the lack of cooperation by Iran in connection with the alleged studies and other associated key remaining issues of serious concern, the agency has not been able to make substantial progress on these issues."

—Daniel Dombey and James Blitz, "Iran Increases Stockpile of Uranium," *The Financial Times*, 19 November 2008; "Iran Makes Nuclear Headway, IAEA Says," *Global Security Newswire*, 19 November 2008; "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of the Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, 19 November 2008.

### **20 November 2008**

The *New York Times* reports that Iran has produced roughly enough LEU that if further enriched, could be used to make a single nuclear device. This estimate is based on the latest IAEA report indicating that Iran has manufactured 630 kg of LEU. Experts caution that the milestone is mostly symbolic, because Iran would have to

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further enrich the LEU for use in a nuclear bomb. According to Richard L. Garwin, a top nuclear physicist who helped invent the hydrogen bomb, "they [Iran] know how to do the enrichment. Whether they know how to design a bomb, well that is another matter." "They have a weapon's worth," Thomas Cochran, a senior scientist in the nuclear program of the National Resources Defense Council, says in an interview with the *New York Times*. He adds that if Iran were to further enrich its stockpiled LEU the amount would be suitable for an implosion-type device.

—William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, "Iran said to Have Nuclear Fuel for One Weapon," *The New York Times*, 20 November 2008; "Iran Has Enough for A-Bomb: Agency," *The West Australian*, 21 November 2008.

#### **21 November 2008**

Iran rejects a *New York Times* report that it has enriched enough uranium to manufacture a nuclear bomb. Iran says that this would require taking additional steps like ejecting IAEA inspectors and withdrawing from the NPT. Ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh says, "This information has no technical basis and gives wrong and misleading information to the public." Iran's envoy to the IAEA indicates that in order for Iran to militarize its enrichment capabilities it would require substantial centrifuge modification that inspectors would undoubtedly notice.

—"Iran Rejects U.S. Reports it has Basis for Atom Bomb," *Reuters*, 21 November 2008.

#### **26 November 2008**

Iran announces it is operating five thousand centrifuges at Natanz, a significant increase from the four thousand it says it was operating in August 2008. According to Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, "Iran will continue to install centrifuges and enrich uranium in order to produce nuclear fuel for the country's future nuclear power plants."

—"Iran says it now runs more than 5,000 Centrifuges," *The Associated Press*, 26 November 2008; Nazila Fathi, "Iran: More Centrifuges Reported," *The New York Times*, 27 November 2008.

#### **1 December 2008**

Ahmad Fayyazbakhsh, deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran announces, "Our organization has decided to build two new plants with a capability of 1,000 MW each instead of completing the second unit of the Bushehr nuclear power plant." The two new plants will be built near Bushehr.

—"Iran to Build New Nuclear Plants Instead of Second Unit at Bushehr," *RIA Novosti*, 1 December 2008; "Iran to Build Two More Nuclear Reactors," *Iranian Press TV*, 2 December 2008.

#### **2 December 2008**

Iranian parliament speaker Ali Larijani says he is considering talks with members of the U.S. Congress to improve ties with the Obama administration. According to Larijani, "several letters were received from members of Congress and Senators. We feel that it is time to hold bilateral negotiations. We have not given a negative response to this issue. It is under examination."

—"Iran Speaker Mulling Talks with U.S. Congress," *Agence France-Presse*, 2 December 2008; "Iran's Parliament Speaker Mulling Talks with U.S. Congress," *The Daily Star*, 3 December 2008.

#### **9 December 2008**

United States intelligence agencies were right to conclude that Iran halted efforts to develop a nuclear weapon in 2003, recently retired Deputy National Intelligence Director Thomas Fingar says. Released in 2007, the latest National Intelligence Estimate stated "with high confidence" that Iran halted its nuclear weaponization work in the fall of 2003. According to Fingar, "I still stand by the judgments in that estimate." He adds, "I still regard Iran as a dangerous place."

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—"Ex-U.S. Official Defends Finding that Iran Halted Nuclear Weapons Program," Global Security Newswire, 10 December 2008; Barbara Slavin, "Official Stands by Iran Nuke Report; Insists Tehran Froze Program," *The Washington Times*, 10 December 2008.

#### **11 December 2008**

Germany says that Iran should face additional sanctions for refusing to halt enrichment. While speaking with French and British counterparts, Volker Stanzel, Chief of Staff to German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinheimer, proposes extending European sanctions on Iran's banking and transportation industries.

—"Germany Wants New Sanctions Against Iran: Report," Agence France-Presse, 13 December 2008; "Germany Seeking New Iran Sanctions, Report Says," Global Security Newswire, 15 December 2008.

#### **14 December 2008**

Iran exclusively uses domestically mined, milled and converted uranium as uranium hexafluoride feedstock for its Natanz centrifuge plant. Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Deputy Director Mohammad Qannadi claims that, "Iran is the seventh country in production of uranium hexafluoride." According to UN Officials, "the conversion plant is now operating steadily and the total amount of UF<sub>6</sub> produced at the installation is about 400 metric tons."

—"Iran Seventh Producer of UF<sub>6</sub>, nuclear fuel — Nuclear Official," Islamic Republic News Agency, 14 December 2008; Mark Hibbs, "All of Iran's UF<sub>6</sub> Centrifuge Feed now Indigenously Mined, Milled," *Platts Nuclear Fuels*, 15 December 2008.

#### **19 December 2008**

The incoming Obama Administration plans to create a new position to coordinate outreach to Iran. Obama is considering several senior diplomats, State Department officials and Iran specialists for this position.

—Eli Lake, "Obama Will Create Iran Outreach Position," *The Washington Times*, 19 December 2008; "Obama to Assign Top Liaison for Iran, Official Says," Global Security Newswire, 19 December 2008.

#### **21 December 2008**

The deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO), Mohammad Qannad, announces the country's plans to build five new nuclear reactors in the next five years. According to Qannad, the IAEO aims to use nuclear energy to meet 10% of Iran's energy needs "in the near future," according to an Iranian *Press TV* report.

—"Iran set to build five new nuclear reactors," [Iranian] *Press TV*, 21 December 2008; "Iran set to build five new nuclear reactors," *Zee News*, 22 December 2008; "Iran to build 5 new nuclear reactors" *Iran News*, 21 December 2008.

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## **2007**

#### **19 January 2007**

Iranian government spokesman Gholamhossein Elham asserts that Iran is "moving toward[s] the production of nuclear fuel, which requires 3,000 centrifuges and more than this figure...this program is being carried out and moving toward completion." Leaders in Tehran suggest that the main nuclear facility at Natanz is readily equipped for installment of all planned centrifuges by the end of the Iranian year, March 20th. The international community is unclear about the actual number mounted at this point, before being ousted from Iran IAEA inspectors reported 164 centrifuges installed on the main floor of Natanz.

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—"Iran poised to start installation of large-scale uranium enrichment program, say diplomats," Associated Press, 19 January 2007.

### **2 February 2007**

According to diplomats speaking on condition of anonymity, Iran has set the stage for the installment of its planned 3,000 centrifuges in the underground hall of its Natanz nuclear facility. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad suggests that the placement of centrifuges in cascades which are necessary for uranium enrichment will commence before the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution on February 11th.

—"Diplomats: Iran puts down piping, cables for underground uranium enrichment," Associated Press, 3 February 2007.

### **6 February 2007**

In direct challenge to limited sanctions and a 60-day ultimatum imposed by the U.N. Security Council last month, Iran continues with its plans to install 3,000 centrifuges in the underground hall of its main nuclear facility in Natanz. Thus far, more than 300 centrifuges have been set up in 2 uranium enrichment units and officials still assert that their ultimate goal is to house 54,000 centrifuges. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a diplomat affiliated with the IAEA and a United States official separately stated that two cascades of 164 centrifuges were installed in the last few days.

—"Officials: Iran set up 2 uranium-enrichment units underground," *Haaretz*, 6 February 2007.

### **9 February 2007**

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani meets with IAEA Chief Mohammad El Baradei today. Subjects of discussion include the recent stemming of aid from the agency for joint nuclear power programs, sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council, and Iran's plan to continue expansion of uranium enrichment efforts.

—"Iranian nuclear negotiator to meet UN atomic agency chief," Agence France Presse, 9 February 2007.

### **10 February 2007**

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suspends about half of the projects involving Iran for which it provides technical assistance. This action, pursued as punishment for Iran's nuclear non-cooperation, is awaiting approval by the IAEA's 35-nation board and will be addressed in March.

—"U.N. nuclear agency plans to cancel some aid to Iran," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 February 2007.

### **21 February 2007**

Iranian officials including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki, and chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani indicate, in separate statements, that Tehran is open to formal negotiations on its nuclear program, but that unconditional suspension of uranium enrichment should not be considered a prerequisite to such talks. In a public speech given to thousands of Iranians, President Ahmadinejad stresses that only if all Western nations, including the United States, with similar programs also suspended their programs would Iran be willing to reciprocate. According to an Iranian diplomat speaking on anonymity, in a meeting earlier in the month chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani made clear to IAEA Chief Mohammad El Baradei that Iran would only consider stalling its enrichment program following talks, not before.

—"Iran defiant on nuclear programme," BBC, 21 February 2007.

### **22 February 2007**

An International Atomic Energy Agency report submitted to the U.N. Security Council concludes that Iran has accelerated its uranium enrichment activities instead of complying with the Council's December 23rd ultimatum to

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cease all activities or face further sanctions. Detailed in this report are the continued construction of a heavy water reactor, transportation of 9 tons of gaseous feedstock to the main facility in Natanz, and the planned expansion of centrifuge installations to 3,000 by May 2007. According to Iranian officials the nation's definitive goal is to reach 54,000 gas centrifuges.

—"Iran continues to enrich in defiance of Security Council, says U.N. nuclear monitor," CBS, 22 February 2007.

#### **5 March 2007**

In opening comments at a board member gathering, International Atomic Energy Agency Chief Mohammad El Baradei warns that despite more than four years spent monitoring Tehran's nuclear ambitions his organization is "unable to provide the required assurance about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program." The IAEA chief stresses that his organization is still unsure about several experiments, procurements and other nuclear activities. Tehran continues to refuse the IAEA's request to place cameras in the underground hall in its Natanz facility that will eventually house 54,000 centrifuges. El Baradei states, "I do not believe that the number of centrifuges has increased, nor do I believe that [new] nuclear material has been introduced to the centrifuges at Natanz."

—"U.N. nuclear watchdog meeting to focus on problems with Iran, progress on North Korea," *USA Today*, 5 March 2007.

#### **6 March 2007**

Chinese Foreign Minister, Li Zhaoxing, tells reporters in Beijing that China "welcomes, supports, and calls upon Iran to step up cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency." China, a strong trade partner and ally of Iran, implores that Tehran consider opening its nuclear facilities to UN inspections in order to avoid further escalation of UN Security Council sanctions and the slashing of IAEA-provided technical aid programs.

—"China urges Iran to open nuclear program to U.N. inspections," *People's Daily*, 6 March 2007.

#### **6 March 2007**

In a letter bearing the signature of Iran's chief representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, Iran attempts to preempt the implementation of new U.N. Security Council sanctions. An excerpt from the document reads that, "[Iran is ready to] negotiate...for the resolution of outstanding issues with the IAEA...without the interference of the United Nation(s) Security Council." IAEA Chief Mohammad El Baradei circulated the letter, dated February 11th, in a board meeting. He stresses that Tehran is prepared to "enter a constructive...negotiation meant to resolve the impasse over its refusal to mothball its enrichment program."

—"Iran wants an end to Security Council 'interference' offers to clear up suspicions," *Boston Herald*, 9 March 2007.

#### **7 March 2007**

The 35-nation board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meets today to deliberate on the number of technical aid programs to Iran to suspend. This decision comes after the U.N. nuclear agency's head Mohammad El Baradei released a report confirming that Tehran openly defied the Security Council's call for it to cease all enrichment activities. Iran's chief envoy to the IAEA, Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, countered criticism of his country by stating that, "weapons of mass destruction have no place in the Islamic Republic of Iran's defense doctrine." He insists that Tehran is not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons, rather that the enrichment program will enable the country to generate its own energy.

—"Japan urges N Korea to scrap nuclear weapons; EU, US deplore Iran's nuclear defiance," MSNBC, 7 March 2007.

#### **9 March 2007**

In an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board meeting, 35 nations approve the suspension of 22 nuclear technical aid projects to Iran as part of imposed U.N. Security Council sanctions. In response, Iran's chief delegate

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to the IAEA Ali Ashgar Soltanieh rejects the decision as the work of a "few countries...to deprive Iran from its inalienable rights for [the] peaceful use of nuclear energy." Soltanieh stresses that as none of the suspended projects are related to enrichment, Iran will continue with the expansion of its program.

—"U.N. Nuclear Agency Curtails Technical Assistance to Iran," *Washington Post*, 9 March 2007.

#### **9 March 2007**

Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, Iran's chief delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency, asserts that Iran has pursued expansion of its enrichment activities in order to generate nuclear power for energy purposes.

—"Iran shrugs off U.N. pressure over its nuclear defiance," *International Herald Tribune*, 9 March 2007.

#### **21 March 2007**

Development of Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactor has seemingly stalled as United States and European officials claim that Russia has pulled out approximately 2,000 of the technicians and engineers it provided to support this project. The return of said specialists to Moscow follows reports of Moscow refusing to deliver nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor until Tehran complies with the U.N. Security Council's demand for the stalling of its enrichment activities. Sergei Novikov, a spokesman for Russian Federal Nuclear Power Agency Rosatom, confirms that the number of Russian workers has in fact dwindled because of Iranian payment delays. The Bushehr reactor is about 95% completed, yet said to be about eight years behind schedule.

—"European and U.S. officials: Russia is pulling out its experts from Bushehr nuclear reactor," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 March 2007.

#### **26 March 2007**

The leaders of Russia, Vladimir Putin, and China, Hu Jintao, collectively release a statement indicating their resolve to "search for a comprehensive, long-term and mutually acceptable solution to the Iranian nuclear problem." They call upon their close ally and trade partner to pursue peaceful means of resolving an increasingly tense dispute a day after Iran partially suspended its cooperation with the IAEA in response to the latest U.N. Security Council sanctions.

—"Russian, Chinese presidents call on Iran to fulfill U.N. demands on nuclear program," *Boston Herald*, 26 March 2007.

#### **26 March 2007**

A day after the Iranian government announced a partial suspension of cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana says that talks will soon resume with Ali Larijani, Iran's main nuclear negotiator, over Iran's nuclear program. The European Union is eager to continue talks as part of its "Twin-Track" approach of imposing tougher sanctions if the country remains in defiance while offering economic and political advantages if it compromises.

—"EU to seek new Iran nuclear talks," *BBC*, 26 March 2007.

#### **26 March 2007**

Tehran denounces a sanctions package approved unanimously over the weekend by the United Nations Security Council. Government spokesman Gholamhossein Elham states, "After this illegal resolution was passed against Iran last night, it forced the government to act based on Parliament's decision regarding the cooperation level with the agency and suspend parts of its activities with the agency." The cutback means that Iran will no longer provide early information to the IAEA about the design of new facilities that are capable of making atomic fuel.

—"Iran to Limit Cooperation with Nuclear Inspectors," *The New York Times*, 26 March 2007.

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**6 April 2007**

Iranian Consultative Assembly Speaker Dr. Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel stresses that top leadership in Pakistan has assured him that Karachi will not take part in the event of a U.S.-led attack on Iran.  
—"Pakistan not to let its territory used against Iran," Dawn (via BBC), 6 April 2007.

**9 April 2007**

Vice President and head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) Reza Aqazadeh celebrates Iran's National Day of Nuclear Technology by stating, "Today, with the start of uranium enrichment on industrial scale, another step was taken for the progress of the Islamic Republic." According to Aqazadeh the IAEO has produced yellow cake as the basic substance for nuclear fuel production throughout facilities in Ardakan, Yazd, Bandar Abbas, and Hormuzgan provinces. A future agenda of the Atomic Energy Organization is to incorporate UF6 production in the Isfahan facility.  
—"Iran nuclear chief says 270 tons of UF6 produced in Iran," Iranian News Agency (IRNA), 9 April 2007.

**10 April 2007**

Iran boasts it has achieved uranium enrichment with 3,000 centrifuges. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says that Iran is now capable of enriching nuclear fuel "on an industrial scale. This nuclear fuel is definitely for the development of Iran and expansion of peace in the world." This milestone is the first step towards Tehran's ultimate goal of establishing 54,000 centrifuges within its Natanz nuclear facility.  
—"Iran Says It Can Enrich Uranium on an Industrial Scale," The New York Times, 10 April 2007.

**12 April 2007**

In an interview with Isfahan TV, Dr. Hoseyn Faqihian, deputy head and director of the Office of Nuclear Fuel Production of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says there is a need to discover new sources of energy due to the depletion of fossil fuels. The most common element that can be used for this purpose is uranium. "At present we have two relatively active mines in Iran. One is in Savand, in central Iran, in which mining operations are in progress. There are other mines near Bandar Abbas, which are in heavy operation." Faqihian comments that the Yusef plant in Isfahan is then capable of converting uranium ore to UF6, its enriched form.  
—"Top nuclear official interviewed live on Iran's Isfahan TV," BBC, 12 April 2007.

**14 April 2007**

Mohammad El Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, says that Iran is only operating several hundred centrifuges at its uranium enrichment plant at Natanz, despite its claims to have activated 3,000. He comments, "Iran is still just at the beginning stages in setting up its Natanz enrichment facility. The talk of building a facility with 50,000 centrifuges is just at the beginning, and it is [currently] only in the hundreds."  
—"UN dismisses Iran's centrifuge claims," Weekend Australian, 14 March 2007.

**16 April 2007**

Ahmad Fayazbakhsh, the deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, asserts that, "Iran is launching two international tenders for the construction of two nuclear power states of between 1,000 and 1,600 megawatts capacity in Bushehr." The newly announced projects would take approximately 9 to 11 years and cost more than \$1 billion.  
—"Iran Says It Wants Bidders for 2 More Nuclear Plants," *The New York Times*, 16 April 2007.

**18 April 2007**

The International Atomic Energy Agency's top inspector confirms that Iran has begun enriching small amounts of

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uranium in more than 1,300 centrifuges at a newly opened underground site at its main nuclear complex.  
—"Atomic Agency Confirms Advances by Iran's Nuclear Program," *The New York Times*, 18 April 2007.

#### **21 April 2007**

Iran's top negotiator Ali Larijani and EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana plan to meet on Wednesday, 25 April to discuss Tehran's disputed nuclear program. This will mark the first talks since additional UN sanctions were imposed on Iran in March.  
—"Iran, EU To Meet on Nuclear Standoff," *China Daily*, 21 April 2007.

#### **26 April 2007**

The Iranian cabinet approves the establishment of nuclear companies named Uranium Processing and Nuclear Fuel Production Company of Iran, Uranium Enrichment Company of Iran, and Nuclear Industry Waste Management Company of Iran. These companies have been established as a private joint-stock entities with an initial investment of one billion Rials for an unlimited period.  
—"Cabinet approves establishment of three nuclear companies," *Jomhuri-ye Eslami*, 26 April 2007.

#### **27 April 2007**

Iran's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Ali Ashgar Soltaniyeh, says that Tehran will continue its peaceful nuclear activities. Commenting on a one-day conference in Paris, Soltaniyeh states, "...when the issue of energy was raised, a number of participants expressed their concern on the possible diversion in use of nuclear energy...we repeatedly underlined that according to the IAEA documents, there have never been any sign of diversion in Iran's nuclear activities."  
—"Envoy to IAEA says Iran to continue peaceful nuclear activities," *Iranian News Agency (IRNA)*, 27 April 2007.

#### **3 May 2007**

Iran underlines its determination to press ahead with sensitive nuclear work despite Western opposition with a senior official saying it is capable of mass-producing machines used for enriching uranium. Ali Akbar Velayati, international affair adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, asserts, "One day Iran had problems to produce one centrifuge, but right now we have obtained the technology for mass production of centrifuges."  
—"Iran Says It Has Mass Nuclear Fuel Capacity," *The Irish Times*, 3 May 2007.

#### **15 May 2007**

In a short-notice inspection of Iran's main nuclear facility at Natanz, conducted in advance of a report to the United Nations Security Council due early next week, the inspectors found that Iranian engineers are already using roughly 1,300 and are producing fuel suitable for nuclear reactors. A diplomat speaking on anonymity confirms, "They are at the stage where they are doing one cascade a week." IAEA chief Mohammad El Baradei asserts, "We believe they pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich." If Tehran continues at this speed, according to experts, 3,000 centrifuges will be operational by June and by end of year 8,000 may be installed.  
—"Inspectors Cite Big Gain By Iran on Nuclear Fuel," *The New York Times*, 15 May 2007.

#### **16 May 2007**

Washington calls for tough international action against Iran after IAEA inspectors conclude that Tehran has made major technical strides toward processing nuclear fuel - material that can power a reactor or an atomic bomb. State Department spokesman Tom Casey declares, "What is key here, and what is obvious to everyone is that Iran has continued to act in defiance of the wishes of the international community. We need to continue to apply

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pressure and increase pressure with an additional Security Council resolution if they don't comply."

—"U.S. urges sanctions against Tehran," *The Washington Times*, 16 May 2007.

#### **24 May 2007**

Iran has again defied UN demands to suspend its nuclear enrichment programs, according to a report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The UN's nuclear watchdog states that Iran has significantly accelerated its enrichment capability and has not provided a range of verification information to the agency. The IAEA's "level of knowledge of certain aspects of Iran's nuclear-related activities has deteriorated."

—"Iranian Defiance of U.N. Detailed," *The Washington Post*, 24 May 2007.

#### **24 May 2007**

Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, asserts that the International Atomic Energy Agency's latest report "proves that Iran is moving within the framework of...international laws, and is merely using its legitimate rights in its peaceful nuclear activities." Larijani adds, "[El Baradei stated] in his report that no sign of reprocessing has been observed in Iran...In both UNSC resolutions it is emphasized that Iran must suspend its reprocessing activities...this proves the UN Security Council is not dealing with Iran's nuclear dossier technically."

—"IAEA chief's report shows not deviation in Iran's nuclear programme," Iranian News Agency (IRNA), 24 May 2007.

#### **25 May 2007**

Mohammad El Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pushes for renewal of negotiation attempts between the West and Iran. He says that even if Iran wanted a nuclear weapon, it would not be "before the end of this decade or some time in the middle of the next decade. In other words three to eight years from now. Iran needs to suspend its enrichment activities as a confidence-building measure, but the international community should do its utmost to engage Iran in comprehensive dialogue."

—"Iran could have nuclear bomb in 2010, UN watchdog warns; Tehran leader brags of atomic programme reaching peak," *The Herald (Glasgow)*, 25 May 2007.

#### **25 May 2007**

Mohammad Sa'idi, Deputy Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran's International Affairs Department, says that International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors are busy inspecting Iran's nuclear facilities in Isfahan. Once done with this first set of inspections, they will then make their way to the Natanz site.

—"IAEA inspectors checking Isfahan nuclear facilities," Iranian News Agency (IRNA), 25 May 2007.

#### **1 June 2007**

Talks between Iran's nuclear negotiator and a top envoy for the European Union end with few signs they are closer to breaking their deadlock over Iran's nuclear ambitions. Javier Solana asserts that he will meet again with Ali Larijani within weeks. Solana comments, "We cannot say that there has been a fundamental breakthrough, but what we can say is that we have advanced in many important subjects."

—"No Breakthrough as Iranian Nuclear Talks Recess," *The New York Times*, 1 June 2007.

#### **23 June 2007**

Iran is significantly closer to acquiring the essential material for a nuclear bomb as Tehran claims to have stockpiled 100kg of enriched uranium, thus far enriched to the level needed to run civilian nuclear power stations.

—"Iran takes step nearer to a nuclear bomb," *The Daily Telegraph*, 23 June 2007.

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#### **26 June 2007**

Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will travel to Tehran in coming weeks at the invitation of the Iranian government to try to clear up longstanding questions about its nuclear program. The purpose of the visit is to "develop an action plan for resolving outstanding issues" relating to Iran's nuclear program. Melissa Fleming, spokeswoman for the IAEA, adds that the inspectors will leave for Tehran "as early as practicable."

—"U.N. Inspectors Invited to Iran For Talks on Nuclear Program," The New York Times, 26 June 2007.

#### **9 July 2007**

Major digging can be seen in recent satellite photos of a mountainside in central Iran near Iran's Natanz nuclear facility. Worries have been stoked by the presence nearby of a fortified building where uranium is being processed. Those structures in turn are now being connected by roads to Iran's main nuclear site. The construction has raised concerns at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). "We have been in contact with the Iranian authorities about this, and we have received clarifications," states Melissa Fleming, IAEA spokeswoman, without further elaboration.

—"Tunneling Near Iranian Nuclear Site Stirs Worry," The Washington Post, 9 July 2007.

#### **10 July 2007**

Iran has slowed expansion of its uranium enrichment program, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Chief of the UN's nuclear watchdog confirms, "Without going into detail, you could say that there is a fairly marked slowdown. It is not a full-size freeze, but it is a marked slowdown" in establishing new uranium enriching centrifuges.

—"Slowdown Seen in Iran's Nuclear Program," The Washington Post, 10 July 2007.

#### **14 July 2007**

The International Atomic Energy Agency affirms that Iran has agreed to let inspectors into nuclear facility at Arak following talks on how to resolve outstanding questions about Tehran's disputed nuclear program. Iran says its Arak research reactor, due for completion in 2008, will make isotopes for medical and other peaceful uses, replacing an older 1970s light water reactor in Tehran.

—"IAEA, Iran Agree on Plan for Visit to Disputed Reactor Site," China Daily, 14 July 2007.

#### **9 August 2007**

Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency, Rosatom, is not planning deliveries of nuclear fuel in the near future to Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant due to technical and financial reasons. In addition, Moscow is said to have issued an ultimatum to Iran demanding a cessation of uranium enrichment, declassification of its nuclear program, and provision of information to International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors.

—"Moscow Has Grown Tired of Iran," Vedomosti, 9 August 2007.

#### **29 August 2007**

Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency make public a plan designed to wrap up by December nuclear issues that have been under investigation for four years. Iran has resolved questions about its past experiments with plutonium in accordance with this plan. It was also clarified that Iran is prepared to come forward with an explanation about a document, assumed to originate from Abdul Qadeer Khan, which depicts how to make uranium into hemispheres, a shape suitable for use in a weapon.

—"UN deal with Iran comes under fire; Tehran 'gaining time,' critics of plan assert," The International Herald Tribune, 29 August 2007.

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### **31 August 2007**

The International Atomic Energy Agency releases a report on Iran that states while it is in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions with its enrichment of uranium, Iran is producing "well below the expected quantity for a facility of this design." The UN nuclear watchdog's deputy director, Olli Heinonen, states, "For the first time in a couple of years, we have been able to agree with the Iranians on a working arrangement, on how to resolve the outstanding issues."

—"IAEA: Iran Cooperating in Nuclear Investigation," *The Washington Post*, 31 August 2007.

### **3 September 2007**

Iran claims that it has reached its goal of running 3,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was quoted by state television as saying that despite economic sanctions by the United Nations, his country had "taken another step in the nuclear progress and launched more than 3,000 centrifuge machines." Meanwhile, a report released last week by the International Atomic Energy Agency declares that Natanz was running 1,968 centrifuges and enriched uranium only to 3.7%, well below the 90% needed for weapons-grade material.

—"Iran says a key nuclear goal has been reached; President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asserts that 3,000 centrifuges are running. The West disputes that number," *Los Angeles Times*, 3 September 2007.

### **14 September 2007**

China urges Iran to continue negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency. "We would advocate a peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation," Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi communicates in talks with visiting Iranian Interior Minister Mostafa Pour-Mohammadi.

—"China urges further talks on Iran nuclear issue," *Xinhua News Agency*, 14 September 2007.

### **17 October 2007**

In a speech at the meeting of the five Caspian littoral states - Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan - President Vladimir Putin asserts that Russia was the only country that had helped Tehran develop its nuclear program. Putin reinforces the idea that the Caspian nations should not be used in any attack by a third country, a comment that appears to be directed at Azerbaijan, which has held talks with U.S. military officials over the situation in Iran.

—"Putin Renews Pledge to Support Iran," *The Moscow Times*, 17 October 2007.

### **21 October 2007**

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, resigns before crucial talks with Europe this week over Iran's nuclear program. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appoint Saeed Jalili, the deputy foreign minister for European and American affairs, as Larijani's replacement. Mr. Jalili is an ally of the president and is considered by political analysts to be a more hard-line figure than his predecessor.

—"Iran's Nuclear Envoy Quits; Talks in Doubt," *The New York Times*, 21 October 2007.

### **21 October 2007**

Tehran denounces a sanctions package approved unanimously over the weekend by the United Nations Security Council. Government spokesman Gholamhossein Elham states, "After this illegal resolution was passed against Iran last night, it forced the government to act based on Parliament's decision regarding the cooperation level with the agency and suspend parts of its activities with the agency." The cutback means that Iran will no longer provide

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early information to the IAEA about the design of new facilities that are capable of making atomic fuel.

—"Iran to Limit Cooperation with Nuclear Inspectors," *The New York Times*, 21 October 2007. "Iran loses its chief nuclear negotiator; Viewed as a voice of moderation, he resigns days after Putin offered Tehran a compromise to end stalemate," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 October 2007.

#### **22 October 2007**

Foreign Ministry spokesman Mohammed Ali Hosseini confirms that Larijani would nonetheless attend crucial talks in Rome on Tuesday with European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana. Hosseini also denies any rift between Larijani and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by stating, "There is harmony among Iranian officials and between the people and Iranian officials. Nuclear policy will be the same as before."

—"Nuclear talks to include ex-broker for Iran; Ali Larijani, whose resignation has set back hopes for a deal, will meet with the EU," *Los Angeles Times*, 22 October 2007.

#### **26 October 2007**

The Bush administration announces tough new sanctions against three of Iran's largest state-owned banks, a move designed to increase pressure on the Iranian government by cutting it off from financial institutions around the world. Sanctions are also imposed on key branches of Iran's military, nine Iranian companies, and five Iranian officials.

—"US issues new sanctions on Iran's state banks - Seeks to push regime to halt nuclear efforts," *The Boston Globe*, 26 October 2007.

#### **15 November 2007**

Iran gives the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a document showing how to cast uranium metal into hemispheres to form the core of a nuclear weapon. Tehran believes this gesture is an important sign that it is cooperating fully with the IAEA in resolving questions about suspicious and secretive nuclear activities that date back two decades. The document was offered by Abdul Qadeer Khan, father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, when Iran covertly purchased nuclear equipment in order to enrich uranium.

—"Iran hands nuclear data over to UN; Document unlikely to help agency's work," *The International Herald Tribune*, 15 November 2007.

#### **4 December 2007**

U.S. Intelligence analysis on Iran's nuclear activities yields that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and has not restarted it since. The findings contradict an assessment by U.S. intelligence officials two years ago that Tehran was seeking nuclear weapons and appears to undercut President Bush's repeated warnings about Iran becoming a nuclear power. The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report - the consensus view of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies - says that Iran continues to enrich uranium, which means it might be able to develop a nuclear weapon between 2010 and 2015 if it restarts its weapons program.

—"Iran halted its nuclear weapons programme in 2003," *The Times* (London), 4 December 2007. "Key Judgments From a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's Nuclear Activity," *New York Times*, 4 December 2007.

#### **18 December 2007**

Russia delivers the first fuel shipment to the power plant in Bushehr, in southern Iran. Russian officials claim that the fuel will be under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency while its inspectors are in Iran, and that Tehran has given its pledge that the fuel will only be used for the power plant. A spokeswoman for Atomstroyexport, the Russian contractor of the Bushehr plant, confirms, "The first phase of delivery has been completed. A small amount of fuel is already on the premises...in a special storage facility."

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—"Russia delivers nuclear fuel to Iran; Tehran announces 2nd power plant," *The International Herald Tribune*, 18 December 2007.

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## 2006

### 3 January 2006

Mohammad Saeedi, Deputy Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that Iran plans to resume research into nuclear fuel production. Announcing on State television Mr. Saeedi says, "As our dear nation knows, about two and a half years ago our country agreed to voluntarily suspend research in nuclear fuel technology. We think that during this period our experts incurred heavy losses and many of our researchers lost their jobs. For the same reason, it was decided to inform the IAEA today on the resumption of the research." Mr. Saeedi also adds that resumption of nuclear fuel research does not mean that actual enrichment is going to resume.

—"Iran announces further resumption of atomic work," *Reuters*, 3 January 2006; "Iran to resume nuclear research," BBC, 3 January 2006.

### 3 January 2006

The U.S. State Department declares that it is going to impose sanctions on nine companies on the basis of credible information that the companies had transferred equipment or technology in violation of the Iran Nonproliferation Act. The State Department list of nine companies includes six in China, two in India, and one in Austria, all accused for having sold materials to Iran that are included in export control lists, or can be used in the production of missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

—"USA sanctions 9 firms under Iran Nonproliferation Act," *Defense Industry Daily*, 3 January 2006; Barry Schweid, "State Dept. sanctions 9 foreign companies for Iran arms sales," *Associated Press*, 27 December 2005.

### 3 January 2006

Iran rejects a Russian uranium enrichment proposal that would allow Russia to host Iran's enrichment program. Mr. Hamid-Reza Asefi, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that, "Iran would not accept any proposal that calls for mere enrichment inside Russia but will consider one that offers a complimentary and workable plan." Also, in a separate statement, Mr. Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, described Russia's proposal as immature, as it contained serious problems and called on Russia to further complement and support their proposal. Mr. Larijani added, "Iran's right for having its own nuclear fuel is irrevocable and should be acknowledged. Iran did not want to depend on others."

—"Iran asks for improvement on Russian nuclear proposal," *Xinhua*, 3 January 2006; Nazila Fathi, "Iran says Russia's Nuclear Plan is 'Not Sufficient'," *New York Times*, 27 January 2006.

### 4 January 2006

The U.S. Department of Treasury imposes sanctions on two Iranian companies, Novin Energy Company and Mesbah Energy Company, for their support of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in connection with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The decision was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13382, an authority aimed at freezing the assets of proliferators of WMD and their supporters, and prohibiting transactions and trade with those designated entities.

—"Treasury employs financial actions against WMD proliferation supporters in Iran," Department of Treasury-Press Release, 4 January 2006.

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#### **4 January 2006**

Author James Risen in his book, "State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration," alleges that in an effort to sabotage Iran's nuclear program, the CIA may have handed Iran a flawed plan for building an atomic bomb. The author also alleges that the Russian engineer who was originally hired by the CIA to deliver the flawed plans to the Iranians, double crossed his employers and offered to help Iran fix the flaws, resulting in a covert operation faux pas.

—Tracy Connor, "Book alleges CIA inadvertently gave Iran formula for nuclear bomb," *New York Times*, 4 January 2006; Josh Meyer, "CIA gave Iran Bomb Plans, Book says," *Los Angeles Times*, 4 January 2006.

#### **4 January 2006**

A 55-page confidential intelligence document drawing on findings from British, French, German and Belgian security agencies alleges that Iran has been seeking sensitive goods, technology and know-how for nuclear weapons and missiles in Europe. The report apparently emphasizes that west European engineering firms, germ laboratories, scientific think tanks and university campuses are being successfully preyed upon by multitudes of middlemen, front companies, scholars with hidden agendas and bureaucracies working for Iranian, Syrian, and Pakistani regimes.

—Ian Traynor and Ian Cobain, "Intelligence report claims nuclear market thriving," *Guardian*, 4 January 2006; "Iran combing Europe for nuke parts," Associated Press, 4 January 2006.

#### **8 January 2006**

Britain's *Observer* newspaper alleges that British officials have apparently allowed the export of 1,000 kg of zirconium silicate to Iran, demonstrating the weakness of British government controls over sensitive materials. Zirconium metal which can be extracted from zirconium silicate can be used to stop fuel rods from corroding and has a number of military applications, including use in a nuclear warhead.

—Anthony Barnett, "UK cleared nuclear cargo to Iran," *Observer*, 8 January 2006.

#### **10 January 2006**

Iran breaks open internationally monitored seals on at least three of its nuclear facilities, clearing the path for the resumption of nuclear fuel research under the supervision of the IAEA. Seals were removed at the Natanz enrichment facility and at two related storage and testing locations known as Pars Trash, near Isfahan, and Farayand Technique. In a parallel development, Mr. Hossein Entezami, spokesman for Iran's National Security Council announced that Iran is going to continue negotiations with Russia vis-à-vis their proposal. He adds, "Negotiations to reach a final conclusion are going to be continued on February 16 in Moscow."

—"Iran announces plan to restart atom work," Agence France-Presse, 9 January 2006; Steven R. Weisman and Nazila Fathi, "Iranians Reopen Nuclear Centers," *New York Times*, 11 January 2006.

#### **12 January 2006**

Iran's move to break IAEA seals clearing the path to resume nuclear research sets the stage for Iran's possible referral to the United Nations Security Council. Foreign Ministers from the UK, Germany and France unanimously agree that the time has come for Iran's nuclear issue to be dealt by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Britain's Foreign Minister, Jack Straw announces that the next step in the process would be to call for an emergency meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to decide the grounds for Iran's referral to the UNSC.

—"EU calls for UN action over Iran," BBC, 12 January 2006; John Daniszewski, "Iran Nuclear Issue Moves toward U.N.," *Los Angeles Times*, 12 January 2006.

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### 13 January 2006

As a response to international pressure to stop nuclear research activities and under threats of a UN Security Council referral, Iran threatens to block UN inspections of its nuclear activities and end all voluntary cooperation if it is referred to the UNSC. Mr. Manoucher Mottaki, the Iranian Foreign Minister adds, that "The Iranian government will have to stop all its voluntary cooperation with the UN nuclear watchdog," if their case is referred to the UNSC. Furthermore, Mr. Mottaki adds, "Iran's right to access nuclear technology is not associated with the will of any particular country," and by agreeing to Iran's referral to the UNSC, "the European countries will lose the means which are currently at their disposal."

—John War Anderson and Daniela Deane, "Iran threatens to block U.N. inspections," *Washington Post*, 13 January 2006; Richard Bernstein and Steven R. Weisman, "Iran responds to criticism with threat to end U.N. inspections," *New York Times*, 13 January 2006.

### 18 January 2006

The EU powers prepare a draft resolution calling on the IAEA Board of Governors to refer Iran's nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council. The draft resolution asks Iran "to help the IAEA to clarify questions regarding possible nuclear weapons activities" and calls on the IAEA Director-General, Mohamed ElBaradei "to transmit a copy of this resolution to the Security Council." The Board of Governors is scheduled to meet next on 2 February.

—"EU drafts Iran Security Council Referral Resolution," Global Security Newswire, 18 January 2006; "IAEA Board to hold special meeting on Iran on 2 February 2006," IAEA, 18 January 2006.

### 18 January 2006

France rejects Iran's requests for more talks on its nuclear program, saying that Tehran first must suspend its atomic activities. In a response to an Iranian request for a ministerial-level meeting with France, Germany, Britain, and the EU, French Foreign Ministry spokesman Denis Simonneau says that Iran's resumption of nuclear enrichment-related activities "means that it is not possible for us to meet under satisfactory conditions to pursue these discussions." In a separate statement, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice brushed aside suggestions about a possible resumption of negotiations with Iran on its nuclear program.

—"Rice rejects renewal of talks with Iran," Associated Press, 18 January 2006; Nasser Karimi, "France rejects Iranian Request for Talks," Associated Press, 18 January 2006.

### 19 January 2006

Amid U.S. and EU demands of swift action to drag Iran to the UN Security Council over its atomic ambitions, Russia expresses that it wants the IAEA to hold off on a formal referral of Iran to the UN Security Council, a move that could lead to possible sanctions. Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov says, "Russia will follow the advice of the IAEA on the nuclear issue at the upcoming Board of Governors meeting." Mr. Lavrov further adds that a "professional appraisal" of the situation was highly important and that the international community should resolve the problem.

—"Russia to follow IAEA advice on Iran nuclear issue-Lavrov," RIA-Novosti, 19 January 2006; "Russia hesitates to act on Iran," *Los Angeles Times*, 19 January 2006; Alistair Lyon, "WRAPUP3-Rice demands U.N. action on Iran nuclear dispute," Reuters, 19 January 2006.

### 22 January 2006

Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator and secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, reiterates that, "if the case goes to the Security Council, we're obliged.... to lift all voluntary measures." He adds that Tehran would even consider resuming efforts to enrich uranium on an industrial scale if its case was reported to the UN Security

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Council.

—Raula Khalaf and Gareth Smyth, "Iran warns against UN referral," *Financial Times*, 22 January 2006.

### **25 January 2006**

Representatives from six key nations, China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States plan to meet in London on 30 January to discuss what actions should be taken regarding Iran's nuclear activities. They are considering a new approach, where they would first urge Iran to suspend enrichment activities and come back to talks with the EU and secondly, give the IAEA more inspection authority. Failure to act on the aforementioned would result in sanctions for Iran.

—"Key Foreign Ministers to discuss Iran Nuclear Issue," Global Security Newswire, 25 January 2006.

### **26 January 2006**

President Bush and the Chinese government declare full support for a Russian proposal to allow Iran to operate civilian nuclear facilities, as long as Russia and international nuclear inspectors are in full control of fuel. Expressing his support for the deal, President Bush adds, "I think that it is a good plan. The Russians came up with the idea, and I support it." In a separate statement, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Kong Quan adds, "We oppose impulsively using sanctions or threats of sanctions to solve problems. This will complicate problems."

—"Bush supports Russian plan to handle Iranian Nuclear Material," U.S. State Department, 27 January 2006; Chris Buckley and Lindsay Beck, "China opposes sanctions to resolve Iran dispute," Reuters, 26 January 2006.

### **27 January 2006**

Responding to international pressure to accept the Russian proposal, Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator calls the Russian plan "positive" but says it is "not sufficient for Iran's nuclear technology." Furthermore, he adds, that "it should be considered along with other proposed schemes" to present a more complete revised proposal.

—David E. Sanger and Elaine Sciolino, "Iran says Russia's Nuclear Plan is 'not sufficient'," *New York Times*, 27 January 2006; "Russia plan not enough for Iran," BBC, 27 January 2006.

### **30 January 2006**

Just before representatives from China, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the EU-3 are to meet in London to discuss Iran's nuclear case for referral to the UN Security Council, senior Iranian officials offer a potential compromise plan. As per the compromise offered, Iran is prepared to allow more time for talks with the Europeans on large scale enrichment, while seeking agreement with the IAEA on the scope of uranium enrichment allowed for research and development purposes.

—Gareth Smyth, "Iran steps up EU diplomacy," *Financial Times*, 30 January 2006; "Iran to present new nuclear proposals to EU," Reuters, 30 January 2006.

### **31 January 2006**

Representatives from the United States, China, Russia, and the EU-3 at their meeting in London, reach a surprising accord that Iran's case should be taken before the UN Security Council. While Russia and China have signed onto a statement that calls on the IAEA to transfer Iran's dossier to the UN Security Council, they insist that Iran's case be "reported" as opposed to "referred" to the Security Council. Reporting does not guarantee sanctions and presents a way to resolve the issue through diplomatic channels.

—Kevin Sullivan and Dafna Linzer, "Iran to be reported to Security Council," *Washington Post*, 31 January 2006; Anne Gearan, "U.N. Council Agrees on Iran Nuclear Review," Associated Press, 31 January 2006.

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### 31 January 2006

The head of Belgium's state security service, Koen Dassen resigns amid allegations that his department failed to disclose nuclear transfers to Iran. Allegedly, a Belgian firm Epsi sold Iran in November of 2004, an isostatic press which could potentially be used to strengthen nuclear weapons components. As quoted in an official Belgian report, in view of an international embargo banning nuclear technology transfers to Iran, the state security agency "assuredly failed in its mission to provide information to authorities and proved itself inefficient."

—"Iran row hits Belgian spy chief," BBC, 31 January 2006.

### 1 February 2006

Former chief spokesman for the National Council of Resistance of Iran, Alireza Jafarzadeh alleges that the Iranian military is working through a front company to build a "top-secret" tunnel in northeast Tehran. Allegedly, the tunnel is meant to further Iran's nuclear weapons research and development activities while shifting most of its operations underground. Also, as per a four-page confidential agency report as quoted in the *New York Times*, the IAEA has uncovered potential connections between Iran's nuclear energy program and military efforts on missiles and explosives. The so called "Green Salt Project" allegedly implicates an Iranian entity for involvement in uranium processing, high explosives and a missile warhead design, suggesting a military-nuclear dimension. [Note: Green Salt derives its name from uranium tetrafluoride (also known as Green Salt), an intermediate product in the conversion of uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride.]

—Joe Fiorill, "Iran resistance alleges more nuclear tunnel work," Global Security Newswire, 1 February 2006; "IAEA sees military link to Iran Nuclear Program," Global Security Newswire, 1 February 2006; Elaine Sciolino and William J. Broad, "Agency says Iran work may link to Weapons," *New York Times*, 1 February 2006.

### 4 February 2006

Following an International Atomic Energy Board of Governors emergency meeting, a Board resolution votes to report Iran to the UN Security Council. The statement calls on Iran "to heed the clear message" of the world community and urges Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and processing activities, cooperate fully with the IAEA, and resume diplomatic negotiations. On a separate but connected note, Iran is given until March 2006 to come clean on its nuclear activities, when IAEA Director-General ElBaradei is scheduled to present his report on Iran's nuclear program.

—"Iran gets an extension until March," RIA-Novosti, 2 February 2006; "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Resolution adopted on 4 February 2006 by the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2006/14," IAEA, 4 February 2006; "Atomic Energy Board votes to report Iran to U.N. Security Council," U.S. State Department, 6 February 2006.

### 7 February 2006

Responding to the IAEA Board of Governors vote to report Iran to the UN Security Council, Iran tells the IAEA to scrap the "containment and surveillance measures" under a 1997 Additional Protocol that had given IAEA inspectors more intrusive inspection powers up until now. Iran has not yet ratified the additional protocol but was voluntarily following all its obligations. Iran has told the IAEA to remove all surveillance gear from its key sites by mid-February, thus, considerably reducing the IAEA's future ability to verify an absence of undeclared nuclear activity.

—Mark Heinrich, "Iran's inspection curb hobbles key IAEA atom probe," *Washington Post*, 7 February 2006; Alissa J. Rubin, "Rejecting cooperation, Iran asks IAEA to remove Seals, Cameras," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 February 2006.

### 8 February 2006

Two German nationals are formally charged with espionage for helping a foreign intelligence agency acquire dual-

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use "delivery system" technology. The two nationals are reportedly accused of "having sold a vibration facility in 2001 and 2002 on behalf of a foreign military intelligence procurement activity." It is alleged that the country reportedly involved in the above clandestine procurement activities is Iran.

—"Germans, Russian aid Iran arms programme-officials," *Reuters*, 8 February 2006; "German spy charges 'on Iran arms'," Associated Press, 3 February 2006; Louis Charbonneau, "Germany holds 2 Men suspected of buying arms for Iran," *Reuters*, 25 February 2006.

### **13 February 2006**

Iran begins to inject UF<sub>6</sub> (uranium hexafluoride) gas into a limited number of centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear enrichment facility. [Note: Uranium enrichment regarded as a crucial step in making nuclear weapons, is seen as the red line by the United States and the European Union in the long running standoff over Iran's nuclear program.] Also, in view of the recent IAEA Board vote, Iran pushed back talks with Russia indefinitely. According to the Iranian presidential spokesman, Gholamhossein Elham, this apparent move was reflective of the broader reality of the "new situation." The talks with Russia were originally scheduled to be held on 16 February.

—"Iran starts nuclear enrichment at Natanz," FBIS Feature, 13 February 2006, FBIS document FEA20060213019476; "Iran starts injection of UF<sub>6</sub> gas into limited number of centrifuges in Natanz," *Tehran Fars News Agency*, 13 February 2006, FBIS document IAP20060213011052; "Iran shelve Russia nuclear talks," *BBC*, 13 January 2006.

### **21 February 2006**

An Iranian delegation headed by Deputy Secretary of the National Security Council Seyyed-Ali Hosseini-Tash concluded talks with his Russian counterpart in Moscow. The talks that were focused on Iran's nuclear program and on the possibility of setting up a joint uranium enrichment venture on Russian territory failed to come to any compromises. However, the talks were described as "positive and constructive" by an Iranian official and further talks are scheduled to be held between the two in Tehran.

—"Ambassador says Iran delegation will visit Moscow Feb. 20," *RIA-Novosti*, 16 February 2006; "Russia nuclear talks underway in Kremlin," *RIA-Novosti*, 20 February 2006; "Iran-Russian nuclear talks close," *BBC*, 21 February 2006.

### **27 February 2006**

Agreeing in principle to the Russian uranium enrichment proposal, Iranian Foreign Minister Manoucher Mottaki says, "We are ready to compromise." However, he maintains that there are four specific issues that need to be addressed: "which countries and firms would be involved, and also, what will the timing and place or places involved vis-à-vis Russia's proposal."

—"Iran announces breakthrough in nuclear talks with Russia," *Global Security Newswire*, 27 February 2006; "Iran ready to compromise on nuclear issue," *Global Security Newswire*, 23 February 2006; Nazila Fathi, "Iran moves towards deal with Russia on Uranium," *New York Times*, 27 February 2006.

### **27 February 2006**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad calls for a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone. Speaking after talks with Kuwaiti leaders, President Ahmadinejad said, "We too demand that the Middle East be free of nuclear weapons, not only in the Middle East, but the whole world should be free of nuclear weapons." President Ahmadinejad further added that while Iran's nuclear program was for peaceful civilian purposes, the possession of nuclear weapons by the superpowers and the occupiers in the Middle East, were a threat to stability.

—"Iran calls for nuclear-free region," *BBC*, 27 February 2006.

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### **28 February 2006**

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei circulated his latest report on the IAEA's nuclear verification in Iran, before the scheduled Board of Governors meeting on March 6. The confidential report states that Iran is determined to make progress on nuclear technology as it had already started operating a 10-centrifuge cascade, and was finishing maintenance on 20 more centrifuges. The report also states that it is "regrettable and a matter of concern" that Iran has not been more forthcoming after three years of intensive agency verification.

—Elaine Sciolino, "U.N. Agency says it got few answers from Iran on Nuclear Activity and Weapons," *New York Times*, 28 February 2006; "IAEA says Iran determined to expand Nuclear Program," Global Security Newswire, 28 February 2006; "Report on Iran Nuclear Safeguards sent to Agency's Board," IAEA, 28 February 2006.

### **2 March 2006**

A third round of talks between Iran and Russia regarding the Russian enrichment proposal ended without any breakthrough. Having agreed in principle to the deal before, Tehran maintains that while being flexible on the implementation of the Russian enrichment proposal, the process of enrichment is a sovereign national right and that "states that have a peaceful nuclear program must not be deprived of this right." In a separate but connected issue, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, is set to meet with the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany, in last minute talks ahead of the scheduled 6 March IAEA Board of Governors meeting. Mr. Larijani believes that the proposed Russian plan can be effective if Iran's case is not reported to the Security Council.

—"Report: Russia and Iran resume nuclear negotiations," Associated Press, 2 March 2006; "Iran will allow IAEA to inspect nuclear programs-negotiator," RIA-Novosti, 2 March 2006; "Larijani: Russian proposal to be first victim if Iran sent to UNSC," FBIS feature, 2 March 2006, FBIS document FEA20060302020379.

### **7 March 2006**

Russia's Energy Engineering Alliance completes installation of equipment at Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. The Bushehr reactor's main supplier is ZIO-Podolsk, a Russian machine building firm, which is part of Russia's Energy Engineering Alliance. The firm has previously supplied Iran with four steam generators and other equipment for the Bushehr project's first reactor block. The company is also known to have specialists working on the ground in Iran to assemble equipment and address on site technical issues.

—"Russian companies install equipment at Iranian NPP," RIA-Novosti, 7 March 2006.

### **7 March 2006**

Mohsen Aminzadeh, the ex-Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran and a member of the Jebhe-e-Mosharekat ("The Cooperation Front"), in a daring expose, writes about Iran's nuclear program and the country's limited capacity for mining uranium. Mr. Aminzadeh states that Iran's nuclear industry, despite "all the innovations of the Iranian experts," needs the cooperation of foreign nations in order to develop. He further adds that "Iran needs to import uranium for its reactor; and even if one day it can enrich uranium, Iran's discovered uranium resources are limited."

—Mohsen Aminzadeh, "The Biggest Diplomatic Defeat for the Islamic Republic of Iran," *Emrooz*, March 7, 2006.

### **8 March 2006**

Speaking at the conclusion of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors meeting that began on 6 March, IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei calls on Iran and the West to return to negotiations in the row over Iran's nuclear program. Furthermore, Dr. ElBaradei calls on Iran to be more transparent working with the Agency and continue to work and take the required confidence building measures in reference to its nuclear program. Mr. ElBaradei also underscores the need for a comprehensive political settlement that takes care of all

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underlying issues.

—"Watchdog holds crucial Iran talks," BBC, 6 March 2006; "IAEA Board of Governors ends Monday meeting," IRNA, 6 March 2006; "IAEA Director General's Remarks at Conclusion of the IAEA Board Meeting, March 8, 2006," IAEA, 8 March 2006.

#### **8 March 2006**

Following the IAEA's Board Meeting, head of the Iranian delegation, Mr. Javad Vaeidi, says that the failure to adopt a resolution at the Board of Governors meeting is indicative of a lack of consensus against Iran. He adds that there are two possible options to resolve the present impasse, "to compromise and cooperate or go for confrontation." He also adds that Iran hopes for the former but would in any case continue to exercise its research and development activities based on its right. Responding to U.S. threats of having the power to cause harm and pain, Mr. Vaeidi adds that the U.S. is also susceptible to such harm and pain, and if the U.S. wishes to choose such a path, "let the ball roll."

—"Statement to the Press," by H.E. Javad Vaeidi, Head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Delegation to the Board of Governors, Acronym Institute, 8 March 2006.

#### **8 March 2006**

The release of Director-General ElBaradei's report to the Board of Governors triggers the participation of the UN Security Council, which is scheduled to take up the issue of Iran's nuclear program in the coming weeks. On a related note, Hassan Rowhani, the former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, reiterates that, "the Additional Protocol will be implemented only if the world agrees not to send Iran's nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council." Furthermore, Mr. Rowhani adds that there were no reasons justifying the West's concerns over Iran's peaceful nuclear activities and dismissed allegations that Iran wants to produce nuclear weapons, saying "twenty centrifuges cannot be a cause of concern for the world."

—Greg Webb, "Nuclear standoff with Iran moves to U.N. Security Council," Global Security Newswire, 8 March 2006; "Rowhani: Iran determined to continue peaceful nuclear work," IRNA, 8 March 2006, FBIS document IAP20060308011017.

#### **13 March 2006**

Following closely on the heels of another round of talks between Russia and Iran, Iran rejects a Russian proposal to enrich uranium for Iranian nuclear reactors. Hamid Reza Asefi, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman says, "We had told the Russians that we will not give up our research and development program and the proposal is ruled out if this part is ignored." In a separate statement, Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, referring to the question of possible withdrawal from the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) adds, "if we reach a point where the existing mechanisms do not provide for the right of the Iranian people, then the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran would be possibly revised and reconsidered." However, Mr. Mottaki is quick to add that leaving the treaty "was not on the agenda yet."

—"Iran rejects Russian uranium enrichment proposal," Global Security Newswire, 13 March 2006; Nazila Fathi, "Iran rejects Russian offer to Defuse Nuclear Dispute," *New York Times*, 13 March 2006; "Senior Iranian official to continue nuclear talks in Moscow-Russian Agency," RIA-Novosti, 13 March 2006, FBIS document CEP20060313950208.

#### **15 March 2006**

The UN Security Council is scheduled to convene a formal meeting to discuss a draft text addressing Iran's nuclear activities. The draft resolution penned by France and the United Kingdom, calls on Iran to comply with IAEA demands by suspending uranium enrichment activities. The resolution also calls on the IAEA Director General,

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Mohamed ElBaradei to report to the Security Council "in 14 days on Iranian compliance with requirements set out by the IAEA Board." The draft also urges Iran to "ratify and implement in full" the Additional Protocol.

—"Full U.N. Security Council to Discuss Iran on Friday," Global Security Newswire, 15 March 2006; Warren Hoge, "Text on Iran's Nuclear Work is under study by the U.N. Council," *New York Times*, 15 March 2006.

#### **16 March 2006**

Responding to questions on the holding of bilateral talks between Iran and the U.S. over Iraq, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns dismisses any notion that direct discussions between the U.S. and Iran will be an effective way of confronting Iran's nuclear program. In a separate statement, Mr. Gregory Schulte, U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA, adds, "the discussions that we are prepared to conduct with authorities from Iran and our Ambassador Khalilzad from Baghdad are focused on Iraq, that's the purpose of those." Mr. Schulte also adds, "we have no intention to open direct negotiations with Tehran on the nuclear issue."

—David Shelby, "State's Burns Rejects Direct U.S.-Iran Talks over Nuclear Issue," U.S. State Department, 16 March 2006; "US rules nuclear issue out of Iran-Iraq talks," *Iran Mania*, 22 March 2006; "US and Iran agree to Iraq talks," BBC, 16 March 2006.

#### **25 March 2006**

Reports indicate that Iran is only a few weeks away from resuming uranium enrichment. Western sources are quoted as saying that Iran is likely to begin testing vacuum sealing on centrifuges and related equipment in a few days. Presumably, after this step Iran is expected to feed uranium hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) gas into a 164 centrifuge cascade in the next few weeks.

—Alissa J. Rubin and Maggie Farley, "Iran's Nuclear Steps Quicken, Diplomats say," Los Angeles Times, 25 March 2006; "Iran reportedly steps up nuclear work," Global Security Newswire, 27 March 2006.

#### **29 March 2006**

The United Nations Security Council releases a Presidential Statement on Iran's nuclear program. The Presidential Statement notes with serious concern the many IAEA reports and resolutions related to Iran's nuclear program, reported to it by the IAEA Director-General, including the 4 February, IAEA Board Resolution. The statement also indicates serious concern vis-à-vis Iran's decision to resume enrichment-related activities, including research and development, and to suspend cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol. The Presidential statement concludes by calling on Iran to take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, and expresses the conviction that such suspension and full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guarantees Iran's nuclear program is for exclusively peaceful purposes. Furthermore, the Presidential statement requests in 30 days a report from the Director-General of the IAEA on the process of Iranian compliance with the steps required by the IAEA Board, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration.

—"Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2006/15," United Nations, 29 March 2006.

#### **4 April 2006**

United Nations nuclear inspectors are to arrive in Iran this week to visit sites including the Natanz uranium enrichment plant. The IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei is also set to join the inspection team to meet with Iranian officials for talks on confidence-building measures. On a separate but connected note, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Motaki told reporters that Iran was prepared to negotiate on the issue of large-scale enrichment but stressed that Iran would never abandon its right to enrich uranium.

—"Iran says ready to discuss Industrial Enrichment," Global Security Newswire, 4 April 2006; "Nuclear inspectors to visit Iran," BBC, 4 April 2006; "Iranian nuclear checks to start," BBC, 8 April 2006.

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#### **11 April 2006**

Addressing a ceremony attended by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, senior military officers, government officials and foreign dignitaries in the holy city of Mashhad, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization presents a 27-minute report on the country's nuclear program announcing that Iran has managed to enrich uranium to 3.5 percent. Adding that Iran had completed the production of the nuclear fuel cycle on the laboratory scale by successfully enriching uranium to 3.5 percent on 9 April, Mr. Aghazadeh further adds that this achievement paves the way for starting the process on an industrial scale in Iran and that Iran was trying to complete a 3,000 centrifuge complex by mid-March 2007.

—"FYI-Ahmadinejad, Aqazadeh Announce Iranian Success in Uranium Enrichment," Tehran Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network-in Persian, 11 April 2006, FBIS document IAP20060411011076; "Iran proclaims breakthrough in nuclear program," Global Security Newswire, 12 April 2006; Nazila Fathi, David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "Iran says it is making nuclear fuel, defying U.N.," *New York Times*, 12 April 2006.

#### **14 April 2006**

An Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) imagery brief shows the construction of a new tunnel entrance near the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan and continued construction at the Natanz uranium enrichment site.

—Paul Brannan and David Albright, "ISIS Imagery Brief: New Activities at the Esfahan and Natanz Nuclear Sites in Iran," Institute for Science and International Security, 14 April 2006.

#### **18 April 2006**

IAEA inspectors are set to take up the issue of P-2 centrifuges referenced in a speech delivered by President Ahmadinejad earlier this week. They will be meeting with Iranian authorities requesting further clarifications on the issue of "research and testing" of technology of an improved centrifuge design. Responding to President Ahmadinejad's assertion, Scott McClellan, the White House spokesman adds, "Undisclosed work on P-2 centrifuges would be a further violation of Iran's safeguard obligations, in addition to those that have already been identified by the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency."

—"Moscow hosts meeting on Iran crisis," *CNN*, 18 April 2006; "IAEA inspectors to press Iran's centrifuge claims," Global Security Newswire, 18 April 2006.

#### **19 April 2006**

Iran is elected to a leadership position at the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Mehdi Danesh-Yazdi, the deputy Iranian ambassador to the United Nations will take up his new role as one of three vice-chairpersons at the Commission.

—"Disarmament board chooses Iranian as vice chair," *Jerusalem Post*, 19 April 2006.

#### **21 April 2006**

Diplomats from the EU-3, France, Britain and Germany reject a suggestion from IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei that Iran pause its uranium enrichment efforts in an attempt to restart negotiations with the EU-3. Iran had previously spoken about a technical pause before putting in motion the next two cascades at Natanz, however, senior EU diplomats have rejected this notion as unacceptable and maintain that "a full suspension is the only way to resolve this."

—"EU powers reject plan for Iran enrichment pause," Global Security Newswire, 21 April 2006.

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#### **25 April 2006**

Iran tells the IAEA that it will refuse to answer questions about a second, secret uranium-enrichment program disclosed by President Ahamdinejad, in a speech earlier this month.

Iran's decision not to answer the IAEA's questions was conveyed directly to IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei.

—David E. Sanger and Nazila Fathi, "Iran is described as defiant on 2nd Nuclear Program," *New York Times*, 25 April 2006.

#### **25 April 2006**

Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator says his country will suspend contacts with the UN's nuclear watchdog if sanctions are imposed. He further adds "military actions against Iran will not lead to the closure of the program. If you take harsh measures, we will hide this program. Then you cannot solve the nuclear issue." On a separate but connected note, top Iranian nuclear officials are in Vienna to make a last-ditch effort at talks ahead of the anticipated IAEA report on the country's nuclear program.

— "Iran threatens to end UN contacts," BBC, 25 April 2006; "Top Iranian nuclear officials to hold talks at IAEA," Global Security Newswire, 25 April 2006.

#### **28 April 2006**

The IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei releases his report on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It states that Iran has ignored a UN Security Council demand to suspend all nuclear fuel enrichment activities. Furthermore, the report states that Iran had not given information on key issues and "after more than three years of agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear program, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern." The report further adds that "any progress in this regard requires full transparency and active cooperation by Iran." Also, the report states that Iran's decision to suspend its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol since February, has limited the Agency's ability to verify the absence of any undeclared nuclear activity.

—"Iran 'fails to heed nuclear call'," BBC, 28 April 2006; "IAEA says Iran defied U.N. Security Council," Global Security Newswire, 28 April 2006; "Report on Iran Nuclear Safeguards Sent to Agency's Board and UN Security Council," International Atomic Energy Agency, 28 April 2006.

#### **28 April 2006**

Addressing a gathering of people during a visit to the Zanjan Province in Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad adds, "the whole nation shouts that nuclear energy is Iran's undeniable right." He further adds, "those who want to deny the Iranian nation of its right through statements and resolutions should know that the people do not give a damn about such measures."

—"Iran does not 'give a damn' about resolution denying nuclear right," OSC feature, 28 April 2006, OSC Document FEA20060428022522.

#### **29 April 2006**

Iran says it is willing to resume the voluntary implementation of the additional protocol allowing snap inspections if its nuclear dossier is dropped by the Security Council and returned to the IAEA. Mohammad Saeedi, the deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization criticizing Dr. ElBaradei's report to the UNSC adds, "If the case returns to the agency again, we will begin the section that concerns the Additional Protocol." Mr. Saeedi further adds, "The enrichment will continue. But...we will continue implementing the Additional Protocol as a voluntary measure."

—"Iran says to allow inspections if U.N. drops case," *New York Times*, 29 April 2006; "Iran proposes return of Nuclear Dossier to IAEA," Global Security Newswire, 1 May 2006.

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### **1 May 2006**

The Iranian government allocates funds to finish the country's first nuclear power plant. Government spokesman Gholam-Hossein Elham adds that Tehran has earmarked \$243 million for the completion of the Bushehr reactor in southwest Iran. Bushehr is expected to come online in 2007.

—"Iran allocates funds to finish first nuclear power plant," Associated Press, 1 May 2006.

### **2 May 2006**

Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization says Iran has managed to enrich uranium up to 4.8 percent purity. Mr. Aghazadeh adds, "enrichment of more than five percent is not on Iran's agenda and this level suffices for making nuclear fuel."

—"Iran achieves higher uranium enrichment level," Agence France Presse, 2 May 2006; "Iran says it has enriched uranium to 4.8 percent," RIA-Novosti, 2 May 2006.

### **2 May 2006**

Iran says it has found uranium ore deposits at three new sites in the center of the country. Mohammad Ghannadi, Iran's deputy chief of nuclear research and technology while addressing a conference says, "we have got good news: the discovery of new economically viable deposits of uranium in central Iran." The new deposits are located at the Khoshoomi region, Charchooteh and Narigam.

—"Iran discovers new uranium deposits," Associated Press, 2 May 2006.

### **3 May 2006**

The United States, Britain and France draft a binding UN Security Council resolution requiring Iran to stop critical nuclear activities. Meanwhile, Russia and China have expressed reservations vis-à-vis the draft resolution. The resolution which has not been made public expresses "serious concern" vis-à-vis Iran's non-compliance with its international commitments.

—"U.S., EU craft U.N. resolution on Iranian nuclear program," Global Security Newswire, 3 May 2006; Elaine Sciolino, "U.S., Britain and France draft U.N. resolution on Iran's nuclear ambitions," *New York Times*, 3 May 2006.

### **7 May 2006**

Iran's parliament threatens to pull out of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if Western pressure over its program increases. The threat comes a day before key UN members are to discuss a binding draft resolution on Iran's nuclear issue.

—"Iran threat to quit atomic treaty," BBC, 7 May 2006.

### **8 May 2006**

In what represents the first direct communication from an Iranian head of state to an American president since 1979, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad writes to President Bush proposing "new solutions" to their differences. In an 18 page letter, while briefly touching upon the nuclear issue and remaining critical of U.S. foreign policy, President Ahmadinejad more broadly focuses on "new solutions for getting out of international problems and the current fragile situation of the world."

—"Ahmadinejad sends letter to Bush," BBC, 8 May 2006; Nasser Karimi, "Iran's leader writes to President Bush," Associated Press, 8 May 2006.

### **9 May 2006**

Choosing to delay a U.N. Security Council resolution to curb Iran's nuclear program, representatives of the United

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States, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany agree to present Iran with a choice of incentives or sanctions in deciding whether to suspend uranium enrichment. In what is being labeled as a package of "new idea" for Iran to consider, the new package does not include security guarantees and does not allow Iran to continue to enrich uranium but however, builds on previous economic and technical assistance incentives offered as part of earlier packages.

—Edith M. Lederer, "U.N. to present Iran Nuke Program Options," Associated Press, 9 May 2006; "West to offer Iran benefits or sanctions," Reuters, 10 May 2006.

#### **12 May 2006**

UN inspectors find new traces of highly enriched uranium on equipment in Iran. The samples of highly enriched uranium are allegedly from the former research center at Lavizan-Shian. Anonymous sources are quoted as saying that the purity of the obtained samples appear to be close to or above the level used to make nuclear warheads.

—"Diplomats: Enriched uranium found in Iran," *CNN*, 12 May 2006; "New HEU traces found in Iran," Global Security Newswire, 12 May 2006.

#### **15 May 2006**

The European Union offers to help Iran obtain the most advanced civilian nuclear technology if Iran halts work on uranium enrichment. In a package that has found support in the White House, Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief speaking to reporters, adds, "if they want to construct a nuclear energy power plant, they would have, in cooperation with the European Union and other members of the international community, the best and most sophisticated technology." Mr. Solana further adds, "if they reject that, it would mean that what they want is something different."

—Jonathan S. Landay and Matthew Schofield, "EU offers civilian nuclear technology to Iran," Knight Ridder Newspapers, 15 May 2006; Mark John, "EU to offer Iran best civil nuclear technology," Reuters, 16 May 2006.

#### **17 May 2006**

Iran's president rejects the latest offer from Europe to quit uranium enrichment in exchange for incentives including a light water reactor. Addressing a crowd in the central city of Arak, President Ahmadinejad adds, "your incentives are definitely not more valuable than nuclear technology," and "how dare you tell our people to give up its gold in return for chocolate."

—Nazila Fathi, "Iran rejects potential European incentives," *New York Times*, 10 May 2006; "Iran shuns EU 'reactor incentive'," BBC, 17 May 2006.

#### **18 May 2006**

Doubts emerge over the technical advancement of Iran's nuclear program over the alleged use of Chinese uranium hexafluoride in Iranian uranium enrichment. It is alleged that Iran's recent breakthrough in uranium enrichment, successfully producing 3.5 percent enriched uranium has been made possible through the use of Chinese supplied uranium hexafluoride that was sold to Iran by China back in 1991.

—"Iran enrichment: A Chinese puzzle," BBC, 18 May 2006.

#### **26 May 2006**

Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, Javad Zarif says Tehran wants to work directly with the United States on an "easily attainable" resolution, if Washington drops the "intimidation tactics." Ambassador Zarif further adds, "We are prepared to engage in serious discussion in order to resolve the issue, and we have not made any exception with regard to the United States."

—"Iran to U.S.: Stop bluster, let's talk," *CNN*, 26 May 2005.

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### **29 May 2006**

Mr. Sadat-Hosseini, an official in the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization says his country is "competing with the advanced world" in seeking to produce energy from nuclear fusion. He further adds, "Iran has done various fusion tests for research purposes at its Amirabad research reactor over the last few years."

— "Iran says research on nuclear fusion progressing," Reuters, 29 May 2006; Breffni O'Rourke, "Iran: Tehran says it is working on advanced nuclear fusion," Radio Free Europe, 30 May 2006.

### **31 May 2006**

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in what seems an apparent U.S. policy change vis-à-vis Iran, announces that the United States will join talks with Iran if Tehran suspends sensitive nuclear activities and permits more intrusive international inspections to resume. Secretary Rice adds, "to underscore our commitment to a diplomatic solution and to enhance the prospects of success, as soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United States will come to the table with our EU-3 colleagues and meet with Iran's representatives." Secretary Rice further adds that the move is meant to "give new energy" to a European effort to develop a package of incentives or potential punishments to convince Iran to pull back from a nuclear program that it insists as peaceful but which the U.S. has argued is a cover for developing nuclear weapons.

—Steven R. Weisman and John O'Neil, "Rice proposes path to talks with Iran on Nuclear Issue," *New York Times*, 31 May 2006; "U.S. willing to join Iran talks," Global Security Newswire, 31 May 2006.

### **1 June 2006**

Iran says it is ready to accept U.S. offer on talks on its nuclear activities but rejects the condition that it first suspend those efforts. Iran's foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki adds that Iran "will not give up its nation's right to enrichment, we will not hold talks over it. But we are ready to hold talks over mutual concerns."

—"Iran cautious over US talks offer," BBC, 1 June 2006; "Iran wants talks with U.S. but refuses nuclear freeze," Global Security Newswire, 1 June 2006.

### **2 June 2006**

The United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany have agreed to "substantive" incentives in an attempt to coax Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment. The package which is to be presented by the EU's foreign policy chief, Javier Solana to Iranian authorities outlines two paths, one for incentives and the other penalties based on response. The new package of incentives which has not been released to the public is expected to include: 1) the provision of light water nuclear reactors and enriched fuel; 2) support for Iranian membership of the World Trade Organization; 3) the lifting of restrictions on the use of US technology in agriculture, and 4) availability of spare parts for civilian aircraft made by US manufacturers. Iran allegedly has until the Group of Eight (G8) Summit in mid-July to consider the offer of incentives to suspend its nuclear enrichment program.

— "'Carrot-stick' deal agreed on Iran," *CNN*, 2 June 2006; "EU's Solana to present Iran with nuclear proposal," *CNN*, 5 June 2006; "Iran 'positive' on nuclear offer," BBC, 6 June 2006; Louis Charbonneau, "Iran has until July to consider atomic offer: Austria," Reuters, 9 June 2006.

### **8 June 2006**

The IAEA releases a report on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report details all developments in Iran since April 2006. The report inter alia notes that Iran has not responded to the Agency's request for clarifications concerning, and access to carry out environmental sampling of, other equipment and materials related to the Physics Research Center (PHRC), and that Iran has not provided any timetable to resolve outstanding issues. The report further notes that contrary to previous reports that Iran

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slowed uranium enrichment in May, Iran is presently installing more centrifuge machines and continuing enrichment work and has begun to enrich a second batch of uranium in its research plant at Natanz.

—"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, 8 June 2006; "Iran 'continuing enrichment work'," BBC, 9 May 2006. Alissa J. Rubin, "Iran starts 2nd Round of Enrichment," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 June 2006.

#### **12 June 2006**

Responding to the package of incentives offered to Iran, Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator says there are "problems and ambiguities" in the recent incentive package offered by the world's leading powers to persuade Iran to curb its nuclear program. He further adds that the offer of nuclear technology is a "positive point" but the key issue of uranium enrichment remains ambiguous. On a separate but connected note, responding to President George Bush's remarks that Iran had "weeks not months" to respond to the package, Hamid-Reza Asefi, Iran's foreign ministry spokesman says, "Iran would take "as long as necessary" before replying.

—Elaine Sciolino, "Iran seeks talks but rejects nuclear Freeze," *New York Times*, 12 June 2006; Gareth Smyth, "Iran sees 'problems' in offer to lure it off the nuclear path," *Financial Times*, 12 June 2006.

#### **12 June 2006**

The Daily Telegraph alleges that Iran is working on a secret military project to develop nuclear weapons that have not been declared to the United Nations inspectors responsible for monitoring Iran's nuclear program. Allegedly, the project is codenamed Zirzamin 27 and its purpose is to enable the Iranians to undertake uranium enrichment to military standard.

—Con Coughlin, "Iran accused of hiding secret nuclear weapons site," *Daily Telegraph*, 12 June 2006.

#### **15 June 2006**

Speaking at a gathering of officials from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke of the honorable and valuable move of the Iranian youth to access indigenous nuclear technology as a historical move contributing to promotion of civilization and urges that it should expand in various directions. He further adds that "any nation determined to build up its own destiny should seek such a key." Responding to Western pressure on trying to limit Iran's nuclear program, Khamenei adds that "Iran will not contend to such pressure. The growing trend of this scientific move is the major goal set by Iran."

—"Access to nuclear energy more important than exploration of oil in Iran," Fars News Agency, 15 June 2006.

#### **26 June 2006**

A confidential report on the technical assessment of Iran's nuclear program by IAEA Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei says that even small-scale enrichment will move Iran toward "successful long-term sustained centrifuge operation." The report further says that centrifuge experiments even without the introduction of uranium hexafluoride can help Iran learn about the "life expectancy ...of key mechanical components" and data "needed for the development of more advanced centrifuge systems."

—"IAEA issues assessment on Iran's nuclear activities," Global Security Newswire, 26 June 2006.

#### **12 July 2006**

Foreign Ministers from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany agree to refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council. The decision to refer Iran to the Security Council could lead to economic sanctions. John Bolton, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN says that the UN Security Council would work on a resolution demanding that Iran suspend all enrichment activities, as required by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

—"Iran referred to Security Council," BBC, 12 July 2006.

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### **24 July 2006**

Iran repeats its refusal to accept any preconditions for nuclear talks with the West. Iranian government spokesman Gholamhossein Elham says, "We are ready to discuss anything in negotiations...(but) we will not accept any preconditions." He further adds, "all parties should be on an equal standing on entering any negotiations, and that halting enrichment would mean Iran would not be in such a position." On a separate but connected note, Iran says it would formally respond on 22 August to a Western package of incentives aimed at resolving the standoff over its nuclear program.

—"Iran rejects talk preconditions," BBC, 24 July 2006; Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran says it will deliver response Aug. 22," Associated Press, 20 July 2006.

### **27 July 2006**

The United States sanctions two Indian firms for missile-related transactions with Iran. The two Indian firms have been sanctioned along with five other firms - two Russian firms, two North Korean firms, and one Cuban firm. All firms have been sanctioned for transferring to Iran equipment and/or technology on export control lists. Under the terms of the Iran-Syria Nonproliferation Act the firms will be barred from receiving U.S. government contracts, assistance, or military trade as well as certain controlled goods which have both civilian and military purposes.

— Carol Giacomo, "US sanctions two India firms for transfers to Iran," Reuters, 27 July 2006; "U.S. punishes 7 companies for Iran deals," *CNN*, 7 August 2006.

### **31 July 2006**

The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 1696 demanding Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities by 31 August. The resolution passes by 14 votes to one with Qatar the lone dissenter. The resolution states that an enrichment suspension, as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the IAEA Board of Governor's requirements, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guaranteed Iran's nuclear program was for exclusively peaceful purposes. The resolution further adds that in the case of Iranian non compliance "appropriate measures" under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations will be adopted to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, subject to further decisions.

—"Security Council Demands Iran Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August, or Face Possible Economic, Diplomatic Sanctions," Department of Public Information, United Nations, 31 July 2006.

### **2 August 2006**

Following the UN Security Council Resolution, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran would not bow to "the language of force and threats." He further adds, "The Iranian people see taking advantage of technology to produce nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes as their right."

—"Iran defiant on nuclear deadline," BBC, 2 August 2006; "Iran vows to produce nuclear fuel," Reuters, 2 August 2006.

### **6 August 2006**

The London *Sunday Times* alleges that Iran is seeking to import large consignments of bomb-making uranium from the Lubumbashi mines in Congo. It further adds that a UN report, dated 18 July, said there was "no doubt" that a huge shipment of smuggled uranium-238, uncovered by customs officials in Tanzania was transported from the Lubumbashi mines in the Congo. However, the UN report does mention that the interdicted uranium shipment was destined for smelting in the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan, delivered via Bandar Abbas, Iran's biggest port.

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—Jon Swain, David Leppard and Brian Johnson-Thomas, "Iran's plot to mine uranium in Africa," *The Sunday Times*, 6 August 2006; U.N. Report Claims Iran seeking African Uranium," *Global Security Newswire*, 7 August 2006.

#### **21 August 2006**

Deputy Director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Mohammad Sa'eedi says Iran's heavy water project will become operational in the near future. Furthermore, Mr. Sa'eedi adds that "considering the technical progress made by Iranian scientists in the nuclear ground, suspension of uranium enrichment has now turned practically impossible."

— "Nuclear Official: Iran's Heavy Water Project to be Commissioned Soon," *Fars News Agency*, 21 August 2006.

#### **21 August 2006**

According to Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, "the Islamic republic of Iran has made its own decisions and in the nuclear case, God willing, with patience and power, will continue its path." This televised announcement comes on the eve of Tehran's self-imposed August 22nd deadline to respond to an incentives package offered by the United Nations (UN) in exchange for Iranian suspension of its enrichment activities. Consequently, Iran has turned away UN inspectors vying to observe ongoing efforts in the main nuclear facility in Natanz.

—"Iran will continue pursuing nuclear technology, supreme leader says," *USA Today*, 21 August 2006.

#### **21 August 2006**

Iran denies access to IAEA inspectors seeking to visit the Natanz enrichment facility. In a separate but connected issue, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says, "the Islamic Republic of Iran has made its own decision and in the nuclear case, God willing, with patience and power, will continue in its path."

—George Jahn, "Iran Denies Inspectors Access to Site," *Associated Press*, 21 August 2006; "Iran turns away IAEA Inspectors," *Global Security Newswire*, 21 August 2006.

#### **22 August 2006**

Iran formally submits a written response to the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany a proposal to resolve the Iranian nuclear crises. The response, which is 21 pages long, offers a "new formula" for discussions. While being comprehensive in content, the response does ask some ambiguities to be removed vis-à-vis the Western offer. The response offering to enter "serious negotiations," however, rejects the only condition set by the United States and its Western allies for talks on the country's nuclear program and insists Iran will continue uranium enrichment.

—"Iran formally rejects demand to suspend enrichment program," *Global Security Newswire*, 22 August 2006; "Iran offers West 'serious' talks," *BBC*, 22 August 2006.

#### **23 August 2006**

Atomstroyexport and Iran's Atomic Energy Organization discuss the implementation of the Bushehr nuclear power plant construction schedule. The talks touch upon equipment deliveries, start-up operations, and the training of personnel, as well as the production of nuclear power plant equipment directly in Iranian enterprises.

—"Atomstroieport, Iran's AEO discuss Bushehr NPP construction," *RIA-Novosti*, 23 August 2006.

#### **23 August 2006**

A staff report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to the Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, titled "Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States" discusses Iran's nuclear program, weapons development and proliferation, and active support for radical Islamist terror groups. The report further critiques U.S. intelligence on Iran, charging the CIA and other agencies on lacking "the

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ability to acquire essential information necessary to make judgments on essential topics, recognized as essential to U.S. national security."

—"Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States," U.S. House of Representatives-Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 23 August 2006.

#### **24 August 2006**

The U.S. says Iran's response "falls short" of the United Nations demands and is "consulting closely" with members of the United Nations Security Council over its next steps. Russia and China express their reservations vis-à-vis sanctions on Iran.

—Helene Cooper, "U.S. says Iranian Nuclear Proposal is Inadequate," *New York Times*, 24 August 2006.

#### **25 August 2006**

The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group and the political wing of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, alleges that Iran has built 15 advanced uranium centrifuges of the P-2 type and will have hundreds more by next year.

—Craig S. Smith, "Foes say Tehran builds Fast Uranium Centrifuges," *New York Times*, 25 August 2006; Yossi Melman, "Dissident group: Tehran producing centrifuges to enrich uranium," *Haaretz*, 24 August 2006.

#### **26 August 2006**

Iran's president Mahmoud Ahamadinejad inaugurates a heavy water production plant at Arak. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi says the establishment of the Arak Heavy Water Plant is in full compliance with international rules and regulations, for use in peaceful domains.

—"Iran nuclear project forges ahead," BBC, 26 August 2006.

#### **29 August 2006**

Japan's Mitutoyo Corp. is under investigation for allegedly exporting sophisticated measuring devices under a falsified name to Iran's Pars Switch Co. in 1997. The sophisticated measuring devices known as coordinate measuring machines, allow mechanical parts to be manufactured to very precise specifications and can be used for the manufacture of specialized equipment, such as centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

—"Martin Fackler, "Japanese Company Suspected of Selling Nuclear Equipment to Iran," *New York Times*, 29 August 2006; "Name faked for nuclear-related export: Mitutoyo sold gear to Iranian company with possible WMD aims," *Japan Times*, 29 August 2006.

#### **31 August 2006**

IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei releases his report on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report states that Iran has ignored a UN Security Council resolution to suspend all enrichment related activities. The report also states that while Iran has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol, it has been providing the IAEA with the required reports and continues to comply with basic, mandatory inspections of nuclear material and facilities. This latest report maintains that the Agency remains committed to pursue all remaining outstanding issues and as a result is still unable to verify the absence of any undeclared nuclear activity. The report also points to a new development vis-à-vis the discovery of highly enriched uranium particles from storage containers located at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility.

—"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, 31 August 2006.

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### **8 September 2006**

Sergei Kiriyenko, head of Russia's Atomic Energy Agency says Iran's Bushehr reactor is scheduled to come online in September 2007. "A realistic deadline (for transmitting power to the grid) is November 2007. This means a physical start-up (of the reactor) in September and the dispatch of fuel...six months earlier."

—"Iran's Russia-built atomic plant to start up Sept '07," Reuters, 8 September 2006.

### **9 September 2006**

The first day of talks between European Union foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, and top Iranian nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, has been constructive. The two representatives will reconvene tomorrow to discuss negotiation points for possible talks among Iran, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and Germany. Also in Europe to meet with leaders regarding Iranian defiance, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao reiterates that the purpose of assembling is that the nuclear issue of Iran will be settled peacefully.

—"EU's Solana meets with top Iranian negotiator on Iranian nuclear defiance," Associated Press, 9 September 2006.

### **11 September 2006**

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Chief Mohammed El Baradei warns that should the United Nations Security Council impose economic sanctions on Iran in response to its continuing nuclear defiance, Tehran may ban future inspections by the IAEA. Addressing the 35-nation IAEA board of governors, El Baradei also reports that he remains hopeful despite the apparent impasse reached with Tehran and his agency's inspectors in light of Iranian leaders' consideration of a temporary ceasing of enrichment activities.

—"Iran considering suspending uranium enrichment for up to two months, diplomats say," Associated Press, 11 September 2006.

### **11 September 2006**

Following talks with EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana, Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator hints that Iran might be ready to temporarily accede to a UN Security Council demand to freeze all uranium enrichment activities. Allegedly, Mr. Larijani has offered a two month voluntary suspension of Iran's nuclear enrichment activities, provided there is no pressure. The details as to the timing of this voluntary suspension, whether before or after negotiations begin is yet uncertain.

—Mark Heinrich, "WRAPUP9-Iran offers 2-month atomic enrichment halt-diplomat," Reuters, 11 September 2006; "Iran indicates possibility of nuclear freeze," Global Security Newswire, 11 September 2006.

### **14 September 2006**

In a letter addressed to Peter Hoekstra, Chairman of the House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Vilmos Cserveny, the IAEA's Director of External Relations critiques the Staff Report of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Intelligence Policy, dated August 23, 2006, entitled "Recognizing Iran as a Strategic Threat: An Intelligence Challenge for the United States." In his letter, Mr. Cserveny points out that the claim in the Staff Report, vis-à-vis Iran enriching uranium to weapons grade is incorrect and furthermore, the IAEA Secretariat takes strong exception to the incorrect and misleading assertion that the Director General of the IAEA decided to remove Mr. Charlier, a senior safeguards inspector of the IAEA for "not having adhered to an unstated IAEA policy barring IAEA officials from telling the whole truth about the Iranian nuclear program."

—Dafna Linzer, "U.N. Inspectors dispute Iran Report by House Panel," *Washington Post*, 14 September 2006.

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#### **14 September 2006**

The *Washington Post* claims that Iran may be experimenting with the enrichment of uranium using laser technology. According to Alireza Jafarzadeh, who heads the Washington-based Strategic Policy Consulting Inc., an Iranian opposition group, says that Iran is secretly conducting laser enrichment activities at Lashkar Ab'ad and is using "every possibility that is available to them to rush to the bomb."

—Edith M. Lederer, "Opposition: Iran Using Laser Enrichment," *Washington Post*, 14 September 2006.

#### **15 September 2006**

French President Jacques Chirac says referring Iran to the UN Security Council is not the best way to resolve a crisis. Suggesting that the best way forward for negotiations is to begin negotiations without any preconditions, and to make concessions once negotiations are underway, President Chirac indicates that he is in favor of a fruitful dialogue between Iran and the P5+1 nations (U.S., U.K., France, Britain, China, Russia and Germany) currently involved over the Iran nuclear issue.

—"Chirac urges no sanctions on Iran," BBC, 15 September 2006.

#### **18 September 2006**

Iran warns that should the United Nations Security Council take action against it, it will no longer cooperate with UN nuclear inspectors. In an address at a general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iranian Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh urges that an agreement is accessible through negotiation, relying on good faith, political will and flexibility." Aghazadeh claims that his country is fighting on behalf of fellow developing country signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) against powers seeking to quell the undisputable right to peacefully acquire nuclear energy. The Head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency's statements follow renewed movement by the Security Council to implement sanctions as punishment for Tehran failing to meet the August 31st deadline to stall its uranium enrichment.

—"Iran warns it will cut cooperation with UN nuclear inspectors," Agence France Presse, 18 September 2006.

#### **20 September 2006**

In talks with French President Jacques Chirac at the UN General Assembly in New York, President Bush agrees to put on hold a push for UNSC sanctions giving the EU-3 (France, Britain, and Germany) more time to persuade Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and resume negotiations over its nuclear program. Also, at the same venue, addressing directly Iranian citizens in his UN General Assembly Speech, President Bush says, "The United States respects you; we respect your country...You deserve the opportunity to determine your own future...Despite what the regime tells you, we have no objection to Iran's pursuit of a truly peaceful nuclear power program. We're working toward a diplomatic solution to this crisis."

—"Bush, Ahmadinejad Spar at the UN," Global Security Newswire, 20 September 2006; Guy Dinmore, Mark Turner and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, "US aggress to delay Iran sanctions," *Financial Times*, 20 September 2006.

#### **20 September 2006**

The U.S. Department of Defense downplays recent reports that it is actively developing plans to go to war with Iran. Pentagon Spokesman Bryan Whitman says, "We're going to approach the concerns that we and the international community have with Iran diplomatically."

—"Pentagon Quiet on Iran War Plans," Global Security Newswire, 20 September 2006.

#### **21 September 2006**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran is prepared to negotiate a suspension of its most sensitive nuclear work if it receives fair guarantees in talks with major powers. Indicating no timeframe, President

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Ahmadinejad says, "We have said that under fair and just conditions we will negotiate about it." Mr. Ahmadinejad further adds that the talks by EU Foreign Policy chief Javier Solana on negotiating a formula for beginning negotiations are moving in the right direction and is a constructive path to take.

—Paul Taylor and Carol Giacomo, "Iran could halt nuclear enrichment: President," Reuters, 21 September 2006.

#### **21 September 2006**

Following Iranian intransigence over suspending its enrichment activities, the P5+1 nations have decided to set another deadline for Iran to agree to terms, paving the way for further substantive talks on its nuclear program. The new deadline, the fourth in four months is tentatively set for around the first week of October.

—Glenn Kessler, "Early October New Deadline for Iran," *Washington Post*, 21 September 2006.

#### **26 September 2006**

In Moscow, Iranian Vice-President and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh says, the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Project has only 7-8 percent work remaining and is scheduled to be completed in six months. In a separate statement, Mohammad Sa'eedi, the Deputy Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) has stressed the need for the construction process of the Bushehr project to be accelerated through increasing the work shifts to three.

—"Aghazadeh: Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant should be implemented in 6 Months," Islamic Republic News Agency, 25 September 2006; "Construction of Bushehr Power Plant Accelerated," Fars News Agency, 26 September 2006.

#### **26 September 2006**

In an agreement signed between Sergei Shmatko, head of Russia's state-run company Atomstroyexport, and Mahmoud Hanatian, vice-president of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Russia agrees to ship about 80 tons of fuel to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant project by March 2007.

—"Russia Agrees to Send Fuel for Nuclear Power Plant," Associated Press, 26 September 2006; "Russia to deliver 80 tons of fuel to Iran NPP-Atomstroieexport," RIA-Novosti, 26 September 2006.

#### **26 September 2006**

Amid speculation ahead of the meeting of Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and E.U. Foreign Policy chief, Javier Solana in Berlin, the deputy-head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Mohammad Sa'eedi says, "the imposition of a three-month moratorium on uranium enrichment will not be discussed during the upcoming talks." This statement follows an alleged report in the *Washington Times*, indicating that Iran is close to an agreement that would include a 90-day suspension of uranium enrichment but wants the deal to include a provision that the temporary halt be kept secret.

—"Iran, EU will not discuss uranium enrichment moratorium," RIA-Novosti, 26 September 2006; Bill Gertz, "Iran close to nuclear suspension," *Washington Times*, 26 September 2006.

#### **28 September 2006**

Two days of talks between Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and EU foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, come to a close without any agreement over Iran's nuclear program. Indicating that the negotiations produced "some possible conclusions," Larijani says that "we hope to be able to embark on the main negotiations as soon as possible."

—"EU-Iran Nuclear Talks End," Global Security Newswire, 28 September 2006; "No Nuclear Deal at EU-Iran Talks," BBC, 28 September 2006.

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### **29 September 2006**

A letter from 1988 by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, recently made public, indicates that Iran was mulling over the need for a nuclear bomb to win the war against Iraq. The letter, which has been made public by former Iranian President Rafsanjani, lists the requirements of military commanders during the war with Iraq. It mentions that Iran would need within five years laser guided and atomic weapons in order to win the war with Iraq.

—Frances Harrison, "Iran mulled nuclear bomb in 1988," BBC, 29 September 2006.

### **2 October 2006**

President Bush signs a new law that imposes economic sanctions against nations and companies that aid Iran's nuclear program. The Iran Freedom Support Act says that the United States should "not bring into force an agreement of cooperation with the government of any country that is assisting the nuclear program of Iran or transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles." The president's signature follows the 28 September house vote on the Iran Freedom Support Act (H.R. 6198).

—"Bush Signs Iran Sanctions Law," Global Security Newswire, 2006.

### **3 October 2006**

Iran suggests that France monitor its nuclear program by setting up a nuclear fuel consortium inside Iran. Speaking on French radio, Mohammad Sa'eedi, the deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization says, "We propose to France to create a consortium for the production of enriched uranium in Iran...That way France... could control in a tangible way our enrichment activities."

—"Iran pushes France nuclear deal," BBC, 3 October 2006.

### **3 October 2006**

The French government rejects the offer made by Iran for France to manage a nuclear fuel consortium in Iran. Addressing reporters, French Foreign Ministry Spokesman Jean-Baptiste Mattei says, "there is a channel of dialogue with the Iranians," that must pass through the EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana. Mr. Mattei further adds, "it's through this channel that we await a response from the Iranians on the suspension" of uranium enrichment, as demanded by the UN Security Council.

—"France Rejects Iran Nuclear Partnership Proposal," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 3 September 2006; "Iran pushes France nuclear deal," BBC, 3 October 2006.

### **4 October 2006**

Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad orders nuclear facilities opened to foreign tourists to prove that the nation's disputed atomic program is peaceful. The presidential order includes opening up the Natanz uranium enrichment facility to tourist visits.

—"Iran: Foreign tourists welcome at nuclear sites," *MSNBC*, 4 October 2006.

### **4 October 2006**

Russia's Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov meets with Iranian National Security Council Secretary and Chief Nuclear Negotiator, Ali Larijani in Tehran, to discuss a diplomatic solution to the standoff over Iran's nuclear program.

—"Iran says Russia may help resolve Nuclear Standoff," *MosNews*, 4 October 2006.

### **6 October 2006**

The United States, Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany are to meet in London to discuss which punitive

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actions to include in a new UN resolution over Iran's nuclear program. Washington and London favor immediate punitive sanctions, but in order to win over Russia and China, they are believed to be considering a series of low-level sanctions as a first step.

—Robin Wright, "World Powers to Discuss Sanctions Against Iran Over Nuclear Program," *Washington Post*, 6 October 2006; "Powers to mull Iran censure plan," BBC, 6 October 2006.

#### **8 October 2006**

Following the meeting of the P5+1 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) in London to discuss possible sanctions, Iran refuses to suspend its uranium enrichment program. Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mohammad Ali Hosseini says, "suspension is completely unacceptable and the threat of sanctions is an inefficient means to achieve a solution."

—"Iran rejects six nations' demands," BBC, 8 October 2006.

#### **11 October 2006**

Iran and Indonesia plan to discuss cooperation in the nuclear field for non-military purposes during the upcoming visit of Indonesian Vice-President Jusuf Kalla to Iran.

—"Iran and Indonesia to discuss nuclear cooperation," Associated Press, 11 October 2006.

#### **11 October 2006**

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defends Iran's nuclear right saying that Iran will continue developing nuclear technology. Iranian state television quotes him as saying, "Our policy is clear, progress with clear logic and insisting on nation's right without any retreat." Commenting on the suspension of Iran's enrichment program, Ayatollah Khamenei, is further quoted as saying "now with steady heart and full confidence we press ahead and nobody can give a good reason that the nuclear path is wrong for the country."

—"Khamenei defends nuclear 'right'," BBC, 11 October 2006.

#### **11 October 2006**

Senior diplomats from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany fail to reach a decision over Iran's nuclear program. While there is general agreement that the Security Council must take some action against Iran, disagreements persist over specific measures that should be part of a resolution. While Washington insists on broad sanctions, such as a total ban on nuclear and missile technology sales, Russia, China, and to a large extent the EU-3, favor softer measures.

—"World Powers Meet, Disagree on Iran," Global Security Newswire, 11 October 2006.

#### **12 October 2006**

Following France's rejection of Iran's proposal to form a nuclear fuel consortium in Iran, Iran's ambassador to Paris, Ali Ahani says Iran invites companies from all over the world to participate in the formation of the nuclear fuel consortium in Iran. Indicating that the initiative is part of a measure to settle the standoff over Iran's nuclear program, Ahani adds, that Iran has been in talks with French nuclear companies Areva and Eurodif.

—"Iran's new nuclear proposal open to all companies: Envoy," Islamic Republic News Agency, 12 October 2006.

#### **18 October 2006**

Diplomats at the UN are working on a resolution proposing sanctions on Iran over its refusal to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. Officials from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are believed to be working on the draft resolution which is due to be introduced to the UN Security Council in the coming week.

—"UN envoys work on Iran resolution," BBC, 18 October 2006.

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#### **18 October 2006**

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani says European states would be losers if they joined the United States to push through a UN Security Council resolution on Iran. Commenting on the European Union's move towards UN sanctions against Iran, Larijani says, "If the other side (the EU) yields to American pressure, it is natural that the situation will become radical. The world will not end but it will affect all our cooperation, in which I figure the other side, will lose more." Mr. Larijani further adds, "Definitely, if a new resolution is issued by the Security Council, we will not be at the point that we are in now for the continuation of talks." Also, in a connected statement, Iranian lawmaker Hamidreza Haji Babaie says, "If any sanction against Iran is ratified, parliament will oblige the government to have minimum cooperation with the IAEA."

—"Iran to EU: you will lose if you back U.N. sanctions," Reuters, 18 October 2006.

#### **18 October 2006**

Following the European Union's agreement to support sanctions on Iran, the proposed draft includes an exemption from sanctions for Russia's Bushehr project in Iran. The move comes in order to reduce potential Russian opposition to a sanctions resolution and to ensure Russia goes along with the draft text.

—"Draft Sanctions against Iran Could Be Ready This Week; Russia to get Exemption for Bushehr," Global Security Newswire, 18 October 2006.

#### **18 October 2006**

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov says international response to Iran's controversial nuclear program should be based on reports by the IAEA. Mr. Lavrov adds, "It is necessary to influence Iran, but actions must be commensurate with what is really happening there. And what is happening there is clear from reports by the IAEA, which mentions no threats to peace and security, but insists on compromise through talks." In a separate statement Russia's deputy foreign minister, Sergey Kislyak says, U.S. refusal to lift sanctions imposed under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 against two Russian companies, Sukhoi and Rosoboronexport, will not affect Russia's cooperation in resolving the dispute over Iran's nuclear program.

—"Action on Iran must be based on IAEA reports Russian FM," RIA-Novosti, 18 October 2006; "U.S. Refusal to Lift Sanctions on Russian Firms will not affect cooperation on Iran, official says," Associated Press, 18 October 2006.

#### **23 October 2006**

Iran launches a second cascade of 164-centrifuges at its pilot fuel enrichment plant. Iran appears to be vacuum testing the second cascade to assess durability and has not introduced any UF<sub>6</sub> gas (uranium hexafluoride) into this cascade.

—Mark Heinrich, "Exclusive-Iran expands nuclear centrifuge programme-diplomats," Reuters, 23 October 2006.

#### **24 October 2006**

Iranian officials including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and chief Iranian envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency Ali Ashgar Soltanieh press that their nations' uranium enrichment activities are successfully expanding in the background of United Nations Security Council deliberation on possible sanctions. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov still remains hopeful that a real chance for negotiated settlement without sanctions exists.

—"Diplomats: Iran testing new set of equipment for uranium enrichment," Associated Press, 24 October 2006.

#### **25 October 2006**

The United Kingdom, France, and Germany circulate their own draft resolution imposing nuclear and missile

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related sanctions on Iran. The circulation of the draft resolution by the EU-3 comes after failing to reach agreement with the United States over the inclusion of an exemption for Russia's Bushehr project in Iran. The draft resolution also puts a halt to overseas financial transactions and travel by Iranians involved in the nuclear program, except for certain humanitarian-related trips. Furthermore, the draft resolution limits the nuclear related technical assistance to Iran by the IAEA to, "medical or humanitarian purposes" or "safety standards."

—Carol Giacomo and Arshad Mohammed, "Europeans move Iran resolution without U.S.," *Washington Post*, 25 October 2006.

#### **27 October 2006**

Reacting to unsubstantiated reports, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov says, that he is not worried that Iran could acquire weapons grade uranium. Ivanov adds, "Iran has launched a second cascade of centrifuges, and this process is fully controlled by the IAEA." Commenting that it is premature to talk about uranium enrichment in Iran, Mr. Ivanov, further adds, that the centrifuges are working in a test mode and are not being used to enrich uranium. Also, in a separate statement, responding to rumors about a possible delay in the completion of the Bushehr power plant project in Iran, the deputy head of Russia's Atomstroyexport, Alexander Glukhov says, the Bushehr nuclear power plant is on schedule to come online in late 2007, and will be brought to full capacity in summer 2008.

—"Russia dismisses fears of Iran's arms-grade uranium," RIA-Novosti, 27 October 2006; "Atomstroieport expects to complete Bushehr NPP in Iran on time," RIA-Novosti, 26 October 2006.

#### **8 November 2006**

Russia has amended the United Nations Security Council's first draft proposing sanctions on Iran to exclude all references to the Bushehr nuclear power plant that it is providing equipment and experts to help build.

—"Moscow presents West with list of watered-down sanctions on Iran," *International Herald Tribune*, 8 November 2006.

#### **23 November 2006**

Speaking before the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governor's conference, Director-General Mohammed El Baradei claims that, 'there are still several issues that need to be clarified to enable us to say that there is no undeclared nuclear activity underway in Iran.' The IAEA head's statements come after receiving a letter signed by head Iranian nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, indicating his nation's intention to compromise with the nuclear watchdog on future monitoring efforts. El Baradei shows his optimism, 'I am confident that by such an approach Iran's nuclear issue as well as regional security, economic problems and other difficulties facing it will be solved.'

—"El Baradei approves of Iran's recent response to IAEA call," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 24 November 2006.

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## **2005**

#### **5 January 2005**

Iran agrees to allow IAEA inspectors to visit the secret military site of Parchin. Inspectors are on standby to visit the plant "within days or weeks" according to IAEA head ElBaradei. U.S. officials allege that a secret annex at the site may be used for researching high explosives.

—"Iran to Allow Military Site Probe," *BBC*, 5 January 2005.

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#### **5 January 2005**

Iran's deal with Russia to start up the Bushehr nuclear plant has been delayed over Russian insistence on payment for spent fuel. Russia's civil nuclear industry negotiates commercial agreements to re-import and dispose of spent fuel sold to clients. Bushehr is scheduled to be launched in early 2006, prior to which the fuel agreement must be signed.

—"Iran Nuclear Fuel Deal Stalled Over Fee: Russia," Reuters, 5 January 2005.

#### **10 January 2005**

Hossein Mousavian, a senior Iranian security official, has stated that Tehran may resume uranium enrichment in March if EU talks "fail to yield satisfactory progress." Regardless, Mousavian states that Iran will consider extending the enrichment freeze only until June and that the nuclear fuel cycle work would never be scrapped. However, "we are fully prepared for a comprehensive arrangement to give all assurances that Iran will not seek nuclear bombs."

—Parisa Hafezi, "Iran May Resume Uranium Enrichment in March," Reuters, 10 January 2005.

#### **11 January 2005**

MP Kazem Jalali, rapporteur of the Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, counts Iran's membership in the IAEA nuclear fuel cycle group as "one of the achievements Iran has gained from negotiations with Europe." He stresses Iran's potential effectiveness as part of this group.

—"Iran's Membership in Nuclear Fuel Cycle Group Important: MP," *Tehran Times*, 11 January 2005.

#### **11 January 2005**

The European Commission has declared the EU's preparedness to resume trade talks with Iran this week, pursuant to Tehran's suspension of uranium enrichment activities.

—"EU and Iran to Resume Talks After Nuclear Deal," Agence France Presse, 11 January 2005.

#### **11 January 2005**

Iranian-born businessman Mohammed Farabakhsh is accused of illegally sending pressure sensors and other equipment to the United Arab Emirates, to be transshipped to Iran in support of its nuclear missile program. Federal searches revealed the shipments were destined for Iran's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which has been sanctioned twice already by the United States.

—Matt Apuzzo, "Businessman Charged by Feds With Aiding Iran Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 11 January 2005.

#### **13 January 2005**

IAEA inspectors arrive at the Parchin base near Tehran. Hossein Mousavian, a member of Iran's nuclear negotiations team, stresses the inspectors' partial access to the site: "It is not necessary for the inspectors to enter the installations. They are authorized to take samples outside (the buildings) using their equipment."

—"UN Monitors to Inspect Iran Site," BBC, 13 January 2005.

#### **17 January 2005**

Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh suggests that U.S. commandos are in Iran selecting sites such as nuclear and missile installations for future air strikes; his intelligence sources point to Iran as the Bush administration's "next strategic target." The White House has countered that Hersh's article, published in the *New Yorker* magazine, is "riddled with inaccuracies." Pentagon spokesman Larry DiRita said of Hersh's article that his "sources feed him with rumor, innuendo, and assertions about meetings that never happened, programs that do not exist, and statements by officials that were never made." Pakistan's Foreign Ministry spokesman has denied Hersh's allegation that U.S.

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Special Forces have been working with Pakistani scientists with Iranian contacts.

—"U.S. Special Forces 'Inside Iran'," BBC, 17 January 2005; "Report Says Pentagon Denies U.S. Plans to Strike Iran," Agence France-Presse.

#### **17 January 2005**

In an NBC news interview, President Bush states that military action against Iran remains an option "if it continues to stonewall the international community about the existence of its nuclear weapons program."

—"Bush Won't Rule Out Action Against Iran Over Nukes," Reuters, 17 January 2005.

#### **18 January 2005**

Ali Aghamohammadi, spokesman for Iran's Supreme National Security Council, dismisses the reports of U.S. commandos carrying out reconnaissance missions on Iranian territory as "psychological warfare." The *Teheran Times* referred to the story as a "ridiculous bluff." Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani earlier stated that Iran did not fear attack, "we can claim that we have rapidly produced equipment that has resulted in the greatest deterrent." IRNA quotes former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as saying "We are not afraid of foreign enemies' threats and sanctions, since they know well that throughout its Islamic and ancient history, Iran has been no place for adventurism." The Mehr news agency, with ties to Ali Khamenei, boasts that Iran "is prepared to attack any intruder with a fearsome rain of fire and death."

—"Iran Reject U.S. Operations Claims," BBC, 18 January 2005; Paul Hughes, "Iran Says Has Military Might to Deter Any Attack," Reuters, 18 January 2005; Nazila Fathi, "Iran, Calling Bush's Words 'Threats,' Says It Is Not Intimidated," *New York Times*, 19 January 2005.

#### **18 January 2005**

Diplomatic sources reveal that IAEA inspectors are pushing to return to the Parchin military complex to retrieve further samples. They have been granted only limited access to the site thus far.

—Louis Charbonneau, "UN Wants to Visit Iran Military Site Again - Diplomats," Reuters, 18 January 2005.

#### **19 January 2005**

Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi has accused the United States of being determined "not to help and encourage the constructive nuclear negotiations between Iran and the EU" and urged incoming Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to review "the false and failed policies of the United States and avoid making the same mistakes."

—"Iran Accuses U.S. of Seeking to Disrupt Nuke Talks," Reuters, 19 January 2005.

#### **19 January 2005**

Iranian First Vice-President Mohammad Reza Aref stresses Iran's lack of a hidden agenda in its pursuit of nuclear technology, reiterating that Iran will never forego its legitimate right to peaceful nuclear technological development. Aref suggests that the United States realizes Iran's "religious beliefs does not allow it to have weapons of mass destruction."

—"West Using Political Approach Towards Iran's Nuclear Program: Aref," IRNA, 19 January 2005.

#### **20 January 2005**

Mostafa T. Zahrani, director general of the Institute for Political and International Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, noted at an international seminar on "Russian-Iranian Energy Cooperation and the Issue of Nonproliferation" in Moscow that "Iran has always acquired through legal paths that which it could buy legally. However, in the situation where the very existence of Iran was threatened, Iran also acquired things on the black

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market. Perhaps this was illegal, but we were forced into it. We have no wish to do anything illegal." Aleksandr M. Afrov, vice-president for Atomstroyeksport, commented on the Bushehr nuclear power project in Iran and attendant negotiations for the delivery of fresh nuclear fuel and return of spent fuel to Russia. "The fuel is ready, the distributor is in possession of it. At the station, everything is ready for its arrival. In accordance with the contract, the fuel should be delivered six months before the first criticality, that is in September-October 2005. The sides have already agreed on the issue of the return of the fuel, only the price needs to be agreed to, and will be agreed to in the near future."

—"PIR Center Hot News: Nuclear Iran," [pircenter.org](http://pircenter.org), 20 January 2005.

#### **20 January 2005**

Iranian President Mohammed Khatami considers the likelihood of a U.S. attack "very negligible," but says Iran is nevertheless maintaining "full vigilance."

—"U.S. Attack 'Madness,' Says Khatami," BBC, 20 January 2005.

#### **20 January 2005**

Appearing on a morning MSNBC program, U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney notes that Iran is "right at the top of the list" of the Bush administration's list of trouble spots worldwide and raised the specter of a preemptive Israeli attack on Iran "if the Israelis became convinced the Iranians had significant nuclear capability." He adds that the United States hoped to avoid a war in the Middle East, and that diplomatic means were preferable to potential alternatives. U.S. officials and foreign diplomats suggest that the heightened rhetoric is designed to get the attention of Iranian officials.

—David E. Sanger, "Cheney Says Israel Might 'Act First' on Iran," BBC, 21 January 2005; Adam Entous, "Cheney Says Iran Tops U.S. List of Trouble Spots," Reuters, 21 January 2005; Paul Richter, "U.S. Adds Israel to the Iran Equation," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 January 2005.

#### **21 January 2005**

Responding to Washington's recent ratcheting up of rhetoric, Iranian ambassador to Britain Mohammad Hossein Adeli declares to BBC radio that "despite irregularities in the past" Iran is now committed to a cooperative stance with the IAEA. Adeli stressed Iran's right to develop nuclear technology while accusing the United States of "false accusations."

—"U.S. Attack Would Destabilize World: Iran Diplomat," IranMania, 21 January 2005.

#### **24 January 2005**

Testifying before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Mossad Chief Meir Dagan asserts that Iran's nuclear program is almost at the "point of no return" and could build a bomb in less than three years. Vice Premier Shimon Peres refers to Iran as the world's single most serious threat but declares that "the United States...must decide, not us. If we go it alone, we will end up alone. Everyone knows our potential but we also have to know our limits."

—Nina Gilbert and JPost Staff, "Iran Nuke Program Nearly Self-Sufficient," *Jerusalem Post*, 24 January 2005; "Mossad Warning Over Nuclear Iran," BBC, 24 January 2005.

#### **24 January 2005**

Hossein Mousavian, a chief Iranian nuclear negotiator, has allowed for the possibility of permitting IAEA inspectors to return to Parchin for further environmental samples.

—"Iran May Allow UN New Visit to Military Base - Report," Reuters, 24 January 2005.

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### **24 January 2005**

Iran's nuclear head Gholamreza Aghazadeh announces the inauguration of a uranium ore concentrate production plant near Bandar Abbas within a year, to be named the Bandar Abbas Yellowcake Production Plant.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran to Inaugurate Uranium Ore Concentrate Production Plant Within a Year," Associated Press, 24 January 2005.

### **31 January 2005**

Citing classified SAVAK documents contained in a recently published book, the author [Khamene'i's representative at the Kayhan Institute] bemoans the changed attitudes of Israel and the United States vis-à-vis Iranian nuclear activities. The documents evidently indicate a complete lack of opposition during the time of the Shah, even going as far as to suggest an Iranian army equipped with nuclear weapons.

—Hoseyn Shari'atmadari, "Daily Views Changed Stance of Israel Regarding Iran's Nuclear Activities," *Kayhan* (Tehran), 31 January 2005.

### **31 January 2005**

Mr. Aqamohammadi, head of the Supreme National Security Council publicity committee, declares that Iran "will never accept total suspension of uranium enrichment" and that the negotiations currently underway are to define the guarantees "so that we can have the fuel cycle and this process can take its proper course." In Brussels, Gholamreza Aqazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, adds that it is "necessary for Europe to do its best to ensure that we reach a clear result in the nuclear negotiations."

—"Iran: Nuclear Official Says Cessation of Uranium Enrichment Unacceptable," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 31 January 2005; "Iranian Nuclear Chief Says EU 'Must Be More Serious' in Talks, Iranian Students News Agency, 31 January 2005.

### **31 January 2005**

In an interview at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland last week, IAEA chief ElBaradei responded to the Bush administration's claim that he is "not tough enough on Iran." "It depends on how you define soft. The results in Iran are something I am quite proud of. Eighteen months ago, Iran was a black box...now we have a fairly good picture of what is happening. We understand how complex and extensive that program is."

—"El-Baradei, Feeling the Nuclear Heat of the US," Arabic News, 31 January 2005.

### **1 February 2005**

Namibian Director of Mines Asser Mudhika emphasizes that the government is working with the IAEA and that "they know the end destination of our uranium." Responding to a recent Reuters article that Iran has held a 15 percent share in Roessing Uranium Limited since 1970, Mr. Mudhika says this is not a secret.

—Christof Maletzky, "Iran Did Not Buy Uranium From Namibia, Govt," *Namibian*, 1 February 2005.

### **1 February 2005**

IAEO Director Gholamreza Aqazadeh complains that nuclear negotiations with the European Union are slow and not up to Iran's expectations, a subject he is broaching in his meetings with EU officials in Brussels. The European Union insists that the negotiations are "on track" and moving quickly enough. Aqazadeh described his meeting with the EU's Javier Solana as positive however, adding: "The next round of negotiations between Iran and the EU will be more intense and more realistic."

—"Current Nuclear Talks Don't Meet Iran's Expectations: IAEO Director," Mehr News Agency, 1 February 2005; "Iranian Nuclear Chief Criticizes Slow Pace of Talks With EU," Mehr News Agency, February 2 2005; "EU Rejects

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Iran Call to Speed Up Nuclear Talks," Reuters, 1 February 2005; "Iran's Nuclear Chief Says Talks With Solana 'Positive'," Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran Radio 1, 1 February 2005.

### **1 February 2005**

Gholamreza Shafei, Tehran's ambassador to Moscow, announces Iranian readiness to sign the pending nuclear fuel agreement with Russia later this month. Mr. Shafei also confirms that Iran is "considering a moratorium, which means a temporary suspension, and not a full stoppage of uranium enrichment;" also that Iran is prepared to allow the IAEA to inspect, saying "if the agency's experts tell us two hours in advance they wish to visit this or that nuclear facility, they will have the permission." Referring to the United States, Shafei stresses that Iran does "not wish to get into conflict with anyone, [but] we will strongly defend our national interests."

—"Iran Ready to Sign Accord on Russian N-Plant," IranMania, 1 February 2005; "Iran May Consider Uranium Enrichment Moratorium - Ambassador," Interfax, 1 February 2005; "U.S. Is Waging a Psychological War - Iranian Ambassador Warns," *Al Jazeera*, 1 February 2005; "Iranian Envoy Says Ready To Let IAEA Inspect Nuclear Facilities Any Time," ITAR-TASS, 1 February 2005.

### **1 February 2005**

U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith expresses U.S. support for diplomatic pressure on Iran to abandon its alleged nuclear weapons program, presenting Libya's recent decision to relinquish its WMD as a possible model for future action.

—"U.S. Hawk Hopes Diplomacy Will End Iran Nuclear Drive," Reuters, 1 February 2005.

### **2 February 2005**

Speaking to reporters, Majles Speaker Gholamali Haddad Adel declares that Iran reserves "the right to take strong and appropriate action if the Europeans resort to delaying tactics." Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi stresses that any suspension of the uranium enrichment program would be "limited and short term" versus the long-term, permanent suspension advocated by Europe. He denies that the European Union is referring Iran's nuclear case to the UN Security Council.

—"Majles Speaker Warns Europeans Against Playing for Time in Nuclear Talks," IRNA, 2 February 2005; "EU Not Trying to Refer Iran's Nuclear Case to Security Council - Kharrazi," Fars News, 2 February 2005.

### **2 February 2005**

Sirus Naseri, a senior Iranian delegation member to the IAEA, says ElBaradei's proposal for a five-year moratorium on the creation of new nuclear fuel production facilities worldwide means that already established nuclear fuel suppliers would essentially be handed a monopoly. Supreme National Security Council spokesman Ali Agha Mohammadi says, "We have the power to negotiate because we keep our [nuclear] achievements in our hands, and we are negotiating to protect them. It's definite that we will protect our scientific achievements as a basic pillar."

—Louis Charbonneau, "Iran Determined to be Nuclear Fuel Exporter [corrected version]," Reuters, 2 February 2005; Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Says it Will Never Scrap Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 3 February 2005.

### **3 February 2005**

Top Iranian nuclear negotiator Hassan Mousavian declares, "We have not yet seen considerable progress in our cooperation and no incentives in political, security, technological, economic and nuclear fields. Now it is time to deliver something to Iranian public opinion and nation." French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie defends efforts to urge Iran to relinquish its nuclear fuel enrichment program, adding that negotiations are "hampered by lack of trust on both sides." Meanwhile, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says the United States would "rebuff

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European efforts to bring it into negotiations with Iran,"

—Lisa Bryant, "France Defends Talks With Iran on Nuclear Fuel," VOA News, 3 February 2005; Najmeh Bozorgmehr, "Iran's Nuclear Envoy Says Europe Failed to Deliver on Nuclear Deal," *Financial Times*, 3 February 2005; Robin Wright, "Rice Says U.S. Won't Join Europe in Iran Nuclear Talks," *Washington Post*, 4 February 2005, p. A10.

### **3 February 2005**

Diplomats citing U.S. intelligence and speaking on condition of anonymity, say Iran is affecting quality checks on centrifuge parts despite pledging a moratorium on such activities.

—George Jahn, "Diplomats: Iran Testing Some Centrifuge Parts, Violating Spirit of Freeze Agreement," *Associated Press*, 3 February 2005.

### **3 February 2005**

Responding to President Bush's State of the Union accusation that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear arms, Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says the charge is baseless. Top nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani stresses, "We have never attempted to develop nuclear weapons and the idea has no room in our defense strategy." The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an opposition group, has asserted that Iran has experimented with "a crucial triggering mechanism for a nuclear weapon."

—"Iran Says Bush's Nuclear Arms Charges Are Baseless," Reuters, 3 February 2005; "Rowhani Says Iran Will Never Compromise Independence, Dignity," IRNA, 3 February 2005; Kerstin Gehmlich, "Iran Tests Nuclear Trigger Mechanism - Opposition," Reuters, 3 February 2005.

### **4 February 2005**

Secretary of State Rice declares that a U.S. attack on Iran is "simply not on the agenda at this point." Following talks with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, Rice said "diplomacy can work" but Iran must show it is prepared to live up to its obligations.

—Anne Gearan, "Rice Says Attacking Iran Is 'Not on Agenda'," *Associated Press*, 4 February 2005; "Rice Urges 'United Front' on Iran," *BBC News*, 4 February 2005.

### **4 February 2005**

EU foreign policy representative Javier Solana stresses that the European Union cannot deliver on trade and technological benefits until Iran provides "concrete guarantees that its [nuclear] program has only peaceful ends."

—Daniel Dombey, "EU Worries That Iran Expects Too Much Too Soon From Nuclear Arms Agreement," *Financial Times*, 4 February 2005.

### **5 February 2005**

The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee launches a "preemptive" examination of U.S. intelligence on Iran "so that you don't get stuck with a situation like you did with Iraq," says Senator Pat Roberts. A recent CIA report concludes that Tehran is "vigorously pursuing programs to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons."

—Greg Miller and Bob Drogin, "Senators Examining Quality of CIA Intelligence on Iran," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 February 2005.

### **6 February 2005**

In a rare interview, Vice-President Dick Cheney states repeatedly that the United States is backing an EU initiative to persuade Iran to freeze its nuclear ambitions, while stressing that no option as been eliminated. Secretary of State Rice tells Iran that in order to avoid Israeli ire, it needs to "live up to international obligations." Secretary of

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Defense Rumsfeld suggests that Iran is actually "years away" from building a nuclear bomb and President Bush advocates a diplomatic path.

—Alec Russell, "Iran Challenges US Over Nuclear Programme," *Daily Telegraph*, 7 February 2005; Julian Borger, "Rice Warns Iran Against Provoking Israel," *Guardian*, 7 February 2005.

#### **6 February 2005**

Hassan Rowhani, secretary-general of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, says "If such an attack [by the United States] takes place then of course we will retaliate and we will definitely accelerate our activities to complete our fuel cycle and make nuclear fuel." On the same subject, Qolamreza Aqazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, states that if, for example, the Bushehr nuclear power plant were to be attacked by Israel or the United States, Iran is "capable of restoring everything in the minimum time."

—"Iran 'to Retaliate if U.S. Attacks'," BBC, 6 February 2005; "Aqazadeh Says Iran Can Restore Nuclear Sites in Case of Attack," *Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1*, 6 February 2005.

#### **7 February 2005**

In an Iranian television interview, Hassan Rowhani, secretary-general of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, declares that Iran will decide by mid-March whether to continue negotiations with the European Union. He says Iran has repeatedly told Europe it would be willing to hold nuclear talks for months, not years, as long as they are fruitful. The secretary asserts Iran will be able to produce yellow cake within the next few months, and referred specifically to activities at the Isfahan UCF and Arak Heavy Water plants. He stresses the importance of Iranian solidarity in the face of U.S. threats, reiterating that the IAEA has repeatedly declared there is no proof of Iran pursuing a nuclear weapons production program and declaring there is "no place for nuclear weapons" in Iran's defense doctrine. Rowhani dismisses the possibility of a U.S. military attack given Iran's cooperation with the IAEA and European Union, suggesting that anyway, Iran's nuclear capability is impervious to bombs and missiles.

—"Iranian TV Interviews Rowhani on US Threats, Nuclear Issue, Security," *Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1*, 7 February 2005.

#### **7 February 2005**

Decrying an "eerie similarity to the events preceding the Iraq war," former Iraq Survey Group leader David Kay urges cautious appraisal of next steps given the escalating rhetoric emanating from Washington regarding Iran's nuclear capability and intentions. He reminds readers that Iran is fully cooperating with the international inspection regime; despite admitting to concealing 18 years of nuclear activities, Iran claims ambitions to nuclear power only, and the IAEA has found no evidence of a nuclear weapons program. In particular, Kay advocates a set of measures tying Iran's nuclear activities to peaceful uses so that any departure is easily detectable; warns against "evidence" provided by regime dissidents with their own agenda; acknowledges the helpfulness of IAEA inspections; urges caution of overheated official rhetoric unsupported by evidence, which serves only to undermine constructive efforts; advocates serious analysis of the evidence available - not to rush or "cook" a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian nuclear activities.

—David Kay, "Let's Not Make the Same Mistakes in Iran," *Washington Post*, 7 February 2005.

#### **7 February 2005**

Iran's Minister of Defense Ali Shamkhani declares in an interview with *Sharq* that it is not in Iran's national interest to acquire nuclear weapons. "We have signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the additional protocol to NPT and respect the safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency. All our nuclear sites are open to the IAEA inspectors and strategically we renounce nuclear arms. We want the Middle East to be free from nuclear arms," he

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said.

—"Shamkhani Says Possession of Nuclear Arms Detrimental to National Interest," IRNA, 7 February 2005.

#### **7 February 2005**

Former Iranian envoy to the IAEA Ali Akbar Salehi, cites significant progress in Iran's ability to use nuclear technology for agricultural, medical, and especially power generation purposes.

—"Former Envoy to IAEA Says Iran Has Reached 'Point of No Return' in Nuclear Science," Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, 7 February 2005.

#### **7 February 2005**

British Prime Minister Tony Blair underscores the importance of EU talks with Iran and of Iran's fulfillment of its obligations.

—"Don't Hinder Peace, Iran is Told," BBC, 7 February 2005.

#### **8 February 2005**

A nuclear official announces that Russia is likely to sign a deal on nuclear fuel shipments to Iran this month. He says the first containers of fuel should be available within two months after the deal is concluded.

—"Official: Iran Nuke Deal Close," *Moscow Times*, 8 February 2005.

#### **8 February 2005**

Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz agrees that diplomacy with Iran is the correct path at this juncture, and asserts that a military strike is not on the agenda.

—Arieh O'Sullivan, "Mofaz: No Attack on Iran for Now," *Jerusalem Post*, 8 February 2005.

#### **9 February 2005**

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warns Iran that the Bush administration's patience is not unending, adding: "It is obvious that, if Iran cannot be made to live up to its international obligations, the IAEA statutes suggest Iran would have to be referred to the UN Security Council."

—Stephen Castle, "Washington Warns Iran That Its Patience Will Not Last Forever," *Independent*, 10 February 2005.

#### **8 February 2005**

According to a diplomat close to the EU-Iran talks in Geneva, Britain, France and Germany "are going to read the riot act to the Iranians" regarding quality control work accomplished on centrifuge parts, which is not permitted (whereas maintenance work is), and which they did not report.

—"Europeans 'To Read the Riot Act' to Iran on Nuclear Activities," AFP, 8 February 2005.

#### **9 February 2005**

President Mohammed Khatami insists on Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology, noting that opinion polls indicate a plurality in favor of proceeding with same.

—"Khatami Says Iran 'Determined To Make Progress' on Nuclear Technology," IRNA, 9 February 2005.

#### **10 February 2005**

President Khatami announces, "The Iranian nation is not after a war, violence or clashes, but the world must know that the Iranians will not tolerate any invasion" and decries U.S. threats as "psychological warfare" in line with its "expansionist policies." Iranian nuclear negotiator Rowhani describes a possible assault on Iranian nuclear sites as

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"the most stupid move." Defense Minister Shamkhani dismisses the possibility of a U.S. attack, saying "Iran is not a small country like Iraq; wherever they attack us, they will be attacked."

—"Khatami, Rowhani React to US 'Threats,' Defend Right to Nuclear Program," IRNA, 10 February 2005.

#### **10 February 2005**

Lt. Gen. Lance Smith, deputy commander of the U.S. Central Command, describes the updating of war plans for Iran as a "normal process," asserting that current military concerns are focused more on possible political influence in Iraq or Afghanistan, and the flow of Iranians feeding the insurgency in Iraq, than any pressure to squelch Iran's nuclear weapons program.

—Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S. Military Says Update of Iran War Plan Is Routine," *Washington Post*, 10 February 2005, p. 18.

#### **11 February 2005**

Russia's foreign ministry announces that the delivery of nuclear fuel to Iran is predicated on Iran signing a bilateral agreement to return spent nuclear fuel to Russia.

—"Nuclear Fuel for Iran: Russia's Terms," *Russia Journal Daily*, 11 February 2005.

#### **11 February 2005**

On the fourth day of meetings with Iran in Geneva, the discussion has turned to the possibility of a European mission to acquire a light water reactor versus the heavy water reactor the Iranians want to build, which would present less of a proliferation concern.

—"Diplomat' Says EU to Offer Mission to Help Iran Get Light Water Nuclear Reactor," AFP, 11 February 2005.

#### **13 February 2005**

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi announces Iranian acknowledgment of the European offer to replace plans for a heavy water reactor, but rejects the offer citing Iranian ambitions to become a major nuclear fuel supplier in the next 15 years.

—"Iran Spurns European Reactor Deal," BBC, 13 February 2005.

#### **13 February 2005**

A Pakistani investigation of the Khan networks dealings with Iran reveal that Khan and his laboratory associates met more than a dozen times over several years, assisting the Iranians in establishing a worldwide procurement network and selling codes, materials, components, and plans to the Tehran government. The Pakistani investigators claim that Iran's centrifuge drawings are very similar to the first generation Pakistan-1 centrifuge. The IAEA has revealed that centrifuges at the Doshan Tapeh base in Tehran closely resemble the more advanced Pakistan-2 centrifuges.

—Massoud Ansari Khan, "Khan 'Sold Nuke Secrets to Tehran," *Financial Times*, 13 February 2005.

#### **16 February 2005**

Referring to a *Washington Post* report that U.S. drones have been over flying Iran seeking evidence of a nuclear weapons program for over a year, Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali Yunesi asserts, "Most of the shining objects that our people see over Iran's airspace are American spying equipment used to spy on Iran's nuclear and military facilities."

—"Iran Says the U.S. Spy Drones Have Flown Over Its Nuclear Sites," Associated Press, 16 February 2005.

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**16 February 2005**

Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rowhani notes Iranian plans to build seven nuclear power plants in the country, and suggests that IAEA investigators are now convinced of Iran's peaceful nuclear ambitions.

—Konstantin Kazeyev, "Iran to Continue Uranium Enrichment and to Build Seven N-Plants," ITAR-TASS, 16 February 2005.

**16 February 2005**

Speaking in London, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom contends that Iran will have the knowledge to build nuclear weapons within six months.

—"Israeli Official: Iran Will Have Knowledge to Build Atomic Bomb in six months," Associated Press, 16 February 2005.

**16 February 2005**

Defusing rumors of an attack on an Iranian nuclear power plant, Ali Agha Mohammadi, Supreme National Security Council spokesman, attributes an explosion in southern Iran to dam-building operations. A previous explanation delivered on state television suggested the possibility of a fuel tank dropping from an Iranian airplane.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Spurns European Reactor Deal," Associated Press, 16 February 2005.

**16 February 2005**

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi announces Iranian appreciation for the European offer to replace plans for a heavy water reactor but rejects it, citing Iranian ambitions to become a major nuclear fuel supplier in the next 15 years.

—Dafna Linzer, "IAEA Digs Into Past of Iranian Program," *Washington Post*, 17 February 2005.

**20 February 2005**

During an interview, Hossein Mousavian, senior nuclear negotiator for Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) describes the SNSC's three policy goals to control the nuclear crises as such:

1. Eliminate the immediate threat of referring the case to the UN Security Council.
2. Preserve the capabilities and fruits of the country's nuclear activities.
3. Create a situation where our nuclear activities, especially enrichment, would continue and the rest of our nuclear activities be strengthened, despite nuclear sanctions.

In addition, Mr. Mousavian breaks down the 3rd goal into a seven-part strategy:

1. Prevent an international front against Iran's nuclear case.
2. Devise a plan and program to gradually alleviate the international community's suspicions about Iran's nuclear activities, which had been created over the course of 20-some years because of the American and Western propaganda.
3. Correct world public opinion, because the Americans had portrayed Iran's nuclear activities as a monster to the world. The polls that were taken worldwide (of course, on a case-by-case basis in different countries) showed that about 66 to 67 percent of the people around the world thought Iran's nuclear activities were a serious threat to international peace. Well, with this kind of public opinion, one cannot pursue nuclear activities peacefully.
4. Build Iran's good relations with the agency because in those days, relations between Iran and the agency had been strained. This was on the agenda of the board of governors, and normalizing these relations again was a very difficult task. We had to go through three stages to do this: addressing the ambiguities and questions of the agency, making efforts to remove Iran from the board of governors' agenda, and going through the stages of rebuilding relations between Iran and the agency.

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5. Reach a national consensus on this crisis, because this is not something for only one agency or one ministry to take full responsibility for. We have to have a national consensus to manage this crisis.

6. Unify management that could manage this crisis and coordinate all activities inside the country.

— "Iran: Negotiator Outlines Strategy, Success, Failures of Nuclear Talks," E'tedal va Towse'eh, 20 February 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050722321001.

#### **21 February 2005**

A senior member of the Iranian negotiating team, Sirius Nasser, says "any negotiations surrounding Iran's nuclear program will be based on the continuation of [uranium] enrichment." Nasser indicates President Bush's comment that military action would not be the first option to address Iran's nuclear ambition, clearly demonstrates Washington is aware a military attack will have no impact.

—"Iran Says its Nuclear Capability 'Not For Sale'," Reuters, 21 February 2005.

#### **21 February 2005**

Preparing for a possible attack by the United States, Iran publicly states it "would respond within 15 minutes to any attack...and it is sharpening its abilities to wage a guerilla war."

—Borzou Daragahi, "Iran Readies Military, Fearing A U.S. Attack," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 21 February 2005.

#### **22 February 2005**

Hossein Musavian, chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, announces an agreement has been reached with Russia to provide nuclear fuel for Iran's nuclear program. Musavian further says the United States and Europe did not have any "problems" with this cooperation.

—"Moscow Says It Has Agreed With the West on Supplying Iran's Nuclear Fuel: Musavian," *Tehran Times*, 22 February 2005.

#### **23 February 2005**

Iran reiterates its unilateral commitment to the EU to stop uranium enrichment was only temporary and voluntary. "In the talks with Europe, we are conquering position after position. The ultimate goal is to preserve [our nuclear] fuel cycle, and we have a long way to go until we achieve it," said Supreme National Security Council Information Committee Director Ali Agha-Mohammadi. Sirius Nasser, head of the technical and nuclear committee of Iran's team of negotiators said: "A final agreement in the new round of talks will be based on continuation of [uranium] enrichment by Iran."

—A. Savyon, "Iran Seeks EU Consent for Modeling Its Nuclear Program on the 'Japanese/German Model' - i.e. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Capabilities Three Months Short of a Bomb," *MEMRI*, 23 March 2005, No. 209.

#### **23 February 2005**

Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom claims Iran is "only six months away from having the knowledge to build a nuclear bomb."

—"Ex-Israel Air Chief's Appointment Fuels Speculation Over Iran Strike," Agence France Presse, 23 March 2005.

#### **23 February 2005**

After meeting with the head of Iran's National Security Council Hassan Rohani, Russian President Vladimir Putin says, "We will continue to cooperate with Iran at all levels, including nuclear energy." The February 18 meeting put the Bushehr plant back on track for completion by 2006. Putin reiterates that he does not believe Tehran intends to develop nuclear weapons.

— Paul de Zardain, "Bush or Bushehr? Russia Puts Its Money on Iran," *Daily Star*, 23 March 2005.

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**23 February 2005**

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder tells reporters that both he and U.S. President George Bush agree Iran "must waive any right to the production [of uranium] thereof, and they must renounce the right to even close the fuel cycle."

—"Transcripts: Bush, Schroeder Discuss Iran," *Washington Post*, 23 February 2005.

**23 February 2005**

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami reiterates that giving up his country's nuclear program or technology are not options agreeable to Iran. Indicating deep differences and mistrust as reasons why the negotiations are going slow, Khatami says he is "not pessimistic...[but] hopeful" about the talks with European negotiators.

— Ali Akbar Careini, "Iran Acknowledges 'Deep Differences' with Europe in Nuclear Talks," Associated Press, 23 February 2005.

**23 February 2005**

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder anticipates a successful outcome of the nuclear talks between Iran and the European Union stating the "common goal" is that Tehran renounces its availability of nuclear weapons.

—"Schroeder Anticipates 'Successful' EU-Iran Nuclear Talks," Islamic Republic News Agency, 23 February 2005.

**23 February 2005**

Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi says since Iran does not intend to produce nuclear weapons, the uranium enrichment program will continue and there is nothing other countries can do to stop them.

—"Kharrazi: Tehran, Determined to Continue Uranium Enrichment," Islamic Republic News Agency, 23 February 2005.

**24 February 2005**

President Bush announces diplomatic steps will be taken to convince the mullahs to give up their nuclear ambitions. National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, indicated the president may still consider offering incentives; a tactic the Europeans are utilizing on Iran. Responding to suggestions that the United States is preparing to bomb Iran, Bush says they are "ridiculous" but "diplomacy is just beginning...and all options are on the table." Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder of Germany says "we absolutely agree that Iran must say no to any kind of nuclear weapon, full stop."

— Elizabeth Bumiller, "Bush May Weigh the Use of Incentives to Dissuade Iran," *New York Times*, 22 February 2005.

**28 February 2005**

Tehran and Moscow sign an agreement in which Russia will supply the nuclear fuel for the Bushehr facility and all spent fuel rods will be returned to Russia.

—"Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal Signed," BBC, 28 February 2005.

**27 February 2005**

U.S. officials announce they have uncovered evidence that associates of Pakistani A.Q. Khan met with Iranian officials 18 years ago and offered Tehran "the makings of a nuclear weapons program." The meeting purportedly took place in Dubai, when at that time, Iran purchased centrifuge designs and a starter kit for uranium enrichment. The U.S. administration believes this demonstrates Iran's interest over the years in nuclear weapons technology, but a Western diplomat said this is a "strong indication...but it doesn't prove it completely." Tehran responded by

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pointing out that Iran had the opportunity to purchase the equipment for building the core of a bomb, but turned it down.

—Dafna Linzer, "Iran was Offered Nuclear Parts," *Washington Post*, 27 February 2005.

#### **28 February 2005**

As inspections into Iran's nuclear activities continue, IAEA head Mohammad ElBaradei says, "I keep calling on Iran to be proactive as possible and to go out of its way to help us bring some of these issues to a closure."

—"UN Call for Iranian Co-Operation," BBC, 28 February 2005.

#### **28 February 2005**

Pakistan dismisses an old report about a meeting between Iranian officials and AQ Kahn. The story was originally published by the *Washington Post* 18 year ago. Foreign Minister spokesman, Masood Khan, said "it's recycling of an old story...and does not warrant a substantive response from us."

—"Pakistan Brushes Off 'Old Story' Tying Khan, Iran," Reuters, 28 February 2005.

#### **March 2005**

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Sergey Kislak says Iran has been gathering components for its nuclear program for 18 years. In a gesture to demonstrate its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only, Tehran delivered a "detailed report on the goals of its program...[and] the IAEA Board of Governors Resolution of November 2004 does not call for the presentation of another report at the next session." Minister Kislak says the current Iranian program is more transparent but additional work is still required. Minister Kislak emphasized: "We are...against Iran acquiring nuclear weapons...we will do everything possible so that the program for the development of peaceful nuclear energy in Iran develops cooperatively."

—"Iran: The Situation Has Become Clearer, But Not All Questions Have Been Answered," Center for Policy Studies in Russia, March 2005.

#### **1 March 2005**

Iran refuses a new request by the IAEA to access a suspected military site. Deputy Secretary General of the IAEA, Peter Goldschmidt, tells the IAEA that Iran continues construction on a heavy water reactor capable of producing plutonium, has denied agency experts further information on the current location of weapons equipment purchase, and delayed informing the agency of tunnel construction for nuclear storage. Iran reiterates that the suspension of enrichment is voluntary and temporary. Giving up enrichment is "something that is not on the table and will not be on the table," senior Iranian envoy Sirius Nasserli tells reporters.

—"Iran Denies Nuke Agency's Visit Request," Agence France Presse, 1 March 2005.

#### **1 March 2005**

"Iran is determined to resume uranium enrichment activities in order to produce nuclear fuel for 20 reactors it plans to build," foreign minister Kamal Kharrazi announces.

—"Iran Determined to Produce Own Fuel for 20 Planned Reactors," Agence France Presse, 1 March 2005.

#### **1 March 2005**

IAEA Director Mohammad ElBaradei, calls on Iran to provide additional documents relating to its nuclear program. The head of the IAEA said the request was to "make up for a lack of confidence created by years of concealment," but also stressed there was no proof Iran is attempting to build nuclear weapons.

—Dafna Linzer, "IAEA Head Waits to Issue Iran Verdict," *Washington Post*, 1 March 2005.

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### **2 March 2005**

The IAEA announces it has not been able to get additional information on Iran's more advanced centrifuge equipment or the source of nuclear contamination discovered during earlier inspections. One Western diplomat says, "It's another failure to disclose activities, which fits a disturbing pattern." Iran has refused the IAEA reentry to Parchin, a military base, because Tehran believes the requirements have been fulfilled, "and thus there is no justification for any additional visit."

— Richard Bernstein, "Nuclear Agency Says Iran Has Blocked Investigation," *New York Times*, 1 March 2005.

### **2 March 2005**

As negotiations with the three European countries continue, an Iranian delegate to the Atomic Energy Agency, Sirius Nasser, says his country's position depends on what the Europeans offer in way of incentives. "If there is a political agreement, it has to be give-and-take...but Iran will have a nuclear fuel production program for peaceful purposes." In response, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the Iranians must "demonstrate that they're prepared to live up to their obligations in a way that is verifiable."

—Allisa Rubin, "Iran Yields Little in Talks with Monitors," *Los Angeles Times*, 2 March 2005.

### **2 March 2005**

IAEA deputy director General Pierre Goldschmidt announces that results from the inspection of five Iranian nuclear sites in early January found no "suspicious equipment."

—"IAEA Found No Suspicious Hardware in Iran," RIA Novosti, 2 March 2005.

### **2 March 2005**

One day after the U.N.'s atomic watchdog presented a report on Iran's nuclear record, the U.S. IAEA ambassador, Jackie Sanders, says "The IAEA is still not able to provide assurances that Iran is not pursuing clandestine activities at undeclared locations." IAEA Director Mohammad ElBaradei added that Tehran needs to take steps to dispel doubts "through transparency measures and co-operation with the [IAEA]."

—"Iran Nuclear Plans Under Pressure," BBC, 2 March 2005.

### **3 March 2005**

Director of the Russian Federal Agency for Nuclear Power (Rosatom), Aleksandr Rumyantsev, provides Iran with scientific documents proving it would be "inexpedient, and even ruinous for the country to develop its own nuclear-fuel cycle."

—"Russia Opposes Iranian Nuclear-Fuel Cycle," RIA Novosti, 3 March 2005.

### **3 March 2005**

A diplomat close to the International Atomic Energy Agency confirms Iran has requested to "expand quality control checks and maintenance of 'nonessential' enrichment centrifuge parts to 'essential' centrifuge parts that have been sealed by the [IAEA] under the [uranium enrichment] suspension."

—"Iran Wants to Break U.N. Seals and Test Nuclear-Related Equipment, Diplomats Say," Global Security Newswire, 4 March 2005.

### **3 March 2005**

A diplomat familiar with the IAEA, who asked not to be identified, says Iran is "pouring the concrete foundation" at the Arak reactor after the IAEA asked Tehran to refrain from building the reactor as a "confidence building measure" in September.

—Michael Adler, "Iran Starts Work on Reactor," *Australian*, 3 March 2005.

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#### **4 March 2005**

Diplomats at a meeting of the IAEA say Iran is using reinforced materials and deep underground facilities to store and protect nuclear materials. Tehran was faulted for starting work on the tunnel, continuing construction at Isfahan, and "ignoring [a] request to scrap" plans for a heavy water reactor. Tehran admits the facility is under construction, but said it was to "increase capacity, safety and security of nuclear material."

—Jahn George, "Iran Builds Bomb-Resistant Underground Nuclear Storage," Associated Press, 4 March 2005.

#### **4 March 2005**

American President George Bush tells the Europeans he wants to make sure the negotiations with Iran continue and offers his assistance to help move the process forward.

—"Bush Offers to Help EU Over Iran," BBC, 4 March 2005.

#### **5 March 2005**

Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rohani announces that his country will suspend all its voluntary confidence-building measures and return to making fuel if Iran is referred to the U.N. Security Council. Mr. Rohani indicates further repercussions could include pulling out of the NPT as some conservative parliamentarians have threatened.

—Paul Hughes, "Iran Says to Make Atomic Fuel if Sent to UN Council," Reuters, 5 March 2005.

#### **6 March 2005**

At a conference on nuclear technology in Tehran, Hassan Rowhani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator says that "the country will never permanently cease enriching uranium." Voicing his dissatisfaction with the pace of the talks, Mr. Rohani says "every time the talks get serious the Europeans say they have to talk to the other side of the Atlantic [the United States]". Should the case be referred to the Security Council, "there would be no more confidence."

—Nazila Fathi, "Iran Says it Won't Give Up Program to Enrich Uranium," *New York Times*, 6 March 2005.

#### **7 March 2005**

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder announces the "American administration very much supports this [EU] position." With talks currently deadlocked and Tehran refusing to give up enrichment, the Europeans insist the enrichment program must be terminated as an "objective guarantee" that Iran is not pursuing arms.

—Markus Krah, "Germany Optimistic on Iran Nuclear Talks," Reuters, 7 March 2005.

#### **7 March 2005**

Hassan Rowhani threatens to follow North Korea's lead if Washington refers Iran to the UN Security Council.

—Ian Traynor, "Iran Hints it May Play Same Nuclear Card as Korea," *Guardian*, 7 March 2005.

#### **8 March 2005**

Head of Iran's parliament foreign policy commission, Alaeddin Borujerdi says if the Europeans insist Iran permanently suspend uranium enrichment, "it will be our last nuclear negotiation with them [Europeans]."

—"Iran Has No Fear of UN Nuclear Referral," Mehr News, 8 March 2005.

#### **10 March 2005**

Pakistani information minister, Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, confirms A.Q. Khan gave centrifuges for enriching uranium to Iran, "but the government was in no way involved."

—"Iran 'Given Pakistan Centrifuges'," BBC, 10 March 2005.

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**11 March 2005**

The foreign ministers of the UK, France and Germany sign a letter stating progress is "not as fast as we would wish, we believe we are moving in the right directions...if Iran does not abide by its agreement...we shall have no choice but to support referring Iran's nuclear programme to the UN Security Council."

—"Iran Nuclear Progress 'Not Fast'," BBC, 11 March 2005.

**13 March 2005**

In response to accusations that Washington has backed a military strike by Israel on Iranian nuclear sites, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice insists the U.S. is committed to following a diplomatic course and "put forward...a strengthened diplomatic hand for the European three to play."

—"No Green Light to Israel for Strikes on Alleged Iran Nuke Site: Rice," Agence France Presse, 13 March 2005.

**13 March 2005**

A *Times* report indicates Israel has drawn up and discussed secret plans with the United States to attack Iran if diplomatic effort fail to stop Iranian nuclear projects.

— Uzi Mahnaimi, "Revealed: Israel Plans Strike on Iranian Nuclear Plant," *Times Online*, 13 March 2005.

**14 March 2005**

A senior Iranian negotiator says the United States should offer further incentives and "unblock frozen Iranian assets, lift sanctions and stop 'hostile measures'." On Friday, U.S. President George Bush offered to lift the block on Iran's membership to the World Trade Organization and allow Tehran to obtain parts for commercial planes, but Tehran rejected the American offer as 'insignificant'.

—"Iran Demands More US Concessions," BBC, 14 March 2005.

**14 March 2005**

Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Jalil Abbas Jilani rejects a report that Pakistan will hand over centrifuge components to UN inspectors which could be compared with machinery sold to Iran. An IAEA spokesman declined to comment, but diplomats close to the IAEA said the parts would arrive soon. Mr. Jilani said, "Pakistan has not been asked to give centrifuges, nor will Pakistan do so."

—"Pakistan Denies it Will Hand Nuclear Parts to UN," Reuters, 14 March 2005.

**16 March 2005**

Iranian government energy policy advisor Hossein Kazempour, invites the Americans to "come and have 50-50 [of an Iranian enrichment program]." He adds, "this offer is on the table. But they have their suspicious but this could be removed by their presence [in Iran's programme]."

—Kevin Morrison, "Iran Offers to Let US Share in its Nuclear Programme," *Financial Times*, 16 March 2005.

**21 March 2005**

IAEA Director Mohammed ElBaradei says Washington "would have to step in" as Tehran needs security guarantees beyond those given by the EU. "I think that when the issue of security comes up, obviously the United States will have to step in, because... the Iranians will very much need the American and not just European assurance," he said.

—"UN Urges US Engagement Over Iran," BBC, 21 March 2005.

**22 March 2005**

A top official quotes Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as saying, "Israel has no intention of attacking Iran and

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continues to support the diplomatic efforts of the international community, in particular the United States, to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons."

—"Israel Has No Intention of Striking Iranian Nuclear Sites: Sharon," Agence France Presse, 22 March 2005.

#### **22 March 2005**

Mohammed Saeidi, vice president for planning and international affairs at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says the generation of nuclear electricity is the "prime priority of Iran's nuclear program." "The people and government of Iran are determined to open their way through the tortuous path of peaceful use of nuclear technology despite all imposed restrictions and difficulties," Mr. Saeidi said.

—Jamey Keaten, "Iran to Deploy Civilian Nuclear Power," Agence France Presse, 22 March 2005.

#### **23 March 2005**

A high ranking official from the Israeli general staff claims the Iranian Defense Ministry is carrying out a secret program to obtain nuclear weapons not connected to the Bushehr facility. During the meeting with Russian members of the press, he added "there are mines where uranium is being extracted, and there are centrifuges belonging to the Defense Ministry."

—"Iran Pursuing Nukes Program Not Related to Bushehr - Israeli Official," Interfax, 23 March 2005.

#### **25 March 2005**

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf announces he may provide the IAEA with uranium enrichment components to clear Pakistan's name from Iran's nuclear program. "We will give you them and you examine them...but once and for all," President Musharraf said. The parts would help establish the origin of the uranium contamination discovered in Iran and if Tehran has been secretly developing nuclear weapons.

—"Pakistan Mulls Nuclear Handover," BBC, 25 March 2005.

#### **30 March 2005**

Iranian President, Mohammed Khatami, accompanies reporters on a tour around the interior of the uranium enrichment facility near Natanz. Several anti-aircraft guns are situated around this heavily guarded site, but no centrifuges were visible during the tour.

—Aresu Eqbali, "Tehran Shows Off Centerpiece of Nuclear Drive," Agence France Presse, 30 March 2005.

#### **12 April 2005**

European diplomats and intelligence agencies report that Iran has removed some of the "yellow cake" uranium from the Isfahan facility. The accusations come at the same time IAEA inspectors inventory the raw processed uranium. The diplomats indicate the discrepancies could be on account of uranium being removed or lost in the waste process.

—Louis Charbonneau, "UN Tallies Uranium in Iran Amid Suspensions - Diplomats," Reuters, 12 April 2005.

#### **12 April 2005**

Israeli intelligence reports indicate that although Iran has suspended uranium enrichment, Tehran continues to acquire elements for its nuclear capability. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon called on U.S. President George Bush "to step up the diplomatic efforts to prevent Tehran from developing a nuclear bomb." Israeli radio reported Sharon's aides as saying "Israel is not initiating or leading an offensive against Iran."

—Aluf Benn, "PM Calls on Bush for More Pressure Against Iran," *Haaretz*, 12 April 2005.

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**12 April 2005**

Russian shipments of enriched uranium for the Bushehr plant may be delayed until autumn. A source in the Russian nuclear authority said "the latest delay did not have any underlying political reasons." The fuel is required six months prior to startup which is tentatively scheduled to start operating in 2006.

—Rabi Ul-Awwal, "Russia Delays Nuclear Fuel Shipments to Iran," Reuters, 12 April 2005.

**13 April 2005**

Iran denies any nuclear material has been moved from the Isfahan facility at the same time the IAEA is monitoring the site. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi, says "Iran seeks nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It would be meaningless for Iran to smuggle."

—"Iran Denies Smuggling Uranium from Monitored Site," Reuters, 13 April 2005.

**13 April 2005**

EU diplomats report that French President, Jacques Chirac, "urged his negotiators to consider Iran's proposal it be allowed to have an enrichment plant with 3000 centrifuges." Chirac's position may be due to Iran's upcoming elections or "diplomatic politeness." Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon reemphasized that Israel would not act unilaterally and called for international action instead.

—Louis Charbonneau, "Chirac Pushes EU to Drop Hard Line on Iran-Diplomats," Reuters, 13 April 2005.

**13 April 2005**

White House press secretary Scott McClellan says the Bush Administration wants to see the Iranian nuclear weapons dilemma "resolved through the diplomatic efforts of the Europeans. We want to see it resolved in a peaceful way." Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby tells the Senate Armed Services Committee that "Tehran probably will have the ability to produce nuclear weapons easily in the next decade."

—Anne Gearan, "Bush Says Diplomacy With Iran is Best," Associated Press, 13 April 2005.

**14 April 2005**

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon says Iran is close to overcoming nuclear weapons "technical problems...[and] once they solve it, that will be the point of no return."

—Mary Lavie, "Sharon Says Israel Won't Attack Iran," Associated Press, 14 April 2005.

**15 April 2005**

European diplomats say France, Britain and Germany are "rock-solid on cessation" of Iran's uranium enrichment program and want "objective guarantees" that Tehran's nuclear program is a peaceful one. Officials close to the talks said the EU-3 is considering Iran's proposal for a pilot facility, but possibly only to keep the discussions going.

—"Europe "Rock-solid" that Iran Cease Enrichment," Iran Mania, 15 April 2005.

**19 April 2005**

Hussein Mussavian, deputy Secretary of National Security in Iran meets with head of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Sergey Lavrov, and Sergey Kislyakov, Deputy Foreign Minister on Non-Proliferation of WMD to prepare a list of documents on an "agreement about mutual protection of secret information and protection of intellectual property, exchanged within the time frame of military-technical cooperation." Sirius Nasser, an Iranian delegation representative, says Iran is growing impatient with the negotiation results and wants to focus on getting Russian support for continuation of its program of "peaceful atom."

—"Simultaneous Negotiations: Moscow Receives Tehran and Washington Envoys," *Kommersant*, 19 April 2005.

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**19 April 2003**

SNSC Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Hussein Musavian insists on Iran's legal right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as guaranteed in the Paris Agreement and in cooperation with international organizations, while emphasizing that Iran has no intention of pursuing nuclear weapons. Musavian characterized his recent talks with the Russian foreign minister as "very constructive and useful," adding "Russia is Iran's most important partner in the field of nuclear technology."

—"Iran Not After Nuclear Weapons: Musavian," IRNA, 20 April 2005.

**20 April 2005**

Top Iranian nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani has warned that "tangible progress" is necessary from the upcoming meeting with European governments to avoid a breakdown of talks.

—Roula Khalaf and Gareth Smyth, "Iran Turns Up Heat on Europe as Nuclear Talks Loom FT Interview Hassan Rowhani," *Financial Times*, 20 April 2005.

**20 April 2005**

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice refers to Russia's "positive role" in the construction of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant, saying it assists non-proliferation objectives in Iran.

—"Russia Plays a "Positive Role" in Iran's Nuclear Issues: Rice," Xinhua, 21 April 2005.

**21 April 2005**

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stresses diplomatic pressure over a possible military strike to deter Iran from achieving nuclear weapon capability.

—"Sharon Puts Diplomacy First in Dealing With Iranian Nuke Row," Xinhua, 21 April 2005.

**21 April 2005**

Sirus Nasser, head of Iran's negotiating team, was upbeat about the latest round of negotiations with the Europeans that ended today, saying they "are on the right track, leading to a wise, logical and balanced solution satisfactory to both sides."

—"Iran, EU-3 End Nuclear Negotiations in Geneva," IRNA, 21 April 2005.

**22 April 2005**

Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's former IAEA envoy, has said that "Iran's decision to master the nuclear fuel cycle is completely clear and irreversible" and it would be counterproductive of the Europeans to reach a deadlock in the nuclear talks, as they would gain only a two-year moratorium on Iranian nuclear activities and lose face internationally.

—"Deadlock in Nuclear Talks Europe's Defeat - Iran's Nuclear Official," Mehr News Agency, 22 April 2005.

**22 April 2005**

Sirus Nasser, top nuclear negotiator for Iran in nuclear deliberations with the Europeans, has asserted "Ultimately, it seems that both sides intend to try and reach a solution" but that it is still too early to predict the outcome.

—"Iran's Top Nuclear Negotiator Speaks of 'Difficult Steps Ahead'," Iranian Radio, 22 April 2005.

**22 April 2005**

Upon request of the Information Ministry, the nuclear spies case has been referred to it - the case's "complexity" has caused delays in reaching a final verdict.

—"Nuclear Spies' Case Waiting for Final Decision at Iranian Intelligence Ministry," Fars News Agency, 22 April 2005.

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**24 April 2005**

Hamid Reza Asefi, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, announces that regardless of the outcome of current talks with the Europeans, Iran will resume uranium enrichment sooner rather than later.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Says It Will Resume Uranium Enrichment Regardless of Outcome of Talks With Europeans," Associated Press, 24 April 2005.

**24 April 2005**

Responding to Kuwaiti environmental concerns, Hamid Reza Asefi, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, declares that IAEA experts confirm that the Bushehr nuclear power plant currently under construction complies with all international standards. Bushehr is due to launch in 2006.

—Konstantin Kazeyev, "Bushehr NPP Complies With International Standards - Diplomat," ITAR-TASS, 24 April 2005.

**26 April 2005**

In response to repeated warnings for Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions or face UN sanctions, Hamid Reza Asefi asserts "we don't know with what language to tell the Europeans and Americans that Iran is not afraid of the UN Security Council. We have been subject to sanctions in the past. In the short term, it has put us under pressure. But in [the] long term, it has helped our economy to flourish."

—Tarek Al-Issawi, "Threat of International Sanctions Not a Major Concern for Iran," Associated Press, 26 April 2005.

**26 April 2005**

The U.S. Congress has 30 days to object to a Pentagon plan to sell 100 "bunker-buster" bombs to Israel - 5,000lb GBU-28 bombs originally developed to obliterate Saddam Hussein's command centers in the 1991 Gulf War. The proposal is widely seen as a "message" to Iran.

—Demetri Sevastopulo, "Message for Iran in Bomb Offer to Israel," *Financial Times*, 27 April 2005.

**27 April 2005**

EU trio diplomats complain that "we are on the defensive now" in nuclear negotiations due to resume with Iran on April 29th. Talks now center on the Iranian proposal versus its cessation of uranium enrichment. Iran's proposal includes building up its enrichment program in stages under close monitoring by the IAEA, eventually to be expanded into a commercial-scale enrichment plant with 54,000 centrifuges, producing low-grade enriched uranium for power plants. According to nuclear experts, a 3,000-centrifuge strength plant could produce enough highly-enriched uranium for one and a half warheads per year.

—Louis Charbonneau, "Iran Steps Up Pressure on EU in Nuke Talks - Diplomats," Reuters, 27 April 2005.

**27 April 2005**

Baroness Elizabeth Symons, Middle East Minister in the British Cabinet, denies any U.S. military intentions against Iran, adding that "if there were, no we would not support them."

—Hannah K. Strange, "Britain Rules Out Strikes on Iran," United Press International, 27 April 2005.

**27 April 2005**

A three-day International Conference on Islamic Unity concluded in Tehran with a 14-article statement condemning any "conspiracy depriving Iran from nuclear energy."

—Demetri Sevastopulo, "Message for Iran in Bomb Offer to Israel," *Financial Times*, 27 April 2005.

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**28 April 2005**

Russian President Vladimir Putin defends a missile deal with Syria and nuclear components sales to Iran in talks with Israeli President Moshe Katsav. Regarding Iran, Putin stresses "we are working to make sure their nuclear ability is used for peaceful means." The president also said "I agree...the Iranian partners should drop the idea of creating a nuclear cycle, and put all their nuclear programs under international control" and stressed that Russia "is resolutely against any attempts on the part of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons."

—Steve Gutterman, "Putin Defends Arms Sales to Syria, Iran," Associated Press, 28 April 2005; "Putin Says Iran Must Put Its Nuclear Program Under International Control," ITAR-TASS, 28 April 2005.

**28 April 2005**

Speaking in the Hague, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi reiterates Iran's "inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

—"Iran's Foreign Minister Says Suspension of Uranium Enrichment "Temporary"," Iranian TV, 28 April 2005.

**28 April 2005**

Ali Aqamohammadi, head of the Information Dissemination Department of the SNSC, stresses that Iran will consider the Paris Agreement "null and void" if the Europeans "fail to adopt a transparent stance" in tomorrow's talks.

—"Nuclear Spokesman Says EU Must Not Wait for End of Iranian Election," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 28 April 2005.

**29 April 2005**

Russia's Rosatom indicates it will supply about 80 tons of low-enriched uranium fuel to the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr as soon as it is "technologically necessary."

—"Russia to Deliver Up to 80 Tons of Nuclear Fuel to Iran," RIA Novosti, 29 April 2005.

**29 April 2005**

Former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is preparing for a June 17th presidential election, affirms that Iran is "determined to have all branches of nuclear technology, including uranium enrichment...at any cost."

—Parisa Hafezi, "Iran to Pursue Nuclear Fuel Cycle - Rafsanjani," Reuters, 29 April 2005.

**2 May 2005**

U.S. officials announce that they want the UN-sponsored global disarmament conference to focus on Iran's nuclear program. The conference examines the NPT but Washington hopes to use the event to condemn Iran and highlight Tehran's treaty violations.

— Louis Charbonneau, "U.S. Targets Iran, North Korea at Nuke Arms Talks," Reuters, 2 May 2005.

**2 May 2005**

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's religious leader, warns the United States to keep out of his country's nuclear affairs. Referring to the upcoming elections in June, he also says Tehran's nuclear policy would not change since no president would violate the country's national interest.

— Frances Harrison, "Iran Issues Nuclear Warning to US," BBC, 2 May 2005.

**3 May 2005**

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi tells a UN conference that Iran is determined to resume enrichment at

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some stage and that United States and Europe should not deny technological advancements to others.

— "Iran Insists on Nuclear Activity," BBC, 3 May 2005.

### **3 May 2005**

Hamid-Reza Asefi, spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, says Tehran will soon resume some unspecified nuclear activities. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Stephen Rademaker announces at the conference that any solution "must include permanent cessation of Iran's enrichment and reprocessing efforts, as well as dismantlement of equipment facilities related to such activity."

—Warren Hoge and David Sanger, "Iran to Resume Nuclear Plans, Official States at U.N. Conference," *New York Times*, 4 May 2005.

### **9 May 2005**

Former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency and United Nations chief arms inspector Hans Blix urges Iran and Israel to support a ban on uranium enrichment throughout the Middle East. In addition to making the Middle East an enrichment-free zone, Mr. Blix also encourages Washington to offer additional incentives as a possible compromise to stop Tehran's nuclear ambition. Iran announces that it will start some work related to enrichment in a few days.

—Irwin Arief, "Blix Proposes Compromise on Iranian Enrichment," Reuters, 10 May 2005.

### **9 May 2005**

Deputy Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Mohammad Saeedi announces at a university conference that "We will lift the first stage of our suspension, that of our UCF [uranium conversion facility] project in Isfahan, in the next few days." He further adds that they were not resuming actual enrichment at this time, but would wait for the outcome of the negotiations.

—Christopher Adams, "Iran Nuclear Talks Near Collapse, UK Warns," *Financial Times*, 10 May 2005.

### **9 May 2005**

Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization for Iran, confirms that 37 tons of raw uranium was converted into gas at the Isfahan facility, just before suspending all uranium enrichment related activities last year.

— Ali Akbar, "Iran Confirms Uranium-To-Gas Conversion," Associated Press, 9 May 2005.

### **10 May 2005**

A French Foreign Ministry spokesman urges Iran to not resume uranium enrichment related activities. "As far as we know, no final decision has been taken by the Iranian side, but we hope Iran will not take such a decision," the spokesman further adds. A government official in London says that if Iran resumes any activities that break the suspension, all negotiations will come to an end.

—"France Presses Iran Over Uranium Enrichment Plans," Reuters, 10 May 2005.

### **11 May 2005**

Senior Iranian envoy Sirous Nasseri delivers a letter, purported to be an official notification whether Iran will resume uranium enrichment, to the International Atomic Energy Agency. On condition of anonymity, an Iranian diplomat says the letter contains details about a four-way meeting with Tehran within the next two weeks.

—"EU-Iran Nuclear Tension Reported," *Los Angeles Times*, 12 May 2005.

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**12 May 2005**

British Prime Minister Tony Blair warns Tehran that his government will support referring Iran to the UN Security Council for any breach of nuclear agreements. Iran's top security official Hassan Rowhani announces that Tehran is prepared to break the moratorium and continue uranium enrichment. Rowhani further adds that, "A continuation of the talks in their present format is impossible. The fundamental proposition that the Islamic Republic of Iran will resume its nuclear development in the near future is beyond question."

— Roula Khalaf and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, "Diplomats Battle to Keep Alive Iran Nuclear Talks," *Financial Times*, 13 May 2005; "Nuclear Tug of War," *Kommersant*, 13 May 2005.

**12 May 2005**

Hassan Rowhani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator says, "The principal that we resume activities has been decided. We are discussing the conditions and timing of that." Mr. Rowhani further emphasizes that the start of nuclear activities in the near future are "definite." British Prime Minister Tony Blair stresses that diplomacy will be used and denies there is any talk about military action against Iran. However, Blair reiterates Iran will be referred to the UN Security Council if it breaks any of its nuclear obligations.

— Ed Johnson, "Blair Backs U.N. Intervention for Iran," Associated Press, 12 May 2005.

**12 May 2005**

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani says his country will not respect the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) if it were to deny Iran the right to pursue peaceful nuclear applications.

—"Iran Won't Respect NPT if Nuke Rights Denied - Rohani," Reuters, 12 May 2005.

**12 May 2005**

Hossein Mousavian, a senior Iranian nuclear negotiator, says Iran is prepared to give negotiations a try before making a final decision about resuming its nuclear program.

—Roula Khalaf and Najmeh Bozorgmehr, "Diplomats Battle to Keep Alive Iran Nuclear Talks," *Financial Times*, 13 May 2005.

**13 May 2005**

Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom states Iran will have the knowledge to build a nuclear bomb within six to nine months.

—"Israel Says Iran Will Have Nuclear Bomb Knowledge," Reuters, 13 May 2005.

**15 May 2005**

The Iranian parliament approves a nonbinding resolution urging the government to resume uranium enrichment for "peaceful use." Senior Iranian nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani adds that Tehran would not immediately resume uranium processing but emphasized negotiations cannot continue unless some activities can be resumed.

—Neil MacFarquhar, "Iran Parliament Calls for Resuming Nuclear Fuel Development," *New York Times*, 15 May 2005.

**18 May 2005**

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw says the EU-3 will hold new talks with Iran to discuss its nuclear program.

—"EU-Iran to Hold New Nuclear Talks," BBC, 18 May 2005.

**18 May 2005**

Iranian Supreme National Security Council negotiator Hossein Mousavian says his country requires incentives before any agreement can be reached regarding cessation of Tehran's nuclear development program. Mr.

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Mousavian indicates a contract for 10 nuclear reactors as a specific example, but reiterates that Iran will not abandon uranium enrichment.

—Neil MacFarquhar, "Iran Seeks Incentives from Europe in Impasse," *New York Times*, 18 May 2005.

#### **19 May 2005**

Iranian presidential candidate Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani says he is prepared to increase trust with the United States, but Washington must first extend the olive branch because a "positive step by the oppressed side [Iran] would indicate that we are weak or might be considered as a display of fear."

—Paul Homes and Barry Moody, "Rafsanjani Urges U.S. to Begin Thaw in Ties," Reuters, 19 May 2005.

#### **20 May 2005**

Iranian exile and former National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) spokesperson Alireza Jafarzadeh says Iran's Defense Ministry is smuggling graphite and graphite compounds, such as ceramic matrix composite (CMC), which could be used to encase a nuclear warhead. Mr. Jafarzadeh adds that a purported steel manufacturing plant near Ardekan is actually a graphite technology plant. Although CMC is a dual-use item, international trading of CMC is prohibited for use in nuclear weapons under the Missile Technology Control Regime.

—Tyler Marshall and Sonni Efron, "Iran Said to Smuggle Material for Warheads," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 May 2005; "Iran Reportedly Smuggling Nuclear-Related Materials," Global Security Newswire, 23 May 05.

#### **21 May 2005**

A proposal that Russia enrich uranium for Iran has not been discussed yet, says Ali Aghamohammadi of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. The proposal involves exporting uranium hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) gas, processed from mined uranium in Iran, to Russia where centrifuges will enrich it into atomic fuel for Tehran. Both Moscow and Tehran deny the idea came from their respective countries. U.S. officials acknowledge the proposal as "Russia has already agreed to provide at least the first decade's worth of enriched uranium fuel for Iran's nuclear reactor at Bushehr. So Iran would have no need to do any conversion work whatsoever," U.S. State Department Richard Boucher says.

—"Iran Douses Hope of Compromise in Nuclear Talks," Reuters, 21 May 2005; "Iran Reportedly Smuggling Nuclear-Related Materials," Global Security Newswire, 23 May 05.

#### **22 May 2005**

Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi claims that if Tehran is turned over to the UN Security Council, "the Europeans will sustain more damage than us...and the Islamic Republic will act unilaterally." Mr. Asefi warns that if negotiations do not succeed, his country "will not be obliged to remain committed [to a previous agreement]."

—"Foreign Ministry Says Iran Will Have No Obligations if Nuclear Case Sent to UN," BBC, 22 May 2005; Nasser Karimi, "Iran Warns Europe to Make Nuke Talks Work," Associated Press, 22 May 2005.

#### **22 May 2005**

Russia's Atomic Energy Agency chief, Alexander Rumyantsev, reiterates that Moscow will continue its nuclear agreement with Iran to meet the scheduled operational date of the Bushehr power plant in late 2006.

—"Foreign Russia to Continue Nuclear Cooperation with Iran - Russian Nuclear Chief," BBC, 22 May 2005.

#### **23 May 2005**

Kazem Jalali of the Iranian Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee says his country has no reason to study a Russian proposal where Iran's uranium would be processed in Moscow, since access to the complete fuel

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cycle is an "inalienable right."

—"Iranian Lawmaker Sees 'No Reason' to Accept Russian Proposal on Uranium Enrichment," *Mehr*, 23 May 2005, in FBIS Document IAP2005052301002.

### **23 May 2005**

Brazilian Science and Technology Minister Eduardo Campos says any nuclear partnership between Brazil and Venezuela which would involve Iran would be rejected. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez says he is interested in developing a nuclear power program to diversify his country's energy sources.

—"Venezuela May Begin Talks with Iran to Discuss the Possibility of Developing Nuke Power," Associated Press, 23 May 2005; "Brazil Would Refuse Nuclear Cooperation With Venezuela if Iran Included," *Rio de Janeiro O Globo*, 23 May 05, in FBIS Document LAP20050523000012.

### **24 May 2005**

As a possible compromise to end the current standoff, European officials indicate they may be open to allowing Iran some uranium research in the future. Surprised U.S. officials say, "We felt assured that conversion would not be on the table now or in the future."

—"Iran Nuclear Negotiators Reconvene in Geneva," Global Security Newswire, 25 May 2005.

### **25 May 2005**

British, French, German, and Iranian officials meet in Geneva to discuss Tehran's nuclear program. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami says his country will move forward regardless of the outcome of the meeting, but adds "this doesn't mean breaking the suspension of the enrichment." Iran agrees to continue its suspension of sensitive nuclear activities in exchange for incentives. The European Union commits to provide Iran with detailed proposals outlining the incentives by early August. Iranian negotiator Hassan Rowhani says the European Union committed to help his country obtain nuclear reactors. In addition, the World Trade Organization agreed to proceed with accession talks with Tehran. Mr. Rowhani warns that the terms must still be approved by the government in Tehran.

—"EU and Iran Begin Nuclear Talks," BBC, 25 May 2005; "Iran Agrees to Extend Nuclear Suspension While Awaiting New EU Proposal," *Global Security Newswire*, 26 May 2005.

### **25 May 2005**

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami says Tehran is "ready to compromise" and remove threats to resume enrichment activities. President Khatami adds that he does not consider activity at a uranium conversion facility as resumption of enrichment.

—"Iran Nuclear Negotiators Reconvene in Geneva," *Global Security Newswire*, 25 May 2005.

### **26 May 2005**

Islamabad provides nuclear centrifuge parts to assist the IAEA with its ongoing investigation to determine if traces of enriched uranium found in Iran were supplied by Pakistani AQ Khan.

—"Pakistan Helps Iran Nuclear Probe," BBC, 26 May 2005.

### **26 May 2005**

The United States removes veto on Iran's bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Mohammed Reza Alborzi, Iran's ambassador in Geneva, tells WTO delegates, "Today, this house with this decision has done service to itself by correcting a wrong."

—"U.S. Withdraws Veto on Iran Quest to Join WTO," *Washington Times*, 27 May 2005.

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**28 May 2005**

Iran's Guardian Council passes a law that calls on the government to develop a nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment. "Approval for the parliamentary legislation into law by the Guardian Council means Europeans should forget the idea of asking Iran to permanently freeze its nuclear activities forever," says Nayereh Akhavan, an Iranian Majlis representative of Isfahan where Iran's nuclear facilities are located.

—"Iran's Guardian Council Approves Law Forcing Government to Develop Nuclear Technology," Associated Press, 28 May 2005.

**28 May 2005**

In an interview with German magazine *Der Spiegel*, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf says Iran is "very anxious to have the [nuclear] bomb." On the following day, President Musharraf says his statements were misunderstood due to misreporting and the comments should be removed.

—"Pakistan Denies Alleged Remarks of Musharraf on Iran Anxious for Nuclear Bomb," Xinhua, 29 May 2005.

**30 May 2005**

Iran will resume its peaceful use of nuclear activity, something guaranteed under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, says Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi. Mr. Asefi assures that his country will not pursue nuclear weapons.

—"Spokesman Says Iran 'Definitely' to Resume Peaceful Nuclear Activities," Islamic Republic News Agency, 31 May 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050531014014.

**30 May 2005**

Dr. Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iranian Ambassador at the United Nation, says the United States is responsible for 90% of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty conference failures because of Washington's unwillingness to commit to nuclear disarmament. "Up to 10 kg of yellow cake is exempt from inspection and we can even exempt 57 kg as well. However, we did not do that. Until now, we have produced 530 tonnes of yellow cake and this has been done under the agency's supervision. Therefore, there were no clandestine activities," Dr. Zarif adds.

—"Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Criticizes US Policy on NPT Review Conference," Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), 30 May 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050530011090.

**31 May 2005**

U.S. President George Bush says there is progress in the negotiations with Iran but the United States will not compromise with Tehran on the uranium enrichment issue.

—"Bush Unwilling to Compromise on Iran Nuclear Issue," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 31 May 2005.

**31 May 2005**

U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says the United States and its allies have successfully intercepted 11 shipments of nuclear materials destined for Iran and North Korea in the past 9 months. "I've cited several cases involving countries of proliferation concern, including Iran," Mr. Boucher adds. "PSI [Proliferation Security Initiative] partners, working at times with others, have prevented Iran from procuring goods to support its missile and WMD programs, including its nuclear program," U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says in a speech marking the second anniversary of the PSI.

—"U.S. Says it Intercepted Nuclear Material for North Korea, Iran," Bloomberg, 1 June 2005; "ROK's Yonhap: U.S. Intercepts Nuclear, Chemical Materials to N. Korea," Seoul Yonhap, 1 June 2005, in FBIS Document KPP20050601000029.

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### **1 June 2005**

A letter addressed to Iranian President Seyyed Mohammad Khatami from Majlis deputies calls on the government to implement the law and carry out peaceful nuclear research. Alireza Zakani, a member of the Majlis presiding board, reads the letter during the Majlis session. A bill specifically ordering the government to continue enrichment is prepared but not passed as a sign of goodwill to display Iran's nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes only.

— "175 Majles Members Urge President Khatami to Pursue Nuclear Activities," Islamic Republic News Agency, 1 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050601014037.

### **3 June 2005**

EU diplomats say Iran has rejected the delay in negotiations and wants to resume talks within one month. Uranium enrichment must be part of any talks and include at least foreign ministry political directors, an EU diplomat adds. An "informed" source tells the Iranian Labor News Agency the response to the EU is not negative.

— "AFP Cites Diplomats Saying Iran Wants EU3 Talks to Resume Quickly," Agence France Presse, 3 June 2005, in FBIS Document EUP20050603102011; "Iranian Official Denies Negative Response to EU Nuclear Request," Iranian Labor News Agency, 3 June 2005, in FBIS Document AP20050603011026.

### **5 June 2005**

Iranian presidential candidate Mohsen Reza'i announces nuclear enrichment will resume within Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty guidelines if he is elected. Mr. Reza'i is the former commander in chief of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corp and current secretary of the Expediency Council.

— "Iran Presidential Candidate Reza'i Says He Will Resume Nuclear Enrichment," *Financial Times*, 5 June 2005.

### **5 June 2005**

Iran agrees to temporarily freeze its nuclear program until the end of July when the EU will provide a proposal for the next round of talks says, Ali Aghamohammadi, a spokesman for Iran's National Security Council. "To make Iran's nuclear facilities active in a proper way, both sides should work toward providing guarantees," Aghamohammadi adds.

— "Iran Extends Temporary Freeze on Nuclear Enrichment Until End of July," Associated Press, 6 June 2005; "Iran Says it Will Delay its Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 6 June 2005.

### **5 June 2005**

Sirous Nasser, head of the Iranian delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, says his country will soon reach a decision on the EU-3's proposal. "Everything will become clear soon. There is not much time left until the final decision," Mr. Nasser adds.

— "Iran 'Top Nuclear Negotiator' Says Iran Will Reach Decision on Europe's Proposal 'Soon'," *Tehran Kayhan*, 13 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050606011012.

### **7 June 2005**

Iran's senior nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, tells reporters "Iran is not seeking WMDs [weapons of mass destruction] because possession of such weapons is against our ethical and religious tenets." Mr. Rowhani adds that WMDs will not play an active role in his government's defense strategy now or in the future.

— "AFP Rowhani Says Iran Ready to Expand Security Cooperation with Kuwait," *Mehr*, 7 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050607011032; "Iran's Rowhani UAE President Discuss Regional Security," Islamic Republic News Agency, 7 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP 20050607011063.

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**7 June 2005**

Asadollah Saburi, deputy head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, announces he will visit the Russian nuclear power plant Kalinin. Mr. Saburi is also in charge of overseeing the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran.

— "Iranian Delegation to Visit Russian NPP," RIA novosti, 7 June 2005.

**9 June 2005**

Initial testing of traces of weapons grade uranium found in Iran two years ago appears to have originated outside of Iran, say two IAEA diplomats. Additional testing is still required and final results will not be available for another month, one of the senior diplomats adds. Both diplomats insist anonymity since they are not authorized to discuss any of the confidential results.

— George Jahn, "Official: Probe Backs Iran on Nuke Claims," Associated Press, 9 June 2005.

**9 June 2005**

Western intelligence officials report that preparatory work is underway at the Natanz plant in Iran to install thousands of centrifuges. The officials say 54,000 centrifuges will be manufactured and installed in the underground facility and that 2/3 of them would be P-2 models.

— Douglas Frantz, "Iran Preparing for Advanced Nuclear Work, Officials Say," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 June 2005.

**10 June 2005**

A senior diplomat from the International Atomic Energy Agency reports that determining the origin of uranium traces found in Iran may be difficult since the samples consist of different enrichment levels and compositions.

— "Even in Best Case for Tehran, Tests May Not Absolve Iran Fully," Global Security Newswire, 10 June 2005.

**10 June 2005**

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami issues a statement stressing that the law to acquire peaceful nuclear technology be fully enforced. The law compels Iran to equip the country with peaceful nuclear technology including the fuel cycle within the framework of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

— "Iran to Implement Law to Acquire Peaceful Nuclear Technology," *Financial Times*, 10 June 2005.

**12 June 2005**

The London Sunday Times reports that North Korean construction experts are in Iran surveying and assisting with secret constructions of underground bunkers that could hide nuclear weapons projects.

— Con Coughlin, "North Korea to Help Iran Dig Secret Missile Bunkers," *London Sunday Times*, 12 June 2005.

**12 June 2005**

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has found no violations after inspecting Natanz. Tehran had barred the IAEA from entering parts of this facility during past inspections.

— "Iran: Spokesman Says IAEA Reports No Violation in Iran's Nuclear Program," Islamic Republic News Agency, 10 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050612011005.

**14 June 2005**

During his opening statement to the board, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Mohammed ElBaradei announces that Iran needs to facilitate the IAEA's job by cooperating with investigators and allowing access to

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more suspected weapons sites. The United States says there is one site where Iran may be testing components for nuclear weapons and the IAEA believes there is another where dual purpose equipment may be stored. "I would...ask Iran to support the agency's efforts to pursue further its investigation of the Lavizan-Shian and Parchin sites," ElBaradei adds.

— Susan Loof, "IAEA Urges More Cooperation From Iran," Associated Press, 15 June 2005; Louis Charbonneau and Francois Murphy, "UN's ElBaradei Demands Access to Iran Military Site," Reuters, 14 June 2005.

#### **15 June 2005**

Head of the Iranian delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Sirous Nasserri says visits to sites, such as Parchin, go beyond IAEA required inspections. The United States claims high explosive testing involving nuclear materials are occurring at Parchin.

— "Iranian Negotiator 'Hints' No Inspections at Suspect Nuclear Site 'Anytime Soon'," Agence France Presse, 15 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050615102019.

#### **15 June 2005**

A draft IAEA report indicates Tehran has admitted to processing plutonium as recently as 1998 after being confronted with the results of samples collected in Iran. A draft speech is scheduled to be made to the International Atomic Energy Agency on June 16 by deputy director for safeguards Pierre Goldschmidt.

— "More on IAEA Says Iran Admits to Processing Plutonium in 1998," Agence France Presse, 15 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050615102022; Richard Bernstein, "Iran Said to Admit Tests on Path to Atom Arms," *New York Times*, 16 June 2005.

#### **15 June 2005**

Iranian presidential candidate Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani says "it's possible that at times, Iran has not reported its activities." The International Atomic Energy Agency draft report indicates that Iran reported receiving bellows [used to connect rotors in a gas centrifuge] in 1997 when in fact the date is closer to 1994/95. The report further says Tehran admitted to "purifying one bottle of plutonium in 1995 and solution in a second bottle as late as 1998." Mr. Rafsanjani accuses the IAEA of not assisting Iran with its peaceful use of nuclear technology.

— "Austria: IAEA Expecting New Revelations on Iran Plutonium Experiments," Agence France Presse, 16 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050616102016; "Iran 'Misled UN on Nuclear Work'," BBC, 15 June 2005.

#### **16 June 2005**

IAEA Director for Safeguards Pierre Goldschmidt states Iran has admitted to providing incorrect information about past experiments involving plutonium. Tehran had claimed all such research ceased in 1993, but results from recent tests show experiments took place in 1995 and 1998. "Iran confirmed the agency's understanding with regard to the chronology," Mr. Goldschmidt adds. The IAEA is still also attempting to obtain crucial shipping documents from Tehran to determine the amount of enrichment related equipment Iran has received. "The agency has asked to see the original supporting documentation of the two Iranian representatives who participated in the meetings with the intermediaries. No positive reply has been received thus far," the report says.

— Greg Webb, "Iran Admits Misstating Plutonium Program to IAEA," Global Security Newswire, 16 June 2005; Alissa Rubin, "Iran Admits More Nuclear Activity," *New York Times*, 16 June 2005.

#### **16 June 2005**

In response to a request from the British Prime Minister and French President to stop uranium enrichment, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says, "we have always emphasized the need to have fuel cycle in line with the international conventions and are waiting for a comprehensive plan from the EU to recognize Iranian

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right to enrich uranium to produce fuel for power plant."

— "Iran Rejects UK-French Call to Halt Uranium Enrichment," Islamic Republic News Agency, 16 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050616012001.

#### **17 June 2005**

Iran claims the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) erred when it reported on Tehran's nuclear experiments. The Iranian delegation says research related to plutonium separation terminated in 1993, but "other activities such as the ones related to purification and related waste management [continued.]" IAEA Chief ElBaradei denies Iran's claim and says the report is correct. The IAEA sets up a special committee to address difficult verification problems such as Iran's nuclear program. U.S. ambassador Jackie Sanders tells reporters: "The proliferation challenges of today, including North Korea and Iran and the revelation of nuclear procurement networks, call for more evolution. The new committee should play a key role in helping us meet these challenges." — George Jahn, "IAEA to Crack Down on Nuke Proliferators," Associated Press, 17 June 2005; "Iran Rejects IAEA Accusation on Plutonium," Agence France Presse, 17 June 2005, in FBIS Document EUP20050617102020.

#### **17 June 2005**

Deputy Head of Political and International Affairs at the Iranian Foreign Ministry Ali Asghar Soltani complains about the recent release of sensitive nuclear information. "Once again, certain confidential and technical information about the research project of dividing Pu [plutonium] was provided to the Security Council members that led to the devising of a well-documented and comprehensive discussion and expressing of opinions on a wide range of issues highlighted in the report of the IAEA deputy head, including the Pu project," Mr. Soltani adds.

— "Iran Protest Leakage to Media of Sensitive Nuclear Information," Islamic Republic News Agency, 17 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050617011050.

#### **18 June 2005**

Head of the Iranian delegation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Sirous Nasseri announces that the IAEA will be visiting Iran to resolve the plutonium production issue. Mr. Nasseri claims the confusion is a result of a difference of opinion and his country has agreed to some experiments in order to reach a clear result.

— "International Atomic Energy Agency Delegation Will Visit Iran to Resolve Plutonium Issue," *Financial Times*, 18 June 2005.

#### **23 June 2005**

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw says Iran's nuclear agreement with Russia is consistent with the NPT. "Russia is under contract first to provide both the design of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr in Iran and also to supply it with fuel and that is consistent with both Russia and Iran's obligations under the NPT," Secretary Straw adds.

— "Russia to Deliver Nuclear Fuel for Bushehr Power Plant in Few Months - Iranian Official," *Moscow News*, 23 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050622011003.

#### **23 June 2005**

Former UNMOVIC chief Hans Blix states Iran is "many years away from being able to convert enriched uranium into a bomb." Mr. Blix describes the Bushehr nuclear plant as being built with low-grade nuclear technology, but warns that Iran has "acquired the capacity to enrich uranium out of their own uranium that they dig out of the ground."

— "Blix Says Iran 'Many Years Away' from Nuclear Bomb-Making Capacity," Agence France Presse, 23 June 2005, in FBIS Document EUP20050623102002.

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**24 June 2005**

Senior nuclear negotiator for the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Hossein Mousavian announces that 95% of Iranians support the government's nuclear program.

—"Determined to Continue Civilian Nuclear Programme - Official," *Financial Times*, 24 June 2005.

**26 June 2005**

Iranian President elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says he will support his government's nuclear program. "It is the right of the Iranian nation to move forward in all fields and acquire modern technology. Nuclear technology is the outcome of scientific progress of Iranian youth," Mr. Ahmadinejad adds.

—"Ahmadinezhad: Iran Will Continue Nuclear Program, Says Does Not Need US Help," IRNA, 26 June 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050626011045.

**27 June 2005**

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder urges new nuclear talks with Tehran after the Iranian presidential elections. The new negotiations surrounding Iran's nuclear program must provide "verifiable guarantees that Iran did not build any nuclear weapons," Chancellor Schroeder adds.

—"Germany's Schroeder Urges New Talks on Iran's Nuclear Program," *Cologne Deutschlandfunk*, 27 June 2005, in FBIS Document EUP20050627086006.

**27 June 2005**

International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors arrive in Iran for what Iranian state-run television says are "within the framework of regular inspections of designated sites."

—"UN Nuclear Inspectors Return to Iran," Agence France Presse, 27 June 2005.

**27 June 2005**

U.S. President George Bush tells German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder that the EU-3 must continue applying pressure on Tehran to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear arms arsenal. "My message to the chancellor is that we continue working with Great Britain, France and Germany to send a focused, concerted, unified message that says the development of a nuclear weapon is unacceptable and a process which would enable Iran to development a nuclear weapon is unacceptable," President Bush adds.

—"Bush Maintains Support for European Diplomatic Effort on Iranian Nuclear Program," *Global Security Newswire*, 27 June 2005.

**28 June 2005**

Aleksander Rumyantsev, head of Russia's Atomic Energy Agency, says "Tehran intends to build another six nuclear reactors." "When Iran announces new tenders to construct nuclear reactors, we'll take part in them," Rumyantsev adds.

—"Russia Wants to Build More Nuke Reactors for Iran," Reuters, 28 June 2005.

**28 June 2005**

International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors arrive in Iran to inspect nuclear facilities.

—"IAEA Experts Arrive in Iran to Inspect Nuclear Facilities," RIA Novosti, 28 June 2005.

**29 June 2005**

U.S. President George Bush issues an executive order "freezing all US assets of eight organizations in Iran, North Korea and Syria deemed to be involved in weapons proliferation, including the Iranian government's Atomic

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Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)." The order will also be used to prevent other countries from engaging in business with those identified as proliferators.

—"Sanctions Threat Over Iran Nuclear Programme," *Financial Times*, 1 July 2005.

#### **2 July 2005**

A high-level official French source says Paris has "intelligence information indicating that Tehran is continuing with its nuclear activities despite its commitment to cease the enrichment and conversion operations."

—"French Source Underlines France's 'Hard-line' Stand on Iran's Nuclear Activities," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 2 July 2005, in FBIS Document GMP20050702700003.

#### **5 July 2005**

Gholamreza Aqazadeh, director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO), says he is not optimistic about the European long-term accord. Mr. Aqazadeh adds that his country is willing to give concessions, but only if Tehran can continue its nuclear activities.

—"IAEO Chief Says Abandoning Nuclear Fuel Cycle 'Greatest Historical Mistake'," *Mission for Establishment of Human Rights*, 5 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050705011054.

#### **5 July 2005**

Iran's Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi tells reporters that "the Europeans should submit their proposal on Iran's nuclear activities by 1 August. However, we will not accept their proposal unless our right to enrich uranium is recognized."

—"Iran's Asefi Says Uranium Enrichment Right Non-Negotiable," Islamic Students News Agency, 5 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050705011038.

#### **6 July 2005**

Iran's state news agency reports that Hassan Rowhani, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, has resigned. A spokesman for Mr. Rowhani denies the report and says he will remain at his position until the new president takes office.

—Nasser Karimi, "Iran's Top Nuclear Negotiator Resigns, State News Agency Says, but Spokesman Denies Report," Associated Press, 6 July 2005; "Iranian Nuclear Chief 'Resigns'," *Independent*, 7 July 2005.

#### **6 July 2005**

Gholamreza Aqazadeh, Director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO), says his government is willing to compromise on the "condition that we can continue our nuclear activities." Mr. Aqazadeh adds that he is not optimistic about the European proposals due by the end of July.

—"Iran's Access to Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Irreversible; IAEO Director," *Tehran Times*, 6 July 2005.

#### **7 July 2005**

Iran asks the International Atomic Energy Agency if it can "break U.N. seals and test atomic equipment that has been mothballed under an agreement with three European Union powers." Mohammed Saeedi, deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization says the testing would not violate Tehran's voluntary suspension of nuclear activities.

—"Iran Seeks Permission to Test Nuclear Equipment," *Los Angeles Times*, 7 July 2005.

#### **6 July 2005**

Intelligence reports obtained from a non-U.S. diplomat in Austria indicate nuclear cooperation between North Korea and Iran has increased. One report says an academic delegation consisting of North Korean scientists and

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atomic technicians held a secret masters course in Tehran on dual-use nuclear technology.  
—Louis Charbonneau, "N. Korea Provides Nuclear Aid to Iran - Intel Reports," Reuters, 6 July 2005.

#### **8 July 2005**

Kazem Jalali of the Iranian Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Committee announces that Iran will build 20 nuclear power plants over the next few years.  
—"Iran Discusses Plans for 20 Nuclear Power Plants with Russia," Interfax, 8 July 2005, in FBIS Document CEP20050708027167.

#### **12 July 2005**

Ali Aqa Mohammadi, head of the Iranian Publicity Committee of the Supreme National Security Council announces that the Iran-EU working committee for nuclear issues will resume talks on 18 July. Head of the Iranian delegation to the IAEA Sirous Nasser and senior nuclear negotiator for the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Hossein Mousavian reiterate that if the official European proposal does not address the main issues raised by Iran, Tehran would resume uranium conversion at the Isfahan facility.  
—"Israeli Iran-EU to Resume Nuclear Talks 18 July; Resuming Uranium Conversion Issue Raised," *Tehran Vision*, 12 July 2005, in FBIS Document AP20050712011037; Nazila Fathi, "Iranians Warning Europe of Resumed Atomic Effort," *New York Times*, 12 July 2005.

#### **13 July 2005**

Head of Russian agency Rosatom Aleksander Rumyantsev proposes to the International Atomic Energy Agency a "scheme to set up a guaranteed reserve stock of nuclear fuel, which would be placed under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This reserve would guarantee fuel deliveries to nuclear power plants in the event that commercial deliveries stop."  
—"Russia Proposes Creating Reserve Stock of Nuclear Fuel Under IAEA Control," RIA Novosti, 13 July 2005.

#### **13 July 2005**

Iran's senior nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani says he may be replaced and the new negotiating team may reverse Tehran's decision to freeze uranium related work. "I don't think anyone is against negotiations, but there might be a difference in our approach about suspension. It is possible that this different viewpoint may be implemented," Rowhani adds.  
—Paul Hughes, "Iran's Top Nuclear Negotiator Says May be Replaced," Reuters, 13 July 2005.

#### **17 July 2005**

Hossein Mousavian, nuclear negotiator for the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, says the European Union is waiting for the new Iranian government to form before nuclear negotiations continue.  
—"Iran's Nuclear Negotiator says EU to Continue Talks when New Government Formed," IRNA, 18 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050717011049.

#### **18 July 2005**

Mohammad Mohaddessin, chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group, warns that Iran's mullahs have made progress in their pursuit of a nuclear bomb and adds that terrorist and fundamentalist activities will continue.  
—"Iranian Resistance Warns of Mullahs' Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Bombs," National Council of Resistance of Iran, 18 July 2005.

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**18 July 2005**

Hossein Mousavian, a senior nuclear negotiator for the Iranian Supreme National Security Council says "as a result of the negotiations [between the EU-3 and Iran], not only Iran's nuclear capabilities were preserved, and we were spared a military attack, but we were also able to complete our nuclear capabilities because of the atmosphere it created."

—"Iranian Resistance Warns of Mullahs' Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Bombs," National Council of Resistance of Iran, 18 July 2005.

**18 July 2005**

Insufficient funds by the Iranian government have delayed construction and pushed back the completion date of the Bushehr plant by several months, says a Russian Atomstroyeksport representative. Sergey Stepashin, head of the Russian Audit Chamber, announces that a parallel Russian-Iranian investigation will be initiated to determine why the project has been delayed. Stepashin says that Yevgeniy Adamov, former Russian minister for nuclear energy who established Atomstroyeksport in 1998 (currently under arrest in Switzerland on fraud charges brought by the United States), will also be questioned.

—"Russian Official Says Lack of Funds from Iran Delaying Bushehr Nuclear Project," Interfax, 18 July 2005, in FBIS Document CEP20050718027210; "Iran Wants to Questions Former Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Adamov, Arrested in Switzerland," Bellona, 18 July 2005.

**18 July 2005**

Senior nuclear negotiator for Iran's Supreme National Security Council Hossein Mousavian, says Iran will grant the EU-3 an extension to "reach an understanding with the new government and the new Iran-EU negotiating team regarding a fuel cycle settlement"—[but] if the EU insists upon suspension of uranium enrichment—"Iran will reject this demand."

—"Senior Iranian Official: Europe Will Recognize Iran's Right to a Limited Nuclear Fuel Cycle; Iran to Start Operations at Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility," Middle East Media Research Institute , No. 940, 22 July 2005.

**19 July 2005**

Ala'eddin Borujerdi, head of the Iranian National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Majles warns that "If the Europeans' suggestion does not guarantee Iran's access to peaceful nuclear technology, the Islamic Republic of Iran will stop the process of nuclear negotiations with Europe."

—"Iran: Majles Members Assert Right to Develop Peaceful Nuclear Technology," *Keyhan*, 19 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050725011043.

**20 July 2005**

Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, announces that the EU-3 will present Iran with its final comprehensive plan on Tehran's nuclear issue in early August.

—"Iranian Nuclear Spokesman Says Rowhani's Message Delivered to EU," *Mehr*, 22 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050722011041.

**20 July 2005**

According to the Iranian newspaper *Keyhan*, former Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) chief Ali Larijani will replace Kamal Kharrazi as Iran's foreign minister.

—"Iranian 'Transition Committee' Favors Former Media Chief for Foreign Ministry," Iran News, 20 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050720011089.

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**21 July 2005**

Iran's president-elect, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Tehran will not pursue atomic weapons or submit to international pressure to abandon its nuclear program.

— "President-Elect Says No to Nuclear Arms," *Chicago Tribune*, 22 July 2005.

**21 July 2005**

Iran's president elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tells a religious gathering that the international community must endeavor to destroy weapons of mass destruction. "We hate nuclear weapons, we are committed to international regulations but will not submit to the irrational wishes of and pressures from other powers," adds Mr. Ahmadinejad.

— "Iranian President-Elect Calls on International Community to Destroy WMD," Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1, 21 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050721011033.

**22 July 2005**

French President Jacques Chirac says Iran will be referred to the U.N. Security Council if they do not eliminate the threat of nuclear proliferation. "I hope that [the negotiations] will succeed and eliminate the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons," Chirac adds. "If this does not prove to be the case, it will, of course, be necessary to transfer the handling to the UN Security Council."

— Adar Primor, "Chirac: Iran's Nuclear Plan May Lead to Sanctions," *Haaretz*, 22 July 2005.

**23 July 2005**

Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi says, "If the European proposals ignore Iran's right to have access to peaceful nuclear technology we will reject it and decide on another course of action."

— "Foreign Minister Kharrazi Says Iran May Reject EU Nuclear Proposals," Islamic Republic News Agency, 23 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050723009010.

**23 July 2005**

Over 13,000 professors and students present Iranian President Mohammad Khatami with a letter calling on him to lift the suspension on uranium enrichment. The letter called on the government "to defend our scientific dignity and national pride."

— "Thousands of Iranian Academics Urge President Khatami to End Nuclear Suspension," *Mehr*, 23 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050723011047; "Iranian Students Urge Tehran to Resume Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 23 July 2005.

**24 July 2005**

EU nonproliferation chief Annalisa Giannella says that Europe is interested in getting from Iran an "'objective guarantee' that their nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes." Asked if permanent cessation of uranium enrichment is the only way Iran can meet that need, Ms. Giannella responds that any enrichment related activities cannot be regarded as carrying out "normal activities".

— Oliver Meier, "The European Union's Nonproliferation Strategy: An Interview with Annalisa Giannella, the Personal Representative on Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to EU High Representative Javier Solana," Arms Control Association, 24 July 2005.

**25 July 2005**

German magazine *Der Spiegel* reports that Iran continues to purchase additional nuclear weapons parts. According to secret documents viewed by *Der Spiegel*, Iran instructs its South Korean partners to purchase materials from,

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for example, the French-based company EADS Sodern, once in South Korea the items are shipped to Iran. Through this method, where the seller is not aware of the final buyer, Iran has purchased 300 units of Nickel 63 and tritium targets. Both items are considered dual-use products which can be used to build a nuclear bomb or as part of a peaceful nuclear energy reactor.

— "German Magazine Reports Iran Continuing to Buy Parts for Nuclear Weapons," *Financial Times*, 25 July 2005; "Iran Acquiring Nuclear Parts from Europe Report," *Iran Focus*, 26 July 2005.

### **27 July 2005**

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami says regardless of the EU proposal, Iran will resume uranium enrichment. An unidentified high ranking Iranian nuclear official adds that part of the nuclear activities will "begin on 1 August if Europe fails to respect the countrys minimum demand at this stage."

— "Iran Firm on Nuclear Resumption," *BBC*, 27 July 2005; "Iran Informs IAEA of Intention to Resume Activities at 'Some' Nuclear Centers," *Mehr*, 27 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050727005002.

### **28 July 2005**

Chairman of the International Relations Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran Mohammad Mohaddessin states that Tehran is acquiring Maraging Steel to produce a nuclear bomb through illicit means. Mr. Mohaddessin claims the steel is illegally smuggled to Iran from other countries by the Iranian Defense Ministry imports, the Iranian National Steel Company (NSC) and its Director General, Amir Harati. Mr. Mohaddessin accuses the regime of using different front companies to illegally purchase Maraging Steel, such as ASCOTEC, in Iran, Germany and the United Arab Emirates, and ICS in Russia.

— "Iran Secretly Acquiring Super-Strong Steel for Nuclear Bomb - Exile," *Iran Focus*, 28 July 2005; "Iran After Obtaining Maraging Steel to Build Nuclear Bomb Casing," *National Council of Resistance of Iran*, 28 July 2005.

### **31 July 2005**

Mehdi Akhundzadeh, Iran's envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Sirous Nasser, Iran's nuclear negotiator, submit a letter to the IAEA, which states that Iran will break the seals and resume nuclear activities at the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi adds that the resumption of nuclear activities will not include the advanced process required to make fuel or weapons.

— "Official Says Iran to Break Seal at Esfahan UCF in Presence of IAEA Inspectors," *Mission for Establishment of Human Rights*, 31 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050731011032; Nazila Fathi and Alan Cowell, "Iran Threatens to Resume Uranium Enrichment," *New York Times*, 1 August 2005.

### **31 July 2005**

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, says the EU-3 must provide a non-aggressions pledge as one incentive for Tehran to forfeit uranium enrichment. Mr. Rowhani also agrees that Iran should continue to freeze on nuclear activities for the time being.

— "Iran Threatens to Resume Nuclear Program Unless EU Offers Non-Aggression Deal," *Guardian*, 1 August 2005, in FBIS Document GMP20050801618005.

### **1 August 2005**

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says that Monday is the last day the EU-3 can submit its proposal to Iran and that there will be no further opportunities to offer their comprehensive plans.

— "Iran Says 'No Other Opportunity' for EU to Submit Nuclear Proposals," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 27 July 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050801011008.

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### **1 August 2005**

A high-ranking Israeli Defense Forces officer says that Tel-Aviv has revised its earlier estimate that Iran would have a nuclear bomb by 2008. Based on new intelligence the estimate is closer to 2012. The officer adds that Iran no longer operates parallel secret military and civilian nuclear program, citing that the military nuclear weapons program is now dependent on its civilian program. In January of 2005, Israeli Mossad Chief Meri Dagan and Vice President Shimon Peres said Iran was the world's most serious threat because it was less than three years away from building a nuclear bomb.

— "Israel's New Estimate: Iran has no Secret Military Track, to have A-Bomb by 2012," *Jerusalem Post*, 1 August 2005, in FBIS Document GMP20050801618005.

### **1 August 2005**

A new U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concludes that Iran is ten years away from developing a nuclear weapon.

— Dafna Linzer, "Iran is Judged 10 Years from Nuclear Bomb," *Washington Post*, 2 August 2005.

### **1 August 2005**

The mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran presents the Secretariat of the IAEA a Verbal Note stating that the EU-3 proposal, "fails to address Iran's rights for peaceful development of nuclear technology, [and] even falls far short of correcting the illegal and unjustified restrictions placed on Iran's economic and technological development"—and firm commitments on security issues." The Iranian Mission further states that the negotiations are not proceeding and that the EU-3 goal is to keep the suspension in place. In light of the IAEA Board of Governors underlining the suspension as "a voluntary, non-legal binding confidence building measure," Iran announces it will resume the uranium conversion activities at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) on 1 August 2005. Iran is committed to non-proliferation and a zone free of WMD in the Middle East, therefore the Islamic Republic of Iran will "continue in good faith and in an expeditious and result-oriented manner, its negotiations with E3/EU," the Iranian Mission concludes.

— "Verbal Note from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency," INFCIRC/648, Verbal Note No.: 350-1-17/928, 1 August 2005.

### **1 August 2005**

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei calls on Iran to "continue the negotiation process with the E3/EU and not to take any action that might prejudice the process at this critical stage when the E3/EU are expected to deliver a package addressing security and political, economic and nuclear issues." "I also call on Iran not to take any unilateral action that could undermine the Agency inspection process at a time when the Agency is making steady progress in resolving outstanding issues."

— "Statement by the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei on Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, 1 August 2005.

### **1 August 2005**

Iran announces in an official Note Verbale to the IAEA that it will resume uranium activities at the Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. The United Nations tells Iran that it could take the International Atomic Energy Agency up to 10 days to install the necessary surveillance equipment at the Isfahan facility before nuclear activities can restart.

— Nazila Fathi, "Iran Tells Europe it's Devoted to Nuclear Efforts and Talks," *New York Times*, 4 August 2005; "Note Verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/648, 1 August 2005.

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### **2 August 2005**

Ali Agha Mohammadi, spokesman for Iran's Supreme National Security Council, says his government has agreed to a two-day delay so that the International Atomic Energy Agency can oversee the dismantling of the United Nations seals at the Isfahan nuclear conversion facility. Iran is also willing to suspend restarting nuclear work if the EU-3 submit draft proposals through 7 August, Mr. Mohammadi adds. IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming says, "We have sent a letter to Iran indicating that it would take at least a week to get our surveillance equipment and other required measures in place."

— Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran to Delay Reopening Nuclear Plant," Associated Press, 2 August 2005; "Iran Delays Resumption of Isfahan Nuclear Center," RIA-Novosti, 2 August 2005.

### **2 August 2005**

The British Foreign Office warns Iran that if it resumes nuclear activities at the Isfahan facility, "negotiations between Iran and Europe would probably be halted."

— Nazila Fathi, "Iran Says it will Break U.N. Seals at a Nuclear Plant," *New York Times*, 2 August 2005.

### **2 August 2005**

White House spokesman Scott McClellan states that Iran will be referred to the United Nations Security Council if Tehran restarts nuclear related activities. "We've made clear that if Iran's going to violate its agreement and restart uranium reprocessing and enrichment activities, then we would have to look to the next step, and we'd be talking with our Europeans friends about that next step," McClellan adds.

— "US Issues Warning After Iran Threat to Resume Nuclear Work," *Bahrain Tribune*, 3 August 2005.

### **2 August 2005**

French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy calls Iran's announcement to resume nuclear activities a "major international crisis". Minister Douste-Blazy insist Tehran must return to the negotiation table and "if the Iranians still do not accept what the council of governors propose, then the international community must turn to the Security Council [and] we will see what type of sanctions to give to Iran," Douste-Blazy adds.

— Christine Ollivier, "France Urges U.N. Intervention with Iran," Associated Press, 2 August 2005.

### **3 August 2005**

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, says Iran wants to continue negotiations with the EU-3 and restart nuclear activities. "Once the Isfahan plant restarts, we want to continue the negotiations with the Europeans," Mr. Rowhani adds.

— Nazila Fathi, "Iran Tells Europe it's Devoted to Nuclear Efforts and Talks," *New York Times*, 4 August 2005; "Iran Anger at European 'Threat'," BBC, 4 August 2005.

### **3 August 2005**

France, Germany and Great Britain submit a letter to Iran urging them not to resume enrichment activities or dialogue between the countries would cease. Iran's top nuclear negotiator Hassan Rowhani responds and says, "They [the EU-3] have clearly told us that if uranium conversion activities start, the talks will be cut off, but this is not acceptable to us. We are ready to continue the talks and the talks would never be cut off by us. But if Europe is willing to stop the talks, this is up to them"... "Iran is prepared to stand against any threats and in case of referral to the Security Council, it is the Europeans who will lose and not Iranians."

— Najmed Bozorgmehr and Christopher Adams, "Iran Calls Decision on Uranium 'Irreversible'," *Financial Times*, 4 August 2005.

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### 3 August 2005

Iran's Supreme National Security Council spokesman Ali Aghamohammadi says the request by the International Atomic Energy Agency to suspend restarting uranium conversion for one week while surveillance equipment is installed is unacceptable.

— "Iran Hopes for Nuclear Restart," CNN, 4 August 2005.

### 4 August 2005

Iran's chief nuclear affairs negotiator and Supreme National Security Council member Hossein Mousavian, says in a televised interview that the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was completed in 2004. "Thanks to our dealings with Europe, even when we got a 50-day ultimatum, we managed to continue the work for two years. This way we completed (the UCF) in Esfahan. This way we carried out the work to complete Natanz, and on top of that, we even gained benefits." Mr. Mousavian adds that "Within that year, the Natanz project reached a stage where the small number of centrifuges required for the preliminary stage, could operate. In Esfahan, we have reached UF4 and UF6 production stages."

— "Chief Iranian Nuclear Affairs Negotiator Hosein Musavian: The Negotiations with Europe Bought Us Time to Complete the Esfahan UCF Project and the Work on the Centrifuges in Natanz," MEMRI, 4 August 2005.

### 5 August 2005

A spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency announces that the governing board will hold a special session to discuss Iran's nuclear program on 9 August.

— "Update 1 'EU3 Calls UN Nuclear Agency Meeting on Iran' IAEA," Reuters, 5 August 2005.

### 5 August 2005

German, French and British Ambassadors deliver the 'Framework for a Long-term Agreement' proposal to Iran. An accompanying letter states the, "E3/EU remain open to discussion of all proposals that could lead to the conclusion of satisfactory long-term arrangements on the basis of the Paris Agreement." The 34 page document sets out possible elements for a future agreement and consist of five main topics: Preamble, Political & Security Co-Operation, Long-Term Support for Iran's Civil Nuclear Programme, Economic & Technological Co-Operation, and Review Mechanism. Under Long-Term Support for Iran's Civil Nuclear Programme the proposal specifically calls on Iran to exclude fuel-cycle related activity, make a "binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than the construction and operation of light water power and research reactors", and "stop construction of its Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak".

— "Text of European Union's Proposal to Iran," *Mehr*, 8 August 2005.

### 5 August 2005

Senior nuclear negotiator for Iran's Supreme National Security Council Hossein Mousavian announces his country rejects the European Union's package of trade and technology incentives because it requires Tehran to abandon all nuclear fuel work. "The proposals are unacceptable"—[and] negate Iran's inalienable right," says Mr. Mousavian. The proposal, part of a document titled 'Framework for a Long-term Agreement', offers Iran long-term support of its civilian nuclear program, but does not allow Tehran to pursue fuel cycle activities with the exception of light water power and research reactors.

— "Iran Rejects 'Unacceptable' EU Nuclear Offer," Agence France Presse, 5 August 2005; Ed Johnson, "Europe Offers Iran Civilian Nuke Support," Associated Press, 5 August 2005.

### 6 August 2005

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says Tehran will not be intimidated by the European's or

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referral to the U.N. Security Council. "Iran is not much familiar with the language of threat, and it is not effective," Asefi tells reporters at a weekly briefing. "What interests us is cooperation. We advise Europe to withdraw its threats."

— "Iran Dismisses Prospects of Being Referred to UN Security Council," Associated Press, 7 August 2005.

#### **6 August 2005**

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is sworn in as Iran's new president.

— "Iran Swears in Hardline President," BBC, 6 August 2005.

#### **7 August 2005**

Head of Foreign Policy Committee of Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Manouchehr Mottaki, says that the seals at the Isfahan facility should be removed by 8 August. "After unsealing of Isfahan's UCF, we should announce our readiness to negotiate with European partners to unseal Natanz facility and restart fuel cycle work", Mr. Mottaki states at the Majlis opening session.

— "Iran: MP Calls for Breaking Seals at Esfahan by 8 Aug," Islamic Republic News Agency, 7 August 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050807011023.

#### **7 August 2005**

Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Gholamreza Aqazadeh officially rejects Europe's recent proposal regarding Iran's nuclear issues. "The issues which are peripheral to the main topics of discussion in the negotiations"—must be eliminated from the main agenda of the negotiations. That is because we believe that such issues have overshadowed the main issues," Mr. Aqazadeh says. "In their proposal, they have used certain words to call for the total stoppage of nuclear activities and this ranges from mining uranium ore the enrichment of uranium and subsequent stages." "The Europeans rejected our proposal without giving us any reasons for doing so and they stated that they themselves had put forward a comprehensive proposal on this matter," adds Mr. Aqazadeh.

— "Iranian Atomic Energy Chief Says EU Proposal 'Insulting'," ISNA, 7 August 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050807011061.

#### **8 August 2005**

Iran feeds uranium ore concentrate into the first part of the process line at the Isfahan uranium conversion facility. The International Atomic Energy Agency begins installing additional surveillance equipment at Isfahan.

— "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2005/67, 2 September 2005.

#### **8 August 2005**

Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, announces that the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility has resumed nuclear activities. "We are restarting work in Isfahan stage by stage, as technical work requires to do so. Today, we restarted work for production of AUC [ammonium uranyl carbonate]," Mr. Saeedi says. "We won't restart work in Natanz for now. We hope we will reach a logical conclusion in talks with Europeans," he adds.

— "Iran Resumes Nuclear Activities at Esfahan's Uranium Conversion Facility," ISNA, 8 August 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050808011004; "Iran Restarts Nuclear Programme," BBC, 8 August 2005.

#### **8 August 2005**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tells UN chief Kofi Annan, "We are ready to continue the negotiations

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with the Europeans. I have initiatives and new propositions that I am going to announce after my government is formed." "We want to continue the negotiations but we want to continue them in the framework of the rules of the International Atomic Energy Agency," President Ahmadinejad adds.

— "Ahmadinejad Ready for More Nuclear Talks Despite 'Insult' ," *Khaleej Times*, 9 August 2005; "Iran Says has New Nuclear Proposal as IAEA Meets ," *Khaleej Times*, 9 August 2005.

#### **8 August 2005**

Sirous Nasseri, head of the Iranian delegation to the IAEA, says his government is interested in negotiating with the EU-3, but only on terms satisfactory to Tehran.

— "Ahmadinejad Ready for More Nuclear Talks Despite 'Insult' ," *Khaleej Times*, 9 August 2005; "Iran Says has New Nuclear Proposal as IAEA Meets ," *Khaleej Times*, 9 August 2005.

#### **8 August 2005**

The Russian Foreign Ministry calls on Iran to halt all uranium conversion work and cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

— "Russia Calls on Iran to Stop Conversion Work ," *Khaleej Times*, 9 August 2005.

#### **9 August 2005**

IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei calls on all countries to "exercise maximum restraint, desist from taking any unilateral actions and continue the negotiation process." "The board has clearly stated in the past that although suspension of enrichment related and conversion activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran is a voluntary decision, it is nonetheless essential for confidence-building and for resolution of outstanding issues relevant to Iran's past undeclared activities," Director ElBaradei adds.

— "IAEA Chief Briefs Press on Iran ," International Atomic Energy Agency, 9 August 2005.

#### **9 August 2005**

Iran rejects European proposals to limit its program in return for economic incentives. Sirous Nasseri, head of the Iranian delegation to the IAEA, says "there is no reason to suspend this activity." Mr. Nasseri adds that his country is interested in offering a proposal of its own and is willing to continue negotiations.

— "Iran Rejects Halt in Atom Activity, but is Likely to Continue Talks ," *New York Times*, 10 August 2005.

#### **9 August 2005**

U.S President George Bush says he views Iranian President Mohammed Ahmadinejad's willingness to continue negotiations as a positive sign.

— Dafna Linzer, "Bush Cautiously Optimistic as Iran Offers to Negotiate," *Washington Post*, 10 August 2005.

#### **9 August 2005**

Director General Mohammed ElBaradei briefs the press on the IAEA's verification work in Iran and confirms that Tehran has introduced feed material into the conversion plant. Director ElBaradei states that he has "been discussing and consulting with many Member States to develop what we call assurance of supply scheme by which countries will have reactor technology and the fuel they need and not necessarily sit on enrichment facilities or reprocessing facilities."

— "Transcripts of the Director General's Press Statement on Activities in Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, 9 August 2005.

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**9 August 2005**

Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani says Tehran would rather face sanctions than back down on its nuclear program and submit to humiliation. Minister Shamkhani also warns that if Iran's nuclear facilities are attacked, Tehran will "put aside all our nuclear commitments".

— "Iran Says Will Drop Nuclear Pledges if Attacked," Reuters, 9 August 2005; "Iran Would Rather be Hit by Sanctions than Back Down Over Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 9 August 2005.

**9 August 2005**

Iranian dissident and spokesman for Mujahedeen-e Khalq, Alireza Jafarzadeh, says Iran has manufactured approximately 4,000 centrifuges, unknown to the International Atomic Energy Agency, capable of enriching uranium to weapons grade.

— William Kole, "Dissident: Tehran has 4,000 Centrifuges," Associated Press, 9 August 2005.

**10 August 2005**

Iran removes IAEA seals from the remaining parts of the process line at the Isfahan uranium conversion facility.

— "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2005/67, 2 September 2005.

**10 August 2005**

Peter Rickwood, International Atomic Energy Agency spokesman, announces that Wednesday's scheduled IAEA meeting with diplomats to address Iran's nuclear activities is cancelled. Mr. Rickwood says more time is required to reach consensus and several diplomats would be meeting in private.

— Andrea Dudikova, "Iran May Draw Rebuke Over Nuke Activities," Associated Press, 10 August 2005.

**10 August 2005**

Mohammad Saeedi, deputy head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, says the IAEA has given Iran permission to remove seals at the Isfahan facility. "Some minutes ago we received a letter from the IAEA, authorizing Iran to remove the seals at the Isfahan plant," Mr. Saeedi adds.

— "IAEA Allows Iran to Remove Nuclear Seals, Official," Reuters, 10 August 2005.

**10 August 2005**

Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya says his country will not support referring Iran to the United Nations Security Council.

— "China Not in Favor of Referring Iran Nuclear Issue to UN," Xinhua, 10 August 2005.

**11 August 2005**

A Resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors expresses "serious concern" that Iran has resumed uranium conversion. The Resolution further urges Iran to cease uranium related activities, recommends the Director General continue to monitor the situation, and request the Director General Mohamed ElBaradei "to provide a comprehensive report on the implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement and this resolution by 3 September 2005."

— "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Related Board Resolutions," International Atomic Energy Agency, 11 August 2005.

**11 August 2005**

A proposal to ship South African uranium yellowcake to Iran for conversion, then returned back to South Africa for

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enrichment into nuclear fuel would more than likely be rejected, a senior Iranian official says, on condition of anonymity.

— "Export of Iran's Nuclear Plant Output Unlikely, Official," Reuters, 11 August 2005.

#### **12 August 2005**

French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy says negotiations to resolve the Iranian uranium conversion crisis are still possible. The French are awaiting the International Atomic Energy Agency's report on Iran due on 3 September before making any further decisions, Minister Douste-Blazy adds.

— "France Believes Talks with Iran on Nuclear Question Still Possible," Agence France Presse, 12 August 2005, in FBIS Document EUP20050815950042.

#### **12 August 2005**

The International Atomic Energy Agency urges Iran to "re-establish full suspension of all enrichment-related activities."

— Ian Traynor, "IAEA Orders Iran to Halt Uranium Enrichment," *Guardian*, 12 August 2005.

#### **12 August 2005**

Sirous Nasser, head of the Iranian delegation to the IAEA, says his country will be a "nuclear fuel producer and supplier within a decade". The European formula "urges Iran to re-establish full suspension of all [uranium] enrichment-related activities."

— William Kole, "IAEA Urges Iran to Freeze Nuke Activities," Associated Press, 12 August 2005.

#### **12 August 2005**

Former Iranian president Akbar Rafsanjani expresses surprise that the International Atomic Energy Agency reached a unanimous decision in calling for Iran to halt enrichment activities. "It was astonishing and really strange"—that eventually what Europeans and America wanted was approved with unanimity. We are now in the preliminary stage of enriching a substance which exists in our country to use the product for energy generation, medical, agricultural and other scientific purposes," Mr. Rafsanjani adds.

— "Unanimous IAEA Call Astonishes Iran's Rafsanjani," Reuters, 12 August 2005; "Rafsanjani: IAEA Board Resolution on Iran 'Tyranical'," Islamic Republic News Agency, 12 August 2005.

#### **16 August 2005**

Iranian students form a human chain around the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility in response to the International Atomic Energy Agency's recent resolution and "bullying by European countries and America."

— "Iran: Over 1,700 Students form Human Chain Around Esfahan UCF," *Mehr*, 16 August 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050816011009.

#### **16 August 2005**

Israeli military chief General Aharon Zeevi says U.S. estimates that Iran is 10 years from producing a nuclear bomb are inaccurate. "Barring an unexpected delay, Iran is going to become nuclear capable in 2008 and not in 10 years," General Zeevi adds.

— "Israel Disputes U.S. Intelligence on Iran, Predicts Nuclear Capability within Three Years," Global Security Newswire, 16 August 2005.

#### **19 August 2005**

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterates that Tehran has never pursued a nuclear bomb and says

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the United States is using deception to mislead the public. "Our governments and I myself have said numerous times that we are not seeking nuclear weapons. The uranium enriched in Iran is only enriched three to four percent, whereas for a nuclear bomb uranium must be enriched 94 to 95 percent," Ayatollah Khamenei adds.

— "Iranian Leader Asks for Trust from EU on Nuclear Program," RIA Novosti, 19 August 2005; "Leader Says Iran no after A-Bomb, Blasts US 'Deception'," Islamic Republic News Agency, 19 August 2005; "Khamenei: Iran 'Solid' in Pursuing Nuclear Drive," Middle East Online, 19 August 2005.

#### **19 August 2005**

Iran's foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says, "Tehran is not afraid of its [nuclear] file being sent to the Security Council." "Sending Iran's case to the Security Council will not make us abandon our peaceful nuclear activities," Minister Asefi adds.

— "Spokesman: Iran not Afraid of UN Security Council," Iran Focus, 19 August 2005.

#### **19 August 2005**

Two Iranian nationals are arrested in Kiev and charged with transporting radiation contaminated equipment from the Russian Chernobyl nuclear power plant. The drivers claim the cryogenic equipment was headed for Iran.

— "Ukrainian Police Seize Chernobyl Cargo Bound for Iran," *KIEV NTN Television*, 29 August 2005, in FBIS Document CEP200508200029029.

#### **20 August 2005**

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says "Iran is ready to talk, without any precondition, to Europe about the Natanz site and other nuclear issues, except the Esfahan UCF [Uranium Conversion Facility]."

— "Spokesman Asefi Says Iran Ready to talk with EU Trio About Natanz Site," *Iranian Student News Agency*, 20 August 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050820011053.

#### **20 August 2005**

A senior Western diplomat says the International Atomic Energy Agency has concluded that "traces of highly enriched uranium on centrifuge parts were from imported equipment, rather than from any enrichment activities by Iran." The findings support Iran's claims that the material came from centrifuge parts provided by Pakistan. The diplomat who confirmed the results spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the case.

— "Tests Support Iran's Claims on Uranium," Associated Press, 21 August 2005.

#### **20 August 2005**

Iran's foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says his country is ready to discuss resumption of nuclear activities in Natanz as long as there are no conditions for starting negotiations. All discussions regarding the Isfahan facility are over and if the "Europeans intend to draw up a new proposal; Iran's rights should be included in it. Then we are prepared to receive such a proposal," Mr. Asefi adds.

— "Iran's Asefi Says Prepared to Discuss Nuclear Activities with EU," Islamic Republic News Agency, 20 August 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050820011036.

#### **22 August 2005**

Former chief nuclear negotiator for Iran, Hassan Rowhani, says Tehran is ready to negotiate a mutual start for the Natanz nuclear facility.

— "Rowhani: Iran to Start Nuclear Activity at Natanz After Agreement With EU," *Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television*, 22 August 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050822011023.

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**23 August 2005**

French foreign ministry spokesman Jean-Baptiste Mattei says nuclear negotiations with Iran scheduled for 31 August have been postponed. "There will, in fact, be no negotiations meeting on August 31 since the Iranians have decided to suspend application of the Paris Agreement," Minister Mattei adds.

— "Europeans Call Off Nuclear Talks with Iran-France," Reuters, 23 August 2005.

**24 August 2005**

Manouchehr Mottaki is confirmed as the new foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

— "Iran's new Foreign Minister 'was involved in terrorism'," *Iran Focus*, 24 August 2005.

**24 August 2005**

IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei meets with Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani. Secretary Larijani expresses his commitment to cooperate with the IAEA and its investigation into Iran's nuclear program.

— "IAEA's ElBaradei Holds 'Constructive' Iran Nuclear Program Meeting with Larijani," International Atomic Energy Agency, 23 August 2005, in FBIS Document EUP20050826001002.

**25 August 2005**

The National Council of the Resistance of Iran alleges that the Arak nuclear site "will be ready in 2008 - seven years before Tehran's official forecasts - to produce 14 kg of plutonium." An International Atomic Energy Agency spokesman says the accusations are nothing new as the IAEA is familiar with the Arak plant and are able to control it. "We conduct our own investigations without taking as our basis reports published by the media," adds the spokesman.

— "French Report: Exiled Opposition Claims Iran Closer to Nuclear Weapons Goal," *Pairs Le Figaro*, 26 August 2005, in FBIS Document EUP20050826338006.

**29 August 2005**

Former representative of Iranian dissident group Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, Alireza Jafarzadeh, alleges Iran's revolutionary guard commander secretly met with A.Q. Khan to "acquire nuclear-capable missiles with a range of 1,800 miles." In addition, Jafarzadeh claims Mohammad Reza Ayatollahi, then deputy director of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (AEO), and Seyyed Mohammad Haj Saeed, chief of the Directorate of Research of the AEO, also met with Khan.

— "Iran's Nuke Missiles" UPI, 29 August 2005.

**29 August 2005**

Iranian nuclear scientists announce they discovered a new technique for separating uranium from "uranium ore and producing yellowcake using biotechnology techniques." A project manager for the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization adds that "The new technique used for the production of yellowcake will reduce costs and efficiency will increase a hundred fold as well. Moreover, this will also prevent environmental pollution."

— "Iranian Scientists Discover new Uranium Separation Technique," *Iran Network 1*, 29 August 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050830011015.

**29 August 2005**

In a comprehensive report on Tehran's nuclear program, International Atomic Energy Agency chief ElBaradei states, "As of 29 August 2005, approximately 4000 kg of uranium in the form of UOC [Uranium Ore Concentrate] had been fed into the process and approximately 600 kg of uranium in the form of AUC [Ammonium Uranyl]

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Carbonate] produced, from which approximately 110 kg of uranium in the form of AUC was fed into the next process line. As of 29 August, no UF4 had been produced as a result of that processing. From the 21 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF4 produced during the previous campaign, approximately 8500 kg of uranium in the form of UF4 was fed into the UF4 to UF6 process line; approximately 6800 kg of uranium in the form of UF6 was produced there from. In a letter dated 29 August 2005, Iran informed the IAEA of its intention to start moving the remaining inventory of UOC to the new storage area, and that it would likely take two months."

—"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2005/67, 2 September 2005.

### **30 August 2005**

Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Najar says "military and non-peaceful use of nuclear technology is *haram* [religiously forbidden] and prohibited." General Seyed Hasan Firuzabadi, chief of the general headquarters of the Iranian Armed Forces adds, "Experience has shown that one cannot talk to America, to negotiate and to reach a compromise. America is not a friend of our nation and our government, because its nature is different from ours." —"Iran Defense Minister: Non-Peaceful use of Nuke Technology Religiously Forbidden," *Mehr*, 30 August 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050830011035; "Iran's new Defense Minister Reiterates Right to Nuclear, Missile Technology," Islamic Students News Agency, 30 August 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050830011034.

### **31 August 2005**

Iran's top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani meets with India's External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh. "The focus of our negotiations with India is on strategic relations, particularly in the field of energy and more particularly, on a natural gas pipeline and the liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply to India," says Larijani.

— Indian Foreign Minister, Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Discuss Energy Cooperation," *New Delphi PTI News Agency*, 30 August 2005, in FBIS Document SAP20050901000017.

### **1 September 2005**

National Council of Resistance of Iran member Hussein Abedini alleges Iranian company Madj Gostar imported 20 kilograms of beryllium from China last year.

—"Iran took Chinese Beryllium for Nuclear Weapons," *Pravda*, 1 September 2005.

### **2 September 2005**

European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana says Iran may be referred to the UN Security Council for its nuclear activities. A meeting set for 19 September by the International Atomic Energy Agency will review a 3 September deadline for Iran to stop work on nuclear weapons related programs.

—"EU Warns Iran could be Hauled before UN," *Iran Mania*, 2 September 2005.

### **2 September 2005**

A report prepared by IAEA head Mohammed ElBaradei states that Iran has produced approximately seven tons of gas used in uranium enrichment since last month. The document, viewed by the Associated Press states, "Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue." The document lists perceived Iranian failings and calls for "access to individuals, documentation related to procurement . . . certain military-owned workshops and research and development locations."

— George Jahn, "U.N. Report says Iran has Produced Tons of Gas Needed for Uranium Enrichment," Associated Press, 2 September 2005.

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### **2 September 2005**

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani responds to the IAEA's report on Iran's nuclear program and says many of the questions have been "legally and technically answered." "The report shows that the IAEA has received sufficient information on [uranium] conversion activities of Iran and the issue is becoming normal [to the agency]. This also includes Esfahan's Uranium Conversion Facility which is quite positive. However, there are certain small questions in the report that call for our further technical and legal cooperation with the agency, and we will continue our cooperation with the IAEA to address such legal aspects," Mr. Larijani adds.

—"Iran Security Chief says IAEA Report 'Both Positive and Negative'," *Iran Network 1*, 2 September 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050902011050.

### **2 September 2005**

IAEA Director-General Mohammad ElBaradei releases a report outlining the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report provides a summary of past resolutions, findings as of November 2004, developments since November 2004, the current overall assessment, and suspension. Director ElBaradei states that Iran has made "good progress" in correcting breaches, but there are still two important issues that need to be resolved in order to provide assurance that there are no undeclared enrichment activities in Iran: "the origin of LEU and HEU particle contamination found at various locations in Iran; and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs." Based on current information, it appears the origin of the HEU contamination is mostly of foreign origin. However, a definitive conclusion with respect to all of the contamination, particularly the LEU contamination can not be determined at this time. "With respect to the second issue — the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes — the Agency has not yet been able to verify the correctness and completeness of Iran's statements concerning those programmes. No additional information or documentation has been provided with respect to Iran's statement that it did not pursue any work on the P-2 design between 1995 and 2002," ElBaradei adds.

—"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2005/67, 2 September 2005.

### **3 September 2005**

International Atomic Energy Agency chief ElBaradei says Iran has cooperated and provided additional information with respect to dates of plutonium research activities. "This is important for establishing the chronology and sequence of events associated with the development of Iran's enrichment program, in particular with a view to ensuring that there has been no other development or acquisition of enrichment design, technology, or components by Iran," ElBaradei adds.

—"IRNA: ElBaradei says Iran Provided IAEA with New Information," Islamic Republic News Agency, 3 September 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050903011033.

### **4 September 2005**

Head Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani rejects the EU's proposal to halt nuclear activities by 19 September, when the UN nuclear agency's board of governors will meet.

—Nazila Fathi, "Iran Rejects an Ultimatum from Europe," *New York Times*, 4 September 2005.

### **4 September 2005**

According to the Fars News Agency, Javad Va`idi has been appointed the deputy head of the Supreme National Security Council secretariat for international security, Hossein Mousavian will become one of Ali Larijani's advisors, and Ali Asghar Slotanieh, Iran's former representative to the IAEA, will join Iran's nuclear negotiating team, replacing Sirous Nasserli.

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—"Changes Reported in Iran's Security Council, Nuclear Negotiation Team," Fars News Agency, 4 September 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050904011043.

#### **9 September 2005**

The Majlis Committee for National Security and Foreign Policy state that if Iran is referred to the UN Security Council, they will obligate the government to suspend the implementation of the Additional Protocol. A current bill collecting momentum and produced by the Majlis deputies states, "From the date of this bill's ratification until the time when the Additional Protocol is fully processed in the Majlis, should Iran's nuclear dossier - in spite of its extensive and all-out cooperation with the IAEA as the only lawful international organization to assess Iran's rights - be referred to any other international organization, the government, by giving one week's notice, is obliged to fully suspend the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the NPT which has voluntarily implemented after the agreement reached between Iran and the three European countries in Tehran on 29 Mehr 1382 [21 October 2003]."

—"Majlis Seeks to Suspend Additional Protocol Implementation if Iran Referred to UN," Fars News Agency, 9 September 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050909011017.

#### **10 September 2005**

Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Deputy Director Mohammad Saeedi says his country will "offer an international tender for the construction of two new nuclear power plants in the near future." Mr. Saeedi adds that the tender will be for two power plants each capable of producing 2000 megawatts of power and the goal will be to produce 20,000 megawatts of power through nuclear energy within the next 20 years.

—"Official Says Iran Wants to Offer Intl Tender for 2 Nuclear Power Plants," *Mehr*, 10 September 2005, in FBIS Document IAP20050910011055.

#### **11 September 2005**

IAEA Deputy Director General Pierre Goldschmidt, charged with investigating Iran's nuclear program, says the UN Security Council must provide IAEA inspectors with greater powers to determine if Iran is trying to build a bomb. "It is reaching the point where it is beyond critical...the IAEA can only work on the basis of the facts that are presented to it, and there have been many serious omissions by the Iranians. The Iranians are exploiting all the loopholes in the international agreements. As to why they are doing this you can draw your own conclusions," Goldschmidt adds.

—Con Coughlin, "UN Inspectors 'Powerless to Stop Atom Bomb Plans in Iran'," *Telegraph*, 11 September 2005.

#### **12 September 2005**

Head of Russia's Federal Agency for Nuclear Power Alexander Rumyantsev and head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Gholam Reza Aqazadeh announce that the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be commissioned by the end of 2006.

—"Bushehr Power Plant to become Operational in 2006," RIA-Novosti, 12 September 2005.

#### **12 September 2005**

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asks Russia, China, and India to support the United States in threatening Iran with sanctions for refusing to halt its nuclear program.

—"Iran and Russia Oppose Security Council Referral," *Moscow Times*, 12 September 2005.

#### **13 September 2005**

Iranian opposition group National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) member Ali Safavi alleges that Tehran has

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been smuggling centrifuges from China for the past two years and is ready to start a nuclear uranium enrichment program. "The first phase involves the manufacture of 5,000 machines. Some two-thirds have been manufactured, tested and ready to be installed," Mr. Safavi adds.

—"Iranian Opposition Group says Iran Building Centrifuges to Extract," *National Council of Resistance of Iran*, 13 September 2005.

#### **15 September 2005**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says his country is willing to provide nuclear technology to Muslim states stating, "Iran is ready to transfer nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries due to their need."

—"Iran's President Says his Regime Prepared to give Atomic Technology to other Muslim States," *Boston Herald*, 15 September 2005.

#### **16 September 2005**

John Wolfe, former Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, speaks out against a potential DOD policy of pre-emptive nuclear strikes against states possessing WMD. He uses the case of mistaken WMD in Iraq as a reason why adopting such a policy would be a mistake.

—Joe Fiorill, "Former US State Department Nonproliferation Chief Opposes Nuclear Pre-Emption Policy," *Global Security Newswire*, 16 September 2005.

#### **18 September 2005**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addresses the United Nations and says some 'powerful' states are preventing free access to technology, specifically nuclear technology. Ahmadinejad claims these same powerful countries have misrepresented Iran's intentions and are using propaganda to discredit their peaceful use of nuclear technology. He further invites other states and private companies to help with the program as a means of confidence-building measure. The following is a summary of direct quotes by President Ahmadinejad outlining the main elements of the initiatives regarding the nuclear issues:

1. The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its previously and repeatedly declared position that in accordance with our religious principles, pursuit of nuclear weapons is prohibited.
2. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that it is necessary to revitalise the NPT and create the above-mentioned ad-hoc committee so that it can combat nuclear weapons and abolish the apartheid in peaceful nuclear technology.
3. Technically, the fuel cycle of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not different from that of other countries which have peaceful nuclear technology.
4. In keeping with Iran's inalienable right to have access to a nuclear fuel cycle, continued interaction and technical and legal cooperation with the IAEA will be the centrepiece of our nuclear policy...With this in mind, I have directed the relevant Iranian officials to compile the legal and technical details, of Iran's nuclear approach, based on the following considerations:
5. The Islamic Republic of Iran, in its pursuit of peaceful nuclear technology, considers it within its legitimate rights to receive objective guarantees for uranium enrichment in the nuclear fuel cycle.
6. The selection of our negotiating partners and the continuation of negotiations with the EU will be commensurate with the requirements of our cooperation with the agency regarding non-diversion of the process of uranium enrichment to non-peaceful purposes in the framework of the provisions of the NPT.
7. The discriminatory approaches regarding the NPT that focuses on the obligations of state-parties and disregards their rights under the Treaty should be discontinued.

—"Iranian President's UN Speech," *BBC*, 18 September 2005.

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#### **19 September 2005**

The United States and European Union call on the International Atomic Energy Agency to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. U.S. envoy Greg Schulte says the possibility of a diplomatic solution still exists, "but this will require Iran to change its course and to co-operate fully with the IAEA to cease its conversion activities..."

—"IAEA Urged to Refer Tehran to UN," BBC, 19 September 2005.

#### **20 September 2005**

Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani warns that snap inspections of its nuclear facilities may stop if Iran is referred to the UN Security Council. "If you want to use the language of force, Iran will be left with no choice [but] to get out of the framework of the NPT and resume enrichment," Secretary Larijani adds.

—"Iran 'May Refuse Nuclear Checks'," BBC, 20 September 2005.

#### **19 September 2005**

Bulgarian customs officials discover 3.5kg of hafnium, a substance which purportedly can be used to make a "dirty bomb," in a car attempting to cross into Romania. *The Sunday Herald* alleges the material may have been headed for Iran via the Bucharest mafia.

—"Bulgaria Thwarts Smuggling of Nuclear Material," Associated Press, 19 September 2005; Gabriel Ronay, "Police Fear Balkan Mafia Eager to Sell A-Bomb to Iran," *Sunday Herald*, 25 September 2005.

#### **21 September 2005**

U.S. State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli says the United States will not withdraw its threat to refer Iran to the UN Security Council. "Our goal is to build the broadest possible consensus...it is a question of not if, but when," spokesman Ereli adds.

—Barry Schweid, "U.S. Delay Drive to End Iran Nuke Program," Associated Press, 22 September 2005.

#### **22 September 2005**

France, Germany and Great Britain drop their demand in a draft resolution which calls on Iran to be referred to the UN Security Council. The wording was dropped after Russia and China expressed opposition.

—"EU Backs Down on Iran Under Russia, China Pressure," Reuters, 22 September 2005.

#### **22 September 2005**

Chinese Ambassador Wu Hailong of the permanent mission to Vienna says the Iranian nuclear issue should be resolved through the IAEA and continued dialogue. "Through negotiations, each party can fully state its case and make its own demands, and the two sides can find the best balance that is conducive to safeguarding the interests of both parties...[but] Iran's legitimate concerns should be treated fairly and objectively," Ambassador Hailong adds.

—"Chinese Ambassador Expounds China's Position on Iran Nuke Issue," *Xinju*, 22 September 2005.

#### **24 September 2005**

The International Atomic Energy Agency Governing Board finds Iran in noncompliance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The resolution passes with 21 votes of approval, 12 abstentions and one opposing vote. Russia and China, opposed to the motion, abstain from voting and Venezuela is the only country that votes against it. The resolution states Iran's noncompliance due to "many failures and breaches" over nuclear safeguards of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty are grounds for referral to the UNSC. Iran objects to the board's decision and states it may not ratify the Additional Protocol. IAEA Director Mohamed ElBaradei says the decision whether to refer Iran to the UN Security Council should not come up prior to November, when the IAEA board meets again.

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The following are excerpts from the International Atomic Energy Agency's Resolution titled "*Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran*," adopted on 24 September 2005:

Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Iran

Recalling Iran's failures in a number of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, its processing and its use, as well as the declaration of facilities where such material had been processed and stored

Recalling also that...Iran's policy of concealment has resulted in many breaches of its obligation to comply with its Safeguards Agreement

Recalling that the Director General noted that good progress has been made in Iran's correction of the breaches

Noting that the Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important outstanding issues after two and a half years of intensive inspections and investigation and that Iran's full transparency is indispensable and overdue

Uncertain of Iran's motives in failing to make important declarations over an extended period of time

Concerned by continuing gaps in the Agency's understanding of proliferation sensitive aspects of Iran's nuclear programme

Recalling the emphasis placed in past resolutions on the importance of confidence building measures

Deploring the fact that Iran has to date failed to heed the call by the Board to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment related activities

Also concerned that Iran has to date failed to heed repeated calls to ratify the Additional Protocol

Noting that the Director General reported that the Agency "continues to follow up on information pertaining to Iran's nuclear programme and activities that could be relevant to that programme" and that "the Agency's legal authority to pursue the verification of possible nuclear weapons related activity is limited"

Noting that the Agency is still not in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran

—"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," *International Atomic Energy Agency*, GOV/2005/77, 24 September 2005; "UN Adopts Motion on Nuclear Iran," BBC, 24 September 2005; Greg Webb, "Iran Found in Noncompliance with Nuclear Treaty Rules," *Global Security Newswire*, 26 September, 2005.

#### **24 September 2005**

With the IAEA finding Iran in noncompliance of the NPT, Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh explains that his country's decision to support the draft resolution of the IAEA was not driven by aligning itself with any single country, but to support Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy "consistent with proliferation norms."

—"Indian Official Spokesman Briefs Media on Draft Resolution on Iran in IAEA," *New Delhi Ministry of External Affairs*, 24 September 2005, in FBIS Document SAP20050925000066.

#### **26 September 2005**

The Foreign Ministry of Iran threatens to cease all voluntary and temporary nuclear agreements unless the IAEA amends the resolution that states Iran is in noncompliance with the NPT. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki says the resolution is a "planned scenario determined by the United States...political, illegal and illogical."

—Gareth Smyth, "Iran Maintains Nuclear Defiance," *Financial Times*, 27 September 2005; "Iran Brands UN Resolution Illegal," BBC, 26 September 2005.

#### **27 September 2005**

Western diplomats report that the quality of UF6 produced at the Isfahan nuclear facility in Iran is not suitable for use at the Natanz enrichment facility. "I wouldn't say it is garbage. But the UF6 produced at Isfahan is of such poor quality that if it were fed into centrifuges it could damage them," a western diplomat adds.

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—Francois Murphy and Louis Charbonneau, "Iran's Uranium Gas Unusable for Atomic Fuel - Diplomats," Reuters, 27 September 2005.

#### **27 September 2005**

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi calls on the IAEA to not insist on the terms of the resolution and correct them. "If the other parties' reaction is not along these lines, the Islamic Republic will take these measures...[and] if the IAEA and European countries don't make up for their error, we will cancel all voluntary measure we have taken," Mr. Asefi adds.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Threatens to Resume Enrichment," Associated Press, 27 September 2005.

#### **28 September 2005**

Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi says his country may retaliate economically against countries that voted in favor of a European-sponsored resolution calling for possible UN Security Council punishment of the Iranians for their nuclear enrichment activities. "What the Indians did was very strange and we are very unhappy about it," adds Mr. Asefi.

—"India Support IAEA on Iran's Nukes," United Press International, 30 September 2005; Matthew Rosenberg, "Iran Protests India's Vote to Put Tehran on Notice Over Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 28 September 2005; "Iran Retaliates Over UN Vote," *Independent*, 28 September, 2005.

#### **29 September 2005**

Pakistani Muslim League Chairman Mohammad Zafarul Haq states his opposition to referring Iran to the UN Security Council. "As a civilized nation, the US should not hasten the issue's referral to the world body," Chairman Haq adds. Deputy Chief of Pakistan People's Party Parliamentarians Nayyar Hussain Bokhari adds that he supports Iran's right to peaceful use and development of nuclear energy programs and objects to the world's leading powers' double standard.

—"Pak Politicians Oppose Iran N-Issue Referral to UNSC," Islamic Republic News Agency, 30 September 2005.

#### **29 September 2005**

The Iranian parliament passes a draft law that directs the government to suspend the Additional Protocol of the NPT. "With the goal of guaranteeing the rights and national interests of Iran, the Majlis obliges the government to suspend the supplemental protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until the right of Iran to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes is acknowledged," the draft law reads.

—"Iran Breach with the IAEA," *Kommersant*, 29 September 2005.

#### **29 September 2005**

The International Atomic Energy Agency names a new board of governors. Of the 30 new members, 16 consist of non-aligned countries. A western diplomat says the balance of power will not change and the United States will maintain the majority.

—"IAEA Names New Board of Governors with More Non-Aligned Members UPDATE," *Forbes*, 29 September 2005.

#### **30 September 2005**

UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw says military action to address the Iranian nuclear crisis is not on the agenda. Secretary Straw adds that European negotiators - with US backing - had "left the door open for further diplomatic action with Iran and I hope that they take this opportunity."

—"UK Rules Out Iran Military Action," BBC, 30 September 2005.

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### **1 October 2005**

According to *Khaleej Times*, Iranian President Ahmadinejad says "if Iran's case is sent to the Security Council, we will respond by many ways, for example by holding back on oil sales."

—"Iran Warns Israel Against Attacking Nuke Sites," *Iran Mania*, 3 October 2005; "Iran Ties Oil Sales to Nuclear Issue," Associated Press, 2 October 2005.

### **2 October 2005**

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad denies any meeting took place with *Khaleej Times* on October 1st. The President's office also denies the interview took place but not the specifics of what he was quoted as saying.

—"Iran Warns Israel Against Attacking Nuke Sites," *Iran Mania*, 3 October 2005; "Iran Ties Oil Sales to Nuclear Issue," Associated Press, 2 October 2005.

### **3 October 2005**

Iranian parliament speaker Gholam Ali Hadad-Adel warns Israel against attacking Iran's nuclear facilities. "If Israel does something stupid and attacks our nuclear facilities like it did in Iraq, we promise to teach it a lesson it will never forget," Mr. Hadad-Adel adds.

—"Iran Warns Israel Against Attacking Nuke Sites," *Iran Mania*, 3 October 2005.

### **3 October 2005**

The United States calls on all foreign countries to stop nuclear projects with Iran. "We think it's self-evident, for example, that in the face of such a finding, no government should permit new nuclear transfers to Iran and all ongoing nuclear projects should be frozen," says assistant U.S. secretary of state for arms control Stephen Rademaker. In response, Russian spokesman Sergey Trepelkov says his country would not end its cooperation with Iran. "Certainly we're not interested in Iran getting nuclear weapons but, as for Bushehr, it's a purely peaceful project, and it fully meets the demands of the International Atomic Energy Agency," Sergei Trepelkov adds. "I don't think there is any ground for ceasing this cooperation."

—"U.S. Urges End to Nuke Project with Iran," Associated Press, 3 October 2005.

### **4 October 2005**

Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, Hamid Reza Asefi, says Iran is ready to resume unconditional talks with the European Union. "Iran has no problems with resuming talks. But it will not accept conditional talks under pressure," spokesman Asefi adds.

—"Iran Wants Unconditional Nuclear Talks with EU," *Khaleej Times*, 4 October 2005.

### **5 October 2005**

International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei says he is hopeful talks will soon resume between Iran and the European Union. "We have a hiccup right now...I am optimistic that in the coming months we will see a resumption of these negotiations," Mr. ElBaradei adds.

—"ElBaradei Hopeful of Iran Nuclear Talks," *Middle East Online*, 5 October 2005.

### **5 October 2005**

According to allegations made by the Iranian opposition group, National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad places the military in control of the country's nuclear program. Commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also take charge of the National Security Council's internal security, strategy and political posts.

—David Sands, "Army Takes Control of Iran Nukes," *Washington Times*, 5 October 2005.

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### **9 October 2005**

Iran's Secretary of the Supreme Council of National Security, Ali Larijani, reiterates that if his country is "addressed with a language of menace and force, we shall continue with the NPT and talking, but will get out of the Additional Protocols."

—Safa Haeri, "Iran Confirms Stopping Additional Protocol of the NPT," *Iran Press Service*, 9 October 2005.

### **11 October 2005**

Ali Agha Mohammadi, spokesman for Iran's Supreme National Security Council, says Tehran believes dialogue and a proposed compromise to receive yellowcake from South Africa can resolve the current crisis. "Iran wants its nuclear case to be transparent and other countries want to ease their concerns through negotiations, so therefore the only solution to reach these objectives is to talk," Mr. Mohammadi adds. "If we need seven or eight more months of talks to reach a final decision on enrichment ... during this period we could accept receiving uranium yellowcake from South Africa and sending back UF<sub>6</sub> gas produced at Isfahan," Mr. Mohammadi says.

—"Iran Softens Tone in Nuclear Stand-off," *Iran Mania*, 11 October 2005.

### **12 October 2005**

Iran's foreign ministry announces it is ready to resume talks with the European Union as long as there are no preconditions, specifically abandoning the nuclear fuel cycle. A European diplomat responds that "we have noted a change in tone in recent days, but the Iranians have to understand that the condition to resume talks is a suspension of conversion and a return to the terms of the Paris accord."

—"Iran Softens Tone in Nuclear Stand-off," *Iran Mania*, 11 October 2005.

### **15 October 2005**

Chairman of Iran's State Expediency Council and former President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, says Iran is ready to discuss the "country's nuclear dossier without any precondition."

—Saloumeh Peyman, "The Return of Rafsanjani," *Asia Times*, 19 October 2005.

### **15 October 2005**

Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice disagree on Iran's right to pursue a nuclear energy program. Secretary Rice states that there is room for negotiations, but Tehran must do so in good faith or they will be referred to the UN Security Council. Minister Lavrov says that Iran has the right to enrich uranium and Moscow does not support sending the issue of Iran's nuclear program to the UN Security Council.

—"Russian and US Disagree over Iran," BBC, 15 October 2005; "US Presses Iran on Nuclear Talks," BBC, 15 October 2005.

### **16 October 2005**

British Ambassador to Iran, Richard Dalton, says new proposals will be offered to Tehran to return to negotiations. "We think that the proposal that the EU put forward can be certainly improved and the proposal of his Excellency Mr. Ahmadinejad made in New York can clearly go on to the table," Ambassador Dalton adds. Specifics about the proposals are not mentioned, but Ambassador Dalton emphasizes that trust between the countries must be restored.

—"EU Prepared to Improve Nuclear Offers to Iran - UK Ambassador," *BBC*, 16 October 2005.

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**18 October 2005**

French Ambassador Bernard Poletti tells Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that his country is ready to assist Tehran in its pursuit of nuclear electricity.

—"Paris Ready to Cooperate with Iran in Nuclear Power," *Mehr News Agency*, 18 October 2005.

**19 October 2005**

Former Soviet Leader President Mikhail Gorbachev says the United States should focus on dialogue instead of applying pressure to bring Iran back to the negotiation table. "We must not dictate our terms. We must conduct responsible dialogue with Iran," adds Mr. Gorbachev.

—"Dictated Terms Not the Answer to Iran's Nuclear Program, Says Gorbachev," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 19 October 2005.

**19 October 2005**

The Iranian Embassy denies South Korean reports that Tehran imposed an import ban against South Korean goods in retaliation for backing the IAEA's resolution which would send Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible sanctions.

—Park Song-wu, "No Sanctions Against Korea: Iran," *Korean Times*, 19 October 2005.

**20 October 2005**

Iran provides the International Atomic Energy Agency with sensitive documents related to its nuclear program and allows inspectors to interview a senior Iranian nuclear official. An unidentified U.S. official says the Iranian concessions are important as it could prevent the matter from being referred to the UN Security Council.

—"Iran Provides Inspectors With New Documents," *Global Security Newswire*, 21 October 2005.

**24 October 2005**

Iran provides UN inspectors with additional centrifuge documentation requested by the International Atomic Energy Agency. "They [the IAEA] demanded information in various fields especially about P1 and P2 centrifuges and we provided them," says Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani.

—"Iran Hopes to Avoid UN Atomic Referral," *Iran Mania*, 1 November 2005; "Iran has Turned Over Centrifuge Details to International Nuclear Inspectors, Officials Say," *Global Security Newswire*, 1 November 2005.

**25 October 2005**

At a public gathering at Narmak Jami' Mosque in Tehran, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declares Iran's nuclear technology is "home-grown" and added that, "we will produce nuclear fuel and sell it to other countries with a 30% discount."

—"Iran's Nuclear Technology is Home-Grown - President," *BBC*, 25 October 2005.

**31 October 2005**

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani states his country will not be intimidated by threats or pressured into giving up our nuclear power program. "They must understand that such an attitude will only persuade us more to have nuclear technology," Mr. Larijani adds.

—"Iran Says Not Afraid of War, Sanctions," *Agence France-Presse*, 31 October 2005.

**1 November 2005**

The Disarmament Committee of the United Nations General Assembly approves an Iranian proposed resolution to strengthen measures to implement nuclear disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

**Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org).**



—"UN Committee Approves Iran-Proposed Resolution to Strengthen Nuclear Disarmament," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 1 November 2005.

### **2 November 2005**

A European diplomat close to the International Atomic Energy Agency says, on the condition of anonymity, that Iran will process a new batch of uranium at the Isfahan nuclear plant beginning next week.

—"Iran to Process Fresh Batch of Uranium: Diplomats," *Reuters*, 2 November 2005.

### **3 November 2005**

UN nuclear inspectors are granted access to Iran's sensitive Parchin military complex. The International Atomic Energy Agency has sought to re-inspect the facility, suspected of nuclear weapons development, but has not been allowed to enter since its last visit in January of 2005.

—"UN Inspectors Visit Iran Complex," *BBC*, 3 November 2005.

### **7 November 2005**

Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani says his country is ready to resume negotiations with the EU as long as Tehran does not have to give up uranium enrichment.

—"Iran Positive About Nuclear Talks," *BBC*, 7 November 2005.

### **7 November 2005**

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw says the EU is reviewing a letter from Tehran calling for resumption in negotiations. However, according to EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana any resumption in negotiations is contingent on Iran first re-establishing suspension of all nuclear activities related to enrichment.

—"Iran Positive About Nuclear Talks," *BBC*, 7 November 2005; "China Daily: EU Studies Iran's Offer for Nuclear Dialogue," *Financial Times*, 8 November 2005.

### **8 November 2005**

The South African government denies that it proposed to help Iran's nuclear program. The South African foreign affairs department says that the report that states their government agreed to supply Tehran with uranium oxide concentrate, to be converted later into uranium hexafluoride gas, is "erroneous and without any foundation."

—"South Africa: SA Role in Iran Nuclear Programme," *Africa News*, 8 November 2005.

### **10 November 2005**

Russia purportedly offers Iran a compromise plan that would allow Tehran to continue uranium conversion at the Isfahan facility. Unnamed officials also add that the United States and European Union are proposing a deal in which enrichment would be performed in Russia and conversion of uranium into uranium hexafluoride gas would be done in Iran. According to the officials, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has given Iran two weeks to respond before the IAEA board meets on November 24.

—"Russia Offers Iran 'Uranium Compromise'," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 10 November 2005; "Iran 'to be Offered Nuclear Deal'," *BBC*, 10 November 2005; David Sanger, "US and Europe to Give Iranians New Atom Offer," *New York Times*, 10 November 2005.

### **11 November 2005**

At a European Parliament conference Mohammad Mohaddessin, chair of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an Iranian opposition group, alleges that the "Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is determined to pursue and complete Tehran's nuclear weapons program full blast...[and] would have the bomb in two or three years time."

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—"Mullah's Leader Determined to Complete Tehran's Nuclear Weapons Program - Mohaddessin," *National Council of Resistance of Iran*, 11 November 2005.

#### **11 November 2005**

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier states that, "Iran has the right for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, not however to nuclear weapons." Minister Steinmeier adds that objective guarantees are required to make sure Tehran is not pursuing nuclear weapons related programs and that their nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.

—"Designated German FM Insists on Iran's N-Rights," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 11 November 2005.

#### **11 November 2005**

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice denies that the United States had any part in a recent EU proposal that would allow Iran to continue limited nuclear work. Indicating that the US is intently interested in the problem but not an author of the proposed EU solution, Secretary Rice adds that, the U.S. is not a "party to these negotiations...there is no U.S.-European proposal to the Iranians."

—"Rice Denies U.S. Is Leading Nuclear Talks With Tehran," *New York Times*, 11 November 2005.

#### **12 November 2005**

Head of Iran's nuclear agency Gholamreza Aghazadeh rejects a proposal calling on Iran to move uranium enrichment to Russia. Mr. Aghazadeh adds that all enrichment must occur in Iran.

—"ElBaradei to Push Iran to Accept Compromise on Uranium Enrichment," *Associated Press*, 13 November 2005.

#### **13 November 2005**

Iran denies reports that a stolen laptop computer from Tehran has nuclear weapons data. "Iran does not have classified data on laptops and the recent claims are not only baseless but also made us laugh," adds Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi.

—"U.S. Claim Nuclear Data Found on Stolen Laptop, Iran Denies Report," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 13 November 2005.

#### **13 November 2005**

International Atomic Energy Agency's chief Mohamed ElBaradei expresses support for the EU proposal calling on Iran to move its uranium enrichment program to Russia.

—"ElBaradei to Push Iran to Accept Compromise on Uranium Enrichment," *Associated Press*, 13 November 2005.

#### **15 November 2005**

International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors arrive in Iran to inspect the Isfahan and Natanz nuclear facilities.

—"UN Inspectors in Iran to Discuss Nuclear Activities," *Financial Times*, 15 November 2005.

#### **16 November 2005**

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi reiterates that his country will not accept any compromise which involves uranium enrichment being conducted outside the country and adds that "enrichment should be carried out on Iranian soil," a position mirrored by Gholam-Reza Aqazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization.

—"Analysis: Iran Nuke Compromise Viable?" *United Press International*, 16 November 2005.

#### **16 November 2005**

A diplomat close to the IAEA says conversion has resumed at the Isfahan nuclear plant. The unnamed diplomat

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adds that "the first drums of new uranium were fed into the process at the uranium conversion facility in Isfahan this morning."

—"Iran Starts New Round of Uranium Conversion: Diplomats" *AFX International Focus*, 16 November 2005.

#### **18 November 2005**

IAEA diplomats report that Iran has provided them with documents that appear to be part of a nuclear warhead design. The IAEA adds that the documents came from the Pakistani A.Q. Khan network. The documents specifically show how to cast "enriched, natural and depleted uranium metal into hemispherical forms," a step that could be used to build the core of an atomic bomb.

—"IAEA: Iran Bought Documents on Enriching Uranium from Black Market, Refusing Access to Site" *Associated Press*, 18 November 2005.

#### **18 November 2005**

U.S. President George Bush backs a proposal that would allow for unprocessed uranium from Iran to be enriched in Russia as part of a joint venture between the countries.

—"Bush Backs Putin Initiative on Iran," *BBC*, 18 November 2005.

#### **18 November 2005**

Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani confirms Tehran has started processing uranium at the Isfahan nuclear facility. Mr. Larijani adds, "We have informed the UN watchdog that Iran wanted to process a new batch of uranium and we have started it."

—"Iran Confirms Processing New Batch of Uranium," *Reuters*, 18 November 2005.

#### **20 November 2005**

The Iranian parliament approves a bill requiring the government to prevent international inspections of all nuclear facilities, in the event the International Atomic Energy Agency refers Iran to the Security Council. The bill is now headed to the Guardian Council where it must be ratified in order to become law.

—"Iran Votes to Block Nuclear Inspections" *Associated Press*, 20 November 2005.

#### **21 November 2005**

United States and European officials agree to not refer Iran to the UN Security Council. Diplomats, speaking on condition of anonymity, say they want to give Russia more time to convince Tehran to move the nuclear enrichment stage to Russia. U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack says Washington is "encouraging Iran to get back to the negotiating table with the EU-3 at this point."

—George Jahn, "U.S., Europe Won't Push for Move on Iran," *Associated Press*, 20 November 2005.

#### **22 November 2005**

Britain, France, and Germany have agreed to meet with Iran, tentatively around December 6, to discuss the Islamic Republic's disputed nuclear program.

—"EU and Iran to meet Dec 6 on nuclear issue," *AFX International Focus*, 22 November 2005.

#### **23 November 2005**

Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Motaki says Iran has not received a joint uranium enrichment venture proposal from Russia.

—"Iran Denies Receiving Russian Uranium Enrichment Proposal," *RIA-Novosti*, 23 November 2005.

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#### **24 November 2005**

The International Atomic Energy Agency postpones referring Iran to the UN Security Council after the European Union asks for additional time to negotiate a joint Russian-Iranian uranium enrichment proposal. In addition, the EU says it will call an emergency board meeting before the next scheduled IAEA meeting in March "if Iranian behavior makes it necessary."

—Richard Bernstein, "Atomic Agency Delays Action on Iran," *New York Times*, 24 November 2005; "Roundup: IAEA Postpones Referral of Iran's Nuclear Issue to UN," *Xinhua*, 25 November 2005; George Jahn, "EU Says Iran Possessed Documents Solely for Making Nuclear Arms," *Associated Press*, 24 November 2005.

#### **27 November 2005**

Behruz Samani, an executive of nuclear activities, says the Isfahan nuclear facility has "made an 87% physical progress." Mr. Samani adds that the main goal is to create enough fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant and "more than 15,000 processes are being carried out in 60 units of the Isfahan UCF."

—"Nuclear Executive Says Iran's Esfahan UCF has Made 87 Percent Physical Progress," *Financial Times*, 27 November 2005.

#### **27 November 2005**

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi states that any meeting with the European Union must include a guarantee that the nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium enrichment, will remain in Iran. "In our view the agenda is clear...it should contain a guarantee for realizing the nuclear fuel cycle inside Iran," adds spokesman Asefi. Mr. Asefi also says that his country has not received any new proposals from Russia or requests for renewed negotiation talks with the EU.

—Nasser Karimi, "Iran Seeks Guarantees on Nuclear Fuel," *Associated Press*, 27 November 2005; "Iran Stresses Enrichment Within its Territory," *Xinhua*, 27 November 2005.

#### **28 November 2005**

Mohammad Mehdi Akhuzadeh, an official representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, states his country is "seriously considering Moscow's proposal to have Iranian uranium enriched in Russia."

—"Tehran Ready to Reply to Russia," *RIA-Novosti*, 28 November 2005.

#### **28 November 2005**

The British government confirms that the EU delivered a letter to Iran over the weekend requesting for renewed negotiations over the nuclear impasse. The British Foreign Office adds that the EU letter calls "to discuss the basis for further negotiations."

—"UK Confirms EU Nuclear Talks Offer with Iran," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 28 November 2005.

#### **28 November 2005**

German magazine *Der Spiegel* alleges that a high-ranking Iranian emissary traveled to North Korea and offered Pyongyang economic aid in exchange for helping Tehran build nuclear tipped missiles.

—"Tehran Lends Pyongyang a Helping Hand," *SPIEGEL*, 28 November 2005.

#### **5 December 2005**

International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei warns Iran that a dangerous escalation will ensue if the Natanz enrichment plant is reopened. Should the Natanz facility become fully operational, Mr. ElBaradei believes Iran could be only a few months away from a nuclear weapon.

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—Anne Penketh, "UN Chief Urges West and Iran to Cool Brinkmanship Over Nuclear Program," *Independent*, 7 December 2005.

#### **5 December 2005**

Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani says his country plans to "construct two more nuclear power plants." In a separate broadcast Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced the new reactor would be built in the Khuzestan province, the site of an unfinished power plant built by France, where construction was halted following the Islamic revolution of 1979.

—Nassir Karimi, "Iran to Build at Least One More Atom Plant," *Boston Globe*, 5 December 2005; "Iran Announces Plan to Construct Second Nuclear Power Plant," *Associated Press*, 5 December 2005.

#### **5 December 2005**

Vladimir Pavlov, head of the Russian company Atomstroyeksport, dealing with the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran, announces that his company is ready to help construct Iran's second nuclear power plant. Mr. Pavlov adds that the Bushehr nuclear power plant is almost complete and should be "connected to the Iran power grid in late 2006."

—"Russia Ready to Build Another Nuclear Power Station in Iran," *BBC*, 5 December 2005.

#### **5 December 2005**

ElBaradei says he understands the West's fear of Iran's nuclear program. "I know it [Iran] is trying to acquire the full fuel cycle. I know that acquiring the full fuel cycle means a country is months away from nuclear weapons, and that applies to Iran and everyone else."

—Yossi Melman, "UN Nuclear Watchdog Shows Greater Understanding of Israel's Concerns," *Haaretz*, 6 December 2005.

#### **6 December 2005**

Head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohamed ElBaradei announces that no "smoking gun" has been found in Iran. "We haven't seen a smoking gun in Iran. We haven't seen an underground production enrichment facility. We haven't seen enough materials in Iran, other than gram quantities, to put into a weapon," says ElBaradei.

—David Horowitz, "ElBaradei to 'Post': No Nuclear 'Smoking Gun' in Iran," *Jerusalem Post*, 6 December 2005.

#### **6 December 2005**

Russian President Vladimir Putin insists that the Iranian nuclear issue be resolved through the International Atomic Energy Agency and asks Tehran to "observe their obligations, including those they have taken unilaterally."

—"Putin: U.N. Agency Should Take Iran Lead," *Associated Press*, 6 December 2005.

#### **7 December 2005**

International Atomic Energy Agency's chief Mohamed ElBaradei says uranium enrichment in Iran could lead to nuclear weapons. Mr. ElBaradei adds that military action is not the solution, but "the window [for negotiations] is not present forever. The international community has begun to lose its patience with Iran."

—World Losing Patience Over Iran: ElBaradei," *Reuters*, 7 December 2005.

#### **7 December 2005**

During an address at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, International Atomic Energy Agency's chief, Mohamed ElBaradei indicates his support for Russia's proposal to Iran. He adds that the proposal, whereby "Russia

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would oversee any enrichment of uranium inside its borders to ensure Iran does not develop the capability on its own, appeared to solve Tehran's stated need to have access to the material for a civilian nuclear programme."

—Peter Spiegel, "ElBaradei still backs Russian plan for Iran," *Financial Times*, 7 December 2005.

#### **8 December 2005**

Germany, Britain, and France in separate statements warn Iranian authorities that resuming research on uranium enrichment centrifuges would go against the commitments made to the EU-3 but also the demands of the IAEA Board of Governors, possibly undermining the pending resumption of EU-Iran nuclear talks. A joint declaration by the EU-3 criticizing Iran's decision is expected soon.

—"EU Expected to Condemn Iran Centrifuge Research Plans," *Global Security Newswire*, 8 December 2005.

#### **9 December 2005**

Former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and ex-chief of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), Hans Blix, says the EU should offer Iran greater incentives to forgo any nuclear weapon ambitions. He adds that the EU has up until this point not offered anything substantive to the Iranians.

—"Iran Should Get Better Offer, Blix Says," *Global Security Newswire*, 9 December 2005.

#### **10 December 2005**

The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, maintaining Iran has a legal right to gain mastery of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, says that "Iran will not resume uranium enrichment as long as negotiations continue with the Europeans." He further adds that "certain countries have signaled their agreement to cooperate in Natanz enrichment facility" and was hoping the "negotiations with the Europeans will facilitate this trend."

—"Iran not to resume enrichment during talks with EU," *Xinhua*, 10 December 2005; "Iran not to continue enrichment during nuclear talks-nuclear official," *BBC*, 10 December 2005.

#### **10 December 2005**

The head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Gholamreza Aghazadeh reveals that Iran is to begin construction of a new, 360 megawatt nuclear plant in the town of Darkhu'in, in the southwestern Khuzestan province. It is going to be an indigenous project relying on domestic-made fuel and Iranian expertise.

—"Iran to build new nuclear plant and pursue enrichment future," *BBC*, 10 December 2005; "Iran starts building new nuclear plant," *United Press International*, 10 December 2005.

#### **11 December 2005**

At a weekly briefing Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi confirms that the Iran-EU nuclear talks are to be held on 21 December in Vienna, Austria. He adds, he hopes the talks will concentrate on the issue of Tehran's rights including its right for carrying out uranium enrichment.

—"Europe-President Talk," *United Press International*, 11 December 2005.

#### **11 December 2005**

Addressing a news conference, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi offers the United States a share in building a new nuclear power plant. "America can take part in international bidding for the construction of Iran's nuclear power plant if they observe the basic standards and quality." Apparently, the offer to the United States refers to the nuclear power plant to be constructed in southwestern Khuzestan, as mentioned by the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, Gholamreza Aghazadeh.

**Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org).**



—Nasser Karimi, "Iran offers U.S. share in building nuclear power plant," *Associated Press*, 11 December 2005;  
"Iran-Nuclear-Construction," *United Press International*, 11 December 2005.

### **13 December 2005**

The United States refuses to provide security guarantees for Iran to make sure Iran does not develop nuclear weapons. At a press briefing, State Department Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli adds, "Before anybody asks the United States to do something, it's up to Iran to answer the questions, act like a responsible member of the international community, and stop violating its agreements with the EU-3 and others."

—"US rejects security guarantees for Iran," *Xinhua*, 13 December 2005.

### **14 December 2005**

Addressing a public meeting in Zahedan, capital of the Sistan-Baluchestan Province in Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says Iran will defend its nuclear achievements and insist on its undeniable right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. He stresses that "those who themselves produce nuclear arms should not raise hue and cry against those who only want to gain access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes."

—"Ahmadinejad: Iran to defend its nuclear achievements," *Islamic Republic News Agency*, 14 December 2005.

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## **2004**

### **6 January 2004**

Iranian Vice-President Ali Abtahi declares the resumption of full diplomatic relations between his country and Egypt. Egypt's Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher states that he had nothing to add and that an announcement would come when a decision had been reached in this regard. Ties between the two countries ruptured in 1980 -- an Iranian move to protest Egypt's 1978 peace treaty with Israel. A key Egyptian demand, to rename a Tehran street named after Anwar Sadat's assassin, was recently met.

—"Iran and Egypt 'To Restore Ties,'" *BBC News*, 6 January 2004.

### **28 January 2004**

Speaking to a gathering of students, SNSC head Rohani announces that Iran's goodwill gesture to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment could stop at any time. "Whenever we think it is right we will restart it," he said.

—"Iran: Uranium Enrichment Halt To Be Short," *Reuters*, 28 January 2004.

### **1 February 2004**

According to the *Tehran Times*, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State John Bolton, currently on a visit to Moscow, admits that Iran's nuclear program is of peaceful intent. The paper suggests that this therefore is proof that U.S. allegations regarding Iran's activities were only "propaganda."

—"Iranian Paper Sees U.S. 'Turnaround' on Bushehr Nuclear Plant," *Tehran Times*, 1 February 2004.

### **1 February 2004**

Hamidreza Asefi, spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, announces that Iran and Russia have no serious differences as concerns cooperation in the nuclear sphere. Talks during Russian Atomic Energy Minister Rumyantsev's upcoming visit to Tehran will focus mainly on "repatriating to Russia spent nuclear fuel originating in that country."

—"Iranian Spokesman Denies Differences With Russia on Bushehr Nuclear Plant," *ITAR-TASS*, 1 February 2004.

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### **3 February 2004**

Iran is prominently cited in an assessment of Middle East proliferation by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who refers to the situation as "unsustainable" and suggests that "if we do nothing, catastrophe is only a matter of time." He supports the idea of a Middle East WMD-free zone, saying that "any enduring peace in the Middle East will only be achieved through an inclusive and comprehensive approach to security, which should include a ban on WMD, limitations on conventional armaments and appropriate security and confidence building measures." He adds: "Any attempt to achieve security for one country at the expense of insecurity for others will ultimately fail."

—"Time Is Ripe To Act on Middle East Weapons," *IAEA.org*, 3 February 2004.

### **12 February 2004**

The discovery in Iran of undeclared designs for centrifuge technology that is key to producing bomb-grade material has led U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton to stress again the U.S. conviction that Iran's nuclear aims are not peaceful. In addition, Bolton questions Iran's commitment to suspending uranium enrichment activities.

—"New Iran Nuclear Designs 'Found'," *BBC News*, 12 February 2004.

### **14 February 2004**

Iran's Foreign Minister Kharrazi announces that Iran is prepared to sell nuclear fuel to international buyers.

—"Iran Ready To Sell Nuclear Fuel Abroad," *Reuters*, 14 February 2004.

### **17 February 2004**

Foreign Minister Kharrazi declares that nuclear fuels for sale were not actually currently available, although Iran certainly had the "capacity and the potential." He also confirms that Iran is in the midst of a research program for the development of a new centrifuge. Iran is being criticized for working within an apparently narrow definition of what it means when it suggests it has suspended its uranium enrichment program.

—"Iran Not Enriching Uranium: Foreign Minister," *Spacewar.com*, 17 February 2004.

### **20 February 2004**

The White House expresses "serious concerns" with regard to a report that parts found in Iran by UN nuclear inspectors appear to correspond to those of a P-2 centrifuge. Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi claims that the P-2 is merely part of a research program, about which the IAEA has been informed.

—"Iran Nuclear Find 'Concerns' U.S.," *BBC News*, 20 February 2004.

### **20 February 2004**

Malaysian police cite evidence that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan sold Iran \$3 million worth of nuclear centrifuge parts in 1994 or 1995 via a middleman named Buhary Syed Abu Tahir.

—"Pakistan's Khan Sold Iran Nuclear Parts, Police Say," *BBC News*, 20 February 2004.

### **22 February 2004**

In a statement released by the Foreign Ministry, Iran acknowledges having secretly bought nuclear parts via international sources, although it continues to insist that its goal is electricity production versus nuclear weapons. Iranian Spokesman Hamidreza Asefi reiterates that all such purchases have been reported to the IAEA.

—"In Face of Report, Iran Acknowledges Buying Nuclear Components," *The New York Times*, 22 February 2004.

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**23 February 2004**

The *Washington Post* reports UN nuclear inspectors have come across further undisclosed research in Iran. Iran experimented with polonium-210, which "heightens suspicions because polonium-210 is so linked to a certain type of neutron-initiator." Iran acknowledges the experiments but points to polonium's possible use also in power generation and says the experiments occurred "some time ago."

—Karl Vick, "Another Nuclear Program Found in Iran," *The Washington Post*, 24 February 2004.

**25 February 2004**

IAEA Director General ElBaradei circulates his report on the agency's nuclear verification in Iran. He praises Iran's cooperation with regard to site access especially, but expresses dismay at the dearth of "prompt information." He describes the P-2 centrifuge discovery as a "setback" and expresses the hope that it would be Iran's last oversight with regard to program disclosure. ElBaradei also suggests that a "comprehensive" suspension of centrifuge manufacturing and assembly would be a good confidence-building measure.

—"Director General Comments on Iran Report," *IAEA.org*, 25 February 2004.

**25 February 2004**

Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamidreza Asefi states that IAEA concerns are "purely procedural" and described the polonium research project as a "misunderstanding" that would soon be resolved. Asefi explained that the polonium research project was undertaken 13 years ago.

—"IAEA Report Confirms Iran's Full Cooperation with UN Nuclear Watchdog: FM Spokesman," *Mehr News Agency*, 25 February 2004.

**26 February 2004**

Speaking to Russia's RIA NOVOSTI, Iran's Aqazadeh expresses disappointment that scheduled construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant is lagging.

—"Bushehr Nuclear Plan Process Lagging," *Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting*, 26 February 2004.

**26 February 2004**

Ken Brill, U.S. ambassador to the IAEA, comments that the recently released IAEA report "proves Iran's October 2003 declaration of the IAEA was neither correct nor complete." Brill reiterates the U.S. position that Iran's nuclear efforts are "clearly geared to the development of nuclear weapons." The United States has again called for the IAEA to refer Iran to the UN Security Council.

—"U.S. Again Accuses Iran of Hiding Nuclear Program," *Middle East Online*, 26 February 2004.

**28 February 2004**

UN inspectors reveal that the unexpected source of some of the highly enriched uranium found on Iranian nuclear machinery is Russia, apparently via the black market versus by government approval. The "strong clue" on which lab studies centered was a 36 percent enrichment level, which occurs only in Russia. Thirty-six percent is short of the 90 percent necessary for bomb-making.

—"Uranium Traveled to Iran Via Russia, Inspectors Find," *The New York Times*, 28 February 2004.

**1 March 2004**

Speaking to reporters in Beirut regarding the likelihood of an Israeli attack on Iran, Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani rules out the possibility, adding however that should Israel be so unwise, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon would regret "his folly."

—"Iran Warns Israel Against Attack," *Daily Times*, 1 March 2004.

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#### **2 March 2004**

IAEA Director General ElBaradei, speaking in Brussels, suggests that Iran is being more cooperative than in the past and that nuclear program verification in Iran is "moving in the right direction."

—"IAEA Director General Says Iran Verification "Moving in Right Direction," *IAEA*, 2 March 2004.

#### **7 March 2004**

SNSC head Hassan Rohani seeks IAEA closure of the Iran file, restating Iran's "inalienable right" to a nuclear program and asking for recognition of that program's peaceful intent.

—"Iran Seeks Nuclear File Closure," *BBC News*, 7 March 2004.

#### **8 March 2004**

The IAEA's Mohamed ElBaradei is meeting in Vienna with the Board of Governors to discuss the report on Iran. ElBaradei evinced serious concern about Iran's patchy declaration on its nuclear program, suggesting it is "a setback to Iran's stated policy of transparency." Iran's ambassador Pirooz Hossein said that the declaration had never been intended to present a "full picture" of past nuclear activities, which is contrary to Iran's October statement that the declaration represented full disclosure.

—"Iran's Nuclear Stance Criticized," *BBC News*, 8 March 2004.

#### **9 March 2004**

A resolution being drafted at an IAEA Board of Governors meeting will include criticism of Iran for not disclosing all of its activities, with the intent thereby of precluding a possible move for sanctions.

—"Iran Set for UN Nuclear Censure," *BBC News*, 9 March 2004.

#### **10 March 2004**

Iran's Foreign Minister Kharrazi threatens halting cooperation with the IAEA if it failed to resist U.S. "bullying" with regard to drafting a resolution censuring Iran.

—"Iran Chides U.S. Nuclear Bullying," *BBC News*, 10 March 2004.

#### **10 March 2004**

Traces of uranium detected last year by UN inspectors are revealed to include some enriched to 90 percent -- weapons grade. The IAEA suggests that the source of the contamination may have been Pakistan.

—"Alarm Raised Over Quality of Uranium Found in Iran," *The New York Times*, 11 March 2004.

#### **12 March 2004**

IAEA talks stall with regard to a U.S.-backed resolution condemning Iran for its alleged nuclear weapons development activities. Non-aligned states hope to integrate praise for Iran's cooperation efforts thus far.

—"IAEA Talks on Iran N-Plan Stalled, No Compromise Reached," *IranExpert.com*, 12 March 2004.

#### **12 March 2004**

Iran's IAEA Ambassador Hosseini announces the postponement of a UN mission to inspect its nuclear facilities. He asserts that the move is not politically motivated but due to administrative draw downs with the approaching Iranian New Year. A new date has not been established.

—"Iran Puts Off UN Nuclear Inspection Mission," *Middle East Online*, 12 March 2004.

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**16 March 2004**

Mohamed ElBaradei, the IAEA director general, is of the opinion that "the Iranians are open to a deal" but normalized relations between Iran and the United States are a prerequisite. In talks with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, ElBaradei advocated a dialogue between the two countries, which Armitage said would be taken under advisement.

—"UN Watchdog Suggests U.S.-Iran Nuclear Dialogue," *Reuters*, 16 March 2004.

**17 March 2004**

Iranian President Khatami indicates that Iran would continue its cooperation with the IAEA "as long as we know the U.S. plots are not effective."

—Parinoosh Arami, "Khatami: Iran to Continue Nuke Cooperation With IAEA," *Reuters*, 17 March 2004.

**17 March 2004**

IAEO head Rohani, speaking in Tokyo, states that Iran would accept nuclear verification teams into the country again after March 27th. IAEA head ElBaradei declared confidence that progress in the Iran case would be made, and that the "ball is clearly in Iran's court" in any attempt to absolve it of possible military intentions attached to its nuclear technology and research.

—"UN Nuclear Chief Says Iranian Cooperation Crucial to Unravel Atomic Program," *AFP*, 17 March 2004.

**18 March 2004**

In talks with President Bush, the IAEA's ElBaradei asserts that Iran is now cooperating fully and that its nuclear weapons-building intentions are still uncertain.

—"UN Briefs U.S. on Nuclear Controls," *BBC News*, 18 March 2004.

**27 March 2004**

A two-person IAEA inspection team arrives in Tehran with visits to the Natanz and Isfahan facilities on their agenda.

—"Nuclear Inspectors Return to Iran," *BBC News*, 27 March 2004.

**29 March 2004**

Gholamreza Aqazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, announces the cessation of centrifuge building for uranium enrichment. UN inspectors have reported finding only "hundreds" of centrifuges, well below what would be needed to build nuclear weaponry. Aqazadeh states that Iran's voluntary action is specifically to engender international trust and confidence.

—"Iran Says It Stopped Building Centrifuges," *Associated Press*, 29 March 2004.

**31 March 2004**

Speaking under condition of anonymity, a Western diplomat suggests that recent intelligence appears to indicate that Iranian enrichment activities have not ceased but merely been moved from Natanz to smaller sites elsewhere. Iran's ambassador to the UN Pirooz Hosseini says these charges are "baseless."

—"Diplomats: New Data Suggests Secret Iran Atomic Plan," *Reuters*, 31 March 2004.

**31 March 2004**

Germany, France, and Britain's foreign ministries have release identical statements criticizing Iran's announced plan to start up a uranium enrichment facility in Isfahan, saying it "sends the wrong signal regarding Iran's readiness to implement a suspension of its activities." UN ambassador Pirooz Hussein rejects the criticism, saying

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"the plant is a totally separate issue from our commitment to the suspension of uranium enrichment," he added that he would be discussing the situation with the three European representatives in the next few days.

—Richard Bernstein, "Europeans Criticize Iran's Plan to Start Up Enrichment Plant," *The New York Times*, 1 April 2003; "Iran Uranium Plant Sparks New Row," *BBC News*, 1 April 2004.

#### **2 April 2004**

An unidentified Western diplomat divulges that HEU has been located at sites other than Natanz and Kalaye, raising further questions regarding Iran's bomb-making ambitions.

—Louis Charbonneau, "More Bomb-Grade Uranium Found in Iran," *Reuters*, 2 April 2004.

#### **6 April 2004**

Speaking after five hours of discussion with Iranian officials, IAEA head ElBaradei refers to "welcome and positive steps" designed to put an end to concerns regarding Iran's nuclear activities. Iran has agreed to schedule UN inspections; its head for atomic energy Gholamreza Aqazadeh has pledged to accelerate Iran's cooperation.

—"Iran Agrees to Nuclear Timetable," *BBC News*, 6 April 2004.

#### **7 April 2004**

Iran declares its intention to move forward with plans to construct a heavy water reactor to produce radioisotopes for medical research. Diplomats greet the announcement with concern however, as it is possible to reprocess the spent fuel rods to produce plutonium.

—"Iran 'to Press On With Reactor'," *BBC News*, 7 April 2004.

#### **21 April 2004**

The Iranian newspaper *Ya-Lesarat* reports the arrest of two atomic experts suspected of passing nuclear secrets abroad.

—"Iran Arrests Two for Passing Nuke Secrets -- Paper," *Reuters*, 21 April 2004.

#### **11 May 2004**

SNSC Secretary General Rohani expresses confidence that the IAEA would provide "a fair and exact report for the June meeting of the board of governors" in view of what he portrays as Iran's full cooperation on the nuclear issue. Iran would like to be dropped from the IAEA agenda after that meeting.

—"Iran Nuclear Case Moving Toward Solution," *Reuters*, 11 May 2004.

#### **29 June 2004**

The IAEA's ElBaradei declares that Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran on the Bushehr reactor is not a matter for concern as it is for energy production only and there exists an agreement to return the spent fuel to Russia.

ElBaradei says the Bushehr reactor was not even mentioned in his talks with President Vladimir Putin.

—"UN Clears Iran Nuclear Facility," *BBC News*, 29 June 2004.

#### **8 July 2004**

ElBaradei expresses the opinion that it is unwise to take Iran to the Security Council, as "you run the risk that Iran might opt out of the NPT and you have another North Korea" and that it was a good idea therefore to give diplomacy a chance in the absence of a "smoking gun."

—Louis Charbonneau, "ElBaradei Wary of Taking Iran to Security Council," *Reuters*, 8 July 2004.

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**12 July 2004**

SNSC Secretary General Rohani, speaking on state television, rules out negotiations with the United States regarding its nuclear program, noting that Iran held talks with Germany, France, and Great Britain at their initiative only and declaring furthermore that the IAEA represented the only viable negotiating party on this issue.

—"Iran Rules Out Direct Nuclear Talks with U.S.," *Reuters*, 12 July 2004.

**29 July 2004**

A Bush administration official reveals that there is an effort underway to determine Israel's intentions regarding a possible unilateral attack on Iranian nuclear installations. Iranian General Mas'ud Jazayeri recently stated that such an attack would be met with "a strong, decisive and effective response."

—Ori Nir, "U.S. Fears Israeli Strike Against Iran," *The Forward*, 29 July 2004.

**10 August 2004**

Germany, France, and Great Britain decline to reply to a list of Iranian demands that includes access to advanced dual-use nuclear technology, removal of restrictions on Iranian nuclear sales, agreement to sell conventional weapons to Iran, assurances regarding the Europeans' commitment to Iran, and support for a nuclear-free Middle East.

—"Iranian Nuclear Demands Stun Europeans," *Associated Press*, 10 August 2004.

**10 August 2004**

The IAEA tentatively concludes that equipment contaminated with HEU and found in Iran originated in Pakistan.

—"Iran Uranium Traces Probably Came From Pakistan, UN Nuclear Watchdog Inspectors Say," *Global Security Newswire*, 10 August 2004.

**18 August 2004**

U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton states that Iran told European Union members that it can produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium for an atomic bomb in one year. Bolton asserts that the United States has tried diplomacy but sees Iran as a threat, and therefore prefers isolation versus engagement with it on the nuclear issue.

—"U.S. Calls Iran Nuclear Threat; IAEA Report Not Expected to Rule Out Iran Weapons Program," *Global Security Newswire*, 18 August 2004.

**19 August 2004**

Iran's Defense Minister Ali Shakhani states that "Israel won't carry out any military action without a green light from America." He warns that Iran may resort to preemptive attack "if it feels threatened." The statement occurred just one day after the deputy chief of the Revolutionary Guard threatened to lay waste to Israel's Dimona reactor should Israel attack Iran's nuclear facilities.

—"Iran: Israel Needs U.S.'s OK to Attack Our Reactor," *The Jerusalem Post*, 19 August 2004.

**20 August 2004**

Foreign Minister Kharrazi suggests that the IAEA withdraw the Iranian dossier from the agenda of the Board of Governors meeting in September.

—"Iran Calls on IAEA to Close Nuclear Dossier," *Tehran Times*, 20 August 2004.

**24 August 2004**

An Iranian nuclear energy official announces that the startup of the Bushehr reactor will be delayed approximately

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one year, until 2006.

—"Iran Delays Nuclear Plant Opening," *BBC News*, 24 August 2004.

#### **28 August 2004**

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami states Iran seeks a more active security role in the Middle East. He further states that Iran has the right to enrich uranium and that Iran is willing to provide guarantees to the IAEA that it is not developing nuclear weapons.

— Miranda Eeles, "Tehran Seeking Role in Mid-East," *BBC*, 28 August 2004.

#### **31 August 2004**

Iran arrests several people tied to the Iraqi-based Iranian opposition group, People's Mujahedeen Organization, for passing information on Iran's nuclear program to "enemies."

— "Iran Arrests Dozens 'For Spying'," *BBC*, 31 August 2004.

#### **1 September 2004**

According to a report released by the IAEA, Iran announces plans to convert 40 tons of raw uranium into uranium hexafluoride.

— "Iran Said to Be Nearing Enrichment of Uranium," *Associated Press*, 1 September 2004.

#### **8 September 2004**

Top Iranian Security advisor, Hassan Rowhani, while in talks in the Netherlands with European Union officials about Iran's nuclear program states: "If the Europeans do not respect their commitments or present an illogical or harsh resolution, Iran has already decided its response." Rowhani further says, "Iran will never compromise on its right to gain access to the complete nuclear fuel cycle."

— "Iran Warns EU of 'Response' if Nuclear Pressure Too High," *AFP*, 8 September 2004; "Iran Will Never Compromise on Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Rowhani," *Tehran Times*, 9 September 2004.

#### **9 September 2004**

Foreign Ministers from Britain, France, and Germany set a two-month deadline for Iran to suspend all enrichment activities during a meeting with Iranian officials in the Netherlands.

— Matthew Clark, "Britain Sets Nuclear Deadline for Iran," *Christian Science Monitor*, 9 September 2004.

#### **13 September 2004**

Iranian opposition group, National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) holds a news conference in Paris, stating that Iran's nuclear activities are "more widespread than it has made public." NCRI is also known as Mujahideen e-Khalq or the People's Mujahideen.

— Donna Bryson, "Iranian Opposition Makes Allegations About Tehran's Nuclear Activities," *Associated Press*, 13 September 2004.

#### **21 September 2004**

Iranian President Khatami states Iran will continue its nuclear program, even if it means an end to UN oversight.

— Ali Akbar Dareini, "Khatami: Iran Will Pursue Nuclear Program," *Associated Press*, 21 September 2004.

#### **4 October 2004**

Iran's parliament meets to draft a bill to force the government to resume uranium enrichment over the objections of the international community.

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— Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Hard-Liners Drafting Bill to Force Resumption of Uranium Enrichment," Associated Press, 4 October 2004.

#### **6 October 2004**

Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, Hossein Mousavian indicates that Iran has produced tons of the hexafluoride gas needed to enrich uranium by converting few tons of yellowcake uranium. Mousavian further states that the UF<sub>6</sub> was produced for peaceful uses and that Iran is ready to take measures to alleviate international concerns about its nuclear program.

— Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iranian Nuclear Official Says Iran Has Produced Gas That Is a Step Toward Nuclear Enrichment," Associated Press, 6 October 2004.

#### **7 - 10 October 2004**

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Alexeyev states that Russia will continue its nuclear technology cooperation with Iran. During a visit by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to Tehran, Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi confirms Iran's stance that it has a legitimate right to gain access to nuclear technology. Mr. Lavrov states in a joint press conference, "Moscow and Tehran could sign an agreement on Russian nuclear fuel supplies to Iran in the very near future."

— "Russia to Continue Nuclear Cooperation with Iran," *Xinhua*, 7 October 2004; "Iran Welcomes Proposals Recognizing its Right to Nuclear Energy - Minister," BBC, 10 October 2004; "Russian Minister Visits Iran, Says Nuclear Fuel Deal Imminent," BBC, 10 October 2004.

#### **12 October, 2004**

Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi assures European officials that Iran would not produce nuclear bombs, so long as its right to enrich uranium was recognized. According to the Associated Press, Kharrazi states: "the time has come for Europe to take a step forward and suggest that our legitimate right for complete use of nuclear energy is recognized [in return for] assurances that our program will not be diverted toward weapons." The statement comes six weeks prior to Iran's deadline to show the IAEA that it has ceased enrichment and all related activities.

— Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Offers Nuclear Assurances to Europe," Associated Press, 12 October 2004.

#### **12 October 2004**

US officials work with European officials to devise a plan to use threats and incentives to persuade Iran to end its nuclear activities.

— Carol Giacomo, "EU Targets Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Response Appears to Doom European Effort," Reuters, 13 October 2004.

#### **14 October 2004**

Russian authorities announce the completion of the Bushehr atomic power plant in Iran. To calm the international community's concerns, Russia agrees not to start the Bushehr plant in Tehran until Iran commits to return all spent nuclear fuel to Russia.

— "Russia Says Finished Building Iran Nuclear Plant," Reuters, 14 October 2004.

#### **15 October 2004**

Senior G-8 representatives meet in Washington to discuss Iran's nuclear program. According to Reuters, Iran is described by a Western diplomat in Vienna as wanting an assurance of no "regime change" like that of Iraq if it is to suspend its enrichment program.

— "Iran Wants Guarantee of No 'Regime Change' - Diplomats," Reuters, 15 October 2004.

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#### **18 October 2004**

Iranian Secretary General for the Supreme National Security Council Hasan Rowhani states that Iran is willing to negotiate with European nations on the length of its uranium enrichment suspension. However, he reiterates Iran's refusal to completely give up its right to carry out the enrichment process.

—"Iran Ready to Negotiate Enrichment Halt Length," Reuters, 18 October 2004.

#### **21 October 2004**

Officials from Britain, France, and Germany present Iran with a "last-chance proposal" for Iran to convince the international community that it is not developing atomic weapons. The three countries offer Iran "valuable nuclear technology" in return for Iran's suspending all uranium enrichment activities. If Iran does not agree it will be threatened with possible UN sanctions.

—"European Heavyweights Pressure Iran Over Nuclear Program; Talks to Continue," AFP, 21 October 2004.

#### **26 October 2004**

Iranian hard-line lawmakers introduce a bill to force the government to resume uranium enrichment and stop UN inspections of nuclear facilities. One-third of parliament members have already signed in support. Analysts suspect that the Iranians are using this as a bargaining tool ahead of the IAEA negotiations this week.

—"Iran MPs Propose Bill to Resume Uranium Enrichment," Reuters, 26 October 2004.

#### **26 October 2004**

Mansour Habashizadeh, head of the Iranian Center for Research and Production of Nuclear Fuel in Iran, announces scientists' successful development of technology to design and produce zirconium, a nuclear metal. The metal is said to be used in the "heart of a nuclear reactor and as a nuclear fuel protector." Zirconium alloy cladding is also said to be used for nuclear fuel tubes placed in the reactor core within the heart of the nuclear reactor.

—"Iran Weighs Incentives to Halt Nuke Plans," Associated Press, 26 October 2004.

#### **29 October 2004**

To assist France, Britain and Germany in negotiations with Iran over its enrichment program, IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei has offered to guarantee Iran a supply of fuel for its nuclear power plants in return for abandoning uranium enrichment activities.

—Louis Charbonneau, "UN Offers to Guarantee Nuke Fuel for Iran--Diplomats," Reuters, 29 October 2004.

#### **31 October 2004**

The Iranian parliament has unanimously approved a bill requiring the government to resume uranium enrichment.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iranian Parliament Approves Bill Requiring Government to Resume Uranium Enrichment," Associated Press, 31 October 2004.

#### **1 November 2004**

Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani says that Iran is seeking to establish a non-aggression pact with neighboring countries.

—"Iran Seeks Regional Non-Aggression Pact," *Tehran Times*, 1 November 2004.

#### **2 November 2004**

Ambassadors from France, Britain, and Germany have released an official statement calling on Iran to halt all uranium enrichment activity in exchange for nuclear technology, access to nuclear fuel, increased trade, and assistance with regional security concerns. Meanwhile, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami has stated that Iran

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is prepared to reach an agreement regarding its nuclear program, as long as Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology is recognized.

—"Iran and EU Hold Last-Chance Meeting on Tehran's Nuclear Program," AFP, 4 November 2004; "Iran 'Ready for Nuclear Accord,'" BBC, 2 November 2004.

### **3 November 2004**

According to Russia's Interfax news agency, Ali Akbar Soltan, deputy director-general of Iran's Foreign Ministry, says that Iran has the capacity to produce nuclear weapons but has no intention of doing so.

—"Iran Can Make Atom Bomb But Does Not Plan To - Iranian Official," AFX News, 3 November 2004.

### **4 November 2004**

An anonymous source has told the Russian News & Information Agency (RIA) that there is thus far no evidence of Iran having worked on nuclear weapons and that IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei is expected to confirm this in his final report on Iran to the Board of Directors at the end of the month.

—"IAEA Finds No Proof of Tehran's Work on Nuclear Weapons," RIA Novosti, 4 November 2004.

### **5 November 2004**

While Iranian diplomats met with EU officials in Paris to find a compromise on Iran's nuclear program, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stated that Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons. Khamenei claims that US accusations are unfounded and "aimed at preventing Iran's technological progress."

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Dismisses Nuclear Ambitions," Associated Press, 5 November 2004.

### **6 November 2004**

China gives Iran public support in its standoff with the IAEA, stating it opposed US efforts to have the matter referred to the UN Security Council.

—"China Backs Iran Amid 'Difficult' Nuclear Talks with EU," AFP, 6 November 2004.

### **7 November 2004**

According to ITAR-TASS Russian News Agency, Japan's *Sankei Shimbun* newspaper alleges that North Korea shipped gas used in atomic fuel enrichment and production of war-grade uranium to Iran on 20 May, and that Iran signed an agreement for the delivery of gaseous fluorine because of a shortage at the Isfahan nuclear research center.

—Andrei Antonov, "Pyongyang Supplies Gaseous Fluorine to Iran - Japanese Newspaper," ITAR-TASS, 7 November 2004.

### **7 November 2004**

In an effort to persuade Iran to abandon its alleged weapons program, Britain offers to build Iran a light-water nuclear reactor and supply it with other needed nuclear material.

—Nicholas Rufford and Robert Winnett, "Britain Offers Iran Nuclear Plant Aid," *Sunday Times* (London), 7 November 2004.

### **8 November 2004**

The Russian Federation ambassador to Iran, Aleksandr Maryasov, says Russia is against "politicizing Iran's nuclear case" through bullying or undiplomatic methods. Maryasov also states that the first phase of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, for which Russia is providing assistance, is almost complete and equipment is being installed.

—"Russian Ambassador Says Moscow Against Politicizing Iran's Nuclear Case," BBC, 8 November 2004.

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#### **9 November 2004**

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexandr Yakovenko has declared that the Russian-Iranian protocol is nearly drafted and will soon be signed. The agreement requires Iran to return any spent nuclear fuel to Russia.

—"Russia-Iran Spent Nuclear Fuel Agreement Nearly Drafted," Interfax, 9 November 2004.

#### **10 November 2004**

Iranian negotiating official Sirus Naseri, in talks with the European Union, warns that Iran will pull out of the NPT and develop its atomic program in secret if "western pressures" persist. "We will never accept cessation [of enrichment]. This issue has been removed from the talks," states Naseri.

—Paul Hughes, "Iran Official Warns of NPT Pull-Out if West Presses," Reuters, 10 November 2004.

#### **13 November 2004**

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi reveals that Iran is in the final stages of talks with European diplomats over nuclear arms. Iran continues to deny developing nuclear arms and has offered guarantees regarding the program's safety.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Says Nuclear Talks in 'Final Stages'," Associated Press, 13 November 2004.

#### **14 November 2004**

The IAEA has published the agreement reached between Iran and the governments of France, Germany, and Britain. The report recognizes Iran's rights to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and reaffirms Iran's commitment to the NPT to not seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Iran agrees "on a voluntary basis, [to] continue and extend its suspension to include all enrichment related activities." The IAEA is to implement the monitoring of this suspension with a steering committee scheduled to meet on the issue in the first half of December 2004.

—"Iran-EU Agreement on Nuclear Programme," IAEA, 14 November 2004.

#### **15 November 2004**

According to Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), the IAEA confirms in its report on Iran that it has not found any evidence that Iran had used nuclear material to develop weapons, although it could not rule out the existence of nuclear materials that had not been declared. Iran has agreed to cease its enrichment program on 22 November and invited the IAEA to monitor. Iran is still facing a 25 November IAEA compliance deadline or else face sanctions by the Security Council.

—"Roundup: IAEA Report: No Proof of Iranian Plans for Nuclear Weapons," DPA, 15 November 2004; "UN Probe Backs Iran Nuclear Claim," BBC, 15 November 2004.

#### **16 November 2004**

Iranian hardliners voice anger over the Iran-EU deal to suspend all activities related to its nuclear enrichment program, saying that there is no guarantee of the EU's commitment.

—Parisa Hafezi, "Iranian Hardliners Unhappy with Nuclear Deal," Reuters, 16 November 2004.

#### **17 November 2004**

The exiled Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), alleges that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan gave Iran weapons grade uranium and a design for a nuclear bomb. According to the same group, Khan had already given a quantity of HEU (highly enriched uranium) to Iran in 2001. Iran is purportedly also secretly enriching uranium at a military site previously unknown to the IAEA, even though it

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promised to halt all such work.

—Louis Charbonneau, "Iran Got Warhead Design, Bomb-Grade Uranium - Exiles," Reuters, 17 November 2004.

#### **18 November 2004**

US Secretary of State Colin Powell suggests that the US has intelligence that confirms Iran is "actively working" to enable its missiles to carry nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Iran is moving forward on its plan to run 50,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium, to meet the fuel requirements of a nuclear reactor set to be finished next year. Iran is thought to currently possess less than 1,000 centrifuges; experts say that the addition of another 500 will produce enough weapons-grade uranium to produce a bomb annually.

—"Iran Said Trying to Fit Missiles for Nukes," *USA Today*, 18 October 2004.

#### **18 November 2004**

Iranian officials deny allegations by an opposition group that Iran is seeking material to build an atomic bomb.

—Parisa Hafezi, "Iran Says It Has No Secret Nuclear Activities," Reuters, 18 November 2004.

#### **19 November 2004**

Western diplomats claim Iran is producing uranium hexafluoride, which can be used to make nuclear weapons, days before its promise to halt such activities takes effect. Iranian officials deny allegations.

—"Iran 'Rushing Nuclear Enrichment'," BBC, 19 November 2004.

#### **22 November 2004**

Iran freezes all sensitive nuclear work including uranium enrichment while France, Britain, and Germany circulate a draft resolution calling on the IAEA to notify member states if it finds Iran has resumed enrichment activity.

—Louis Charbonneau, "Iran Halts Key Nuclear Work to Avoid UN Sanctions," Reuters, 22 November 2004; "EU 3 Circulate Iran Draft Calling for Notification," Reuters, 22 November 2004.

#### **23 November 2004**

According to the Chinese news agency Xinhua, Iranian officials reject IAEA allegations that Iran produced two tons of uranium hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) gas for military purposes. Officials respond that the gas was used for an unspecified research project.

—"Iran Rejects Accusation on Military Use of UF<sub>6</sub>," Xinhuanet (China), 23 November 2004.

#### **23 November 2004**

The CIA releases an unclassified version of its report to Congress outlining concerns over various countries, including Iran spreading technology or expertise that can be used to make WMD. The report, covering all activities between July 1 and December 31, 2003, affirms that Iran "vigorously" pursued programs to produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in late 2003, and is currently working to improve delivery systems. The report also discusses serious concerns regarding Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan and his network's involvement with Iran. Specifically, the report addresses the following:

In 2003, Iran continued to pursue an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle with clear weapons potential

Beginning August 2002, an Iranian opposition group revealed several previously undisclosed nuclear facilities in Iran

The IAEA has reported several failures by Iran to disclose facilities and activities, contrary to its safeguards obligations

A.Q. Khan's network provided Iran with designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models and components

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The IAEA has reported further evidence of Iran breaching its obligations under the NPT, including failures to report:  
report the importation and chemical conversion of uranium compounds  
report the separation of plutonium from irradiated uranium targets  
report the enrichment of uranium using centrifuges and lasers  
provide the design information for numerous fuel cycle facilities  
Furthermore, the CIA report affirms that although Iran signed the Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, it has taken no steps to ratify it during the reporting period.

—"CIA: Countries Spreading WMD Technology May Be Growing in Number," Associated Press, 23 November 2004; Tabassum Zakaria, "CIA Says Iran, Qaeda Pursued Nuclear Weapons," Reuters, 23 November 2004; Doug Jehl, "C.I.A. Says Pakistanis Gave Iran Nuclear Aid," *The New York Times*, 24 November 2004; "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July through 31 December 2003," CIA, [www.cia.gov](http://www.cia.gov), 23 November 2004.

#### **24 November 2004**

Iran requests that EU nations allow it to continue to conduct "research and development" with centrifuges during the freeze period. Western diplomats say the European Union has rejected their request.

—"Iran Wants to Amend Nuke Freeze, EU Says No," Reuters, 24 November 2004.

#### **27 November 2004**

Pakistani government officials downplay allegations from a newly released CIA report that A.Q. Khan provided more assistance to Iran's nuclear program than previously revealed. Khan is said to have provided "significant assistance" to Iran, including designs for Pakistan's older centrifuges, as well as for more advanced and efficient models and components. Although pardoned by Pakistani President Musharraf, Khan is still under house arrest in Pakistan.

—Paul Alexander, "Pakistan Downplays CIA Report on Leaks," Associated Press, 27 November 2004.

#### **28 November 2004**

Iran drops demands to be allowed to continue some of its nuclear activities. An IAEA draft resolution for Iran to continue its suspension of nuclear-related activities was held up due to Iranian demands for some sensitive technology to be exempt from the deal.

—"Iran Offers Nuclear 'Concession'," BBC, 28 November 2004.

#### **29 November 2004**

The IAEA Board of Governors has adopted a resolution regarding Iran, putting into effect the NPT Safeguards Agreement. The report welcomes Iran's voluntary decision to suspend all enrichment related and reprocessing activities. IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei has revealed that surveillance cameras are now in place to monitor Iran's 20 sets of centrifuge components. Meanwhile, the United States has reaffirmed its preparedness to unilaterally refer Iran to the Security Council if this is deemed necessary. Iran continues to deny allegations that it has a secret or ill-intentioned nuclear program.

—"Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA, 29 November, 2004; Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, "Statement to the Board of Governors," IAEA, 29 November 2004; "US Keeps Nuclear Pressure on Iran," BBC, 29 November 2004; "Iran Has Never Had Nuclear Weapons Program - Embassy," Interfax, 29 November 2004.

#### **30 November 2004**

Top Iranian negotiator Hassan Rowhani affirms that Iran has not abandoned its right to enrich uranium as the

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agreed upon suspension is only temporary while the IAEA inspects Iranian nuclear sites over several months. EU officials still hope Iran will make the suspension permanent in return for trade deals and other incentives.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran's Top Nuclear Official Says Tehran Has Not Abandoned Enrichment of Uranium Since Its Suspension is Limited," Associated Press, 30 November 2004; Paul Hughes, "Iran Says Nuclear Freeze Won't Last Long," Reuters, 30 November 2004.

#### **1 December 2004**

Iranian Ministry of Information announces the arrest of Iranian Asghar S. who was allegedly pretending to work on nuclear centrifuges in order to "damage Iran's recent nuclear agreements and commitments" as a spy.

—"Iran Says it has Arrested Spy Trying to Taint its Nuclear Agreements," Associated Press, 1 December 2004.

#### **2 December 2004**

The National Council of Resistance to Iran (NCRI) opposition group has raised suspicions regarding two covert Iranian military sites where nuclear activities may be taking place, sparking IAEA's interest to inspect the sites. UN diplomats state that the IAEA lacks the legal authority to search these sites as they may only monitor civilian nuclear programs, and the facilities in question were never declared as nuclear sites.

—Louis Charbonneau, "UN Lacks Right to Inspect Sites in Iran - Diplomats," Reuters, 2 December 2004.

#### **2 December 2004**

IAEA inspectors seek access to two secret Iranian military sites. Intelligence data suggests the Iranian Ministry of Defense may be working on atomic weapons there. The information is based on satellite photos indicating testing of high explosives, and procurement records showing the purchase of equipment that may be used for uranium enrichment. The two sites are the decades-old Parchin military complex, southeast of Tehran, and a newer facility, Lavizan II, built in northeastern Tehran. Information on the second site was provided by the Iranian opposition group, the National Council of Resistance to Iran (NCRI).

—William J. Broad, David E. Sanger and Elaine Sciolino, "Arms Inspectors Said to Seek Access to Iran Sites," *The New York Times*, 2 December 2004.

#### **3 December 2004**

The Iranian chief of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani, says Iran expects to join the club of nuclear states. Rafsanjani declares that Iran is ready to reassure the world that it is not looking to acquire nuclear weapons, although it is also not willing to give up its legal right to pursue the matter. Iran seeks to restart its enrichment processes within six months.

—"Rafsanjani Says Iran Expected to Join Club of Nuclear States," BBC, 3 December 2004.

#### **5 December 2004**

The Iranian daily newspaper *Shargh* quotes Sirous Nasser, a member of Iran's nuclear program negotiating team, as stating that Iran has mastered the nuclear fuel cycle since last year.

—Nazila Fathi, "Iran Hints it Sped Up Enriching Uranium as a Ploy," *The New York Times*, 6 December 2004.

#### **21 December 2004**

Iran has decided to continue its production of UF<sub>4</sub> (uranium tetrafluoride) until the end of February. Although Iran is within its legal rights - the accord allows the country to finish limited conversion work begun prior to the suspension - Western diplomats view Iran's actions as breaking the spirit of its agreement to cease all enrichment activities.

—Louis Charbonneau, "Iran Atomic Work Breaks Spirit of Accord - Diplomats," Reuters, 21 December 2004.

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#### **22 December 2004**

Iranian Intelligence Minister Ali Yunesi claims Iran has arrested more than 10 people on nuclear spying charges over the past few months. The alleged spies are said to be passing sensitive information to the Mossad and the CIA.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran Says It Has Detained More than 10 in Recent Months on Nuclear Spying Charges, Associated Press, 22 December 2004.

#### **22 December 2004**

British Prime Minister Tony Blair states Europe will ensure Iran abides by its obligations to its international commitments. Meanwhile Iranian parliament members reaffirm their commitment to pressure Tehran to resume its nuclear efforts if Europe doesn't fulfill its part of the agreement.

—"Europe to Ensure Iran Follows Agreement, Blair Says," Global Security Newswire, 22 December 2004.

#### **27 December 2004**

Russian head of Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), Aleksandr Rumyantsev states Russia is very likely to start supplying nuclear fuel to Iran's Bushehr power plant in 2005. The two countries are scheduled to sign an agreement in January. Meanwhile, Tehran has promised new contracts for Russia, including seven generating units worth \$10 billion.

—"Russian-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation to be Accelerated in January," Ria Novosti, 27 December 2004.

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## **2003**

#### **24 January 2003**

Aleksander Rumyantsev, Russian Atomic Energy Minister, responds to a statement of an US official that the United States would not object to the construction of single nuclear reactor in Iran, he says that he is glad about the "favorable shift" in US attitude.

—"Russian minister welcomes relaxation of US stance on nuclear plant in Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 24 January 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **1 February 2003**

Viktor Kozlov, head of Atomstroieexport, says that his company will seek fresh contracts with Iran. He brushes aside US concerns that the reactor could be used to develop nuclear weapons. Mr. Kozlov states, "Russia is convinced that the plants it builds in neighboring counties are used only for civilian purposes....You shouldn't think Russian leaders are stupid."

—Clara Ferreira-Marques, "Russia Seeks Iran Nuclear Deals," Reuters, 3 February 2003, [www.moscowtimes.com](http://www.moscowtimes.com).

#### **3 February 2003**

In response to US State Department spokesman Richard Baucher statement that Iran is allegedly using technologies provided by Russia to obtain nuclear weapons, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev says that Russia does not violate international obligations and that "all of Iran's activities are under IAEA control."

—Andrei Popov, "Russian minister emphasizes cooperation with Iran comes under IAEA control," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 3 February 2003; in FBIS Document CEP 20030203000375, 3 February 2003.

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#### **4 February 2003**

Western diplomatic sources say that the International Atomic Energy Agency plans to conduct an inspection of Iranian nuclear facilities during the first half of 2003 amid rising concerns of Tehran's nuclear capability.

—"IAEA plans to examine Iran's nuclear facilities," Middle East Newline, 4 February 2003, [www.menewline.com](http://www.menewline.com).

#### **4 February 2003**

Dr. Mohamed El Baradei states that he will be heading to Iran later this month with a team of IAEA experts to discuss Iran's nuclear programs and to urge the Iranians to accept the additional inspection protocol. Dr. El Baradei says "I would like to discuss with Iranian officials the possibility of Iran joining the Additional Protocol....That I think would clearly create additional assurance with regard to the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme."

—"U.N. wants to verify if Iran atomic plans peaceful," Reuters, 4 February 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **5 February 2003**

Ali Akbar Salehi, Iranian Representative to the IAEA, says that Iran has always been in favor of the Additional Protocol on inspection of nuclear sites. He adds that only 50 members of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have signed the additional protocol, and it has been ratified in only 27 countries. Mr. Salehi adds that the Head of the IAEA should not speak as a spokesman for the US administration.

—"IAEA does not need US claims to do its own job, Iranian envoy," IRNA (Tehran), 5 February 2003, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

#### **5 February 2003**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev tells Vremya Novostei that the plant that Russia is building in Bushehr is identical to the one the US had promised to build in North Korea. He adds, "The IAEA last year carried out 60 inspections in Iran without finding a single case of abuse."

—"Russia sells uranium to South Korea, seeks nuclear contracts in Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 5 February 2003; in FBIS document CEP20030205000149, 5 February 2003.

#### **9 February 2003**

Iranian President Mohammed Khatami declares that Iran had discovered and extracted indigenous uranium in the Savand area 200km from Yazd, which would be used to produce nuclear energy. President Khatami says, "Iran has discovered reserves and extracted uranium....[W]e are determined to use nuclear technology for civilian purposes." With regard to IAEA inspections President Khatami states, "It is our legitimate right to obtain nuclear energy for peaceful aims....We are ready to accept inspectors to check our (nuclear) activities in order to reveal the lies told by others."

—"Khatami says Iran mines uranium for nuclear plant," Reuters, 9 February 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **10 February 2003**

Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, Iranian Vice President and head of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Organization, says that Iran is not interested in nuclear arms production but seeks to acquire nuclear know how to generate electricity to meet its energy demands. He also says that Iran plans to build a factory for the production of uranium yellow cake. As he put it, "the [Iranian Nuclear Energy] Organization started its activities by drilling special wells in Arkedan of Yazd, where uranium reserves lie deep underground. It now plans to build a factory for the production of yellow cake." He also says, "With the completion of the Isfahan factory in the near future, we hope to complete the fuel cycle and indigenously produce fuel for our plants."

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—"Aqazadeh says Iran seeks nuclear know how to generate electricity, not weapons," IRNA (Tehran), 10 February 2003; in FBIS document IAP20030210000068, 10 February 2003.

#### **10 February 2003**

Melissa Fleming, spokeswoman for the IAEA, says that the agency has long been aware of Iran's indigenous uranium explorations efforts. She states, "This comes as no surprise to us, as we have been aware of this uranium exploration project for several years now....[I]n fact, a senior IAEA official visited this mine in 1992."

—"U.N. Aware of Iran's Uranium Plants," Associated Press, 10 February 2003, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com).

#### **11 February 2003**

The Russian company Atomstroieexport announces that it has begun technical studies on the construction of a second unit at Bushehr.

—"Russia starts feasibility study on second unit at Iranian nuclear power plant," Radio 1 (Tehran), 12 February 2003; in FBIS document IAP20030212000004, 12 February 2003.

#### **13 February 2003**

Nikolai Shengaryov, spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, says that Russia may provide the Bushehr reactor with fuel from the newly found uranium reserves in Iran.

—"Russia can use Iran's uranium deposits for Bushehr project," IRNA (Tehran), 13 February 2003, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

#### **16 February 2003**

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi tells a news conference that Iran wants the Middle East to be completely free of weapons of mass destruction. He says, "We believe the Middle East should be free of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons." Mr. Kharrazi also accuses Washington of hypocrisy on the subject, specifically for accusing Iran of developing weapons of mass destruction while being silent on Israeli nuclear weapons.

—"Iran Wants No Mass Destruction Arms in Middle East," Reuters, 16 February 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **17 February 2003**

A delegation of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Power is visiting Iran to discuss the construction of Bushehr and nuclear cooperation.

—"Russian delegation in Iran for nuclear power talks," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 17 February 2003; in FBIS document CEP20030217000041, 17 February 2003.

#### **19 February 2003**

Emma Udwin, spokeswoman for the European Commission, says that the EU understands Iran's need to develop a nuclear program for peaceful uses but advised the Iranians to sign the IAEA additional protocol to remove suspicions about their intentions.

—"EU understands Iran's need for nuclear energy," IRNA (Tehran), 19 February 2003; in FBIS document IAP20030219000039, 19 February 2003.

#### **22 February 2003**

In a meeting in Tehran between President Khatami and IAEA Chief Mohamed El Baradei, Iran agreed to provide the IAEA preliminary information about any plans to build new nuclear facilities. The two leaders met after El Baradei visited a plant that is being built in Natanz. President Khatami says Iran would further cooperate with the IAEA to avoid any "misunderstandings," and states "we hope the Iranian efforts, which are legal and fair, will not become a victim of the discriminatory policies of certain countries. Dr. El Baradei stressed that if Iran signed the additional

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protocol, the country would dispel doubts about its nuclear ambitions. Iran has refused the additional protocol—which would allow the IAEA to conduct snap inspections and give the agency freer access to nuclear sites with little prior warning—but agreed to hold more talks on the issue.

—"Iran gives nuclear pledge," BBC (London), 22 February 2003, [news.bbc.co.uk](http://news.bbc.co.uk).

#### **24 February 2003**

In an interview with CNBC, John Bolton, undersecretary of state, says that Iran plays a leading role in the Bush administration agenda, and that Iran is seeking technological assistance from North Korea and China to enhance its weapons of mass destruction programs.

—"Iran seeks WMD help from China, N. Korea," Middle East Newsline, 24 February 2003, [www.menewline.com](http://www.menewline.com).

#### **22-23 February 2003**

Occupied with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction controversy, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency Dr. Mohamed El Baradei had to cut short his long-awaited inspection of Iran's unreported nuclear sites in Natanz and Arak. The IAEA has consequently decided to reduce the scope of its inspections in Iran.

—"IAEA cuts short inspections of Iran's nukes," *World Tribune*, 24 February 2003, [www.worldtribune.com](http://www.worldtribune.com).

#### **28 February 2003**

The British government disputes a claim by the BBC that it sold beryllium to Iran, which is used in the development of nuclear weapons. The British Foreign Office Minister Mike O'Brien says that the export of less than one-half of an ounce of this precious metal was "not of concern with respect to use in weapons of mass destruction."

—"London Denies Ban on Beryllium Exports," *Iran-Daily*, 1 May 2003, [www.iran-daily.com](http://www.iran-daily.com).

#### **4 March 2003**

Hassan Rohani, secretary general of the Iranian National Supreme Security Council, says that, "Iran will start operating its nuclear facility in Isfahan early next [Iranian] year." The Iranian calendar year starts on 21 March. The United States fears the uranium processing plant may be a part of a secret program to develop nuclear weapons.

—"Iran Uranium Facility Seen Onstream in Few Weeks," Reuters, 4 March 2003, [story.news.yahoo.com](http://story.news.yahoo.com).

#### **10 March 2003**

Iran accuses the United States of sabotaging its cooperation with the IAEA by constantly alleging that Iran is attempting to build nuclear weapons. Hamid Reza Asefi, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman, tells IRNA, "We believe that the US is sabotaging the close and constructive cooperation between Iran and the IAEA....The arrogant US officials are about to weaken the international organization by distorting facts."

—"Iran Says US Sabotaging Its Cooperation with IAEA," Reuters, 10 March 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **10 March 2003**

US Diplomatic sources claim that the uranium enrichment facility near Natanz is much further along than previously revealed. They claim that the plant is "extremely advanced" where "hundreds" of gas centrifuges are assembled and ready to enrich uranium. The plant allegedly also contains "the parts for a thousand others ready to be assembled."

—"Iran's Nuclear Threat," *Time*, 10 March 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **10 March 2003**

Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman Aziz Ahmed Khan rejects media allegations at a weekly press briefing and

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declares that Pakistan has not extended any nuclear cooperation to Iran.

—"No Cooperation In Iranian Nuclear Program: FO," PNS (Islamabad), 11 March 2003, [www.paknews.com](http://www.paknews.com).

#### **11 March 2003**

The head of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei says that the uranium enrichment plant he visited in Iran was "very sophisticated." He also states "I have impressed on the Iranian authorities the need to be fully transparent, the need to sign the additional protocol."

—"IAEA's El Baradei Says Uranium-Enriching Plant in Iran 'Very Sophisticated'," AFP (Paris), 11 March 2003; in FBIS document EUP20030311000370, 11 March 2003.

#### **11 March 2003**

Iranian President Mohammed Khatami and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov meet in Tehran to discuss various issues including Iraq and the Iranian Russian nuclear energy cooperation.

—"Iranian president, Russian foreign minister discuss Iraq, Caspian, nuclear energy," Radio 1 (Tehran), 11 March 2003; in FBIS document IAP20030311000075, 11 March 2003.

#### **11 March 2003**

Bushehr plant Manager Nasser Sharif-Loo states that Russia and Iran have begun preliminary discussion to build a second nuclear plant in southern Bushehr.

—"Iran, Russia discuss building of second nuclear plant in Bushehr," IRNA (Tehran), 11 March 2003; in FBIS document IAP20030311000039, 11 March 2003.

#### **11 March 2003**

Iranian officials declare that Russia will provide the Bushehr nuclear plant with its first shipment of enriched uranium in May. The shipment will consist of 90 tonnes of fuel.

—"Iran to receive Russian uranium for reactor in May," Reuters, 11 March 2003, [www.sierratimes.com](http://www.sierratimes.com).

#### **11 March 2003**

According to the Iranian deputy head of Atomic Energy Organization Assadollah Sabori, the Bushehr nuclear plant is nearing completion. He says that "Over 70 percent of the work has been accomplished."

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran's Nuclear Plant Nears Completion," Associated Press, 11 March 2003, [www.mcall.com](http://www.mcall.com).

#### **11 March 2003**

Mostafa Tajzadeh, a member of the reform movement in the Iranian Parliament, maintains that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons, while asserting that Iran has the right to develop them. He says, "It's basically a matter of equilibrium....One the one hand Israel says, 'If I don't have it, I don't have security.' And we say, 'As long as Israel has it, we don't have security'."

—Karl Vick, "Iranians Assert Right To Nuclear Weapons," *Washington Post*, 11 March 2003, [www.washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com).

#### **12 March 2003**

Iran's nuclear chief Gholam Reza Aghazadeh tells *Le Monde* that Iran is willing to sign the additional protocol of the NPT if Western countries drop their economic sanctions against Tehran. He says "We are waiting for the sanctions to be lifted before we sign."

—"Iran Would Sign Nuclear Treaty If Sanctions Lifted," Associated Press, 12 March 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

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**12 March 2003**

In an interview with a Russian newspaper, Russian Energy Minister Alexander Romyantsov confirms that despite US pressure, Russia and Iran are determined to continue their nuclear cooperation.

—"Iran, Russia determined to continue nuclear cooperation despite US pressure," IRNA (Tehran), 12 March 2003; in FBIS document IAP20030312000119, 12 March 2003.

**12 March 2003**

US state department officials confirm Pakistan's claim that it is not providing assistance to Iran's nuclear program. Richard Boucher states at a Washington briefing, "We do believe that Pakistan takes this (nuclear) responsibility seriously."

—"No Pakistan support to Iran's N-plan: US," *Dawn*, 12 March 2003, [www.dawn.com](http://www.dawn.com).

**13 March 2003**

A senior Iranian official reveals that Iran is seeking to establish its own fuel cycle out of concern that US pressure may work on foreign suppliers. Iran's ambassador to the United Nations Javad Zarif says in an interview at the UN, "You don't expect Iran to sit still....We don't have any confidence that two years down the road, three years down the road, the pressure by the United States may or may not work on our suppliers. We have to create source of self-sufficiency, which will include a fuel cycle program."

—Colum Lynch, "Envoy: Iran to Continue Its Nuclear Power Effort," *Washington Post*, 13 March 2003, [www.washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com).

**15 March 2003**

Iranian officials indicate that Iran is prepared discuss committing to the IAEA's additional protocol safeguards in return for technical assistance from the international community.

—"Iran seeks returns for nuclear safeguard," *Gulf Daily*, 16 March 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**20 March 2003**

A report from the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry reveals that Russia will provide fuel to the Bushehr nuclear plant for the duration of its operation.

—"Russia to provide Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant with fuel throughout its operation," *Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey* (Moscow), 20 March 2003; in FBIS document CEP20030320000440, 20 March 2003.

**20 March 2003**

Russia declared that it does not intend to evacuate Russian experts and their families from Bushehr due to the Iraq conflict even though Bushehr is located 300 miles from Basra.

—"Russian experts not to be evacuated from Iranian power station," *ITAR-TASS* (Moscow), 20 March 2003; in FBIS document CEP20030320000029, 20 March 2003.

**24 March 2003**

According to Russia's Ministers of Defense and Atomic Energy, Russia is disturbed by media reports that Western companies have been involved in shipping weapons of mass destruction technology to Iran. This came after media reports of the discovery of a centrifuge complex in Iran that could be used to enrich uranium which was produced with the aid of the British-Dutch URENCO Company.

—"Russia concerned about reports on Iran developing dual-purpose technology," *Interfax* (Moscow), 24 March 2003, in [www.interfax.com](http://www.interfax.com).

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**24 March 2003**

According to reports from Moscow, Russia will shortly deliver the first 40 tons of nuclear fuel rods for Bushehr. It is also reported that the Russian Atomstoieexport has signed a contract with TWEL, one of the world's largest suppliers of fuel rods to acquire fuel rods for Bushehr.

—"Russia ready to start supply of nuclear fuel to Iran," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 24 March 2003; in Lexis-Nexis, in [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**26 March 2003**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev confirms that uranium enrichment equipment to Iran was supplied by the Western European company Urenco and not Russian companies. He states that part of the uranium enrichment equipment found in Iran bears Urenco markings. Previously, Urenco management had claimed that the centrifuge production technology was stolen from them two decades ago.

—"Rumyantsev: Russia did not supply uranium enrichment equipment to Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 26 March 2003; in FBIS document CEP20030326000342, 26 March 2003.

**26 March 2003**

A Russian minister accuses the United States of hypocrisy in criticizing Russian sales of nuclear technology to Iran, while ignoring similar activity by western companies. Alexander Rumyantsev says, "We also have complaints against the United States....It is always criticizing us, but its close economic partners supply Iran with sensitive technology."

—"Russia slams US on Iran nuke program," Reuters, 26 March 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**28 March 2003**

The British-Dutch company Urenco denies the suggestions by the Russian government that it has provided enrichment equipment to Iran, and demands that these allegations be immediately withdrawn.

—Nick Paton Walsh "Russia adds to Iran nuclear row," *Guardian*, 28 March 2003, [www.guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk).

**9 April 2003**

The General Director of Atomstoieexport Victor Kozlov tells Interfax that the war in Iraq will not affect the completion date of Bushehr's first power producing unit. The construction of Bushehr is to continue as planned without postponement.

—"Atomstoieexport says Iraq war will not change schedule for Bushehr project," Interfax (Moscow), 9 April 2003; in FBIS document CEP20030409000170, 9 April 2003.

**28 April 2003**

US Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf accuses Iran of cheating on its obligation under the NPT, stating that Iran has an "alarming, clandestine program" and "is going down the same path of denial and deception that handicapped international inspections in North Korea and Iraq."

—"US Accuses Iran of Cheating on Nuclear Arms Pact," Reuters, 28 April 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**6 May 2003**

The head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization Gholam Reza Aqazedah presents an exhaustive sketch of Iran's nuclear program to United Nations diplomats reiterating that the program is peaceful.

—"Iran Firm on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, Official Tells UN," *Tehran Times*, May 8 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

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**7 May 2003**

In spite of US accusations, Iran states that it is expecting to receive a clean bill of health from the IAEA 16 June board meeting.

—"Iran Expects Clean Bill of Health from IAEA," Reuters, 7 May 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**8 May 2003**

Diplomats say that the United States is lobbying the board of the International Atomic Energy Agency for a declaration that would declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—"Washington lobbies for UN censure of Iran's nuclear plans," Associated Press, 9 May 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**8 May 2003**

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Naqi Kamal Kharazi reveals in an interview that Iran is ready for a dialogue with the United States; however it would like the United States to stop making malicious allegations about the nature of Iran's nuclear program and to stop backing the Mujahidin e-Khalq group.

—"Iranian FM Kharazi on Nuclear Issue, Iraq; Urges US, EU to Stop Backing MKO," *La Repubblica* (Rome), 9 May 2003; in FBIS Document EUP20030509000417, 9 May 2003.

**13 May 2003**

Russian officials and representatives of the Russian TVEL fuel company are negotiating with Iranians officials regarding the return of Russian spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Russia negotiating on return of spent nuclear fuel with Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 13 May 2003; In FBIS document CEP20030513000308, 13 May 2003.

**14 May 2003**

Colin Powell and Igor Ivanov are meeting in Moscow to discuss a variety of issues, including the war in Iraq, terrorism, and the Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation.

—"Iranian Radio Expects Nuclear Ties with Russia to Continue Despite Powell Visit," Radio 1 (Tehran), 14 May 2003; in FBIS document IAP20030514000054, 14 May 2003.

**15 May 2003**

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Mamedov urges Iran to sign a protocol placing all its nuclear facilities under IAEA control.

—"Moscow urges Tehran to sign protocol on IAEA control over nuclear facilities," Interfax (Moscow), 15 May 2003; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**15 May 2003**

US Secretary of State Collin Powell states that the United States does not plan to take military action to stop Iran's nuclear programs. Mr. Powell says, "We are concerned about what Iran is doing (with its nuclear program)....We will work with the international community to persuade Iran they should not move in this direction....But it's not a matter for the armed forces of the United States at the moment."

—Jonathan Thatcher, "US: No Plans for Military Action in Iran," Reuters, 15 May 2003, [www.reuters.com](http://www.reuters.com).

**17 May 2003**

Iranian officials state that Tehran supported the Syrian proposal to the UN to rid the Middle East of weapons of

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mass destruction.

—"Iran says it backs Syria's anti-WMD proposal to UN," Reuters, 17 May 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **24 May 2003**

George Papandreou, the Foreign Minister of Greece who currently holds the European Union's rotating presidency, clarifies after a meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister that the EU has never claimed that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.

—"Greek FM: EU Has Never Says Iran Has Nuclear Weapons," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 24 May 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

#### **27 May 2003**

In the aftermath of a recent meeting of European Union Foreign Ministers in Greece, EU officials are stepping up pressure on Iran and are implying that Iran should fully comply with the NPT or risk European change in attitude toward Iran.

—"EU presses Iran on nuclear arms," *Financial Times* (London), 27 May 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **27 May 2003**

US officials say that the Bush administration is considering a Pentagon plan to destabilize Iran's powerful clergy through covert action. The administration officials are exploring ways to enhance public uprisings to diminish the influence of the religious Mullahs in Iran.

—William Douglas, "Plans to destabilize clergy," *Long Island Newsday*, 28 May 2003.

#### **27 May 2003**

According to US and European officials, as a result of US pressure, Russia is telling Iran that it must sign the additional protocol in order to receive nuclear fuel for Bushehr.

—Guy Dinmore, "Russia presses Iran over nuclear fuel," *Financial Times* (London), 27 May 2003, in [www.ft.com](http://www.ft.com).

#### **27 May 2003**

In a Washington press conference, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) reveals the existence two previously undisclosed uranium enrichment facilities west of Tehran.

—Howard LaFranchi, "US weighs a tougher Iran stance," *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 May 2003, [www.csmonitor.com](http://www.csmonitor.com).

#### **28 May 2003**

IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming states that the IAEA has conducted several inspections in Iran since Mohamed El Baradei's last visit to Iran in February. Ms. Fleming also reveals that various swipe samples have been gathered by the inspectors and are currently being analyzed by the agency.

—"UN Nuclear Inspectors Continuing Inspections in Iran Ahead of Report," Paris AFP, 28 May 2003; FBIS EUP20030528000438, 28 May 2003.

#### **30 May 2003**

US military officials in Iraq notify the IAEA that its inspectors will be barred from entering the Tuwaitha nuclear research center when they arrive in the country next week. Moreover, according to the IAEA, the inspectors will eventually be permitted to perform only the minimum extent of checks required by international law, which amounts to conducting an inventory of one small area at the center where radioactive material was stored before the war. The inspectors will not be permitted to conduct an investigation of public health claims linked to the

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looting of nuclear materials from the center, nor will they be involved in the hunt for weapons of mass destruction.  
—Julian Borger, "Iraq: after the war: Looting inquiry ban on nuclear inspectors," *Guardian*, 30 May 2003.

### **30 May 2003**

According to US officials, hawkish members of the pentagon are cheering the Iran Democracy Act, which was proposed by Senator Sam Brownback. This legislation would allocate a sum larger than \$50 million to Iranian opposition groups to support calls for a referendum in Iran on a secular democracy.

—Guy Dinmore, "Pentagon Pushes Tougher US line on Iran," *Financial Times* (London), 30 May 2003.

### **30 May 2003**

The Foreign Minister of Iran invites Western countries to participate in the building of new nuclear plants in Iran. Mr. Kharazi also pledges to sign the IAEA's additional protocol if Iran gets access to the most modern atomic technologies.

—"Iran invites West to build nuclear plants," *Associated Press*, 30 May 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **30 May 2003**

In a surprising twist, Russia's Atomic Minister offers the United States the choice to join Russia in building an Iranian nuclear power plant. Russian Minister Romyantsev says, "There is enough place for everyone....We have made this proposal to our American colleagues several times during discussions on expert level, and they have been saying they need to think about it."

—"Minister offers US to join nuke deal with Iran," *Russia Journal* (Moscow), 30 May 2003, [www.russiajournal.com](http://www.russiajournal.com).

### **30 May 2003**

Sources in the Russian Federation Defense Ministry state that Iran is showing interest in acquiring advanced air defense technologies for the protection of the Bushehr nuclear facilities.

—Vladimir Urban, "Iran Shows 'Heightened Interest' in Acquiring Russian Weapon Systems," *Russkiy Kuryer* (Moscow), 30 May 2003; in FBIS CEP20030616000177, 30 May 2003.

### **Early June 2003**

Hoping that Iranian dissident groups will mount a coup against the Iranian government before it develops nuclear weapons, some senior officials at the Pentagon are suggesting widespread covert operation against the Iranian regime.

—Julian Coman, "US Considers Helping Terror Group To Stop Iran's Nuclear Programme," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 1 June 2003.

### **2 June 2003**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Romyantsev says that Russia and Iran have reached an agreement in principle that mandates that all spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr's first unit will be returned to Russia for storage and processing during the entire period of Bushehr's operation.

—German Solomatin, "Spent Nuclear Fuel From Bushehr Plant To Return to Russia," *ITAR-TASS* (Moscow), 2 June 2003; in FBIS Document CEP20030602000366, 2 June 2003.

### **3 June 2003**

Vladimir Putin declares that Russia is determined to continue its nuclear cooperation with Iran, which will be subject to the supervision of the IAEA.

—"Putin: Iran, Russia will continue their joint nuclear programs," *IRNA* (Tehran), 3 June 2003, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

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**4 June 2003**

Andrei Illarionov the top economic advisor to Russian President Putin, implies that further work on Bushehr hinges on Iranian acceptance of additional inspections by the IAEA.

—Peter Baker, "Russians Pressure Iran On Weapons," *Washington Post*, 5 June 2003.

**4 June 2003**

British Prime Minister Tony Blair states that Russia had pledged to suspend a planned shipment of nuclear fuel to Iran until the Iranians accept further international controls. Russia's top nuclear official denies this report and says that no such pledge had been given.

— Michael Wines, "Russia Pausing on Iran Nuclear Deal, Blair Says; Denial Follows," *New York Times*, 5 June 2003.

**5 June 2003**

Norinco, a major Chinese conglomerate, denies US allegations that it aided Iran's missile program and demands that the United States lift the penalties that were imposed on Norinco products, which include firearms and firefighting technology.

—"Chinese Firm Denies Aiding Iran On Weapons," 6 June 2003.

**5 June 2003**

The Russian government vows to resume its nuclear assistance to Iran even if the latter rejects the tougher inspection regime that US demands. Dmitry Rogozin, chairman of the Duma's committee on international affairs, tells reporters in an interview, "We genuinely do not understand what the Americans want from us....We are not so insane as to set up a time bomb under our own chairs."

—David Sands, "Moscow To Keep Helping Tehran," *Washington Times*, 6 June 2003.

**5 June 2003**

Russian official states that Russia will supply Bushehr with nuclear fuel even if Iran does not sign the IAEA's additional protocol.

—Kseniya Kaminskaya, "Russia To Supply Nuclear Fuel to Iran Regardless of IAEA Protocol Outcome," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 5 June 2003; in FBIS document CEP20030605000051, 5 June 2003.

**5 June 2003**

Gholam Reza Shafei, Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, says that Iran is ready to sign an agreement with Russia concerning the return of used nuclear fuel from Russia.

—"Iran ready to sign protocol on returning used nuclear fuel to Russia," Interfax (Moscow), 5 June 2003.

**6 June 2003**

The IAEA claims that Iran has not met its obligations to "account for nuclear material, report on its processing and use, and to declare facilities where the material is stored and processed."

— "UN suspects Iran of nuclear breaches," BBC (London), 6 June 2003, [www.news.bbc.co.uk](http://www.news.bbc.co.uk).

**10 June 2003**

Iran states that 12 years ago it received 1.8 tons of uranium from China. The head of the Iran's Atomic Energy Organization confirms that the 1991 shipment included 1 ton of hexafluoride and 800 kilos of UF<sub>4</sub> uranium. He adds that at the time, Iran and China did not see any legal necessity to inform the IAEA about the Uranium shipment.

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—"Iran says it received 1,800 kg of uranium from China," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 June 2003; in Lexis-Nexis, in [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**11 June 2003**

The Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* reports that in the past year, Iranian nuclear experts secretly visited North Korea, possibly to receive advice on how to deal with international inspectors. An Iranian official denies the reports and states that no Iranian nuclear officials have visited North Korea.

—"Iran's nuclear experts seek Pyongyang's advice: Three visits this year: 'Axis of evil' sharing information on inspections: report," Reuters, 12 June 2003; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**13 June 2003**

The English newspaper *timesonline.com* reports that it acquired a confidential IAEA report that states that Iran has "failed to meet its obligations...with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the processing and use of that material, and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed."

— Philip Webster, "Britain takes steps to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions," *Times Online*, 13 June 2003, [www.timesonline.co.uk](http://www.timesonline.co.uk).

**15 June 2003**

The *London Sunday Telegraph* reports that Iran is recruiting top Iran weapons scientists in Iraq and overseas. It states that an Iraqi Islamic militia the pro-Iranian Badr Brigade is helping Iraqi scientists travel across the Iraq-Iran border.

—Philip Sherwell, "Iran Recruits Saddam's Scientists To Build Long-Range Missile," 15 June 2003.

**15 June 2003**

US intelligence officials claim that North Korea is exporting missiles to Iran by air because one of the North Korean ships that were loaded with missiles was intercepted in December on its way to Yemen. The officials add that six Iranian cargo aircrafts have been spotted leaving Sunan airport in Pyongyang since April. They believe the planes contained disassembled Rodong missiles, similar to the missiles that North Korea exported to Pakistan in 1998.

—Yi Ch'ol-hui, "ROK's Chungang Ilbo Cites ROK, US Intelligence on DPRK Missile Exports to Iran," *Chungang Ilbo* (Seoul), 16 June 2003; in FBIS document KPP2003061600012, 16 June 2003.

**16 June 2003**

In a statement agreed to at a meeting in Luxemburg, European Union foreign ministers back the calls of the IAEA for Iran to adopt the additional protocol of the NPT and allow more intrusive inspections of its nuclear program.

—"EU backs Iran nuclear inspections," BBC, 16 June 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

**16 June 2003**

US officials express concerns over Russia's training of hundreds of Iranian technicians and scientists in complex nuclear processes in various Russian academic institutions.

—Nick Paton Walsh, "UK Daily Reports Russia Training Iranian Scientists," *Guardian* (London), 16 June 2003; in FBIS document EUP20030618000254, 16 June 2003.

**16 June 2003**

During the presentation of the latest IAEA report on the implementation in Iran of the NPT safeguards agreement, Mohamed El Baradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, states that "the report points out that Iran has failed to report certain nuclear material and activities and that cooperative actions being taken in

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cooperation with Iranian authorities."

—"IAEA's El Baradei: Iran Failed to Report Certain Nuclear Material, Activities," AFP (Paris), 16 June 2003; in FBIS document EUP20030616000126, 16 June 2003.

#### **18 June 2003**

Iranian officials reject the IAEA charges that Iran has failed to honor international agreements by not reporting nuclear material. Iran's ambassador to the IAEA Ali Salehi states that Iran is not prepared to allow the IAEA more intrusive inspections but would consider the matter if the IAEA avoids using the "language of force" in its statement on Iran.

—Michael Adler "Ambassador to IAEA Insists Iran Fulfilled Obligations under All NPT Provisions," AFP (Paris), 18 June 2003; in FBIS document EUP20030618000239, 18 June 2003.

#### **19 June 2003**

The IAEA derestricts a report on Iran. The report falls short of declaring Iran in violation of the NPT, It outlined three major issues: Iran should have been more forthcoming about the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and the Arak heavy water production plant. The existence of both of these facilities was divulged by the Iranian opposition group Mujahideen Khalq, which is on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations. Iran failed to report that in 1991 it purchased 1.8 tons of uranium from China. Earlier in June 2003 Iran prohibited inspectors from the IAEA from taking environmental samples at the Kalaye power plant.

—International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna), Director General, "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," 19 June 2003, [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org).

#### **19 June 2003**

A spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry says that Russia supports the IAEA's Board of Governors' statement on Iran.

—German Solomatin, "Russian Atomic Energy Ministry Backs IAEA Statement on Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 19 June 2003; FBIS document CEP20030619000332, 19 June 2003.

#### **20 June 2003**

An Iranian official states that Iran has completed the feasibility studies and preliminary investigation regarding the construction of a second nuclear power plant in Bushehr. Mr. Ahmadi adds, "We hope that after the allocation of the necessary funds, the contract for the new power plant will be concluded before the inauguration of Bushehr power plant at the latest."

—"Iranian Official Says Study Ended, Second Nuclear Power Plant to Be Built at Bushehr," Fars News Agency (Tehran), 20 June 2003; FBIS document IAP20030620000020, 20 June 2003.

#### **21 June 2003**

Obninsk State Technical University of Atomic Energy administrators deny Western media reports that their institution is training Iranian specialists in nuclear energy. The university director tells Interfax that the university offers the Iranians a number of three-month Russian technical language courses, no more.

—"Russian University Denies Training Iranians in Nuclear Energy," Interfax (Moscow), 21 June 2003; in FBIS document CEP20030621000017, 21 June 2003.

#### **22 June 2003**

In an interview with an Iranian newspaper, Isaqoli Ahmadinia, a member of the Iranian Majles energy committee, states that "Iran and Russia are currently discussing the construction of a second nuclear plant in Bushehr, but they

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have not signed a definitive contract...[S]ix power plants are being planned, estimated to be complete by 2012."  
—"Iran: Deputy Comments on Plans for Second Nuclear Plant," *Yas-e Now* (Tehran), 22 June 2003; in FBIS document IAP20030624000081, 22 June 2003.

### **26 June 2003**

Numerous US congressmen ask the Bush administration to utilize economic sanctions against Iran and private corporations that deal with the Iranian regime. In a congressional hearing, state department officials admit using diplomatic pressure against European governments and corporations to cancel oil and gas contracts with Iran.  
—"Members of House panel call for sanctions against businesses dealing with Iran," AFP (Paris), 26 June 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **30 June 2003**

Nikolai Shingarev tells ITAR-TASS that Russia and Iran have reached an agreement to set the final dates of deliveries of nuclear fuel by the end of the week. Mr. Shingarev states that the two countries atomic energy agencies chiefs "discussed in detail technical issues of the nuclear power plant construction, the schedules of work, and deliveries of equipment for the first reactor of the Iranian nuclear power plant...[T]he general contractor of the construction, the Russian company Atomstoieexport, should supply and assemble 20,000 tonnes of equipment at the Bushehr nuclear power plant by the year's end."  
—German Solomatin, "Nuclear Fuel Supply Dates To be Decided by End of Iranian Visit," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 30 June 2003; FBIS document CEP20030630000215, 30 June 2003.

### **30 June 2003**

During his fourth visit to Iran in less than two years, British Foreign Minister Jack Straw calls on the Iranian government to sign the NPT additional protocol "unconditionally" and warned that Iranian-English relations may suffer if it does not. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi bluntly replied in the same press conference that Iran will not make any concessions on the additional protocol until the international community made some concessions toward Iran.  
—"Iran refuses to budge on nuclear inspections after Straw warning," AFP (Paris), 30 June 2003; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **Early July 2003**

The US government imposes sanctions on six companies (5 Chinese and 1 North Korean) for selling weapons technology to Iran. The sanctions include a ban on trading with and receiving assistance from the US government and are to remain in place for two years. The six companies to be sanctioned are:

- Taian Foreign Trade General Corporation of China
- Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant of China
- Liyang Yunlong Chemical Equipment Group Company of China
- China North Industries Corporation (Norinco)
- China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC)
- Changgwang Sinyong Corporation (North Korea)

—"US punishes firms over Iran," BBC, 7 July 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

### **2 July 2003**

The Japanese Foreign ministry announces that it will hold bilateral talks with Iran over nuclear nonproliferation on 12 July. This will be the fourth such meeting between the Foreign Ministry director generals of Iran and Japan, and

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it is to be held in Tehran.

—"Japan to Hold Bilateral Nuclear Talks With Iran," Jiji Press (Tokyo), 2 July 2003; FBIS document JPP20030702000150, 2 July 2003.

### **2 July 2003**

Iran and the IAEA announce that Mohamed El Baradei will visit Iran on 9 July, for the second time this year. This planned visit came after the unfavorable IAEA report on Iran, after which Hassan Rowhani, the Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, invited Dr. El Baradei to visit Iran "to remove technical problems." An Iranian senior official says "I do think this means Iran is moving to sign the [additional] protocol. It is a confirmation that Iran wants to work with the agency."

—Nazila Fathi, "A U.N. Official to Visit Iran over Nuclear Sites," *New York Times*, 2 July 2003.

### **2 July 2003**

Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, Iran's atomic energy chief offers, Russia a chance to build more nuclear power stations in Iran. He states, "Beside Bushehr, we intend to build several more nuclear power stations with the overall power capacity of 6,000 megawatts, and we are offering Russia a chance to take up this opportunity."

—"Iran offers Russia chance to build more nuclear reactors," AFP (Paris), 2 July 2003; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **1 July 2003**

Iranian member of Parliament Hassan Qashqavi says that Iran will sign the NPT's additional protocol only when the IAEA gives Iran a guarantee that it will provide it with nuclear know-how. He adds that if the IAEA accepts this premise Iran will have no problem accepting the additional protocol.

—"Deputy Says Iran Will Sign Additional Protocol in Return for Nuclear Technology," *Tehran Times*, 2 July 2003; in FBIS document IAP20030702000033, 2 July 2003.

### **2 July 2003**

Gholam Aghazadeh, Iranian Vice-President, states after talks with the Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian Atomic Energy Minister, that he is hopeful that Russia will begin to supply Bushehr with nuclear fuel. Mr. Rumyantsev says that Russia will supply one load of 500 kilos of nuclear fuel from its Siberian storage facilities for the experimental launch of Bushehr and 10 loads of 500 kilos of nuclear fuel for the operation of the plant.

—Dmitry Vinitsky, "Russia To Supply Nuclear Fuel in Batches for Running of Bushehr Plant," *ITAR-TASS (Moscow)*, 2 July 2003; FBIS document CEP20030702000378, 2 July 2003.

### **3 July 2003**

Iran's nuclear chief reveals that he was assured by Russian officials that Moscow will not hold up the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant as a way to force Iran to accept the NPT's additional protocol inspections.

—Jeanne Whalen, "Russia Won't Hold Up Work on Nuclear Plant, Iran Says," *Wall Street Journal*, 3 July 2003.

### **7 July 2003**

An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman confirmed that Iran has successfully conducted the final test of its Shahab-3 (shooting star) medium-range missile. This missile was first tested in 1998 and possesses a range of 810 miles. It is widely believed that the Shahab-3 was built with North Korean assistance; however, the Iranian government claims that the missile relies entirely on Iranian expertise. Due to its range, the Shahab-3 is capable of reaching Israel and Saudi Arabia. [Note: It is also capable of carrying an unconventional warhead.]

—Nazila Fathi, "Iran Confirms Final Test of a Midrange Missile," *New York Times*, 7 July 2003, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com).

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### 8 July 2003

US State Department official Richard Boucher states that Iran's testing of the Shahab-3 poses a threat to the Middle East and to US interests in the region.

—"US: Iran's test of Shihab-3 missile poses threat to Mideast," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 8 July 2003, [www.haaretzdaily.com](http://www.haaretzdaily.com).

### 8 July 2003

Arye Herzog, head of the Homa Missile Defense Program at the Israeli Defense Ministry, states that Israel's Arrow anti-ballistic missile system is fully capable of defending Israel from Iran's Shahab-3 Missile. He tells IDF radio, "We are fully capable of dealing with whatever the Iranians have today, which is the Shahab-3."

—"Defense Official: Arrow System Provides 'Full Protection' Against Iran's Shahab-3," IDF Radio (Tel Aviv), 8 July 2003; in FBIS document GMP20030708000028, 8 July 2003.

### 9 July 2003

At a news conference, Alireza Jafarzadeh, a spokesman to the Iranian opposition group NCRI, reveals the existence of a new Iranian nuclear complex northwest of Tehran. According to Mr. Jafarzadeh, the site—known as the Kohladouz complex—is under more direct military control than other sites that were previously revealed by NCRI and confirmed by the IAEA. In addition, Mr. Jafarzadeh states that information on the site came from the group Mujahedeen Khalq and that the complex is hidden among warehouses and workshops for building tanks and armored personnel carriers.

—Brian Knowlton, "Iranian Exiles Describe Newly Found Nuclear Site," *International Herald Tribune*, 9 July 2003.

### 5 August 2003

A Japanese newspaper claims North Korea is in talks to export its Taepodong-2 long-range ballistic missile to Iran and to jointly develop nuclear warheads with Tehran. They would also send experts to Iran to provide them with assistance on missile technology. [Note: The Taepodong-2 has a range of over 6,000km (3,700 miles)].

—"North Korea Plans to Export Missiles to Iran," Reuters, 5 Aug 2003, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com).

### Mid-August 2003

Britain, Germany, and France offers to assist Iran with technology, if Iran stops its disputed nuclear fuel enrichment program and agrees to sign the Additional Protocol to the NPT.

—Paula Taylor and Louis Charbonneau, "E.U. big three offer Iran carrot for nuclear deal," Reuters, 19 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### 26 August 2003

IAEA Inspectors find traces of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at Iran's Natanz nuclear plant. Iranian officials claim the traces came from equipment imported from "another country" [unidentified] which included centrifuges used to enrich uranium and machinery associated with them. Mark Gwozdecky, a spokesman for the IAEA says Iran has "a large and sophisticated nuclear program".

—"Iran nukes still a concern-IAEA," CNN, 26 Aug 2003, [www.cnn.com](http://www.cnn.com).

### 29 August 2003

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei wants Iran to sign on to the Additional Protocol of the NPT to allow the IAEA inspections at any time. "If you have nothing to hide, there is no reason not to be transparent."

—BBC (London), *HARDtalk television interview*, 29 Aug 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

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### **Early September 2003**

US Secretary of State, Colin Powell says, "We never asked Russia to not build the plant at Bushehr. That's strange. When I was in the Clinton administration, we told the Russians, and more than once, not to build that nuclear power plant in Iran. When they persisted, we pushed them to narrow the scope of their cooperation. In this we succeeded." The stalemate between U.S. and Russia over Iran has prevented them from working together on projects that may inhibit proliferation.

—Rose Gottemoeller, "Breaking the Stalemate in Iran," *New York Times*, 7 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **8 September 2003**

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) praises Iran's efforts in complying with IAEA requests, and encourages Iran to continue handling the matter "with full transparency" in an IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna. The NAM also reiterates that member states have "basic an inalienable rights to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes."

—Statement by NAM, IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, Vienna, Austria, 8 September 2003, [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org).

### **9 September 2003**

Regarding the Iranian issue, ElBareidi states that the finding of different levels of enrichment and different isotopes raises questions over where the enrichment took place. He claims this information needs to be clarified along with the origin of any equipment involved. In regards to testing of centrifuges, IAEA experts claim "testing with nuclear material must have taken place for Iran to reach the stage that it has." Various scenarios that need to be examined include contamination of equipment, importation of enriched uranium, enrichment inside Iran and possibly a combination of the above. ElBaradei seeks answers by end of November.

—Director General's Remarks to the IAEA Board of Governors during its meeting on 9 September 2003. [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org).

### **12 September 2003**

IAEA adopts a resolution to urge Iran to comply with their requests for full transparency by the end of October.

—Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 12 September 2003, [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org).

### **13 September 2003**

US State Department spokesman Adam Ereli says, "If Iran fails to take those steps by the deadline [of October 31], that would constitute further evidence of its ongoing efforts to conceal its clandestine activities." Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, accuses the United States of "having territorial ambitions in the region" and claims Iran will not accept any deadlines as it is a sovereign country.

—"US gives Iran nuclear caution," BBC (London), 13 September 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

### **16 September 2003**

Russia's nuclear power minister says Russia and Iran moved closer to an agreement "on the return of spent nuclear fuel" from the Bushehr reactor that Russia is building Iran. The only obstacle is said to be a technical argument pertaining to environmental protection.

—George Jahn, "Russia, Iran Near Nuclear Fuel Deal," Associated Press, 16 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **17 September 2003**

The United States pressures Russia over its nuclear links with Iran by sending the US arms control chief to Moscow. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak says in interview with the *Vremya Novostei Daily*, "I think our American

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colleagues understand very well that it is pointless to put pressure on us."

—"Don't Pressure us, Russian says as US arms control chief arrives in Moscow," AFP, 17 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **19 September 2003**

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami declares, "We don't need atomic bombs, and based on our religious teaching, we will not pursue them...but at the same time, we want to be strong, and being strong means having knowledge and technology." John Bolton of US State Department claims that Iran, as an oil- and gas-rich country, does not need nuclear energy.

—Scott Peterson, "A push for candor on Iran nukes," *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **19 September 2003**

Due to the IAEA's annual rotation of its board members, Iran's representation is replaced by Pakistan. Iran can still be present to voice concerns as an observer.

—"IAEA chooses new governing board, Iran no longer a member," AFX, 19 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **19 September 2003**

Ayatollah Ahmad Janati, head of the Guardian Council of Iran and a top Iranian cleric, states that Iran should consider leaving the NPT after international pressures on its nuclear program.

—"Iranian cleric for pulling out of NPT," AFP (Paris), 19 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **20 September 2003**

Tehran rejects Britain, France, and Germany's offer for technology cooperation.

—Dan De Luca, "Europeans fail to end Iranian nuclear crisis," *Guardian* (London), 20 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **20 September 2003**

According to Reuters, Russian President Vladimir Putin claims he has proof that Western firms are "working in Iran's atomic technology sector, including dual-use technology."

—"Putin says Western firms helping Iran nuclear industry," Reuters, 20 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **20 September 2003**

According to an UPI analysis, although there is a consensus amongst the reformist and right-wing figures and bodies in "seeing the [October] deadline as an affront to Iran's national dignity," divisions within Iran's political circle have come out over how to react to IAEA's October deadline. Different groups show dissenting views on cooperation.

—"Analysis: Splits in Iran on nuke ultimatum," *United Press International*, 20 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **21 September 2003**

Iranian Guardian Council leader Jannati again urges Iran's withdrawal from the NPT. "What is wrong with considering this treaty on nuclear energy and pulling out of it? North Korea withdrew." According to *The Telegraph* (London), many fundamentalist clerics like Jannati share these views after looking to neighboring countries like Israel and Pakistan, which have not signed onto the NPT, and India, which has decided not to sign the protocol.

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—David Wastell and Behzad Farsian, "Iranian cleric urges Tehran to defy West's nuclear curbs," *Telegraph* (London), 21 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **21 September 2003**

Iran Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi claims, "I do not believe Iran will reach a dead end which could lead to sanctions." He further says Iran's nuclear activities were for peaceful ends and "totally transparent."

—"Iran can avoid U.N. sanctions over nukes—official," Reuters, 21 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **22 September 2003**

According to the Associated Press, Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's representative to the IAEA, claims Iran will "scale back its cooperation" with the IAEA in response to the October deadline. Iran claims its nuclear programs are meant to generate electricity and any contaminated equipment found was due to previous ownership before its import.

—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Iran to Scale Back Cooperation with U.N.," Associated Press, 22 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **23 September 2003**

According to Agence France Presse, IAEA spokeswoman Melissa Fleming claims, "The first [IAEA] mission is leaving on Friday [to Iran] and what will follow will be a lot of talks and inspections." Fleming says the IAEA is "moving forward with a very detailed and intense plan of work," regardless of Salehi's comments, since nothing official had been sent to the IAEA on Iran's behalf.

—"IAEA mission heading to Iran Friday," AFP (Paris), 23 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **24 September 2003**

An analysis by the *Christian Science Monitor* during the week of Iran's Military Parade claims Iran and the United States are engaged in supportive "quiet discourse," despite the hostility between the two countries.

—Scott Peterson, "Hostile in public, Iran seeks quiet discourse with US," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **25 September 2003**

US President Bush exclaims that the world must unite to denounce Iran's nuclear weapons program. UN inspectors find highly enriched uranium in Iran this same day at a second site there. The trace elements were said to be enough to "supply the fissile material for a nuclear bomb."

—Alex Keto, "Bush: World Must Unite to Condemn Iran's Nuclear Program," Dow Jones, 25 September 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **25 September 2003**

UN nuclear inspectors find traces of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium at a second site in Iran. Diplomats say minute quantities of uranium were found last month at the Kalaye Electric Company on the southern outskirts of the capital, Tehran. The IAEA's board of governors has set a 31 October deadline for Iran to disprove US claims that it is secretly trying to make nuclear weapons.

—"Iran under pressure over uranium 'find'," BBC (London), 25 Aug 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

#### **25 September 2003**

In addressing the 58th UN General Assembly session in New York, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi claims that Iran is adamant about following its peaceful nuclear program. "Iran's nuclear program is clearly for peaceful purposes, especially for generation of 7,000 megawatts of energy within framework of the national development

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plan's target by the year 2020."

—"FM: Tehran is ready to follow its peaceful nuclear program," IRNA (Tehran), 26 September 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

### **30 September 2003**

US President Bush and Russian leader Putin meet to discuss the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

—"Bush and Putin discuss Iranian nuclear weapons today," Al-Jazeera (in Arabic), 26 September 2003, [www.aljazeera.net](http://www.aljazeera.net).

### **30 September 2003**

IAEA Head Mohamed ElBaradei sets expectations as a team of senior IAEA inspectors prepare for their visit to Iran on 2 November. ElBaradei reassures that the 31 October deadline is "decisive and non-negotiable."

—"ElBaradei Outlines Expectations as Inspectors Depart to Iran," WorldAtom Report, IAEA, 30 September 2003, [www.iaea.org](http://www.iaea.org).

### **30 September 2003**

The Arab states of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia criticize the IAEA of being pro-Israel in their dealings with Iran by singling them out and therefore causing a serious threat to the stability of the entire region. According to the BBC, the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal claims at a UN General Assembly, "What surprises us is that at a time when the [IAEA] is intensifying its efforts and monitoring [NPT] member countries, we see that it continues to ignore the rejection of Israel in not joining the treaty."

—"Nuclear watchdog 'ignores Israel'," BBC (London), 30 September 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

### **1 October 2003**

According to the *Tehran Times*, Iranian Majlis Vice-Speaker Mohammad-Reza Khatami exclaims, "the world must have trust in us that we are planning to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes." Khatami states that Iran's nuclear activities are well within the guidelines of international treaties and that Tehran has no obligation to go beyond them.

—"Iran Not Obligated to Go Beyond International Nuclear Treaties: MP," *Tehran Times*, 1 October 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

### **1 October 2003**

Iranian government spokesman Abdollah Ramezanzadeh says the government is part of a multi-party decisionmaking committee that is examining options of how to deal with the IAEA's deadline and whether or not to sign the additional protocol to NPT.

—"Government, only one in multi-party decision making over protocol," IRNA (Tehran), 1 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

### **1 October 2003**

Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi declares Iran's decision to cooperate with the IAEA.

—"Kharrazi declares further cooperation with IAEA," IRNA (Tehran), 1 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

### **1 October 2003**

According to an Iranian official, IAEA Deputy Director for Department of Safeguards Pierre Goldschmidt leads a team to Tehran for discussions on the implementation of safeguards.

—"Two IAEA officials to leave for Tehran Wednesday evening: source," IRNA (Tehran), 1 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

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### **3 October 2003**

Iran appoints a five-member team to determine Iran's stance toward the IAEA's deadline. The members are Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi; Minister of Information Ali Yunessi; Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani; Secretary of the High National Security Council Hassan Rowhani; and the supreme religious leader's adviser for international affairs, Ali Velayati.

—"Iran Names Panel on Nuclear Inspections," *New York Times*, 3 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **5 October 2003**

The IAEA conducts inspections of the Kolehdoz military base in Iran. *Al-Hayat* claims no traces of uranium enrichment or other nuclear activity were found.

—"First Iranian nuclear site inspected," United Press International, 9 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **5 October 2003**

Dialogue is established between the United States and Iran even though tensions between the two countries run high over the question of Iran's nuclear program.

—Jason Burke and Dan de Luce, "US and Iran in secret peace talks," *Observer*, 5 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **5 October 2003**

Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's representative to the IAEA, claims that Iran does not consider itself bound to the 31 October deadline, as it has not formally accepted the resolution; however, Iran still intends to cooperate with the IAEA and give answers as quickly as possible.

—"Iran says 'not bound' by IAEA deadline, but promises quick answers," AFP (Paris), 5 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **6 October 2003**

Iran says it will provide a detailed list of imported parts for its uranium enrichment program and show UN inspectors the location where they are stored. "These are items which were not bought officially, they were bought through intermediaries and it is not possible to trace intermediaries," says Iran's Ali Akbar Salehi.

—"Iran releases nuclear data," BBC (London) 6 October 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

### **6 October 2003**

Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) Spokesman Saber Zaimian says the two-day talks with IAEA's representatives in Tehran were positive. "It seems possible to reach the two sides favorable answers earlier than the predicted time regarding mutual trust between Iran and the agency."

—"Iran's cooperation with IAEA favorable as before: IAEO spokesman," IRNA (Tehran), 6 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

### **6 October 2003**

Kamal Kharrazi says, "We will not allow anyone to deprive us of our right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and in particular our right to enrich fuel for our power stations." He further confirms Iran's commitment to the NPT and reassures cooperation.

—"Defying IAEA ultimatum, Iran sticks to right to enrich uranium," AFP (Paris), 6 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

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**7 October 2003**

Khatami claims that due to popular support by its people, Iran does not need weapons of mass destruction nor nuclear armament.

—"Popular Government Needs NO WMD: Khatami," Mehr News Agency, 7 October 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

**7 October 2003**

Iran's Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), Rowhani, makes statement against the United State's abuse of the IAEA and biased actions toward Iran. "This is the worst kind of interference in international law and order when a specialized United Nations agency and its legal authority are exploited for political objective of the United States," says Rowhani in an address to the 18th Conference of the Friday Prayers Leaders from across the country.

—"Washington Opposed to an Independent and Prosperous Iran: SNSC Chief," IRNA (Tehran), 7 8 October 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

**7 October 2003**

Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou says it is Iran's absolute right to use peaceful nuclear energy in the framework of international regulations and urged EU's cooperation with Iran.

—"Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy Iran's Absolute Right: Greek FM," IRNA (Tehran), 9 October 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

**8 October 2003**

Iran's President Khatami claims, "We are ready to do everything that does not damage our national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, even accepting the additional protocol."

—"Iran's president says to allay all concerns about nuclear program but national security is off limits," Associated Press, 8 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**8 October 2003**

Iranian envoy, Gholamreza Shafei, in response to news that Iran will sign a nuclear agreement with Russia that would allow the construction of an \$800 million nuclear power plant, Iran's first, to go live in 2005, says to the ITAR-TASS news agency, "Negotiations are taking place to iron out some technical issues. We hope that the protocol will be signed very shortly either in Tehran or Moscow."

—"Iran expects to sign final nuclear deal with Russia," AFP (Paris), 8 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**8 October 2003**

Khatami states Iran will extend all cooperation to the IAEA but will continue to enrich uranium.

—"Iran will cooperate fully with IAEA but will resume its uranium enrichment," AFP (Paris), 8 October 2003, [www.daralhayat.com](http://www.daralhayat.com).

**9 October 2003**

US Undersecretary of State John Bolton says, "I think what will happen prior to October 31st is the Iranians will cooperate a little bit and the issue will be, 'Did they cooperate enough?'"

—Andrew Cawthorne, "U.S. says Iran to try to avert showdown," Reuters, 9 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**9 October 2003**

IAEA Head ElBareidi says, "[Iran] has promised information will be forthcoming but it has not yet been provided. The central question is whether Iran has any [uranium] enrichment activities that we have not been informed

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about. On that question I haven't got satisfactory information." The statement is made as Iran is fast approaching the 31 October deadline.

—"UN nuclear agency warns Iran 'time is running out'," *Financial Times* (London), 9 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **10 October 2003**

In efforts to protect themselves against a potential attack from Iran, the US government considers stationing defensive missiles in European countries.

—"US mulling defensive missiles against Iran in Europe," AFP (Paris), 10 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **11 October 2003**

Israel's spy agency Mossad draws up pre-emptive attack plans on six suspected nuclear weapons preparation sites in Iran. Mossad claims to AFP that "complete destruction of the targets by F-16 fighter bombs [is] deemed achievable."

—"Israel ready to launch preemptive strike on nuclear sites in Iran," AFP (Paris), 11 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **13 October 2003**

Iranian opposition group National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) claims there are undeclared, hidden nuclear facilities in Iran.

—Louis Charbonneau, "Exile Opposition: Iran Hiding Another Nuke Site," Reuters, 13 October 2003, [www.reuters.com](http://www.reuters.com).

#### **13 October 2003**

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Yakovenko confirms Russia's determination to continue its nuclear cooperation with Iran.

—"Russia continues nuclear cooperation with Iran," IRNA (Tehran), 13 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

#### **13 October 2003**

Statements of Israel's plans for pre-emptive strikes on Iranian nuclear plants, as well as strategic targeting through Navy sea operations with the help of the United States, is confirmed by high-ranking Mossad officials according to Major Israeli commentators.

—Asaad Telhami, "Mossad Involved in Leaks on Israel's Plan to Attack Iranian Nuclear Plants, Al-Hayat, 13 October 2003, [www.daralhayat.com](http://www.daralhayat.com).

#### **13 October 2003**

Iranian government spokesman Abdullah Ramezanzadeh responds to Israel's reports of planned air strikes by saying, "We are used to such foolish rhetoric from Israel and consider it not even worth replying, but still Israel knows not to mess around with us."

—"Iran warns Israel over reports of planned air strike," *Haaretz*, 13 October 2003, [www.haaretzdaily.com](http://www.haaretzdaily.com).

#### **14 October 2003**

US Foreign Secretary Jack Straw has not ruled out the use of military sanctions on Iran should it not comply with the 31 October IAEA deadline.

—Pippa Crerar, "Nuclear Iran: Straw Refuses to Rule out Military Action," *The Scotsman*, 14 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

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**14 October 2003**

IAEA Spokeswoman Melissa Fleming says, "There are two phases to our work. The first phase involves Iran providing all the information to us on unresolved questions no later than October 31." The second is said to involve the verification of the information provided by them. IAEA stands firm on the deadline.

—"UN nuclear watchdog says deadline for Iran is firm," AFP (Paris), 14 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**14 October 2003**

Iran's ambassador to the IAEA, Ali Akbar Salehi, in responding to an allegation that Iran had been hiding a nuclear facility near Isfahan, tells Reuters, "We have certainly not [hidden any facilities from the IAEA]." National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) opposition group head Firouz Mahvi says, "The site has been built to test centrifuges that enrich uranium."

—"Iran has no secret nuclear facilities: Official," *Tehran Times*, 15 October 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

**16 October 2003**

Britain, France, and Germany send officials to Iran to explore "last-ditch mission" to resolve Iran's reservations with accepting the 31 October deadline. A Western diplomat in Tehran says to Reuters, "There were meetings here with senior government officials from Germany, Britain, and France to follow up on the letter and to find a constructive avenue to settle this crisis peacefully."

—"EU big three exploring last-ditch Iran nuke deal," Reuters, 16 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**16 October 2003**

IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBareidi flies to Iran to attempt to avert an international crisis over its alleged nuclear weapons program. "The key issue is the enrichment program—to make sure we have seen all nuclear experiments that have taken place in Iran; that we have seen all the nuclear material in Iran," says Dr. ElBareidi to *Guardian* reporters.

—Ewen MacAskill and Luke Harding, "UN Nuclear agency chief flies to Iran," *Guardian*, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**16 October 2003**

Iran's head of the parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy committee says, "Iran's case should not go before the [UN] Security Council. If allowing inspections of military sites resolves this problem, then we should do it."

—Brian Murphy, "Iran offers wider nuclear probes to avoid Security Council debate," Associated Press, 16 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**16 October 2003**

IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBareidi says he has been assured of Iran's willingness to cooperate and speed up the process of answering all of IAEA's questions on its activities during his visit to Iran.

—Jim Muir, "Iran promises nuclear answers," BBC (London), 16 October 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

**17 October 2003**

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami calls IAEA's resolution against Iran's nuclear activities unfair and unjust, when speaking in a press conference on the sidelines of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit. Khatami describes development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction "very dangerous," reiterating that the Islamic Republic has always stressed the clearing of the region and the world from such weapons.

—"Khatami terms IAEA's resolution as unfair," IRNA (Tehran), 17 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

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**17 October 2003**

IAEA Director-General ElBareidi states that Tehran has refused to cease its uranium enrichment.

—"ElBareidi: Tehran refuses to Cease Enriching Uranium," AlJazeera (online in Arabic) 17 October 2003, [www.aljazeera.net](http://www.aljazeera.net).

**17 October 2003**

In the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) press conference in Malaysia, Khattami states that Iran will not end its nuclear program. Khattami also reminds that Iran was one of the first nations to support a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

—"Tehran ready to Sign Additional Protocol," Al-Jazeera (online in Arabic) 17 October 2003, [www.aljazeera.net](http://www.aljazeera.net).

**18 October 2003**

Iran begins negotiations with Mohamed ElBareidi over signing of NPT's additional protocol, which would allow inspectors open access to all Iran's suspected nuclear facilities. Iranian parliament's head of the National Security and Foreign Policy committee, Mohsen Mirdamadi says, "Iran's case should not go before the Security Council. If allowing inspections of military sites resolves this problem, then we should do it."

—"Iran, IAEA Negotiate Signing of More Protocol to Treaty," Associated Press, 18 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**19 October 2003**

Iran confirms reports of inviting Britain, France, and Germany to visit Tehran for discussion on resolving nuclear issue.

—"Iran Confirms EU Big Three FMs Invited to Visit Tehran," *Tehran Times*, 19 October 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

**20 October 2003**

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi states he is hopeful of coming to a resolution on issues over Iran's nuclear activities.

—"Kharrazi hopes issues between Iran, IAEA will be resolved through negotiations," IRNA (Tehran), 20 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

**20 October 2003**

British Foreign Office confirms Jack Straws intent to leave for Iran to join EU counterparts on talks over assisting Iran's "civilian nuclear project."

—"EU Visits to Tehran to go ahead, UK confirms," IRNA (Tehran), 20 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

**21 October 2003**

Iran concedes to demands of the IAEA after talks with Britain, France, and Germany, and confirms signing of NPT's Additional Protocol, allowing the UN watchdog open and unannounced inspections. Iran also agrees to suspend all "uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities."

—"Full text: Iran declaration," BBC (London), 21 October 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

**21 October 2003**

According to *Haaretz*, Israel's Director of Military Intelligence Major General Aharon Ze'evi says, "by the summer of

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2004, Iran will have reached the point of no return in its attempts to develop nuclear weapons."

—"Israel: Iran will soon have nuclear arms knows-how," *Haaretz*, 21 October 2003, [www.haaretzdaily.com](http://www.haaretzdaily.com).

#### **22 October 2003**

Hassan Rowhani, secretary of the Supreme National Council, states that Iran has no objections to transparency of its nuclear interests and hid portions of its legal nuclear activities due to "illegal sanctions" and an "increase in the number of embargoes," in the past. He further claims Iran has always taken initiative over signing disarmament treaties and sees creation of WMD an act that would weaken stability and security in the region and world.

—"Rowhani: Iran has been forerunner in signing disarmament treaties," IRNA (Tehran), 21 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

#### **22 October 2003**

Iranian President Khatami urges for IAEA to have an unbiased approach when dealing with Iran on nuclear issues. Khatami states, "if our security and national interests are ensured, we will have no worries over the beginning of the ratification process of the Additional Protocol."

—"Khatami calls for IAEA's impartial approach to Iran's nuclear programs," IRNA (Tehran), 22 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

#### **22 October 2003**

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi refers to Iran-EU talks as "positive" and states, "the United States cannot ignore Iran's significant status in the region and the country's great potential in settling regional problems."

—"Kharrazi terms talks between Iran, EU ministers "positive," IRNA (Tehran), 22 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

#### **22 October 2003**

Mohsen Mirdamadi, head of the Iranian Majlis National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, noted Iran's move toward accepting the Additional Protocol as "logical." Hojatoleslam Hassan Rowhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, says that Iran has no intention of joining the additional protocol prior to 20 November.

—"Mirdamadi says Iran's decision to join NPT protocol is logical," IRNA (Tehran), 22 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

#### **22 October 2003**

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder calls the agreement reached between Iran and three EU representatives as "good and important."

—"Schroeder calls Iran-EU agreement 'good and important,'" IRNA (Tehran), 22 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

#### **22 October 2003**

Various Iranian press agencies exclaim mixed feelings over leadership's decision to sign the additional protocol to the NPT.

—"Iran's nuclear move in press spotlight," 22 October 2003, BBC (London), [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

#### **22 October 2003**

Iranian Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei grants approval on agreement over signing of NPT protocol.

—"Supreme Leader approves talks on NPT Additional Protocol," IRNA (Tehran), 22 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

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**22 October 2003**

Iran says will hand over full details on its nuclear enrichment program to the IAEA to allay concerns.  
—"Iran to Provide IAEA with Key Nuke Documents," Reuters, 22 October 2003, [www.reuters.com](http://www.reuters.com).

**22 October 2003**

Iranian ultra-conservatives see Iran's move to allow tougher nuclear inspections as an "ignominious capitulation to Western pressure."  
—Jim Muir, "Nuclear deal splits Iran hardliners," BBC (London) 22 October 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

**23 October 2003**

IAEA receives comprehensive documents from Iran on its past nuclear activities.  
—"Iran hands over nuclear papers," BBC (London) 23 October 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

**23 October 2003**

Iran receives world support on its decision to sign protocol to NPT. Iranian representative to the IAEA says Iran is also ready to sign a protocol to a previous agreement with Russia over the return of spent fuel from Bushehr nuclear power plant.  
—"World Acclaims Tehran Declaration," *Tehran Times*, 23 October 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

**23 October 2003**

Diplomats raise concerns over Iran's lack of information supplied regarding traces of highly enriched uranium and warn that it may lead to a declaration of a violation of the NPT if not cleared up by the 20 November IAEA Board of Governors meeting. Pakistan is suspected of being the most likely origin of questionable centrifuges by the diplomats.  
—"Iran must clear up all concerns in UN Dossier—Diplomats," Associated Press, 23 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**24 October 2003**

The United States still voices concerns over Iran's nuclear program. Colin Powell is noted as telling French journalist, "They have tried to hide their weapons program from the IAEA and the international community."  
—Louis Charbonneau, "U.S. isolate on Iran nuke programme—diplomats," Reuters, 24 October 2004, [www.reuters.com](http://www.reuters.com).

**24 October 2003**

1,500 Iranian hard-line protestors gather in Tehran to denounce Iran's decision to sign additional protocol and urge withdrawal from the NPT.  
—Ali Akbar Dareini, "Hard-liners hold rally to denounce Iran's nuclear agreement," Associated Press, 25 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**26 October 2003**

Iran continues its uranium enrichment even though promises were made to halt it. Hamid Reza Asefi, Foreign Ministry spokesman, claims, "officials were still studying 'the modalities of a suspension'." The IAEA has said it will again review Iran's compliance on 20 November.  
—"Iranians still enriching uranium," BBC (London) 26 October 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

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**27 October 2003**

US intelligence sources of Iranian and Iraqi exile groups are deemed "questionable." Former IAEA weapons inspector David Albright says, "There is a drumbeat of allegations, but there's not a whole lot of solid information. It may be that Iran has not made the decision to build nuclear weapons. We have to be very careful not to overstate the intelligence."

—Robert Collier, "U.S. gleans facts on Iran from debatable source," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 27 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**28 October 2003**

EU foreign ministers urge Iran to meet its pledge to stop uranium enrichment and allow inspections of its nuclear program. Concern is raised as Iran has still not set solid dates for these steps.

—"Iran urged to allow UN inspections," Associated Press, 28 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**28 October 2003**

Iranian President Khatami urges the EU to stick by its original commitment to help them with acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

—"EU should stand by its commitments: Khatami," *Tehran Times*, 29 October 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

**29 October 2003**

The United States is ready to resume some diplomatic talks with Iran. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage says, "We are prepared to engage in limited discussions with the government of Iran about areas of mutual interest as appropriate."

—"U.S. eyes limited talks with Iran," BBC (London), 29 October 2003, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

**29 October 2003**

Russian Minister of Nuclear Energy Alexander Rumyanstev says Russia is ready to begin preliminary discussions on building the second phase of the Bushehr power plant in Iran. They are now at a completion rate of 80-85 percent and expect the billion dollar reactor to become operational in the first months of 2005.

—"Russian official: No obstacle in sending fuel to Bushehr plant," IRNA (Tehran), 29 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

**29 October 2003**

Iranian Majlis Speaker Mehdi Karroubi says the Majlis will ratify the draft on the additional NPT protocol.

—"Majlis will ratify cabinet's proposal draft on additional protocol," IRNA (Tehran), 29 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

**30 October 2003**

The IAEA states it will not take any action on Iran on the 31 October deadline as it is still in the process of analyzing documents handed over by the Iranian government.

—"U.N. nuclear agency won't take action as Iran deadline passes," Associated Press, 30 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**30 October 2003**

In response to Armitage's comments, Iranian government spokesman, Abdullah Ramezanzadeh says, "[The US] has leveled too many false accusations against us and they should stop that. They should also unfreeze our assets and lift the sanctions."

—Nazila Fathi, "Iran Demands Concessions from U.S. in Return for Cooperation," *New York Times*, 30 October 2003, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

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### **31 October 2003**

Senior Iranian cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati says although Iran has accepted to sign the additional protocol, "...Our 'red lines' still exist." He further says, "If the European party fails to live up to its commitments, the commitments that we made should be in return regarded as canceled."

—"Top cleric says Iran's 'red lines' still exist over NPT protocol," IRNA (Tehran), 31 October 2003, [www.irna.ir](http://www.irna.ir).

### **31 October 2003**

IAEA Director-General ElBareidi says he hopes to have the report of the Iranian documents on whether they complied with IAEA demands out in about two weeks.

—Irwin Arief, "Too Soon to say if Iran met UN Demands—ElBareidi," Reuters, 31 October 2003, [www.reuters.com](http://www.reuters.com).

### **1 November 2003**

More protests are held in Tehran over the government's decision to sign the additional protocol to NPT, fueled by concerns raised by young Iranians over national security.

—"Protests held over Iran's Adherence to Additional Protocol," *Tehran Times*, 1 November 2003, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

### **2 November 2003**

President Khatami expresses his support for cooperation between India, Iran and Afghanistan, stressing in particular that Iran and India should strive to establish peace, security and progress in the region.

—"Khatami for Trilateral Ties Among Iran, India, Afghanistan," *The Times of India*, 2 November 2003.

### **3 November 2003**

Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, Javad Zarif, declares Iran's voluntary decision to meet the obligations of the additional protocol to the NPT even pending its ratification by the Iranian parliament. Zarif calls the step a confidence-building measure, insisting however on Iran's "inalienable right" to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

—"Iran to Observe Anti-Nuclear Pact," Reuters, 3 November 2003.

### **3 November 2003**

Hassan Rohani, head of the Supreme National Security Council, cancels a visit to Russia to discuss Iran's nuclear program. It is speculated that the cancellation is due to a coincident three-day visit to Moscow by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

—"Senior Iranian Official Cancels Planned Visit to Russia," Xinhua, 3 November 2003.

### **5 November 2003**

Secretary General of the OIC Abdelouahed Belkeziz welcomes Iran's cooperation with the IAEA and its decision to sign an additional protocol to the NPT.

—"Nuclear Worries in Iran," *IRNA*, 6 November 2003.

### **5 November 2003**

Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's chief IAEA delegate, acknowledges past mistakes in reporting nuclear activities, adding however that the NPT additional protocol would be ready to sign within two weeks. Salehi also acknowledges that the promised moratorium on Iran's uranium enrichment program has yet to take effect. An unidentified senior State Department official says that Washington expects the pending IAEA report to support the U.S. position that

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Iran has engaged in an advanced program to produce nuclear weapons.

—"Iran Envoy Says Iran Will Sign Pact with IAEA in 2 Weeks," *Associated Press*, 5 November 2003.

#### **6 November 2003**

According to an unidentified senior State Department official, Russia has been pressuring Iran to open its facilities to intrusive inspections, warning that it may delay or put a halt to Russian assistance with the construction of the nuclear reactor at Bushehr if Iran does not follow through with its promises to the IAEA. However Nikolai Shingarev, spokesman for Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, rejects the assertion that work might stop on Bushehr, and reaffirms that Russia would in fact "do its best to expedite the process."

—"Russia Rejects U.S. Claim on Blocking Bushehr Nuclear Energy Project," *IRNA*, 6 November 2003; "State Department Official Credits Moscow with Helping to Restrain Iranian Nuclear Program," *Associated Press*, 6 November 2003.

#### **7 November 2003**

A CIA report claims that Iran has 'vigorously' pursued WMD production, seeking help variously from Russia, China, North Korea, and Europe in its efforts. Further, the semi-annual unclassified report to Congress states that the "United States remains convinced that Tehran has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program." CIA imagery suggests that Iran is burying a uranium centrifuge enrichment facility at Natanz, about 100 miles south of Tehran, presumably to protect it in case of attack.

—Tabassum Zakaria, "Iran 'Vigorously' Pursued WMD First Half 2003—CIA," *Reuters*, 7 November 2003.

#### **8 November 2003**

Iran's National Security Council head Rohani, speaking after meeting with IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei in Vienna, states that Tehran will be sending a letter to the IAEA next week. It will confirm Iran's intention to sign the NPT additional protocol, in addition to indicating precisely when Iran will begin implementing the agreement to cease its uranium enrichment program.

—"Iran To Confirm Nuclear Accords," *BBC*, 8 November 2003.

#### **9 November 2003**

The IAEA releases a report revealing Iran's admission that it had produced a small amount of plutonium and conducted tests on uranium hexafluoride, in addition to having established a uranium enrichment plant, all of which it had earlier denied. The report says that "given Iran's past pattern of concealment, it will take some time before the agency is able to conclude that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes."

—Ian Traynor, "UN Says Iran Produced Plutonium," *The Guardian*, 10 November 2003.

#### **9 November 2003**

In a meeting with German Ambassador Paul Maltzahn, First Vice President Mohamedreza Aref reiterates Iran's oft-proclaimed assertion of its legitimate right to pursue nuclear energy development for peaceful purposes.

—"Every State Has Right to Use Nuclear Energy for Civilian Purposes: Aref," *Mehr News Agency*, 10 November 2003.

#### **10 November 2003**

In Moscow, Iran nuclear affairs chief Hassan Rohani declares Iran's intention to "eliminate all concerns and fears" in the international community with the immediate temporary cessation of uranium enrichment activities. Later that day, permanent envoy to the IAEA Ali Akbar Salehi submits an official letter to IAEA chief ElBaradei, confirming Iran's readiness to sign the NPT's additional protocol, thereby allowing international inspections of its nuclear

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facilities. Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed the Iranian declarations, noting that Russia was willing to proceed with the delayed completion of the Bushehr reactor, which is expected to go online in Spring 2005. Rohani also mentions upcoming negotiations with Russia to discuss the building of a second nuclear reactor at Bushehr. —"Iran Moves To Calm Nuclear Fears," *BBC*, 10 November 2003; "Iran Suspends Uranium Enrichment, Agrees to Closer Nuclear Inspections," *AFP*, 10 November 2003; "Iran Hands Report on Stopping Uranium Enrichment Activity to IAEA," *IRNA*, 10 November 2003.

#### **11 November 2003**

The 24-year break in relations between Egypt and Iran come to an end with over an hour-long meeting between Presidents Mubarak and Khatami at the Hotel Intercontinental in Geneva.

—"Mubarak and Khatami Meet in Geneva and Bring to an End 24 Years of Severed Relations," *Dar Al-Hayat*, 12 November 2003.

#### **11 November 2003**

The United States and the European troika of Germany, France, and Great Britain apparently agree that it is not clear whether Iran has fully responded to the requests of IAEA chief ElBaradei, suggesting that despite Iran's statement regarding temporary cessation of uranium enrichment activity, its definition of enrichment may be too narrow. At the end of October, ElBaradei wrote to Iran in an attempt to clearly define the activities that required suspension. The first request, apparently undisputed, involves putting a stop to testing or operating gas centrifuges, a halt to the installation of centrifuges at Natanz, and ceasing laser enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities. There appears to be some question however regarding Iran's response to ElBaradei's requests to cease the production and assembly of centrifuges or centrifuge components other than at Natanz, as well as halting equipment imports relevant to the program.

—Bronwen Maddox, "One Small Sliver of Hope From a Recalcitrant Tehran," *The Times*, 11 November 2003.

#### **11 November 2003**

Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rohani commented that the IAEA's report was generally favorable except for a criticism regarding Iran's failure to report its nuclear energy activities. Rohani affirmed that the pending IAEA Board of Governors meeting would not lead to problems for the country, assuming the deliberations were not biased.

—"EU, IAEA Know Consequences of Reneging on Tehran Declaration," *Mehr News Agency*, 12 November 2003.

#### **12 November 2003**

The IAEA report released today claims no evidence of a secret weapons program in Iran but showed concern regarding its production of plutonium, often associated with bomb-making. President Khatami states that although the IAEA report was on the whole positive, it lacked balance, saying "Iran has used the plutonium for manufacturing pharmaceuticals and the IAEA experts themselves well know that such [a] negligible amount of plutonium cannot be used for making [a] bomb." Khatami asserts that the report nevertheless proved Iran's innocence regarding its alleged nuclear weapons program. Khatami concludes by saying that "Iran will never go to enrichment of uranium over the 3.5 percent [mark] which is weapons-grade," and "we understand the world's concern in this respect."

—"Iranian President Optimistic after Nuclear Report," *Reuters*, 12 November 2003; "President: IAEA Report on Iran Positive, with Unacceptable Parts," *IRNA*, 12 November 2003.

#### **12 November 2003**

Foreign Minister Kharazmi discusses Iran's cooperation with the IAEA and the EU with the representative of the

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current EU presidency, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini. Kharrazi says that the IAEA report proved Iran's lack of a nuclear program and that Iran had been transparent in its dealings with the agency, adding that with its recent decisions to sign the additional protocol and suspend uranium enrichment, it was now up to Europe to fulfill its part of the agreement. Frattini commends Iran's recent positive steps, which have encouraged the EU to cooperate with Iran and "lobby for its nuclear program." Foreign Ministry spokesman Asefi also comments on the IAEA report, stressing again Iran's efforts at transparent cooperation with the IAEA and echoing President Khatami's comments that plutonium enrichment had been effected for laboratory purposes only.

—"Kharrazi, Frattini Discuss Iran-EU Cooperation," *IRNA*, 12 November 2003; "Asefi Says IAEA Report 'Could Have Been Better'," *IRNA*, 12 November 2003.

#### **12 November 2003**

Gholamreza Aghazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO), says the topics for future IAEA Board of Governors discussions were unpredictable, since "at present all the issues related with Iran are political."

—"IAEO Head: Agenda of IAEA Board of Governors Unpredictable," *IRNA*, 12 November 2003.

#### **12 November 2003**

U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton greets the IAEA's report on Iran saying that it is "impossible to believe" and that the report in fact underscores the U.S. stance that "the massive and covert Iranian efforts to acquire sensitive nuclear capabilities make sense only as part of a nuclear weapons program." British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw strikes a less critical note in his response to the report, affirming that although the report was "very worrying in terms of what it discloses, [it] also shows a pretty high level of cooperation."

—Carol Giacomo, "U.S. Seeking Consensus Approach with Allies on Iran," *Reuters*, 12 November 2003; Straw Breaks Ranks With U.S. Over Iran," *Reuters*, 12 November 2003.

#### **13 November 2003**

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi begins a two-day visit to Tokyo to talk about its nuclear program and possible cooperation in the development of an oil field believed to be Iran's largest. Such a deal may secure Japan's access to vital oil reserves.

—"Iranian Foreign Minister Arrives in Japan for Oil, Nuclear Talks," *Associated Press*, 13 November 2003.

#### **13 November 2003**

Former chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix questions the claim that Iran was engaged in developing nuclear weapons, saying there was no "direct evidence" of this. He adds that Iran's civilian reactors were not, in and of themselves, a worry.

—"Blix Casts Doubt on Nuclear Bomb Charges," *Reuters*, 13 November 2004.

#### **14 November 2003**

Still in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Kharrazi stresses again Iran's determination to "use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." Japanese Foreign Minister Yamaguchi praised Iran's latest confidence-building steps vis-à-vis the IAEA.

—"Kharrazi Refreshes Vows Iran's Nuclear Program Peaceful," *IRNA*, 14 November 2003; "Kharrazi Says IAEA Should 'Seriously' Consider Iran's Cooperation," *IRNA*, 14 November 2003.

#### **14 November 2003**

Amr Musa, the Arab League's secretary general, decries the hypocrisy of singling out Iran for its alleged nuclear weapons program while ignoring Israel's weapons of mass destruction.

—"Arab League Says 'Double Standards' in Singling Out Iran Over Nuclear Issue," *AFX News*, 14 November 2003.

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**15 November 2003**

Iran's chief IAEA delegate Ali Akbar Salehi speaks of not-further-defined "consequences" should the issue of Iran's suspected nuclear activities be referred to the UN Security Council.

—"Iran Issues Grave Warning to US over Nuke Debate," *Associated Press*, 15 November 2003.

**16 November 2003**

Iran's successful effort to enrich uranium using laser technology is referred to as a "troubling achievement in the annals of weapons proliferation." The IAEA report on Iranian nuclear activities acknowledges the recent opening of a pilot plant for laser-enrichment and concordant success in enriching tiny amounts of uranium -- grams not kilos. Some nonproliferation experts describe Iran's accomplishment as "startling."

—Ian Hoffman, "Iran's Lasers Startle Experts," *The Argus Online News*, 16 November 2003.

**17 November 2003**

Israel Radio quotes Meir Degan, head of Mossad intelligence, as saying that Iran was close to "the point of no return" in its nuclear weapons program, and that this presents the greatest threat faced by Israel since its inception.

—"Mossad Head: Nuclear Iran Is Worst Ever Threat to Israel," *Haaretz*, 17 November 2003.

**17 November 2003**

Prior to a meeting with SNSC Secretary Rohani, the EU head of foreign and security policy Javier Solana expresses the hope and belief that the matter of Iran's nuclear program would not be referred to the UN Security Council. Solana also tells reporters that he thought Iran had thus far been honest with the European Union. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell later comments that Solana's evaluation was premature given Iran's past dissembling. Separately, Russia's atomic energy minister Alexander Rumantsyev remarks that in the absence of evidence against Iran, "sanctions are unacceptable;" Iranian IAEA envoy Salehi suggests that the EU draft resolution for the IAEA board meeting is forward looking and makes no reference to the possibility of having the case brought before the UN Security Council.

—"Solana: Iran Has Been Honest With Us," *IRNA*, 17 November 2003; "Powell Says Solana Went Too Far Calling Iran 'Honest' on Nuclear Program," *AFX*, 17 November 2003; "Sanctions Against Iran 'Unacceptable:' Russian Minister," *AFP*, 17 November 2003; "Salehi: EU Draft Resolution Future Looking in Nature," *IRNA*, 17 November 2003.

**17 November 2003**

Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Rohani appeals to Europe to help make the Middle East a WMD-free zone, pointing especially to the danger posed by Israel's WMD arsenal. Rohani assesses his meetings with the EU's Frattini, Patten, and Solana as "constructive and positive"—a sentiment echoed by the Europeans. Rohani also declares again Iran's commitment to the agreement reached with the EU in Tehran.

—"Iran Calls on EU to Work for a WMD-free Middle East," *IRNA*, 17 November 2003; "EU, Iran Underline Commitment to Tehran Agreement," *IRNA*, 17 November 2003; "Rowhani, Patten Discuss EU-Iran Ties," *IRNA*, 17 November 2003.

**17 November 2003**

SNSC Secretary Rohani appeals to Europe to help make the Middle East a WMD-free zone, pointing especially to the danger posed by Israel's WMD arsenal. Rohani assesses his meetings with the EU's Frattini and Solana as 'excellent' and declares again Iran's commitment to the agreement reached with the EU in Tehran.

—"Iran Entitled to Civilian Use of Nuclear Energy: Lahoud," *IRNA*, 17 November 2003.

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### **17 November 2003**

According to the Lebanese newspaper *Dar Al-Hayat*, Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz states that Iran is reaching the point of no return and Israel will not accept Iranian possession of nuclear weapons.

—"Mofaz Affirms: Israel Will Launch an Attack on Iran to Hinder Its Development of Nuclear Weapons," *Dar Al-Hayat*, 17 November 2003.

### **18 November 2003**

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell meets with 25 current and future EU members to discuss whether Iran's nuclear program should be declared in violation of the NPT. Powell fails to persuade his counterparts that such a declaration should be supported at the IAEA board meeting on November 20th.

—"Powell Tries to Persuade EU to Get Tough With Iran," *Associated Press*, 18 November 2003.

### **19 November 2003**

According to the Israeli newspaper *Maariv*, Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom states that Israel is not planning an attack on Iran's atomic infrastructure.

—"Shalom: "There Is No Intention of Attacking Iran's Nuclear Facilities," *Maariv*, 19 November 2003.

### **19 November 2003**

At the end of a two-day conference in Brussels, EU foreign ministers reaffirm that the European Union welcomes Iran's commitments per its agreement in Tehran on October 21 and "is now looking forward to its prompt and full implementation."

—"EU Foreign Ministers Reaffirm Commitment to Tehran Declaration," *IRNA*, 19 November 2003.

### **19 November 2003**

IAEA Chief ElBaradei criticizes the EU draft resolution on Iran as inadequate, a view echoed by the United States.

—"U.S., ElBaradei Want Stronger Condemnation of Iran," *Reuters*, 19 November 2003.

### **20-21 November 2003**

The 35-nation IAEA Board of Governors considers the recent report on Iran and subsequent European draft resolution; official talks will continue over the weekend. The United States and Israeli Prime Minister Sharon urged the European Union to adopt a tougher stance regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions. On Friday, the United States abandoned efforts to include a specific reference to Iranian non-compliance with the NPT in the revision of the draft resolution.

—"UN Nuclear Panel Meets on Iran," *BBC News*, 20 November 2003; "UN Nuclear Agency Appears Headed Toward Condemning Iran for Past Covert Program," *Associated Press*, 20 November 2003; "Sharon Says EU Should Get Tougher With Iran," *Reuters*, 20 November 2003; "U.S. Softens Hard Line on Iran's Nuclear Cover-Up," *Reuters*, 22 November 2003.

### **23 November 2003**

Israeli defense minister Shaul Mofaz says that Israel is prepared to undertake unilateral military action toward Iran should their nuclear weapons development not be halted.

—"Israel Threatens Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Targets," *Scotsman*, 23 November 2003.

### **26 November 2003**

Five days of talks yield an agreement on the UN resolution originally drafted by Britain, France and Germany. The

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resolution, passed today, makes no threat of UN Security Council referral, a fact welcomed by Iran. The final compromise text applauds "Iran's offer of cooperation and openness" but "strongly deplores" its past obfuscation efforts, in addition to warning against "further serious Iranian failures."

—"UN Powers Agree on Iran Warning," *BBC News*, 25 November 2003; "UN Censures Iran Nuclear Cover-Up," *BBC News*, 26 November 2003.

#### **8 December 2003**

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamidreza Asefi affirms that although uranium enrichment is within its rights and halting it is not part of the Tehran Declaration, Iran has proved its goodwill and allayed international concerns by volunteering to temporarily suspend this procedure.

—"Iran Has Absolute Right for Enriching Uranium: FM Spokesman," *Mehr News Agency*, 8 December 2003.

#### **18 December 2003**

Iran's Ambassador Salehi and IAEA Director ElBaradei sign the Additional Protocol to the NPT. Iran has affirmed that it is already in compliance with the provisions of the protocol.

—"Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards," *IAEA.org*, 18 December 2003.

#### **22 December 2003**

Responding to a recent statement by Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, President Khatami says Israel "would be making a mistake" if it carried out an implied threat to eliminate Iran's nuclear capabilities. Iranian Air Force General Seyed Reza Pardis went further, stating that should Israel attack Iran, it would be "digging its own grave."

—"Iran Warns Against Israeli Strike," *BBC News*, 22 December 2003.

#### **October-December 2003**

A review of Iranian documents released to the IAEA has provides disturbing insights into a vast worldwide procurement network for Iran's secret nuclear program, over a 17-year period. According to U.S. and European sources familiar with the investigation, Pakistan appears to have been the source of crucial technology that would enable Iran to become a nuclear weapons power.

—Joby Warrick, "Nuclear Program in Iran Tied to Pakistan," *Washington Post*, 21 December 2003.

#### **October-December 2003**

According to documentation provided to the IAEA, Iran's Pakistan connection appears to have been established around 1987, after Iran tried unsuccessfully for years to develop its own enrichment capabilities. A Pakistani-designed centrifuge proved the key to Iran's technological problems, finally permitting some forward progress in its research—although even after almost 20 years, it apparently has yet to produce sufficient fissile material for a bomb. The documents provided by Iran make no specific allusion to Pakistan, only to its "signature technologies."

—David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, "From Rogue Nuclear Programs, Web of Trails Leads to Pakistan," *The New York Times*, 4 January 2004.

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## **2002**

### **January 2002**

Iran prepays a Russian company, Kolomensky Zavod, \$2 million for five emergency diesel generator plants, at least some of which are for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. [Note: See 11 February 2002.]

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—"Russia: Moscow Region Firm to Supply Emergency Units for Iran's Nuclear Plant," *Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey* (Moscow), 11 February 2002; FBIS Document CEP20020211000087, 11 February 2002.

### **3 January 2002**

*Intelligence Newsletter* reports that there are three military nuclear facilities in Iran: the Amriabad laboratory, built in 1967 and upgraded by the United States in 1970 and 1974; in Karaj, 45km west of Tehran; and in Moallem Kalayeh, which reportedly has a 40MW reactor. The report also says that 300 Iranian nuclear experts are being trained around the world, mostly in Russia.

—"Will Tehran Master Nuclear Bomb Technology by 2005?," *Intelligence Newsletter*, 3 January 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **7 January 2002**

Alexander Rumyantsev, the Russian atomic energy minister, says that Russia will respect its agreements with Iran and will complete the nuclear reactor in Bushehr by 2004. He adds that the Bushehr project is similar to other projects Russia has carried out in China and India and that it is for purely peaceful purposes. Former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani says that Iran has never been interested in acquiring nuclear weapons.

—"Russia Pledges to Continue Iranian Nuke Project," *Middle East Newslite*, Vol. 4, No. 8, 7 January 2002; Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russia Will Complete Reactor Deal with Iran and Is Considering Tentative Request from North Korea," *Associated Press*, 27 March 2002; Lexis-Nexis [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **8 January 2002**

Former Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani says "Iran is not seeking to arm itself with non-conventional weapons." [Note: See 14 December 2001 for a statement by Rafsanjani regarding nuclear arms.]

—"Daily Defends Iran's Right to Access Nuclear Technology for Peaceful Purposes," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 8 January 2002; FBIS Document IAP20020108000047, 8 January 2002.

### **9 January 2002**

The press secretary of the Iranian embassy in Azerbaijan, Ezzatollah Jalalim denies Iran has nuclear weapons, saying, "Tehran has never and will never try to acquire nuclear weapons from other countries as Iran itself is capable of solving this problem relying on its own resources if the need should arise."

—"Iranian Envoy In Azerbaijan Denies Tehran Has Nuclear Weapons," MPA (Baku), 9 January 2002; FBIS Document CEP20020109000141, 9 January 2002.

### **10 January 2002**

Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations, Hadi Najad-Hosseinian, writes a letter to the UN Secretary-General denying an Israeli statement that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons.

—"Iran: UN Envoy Rejects Israeli Allegation Of Seeking To Obtain Nuclear Arms," *Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1* (Tehran), 10 January 2002; FBIS Document IAP20020110000022, 10 January 2002.

### **25 January 2002**

*Middle East Newslite* reports that the United States is trying to prevent Russia from selling a second reactor to Iran.

—"US Seeks to Stop Second Russian Nuke reactor in Iran," *Middle East Newslite*, 25 January 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

### **30 January 2002**

The new Russian ambassador to Iran, Aleksandr Maryasov, denies that Russia is helping Iran acquire nuclear

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weapons. "What America and Israel are alleging is not true since we have never cooperated in the production of nuclear arms," he says. "These countries are only making baseless allegations. We should ignore these allegations," —"Iran: Russian Envoy on Afghanistan, Terrorism, US, Israel, Nuclear Power Plant," IRNA (Tehran), 30 January 2002; FBIS Document IAP20020206000065, 30 January 2002.

### **31 January 2002**

Efraim Sneh, Israeli minister of transportation calls for sanctions against Iran so it will not have money to build nuclear arms. "The most important and maybe the most urgent thing," he says, "is to urge the Russian to stop the technological assistance, and especially for the Iranian nuclear project."

—Steve Weizman, "Israeli Minister Urges US to Pressure Russia to Stop Helping Iran Develop Nuclear Arms," Associated Press, 31 January 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **Late January 2002**

The CIA issues a report that says Iran "remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire (weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons) technology from abroad....In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop a domestic capability to produce various types of weapons—chemical, biological, nuclear—and their delivery systems."

—George Gedda, "US Says Iran Making Headway on Nuclear Weapons Program," Associated Press, 11 February 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **1 February 2002**

Hasan Ruhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, says Iran is not building nuclear arms and that the International Atomic Energy Agency can investigate American allegations.

—"Iran: Secretary of Security Council Says Bush Has No Proof for Remarks on Iran," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 1 February 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **2 February 2002**

Aleksandr Losyukov, deputy Russian foreign minister, says the United States should not pressure Russia against helping Iran build the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "We have very clear instructions from the Russian leadership," he says, "to conduct cooperation within the framework of the existing international restricting regimes....One should have no ground to object against our contacts with Iran either in the political or trade and economic spheres."

—"Russia Will Tolerate No Outside Pressure in Its Dealings with Iran—Official," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 2 February 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **3 February 2002**

Russian intelligence sources say Iranian scientists being trained at the NIKIET Institute in Russia are acquiring knowledge that can be used for Iran's nuclear weapons program. "They are here unofficially and have been told to keep as low a profile as possible," says the Russian intelligence source. "They are being taught and are gaining experience they cannot get at home. It is hardly a secret that the Iranians are in a race to develop nuclear weapons."

—Sarah Baxter, Uzi Mahnaimi, Mark Franchetti, "Bush Trains His Military Sights on the Iran-Iraq 'Axis of Evil'," *Sunday Times* (London), 3 February 2002, "Efforts to Cement Coalition Threatened by US Inclusion of Iran in Axis of Evil," FBIS Document EUP20020203000066, 3 February 2002.

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#### **4 February 2002**

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov says Russia will not limit its military or technical cooperation with Iran, including construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "The construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr meets all commitments that Russia has undertaken to the global community," he says. "I think I should mention that the United States is building a similar nuclear power plant in North Korea."

—"Russian Defense Minister Defends Technical Aid For Iranian Nuclear Power Station," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 4 February 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **4 February 2002**

Iranian Defense Minister Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani says if Israel attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Israel "will receive a response, which no politician in Israel can even imagine." Asked if he means a nuclear response, Shamkhani says no, but says "actions will speak." He denies that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons or that Russia is supplying Iran with parts to enrich uranium.

—"Interview with Iranian Defense Minister on Terrorism Charges, Nuclear Program," Al-Jazirah Satellite Channel Television (Doha), 5 February 2002; in FBIS Document GMP20020206000187, 5 February 2002.

#### **5 February 2002**

A senior Israeli defense source says, "We cannot live with nuclear weapons in Iran....We prevented the Iraqis in the past and we can also prevent them."

—"Senior Defense Source: 'Israel 'Can Prevent' Nuclear Weapons in Iran," *Ynet* (Tel Aviv), 5 February 2002; in FBIS Document GMP20020206000124, 5 February 2002.

#### **5 February 2002**

Iranian Defense Minister Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani says it is not in Iran's interest to acquire nuclear weapons. "The presence of nuclear weapons with us," he says, "will turn us into a source of threat for others, which could be seriously exploited to harm our relations with the countries in the region."

—"Iranian Defense Minister Shamkhani on Nuclear Weapons, US Military Presence, Other Issues," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), 5 February 2002; in FBIS Document GMP20020205000045, 5 February 2002.

#### **5 February 2002**

Ali Shamkhani, the Iranian Defense Minister, warns Israel against attacking the nuclear plant in Bushehr. He adds that the retaliation to such an act will be unimaginable. He also dismisses reports that Iran received shipment of enriched uranium-235 from Russia.

—"Interview with Iranian Defense Minister on Terrorism Charges, Nuclear Program," Al Jazirah Satellite Channel (Doha), 5 February 2002; FBIS document GMP20020206000187, 5 February 2002; "Iran: US presence Afghanistan a 'threat'," *Deutsch Presse-Agentur* 6 February 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **6 February 2002**

CIA Director George Tenet testifies before a Senate hearing that Iran may be able to make enough fissile material for a bomb by 2010 or much sooner if Iran were to get fissile material elsewhere.

—George Gedda, "US Says Iran Making Headway on Nuclear Weapons Program," Associated Press, 11 February 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **6 February 2002**

Kamal Kharazi, the Iranian foreign minister, rejects allegations that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons.

—"Iran Says US Allegations Have Roots in Domestic Problems," IRNA (Tehran), 6 February 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

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### **6 February 2002**

The *Sunday Times* reports that the Russian Research and Planning Institute for Power Supply Technologies (NIKIET) is training a handful of Iranian engineers in technologies that can be used for the production of nuclear weapons. —Sarah Baxter and Mark Franchetti, "Russia, Iran Run N-School Exchange," *Sunday Times* (London), 6 February 2002; Lexis-Nexis [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **7 February 2002**

Gholam Reza Shafei, Iran's ambassador to Russia, rejects the US accusations that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. He adds that the Iranian-Russian agreement has no military dimension and that the International Atomic Energy Agency regularly visits the Bushehr reactor.

—"IRNA: Envoy Rejects US Claims on Iran Seeking Nuclear Weapons," IRNA (Tehran), 7 February 2002; in FBIS document IAP20020207000091; 7 February 2002, "Russia: Iranian Envoy Denies Iran Intends to Develop, Purchase Nuclear Arms," Interfax (Moscow), 7 February 2002; FBIS document CEP20020207000105, 8 February 2002.

### **7 February 2002**

Israeli Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer says Israel should not strike Iran's nuclear program, but should act through diplomatic channels and economic pressure to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, which he says could happen in 2005.

—"Ben-Eliezer Opposes Preemptive Military Strike On Iran's Nuclear Program Targets," Voice of Israel Network B (Jerusalem), 7 February 2002; FBIS Document GMP20020207000204, 7 February 2002.

### **8 February 2002**

George Tenet, head of the CIA, says that Iran might be able to "produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon by the end of this decade...Obtaining material from outside could cut years from this estimate." John Pike of GlobalSecurity.org says that there is no evidence that Iran is building a reprocessing facility to produce weapon-grade plutonium.

—John Diamond, "Israel: Iran Could Have Nuclear Arms in 5 Years, Defense Minister Calls Nation 'Twin' of Hussein's Iraq," *Chicago Tribune*, 8 February 2002.

### **11 February 2002**

The Kolomensky Zavod holding company begins building diesel emergency power plants for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. According to the contract signed by Atomstroyeksport JSC [joint stock company], Iran will get four DGU6200 diesel generator plants, each including two 15-9DG diesel generators, plus one DGU-3100 plant, including one 15-9DG diesel generator. It is not clear if all the plants are destined for Bushehr. The plants, whose generators can each provide 3,100KW of electricity, are for emergency cooling of a nuclear reactor in an emergency, plus emergency power for the nuclear plant. Each diesel generator cost \$700,000, and Iran has prepaid \$2 million for the order in January 2002. The first diesel plant is to be delivered this year. [Note: See 3 January 2002.]

—"Russia: Moscow Region Firm to Supply Emergency Units for Iran's Nuclear Plant," Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Moscow), 11 February 2002; in FBIS Document CEP20020211000087, 11 February 2002.

### **14 February 2002**

Valeriy Lebedev, Russian deputy minister of atomic energy, says spent Russian nuclear fuel from Russian-built plants abroad will be returned to Russia. He says Russia is committed to finishing the Bushehr nuclear power plant in late 2004 or early 2005.

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—"Russian to Take Back Spent Fuel from Nuclear Stations Abroad," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 14 February 2002; in FBIS Document CEP20020214000089, 14 February 2002; "Official: Russia Committed to Completing Nuclear Reactor In Iran," Associated Press, 14 February 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **15 February 2002**

US Vice President Dick Cheney says Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction.

—"Russia Interested in Closer Ties with Iran—Radio," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 16 February 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **15 February 2002**

Interfax reports that Kamal Kharazi, the Iranian foreign minister, will visit Moscow for a two-day visit starting 18 February 2002. The negotiations with Russian officials will focus on weapons of mass destruction, among other issues.

—"Iranian Foreign Minister To Visit Russia Next Week," Interfax (Moscow), 15 February 2002; in FBIS document Russia: Iranian Foreign Minister to Pay 2-day Visit to Moscow 18 Feb," CEP20020215000207, 19 February 2002.

#### **17 February 2002**

Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, says that Moscow and Tehran are following a peaceful collaboration in the use of nuclear energy.

—"Nuclear Cooperation Peaceful," *Iran Daily* (Tehran), 17 February 2002; in FBIS document IAP20020216000097, 17 February 2002.

#### **18 February 2002**

Viktor Kozlov, director general of Atomstroyeksport, says Russia and Iran are discussing building another nuclear power plant in Iran, and that Russian has given Iran a feasibility study of possible locations. [Note: See 4 September 2001.]

—"Russia In Talks On Building Another Nuclear Power Plant In Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 18 February 2002; in FBIS Document CEP20020218000056, 18 February 2002.

#### **19 February 2002**

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi postpones a visit to Russia for "technical reasons." Among other issues, he was to discuss Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran.

—Dina Pyanykh and Dmitry Vinitsky, "Iran FM Visit To Moscow Postponed "For Technical Reasons," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 19 February 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **19 February 2002**

At a press conference following meetings with Russian officials in Moscow, John Bolton, US undersecretary of state, says he expressed US concerns over Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran. He says the two sides have differences over the issue and that is important the two sides come to an understanding. He says US President George Bush is very concerned about proliferation. Bolton says the United States will not compensate Russia if it were to give up construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant or halt conventional arms sales to Iran.

—"USA Concerned Over Russian-Iranian Cooperation—Russian Paper," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 February 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **20 February 2002**

The *Middle East Newsline* reports that Russian and Iranian officials cannot agree on the transfer of at least three

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additional nuclear reactors and other nuclear technology. Western diplomatic sources believe that this disagreement stands behind the delay of the visit of Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Kamal Kharazi to Moscow. Russian officials confirmed that Mr. Kharazi did not arrive in Moscow amid disagreement over some issues. Iran has complained after Russia decided to postpone the completion of the Bushehr nuclear reactor to 2005 instead of 2003 as initially agreed upon. Yet, Victor Kozlov, director-general of Atomstroyeksport, the company building the Bushehr nuclear reactor, says that his company has sent a feasibility study for new nuclear reactors in Iran. —"Iran, Russia Fall Out Over Nuke Program," *Middle East Newslines*, Vol. 4, No. 72, 20 February 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

#### **21 February 2002**

Valery Lebedev, Russian deputy atomic energy minister, says that Moscow plans to complete the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant by late 2004 or 2005. He reiterates that Russia will not cancel its contract with Iran despite US pressure.

—"Iran's Nuclear Reactor Again Set Back," *Middle East Newslines*, Vol. 4 No 74, 21 February 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

#### **21 February 2002**

Amin Tarzi, a senior analyst at the Center of Nonproliferation Studies, says, "The Iranian nuclear program is in shambles and the people who read all the intelligence know that."

—Scott Peterson, "Iran's Nuclear Challenge: Deter, not Antagonize," *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 February 2002, [www.csmonitor.com](http://www.csmonitor.com).

#### **25 February 2002**

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service issues a report that says Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons and, according to US military and intelligence sources, has tried to develop the capability to enrich uranium by buying parts from Western European companies.

—Stewart Ball, "'Axis' Harbours Nuclear Plan: CSIS: New Intelligence Report Says Iraq and Iran Want the Weapons 'At Earliest Opportunity'," *National Post* (Toronto), 26 February 2002, in "Canadian Intelligence Service Report Seen Bolstering US 'Axis of Evil' View," FBIS Document EUP20020227000171, 26 February 2002.

#### **25 February 2002**

*Marianne*, a weekly published in Paris, reports that the Russian minister of atomic energy has imposed severe restrictions on nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran. The weekly adds that Russian scientists will leave Iran. Hamid Reza Asefi, Iranian foreign ministry spokesman, did not challenge the veracity of these reports but refused to confirm them.

—"Are Russian Specialist Leaving Bushehr Power station?," *Bonyan* (Tehran), 25 February 2002; in FBIS document IAP 20020224000056, 26 February 2002.

#### **26 February 2002**

Hamida Edalat, MP from Bushehr, says "it is not true that Russian experts are leaving Iran after pressures were exerted by America." She adds that "parts of executive operation that were to be handed over to Iranians according to the contract are being handed over and the Russian experts are leaving the country for this reason." Hamid Reza Asefi, spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, says there has been no change in Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation. Aleksandr Maryanov, Russian ambassador to Iran, says Russia will fulfill its obligation to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant. And "will be implementing in full all accords reached in connection with this project no matter what the prospects for expanding Russian-Iranian cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy might be."

—"Deputy Denies Russians Leaving Iran Under US Pressure," *Nowruz* (Tehran), 26 February 2002; in FBIS

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Document IAP20020226000034, 26 February 2002; "Russia To Honor Its Commitments in Building Iran Nuclear Plant," RIA-Novosti (Moscow), 26 February 2002; in FBIS Document CEP20020226000382, 26 February 2002; "Iranian FM Official: There Has Been No Change in Nuclear Coop with Moscow," IRAN (Tehran), 26 February 2002; in FBIS Document IAP20020226000098, 26 February 2002.

#### **26 February 2002**

The Iranian embassy in Georgia issues a statement denying claims by Levan Kidzinidze, former aid to Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze, that with Abashidze's help, four physicists were sent to Iran in 1995 to help Iran develop nuclear weapon. The statement calls the claims "the figment of a sick imagination." [Note: See also 1995.]

—"Iran Denies Former Georgian Official's Nuclear Program Claims," Kavkasia-Press (Tbilisi), 26 February 2002; in FBIS Document CEP20020226000312, 26 February 2002.

#### **28 February 2002**

The United States acknowledges that Russia has started efforts to stop the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that the Russians have punished entities involved in illicit activities with Iran.

—"US Acknowledges Russia Efforts on Iran WMD," *Middle East Newslines*, 28 February 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

#### **March 2002**

The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin reports that the facility of Chalus is located 20 kilometers south of the town bearing the same name. It is allegedly an underground nuclear weapons development facility built in the Alborz mountains. Iranian authorities tell their citizens that the facility is an electricity generation plant operated by Canadians.

—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, [www.meib.org](http://www.meib.org).

#### **March 2002**

The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin reports that the Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine is located in Karaj. The center reportedly has a radiochemistry lab, dosimeter lab, a Chinese calutron and a Belgian cyclotron.

—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, [www.meib.org](http://www.meib.org).

#### **March 2002**

The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin reports that Iran's civilian and military nuclear programs are headquartered in Tehran. The Tehran Nuclear Research Center has a 5MW nuclear research reactor. It also has a uranium yellowcake production facility. Tehran also hosts the AEOI center for Theoretical Physics and Mathematics, which carries out research on nuclear physics and plasma physics.

—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, [www.meib.org](http://www.meib.org).

#### **March 2002**

The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin reports that the Nuclear Research Department at the University of Yazd carries out geological research and mining in the Saghand uranium deposits. The deposits are believed to contain 5,000 tons of uranium oxide with a U-235 content between 0.08% and 1.0%.

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—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, [www.meib.org](http://www.meib.org).

#### **March 2002**

The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin reports that Neka is allegedly a nuclear facility near the Caspian Sea. Reports claim that it is an underground facility.

—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, [www.meib.org](http://www.meib.org).

#### **March 2002**

The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin reports that the location of the Rudan Nuclear Research Center is near the city of Shiraz. The facility is believed to focus on uranium yellowcake processing into uranium hexafluoride gas.

—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, [www.meib.org](http://www.meib.org).

#### **March 2002**

Middle East Intelligence Bulletin reports that there are unconfirmed reports of a nuclear reactor in Tabas.

—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, [www.meib.org](http://www.meib.org).

#### **March 2002**

The Middle East Intelligence Bulletin reports that Isfahan is believed to be the center of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. The Nuclear Technology Research Center at the University of Isfahan allegedly employs 3,000 scientists. Isfahan is also home of a 27KW Chinese-supplied miniaturized neutron source reactor.

—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, [www.meib.org](http://www.meib.org).

#### **3 March 2002**

Russian radio reports that Iran and Russia are facing serious financial differences relevant to the construction of Bushehr nuclear power plant. The Russian Mignews Internet Agency quotes Russian diplomatic sources who say that Iran has not met its payment commitments.

—"Russia and Iran Fall Out Over Nuclear Power Station," Ekho Moscow Radio, 3 March 2002; FBIS document CEP20020303000010, 21 June 2002.

#### **4 March 2002**

Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, Russian deputy minister of atomic energy, denies the existence of any financial problems preventing the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Russia: Official Denies Problems of Financing Iran's Nuclear project," Interfax (Moscow), 4 March 2002; FBIS document CEP20020304000079, 21 June 2002.

#### **5 March 2002**

Iran and Russia reject allegations that Russian nuclear scientists have withdrawn from the Bushehr nuclear plant.

—"Iran, Russia firm on Nuclear Cooperation," United Press International, 5 March 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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**7 March 2002**

*Haaretz* reports that China's ambassador to Israel, Pan Zhanlin, asserts that China opposes the spread of weapons of mass destruction and would punish any Chinese company exporting such technology. This statement was in response to allegations of Chinese exports of arms technology to Iran.

—Gideon Alon, "China Opposes Proliferation of Nuclear Technology to Iran," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 7 March 2002; Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

**7 March 2002**

Victor Kozlov, director-general of Atomstroyeskport, visits Iran to coordinate the Bushehr project.

Atomstroyeskport signs contracts with Iranian subcontractors. It will soon start the installation of the already supplied material.

—"Russian Nuclear Official Visits Iran to Coordinate Bushehr Project," *RIA-Novosti* (Moscow), 7 March 2002; FBIS Document CEP20020307000113, 21 June 2002.

**11 March 2002**

Victor Kozlov, director-general of Atomstroyeskport, says that Iran will decide on the construction of a second nuclear reactor in Bushehr by the end of this year. Iran will also choose the site for two new nuclear reactors in few months.

—"Iran Will Decide on Second Russian Nuclear Power Plant by Year-End," Agence France Presse, 11 March 2002, Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

**14 March 2002**

UN General-Secretary Kofi Annan says there is no evidence that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons.

—"Iran Commentary Says Kofi Annan Exposed False US Allegations," *Financial Times*, 14 March 2002, Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

**15 March 2002**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev says that Russia will meet all the commitments to the nuclear power plant in Bushehr.

—"Russian Nuclear Contract With Iran on Track, Further Ones Possible," British Broadcasting Corporation, 15 March 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

**18 March 2002**

In response to the US announcement of its new nuclear weapons strategy targeting seven states, including Iran, and hinting about an end to the moratorium on nuclear testing, Iran writes a letter of protest to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi writes, "US threats are a flagrant violation of its commitments to the [Nuclear] Non-Proliferation Treaty and go against guarantees given by US officials."

—Agence France-Presse, 18 March 2002; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

**19 March 2002**

Wolfgang Hoffman, the executive secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, says that legal problems have prevented Iran from sending data to the organization. [Note: See 26 March and 15 April 2002.]

—"Executive Secretary 'Optimistic' US Will Stick To Nuclear Moratorium," *Der Standard* (Vienna), 19 March 2002; in FBIS document EUP20020319000088, 21 June 2002.

**21 March 2002**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Majid Teymuri, director of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, has said that the plant

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is four months behind its timetable because of ongoing adjustments in detailed design engineering.

—"Bushehr 1 Plant Changes To Fit VVER Mean Startup in Early 2004," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 43, No. 12, 21 March 2002, [www.mhenergy.com](http://www.mhenergy.com).

#### **21 March 2002**

The US Department of Defense reports that because of tight resources and a relatively less developed technological base, Iran is not likely to produce fissile material on its own.

—Yekaterina Vladimirova, "Will Russia Give Weapons Of Mass Destruction to Third World Nations?" *Utro.ru* (Moscow), 21 March 2002; "Russia Exodus of Scientists Raises Proliferation Concerns," FBIS document CEP20020404000303, 5 April 2002.

#### **26 March 2002**

The *Guardian* of London reports that Iran has withdrawn its contribution to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization to protest against US hostility to the treaty. [Note: See 19 March and 15 April 2002.]

—Julian Borger and John Gittings, *The Guardian* (London), 26 March 2002, [www.guardian.com](http://www.guardian.com).

#### **26 March 2002**

Azerbaijani newspaper *Azadliq* reports that Iranians have transported loads of soil from Babak and Culfa districts in Azerbaijan. These regions are believed to be very rich in uranium. The newspaper reports that excavations took place at night.

—"Iran smuggling Uranium From Azeri Excalve," British Broadcasting Corporation (London), 26 March 2002, Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **27 March 2002**

Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian atomic energy minister, says that Russia may supply nuclear fuel to Iran on the condition that the fuel be returned to Russia for reprocessing.

—"Russia to Supply Nuclear Fuel to Iran on Condition of its return for reprocessing-Atomic Ministry," *Interfax*, 27 March 2002; [cnsinfo.miis.edu](http://cnsinfo.miis.edu).

#### **28 March 2002**

Inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency find no evidence that Iran is using its nuclear reactor for military purposes.

—"IAEA fails to Find Evidence of Iran's Nuclear Weapon Program," [www.nci.org](http://www.nci.org), 2 April 2002.

#### **28 March 2002**

IRNA reports that Mohammed Javad Zarif, Iran's deputy foreign minister, regrets the failure of efforts made by the international community to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and offer guaranties to non-nuclear states for their security.

—"Iran Calls for Global Efforts to Secure Disarmament Success," *Xinhua General News Agency* (Beijing), 28 March 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 March 2002**

A Russian diplomat says that the world community does not have any solid evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.

—Vladimir Suprun, "Russia Expert Sees no proof of Iran Nuke Military Program," *ITAR-TASS* (Moscow), 28 March 2002; Lexis-Nexis [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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#### **29 March 2002**

Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatoly Kinakh says that Ukraine had severe economic losses because it complied with the United States and did not sell nuclear reactors to Iran. Yet, it is getting nothing in return. Officials at the state-owned Turboatom say that the Ukrainian nuclear industry lost \$1.5 billion because it agreed not to sell the reactor to Iran.

—"Ukraine's Premier Complains of Poor US Support," *Deutsch Presse-Agentur*, 29 March 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **1 April 2002**

Kamal Kharazi, the Iranian foreign affairs minister, visits Moscow after his planned visit was postponed following divergence between Iran and Russia. [Note: See 18 February 2002.] This visit comes amid US pressure on Russia to stop its cooperation with Iran in the nuclear and missile fields. Mr. Kharazi is expected to discuss the completion of the Bushehr nuclear plant construction.

—"Russia Receives Iranian Envoy, Faces Down US Over Nuke Plant," [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), accessed on 2 April 2002.

#### **2 April 2002**

Alexander Kudryavtsev, Russian Atomic Energy Minister, says that despite Russian and Iranian divergence over payment schedule and technical specification, the cooperation between Iran and Russia will continue. He adds that 5,000 tons of material has been shipped to Bushehr. Iran has requested the construction of three new nuclear reactors. However, Russia has not agreed to the request yet. Iran cancelled a visit of its foreign affairs minister after Putin refused to meet with him.

—"Russia Transfers equipment for Bushehr" *Middle East Newsline* Vol. 4, No. 123, 2 April 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

#### **4 April 2002**

Kamal Kharazi, Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister, says that the cooperation agenda between Iran and Russia includes completing the construction of the nuclear power station in Bushehr.

—"Russia and Iran Negotiate Completion of Nuclear Plant construction," *Interfax (Moscow)*, 4 April 2002.

#### **4 April 2002**

Alexander Lusyukov, Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister, says that Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation will not be at the expense of other countries. He also rejects US and Israeli allegations that the Russian-Iranian cooperation will put Iran in a position to produce nuclear weapons.

—"Moscow: Nuclear and Military Cooperation with Tehran is not aimed at any other Country's Interests," *Asharq Alawsat (London)*, 4 April 2002, [www.asharqalawsat.com](http://www.asharqalawsat.com).

#### **4 April 2002**

The British Broadcasting Corporation reports that Iran and Russia are discussing the construction of a second unit at the Bushehr power plant. Victor Kozlov, director of Atomstroyeksport, says, "guided by the results of work on the first power unit, the sides are now discussing a possibility of completing construction of the second unit." He adds that the construction contract might be signed in the coming two years.

—"Iran, Russia Discuss Building 2nd Unit at Bushehr Power Plant," *British Broadcasting Corporation (London)* 4 April 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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**5 April 2002**

Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, rejects US allegations that Russia has supplied dual-use items to Iran.  
—"Russian Foreign Minister rejects US Claims of Dual-Purpose Supplies To Iran" Interfax (Moscow) 5 April 2002; in FBIS document CEP20020405000142, 8 April 2002.

**15 April 2002**

Fayruz Hassini, Iran's representative at the United Nations in Vienna, denies allegations that Iran has stopped cooperating with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization. He says that Iran was among the first signatory countries. [Note: See 19 and 26 March 2002.]

—"Iran denies stopping cooperation with Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization," *Asharq Alawsat* (London) 4 April 2002, [www.asharqalawsat.com](http://www.asharqalawsat.com).

**20 April 2002**

The deputy Russian atomic energy minister says that Russia has decided to complete the nuclear reactor in Bushehr. He adds that all necessary documents for the construction of two other new reactors have been prepared.

—"Iran: Russian Official Says Documents For Another Two Nuclear Reactors Ready," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 April 2002, [cnsinfo.miis.edu](http://cnsinfo.miis.edu).

**23 April 2002**

John Wolf, US assistant secretary of state, says that the United States failed to stop Russian nuclear assistance to Iran.

—"US Fails to Stop Russian Nuke AID To Iran," *Middle East Newslines*, 23 April 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

**26 April 2002**

Interfax reports that the Leningradsky Metallichesky Zavod [Leningrad Metal Factory] has manufactured basic parts of the 1,000MW turbine to be installed in Bushehr.

—"Leningrad Company Manufacturing Parts For Nuclear Power Plant in Iran," Interfax (Moscow) 26 April 2002; in FBIS document CEP20020426000006, 21 June 2002.

**27 April 2002**

The construction of the main component of the 1,000MW nuclear power plant is complete. The turbine will be tested soon. A Russia official says that despite US pressure, the nuclear power plant in Bushehr will be operational in 2003.

—"Iran: First Bushehr Nuclear Power Station to become operational in 2003," Voice of The Islamic Republic of Iran, Radio 1 (Tehran), 27 April 2002, in FBIS document IAP20020427000001, 21 June 2002.

**2 May 2002**

The general director of the Russian nuclear organization says that the financial problems between Russia and Iran that were facing the completion of the Bushehr power plant have been resolved.

—"IAEA Deems Iran's Nuclear Activities Peaceful," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 2 May 2002, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

**6 May 2002**

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov says that Russia is ready to resolve US concerns about the Russian Nuclear cooperation with Iran.

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—"Ivanov Says Russia is Ready to resolve US Concern over Nuclear Cooperation with Iran," *RIA-Novosti* 6 May 2002; FBIS document CEP20020507000008 24 June 2002.

#### **9 May 2002**

The Bush administration decides to impose new penalties on Chinese, Armenian, and Moldavian companies believed to be assisting Iran's weapon of mass destruction program. These entities are Lizen Open Joint Stock Company and Armen Sargasian, Armenia; LiyangYunlong, Aka Liyang Chemical Equipment Company, Zibo Chemical Equipment Plant, Aka Chemet Global Ltd, China National Machinery and Electric Equipment Import and Export, Wha Cheong Tai Company, China Shipbuilding Trading Company, The China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation, The China National Aero-Technology Import and Export, QC Chen, China; Cuanta SA, Mikhail Pavlovitch, Moldova.

—"US to Penalize Foreign Firms over Iran ties," *New York Times*, 9 May 2002; Federal Register Vol. 67, No. 95, 16 May 2002.

#### **10 May 2002**

Russian officials of the foreign ministry and Atomic Energy Ministry visit Washington to lessen the worries of the American administration with respect to the Russian-Iranian cooperation. They will also offer a new plan for cooperation with the United States regarding the Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation.

—"Minatom Chief in America to Lower Pulses over Iranian Nuke Plant," *Bellona Report* vol. 3-2001, 10 May 2002 [www.bellona.no](http://www.bellona.no).

#### **10 May 2002**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev says that the construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr remains "a sensitive topic." He stresses that the reactor cannot be used for the production of nuclear weapons.

—Charles Digges, "Russian Nuke Minister Says US Tensions Easing over Iranian Nuke Plant," *Bellona*, 10 May 2002, [www.bellona.no](http://www.bellona.no).

#### **10 May 2002**

The *Washington Times* reports that Iran has moved air defense missiles to its nuclear facilities. These missiles consist of several batteries of US-made Hawk missiles that have been improved and are now dubbed I-Hawks and are deployed around the Bushehr area.

—Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, "Inside the Ring," *Washington Times*, 10 May 2002, [www.washingtontimes.com](http://www.washingtontimes.com).

#### **13 May 2002**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev says that Russia and the United States must reach an agreement regarding Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. He adds that the Russian cooperation with Iran is respectful of international regulations and that Iran has signed all the documents required by the International Atomic Energy Agency and that the IAEA has carried out more than 60 inspections in Iran without finding any proof of any illegal activities.

—"Atomic Energy Ministry Is Counting on The US to Understand Russia's Position on Cooperation with Iran," *Interfax* (Moscow), 13 May 2002.

#### **13 May 2002**

Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Igor Ivanov says that the United States should refrain from making unfounded

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allegations about Russia's peaceful nuclear cooperation with Iran.

—"Ivanov Urges US to Refrain from sullyng Iran-Russia Nuke Cooperation," IRNA (Tehran), 13 May 2002.

#### **13 May 2002**

Vladimir Orlov, Director of the PIR Center for Political Studies, says that the Russian government has instructed institutes to limit contacts with Iranian scientists and that any training offered should be explicitly approved by the security services. Analysts from PIR say that the aim of Iran is to accumulate expertise to build nuclear weapons.

—"Lax Nuke Control Casts Shadows on US-Russia Partnership," Dow Jones Newswire, 13 May 2002.

#### **14 May 2002**

Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense Policy Board, says that Russia's Soviet-era debt should be forgiven. Such action might help persuade Russia to stop its nuclear cooperation with Iran.

—"Debt Relief May Wean Russia from Iran, US Official," Reuters, 14 May 2002; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 15 May 2002.

#### **15 May 2002**

Husayn Afarideh, head of the Iranian Majlis Energy Commission, calls upon the International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent propaganda against Iran's peaceful nuclear programs. In a meeting with Werner Burkart, IAEA deputy director, Afarideh points out the IAEA positive reports about Iran and the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. Afarideh invites Burkart and IAEA high officials to visit nuclear facilities in Iran, including Bushehr.

—"Iran: Majles Official Urges IAEA to Thwart propaganda against Nuclear Programs," IRNA (Tehran), 15 May 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

#### **15 May 2002**

US Secretary of State Colin Powell says that Russia and the United States are still in disagreement concerning the transfer of sensitive equipment to Iran.

—"US, Russia Disagree on Iran: Powell," Agence France Presse, 15 May 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **16 May 2002**

The *Jerusalem Post* reports that the Israeli government is lobbying the US administration to put the Iran-Russia nuclear cooperation at the top of the agenda of the discussion of Presidents Bush and Putin.

—Herb Keinon, "Israel Wants Iran Nukes on Agenda of Bush-Putin Summit," *Jerusalem Post*, 16 May 2002.

#### **17 May 2002**

The United States claims that Kvant Company, based in Chisinau, Moldova, helped Iran produce nuclear weapons. The company was founded in 1950 and specialized in electronic military equipment. It went bankrupt in 2001.

—"US Says Moldova Helped Iran Produce Weapons of Mass Destruction," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 May 2002, Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **17 May 2002**

The Iranian embassy in Yerevan protests US allegations that Armenian entities have transferred nuclear technology to Iran. The embassy claims that not one Armenian-Iranian joint-venture is engaged in developing high military technology.

—"Armenia: Iranian Embassy Rejects US Allegation Over Transfer of High Technology," *Financial Times* (London), 17 May 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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**21 May 2002**

The *Middle East Newsline* reports that Russia plans to start operating the first unit of the Iran nuclear power plant by the end of 2003.

—"Russia Pledges To Continue Bushehr," *Middle East Newsline*, Vol. 4, No. 187, 21 May 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

**22 May 2002**

Anton Khlopkov, a Russian security expert, says that the Russian technology transferred to Iran in the construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr cannot be used for the development of nuclear weapons.

—Anatoly Yurkin, "Russian Technologies Supplied To Iran Unfit for Making Nuclear Weapons," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 22 May 2002; in FBIS document CEP20020522000305, 24 June 2002.

**24 May 2002**

Maxim Shingarkin, a leading Russia nuclear expert, says that the reactor sold to Iran, a VVER-1000, can be used to produce nuclear weapons grade plutonium irrespective of IAEA inspections. He says that the reactor produces neutrons. Even if Iran returns the spent fuel to Russia, they will be able to produce plutonium with such a reactor.

—"Russian Warns Bushehr Could BE Used for Nukes," *Middle East Newsline*, Vol. 4, No. 192, 24 May 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

**24 May 2002**

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld says that Iran's goal behind acquiring nuclear technology is clear. Iran is trying to develop "the full spectrum" of weapons of mass destruction, he says.

—"Rumsfeld Iran's Nuclear Ambitions 'unambiguous'," Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Washington), 24 May 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**24 May 2002**

Yevgeny Reshetnikov, Russian deputy atomic energy minister, says that Iran "cannot and will not use for any ends enriched nuclear fuel" from the Bushehr reactor. The fuel will be shipped back to Russia.

—Eric Helque, "Putin Rebuffs US Concern Over Iran Nuclear Threat," Agence France Presse, 24 May 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**24 May 2002**

General Yuri Baluyevsky, Russian deputy chief of staff, says that Iran has received tactical nuclear weapons from a country other than Russia. [Note: He may be referring to Kazakhstan. See March 1993 entry.]

—"Iran, Russia Again Argue Over Nukes," *Middle East Newsline*, Vol. 4, No. 207, 24 May 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

**25 May 2002**

Alexander Rumyantsev, the Russian atomic energy minister, says he is pleased by the US-Russia summit. Yet he acknowledges that Russia failed to eliminate US concerns over the Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation. He says that the creation of a joint Russian-US group of experts constitutes an additional step towards the signing of a bilateral treaty on the peaceful use of atomic energy. He adds that the construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr does not mean the transfer of technologies to Iran and that the plant will be supervised for at least 10 years by Russia and will be subject to the same security measures in Russia.

—"Rumyantsev Sees Russo-US Nuclear Expert Groups as Step to Atomic Energy Treaty," Nuclear.ru (Moscow) 25 May 2002; in FBIS document CEP20020531000149, 25 May 2002; "Russia Nuclear Minister Pleased With summit, though Iran remains an Issue," Interfax (Moscow), 25 May 2002; FBIS document CEP20020525000111, 24 June 2002.

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**26 May 2002**

US President Bush announces that Russia has proposed international inspections, possibly by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), of the nuclear plant it is helping build in Iran to assuage US fears that the facility might help Tehran produce atomic weapons. Bush says that Russian President Putin will put pressure on Iran so that it allows international inspections of its Russian-made nuclear reactor.

—Ron Hutcheson, "Putin Offers Inspectors in Iran," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 27 May 2002, [www.philly.com](http://www.philly.com); Steve Holland, "Bush Says Iran Nuclear Plant Might Be Inspected," Reuters (Paris), 27 May 2002; Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

**26 May 2002**

Kamal Kharazi, the Iranian foreign minister, approves of Russia's defense of the Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation during US President George Bush's visit to Moscow.

—"Iran Welcomes Russia's Defense Of Tehran-Moscow Nuclear Cooperation," IRNA (Tehran), 26 May 2002; FBIS document 2002052600039, 26 May 2002.

**26 May 2002**

Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian atomic energy minister, says that a Russian delegation will fly to Tehran to discuss the delivery of nuclear fuel to the Iranian nuclear reactor in Bushehr.

—"Russian Delegation in Iran Soon To discuss Nuclear Fuel Delivery," Agence France Presse (Paris), 26 May 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**27 May 2002**

Israeli security sources say that Israel is examining a possible attack on the Iranian nuclear power plant in Bushehr, in the same way it bombed the Iraqi reactor in 1981.

—"Al Qanat: Israel May Attack Iran's Nuclear Reactor," Al Qanat (Cairo), 27 May 2002; in FBIS document 20020527000075, 24 June 2002.

**27 May 2002**

Husayn Afarideh, head of the Iranian Majlis Energy Commission, says that the International Atomic Energy Agency has planned 70 visits to the Bushehr nuclear power plant during the next year. He adds that the construction of the plant is going well and that about 1,000 Russian experts are at the site.

—"IAEA to Inspect Iranian Nuclear Plant," Reuters, 27 May 2002; [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

**28 May 2002**

Husayn Afarideh, head of the Majlis energy commission, says that the construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor will be undertaken under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Melissa Fleming, spokesperson of the IAEA says that IAEA representatives have visited the nuclear plant before and that once nuclear materials are supplied to the plant, four to six visits will be carried out a year.

—"Iranian Nuclear Plant to be Built under IAEA Supervision," IRNA 28 May 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

**28 May 2002**

Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian atomic energy minister, says that Russia will train 100 Iranian engineers to operate at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He adds that the nuclear plant will be operational in 2004/2005 and the next six years will be a transitional period. During this period, Russian and Iranian expert will run the facility.

—"Russia to Train 100 Iranian engineers to Operate Bushehr-1 Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 28 May 2002; in

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FBIS document CEP20020528000137, 24 June 2002; "Russia will Train 100 Iranian Engineer working at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant," *Asharq al Awsat* (London) 29 May 2002, [www.asharqalawsat.com](http://www.asharqalawsat.com).

### **30 May 2002**

Muhammad Jawad Zarif, the Iranian deputy foreign minister, and Russian Foreign Ministry official Georgy Mamedov meet concerning non-proliferation issues.

—"Russia and Iran Engage in First Non-proliferation Talks," Agence France Presse, 30 May 2002; in Iran Expert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 31 May 2002.

### **31 May 2002**

The *Middle East Newsline* reports that Iran and Russia are believed to be in disagreement about tighter International Atomic Energy Agency inspections to nuclear sites in Iran. Iran opposes the Russian proposal for tighter inspections. Russia is trying to ensure that Iran cannot use the Russian built facilities to produce nuclear weapons. Iranian officials have not signed a protocol that will allow a more comprehensive inspection of nuclear site that will unveil if a facility has any secret activities. [Note: See 28 July 1997 and 1 June 2000 for more on Iran and the Additional Protocol.]

—"Iran, Russia Disagree on Tighter IAEA Controls," *Middle East Newsline*, Vol. 4, No. 202, 31 May 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

### **10 June 2002**

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asifi rejects the remarks of General Yuri Baluyevsky, Russian deputy chief of staff, that Iran has the equipment to produce nuclear weapons. He adds that the Russian official was not aware of Iran's peaceful nuclear program.

—"Iran Rejects Reports on Nuke Weapons, reiterates IAEA Pledge," IRNA (Tehran), 10 June 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

### **16 June 2002**

Hassan Ruhani, secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, says that Iran will respect the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

—"Iran says it Abides by Non-Proliferation Treaty," IRNA, 16 June 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

### **21 June 2002**

The *Christian Science Monitor* publishes a detailed article on Russian cooperation with Iran on the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Of the nuclear cooperation, John Bolton, undersecretary of state in charge of arms control, says, "The quality of the relationship with Russia really depends fundamentally on how they address this question in the future." Valentin Tikhonov, an expert from the Russian Academy of Sciences, says, "The new generation [of nuclear experts] may work in Iran, and may work on nuclear weapons because their lives are too hard and they want money, money, money." An unnamed senior US official says Russia "is giving meaningful help [to Iran] in mastering the nuclear-fuel cycle, and some critical technologies like sophisticated metal alloys [and for] laser isotope separation techniques...that are involved in building the bomb. There's enough to see a pattern of a determined Iran effort that unfortunately struck positive responses from some Russian entities." The official says, "If their [the Russians'] security is as effective as they claim it to be, and we think it is, they should be able to track these things down. They know who is flying on Aeroflot to Tehran." Vladimir Orlov, head of the PIR Center, a think tank in Moscow, says, "There is practically zero risk that Iran will use the Bushehr power plant for nuclear proliferation," noting that Russia will supply all the fuel and take back spent fuel. "Russia doesn't want—and will not support—any ambitions of Iran which may be interpreted as nuclear weapons ambitions." Rose Gottemoeller, former US deputy undersecretary of Energy responsible for nonproliferation, says, "Everyone else has cut off cooperation

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with Iran on nuclear technology, including the Chinese." She says the real risk is "bottom feeders—small Russian industrial or research institutions that are desperate, or they wouldn't be trying to take extreme measures, such as false invoices...to mask their sales." She says that although most Russian entities will follow export rules, "...the Russian system being what it is, I'm sure there are others who could pop out of the mud at any time." Gary Samore, a special adviser to President Clinton on nonproliferation now at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, says, "There may be a real opportunity now, post-September 11, for the US and Russia to work out an agreement that would give the Russians a strong incentive to go all the way in enforcing what they say is their policy." He says the United States should accept and "grandfather" the Bushehr deal and give Russia incentives for limiting the deal by taking responsibility for fuel supplies and forcing Iran to publicly commit to not seeking a fuel-cycle and to agree to tougher IAEA inspections. "The sooner you can step in to slow down or stop [Iran's] program, the better," he says. "If we just let the situation drift and don't do anything, they will get closer and closer, and will eventually reach the technical point of no return." [Note: See 11 July 2002 entry.]

—Scott Peterson, "Russian Nuclear Know-How Pours into Iran," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 21 June 2002, p. 1; Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **21 June 2002**

Robert Nigmatulin, Russian deputy minister of atomic energy, says that Iran does not have the technology to separate plutonium from irradiated nuclear fuel and will not be able to develop such technology on its own.

—"Russian officials Vow to Complete Iranian Nuclear Power Station," *Financial Times*, (London) 21 June 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **24 June 2002**

Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Valery Lebedev says that spent fuel from an Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant would be returned to Russia, countering worries that Iran could use the fuel to develop nuclear weapons. The statement was in response to claims from Greenpeace International that the waste would remain in Iran.

According to Lebedev, "Russia will definitely observe the principles of the International Atomic Energy Agency under which spent fuel will return to the country supplying the fuel."

—Agence France-Presse, 24 June 2002; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **25 June 2002**

M. Dimitriov, Russian deputy defense minister, rejects allegations that Russia and Iran cooperate on unconventional weapons. He says that the construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr complies with international laws and regulations.

—"Russia rejects That Cooperation With Iran is 'Unconventional'," IRNA (Tehran), 25 June 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

#### **11 July 2002**

At a meeting with Russian experts in Moscow, US analyst Robert Einhorn of the Center for Strategic and International Studies says the United States should lift its opposition to Russian cooperation on the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "Russia is too committed to complete the Bushehr project and has a strong economic and political stake in carrying the project to fruition," he says. "It's time to adopt a new approach. The United States should agree to a full range of nuclear cooperative activities (with Russia) despite...the Bushehr project, provided Iran is ready to accept certain critical restrictions on its own nuclear activities and to accept stronger means of (verification)." He says Russia should limit its cooperation to Bushehr, and commit to supplying the fuel and taking back the spent fuel. Russia should also persuade Iran to sign the Additional Protocol, he adds.

—"US academics in plan to end row with Russia on Iran," Reuters, 11 July 2002; in IranExpert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 12 July 2002.

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**12 July 2002**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev confirms that Russia will take back the spent fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He says Russia completed a protocol with Iran in November 1998 that said Russia would take the spent fuel. Russia passed a law in 2001 to allow the import of the spent fuel, and Russia and Iran will sign the protocol in September or October, he says. The reactor will be finished in December 2003 and in operation by 2005, he says. "Construction of the first power unit is nearing completion," he says. "Heavy equipment is being supplied, along with the reactor's body, pipes, and pumping equipment. In August, a turbine will be delivered."

—Eric Engleman, "Russia pledges to accept spent nuclear fuel from Iranian power plant," Associated Press, 12 July 2002.

**12 July 2002**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev says, "We see no other future work with Iran besides this (Bushehr) agreement." Russia will complete two blocks of the plant already under construction and may bid for two more at the site, he says.

—Dmitry Zaks, "Russia-Iran nuclear cooperation to end with Bushehr: minister," Agence France Presse, 12 July 2002.

**Mid-July 2002**

Uri Lubrani, an official with the Israeli Defense Ministry, meets in Washington with US officials about Iran's non-conventional weapons program.

—Janine Zacharia, "In closed-door meeting, Israeli expert cautions US about Iran weapons threat," *Jerusalem Post*, 24 July 2002.

**17 July 2002**

Russian ambassador to the United States, Alexander Vershbow, says of the US-Russian disagreement over Russian Bushehr, "In my view, Russia should be concerning itself with its own security and global security and should for this reason be far more vigilant and should be preventing the transfer of technology and know-how that could accelerate Iran's development of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Experts of both countries are in no doubt that Iran is attempting to procure this technology. So this is, in actual fact, a question of security, not economics. But at the same time many fields of cooperation of Russia and the United States, which could be very profitable economically, have been blocked on account of our concern at the leaks of technology and know-how. And while this concern persists, very profitable cooperation in the aerospace and nuclear sphere cannot move forward."

—Vladimir Skosyrev, "Dialogue of the Deaf and the Dumb: As Under Clinton, So Under Bush, Iran's Nuclear and Missile Program Remains a Stumping-Block in Russo-American Relations," *Moscow Vremya*, 17 July 2002; in "Solutions to 'Iran' Question Proposed, Russian Skeptical," FBIS Document CEP20020717000324, 17 July 2002.

**24 July 2002**

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko says of Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, "We declare once again that the cooperation is solely peaceful and not against the interest of any third country."

—"Russia for expansion of relations, cooperation with Iran," Islamic Republic News Agency, 24 July 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

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### 26 July 2002

Russia releases a proposal to build a total of six reactors in Iran over the next ten years, four at Bushehr and two at Akhvaz. Russia will bid for the construction after completing the first reactor at Bushehr in 2003 or 2004. The proposal might be signed by Russian and Iranian officials at a September meeting in Tehran. The proposal also includes major cooperation in non-nuclear energy development in Iran. [Note: On 12 July 2002, the Russian atomic energy minister said nuclear cooperation with Iran would be limited to Bushehr.]

—Angela Charlton, "Russia Plans New Nuclear, Oil Cooperation with Iran Despite US Opposition," Associated Press, 26 July 2002.

### 29 July 2002

The United States sends a delegation including Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Undersecretary of State John Bolton to Moscow. The trip was planned before Russia announced a new proposal for expanded nuclear cooperation with Iran, but the issue will be raised. [See 26 July 2002 entry.] "It's fair to say the White House was infuriated by that and extremely surprised by the proposal," a US official says. "What we were told was: It's a draft and it's not done." In talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent weeks, President Bush believed Putin had assured him that Russia would limit its nuclear cooperation with Iran. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Billingslea tells a Senate hearing, "If we were upset about one reactor at Bushehr, you can imagine how upset we would be at the prospect of five or six."

—Peter Baker, "US Team to Press Moscow on Iran Issues," *Washington Post*, 30 July 2002; David R. Sands, "US Moves to Head Off Russia-Iran Nuke Pact," *Washington Times*, 31 July 2002.

### 29 July 2002

Javier Solana, the European Union's High Representative on Foreign and Security Policy, states while in Tehran, "EU-Iran relations can never reach their full potential if we do not eliminate problems that hamper such a positive development. One is nonproliferation [and] acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. ... Differences of this nature are a serious obstacle to closer relations."

—"US Turns Up Heat on Russia over Iran," *Disarmament Diplomacy* Issue No. 66, September 2002, Acronym Institute, [www.acronym.org](http://www.acronym.org).

### 29 July 2002

Marshall Billingslea, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated in his testimony in front of the Senate that "Iran is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons, and we are concerned that the Bushehr nuclear power project is, in reality, a pretext for the creation of an infrastructure designed to help Tehran acquire atomic weapons."

—"US Irked by Potential Growth in Russian Nuclear Aid to Iran," *Arms Control Today*, September 2002, [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org).

### 30 July 2002

The *New York Times* reports that some US defense officials believe the Bushehr nuclear power plant should be destroyed before it goes into operation in the next 34 months. The report also mentions that Israel has said it would not allow the plant to open. An editorial in the state-run *Tehran Times*, states, "Iran will definitely not sit by idly if its nuclear installations are attacked. It is a matter of national pride and security."

—Dana Priest, "US May Put Iranian Nuclear Plant on Hit List," *New York Times*, 30 July 2002; in IranExpert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 30 July 2002; David R. Sands, "US Moves to Head Off Russia-Iran Nuke Pact," *Washington Times*, 31 July 2002.

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### 31 July 2002

US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham and Undersecretary of State John Bolton meet with Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev to discuss issues relating to nuclear proliferation and Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. Neither US official makes statements on their visit on Wednesday. The day before, State Department spokesman Philip Reeker said that the US officials will convey to the Russians their concerns about Russian cooperation with Iran. Reeker stated, "We've consistently urged Russia to cease all nuclear cooperation with Iran... Contributing to Iranian nuclear weapons ambitions would be counterproductive ... to Russia's broader strategic interests."

—Steve Gutterman, "US officials meet with Russian nuclear chief amid American concern over Moscow's Iran plans," *The Associated Press*, 31 July 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### 31 July 2002

Russian diplomat states that Moscow demanded from a Washington firm a proof that Iran was developing nuclear weapons with Russia's help. A Russian official states "Our cooperation is focused on economic aspects that do not undermine the non-proliferation regime ... If the US side has any doubts about this, then we want to hear specific facts."

—"Under US pressure, Russia stands ground over Iranian nuclear program," *Agence France Presse*, 31 July 2002; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### 31 July 2002

US Secretary of State Colin Powell meets with his Russian counterpart Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and voices concern about an Iranian nuclear plant that is under construction. A senior US official stated that Russian Foreign Minister responded to Secretary Powell's concern and promised to look into the matter. More so, the senior official dismissed a *Washington Post* suggestion that the United States may pre-emptively strike the plant to stop it from becoming operational in two to three years.

—"Russia's Iran Plant Concerns Powell," *Washington Times*, 1 August 2002, [www.washingtontimes.com](http://www.washingtontimes.com).

### 31 July 2002

Alexander Yakovenko, a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, states on CNN, "The position of Russia on cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field remains unchanged. This cooperation bears an entirely peaceful and mutually beneficial character and is fully consistent with all the international obligation of Russia, primarily in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. The whole activity of Iran in the nuclear field as a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is under the control of the [International Atomic Energy] Agency, which, as is known, has identified no violations by Iran of its obligations. At the present time we are collaborating with Iran in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr and in the ensuring of its nuclear safety. As to the prospects of cooperation with Iran in the field of peaceful uses of the atom, the Long-Term Program...speaks only of the available potentialities..."

—"US Turns Up Heat on Russia over Iran," *Disarmament Diplomacy* Issue No. 66, September 2002, Acronym Institute, [www.acronym.org](http://www.acronym.org).

### 1 August 2002

US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham states after his meeting with Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian Nuclear Energy Minister, "The expansion of Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran remains an issue of utmost concern to us. It has been raised to the highest levels, we are in the middle of sensitive discussion on this matter. ... We have long been concerned that Iran's only interest in nuclear civil power, given its vast domestic energy resources, is to support its nuclear weapons program. For that reason, we have consistently urged Russia to cease all nuclear

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cooperation with Iran, including its assistance to the reactor in Bushehr." ... Iran according to Abraham was "aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons as well as [other] weapons of mass destruction."

—"US Turns Up Heat on Russia over Iran," *Disarmament Diplomacy* Issue No. 66, September 2002, Acronym Institute, [www.acronym.org](http://www.acronym.org).

#### **1 August 2002**

US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham says that during his meetings in Moscow on Wednesday he urged the Russians to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran. He states, "we consistently urge Russia to cease all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including its assistance to the reactor in Busheir." Secretary Abraham accuses Tehran of "aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons as well as weapons of mass destruction."

—"Russia must end Iran nuclear deal," BBC News, 1 August 2002; [news.bbc.co.uk](http://news.bbc.co.uk).

#### **1 August 2002**

Alexander Yakovenko an official spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that Russia's position with regard to its atomic energy cooperation with Iran remains unchanged. Mr. Yakovenko states, "the 'long-term programme' for the development of trade, economic, industrial and technological cooperation between Russia and Iran for the period of up to 2012 mentions only the existing potential possibilities, the implementation of which depends on many factors, including political of course." He reiterates that Russian-Iranian cooperation in the sphere of Atomic energy "is of a peaceful, mutually advantageous character, which is in full conformity with all international commitments undertaken by Russia, above all in the sphere of nuclear non-proliferation."

—"Position of Russia with Regard to Cooperation with Iran in Atomic Energy," *RIA Novosti*, 1 August 2002, IranExpert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 2 August 2002.

#### **2 August 2002**

According to a statement issued by the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Energy, after a third day of meetings with US officials, Russia's Minister of Nuclear Energy Alexander Rumyantsev states that Russia would take into account "political factors" before deepening its aid to Iran. US Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham says, "No one should be under any impression that there is anything but the utmost concern on this question on our part, and those concerns have been frankly and directly conveyed during our meetings here."

—Steven Lee Myers, "Russia Indicated It Might Reconsider Iran Nuclear Plants Plan," *New York Times*, 2 August 2002, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com).

#### **7 August 2002**

Shamim Chaudhury, head of the IAEA's technical cooperation department for the Middle East and Western Asia, inspects the Bushehr nuclear plant in southern Iran to check for compliance with international regulations for the exploitation of nuclear energy and safety standard. Iran has expanded its coordination with the IAEA in recent years by opening the plant for inspections and handing over documents related to the plants design and safety. Hamid Reza Asefi, an Iranian Forging Ministry official states that the Iran intends to complete the construction of the Bushehr plant; he says "We don't pay attention to threats and are determined to finish the works on the Bushehr station."

—"Iran nuclear plant receives IAEA inspection," *Power Engineering*, 7 August 2002, IranExpert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 9 August 2002.

#### **11 August 2002**

Gholamreza Shafe'i, Iranian ambassador to Russia, rejects Western media claims that Russia had retreated from its past positions as it related to cooperation with Iran. He states, "Contrary to such rumors, since last month, the

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Russians have actually become more serious about cooperating with Iran." With regard to the 10-year cooperation plan between Russia and Iran, the Iranian ambassador says, "The Russian government has approved of the plan and it has no intention of backtracking on the issue of cooperation with Iran." .... "The Plan will serve Russian interests even more than Iranian interests." He adds, "The atomic cooperation between Iran and Russia is aimed at making peaceful use of atomic energy and that is something that every country, even America, has approved of." ... "The International Atomic Energy Agency has not observed even one case of wrongdoing at the Bushehr reactor." —"Iran: Ambassador says Russia has not changed views on cooperation," IRNA, 11 August 2002, IranExpert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 13 August 2002.

#### **12 August 2002**

Russia's First Atomic Energy Minister Lev Ryabev mentions that the Atomic Energy Ministry is drawing up documents to be signed with Iran regarding the return of spent Russian nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant to Russia. He also adds that this control will prevent the possibility "of spent fuel being used for any other purposes." With regard to general Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation on Bushehr, Mr. Ryabev states, "We plan to start putting it in operation in 2003 or in 2004....As for plans for further programs, no concrete agreements have been reached. Moreover, no contracts have been signed....I would not like to say that will build only one reactor. But I also would not like to say that we will certainly build six or any other number of reactors, since any such statements would be premature." Mr. Ryabev mentions that, "The most realistic follow up of the cooperation would be to complete the second power generating unit of the Bushehr plant. But, so far, there are no corresponding agreements or documents." The First Atomic Energy Minister once again stresses that "there is no military cooperation between Russia and Iran in the nuclear area." He recalls that during a meeting with US officials in April, he proposed setting up a joint US-Russian expert group that would look into Russia's cooperation with Iran and what the US views as a matter of concern. Mr. Ryabev says, "Unfortunately, no such steps have been taken. There is only criticism, and when you ask for documents to prove this concern, no such documents are made available. Only an emotional call to stop this cooperation follows."

—"Russia to arrange return of spent nuclear fuel from Iran," *Interfax*, 12 August 2002, IranExpert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 13 August 2002.

#### **15 August 2002**

Evgeny Primakov, the head of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, states that, "Russia has helped and will help build the nuclear power plant in Bushehr." He also adds, "We are delivering reactors of the type the United States want to deliver to North Korea. We are working under supervision of IAEA. We exclude in our cooperation with Iran all the actions that might lead to the creation of the weapons of mass destruction."

—"Russian-Iranian Cooperation in the Nuclear Energy Area," *Yadernaya Rossiya Segodnya*, 15 August 2002.

#### **15 August 2002**

Ali Reza Jafarzadeh, the representative of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, an Iranian rebel group accuses the Iranian government of building two secret nuclear sites, a nuclear production plant and research lab at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak. He says, "These two nuclear sites have been kept secret until now." NCRI is accused by the State Department of being the same group as Mujahedin-e Khalq, which killed several US citizens in Iran during the 1970s. Philip Reeker, a State Department spokesman said, "it's a terrorist organization. It's listed as such, designated as a foreign terrorist organization under US law."

—"Group: Iran's Nuke Program Growing," *The Associated Press*, 15 August 2002; *New York Times*, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com), 15 August 2002.

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#### **20 August 2002**

Amir Hossein Zamani Nia arrives to Moscow for discussions with officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry on issues of mutual interest. Alexander Yakovenko, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, expresses hope that cooperation between Russia and Iran in economic and commercial fields would increase in the future. When asked about the statements of the US ambassador that Iran may use its nuclear cooperation with Russia for military uses, Mr. Yakovenko said that this claim is not important, and the important thing is that Russian officials have repeatedly declared their views on the subject stressing that nuclear cooperation between Moscow and Tehran is not military.

—"Iran-Russia to discuss non-proliferation, Middle East," IRNA, 20 August 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

#### **21 August 2002**

Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian Atomic Energy Minister, says that Russia had signed all the necessary agreements to import the radioactive fuel waste from the Iranian Bushehr plant. He states, "We will return all the spent nuclear fuel, and it will not fall into anybody's hands but Russia's....now, we are completely legitimate."

—"Russia to import Iranian nuclear fuel waste," AFP, 21 August 2002, in IranExpert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 22 August 2002.

#### **24 August 2002**

Jayantha Dhanapala, the United Nation's Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, states in a press conference in the Uzbek capital that Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation is under the supervision of the IAEA, which has yet to observe any violations. Mr. Dhanapala points out that the cooperation between the countries follows a routine economic deal aiming to access new technology.

—"UN official: Iran's nuclear program is peaceful," IRNA, 24 August 2002, in IranExpert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 30 August 2002.

#### **28 August 2002**

Alexander Losyukov, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, says that Russia does not see anything threatening in its cooperation with Iran. He also mentions that cooperation with Iran is moving at a very good level, and that it corresponds to Russia wish to develop good neighborly relation with Iran.

—"Iran-Russia cooperation not a threat to other states — Russian official," IRNA, 29 August 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

#### **1 September 2002**

Atomstroiexport chief Viktor Kozlov states that Russian technicians began the assembly of the heavy equipment due to form part of the first reactor at Bushehr. He says "all the material envisaged in the contract [with Iran] has arrived by sea in the Iranian port [of Bushehr] on the Gulf." Mr. Kozlov, the chief of the state controlled firm that is charged with the implementation of the \$800 million Russia-Iranian contract, says that 600 Russian technicians were currently in Bushehr and by the end of the year that their number would increase to about 2000. He states "they will be joined by their families and will live in a special village that has been set up for them near the site of the plant."

—"Russia begins assembly of heavy equipment at nuclear plant in Iran," Agence France Presse, 1 September 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **2 September 2002**

The Iranian Foreign Ministry announces that the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is going on as scheduled and the facility will be commissioned on time. Hamid Reza Asefi, a spokesman of the Iran's Foreign Ministry, says that heavy equipment has arrived from Russia and that assembly work is underway in the reactor

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building of the plant.

—"Iran says Bushehr nuclear power plant develops well," Xinhua, 2 September 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **2 September 2002**

The Atomic Energy Ministry of Russia has drawn up a plan for the return of spent nuclear fuel from the Iranian plant. Valery Lebedev, Russia's Atomic Energy Deputy Minister states, "Russia will strictly adhere to the principles of the International Atomic Energy Agency, under which spent nuclear fuel must be returned to the country supplying the fuel." The Ministry adds that spent fuel would be held for three years in a cooling tank at the Iranian plant before it is returned to Russia due to the requirement of its transport.

—"Russia drafts agreement on returning spent nuclear fuel from," Associated Press, 2 September 2002, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **4 September 2002**

In an exclusive interview with RIA Novosti, Hossein Afarideh the Chairman of the Iranian Majlis Energy Commission says that Russian-Iranian energy cooperation is not limited to the building of the Bushehr plant. He mentions that Russia and Iran are currently discussing project "Tabas," an opportunity to build Iran's first thermal power plant using natural coal. Mr. Afarideh also adds that the Iranian energy sector has significant potential, and that in addition to Russia, other European companies are also taking an active part in the oil and gas sector development. He states "we are currently cooperating with Japanese, German, and Italian companies."

—"Russian-Iran energy cooperation not limited to building Bushehr nuclear power plant only," CNA, 4 September 2002, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **6 September 2002**

Hossien Afarideh, Chairman of the Iranian Parliament's Energy Commission, says that the allegation of some politicians that the Russian-Iranian cooperation on nuclear energy for peaceful use has "a dual meaning are groundless." Mr. Afarideh emphasizes that "every one knows that the nuclear power plant in Bushehr is being built for energy production purposes only....Moreover, the construction of the power plant has been monitored by the IAEA experts."

—"Iran Denies Allegations of WMD Production," *Yadernaya Rossiya Segodnya*, 6 September 2002.

#### **10 September 2002**

Atomstroiexport General Director Victor Kozlov tells Interfax that Russia will ship a turbine to the Bushehr nuclear power plant that is currently under construction. He says, "The turbine has a capacity of 1,000 megawatt and was assembled at the Leningrad Metal Works. It has been loaded on a ship en route to Iran and will be delivered to the construction site in four weeks."

—"Russia to Ship Turbine to Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in October," Interfax (Moscow), 10 September 2002.

#### **11 September 2002**

John Bolton, the US Under Secretary of State arrives in Moscow. According to the US ambassador to Russia, Alexander Vershbow, Mr. Bolton will meet with Russian officials to discuss the export of high technologies and weapons to Iran. Mr. Vershbow says that United States hopes that Russia will assure that it is controlling the export of sensitive technologies to Iran.

—"US Under Secretary of State Arrives in Moscow," Interfax (Moscow), 11 September 2002.

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### **13 September 2002**

During a meeting with the US Under Secretary of State John Bolton, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Mamedov once again emphasizes that there was no basis for US concern about Russian-Iranian cooperation. During an interview following the meeting, Mr. Mamedov states, "Russian-Iranian cooperation on nuclear technology is totally peaceful, it is within the framework of international laws and regulations and it is also under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thus, there is no basis for US official's concern about this issue....Despite this, the Americans always insist upon raising this issue at their consultation with us. This is despite the fact that Moscow has also expressed its concerns about Washington's nuclear cooperation with several countries that have their own nuclear arsenals....[I]n our talks with the American delegation, we said that Russia is an independent country and that our cooperation with Iran and other countries is aimed at furthering our own national interests."

—"Radio reports on US-Russian talks on Iranian nuclear programme," BBC, 13 September 2002, Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **15 September 2002**

A Russian official comments with regard to Washington opposition to Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran: "It has become quite clear for Russia that the US is seeking to protect and expand its economic and political interests. Russia is also pursuing the same course and has adopted the same policy. For ages, Russia has had relations with these three countries and it would be foolish if Russia were to suddenly decide to sever all its contacts and matters with them merely for the sake of Washington's interests. Russia cannot give such a costly gift to Washington."

—Javad Tamimi, "Does Russia Prefer Iran Over the US?" Tehran Mardom Salari (Tehran), 15 September 2002; in FBIS document IAP20020924000037, 24 September 2002.

### **16 September 2002**

Just before his departure to Vienna, US Deputy Secretary of State John Bolton meets with Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyanstsev at the Russian of Atomic Energy Ministry at Bolshaya Ordynka Street to discuss Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation. He states after the meeting that, "the Russian side had presented the US with its proposals." Russian Minister Rumyanstev says in an interview regarding the disagreements between the United States and Russia, "the most important thing we have is an understanding that Russia and the United States must reach an agreement on this issue. The fact that it is not always clear how we will be able to agree on intricate matters is another matter. At any rate, we need a compromise that takes account of both countries' interests."

—"US Seen Offering To Compensate Russia if It Halts Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," Moscow Kommersant (Moscow), 16 September 2002; in FBIS document CEP20020916000279, 16 September 2002.

### **16 September 2002**

Gholamreza Aqazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, in his address to the 46th general conference of the IAEA, says that Iran, as a vanguard of advocates of nuclear-free zones, played an active role in the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in 1974, in the UN General Assembly. He states, "The Islamic Republic of Iran, in line with the Islamic and humanitarian beliefs, has always fostered cooperation with the IAEA and has carried out all the scientific and research programs and civilian application of nuclear energy especially the Bushehr power plant in coordination with the international agency and its supervision." Mr.

Aqazadeh says that in the next 20 years Iran has long-term plans to set up nuclear plants to bring its electricity output capacity of 6,000 megawatts. Mr. Aqazadeh mentions that Iran calls for transparency in nuclear programs and always condemns any country that may seek access to the weapons of mass destruction.

—"Iran, vanguard of nuclear-free zones, says Aqazadeh," IRNA (Tehran), 16 September 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

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### **17 September 2002**

Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, met with Dr. Mohammed El Baradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and emphasized his willingness to continue close cooperation in the future. Mr. Aqazadeh says that Iran is willing to continue its cooperation with the IAEA in reaching an annual output of 6000MW of atomic energy and in conducting atomic sciences research work inside Iran. Mr. Aqazadeh emphasizes, "The expansion of Iran's atomic energy production capabilities is based on a precisely scientific, pre-planned basis, and Iran is determined to follow its objectives in full cooperation and harmony with the IAEA." —"Iran's atomic energy organization head meets IAEA head in Geneva," IRNA (Tehran), 17 September 2002, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **Mid-September 2002**

Viktor Kozlov, general director of Atomstroieksport, which serves as the marketing arm of Russia's atomic energy ministry (Minatom), emphasizes that the design of the Bushehr nuclear plant and Russia agreement with Iran to import the used fuel render the Bushehr project harmless. Mr. Kozlov says "Russia in principle is not interested in the proliferation of nuclear weapons... Russia is cooperating in the construction of the power plant here because it is absolutely sure that that is not the situation."

—Douglas Birch, "US Uneasy At Russian Company Building Nuclear Reactor In Iran," Baltimore Sun, 13 September 2002, in RANSAC Nuclear News, 18 September 2002, [www.ransac.org](http://www.ransac.org).

### **Mid-September 2002**

To dismiss accusations that Minatom was not answerable to the Russia government, Viktor Kozlov, general director of Atomstroieksport, which serves as the marketing arm of Russia's atomic energy ministry (Minatom), assures that all the activities of Atomstroieksport are answerable to the Russian government. He said, "Our activities are completely under state control... we were able to start negotiations with Iran only after the state signed an intergovernmental agreement. We have no right to do anything without permission."

—Alexander Smotrov, "Moscow Announced The Inappropriateness Of US Sanctions Against Three Russian Defense Enterprises," RIA Novosti, 13 September 2002, in RANSAC Nuclear News, 18 September 2002, [www.ransac.org](http://www.ransac.org).

### **17 September 2002**

A representative of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy tells ITAR-TASS that Russia is not going to curtail its nuclear power cooperation with Iran, in spite of such reports in some media outlets. The Russian representative said, "it will fully meet its commitments on the building of the first power unit of the nuclear power (NPP) in Bushehr....They say that the United States suggested to Russia exchanging of Iranian contracts for American contracts for the processing of nuclear fuel....The US suggestion is still a suggestion and nothing more, but we bear in mind that a bird in the hand is better than two in the bush."

—"Russia not to curtail nuclear power cooperation with Iran," IRNA (Tehran), 18 September 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

### **18 September 2002**

Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy denies, media reports that Iran no longer has an interest in cooperation with Russia. He stated, "We have met with the Iranian delegation. The Iranian vice-president and the chairman of the Commission on Atomic Energy, Gholam Reza Agazadeh did not [say] anything like this either in a meeting with us or at the plenary session....[O]n the contrary, the Iranians publicly declared at the session that their nuclear activities are completely open and invited all IAEA member states to cooperate in implementing ambitious plans to create 6MW nuclear power plants in about 20 years."

—Yuri Koslov, "Official says Iran not to give up nuclear cooperation with Russia," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 18 September 2002, in FBIS document CEP20020918000405, 18 September 2002.

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### **19 September 2002**

An unnamed official of the Russian atomic energy ministry says that Russia has yet to receive Iran's agreement for Moscow to import back radioactive fuel waste from an Iranian nuclear power plant that Russia is building in Bushehr. The official states that a new clause to the Russian-Iranian accord on Bushehr project "has been presented to Iran....As soon as Iran makes a judgment on documents concerning the return of spent nuclear fuel, the clause will be added to the agreement."

—"Russia admits Iran dragging feet on nuclear waste agreement," AFP, 19 September 2002, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **22 September 2002**

According to an unidentified Minatom spokesman quoted by Interfax, Iran has still not signed the Spent Nuclear Fuel agreement, which was prepared last month by the Atomic Ministry. The agreement dictated that all spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor will be sent back to Russia. The unidentified official says that "Russia will not supply nuclear fuel to the Bushehr nuclear power plant until an agreement on the [spent fuel's] return to Russia is signed." Russia's Atomic Minister Alexander Rumyantsev is quoted as saying that Iran was not being uncooperative regarding Bushehr with Russia. He states "on the contrary, at the general conference the Iranians proclaimed the complete openness of their nuclear activities."

—Charles Digges, "Minatom Official Admits Iran is Hedging on Returning Bushehr SNF," Bellona, 23 September 2002, [www.bellona.no](http://www.bellona.no).

### **23 September 2002**

Alexander Rumyanstev, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, says that Russia will continue its nuclear cooperation with Iran in spite of US officials' calls not to do so, and that the Bushehr plant will come on stream by the end of 2003. Mr. Rumyanstev states that Russian experts will remain in Iraq until the completion and activation of the Bushehr power plant, and he reiterated that Russia has signed a protocol to import the used nuclear fuel from Bushehr back to Russia.

—"Bushehr power plant to come on stream by end of year 2003," IRNA (Tehran), 23 September 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

### **23 September 2002**

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov says that Moscow is determined to continue its cooperation with Tehran while viewing its economic interests as well as its obligations as for the nonproliferation principle. Mr. Ivanov tells reporters in Madrid that Russia is an independent decisionmaker in the sphere of military technical cooperation with countries such as North Korea and Iran. Furthermore, Mr. Ivanov states that Russia only exports to Iran the type of weapons that cannot have a destabilizing influence on the region; he says, "...the talk is about deliveries of defensive weapons — air defense means, armored personnel carriers, anti tank and small weapons."

—"Russia official: Moscow to continue cooperation with Iran," IRNA (Tehran), 23 September 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

### **23 September 2002**

Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian Atomic Energy Minister, says that Russia may launch the Bushehr nuclear power plant by the end of 2003. He states, "aside from the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Russia has no nuclear programs with Iran... we do not plan to close this project, and we will bring it to the end."

More so, the minister states that it was very difficult for the Russians to decide to finalize the construction of the Bushehr plant, which was started by the German company Siemens. He says, "We had to work on a foreign project, practically without blueprints. In addition, some of the German equipment did not fit the parameters of

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the Russian unit, and we had to order new equipment to Russian plants." Furthermore, Mr. Rumyantsev mentions that two protocols signed by the Russian and Iranian ministries in October 1998 and June 2002 stipulate the obligatory return of the spent nuclear fuel from Iran to Russia. He adds, "we think this norm should be defined both by protocols signed by the ministries and an intergovernmental agreement ... the Atomic Energy Ministry has sent the full text of an addition to the agreement to Iran for coordination. Now it is waiting for an answer." —"Russia may launch Bushehr nuclear power plant by late 2003," Interfax (Moscow), 23 September 2003, in FBIS document CEP 20020923000142, 23 September 2003.

#### **28 September 2002**

Alexander Romiantsov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, reiterates the peaceful nature of Bushehr power plant. He points that 60 expert groups of the IAEA have traveled to Iran and yet to detect any violations. —"Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant for Peaceful Purposes: Russian Minister," Tehran Times, 28 September 2002, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

#### **29 September 2002**

Diplomatic sources in Moscow mention to Interfax that Iran has yet to approve the long-term program for economic cooperation until the year 2012, which was proposed by Russia. They state, "Iran has asked Russia to put off a meeting of the intergovernmental commission for trade and economic cooperation, which was earlier set for September, and was to initial the draft program... it needs to study the draft more thoroughly... hopefully, the Russian-Iranian intergovernmental commission for trade and economic cooperation will convene in Tehran and come to terms on the program before the end of 2002." The above mentioned program envisions cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in building several nuclear power plants in Iran, and in the energy sector." —"Russian: Iran postpones joint meeting set to discuss long term economic coop," Interfax (Moscow), 29 September 2002, in FBIS document CEP20020929000012, 29 September 2002.

#### **4 October 2002**

In an interview to the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*, Nikolay Shingarev, head of the public relations board at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, assures the Israelis that Russia will not provide Iran with Nuclear weapons. He says "We understand Israel's concern and can assure it that we will not supply any equipment, know-how, or materials enabling Iran to obtain nuclear weapons." Mr. Shingarev adds, "We made sure that the uranium supply for the reactor would be closely monitored and that Iran would return the waste to us." —Yosi Melman, "Russia: We Will Continue To Assist in Developing the Iranian Reactor," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 4 October 2002, in FBIS document GMP20021004000135, 4 October 2002.

#### **8 October 2002**

Andrei Nikolayev, head of the Russian State Duma Commission for Defense Affairs, says that the Iranian-Russian relations are strong. He adds that the US allegations of the Bushehr nuclear reactor possibly being used for military uses are baseless, because Iran has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). —"State Commission Chief Says Iran, Russia Have Excellent Ties," IRNA (Tehran), 8 October 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

#### **9 October 2002**

US Undersecretary of State John Bolton mentions that Russia's support for Iran's nuclear program could undermine a \$20 billion US-led effort to help dismantle the former Soviet Union's military arsenal. He also states at a Senate hearing that Russia's cooperation with Iran is complicating US efforts to rally international support for President Bush's 10-year plan to contain and destroy Russian chemical and nuclear weapons stocks. —David Sands, "Bolton says support for Tehran's nuclear program foils G-8 agenda," *Washington Times*, 10 October 2002, [www.washingtontimes.com](http://www.washingtontimes.com).

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### **15 October 2002**

Alexander Rumyantsev told a press conference in Novouralsk says "our plants have the capacity to manufacture equipment for just six nuclear units over the next ten years." He also mentions that economic and political factors have an impact on Russian Iranian atomic cooperation.

—"Rumyantsev: Economic, political issues impact on Russia-Iran atomic energy ties," Interfax (Moscow), 15 October 2002; in FBIS document CEP20021016000117, 16 October 2002.

### **21 October 2002**

The Israeli newspaper *Haaretz* reports that North Korea is producing enriched uranium and testing long-range missile engines in Iran in exchange for North Korean aid to Iran in these two areas, as well as the concealment of North Korean efforts from the United States and other countries.

—Ze'ev Schiff, "North Korea Producing Enriched Uranium in Iran," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 21 October 2002; in FBIS document GMP20021021000045, 21 October 2002.

### **21 October 2002**

According to the *Washington Post*, to keep Iran from developing nuclear weapons, US officials privately offer a potentially lucrative economic package to Russia in exchange for halting construction of the nuclear reactor in Bushehr and other nuclear cooperation with Tehran; however, Russia has resisted the proposal. Yuri Bespalko, a spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry says "Americans are being rather sly when they offer this kind of swap... It's better to have a bird in the hand than two in the bush."

—Peter Baker, "Russia Resists Ending Iran Project," *Washington Post*, 22 October 2002, [www.washingtontimes.com](http://www.washingtontimes.com).

### **22 October 2002**

Iranian and Russian officials, including the Russian Atomic Energy Minister and the vice president of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, meet in Moscow to discuss the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant. A representative of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry says that the participants at the meeting discussed "the issue of making an amendment to the Russian-Iranian agreement in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr, which is concerned with the return of spent nuclear fuel from Iran to Russia. Iran has re-confirmed its readiness to return spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr to Russia."

—"Russia, Iran discuss Bushehr nuclear power plant construction," Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey (Moscow), 22 October 2002; in FBIS document CEP20021022000406, 22 October 2002.

### **23 October 2002**

Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev rejects US concerns that Russia was supplying Iran with military nuclear technology; he states, "Russia is not supplying Iran with any technology related to nuclear weapons and is not carrying out negotiations in this field."

—"Russia Denies Supplying Iran With Military Nuclear Technology," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 23 October 2002, [www.tehrantimes.com](http://www.tehrantimes.com).

### **24 October 2002**

In spite of reports that the United States has promised Russia \$10 billion if it ceases its nuclear cooperation with Iran, Nikolai Shingaryov, an official at the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, tells Interfax that the ministry has yet to receive an official US proposal of economic incentive in exchange for terminating its atomic cooperation with Iran. He states, "America did not make an official proposal to the effect at a Moscow meeting between Russian Atomic

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Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev and US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton last week... the Atomic Energy Ministry is ready to discuss American proposals if they are officially made to Moscow."

—"US does not offer Russia incentive to end nuclear cooperation with Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 24 October 2002; in FBIS document CEP20021024000115, 24 October 2002.

### **27 October 2002**

In Tehran, fears of possible attack of Israel to the Bushehr nuclear reactor are very much alive. Iran's Foreign Minister Kamel Kharrazi tells the *Independent*, "everyone in Iran is concerned about the Israeli threat... they have missiles; they have everything. That is why we have been trying to develop our missile technology to defend ourselves." Mr. Kharrazi asserts that the Bushehr plant was being built for the production of electricity, he adds, "we are negotiating with the Russians to provide fuel for the power plant to be returned afterwards."

—"Confrontation with Iraq: Russia refuses to stop aiding Iran's nuclear programme," *Independent* (London), 27 October 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **5 November 2002**

In an interview with the *Times*, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon calls on the international community to target Iran as soon as the imminent conflict with Iraq is complete. He says, "one of the things I mentioned is that the free world should take all the necessary steps to prevent irresponsible countries from having weapons of mass destruction: Iran, Iraq of course, and Libya is working on a nuclear weapon....I talked about these things with Vladimir Putin a few days ago and I have been to Washington and one of the things I talked about was what will be [*sic*] later, if Iraq is going to be disarmed."

—Stephen Farrell, "Attack Iran the day Iraq war ends, demands Israel," *Times Online*, 5 November 2002, [www.timesonline.co.uk](http://www.timesonline.co.uk).

### **13 November 2002**

Yuri Fedotov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, expresses Moscow's desire to broaden its ties with Tehran. He states, "Iran-Russia relations is one of the issues constantly discussed between US and Russian officials....Moscow is still interested in broadening cooperation with Iran and is determined to continue developing mutual ties in various fields."

—"Russian deputy foreign minister says Moscow 'determined' to continue ties with Iran," IRNA (Tehran), 13 November 2002; in FBIS document IAP20021113000057, 13 November 2002.

### **15 November 2002**

Sergei Ivanov, Russian Defense Minister, rejects accusations that Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran has allegedly violated the system of control over weapons of mass destruction. He tells journalists that Russia's cooperation with Iran is purely commercial and did not allow any breaches of the nonproliferation system. Mr. Ivanov also says that these allegations are a "myth which, unfortunately, is widespread in the world." He adds "this myth is encouraged by a few countries and spread by Western media." With regard to the Bushehr nuclear plant construction, Mr. Ivanov stated, "The construction is fully controlled by the IAEA. For this reason, when Russia is accused of violating the regime of nonproliferation with this project, we can only be indignant."

—"Russian co-operation with Iran does not violate arms control," *Pravda*, 15 November 2002, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com); "Russian defense minister says arms trade with Iran abides by nonproliferation rules," 15 November 2002; in FBIS document CEP20021115000016, 15 November 2002.

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### **18 November 2002**

In an interview with the Russian website Gazeta.ru, Alexander Rumyantsev, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, states that there is a ten-month lag in the Bushehr project. Mr. Rumyantsev mentions, "This is how things stand in Bushehr. As you probably know, there is a ten-month lag behind the schedule related to objective reasons when the construction was suspended. We are trying to make up the lag but are not managing to make it up in one go. From the point of view of the adjusted schedule, things are going well and I intend to visit Iran in the near future. We are also training local cadres; these people are undergoing training starting with creating the station's equipment where we are building the nuclear facilities. They will not send for us for repairs but will roll out a national base in their own country. Where will the processed nuclear fuel go from Iran? We actively guided through the summer amendments to our legislation for this reason and we now have a legislative basis for supplying fresh nuclear fuel abroad and collecting the processed fuel. Thus, Russia will meet all its international obligations on the nonproliferation of nuclear materials."

—"Atomic Energy Minister Rumyantsev Mulls Terrorism, Bushehr, Safety, Environment," *Gazeta.ru* (Moscow), 18 November 2002; in FBIS document CEP 20021118000154, 18 November 2002.

### **22 November 2002**

A Russian expert tells Interfax that Russia is abiding by international standards in cooperation with Iran. He states "we are tightening export control. Russia's conscience is clear ... Russia is not involved in creating a full nuclear cycle in Iran."

—"Russia said to abide by international standards in cooperation with Iran," *Interfax* (Moscow), 22 November 2002; in FBIS document CEP20021122000002, 22 November 2002.

### **26 November 2002**

Russia gives assurances to Canadian Foreign Minister Bill Graham, who is visiting Russia, that it had taken steps to ensure Iran could not use the Bushehr reactor to produce nuclear weapons. Mr. Graham says, "The Russians have a vested interest in making sure this plant works in such a way that nuclear materials don't get diverted to improper uses... I got very good assurances from the minister [Alexander Rumyantsev] that the Russians are serious about monitoring and controlling and they'll make sure that Bushehr does not become a place for diversion of materials."

—"Russia: Iran nuke plant won't make weapons," *Russia Journal*, 26 November 2002, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 26 November 2002.

### **28 November 2002**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev states in an internet conference that Russia will not import spent nuclear fuel in the near future. He mentions that 80-85 percent of spent fuel is controlled by the United States, and for that Russia cannot participate without US consent. Mr. Rumyantsev says that Russia is currently negotiating with the United States but "the negotiations are difficult, because the US is criticizing us for cooperation with Iran....[W]hile negotiations are being conducted with the US, no foreign [spent nuclear] fuel will be supplied to Russia in the next few years."

—"Russia won't import nuclear waste in near future — Atomic Energy Ministry," *Interfax* (Moscow), 28 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **12 December 2002**

CNN confirms reports and shows satellite pictures of two additional nuclear facilities in Iran: Natanz, a possible uranium enrichment facility located 100 miles south of Tehran; and Arak, a possible heavy water production facility that is located about 150 miles south of Tehran.

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—"Satellite images of two sites in Iran show the construction of secret nuclear fuel cycle facilities, according to ISIS assessments and confidential sources," ISIS Issue Brief, 12 December 2002, [www.iran-press-service.com](http://www.iran-press-service.com).

#### **14 December 2002**

Following reports disclosing that Iran is building additional nuclear plants in Arak and Natanz, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi rejects the allegations that Iran is concealing the building of these additional sites. He says, "The Islamic Republic of Iran's activities in this field are totally transparent, clear, and peaceful and there is no secret and obscure point on the launch of these (plants) in the future....[B]asically there is no possibility of concealing such centers." Mr. Kharrazi explains, "Iran wanted the two centers to generate part of its electricity needs....[B]y the next 20 years, Iran has to produce 6,000 megawatts of electricity by nuclear plants and the launch of these two centers are aimed to produce necessary fuel for these plants."

IAEA director Dr. Mohamed El Baradei says that he learned of these facilities six months ago, three months before the Iranians officially notified him. He states, "The Iranians told me we could not visit the sites as planned this week because President Mohammad Khatami would be out of the country and 'they need some time to prepare'." White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, however, expresses concerns about the Arak and Natanz facilities, emphasizes that these facilities reinforce increasing US concerns about Tehran's "across-the-board pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile capabilities." He adds, "Our assessment, when we look at Iran, is that there is no economic gain for a country rich in oil and gas, like Iran, to build costly indigenous nuclear fuel cycle facilities... Iran flares off more gas every year than the equivalent power it hopes to produce with these reactors." —"Iran confirms building new nuclear facilities," Iran Press Service, 14 December 2002, [www.iran-press-service.com](http://www.iran-press-service.com).

#### **24 December 2002**

While speaking to reporters in Bushehr at the plant construction site, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev mentions that he received a confirmation from Iran that there are no differences over the wording of the nuclear fuel supply contract. Mr. Rumyantsev also states that he was satisfied with the progress in the construction work and the plant's readiness for the installation of technological equipment. He also tells ITAR-TASS that he was satisfied with the preparation of the storage facility for nuclear fuel that will be supplied to Iran in the middle of next year. Iran declares that it is going to increase its security at the Bushehr plant. Ali Shamkhani, Iranian Defense Minister, promises that any attack against the Bushehr plant would result in a strong and resolute military response.

—"Russian minister satisfied with work at nuclear power plant in Iran," ITAR-TASS, 24 December 2002, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 24 December 2002.

#### **24 December 2002**

While on his first visit to Pakistan, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami states that Iran does not want nuclear weapons and would prove it by sending Bushehr's spent fuel rods [a potential source of fissile material] abroad for reprocessing. He mentions, "we have no problem with sending the nuclear waste and uranium waste to other countries....We are not insisting on keeping them in Iran, where they could also pose an environmental problem." —"Iran vows to build nuclear plant for energy only," Associated Press, 24 December 2002, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 24 December 2002.

#### **25 December 2002**

Russia brushes aside US criticism and declares that it had agreed with Iran to speed up building the Bushehr reactor and to consider constructing another reactor. Russian Atomic Minister Aleksandr Rumyantsev states, "We always tell our American colleagues that all Iran-Russia cooperation is in accordance with international regulations

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and the resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency." Iranian Vice President Gholam Reza Aqazadeh concurred and says, "We agreed to speed up the completion process of the Bushehr power plant....A second subject we have agreed upon is to carry out feasibility studies for a second power generation unit. We hope to start a joint study in the next few months."

—"Iran: Russia Says to Go Ahead Iran Nuclear Reactor," Reuters, 25 December 2002, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **26 December 2002**

The Russian Atomic Ministry declares that Russia and Iran are increasing their nuclear cooperation. Russian Minister of Atomic Energy meets with Gholam Reza Agazadeh, Iranian Vice President and head of the Atomic Energy Organization. They both agree to stick to the plan and bring Bushehr's first block 1000MW unit online in December 2003. Russia is also considering potential orders for several more Iranian reactors as part of a ten year plan to provide Iran with 6000MW of nuclear power. Mr. Romyantsev says that "Russia is extremely interested in discussing such a project."

—Nick Allen, "Russia and Iran boost nuclear pact," Guardian (London), 27 December 2002, [www.guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk).

#### **27 December 2002**

In a press conference in Moscow, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Romyantsev states that Russia and Iran have finalized a contract on fuel supplies for the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. Mr. Romyantsev also mentions, "The text of the contract is currently being analyzed with the Russian Foreign Ministry....Russia commits itself to supplying Iran with nuclear fuel, and Iran commits itself to returning it....We hope this contract will be signed within a month."

—"Russia, Iran seal contract on nuclear fuel supplies for Bushehr plant," Interfax (Moscow), 27 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **27 December 2002**

In a press conference in Moscow, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Romyantsev states that his Ministry believes that new nuclear power units in Iran may be build in the distant future. He mentions, "We can only speak of the construction of new nuclear power units in Iran in hypothetical terms... Russia is building one unit in Iran today, and there have been no agreements on the construction of another so far." As for possibility of building an additional power unit at Bushehr, Mr. Romyantsev says, "it would be more expedient to build a new power unit at a new site instead of adding to a facility left by the German Siemens company, which initially planned two units."

—"Russian Ministry Thinks Iran Will Build New Nuclear Facilities in Distant Future," Interfax (Moscow), 27 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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## **2001**

### **8 January 2001**

Moscow's *Segodnya* reports that two Russian companies, Atom mash of Volgodonsk, and Izhorsk and Podolsk Machine-Building Plants [Izhorskiye Zavody of St. Petersburg], will provide much-needed parts for the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran. The shipment comes in light of what the Moscow daily states is Iran's "chronic electricity crisis," and will consist of window covers, atomic filters, and domed roofs.

—Bill Samii, "Russia Ships Parts to Bushehr," *Iran Report*, 8 January 2001, Vol. 4, No. 1, [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org).

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### **11 January 2001**

The footing for a reactor at Bushehr ships from Volgodonsk en route to Iran. The piece was made by Atom mash, a Russian producer of nuclear power plant equipment.

—Vyacheslav Bondarenko, "Russia: First Segments of Nuclear Power Plant Sent to Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 12 January 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010112000336, 12 January 2001.

### **16 January 2001**

Yevgeniy Adamov, the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, says Russia is working on a feasibility study for constructing a second reactor at Bushehr. [Note: See 13 June 2001.] The first reactor is 90% complete, he says, though it is not slated to go into operation until 2003. [Note: See 27 June 2001.]

—Veronika Voskoboinikova, "Russia Starts Work on Second Reactor For Iranian Nuclear Power Station," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 16 January 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010116000122, 16 January 2001.

### **24 January 2001**

Israeli news outlet MIGnews reports that Israel and the United States paid Ukraine not to take part in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. According to MIGnews, Israel gave humanitarian aid to Ukraine, part of which was used to build a new wing at the Medical Academy of Kharkov. The United States paid Ukraine \$250,000.

—Igor Moldavsky, "Moshe Qatzav in Our 'Historic Homeland'," MIGnews (Tel Aviv), 24 January 2001, in "Israel, US Reportedly Paid Ukraine for Rejecting Work on Iran Nuclear Reactor," FBIS Document GMP20010124000095, 24 January 2001.

### **30 January 2001**

Construction on the Bushehr nuclear power plant is expected to be finished by February 2003, says Khalil Musavi, spokesman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Construction is proceeding according to a plan signed in 1998, which called for finishing the project in 52 months.

—"Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Proceeding 'At Full Speed,' Due For Completion Feb 2003," IRNA (Tehran), 30 January 2001; in FBIS Document IAP20010130000006, 30 January 2001.

### **21 February 2001**

Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, Russian deputy atomic energy minister, says "major construction work" will begin this year on the first reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Seven hundred eight Russian specialists are working at the site, he says, and the first reactor should be finished by the end of 2003. [Note: A recent report said the project would be finished in February 2003. See 30 January 2001.]

—"Russia to Start Building Nuclear Reactor in Iran in 2001," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 21 February 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010221000269, 21 February 2001.

### **22 February 2001**

Khalil Musavi, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says in an interview that the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be economical, "but the important point about building atomic power plants lies in transfer of nuclear technology and transferring its new technology inside the country." He says the Bushehr "building program is in progress in accordance with our contract with the Russians, and we are not too far behind schedule."

—Gholamreza Afshari, "Fate of Bushehr's Atomic Power Plant is to be Clarified After 30 Years," *Jam-e Jam* (Tehran), 22 February 2001, in "Iran: Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant To Be Operational With Russia's Help By 2002," FBIS Document IAP20010306000044, 22 February 2001.

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#### **24 February 2001**

Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister, says the reactor and turbine equipment will be delivered to the Bushehr nuclear power plant shortly, and construction of the "first block" will begin this year. —"First Block of Iran's Nuclear Power Station to Go On Stream This Year," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 24 February 2001, in "Tehran Times: Work on First Block Of Iran's Nuclear Power Plant Begins This Year," FBIS Document IAP20010224000025, 24 February 2001.

#### **26 February 2001**

Dany Shoham, an Israeli expert on weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, says Iran is only a few years away from getting a nuclear bomb. The only thing lacking is fissile material, says Shoham, a senior researcher at Bar-Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Iran is working hard to get fissile material, and with it Iran could have a bomb within a year.

—David Rudge, "Iran, Iraq in Non-Conventional Arms Race," *Jerusalem Post*, 26 February 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **March 2001**

*Arms Control Today* reports that, according to US intelligence assessments, despite being a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is continuing its acquisition of nuclear-related technology. Russia's intelligence assessments, last time they were released, were in agreement with the US assessment. Russian officials, however, firmly refute that civilian aid supplied to Iran can help them develop military nuclear capability. In a recent testimony, Robert Einhorn, the assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, says that despite the promises from Russian officials, assistance to Iran from government-associated sources continues and has in fact accelerated in recent months. He adds that this assistance goes beyond the Bushehr plant and "much of this assistance involves technologies with direct application to the production of weapons-grade fissile material and could significantly shorten the time Iran would need to acquire weapons-usable fissile material." Russia, as the only supplier of nuclear technology, is critical to Iran's efforts to gain weapons of mass destruction. Russia is reportedly involved not only for financial gains but also to "advance important security interests." Iran's acquisition motives, on the other hand, stem from a need for self reliance and regional hegemony, and therefore are entrenched in the values of the Islamic Republic, and thus not easily changed. The US policy of isolation has succeeded in retarding Iran's speed of acquisition as well as making it costlier.

—Michael Eisenstadt, "Russian Arms and Technology Transfers to Iran: Policy Challenges to the United States," *Arms Control Today*, March 2001, [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org), accessed 7 February 2001.

#### **4 March 2001**

In response to a report made by *Bonyan* that Russian specialists working on the Bushehr nuclear power plant would return to Russia, Hamid Reza Asefi, a spokesman for Iran's Foreign Minister, says Iran-Russia cooperation in the field of nuclear technology will continue, stating it is "developing successfully and has good prospects, and a preliminary date has been set for launching of the first unit of the nuclear power plant—December 2003."

—Bill Samii, "Nuclear Cooperation Not Linked to Cancelled Moscow Visit," *Iran Report*, 4 March 2002, Vol. 5, No. 8, [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org).

#### **5 March 2001**

*Iran Report* reports that the US Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Advanced Conventional Munitions (ACM)" says Iran "remains one of the most active countries" in the pursuit of WMD and ACM. Much of the effort Iran exerts for this purpose, according to the report, is directed at Russia, China, North Korea, and Western Europe,

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from which Iran has sought to acquire nuclear weapons and technology.

—Bill Samii, "Iranian WMD and ACM Developments Continue," *Iran Report*, 5 March 2001, Vol. 4, No. 9, [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org).

#### **8 March 2001**

Asadollah Saburi, the deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says 50% of the work on the first unit of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is complete. [Note: See 16 January and 27 June 2001 for differing recent estimates of completion percentages.] As for construction delays, he says "the Russian experts' level of management and planning did not equal their level of technical qualifications." In response to a question about Iran's plans for spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr plant, he says "we intend to use new technology for recycling uranium and thus use the remains once again in the plant."

—"Iran: Equipment for Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant to be Installed Soon," Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network 1 (Tehran), 8 March 2001; in FBIS Document IAP20010308000065, 8 March 2001; "Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant's Main Equipment to be Installed in 1380 (2001-2)," *Aftab-e Yazd* (Tehran), 10 March 2001; in FBIS Document IAP20010327000084, 10 March 2001.

#### **12 March 2001**

The reactor equipment for the Bushehr nuclear power plant is 90% complete, says the public relations service of Izhorskiye Zavody of St. Petersburg, where it is being built. The equipment for the first unit of the plant will be sent to Iran in the third quarter of the year, the service says. The four casings for the steam generators and the "entire set of collectors" are complete. "The electrical equipment, the embedded fittings, and the mountings for the circulating pump" are being prepared for shipment. The reactor housing and "the set of devices to fit inside the housing are at various stages of completion." The "dry shielding and the reactor truss" will be sent to Iran in the second quarter of the year.

—Denis Pinuk, "Russian Equipment Almost Ready for Iranian Bushehr Reactor," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 12 March 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010312000388, 12 March 2001.

#### **12 March 2001**

Russian President Vladimir Putin says he talked with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami about delays in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and says they "came to the conclusion that they are technical in nature, stemming from sluggishness of the partners, which we will correct."

—"Putin Says Russia Will Help Develop Nuclear Power Engineering," Interfax (Moscow), 12 March 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010312000145, 12 March 2001.

#### **12-15 March 2001**

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Mohammed Khatami sign a series of nuclear and military accords. Khatami says that Iran plans to order a second nuclear power plant after the completion of the first one in Bushehr.

—"Russia, Iran Sign Nuclear, Economic Cooperation Communique," Interfax (Moscow), 16 March 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010316000331, 16 March 2001; Henry Meyer, "Despite US Disapproval, Russia's Putin Praises Ties with Iran," *Agence France Presse* (Moscow), 5 April 2002; Ronen Bergman, "The Iranian Reactor in the Picture Is Supposed to Be Operational With Two or Three Years," *Yediot Aharonot* (Hamusaf Lahag supplement) (Tel Aviv), 29 September 2001; in "Article Views Iranian efforts To Achieve Nuclear capability" FBIS document GMP20010927000222, 8 March 2002.

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**14 March 2001**

Russian television reports that Izhorskiye Zavody of St. Petersburg will get \$50 million for its work on equipment for the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Russia: Iranian President Khatami Visits St. Petersburg Defense Plant," RenTV (Moscow), 14 March 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010314000300, 14 March 2001.

**15 March 2001**

Mohammad Khatami, the Iranian President, visits Izhorskiye Zavody of St. Petersburg, where equipment is being built for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Plant director Yevgeniy Sergeyev says delays in construction of the Iranian plant are not because of his company, but because the plant had been designed by a German company and had to be redesigned to work with Russian equipment. Sergeyev says Khatami told him a contract for a second unit at Bushehr would be signed as soon as the "first block" equipment is delivered.

—"Iranian President Said Unhappy About Delays in Nuclear Plant Construction," RIA (Moscow), 15 March 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010315000077, 15 March 2001.

**16 March 2001**

Vladimir Orlov, director of the PIR Center, a Moscow-based nongovernmental organization devoted to nonproliferation, says "it is our judgment that Iran has a certain interest in military nuclear research....It appears that Iran's research is not advanced and no political decision has been made in Iran in this field. It's just that they try to keep abreast with the events in order not to fall behind."

—"Press Conference With PIR Center Officials Regarding Russian-Iranian Defense and Nuclear Cooperation," Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 16 March 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**16 March 2001**

Vassili Grornov, Russian Ambassador to Brazil, denies that Russia will sell nuclear weapons to Iran.

—"Russian Ambassador to Brazil Denies Sale of Atomic Weapons to Iran," *Journal de Brasilia* (Brasilia), 16 March 2001; in FBIS Document LAP20010316000039, 16 March 2001.

**16 March 2001**

In an interview, Vladimir Sliviyak, co-chairman of Ekozashchita, says in signing the contract to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant, "Russia assumed obligations that cannot be realized. The reactor was 40% completed by the German division of Siemens, and we received the contract on the condition that we finish all construction by the end of 2001. According to associates of Atomstroyeksport, the authors of the contract were aware that the deadline was unrealistic. Specialists are also certain that the deadline that has now been announced, the end of 2002 is also unrealistic—six years are needed." Sliviyak also says Russia typically finances construction of nuclear power plants abroad, and that Iran is the exception. "We do not extend credit to it, but there is concealed financing—we spend our own money to produce the equipment, ship it there, and then are supposed to receive reimbursement." [Note: On 7 January 1995, an Iranian official said the first unit was 90%. In August 1995, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov said the first unit was 70% complete.]

—Yekaterina Kats, "Ekozashchita Group Co-Head Sliviyak Interviewed on Nuclear Technology Exports," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 16 March 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010316000106, 16 March 2001.

**16 March 2001**

In a bilateral meeting with Russia on nuclear energy, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official, Yuji Miyamoto, the ministry's director general for arms control and scientific affairs, says Japan is opposed to Russia's deal to build a nuclear power plant in Iran.

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—"Japan Voices Opposition to Russia's Nuclear Aid to Iran," Kyodo (Tokyo), 16 March 2001; in FBIS Document JPP20010316000156, 16 March 2001.

### **22 March 2001**

Four 82-ton water tanks are ready for delivery to the Bushehr nuclear power plant, says Nikolay Krivoshlykov, director-general of Atommas, the factory which built the tanks. They will be shipped to St. Petersburg and then by sea to Iran. The tanks are part of the reactor's emergency cooling system. The factory in Volgograd has an order for Bushehr worth \$18 million.

—"Russian Factory Ready to Dispatch Equipment to Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 22 March 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010324000098, 22 March 2001.

### **30 March 2001**

Russian government sources say the replacement of Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov with Aleksandr Rumyantsev will not mean an end to Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran.

—"Russia to Continue Nuclear Energy Cooperation With Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 30 March 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010330000115, 30 March 2001.

### **April 2001**

*Arms Control Today* reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin reaffirms Russia's commitment to complete the Bushehr nuclear power station. Officials from the US government also comment on the nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran as not being "well advised." The reactor at Bushehr has yet to be completed, with delays attributed to both Iranian and Russian sides, and is scheduled to be completed in 2003. Russia reaffirms that its activities in Iran are under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran is reported to have expressed further interest in a second reactor in Bushehr once work on the current one is complete.

—Wade Boese, "Putin Reaffirms Arms Sales, Nuclear Assistance to Iran," *Arms Control Today*, April 2001, [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org), accessed 7 February 2001.

### **15 April 2001**

Following a ceremony, workers began laying the foundations of the steam power generator at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The work is first "executive move" by the Russian in building the plant following lengthy studies, surveys, and examinations, says Asadollah Saburi, the deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. He says 3,000 cubic meters of cement will be used in the foundations, which will be built by an Iranian engineering company under Russian supervision.

—"Iran: Ceremony Marks Start of Bushehr Nuclear Reactor Steam Generator Construction," IRNA (Tehran), 16 April 2001; in FBIS Document IAP20010416000093, 16 April 2001.

### **16 April 2001**

Russia and Iran are negotiating the construction of additional reactors at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, says Aleksandr Rumyantsev, Russian Atomic Energy Minister. "These intentions are true but no documents have been signed yet," he says. As for construction delays, he says, "if there was some lagging in the construction schedule we will catch up with it soon. All contract commitments will be fulfilled." According to a report, the main equipment for the reactor will be delivered in July and installation will begin in September. [Note: See 11 May 2001.]

—"Russia, Iran Discussing Additional Reactor in Bushehr," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 16 April 2001, FBIS Document CEP20010416000189, 16 April 2001.

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**11 May 2001**

Russia is negotiating with Iran to build five or more nuclear power plants, Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, the Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister says. Possible sites are being examined, including Bushehr, Karun, and an area near the Caspian Sea. Reshetnikov says he does not know when a contract will be signed. [Note: See 16 April 2001.]  
—"Russia Offers to Build More Nuclear Plants in Iran," ITAR-TASS, 11 May 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010512000081, 11 May 2001.

**28 May 2001**

Khusro Abedi, an official of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says the first unit of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is 52% complete and should be finished within three years. [Note: See 16 January and 27 June 2001 for differing estimates of completion.]  
—"Work in Progress at Bushehr Power Plant," *Iran Daily* (Tehran), 28 May 2001; in FBIS Document IAP20010528000051, 28 May 2001.

**12 June 2001**

Bulat Nigmatulin, Russian deputy atomic energy minister, says Russia will not halt nuclear cooperation with Iran. He says such cooperation has "breathed life into our atomic machine-building programme. Iran pays for atomic power stations not with credits, but as and when the equipment is supplied. We supply equipment and get money for it."  
—"Deputy Minister: Russian Will Not Halt Nuclear Cooperation With Iran, India," *Informatsionnoye Agentstvo Ekho Moskvyy* (Moscow), 12 June 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010612000243, 12 June 2001.

**13 June 2001**

Interfax reports that according to anonymous sources the company Atomenergoprojekt is working on a feasibility study for an additional two reactors at Bushehr, a study which should be finished by the end of the year. A source at the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry says additional reactors after the first unit are "not ruled out," but would not necessarily be built at Bushehr. [Note: See 16 January 2001.]  
—"Russia to Complete Study For Second Unit at Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant By Year's End," Interfax (Moscow), 13 June 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010613000151, 13 June 2001.

**14 June 2001**

Eshaq Jahangiri, the Iranian Minister of Industries and Mines, says that the Jajorm Alumina project, the biggest mineral project to date in Iran, is to be put into operation in March of 2002. The implementation of this project will diminish Iranian reliance on imports and save it considerable amount of expenses.  
—"Alumina project to be operational by year-end," IRNA, 14 June 2001, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

**15 June 2001**

Sources in the Ministry of Economic Development deny a report in the *Washington Post* that Russia has shipped to "Iran durable aluminum," which can be used in the creation of nuclear weapons. US officials have said the metal can be used to make rotor blades for uranium-enriching gas centrifuges. Russian experts from the Economic Development Ministry say that they have supplied neither aluminum, nor any of its products or its alloys. [Note: See 26 September 2001.]  
—"Russia Rejects US Accusations of Shipping Durable Aluminum To Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 15 June 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010615000370, 15 June 2001; Toby Harnden, "Aluminum Shipment To Iran Draws US Protest," *Daily Telegraph* (London), 16 June 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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### **18 June 2001**

Igor Sergeev, adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin, says Russia is not assisting Iran in developing nuclear weapons. "To obtain weapons from the light water reactor in Iran is impossible," he says.

—Barry Schweid, "Putin Adviser Denies Russia Helping Iran's Nuclear Program," Associated Press, 18 June 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **27 June 2001**

Vladimir Vinogradov, the Russian deputy atomic energy minister, says the first unit at the Bushehr nuclear power plant is now 80% complete. [Note: See 16 January 2001.] He says, "Russia has no complaints about how Iran is fulfilling its financial obligations."

—"Russian Official: First Unit of Iran's Bushehr Power Plant Nearly Complete," Interfax (Moscow), 27 June 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010627000232, 27 June 2001.

### **July 2001**

A steam generator is delivered for the Bushehr nuclear power plant, according to Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov.

—"Russia Prepares Feasibility Study For New Reactors At Iranian Nuclear Plant," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 September 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010904000017, 4 September 2001.

### **3 July 2001**

Mohammed Al-Baradi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, says, "We have not seen any violation of [Iran's] obligation under the Non-Proliferation Treaty."

—Bob Edwards, "Mohammed Al-Baradi on UN Sanctions Against Iraq, Nuclear Inspections in North Korea and Iran and Nuclear Energy For Electricity," National Public Radio, 3 July 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **9 July 2001**

Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, Israeli defense minister, says Iran could have nuclear weapons by 2005.

—"Israeli Defense Minister: Iran Could Have Nuclear Weapons By 2005," Associated Press, 9 July 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **11 July 2001**

Aleksander Rumyantsev, the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, says "that when we supply Iran with fresh fuel within three years [from now]...it will be returned to Russia again." [Note: Rumyantsev seems to be saying that Russia will begin sending nuclear fuel to Iran within three years, and that it will be returned to Russia as spent fuel.]

—"Russian Atomic Energy Minister Upbeat About Import of Spent Nuclear Fuel," Russian Public Television ORT 1 (Moscow), 11 July 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010711000283, 11 July 2001.

### **25 July 2001**

The *Tehran Times*, without attributing a source, denies claims by US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Sen. Jesse Helms that China has sold Iran dual-use technology that could be used to make nuclear arms.

—"Iran: US Official's Claims of Iran-China Nuclear Cooperation 'Baseless'," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 25 July 2001; in FBIS Document IAP20010725000012, 25 July 2001.

### **2 August 2001**

Valeriy Kondryatev, the technical director for the Leningrad Metal Factory, says the main parts of the turbine for the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be complete by December 2001.

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—"Russian Company Makes Turbine for Chinese Nuclear Power Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 2 August 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010802000155, 2 August 2001.

#### **16 August 2001**

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld accuses Russia of helping Iran in developing nuclear weapons.

—"US Official Accuses Russia of Assisting Iran's Nuclear Program," Xinhua General News Service, 17 August 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **22 August 2001**

Syed Anwar Mehmood, Pakistani Federal Secretary of Information, denies a report in the *Wall Street Journal* that Pakistan sold nuclear technology to Iran, among other countries.

—"Pakistan Strongly Rejects Allegation of Sale of Nuclear Technology," *Jang* (Rawalpindi), 22 August 2001; in FBIS Document SAP20010823000118, 22 August 2001.

#### **24 August 2001**

Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, Israeli defense minister, says in the next decade, Iran's nuclear program will reach a "point of no return," from which time "it would be impossible to stop it from attaining a bomb." [Note: See 2 and 13 September 2001 for further Israeli estimations on Iran's nuclear program.]

—Yoav Limor, "And the World Remains Silent," *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), 24 August 2001, in "Israeli Officials Voicing Growing Concern Over Iranian, Iraqi Nuclear Efforts," FBIS Document GMP20010824000132, 24 August 2001.

#### **2 September 2001**

*Haaretz* of Tel Aviv reports that Israeli intelligence believes Iran will be able to create a nuclear bomb by 2005, but this can be stopped if Russia stops providing assistance. [Note: See 24 August and 13 September 2001.]

—Aluf Ben, "Sharon To Ask Putin to Stop 'Spillover' To Iran," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 2 September 2001, in "Sharon To Raise With Putin Danger of Nuclear 'Spillover' From Russia To Iran," FBIS Document GMP20010902000100, 2 September 2001.

#### **4 September 2001**

Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, the Russian atomic energy minister, says he is sending a delegation to Iran with a completed feasibility study for construction of additional reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "Iran can order the construction of at least one more reactor," he says. Contract negotiations for the additional reactors could start in December, he says. He also says a steam generator was delivered to Iran in July for the first unit and the reactor will be delivered in November.

—"Russia Prepares Feasibility Study For New Reactors At Iranian Nuclear Plant," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 September 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20010904000017, 4 September 2001; "Iran: Russia to Build More Nuclear Reactors In Iran Despite Sharon's Requests," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 5 September 2001; in FBIS Document IAP20010905000010, 5 September 2001.

#### **4 September 2001**

Ali Shamkhani, the Iranian defense minister, says that the delay of his visit to Russia is a result of the presence of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in Moscow. He adds that the Iranian defense ministry postponed the visit and that it will take place at the appropriate moment. He also says that the pressures from other countries will not influence the relations between Russia and Iran.

—"Shamkhani: Iran, Russia not to be Influenced by External Pressure," IRNA (Tehran), 4 September 2002, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

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### **5 September 2001**

A senior Bush administration official says that Russian companies continue to provide Iran with weapons of mass destruction technology. The official claims that this technology could assist Iran in developing chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. Although Russia officially agrees with the United States that there should be limits on providing technology to Iran, Russian authorities do not appear to have "clamped down" on this.

—Barry Schweid, "Russians still provide Iran technology for weapons of mass destruction, US official says," The Associated Press, 5 September 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **7 September 2001**

The CIA issues a report that says, "During the second half of 2000, entities in Russia, North Korea, and China continued to supply crucial ballistic missile-related equipment, technology, and expertise to Iran. Teheran is attempting to develop a domestic capability to produce various types of weapons...and their delivery systems." The report also states, "The expertise and technology gained, along with the commercial channels and contacts established—particularly through the Bushehr nuclear power plant project—could be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons research and development program."

—"CIA: China Helps Iran's Missile Programs," *Middle East Newsline*, 10 September 2001.

### **10 September 2001**

Hamid Reza Asefi, Foreign Ministry spokesman for Iran, says that despite the use of chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction against Iran, Iran "has never embarked on production of such weapons." The report comes after allegations by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Iran is seeking foreign sources of technology to develop weapons of mass destruction. [Note: See 7 September 2001.] Asefi compares Iran's compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards with Israel's lack of transparency. "Iran's defensive and nuclear cooperation with some foreign countries are within the framework of international conventions, in line with the industrial and economic development of the country and aimed at maintaining world peace and security," he says.

—"Iran Denies Seeking Nuclear Weapons," *Iran Expert*, 10 September 2001, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com); "Iran Rejects US. Report on Arms Programmes," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 10 September 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **13 September 2001**

In response to accusations by the Mossad, Israel's secret intelligence agency, that Iran will be capable of producing an atom bomb by 2005, Binyamin Ben Eliezer, Israel's defense minister, calls for a meeting between security and intelligence services to discern the validity of the Mossad allegation. According to *Jane's Foreign Report*, previous Mossad conclusions proved false, and Eliezer and the heads of the security services believe Iran is still far from producing a weapon. [Note: See 24 August and 2 September 2001.]

—"Iran's 'Nuclear Weapon'," *Iran Expert*, 13 September 2001, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **13 September 2001**

*Iran Expert* reports that in light of Iran's recent refusal to ratify two new provisions of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United States and Israel have cast Iran as the most significant threat to peace in the Middle East. Iran believes itself justified not to ratify the provisions on the grounds that it has been denied nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, which is provided under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Mohammad Khatami, Iran's president, continues to refute claims that Iran is seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. Much of Western consternation comes in light of increasing evidence that Iran is using clandestine methods to

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acquire nuclear weapons. *Jane's Defense Weekly* reports Iran has attempted to acquire enriched uranium, fuel fabrication and processing capabilities, research reactors, gas centrifuge and enrichment technology, and uranium conversion and laser enrichment plants.

—"Missile Development and Iranian Security," *Iran Expert*, 13 September 2001, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **19 September 2001**

Yevgeny Adamov, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, says that the Russians have started the construction of another nuclear reactor in Iran. He said that Russia doubts that Iran will use this facility for the production of nuclear weapons. Adamov also says that 90% of the work on a nuclear reactor has been finished in the city of Bushehr and that the reactor will be completed in two years.

—"The First Support that Khatami Has Received for a Second Term - Russia Establishes a Second Nuclear Reactor in Iran," *Al-Zaman* (Cairo), 18 January 2001, [www.azzaman.com](http://www.azzaman.com).

#### **26 September 2001**

Yediot Aharonot reports that Israel and the United States received information that a Russian company is selling centrifuge parts for uranium enrichment to Iran. Israel has given to Russian President Vladimir Putin documents proving the involvement of some Russian entities in selling such equipment to Iran. President Vladimir Putin responded, "Your scientists must be mixed up. This is not equipment for centrifuges but aluminum parts for the construction of airplanes." A source in the Israeli prime minister's office said, "The documents in this file are so conclusive that it is clear that Putin is lying or that he was deceived by his men." Israel and the United States believe that the Bushehr complex, given its immensity, can hide plutonium separation plant even if the reactor itself is under IAEA supervision. Russians are also believed to be training Iranian engineers and physicists in a research center in Moscow and in a nuclear power plant in Novovoronezh.

—Ronen Bergman, "Article Views Iranian Efforts to Achieve Nuclear Capability," *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), 26 September 2001; in FBIS Document GMP20010927000222, 26 September 2001; Ronen Bergman, "The Iranian Reactor in the Picture Is Supposed to Be Operational With Two or Three Years" *Yediot Aharonot* (Hamasaf Lahag supplement) (Tel Aviv) 29 September 2001; in FBIS document "Article Views Iranian Efforts To Achieve Nuclear Capability" GMP20010927000222, 8 March 2002.

#### **2 October 2001**

A source in the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy says the major equipment for the first reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be there early in 2002. The first unit is 80% complete, according to the source, and more than 1,000 Russians are working at the site. After the reactor is finished—projected for 2003—it will take 18 months to load the fuel and test it, the source says.

—"Russia To Deliver Nuclear Reactor to Iran in November," *ITAR-TASS* (Moscow), 2 October 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20011002000146, 2 October 2001.

#### **2 October 2001**

Russia's atomic energy minister announces that in November 2001 it plans to deliver the first of two nuclear reactors for a 1000MW power station. Russian technicians at Bushehr will be mostly responsible for building the station. This announcement is the result of over a year of discussions.

—Michael Wines, "Russia and Iran Sign Arms Deal; Nuclear Reactors on the Way," *New York Times*, 3 October 2001, p. 12; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **15 October 2001**

ITAR-TASS reports that Aleksandr Rumyantsev, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, believes the construction of

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the Bushehr nuclear power plant may be delayed if the war in Afghanistan expands. Rumyantsev further states that up to 1,000 workers may have to be recalled if the war escalates, but if construction is unimpeded by the conflict the plant will be complete by 2003 plus an additional 18 months to load fuel and test the reactor.  
—Bill Samii, "Bushehr Completion May be Delayed if War Spreads," *Iran Report*, 15 October 2001, Vol. 4, No. 39, [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org).

### **31 October 2001**

US intelligence sources say that China is selling nuclear technology to Iran in violation of a pledge given one year ago to halt missile sales to the Middle East. Jon Kyl, the ranking Republican on the Senate Sub-Committee on Technology, says that China is providing Iran with the technology to use nuclear warheads on missiles  
—"Amid Afghan War China Sells Missiles to The Middle East," Middle East Newline Vol. 3, No. 415, 31 October 2001, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

### **2 November 2001**

Hadi Najad-Hosseini, Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, on a visit to Washington, DC, says Iran would not abandon its nuclear weapons program. The *Washington Times* reports US intelligence services believe Iran has undoubtedly spent between \$12-15 billion to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.  
—"A Reformer Without Results; Iran's Khatami Needs to Hand Over Terrorists," *Iran Expert*, 2 November 2001, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **6 November 2001**

Russian President Vladimir Putin says, "We have not ever sold anything to Iran out of the range of technology or information that would help Iran develop missiles or weapons of mass destruction." As for Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, he says "it has nothing to do with developing nuclear weapons. We are categorically opposed to transferring any technologies to Iran that would help it develop nuclear weapons."  
—Barry Schweid, "Russian Leader Disputes Reports Russia Helping Iran Develop Weapons Of Mass Destructions," Associated Press, 6 November 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **8 November 2001**

While in Washington, DC, Efraim Sneh, Israeli transportation minister, says he is certain "the central support for the Iranian nuclear project is provided by Russia."  
—"Israeli Says Russia Helps Iran On Nuclear Weapons," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, 8 November 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **10 November 2001**

Basij forces in Iran begin training for an imaginary invasion against Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. Training also includes familiarization with radioactive residue leakage and similar scenarios.  
—"Basij Conducts Military Exercises Protecting Bushehr Nuclear Facility," *Iran Expert*, 10 November 2001, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

### **13 November 2001**

Interfax reports that Izhorskiye Zavody of St. Petersburg will ship equipment to the Bushehr nuclear power plant on 16 November, according to a source in the company. The company has built the "casing and upper unit of the reactor's water unit, a compensator, all of the units within the casing, a steam generator, and other equipment," according to the source.

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—"Russia: Equipment To Be Delivered To Iranian Nuclear Plant 16 November," Interfax (Moscow), 13 November 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20011113000073, 13 November 2001.

#### **16 November 2001**

Izhorskiye Zavody of St. Petersburg ships the 350-ton assembly kit for a nuclear reactor to the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Assembly will begin soon after it arrives in Iran, says Viktor Kozlov, general director of the Atomstroyeksport company. Kozlov says delays in construction at Bushehr are "not because of technical problems. The original construction schedule was tighter than actually needed. We wanted to speed up the works this way." Russia and Iran will sign a revised construction schedule that calls for the plant to be finished in December 2003, ITAR-TASS reports.

—"Russia To Start Assembling Iran Reactor By Year's End," ITAR-TASS, 16 November 2001; in FBIS Document CEP20011119000058, 16 November 2001.

#### **18 November 2001**

The *Middle East Newslines* reports that Iran is preparing to receive a light water nuclear reactor from Russia. Work on the reactor had been completed at Izhorskiye Zavody of St. Petersburg. The VVER-type reactor, which was built in three years, weighs 317 tons and will be assembled upon its arrival to Bushehr in about a month. The nuclear reactor is scheduled to be operational in 2003. This reactor is part of an \$800 million contract Russia and Iran signed in 1995.

—"Russian Nuke Reactor Leaves for Iran," *Middle East Newslines*, Vol. 3, No. 439, 18 November 2001, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

#### **19 November 2001**

US Secretary of State Colin Powell warns Russia against its continuous WMD assistance to Iran. He says that the United States is highly concerned by the Russian nuclear assistance to Iran. Mr. Powell's warning comes after Russia shipped a cylindrical reactor to Iran.

—"US Warns Russia Against Nuke Help to Iran," *Middle East Newslines* Vol. 3 No 441, 19 November 2001, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

#### **30 November 2001**

Interfax reports Russia has sent to Iran a VVER-1000 [1000MW light water] nuclear reactor. The unit will be installed in the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran. Bulat Nigmatulin, Russia's Deputy Atomic Energy Minister, says the plant should be "launched" by September 2003. The Atomic Energy Ministry does not exclude the possibility that more nuclear power plants will be constructed, which may or may not be in Bushehr. The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry and its Iranian counterpart have scheduled fueling of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and will provide training for Iranian scientists at the Novovoronezhskaya nuclear power plant in Russia.

—"Russia Ships Reactor to Bushehr, Will Train Iranian Nuclear Physicists," *Iran Expert*, 30 November 2001, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com).

#### **11 December 2001**

US officials say they are prepared to impose sanctions on Russia for allegedly aiding Iran develop nuclear weapons.

—"Putin Supports US War On Terrorism, Resists Pressure To Sever Ties With Iran," *Washington Times*, 11 December 2001; in *Iran Expert*, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 14 March 2002.

#### **11 December 2001**

A high-ranking Pakistani official denies nuclear cooperation with Iran.

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—"Pakistan, Iran Ready for New Strategic Cooperation," Iran Press Service, 11 December 2001; in Iran Expert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 14 March, 2002.

#### **13 December 2001**

German news outlet DDP reports that a German company may have shipped material to Iran that could be used to make nuclear weapons. Bremen-based company J.C. Niemann reportedly shipped round aluminum rods without an export license. The Bremen Public Prosecutor's Office has been investigating the matter for four years and is considering charges. [Note: The report does not state when the material was allegedly shipped to Iran.]

—"German Company Reportedly Supplied Iran With Dual-Use Goods," DDP (Berlin), 13 December 2001; in FBIS Document EUP20011213000087, 13 December 2001; "Germany: No Charge Planned Yet Against Bremen Company for Exports to Iran," DDP (Berlin), 13 December 2001; in FBIS Document EUP20011213000145, 13 December 2001.

#### **14 December 2001**

Speaking at weekly prayers in Tehran, former President Hashemi-Rafsanjani says, "The use of an atomic bomb would totally destroy Israel, while (the same) against the Islamic world would only cause damage. Such a scenario is not inconceivable." He says, "if the Islamic world armed itself with the same arms, then that equilibrium would be broken." He says, "We do not want the fall victim to insecurity, and we do not want the confrontation to turn into World War Three. That is the worst that could happen." He says, "if a day comes when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the arms Israel has in its possession, the strategy of colonialism would face a stalemate because application of an atomic bomb would not leave anything in Israel but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world."

—"Rafsanjani Says Mideast Nuclear Conflict Possible," Agence France Presse, 14 December 2001; in Iran Expert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 14 March, 2002; "Iran's Rafsanjani Suggests Nuclear Attack on Israel," *World Tribune* (London), 17 December 2001; Michael Rubin, "The Iranian Ticking Bomb," *The Jerusalem Post*, 17 February 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **Mid-December 2001**

Asadollah Saburi, deputy director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, confirms that China has refused to deliver two 300MW reactors to Iran. The Bushehr nuclear power plant is scheduled to go into operation in 2005. The initial output of the plant will be only 20% of what was originally planned, in part because of the Chinese decision to withhold the reactors.

—"Will Tehran Master Nuclear Bomb Technology By 2005?," *Intelligence Newsletter*, 3 January 2002; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **17 December 2001**

Efraim Halevy, the head of the Israeli intelligence organization Mossad, says that Iran is developing nuclear and other non-conventional weapons.

—Yoav Appel, "Mossad Chief: Iran Developing Nukes," *Washington Post*, 17 December 2001, [www.washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com).

#### **17 December 2001**

*Middle East Newslines* reports that although US administration officials agree that Iran is approaching nuclear capability, they believe that the nature of the Iranian regime offers possibility of democratic change.

—"US will not Target Iran in War Against Terror," *Middle East Newslines*, Vol. 3, No. 481, 17 December 2001, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

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### **18 December 2001**

Gholam Reza Shafei, Iranian ambassador to Russia, and a delegation of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran visits the Ordzhonikidze plant near Moscow. The plant is building the fourth steam generator for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The first three generators have been shipped to Iran. Shafei says it is important for the project to be finished according to schedule. He says Iran hopes to be compensated for delays in construction of the plant.

—"Iran's Ambassador To Russia Visits Nuclear Power Plant," IRNA, 18 December 2001; in Iran Expert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 14 March 2002.

### **19 December 2001**

Russia's State Duma ratifies a cooperation treaty with Iran. Alexander Losyukov, Russia's deputy foreign minister, says, "The key areas of our cooperation will be in the military-technological sphere and the peaceful use of the nuclear atom." He says construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is a "symbol of the new stage of cooperation."

—"Russian Parliament Ratifies Cooperation Treaty with Iran," Agence France Presse, 19 December 2001; Iran Expert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 14 March, 2002.

### **22 December 2001**

The director of the open joint-stock company Tsenrtenerhamantazh of Minsk, Belarus, says the company has won a contract to build the turbine shop for the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Belarusian Company to Participate in Iranian Nuclear Power Project," Radio Minsk, 22 December 2001; Iran Expert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 14 March 2002.

### **26 December 2001**

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres writes letters to the foreign ministers of the countries on the United Nations Security Council protesting recent remarks by former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani that seemed to imply Iran would use nuclear weapons against Israel. Peres calls Rafsanjani's remarks "bone-chilling," and says they show Iran's nuclear program is not peaceful. [Note: See 14 December 2001 for Rafsanjani's remarks.]

—"Peres Protests Iranian Threat to Destroy Israel," *Jerusalem Post*, 26 December 2001; Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **29 December 2001**

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres says that a 14 December 2001 speech by former Iranian President Rafsanjani "leaves no room for any doubt as to Iran's hatred of Israel and its declared goal to destroy it." In a letter to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, Peres says the speech "clearly contradicts the Iranian claim that its plans to acquire nuclear technologies are designed only for peaceful purposes."

—"Israel Feats Iran Will Use Nuclear Arm," Reuters, 29 December 2001; Iran Expert, [www.iranexpert.com](http://www.iranexpert.com), 14 March, 2002.

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## **2000**

### **January 2000**

Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev meets with Hasan Ruhani, chief of the Iranian Supreme Security Council. Sergeyev says, "Russia intends to maintain the dynamics of its bilateral ties with Iran in the military, military-technical, scientific technical, and energy fields."

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—*New York Times*, 17 January 2000, p. A1; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

#### **14 January 2000**

According to Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvyy (Moscow), the Russian commission on military industry, chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin, decides that Russia will build three reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, not just the original one. ITAR-TASS, however, reports that a possible deal was announced by Vice Prime Minister Klebanov after his meeting with Iranian Supreme Security Council chief Hassan Ruhani, but does not indicate that a final decision has been made.

—AP (Moscow), 14 January 2000; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu); "Russia To Build Three Reactors For Iran at Bushehr," Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvyy (Moscow), 14 January 2000, in FBIS Document FTS20000114001000, 14 January 2000.

#### **15 January 2000**

The Czech newspaper *Lidove Noviny* reports that Great Britain and the United States protested the planned delivery of items for the nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran. Both countries fear Iran will misuse the products to develop nuclear weapons. Though the Iranian deal means significant revenue for the Czech company ZVVZ Milevsko, any potential profit may be offset by sanctions imposed by the United States or Britain. Thus far, nineteen countries have turned down Iran's offer to supply it with equipment for its nuclear power plant, which in turn may cast the Czech Republic as a political pariah among its European counterparts. [Note: See 30 April 2000.]

—"UK, USA Protest Against Czech Republic's Planned Iranian Delivery," BBC, 15 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **15 January 2000**

The Japanese Metropolitan Police Department's (MPD) public safety division arrested two former executives of a now defunct Japanese optical equipment manufacturer on the suspicion that the company had exported sensitive equipment to Iran. The company, known as Sunbeam, reportedly illegally sold 3,100 sighting lenses in April and December 1995 to Iran. The sighting lenses can be used with "RPG-7" anti-tank weapons. Similar sighting lenses, also sold by Sunbeam, were found on board a North Korean submarine that ran aground in South Korean waters in September 1996. Japanese officials believe that the sighting lenses were sold to Iran, which in turn supplied them to North Korea in exchange for missile technology. North Korean defectors have reportedly told interrogators, "North Korea has imported Japan's high-tech devices necessary for the development of nuclear weapons and other military equipment through third countries." Japanese officials are concerned that equipment made in Japan and sold illegally by Japanese companies may pose a threat to Japan's security.

—"Police Suspect That DPRK Imports Japanese Parts From Iran," *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), 16 January 2000, FBIS Document, FTS20000118000572, 16 January 2000.

#### **16 January 2000**

The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies criticizes nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia and warns that it reflects Iran's desire to become the regional power in the Middle East. Regarding statements that Igor Sergeyev, the Russian defense minister, made about Russia's intent to carry out mutual agreements signed with Iran in 1998 and 1999, the center said that the statements were a surprise since Russia and Iran claim that their cooperation would not include developing Iran's nuclear capabilities for military use. According to the center, the statements were made two weeks after Russia assured that it is resolved to speed up the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power station. After meeting with Sergeyev in Moscow, the General Secretary of the Iranian National Security Council, Hassan Ruhani, said that the Russian-Iranian cooperation is "being conducted in the framework of

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international law and is characterized by transparency." He also reportedly stated that "any interference on the part of a third party in our relations is unacceptable." After meeting with Ruhani, Aylia Klibanov, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister, said that Iran may request three nuclear power plants from Russia and that the prospective deal "complies with all international obligations related to organizing the use of nuclear energy."

—"Criticism From the Emirates Over the Nuclear Cooperation Between Tehran and Moscow," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), 17 January 2000; "Khalkhali Announced His Return to Political Work - Moscow and Tehran Reaffirm Their Commitment to Continuing Nuclear and Military Cooperation," *Al-Nahar* (Beirut), 15 January 2000, [www.annaharonline.com](http://www.annaharonline.com).

#### **17 January 2000**

The CIA reports that Iran may be capable of producing a nuclear weapon now. This assessment is based on the fact that Western intelligence has not been able to track the exchanges that are occurring on Iran's part, so the CIA cannot rule out the possibility that Iran may have the weapons. Russia continues to cooperate with Iran but deny aiding them with a weapons program. Iran also continues to deny that they are pursuing a weapons program. According to David Albright, a nuclear analyst in Washington, "Iran has made it clear that it will not be the last major country in the region to develop nuclear weapons."

—James Risen and Judith Miller, "CIA Tells Clinton an Iranian A-Bomb Can't Be Ruled Out," *New York Times*, 17 January 2000, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com), accessed 7 February 2002.

#### **17 January 2000**

Iran rejects accusations made by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that it is building and attempting to procure nuclear arms. The rebuttal comes in response to accusations made by the CIA in the *New York Times* that Iran is seeking to obtain nuclear arms. A source from the Iranian Defense Ministry says "The Islamic Republic of Iran which made the initiative to establish a dialogue of civilizations has no need of nuclear weapons and declares against violence."

—"Iran Denies Striving to Possess Nuclear Arms," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 19 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **18 January 2000**

According to Efraim Sneh, Israel's deputy defense minister, the United States has failed in its attempts to contain Iran's nuclear capability. Sneh said that Israel must continue to build a wall of deterrence against Iran "perhaps different and greater than the one we have today." Referring to Iran's missile arsenal, Sneh stated that "it's clear that such missiles with such a large radius and warhead capability are not intended to solve their problems with Iraq, their enemy neighbor." Sneh implied that Israel might try to stop the progress of Iranian nuclear projects, but did not give specifics. He said "there is a list of other things ... but I'm not sure they should be discussed publicly." In the past, Sneh has expressed that Israel should think about launching a pre-emptive strike against Iran to destroy its nuclear facilities.

—"US Faulted on Iran Nuke Containment," *Washington Post*, 18 January 2000, [www.washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com).

#### **26 January 2000**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov says construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is progressing and that 200 Russian specialists are working at the site.

—Anna Bazhenova, "Russia: Nuclear Plant Building Continues in Iran, PRC," Itar-Tass (Moscow), 26 January 2000, in FBIS Document FTS20000126001626, 26 January 2000.

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### **27 January 2000**

Asadollah Saburi, Iran's Deputy Head of the Atomic Energy Organization, says 26.4% of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is complete, and expects 38% to be complete by the end of the current Iranian year. Saburi blames periods of slow progress on ambiguities within the contract between Russia and Iran over each nation's respective duties regarding construction of the plant.

—"Iran: Official says China has Stopped Nuclear Cooperation," BBC, 27 January 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **31 January 2000**

Asadollah Saburi, Deputy Head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says Iran has severed its ties with China regarding nuclear projects. Saburi states "The Chinese reached a conclusion to work on nuclear matters with other countries, not Iran. Our contract was cancelled partly for political reasons."

—"Iran Admits Chinese Link Severed," *Nuclear Engineering International*, 31 January 1998, p.4, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **31 January 2000**

*Lidove Noviny*, the Czech newspaper, reports the Czech Republic government is reconsidering its stand on whether to allow ZVZ Milevsko to provide the Bushehr nuclear power plant with equipment. A great many countries have already refused to provide Iran with technical assistance, a fact that supplants some of the Czech Republic's original stalwartness with reticence regarding the sale of nuclear technology to Iran. Mahmud Mohammadi, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, states "a reaction to such interference in the domestic affairs of Iran, Tehran has decided to reduce the level of its economic and political cooperation with Prague."

—Bill Samii, "Czech Work on Bushehr Reactor in Doubt," *Iran Report*, 31 January 2000, Vol. 3, No. 5, [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org).

### **February 2000**

The CIA releases a report on Iran's nuclear program that reads, "During the first half of 1999, Russia also remained a key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran. With respect to Iran's nuclear infrastructure, Russian assistance enhances Iran's ability to support a nuclear weapons development effort. By its very nature, even the transfer of civilian technology may be of use in Iran's nuclear weapons program....Russia has reiterated previous commitments to observe certain limits on its nuclear cooperation with Iran, such as not providing militarily useful nuclear technology, although—as indicated above—Russia continues to provide Iran with nuclear technology that could be applied to Iran's weapons program."

—Non-Proliferation Center, Director of Central Intelligence, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating To Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 1999"; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **February 2000**

The US Senate approves legislation that would authorize sanctions on all entities that cooperate with Iran's biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs.

—"Iran Nuclear Milestones," *The Risk Report*, Volume 6 Number 4, July-August 2000, accessed in [www.wisconsinproject.org](http://www.wisconsinproject.org).

### **1 February 2000**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov admitted that installation of a VVER-1000 [1000MW light water] reactor at Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant is running 18 months behind schedule. Deputy Minister of

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Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Reshetnikov said that large-scale physical work at Bushehr has only just begun. A great deal of preliminary engineering and design work was needed in order to determine what use could be made of the existing German installations and components left over when German firms withdrew from the construction project in 1979. Much of the equipment onsite is obsolete and will have to be replaced. Out of 80,000 items of German equipment available at Bushehr, about 47,000 are likely to be useable. About 11,000 items of electrical and mechanical equipment are ready for use but lack the required quality assurance documentation. The plant is now scheduled for commissioning in March 2002, but Minatom officials hope that the reactor will be commissioned four or five months before this.

—"Bushehr Reactor Installation Running behind Schedule," 1 February 2000, Nuclear News, February 2000, p. 30.

### **2 February 2000**

According to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Iran tried to acquire technology and equipment for weapons of mass destruction from Russia, China, and North Korea. The CIA's Non-Proliferation Center reports "In doing so, Tehran is attempting to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of weapons — nuclear, chemical and biological — and their delivery systems." Iran's system of acquiring nuclear technology has become more efficient and modern, the CIA reports, and uses this "guise, to obtain whole facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility, that in fact could be used in any number of ways in support of efforts to produce fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon."

—Jim Mannion, "Iran Tapped Russia, China for Weapons of Mass Destruction Technology: CIA," Agence France Presse, 2 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **3 February 2000**

During a meeting with acting president Vladimir Putin, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov denies allegations of supplying Iran and India with dual-use high technologies, including nuclear technologies. However, Adamov states that Minatom intends to continue building nuclear reactors in Iran and India, in spite of pending US sanctions against a number of Russian research centers and academic institutions. The profit from building the nuclear power plant in Bushehr will be \$800 million, and the other three Iranian projects are worth \$2.5 billion. —Andrey Bagrov, "Putin Offers Madeleine Albright Adamov's Rib," Kommersant, 3 February 2000, p.2; in "Putin Backs Adamov on Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," FBIS Document FTS20000203000949, 3 February 2000.

### **9 February 2000**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov says that Russia is determined to continue construction of the nuclear power plant in Iran, for which Russia could earn up to \$1 billion per reactor. He denies reports in Western media stating that Russia would end its cooperation with Iran in exchange for \$100 million from the United States. —"Rossiya prodolzhit stroitelstvo AES v Irane, zayavlyayet glava Minatoma" [Russia will continue construction of the nuclear power plant in Iran, says the Head of Minatom], Interfax, 9 February 2000.

### **17 February 2000**

Deputy Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, Pavel Rychetsky, announces that the Czech government has blocked a \$27.5 million contract for a private Czech company to sell cooling equipment for the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Iranian Radio: Czechs Pressurized by US Over Bushehr," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran External Services (Tehran), 17 February 2000, in FBIS Document IAP20000217000062, 17 February 2000.

### **28 February 2000**

The *Financial Times* reports the Czech Republic will no longer provide Iran with equipment or know-how for the

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Bushehr nuclear power plant. This decision comes in the face of considerable scrutiny from the United States and the United Kingdom.

—Robert Anderson, "Czechs to Stop Help to Iran," *Financial Times*, 28 February 2000, p.3, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **29 February 2000**

In an interview with Reuters, Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Asadollah Saburi says that Iran needs assistance from Western experts to conform to international nuclear safety standards. He notes that Western sanctions on "dual-use" technology have prevented Iran from having high-quality assistance on nuclear safety: "We are deprived of quality supervision. Otherwise, we could have assured ourselves and the world of our operations' safety." The United States and Israel are committed to preventing Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology, as it could lead to the development of nuclear weapons. The US Senate voted last week to impose sanctions on any state that supplied nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons technology or equipment to Iran. Saburi denies that Iran seeks nuclear weapons: "I assure the world we are not doing anything against international conventions. Our operations are fully open and transparent."

—Reuters (Tehran), 29 February 2000; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **29 February 2000**

Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Asadollah Saburi asserts in an interview with Reuters that the Bushehr project with Russia is about one-third completed. He says that approximately 700 Russian experts are currently working at Bushehr and in one year this number would increase to about 1,500. Saburi states that negotiations are underway between Iran and Russia on a second reactor: "We are after a new generation of enhanced-quality reactors for the new plant: a 1,000MW if in Bushehr and smaller ones if in another site, possibly two 640MW units."

—Reuters (Tehran), 29 February 2000; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **9 March 2000**

According to *Die Welt*, "Tehran is working to develop missiles and nuclear weapons." The Federal German Intelligence Service (BND), reports Iran's decision to expand its arms industry may provide it with similar in-roads to procure nuclear weapons. The BND further states "Iran is striving to control either nuclear fuel cycle, from uranium prospecting to reprocessing. In so doing, knowledge is also gained that can be used to build nuclear weapons."

—"German Newspaper Assesses Iranian Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programme," BBC, 9 March 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **14 March 2000**

President Clinton signs the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, an act which allows him to take punitive measures against any individual or organization that provides any material aid to Iran's nuclear or any other WMD program. The legislation also cuts considerable funding from the US-Russian space station project unless Russia is determined to have demonstrated a commitment to oppose Iranian nuclear weapons program. Sergei Ivanov, the secretary of the Russian Security Council says in an interview that Russia assisting Iran in a weapons program would be like giving them a "grenade with a pulled out pin," that could "be hurled back at Moscow." The Russian Foreign Ministry reacted to the legislation by saying that the bill may considerably affect US-Russian relations particularly in the field of nonproliferation and export controls.

—Matthew Rice, "Clinton Signs 'Iran Nonproliferation Act,'" *Arms Control Today*, April 2000, [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org), accessed 7 February 2002.

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#### **14 March 2000**

Russia will fulfill all contracts for weapons exports to Iran signed before 30 June 1995. That is the date when Russia signed the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission agreement pledging not to enter into contracts with Iran for military hardware or expanding military-technical cooperation after 1999. Sergey Ivanov, secretary of the Russian Security Council, stated that while Russia is not entering into new contracts with Iran, fulfilling the obligations on contracts signed in 1992-1993 is important for the country's prestige and business reputation. Ivanov stressed that Iran is under IAEA safeguards, and Russia welcomes IAEA inspections of the civilian nuclear power plant in Bushehr.

—"Rossiya prodolzhit postavku vooruzheniy Iranu po kontraktam, podpisannym do 1995 goda - sekretar Sovbeza RF" [Russia will continue exports of weapons to Iran according to contracts signed before 1995 - Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation], Interfax, 14 March 2000.

#### **23 March 2000**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov meets with Jessica Matthews, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to accept an invitation for an international conference on nonproliferation in Washington, DC in March 2000 and to discuss some issues of management of nuclear materials, including Russia's cooperation with Iran. Adamov pointed out that no one in the United States can explain how the Bushehr nuclear plant will increase Iran's military nuclear potential, and that the United States is building a similar nuclear plant in North Korea. Adamov emphasized that Russia and the United States have not worked out an agreement on preventing excessive accumulation of separated plutonium, and no negotiations on the subject are being held. After the meeting with Matthews, he stated that Russia does not intend to stop exporting nuclear reactors to Iran and other countries, even if the US Congress approves a proposal to allocate an additional \$100,000 [*sic*] for work on nonproliferation and nuclear security.

—Andrey Vaganov, "Yevgeniy Adamov nastroyen reshitelno" [Yevgeniy Adamov is full of determination], *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 11 February 2000, news.mosinfo.ru/news.

#### **23 March 2000**

According to David Kyd, spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has a peaceful nuclear program. In a news conference at United Nations headquarters in Vienna, Kyd stated that the IAEA has regularly inspected Iranian nuclear facilities and has never observed anything, which would indicate that the Iranian nuclear program has any military purposes. Kyd also said that the IAEA is cooperating with Iran to promote the highest international safety standards at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He reminded his audience that Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its nuclear facilities are permanently under IAEA supervision. In addition, Kyd said the IAEA has not received any intelligence from the United States that indicates that Iran is using its nuclear program for producing weapons. The United States and other Western countries have an embargo on numerous dual use items because they believe Iran is using its civilian nuclear program to prepare for producing nuclear weapons. US officials have criticized the IAEA inspections, because they claim that the IAEA failed to detect Iraq's large nuclear program in the 1980s.

—"IAEA Spokesman: Iran's Nuclear Program Peaceful," IRNA (Tehran), 23 March 2000, www.irna.com; "IAEA: Iran's Nuke Program Is Peaceful," Middle East Newslines (London), 24 March 2000.

#### **31 March 2000**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov states that Iran intends to contract with Russia for the construction of three additional reactors for the nuclear power plant at Bushehr.

—"Iran Gotov Zakazat Rossii Stroitelstvo Eshche Trekh Blokov Dlya AES V Bushere" [Iran Is Ready To Order From Russia Three Additional Reactors For The Nuclear Power Plant In Bushehr], Interfax, 31 March 2000.

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### **3 April 2000**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov says during an appearance on Iranian television that Iranian authorities plan to accept Russia's proposal for cooperation on construction of three new nuclear reactors in Iran. According to Adamov, Russian experts are about to finish their work on the Bushehr plant, but may continue their activities in the next few months. Iranian authorities emphasized the peaceful character of the country's nuclear program. IAEA Press Secretary David Kyd recently gave a similar statement.

—"Tegeran Prinyal Predlozheniye Rossii Sotrudnichat V Sozdanii Trekh Yadernykh Reaktorov" [Tehran Accepted Russia's Offer To Cooperate In Construction Of Three Nuclear Reactors], Interfax, 3 April 2000.

### **4 April 2000**

Russian daily *Izvestiya* reports that Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov has recently said that Iran has agreed to a deal for the construction of three nuclear reactors in addition to the one under construction at Bushehr. One additional reactor would be built at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and the other two at a location not yet specified. The deal would be worth \$3.3 billion. [Note: See 14 January 2000.] About 1,000 Russians are working on the first reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. [Note: On 26 January 2000, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov said 200 Russians were working at Bushehr.]

—Mariya Ignatova, "Nuclear Expansion: Russia Wants to Consolidate Its Hold on Eastern Nuclear Markets," 4 April 2000, in FBIS Document CEP20000404000039, 4 April 2000.

### **4 April 2000**

Under pressure from the United States, the Czech parliament approves a law to ban all Czech exports to the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. The purpose of the bill was to prevent the ZVZ Milevsko company from cooperating with Iran in the construction of the Bushehr plant. Last year, the company signed a \$30 million contract to provide air conditioning ducts for the plant. The lower chamber of the Czech parliament approved the bill in March at a time when Czech President Vaclav Havel assured US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that the government would ban such exports to Iran. The lower chamber rejected a proposed modification to provide compensation for the loss of revenue to the company, but the ministry of industry will provide compensation. Violations of the new law will be punished with a \$563,000 fine and the confiscation of goods. President Havel must still sign the bill before it can be enforced.

—"Czech parliament bans exports for nuclear plant in Iran," Associated Press, 5 April 2000; "Iran Nuclear Milestones," *The Risk Report*, Volume 6 Number 4, July-August 2000, accessed in [www.wisconsinproject.org](http://www.wisconsinproject.org).

### **4 April 2000**

According to Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko, international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency have confirmed that Iran's nuclear program is purely civilian. Yakovenko stated that Russia believes "Iran has a right to develop nuclear programs of a non-military nature, in line with international treaties and agreements." Since the United States has blacklisted 10 Russian research centers and companies alleged to be cooperating with Iran on missile and nuclear research, the Russian Ministry of Education has stated that it would prevent Iranian students from participating in a Baltic University research project. Alexander Kondakov, the Russian minister of education, has agreed that Iranian students may have had access to Russian nuclear rocket technology through their studies.

—"Russia Defends Nuclear Cooperation With Iran, Makes First Concession," AFP (Moscow), 4 April 2000.

### **6 April 2000**

The *New York Times* reports an Iranian truck with a cargo of radioactive material was seized at the border of

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Uzbekistan. It is uncertain whether the material could be used to make a nuclear weapon. The truck is not the first to be intercepted at the border, the report says, but American intelligence agencies believe no weapons-grade nuclear material has made it through.

—"Radioactive Material Bound for Pakistan Seized," *The Hindu*, 6 April 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "The Week in Review — Nuclear Materials Seized in Uzbekistan," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 April 2000; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **12 April 2000**

The Federation of American Scientists reports that due to a lack of infrastructure within the country, Iran's nuclear weapons program is not expected to advance without significant foreign assistance. Iran is thought to be unable to manage the production of weapons-grade nuclear material. To shorten the projected period to acquire these materials, Iran is attempting to develop the capability to produce both highly enriched uranium as well as plutonium, while simultaneously trying to acquire fissile material from outside sources, mainly those that were the former Soviet Union. Iran's claims are that they are trying to launch a complete nuclear fuel cycle for their civilian nuclear holdings; however, this is the same fuel cycle that could support a weapons program. The CIA recently said that Iran's nuclear weapons capability can no longer be ruled out; this assessment comes, however, on the basis that the United States is not able to clearly track the advances that Iran is making.

—John Pike, "Nuclear Weapons," Federation of Atomic Scientists, 12 April 2000, [www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org), accessed 7 February 2002.

#### **22 April 2000**

Yuriy Savelyev, former dean of Baltic State Technical University, denies allegations of military cooperation with Iran. In accordance with the bill on nonproliferation recently passed by the US Senate, the university was classified in March 2000 as an establishment promoting proliferation by educating Iranian students in the field of nuclear energy. Savelyev, who was forced to resign due to these circumstances, confirmed that Iranian students studying at the university were specializing only in civilian applications.

—"V Baltiyskom tekhnicheskoy universitete v Peterburge oprovergayut obvineniya v sotrudnichestve s Iranom v voyennoy sfere" [Baltic Technical University in St.Petersburg denies accusations of military cooperation with Iran], Interfax, 8 April 2000.

#### **22 April 2000**

According to experts at the Georgian Institute of Physics, laboratory tests show that the 920 grams of uranium, which was seized in Ajaria, is up to 30% enriched uranium-235. The experts say that this type of uranium is no longer used in Georgia and therefore the substance is probably from a foreign source. This type of uranium is typically used at nuclear power stations. In response to press reports that the uranium was destined for Iran, the Iranian Embassy in Tbilisi has issued a protest against these allegations. [Note: See 1 May for Iranian denial.]

—"Four Arrested in Ajaria Over 920 Grams of Smuggled Uranium," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 29 April 2000; in FBIS Document CEP20000503000009, 29 April 2000.

#### **25 April 2000**

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamel Kharazi charges that developing countries are being denied nuclear technology by industrialized nations. In Iran's statement at the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, Kharazi noted, "The main objective of these regimes, disguised under the pretext of nonproliferation, is to secure the dominance and exclusive possession of nuclear technology by developed countries."

—Reuters, 25 April 2000; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

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**1 May 2000**

Iran's embassy in Georgia denies 920 grams of uranium was seized in Ajaria last week. [Note: See 22 April 2000.] Prime-News of Tbilisi, Georgia reports four people attempting to smuggle the highly illegal uranium-238 were detained by Georgian authorities. Kamal Kharazi, Iran's foreign minister, denies any wrongdoing labeling such actions as instigated by the West in an attempt "to secure the dominance and exclusive possession of nuclear technology by developed countries."

—Bill Samii, "Tehran Complains About Access to Nuke Technology," *Iran Report*, 1 May 2000, Vol. 3, No. 17, [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org).

**1 May 2000**

London-based daily *Al-Hayat* reports that several of 13 people accused of spying on Iran for Israel were investigating the Bushehr nuclear power plant and nuclear cooperation with Russia and China.

—Muhammad Nun, *Al-Hayat* (London), 1 May 2000, in FBIS Document GMP20000501000050, 1 May 2000.

**11 May 2000**

Russian President Vladimir Putin has instituted changes to the 1992 presidential decree "On Controlling the Export of Nuclear Materials, Equipment and Technologies from the Russian Federation" that permit Russia to supply nuclear technologies and materials to countries whose nuclear programs are not fully monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This is reportedly Moscow's response to the US Congress's passage of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, which imposes sanctions against Russian companies suspected of supplying Iran with prohibited technologies and materials. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Atomic Energy stated that Russia's ability to export nuclear materials and technologies has been "broadened considerably." It is believed that Putin revised his predecessor's decree in order to expedite the implementation of a contract with Teheran in the near future. Russia is currently building two reactors for the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr. The contract won by the Atomic Energy Ministry is worth about \$800 million. In addition, Moscow and Tehran are holding talks on the construction of three more nuclear facilities in Iran, valued at \$2 billion. Iran already operates two nuclear reactors at the Bushehr plant that are potentially capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium. These plants are monitored by the IAEA. Several other plants, however, are not being monitored. This is the reason the United States asserted that Russia's assistance is helping Iran acquire a nuclear weapon capability.

—Mikhail Kozyrev, "Russia Authorizes Itself to Cooperate With Iran," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 11 May 2000, p. 20; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com), 7 June 2000.

**16 May 2000**

At the sixth Review Conference of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi says Iran is committed to the treaty and favors a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

—"Kharazi Stresses Iran's Nuclear Programs Above Board," IRNA (Tehran), 16 May 2000, in FBIS Document IAP20000516000037, 16 May 2000.

**17 May 2000**

In a meeting with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in Iran, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency Mohammed Al-Baradi says Iran's nuclear activities adhere to international law and that cooperation between Iran and the IAEA has been good.

—"IAEA: Iran Nuclear Program Conforms With Regulations," IRNA (Tehran), 17 May 2000, in FBIS Document IAP20000517000058, 17 May 2000.

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### 18 May 2000

*Vision of the Islamic Republic* of Iran reports both Mohammad Al-Baradi, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, met to discuss the need to establish a Middle East nuclear-free zone. Al-Baradi further emphasized the agency's desire to provide assistance to Iran in other areas of cooperation besides the Bushehr nuclear power plant such as health, agriculture, industry, and hydrology.

—"Visiting IAEA Official Meets Head of Atomic Energy Organization," BBC, 18 May 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### 19 May 2000

Iran asked the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for help in operating a center for nuclear studies. Iran denies reports that it is trying to develop nuclear weapons rather it seeks help from western experts to ensure that existing nuclear projects are following the highest international safety standards. On 17 May, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, informed the director of the IAEA, Mohammed Al-Baradi that Iran wishes to obtain more of its support. Aqazadeh invited the IAEA to supervise a nuclear education center located west of Tehran. A prominent official in the Iranian Atomic Energy Agency stated recently that Iran's first energy producing nuclear reactor (with Russian support) located at the Gulf port of Bushehr does not have the highest quality of supervision due to the imposed western sanction on "dual-use" technology. Iran said that western sanctions hinder attempts to obtain 10% of the energy that Iran needs for the next two decades by using nuclear energy.

—"Iran asks the Energy Agency (IAEA) for help to operate a center for nuclear studies," *Al-Zaman* (London), 19 May 2000, p. 3.

### 22 May 2000

Iranian ambassador to Russia Mehdi Safar says construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is nearly 40% finished. Safar says Iran and Russia are discussing the construction of four total units at Bushehr, a deal which would be worth \$3.5 billion total. [Note: A previous report said Iran had agreed to construction of an additional three reactors, one at Bushehr and the other two at a location not yet specified. See 4 April 2000.]

—"Russia, Iran View Progress In Bushehr Nuclear Plant Build," Interfax (Moscow), 22 May 2000, in FBIS Document CEP20000522000156, 22 May 2000.

### 29 May 2000

Bulgarian customs arrests a Kurd named Hanafi Yukazan with a container of highly enriched uranium. The arrest leads to a US investigation into smuggling of uranium and plutonium to Iran and Iraq from Ukraine.

—"Bulgarian Sources: US Tracking Ring Smuggling Uranium, Plutonium to Iraq, Iran," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), 27 December 2000, in FBIS Document GMP20001227000062, 27 December 2000.

### 1 June 2000

*Nucleonics Week* reports that unless the United States ends its antagonism to Iran's nuclear development program, senior Iranian officials said, Iran will not sign INFCIRC-540 (the "Additional Protocol" for more intrusive IAEA safeguards). A senior Iranian diplomat told *Nucleonics Week* on 8 May that some disarmament and arms control Iranian officials have proposed committing Iran to INFCIRC-540, but "Tehran always replies by asking us whether signing it will mean that the US stops harassing our nuclear development program, and so far the answer has been no." Iranian officials point out that their country signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) yet the United States "persists in making claims that we have a program to produce chemical weapons. Our implementing the CWC hasn't stopped the US from continuing its propaganda war against our industry." The

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Iranian diplomat also noted, "So we have no assurance that if we agree to the Additional Protocol, the US will stop attacking our nuclear program." Iran has never been cited a violation of its safeguard agreement and remains a member in good standing of the NPT. However, as one European safeguards official stated, "It is generally understood but never publicly acknowledged (by the IAEA), that Iran is one of the key targets, not Australia or Sweden." [Note: See 1 June 2000 and 31 May 2002 for more on Iran and the Additional Protocol.]

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran Won't Accept More Inspections Unless US Stops Nuclear Blockade," *Nucleonics Week*, Vol. 41, No. 22, 1 June 2000, [www.mbenergy.com](http://www.mbenergy.com).

#### **1 June 2000**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeney Adamov says US efforts to persuade Iran not cooperate in the nuclear field with Iran "should be viewed as a desire to deprive Russian factories of orders."

—"Russian Minister Rejects US 'Economic Pressure' Over Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 1 June 2000, in FBIS Document CEP20000601000135, 1 June 2000.

#### **1 June 2000**

Arms control critics in the United States, such as Senator Jon Kyl, feel that Iran and other "rogue" states could develop nuclear weapons without testing them. Kyl said, "Although nuclear testing is essential to maintaining the sophisticated nuclear weapons in the US arsenal today, it is not required to develop relatively simple first-generation nuclear devices, like those sought by Iran and Iraq." He further said on 5 June 2000 in Washington that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) couldn't stop the nuclear weapons program of any "rogue" state.

Russia, unlike the United States, has developed the capability of increasing the production of nuclear weapons without violating the CTBT. Therefore, they will continue to oppose Senate ratification of the CTBT, which is useless at a time when China, North Korea, and Russia transfer nuclear weapons and missile technology to Iran, Libya, and Syria, critics added.

—"Iran Could Develop Nuke Weapons Without Tests," *Middle East Newline*, Vol. 2, No. 216, 7 June 2000, [www.menewline.com](http://www.menewline.com).

#### **26 June 2000**

Iranian President Mohammed Khatami says that Iran had good relations with China, but had not discussed the issue of nuclear cooperation with Chinese officials. According to Khatami, discussions between China and Iran focused on economic, industrial, and technological cooperation. A Chinese government spokesman said that Khatami's visit to China had nothing to do with military cooperation. His statement was an apparent response to Western suspicions that Iran and China share weapons technology, including missile technology.

—Muhammad Nun, "Iran's Khatami on Nuclear Issue, US Accusations, Peace Process," *Al-Hayat*, 26 June 2000, pp. 1, 6; FBIS Document GMP20000626000034, 26 June 2000; "Khatami denies nuclear links," Reuters, 26 June 2000; in *South China Morning Post*, 26 June 2000, [www.scmp.com](http://www.scmp.com).

#### **6 July 2000**

President Mohammad Khatami stated at a July 6 meeting that "while the Islamic Republic of Iran is the front runner of nuclear disarmament, we are being accused of trying to obtain these weapons. We are seeking nuclear technology only for the development of the country and not for any other purposes." On July 2, state radio condemned allegations by German intelligence chief August Hanning that Iran is working on a secret program to enrich uranium for use in weapons. One day before Khatami's comment, Kazakhstan security forces detained three people who were smuggling Uranium-235, which "was expected to be brought to Afghanistan and then, ...to Iran," Moscow's NTV reported.

—"Nuclear Allegations Protested," *Iran Report*, Vol. 3, No. 27, 17 July 2000; "Iran: President Khatami Says Iran

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'Front Runner of Nuclear Disarmament," Tehran Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 July 2000; in FBIS Document IAP20000706000047, 6 July 2000.

### **3 August 2000**

At a meeting between Iranian Energy Minister Habibollah Bitaraf and Russian Minister for Industry, Science and Technology Alexander Dondukov in Moscow, the two nations vow to increase cooperation on nuclear power engineering, oil, and gas. Russian spokesperson Vadim Lazutin says, "Iran is interested in furthering cooperation with Russia primarily in the nuclear power engineering sphere as well as in oil and gas shipments."

—Agence France-Presse, 3 August 2000; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

### **9 August 2000**

The CIA publishes a report that says in 1999, Russia was one of Iran's main sources of parts and technology for the creation of weapons of mass destruction.

—"Iran: Radio Comments On Russia's Rejecting US Report on Weapons Transfers," *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 11 August 2000, in FBIS Document IAP20000811000057, 11 August 2000.

### **26 August 2000**

Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani addresses the nuclear threat to Iran and its response. "We have neighbors who, due to international competition, have gained nuclear weapons," he says. "We do recognize that it is their right to have such capabilities, and they have apparently done so. We have no other alternatives but to defend ourselves in view of these developments. Although we are not trying to obtain non-conventional weapons, we must however, be able to protect ourselves against such threats."

—"Iran: Defense Minister Shamkhani Comments on Current Projects," *Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Network*, 26 August 2000, p. 1; in FBIS Document IAP20000826000059, 26 August 2000.

### **29 August 2000**

At an inter-parliamentary conference in New York, the speaker of Iran's parliament Mahdi Karrubi, says "it is imperative that serious action be taken to achieve total elimination of nuclear weapons."

—"Iranian Majiles Speaker Karrubi Addresses Inter-Parliamentary Session In NY," IRNA (Tehran), 30 August 2000.

### **17 September 2000**

At the 44th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, renews Iran's call for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

"After about three decades of international efforts," he says, "it is however quite unfortunate to see Israel still roaming around without showing any signs of tendency towards embracing Non-Proliferation Treaty and other international legally binding instruments in this regards."

—"Iran Urges Pressure on Israel To Accede to Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in ME," IRNA (Tehran), 17 September 2000, in FBIS Document IAP20000918000065, 18 September 2000.

### **19 September 2000**

The *New York Times* reports that the United States has been pressing Russia not to proceed with plans to sell Iran laser technology. US officials say that this technology can be used to make nuclear weapons. Since July, US President Bill Clinton has raised the prospective sale of laser technology at least two times in meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin told Clinton that Russia would work with Washington to resolve the issue. Officials said it was scheduled to be discussed over the weekend by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency. US officials said they were encouraged by Putin's statement but they also called the response ambiguous, due to the dual-use

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nature of the laser technology. The US administration complained about the possible sale of laser equipment after a US corporate nuclear fuel provider abandoned the project, deciding that it was not economically competitive in a civilian nuclear program. The United States apparently believes that the technology is too expensive for refining nuclear fuel for commercial use, and is mostly suited to producing fissile material for bombs. A US administration nuclear expert said he believes that the US team of experts had made a "very persuasive technical case" and that the equipment the Russian institute is trying to sell Iran could not be used efficiently for other than military purposes. "I cannot conceive of this type of equipment being used for any other purpose other than the one we are concerned about," the official said. Boris Yatsenko, director of the Science and Technology Center of Microtechnology, a unit of the Russian government's D.V. Efremov Institute of St. Petersburg, in an email sent to the *New York Times*, said his institute was planning to sell the equipment, which he said was solely for "medical, industrial, and scientific purposes." He said that the average power of the laser would be 15-20W. The American expert said that according to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the threshold for the type of "copper vapor" laser the institute is planning to sell Iran is 40W. While the institute's lasers are less powerful than the suppliers group threshold, "they can still be of concern," he added. "It depends on how Iran is planning to use them, on what other equipment Russian is selling, and what the entire system looks like." Yatsenko also stated, "Our scientists and technicians will execute maintenance and guarantee support of the deliverable equipment during agreed periods." He also made it clear that the organization did not need the government's approval because he stated that the equipment was purely for nonmilitary purposes.

—Judith Miller, "US Asks Putin Not to Sell Iran a Laser System," *New York Times*, 19 September 2000, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com); Judith Miller, "Russia Sends Mixed Signals on Laser System Sale to Iran," *New York Times*, 20 September 2000, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com).

#### **20 September 2000**

*The Telegraph* of London reports the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believes Iran's nuclear weapons capability is advancing at a rapid pace, sufficiently enough to allow Iran to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching London or New York within the next decade. The CIA lists Iran as one of five countries that pose a risk to international security. Norman Schindler, Deputy Director of the CIA, says "Iran is attempting to develop the capability to produce both plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and it is actively pursuing the acquisition of fissile material and the expertise and technology necessary to form the material into nuclear weapons."

—Michael Smith, *Calgary Herald*, 27 September 2000, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **21 September 2000**

Russia halts the sale of laser technology to Iran because of US concerns it could be used to make nuclear weapons. "We think that the equipment meant for Iran does not fall under limits of the international exports regime," says Yuri Bepalko, spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom). "Nevertheless, the topic is sensitive, especially for the United States, and a decision has been made to give the issue more thorough consideration. This is being done by two commissions, Russian and American." The technology would have come from the Yefremov Scientific Research Institute in St. Petersburg, part of Minatom. The institute's director of microtechnology says the equipment, with an average capacity of 15 to 20W, could be used only for medical, industrial, or scientific uses. Sources say the deal may go through if the Russian and American commissions conclude the technology cannot be used for military uses.

—"Russia: Experts Believe Freeze on Laser Deal With Iran 'Temporary'," *Interfax* (Moscow), 21 September 2000, in FBIS Document CEP20000921000163, 21 September 2000.

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### **October 2000**

Officials in Russia confirm that they will stop a shipment of a laser isotope separator to Iran, which the US government believes will be used for the production of weapons grade uranium. Yuri Bepalko, the head of public relations for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry says in an interview that depending on approval by US and Russian commissions, the deal could proceed. Boris Yatsenko, the director of Microtechnology at the Yefremov Scientific Research Institute, the laboratory that was going to sell Iran the laser says that the laser, which is only 15-20W, is "intended 'only for medical, industrial and scientific purposes'." Also, at 15-20W, the laser is considerably lower than the 40W threshold imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a group of 34 countries that agreed to impose export controls on dual-use material that could be used for weapons production. The US Enrichment Corporation, a private nuclear fuel provider that inherited the US government's laser program says that though the technology works, it does not yield enough uranium to make it viable.

—Alex Wagner, "Moscow Puts Hold on Transfer of Laser Isotope Separator to Iran," *Arms Control Today*, October 2000, [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org), accessed 7 February 2002.

### **18 October 2000**

Mohammad Khatami, Iran's president, tells Sergei Ivanov, secretary of Russia's National Security Council, that Iran has the right to use nuclear technology. Khatami stresses the importance of adhering to international norms related to nuclear technology, stating Iran's cooperation with Russia to build a nuclear power plant in Iran is testament to Iran's adherence to international law.

—"Khatami Stresses Right to Use Nuclear Technology," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 18 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **16 November 2000**

Major General Uzi Dayan, head of the Israeli National Security Council, tells Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov that Israel is concerned about Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. Ivanov replies that Russia is helping Iran with the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

—"Israel-Russia's Ivanov-Transfer of Nuclear 'Know-How' to Iran to Continue," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 16 November 2000, in FBIS Document GMP20001116000160, 16 November 2000.

### **28 November 2000**

After visiting Iran, Russian State Duma Deputy Kurban-Ali Amirov says Iran is unhappy with the progress of construction at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He says the Iranians said Western companies work faster and are more specific about deadlines. He says the Iranians said "it has become hard to have dealings with Russian business."

—"Russia: Iran Displeased With Deadline For Completing Bushehr Nuclear Plant," *Interfax* (Moscow), 28 November 2000, in FBIS Document CEP20001128000216, 28 November 2000.

### **30 November 2000**

Russian Atomic Energy Ministry spokesman Andrei Yedemsky says Russia will get a contract to build a second reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, a deal worth about \$1 billion. [Note: See 14 January, 4 April and 22 May 2000.]

—"Russia To Build 2nd Unit At Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant," *Interfax* (Moscow), 30 November 2000, in FBIS Document CEP20001130000317, 30 November 2000.

### **14 December 2000**

Russia and Iran issue a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to the nonproliferation of weapons of mass

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destruction, following a bilateral meeting in Tehran.

—"Russia, Iran Confirm Adherence To Nuclear Nonproliferation," Interfax (Moscow), 14 December 2000, in FBIS Document CEP20001217000050, 14 December 2000.

#### **20 December 2000**

The Iranian newspaper *Hayat-e No* reports that within the next year, Iranian authorities will permanently evacuate the villages surrounding the uncompleted Bushehr reactors. An unnamed official states, "A team of European experts is at the Bushehr site now to examine the possible effects of radiation" and adds that the two reactors are expected to be operational in 2004.

—Agence France-Presse, 20 December 2000; in *Gulf* 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **26 December 2000**

The Atommash association in Volgodonsk begins shipping parts for the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—Arkadiy Yuzhnyy, "'Putin's Lamp' Will Light Up In Iran," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 26 December 2000, in FBIS Document CEP20001226000143, 26 December 2000.

#### **27 December 2000**

*Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* of London reports that the United States is investigating a ring smuggling uranium and plutonium to Iran and Iraq from Ukraine. The ring was discovered when Bulgarian customs arrested on 29 May a Kurd named Hanafi Yukazan with a container of highly enriched uranium.

—"Bulgarian Sources: US Tracking Ring Smuggling Uranium, Plutonium to Iraq, Iran," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), 27 December 2000, in FBIS Document GMP20001227000062, 27 December 2000.

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## **1999**

### **1999**

Iran allocates \$150 million for this year's work on building the Bushehr nuclear power plant, up from \$100 million in 1998. [Note: See 11 October 1998 entry for a slightly different amount.]

—"Iranians To Learn In Russia How To Operate Nuclear Power Plant," Middle East News Items, 4 February 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **9 January 1999**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, says construction will begin this year on the first reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He says the first unit is between 30 and 40% complete. He says Minatom is negotiating a deal to build a second unit at Bushehr. He says a joint Russian-Iranian team of technicians is being formed to run the plant and should be formed by 2000 or 2001. One thousand Russians are now working at Bushehr, and more will work there this year, he says.

—"Russia To Start Bushehr Reactor Construction, Negotiate Second Deal—Minister," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 10 January 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **12 January 1999**

US National Security Advisor Samuel Berger announces US sanctions against three Russian entities for aiding Iran's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The entities are the D. Mendeleyev University of Chemical Technology, the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology, and the Moscow Aviation Institute.

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"The administration has authority to act against entities that violate nonproliferation standards," Berger says, "and we will use that authority to protect our security. In the end, though, the most effective shield against proliferation from Russia is not US penalties, but a Russian export control system that is designed to work and does." Twelve Russian corporations and institutes are barred from buying US goods, exporting to the United States, or selling to the US government because they have aided Iran's weapons programs. Yevgeniy Primakov, the Russian Prime Minister calls the action "counterproductive to US-Russian relations." A statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign affairs defends the companies by saying that their actions were consistent with Russian legislations and Russian obligations in the international agreements of non-proliferation.

—Howard Diamond, "US Sanctions Russian Entities for Iranian Dealings," *Arms Control Today*, January/February 1999, [www.armscontrol.org](http://www.armscontrol.org), accessed 7 February 2002; "US Penalizes Russian Institutions For Nuke Aid To Iran," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 13 January 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **13 January 1999**

Pavel Sarkisov, rector of the D.I. Mendeleyev Russian Chemical-Technical University, says that his university had nothing to do with the sale of missile technology to Iran. Sarkisov says that the university deals with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, that the Department of Physical Chemistry trains specialists and conducts studies of zirconium for the nuclear industry, but this research is not secret and does not involve the export of nuclear technology. Sarkisov adds that the university has no contracts with Iran in the areas of zirconium research or the burial of spent nuclear fuel, and has not trained personnel for Iran in the past 15 years, although an Iranian post-graduate at the university is conducting non-military-related research on the synthesis of polystyrene. [Note: See 12 January 1999.]

—"RKhTU im. Mendeleyeva oprovergayet fakt prodazhi raketnykh tekhnologiy Iranu," Interfax, No. 2, 13 January 1999.

### **13 January 1999**

The Iranian embassy in Moscow denies any knowledge of two institutes alleged to have cooperated with Iran's missile and nuclear weapons programs [presumably the Design Institute of Power Technology and the Moscow Aviation Institute] and says that Iranian students are studying only humanities at Moscow University. [Note: See 12 January 1999.] Moscow University was not mentioned by US National Security Adviser Samuel Berger in his list of entities under sanction. It is unclear if the embassy is referring to another allegation of cooperation that included the University of Moscow or if one of the three entities listed by Berger are affiliated with the university.]

—"Iran Denies Nuclear Cooperation With Russian Institutes," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 13 January 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **14 January 1999**

Russian officials express displeasure at the US sanctions aimed against three Russian institutes for allegedly aiding Iran's missile and nuclear weapons programs. "Strong-arm measures or sanctions against our organizations are counterproductive for Russian-American relations," says Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov. Pavel D. Sarkisov, rector of Mendeleyev University, one of the three penalized institutes, says the school's graduates are not trained in handling weapons-grade nuclear material or making nuclear weapons. "My theory of how our institute has ended up on the blacklist is that probably some of our former students were hired on an individual basis by someone commissioned by Iran to create its nuclear defense complex," Sarkisov says. "We could have helped Iran if we wanted to, but we never did." [Note: See 12 and 13 January 1999.]

—"Russia Voices Ire Over US Sanctions on 3 Institutes; Diplomacy: Officials In Moscow Deny Helping Iran Develop Nuclear Arms, Say Punitive Action is Hypocritical," *Los Angeles Times*, 14 January 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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#### **14 January 1999**

A spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry says that Russia will increase its staff working on the Bushehr nuclear power project in Iran over the next few months from 300 workers to 1,000 workers. Russia is currently assisting Iran in building a 1,000MW light water reactor at Bushehr, which both countries insist is strictly for peaceful nuclear energy. The Russian spokesman says that the increase in staff is aimed at helping to meet the construction deadline, which for the first unit is set at May 2003. Iranian TV covered the story on 15 January 1999. The worker increase may be a response to the announcement that the United States will impose sanctions against three Russian institutes due to the export of sensitive technology to Iran.

—"Russia To Triple Number Of Nuclear Experts In Iran," Adam Tanner, Reuters, 14 January 1999, [www.yahoo.co.uk](http://www.yahoo.co.uk); "Russia To Triple Staff At Iran Nuclear Plant," Inquisit, BBC, 15 January 1999.

#### **20 January 1999**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov says that the United States has not provided any information to justify the sanctions imposed upon three Russian institutions accused of providing assistance to Iran's missile and nuclear programs. Adamov says Russia does not want neighboring states to acquire nuclear weapons. According to Adamov, "The Russian special service strictly control[s] enterprises and institutes with nuclear technologies."

[Note: See 12, 13, 14 January 1999.]

—"Russia: US Gave No Evidence of Nuclear Accord Violations," Interfax (Moscow), 20 January 1999; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-99-020, 20 January 1999.

#### **21 January 1999**

*Foreign Report* reports that the Israeli Mossad estimates that as many as 10,000 Russians are helping Iran's unconventional weapons programs. The journal also reports that Israeli officials believe Russian scientists may have smuggled a supercomputer into Iran that could aid a nuclear weapon program.

—Arieh O'Sullivan, Douglas Davis, "'Foreign Report:' 10,000 Russian Experts In Iran," *Jerusalem Post*, 21 January 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **25 January 1999**

In an interview with the Russian television company NTV, secretary of the Russian Security Council and chief of staff of the President Nikolay Bordyuzha says, "We, the same as the United States, are not interested in Iran getting nuclear and missile technologies." He noted, "There is a commission on export control, which is headed by First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov. Some organizing measures were taken for preventing the leakage of missile and nuclear technologies not just to Iran, but, in general, away from Russia."

—ITAR-TASS, 25 January 1998; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **29 January 1999**

*Russia Today* reports that advertisements placed in the Iranian press by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran say that Iran seeks to recruit engineers to receive training in Russia for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The advertisements say that a total of 225 engineers were needed, with expertise in physics, nuclear physics, mechanical engineering, or computer science. Applicants must be Iranian nationals, and successful candidates will be sent to Russia after a short period of training in Iran. The advertisements appeared despite the recent imposition of sanctions on Russian research institutes, and threats to curtail space cooperation, by the United States.

—"Iran Recruits Engineers for Nuclear Training in Russia," *Russia Today*, 29 January 1999, [www.russiatoday.com](http://www.russiatoday.com).

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### **29 January 1999**

The Russian Atomstroyeksport company says that Iran and Russia are exploring further nuclear cooperation. Iran proposes that Russia starts the construction of a third unit in Bushehr.

—Oleg Lebedev, "Russia proposes Further Nuclear Power Cooperation With Iran," RIA (Moscow), 9 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990209001331, 9 February 1999.

### **February 1999**

Iran agrees to buy turbines from a factory in St. Petersburg, Russia. The deal would add significantly to the \$850 million contract for Russia to build the nuclear reactor at Bushehr.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **3 February 1999**

Radio reports from the United Kingdom report that the first group of Iranian nuclear scientists will go to Russia in March 1999, as part of a contract related to the Bushehr nuclear power project. Thirty-eight Iranian nuclear engineer specialists will soon leave for Russia, where they will receive training in nuclear energy. The students are expected to stay in Russia for 13 months or more.

—"Russia Confirmed Its Plans for Nuclear Cooperation with Iran." *Etelaat* (Farsi Version), 4 February 1999.

### **4 February 1999**

Intel and Sun Microsystems say they have no current business with three Russian institutes against whom the United States recently applied sanctions for allegedly aiding Iran's missile and nuclear weapons programs. But the US companies say the Russian institutes may have already acquired their technology.

—"Intel and Sun Warned Not To Deal With Institutes Working With Iran," *Middle East News*, 4 February 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **12 February 1999**

Russian machine-building company Izhorskiye Zavody of St. Petersburg begins production of equipment for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The company received its first advanced payment in late December 1998, an undisclosed amount, and will build the reactor vessel, the steam generator casing, the "lid for the No. 1 unit," and "inner appliances." Production is expected to take three years.

—"Russian Company Starts Building Nuclear Power Equipment For Iran," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 12 February 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **12 February 1999**

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens says, "We know that [the Iranian nuclear program] isn't going smoothly. But with the help of foreigners, the Russians and others, I think in time they can achieve operational capacity."

—"Arens: Iran Nuclear Capability Overblown," *Jerusalem Post*, 12 February 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **16 February 1999**

*Yediot Aharonot* reports that intelligence sources say that Iran has crossed the point of no return in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Western efforts to prevent Iran from such acquisition have failed. These sources say that it is only a matter of time and Iran will have a nuclear weapon.

—Alex Fishman, "Iran's Nuclear Development Reached 'Point of No Return'," *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv) 16 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS 19990216001294, 16 February 1999.

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### **18 February 1999**

Gennadiy Kulik, Russian deputy prime minister, says Russia will fulfill its commitment to Iran to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Russia To Carry Out Its Commitments Regarding Bushehr Plant—Minister," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 18 February 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **18 February 1999**

Iranian President Mohammed Khatami visits Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. Khatami wants construction of the first phase to finish soon, fulfilling government hopes that the plant will help boost Iran's weak economy. He says the plant will "show the world Iran's technical capabilities." Khatami says that the Bushehr project would provide 3,500 jobs in Iran and be "a brilliant star" in the country's economy.

—"Khatami Wants N-Plant Readied Earlier," *Dawn* (Karachi), 20 February 1999, [www.dawn.com](http://www.dawn.com); "Khatami Defense Bushehr Power Plant," *Dawn*, 18 February 1999, [www.dawn.com](http://www.dawn.com).

### **25 February 1999**

Several Russian officials deny Russia's alleged illicit cooperation with Iran on nuclear missile technologies. The officials included Speaker of the Russian Duma Gennadiy Seleznev, a spokesman for Russian General and Vocational Education Minister Vladimir Filippov, Rector of the D.I. Mendeleev Russian Chemical-Technological University Pavel Sarkisov, former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Rector of Moscow Aviation Institute Aleksandr Matviyenko, and Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeev.

—"Seleznev Denies Claimed Russian Cooperation with Iran," Interfax, 25 February 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990225000895, 25 February 1999; "USA Imposes Sanctions on Russian Firms Suspected of Nuclear Links to Iran," ITAR-TASS, 25 February 1999; Ekho Moskvyy Radio, 25 February 1999; in "Iranians at Russian Institute Comply with Nuclear Agreements - Rector," Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com), 26 February 1999; Interfax, 25 February 1999; in "Russian Minister Denies US Claims of Nuclear Cooperation with Iran"; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com), 27 February 1999.

### **March 1999**

Russian Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov publishes an article in *Yadernyy Kontrol*. Mikhailov says that agreements with Iran are being developed along the lines of the Bushehr project. Mikhailov attributes the three-year delay in execution of the project to relocating the site from the seismically active northern region of the country, proposed earlier by the Iranians, to its present location in 1995. Additional time was lost because of Iran's insistence on carrying out the construction and maintenance work independently. After Iran made no tangible progress, Minatom took full charge of the construction in 1998; currently there are 600 Russian specialists working on the site. Mikhailov also explains that the Iranian offer for cooperation in uranium mining and enrichment was similar to Minatom's agreement with China, where Russia is building a gas centrifuge plant. Mikhailov asserts that despite criticism by Russian opposition political parties and the United States, Russia must continue its nuclear cooperation with Iran if it wants to retain its allies in the Persian Gulf region and in the Islamic world in general. —Viktor Mikhailov, "Minatom i Mezhdunarodnoye Sotrudnitchestvo" [Minatom and International Cooperation], *Yadernyy Kontrol*, Vol. 2, March-April 1999, pp. 62-66.

### **11 March 1999**

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami announces at a state dinner in Rome that his country will work towards the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Khatami's meeting with Massimo D'Alema, Italy's Prime Minister, signifies a relationship in which, he states, "Iran and Italy can work together towards opposing all forms of

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violence, aggression, terrorism, racial and ethnic discrimination, as well as the proliferation of nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction."

—"Iranian Leader Offers to Curb Nuclear Arms/'We Can Work Towards Opposing All Forms of Violence, Aggression and Terrorism'," *The Australian*, 11 March 1999, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **16 March 1999**

Kamal Kharazi, Iranian foreign affairs minister meets with Mohammed Al-Baradi the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency and Wolfgang Hoffman, the executive secretary of the organization of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Kharazi reiterates the peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program and calls for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. Kharazi also thanks the International Atomic Energy Agency for its support for Iran against US criticism.

—IRNA 16 March 1999; in "Iran's Kharazi Meets IAEA, CTBT Chiefs in Vienna," FBIS Document FTS19990316001825.

#### **17 March 1999**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russian minister of atomic energy, says that Russia has proposed that the United States lift all sanctions imposed on two leading Russian nuclear research centers in exchange for the complete cessation of the centers' cooperation with Iran. [Note: See 12 January 1997.] The aim of the proposal is to reinstate valuable contracts between the United States and the institutions. Adamov proposed signing a separate agreement for each institution: one for the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Energy Technologies (NIKIET), and one for the D.I. Mendeleyev Russian Chemical-Technological University. NIKIET was preparing a contract to sell a research reactor to Iran, but the Russian government decided not to sell the reactor. A US expert said that NIKIET was the focus of US concerns, because it is the principal Russian entity that could have provided assistance beyond the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The D.I. Mendeleyev Russian Chemical-Technological University provided unclassified information on heavy water technologies to Iran. According to a senior US official, Adamov allegedly has Prime Minister Primakov's support for putting forward the proposals. Under Adamov's proposal, a procedure would be established to resolve future disputes regarding the provision of Russian nuclear technology to Iran. The US Department of Energy has been so worried about the safety implications of the sanctions that it secretly appealed to the White House, asking that some exceptions be made so that important safety work could go forward, a US official said.

—Michael R. Gordon, "Russia to Offer US Deal to End Iran Nuclear Aid," *New York Times*, 17 March 1999; "Moskva gotova svernut raboty s Iranom v obmen na snyatiye SShA sanktsiy v otnoshenii dvukh rossiyskikh yadernykh NII," Interfax, No. 1, 17 March 1999; "Russia to Expand Peaceful Nuclear Programs in Iran," Interfax, No. 2, 17 March 1999.

#### **22 March 1999**

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov agree to set up a joint committee to oversee the transfer of non-conventional weapons technology to Iran. Netanyahu says during the meeting with Primakov that Iran does not possess a missile that is able to reach Israel. Prime Minister Primakov refuses to answer questions as to whether Russia was granting Iran assistance in the nuclear field.

—"Committee to Oversee Russian Technology Transfers to Iran," *Qol Yisrael*, 22 March 1999, FBIS Document FTS19990322001172, 22 March 1999.

#### **April 1999**

Izhorskiye Zavody of St. Petersburg begins producing equipment for the primary circuit, reactor vessel, steam generator casing and internals for the Bushehr reactor in Iran.

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—"Iran Nuclear Milestones," *The Risk Report*, Volume 6, Number 4, July-August 2000, accessed in [www.wisconsinproject.org](http://www.wisconsinproject.org).

#### **April 1999**

US intelligence reports that at least four subsidiaries of the Czech company Skoda, among them Skoda-Praga and Skoda-Plzen, were negotiating with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy regarding the Bushehr atomic power plant. However, the Czech subsidiaries back out under US pressure.

—Vladimir Lapskiy, "Sol Na Ranu Vashingtona," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 19 May 1999, p. 7.

#### **2 April 1999**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russian minister of atomic energy, rejects comments by Viktor Mikhailov, former Russian minister of atomic energy, that Russia might stop nuclear cooperation with Iran. Adamov says Mikhailov's remarks do not represent the thinking of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and that they stem from Mikhailov's failure to "develop" the Bushehr nuclear power plant project while he was minister.

—"Atomic Energy Minister Stresses Continued Cooperation With Iran," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 April 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **4 April 1999**

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu asks the US Congress to wait six months before applying sanctions against Russia or Russian entities for exporting dangerous items to Iran to see if Russia halts the exports on its own. The request is believed to be the result of a meeting the week prior between Netanyahu and Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov. Netanyahu had previously asked the United States to impose sanctions against Russia for exporting items to Iran. One unnamed congressman replied that if the US does not apply sanctions, Iran will have nuclear weapons in six months.

—"Israel: USA Reportedly Angry At Netanyahu's 'New Policy' Towards Russia," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 5 April 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **13 April 1999**

Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens calls for severing Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. At the same time, Russia says that it will honor its agreements and will work to reach new agreements with Iran.

—Sajedi report from Moscow, *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 13 April 1999; in "Israel Objects to Russia-Iran Nuclear Cooperation"; FBIS Documents FTS19990413000894, 13 April 1999.

#### **23 April 1999**

Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, Russian deputy minister of atomic energy, says Russia has made a "technical and commercial proposal" to Iran for the construction of a second unit at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Russia Offers To Construct Nuclear Power Unit In Iran," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 April 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **3 May 1999**

The *Jerusalem Post* reports that Chinese leaders have informed Israeli President Ezer Weizman that China will not supply Middle Eastern countries with "weapons that could pose a threat to Israel." The pledge follows Weizman's visit to China, during which he discussed the issue of Chinese missile and nuclear assistance to Iran with Chinese government officials.

—Batsheva Tsur, "China Vows Not to Sell Nukes to Iran," *Jerusalem Post*, 3 May 1999, p. 3; in Lexis-Nexis, 3 May 1999, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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### **7 May 1999**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov says that Iran has officially offered to expand its cooperation with Russia on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and explore the possibility of building a second unit at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Adamov says that both sides should carefully study the feasibility of constructing a second reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He adds that Russia has not yet decided on this offer, and it is preparing a reply to the Iranian proposal. Adamov does not rule out the possibility of Iran awarding the contract to another country after it examines Russia's reply. Russia is continuing the work on the first block, which "is going actively enough, strictly in line with the contract," Adamov says.

—"Iran Offers to Expand Nuclear Cooperation," Interfax, 8 May 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990508000294, 8 May 1999.

### **19 May 1999**

After Iranian President Mohammad Khatami's five-day state visit to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Saudi Arabia issue a joint statement in which the two countries "expressed their support for turning the Middle East into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, expressing their absolute belief that Israel's policy, based on producing and stockpiling types of weapons of mass destruction and its non-compliance with international laws and treaties poses a real and serious threat to peace and security in the region."

—"Saudi, Iranian Leaders Issue Joint Statement," SPA (Riyadh), 19 May 1999; in BBC (London), 19 May 1999, [www.bbc.co.uk](http://www.bbc.co.uk).

### **19 May 1999**

*Rossiyskaya Gazeta* reports that Russia has almost completed construction of the first unit of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. Russia will earn around \$1 billion for the completion of the first unit. About 1000 Russian specialists are currently working on the second reactor at Bushehr. Many potential suppliers and builders of atomic power plants have backed out of cooperating with Iran in the nuclear field due to US pressure.

—Vladimir Lapskiy, "Sol Na Ranu Vashingtona," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 19 May 1999, p. 7.

### **24 May 1999**

*Iran Report* reports that several Russian companies are involved with the Bushehr nuclear power station in Iran: Electrosila signed an \$18 million contract to supply power generators; Izhorskiye Zavody of St. Petersburg signed a \$44 million agreement to supply a reactor; and the Leningrad Metal Factory is expected to sign a contract to provide turbines. In addition, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry is training 38 Iranian nuclear specialists at the Atomtekhnenergo facility. The Iranians will have the opportunity to make international connections because the facility already trains Bulgarian specialists, and will soon train Indian and Chinese nuclear scientists.

—Bill Samii, "Russia Rejects US Nuclear Worries," *Iran Report*, 24 May 1999, [www.rferl.org/iran-report](http://www.rferl.org/iran-report).

### **6 June 1999**

F. Dawlatabadi, the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry's department for the CIS and Caucasus, says that Iran and Russia are considering a plan to expand their cooperation in nuclear power engineering. Dawlatabadi says that the cooperation between the two countries is peaceful and both sides are working on a new phase of cooperation with regard to construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—Konstantin Kazeyev, "Iranian Official on Nuclear Cooperation with Russia," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 6 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990606000549, 6 June 1999.

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**6 June 1999**

The Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine in Karaj starts a three-week "regional training course" on "non-destructive nuclear testing." Officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency attend the course. Mohammad Haji, deputy of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran for safety system, says, "The purpose of the training course is to upgrade the scientific know-how and standardization of quality control in industries that need to conduct nuclear tests." Such industries include oil, petrochemicals, shipping, and airplane manufacturing, he says.

—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program" Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, <http://www.meib.org>; "Regional Training Course On Quality Control, Nuclear Tests Opens," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 June 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**8 June 1999**

Speaking at an international conference on the safety of Russia's power stations, Bulat Nigmatulin, the Russian Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy, says that Russia might sign new agreements to construct VVER-1000 [1000MW] nuclear power reactors in several countries, including Iran. Currently, Russia is building one VVER-1000 light water reactor in Iran. The cost to construct a VVER-1000 light water reactor is \$1.5 to \$2 billion. Nigmatulin states that Russian power stations "are equipped with highly safe reactors." He also announces that preliminary talks have begun with Iran [presumably on an additional reactor].

—"Russia May Build Other Nuclear Reactors Abroad," Interfax (Moscow), 8 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990609001048, 8 June 1999; "Russia to Build 'Modern' Nuclear Plants," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 9 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990609000383, 9 June 1999.

**11 June 1999**

The Iranian embassy in Baku expresses its concern to the Azeri authorities over alleged negotiations to dump of radioactive waste in the Caspian Sea. [Note: See also 24 October 1997.]

—IRIB Television (Tehran), 11 June 1999; in "Iran Contacts Azerbaijan Over Nuclear Waste in Caspian," FBIS Document 19990611001699.

**14 June 1999**

The *Iran Report* reports that a 1997 Georgian state chancellery document reveals that Iran obtained nuclear reactor equipment from Georgia for \$36,000. Iran is also reported to be seeking Georgian nuclear scientists for research at Iranian universities, a move made possible by Georgia's foundering economy.

—Bill Samii, "Iran's Kharrazi Visits Georgia," *Iran Report*, 14 June 1999, Vol. 2, No. 24, [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org).

**28 June 1999**

Russian Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin signs a directive permitting the Russian government to prepare for negotiations with Iran to build three new units at the Bushehr nuclear power station. If the negotiations are successful, Russia will earn \$2 billion, according to preliminary calculations. Discussions on this topic will take place during the visit of Iranian Interior Minister Abdul Wahid Musavi-Lari to Russia 29 June-1 July 1999. In May 1999, Iran put forward a proposal to Russia for building an additional unit at the Bushehr nuclear power station. According to Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Vladimir Vinogradov, Russia won the Bushehr contract despite competition from several European Union countries, and, apart from political considerations, Iran selected the Russian bid because Russian nuclear technology is cheaper than European technology. Russia refutes US allegations that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program and explains that the Bushehr contract stipulates the construction of VVER-1000 [1000MW light-water] nuclear reactors, which cannot produce sufficient plutonium for fabricating nuclear weapons. Moreover, the spent fuel would be returned to Russia. At present, Russia is building

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one VVER-1000 light water reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. This contract is worth more than \$800 million. Russian nuclear specialists expect to fulfill \$150 million of the Iranian contract in the current year. According to Minatom, the first unit is 30 to 40% complete.

—Dow Jones International News; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu); Ivan Gidasov and Mariya Ignatova, "Nash Milyy Yadernyy Drug [Our Dear Nuclear Friend]," *Izvestiya*, 30 June 1999, [www.roline.ru](http://www.roline.ru).

### **3 July 1999**

In a meeting with Majlis (Iranian parliament) Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, the deputy chairman of the Duma (Russia's lower house of parliament) Artur Chilingarov, says that the cooperation between Russia and Iran in constructing the Bushehr nuclear power plant was a model of bilateral cooperation. Chilingarov also says that Russia is prepared to expand scientific and technical relations with Iran.

—"Iran's Speaker, Russian Official Discuss Bushehr, Ties," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 3 July 1999, FBIS Document FTS19990703000671, 3 July 1999.

### **6 July 1999**

Deputy chairman of the Czech Republic's Chamber of Deputies Jiri Payne urges Industry Minister Miroslav Gregr not to support the possible delivery of Czech cooling facilities for an Iranian nuclear plant built with Russian assistance, as it could augment Iran's nuclear capacity. According to Payne, "This has unquestionable security impact on the whole region...."

—BBC Worldwide Monitoring — CTK News Agency — Prague, 6 July 1999; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **9 July 1999**

The *National Post* of Toronto reports that the United States is concerned over the possible sale of Canadian fusion technology and a tokamak fusion reactor to Iran. There is a possibility that this may constitute the sale of sensitive or dual-use technology. The Nuclear Control Institute, based in Washington, DC, says that even though Iran has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran might use the reactor to obtain weapons-grade plutonium. According to an unnamed senior US government official, Canadian officials in the Export Control division at the Foreign Affairs Ministry have assured the United States that Canada will not permit the export of fusion technology and the tokamak reactor to Iran. [Note: See 12, 14 July 1999.]

—Peter Morton, "Canada's Nuclear Deal with Iran Alarms the US," Robert Fife, *National Post* (Toronto), 9 July 1999, [www.nationalpost.com](http://www.nationalpost.com); Robert Fife, "Canada Set to Block Reactor Sale to Iran: US," *National Post* (Toronto), 14 July 1999, [www.nationalpost.com](http://www.nationalpost.com), (15 July 1999).

### **12 July 1999**

Reuters reports the Canadian Center for Fusion Magnetism, is currently discussing plans to provide Iran with nuclear technology know-how and an experimental reactor. [Note: See 9, 14 July 1999.]

—Bill Samii, "Iran Seeking Fusion Reactor?," *Iran Report*, 12 July 1999, Vol. 2, No. 28, [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org).

### **14 July 1999**

The Canadian Foreign Ministry gives the United States "strong assurances that Canada will block the proposed sale" of a fusion reactor to Iran.

—"Canada Not To Sell Fusion Reactor To Iran," *Xinshua*, 14 July 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **20 July 1999**

The US House of Representatives passes a measure to withhold funds from International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) programs that assist Iran in the construction of a nuclear power plant. The measure, sponsored by New

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Jersey Democratic Representative Robert Menendez, would allow the release of funds to the IAEA only if the secretary of state certifies that Iran is not using the money to acquire sensitive nuclear technology or for military uses.

—Ceci Connolly, Tom Edsall, *Washington Post*, 20 July 1999.

#### **20 July 1999**

Karel Samec, spokesman for Czech engineering company Skoda Plzen, says the company is negotiating a \$200 million contract with Iran for consulting work at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "In no case will we be supplying nuclear components or technology to Iran," he says. Jocelyn Greene, spokeswoman for the US embassy in the Czech Republic, says the United States opposes Czech nuclear cooperation with Iran.

—"Skoda Helps Bushehr," *Nuclear Engineering International*, 20 July 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **21 July 1999**

Iran condemns the decision by the US House of Representatives to stop the payment of the US share to the budget of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such action will prevent the IAEA from assisting Iran in the construction of its nuclear plants. The House of Representatives made the payment contingent on confirmation by the US Secretary of State that the funds will not go to assist Iran. [Note: See 20 July 1999.]

—Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 21 July 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990721000684, 21 July 1999.

#### **22 July 1999**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that the foreign affairs department of the Canadian government is expected to prepare a preliminary report within a month on plans to sell Canada's fusion energy research program to Iran. Sean Rowan, spokesman for the foreign affairs department, says the report will follow analyses by the Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB) and the department "to see where exactly the components and reactor as a whole fit into existing Canadian legislation." Managers at the Canadian Center for Magnetic Fusion in Varennes, Quebec have discussed selling the tokamak reactor, related equipment, and technology to a research center in Iran. The Center expects that the Iranians would hire about 10 researchers from Varennes as consultants. However, Rowan says that a sale would not take place for a long time and would be subject to extensive export control investigation. He says "obviously, fusion reactors are currently experimental and have not been proven capable of producing commercially viable energy nor nuclear explosive devices." In addition, Rowan notes that "Canada does have a policy of controlled engagement with Iran right now. It places limits on bilateral relations with them because of certain Iranian policies in the area of human rights, support for international terrorism, rejection of the Middle East peace process, and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction."

—Ray Silver, "Canadians Planning Report On Sale of Fusion Research Work to Iran," *Nucleonics Week*, 22 July 1999, p. 4.

#### **24 July 1999**

Former Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani says that Iran has regularly paid its contribution to International Atomic Energy Agency. [Note: This statement is probably in response to a 20 July 1999 vote by the US House of Representatives to withhold funding for the IAEA.] He adds that Iran has called for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East.

—IRNA (Tehran) 24 July 1999; in "Tehran Papers Slams US 'Threats' Against IAEA Over Iran," FBIS Document FTS19990724000294 24 July 1999.

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### **26 July 1999**

Nonproliferation issues, export control and disarmament policies are discussed between the Russia and Iran at the level of directors of departments from the foreign ministries of the two countries. The two countries also discuss future nuclear cooperation.

—ITAR-TASS, Moscow 27 July 1999; in "Russia, Iran Hold Nuclear Nonproliferation Talks," FBIS Document FTS 19990727000371, 26 July 1999.

### **28 July 1999**

After a meeting with Iranian Minister of Mines and Metals Eshaq Jahangiri, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Nikolai Aksyonenko tells journalists that Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, would visit Moscow in August or September. Sources in the Russian government have reported that Aqazadeh will visit Russia to discuss cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Aksyonenko also tells journalists that Russian Prime Minister Igor Ivanov is planning to visit Tehran. Aksyonenko said, "we are ready to sign an intergovernmental agreement on scientific and technical cooperation."

—"Iranian Atomic Energy Chief to Arrive in Moscow," Interfax (Moscow), 28 July 1999; Dimitriy Kirsanov, "Russia, Iran to Exchange Visits, Sign Accord," Itar-Tass (Moscow), 28 July 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990728000980, 28 July 1999.

### **2 August 1999**

Russian Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin declares that it is not in Russia's interests for other countries, including Iran, to acquire nuclear weapons. Stepashin adds that Russia is prepared to look into specific instances, if any, of Russian nuclear technology and weapons proliferation. Stepashin's declaration is made following a meeting with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in Moscow. According to Stepashin, Barak expressed concern over the proliferation of missile technology to Iran and the absence of a control mechanism in Iraq. Barak speaks to Russian journalists after the talks with President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin, and Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. He says that Russia denied allegations of nuclear technology proliferation and requested more information on this subject.

—"Rossiya Ne Zainteresovana, Chtoby Kakiye-Libo Strany, v Tom Chisle Iran, Obladali Yadernym Oruzhiyem-Stepashin" [It is not in Russia's Interest for Other Countries, Including Iran, to Possess Nuclear Weapons-Stepashin], Interfax, 2 August 1999, [www.interfax.com](http://www.interfax.com); "V Moskve Izraillskogo Premera Zaverili, Chto Rukovodstvo RF Ne Dopustit Utechek Yadernykh Tekhnologiy" [In Moscow the Israeli Premier is Assured that the Leadership of the Russian Federation Does Not Allow Leakage of Nuclear Technology], Interfax, 2 August 1999.

### **3 August 1999**

*Mlada Fronta Dnes* reports that Czech officials have been trying in vain for three months to find a way to prevent Czech firms from assisting Iran in the completion of the Bushehr nuclear plant. The Czech firm Skodaexport is trying to provide some technical assistance to Iran. Czech lawyers and Ministry officials have concluded that there is no mechanism for stopping Czech firms from offering advice abroad.

—CTK (Prague), 3 August 1999; in "Unofficial Contacts With Bushehr Project Continue," FBIS Document FTS 19990803000393, 3 August 1999; BBC Worldwide Monitoring — CTK News Agency — Prague, 3 August 1999; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **9 August 1999**

The German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine* reports German companies have been warned by the German government against doing business with several Russian firms accused of assisting Iran's weapons procurement

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program. Russia refutes the claims stating "nobody has proved that Russia supplies missile technologies to Iran."  
—Bill Samii, "Russia, Iran, and Israel Discuss WMD," *Iran Report*, 9 August 1999, Vol. 2, No. 32, [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org).

#### **21 August 1999**

Iran's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics dismisses a report by a Turkish daily alleging that Iran intends to perform nuclear tests.

—IRNA, 21 August 1999; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **22 August 1999**

Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani says that Iran's armed forces do not have any research program for developing nuclear energy for military purposes. Shamkhani points out that Iran adheres to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and that Iran's current programs are for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and conform to internationally agreed standards. He also notes that the policy of the Iranian government is to get rid of non-conventional weapons in the Middle East and Gulf region. Iran says that US-Israeli allegations regarding Iran's nuclear program are propaganda from "Zionist circles" aimed at preventing Iran from conducting peaceful nuclear projects.

—"Air-to-Ground Missile Tests Performed Successfully: Iran Denies Its Intention of Conducting Nuclear Missile Tests for Military Purposes," *Al-Ayam* (Bahrain), 23 August 1999.

#### **1 September 1999**

*Nezavismaya Gazetta* reports that future scientists at the Bushehr Nuclear plant will undergo a technology, work organization, and equipment training at the Balakovo nuclear power station. The Russian station is believed to be similar to the Bushehr plant, and will provide Iranian specialists with information pertinent to the safe management of a nuclear reactor. The Iranian specialists are expected to complete their training by August 2001.

—Sergey Sergiyevskiy, "Iranian Trainees at Balakovo Nuclear Power Station," *Nezavismaya Gazetta* (Moscow), 1 September 1999; in "Russia To Train Nuclear Specialists For Bushehr," FBIS Document FTS 19990902000321, 1 September 1999.

#### **7-9 September 1999**

In an interview with a Russian television station, Mehdi Safari, Iran's ambassador to Moscow says that "as long as the Russians do not fulfill their initial commitment to complete, the Bushehr plant no new contract will be signed with them." *Iran Daily* also quotes Safari as saying "delays have occurred in this project, but we hope the Russians will carry out their responsibilities as planned." The Bushehr nuclear power plant was initially supposed to be completed by 2002, but Russian officials now say they expect the first unit to be finished by May 2003. Iran denies this report, however, saying that Iranian ambassador to Russia Mehdi Safari said that Iran might hold off on nuclear cooperation with Russia due to delays in the completion of the Bushehr plant. IRNA reports that the Iranian embassy told Interfax that "Iran, as before, is prepared to expand its cooperation with Russia in all fields."

—"Russia Failing Its Nuclear Commitments," *Iran Daily* (Tehran), 8 September 1999, [www.iran-daily.com](http://www.iran-daily.com); "Embassy Denies Nuke Suspension Report," *Iran Daily* (Tehran), 9 September 1999, [www.iran-daily.com](http://www.iran-daily.com).

#### **10 September 1999**

Sean Rowan, spokesman for the Canadian foreign ministry, says Canada has put an experimental fusion reactor on its export control list, effectively barring its potential sale to Iran. [Note: See 14 July 1999.]

—"No Nukes: Ottawa Rejects Hydro-Quebec's Plan To Sell Iran Experimental Fusion Project," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 10 September 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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**21 September 1999**

Akram Zaki, chairman of Pakistan's Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, tells the Middle East Institute that Pakistan would not give, nor has it ever given, sensitive nuclear information or technology to other countries. Pakistan is neither aware of, nor party to, Iran's interest in the nuclear field, he says.

—"N-technology never passed on to other countries: Zaki," *The News International*, 21 September 1999, [www.jang.com.pk](http://www.jang.com.pk).

**21 September 1999**

Four men are arrested while trying to sell 1kg of uranium-235 in Batumi, Georgia. The leader of the group is Valiko Chkhivazde, a professional chemist. Shukri Abramidze, Leader of the Georgia Academy of Sciences Physics Institute's Atomic Center, believes the U-235 was destined for Iran.

—Mikhail Vignanskiy, "Georgians Detain Uranium Traders," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 23 September 1999; in "Georgia: Seized Uranium May have been Iran-bound," FBIS Document FTS 19990923000335, 23 September 1999.

**24 September 1999**

ITAR-TASS reports that the Russian Leningrad Metal Factory signs a \$38 million contract with the Atomstroyeksport company to provide a 1,000MW turbine for the Bushehr nuclear power station in Iran. The turbines will reportedly be delivered during the second half of 2000.

—"Russian Company to Supply Nuclear Turbine to Iran," ITAR-TASS, 24 September 1999, FBIS Document FTS19990925000885, 24 September 1999.

**27 September 1999**

The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and other armed forces of Iran stage a "nuclear defense" drill in an abandoned village near Hamadan. The mock war is code-named "ya Fatima az-Zahra" (invoking prophet Mohammad's daughter Fatima). Local fire fighting and relief personnel practice extinguishing fires and providing medical attention, including giving victims "anti-nuclear baths." This drill occurs on the 10th anniversary of the day Iranian forces "ousted" Iraqi troops from the city of Abadan in southwestern Iran.

—"Armed Forces Stage Nuclear Defense Maneuvers In Hamedan," IRNA, 27 September 1999, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com).

**27 September 1999**

Iranian Ambassador to Russia, Mehdi Safari, says that Iran and Russia should "develop cooperation in all spheres, including military-technical ties, the exchange of technologies, etc." Safari says that Iran was not a threat to the United States. In fact, Safari says Washington is manufacturing threats as a "pretext for the deployment of a limited national anti-missile defense system." Safari adds that, "Iran strictly abides by the principle of nonproliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction."

—"Iran for Ties With Russia," Interfax (Moscow), 27 September 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990927000608, 27 September 1999.

**28 September 1999**

At the annual meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, calls for Israel to put its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

—"Indirect Non-Proliferation Discussions With Israel," *Middle East News*, 11 October 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**29 September 1999**

*Haaretz* reports that Iran approached Israel through the United Kingdom to discuss nuclear proposals, such as not

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striking first, not arming missiles with nuclear warheads, and restricting long-range missiles. Israel refused to respond to the proposals, in part because doing so could acknowledge the existence of Israeli nuclear weapons. [Note: See 30 September 1999.]

—"Indirect Non-Proliferation Discussions With Israel," *Middle East News*, 11 October 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **30 September 1999**

Hamid Reza Assefi, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, denies that Iran has approached Israel through the United Kingdom with proposals on limiting nuclear weapons. "The Islamic Republic of Iran's talks with the British government concerned international disarmament and ways of confronting proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction," he says. "Neither in these or any other talks anything was raised to link these measures with the Zionist regime." The British Foreign Office also denies that it acted as an intermediary between Iran and Israel on the issue of nuclear arms. [Note: See 29 September 1999.]

—"Indirect Non-Proliferation Discussions With Israel," *Middle East News*, 11 October 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **4 October 1999**

*Unian* reports that Ukraine is under pressure to reconsider its decision not to participate in the construction of the nuclear complex in Bushehr. Russia has told Ukraine that some parts of the nuclear plants that were planned to be built in India can be transferred to Ukrainian companies.

—*Unian* (Kiev), 4 October 1999; in "Ukraine May Review Iran Nuclear Plant Project Decision," FBIS Document FTS 19991004000964, 4 October 1999.

#### **7 October 1999**

At a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Javad Zarif, Iranian deputy foreign minister, calls for practical steps towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. He says nonproliferation cannot work while nuclear weapons exist.

—"Iran Calls For Elimination of Nuclear Arms," Xinhua, 7 October 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **11 October 1999**

Swedish state television reports that Iranian agents have smuggled US electronic equipment used in Swedish nuclear reactors from Sweden to Iran. The Swedish police are searching for the suspect, Ehsan Amuzandeh, an Iranian-born college student, who admitted previously that he had sent such equipment to a Tehran university last year. [Note: See 25 November 1999.]

—AP (Sweden), 11 October 1999; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu); "US Nuke Equipment Smuggled To Iran," *Middle East Newslines*, 11 October 1999, [www.menewslines.com](http://www.menewslines.com).

#### **2 November 1999**

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak expressed his concern to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin over continued Russian missile and nuclear technology leaks to Iran. Putin replies that his government was trying to stop the "leaks," but it was difficult due to private companies' involvement. Putin adds that Iran might be receiving technology from other sources. Putin also states that discussions over the technology leaks to Iran were ongoing with the United States. He reiterates Russia's proposition to hold similar talks with Israel by establishing a joint committee to exchange information on the transfer of technology to Iran, a proposal Israel has not favored in the past.

—Aluf Benn, "Barak complains to Russia about leaks to Iran," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 3 November 1999,

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www3.haaretz.co.il; *Qol Yisrael*, 2 November 1999; in "Putin Promises Baraq to Stop Russian Nuclear Exports," FBIS Document FTS 19991102000213 2 November 1999.

#### **15 November 1999**

Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, meets in Russia with officials regarding the progress on the Bushehr nuclear power plant, bilateral cooperation on nuclear power plants, and upgrading existing nuclear cooperation. The two sides agree that the remaining work on Bushehr would have to go more quickly. A report on the plant will be given to the International Atomic Energy Organization. Gholam Reza Aqazadeh also says that 26% of the nuclear power plant is completed and that 25% of the station power engineering equipment has been installed.

—"Atomic energy organization head off to Moscow," IRNA, 15 November 1999, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com); "Moscow committed to nuclear power plant agreement with Tehran," IRNA, 15 November 1999, [www.irna.com](http://www.irna.com); Interfax (Moscow), 18 November 1999; in "Russia, Iran: Bushehr Nuclear Plant Build Satisfactory," FBIS Document FTS 19991118001433 18 November 1999.

#### **18 November 1999**

Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that the construction of the nuclear power plant at Bushehr is on schedule and that the project has reached "a good technical level."

—Agence France-Presse, 18 November 1999; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **21 November 1999**

A senior Israeli military official says Iran will have nuclear capability within five years if the United States does not pressure Russia to stop providing military aid to Iran. Israeli intelligence has information that Iran plans to upgrade its Shehab-3 ballistic missile to make it capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and to extend its range to 1,300 miles. The Israeli official says that Iran is currently working on the Shehab-4 and Shehab-5. He says that because of this new intelligence, the United States and Israel are discussing ways to increase pressure on Russia to stop military assistance to Iran. He also states that Israel views the combination of surface-to-surface missiles and non-conventional weapons in Iran as "a threat to the world."

—Ron Kampeas, "Iran Issues Russia Ultimatum to US," *Washington Post*, 21 November 1999, [www.washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com).

#### **25 November 1999**

Iranian-born Swedish university student Ehsan Amuzandeh is convicted of smuggling equipment to Iran that could be used to trigger nuclear weapons. He is sentenced to four months in jail. [Note: See 11 October 1999.]

—AP (Stockholm), 25 November 1999; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu); "Peking Ceases Its Nuclear Cooperation With Tehran, An Iranian Student Smuggles Nuclear Technology From Sweden," *Al-Zaman* (London), 10 December 1999, p. 1.

#### **27 November 1999**

The Czech firms [ZVVZ] Milevsko and Skoda Praha win a contract for the delivery of ventilation equipment for the Russian companies completing the construction of the nuclear power plant Bushehr.

—CTK (Prague), 27 November 1999; in "Czech Firms Win Contract To Work on Iran Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS 19991127000666, 27 November 1999.

#### **28 November 1999**

Igor Ivanov, the Russian foreign minister, says that the construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr

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concerns only Russia and Iran. No other country has any influence on the construction process, he says. He discards fears that Russia might yield to US pressure to suspend the construction of the nuclear power plant. The Iranian vice-parliamentary speaker says that Iran has made its relations with Russia a "priority" and that progress on Bushehr demonstrates that both countries have rejected US pressure. Russian Power Minister Yevgeniy Adamov says that construction on Bushehr is "developing dramatically" and that it is "gradually entering a timetable which was largely directive but which is more and more becoming an actual timetable of meeting out obligations."

—Vladimir Dunayev, "Russian Minister's Successful Lightning Visit. Tehran and Moscow will Cooperate Still More Closely," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 30 November 1999; in "Ivanov Visits Tehran, Signs Cooperation Agreements," FBIS Document FTS 19991130000856, 30 November 1999; Russia Rejects US Pressure To Halt Iranian Cooperation, Middle East Newline, 29 November 1999, [www.menewline.com](http://www.menewline.com).

### **29 November 1999**

IRNA reports that Wolfgang Hoffman, the first executive secretary of the preliminary commission of the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), is expected in Tehran for a three-day visit. Mr. Hoffman is expected to discuss Iranian views of the treaty and explore cooperation possibilities between the CTBT and Iran.

—IRNA (Tehran) 29 November 1999; in "Iran: CTBT Official Due in Tehran for Talks" FBIS Document FTS 19991129001005 29 November 1999.

### **3 December 1999**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, says work on Iran's nuclear power plant in Bushehr is moving at a brisk pace. Adamov reports over 1,500 people are being used to complete the project, which now includes the building of a second power unit.

—"Iranian Nuclear Project Going 'at Brisk Pace'," British Broadcasting Corporation, 3 December 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **9 December 1999**

The Tehran press reports Iran has cancelled an agreement with China to build a nuclear power plant in Bushehr. US accusations that Iran is attempting to build weapons of mass destruction may have propelled China to change its mind, Tehran reports. A similar agreement between the Ukraine and Iran was terminated under US pressure in 1998. Iran announces it will end its nuclear cooperation with China for "political reasons" and not due to pressure from the United States on China. The joint Russian-Iranian nuclear power plant project in Bushehr Iran is said to be for peaceful purposes and falls under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

—"Peking Ceases Its Nuclear Cooperation With Tehran, An Iranian Student Smuggles Nuclear Technology From Sweden," *Al-Zaman* (London), 10 December 1999, p. 1; "Iran Cancels Nuclear Power Plant Project with China," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 December 1999, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **9 December 1999**

US General Anthony Zinni, commander-in-chief of US Central Command, says, "I think [Iran] will have nuclear capability in a few years."

—"UPI Focus: General: Iran Greater Threat Than Iraq," United Press International, 9 December 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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## 1998

### 1998-1999

The US government discloses intelligence information that Russian entities are involved in transferring WMD technology to Iran. The Russian government cracks down on the sources of information, thus preventing any further leaks about Russian-Iranian WMD activities. The Russian government action virtually stops intelligence collection, especially in the years 1998 and 1999. These years are marked by intense Iranian activities in its WMD programs.

—"US Sent Data To Russia on Iran WMD," *Middle East Newsline*, Vol. 4, No. 199, 29 May 2002, [www.menl.com](http://www.menl.com).

### 1 January-30 June 1998

China supplies Iran with a zirconium production facility for its civil nuclear program, according to the CIA. Iran will use the facility to produce cladding for reactor fuel, the CIA reports. Under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards guidelines, Iran is not required to place the zirconium plant or its products under international safeguards. Apparently, China is standing by its pledge from the October 1997 US-China summit by not engaging in any new nuclear cooperation with Iran. It is, however, completing two ongoing nuclear projects. Chinese President Jiang Zemin fulfilled his commitment to the United States by implementing regulations that cover the sale of dual-use nuclear equipment. The regulations took effect in June [1998?]. Entities within China, however, continue to provide missile-related items and assistance to several countries.

—"Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," Non-proliferation Center, Director of Central Intelligence, 1 January 1998 - 30 June 1998, [www.odci.gov](http://www.odci.gov).

### 7 January 1998

Iranian President Khatami denies allegations that Iran is seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. "We are not a nuclear power and do not intend to be, we have not plans to build nuclear weapons and are only seeking to have peaceful nuclear energy," he says.

—"Khatami Denies Iran Seeking to be a Nuclear Power," Agence France Presse, 7 January 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### 8 January 1998

Kenneth Bacon, the US Pentagon spokesman, states the United States is hopeful that statements made by Iran regarding its nuclear capabilities are true. [Note: See 7 January 1998.] But reports of nuclear component exports to Iran have provided the United States with reason to believe Iran is moving towards the development of nuclear weapons. "We don't see any signs they are stopping their efforts to develop or procure longer range ballistic missiles," he says.

—"Pentagon Skeptical of Iranian's Claims on Nuclear Issue, Terrorism," Agence France Presse, 8 January 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### 8 January 1998

Iranian President Mohammad Khatami reaffirms his administration's desire to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He also declares that Iran is neither currently planning to build nuclear weapons nor will attempt to do so in the future, any nuclear technology will be applied to developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

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—"Khatami Gives Interview to CNN," IRIB Television (Tehran), 8 January 1998; FBIS Document FTS19980113001314, 13 January 1998.

### **9 January 1998**

According to Zeef Schiff, an editorialist for *Haaretz* in Tel Aviv, Israel must modernize its defensive capabilities sufficiently to compensate for its adherence to a strategic doctrine originally written in 1956. This doctrine, anachronistic in light of contemporary issues facing Israel, is insufficient to properly protect Israel from attack. Due to territorial changes Schiff believes that Israel will need to concentrate on early warning systems based on satellite technology to negate threats posed by newly developed weapon systems in neighboring countries such as Syria, Iran, and Iraq.

—Zeef Schiff, "Facing up to Reality," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 9 January 1998, p. 7; in "Commentator Urges Updated Defense Doctrine," FBIS Document FTS19980109000323, 9 January 1998.

### **11 January 1998**

A *Jerusalem Post* editorial of an interview between CNN and Iranian President Mohammad Khatami [Note: See 7 January 1998] says that his statement about Iran's adherence to peaceful nuclear-use doctrine contradicts the fact that the Iranian government has spent \$1.2 billion on the Shehab missile, which is capable of carrying a one-ton warhead 1,200 kilometers. The CIA, the *Post* says, purports that Iran is attempting to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

—"In the Shadow of the Mullahs," *The Jerusalem Post*, 11 January 1998, p. 8; in "Post Urges Israel to View Iran With 'Great Suspicion'," FBIS Document FTS19980112000498, 12 January 1998.

### **16 January 1998**

The United Arab Emirates gives the United States a list of 15 steps the country is taking to prevent Iran from getting weapons of mass destruction.

—Reuters, 16 January 1998, 0551; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **19 January 1998**

The Jewish Telegraph Agency reports that a two-year investigation by Britain's MI-5 intelligence agency and its European counterparts has uncovered a sophisticated supply network from Britain through Germany and Austria ending in Iran. It is used to accelerate the Iranian program for producing missiles and nuclear warheads. British customs officials say that Iran planned to use Britain as "a conduit for acquiring high-strength steel of a quality used in missile casing, and centrifuges for weapons-grade uranium." Iranian scientists have already acquired other vital components for their program, disguising some as medical equipment and auto parts. A police raid in Germany uncovered a front company for the Defense Industries Organization, an arm of the Iranian Defense Ministry. German authorities found documents detailing a huge purchasing operation to obtain weapons of mass destruction at the front company. Experts fear that "the technology acquired by the front company will significantly assist the Iranian missile and nuclear programs." British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook says that he doubts if economic sanctions would "have serious effects on Iran's attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction."

—Douglas Davis, "Iran Using Britain As Center Of Its Weapons Network," Jewish Telegraph Agency, 19 January 1998, [www.jta.org](http://www.jta.org).

### **22 January 1998**

Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin decrees a prohibition on the transfer of material or information not

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listed in Russia's export control documents to any country suspected of procuring the information in order to develop nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their affiliated delivery systems. US Vice President Al Gore expresses his concern, noting that Russian companies are rumored to have agreements with Iran that could aid it in producing weapons of mass destruction.

—Moscow Interfax, 22 January 1998; in "Further on Russian Decree on Arms-Related Exports," FBIS Document FTS19980122000889, 22 January 1998.

#### **22-28 January 1998**

The French newspaper, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, reports that the Israeli secret service believes Iran, after failing to obtain nuclear technology from China, North Korea, and Russia, began communications with the Republic of South Africa on acquiring uranium enriching equipment and technical guidance. The report further states that the source of this expertise is of Israeli origin, and that the Iranian Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharazi, has met three times with officials in Pretoria and is alleged to have reached an agreement.

—*Le Nouvel Observateur* (France), 22-28 January 1998, p. 45; in "South Africa Allegedly Selling Nuclear Technology to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980122000661, 22 January 1998.

#### **26 January 1998**

At a closed-door meeting, the Israeli Knesset's State Comptroller Committee discusses Iran's long-range missiles and nuclear capabilities. Israeli experts say that Iran may develop a nuclear weapons capability in less than 18 months. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cautions Israel to be prepared for an Iranian threat if the United States fails to stop Iran from building nuclear weapons. Uzi Aram, Israeli advisor to the prime minister, is working closely with US Vice President Al Gore, to put an end to Russian supply to Iran of hardware and scientific assistance for weapons of mass destruction.

—"PM Warns Of Iranian Threat," Israel Internet News Service, 27 January 1998, [www.iinsnews.com](http://www.iinsnews.com).

#### **26 January 1998**

A spokesman for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mahmud Mohammadi, comments that US propaganda is designed to "divert attention of public opinion from Washington's military-political support for the Zionist regime." Mohammadi further states that Iran has and will continue to adhere to the convention banning production, proliferation, and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

—IRNA (Tehran), 26 January 1998, Headline; in "Spokesman Identifies Israel as Focus of Insecurity, Threat," FBIS Document FTS19980126001094, 26 January 1998.

#### **27 January 1998**

Russian President Putin's spokesman, Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, reasserts that Russia will neither provide Iran with ballistic missile technology nor participate in Iranian missile programs. American intelligence believes that Iran could be capable of deploying missiles with nuclear or chemical warheads within two to three years. The US government warns that any technological assistance from Russia to Iran will be met with sanctions, possibly undermining the stability of US-Russia relations. Yastrzhembskiy assures the United States that any past wrongdoing was instigated by "individual irresponsible firms," and that "there is no longer any cause for concern."

—Marina Kalashnikova, "Iran is our Friend, But the United States is Dearer Still," *Kommersant-Daily* (Moscow), 27 January 1998, p. 5; in "Progress on Iran Export Controls 'Not Enough' for US," FBIS Document FTS19980127000889, 27 January 1998.

#### **February 1998**

China suspends the sale by The China Nuclear Energy Industry to Iran of hundreds of tons of anhydrous hydrogen

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fluoride, which can be used to enrich uranium. The chemical was intended for the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center. The amount would have been enough to last a decade in an "ambitious nuclear program." The suspension of the sale comes three years after the United States first discovered the sale and nearly two years after China pledged not to sell such products to Iran.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **February-March 1998**

A few days after Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi's visit to Russia, the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, Viktor Mikhailov, is abruptly removed from his position. Official sources state that Mikhailov asks to leave his position so he can concentrate on scientific research. Speculation is that he is removed due to disputes over his suggestions for broadening nuclear cooperation with Iran. Two days later, Yevgeniy Adamov is appointed as the new Minister for Nuclear Energy. Adamov is the former head of the Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering, where he developed a program in nuclear safety. Last month he accompanied Mikhailov to Tehran to meet with Iranian officials. US officials are concerned over the appointment of Adamov, but he has assured those same officials that he has no intention of helping Iran develop nuclear weapons. However, later in the week he announces that Russia plans to sell several more nuclear reactors to Iran. That same day, Ukraine announces that it will cancel plans to supply turbines for the Bushehr reactor. In response, Russian officials say that Russia could build the turbines itself at a factory near St. Petersburg. US officials say that the plant would have to be retooled first, adding further delays to the Iranian nuclear project. Later in the month, Mikhailov emerges as First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy and boasts that 1,000 Russians will be in Iran by the end of the year building the first of several nuclear reactors. He also says that he has recommended Yevgeniy Adamov as his successor because of his strong support of the type of reactor being built in Iran.

—Michael R. Gordon, "Atom Chief of Russia is Removed From Post," *New York Times*, 3 March 1998; Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Names Atomic Chief, and the US is a Little Wary," *New York Times*, 5 March 1998; Michael R. Gordon, "Russia Plans to Sell Reactors to Iran Despite US Protests," *New York Times*, 7 March 1998; Tyler Marshall, "Kiev Drops Nuclear Deal With Iran," *New York Times*, 7 March 1998; Michael R. Gordon, "Ex-Moscow Atom Chief Still in the Fray," *New York Times*, 17 March 1998.

### **2 February 1998**

Because of delays and quality control problems with Iranian subcontractors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran converts many of the subcontracts with Iranian subcontractors to Russian contractors on a "turnkey" basis. This will also improve Russian control over and integration of the project. Iranian subcontractors tasked to build the reactor hall had completed only five months worth of work in 25 months.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **2 February 1998**

A report by Omid Suresrafil in the *Tehran Times* decries US proliferation hypocrisy as symbolic of its attempt to divert attention from its own nuclear stockpiles. Suresrafil elaborates that the United States has turned a blind-eye towards its main ally in the Middle East, Israel, regarding its nuclear stockpile. The reports further condemns the efforts of William Perry, US Defense Secretary, who was told by an unnamed Israeli military official on a trip to the Middle East in January that Iran could be capable of developing a nuclear weapon in five years. This anonymous source hinted at the possibility that Israel may repeat its action against Iraq in 1981 and attack suspected Iranian nuclear facilities.

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—Omid Suresafil, "Open Hypocrisy, American Style," *Tehran Times* (Iran), 9 February 1998, p. 14; in "Iran Daily on US Proliferation 'Hypocrisy'," FBIS Document FTS19980218000856, 18 February 1998.

### **3 February 1998**

The Iranian newspaper *Farda* reports that Iran is unhappy with Russian work at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and that Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, did not accompany Viktor Mikhailov, head of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, on a recent trip to Bushehr to show disapproval. Mikhailov says there is no delay in construction, but that any Russian worker who causes delay will be fired.

—"Iran Not Satisfied With Russia Over Nuclear Power Plant—Report," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 3 February 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **9 February 1998**

James Foley, a spokesman for the US State Department, says the United States wants Ukraine to refrain from making any deal with Iran that will provide it with nuclear weapons technology. Such a deal, the State Department asserts, will result in significant cuts of US aid to Ukraine. Washington has thus far refused to allow a deal between Westinghouse Electric Corporation of the United States and Ukraine that provides Ukraine with two nuclear plants, and will not allow any deal to take place until an agreement is reached on the Iranian reactor. He says the United States may even pay Ukraine for financial losses it sustains from scrapping the Iranian deal. *Qol Yisrael International Service* reports that the US government suspended several agreements with Ukraine in an effort to coerce it to not sell Iran nuclear turbines.

—"US Puts Pressure on Ukraine to Stop Nuclear Reactor Sale to Iran," Agence France Presse, 9 February 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "US-Ukraine Discord Over Iran," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, February 1998, p. 53; "US Pressures Ukraine Over Turbine Sale To Iran," RFE/RL Newswire, 10 February 1998; *Qol Yisrael International Service* (Jerusalem), 9 February 1998; in "Program Summary-Jerusalem," *Qol Yisrael Persian* 091500," FBIS Document FTS19980209001278, 9 February 1998.

### **10 February 1998**

The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reports that the Iranian government decided to conclude a "contract for completing the first unit" of its nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Observers said that the contract could be in reference to a statement in October 1997 by the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Commission, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, about Iran's intention to construct a second 1,000MW reactor at Bushehr with Russian assistance. Two Russian reactors have been planned in Iran for several years, but high costs meant that work on only one has begun so far. Aqazadeh also announces that Iran "wants to sign two separate contracts;" one with Russia for two 440MW units, and the other with China for two 300MW units.

—"Iran Ready For Contract To Complete First Unit Of Nuclear Plant," Agence France Presse, 10 February 1998.

### **13 February 1998**

Viktor Mikhailov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, says that Iran does not possess "the scientific and technological potential necessary and sufficient," to manufacture nuclear weapons. Mikhailov refutes Benjamin Netanyahu's promulgations that Iran is attempting to build a nuclear weapon. Russia's Energy Minister further asserts that any transfer of information to Iran is solely for peaceful purposes, refuting reports that Russia is providing Iran with centrifuges used to manufacture weapons-grade material.

—Interfax (Moscow), 13 February 1998; in "Russian Minister Says Iran Cannot Produce Nuclear Weapons," FBIS Document FTS19980213000760, 13 February 1998.

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#### **14 February 1998**

US and Ukrainian officials discuss the sale of two turbines from Ukrainian company Turboatom to a Russian company for use at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The United States opposes the sale. Volodymyr Horbulin, secretary of Ukraine's National Security and Defense Council, says the United States and Ukrainian governments will decide in the next two or three weeks whether the sale will go through. Russian news sources report that the United States and Russia have reached a tentative agreement regarding the export of Ukrainian equipment for the Iranian nuclear reactor power plant in Bushehr. The plant is to consist of one VVER-1000 light water nuclear reactor that can generate 1,000MW.

—Security Official Discusses Iranian Nuclear Project With US Envoy," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 February 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); *UNIAN* (Kiev), 14 February 1998; in "Ukrainian, US Officials Discuss Nuclear Project in Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980214000487, 14 February 1998; Moscow Interfax, 14 February 1998; in "Foreign Minister, US Envoy Discuss Iran's Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980214000404, 14 February 1998.

#### **16 February 1998**

Stephen Sestanovich, US Ambassador-at-Large, says an agreement between the United States and the Ukraine regarding construction aid to Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant will be reached within two to three weeks. Turboatom, the Ukraine company in question, reportedly has a deal to supply Iran with two turbines for the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran. Turboatom says the parts are for "the electrical cycle of the Russian-Iranian contract and has nothing to do with the nuclear cycle."

—"Security Official Discusses Iranian Nuclear Project with US Envoy," BBC, 16 February 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **18 February 1998**

According to *Haaretz* Iran will hold negotiations with the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry (Minatom) to procure a 40MW nuclear reactor. Western sources also assert that Iran seeks a supply of heavy water to aid in the production of plutonium for weapons manufacture. Such an agreement would violate an agreement between Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and US Vice President Al Gore. *Haaretz* also adds that Professor Gerald Steinberg, an arms control expert at Bar-Ilan University, believes if Iran is interested in nuclear research, it already has a 5MW research reactor that does not produce plutonium to conduct analyses. Viktor Mikhailov, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, reasserts that Iran is still not in a position to build a nuclear weapon. Mikhailov further asserts transparency is possible since "Russia will build the nuclear power plant in Bushehr not partially, as supposed, but on a turnkey basis, since Iran is not capable with its part of the work."

—David Makovsky, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 18 February 1998, p. 1; in "Iranian Negotiating Purchase of Nuclear Reactor From Russia," FBIS Document FTS19980218000122, 18 February 1998; *Segodnya* Newscast NTV (Moscow), 18 February 1998; in "Russian Atomic Energy Minister Denies Nuclear Help to Iraq," FBIS Document FTS19980219000798, 19 February 1998; Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-ITASS World Service (Moscow), 18 February 1998; in "Russia to 'Take Charge' of Building Iranian Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980219000585, 19 February 1998.

#### **22 February 1998**

The *Washington Post* reports that while Iran has finished the equivalent of five months of work on the Bushehr reactor in the past 25 months, Russia plans to finish the reactor in 30 months. Both Iran and Russia deny that the project will provide Iran with nuclear weapons technology.

—David Hoffman, "Russia Expanding Role In Iranian Power Plant US, Israel Object That Technology Might Aid Development Of Nuclear Weapons Program," *Washington Post*, 22 February 1998.

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#### **22 February 1998**

*Ukrainian Weekly* reports that the United States and Russia are placing conflicting pressures on Ukraine over its potential sale of turbines to Russia. Russia needs the turbines to construct a nuclear power plant in Iran. Ukraine would prefer to allow turbine manufacturer Turboatom to sell at least one turbine to Russia. Ukraine is not expected to make a final decision until late March 1998. If Ukraine sells the turbines to Russia, Russia has promised to provide its own technology and credits to complete two power plants in Ukraine. If Ukraine decides not to sell the turbines, however, they will be forced to forfeit all future dealings with Russian firms, resulting in a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars. The United States opposes the transfer of any nuclear technology to Iran, despite the fact that Iran has promised to accept international safeguards for the new facility. The United States believes Iran will ultimately use the technology to make nuclear weapons.

—Pavel Polityuk, "Ukraine Pressured To Make Decision On Sale Of Turbines Needed In Iran," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 22 February 1998, p. 2; Yaro Bihun, "Ukraine Caught Between US, Russia In Sale Of Nuclear Technology To Iran," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 22 February 1998, p. 1.

#### **24 February 1998**

David Kyd, the spokesperson of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reports the Russian ministry for nuclear power (Minatom) is conducting negotiations with Iran over the delivery of a 40MW nuclear reactor to Iran. Kyd refutes allegations made by Israeli intelligence services that Iran is trying to procure heavy water from Russia. —"Moscow to Supply Iran with Nuclear Reactor," Global News Wire, 24 February 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

#### **24 February 1998**

Global News Wire reports that the German intelligence service, Bundes Nachrichten Dienst (BND), says Iran is attempting to build nuclear weapons at a site outside of Isfahan, Iran.

—"Moscow to Supply Iran with Nuclear Reactor," Global News Wire, 24 February 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

#### **24-26 February 1998**

The Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi visits Russia to meet with Russia Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, Defense Council Secretary Ivan Rybkin, and Moscow Mayor Yury Luzhkov. Discussion topics include, among other things, Iran's ties with Russia, the crisis in Iraq, and the Russian construction of a nuclear reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. Kharazi also talks to Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov, who indicates that Russia will take over the construction of the Bushehr plant from local companies. This seems to validate claims over the growing problems concerning Bushehr's refurbishment. [Note: See also 2 and 22 February 1998, 16 November 1998, and March 1999.]

—Agence France-Presse, "Iranian Foreign Aide on a Visit to Moscow," *The New York Times*, 25 February 1998; K. Ilieva et al., "Validation of Neutron Fluence Calculation Methodology for VVER-440 Vessel," *Nuclear Science and Engineering*, 1997, Vol.125, pp. 243-247.

#### **25 February 1998**

Iran's Economics Council budgets 11.5 billion Rials for a contract to improve the safety system at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"More Funds Earmarked For Bushehr Nuclear Power Station," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 February 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

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### **28 February 1998**

In an interview with *Russian Daily*, Kamal Kharazi, the Iranian foreign minister, states Russia is fully aware that Iran does not seek to procure weapons of mass destruction, and that Iran-Russia cooperation is relegated to non-military use of nuclear energy.

—IRNA (Tehran), 28 February 1998; in "Iranian Foreign Minister Interviewed by Russian Daily," FBIS Document FTS19980301000282, 1 March 1998.

### **March 1998**

Russia proposes to assist Iran in deploying a constellation of communication and earth-monitoring satellites. The project would be run by the Spurt Scientific-Industrial Center, with the satellites being developed by the Reutov Machinery-Building Scientific-Industrial Association. If deployed such a system would allow Iran to keep track of its neighbors and may even lead to regional stability. Or the system could be used for targeting of unfriendly neighbors. Whether such a system is affordable for Iran is unknown.

—*Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 16 March 1998, p. 21, [www.aintionnow.com](http://www.aintionnow.com).

### **March 1998**

Labor MK Rafi Elul meets with an unknown US source, reportedly with long-time connections to the Israeli government, who states that in 1995 she gave to both the CIA and Israel Iranian government documents on Iran's successful efforts to obtain nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union. [Note: For more on this topic, see 1995, 9, 10 (2 entries), 11, 15, and 16 April 1998. 1991, 13 October, December, and 27 December 1991 entries may also be related.]

—Steve Rodan, "MK Elul Says Israel, US Have Known of Iranian Nukes for Years," *Jerusalem Post*, [www.jpost.co.i](http://www.jpost.co.i), 12 April 1998.

### **3 March 1998**

Mikhail Virchenko, chief engineer at Turboatom in Ukraine, says his company "is doing design work on a one million-kilowatt [1,000MW] turbine for the Bushehr nuclear power station in Iran." The Ukrainian company Turboatom was contracted by the Russian firm Zarubezhatomenergostroy (company for nuclear power engineering abroad) to design the turbine Russia needs for the Bushehr nuclear station in Iran. Turboatom hopes to sign a contract with Russia for manufacturing the turbine once the design phase is completed. [Note: See 14 February 1998.]

—"Ukraine Working On Turbine For Iranian Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 3 March 1998, FBIS-SOV-98-062, 3 March 1998.

### **5 March 1998**

The Russian-Iranian intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation comes to a tentative agreement during its second session regarding the construction of a third and fourth nuclear power station. Vladimir Bulgak, the Russian deputy prime minister, reasserts that Iran's nuclear transparency is intact, noting its membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency and its status as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

—Konstantin Kazeyev, ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 5 March 1998; in "Russia Agrees to Build Two More Nuclear Reactors for Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980306000050, 6 March 1998.

### **6 March 1998**

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Gennadiy Udovenko and US Secretary of State Madeline Albright sign a nuclear cooperation agreement ending all Ukrainian nuclear cooperation with Iran. In return, the United States will support Ukraine's bid to become a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Albright describes Ukraine's

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move to end nuclear commerce with Tehran as an act of, "great statesmanship." US officials expect Ukraine's decision to delay the completion of the 1,000MW nuclear reactor at Bushehr, which Russia is building. Ukraine's AOA Turboatom of Kharkiv was to build a \$45 million turbine for the \$850 million light water reactor. Moscow has said that it will produce the turbine for itself at a St. Petersburg plant, contradicting one US official who said no one else in the world could make the turbines, "such that they can be bought off the shelf for Bushehr." At the signing ceremony, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma echoes Moscow's appraisal, saying that Russia could produce the turbine for itself. The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry believes Ukraine's withdrawal from the project does not upset the time table for the completion of the Bushehr station, "Ukraine is just one subcontractor which can be replaced quite easily with another," notes Vitaliy Nasonov, a spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry. Possibly responding to the US attempt to sabotage the Bushehr project, Georgy Kaurov, spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, announces that Moscow has reached an agreement in principle with Tehran to build two additional reactors at Bushehr.

—Howard Diamond, "US, Ukraine Sign Nuclear Accord, Agree On MTCR Accession," *Arms Control Today*, March 1998, p. 23; "Ukraine, US Sign Agreement On Satellite, Space Technologies," FBIS Document SOV-98-065, 6 March 1998; Interfax (Moscow), 6 March 1998; in "Ukraine Not To Supply Equipment to Iran Nuclear Power Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980306000528, 6 March 1998; Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 6 March 1998; in "No Problem With Ukraine Withdrawal From Iran Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980306000724, 6 March 1998.

#### **6 March 1998**

Georgy Kaurov, spokesman for Russia's atomic energy minister, announces Russia will build two more nuclear reactors in Iran in addition to Russia's \$850 million deal to build a 1,000MW nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Kaurov says Russia "agreed in principle" with Iran on the construction of two more reactors at Bushehr. Construction is not expected to begin for five years. This new deal was not a signed contract, but was rather a verbal agreement. Vitaliy Nasonov, a spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry (Minatom) says, "Russia will not sign any new documents with Iran until it has completed the contract to build the nuclear power station at Bushehr." He says Russia is not refusing to expand cooperation with Iran entirely, just "not until the 21st century." Russia and Iran initially signed a contract on 8 January 1995 for the first reactor at Bushehr. Russia took over construction of the reactor at Bushehr in February 1998 due to delays by Iran. Kaurov says that Russia plans to speed construction of the current project and expects to finish the reactor in two-and-one-half years. Next, construction would start on two new 640MW power reactors, "which are still being developed." [Note: This seems to be the first mention of 640MW reactors at Bushehr. Previously, two 440MW reactors had been discussed for Bushehr.] An unnamed American official doubts Iran will have enough money to pay for the planned reactors. "Whether they can get the first one done is iffy, and the chance of their completing the second, third, or fourth is highly unlikely," the official says.

—"Russia To Build Reactors For Iran," *Washington Times*, 7 March 1998, p. A69; Veronika Romanenkova, "No More Nuclear Plants In Iran Until Bushehr Completed," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 6 March 1998, in FBIS-TAC-98-065, 6 March 1998; "Iran's Nuclear Reactor," Israel Internet News Service, 12 March 1998, www.iinsnews.com; "Russia, Iran Agree On Nuclear Reactor," *Russia Today*, 6 March 1998, www.russiatoday.com; "Russia Plans To Sell Reactors To Iran Despite US Protest," Michael R. Gordon, *New York Times*, 7 March 1998, p. A3.

#### **7 March 1998**

Iran lambastes Ukraine for its decision to back out of a deal with Iran to provide it with turbines for its nuclear power plant at Bushehr. Iran state radio calls the move unwise, stating, "Ukraine is only losing its political and commercial credibility. It lacks the qualifications to boost relations with Iran." Mahmud Mohammadi, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, condemns Ukraine's inference that it has an agreement with Iran on the construction of a

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nuclear plant in Bushehr, Iran. Mohammadi further states that its interest in nuclear technology is for peaceful purposes that are within the right of any sovereign state wishing to further its national development. Ukraine's decision comes after it reached an agreement with the United States on a new 30-year nuclear cooperation accord that will provide Ukraine will considerable funding. This accord confirms the two states' commitment to controlling the export of nuclear technology to states that do not possess nuclear weapons and allows Kiev to purchase American fuel for its reactors. [Note: See 6 March 1998.]

—"Russia Agrees, Ukraine Cancels Nuclear Deal with Iran," BBC World Service: Europe, 6 March 1998; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu; "Iran Slams Ukraine as 'Unreliable' after Halting Nuclear Ties," *Agence France-Presse*, 7 March 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; IRNA (Tehran), 7 March 1998; in "Iran Offers Kosovo Mediation, Deplores Nuclear 'Ballyhoo'," FBIS Document FTS19980307000402, 7 March 1998.

### **9 March 1998**

Viktor Chernomyrdin, the Russian prime minister, announces Russia will not violate international agreements by providing Iran or any other nation that is in violation of the current international regime with missile or nuclear technologies.

—Yelena Kornysheva, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 9 March 1998; in "Chernomyrdin Denies Transfer of Nuclear Technology to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980309000267, 9 March 1998.

### **11 March 1998**

Asadollah Saburi, deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), and Yevgeniy Adamov, the Russian atomic energy minister, discuss options regarding cooperation in constructing the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Russia promises to build turbines needed for the nuclear power plant's generators if Ukraine fails to provide them. Adamov invites AEOI head Gholam Reza Aqazadeh to Russia for a meeting in May to discuss future cooperation concerning Russia's building of two more energy units for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The United States continues to denounce any agreements made between Russia and Iran concerning the transfer of nuclear technology. Moscow counters US apprehension by reminding the United States that the VVER-1000 reactor, which would be used in the construction of the Bushehr plant, cannot be used for the production of nuclear materials. Russia intends to continue its relationship with Iran concerning nuclear power despite US opposition.

—Interfax (Moscow), 11 March 1998; in "Adamov: Ukraine's Decision Has No Impact on Bushehr Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980311001280, 11 March 1998; Interfax (Moscow), 11 March 1998; in "Atomic Energy Minister Reaffirms Iran Contract," FBIS Document FTS19980311000439, 11 March 1998; Andrey Shitov, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 11 March 1998; in "Nuclear Power Minister: Cooperation With Iran to Continue," FBIS Document FTS19980311000370, 11 March 1998.

### **11 March 1998**

The United States, resolute in its opposition to Russian participation in Iranian nuclear affairs, offers "to lift all 'space' quotas for Russia in exchange for the cessation of construction work on the nuclear power station in Iran."

—Valeriya Sycheva, "A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in Outer Space," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 11 March 1998; in "GCC: Russia Offered Space Quotas for Bushehr," FBIS Document FTS1998031100032, 11 March 1998.

### **12 March 1998**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister confirms that Russian plans to finish construction of the Bushehr electric power station within 55 months of signing of the contract in January 1995. Asadollah Saburi, vice president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Adamov agree that US opposition to the construction will not have a negative effect on completion of the Bushehr electric power station.

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—Aleksandr Koretskiy, "Russia and Iran to Join Forces Against America. Ukraine Rejects What It Was Not Offered," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 12 March 1998; in "Cooperation With Iran Developing 'To Spite Washington'," FBIS Document FTS19980312000289, March 12 1998; Aleksey Zayko, "Ministry of Atomic Energy Will Continue Nuclear Cooperation With Iran; Americans Have Not Managed To Persuade Russia," *Russkiy Telegraf* (Moscow), 12 March 1998; in "Russia May Build Turbine for Bushehr Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980312000544, March 12 1998.

### **13 March 1998**

The *Washington Times* reports that in the last few weeks, information has surfaced that China has again tried to sell nuclear equipment with weapons applications to Iran even after promising to halt nuclear exports to Iran.

—Bill Gertz, "China in New Nuclear Sales Effort; White House Plays Down Finding," *Washington Times*, 13 March 1998.

### **13 March 1998**

Belarusian authorities accuse the media of "falsely interpreting the results of [Belarus President] Alyaksandr Lukashenka's visit to the Middle East." Ivan Antanovich, the Belarusian Foreign Minister, refutes allegations that Belarus is negotiating with Iran over cooperation in the area of nuclear technology.

—Segodnya Newscast, NTV (Moscow), 13 March 1998; in "Belarus Blames Russian Media for Iran Nuclear Reports," FBIS Document FTS19980313001324, March 13 1998.

### **13 March 1998**

ITAR-TASS reports that Iran made three attempts in 1997 to procure Russian nuclear components and technologies. According to the report, the Sanam, a state-run company in Iran, attempted to purchase dual-use technologies from the Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute in Zhukovskiy and the Mytishchi machine-building plant in order to build its own missiles. Vladimir Orlov, the director of the Russian center for political studies, claims a 32-year-old Iranian citizen, Reza Teymiri, was arrested last November [1997]. Orlov asserts that such incidents highlight the importance of curtailing the problem before it becomes wider spread, asserting "This is not Russia's problem alone. Iranians are very active in the CIS. US companies also tried to pass on to Iran components of rocket technology."

—Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 13 April 1998; in "Iranian Attempts To Obtain Russian Nuclear Parts Thwarted," FBIS Document FTS19980413000419, 13 April 1998.

### **13 March 1998**

Russia rejects a US proposal to increase quotas regarding satellite launches in return for Russian promise to end construction of Bushehr power plant. [Note: See 11 March 1998.]

—"End of Chernomyrdin's Visit to the US," *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 13 March 1998; in "Commentary Praises Russian Premier's Stance on US," FBIS Document FTS19980313001091, March 13 1998.

### **14 March 1998**

The *Times* of London reports that US intelligence discovered Iran and China have discussed a deal that would provide Iran with hundreds of tons of nuclear material. The report comes only several weeks after the Clinton administration and China reached an agreement halting any transfer of nuclear technology. Further talks between the US Department of State and China reveal China has reaffirmed its agreement to not supply Iran with anhydrous hydrogen fluoride, used in enriching uranium. [Note: See 13 March 1998 for a *Washington Times* report that China is continuing nuclear cooperation with Iran.]

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—Tom Rhodes, "US Halts Chinese Nuclear Aid to Iran," *The Times*, 14 March 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **15 March 1998**

Iran says China will continue its assistance to Iran despite reports by the United States that China has halted all nuclear technology trade with Iran. Mahumd Mohammadi, Iran's foreign ministry spokesman, claims "Iran's nuclear program and cooperation with other countries is entirely peaceful, in accordance with international regulations and under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." US lawmakers were reportedly told in closed briefings that China will most likely continue to provide Iran with nuclear assistance, which runs contrary to a previous agreement reached between the United States and China. [Note: See also 13 and 14 March 1998.]

—"Iran Denies Halt in Nuclear Cooperation with China," Agence France Presse, 15 March 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **15 March 1998**

Iran denounces US propaganda of nuclear cooperation between Iran and China. Mr. Mohammadi, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, attributes this action to an US attempt to divert attention from what he believes is an increasing stockpile of nuclear weapons in Israel. Mohammadi further stresses that any collaboration concerning the exchange of nuclear information with other countries is explicitly done with peaceful objectives. Muhammad-Reza Ismailzadeh declares US attempts to damage the nuclear relationship between Iran and Russia is done so despite a declaration by the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran's nuclear installations and reactors are for peaceful use only. Ismailzadeh warns that US endeavors in this area, such as its success in forcing China to end peaceful nuclear cooperation with Iran, will further US resolve in this arena.

—*Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 15 March 1998; in "Iran Condemns US Reports on Sino-Iranian Nuclear Ties," FIBS Document FTS19980315000482, 15 March 1998; Novosti Russian Public Television (Moscow), 15 March 1998; in "Abandoning Iranian Nuclear Project Loses Turboatom Money," FIBS Document FTS19980315000199, 15 March 1998; Mohammad-Reza Esmail-Zadeh, "Nuclear Cooperation Between Iran and Russia?," *Resalat* (Tehran), 15 March 1998, p. 16; in "Daily Criticizes US Moves Against Iran-Russian Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19980324001498, 24 March 1998.

#### **16 March 1998**

International Atomic Energy Agency spokesman David Kyd announces that the "IAEA has not detected any suspicious nuclear activities being carried out" in Iran which violate the NPT or any other laws governing non-proliferation. The IAEA team inspected the research center at Isfahan and the experimental reactor at the University of Tehran four times in the last year. The two reactors under construction at Bushehr were not inspected because no form of nuclear fuel has been transferred there yet. Kyd also stresses that the "IAEA [has] never detected any sort of suspicious activity in Iran."

—"IAEA: No Suspicious Nuclear Activities Detected In Iran," IRNA (Tehran), 16 March 1998; in FBIS-NES-98-075, 16 March 1998.

#### **17 March 1998**

The *New York Times* reports that under the agreement reached earlier this month by Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and US Vice President Al Gore, a new commission of experts will be formed to discuss and monitor the export of sensitive nuclear and missile related technology. Chernomyrdin also reaffirms an earlier Russian pledge to have no further nuclear cooperation with Iran while work is continuing on the current nuclear reactor.

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How this pledge will affect future cooperation has not been announced.

—Steven Erlinger, "Russia Vows to Push Pact Cutting Arms," *New York Times*, 17 March 1998.

#### **17 March 1998**

China denies that Chinese companies have sold the chemical anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) to the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center in Iran. Zhu Bangzao, a spokesman for China's foreign ministry, says "China is a signatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It does not advocate, encourage or engage in nuclear weapons proliferation, nor does it help other countries develop nuclear weapons."

—"China Denies Nuclear Sales to Iran," Agence France Presse, 17 March 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **17 March 1998**

A ministry official of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry confirms that Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Gholam Reza Aqazadeh will visit Moscow next May to discuss the \$800 million contract to construct the Bushehr energy station. The Bushehr station, which he states will be completed before 2000, is planned to eventually consist of two power units with VVER-1000 reactors and two with VVER-440 water-moderated reactors. Dmitriy Frolov, in an article for *Novyye Izvestiya*, reports the importance of the sales to the failing Ministry of Atomic Energy, which could receive \$1.5 billion from Iran for the purchase of uranium.

—Interfax (Moscow), 17 March 1998; in "Russia To Earn \$5 Billion Building Nuclear Plants Abroad," FBIS Document FTS19980317001019, 17 March 1998; Dmitriy Frolov, "Iranian Issue Has Played Into Hands of Ministry of Atomic Energy," *Novyye Izvestiya* (Moscow), 17 March 1998, p. 5; in "Uranium Seen as Focus of Gore-Chernomyrdin," FBIS Document FTS19980317000745, 17 March 1998.

#### **19 March 1998**

Anatoliy Bugayets, director general of the Ukrainian Turboatom company, says the failure of Ukraine to participate in construction of the nuclear power station in Bushehr will cost more than the previously quoted \$45 million possibly costing Ukraine \$450-\$500 million. Ukraine may lose the Iranian market entirely, a fact Bugayets reports could have significant repercussions. Turboatom was to build a turbine or turbines for the plant. [Note: See 6 March 1998.]

—Interfax (Moscow), 19 March 1998; in "Withdrawal From Iranian Nuclear Plant May Cost \$500 Million," FBIS Document FTS19980320001708, 20 March 1998.

#### **19 March 1998**

An Israeli minister and US Vice President Al Gore discuss Russia's transfer of missile technology to Islamic regimes. A Russian military expert warns Russia's government that exchange of nuclear and missile technology with Iran could undermine Russia's future security.

—*Qol Yisrael International Service* (Jerusalem), 19 March 1998; in "Program Summary— Jerusalem *Qol Yisrael*, Persian 191500, FBIS Document FTS19980322000208, 22 March 1998.

#### **24 March 1998**

Yevgeniy Adamov, the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, reconfirms Russia's intention to continue work on the nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran. In response to accusations from the US government, Adamov assures that Russia "does not accept double standards in the sphere of cooperation with non-nuclear countries. We proceed from the fact that Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is ready to make its facilities available for oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency."

—Interfax (Moscow), 24 March 1998; in "Russia Determined to Build Nuclear Power Station in Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980324001245, 24 March 1998.

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### **26 March 1998**

In a news conference after a meeting with workers from the Turboatom plant in Kharkov, Yevgeniy Marchuk, the former Ukrainian prime minister, announces the decision of the Ukrainian government to cancel the turbine deal for the Bushehr nuclear power station is not final. Marchuk believes the decision was "short-sighted" and says he will provide political backing to counter allegations of any wrong-doing. Leonid Kuchma, the Ukrainian president, counters these remarks at a press conference in Sofia, stating that Ukraine will adhere to the agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Kuchma asserts that discerning Iranian government intentions regarding nuclear technology is difficult. He believes caution will best serve the Ukrainian administration. Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, asks for a definitive answer from the Ukrainian government regarding its involvement with the Bushehr plant in southern Iran. Ukraine vows to provide an answer within a week. [Note: See 6 March 1998 entry for Ukraine's original announcement that it will not participate in Bushehr.]

—Interfax (Moscow), 26 March 1998; in "Ukrainian Premier: Iranian Turbine Deal Can Still Proceed," FBIS Document FTS19980326001329, 26 March 1998; Ukrayinske (Kiev), 26 March 1998; in "Kuchma: Ukraine Adheres To Non-proliferation Treaty," FBIS Document FTS19980326000658, 26 March 1998; Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 26 March 1998; in "Russian Wants Ukraine's Answer on Bushehr Project Plans," FBIS Document FTS19980326000366, 26 March 1998.

### **6 April 1998**

Yevgeniy Adamov, the Russian Minister for Atomic Energy, confirms that Gholam Aqazade, the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, is invited to Moscow in May to discuss organizational matters pertaining to the construction of the Bushehr nuclear energy plant. Adamov hopes to establish a new contract with Iran regarding the construction of a research nuclear reactor. This reactor, Adamov affirms, can be delivered with uranium enrichment less than 20%, a level the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would find acceptable. Adamov further promises to continue "cooperation in nuclear power engineering with Iran."

—Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 6 April 1998; in "Iranian Atomic Energy Chief Invited to Visit Moscow," FBIS Document FTS19980406000694, 6 April 1998; Interfax (Moscow), 6 April 1998; "Russia Ready to Build Research Nuclear Reactor in Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980406001068, 6 April 1998; Russian Public Television (Moscow), 6 April 1998; in "Russia To Build Nuclear Plant in Iran Despite US Pressure," FBIS Document FTS19980407000092, 7 April 1998.

### **6 April 1998**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov says that Russia proposed building a research reactor in Iran. The contract was first drafted in 1996 and is now awaiting approval by both governments. Adamov says that the reactor would use enriched uranium of 20% or less and would meet IAEA requirements. Adamov also says that Russia was planning on "stepping up the pace of construction" at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Russian officials are considering finishing the project on a "turnkey" contract basis. This will allow Russia to raise the price of the reactor from \$780 million to just over \$1 billion.

—"Russia Plans New Reactor In Iran, Official Says," *Washington Post*, 7 April 1998, p. 18; "Russia Steps Up Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," *Monitor*, 7 April 1998; Dmitriy Frolov, "Iranian Question In Minatom's Hands," *Novyye izvestiya*, 17 March 1998, p. 5.

### **7 April 1998**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, describes the relationship between Tehran and Moscow as "strategic and excellent," reminding the international community that any nuclear relationship between Russia and Iran, such as the Bushehr nuclear power plant project, "poses no danger."

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—IRIB Television (Tehran), 7 April 1998; in "Russian Minister Stresses Commitment to Nuclear Deal," FBIS Document FTS19980407001218, 7 April 1998.

#### **7 April 1998**

Azerbaijani customs seize 22 tons of steel alloy on the Azerbaijani-Iranian border. [Note: See also 26 April 1998.] —Azeri Paper Sees 'Iranian Hand' In Nuclear Smuggling, *Zerkalo* (Baku), 4 July 1998, pp. 5, 26, FBIS-SOV-98-188, 7 July 1998; ANS TV (Baku), 19 June 1998; in BBC Summary Of World Broadcasts, 23 June 1998; in "Authorities Arrest Four After Theft Of Radioactive Material," Lexis-Nexis, 23 June 1998, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **9 April 1998**

The *Jerusalem Post* reports that Iran received nuclear warheads from a former Soviet republic in the early 1990s, maintained by Russian experts. This information is based on Iranian government documents relayed to Israel and acquired by *The Post*. These documents contain correspondence between leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iran's government officials that discusses Iran's successful acquisition of nuclear warheads from former Soviet republics. US congressional experts have deemed the documents authentic; Israel is still studying them. *The Post* notes that these documents appear to support reports from 1992 that Iran received up to four nuclear warheads and enriched uranium from Kazakhstan, with assistance from the Russian underworld. [Note: For more on this topic, see 1995, 10 (2 entries), 11, 15, and 16 April 1998. 1991, 13 October, December, and 27 December 1991 entries may also be related.]

—Steve Rodan, "Documents obtained by 'Jerusalem Post' show: Iran has four nuclear bombs," *Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem), 9 April 1998, pp1, 2; in "Iran Said To Obtain Four Nuclear Bombs From CIS Republics," FBIS Document FTS19980417000482, 17 April 1998.

#### **10 April 1998**

The *Jerusalem Post* reports that top-secret Iranian government documents indicate that Iran paid \$25 million for two tactical nuclear weapons smuggled out of Kazakhstan in the early 1990s. An unknown exiled Iranian scientist delivered the documents to Labor MK Rafi Elul. The weapons, delivered to the Lavizan industries in Iran, allegedly were impossible to use due to a safety mechanism on their covers. A source identified as Engineer Turkan in the documents said that the only way to make the weapons operational would be "to bring the experts from the country in which they were produced [to Iran] and to remove the covers." Argentine and Russian technicians reportedly aided the operation; the documents indicate that Turkan deemed the Argentine workers ineffectual and hoped that the Russian experts would "not cause these problems." The US government reportedly has been holding these documents for several years, but believes that the documents are false. [Note: See 9 April 1998 entry that states that the United States confirms the authenticity of the documents.] When asked about claims that Iran acquired nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, State Department spokesperson James Rubin stated, "There was no evidence to substantiate such claims." Rubin added, "While we remain concerned about Iranian intentions to acquire nuclear weapons capability, we have no information suggesting that Iran is in possession of nuclear warheads acquired from the former Soviet republic of Kazakhstan."

—Steve Rodan, "Iran Paid \$25m. For Nuclear Weapons, Documents Show," *Jerusalem Post*, 10 April 1998, [www.jpost.co.il](http://www.jpost.co.il).

#### **10 April 1998**

In response to accusations that Russia supplied Iran with nuclear weapons in the early 1990s, Russian Foreign Ministry's spokesperson Gennady Tarasov asserts, "Russia has stated on many occasions that it has never rendered Iran any assistance in creating weapons of mass destruction." He adds, "Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear sphere is orientated at purely peaceful and civil goals." [Note: See 13 April 1998 for an additional Russian

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response.]

—"Russia Denies Nuclear Arms Supplies to Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 10 April 1998; in "Russia Denies Supplying Nuclear Arms to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980410000237, 10 April 1998.

#### **11 April 1998**

Labor MK Rafi Elul says that Israel and the United States have suspected for years that Iran acquired nuclear weapons smuggled from the former Soviet Union. Elul reportedly met with an unknown US source, reportedly with longtime connections to the Israeli government, in March 1998 who said that in 1995 she gave both the CIA and Israel Iranian government documents on Iran's successful efforts to obtain nuclear weapons.

—Steve Rodan, "MK Elul Says Israel, US Have Known of Iranian Nukes for Years," *The Jerusalem Post*, www.jpost.co.il, 12 April 1998.

#### **12-13 April 1998**

Russia's ambassador to Iran, Kostantin Shuvalov, visits the Bushehr nuclear power plant to inspect certain sections of the plant as well as the progress of the Russian specialists working on the plant. Shuvalov says that a completion date for the reactor would be announced at an upcoming meeting in Russia by the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeni Adamov says on 13 April 1998 that he "will try to persuade President Boris Yeltsin to authorize the sale of an experimental nuclear reactor to Iran." [Note: See 6 April 1998.] Adamov says that the "experimental installation" would be a research reactor using a uranium grade of less than 20 percent.

—"Russian Ambassador Visits Controversial Nuclear Plant In Iran," Agence France Presse, 12 April 1998.

#### **13 April 1998**

Georgy Kaurov, spokesperson for the Russian nuclear energy ministry, says that "no nuclear warheads of the former USSR and currently at Russia's disposal were either handed over or sold to other countries." His announcement comes in response to an article in the *Jerusalem Post* that alleges that Iran received two nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan. Kaurov assures that "not a single [warhead] has disappeared."

—"Nuclear Energy Minister Denies Russian Warhead Sales," Interfax, 13 April 1998; "Kazakhstan Denies Missile Sales To Iran," Agence France Presse, 15 April 1998, guide-p.infoseek.com.

#### **15 April 1998**

Kazakhstani Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev says that "Kazakhstan doesn't supply these types of weapons [nuclear warheads] to Iran and our cooperation is based on economic projects."

—"Nuclear Energy Minister Denies Russian Warhead Sales," Interfax, 13 April 1998; "Kazakhstan Denies Missile Sales To Iran," Agence France Presse, 15 April 1998, guide-p.infoseek.com.

#### **15 April 1998**

Nikolay Kovalev, leader of the Russian FSB (Federal Security Service), reports that President Boris Yeltsin informed him of the need to stop illegal deals with Iran regarding dual-purpose technologies. The order comes after a report last week by the *Jerusalem Post* said the newspaper had documents relating to an exchange made in 1991 between Russia and Iran of two tactical nuclear warheads.

—Aleksandr Shumilin, "Russia and Israel Warn United States of Iran's Attempts to Acquire Nuclear Weapons," *Kommersant-Daily* (Moscow), 15 April 1998, p. 5; in "TV Exposure Debunks Charge of Nuclear Tie With Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980415001082, 15 April 1998; Interfax (Moscow), 15 April 1998; in "Kazakhstan Denies Israeli Daily Report of Iran Warhead Sale," FBIS Document FTS19980415000908, 15 April 1998.

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#### **15 April 1998**

At the annual meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, Iran reasserts its stance regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Iran's delegation, which includes senior officials of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, affirms that its country's use of nuclear technology is for scientific, medical, industrial, and agricultural purposes only.

—IRNA (Tehran), 15 April 1998; in "Iran Tells UN Commission Nuclear Research For Peaceful Use," FBIS Document FTS19980415000180, 15 April 1998.

#### **16 April 1998**

Following a series of *Jerusalem Post* articles saying that Iran acquired nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, two US Congressmen, Jim Saxton and Bill McCollum, say that they have closely followed Iran's military programs and that Iran "has obtained nuclear weapons as well as established a ballistic missile command-and-control system to launch them." They have called on the Clinton administration to form a new policy on Iran, in light of its nuclear weapons capability. The Congressmen's statements conflict with what the Defense and State departments allege about Iran's nuclear program. Saxton is chairman of the House Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, and McCollum is a former member of the task-force. Both say they have been receiving reliable information for years "that Iran has been obtaining nuclear weapon's parts and supplies from the former Soviet republics and Central Asia." McCollum says that Iran's policy indicates that "it already has nuclear weapons and is now trying to acquire a delivery system to launch them." McCollum supports his claims by citing the acquisition of ballistic missiles and the establishment and exercising of a distinct national-level command and control system as examples of Iran's capabilities.

—Steve Rodan, "Two US Congressmen Say Iran Has Nukes," *Jerusalem Post*, 16 April 1998, [www.jpost.co.il](http://www.jpost.co.il).

#### **17 April 1998**

A truck is stolen in Isfahan on its way to the Bushehr nuclear power plant, reportedly containing several pieces of welding devices. [Note: See 10, 13 May 1998 for more on the theft. See also 5 June 1998 for what is perhaps a related entry.]

—IRNA (Tehran), 13 May 1998; in "Iran: 'No Special Significance' To Stolen Truck's Contents," FBIS Document FTS19980513000452, 13 May 1998.

#### **18 April 1998**

*Segodnya* of Moscow reports that the US State Department essentially admitted its tactics to deter Russia from allowing the transfer of military and dual-purpose technologies to Iran will change to focus on individual firms. The reports asserts, "These firms will now face a 'red light': On plausible pretexts (not because of ties with Tehran) they will be refused grants and technical assistance." These firms are on a list, which *Segodnya* alleges, was made by the US government that includes some 20 Russian companies accused of transferring dual-purpose technologies to Iran.

—Georgiy Bovt, "United States Wages Undeclared War Against Russian Firms; Everyone Suspected of Being 'Soft on Iran' Will Be Subjected to Secret Sanctions," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 18 April 1998, p. 1; in "Russian Firms Face 'Informal Sanctions' Over Iran Ties," FBIS Document FTS19980420000215, 20 April 1998.

#### **19 April 1998**

Volodymyr Bronnikov, former director of the Zaporizhzhya-based nuclear power plant, confirms that Russian and Iranian companies participating in the construction of Bushehr nuclear power plant approached him and Volodymyr Dudnyk, manager of the EnerhoDarBud construction company, about building an installation in Iran similar to the EnerhoDar site in Ukraine. Bronnikov says he refused the offer.

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—Intelnews (Kiev), 19 April 1998; in "Ukrainian Nuclear Specialist Refuses To Work for Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980419000049, 19 April 1998.

#### **22 April 1998**

Mahmud Mohammadi, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, denounces US policy towards Iran and the White House's antipodal behavior. Mohammadi says such US activities insinuate hostility towards Iran that contradicts what Iran has promised to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). "The Islamic Republic of Iran always wants the Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction," Mohammadi says.

—IRNA (Tehran), 22 April 1998; in "Iranian Spokesman Deplores 'Hostile' US Attitude," FBIS Document FTS19980422000821, 22 April 1998.

#### **22 April 1998**

Pakistani President Rafiq Tarar asserts that Pakistan has not and will not export nuclear technology to any country. "Neither we are [*sic*] helping the Iranian nuclear programme nor [do] we intend to do so."

—*The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), 22 April 1998, p. 5; in "Tarar: No Nuclear Technology Exported to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980424002202, 25 April 1998.

#### **23 April 1998**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, reports that Russia "is stepping up" work on the nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran, which now includes over 300 Russian specialists.

—Oleg Lebedev, RIA (Moscow), 23 April 1998; in "300 Russian Specialists Completing Bushehr Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980423000672, 23 April 1998.

#### **23 April 1998**

Mehdi Safari, the Iranian ambassador to Russia, says that Iran "has never intended" to have nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Safari further stresses that Iran and Russia have never had any intention to cooperate on developing missile technologies, citing Iran's adherence to International Atomic Energy Agency regulations.

—Interfax (Moscow), 23 April 1998; in "Envoy Says Iran 'Never Intended' To Have Nuclear Weapons," FBIS Document FTS19980423000625, 23 April 1998.

#### **23 April 1998**

British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook reveals that MI6, Britain's foreign espionage service, has thwarted Iran's efforts to obtain British nuclear technology in the past year. Cook states that MI6 and the GCHQ communications monitoring agency have "tracked Iran's nuclear weapons programme, and have enabled [Britain] to disrupt Iranian attempts to procure British technology."

—"British Secret Services Thwart Iranian Efforts to Get Nuclear Technology," *Agence France-Presse*, 23 April 1998; in *Gulf 2000*, www1.columbia.edu.

#### **26 April 1998**

Russia announces it has captured 22 tons of nuclear missile parts destined for Iran from Russia via Azerbaijan. Natan Sharansky, a minister in charge of Israeli-Russian relations, speaks with Yevgeniy Primakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, about assuaging Israeli fears over Russian nuclear-technology transfers to Iran. *Yediot Aharont* of Tel Aviv opines that Russia made the announcement because of fears the United States will institute sanctions against Russian companies allegedly guilty of transferring nuclear technology to Iran. [Note: See also 7 April 1998.]

—Itamar Eichner, Mikhal Grievsky, and Eytan Glickman, *Yediot Aharont* (Tel Aviv), 26 April 1998, p. 10; in

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"Primakov Briefs Sharansky on Capture of Nuclear Components," FBIS Document FTS19980426000299, 26 April 1998.

**28 April 1998**

*Yediot Aharonot* of Tel Aviv reports that Russia agreed to provide Iran with knowledge regarding the production of heavy water, which can be used to build specific kinds of nuclear weapons. Israeli sources reporting the matter, state "If the Iranians can acquire on the black market a quantity of fissile material used to make nuclear bombs, it will accelerate their timetables." This report further states that Russian assistance may make it possible for Iran to develop not only nuclear capabilities, but chemical and biological as well.

—Arye Egozi, *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), 28 April 1998, p. 19; in "Iran Receives Russian Heavy Water Production Expertise," FBIS Document FTS19980428000340, 28 April 1998.

**29 April 1998**

At a meeting with officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC commander Yahya Rahim Safavi says, "Can we withstand American's threats and domineering attitude with a policy of détente? Can we foil dangers coming from America through dialogue between civilizations? Will we be able to protect the Islamic Republic from international Zionism by signing conventions to ban proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons?" [Note: According to Michael Eisenstadt, the IRGC is believed to control Iran's WMD and missile programs, giving Safavi's views on these matters much importance.]

—Agence France Presse, 29 April 1998; in Michael Eisenstadt, "Living With a Nuclear Iran?," *Survival*, 3 August 1999, pp. 124-48.

**29 April 1998**

Amnon Shahak, Israel's chief of staff, states in an interview with *Qol Yisrael* that he believes Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons, but warns if Iran does acquire nuclear weapons in the future, it will represent a major threat to the stability of the region.

—*Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 29 April 1998; in "Shahaq on Iranian Danger, PA Action Against Terrorism," FBIS Document FTS19980429001161, 29 April 1998.

**6 May 1998**

A nuclear scientist from Pakistan denies there is any cooperation between Islamabad, Tehran, and Baghdad regarding nuclear weapons technology.

—IRIB Television (Tehran), 6 May 1998; in "Pakistan Scientist Denies Iran-Pakistan Nuclear Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19980506001511, 6 May 1998.

**7 May 1998**

Alexander Maidannik, press secretary to Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, says Ukraine gets more benefits by not selling components for the Bushehr nuclear power plant than by participating in the project. [Note: See 6 March 1998.] He cites promises of US aid to Ukraine, including for the Kharhov region, where the plant that was to build turbines for the Bushehr project is located.

—"Ukraine Benefits From Quitting Bushehr Project—Spokesman," ITAR-TASS, 7 May 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**9 May 1998**

Cable News Network reports that Iran hopes to obtain a second reactor from Russia, in addition to the Bushehr

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reactor, from Russia.

—"Iranian Nuclear Chief To Visit Russia Amid Controversy," CNN, 9 May 1998, [www.cnn.com](http://www.cnn.com).

#### **10 May 1998**

The *Iran Daily* reports that components destined for the Bushehr nuclear power plant were stolen in Isfahan. Yevgeniy Adamov, the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, believes the equipment does not represent any kind of radiation concern. According to Iranian officials, the truck, which belongs to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), was carrying inconsequential parts destined for tests in Tehran. The AEOI believes the truck, and not the parts, was the target of the theft. [Note: See 17 April 1998 for the first report of the stolen truck.]

—"Components of Bushehr Plant Stolen," *Iran Daily* (Tehran), 10 May 1998, p. 1; in "Iran Daily on Theft of Bushehr Nuclear Plant Components," FBIS Document FTS19980513001663, 13 May 1998; Informationsnoye Agentstvo Ekho Moskvyy (Moscow), 10 May 1998; in "Russian Official: No Threat From Stolen Nuclear Parts," FBIS Document FTS19980510000365, 10 May 1998; Agence France Presse (North European Service) (Paris), 10 May 1998; in "Agence France Presse-Vehicle Carrying Iranian Nuclear Parts Disappears," FBIS Document FTS19980510000051, 10 May 1998.

#### **10 May 1998**

Iran announces that a delegation from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran will visit Russia and China to "discuss nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes." Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, AEOI head, will stay one week in Moscow to discuss nuclear cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, and the completion of the Bushehr power plant. The AEOI plans to make a similar visit to China within the year.

—IRNA (Tehran), 10 May 1998; in "Iranian Atomic Energy Chief to Visit Russia, China," FBIS Document FTS19980510000042, 10 May 1998.

#### **11 May 1998**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Nuclear Energy Minister, says it is not possible for nuclear technology used in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran to be used for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Adamov says the reactor "can under no circumstances be used for military purposes."

—"Russian Nuclear Hi-Tech to Iran 'purely peaceful': Moscow," Agence France Presse, 11 May 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **11 May 1998**

In an interview with Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvyy, Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, cites the contradiction between US policy towards North Korea's reactor and the reactor in Bushehr as the reason why difficulties regarding reconciliation of differences over the Bushehr plant have been hard to resolve. Adamov says Iran's position regarding nuclear technology includes both nuclear weapon development and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Future talks between Gholam Reza Agazadeh, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran chairman, and Adamov will focus on peaceful applications of nuclear technology, specifically, the Bushehr plant and a research reactor with 20% uranium enrichment for Iran. Adamov refutes accusations that Russia will provide assistance for a centrifuge for uranium enrichment.

—Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvyy (Moscow), 11 May 1998; in "Russian Atomic Energy Minister Interviewed," FBIS Document FTS19980511001552, 11 May 1998; Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 11 May 1998; in "Russian, Iranian Nuclear Officials To Meet in Moscow," FBIS Document FTS19980511000622, 11 May 1998.

#### **12 May 1998**

Yitzhak Mordechai, Israel's defense minister, proclaims the Muslim states of the Middle East represent the

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greatest threat to stability in the region. Iran specifically is singled out by Mordechai, who proclaims, "The biggest threat in this context comes undoubtedly from Iran, which strives to assemble missiles capable of reaching any target on our territory and to manufacture its own nuclear weapons." Mordechai further states Iran's desire to attain nuclear weapons must be countered by a strong Israeli response.

—Yitzhak Mordechai, "The Source of Our Strength," *Russkiy Izrailtyanin* (Tel Aviv), 12 May 1998, p. 6; in "Mordechai Views Elements Necessary To Safeguard Future," FBIS Document FTS19980512001371, 12 May 1998.

### **12 May 1998**

Russian President Boris Yeltsin reassures US President Bill Clinton during a phone conversation that Russia is unaware of any Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear capabilities.

—Interfax (Moscow), 12 May 1998; in "Further on Yeltsin, Clinton Phone Call on India, Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980512001322, 12 May 1998.

### **12 May 1998**

Prior to talks in Moscow, Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, confirms plans to build another reactor for the Iranian government. The reactor will be a 20% enriched uranium reactor for research purposes. Adamov says he and his Iranian counterpart, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, will discuss the lack of progress made on the construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran. Yevgeniy Adamov further calls "for the expansion of cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy between the two countries," though he states any work on additional nuclear power plants may delay completion of construction of Iran's Bushehr plant.

—Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 12 May 1998; in "Russia: Adamov on Upcoming Talks With Iran's Aqazadeh," FBIS Document FTS19980512000070, 12 May 1998; *Qol Yisrael International Service* (Jerusalem), 12 May 1998; in "Iran's Aqazadeh in Moscow To Discuss Atomic Energy," FBIS Document FTS19980512001316, 12 May 1998; IRNA (Tehran), 12 May 1998; in "IRNA: Russian Minister on Iran-Russia Nuclear Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19980512000402, 12 May 1998.

### **13 May 1998**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) reports the truck stolen on April 17 in Isfahan on its way to Bushehr, contained several pieces of welding devices. [Note: See 17 April, 10 May 1998 for more on the theft.]

—IRNA (Tehran), 13 May 1998; in "Iran: 'No Special Significance' To Stolen Truck's Contents," FBIS Document FTS19980513000452, 13 May 1998.

### **13 May 1998**

During a visit to Oman, Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Commander of the Iranian Navy, proclaims Iran "has no nuclear weapons and does not want to have any." He further states that Iran's facilities have undergone repeated IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspections that confirmed the absence of nuclear weapons in Iran on several occasions.

—Ahmad Anwar, "Commander of Revolutionary Guard Navy: 'Iranian-Omani Cooperation Guarantees Security of Navigation in Strait of Hormuz'," *Al-Hayat* (London), 13 May 1998, p. 4; in "Iranian Naval Aide on Cooperation With Oman, Other Issues," FBIS Document FTS19980513000938, 13 May 1998; Rafael Bikbayev, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 13 May 1998; in "Iranian Naval Commander on Nukes, Indian N-Tests, Maneuvers," FBIS Document FTS19989513001160, 13 May 1998.

### **13 May 1998**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, and Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, discuss the bilateral contract for constructing the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Russian

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experts believe preliminary estimates of the cost of the project need to increase by \$50 to \$100 million to compensate for delays and Iran's mismanagement of the project. The two officials also discuss the "implementation of the contract, specifically questions of the transfer to the Russian side of full volume of work under the turn-key principle, with simultaneous employment of Iranian subcontractors."

—*Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 13 May 1998; in "Iran Radio Commentary on Nuclear Cooperation With Russia," FBIS Document FTS19980513001016, 13 May 1998; Interfax (Moscow), 13 May 1998; in "Russian, Iranian Ministers Discuss Bushehr Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980513000403, 13 May 1998; ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 13 May 1998; in "ITAR-TASS Reports on Russian-Iranian Nuclear Plant Talks," FBIS Document FTS19980513000678, 13 May 1998.

#### **14 May 1998**

Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (IAO) head, announces the completion of Bushehr power plant "will open a new chapter in Tehran-Moscow ties and will assure the Iranian nation and government that Russia is serious in expanding its ties with Iran." Georgiy Kaurov, ministry spokesman, tells *Al-Hayah*, that a tentative agreement regarding the possible construction of two more nuclear reactors for use as electric power generators, and a reactor for research use will be discussed.

—Jalal al-Mashitah, "Moscow Pledges Completion of Bushehr Station, Does Not Rule Out Supplying Tehran With Three Reactors," *Al-Hayat* (London), 14 May 1998, p. 4; in "Bilateral Cooperation on Nuclear Power to Continue," FBIS Document FTS19980514000387, 14 May 1998; IRNA (Tehran), 14 May 1998; in "Iran Nuclear Official, Kremlin Spokesman on Bushehr, Ties," FBIS Document FTS19980514000445, 14 May 1998.

#### **14 May 1998**

Aleksey Yablokov, former adviser on scientific and environmental issues in Russia, says in an interview that Yeltsin "banned the Atomic Energy Ministry from selling brand-new uranium enrichment technologies to Iran in 1995, but the part of the program covering training of Iranian scientists in Russia has remained in force."

—Anna Zafesova, "Those Hidden Bombs," *Panorama* (Milan), 14 May 1998, p. 117; in "Scientist Accuses Ministry of Nuclear Proliferation," FBIS Document FTS19980508000974, 8 May 1998.

#### **14 May 1998**

ITAR-TASS reports that Gennadiy Seleznev, the Russian State Duma Chairman, says he supports moves to solidify the relationship between Russia and Iran throughout "all spheres, including the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran with the help of Russia."

—ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 14 May 1998; in "Duma Speaker, Iranian Vice President Aqazadeh Hold Talks," FBIS Document FTS19980514001631, 14 May 1998.

#### **15 May 1998**

In response to the poor progress made on the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, Yevgeniy Adamov, Russian minister of atomic energy, says Russia and Iran will explore methods to speed up construction of the nuclear power plant. Adamov reaffirms that "Iranian-Russian ties are profound and serious in all areas, including in the area of peaceful use of nuclear power." In response to US attempts to impede work between the two nations, Iran will cede most of the workload of the Bushehr plant construction over to Russia, an action that adds \$50-100 million to the \$800 million already agreed upon. [Note: See 13 May 1998.]

—Aleksey Zayko, "Russian Receives Exclusive Rights to Iranian Atoms," *Russkiy Telegraf* (Moscow), 15 May 1998, p. 4; in "Russian-Iranian Nuclear Prospects 'Extremely Promising'," FBIS Document FTS19980520000227, 20 May 1998; Denis Pinchuk, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 15 May 1998; in "Iran To Speed Up Joint Construction of Bushehr Atomic Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980515001360, 15 May 1998.

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**15 May 1998**

Mikhail Bogdanov, Russia's ambassador to Israel, says Israeli evidence purporting that Russia has given missile and nuclear technology to Iran is inaccurate. Bogdanov says "the Russian-Israeli dialogue on Iran and other Middle East issues will continue," an attitude he believes is confirmed by Deputy Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov's visit with Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's Prime Minister.

—Steve Rodan, *The Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem), 15 May 1998, p. 1; in "Envoy Denies Russia Supplying Nuclear Technology To Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980515000462, 15 May 1998.

**15 May 1998**

An Iranian delegation led by Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, visits the St. Petersburg Yefremov Electrophysical Apparatus Scientific Research Institute (EASRI) to "familiarize [Iran] with the scientific work of EASRI and to [*sic*] search for a 'common ground' in Russian and Iranian research." Vasiliy Glukhikh, director of NIIIEFA, says that the institute conducts fundamental and applied research in fields specified in the agreement. These fields include controlled thermonuclear fusion, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the production and application of radioisotopes and laser technology. Glukhikh also says that the goal of the visit was a search for "common ground" in Russian and Iranian research.

—Denis Pinchuk, ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 15 May 1998; in "Russian Nuclear Research Institute Chief on Iranian Visit," FBIS Document FTS19980515000790, 15 April 1998.

**16 May 1998**

Gennadiy Seleznev, chairman of the Russian State Duma, and Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of Russia's Atomic Energy Organization, meet to discuss the development of ties between Russia and Iran regarding the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Duma Chairman, Iranian Atomic Energy Official Discuss Cooperation," BBC, 16 May 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**16 May 1998**

Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, spokesman for Russian President Boris Yeltsin, says Russia will finish building the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, which he states is under the strict supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He further states that no country should be prevented access to nuclear power, and that any allegations by "feverish minds in some US and Israeli media organizations" that Russia is providing missile technology to Iran are false.

—Interfax (Moscow), 16 May 1998; in "Spokesman Reiterates Peaceful Nature of Iran Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980516000093, 16 May 1998.

**16 May 1998**

Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, Iran's vice president, announces he will meet with the chiefs of Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry in an effort to determine "a new timetable and to break the deadlock" regarding construction delays of Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran.

—*Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 16 May 1998; in "Atomic Energy Chief: Bushehr Construction Behind Schedule," FBIS Document FTS19980516000314, 16 May 1998.

**17 May 1998**

Russia proclaims that agreements with Iran made by Gazprom, Petronas, and Total regarding the construction of Bushehr's nuclear power plant are legitimate, and that any collaboration with the Iranian government over the

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nuclear technology is "based solely on peaceful relations."

—IRIB Television (Tehran), 17 May 1998; in "Russia: Oil, Bushehr Projects To Be Completed," FBIS Document FTS1998052000070, 20 May 1999.

#### **18 May 1998**

Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, informs reporters in Russia that Iran "has never tried to use Russian nuclear technology for military purposes." Agreements pertaining to nuclear technology transfers between the Iran and Russia, he asserts, are based on a doctrine of peaceful collaboration. This collaboration is finalized in a protocol concerning the agreement between Russia and Iran over the building of Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. He announces Iran's interest in building new nuclear power stations and facilities. Aqazadeh asserts that for nuclear power stations to be efficient they must have research facilities to act as an adjunct, "to ensure normal operation of the nuclear plant."

—Interfax (Moscow), 18 May 1998; in "Aqazadeh: No Military Use For Russian Nuclear Technology," FBIS Document FTS19980519001737, 19 May 1998; *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 18 May 1998; in "Iran, Russia Finalize Protocol on Completing Bushehr Plant," FBIS Document FTS19980520000697, 20 May 1998; Interfax (Moscow), 18 May 1998; in "Iran Says Russian Assistance Has Priority in Nuclear Sphere," FBIS Document FTS19980518001177, 18 May 1998.

#### **19 May 1998**

Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), says Iran opposes nuclear tests by all countries. Aqazadeh says US claims that Iran is seeking to obtain a nuclear device are false, and that any program meant to develop a nuclear weapon does not exist. If the United States is serious about nonproliferation in the Middle East, Aqazadeh says, then it should limit its cooperation with Israel to develop nuclear missiles. At the same time, Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Minister of Nuclear Energy, reemphasizes the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant will not provide Iran with the means to develop nuclear weapons.

—"Iran: Atomic Energy Official Aqazadeh Dismisses 'Baseless US Claims'," BBC, 19 May 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **19 May 1998**

Both Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, proclaim that the finalization of the protocols pertaining to the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant are based in part on the emphasis "that fossil fuels are finite resources and that it is necessary to obtain nuclear energy." Both ministers reaffirm their commitment to the laws established by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), promising each country "will only make peaceful use of nuclear energy." Aqazadeh repeats his condemnation of America's "double standards" noting its sale of weapons to Israel.

—*Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 19 May 1998; in "Iran 'Will Only Make' Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy," FBIS Document FTS19980520000622, 20 May 1998; *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 19 May 1998; in "Tehran Radio Comments on Iran-Russia Nuclear Agreement," FBIS Document FTS19980519001013, 19 May 1998.

#### **19 May 1998**

Benjamin Netanyahu, prime minister of Israel, asks Viktor Posuvalyuk, Russia's deputy foreign minister, to stop supplying arms to Iran, and to clarify Russia's position regarding its supplying of nuclear technology to Iran.

—*Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 19 May 1998; in "Netanyahu Meets Posuvalyuk, Asks To Stop Arms to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980520000497, 20 May 1998.

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**22 May 1998**

Muhammad ElBaradi, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reaffirms the peaceful nature of Iran's and Russia's nuclear cooperation, assuring the international community that Russia's aid in helping Iran complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant will not prepare it for the production of nuclear weapons.  
—IRNA (Tehran), 22 May 1998; in "IAEA Head Says Iran-Russia Nuclear Cooperation Peaceful," FBIS Document FTS19980522001233, 22 May 1998.

**22 May 1998**

In a move to emphasize what Israel believes is a dangerous matter, Natan Sharansky, Israel's Industry and Trade Minister, asks for promises from Sergey Kiriyenko, Russia's Prime Minister, that Russia will not provide missile technology to Iran. Kiriyenko assures Sharansky that "within the framework of our cooperation with countries in the Middle East and elsewhere, we will take no step that might affect Israel's security."  
—Ada Kohen, *Aviv Maariv* (Tel Aviv), 22 May 1998, pp. 1, 2; in "Sharansky-Russian Aid To Iran Must Stop Within 'Weeks'," FBIS Document FTS19980522000319, 22 May 1998.

**26 May 1998**

Zhu Rongji, China's Prime Minister, confirms to Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, that China will not provide nuclear and ballistic missile technology to Iran. This promise comes as a result from China's 1995 agreement with the United States to reduce cooperation with Iran.  
—IDF Radio (Tel Aviv), 26 May 1998; in "Arad Comments on China Talks; Netanyahu 'Satisfied' on Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980526000345, 26 May 1998.

**28 May 1998**

Ali Khurram, Iran's United Nations envoy in Geneva, states his country's opposition to the development of nuclear weapons in the Asian continent. Khurram stresses his country's adherence to the peaceful use of nuclear technologies and warns that India's weapons test risk heightening the arms race between India and Pakistan.  
—*Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 28 May 1998; in "Iranian UN Envoy Warns of Intensification of Arms Race," FBIS Document FTS19980528001330, 28 May 1998.

**29 May 1998**

Greenpeace International asks Iran not to "go nuclear" following nuclear weapons test conducted by India and Pakistan. Simon Carroll, nuclear and disarmament advisor to the Netherlands-based environmental and human rights group, says he "hopes that recent nuclear testings by India and Pakistan do not induce Iran and other countries in the Middle East to follow suit...though we have no evidence that Iran is moving in that direction."  
—IRNA (Tehran), 29 May 1998; in "Greenpeace Urges Iran 'Not To Go Nuclear'," FBIS Document FTS19980529000961, 29 May 1998.

**29 May 1998**

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mahmud Mohammadi calls on India and Pakistan to "stop immediately their atomic tests and the nuclear arms race and to sign the international conventions on banning nuclear tests."  
—"Iran Demands Halt to Nuclear Tests by India, Pakistan," *Agence France-Presse*, 29 May 1998; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

**29 May 1998**

Kamal Kharazi, Iran's foreign minister, proclaims Iran's concern over the intensification of nuclear rivalries in the Middle East, hoping nations of the region will join the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Kharazi, while on a

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visit to Ashgabat, tells IRNA that "we believe that the countries that were not prepared to join the talks on nuclear disarmament and to decide on the comprehensive elimination of atomic weapons, are guilty of causing these dangerous rivalries."

—IRNA (Tehran), 29 May 1998; in "Kharazi Says Iran Will Try To Create Nuclear Free Zone," FBIS Document FTS199805290001394, 29 May 1998.

### **30 May 1998**

The Islamic Republic News Agency reports that the international mass media believes Iran is trying to obtain nuclear weapons in light of the successful tests in India and Pakistan. In response, Iran states, "It is rational as in the Iraqi crisis for Iran to adopt a rational stance and while stressing its commitment to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and condemn both sides as being responsible for escalating tension in the region."

—IRNA (Tehran), 30 May 1998; in "Iranian Dallies Call For End to Nuclear Arms Race," FBIS Document FTS19980530000309, 30 May 1998.

### **1 June 1998**

Admiral Ali Shamkhani, Iran's minister of defense, states that Iran believes the Middle East and the Persian Gulf should be free of non-conventional arms. Shamkhani emphasizes Iran's policy against any nuclear test conducted to further nuclear weapons manufacturing expertise. This statement comes as a result of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan. Shamkhani says Iran will remain in compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and opposes states in and outside the region that wish to obtain nuclear weapons. But he stresses the importance of allowing states to pursue peaceful use of nuclear technology.

—IRNA (Tehran), 1 June 1998; in "Defense Minister: Iran Against Development of Nuclear Arms," FBIS Document FTS19980601001200, 1 June 1998.

### **1 June 1998**

Kamal Kharazi, Iran's foreign minister, tells journalists upon his arrival in Islamabad, Pakistan that Muslim countries are pleased with advances Pakistan has made regarding its nuclear capabilities. Kharazi points out that despite recriminations from international sources, the Islamic world understands Pakistan's decision to conduct nuclear tests, a choice he believes is understandable in light of India's recent detonation of a nuclear device. Though he is pleased with Pakistan's recent success, he hopes it will use restraint to reduce tensions in the region. Sanctions against Pakistan, Kharazi states, will be firmly opposed by Iran.

—Radio Pakistan Network (Islamabad), 1 June 1998; in "Minister Kharazi: Iran's Nuclear Program Peaceful," FBIS Document FTS19980601000975, 1 June 1998; IRNA (Tehran), 1 June 1998; in "Kharazi: Iran's Nuclear Program Peaceful, Under IAEA Watch," FBIS Document FTS19980601001398, 1 June 1998.

### **1 June 1998**

Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, says he is concerned about the proliferation of nuclear technology in western Asia, an area the Islamic Republic News Agency says alludes to Iran and Iraq. He further states his disapproval of the visit of Kamal Kharazi, communication advisor of the prime minister, to Pakistan, where it is assumed by the Israeli government that Iran is seeking to develop nuclear weapons. Iran claims that it does not approve of Pakistan's and India's nuclear tests, deeming them "destabilizing and dangerous."

—IRNA (Tehran), 1 June 1998; in "IRNA: Israel Resumes Disinformation Campaign Against Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980601001436, 1 June 1998.

### **2 June 1998**

Upon his return from Pakistan and India, Kamal Kharazi, Iran's foreign minister, reports that "the atmosphere is

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conducive for Indo-Pak serious and comprehensive talks." He further states that both Pakistan and India are willing to put a temporary moratorium on further tests until negotiations are finalized. Both countries, he proclaims, show "positive signs" that they would be willing to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if it is "based on mutual confidence and on the framework of the military strength and capabilities of the two nations." Kharazi states that Iran "does not encourage the procurement and manufacture of nuclear weapons and that Iran is not at all interested in doing so." He believes Pakistan's detonation represents a symbol within the Islamic community of resolute opposition to what it believes is an Israeli threat. Iran's foreign minister further stresses Iran does not have a definitive plan regarding nuclear weapon procurement, and that it does "want to see that nuclear disarmament program become effective."

—IRNA (Tehran), 3 June 1998; in "Kharazi: Iran 'Not At All Interested' in Nuclear Weapons," FBIS Document FTS19980603001537, 3 June 1998.

#### **5 June 1998**

Zeev Schiff writes in an article in *Haaretz* that Israel's "window of opportunity" is at risk of shutting if it ignores the proliferation of nuclear technological endeavors taking place in the Middle East. He states that countries like Iran will inevitably transfer their technology to other nations and will cause an arms race in the region. Washington's resolve to limit Tehran's ability to produce a nuclear weapon is no longer palatable and its ability to discern whether a nation is nuclear capable, something it failed to do prior to India's detonation of a nuclear device, is no longer adequate. Schiff believes lack of transparency among Pakistan, India, and other nations in the region will cause a "guessing game" that will threaten the region's stability. He concludes that "although the dangers are great, Israel will probably stick even more firmly to its nuclear policy now that Pakistan has the bomb and now that the prospects of Iran going nuclear have increased."

—Zeev Schiff, "The Window of Opportunity is Closing," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 5 June 1998, p. 6; in "Israel's Options for Curbing Iran Nuclear Race 'Limited'," FBIS Document FTS19980605000461, 5 June 1998.

#### **5 June 1998**

Iranian Judiciary Chief Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi says, "We are living at [a] time when the United States supports Israel, which has the biggest arsenals of the mass destruction and nuclear weapons [and] an atomic power is needed in the world of Islam to create a balance in the region."

—IRNA, 5 June 1998; in Michael Eisenstadt, "Living With a Nuclear Iran?," *Survival*, 3 August 1999, pp. 124-48.

#### **5 June 1998**

Shaykh Hamad Bin-Khalifa al-Thani, Qatar's Emir, says Iran's nuclear programs are for peaceful purposes, and "are transparent and under the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) supervision." Speaking at the French International Studies Institute, the Emir states Iran has shown a strong aversion to pursuing nuclear technology as a means to generate weapons.

—IRNA (Tehran), 5 June 1998; in "Iran: Qatari Emir Says Iran's Nuclear Program Peaceful," FBIS Document FTS19980605000281, 5 June 1998.

#### **5 June 1998**

A truck carrying equipment for a nuclear reactor is intercepted by the Kapitan Andreevo Border Checkpoint at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Some documentation stated that the items were en route from Austria to Iran, while other documentation stated that the items were en route from France to Armenia. The Iranian Embassy in Baku denies the Iranian military or civilian involvement is trying to import the metal, although it did not rule out the use of this steel for civilian purposes by a private company. The Embassy calls a *Russkiy Telegraf* story reporting the matter "libelous" and states that it was an attempt by, "Zionist information circles" to cover up Israeli nuclear

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projects. [Note: See 17 April 1998 for what may be a related entry and 29 May and 27 December 2000 for other seizures/arrests at the Bulgarian border.]

—Azeri Paper Sees 'Iranian Hand' In Nuclear Smuggling, *Zerkalo* (Baku), 4 July 1998, pp. 5, 26, FBIS-SOV-98-188, 7 July 1998; ANS TV (Baku), 19 June 1998; in BBC Summary Of World Broadcasts, 23 June 1998; in "Authorities Arrest Four After Theft Of Radioactive Material," Lexis-Nexis, 23 June 1998, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Customs Officers Detect Nuclear Reactor Parts," *Kontinent* (Sofia), 6 June 1998, p. 1; in "More Details on Seizure of Reactor Parts at Border," FBIS Document FTS19980608000222, 8 June 1998.

#### **7 June 1998**

Sergey Karaganov, president of the Foreign and Defense Policy Council, says nuclear tests conducted by Iran and Pakistan are unlikely to produce a "domino-effect" of weapons production in other countries. Karaganov asserts it will take Iran ten years to produce a bomb.

—Interfax (Moscow), 7 June 1998; in "Russia: 'Threshold' States Not Ready To Test Nuclear Arms," FBIS Document FTS19980607000047, 7 June 1998.

#### **8 June 1998**

The Persian daily newspaper *Kar-va-Kargar* states that Iran needs a nuclear capacity to protect its national security: "Considering the nuclear capability of India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and the Zionist regime (Israel), Iran's geopolitical situation demands a revision in this regard." Iran continues to deny accusations that it seeks weapons of mass destruction and maintains that it possesses a peaceful nuclear program that is open to inspection.

—Reuters, 8 June 1998; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

#### **9 June 1998**

Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reports Iran has labeled accusations that it is working with Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons as "baseless." Mahmud Mohammadi, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman, says though Iran views an arms race between India and Pakistan as destabilizing, and it sees Pakistan's successful exploding of a nuclear device as providing an "Islamic deterrent" to Israel. Mohammadi dismisses Israeli concern as an attempt to divert attention away from its own nuclear program. Iran claims stability in the region can only be attained through the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. He further states Iran's stance "has always stressed that the South Asian regions and the Middle East eventually be non-nuclear zones."

—"Iran Denies Charge on Nuclear Technology Transfer," Xinhua News Agency, 9 June 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; IRNA (Tehran), 9 June 1998; in "Iran Denies Asking Pakistan To Transfer Nuclear Technology," FBIS Document FTS19980609000202, 9 June 1998.

#### **10 June 1998**

Turkey announces it is "uncomfortable" with Iran's efforts to develop nuclear arms, believing Iran will choose to pursue nuclear weapons development if South Asia's nuclear programs prove successful. Ambassador Korkmaz Haktanir, undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry, says Turkey is specifically wary of Iran acquiring nuclear technology.

—Selcuk Gultasli, "Iran Makes Turkey Uneasy," *Zaman* (Istanbul), 10 June 1998, p. 7; in "Turkish Unease at Nuclear Tests, Iran Arming Effort Seen," FBIS Document FTS19980611000673, 11 June 1998.

#### **11 June 1998**

*Israel Wire* reports that Pakistan has assured Israel's ambassadors to the United States and the United Nations that Pakistan will not transfer nuclear technology or materials to Iran or to other Middle Eastern countries. Israeli officials had feared that Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi's visit to Pakistan shortly after its May 1998 nuclear

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weapons tests was a sign that Pakistan was preparing to sell nuclear technology to Iran.

—"Pakistan Promises Not To Provide Nuclear Aid To Iran," *Israel Wire*, 11 June 1998, [www.israelwire.com](http://www.israelwire.com).

### **13 June 1998**

In an article for the *Frontier Post*, Dr. Jassim Taqui warns that India's Russian-based nuclear technology may provide Iran with a source to provide information and expertise regarding its own Russian-based nuclear technology.

—Dr. Jassim Taqui, "Nuclear Bombs Up for Sale!," *Frontier Post* (Peshawar), 13 June 1998, p. 8; in "Article Warns of Indian Sale of N-Technology to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980614000123, 14 June 1998.

### **16 June 1998**

Mustafa Zarei, a Majlis deputy from Sarvestan, says Iran must counter US and Israeli propaganda by producing a nuclear arsenal. "So far we have not tried to acquire weapons of mass destruction, but it is essential for us and the Islamic world to have such weapons so as to prevent the Israeli acts of aggression," he says.

—"Majlis Deputy From Sarvestan Says we Must arm Ourselves With Nuclear Weapons," *Kar va Kargar* (Tehran), 16 June 1998, p. 2; in "Majles Deputy Says Iran Should Acquire Nuclear Weapons," FBIS Document FTS19980623001742, 23 June 1998.

### **16 June 1998**

Harvard University arms control expert Graham Allison says Israel and the United States have improperly characterized Russian ballistic missile technology transfers to Iran as a matter of deliberate Russian foreign policy. Allison believes that the transfers are instead the product of a combination of private Russian business interests and corrupt government bureaucrats. Allison believes that if it were Russian government policy to export weapons technology to Iran, complete missile and nuclear weapons systems would be transferred rather than components. Vladimir Orlov, director of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia, says that the effective implementation of Russian export controls is highly dependent upon the effectiveness of Russian customs officials.

—"Russian Sales To Iran Are Business, Not Policy," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 16 June 1998, [www3.haaretz.co.il/eng](http://www3.haaretz.co.il/eng).

### **16 June 1998**

Interfax reports that Turboatom, the Ukrainian plant contracted to supply Iran with turbines for its planned Bushehr nuclear power station, wants compensation for the loss it has suffered due to Ukraine's withdrawal from the agreement to supply the turbines, said Turboatom's General Director Anatoliy Bugayets. The plant's overall losses total about \$130 million and its direct losses (the amount spent on the development of the turbine) total \$5.1 million. A total of 5,000-7,000 jobs may also be lost.

—"Atomic Plant Wants Damages For Loss Of Iranian Contract," Interfax (Moscow), 16 June 1998, FBIS-SOV-98-167, 16 June 1998.

### **20 June 1998**

Refuting Azerbaijan's Turan news agency's report of the capture of equipment with nuclear missile applications, the Iranian Embassy says the detainment of the truck does not involve Iran and is solely an attempt by Israel to divert attention from its nuclear stockpile. [Note: This entry is related to entries on 17 April and 5 June 1998 for other reports involving a truck carrying nuclear materials.]

—IRNA (Tehran), 20 June 1998; in "Iran Embassy Denies Reports Nuclear Reactors Bound for Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980620000795, 20 June 1998.

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**21 June 1998**

Refael Eytan, Israeli Agriculture and Environment minister, says US attempts to improve relations with Iran could be beneficial if "it leads to a more moderate Iran and dissuades the Iranians from attaining nuclear and other weapons."

—Israel Television Channel 1 (Jerusalem), 21 June 1998; in "Minister Approves of US-Iran Ties If Productive," FBIS Document FTS19980621000524, 21 June 1998.

**21 June 1998**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, says Russia will continue its work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Adamov further says that despite attempts by the United States to monopolize the nuclear technology market, Russia will continue to seek opportunities in this field.

—IRNA (Tehran), 21 June 1998; in "US Opposition Fails To Stem Russia-Iran Nuclear Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19980621000095, 21 June 1998.

**22 June 1998**

Anatoliy Buhayets, Ukraine's Turboatom nuclear power plant manager, reports that Turboatom lost approximately \$260 million in a deal that it had with Iran. Under the deal, Turboatom would have supplied turbines to a nuclear power plant in Iran. However, the United States pressured Turboatom to cancel the sale. Buhayets said that the United States should compensate Turboatom for the lost revenue.

—"Turboatom Compensation," Eastern Economist, 22 June 1998, Vol. 5 #22/230, p. 6.

**25 June 1998**

In response to complaints by Iranian officials that the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran is not progressing sufficiently, Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Nuclear Energy Minister, says by September there will be two shifts of Russians working in Bushehr, Iran. Adamov plans to oversee the construction personally, and make further attempts to increase the scope of the Iran-Russia nuclear technology relationship.

—Andreie Ivanov and Judith Perera, "Politics-Russia/Iran: Russian-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation," Inter Press Service, 25 June 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**3 July 1998**

K. Subramanyam, a defense analyst from India, says there is little existing evidence that proves Iran assisted Pakistan with its nuclear program. This statement runs counter to a previous promulgation made by Iftikhar Khan Chaudhry, a Pakistani nuclear scientist in the United States. Chaudhry is one of six nuclear scientists that defected to the United States in protest of alleged discussions among Pakistan policymakers of a pre-emptive strike against India. Subramanyam asserts that rumors of Iranian assistance to Pakistan's nuclear program are exaggerated. "We have not heard of Iran having provided monetary or technological help to Pakistan, facilitating nuclear explosions by the latter last month," he says.

—IRNA (Tehran), 3 July 1998; in "Indian Expert Doubts Iran Helped Pakistan Nuclear Program," FBIS Document FTS19980703000461, 3 July 1998.

**4 July 1998**

Deputy Department Head of the Azerbaijani Ministry of National Security Tofiq Babayev states that four people have been arrested for attempting to sell a container of a cesium isotope for \$1.4 million. If convicted, the suspects face imprisonment for up to five years. The Azerbaijani television station ANS reports that the material may have been taken from an industrial plant in Sumgait, about 39km north of Baku. Babayev says that the Ministry had received reports that a group of Azerbaijanis were attempting to sell uranium obtained from a military unit

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stationed in Azerbaijan. One of the suspects, who was the head of a workshop in the Sumgait plant and allegedly stole four containers of radioactive material, is suffering from prolonged radiation exposure. The Ministry of National Security is also searching for 14 other types of radioactive material stolen from various Azerbaijani chemical enterprises. Babayev states that the collapse of systems of proper control over radioactive substances has made such thefts commonplace in Azerbaijan. The head of the Ministry's press service states that the most likely potential buyer of the cesium would be a country interested in developing nuclear projects. The head of the press service says that two recent attempts by Iran to import missile- and nuclear-related goods supports the hypothesis that Iran is behind the theft of the radioactive material. [Note: See 14 Nov 1992 for other possible illegal exports from Azerbaijan to Iran. See 7 April and 5 June 1998 for other possible attempts to smuggle nuclear-related material into Iran in general.]

—"Azeri Paper Sees 'Iranian Hand' In Nuclear Smuggling," *Zerkalo* (Baku), 4 July 1998, pp. 5, 26; FBIS-SOV-98-188, 7 July 1998; ANS TV (Baku), 19 June 1998; in BBC Summary Of World Broadcasts, 23 June 1998; in "Authorities Arrest Four After Theft Of Radioactive Material," Lexis-Nexis, 23 June 1998, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **10 July 1998**

*Haaretz* reports that an analysis by Professor Shay Feldman, due to appear in *Update*, the publication of Tel Aviv University's Institute of Strategic Studies, says, "It does not seem that Pakistan will transfer nuclear materials or sensitive nuclear technology to Iran or one of the Arab states." Feldman says the decision is based on Pakistan's desire to maintain its nuclear edge over Iran, which he believes will "constitute the undermining of its recently acquired advantage."

—Amnon Barzilay, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 10 July 1998, p. 10; in "Pakistan Nuclear Technology Transfer Said Unlikely," FBIS Document FTS19980710000867, 10 July 1998.

#### **12 July 1998**

During an interview in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, Iran's Defense Minister, says Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear technologies will help counter the threat of Israel, but states that Iran does not wish to see an arms race in the region. Shamkhani states, "Logic says that Iran is always against any kind of arms race, especially a nuclear one. We believe that this trend entails danger and damage, including economic damage, and will not achieve the cherished security. We do not support any endeavor to acquire nuclear weapons."

—*al-Ittihad* (Abu Dhabi), 12 July 1998; in "Shamkhani Offers Defense Pact to Gulf States," FBIS Document FTS19980712000323, 12 July 1998.

#### **14 July 1998**

In response to allegations made by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram*, Ji Pei Ding, China's assistant foreign minister, reaffirms its stance that it will not sell nuclear technology to Iran.

—*Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 14 July 1998; in "Netanyahu Bureau Reaffirms PRC Pledge on Sales to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980714000925, 14 July 1998.

#### **17 July 1998**

Iran and Russia conclude discussions regarding the proliferation, disarmament, and export of nuclear technologies. The two sides report that the conference is meant to strengthen the relationship between the two nations regarding nonproliferation issues, and that each nation believes an attack or threat of an attack on peaceful nuclear facilities will likely provoke a response as dictated in the United Nations Charter. A further statement on the agreement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is agreed upon by the two nations. Both Russia and Iran state that a nuclear-weapon-free zone will reduce the tension created by India's and Pakistan's nuclear

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tests. Though they express their resolute dedication to prohibitive measures against the spread of nuclear technology, they reaffirm the importance of maintaining the right of any nation wanting nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

—IRNA (Tehran), 17 July 1998; in "Iran, Russia To Promote Non-proliferation, Disarmament Aims," FBIS Document FTS19980717000611, 17 July 1998; Yuriy Ulyanovskiy, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 18 July 1998; in "Iran's Adherence to Non-Proliferation Regime Welcomed," FBIS Document FTS19980718000324, 18 July 1998.

#### **20 July 1998**

Nikolay Kovalev, director of the Russian Federal Security Service, reports that it has gathered two years' worth of evidence regarding Iran's attempts to procure Russian nuclear and missile technology, as well as materials used in the manufacture of non-conventional weapons. Kovalev promises Russia will make every effort to stop any attempt to obtain technologies used to produce weapons of mass destruction or launchers.

—Arye Bender (Tel Aviv), 20 July 1998, p. 23; in "Kovalev Lists Iran Attempts to Acquire Nuclear Technologies," FBIS Document FTS19980720001030, 20 July 1998.

#### **24 July 1998**

US Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Sergey Kiriyenko discuss Russia's cooperation with Iran regarding nuclear technologies. Gore says the United States would like to see Russia cease cooperation with Iran in building the Bushehr nuclear power station, which he believes could be used in military applications. Russia asserts its decision to provide assistance to Iran does not violate the nuclear and missile nonproliferation regime, and that all technological expertise was for peaceful purposes.

—Ivan Ivanov and Yelena Kornysheva, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 24 July 1998; in "Russian Delegates 'Not Euphoric' About Gore-Kiriyenko Talks," FBIS Document FTS19980724001337, 24 July 1998; Interfax (Moscow), 24 July 1998; in "Sources Say US Urges Russia To Limit Iranian Nuclear Ties," FBIS Document FTS19980724001145, 24 July 1998; IRNA (Tehran), 24 July 1998; in "IRNA: US Asks Russia To Stop Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980724001493, 24 July 1998.

#### **25 July 1998**

Russia rejects further US pleas to halt construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran.

—IRIB Television (Tehran), 25 July 1998; in "Iranian TV: Russia Rejects US Call on Nuclear Ties," FBIS Document FTS19980725000229, 25 July 1998.

#### **28 July 1998**

Martin Indyk, assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iran's Shehab-3 and Shehab-4 missiles are linked to its nuclear weapons program. He says Iran has a "clandestine nuclear weapons program." He says assessments vary of when Iran can produce a nuclear weapon, adding "there are large gaps in our knowledge of what is going on there because it's a clandestine program."

—*Washington Times*, 29 July 1998, p. A12; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

#### **29 July 1998**

Russia denies that Iranian students trained at the Baltic Technical Institute were provided with sufficient expertise regarding nuclear missile technology. The head of the training program at the Institute says no leakage of "sensitive technologies" was transferred to any of the Iranian students.

—"Russian College Denies Passing on Nuclear Technologies to Iran," British Broadcasting Corporation, 29 July 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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### **30 July 1998**

US President Bill Clinton imposes sanctions on seven Russian companies accused of selling weapons technology to Iran. The companies accused of wrongdoing believe such sanctions are "perplexing" since "they have always operated in accordance with Russian legislation."

—"US Again Uses the Same Failed Policy," *Iran News* (Tehran), 30 July 1998, pp. 2, 15; in "Tehran Paper on US, Israeli Attempts To Impede Ties," FBIS Document FTS19980806002608, 6 August 1998; Leonid Gankin, "Kokoshin Provokes Clinton To Impose Sanctions on Russian Organizations," *Kommersant-Daily* (Moscow), 30 July 1998, p. 2; in "Firms 'Perplexed' but Not Worried by US Sanctions," FBIS Document FTS19980806002351, 6 August 1998.

### **1 August 1998**

Mehdi Akhundzadeh, Iran's Ambassador to Pakistan, says Iran and Pakistan do not have an agreement regarding nuclear cooperation. Akhundzadeh further states Iran's missile program is solely for defensive purposes.

—IRNA (Tehran), 1 August 1998; in "Iranian Ambassador: No Iran-Pakistan Nuclear Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19980805002925, 5 August 1998.

### **3 August 1998**

In protest of Iran's nuclear program, the US House of Representatives votes to cut funding for the International Atomic Energy Agency by the exact amount that the IAEA is assisting Iran with the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The United States believes that the Bushehr project could help Iran's nuclear weapons program. [Note: See 5 August 1998.]

—"US Congress Iran Nuclear Vote," BBC News, 4 August 1998, news.bbc.co.uk.

### **5 August 1998**

The Islamic Republic News Agency says the vote by the US House of Representatives to cut funding to the International Atomic Energy Agency because of its assistance to Iran "defies all logic," in light of the purported 200 nuclear weapons Israel has in its possession. [Note: See 3 August 1998.] In rebuttal to the US decision, David Kyd, IAEA spokesman, says "This action cannot influence this agency's general policies...All the member states of this agency are satisfied with the peaceful nuclear cooperation between the agency and Iran and the agency will support any peaceful use of nuclear energy in the world."

—IRNA (Tehran), 5 August 1998; in "Tehran Paper Attacks US Resolution Against IAEA," FBIS Document FTS199805001091, 5 August 1998; *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 5 August 1998; in "US Congress Move 'Cannot Influence' IAEA-Iran Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19980805003050, 5 August 1998.

### **5 August 1998**

Refael Kohen, director of the Ministry of the Interior, files an affidavit that says the High Court of Justice in Israel believes Israeli citizen Gregoriy Luchansky is trading in radioactive materials and the company he owns is providing nuclear information to North Korea and Iran.

—*Globes* (Tel Aviv), 5 August 1998; in "Israel Official: Luchansky Supplied Iran Nuclear Material," FBIS Document FTS19980805002151, 5 August 1998; Shmuel Dekalo, "Interior Ministry: Luchansky Supplied Iran With Nuclear Missile Construction Material," *Globes*, 6 August 1998, www.globes.co.il.

### **11-12 August 1998**

Andrey Kokoshin, Russia's Security Council Secretary, concludes his visit to Israel by assuring Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu of Israel that Russia is not supplying nuclear technology to Iran to be used for nuclear missile development. Natan Sharansky, Israel's Trade Minister, states he has proof of Russian-Iranian cooperation

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regarding dual-purpose nuclear technologies, which Israel may provide to the United States if Russia does not force its military-industrial companies to cease its work with Iran. Netanyahu states that the Russian government should "intensify 'a dozen times over' its work on preventing the leakage of nuclear and missile technologies to Iran."

—Dmitriy Kaledin, "Mild Annoyance in Framework of Working Visit," *Novvye Izvestiya* (Moscow), 11 August 1998, p. 3; in "Israel Complaint on Iran Seen as 'Convenient Pretext'," FBIS Document FTS19980811000185, 11 August 1998; Leonid Feyglin, "Israel Threatens Russian With Sanctions. US Sanctions," *Kommersant-Daily* (Moscow), 12 August 1998, p. 3; in "Israelis Unconvinced on Iran Arms Link," FBIS Document FTS19980812000633, 12 August 1998.

### **1 September 1998**

Yitzhak Mordechai, Israel's Defense Minister, meets with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who promises China will not provide Iran with nuclear technology that could be used to manufacture missiles.

—Israel Television (Jerusalem), 2 September 1998; in "China's Zemin Promises Mordechai No Nuclear Aid To Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980902001418, 2 September 1998.

### **2 September 1998**

Andrey Kokoshin, the Russian National Security Council Secretary, Sandy Berger, the US National Security Adviser, and Natan Sharansky, Israeli Cabinet Minister, meet in Moscow to discuss the transfer of missile and nuclear technology to Iran from Russian companies. A separate meeting reportedly takes place between Sharansky and Kokoshin, in which Sharansky pushes for stricter measures to be taken against Russian companies accused of providing nuclear weapon technology to Iran.

—*Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem), 3 September 1998, p. 4; in "Sharansky, Russians Discuss Peace Process, Aid to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980903000964, 3 September 1999.

### **21 September 1998**

A report by Denmark's Armed Forces Intelligence Service says Russia constitutes a serious threat to Middle East stability. Specifically, the report discusses Russia's close ties to Iran as being "private, profit-oriented, foreign policy," that have been established to develop a trade of weapons technology and technology for developing nuclear power, which "in a number of cases are [sic] in direct violation of international conventions."

—Jesper Larsen, Karl Erik Nielsen, and Ole Damkjaer, "Moscow Is Still a Problem for Denmark," *Berlingske Tidende Sondag* (Copenhagen), 20 September 1998, p. 8; in "Danish Intelligence Report on Russia Threat," FBIS Document FTS19980925001178, 25 September 1998.

### **23 September 1998**

Gennadiy Seleznev, Russian State Duma speaker, says nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran is based on the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The speaker affirms Russia's desire to help Iran set up a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East by stating, "We are vitally interested in the inadmissibility of spreading weapons of mass destruction in the region. The appearance of such weapons will not solve a single problem. It will, on the opposite, give rise to a complex of new one."

—Konstantin Kazeyev, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 23 September 1998; in "Russian Parliamentary Delegation Ends Iran Visit," FBIS Document FTS19980923001360, 23 September 1998.

### **26 September 1998**

In an effort to keep Russian scientists away from financially lucrative jobs in countries like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, the United States signs an agreement with Russia ensuring \$30 million will be made available to develop

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conversion projects in the nuclear sphere.

—Ivan Kononov, Russian Public Television (Moscow), 26 September 1998; in "US Aid Aims To Prevent Nuclear Brain Drain From Russia," FBIS Document FTS199809030000411, 30 September 1998.

#### **27 September 1998**

Efraim Sneh, a member of Israel's Labor Knesset and the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, espouses a strategy against Iran that calls for a pre-emptive strike against Iran. This action, Sneh asserts, "aims to prevent Iran from having nuclear capability. That must not happen. Twenty-five years after the Yom Kippur War, the Iranians must not have a nuclear bomb because they already have the means to launch it at the heart of the State of Israel."

—Hayim Shibi, *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), 27 September 1998, p. 14; in "Labor MK Sneh Calls for 'Preemptive Strike' on Iran," FBIS Document FTS19980927000038, 27 September 1998.

#### **5 October 1998**

*Der Spiegel* reports that Iran's government is "making intensive efforts to acquire sensitive high technology for military purposes." It further asserts that German companies must use caution in their negotiations with Iran, warning that Iran is trying to procure "nuclear and carrier technology as well as the production of biological and chemical weapons."

—"Caution Required," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 5 October 1998, p. 19; in "Ministry Warns Against Sale of Weapons to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19981005000820, 5 October 1998.

#### **5 October 1998**

*Nuclear Fuel* reports that US and European officials say that Iran, Pakistan, and India were attempting to procure materials and technologies that would allow them to purify nuclear materials using lasers.

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran Said To Be Stepping Up Effort To Support Laser Enrichment Program," *Nuclear Fuel*, 5 October 1998, Vol. 23, No. 20, pp. 1, 17-18.

#### **10 October 1998**

William Cohen, US Secretary of Defense, on a tour of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf says, "Iran foreign policy has not changed," and it continues to try to acquire nuclear weapons.

—IRIB Television (Tehran), 10 October 1998; in "Tehran TV Cites Secretary Cohen's Remarks on Iran, Mideast," FBIS Document FTS19981010000510, 10 October 1998.

#### **11 October 1998**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran obtains permission from the Economic Council of Iran to allocate 418,000 million Rials (\$140 million) for the completion of the Bushehr power plant. The government also approves a request by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to amend its contract with Russia for the construction of the plant; details of the changes to the contract are not reported.

—*Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 11 October 1998; in "Economic Council Grants Budget for Bushehr Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19981011000657, 11 October 1998; Reuters, 12 October 1998; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu; "Iran Okays Financing Of Nuclear Plant," *Dawn*, 13 October 1998, www.dawn.com.

#### **20 October 1998**

Bulat Nigmatulin, Russia's deputy minister of nuclear energy, proclaims Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant will be completed as scheduled.

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—Natalia Kozlova, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 20 October 1998; in "Russian Official: Nuclear Plant in Iran To Be Built on Time," FBIS Document FTS19981020001647, 20 October 1998.

#### **21 October 1998**

US General Anthony Zinni predicts that Iran will have a nuclear capacity in five years. He says that this capacity, combined with Iran's long-range missiles that are capable of delivering nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, "will be a more significant problem than Iraq....In the longer term, Iran is a greater threat."

—Susanne M. Schafer, "US General Warns on Iran Nukes," AP (Washington), 21 October 1998; in *Gulf 2000*, www1.columbia.edu.

#### **25 October 1998**

Shaykh Salim al-Sabah, Kuwait's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and Ali Jannati, Iran's Ambassador to Kuwait, meet to discuss the nature of Iran's nuclear programs. Jannati proclaims "that it has been proved to Kuwait that the Iranian nuclear programs are for peaceful plans."

—IRNA (Tehran), 25 October 1998; in "Iranian, Kuwaiti Officials Discuss Security, Defense Issues," FBIS Document FTS19981025000658, 25 October 1998.

#### **November 1998**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov visits Iran. Iran asks Russia "to prepare a feasibility study for adding three more nuclear reactors at Bushehr." Adamov estimates that the reactors would cost between \$3 billion and \$4.5 billion.

—"Nuclear Exchanges Intensify," *Iran Brief*, 8 February 1999, p. 11.

#### **16 November 1998**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, says Iran and Russia will discuss improving the work efficiency of the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. Adamov calls work thus far on the plant faulted and having only begun in earnest once Russia "assumed the implementation of a turn-key project," which the Bushehr contract became after contractual renegotiations.

—"Atomic Energy Minister to Visit Site of Iran's Bushehr Power Station," BBC, 16 November 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

#### **20 November 1998**

Despite increasing frequency of US condemnation of Russia's participation in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant continues, Yevgeniy Adamov, head of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, says Russia will continue to work on the plant regardless of US discontent over the issue.

—Radzhab Safarov, "Russia Will Complete the Nuclear Power Station in Iran. Not Matter What the Cost to the United States," *Kommersant* (Moscow), 20 November 1998, p. 4; in "Kommersant View Pros, Cons of Completing Bushehr," FBIS Document FTS19981120000877, 20 November 1998.

#### **23 November 1998**

Yevgeniy Adamov, Russia's Minister of Nuclear Energy, in a meeting with Hassan Habibi, First Deputy President of Iran, says "Iran's plans for a developing healthy nuclear energy resources are wise." Adamov further states Iran's efforts to develop peaceful uses for nuclear technology would be augmented by Russian assistance in the way of nuclear energy development and safe disposal of nuclear waste.

—IRNA (Tehran), 23 November 1998; in "Adamov: Russia-Iran Nuclear Energy Cooperation To Continue," FBIS Document FTS19981123001704, 23 November 1998.

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### **23 November 1998**

The Iranian Majlis (parliament) speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri assures visiting Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Adamov that Iran will only use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nuri says, "It has become clear to the world that Iran, a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a member of the Nuclear Disarmament Conference, is not after stockpiling nuclear weapons." Nuri also expresses satisfaction with Iranian-Russian relations and states his hope that Russia and Iran expand further their cooperation.

—"Iran Reiterates Peaceful Use Of Nuclear Energy," 25 November 1998, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Xinhua, 25 November 1998; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **23 November 1998**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov signs a protocol with the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Gholam Reza Aqazadeh to conduct a feasibility study regarding the Bushehr nuclear power project. According to Reuters, Iran wants the feasibility study to center on building three additional nuclear reactors at the Bushehr site. Russia is currently assisting Iran in the construction of a 1,000MW nuclear reactor, with a second reactor already under agreement. Adamov says that Iran's willingness to purchase more nuclear reactors proves that "the Iranian side believes the work will be completed." The additional reactors will reportedly cost between \$3 billion to \$4.5 billion.

—"Iran Wants Russia to Build Three More Reactors," Reuters, 25 November 1998.

### **24 November 1998**

During talks with Yevgeniy Adamov, Russian's Minister of Nuclear Energy, former Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani, head of Iran's Expediency Council, stresses the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, affirming "any country is legally entitled to engage in peaceful development of the atom and no country has the right to put obstacles in the way of the economic development of independent states."

—Konstantin Kazeyev, ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 24 November 1998; in "Iranian Leaders Reiterate Nuclear Program Peaceful," FBIS Document FTS19981124000283, 24 November 1998.

### **24 November 1998**

Russia and Iran sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) at the conclusion of Russian Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Adamov's meeting in Iran. The MOU is a cooperative action meant to promote and eventually establish a consortium between the two nations for the building of a second unit of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, as well as "new generation" power plants in Iran. Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says the speed of the work on the plant has increased appreciably since the signing of the MOU. Proof of this, he further states, is the completion of the "metal chamber" of the plant while the "concrete chamber" will be completed with the next few months. The MOU also provides for modifications to the pay schedule, while promising a completion date will fall within the originally projected 52 months. An exchange of academicians as well as information on nuclear sciences to increase Iranian nuclear know-how are also provided by the MOU.

—IRNA (Tehran), 24 November 1998; in "Russia, Iran Sign MOU on Building New Nuclear Power Plants," FBIS Document FTS19981124000873, 24 November 1998.

### **24 November 1998**

In contrast to previous reports, Iran announces that the Bushehr nuclear power plant will not be completed as scheduled due to technical problems. According to the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, the plant will be completed in 52 months. The completion of the first phase of the construction was originally planned for 1999. [Note: Reports differ on the dates originally anticipated for the completion of the

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Bushehr reactor.]

—"Completion of Iran's Nuclear Power Plant Delayed," Iran Weekly Press Digest, 24 November 1998; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **25 November 1998**

Russia strongly defends its decision to complete construction of the Iranian nuclear reactor and accuses the United States of "double standards" in its efforts to force Russia to terminate the project.

—"Russia Defends Nuclear Deal with Iran, Blasts US Opposition," *Agence France-Presse*, 25 November 1998; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **25 November 1998**

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says Russia's assistance to Iran in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant amounts to advancing Iran's capacity to build non-conventional warheads for the ballistic missiles he believes Iran is developing, "This is a step that runs counter to efforts at reaching peace and stability in the Middle East."

—*Maariv* (Tel Aviv), 25 November 1998; in "Israeli Concern Over Iran Nuclear Reactors," FBIS Document FTS19981125001315, 25 November 1998.

#### **25 November 1998**

*Die Welt* reports Pakistani nuclear scientists are continuing their working relationship with Iranian nuclear scientists. The report further asserts that German intelligence believes Iran is working to develop sensitive technologies designed to enrich uranium to produce nuclear weapons, which they believe Iran will be capable of producing in three years.

—*Maariv* (Tel Aviv), 25 November 1998; in "Iran, Pakistan Nuclear Cooperation Cited," FBIS Document FTS19981125001448, 25 November 1998.

#### **25 November 1998**

Russian Atomic Energy Ministry Deputy Minister Viktor Mikhailov tells journalists that the Atomic Energy Ministry plans to export 50% of its atomic industry output by 2000. The Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran employs 1,100 Russian engineers and will take at least 10 years to finish. Mikhailov says that "Iran is a promising market for the sale of advanced Russian technologies."

—"Deputy Minister Assesses Iran Project," Interfax News Agency (Moscow), 25 November 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, 4 December 1998, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **26 November 1998**

The Russian Foreign Ministry states that the first phase of the construction of the Bushehr reactor will be completed in May 2003. This statement comes after a visit to Tehran by Russian Atomic Energy Minister Adamov.

—"Russia Says Iran Nuclear Reactor Ready by 2003," Reuters, 26 November 1998; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **27 November 1998**

*Israel Wire* reports that Israeli security officials are concerned with the new Russian-Iranian cooperation agreement to expedite construction of Iran's nuclear power plant. The officials said that this project will assist Iran in achieving a nuclear capability and that Russia is also involved in Iran's long-range missile program, which will be coordinated with its nuclear program.

—"Israel Concerned with Russian Nuclear Aid to Iran," *Israel Wire*, 27 November 1998, [www.israelwire.com](http://www.israelwire.com).

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### **December 1998**

US intelligence sources say that the Russian Research and Planning Institute for Power Supply Technologies (NIKIET) and another research institute, probably the Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology, are negotiating for the construction of a 40MW heavy water research reactor in Iran.

—Ronen Bergman, "The Iranian Reactor in the Picture Is Supposed to Be operational With Two or Three Years," *Yediot Aharonot* (Hamasaf Lahag supplement) (Tel Aviv), 29 September 2001; in "Article Views Iranian efforts To Achieve Nuclear capability," FBIS document GMP20010927000222, 8 March 2002.

### **1 December 1998**

Iranian Defense Minister Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani tells US reporters that Iran was not pursuing a nuclear arms program. He also says that US statistics regarding Iranian arms purchases were wrong. In light of the recent South Asia nuclear tests, Shamkhani says that Iran would continue to honor its commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as the Comprehensive Tests Ban Treaty and would not conduct a nuclear test. He stresses that Iran would "never start a war against any other country."

—"Defense Minister Denies Iran Developing Nuclear Weapons," IRNA (Tehran); in FBIS-NES-98-335, 1 December 1998.

### **1 December 1998**

Russia and Iran agreed to expand their nuclear cooperation to include three additional VVER-640 pressurized water reactors as part of the Bushehr project. Russia is already assisting Iran with a VVER-1000 nuclear reactor at Bushehr, which should be completed in 2004. So far, Russia has received \$50 million of the \$800 million deal. With the addition of three VVER-640 reactors to the project, the total cost of the Bushehr project will extend upwards of \$4.5 billion.

—Thomas Nilsen, "Three New Russian Reactors for Iran," *Bellona*, 1 December 1998, pg. 20.

### **1 December 1998**

Hamid Reza Asefi, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman, says that contrary to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent statement, Iran is not seeking access to nuclear weapons. Asefi adds that Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation is for "peaceful purposes" and that all nuclear programs are under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Russia is helping Iran build the Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran.

—"Iran Rejects Israel Allegations On Nukes," *Pakistan Link*, 1 December 1998, [www.pakistan.com](http://www.pakistan.com).

### **2 December 1998**

Vladimir Rakhmanin, a spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, states that cooperation between Russia and Iran in the nuclear industry fully conforms to all international commitments of both countries. During a recent visit to Iran by Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov, an agreement was signed to accelerate the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr and to discuss possible cooperation for building more nuclear power plants in the future. The agreement has been criticized by Israel, which claims it will compromise attempts to achieve peace in the region.

—"Russia Says Nuclear Cooperation With Iran Conforms to NPT," *Interfax*, 2 December 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **2 December 1998**

A Ukrainian official says Ukraine still may go ahead with plans to provide Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant with turbines. Turboatom, the Ukrainian company involved in the deal, says it lost tens of millions of dollars by not

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providing Iran with the originally agreed upon turbines, and may lose more if its reputation is tarnished by the deal. The official further states, "If we do not receive real compensation for our losses from the United States, we could lose more than we have already lost."

—"Kiev Still Considers Russian Turbine Deal with Iran," Global News Wire, 11 December 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **7 December 1998**

*Iran Report* reports that Anatoly Buhayets, director of Turboatom, the Ukrainian company originally contracted to supply turbines for the Bushehr plant, met with William Taylor, the US coordinator of assistance to the newly independent states, to find alternative means of compensation for cancellation of its deal for Bushehr. Buhayets finds the results of the meeting less than satisfactory, stating the United States failed to provide sufficient guarantees of compensation.

—Bill Samii, "Ukraine is Winner in Russia-Iran Nuclear Project," *Iran Report*, 7 December 1998, Vol.1 No.3, [www.rferl.org](http://www.rferl.org).

#### **8 December 1998**

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asks Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov for a Russian commitment not to provide assistance to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Possible US actions against Russia include suspension of projects such as the Nunn-Lugar program, which provides increased safeguards to Russia's nuclear program. Albright invites Ivanov to Washington in April 1999 to meet with US President Bill Clinton.

—Yevgeniy Antonov, "US Issues Ultimatum," *Moscow News*, 24-30 December 1998; Whitney, Craig R; "Albright Presses Russia To Limit Aid To Iran," *New York Times*, 10 December 1998.

#### **9 December 1998**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeniy Adamov insists that Russia would go ahead with its project to build a nuclear reactor in Iran, and says the project is for peaceful purposes and would earn more money for Russia's nuclear industry than aid programs could provide. Adamov says that the reactor project is purely a business deal that was carried out with consideration for the political sensitivities involved, criticizing the United States for its "biased and politicized" objections to the project. Adamov also says that he took Russian nuclear specialists to Iran in November 1998 to discuss training for Iranian nuclear scientists. Russia was ready to provide extensive training, Adamov says, but he did not give further details, which he said were still being finalized. PIR Center Director Vladimir Orlov says that the Russian government was lax in preventing the export of weapons technology.

—Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russia's Nuclear Chief Hails Deal with Iran," Associated Press, 9 December 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **10 December 1998**

Israel Wire reports that Israeli intelligence and security officials have revised their estimate of how long it will take Iran to develop a nuclear weapon capability. The previous estimate of five to seven years has been changed to two to three years. Uzi Arad, special advisor to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and Minister of Industry and Trade, Natan Sharansky, met with US National Security Advisor Sandy Berger in mid-December 1998 to discuss the issue.

—"Iran to Reach Nuclear Capability Sooner Than Expected," Israel Wire, 10 December 1998, [www.israelwire.com](http://www.israelwire.com).

#### **11 December 1998**

During meetings with Russian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and senior Russian officials, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott expresses US concerns that Iran may update missile and nuclear programs because of

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increased cooperation between Russia and Iran. The United States believes that Russian firms are passing sensitive technologies to Iran and is concerned about the Russian participation in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr. First Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Maslykov says that the allegations are unsubstantiated and that Talbott does not have specific examples of such activity.

—"UPI Focus: Talbott Raises Iranian Issue in Russia," Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 December 1998, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **15 December 1998**

The *Washington Times* reports that President Clinton has placed economic sanctions on two Russian organizations, the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology (NIKIET) and the Mendeleev University of Chemical Technology, due to their illicit trade with Iran. The White House neither confirms nor denies this report.

—Bill Gertz, "Russia Warned on Nuclear Deals with Iran," *Washington Times*, 15 December 1998; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **16 December 1998**

The United States warns Russia that it would impose sanctions if it does not halt cooperation with Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Some US government programs with Russian nuclear institutions have already been curtailed. According to State Department spokesman James Rubin, the United States is aware that a number of Russian institutions are engaged with cooperation with Iran and is ready to take decisive action to stop the flow of sensitive technologies to Iran. If Russia does not cease cooperation with Iran's ballistic missile program, the United States government may not approve expansion of the space launch market. Russia currently earns "hundreds of millions of dollars annually" from US-Russian collaboration on a satellite launch program. Russia made a commitment to limit its assistance to Bushehr. However, the United States is confident that Iran is using the Bushehr project as a cover to acquire sensitive Russian nuclear technology.

—Carol Giacomo, "US Warns Russia On Iranian Nuclear Program," Reuters, 16 December 1998; "US Tells Russia to Sever Nuclear Ties with Iran or Risk Loss," *Dawn*, 15 January 1999, [www.dawn.com](http://www.dawn.com).

#### **29 December 1998**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Environmental Protection Organization agree to cooperate in joint projects, especially the marine environment, and to meet to review any nuclear incidents.

—"Atomic, Environmental Bodies Agree On Scientific, Technical Cooperation," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 January 1999; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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## **1997**

### **1997**

Iran hires a number of South African technicians whose jobs were eliminated following the demise of South Africa's nuclear weapons program. Iran has shown an interest in laser isotope separation, an area in which South Africa and Russia are known to have collaborated.

—Marina Bidoli, "Atomic Energy Corp In Danger Of Being Vaporized," *Financial Mail*, 15 August 1997; Inigo Gilmore, "Daily On Iranian Nuclear 'Shopping List' in South Africa," *Times* (London), 18 August 1997; Mathew Campbell and Uzi Mahnami, "Iran's Mullahs On Brink Of A Nuclear Bomb," *Times* (London), 21 December 1997; G.N. Markov, V.N. Likhman, and E. Ronanader, "Multiple Photoionization of  $^{169}\text{Yb}$  in a Three-Level Atomic

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Medium by the Collinear Propagation of Laser Pulses," *Journal of Physics*, Section B, 1995, Vol. 28, pp. 215-220;  
Ann MacLachlan and Michael Knapik, "South Africa to End MIS SWU Project, *Nuclear Fuel*, 12 December 1997.

### **1997**

Mohammad Husayn Mahluji, Iranian Minister for Mines and Metals, signs a letter of intent pledging Iran's interest in buying the ailing German machine tool manufacturer Magdeburg GmbH.

—"Tehran to Buy German M-Tool Maker," Iran Brief, 6 January 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **6 January 1997**

The *Iran Brief* reports that China is planning to complete a uranium hexafluoride plant in Iran, according to US and International Atomic Energy Agency officials. [NOTE: In November 1996, China formally pledged to the United States that it would pull out of the project. See November 1996.]

—"Chinese To Deliver Hex Plant Despite Assurances," *The Iran Brief*, 6 January 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **6 January 1997**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says that 1,000 Russian engineers will work at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran.

—"Nuclear Energy Ministry Steps Up Exports in 1996," *Interfax (Moscow)*, 6 January 1997; in FBIS Document FTS 19970317001501.

### **8 January 1997**

The United States continues to urge China to abandon its plan to construct a uranium hexafluoride conversion plant in Iran. Iran wants the plant for its commercial nuclear power plant program. US officials, however, contend that the plant is part of Iran's nuclear weapons development program. The plant would convert uranium oxide to a gaseous state so that it can be enriched to fuel-grade material, either through diffusion or centrifuge technology.

—*Jane's Defense Weekly*, 8 January 1997; in Gulf 2000, [gulf2000.columbia.edu](http://gulf2000.columbia.edu).

### **30 January 1997**

Iran's Atomic Energy Council recommends pursuing negotiations with China to build nuclear power plants.

—"Iranian Atomic Energy Council Urges Cooperation with Iran," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 February 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **February 1997**

Iran is in the market for \$50 million worth of turbines for the Bushehr power plant, according to Ukrainian officials.

—Associated Press, 25 February 1995; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **February 1997**

Physicists from Tblisi State University and at least one plasma physicist from the former Soviet Union have accepted offers to work for Iran.

—R. Adam Moody, "Armageddon For Hire," *Jane's International Defense Review*, February 1997, pp. 21-23; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

### **February 1997**

The Australian press reports on a top secret US policy for using nuclear weapons against Iraq. A senior Clinton

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advisor is quoted as saying, "It is US policy to target nuclear weapons if there is the use of weapons of mass destruction. Whether we would use it is another matter." It is assumed that Iran would be similarly targeted if there was an attack using weapons of mass destruction on US interests.

—"Atomic warheads Aimed At Iraq After US Policy Switch," *Melbourne Age*, 2 February 1998.

#### **February 1997**

The CIA says that Israel is not expected to launch an attack against Iran even if Iran develops nuclear weapons. Technical considerations and regional problems would hinder any such attack. It is reported that Israel could attack Iran by flying over Turkey but that would present considerable logistical problems.

—"Israel Unlikely to Hit Out at Iran," *Asia Times*, 24 February 1997.

#### **February 1997**

An Austrian company completes a cyclotron, which can be used to enrich uranium, at Iran's nuclear research center in Karaj. The cyclotron, listed in a secret deal as "medical equipment," violates European Union trade sanctions against Iran. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) issues a statement on 27 February 1997 denying that Iran was pursuing a uranium enrichment capability. The AEOI reportedly runs a number of front companies in Vienna, Austria, to buy components for Iran's nuclear weapons program. [Note: See also 23 February 1997.]

—Con Coughlin, "Iran: Article Highlights Danger Of Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 23 February 1997, p. 24; "US Sounds Alarm Over Iran Nuclear Threat," FBIS-NES-97-036, 23 February 1997; "Iran: IAEA Denies UK Press Report On Iran's Nuclear Program," IRNA (Tehran), 28 February 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-97-040, 28 February 1997.

#### **February 1997**

Reports say China is Iran's most important nuclear trading partner, selling over \$60 million worth of equipment per year, although Iranian scientists have reportedly been disappointed with the quality of some of the Chinese equipment. Fourteen Chinese nuclear experts are currently working at Iranian nuclear facilities.

—Con Coughlin, "Iran: Article Highlights Danger Of Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 23 February 1997, p. 24; "US Sounds Alarm Over Iran Nuclear Threat," FBIS-NES-97-036, 23 February 1997; "Iran: IAEA Denies UK Press Report On Iran's Nuclear Program," IRNA (Tehran), 28 February 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-97-040, 28 February 1997.

#### **February 1997**

According to Husayn Abedini, a member of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, "there is no doubt that Iran is intensifying its efforts to acquire a nuclear weapons arsenal. If they continue to make progress at the current rate, they will have their own nuclear capability within five years." [Note: The Mohajedin-e Khlaq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program.]

—Con Coughlin, "Iran: Article Highlights Danger Of Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 23 February 1997, p. 24; "US Sounds Alarm Over Iran Nuclear Threat," FBIS-NES-97-036, 23 February 1997; "Iran: IAEA Denies UK Press Report On Iran's Nuclear Program," IRNA (Tehran), 28 February 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-97-040, 28 February 1997.

#### **7 February 1997**

Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, Russian deputy atomic energy minister, says the light water nuclear reactors Russia is building in Iran cannot be used to make weapons-grade uranium or anything else of military value. He also notes that the reactors are under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He says the project to build the

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Bushehr nuclear power plant is "making brisk progress," and that the plant should be in operation in four years.  
— "Russia Says Nuclear Reactors For Iran, China, India, Purely Civilian," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 February 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **18 February 1997**

On a trip to Israel, Li Lanqing, Chinese deputy prime minister, says China is not providing nuclear cooperation to Iran. "We will not do anything that could harm you," he says. "You can relax." David Levi, Israeli foreign minister, says, "We expect China, as a country which wants to contribute to peace, to do everything it can to curtail such dangers which could lead to war."

— "Vice-Minister Visiting Israel Denies Nuclear Aid to Iran," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 February 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **23 February 1997**

The *Sunday Telegraph* of London reports that for over one year, Austrian nuclear scientists have been working on a cyclotron for enriching uranium at Iran's nuclear research facility in Karaj. Austria clandestinely sold Iran the cyclotron as "medical equipment." Tehran has a variety of "front companies" in Vienna that are used to purchase nuclear weapons technologies. This Austrian technology is more sophisticated than what Iran receives from China or North Korea, and could facilitate the production of weapons-grade uranium "within a few years." [Note: The *Sunday Telegraph* reports having received the information about the Austrian connection from unnamed "documents" from an unnamed source.]

— Con Coughlin, "US Sounds Alarm Over Iran Nuclear Threat," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 23 February 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970625003657.

#### **24 February 1997**

On his way to Iran, I.K. Gujral, Indian external affairs minister, says he will not discuss nuclear cooperation with Iran on his trip.

— "Visiting Indian Foreign Minister Says Nuclear Cooperation Not On Agenda," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 February 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **25 February 1997**

China's president, prime minister and foreign minister assure Israel's Foreign Minister David Levi that China has stopped discussing nuclear matters with Iran. [Note: The article does not give any specific details on what the Chinese leaders said.]

— "China to Levi: Nuclear Talks With Iran 'Suspended'," *Qol Yisra'el* (Jerusalem), 25 February 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970625004062.

#### **28 February 1997**

Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani visits the Bushehr nuclear power plant and says, "The Islamic Republic of Iran will employ nuclear power in order to boost its development efforts....The construction and operation of modern power stations is essential for implementing the Islamic Republic of Iran's long-term plans for development and public welfare, in particular for the Iran-1400 [year ending 2001] programme."

— "Rafsanjani Inspects Bushehr Nuclear Plant: Iran Resolved To Use Nuclear Power," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 March 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 February 1997**

*Konversiya* of Moscow reports that since 1992, Russia has sent 14 nuclear physicist-engineers to work in Iran.

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Starting in 1994, other countries from the former Soviet Union have sent 50 engineers and 200 technicians to work in Iran's nuclear industry, earning \$5,000 per month.

—S.I. Simanovskiy, "The International Aspects of Conversion in Russia: Problems and Threats," *Konversiya* (Moscow), 28 February 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970626002802.

#### **March 1997**

John Holum, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, testifies that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, but that it would not be able to produce enough fissile material until 2005 to 2007. [Note: In 1995, Holum said Iran might be able to make a bomb by 2003.]

—Associated Press, 5 May 1997, pp. 1, 26; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

#### **6 March 1997**

Iranian President Rafsanjani says that the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be capable of producing 2000MW of power. [Note: This seems to indicate another 1000MW reactor will be added after the one under construction is completed.]

—"Bushehr Development Projects, Nuclear Power Plant Outlined," *Iran in Persian* (Tehran), 6 March 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970828001096.

#### **11 March 1997**

Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov says that Russia is not involved in Iranian nuclear missile projects. He adds that Russia is supplying Iran with the same light water reactors as the U.S. is supplying North Korea.

—ITAR-TASS, 11 March 1997; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

#### **16 March 1997**

During a program featuring the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, a Russian television correspondent says that the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Reza Amrollahi, "does not hide the fact that his country has the scientific potential for creation of its own nuclear weaponry." [Note: Amrollahi later denies this accusation. See 15 April 1997.] Aleksandr Steblyanko, the chief of construction at Bushehr, says "as at any nuclear station, the spent raw material—the spent products of the nuclear station—may no doubt be used as raw material for future military uses perhaps, but it all depends on politics." According to the correspondent, the Bushehr plant will provide 10% of Iran's electricity needs, and is "primarily Iran's testing ground for studying nuclear technology." Approximately 100 Russian technicians are working at Bushehr, earning \$700 per month. Iran pays Russia about \$7000 for each expert.

—"TV Features Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Site," NTV (Moscow), 16 March 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970318001331.

#### **19 March 1997**

According to Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, Russia's Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy, Iran recently paid Russia its first installment for building the nuclear power reactor in Bushehr. Iran has also paid Russia for its nuclear technicians working on the project. [Note: See 16 March 1997]. The Russians have started construction on "steam generators and other equipment with a long production cycle." Reshetnikov says that Iran has paid 10% of the total project cost, which is approximately \$800 million. He also says the project is on schedule. [Note: See 16 March 1997. Aleksandr Steblyanko, the chief of construction, says the project was one year behind schedule.]

—"Iran Pays First Installment on Bushehr Nuclear Plant," *Interfax* (Moscow), 19 March 1997; in FBIS Document

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FTS19970319000515; Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 21 March 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970321001323.

### **21 March 1997**

According to a top official at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), a new stage of construction began at Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant after Iran made a \$60 million advance payment to Russia. Minatom Deputy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov said that the reactor vessel has been manufactured and experts have begun building the plant's steam generators and other equipment. Assembly of the plant's VVER-1000 [1000MW] light water reactor will begin in early 1998. The Bushehr-1 reactor is scheduled to be commissioned in 2001.

—Veronika Romanenkova "Russia: Russian Experts Start Building Generators At Bushehr," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 21 March 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-97-080, 21 March 1997; "The World Today" Voice of Russia World Service (Moscow), 21 March 1997;" in "Russia: Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Activity Discussed;" in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-97-081, 22 March 1997.

### **21 March 1997**

*Haaretz* reports that, according to "Project Risk," a non-governmental organization that tracks weapons proliferation, Iran purchases prohibited and sensitive technology via front companies in the guise of charitable organizations. The most active is the *Bonyad-e Mostazafin* ("Foundation for the Oppressed"). Former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres says that German organizations "are the most problematic" for selling sensitive technology to Iran. Peres says that the German government does not always actively try to stop illicit shipments to Iran. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency acknowledges a strong relationship with the German government, but says, "there are sectors of German industry that are more mechanized to help Iran's nuclear efforts."

—Ronen bergman, "Iran Has No Atom Bomb. So Far," *Haaretz*, 21 March 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970325000828.

### **23 March 1997**

When asked whether Iran is pursuing a nuclear bomb, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani tells CBS's 60 Minutes, "absolutely not. We hate that weapon." The CBS correspondent then asks if Rafsanjani would "swear by Allah." Rafsanjani replies, "there's no need to take an oath. We are a frank people. We make missiles and we tell everybody that our missile industry is strong. But we're not after nuclear bombs and we won't go after biological and chemical weapons." Rafsanjani says that nuclear energy is necessary to help meet Iran's electricity needs, and that the technology was originally supported by the United States when the Shah was in power.

—"Rafsanjani: United States Should Show Goodwill," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 24 March 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970324001051; "IRNA Reports on Rafsanjani Interview With CBS," IRNA (Tehran), 23 March 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970324001202.

### **April 1997**

The *Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis* reports that the Iranians were offering former Soviet scientists \$5000 per month to work on special projects in Iran. There are also additional allegations that technicians from North Korea, China, Pakistan as well as Russian and the West were all at work in Iran.

—"Iran: Headed for a National Deterrent?," *Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis* (Boston), April 1997; in "Exploring US Missile Defense Requirements in 2010:What are the Policy and Technology Challenges?," Federation of Atomic Scientists, [www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org).

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#### **11 April 1997**

*Nezavisimaya Gazeta* of Moscow reports that Russia may be willing to sell Iran its S-300 air defense missile system to protect the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Moscow May 'Examine Question' of S-300 Deliveries to Iran," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), 11 April 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970411000205.

#### **11-12 April 1997**

During a meeting in Moscow between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, speaker of the Iranian parliament, Yeltsin announces that Russia has "a good positive cooperation with Iran, which shows a tendency to increase." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Posuvalyuk and his Iranian counterpart Mahmud Vaezi sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on export controls, emphasizing their commitment to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

—"Moscow Reaffirms Friendly Relations With Tehran," *Jamestown Monitor*, 14 April 1997; "Iran: Nuclear Export Control Agreement Signed With Russia," *Voice of The Islamic Republic of Iran* First Program Network (Tehran), 12 April 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-97-102, 12 April 1997.

#### **13 April 1997**

*Moskovskiy Novosti* of Moscow reports that Iran will obtain nuclear weapons in 10 to 15 years.

—"Russia's Supplies of Armaments to Iran," *Moskovskiy Novosti* (Moscow), 13 April 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970717001163.

#### **13 April 1997**

Hassan Ruhani, deputy speaker of Iran's Majlis (Parliament), says that Germany should pay Iran "18 billion marks related to the Bushehr nuclear court case."

—"Majles Deputy Speaker Calls for Compensation from Germany," *IRIB Television First Program Network* (Tehran), 13 April 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970413000175.

#### **15 April 1997**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that a Russian television report on the Bushehr nuclear power plant erroneously stated that Iran was technically capable of building a nuclear weapon. The Russian report "is completely contrary" to Amrollahi's statements. [Note: See 16 March 1997 entry for more on the television report.]

—"Iran Denies Russian TV Report on Nuclear Capabilities," IRNA (Tehran), 15 April 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970415000578.

#### **16 April 1997**

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma says that his country will not sell Iran turbines for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. According to Volodymyr Ogrzyzko, head of the president's Foreign Policy Department, "Ukraine is not involved in any sort of activities related to the project." Ogrzyzko does say, however, that relations with Iran "are developing" and that any cooperation will fall under international regulations. An official from Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy says "all the necessary equipment for the nuclear power plant is produced in Russia, so we do not need the help of third countries in this case." An organization in St. Petersburg, Russia will make the turbines for the Bushehr plant. [Note: Ukraine later decides that it will sell turbines to Iran. See 26 July 1997.]

—"Ukraine President Cancels Turbine Deal With Iran," *Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 15 April 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970415000080; "Spokesman on Export of Parts for Iranian Nuclear Plant," *UNIAN* (Kiev), 16 April 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970416002709; "Official Denies Involvement in Nuclear Reactor for Iran," *Intelnews* (Kiev) 18

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April 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970418000099; Veronika Romanenkova, "Ministry 'Unruffled' by Kiev's Refusal to Supply Turbines," *ITAR-TASS* (Moscow), 16 April 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970416000535; "Ties With Kiev Not Affected By Iranian Contract," *Interfax* (Moscow), 18 April 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970418000288.

#### **17 April 1997**

*Hamburg Stern* reports additional details of Iran's European smuggling network, as provided in a German report on the Iranian Defense Industries Organization. German officials believe that Germany is the central location for the Iranian procurement network. This problem has been aggravated by the fact that Iran has received loans worth 5 billion DM from Germany and Germany appears unwilling to enforce laws concerning dual-use items. It is believed that part of these loans have been used to found a machine-tool industry in Iran. This program started in 1992 and is indicative of the ineffectiveness of the western embargo against Iran.

—Rudolf Lambrecht, "A Roaring Trade With Tehran," *Hamburg Stern*, 17 April 1997.

#### **17 April 1997**

In a statement before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, a spokesman for the State Department says that Iran "has demonstrated a determined effort to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missiles capable of delivering them, and dangerous advanced conventional weapons." In the statement, State Department officials David Welch and Robert Einhorn note that Iran has "dedicated civilian and military facilities and technologies that are inconsistent with a purely peaceful nuclear program." The officials said the United States has approached a number of supplier governments bilaterally to prevent such transfers. Most governments, they said, have chosen not to pursue any peaceful nuclear cooperation with Iran, "with Russia and China being notable exceptions," since such cooperation could be used to further Iran's nuclear weapons program. Because of Iran's effort to develop WMD and associated delivery systems, and its continuing support for terrorism, Welch and Einhorn say the United States has combined nonproliferation and anti-terrorism efforts with economic and political pressure. However, they added, "current tools—economic sanctions such as the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and the president's embargo, the missile and CBW sanctions laws, the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act, and the many nuclear sanctions laws—teach the limits of effective unilateral initiatives." The statement says that US policy would be more successful if the United States had cooperation from its allies to use "our common political and economic clout to have a real tangible impact on Iran."

—"Iran And Proliferation," Statement of David Welch, Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, and Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 17 April 1997.

#### **27 April 1997**

*Welt am Sonntag* of Hamburg reports that, according to Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Iran has a nuclear weapons development program. The report says Tehran will not have the technical capability to produce nuclear weapons until at least 2002, although that timeframe could be accelerated if Iran acquires weapons-grade fissile material on the black market.

—Heinz Vielain, "Intelligence Service Warns: Iran Is Developing Nuclear Weapons," *Welt am Sonntag* (Hamburg), 27 April 1997 p. 4; in "Germany: BND Says Iran 'Stepped Up' Arms Programs 'Considerably'," in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-97-118, 28 April 1997.

#### **30 April 1997**

The foreign ministers of the European Union call on Iran to abide by nuclear non-proliferation agreements.

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—"EU To Crack Down On Iranian Operations," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*, 30 April 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **3 May 1997**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that of all the countries in its region, Iran has the most self-sufficient industries for peaceful nuclear technologies.

—"Energy Official: Iran Leads Region in Nuclear Self-Reliance," IRNA (Tehran), 3 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970503000072.

### **5 May 1997**

Iran will not be able to make a nuclear bomb until "the middle of the next decade," says a senior Israeli intelligence official. According to Israeli and other sources, Iran's nuclear ambitions have been delayed by US pressure on Iran's nuclear suppliers.

—"Iran Nuclear Weapons Program Delayed," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 May 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **7 May 1997**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), says that Iran has successfully produced nuclear materials instrumental for nuclear medicine. He also says that the AEOI has "successfully engaged in 178 cases of expansion of technology transfer and innovation." The AEOI also "provided its industries with 120,000 industrial radioactive forces" between 1989 and 1994. An Iranian television program featuring the Karaj nuclear facility says that Iran can produce "30 million-electron-volts proton ion and 15 million-electron-volts deuteron ion used in nuclear physics and radiochemistry."

—"Nuclear Substances for Medicine," *Resalat* (Tehran), 7 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970627001465; "Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Head Notes Achievement," IRNA (Tehran), 7 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970507000193; "TV Shows Atomic Energy Center in Karaj," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 7 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970507001107.

### **7 May 1997**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), says that Iran has established the "center for research and application of radio process" in Yazd province. Amrollahi added that the AEOI is building a second Tokamak nuclear fusion research reactor.

—"Iran: Iran's Atomic Energy Organization Head Notes Achievements," IRNA (Tehran), 7 May 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-97-127, 7 May 1997.

### **11 May 1997**

Israeli Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Amnon Lipkin-Shahak says, "Iran is quite a few years away from having a [nuclear] bomb. The only way to stop it is by not allowing it to take shortcuts through persons or through technology that can be purchased in the free world."

—"Chief of Staff on Syria, Iran, PA Threats," *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), 11 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970512001098.

### **13 May 1997**

Sergey Tretyakov, Russia's ambassador to Iran, says that Russia's assistance in building the Bushehr nuclear power plant is completely legal. He says that the pursuit of nuclear technology for peaceful uses is "the right of every country."

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—"Russian Ambassador Defends Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 13 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970513000472.

#### **15 May 1997**

The Frankfurt Administrative Court decides that the German embargo on Iran includes services for increasing nuclear safety, in addition to technology for nuclear plants. The German government had denied a license to an engineering firm planning to help examine the "external concrete claddings of the two reactor blocks at the Bushehr nuclear power plant." The company said that it would only "examine the statistics of the nuclear plant's concrete cladding," which would help improve the safety of the facility. [Note: See 21 March 1997.]

—Juergen Schenk, "Service Also on Embargo List," *Frankfurter Rundschau* (Frankfurt/Main), 16 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970516000470.

#### **19 May 1997**

Germany creates "coordination agency for Iran" in Cologne's customs investigation office. This agency will monitor "suspicious 'Iranian-controlled firms in Germany'." German customs officials are currently investigating 10 organizations for illicit sales to Iran.

—"Agency Established To Prevent Arms Exports to Iran," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 19 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970520000550.

#### **26 May 1997**

*Rose al-Yusuf* of Cairo reports that Egypt has received "a dangerous report...whether by accident or design, from a European capital" of Israel's intentions to bomb the nuclear power plant near Bushehr, Iran. The report says Israel would only attack the facility if it seemed imminent Iran would invade neighboring countries. Israel could damage, but may not be able to completely destroy, the nuclear reactors, the report says. [Note: Israel bombed Iraq's Osirak reactor at Al-Tuwaita in 1981, but this did not eliminate Baghdad's nuclear weapons programs.] Israel would need the United States' approval to carry out such an attack.

—Faizah Saad, "Israeli Plan to Strike Iranian Nuclear Reactors," *Rose al-Yusuf* (Cairo), 26 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970609000129.

#### **30 May 1997**

*Frankfurter Allgemeine* of Frankfurt/Main reports that, according to German intelligence sources, Iran aims to use Syria as a supplier route for its weapons of mass destruction programs. Syria is not subject to export controls as stringent as those against Iran, and has "fewer difficulties in the development of ultramodern mass destruction factories."

—"Iran Wants To Use Syrian Espionage Network," *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (Frankfurt/Main), 30 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970530000438.

#### **31 May 1997**

Iran's Ambassador to Kazakhstan, Hasan Qashqavi, says that Iran is not pursuing nuclear weapons, and that its nuclear programs are strictly for peaceful purposes.

—"Iranian Envoy Stresses Peaceful Intent of Nuclear Program," IRNA (Tehran), 31 May 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970602000105.

#### **2 June 1997**

Iran announces the first phase of its \$33 million electron accelerator is operating. The center is in Yazd. The accelerator is believed to be a 3 MeV Van de Graaff accelerator. Iran's state-run radio says that the accelerator

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would be used for various industrial purposes, and not as a tool to develop nuclear weapons as the United States has claimed. [Note: See 3 June 1997.]

—"Iran: First Phase of Iran's Electron Accelerator Operational," FBIS Document FBIS-NES-97-153, 2 June 1997; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998; H. Afaideh, M. Lamahi, S.A. Durrani, "Beam Profile of Particles Produced by 3 MeV Van de Graaff Accelerator," Nuclear Tracks and Radiation Measurements, 1991, Vol. 19, pp. 801-802; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998; "Iran Commissions Electron Accelerator," Reuters, 1 June 1997.

### **3 June 1997**

Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani inaugurates the "centre for research and application of radio process" in Yazd, in central Iran. [Note: See 2 June 1997.] Rafsanjani says Iran will soon be able to "enter the exclusive market" of nuclear medicine and agricultural products. He says the work of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has met most of the needs of the country for such products. He says every country has a right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and that Iran has achieved success in the fields of nuclear medicine and agriculture despite the opposition of the United States.

—"President Says Iran To Join 'Exclusive Market' Of Nuclear Medicine Soon," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 June 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **9 June 1997**

Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani denies that Iran seeks nuclear weapons. "We are a serious military power," he says. "However, we have always detested nuclear and chemical weapons, which are deployed by American and by the West in general."

—"President Says Elections Defeat For West; Denies Nuclear Capability Plan," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 June 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **9 June 1997**

Anatoliy Minchenko, Ukraine's minister for industrial policy, says that Ukraine wants to promote cooperation in "nuclear power engineering" with Iran. Ukraine's Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udoenko, did not mention the sale of turbines for the nuclear power plant near Bushehr, Iran. [Note: See 16 April 1997 and 26 July 1997.] Ukraine's Kharkiv Turboatom company had planned to sell Iran the turbines, but the United States has been very vocal against the deal.

—"Government Urges Iran To Help Settle Turkmen Oil Debt," *UNIAN* (Kiev), 9 June 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970609000845; "No Discussion on Turbine Delivery to Iran Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 9 June 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970609000909.

### **10 June 1997**

Russia issues a statement proposing cooperating with Iran on nuclear safety, which would be applied to Iran's "peaceful use of nuclear power."

—"Nuclear Power Safety Talks With Iran Approved," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), 10 June 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970612000346.

### **12 June 1997**

Mohamed Al-Baradi, the newly elected Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), acknowledges that Iran has maintained a positive relationship with the IAEA. Inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities

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indicate that the country is compliant with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. "Our relations with Iran contain nothing special or different from our relations with other countries," he says.

—Abd al-Munim Tawfiq, "Interview with Dr. Muhammad al-Baradii," *Al-Quds al-'Arabi* (London), 12 June 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970617001352.

#### **Mid-June 1997**

A delegation of officials from Russia's nuclear industry goes to Tehran to discuss payment for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Sources say \$700 million will be paid in cash and \$300 million in barter goods, mostly food. The rights to import the barter goods have reportedly gone to Imperial bank, with ties to Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Stolichny bank, with ties to Moscow Mayer Yury Luzhkov and National Security Advisor Boris Berezovsky.

—"Iranian Nuclear Trade With Russia Goes Nuts; Pistachios Marketed For Sexual Potency," *Journal of Commerce*, 11 June 1997, p. 7B; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **20 June 1997**

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu presses US President Bill Clinton "to exert all his influence" to stop Russia from helping Iran obtain nuclear weapons. Netanyahu wrote Clinton "a secret letter" indicating that Clinton should persuade Russia to not sell nuclear reactors to Iran.

—Ben Kaspit, "Netanyahu Urges Clinton Action Against Iran Nuclear Efforts," *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), 20 June 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970620000245.

#### **23 June 1997**

In the final report of the Denver "G-7 plus one" summit, leaders of the world's leading industrial countries called on all states to curtail supplies of dual-use technology to Iran's strategic weapons program. The report was signed by Russia, which along with China is Iran's largest supplier of advanced conventional weapons, as well as a supplier of dual-use technology. The report says, "We call on all states to avoid cooperation with Iran that might contribute to efforts to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities, or to enhance chemical, biological, or missile capabilities in violation of international conventions of arrangements."

—"G-7 Ups Pressure On Tehran," *The Iran Brief*, 3 July 1997, p. 7.

#### **23 June 1997**

Viktor Mikhailov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, says Moscow will continue to develop the 1000MW nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran. He says that the project is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and will be completed on schedule. Russia may sign an agreement to construct another 1000MW reactor and two 440MW reactors in Iran.

—"Interfax Foreign Trade Report for 24 June," Interfax (Moscow), 24 June 1997; in FBIS, FTS19970627001478; "Minister Says Iranian Nuclear On Time, Criticizes U.S.," IRNA (Tehran), 23 June 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970623001236.

#### **24 June 1997**

The head and deputies of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran appear before the power committee of the Iranian Parliament to respond to charges of inefficiency in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. According to the Iranian daily *Resalat*, "because they made conflicting statements, the members of the commission decided to visit the plant in the Gulf port of Bushehr on Monday to closely investigate the situation." *Resalat* reports that there were "difficulties in carrying out projects in certain units of the plant." [Note: See 3 September 1997 for Reza Amrollahi's replacement as head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.]

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—"Iranian Parliament To Investigate Inefficiency At Nuclear Power Plant," Agence France Presse, 25 June 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **24 June 1997**

Mohammad Sadeq Ayatollahi, Iran's permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, says the Bushehr plant will be open in three years. He says Iran wants to reduce its dependence on oil and get 20% of its energy from nuclear power.

—"Iranian Parliament To Investigate Inefficiency At Nuclear Power Plant," Agence France Presse, 25 June 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **25 June 1997**

Agence France Presse reports that Iran has five small reactors at research centers in Tehran and Isfahan. Three of the reactors are Chinese-made.

—"Iranian Parliament To Investigate Inefficiency At Nuclear Power Plant," Agence France Presse, 25 June 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **26 June 1997**

The US military commander in the Persian Gulf says Iran can build nuclear weapons by 2000 if its gets fissionable material. "If they can get those," says General Binford Peay, "you will see them be able to bring that to some form of weaponization, and I would predict to you that would be some time at the turn of the century, the near-end of the turn of the century." Peay says he does not know how close Iran is to getting a nuclear weapon. "I wouldn't want to put a day on it," he says. "I don't know if it's 2010, 2007, or 2003. I am just saying that I think it is coming closer."

—"Iran Likely To Have Nuclear Weapons Capability Soon: US Military," Agence France Presse, 26 June 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 June 1997**

A top-secret report prepared by European intelligence services for leaders of the European Union and leaked to the Italian newspaper *La Stampa*, concludes that Iran will have nuclear weapons "in five, or at most seven years from now." The document also reports that Iran has requested Chinese assistance in its efforts to procure enriched uranium through the construction of plants designed to convert uranium from its mineral form.

—"US Protests Chinese Trade Policy," *The Iran Brief*, 3 July 1997; "EU Leaks Report On Nuclear Program," *Iran Brief*, 3 July 1997, p. 5; Maurizio Molinari, in *La Stampa* (Turin), 28 June 1997; FBIS-TAC-97-181, 30 June 1997.

#### **29 June 1997**

The Commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, Major General Moshen Rezai says in a published interview that Iran does not plan to obtain nuclear or other forbidden weapons.

—"Tehran Ready To Sign Defense Pacts With Arab Neighbors," IRNA (Tehran), 29 June 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970629000173.

#### **July 1997**

The Clinton administration complains to Russian President Boris Yeltsin that Russia gave important nuclear technology to Iran in 1996.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

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### July 1997

In a further indication of Turkish-Israeli strategic cooperation, analysts from both countries now believe that Iran will be able to develop nuclear weapons for at least 10 years.

—Steve Macko, "Iran's Nuclear Program Suffering Setbacks," IINS News Service, 18 July 1997.

### July 1997

Russia provides assistance in uranium mining in the areas of Saghand and Yazd in Iran. Though Russia has denied the allegation, the atomic ministry acknowledges that the uranium mining in Iran was planned at a small scale.

—Ronen Bergman, "The Iranian Reactor in the Picture Is Supposed to Be operational With Two or Three Years," *Yediot Aharonot* (Hamasaf Lahag Supplement) (Tel Aviv), 29 September 2001; in "Article Views Iranian efforts To Achieve Nuclear capability," FBIS Document GMP20010927000222, 8 March 2002.

### 2 July 1997

Russia and Iran sign an agreement in Tehran in which Russia pledges to uphold and monitor international safety norms, as they continue to honor their contract with Iran to build the nuclear reactors in Bushehr. The agreement also states that the norms will be enforced even after the completion of the project.

—"Moscow's support for Iran's nuclear program," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, 4 July 1997, p. 1; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com. [CNS Translation]

### 3 July 1997

The US State Department spokesman says the United States does not have enough evidence to impose sanctions on China for its nuclear assistance to Iran. State Department spokesman Nick Burns says in a briefing that "We are willing to and we are obligated to implement our law, but we can't do it based on suppositions or appearances. We must do it on concrete evidence, and we are pursuing that concrete evidence right now." He says, "While the United States continues to be concerned about many actions of the government of China regarding proliferation, and while we discuss this—in fact, Secretary Albright discussed it just the other day in Hong Kong with Vice Premier Qian Qichen—we cannot find a country guilty of violating a law without evidence, without concrete evidence. We don't have that evidence in the current realm."

—"US Admits It Has No Proof Of Chinese N-Sale To Pakistan," *Dawn* (Karachi), 5 July 1997.

### 3 July 1997

Reuters reports that the Clinton administration has complained to the Russian government that Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran exceeds the restrictions Russian President Boris Yeltsin promised two years ago. An anonymous US official also said Washington is concerned that Russian technical advice to Iran's uranium mining and processing efforts could eventually help Iran build a nuclear bomb. According to the official, if Iran acquires the ability to mine and process uranium, it could either enrich it to weapons grade, or irradiate it in a nuclear reactor to produce plutonium.

—R. Jeffrey Smith, "Administration Concerned About Russia's Nuclear Cooperation with Iran," *Washington Post*, 3 July 1997, p. A07; "Iran and Russia in Talks on Nuclear Cooperation," Reuters, 3 July 1997; "Iran Says First Nuclear Plant Unit on Stream Soon," Reuters, 7 July 1997.

### 4 July 1997

*Nezavisimaya Gazeta* of Moscow reports that the United States is apprehensive of Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. Washington is specifically concerned that Iran may be learning about uranium enrichment from Russian scientists.

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—"United States and Israel Concerned by Russian-Iranian Cooperation," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), 4 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970709000330.

#### **6 July 1997**

Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai says Iran is trying to get unconventional weapons, and says, "Israel is using all means at its disposal in order to foil Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear and missile technology."

—"Mordechai Warns Of Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," *Middle East News*, 6 July 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **6 July 1997**

Russia and Iran sign a nuclear safety agreement, which will bring Russian inspectors to the Bushehr nuclear power plant in one month. Yuriy Vishnevskiy, chairman of Russia's Nuclear Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor), and Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, sign the agreement.

—Konstantin Kazeyev, "Cooperation Accord on Bushehr Nuclear Plant Signed," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 7 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970707000148.

#### **7 July 1997**

Reza Amrollahi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Agency, says that the Bushehr nuclear power plant will soon be producing 1000MW of energy. He says that Iran's nuclear programs are strictly peaceful. He says Iran is interested in expanding its nuclear cooperation with Russia, particularly in the construction of more nuclear power plants.

—"Russian-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 8 July 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-97-189, 8 July 1997; "Iran Official Denies Allegations on Nuclear Program," *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 7 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970707000843.

#### **8 July 1997**

ITAR-TASS reports that Russia may supply Iran with two more VVER-1000 [1000MW] light water reactors for the Bushehr power station, in addition to one to be provided under a 1995 agreement. The Bushehr plant is scheduled to come on line in four years.

—"Russian-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 8 July 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-97-189, 8 July 1997.

#### **8 July 1997**

An official for Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry says that the next stage in development of Iran's nuclear power plant in Bushehr will begin in the second half of 1998. Approximately 750 Russian specialists will work on the reactor. Iran will send power plant staff to the Kurchatov Institute and the State Scientific Center (Postatov) in Russia for training. The plant is expected to be finished in 2001 as part of a \$780 million contract with Russia.

—Anna Bakina, "Russia To Proceed With Construction of Iran Nuclear Plant," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 8 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970708000876; "Russian Atomic Ministry Cited on Iran's Nuclear Plant", *Voice of Russia World Service* (Moscow), 9 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970710000204.

#### **9 July 1997**

Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND) says that Iran's nuclear programs focus on all phases of the fuel cycle. Iran is a "center of proliferation activities," even though no proof of any Iranian nuclear bomb exists.

—Hans-Joerg Helms, "Serious Danger to World Peace," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), 9 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970709000555.

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### **9 July 1997**

Russian Minister of Atomic Power Viktor Mikhailov states at a news conference that nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran is for peaceful purposes only and has no military aspect. He also emphasizes that Russia has sacrificed financial gain in the past by supporting Western plans to sanction another country's nuclear program, and would not make a similar mistake again. Mikhailov specifically mentions the 1995 nuclear deal with North Korea, which Russia halted to support US sanctions against Pyongyang. However, when it became clear that North Korea was unable to develop nuclear weapons, the United States offered to build a nuclear station. This outcome, Mikhailov says, cost Russia millions of dollars. Also, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Tarasov notes that Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran is "under IAEA's guarantees and controls," and is not out of line with its international obligations.

—Valentin Kunin, "Nuclear Cooperation Between Russia And Iran Has No Military Aspect," RIA Novosti, 10 July 1997; Yuri Alexeyev, "Russia Has Been Strictly Fulfilling Its International Commitments Not To Proliferate Weapons Of Mass Destruction And Rocket Delivery Vehicles," RIA Novosti, 9 July 1997.

### **11 July 1997**

Upon arriving to his new post in Iran, Russia's ambassador to Iran, Konstantin Shuvalov, says that nuclear cooperation between the two countries "is being carried out in strictest compliance with international norms and poses no danger to peace and security in the region."

—Konstantin Kazeyev, "Russian Envoy to Iran: Nuclear Cooperation to Continue," ITAR-TASS, 11 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970711000720.

### **14 July 1997**

Yuriy Vishnevskiy, chairman of the Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatombnadzor), says Russia will send its first group of nuclear and radiation inspectors to the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran "next September." He says that Iran requested the inspectors' assistance because it has no nuclear safety specialists of its own. [Note: See 6 July 1997.]

—"Russian Nuclear Inspectors to Visit Bushehr Site," Interfax (Moscow), 14 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970714000259.

### **18 July 1997**

An anonymous Israeli intelligence official says that Iran has had difficulties with its nuclear weapons program, and will not have an atomic bomb "until the middle of next decade." The official partially credits efforts by the United States to limit the supply of nuclear technology into Iran. The Central Intelligence Agency assesses that Iran will have an atomic bomb by 2007, revised from a 1992 estimate that Iran would have such a weapon by 2000. Mustafa Kibaroglu, a Turkish nuclear proliferation expert, says Iran will not have a "high-quality nuclear weapon" for at least 15 years. Israeli and Turkish analysts believe that it will take at least an additional five years for Iran to develop small and reliable weapons that can be delivered by missiles or aircraft.

—"Iran's Nuclear Program Suffering Setbacks," IINS News Service, 18 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970718001176.

### **18 July 1997**

US pressure may be the reason for China's decision to cancel a supply of small nuclear energy reactors to Iran. It is not clear whether China will supply Iran with a uranium hexafluoride production plant, used for uranium enrichment.

—Steve Macko, "Iran: Iran's Nuclear Program Suffering Setbacks," "Iran's Nuclear Ability," IINS News Service; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-97-199, 18 July 1997.

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**19 July 1997**

International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Hans Blix arrives in Iran ostensibly to "inspect" two nuclear research centers. An IAEA spokesman says Blix would visit the Bonab nuclear research center in West Azerbaijan province and the center in Mazandaran province. Neither site is subject to IAEA safeguards, and IAEA sources said the agency knows little about them.

—"Blix Visits Iranian Nuclear Sites," *The Iran Brief*, 1 August 1997.

**21 July 1997**

Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai says, "Iran will never manage to produce nuclear weapons. We will make every effort to prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons, because whoever aims or threatens to produce nuclear weapons against Israel will never succeed."

—Pinhas Amar, "Mordechai—Iran 'Will Never Manage' To Make Nuclear Weapons," *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), 22 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970722000478.

**22 July 1997**

In an Iranian television broadcast, Iranian President Rafsanjani says Iran is not seeking nuclear weapons "at all." He describes the program as "for the peaceful development of the country and humanitarian and health fields under full supervision of the IAEA." However, the IAEA has a limited safeguards agreement with Iran, and supervises very few of Iran's nuclear activities. An IAEA source says the agency "will not get involved" in completing Bushehr, saying "statements by Iran that Busheir [Bushehr] is being finished under IAEA auspices simply aren't true."

—"Blix Visits Iranian Nuclear Sites," *The Iran Brief*, 1 August 1997.

**22 July 1997**

During a visit to Iran, Hans Blix, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), says that Iran's nuclear programs are for peaceful purposes, and that Iran has always allowed the inspection of its nuclear facilities with little advanced notice. The IAEA detected no plutonium during recent inspections of Iran's nuclear research centers. Iranian President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani tells Blix, "Iranian nuclear programs are crystal clear and transparent and for humanitarian purposes. We always welcome sharing experience with respective international agencies." Blix says that all nations have "the natural right" to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

—"Rafsanjani Gives Assurances on NPT to IAEA Director," IRNA (Tehran), 22 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970722001227; "IAEA: No Sign of Attempts To Make Nuclear Weapons in Iran," *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 23 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS 19970723000215.

**24 July 1997**

The *Iran Daily* criticizes the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) "double-standards" two days after its Director-General met with Iran's president in Tehran. The daily cites the IAEA as "a product of the Western system" such as its "covert support for Israel's formidable nuclear weapons program and Washington's irritating charges about Tehran's bid for the bomb." [Note: See 22 July 1997 and 28 July 1997.]

—"Censuring the IAEA," *Iran Daily* (Tehran), 24 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970730000892.

**26 July 1997**

The Turboatom company in Kharkov, Ukraine agrees to develop a slow-rotation turbine for Iran's nuclear power plant in Bushehr. The turbine operates at 1,500 rotations per minute, and is considered safer and less expensive than a fast-rotating turbine. [Note: Ukraine had previously decided not to sell Iran turbines. See 16 April 1997.]

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—"Ukraine Firm to Supply Turbine for Iranian Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 26 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS 19970726000477 .

### **28 July 1997**

During his visit to Tehran, Hans Blix, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), says that Iran has not violated any of its nuclear safeguards commitments. The IAEA, at Tehran's request, is helping improve Iran's nuclear fuel safety procedures. Blix says that Iranian President Rafsanjani responded positively to a suggestion that Iran sign the strengthened safeguards agreement [the so-called Additional Protocol]. According to Blix, Rafsanjani also confirmed "that the agency is welcome to go to any place any time [it] wanted in Iran" to inspect its nuclear facilities. Blix and Rafsanjani also discuss the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. [Note: See 1 June 2000 and 31 May 2002.]

—Zahra Ajdari, "Contrary to Western Charges: IAEA has no Reservations About Iran's Nuclear Program," *Iran Daily* (Tehran), 28 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970802000150.

### **28 July 1997**

In an editorial criticizing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Tehran's *Jomhuri-ye Eslami* writes, "the policy of double standards by the IAEA and by the supporters of the Zionist regime [Israel] should not be ignored and taken lightly, because it has placed the entire region in peril." Incensed that the IAEA "intentionally ignore[s]" Israel's nuclear weapons program, the daily says, "it is not logically acceptable for nations and governments that have roots in the region—that is, 'the true owners of the Islamic territories'—to be facing a nuclear threat, while a bunch of Zionist occupiers who have no roots in the region whatsoever are allowed to threaten others in order to ensure their own safety and to constantly add to their nuclear assault capabilities." The paper says that all nations should "force the Zionists to destroy their nuclear arms." [Note: The *Iran Daily* also criticizes the IAEA on 24 July 1997.]

—"Double Standards—Why?" *Jomhuri-ye Eslami* (Tehran), 28 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS199708080007770.

### **29 July 1997**

A spokesman for Russia's Foreign Ministry says that Russian nuclear assistance to Iran is fully in line with all nonproliferation commitments.

—"Russian Foreign Ministry Denies Supplying Iran," RIA (Moscow), 29 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970729000784.

### **3 August 1997**

Hans Blix, Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, inspects the Karaj Nuclear Research Center in Iran. He concludes the facility is for peaceful purposes only.

—Voice of Russia World Service (Moscow), 3 August 1997; in "Moscow Slams US 'Allegations' on Iran's Nuclear Plans," FBIS Document FTS19970804000263, 4 August 1997.

### **15-16 August 1997**

*Mail and Guardian* of South Africa reports a meeting between Reza Amrollahi, Iran's Deputy Minister of Atomic Affairs, and Dr. Waldo Stumpf, head of South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), took place at Pelindaba near Pretoria, where the two officials allegedly discussed a list of items needed for manufacturing nuclear weapons. *Jane's Defense Review* reports the meeting was arranged by President Nelson Mandela's office, which immediately rejected the idea of any kind of transfer. Conflicting reports exist regarding whether the meeting actually took place, with Tehran saying "considerable progress" was made towards acquiring aid to develop nuclear weapons. South African Defense Force officials claim a number of technicians no longer needed by South

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Africa's defunct nuclear program have been hired by Iran. F. "Pik" Botha, who is alleged to have been present at the meeting, said only peaceful applications of nuclear technology were discussed. [Note: See 1997 and 11 September 1997 entries for more on Iran and South Africa meetings. See 17 August 1997 for Iranian statement on this meeting.]

—*Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), 15 August 1997; in "Iran Said To Request Nuclear Weapons Items From AEC Head," FBIS Document FTS19970814001272, 14 August 1997; Inigo Gimore, "Iran sought Pretoria nuclear deal," *The Times* (London), 16 August 1997; in "Daily on Iranian Nuclear 'Shopping List' in South Africa," FBIS Document FTS19970818000421, 18 August 1997.

#### **17 August 1997**

In response to a report by *The Times* of London [See 15-16 August 1997], the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) denies it made efforts to obtain material for nuclear weapons manufacturing from South Africa. The AEOI says such an action would contradict the policies it adheres to as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and that any nuclear activities undertaken by Iran would be done for peaceful purposes to be policed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The AEOI further states that Reza Amrollahi, the organization's head, has never been to South Africa, let alone attempted to procure nuclear technologies.

—IRNA (Tehran), 17 August 1997; in "Tehran Rejects 'Baseless' Report on Nuclear Weapons," FBIS Document FTS19970817000490, 17 August 1997.

#### **18 August 1997**

David Kyd, spokesman for the International Atomic Energy Agency, says the agency has no evidence to support a report in *The Times* of London that Iran is trying to get nuclear material and equipment from South Africa.

—"IAEA Official Denies 'The Times' Report On Iran's Nuclear Activities," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 August 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **18 August 1997**

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hannadii Udovenko says that Ukraine may sign a contract to provide Russia with a 1,000MW turbine for a reactor it is building in Bushehr, Iran. The Kharkiv-based factory, Turboatom, made the proposal, according to Interfax. The United States and Israel contend that the Bushehr plant may help Iran develop nuclear weapons. Udovenko said that signing the contract with Russia "could complicate relations with [Ukraine's] partners." According to Israeli Trade and Industry Minister Natan Sharansky, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma promised that Ukraine would not provide the turbines to Russia, nor "do anything to help Iran, Iraq, or Libya build weapons of mass destruction."

—"Ukraine May Supply Turbine To Iran," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 24 August 1997, p. 2.

#### **19 August 1997**

Tehran's *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* reports Benjamin Netanyahu has once again accused Iran of attempting to obtain nuclear technologies for building weapons of mass destruction (WMD). At the same time the leadership of the Labor Party, which opposes Tel Aviv's ruling party, seeks to cajole Russia into abating its alleged nuclear technology transfers with Iran by appealing to France to apply pressure.

—*Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 19 August 1997; in "Tehran Radio Commentary Rejects Israeli Missile Allegations," FBIS Document FTS19970819000717, 19 August 1997.

#### **19 August 1997**

Hennadiy Udovenko, Ukraine's Foreign Minister, says it will look into participation by the Ukrainian company Turboatom in the Russian-Iranian contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr, Iran.

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—Interfax (Moscow), 19 August 1997; in "Ukrainian Foreign Minister on Construction of NPP in Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970819000840, 19 August 1997.

#### **20 August 1997**

Vladimir Yatsenkovskiy, Ukraine's Foreign Ministry spokesman, says no agreement exists between Turboatom and Russian on supplying turbines for the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran.

—Interfax (Moscow), 20 August 1997; in "No Contracts Exist for Turbines to Iranian Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19970820001037, 20 August 1997.

#### **21 August 1997**

Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, Iran's new Defense Minister, reasserts that Iran's nuclear programs are for peaceful purposes, while at the same time stating Tehran is ready to establish an alliance with Arab states to ensure regional security.

—IRIB Television (Tehran), 21 August 1997; in "Shamkhani: Iran's Nuclear Programs for Peaceful Purposes," FBIS Document FTS19970821001383, 21 August 1997.

#### **23 August 1997**

During a stopover at the Beijing airport, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets with the Deputy Prime Minister of China. Netanyahu says he received assurances that China would not help Iran to build a nuclear reactor. A Chinese official declines to respond directly to questions whether Vice Premier Li Lanqing had given such assurance.

—"China Silent On Whether Iran Nuclear Sale Shelved," Reuters, 26 August 1997.

#### **26 August 1997**

The South African Press Association (SAPA) reports that Dr. Waldo Stumpf, South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) chief, has denied that Iran attempted to buy nuclear weapons technologies from South Africa last year. He further denies the report made by *Jane's Defense Weekly* that claims he and Reza Amrollahi, Iran's Deputy Minister for Atomic Affairs, met to discuss nuclear technology issues.

—SAPA (Johannesburg), 26 August 1997; in "AEC Denies Iran Tried To Obtain Nuclear Technology," FBIS Document FTS19970826001352, 26 August 1997.

#### **26 August 1997**

Ukraine reaffirms its commitment to Israel not to provide turbines for use in Iran's planned nuclear reactor in Bushehr. Ukraine's Secretary of State for National Security assures Avigdor Qahalani, Israel's public security minister, that he will not allow such a project to continue. Interfax reports that Volodymyr Yatsenkivsky, Ukraine's Acting Chief of the information department of the Foreign Ministry, states in the No. 239 business report for August 18-25 that Ukraine never signed contracts to supply turbines to the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran.

—Amir Taheri, "Iran Postpones Building Three Nuclear Stations," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), p. 1; in "Iran Postpones Nuclear Power Stations for 'Budget' Reasons," FBIS Document FTS19970826000628, 26 August 1997; "Ukraine Business Panorama," Interfax (Moscow), 26 August 1997; in "Ukraine Business Panorama for 18-25 August," FBIS Document FTS19970905000888, 5 September 1997; *Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 26 August 1997; in "Ukraine Promises Not To Supply Turbines to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970826000811, 26 August 1997.

#### **26 August 1997**

Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, asks the world's major powers to come together to prevent Iran and Iraq from developing nuclear weapons, stating "They're not partners in the process and they're arming themselves

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feverishly and this is a problem for the international community," he says. Netanyahu asserts that his success in securing China's promise not to provide Iran with a nuclear reactor is indicative of the type of sentiment needed in the international community to "ensure Iran does not arm itself with non-conventional weapons."

—*Kyodo* (Tokyo), 26 August 1997; in "Netanyahu Urges Action on Iran, Iraq Arms Developments," FBIS Document FTS19970826000218, 26 August 1997.

#### **26 August 1997**

Iran states it will postpone the building of three nuclear power stations. An unidentified source says the decision is due to budget constraints that Iran hopes to be rectified soon to ensure the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be completed by the end of 2000.

—Amir Taheri, "Iran Postpones Building Three Nuclear Stations," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), p. 1; in "Iran Postpones Nuclear Power Stations for 'Budget' Reasons," FBIS Document FTS19970826000628, 26 August 1997; "Ukraine Business Panorama," Interfax (Moscow), 26 August 1997; in "Ukraine Business Panorama for 18-25 August," FBIS Document FTS19970905000888, 5 September 1997.

#### **27 August 1997**

A high-ranking British Foreign Office official informs *Izvestiya* that it believes there is a possibility that technological information pertaining to nuclear technology could be transferred to Iranian technicians who are being trained by Russian scientists. The exchange of information is part of an agreement signed between Tehran and Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy to provide building expertise for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Tehran, Britain asserts, has kept spent nuclear fuel instead of transferring it to Russia as stipulated in the agreement. Britain further believes Iran has procured nuclear technologies that do not have civil applications, specifically, the purchase of a uranium enrichment plant from China, which cannot be used in a civilian reactor.

—Konstantin Eggert, "Moscow and Tehran Swear Their Motives Are Pure. Russia Suspected of Handling Nuclear and Missile Secrets to Iran," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 27 August 1997; in "Reaction to Netanyahu 'Concern' Over Cooperation With Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970827000374, 27 August 1997.

#### **27 August 1997**

Konstantin Shuvalov, Russia's Ambassador to Tehran, says Russia will continue its work to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran despite rumors of Russian assistance to Iran regarding the export of long-range missiles. The Ambassador states, "The Russian Foreign Ministry has strongly rejected these rumors. Russia has only committed itself to complete the Bushehr nuclear power station for the peaceful use of nuclear energy."

—IRIB Television (Tehran), 27 August 1997; in "Russian Ambassador Denies Reported Missile Sales to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970827000370, 27 August 1997.

#### **31 August 1997**

*The Observer* of London reports that intelligence agencies have "uncovered" a clandestine attempt by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to procure nuclear weapon technology from British firms. The accused, Husayn Jafari, an Iranian-born businessman who is based in Glasgow, is involved in a disparate number of interests. He recently attempted to procure a spectrometer, only seven of which exist in the world. The spectrometer is primarily used in nuclear weapons research to analyze whether uranium is sufficiently enriched, and is purported to be worth 700,000 Pounds Sterling. Export of the item in question, a Model 54 "mass spectrometer," is strictly regulated by the Department of Trade and Industry. Mr. Jafari has approached VG Elemental, one of four British manufacturers of the spectrometer, and was also seen meeting with Iranian "nuclear procurement experts" in Istanbul, Turkey. According to the newspaper, Jafari met an Iranian delegation at the hotel, among which reportedly was Sayyid Musavi, vice president of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization. The paper also writes that according to a letter

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written to Musavi, Jafari had offered to supply the spectrometer to Iran for \$3 million.

—Leonard Doyle, Jonathan Calvert, and Robin McKie, *The Observer* (London), 31 August 1997, p. 1; in "Iranian Businessman Attempts To Purchase Nuclear Technology," FBIS Document FTS1997083100072, 31 August 1997; Associated Press, 30 August 1997; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

### **September 1997**

*Jane's Intelligence Defense Review* reports that former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says that based on a variety of data, "we know that since the mid-1980s, Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear weapons." US State Department staff also state that there is evidence that Iran is engaged in nuclear activities "not conducive to [a] strictly peaceful program." Iran's nuclear industry is growing, with 3,000 personnel working at various sites in Isfahan. A second, top-secret weapons design center is near the Caspian Sea, at Moallem Kalayeh. Two other research sites are located at the Bushehr nuclear power plant and at Sharif University. A source at the Israeli Embassy in the United States said nuclear activities at the university were likely to have been moved since the university had been under Western surveillance. "Work continues" at the Bushehr nuclear power plant, even though the plant was badly damaged during the 1980-88 Gulf War.

—Al J. Venter, "Iran's Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion Or Ominous Truth?," *Jane's International Defense Review*, September 1997, pp. 29-31.

### **1 September 1997**

The general director of the Czech Republic's Skoda factory, Lubomir Soubek, says that his company intends to export a variety of products, including equipment for sugar refineries, to Iran. However, Soubek denies that Skoda was involved in Iran's nuclear program, saying "Skoda is not building any nuclear power plant in Iran, nor is it supplying to Iran nuclear reactors or other sensitive items."

—"Czech Republic: Skoda Denies Exports Of 'Sensitive Items' To Iran," Vitezslav Kulich, *Pravo* (Plzen), 1 September 1997, p. 14; in FBIS Document FBIS-EEU-97-245, 2 September 1997.

### **2 September 1997**

The *Washington Times* reports that, according to the US Office of Naval Intelligence's (ONI) report on worldwide maritime challenges, China has been shipping critical military technology and materials to Iran and Iraq, to be used in their nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.

—Bill Gertz, "Navy Finds That China Is Top Illicit Arms Supplier To Iran, Iraq," *Washington Times*, 2 September 1997, www.washtimes.com.

### **3 September 1997**

Iranian radio announces that Gholam Reza Aqazadeh has been appointed to replace Reza Amrollahi as head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Gholam Reza was head of the oil industry from 1982 to August 1997, when President Mohammad Khatami took office. [Note: See 24 June 1997.]

—"Iran's Former Oil Minister Appointed Nuclear Chief," Agence France Presse, 3 September 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

### **8 September 1997**

Reuters reports that arms control experts from the Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) in Washington, DC sent a letter to US President Bill Clinton warning him against rushing into implementing the 1985 US-China Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement; the issue is expected to be discussed during Chinese President Jiang Zemin's October 1997 visit to Washington. NCI President Paul Levanthal pointed out that China could be shipping excessive

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quantities of heavy water to Pakistan, and that China gives assistance to Iran's nuclear energy program as well.  
 —Carol Giacomo, "Clinton Warned Not to Rush China Nuclear Trade," Reuters, 8 September 1997.

**11 September 1997**

Xinhua reports that South African Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs Penuell Maduma says that South African uranium export policy was discussed at a meeting with Iranian officials in South Africa.

—"S. Africa Denies Nuclear Deal With Iran," *Newspage*, 11 September 1997, [www.newspage.com](http://www.newspage.com).

**11 September 1997**

The Federal Intelligence Service (BND) of Germany reports that "in addition to 'legal' purchases for its several hundred companies in Iran, the foundation also procures goods for Iran's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and missile programs. Fake companies in Iran and abroad are often used as intermediaries for this purpose."

—Karl Guenther Barth and Joerg Schmitt, "Hot Goods for the Mullahs," *Stern* (Hamburg), 11 September 1997, pp. 182-184; in "Export of Dual-Use Goods to Iran Investigated," FBIS Document FTS19970911000422, 11 September 1997.

**11 September 1997**

*Haaretz* reports that Iran is trying to procure a nuclear reactor for research purposes from India. Hussain Mashayqi, head of the Iranian National Energy Agency, met in New Delhi for the conference of the International Agency for National Energy, where Mashayqi was quoted as saying "we greatly value our cooperation with the Indian nuclear scientists and we are willing to renew talks with them." He further promulgated Iran's adherence to the established rules of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), assuring that Iran's nuclear program is "completely transparent."

—"Iran Interested in Acquiring Nuclear Reactor from India 'on the Condition that the Transaction is Realized'," *Haaretz* (Internet version), 11 September 1997; in "Iran Seeks Nuclear Reactor from India," FBIS Document FTS19970912000590, 12 September 1997.

**11 September 1997**

The Russian government denies US allegations that Russia and China have provided Iran with information on how to develop long-range missiles that can carry nuclear warheads.

—*Qol Yisrael International Service* (Jerusalem), 11 September 1997; in "Program Summary-Jerusalem *Qol Yisrael* Persian 111400," FBIS Document FTS19970914000301, 14 September 1997.

**11 September 1997**

Penuell Maduna, Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister of South Africa, says previous allegations of South Africa's collaboration with Iran over the latter's development of nuclear weapons technology are erroneous. He further asserts that the only meeting Dr. Waldo Stumpf, head of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), or any other AEC official had took place in a public restaurant in 1996 in Cape Town with Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, Iran's then petroleum minister. The meeting he reports, was part of a plan to set up a possible oil storage agreement at Saldanha. [Note: Aqazadeh was appointed head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran on 3 September 1997.]

—SAPA (Johannesburg), 11 September 1997; in "Official Denies Nuclear Business Transactions With Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970911000337, 11 September 1997.

**13 September 1997**

A Russian intelligence officer, speaking on condition of anonymity, says that it was "totally unfeasible" for Iran to

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build a nuclear weapon. He says that Russian and other foreign intelligence estimates put an Iranian nuclear weapons capability at least 10 years in the future. The intelligence officer said that the world community could control Iran's nuclear development, and prevent it from gaining access to nuclear weapons. The officer responds to Western and Israeli criticism about Russia's role in the project to construct a nuclear reactor at Bushehr by saying that Russia had more to lose than the critics of the project did. "Our country, due to its geographic proximity, should be more alarmed by the prospect of nuclear weapons in Iran than Israel," he says.

—"Unfeasible For Iran To Develop Nuclear Weapons," Interfax (Moscow), 14 September 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-97-257, 14 September 1997.

#### **14 September 1997**

Ehud Barak, chairman of Israel's Labor Party, says Russia's increasing influence on Iran's alleged unconventional weapons development represents a danger to the world.

—*Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 14 September 1997; in "Baraq Protests Russia Nonconventional Weapons Aid to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970914000175, 14 September 1997.

#### **15 September 1997**

*Haaretz* reports that Iran is considering the acquisition of a nuclear research reactor from India on the condition that India guarantees it will "uphold its commitments," according to Iranian National Energy Agency head Husayn Mashayqi. The Indian Atomic Energy Ministry, said Mashayqi, reneged on a proposal to build a research reactor in Iran during the 1980s.

—"Iran Seeks Nuclear Reactor From India," *Haaretz* (Internet version), 11 September 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-97-258, 15 September 1997.

#### **15 September 1997**

Yevgeniy Primakov, Russia's foreign minister, assures Yusuf Bin-Alawi, state minister on Foreign Affairs of Sultanate of Oman, that Russia has not provided Iran with information to aid it in the construction of nuclear weapons. Primakov states, "I want to say with the whole responsibility that Russia does not implement any state projects with Iran. According to our information, there is not leakage of any data which could help Iran to create nuclear weapons..."

—Yuriy Alekseyev, RIA (Moscow), 15 September 1997; in "Oman Backs Russia's Noninvolvement in Iranian Nuclear Deals," FBIS Document FTS19970915000940, 15 September 1997.

#### **15 September 1997**

China's ambassador to Iran, Shi Ji Wang, expresses interest in developing relations with Iran and in helping build a nuclear power plant in central Iran, according to the official Iranian news agency IRNA. IRNA reports China is "fully determined" to continue construction of the 1,300MW power plant near Arak in central Iran.

—"China Said Keen To Develop Ties With Iran," *Iran Weekly Press Digest*, 15 September 1997 [www.neda.net](http://www.neda.net).

#### **16 September 1997**

*Nezavisimaya Gazeta* of Moscow reports that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has asked that existing economic deals between Israel and Russia to be put on hold. This comes in response to rumors that Russia is providing nuclear weapon and ballistic missile know-how to Iran. According to the Israeli daily *Haaretz*, a "vast number of Russian military enterprises" are involved in modernizing Iran's military industry. Israel believes that if technological assistance from Russia to Iran does not cease, Iran will eventually be capable of developing ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000km. Yevgeniy Primakov, Russia's foreign minister, believes reports of Russian-Iranian ties to develop nuclear weapons capabilities are erroneous, saying "press reports and certain politicians'

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statements that Russia is allegedly helping Iran to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles," are completely false.

—Boris Petrovskiy, "Is Israel Entering Into Cooperation With Russia? By Accusing Moscow of Helping Tehran Develop Nuclear Weapons, Binyamin Netanyahu Is Trying To Distract Attention From Real Problems in Near East," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), 16 September 1997; in "Primakov Denies Nuclear Weapon Aid to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970916000450, 16 September 1997.

#### **17 September 1997**

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei denies that Iran seeks nuclear or chemical weapons. "Those claims have lost credibility in the eyes of the world's public," he says. "If such arms were source of real strength, the governments possessing those would have long succeeded in imposing their will over the world."

—"Khamenei: Iran Not Attempting To Acquire Nuclear Weapons," Xinhua (Beijing), 17 September 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **18 September 1997**

*Qol Yisrael* reports that Russia has once again denied that ties between Russian and Iran exist regarding transfers of unconventional weapons technology. The Russian ambassador to Israel in a meeting with Yuliy Edelstein, Immigrant Absorption Minister, says collaboration between Russia and Iran is solely for peaceful purposes.

—*Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 18 September 1997; in "Russian Ambassador Denies Nonconventional Aid to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970918000985, 18 September 1997.

#### **20 September 1997**

Iran criticizes the United States for carrying out sub-critical nuclear tests. "At a time when the United States finds fault without supervised peaceful nuclear activities, it engages in destructive atomic tests," says Mahmud Mohammadi, spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry. "America's hostility against Iran has made it disregard the peaceful nature of our activities. This is a discriminatory attitude towards nuclear non-proliferation conventions."

—"Iran Raps US Nuclear Test," Agence France Presse, 20 September 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **21 September 1997**

Viktor Mikhailov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, proposes to US Energy Secretary Federico Pena that the two countries establish a joint system of controlling the Bushehr nuclear power plant "to dismiss all suspicions from the part of the United States about Russia's giving out nuclear technologies to Iran." This he believes will assuage US fears by allowing it to monitor administrative aspects of the plant, while at the same time policing how nuclear fuel elements in the reactors are serviced during refueling.

—Andrey Surzhansky, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 21 September 1997; in "Russia Proposes U.S. Joint Control of Iranian Plant," FBIS Document FTS19970921000253, 21 September 1997; Andrey Surzhanskiy, ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 21 September 1997; in "Russia's Mikhaylov on Iranian Plant Proposal," FBIS Document FTS19970921000273, 21 September 1997 ; Reuters, 21 September 1997; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **22 September 1997**

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warns efforts by Iran to acquire nuclear technology "may be the most dangerous development in the 21st century." If its progress is allowed to go unabated, he states, it might someday have the technology to hit targets as far away as the United States. "Thus Russia should stop the delivery of modern weapons technology to Iran immediately and other countries should also try to induce Russia to take this step."

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—Burkhard Bischof, "Netanyahu Warns Against 'World Power Iran'," *Die Presse* (Vienna), 22 September 1997, p. 5; in "Netanyahu Warns: Iran About To Become 'World Power'," FBIS Document FTS19970922000237, 22 September 1997.

### **22 September 1997**

US Vice President Al Gore says he wants Russia to cease cooperation with Iran over the building of Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. Viktor Chernomydrin, Russia's prime minister, who met with Gore in Washington the day before, reasserts his country's position that its dealings with Iran are of a peaceful nature.

—*Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 22 September 1997; in "Iranian Radio: Supervision Plan Contrary to Russian Policy," FBIS Document FTS19970922000975, 22 September 1997.

### **23 September 1997**

*Iran News* denounces 'Zionist' attempts to lobby the US Congress to impose sanctions on Russia for providing Iran with nuclear technology. The daily asserts that both Russia and Iran have allowed inspections of the plant to take place, and that inspectors from international organizations have confirmed the plant is designed for peaceful applications. Mahmud Mohammadi, spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry, affirms this conclusion, stating the plant complies with the tenets of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—IRNA (Tehran), 23 September 1997; in "Iran Daily on Russian Proposal to US on Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19970923000200, 23 September 1997; IRNA (Tehran), 23 September 1997; in "Iranian Spokesman: Bushehr Plant for Peaceful Purposes," FBIS Document FTS19970923001304, 23 September 1997.

### **23 September 1997**

Iran rejects the idea of the United States jointly monitoring the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "The only authorized body to supervise Iran's nuclear power plant in Bushehr is the International Atomic Energy Agency," says Mahmud Mohammadi, spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry. The Iranian news agency IRNA reports that Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov told Iran's ambassador in Moscow that Russia had not offered a joint monitoring agreement to the United States. [Note: See 21 September 1997 for a report of a Russia proposal for joint US-Russian monitoring.]

—"Iran Rejects U.S. Involvement In Nuclear Power Plant," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 September 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "Iran Rejects U.S. Monitoring Its Atomic Plant" *Russia Today*, 24 September 1997, [www.russiatoday.com](http://www.russiatoday.com); "Russia Says Only IAEA Will Monitor Iran Plant- IRNA," Reuters, 23 September 1997.

### **25 September 1997**

US Vice President Al Gore says the United States may install economic sanctions on Russia if its assistance to construction efforts at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran continues. Israel at the same time continues to lobby the US Congress for similar sanctions, and has made tentative announcements to halt plans to purchase Russian oil. Viktor Chernomydrin, Russia's prime minister, labels such attempts as "stupid," in light of the International Atomic Energy Agency's continued affirmation that work on the Bushehr plant is within the rules established by the Agency, "We have obligations (to Iran), we are fulfilling them and we will not break them, even if that is what some would like. But it seems that the Americans do not want to stop running the bogey of 'seeking nuclear bombs' against Iran."

—"Another Fiasco for Washington and Tel Aviv," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 25 September 1997, p. 4; in "Daily Urges U.S., Israel To End 'Nonsensical' Accusations," FBIS Document FTS19971003000265, 3 October 1997.

### **26 September 1997**

Trade with Iran, Boris Yeltsin states, is consistent with the Russo-American bilateral commission's analysis that

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Russia has not delivered military missile or nuclear technologies to Iran. "Maybe there will be some supplies of armaments, but not of missiles or missile weapons-grade uranium technologies."

—Igor Shchegolev, ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 26 September 1997; in "Yeltsin: Iranian Trade To Grow But Not Missiles, Uranium," FBIS Document FTS19970926000367, 26 September 1997.

#### **26 September 1997**

Valeriy Nesterushkin, Russia's Foreign Ministry spokesman, says Russia will remain true to its commitment to complete construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. US opposition, he states, should have been lessened by Russia's disclosure of its plans and assurances that the nuclear power plant is "under the full vigilance and supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the peaceful purpose nature of the Bushehr's nuclear plant had been confirmed by IAEA."

—IRNA (Tehran), 26 September 1997; in "IRNA Cites Russian Spokesman on U.S. Anxiety Over Bushehr," FBIS Document FTS19970926001245, 26 September 1997.

#### **26 September 1997**

Russian President Boris Yeltsin says there was nothing "further from the truth" than reports that Russia has supplied ballistic missile and nuclear technologies to Iran. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, meeting with US Vice President Al Gore, expresses concern over the possibility that Iran was developing nuclear weapons, but denies that Russia was involved in transferring nuclear technology.

—"Focus-Yeltsin Denies Helping Iran To Design Missiles" Reuters, 26 September 1997; Vladimir Mikheyev, "Russia Will Not Surrender What Belongs To It," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 25 September 1997, p. 1; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-97-268, 25 September 1997.

#### **27 September 1997**

To counter what he believes to be "discriminatory" acts by foreign powers toward Iran, Kamal Kharrazi, Iran's foreign minister, says "the Nonaligned Movement [NAM] should seriously work for a review in the general policies on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and removing the restrictions and monopolizations for access to the nuclear technologies that are aimed at peaceful utilization of nuclear energy."

—"Kharrazi Speaks in NAM Session," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 27 September 1997; in "Tehran Radio Commentary on Kharrazi Speech to NAM Ministers," FBIS Document FTS19970927000613, 27 September 1997.

#### **28 September 1997**

A senior defense source from Israel says Iran's attempts to present the Bushehr nuclear power plant as for civilian use only is "a type sophisticated fraud." The facility, according to the senior defense source is only "a part of the overall picture of Iran's ongoing effort to achieve nonconventional weapons—atomic, biological, and chemical—while also developing long-range missiles."

—Alex Fishman, *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), 28 September 1997, p. 6; in "Presenting Iranian Reactor as Civilian is 'Fraud'," FBIS Document FTS19970928000571, 28 September 1997.

#### **30 September 1997**

Boris Yuriy Deryabin, Security Council deputy secretary, says Russia would like to further its cooperative relationship with Iran by building more nuclear power plants in Iran.

—Nataliya Panshina, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 30 September 1997; in "Russia 'Ready To Build' Power Plant in Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970930000890, 30 September 1997.

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**October 1997**

L.P. Chromova, the director of Inor, and A. Asgharazadeh, the director of an unidentified Iranian facility, reach an agreement regarding the supply of a specialty alloy.

—Bill Gertz, "Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals," *Washington Times*, 20 October 1997.

**1 October 1997**

Unnamed officials at the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry say the ministry hopes to get contracts for an additional 1,000MW reactor and two 400MW reactors in Iran after the first 1,000MW reactor is finished at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. [Note: They are probably referring to two 440MW reactors, not 400MW, that have been under discussion for some time between Russian and Iran.]

—"Russia Hopes For Fresh Contracts To Build Iranian Nuclear Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 October 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**1 October 1997**

Mahdi Safari, Iran's Ambassador to Moscow, says attempts by the United States to infringe on the sovereign rights of two countries, Russia and Iran, do not "correspond with the ethics of international relations." Russia's promise to complete the nuclear power station in Bushehr, he believes, is symbolic of the relationship Iran and Russia should have in the field of energy development. Safari says, "Mutually beneficial cooperation between the Russia and Iran will develop further despite outside pressure." The plant once constructed will provide 5% of Iran's electricity output.

—Interfax (Moscow), 1 October 1997; in "Iranian Envoy Faults U.S. Moves To 'Interfere' in Russia Ties," FBIS Document FTS19971001001218, 1 October 1997.

**1 October 1997**

Yitzhak Mordechai, Israel's Defense Minister, says he believes Iran is "determined to manufacture long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Israel, the Gulf states, Asia and parts of Europe. This is a real danger...We know an Iranian nuclear weapons manufacturing program is going on with help from Russian scientists."

—Steve Rodan and Arieh O'Sullivan, *The Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem), 1 October 1997, p. 7; in "Mordechai on Iranian Threat, Syria, Labanon," FBIS Document FTS19971002001023, 2 October 1997.

**2 October 1997**

The Russian Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear and Radiation Safety (Gosatomnadzor) says it will work with Iran to ensure that the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran is constructed safely, a fact necessitated by Iran's lack of experts in this field. The report by Gosatomnadzor further alludes that the Kharkov-based company Turboatom will provide Bushehr's turbine.

—Interfax (Moscow), 2 October 1997; in "Russian Committee To Ensure Safety at Bushehr Nuclear Plant," FBIS Document FTS19971002000619, 2 October 1997.

**2 October 1997**

Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, assures Muhammad al-Baradi, the new Secretary-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that Iran will follow all regulations dictated under the purview of the Agency in an effort to obtain information necessary to use nuclear technologies. In light of the fact that Iran will deplete its oil reserves in 20 years, Aqazadeh asserts, Iran must strive to obtain the necessary know-how in nuclear technology applications.

—Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 2 October 1997; in "Iranian Nuclear Official Meets Incoming IAEA Head," FBIS Document FTS19971002000946, 2 October 1997.

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### **2 October 1997**

Hans Blix, Secretary-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, assures Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, that cooperation between the Agency and Iran will continue. He says, "I have always announced that no violation had been seen while conducting inspections in the Islamic Republic of Iran." Aqazadeh says Iran hopes to produce 20% of its power from nuclear power, an ambition he hopes will be aided by potential agreements with China and Russia.

—IRNA (Tehran), 2 October 1997; in "Iranian Atomic Energy Chief Holds Talks With IAEA's Blix," FBIS Document FTS19971002001527, 2 October 1997.

### **2 October 1997**

Asked by a reporter in Tehran why the schedule for completing the Bushehr nuclear power plant has changed, Mikhail Sarafanov, Russia's deputy minister for foreign economic relations and trade, says the "delays in the schedule of construction of the nuclear plant were not the Russian side's fault." [Note: The article does not say how long the schedule is pushed back.]

—"Construction of Bushehr Nuclear Power Station 'Delayed'," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 October 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **3 October 1997**

Gholam Reza Aqazadeh, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says Iran will pursue cooperation with Russia and China because Iran "cannot let go of major investments" in nuclear technology. "Our oil and gas resources are limited and the use of atomic energy is necessary for us," he says. He says Iran wants to buy two additional 440MW reactors from Russia and two 300MW reactors from China.

—"Iran Vows To Develop Nuclear Program With Russian, Chinese Help," Agence France Presse, 3 October 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **3 October 1997**

A spokeswoman for Russia's Counter-Intelligence Service says, "Israeli media reports on Russia's sales of military nuclear technologies to Iran," are completely false. She reports that common sense prevents Russia from selling nuclear missile technology so close to Russia. "Iran is situated too close to our borders and to plant a nuclear bomb under oneself would be a suicide."

—Olga Semenova, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 3 October 1997; in "Russian Intelligence Spokesman on Nuclear Weapon Safety," FBIS Document FTS19971003001062, 3 October 1997.

### **5 October 1997**

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi says, "We are certainly not developing an atomic bomb, because we do not believe in nuclear weapon....We believe in and promote the idea of the Middle East as a region free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. But why are we interested to develop nuclear technology? We need to diversify our energy sources. In a matter of a few decades, our oil and gas reserves would be finished and therefore, we need access to other sources of energy....Furthermore, nuclear technology has many other utilities in medicine and agriculture. The case of the United States in terms of oil reserve is not different from Iran's. The United States also has large oil resources, but at the same time they have nuclear power plants."

—*Washington Post*, 5 October 1997, p. C4; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

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**7 October 1997**

Major General Zeev Livne, Israel's military attaché to Washington, reports that Iran's recent successful firing of new long-range missile does not mean it is too late to prevent Iran from making progress in nuclear technology. At the same time, Uzi Arad, diplomatic adviser to Israel's prime minister, and Brigadier General Amos Gilad, head of the Research Division of Military Intelligence, say they have information regarding Russia's participation in efforts by Iran to produce nuclear weapons and long-range missiles capable of employing non-conventional warheads. —Yerah Tal, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 7 October 1997, p.1; in "IDF Attache—'Not Too Late' To Stop Iranian Missile Plan," FBIS Document FTS19971007000459, 7 October 1997.

**8 October 1997**

Kuwait's Information Minister Sheikh Saud Nasser al-Sabah says that Iran's attempts to open a dialogue with Western powers would be more likely to succeed if words were accompanied by actions to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Al-Sabah says that the confrontation between Iran and the West puts Kuwait in a difficult position, as if "between a rock and a hard place." He welcomes a change in the relationship, saying that tension between Iran and the United States "does not serve our interest here." —Ashraf Fouad, "Iran Overtures Must Include Arms Control—Kuwait," Reuters, 8 October 1997.

**8 October 1997**

US administration officials say that China has completely severed nuclear cooperation with Iran and are preparing a statement that will minimize Iran's reaction. The report says that China reached this decision in order to encourage the United States to implement the 1985 bilateral agreement on peaceful nuclear cooperation, which would allow American companies to export nuclear technology to China. —Kyodo, 8 October 1997; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

**9 October 1997**

*Haaretz* of Tel Aviv reports that Israel and the United States failed to reach an agreement on how to induce Russia into halting its assistance to Iran to develop weapons of mass destruction. *Haaretz* reports Israel has suggested military action be taken against Iran, an action Israel has failed to convince the United States to take. Israel believes the time to strike Iran is limited and if Russia continues its aid, Iran will have ballistic missiles capable of mounting nonconventional warheads within 12 to 18 months. —Yerah Tal, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 9 October 1997, p. 2; in "Israel Suggests to U.S. 'Military Action' Against Iran," FBIS Document FTS19971009000495, 9 October 1997.

**9 October 1997**

In an interview, US Secretary of Defense William Cohen says that China has been exporting [nuclear] technology to the Middle East, particularly to Iran. Cohen notes that China will soon become a net oil importer, and thereby will have more of an interest in the stability of the Middle East. He also notes that Iran is trying to develop more sophisticated chemical, biological, and, possibly, nuclear warheads. —"U.S. Push for Chinese Military 'Transparency': Q & A with William Cohen," *International Herald-Tribune*, p. 10, 9 October 1997.

**14 October 1997**

US State Department spokesman James Rubin says the United States wants China to make "clear and unequivocal assurances" that it will not give nuclear weapons technology to Iran. —"Administration Wants Guarantee No Nuclear Technology," Associated Press, 14 October 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

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#### **14 October 1997**

Iran requests the United States provide definitive proof of Iranian attempts to obtain nuclear weapons. Hasan Qashqavi, Iran's Ambassador to Almaty, states "Iran invites the United States to submit the documentary proof to the world forum to prove of its uninterrupted allegations." Iran reasserts its interest in nuclear technology is for peaceful purposes only, "Iran's objective behind setting up the Bushehr nuclear power plant is to gain access to a cheap source of energy through the development of a nuclear station with the cooperation of Russia."

—IRNA (Tehran), 14 October 1997; in "Iran's Ambassador to Almaty Asks U.S. To Prove Nuclear Claims," FBIS Document FTS19971014001717, 14 October 1997.

#### **15 October 1997**

Terry Taylor, the assistant director of the institute and editor-in-chief of *Military Balance*, says rumors of the qualitative gap between Iran's and Israel's armies will not be affected by Iran's procurement of nuclear technology. Taylor asserts, "Israel has the regional monopoly on the nuclear and satellite subjects. The edge continues to be most significant and there is no place for hasty conclusions only in view of the weapons transactions by Arab countries."

—Sharon Sade, "Report: Doubtful that Iran Will Develop Nuclear Bomb within a Year," *Haaretz* (Internet version), 15 October 1997; in "Advanced Stage of Iran Nuclear Program Questioned," FBIS Document FTS19971017000577, 17 October 1997.

#### **15 October 1997**

A Majlis [Iranian Parliament] session passes a bill that will provide for economic and trade cooperation between Russia and Iran. The bill stipulates that the two countries will cooperate in the field of nuclear technology.

—IRIB Television (Tehran), 19 October 1997; in "Iranian Majles Passes Bill on Cooperation with Russia," FBIS Document FTS19971019000207, 19 October 1997.

#### **16 October 1997**

US State Department spokesman James Rubin says that China must halt all nuclear cooperation with Iran. Rubin also says that if China hoped to receive any nuclear technology assistance from the United States, Beijing must even stop supplying Tehran with equipment that is allowed under international treaties. This issue is stalling negotiations between Chinese President Jiang Zemin and US President Bill Clinton on an agreement on peaceful cooperation between Beijing and Washington. This agreement will be discussed during a summit meeting on 29 October 1997.

—Charles Snyder, "Iran Links Issue Holding Up U.S. Nuclear Technology Deal Hong Kong Standard," 16 October 1997, [www.hkstandard.com](http://www.hkstandard.com).

#### **17 October 1997**

Senior US officials say China has agreed not to continue nuclear assistance or sales of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen reportedly made the pledge in a meeting with US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. An agreement on this issue could lead to the end of a US embargo on sales of civilian nuclear technology to China.

—"China To Stop Nuclear Aid, Selling Missiles To Iran: Report," Agence France Presse, 18 October 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **21 October 1997**

China confirms its stance that it will not provide Iran with nuclear technology. Shen Guofang, China's Foreign

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Ministry spokesman, says "China has never transferred nuclear weapons and technology to any country including Iran." [Note: See 17 October 1997.] Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mahmud Mohammadi criticizes the United States for convincing China not to cooperate with Iran in the nuclear realm. "America's effort to pressure China into stopping peaceful nuclear cooperation with Iran is interference in other countries' internal affairs," he says. "The United States, motivated by political intentions and self-interest, has embarked on false propaganda against such cooperation." The Chinese foreign ministry says China has never "transferred nuclear weapons or technology to any country including Iran." He says, "Iran is not planning to purchase missiles from China." Cooperation between the two nations, Mohammadi states, is of a peaceful nature and is closely scrutinized by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He says, "Iran is not planning to purchase missiles from China." China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said that China had stalled cooperation with Iran due to "some disputes over the contract." [Note: See 25 October 1997.]

—AFP (Hong Kong), 21 October 1997; in "AFP: Spokesman Calls For Nuclear Accord," FBIS Document FTS19971021000352, 21 October 1997; "Iran Slams U.S. Interference Over Nuclear Cooperation," Agence France Presse, 21 October 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; IRNA (Tehran), 21 October 1997; in "U.S. 'Interference' in 'Peaceful' Iran-PRC Nuclear Relations," FBIS Document FTS19971021001109, 21 October 1997; "China Sites Dispute With Iran In Bid For U.S. Nuclear Exports," *Washington Times*, 22 October 1997, p. 12.

#### **24 October 1997**

*Sharg* of Baku reports Iran is dumping nuclear waste on Azerbaijani territory occupied by Armenian forces. Due to the absence of reliable detection equipment at border checkpoints, there is no "control over the import of radioactive elements," according to Azerbaijani specialists. The Azerbaijani government has not confronted Iran about the alleged dumping because of the difficulty of entering Armenian-occupied territories to obtain definitive proof. Director of Azerbaijan's Izotop Association Agababa Huseynov raised the issue at an International Atomic Energy Agency seminar in Vienna, "The Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Nonproliferation." Huseynov cites "a number" of examples proving the presence of radioactive materials on Azerbaijani territory, particularly in locations where former Soviet armed forces personnel are stationed. Azerbaijan is not a member of the IAEA. [Note: See also 11 June 1999.]

—S. Aliyeva, "Iran Allegedly Dumping Waste In Azerbaijan," *Sharg* (Baku), 24 October 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-TEN-97-297, 24 October 1997.

#### **25 October 1997**

In an effort to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, 250 members of the European Parliament (EP) ask the European Union to keep its ambassadors out of Iran. Iran proposes the EP confer with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who they believe can assuage any of the EP's fears. The IAEA has repeatedly said Iran's nuclear program is peaceful.

—"Truth Will Prevail," *Iran News* (Tehran), 25 October 1997, p. 2; in "Editorial on Diplomatic 'Failure' To Present Facts on Iran," FBIS Document FTS19971031001310, 31 October 1997.

#### **25 October 1997**

As part of the "pragmatic policy of engagement," the United States secures promises from China over the sales of nuclear technology to Iran. The United States, fearing the civilian nuclear technology provided to Iran by China could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction, threatens to withhold US nuclear reactors and technology for China's civilian industry if China does not cease in its nuclear cooperation with Iran. According to a US official China has provided "very firm, clear, and explicit assurances" that it will not allow the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran. President Clinton sums up the US relationship, stating "China has lived up to its pledge not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in third countries, and it is developing a system of export controls to prevent

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the transfer or sale of technology for weapons of mass destruction." [Note: See 21 October 1997.]

—Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), 25 October 1997; in "AFP: Clinton Calls For 'Pragmatic Policy of Engagement'," FBIS Document FTS19971025000041, 25 October 1997.

#### **26 October 1997**

Yevgeniy Primakov, Russia's foreign minister, says, "Russian does nothing through governmental or non-governmental channels to help Iran to acquire mass destruction weapons and long-range ballistic missiles." The remark comes in response to Israeli concerns regarding the trade relationship between Russia and Iran.

—Aleksandr Zhurdo and Anatoliy Kerzhentsev, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 26 October 1997; in "Primakov, Netanyahu Discuss Mideast Peace, Iran," FBIS Document FTS19971026000532, 26 October 1997.

#### **27 October 1997**

Attempting to rally support for sanctions to be placed on Russia, Benjamin Gilman, chairman of the US House International Relations Committee, says, "It is clear that Russia has already provided Iran with critical know-how and technological support." According to sources Iran is supposedly within a year of reaching a point in its technological expertise that a cessation of Russian assistance will not significantly diminish Iran's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction.

—"Desperately Seeking a New Russia," *The Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem), 27 October 1997, p. 6; in "Sanctions Against Russian Military Aid to Iran Urged," FBIS Document FTS19971027001197, 27 October 1997.

#### **28 October 1997**

In talks at the nuclear technology conference in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Reza Amrollahi, Iran's representative to the conference, states "Iran's Atomic Energy Organization pursues utilization of nuclear technology for development of the country." Amrollahi enumerates his country's activities as solely for peaceful purposes that include construction of the Bushehr power plant, mining of uranium, manufacture of radioactive isotopes and research in the country's various reactors.

—IRNA (Tehran), 28 October 1997; in "Iranian Official on 'Peaceful Nature' of Nuclear Program," FBIS Document FTS19971028001046, 28 October 1997.

#### **29 October 1997**

The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reports Washington and China are working to reach an agreement over nuclear trade between China and Iran. Iran perceives the initiative as a means for the United States to procure substantial funding for reactor sales to China. Iran sees this as hypocritical in light of recent US denouncement of China as a nuclear security risk. *Iran Daily* states, "After all, it is too naïve to trust the promises from a country that is held by the US intelligence agencies as the main culprit behind the global spread of nuclear weapons."

—IRNA (Tehran), 30 October 1997; in "Iranian Paper on U.S.-China Summit, Nuclear Issue," FBIS Document FTS19971030000059, 30 October 1997; "Uncle Sam Adopts Bad Boy," *Iran Daily* (Tehran), 30 October 1997, p. 1; in "Iran Daily Comments on U.S., Chinese Nuclear Cooperation," FBIS Document FTS19971106000275, 6 November 1997.

#### **29 October 1997**

Chinese officials provide "authoritative, written communications" that China will not engage in new nuclear cooperation with Iran. China will complete two current projects: a zero-power research reactor that uses heavy water and natural uranium, scheduled to be completed by the end of 1997; and the production of zirconium tubes, designed to hold fuel pellets in the core of a nuclear reactor. China has also agreed not to provide equipment to construct a heavy water, low-enriched uranium nuclear reactor to Iran, and to halt its plans to build a uranium

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hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) conversion plant in Iran. [Note: See 21 and 25 October 1997.]

—"China Agrees to End Nuclear Trade With Iran When Two Projects Completed," *NuclearFuel*, 3 November 1997, p. 3.

#### **November 1997**

The US Defense Department releases a report that says "Chinese and Russian supply policies are key to Iran's success" in acquiring nuclear weapons.

—Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response* (Washington, DC: November 1997); in Michael Eisenstadt, "Déjà vu All Over Again? Iran's Military Build-Up: An Assessment," National Defense University, 22 February 1994.

#### **November 1997**

A 32-year-old Iranian citizen, Reza Teymiri, is arrested in Russia in connection with acquiring nuclear technology for Iran, according to Vladimir Orlov, the director of the Russian center for political studies. [Note: The 14 and 18 November 1997 entries may refer to the same arrest.]

—Veronika Romanenkova, ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 13 April 1998; in "Iranian Attempts To Obtain Russian Nuclear Parts Thwarted," FBIS Document FTS19980413000419, 13 April 1998.

#### **3 November 1997**

*Stern* of Hamburg reports that Germany fears that "the potential end buyer" of the Zwentendorf nuclear reactor in Vienna, Austria, which is to be dismantled, will be Iran. Germany, which provided the reactor, believes that Iran will use the equipment to aid in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. [Note: See also 7, 8, and 11 November 1997.]

—Kid Moechel and Rudolf Lambrecht, "Nuclear Technology for the Mullahs?," *Stern* (Hamburg), 6 November 1997, p. 274; in "Vienna Firm Suspected of Offering Nuclear Parts to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19971106000227, 6 November 1997.

#### **4 November 1997**

US Secretary of Defense William Cohen reveals that the United States has bought 14 nuclear-capable MiG-29 aircraft from Moldova to prevent their sale to Iran.

—"U.S. Buys Nuclear-Capable MIGS to Keep Iran From Getting Them," Agence France Presse, 4 November 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **7 November 1997**

The Foreign Ministry of Germany intervenes with the Foreign Ministry of Austria to determine whether parts from the "dead" Zwentendorf nuclear power plant in Vienna are headed for Iran. Germany believes the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran may be attempting to buy the parts. The Austrian company asserts each piece has been carefully cataloged to prevent any illicit trade. [Note: See 3, 8, and 11 November 1997.]

—"Parts of Zwentendorf Sold to Iran?," *Kurier* (Vienna), 7 November 1997, p. 4; in "Viennese Company Denies Making Nuclear Sales to Iran," FBIS Document FTS19971107000403, 7 November 1997.

#### **8 November 1997**

*Salzburger Nachrichten* reports that IDPC, the Vienna-based company that bought parts from the recently decommissioned Zwentendorf nuclear power plant in Vienna, must apply for individual export permits on a case-by-case basis. This comes as a result of allegations that the parts could be sold to Iran. Siemens, which began the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, says the technologies are not interchangeable, one

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reactor being a pressure water type and the other a boiling water reactor. [Note: See also 3, 7, and 11 November 1997.]

—Werner A. Beninger and Gertraud Leimueller, "From Zwentendorf to Iran," *Salzburger Nachrichten* (Salzburg), 8 November 1997, p. 4; in "More Details on Allegedly Planned Nuclear Deal With Iran," FBIS Document FTS1997111000628, 10 November 1997.

#### **10 November 1997**

The *Iran Brief* reports that according to US intelligence reports China, despite a May 1997 pledge not to provide nuclear technology to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, has continued its nuclear cooperation with both Iran and Pakistan.

—"China Backs Off From Iran—Maybe," *Iran Brief*, 10 November 1997, pp. 1, 2.

#### **11 November 1997**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran denies that atomic power plant equipment from the dismantled Zwentendorf nuclear energy plant in Vienna is destined for the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran. The equipment has been sold to the Russian company Mosenergmontash, reports IDPC, the Austrian company responsible for the equipment. According to Michael Machura, head of the IDPC, the "equipment is old and worn out. It cannot at all be used at the Bushehr atomic power plant, which is currently under construction." Machura affirms that installation of any equipment in the Bushehr plant would fall under the purview of the International Atomic Energy Agency. [Note: See also 3, 7, and 8 November 1997.]

—IRNA (Tehran), 11 November 1997; in "Correction: Iran Denies Austrian Equipment To Be Used," FBIS Document FTS1997111000438, 11 November 1997.

#### **12 November 1997**

Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iran's deputy permanent representative to the United Nations, says at the United Nations General Assembly that Iran is committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency. He says Iran's commitment to safeguards has been confirmed by the IAEA, and that Iran is open about its nuclear activities. He says that fears of violations of IAEA safeguards should be expressed to the IAEA, but that repeated, politically motivated claims of violations by some countries hurt the IAEA's ability to do its job, an apparent reference to stated US concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

—"UN Envoy Says Tehran Abiding By Its Nuclear Commitments," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 November 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **14 November 1997**

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detains an Iranian citizen attempting to buy dual-use technology that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. [Note: The November 1997 and 14 November 1997 entries may refer to the same arrest.]

—Interfax (Moscow), 14 November 1997; in "Russian FSB Holds Iranian for Attempt To Buy Documents," FBIS Document FTS19971114001132, 14 November 1997.

#### **17 November 1997**

Russia says it will not change its policy on Russia-Iran cooperation in using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes despite the recent capture of an Iranian citizen who was attempting to procure dual-use nuclear technology. [Note: See 18 November 1997 entry on the arrest of an Iranian citizen.]

—Interfax (Moscow), 17 November 1997; in "Russian Minister: Nuclear Cooperation With Iran To Continue," FBIS Document FTS19971117000779, 17 November 1997.

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**18 November 1997**

Mahmud Mohammadi, spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, says Israel's possession of nuclear weapons points to its aggressive intentions and opposition to peace and security. Referring to a recent statement by former Israeli Prime Minister Sharon Perez that Israeli nuclear weapons ensure peace in the region, Mohammadi says it is "shameful" that a former Israeli official admits Israel has nuclear weapons at the same time Israel is loudly claiming that Iran is seeks nuclear weapons.

—"Iran Condemns Israeli Nuclear Weapons Program," Xinhua (Beijing), 18 November 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**18 November 1997**

*Al-Sharq al-Awsat* reports that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) has in its custody an Iranian Embassy employee accused of attempting to obtain documents relating to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. This is the third such incident, according to the FSB. [Note: The November, 14 November, and 17 November 1997 entries probably refer to the same arrest.]

—Sami Amarah, "Russian Intelligence Official Tells Al-Sharq al-Awsat About Third Attempt in One Year To Smuggle Nuclear Weapons Documents to Tehran," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), 18 November 1997, p. 5; in "Russian Intelligence Aide on Incidents Involving Iranians," FBIS Document FTS19971118000893, 18 November 1997.

**18 November 1997**

Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine's president, says his country's involvement in the construction of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr will be relegated to "the electrical and not the nuclear cycle." Kuchma further asserts that the Ukraine's decision is meant to create jobs and provide the Kharkov Turboatom plant with prospects for future building contracts.

—UNIAN (Kiev), 18 November 1997; in "Kuchma on Involvement in Iran Nuclear Plant Project," FBIS Document FTS19971118001162, 18 November 1997.

**24 November 1997**

The *Jerusalem Report* reports that Iran wants to buy portable uranium-enrichment facilities from South Africa for use in building nuclear weapons. A deal would be worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

—"Exclusive: Iran Seeks To Buy 'Israeli' Nuclear Technology From South Africa," *Jerusalem Report*, 11 December 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**24 November 1997**

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy says it will increase cooperation with countries wishing to pursue civilian-use nuclear technology. "This fully applies to Iran as well," reports Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov. Mikhailov says his country's relationship with Ukraine regarding nuclear cooperation in civilian-use technology is "satisfactory."

—Interfax (Moscow), 24 November 1997; in "Russian Minister on Nuclear Power, Weapons," FBIS Document FTS19971124001437, 24 November 1997.

**27 November 1997**

Dr. Muhammad al-Baradi, the new IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Director-General, in an interview with *al-Majallah* of London says Iran's nuclear capabilities have been closely monitored by the IAEA. Whether Iran or any nation will be capable of producing nuclear weapons in the future does not fall under the purview of the Agency, "In fact, this is not our responsibility, as our current responsibility lies in carrying out inspection operations

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and presenting a detailed report to IAEA member states."

—*al-Majallah* (London), 30 November 1997, pp. 20-25; in "IAEA Director Discusses Agency Activities," FBIS Document FTS19971215001269, 15 December 1997.

#### **November-December 1997**

Further indications of the split in Israeli thinking over Iran is indicated by two recent reports in the Israeli press. In the first report, *Maariv* presents four working assumptions regarding Iran's programs for weapons of mass destruction. The first is that sooner or later Iran will have the capability of launching long-range missiles with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. Second is that Iran is receiving aid in the development of these weapons from various countries including Russia, China, and North Korea. The third assumption is that the United States is the only country that can have a serious impact on Iranian arms development. And lastly, Israeli deterrence capability needs to be strengthened. Yifah Shapir, a researcher at the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies believes that Israeli officials overestimate Iran's technical capabilities. This tends to support US claims that Iran may not be able to integrate components received from various suppliers into a workable missile system.

—Ben Kaspi, "Efforts to Curb Iranian Proliferation Viewed," *Maariv*, 7 December 1997; "Israel Within Iran's Missile Range in 18 Months," *The Jerusalem Post*, " 1 November 1997; Jonathan S. Landay, "More Flaws in Policy to Isolate Iran," *Christian Science Monitor*, 23 October 1997.

#### **December 1997**

An article in *Yedi'ot Aharonot* presents details of Ariel Sharon's proposal that Israel pay off its debt owed to Iran in order to ease tensions between the two countries. Also revealed are details of secret talks between Sharon and Russia concerning Gazprom efforts to sell natural gas to Israel. Sharon proposed that Gazprom buy the Israeli debt from Iran and then allow Israel to settle with the new owners. Much controversy surrounds this proposal, with the Defense Ministry worried about Sharon's initiatives. The Gazprom deal has been put on hold, as have other projects between Russia and Israel.

—Galit Yemini, "Intelligence Sources Split on Attitude Toward Iran," *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 12 December 1997; Ed Blanche, "Israel Stops Gas Deal in Russia-Iran Missile Row," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 17 September 1997; Steve Rodan, "Israel Ban on Russian Sales Excludes Defense Business," *Defense News*, 22 September 1997.

#### **4 December 1997**

US State Department spokesman James Rubin "expressed confidence" that South Africa would not assist Iran in developing nuclear weapons. Rubin said the United States was aware that Iran was actively seeking nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. However, he said "The United States has high confidence in South Africa's commitment to its obligations under the (Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty not to assist efforts of any other countries, including Iran, to acquire nuclear weapons."

—"U.S. Confident S. Africa Not Aiding Iran," Reuters, 4 December 1997.

#### **9 December 1997**

*The Times* of London reports Israel's recent procurement of 25 F-15I fighter planes from the United States signals the probability that Israel could respond to an alleged nuclear threat from Iran in the same fashion as it did against the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, which was destroyed in a air strike by Israeli fighters. Yitzhak Mordechai, Israel's Defense Minister, states "The other side must know that Israel will not take it lightly if someone targets us with long-range missiles and threatens our population." Mordechai further states that if Iran's nuclear program continues to go unchecked by the international community Iran will become a nuclear power by 2005.

—*The Times* (London), 9 December 1997; in "UK Paper: Israel Planning to Neutralize Iran Missile Threat," FBIS Document FTS19971213000062, 13 December 1997.

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**11 December 1997**

*The Jerusalem Times* reports that Iran is trying to purchase nuclear technological information and parts from South Africa's now defunct nuclear weapons program. The *Times* reports Kamal Kharazi, Iran's Foreign Minister, has traveled to South Africa three times in the last several months to procure items necessary to enhance Iran's growing nuclear program. It is believed that Iran, which did not support South Africa during apartheid, will be embraced by the money-starved South African government.

—The Jerusalem Staff, "Exclusive," *The Jerusalem Report* (Jerusalem), 11 December 1997, p. 4; in "Iran Seeks To Buy S. African Nuclear Elements, Knowhow," FBIS Document FTS19971127000028, 27 November 1997.

**11 December 1997**

The *New York Times* reports that the US Clinton administration next week will transmit formal certification of China's nonproliferation credentials in a statement to Congress. The certification will include China's assurances that it has halted assistance to Pakistan or any other country that is seeking to develop nuclear weapons; is ceasing its nuclear power projects with Iran, including the construction of a uranium conversion facility; and is establishing a system of export controls. If Congress neither overturns the certification nor passes new legislation regarding the certification, then it will take effect 30 days after Congress reconvenes in 1998.

—Tim Weiner, "U.S. Says China Isn't Giving Nuclear Aid to Others," *New York Times*, 11 December 1997.

**14 December 1997**

*Haaretz* reports that Russia has uncovered an Iranian network seeking to procure nuclear weapon technology. According to Viktor Posuvalyuk, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister, the network comprises several students studying nuclear physics and missile science and one working through an Iranian embassy. Posuvalyuk says the effort to cut off the students' access to the information is an example of the Russian administration's continuing efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining information useful in developing nonconventional weapon systems.

—Yosi Melman, *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 14 December 1997; in "Russia's Posuvalyuk Notes Exposure of Iranian Nuclear Ring," FBIS Document FTS19971214000379, 14 December 1997.

**18 December 1997**

Efrayim Sne, Israeli Knesset member, says diplomatic efforts to halt Iran's development of nonconventional arms have thus far failed. Asserting Iran views Israel as its "main ideological rival," Sne believes Iran's nuclear development will likely produce a Shehab-3 missile capable of striking Israel within 18 months.

—Batsheva Tzur, *The Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem), 18 December 1997, p. 4; in FBIS Document FTS19971218000903, 18 December 1997.

**18 December 1997**

A spokesman for the US State Department says that due to the existing China-Iran relationship, the United States is seeking assurances that the zirconium-tube facility that South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) is selling to China will not be transferred to Iran. The spokesman says that in general, "the transfer of zirconium fuel fabrication technology and equipment is not normally a proliferation-sensitive issue," and the equipment is not on the Nuclear Suppliers' Group "trigger list." The United States considers South Africa to have first-rate nuclear proliferation credentials, and they have exchanged notes formally implementing a new nuclear cooperation agreement to give South Africa access to US nuclear technology and materials.

—Simon Barber, "U.S. Seeks Assurance On Atomic Energy Plant Sale To China," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), 18 December 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-97-352, 18 December 1997.

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**19 December 1997**

The *International Herald Tribune* reports that Israel has recently hinted that it will put its nuclear missiles on "launch-on-warning" alert to deter a first strike against Israel's missiles. The *Tribune* quotes an unnamed CIA analyst who says this is a "bluff" to dissuade Iran from investing in nuclear weapons.

—Joseph Fitchett, "Israelis Reaction To Iran's Buildup Is Heightening Nuclear Fears In Mideast," *International Herald Tribune*, 19 December 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**20 December 1997**

The Federal German Intelligence Service (BND) says "the radical-Islamic 'theocratic state' wants to possess medium-range missiles equipped with nuclear warheads within a decade." The "theocratic state" it is referring to is Iran, which it believes is pursuing the darker half of dual-use technologies despite Iran's constant promulgations that it seeks only to acquire civilian-use nuclear technology. Groups within Germany believe the role of Russia in supplying nuclear technology needs to be reexamined, stating that items proven to be outside the capability of Iran's nuclear development still find their way into Iran's nuclear program.

—Michael Jach, "Missiles for Allah," *Focus* (Munich), 20 December 1997, p. 58; in "BND Briefs Bonn on Iran's Nuclear Missile Program," FBIS Document FTS19971220000551, 20 December 1997.

**21 December 1997**

The *Sunday Times* of London reports that, according to Israeli intelligence sources, Iran is recruiting nuclear scientists employed during the apartheid era in South Africa. An unidentified South African government spokesman says that "there may well be nuclear experts who have been made redundant in South Africa and who are willing to give their skills to any country prepared to pay."

—Matthew Campbell and Uzi Mahnami, "Iran's Mullahs On Brink Of A Nuclear Bomb," *Sunday Times* (London), 21 December 1997.

**23 December 1997**

Gid'on Frank, head of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, says there has been no change in Israel's nuclear policy. [Note: He may be referring to a 19 December 1997 article in the *International Herald Tribune* that Israel may put its nuclear forces on high alert.]

—"Ze'ev Schiff Atomic Energy Commission Head Denies Nuclear Policy Change," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 23 December 1997, p. 1; FBIS-TAC-97-357, 23 December 1997.

**24 December 1997**

Israeli sources say Iran tried to buy nuclear enrichment facilities from South Africa.

—Associated Press, 24 December 1997, 1305; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

**29 December 1997**

Waldo Stumpf, chief executive officer of South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), will require an end-user statement from China before a plant leaves South Africa, and that "China won't get any technology transfer," and assured that "this plant will not be re-exported to Iran." [Note: The "plant" probably refers to a zirconium-tube facility. See 18 December 1998.]

—Mark Hibbs, "End-User Statement, Export Permit Still Pending For AEC-China Deal," *Nuclear Fuel*, vol. 22, no. 26, 29 December 1997, p. 3.

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### **Late 1997**

Talks are held between Belarusian Foreign Minister Ivan Antonovich, Iranian Vice President Hassan Habibi, and Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi. The United States fears Belarus will become a "conduit for Russian missile and nuclear weapons technology to Iran." The United States claims that Belarus is acting as a proxy for Russia in negotiating sales of technology to Iran. The deals are being handled in Tehran by the Belarusian military officer Rybak.

—Bill Gertz, "Belarus, Iran Plan Weapons-Trade Pact," *The Washington Times*, 17 February 1998.

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## **1996**

### **1996**

The CIA says Russia has given important nuclear technology to Iran this year. [Note: In July 1997, the Clinton administration complains of these transfers to Russian President Boris Yeltsin.]

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **1996**

The Wassenaar Agreement comes into effect. With this agreement, the sales of strategic dual use items to Iran are curtailed. The United States seeks to persuade other Western industrialized countries not to reschedule any existing credits to Iran, not to issue any new credits, and to oppose new loans for Iran from multilateral banks.

—"North Africa and Middle East/Iran," p. 170, [www.ceip.org](http://www.ceip.org).

### **1996**

The US Arms Controls and Disarmament Agency reports to Congress that "although Iran's rudimentary [nuclear] program has apparently met with limited success so far, we believe Iran remains intent on acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Iran's questionable nonproliferation credentials have caused many nuclear suppliers to refrain from cooperation with Tehran."

—"Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," Arms Control And Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Annual Report, 1996.

### **2 January 1996**

President Hashemi-Rafsanjani inaugurates the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran's (AEOI) new research center in Tehran.

—"President Inaugurates New Nuclear Research Facility," IRNA (Tehran) 2 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960102000243, 2 January 1996; "President on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power," IRNA (Tehran) 2 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960102000270, 2 January 1996.

### **2 January 1996**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that the country's first nuclear power plant [Bushehr] will become operational by 1999. At the same time, Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani says that work has begun on the Bushehr power plant. He states that "making use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes is something without which a country could not find its real standing in the world."

—"President Inaugurates New Nuclear Research Facility," IRNA (Tehran) 2 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS

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19960102000243, 2 January 1996; "President on Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power," IRNA (Tehran) 02 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960102000270, 2 January 1996.

#### **4 January 1996**

Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy spokesman Georgiy Kaurov says Russia will supply Iran with equipment for Bushehr in April 1996 or May 1996.

—"Russian Source On Iran's Nuclear Plant Project," Xinhua (Beijing), 21 December 1995 FBIS-CHI-95-245, 21 December 1995; Mark Hibbs, "Russian Industry Now Tapping Iran Bushehr Credit, AEOI Says." *Nucleonics Week*, 25 January 1996, pp. 4-5; "Russian Specialists Inspect Iranian Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 4 January 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-96-004, 4 January 1996; Oleg Kuzmin, "'Financial Problems' Check Iran's Work On Powerplant," Itar-Tass (Moscow), 20 November 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-224, 20 November 1995.

#### **7 January 1996**

Brigadier General Yaaqov Amidror, the deputy head of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Intelligence Branch, says that Iran is the foremost threat in the region, where military buildup is increasing. Iran, according to this report, is trying to produce a nuclear weapon and will be able to produce unconventional weapons within five years.

—Udi Segal, "Briefing Views Syrian, Iranian Strategic Aims," IDF Radio (Tel Aviv) 7 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 1996010700064, 7 January 1996.

#### **8 January 1996**

Dr. Husayn al-Shahrestani, an Iraqi atomic scientist who defected from Iraq in 1991 and now teaches nuclear sciences at the University of Tehran, says the Iranian nuclear program is not as developed as the Iraqi program because they lack the human and technical resources. He does not believe that the Iranians are seriously seeking a nuclear weapon.

—Ghalib Darwish, "The World of Iraqi Atom; Saddam Dreamed of Changing the Map of the Middle East Under the Threat of Nuclear Arms," *Al-Majallah* (London), 8 January 1996; in "Interview With Iraqi Nuclear Scientist," in FBIS Document FTS19960101000273, 8 January 1996.

#### **8 January 1996**

On a state-run Tehran radio report, China's First Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei says that, "China will continue its cooperation with Iran on the peaceful use of nuclear energy within the framework of regulations set by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and considers this a principled and correct policy."

—"China Assures Iran On Nuclear Cooperation," *Washington Post*, 9 January 1996, p. A9.

#### **9 January 1996**

Under US pressure, China announces that plans to sell Iran two nuclear reactors have been cancelled. Chen Chi Chan, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman says that the agreement between China and Iran for a nuclear power plant has been frozen, but that China is still interested in the continuation of the cooperation between the two countries. [Note: US officials said on 27 September 1995 that China canceled the deal, but on 29 September 1995, a Chinese official said the deal was not cancelled.]

—"Foreign Ministry Holds Regular News Conferences on Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," IRNA (Tehran) 9 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960109000041, 9 January 1996; "China Says Deals to Sell Iran Nuclear Reactors Scrapped," The Associated Press, 9 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **12 January 1996**

The Russian and Iranian contract on the Bushehr power plant goes into effect. Russia is under a contractual

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obligation to complete and render operational the Bushehr nuclear power plant within 55 months.

—"Nuclear Contract with Iran Begins Fulfillment," *Interfax* (Moscow), 6 February 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960206000785, 6 February 1996.

#### **15 January 1996**

The Slovak economic minister, Jan Ducky, says that the Slovak Republic is incapable participating in the construction of a new power station in Iran. The economy minister says this in response to a report that Slovakia and Russia will cooperate in building a nuclear power station for Iran.

—"Slovakia Not to Build Nuclear Power Plant in Iran-Minister," *Czech News Agency (CTK)*, 15 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **16 January 1996**

Ehud Barak, the Israeli foreign minister, praises US efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear capabilities and adds that Iran remains a threat to regional stability.

—Shlomo Raz, "Vice President Gore Arrives, Greeted by Peres Peres, Baraq, Gore Holds Meeting," *Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 16 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960116000030, 16 January 1996.

#### **16 January 1996**

Reuters reports that Slovakia has offered to help Iran with the construction of the Russian nuclear power plants by providing technical aid on matters such as security and safety, but Iran has not yet asked for help, according to a Slovak official.

—Reuters, 16 January 1996; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **23 January 1996**

Sergey Tertyakev, the Russian Ambassador to Iran, says that Russia is dedicated to all its commitments to Iran, stressing its determination to complete the Bushehr power plant. He adds that he foresees no setbacks as financial matters have been resolved.

—"Tehran, Moscow Not Rivals in CIS States," *IRNA* (Tehran), 23 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960123000117, 23 January 1996.

#### **25 January 1996**

*Intelnews* of Kiev reports that Turboatom plant in Kharkov is to sign a production contract with ZaganAtomEnergostroy in Moscow for the production of two turbines for the Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Kharkov To Manufacture Turbines for Iranian Nuclear Plant," *Intelnews* (Kiev), 25 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960125000760, 25 January 1996.

#### **25 January 1996**

Husayn Musavian, Iran's ambassador to Germany, refutes allegations made by German intelligence that Iran was buying nuclear material. He says that Iran is ready to cooperate with Germany in curbing nuclear proliferation.

—"Musavian Denies DND Allegations on Iran's Nuclear Activities," *IRNA* (Tehran), 25 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960125000341, 25 January 1996.

#### **26 January 1996**

Teymuraz Abzianidze, the director of Tblisi Institute of Stable Isotopes, says that it is possible that countries like Iran could use the qualified and specialized scientists from plants such as these in Russia to manufacture nuclear weapons.

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—"Iran or Iraq' Could Attract Sukhumi Nuclear Scientists," NTV (Moscow), 26 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19970425001334, 25 April 1997.

### **29 January 1996**

Fernando Petrella, vice foreign minister of Argentina, says that so far, Argentina has stopped legal action by the government of Iran against Argentina over the breach of an \$18 million contract for the sale of nuclear technology to Iran. [Note: See entries February 1992; 2 March 1992; 1 October 1992; 22 September 1992.]

—"Argentinean Ministry 'To Bar' Iranian Legal Action," *CLARIN* (Buenos Aires), 29 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960129000152, 29 January 1996.

### **30 January 1996**

ITAR-TASS reports that an estimated 30 Russian specialists are working at the Buhsher nuclear power plant. In addition to completing construction of the site, the specialists are also effecting repairs of "subsidiary objects."

—Veronica Romanenkova, "Russia Assists building Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Powerplant," *ITAR-TASS* (Moscow), 30 January 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960130000231, 30 January 1996.

### **February 1996**

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov discuss Iran's purchase of two nuclear reactors from Russia. Primakov reassures Christopher that Russia is "also concerned about Iran developing weapons of mass destruction" and "does not want to enhance Iran's [nuclear] capacity."

—"Primakov Reassures Christopher Over Supply of Reactors to Iran," *The Financial Times* (London), 12 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **2 February 1996**

Iran dismisses reports of a fire at Isfahan Nuclear Center as propaganda spread by the United States and its allies. Iran also denies the existence of a nuclear power plant in Isfahan.

—"Iran Commentary Denies Reported Fire at Esfahan Nuclear Center," Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 2 February 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960202000274, 2 February 1996.

### **6 February 1996**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says Iran has successfully developed laser technology and produced zero-power and miniature reactors.

—"Iranian Atomic Energy Chief Interviewed On Nuclear Issues," Voice of Islamic Republic Of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), February 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-025, 6 February 1996.

### **7 February 1996**

Yevgeniy Mikerin of the Russian Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering says the Bushehr nuclear power plant will receive fuel from a chemical plant based in Novosibirsk. The plant makes fuel cassettes for Chernobyl-type VVER-1000 reactors that will be built in Bushehr. The plant will begin making the fuel a year before the Bushehr reactor will begin operation. He adds that this order will allow the plant in Russia to maintain its personnel and increase productivity.

—Veronika Romanenkova, "Novosibirsk Plant to Supply Iran with Nuclear Fuel," *ITAR-TASS* (Moscow), 7 February 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960207000836, 7 February 1996.

### **7 February 1996**

The Iranian daily newspaper *Salam* reports that there are 80 nuclear projects underway in Iran "to provide the

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country's electricity needs by using atomic energy." Some of the projects are believed to be used in the construction of the Bushehr power station and the "Esteqlal [independence] atomic power plant." However, an Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) spokesman claims that the report is incorrect, and that an "Esteqlal atomic power plant" does not exist.

—"Iran Nuclear Power Plans Include 80 Projects," Paper Executive News Service, 7 February 1996.

#### **7 February 1996**

Georgiy Kaurov, the head of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's public relations department, says that Iran has started paying Russia for building the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He says Russian technicians are preparing the site for construction, which is to begin in May.

—Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **8 February 1996**

Yunes Masumzadeh, the deputy director of Self-Sufficiency Jihad, the Iranian Ground Forces wartime organization, says that Iran only seeks nuclear power for energy purposes and not to acquire weapons. He adds that the country's research centers are not active in regards to nuclear weapons.

—"Official Cited on Ground Forces' 'Self-Sufficiency Jihad'," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 8 February 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960202000626, 8 February 1996.

#### **10 February 1996**

The Khabar-servis agency reports that there are ongoing regular unofficial consultations between representatives of the Iranian Nuclear Energy Organization and a group of Armenian nuclear specialists that work at the Metsamor AES nuclear power plant. According to the information available, Iran hopes to acquire nuclear experts as technical consultants about the working of nuclear reactors and the utilization of nuclear energy. Moreover, as Armenia does not have much expertise in nuclear matters, the Armenian power plant may be disguising the leakage of Russian expertise to Iran. [Note: See 22 March 1996.]

—T. Salakhly, "The Metsamor AES: Iran's Unofficial Nuclear Center?," *Zerkalo* (Baku), 10 February 1996; in "Nuclear Cooperation With Iran Alleged," in FBIS Document FTS 19960210000430, 10 February 1996.

#### **11 February 1996**

The possible presence of a German scientist in Tehran alarms the international community. He is a scientist who has been charged with supplying valuable and up-to-date information and equipment to the Iraqi government.

—Allan George, "Tehran Follows Baghdad on German Expert's Route; West Alarmed at Reports of Nuclear Spy's Arrival in Iran," *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 11 February 1996; in "German Nuclear Expert Said to be in Tehran," in FBIS Document FTS 19960211000209, 11 February 1996.

#### **12 February 1996**

Former Iraqi nuclear scientist Hussain al-Sharistani says of Iran's nuclear program, "international conditions and Iran's present economic situation render a nuclear weapons program unfeasible. The Iranian nuclear program lacks scientific expertise, equipment, and nuclear installations." [Note: Sharistani was imprisoned by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein for refusing to build nuclear weapons, and then escaped during the Persian Gulf War. He was reported to be in Iran in 1991 and 1992.]

—"Scientist Views Iraq's, Iran's Nuclear Programs," *Al-Majallah*, in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-96-002, 12 February 1996; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

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**21 February 1996**

South Africa's Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Pik Botha says South Africa has not supplied Iran with uranium in any form in the past five years.

—"South Africa; Energy Minister Says No Uranium Sent to Iran in Last Five Years," The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 23 February 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**22 February 1996**

Ali Akbar Velayati, the Iranian foreign minister, speaking at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, expresses his concern over the continued existence of nuclear weapons and adds that their elimination poses the greatest challenge to the new era. He also encourages the relevant states to sign and accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in a timely manner.

—"Iran's Velayati Deplores 'Frenzied Nuclear Arms Race'," IRNA (Tehran), 22 February 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19970425001345, 25 April 1997.

**29 February 1996**

US Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis declares that the United States is convinced that Iran is attempting to steal nuclear technology and materials to develop nuclear weapons. Iran is "many years away" from possessing a nuclear weapons capability, but stealing nuclear technology or material "can reduce the time dramatically in terms of developing a weapon," Davis said.

—"U.S. Says Iran Wants To Steal Nuke Arms Capability," Executive News Service, 29 February 1996.

**29 February 1996**

Info-Tass reports that the Asian Foundation for Thermonuclear Studies, formed as a result of a meeting between representatives of Russia's scientific circles and officials from nuclear ministries and corporations of China, India, and Iran, plans to design the world's first international experimental thermonuclear reactor. Scientists have proposed a design deadline for the reactor for July 1998. Russia's contribution will most likely be in the form of scientific and technical expertise and innovative thinking. [Note: The foundation is also called the Asian Fusion Research Foundation. See 4 and 29 March 1996.]

—Atomnoy Energii, "Russia: A New Asian Foundation For Thermonuclear Studies Will Design The World's First International Experimental Thermonuclear Reactor," *Byulleten' Tsentra Obshchestvennoy Informatsii Po*, No. 6, p. 74.

**March 1996**

Spain and Iran negotiate a comprehensive economic deal worth \$1.5 billion that provides room for cooperation in the field of nuclear technology. Nuclear cooperation between the two countries would be in the form of Spanish technical monitoring of the construction and the introduction of Western technologies at the Bushehr nuclear facility.

—"Spain Providing Credits for Deal Involving Energy and Nuclear Projects," The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 5 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**March 1996**

Russia's ambassador to Iran, Sergei Tretyakov, says Russia could further assist Iran in building more nuclear power stations after it concludes work on the Bushehr nuclear facility in southern Iran.

—"Russia-Iran Nuclear Ties May Expand, Ambassador Says," *Journal of Commerce*, 19 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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### **3 March 1996**

Iran's disarmament proposal put forward at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva draws the support of 40 nations worldwide. By making this proposal, according to a diplomatic source, Iran has removed the political stalemate and revived the disarmament process.

—"Velayati Disarmament Proposal Supported by 40 Countries," IRNA (Tehran), 3 March 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960303000457, 3 March 1996.

### **4 March 1996**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov says Russia will ship equipment in April for construction on the Bushehr nuclear power plant pursuant to a deal signed last year between the two states. He also announces that the number of Russian experts at Bushehr will increase from 20 to 500. He estimates the project will take 2.5 years to complete. In accordance with this deal, Russia will also provide Iran with nuclear fuel and help train its engineers and technicians.

—"Russia to Ship Nuclear Equipment to Iran," Xinhua News Agency, 4 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **4 March 1996**

Representatives from China, India, Iran, and Russia sign a protocol in Moscow establishing the Asian Fusion Research Foundation to cooperate in the study of nuclear fusion. The final agreement is to be signed in Montreal during an August 1996 expert conference sponsored by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Russian officials say financial support for the project was not discussed at the meeting. Western authorities believe the cooperative fusion research will probably aim to establish a tokamak, and, because no fissile materials will be produced, will not pose a proliferation threat. Western officials doubt that the project will receive enough financial support to generate important fusion engineering innovations. [Note: The foundation is also called the Asian Foundation for Thermonuclear Studies. See 29 February and 29 March 1996.]

—Mark Hibbs, "Russia, China, Iran, And India Agree To Fusion R&D Cooperation," *Nucleonics Week*, 21 February 1996, p. 15; Ishtiaq Ahmad, "Pakistan: Iranian Minister Talks To Media In Islamabad," *Nation* (Islamabad), 5 March 1996, pp. 1, 11; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96- 049, 5 March 1996.

### **4 March 1996**

Morteza Sarmadi, the Iranian deputy foreign minister, denies any nuclear cooperation between China, India, Iran, and Russia at present, but says that such cooperation is welcome.

—Ishtiaq Ahmad, "Iranian Minister Talks to Media in Islamabad," *The Nation* (Islamabad), 5 March 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960305000766, 5 March 1996.

### **6 March 1996**

According to Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov, Moscow is considering training Iranian nuclear scientists in Russia to work at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. However, no formal contract has been signed. Mikhailov says, "No such contract has been signed, but it will be."

—"Middle East: Russia May Train Iranian Nuclear Specialists for Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Plant," British Broadcasting Corporation, 6 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **6 March 1996**

Hans Blix, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pays a secret visit to Israel for "professional consultations." A senior IAEA team is soon to go to Iran to investigate suspicions of Iranian centrifugal uranium enrichment plant.

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—Aluf Ben, "IAEA's Blix Said To Make 'Secret' Visit 'Last Week'," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 6 March 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960306000219, 6 March 1996.

#### **11 March 1996**

The Spanish newspaper *El Pais* reports that Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati asked the E.U. to "give the necessary cooperation for Iran to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful purposes." In exchange, Velayati promised that Iran would "initiate serious cooperation against terrorism."

—Michael Binyon and Ross Dunn, "Assad Spurns Sinai Summit," *Times* (London), 12 March 1996.

#### **13 March 1996**

Glenn Schweitzer, director of the National Research Council's Office for Central Europe and Eurasia, says he has met specialists in nuclear weapons-related fields, and some of them had tried to go to North Korea, some were working for China, and others were being recruited by India and Iran. Schweitzer suggests that the United States expand existing projects and create new ones that will provide cutting-edge research opportunities for nuclear weapons scientists in non-weapons-related areas.

—Glenn E. Schweitzer, "Scientists, Engineers & Proliferation Of Weapons Technology," Statement Before the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, 13 March 1996; John J. Fialka, "Senate Hearing Targets Nuclear Thefts In Russia," *Wall Street Journal*, 13 March 1996, pp. A3-A16; "Hearings On Global Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction: Illicit Trafficking In Nuclear Materials," Staff Statement, US Senate Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, 22 March 1996.

#### **17 March 1996**

Anatoly Zhilinskiy, the head of the Tehran office of the Russian nuclear power construction company Zarubezhatomenergostroy (company for nuclear power engineering abroad), says that the biggest impediment to its work in Bushehr is the lack of technical documentation from the previous German company that had begun work on the nuclear power plant. He says that under the Russian-Iranian nuclear agreement, Zarubezhatomenergostroy must complete the Bushehr nuclear power station using Russian machinery. However, Iran requested that the Russian company keep German equipment already installed, some of which has no technical supporting documents. According to Zhilinskiy, Zarubezhatomenergostroy is "not authorized to use technical equipment without relevant documentation," and if the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) fails to obtain these documents, the Russian company would be forced to "remove" the German machinery. Zhilinskiy states that Russia has already submitted a construction proposal to Iranian officials for building a new nuclear power plant in Iran. However, Iran is not likely to consider the proposal until the Bushehr nuclear station is completed.

—"Contractor Details Nuclear Plant Construction," *Salam* (Tehran), 17 March 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960317000365, 17 March 1996.

#### **17 March 1996**

More than 600 Russian engineers are working at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Under the contract, Russia is to complete the nuclear power plant by supplying equipment, facilities, as well as fuel for running the plant. The agreement also includes provisions for the supply of \$30 million worth of fuel and for the removal the spent fuel from 2001 to 2011. Sergey Tretryakov, the Russian ambassador, also says that Iran and Russia's cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy will not stop with Bushehr, as the possibility for cooperation for a second power plant exists under a protocol signed by the two countries for the construction of the second atomic power plant.

—"Xinhua Reports on Russian Military, Nuclear Aid to Iran," Xinhua (Beijing), 17 March 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960317000020, 17 March 1996.

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### **17 March 1996**

Iran refutes new allegations by the United States that it is seeking nuclear weapons, calling the accusations "absurd." A senior Iranian official reiterates Iran's "inalienable right to use nuclear technology."

—"Iran Rejects US Charges of Developing Nuclear Weapons," Agence France Presse, 17 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **18 March 1996**

The Russian Ambassador to Iran, Sergey Tetryakov, says that according to the bilateral cooperation for nuclear energy, Russia and Iran are not limited to the Bushehr nuclear power station. He adds that Russia could help Iran build more power stations once it completes Bushehr.

—Reuters, 18 March 1996; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **19 March 1996**

Representatives from the Russian Atomic Ministry deny any other deals for cooperation with Iran once the Bushehr nuclear power plant is completed. They say, however, another unit could be installed at the Bushehr power plant. There have still not been any discussions on this issue, as all depends on the implementation of the Bushehr project. The Russian officials, however, do not rule out further cooperation at the end of this project. The Bushehr agreement provides for the putting in place of two VVER-1000 light water reactors at 1000MW capacity each and two VVER-440 reactors at 440MW capacity each.

—"Atomic Ministry Denies New Nuclear Deal With Iran," Interfax (Moscow) 19 March 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960319000470, 19 March 1996.

### **21 March 1996**

Andrei Gagarinsky, director of Russia's Nuclear Physics Research Institute, says that the institute is in negotiations with Iranian officials for the training of Iranian nuclear technicians. Several dozens of Iranians are to train in Russia at a cost of \$2000 per month, and training is expected to range from a few months to several years.

—*Iran Digest*, 21 March 1996; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu); "Russia: Specialists To Train Iranians For Bushehr Nuclear Plant," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-96-057, 21 March 1996; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

### **22 March 1996**

A document by the Minority Staff of the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations states that the "southern tier" countries of the former Soviet Union (i.e., the Caucasus and Central Asia) should receive greater attention from a counter-proliferation standpoint. According to the statement, Armenian scientists commonly emigrate to Iran, and representatives of North Korea, Iraq, and Iran traveled to Uzbekistan in 1992 to recruit nuclear scientists. The statement mentions reports of nuclear scientists being pulled off a plane bound for North Korea. The statement also contains a copy of an advertisement by the Hong Kong Sun Shine Industrial Company that offers the services of former Soviet weapons experts "willing to work in a country which needs their skills and can offer reasonable pay." The statement reiterates Schweitzer's call for expansion of joint peaceful scientific projects between the United States and former Soviet Union.

—Glenn E. Schweitzer, "Scientists, Engineers & Proliferation Of Weapons Technology," Statement Before the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, 13 March 1996; John J. Fialka, "Senate Hearing Targets Nuclear Thefts In Russia," *Wall Street Journal*, 13 March 1996, pp. A3-A16; "Hearings On Global Proliferation Of

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Weapons Of Mass Destruction: Illicit Trafficking In Nuclear Materials," Staff Statement, US Senate Permanent Subcommittee On Investigations, 22 March 1996.

#### **24 March 1996**

Andrey Gagarynskiy, the director of foreign relations of the Kurchatov Science Institute in Moscow, says that Russia and Iran are examining training programs for the engineers who will be operating the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. He adds that the two countries will soon be signing an agreement to this end.

—"Moscow: Russia Will Train Iranian Engineers In Nuclear Science," *Keyhan* (Tehran) 24 March 1996; in "Russia To Train Iranian Engineers in Nuclear Science," FBIS Document FTS 1996032400297, 24 March 1996.

#### **25 March 1996**

Iran says that despite the United States' best efforts, China has rejected demands for China's stop of nuclear cooperation with Iran.

—"US Attempts to Block Chinese Nuclear Cooperation Viewed," *Tehran Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran) 25 March 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960325000343, 25 March 1996.

#### **26 March 1996**

The United Arab Emirates foreign ministry acting undersecretary expresses his country's concern over Iran's alleged attempt to procure nuclear weapons.

—"UAE Concern About Iranian Nuclear Program 'Unfounded': Tehran," *Agence France Presse*, 28 March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 March 1996**

Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman expresses regret over the United Arab Emirate's statement of concern over Iran's nuclear reactor. He further states that the nations in the Middle East should stand beside Iran against Israel, which he says poses a greater threat to the region. He also adds that Iran's commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its active membership in the International Atomic Energy Agency stand as testaments to its commitment to nonproliferation.

—"Foreign Ministry Expresses 'Regret' Over UAE's Statements," *Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 28 March 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960328000706, 28 March 1996.

#### **28 March 1996**

The *Independent* reports that, according to Western diplomatic sources, Iran is buying enriched uranium from Russian diplomats based in the northern city of Afghanistan, Mazar-e-Sharif. This uranium is part of the material that is being plundered out of the former Soviet Union's inadequately secured nuclear installation. According to this report, this material is smuggled to Afghanistan and the Pakistani border town of Peshawar. The enriched uranium was stolen out of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan by security guards as part of a "bonus" payment and was sold to the Iranians by Russian diplomats. According to this report, Mazar-e-Sharif is a transit location for smuggled materials and one with a large Russian consulate, with Peshawar as the final destination, where, according to the report, there are such dangerous smuggled goods as enriched uranium, super-powerful magnets, catalysts, and metal alloys for making thermo-nuclear warhead shelling. According to the CIA, Iran, which is secretly building a nuclear weapons program, is the leading buyer of contraband, and in Peshawar there are "Iranian colonels and majors walking around with Samsonite suitcases full of \$100 bills who are shopping" for nuclear material.

—Tim McGirk, "Iranians 'Buying ex-Soviet Uranium'," *Independent* (London), 28 March 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960328000707, 28 March 1996.

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### **29 March 1996**

The Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran reports that the nuclear reactors under construction in Iran and their facilities are under international supervision, with experts freely visiting the nuclear and chemical facilities.

—"Commentary Criticizes Remarks on Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 29 March 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960329000422, 29 March 1996.

### **29 March 1996**

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and other Russian research centers, India's Institute for Plasma Studies, China's National Nuclear Corporation, and Iran's nuclear power industry form the Asian Foundation for Thermonuclear Studies, pursuant to an agreement reached in Moscow to create the foundation would pool the four countries' nuclear expertise to work on controlled thermonuclear fission. [Note: The foundation is also called the Asian Fusion Research Foundation. See 29 February and 4 March 1996.]

—"RUSSIA: Russia, India, China, and Iran Form Nuclear Research Body," British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), March 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **April 1996**

British Defence Secretary Michael Portillo visits Israel, where he may have discussed joint Israeli-British military action against the Iranian nuclear plant.

—Christopher Walker, "Israeli Spokesman Voices Concern Over Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," *Times* (London), 19 April 1996, p. 13; in FBIS Document FBIS-TOT-96-015-L, 19 April 1996; James Bruce, "Iran Warns USA To 'Think Twice' About An Attack," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 June 1996, p. 27; Eric Salerno, "Iran's Atom Bomb In Israel's Gun Sights," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 28 June 1996, p. 9; in "Egypt: 'Sources' Say Israel-Turkey Accord Aimed Against Iran Threat," FBIS-NES-96-126, 28 June 1996.

### **April 1996**

Egyptian sources say the basis of the 1995 Israeli-Turkish military cooperation agreement may be plans for an air strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, allowing Israel access to Turkish air bases from which "any Iranian target" is reachable.

—Christopher Walker, "Israeli Spokesman Voices Concern Over Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," *Times* (London), 19 April 1996, p. 13; in FBIS Document FBIS-TOT-96-015-L, 19 April 1996; James Bruce, "Iran Warns USA To 'Think Twice' About An Attack," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 12 June 1996; p. 27, Eric Salerno, "Iran's Atom Bomb In Israel's Gun Sights," *Il Messaggero* (Rome), 28 June 1996, p. 9; in "Egypt: 'Sources' Say Israel-Turkey Accord Aimed Against Iran Threat," FBIS-NES-96-126, 28 June 1996.

### **April 1996**

The US Defense Department releases a report that says, "At this stage, Iran's scientific and technical base remains insufficient to support major nuclear programs. The Iranians recognize their dependence on foreign assistance and are encouraging younger Iranians to study abroad to gain needed technical assistance."

—Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response* (Washington, DC: April 1996), p. 14; in Michael Eisenstadt, "Déjà vu All Over Again? Iran's Military Build-Up: An Assessment," National Defense University, 22 February 1994.

### **6 April 1996**

Albert Chernishev, Russian deputy foreign minister, says in an interview that the construction on the Bushehr nuclear power plant continues successfully and in accordance with the norms and guidelines imposed by the

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international system and the strict control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He adds that allegations of Russia helping Iran acquire nuclear weapons are unfounded because Russia does not want another neighbor with nuclear weapons.

—"Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Views Relations with Iran," Voice of Russia World Service (Moscow) 6 April 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960406000343, 6 April 1996.

#### **10 April 1996**

Oleg Velichko says besides the Bushehr project, there are "other projects in Russian-Iranian cooperation aimed at using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes." He does not specify the projects but notes that they "will not give Iran the possibilities to use nuclear technologies for military purposes."

—Oleg Velichko, "Russia Plans New Nuclear Projects in Iran," ITAR-TASS, 10 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **10 April 1996**

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets reassures Iranian Ambassador Mehdi Safari that the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be finished despite US concerns over the project. He also announces plans for further economic cooperation between Russian and Iran and stresses both countries need to enhance cooperation in the fields of metallurgy, petrochemicals, and military technology.

—"Russia Assures Iran Nuke Plant Project Will Be Completed," Agence France Presse, 10 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **14 April 1996**

Albert Chernishev, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, says that there exist other projects for the cooperation between Russia and Iran for the peaceful use of nuclear energy in Bushehr. He also adds that the power plant in Bushehr will not create the possibility for Iran's use of it for military purposes and that the agreement between the two countries provides for reactors that do not produce plutonium that can be used for weapons.

—"Russian-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation Viewed," Voice of Russia World Service (Moscow), 14 April 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960414000330.

#### **15 April 1995**

According to a commentary on Russian radio, cooperation between Iran and Russia is proceeding smoothly with the possibility for cooperation on future projects, but that the point of agreements has not yet been reached.

—"Russian Diplomat Cited on Nuclear cooperation With Iran," Voice of Russia World Service (Moscow), 15 April 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960415000548, 15 April 1995.

#### **15 April 1996**

Russian officials say that they will not discuss the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran during a nuclear safety summit that they will be hosting. Georgy Kaurov, a spokesman for the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry, says that the reactors under construction pose no threat of nuclear proliferation, and the agreement between Iran and Russia is irrelevant and will not be under discussion.

—FWN/UPI, 15 April 1996; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **17 April 1996**

The *Washington Times* reports that Chinese experts will soon arrive in Iran to begin construction on a uranium enrichment plant near the city of Isfahan. The article reports that the new plant will process uranium ore and other products that can be used in nuclear weapons.

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—Andrei Loshchiln, "China Will Allegedly Help Iran Build a Nuclear Enterprise," The Russian Information Agency (ITAR-TASS), 18 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **18 April 1996**

An official of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) says a joint Chinese-Iranian team had been formed to prospect for uranium in eastern Iran. [Note: See 17 April 1996.] The exploration team is searching for deposits in the provinces of Yazd, Khurasan, and Kerman. In addition to sizeable uranium deposits, Iran has plants for processing ore into uranium yellowcake, and may be constructing a uranium hexafluoride plant with Chinese assistance. Iran has imported chemicals used to make uranium hexafluoride, a chemical used for enrichment, from both China and Russia. A Chinese delegation was scheduled to be sent to the Isfahan nuclear complex to work on the final design phase of a uranium hexafluoride plant. [Note: See 17 April 1996.] Iran intends to declare this plant to the International Atomic Energy Agency for monitoring. Some intelligence sources believe a pilot "hex" plant was constructed several years ago at Rudan, near Shiraz, with Chinese assistance.

—"Uranium Exploration With China," *Iran Brief*, 6 May 1996.

#### **18 April 1996**

Viktor Mikhailov, the Russian atomic energy minister, says that his office is very active in preventing the export of dual-use technology and materials from Russia's dismantled nuclear warheads. He assures that none have been sold to either Iran or any other country. He continues to say that Russia will continue to honor its commitment to Iran in the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Minister says Recovered Plutonium Will Last 20-30 Years," Interfax (Moscow) 18 April 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960418000596, 18 April 1996.

#### **19 April 1996**

An Israeli spokesman says that a Western-led coalition will begin a strike to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capability. He says that the attack will be on Iran's secret nuclear installation in Neka, 100 km Northeast of Tehran. These remarks come following some reports about Chinese experts expected in Tehran to begin construction on a new uranium enrichment plant. [Note: See 17 and 18 April 1996.]

—"Israeli Spokesman Voices Concern Over Iran's Nuclear Ambition," *The Times* (London) 19 April 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19970522002121, 22 May 1997.

#### **20 April 1996**

Interfax reports that Iran and Russia are holding talks on training over 700 Iranian nuclear experts for work in the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The talks are between the Iranians and Russia's Zarubezhatomenergostroy (company for nuclear power engineering abroad), which is engaged in the construction of Bushehr. Other Russian scientific institutions, however, are also considering training Iranian experts.

—Reuters, 20 April 1996; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **21 April 1996**

President Bill Clinton, at the end of the nuclear safety summit held in Moscow, states his opposition to the nuclear cooperation between Iran and Russia and asks that Russia ends its assistance.

—"Radio Criticizes US Stance on Russia-Iran Nuclear Ties," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 21 April 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960421000162, 21 April 1996.

#### **23 April 1996**

Iranian English-language newspaper *Iran News* says that Iran has the right as any other country to acquire nuclear

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technology for peaceful purposes.

—"Paper: Iran has the Right to Obtain Nuclear Technology," IRNA (Tehran) 23 April 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960423000719, 23 April 1996.

#### **23 April 1996**

Speaking at a news conference following the Russian-American Summit, US President Bill Clinton says that Russia's delivery of nuclear reactors to Iran would not harm US-Russian relations. He adds that the outcome of the talks with Russia outweigh a difference of opinion in regards to the cooperation between Iran and Russia. [Note: See 21 April 1996.]

—"US-Russian Talks on Nuclear Cooperation With Iran Viewed," Voice of Russia World Service (Moscow) 23 April 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960423000848, 23 April 1996.

#### **29 April 1996**

The Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres says that Iran has the potential to procure nuclear weapons with four years. Peres: "I believe that in four years, they (Iran) may reach nuclear weapons." Peres further expresses his surprise at Egypt's criticism on Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona. He says that since Egypt is unable to prevent Iran from acquiring and threatening Israel with weapons of mass destruction, there should be no question of Israel's defensive weapons.

—"Peres on Peace Process, Nuclear Threat, US Defense Pact," *Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 29 April 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960429000395, 29 April 1996; "Iran Could Have Nuclear Weapons in Four Years: Peres," Agence France Presse, 30 April 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **May 1996**

*Iran Brief* reports that a joint Chinese-Iranian team has been formed to look for uranium in Yazd and possibly Kerman. It also reports that China and Russia have imported chemicals into Iran, including anhydrous hydrogen fluoride, that can be used to make uranium hexafluoride. [Note: See 17 and 18 April 1996.]

—"Uranium Exploration With China," *Iran Brief*, 6 May 1996; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; "Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

#### **May 1996**

There are currently about 30 Russian nuclear specialists working at Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. [Note: See 17 March 1996 for a report that 600 Russians are working there.] Russian specialists will conduct a survey of the buildings at the Bushehr nuclear plant, said Aleksandr Bryukhov, an executive supervising the construction of Russian nuclear power plants abroad. The Bushehr nuclear power plant is expected to start operating in 2001.

—Aleksandr Kushni, "Russia: U.S. Fears Over Iran's Bushehr Powerplant Viewed," Voice Of Russia World Service (Moscow), 3 February 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-96-024, 3 February 1996.

#### **6 May 1996**

The *Iran Brief* reports that the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) is discussing the purchase of technology and equipment from the unfinished Hanau research reactor, in Germany, with the German government. According to unnamed sources, Minatom may seek to acquire technical data in order to use the German equipment stored at Iran's unfinished Bushehr nuclear reactor.

—"Russia May Buy Hanau Reactor" *Iran Brief*, 6 May 1996, p. 11.

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**11 May 1996**

China pledges to the United States not to assist with any nuclear facility that is not safeguarded.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

**11 May 1996**

In a meeting between Willy Wimmer, the vice president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Iranian Majlis Speaker Nateq-Nuri, Wimmer says that "the negative propaganda of the Western media, saying that the Islamic Republic of Iran is trying to access nuclear weapons, has changed international norms and criteria into a political weapon."

—"Majlis Speaker Discusses Relations with OSCE Official," IRIB (Tehran), 11 May 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960511000321, 11 May 1996.

**30 May 1996**

Yevgeniy Primakov, the Russian Foreign Minister, elaborating on the nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran, says that the nuclear reactors sold to Iran are only to be used for civilian purposes, and adds that they are similar to the reactors that America sells to North Korea.

—"Commentary Backs Primakov Statements on Nuclear Cooperation," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran) 30 May 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960530000529, 30 May 1996.

**1 June 1996**

Iranian President Rafsanjani says in a speech that Iran has "endless" gas reserves and 150 years of oil reserves. He announces a new gas field has been discovered with at least 9 trillion cubic feet of gas. He estimates Iran has 93 billion barrels of oil in reserve. Anthony Cordesman, an analyst for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, writes later that these statements undermine Iran's claims that it needs nuclear energy.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

**4 June 1996**

Interfax reports that the nuclear power plant that Russia is building in the Bushehr province of Iran will cost Russia \$60 million. It is estimated that about 200 Russian nuclear scientists are presently working in Iran. Iranian personnel for the power plant will be trained at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant's training center.

—"Russia to Invest \$60 Million in Nuclear Plant in Iran," Interfax (Moscow) 4 June 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960604000561, 4 June 1996.

**7 June 1996**

Sergey Tetrayakov, the Russian ambassador to Iran, says that the feasibility study of the Bushehr project was recently completed and construction is expected to start soon. He expresses optimism for the completion of the project in 48 months. He re-emphasizes that Russia's assistance with the Bushehr power plant is for peaceful purposes and is monitored by international inspectors.

—Irfan Parviz and Mojgan Tavassoli, "Irano-Russian Military Cooperation Not Against Any Other Country," *Iran News* (Tehran), 7 June 1996; in "Russian Envoy on Iranian-Russian Military Cooperation," in FBIS Document FTS 19960607000034, 7 June 1996.

**18 June 1996**

A senior official of the Russian Foreign Ministry says Moscow will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons

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because that would endanger Russian national interests.

—Huda Al-Husayni, "Russian Foreign Ministry Official Tells Al-Sharq Al-Awsat; We Will Not Allow Iran To Become Nuclear State," *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 18 June 1996; in "Russia 'Will Not Allow Iran To Become Nuclear State,'" in FBIS Document FTS 18 June 1996.

#### **21 June 1996**

Lynn Davis, US Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs, says during hearings of the House Committee on International Affairs that the United States will continue to press Russia to cease cooperation with Iran in the nuclear field due to concern that Iran intends to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

—"Struggle For Iran Is Not Finished," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 21 June 1996, p. 3.

#### **27 June 1996**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov rejects allegations of military nuclear cooperation with Iran and says that while there still exist some minor issues to be addressed, the first shipment of equipment necessary for the work in Bushehr has been sent out. He adds that safety is a foremost concern for Bushehr, but expresses satisfaction with the pace of work at the plant. He also states that the Iranian administrators of the power plant will begin their training while the work at Bushehr is being completed. He says that there will be some Russian personnel present at the plant acting as overseers, but that he is confident that there will be capable Iranian personnel to run the plant. In regard to continuing nuclear cooperation with Iran, he says that once the four reactors have been constructed, there might be a possibility for further cooperation.

—"Atomic Energy Minister on Ties With Iran," *ABRAR* (Tehran), 27 June 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960627000742, 27 June 1996.

#### **27 June 1996**

Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister in charge of legal affairs says that Iran has the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that the US Congress does not have the authority to make interventions in its relations with other countries.

—"Officials say Clinton's Stance 'Not New'," *IRIB* (Tehran), 27 June 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960627000439, 27 June 1996.

#### **30 June 1996**

Ali Vahid Khorram, advisor to the Iranian Foreign Minister, says that Iran favors a Persian Gulf and Pacific region free of weapons of mass destruction.

—"Ministry Adviser Views Ties to Middle Eastern Countries," *IRNA* (Tehran) 30 June 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960630000200, 30 June 1996.

#### **Third Quarter 1996**

The Isfahan Alloy Steel complex opens as part of a \$600 million deal with Danieli Officine Meccaniche of Italy, the Iranian National Steel Company, and Nippon Steel of Japan. [Note: See July 1996.]

—"Isfahan's Alloy Steel Complex Goes On Stream," *Iran Business Digest*, 22 August 1996; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998; "Danieli At Risk In Isfahan Project," *Iran Brief*, 6 May 1996, p. 5; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

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### **Third Quarter 1996**

Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessne state that recent incidents in Turkey and Germany indicate that Iran is seeking high-quality nuclear material.

—"Smuggling: Arms, Nuclear Technology And Materials, And Aliens," *Trends In Organized Crime*, Vol. 2, No. 1, Fall 1996, pp. 64, 65.

### **July 1996**

Cypriot officials are notified of the shipment of civilian nuclear reactor equipment heading towards Iran. US and Cypriot officials are preparing to intercept a shipment of equipment for a civilian reactor in Iran, expected to be shipped via Cyprus.

—Steve Rodan, "Cyprus, US Team To Block Flow Of Nonconventional Arms To Iran," *Defense News*, 4 November 1996, p. 15.

### **July 1996**

British customs seize 110 pounds of American-made maraging steel at the port of Barking that was destined for Iran. Iran used a front company to order the steel. According to one analyst, this incident shows Iran cannot yet make its own maraging steel at the Isfahan Alloy Steel Complex. [Note: See Third Quarter 1996.]

—Con Coughlin, "Britain Seizes Bomb-Grade Steel Cargo," *Washington Times*, 11 August 1996, p. A8; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **July 1996**

The Second International Machine-Tool, Construction Equipment, and Heavy Machinery Fair is held in Iran. Iranian Commerce Minister Yahya Al-e Ishaq, speaking at the opening ceremonies, says that despite US sanctions, Iran is currently exporting industrial technology and equipment, and that they have been able to secure overseas markets in both Africa and Central Asia. Companies from Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Britain took part in the fair.

—"Iran Holds Machine-Tool Fair," *Iran Brief*, 1 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **4 July 1996**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, says that US allegations of Iran's military nuclear program is an attempt to blemish Iran's as well as other Muslim countries' reputations around the world. He says that the Bushehr power plant is strictly for peaceful uses and that the first reactor of the power station is going to have an output that will meet the country's total demand for electricity. He goes on to reveal that Iran is planning to sell its share in the French uranium enrichment plant. He goes on to reaffirm Iran's firm stance behind the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency. He also explains that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran functions directly under the control of President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

—"US opposed to Muslim Countries Having Nuclear Programmes," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 4 July 1996, in "Daily Criticizes US Opposition to Nuclear Programs," in FBIS Document FTS 19960704000589, 4 July 1996.

### **5 July 1996**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says Iran plans to sell its share in a French uranium-enrichment plant.

—IRNA, 7 July 1996; in *Gulf 2000*, [www.columbia.edu](http://www.columbia.edu).

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**5 July 1996**

*Al-Shab* of Cairo reports that Iran has been able to "steal or secretly buy" two nuclear weapons. The report also says that unnamed US sources say there are 200 specialists and 2,000 researchers working in the nuclear field in Iran.

—Adil Hussein, "Islamic Affairs: Political Islam Review," *Al-Shab* (Cairo), 5 July 1996, p. 5; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-137, 16 July 1996.

**7 July 1996**

IRNA reports that the first reactor unit at the Bushehr power station will become operational by the end of the second five-year development plan [1999]. The reactor is expected to boost the country's electricity capacity to 2,400MW, enough to meet the country's total electricity demand.

—IRNA, 7 July 1996; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

**10 July 1996**

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warns the US Congress that nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran and Iraq would have dire consequences and calls for a strong international effort to isolate the two Middle East states.

—"Iran Rejects Netanyahu's Charges Over Nuclear Arms," Agence France Presse, 11 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, www.lexis-nexis.com.

**11 July 1996**

Iran rejects Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's recent allegations over nuclear weapons. [Note: See 10 July 1996.] Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister responds, "Iran's doors are always open to international inspectors," and that they already had "visited Iran several times and confirmed that Iran plans to use atomic energy for peaceful purposes only."

—"Iran Rejects Netanyahu's Charges Over Nuclear Arms," Agence France Presse, 11 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, www.lexis-nexis.com.

**11 July 1996**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Ukraine will participate in a Russian-Iranian nuclear project by supplying a turbine for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The turbine will be manufactured at Ukraine's Kharkiv Turbatom factory, which has manufactured turbines for nuclear facilities in Cuba, Finland, and Bulgaria. According to the terms of the contract, Ukraine will supply the 1,000MW turbine and other equipment to Iran by the end of 1998. The Sumy Pump Factory, which produces pumps for nuclear power plants, is expected to participate in the \$50 million project. The United States is expected to pressure Ukraine to cancel the deal.

—Peter Coryn, "Ukrainian Industry To Participate In Russian Nuclear Project In Iran," *Nucleonics Week*, 11 July 1996, pp. 1, 11; "Ukraine: Kiev To Supply Turbine For Iranian Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 4 July 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-96-131, 4 July 1996.

**17 July 1996**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says that the US delegation that was in Moscow to discuss US-Russian economic cooperation did not raise the issue of Russian cooperation in building the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He says, "We shall cooperate with Iran. We built, are building, and will continue to build power plants [in Iran]."

—"Mikhailov on US Nonmention of Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 17 July 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960717000334, 17 July 1996; Andrei Chitov, "Gore Delegation Skipped Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal in

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Moscow," The Russian Information Agency (ITAR-TASS), 17 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **22 July 1996**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran reports that it manufactured two nuclear processed radio-drugs, Talium (heart related) and Galium (cancer related). The AEOI claims it is only producing Talium and Galium at one-eighth of its production capacity (sufficient for domestic use). The AEOI says if the two drugs were produced at full capacity, Iran would be able to export them.

—"First Nuclear Medicine in Iran, Says Tehran Radio," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 22 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **22 July 1996**

According to a report by the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), there is "scarcely a doubt remaining that Iran is interested in buying nuclear materials" on the black market. The report details Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear materials on the international black market, as well as from German companies. The BND warns of the increased "professionalism" of nuclear smugglers. US CIA head John Deutch says that "Iran has attempted to obtain nuclear materials on the black market.

—Juergen Marks "Basar Des Schreckens [Terror Bazaar]" *Focus*, 22 July 1996, pp. 28-29. "Germans Warn Of Nukes" Iran Brief, 5 August 1996, p. 9.

### **24 July 1996**

An Iranian construction worker is irradiated by Iridium-142 at the Gilan combined-cycle gas plant near the city of Rasht. The Iranian authorities state that the Rasht power plant is not a nuclear power plant, but confirm that the accident has occurred. The worker found the unshielded Iridium, which had been misplaced for about two hours, and "carried it to another part of the construction site." Iridium-142 is used in the X-ray testing of welds. According to *Hamshahri*, a Tehran city government newspaper, 50 people were exposed to radiation, seven of whom were engineers from the German firm Siemens. The German firm is participating as part of a European consortium in construction of the Iranian facility. The paper also reported that the incident resulted in the hospitalization of 21 people. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran denies the reports, referring to testing results that showed that only the one worker was injured. According to a press release issued by Siemens, no German workers were injured. According to "Western intelligence experts," the "radiation incident" occurred at the secret Neka nuclear facility near the Caspian Sea. Unnamed Iranian reports cited in London's *Sunday Telegraph* believe the Neka facility is part of Iran's nuclear weapons development program. A Siemens' press release discounted the allegations, saying "there is no operating nuclear power station in Iran." [Note: See 31 July and 2 August 1996.]

—"AEOI, Siemens Battle Reports Of Iran Nuclear Plant Accident," *Nucleonics Week*, 8 August 1996; "Industrial Source Radiation Incident Occurs." *Nuclear News*, September 1996, p. 32; "Iran Paper Reports Leak At Nuclear Power Plant," *New York Times*, 1 August 1996, p. A4; "Iran: The Nuclear Power Plant That Never Was...," *NucNet News*, [www.aey.ch](http://www.aey.ch), 31 July 1996; "Reports Of Iranian Radiation Incident Draw Probe From Western Intelligence," *Washington Times*, 15 August 1996, p. A15; "Official Tells Agence France Presse Contamination Incident 'Nothing Serious'," Agence France Presse (Paris), 31 July 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960731000234, 31 July 1996.

### **31 July 1996**

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that 25 people were exposed to radioactive material after an accident at a power station in Racht, northern Iran.

—"URGENT Some 25 People Exposed to Radioactive Waste in Iran: IAEA," Agence France Presse, 31 July 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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#### **1 August 1996**

In a commentary following the talks on nuclear disarmament in Geneva, Iran emphasizes its commitment to the eradication of nuclear weapons in its previous proposal that would require a record which would aid in the banning of the weapons as well as preventing the illegal transfer of nuclear technology for military purposes. —"Geneva Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Talks Viewed," *Abrar* (Tehran), 1 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960801000455, 1 August 1996.

#### **2 August 1996**

In a sermon made at the Friday prayers in Iran, Iranian President Rafsanjani says that the United States is opposed to Iranian advances in the field of nuclear technology because its concern that the nuclear power plant at Bushehr will be converted for the production of plutonium for atomic weapons. He questions the legitimacy of the United States as moral authority to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons when the United States is the only country to ever use the atom bomb on any country. Iran, he says, is using this advanced skill for the production of medicines. He also states that the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announces a few times each year that there is no evidence that Iran is attempting to manufacture nuclear weapons. He also clarifies the incident that had taken place at the thermal power plant. [Note: See 24 and 31 July 1996 entries.] He explains the radioactive contamination as a safety kit containing a radioactive core breaking and a worker picking it up got contaminated. He explains this incident as something that could occur in any sensitive industrial installation, and accuses "mischievous propaganda" charging that a "nuclear incident had taken place in Iran." —"Hashemi-Rafsanjani on Unity US Sanctions," *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 2 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960802000349, 2 August 1996.

#### **4 August 1996**

The *Sunday Telegraph* of London reports that, according to nuclear specialists, Iran could acquire a nuclear weapon by 2001. The report says Iran has several "top-secret" nuclear facilities that are not safeguarded, the largest being an underground nuclear facility at Isfahan. According to the report, other clandestine Iranian nuclear installations are the Neka nuclear facility, built near the Caspian Sea, and a nuclear facility at Darkhovin, run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. In early 1996, Israel planned pre-emptive air strikes against these nuclear installations but was convinced not to by the United States, the report says. Iran's official nuclear research headquarters is located in Tehran. —Con Coughlin, "Iran: UK Article Examines Possible Targets of U.S. Strike," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 4 August 1996, p. 20; in "Tempting Array Of Strike Targets For Pentagon," in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-151, 4 August 1996.

#### **5 August 1996**

The Iranian embassy in Moscow denies a Russian media report that Tehran attempted to obtain nuclear weapons-related material. —"Iran: Embassy Denies Iran Seeking Nuclear Weapons Components," *IRNA* (Tehran), 5 August 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-152, 5 August 1996.

#### **7 August 1996**

In a rebuttal to a recent statement by Israel that German intelligence had uncovered Iran's attempts to acquire materials necessary for the production of nuclear weapons, the Iranian embassy releases a statement to reiterate its attitude toward nonproliferation. [Note: See 22 July 1995.] The Iranian statement declares that unlike Israel, Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that it is an active member of the International Atomic

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Energy Agency (IAEA). It adds that, unlike Israel, Iran's nuclear installation have been under IAEA supervision, and that Iran has been active in asking that the Middle East be declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

—"Iranian Embassy States Position on Nuclear Weapons," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), 7 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19970425001363, 25 April 1997.

#### **8 August 1996**

Ali Akbar Velayati, the foreign minister of Iran, in an interview with Iranian television declares that the budget the Iranian government allocates for defense is almost less than that of the regional states of the Persian Gulf, and thus shows that the accusations leveled by the United States are unfounded. They reiterate that Iran is an active member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and are signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

—"Velayati on US 'Baseless' Allegations," IRIB (Tehran), 8 August 1998; in FBIS Document FTS 19960808000373, 8 August 1996.

#### **12 August 1996**

Iran threatens to block the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) if its demands to change to the draft text are not met. Iran's delegate to the International Conference on Disarmament says Tehran has three concerns: The treaty does not call for a wider commitment to disarmament; the "national technical means" clause for monitoring could be used as a cover for spying; and Israel's membership in the executive council should not be part of Middle East group but as a Western nation. [Note: Iran announces on 11 September 1996 that it will sign the treaty.]

—"Iran Threat to Block N-Treaty," *The Financial Times* (London), 13 August 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, www.lexis-nexis.com.

#### **13 August 1996**

The US representative at the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva states that Iran, India, and Pakistan dispute negotiation on banning the testing of nuclear weapons. Whereas Pakistan refuses to sign until India does so, India refuses because of the Western pressure. Iran refuses because Israel is not under pressure to sign the Treaty of Non-Proliferation. [Note: Iran announces on 11 September 1996 that it will sign the treaty.]

—"Iran Clarifies Stand on Nuclear Disarmament Conference," IRIB (Tehran), 13 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960813000628, 13 August 1996.

#### **13 August 1996**

Commenting on a recent report by the *Sunday Telegraph* that the British confiscated a cargo bound for Iran that could have been used for the construction of missile and atomic installations, Iran says that these are instances of the efforts made by its adversaries to harm Iran's reputation in the international community.

—"Reports on Iran's Development of Nuclear Energy Denounced," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 13 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960813000627, 13 August 1996.

#### **14 August 1996**

Iran is believed to be able to obtain nuclear equipment more effectively and at a cheaper cost than Iraq had been, and is feared to use it to increase instability in the region.

—Huda al-Husayni, "The American Change: Military Confrontation Between the United States and Iran Will Not Take Place Unless Washington Establishes That Tehran Had a Hand in the al-Khubar Explosion," *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 14 August 1996; in "US Line on Iran Seen as Attempt to Shake its Stability," in FBIS Document FTS 19960814000258, 14 August 1996.

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### **15 August 1996**

Mohammad Javad Zarif, the deputy foreign minister of Iran, at a news conference in Geneva says that Iran is willing to implement the final document of the treaty banning nuclear tests. But he adds that the United States wants the treaty signed for domestic purposes. He further adds that from his country's point of view, the few unresolved issues remain so because of the lack of will from a few governments. Sirus Naseri, the Iranian representative to these talks in Geneva says that the treaty text is not acceptable to Iran, but that there is another prospect to end the conference in a satisfactory manner. He asserts that the treaty is very important to Iran as well as to many other developing nations and adds that Iran is endeavoring to resolve the situation despite American attempts at disruption. [Note: Iran announces on 11 September 1996 that it will sign the treaty.]

—"Tehran to Respect Final Nuclear Test Ban Document," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 15 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960815000508, 15 August 1996; "Iranian Official on Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Voice of Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 15 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960815000110, 15 August 1996.

### **20 August 1996**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, announces that subsequent to the signing of the agreement with Russia for the completion of the Bushehr power plant, "the construction of the first phase will be completed and it will join the national grid by the end of the second economic, social, and cultural development plan." Amrollahi says that the Bushehr nuclear power plant is worth over \$10 billion in today's economy because of the investments previously made for its construction. He further comments on Germany's refusal to deliver some equipment and documents despite a ruling given by a Geneva arbitration court, and adds that Russia is demonstrating political independence by accepting to work on the Iranian nuclear power plant.

—"Bushehr Nuclear Plant to Be Complete by end of Second Development Plan," *Keyhan* (Tehran) 20 August 1996, in "Official Comments on Construction of Nuclear Plant," in FBIS Document FTS 19960820000345, 20 August 1996.

### **20 August 1996**

Reza Amrollahi, head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that the two 300MW nuclear power plants that will be constructed by China will be ready in nine years.

—Dow Jones News, 20 August 1996; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

### **22 August 1996**

In an interview with Iranian television, Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's foreign minister, defends Iran's right, as a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to obtain nuclear technology from those countries that already have the technology under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). He further states that the technology transfer is for the peaceful uses of that energy that would serve for the development of the recipient state.

—"Foreign Minister Velayati on Foreign Policy," IRIB (Tehran), 22 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960822000468, 22 August 1996.

### **22 August 1996**

*Hamshahri* of Tehran reports that three mines with 800 tons of uranium reserves were discovered in Yazd Province, Iran.

—"Dr. Jalil Rowshandel and Dr. Saideh Lotfia Iran's Need For Nuclear Energy, Uranium Reserves Noted," *Hamshahri* (Tehran), 22 August 1996, p. 11; n FBIS-NES-96-176, 22 August 1996.

### **24 August 1996**

In a commentary following the decision to approve the Comprehensive test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the United

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Nations General Assembly, Iranian representative Sirus Naseri expresses his doubts that the approval of the treaty could carry the same commitments and guarantees [presumably as it would carry if it were approved in the Conference on Disarmament]. He says that while Iran agrees with the general principles of the treaty, Iran's final agreement remains dependent "on the way it is submitted at the UN General Assembly."

—"Government Said in Accord With CTBT Principles," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 24 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960824000211.

#### **26 August 1996**

Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign minister of Iran, says Iran has no interest in acquiring chemical or nuclear weapons. He says that as the head of the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has frequently stated, Iran is not attempting to produce nuclear weapons.

—"Velayati Comments on US Policy, Egypt," *Resalat* (Tehran), 26 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960826000549, 26 August 1996.

#### **29 August 1996**

Because Iran exports a sizeable amount of its energy product to neighboring countries, Iran states its need for atomic energy for energy needs within the country, so as not to resort to fossil fuel power plants.

—"Energy Minister Explains Need for Nuclear Power Plants," IRIB (Tehran), 29 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960829000543, 29 August 1996.

#### **31 August 1996**

The German company Siemens states that Iran has asked an international board of arbitration in Switzerland to implement the compensation for damages due for not finishing construction on the nuclear reactor in Bushehr. A spokesman for the company would not comment on whether Iran is asking for 8 billion marks. The board of arbitration declared the contracts between Iran and Siemens as closed in 1982 and mutual demands for compensation impossible. Therefore, the present actions by Iran are not understood by many observers.

—"Angry reaction from Iran vis-à-vis Germany; compensation for damages demanded from Siemens," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, 31 August 1996, p. 5; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com). [CNS Translation]

#### **September 1996**

Following a meeting with International AEA Director General Hans Blix, Iran refuses to allow environmental monitoring of its declared nuclear facilities under Part I of the IAEA's 92+3 enhanced safeguards program. According to diplomatic sources, Iranian representatives at the IAEA General Conference were concerned that environmental samples from Iranian sites could be given to the United States and other "foes." The samples would be taken to detect nuclear activities at Iran's safeguarded facilities. However, deputy director general for safeguards, Bruno Pellaud, said samples sent to laboratories abroad would be kept anonymous. Pellaud added that any country conducting sample analyses would be prohibited from conducting analysis beyond the 93+2 guidelines.

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran Balking At Approval Of IAEA Environmental Monitoring," *NuclearFuel*, 23 October 1996, pp. 2-3.

#### **2 September 1996**

The *Muslim* of Islamabad reports that, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has "undeclared nuclear facilities" and "hidden quantities" of nuclear material. The report says Pakistan has supplied uranium enrichment equipment, which was originally received from Germany, to Iran and North Korea.

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—Aroosa Alam, "IAEA Asks Pakistan To Curb Its 'N Pursuits' in Pakistan, *Muslim* (Islamabad), 2 September 1996, pp. 1, 11; in "IAEA Requests Cessation of 'Illegal' Nuclear Program" FBIS-NES-96-173, 2 September 1996.

#### **6 September 1996**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, states that the world is not invulnerable to nuclear aggression. He adds that nuclear arsenals are not yet eliminated and the Non-Proliferation Treaty of is not yet universalized. Despite this, he says there are still encouraging signs that there are developments being made. He adds that the complete eradication of nuclear arms and of the means of producing these devices should be supported, adding, however, that an international agreement distinguishing the production of material for military and peaceful purposes should be clearly outlined.

—"Head of Atomic Energy Organization Addresses IAEA Meeting," IRNA (Tehran), 17 September 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960917000533, 17 September 1996.

#### **11 September 1996**

Despite having criticized the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) text, Mohammad Jafar Zafid, deputy Iranian foreign minister and the head of the Iranian delegation to the CTBT talks, announces that Iran is going to sign the treaty. He emphasizes that Iran agrees with this decision because of its strong desire for the banning of nuclear weapons tests. He restates his disappointment at the lack of balance in the document and says that Iran will continue to seek total disarmament of nuclear weapons.

—"Deputy Minister Signals Intent to Sign 'Flawed' CTBT," IRNA (Tehran), 11 September 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960911000380, 11 September 1996.

#### **24 September 1996**

Israeli sources say, "Iran is very far from having the capacity to build a nuclear installation." [Note: This contradicts a precious statement by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu. See September 1996 entry.]

—Martin Sieff, "Netanyahu's Nuke Claim Lacks Support," *Washington Times*, 22 October 1996, p. A11; Hayim Shibi and Arye Egozi, "Israel: ReportIraq 'Very Far' From Nuclear Capacity; Iran Within 4 Years," *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), 25 October 1996, p. 16; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-187, 25 October 1996.

#### **25 September 1996**

Iran signs the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty despite reservations. In an interview shortly after the signing of the treaty, Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's foreign minister and head of the delegation, says that this is "a practical and clear sign of the truth" of Iran's steadfastness in their support of total disarmament of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, he says that his signature was accompanied with a letter that outlines Iran's reservations, which are that the treaty "fails to be within a framework of comprehensive nuclear disarmament treaty, [...] that in the field of control and supervision, national technical equipment only plays a complementary and temporary role," [...] and "that we oppose Israel to be placed in the Middle East and eastern Asia group."

—"Velayati-Republic Signs Test Ban Treaty With Reservations," IRIB (Tehran), 25 September 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960925000496, 25 September 1996.

#### **25 September 1996**

US Assistant Secretary of State Thomas McNamara says Germany is unintentionally helping Iran develop nuclear weapons by aiding Iran's civilian nuclear program. "There's no way to do it without facilitating Iran's attempts to develop a nuclear weapons capability," he says.

—Associated Press, 25 September 1996; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

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### **26 September 1996**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Russian companies participating in the construction of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant failed to supply Tehran with VVER-type reactor equipment as stipulated under an \$800 million contract. Officials from the Russian firms said "metallurgical specifications" of the German equipment, installed at the Bushehr plant by Siemens, do not match specifications for the Russian equipment. According to Russian industry sources, the "optimal solution...would be for Minatom [the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy] to exactly match the metallurgy of the [Russian] equipment" with that of the equipment previously installed by Siemens-Kraftwerk Union. Such a move would greatly increase the construction costs and delay completion of the reactor until after 2003. Russian firms are having trouble fitting VVER steam generators into the German plant design, causing Iran to seek out Siemens steam generators. Iran also sought to expand participation in the project to include Western firms such as Electrowatt of Switzerland and Hochtief of Germany. However, Western firms will not join the project as long as the United States opposes it. Iran has paid Russia less than \$100 million for its work, and will not make further payments until Minatom commits to a "firm completion deadline." Participating Russian companies refuse to accept such an obligation due to numerous unsolved technical problems at Bushehr, as well as concerns about paying heavy fees if the reactors are not completed on time.

—Mark Hibbs, "Russia-Iran Bushehr PWR Project Shows Little Concrete Progress," *Nucleonics Week*, 26 September 1996, pp. 3-4.

### **28 September 1996**

Sergei Baburin, the vice-speaker of the Russian State Duma, on a visit to Iran says that the two countries can cooperate in several fields including nuclear energy.

—"Russian Duma Deputy Speaker Discusses Cooperation," IRNA (Tehran), 28 September 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19960928000325, 25 September 1996.

### **October 1996**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran says it will send a "number of men" to Russia in order to train them for technical positions at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran.

—"Russia to Train Iranians for Nuclear Plant," Agence France Presse, 12 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **1 October 1996**

According to an Iranian military source, Iran made a formal request to China regarding the dispatch of an Iranian observation team to China's next scheduled nuclear test. Iran also requested training for ten or more Iranian personnel at Chinese nuclear weapon test sites.

—"Iran's Chinese Shopping List," *Iran Brief*, 1 October 1996, p. 4-5.

### **16 October 1996**

*Yadernyy Kontrol* of Moscow reports that Iran has several nuclear installations: a 5MW TRR light water reactor supplied by the United States, which uses 20% enriched uranium that Iran gets from Argentina; a zero-capacity heavy water reactor; a neutron source using 90% enriched uranium; a light water training reactor of subcritical capacity; and a graphite training reactor of subcritical capacity. All but the 5MW reactor were supplied by China.

—Roland Timerbayev, "How Realistic is the Creation of a Nuclear Free Zone in the Near East?," *Yadernyy Kontrol* (Moscow), 16 October 1996; in "Near East Nuclear-Free Zone Proposed," in FBIS Document FTS 19961016000695, 16 October 1996.

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#### **22 October 1996**

Cypriot government spokesman Yiannakis Cassoulides says an expected shipment of civilian nuclear reactor equipment en route to Iran has not yet arrived. The interdiction is part of a bilateral effort by the United States and Cyprus to stop the flow of technologies and equipment that could aid Iran's nuclear program. Due to lax port regulations, the Cypriot ports of Larnaca and Limassol have become important transit points for shipments of unconventional weapons to Iran and Syria.

—Steve Rodan, "Cyprus, US Team To Block Flow Of Nonconventional Arms To Iran," *Defense News*, 4 November 1996, p. 15.

#### **27 October 1996**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran issues a report rejecting a US accusation that Iran had stolen a portion of a US uranium shipment from Kazakhstan. According to reports, the shipment contained enough uranium to make 21 nuclear bombs. However, uranium sufficient to make two nuclear bombs was reported missing from the original mass. Subsequently, the United States accused Iran of the stealing the missing uranium.

—"Radio Commentary on Row with USA About Missing Kazakh Uranium," The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 29 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **4-5 November 1996**

US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Affairs Lynn Davis discusses arms control issues with Chinese officials in China. She meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Davis raise the issue of Chinese assistance to Iran and Pakistan. China gives a formal pledge that it will pull out of a project to build a hexafluoride plant in Iran. [Note: See 6 January 1997.]

—"China Says Taiwan Key Issue At US Arms Talks," Reuters, 5 November 1996; Mure Dickie, "China and US Diverge on Arms Talks," *Washington Times*, 6 November 1996, p. A2; "Chinese To Deliver Hex Plant Despite Assurances," *The Iran Brief*, 6 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); R. Jeffery Smith, "China May cancel Proposed Sale of Nuclear Facility to Iran," *The Washington Post*, 6 November 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **14 November 1996**

In a meeting between Sayyid Shamseddin Kharraqani, the Iranian ambassador to the Netherlands, and J.J. Voorhoeve, the Dutch Minister of defense, Voorhoeve praises the efforts put forth by Iran in the arena of nuclear disarmament and the abolition of chemical weapons. He adds that the Netherlands attaches a great importance to Iran's position in the international arena.

—"Envoy to Netherlands Meets With Dutch Defense Minister," IRNA (Tehran), 14 November 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961114000477, 14 November 1996.

#### **16 November 1996.**

Chinese Premier Li Peng meets with Iran's vice-president, Hassan Habibi

—"Relations With Iran," in FBIS Document Fbis-Trends-02dec96-Prc On Iran Visit, 3 December 1996.

#### **18 November 1996**

The third Iran-Russia roundtable discussions are to be held in Tehran. [Note: The second discussions held in Moscow in late 1996 dealt with the promotion of ties between the two countries, strategic as well as nuclear cooperation as well as the positions of the West.]

—"Deputy Minister Previews Discussions With Russia," IRNA (Tehran), 18 November 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961118000493, 18 November 1996.

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### **19 November 1996**

Wen Wei Po of Hong Kong, a Chinese-owned publication, publishes a "special article" that reaffirms Beijing's position that Iran complies with international regulations and that therefore it is "entirely reasonable and legitimate" for China to provide nuclear reactors to Iran.

—"Relations With Iran," Fbis-Trends-02dec96-Prc On Iran Visit, 3 December 1996.

### **23 November 1996**

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati says the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be completed on time.

Velayati says, "There are no problems with Russia regarding the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and the project will be completed on schedule."

—"Russia Nuclear Power Plant in Iran Completed on Schedule," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 November 1996; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **26 November 1996**

A meeting between the Israeli Cabinet and Leonid Kuchma, the Ukrainian president, takes place in Israel. In response to Israeli Foreign Minister David Levi's request to stop Ukrainian firms from participating in the construction of nuclear reactor in Iran, Leonid Kuchma says that he will stop the supply of turbines from Ukraine for the Iranian reactor if it becomes clear that its use could be for producing nuclear weapons.

—Anatoliy Kerzhentsev, "Israel Keeps Moving Closer to Ukraine," *Krud Uktaina* (Kiev), 26 November 1996; in "Kuchma Asked To Halt Nuclear Aid to Iran," FBIS Document FTS 19961126000722, 26 November 1996.

### **1 December 1996**

*Haaretz* reports that, according to Israeli analysts, Iran is accelerating its attempts to acquire conventional and unconventional weapons. The analysts also report that Iran now needs significantly less time than was expected to produce a nuclear weapon. The reports also adds that Iran is doing all it can to achieve nuclear capability.

—Eytan Rabin, "Analysts 'Very Concerned' With Iran's Military Moves, Deals," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 1 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961201000267, 1 December 1996.

### **2 December 1996**

*US News and World Report* reports that, according to unnamed European intelligence sources, Iran is trying to construct mine shafts in preparation for conducting nuclear tests. The shafts, which are several hundred yards deep, will make the detection of these tests more difficult. Iran is obtaining the technology to build the shafts by saying that it needs the technology to improve the Kazd [Yazd] uranium mines. Although Russia has assisted Iran with the mining project, the intelligence sources believe that Russia has not disclosed "all its advanced technology" on the subject. According to the sources, Iran is attempting to acquire the technology through industrial espionage.

—"Deep Dark Secrets," *US News And World Report*, 2 December 1996, p. 27.

### **3 December 1996**

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Davydov says that the reactors that Russia is constructing at Bushehr are civilian light water reactors with ordinary output, which cannot produce plutonium.

—Aleksandr Zayaran, "Minister Says Nuclear Reactor for Iran 'Ordinary'," *NTV* (Moscow), 3 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961203000667, 3 December 1996.

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#### **5-18 December 1996**

In response to US concerns, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian denies that Chinese nuclear and missile sales to Iran and Pakistan violate any international agreements.

—Warren Strobel and Bill Gertz "Chinese General Hits Arms Reports," *Washington Times*, 10 December 1996; "China Says US Arms Sales To Taiwan Could Ruin Ties," in Executive News Service, 12 December 1996.

#### **5 December 1996**

ITAR-TASS reports that Zarubezhatomenergostroy (Russian company for nuclear power engineering abroad) and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran have signed three agreements: for the preparation of designs for building a mine at Saghand; for the technology design and documentation for construction of a uranium ore enrichment plant at Saghand; and for the completion of construction of Block 1 of the Bushehr power station.

—"No Complications' Seen for Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation," Itar-Tass (Moscow) 5 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19970626002353, 26 June 1997.

#### **5 December 1996**

Mohammad Husayn Mahluji, Iranian Minister for Mines and Metals, visits Germany and signs a letter of intent to buy German machine-tool maker Sket Magdeburg GmbH. The *Iran Brief* writes that Iran could be attempting to repeat Saddam Hussein's approach to building nuclear weapons. Hussein in 1987 bought the British machine-tool maker Matrix Churchill, which supplied Iraq with machine tools under dual-use export licenses, some of which were found to part of Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

—"Tehran To Buy German M-Tool Maker," *The Iran Brief*, 6 January 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **7 December 1996**

Russia's Deputy Prime Minister (and Foreign Economic Relations Minister) Oleg Davydov says the Russian-Iranian nuclear power cooperation is without complications and restrictions. Davydov adds that the cooperation between the two countries is continuing pursuant to contracts already signed.

—"Russian, Iranian Ministers Say Nuclear Cooperation Going to Plan," The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 7 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **11 December 1996**

Majlis Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri indicates that Iran's relations with Russia are excellent and bilateral relations should be expanded. He further indicates that Russia is committed to completing the Bushehr nuclear power plant despite "foreign pressures."

—"Nateq-Nuri Hails 'Excellent' Relations with Russia," IRNA (Tehran) 10 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961211000718, 11 December 1996.

#### **12 December 1996**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Chinese officials said it is their "firm intention to export the UF<sub>6</sub> [hexafluoride] plant to Iran." [See November 1996 and 6 January 1997.]

—"Chinese To Deliver Hex Plant Despite Assurances," *The Iran Brief*, 6 January 1997, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **12 December 1996**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that US officials have said China has not met the conditions for President Bill Clinton's certification of China's nonproliferation credentials, which would enable the 1984 Sino-US nuclear cooperation agreement to enter into force. A possible compromise is a "partial certification," which would allow contracts to be

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signed but not allow transfers of components. China's assistance to nuclear programs in Pakistan and Iran are the primary obstacles to certification. Specifically, US officials are concerned about China's recent statement that it intends to sell a uranium hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) plant to Iran. The plant would convert uranium oxide to UF<sub>6</sub> using gas centrifuges. China may also be preparing to sell a heavy water weapon-grade HEU research reactor to Iran. The United States wants China to stop using HEU in its nuclear fuel cycle, and to pledge not to export HEU-fueled reactors.

—Mark Hibbs, "China Has Far To Go Before US Will Certify, Agencies Now Say," *Nucleonics Week*, 12 December 1996, pp. 1, 8-10.

#### **16 December 1996**

Israeli defense officials describe Iran's attempts to gain nuclear and other unconventional weapons as "unprecedented." US intelligence sources indicate that Iran's unconventional weapons will become operational in 2002. Additionally, Israeli sources indicate that Iran and Syria have strengthened strategic ties, specifically with respect to unconventional weapons.

—Eytan Rabin, "Defense Sources Report Iranian Arms Buildup," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 12 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961216000444, 16 December 1996.

#### **16 December 1996**

*Focus* calls Iran, as a country, the most active proliferator of weapons of mass destruction in the world. *Focus* reports that the Iranian civil nuclear program is comprehensive, which could possibly lead it to make nuclear weapons. Iran's pledges that its nuclear program is peaceful are countered by Western intelligence sources stating that Iran is actively seeking to acquire "gas-ultra-centrifuges" that can be used for nuclear weapons production.

—"Realistic threat from NBC weapons," *Focus*, 16 December 1996, No. 51, p. 64; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com. [CNS Translation]

#### **16 December 1996**

*Nuclear Fuel* reports that Chinese sources confirmed that China will continue with the deal to build a hexafluoride plant in Iran and that Iran notified the International Atomic Energy Agency of its plans to purchase the plant. Ostensibly, Iran would use the plant to convert its own uranium yellowcake deposits to hexafluoride for export. However, US officials are concerned that the plant could be used to produce weapons-grade nuclear material. In early November 1996, John Holum, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), announced that China had cancelled the UF<sub>6</sub> plant sale because Iran could not pay for it. Apparently, by making public the possible cancellation of the deal, ACDA was attempting to pressure China.

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran Told IAEA It Will Build Chinese UF<sub>6</sub> Plant At Isfahan," *NuclearFuel*, 16 December 1996, p. 1, 10-11.

#### **17 December 1996**

*Al-Shab* of Cairo reports that the United States has completed a military plan to strike Iran. Based on the confessions of suspects who outlined Iranian involvement in the Al-Khobar bombing that killed 20 American, the US strikes are planned for terrorist training centers around Tehran as well as Qom and Nahavand. Strikes are also planned for industrial, chemical, and nuclear installations in Tehran, Khark, Isfahan, Bandar-e-Khomayni, and at missile bases in Shahrawand, Shiraz, and Bandar-e Abbas. Iran warns that any attack on it will destabilize stability in the whole region.

—"Paper Details US Plan for 'Military Strike' on Iran," *Al-Shab* (Cairo), 17 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961217000890, 17 December 1996.

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#### **18 December 1996**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says said the upcoming operation of the cyclotron facility at Karaj is a sign of Iran's emerging capability to manufacture radioisotopes. Amrollahi says that Iran found uranium deposits in Saghand and Bandar-e Abbas.

—"Iran: Construction Of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Under Way Again," IRNA (Tehran), 19 December 1996; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-96-245, 19 December 1996.

#### **19 December 1996**

The *Christian Science Monitor* reports that China has quietly relayed to the Clinton administration that it is cancelling the sale of a uranium hexafluoride conversion plant to Iran. [Note: See 4 November 1996.]

—"Jonathan S. Landay, "China to Halt Nuclear Deal with Iran, US Official Say," The *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 December 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **23 December 1996**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran issues a statement saying that it does not have a nuclear weapons program. This statement is in response to reports of underground columns in the city of Yazd. It adds that digging tunnels and constructing columns are fundamental parts to mining activities, and not out of the ordinary.

—Xinhua, 23 December 1996; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **23 December 1996**

Ali Akbar Velayati, Iranian foreign minister, and Yevgeniy Primakov, Russian foreign minister, sign a Memorandum of Understanding on export controls. Primakov says the document will "serve a very noble cause, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and corresponding technology throughout the world." He also reiterates Russia's commitment for the completion of the nuclear power plant in Bushehr and says they will maintain their ties and act in accordance with international standards.

—"Further on Velayati-Primakov News Conference on 22 Dec," IRNA (Tehran) 23 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961223000516, 23 December 1996.

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## **1995**

### **1995**

An International Atomic Energy Agency delegation visits the Moallem Kalayeh facility located in the mountain near the city of Qazvin and reports that the facility is a recreational center for the nuclear industry staff and not a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.

—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, March/April 2002, [www.meib.org](http://www.meib.org).

### **1995**

Cyprus seizes zirconium destined for Iran, which could be used in the zirconium tube factory under construction by China in Iran.

—Steve Rodan, "Cyprus, US Team To Block Flow Of Nonconventional Arms To Iran," *Defense News*, 4 November 1996, p. 15.

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**1995**

While in Russia for negotiations with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, Revolutionary Guards General Sardar Shafaq defects to the United States. [Note: The Revolutionary Guards reportedly control Iran's nuclear weapons program.]

—Kenneth Timmerman, "Rev Guards General Defects," *The Iran Brief*, 1 June 1995, p. 11; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

**1995**

John Holum, director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, says Iran might be able to produce a nuclear bomb by 2003. [Note: In March 1997, Holum says Iran might be able to produce a bomb by 2005-2007.]

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

**1995**

Iran's Atomic Energy Council (AEC), chaired by President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, renews interest in acquiring two 300MW reactors from China. Talks between the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and China about the project are held, but "appeared to lapse" under strong US pressure.

—Alan George, "Revival Of Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Causes Alarm," *Jane's Intelligence Review & Jane's Sentinel Pointer*, April 1997, p. 6.

**1995**

According to Levan Kidzinidze, former aid to Ajarian leader Aslan Abashidze, four physicists are sent to Iran to help Iran develop nuclear weapons with Abashidze's assistance. [Note: On 26 February 2002, the Iranian embassy in Georgia issues a statement denying this; see 26 February 2002 entry.]

—"Iran Denies Former Georgian Official's Nuclear Program Claims," *Kavkasia-Press* (Tbilisi), 26 February 2002; in FBIS Document CEP20020226000312, 26 February 2002.

**1995**

An unknown US source, reportedly with longtime connections to the Israeli government, gives both the CIA and Israel Iranian government documents on Iran's successful efforts to obtain nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union. [Note: For more on this topic, see 9, 10 (2 entries), 11, 15, and 16 April 1998. 1991, 13 October, December, and 27 December 1991 entries may also be related.]

—Steve Rodan, "MK Elul Says Israel, US Have Known of Iranian Nukes for Years," *The Jerusalem Post*, [www.jpost.co.il](http://www.jpost.co.il), 12 April 1998.

**January 1995**

Aleksei Yablokov, chairman of the Security Council commission for ecological security, says that Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov signed a protocol with Iran "which said that contracts will be written for the training of nuclear physicists for Iran and for the construction of a centrifuge plant."

—"Yablokov: Nuclear Technology Sale To Iran 'Dangerous'," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-091, 5 May 1995; Michael Mihalka, "Continuing Saga Of Gas Centrifuges To Iran," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 97 Part I, 19 May 1995.

**January 1995**

Iranian President Rafsanjani inaugurates the site of the Bonab nuclear research center, but it is unclear if

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construction at the site is beginning or ending. [Note: See 11 September 1994.]

—"Blix Visits Iranian Nuclear Sites," *The Iran Brief*, 1 August 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### January 1995

The *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* releases a report on Iran's nuclear program. According to the report, US officials, such as James Woolsey, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency have put the timeframe for Iran's nuclear program to be weapon-capable by early next century. According to the report, Iran needs fissile material to build a nuclear weapon, and its prospects for manufacturing this material are not very high unless it overcomes certain logistical obstacles such as management issues, the lack of technological and technical skills, as well as the general lack of infrastructure. Although Iran has the money to acquire this material from illicit foreign sources, US intelligence officials say that dependence on foreign sources for this material is uncertain, and Iran's tactic is expected to contain plans to develop an indigenous facility to produce fissile materials as well. Iran has been in the market for the acquisition of dual-use material, but has so far not succeeded in acquiring fissile materials. Iran has several research reactors, one provided by the United States that runs on low-enriched uranium, and others provided by China; none of which are believed to be capable of weapons production. The United States had also provided 'hot cells,' which are "heavily shielded rooms with remotely operated arms used to chemically separate material irradiated in the research reactor, possibly including plutonium laden 'targets'." Additionally, according to sources in the US government "China has also helped Iran create nuclear fuel facilities for uranium mining, fuel fabrication, uranium purification, and zirconium tube production, and it may soon supply facilities to produce uranium metal and uranium hexafluoride." China also signed in 1992 a "preliminary agreement" for the supply of two 300MW electric light water reactors, without specified delivery dates. All of China's activities however are reportedly consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as being under IAEA safeguard. China is not thought to be helping Iran with weapons production. It is not clear according to US sources that Iran has made a choice about having an indigenous production of fissile material or whether to acquire it from illicit sources. According to Warren Christopher, US Secretary of State, Iran has been in the market for "heavy water research reactors that are best suited to producing weapon-grade plutonium, not electricity." According to a senior US government official, Iran is now focusing on centrifuge designs and "looking toward a pilot plant, possibly large enough to produce enough highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons." Iran however still lacks the technical capability to manufacture these centrifuges and still has to rely on the import of technical skill as well as the hardware. [Note: The United States gave Iran hot cells in the 1960s; see 1960s.]

—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Washington, DC) January 1995, [www.bullatomb.org](http://www.bullatomb.org), accessed 7 July 2002.

### 3 January 1995

Italian police seize "ultra-sonic equipment for the testing of nuclear reactors," which originated in Slovakia, passed through the port of Bari, and were destined for Iran via Greece. Iranian smuggling is also said to receive active support from Syria and Pakistan, who often transship items to Iran.

—Chris Hedges, "A Vast Smuggling Network Gets Advanced Arms To Iran," *New York Times*, 15 March 1995, p. A1; Bruce Johnson, "Iran-Bound N-Plant Parts," *Daily Telegraph*, 1 March 1995.

### 5 January 1995

US Defense Secretary William Perry says Iran may be closer than previously thought to getting a nuclear weapon. "How soon...depends how they go about getting it," he says. He says Iran could get a bomb from the former Soviet Union, which could happen in "a week, a month, five years." He says if Iran gets enough fissile material, "five years is on the high end," while otherwise it "will take them much longer than five years," though this time could be

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shortened by hiring experts from the former Soviet Union.  
—Associated Press, 5 January 1995; in Gulf 2000, [www.columbia.edu](http://www.columbia.edu).

#### **6 January 1995**

A "senior official" [presumably American] says that Iran's resolve to produce nuclear weapons could result in an Israeli preemptive strike. The official says, "The date by which Iran will have nuclear weapons is no longer 10 years from now. If the Iranians maintain this intensive effort to get everything they need, they could have all their components in two years. Then it will be just a matter of technology and research. If Iran is not interrupted in this programme by some foreign power, it will have the device in more or less five years."  
—Reuters, 6 January 1995; in Gulf 2000, [www.columbia.edu](http://www.columbia.edu).

#### **6 January 1995**

A Russian official arrives in Iran to conclude an agreement to repair and complete the nuclear power plant in Bushehr in southern Iran. Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov says that he hopes that the contract to begin work on the power plant will be concluded within days.  
—Associated Press, 6 January 1995; in Gulf 2000, [www.columbia.edu](http://www.columbia.edu).

#### **7 January 1995**

The deputy director of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant announces that Iran has signed an \$800 million contract for Russia to complete construction of the plant. According to the Iranian official named only as Mr. Khabir, Russia agrees to complete the first of the plant's two units within four years. According to the official, the plant's first unit was 90% complete with 60% of its equipment installed before Kraftwerk Union halted construction. The plant's second unit was 50% complete when construction was stopped, the official says. He also mentions that forty Iranian companies will be involved in the project. Iran's permanent mission to the United Nations issues a press release regretting a 5 January *New York Times* article that quotes US Defense Secretary William Perry as saying Iran could build a nuclear bomb in five years. "Iran simply does not have the ambitions to become a nuclear weapon state and as a matter of national policy it has denounced nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction," the Iranian press release says. The IAEA has conducted routine and unannounced inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities, the latest of which was done from 15 to 21 November 1993, the press release says. [Note: Khabir's statements come one day before the deal was actually signed. See 8 January 1995.]  
—"Iranian-Russian Agreement for Bushehr Power Plant Accord Worth \$800 Million to Complete Project," IRIB Television Third Program Network (Tehran), 7 January 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970523002901, 23 May 1997; "UN Mission Denies Times Nuclear Build-Up Allegations," IRNA (Tehran), 7 January 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970523002899, 25 May 1997.

#### **8 January 1995**

Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov and Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, sign an \$800 million contract that commits Russia to complete one of two nuclear reactors in Bushehr within four years. The contract formalizes a 1993 Russian agreement in principle to complete the facility. The contract calls for Russia to build a VVER-1,000MWe reactor at the site. German firm Siemens-Kraftwerke Union, began construction of the Bushehr plant in 1974, but failed to complete the project before the 1979 Islamic revolution. [Note: See November 1974 and March 1979 entries.] Germany has since prohibited the export of equipment vital to the project's completion. The bilateral meetings also included discussion of the construction of another 1000MW unit and two 440MW reactors at Bushehr, education of Iranian students and postgraduates at Russian institutes, and training for Iranian experts in the operation of nuclear power facilities in Russia. [Note: Some sources put the value of the deal at \$1 billion rather than \$800 million.]

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—"Iran's Nuke Plant Deal With Russia Raises Fears," *Washington Times*, 10 January 1995, p. A13. "Russia Signs Deal For Iranian Nuclear Plant," Reuters, 8 January 1995, in Executive News Service, 8 January 1994; "Iran, Russia Agree On \$800 Million Nuclear Plant Deal" *Washington Post*, 9 January 1995, p. A18; "Russia Has Agreed On The Terms..." *Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor*, Vol. 2, No. 11, 16 January 1995; "Russian Visits Iran To Sign Nuclear Deal" *Washington Post*, 7 January 1995, p. A17; "Russian Minatom and the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA" *ENS NucNet*, 12 January 1995; Iran Warns Russia Not to Cancel Nuclear Deal," Xinhua (Beijing), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000069, 9 May 1995.

#### **9 January 1995**

Israeli television reports that Israeli experts are more worried about the help Russian training will give to Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program than would the supply of enriched uranium to operate the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Russia to Train 500 Iranians," Israel Television Channel 1, (Jerusalem), 9 January 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970523002903, 23 May 1997.

#### **9 January 1995**

In a joint press conference in Jerusalem with US Secretary of Defense William Perry, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says "without foreign aid, Iran will reach nuclear capability within seven to 15 years." Perry says that time could be even shorter if Iran gets fissile material from another country.

—"Rabin, Perry Address Iranian Threat," Israel Television Channel 1 Network (Jerusalem), 25 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970523002907, 23 May 1997.

#### **9 January 1995**

The *Iran Brief* reports that, according to US and Israeli intelligence officials, Iran will acquire a nuclear bomb "in more or less five years." [Note: See the other 9 January 1995 for a different estimate.] The report says US Department of Energy (DOE) officials have "almost no doubt" that Iran obtained nuclear material from the Central Asian Republics, and "if Iranians maintain this intensive effort to get everything they need, they could have all their components in two years. Then it will be just a matter of technology and research."

—"Iran Ever Closer To The Bomb," *Iran Brief*, 9 January 1995, p. 8.

#### **10 January 1995**

CIA Director James Woolsey tells the Senate intelligence committee that Iran is most likely to continue developing nuclear weapons through indigenous resources; in which case it might have a weapon by 2000. He also says "Iraq and Iran...have the basic technology to eventually develop [nuclear] weapons."

—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, January 1995, [www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/ja95/ja95.albright.html](http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1995/ja95/ja95.albright.html); US Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Global Threat Assessment, Testimony of CIA Director James Woolsey, 10 January 1995; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995.

#### **10 January 1995**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov asserts that "the Russia-Iranian cooperation in nuclear power engineering has peaceful goals." He says that the "nuclear reactor to be finalized by Russian specialists in Iran cannot be used for war purposes since war plutonium is made by reactors of another type."

—"Iranian-Russian Agreement for Bushehr Power Plant Mikhailov Statement," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 10 January 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970523002905, 23 May 1997.

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**10 January 1995**

The International Atomic Energy Agency says there is no evidence that Iran is constructing nuclear weapons. The report comes after recent allegations by the United States and Israel that Iran will have a nuclear bomb within 7-15 years.

—"Iran Gets Nuclear All-Clear," *The Independent*, 11 January 1995, p. 15; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**10 January 1995**

Iranian First Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Hashemi dismisses US concerns about Iran's nuclear ambitions saying that Iran has always declared its opposition to the presence of weapons of mass destruction in the region. He says the United States should force Israel to allow international inspection of its nuclear arsenal.

—Reuters, 10 January 1995; in *Gulf 2000*, [www.columbia.edu](http://www.columbia.edu).

**11 January 1995**

In response to speculations in the Western media that Israel is considering an attack on Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant, Iran warns Israel that such an attack would be a "blunder." According to the Iran News, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq Nuri's responds to rumors of an Israeli strike by saying, "Should Israel commit such a blunder, we will teach her a lesson not to ever attempt another aggression against Iran." Iran cautions Israel for the second time not to attack the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—Ralph Joseph, "Iran Warns Israel Not To Attack," UPI, 11 January 1995; in Executive News Service, 11 January 1995.

**12 January 1995**

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy issues a statement that it plans to establish a managerial office in Tehran and that currently 150 Russian specialists are working at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Russian Minatom;" in *ENS NucNet*, 12 January 1995.

**19 January 1995**

Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Iran's President, says Iran does not have a nuclear arms program. The report comes from the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), which recently reported on the President's visit to a research center for agriculture and nuclear medicine where he denounced Western propaganda as an attempt "to deprive Iran of the enormous benefits of nuclear science."

—Ralph Joseph, "Rafsanjani: Iran has no Nuclear Program," United Press International, 19 January 1996; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**19 January 1995**

Iranian President Rafsanjani inaugurates a nuclear medical research and production unit at Karaj that reportedly puts Iran in the field of advanced medical scans. The facility is a cyclotron accelerator with a 30 million electron-volt power and will initially be used to produce radioactive materials used in medical scans. The cost of building the facility is reported at \$9 million in foreign exchange funds in addition to \$4.9 million (8.5 billion Rials). An Iranian scientific crew will be running the facility as part of the Center for Agricultural Research and Nuclear Medicine, an affiliate of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The facility is located in Karaj, 35km (22 miles) northwest of Tehran. When fully operational, the facility will be a modern research and production facility making it an exporter of a range of products used in nuclear medicine.

—Reuters, 19 January 1995; in *Gulf 2000*, [www.columbia.edu](http://www.columbia.edu).

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### **20 January 1995**

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher states that Iran is undertaking a "crash effort to develop nuclear weapons." He expresses concern that other countries are assisting Iran in developing nuclear technology. According to a US official, Christopher's comments are targeted at Russia, which recently concluded a contract with Iran for the completion of two nuclear reactors. US diplomats indicate that it will be more difficult to secure Congressional approval for Russian aid if the contract is implemented. Sources say the United States is intensifying its efforts on several fronts to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons; including discouraging Russia and China from selling nuclear reactors to Iran.

—Steven Greenhouse, "US Seeks To Deny A-Plants To Iran," *New York Times*, 24 January 1995, p. A4; Daniel Williams and Thomas W. Lippman, "Christopher Charges Iran Continues Nuclear Program," *Washington Post*, 21 January 1995, p. A11.

### **20 January 1995**

*Middle East International* reports that Russia may have been secretly assisting Iran in basic nuclear research since the 1980s, when the Islamic revolution and Iran-Iraq War led to a cutoff of Western nuclear technology. The reactor at Iran's Nuclear Research Center acquired "critical assembly capability" in 1990, which suggests that Iran, a state with little nuclear technology of its own, received assistance from Russia or Pakistan or both. Russia's December 1994 contract [signed 8 January 1995] to complete Iran's 1300MW pressurized water reactor (PWR) at Bushehr-1 would be a "logical follow-on" to such secret cooperation, although the deal is considered to be far more significant than any previous cooperation between the two countries.

—Marko Milivojevic, "Nuclear Deal," *Middle East International*, 20 January 1995, p. 14.

### **26 January 1995**

Thomas Graham, a senior official at the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency says that Iran has "no current program" for the production of weapons-grade nuclear material. However, Graham said that the US government has "reached the conclusion" that Iran intends to develop a nuclear weapon capability in the future. Graham also says that Iran is in full compliance with all of its Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations, noting that the United States is more concerned with Iran's future intentions. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has repudiated European and US allegations that Iran has key chemicals to separate plutonium from irradiated uranium fuel. According to certain European and US sources, Iranian officials at AEOI seek a peaceful nuclear program and would like to build nuclear reactors with Russian and Chinese help. However, other non-AEOI officials in Iran believe that "Iran should have nuclear weapons capabilities."

—Mark Hibbs and Neal Sandler "Iran Has 'No Program To Produce Fissile Materials,' US Envoy Says," *Nucleonics Week*, 2 February 1995, pp. 7-8; Anthony Goodman, "US Says Iran Abides By Pact But Seeks Nuke Option," Reuters, 26 January 1995 in Executive News Service.

### **28 January 1995**

The *Guardian* reports that Iran is trying to garner support to prevent the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the United States is concurrently increasing its efforts to deny nuclear technology to Iran. Iran is annoyed that its efforts to acquire nuclear technology for peaceful use are being thwarted by nuclear suppliers following the US lead.

—"Middle East," *International Security Digest*, January 1995.

### **February 1995**

*Zhongguo Kexue Bao* reports that the Azad University in Tehran reported to the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Plasma Physics that the HT-6B tokamak provided to it by the Institute performed a successful 20

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millisecond discharge. This is China's first international transfer of nuclear fusion research technology. The tokamak, a small fusion research apparatus, was built in the mid-1980s by the Institute and was operated for 10 years before its installation in Tehran in 1994. China and Iran intend to conduct joint research in nuclear fusion.  
—"Technology Transfer (China/Iran)," *S&T Perspective*, Vol. No. 5, 30 June 1995, p. 6.

#### **February 1995**

The White House indicates that the Russia-Iran nuclear deal could strain relations between Russia and the United States. The administration is seeking to deny Iran advanced technologies by intensifying efforts to dissuade Western nations from providing subsidized loans to Iran. The administration has been successful in persuading Western European nations and Japan not to supply nuclear technology to Iran, and is continuing to press the issue with these countries.

—Steven Greenhouse, "US Seeks To Deny A-Plants To Iran," *New York Times*, 24 January 1995, p. A4; "Clinton Said To Warn Russia On Selling Reactors To Iran," *Rossiyskiye Vesti* (Moscow), 14 February 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-030, 14 February 1995.

#### **11 February 1995**

President Hashemi-Rafsanjani criticizes alleged American propaganda, stating that Iran's strict adherence to the tenets of Islam do not allow attempts to develop "destructive and antihuman nuclear weapons..." This exclamation comes as part of a report conducted by the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran in which Rafsanjani reiterates Iran's cooperative relationship with the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

—"Rafsanjani Addresses Foreign Diplomats: Nuclear Weapons are Against Iranian Ideology," British Broadcasting Corporation, 11 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **12 February 1995**

A Congressional Research Service report says that China provides nuclear reactor and technology assistance and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.

—Robert Shuey and Shirley A. Kan, "CRS Issue Brief. Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 12 February 1996, p. 15.

#### **13 February 1995**

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher states that the Iranian-Russian nuclear deal should not go forward because Iran is a sponsor of international terrorism. He says that the United States might discontinue aid to Russia if the contract is implemented. According to US officials, Iran is now the "biggest potential nuclear threat in the developing world."

—"US State Secretary Christopher Stated...," *Mainichi Shimbun*, 14 February 1995.

#### **15 February 1995**

ITAR-TASS news agency reports that Russian reactors used in the construction of nuclear power plants in Iran cannot be used for military purposes. An anonymous ministry specialist says that the reactors are incapable of producing the fissionable material needed to produce a weapon.

—"Moscow Says Russian Reactors in Iran are not Military," British Broadcasting Corporation, 15 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **16 February 1995**

Aleksei Yablokov, chairman of the Security Council commission for ecological security, says that the nuclear power

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plant Russia is planning to build at Bushehr will have the capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium. "Thanks to Russia, Iran will be in a position to get the nuclear bomb within a few years," Yablokov says.

—Penny Morvant, "Officials Say Reactors Are Capable Of Producing Plutonium," *OMRI Daily Report*, No. 38, Part I, 22 February 1995; "Russian Official Warns Of Iran's Nuclear Goal," *Washington Times*, 16 February 1995, p. A17; Andrey Serov, "Nuclear Reactors Exported To Iran Unfit For Military Use," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 14 February 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-030, 14 February 1995; "Russia Spells Out Pact With Iran For A-Plant," *New York Times* 21 February 1995, p. A5; "Russia Might Build Four Reactors For Iran," *Washington Times*, 21 February 1995, p. A13.

#### **17 February 1995**

The *New York Times* reports there is no firm evidence indicating that Iran, Jordan, or Lebanon has attempted to acquire weapons grade nuclear material.

—Craig Whitney, "Smuggling Of Radioactive Material Said To Double In A Year," *New York Times*, 18 February 1995, p. A2.

#### **17 February 1995**

A Chinese official defends China's right to sell peaceful nuclear technology to Iran under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

—Patrick E. Tyler, "China Warns Against 'Star Wars' Shield For US Forces In Asia," *New York Times*, 18 February 1995, p. A4.

#### **18 February 1995**

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy reports it will build three more nuclear reactors for Iran. The three reactors consist of one light water VVER-1000 [1000MW] reactor and two VVER-440 [440MW light water] reactors, all of which would be built at Bushehr. A spokesman for the ministry says it has made further plans with Iran to construct a desalting installation with a nuclear reactor. Iran continues to refute claims by Western nations that Iran is striving to produce nuclear weapons. In particular Iran denies claims made by Aleksei Yablokov, a Russian government ecological safety officer, that Iran could use Russian-made reactors to produce a nuclear bomb.

—"Russia to Build Three More Nuclear Reactors for Iran: official," Agence France Presse, 18 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **19 February 1995**

Georgiy Kaurov, a spokesman at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, says spent fuel at Iran's nuclear power plants will be relocated to Russia in accordance with the contract signed between the two nations.

—"Iranian Nuclear Waste to be Processed in Russia," British Broadcasting Corporation, 21 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **22 February 1995**

According to Israeli television, Turkish security authorities arrested members of a network involved in smuggling plutonium and osmium to be used in the production of nuclear weapons in Iran. Members of the network reportedly have been in contact with several key officials in Iran, possibly the Iranian defense minister.

—"Turkey Reportedly Uncovers Iranian Nuclear Smuggling Ring: Israeli TV Report," British Broadcasting Corporation, 22 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **22 February 1995**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says his nation "respects efforts aimed at the

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elimination of atomic weapons in the region," but believes his nation must have room to make independent decisions. Reiterating Iran's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Amrollahi says Israel has not been in full compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

—"Iranian Nuclear Energy Head Amrollahi Condemns NPT 'Discrimination'," British Broadcasting Corporation, 22 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **22 February 1995**

US State Department Spokesperson Christine Shelly says that in spite of US opposition to Russia's agreement to sell nuclear reactors to Iran, the Clinton administration is committed to continued aid to Russia. According to Shelly, linking US aid to Russian actions would be "counterproductive" to accomplishing the main goal of US aid, which is "to support Russia's transition to a democratic government and to a market economy." Speaker of the US House of Representatives Newt Gingrich has stated that the United States should end aid to Russia if it follows through with supplying the nuclear reactors to Iran.

—Michael Mihalka, "Iran Nuclear Deal Won't Stop Russian Aid," *OMRI Daily Report*, No. 39, Part 1, 23 February 1995.

#### **24 February 1995**

Despite rumors that Iran will be capable of producing a nuclear weapons in as little as three years, David Iriy, head of the Israeli delegation at multilateral arms control talks, says Iran will need at least five years to produce a nuclear weapon. But Iriy does believe Iran will be capable of producing weapons, stating "The Russians and Chinese are selling civilian nuclear reactors which will allow Iran to become a military nuclear power, all the more since North Korea is supplying Scuds as well as the technology to produce the missiles."

—"Iran will take five years or more to build the bomb: Israel," Agence France Presse, British Broadcasting Corporation, 24 February 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **25 February 1995**

The Associated Press reports that a nuclear power plant will soon be connected to Iran electricity grid, which is the first indication that a nuclear facility is near completion. A deputy governor of Southern Bushehr Province says that the plant will come on stream during an "imminent" visit by President Hashemi Rafsanjani; this visit has not been announced.

—Associated Press, 25 February 1995; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **Late February 1995**

Russian Minister for Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov justifies Russia's agreement to supply a light water reactor to Iran by noting that it is the same kind of reactor that the United States will supply to North Korea with the help of an international consortium. Mikhailov adds that cancellation of the Russian deal might cause Iran to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, at which point the United States would move to build nuclear facilities in Iran [to persuade it to remain a party to the Treaty, as it did with North Korea].

—Fred Hiatt, "US Efforts to Block Iran Reactor Sale Cause Anger in Moscow," *Washington Post*, 3 March 1995, p. A32.

#### **February-March 1995**

Russian officials say that discussions with Iran for the supply of additional reactors [to the one it agreed to build at Bushehr in January 1995] includes research reactors to be located at Iranian universities. Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy spokesman Georgi Kaurov says the total value of the contracts could reach \$3 billion, although Western diplomats in Moscow have estimated that the value could be as high as \$8 billion. Another report

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indicates that Russia will also assist Iran in the maintenance of its operating research reactors, and that 3,000 Russians will arrive at Bushehr in the near future to work on the construction of the nuclear power plant. A Minatom statement on 20 February says Russia is looking into the supply of desalination facilities to Bushehr and light water research reactors to universities in Iran. The head of the Russian Security Council's ecological safety committee, Alexei Yablokov says that the reactor deal involves a Russian commitment to recycle the spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor and "return plutonium" to Iran.

—Fred Hiatt, "US Efforts to Block Iran Reactor Sale Cause Anger in Moscow," *Washington Post*, 3 March 1995, A32; Charles W. Holmes, Cox News Service; in *Washington Times*, 12 February 1995, pp. A1, A9; Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Russia Plans To Build Four N-reactors in Iran," Reuters, 20 February 1995; in Executive News Service, 20 February 1995.

### **Early March 1995**

Russia and Iran sign an additional protocol to the contract for the supply of a VVER-1000 [1000MW light water reactor] to Iran. The protocol adds \$140 million to the contract and calls for Russia to make changes to the foundations at Bushehr and redesign the turbine room so that the Russian reactor components can be fit into the modified structures. Iran had originally planned to undertake this work itself. The major work will begin in 1996.

—Aleksandr Koretskiy, *Kommersant-Daily*, 11 March 1995, p. 4; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-049 (FEDS Server), 11 March 1995.

### **March 1995**

US Secretary of Defense William Perry says Russia is helping Iran build up its nuclear capabilities. Russian officials reply that Iran's nuclear technology is similar to that in 25 other states and is the same type of reactor the United States is selling to North Korea.

—Fahmi Huwaydi, "Drums of War Between Washington and Tehran," *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 9 May 1995; in "Writer Rules Out US-Iran Military Clash," FBIS Document FTS19950509000330, 9 May 1995.

### **March 1995**

US officials say that nuclear cooperation was discussed when South African Energy Minister Pik Botha led a delegation to Iran in March 1995, although intelligence sources have indicated that South Africa has not given Iran any nuclear technology or information. [Note: See 19 and 20 August 1995 entries for Botha's admission that discussions included a plan to supply Iran with uranium.]

—James Adams, "US Fears South Africa Will Sell Nuclear Technology To Tehran," *Sunday Times*, 23 April 1995.

### **2 March 1995**

A senior Israeli military official says that Iran tried to buy centrifuges, heavy water, and other parts needed to start a nuclear weapons program, from Argentina. A diplomat from the Argentine embassy in Tel Aviv confirms that Argentina was negotiating to sell such items, but agreement was never reached due to the "political situation." The Argentine diplomat would not confirm that Iran had an agreement to buy fuel rods and then negotiated for the heavy water. Iran also tried to obtain other components for uranium enrichment, including uranium hexafluoride; this pattern of acquisition and Iran's drive to self-sufficiency for nuclear production signals military intent, says the Israeli official. Iran has organized a network of front organizations throughout Europe to buy nuclear and missile technology. Purchases are often made in the name of Sharif and Amir Kabir universities. The Israeli official says, "We have to ask ourselves why Iran needs its own production of heavy water and an enrichment capability when it is provided by the supplier."

—"Iran Tried to Buy Nuclear Weapons Materials from Argentina," *The Jerusalem Post*, 2 March 1995, p. 2; in Lexis-

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Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Daniel Blumenthal, "Syria Said to Keep Trying To Purchase Nuclear Reactor," *Ambito Financiero* (Buenos Aires), 16 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS 19961216000408, 16 December 1996.

### **2 March 1995**

Russian Atomic Energy Ministry spokesman Georgy Kaurov complains of US "double standards" concerning the Russian proposal to furnish Iran with a nuclear reactor. He says that the dispute may turn into a contentious issue at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference in April 1995. Kaurov compares the \$800 million Russian-Iranian deal with the US plan to supply North Korea with a light water reactor. He also claims that production of weapons-grade material from a light water reactor is not possible. US officials argue that no nuclear technology should be supplied to Iran on the grounds that it could aid Iran in becoming a "nuclear-armed terrorist state." According to a Western diplomat, Iran "has an extremely low level of technology. By giving them nuclear reactors, you are putting them a step up the ladder." Kaurov notes in response that many Iranian nuclear experts were trained in the United States.

—"Russia Attacks US Effort Against Reactor In Iran," *Wall Street Journal*, 2 March 1995, p. A10.

### **6 March 1995**

Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's Foreign Minister, warns an arms race in the Middle East could precipitate a global war. Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reports Iran has remarked on its adherence to the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, stating it is Israel not Iran that is suspected of having a nuclear arsenal of 200 warheads, and it is Israel, because of its arsenal, that creates tension in the region.

—"Iran Warns Against Nuclear Arms in Region," *The Jerusalem Post*, 6 March 1995, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **6 March 1995**

The Italian authorities intercept crates of "ultra-sonic equipment for the testing of nuclear reactors" on a ship believed bound for Iran. The ship carrying the crates is owned by the Milan-based freight forwarder, Rondine, and was stopped due to discrepancies regarding the ship's export licenses.

—"Nuclear Gear Seized in Italy," *The Iran Brief*, 6 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **8 March 1995**

Israel threatens to impose sanctions on Russia if it does not halt plans to build a nuclear plant in Bushehr. Evt Liebermann, head of the Likud party of Israel, says, "Israel will prevent, by all means possible, Russia from building a nuclear plant in Iran." He further states correspondence between Israel and Russia is underway on what actions should be taken against Iran.

—"Israel Threatens Russia with Sanctions over Iran Nuclear Plant," Agence France Presse, 8 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **10 March 1995**

The *Middle East Economic Digest* reports that senior Russian officials say Russia will continue its relationship with Iran over nuclear reactors in Iran despite threats by the United States to halt economic aid to Russia. Sergei Karaganov, a member of the Russian Presidential Council, says the West need not be worried by the sale of a nuclear reactor to Iran, which is something that cannot be connected to arms manufacture.

—"Iran: Russian Nuclear Deal 'will go ahead'," *Middle East Economic Digest*, 10 March 1995, p. 10; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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**12 March 1995**

Reza Amrollahi, head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, calls "baseless" US accusations that Iran will use Russian help to develop nuclear weapons. Amrollahi points out that as a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has the right to receive assistance in the development of peaceful nuclear technologies. Amrollahi says that the first unit of a power plant at Bushehr will be completed in four years, and would have a generating capacity of 1,000MW. He said that 200 Russian and 500 Iranian experts and technicians are working to complete the plant. —"Iran Stresses Peaceful Use Of Nuclear Plant," Executive News Service, 12 March 1995; Reuters, 12 March 1995.

**15 March 1995**

The *New York Times* reports that, according to Western intelligence officials, Iran uses dozens of locations in Europe to smuggle nuclear weapons-related technology into Iran. Iran seeks to obtain equipment from several sources, and then dismantles it into small pieces to be shipped on different circuitous routes to Iran. Iran uses small aircraft to ship parts to Poland and other Eastern European countries, sometimes via Vienna or Brussels, to be trucked to cargo ships or put on cargo planes to Iran. Pakistan and Syria also reportedly receive items to transship to the Iranian nuclear program. The officials indicate that Iran uses many of the same smuggling routes and contacts that Pakistan and Iraq used to develop their nuclear weapons programs. Intelligence officials believe the small Hartenholm airport, located north of Hamburg in Germany, is used by its Iranian owners as part of this Iranian nuclear smuggling network [Note: See 1993 entry.]

—Chris Hedges, "Nuclear Trail—A special report; A Vast Smuggling Network Feeds Iran's Arms Program," *The New York Times*, 15 March 1995, p. A1.

**15 March 1995**

The *Iran Brief* reports that, according to Iranfax, Iran is capable of producing uranium hexafluoride, or "hex," which can be used for fuel in the centrifuge uranium enrichment process that produces weapon-grade fuel. Hex is created by combining a fluorification agent and processed uranium, the fluorification agent in the case of Iran being hydrogen fluoride. The latter ingredient was supposedly obtained from Germany and China in large amounts. Iranfax reports that European export control officials have been investigating purchases of dual-purpose technologies by Iran that can be used in centrifuge enrichment programs. Semi-permeable membrane technology from European sources and Japan, Iranfax states, can be used to make uranium hexafluoride gas.

—"Iran Now Capable of Producing Nuclear Weapons Material," *The Iran Brief*, 15 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

**16 March 1995**

Alexei Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Security Council's commission on environmental security, says rumors of energy shortages are fabrications to justify the building of reactors such as the one at Bushehr. Yablokov asserts that Iran is rich with "immense oil and gas resources, so it could have only military reasons for wanting the power station."

—"Russian Official Warns Against Nuclear Cooperation with Iran, China," Agence France Presse, 16 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

**16 March 1995**

The US Senate votes 97-3 to cease funding a nuclear cooperation agreement with Russia if Russia provides Iran with a nuclear reactor. The Senate bill will have to be harmonized with one already passed in the US House of Representatives.

—Bill Gertz, "Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia," *Washington Times*, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16.

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#### **16 March 1995**

Kenneth R. Timmerman, the Director of the Middle East Data Project, testifies before the US Senate that in 1993, US companies exported dual-use technologies to Iran, including "toxins, turbojet engines, air or vacuum pumps, machinery for liquefying gas, centrifuges and centrifuge parts, machine-tool holders, gas separation equipment, hydraulic presses, and laboratory furnaces," without proper Department of Commerce (DOC) licensing or inspection. An official from the Department of Commerce calls Timmerman's testimony "inaccurate and without foundation."

—Bill Gertz, "Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia," *Washington Times*, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16.

#### **17 March 1995**

The International Atomic Energy Agency commends the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran for its cooperation with inspections made by the IAEA. The IAEA's press office says, "The Islamic Republic of Iran's cooperation with those who had visited—and visit—Iran to inspect its atomic energy industries on behalf of the IAEA has been extraordinary and much more than expected of a member of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

—"IAEA Praises Iran's Atomic Energy Organization for its Cooperation," British Broadcasting Corporation, 17 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **17 March 1995**

Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee, states that the nuclear deal between Russia and Iran does not violate a single international law, but he says President Clinton's decision to prevent the US oil firm Conoco from implementing a deal with Iran will make it more difficult for Russia to go ahead with the lucrative contract.

—Michael Mihalka, "Harsh Russian Reaction To US Senate Vote To Block Russian- Iranian Deal," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 56, Part 1, 20 March 1995.

#### **18 March 1995**

Reuters reports that Yuri Kotov, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry department that deals with Iran, said that Russia does not plan to concede to US pressures and will go ahead with the \$1 billion nuclear reactor agreement with Iran. Kotov stresses that the Russian-Iranian deal is based on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, much like the US-North Korean agreement. The Russian contract includes one reactor, with the possibility of three additional reactors to be constructed at a later date.

—"Russia's Not Willing To Halt Deal With Iran," *Washington Times*, 18 March 1995, p. A6.

#### **21 March 1995**

According to a US government source, Iran is interested in setting up a consulate in Aktau (formerly Shevchenko), Kazakhstan. The United States is concerned about Iran's intentions, since Aktau houses Kazakhstan's fast breeder reactor, which can produce at least 110kg of plutonium a year. [Note: The Aktau reactor is used to generate electricity and to desalinate water. Russia was discussing the supply of a water desalinization reactor to Iran.]

—Information provided by William C. Potter from personal interview with a US government official (name withheld) 21 March 1995. For information on the Aktau reactor, see William C. Potter et al., *Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States*, Monograph No. 1, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 1993, pp. 17-18.

#### **22 March 1995**

Interfax reports that Russian experts have begun to examine the condition of the Bushehr nuclear power station. A spokesman for the Russian company that builds nuclear facilities abroad, Zarubezhatomenergostroy, says that

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some of the equipment that had been specially stored shows "almost no signs of corrosion" and adds that the "devices kept in zinc containers filled with nitrogen are in an ideal state and can be used at any moment." The Russian experts however say that the plant's "electrical equipment requires complete replacement 'because it doesn't function or meet the requirements of designers'." A complete report will be submitted to Iran in September.

—Interfax, 22 March 1995; in *Gulf* 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **22-23 March 1995**

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher meet in Geneva to discuss US opposition to the pending Russian sale of two light water reactors (LWRs) to Iran. The only agreement reached during the meetings between two parties is a decision to meet again before Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton meet on 9 May 1995 in Moscow. US officials have admitted that the sale of Russian LWRs, worth between \$800 million and \$1 billion, would not directly assist the Iranians in building a nuclear bomb. The agreement would include the training of Iranian experts in Moscow. Russia has already sent 200 of its own experts to Iran. Iran will reportedly return spent fuel to Russia. The US has argued that the sale would be "counterproductive" to nonproliferation efforts and "could provide cover for Tehran to acquire other technology and materials useful in a weapons program." The US has pointed to a tightening of its trade embargo with Iran; including the cancellation of an agreement worth \$1 billion between Iran and Conoco, as evidence of US willingness to accept economic loss.

—John J. Schulz, "Washington Unable To Derail Russian-Iranian Nuclear Accord," *Arms Control Today*, April 1995, p. 20; Michael Mihalka, "...And Presses Ahead With Reactor Deal," *OMRI Daily Digest*, 5 May 1995.

### **23 March 1995**

Yevgeniy Primakov, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service Director, says the United States need not worry about Iran's supposed nuclear weapons program. According to Primakov, "After considering voluminous material, we have concluded that Iran at present does not possess nuclear weapons...nor any evidence of the existence in that country of a coherent military nuclear program." US concerns stem from growing reports of Iranian attempts to procure nuclear technology. Primakov counters such assertions by saying Iran would have great difficulty in developing a weapons program even if its supply to information went "unimpeded."

—"Russia Describes Iranian Nuclear Potential," United Press International, 23 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **23 March 1995**

Reuters reports that Lieutenant-General Gennady Yevstafyev, a senior official of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), says that Russia will proceed with the nuclear reactor sale because the SVR officials "have no grounds for changing our assessment vis-a-vis Iran."

—"Russia's Not Willing To Halt Deal With Iran," *Washington Times*, 18 March 1995, p. A6; "Russia Dismisses US Fears Over Deal With Iran," Executive News Service, 23 March 1995; A. Peslyak, "Iran Reactor Cannot Produce Weapon-Grade Plutonium," Russian Television Network (Moscow), 16 April 1995 in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV- 95-082.

### **28 March 1995**

In an effort to convince Russia to end its nuclear cooperation with Iran, the United States temporarily ends plans to sign an agreement with Russia on the peaceful use of nuclear power. Hazel O'Leary, the US Energy Secretary, believes the threat from Iran is serious, stating Washington is resolute in its desire for Russia to end its assistance to Iran. But Washington's action has not provided the desired response, and Russia continues to deal with Iran, adhering to a \$1 billion contract with Iran to complete a nuclear reactor in Bushehr within four years, with

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stipulations for a further three in the future.

—Jim Mannion, "US Puts off Nuclear Agreement with Russia over Iranian Nuclear Deal," Agence France Presse, 28 March 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **30 March 1995**

In response to US objections to Russian nuclear assistance to Iran, Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, says that the nuclear cooperation between the Iran and Russia is in line with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that Iran's nuclear facilities has been inspected by the IAEA without any violations.

—"Russian-Iranian Reactor Deal Defended Atomic Energy Official Comments," Voice of Russia (Moscow), 30 March 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970508000812, 30 March 1995.

### **April 1995**

The United States says Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov is planning to sell Iran uranium-enriching gas centrifuges. Sometime afterward, perhaps in May, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says he did not know about a deal for gas centrifuges. [Note: For more on the alleged centrifuge deal see 4, 5, 11, 12, 17, and 18 May 1995 entries.]

—Vladimir Abarinov, "Moscow and Washington Have Held Their Own; The Presidents Have Managed Not to Worsen Relations," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in "Summit Said Successful Amid Modest Expectations," FBIS Document FTS1995051200350, 12 May 1995.

### **April 1995**

While on a trip to the United States, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak says that Iranian nuclear weapons would threaten Arab security. But he says, "We do not think the Iranians are seeking that goal. We got clear assurances from the Russians, during the recent visit of the Russian Foreign Minister to Cairo, that the nuclear reactors Iran wants to buy from Moscow would not be aiding Iran in the production of a nuclear bomb."

—Makram Muhammad Ahmad, "Daily Claims Relations With US Improved," *Al-Musawwar* (Cairo), 14 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950414000012, 14 May 1995.

### **3 April 1995**

During a Moscow visit, US Secretary of Defense William Perry says the United States might be willing to compromise with Russia on the reactor deal with Iran. He suggests that if the deal must go through, several steps there could be taken to reduce proliferation risks, such as strict control over the type of fuel to be generated. Perry admits that the imposition of constraints on the reactor sale is "a very poor second choice," and states that the United States will continue to push Russia to abandon the deal. However, Perry says that aid to Russia, especially aid for defense conversion, should not be cut off regardless of the outcome of the Russian-Iranian reactor deal. At a meeting between Perry and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, Russia rejects the US request that it cancel its contract to supply Iran with nuclear technology and equipment. US officials reveal that the United States has promised Russia "tens of millions of dollars" and a leading membership in the Korean Peninsula Development Organization if it suspends its nuclear agreement with Iran.

—Bill Gertz, "Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia," *Washington Times*, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16; Fred Hiatt, "Perry Hints At Iran Compromise," *Washington Post Foreign Service*, 4 April 1995; in Executive News Service, 4 April 1995; "Although US Defence Secretary ...," *Sankei Shimbun*, 4 April 1995.

### **4 April 1995**

An unattributed official of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry says Russia will not cancel its contract to build the

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Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran, because it "will in no way enable that country to accumulate weapons-grade nuclear materials."

—"Russian-Iranian Reactor Deal Defended; Moscow to Proceed With Plans," *Kommersant Daily* (Moscow), 4 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970508000816, 8 May 1997.

#### **5 April 1995**

News reports say Germany was unsuccessful in attempts to persuade the United States to reconsider its opposition to the Russian-Iranian reactor deal. A senior Western official revealed that in the past few months, the United States and Germany had been involved in "an informal exchange of views" on this matter, but the United States declined to openly renew consideration of the deal. One Executive Branch official contends that Secretary of State Warren Christopher is the driving force behind US opposition, and that there are US officials who "see virtue in holding nuclear talks with Teheran; in part because Washington is willing to provide power reactors to the DPRK." Although the United States and Israel have claimed that Iran has a secret nuclear program, an International Atomic Energy Agency official states that "no new information has come forth which would justify a return non-routine visit [to Iranian facilities]." Reshetnikov states that US opposition to the Russian reactor sale is based on "considerations of economic competition." A Western source indicates that Moscow will go through with the deal because the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Russia hopes to "exert some influence" in the Middle East and Central Asia. Moreover, Russia itself has 30 million Muslim citizens. Spain is reportedly also considering selling nuclear technology and supplies to Iran. An effort in the late 1980s by a Spanish Siemens' licensee to establish a supply link with Iran was unsuccessful.

—Mark Hibbs, "US Rebuffed German Initiative To Reconsider Iran Nuclear Deal," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 March 1995, pp. 10-11; Galina Penenkova, "Sale Of Nuclear Reactors To Iran Assessed," *Voice of Russia World Service* (Moscow), 5 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-066; Veronika Romanenkova, "Iran Reactor 'Ballyhoo' Said Due To Competition" *ITAR-TASS* (Moscow), 5 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-066.

#### **6 April 1995**

A senior official from the South Korean government characterizes as "groundless" press reports in Japan and the United States that the United States was trying to include Russian participation in the North Korean project in an effort to persuade Russia to cancel its deal with Iran. The official says that the reports were meant to upset the system of cooperation that South Korea has with its allies on the nuclear reactor deal. Vyacheslav Sychev, an expert from the information department of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy says that "reports on Russia's possible participation in KEDO is a smokescreen for a large-scale operation to torpedo the Russo-Iranian contract on the delivery of Russian reactors to Tehran."

—Andrey Kirillov and Vladimir Solntse, "Panov Comments On Supplying Reactors To DPRK," *ITAR-TASS* (Moscow), 5 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-066, 5 April 1995.

#### **10 April 1995**

A Russian official says the United States opposes the Iran-Russia nuclear deal because the United States does not want commercial competition. "Americans are ready to strangle any potential competitors in the market of advanced technologies," says Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy. He notes that the reactors Russia plans to supply to Iran are the same type the United States plans to supply to North Korea.

—"Iran Nuclear Pullout Would Be 'Disgrace' Russian Ministry Says US Jealous of Competitors," *RIA* (Moscow), 10 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950410000009, 10 April 1995.

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**11 April 1995**

The Islamic Republic News Agency reports that Boris Shikhmyradov, Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister, supports Iran-Russian nuclear cooperation. Shikhmyradov says the relationship between Iran and Russia would be beneficial for Turkmenistan, which he believes is ready "to play the role of transit territory between Russia and Iran."

—"Turkmenistan Backs Iran-Russia Nuclear Cooperation - IRNA," British Broadcasting Corporation, 11 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**11 April 1995**

Russia denies that CIA-provided intelligence information proves that Iran's nuclear program has a military dimension, and says it will never give in to US pressure. The Iranian deal will be extremely profitable for Russia, and US pressure is regarded in Moscow as the result of economic competition, because the net profit from the nuclear deal with Iran can bring Russia \$7 to \$8 billion. Only the United States and Russia have capabilities to produce absolutely safe reactors, and Russia argues that the VVER-1000 [1000MW] light water reactors (LWRs) it will sell to Iran are safe and cannot be used for military purposes. Russia is afraid that there will be a repeat of the deal with North Korea, when US pressure led to the replacement of Russian contractors with US contractors.

According to Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma International Relations Committee, there is a remote possibility that Russia will be allowed to join the North Korean project and sell nuclear reactors to North Korea.

—Sergey Tsekhmistrenko "Russians Do Not Listen To Americans," *Kommersant*, 11 April 1995, p. 11.

**17 April 1995**

During Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani's state visit to India; Indian officials say that a 1975 India-Iran agreement lays the groundwork for future nuclear cooperation between the countries, although India recently gave in to US pressure and refused to sell Iran a nuclear reactor.

—Martin Walker, "Iran Upstages US With Nuclear Co-Operation Deals," *Guardian* (London), 18 April 1995.

**17 April 1995**

The US Secretary of State Warren Christopher calls for a cancellation of a Chinese plan to sell two 300MW reactors to Iran. Iran has reportedly sent an initial payment to China, while China has done seismic surveys of the Esteqlal site, located near the Bushehr complex. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen tells US Secretary of State Warren Christopher that China's decision to sell Iran two 300MW pressurized water reactors (PWRs) was consistent with international law.

—Gregory Polyanichko, "On Russia's Nuclear Reactor Sale To Iran, Ukrainian Relations," *Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor*, 12 June 1995, pp. 12-15; Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," *Arms Control Today*, June 1995, pp. 20, 23; Evan S. Medeiros, "China, Russia Plan To Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales To Iran," *Arms Control Today*, May 1995, p. 23; Martin Walker, "Iran Upstages US With Nuclear Co-Operation Deals," *Guardian* (London), 18 April 1995.

**17 April 1995**

Russia's ambassador to Iran, Sergey Tretyakov, says Russia will continue to cooperate with Iran in the nuclear field despite US pressure. He says, "Moscow will not accept any advice from the United States about its relations with other countries; in particular with the Islamic Republic of Iran."

—"Envoy to Iran Comments," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 17 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003069, 17 April 1995.

**18 April 1995**

The *Guardian* reports that Republicans leaders in the United States "suspect the Russian deal includes providing

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Iran with reprocessing facilities." [Note: It is likely that the article is referring to enrichment facilities, not reprocessing facilities.]

—Martin Walker, "Iran Upstages US With Nuclear Co-Operation Deals," *Guardian* (London), 18 April 1995.

#### **18 April 1995**

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres says, "We know...[Iran] works very hard in various ways to attain a nuclear option. That not only means that it will attain a nuclear capability, but it says publicly that it plans or demands the destruction of another people."

—"Peres on NPT, Talks with Syria," IDF Radio (Tel Aviv), 18 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950418000033, 18 April 1995.

#### **19 April 1995**

On a trip to Washington, DC, a Russian official hints that Russia might reconsider its nuclear deal with Iran if the United States were to buy Russian uranium. "If the issue of uranium shipments is solved, then the Russian-Iranian agreement can be considered from another point of view," says Oleg Davydov, foreign trade minister and deputy premier. "We are strategic partners of the United States and therefore can hold talks on the 'nuclear deal' issue," he says, adding "one may understand the US concern over the possibility that Russia can provide technologies for Iran which would allow it to accelerate the creation of nuclear weapons." He adds that Russia is committed to non-proliferation, and says "we are not going to transfer nuclear technologies to anyone; including Iran."

—Andrey Surzhanskiy, "Official Links Deal to US Uranium Purchase," ITAR-TASS, 19 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003065, 19 April 1995.

#### **19 April 1995**

Iranian President Rafsanjani reiterates Iran's determination to develop nuclear power capabilities despite US opposition. He adds that he believes Russia will follow through with its deal to supply reactors to Iran. Rafsanjani also says he supports what he called "a conditional extension" of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

—"Iranian Chief Adamant On Russian Atom Deal," *New York Times*, 20 April 1995, p. A6.

#### **20 April 1995**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Arab diplomatic sources do not believe the United States can substantiate its accusation that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Arab officials noted that the International Atomic Energy Agency has found no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. The officials add that because the Arab states could be threatened by Iran, they cannot support US efforts to isolate Iran.

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran's Arab Neighbors Don't Believe US has Proof Of Weapons Ambitions," *Nucleonics Week*, 20 April 1995, p. 10.

#### **20 April 1995**

*Sabah Al-Khayr* of Cairo reports that according to secret documents allegedly smuggled out of Iran and obtained by the United States, Iran has secretly obtained nuclear material that could be used for a nuclear weapon. The documents allege that Iran imported the material through a nearby country with the cover story that the uranium would be used for medical purposes. Instead, however, it was intended to be "chemically processed" for use in a nuclear weapon, according to the secret documents. The documents also allege that Iran has secretly cooperated with Pakistan on nuclear issues. [Note: According to *Sabah Al-Khayr*, the documents were reportedly smuggled out of Iran by six defecting Iranian intelligence officials; reportedly including intelligence Chief Ali Fallahian. See July 1995 entry on the reported defection of Fallahian. Fallahian ran against President Khatami for the presidency of Iran in 2001 and as of 9 August 2002 was still in Iran.]

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—Ahmad Nasr, "Intelligence Chief Reportedly Defects to US," *Sabah Al-Khayr* (Cairo), 20 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS1995042000066, 20 April 1995.

#### **21 April 1995**

*Deutsche Presse-Agentur* reports Iran will not sign an indefinite extension to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) unless the five nuclear powers agree to reduce and eventually eliminate its nuclear arsenals. The treaty ends in a year, and Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's foreign minister, demands the nuclear states end production of weapons-grade nuclear material, and make accommodations to allow the transfer of nuclear energy technology to other states in need of other forms of energy production.

—"Iran Reject NPT Unless all Nuclear Weapons are Scrapped," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 21 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **22 April 1995**

London-based Arabic periodical *Al-Majallah* publishes a report based on an interview with an unnamed former Iranian nuclear scientist, offering an insider's look at Iran's nuclear program. According to the scientist, who reportedly lives in Europe and held an "important position" in Iran's Nuclear Energy Organization prior to the Iranian Revolution, Iran needs at least 10 years to build a nuclear weapon because construction of the Bushehr and Darkhovin reactors has been dormant for so long--17 years. According to the scientist, in 1979 Iran had a plan to create the technology to build nuclear weapons. Iran expected to have a weapon within ten years of completion of the reactors--the late 1980s. The scientist, however, says reports that Iran has acquired or attempted to acquire nuclear warheads from former Soviet republics and other countries are not true and are part of the US-led propaganda campaign against Iran. But the scientist says Iran has large amounts of uranium, enriched uranium, and plutonium, obtained from sellers in Sierra Leone and Chad. [Note: This seems to corroborate part of a report in *Sabah Al-Khair* that Iran illicitly brought nuclear material into the country. [Note: See 20 April 1995. The *Al-Majallah* report does not clearly state if the scientist worked for Iran's nuclear program after the Iranian Revolution, and if so, for how long, which raises the question of what he knows first-hand about Iran's nuclear program versus what he is conjecturing based on his past experience.]

—"Ali Nuri Zadah, "Khomeyni Abolished Nuclear Reactor Projects and Considered Them Idolatrous; Iranian Nuclear Capability: Reality or Propaganda," 22 April 1995; in "Article Views Quest for Nuclear Power;" FBIS Document FTS19950422000078, 22 April 1995.

#### **23 April 1995**

The *Sunday Times* of London reports that, according to US intelligence sources, Iran may be seeking nuclear information and assistance from South Africa. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) says a delegation of South Africans led by Pik Botha, South Africa's Energy Minister, visited Tehran in March, and Iran is believed to have asked about establishing a relationship between the two nations to provide Iran with nuclear technology. South Africa's now defunct nuclear program is reported to have produced at least six nuclear weapons, and its now unemployed nuclear scientists may find Iran to be financially attractive. The *Sunday Times* reports South Africa has continued to seek new arenas of profit to halt its financial downturn and has aggressively pursued the export of munitions and small arms.

—James Adams, "US Fears South Africa Will Sell Nuclear Technology to Tehran," *Sunday Times*, 23 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **23 April 1995**

In New York for the Non-Proliferation Review and Extension Conference, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says, "We are prepared to discuss the Iranian issue," referring to Russia's nuclear deal with Iran.

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—"Kozyrev 'Prepared to Discuss' Supply of Reactors to Iran," Russia Public Television First Channel Network, 24 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003064, 22 April 1997.

#### **25 April 1995**

At a meeting of ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Indonesia, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati says the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should not be extended indefinitely without conditions, but only if the treaty is completely implemented, presumably a reference to Israel's nonparticipation in the treaty. Velayati calls on NAM to "take necessary measures against those governments which allowed Tel Aviv to develop and keep nuclear weapons." He says the only way to achieve a nuclear-free world is by expanding nuclear-weapon-free zones.

—"Velayati Comments on Implementation of NPT," IRNA (Tehran), 27 April 1995, FBIS Document FTS19950427000048, 27 May 1995; "Velayati on NPT Expansion," Kyodo (Tokyo), 25 April 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950425000040, 25 April 1995.

#### **27 April 1995**

The United States accuses Russia of initiating talks with Iran about the sale of weapons-grade uranium to Iran, despite assurances from Russia that it has no plans to provide Iran with uranium for nuclear weapons manufacture. Viktor Mikhailov, the Russian minister of atomic energy, is reported to be responsible for starting the rumor of a uranium sale to Iran, an admission Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's Foreign Minister, says was not within the purview of Mikhailov to make. Russia asserts it will not "back down" to US pressure to end its dealing with Iran in the field of nuclear technology, though it provides assurance that no uranium deal will be made. US pressure includes Russia's exemption from a deal that will provide Russia with a share of \$4.5 billion US-North Korea nuclear deal.

—Robin Wright, "US Report Casts New Doubt on Russia-Iran Deal," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 April 1995, p. 13; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 April 1995**

Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev says that, with respect to nonproliferation, it would be safer for Iran to purchase a nuclear reactor from Russia than to seek nuclear technology from another source. Kozyrev reiterates that Russia will not assist Iran in manufacturing nuclear weapons, but will build the reactor for peaceful purposes. In a speech at the Johns Hopkins International Research Center, Kozyrev says, "I do not see any reasons why we should abandon the sale of reactors which is being conducted in compliance with international guarantees." It will take Russia 55 months to bring the reactor on line.

—"Further Reportage On Kozyrev Visit To Washington" FBIS-SOV-95-083, 28 April 1995; Vladimir Kikilo, Viktor Khrekov and Vitaliy Chukseyev, "Further Reportage On Kozyrev Visit To Washington" ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 29 April 1995 in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083; Gennadiy Yezhov and Andrey Serov, "'Absolutely No Changes' To Contract With Iran" ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-091; "Russian Official Defends Reactor Sale To Iran." Xinhua (Beijing), 29 April 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-083.

#### **29 April 1995**

US newspapers report Russia has promised to provide Iran with a centrifuge that will allow it to make nuclear weapons. The *New York Times* and *Washington Post* report that an agreement was reached in January 1995 in which Russia will sell Iran a centrifuge plant. Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister, says such allegations are completely false, stating, "We will not give Iran or any country nuclear weapons capability or technology." The *Washington Post* reports that the United States is strongly opposed to all aspects of the secret protocol between Russia and Iran, but is especially concerned about the inclusion of uranium enrichment technology. Reports say

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that meetings on the subject with high-level Russian diplomats, including Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, have revealed that the centrifuge plant sale was still under consideration in Moscow. According to US officials, the Russian government seems divided between the Atomic Energy Ministry, which expects a large profit from the roughly \$1 billion sale, and the Foreign Ministry, which is anxious to improve US-Russian relations.

—"Russia Promised Iran Centrifuge, Useful in Making Nuclear Weapons," Agence France-Presse, 29 April 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); R. Jeffrey Smith and Michael Dobbs, "Russia Promised To Sell Centrifuge Plant To Iran," *Washington Post*, 29 April 1995, p. A8.

### **29 April 1995**

*Komsomolskaya Pravda* reports that Russian officials claim to have drafted the reactor agreement with Iran only after reviewing Iran's nuclear capabilities and finding them non-threatening. Potential profits from the deal exceed proposed US economic assistance to Russia.

—"Iran Reactor Issue To Be Discussed When Clinton...," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083, 29 April 1995; "US Says G-7 Nations Reviewing Ties With Iran," Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-084.

### **30 April 1995**

In an address to the World Jewish Congress, US President Bill Clinton announces that he will ban all US trade with Iran, including purchases of Iranian oil by US firms, which last year accounted for over 20% of Iran's oil exports and totaled almost \$4 billion. Also banned will be \$326 million of direct US exports to Iran. The executive order is to take effect in the first week of June. Clinton also said he would press US allies to impose similar sanctions. In his speech, Clinton cites Iranian agreements with Russia to buy nuclear reactors and gas centrifuge equipment as proof that Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The embargo is reportedly a demonstration of US determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and is imposed on the basis that Iran is a terrorist state and is seeking weapons of mass destruction.

—Ann Devroy, "President Will Ban All Trade With Iran," *Washington Post*, 1 May 1995, p. A1; Todd S. Purdum, "Clinton To Order A Trade Embargo Against Teheran," *New York Times*, 1 May 1995, p. A1; Martin Walker, "US Draws Up Tough Sanctions On Iran," *The Guardian*, 6 April 1995; Fahmi Huwaydi, "Drums of War Between Washington and Tehran," *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000330; "Iran Reactor Issue To Be Discussed When Clinton...," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083, 29 April 1995; "US Says G-7 Nations Reviewing Ties With Iran," Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-084.

### **Early May 1995**

Russian officials were sending mixed signals on the question of whether Russia will provide the Iranians with gas centrifuges. Lev Ryabev, the First Deputy Minister for Atomic Energy, denies that Russia will provide centrifuges to Iran. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Grigory Karasin says, "Moscow will not risk any steps which could facilitate the development of technology for the production of nuclear weapons by Tehran," but added that the question of selling the centrifuges was a "separate issue."

—Michael Mihalka, "Russia Sends Mixed Messages On Centrifuges To Iran," *OMRI Daily Digest*, 5 May 1995.

### **May 1995**

In an interview with a US television station, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani says that Iran "neither had nuclear weapons nor was it seeking to acquire or develop them."

—Al J. Venter, "Iran's Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion Or Ominous Truth?," *Jane's International Defense Review*, September 1997, pp. 29-31.

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### 1 May 1995

*US News and World Report* reports that, according to Iranian exiles residing in Europe, Iran has constructed a clandestine site to develop nuclear weapons inside a mountain tunnel, close to the city of Chalus on the Caspian Sea. The exiles claim that Iran has employed technicians from the former Soviet Union, China, and North Korea at the site. [Note: The article contains a small map indicating the location of the alleged nuclear weapons facility.] —"Tehran's Magic Mountain," *US News and World Report*, 1 May 1995, p. 24.

### 1 May 1995

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says, "Based upon a wide variety of data, we know that since the mid-1980s, Iran has had an organized structure dedicated to acquiring and developing nuclear weapons." He says that in the "organization, programs, procurement, and covert activities, Iran is pursuing the classic route to nuclear weapons which has been followed by almost all states that have recently sought a nuclear capability." —David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, January 1995, [www.bullatomsci.org](http://www.bullatomsci.org).

### 2 May 1995

In an interview with a Swiss news outlet, an Iranian nuclear official says Iran wants to develop its nuclear sector "for the production of energy, not for bombs." "Our power is not based on nuclear weapons," says Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. "We do not want them [nuclear weapons] because we believe that they are no longer useful in today's world," he says. Asked why Iran needs nuclear energy with its vast oil reserves, Amrollahi says, "It is nothing but reasonable to develop all possible energy sources: water, solar energy, and wind....We cannot burn all our fossil fuel reserves in power plants. This would cause additional environmental pollution. In 20 years we want to produce 20% of our energy by nuclear means. There is something else: Why were the Americans not against it when the Shah built the nuclear power plant of Bushehr in those days? He was able to complete 85% of it without any objection....Why is the United States putting pressure on Russia, while it spares no effort to help North Korea get new nuclear reactors?." Amrollahi says 200 Russian engineers and 500 Iranian experts have been working on the Bushehr plant since last year. Amrollahi calls "absolutely wrong" reports that Iran sought from Russia a heavy water reactor, which would be more useful than light water reactors for weapons production. As for US assertions that Iran has tried to buy plutonium from Central Asian republics, Amrollahi responds: "What for? The Americans like to assert wrong things. If they have proof, I call on them to submit it to the IAEA. The IAEA has also called on the Americans, but so far without success." Amrollahi denies that Iran has recruited nuclear experts in the former Soviet Union. "Russia is our contracting party," he says. "It is its task to take scientists and engineers to Iran. We do not interfere there." Amrollahi says Iran has a 5MW research reactor in Tehran and a "small research reactor" in Isfahan, which he says is used for the training of staff. As for nuclear contracts with China, Amrollahi says China is to build two nuclear power plants, each with a capacity of 300MW. "We are in the final stage of the technical preparation," Amrollahi says of the Chinese deal. "We have not yet started with the work on the spot." [Note: The date of the interview is not known.] —"Iranian Official Denies Existence of Nuclear Weapons Program," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (Zurich), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950502000035, 2 May 1995.

### 2 May 1995

White House spokesman Mike McCurry stated that the strengthened US embargo against Iran will help to persuade Russia to cancel the reactor deal. Moreover, McCurry says that since the announcement of the trade embargo, other G-7 nations have begun reviewing their policies toward Iran. —"Iran Reactor Issue To Be Discussed When Clinton," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-083, 29 April 1995; "US Says G-7 Nations Reviewing Ties With Iran Xinhua (Beijing), 2 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-084.

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#### **2 May 1995**

The *Washington Post* reports that President Clinton's call for a multilateral trade embargo against Iran fell on deaf ears in Europe and received a lukewarm reception from Japan. Many European countries have refused to participate, arguing that political dialogue is the only way to influence Iranian behavior. Japan may consider again suspending its loans to Iran, but its dependence on Iranian oil is likely to keep Japan from going much farther. Without the cooperation of other major trading nations, the US embargo is unlikely to have much effect on Iran. —Fred Barbash, "Clinton's Call For Boycott Of Iran Drawing Little Support Abroad," *Washington Post*, 3 May 1995, p. A27.

#### **4 May 1995**

A Russian official denies reports that Russia has agreed to sell Iran a uranium-enriching gas centrifuge facility. "No contracts or agreements on this question have been signed," says Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy. "And you can have discussions on any subject, and in this instance these are just empty words." Another Russian nuclear official says Russia is discussing with Iran the training of Iranian nuclear physicists, but no agreement has been signed. "Most of the Iranian nuclear physicists have undergone training in the West," explains Lev Ryabev, Russia's first deputy minister for atomic energy. "It would be natural if they learned to operate Russian-made equipment which will be installed in Bushehr. Ryabev says Russia has started no construction yet at the unfinished nuclear power plant: "We have not laid a single brick in Bushehr yet."

—"4 May Russian TV Commentary," Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network, 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003038, 22 April 1997; "No Dual-Purpose Nuclear Equipment for Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003054, 22 April 1997.

#### **4 May 1995**

A Russian official refutes the suggestion of US ambassador to the United Nations Madeline Albright that Russia might forgo the sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. "Russia will not cancel its decision, even in the face of threats from foreign countries," says Grigoriy Karasin, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry.

—"Russia Will Not Cancel Nuclear Deal With Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003044, 22 April 1997.

#### **4 May 1995**

Uzbek President Islam Karimov says he disapproves of Russia's deal to sell nuclear reactors to Iran.

—Vilor Niyazmatov, "Uzbek President Opposes Sale," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003058, 22 April 1997.

#### **4 May 1995**

Iran's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency affirms Iran's intention to return spent fuel to Russia. This prompts speculation that Iran is willing to compromise on some aspects of its nuclear deal with Russia in order to soften US resistance. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher welcomes the Iranian statement, which was made at the New York conference on the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Christopher adds, however, that the Russian-Iranian nuclear deal would be a major topic of discussion at the upcoming Clinton-Yeltsin summit meetings in Moscow, and that Clinton would share "very sensitive information concerning Iran's true intentions" with his counterpart in hopes of convincing Yeltsin to cancel the agreement. Evgenii Mikerin, head of the Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities Directorate at Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, says that the plutonium from the Bushehr type of light water reactor does not readily lend itself to such applications. Although Iran has expressed an interest in acquiring centrifuge technology for uranium enrichment, Russia has

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never considered delivery of such technology, Mikerin says.

—Gregory Polyanichko, "On Russia's Nuclear Reactor Sale To Iran, Ukrainian Relations," *Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor*, 12 June 1995, pp. 12-15; Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," *Arms Control Today*, June 1995, pp. 20, 23; Evan S. Medeiros, "China, Russia Plan To Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales To Iran," *Arms Control Today*, May 1995, p. 23; Steven Greenhouse, "Iran Says It Would Return Nuclear Fuel To Russia," *New York Times*, 5 May 1995, p. A4.

### 5 May 1995

Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission for Ecological Safety, says Russia had agreed to deliver gas centrifuges to Iran in a protocol to the Russian-Iranian agreement to build a nuclear power station. "According to the protocol, delivery of centrifuges to Iran is not an immediate task but will happen in six months or so," Yablokov says. But another Russian official, Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy, contradicts Yablokov on the centrifuge deal. Kaurov says "there is nothing about the installation of centrifuges or the transfer of centrifugal technology" in the Russian-Iran nuclear agreement. [Note: Yablokov refers to the protocol to the agreement, not the agreement itself, while Kaurov is speaking about the actual agreement, so both could be speaking correctly.] Yablokov says a centrifuge deal would raise many questions about Iran's intentions: "It is the military atom that Iran wants to develop....If Iran has a nuclear station, it won't need a uranium enrichment [gas centrifuge] facility at all. It is a thousand times cheaper to buy fuel, which is necessary for the power station, from the same country which is building the station." Yablokov also raises questions about why Iran needs nuclear energy at all: "According to the protocol to the agreement, we will train 20 Iranian scientists in our classified facilities. But why does Iran need so many specialists for one power station? Iran, with its enormous supplies of gas and oil, should also explain to the world community why it needs to develop nuclear power engineering at all, as it is much cheaper to obtain energy from gas and oil. The enrichment of uranium, large-scale training of scientists, modern nuclear technologies which Russia will inevitably pass on to Iran together with the power station--this is very dangerous."

—"Nuclear Technology Sale to Iran 'Dangerous'," *Informatsionnoye Agentsvo Ekho Moskvyy* (Moscow), 5 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950505000132, 5 May 1995; Anatoliy Yurkin, "Russian Ministry Denies Gas Centrifuge Deal With Iran," ITAR-TASS, 5 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003034, 22 April 1997.

### 5 May 1995

A Russian atomic energy official says Russia intends to sign contracts to build another three reactors at Iran's Bushehr nuclear energy plant. One would be the 1000MW VVER-1000 light water reactor and the other two would be the 440MW VVER-440 reactors, says the unnamed official of Russia's Ministry for Nuclear Energy. The official also says there is an understanding between Iran and Russia to train Iranian nuclear experts to use the Russian-made reactors at Bushehr, but he says "the understanding is only verbal and no documents have been signed on this score." [Note: See 4 May 1995.]

—"Russian Official Claims More Energy Units to be Built For Iran," *Interfax* (Moscow), 5 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003040, 22 April 1997.

### 5 May 1995

In a television interview, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says Russia has received about \$5 million so far for its work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran. The work has consisted of inspecting the equipment left by the German contractor that stopped construction in 1979 and reviewing what reconstruction needs to be done to the cement foundation. Mikhailov says this stage should be finished by the end of October.

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—"Russian Officials Interviewed," Russian Public Television First Channel Network (Moscow), 15 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003032, 22 April 1997.

#### **5 May 1995**

The Egyptian newspaper *al-Akhbar* criticizes US pressure on its allies to join it in imposing a trade ban on Iran. The United States is further criticized by the newspaper for exercising a double standard in the Middle East by condemning and isolating Iran for possible nuclear aspirations without taking any actions against Israel.

—"Paper: US 'Double Standards' On Iran, Israel," MENA, 5 May 1995 [based on an article in *Al-Akhbar*]; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-087, 5 May 1995; "Paper: Clinton 'Wrong Decision' On Iran Embargo," Agence France Presse (Paris), 4 May 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-087, 4 May 1995.

#### **7 May 1995**

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev tells Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Vaezi that Russia will honor its commitments to Iran, including the deal for the Bushehr nuclear power station. Chernyshev says Russia opposes sanctions against Iran. The Russian official also says US President Bill Clinton is expected to raise US opposition to the Bushehr deal in a pending visit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, but that Russia intends "to remain as assertive as before."

—"Official Says Moscow Respects Its Commitments to Iran," IRNA (Tehran), 7 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003030, 7 May 1995.

#### **8 May 1995**

US President Clinton signs an executive order imposing an even tighter embargo against Iran, "banning virtually all US trade and investment" with Iran. [Note: See 30 April 1995 entry for Clinton's announcement of the embargo.]

—"Iran Warns Russia Not to Cancel Nuclear Deal," Xinhua (Beijing), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000069, 9 May 1995.

#### **8 May 1995**

Iran's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Dr. Kamal Kharazi, says many countries in the Middle East are watching whether at a summit between the two leaders Russian President Boris Yeltsin "will succumb to US President Bill Clinton's demands or fulfill his country's commitment to Iran," referring to US pressure on Russia to cancel the deal for the nuclear energy plant at Bushehr. Kharrazi says he believes Russia will "honor" the deal. Kharrazi goes on to say that "Iran supports one of the groups which believes the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] should be extended subject to the condition that there be a built-in mechanism which will ensure a review of the commitments made by the five major nuclear powers....This mechanism should be able to eradicate deadly weapons from the globe forever."

—"Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation Envoy on Commitment, Regional Issues," *Tehran Times* (Tehran), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950509000328, 9 May 1995.

#### **8 May 1995**

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says Russian President Boris Yeltsin does not know the details of the agreement between Russia and Iran for construction of a nuclear power plant. Christopher says Yeltsin has been misled by his advisors about the deal. [Note: Christopher may be referring to the additional protocol to the agreement, which included provisions besides construction of the plant.]

—"Press Officials Consider Relations with Russia, Radio Views Christopher's Remarks," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 8 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950508000255, 8 May 1995.

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**8 May 1995**

Russian Ambassador to Iran, Sergey M. Tretyakov, says Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran is peaceful, reiterating that Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has been monitored by inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

—"Russian Ambassador on Relations with Tehran," IRNA (Tehran), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422003028, 22 April 1997.

**9 May 1995**

In a Kremlin meeting, Russian President Boris Yeltsin tells German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that Russia will supply equipment to Iran for its nuclear power station, but that it can be used only for peaceful purposes. [Note: Yeltsin's statement that it can be used only for peaceful purposes may refer to his imminent "cancellation" of the "military elements" of the nuclear deal with Iran. See 11 May 1995.]

—"Yeltsin Confirms Delivery of Equipment," Interfax (Moscow), 9 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS 19970422003024, 22 April 1997.

**10 May 1995**

US President Bill Clinton tells Russian President Boris Yeltsin that Iran is following a blueprint for acquiring nuclear weapons provided by Pakistan more than four years ago.

—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, January 1995, [www.bullatomsci.org](http://www.bullatomsci.org).

**10 May 1995**

The Natural Resources Defense Council discloses details of the secret protocol between Russia and Iran, which calls for 10 to 20 Iranian nuclear technicians to be trained in Russia each year.

—"Russia-Iran Protocol Provides Evidence of Discussions, But No Firm Agreement On Sale Of Centrifuge Plant For Uranium Enrichment," Natural Resources Defense Council News Release, 10 May 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

**10 May 1995**

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres says Israel believes Iran is trying to obtain nuclear weapons as soon as possible by importing scientists and technology.

—"Peres Discusses Russian Nuclear Aid to Iran," *Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000349, 10 May 1995.

**10 May 1995**

The Russian ambassador to the United States, Yuliy Vorontsov, says Russia will most likely not sell uranium-enriching centrifuges to Iran, nor will it train Iranian nuclear scientists. He says such a deal could be seen as a "military program" contrary to Russian policy. According to Vorontsov, the deal was not authorized by the Kremlin, but rather was set up by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. By cancelling these portions of Russia's nuclear deal with Iran, the \$1 billion deal will lose half of its value, he says. The sales of the light water reactors to Iran, however, are "intended for peaceful purposes," he says. "I have repeatedly told the Americans, pay us \$500 million and we will cancel the supplies of light water reactors to Iran," he says. "They only smiled." [See 4 and 5 May 1995.]

—"Russia May Call Off Training Iranian Physicists," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS 19970422003022, 10 May 1995.

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### **10 May 1995**

An unnamed high-ranking Russian diplomat says Russia's nuclear deal with Iran does not pose a military threat. "This deal is being strictly controlled by the Russian special services, whose duty is to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons," he says. "Naturally, Moscow does not intend to tolerate any loopholes for the spreading of nuclear threat."

—"Iran Deal Strictly Controlled by Special Services," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000373, 10 May 1995; "Moscow To Leave No Loophole for Nuclear Spread," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000416, 10 May 1995.

### **10 May 1995**

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy will not cease work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant while the deal is reviewed by the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, says ministry spokesman Georgiy Kaurov. [See 11 May 1995 for more information on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.] The commission "will thoroughly analyze the contract details and not find a single rotten thing in it," Kaurov says. "The contract on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran does not violate either international or Russian-US agreements."

—"No Plans to Halt Iran Deal During Commission Talks," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950510000372, 10 May 1995.

### **10 May 1995**

A Russian delegation led by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and a US delegation led by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher begin discussions on Russia's nuclear deal with Iran. Russian National Security Council Secretary Oleg Lobov and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev are also members of the Russian delegation. Foreign Economic Relations Minister Oleg Davydov says that Russia is compelled to cooperate with Iran because of its geographic location and because it is not in Russia's interest to have another "unfriendly neighbor in the vicinity of its southern border." Davydov denies reports that the United States had shown Russian officials an Iranian "blueprint" for nuclear weapons development. Instead, Davydov characterizes the report as an analysis which points toward Iran's intentions to "be closer to development of nuclear weapons." A senior Russian Foreign Ministry official said that there was no substantiated evidence that Russian nuclear reactors in Iran were going to be used for non-peaceful purposes. The official said that Russian agencies "in charge of nuclear nonproliferation have the deal under their firm control" and that Russia has resolved "to leave no loophole for proliferation of nuclear weapons." The Russian-Iranian reactor deal calls for the completion of a nuclear power plant with a 1,880MW capacity. The Bushehr facility will likely have four reactors, the first with a 1,000MW capacity, the second with an unspecified capacity, the third and fourth reactors each with a 440MW capacity.

—"Moscow 'Determined To Leave No Loophole'," Interfax (Moscow), 10 May 1995; in "No Plans To Suspend Deal During US-Russian Commission Discussions," JPRS Document JPRS-TAC-95-002, 10 May 1995.

### **11 May 1995**

At a joint press conference with US President Bill Clinton, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announces that Russia will not sell a gas centrifuge to Iran and will eliminate all "military" aspects of Russia's nuclear deal with Iran. Yeltsin says the "military element" includes "the creation of nuclear weapons-grade fuel and a centrifuge and the construction of silos" [presumably for uranium storage]. The Russian-American Commission for Economic and Technological Cooperation (Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission) will review the military components of the nuclear deal, as well as other matters of Iranian-Russian military relations. In particular, the commission will review the protocol to the Iran-Russia nuclear agreement, which, among other things, deals with how to handle spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste from the reactors. [Note: For more information on the secret additional protocol, see 5, 11, 17, and 18 May and 2 June 1995.] Iranian deputy foreign minister Mahmud Vaezi says: "Since this [Gore-

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Chernomyrdin] committee will deal with military issues, it is not likely to be at odds with our agreement with the Russians." Vaezi also says Russian officials gave him "definite assurances" that the contract for the construction of the Bushehr plant will be fulfilled. "Clinton has achieved no success," Vaezi says, in convincing Russia not to go ahead with "the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran." Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov refuses to rule out the sale of a centrifuge to Iran in the future, but says the agreement signed with Iran does not include a centrifuge. Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says in a radio interview that Iran did not seek centrifuges and they are not part of the agreement with Russia. [Note: See 17 and 18 May and 2 June for apparently contrary reports.] Amrollahi says, "Anyone who knows about these things knows there can be no centrifuge in the nuclear power plant agreement....In our agreement, we made no mention of centrifuge, and have never sought this. I think this is nothing but childish hostility started by the United States." Amrollahi also denies that Iran seeks nuclear energy for military purposes; the International Atomic Energy Agency agrees with this assessment. Iran has spent \$10 to \$12 billion on the Bushehr power plant, according to Amrollahi, and could produce electricity from it if it spends less than \$800 million more. "It is logical," Amrollahi says, "for our country to complete this plant as soon as possible so that we do not waste the investment and so that we can end the energy shortage in the country, giving us a reliable source of energy for at least 30 years, the lifespan of a power plant, and making the most of our investment." In a separate interview, Amrollahi denies that Iran bought 500kg of uranium--or any uranium--from Kazakstan.

—Stanislav Kucher and Ravil Zaripov, "Deal Which Never Was," *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in "Clinton Stand on Iran Seen as Gesture to Republicans," in FBIS Document FTS19950512000306, 12 May 1995; "Views on US-Russian Talks on Ties to Iran Envoy Stresses No Military Motives," IRNA (Tehran), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950511000292, 11 May 1995; "Clinton Achieved No Success," Agence France Presse (Paris), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950511000290, 11 May 1995; "Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation, Russia Said Committed to Cooperation," IRNA (Tehran), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950512000271, 12 May 1995; Vladimir Abarinov, "Moscow and Washington Have Held Their Own; The Presidents Have Managed Not to Worsen Relations," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in "Summit Said Successful Amid Modest Expectations," in FBIS Document FTS19950512000350, 12 May 1995; "Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation Interview With Atomic Energy Head," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950511000316, 11 May 1995; "Russia Withstands US Pressure on Nuclear Deal," 11 May 1995, IRNA; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002977, 22 April 1997; Bernard Cohen, "Bite-Sized Concession From Yeltsin to Clinton," 11 May 1995, *Liberation* (Paris); in "Articles Review Clinton-Yeltsin Summit Meeting Seen 'Hardly Reassuring'," 11 May 1995; Gennadiy Yezhov and Andrey Serov, "Russian Minister Explains Tasks of Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission," 11 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002979, 22 April 1997; "Iran's Vaezi Gives Statement in Almaty," IRNA, 1 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002994, 22 April 1997.

### 11 May 1995

Georgiy Kaurov, spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, says there were never plans to sell centrifuges to Iran. Nor has a decision been reached as to whether Iranian spent fuel will be transferred to Russia or left in Iran under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision. Mikhail Kokeev, a deputy in the Russian Foreign Ministry, adds that Russia would not advocate projects which would improve Iran's military posture, but admitted that several entities within the Russian bureaucracy had contemplated supplying dual-use technologies to Iran.

—"Yablokov: Nuclear Technology Sale To Iran 'Dangerous'," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-091, 5 May 1995; Michael Mihalka, "The Mysterious Case Of The Centrifuge Concession," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 92 Part I, 12 May 1995.

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**11 May 1995**

Iran's ambassador to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York calls for a nuclear-free Middle East and calls for international pressure on Israel to give up its nuclear arms. "Every effort should be made," says Ambassador Sirus Nasser, "to implement the treaty in all its aspects to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. This, of course, should by no means hamper the peaceful use of nuclear energy."

—"Naseri Address UN Conference on NPT Issues," IRNA (Tehran), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950512000507, 12 May 1995.

**12 May 1995**

Dr. Gerald Steinberg, Director of Research in Arms Control at the BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, writes that the cancellation of a centrifuge deal will greatly impede Iran's ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Steinberg asserts Iran will have difficulty in securing an alternate source for gas centrifuge technology, and this reversal is an "important victory" for the US administration. According to Steinberg, though this represents a major setback for Iran it is unlikely Iran will halt its nuclear program.

—Gerald Steinberg, "Yeltsin Decision Slows Iranian Nuclear Effort," *The Jerusalem Post*, 12 May 1995, p. 22; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**12 May 1995**

Mahmud Vaezi, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister, says despite the recent agreement reached between the United States and Russia, Iran believes the latter will not sway from its commitment to Iran. Vaezi states, "My impression from Yeltsin's news conference (Wednesday), is that Russia will carry out the agreement it has signed with Iran in this regard."

—"The Nuclear Deal with Russia; Vaezi says he Expects Russia to Implement Bushehr Agreement," British Broadcasting Corporation, 12 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**12 May 1995**

The first deputy speaker of Russia's State Duma, Mikhail Mityukov, says the details of the nuclear cooperation agreement between Russia and Iran will not be subject to review by the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission and no changes will be made to the agreement. Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov announces Russia will uphold its obligations to Iran for the "peaceful use of nuclear energy." [Note: See 11 May 1995.]

—"Views on Russian Relations, Nuclear Cooperation, Russia Said Committed to Cooperation," IRNA (Tehran), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950512000271, 12 May 1995; "The Russian Federation Did Not Plan the Delivery of Uranium-Enrichment Centrifuges," *Segodnya* (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in "Russian Official Clarifies Nature of Nuclear Deal With Iran," FBIS Document FTS19970422002963, 22 April 1997; "Mityukov Tells Iran No Change in Nuclear Cooperation Accord," IRNA (Tehran), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002967, 22 April 1997.

**12 May 1995**

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says "hundreds of experts from Russia and China, who can smell hundreds of millions of dollars, will help Iran gain the technological know-how to convert its nuclear reactors for military use."

—"Iranian Threat Persists; US Efforts Fail," *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950512000260, 12 May 1995.

**12 May 1995**

The Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives approves a bill that would bar financial aid to any country that sells nuclear technology and weapons to Iran. The bill would affect about 25% of aid to Russia,

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but would not affect aid to dismantle Russia's nuclear weapons. Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma International Affairs Committee, calls the move "not very wise" and says in trying to persuade Russia the committee's math does not add up: "The entire aid the US is giving to Russia totals \$400 million, while Russia's deal with Iran is estimated at \$1 billion."

—Aleksandr Sychev, "Russian Given Yellow Card by US Congressman," *Izvestiya*, 13 May 1995; in "US Congress Vote 'Warning Signal' on Iran Deal," FBIS Document FTS19950513000202, 13 May 1995; Pavel Kuznetsov, "Lukin Calls US Congress Resolution 'Not Very Wise'," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 12 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002973, 22 April 1997.

### **13 May 1995**

Iran's embassy in Germany releases a statement that says Russian President Boris Yeltsin's agreement to cancel the military element of the Iran-Russia nuclear deal was a "face-saving move" for the United States. [Note: See 11 and 12 May 1995.] "Since Clinton's hasty action in cancelling [the] Tehran-Moscow nuclear deal has produced no results, Washington, in a bid to regain its lost prestige, claimed that Russia has agreed to drop [the] military part of its nuclear deal with Tehran," the statement says.

—"Embassy Refutes US Claims on Russian Deal," IRNA (Tehran), 13 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950513000180, 13 May 1995.

### **Mid-May 1995**

Iranian officials say Iran has paid between \$800 and \$900 million as a down payment to China for construction of two 300MW pressurized water reactors, one of which is reported to be installed in the Esteqlal facility, near Bushehr.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **15 May 1995**

The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission will review the issue of a potential deal for Iranian nuclear experts to be trained in Russia, says Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy. [See 11 May 1995 for more on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. See 4 May 1995 for more on the possibility of Russia training Iranian nuclear experts.] Kaurov says the Iranian experts would be trained to operate the Russian-made reactors to be installed at Bushehr. Kaurov also mentions the possibility of a deal for building more reactors: "Specialists will have to be trained to operate Russian-made equipment anyway, bearing in mind the nuclear ministry is planning to conclude more contracts with Iran on the construction of another three power units with light water reactors." [See 5 May 1995 for more on the additional reactors.] The Commission, Kaurov says, will also decide what should be done with spent nuclear fuel from the Iranian reactors, whether it should be sent to Russia for processing or stored in Iran under International Atomic Energy Agency supervision.

—"Gore-Chernomyrdin to Discuss Iranian Specialist Training," Interfax (Moscow), 15 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002960, 22 April 1997.

### **15 May 1995**

Russia must honor its nuclear agreement with Iran, says Viktor Ilyukhin, chairman of the State Duma's Security Committee. "Russia is a sovereign state and it has the right to choose who to do business with and what to sell," he says.

—"Agreement 'Must Be Honored'," Interfax (Moscow), 15 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002962, 22 April 1997.

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### 15 May 1995

A senior US State Department official suggests that there was evidence within the Bushehr contract that Russia intended to provide Iran with plutonium separation technology, but noted that Russia promised not to deliver such technology. [Note: This probably refers to the gas centrifuge in the secret additional protocol.]

—Gregory Polyanichko, "On Russia's Nuclear Reactor Sale To Iran, Ukrainian Relations," *Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor*, 12 June 1995, pp. 12-15; Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," *Arms Control Today*, June 1995, pp. 20, 23; Evan S. Medeiros, "China, Russia Plan To Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales To Iran," *Arms Control Today*, May 1995, p. 23.

### 15 May 1995

Reza Amrollahi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, tells the *New York Times* that Iran is planning to build about ten nuclear reactors within the next 20 years. Further plans include training Iranian researchers by Chinese nuclear physicists and nuclear engineers.

—"Iran wants to build ten nuclear reactors," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 May 1995, p. 3; via Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com). [CNS Translation]

### 16 May 1995

Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani rejects US accusations that Iran seeks nuclear weapons. "We have repeatedly announced, and this has been confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency," he says, "that Iran's aim in obtaining nuclear energy is to use it for peaceful purposes and meet its energy requirements."

—"President Interviewed on US Television Network Says US, Israel 'Supporters of Terrorism'," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 16 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950516000338, 16 May 1995.

### 16 May 1995

Following closed hearings with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, Chairman of the Russian State Duma International Affairs Committee Vladimir Lukin says any undesirable aspects of the nuclear deal with Iran are because the "Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), while negotiating with Iran on the sale of light water nuclear reactors, did not consult either with the President or with the Government of Russia. As a result, it looked as if we signed the deal on behalf of Russia, though in fact it was signed on behalf of a specific ministry....I would like Minatom to sell as much of its products as possible, but so that our grandchildren don't have a group of nuclear states around Russian borders." According to an anonymous Duma member, Kozyrev says the deal for the centrifuge was secret outside of Minatom and was not known to Russian President Boris Yeltsin. [Note: See 8 May 1995 entry for an indication that US Secretary of State Warren Christopher believed Yeltsin did not know of the deal.]

—"Lukin Reviews Kozyrev's Responses to Duma Questions on Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 16 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002958, 22 April 1997; Georgiy Bovt, "Regarding the Russian-Iranian Nuclear Deal," *Kommersant Daily* (Moscow), 18 May 1995; in "Iran Deal Pending Until Gore-Chernomyrdin Talks," FBIS Document FTS199505180003456, 18 May 1995.

### 17 May 1995

In an interview on Russian radio, Russian politician Ala Yaroshenskaya says a protocol signed by the heads of the Russian and Iranian atomic energy ministries called for signing a contract within six months to build a uranium mine and a uranium-enriching gas centrifuge in Iran. [Note: Yaroshenskaya's title is not given. If Yaroshenskaya's assertion of the existence of this protocol is true, the Russian and Iranian atomic energy ministries lied or were incorrect when they said they never discussed the sale of a gas centrifuge. It would also mean that Russian President Boris Yeltsin's agreement to cancel the sale of the centrifuge was not an empty gesture as Iran has

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alleged. See 11 and 12 May 1995.]

—"Official on Cancellation of Centrifuge Sale," Moscow Mayak Radio Network (Moscow), 17 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950517000377, 17 May 1995.

### 18 May 1995

Despite recent pressure asserted by the United States on Russia to halt the transfer of nuclear materials to Iran, China says it still plans to discuss delivery of a two-unit nuclear reactor to Iran. Chinese officials say they see no reason not to sell Iran or any other signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear energy equipment and technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency, China asserts, has not provided evidence to sway China from its obligations.

—Steve Mufson, "Chinese Nuclear Officials See No Reason to Change Plans to Sell Reactor to Iran," *The Washington Post*, 18 May 1995, p. A22; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

### 18 May 1995

Vitaliy Konovalov, First Deputy Minister of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, says Minatom has not signed any secret contracts with Iran for the sale of a uranium-enriching gas centrifuge. But he says Iran asked Russia to sell "nuclear high-technology" and to build a factory for producing nuclear fuel. "This request was specified in the protocol, which was signed by Minatom Minister Viktor Mikhailov following the result of one of his visits to Iran," Konovalov says. "This was merely Iran's request, and Russia did not assume any commitments." Konovalov says Russia does not intend to sell a gas centrifuge to Iran nor build a factory for producing nuclear fuel. "A country with one nuclear power station does not need such a factory," he says, adding that such a factory would only make economic sense if Iran had at least ten nuclear power plants. An unnamed Russian diplomat says Mikhailov did not secretly sign an agreement without permission of the Russian government, but rather merely signed the record of his January 1995 talks with Iranian officials in Tehran. But the diplomat says Mikhailov "displayed some autonomous actions because the issue of delivery of gas centrifuges, contrary to the issue of preparing [training] [nuclear] specialists, goes beyond the scope of the basic agreements signed with Iran in 1992." The diplomat says Mikhailov probably did not have the approval of the Russian government for such an agreement. [The existence of such a protocol seems to contradict the 11 May 1995 statement by Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, that Iran never sought a gas centrifuge. It also seems to contradict the 12 May 1995 statement by Georgiy Kaurov, head of the information directorate of Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy that Russia was never going to sell a centrifuge to Iran. See also 17 May 1995 entry for more on the protocol.] In an interview on Iranian television, Amrollahi says "there was no such thing called a centrifuge....What they have made such a hue and cry about is a pure lie and is merely a propaganda clamor to pretend that Clinton did not return empty-handed from Moscow....[Note: This is the same explanation given by the Iranian embassy in Germany. See 13 May 1995 entry.] Our agreement, which is about a power station, includes the fuel as well. Therefore, there was no fuel requirement for us to seek to enrich uranium....Our contract never included a centrifuge system." Amrollahi also says Iran plans to buy two 300MW reactors from China, the first of which will take seven years to build and install and the second eight years. [Note: See 21 and 30 May 1995 for more information on Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran.]

—"Russian Ministry Denies Secret Nuclear Deal With Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 18 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002956, 22 April 1997; "Diplomat on Factory Contract With Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 18 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970508002693, 8 May 1997; "Atomic Energy Head on Nuclear Program," IRIB Television Second Program Network (Tehran), 18 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950518000560, 18 May 1995.

### 18 May 1995

*Informatsionnoye Agentstvo Ekho Moskvyy* (Moscow) reports that a senior Russian Foreign Ministry official said the

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Russian government would have prevented the transfer to centrifuges if the United States had not done so.  
—"Yablokov: Nuclear Technology Sale To Iran 'Dangerous'," FBIS-SOV-95-091, 5 May 1995; Michael Mihalka, "Continuing Saga Of Gas Centrifuges To Iran," *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 97 Part I, 19 May 1995.

#### **18 May 1995**

An Azeri news outlet, quoting "credible sources" in Moscow, says the reactors for Bushehr will be shipped from Russia to Iran through Armenia.

—"Nuclear Alliance Russia-Armenia-Iran," *Turan* (Baku), 18 May 1995; in "Nuclear Parts Said Shipped to Iran via Armenia," FBIS Document FTS19950518000454, 18 May 1995.

#### **19 May 1995**

US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns says the 100 Russian advisers provided to Iran to develop its nuclear technology capabilities could be used to build nuclear weapons.

—"US Voices Extreme Concern Over Russian Engineers in Iran," Agence France Presse, 19 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **19 May 1995**

A Pakistani foreign office spokesman denies that Pakistan secretly cooperated with Iran in the nuclear field. "We had been cooperating with Iran just like with any other country under the aegis of International Atomic [Energy] Agency for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology," the spokesman says.

—"Spokesman Denies Reports of Nuclear Ties With Iran," *The Frontier Post* (Peshawar), 19 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950519000320, 19 May 1995.

#### **21 May 1995**

According to information from the Israeli embassy in India, India and Iran have agreed to cooperate in nuclear research and development, and India has sent nuclear experts to Iran.

—"Ben Kaspi and Hemi Shalev, "Israeli Paper Alleges Indo-Iran Nuclear Ties," *Maariv* (Tel Aviv), 21 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950521000175, 21 May 1995.

#### **21 May 1995**

The Russian ambassador to Iran, Sergey M. Tretyakov, says Iran must pay 10% of the \$1 billion Bushehr deal by the end of the year. "This is not a credit deal but a cash deal," Tretyakov says. "If the Iranians pay 10%, we will deliver 10% of the nuclear power plant." He says about 150 Russian scientists are doing feasibility studies at the site of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "It's a more difficult project because we have to finish the project on the basis of Germans," he says, referring to the German contractor that halted work on the plant in 1979.

—Chen Ming, "Russian Envoy Interviewed on Iran Reactor Sale," Xinhua (Beijing), 21 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950521000015, 21 May 1995.

#### **21 May 1995**

Nuclear cooperation plans between Iran and China are near collapse, according to "an Iranian source." According to the source, "the recent talks in Beijing showed that the positions of the two sides were far apart." Iran and China had an understanding to sign an agreement this summer for the construction of two or three nuclear power stations, the source says, but that now seems unlikely, the source says. China cannot guarantee it can provide all the parts needed for the power plants, as some are made in Germany, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic. China is modifying its reactors to work without the foreign parts, but this will take four years. Also, Iran failed to give China detailed plans on how it would pay the 1.2 billion Pounds Sterling for China to begin work on the first

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two plants. China reportedly was not interested in payment with Iranian crude oil. Iranian sources say US opposition to Iran's nuclear program may also be a factor in delaying a deal. [Note: See 30 May 1995.]  
—"Nuclear Plans With China Near Collapse," *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 21 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950521000165, 21 May 1995.

#### **22 May 1995**

The *Independent* reports that Israel is considering whether to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. Diplomacy thus far via the United States has failed to achieve what Israel believes is an appropriate response to Iran's increasing nuclear abilities. Israel conducted an attack on an Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak in 1982, which was where Iraq had centralized its nuclear program. According to Israeli sources, security officials in Israel do not believe a similar attack to the one on Osirak would be successful, citing Iran's dispersed nuclear technology.

—Patrick Cockburn, "Israel Targets Iranian Nuclear Plants for Raids," *The Independent*, 22 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **22 May 1995**

Agence France Presse reports that Viktor Mikhailov, Russia's Atomic Energy Minister, says Moscow and Iran have concluded a new nuclear accord that provides for plans to construct a pressurized water research reactor. Mikhailov says, "Moscow has no intention of reducing its cooperation with Iran in the area of the use of civilian nuclear energy and on the contrary will honor inter-governmental accords." Mikhailov says Russia plans to sign a contract by the end of the year to build a 40MW light water research reactor in Iran. Reports also indicate that the Iranian Majlis has allocated \$700 million for the first stage of a contract for the construction of the research reactor.

—"Russia Announces New Nuclear Accord with Iran," Agence France Presse, 22 May 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "Plans for Second Contract With Iran Revealed," Interfax (Moscow), 22 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950522000335, 22 May 1995; RIA News Agency, 22 May 1995; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **23 May 1995**

Viktor Mikhailov, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy, says 20 to 40 Iranians will be trained in Russia.

—Michael Mihalka, "Russia To Continue Nuclear Cooperation With Iran," *Omri Daily Digest*, 23 May 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

#### **24 May 1995**

A top German official says Iranian nuclear power plants would not be a threat to peace. "Plants placed at the disposal of Iran are not capable of producing atomic weapons," says Rainer Funke, parliamentary secretary of the Ministry of Justice and member of the Bundestag.

—"German Official Holds Talks With Velayati; States Eagerness for 'Friendly Relations'," IRNA (Tehran), 24 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS 19950524000289, 24 May 1995.

#### **24 May 1995**

A Russian Foreign Ministry official says Russia will not recall its nuclear experts from the Bushehr nuclear power plant, despite fears expressed by US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns that they could be a source of "leaks of information on nuclear military technology." The unnamed diplomat says such leaks are prevented by the procedure Russia uses to select nuclear experts to send to Iran as well as the peaceful nature of their work in Iran. "It is more in the interest of Russia than...the United States that no new nuclear states should appear along the

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borders of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States," he says.

—Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, "Diplomatic Panorama," Interfax (Moscow), 24 May 1995; in "Nuclear Specialists Not to Return From Iran," FBIS Document FTS19950524000371, 24 May 1995.

### **30 May 1995**

The Russian ambassador to Iran, Sergey Tretyakov, says "we are convinced that Iran has no ambitions in the nuclear field." "Even if they had, I think it would take them 50 years," he says.

—Robert Fisk, "Russian Envoy Downplays Iran's Nuclear Ambitions," *The Independent* (London), 30 May 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970422002946, 22 April 1997.

### **30 May 1995**

Asked by a Russian reporter why Iran needs a nuclear power plant when it is a major exporter of gas and oil, Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, responds, "We are a developing country; we need to expand our energy base. You can't rely entirely on oil and gas alone." He says Iran is also building hydroelectric and thermal power stations, and hopes to get one-fifth of its energy from nuclear energy.

—Leonid Mlechin, "Iran is Happy That Yeltsin and Clinton Could Not Agree, and Offers Moscow Alliance and Friendship," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 30 May 1995; in "Iran Hails Russian-US 'Confrontation,'" FBIS Document FTS19970422002948, 22 April 1997.

### **30 May 1995**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says China has supplied Iran with one small research reactor and will supply another. [Note: Iran's planned nuclear cooperation with China seems to have been scaled back in recent days. On 18 May 1995, Amrollahi said Iran hoped to buy two or three nuclear power plants from China. See 21 May 1995 entry for a report that Iran's nuclear cooperation with China was near collapse. See 1 June 1995 for a report that Iran signed a deal for two new Chinese reactors.]

—Leonid Mlechin, "Iran is Happy That Yeltsin and Clinton Could Not Agree, and Offers Moscow Alliance and Friendship," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 30 May 1995; in "Iran Hails Russian-US 'Confrontation,'" FBIS Document FTS19970422002948, 22 April 1997.

### **1 June 1995**

The *Iran Brief* reports that Iran has signed an agreement with China for the sale of nuclear power reactors, according to Iranian news sources. The two new reactors are expected to cost between \$800 million and \$900 million. Referring to previous oppositional sentiment expressed by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Qian Qichen, the Chinese foreign minister, says, "There is no international law or international regulation or international agreement that prohibits such cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy." China has helped Iran in the past with construction of mining, milling, and enrichment facilities for Iran's uranium supplies, and began construction of a 27MW research reactor in Isfahan. [This probably refers to a 27kWt reactor that China built at Isfahan. The 27MW reactor proposed for installation at Isfahan by China but never realized should not be confused with the 27kWt Chinese-supplied reactor at Isfahan that went critical March 1994. For entries on the 27 kWt reactor, see 1991, September 1991, March 1994, and 7 September 1995. For entries on the 27MW reactor, see 21 January 1990, 14 March 1990, June 1990, and November 1991. See 30 May 1995 entry for a report that Iran was going to buy only one additional reactor from China.]

—"Chinese Reactor Sale Goes Forward," *The Iran Brief*, 1 June 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **1 June 1995**

An Iranian radio station reports that Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said Iran

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would open three more yellowcake milling facilities in addition to the one at Saghand. Two sites were identified as Bandar-e Abbas and Bandar-e Lengeh.

—Al J. Venter, "Iran's Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion Or Ominous Truth?," *Jane's International Defense Review*, September 1997, pp. 29-31.

#### **2 June 1995**

A report by Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission for Ecological Safety, quotes the additional protocol to the Iran-Russia nuclear contract of January 1995, showing that the two sides had in fact discussed the sale of a centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment and called for the signing of a contract within six months for the construction of a uranium silo. The protocol, signed by the heads of Iran's and Russia's atomic energy agencies, Reza Amrollahi and Viktor Mikhailov, also calls for a contract to be signed in the first quarter of 1995 for the delivery of 2,000 tons of natural uranium. [Note: The protocol contradicts Amrollahi's previous statement that Iran never sought a centrifuge. See 11 May 1995. Also, the uranium silos are probably the silos whose sale Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to cancel on 11 May 1995 because they represent a military aspect of the nuclear deal.] Yablokov also asserts that the Russia nuclear deal violates the 1992 framework agreement with Iran (Decree No. 592 of 17 August 1992), because that agreement called for the supply to Iran of two medium reactors VVER-440 [440MW], not the 1000MW VVER-1000 reactors.

—Aleksey Yablokov, "Atomic Energy Ministry Confused Its Own Interests With National Interests in Signing the Protocol with Iran," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 2 June 1995; in "Iran Nuclear Deal Not in 'National Interest'," FBIS Document FTS19970423001537, 23 April 1997.

#### **8-9 June 1995**

*Al-Sharq* of Doha reports that during the Shah's rule, Iran "conducted studies and research in the nuclear field in violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty." The report assumes "remnants" of past nuclear weapons design activity are still present in Iran, and says "it is possible that Iran has unassembled equipment, radioactive materials, and other devices it had bought." The report also states the 1991 Persian Gulf war may have convinced Iran of the need to obtain nuclear weapons for deterring any future aggression against it. However, because Iran gives the development and modernization of its army a higher priority than its nuclear weapons program, future nuclear weapons production will be "difficult to achieve." The report concludes: "Allowing Iran to obtain the technology for the production of nuclear weapons will not serve Russia's interests."

—"Iranian Nuclear Project, US-Russian Factors Analyzed," *Al-Sharq* (Doha), 8 June 1995-6 September 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 10 August 1995.

#### **12 June 1995**

At a meeting with leaders of the Group of Seven (G-7) Russian President Boris Yeltsin says the international community should be watchful of Iran's nuclear research activities. The leaders at the meeting agree to stop any assistance to Iran's civilian nuclear needs if Iran attempts to develop nuclear weapons.

—"G-7, Russia Concerned about Iran's Nuclear Intentions," Xinhua News Agency, 17 June 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **12 June 1995**

Evgenii Mikerin, head of the Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Weapons Production Facilities Directorate at Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy, says that the US opposition to the Russian-Iranian reactor deal stems from a desire to secure the Iranian market for itself. In support of his argument, Mikerin points to US intercession in North Korea, which resulted in the cancellation of a previously existing Russian-North Korean reactor deal. Mikerin stresses the

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particular importance of the Iranian deal as a means to keep Russian nuclear scientists, designers, and equipment manufacturers employed. According to Mikerin, Russia hopes to provide Iran with additional reactors and a complete fuel cycle in the future. According to Mikerin, Russia is to provide Iran with reactor fuel and reprocessing services, but Iran must accept the return of reprocessed materials, including waste products. The United States is threatening to terminate "certain bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements" and block Russian participation in the G-7 industrial forum unless Russia abandons the Bushehr deal. The United States is also warning Moscow that the deal could jeopardize current negotiations aimed at reaching a "broad nuclear cooperation agreement" for the creation of joint ventures to finance new Russian reactors. The cooperation agreement could also lead to the sale of up to \$100 million in Russian nuclear equipment in the United States. Mikerin says that Russia would not work toward the implementation of disarmament agreements until the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission firmly settles issues surrounding the Iran deal. Once this has been achieved, Mikerin expects "an upswing in disarmament activities."

—Gregory Polyanichko, "On Russia's Nuclear Reactor Sale To Iran, Ukrainian Relations," *Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor*, 12 June 1995, pp. 12-15; Evan S. Medeiros, "Clinton, Yeltsin Continue Debate Over Russia-Iran Nuclear Deal," *Arms Control Today*, June 1995, pp. 20, 23; Evan S. Medeiros, "China, Russia Plan To Go Ahead With Nuclear Reactor Sales To Iran," *Arms Control Today*, May 1995, p. 23.

#### 15 June 1995

*Foreign Report* reports that Russia and Iran are negotiating a "nuclear powered desalination plant" as part of the complex at Bushehr. The project, included in the January 1995 Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation agreement, would be the first of its kind outside of the former Soviet Union. Officials from the two countries have discussed the Russian APWS-40 desalination system and BN-350 reactor, produced by Russia's OKMB Mechanical Engineering.

—"Iran's Odd Reactor," *Foreign Report*, 15 June 1995, p. 24.

#### 17 June 1995

The chairman's statement from the Group of Seven meeting in Halifax, Canada, which included Russian President Boris Yeltsin, calls "on all states to avoid any collaboration with Iran which might contribute to the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability."

—"Reportage Continues on G-7 Halifax Summit; 'Text' of Chairman's Statement," Kyodo (Tokyo), 17 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970604001688, 4 June 1997.

#### 17 June 1995

Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, says Russia will consider at the 29-30 June meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission a US recommendation that nuclear fuel supplied for the Bushehr nuclear power plant be no more than 20% enriched uranium. [See 11 May 1995 for more information on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.] He also says there are plans for Russia to conduct inspections anytime at the plant. He denies that Russia plans to build a plant for extracting uranium, but confirms that Iran asked for this, as recorded in the protocol of the talks in January 1995. [Note: This may contradict a statement by Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, on 11 May 1995 that Iran did not seek a gas centrifuge.] Mikhailov also says Iran has asked Russia to sell it 2,000 tons of natural uranium, but the two sides could not agree on a price. [Note: See 2 June 1995.]

—"Russia, US to Consider Nuclear Material Use," *Interfax* (Moscow), 17 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950617000072, 17 June 1995.

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**22 June 1995**

Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani marks the completion of the first phase of a nuclear research center in Bonab, East Azerbaijan province, which reportedly can be used for radiating agricultural products. It was paid for with 306 billion Rials and \$200,000 in foreign exchange disbursements.

—"Reportage on Iranian President Rafsanjani Visit; Nuclear Research Center Opened," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 22 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950622000242, 22 June 1995.

**22 June 1995**

Russian nuclear experts say it would be easier in some ways to build a new nuclear power plant at Bushehr than to finish the one left partially built by a German contractor. Russian experts inspecting the site say the main problem is the lack of documentation on the site, as the German contractor did not leave it all with Iran. As many as 220 Russian experts have been inspecting the site and collecting data for further design. This stage of work should be finished in June, says one Russian working at the site, after which about 50 to 60 Russian experts will remain at the site. Another problem, Russian experts say, is the plant's 1970s design does not meet current safety standards.

—Boris Konovalov, "Maybe Iran Does Want to Develop a Nuclear Bomb. But It Will Hardly Be Able to Do So in the Foreseeable Future," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 22 June 1995; in "Iran Nuclear Details Not Yet Finalized."

**22 June 1995**

V.V. Krotov, general director of Atomredmetzoloto, says Iran asked his company to study Iran's potential for mining uranium. Krotov says Iran has two uranium deposits, but they would require a 300-meter-deep mine and would not be worth mining anywhere else in the world. This would only produce about 50 tons of uranium a year, he says, while the Bushehr plant would need three times that. Krotov says his company agreed to modify Iranian designs for a mine and a uranium-enrichment plant. "But there was no contract," he says, "only a protocol of intent to conduct negotiations." [Note: For more information on the protocol, see 5, 11, 17, and 18 May and 2 June 1995.]

—Boris Konovalov, "Maybe Iran Does Want to Develop a Nuclear Bomb; But It Will Hardly Be Able to Do So in the Foreseeable Future," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 22 June 1995; in "Iran Nuclear Details Not Yet Finalized."

**22 June 1995**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, refutes Western allegations that assistance from Russia will result in the development of nuclear weapons in Iran. Amrollahi says Iran is "completely open to international monitoring" and will place "any facility" at the International Atomic Energy Agency's disposal for inspections at "any time."

—Boris Konovalov, "Paper: Iran Nuclear Deal Details Not Yet Finalized," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 22 June 1995, p. 3; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 22 June 1995; Vadim Markushin, "Mehdi Safari: 'Iran Has An Abhorrence Of Nuclear Weapons'," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12 September 1995, p. 3; in "Iranian Envoy Comments On Bushehr Nuclear Agreement," FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-176, 12 September 1995.

**26 June 1995**

An unnamed high-ranking Russian diplomat denies that the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which will meet 29-30 June, will make a secret agreement for when Russia will end military cooperation with Iran.

—Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, "Diplomatic Panorama," Interfax (Moscow), 26 June 1995; in "Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Not to Sign Document on Iran," FBIS Document FTS19950626000230, 26 June 1995.

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### **29 June 1995**

At a meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, US Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin decide that Russia's nuclear deal with Iran will be discussed only in one-on-one meetings between the two. Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says "an atomic power station with two or four units will be constructed and there is going to be no wavering about this."

—Igor Barsukov and Pavel Vanichkin, "Further on Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Meeting 'No Wavering' Over Iran Nuclear Deal," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 29 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950629000346, 29 June 1995.

### **30 June 1995**

Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and US Vice President Al Gore announce that they discussed in detail today the issue of Russia's nuclear deal with Iran. Chernomyrdin says many issues need to be discussed further and that Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran will not lead to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Gore says the United States will give Russia confidential information that shows why the United States is concerned with the deal.

—Igor Barsukov and Pavel Vanichkin, "Further on Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Meeting; Chernomyrdin, Gore Discuss Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 30 June 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950630000433, 30 June 1995.

### **30 June 1995**

The *Financial Times* reports that in July 1995, the International Institute of Strategic Studies will release a research paper by Ahmed Hashim on the Iranian government's capability to gain and keep support for nuclear weapons development. Hashim, a senior official at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC claims "intense political factionalism" reduces Iran's capacity to develop nuclear weapons, because government must have the "ability to reach a consensus on the need for nuclearisation."

—Bruce Clark, "Divided Iran 'In Political And Economic Crisis'," *Financial Times*, 30 June 1995, p. 4.

### **July 1995**

*Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy* reports that four senior officials of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Information, including Minister Ali Fallahian, defect from Iran. [Note: Fallahian ran against President Khatami for the presidency of Iran in 2001 and as of 9 August 2002 was still in Iran. See 20 April 1995.]

—"Iran, Confronting Internal Chaos, Strengthens Defenses and Forges New Strategic Links," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, July-August 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

### **2 July 1995**

Iranian President Rafsanjani says Iran does not have a nuclear weapon program and that this was verified by International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. Rafsanjani believes that Russia should proceed with the sale of nuclear technology to Iran despite the "inappropriate" opposition from the United States.

—"US Vice President Leaves Russia After Visit," Reuters (Moscow), 1 July 1995; in Executive News Service, 1 July 1995; "Iran Expects Russian Nuclear Deal To Go Ahead," Reuters (Washington), 2 July 1995; in Executive News Service, 3 July 1995.

### **3 July 1995**

At a press conference in Moscow, International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix says that IAEA inspections did not detect any evidence of nuclear-military programs in Iran. Blix says that he does not view US opposition to the Russian-Iranian agreement as interference in the internal affairs of the two countries, and that "such contracts must be open to the public, since it is the matter of nuclear safety for many countries." According to Blix, new restrictions "on selling nuclear materials or technologies for their production" are complicating current

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discussions between Russia and the US on Russian sales of enriched uranium and the Russian-Iranian deal. The restrictions did not exist when Russia and Iran signed the agreement in early 1995. Under the Russian-Iranian agreement, the first VVER-1000 type [1000MW] reactor should be activated by the year 2000.

—Yuri Kozlov, "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 4 July 1995; Veronika Romanenkova, "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation, Offers To Supervise Iran Construction," ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 3 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 3 July 1995; "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation, No Traces Of 'Military Programs' In Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 3 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 3 July 1995; Anna Bakina, "Nuclear Energy Minister On Talks With Blix," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 7 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-131, 7 July 1995.

#### **4 July 1995**

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix meets with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in Moscow. Kozyrev states that Russia welcomes IAEA supervision of Russian programs to construct nuclear reactors in Iran, India, and elsewhere. Blix says that the IAEA is ready to oversee implementation of the Russian-Iran agreement on the completion of the nuclear power station in Bushehr. According to Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov, Russian supervision of the construction of "two to four sets" at Bushehr may be increased.

—Yuri Kozlov, "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 4 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 4 July 1995; Veronika Romanenkova, "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation, Offers To Supervise Iran Construction," ITAR-TASS World Service (Moscow), 3 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 3 July 1995; "Kozyrev, IAEA Director Discuss Nuclear Cooperation, No Traces Of 'Military Programs' In Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 3 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-128, 3 July 1995; Anna Bakina, "Nuclear Energy Minister On Talks With Blix," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 7 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-131, 7 July 1995.

#### **5 July 1995**

ITAR-TASS reports that Iranian and Russian nuclear experts are scheduled to meet this week to discuss fuel options for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The experts will choose between two Russian nuclear fuel plants, one at Elektrostal and the other at Novosibirsk. The provision of fuel is part of Russia's January nuclear deal with Iran.

—Veronika Romanenkova, "Russian, Iranian Nuclear Experts To Discuss Fuel Supplies," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 5 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970417001361, 17 April 1997.

#### **7 July 1995**

China plans to supply Iran with nuclear reactors, scientific and technical training, expertise and components for missile production, and materials relevant to chemical weapons production. According to Western intelligence sources, China already supplies Iran with its "strongest and biggest nuclear backing."

—Aluf Ben, "Maneuvering Between Giants," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 7 July 1995, p. B1; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-133, 7 July 1995.

#### **8 July 1995**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says the United States is welcome to submit a proposal for control of nuclear activity at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Mikhailov, Iranian Official Discuss Reactor Further on Mikhailov Comments," IRNA (Tehran), 8 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950708000330, 8 July 1995.

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### **9 July 1995**

Kazakhstani and US officials report that in 1992-1993 Iran was seeking an agreement with Kazakhstan on purchases of low-enriched uranium (LEU) and beryllium metal from the Ust-Kamenogorsk fuel fabrication facility. According to Ergali Bayadilov, Director General of the Kazakh Atomic Energy Agency, Iran wanted to purchase safeguarded LEU to fuel the soon-to-be supplied Russian VVER-1000 [1000MW] reactor. The Ust-Kamenogorsk facility produces UO<sub>2</sub> pellets for Soviet-design VVER-1000 reactors. Kazakhstan's "chief official for nuclear materials accounting and control" and US officials says that there was no substance to media reports that Iran had sought to smuggle or steal over 500kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Ust-Kamenogorsk, material that was later transferred to the United States in "Project Sapphire" [also referred to as Operation Sapphire]. According to a US official, the HEU, which had been intended for use as fuel in Soviet submarines, remained in storage at the Ust-Kamenogorsk site because the facility does not have the capacity to process HEU into LEU. US officials also say that Iran was interested in purchasing beryllium from a metal processing plant located near the Ust-Kamenogorsk fuel fabricating facility. Iran might have used the beryllium in research reactors to be supplied later by Russia. However, the Ust-Kamenogorsk beryllium is pure enough to be utilized in nuclear and missile programs as well. [Note: See 1992 entry.]

—Mark Hibbs, "Kazakhs Say Iran Sought LEU For VVER, Not 'Sapphire' HEU," *Nuclear Fuel*, 17 July 1995, pp. 11-12.

### **11 July 1995**

Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani says, "The American people should rest assured that we are not pursuing, not on the path of acquiring nuclear weapons. The benefits of nuclear technology, of course, are numerous, and we cannot forgo other uses of peaceful nuclear technology."

—"Rafsanjani Views US, Other Issues," IRNA (Tehran), 11 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950711000440, 11 July 1995.

### **13 July 1995**

The Russian Federal Nuclear Center in Snezhinsk makes public that it has developed a technique using environmental monitoring that can expose clandestine nuclear weapons manufacturing around the world. According to Snezhinsk nuclear scientists, the new method has a "100% certainty of detection," and allows them to "distinguish between peaceful and military activities." The new technique will reportedly help identify whether or not countries like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea maintain undeclared nuclear weapons programs.

—Radio Rossii Network (Moscow), 8 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-131, 8 July 1995, "IAEA Delegation Visits Center in Snezhinsk."; "Unique Method Will Identify Nuclear Weapons," Russian Television Network (Moscow), 13 July 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-142, 13 July 1995.

### **29 July 1995**

The director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguard division, identified as H. Tanei, says in a letter to Iran's IAEA mission that there is no evidence Iran has received nuclear materials.

—"IAEA Said Unable to Verify Nuclear Material," IRNA (Tehran), 29 July 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950729000407, 29 July 1995.

### **August 1995**

Russia signs a contract with Iran to sell two VVER 440MW reactors that use enriched uranium, which Iran needs for nuclear weapons development. [Note: ITAR-TASS reports that a deal is signed on 5 September 1995 for two 440MW reactors. See 5 September 1995 entry. See 29 August 1995 for the denial by Russian and Iranian officials of a deal for additional reactors.] The reactors will probably be installed at the Neka complex, which was unknown to the International Atomic Energy Agency before now. Iran and Russia insist that there are no illicit activities

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involved in the reactor transactions. The IAEA maintains that Iran's recent activities do not signal a move in a dangerous direction, but others contend that the IAEA is repeating the same error it made with Iraq. The deal is made after a visit to Moscow by an Iranian delegation, and it is signed during a reciprocal visit by a Russian delegation to Tehran later in August. [Note: This probably refers to the Russian delegation to Iran led by Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov. See 17 August 1995 entry.] The Iranian delegation, which included Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran, and Sayyid Mohammed Rasuli, head of the Isfahan Nuclear Center, went to Moscow to work out details concerning the Iranian-Russian deal for the completion of two reactors at Iran's Bushehr power plant. [Note: See 7 August 1995 entry for more on the meeting.] The *Sunday Telegraph* of London reports that the Neka facility, located in an underground bunker, "is one of a network of highly sensitive Iranian nuclear research establishments," and a part of Iran's nuclear weapons program, dubbed "The Great Secret Project." US State Department spokesperson Nicholas Burns says the State Department cannot confirm reports about the Neka deal, stating that "We have seen the reports...We can't confirm them; we don't have independent verification of them." According to an unnamed US official, the Clinton administration was unaware of the Neka deal, but will conduct an investigation.

—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July 1995-August 1995, pp. 21-26; Con Coughlin, "Unveiled: Iran's Bomb Plans," *Sunday Telegraph*, 24 September 1995; Con Coughlin, "Russia Set To Sell 2 Nuclear Reactors To Iranian Regime," *Washington Times*, 28 August 1995, pp. A1, A18; Martin Sieff, "Report Of Reactor Sale Leads To Probe," *Washington Times*, 29 August 1995, p. A7.

#### **August 1995**

South African Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo announces South Africa has concluded a bilateral agreement with Iran to establish nuclear technology assistance "for peaceful purposes." Nzo says South Africa's cooperation with Iran is "within the scope" of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Israeli Foreign Ministry Deputy Director General Zvi Mazael says he will inform Nzo that the South African agreement constitutes a violation of the US embargo on Iran. —"South African FM To Visit Israel," UPI, 12 September 1995; in Executive News Service, 12 September 1995; "Sale Of Nuclear Secrets To Iran Denied," SAFM Radio Network (Johannesburg), 22 August 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-016-L, 22 August 1995.

#### **August 1995**

After quarterly International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of Iranian nuclear complexes over the past year, IAEA spokesman David Kyd reports that the inspectors "haven't seen anything to indicate" Iran has a nuclear weapons program. According to one US official, "there has been no material breach of the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] treaty per se." However, Kyd notes, "We don't give the Iranians a clean bill of health; we just haven't seen anything to indicate otherwise." The IAEA intends to implement new, "stronger" inspection measures, called the "93+2" program. Under the new program, the IAEA will ask countries for more detailed nuclear import and export reports and the authorization to install "special monitoring equipment...that would trigger an alarm in Vienna" in case of nuclear activity at a site. The program will be used only at nuclear facilities the IAEA has permission to inspect. Kyd says Iran is expected to accept the new program if it is approved by the Board of Governors and if all other countries are subject to the same safeguards.

—"IAEA Seeks Enhanced Inspections In Iran," *Risk Report*, August 1995, p. 5.

#### **August 1995**

US officials say Iran needs eight to ten years to develop a nuclear bomb

—"A Nuclear Race Between Iraq, Iran and Libya?," *Risk Report*, August 1995, p. 5.

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### August 1995

*Priroda* of Moscow publishes an interview with Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov in which he discusses in detail Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran. Mikhailov says Russia's nuclear contract with Iran does not violate the 1992 framework agreement. He says the agreement refers to "average-capacity" reactors, not any specific wattage, "so we have no violation of the agreement." [Note: Mikhailov's comments on this matter appear to be in response to an article by Aleksey Yablokov, chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council's Interdepartmental Commission for Ecological Safety. See 2 June 1995.] According to Mikhailov, the German Siemens firm completed 70% of the work on the first reactor at Bushehr and 45% of the second reactor. [Note: In January, an Iranian official said the reactors were 90 and 60% complete, respectively. See 7 January 1995.] Mikhailov says there are two research reactors operating in Iran, one built by the Chinese and the other built by the United States. He also says Iran has four nuclear facilities that produce isotopes for agriculture and medicine. Mikhailov asserts it would be economical for Iran to extract its own uranium, but its ore reserves are complex with little uranium content. He says Iran approached Russia about building a uranium mine, and Russia replied that the establishment of a fuel cycle including extraction and enrichment of uranium should be discussed after at least two of the reactors at Bushehr are finished. Russia has a \$1 million contract with Iran, he says, to examine how Iranian uranium can be best processed. The contract expires at the end of the month, he says, and he expects it to be terminated. Mikhailov says the Russian government authorized the sale of 2,000 tons of uranium to Iran, but the authorization expires at the end of the year and Russia and Iran have not been able to agree on a price. "It is unfortunate that we could not conclude a contract," Mikhailov says. "They insisted on their low prices. Perhaps because they do not have any special need for uranium at present." [Note: It is not clear from the interview when the Russian government authorized the sale of uranium, perhaps as part of the framework agreement in 1992 or as part of the 1995 contract.] Russia asked Iran why it needed that amount of uranium, Mikhailov says, to which Iran replied that "they wanted to have customer-supplied raw materials to supply research reactors with fuel." —I.N. Arutyunyan, "Nuclear Cooperation with Iran: The View From Ordynka," August 1995, *Priroda* (Moscow); in "Mikhailov Interview on Iran Nuclear Deal," FBIS Document FTS19970326001456, 26 March 1997.

### 1 August 1995

At a meeting of the ASEAN security forum in Brunei, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher tells Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev that the United States sees no changes in Iran's policy that lessen concerns about its possible work on nuclear arms. Kozyrev responds that Russia understands the US concerns and that the issue should be reviewed further in talks between the United States and Russia. But he says Russia has no proof Iran is creating nuclear arms.

—"Further on Kozyrev, Christopher Talks in Brunei; US Urges Halting Deal With Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 1 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950801000496, 1 August 1995.

### 5 August 1995

*Janes Defence Weekly* reports that more than 25 nations, including the United States, Russia, and Eastern European countries, are scheduled to meet in Paris under the umbrella organization, New Forum, to discuss military and dual-use export regulations and related topics such as pre-notification. The United States has made pre-conference proposals calling for a ban on sales of nuclear related items to Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and for multilateral negotiations regarding sensitive dual-use items. Russia's membership in the New Forum, the successor organization to COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls), was recently approved after Russia agreed to conclude arms sales to Iran currently in progress, but not to undertake any further trade with Iran. Membership in the New Forum demands accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as agreement to abide by chemical and biological weapons accords,

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but does not allow states a unilateral right to veto a given export.

—Barbara Starr, "Nations Meet To Discuss New Forum For COCOM," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 5 August 1995, p. 5.

#### **7 August 1995**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov meets with an Iranian delegation. Both sides agree that a plan for funding construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant should be concluded as soon as possible. A survey of the site by Russian experts will be finished in August or September. A Russian official says Russia and Iran will soon sign amendments to the January 1995 nuclear contract. The most significant amendment, says Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Lev Ryabev, is a provision for used nuclear fuel to be returned to Russia, where it will be processed at the Mayak plant in the Chelyabinsk region, and temporarily stored at the ore-dressing plant in Krasnoyarsk-26.

—Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, "Diplomatic Panorama," Interfax (Moscow), 7 August 1995; in "Nuclear Energy Ministry Delegation to Visit Iran; Project to Proceed After Amendments," FBIS Document FTS19950807000360, 7 August 1995; "Talks Move Onto Practical Level," *Rossiyskiye Vesti* (Moscow), 9 August 1995; in "Atomic Energy Minister, Iranian Team Discuss Bushehr Plans," FBIS Document FTS19950809000010, 9 August 1995.

#### **8 August 1995**

A Belarusian Foreign Ministry senior official refutes charges that Belarus may participate in nuclear deals with Iran. The senior official says, "The sales of nuclear arms components or technological cooperation in that area have never been mentioned." [Note: See similar statements in Late 1997 and 13 March 1998 and contradictory information in December 2001.]

—"Chyhir On Arms Supply For Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 8 August 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-016-L, 8 August 1995.

#### **9 August 1995**

Israeli television reports that Iran has been attempting to infiltrate Israel's Dimona nuclear complex in order to obtain information about the facility. The Iranians reportedly "recruit people and infiltrate them as innocent workers in the nuclear reactor."

—Roni Daniye, "Iran 'Trying to Recruit' Assassins To Kill Rabin," Channel 2 Television Network (Jerusalem), 9 August 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-154, 9 August 1995.

#### **9 August 1995**

*The Jerusalem Post* reports that Russia will continue with plans to construct a nuclear power station in Iran, but will require that Iran return spent fuel from the light water reactors it will use in the plant at Bushehr.

—"Russia, Iran Talk Nukes," *The Jerusalem Post*, 9 August 1995, p. 5; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **15 August 1995**

At a George Washington University forum entitled "Preventing Super-Terrorism," leading Israeli nuclear physicist Yuval Neeman recommends that Israel "should abandon its present stance and explicitly go nuclear" if Tehran obtains a nuclear bomb. Asserting that an Iranian nuclear capability would place the world "on the brink of a new holocaust," Neeman argues that Israel would need a credible and effective second strike capability in order to deter the nuclear threat from Iran.

—"Neeman Ponders Iranian Nuclear Threat," *Iran Brief*, 9 October 1995, p. 3.

#### **17 August 1995**

A Russian delegation led by Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov visits Tehran to partially

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renegotiate the January 1995 contract providing for the construction of Bushehr nuclear power station's first unit in Iran. In particular, Minatom seeks to guarantee that Russian nuclear fuel burned in Iranian reactors will be returned to Russia as spent fuel for reprocessing. According to the contract, Russia will begin supplying fuel when the power station is completed in 2001, and will continue for 30 years. The installation of the Russian VVER-1000 [1000MW] reactor, shipment of the fuel, and loading the fuel into the reactor will be under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Intending to develop closer relations with Russia, Iran expresses interest in building a second unit at Bushehr using another 1,000MW VVER-1000 light water reactor (LWR), and a third and fourth unit employing 440MW VVER-440 reactors. Successful talks may prompt amendments to the original contract, potentially raising the contract's estimated cost to over \$800 million.

—"Minatom Tries To Raise The Cost Of The Deal With Iran," *Segodnya*, 18 August 1995, p. 3; Interfax, Aleksei Kondratyev, "'Repercussions' of Nuclear Deal With Iran Viewed," Voice of Russia World Service (Moscow), 8 August 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-153, 8 August 1995; Anna Bakina, "Nuclear Energy Ministry Delegation To Visit Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 7 August 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-152, 7 August 1995; *Segodnya*, "Russian Minatom Delegation Will Visit Iran," 15 August 1995, p. 1.

### **18 August 1995**

Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov says construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is planned to begin in November or December. [Note: He may be referring to the beginning of construction on two additional proposed reactors, not the original reactor. See 5 September 1995 entry for a similar statement by a Russian official.] Nearly 200 Russian scientists have been working on the reactor since January, and 3,000 additional workers are to be part of the contingency as well.

—Oleg Kuzmin, "Team to Discuss 'Peaceful' Nuclear Use With Iran Power Plant Construction in November," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 18 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950818000196, 18 August 1995; "Russian: Nuclear Plant Construction to Begin within Three Months," The Associated Press, 20 August 1995, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **19 August 1995**

South African Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Pik Botha says that March 1995 talks with Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, had covered a previously discarded scheme for South Africa to sell enriched uranium to Iran. [Note: See March 1995 entry.]

—Edyth Bulbring, "US Concerns Over Nuclear Links With Iran Viewed," *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 20 August 1995, p. 2; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-016-L, 20 August 1995.

### **20 August 1995**

The United States urges the South African government not to share nuclear-related information with Iran. The United States concern was raised by a March 1995 meeting on nuclear issues between South African Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Pik Botha and Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Acting on British and German information regarding Iran's military ambitions, South African Foreign Affairs Minister Alfred Nzo wrote in an unsent 13 April 1995 letter to Botha, "I believe any cooperation in the nuclear field between Iran and South Africa has the potential to damage our international reputation as a responsible possessor of advanced technologies." The letter was never sent because of the belief that talks focused only on nuclear medical isotopes. [Note: On 19 August 1995, Botha said that talks with Amrollahi had also covered a previously discarded scheme for South Africa to sell enriched uranium to Iran.]

—Edyth Bulbring, "US Concerns Over Nuclear Links With Iran Viewed," *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 20 August 1995, p. 2; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-016-L, 20 August 1995.

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### **21 August 1995**

South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo denies reports that his country is giving nuclear secrets to Iran, but that the cooperation is within the scope of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. "What was at stake was isotopes for peaceful purposes," he says. The two countries concluded a nuclear technology deal involving isotopes for the use of peaceful purposes. [Note: See March, 19 August, and 20 August 1995 entries for more on Iran-South African nuclear cooperation.]

—"First Shipment of Iranian Oil to Arrive in Aug; Nzo Denies RSA Selling Nuclear Secrets," SAFM Radio Network (Johannesburg), 22 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950822000239, 22 August 1995; Reuters, 21 August 1995; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

### **24 August 1995**

Atomic Energy Deputy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov signs an extension to a January 1995 contract with Iran. The contract is amended to include the supply of Russian nuclear fuel to Iran for 10 years. The amendment adds \$300 million to the \$800 million Russian- Iranian nuclear power contract. The nuclear fuel will be provided by the Novobinsk nuclear plant and returned for reprocessing and storage at the RT-2 nuclear facility in Zhelenogorsk (formerly Krasnoyarsk-26). In response to allegations that Russia may secretly provide Iran with nuclear technologies, Russian Nuclear Power Minister Viktor Mikhailov explains that there is only one contract, signed between Russia and Iran for sale of one VVER-1000 [1000MW] reactor and the provision of its nuclear fuel supply. [Note: See 29 August 1995 entry for a similar statement by Mikhailov and Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, that only one contract exists.] Mikhailov adds that the contract includes "the eventual supply of up to four reactors for the Bushehr site." [Note: On 29 April 1995, Mikhailov says there is only one contract for the construction of the first reactor at Bushehr.] Mikhailov, however, is uncertain about a time frame for the signing of contracts for the additional units.

—"Russian Contract Extended To Fuel," 1 October 1995, *Nuclear News*, October 1995, p. 47; "Delegation In Iran Signs Contract on Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 24 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950824000462, 24 August 1995.

### **28 August 1995**

Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov says Iran will pay the ministry \$20 million this year for the work of Russian experts at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Iran to Pay \$20 Million For Bushehr Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 28 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950828000405, 28 August 1995.

### **29 August 1995**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov deny a report of a secret deal to build two nuclear reactors in Iran. "There is in face just one contract," Mikhailov says, "to finish the construction of the first reactor unit at Bushehr--and the work is scheduled to be completed in four-and-one-half years." [Note: See August and 5 September 1995 entries for reports that a deal was signed for two 440MW reactors.]

—Anna Bakina, "Moscow Denies Secret Nuclear Deals With Iran; Minister Calls Report 'Disgraceful,'" 29 August 1995, ITAR-TASS; in FBIS Document FTS19950829000226, 29 August 1995; "Nuclear Energy Official Denies Deal With Russia," IRNA (Tehran), 29 August 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950829000219, 29 August 1995.

### **30 August 1995**

Waldo Stumpf, of the South African Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), assures a US delegation led by Hazel O' Leary, US Energy Secretary, that South Africa will not provide nuclear weapons technology to Iran.

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—"South Africa; Atomic Energy Body Tells USA Nuclear Weapons Know-How will not be Sold to Iran," British Broadcasting Corporation, 30 August 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **September 1995**

*Risk Report* states that pro-Israeli lobbying organizations such as the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) view the United States as the key to halting Iranian nuclear development, and have been urging legislation to penalize foreign companies trading with Iran. In April 1995, AIPAC supported a bill by US Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) to ban trade between US companies and firms abroad known to export sensitive technology to Iran and Libya. One Pentagon official observes that this legislation "scared the White House to death," prompting a ban on trade with Iran. [Note: See 30 April 1995.] Fearing a nuclear-capable Iran, an anonymous Israeli government analyst explains that "in strategic terms, Iran has become the most important threat" to Israeli security. Efraim Kam, a political observer at Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center for International Studies, contends that the threat from Iran will grow in the near future due to the end of the Iran-Iraq War and because "Iran is run by a radical regime that desires to change the status quo."

—"Israelis See Iran As A Nuclear Menace," *Risk Report*, September 1995, p. 9.

### **September 1995**

Eduard Akopyan, the director of the All-Russian Industrial Association Zarubezhatomenergostroy (company for nuclear power engineering abroad), states that Russia will provide Iran with the results of an assessment of the incomplete Bushehr nuclear station and construction designs of Unit 1. In October 1995, a \$800 million contract for the completion of the first 1,000MW reactor will officially enter into force. Russia will have 55 months to complete the construction of Unit 1. Spent fuel from the reactor will be returned to Russia for reprocessing, with the vitrified waste returned to Iran. If the project is successful, the contract will be extended to include the completion of Bushehr-2. [Note: This may conform with a 7 September 1995 statement by a Russian official that a second and third reactor will be built at Bushehr only after the completion of the first reactor. Also, on 24 August 1994, Viktor Mikhailov, Russian minister of atomic energy, said the amended Iranian-Russian nuclear contract may call for the eventual construction of up to four reactors.] Due to seismological instability, Russia and Iran decided to relocate to Bushehr two VVER-440 [440MW light water] nuclear reactors originally planned for a site in northern Iran. He adds that Russia has not signed a secret contract for military nuclear cooperation with Iran and all contracts are for strict peaceful use and that they are all under strict IAEA control.

—Boris Konovalov, *Nucleonics Week*, "Russia On Track To Restart Work On Iran's Bushehr-1 In October," 7 September 1995, pp. 7-8; Interfax, 5 September 1995; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **September 1995**

*Risk Report* reports that Western intelligence sources said Iran has obtained gas centrifuge design data and is now seeking component technology that will enable its military to enrich uranium for a nuclear weapons program. Particularly worrying, said senior US officials, according to the report, is a potential deal between China and Iran which would see the transfer of a "turnkey" facility to convert uranium to hexafluoride gas. Centrifuges use hexafluoride gas to enrich uranium. Iran has already received Chinese assistance in mining, purification, and fuel fabrication. US officials said that given the fact that reactor-grade uranium is easily obtainable in the world market there is no rationale for Iran's efforts to build or acquire centrifuges other than a nuclear weapons program. "Foreign officials" said Iran has been trying to buy a fluorine production plant from France. Hexafluoride gas production requires fluorine. Iran is said to have attempted, without success, to purchase fluorine in 1991 for the Sharif University of Technology. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran disclosed that Iran is trying to exploit its own uranium sources in the Saghand region of Yazd province, although a February 1992 inspection revealed there were fewer than two dozen workers operating drilling rigs at the site. Also, it is reported that Iran wants to buy 2,000

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tons of Russian natural uranium, ostensibly for the Bushehr reactor project. As the Bushehr reactors are not expected to use natural uranium, US officials express concern that the uranium is actually destined to be enriched and used in bombs. The US officials raised similar concerns in connection with the visits of Iranians to Kazakhstan during 1992-93 to buy low-enriched uranium.

—"Iran's Phantom Bomb," *Risk Report*, September 1995, vol. 1, No. 7, pp. 1, 3-4.

### **3 September 1995**

Israeli television reports that Israel and Russia secretly reached an agreement "on restricting Iran's nuclear option." Russia pledged to monitor the reactors it will export to Iran in order to prevent the use of the installations for military purposes. Russia also agreed to "keep Israel briefed" about the issue.

—Qobi Marenk, "'Secret' Accord With Russia On Iranian Nuclear Options," Channel 2 Television Network (Jerusalem), 3 September 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-171, 3 September 1995.

### **5 September 1995**

Russia and Iran sign a contract for the construction of two additional reactors at Bushehr. According to an official of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, they will be light water VVER-440 [440MW] nuclear reactors, and construction will begin in November. [Note: Other sources report that the deal was signed in August 1995. See August 1995 entry. Russian and Iranian officials have made and will make several confusing remarks about the deal. See 24, 29 August, 7, and 12 September 1995 entries.]

—"Veronika Romanenkova, "Daily Views 'New Details' of Iranian Nuclear Deal; Plans for Two More Reactors Noted," ITAR-TASS, 5 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950905000370, 5 September 1995.

### **5 September 1995**

Eduard Akopyan, head of the Zarubezhatomenergostroy company for nuclear power engineering abroad, says that "all contracts with Iran are exclusively peaceful and do not differ from dozens of contracts with other states."

—Interfax, 5 September 1995; in *Gulf 2000*, www1.columbia.edu.

### **5 September 1995**

Mikhail Fedorov, the chairman of the Ministry of Atomic Energy committee for international relations, says that Russia will have to open a scientific research center in Iran in order to realize the agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Reportedly, the center will have a model reactor to train Iranian specialists. Negotiations for this center are in progress.

—Interfax, 5 September 1995; in *Gulf 2000*, www1.columbia.edu.

### **6 September 1995**

Russia confirms that work is to begin on a nuclear reactor at Bushehr. [Note: A Russian official said on 18 August 1995 that construction would begin in November or December.]

—"Russia Confirms Bushehr Construction Commencement," IRNA, 6 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950906000388, 6 September 1995.

### **6 September 1995**

US officials say Russia has notified the United States that it will go ahead with the export of up to four nuclear reactors to Iran, ignoring US requests to cancel the deal because of proliferation concerns. US State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns says Russian leaders could not "have failed to understand our position...[that any sale would] be a very serious issue." An aide to Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee Chairman Mitch McConnell says McConnell is "actively considering" preventing approval for a proposed \$250 million in

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economic aid to Russia for FY 1996 on account of the reactor agreement. However, the Nunn-Lugar program, whereby the United States provides funding for the dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons, would not be affected by the move. The Clinton administration opposes linking the reactor deal with economic aid, arguing that the reactor deal promises much greater economic rewards [to Russia] (\$1 billion) than the aid package.

—R. Jeffrey Smith, "Russia Tells US It's Going ahead With Sale To Iran Of Up To 4 Nuclear Reactors," *Washington Post*, 7 September 1995, p. A33.

#### **7 September 1995**

A report released today by the Natural Resources Defense Council says Iran has two operating reactors that are suitable for plutonium production: the 5MWt reactor at Teheran University and the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center. The Teheran University reactor can produce 600g of plutonium per year. Although the reactor's highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel could be used to produce a nuclear weapon, the spent fuel derived from it is low in plutonium content and therefore is not of proliferation concern. To produce sufficient plutonium for a nuclear weapon, Iran would have to set aside several years' worth of spent fuel, which is in violation of its commitments under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Isfahan research reactor is only 27kW, and its output is insignificant. Three Iranian plants are suspected of conducting uranium enrichment research: the Sharif University of Technology, the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center, and the Karaj Nuclear Medical Research Center. IAEA inspectors believe that a calutron at Karaj is a 1 milliampere device, suitable only for medical purposes; including zinc separation. In contrast, Iraq employed 600 milliampere calutrons for its nuclear weapons program. The Karaj calutron could be comparable to the China Institute of Atomic Energy's (CIAE's) F1 separator, which "has a beam operating in the range of hundreds of microamperes to several milliamperes." The F1 can enrich uranium to 36%, and is capable of separating lithium, potassium, rubidium, silver, neodymium, samarium, gadolinium, and erbium. Although the F1 is unsuitable for the separation of zinc, the CIAE's F2 and F3 versions, with "tens to hundreds of milliamperes of beam current," are believed to be capable of conducting zinc separation.

—David A. Schwarzbach, "Iran's Nuclear Program: Energy Or Weapons," *Iran's Nuclear Program: Energy Or Weapons*, Washington: Natural Resources Defense Council, 7 September 1995.

#### **7 September 1995**

*Izvestiya* of Moscow reports that work is to begin on the second and third reactors at Bushehr (the type VVER-440 [440MW] reactors) only after the first reactor (the type VVER-1000 [1000MW light water] reactor) is complete. [Note: This contradicts a Russian official who said work would begin on the second and third reactors in November 1995. See 5 September 1995.]

—Aleksy Portanskiy, "First Nuclear Contract With Iran Designed to Run for 55 Months," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 7 September 1995; in "No 'Military Orientation' in Iran Nuclear Projects," FBIS Document FTS19950907000208, 7 September 1995.

#### **10 September 1995**

The Iranian ambassador to Russia, Mehdi Safari, says "Tehran will sign no other contracts to build nuclear stations" after the 8 January 1995 contract with Russia to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He says Iran is "firmly opposed to atomic and other destructive weapons," and that its nuclear program is only because of "limited oil resources."

—Agence France Presse, 10 September 1995; in *Gulf 2000*, www1.columbia.edu.

#### **11 September 1995**

Michael Eisenstadt, an analyst with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy testifies before the US House

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International Relations Committee that despite the widespread belief that Iran's nuclear program is "in its early stages," US, Russian, German, and Israeli intelligence services are convinced that Iran is attempting to obtain nuclear weapons. He testifies that Iran may need approximately five to seven years to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. However, CIA officials estimate that if Iran has access to fissile material and assistance from abroad, it is likely to achieve a nuclear weapons capability in eight to ten years. Assistance from China and Russia in obtaining fissile materials and nuclear technologies may very likely accelerate an Iranian nuclear weapons program. However, a 1993 estimate by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service states that Iran could not acquire a nuclear weapons capability in less than ten years, even with the necessary funds and foreign assistance.

—"Prepared Testimony of Michael Eisenstadt, Senior Fellow, The Washington Institute For Near East Policy, Before The House International Relations Committee. Iran's Military Capabilities and Intentions: An Assessment," Congressional Hearing, 11 September 1995.

#### **12 September 1995**

South Africa's Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Pik Botha denies the existence of a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran.

—"Minister Says No Nuclear Accord with Iran," SAPA (Johannesburg), 12 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950912000066, 12 September 1995.

#### **12 September 1995**

A foreign assistance budget that would prohibit any future US aid to countries which agree to assist Iran in developing nuclear related capabilities was passed by a US Senate Appropriations subcommittee. On 8 June 1995, the US House of Representatives passed a similar amendment to the American Overseas Interests Act (H.R. 1561) stipulating an automatic cut-off of foreign assistance to any state that supplies Iran with nuclear reactor technology. The Clinton administration has said it would veto the bill. The foreign assistance budget also allocates \$16.5 million to the FBI to "counter" nuclear smuggling in the former Soviet Union.

—David Rogers, "GOP Proposes Halting Aid To Russia If Moscow Keeps Nuclear Ties To Iran," *Wall Street Journal*, 13 September 1995, p. A5.

#### **12 September 1995**

Iranian Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Safari declares to Russian journalists that Iran does not intend to build nuclear weapons, and added that the Bushehr nuclear power station will be Iran's "first and last." [Note: See 10 September 1995 entry for a similar statement by Safari.]

—Boris Konovalov, "Paper: Iran Nuclear Deal Details Not Yet Finalized," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 22 June 1995, p. 3; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-95-014-L, 22 June 1995; Vadim Markushin, "Mehdi Safari: 'Iran Has An Abhorrence Of Nuclear Weapons'," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12 September 1995, p. 3; in "Iranian Envoy Comments On Bushehr Nuclear Agreement," FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-176, 12 September 1995.

#### **12 September 1995**

Chinese ambassador to Iran, Huali Ming, says that China and Iran are negotiating the financial terms for the sale of two 300MW nuclear reactors to Iran. The total cost of the project is estimated at \$800 million, but according to Chinese sources, Iran's economic difficulties are preventing it from covering the costs.

—Agence France Presse, 12 September 1995; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

#### **13 September 1995**

Work will begin on the first reactor at Bushehr in one month, according to the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry. [Note: A report on 6 September 1995 said work had already begun, but have been only feasibility studies and

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assessments of the site.]

—"Bushehr Nuclear Plant to Begin Construction," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 13 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950913000348, 13 September 1995.

### **13 September 1995**

The Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, while in Kiev, is assured that Ukraine is not selling Iran nuclear technology or equipment.

—Shim'on Schiffe, "Rabin On Extradition, Iranian Nuclear Ties," *Yediot Aharonot* (Tel Aviv), 13 September 1995, pp. 1, 19; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-95-177, 13 September 1995.

### **14 September 1995**

In a meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in Moscow, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin criticizes the sale of Russian reactors to Iran. In response, Kozyrev explains that the "peaceful" Russian-Iranian agreement complies with Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) requirements, and pointed out that, unlike Israel, Iran has signed the NPT. Consequently, Russian-Iranian cooperation poses no threat to Israeli security. "We have reliable information that Iran is not planning to make nuclear weapons," a Russian Atomic Energy Ministry senior official says in an interview with Interfax. After meeting with Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Rabin says if the United States could not convince Russia to drop the deal with Iran, Israel had very little chance to do so. Israel is ready to make economic concessions if Russia cancels its nuclear contract with Iran, but Russian officials rejected this possibility.

—"Reactor Is For Peaceful Use By Iran, Russians Tell Rabin," *International Herald Tribune*, 15 September 1995; "Rabin Fails To Sway Russia On Reactors For Iran," *Financial Times*, 15 September 1995; "Moscow Bridles Against Accusations," *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 16 September 1995, p. 1; "Rabin Has Not Closed Nuclear Plant In Bushehr," Aleksei Chukurov, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 16 September 1995, p. 1.

### **14 September 1995**

South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo states that South Africa "has not entered into any agreement concerning nuclear cooperation with Iran." The Israeli newspaper *Maariv* reports that a "high-ranking South African source" said South African nuclear assistance to Iran would not be of "military use."

—"South African 'Source' On Nuclear Aid To Iran," David Makovsky, *Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem), 14 September 1995, p. 1; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-178, 14 September 1995.

### **15 September 1995**

In a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin says, "We understand Iranian nuclear aspirations, and I can assure you that we are aware of everything because Iran is our neighbor. That is why we will not allow our know-how and technology to be used for the production of nuclear weapons."

—"Rabin Fears of Iran Nuclear Ambitions 'Groundless' Vows Not to 'Neutralize' Nuclear Site," *Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 15 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950915000163, 15 September 1995.

### **15 September 1995**

The *Washington Times* reports that the US government fears that new relations between the Russian intelligence services and the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) may involve "disclosures" of classified CIA information on Iran's nuclear weapons program that was presented to Russia in spring 1995. US intelligence about Iranian attempts to obtain technologies and equipment for its nuclear weapons program was shared with Russian officials in an attempt to persuade those officials to halt Russia's sale of nuclear reactors to Iran. The Senate

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Intelligence Committee, at the request of Senator Jon Kyl, is investigating possible leaks of US-held information on Iranian nuclear activities. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms, when asked about the Russia-Iran intelligence connection, says: "I better not comment on that because what I know is classified. I don't know why it's classified... I'm not anti-Yeltsin, but I think he's wrong as hell on this."

—Bill Gertz, "Congressional Panels Probe Use Of US Data In Russia-Iran Deal," *Washington Times*, 15 September 1995, p. A12.

#### **18 September 1995**

During a meeting at the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference in Vienna, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov and Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Chairman Reza Amrollahi discuss four amendments to the Russian-Iranian nuclear contract concerning financial compensation. According to Russian officials, the financial agreement between Minatom and AEOI involves some barter trade, with the remainder to be paid by Iran in hard currency. A Russian official noted, "Iran wants to have the countertrade share as large as possible, and we want it to be as small as possible." Also at the conference, Mikhailov meets with US Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Hazel O'Leary. Mikhailov assures O'Leary that "unconfirmed reports" on Russian assistance to Iran in building underground nuclear installations are unsubstantiated. Mikhailov also rejects the suggestion that Iran could make use of expertise provided by the Russians during training to develop nuclear weapons. The security measures designed to block information leaks from Minatom "impress" DOE officials, but do not change the US opposition to Russia's nuclear agreement with Iran. One US official says: "The meeting made clear that we are not going to change Mikhailov's mind on Iran." The AEOI declares Iran's readiness to take additional measures to assure that the Iranian nuclear program is only used for peaceful purposes in exchange for "greater international cooperation" and the end of the US "uncompromising campaign" to restrict any international nuclear technologies or scientific exchange with Iran. The United States tried to convince Russia to include the obligatory use of "enhanced safeguards" in its nuclear contract with Iran. According to a Russian diplomat, if Iran decides to abandon the production of enriched uranium or plutonium separation, "that would have to be a step Iran alone would have to take."

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran, Russia Still Settling Countertrade Terms For PWRs," *Nucleonics Week*, 5 October 1995, pp. 9-10.

#### **20 September 1995**

Goeriy Kaurov, the head of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's public relations department, says that Russia is taking every measure to prevent misuse of Russian technology for military purposes.

—ITAR-TASS, 20 September 1995; in *Gulf 2000*, www1.columbia.edu.

#### **24 September 1995**

The Chinese Ambassador to Iran say uranium enrichment and other nuclear technologies that China is supplying to Iran are intended only for peaceful uses and are a part of an agreement signed ten years ago. The International Atomic Energy Agency has been monitoring Iran's nuclear facilities regularly and has said the agreement poses no proliferation threat.

—Martin Walker, "US Fears Beijing May Be Split Over Mending Fences," *Guardian*, 25 September 1995.

#### **24 September 1995**

The *Sunday Telegraph* of London reports that China has installed a calutron system for enriching uranium at a nuclear research facility at Karaj, about 100 miles northwest of Tehran. This technology is similar to that used by Iraq to make weapons-grade uranium.

The *Sunday Telegraph* article quotes a report by Dr. Abbas-Pur, a top nuclear adviser to the Iranian president, in

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which he said Iran has "concluded the first phase necessary to make an atom bomb." The same report by Abbas-Pur allegedly also praises the help Russian experts have given in developing Iran's nuclear arsenal.

—Con Coughlin, "Unveiled: Iran's Bomb Plans," *The Sunday Telegraph* (London), 24 September 1995; in "Article on PRC's 'Final Piece' for 'Islamic Bomb'," FBIS Document FTS19970602002238, 2 June 1997.

#### **24 September 1995**

The *Sunday Telegraph* reports that Viktor Mikhailov, Russian Atomic Energy Minister, was criticized by "many top brass in Moscow" for negotiating the sale of nuclear technology to Iran. According to a senior defense official, Mikhailov is "a law unto himself and not even the President can control him." Despite Foreign Ministry support for Mikhailov's view that the agreement with Iran is "purely [a] commercial deal," Russian military officers disapprove of Mikhailov's efforts. These military officers fear Russian nuclear deals with Iran may contribute to an Iranian nuclear weapons program. With the Russian military stretched thin battling internal strife, Russian military officials are concerned about the prospects of a nuclear-armed Iran, saying, "That's all we need--mad mullahs with nukes." However, Russian concerns about NATO expansion and about appearing to yield to US pressure strengthened the pro-deal faction's position within the Russian Defense Ministry, the *Sunday Telegraph* reports.

—Carey Schofield, "All We Need- Mad Mullahs With Nukes," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 24 September 1995; Carey Schofield, "All We Need--Mad Mullahs With Nukes," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 24 September 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998; Con Coughlin, "Chinese Help Iran Join The Nuke Club," *Washington Times*, 25 September 1995, pp. A1, A8.

#### **25 September 1995**

Experts in the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry say they doubt China is supplying Iran with uranium-enriching centrifuges. [Note: See 24 September 1995 entry for a report of China supplying Iran with uranium-enriching centrifuges.] Russian officials insist that the Chinese do not have the technology to build the centrifuges. Russia exported first-generation centrifuges to China several decades ago. In 1993, Russia agreed to build a centrifuge plant in China to enrich uranium for use in a nuclear power plant. Under the term of this contract, China is not allowed to export the centrifuges to a third country or to use it to produce materials for nuclear weapons.

—"Ministry Doubts China Supplying Centrifuges to Iran," Interfax (Moscow), 25 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950925000313, 25 September 1995; "Iran-Russian Nuclear Experts Deny Reports On Chinese Arms Supplies," Reuters Insurance Briefing, 27 September 1995.

#### **25 September 1995**

The *Washington Times* reports that only 5 out of 11 nuclear facilities in Iran are under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Though the Isfahan nuclear complex was inspected by the IAEA in 1992, with no discrepancies noted, half of the complex is reported to be built underground, while the other half is hidden by camouflage, the report says. Isfahan is the focus of Iran's nuclear weapons program, manned by personnel trained in China and Russia, the report says. The article says that, until the Russians agreed to sell Iran two VVER 440 reactors in August 1995, the IAEA, the United States, and Britain knew nothing of the Neka complex, the reactors' destination. Neka is 100 miles northeast of Tehran.

—Con Coughlin, "Chinese Help Iran Join The Nuke Club," *Washington Times*, 25 September 1995, pp. A1, A8.

#### **26 September 1995**

Russian ambassador to Iran Sergey Tretyakov announces Russia will not sell nuclear power plants to Iran.

—Amir Taheri, "Russian and Chinese Eagerness to Please Washington Takes Iranian Nuclear Program to Dead End,"

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*Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 30 September 1995; in "Nuclear Program Said on 'Verge of Collapse'," FBIS Document FTS19950930000338, 30 September 1995.

### **26 September 1995**

Chen Jian, a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of China, says that China is not building an enrichment plant in Iran. Chen says, "[T]here isn't any nuclear cooperation between China and Iran that is not under the safeguard of the International Atomic Energy Agency." Chen also said that China has never exported any sensitive reprocessing, uranium enrichment, or heavy water production technology or equipment. Iran denies that China sold it uranium enrichment technology.

—"Foreign Ministry Holds Regular News Conference," Xinhua (Beijing), 26 September 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-186, 26 September 1995; "Nuclear Cooperation With Iran: A Confused Picture," *Nuclear Proliferation News*, 12 October 1995, p. 14; "Foreign Ministry Holds Regular News Conference Denies Nuclear Work in Iran," Xinhua (Beijing), 26 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950926000112, 26 September 1995.

### **27 September 1995**

In a meeting with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen reportedly says China is cancelling a deal to sell two 300MW nuclear reactors to Iran. According to Iran's Foreign Minister Spokesman Mahmud Mohammadi, China is still interested in selling reactors to Iran, but the deal is suspended because of problems with the site's suitability. Qian says that the decision was made by China unilaterally, not because of US pressure. Russia expresses its concern that the United States may use China's decision in order to push Russia to also cancel its deal with Iran.

—Amir Taheri, "Russian and Chinese Eagerness to Please Washington Takes Iranian Nuclear Program to Dead End," *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 30 September 1995; in "Nuclear Program Said on 'Verge of Collapse'," FBIS Document FTS19950930000338, 30 September 1995; Amir Taheri, "Beijing Cancels Deal to Build Two Nuclear Stations for Iran," 29 September 1995; in "China Reportedly Cancels Nuclear Project Deal," FBIS Document FTS1995050929000186, 29 September 1995; "Spokesman Comments on Nuclear Nonproliferation," IRNA (Tehran), 30 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950930000187, 30 September 1995; Elaine Sciolino "China Cancels Deal For Selling Iran 2 Reactors" *New York Times*, 28 September 1995, pp. A1, A3; John M. Goshko, "China Drops Reactor Deal With Iran," *Washington Post*, 28 September 1995, p. A22; Vladimir Skosyrev, "China Broke Off The Nuclear Deal With Iran," *Izvestia*, 29 September 1995, p. 4; Amir Taheri, "Nuclear Program Said on 'Verge of Collapse'," *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 30 September 1995 in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-193, 30 September 1995; Tillie K. Fowler, "China's Nuclear Arms Bazaar," *Washington Times*, 16 October 1995, p. A1.

### **27 September 1995**

Though there has been discussion of the possible construction of two additional nuclear power plants in Iran, Sergei Tretyakov, Russia's Ambassador to Iran, says Russia will focus on the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran for the time being. He states, "The (old) project still stands but there have been no recent negotiations on the subject. It could be undertaken one day, but not before the completion of the other plant."

—"Russian Official Denies Sale of Two New Nuclear Reactors to Iran," Agence France Presse, 27 September 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **28 September 1995**

US officials say they "accepted China's word" that China has discontinued a 1992 deal to supply two 300MW reactors to Iran. [Note: See 27 September 1995.] According to Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Project On Nuclear Arms Control, suppliers often include additional "sweeteners," such as uranium enrichment technology, plutonium

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processing technology, or small research reactors in a contract for nuclear reactors, but now the United States can be certain Iran will not receive such technology from China. Milhollin says China had also considered exporting a 30 to 50MW research reactor to Iran that could be used in a nuclear weapons program. Milhollin theorizes that China's cancellation indicated that Iran could not pay for the deal and that it got a better offer from Russia.  
—Carol Giacomo, "US Takes China's Word On Iran Deal," Executive News Service, 28 September 1995 Reuters.

### **28 September 1995**

The Islamic Republic News Agency says that Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Mahmud Mohammadi says there has been no change in "peaceful nuclear cooperation" between Iran and China. Iranian diplomat Husayn Aminian Tossi says in Beijing that he had seen reports of the cancellation of the deal between Iran and China for two 300MW reactors, but the reports had not been confirmed.

—China Reportedly Cancels Nuclear Project Deal FBIS-NES-95-190, 28 September 1995; "Spokesman Comments on Nuclear Nonproliferation." IRNA (Tehran), 30 September 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-190, 30 September 1995; "China Softens Stance against Iranian Reactors," *Washington Post*, 30 September 1995, p. A9; Jeffrey Parker, "China Puts Iran Nuclear Genie Back in Bottle," Reuters Insurance Briefing, 29 September 1995; *Arms Control Today*, "China's Reactor Sale To Iran Now in Doubt," October 1995, p. 24.

### **29 September 1995**

At the United Nations, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen says China has suspended its nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran because of the site's unsuitability. He rejects the US statement that the sale of two 300MW reactors to Iran had been cancelled, and says the deal has been "suspended for the time being," because of a disagreement between the two sides over the final site selection. But he says Russia is threatened with being "left alone in the international arena," if it proceeds with its Iranian nuclear contract. The Chinese chose a site near Darkhovin, the intended location for French reactors, which were also left unfinished after a construction project was undertaken during the 1970s. Iran considers the Darkhovin site unsuitable because of its close proximity to the border with Iraq. [Note: See 27 September 1995.]

—Mark Hibbs "Iran, China Said To Disagree Only On Site Selection For New PWRs" *Nucleonics Week*, 5 October 1995, pp. 1, 8-9; "Iran's Hidden Nuclear Card." Intelligence Newsletter, 12 October 1995, p. 1; "US Remarks on Tehran-Chinese Nuclear Ties Viewed Radio Addresses 'Backfired' Efforts," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 30 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950930000186, 30 September 1995; Yaderniy Kontrol, "China Has Terminated Its Contract With Iran. Will Russia Follow Suit?," September 1995, p. 5; "China Softens Stance Against Iranian Reactors," *Washington Post*, 30 September 1995, p. A9.

### **30 September 1995**

A spokesman for the Chinese delegation at the United Nations says China has not abrogated its peaceful nuclear deal with Iran. A spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Tehran stated that there is no reason that the China-Iran nuclear deal should be halted, because it is under IAEA safeguards and consistent with Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows peaceful nuclear cooperation. Fifteen Chinese nuclear experts are reportedly working at Iran's Isfahan secret nuclear facility

—"No Reason to Stop Nuclear Deal Further On Chinese Stand," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 30 September 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19950930000183, 30 September 1995; "China Softens Stance against Iranian Reactors," *Washington Post*, 30 September 1995, p. A9; "No Reason To Stop Nuclear Deal IRNA (Tehran), 30 September 1995 in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-190; Con Coughlin, "China Drops Iran Atom Deal," *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 1 October 1995.

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### 30 September 1995

At a conference sponsored by the Union of Scientists for Disarmament in Castiglioncello (Italy), Iranian representative to the Chemical Weapons Convention at the Hague Hassan Mashadi declares that Iran is "keeping its nuclear options open." Mashadi adds, "Iran does not believe it should renounce that [nuclear weapons] option if its survival is at stake." According to Mashadi, Iran fears an attack by Israel, which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and believes that for the sake of security it has to have long-range missiles. "You cannot expect a nation with legitimate security concerns to sit idly by in the face of a threat. If you tell them not to go nuclear, then what option do you leave open for them?" Mashadi adds, "Iran is not a country to be ignored. If these pressures continue, there will be an explosion, and the whole region will be on fire." Independent Iranian analyst Shahram Chubin contradicts his colleague, saying that Israel is a "political problem, not a national security issue." However, Chubin says there are "clear signs" that Iran is keeping open a nuclear weapons option and claims that Iran has legitimate reasons to think it necessary to do this. He notes, however, that the possession of two or three weapons "will only generate concern." Mashadi qualifies his declarations, saying that his opinions were his own and not those of the Iranian government. However, according to former *New York Times* journalist Leon Siegel, Mashadi "was giving a clear message. He was obviously comfortable with what he was saying and authorized to say it."

—"Iran 'Keeping Its Nuclear Options Open,' Official Says," *Iran Brief*, 9 November 1995, pp. 1-2.

### Late September 1995

Chinese specialists are working at the Karaj complex, where China has installed a uranium-enrichment calutron system that some nuclear experts say will enable Iran to produce weapons-grade uranium. Some sources say the Chinese system resembles one the Iraqis used in their attempt to build a nuclear bomb. A top US official says that in addition to supplying uranium-processing facilities, the Chinese have also assisted Iran in developing uranium mining, fuel fabrication, and zirconium tube production, and may provide uranium metal and uranium hexafluoride manufacturing plants in the near future. China's contribution to Iran's nuclear development is thought to be confined to the transfer of technological information, and has not included actual weapons-related assistance. Chinese facilities in Iran are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency inspection, and thus far China's assistance seems to be in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July 1995-8/95, pp. 21-26; Con Coughlin, "Chinese Sell Iran Vital Link To Build Bomb." *Sunday Telegraph*, 24 September 1995; Con Coughlin, "Unveiled: Iran's Bomb Plans," *Sunday Telegraph*, 24 September 1995.

### October 1995

*Nuclear Engineering International* reports that Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov said that by the end of 1995, Iran will make an initial payment of about \$20 million on its \$800 million contract for the completion of the first nuclear reactor at Bushehr. The payments are being arranged by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), Russia's Alta Bank, Iran's Melli Bank, and the Iranian government.

—"Iran Begins Paying For Bushehr," *Nuclear Engineering International*, October 1995, p. 12.

### 2 October 1995

Eduard Akopyan, director of the Russian Industrial Association Zarubedzatomenergostroy, an organization that builds nuclear power plants abroad, says "Russia's accords with all partners, with Iran and China; in particular, on the delivery of light water VVER nuclear reactors remain in effect."

—Veronkia Romanenkova, "Moscow to Proceed With Nuclear Deal With Iran," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 2 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951002000257, 2 October 1995.

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### **2 October 1995**

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says, "With respect to the Iran nuclear situation, the Chinese foreign minister indicated they were not going forward with that particular transaction for various reasons, and that seems to be where the matter now rests."

—Susan Cornwell, "Clinton, China's Jiang To Meet October 24th," Reuters, 2 October 1995.

### **2 October 1995**

The Iranian press says China should have a more firm and clear position on its nuclear cooperation with Iran.

—"Nuclear Cooperation With Iran: A Confused Picture," *Nuclear Proliferation News*, 12 October 1995, p. 14.

### **3 October 1995**

In a speech at the London Royal Institute of International Relations, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen says that China's sale of two 300MW nuclear reactors to Iran has not been cancelled. Qichen's statement refutes the US claim that the deal had been terminated. [Note: See 27 September and 2 October 1995 for US statements that the deal had been cancelled.] Qichen reiterates China's support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and emphasizes that China will not help other countries develop nuclear weapons. According to the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, US officials misinterpreted Qichen's statement that the deal had been suspended; Qichen only meant that a suitable site for the reactors had not yet been found. [Note: See 29 September for a similar statement by Qichen.]

—"Nuclear Ties With China, US Reaction Discussed," Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 4 October 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-196, 4 October 1995.

### **3 October 1995**

*Komsomolskaya Pravda* reports that a Russian nuclear expert said it is unlikely that China could provide Iran with a uranium enrichment facility. China utilizes the oldest and least efficient method of uranium enrichment (gaseous diffusion) and needs the fuel it produces for its reactors. Even though China bought new technology from Russia, the centrifuge plant in Shangsi will produce only four percent uranium for use as reactor fuel. As the gas centrifuge plant is still being built, there is nothing China could have sold to Iran which could help it enrich uranium, the Russian experts said. [Note: Other news sources report similar statements by Russian officials on 25 September 1995. It is not clear if this report is based on the same statement.]

—Andrei Kabannikov, "In Iranian Bombs There Is American Filling And Chinese Spices," *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 3 October 1995, p. 7.

### **7 October 1995**

Iranian President Rafsanjani says that the cost, method of payment, and payment schedule for the two 300MW Chinese reactors are still being discussed.

—"China 'Has Not Cancelled' Nuclear Reactor Deal," IRNA (Tehran), 9 October 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-195, 9 October 1995.

### **9 October 1995**

Iranian Ambassador to China Husayn Mir-Fakhr says China's sale of two nuclear reactors to Iran has not been terminated.

—"China 'Has Not Cancelled' Nuclear Reactor Deal," IRNA (Tehran), 9 October 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-195, 9 October 1995.

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### **15 October 1995**

The *Sunday Times* of London reports China will go ahead with a deal to provide Iran with uranium processing technology used for making nuclear weapons. The announcement comes despite a recent agreement between the United States and China over cancellation of the Chinese sale of two 300MW nuclear reactors to Iran. [Note: See 27 September and 2 October 1995 for US statements that China cancelled the deal.] Leonard Spector, an expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, says that Iran's desire to have a uranium hexafluoride plant may mean Iran is moving towards building a nuclear weapon. The plant in question can be used to convert uranium into metal or gas that in turn could be enriched to make either fuel for nuclear weapons or to power reactors. Spector notes that Iran is likely to state it is using the converted uranium to power reactors, but "it would be totally uneconomic to use it to feed power plants, so you have to say what else would they want it for." International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, experts say, only provide a modicum of protection against misuse of nuclear technology, citing the agency's frequent visits to Iraq that did not prevent Saddam Hussein from developing a nuclear weapons program.

—Nick Rufford, "China Defies US with Iran Nuclear Deal," *Sunday Times* (London), 15 October 1995; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **20 October 1995**

Skoda Plzen management states that while the Czech company is increasing commercial cooperation with Iran, "it ruled out the possibility that Skoda would like to conduct business in Iranian weapons and nuclear technology."

—"Reports View Skoda Plzen's Dealings With Iran," *Mlada Fronta Dnes* (Prague), 21 October 1995, pp. 1-2; in FBIS Document FBIS-EEU-95-206, 25 October 1995.

### **23 October 1995**

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says China had assured him that its export of nuclear reactors to Iran "would not create any security risks to Israel."

—"China Reassures Israel On Iran Nuclear Deal," Reuters, 24 October 1995.

### **25 October 1995**

Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov says the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry will train Iranian nuclear experts in Russia. They will probably be trained at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant, 42 kilometers from Voronezh, he says. The training of the Iranian experts will be to ensure the safe operation of the nuclear power plant to be constructed at Bushehr. He also says a delegation from the atomic energy ministry will go to Iran 26 October to submit a feasibility study of the equipment and site at Bushehr and to discuss problems with construction. He says Russian construction at Bushehr is expected to commence in November 1995.

—"Atomic Ministry to Train Iran Nuclear Specialists," Interfax (Moscow), 25 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951025000401, 25 October 1995.

### **25 October 1995**

Czech company Skoda Plzen says it would like to do business with Iran, but will not sell weapons or nuclear technology.

—"Report Views Skoda Plzen's Dealings With Iran," *Mlada Fronta Dnes*, 25 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19970416000956, 16 April 1997.

### **31 October 1995**

Russia and Iran agree on a timetable for payments for construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant after a meeting in Tehran between Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksey Bolshakov and the head of the Atomic Energy

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Organization of Iran, Reza Amrollahi. The first payment will be before the end of 1995.

—Oleg Kuzmin, "Iran To Pay Russia for Nuclear Powerplant in 1995," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 31 October 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951031000531, 31 October 1995.

#### **4 November 1995**

*Jane's Defence Weekly* reports that, according to Russian and Iranian sources, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev will soon visit Iran "to discuss military cooperation." Iranian defense officials insist that Grachev's visit is unrelated to the Russian-Iranian nuclear deal. *Jane's* reports that a growing number of Russian military officials who share US concerns about Iran's attempts to obtain nuclear weapons and who feel threatened by Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia have expressed opposition to the Russian-Iranian nuclear contract. NATO's perceived eastward expansion and increasing rancor between the Russian military and Western policymakers, however, have muted domestic Russian opposition to the nuclear deal.

—"Grachev To Visit Iran To Discuss Co-operation," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 4 November 1995, p. 4.

#### **6 November 1995**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says 25% of the \$780 million cost of construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant will be paid by the supply of goods to Russia. Also, Iran will pay Russia in rials for "local work," he says. [Note: The price of the contract has variously stated as \$800 million and \$1 billion, most often \$800 million. See 7 and 8 January 1995.]

—"Work Said to Begin on Bushehr Nuclear Plant," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 6 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951106000244, 6 November 1995.

#### **6 November 1995**

After visiting several nuclear facilities in Iran, two experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency say they witnessed no violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. IAEA experts Vlado Valkovich and Frank Watt say the Iranian nuclear program is "entirely for peaceful purpose[s]." Valkovich, a "specialist in precise devices of the IAEA in Australia," claims that Iran has progressed in its use of the Karaj research center's accelerators and cyclotrons.

—"IAEA Reportedly Confirms 'Peaceful Efforts'," IRNA (Tehran), 6 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951106000410, 6 November 1995.

#### **6 November 1995**

*Iran Brief* reports that, according to Iranian journalist Fereyduun Sahebjam, Iran has constructed several secret nuclear weapons facilities with North Korean assistance. The report says Iran has built two underground reactors and possibly an underground calutron uranium enrichment facility. The two underground reactors were built with the help of North Korean Air Force Commander General Cho Myong Rok. Iran built one of the reactors in the desert near Tabas in a nuclear complex constructed with Chinese and North Korean assistance. The report says that in February 1994, North Korea and Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement, according to South Korean and Arab media sources. Iran has also tested North Korean missiles in the region between Shahrud and Damghan, east of Tehran.

—"Secret Nuclear Sites Detailed," *Iran Brief: Policy, Trade, & Strategic Affairs*, 6 November 1995.

#### **8 November 1995**

*Haaretz* of Tel Aviv reports that the deal for Russia to supply Iran two additional 440MW nuclear reactors has been canceled because of financing difficulties. The Israeli daily further reports that as many as 1,400 Russians will work on construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

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—Aluf Ben, "Information Received on Russians Building Iran's Reactor," *Haaretz*, 8 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS199511080000396, 8 November 1995.

### **13 November 1995**

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Larijani says that because Germany refused to finish construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Iran has sought to build another nuclear reactor valued at \$300 million. Larijani said that Iran has China's help on the construction of a nuclear reactor, and that Russia will finish the Bushehr reactor. Larijani says Iran has no reason to want nuclear weapons, since it has sufficient conventional capabilities to deter an attack. According to Larijani, Iran has the right to build nuclear weapons but would receive no benefit from doing so. Larijani explains that Iran needs to build new nuclear reactors to meet its energy requirements.

—Zaki Shihain, "Minister Larijani Addresses Nuclear Issues," *Al-Wasat* (London), 9 October 1995-15 October 1995, pp. 20-21; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-198, 13 October 1995.

### **17 November 1995**

*Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor* reports that, according to Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis, the United States continues to try to persuade Russia not to provide Iran with four nuclear reactors for the Bushehr nuclear facility, arguing that "such technology is dangerous in the hands of Iran." Thus far, Russia has refused to cancel its \$1 billion nuclear contract despite a law passed by the US Congress withholding \$195 million in aid to Russia for weapons dismantlement. The Russian journal *Novaya Yezhednevnyaya* called the sanctions "unfair considering that the US provided the same light water reactor technology to North Korea."

—"Russian Firm On Iran Reactor Sale: Could Mean Loss Of US Aid," *Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor*, 17 November 1995, pp. 4-5.

### **20 November 1995**

The Russian ambassador to Iran, Sergey Tretyakov, says financing problems may delay the start of construction on the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "The Russian side," he says, "confirmed Moscow's political will for cooperation with Iran in the area of nuclear energetics when Russian Deputy Premier Aleksey Bolshakov was on his recent visit in Iran and conducted negotiations with Reza Amrollahi, president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran." He says, however, "the financial problems that emerged are a hindrance to the implementation of the agreements reached." After the visit, Iran gave Russia documents to open bills of credit, he says. Iran is to pay Russia \$20 million for completed survey and design work and open bills of credit worth \$60 million. "The Russian side could not work without funds," Tretyakov says. "Bills of credit and ready money are different things." [Note: See 22 November 1995 for his statement that the financing problems are solved.]

—Oleg Kuzmin, "'Financial Problems' Check Iran's Work on Powerplant," *ITAR-TASS* (Moscow), 20 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951120000761, 20 November 1995.

### **22 November 1995**

Russian Ambassador Iran Sergey Tretyakov says the financing problems with the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant have been solved. [Note: See 20 November 1995 for his statement that financing problems were hindering construction.]

—"Russian Envoy's Comments on Nuclear Ties Reported," *IRNA* (Tehran), 22 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951122000773, 22 November 1995.

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### **24 November 1995**

In a meeting in Tehran with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Vaezi, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov says Russia will complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant "in due time."

—"Minister Promises Completion of Iranian Nuclear Plant," IRNA (Tehran), 24 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951124000082, 24 November 1995.

### **30 November 1995**

Russian Atomic Energy Deputy Minister Yevgeniy Reshetnikov says Russia has begun implementing its contract to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He says the ground is now being cleared prior to installing equipment and water and power lines, which is to start in April. He also says Iran and Russia have agreed to train Iranian nuclear experts at a Russian nuclear power plant 42 kilometers from Voronezh. [Note: According to another report, they will be trained at the Novovoronezh power plant, 42 kilometers from Voronezh. See 25 October 1995.]

—"Moscow Begins Work on Iranian Nuclear Plant," Interfax (Moscow), 30 November 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951130000187, 30 November 1995.

### **30 November 1995**

The Russian "right-wing" daily paper *Segodnya* publishes a "high-level leaked document" that includes plans for aggressive reactions to NATO expansion, including the threat to sell nuclear weapons to Iran and Iraq.

—Russia's "Secret Plans" *Foreign Reporter*, 30 November 1995.

### **December 1995**

The US Congress passes new economic sanctions against Iran and President Clinton signs them. The new legislation draws upon the "D'Amato Bill," a set of strict sanctions against Iran. According to the new law, any foreign company investing over \$40 million that "significantly and materially contribute[s] to the development of petroleum resources in Iran" will be subject to economic sanctions. Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, sponsor of the bill, says, "Our intention is to let Iran know that if they continue to export revolution, support terrorism, and develop weapons of mass destruction, we will keep the pressure on."

—Thomas W. Lippman, "White House, Hill Agree On New Iran Sanctions," *Washington Post*, 13 December 1995, p. A34; "AIPAC Joins The Fray," *Iran Brief*, 4 December 1995, pp. 3-4.

### **2 December 1995**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says \$780 million has been allocated for completion of the Bushehr power plant, \$200 million of which will be paid in rials.

—"Nateq-Nurei Continues Visit to Bushehr Province, Derides US Criticism," IRIB Television First Program Network (Tehran), 2 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951202000122, 2 December 1995.

### **6 December 1995**

In an interview on Iranian television, Mr. Dust-Mohammadi, technical affairs deputy of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says the planned location of two 300MW nuclear reactors to be built by China has been moved from Darkhovin to Bushehr. "The reason for choosing Bushehr," he says, "is its potential and plentiful water resources. This issue has delayed the implementation phase of the agreement." He says the primary reason for the delay in Iran's contract with China for the reactors was the question of location. [Note: See 29 and 30 September 1995 for more on the proposed location of the reactors. US officials have said China agreed to cancel the deal, but Chinese officials and Iranian officials have said it is on hold because of problems with choosing a site. See 27 September 1995.]

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—"TV Panel Discussion Views Nuclear Power Plant Construction," IRIB Television First Program Network, 6 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951206000573, 6 December 1995.

### **13 December 1995**

*Washington Times* columnist Stephen Green writes that Iran is close to acquiring a uranium enrichment capability because of Chinese assistance. With Chinese help, Green writes, Iran reportedly built a cyclotron uranium enrichment facility in Karaj, 25 miles south of Tehran, according to information from the National Council of Resistance of Iran (the Mojahedin-e Khalq). Iran has 10 locations devoted to nuclear activities, and may be building an eleventh site south of Tabriz with Chinese help, Green writes.

—Stephen Green, "Nuclear Helping Hand for Iran," *Washington Times*, 13 December 1995, p. A18.

### **18 December 1995**

*Nuclear Fuel* reports that Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Yevgeniy Mikerin declares that Russia and Iran "have made no agreements" regarding the future of spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power station. The report says the issue concerns whether the spent fuel will remain in Iran or will be returned to Russia for reprocessing. In Mikerin's words, "both sides have left open spent fuel management options." Mikerin adds that although both countries are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), neither of them has signed a contract to place Iranian spent fuel under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. The United States wants Russia to require that Iran not reprocess the spent fuel, the report says. A senior Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy official considers such a requirement "beyond NPT safeguards requirements" and claims that Russia "would not initiate" discussions on Iran not reprocessing spent fuel after commercial agreements with Iran have been completed. Mikerin notes that only the front end of the fuel cycle for the two VVER-1000 [1000MW] reactors is addressed under the Russo-Iranian nuclear agreement. Furthermore, Mikerin says Russian environmental law mandates that if Iran chooses to return the spent fuel to Russia, Iran would have to return the fuel after 25-30 years of storage or reprocess it in Russia. Under those conditions, Iran must take back vitrified high-level radioactive waste (HLW), reprocessed uranium, and separated plutonium, which would be placed under IAEA safeguards. Russian specialists analyzed the possibility of shipping the spent fuel from Bushehr to Krasnoyarsk-26 through the Caspian Sea and concluded that because of inadequate transport conditions in Iran, the shipment cannot be delivered. Russian specialists, however, suggest that the fuel can be shipped from Iran to Krasnoyarsk via Shevchenko, Kazakhstan. Minatom's nuclear contract with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) states that Russia is to provide the Bushehr station with the first core of low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, which will be produced at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant. The Novosibirsk Plant is expected to produce reloads for the Iranian reactors.

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran May Keep Russian Spent Fuel Or Take Plutonium, Reprocess Waste," *Nuclear Fuel*, 18 December 1995, pp. 1, 10.

### **18 December 1995**

Jozef Sucha, press secretary for the Slovak Ministry of Economy, says on a recent visit to Russia by Slovak Minister of Economy Jan Ducky, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov offered to have Slovak companies provide equipment for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Ducky did not respond to the proposal, but considers it serious enough to report at the next cabinet meeting, says the press secretary. Sucha says the offer must be carefully considered because of US opposition to construction of the Bushehr plant. In Mikhailov's words, "the Slovak Republic could gain up to \$20 million annually for supplies of boiler room and other equipment for the Iranian nuclear power plant." Sucha said Ducky will probably raise the issue at a future Slovak cabinet meeting. Concerned about US opposition to the Russian-Iranian nuclear deal, Sucha noted that Slovakia would only participate in the project if it did not involve political repercussions. Mikhailov adds, "From my point of view, cooperation with

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Slovak partners on the projects in Iran and Cuba is even more important than the construction of one unit in Mochovce."

—"Russia Offers Aid For Iranian Nuclear Project," 19 December 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-EEU-95-245; Ivan Drabek, "Moscow Proposes That We Earn Money For Mochovce In Iran," *Pravda* (Bratislava), 18 December 1995, pp. 1, 6 in FBIS Document FBIS-EEU-95-245.

#### **19 December 1995**

A press release from the Iranian embassy in Pakistan "categorically" rejects allegations printed in the Pakistani press that Iran offered to buy nuclear technology from Pakistan. According to the Iranian press release, unnamed Pakistani officials verified "the falsehood of such claims." In December 1992, Iran allegedly offered Pakistan \$3.5 billion to share "nuclear know-how." According to reports in the Pakistani press, during Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's visit to Tehran, Iranian leaders reiterated the offer. Pakistan once again rejected the proposal, saying that "whatever little capability [Pakistan] has, that it was for peaceful purposes and could not be transferred to any third country." The US Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel confirmed that Pakistan rejected the proposal. [Note: See December 1992].

—"Tehran: Not Seeking Pakistani Nuclear Technology," FBIS Document FIBS-NES-95-246, 21 December 1995; IRNA (Tehran), 21 December 1995; Istashamul Haque, "Iran Offer of Money for Nuclear Technology Rejected," *Dawn* (Karachi), 20 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951220000165, 20 December 1995.

#### **21 December 1995**

In an interview with Beijing-based new outlet Xinhua, Georgiy Matchitidze, counselor of the Russian Embassy in Iran, says construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant has been postponed until next year because of financial problems and elections in Russia. Iran has given Russia only \$60 million, he says, the cost of the feasibility study. "We should need at least \$50 million more to start construction of the project because we have to purchase equipment and related facilities of the plant," he says. Most of the Russian experts working at Bushehr have returned home after completing the feasibility study. According to an anonymous source, Iran had opened two letters of credit for Russia worth a total of \$80 million. Russia had threatened to send home its 160 experts if Iran did not extend the letters of credit, according to the source. [Note: According to a previous report, Iran paid Russia \$20 million for the feasibility study and opened letters of credit worth \$60 million, a total of \$80 million. This may be the \$80 million mentioned above as the total of two letters of credit. See 20 November 1995. A report on 22 June 1995 said as many as 220 Russian experts were working on the site.]

—"Russian Source on Iran's Nuclear Plant Project," Xinhua (Beijing), 21 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951221000521, 21 December 1995.

#### **21 December 1995**

Georgiy Matchitidze, an official in the Russian Embassy in Iran, says due to financial problems in Iran and the imminent Russian elections, construction of the Bushehr nuclear power station will begin in 1996, not December 1995 as originally scheduled. Although Iran has paid Russia \$60 million to conduct a feasibility study, Matchitidze says Iran has to pay at least \$50 million more for Russia to begin construction. A Xinhua report says that only seven or eight Russian experts are working in Iran, with the rest returned to Russia, having completed the study on technical conditions for the plant. However, Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran disputes the report.

—"Russian Source On Iran's Nuclear Plant Project," in Xinhua (Beijing), 21 December 1995; FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-245, 21 December 1995.

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### **23 December 1995**

Israeli Foreign Minister Ehud Barak states that a regional peace including Iran would be required before Israel would discuss the future of its nuclear program.

—Serge Schmemmann, "Peres Says Israel, With Regional Pact, Would End Atom Effort," *New York Times*, 23 December 1995, p. 5; Imanuel Rosen, "Ministers, Officials React To Peres' Comments; Ministers Criticize Remarks," Channel 2 Television Network (Jerusalem), 24 December 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-247, 24 December 1995; "Official Statement Denies Change In Nuclear Stance," *Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 24 December 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-247, 24 December 1995; "Baraq: Nuclear Issue Addressed Only After Peace," *Qol Yisrael* (Jerusalem), 27 December 1995; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-95-249, 27 December 1995.

### **29 December 1995**

Shimon Peres, Israel's prime minister, receives assurances from Nursultan Nazarbayev, the President of Kazakhstan that his country is looking to reduce Iran's influence in the region. Because of its voluntary forfeiture of nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan is reticent of any neighboring country's attempts to procure weapons of mass destruction.

—Michael Sheridan, "Israel Finds New Ally to Stop Iran N-Bomb," *The Independent*, 29 December 1995, p. 10; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **29 December 1995**

After a recent trip to Iran, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Oleg Davydov says Iran and Russia have reached an agreement for Iran to pay its debt to Russia with \$230 million worth of oil and \$150 million in cash. [Note: It is not clear if this agreement directly affects the construction by Russia of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.]

—"Davydov Ends Iran Visit; Nuclear Cooperation Reported Iran Ready to Buy Russian Equipment," *Interfax* (Moscow), 29 December 1995; in FBIS Document FTS19951229000108, 29 December 1995.

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## **1994**

### **1994**

Iranian government representatives visit the Ublinsky Metallurgical Works in Kazakhstan. This site reportedly specializes in uranium and has not been properly guarded for up to two years. The United States asked the Kazakhstani government to block any Iranian transactions. The United States prevents Iran from purchasing beryllium from Kazakhstan, which is one of the few places in world with a beryllium processing plant. After the CIA found out that Iranian agents had visited the Kazakhstan plant, US agents began negotiations with the plant and purchased its entire inventory. The beryllium, which was sufficient for 20 nuclear warheads, was transferred to the United States to be modified for non-military use.

—Al J. Venter, "Iran's Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion Or Ominous Truth?," *Jane's International Defense Review*, September 1997, pp. 29-31; Con Coughlin, "Iran Plays With Nuclear Fire As Israel Watches," *Sunday Telegraph* (UK), 15 January 1995.

### **1994**

The BND German intelligence service is aware of 124 cases involving the purchase of nuclear materials on the black market in 1994.

—Juergen Marks, "Basar Des Schreckens [Terror Bazaar]," *Focus*, 22 July 1996, pp. 28-29.

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## 1994

Although the Clinton administration has called for a total embargo of nuclear technology on Iran, China and Russia agree to sell nuclear facilities to Iran in 1994, while other nations such as Japan and Germany continue to sell Iran high-tech dual-use technology. Israel is concerned that Iran may acquire key nuclear components from the former Soviet Union, thus shortening the predicted eight to ten years Iran is expected to need to be able to produce nuclear weapons.

—Leonard Spector, "'Islamic Bomb' West's Long-Term Nightmare," *Washington Times*, 19 January 1994, p. A19.

### January 1994

Italy seizes ultrasound equipment bound for Iran at the port of Bari. The equipment can be used for reactor testing.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### 4 January 1994

US Undersecretary for International Security Lynn Davis says that Iranian nuclear procurement is "inconsistent with any rational civil nuclear program." The CIA has concluded that Iran's nuclear program is in its "infancy stage," but that Iran could possess nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

—*Security Affairs*, April-May 1994, p. 3; Jack Kelley, "Nuclear Program in the works/US firms many have helped supply parts," *USA Today* January 4, 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com, 13 February 1994.

### 5 January 1994

Eberhard Posner, head of corporate communications for Germany's Siemens, in a letter to *The New York Times*, refutes speculation that his company is "somehow involved in Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear technology." Posner says, "Siemens has no joint venture with Skoda Plzen in nuclear technology. We have no activities whatever to enable third parties to advance nuclear technology in Iran." He concludes that Siemens "has no plans to complete Bushehr—with Skoda or anyone else."

—Eberhard Posner, "No Iran Nuclear Role for German Company," *The New York Times*, 13 January 1994, p. A14.

### 12 January 1994

Ali Shirzadian, spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that claims of an Iranian nuclear weapons program reported in *USA Today* are "sheer lies" and that such accusations are part of a US plot against the Islamic world. Shirzadian says that Iran is an active member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and has been faithful to its commitments as a signatory to the [Non-Proliferation Treaty]."

—*Reuters*, 12 January 1994; in Executive News Service, 31 January 1994; "US Report on Iranian Weapons Production Dismissed as 'Sheer Lies'," IRNA (Tehran); British Broadcasting Corporation, 14 January 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com, 20 February 1994.

### 13 January 1994

Two Iranian officials visit Bonn, Germany. One of the officials, Javad Larijani, states that the most "negative point" in German-Iranian relations is Germany's refusal to continue construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Today, the officials are expected to visit the Siemens corporation in Munich. [Note: Siemens was building the reactor in Bushehr before the government pulled out of the contract. See February 1991 and 30 June 1991 for other meetings between Iran and Germany.]

—"Pardon for German in Iran?" *Taz, die Tageszeitung*, 13 January 1994, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com. [CNS Translation]

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### **27 January 1994**

The Iranian Permanent Mission to the United Nations releases a press release regarding CIA Chief James Woolsey's 25 January 1994 testimony before the US Congress. The release denies that Iran has a nuclear weapons program and affirms that Iran cooperates with the International Atomic Energy Agency in regards to inspections, such as the last IAEA visit in November 1993. The release states that Woolsey's remarks about Iran were "self-serving" and were made in the interest of "securing budgetary and otherwise allocations for the current administration" in the United States.

—Islamic Republic of Iran, Permanent Mission to the UN, Press Release No. 103, 27 January 1994; in IRNA (Tehran); in JPRS-JND-94-007, 31 January 1994, p. 12; Reuters, 27 January 1994; in Executive News Service, 31 January 1994.

### **February 1994**

Major General Mohsen Rezaie, the commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), dismisses an accusation that Iran is trying to obtain nuclear weapons as "just a baseless rumor." Rezaie states that Iran will not allow North Korea or any other country to use Iran as a testing ground for nuclear weapons.

—IRNA (Tehran), 23 February 1994; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-007, 23 March 1994, p. 8; Reuters, 24 February 1994; in Executive News Service 24 February 1994.

### **February 1994**

A US Department of Defense official says that Iran currently is negotiating with China and Russia for the purchase of commercial nuclear reactors that could be used for military purposes.

—Philip Pinnegan and Theresa Hitchens, *Defense News*, 28 February-6 March 1994, p. 6; Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service, 3 February 1994.

### **February 1994**

Amid concerns that Iran will acquire dual-use technology and use it to develop nuclear weapons, the United States is urging other countries not to sell such technology to Iran. US officials say that they are concerned that Iran may try to obtain items such as centrifuges and high-speed computers that can aid in the development of nuclear weapons. The United States is sharing information with other countries concerning Iran's procurement network.

—Philip Finnegan and Theresa Hitchens, *Defense News*, 28 February-6 March 1994, p. 6; Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service.

### **February 1994**

North Korea and Iran sign a nuclear cooperation agreement, according to South Korean and Arab media sources. Iran has also tested North Korean missiles in the region between Shahrud and Damghan, east of Tehran.

—"Secret Nuclear Sites Detailed," *Iran Brief: Policy, Trade, & Strategic Affairs*, 6 November 1995.

### **2 February 1994**

A senior Clinton administration official says that Iran's efforts to obtain nuclear technology and materials from the former Soviet Union have been unsuccessful.

—Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service, 3 February 1994.

### **7 February 1994**

US Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs Lynn Davis says that the United States will press the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls' [COCOM] successor regime, which will be formed once

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COCOM is dissolved on 31 March 1994, to halt transfers of dual-use and military technology to Iran.

—Philip Finnegan and Theresa Hitchens, *Defense News*, 28 February-6 March 1994, p. 6; Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service.

#### **10 February 1994**

Vaclav Klaus, prime minister of the Czech Republic, while on an official visit to Israel, says Skoda has done nothing wrong. Klaus dismisses the allegations as "rumors and speculations usually created by the competition in the Western European countries, in the United States' companies which want to catch the markets themselves and try in advance to send rumours to undermine the Czech position."

—"Vaclav Klaus Denies Reports of Nuclear Sales to Iran," BBC, 10 February 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **Mid-February 1994**

A North Korean delegation composed of 29 experts in military technology returns from a "long visit" to Iran, during which they signed an agreement on military and nuclear cooperation, according to the Arab weekly *Al-Watan Al-Arabi*. The delegation was led by North Korean Air Force commander Cho Myong Nok. Diplomatic sources believe that the North Koreans visited military and nuclear facilities in Iran.

—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 24 February 1994; in FBIS Document JPRS-JND-94-007, 23 March 1994, pp. 27-28; *The Washington Times*, 25 February 1994.

#### **16 February 1994**

CIA spokesperson Dave Christian says that according to the latest estimates, Iran could develop a nuclear bomb within six to eight years. Christian states that the Iranian nuclear weapons program is in its early stages and still heavily relies upon foreign technology and expertise.

—Philip Finnegan and Theresa Hitchens, *Defense News*, 28 February-6 March 1994, p. 6; Alan Elsner, Reuters, 3 February 1994; in Executive News Service.

#### **18 February 1994**

The German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology (BMFT) issues a report stating that the Physics Research Center (PHRC) at Sharif University is involved in the procurement of "nuclear-related materials" and that the Educational Research Institute (ERI) and the Iranian Research and Development Organization are "wholly or in part devoted to military projects...with the aim of supplying know-how, equipment, and materials." As a result of German intelligence reports in 1992 and 1993, the German export control review body, the Bundesamt für Wirtschaft (BAW), was instructed to deny all requests by Sharif University to import equipment from Germany.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nuclear Fuel*, 28 March 1994, pp. 10-11.

#### **23 February 1994**

In an interview with the English daily *Tehran Times*, Major General Mohsen Rezai denies Iran is involved in developing nuclear weapons, stating, "Political logic, morality, our own culture and above all the situation in today's world does not allow us to have such deadly weapons."

—"IRGC Head Denies Iran Wants Nuclear Weapons; Reports UK-US-Israeli Gulf 'plot'," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 February 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **March 1994**

A Chinese-supplied 27kWt miniature neutron source reactor at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center goes critical. [Note: This reactor should not be confused with a 27MW reactor also proposed for sale by China for

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installation at Isfahan. See 21 January 1990, 14 March 1990, June 1990, November 1991, and 1 June 1995 for entries on the 27 MW reactor.]

—Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, "Iran's Nuclear Facilities: a Profile," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1998.

#### **21 March 1994**

Russian experts start work on the first unit of Iran's 1000MW plant, according to a source at the plant. Iran signed an agreement with the Russian experts several months ago. The Bushehr nuclear power plant is scheduled to be finished in four years. According to the report, 85% of the construction and 65% of mechanical and electrical work at Bushehr is complete.

—*Jomhuri-ye Eslami* (Tehran) 13 April 1994, p. 4; in FBIS-NES-94-079, 25 April 1994, p. 82; Mena (Cairo), 13 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p. 49.

#### **April 1994**

During a visit to Pakistan, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Nateq Nuri denies Western media reports that he held talks with Pakistani officials concerning cooperation between Iran and Pakistan in the field of nuclear technology. Some US officials have claimed that Iran is trying to purchase weapons technology from Pakistan.

—*Nucleonics Week*, 21 April 1994, pp. 14-15.

#### **April 1994**

The *Independent* reports that the United Kingdom vice-chancellors rejected a secret government proposal to exclude students and researchers from countries such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, China, and Libya from working at British universities in fields of study that could be useful in the development of nuclear weapons.

—Ngaio Crequer, *Independent*, 25 April 1994.

#### **6 April 1994**

Ilja Mazanek, the director of Czech Republic's Foreign Ministry's Middle East and North Africa department, says that the Czech Republic is not exporting any weapons or components for nuclear power plants to Iran.

—CTK, 6 April 1994; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

#### **13 April 1994**

A source at the uncompleted Iranian Bushehr nuclear power plant reports that 30,000 tons of the plant's main parts are being stored in Iran after export from Germany, although another 7,000 tons that were reportedly paid for by Iran are being held up because Germany has not issued an export permit.

—*Jomhuri-ye Eslami* (Tehran) 13 April 1994, p. 4; in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-94-079, 25 April 1994, p. 82; Mena (Cairo), 13 April 1994; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p. 49.

#### **18 April 1994**

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix visits Iran to discuss a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East. Blix also discusses verification and safeguards arrangements in a nuclear-weapon free zone. Blix meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, Atomic Energy Organization Commission Chairman Reza Amrollahi, the first Deputy to the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Habibi, and the Deputy to the Speaker of the Majlis, Hassan Ruhani, as well as various members of parliament. Additionally, Blix discusses the possibility of cooperation in technical matters, such as the use of radioisotopes to study rising water levels in the Caspian Sea. Amrollahi states that Blix has supported Iran's proposal to establish a nuclear-free Middle East, which would require that all countries in the region cooperate on the issue.

—Director General Of IAEA Visits Iran IAEA Press Release (PR 1904), 20 April 1994; "Amrollahi On Blix Meeting."

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IRNA (Tehran), 19 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p. 15; "Commentary Views Blix Visit." Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), 20 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, pp. 15-16; "Blix Meets Amrollahi." IRNA (Tehran), 18 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-010, 5 May 1994, p. 14.

#### **17 May 1994**

A US General Accounting Office (GAO) report ["Export Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Items Need to be strengthened" (GAO-NSIAD-94-119)] says that since 1988, the United States has approved 24% of Iranian requests for shipments of nuclear-related material. The report states that the US government has approved 1,508 export licenses for nuclear-related equipment destined for "companies or sites known or suspected to be involved in developing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials."

—R. Jeffrey Smith, "GAO Details Lax Control Of Nuclear-Tech Exports," *The Washington Post*, 18 May 1994, p. A17; Vincent Kiernan, "Is US carelessness arming foreign powers?," *New Scientist*, 28 May 1994, p. 8.

#### **June 1994**

A Chinese research reactor begins operation at Isfahan.

—Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

#### **7 June 1994**

A Chinese nuclear engineer working with a group of Chinese experts for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran on the construction of uranium enrichment plants at Rudan in Shiraz, in southeastern Iran is kidnapped. Two Iranian technicians are kidnapped at the same time, and it is likely that the three experts had critical classified information on Iran's nuclear program. Iran's Interior Ministry acknowledges the disappearances in mid-June. Iran says seven people working on mining and uranium conversion in Fasa, southern Iran, have disappeared. They also include three North Korean technicians, an Australian, and two Iranian technicians.

—"Mysterious Disappearances," *Intelligence News Letter*, 23 June 1994, p. 5.

#### **12 June 1994**

Inferences made by President Clinton that Iran may misuse the nuclear technology it is given by Russia to produce nuclear weapons rather than to generate electricity provokes a response by Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister. Kozyrev says, "Iran clearly stated it is prepared to open its nuclear facilities for inspection."

—*Al-Wasat* (London), 12-18 June 1994, p. 24; in "Kozyrev Terms Relations With Iran, Iraq 'Good'," in FBIS Document FTS19970603002465, 3 June 1997.

#### **16 June 1994**

ITAR-TASS reports that Russia will assist Iran in completing construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The plant is expected to produce one-seventh of Iran's electricity demand and is scheduled for completion by 1995. Russian specialists are doing technical research for the project.

—Oleg Kuzmin, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 16 June 1994; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-94-117, 17 June 1994, p. 12.

#### **29 June 1994**

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin says in an interview that Israel is asking the United States for help in stopping Iran and Iraq from developing long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. According to an Israeli intelligence official, China, North Korea, and some European countries are supplying manufacturing tools and components Iran is using in its nuclear weapons program. The official notes that Israel regularly provides the names of nuclear suppliers suspected of dealing with Iran to other countries' intelligence services, and adds that a first step in

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confronting Iran's nuclear weapons development should "focus on sanctions or a boycott."  
—Richard C. Barnard, *Defense News*, 4 July 1994, pp. 4, 29.

#### **Late June 1994**

The secretary general of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, Mostafa Hijri, says that Iran intends to develop its own nuclear arms.

—Mouna Naim, "Un Dirigeant Kurde Demande Que Le Regime De Teheran Soit Mis En Quarantaine," [Kurdish Leader Asks That The Tehran Regime Be Quarantined] *Le Monde*, 29 June 1994.

#### **4 July 1994**

Iran and China announce a deal for a 300MW reactor near Tehran.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

#### **13 July 1994**

*Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), reports that Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev, deputy chief of the Main Administration of the Russian Ministry of Defense, says that reports of a Kazakhstani sale of nuclear warheads to Iran are unfounded.

—"General Examines Nuclear Safety Concerns;" in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-014, 13 July 1994, p. 46.

#### **17 July 1994**

*The Sunday Times* reports that two North Koreans in possession of diplomatic passports were detained in Macau carrying \$180,000 in counterfeit US bills. According to sources in the US Secret Service, North Korea may have agreed to accept high payments made in fake dollars for the sale of nuclear technology to Iran. In 1989 Iran and North Korea reached an agreement on "economic, scientific and technological cooperation" and on "exchanges of military and science information," which opened channels for trade in nuclear technology.

—Nick Rufford, "Iran Linked To Flood Of Fake Dollars," *Sunday Times* (London), 17 July 1994, p. 18.

#### **27 July 1994**

In an effort to "remain committed" to the regulations promulgated by the International Atomic Energy Agency on nuclear nonproliferation, Iran says it will accept the Agency's supervision of the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Iran Agrees to Bring Nuclear Plant Under IAEA Supervision," *Agence France Presse*, 27 July 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **August 1994**

During a news conference, President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani says that even if North Korea has developed nuclear weapons, Iran does not want them. Rafsanjani was responding to the question of whether Iran is attempting to buy nuclear weapons from North Korea. Rafsanjani adds that Iran is not trying to obtain nuclear weapons.

—"Rafsanjani Denies Seeking Nuclear Weapons From DPRK," *Asian Defence Journal*, August 1994, p. 91.

#### **10 August 1994**

German police arrest a Spanish or Columbian national who arrived in Munich on a Lufthansa flight from Moscow carrying 300 grams of plutonium concealed in a metal box and "lead foil." After being told by the arrested man that two people, a Frenchman and a Spaniard, were waiting for him at the airport, German police were able to

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arrest them as well. According to another source, the man smuggling "between 100 and 300 grams" of plutonium is a Spanish businessman named Javier Bengoechea Arratibel. The source also said that Bavarian police had arrested a "Columbian and two Spaniards," and that those arrested were not part of "an international terrorist group". According to an article in *Der Spiegel*, confirmed by police spokesman Fritz Dillinger, approximately 2.2lbs of lithium 6 were seized as well. Officials with Bavaria's special police services believe that the illegal shipment "could wind up in an Arab country's embassy." Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran have been named as possibilities. Russian Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Sidorenko was also on the Lufthansa flight.

—Yaderny Chemodanchik, "'Zasvetilsya' V Bonne" [A Nuclear Briefcase Shows Up In Bonn], *Komsomalskaya Pravda* (Moscow), 17 August 1994, pp. 1, 3; Michael Binyon, "West Dismisses Russian Denials On Smuggled Plutonium," *The Times*, 16 August 1994, Terrence Petty, "H-bomb Material Included In Seizure," *Washington Times*, 21 August 1994, p. A9.

### **13 August 1994**

John D. Holum, the director of the US Arms Control Agency, says Iran is still attempting to build a nuclear weapons program despite information provided by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors that they are aware of no wrongdoing. Concerned that Iran's signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968, which included a stipulation that it could obtain nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, Holum says Iran's objectives are obvious "in terms of their procurement activities, the kinds of reactors they're interested in acquiring."

—"Teheran Pursuing Nuclear Programs," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, 13 August 1994, p. A4; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **22 August 1994**

Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, referring to Israel's warning to Germany that smuggled Russian plutonium is being received by Iran, tells visiting German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel that "the time has come to settle accounts with Iran." Peres says that there is information indicating that Europeans have been selling "nuclear merchandise" to Iranians or Iranian groups. Peres wants Germany, which has hosted the head of the Iranian security services, to pursue a harder line against Iran in its foreign policy.

—Roger Boyes, "Peres Tells Germans Stolen Plutonium Is Reaching Tehran," *The Times* (London), 23 August 1994; John Rettle, "Pakistan 'Has The Bomb'," *Atom* (UK), 24 August 1994; "Potential Buyer Of Russian Uranium," *Asian Recorder*, 25 June 1994, p. 24055.

### **September 1994**

A senior Iranian official states that Iran is considering withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) because Western nations continue to deny it nuclear technology, even though it has complied with the NPT's requirements. The official statement confirms "rumors" circulating in the Western intelligence community that Iran might decide to leave the NPT. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in Geneva, the Iranian delegation claims that Iran is not being granted access to technology designed for peaceful use of nuclear energy as stipulated by Article IV of the NPT. Iranian delegates to the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference in Vienna say that Iran would postpone its decision on withdrawal from the NPT until closure of the final Preparatory Committee meeting for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. A US official notes that Iran had nothing to gain from leaving the NPT and would be "better off" gauging the extent of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) support at the January 1995 PrepCom meeting. A Japanese official remarks that North Korea had succeeded in withdrawing from the NPT and was "rewarded with power reactors." The Japanese official says Iran might attempt a similar maneuver. Officials observe that although the Iranian delegation to the General Conference seemed sympathetic to the NPT and uneasy with the hardline stance ordered by Tehran, "quitting the NPT is a card" Iran could play at any time. Pakistani sources confirm

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Iranian claims that the United States pressured Pakistan into denying Iranian nuclear specialists access to a Chinese-supplied pressurized water reactor (PWR) at Chashma, northeast of the Pakistani town, Faisalabad.  
 —Mark Hibbs, "Iran May Withdraw From NPT Over Western Trade Barriers," *Nucleonics Week*, 22 September 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; Mark Hibbs, "Western Group Battles Iran At Third NPT Prepcom Session" *Nucleonics Week*, 22 September 1994, pp. 9-10; Mark Hibbs, "It's 'Too Early' For Tehran To Leave NPT, Delegates Say," *NuclearFuel*, 26 September 1994, pp. 9-10.

#### **September 1994**

The US Central Intelligence Agency reports that Iran is using Russian expertise and technology to expedite its nuclear weapons program. Some US and Israeli officials believe that Iran could produce a nuclear weapon within five years. Iran's mission to the United Nation flatly denies these allegations in a statement which read that "Iran does not, and will not, in light of its own national interest, engage in a nuclear weapon program."

—"Iran's Nuke Plant Deal With Russia Raises Fears" *Washington Times*, 10 January 1995, p. A13; "Russia Signs Deal For Iranian Nuclear Plant," Reuters, 8 January 1995, in Executive News Service, 8 January 1994; "Iran, Russia Agree On \$800 Million Nuclear Plant Deal," *Washington Post*, 9 January 1995, p. A18; "Russia Has Agreed On The Terms . . .," *Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor*, Vol. 2, No. 11, 16 January 1995; "Russian Visits Iran To Sign Nuclear Deal," *Washington Post*, 7 January 1995, p. A17.

#### **1 September 1994**

In a speech at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Iranian Foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati proposes that the Persian Gulf States create a forum for the discussion of security issues, including a commitment to forswear nuclear weapons acquisition and establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Gulf region.

—Robert Evens, Reuters, 1 September 1994.

#### **11 September 1994**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, breaks ground at the site for the nuclear research center at Bonab. He says the research there will be for "agricultural purposes." It is scheduled to open in July 1995. The Iranian press has called it a "cyclotron center" for research in nuclear medicine and agriculture. [Note: See January 1995.]

—"Blix Visits Iranian Nuclear Sites," *The Iran Brief*, 1 August 1997; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

#### **19 September 1994**

Israeli Army intelligence head Uri Saguy says that within about eight years, Iran is likely to have developed a nuclear weapon. Saguy adds that Israel and other countries are undertaking measures to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions.

—Reuters, 19 September 1994; in Executive News Service, 19 September 1994.

#### **19 September 1994**

Reza Amrollahi, Iranian Vice President and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), says at the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference that Iran intends to continue construction of the Esteqlal nuclear plant in Bushehr as part of a two-year-old bilateral cooperation agreement with China. According to an Iranian official, Iran would prefer to receive technical assistance from the United States and Europe, but because of the West's reluctance to supply Iran with the necessary nuclear technology and equipment, Iran has been forced to turn to China and Russia for assistance at Bushehr. [Note: The Federation of American Scientists reports that the Esteqlal nuclear plant is at Darkhovin, not Bushehr. See 1993 entry on Esteqlal. Note: See July 1991, October 1991,

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31 October 1991, and 29 September 1994 for additional information on China's role in the construction of Bushehr.]

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran May Withdraw From NPT Over Western Trade Barriers," *Nucleonics Week*, 22 September 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; Mark Hibbs, "Western Group Battles Iran At Third NPT Prepcom Session," *Nucleonics Week*, 22 September 1994, pp. 9-10.

#### **22 September 1994**

Reza Amrollahi, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, says that the first nuclear power plant in Bushehr will be completed, with Russian assistance, in 1999. Amrollahi also confirms that Iran intends to build two more power plants with production capacities of 300MW each with China's help.

—ITAR-TASS, 22 September 1994; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **23 September 1994**

Michael Ryzhov, director of international relations for the Russia Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), says that Minatom and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) have agreed on a draft contract for the completion of Bushehr-1 but are still negotiating the financing for the project. The contract will involve the installation of VVER-1000 equipment in the reactor building that was partially constructed by Siemens in the late 1970s. Minatom and AEOI still need to determine how to modify the building, which was designed for four Siemens vertical steam generators, so that it can house six horizontal VVER steam generator units. Ryzhov adds that Minatom expects to finish the project within five years.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 29 September 1994, pp. 3-4.

#### **23 September 1994**

CIA Director James Woolsey says "Iran is also looking to purchase fully fabricated nuclear weapons in order to accelerate sharply its timetable."

—James Woolsey, "Challenges to Peace," speech before the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 23 September 1994 (mimeo); in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995.

#### **29 September 1994**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that, according to Iranian officials, China will construct a minimum of two pressurized water reactors at Bushehr. Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, names the Chinese reactor project Esteqlal. An Iranian official says his country has already made a "down payment" on the reactors and wants "to see some results."

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 29 September 1994, pp. 3-4.

#### **October 1994**

US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin reach an agreement in which Russia will ban nearly \$1 billion worth of arms exports to Iran in exchange for access to export markets and US financial assistance. Yeltsin indicates that Russia will fulfill its previous commitments to Iran, but it is not clear whether the 1992 Russian agreement to provide two nuclear reactors and 170 technicians to Iran will be terminated.

—James Bruce, "Russian Agrees 'Arms Sales To Iran' Ban," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 8 October 1994, p. 2.

#### **4 October 1994**

The *Washington Times* reports that the US Congressional Research Service published a report by Kenneth Katzman and Rinn-sup Shinn that notes that "there is concern that North Korea may transfer nuclear technology to Iran" in

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order to obtain Iranian financing for its nuclear efforts. The report noted US fears that North Korea may sell "a completed nuclear weapon or key nuclear technology" to its clients in the Middle East who have been purchasing North Korean ballistic missile technology, including Iran.

—Andrew Borowiec, "N. Korea Sells Arms To Iran, Syria," *Washington Times*, 4 October 1994, p. A13.

#### **5 October 1994**

The *Washington Times* reports that US officials believe China has been a major contributor to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and is also providing Iran and Algeria with nuclear weapons technology.

—Bill Gertz, "China Will Stop Missile Sales; U.S. Will Lift Sanctions," *Washington Times*, 5 October 1994, p. A3.

#### **26 October 1994**

*Al-Hayat* reports that, according to Russian Counterespionage Agency statistics, about 12% of applied physicists and 40% of highly qualified theoretical physicists have emigrated from the former Soviet republics, in particular from Russia. A recent Labor Institute poll indicated that 40% of former Soviet scientists might be willing to emigrate, and 13% are prepared to do so immediately. The report says such emigration could aid Middle Eastern or Asian countries in the acquisition of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

According to the report, General Viatchilev Ogordonikov, deputy director general of the Russian Interior Ministry and member of the Control Council of Rosvooruzheniye, the state company for the export and import of military weapons and equipment, accused the West of using espionage and open financial appeals to lure "the cream of Russian scientific thinking." Furthermore, Ogordonikov stated that Kalmykya has emerged as a key transfer point in the emigration of Russian specialists to Iran. According to Ogordonikov, a shipment of radioactive material was recently seized while in route from Kalmykya to Central Asia. Counterespionage experts indicated that in most cases the final destination for such shipments is often Iran, Iraq, or North Korea. An ensuing investigation revealed that the radioactive substance was originally sent from Chilyabinsk [Chelyabinsk] in western Siberia, site of a Russian nuclear complex. The shipper of the radioactive material left the country and cannot be traced.

—"Paper Reports On Arms Shipment To Iraq, Iran;" in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-94-210, 26 October 1994.

#### **November 1994**

Interfax reports that a high-ranking Russian diplomat denied rumors that Kazakhstan would have sold 600kg of uranium to Iran had the United States not purchased it first. According to the official, the Kazakhstani fuel is incompatible with Iran's nuclear research reactor, and Iran has no other operational nuclear power stations. Also, the official said, "Over the recent years, Iran has not shown any nuclear ambitions." The official contends that the motive behind such rumors is to give momentum to a plan to place Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and in particular Russian, nuclear programs under either US or international control. The official suggested that these rumors are linked to recent reports about Russian and CIS nuclear materials smuggling.

—"Uranium Said Unsuitable For Iran's Reactor," in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-94-228, 25 November 1994.

#### **16 November 1994**

Boris Rosev, a Los Alamos National Laboratory technical staffer who recently spent more than one year in Russia studying its nuclear safeguards, says that President Yeltsin is using Russia's perceived technical expertise in the sphere of nuclear weapons to lure foreign investment. Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and other nations have set up trade offices in Moscow and are soliciting Russian research laboratories to work on their nuclear programs. Foreign nuclear projects are submitted to the government for approval but, according to Rosev, "it is easy to bribe anyone in the hierarchy to grant approval, or to change the name of the project." Rosev says that Russian scientists who work on foreign nuclear programs can see a ten-fold increase in wages, making it extremely difficult for them to turn down these projects. According to Rosev, the Russian government provides

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few subsidies to national research laboratories, and scientists are sometimes told that "the money is not there" for wages. According to Rosev, provisions for the direct payment of Russian scientists should be included in US programs for the safeguarding of nuclear materials at Russian research facilities and weapons sites.

—Kathleen Hart, "Russian Weapons Scientists Said To Be Working On Foreign Nuclear Projects," *NuclearFuel*, 21 November 1994, pp. 2-3.

#### **20 November 1994**

Iran says Russia agrees to finish the first reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant for \$800 million. Reuters reports that Russian experts have already started work on the project. An official of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, identified as Mehralizadeh, says work at the plant has continued with a \$850 million. [Note: The contract for the plant is signed on 8 January 1995.]

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995; Reuters, 20 November 1994; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **22 November 1994**

Reuters reports that the United States has secretly negotiated to bring one-half ton of highly enriched uranium to the United States from a poorly protected site from Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kazakhstan. The US clandestine operation named "Operation Sapphire" retrieved enough uranium to build 20 to 50 nuclear weapons. [Note: The *Sunday Times* of London says 20 bombs, Reuters says 50.] The 600kg of uranium was secured by 31 nuclear specialists from the Ulba metallurgy plant in Kazakhstan, a former Soviet republic. The Russian government, which still considers Kazakhstan under its "sphere of influence," agreed to sell the uranium to the United States for what is rumored to be in the "low tens of millions of dollars." The US operation was initiated after rumors arose that Iranian scientists had recently obtained beryllium and low-enriched uranium for Iran's nuclear weapons program from the Kazakh plant, a conclusion the Kazakh government denies.

—James Adams, "America's Secret Deal Stopped Iranian Nuclear Bomb," *Sunday Times*, 27 November 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Reuters, 22 November 1994; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **25 November 1994**

Kazakh and Russian officials deny that Kazakhstan was going to sell Iran the 600kg of enriched uranium transferred to the United States if the United States had turned down the deal. Kazakh Deputy Minister Bulat Nurgaliyev denies that his country had held any talks on the matter with Iran. He adds that if the United States or the other signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had not been willing to purchase the material, it would have been transferred under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and kept in the same storage facilities at the Ulba metallurgical plant. The report also states that experts express skepticism about the alleged plans to transfer the uranium to Iran because the uranium in question was in alloy with beryllium. According to a high ranking Russian Atomic Energy Ministry official, the technology for extracting uranium from beryllium is difficult and expensive, and Iran does not have it.

—Interfax, 26 November 1994; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **27 November 1994**

Andrey Kozyrev, Russia's Foreign Minister, says inspections conducted recently by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) prove the "peaceful nature" of Iran's nuclear program. Kozyrev says Moscow will expand its nuclear relationship with Iran, citing the IAEA report as proof of Iran's good conduct in the nuclear field.

—"Russian Foreign Minister Cited on Readiness to Expand Atomic Cooperation with Iran," BBC, 29 November 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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#### **December 1994**

CIA Director James Woolsey claims Iran would need eight to ten years to build a bomb.

—Senthil Ranasabapathy, "No Evidence Of Iranian Nuclear Bomb Plan Says IAEA," *IPS Daily Journal*, 11 January 1995.

#### **5 December 1994**

The *Iran Brief* reports that, according to US sources, Iran recently procured uranium hexafluoride, commonly known as UF<sub>6</sub>, from China. UF<sub>6</sub> is a gaseous form of uranium used in the enrichment process to produce weapons-grade uranium.

—"Chinese Uranium Sale," *The Iran Brief*, 5 December 1994; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **8 December 1994**

US Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis says Iran "continues to purchase" nuclear reactors from Russia and China. Davis says that the United States has been pushing for an agreement with Russia to ban arms sales to Iran. According to Davis, Russia is committed to fulfilling its current contracts with Iran, but has agreed to ban future arms sales. As an incentive for this agreement, the United States has offered support for Russian membership in a new policy coordinating organization that seeks to control sensitive exports. The European countries are willing to admit Russia into this new regime in spite of Russian arms sales to Iran. "Maintaining their political relationship with Russia and their reluctance to single out Iran have been given priority over their non-proliferation goals," Davis said.

—"US, Europe Differ On Iran Policy, Official Says," Executive News Service, 8 December 1994.

#### **14 December 1994**

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin states during a visit to Japan that he believes North Korea is exporting nuclear weapons technology to Iran. Rabin says he is concerned about nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and wants to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, monitored by all Middle Eastern nations, as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency have been "ineffective" in their attempts to monitor the region.

—"Israel Accuses N. Korea Of Supplying Missiles To Iran Executive News Service," 14 December 1994; "Rabin Says N.Korea Exports Scud Missiles To Iran," Reuters, 15 December 1994; in Executive News Service, 15 December 1994; Miho Yoshikawa, "North Korea-Iran," Reuters, 13 December 1994; in Executive News Service, 13 December 1994; "Crainte D'Une Cooperation Militaire Entre L'Iran Et La Coree Du Nord" [Fear of Military Cooperation Between Iran and North Korea], *Le Monde*, 15 December 1994.

#### **20 December 1994**

Frantisek Svitak, Vice President of Skoda Plzen Engineering Consortium in the Czech Republic, says the company is still considering trading with Iran in nuclear power technology, but will only do so through Russia.

—"Skoda Plzen Seeks Nuclear Deal with Iran," CTK National News Wire, 20 December 1994, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **Late 1994**

*PPNN Newsbrief* reports that Iran is facing difficulties in locating funding for the Russian completion of its Bushehr reactors and is seeking to import less costly VVER equipment from unfinished reactors in Eastern Europe. The US government reportedly has pressured Poland not to respond to an Iranian request for components from the uncompleted Zarnowiec plant where the Soviet Union had been building two VVER-440 type reactors. The United States also is said to have urged Germany not to allow the transfer of parts from the Greifswald plant in the former East Germany to Iran.

—*PPNN Newsbrief*, Fourth Quarter 1994, p. 16.

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## 1993

### 1993

China agrees to sell two 300MW Qinshan reactors under a project named Esteqlal for the facility of Darkhovin located south of the city of Ahvaz. [Note: Esteqlal usually refers to a plant under construction at the Bushehr site. See 19 September 1994, 29 September 1994, 17 April 1994 entries. But according to the Federation of American Scientists, Esteqlal is a project at the Darkhovin site. FAS reports that many sources incorrectly refer to Esteqlal as being at Bushehr, not Darkhovin.]

—Michael Rubin, "Iran's Burgeoning WMD Program," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, March/April 2002, [www.meib.org](http://www.meib.org); Federation of American Scientists, "Darkhovin," [www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org).

### 1993

China provides Iran with an HT-6B Tokamak fusion reactor that is installed at the Plasma Physics Research Center of Azad University. The center is believed to be run by M. Qorannevis.

—"Transfer of Nuclear Device to Iran Cited," FBIS Document FBIS-CHI-95-078, 21 April 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

### 1993

Iran asks Russia for heavy water reactors, and Russia refuses because of proliferation concerns.

—"Press Conference With PIR Center Officials Regarding Russian-Iranian Defense and Nuclear Cooperation," Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 16 March 2001; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### 1993

President Clinton and former President Bush convince Russian President Boris Yeltsin to kill negotiations with Iran on the sale of a natural-uranium-burning [heavy water] reactor. Such reactors can be used to produce weapons-grade fissile material. [Note: See previous 1993 entry on Russia and heavy water reactors.]

—Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Seeks To Deny A-Plants To Iran," *New York Times*, 24 January 1995, p. A4.

### 1993

The Czech engineering firm, Skoda, considers selling nuclear technology to Iran; Skoda first attempts to do so in cooperation with Germany's Siemens. When Siemens refuses, Skoda pursues the matter on its own with the support of Czech industry minister, Vladimir Dlouhy. However, sharp Western protests causes Skoda to abandon the effort. Frantisek Svitak, Vice President of Skoda's nuclear division, says later that Skoda would not sell nuclear technology directly to Iran until adequate nuclear safeguards were in place. Svitak, however, indicates that Czech nuclear technology sold to Russia could end up in Iran.

—"Something Clunky Out East," *Economist* (London), 18 February 1995, pp. 68-69.

### 1993

Iranian arms dealers Mehdi Kashani and Musa Khair Habibollahi purchase the small Hartenholm airport located north of Hamburg in Germany. The Iranians have reportedly been using the airport as a transit point for smuggling weapons-related materials and technology since sometime after 1985, and according to Western intelligence officials, continue to use the airport for smuggling nuclear weapons-related items and other goods under the new

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management of another Iranian, Nick Ahmed Semnar. [Note: See March 1995 entry.]

—Chris Hedges, "Nuclear Trail—A Special Report; A Vast Smuggling Network Feeds Iran's Arms Program," *The New York Times*, 15 March 1995, p. A1.

### 1993

Germany's Leybold AG sharply tightens its export controls on nuclear-related items, virtually prohibiting the transfer of dual-use items to Iran. Leybold checks with German and US authorities and investigates its potential buyers before making a sale, and through use of databases it seeks to identify possible third-party front companies that might be attempting to buy items for threshold states.

—Linda Rothstein, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1993, pp. 4-5.

### 1993

A feasibility study shows that it would be possible to convert Iran's 5MW nuclear research reactor from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium (LEU). Future studies will be conducted to compare the possible loadings for the LEU core. These studies will need to consider the economics of such conversion and the increased handling of uranium that it will entail.

—S.M. Nejat, *Nuclear Engineering International*, December 1993, pp. 45-46.

### 1993

US companies export dual-use technologies to Iran, including "toxins, turbojet engines, air or vacuum pumps, machinery for liquefying gas, centrifuges and centrifuge parts, machine-tool holders, gas separation equipment, hydraulic presses, and laboratory furnaces," without proper Department of Commerce (DOC) licensing or inspection, according to US Senate testimony in 1995 by Kenneth R. Timmerman, director of the Middle East Data Project. An official from the Department of Commerce in 1995 describes Timmerman's testimony as "inaccurate and without foundation."

—Bill Gertz, "Senate Sends Tough Message To Russia," *Washington Times*, 17 March 1995, pp. A1, A16.

### 1993

A Russian foreign intelligence report says Iran has devised a way to dodge export regulations. Other reports refer to extensive Iranian efforts to procure fissile material.

—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July 1995-8/95, pp. 21-26.

### 7 January 1993

Kim Yong Sop, the North Korean ambassador to Egypt, says that reports that North Korea is exporting nuclear technology to Iran are erroneous. Kim further states his country does not have nuclear capabilities, therefore, it is not able to transfer nuclear technology to another country.

—"North Korean Ambassador Denies Nuclear Exports to Iran, Iraq," Middle East News Agency (Egypt), 7 January 1993, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### 23 January 1993

Gad Yaacobi, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, says Iran devotes \$800 million per year to the development of nuclear weapons. He warns that Iran has become "the main threat now" to peace in the Middle East.

—Charles A. Radin, "Israeli Envoy Says Iran is Now Main Threat in Mideast," *The Boston Globe*, 23 January 1993, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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**27 January 1993**

*Sakartvelos Respublika* (Tbilisi) reports that in a treaty of friendship and cooperation signed by Iran and Georgia, both nations agree that they share a similar view in support of disarmament, controls on weapons of mass destruction, and their reduction and eventual elimination. The treaty also states that both nations wish to declare the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea both a zone of peace and a nuclear and chemical weapon-free zone.

—"Friendship, Cooperation Treaty With Iran Published" *Central Eurasia*, 27 January 1993, pp. 60-63.

**28 January 1993**

Russia expresses concern over the spread of weapons to other countries, and it identified certain areas of concerns. In varying degrees, Russia is concerned about Israel, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Taiwan, Syria, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt and South Korea.

—Jeff Berliner, "Russia Worried About Spread Of Weapons," Executive News Service, 28 January 1993.

**31 January 1993**

At a Teheran news conference, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani denies reports that Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon. President Rafsanjani declares that Iran "cannot afford to purchase [and] will never try to purchase" nuclear bombs.

—Caryle Murphy, "Iranian Sees No Breakthrough On U.S. Ties," *The Washington Post*, 1 February 1993, pp. A12, A15.

**February 1993**

Akbar Torkan, former Iranian defense minister, says, "Can our Air Force...take on the Americans, or our Navy take on the American Navy? If we put all our country's budget into such a war, we would have just burned our money. The way to go about dealing with such a threat requires a different solution entirely."

—*Financial Times*, 8 February 1993, p.4; in Michael Eisenstadt, "Living With a Nuclear Iran?," *Survival*, 3 August 1999, pp. 124-48.

**February 1993**

The International Atomic Energy Agency confirms that Argentina will export a shipment of 20% enriched uranium to Iran in 1993.

—Claude van England, "Iran Defends Its Pursuit Of Nuclear Technology," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 February 1993, p. 7; *The Arms Control Reporter*, March 1993.

**2 February 1993**

An Anti-Defamation League (ADL) report says the United States is inadvertently aiding Iran's nuclear weapon program by supplying it with more than \$650 million a year in computers and "other federally listed nuclear relevant technologies." The report also states Iran's ability to purchase dual-use technologies has been bolstered by increasing US purchases of Iranian oil. The US Department of Commerce says any dual-use technology sent to Iran is carefully scrutinized by the Departments of Energy, State, and Defense, which calls the checks "adequate and rigorous."

—Steve Rodan, "ADL: U.S. Companies Helping Iran's Nuclear Program," *The Jerusalem Post*, 10 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**16 February 1993**

President Rafsanjani and Jiang Xinxiong, the president of the China National Nuclear Industrial General Corporation, meet to discuss the construction of a 300MW nuclear power station in Iran. China promises to provide the technology and equipment for the construction of the nuclear power station.

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—"Rafsanjani Says Nuclear Energy Used for Peaceful Purposes; Cooperation with PRC," *New China*, 17 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **17 February 1993**

*Sueddeutsche Zeitung* reports that Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev, while in Egypt, says that Kazakhstan never sold any materials that could be used in the production of nuclear weapons. The atomic weapons of the former Soviet Union are under control of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.

—"Kazakhstan mediates in the Iranian-Egyptian dispute," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 17 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com). [CNS Translation]

#### **17 February 1993**

Iranian President Rafsanjani says nuclear cooperation between China and Iran is for peaceful purposes only, "All the world should believe that Iran and China are cooperating in the field of nuclear technology for the purpose of the peaceful use of nuclear energy-not for military purposes." [Note: See 21 February 1993 entry for the signing of a nuclear agreement between China and Iran.]

—"Rafsanjani Says Nuclear Energy Used for Peaceful Purposes; Cooperation with PRC," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 February 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **18 February 1993**

In response to allegations made by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Iran is working towards developing a nuclear weapon by the year 2000, Reza Amrollahi, head Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says, "Our nuclear program is peaceful...my country has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has expressed its willingness to honor it. Also, we are an active member of the International Atomic Energy Agency." Amrollahi asserts Iran seeks only to improve its ability to generate electricity for its populace and complete the work already started under the former Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, but he says Iran is involved with research to produce radioisotopes at a laboratory in Karaj. In response to claims by the CIA that it has halted sales of nuclear supplies to Iran by China and Argentina, Amrollahi says his organization is still purchasing low-grade uranium from Argentina and has signed a contract with China for the purchase of a nuclear reactor. The International Atomic Energy Agency confirms that a shipment of 20% enriched uranium from Argentina will arrive in Iran within the year.

—Claude van England, "Iran Defends Its Pursuit of Nuclear Technology," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 February 1993, p.7; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **21 February 1993**

Iran and China sign a deal in Tehran to construct two 300MW nuclear power plants in Ahvaz, following an agreement signed in Tehran in February of 1992. [Note: See 22 November 1992 entry.]

—"Update To Iranian Nuclear Facilities," *The Arms Control Reporter*, March 1993; Reuters, 22 February 1993; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **24 February 1993**

CIA Director James Woolsey says that the United States is concerned about Iran's nuclear potential, even though Iran is still eight to ten years away from being able to produce its own nuclear weapon. Woolsey said that Iran could become a nuclear power sooner if it acquired assistance from abroad.

—"U.S. Outlines Concern Over North Korean A-Arms," *New York Times*, 25 February 1993, p. A5; "German Magazine: DPRK Produced 1 Nuclear Weapon"; *Central Eurasia*, 3 March 1993, p. 8; Original Source: KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 2 March 1993; Jim Mann, "N. Korea Nuclear Arms Potential Cited by CIA". *Los Angeles Times*, 25 February 1993, p. A4.

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### **March 1993**

The *Arms Control Reporter* reports that by December 1991, Iran had imported four nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union, including a nuclear artillery shell, two nuclear warheads that could be launched on Scud missiles, and one nuclear weapon that could be delivered by a MiG-27 aircraft. [Note: See 24 May 2002 entry.] The report says that fissile material was exported from Kazakhstan to Iran and the rest of the components were exported from other republics of the former Soviet Union through Turkmenistan. Although the codes to arm the warheads were not provided with the missiles, the report says two experts from Russia arrived to bypass arming codes. Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, denies that Iran has received or will receive nuclear assistance from the former Soviet Union. While a report by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) states that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, the FIS report agrees with the conclusion expressed by US CIA Director James Woolsey on 24 February 1993 that Iran could indigenously produce a nuclear bomb within 10 years. Iran denies these claims and has stated that its nuclear research is directed towards building two 1200MWe nuclear reactors at Bushehr, as well as producing cyclotrons and radioisotopes. [Note: The 1200MWe reactors are sometimes referred to as 1293MW. See 3 December 1996 and 6 March 1990.]  
—"Update To Iranian Nuclear Facilities," *The Arms Control Reporter*, March 1993.

### **1 March 1993**

British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd says the United Kingdom is tightening its export controls on dual-use technology and military-related equipment to Iran. Under the new British export controls, the Department of Trade and Industry will refuse approval of licenses for banned nuclear or military items listed on international rosters to Iran. The new British export restrictions exempt items considered necessary for keeping civil aircraft safe and also exempt radioactive materials used in medicine.  
—Jimmy Burns and Gillian Tett, "UK Tightens Rules On 'Dual-Use' Iran Exports," *Financial Times*, 2 March 1993, p. 8.

### **5 March 1993**

*Proliferation Issues* reports that the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) has issued a report that says Iran does not possess nuclear weapons and even with outside help, it will take Iran more than 10 years to develop nuclear weapons. Russian FIS experts said three factors that inhibit Iran's nuclear weapons program include the weakened state of Iran from the Iran-Iraq War, the great dependency of Iran on foreign assistance in technology and science, and the low level of development of Iran's industry. The report states that Iran has attempted to overcome its lack of technology and science through buying "dual-use" technology from other countries as Pakistan and Iraq have done. Russian FIS experts said that Iran carries out research on nuclear energy at Karaj, Tehran, and Isfahan, with increased attention being given to the Tehran facility. Since 1968, a 5MW research reactor that uses nuclear fuel enriched to 93% has operated at the Tehran plant. The Russian report concludes that despite concerns over statements made by both Iranian leaders and foreign intelligence services that Iran will soon develop a nuclear bomb, there is no evidence to substantiate such claims.  
—"A New Challenge After The Cold War: Proliferation Of Weapons Of Mass Destruction," *Proliferation Issues*, 5 March 1993, pp. 28-29.

### **9 March 1993**

Factory officials at a beryllium plant in Ustkamenogorsk, Kazakhstan, say that an Iranian delegation had visited the plant in August 1992 but deny that any sale took place. The British Broadcasting Corporation reports, however, that the Iranians purchased beryllium, a key component in nuclear weapons production, as well as 100 tons of

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uranium on that occasion.

—Agence France Presse, 9 March 1993; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **10 March 1993**

An editorial in the *Tehran Times* says that the Iranian Foreign Ministry should file official protests with countries in the Third World that accuse Iran of attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Specific reference was made to a British television report of 8 March 1993, which declared that Iran is attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, technical assistance, and nuclear weapons materials from Kazakhstan.

—"Foreign Ministry Urged to Protest Accusations on N-Arms," *Proliferation Issues*, 22 March 1993, p. 26. IRNA (Tehran) in English 10 March 1993.

### **13 March 1993**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, denies allegations by Western intelligence sources that Iran is trying to acquire nuclear weapons and declared that Iran has completely complied with the requirements of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. He also refutes a recent report by the British Broadcasting Corporation that Iran is seeking to acquire nuclear weapons technology from Kazakhstan. Amrollahi says, "We don't have a bomb, nor are we seeking one. We oppose nuclear weapons because of our convictions." Amrollahi also declares that Iran had completed work on five of twelve projects for finding uranium and says, "We hope to produce and sell uranium to the world some day."

—"Iran's Nuclear Chief Denies Seeking Weapons," *Reuters*, 13 March 1993 Executive News Service, 13 March 1993.

### **15 March 1993**

The *Times* of London reports that an Iranian opposition official has said that Russia is assisting Iran with the construction of two 440MW nuclear reactors at Gorgan. The Iranian opposition leader also declared that China is prepared to assist Iran in constructing two 300MW nuclear reactors at the Darkhovin facility.

—David Watts, "Tehran Denies Nuclear Charges," *Times*, 15 March 1993.

### **21 March 1993**

*US News and World Report* reports that North Korea and Iran have an agreement to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea reportedly is to sell Iran unspecified numbers of nuclear weapons as well as designs for nuclear weapons plants, in return for Iran giving North Korea \$500 million for the development of ballistic missiles that could reach Japan.

—Reuters, 21 March 1993; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **26 March 1993**

Jyotindra Nath Dixit, director general of India's Foreign Ministry, says the Indian government refused a request from Iran for an experimental nuclear reactor three years ago. In light of the relationship between Iran and Pakistan, India said it found it unwise to provide Iran with a reactor at the time. Dixit further states that international pressure to stop nuclear proliferation was a factor.

—Asher Wallfish, "Indian official: Delhi Ignored Iranian Request for Nuclear Reactor," *The Jerusalem Post*, 26 March 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **31 March 1993**

*Qol Yisral* reports that Israel's ambassador to Kazakstan received a "commitment" that Kazakstan had not sold nuclear warheads to Iran and does not intend to do so in the future because it wishes to strengthen its ties with

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Israel and western countries.

—"President Reportedly Denies Nuclear Deals With Iran," *Central Eurasia*, 31 March 1993, p. 71.

### **31 March 1993**

Reuters reports that Russia will build a nuclear power plant in Iran. Eduard Akopyan, head of the Russian state company that builds atomic power plants abroad, Zarubezhatomenergostroy, says that the Iranian plant will have two modernized pressurized water reactors. Construction is expected to take seven to eight years. Western governments are expressing concern about the safety of the Russian plants. However, Sergey Shoigu, head of the State Committee for Emergency Situations, rules out the possibility of a major accident.

—"Russia To Build Nuclear Power Plants Abroad," Executive News Service, 31 March 1993.

### **April 1993**

The Iranian parliament ratifies nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia and China. Iran will buy two VVER-440s [440MW reactors] from Russia and two 300MWe pressurized water reactors similar to those at Qinshan from China. [Note: See 21 February 1993 entry for the signing of the agreement. See 24 February 1993 for the Iranian president's comments on the agreement. See 13 April 1993 for more on the ratification.]

—"Agreements Ratified," *Nuclear Engineering International*, July 1993, p. 10.

### **April 1993**

Iran expresses interest in India's new monazite-based fuel cycle technology for fast breeder reactors. The technology uses a blanket of thorium produced from the beach sands of Kerala, in southwest India.

—Cecil Victor, *Patriot* (New Delhi), 10 April 1993, p. 5; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-019, 22 June 1993, p. 9.

### **3 April 1993**

Eduard Akopyan, head of the Russian Zarubezhatomenergostroy company that builds atomic plants abroad, says Russia and Iran are discussing where a nuclear reactor should be built. According to Akopyan, the reactor will consist of two units with water-cooled reactors capable of producing 440MW each.

—"Russia Building Nuclear Power Stations for Iran and Other Countries," British Broadcasting Corporation, 3 April 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **13 April 1993**

The Islamic Majlis of Iran ratifies bills on cooperation pacts with Russia and China. In July 1989, Iranian President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani signed the 10-point Iran-Russia cooperation pact on peaceful utilization of "nuclear materials and related equipment."

The agreement between Russia and Iran includes fundamental research and its application in the use of nuclear energy, research on safety in nuclear power stations, radiological and nuclear safety, and the production and use of isotopes. The agreement also provides for the "planning, construction, and utilization of nuclear research reactors and nuclear power stations, the production of components and the material needed for nuclear reactors, and research in laser production technology and applications."

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry will sign the accords, and all cooperative projects will be subject to IAEA safeguards. The 12-part agreement between Iran and China, which President Hashemi-Rafsanjani signed in September 1992, provides for joint work on nuclear power plants, uranium extraction and exploration, and radiation safeguards.

—"Majles Ratifies Agreements on Nuclear Cooperation," IRNA (Tehran), 13 April 1993, in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-011, 23 April 1993; "Nuclear Accords with the PRC, Russia Approved." *Hamshahri* (Tehran), 14 April 1993,

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p. 2; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-012, 4 May 1993, pp. 17-18; "Iran Ratified Nuclear Agreements with Russia and China," *Nuclear News*, May 1993.

#### **14 April 1993**

*Paris Match*, a French weekly, reports Tehran is investing \$2 billion per year to develop its nuclear capability. —"Paris Match: Iran Spending Billions on Arms," *The Jerusalem Post*, 14 April 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **22 April 1993**

*Foreign Report* reports that North Korea is supplying Iran with nuclear know-how, technology, equipment, and materials such as enriched uranium. —"An Israeli Lesson For North Korea?," *Foreign Report*, 22 April 1993.

#### **May 1993**

Russian Deputy Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Sidorenko says Russia will build several modernized VVER reactors in both Iran and China. Negotiations with Iran are in their final stage, he says. Although weapons-grade material could be produced from the spent fuel, he says Iran will promise to adhere to the internal safeguards agreement and will allow for international supervision. —"Russia Set To Supply Iran, China With Nuclear Plants," *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 May 1993, p. A9.

#### **11 May 1993**

US intelligence analysts allege that Iran has sought weapons-related nuclear equipment and experts from Ukraine. Both nations have denied the allegations. —John J. Fialka, "Iran Nuclear Power Effort Hides Drive For Weapons, Some U.S. Analysts Say," *The Wall Street Journal*, 11 May 1993, p. A10.

#### **11 May 1993**

Experts from Russia and China arrive in Tehran to work on Iran's civilian nuclear program, which the United States believes constitutes an effort to build weapons of mass destruction. —John J. Fialka, "Iran Nuclear Power Effort Hides Drive for Weapons, Some U.S. Analysts Say," Information Bank Abstracts, 11 May 1993, p. 14; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **12 May 1993**

Mohammed Mohammadi, an official of Iran's Foreign Ministry's Information Department, says, "At present, none of Iran's industrial or military installations nor [*sic*] any of its research centers is capable of producing such weapons [weapons of mass destruction]." Iran further states that due to this belief it has no hesitation in promulgating its desire to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. —"Iran 'incapable' of producing weapons of mass destruction," *Agence France Presse*, 12 May 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **24 May 1993**

*Time* publishes an interview with Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who declares that nuclear weapons are not in the interest of anyone. He says it would be irrational for Iran to use its limited resources to develop nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons can never be used in the region. Asked about a potential nuclear war between India and Pakistan, he says Iran is more concerned with Israel's nuclear potential. President Rafsanjani says that even if countries of the Third World tried to acquire nuclear weapons, they could never

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compete with the major nuclear powers.

—James R. Grimes and Karsten Prager, "Iran: Yes To Revolution And To Moderation," *Time*, 24 May 1993, pp. 46-49.

#### **9 June 1993**

*The Los Angeles Times* reports that the United States is worried that a \$360 million loan provided to Iran by Japan will allow Iran to fund its nuclear weapons program. Japan labels the money as means to "moderating" Iranian activity.

—Douglas Frantz, "U.S. Worried Over Japanese Loan to Iran," *Los Angeles Times*, 9 June 1993, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **10 June 1993**

The United States and European Community (EC) agree to study information regarding Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program. US Secretary of State Warren Christopher says, "Iran must understand that it cannot have normal commercial relations on the one hand while trying to develop weapons of mass destruction on the other." Christopher, who leads the effort to install sanctions against Iran, says Iran will yield to economic coercion since "Iran's economy is in trouble."

—Norman Kempster, "EC will study economic sanctions against Iran," *Los Angeles Times*, 10 June 1993, p. 18, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **18 June 1993**

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran reports that the partnership of Amir Kabir Technological University and the Atomic Energy Organization has produced its first X-ray tube using cobalt-57. The X-ray tube is designed to detect uranium.

—"X-ray Tube for Detecting Uranium Made in Iran for the First Time," British Broadcasting Corporation, 18 June 1998; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **25 June 1993**

An Agence France Presse report says that the Swiss are major suppliers for Iran's nuclear weapons program. The report adds that at least 10 companies have exported materials and equipment that could be used to produce nuclear chemical and biological weapons, as well as long-range missiles. The Hebrew language newspaper *The Daily Maariv* says that Switzerland possesses high technology, loose and legal export controls, and the inclination to sell. *Maariv* adds that because there is no 'end-user' provision in Switzerland, firms can sell parts through intermediaries. The paper also says that Swiss exports to Iran almost doubled in a span of three years. [Note: See 28, 30 June 1993.]

—Agence France Presse, 25 June 1993; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **27 June 1993**

*The Daily Yomiuri* reports Israeli officials met with their North Korean counterparts in an effort to convince North Korea not to provide Iran with nuclear technology and Nodong-1 missiles. Israel believes the missiles would be able to hit Israel and other nations of the Persian Gulf and has asked North Korea in the past to forego any sales to Iran.

—Yomiuri Shimbun, *The Daily Yomiuri*, 27 June 1993, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 June 1993**

Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's prime minister, says allegations made by the newspaper *Maariv* that Swiss companies are

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providing information and supplies to Iran for its nuclear program are false, stating, "The newspaper doesn't know what it is talking about." [Note: See 25, 30 June 1993.]

—"Rabin Scoffs at Report of Swiss Nuclear Sales to Iran," *Agence France Presse*, 28 June 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **30 June 1993**

Shimon Peres, Israel's foreign minister, asks the Swiss authorities to regulate its exports of materials and equipment that could be used to develop nuclear weapons. The Swiss deny that its regulations pertaining to the export of such equipment are lax. [Note: See 25, 28 June 1993.]

—"Israel asks Swiss to step up curbs on nuclear sales to Iran, Iraq," *Agence France Press*, 30 April 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **July 1993**

A new export law decreed by the Italian Foreign Trade Ministry comes into effect, requiring special authorization from the Trade Ministry for all dual-use equipment exports. However, even prior to this law, special authorization would have been needed for export of steam condensers. In the past, uncertainties about the possible utility of dual-use equipment allowed strategic items to be exported from Italy to "high-risk" countries such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq. [Note: See 11 and 13 November 1993 for Italian seizure of steam generators bound for Iran.]

—"Background To Seizure Of Nuclear Shipment Bound For Iran Outlined," in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, pp. 54-55; "Italian Police Seize Iran-Bound Consignment," Reuters, 11 November 1993; "Iran: Nuclear Equipment Seized in Italy," *Intelligence Newsletter*, 25 November 1993, p. 7; "Police Seize Nuclear Material Destined for Iran," RAI Televideo Teletext (Rome), 11 November 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, p. 54.

### **3 July 1993**

Iran says no link exists between it and Switzerland for the trade of nuclear materials. Mohammad Reza Alborzi, Iran's ambassador to Switzerland, denies any link, stating, "Such accusations are baseless and are aimed at discouraging Switzerland from doing business with Iran." At the same time the Swiss assure its export procedures fully comply with the rules of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). [Note: See 25, 28, 30 June 1993.]

—"Iran denies nuclear cooperation with Switzerland," *Agence France Press*, 3 July 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **8 July 1993**

The Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran reports that Li Lanqing, China's vice-premier, and Hamid Mirzadeh, Iran's vice-president, concluded a four-day meeting in which they created a memorandum calling for the construction of two 300MW nuclear power plants in Iran. The Chinese agency Xinhua says the project is "only for peaceful use of nuclear energy and will be put under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency." [Note: See 31 October 1992, November 1992.]

—"Iran-China cooperation 'for peaceful use' of nuclear energy," *The Monitoring Report*, 8 July 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **15 July 1993**

According to US Energy Department officials, the Russian government is proceeding with plans to sell a VVER-440/V318 nuclear power plant to Iran.

—Ed Lane, "Russia Pursues Reactor Sales Despite Stiff U.S. Opposition," *Energy Daily*, 15 July 1993, p. 10.

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### **Second Quarter 1993**

Various Iranian leaders visit the Czech Republic to try to finalize a number of deals arranged by Al Haj Azimi, vice-president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Akbar Itamad, technical advisor to the Iranian Supreme National Security Council. The leaders involved include Ayatollah Mohajirani, an advisor on nuclear matters to President Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Reza Amrollahi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and nuclear physicist Mahdi Chamran, head of the Iranian VAVAK intelligence services.

—*Intelligence Newsletter*, 2 September 1993, pp. 1, 5.

### **10 August 1993**

Sergei Tertiakov, the Russian Ambassador to Iran, says Russia will complete the construction of the nuclear power plant in southern Iran started by the German company Siemens. In response to allegations made by the United States that Russian assistance amounts to arming Iran with nuclear weapons, Tertiakov says, "We have independent relations with Iran and have told the Americans that there is no obstacle on the way of our peaceful nuclear cooperation."

—"Russia is ready to complete Iranian power plant: Russian ambassador," *Agence France Press*, 10 August 1993, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **27 August 1993**

Russia's Ambassador to Iran states that Washington has not produced any concrete proof supporting the accusations that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.

—*Moscow News*, 27 August 1993, p. 5.

### **September 1993**

A US House of Representatives subcommittee investigation documents that over 230 companies from the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, including over 50 US businesses, have sold materials and equipment to Iran useful in the production of weapons of mass destruction. These transactions were made with the approval of their government export-control officials, according to Kenneth R. Timmerman. Timmerman claims that since the US Congress passed additional restrictions on sensitive technology sales to Iran in October 1992, US companies have been permitted by the US Commerce Department to export centrifuges, gas separation devices, gas chromatographs, machine tools, mass spectrometers, and million-dollar supercomputers to Iran that can assist Iran in developing nuclear weapons. Between January 1993 and June 1993, one of these sensitive US high-technology exports was shipped straight to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Administration of the Department of Commerce Iain Baird calls Timmerman's claims misleading, citing the Commerce Department's full compliance with the 1992 National Defense Authorization Act. Baird adds that a \$1 million computer exported to Iran was actually an outdated computer "attached to a well-logging system used in the oil and gas industry" which was not considered a national security concern.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Caveat Vendor," *The New York Times*, 25 October 1993, p. A19; Iain Baird, "Letter: On Trade Surveillance; U.S. Monitors High-Tech Exports to Iran," *The New York Times*, 3 November 1993, p. A26.

### **September 1993**

The United States proposes to the G-7 nations that COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] export restrictions be eased and a new system created to monitor the export of conventional weapons, raw materials, and dual-use technologies to developing countries. However, the United States will only weaken the restrictions in return for a pledge that the former socialist states will not export military technologies to developing

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countries engaged in regional conflicts, including Iran.

—Vladimir Mikheyev, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 14 September 1993, p. 3; in FBIS Document FBIS-SOV-93-178, 16 September 1993, p. 14.

### **September 1993**

Mohsen Nurbakhsh, Iran's vice-president for economic affairs, declares to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that Iran will not seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction under any circumstances. Although the United States has claimed that Iran is attempting to develop chemical and nuclear weapons, Nurbakhsh states that Iran has adhered to all international agreements concerning the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons.

—Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 30 September 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-031, 8 October 1993, p. 16; Reuters, 29 September 1993.

### **2 September 1993**

The *Intelligence Newsletter* reports that the French firm CKD is delivering nuclear materials to Iran. The report also says that a secret clause in a French-Iranian agreement, signed on 29 December 1991, provides for the resumption in 1994 on construction on three reactors in Iran.

—*Intelligence Newsletter*, 2 September 1993, p. 16; Reuters, 29 September 1993.

### **27 September 1993**

In a speech to the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, claims that Iran's nuclear program is completely peaceful, that Iran is the first country to promote a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the Middle East, and that creating such a zone will be put on hold until Israel cooperates on nuclear issues. Amrollahi also says that Iran's adherence to IAEA safeguards is clear and that Iran took the initiative of inviting the IAEA to visit Iran's nuclear facilities.

—IRNA (Tehran) 29 February 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-031, 8 October 1993, p. 16; IRNA (Tehran), 28 November 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-034, 27 October 1993, pp. 27-28.

### **October 1993**

Siemens challenges allegations that it is considering a plan to have a subsidiary of the Czech firm Skoda complete a reactor at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Intelligence sources say that Siemens has a share in the subsidiary. Siemens spokesman Wolfgang Breyer denies that his company is "involved in any activities whatsoever which would enable third parties to complete the Bushehr plant."

—Robert S. Greenberger, Clinton Administration Accuses Bonn of Blocking its Efforts to Isolate Iran, *The Wall Street Journal*, 14 October 1993, p. A18; Terence Roth, "Bonn Denies Blocking Effort to Pressure Iran," *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 October 1993, p. A10.

### **October-November 1993**

A team from the International Atomic Energy Agency visits Iran, but like the previous visit in February 1992, it is not a full or special inspection mission. The team visits three nuclear research centers, at Tehran, Isfahan, and Karaj, but is not given full access to all activities nor to soil and particle samples at the sites.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **October 1993**

Iranian officials state that "little progress has been made" on Iran's purchase of Russian VVERs to be constructed at

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Bushehr.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 14 October 1993, p. 9.

### 5 October 1993

Pinar Bakir, a Turkish businessman and economics professor, is arrested in Turkey for possession of 2.5kg of uranium, which he was allegedly smuggling from Russia to Iran. Four Iranians and four Turkish citizens are arrested in the raid while trying to purchase the uranium from Bakir. Police suspect the four Iranians of working for SAVAMA, the Iranian secret service. Police identify Turker Gelendost, who is among those arrested, as the central figure in the smuggling of the uranium from Russia to Turkey. According to chief of the police anti-smuggling department, Salih Gungor, visitors from Russia brought the uranium into Turkey, where they sold it to Turks. Deputy Head of the Turkish Cekmeci Nuclear Research Center Erol Balıkcıgil announces that the smuggled material "only has about 2.5 to 3.5% uranium-235 and cannot be used in nuclear weapons manufacture." Meanwhile, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Alaeddin Borujerdi denies that Russian uranium is destined for Iran, calling the case a plot to undermine Turkish-Iranian relations and stating that Iran is willing to cooperate with Turkish security forces in the matter. Iran continues to deny that it is attempting to develop nuclear weapons. Another Iranian is being sought in connection with the case. The uranium was to be sold for \$40,000 per gram. However, a specialist at the Cekmeci Nuclear Research Center estimates that "the whole amount was worth only a few thousand dollars."

—Meral Tamer, *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 9 October 1993, p. 6; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-036, 17 November 1993, p. 42; Istiklal Sevinc, *Milliyet* (Istanbul), 9 October 1993, p. 16; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-036, 17 November 1993, p. 42; Deutsche Press Agentur, 7 October 1993; Reuters, 7 October 1993; Reuters, 6 October 1993; in Executive News Service, 7 October 1993.

### 15 October 1993

The *Wall Street Journal* reports that Siemens, the company that held the contract to build the nuclear reactor in Bushehr, would be willing to aid Iran indirectly with the continuation of the reactor. Iran has been asking for export licenses from Germany for the continuation of the project. The *Wall Street Journal* further notes that Iranian Secret Service Minister Ali Fallahian met with representatives of Siemens in Munich. Siemens had signed a contract with the Czech company Skoda-Energo, and stated that they themselves would not be willing to end the construction of the reactor in Bushehr. The Czechs have just recently sold fuel rods from the closed Greifswald reactor. American intelligence services believe that Siemens may have been trying to give the Iranian Secret Service Minister access to these fuel rods through the Czechs. [Note: See 16 October for Siemens denial.]

—"Anger in the West about German-Iranian cooperation," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 October 1993, p. 3; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com. [CNS Translation]

### 16 October 1993

A spokesperson for the German company Siemens refutes allegations made by the *Wall Street Journal* that there was a meeting between company officials and the Iranian Secret Service Minister Ali Fallahian. [Note: See 15 October 1993.] The spokesperson also says that the German government's decision from 1991 not to extend export licenses for the continued construction of the reactor in Bushehr is considered binding. The paper also alleges that the venture between the Czech firm Skoda and Siemens is meant for turbine construction; this, however, is not true, as well as the allegations that the two companies would be involved in building nuclear reactors and their components together. The spokesperson considers the allegations that Siemens is trying to get fuel rods to Iran via the Czech company Skoda "grotesque." He further states that Siemens does not have access to the fuel rods from the Czech Greifswald reactor, and that they would not even be useful in Bushehr because of the differences between the two reactors.

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—"Siemens does not want to finish the Iranian nuclear reactor," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 October 1993, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com). [CNS Translation]

#### **20 October 1993**

At a meeting of NATO Defense Ministers to discuss strategies for countering a "growing nuclear threat from maverick nations and guerilla groups," US Defense Secretary Les Aspin submits proposals to NATO that include plans to improve intelligence networks in order to identify technologies or nuclear arms that may have been obtained or were being sought by nations such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and others.

—Charles Aldinger, Reuters, 20 October 1993; in Executive News Service, 21 October 1993.

#### **21 October 1993**

Yossi Beilin, deputy foreign minister of Israel, says Israel is concerned with German firms' attitude toward continuing nuclear trade with Iran. Israel cites Germany's recent objections to placing economic sanctions on Iran at a G-7 meeting, as well as a rescheduling of \$5 billion worth of debts owed by the Iranian government. Israel believes Germany is so inclined to do business with Iran that it may risk chastisement from the rest of European Community and the United States to make money.

—Evelyn Gordon, "Foreign Ministry Monitoring German Nuclear Sales to Iran," *The Jerusalem Post*, 21 October 1993, p. 14; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **25 October 1993**

*US News and World Report* reports that unidentified intelligence sources have claimed that scientists working in the Soviet Union's nuclear program in Kazakhstan sold weapons-grade uranium to Iran. Sources also say that Iran has set up five separate, competing units to work on the nuclear weapons program, and that it has divided the program into smaller projects so that the necessary technology can be acquired without detection by the West. Iranian President Rafsanjani requested the assistance of Kazakh nuclear scientists to help Iran "develop its nuclear capability" during a visit to Kazakhstan. A meeting was reportedly held between Kazakhstani experts and Reza Amrollahi, the Iranian deputy president for atomic affairs and the chairman of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, on the topic of giving aid.

—"Copycatting," *US News and World Report*, 25 October 1993; "Kazakhstan Seeks Iran's Help to Develop Nuclear Capability," in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-036, 17 November 1993, p. 44, *Al-Shura* (Beirut), 1 November 1993, p. 12.

#### **28 October 1993**

The French weekly *Le Point* reports that the Czech firm Skoda Plzen has signed a contract to provide Iran with technology for nuclear reactors in exchange for petroleum products.

—CTK (Prague), 9 December 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-001, 6 January 1994, pp. 8-9.

#### **11 November 1993**

Italian customs authorities seize eight steam condensers for nuclear reactors, manufactured by the Italian firm Ansaldo, and prevent them from being exported to Iran. Italian authorities suspect that the condensers, valued at about \$15 million, could be used for nuclear weapons production, and they are attempting to determine if the shipment of sensitive equipment was intended to be concealed by shipping it first to Germany. The order for the eight condensers was originally placed with Breda Termomeccanica (subsequently acquired by Ansaldo) by the German firm Kraftwerk Union for use in an Iranian nuclear power plant, but delivery was prevented by an embargo instituted during the Iran-Iraq War. Special authorization was needed to export the steam condensers, and would have been necessary even prior to the September 1993 Italian export law which requires special authorization

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from the Trade Ministry for all dual-use equipment exports. [Note: See 13 November 1993.]  
—Giorgio Cecchetti, *La Republic* (Rome), 12 November 1993, p. 23; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, pp. 54-55. "Background To Seizure Of Nuclear Shipment Bound For Iran Outlined" JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, pp. 54-55; "Italian Police Seize Iran-Bound Consignment." Reuters, 11 November 1993; "Iran: Nuclear Equipment Seized in Italy." *Intelligence Newsletter*, 25 November 1993, p. 7; "Police Seize Nuclear Material Destined for Iran" RAI Televideo Teletext (Rome), 11 November 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-037, 8 December 1993, p. 54.

### **13 November 1993**

An Italian judge confiscates parts deemed to be for nuclear reactors. The judge states that these parts can be used militarily and that they were meant to reach Iran. The parts are from the German company Siemens, whose spokesperson says that the steam generators that were confiscated are 16 years old and were supposed to be put into storage. Italy, along with most Western states, usually does not ship or transfer materials of such nature that can be used for military purposes. The steam generators were brought to the port of Marghera from Milan a couple of months ago. The Siemens spokesperson states that the generators were built in Italy in 1977 for the use in the reactor project in Iran. [Note: See 11 November 1993.]

—"For Iran intended reactor parts confiscated," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, 13 November 1993, p. 3; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com. [CNS Translation]

### **14 November 1993**

In response to allegations that Iran has links to eight generators seized in Italy, Iran says it "has no direct links to these generators and by publicizing the issue, the West pursues other aims." The generators belong to the German company Siemens, which refuses to complete work on the Bushehr reactor in southern Iran despite pleas by the Iranian government to do so. [Note: See 11 and 13 November 1993.]

—"Iran Denies Link to Nuclear Generators seized in Italy," *Agence France Presse*, 14 November 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

### **15 - 21 November 1993**

A group of International Atomic Energy Agency officials, led by IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards Bruno Pellaud, visits Iranian nuclear facilities in Tehran, Isfahan, and Karaj. In December 1993, IAEA spokesman David Kyd reports that the officials "found no evidence which was inconsistent with Iran's declaration that all its nuclear activities are peaceful." Both the IAEA visit to Iran in November 1993 and an earlier IAEA visit to Iran in 1992 were carried out under "a standing invitation from Iran to discuss its nuclear program." According to Kyd, the IAEA visit to Iranian nuclear facilities "was not an inspection per se but a familiarization visit" to see if anything had changed since the February 1992 IAEA visit to Iran. The visits were made partly in response to allegations in the West, including claims by members of Iranian opposition groups in exile and "pro-Israel researchers," that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program. Like the previous IAEA visit in February 1992, it is not a full or special inspection mission. The team is not given full access to all activities nor to soil and particle samples at the sites.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000; *Jomhuri-ye Eslami* (Tehran), 4 December 1993, p. 14; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-002, 18 January 1994, pp. 14-15; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 16 December 1993, pp. 10-11.

### **27 November - 3 December 1993**

The director of the Czech firm Skoda Plzen, Lubomir Soudek, visits Tehran to discuss "energy cooperation" and "possible component deliveries for the construction of a nuclear power plant." US intelligence sources believe that Iran has a clandestine program to develop nuclear arms and the United States fears that Czech supplies could help

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Iran produce nuclear waste from which it could extract plutonium for a nuclear bomb.

—Stephen Engelberg, *New York Times*; in *San Francisco Chronicle*, 16 December 1993, p. A15; *CTK* (Prague), 22 December 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-003, 31 January 1994, pp. 43-44.

#### **December 1993**

In response to pressure from the United States against Czech sales of nuclear components to Iran, the Czech government states that it "has not decided, nor does it intend to decide in the foreseeable future, on any shipments of nuclear technology to Iran." Earlier in the month, the Czech minister of industry and trade had defended a possible deal between Skoda and Iran.

—Stephen Engelberg, *New York Times*; in *San Francisco Chronicle*, 16 December 1993, p. A15.

#### **December 1993**

A report in the Israeli daily *Haaretz* by analyst Danny Keshem alleges that the Czech firm Skoda Plzen is providing Westinghouse of the United States and Siemens of Germany with access to the Iranian nuclear market, thus violating "the restrictions imposed by their home countries on trade with Iran." Skoda spokesman Jaroslav Hudec calls the report "misleading" and says that except for limited cooperation on a very specific set of products for nuclear power plants, Skoda has virtually no other connection with Westinghouse. Hudec adds that Skoda is involved in talks with Siemens, but only pertaining to joint production of turbines.

—*Lidove Noviny* (Prague), 17 December 1993, p. 8; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-002, 18 January 1994, p. 38.

#### **December 1993**

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin asks Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec to prevent export from the Czech Republic to Iran of equipment that can be used in Iran's nuclear program, even for peaceful purposes, according to Israeli Ambassador to the Czech Republic Moshe Yegar. During his visit to Israel, Zieleniec claims that Czech exports could not be used by Iran for purposes that were not peaceful.

—*CTK* (Prague), 22 December 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-003, 31 January 1994, pp. 43-44.

#### **December 1993**

Germany refuses to resume construction of the 80-percent-complete Siemens-built nuclear power plant at Bushehr for fear that it could be accused of helping advance Iran's nuclear weapons program.

—Agence France Presse (Paris) 13 December 1992; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-93-001, 7 January 1993, p. 25.

#### **5 December 1993**

Kamal Kharazi, Iran's representative to the United Nations, says Iran is committed to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

—"Iran backs establishment of nuclear-free Middle East," *Moneyclips*, 5 December 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **9 December 1993**

North Korea and Iran conclude a fifth joint committee meeting centered around increasing economic, scientific, and technological ties. Iranian Defense Minister Mohammad Foruzandeh led the Iranian delegation.

—Reuters, 10 December 1993; in Executive News Service, 10 December 1993; Reuters, 12 December 1993, in Executive News Service, 13 December 1993.

#### **9 December 1993**

The manager for technical service of nuclear power plants for the Czech firm Skoda Plzen, Frantisek Svitak, says

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that Iran wishes to build a nuclear power plant and that Skoda could provide it with reactor equipment through a Russian general supplier.

—CTK (Prague), 9 December 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-001, 6 January 1994.

### **9 December 1993**

Reuters reports that the US State Department warned Ukraine against selling nuclear or conventional weapons to Iran or other outlaw states. A State Department official says the Ukraine had assured the United States that it would "exercise restraint in arms transfers to areas of concern."

—"U.S. Warns Ukraine Against Arms Sale To Iran," Executive News Service, 9 December 1993; "Kiev Denies Nuclear Technology Sold to Libya, Pakistan." UNIAN (Kiev), 6 October 1993; in FBIS-SOV-93-193, 7 October 1993, p. 54.

### **10 December 1993**

US Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis reports that US intelligence indicates that scientists from the former Soviet Union have gone to Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, where they may be assisting in the development of nuclear weapons. Davis says that the migration of former Soviet scientists is hard to document and that she does not have details on the number of scientists or the actual work they are performing. According to Davis, the United States cannot prevent scientists from migrating where they want and selling their expertise, but it does "have better control on items and trade."

—Carol Giacomo, "Ex-Soviet Scientists Said Going To Iran, Iraq," Executive News Service, 10 December 1993  
Reuters, 10 December 1993.

### **13 December 1993**

*Defense News* reports that the CIA "believes that Iran could have nuclear weapons within eight to 10 years, even without critical assistance from abroad."

—Theresa Hitchens and Brendan McNally, *Defense News*, 13-19 December 1993, p. 3.

### **19 December 1993**

Russian Ambassador to Iran Sergei Tretyakov confirms that Russia will help Iran build a nuclear power plant, indicating that a preliminary agreement has been reached but that financing is still being negotiated. Financial problems stall Russia's assistance to Iran in the construction of a nuclear power plant in Bushehr and in the completion of a second plant started by Germany but abandoned for political reasons. Iran has requested that Russia fund the projects, but Russia has refused due to its own financial crisis.

—Radio Rossii Network (Moscow), 19 December 1993; in FBIS Document FBISOSOV-93-242, 20 December 1993, p. 53; Agence France Presse (Paris) 19 December 1993; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-94-002, 18 January 1994, p. 39.

### **21 December 1993**

Iran's ambassador to the Czech Republic, Rasul Movahedian, asserts that Iran's involvement with Skoda is directed only toward peaceful projects.

—John Mastrini, Reuters, 21 December 1993; in Executive News Service, 21 December 1993.

### **22 December 1993**

Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's prime minister, "emphatically" asks Josef Zieleniec, Foreign Minister of the Czech Republic, not to provide nuclear power components to Iran. Zieleniec denies that any exports to Iran could be used to aid in the development of nuclear weapons. Skoda Plzen, a Czech company with experience building nuclear power plants, recently admitted having discussions with Iran regarding "supplies of parts from a nuclear power plant."

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—"Israel Requests No Nuclear Supplies to Iran," CTK National News Wire, 22 December 1993; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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## 1992

### 1992

South Africa reships furnace equipment to Iran supplied to it by Germany in the early 1980s.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 20 August 1992, pp. 7-8.

### 1992

Iranian physicists from Shiraz University publish designs for an intrinsically safe reactor in the Chinese *Nuclear Science Journal*.

—M.R. Eskandari and A.A. Harms, "Intrinsic Reactor Safety With Temperature Sensitive Isotope Triggers," *Hezi Kexue* (Nuclear Science Journal), 1992, vol. 29, pp. 81-87; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Unpublished Report, October 1998.

### 1992

Former Iraqi nuclear scientist Hussain al-Sharistani is seen in Iran. [Note: He was also seen in Iran in 1991. He was previously imprisoned by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein for refusing to build nuclear weapons but escaped.]

—"Iranian Sources Reveal: Iraqi Nuclear Scientist Sharistani Alive, Residing in Tehran," *Sawt al-Kuwait*, in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-92-1000, 22 May 1992; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Unpublished Report, October 1998.

### 1992

A US State Department official says of Iran's nuclear program, "I don't think the Iranians are going about it in such a brutish fashion as Saddam Hussein. Their program is much more subtle and long-term." Further reports from officials say, "We have not established that there are any secret nuclear facilities in Iran."

—Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995. Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

### 1992

A Chinese cyclotron is installed at Karaj.

—Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

### 1992

Argentina agrees to sell a "fuel fabrication facility" and a "uranium dioxide conversion plant" to Iran. Argentina rejects Iran's request for a facility to produce heavy water. Argentina cancels the deal under US pressure. Iran protests, saying that the equipment would have been covered by International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Argentina provides Iran "hot cells."

—Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

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**1992**

The United States tries to persuade China not to deliver a research reactor at Isfahan. China decides to go ahead with the deal in September 1992 after the United States sells F-16 fighters to Taiwan.

—Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

**1992**

The United States Congress passes the 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act, which prohibits the export of nuclear equipment and technology as well as exports to Iran of dual use technology and US government commercial arms sales.

—"North Africa and Middle East/Iran," p. 170, [www.ceip.org](http://www.ceip.org), accessed on 13 March 2002.

**1992**

Iran reportedly signs a secret deal with Kazakhstan to buy four nuclear warheads, but the CIA stops the deal. In an unsuccessful attempt, the Iranians approach the Ulba Metallurgical Plant within the Ust-Kamenogorsk production complex in Kazakhstan in order to purchase beryllium and enriched uranium. The plant makes reactor fuel and metal components for the defense industry and has 600kg of surplus highly enriched uranium. There are conflicting reports as to why the Iranians wanted to purchase the uranium. Reports indicate that the Iranians sought to use the uranium as reactor fuel or for weapons. According to Ergali Bayadilov, Director General of the Kazak Atomic Energy Agency, Iran wanted to purchase safeguarded low-enriched uranium (LEU) to fuel the soon-to-be supplied Russian VVER-1000 [1000MW light-water] reactor. [Note: See 9 July 1995.]

—"North Africa and Middle East/Iran," p. 170, [www.ceip.org](http://www.ceip.org), accessed on 13 March 2002; Mark Hibbs, "Kazakhs Say Iran Sought LEU For VVER, Not 'Sapphire' HEU," *Nuclear Fuel*, 17 July 1995, pp. 11-12; David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, January 1995, [www.bullatomsci.org](http://www.bullatomsci.org); Douglas Davis, "Report on Foreign Assistance to Nuclear Program," *The Jerusalem Post* (Jerusalem), 8 September 1995, in FBIS Document FTS19950908000168, 8 September 1995.

**1992**

Iran acquires nuclear weapons "ready for immediate use" from CIS countries, according to the German weekly *Focus*. The weapons are reportedly "an atom bomb which can be dropped from an airplane and a launcher for missiles with nuclear warheads." [Note: This probably refers to reports that Iran bought nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan. See 1992 entry above.]

—"Iran Reportedly Acquires Nuclear Arms from CIS," *Central Eurasia*, 28 January 1993, p. 6.

**1992**

The Israeli Defense Forces report that Iran might be able to produce a nuclear bomb within a decade.

—Reuven Pedatzur, "Rules of the Game," *Haaretz* (Jerusalem) 5 December 1996; in "Recent Statements Seen leading to Overt Nuclear Deterrence," in FBIS Document FTS19961202000534, 5 December 1996.

**1992**

Iran's nuclear program has an annual research budget of \$800 million, and has major facilities at Tehran University, Moallem Kalayeh, and Isfahan. Iran's nuclear research program has received technical assistance from North Korea, India, and China. Two hundred technicians and more than 50 nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union have signed agreements with Iran.

—"Iranian Diplomats On Nuclear Warhead Purchases," *Proliferation Issues*, 5 March 1993, pp. 14-16; Paul BeaverFlash Points Update *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 3 April 1993, pp 20-21.

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### 1992

Iran and Russia sign an intergovernmental agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran on the border with Turkmenistan by the Caspian Sea. The United States and International Atomic Energy Agency protest the decision. According to the leading Russian newspapers, the main reason for US objections is that Western countries want to force Russia out of the nuclear market. However, the project is important for Russia because of its deteriorating economic situation and severe need for hard currency.

—Aleksandr Bushev "Atomic Mirage At The Caravan Route: Will Turkmenistan Get Involved In The Russia's Plans To Construct a Nuclear Power Plant In Iran?" *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 28 July 1993, p. 2.

### 1992

Iran and Russia sign two agreements, "On Building a Nuclear Plant" and "On Cooperation in the Area of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy." The Iranians want the Russians to build a nuclear power plant in northern Iran, but the geological data show the area was susceptible to dangerously high seismic activity, and it is decided to continue the work started years previously at the Bushehr site.

—Viktor Mikhaylov, "Minatom and International Cooperation," *Yadernyy Kontrol* (Moscow), Volume 44, Number 2, March-April 1999, pp. 62-66.

### 1992

The International Atomic Energy Agency Department of Safeguards has twice inspected nuclear facilities that were identified in news media and intelligence reports as sites where nuclear weapons are being developed. The IAEA finds no evidence of illegal nuclear activity either time. During a visit to an Iranian nuclear facility cited as having a fissile material production pilot program, IAEA inspectors find no evidence of undeclared activities. According to diplomatic sources, the United States provides the IAEA with limited intelligence information on Iran's alleged covert nuclear activities. The United States says later that the IAEA was unable to detect the alleged activities because it did not have access to the same detailed, highly classified, intelligence information as the United States. However, not all US governmental officials agree on the validity of the US data.

—Mark Hibbs. "Iran Balking At Approval Of IAEA Environmental Monitoring." *NuclearFuel*, 23 October 1996, pp. 2-3.

### 1992 - 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency requests and Iran grants visits in 1992 and 1993 and finds the visited sites were consistent with peaceful uses. These visits, however, are pronounced inconclusive because of the size of these sites and because Iran does not allow the inspectors to perform the full range inspection methods including environmental monitoring.

—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Washington, DC) January 1995, [www.bullatomsci.org](http://www.bullatomsci.org), accessed 7 July 2002.

### 1992

Iran declares its Isfahan site to the International Atomic Energy Agency for the first time.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992, p. 43.

### 1992

Brazilian Brigadier General Hugo Piva may be working in Iran, and US reports say Iran may receive nuclear weapons technology from Brazil.

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—Ben Sanders and John Simpson, "Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation," *Country Files*, University of Southampton, 1991.

#### **1992**

China and Iran sign an agreement regarding the supply of two 300MW reactors, according to Chinese Ambassador to Iran Hua Liming in an interview years later. The deal had previously been dropped because China was concerned about Iran's ability to finance the project, but China decides to go ahead with the arrangement. Other sources suggest it is questionable whether the transaction will actually take place, because of disagreements over the site where the reactors will be constructed and the handling of spent fuel, as well as financial and technical difficulties. —David Albright "An Iranian Bomb?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July 1995-8/95, pp. 21-26; "Chinese Diplomat Discusses Nuclear Assistance To Iran," *Resalat* (Teheran), 12 September 1995; in FBIS-TAC-95-005; Con Coughlin, "Chinese Sell Iran Vital Link To Build Bomb," *Sunday Telegraph*, 24 September 1995.

#### **1992**

France denies reports that it will supply Iran with highly enriched uranium pursuant to a possible secret addendum to the Eurodif deal. [Note: See 25 October 1991 and 29 December 1991].

—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **1992**

CIA Director Robert Gates testifies that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons and could procure one by 2000 if the West does not intervene.

—Steve Coll, U.S. Halted Nuclear Bid By Iran; China, Argentina, Agreed to Cancel Technology Transfers, *The Washington Post*, 17 November 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **January 1992**

Iran asks the French government to deliver enriched uranium as specified in a 1974 contract between the Shah and a French consortium to build a uranium enrichment plant. However, under heavy US pressure, France decides not to sell nuclear technology to Iran. [Note: See 1974 and 1979.]

—Matthew Fraser, "France Makes Up with Iran in Secret; Even Though Pact May Give Nukes to Fundamentalists," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 6 January 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **January 1992**

Reports say Iran has received nuclear weapons technology from Brazil and India.

—Amir Tahiri, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 31 December 1991, p. 1; in *Proliferation Issues*, 31 January 1992, pp. 67-68.

#### **January 1992**

Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister Husayn Haqani denies reports of an Iranian-Pakistani cooperation agreement on nuclear technology. He says Pakistan would not export nuclear technology. [Note: See 1991 (2), May 1991 (2), November 1991 for more on cooperation between Iran and Pakistan.]

—Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 12 January 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 31 January 1992, p. 31.

#### **January 1992**

Hamian Vahdati, thought to be heading Iran's nuclear program, says that no country can be taken seriously

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without a nuclear research program, and that Iran wants to have the technology and knowledge to make nuclear weapons in case it needs them. Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Vaezi asserts that Iran opposes nuclear weapons buildup.

—Amir Taheri, *Die Welt* (Bonn), 27 January 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 3 March 1992, p. 9; Hugh Carnegie, *Financial Times*, 29 January 1992, p. 4.

#### **January 1992**

The Tajikistan parliament acknowledges that negotiations are underway with Iranian representatives for the sale of enriched uranium and uranium production technology. Joint uranium production and enrichment efforts between Tajikistan and Iran are being considered.

—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, March 1992, pp. 9-11; *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 3 January 1992.

#### **January 1992**

Iran's Mojahedin-e Khalq opposition group reports that Iran requested nuclear warheads and uranium enrichment technology in a recent meeting with Chinese officials. [Note: The Mohajedin-e Khlaq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program.]

—Brian Dickinson, *Washington Times*, 16 January 1992, p. G4.

#### **January 1992**

Syria and Iran sign a "nuclear pact," under which Iran agrees to provide Syria with a "nuclear umbrella" in the case of an Israeli attack.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News*, August 1992, p. 52.

#### **January 1992**

The Kazakhstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs denies reports that Kazakhstan planned to sell nuclear ballistic missiles to Iran. Reports that President Nursultan Nazabayev had traveled twice to Iran are also dismissed.

—Vladimir Desytov, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 31 January 1992, p. 3; in *Proliferation Issues*, 3 March 1992, p. 12.

#### **January 1992**

Reports say Iran and North Korea have been making secret weapons deals and have been attempting to expand nuclear research cooperation programs. Iran has already received nuclear weapons technology from North Korea.

—Amir Tahiri, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 31 December 1991, p. 1; in *Proliferation Issues*, 31 January 1992, pp. 67-68; Brian Dickinson, *Washington Times*, 16 January 1992, p. G4.

#### **January-September 1992**

Despite tough new export controls, Germany approves about 80% of applications for licenses--approximately 200 licenses--to export to Iran dual-use technology included on the German "C list" of controlled items.

—Steve Coll, "German Exports Helping Iran Rebuild, Rearm; Bonn Approves 80% of Requests To Sell Tehran High-Tech Goods," *Washington Post*, 6 December 1992, p. A33.

#### **January-February 1992**

Soviet scientists are offered up to \$20,000 per month to work on Iran's nuclear program and are reported to be in Iran as of February 1992. Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, however, rejects speculations that his country has been trying to hire the scientists. One report claims that Iran has hired more than 50 former Soviet nuclear

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scientists. Alireza Jafarzadeh of the Mojahedin says "dozens" of nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union are already at five Iranian nuclear facilities: Gorgan, Moallem [Kalayeh], Isfahan, Karaj, and Darkhovin.

—Gerald R. Seib and John Fialka, "Scientists of Former Soviet Union Find the U.S. Slow in Putting out the Welcome Mat for Them," *The Wall Street Journal*, 3 February 1992, p. A14; Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "U.S. to OK High-Tech Sales to Iran and Syria," *The Los Angeles Times*, 13 February 1992, p. A1; Anatoly Karpichev, *Pravda* (Moscow), 21 January 1992, p. 4; in *Proliferation Issues*, 14 February 1992, p. 27-29; Norman Kempster, "Former Soviet Nuclear Lab Seeks U.S. Aid," *The Los Angeles Times*, 15 February 1992, p. A1.

### **17 January 1992**

The *Washington Times* reports that China is supplying a reactor and an electromagnetic isotope separator to Iran. Syria is trying to buy a Chinese nuclear reactor.

—Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz "Arms-Happy Gulf Resists New Curbs" *The Washington Times*, 17 January 1992, pp. A1, A10.

### **22 January 1992**

US Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson, during a meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Guido di Tella, expresses concern over the planned sale of nuclear material to Iran by Argentina's Investigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP). Initially, the Argentine government said that the sale could go through if Iran signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency within 40 days. [Note: See 26 January 1992 for Argentina's decision to suspend the sale.]

—Jose Maria Monzon, "The INVAP, Applied Research Institute, Case," *Noticias Argentinas* (Buenos Aires) 7 February 1992; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-004, 21 February 1992, pp. 6-7.

### **26 January 1992**

Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister announces the suspension of an \$18 million contract between Iran and Argentina's Investigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP), which would provide Iran with nuclear technologies.

—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **31 January 1993**

At a Tehran news conference, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani denies Western reports that Iran is trying to build a nuclear weapon. President Rafsanjani declares that Iran "cannot afford to purchase [and] will never try to purchase" nuclear bombs.

—Caryle Murphy, "Iranian Sees No Breakthrough On U.S. Ties," *The Washington Post*, 1 February 1993, pp. A12, A15.

### **31 January 1992**

*Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* of London reports that Iran and France have signed a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation. Under the agreement, France will supply Iran with enriched uranium. The United States is concerned by the deal, and is expected to request a full explanation of the secret agreement. During the Shah's rule, Iran signed a nuclear agreement with France that Iran later invoked in requests for French enriched uranium. France hesitated to comply due to the possible military applications of the enriched uranium. Contract disputes between the two states also led to a 12-year financial dispute wherein Iran demanded that France repay a \$1 billion loan.

—Iran, France Said To Sign Secret Nuclear Accord *Proliferation Issues*, 31 January 1992, pp. 67-68; Amir Tahiri *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 31 December 1991, p.1.

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### **31 January 1992**

The Iranian deputy Foreign Minister for Euroamerican Affairs rejects claims that Iran had purchased nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan.

—Vladimir Desyotov, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 31 January 1992, p. 3; in *Proliferation Issues*, 3 March 1992, p. 12.

### **February 1992**

At the invitation of Reza Amrollahi, director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency visits six locations in Iran in seven days, including Bushehr, the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center, the Amirabad Nuclear Research Center in Tehran, the Karaj Agricultural and Medical Research Center, Saghand, and Moallem Kalayeh. Three of the facilities have never been inspected before. IAEA Deputy Director Jon Jennekens says, "We visited without any restriction everything we had asked to see. All nuclear activities in Iran are solely for peaceful purposes." One team member, however, calls Jennekens' report an "impudent and unfounded whitewash." It is alleged that the Iranians took the team to a decoy site, a vacation spot known as Moallem Kalayeh, rather than a town by the same name said to house uranium enrichment facilities. In response to a charge that the IAEA had inspected a fake facility and not the real Moallem Kalayeh facility, David Kyd, spokesman for the IAEA, says, "None of our member states ever suggested that we were taken to a wrong location." An official with the IAEA says the calutron inspected did not have the direct capability to enrich uranium. —Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995; Neel Patri, *Nucleonics Week*, 28 November 1991, p. 8; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 21 November 1991, pp. 2-3; George J. Church, *Time*, 16 December 1991, pp. 42, 47-48; Michael Z. Wise, "Atomic Team Reports On Iran Probe," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1992, pp. A29, A30; Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 40; Paul Lewis, "Pakistan Tells of Its A-Bomb Capacity," *The New York Times*, 8 February 1992, p. A5; *International Herald Tribune*, [pub. not in L-N] 14 February 1992, p. 5; Michael Z. Wise, "Atomic Team Reports On Iran Probe," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1992, pp. A29, A30; IRNA (Tehran), 26 February 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 13 March 1992, p. 19; *Arms Control Today*, March 1992, p. 28; Jim Mann, "Iran Determined to Get A-Bomb, U.S. Believes; Arms: Officials Say Tehran is Using Chinese Technology in a Long-Term Effort to Develop Weapons," *The Los Angeles Times*, 17 March 1992, p. A1.

### **February 1992**

CIA Director Robert Gates testifies before Congress that Iran is "building up its special weapons capability as part of a massive...effort to develop its military and defense capability."

—*New York Times*, 30 November 1992, pp. A1 and A6; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995.

### **February 1992**

The *Economist* reports that Iran has plans to obtain "a few" power reactors through legitimate channels from China and India.

—"Dimona Et Al" *The Economist*, 14 March 1992, p. 46.

### **February 1992**

The Russian Federation's permanent representative to the United Nations rejects reports that a former Soviet Republic, a Muslim state, sold three tactical nuclear weapons to Iran. Iran reportedly paid between \$130 to \$150 million dollars for the bombs in question. Russian President Boris Yeltsin also denies the reports, saying that all nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union are under control. [Note: This probably refers to reports that Iran bought nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan.]

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—Radio Rossii Network (Moscow), 24 January 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 14 February 1992, p. 22; Jeff Kamen, *Defense News*, 24 January 1992, pp. 47-48; Tony Walker, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 March 1992, p. 23.

### **February 1992**

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif denies rumors that Pakistan is helping Iran rebuild and upgrade a research reactor. [Note: See 2 November 1991.] Pakistan refuses Iranian offers to purchase nuclear weapons technology in exchange for writing off Pakistani debt.

—*Nuclear Engineering International*, February 1992, p. 7; Rauf Siddiqi, *Nucleonics Week*, 20 February 1992, pp. 15-16. *Nuclear Engineering International*, February 1992, p. 7; Rauf Siddiqi, *Nucleonics Week*, 20 February 1992, pp. 15-16.

### **February 1992**

In discussions with the President of Iran, German Economic Minister Juergen Moellemann reiterates that his country will not approve delivery of parts for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Several German firms that formerly dealt with Iraq and aided its nuclear program are now in contact with Iran.

—Wolfgang Hoffman, *Die Zeit* (Hamburg) 21 February 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 3 March 1992, p. 33; Scheherazde Daneshkhu, "Iran presses on with campaign to rebuild its military might," *The Financial Times*, 6 February 1992, p. 4; Anton La Guardia, "Israel turns spotlight on Iranian arms," *Daily Telegraph* (London), 3 February 1992, p. 19.

### **February 1992**

The Belgian firm Ion Beam Applications signs a contract to sell a cyclotron to Iran. Iran says that the cyclotron will be used for medical purposes, although it may have other applications. IBA already has acquired an export permit. [Note: See 1991 and 11 May 1991 entries.]

—R.H., *Het Belang Van Limburg* (Hasselt), 12 February 1992, pp. 1, 4; in *Proliferation Issues*, 3 March 1992, pp. 39-40.

### **February 1992**

Iran says that it is ready to sign an agreement renouncing nuclear weapons development.

—Wolfgang Hoffman, *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), 21 February 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 3 March 1992, p. 33.

### **February 1992**

The Washington, DC-based Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy newsletter reports Iran is within two months of reassembling nuclear warheads acquired from the former Soviet Union. Iran has hired nuclear scientists from Kazakhstan.

—Harvey Morris, "Scare Over Nuclear Arms Leaks Focuses On Iran," *The Independent*, 25 February 1992.

### **3 February 1992**

Argentine Foreign Minister Guido di Tella denies that the Argentine government cancelled the export of all nuclear materials to Iran at the request of the United States [Note: See 22 and 26 January 1992 for more on this topic.]

—"Argentine Official Denies Cancellation of Nuclear Material Export to Iran," *The Xinhua General Overseas News Service*, 3 February 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **5 February 1992**

The Associated Press reports that, according to US and Iranian sources, Iran is procuring nuclear weapons technology from the former Soviet republics and China. [Note: See 1985-1990 entry.] According to the Mojahedin-

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e Khalq of Iran, the Islamic Republic entered into a deal to buy two 450MW nuclear reactors from the former Soviet Union. [Note: This may refer to two 440MW reactors, rather than 450MW.] In addition, the group reports that experts from Turkmenistan completed a geological survey to determine whether the two reactors could be installed northeast of Gorgan, adjacent to the Caspian Sea. Iran is still trying to purchase a reactor from China, and has purchased from China calutron equipment and giant magnets used to make weapons grade plutonium, according to the Mojahedin. The group also states that Iran has recruited many highly paid nuclear experts from the former Soviet republics and that Iranian President Rafsanjani ordered Iranian nuclear experts to Europe to work at nuclear labor and technologies companies in order to procure nuclear secrets. [Note: The Mojahedin-e Khlaq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program.]

—Ruth Sinai, "Iran Turning Increasingly to the Former Soviet Republics and to China for Help in Getting Nuclear Weapons Technology, U.S. Official and Iranian Sources Said Wednesday," *The Associated Press*, 5 February 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **7 February 1992**

Argentine President Carlos Menem blocks the shipment of dual-use technology from Argentina's Investigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP) to Iran, despite the earlier arrival of Argentine technicians in Iran in connection with the deal. The deal, which has been valued at \$18 million, involves nuclear reactor material, including tubing and machine tools. Another source indicates that the blocked shipment includes equipment for two contracts between INVAP and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran: \$9.7 million worth of equipment for a uranium conversion and purification pilot plant and \$14.9 million worth of equipment for a fuel fabrication pilot plant. INVAP also has a contract to conduct \$5.6 million of support work for the operation of the Tehran Nuclear Research Center's research reactor with a 20% core.

—"INVAP Fears Bankruptcy After Shipment is Halted," *Nuclear Engineering International*, June 1992, p. 12.

### **13 February 1992**

The *Los Angeles Times* reports that the United States is trying to implement an export policy preventing US exports of dual-use technology to Iran. Iran already has purchased \$60 million of high-tech equipment, including powerful computers that may have nuclear applications.

—Douglas Frantz and Murray Waas, "U.S. to OK High-Tech Sales to Iran and Syria," *The Los Angeles Times*, 13 February 1992, p. A1.

### **15 February 1992**

*The Washington Post* reports that many Iranian scientists, including Ahmad Sofudhehnia, have returned from exile or have been released from jail to work on developing Iran's nuclear programs.

—Michael Z. Wise, "Atomic Team Reports On Iran Probe," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1992, pp. A29, A30.

### **23 February 1992**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, inaugurates Iran's first graduate degree in nuclear engineering. Over 40 foreign nuclear experts will assist in teaching the post-graduate courses. However, the nationality of the foreigners is unclear. Iran rejects western allegations that the program proves that the Islamic Republic is seeking nuclear weapons.

—"Iran to Train Own Nuclear Experts," *The Xinhua News Agency*, 23 February 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **24 February 1992**

NBC-TV reports that US intelligence reports say that Iran and Pakistan have been cooperating in making a nuclear

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bomb for the last two years.

—Press Trust of India, 24 February 1992; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **26 February 1992**

Reza Amrollahi, the president of Iran Atomic Energy Organization, says at an International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting that Iran will complete the nuclear reactors of Bushehr.

—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **March 1992**

US Ambassador to China, J. Stapelton Roy, visits a Chinese nuclear reactor outside Beijing and inspects a model of the reactor destined for Iran. On the occasion, US diplomats pressure Chinese officials to cancel the transfer.

—Steve Coll, U.S. Halted Nuclear Bid By Iran; China, Argentina, Agreed to Cancel Technology Transfers, *The Washington Post*, 17 November 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **March 1992**

Despite US pressure, India resumes its deal to sell a 10MW nuclear research reactor to Iran. [Note: See 22 November 1992.] The director of the Indian Nuclear Committee, Mr. Ingra, says that his country has the right to export nuclear reactors to Iran.

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 25 March 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 8 April 1992, p. 1.

### **March 1992**

A US Republican task force reports that Iran has possessed all of the necessary components to build a nuclear bomb since December 1991.

—Tony Walker, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 March 1992, p. 23.

### **March 1992**

Paul Muenstermann, vice president of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), says that Iran received two of three nuclear warheads and medium-range nuclear delivery systems that are missing from Kazakhstan. Iranian officials and the commander of the CIS Joint Armed Forces reject these claims. Russian General Victor Samoilov, however, who handles disarmament issues for the CIS general staff, admits that three nuclear warheads were missing from Kazakhstan. Also, Iran allegedly purchased four 152mm nuclear shells from the former Soviet Union, which were allegedly stolen and sold by former Soviet Army officers. The Iranian Foreign Ministry denies these allegations. Lt. General Sergey Zalentsov, senior commander of the United Armed Forces of the CIS and deputy-in-charge of all CIS nuclear arms, also rejects the reports. Iran reportedly received the warheads from Kazakhstan through Bulgaria. However, Iran did not receive the necessary launch codes or missiles capable of carrying the warheads. [Note: See 16 March 1992 entry for the response from Russian and Kazakh officials.]

—"Iran Buys Bomb," 16 March 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 52; Nickolay Kalintsev, ITAR-TASS, 16 March 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 3 April 1992, p. 17; *The Press Democrat*, 17 March 1992, p. A4; Sofia Khorizont Radio Network, 17 March 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 16 March 1992, p. 13.

### **March 1992**

*The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* reports that Iran has imported unsafeguarded enriched uranium from an unknown

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country and calutron magnet cores from West Germany.

—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, March 1992, pp. 9-11.

### **2 March 1992**

Argentine President Carlos Menem cancels Investigaciones Aplicadas' (INVAP) proposed shipment of machine tools worth \$18 million to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran due to lack of adequate safeguards. [Note: See entry on the blocking of the deal on 7 February 1992. See 17 November 1992 for more on this topic.]

—Richard Kessler, "General Atomics, INVAP Explore Research Reactor, Nuclear Ties," *Nucleonics Week*, 2 April 1992, p. 15.

### **15 March 1992**

*The Houston Chronicle* reports that Iran has ample enriched uranium to construct a nuclear warhead. The *Chronicle* reports that Iran is also recalling its Silkworm missiles, currently positioned in the Persian Gulf, which could be armed with a nuclear warhead in a single day.

—"Intelligence Report," *The Houston Chronicle*, 15 March 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **16 March 1992**

Russian and Kazakh officials deny a report in the German magazine *Stern* that Iran acquired two nuclear devices and their delivery systems from Kazakhstan. Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Ivan Krylnik says, "All nuclear weapons are under the strictest centralized control and selling them or stealing them is impossible." The spokesman for Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev says, "Our president has more than once emphasized that our nuclear weapons are under safe control" and that Kazakhstan is "living up to its obligations on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons." However, the US magazine *US News and World Report* quotes an unidentified high-ranking Russian officer as substantiating a US intelligence report that three short-range nuclear weapons have disappeared from an arsenal in Kazakhstan. The US magazine reports the weapons have been sold to Iran. [Note: See March 1992 entry for comments by the German intelligence service on the matter. See 17 March 1992 entry for the denial of a CIS general.]

—"Russia, Kazakhstan Deny Iran Has Obtained Soviet Nuclear Warheads," The Associated Press, 16 March 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **17 March 1992**

CIS armed forces command general, Sergei Zelentsov, denies reports that a Kazakh scientist sold tactical nuclear weapons to Iran. Zelentsov says, "I can guarantee that no scientist had access to these weapons." He says, "No unauthorized person can gain access to nuclear weapons, and no such person could gain access in the future."

—"No Arms to Iran," *The Independent* (London), 17 March 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Fred Hiatt, "Russians Contest Ukraine's Suspension of Tactical Nuclear Arms Transfer," *The Washington Post*, 18 March 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **30 March 1992**

Owner of Ray Amiri Computer Consultants, Reza (Ray) Amiri, and the firm's operations manager, Mohammad (Don) Danesh, plead guilty for illegally shipping nuclear weapons and missile guidance systems components to Iran. Amiri and Danesh are convicted on 19 counts, including falsifying customs declarations and exporting controlled commodities such as oscilloscopes, logic analyzers, pulse generators, and a universal programming system to the Ministry of Defense in Tehran. [Note: See 29 August 1991 for their arrest.]

—Lynn Smith, "Pair Plead Guilty To Illegally Exporting Equipment to Iran," *Los Angeles Times* (Orange County Edition), 31 March 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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#### **April 1992**

*The European* of London reports that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service has said that Iran definitely received two warheads stolen from Semipalatinsk. The report says that the organization selling the weapons had ties to Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 53; Roger Fallgot and Ian Mather, *The European*, 30 April-3 May 1992, pp. 1-2.

#### **April 1992**

Argentina suspends contracts for nuclear projects in Iran.

—Warren H. Donnelly and Zachary S. Davis, "Iran's Nuclear Activities and the Congressional Response," *CRS Issue Brief*, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 20 May 1992.

#### **11 April 1992**

Russia issues Decree No. 388, which provides the basis for a Russian export control structure. A potential problem in the current export control structure is that Georgii Khizha, who heads the Export Control Commission, also heads the Commission for Military and Technical Cooperation, which is assigned to promote the export of Russian defense items. As a result of such bureaucratic inconsistencies, Russia decided to sell two nuclear plants to Iran.

—William C. Potter, "Nuclear Exports From the Former Soviet Union: What's New, What's True," *Arms Control Today*, 1-2/93, pp. 3-10.

#### **15 April 1992**

Israel's Chief of General Staff, Major General Amnon Shahak, says Iran's desire to procure nuclear weapons is a "worrisome trend" that should be watched carefully by Israel, the Arab countries, and the international community.

—Alon Pinkas, "Shahak: Don't Ignore Iranian Nuclear Efforts," *The Jerusalem Post*, 16 April 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **May 1992**

The International Atomic Energy Agency says it has no information on Iran acquiring nuclear warheads. *The European*, a weekly newspaper, reports that "Iran has obtained at least two nuclear warheads out of a batch officially listed as "missing from the newly independent republic of Kazakhstan..." *The European* also reports that a top secret report from Russian intelligence was sent to the CIA outlining Iran's procurement of Kazakhstan's missing nuclear warheads.

—"IAEA Has No Information on Nuclear Warheads in Iran," *Moneyclips*, 6 May 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **May 1992**

Iranian diplomats say Iran could buy nuclear reactors from anywhere and that Iran's electricity industry needs "a large number" of them. In addition, they could pay cash for them. However, Iranian diplomats say India was not approached for a deal.

—"India Was Not Approached For Nuclear Power Says Iran," *Moneyclips*, 22 May 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **2 May 1992**

Russian television reports that Russian intelligence has told the CIA that two nuclear warheads from Semipalatisk,

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Kazakhstan, were sold to Iran and another unknown Middle East country with the permission of Kazakhstani President Nazarbayev. The warheads are of a capacity ranging from 2 to 5 kilotons. [Note: See 27 May 1992 entry for NATO statement rebutting this report.]

—Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **4 May 1992**

The Chairman of the Kazakh KGB denies reports that Kazakhstan sold two nuclear warheads to Iran. The KGB Chairman dismisses reports of a sale as a "disinformation plot aimed at positioning relations between Kazakhstan and Russia" and "the moderate and realistic policies" of Kazakhstan.

—"Kazakh KGB Denies Sale of Nuclear Warheads to Iran," The British Broadcasting Corporation, 5 May 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **13 May 1992**

The Associated Press publishes a list of companies that sold advanced technology to Iran; the companies are also identified as having supplied equipment to Iraq for its nuclear and missile program. The companies are Siemens Corporation (a subsidiary of Siemens AG of Germany), \$21 million in computers, communication equipment, electronic assemblies, integrated circuits, and other items; Honeywell Inc., \$10 million for computers in use at refineries, replacement parts for electronic assemblies, and technical models; Honeywell Bull Inc. (joint venture of Groupe Bull of France and NEC Corp. of Japan), \$5.2 million in computers, some for a national census project, and other to be sold by distributors; Finnigan Mat, \$684,062 in computers, some for research on biological compounds, and others for oil refineries; Rockwell International Corporation, \$540,767 in technical models, transmission equipment, and helicopter equipment; Sackman Associates, \$423,200 in computers for use in hospital X-Ray equipment; Carl Zeiss Inc. (US subsidiary of German company), \$85,000 for computers to measure and evaluate photographic data; Tektronix Inc. \$63,835 in computer equipment; Unysis Corporation, \$13,900 in computers to be used by Swissair in Tehran; Data General Corporation, \$10,000 for computers used in demonstration at trade fairs in Iran; Wild Magnavox (joint venture between Magnavox and Wild of Switzerland), [no dollar value] for repairs if defective equipments used for mapping and surveying.

—Associated Press, 13 May 1992; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **22 May 1992**

The spokesman at the Iranian embassy in India denies that Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati discussed a 10MW reactor on his recent trip to India. An Indian official says India and Iran had "preliminary discussions" last year about the reactor. The Iranian official also says, "Iran has enough money to buy a nuclear reactor from anywhere in the world. We need a large number of reactors for our power industry and we have the money to buy them."

—Reuters, 22 May 1992; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu); accessed 25 March 2002.

#### **27 May 1992**

NATO officials say all of the more than 17,000 tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union have been returned to Russia. [Note: This rebuts a 2 May 1992 report that Kazakhstan sold Iran two nuclear weapons.]

—*The Daily Telegraph*, 2 May 1992; in Gulf 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **June 1992**

Kazakh deputy Ozhas Suleymanov says the three missing nuclear weapons said to have been transferred to Iran have been found at Semipalatinsk.

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—Roger Fallgot and Ian Mather, *The European*, 20 April-3 May 1992, pp. 1-2; Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 52.

#### **June 1992**

An Israeli newspaper reports that Iran is receiving nuclear weapons development assistance from nine western firms.

—*Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 11 June 1992, p. 5; in *Proliferation Issues*, 19 June 1992, p. 17.

#### **June 1992**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, criticizes Israel's Air Force commander for saying that Israel may take military action against Iran's nuclear installations.

—*International Atomic Energy Agency Information Circular*, 14 July 1992.

#### **8 June 1992**

*Middle East Defense News* reports that a geological survey is underway at Gorgan with assistance from Turkmenistan as possible site for 450MW power reactor which Iran is negotiating to purchase from the former Soviet Union. According to Western intelligence, Gorgan is not a civilian site and was not visited by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1992 or declared to the IAEA. Western intelligence also reports that nuclear scientists from Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan are employed at Gorgan with salaries upward of \$20,000 a month. Again according to Western intelligence reports, the Gorgan site is not funded by the Central Bank of Iran but rather Great Nuclear Plan. The reports also say that Iran allotted \$4.2 billion for nuclear weapons development over the next three years.

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **8 June 1992**

*Middle East Defense News* reports that intelligence sources believe the Isfahan site is meant to contain the facilities for the entire uranium fuel cycle.

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **12 June 1992**

The *Sunday Times* of London reports the Iran is offering Russian émigrés in Israel thousands of dollars a month and luxury housing to continue nuclear research programs in Iran.

—"Iran Lures Jobless Russian Scientists," *Moneyclips*, 13 July 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **19 June 1992**

*Proliferation Issues* reports that the head of the Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence Branch, Major General Uri Saqi, warns that Iran is within 10 years of developing nuclear weapons capability. At least nine Western firms and dozens of nuclear scientists are involved in developing the Iranian atomic program. A senior Israeli government source said that Israel would not sit passively by while Iran develops its nuclear program but would use all options to stop it.

—"Western Firms' Links With Iran, Libya Cited," *Proliferation Issues*, 19 June 1992, p. 17.

#### **21 June 1992**

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati denies accusations that Iran is trying to indigenously produce a nuclear weapon before the close the 20th century. Velayati also denies reports that Iran possesses the necessary equipment needed to produce nuclear weapons. The Iranian Foreign Minister adds that all Iranian nuclear facilities

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are open the International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

—"Iranian Foreign Minister Says Iran Incapable of Producing Nuclear Bombs," The British Broadcasting Corporation, 22 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **13 July 1992**

Iranian President Khamenei says allegations that Iran is seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction are the result of "American and Zionist loudspeakers....They know it is a lie....You are mistaken if you think that the Islamic Republic's strength lies in the obtaining or domestic manufacture of an atomic bomb.....The power of faith will foil all the conspiracies and ploys of the enemy."

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **July 1992**

An IAEA team visits several Iranian nuclear sites and reported having seen nothing to suggest Iran is developing nuclear energy for non-peaceful uses. Several countries noted that they were not convinced the IAEA visit was absolutely conclusive.

—Harvey Morris "Scare Over Nuclear Arms Leaks Focuses On Iran" *The Independent*, 25 February 1992.

### **30 July 1992**

*The China Daily* newspaper reports Iran, Bangladesh, and Egypt are exploring deals to purchase 300MW reactors from China.

—Kathy Wilhelm, "China May Sell Nuclear Reactors to Bangladesh, Egypt and Iran," The Associated Press, 30 July 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **31 July 1992**

The German government reaffirms that it will refuse to grant Siemens an export license to complete the Bushehr nuclear plant in Iran. The announcement came from the Economics Ministry in response to the news that Iran would file a lawsuit against Siemens with the International Chambers of Commerce in Paris.

—"German Government Blocks Completion Of Nuclear," CompuServe-Executive News Service, 3 August 1992.

### **31 July 1992**

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati says that Iran has no interest in developing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and continues to say that he rejects any claim that Iran is developing any weapons of mass destruction. He adds that Iran has a negative position toward chemical and biological weapons. He also says that at a time when the former Soviet Union is asking the West for funds to dispose of their arsenals, he says it would not be an advisable policy to seek the acquisition of these weapons.

—Reuters, 31 July 1992; in *Gulf* 2000, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

### **August 1992**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that German intelligence is investigating the possibility that earlier this year, South Africa reshipped furnace equipment to Iran supplied to it by Germany in the early 1980s.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 20 August 1992, pp. 7-8.

### **2 August 1992**

The managing director of the German company Siemens, Von Pirer, and the head of Qeshm Free Zone Trade Authority, Ali Shams Ardakani, sign a deal to build a gas-fired power station in the free zone of Qeshm Island, Iran,

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in the Persian Gulf.

—"Siemens to Build Power Plant at Queshm, Iran," The Xinhua News Agency, 2 August 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **3 August 1992**

Siemens of Germany formally notifies Iran that the Bushehr deal was cancelled indefinitely.

—"Iran Threatens Siemens," *Middle East Defense News*, 17 August 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **4 August 1992**

The deputy of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran chastises the German government for not fulfilling its commitment to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant. He also adds that despite the concerns from some countries, Bushehr has no military application. The deputy says, "We have begun discussions with China about the establishment of new power stations." German Economics Affairs Minister Juergen Moellemann says no German firm, including Siemens AG, will be allowed to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Atomic Energy Official On Bushehr Nuclear Power Station; Negotiations With China," The British Broadcasting Corporation, 4 August 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "Minister Affirms Refusal" *Proliferation Issues*, 12 August 1992, p. 26.

### **19 August 1992**

*The Financial Times* reports that Iran threatened to sue the German electronics company Siemens AG for refusing to complete construction of nuclear power plant begun in 1975 at Bushehr.

—"China Nuclear-Plant Announced," Fact on File World News Digest, 17 September 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **24 August 1992**

According to Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Iran and the Russian Federation sign a 15-year bilateral nuclear agreement in Tehran, which covers increased cooperation in nuclear safety; radioisotope production and use in the fields of medicine, agriculture, and industry; construction and operation of nuclear power plants; research and development; and training. Amrollahi says this general agreement calls for the construction of two Russian VVER-440-213 (water-cooled and moderated) type pressurized water reactors in Iran. [Note: Amrollahi reveals the agreement at the International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference in September 1992. See 23 September 1992 entry. ITAR-TASS reports on 7 September that Minatom Information Department head Georgiy Kaurov says the document will be signed on 21 September at the beginning of the General Conference and will include cooperation on the industrial production of nuclear reactor and fuel cycle components and materials. IAEA sources on 15 September report the two countries have reached agreement on the basic (terms) for cooperation and will sign the pact "soon."]

—Iranian Press Release; in *ENS NucNet*, 30 September 1992; IRNA (Tehran), 23 September 1992; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-036, 7 October 1992, p. 21; Mark Hibbs, "Russian Industry May Be Key To Iran's Reactor Prospects," *Nucleonics Week*, 17 September 1992, Vol. 33, No. 38, pp. 3-4; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **28 August 1992**

Kazakhstan's Defense Minister S. Nurmanambetov denies reports that Kazakhstan sold Iran three nuclear weapons. Nurmanambetov says, "We declare that there are no nuclear weapons on the territory of Kazakhstan. The nuclear weapons were withdrawn back in November 1991. The logical conclusion to be drawn is how can it sell what does not exist?"

**Related content is available on the website for the Nuclear Threat Initiative, [www.nti.org](http://www.nti.org).**



—"Kazakh Defense Minister Denies Selling Iran Nuclear Weapons," The British Broadcasting Corporation, 28 August 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **September 1992**

China agrees to supply Iran with two 300MW reactors. The US State Department strongly objects to the deal with the China. [Note: See 13 April 1993 entry for Iran's ratification of the agreement.] The Chinese-contracted plant will be of similar design to China's own Qinshan plant. Observers question China's ability to complete the Iranian project as key components in the Qinshan station, such as the pressure vessel, instrumentation and control, and primary pumps, were imported from international dealers. China it expects to be able to supply the components prior to the Iranian reactor's projected start up date in 2002.

—"Iran Goes Shopping For Nuclear Technology," 1992 *Nuclear Engineering International*, November 1992, p. 2 ; "Iran signed a nuclear cooperation pact with China," *Nuclear News*, October 1992, pp. 17-18; Elaine Sciolino, "China Will Build a Plant for Iran," *The New York Times*, 11 September 1992, p. A6; George Gedda, *The Herald*, 12 September 1992.

#### **September 1992**

The German press speculates that Iran and North Korea have made a secret agreement to jointly develop nuclear weapons.

—Andi Spicer, "Energy: Iran And Russia To Build Joint Nuclear Power Plant," Inter Press Service, 21 September 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **September 1992**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that a German official and other sources say Russia has been putting pressure on the German firm Siemens AG to work with it in constructing a nuclear reactor in Iran. Germany has been resisting Russia's efforts to retransfer to Iran "advanced reactor electronic diagnostic and control technology" made by Siemens/Kraftwerk Union that the Soviet Union imported in 1989.

—Mark Hibbs, "Russian Industry May Be Key To Iran's Reactor Prospects," *Nucleonics Week*, 17 September 1992, Vol. 33, No. 38, pp. 3-4; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **September 1992**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Argentine President Carlos Menem has blocked the supply to Iran of equipment for a pilot fuel fabrication plant and a uranium conversion facility. [Note: See 7 February 1992 and 2 March 1992 entries.] Argentina cancels negotiations for supplying Iran with a heavy water production plant. Iran reportedly also sought hot-cell equipment from industry in Argentina and Europe, although a US official says Iran has not obtained any equipment that can be used to reprocess fuel.

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran Sought Sensitive Nuclear Supplies from Argentina, China," *Nucleonics Week*, 24 September 1992, pp. 2-3.

#### **September 1992**

Iran's permanent representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed Sadeq-Ayatollahi, says that Iran is willing to accept additional safeguards on two reactors to be supplied by Russia and would have "no objections" to returning spent fuel from the reactors to Russia. [Note: As of mid-October 1992, Russia had not agreed to a US request to accept the return of spent fuel from Iran.]

—Mark Hibbs, *NuclearFuel*, 12 October 1992, p. 5.

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### **2 September 1992**

The *Washington Times* reports that Reza Amrollahi, director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said that the country would have several nuclear plants within the next 10 years. He also said that countries that refuse to help Iran with its program "will lose," in an apparent reference to West Germany, which will not allow Siemens to complete construction on a nuclear plant begun before 1980. However, "Iran is believed to closely cooperate in such matters with [China]," and India has offered to build atomic plants abroad to generate hard currency.

—Iran Sees Role As Nuclear Power *Washington Times*, 2 September 1991, p. A2.

### **7 September 1992**

The BBC Summary of World Broadcasts reports that Iran and Russia plan to sign a joint declaration for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to build a nuclear power plant in Iran. The signing ceremony is to be held at the opening of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Geneva on 21 September. The cooperation between the two countries will be for the cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, joint research, the training of personnel, as well as industrial production of materials necessary for use in nuclear reactors, and the nuclear fuel cycle. However, none of this material or equipment is to be used military purposes, and is to be under strict IAEA safeguards control for the full period of their use.

—BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 September 1992; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

### **8 September 1992**

Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani denies any cooperation between Iran and Pakistan for the production of nuclear weapons. [Note: See 1991 (2), May 1991 (2), November 1991 and December 1992 for more on cooperation between Pakistan and Iran].

—BBC/SWB, 8 September 1992; in Gulf 2000, www1.columbia.edu.

### **10 September 1992**

Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani announces that China agrees to provide Iran with its first nuclear power plant (300MW). China and Iran reiterate that this plant is intended solely for peaceful purposes, and that it would be available to international inspectors in accordance with 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Iranian President Rafsanjani and Chinese President Yang Shangkun attend the signing ceremony in China. The agreement was signed by Song Jian, Chinese Minister for Science and Technology, and Reza Amrollahi, head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization. The deal calls for China to assist in the construction of at least four nuclear power stations and a research center. Iranian Central Bank Governor Mohammad Hossein Adeli is presently in Beijing signing "necessary financial arrangements." A spokesperson for the US State Department strongly criticizes the recently announced China-Iran nuclear cooperation agreement. "Any nuclear cooperation with Iran," the spokesperson says, "even for peaceful purposes and even under IAEA safeguards ... is highly imprudent and should be avoided" the spokesperson commented.

—"China Nuclear-Plant Announced," *Fact on File World News Digest*, 17 September 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Iran Goes Shopping For Nuclear Technology," 1992 *Nuclear Engineering International*, November 1992, p. 2; "Iran signed a nuclear cooperation pact with China," *Nuclear News*, October 1992, pp. 17-18; China To Supply Military, Nuclear Power Equipment: Agreement Signed In Beijing," *Proliferation Issues*, 16 September 1992, p. 19; "U.S. Objections Termed 'Arrogan'," *Proliferation Issues*, 16 September 1992, pp. 2-3.

### **11 September 1992**

Alireza Jafarzadeh, a spokesperson for the Mojahedin-e Khalq of Iran, the largest Iranian anti-government opposition group, tells a news conference that the government in Tehran has increased the nuclear development budget from \$200 million in 1991 to \$800 million in 1992, and are therefore "coming closer to obtaining a nuclear

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bomb." He adds that according to the intelligence gathered by supporters of his group inside Iran, the plant that China has agreed to supply is intended to complete a nuclear center at a military base in Darkhovin, which is one of five nuclear sites in Iran. He also says that work on the nuclear program is running in conjunction with efforts to further the biological and chemical programs. [Note: The Mohajedin-e Khlaq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program.]

—Reuters, 11 September 1992; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **12 September 1992**

The US Department of State calls China's sale of a nuclear reactor to Iran an "imprudent move" as this will heighten Iran's nuclear capability. The State Department fears that the reactor could be used for the development of nuclear weapons.

—Reuters, 11 September 1992; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **16 September 1992**

Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen rejects US concerns over the sale of a nuclear reactor to Iran, noting that Iran has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and accepts International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

—"Iran Goes Shopping For Nuclear Technology," 1992, *Nuclear Engineering International*, November 1992, p. 2; "Iran signed a nuclear cooperation pact with China" *Nuclear News*, October 1992, pp. 17-18.

#### **22 September 1992**

An Iranian official denies knowledge of any deals with Argentina for fuel cycle facilities or a research reactor. The Iranian official also said that the only nuclear agreement Iran had with Argentina called for the supply of nuclear fuel for the 5MW research reactor at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.

—Mark Hibbs, "Sensitive Iran Reactor Deal May Hinge On MFN For China," *Nucleonics Week*, 1 October 1992, pp. 5-6.

#### **23 September 1992**

Chinese official Xuehong Liu tells the journal *Nucleonics Week* that China "could not supply" Iran with a nuclear research reactor for "technical reasons." [Note: See March 1992 entry for entry on US pressure. The research reactor probably is a 20MW reactor. See 1 October and 17 November 1992 entries.]

—Steve Coll, "U.S. Halted Nuclear Bid By Iran; China, Argentina, Agreed to Cancel Technology Transfers," *The Washington Post*, 17 November 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **23 September 1992**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that Iran is holding talks with both China and Russia the possible purchase of four nuclear reactors. The Chinese units are two 300MW reactors based on Westinghouse design but built in China. The Russian units are of the VVER-440-213 type. Amrollahi said the reactors meet IAEA safety standards and would be used for peaceful applications

—"Iran Seeks To Buy Russian, Chinese Nuclear Reactors" CompuServe-Executive News Service, 23 September 1992; "Iran Plans To Buy Four Nuclear Reactors," *Moneyclips*, 23 September 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **23 September 1992**

At a press conference during the IAEA General Conference in Vienna, Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that Iran and Russia have signed a 15-year bilateral nuclear accord on 24 August 1992. [Note: See 24 August 1992 entry.]

—Mark Hibbs, *NuclearFuel*, 12 October 1992, p. 5.

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### **October 1992**

Ayatollah Mohajerani, deputy president of Iran, says "because the enemy [Israel] has nuclear facilities, the Muslim states too should be equipped with the same capacity."

—*Washington Post*, 17 November 1992, p. A30; in Michael Eisenstadt, "Living With a Nuclear Iran?," *Survival*, 3 August 1999, pp. 124-148.

### **Early October 1992**

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy agrees during a meeting with officials from the US Department of State that Russia will make the sale of pressurized water reactors to Iran conditional upon Iran's acceptance of additional safeguard measures. According to Russian officials, their government also accepted a US request that Russia refrain from supplying Iran with any reprocessing or enrichment technology or equipment. However, Russia did not state that it would honor a further US request that Russia accept the return of spent fuel from Iran.

—Mark Hibbs, *NuclearFuel*, 12 October 1992, p. 5.

### **1 October 1992**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Liu Xuehong, Chinese deputy director general of the Ministry of Energy and Bureau of International Cooperation at the China National Nuclear Corporation, says China cannot supply a 20MW reactor to Iran for "technical reasons." Iran has been seeking a 25 to 30MW heavy water-moderated natural uranium-fueled reactor. Given that Iran planned to purchase fuel cycle and heavy water production facilities from Argentina, the United States is now convinced that Iran has non-peaceful nuclear objectives. Western officials doubt that China is really unable to supply the Iranian reactor. Liu says that the reactor sought by Iran is too small to pose a proliferation threat. However, US experts speculate the reactor could be capable of producing 6kg of plutonium per year. Although the International Atomic Energy Agency does not consider such an amount to be significant, it is enough to produce a nuclear bomb. The United States has pressed China not to export the reactor. [Note: See 23 September and 17 November 1992 for entries on US pressure on China.]

—Mark Hibbs, "Sensitive Iran Reactor Deal May Hinge On MFN For China," *Nucleonics Week*, 1 October 1992, pp. 5-6.

### **12 October 1992**

Mohammed Mohadessin, director of international relations for the Iranian opposition group Mojahedin-e Khalq, says Iran has paid Kazakhstan for nuclear warheads but has not received them. Mohadessin's comments match US intelligence reports. [Note: The Mojahedin-e Khalq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program.]

—Nick Ludington, "Iran Buying Nuclear Warheads from Kazakhstan Says Opposition Group," *The Associated Press*, 21 October 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **13 October 1992**

Kazakhstani and CIS military headquarters in Moscow deny that Iran bought four nuclear warheads from the former Soviet Republic. Mohammed Mohadessin of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, says that Tehran paid for the warheads but Kazakhstan had not yet delivered them. A commentary published in the Russian military newspaper *Red Star* says that the accusation is false, and that all the nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan are under reliable supervision, and that no one has the ability or the desire to sell any of them.

—Associated Press, 13 October 1992; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

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#### **15-24 October 1992**

A delegation visiting Iran from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) discusses the use of Russian technology for uranium extraction in Iran, possibly through joint ventures. The delegation also discusses the schedule for equipment deliveries for the reactor Russia will supply Iran under an August 1992 agreement. In considering the fuel supply for the reactor, the two sides raise the possibility of Russian involvement in prospecting for uranium deposits in Iran. The Russian team includes Atomredmetzoloto (formerly the "raw materials main administration" of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building) President Vyacheslav Krotkov, Chemical Technology Research Institute Deputy Director Boris Laskorin, and Zarubezhatomenergostroy (an independent state foreign trade association that was also previously part of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building) packaged deliveries department head Sergey Kulikov. MINATOM officials refrain from commenting on the results of the discussions. —*Kommersant-Daily*, 27 October 1992, p. 4; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-92-041, 12 November 1992, p. 22.

#### **29 October 1992**

Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Chinese President Yang Shangkun dismiss charges of collaboration on an Iranian nuclear weapons program. China states that it is only helping Iran develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. US officials say Iran has bought uranium enrichment equipment from China and may be actively seeking to develop a nuclear weapon.

—"Iranians Deny Allegations," *Proliferation Issues*, 29 October 1991, p. 4; "Iranian Nuclear Collaboration Denied" *Proliferation Issues*, 29 October 1991, p. 3; Iran And China Dismiss Nuclear Weapons Charges *Financial Times*, 1 November 1991, p. 6.

#### **14 November 1992**

Mayak Radio Network (Moscow) reports that an undisclosed portion of the uranium stolen from the Chepetsk plant apparently made its way to the Russian town of Grozny, Chechnya, where it was reportedly purchased for 280 million rubles by buyers from Azerbaijan who intend to sell it to Iran for \$15 million. [Note: See also 4 July 1998.]

—"Unenriched Uranium-238 Reportedly Sold in Grozny," *Proliferation Issues*, 24 November 1992, p. 26.

#### **17 November 1992**

The *Washington Post* reports that US Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency Richard T. Kennedy managed to block Argentina's deal to supply Iran with equipment for making heavy water and nuclear fuel by agreeing to assist Investigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP), the company involved in the canceled sale, to find alternative business in the United States by developing ties with General Atomics, Inc.

—Steve Coll, "U.S. Halted Nuclear Bid By Iran," *Washington Post*, 17 November 1992, pp. A1, A30.

#### **17 November 1992**

The *Washington Post* reports that US Ambassador to Beijing J. Stapleton Ray successfully lobbied Chinese officials into stopping the transfer of a research reactor to Iran for "technical reasons." Such a reactor contains Western parts, which can be embargoed to block the sale. Iranian Ambassador to the IAEA Mohammed Ayatollahi had stated that Iran was seeking fuel-fabrication technology because there had been supply problems with the enriched uranium shipped from Argentina. [Note: The reactor proposed for transfer is probably a 20MW reactor. See 23 September and 1 October 1992 entries.]

—Steve Coll, "U.S. Halted Nuclear Bid By Iran," *Washington Post*, 17 November 1992, pp. A1, A30.

#### **17 November 1992**

The *Washington Post* reports that Pakistan denies charges that it has sold centrifuge design data it stole from

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Urenco to Iran.

—Steve Coll, "U.S. Halted Nuclear Bid By Iran," *Washington Post*, 17 November 1992, pp. A1, A30.

#### **18 November 1992**

Richard Boucher, spokesman for the US State Department, says there is no proof that Iran has purchased atomic warheads from the former Soviet Union.

—"UN inspectors become lucky nuclear supplier to Iraq identified. Baghdad continues to hold back the list of suppliers," *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 November 1992, p. 9; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com). [Center for Nonproliferation Studies translation.]

#### **22 November 1992**

At a meeting between Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and the president of the China National Nuclear Corporation, Jiang Xinxiong, Velayati expresses his hope that Iran and China will strengthen their cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Jian Xinxiong is in Iran holding business talks with Iran's atomic organization leaders over the bilateral cooperation in building a 300,000kW (300MW) nuclear power station in Iran. [Note: See 31 October 1992, 8 July 1993.]

—Xinhua, 22 November 1992; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **25 November 1992**

The Chinese ambassador to Iran, Hua Liming, states that nuclear cooperation between Tehran and Beijing to build a nuclear power plant will continue despite Western objections.

—Chinese Ambassador Says Nuclear Cooperation for Peaceful Purposes Will Continue," The British Broadcasting Corporation, 27 November 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **27 November 1992**

Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Besharati says "rumors that Iran is after obtaining nuclear weapons are all lies and calculated by the enemies of the Islamic Revolution." Besharati also states, "Our weapons are not comparable with the military resources of the region qualitatively and quantitatively."

—"Iran Not Seeking Nuclear Weapons; Official," The Xinhua News Agency, 27 November 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 November 1992**

According to reports, Iranian President Rafsanjani and the deputy head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran travel to Yazd to evaluate work on a major Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps nuclear research center.

—"Opposition Says Iranian President Visits Nuclear Center," ITAR-TASS, 28 November 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **30 November 1992**

The *New York Times* reports that a CIA draft report concludes that Iran is making progress on its nuclear arms program and could develop a weapon by 2000. The highly technical report however is contentious as intelligence experts are divided on the meaning of Iran's \$2 billion annual buildup.

—Elaine Sciolino, "CIA Says Iran Makes Progress on Atom Arms," *New York Times*, 30 November 1992; in *Gulf 2000*, [www1.columbia.edu](http://www1.columbia.edu).

#### **December 1992,**

Two Iranian diplomats discuss via telephone the acquisition of four nuclear warheads by Iran from one of the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. The two diplomats are identified as an Iranian Foreign Ministry

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official Abdolrahmani, who is in charge of relations with the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, and Iranian Deputy Sirus Nasiri Tabatabai-Kia, who is second in command in the Iranian delegation to United Nations institutions and international organizations in Geneva. In the tapped phone conversation between Abdolrahmani and Tabatabai-Kia, which is obtained from an European intelligence service, Abdolrahmani confirms that one of the Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union sold four warheads to Iran. Tabatabai-Kia notes that the purchases "completed their mission in the best possible way." Abdolrahmani says that the warheads had not arrived because of a problem with transportation, and that he does not know how much the warheads cost because "some other guy arranged the issue of the payment." In the course of the conversation, the names of Iranian President Rafsanjani's brother-in-law Hajj Mohsen Rafij, and the Iranian defense minister Akbar Torkan are mentioned in connection with the sale.

—"Tapped Line Said To Reveal Deal On Warheads," FBIS, 15 January 1993, pp. 61-62.

#### **December 1992**

Iran offers \$3.5 billion to Pakistan to share its nuclear technology. [Note: See 19 December 1995.]

—Istashamul Haque, "Iran Offer of Money for Nuclear Technology Rejected," *Dawn* (Karachi), 20 December 1995, in FBIS Document FTS19951220000165, 20 December 1995; "Tehran: Not Seeking Pakistani Nuclear Technology," FBIS Document FIBS-NES-95-246, 21 December 1995; IRNA (Tehran), 21 December 1995.

#### **24 December 1992**

The *Washington Post* reports that the Iranian government saved the International Center for Theoretical Physics through a timely \$3 million loan. The center is a small, advanced science and nuclear physics facility located in Trieste above the Adriatic Sea run by Mohammed Abdus Salam, Pakistan's preeminent theoretical and nuclear physicist, who oversees post-doctoral work done by government-employed nuclear and other scientists from Third World countries including Iran.

—Steve Coll, "Loan from Tehran Saves Third World Nuclear Research Center," *Washington Post*, 24 December 1996; in *Gulf 2000*, www1.columbia.edu.

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## **1991**

#### **Prior to 1991**

Western observers fear Pakistan may share its nuclear technology with other Islamic states such as Iran and Iraq. Pakistan is currently the only Islamic nation with the necessary components for a nuclear arsenal, and it has approximately five to ten weapons. Although Pakistan has told the United States that it will not share nuclear technology with other nations, Pakistan has already been implicated previously in transferring sensitive nuclear technology to Iran and Iraq before the outbreak of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

—Leonard Spector, "Islamic Bomb West's Long-Term Nightmare," *Washington Times*, 19 January 1994, p. A19.

#### **1991**

Sharif University places an order with Air Products' branch in the United Kingdom for 45 cylinders of fluorine, used to make uranium hexafluoride. The British government stops delivery after a small amount is delivered. The fluorine was intended for Sharif University of Technology.

—Herbert Krosney, "Deadly Business, Four Walls Eight Windows," 1993; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," Center for

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Nonproliferation Studies, Unpublished Report, October 1998.; "Iran's Phantom Bomb," *Risk Report*, September 1995, vol. 1, No. 7, pp. 1, 3-4.

**1991**

China sells Iran a cyclotron, which will be eventually installed in 1992 at Karaj.  
—Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

**1991**

China sells Iran a 27kW research reactor. [Note: Construction of the reactor begins at Isfahan in September 1991. See entry. Also see March 1994 and 7 September 1995 entries on this reactor. This reactor should not be confused with a 27MW reactor also proposed for sale by China for installation at Isfahan. See 21 January 1990, 14 March 1990, June 1990, November 1991, and 1 June 1995 for entries on the 27MW reactor.]  
—Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

**1991**

A criticality study is published of the low- and highly enriched uranium spent fuel from the Tehran research reactor. The study determines the best storage positions of the spent fuel in the cooling pool. According to one analyst, this study may mean Iran is considering research into reprocessing the spent fuel.  
—M. Zaker, H. Azimi, "Criticality Calculations of Spent Fuel Storage Racks," Proceedings of the ICNC 1991, International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety, Oxford, U.K., p. V/192-5, Vol. 2; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Unpublished Report, October 1998.

**1991**

Former Iraqi nuclear scientist Husayn al-Sharistani is in Iran. He gives information [presumably to Iran] on Iraq's nuclear weapons program, information which is shared with Pakistan. Sharistani was previously imprisoned by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein for refusing to build nuclear weapons. [Note: He is also reported to be in Iran in 1992.]  
—Yossef Bodansky, "Pakistan's Nuclear Brinkmanship," 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Unpublished Report, October 1998.

**1991**

Chinese technicians are seen at the Darkhovin site near Ahvaz installing uranium-enrichment equipment.  
—Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

**1991**

According to German intelligence reports, Iran possibly imports uranium-melting technology from Pakistan. Pakistan acquired this technology from the company Urenco in the mid-1980s.  
—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**1991**

Iran provides a \$3 million loan to save the International Center for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy from a financial crisis. Iran sends 77 nuclear and other scientists to study at the center. The center has a "policy of ignoring" whether visiting nuclear scientists are working in civilian or military projects. The center has access to a

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US-made supercomputer, lasers, and advanced microprocessors.

—Steve Coll, "Loan From Tehran Saved Third World Nuclear Research Center," *The Washington Post*, 24 December 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### 1991

Iranian nuclear physicist and senior intelligence officer of the Iranian General Command headquarters, Dr. Mahdi Chamran, visits Kazakhstan. While in Kazakhstan, Chamran supposedly meets with a high-ranking Kazakh official with access to both the Kurchatov Institute (Moscow) and the Semipalatinsk nuclear test and development site. Upon his return to Iran, Chamran reports to the office of President Hashemi-Rafsanjani. Chamran tells Rafsanjani that if Iran so desired, it could renew its efforts to procure nuclear weapons. According to a US House of Representative report on Iran's strategy and nuclear capabilities, Rafsanjani convenes a "high-level commission to study the validity of the offer, and if found viable, means to implement it."

—Alon Pinhas, "Thinking the Unthinkable About Iran," *The Jerusalem Post*, 23 April 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### 1991

Iran purchases a cyclotron accelerator from the Belgian company Ion Beam Applications. The cyclotron is reportedly for its Nuclear Medical Research Center in Karaj. The center is said to be civilian, but Chinese and Russian technicians have been seen at the site. [Note: See 11 May 1991 and February 1992 entries.]

— "Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News*, August 1992, pp. 44.

#### 1991

Iran begins negotiations to rebuild the Bushehr reactors with nuclear construction firms in Argentina, Brazil, France, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia.

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### 1991

Iran awards a subsidiary of the British firm MW Kellogg (a firm that also was involved in America's Manhattan project in the 1940s) a \$400 million contract to build a civilian ammonia and urea plant for manufacturing fertilizer at Bojnurd in Khurasan province, near Turkmenistan. According to Natural Resource Defense Council in Washington, DC, industrial procedures in the production of synthetic ammonia can also be used to manufacture heavy water.

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### 1991

China agrees to sell a nuclear research reactor to Iran, according to the US Senate Committee on Government Affairs.

—"The China-Iran Nuclear Cloud," *Middle East Defense News*, 22 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### 1991

Iran allocates \$4.2 billion for its nuclear program for 1991 to 1994.

—Amir Taheri, *Die Welt* (Bonn), 27 January 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 3 March 1992, p. 9; Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News*, August 1992, pp. 43.

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### 1991

The Iranian opposition group Mojahedin-e Khalq says the budget for Iran's nuclear program for 1990-91 is \$200 million. The Mojahedin also says that the nuclear weapons program fund is increased to \$500 million in 1991. [Note: The Mojahedin-e Khalq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program.]

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992, pp. 47; Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Wall Street Journal*, 24 July 1991, p. A10.

### 1991

Leybold AG of Germany and an official at the Iranian embassy in Germany, Said Karim Ali Subhani, negotiate the sale of a vacuum arc remelting furnace to Iran, according to German intelligence information. The furnace was scheduled to be transshipped via India, but the shipment "apparently was not completed." According to *Nucleonics Week*, Subhani is a "key broker for nuclear, chemical, and biological technology." [Note: The information on the transaction is released in August 1992, and a Leybold spokesperson denies the report in August 1992.]

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 20 August 1992, pp. 7-8.

### 1991

A top-secret report from the newly formed Russian intelligence service claims that Iran has obtained at least two nuclear warheads from a batch listed as missing from Kazakhstan. The nuclear weapons were reportedly smuggled across the border to Iran in 1991 and are under the control of Reza Amrollahi, who is head of the Iranian Organization for Atomic Energy and is also in charge of recruiting atomic scientists from the former Soviet Union. Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev is believed to have engineered the weapons deal with Iran, exchanging warheads for hard currency or gasoline. US officials have denied aid to Kazakhstan based on the belief that Kazakhstan has nuclear ambitions.

—Roger Fallgot and Jan Mather, "Iran Has N-Bomb," *The European*, 30 April-3 May 1992, p. 1.

### 1991

Pakistani General Mirza Aslam Beg proposes to create a strategic alliance with Iran, including the sharing of nuclear weapons technology. The plan is scrapped by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Pakistan and Iran currently receive a large amount of nuclear-related assistance from China, raising the possibility of three-way nuclear trade in the future.

—Leonard Spector, "Islamic Bomb West's Long-Term Nightmare," *Washington Times*, 19 January 1994, p. A19.

### 1991-1992

Iran successfully recruits 14 Russian nuclear scientists to work in Iran. Iran attempts to recruit Vladimir Kubov and Philip Gurkhanian from the Kurchatov Institute, Arsen Hamidiadeh from Kazakhstan, and Aleksandr Ahmediadeh from Turkmenistan. Six experts and scientists from the former Soviet Union are working at the Karaj nuclear site. Others are working at the Gorgan site, including Drs. Larichenkov and Ayshrov, both ethnic Russians. One of the 14 scientists has been identified as Khaled Nickov

—"Libya and Iran Seek Ex-Soviet Scientists," *Science*, 15 March 1996, p. 1485; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Unpublished Report, October 1998; Yossef Bodansky, "Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons And Moves To Provide Cover To Syria," *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*, February 1992; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and

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Assessment," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Unpublished Report, October 1998; "Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992, pp. 1-5, 7; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Unpublished Report, October 1998.

#### **January 1991**

Iran steps up efforts to buy nuclear technology abroad at the start of the U.N. offensive against Iraq. According to a US State Department official, Iran is researching uranium enrichment methods and probably has "agents in Europe are scouring the market" for enrichment technology. The United States is concerned that Iran may acquire or already has acquired an unsafeguarded enrichment facility for which it might get parts from Eastern Europe.

—Douglas Frantz, *Los Angeles Times*, 31 October 1991, p. A4; Jim Mann, *Los Angeles Times*, 27 January 1991, pp. A1, A28-A29; PPNN, *International Herald Tribune*.

#### **January 1991**

Germany says it will deny requests from Siemens and from Iran to approve export licenses for components for the Bushehr reactors in Iran. Siemens denies reports that it will rebuild the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 7 February 1991, pp. 15-16; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 21 February 1991, pp. 8-9; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 2 May 1991, pp. 17-18; Jim Mann "Iran's Nuclear Plans Worry Us Officials" *Los Angeles Times*, 27 January 1991, pp. A1, A28-A29.

#### **January 1991**

The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) awards Iran 940 million French francs as part of the settlement with the Eurodif consortium. The ICC also orders Framatome of France to pay 550 million francs to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran as reimbursement for the 271 million francs Framatome was paid for the Darkhovin reactors, plus interest.

—*Nuclear News*, February 1991, p. 48; *Nucleonics Week*, 28 February 1991, p. 15; *Nuclear Engineering International*, April 1991, p. 8.

#### **February 1991**

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati goes to Germany to discuss with German officials the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. German Environment Minister Klaus Topfer goes to Iran to inspect the plant. [Note: See 30 June 1991, 13 January 1994.]

—"Iran Pledges To Complete Nuclear Plant," *Middle East Defense News*, 29 April 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **February 1991**

Iran negotiates the purchase of a 10MW nuclear research reactor subsequently installed at the Moallem Kalayeh site. [Note: Construction began on the Moallem Kalayah site in 1987, and a 10MW Indian reactor was planned for the site. See 1987 entry.]

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **February 1991**

India and Iran exchange nuclear scientists. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran negotiates to purchase nuclear technology or expertise from India following a 1 February 1991 announcement by the Indian Atomic Energy Commission that India will seek to export its nuclear technology.

—Shekhar Hattangadi, *Nucleonics Week*, 7 February 1991, p. 17; *Nuclear News*, March 1991, p. 56.

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#### **February 1991**

Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs denies that Iraq moved highly enriched uranium or nuclear equipment to Iran during the Persian Gulf War.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 21 February 1991, pp. 8-9; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 14 February 1991, pp. 2-3; Mark Hibbs, *Nuclear Fuel*, 14 October 1991, pp. 10-11.

#### **February 1991**

Iran's foreign minister requests West Germany to authorize shipment of components for the two unfinished nuclear reactors at Bushehr.

—IRNA (Tehran), 4 March 1991; in *Nuclear Developments*, 19 March 1991, pp. 21-22.

#### **7 February 1991**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Spain's Equipos Nucleares, a Siemens' licensee, is interested in receiving a subcontract from Siemens to complete Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 7 February 1991, pp. 15-16.

#### **7 February 1991**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Khalil Musavi, Iran's ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency, states that a Soviet-Iran nuclear cooperation agreement signed in 1990 will not lead to an agreement by the Soviet Union to complete the Bushehr reactors.

—Mark Hibbs, "German Officials Say Government May Not Let Bushehr Be Finished," *Nucleonics Week*, 7 February 1991, pp. 15-16.

#### **28 February 1991**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that a French court has blocked payment of \$110 million from Framatome to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. Framatome was told to pay the money by the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration in Lausanne. The money is the down payment of 271 million francs, plus interest, paid by Iran for construction of two reactors at the Karun nuclear power plant. Iran cancelled the contract for construction after the revolution in 1979. The French companies Framatome, Alsthom, and Spie-Batignolles have filed a \$5 billion franc suit against Iran for breach of contract. [Note: See January 1991 entry for the ICC's ruling against Framatome. See August 1991 for the court's subsequent ruling against Iran for breach of contract.]

—"France," *Nucleonics Week*, 28 February 1991, p. 15; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **4 March 1991**

The German company Kraftwerk Union (KWU) finalizes plans to complete two reactors begun at Bushehr in 1976.

—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **11 March 1991**

The Islamic Republic News Agency reports that West German firm Kraftwerk Union will resume completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in the "near future."

—"Work To Resume On Abandoned Iranian Nuclear Plant," Associated Press, 11 March 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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**22 April 1991**

Noremy Bin Muslim, deputy director of the International Atomic Energy Agency inspects several projects of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Bin Muslim meets with AEOI head Reza Amrollahi and discusses IAEA cooperation with Iran.

—"IAEA Official Tours Nuclear Facilities," *Nuclear Developments*, 20 May 1991, p. 20.

**29 April 1991**

*Middle East Defense News* reports that Siemens has acknowledged it approached the West German government in 1987 for permission to allow its subsidiary, Kraftwerk Union, to rebuild the Bushehr nuclear power plant. But Siemens says it has "not approached the government since then." Iran has given KWU new proposals for completing the plant, but nothing has been agreed upon, according to the report. Siemens says it believes Iran now wants a gas turbine plant rather than the light water, low-enriched uranium plant, because it is cheaper.

—"Iran Pledges To Complete Nuclear Plant," *Middle East Defense News*, 29 April 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**29 April 1991**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, meets with Mexican Energy Minister Fernando Hiriart in Mexico City. Iran and Mexico sign a nuclear cooperation agreement that calls for the exchange of scientific and technical information about nuclear energy and for cooperation in nuclear security.

—"Energy Cooperation Agreement With Iran--With Emphasis on Nuclear Energy," *Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran* (Tehran), 29 April 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**May 1991**

Mohammad Hussein Mahlujchi, Iranian Mines and Metals minister, goes to Germany to order from Kraftwerk Union a \$1.4 billion natural gas power plant; construction is to begin in 1992. [Note: Kraftwerk Union is the company that was building the Bushehr nuclear power plant.]

—"Germany Renounces Nuclear Plant In Iran, Considers Pesticides," *Middle East Defense News*, 22 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**May 1991**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that the German government denies that it favors allowing Siemens to supply new reactors rather than complete the heavily damaged, uncompleted reactors at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The German Federal Ministry of Research and Technology and the Federal Ministry of Economics favor new reactors, according to the report. Engineers from Siemens and the German reactor inspectorate Technischer Ueberwachungsverein (TUeV) say that 5 to 8 billion DM would be necessary to repair the reactors.

—Mark Hibbs, "Bonn Will Decline Teheran Bid To Resuscitate Bushehr Project," *Nucleonics Week*, 2 May 1991, pp. 17-18.

**May 1991**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Iran has a nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan and secret nuclear agreements with South Africa and China, which may reflect nuclear weapons ambitions on the part of Iran. European officials express concern that Iran might seek Pakistan's assistance in enriching uranium obtained under a secret nuclear cooperation agreement from South Africa in 1988-89. [Note: See 1988-1989 entry regarding South African cooperation.]

—Mark Hibbs, "Bonn Will Decline Teheran Bid To Resuscitate Bushehr Project" *Nucleonics Week*, 2 May 1991, pp. 17-18.

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### **May 1991**

US officials claim that China and Pakistan are aiding Iran in the development of a nuclear bomb.

—Bill Gertz, *Washington Times*, 30 May 1991, pp. A1, A11.

### **2 May 1991**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that sources in Europe believe Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), does not control all activities at AEOI. US sources claim that Iran's secret efforts in nuclear development are organized outside of the AEOI.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 2 May 1991, pp. 17-18; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 4 September 1991, pp. 7-8.

### **11 May 1991**

First Iranian Vice President Hassan Habibi inaugurates the Nuclear Medical Research Center at Karaj. The center is located northwest of Tehran near an Air Force base and large military industrial complex, and it is staffed with Chinese and Russian technicians according to Western intelligence. This center is supposed to be civilian nuclear facility devoted to nuclear medicine and agriculture. A cyclotron accelerator from Belgium's Ion Beam Applications has been installed at the site. [Note: See 1991 and February 1992 entries.]

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

### **June 1991**

The German government announces that it will not permit Siemens-Kraftwerk Union to complete Iran's Bushehr reactors, and that Empresarios Agrupados of Spain, a Siemens' licensee, will also be prohibited from completing the reactors. Germany has paid Iran 300 million DM for parts not delivered, but Iran may seek 5 billion DM in damages. The German delegation says the reason for not allowing continuation of the project is because of the lack of security at the plant. Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says Iran needs to spend \$30 million to secure the site for construction, while Iran would lose \$10 billion if the plant is not finished. [Note: See 29 June 1991 entry for Iran's response to the decision.]

—*Washington Times*, 2 September 1991, p. A2; Mary Gordon, *San Francisco Chronicle*, 28 August 1991, p. A2; Mary Gordon, *Orange County Register*, 28 August 1991, p. D6; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 4 July 1991, pp. 7-8; IRNA (Tehran), 2 July 1991; in *Proliferation Issues*, 24 July 1991, p. 16; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 10 July 1991; in *Proliferation Issues*, 24 July 1991, pp. 17-18; Mark Hibbs, *Nuclear Fuel*, 9 December 1991, pp. 11-12; Ralph Joseph, "Iran Pledges To Build Nuclear Plant Without German Help," UPI, 7 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

### **June 1991**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Italy's foreign trade minister says that Italy will not allow export of steam generators built by Breda [Termomeccanica, later Ansaldo] for Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant. Ansaldo transferred the four steam generators to Siemens of Germany, but they will remain in Italy. The generators were built by Italy's Breda for Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant, but Italy's Foreign Trade Minister Vito Lattanzio says Italy has no intention of exporting them. [Note: See mid-1976 entry on the contract for the generators. Also see 11 November 1993 entry on the seizure of the equipment by Italian customs.]

—"Italy: Bushehr Steam Generators Transferred", *Nucleonics Week*, 6 June 1991, p. 16.

### **14 June 1991**

Mohammad Mohaddessin, director of the International Affairs Section of the Iranian opposition group Mojahedin-e Khaleq, says Iran has spent \$200 million on its nuclear weapons program since March 1990. [Note: The

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Mohajedin-e Khlaq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program. See 30 June 1991 for other claims by Mohaddessin.]

—Ruth Sinai, "Iran Said Trying To Develop Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 14 June 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **18 June 1991**

In response to accusations made by the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, Iran's First Vice President Hasan Habibi says Iran's nuclear program was exclusively for peaceful purposes. This is the policy of President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani's government. [Note: See 14 June 1991 entry for allegations by the Mojahedin.]

—"Habibi Says Nuclear Programs for Peaceful Purposes Only," *Proliferation Issues*, 24 July 1991, p. 15.

#### **29 June 1991**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) criticizes Germany for not allowing completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant by a German company. "Iran cannot remain indifferent to this decision," says the statement from the AEOI. "Rather than halt work on the project for security reasons and suggest the building of a gas-powered station, the German government should have proposed modernizing the Bushehr facility." German Economic Minister Juergen Moelleman, on a trip to Tehran, tries to persuade Iranian officials from rebuilding the Bushehr plant. [Note: See June 1991 entry for Germany's announcement that it will not to allow Siemens-Kraftwerk Union to continue the project.]

—"Iran Slams German Decision To Drop Work On Bushehr Nuclear Station," Agence France Presse, 29 June 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **30 June 1991**

The *Boston Globe* reports that on his recent trip to the United States, Mohammed Mohaddessin, foreign policy spokesman for the Mojahedin Iranian opposition group, says Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. "What the regime is doing," he says, "is concentrating on research in order to develop nuclear weapons themselves. They are looking for technical assistance, for materials." He says, however, Iran is far from developing nuclear technology. He claims that Iran has created a special unit of the Republican Guards to secretly develop nuclear weapons out of sight of the International Atomic Energy Agency. "The regime is doing their utmost to get assistance from Western Europe," he says. "They have had extensive discussions and negotiations concerning this matter with France, Italy, and Germany. They have sent a number of their experts and researchers to China for training purposes and to obtain expertise." The Chinese foreign ministry denies a report that an Iranian delegation was in China to discuss nuclear technology. Spokesmen for the White House and US State Department say there is no proof that China has sold nuclear technology to Iran. [Note: The Mojahedin-e Khlaq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program. See 14 June 2001 for other claims by Mohaddessin. See February 1991 and 13 January 1994 for other meetings between Iran and Germany.]

—Mary Curtius, "Dissidents Say Tehran Is Pursuing Nuclear Arms," *The Boston Globe*, 30 June 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **30 June 1991**

Juergen Moelleman, the German economic minister, meets with Iranian officials to discuss German-Iranian trade. The meeting may have included talks on the Bushehr reactor, which was to be built by Siemens-Kraftwerk Union of Germany. Germany halted work on the project during the Iran-Iraq War, and the German government now claims the reactor cannot be completed because its technology is outdated and unsafe.

—"Dispute With Germany Over Nuclear Plant" *Proliferation Issues*, 24 July 1991, p. 16.

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### **Late June 1991**

During meetings with the US Congress, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, an Iranian opposition group, accuses the Iranian government of trying to buy or develop nuclear weapons with the help of China. Both Iran and China deny the allegation. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also denies reports that Iran sent emissaries to Beijing to purchase Chinese nuclear weapons technology. On 7 October the Mojahedin says that an Iranian delegation of scientists traveled to China and North Korea to discuss "expanding deliveries of nuclear and ballistic missile technologies." [Note: The Mojahedin-e Khalq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program.]

—*Salam* (Tehran), 20 June 1991, p. 12; in *Proliferation Issues*, 24 July 1991, pp. 15-16; *San Jose Mercury News*, 30 June 1991, p. 21A; Xinhua(Beijing), 27 July 1991; in *Nuclear Developments*, 23 April 1991, p. 2; Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Wall Street Journal*, 24 July 1991, p. A10.

### **July 1991**

Chinese experts are allegedly assisting the Iranians with their laser enrichment research at Moallem Kalayeh, at the city of Qazvin.

—Tehran Radio, 3 August 1991, JPRS-TND-91-013, 2 August 1991.

### **July 1991**

During talks with Iran's President Hashemi Rafsanjani, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng agrees to provide expertise and technology to complete nuclear reactors begun by France and Germany, according to sources in Iran's government. Iran announces that China will assist in rebuilding the Bushehr reactor but continues negotiations with Germany's Siemens. [Note: See October 1991, 31 October 1991, 19 September 1994, and 29 September 1994 for additional information on China's role in the construction of Bushehr.]

—*Sawt al-Kuwayt al-Duwali* (London), 11 July 1991, pp. 1, 4; in *Proliferation Issues*, 8 August 1991, pp. 19-20; "Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

### **July 1991**

Brazilian Infrastructure Minister Joao Santana says that Brazil is discussing the possible sale of equipment from the Angra-3 nuclear power plant for use in Iran's Bushehr reactor. The German government would have to approve any retransfer of the US equipment and technology Germany supplied for Angra-3, worth \$150 million. [Note: See 7 July and 30 November 1991 for additional information on this topic.]

—Christina Lamb, *Financial Times*, 5 December 1991, p. 6; Mark Hibbs, *Nuclear Fuel*, 9 December 1991, pp. 11-12.

### **1 July 1991**

In response to reports that Iran was negotiating to buy nuclear weapons technology from China, China says it does not "advocate, encourage, or practice nuclear proliferation, nor does it help other countries to develop nuclear weapons."

—"China (People's Republic)" *Milavnews*, July 1991, pp. 6-7.

### **7 July 1991**

After meeting with Chinese Premier Li Ping, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani says Iran will complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant despite the German government's refusal to allow a German company to take part in the project. "We are determined to complete this major project, and will do so with the help of God," Rafsanjani says in a letter to the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. [Note: See June 1991 entry for Germany's announcement that it will not allow continuation of the Bushehr project.]

—Ralph Joseph, "Iran Pledges To Build Nuclear Plant Without German Help," UPI, 7 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis,

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www.lexis-nexis.com; "An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

#### **7 July 1991**

Joao Santana, Brazil's infrastructure minister, visits Tehran to discuss the sale of \$150 million worth of German-made nuclear equipment from Brazil's Angra III power station.

—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

#### **8 July 1991**

Talks break down between Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and French officials over repayment of French debt to Iran after Iran demanded access to enriched uranium from Eurodif's enrichment plant in Drome, southern France. France refuses Iran's request for enriched uranium, but the *Teheran Times* denies the request was ever made. The dispute stems from the Shah's \$1 billion investment or loan to the French Energy Commissariat for the construction of Eurodif's plant. France has paid back \$630 million, but Iran and France disagree on the total debt France owes from interest on the debt.

—William Dawkins, "French-Iranian Talks On Nuclear Loans Suspended," *Financial Times* (London), 8 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; Charles Hoots, *Nucleonics Week*, 18 July 1991, pp. 5-6; Charles Hoots, *Nuclear Fuel*, 22 July 1991, pp. 5-6; *San Francisco Chronicle*, 14 September 1991, p. A17; *New York Times*, 5 July 1991, p. A5; Louise Lief with S.J. Hedges, *U.S. News & World Report*, 25 November 1991, p. 42; *Voice of Mojahed*, [Ed.: clandestine], 24 October 1991; in *Proliferation Issues*, 7 November 1991, p. 23; Scheherazade Daneshkhu, *Financial Times*, 17 October 1991, p. 4.

#### **10 July 1991**

An Iranian delegation of scientists and technicians go to China and North Korea to discuss buying nuclear and missile technology, according to Iranian exile sources. One reason for the trip, according to *Middle East Defense News*, was to show France that Iran could find another source of uranium. [Note: See 8 July 1991 for France's refusal to give Iran access to enriched uranium.]

—"The China-Iran Nuclear Cloud," *Middle East Defense News*, 22 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

#### **12 July 1991**

Rasfanjani criticizes France for not supplying highly enriched uranium to Iran, and says Iran can get it elsewhere, such as China and North Korea. [Note: On 8 July 1991, France refused to give Iran access to enriched uranium. See also 10 July 1991.]

—"The China-Iran Nuclear Cloud," *Middle East Defense News*, 22 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

#### **18 July 1991**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Iran's President, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani expressed interest in restarting the country's nuclear program.

—Charles Hoots, "Iran And France Close To End Of Nuclear Dispute, But Not Yet," *Nucleonics Week*, 18 July 1991, pp. 5-6.

#### **22 July 1991**

*Middle East Defense News* reports that the Mojahedin-e Khalq, Iranian opposition claims that parts of the 5MW research reactor in Tehran have been moved to the Isfahan nuclear research center. The opposition also claims that the Revolutionary Guards have a secret nuclear weapons center at Moallem Kalayeh, north of Qazvin in the

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Elburz Mountains. The opposition also claims that Iran has created a special unit within the Ministry of Defense, led by two nuclear experts, "Dr. Nari and Dr. Musavi," to research nuclear weapons and acquire nuclear technology from other countries. The article says US intelligence sources believe Rafsanjani has decided on China as its primary partner in the nuclear field. Chinese experts are now working at the Qazvin nuclear research center. [Note: The Mohajedin-e Khlaq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program.]

—"The China-Iran Nuclear Cloud," *Middle East Defense News*, 22 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **August 1991**

The International Court of Arbitration rules that Iran owes French firms \$710 million for the cancellation of a contract for two 900MW pressurized water reactors, which were under construction at Darkhovin. [Note: In January 1991, the court ruled French firms had to pay Iran, and on 28 February, a French court blocked the payment. See January and 28 February 1991.]

—*Nuclear News*, November 1991, pp. 26, 123.

### **3 August 1991**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says "Iran is not capable of making atomic bombs. Our objective in promoting nuclear industries," he says, "is merely its peaceful use specially in the field of atomic energy and its application in agriculture and medicine."

—"Atomic Energy Head Amrollahi Says 'Iran Is Not Capable Of Making Atomic Bombs,'" BBC Summary Of World Broadcasts, 5 August 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **28 August 1991**

The *Orange County Register* reports that more than 300 export licenses for computers to be sent to Iran have been granted by the United States, for a total value of \$138 million, including a license for a \$130,000 oscilloscope. [Note: See 29 August 1991.]

—Mary Gordon, "US Exported Millions in Equipment to Iran, Syria," *Orange County Register*, 28 August 1991, p. D6.

### **29 August 1991**

Two Iranian citizens, Don Danesh and Reza Amiri, are arrested by federal agents in Newport Beach, CA, for allegedly shipping to Iran portable oscilloscopes, which can be used in analyzing nuclear tests. [Note: See 28 August 1991. See 30 March 1992 for their conviction.]

—Dean Takahashi, "Pair Held For Allegedly Selling Gear To Iran," *Los Angeles Times*, 29 August 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **September 1991**

Syria's Chief of Staff, Hikmat Shahabi, tours Iran's nuclear facilities.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News* (*Middle East Defense News*), August 1992, p. 43.

### **September 1991**

US satellite photographs show major construction on a plutonium production plant and a large number of Chinese technicians at Isfahan. [Note: See 21 January 1990.]

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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### **September 1991**

US satellite images show early construction stages at the site of a research reactor to be supplied to the Isfahan nuclear research complex by China under a June 1990 contract. A US official says the allegation, stemming from the Mojahedin-e Khalq, is "not true" since US satellite imagery "shows nothing on the ground, except for what Iran has declared to the IAEA." [Note: See February 1992 for the IAEA visit to the construction site. Note: The Mojahedin-e Khalq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program.] —Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992, p. 43; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 20 August 1992, pp. 7-8.

### **September 1991**

Construction begins at Isfahan on a 27kW research reactor sold by China to Iran. [Note: The reactor goes critical on March 1994. See entry. This reactor should not be confused with a 27MW reactor also proposed for sale by China for installation at Isfahan. See 21 January 1990, 14 March 1990, June 1990, November 1991, and 1 June 1995 for entries on the 27 MW reactor.]

—Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

### **September 1991**

Cuba and Iran sign an agreement to exchange information on nuclear technology. Fidel Castro Diaz-Balart, the head of Cuba's nuclear energy program, finalizes the agreement during a visit to Iran.

—Ann MacLachlan and Charles Hoots, *Nucleonics Week*, 10 October 1991, pp. 2-3; *Tele Rebelde Network* (Havana), 1 October 1991; in *Proliferation Issues*, 29 October 1991, p. 30; *Tele Rebelde Network* (Havana), 26 September 1991; in *Proliferation Issues*, 29 October 1991, p. 30.

### **1 September 1991**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says Iran will have several nuclear power plants in the next ten years.

—"Nuclear Power Plants To Be Established," BBC Summary Of World Broadcasts, 10 September 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

### **18 September 1991**

Mohammed Javad Larijani, a member of Iran's National Security Council, says nuclear weapons have been "erased from Iran's policy." He notes that President Rafsanjani has repeatedly called for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

—William Claiborne, "U.S.-Iranian Cooperation Seen Possible; Aide To Rafsanjani Says Some Obstacles Still Block Talks On Range Of Interests," *Washington Post*, 18 September 1991.

### **24 September 1991**

At the 35th general session of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says the "peaceful use of atomic energy is the right of all nations, and provided the entire control and inspection measures and systems have been checked out, no country should be deprived of that right." He says Iran will complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant "through any means possible, even through purchasing and reordering the project's withheld spare parts." He says Iran "expects the IAEA to cooperate in all stages including that of implementation of the construction and activation of the said plant."

—"Construction of Bushehr Nuclear Plant To Be Completed," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 September 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

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### **October 1991**

A delegation from Syria arrives in Iran to begin negotiations on a possible Iranian-Syrian nuclear pact.

—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **October 1991**

India offers to sell a 10MW research reactor to Iran. The two countries also discuss a nuclear cooperation agreement, and Iran has requested India's helping building a pressurized heavy water reactor. Iran is reportedly interested in a 30MW reactor.

—IRNA (Tehran) 2 October 1991; in *Proliferation Issues*, 29 October 1991, p. 35; Warren H. Donnelly and Zachary S. Davis, "Iran's Nuclear Activities and the Congressional Response," *CRS Issue Brief*, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 20 May 1992.

### **2 October 1991**

Iran is ordered by an arbitration court in Switzerland to pay 4.06 billion francs to a French consortium of Framatome, Alcatel Alsthom, and Spie-Batignolles for canceling a contract to build a nuclear power plant in Darkhovin. [See the January, 28 February, 8 July, October 1991 entries for other developments in the loan dispute.]

—"Iran Told To Pay French Nuclear Consortium 4.06 Billion For Damages," *AFX News*, 2 October 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **10 October 1991**

Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Alaeddin Borujerdi meets with Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in New Delhi to discuss the purchase of 10MW reactor. [Note: See October 1991 entry for more on Iran-Indian nuclear cooperation.]

—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **13 October 1991**

*Al Ahram* of Cairo reports Iran has bought five tactical nuclear missiles from Kazakhstan. [Note: Later reports say only three missiles were involved and that the warheads came from the Semipalatinsk complex. Note: See December 1991.]

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News*, August 1992, p. 52.

### **19 October 1991**

The Iranian embassy in India calls "baseless" reports of nuclear cooperation between Iran and China. "Iran like India is in favor of nuclear disarmament in the world," the statement says. The Chinese Foreign Ministry denies a report in the *Washington Times* on 16 October that said China was helping Iran build a nuclear reactor as part of a nuclear weapons program.

—"Iran Denies Alleged Nuclear Collaboration With China," *Xinhua*, 19 October 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "China Denies Helping Iran Build Nuclear Reactor," *Associated Press*, 19 October 1991, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **22 October 1991**

The French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas says Iran's demand for enriched uranium from France is the main

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obstacle to solving a longtime debt dispute between the two countries. "There is still a major point which is the right or not to have uranium," Dumas says. "I think that we shall find a formula." [Note: See 8 July 1991.]  
—"Uranium Poses Main Problem To Settlement Of Dispute With Iran: Dumas," Agence France Presse, 22 October 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **23 October 1991**

In an interview published in Iran's *Abrar* newspaper, Iranian Deputy President Ayatollah Mohajerani says that because Israel "has nuclear facilities, the Muslim states, too, should be equipped with the same capacity," adding that "therefore Muslims should strive to go ahead" with nuclear development. Soon after Mohajerani's statement, the Iranian United Nations mission denies that the country has a nuclear weapons development program.  
—IRNA (Tehran), 23 October 1991; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-91-017, 7 November 1991, pp. 23-24; Milavnews, November 1991, p. 3.

#### **25 October 1991**

Iran and France sign a \$1 billion agreement settling a financial dispute over Iran's involvements in the Eurodif uranium enrichment plant. France will pay \$1 billion to cover the balance of repayment plus interest, and Iran will retain a small share of the Eurodif consortium. This may cancel the possibility of reimbursement to French firms for claimed damages caused by Iran's cancellation of a nuclear plant contract.  
—R. Jeffrey Smith, *Washington Post*, 30 October 1991, pp. A1, A20; Elaine Sciolino, *New York Times*, 31 October 1991, p. A9; *Wall Street Journal*, 18 November 1991, p. A17; "An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **30 October 1991**

Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, says China is supplying Iran with uranium-enriching equipment. "There is no question that the supplies far exceed the needs of Iran's civilian nuclear industry," he says.  
—Simon Tisdall, "China 'Helps Iran To Make N-Bombs,'" *The Guardian* (London), 31 October; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **31 October 1991**

Chinese President Yang Shangkun visits the Chinese-built nuclear research center at Isfahan in Iran. He also visits the Darkhovin facility in Ahvaz. He promises technical assistance to Iran to complete the Darkhovin and Bushehr reactors.  
—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "Chinese President Visits Nuclear Center In Iran," *Middle East Defense News*, 25 November 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **Late October 1991**

A US National Intelligence Estimate concludes that Iran is seeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability, indicating concern for Iran's cooperation with China. The report adds that Iran's nuclear program appears disorganized and in its early stages. US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard H. Solomon acknowledges that China sold nuclear-related technologies to Iran despite previous assurances from China that it would not do so.  
—R. Jeffrey Smith, *Washington Post*, 30 October 1991, pp. A1, A20; Elaine Sciolino, *New York Times*, 31 October 1991, p. A9; *Wall Street Journal*, 18 November 1991, p. A17.

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### **Late October-early November 1991**

China acknowledges that it has cooperated with Iran's peaceful nuclear program. The Chinese statement comes after US Assistant Secretary of State Richard H. Solomon testifies before a Senate panel that US intelligence agencies believed China has sold nuclear equipment to Iran.

—"China Releases Details Of Nuclear Program With Iran," 4 November 1991, Associated Press; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **November 1991**

Iran and Pakistan sign an agreement for joint development of nuclear weapons, according to Iran's Mojahedin-e Khalq opposition group. The group says Iran will provide \$5 billion in funding; Pakistan will supply expertise in uranium enrichment and other areas. Pakistan denies the reports.

—*Al-Diyar* (Beirut), 12 January 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 14 February 1992, pp. 13-14; Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network (Tehran), 12 January 1992; in *Proliferation Issues*, 31 January 1992, p. 31.

### **November 1991**

India signs an agreement to supply Iran with a 10MW research reactor, as part of a memorandum of understanding on scientific and technical cooperation. The reactor is to be located at Moallem Kalayeh, a secret uranium enrichment complex near Qazvin. Under pressure from the United States and other countries, India cancels its agreement.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992, p. 44; *Financial Times*, 21 November 1991, p. 6; Steve Coll, *Washington Post*, 15 November 1991, pp. A33, A39; William Drozdiak, *Washington Post*, 22 November 1991, pp. A35, A38; Neel Patri, *Nucleonics Week*, 28 November 1991, p. 8; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 21 November 1991, pp. 2-3; Mark Hibbs, Neel Patri, and Neal Sandler, *Nuclear Fuel*, 25 November 1991, pp. 8-9.

### **November 1991**

China sells Iran a small nuclear reactor apparently for training and research and installs uranium enrichment equipment at Darkhovin in Ahvaz.

—Kathy Wilhelm, "China May Sell Nuclear Reactors to Bangladesh, Egypt and Iran," The Associated Press, 30 July 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News*, August 1992, p. 44; "Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **November 1991**

China confirms that it signed contracts to sell an electromagnetic separator [calutron] and a mini-reactor to Iran. Both Iran and China claim the reactor and calutron are to be used for peaceful purposes.

—*New York Times*, 19 December 1991, p. A11; George J. Church, *Time*, 16 December 1991 pp. 42, 47-48; Neel Patri, *Nucleonics Week*, 28 November 1991, p. 8; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 21 November 1991, pp. 2-3; Mark Hibbs, Neel Patri, and Neal Sandler, *Nuclear Fuel*, 25 November 1991, pp. 8-9; Louise Lief with S.J. Hedges, *U.S. News & World Report*, 25 November 1991, p. 42; Mark Hibbs, *Nuclear Fuel*, 9 December 1991, pp. 11-12.

### **November 1991**

Hans Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, says he has "no cause for concern" regarding Iran's attempts to acquire nuclear technology. But he says the IAEA may begin implementing special inspections for problem nations, with Iran as a possible test case.

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—Neel Patri, *Nucleonics Week*, 28 November 1991, p. 8; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 21 November 1991, pp. 2-3; Louise Lief with S.J. Hedges, *U.S. News & World Report*, 25 November 1991, p. 42.

#### **November 1991**

After being pressured by the United States, China holds off on its offer to sell Iran a nuclear reactor [rated around 27MW]. [Note: The 27MW reactor proposed for installation at Isfahan by China but never realized should not be confused with a 27kWt Chinese-supplied reactor at Isfahan that went critical March 1994. For entries on the 27kWt reactor, see 1991, September 1991, March 1994, and 7 September 1995. For entries on the 27MW reactor, see 21 January 1990, 14 March 1990, June 1990, November 1991, and 1 June 1995.]

—William Drozdiak, *Washington Post*, 22 November 1991, pp. A35, A38.

#### **November 1991**

Israeli officials contend that, with Pakistan's help, Iran could produce a nuclear bomb by the end of the decade. US officials estimate 10 to 15 years and say Iran is seeking a wide range of nuclear weapons technology.

—Mark Hibbs, Neel Patri, and Neal Sandler, *Nuclear Fuel*, 25 November 1991, pp. 8-9; Anton La Guardia, *Daily Telegram*, 2 March 1992; Neel Patri, *Nucleonics Week*, 28 November 1991, p. 8; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 21 November 1991, pp. 2-3.

#### **November 1991**

The US administration calls for a total embargo on nuclear technology to Iran and urges other nuclear suppliers, including China, to take similar action. The United States asks France to join an embargo against Iran. French officials reply that "this is not a question of export control policy. This is politics, full stop. American does not like the current Iranian regime, and they want us to buy on to their hatred of the moment. No way."

—*Financial Times*, 21 November 1991, p. 6. Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995.

#### **November 1991**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and Siemens hold their first mediation talks in Geneva. No results were forthcoming. The spokesperson for the German Economics Ministry says the Paris Chamber of Commerce had no legal jurisdiction in the dispute. According to Siemens, work on the two nuclear reactors at Bushehr is between 60 and 80% complete.

—"German Government Blocks Completion Of Nuclear," Compuserve-Executive News Service, 3 August 1992.

#### **1 November 1991**

The *San Francisco Chronicle* reports that Iran acknowledged buying nuclear technology and equipment from China but claims it was for peaceful purposes. Iran also says China had accepted International Atomic Energy Agency restrictions on the sale of nuclear technology to other countries. China has sold nuclear technology to Algeria, Iraq, and Pakistan, which is also reported to have a nuclear weapons program. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said he had no details on Chinese-Iranian nuclear cooperation, but he said that all nuclear cooperation programs must be for peaceful purposes only, that installations must be open to international inspections, and that the recipient could not transfer any unpacked technology without China's permission.

—"Iran Insists Nuclear Supplies Aren't For Arms," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1 November 1991, p. A12.

#### **1 November 1991**

*The New York Times* report that US analysts insist that Iran has neither the money nor the professional personnel to produce a nuclear weapon in a short time. One expert said that China might assist Iran in nuclear weapons

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development, but that such assistance "will certainly not be on the scale of Western help to Iraq."  
—"Iran Denies Deals Tied To Atom Arms." *The New York Times*, 1 November 1991, p. A9.

#### **4 November 1991**

China releases details of its nuclear cooperation with Iran. According to a statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, China and Iran signed deals for an electromagnetic separator for isotope production in 1989 and for a small reactor in 1991. "These facilities are used for nuclear medical diagnosis and nuclear physics research, isotope production, education, and personnel training," the statement says. "Guided by the internationally observed regulations, China had requested the International Atomic Energy Agency to enforce safeguards before these facilities were shipped." A US State Department spokesman says, "We are concerned that any dual-use equipment sold to Iran for commercial purposes could be diverted to other applications."

—"China Releases Details of Nuclear Program With Iran," Associated Press, 4 November 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **6 November 1991**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says Iran's nuclear cooperation with China is within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He says the United States is making "feverish propaganda on Iran's nuclear potential."

—"Iranian Official Welcomes Cooperation With China On Nuclear Energy," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 November 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **11 November 1991**

Indian Foreign Minister Sing Solanki signs a technical cooperation deal with Iran ensuring the delivery of 10MW reactor to Iran.

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **12 November 1991**

Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif denies that Pakistan might help Iran rebuild a 20-year-old nuclear research reactor. [Note: This refers to research reactors that were supplied by the United States in the 1960s under the atoms for peace program].

—"Pakistan Denies Helping Iran In Nuclear Research," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 November 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **15 November 1991**

The *Times* of London reports that the US State Department has asked India not to sell Iran a nuclear research reactor.

—"Reactor Plea," *The Times* (London), 16 November 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **22 November 1991**

In response to Indian plans to sell Iran a nuclear research reactor, US Assistant Secretary of State Reginald Bartholomew goes to New Delhi to persuade India to cancel the sale.

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 November 1991**

India says it will sell a nuclear reactor to Iran, and says it has not been pressured by the United States or any other body to stop the deal.

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—"India To Sell Nuclear Reactor To Iran; US Pressure Denied," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 November 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **30 November 1991**

Brazilian Infrastructure Minister Joao Santana says Brazil is not selling equipment to Iran from its Angra III nuclear power plant. "Six months ago Iran consulted with Brazil about buying Angra III, but I told them that there was no interest in such a sale," he says. "Six months later, Brazil continues to maintain its position and I don't even know if Iran is still interested."

—"Brazil Denies Planning Nuke Sale To Iran," Agence France Presse, 30 November 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **December 1991**

*Time* magazine reports that Iran has an enrichment plant--possibly a centrifuge facility--at Moallem Kalayeh and may have another centrifuge plant at Karaj. These reports are termed "speculative" by a nuclear industry journal. —George J. Church, *Time*, 16 December 1991 pp. 42, 47-48; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, March 1992, pp. 9-11.

### **December 1991**

Diplomats from the United States and Iran have informally discussed some form of "nuclear rapprochement." However, the United States expresses concerns that Iran may purchase stockpiled plutonium from North Korea. —Mark Hibbs, *Nuclear Fuel*, 9 December 1991, pp. 11-12; Steven R. Weisman, *New York Times*, 20 December 1991.

### **December 1991**

*Nuclear Fuel* reports that China is providing Iranian nuclear experts with know-how and design information, some of which may be related to fissile material production and weapons development.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nuclear Fuel*, 9 December 1991, pp. 11-12.

### **December 1991**

The final settlement on the Eurodif dispute is reached, and reports persist of a "secret clause" allowing Iran to purchase French uranium. France insisted it will not allow future Eurodif enriched uranium transfers to Iran. —Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992, p. 51; Amir Tahiri, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 31 December 1991, p. 1; in *Proliferation Issues*, 31 January 1992, pp. 67-68; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, March 1992, p. 28.

### **December 1991**

France loses a court case that it had brought against Iran for breach of a contract under which France was to construct two pressurized water reactors at Karun.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nuclear Fuel*, 9 December 1991, pp. 11-12.

### **December 1991**

Argentina is selling hot cells to Iran. Iran may have received other nuclear-related assistance and material from Argentina. Argentina reportedly remains interested in helping Iran complete construction on the two reactors at Bushehr. [Note: The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists describes hot cells as "heavily shielded rooms with remotely operated arms used to chemically separate material irradiated in the research reactor, possibly including plutonium laden 'targets'."]

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—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Washington DC) January 1995, [www.bullatomb.org](http://www.bullatomb.org), accessed 7 July 2002; George J. Church, *Time*, 16 December 1991 pp. 42, 47-48; Steve Coll, *Washington Post*, 15 November 1991, pp. A33, A39; Mark Hibbs, *Nuclear Fuel*, 9 December 1991, pp. 11-12.

#### **December 1991**

Iran brings a multi-billion dollar lawsuit against the German government for preventing Siemens from completing the two reactors at Bushehr.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nuclear Fuel*, 9 December 1991, pp. 11-12.

#### **December 1991**

Nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan are reportedly transferred via Turkmenistan to Iran. [Note: See 13 October and 27 December 1991.]

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News*, August 1992, p. 52.

#### **December 1991**

An official who saw the calutron provided to Iran by China says that the Iranians have met with difficulties in operating the calutron at "design current," although other reports say Iran could reverse-engineer the calutron. Another report indicates the calutron has not yet been installed.

—Neel Patri, *Nucleonics Week*, 28 November 1991, p. 8; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 21 November 1991, pp. 2-3; George J. Church, *Time*, 16 December 1991, pp. 42, 47-48; Michael Z. Wise, "Atomic Team Reports On Iran Probe," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1992, pp. A29, A30.

#### **18 December 1991**

Asked about rumors of nuclear cooperation between Iran and China, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Mr. Karrubi, says "those rumours are fabricated by Western arrogant powers and they are not true." [Note: China acknowledged cooperating with Iran in its peaceful nuclear program in late October or early November. See 4 November 1991.]

—"Speaker Karrubi Denies Nuclear Cooperation With China," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 December 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **27 December 1991**

The magazine *Al-Watan Al-Arabi* reports that Iran purchased three nuclear weapons from a former Soviet republic for an estimated \$175 million and hired in excess of 50 Soviet nuclear experts at salaries comparable to \$5,800 a month to assemble the purchased bomb components. Kazakhstan is alleged to be the supplier in this deal because it is the only former Soviet republic known to have nuclear weapons. [Note: for earlier reports on this see 13 October and December 1991.]

—The Associated Press, "Iran Purchased Nuclear Weapons, Journal Reports," *The Toronto Star*, 24 January 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **29 December 1991**

France's secretary general of the foreign ministry goes to Tehran to finalize the \$1 billion Eurodif agreement between France and Iran. [Note: See 25 October 1991.] Further, France and Iran reach a preliminary understanding on the settlement of a disputed loan during the French Foreign Minister Francois Scheer's visit to the Iranian capital.

—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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nexis.com; "Iran, France Said To Sign Secret Nuclear Accord Proliferation Issues," 31 January 1992, pp. 67-68; Amir Tahiri, *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), 31 December 1991, p.1.

#### **Late 1991**

Argentina considers supplying Iran with "turnkey" facilities for converting uranium concentrate to uranium dioxide and for fuel fabrication, the United States believes. Also, the United States believes the two countries are negotiating heavy water production equipment sales as well. The United States other countries supply the Argentine government with intelligence information that convinces it to halt the exports.

—Mark Hibbs "Sensitive Iran Reactor Deal May Hinge on MFN for China" *Nucleonics Week*, 1 October 1992, pp. 5-6.

#### **Late 1991**

A CIA and US Congressional assessment estimate that there is a "high degree of certainty that the government of Iran has acquired all or virtually all of the components required for the construction of two to three nuclear weapons."

—Alon Pinhas, "Thinking the Unthinkable about Iran," *The Jerusalem Post*, 23 April 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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## **1990**

### **Early 1990s**

The Iranian government decides that by 2005 up to 20% of the energy in Iran will be produced by nuclear electric power and that 10 nuclear units will be built.

—Radzhab Sattarovich Safarov, "Russia and Iran on the Threshold of the 21st Century," *Nezavisimay Gazeta* (Moscow), 20 March 1997; in "RF-Iranian Ties, Energy Policy Surveyed," FBIS Document FTS 19970407001180, 5 April 2002.

### **1990**

The reactor at Iran's Nuclear Research Center acquires "critical assembly capability." A reports says this suggests that Iran, a state with little nuclear technology of its own, received assistance from Russia or Pakistan or both.

—Marko Milivojevic, "Nuclear Deal," *Middle East International*, 20 January 1995, p. 14.

### **1990**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) conducts uranium exploration at the Saghand Uranium mine in Yazd. [Note: The AEOI also conducts exploration there in 1984-1985 and 1989. See entries.]

—"Iran's Nuclear Network," *The Risk Report*, September 1995; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Paper, October 1998.

### **1990**

China and Iran sign a military and scientific cooperation pact.

—"China Nuclear-Plant Announced," *Fact on File World News Digest*, 17 September 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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### 1990-1991

The US Department of Commerce approves the sale of high-technology equipment to Iran during a 13-month period in 1990-1991 worth \$59 million. The director of the Washington, DC-based group the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Gary Milholin, says that the equipment sold to Iran by the Commerce Department constitutes dual-use technology that can be used to produce nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

—Keith Bradsher, "US Allowed Some High-Tech Sales to Iran in 90," *New York Times*, 31 January 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com.

### 1990

Iran and the Soviet Union sign a nuclear cooperation agreement. [Note: See 7 February 1991.]

—Mark Hibbs "German Officials Say Government May Not Let Bushehr Be Finished" *Nucleonics Week*, 7 February 1991, pp. 15-16.

### January 1990

Officials from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran visit South Korea to request assistance on the Bushehr nuclear power plant. [Note: In February 1990, Korea Power Engineering Company representatives travel to Iran to conduct a feasibility study on completing the plant.]

—*Korea Times* (Seoul), 2 March 1990, p. 8; in *Nuclear Developments*, 16 March 1990.

### 21 January 1990

Iran's Minister of Defense of the Armed Forces and Logistics, Ali Akbar Torkan, and China's Deputy Director of the Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense sign a 10-year agreement to construct a 27MW plutonium production plant in Isfahan. As part of the agreement, China will also supply additional calutrons and other uranium enrichment technology. The deal is facilitated by the export arm of China's Ministry of Energy Resource, the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation (CNEIC). [Note: The 27MW reactor proposed for installation at Isfahan by China but never realized should not be confused with a 27kWt Chinese-supplied reactor at Isfahan that went critical March 1994. For entries on the 27kWt reactor, see 1991, September 1991, March 1994, and 7 September 1995.]

—"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexis-nexis.com; Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Mednews), August 1992, pp. 47, 130; Jim Mann, *Los Angeles Times*, 17 March 1992, pp. A1, A11; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, pp. 9-11.

### February 1990

Korea Power Engineering Company representatives travel to Iran to conduct a feasibility study on completing the plant. [Note: In January 1990, officials from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran visited South Korea to request assistance on the Bushehr nuclear power plant.]

—*Korea Times* (Seoul), 2 March 1990, p. 8; in *Nuclear Developments*, 16 March 1990.

### February 1990

Iran and Spain sign a protocol saying that Associated Enterprises of Spain will build the Bushehr reactors, with some assistance from Kraftwerk Union (KWU). German export law prohibits KWU from working directly on the project, but the companies hope to circumvent this by having Spain as the main contractor. Safeguards will apply.

—Angel Munoz, *El Independente*, 5 February 1990, p. 2; in *Nuclear Developments*, 16 March 1990, p. 2; Angel Munoz, *El Independente*, 6 February 1990, p. 4; in *Nuclear Developments*, 16 March 1990, p. 38-39.

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### **5 February 1990**

*El Independiente* of Madrid reports that 2,000 workers, plus 200 scientists, are or were working on Iran's nuclear research.

—*El Independiente* (Madrid), 5 and 6 February 1990; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **7 February 1990**

Iranian Parliament Speaker Kharrubi inaugurates the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran's Jabir bin al-Hayyan laboratory. It will be used for teaching nuclear technology.

—"Iran Nuclear Research Laboratory Opened," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 February 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **12 February 1990**

*US News and World Report* reports that Pakistan is helping Iran build a plutonium reactor.

—*US News and World Report*, 12 February 1990.

### **March 1990**

Iran possibly opens a uranium ore processing plant near the Saghand uranium mine in Yazd province.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

### **6 March 1990**

The Soviet Union and Iran sign a protocol under which the Soviet Union will build two VVER 440 reactors in Iran in return for three billion cubic meters of natural gas. The countries also agree to cooperate in nuclear research for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union will also complete the two 1293MW pressurized water reactors at Bushehr that Siemens-Kraftwerk Union of West Germany has refused to finish until the Iran-Iraq War is formally ended. [Note: The 1293MW reactor under construction at Bushehr is also referred to as 1200MWe. See November 1974, May 1987, and March 1993.]

—*Nuclear News*, April 1990, p. 19; *Nuclear Engineering International*, May 1990, p. 7; *Nuclear Engineering International*, June 1990, p. 24; *Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly*, 19-25 March 1990, p. 2; "USSR/Iran: Iranians Say Soviets Will Aid In Nuclear" *Nucleonics Week*, 15 March 1990, p. 18.

### **9 March 1990**

Iran's Mojahedin-e Khalq opposition organization claims that Iran country has allocated \$200 million for nuclear weapons programs and is receiving help from Argentina, Pakistan, and China. A US administration official says Iran wants to acquire nuclear weapons, and adds that the United States has tried to prevent the Argentina, Pakistan, and China from "selling equipment that would give Iran secrets to enable them to produce these types of weapons." [Note: The Mojahedin-e Khlaq is known to make exaggerated claims about the Iranian government and its nuclear program.]

—"Commentary On Claims Of Nuclear Capability," *Proliferation Issues*, 24 July 1991, pp. 15-16.

### **14 March 1990**

The Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center opens. The center includes subcritical mass reactors and neutron production laboratories designed and built by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran for the purpose of gaining the technology to design nuclear reactors. The reactors use natural uranium. The neutron production laboratory has "Kacgraft" and "Walton" neutron-producing equipment. The laboratory is for training the center's staff. The

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research from the center is planned to be used to build a 27MW reactor in the next two years. [Note: The 27MW reactor proposed for installation at Isfahan by China but never realized should not be confused with a 27kWt Chinese-supplied reactor at Isfahan that went critical March 1994. For entries on the 27kWt reactor, see 1991, September 1991, March 1994, and 7 September 1995. For entries on the 27MW reactor, see 21 January 1990, 14 March 1990, June 1990, November 1991, and 1 June 1995.]

—"Esfahan Nuclear Centre Reactors Become Operational," BBC Summary Of World Broadcasts, 27 March 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **15 March 1990**

*Nuclear Developments* reports that according to a Jane's publication, Chile, Iran, South Korea, and Libya are capable of producing nuclear weapons.

—"Defense Minister Denies Nuclear Capability: Jane's Report," *Nuclear Developments*, 15 May 1990, p. 11.

#### **16 March 1990**

*Nuclear Developments* reports that the Soviet minister of transport and the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran reach an agreement for the Soviet Union to assist in the construction of two 440MW nuclear plants in Iran. The two nations also agree to cooperate for peaceful purposes in the nuclear field.

—"USSR To Aid Establishment Of Nuclear Power Units" *Nuclear Developments*, 16 March 1990, p. 25.

#### **June 1990**

*Nuclear Engineering International* reports that Argentina has attempted to revive work at Bushehr.

—*Nuclear Engineering International*, June 1990, p. 24.

#### **June 1990**

China's Nuclear Industry Organization signs a contract to supply the Atomic Energy Organization with a "micro-nuclear" research reactor to be built at Isfahan. The size of the reactor was not disclosed, but one source implies it is approximately 30MW. [Note: This description of 30MW reactor may refer to the 27MW reactor proposed for installation at Isfahan. The 27MW reactor proposed for installation at Isfahan by China but never realized should not be confused with a 27kWt Chinese-supplied reactor at Isfahan that went critical March 1994. For entries on the 27kWt reactor, see 1991, September 1991, March 1994, and 7 September 1995. For entries on the 27MW reactor, see 21 January 1990, 14 March 1990, November 1991, and 1 June 1995.]

—*Zhongguo Xinwen She* (Beijing), 11 June 1990; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-016, 28 June 1990, p. 3; *Keyhan* (London), 19 July 1990, p. 4; in FBIS Document JPRS-TND-90-016, 20 September 1990, pp. 33-34; *Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly*, 19-25 March 1990, p. 2.

#### **June 1990**

A US National Intelligence Estimate is released that says Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability.

—Bill Gertz, *Washington Times*, 1 November 1991, p. A7.

#### **July 1990**

Kraftwerk Union of West Germany expresses its unwillingness to complete work on the Bushehr reactors. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran says that the country's nuclear program is suffering because of German export controls. West Germany has also prevented Spain from finishing construction on the reactors.

—*Keyhan* (London), 19 July 1990, p. 4; in *Nuclear Developments*, 20 September 1990, pp. 33-34; IRNA (Tehran), 23 September 1990; in *Nuclear Developments*, 25 October 1990, p. 37; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 25 October 1990, pp. 1-2.

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### **July 1990**

The United States, Japan, and countries in Western Europe lift controls on high-tech goods to Eastern Europe, making it easier for Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to buy dual-use goods for nuclear weapons through Eastern Europe. A US State Department official says Iran is researching enrichment methods and that it probably had "agents in Europe scouring the market" for needed technology.

—Jim Mann, "Iran's Nuclear Plans Worry Us Officials," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 January 1991, pp. A1, A28-A29.

### **August 1990**

*Nuclear Engineering International* reports that France and Iran are continuing discussions on resolving a dispute about a \$1 billion loan made by Iran to the French Atomic Energy Commission in 1974 to build the Eurodif enrichment plant. As part of the loan conditions, Iran agreed to pay part of the plant's operating costs and take 10% of the enriched uranium produced. However, after the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, Iran demanded full repayment of the Iran interest. France has paid back \$630 million, but is asking for damages from Iran for Eurodif, since Iran backed out of the agreement.

—"France And Iran Talk Over Loan," *Nuclear Engineering International*, August 1990, p. 4.

### **Third Quarter 1990**

The *PPNN Newsbrief* reports that Argentina may have to revise its contracts for delivery of 20% enriched uranium for the research reactors it has supplied to Algeria, Iran, and Peru, due to delays in production at the Pilcanyeu enrichment plant.

—"Nuclear Trade And International Cooperation: Argentina," *PPNN Newsbrief*, Autumn 1990, p. 3.

### **September 1990**

The Iranian press criticizes West Germany refusing to rebuild Bushehr.

—Jim Mann, "Iran's Nuclear Plans Worry Us Officials," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 January 1991, pp. A1, A28-A29.

### **6 September 1990**

Indonesian Vice President Sudharmono and Reza Amrollahi, president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, discuss bilateral cooperation for peaceful nuclear energy development between Iran and Indonesia.

—*Antara* (Jakarta), 6 September 1990; in *Nuclear Developments*, 15 October 1990, p. 2; "Sudharmono, Iranian Official On Atomic Energy" *Nuclear Developments*, 15 October 1990, p. 2.

### **6 September 1990**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says Iran's nuclear program is suffering because of export controls, despite the country's adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and full-scope safeguards. He also says the International Atomic Energy Agency is emphasizing its safeguards role to the detriment of its promotional role, and adds that no developing country has diverted nuclear material from a power plant for military use.

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran Negotiating With USSR For Supply Of "Several" PWRs," *Nucleonics Week*, 25 October 1990, pp. 1-2.

### **18 September 1990**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says that stricter International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards have complicated the nuclear industry and have made it costly for developing countries to build nuclear projects.

—"Official Reviews Need For Nuclear Energy," *Nuclear Developments*, 25 October 1990, p. 37.

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### **23 September 1990**

Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, says Iran may cooperate with the Soviet Union in the construction of future nuclear power plants as a "logical consequence of the unacceptable attitude of West Germany since the victory of the Islamic revolution." He says Iran is waiting for a decision by West Germany on the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant "to take appropriate measures."

—"Iran Awaiting Final Word From Bonn on Bushehr Nuclear Plant," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 September 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **October 1990**

*Nuclear Developments* reports that Iran is cooperating with the Soviet Union in setting up new nuclear power plants in Iran.

—"Official on FRG, USSR Nuclear Plant Links" *Nuclear Developments*, 25 October 1990, p. 37.

### **October 1990**

Khalil Musavi, Iran's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, does not confirm a report that the Soviet Union might rebuild the Bushehr PWRs that were damaged by Iraqi air strikes while under construction.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 25 October 1990, pp. 1-2.

### **9 October 1990**

At a meeting of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran chaired by Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the decision is made to rebuild the Bushehr nuclear power plant, damaged by numerous Iraqi attacks.

—"Iran Pledges To Complete Nuclear Plant," Middle East Defense News, 29 April 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **21 October 1990**

Khalil Musavi, Iran's representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, says that Iran has been negotiating with the Soviet Union for the supply of several 440MW pressurized water reactors for about six or seven months.

—Mark Hibbs, "Iran Negotiating With USSR For Supply Of 'Several' PWRs," *Nucleonics Week*, 25 October 1990, pp. 1-2.

### **November 1990**

Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani says Iran will abide by nuclear safeguards.

—Jim Mann, "Iran's Nuclear Plans Worry US Officials," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 January 1991, pp. A1, A28-A29.

### **6 November 1990**

Hans Blix, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, meets with Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, to discuss an agreement banning nuclear weapons. Rafsanjani praises the IAEA's work in promoting safety and arms control. Referring to Iraq, Rafsanjani says that merely signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is not sufficient. Some countries, he says, will not adhere to international regulations, although of course Iran will.

—*Nuclear Developments*, 6 December 1990, p. 18.

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## 1989

### 1989

Iran signs a nuclear cooperation agreement with Czechoslovakia.

—"Iran To Complete Busheir Site," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 January 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### 1989

Reza Amrollahi, the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, is appointed as one of Iran's three deputy presidents.

—Islamabad Domestic Service; in *Nuclear Developments*, 23 December 1988, p. 17; Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News*, August 1992, p. 43.

### 1989

The first Chinese calutrons arrive in Iran.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News)*, August 1992, p. 47.

### January-February 1989

Iran holds talks with the Argentine-West German-Spanish consortium, which demands that a peace treaty be in place before work restarts at Bushehr.

—*Nuclear Engineering International*, February 1989, p. 5.

### February-March 1989

Iran expects to have uranium mines in Yazd in operation within three to four years. The 5000 tons there will exceed domestic requirements, so Iran plans to export the surplus. Iran will invest \$4 million in the site within the next three years. Iran has been prospecting uranium for five years, with resources in the provinces of Isfahan, Azerbaijan, Khurasan, and Sistan va Baluchistan. The uranium processing plant in Yazd is completed by the end of 1989; there are 800 employees at the plant.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News)*, August 1992, p. 47.

### February 1989

*Nuclear Engineering International* reports that Iran has held talks with a consortium from Argentina, Spain, and West Germany about contracting to aid in the completion of the Bushehr power plant. The plant's main contractor, Siemens-Kraftwerk Union of West Germany, has said that it will not consider completing the plant until a peace treaty for the region is in force.

—"Iranian Plant Still Planned" *Nuclear Engineering International*, February 1989, p. 5.

### 2 March 1989

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Heinrich von Pierer, of Kraftwerk Union (KWU) and who was the man behind the successful efforts to get orders for the two Bushehr PWRs in Iran in the 1970s, said that KWU "is still holding talks" with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to complete the war-damaged units.

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—Mark Hibbs "Framatome Deal Might Counter Kwu's 41% Nuclear Contract Plunge" *Nucleonics Week*, 2 March 1989, pp. 7-9.

#### **April 1989**

Argentina is in the process of replacing the core of Iran's research reactor at Tehran University.  
—*Clarín* (Buenos Aires), 4 April 1989, p. 12; in *Nuclear Developments*, 23 May 1989, pp. 10-11.

#### **April 1989**

Iran expresses interest in purchasing technology and reactors from an Argentine-Turkish consortium.  
—Aziz Utkan, *Hurriyet* (Istanbul), 12 April 1989, p. 13; in *Nuclear Developments*, 5 April 1989, pp. 39-40.

#### **April 1989-October 1990**

Two Iranian nationals, Ray Amiri and Dan Danesh, illegally export Tektronix oscilloscopes to Iran from the United States. The oscilloscopes are used to process nuclear weapons test data. Amiri and Danesh also export logic analyzers, pulse generators, and other electronic equipment that could be used to develop nuclear weapons.  
—James V. Grimaldi and David Greenwald, *Orange County Register*, 30 August 1991; Cristina Lee, *Los Angeles Times*, 13 September 1991, p. D2.

#### **May 1989**

The United States alleges that Iran may have received illegal nuclear-related exports from West Germany.  
—*Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 8 May 1989, pp. 166-68; in *Nuclear Developments*, 23 May 1989, pp. 42-44.

#### **Mid-1989**

The International Atomic Energy Agency says it is ready to cooperate on assessing the damage done by Iraqi bombing raids on the Bushehr nuclear power plant.  
—Gamini Seneviratne, *Nucleonics Week*, 26 February 1987, p. 13; *Worldwide Report*, 23 April 1987, p. 46; in AFP (Paris), 24 March 1987; *Nuclear Engineering International*, June 1987, p. 32; *PPNN Newsbrief*, March 1988, p. 4; in IAEA Newsbriefs, November 1987; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 26 November 1987; Gamini Seneviratne, *Nucleonics Week*, 3 March 1988, p. 7; Aziz Utkan, *Nuclear Developments*, 5 May 1989, p. 20; in MENA (Cairo), 21 April 1989; *Nuclear News*, August 1989, p. 101.

#### **June 1989**

Discussions between Iran and the Eurodif consortium over the repayment of a 1974 loan from Iran are broken off.  
—Ann MacLachlan, *Nuclear Fuel*, 26 June 1989, pp. 4-5.

#### **June 1989**

Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani signs a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union. Iranian Prime Minister Husayn Musavi did not confirm a report that said the Soviet Union might rebuild the pressurized water reactors, which were damaged by Iraqi air strikes.  
—Mark Hibbs "Iran Negotiating With USSR For Supply Of "Several" PWRs" *Nucleonics Week*, 25 October 1990, pp. 1-2.

#### **1 June 1989**

*Nuclear Engineering International* reports that a shipment of low-enriched uranium from Argentina to Iran was delayed by the International Atomic Energy Agency. [Note: The IAEA had approved the shipment in October 1988.

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See October 1988.]

—"Argentina: Power Cuts," *Nuclear Engineering International*, June 1989, p. 21.

#### **22 June 1989**

International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Hans Blix inspects the Bushehr nuclear power plant damaged by numerous Iraqi air raids and calls for increased security of nuclear facilities.

—"Iran Atomic Energy Agency Head Goes to Bushehr," British Broadcasting Corporation, 24 June 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **22 June 1989**

In a meeting in Moscow, Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sign agreements that include cooperation in the nuclear field.

—"Moscow, Iran Sign Economic Pacts, Hint Future Arms Deals," *Los Angeles Times*, 22 June 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **25 June 1989**

The Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Hans Blix, meets with the Prime Minister of Iran, Husayn Musavi. Blix announces the IAEA's readiness to cooperate with Iran in setting up nuclear reactors in Iran for peaceful purposes. The prime minister criticized the West German government for its reluctance to complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor.

—"Musavi Receives IAEA Chief Blix 25 June," *Nuclear Developments*, 14 July 1989, pp. 14-15.

#### **26 June 1989**

Iranian Prime Minister Husayn Musavi says Iran will build nuclear reactors for "peaceful purposes" with help from other countries.

—"Iran N-Plan," *Financial Times* (London), 26 June 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **29 June 1989**

The Iranian Parliament's budget committee inspects the Bushehr nuclear power plant to determine how much it will cost to finish. The committee chairman, Morteza Alviri, says \$3 billion has been spent on the plant so far and that one of the two 1,300MW reactors is 90% complete.

—"Cost Of Completing Bushehr Nuclear Plant Being Assessed," British Broadcasting Corporation, 18 July 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **3 July 1989**

Iranian Finance Minister Mohammed Javad Irvani says Iran may cancel its contracts with West German companies building the Bushehr nuclear power plant. "The West Germans have not performed, and they are killing time," he says. "We want our projects to be finished because a lot of money has been invested. So any country that offers assistance to us, we will take it." He suggests the Soviet Union might be an alternative source of nuclear technology.

—Patrick E. Tyler, "Rebuilding Plan to Cost \$15 Billion, Tehran Says," *Washington Post*, 3 July 1989, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **28 July 1989**

*Nuclear Developments* reports that a West German parliamentary committee is investigating alleged illegal nuclear

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exports by West German firms.

—"FRG Official Views Brazil's Capability Of Making Bomb" *Nuclear Developments*, 28 July 1989, p. 9.

### **August 1989**

An Asian Energy Institute (AEI) is formally launched in New Delhi, India. The Institute's aim is to promote and coordinate "research on energy" in 11 countries in the region: China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Iran, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Jordan, and India. AEI will identify energy-efficient technologies and work on transferring these to countries within the region, besides improving information exchange on different aspects of the production, consumption, and conservation of energy.

—"Asian Energy Institute Opens," *Nuclear Engineering International*, November 1989, p. 7.

### **1 August 1989**

*Nuclear Engineering International* reports that Eurodif, a consortium with the participation of France (52% stake), Italy (16% stake), Spain (11% stake), Belgium (11% stake), and Iran (10% stake), still intends to construct a small enrichment plant that would use laser technology.

—"Longer Life For Enrichment Plant" *Nuclear Engineering International*, August 1989, p. 4.

### **8 August 1989**

Iranian Prime Minister Husayn Musavi inaugurates a new center for producing radioisotopes at the nuclear research center of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). Reza Amrollahi, head of the AEOI, says the radioisotopes produced at the site will be used for medicine and the creation of radio-drugs, which will serve the needs of 5,000 patients nationwide.

—"Iran: Radioisotope Department Opens At Nuclear Research Centre," British Broadcasting Corporation, 8 August 1989, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **September 1989**

Iran is receiving nuclear technology and assistance from the Soviet Union. Iran says its program is strictly for peaceful purposes.

—*Nuclear Developments*, 26 October 1989, pp. 33-34.

### **26 October 1989**

*Nuclear Developments* reports that Iran claims the Soviet Union is helping it to develop its nuclear energy program by providing technology and general assistance. The journal also reports that Iran intends to export high-grade uranium from its Saghand, Yazd mine.

—"Iraqi Effort To Get Nuclear Missiles Viewed," *Nuclear Developments*, 26 October 1989, pp. 33-34; "Atomic Energy Official On Exporting Uranium," *Nuclear Developments*, 26 October 1989, p. 34.

### **November 1989**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Spain may finish the Bushehr nuclear power plant alone, but not until the Iran-Iraq War ends with a peace treaty.

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 9 November 1989, p. 7.

### **9 November 1989**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that the executive vice president of Nuclear Power International, a new joint venture between Siemens of West Germany and Framatome of France, says that Siemens AG is a long way from an agreement with Iran to complete the two pressurized water reactors at Bushehr. The report also says Empresarios

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Agrupados of Spain is also investigating the completion of the plants in Iran, but nothing can be done without the cooperation of Siemens.

—Mark Hibbs, "Siemens A 'Long Way' From Agreement To Complete Damaged Iranian Program," *Nucleonics Week*, 9 November 1989, p. 7.

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## 1988

### 1988

While Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani served as Majlis speaker and acting commander-in-chief of the armed forces, he said in a talk with military officers that the Iran-Iraq War "taught us that international laws are only scraps of paper." He says Iran should consider getting chemical and biological weapons.

—Michael Eisenstadt, "Déjà vu All Over Again? Iran's Military Build-Up: An Assessment," National Defense University, 22 February 1994.

### 1988

Iran receives a delivery of large quantities of uranium concrete from South Africa. A book reports that Iran owns 15% of the Rossig uranium mine in Namibia.

—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com). Shyam Bhatia, *Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East*, (New York, NY: Routledge Press) 1988, p. 83; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

### 1988

An Iranian scientist reports that Iran has built a plutonium extraction laboratory at the Tehran Research Center, but the laboratory has not yet operated with plutonium-bearing materials.

—Leonard S. Spector and Jacqueline R. Smith, "Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear weapons 1989-1990, (Boulder, Westview Press: 1990), p. 208.

### 1988

Argentina helps service an Iranian nuclear power plant. Argentine exports to Iran are termed politically dangerous.

—*Wall Street Journal*, 10 February 1992, p. A12; Niguel J. Culaci, *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), 25 May 1988, p. 8; in *Nuclear Developments*, 13 July 1988, pp. 1-2.

### 1988-1989

Iran approaches Pakistan for help in enriching uranium. The head of Pakistan's uranium enrichment program begins to hold talks with officials at the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran in 1988. Rumors that Pakistan is helping Iran develop nuclear weapons persist. [Note: See also November 1986 and 1987 and June 1988 for more on the agreement to cooperate between Pakistan and Iran.]

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 2 June 1991, pp. 17-18; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, March 1992, p. 9-11.

### 1988-1991

China trains engineers of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the majority of them from the Isfahan facility, in nuclear reactor design in China, according to an official European source. European officials also say

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China has been supplying the AEOI with nuclear equipment and information on facility design. [Note: These transactions apparently took place under a secret China-Iran nuclear cooperation agreement reached after 1985. See Mid-1980s entry.]

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 2 May 1991, pp. 1, 10-11; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 23 May 1991, pp. 17-18; Mark Hibbs and Neel Patri, *Nucleonics Week*, 21 November 1991, pp. 2-3; Mark Hibbs, Neel Patri, and Neal Sandler, *NuclearFuel*, 25 November 1991, pp. 8-9.

### **1988-1989**

Large quantities of uranium concentrate are delivered to Iran from South Africa. Intelligence reports from European officials worry that Iran might seek to enrich this material clandestinely, with the help of Pakistan. Abdul Qadir Khan, who is in charge of Pakistan's uranium enrichment program, holds talks with officials at the Atomic Energy Organizations of Iran (AEOI) beginning in 1988, when nuclear cooperation between the two nations increases. Reza Amrollahi, head of the AEOI, says Iran's nuclear program is dedicated exclusively to peaceful uses, but there are indications that Amrollahi is not fully in control of AEOI.

—Mark Hibbs, "Bonn Will Decline Teheran Bid To Resuscitate Bushehr Project," *Nucleonics Week*, 2 May 1991, pp. 17-18.

### **24 February 1988**

*Somos* of Buenos Aires reports that at the request of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Argentina reconverted the core of an Iranian research reactor and provided the fuel for operating it. Argentina, West Germany, and Spain are cooperating in completing the Iranian nuclear power plant at Bushehr.

—"Sabato On Argentina-Brazil Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," *Nuclear Developments*, 24 February 1988, pp. 20-21.

### **25 February 1988**

*Nuclear Developments* reports that the prime minister of Sudan has confirmed a black market of uranium operated out of Khartoum where one kilogram costs \$3 million. Sudan and other African nations ran a network of black market exports, which included sales to Iran and Iraq during 1987 and 1988.

—"Former Officer Reveals Black Market Uranium Sales" *Nuclear Developments*, 25 February 1988, pp. 30-31.

### **March 1988**

The IAEA says that it will send inspectors to Bushehr in a few months to assess the damage from Iraqi attacks on the nuclear power plant.

—Gamini Seneviratne, *Nucleonics Week*, 26 February 1987, p. 13; Worldwide Report, 23 April 1987, p. 46; in AFP (Paris), 24 March 1987; *Nuclear Engineering International*, June 1987, p. 32; *PPNN Newsbrief*, March 1988, p. 4; in IAEA Newsbriefs, November 1987; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 26 November 1987; Gamini Seneviratne, *Nucleonics Week*, 3 March 1988, p. 7; Aziz Utkan, *Nuclear Developments*, 5 May 1989, p. 20; in MENA (Cairo), 21 April 1989; *Nuclear News*, August 1989, p. 101.

### **June 1988**

The *Observer* (London) reports that Pakistan and Iran have signed a cooperation agreement under which Iranian engineers will be trained in Pakistan. M.A. Khan of Pakistan and Reza Amrollahi of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran are said to have signed the pact; however, both Pakistan and Iran deny its existence. Pakistan says that it would not sign an agreement with Iran since Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan also denies that any Pakistani aid will be provided to the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Six Iranian engineers are said to be in Pakistan under a 1987 agreement. [Note: See 21 June 1988.]

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—*Al-Watan* (Kuwait), 13 June 1988, p. 1; in *Nuclear Developments*, 13 July 1988, p. 19; Islamabad Domestic Service, 14 June 1988; in *Nuclear Developments*, 21 June 1988, p. 24; *Kayhan International* (Tehran), 14 June 1988, p. 2; in *Nuclear Developments*, 10 August 1988, p. 22.

#### **14 June 1988**

India news media reports that Pakistan has agreed to train Iranian nuclear personnel.

—John Gunther Dean, "Reported Pakistani and Iranian Nuclear Cooperation," Embassy Cable, 14 June 1988, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

#### **21 June 1988**

Islamabad Domestic Service says that Pakistan denies signing a secret nuclear pact with Iran. The spokesman claims that no Pakistani scientist has visited Iran's nuclear plant in Bushehr in recent years, nor has an Iranian nuclear expert received advanced training in Pakistan. [Note: see entry 14 June 1988.]

—"Spokesman Denies "Secret" Nuclear Pact With Iran" *Nuclear Developments*, 21 June 1988, p. 24.

#### **19 July 1988**

Iraq attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

#### **September 1988**

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) approves the sale by Argentina of 115.8kg of 20% enriched uranium to Iran. The order is to be filled by mid-1990. [Note: Argentina and Iran had agreed on the sale on 5 May 1987; however, the IAEA delays the supply in June 1989. See 5 May 1987 and June 1989 entries.]

—Gamini Seneviratne, *Nuclear Fuel*, 3 October 1988, p. 13; Richard Kessler, *Nuclear Fuel*, 14 November 1988, pp. 3-4; Richard Kessler, *Nuclear Fuel*, 24 July 1989, pp. 12-13.

#### **Mid-September 1988**

A recommendation by the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the IAEA governing board to approve Iran's request for the agency's help in transferring from Argentina 115.8kg of 20% enriched uranium is postponed. The issue will be put on the agenda for the next meeting on 26 September 1988. The enriched uranium fuel for Iran's research reactor had been supplied by the United States, but that supply had been interrupted. The reactor is to be converted from highly enriched to low-enriched uranium with IAEA assistance.

—Gamini Seneviratne, "IAEA Board Postpones Decision On Argentina-Iran Fuel Transfer" *Nucleonics Week*, 22 September 1988, p. 3.

#### **26 September 1988**

The International Atomic Energy Agency approves Iran's request for assistance in receiving 115.8kg of 20% enriched uranium from Argentina. The fuel is to be supplied by Argentina's Investigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP). The research reactor that will use the fuel started up in 1967 and has operated on 93% enriched uranium supplied by the United States. The United States stopped authorizing export of the fuel by the United Nuclear Corporation in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

—Gamini Seneviratne, "IAEA Approves Argentine Fuel For Teheran Research Reactor," *Nuclear Fuel*, 3 October 1988, p. 13.

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### **October 1988**

At an annual conference held to draw Iranian nuclear scientists living in exile, Rafsanjani appeals to the participants to return home permanently. Rafsanjani also openly calls for the development of nuclear weapons. —Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News, August 1992, p. 42; Warren H. Donnelly and Zachary S. Davis, "Iran's Nuclear Activities and the Congressional Response," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 20 May 1992, p. 10.

### **6 October 1988**

In an address to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps broadcast on Tehran radio, Iranian Parliament Speaker Hashemi-Rafsajani calls for developing nuclear and other unconventional weapons. The importance of such weapons "was made very clear during the [Iran-Iraq] war," he says. "We should fully equip ourselves both in the offensive and defense use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons. From now on, you should make use of the opportunity and perform this task."

—"The China-Iran Nuclear Cloud," Middle East Defense News, 22 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **14 November 1988**

*Nuclear Fuel* reports that Argentina has contracts to supply 115.8kg of 20% enriched uranium to Iran, which must be filled by mid-1990.

—Richard Kessler, "Argentina's Cnea Turns To Soviets For Small Supply Of Enriched Uranium," *Nuclear Fuel*, 14 November 1988, pp. 3-4.

### **23 December 1988**

Islamabad Domestic Service says that Pakistan denies that it is assisting Iran in building a nuclear facility at Qazvin.

—"UK Paper's Claim Of Nuclear Help To Iran Denied," *Nuclear Developments*, 23 December 1988, p. 17.

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## **1987**

### **1987**

Iran says it plans to build a yellowcake plant in Yazd Province. [Note: Construction begins in 1989.]

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995.

### **1987**

At a conference on nuclear science in Tehran, attendees say Iran is researching laser isotope separation.

—"Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 1995, Special Report No. 6; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

### **1987**

Fifteen Iranian engineers from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran are training in China in the fields of nuclear reactor design and research pursuant to a secret bilateral agreement signed after 1995.

—"An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1992," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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**1987**

Iran receives a small calutron for experimental uranium isotope separation from the Chinese for the Isfahan nuclear research center. The Isfahan facility is now believed by some to contain processing capabilities for the entire uranium fuel cycle. According to US officials, the calutron is "desk-top sized," and is capable of a current of one milliamp, too small to enrich uranium. US officials, however, fear Iran could reverse engineer it to make larger calutrons. According to a report by the China Institute of Atomic Energy, the calutron can enrich uranium to 36.5%. —"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Mark D. Skootsky, "U.S. Nuclear Policy Toward Iran," 1 June 1995; Li Gongpan, Lin Zhizhou, Xiang Xuyang and Deng Jingtang, "Electromagnetic Isotope Separation At the China Institute of Atomic Energy," *Nuclear Instruments and Methods In Physics Research, Section B*, 1992, Vol. B70, p. 17-20; in Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance to Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs; Emphasis on Russian Assistance: Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

**1987**

Iranian President Rafsanjani commissions a study on the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. —Alon Pinkas, "Thinking the Unthinkable About Iran," *The Jerusalem Post*, 23 April 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**1987**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran begins to transfer test equipment, computers, and scientific instruments bought from the West from Tehran to Isfahan. [Note: Prior to the move to Isfahan, laser isotope separation research was conducted at Amir Kabir Technical College.] —"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**1987**

Construction begins on a nuclear research and production center for weapons-grade fissile material at Moallem Kalayeh. The facility is said to contain uranium labs and laser enrichment equipment. The facility is run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. A 10MW reactor from India is planned for the site, but apparently the plan is never realized. Iranian investment at the site totals \$300 million by 1995. —"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Anthony H. Cordesman, "Threats and Non-Threats From Iran," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 26 January 1995.

**1987**

Under Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Moshen Rezai, a special unit of the IRGC begins working on a project at Bandar-e Abbas to extend the range of Silkworm missiles procured from China with the intention of arming them with nuclear warheads —"Nuclear Facilities," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 June 1992; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**1987**

Argentina concludes a deal to sell 20% enriched uranium to the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. —"The China-Iran Nuclear Cloud," *Middle East Defense News*, 22 July 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**1987**

Siemens tries to convince the West German government to allow its subsidiary, Kraftwerk Union, to rebuild the

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Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Iran Pledges To Complete Nuclear Plant," Middle East Defense News, 29 April 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**1987**

Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran begins, according to a 1999 article written by Viktor Mikhaylov, then chairman of the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy's Scientific Council.

—Viktor Mikhaylov, "Minatom and International Cooperation," *Yadernyy Kontrol* (Moscow), Volume 44, Number 2, March-April 1999, pp. 62-66.

**1987**

Iran purchases "a large quantity of materials needed for the production of atomic weapons" from Japan, according to a Kuwaiti newspaper.

—*Nuclear Developments*, 5 May 1989, p. 20; in MENA(Cairo), 21 April 1989.

**1987**

Pakistan and Iran sign an agreement to send Iranian engineers to Pakistan for training. The agreement is signed between Reza Amrollahi, director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and Munir Ahmad Khan of Pakistan. The deal calls for at least six Iranian scientists to get training at the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology and the Nuclear Studies Institute at Nowlore. Two of the scientists to be trained have been identified as Saeed Reza or Sayyid Reza and Hadi Ranbshahr or Hadi Rambashahr.

—*Nuclear Developments*, 13 July 1988, p. 19; in *Al-Watan* (Kuwait), 13 June 1988, p. 1; Mark Gorwitz, "Foreign Assistance To Iran's Nuclear and Missile Programs: Emphasis On Russia Assistance; Analysis and Assessment," CNS Unpublished Report, October 1998.

**1987**

Iran demands that West Germany finish the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Iran has already paid for the reactors, according to some sources. The United States pressures West Germany not to complete the reactors. Iran signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970, but US officials say there are "solid nonproliferation grounds" for not completing the reactors. The West German Foreign Office has refused to export the components, citing restrictions on exports to regions of conflict, but since those do not apply to civil nuclear technology, Iran may file compensation claims. Equipos Nucleares of Spain, a Siemens' Licensee, would like to receive a subcontract from Siemens to complete Iran's reactors.

—Mark Hibbs, "German Officials Say Government May Not Let Bushehr Be Finished," *Nucleonics Week*, 7 February 1991, pp. 15-16.

**1987**

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is unable to account for fissile material that Iran said it moved to Bushehr from another site in Iran. The IAEA's investigation is hampered by the fact that Iran never declared the material. West Germany requests and is given permission to send engineers from TUeV [German reactor inspectorate Technischer Ueberwachungsverein] to the reactor site to search for the material with a Geiger counter, but nothing is found.

—Mark Hibbs, "Bonn Will Decline Teheran Bid To Resuscitate Bushehr Project," *Nucleonics Week*, 2 May 1991, pp. 17-18.

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### **Late 1987-September 1990**

The US government approves sales of "more than \$306 million in high-technology items," including computers and oscilloscopes, which may have nuclear weapons applications, to Iran and Syria. The United States grants export licenses for \$138 million worth of computers to Iran. Shipments of other nuclear-related technology, including a \$130,000 oscilloscope, are also approved. These items may have nuclear weapons applications. The approvals were granted despite a US ban on the sale of sensitive technology to these countries by taking advantage of loopholes in US law; such as the "sanctity of previous contracts" (those approved before legislation is passed); the practice of allowing US-made equipment to be repaired in other countries, including those designated as supporters of terrorism; and the practice of permitting US-made parts to be sold in countries on the terrorist list if they are built into foreign equipment and comprise less than 20% of that equipment. US arms control expert Gary Milhollin identifies the dual-use items on the list. A Commerce Department spokesperson declined to comment on the approvals.

—Mary Gordon, "U.S. Exported Software, Parts To Iran, Syria, Records Show," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 28 August 1991, p. A2.

### **1987-1988**

Iran and Iraq both say Iraq might attack the Bushehr complex.

—Gamini Seneviratne, *Nucleonics Week*, 26 February 1987, p. 13; *Worldwide Report*, 23 April 1987, p. 46; in AFP (Paris), 24 March 1987; *Nuclear Engineering International*, June 1987, p. 32; *PPNN Newsbrief*, March 1988, p. 4; in IAEA Newsbriefs, November 1987; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 26 November 1987; Gamini Seneviratne, *Nucleonics Week*, 3 March 1988, p. 7; Aziz Utkan, *Nuclear Developments*, 5 May 1989, p. 20; in MENA (Cairo), 21 April 1989; *Nuclear News*, August 1989, p. 101.

### **January 1987**

Abdul Qadir Khan, Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, revisits Bushehr. [Note: Khan first visited Bushehr in February 1986.]

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992; p. 42.

### **January 1987**

At a secret meeting, Iranian officials decide to allocate additional funds toward developing nuclear weapons.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992; p. 42.

### **January 1987**

Fereyduun Fesharaki, who headed the Shah's secret nuclear weapons program, returns to Iran after a seven-year exile; all of his expenses are paid by the government.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defense News (Middle East Defense News), August 1992; p. 42.

### **February 1987**

A team of 18 French engineers from Framatome inspects the Bushehr nuclear power plant to assess the damage from Iraqi bombing raids and to determine what it will take to rebuild. The team finds the plant "far from

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complete."

—"Iran To Complete Busheir Site," *Middle East Defense News*, 8 January 1990; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com);  
"Iran Pledges To Complete Nuclear Plant," *Middle East Defense News*, 29 April 1991; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com);  
Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya," A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from *Middle East Defense News (Mednews)*, August 1992; p. 42.

#### **17 February 1987**

*The Muslim* (Islamabad daily) reports that Pakistan's president offered nuclear cooperation to all member countries of the Organization of Islamic Conference, which includes Iran.

—"Measures Taken To Protect Nuclear Plants," *Worldwide Report*, 17 February 1987, p. 38.

#### **March-April 1987**

A French analyst reports that Pakistan "might be tempted to sell nuclear fire" to Iran for several billion dollars.

—*Worldwide Report*, 23 April 1987, pp. 56-57; in *Nawa-e Waqt* (Karachi), 10 March 1987. p. 10; *Worldwide Report*, 18 August 1987, pp. 92-98; in Michel Balthasart, *Le Vif/L'Express* (Brussels), 24 April 1987, pp. 10-19.

#### **19 March 1987**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Argentina will enforce strict guidelines for nuclear trade with Iran on a case-by-case basis but it has left the door open for export of medium-enriched uranium for Iran's research reactor and the transfer of certain uranium enrichment technology.

—Richard Kessler, "Argentina To Enforce Curb On Nuclear Trade With Iran," *Nucleonics Week*, 19 March 1987, p. 12.

#### **April 1987**

Iran, Libya, and Pakistan state that they wish to acquire a nuclear weapon to counter the Israeli nuclear threat. A Belgian newspaper claims that Belgium has provided nuclear-related training to Iranians.

—*Worldwide Report*, 18 August 1987, pp. 92-98; in Michel Balthasart, *Le Vif/L'Express* (Brussels), 24 April 1987, pp. 10-19.

#### **April 1987**

*Nuclear News* reports that a West German-Argentine-Spanish Consortium may complete work on Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. The report says representatives of Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of West Germany have visited the site over the past two years to assess the situation. KWU is also concerned about legal difficulties over its cancelled contract (cancelled in 1979) and payments for equipment. The West German-Argentine joint venture, ENACE, and Spain's Empresarios Agrupados are also involved in the consortium. Both Spain and Argentina established relations with KWU when KWU built some of their nuclear plants.

—"Consortium Proposed For Bushehr Completion," *Nuclear News*, April 1987, p. 63.

#### **23 April 1987**

*Worldwide Report* reports that Iran recently gave the International Atomic Energy Agency warning before "nuclear matter" was stockpiled at the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Nuclear Matter Stockpiled," *Worldwide Report*, 23 April 1987, p. 46.

#### **May 1987**

*Nuclear Engineering International* reports that Argentina might supply Iran with 20% enriched uranium for Iran's research reactor if current negotiations succeed. Iran and Argentina signed nuclear cooperation agreements in

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December 1985. An Argentina-Spain-West Germany consortium, including ENACE (Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Electricas, a West Germany-Argentina joint venture), Empresarios Agrupados and Kraftwerk Union, has proposed to complete one unit of Iran's twin 1200MWe Bushehr plant. [Note: The 1200MWe reactors are sometimes referred to as 1293MW. See 3 December 1986 and 6 March 1990.]

—"Argentina Steps Out With The Argos Phwr," *Nuclear Engineering International*, May 1987, p. 2.

#### **5 May 1987**

After 18 months of negotiations, Argentina's Investigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP) and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran sign a \$5.5 million contract for INVAP to supply Iran with a new core for its US-supplied research reactor at Tehran University. INVAP will modify the core to operate with 20% enriched uranium; the core was originally designed by the United States to take 93% enriched uranium. The 5 May agreement, reportedly acknowledged by the Argentine Foreign Ministry on 18 May, is apparently for broader nuclear cooperation. In addition to the reactor core, Argentina may supply uranium enrichment technology, although Iran says this would be used to produce low-enriched uranium only. Argentina will train Iranian experts at its Jose Balseiro Nuclear Institute as an element of its fuel cycle technology transfer to Iran. CNEA [Commission Nuclear Energy Argentina], will provide the 115.8kg of uranium from its Pilcanyeu enrichment plant. [Note: The International Atomic Energy Agency approves the supply of uranium in September 1988, but later delays it in June 1989 (see entries).]

—Richard Kessler, *Nucleonics Week*, 14 May 1987, pp. 6-7; *Nuclear News*, July 1987, pp. 4-5; *Nuclear Engineering International*, July 1987, pp. 4-5; Richard Kessler and Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 12 November 1987, pp. 6-7.

#### **7 May 1987**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Argentine officials deny US claims that part of an unsafeguarded 1986 shipment of uranium dioxide to Algeria was retransferred to Iran.

—Richard Kessler, "Panel To Guide Nuclear Technology Sales From Argentina To Algeria," *Nucleonics Week*, 7 May 1987, p. 6.

#### **12 May 1987**

*Noticias Argentinas* (Buenos Aires) reports Argentina is planning to participate in the final stages of construction of Iran's Bushehr power plant. The Iranian plant uses enriched uranium so that, earlier in its construction, Argentina could only provide its experience with engineering details, as Argentina works exclusively with natural uranium. The West German Kraftwerk Union (KWU) will join the Argentina-West Germany joint venture Argentine Nuclear Enterprise for Electrical Power Plants (ENACE), Spain's Empresarios Agrupados (EMAG), and Iranian companies to build the plant. KWU built Argentina's Atucha I plant and is presently in charge of its Atucha II project. EMAG is also building a KWU designed reactor in Spain.

—"Nuclear Plant," *Worldwide Report*, 12 May 1987, pp. 16-17.

#### **18 May 1987**

An Argentine official confirms that Argentina has signed a wide-ranging nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran on 5 May 1987. [Note: See also 5 May and 4 June 1987.]

—"Argentina Confirms Deal For Work On Bushehr," *Nuclear News*, July 1987, p. 54.

#### **June-September 1987**

Argentina rejects reports that it has transferred uranium enrichment techniques to Iran. It also denies that it is interested in engaging in such transfers.

—Daniel Santoro, *Somos* (Buenos Aires), 16 September 1987, pp. 40-42; in *Nuclear Developments*, 24 February 1988, pp. 20-21; Richard Kessler, *Nucleonics Week*, 4 June 1987, p. 6.

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#### **June 1987**

*Nuclear Engineering International* reports that West Germany's Kraftwerk Union (KWU) declines to resume construction of Iran's Bushehr-1 power plant. KWU had previously confirmed that it was negotiating with companies from Argentina and Spain at Iran's request, to complete Bushehr-1 with an international consortium. —"Iran: Bushehr Still In Limbo," *Nuclear Engineering International*, June 1987, p. 32.

#### **4 June 1987**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that an Argentine official denies reports that Argentine companies, together with West Germany's Kraftwerk Union (KWU) and Spain's Empresarios Argupados, recently signed a contract to finish Iran's Bushehr-1 PWR plant. [Note: See 5 and 18 May 1997. It is not clear if the official made the denial before or after another official confirmed the agreement on 18 May 1997.] The official says there is "nothing new" in long-running negotiations between Iran and the West German-Argentine-Spanish consortium on completing the plant. The Argentine companies involved are Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Electricas (a joint venture of Argentina and West Germany), Techint SA, Argatom, and Nuclar. Argentina will insist on International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to cover any nuclear transfers to Iran. Argentina has not ruled out certain nuclear sales to Iran, but it has banned export of technology, materials, or equipment that could be used to enrich uranium, reprocess fuel or produce heavy water. Argentina denies any interest in transferring uranium-enrichment information to Iran and denies that the subject had been discussed in the past 18 months.

—Richard Kessler, "Argentina Denies Deal With KWU And Iran To Finish Bushehr-1," *Nucleonics Week*, 4 June 1987, p. 6.

#### **July 1987**

*Nuclear News* reports that Argentina wants to earn extra money for its atomic energy agency by exporting nuclear supplies and services, subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, to such countries as Iran and Albania.

—"Still Committed To Nuclear, Alfonsin Says," *Nuclear News*, July 1987, p. 54.

#### **13 July 1987**

The *Star* of Johannesburg reports Iran is secretly buying uranium from a British-run mine in South African-occupied Namibia. Iran has been buying uranium from the mine at Rossig for the past eight years. [Note: See also 1979-1987 and 1988 reports.]

—"Paper Reports Uranium Sales," 13 July 1987, *Worldwide Report*, 13 July 1987, p. 40.

#### **29 July 1987**

South African media reports that Iran is developing nuclear weapons with help from South Africa and Argentina.

—Edward J Perkins, "Nuclear News from South Africa," Secret Cable [US Embassy in South Africa], 29 July 1987, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.co.

#### **20 August 1987**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that Argentina could win \$100 million in nuclear business under proposed contracts to finish Iran's stalled Bushehr-1 PWR. The plan to complete Bushehr-1 under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards teams five Argentine firms, which would be responsible for the auxiliary systems and most safety work, with West Germany's Kraftwerk Union, which would act as project manager and oversee all nuclear steam supply system-related work and fuel supply, and Spain's Empresarios Agrupados, which would handle the conventional side. Iran's leaders have reportedly shown great interest in the plan. The consortium has bid for the at least \$400

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million project, but business has been stalled by West Germany's refusal to renew an export license for shipment of nuclear steam supply system components until the Iran-Iraq War ends. Argentine technicians have visited the Bushehr site in the "recent past."

—Richard Kessler, "Cnea Estimates Bushehr-1 Work Worth \$100 Million To Argentina," *Nucleonics Week*, 20 August 1987, p. 13.

#### **September 1987**

Iran holds a conference on laser isotope separation.

—*Jane's Intelligence Review*, Special Report No. 6, May 1995, p. 14; in Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

#### **November 1987**

After Iraq bombs the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Iran requests that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) send a safety mission to the plant. The IAEA declines to send a mission. [Note: The IAEA continues to refuse to send inspectors until March 1988, when it says that it will inspect Bushehr in a few months. See also March 1988, Mid-1989, and 22 June 1989.] Further, Argentina halts talks on completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. An agreement on restarting construction of the plant is cancelled after Iraq bombs the plant on 17 and 19 November 1987.

—Gamini Seneviratne, *Nucleonics Week*, 26 February 1987, p. 13; *Worldwide Report*, 23 April 1987, p. 46; in AFP (Paris), 24 March 1987; *Nuclear Engineering International*, June 1987, p. 32; *PPNN Newsbrief*, March 1988, p. 4; in IAEA Newsbriefs, November 1987; Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 26 November 1987; Gamini Seneviratne, *Nucleonics Week*, 3 March 1988, p. 7; Aziz Utkan, *Nuclear Developments*, 5 May 1989, p. 20; in MENA (Cairo), 21 April 1989; *Nuclear News*, August 1989, p. 101. *Nuclear Engineering International*, April 1988, p. 8.

#### **12 November 1987**

*Nucleonics Week* reports that the president of Argentina has approved negotiations between Argentine companies and Iran on nuclear supply contracts. There are also reports that Argentine and other foreign companies—including West Germany's Kraftwerk Union (KWU), Spain's Empresarios Agrupados, Argentina's Techint and Nuclar and the West Germany-Argentina joint venture Empresa Nuclear Argentina—have formed a management structure or unincorporated holding company to bid for that business. KWU says that it is talking to other firms about work for Iran, but KWU says no holding company has yet been formed. Argentina also says that talks with Iran go beyond completing the long-stalled Bushehr-1 PWR and include Bushehr-2, which is reportedly 45% complete. Estimates for the total for both units are \$2.35 billion, with Argentine companies getting up to \$400 million. KWU's talks about forming a consortium are limited to Bushehr-1, but it is interested in Bushehr-2 as well. Argentina emphasizes that all nuclear exports, including any business with Iran, be covered by International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

—Richard Kessler and Mark Hibbs, "Alfonsin Oks Iran Nuclear Deals For Argentine Firms," *Nucleonics Week*, 12 November 1987, pp. 6-7.

#### **17 November 1987**

Iraq attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

#### **19 November 1987**

Iraq attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

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## 1986

### 1986

An Iranian team visits Argentina to discuss the possible involvement of Argentina and Spain in the construction of the Bushehr reactors. West Germany and Argentina will train Iranian technicians to assist in the completion of the work. West Germany will not issue an export license for the remaining 10% of the equipment for the plant (the nuclear steam supply system) until the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Argentina and Iran cooperated on nuclear issues when the Shah was in power, but Argentina is concerned about Iran's finances.

—Ann Maclachlan, "Iran Seeking Way To Finish Bushehr Plant But Bonn Denies Exports," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 October 1986, Vol. 27, No. 44, pp. 4-5; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexisnexis.com](http://www.lexisnexis.com); Richard Kessler, *Nucleonics Week*, 15 May 1986, pp. 3-4; Richard Kessler, *Nucleonics Week*, 11 December 1986, pp. 1-2.

### 1986

Two Argentine companies make "business overtures" to Iran without informing the Argentine Foreign Ministry. The ministry vetoes the deals after it is informed. Part of a January 1986 shipment of at least 3,300lbs of uranium dioxide from Argentina to Algeria is retransferred to Iran, according to Reagan administration officials. Argentina denies the allegation. According to another report, the shipment consists of 6,600lbs of uranium (3 metric tons).

—*Nucleonics Week*, 10 September 1987, pp. 6-7. Leonard S. Spector, *Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986-1987* (Cambridge: Ballinger publishing Co., 1987), pp. 46-47; Richard Kessler, *Nucleonics Week*, 7 May 1987, p. 6.

### January 1986

Investigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP) of Argentina begins negotiations with Iran on the supply of a new core for Iran's U.S.-supplied research reactor in Tehran. [Note: A contract was signed in May 1987 (see 5 May 1987) and later suspended (see 26 January 1992. For other related entries, see 26 September 1988, 22 January 1992, 3 and 7 February 1992, 2 March 1992, April 1992, and 17 November 1992.)]

—*Nuclear Engineering International*, July 1987, pp. 4-5.

### February 1986

Abdul Qadir Khan, Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist, makes a secret visit to Bushehr. Pakistan and Iran sign a secret nuclear cooperation agreement later in the year. < br />—Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya," a Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report, August 1992, p. 41-42.

### 21 February 1986

China's Foreign Ministry announces that notices have been sent to all nations receiving nuclear exports from the People's Republic of China (PRC) to accept safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The announcement stated that nuclear cooperation with France, West Germany, the United States, Brazil, Pakistan, and Japan is limited to peaceful use and that no cooperation agreements exist with Iran. The Chinese spokesman denies the charges from U.S. Senator Alan Cranston that China is exporting nuclear technology to Pakistan, South Africa, and Iran.

—"China's Nuclear Exports, International Safeguards Discussed," *World Wide Report*, 21 February 1986, p. 5.

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### **26 February 1986**

Iran and Iraq say to both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the press that an attack by Iraq against an Iranian nuclear facility is possible.

—Gamini Seneviratne, "USSR Says IAEA Can Hold Safeguards Inspections At Bn-600 Breeder," *Nucleonics Week*, 26 February 1987, p. 13.

### **April 1986**

The Comision Nacional del Energia Atomica (CNEA) of Argentina reviews a proposal by Iran to complete the Bushehr reactors. Although the Argentine government requires that a cooperation agreement between the two countries be in effect before Argentina becomes involved, CNEA is said to be interested in participating.

—Richard Kessler, *Nucleonics Week*, 1 May 1986, p. 7.

### **12 July 1986**

Iraq attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000; "Iran Atomic Energy Agency Head Goes to Bushehr," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 June 1989, [www.lexisnexis.com](http://www.lexisnexis.com).

### **1 September 1986**

France and Iran are near agreement on their dispute over the Eurodif enrichment plant. Iran wants repayment of a \$1 billion loan to France's Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique for Iran's participation in Eurodif. France wants compensation for the enrichment services allotted to Iran. The settlement with France might include French participation in Iran's partially completed Bushehr nuclear units.

—"France and Iran may be nearing agreement," *Nuclear News*, September 1986, p. 90b.

### **30 October 1986**

*Nucleonics Weeks* reports that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) is in a dispute with the West German government over delivery of components for Bushehr nuclear power plant ordered from Kraftwerk Union (KWU) in 1974.

—"Iran Seeking Way to Finish Bushehr Plant But Bonn Denies Exports," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 October 1986, pp. 4-5.

### **November 1986**

Following a request from Iran, Pakistan's president says Pakistan is willing to cooperate with Iran on nuclear matters.

—*Worldwide Report*, 17 February 1987, p. 38; in Saeed Qureshi, *The Muslim* (Islamabad), 23 November 1986, p. 1.

### **December 1986**

Argentina's ENACE (Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Electricas) is acting as a go-between for Brazil and Kraftwerk Union of West Germany, which is attempting to persuade Brazil to do nuclear-related business in Iran, according to "local reports" that are denied by ENACE. [Note: See 3 December 1986, 1991, 1992, and January 1992 for additional information on Brazil's nuclear cooperation with Iran.]

—Richard Kessler, *Nucleonics Week*, 11 December 1986, pp. 1-2.

### **1 December 1986**

The French Finance Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond and Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati agree to terms

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for France to start repaying the \$1 billion loan made by Iran during the Shah's reign to support the Eurodif enrichment project. The Iranians say the Eurodif project owes them some \$500 to \$700 million in interest on top of the loan itself. France claims nearly \$2 billion in losses on the power station contracts and a \$1.3 billion loss of revenue for enrichment services. The French side has agreed to an initial installment on the loan repayment of around \$330 million.

—"France and Iran Have Agreed on Eurodif Repayment," *Nuclear News*, December 1986, pp. 17-18.

### **3 December 1986**

A delegation from the West Germany-Argentina joint venture Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Electricas (ENACE) meets with senior Iranian nuclear and governmental leaders in Teheran. The officials meet about expanding commercial ties beyond an existing contract for ENACE to train nuclear engineers and technicians from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), which will help finish the long-stalled 1293 MW PWR, Bushehr-1. [Note: The 1293MW reactor under construction at Bushehr is also referred to as 1200MWe. See November 1974, May 1987, and March 1993.] West Germany has refused to renew an export license for the shipment to Iran of 7,000 metric tons of major nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) items until the Iran-Iraq War ends. ENACE President Abel Julio Gonzalez denies local industry reports that Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of the FRG is trying to persuade Brazilian nuclear companies to share the risk of doing business in Iran or that ENACE is acting as a go-between towards that end. Officials of Comision Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA) decline to comment on reports that CNEA offered to share nuclear fuel cycle information with Teheran. Teheran threatened to break off economic ties with Bonn unless all the parts for Bushehr-1 that Iran has paid for are shipped. Analysts note that any Bushehr work that vendor KWU could get the ENACE-led group to do, could help it win a contract from CNEA to supply the NSSS for Argentina's fourth nuclear station over competitor Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. (AECL). Argentina is involved with a West German-Spanish consortium that is negotiating a contractual model with the AEOI for completing Bushehr-1.

—Richard Kessler, "Argentine's Hope for Expanded Iran Contracts from Teheran Talks," *Nucleonics Week*, 11 December 1986, pp. 1-2.

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## **1985-1980**

### **Mid-1980s-Early 1990s**

Iran and North Korea begin cooperating on nuclear issues "at a very low level" in the mid-1980s. In the early 1990s, reports surface that the two countries have cooperated in nuclear weapons development. North Korea has assisted Iran in uranium exploration and mining. US Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz says North Korea has no reason to reprocess plutonium, and should accept International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, as required under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, September 1991, pp. 404-411.

### **Mid-1980s**

An estimated 15,000-17,000 Iranian students are sent abroad for nuclear-related training. Some return to teach at Sharif Technical University, which is also established at this time "to serve as a pool of trained technicians for the nuclear weapons program."

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—Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 43.

### **Mid-1980s**

China and Iran sign a secret nuclear cooperation agreement sometime after 1985, according to European officials. [Note: Under the agreement, China trains engineers from the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and supplies nuclear equipment and information on facility design. See 1988-1991 entry.]

—Mark Hibbs, *Nucleonics Week*, 2 May 1991, pp. 17-18; Mark Hibbs and Neel Patri, "U.S. To Ask New Delhi To Back Off On Research Reactor Offer To Iran," *Nucleonics Week*, 21 November 1991, Vol. 32, No. 47, pp. 2-3; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Mark Hibbs, Neel Patri, And Neal Sandler, "U.S., Europe Doubt Israeli Claim Of Iranian Nuclear Weapons Effort," *NuclearFuel*, 25 November 1991, Vol. 16, No. 24, pp. 8-9; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **1985**

China supplies Iran with a subcritical research facility, also referred to as a "training reactor," for the Isfahan nuclear research center. [Note: See 1984 entry on Isfahan. In July 1991, US officials indicate that they are not concerned about China's construction of the facility.]

—Mark Hibbs And Neel Patri, "U.S. To Ask New Delhi To Back Off On Research Reactor Offer To Iran," *Nucleonics Week*, 21 November 1991, Vol. 32, No. 47, pp. 2-3; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "Iran's Nuclear Weapons Program: Iranian Procurement Fronts," *Mednews*, 8 June 1992, p. 3.

### **1985**

The regime in Iran decides to restart its nuclear program, but on a smaller scale than the program begun by the Shah.

—*Al-Watan* (Kuwait), 13 June 1988, p. 1; in *Nuclear Developments*, 13 July 1988, p. 19.

### **12 February 1985**

Iraq attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000; "Iran Atomic Energy Agency Head Goes to Bushehr," BBC, 24 June 1989, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **March 1985**

Iran discovers "high-quality uranium" in the Saghand region of the Yazd province after "several years of exploratory work." Approximately 5,000 tons of uranium are said to be located at the site.

—*Nuclear News*, March 1985, pp. 117-118.

### **1 March 1985**

*Nuclear News* reports that Iran has stopped construction work on nuclear plants being built by West German and French companies.

—"The Iranian Nuclear Energy Establishment," *Nuclear News*, March 1985, pp. 117-118.

### **4 March 1985**

Iraq attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant. [Note: See also 5 March 1985; these entries may refer to the same

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attack.]

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000.

#### **5 March 1985**

Iraq attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

—"Iran Atomic Energy Agency Head Goes to Bushehr," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 June 1989, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **September 1985**

The foreign ministers of Iran, Syria, and Libya say that their countries should develop nuclear weapons to counter the Israeli nuclear threat.

—*Haaretz* (Tel Aviv), 9 September 1985; in Mati Peled, *Worldwide Report*, 9 January 1986, pp. 61-63.

#### **1 October 1985**

A team from Kraftwerk Union visits Bushehr to assess the feasibility of completing at least one of the 1,300MW pressurized water reactor plants. West Germany is reluctant to complete the project as long as the Iran-Iraq War continues, since Bushehr has already been the target of an attack.

—"Bushehr in The Budget," *Nuclear News* October 1985, p. 76.

#### **25 October 1985**

The Chinese Foreign Ministry says there is "no relationship of cooperation between China and Iran," and "as for South Africa, the position of the government is known to all." The statement was issued in reaction to US Senator Alan Cranston's claims that China had assisted those countries in the development of nuclear weapons. Last week, China also denied that it was allowing Pakistan to test an atomic bomb in a remote province. Cranston made these allegations when referring to the US-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement signed in July of 1985. The Ministry said that all cooperation between China and the United States, France, West Germany, Brazil, and Japan was for peaceful purposes. The US State Department claims that China has made no promises to Iran. China denies that there is any nuclear cooperation between the countries. The State Department says Iran visits many countries to discuss nuclear trade.

—Robert Thomson, "China denies nuclear weapons allegations," *The Financial Times*, 25 October 1985, p. 4; Richard Kessler, "Argentine Officials Deny Any Purchases Of Chinese Heavy Water," *Nucleonics Week*, 31 October 1985, Vol. 26, No. 44, p. 5; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); *Fujian Rigao* (Fuzhou), 14 November 1985, p. 4.

#### **November 1985**

The Iranian government runs an advertisement in the foreign edition of *Kayhan* inviting Iranian nuclear scientists living abroad to attend a conference in March 1986. The government offers to pay all expenses for the scientists.

—Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 41.

#### **1 November 1985**

Iran signs an agreement with an unnamed foreign contractor for the construction of a water desalination plant to provide fresh water for use in nuclear plants. The Islamic Republic News Agency on 28 August 1985 reported that this will enable Iran to continue construction on the Bushehr plant which had been interrupted by the revolution in 1979. Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of West Germany was asked in 1984 to resume construction of the Bushehr plant, but it agreed only to carry out a survey to see whether resumption of the work was possible after such a long

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break. KWU said it would not resume construction until after the Iran-Iraq War ended.

—"Iran Pushes on With Nuclear Power Plant" *Nuclear Engineering International*, November 1985, p. 4.

#### **December 1985**

Argentina and Iran sign a nuclear cooperation agreement in which Argentina agrees to supply Iran with 20% enriched uranium (HEU). According to a Brazilian publication, Argentina has been approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency as one of the countries that may sell enriched uranium to Iran. Argentina's nonproliferation directive of 1985 "leaves the door open" for the sale of HEU and "certain uranium enrichment technologies."

—*Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro), 14 June 1987, p. 21; in *Worldwide Report*, 18 August 1987, pp. 62-63; Richard Kessler, "Argentina To Enforce Curbs On Nuclear Trade With Iran," *Nucleonics Week*, 19 March 1987, Vol. 28, No. 12, p. 12; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **1984**

Iran opens a nuclear research center at Isfahan (32.40 N, 51.40 E) with the assistance of China. The site is large with room for expansion. According to European intelligence sources, the site has many buildings, some underground. The site is 4km outside Isfahan, between Shahrída and Fulashans.

—*Nuclear Engineering International*, December 1984, p. 13; Akbar Etemad, "Iran," in *European Non-proliferation Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), Harald Muller, ed., p. 9; "Proliferation: Pulling a Bomb Apart," *The Economist*, 14 March 1992, vol. 322, no. 7750, p. 46.

#### **1984**

Iran may have obtained from Pakistan the knowledge of how to melt uranium. This information is said to have been diverted from Uranit GmbH of Germany to Pakistan via Switzerland.

—Mark Hibbs, "Agencies Trace Some Iraqi Urenco Know-How To Pakistan Re-Export," *Nucleonics Week*, 28 November 1991, Vol. 32, No. 48, p. 1; Neel Patri, "India Says Research Reactor Sale To Iran Is In Preliminary Stages," *Nucleonics Week*, 28 November 1991, Vol. 32, No. 48, p. 8; Mark Hibbs, "Nuclear Commerce At Issues Tehran Leans Westward," *Nuclear Fuel*, 9 December 1991, Vol. 16, No. 25, pp. 11-12.

#### **1984**

China may supply Iran with a research reactor. China has already supplied Iran with a small calutron similar those the Iraqis were using to secretly enrich uranium. There are reports that Pakistani and Chinese experts have set up uranium enrichment centrifuges at Moallem Kalayeh in Iran.

—"Dimona Et Al," *The Economist*, 14 March 1992, p. 46.

#### **1984**

Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of the West Germany indicates that it will complete Iran's Bushehr nuclear plant only if the Iran-Iraq War ends. This comment follows a survey of the plant by KWU. Iran is now demanding that the company complete the plant, since the war is over.

—"Iran Is Demanding That Kwu Finish The Bushehr Plant," *Nuclear News*, November 1990, p. 53.

#### **Early 1984**

Kraftwerk Union (KWU) submits a new bid for work on Bushehr and negotiations begin. KWU spokesman Wolfgang Breyer says the delivery of components is continuing as agreed in the arbitration agreement of 1982. He says most of the 35,000 metric tons of equipment has been shipped and only about 7,000 metric tons of trigger-list components are affected by the September 1984 export license expiration. According to Reza Amrollahi, president

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of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the Bushehr components in storage are the pressure vessel, pressurizers, main coolant pumps and other major NSSS [Nuclear Steam Supply System] items. A German official says that the equivalent of a full core of fuel is in storage in West Germany. Breyer confirms that at AEOI's request, KWU is negotiating with companies from Argentina and Spain for the completion of Bushehr-1 by an international consortium. The Spanish companies are assumed to include those working on the Trillo plant, a 1,157MW KWU PWR under construction near Madrid. The Argentinean company commissioned to work on Bushehr, Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Electricas (ENACE), a subsidiary of Commission Nuclear Energy Argentina (CNEA), operates a KWU heavy water reactor and is building another. [Note: For additional information on ENACE, see also December 1986, 3 December 1986, April 1987, May 1987, and 12 May 1987.]

—"Iran Seeking Way to Finish Bushehr Plant But Bonn Denies Exports," *Neuclonics Week*, 30 October 1986, pp. 4-5.

#### 1984-1986

Saudi Arabia works on plans for defending against the effects of nuclear weapons. Low-cost methods are developed for protection against fusion neutrons. Dr. Sumir Sahin of Turkey is involved in those efforts, and he is also involved in Saudi Arabia's nuclear cooperation with Taiwan.

—Sumer Sahin and Anil Kumar, "The Effect of the Spectrum Softening Within the Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW) on the Biological Dose," *Atomkernenergie Kerntechnik*, 1986, Vol. 45, pp. 117-121; T.A. Al-Kusayer, "Assessment of the Radiation Protection Capability of Desert Sand Against Fusion Neutrons," *Atomkernenergie Kerntechnik*, 1986, Vol. 49, pp. 209-211; A.A. Hasan, S. Sahin, C. Chung, "Yields of Short-Lived Fission Products in <sup>235</sup>U," *Transactions of the American Nuclear Society*, 1985, Vol. 49, pp. 209-211; A.A. Hasan, S. Sahin, C. Chung, "Measurement of the Short Lived Cumulative Fission Yield in U-235," *Radiation Effects*, 1986, Vol. 93, pp. 193-196.

#### February-May 1984

A team of 44 German engineers returns to Iran to do a feasibility study on completing the Bushehr reactors.

—Dominique Leglu, *Liberation* (Paris), 27 April 1984, p. 23.

#### 24 March 1984

Iraq attacks the Bushehr nuclear power plant. [Note: For additional Iraqi attacks on Bushehr, see 12 February 1985, 4 March 1985, 5 March 1985, 12 July 1986, 17 November 1987, 19 November 1987, and 19 July 1988.]

—Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran and Nuclear Weapons: A Working Draft," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 February 2000; "Iran Atomic Energy Agency Head Goes to Bushehr," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 June 1989; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### April 1984

*Jane's Defence Weekly* cites reports from West German intelligence that Iran may have a nuclear bomb within two years. According to a French report, "very enriched uranium" from Pakistan can contribute to this effort. The Germans leaked this news in the first public Western intelligence report of a post-revolutionary nuclear weapons program in Iran.

—Dominique Leglu, *Liberation* (Paris), 29 April 1984, p. 23; Kenneth R. Timmerman, *Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya* (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992), p. 43.

#### Mid-Late 1984

Iran asks Germany to complete the Bushehr reactors.

—*Nuclear Engineering International*, November 1985, p. 4.

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#### **November 1984**

Swedpower of Sweden is asked to evaluate Kraftwerk Union's proposal on completing Bushehr; Swedpower refuses the offer. [Note: See 4 December 1984.]

—*Ny Dag* (Stockholm), 8 November 1984, p. 8; in *Worldwide Report*, 4 December 1984, p. 35.

#### **4 December 1984**

*Ny Dag* reports that Iran contacted Sweden's Swedpower to request help in evaluating a proposal presented by Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of West Germany for the completion of two nuclear plants in Bushehr in southern Iran. After discussion with the Swedish Industry Ministry, Swedpower is forced to reject the Iranian proposal. A Kraftwerk Union spokesman says KWU considers it technically impossible for Iran to build a nuclear bomb. [Note: See November 1984 entry.]

—"Swedish Firm Denies Aid in Recommencing Nuclear Plant Work" *World Net Report*, 4 December 1984, p. 35; *Ny Dag* (Stockholm), 8 November 1984, p. 8.

#### **1982**

The International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration Court rules on Iranian demands to have the components of the nuclear reactors delivered.

—"Iran Seeking Way to Finish Bushehr Plant But Bonn Denies Exports," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 October 1986, pp. 4-5.

#### **1982**

Kraftwerk Union (KWU) engineers are back at the Bushehr site.

—Ann MacLachlan, "Iran Seeking Way To Finish Bushehr Plant But Bonn Denies Exports," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 October 1986, Vol. 27, No. 44, pp. 4-5; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **18 March 1982**

The head of Iran's Nuclear Technology Center in Isfahan says that it will resume importing nuclear technology.

—"Iran to Restudy A-Power," *New York Times*, 18 March 1982, p. A7; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **27 March 1982**

Iranian radio broadcasts a statement by the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran that says an agreement has been reached between Iran and the German company Kraftwerk Union (KWU). KWU will "deliver, at European ports, all [outstanding] equipment and ancillaries, and to pay for packing and transport; to pay DM 15,000,000 (about \$3,400,000) to cover the cost of transport to Iran, to take "upon itself the task of solving its problems with the German state insurance," to give Iran half the fuel at one time, and to "pay all legal costs....If the Majlis [parliament] approved, the power station's No. 1 set would be completed; 70% of the station had already been completed."

—"Iran; Nuclear Power Agreement with FRG Firm," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 April 1982; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **30 March 1982**

The BBC Summary of World Broadcasts reports that Iran's nuclear program consists of three phases: designing and manufacturing a subcritical reactor, a reactor, and a nuclear power station.

—"Iranian Nuclear Programme," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 March 1982; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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### **31 March 1982**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Federal Republic of Germany are involved in arbitration for claims of losses from both sides. A preliminary agreement seems to have been reached that could bring about the resumption of construction of one of the two 1,300MW reactors in Bushehr by the Kraftwerk Union (KWU). This agreement still awaits approval from the relevant Iranian government bodies. The KWU says that one of the two reactors was almost 70% complete before the Islamic Revolution broke out. Klaus Barthelt, the CEO of KWU, speculates that the plant in Bushehr has most likely been damaged by the severe climate of the region.

—Kevin Done, "German Group Nears Deal in Iranian Power Station Dispute," *Financial Times* (London), 31 March 1982, p. 20; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **11 June 1982**

Iran wants the investments it made in 1975 to the nuclear power consortium Eurodif returned from the French Atomic Energy Commission. French Judge Marcel Caratini says he is incapable of ruling on this issue, but says he rejects Eurodif's claim to \$739.4 million in damages because Iran withdrew from the consortium.

—*Wall Street Journal*, 11 June 1982, p. 28; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **16 June 1982**

Iran agrees to have Kraftwerk Union, the German company that began construction on the nuclear power plant in Bushehr, to complete at least one of the two 1,200MW reactors at the site. To explain the change from Ayatollah Khomeini's previous anti-nuclear policies, Iran states that the reason for pursuing nuclear technology is more to gain "native expertise" rather than for energy purposes, since Iran holds "18 percent of the world's gas reserves." [Note: In later years, Iranian officials repeatedly claim Iran needs nuclear reactors for energy.]

—Richard Johns, "Middle East's Uneven Nuclear Progress," *Financial Times* (London), 16 June 1982, p. 28; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **29 June 1982**

Tehran radio reports that the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has said that the French court decision regarding a dispute of frozen investments will help Iran with the Bushehr nuclear project. Thirty-five thousand tons of equipment and half of the required amount of fuel for the reactors will be given to Iran. The Majlis [Iranian Parliament] must decide whether to accept this offer and to continue with the project, the report says.

—"Iranian Nuclear Power Project," BBC World Summary of Broadcasts, 6 July 1982; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **9 September 1982**

The Reagan administration announces that it plans to tighten export controls. The administration names 63 countries to which the transfer of nuclear technology will be put under more scrutiny. Iran is on this list, and sources say that Iran and a few other countries have been included on the list only because of their instability.

—Milton R. Benjamin, "Administration Will List 63 Countries Subject to Nuclear Export Restrictions," *The Washington Post*, 9 September 1982, p. A4; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **1 October 1982**

Indian radio reports that India will send a group of nuclear engineers and scientists to Iran in November. They will inspect the Bushehr nuclear power plant to study the problems.

—"Other Reports; Indian Team to Study Iran's Nuclear Power Problems," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 October 1982; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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**17 October 1982**

The Islamic Republic News Agency reports that work is commencing on the construction of a nuclear power plant. The work is divided into three phases. [Note: See 16 March 1982.] A group of Iranian nuclear scientists at the Nuclear Technology Center in Isfahan is conducting research that should be done in two years. The government is providing the resources and equipment. The second phase consists of building a test reactor, and the third phase consists of building the power plant. Dr. Saidi, the head of the Nuclear Technology Center, says that Iran is working towards the provision of uranium by using the country's resources. He also says that the Nuclear Technology Center was built by a French company for 300,000 million Rials, but that the company was "expropriated" after the Islamic Revolution.

—"Iran; Nuclear Power Project," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 October 1982; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**1981**

Iran seeks 2.1 billion DM in compensation from the German Kraftwerk Union for withdrawing from the nuclear power project in Bushehr. The company in turn seeks 1.8 billion DM for the machinery it has produced but has never delivered because of the cancellation of the contracts.

—Kevin Done, "German Group Nears Deal in Iranian Power Station Dispute," *Financial Times* (London), 31 March 1982, p. 20; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**2 June 1981**

Shiraz Radio quotes the Iranian Prime Minister as saying that nuclear power stations are not economical and that nuclear activity will be restricted to research.

—"Iran and nuclear power," the British Broadcasting Corporation, 2 June 1981; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**7 August 1981**

Iran refuses to let 62 French nationals leave Iran following the refusal of French authorities to refund Iran for its contribution in Eurodif project. There are actually 110 French nationals who have been denied exit of Iran.

—"Iran Won't Allow 62 French Citizens to Leave the Country," *New York Times*, 7 August 1981; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**21 December 1981**

Reza Amrollahi, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announces that huge uranium deposits have been discovered in four locations in Iran.

—"Discovery of Uranium," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 December 1981; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**1980**

Iran decides to restart the construction of its nuclear reactors.

—"Iran Seeking Way to Finish Bushehr Plant But Bonn Denies Exports," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 October 1986, pp. 4-5.

**1980**

Iran and the German company Kraftwerk Union (KWU) begin litigation in Geneva over the compensation of losses both sides claim to have incurred due to KWU's withdrawal from the nuclear power project in Bushehr.

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—Kevin Done, "German Group Nears Deal in Iranian Power Station Dispute," *Financial Times* (London), 31 March 1982, p. 20; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **1980-1983**

Iran asks for India's help in completing the Bushehr reactor after West Germany halts work on the project in 1980.  
—*Nuclear News Buyers Guide*, March 1983, pp. 19-24.

### **19 February 1980**

Andre Giraud, French Industry Minister, says that France will not refund Iran after its withdrawal from the Eurodif consortium.

—*New York Times*, 19 February 1980; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **20 February 1980**

Mr. Qutbzadeh, Iran's foreign minister, says that Iran is withdrawing from Eurodif and expects to receive a refund of the \$1 billion that the former regime put in the Eurodif consortium.

—*The Washington Post*, 20 February 1980; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **March 1980**

A US report quotes an intelligence source who says that Iran's interest in new smaller reactors leads him to believe that it wants to develop nuclear weapons.

—Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 208.

### **12 June 1980**

Ali Reza Nobari, the newly appointed Governor of the Iranian central bank, is leading a delegation to France to resolve differences between the two governments over refunding Iran the \$1 billion it has contributed to the Eurodif project.

—"Delegation in France to Discuss the Eurodif project," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 June 1980; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **September 1980**

West Germany halts construction on Iran's Bushehr PWR, and has refused to resume work on the project despite Iran's request.

—Charles Hoots, "Iran And France Close To End Of Nuclear Dispute, But Not Yet," *Nucleonics Week*, 18 July 1991, pp. 5-6.

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## **1979-1976**

### **Late 1970s**

The United States obtains intelligence data indicating that the Shah has set up a clandestine nuclear weapons development program. Also, according to Akbar Etemad, director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran until October 1978, researchers at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center are involved in laboratory experiments that could have applications for reprocessing spent fuel.

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—Leonard S. Spector, *Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986-1987* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 50-51.

#### 1979

Because of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the United States stops its supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to Iran. Iran cancels its agreement with the Eurodif consortium, demanding full repayment of the \$1 billion loan it provided for the construction of the Tricastin plant. Iran halts payments begun in 1977 for future enrichment services.

—Richard Kessler, "Argentina's Invap To Supply Iran Fuel For Research Reactor," *Nucleonics Week*, 14 May 1987, Vol. 28, No. 20, p. 2; Gamini Seneviratne, *Nuclear Fuel*, 3 October 1988, p. 6; *Nuclear Engineering International*, August 1990, p. 4; *Nuclear News*, February 1991, p. 48; *Nucleonics Week*, 28 February 1991, p. 15; *Nuclear Engineering International*, April 1991, p. 8; Ann Maclachlan, "Eurodif's Balance Sheet Threatened By Iranian Problem," *Nuclear Fuel*, 10 June 1991, Vol. 16, No. 12, pp. 4-5; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### 1979

Iran cancels a deal with the French for the Karun River nuclear power plant at Darkhovin near Ahvaz.

—"Iran To Complete Bushehr Site," *Mednews*, 8 January 1990, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### 1979

Eurodif goes to the arbitration court of the International Chamber of Commerce of Paris with a complaint against the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The court orders a freeze on all Iranian assets in Eurodif.

—"Iranian denunciation of France over Shah's Nuclear Loan," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 August 1982; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### 1979

Approximately one-tenth of the tonnage of plant equipment for the Iranian reactor at Bushehr is shipped from West Germany before the project is halted.

—"Bushehr in The Budget," *Nuclear News*, October 1985, p. 76.

#### 1979

*Nucleonics Week* reports that the West German government will refuse to grant an export license for components for Iran's Bushehr plant. Kraftwerk Union stops construction on the PWRs at Bushehr in 1979 when the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini takes power.

—Mark Hibbs, "German Officials Say Government May Not Let Bushehr Be Finished," *Nucleonics Week*, 7 February 1991, pp. 15-16.

#### 1979

The two Bushehr reactors, both 1,293MW PWRs, are nominally cancelled in 1979 when the Shah leaves Iran.

—"Iran Seeking Way to Finish Bushehr Plant But Bonn Denies Exports," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 October 1986, pp. 4-5.

#### 1979

The *Middle East Economic Review* reports that Iran is seeking to purchase a 30MW research reactor.

—PPNN, *Middle East Economic Review*, 6 July 1990.

#### 1979-1987

Iran secretly purchases uranium from the British-operated mine at Rossing in Namibia, according to *The Observer*

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of London. The paper claims that Iran owns a share of the mine run by Rio Tinto-Zinc of London. South Africa's Atomic Energy Commission says, "in the case of Iran, the NPT safeguards agreement as concluded between Iran and the [IAEA] supplies." [Note: Iran reportedly reached a secret agreement with South Africa in 1976 for the supply of uranium, and sales apparently continued in 1988-1989. See 1988-1989 entry.]

—*Star* (Johannesburg), 21 May 1987, p. 3; in *Worldwide Report*, 13 July 1987, p. 40.

#### **January 1979**

The Shah of Iran is deposed in the Islamic Revolution and Iran's Prime Minister "annuls" its reactor contract with France. [Note: See October 1977 entry on the signing of the contracts.]

—Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 96.

#### **March 1979**

Framatome of France, which had worked without payment since October 1978, pulls out of Iran. Kraftwerk Union recalls its Bushehr staff and lays off most of its Iranian work force.

—Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 96.

#### **10 April 1979**

Iran cancels the construction of two French power plants. The two power plants being built by a West German company are closer to being finished than the French plants, and are supposed to be done on time.

—*Wall Street Journal*, 10 April 1979, p. 5; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **11 April 1979**

Fereydu Sahabi, Iran's Deputy Minister of Energy and Supervisor of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, states that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran is significantly cutting back its activities. He says that the two power stations provided by West Germany for the nuclear facility in Bushehr are half finished and construction will continue. All other nuclear power projects will be cancelled. He says no foreigners will be used in the AEOI's activities and that prospecting and extracting uranium will continue. Iran cancels the order of two nuclear stations from France, though a week earlier it was stated that this order was to be completed.

—"Iran: In Brief; Nuclear energy policy," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 April 1979; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **May 1979**

During the Iranian Revolution, a Khomeini adviser tells energy specialist Dr. Fereydu Fesharaki, "It is your duty to build the atomic bomb for the Islamic Republican Party."

—Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 208.

#### **30 May 1979**

The *Washington Post* reports that Iran is considering the cancellation of its four nuclear power station projects. In attempts to undo the Shah's development plans and to change the country's economic emphases, the head of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) wants to end the construction of the two West German nuclear power stations that are 77% complete. The cancellation is not official yet, but seems likely, judging by statements coming from Fereydu Sahabi, the AEOI's head. Iran had planned to build 20 nuclear power stations by 1994. Two reactors under construction by the West German company Kraftwerk Union at Bushehr are 1,200MW. The two reactors under construction by France on the Karun River at Darkhovin near Ahvaz have already been cancelled. Iran has spent \$3.1 billion on Bushehr, and it appears the project can only be completed with more investments from other

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countries. A study conducted by Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani, a research fellow at the Rockefeller Foundation, states that the actual costs of the Bushehr nuclear power station are around 13.2 billion marks. He also states that Iran's initial plan of 20 reactors would have cost up to three times more than the \$30 billion that Iran had thought. Mansur Ruhi, the Bushehr plant executive, says he feels the country lacks the resources and technology to run such a program, and the program should be stopped. Before the revolution in February, Iran purchased 28,000 tons of uranium that would be of little use if the nuclear program ends. Iranian officials state, however, that they will continue uranium exploration in Iran, as it is something they will be able to market abroad.

—William Branigin, "Iran Set to Scrap \$34 Billion Worth of Civilian Projects," *The Washington Post*, 30 May 1979, p. A22; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **8 June 1979**

Kraftwerk Union, the West German company building the nuclear reactors in Bushehr, halts work because Iran has failed to pay \$450 million.

—John M Geddes, *New York Times*, 8 June 1979, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **12 June 1979**

Fereydun Sahabi, head of the AEOI, says that the contracts for construction of nuclear power plants are being reviewed. Because the Iranian government is refusing to extend work permits to the 200 Germans working on the nuclear power station in Bushehr past 21 June, plans are made to hand the work over to the Iranians. This development makes it unclear whether construction will be able to continue. Completing the reactor is now estimated to cost around 13,000,000 instead of 8,000,000 DM.

—"Iran, W German Nuclear Power Contract," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 June 1979; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **25 June 1979**

The German company Kraftwerk Union (KWU) will hand the Bushehr nuclear power plant over to the Iranians. The project is worth about \$5 billion. It is not finished, but one of the two reactors is reportedly 85% complete.

—"The About-Face In Iran On Nuclear Power Plants," *Business Week*, 25 June 1979, p. 38; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **10 July 1979**

According to Abbas Taj, Iran's Minister of Energy, work is halted at both the Bushehr and Ahvaz nuclear power plants due to the inability to pay the workers.

—"Iran: In Brief; Work Halted On Nuclear Power Stations," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 July 1979; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **19 July 1979**

Fereydun Sahabi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Deputy Energy Minister, says that construction will end completely at the Ahvaz nuclear power plant and that government has not yet decided whether to continue work at the Bushehr plant. Sahabi says that if Iran decides to end all nuclear activities, all agreements having to do with building nuclear plants and supplying fuel will be cancelled. He also says that it is crucial for the country to acquire more knowledge in the nuclear energy field and to achieve self-sufficiency.

—"Iran's Reconsideration of Nuclear Power Policy," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 July 1979; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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### 31 July 1979

The German Siemens subsidiary Kraftwerk Union (KWU) decides to formally end its contract with Iran to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Iran owes the company \$450 million. If Iran pays that amount, KWU says it may consider resuming construction.

—*New York Times*, 1 August 1979, p. 3; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "German Concern Ends A-Contract," *Facts on File World News Digest*, 3 August 1979, p. 586 E2; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### August 1979

Kraftwerk Union (KWU) formally terminates the Bushehr reactor projects. Most reports say that the first reactor is 75-85% complete, the second reactor is 45-70% complete, and 90% of the parts have been shipped. Iran has spent 5.5 billion DM on the project. One report, however, quotes Reza Amrollahi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), as saying that only one-tenth of the total tonnage of equipment has been shipped; another says that 20,000 tons of equipment have been sent, with 7000 tons remaining. [Note: The 11 August 1979 entry refers to Fereidun Sahabi as head of the AEOI.]

—Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 92; *Nuclear News*, October 1985, p. 76; Richard Kessler, "Argentina Has Denied That It Is Studying A Proposal From Iran," *Nucleonics Week*, 1 May 1986, Vol. 27, No. 18, p. 7; Mark Hibbs And Richard Kessler, "Alfonsin Oks Iran Nuclear Deals For Argentine Firms," *Nucleonics Week*, 12 November 1987, Vol. 28, No. 46, p. 6-7; *Keyhan* (London), 19 July 1990, p.4; in *Nuclear Developments*, 20 September 1990, pp. 33-34; Mark Hibbs, "Negotiating With USSR For Supply Of 'Several' PWRs," *Nucleonics Week*, 25 October 1990, Vol. 31, No. 43, pp. 1-2; IRNA (Tehran), 23 September 1990 (in *Nuclear Developments*, 25 October 1990, p. 37); IRNA (Tehran), 4 March 1991 (in *Nuclear Developments*, 19 March 1991), pp. 21-22.

### 11 August 1979

Fereydu Sahabi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, estimates the cost to Iran for the unfinished nuclear reactor in Bushehr to be as much as 5.877 billion DM. Iran demands to receive \$1 billion from West Germany to make up for the losses incurred by the unfinished nuclear power plant in Bushehr. [Note: The August 1979 entry refers to Reza Amrollahi as head of the AEOI.]

—"Iran: In Brief; Cost Of Cancellation Of Bushehr Nuclear Project," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 August 1979; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); *New York Times*, 11 August 1979, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### 24 October 1979

A French court rules Iran cannot sell its 10% stake in Eurodif, which enriches uranium. The court also rules that repayment of a \$1 billion loan made by Iran to Eurodif before the revolution be suspended.

—"Nuclear Stake Frozen," *Facts on File News Digest*, 31 December 1979, p. 976 E2; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### 15 November 1979

The *Washington Post* reports that Iran is considering the cancellation of four nuclear power projects by West Germany.

—Jonathan C. Randal, "Iranian Aide Says Women May Be Freed; Iranian Official Says Seven U.S. Women May Be Released; Shift in Attitude Follows Reports of Maltreatment," *Washington Post*, 15 November 1979, p. A1; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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### **Post-1979**

After the Iranian revolution in 1979, Iran refuses to accept shipment of Eerkens' lasers. The sale was approved by the US government. [Note: See 1976 entry.]

—Herbert Krosney "Chapter 2; 1975: Nuclear Dawn," *Deadly Business* (New York: Four Walls Eight)

### **1978**

The US Department of Energy (DOE) grants Jeffrey Eerkens a license to sell four lasers to Iran. The lasers are shipped in October 1978. Although Eerkens' application states that the lasers will be used for laboratory plasma research, they can be modified to enrich uranium. DOE approves the sale because it has doubts about the viability of the process. [Note: Eerkens visited Iran in 1976. See 1976 entry. After shipping the lasers, he reports that based on subsequent research, the design he supplied is "unworkable as a means for enriching uranium."

—Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 205.

### **January 1978**

US President Jimmy Carter and the Shah resolve the major outstanding issues involved in reaching a new bilateral agreement for nuclear cooperation. Iran agrees to accept extra safeguards beyond International Atomic Energy Agency requirements, and the United States agrees to grant Iran "most favored nation" status for reprocessing so that Iran would not be discriminated against when seeking permission to reprocess US-origin fuel. The two countries began negotiating a new agreement in 1975, as an agreement was required for the sale of light water reactors (LWRs) and fuel to Iran. [Note: The negotiations fail to reach conclusion before the Shah was overthrown in 1979.]

—*Nucleonics Week*, 12 January 1978, pp. 2-3; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World*, (George Allen & Unwin: London), 1982, p. 88.

### **1 January 1978**

US President Jimmy Carter and the Shah of Iran agree on a plan for Iran to purchase between six and eight light water nuclear reactors from the United States, pending approval by the US Congress.

—"Carter will meet Sadat to Discuss Talks on the Mideast; Carter will visit Sadat to Discuss Mideast Diplomacy," *The Washington Post*, 1 January 1978; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **10-11 July 1978**

The United States and Iran initial the US-Iran nuclear agreement. The minutes of a meeting at the US embassy in Iran say that the "main problem of reprocessing has been worked out, thanks in large measure to Ambassador Sullivan's suggestions of five weeks ago." [Note: The memorandum of 20 October 1978 says this took place on 10 July while the "Country Team Minutes" of 12 July 1978 say this took place 11 July.]

—"Iran: The US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement," Department of State Memorandum, 20 October 1978; in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com); "Country Team Minutes," 12 July 1978; in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

### **12 July 1978**

The United States and Iran are still negotiating details of language for the bilateral nuclear agreement between the two countries.

—"Country Team Minutes," 12 July 1978, in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

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### **23 August 1978**

The US Ambassador to Iran reports in an embassy meeting that the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission is split 2-2 on the US-Iran bilateral nuclear accord and that this might attract attention to the issue before it reaches Congress. He further says that after speaking to a number of key legislators that he foresees no problems, except that this issue might shed some unfavorable light on Iran. Another embassy official says that Iran made changes to the Persian text of the bilateral nuclear agreement, and says that the government of Iran hopes to sign the accord by 10 September.

—"Country Team Minutes," 27 August 1978, in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

### **October 1978**

Facing internal criticism of the nuclear power program and financial difficulties, the Shah postpones the purchase of four additional reactors from Kraftwerk Union (KWU). Akbar Etemad, director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, resigns amid allegations of mismanagement and embezzlement. Former AEOI Vice President Dr. Ahmad Sofudehnia replaces Etemad. He states that "there will be some place for atomic energy, but whether it will be 23,000MWe, I cannot say." [Note: A letter of intent for the four reactors was signed in November 1977. Work on the first two KWU reactors reportedly will continue.]

—*Energy Daily*, 13 October 1978, p. 1; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (George Allen & Unwin: London, 1982), p. 96; *Nucleonics Week*, 26 October 1978, pp. 13-14; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (George Allen & Unwin: London, 1982), p. 96.

### **11 October 1978**

*The Wall Street Journal* reports Iran will suspend its extensive nuclear purchase program to face an increase in social spending.

—*The Wall Street Journal*, 11 October 1978; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **17 October 1978**

A secret US Department of State telegram from the American embassy in Iran to the Secretary of State says now is not a good time to conclude bilateral nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran because the unstable political situations in Iran and a reorganization of Iranian bureaucracy has halted all proceedings. The Shah told the American ambassador, according to the telegram, that only the nuclear plants that are already under construction by the French and German companies, Bushehr and Darkhovin, will continue at this time. Because no US nuclear sales are likely to take place soon, the document says, there is no rush resolve outstanding issues in the agreement. The telegram says the situation is confused by the replacement of Dr. Etemad by Dr. Sofudehnia as head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the absorption of the AEOI into the Ministry of Energy, the investigations of AEOI officials for corruption, and a reassessment of Iran's energy needs. [Note: See October 1978 for more on the change in control of the AEOI. See 29 June 1982, 1 September 1986, February 1987, and 9 November 1989 for additional information on France's role in the construction of Bushehr.]

—"US-Iranian Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement," Secret Telegram, 17 October 1978, in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

### **18 October 1978**

Secretary of Energy James R. Schlesinger signs a memorandum forwarding the US-Iran nuclear agreement to the President for his approval before it can be formally signed and sent to Congress for 60 days' consideration.

—"Iran: The US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement," Department of State Memorandum, 20 October 1978, in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

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### **20 October 1978**

A confidential US State Department document says that the United States is encouraged by Iran's efforts to expand its non-oil energy base, and is hopeful that the US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement will be concluded soon and that American companies will be able to play a role in Iran's nuclear energy projects. The Agreement, initialed on 10 July, is to govern the export and transfer of equipment and material pertaining to Iran's nuclear energy program. A key issue in the negotiations, according to the document, was how the United States would approve of what to do with spent fuel while Iran wants "non-discriminatory treatment in this regard." The agreement was sent to the President of the United States for approval before its transmission to Congress for 60 days' consideration. The US-Iran bilateral accord is the first nuclear cooperation agreement submitted to the Congress under the Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

—"Iran: The US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement," Department of State Memorandum, 20 October 1978, in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

### **1977**

Iran agrees to pay 943 million French francs (approximately \$180 million) for future uranium enrichment services from the Eurodif consortium's Tricastin plant. [Note: Only 350 million francs are paid before the deal is cancelled in 1979; *NuclearFuel* reports that the 1977 loan was for the construction of Eurodif's Georges Besse plant at Tricastin. In 1974, Iran received a loan for the construction of the plant. See relevant entries.

—"Arbitrators Favor Iran in Part of Eurodif Fight," *Nuclear News*, February 1991, p. 48; "France," *Nucleonics Week*, 28 February 1991, Vol. 32, No. 9, p. 15; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); *Nuclear Engineering International*, April 1991, p. 8; Ann MacLachlan, "Eurodif's Balance Sheet Threatened by Iranian Problem," *NuclearFuel*, 10 June 1991, pp. 4-5; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **12 April 1977**

The United States and Iran sign an agreement to exchange nuclear technology and cooperate in nuclear safety.

—New York Times, 12 April 1977, in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **2 May 1977**

Jean-Pierre Foucarde, French equipment minister, arrives in Tehran to negotiate the purchase by Iran of six nuclear reactors at a value of \$7 billion.

—The Washington Post, 2 May 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **13 May 1977**

France agrees to build in Iran two 900,000kW [900MW] nuclear power generators worth \$2 billion. The plants will be built in the town of Darkhovin on the Karun river, near the Iranian city of Ahvaz. France says it is ready to build eight additional nuclear plants if the United States withdraws from a deal to build eight plants for \$16 billion.

[Note: See 16 June 1977.]

—The Wall Street Journal, 13 May 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **13 May 1977**

The nuclear reactors under construction in Germany for Bushehr are 30% complete.

—The Wall Street Journal, 13 May 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **16 June 1977**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran grants \$2 billion to Framatome, Spie-Batignolles and Alsthom-Atlantic for the construction of two nuclear power plants on the Karun river banks at Darkhovin. The plant will generate

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930,000KW each. [Note: See 13 May 1977.]

—The Wall Street Journal, 16 June 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **9 August 1977**

The United States and Iran resume talks about multi-billion-dollar nuclear cooperation. Iran states that it has no intention of constructing a reprocessing facility.

—"US, Iran Resume Atom Power Talks," The Washington Post, 9 August 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **13 September 1977**

France agrees to sell Iran two nuclear reactors and to train 350 Iranian technicians. Creusot Loire SA and its subsidiary Framatome will provide boilers and core of nuclear reactors worth \$800 million. Alstom-Atlantic will provide turbo generators worth \$600 million. Spie-Batignolles SA will provide engineering work at a value of \$800 million. Cogema will provide \$700 of enriched uranium fuel.

—The Wall Street Journal, 13 September 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **October 1977**

After a delay of more than three years, France and Iran finalize the deal for two French reactors to be built at Darkhovin, near the city of Ahvaz, in south-west Iran. Separate contracts cover the reactors, the financing terms, the fuel, and the control of spent fuel. [Note: See also June 1974, November 1974, and October 1996 entries on this agreement. The project is abandoned after the Shah is deposed. See January 1979 and March 1979 entries.]

—Nucleonics Week, 20 October 1977, pp. 13-14; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World*, (George Allen & Unwin: London), 1982, p. 92.

### **3 October 1977**

The Iranian news agency reports that Iran and Austria will cooperate in nuclear waste storing.

—The Washington Post, 3 October 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### **November 1977**

Iran signs a "'qualified' letter of intent" to purchase four additional 1,200MWe pressurized water reactors worth \$5 billion from Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of West Germany.

—Nucleonics Week, 17 November 1977, pp. 2-3; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World*, (George Allen & Unwin: London), 1982, p. 90.

### **8 November 1977**

A US State Department memorandum suggests that President Carter discuss the proposed nuclear bilateral agreement with Iran at the upcoming meeting with the Shah.

—Cyrus Vance, "Visit of the Shah and Shahbanou," Department of State Memorandum, 8 November 1977, in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

### **11 November 1977**

Iran and Kraftwerk Union AG, a subsidiary of Siemens AG of West German, a letter of intent to build four nuclear reactors in Iran. Two of these reactors will be built near the Indus area of Isfahan, and the other two will be built between Isfahan and Lake Reza'iyyah (modern-day Lake Urm'iyyah) on the Iranian-Turkish border.

—The Wall Street Journal, 11 November 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

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**1 December 1977**

The West German Cabinet gives Kraftwerk Union AG the authorization to build four nuclear reactors in Iran at price of \$4.8 billion.

—The Wall Street Journal, 1 December 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

**1976**

Iran expresses interest in acquiring uranium enrichment technology. In a discussion of Iranian investment schemes in nuclear technology during the 1970s, Krosney notes that in 1976 Iran agreed to buy "an experimental laser system" potentially capable of enriching uranium. Iran bought four gas lasers from the US company Lischem and agreed to finance further research in this area by Lischem head Jeff Eerkens. Commenting on the sale, US Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear export division head James Kratz said, "We are reasonably confident that it is not a viable process for uranium...We checked with our technical experts and they had no problem with it."

—Richard Kessler, "Argentina's Invap to Supply Iran Fuel for Research Reactor," *Nucleonics Week*, 14 May 1987, p. 2; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); Herbert Krosney "Chapter 2, 1975: Nuclear Dawn," *Deadly Business* (New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993), pp. 11-30.

**1976**

South Africa agrees to supply \$700 million of yellowcake to Iran in return for Iran helping to finance an enrichment plant in South Africa. According to the US State Department, an official with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran confirms, despite public denial, that a secret agreement was reached for Iran to purchase uranium, which may have originated in Namibia. Independent sources are unable to verify the delivery of the material. [Note: A 1987 report on Iran's secret purchase of uranium from a mine in Namibia is likely the secret deal referred to in this entry, which apparently was continued under Khomeini. See 1979-1987 entry. Later Western intelligence reports indicate that South Africa delivered large amounts of uranium to Iran in 1988-1989. See 1988-1989 entry.]

—Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, *Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 1989-1990* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p.205.

**1976**

Kraftwerk Union of West Germany wins a contract to construct nuclear plants in Iran and assigns an order for eight steam generators from Ansaldo of Italy for shipment to Iran. [Note: The contract is later cancelled by the Khomeini government, but four of the generators were paid for. Demonstrations at the Ansaldo plant halts shipment of two of the steam generators to Iran. Ansaldo sources note that neither KWU, Ansaldo, nor other subcontractors have any intention of working at the site to install or startup equipment.]

—"Italy: Referendum Approval Uncertain," *Nucleonics Week*, 29 October 1987, p. 13.

**1976**

Jeffrey Eerkens, a scientist working on classified US uranium-enrichment projects, travels to Iran to discuss funding for a specialized laser enrichment process he has developed. Before going to Iran, Eerkens requests the approval of the Energy Research and Development Administration, which objects to his visit. [Note: In 1978, Eerkens is granted a license to ship four lasers to Iran. See 1978.]

—Leonard S. Spector, *Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1986-1987* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 46-47.

**Mid-1976**

Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of West Germany signs a contract with Iran for work on the Bushehr reactors. The Italian company Ansaldo is included in the contract as the steam generator supplier. [Note: Agreement for this sale was

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reached in November 1974. KWU began work on the plant in August 1975. Work was later halted on the reactors in March 1979. The order for the generators is placed with Breda Termomeccanica (later acquired by Ansaldo). The shipment of the steam generators is halted by an embargo during the Iran-Iraq War, and on 11 November 1993, Italian Customs seizes the generators. See relevant entries.]

—Nucleonics Week, 8 July 1976, pp. 4-5; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (George Allen & Unwin: London, 1982), p. 89; "Demonstrators Protest Iran Shipment," *Nucleonics Week*, 29 October 1987, p. 13.

#### **May 1976**

The United States supplies 226kg of depleted uranium to Iran for aircraft wing ballast.

—"US Supplied Nuclear material to Iran," 29 January 1980, in Digital National Security Archive [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

#### **1 July 1976**

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) signs an agreement with Kraftwerk Union of West Germany for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant at a cost of 7.8 billion DM, 5.8 billion of which Iran has already paid. The agreement stipulates that Kraftwerk Union will construct two pressurized light water units 18km southwest of Bushehr. Both units will have outputs of 3,765MWt, or 1,296MW. The AEOI signs additional agreements with KWU for the supply of 200,000 cubic meters of pure water and the required fuel for the Iranian plant.

—"Russia Helps Build Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant," in FBIS Document FBIS-NES-94-079, 25 April 1994, p. 82.

#### **August 1976**

Talks between Iran and the United States on nuclear cooperation are suspended after disagreement on safeguards.

—"US, Iran Resume Atom Power Talks," *The Washington Post*, 9 August 1977; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

#### **October 1976**

French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing establishes an agreement for Iran to purchase two French reactors immediately and six more eventually. [Note: Although Iran and France reached a preliminary agreement for two reactors in June 1974, Iran faces difficulties in negotiating acceptable financing and pricing for the reactors. According to one source, a final agreement is not reached until October 1977. A different source, however, asserts that an agreement is made in November 1974. See relevant entries.]

—Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 91.

#### **October 1975-September 1976**

The budget for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran is increased from \$30.8 million in fiscal year 1975 to more than \$1 billion for fiscal year 1976.

—United States Energy Research and Development Administration, "Iran: Atomic Energy Programme," October 1976, p. 3.

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## **1975-1970**

1975

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According to US specialist George Quester, Iran's Atomic Energy Commission currently has a staff of approximately 150 individuals trained in nuclear physics, with more than half of the Commission's foreign staff coming from Argentina. A high-level Iranian official says British and American nuclear energy advisors are also being brought into Iran, and implies that Iran also receives advisors from India. Iran is sending 100 students abroad for advanced training in nuclear science, and it plans to send 300 students in 1976 to West Germany, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.

—George Quester, "The Shaw and the Bomb" (unpublished paper, 1975), and a private interview conducted in February 1975; in Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 199.

### 1975

Iran's delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference reaffirms his country's opposition to nuclear weapons development. The Shah of Iran claims that the prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons is "ridiculous" considering the arsenals held by the United States and Soviet Union.

—Ernest W. Lefever, *Nuclear Arms in the Third World* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 52.

### 1975

US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Iranian Finance Minister Hushang Ansari sign a broad trade agreement that calls for the purchase of eight reactors valued at \$6.4 billion. The US Atomic Energy Commission agrees to supply Iran with fuel for two 1,200MWe light water reactors and signs a provisional agreement to supply fuel for as many as six additional reactors with a total power capacity of 8,000MWe. The fuel agreements, however, are both subject to US governmental approval.

—*The Times* (London); in Poneman p. 87 and Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 190.

### January 1975

The chairmen of the member-states of the Atomic Energy Commissions of the Regional Cooperation for Development (Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey) meet to discuss "ground rules for a joint atomic energy organization."

—Irfan Parviz, "Regional Atom Chiefs in Talks on Three-Country Organization," *Tehran Journal*, 27 January 1975; in Cahn, p. 193.

### February 1975

Iran and India sign a nuclear cooperation agreement.

—US Department of State, "Atoms for Peace Agreement with Iran," *Department of State Bulletin* 36 (15 April 1957), p. 629.

### February 1975

The Shah of Iran says his country has "no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons but if small states began building them, then Iran might have to reconsider its policy."

—*Der Spiegel*, 8 February 1975; in Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 199.

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### **8 February 1975**

A State Department memorandum to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on the meetings of the US-Iran Joint Commission says Iran is interested in at least four dual-purpose nuclear power and desalination plants, worth about \$1 billion each, which could be contracted to US companies. The memo says French and German companies won four projects by agreeing to provide them as "super-turnkey" projects.

—Charles W. Robinson, "Major Economic Cooperation Projects with Iran," Confidential Memorandum, 8 February 1975, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

### **March 1975**

The Iranians push for reprocessing facilities to be located in Iran. The United States and Iran continue discussions on the issue.

—Leslie H. Gelb, "U.S. Nuclear Deal with Iran Delayed," *The New York Times*, 8 March 1975, p. 2.

### **3-4 March 1975**

The US-Iran Joint Commission meets in Washington, DC. The State Department reports that the two sides make progress in negotiating the agreement on cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy, which would provide for the exchange of peaceful nuclear information and the transfer of nuclear equipment and enriched uranium. Iran says it will award contracts to US firms for nuclear power and desalination plants of up to 8,000MW. Iran says it is prepared to invest \$2.75 billion in a private enrichment plant in the United States.

—"Current Foreign Relations: US-Iran Commission cements bilateral ties; Iraq and Iran agree to settle differences," Secret Report [State], 12 March 1975, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

### **27 March 1975**

US Energy Research and Development Administration officials rank several countries in descending order of their likelihood to seek nuclear weapons development: India, Taiwan, South Korea, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Iran [least likely].

—M. Gordon Jones, "Discussion of Pakistan's Nuclear Program," Confidential Letter, 1 April 1975, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

### **9 May 1975**

A US State Department briefing memorandum to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger says that the outstanding issue in the US-Iranian nuclear accord is whether to allow Iran to reprocess US-supplied plutonium. The memo says Iran likes the idea of a multinational reprocessing plant but wants US agreement to allow Iran to reprocess US fuel if Iran makes a "good faith" effort to establish a multinational reprocessing plant. The US position, as approved by the President, the memo says, is to limit the risk of nuclear proliferation by requiring that a multinational plant be realized before Iran is authorized to reprocess US fuel.

—Sidney Sober, "Your Meeting with the Shah at Blair House," Confidential Briefing Memorandum, 9 May 1975, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

### **7 July 1975**

A US State Department memorandum says Pakistan expects to recover 50% of the cost of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant's cost from reprocessing Iran and Japan's spent fuel.

—Teresita Schaffer, "Status of Pakistan's Reprocessing Plant," Limited Official Use Memorandum, 7 July 1976, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

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### August 1975

A German team from Kraftwerk Union (KWU) begins work on the Bushehr reactors on the basis of a letter of intent. [Note: An agreement for the supply of two reactors was reached in November 1974, but no contract is signed until mid-1976. See relevant entries.]

—Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 89.

### Mid-1970s

Denmark supplies Iran with 10kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 25kg of natural uranium for research reactor fuel. [Note: After Iraqi bomb attacks on Iran's Bushehr reactors in November 1987, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirms that Iran had moved a small amount of research reactor fuel to the site in hopes of heading off an attack. One source indicates the fuel was supplied by Denmark.]

—Mark Hibbs, "Bushehr Construction Now Remote After Three Iraqi Air Strikes," *Nucleonics Week*, 26 November 1987, pp. 5-6.

### 1974

Iran makes a \$1 billion loan to Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA) to build a uranium enrichment plant at Tricastin, France for the Eurodif consortium. In return, Iran will receive a 10% stake in the plant and may increase its share to 15% in later years. Iran asks for French assistance in uranium prospecting. [Note: In 1977 Iran agrees to make an additional payment for future uranium enrichment services from Eurodif. See 1977. Iran cancels its agreements with Eurodif during the Islamic Revolution in 1979. See relevant entry.]

—Ali Reza Jahan-Shahi, "Iran and France to Jointly Build Uranium Plant," *Tehran Journal*, 5 January 1975; in Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 190.; Clyde H. Farnsworth, "France Gives Iran Stake in Uranium," *New York Times*, 4 January 1975; in Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 190; "France and Iran Talk Over Loan" *Nuclear Engineering International*, August 1990, p. 4.

### March 1974

The Shah announces that Iran intends to generate 23,000MWe at nuclear power plants "as soon as possible," with an initial target date of 1994. The Shah establishes the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), with the Swiss-trained nuclear physicist Dr. Akbar Etemad as its chairman, and announces that it will be run under his direct supervision. The AEOI's budget for fiscal year 1975 is set at \$30.8 million.

—*Kayhan International*, 3 August 1974, p. 4; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 86, 92; *Tehran Journal*, 18 March 1974, p. 2; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982). Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 189; Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 86.

### 1 April 1974

The US Secretary of State tells the US ambassador to Iran that the United States is prepared to explore possibilities of cooperation with Iran and that the Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission is prepared to go to Tehran with a group of experts to explore the best avenues for cooperation with Iran in the field of nuclear energy.

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—"Issues and Talking Points: Intensified Bilateral Cooperation," Department of State Briefing Paper, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

#### **11 April 1974**

A US State Department telegram says the United States considers cooperation with Iran in the field of nuclear energy as an alternative means for energy production to be a suitable area for joint collaboration and cooperation. The Secretary of State suggests for this to be the first working group for the US-Iran joint economic commission. The United States also prepares the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission with a team of experts to visit Tehran to discuss the most useful ways in which the two countries could cooperate.

—"US-Iran Cooperation," Department of State Telegram, 11 April 1974, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

#### **May 1974**

During a trip to Iran, US Atomic Energy Commission chairperson Dr. Dixie Lee Ray mentions the possibility of establishing regional enrichment and reprocessing facilities for the Middle East. [Note: In March 1975, Iran suggests that a reprocessing facility be located in Iran. See March 1975.]

—Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 190.

#### **May 1974**

Following an official visit to Tehran by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Iran and India issue a communication stating that contacts will be made "between the atomic energy organizations in the two countries in order to establish a basis for cooperation in this field."

—"Full Text of Iran-India Joint Communique," *Iran Almanac* (Tehran: The Echo of Iran, 1974), p. 176; Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 193.

#### **May 1974**

Rear Admiral Oscar Armando Quihillat, the former president of Argentina's Atomic Energy Commission, visits Tehran and provides Iran with advice on nuclear energy.

—James F. Clarity, "Iran Negotiates for Nuclear Energy Aid," *New York Times*, 27 May 1974; in Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 193.

#### **15 May 1974**

Iran's safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) enters into force.

—*The Annual Report for 1992*, International Atomic Energy Agency, Document GC(XXXVII)1060, July 1993, p. 140; Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 187.

#### **30 May 1974**

The visit by the United States Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Dixie Ray, lays the ground work for collaboration, and assures Iran of US intentions with regard to cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.

—"Summary of Developments in Secretary's Absence," 30 May 1974, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

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#### June 1974

The Shah of Iran says that Iran will have nuclear weapons, "without a doubt and sooner than one would think." The statement is denied by Iran's embassy in France, and the Shah later backs off the statement, reaffirming that "not only Iran, but also other nations in the region should refrain from planning to gain atomic arsenals."

—John K. Cooley, "More Fingers on Nuclear Trigger?," *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 June 1974; in Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 199; "The Shah Meets the Press," *Kayhan International*, 5 October 1974; in Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 199.

#### June 1974

Atomic Energy Organization of Iran Chairman Akbar Etemad and the Shah travel to Paris, where France and Iran ratify a preliminary agreement for France to supply five 1,000MWe reactors, uranium, and a nuclear research center to Iran. [Note: According to Poneman, a final agreement for construction of two initial units, to be built at the town of Darkhovin, on the river Karun, is not reached until October 1977, following an October 1976 agreement. However, Cahn indicates that an agreement for two reactors is reached in November 1974. See relevant entries. Apparently no progress is made on the supply of a research center; no location is mentioned.]

—*Kayhan International*, 29 June 1974, p. 1; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 88.

#### June 1974

The United States and Iran reach a provisional agreement for the United States to supply two nuclear power reactors and enriched uranium fuel. [Note: A broader agreement is reached the following year. See 1975 entry.]

—*Kayhan International*, 29 June 1974, p. 1; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 87.

#### October 1974

Several sources report that Iran has expressed interest in purchasing uranium from Australia on a regular basis.

—"Iran is Interested in Uranium—Whitlam," *Kayhan International*, 5 October 1974; in Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 190.

#### 20 October 1974

A State Department document says the United States and Iran are preparing to negotiate an agreement that would permit the sale of nuclear reactors as well as enriched fuel "at levels desired by the Shah." The administration is also awaiting Atomic Energy Commission's approval to present Iran with a draft of a nuclear cooperation agreement. [The United States also notifies the Shah of their support for Iran's proposal to buy up to 25% interest in a commercial uranium enrichment plant.]

—Alfred L. Atherton, "Strategy for your visit to Iran," Confidential Department of State Briefing Memorandum, 20 October 1974, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

#### November 1974

Iran signs agreements to purchase two 1200MWe pressurized water reactors (PWRs) from the German firm Kraftwerk Union (KWU) to be installed at Bushehr and two 900 MWe reactors from Framatome of France to be installed at Bandar-e Abbas. Under the contracts, France and Germany will provide enriched uranium for the initial

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loading and ten years' worth of reloads. The plants are to be provided on a "super turnkey" basis, with the foreign companies supplying both nuclear facilities and supporting infrastructure. The French reactors are to be built under license from Westinghouse of the United States. [Note: Preliminary agreement for the French reactors was reached in June 1974; Poneman says further agreement is reached in October 1976 and the deal is not finalized until October 1977. See relevant entries. The 1200MWe reactors are sometimes referred to as 1293MW. See 3 Decmeber 1996 and 6 March 1990.]

—Ann Maclachlan, "Iran Seeking Way To Finish Bushehr Plant But Bonn Denies Exports," *Nucleonics Week*, 30 October 1986, Vol. 27, No. 44, pp. 4-5; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com); "Iran into Uranium in Big Way—Etemad," *Kayhan International*, 30 November 1974; in Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 189-191.

### 3 November 1974

The United States and Iran agree to form a US-Iran Joint Commission intended to strengthen ties between the two countries various fields, and particularly that of nuclear energy and power generation, for which an agreement is under discussion. In the meantime, provisional contracts have been signed for the United States to provide enriched fuel for eight power reactors, whose construction is under discussion between Iran and American firms. Both sides have agreed to discourage further national development of nuclear weapons capabilities as per the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which both countries are signatories.

—"US-Iran Joint Statement," Unclassified Briefing Paper, 3 November 1974, in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

### 7 November 1974

A US State Department document says nuclear cooperation between Iran and the United States is the centerpiece of the US-Iran Commission, per the wishes of the Shah. The document suggests that the efforts for nuclear energy should be headed by the US Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), whose head should be an unofficial member of the Joint Commission.

—Robert S. Ingersoll, "US-Iran Joint Commission," Secret Briefing Memorandum, 7 November 1974, in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

### 1973-1976

Argentina, with the Peronist party in power, conducts "shady nuclear trade" with Iran. [Note: No details are provided, but this could possibly include the supply of advice on nuclear energy provided in May 1974. See May 1974.]

—Richard Kessler, "Argentina to Continue Seeking Nuclear Sales to Middle East," *Nucleonics Week*, 27 April 1989, p. 11; in Lexis-Nexis, [www.lexis-nexis.com](http://www.lexis-nexis.com).

### December 1972

The Iranian government announces that it intends to obtain nuclear power plants within the next ten years, and Iran's Ministry of Water and Power begins to study the possibility of constructing a nuclear power plant in southern Iran.

—"Nuclear Plant Study Started," *Kayhan International*, 19 December 1972; in Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 189.

### 2 February 1970

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Iran ratifies the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

—*The Annual Report for 1992*, International Atomic Energy Agency, Document GC (XXXVII) 1060, July 1993, p. 140.

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## 1960-1957

### March 1969

Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique (CEA) of France agrees to repair the research reactor in Tehran.

—James F. Keeley, ed., *Listing of Bilateral Civilian Nuclear Co-operation Agreements*, Strategic Studies Program of the University of Calgary.

### 13 March 1969

The White House approves the amendments to the Iran-United States Agreement for Cooperation concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy of 1957, which prolongs the agreement for 10 years.

—"Proposed Agreement for Cooperation between the US Government and the Government of Iran concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy," Memorandum, 13 March 1969, in Digital National Security Archive, [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

### 1 July 1968

Iran signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the day it is opened for signature.

—Anne Hessing Cahn, "Determinants of the Nuclear Option: The Case of Iran," *Nuclear Proliferation in the Near-Nuclear Countries* (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975), Onkar Marwah and Ann Shulz, eds., p. 186.

### September 1967

The United States supplies 5.545kg of enriched uranium, of which 5.165kg contain fissile isotopes, to Iran for fuel in a research reactor. The United States also supplies 112g of plutonium, of which 104g are fissile isotopes, for use as "start-up sources for research reactor."

—"US Supplied Nuclear material to Iran," 29 January 1980; in Digital National Security Archive [nsarchive.chadwyck.com](http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com).

### November 1967

The 5MWt pool-type, water-moderated research reactor supplied to Iran by GA Technologies of the United States goes critical, using 5.585kg of 93% enriched uranium supplied by the United Nuclear Corporation to the United States. [Note: The United States halted the supply of highly enriched uranium fuel loads for the reactor in 1979 due to the Islamic Revolution. See relevant entry.]

—Richard Kessler, "Argentina Offers Research Reactor Upgrade and New Unit for Iran," *Nucleonics Week*, 22 January 1987, p. 4; Samini Seneviratne, "IAEA Approves Argentine Fuel for Tehran Research Reactor," *NuclearFuel*, 3 October 1988, p. 13; Warren H. Donnelly and Zachary S. Davis, "Iran's Nuclear Activities and the Congressional Response," CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 20 May 1992.

### 11 February 1961

The US Department of State disagrees with the Joint Chiefs of Staff's suggestion to place nuclear weapons in Iran as part of US policy toward Iran.

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—George A. Morgan, "Iran- The Current Internal Political Situation in Iran," Secret Internal Paper, 11 February 1988, in Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.

### 1960

Iran arranges to purchase a 5MW research center at Tehran University.

—Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 84.

### 1960s

While the United States is supplying a research reactor, it also sells Iran many hot cells. [Note: The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists describes hot cells as "heavily shielded rooms with remotely operated arms used to chemically separate material irradiated in the research reactor, possibly including plutonium laden 'targets'."]

—David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Washington, DC), January 1995, www.bullatomsci.org, accessed 7 July 2002; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "Spotlight Shifts to Iran," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1992, pp. 9-11.

### 1959

The Shah orders the establishment of a nuclear research center at Tehran University.

—Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 84.

### 1957

The Institute of Nuclear Science, under the auspices of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), moves from Baghdad to Tehran, and the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, takes a personal interest in nuclear energy.

—His Imperial Majesty Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi Shahanshah of Iran, *Mission for My Country* (London: Hutchinson, 1961), pp. 307-308.

### 1957

The United States and Iran sign a civil nuclear cooperation agreement as part of the US Atoms for Peace program. The agreement, which provides for technical assistance and the lease of several kilograms of enriched uranium, also calls for cooperation on research on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

—US Department of State, "Atoms for Peace Agreement with Iran," *Department of State Bulletin 36* (15 April 1957), p. 629; in Daniel Poneman, *Nuclear Power in the Developing World* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 84.

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