01/23/10

By 21 December Peiper had decided to withdraw all his forces to the immediate area of La Gleize.  His only possible course of action was to defend his position with ever dwindling hopes of relief from his division.  The American pincers continued to close on the kampfgruppe: the 30th Infantry Division hammered away from the west, the 3rd Armored Division approached from the north and northeast, and the 82nd Airborne Division attacked Peiper from the southwest.  With increasing fury the Americans brought the power of their artillery to bear.  Most of the 105mm guns of the 30th Infantry Division’s artillery group bombarded Peiper 21-22 December, along with a 155mm gun commandeered by the 740th Tank Battalion commander.  Peiper’s artillery was almost out of ammunition and virtually silent.

The Königstigers defended an arc that covered the northeastern to southeastern approaches to La Gleize.  This area included some excellent fields of fire, with long range shots to enemy approach routes.  During the consolidation on La Gleize the blocking group at the Marechal mill moved onto high ground at the Werimont farm a few hundred meters southeast of the village.  Hantusch’s Tiger and the PzKw IV were reinforced at the farm by Tiger 213 and two Panthers.  SS-Hauptsturmführer Möbius’s Tiger 204 was positioned beside an orchard at the eastern edge of the village.  Tiger 334 guarded the Hassoumont farm area to the northeast, while the 3. Kompanie tank that had thrown a track while approaching on the N33 from the east was still manned.  One other Königstiger, probably a 1. Kompanie tank used by SS-Obersturmführer Wessel, ended the battle on a narrow side street of the village.  Whether this poor location was its final fighting position or it had broken down there is unknown. 

Final locations of Tiger tanks during the defense of La Gleize, 22-24 Dec 1944.  Approximate fields of fire and ranges are shown.  (from 1:25000 mapsheet Harzé - La Gleize 2-M834 49/7-8, Military Geographical Institute, Brussels)

The rain of American artillery onto the German positions at La Gleize continued unabated through the morning of 22 December.  One estimate states that the 30th Infantry Division’s artillery poured over 57,000 shells into the area. (14)  The constant bombardment aggravated the Germans’ lack of sleep, and food was in as short supply as ammunition and fuel.  PzKw IV driver Rolf Ehrhardt stationed at the Werimont farm remembered that his crew had been issued three days’ rations before the initial advance.  By 23 December they were subsisting on sugar cubes and frozen apples found in the farmhouse.  Some crewmen stayed on the tanks while others sheltered in cellars.  “Everyone, whether common soldier or commander, had long since exceeded the limit of his ability to go on.  The faces were drawn, unshaven and unwashed, the eyes inflamed, everyone had caught cold.  Many of the men had wounds.”  (15)

In the midst of these hardships on 22 December the 3rd Armored Division launched its most successful attacks against La Gleize.  TF McGeorge initially tried to push down the road from Bourgomont, to be turned back by tank fire from the Hassoumont farm area.  However, Tiger 334 was knocked out during this action, its hulk blocking the road from Bourgomont.  Late in the day McGeorge tried an advance from a new direction, moving his tanks down the road from Francorchamps which TF Lovelady had used earlier and turning west to approach La Gleize over relatively open ground.  The open fields of fire gave the Tigers an opportunity to use their superior firepower to advantage.  SS-Hauptsturmführer Möbius, firing his 204 from a commanding position at the eastern edge of the village, knocked out a Sherman at a range of 2,400 meters with two shots.  Tigers 213 and 211 along with the Panthers at the Werimont farm engaged the TF McGeorge tanks at ranges up to 1,500 meters.  They kept up a hot fire, but the numerical superiority of the American tanks soon told.  The crew of Tiger 211 abandoned their tank after several hits to the turret knocked out the sensitive electrical firing system and the tank commander, SS-Untersturmführer Hantusch, was wounded in the head.  Shortly afterwards the crew of Tiger 213 followed suit after accurate American fire blew off the front third of the tank’s gun.  Darkness brought McGeorge’s advance to a halt, but the day’s actions had seen three of the Königstigers in La Gleize put out of action.  As Rolf Ehrhardt put it, “Our trump card had failed when we needed it most.”  (16)

Tiger 334 rests beside a destroyed Sherman from TF McGeorge on the road from La Gleize to Bourgomont.  (US National Archives at College Park, Signal Corps Collection)

A modern view taken in the fields of the Werimont farm, showing the approximate field of fire of Tiger 213.  Tank 211 was located farther to the left, beyond the farm buildings.  They were firing at the tanks of TF McGeorge coming from left to right along the road in the distance, at ranges of 1000 to 1500 meters.  (author's photo)

Tigers 213 (left) and 211 knocked out at Werimont farm after the battle.  (December 1944 Museum, La Gleize)                     

The battle for Stavelot continued on 22 December.  Heavy fighting broke out in some houses on the western edge of town, where soldiers of the Leibstandarte’s reconnaissance battalion were surrounded.  The battalion commander ordered SS-Oberscharführer Wendt with his Tiger 133 to mount a relief attack.  Wendt recalled that he fired a shell that exploded beside the house, but nothing happened.  In all probability Wendt fired at one of the first houses on the outskirts of Stavelot and did not enter the city or go all the way to the house where the reconnaissance battalion men were trapped.  When he returned to the command post, Knittel was still in telephone contact with his trapped men and ordered Wendt to advance again.  (17)  Wendt returned in the direction of Stavelot and “tried to do my best.  But suddenly my driver turned around.  The intercom on board didn’t work anymore.  Slowly, we rolled toward the rear.  We had already passed the command post and the tank stopped 200 meters from the Petit-Spai bridge.  I realized only then the meaning of the disaster.  Our tank had been struck and the radio operator had been killed.  The shell had struck the base of the turret and deflected downward into the hull.  Shrapnel damaged the transmission and the hydraulic fluid ran out.  We could still fire but it was impossible to drive the tank.”  (18)

Map of the area between Stavelot and Trois Ponts.  The Tiger tanks had taken the route shown in red.  Werner Wendt was operating from the headquarters of the 1st SS Reconnaissance Battalion located at the Antoine Farm. (Microsoft MapPoint via Expedia.com)

This is probably the same action seen by Charles Corbin, an observer with the 3^rd Armored Division’s 391^st Armored Artillery Battalion.  Corbin was posted in a house on the edge of Stavelot, from which he saw what he described as a Mark VI Tiger tank close by in some trees.  As the tank moved a Sherman of TF Lovelady also in Stavelot took it under fire, “but three balls of fire bounced off of it and it backed away never moving its turret.”  (19)  The shot that damaged Wendt’s tank was probably from this Sherman.  The Germans realized that they would not be able to reopen the route to Peiper through Stavelot, and went over to the defensive.

SS-Oberscharführer Werner Wendt.  Photo taken in August 1943 when Wendt was an SS-Unterscharführer.  (author’s collection)

Peiper was trapped in what the Germans called the “cauldron” of La Gleize.  The Americans mounted no strong attacks on 23 December, but continued their intense artillery fire.  German tank fuel and ammunition were exhausted.  Peiper, unable to advance further and knowing that he would get no relief, had begun the day before requesting permission from 1. SS-Panzerdivision to withdraw.  Radio contact was sporadic, and the answers Peiper received convinced him that the division did not realize the severity of his situation.  One radio message notified him that six Königstigers were operational at Stavelot and asked where they should be sent.  “By airdrop to La Gleize” was Peiper’s aggravated answer. (20)

Finally on 23 December Peiper received permission to break his force out of La Gleize and move to link up with his division.  The remaining 850 soldiers of the kampfgruppe moved out on foot at 2:00 am on 24 December.  With them were the officers and men of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 who had fought in La Gleize: von Westernhagen; his adjutant Kalinowsky (who was wounded); company commanders Wessel, Möbius, and Birnschein (badly wounded); and the remaining Tiger crews.  The wounded who could not walk were left behind in the village under the care of SS medics.  Also left behind was a small defensive covering force, which had the mission of wrecking the remaining operational tanks and heavy weapons after the kampfgruppe departed.  For the next day and a half Peiper led his men along a circuitous route through the woods which he hoped would avoid enemy patrols and bring him to the German positions east of the Salm River.  After several brushes with the enemy the kampfgruppe elements crossed the Salm and reached the lines of the 1. SS-Panzerdivision.  Most of the men had to swim the Salm, and von Westernhagen described the men of his group as walking icicles as they reached the division command post on Christmas morning. (21)

Scattered elements of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501 continued to fight.  On Christmas morning SS-Oberscharführer Wendt received word that the reconnaissance battalion was withdrawing across the Ambleve.  Wendt sent his loader to inform his platoon leader, SS-Oberscharführer Brandt, of the withdrawal.  As Brandt climbed down from his tank an American shell, the only one of the morning, fell right in front of him.  Brandt was mortally wounded and Wendt’s loader was killed.  Another crew managed to drive Brandt’s Tiger across the Ambleve and link up with the rest of their company.  Wendt and his driver prepared to destroy their immobilized tank 133 with demolition charges in the turret and engine compartment.  They set the charges and crossed the river on an improvised infantry bridge.  As they climbed the opposite slope they continued to watch their tank, but Wendt never saw the charges explode.  The explosives may have gone off later, as a U.S. Air Force observer reported in the summer of 1945 seeing a Royal Tiger at the Petit Spai bridge with the rear of the turret and the frontal hull roof smashed in, though he attributed this damage to Allied bombing. (22) SS-Untersturmführer Kalinowsky’s 008, which had been left with engine trouble near Knittel’s command post at the Ferme Antoine between Stavelot and Trois Ponts, continued to fight on until its crew set it on fire and withdrew with the last elements of the reconnaissance battalion Christmas morning.

SS-Oberscharführer Wendt’s Tiger Nr. 133 after the battle.  It had been pushed off the road near the Petit-Spai bridge.  Scrap metal dealers have already removed the turret in this view.  (December 1944 Museum, La Gleize)

008 was abandoned by its crew near the Antoine farm between Stavelot and Trois Ponts.  (December 1944 Museum, La Gleize)

Christmas Day also saw one of the strangest episodes of s. SS-Pz.Abt. 501’s actions in the Ardennes.  On Christmas morning SS-Unterscharführer Blase in Tiger 332 was moving north along the N33 through the small village of Coo-Biester, about five kilometers south of La Gleize.  He was probably trying to link up with Kampfgruppe Peiper, but how he had reached the area and why he was still moving toward La Gleize on 25 December remain a mystery.  At the same time, elements of the 740th Tank Battalion were moving south along the N33 after the capture of La Gleize.  Sergeant Glenn George in a Sherman encountered 332 parked on the side of the road.  George immediately directed his gunner to fire at the Tiger.  The crew had a white phosphorous shell loaded, and the smoke from this exploding shell apparently caused the German crew to think their vehicle was on fire.  To George’s surprise they opened their hatches and scrambled out of the Tiger.  George chased them off with machinegun fire and continued his advance.  (23) Later a unit of the 463rd Ordnance Evacuation Company recovered the still operational Tiger 332 and transported it to Spa.  It was eventually shipped to Aberdeen Proving Ground, one of the first Königstigers captured by the Americans.

Notes:

(14) Ibid., 225.

(15) Agte, Michael Wittmann, 318 (English translation page 514); Cuppens, Massacre a Malmedy?, 79; Leibstandarte IV/2

(16) Agte, Michael Wittmann, 319 (English translation page 515); Cuppens, Massacre a Malmedy?, 79.

(17) Timo Worst, email to author, 9 June 2004.

(18) Werner Wendt, letter to author, 31 March 1997.

(19) Charles R. Corbin, “Memories of Parfondruy, Belgium December, l944” on 3^rd Armored Division WWII Web site  http://home.earthlink.net/~crcorbin/Corbinp.html

(20) Agte, Michael Wittmann, 320 (English translation page 515).

(21) Heinz von Westernhagen, letter to mother, 29 December 1944, photocopy courtesy Wilhelm Kiesselbach.

(22) Werner Wendt, letter to author, 31 March 1997; Reynolds, The Devil’s Adjutant, 223.

(23) Glenn D. George, telephone interview by Harry Miller, tape recording, 1993.

All text copyright 2005-2010 Gregory A. Walden. All rights reserved; material from this website may only be republished with the author’s permission.