

IAR | INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

Research. Analysis. Conclusions.

In Omnem Scientiam Veritatem Confugit

Adanma Osakwe

China-Nigeria Relations: The Nigerian Niger Delta and Continent Wide Patterns

Guy Ras

India in the 21st Century: How Economics Shape Foreign Policy

Jeremy Ghassemi

Panel Discussion: The Egyptian Revolution, One Year Later

The Journal of the International Affairs Review Organization

2130 Fulton Avenue - San Francisco, CA - 94117 - University of San Francisco

Campus Event

Tuesday - March 27, 2012 - 5:45 PM

USF Main Campus, Fromm Hall

Enter from Parker Street between Golden Gate & Fulton

Climate Change

An **interview** and book signing with **Nobel Laureate** Burton Richter, Ph.D., Paul Pigott Professor of Physical Sciences Emeritus, **Stanford University**

Oceans are the globe's largest CO₂ reservoirs and the Pacific is the world's biggest ocean with China and California on opposite continents churning out greenhouse gases. Dr. Richter's belief that "the public needs and deserves an honest science-based explanation of what we know, how we know it, what the uncertainties are, and how long it will take to reduce these uncertainties" led him to write his prize-winning book *Beyond Smoke and Mirrors...* Come join the debate!

Dr. Richter is also the Director Emeritus of the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory at Stanford, winner of the Presidential Fermi Award (2011), and has authored over 300 scientific papers.

Dr. Patrick L. Hatcher of the Center and Prof. Marcelo Camperi, Dean of Arts and Sciences at USF, will moderate.

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Bachelor of Arts, International Studies

BA, International Studies

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Founders

Note

To our March readers,

Inside this March issue you will see a compilation of articles that span multiple different regions of the world. Adanma Osakwe has provided a condensed copy of her full thesis on China-Nigeria relations, a fascinating investigation of how the world's fastest growing economy has begun investing in the world's poorest continent. Following this is the work of Guy Ras, who has examined arguably China's closest economic competitor in India, exploring how India's rapid economic growth and expansion is affecting this country's expanding foreign policy menu.

In keeping with our journal intentions, we are following up on past events with an in-depth analysis of what has happened in Egypt one-year since the tumultuous "Arab Spring." Senior staff writer Jeremy Ghassemi sat down with the University of San Francisco's Dr. Stephen Zunes of the Politics department and two students from Egypt who were personally involved in the uprisings to discuss what has and hasn't changed in Egypt since the revolt.

As a research organization, the IAR is always aware of recent books that have been published in fields that relate to international relations. As is such, Dr. Hatcher of the Center for the Pacific Rim reviews Harvard's Ezra Vogel's *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* as part of our regular book reviews. You will find his critique very well analyzed and important to consider prior to reading Vogel's work on arguably China's most important figure next to Mao.

Cheers,

Cass Krughoff
Publication Manager

Is China good for Africa? Drawing specifically on the Nigerian experience, I argue that China is valuable for Nigeria because there has been an escalation in the establishment of infrastructure, intensification of skill and human capital, and a re-articulation of old colonial dealings. China's growing industries demand new energy and raw material suppliers; its exporters are demanding increased markets. Nigeria has become central to these strategies and this thesis explores the complexities of the China-Nigeria relationship. A question of concern is whether Chinese actions in Nigeria will serve to aggravate or assist Nigerians out of poverty to achieve sustainable economic development. This research will expand our understanding of the impact of Chinese undertakings in Nigeria.

Keywords: China and Africa, markets, foreign policy, Nigerian Niger Delta, equity oil, oil strategy opportunities and challenges, bilateral trade relations, trade-related gains and losses, infrastructure, corruption, energy cooperation, energy rivalry

Adanna Imeobong Osakwe is a Nigerian-American raised in Geneva, Switzerland but born in Queens, New York. Osakwe attended the International School of Geneva and graduated from UMASS Boston with a B.A. Cum Laude in Economics, as well as an M.A. in International Studies from the University of San Francisco. Her research has focused on intellectual property rights protection; and China-Nigeria relations. Along with working in the Patent Office of The Department of Commerce, Osakwe has also worked at The Whitaker Group (a Think Tank focused on US Foreign Investment on the African continent) and the International Center on Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva where she worked on the impact of a growing Chinese presence on sustainable development and multilateral trade. Currently Osakwe works at the San Francisco Human Rights Commission as a Discrimination Investigation Intern. If you would like to contact Adanna for the full copy 127 page thesis, please contact her at adanmaosakwe@hotmail.com.

Chapter I

In 2011, "Chinese Investment in Africa- An Empirical Analysis" highlights that Africa has been associated with pictures of deadly disease, starvation, corruption, civil unrest, military conflicts, unstable political regimes, and mounting social and economic depression. These undesirable depictions give many investment companies a negative perception about Africa as a whole (p. 7). While such descriptions are true for some nations in the region, they fail to represent the mainstream of the African nations, like Nigeria.

There is evidence that Nigeria has made some positive improvements which have been highly attractive to foreign investors, especially, the Chinese investors. In this regard, the Chinese government regularly commissions state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for infrastructural aid projects in countries where it wishes to expand its sphere of influence (Giovannetti & Sanfilippo, p. 19). China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria is actively facilitated by governmental aid programs, with a major emphasis in the oil industry. There are three main types of Chinese FDI in Africa: 1) FDI targets the Chinese world market import of natural resources, 2) it targets the African market export of low-cost manufactures, and 3) it targets the world market tariff-jumping (Giovannetti & Sanfilippo, p. 11). Currently, investments in infrastructures linked to natural resource extraction and telecommunications prevail, involving mainly SOEs. Oil is a compelling economic indicator and has long been perceived as a strategic resource for nations.

China is now the world's second largest oil-consuming country after the United States

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(Zhao, 2007, p. 399). China's rapidly growing economic demands and its external ventures for oil in Nigeria are best understood in terms of its historical and growing trade, foreign aid, and strategic interest in Nigeria. The entry of Chinese oil companies into the context of a "new" scramble for Africa's resources has led to a response by the Nigerian petro-state (a state whose wealth originates from oil revenue) and ruling elite to develop strategic moves to increase oil revenues and to expand its near-total dependence on Western actors (Obi, 2008, p. 417). With growing investments by China in Africa, differing perspectives abound on the possible effects of China's involvement with Nigerian oil. Signifying the importance of Nigeria to China, in January 2006, Abuja signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Beijing for the Establishment of Strategic Partnership programs to enhance their economic ties. In doing so, Nigeria became the first African country to sign such an agreement with China (Taylor, 2007, p. 631).

Chapter II: The Project and its Development

Research Methodology

The credibility of findings and conclusions is primarily dependent on the quality of the research design, data collection, data management, and data analysis. This section is dedicated to the description of the methods and procedures which will be executed in order to obtain the data, how the conclusion will be reached. This section is to justify the ways by which the study was conducted and will assist in giving it purpose and strength as it will then be truthful and analytical. All these elements of my study will assist in the processing of the data analysis and the formulation for conclusions and recommendations. This research will cover the following areas: the research design and method, the participants or subjects to be studied, the data collection instrument, and the data analysis technique. I utilized both qualitative and quantitative approaches for the data-gathering.

The focus of the assessment is on Chinese investments and engagements and how they affect the oil-rich region of Nigeria's Niger Delta, which in turn impacts the political, economic and cultural aspects of Africa. In order to gather the necessary empirical data, I obtained an internship in Genève, Switzerland from 4 January 2011 to 21 January 2011 at the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) on the China and Nigeria program.

Research Design

In this study I drew on both primary and secondary source data. The primary data was comprised of qualitative interviews and government documents. The secondary data was derived from archival research and existing literature which was to support the gathered findings. The interviews focused on personal accounts, observations, description and the individual insights of the participants. In addition, the interviews aimed to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of outcomes and the consequences of these investments regarding Chinese investments in Nigeria as perceived by the respondents. I wanted to conduct interviews to acquire a firsthand account of the respondents' experiences.

Chapter III: Data Analysis and Discussion of Findings

Data Analysis

The emerging "giant" of China is undeniably at the center of the explosion of Africa-Asian trade and investment, presenting an emblem of a new advancement in South-South commercial affairs (Broadman et al., 2007, p. 1). I argue that China is good for Nigeria because there has been an increase in the establishment of infrastructure, strengthening of skills and human capital, and the breaking of colonial interactions with the West.

Infrastructure Advancements

Manufacturing Growth

The establishment of Chinese infrastructure is valuable for Nigeria because it has built up Nigeria's manufacturing sector and increased quality and speed of construction. Construction and infrastructure are sectors in which China has made its prime commercial footprint in Africa (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 3). Manufacturing reveals the overall forte of the country and plays a vital and strategic role in economic growth ("Trade; China Pushes for Larger Trade Volumes With Country," 2011, p.1). Figure 7 (from the World Bank PPIAF-Database) highlights that Nigeria, though a major beneficiary of Chinese infrastructure finance, received comparatively small volumes of Chinese infrastructure finance during 2002 and 2005. However, in 2006 there was a major surge when China made almost US\$5 billion of infrastructure finance assurances to Nigeria, which accounts for 70% of China's total guarantees to sub-Saharan Africa that year (Ogunkola, 2008, pp.80-83). Figure 8 depicts the sectoral spread of Chinese infrastructure finance, pledges in Nigeria where electricity is at the highest value of 33.4%, transport at 33.2%, ICT at 17.4%, general at 14.0%, and last water at 2.0%. (**Figures in References**).

In pursuit of practical confirmation regarding impacts of Chinese infrastructure finance commitments, nine case studies were captured, namely Kajola Specialized Railway Industrial Free Trade Zone, and Ofada Vee Tee Rice Limited. Major findings from the cases are presented below (Oyeranti et al., 2010, p.3).

Kajola Specialized Railway Industrial Free Trade Zone

This project is a strategic move by the Ogun state government to take maximum advantage of the railway modernization programme and the projected inland container terminal project of the federal government. The objective is to attract specialized industries and businesses offering complementary services to these two projects of the federal government. Some of the investors expected in the zone include: railway industrial park, locomotive workshop, railway related service, foundries, metal fabrications, logistics, new towns development, shopping centers, commerce & industries (fruit juice processing, ceramic making, dairy production, furniture making, garment production and Kola processing. Varied activities ranging from acquisition of 2000 hectares of land to sourcing of environmental baseline data to identification of resettlement sites for affected people to design of infrastructural development plan have capped in the launch of the zone (Ogunkola et al., 2008, p.104).

The zone is a joint venture of the Ogun State Government and the Chinese Civil Engineering Construction Company (CCECC). The company's investment was estimated at about N115.8 billion. The government envisaged that the project would facilitate rapid mechanization of the state and deepen FDI inflow to the state. It is also important to note that since this is one of the three free trade zones recognized in the state, it is destined to serve as a growth pole. This is surrounded by the larger concept of concurrent development of all parts of the state (Ogunkola et al., 2008, p.104).

Ofada Vee Tee Rice Limited

This is another project linking Ogun state and a Chinese firm. The company's equity shares are to be owned by the Ogun State government, the federal government, and Vee Tee Group with the latter holding the bulk of the shares. The company has indeed designed a capacity of 225, 000 (9000 bags) tons of rice per day of which the first phase is estimated to yield to the market about 75,000 (3000 bags) of rice per day in the last quarter of 2008. The capital outlay is estimated at about \$2 billion. The company is to produce rice which will compare positively with that from around the world. The local farmers are to source paddy rice to the company that will be processed (de-husking, de-stoning, parboiling, sorting, polish, packaging and marketing) by the company. The large volume of rice imported into the country is a signal of the huge potential demand for the commodity and thus market should

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not be a constraint to the effective performance of the company (Ogunkola et al., 2008, p.104).

The contribution of the company of self-sufficient food production and foreign exchange savings is commendable. Optimal benefits from the formation of Ofada Vee Tee Rice require proper incorporation of rice farmers into the plan of the company. The company's promise of provision of seeds and extension services may be unsatisfactory. The market for the paddy rice must be definite. Thus, plan for over-as well as under-supply of paddy rice to the company is required for effective response by the farmers (Ogunkola et al., 2008, p.104). The backward linkage of the company is important for the economy in terms of employment and rural livelihood. The current prediction is approximately 30,000 farmers who are to supply paddy rice to the company. Other beneficiaries include transporters and traders of the raw materials and the finished products (Ogunkola et al., 2008, p. 105).

Improved Speed and Quality

Chinese construction companies have brought to Nigeria the ability to do quality work at a fast rate. The most important factors are indeed, access to capital and supply chain throughout. Given the rapid inroads that they have made in Africa's construction industries in a short period of time, it is undeniably evident that Chinese companies have the aptitude to prepare quality work at a fast rate, over other market players (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 4). One of the topmost advantages, however, is the simplification of their access to capital, often through Chinese government concessional loans.

Chinese companies, predominately SOEs, can secure the necessary funds for advance payment and performance bonds from their head offices in China and make full use of their access to competitively priced capital from Chinese banks. They and other smaller private companies can also secure loans at flexible rates from Chinese banks such as the Bank of China, the China Development Bank and the China Exim Bank. This trend has significant implications for the companies' overheads. Hence, while local and foreign construction companies operate on profit margins of 15-25 percent, Chinese companies usually operate on profit margins of fewer than 10 percent, making them extremely competitive on price (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 5). Chinese companies may occasionally weaken competitors by up to 50 percent on the price of the overall bid. While this may not be a hard or a fast rule, it is clear that Chinese companies' entry into Africa's construction sectors has strengthened market competition.

China intends to further promote its agricultural cooperation exchanges with African nations at various levels, through multiple channels and in various forms. Focus will be laid on the collaboration in land development, agricultural plantation, breeding technologies, food security, agricultural machinery and the processing of agricultural and side-line products. China will deepen cooperation in agricultural technology, and speed up the formulation of China-Africa Agricultural Cooperation Program ("China's Africa Policy," 2006, p. 5). Brennen (personal communication, February 23, 2011), Junior Associate at United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), mentioned, "There has been a major food crisis in Africa, Nigeria witnessed a lot of regression... Are we going to be able to develop agriculture on our own?" Western farmers are not eager to invest in agronomy, but the Chinese are approaching. The Chinese come to show their ability and enhance their own interest. They continue to grab and grapple with assets that Western oil companies are not willing to develop. They go into countries and put down as little as possible for expensive exploration. The Chinese are incontestably willing to do it. This is a reason as to why Western counterparts are not as competitive with oil companies in Africa. The Chinese government initiatives work for the Chinese interest. However, Western companies do not have a government enterprise. China is more competitive with both a free market and free enterprise (personal communication, February 23, 2011).

Supply-Chain Management.

Supply-chain management of Chinese companies is improving speedily, if not already having peaked international standards (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 7). Their worksites are normally highly organized and all the personnel from the executive down habitually live and work on the site full time. This sort of hands-on approach lends itself to organization, which saves considerable time and provides administration with a profound understanding of the project and the ability to handle encounters as they occur. Chinese managers, engineers, and laborers usually reside together in austere settings with slight noticeable difference between them, working hard for long hours and salaries much lower than those of Western personnel (Moorcraft, 2007, p.2). This undeniably facilitates understanding and communication, enhancing the ability and production of their effort, at a fast rate, as they live in close vicinity to the construction site.

It is important to note the “hot bed” shift strategy, employed by some Chinese companies, ensuring that workers can be on site around the clock (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 9). Double shift productivity at the construction site is represented in the “one bed, two workers” policy whereby a night-shift worker and a day-shift worker share the same bed, ensuring double work capability. The rate of nonattendance of Chinese construction workers remains moderately low; Chinese workers have absentee rates of practically nil (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 9). One of the main reasons for the economic success of infrastructural development in Nigeria is this practice of hard work. The contribution of infrastructural development to broader economic and social development is now widely known. China’s focus on Nigeria’s infrastructural development with the construction of roads, bridges, hydroelectric and irrigation schemes, schools, hospitals, health centers and an array of government buildings has made a clear and definite influence on improving the lives of people across Africa (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 16).

New Middle Class

Chinese language in Nigeria

One of the ways Nigerians can irrefutably benefit from interaction with China is to learn, study and facilitate dialogue with the Chinese fluently by the exchange of students between China and Nigeria. China will increase the number of government scholarships as it sees fit. The Chinese will continue to send teachers to help African countries in Chinese language teaching and carry out educational assistance projects to help develop Africa’s weak disciplines. These disciplines are medicine, science, health, and media. It intends to strengthen cooperation in such fields as vocational education and distance learning while encouraging exchanges and cooperation between educational and academic institutions of both sides (“China’s Africa Policy,” 2006, p. 7).

The role the Chinese are currently playing in the development of Africa upholds that the Chinese language be taught in African schools and universities as a component of a Nigerian’s syllabus (“Africa; Why Chinese Should Be Taught in Schools,” 2010, p. 1). African states should definitely prioritize the Chinese language due to a number of reasons. First and foremost, the Chinese currently extract most of their raw materials from Africa. A survey of China-Africa immersion indicates that the presence of China in the swamplands of the Niger Delta is where night and day oil rigs produce oil (“Africa; Why Chinese Should Be Taught in Schools,” 2010, p. 1). As these assets get exploited, there must be an intrinsic need for communication and understanding and a clear comprehension of each other, with or without interpreters. Second, with Nigerians learning the language and understanding the Chinese culture, this in turn will enable Africa to get better contracts from their trade and related negotiations with China.

Bilateral cultural exchange in diverse forms between people’s organizations and institutions are relevant in cultural cooperation (“China’s Africa Policy”, 2006, p. 7). Kimani (2010), articulated, “The advice I would give to many African students at the universities now is to learn the Chinese language because relations are bound to get stronger” (p.1).

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Consequently, by enhancing an understanding of the Chinese culture and language, Nigeria-China relations will be more productive. There will be a resulting development of mutual relations in culture and trade between the two countries, portraying a growing Chinese middle class in Nigeria. A qualitative interview with Chinese Africanist Wong (personal communication, January 20, 2011), History Professor at Ecole Internationale de Genève (EIG), confirmed that “one of the best ways Africans can benefit from interaction with China is for Africans, especially Nigerians, to learn and study the Chinese language proficiently” (personal communication, January 20, 2011). The role that China is currently playing signifies that it is essential for the Chinese language to be taught in African schools and universities. As China currently mines most of its raw materials from the Niger Delta, it is implicit that there is a sense of urgency for both parties to relate directly with one another (personal communication, January 20, 2011).

In short, by learning the Chinese language, this serves as a medium through which Nigerians will be able to develop their skill and expertise in whatever pursuits they set out to accomplish. Presently, Africa is inadequately equipped to do this, with the only Chinese language programs on the continent currently at Nnamdi Azikiwe University in Nigeria and the University of Stellenbosch in South Africa (Vines, 2007, p. 8). Africa must have a well-functioning free market to thrive in recording high economic growth rates like that of China. One important lesson Africa should take and use to their advantage is as their connections are becoming stronger and stronger, Nigerians must embrace culture and diversity in order to understand the Chinese and to ameliorate the living standards for themselves (Kimani, 2010, p.1).

The Chinese have taught Africans how to develop skills

The Chinese have built a new middle class amongst Nigerians by establishing training programs to build skills for human growth and development. The key lies in the hands of African-policy makers to take advantage of this opportunity to boost economic growth. Generally speaking, Africa lacks institutional regulatory frameworks and human capacity to monitor and encourage direct investment in terms of local skills development and technology transfer which the Chinese assert (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 15). Chinese workers are well trained and considered technically skilled. The skills level of Chinese workers is recognized across the industry. They undertake an intensive training programme, prior to expatriation. More so, Chinese workers are multi-skilled and will be involved in each phase of construction. Whereas it is normal practice to employ tiered hierarchies of workers, it has been found that Chinese handcraft workers can also double up as manual laborers and participate in manual labor as well as the more skilled happenings of an artisan. Thus, one Chinese worker trains Africans on how to dig the foundations, lay the cables, and devise the electricity at a construction site (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 9).

With regard to employment of skilled local labor, Chinese companies rely more heavily on credentials and professional papers to assess the capability of potential employees. However, few construction workers in Africa possess formal training and qualifications, thereby putting them at a disadvantage for recruitment (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 10). Where there is a lack of skilled labor and local procurement sources, forcing the majority of the Chinese companies to import all their necessities in terms of materials and labor directly from China to Africa, the Chinese construction companies assert that they provide employees and Africans with on-the-job training, with major importance placed on machine operation. Several local construction engineers also report that they often grasp new technique and strategy on visiting Chinese sites along with consultants and suppliers who are also exposed to new work and business practices and developments in the industry, introduced by the Chinese (Corkin et al., 2008, p. 10). Castello (personal communication, January 18, 2011), Strategic Adviser of Media and Public Relations at the World Food Programme (WFP), stated, “I know that many countries complain that Chinese projects always use Chinese workers

that are brought from China...One important reason I believe is that it is very difficult to find good local skill available”(personal communication, January 18, 2011). However, the Chinese continue to teach Nigerians on how to operate technology and in so doing, Nigerians become increasingly proficient in technological advancements.

In the area of human capital development, China continues to send its experts, technicians, and medical personnel to succor their fellow African states in capacity building. Over the years, according to Mohan & Kale (2007), China has sent 15,000 to 20,000 medical personnel and more than 10,000 agro-technicians and continues to provide scholarships for graduate education to African studies. During the 2006 Beijing Summit, the Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China pledged to train 15,000 African professionals from 2007-2009. By March 2007, eleven Confucius Institutes in Africa were up and running in Egypt, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Rwanda and Madagascar (p. 12).

The formation of Confucius Institutes in Africa, and training of African professionals in various professions by China, is very important for these trainees, as they might become the future entrepreneurs, managers, engineers, doctors and even policy makers in Africa. In international studies, the importance of scholars and professionals who train in other countries cannot be underestimated in terms of transfer of cultures, language, practices and technologies from host country to their own nations. China’s “raison d’être and fait-accompl” is to use this as a strategy to enhance the growth and consolidation of its soft power (the ability to gain support by cultural and political influence—while Western powers are finding it ever harder to push their ideology that egalitarianism is the only valid system of government) in the growing global economy (Mohan & Kale, 2007, p. 12; Hilsun, 2006, p. 28).

Re-articulating Colonialism

Renewed Principles of Respect for National Sovereignty & Non-Interference in Internal Affairs.

China’s long-held policy of non-interference is simply a pledge to support those in power in any given country, however crooked or corrupt they may be. The idea of opposition is anathema to the one-party state, where philosophy has given way to the notion that economic growth depends on stability, and constancy requires repression (Hilsun, 2008, p.24). The Chinese believe that they have understood the problem in Africa: “Western style democratic theory simply isn’t suited for African conditions, but rather carries with it the root of disaster” (Hilsun, 2008, p.24) While the West talks of helping Africa and of saving it from itself, at the FOCAC, China spoke of a strategic partnership and a joint alliance on global security threats, including Africa in rebalancing the post-colonial, post-cold war, post-Iraq world (Hilsun, 2006, p. 27). The Chinese in Africa are not only altering the continent’s political, economic and social landscape, but are sending nervous quivers to Western governments (“China in Africa: Why the West is Worried,” 2008, p. 13). According to Moorcraft (2007), author of “Why Beijing succeeds in Africa; West hurt by paternalism, focus on human rights” exclaimed, “Forget about Western campaigns about ‘making poverty history’; instead ‘make lecturing African leaders history’...Western aid hasn’t worked. Giving more aid to Africa is like telling an alcoholic he needs a stiff drink to help kick his addiction” (p. 1).

China develops exchanges of various forms with friendly political parties and organizations of African countries on the basis of the principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. The purpose of such exchanges is to increase understanding and friendship and seek trust and cooperation (China’s African Policy, 2006, p. 4). Jackson (personal communication, January 10, 2011), Research Assistant at United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), believes that through China’s non-interference policy, Africa is no longer perceived as being in the shadow or the dark side, but currently at the center of global media focus. All spotlight

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is now on Africa. Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and Spain have clearly lost ground and lost touch with Chinese links who should have produced the (Western style) democratization to achieve sustainable economic development. The US is perceived as a forceful country which is keen on exploiting military power to levy its one-sided perceptions on Africa. Some individuals point to China as a new version of a colonial power, while others look to it as a blessing and opportunity which Africa should use to its maximum potential. In the final analysis, what it comes down to is that China is developing the African economy overall (personal communication, January 10, 2011).

African leaders are increasingly scornful of Western conditionality; they are welcoming the far less hypocritical Chinese way of establishing business (Moorcraft, 2007, p. 1). Africa needs not liberal kindness but rather, investment by business. Presently, only very big Western oil companies and the Chinese take the risk. After more than a trillion dollars of Western aid, many African citizens are more subordinate than ever. There is simply no link between aid and economic growth. Africa, just like any other region, wants to finance its own recovery through its ownership of resources and through FDI (Moorcraft, 2007, p. 1). Umejei (2011), author of "Another Look at China's Trade Investment in the Country," stated: "Chinese trade investment in Nigeria should no longer be seen as inimical to the growth of Nigeria" (p. 2). Umejei highlighted that the Chinese do not interfere in the international politics of their trade partners, in contrast to the countries of the West who consistently put Nigerians into trouble by making them buy their political and economic system, "hook line and sinker without giving a thought to how compatible those systems and structures are to our own peculiarities" (Umejei, 2011, p.2). Thus, China is developing a partnership with Africa. Certainly, it is a truth that has altered the foreign policies of several Western countries towards Africa. Their worries cannot be overestimated when China's policy of non-interference is positioned with the "modus operandi" of western nations (Umejei, 2011, p. 1).

During the visit of 40 African heads of state to Beijing in November 2007, African leaders were thrilled that China wanted to talk about trade, investment and brotherhood rather than, to quote reporter Hilsum, "pesky subjects Western leaders like to bring up like human rights, good governance, corruption, genocide, and all that" (Cited in Moorcraft, 2007, p. 1). African leaders are normally much more content dealing with the Chinese as opposed to Westerners. President Festus Mogae of Botswana admitted:

"I find that the Chinese treat us as equals, while the West treats us as former subjects. That is the reality. I prefer the attitude of China to that of the West." Because of all these, the Chinese are not imposing any ideology, it's a willing buyer, willing seller. (Moorcraft, 2007, p. 2)

In addition, the fact that there have been phenomenal growth rates in China and hundreds of millions have been elevated from poverty makes an attractive model for Africans to partner with China. Indisputably, China's efforts suggest that the removal of poverty must precede the introduction to fairness. The West needs to escape from the inborn notion that its African policies are superior, while Chinese actions are inferior and detrimental (Moorcraft, 2007, p. 2).

China will continue to strengthen unity and collaboration with African countries on the international arena, conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on major international and regional issues, and stand for mutual support on major issues concerning state sovereignty and national dignity (China's Africa Policy, 2006, p. 4). Lee (personal communication, January 17, 2011), Labor Relations Student Intern at International Labor Organization (ILO), remarked, "China has brought a model of economic reclamation that works without the involvement of foreign advice-givers institutions of the West" (personal communication, January 17, 2011). China has made a superb difference in Nigeria, which further accentuates the negativities and the discrepancies of the West, drawing on the

mercantilist colonial approach, contradicting its unambiguous disappointment to come up with any real success story for the African continent, despite endless policies and treaties devised by technocrats. Furthermore, Wang (personal communication, January 6, 2011), Climate Change and Development Intern at International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), said, “The West and multilateral institutions are in a sheer catastrophe when compared to China...I am tired of the American slant, they are always telling us how to do business, they think they are providing a service for us.” (personal communication, January 6, 2011)

Nigeria needs trade, not aid. China, for all its immediate self-interest, continues to provide just that. Many Chinese reside in Nigeria now, more than Britons during the height of the empire. Africa is no longer striking to European settlers anymore, but the Chinese. While the European Union continues to view Africa as a burden, China sees it as a valuable market. In spite of the dangers of the “new” scramble for Africa, China might just be a provider of opportunity for Africa while Europe and the United States have simply failed to deliver (Moorcraft, 2007, p. 2). The ball is now in Africa’s court –“to fully embrace the new-kid-on-the-block, or hang onto friendships and policies by maintaining the status quo” (“China in Africa: Why the West is Worried,” 2008, p. 13).

Supplementary evidence reinforced that China has surprised everyone. China is a trendsetter and forces Western governments to become more mindful (“China in Africa: Why the West is Worried,” 2008, p. 15). Chinese resurgence in Africa has caught its traditional Western protagonists off guard and they are worried with fine reason. Uche (personal interview, January 18, 2011), Media Specialist at International Telecommunications Union (ITU), makes critical statements. Uche (2011) underlined the importance that China’s presence in Africa has served as a wake-up call amongst the Europeans and Americans. Many Europeans did not put Africa as high as it should have been on the pedestal. As the Chinese non-interference policy deepens, China will also have a growing self-interest in Africa’s longer term stability, prosperity and development—and will likely pay more attention to governance and environmental problems in line with its own self-interest.

There is a likelihood that China’s sudden and studied entry into African aid and investment markets will generate strong opposition amongst more traditional European and American actors who risk losing market share and influence on the African continent (personal communication, January 18, 2011). Student Migration Intern, Boateng (personal communication, January 17, 2011) at International Organization for Migration (IOM), ideas are focused around the non-interference policy and further extend to the grand multilateral institutions, the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) needing to revisit this field, underscoring a sense of urgency for the continent. Today, everyone wants to be seen as taking Africa seriously, just like the Chinese have done.

A New Honesty to Relationships.

China is not a hypocrite, it is not a democracy, and its own human rights record is not satisfying. Complementing the attraction of China’s policy of non-interference is the propensity of African rulers to be despotic and corrupt. Corrupt politicians detest inspection, and in China they may have found a willing companion (Umejei, 2011, p. 1). A growing number of Chinese who work in Africa are beginning to realize their government and African governments’ attention to human rights is scarce. China considers itself a better substitute to the West, because it shares some of the same problems. China stresses the respect for Africa’s path to development which in practice, is based on a mutual understanding of a non-interference policy where China financially supports Africans with no political strings attached. According to a Chinese official with the Ministry of Commerce, all the new aid packages destined for African countries were offered unselfishly and there “were no political strings attached or interference in internal affairs” (Lagerkvist, 2009, p.128). The lack of conditionality in aid projects and the traditional strong emphasis on sovereignty by the

Is China Good for Africa?

Chinese government might be eye-catching not just to undemocratic African heads of states but also to populaces who have been on the receiving end of structural adjustment programs formulated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) in Washington DC (Lagerkvist, 2009, p.128).

Some Western observers believe that China is not fully equipped to support civil liberties and rights in Africa. They argue that “China is exporting some of its most dysfunctional domestic practices including corruption, bad lending, disregard for labor rights and poor environmental standards” (Lagerkvist, 2009, p.128). Other scholars highlight that they are less certain, though they assert that they correctly suggest that liability and transparency are definitely not “core values” in Sino-Africa trade relations. Some researchers point to the opposite. They argue that Chinese experts are invited to developing countries to lecture on the Chinese experience, and that the Chinese government officials address less developed countries on how to combat corruption and strive for good governance. Who should we really believe? Unlike most Western witnesses, Chinese forecasters do not necessarily view the prevalence of widespread corruption practices as an integral problem of autocratic politics (Lagerkvist, 2009, p.129).

A major problem for many African countries is that there is not yet a solid foundation for a Chinese expansion model to be well grounded. In addition, many African states are marred by kleptocratic elite reigning over fragile states with poor institutional functions. The problem for China in Africa might be that the Chinese misjudged many latent potential conflicts and security threats as well as imperfections of the political systems on the continent. Thus, the Chinese find themselves involved on a scale and depth they did not at first imagine. Furthermore, they have no strategy to tackle corruption and the problems of lack of transparency which may become greater as the volume of foreign aid rises (Lagerkvist, 2009, p. 129). China’s efficient governance may turn into horrific governance due to neglect of corruption and misappropriation, being perhaps the greatest factor in current Chinese aid policy and developmental strategy for Africa (Lagerkvist, 2009, p. 129). Nevertheless, the Chinese aid consultants are concerned with how their resources are utilized (Lagerkvist, 2009, p.129).

Leaders of China and Nigeria are educated; therefore, they need to demonstrate integrity, honesty, transparency, and good governance to assist their governments to combat corruption. In order to maintain strong rapport and liaison between the Chinese and Nigerians, it is necessary that there is a complete understanding of the true cultural and political ethos in both China and Africa, particularly Nigeria. The negative realities of authoritarianism, corruption, and other human rights violations must be scrutinized and addressed so that Nigeria can be seen in a more positive light.

Though there is an implicit need to establish a fair and just system of the international rule of law, equal rights, and effective mechanisms to combat corruption, the relationship between China and Nigeria is equal. Anshan (2011), a professor at the Center for African Studies, at Peking University in China, remarked, “The reason, in my opinion, can be attributed to China’s foreign assistance philosophy, which regards partner countries as equal and believes assistance should be mutually beneficial” (“Africa: From ‘How Could’ to ‘How Should- the Possibility of Trilateral Cooperation,” p. 2). Both nations have been colonized or semi-colonized; they have experiences that have provided them with similar circumstances of conducting international relations: mutual respect and equal footing (Anshan, 2011, p. 2). Indeed, the China-Africa partnership is equal, and China has never used the term donor-recipient, (which is a philanthropic term) to describe China-Nigeria undertakings; “partner” is used instead. China reinforces the fact that assistance is not unilateral but mutual.

With more attention placed on human rights abuses and concerns, a new honesty will be reinforced in the partnership, allowing China-Nigeria undertakings to be stronger and of mutual benefit to both nations. Anshan (2011) put it best when he said, “Africa’s development impasse demands a new level of consciousness, a greater degree of innovation,

and a generous dose of honesty about what works and what does not as far as development is concerned” (p. 2). In short, a new truth will be re-articulated about the China-Nigeria relations idea of no-political strings attached and the non-interference policy in domestic affairs, underscoring equal bilateralism, co-development, mutual respect, and equality in international relations. If the Chinese and Nigerians are able to deal with their realities better than the European colonial powers did, Chinese and Africans may be able to rid their nations of venality. There may be an increased potential for China to underwrite global equity through becoming a solid partner in taking the industrial revolution to African nations (Lagerkvist, 2009, p.130).

Chapter IV: Conclusions & Recommendations

Conclusion: Forging or Fuelling a New Consensus?

Evidence and analysis throughout this paper suggest that Nigerians have an acceptance and positive impression of China’s growing impact on their nation, to a certain extent. However, public perceptions of the Chinese presence may possibly turn negative if the Nigerian government, like other African governments, handles the relationship poorly by not ensuring legitimacy and agency for Nigerians. China has promised billions of dollars in loans and assistance for Nigeria’s crumbling infrastructure, which by all means could offshoot possible job prospects and economic development. There has been a lack of extensive progress on these projects thus far, which has elevated fears that much of the monies have been stolen and disappeared to Nigeria’s notoriously corrupt political officials.

Africa can unquestionably derive vital trainings from China’s success in healing itself from an inherent cycle of poverty (Rotberg, 2008, p. 292). The challenge posed is for African policymakers and a strong civil society to recognize the fundamental teachings from China’s experience and to adapt accordingly to the specific circumstances of their individual African states. China’s role in Africa is escalating and Nigeria will be a central player in determining the setting and capacity of that role. If China’s upswing is peaceful, careful management on all sides is necessary to underscore that China’s augmentation occurs justifiably and human rights developments are respected in Africa and do not hurt Africans (Rotberg, 2008, p. 293).

Overall, Chinese commitment with Nigeria differs from other actors’ involvement as Chinese interests stretch beyond the offshore oilfields and into the core of Nigeria, laying down long-lasting assets. China can be acknowledged as a potential agent of change in Nigeria which can be developed by those interested in improving the country’s portion (Taylor, 2007, p. 643). If China continues to participate in Nigeria’s infrastructure, both domestic and foreign investment will continue to soar. Beijing recognizes that it has to engage with the issue of governance and economic management in Nigeria as a means to uphold Chinese investment interests. In short, the undertaking of the West is to take on Beijing in respective regions where reciprocated interests congregate as a way to advance the interests of the Nigerian inhabitants as a whole, rather than the corrupt elites (Taylor, 2007, p. 643).

In conclusion, the Chinese have been involved in Africa as capitalists, comrades, and immigrants. China has engaged in Africa’s territory and strengthened ties in quests for natural resources and new markets. China’s new foreign policy towards Africa expounds on tactics that date back to the mid-1950s. China attempts to exert its diplomacy on the African continent to gain access to its natural resource wealth. The question as to whether China is a development partner, economic competitor, or colonizer is contested; however, China has established partnerships with Nigeria and other parts of Africa to gain control of resources to better their own economy and assist with the buildup of the Nigerian economy. As a result of China’s characteristics and involvement in Nigeria, there has been a “new” scramble for Africa. Developing nations are rich in raw materials and natural resources. As a result, foreign investments and monies are now being moved and reinvested in developing countries, like China and Nigeria, as opposed to Western worlds.

Recommendations

1. Nigeria must continue to build, maintain and embrace a mutually trusting and respectful alliance with China. The partnership will continue to pave the way for structural engagements to the greatest extent between the two countries (Marchi, 2008, p. 12).
2. Both Nigerian and Chinese foreign policy should represent the full capacity of both nations' values and insights. A foreign policy focused on a particular issue, such as trade or human rights, might run the risk of never establishing the kind of relationship in which complex questions can be posed and experiences voiced. A balanced partnership is key, opening the door for meaningful discussion. Concerns and implications must be pursued in proximity with one another and not seen as a matter of either/or (Marchi, 2008, p. 12).
3. China is irrefutably an active participant in both the global economic and political system. Thus, Nigeria should continue to accelerate China's integration into the global system and encourage China to participate fully in international human rights institutions and civil society organizations (Marchi, 2008, p. 12).
4. With careful research drawn to international best practices, both Nigerian and Chinese officials will demonstrate increased awareness of the challenges accompanied by economic development. They will be forthcoming about finding innovative responses to human rights violations (Marchi, 2008, p. 12).
5. Both Nigerian and Chinese foreign policy makers must be cognizant that though political change has proceeded more slowly than economic development, an understanding of human rights must advance in both nations. Considerable progress must be made in both nations. The lessons learned by Nigeria are important to share with China as it develops its own human rights system (Marchi, 2008, p. 12-13).
6. Nigerian foreign policy development must note that the Chinese community in Nigeria is versatile with views ranging over a wide scope. The perceptions of the Nigerian-Chinese community cannot be summed up in a singular and unified voice. Certain issues can be divisive amongst Nigerians of Chinese heritage. Therefore, Nigerian foreign policy should be conscious of diversity (Marchi, 2008, p. 13).
7. Nigerians and Chinese should ensure and employ the use of policy instruments at their disposal and in this context, seek in a systematic way the highest possible degree of coherence between trade, economic and development policies, and other policies of both countries with an impact on their trade, agricultural, national security, environment, social and physical infrastructures, in addition to research and technology (Amadasun, 2008, p. 27).
8. The linkages between poverty reduction, development aid, bilateral trade, adjustments and humanitarian policy fields are all fundamental to ensure poverty alleviation for the vulnerable populaces in ethnic communities and locales (Amadasun, 2008, p. 27).
9. Nigerians and Chinese should be acknowledged where economic development policies are discussed in international forums, enabling both nations' presence as active participants at the forefront of the international agenda (Amadasun, 2008, p. 27).
10. I will conduct an ethnographic comparative study amongst three other oil-rich countries, examining the trends of Chinese actors in African communities and their overall social integration across the continent (Large, 2008, 58).
11. In order for Nigeria to benefit effectively from its engagement with China, several steps must be taken. Nigeria needs to (a) assemble comprehensive data on the financial, commercial, social and environmental impact of Chinese investments; (b) establish the development goals and set priorities to be identified; (c) articulate

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strategies on how the priorities will be met; (d) make provisions of institutional arrangements to implement the mechanisms; and (e) ensure that all stakeholders are included, especially the less privileged, in the policy planning phases. If these steps are taken, Nigeria will be able to (a) attract Chinese foreign investment, which in return will significantly reduce its capital deficit; (b) invest in its infrastructure sector with attention placed primarily on transportation, energy, and agriculture; (c) ensure a major increase in the competitiveness of their goods and value added towards natural minerals produced in their country (Ampiah & Naidu, 2008, p. 149).

- Adanma Osakwe

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Figure References

Figure 8)





Figure 7)



As India's economy has become more integrated into global markets, its interest and involvement in international affairs has risen accordingly, resulting in the need for India to develop an articulated and non-contradictory foreign policy to support and protect its growing domestic economy and its economic interests abroad. This process is in stark contrast to the path India has taken during most of its history since its founding in 1947 and reflects the way in which economic growth and foreign policy development go hand in hand as Indian prominence on the world stage grows. By looking at the historical context within which these changes have taken place, this paper will examine the evolution of India's economic policies over time and how these result in a corresponding change in foreign policy.

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India in the 21st Century: How Economics Shape Foreign Policy

Brief Historical Overview

Colonized by the British in the 18th century, India was the most important British colony during the period of European colonialism. This was as a result of the Indian subcontinent's size and the abundance of natural resources to be found there. However, efforts directed at Indian independence began to materialize in the 19th century and were formalized with the founding of the Congress Party in 1888 which signified the first forum for organized opposition to British rule (Young & Kent, 2004). In the 1930s, the Congress Party had effectively become a Hindu-dominated organization as a result of tensions between Hindus and Muslims, and various Muslim political groups coalesced under the Muslim League. After World War II, Indian independence had become inevitable, particularly in light of the deterioration of European colonialism generally. In the case of India, however, the separation of the Congress Party and the Muslim League into sectarian groups paved the way for the eventual two-state solution of India (Hindu) and Pakistan (Muslim) when independence from the British took place. During the process of partition there occurred numerous incidents of violence in which thousands died, often precipitated by the large numbers of people who were displaced and moved from Hindu controlled areas which would become part of India, to Muslim controlled areas which were to become part of Pakistan, and vice-versa. Young and Kent (2004) note that British preference for the Muslim League as more reliable partners in World War II, as well as a lack of administrative preparation of local officials leading up to independence, demonstrates British culpability in the outcome. This outcome includes regional conflicts in which territorial disputes over the Kashmir area

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of northern India, for example, have resulted in two major wars (1965 and 1971) and ongoing clashes. It is also important to note that during the period of partition Pakistan consisted of two, non-contiguous, territories – West Pakistan and East Pakistan. The former constitutes the territorial boundary of modern-day Pakistan, while the latter gained independence from Pakistan in 1971 as Bangladesh with the support of India.

India in 1947 was born into the bipolar tensions of the Cold War. Generally, India's government, led by its first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, pursued a policy of non-alignment. The following two decades reflected a neutralist policy, however, in the early 1970's the Nixon administration's support of Pakistan as a necessary conduit through which to channel Chinese relations, could be seen as having pushed India closer toward the Soviet Union. Young and Kent (2004) note that public opinion in the United States tended to favor the Bangladeshi cause in 1971, nevertheless, the White House viewed India's support for Bangladesh as a threat to Pakistan itself and could not allow for the loss of a crucial ally in its line of communication to China. That same year, India and the Soviet Union signed a 24 year friendship treaty in New Delhi which could be seen as a step away from India's nonaligned policy.

Foreign Policy Context

Historically, India's Policy Planning Division in the Ministry of External Affairs has been, as Kapur (2009) notes, an "administrative backwater" (p. 207). This can arguably be largely attributed to Nehru's insistence on the adoption of non-alignment and neutralist policies in the decades following India's independence. However, India's large population as well as its position as the world's largest democracy and its growing economic stance, precipitated, sometimes reluctantly, greater involvement in world affairs. This can be seen, for example, in India's 1991 "accession for a two year term to the United Nations Security Council" (Schaffer, 2009, p. 71). This behavior however, is quite a departure from India's traditional sense of nationhood and foreign affairs as can be seen in Nehru's 1927 essay A Foreign Policy for India which, as Mehta (2009) notes, is "preoccupied with domestic issues" (p. 214). Indeed, India's foreign policy has been described as being primarily driven by "cautious prudence" (ibid, p. 230), while India's behavior since the economic reforms begun in 1991, suggest that India's foreign policy is driven rather by pragmatic decision-making propelled by economic considerations.

Economic Context

As Mukherji (2010) notes, for over forty years, India had adopted and pursued a policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) which is an inward-looking economic policy aimed at creating rapid industrialization by restricting foreign imports and embracing governmental policies fostering domestic production for domestic consumption. In India, this was embodied by the Five Year Plans begun under Nehru which saw "extensive regulation by the state" (Sharma, 2009, p. 29). Such government involvement in the economy, seen by Nehru as both necessary and desirable as the government played its custodial role, nonetheless "earned India the dubious distinction of being the most controlled economy in the non-Communist world" (ibid, p. 76). As Sharma (2009) notes, despite positive GDP growth in the 1980s which had suggested to the Indian government that their economic policies were bearing fruit, excessive short term borrowing at high interest rates to fund increased governmental spending and a decline in exports caused a severe debt crisis by the end of the decade.

In the early 1990s, with the Gulf War looming, money from Indian nationals working in the Persian Gulf states decreased markedly which served to exacerbate an already tenuous economic situation. India then turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which granted standby funds of over two billion dollars over a period of 2 years (Sharma, 2009). However, as with all IMF assistance, the receipt of these funds was contingent upon a market

liberalization strategy. In India this was embodied in the form of wide-ranging economic reforms aptly named the New Economic Policy (NEP) (Sharma, 2009). The adoption of these market reforms resulted in rapid GDP growth due to, among others, the mobilization of the private sector as well as promotion of exports and greater trade due to significant reductions in tariffs and trade barriers. Mukherji (2010) refers to this as a “policy paradigm shift” (p. 488) and suggests that this might not have happened absent the debt crisis as “policy change is generally a more gradual and consensual process” (p. 493) in democracies. This is reflective of Bajpai (2010) when he notes that the neo-liberal view is that of the market economy as vital for national security: “Free trade is a relationship of mutual gain, even if the gain is asymmetric, and is therefore a factor in the relations between states (p. 523), highlighting the inexorable connection between foreign policy and economics.

Economics and Foreign Policy: Parallel Tracks

The evolution of Indian foreign policy from its neutral, non-aligned position, to its more outward looking policies of today, seems to be closely related to its economic reforms. Mohan (2010) suggests that nonalignment reflected the Indian belief that “emphases on sovereignty and self-reliance were effective antidotes to the perceived emergence of ‘neocolonialism’” (p. 137) and that the nation’s independent foreign policy was fundamental to its self-determination. Mehta (2009) suggests that there are two views of India’s nonalignment policy – the first, reminiscent of the nation-building echoed above when a weak country, just out from under the thumb of the great powers, would use non-alignment as a way to keep powers it was unable to fight, out of its domain, and using the idealist language of non-alignment to do so. India’s desire to be independent of colonial powers is demonstrated in both economic, as well as foreign, policy. Domestically India adopted ISI as well as other inward-looking economic policies which echoed their non-aligned, neutralist stance, which again highlights the vital connection between foreign policy and economics.

Conversely, Mehta suggests in his second view that foreign policy is a development of necessity which is suggested by Pant (2009) when recounting the change in Indian policy regarding what it previously coined “extra-regional navies” (p. 279) in the Indian Ocean. Such a change in position, it could be argued, has resulted from the increasing importance of the Indian Ocean as a means by which to obtain the energy necessary to fuel the growing economies of the area generally and of India in particular. This suggests that the impetus of ‘practicality’ will tend to sway in favor of economic interests.

The building of ties with other nations in the area also suggests economic motives that undergird foreign policy decisions, rather than ideology per se. This too suggests a pragmatic driver for foreign policy. Such pragmatism may also be seen in the array of coalition-building and bilateral activities and away from the more traditional “multilateral activism” (Mohan, 2010) in which India was previously engaged. For example, connections with the IBSA, (India, Brazil and South Africa), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as military and strategic ties to Tajikistan (Moore, 2007) show that India’s national security interests trump whatever past ideologies may have come into play. Additionally, Moore (2007) states that strategic possibilities for both China and India exist in Central Asia and that India can use the central Asian region as either a buffer against or a bridge to counterbalance China’s alliance with Pakistan which Frankel (2011) characterizes as “all embracing” (p. 7). In this way, India’s cooperation with Tajikistan suggests that India recognizes and is taking advantage of just such opportunities. As Khan (2011) notes regarding India’s strategic ties with Israel, “Nehru’s dream of leading a non-aligned bloc made Delhi to think (sic) any positive gesture towards Israel as harmful to its vital interests” (p. 133) however, today India is Israel’s defense industry’s largest market.

Central to India’s greater involvement in foreign affairs, is its fostering of strong

bilateral relationships and ownership of regional responsibilities which is, at its most fundamental level, a product of economic growth. As Pant (2009) notes, “India has been forced to shed some of the reticence that has characterized the conduct of its foreign policy in the post-independence period, and the country has been called upon to provide security in its neighborhood, including the Indian Ocean region” (p. 296). Indeed, Mohan (2010) suggests that India “is moving away from the traditional emphasis on equity and justice to the imperatives of order and stability” (p. 142) and it could be argued that a greater emphasis on such goals becomes a pragmatic priority when attempting to safeguard and perpetuate economic growth. These are but a handful of examples, yet they are significant in light of India’s historical adherence of non-alignment as foundational to its foreign policy. Central to the argument here is the fact that all of these foreign policy changes are undergirded and propelled by the powerful force of economics.

Looking Ahead

In considering the future of Indian foreign policy and where it may lead, one must keep in mind that economic forces are just as important, if not more so, than political considerations or ideology. This can clearly be demonstrated by the example set by the Indian debt crisis in the mid-late 1980s and the resulting market liberalization policies adopted in 1991. With this in mind, it is important to note that as India’s economy grows by leaps and bounds so will its global significance. As a result, Indian policy makers must articulate a cohesive foreign policy which, even with the changes that have already occurred, is still sorely lacking. This can be seen in India’s “warm” (Twining, 2008, p. 30) relationship with an oppressive military dictatorship in Myanmar. Twining notes that India “does not prioritize democracy promotion in its foreign policy” (p. 30) and this can be seen as a peculiarity considering India’s own political system. Another area of concern is New Delhi’s relationship with Teheran. Twining (2008) describes India’s economic relationship with Iran at some 4 billion dollars annually, and notes that Iranian oil exports to India account for 14% of aggregate Indian oil imports. Furthermore, Twining mentions that India and Iran are currently cooperating on a joint project to construct an oil pipeline between these two nations, through Pakistan. The relationship between India and Iran is somewhat inconsistent in light of India’s other bilateral relationships. For example, its close military and strategic relationship with Israel, outlined by Khan (2011). Israel, which views Iran as its greatest existential threat (ibid, 2011), has been selling military arms to India which are then used to fight Pakistan. Needless to say, the use of Israeli arms by India against a Muslim country – Pakistan – while India still maintains close economic ties with Iran, as mentioned above, must be seen as a glaring contradiction. To further complicate the matter, India also “enjoys non-oil trade of \$24 billion annually” (Twining, 2008, p. 6) with the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which “collectively constitute as big a market for Indian goods and services as the United States (ibid, p. 6). This relationship seems to be inherently incompatible both with India’s relationship with Israel, as well as its relationship with Iran, a Shiite state, when considering that Saudi Arabia is a Sunni state. As Twining (2007) notes:

Now that India is strong, boasts one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, and is being courted by the same great powers that once excluded it from their clubby ranks, Indian leaders will find that they will be expected to take clear positions on contentious issues (p. 31).

This highlights India’s need to clarify its foreign policy as it becomes part of the center stage of the international scene and to accept the expectation that will inevitably ensue. As Mohan (2010) offers, “India is learning to work with other powers to develop norms, even if they are not comprehensive, and implement them against the wishes of many past fellow travelers from the Third World (p. 141) which suggests that India will need to make difficult determinations that will challenge not only its foreign policy and define its place among the

India in the 21st Century

nations of the world, but will also cut to the core of India's identity. India's economic growth has propelled her to the forefront of international politics and trade. This position requires foreign policies that are congruent with its new role and which mark a new direction for India to support and protect its growing domestic economy and its economic interests abroad.

- Guy Ras

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The Abeyance

CAMPUS EVENT

**- March 27th, 5:45 PM,
Fromm Hall:**

- CLIMATE CHANGE -

An interview and book signing with

Nobel Laureate Burton Richter

(Paul Pigott Professor of Physical
Sciences Emeritus)

Stanford University

Notes Abroad:

- February 15th: Iran announces advancements in its nuclear capabilities, provoking increased tension between Iran and an international coalition aiming to stem Iran's nuclear program.

- March 10th: Thousands continue to protest the re-election of Russian President Vladimir Putin on claims of widespread fraud.

- March 11th: Japan commemorates the anniversary of the devastating earthquake and subsequent tsunami and nuclear disaster.

Domestic

- February 14th: President Obama proposed higher taxes on the rich and tax code restructures as part of a budget plan to reduce the U.S. budget deficit.

- March 6th: Presidential candidates Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum split several "Super Tuesday" victories, extending a contentious Republican nomination process

- March 16th: Gasoline prices climb 6 percent as political sparring and pipeline capability have reduced

output

The March Thought:

"The world economy has stepped back from the brink, and we have causes to be a little bit more optimistic, but optimism should not give us a sense of comfort, and certainly should not lull us into a false sense of security."

- Christine Lagarde, Head of IMF
On forecasting global economic conditions with prevailing problems in the Eurozone

Source: WSJ

The Interview

2011 began with sweeping pro democracy protests across the Arab world; an event now referred to as the Arab Spring. Egypt was one of the countries engulfed in protests and on February 11th 2011, Egyptians successfully ousted long time dictator Hosni Mubarak; however over a year has past and democracy is still far from being achieved. IAR staff writer Jeremy Ghassemi spoke with Stephen Zunes, professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of San Francisco, and discussed the how the revolution began, the challenges Egyptians currently face, and what the uprisings mean for American foreign policy. Egyptian born USF students, Aly el Sakhaw and Jeremiah Davis also provided their insight into what has transpired in Egypt over the last year.

Jeremy Ghassemi is senior staff writer for the International Affairs Review. Mr. Ghassemi holds a B.A. in Politics from the University of San Francisco, and will continue writing about politics and pursue a masters degree in international studies.

Aly el Sakhaw is a nineteen year-old student from Alexandria, Egypt. He is a freshman at USF majoring in Politics. Jeremiah Davis is a twenty two year-old student from Cairo, Egypt. He graduated from USF in 2011 with a B.A. in International Studies and is currently getting his M.A. in International Studies at USF.

Stephen Zunes is professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of San Francisco, where he coordinates the Middle Eastern Studies Program. He serves as a senior analyst for the Foreign Policy in Focus project at the Institute for Policy Studies and chairs the academic advisory committee of the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.

- February 8th, 2012

(**Ghassemi**): January 25th was previously known as National Police Day in Egypt, but after 2011, it will forever be known as the “Day of Revolt.” A day where Egyptians mobilized en masse to protest then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s dictatorship, police brutality, state of emergency laws, political corruption, high unemployment, restrictions on freedom of press and speech, and many other injustices fueled Egyptians to take command of their future and wellbeing. The protests were predominately nonviolent and after 18 days, on February 11th, Hosni Mubarak resigned from an office, which he held for 30 years. And today

we sit, nearly a year after that momentous occasion, with plenty discuss here in San Francisco and plenty to achieve in Egypt. To begin, Aly you were in Alexandria, during the revolution, can you describe what the atmosphere was like and how you felt during the protests? (**Aly**): On the 25th of January, I remember I was in downtown Alexandria. And it started when Ben Ali left Tunisia; everyone started talking “Egypt is not Tunisia, that’s not going to happen here.” But then, people started creating events on Facebook, about where to gather in Alexandria, places to go to. We went on the 25th, we started looking around, some people where gathering but not a lot. We felt frustrated; we felt that nothing will happen. But when I went back home on the 25th, approx midnight, the police started

The Egyptian Revolution: One Year Later

beating up the protestors in Cairo. And that's when it got serious. And two days later we had the day of rage, the Friday of rage, and basically that's when everything really started.

(Ghassemi): So, Jerry I know that you were away at that time because we had class, what was the feeling like being away? How were you able to contact your family members?

(Davis): At first, honestly, I kind of threw the protest aside, like all the other protests that AUC or other organizations would put together in Tahrir. So I thought, at least for the first day, that it was going to pass very quickly. So I wasn't too nervous about it. But once everything started to unravel, it was honestly very hard not to be there. My family they were all doing well, I wanted to go back, they wanted me to stay. They actually told me that I could probably have more damage, doing as much as I can do to help the cause from here. Rather than, being there because there was already, however many million of people that would be involved in the streets. And it was tough not to be there, but I really valued the experience I had here, what I was able to get involved with here. We (Jerry and professor Zunes) were able to put together a good teach-in here at the University of San Francisco. And San Francisco had one of the larger solidarity protests outside of Egypt, so it was a success in that way from not being able to be there. **(Ghassemi):** Was that held at civic center or around Market Street?

(Davis): That one started at the UN Plaza and then walking through civic center, coming on market and coming back through the plaza. Overall it was unfortunate not being there (Egypt), but I valued my experience.

(Ghassemi): Professor Zunes, what was it like teaching Middle Eastern politics during that event and seeing all these sweeping changes happen in real time.

(Zunes): It felt like it must have felt to teach eastern European politics during 1989. To see the amazing things going on, not just in Egypt of course, but throughout the Arab world. And it was pretty intense for me because of the two research areas that I am best known for are middle eastern politics and unarmed insurrections against authoritarian regimes. I've written about

such uprisings in the Philippines and Serbia and Bolivia and other countries and here it is in the region of my specialization. It was also exciting because I had actually co-lead a seminar at the Inn Khaldun Center in Cairo just a couple years earlier on the history and dynamics of strategic nonviolent action. And so I knew that there was interest by Egyptian oppositionists, I knew that they were thinking about possibly doing this. I had seen the trends in Egypt that I'd seen in these other countries prior to the uprising: a dramatic increase in strike by labor movements, small but growing pro democracy struggles, and an explosion of NGOs and communications through social media and other things, as well as a series of regime blunders. The murder of a famous blogger, the parliamentary elections that fall that were even more transparently fraudulent than usual and I actually predicted, in an article published early December, which was even before the Tunisian uprising, that Egypt could be the very next country to experience this very kind of pro democracy uprising. I didn't expect it to happen as soon as it did or as quickly as it did. But, I can definitely see it coming to a degree and it was just so exciting to see it unfold that

winter. **(Davis):** And professor Zunes has a piece in Civilian Jihad, just check out the book, its basically a collaboration of all sorts of thinkers in this field, who in a lot of ways called what was going to happen. Who said that the stage was already set and they were just writing about it. **(Zunes):** And it came out prior to the uprisings, it was on that very topic: non-violent resistance in the Arab world for democracy.

(Ghassemi): So when did it become apparent to you three that Mubarak could very well be on his way out? When did you all start believing? Was it the "Day of Rage" for you Aly? I know you mentioned it previously. **(Aly):** The day of rage, honestly I have never seen my country in such chaos. I live thirty minutes away from Alexandria and there is an army base where I live. And that's where at 6 o'clock, the tanks started rolling down and we knew that, something is going wrong. No police in the street whatsoever,

it's the army taking charge, and just thugs everywhere along the streets. So we kind of felt like the regime is actually feeling the pressure now, they can't handle it anymore. And they just continued, a couple of days later, they kept resisting, but every time more people would go (to protest). Where I live there is a mosque, the Ibrahim Mosque, its like our Tahrir square in Alexandria, more people started going. More people started going in Suez, more people started going in Cairo. And after his (Mubarak's) first speech, he made a split between people's opinions, but still a lot of peoples' minds were made up. **(Davis)**: The day that I would say, was the day that the cell phone connection was cut off as well as the internet...

(Ghassemi): And that was the 26th? **(Aly)**: It was the 27th. At night we started losing connection. **(Davis)**: And it lasted for about 5 days, so I thought right there, right from the beginning that that was going to be a humongous problem, considering, already people trying to bring down the regime. And then now completely cutting them off, sending them outside instead of in their homes on the internet, so forcing them basically to going to the streets. **(Zunes)**: I was looking forward to the 25th, I had heard about it and what I assumed, and from what I understand from the main organizers what they had assumed, was that it would be much larger than the other pro democracy demonstrations they've had. It would be pretty quickly dispersed, but hopefully they would be inspired to come back in a few days later, or whatever. But when it ended up being hundreds of thousands of people, I thought to myself, whoa, they might actually pull this off. And then I still wasn't sure how it would go but then Friday, when the number was even larger. I began thinking that they might just bring him down.

(Ghassemi): And during that time what do you think was the biggest obstacle Egyptians faced during those 18 days. You (Jerry) might have touched on that with the cell phones being cut off, but to you what was the biggest obstacle from the 25th to the 11th (of February)? **(Aly)**: I would say just having more people to go,

because after his speech, a lot of people were like "we can leave him, he can stay in power until September, he said he would leave in September, so just go back home guys its not that big of a problem." People thought about "the country, the economy, our beloved Egypt." But I think that that was the biggest threat at the time, the split in our opinions as Egyptians, I think that was the biggest threat. But we got through it. **(Davis)**: I would say that in conjunction to what Aly was saying was that, the fear, basically getting over a certain type of fear of actually being able to go outside. It had been 30 years where very little political activity from everyday people, who aren't necessarily politicians or involved in some way like that. And there was a fear because there was a large split between two different schools of thought, I believe, on what they thought the future of the country was. So in a lot of ways there was an older generation who hadn't caused the revolution and who also felt that their president was their president and in a way almost like a father figure, I've heard that several times from people. So, I think it was getting over a certain fear but then also getting over the fact that our parents and certain people are telling us otherwise also.

(Ghassemi): Anything to add? (To Zunes) **(Zunes)**: Indeed. There has long been a sense of fatalism in the Arab world, that its either local despots or foreign imperialists are always going to determine our fate. There is that fear and a combination of repression or divide and rule or minor concessions, that his son will not succeed or he will shake up the cabinet might end up getting enough people to fall back that it would add up to that sense of discouragement and powerlessness. And yet the fortitude was really impressive, the youthful energy was so impressive, and also just strategically and tactically, I think was brilliant. I study nonviolent action, not from the perspective of a pacifist, not from the perspective of a Ghandian or anything like that, I basically approach it from a strategic studies area, the same way a lot of people study guerrilla war, for example. And I must say, the folks down in Tahrir Square, they were brilliant.

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(Ghassemi): Fantastic, so we've heard plenty about how Facebook, Twitter, and other social media mobilized people but what has not been discussed completely that can also be accredited to Mubarak's downfall? **(Zunes)**: I think it was certainly useful in terms of getting around government repression, raising consciousness about abuses by the authorities, and to a limited extent to some tactical coordination. Let's remember that only 15% of Egyptians even had access to the internet and much of those were through heavily patrolled internet cafes. Secondly, the movement grew the most during those four or five days when the internet was shutdown and cell phone service was cutoff, in fact if anything, it might have increased the numbers because a lot of people who were at home trying to follow what was going on, couldn't trust the state media of course, they couldn't find out on the internet, so they went out themselves and got swept up, and even more so parents who were worried about their kids, couldn't call their kids, went out looking for them and they joined the masses. And given the fact that we have had successful nonviolent insurrections in Eastern Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, Africa, before they had social media and widespread access to the internet, I think it serves as a reminder that it is a tool, nothing more. When people are dedicated to a struggle, they will find a way of communicating, one way or another. So in other words, while it was useful in a whole number of ways, I don't want to fall into kind of technological determinism that that somehow caused the revolution.

(Ghassemi): Calling it a Facebook revolution basically, is dismissive?

(Zunes): Yes, western technology saves the day kind of thing. **(Davis)**: But as far as others...

(Ghassemi): April 6th movement?

(Aly): Yes **(Davis)**: I would say Ultras, which are; they are the hooligans; "football fans."

They are basically a set of fans, who work with a team, who believe in a team until it's death, you know? (Laughs) **(Ghassemi)**:

Yes (Laughs) **(Davis)**: So these Ultras were a very large part of the frontlines, a lot of the

violence, and a lot of the martyrs who died in the revolution were a lot of ultras of different football clubs. That would be one thing that I would say is not discussed enough in comparison to technology. Another would be, just people in general. You have April 6th movement, Kefaya (enough in Arabic), and different movements who were able to spearhead and direct things. But just the sheer power of the numbers, of people, there is nothing any force can do in response to that. And I think that wasn't talked about enough. You are always looking for what are the plans? What are the causes? Who did this? How did this happen? But what I saw that it was just a lot of people overpowering.

(Ghassemi): Anything to add Aly? **(Aly)**: Yea I completely agree with Jerry. I mean the ultras, were guarding the entrance of Tahrir Square. They follow their teams everywhere and they always see what police brutality is, at every match. So they already know how the police system in Egypt works, they know they. So they knew how to defend the protestors, how to guard the protestors, they were very well organized..

(Davis): Because it reflects a soccer match in a way. (Laughs) **(Aly)**: Exactly, a lot of people and they are used to it, so they did a very good job; all of the movements.

(Ghassemi): What role did Otpor, the Serbian youth movement that overthrew Milosevic, have in this revolution? Was it (their role) only with the April 6th organizers?

(Zunes): At the Inn Khaldun workshop that I was at was the very first time that Otpor people met people in the Egyptian opposition I helped introduce them actually. But we also had people from South Africa, from the AMCUDF anti apartheid struggle as well as a leader in the first Palestinian Intifada. So it wasn't just Serbians, but other people who had experience in this kind of thing. Subsequently, a handful of Egyptian activists did go to Belgrade, to train with Otpor veterans, they have a group called C.A.N.V.A.S.: Center for Applied Non Violent Action and Strategies based in Belgrade. But from what I heard they do good work, and I'm friends with them, I've worked

with them in several countries; but I heard some complaints that their work was rather formulaic. They had some good ideas, but some that didn't really apply, so I think it is very useful in any struggle to learn from parallel struggles in other countries. This idea that some conspiracy theorists have had that, this was somehow a conspiracy by foreign NGOs and because Otpor had twelve to thirteen years earlier had gotten a small amount of money from the National Endowment for Democracy, which is funded by the U.S. government, therefore the US government was part of this conspiracy, I mean it gets really, really, out of hand. It reminds me of the idea that "oh if a couple Cuban advisors trained some guerillas in the use of this weapon, therefore they were responsible for the guerrilla revolution." I, again, I respect the work of CANVAS does, but I think we need to be really careful to not overstate their impact. **(Davis)**: One thing I would add to that is exactly what he said, is that I think in any movement, you are just always trying to find the best resources and pull the different resources that you have because obviously you are trying to something that has never really been done before. So you're going to try to find help from any movement, anywhere. **(Zunes)**: And to somebody who has studied a number of these uprisings, there were things that Egyptians did that were unique, that have never been done before, anywhere else. **(Ghassemi)**: Can you elaborate? **(Zunes)**: New tactics. The reason January 25th worked itself, and I've never heard this in any case, was that they advertised on Facebook and elsewhere, ok, we're going to meet at these half dozen or so main squares and walk down these boulevards towards Tahrir. But of course the government can read Facebook, and they had all their troops and tanks are ready to block the roads, and break up things in the square. But through word of mouth and other ways, they said "no", we're actually gathering at dozens of smaller squares, going through these little back alleys, many of which are too narrow for the army personal carriers and tanks to go through. And, then you got an amazing

scene, I wished I could have been there, when people coming out of the alleys and just see all these people; I've never seen that before and there are a number of other examples as well. So this is very much a homegrown revolution, let's make no mistake about that.

(Ghassemi): That's an amazing story; I've never heard that before. 18 days after the 25th, Mubarak is gone and during that time, between the 25th and the 11th of February, the military at least through my perspective from watching it on the news, they almost seemed like allies to the cause. They refused to fire live rounds, and there was images of them standing side by side with the protestors. But why has this changed so drastically? And why has the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces of Egypt, or SCAF, just suddenly engage in a military junta? How did this suddenly come about? **(Davis)**: Well I would say that they were in a military junta the whole time and what we are seeing right now are their true colors. I would say that the military was strategic in its plan to take the side of the protestors and not Mubarak. I think that they were scared of the people in a lot of ways. I do think that they are one of the strongest institutions, or the strongest institution in the country, also and very well respected. So in a lot of ways the people didn't want an altercation with the military, but at the same time right now if your not on the side of the revolutionaries or if your not on the side of having progress or having development or value in human rights, at least those types of issues, then you are thrown aside. And the military is finding themselves in that kind of position now. **(Ghassemi)**: Aly, while you were on the ground in Alexandria, were you able to see that shift, basically the junta starting? **(Aly)**: When Mubarak stepped down, we were all in love the soldiers and the tanks, we were taking pictures next to the tanks, high fives; it was honestly a good feeling but there was some doubt that something is not right. So now what? Should we all go back home? And that's what happened, and should we all go back home and let the Army take charge. They know

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more, they know better, they know how the country works, I mean... **(Davis)**: They're the army. **(Aly)**: It's the army, we've always this feeling that the army is not corrupted, the Egyptian government, but the army? No way. The army is men of honor.

(Ghassemi): What gave that ideology, that belief? **(Aly)**: I would say our history.

(Zunes): It goes back to 1952 and the revolution... **(Aly)**: And '73.. **(Zunes)**: The revolution that overthrew the corrupt King Farouk and the dynasty, and established the Republic. And despite Nasser's many faults he did push wealth downward, he abolished the old feudal system, established a good education system, and gave a lot of hope for folks. And this is in contrast to the police, who were notoriously corrupt, through bribery, extortion, and some of the worst torture all that kind of stuff went on in the police. And the military were seen as above that. Now at the same time of course, the military was always the backbone of Mubarak's regime, he was head of the air force, before he became Sadat's vice president, and then president. And when they got rid of Mubarak it was more of the coup de grace than a coup d'état. I mean it was pretty clear from Mubarak's non-resignation speech on day seventeen that if they didn't push him aside, they could be conceivably swept away with him. And also of course the fact that while individual police profited from the system, an individual soldier was just a normal everyday Egyptian almost every Egyptian family has a cousin or brother, or somebody in the military so there is that kind of connection. I don't doubt for a moment that if Mubarak thought he'd get away with it, he would have ordered a Tiananmen Square type massacre in Tahrir Square. But I think even the more hard-line generals who supported him, would have been willing to order that, knew that the troops would not. They wouldn't obey.

(Davis): Yea, that's true. **(Ghassemi)**: We know that SCAF has been basically abusing protestors in Tahrir and other places, did that happen almost immediate or was it a response toward people demanding a

transition to democracy? When did that come about? **(Davis)**: well that's why I would say they were showing their true colors, because I don't think they really made a distinction between when they were going to change their plan at all. I think they had the same plan the entire time, they were expecting people to go home, they were expecting activists to slow down, and for everything to slow down so that this would be the last government transition. The SCAF, since March, April, May, they were harassing protestors in Tahrir. Once the cameras left they were doing massacres. I don't know how many thousand, twelve thousand, to fifteen thousand, to eighteen thousand people have been arrested, a lot of them being activists, a lot of the people who were just involved in the revolution. It really started right away, because I don't think they're plan was any different from the beginning. **(Ghassemi)**: And what other type of abuses has SCAF committed since? **(Aly)**: Oh, killing. Killing and throwing people in the garbage cans.

(Zunes): Torture and shooting into unarmed demonstrations, vicious censorship, military trials, secret military tribunals, where people will get long sentences for such crimes as insulting the military. They refused to lift the emergency law, which had been around for thirty years, which was one of the very first demands by the protestors, and despite all of these abuses they are still getting their 1.5 billion dollars or US taxpayer funded assistance annually. **(Davis)**: And actually that's all just physical abuse, even besides the verbal abuse of completely tarnishing the protestor's names, tarnishing the reputations of all these individuals, tarnishing Mohamed ElBaradei as a presidential nomination, as well as April 6th movement, a lot of the youth movements, by calling them thugs.

(Zunes): Slander and liable and you get the thugs to attack and harass people. One thing that's important to remember about the military is that they're not just a monopoly of force, but their role in the economy. They own huge sections of the economy, everything from whole manufacturing sectors to luxury tourist resorts and they don't want accountability, they like their

privileged position. The army in Egypt plays a similar role to a ruling autocratic party in a lot of other countries, or a crony capitalist class in some. It's comparable; I think neither side will like this analogy, to the revolutionary guard in Iran that their fingers are into everything, basically. It's guarding that privilege, I think, and protecting that privilege is one thing that has made them so rigid and reluctant to actually provide for a more transparent and democratic system.

(Aly): I will just like to add something, the real problem. We have a term in Egypt that we have been using ever since Mubarak left, which is the "party of the couch." Which are everyday people who are not as involved in party politics or politics in general. They just sit on the couch watching their TV and just make up their own minds and decisions. The name in Arabic is "hizb el kanaba." The problem is that the SCAF they manage to brainwash a lot of people into believing that Mohamed ElBaradei, 6th of April Movement, that its all a conspiracy basically. "They went to Serbia and received money, don't believe them, we want to settle things down because Egypt is going into a crisis and we want the wheel of productivity to get Egypt working again." **(Zunes):** "Those nasty protestors are disrupting things and hurting the economy." And they will prosecute people, arrest people; close down office of NGOs that get a few thousand dollars from foreign foundations. While they receive a billion (dollars) in foreign aide from the United States and they also have no objections to the millions of dollars from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Gulf sources to support the Islamists. **(Aly):** That's another problem.

(Davis): It's perfect what they're saying too because basically the Egyptian government through the media is trying to convince the people that Egypt's bankrupt. When this past month figures have come out that exports are one of the highest percentage growth as well as the Suez Canal has grown by eleven percent. It's not to say that the economy is booming, and it has suffered through tourism and other different factors of the economy, but in general they're trying to completely say that the protestors are to blame for the

suffering economy.

(Ghassemi): So what have activists done to combat these abuses, they obviously have to change their strategy a little bit to remain nonviolent? I mean they're facing a pretty incredible opposition right now.

(Aly): A month ago, 6th of April Movement, they started this, what would it be called?

(Asks Jerry). **(Davis):** It's a liars campaign.

(Aly): It's a campaign and it's called Liars (Kaziboon in Arabic). Basically in every city in Egypt they went and showed pictures, movies, of what SCAF.. **(Davis):** Brutality..

(Aly): Yea, what SCAF is all about, what they're doing on the streets.

(Zunes): Including a deliberate divide and rule between Christians and Muslims, just like Mubarak used to do. **(Ghassemi):** Between the Coptics and Muslims?

(Zunes): Exactly. **(Davis):** And so the government they try to make it seem as if there is a conflict, but the people are constantly saying that they're "one hand." It is just an attempt to pin religion versus religion.

(Aly): Yes, that's true because what professor Zunes just said, the SCAF they destroyed churches and they said, "it's not our fault we didn't do anything"... **(Davis):**

"Its al-Qaeda" (laughs) **(Aly):** They were trying to get Muslims and Christians to fight, just so they can, like... **(Ghassemi):** So that they can still be in power.

(Aly): Yea, exactly, just let the people fight. **(Ghassemi):** And on the ground when people are being shot and dying, how are activists able to get aid? Are they setting up medical tents, how is that

going about? **(Davis):** All over Tahrir, it's filled with medical tents. There are students from universities all over Cairo who come to the square to help out with anything. And they supply everything, they're quite a strong group of individuals, these are all selfless people, without any party affiliation. They don't really care actually, they only care about the country, and they don't even care about politics. And one more thing about the campaign, when Aly was saying about the campaign, Kaziboon, what's amazing about this campaign is that a lot of people have

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very little internet access, so the fact that you're able to get in a large area, maybe in a square, you're able to put a film strip, you're able to put up a large cinema type projector and for a lot of people, a lot of people haven't seen the police brutality if you weren't in Tahrir. Other than internet shots that people at home who have the money, who have laptops, computers, these things as well as a lot of people spend their time in the streets. So naturally, a lot of people, even if they had nothing to do with the campaign, they didn't know about it, naturally they get brought into the square to see things to watch these videos. And then they're hearts and minds begin to change. **(Aly)**: Yea exactly, it happened all over Egypt too.

(Ghassemi): So professor Zunes, this question is for you, why did abuses by SCAF take months to make headlines in the United States? **(Zunes)**: Well I think it's been escalating, there was that initial incident in April, which broke up a demonstration, but things have been getting worse. And historically, when you have hundreds or thousands of millions of people in the streets its good coverage, whereas this crackdown was generally smaller scale and the like. And also people want a happy ending and so people want to think that there was a happy ending and that was it. And finally once again, it's been a long tradition of the United States to highlight abuses by authoritarian regimes that don't support US hegemony, while to downplay or ignore human rights abuses by regimes that are supportive of US policy goals in the region. **(Ghassemi)**: And now is there anything currently that is not covered at all or not covered properly by major networks in this country? **(Zunes)**: I think a lot of the networks kind of bought into the line of sectarian strife, exaggerating the...

(Ghassemi): The clashes in May we saw between Copts and Muslims.

(Zunes): Yea and not aware of the efforts by the regime to manipulate that. While I do not personally do not like the policies or positions of the Muslim Brotherhood, I think there is a tendency to kind of lump

them with the Salafis and more extreme elements, which gives people the impression "that maybe we should support the military after all, because without democracy the crazy fundamentalists will take over and support al-Qaeda and destroy Israel," you know that kind of thing. I think there is also a degree into which people don't provide enough agencies for the people who made the revolution. Again exaggerating the rule of foreign governments, or foreign NGOs, or the internet, that kind of thing. And a failure to recognize that power comes from the people themselves and that this is very much a homegrown, indigenous movement, that came from the courage and tenacity, and brilliant tactical and strategic thinking of Egyptians themselves. **(Ghassemi)**: Would you guys like to add? **(Aly and Davis)**: He actually said everything! (Laughs)

(Davis): Because the Muslim Brotherhood, a key thing is that they're not what the media portrays them out to be and also Egyptians and Muslims are not just following a Muslim political party, which I think is the assumption that's made. When I was in Tahrir this year anniversary, there was a lot of backlash of protestors toward the Muslim Brotherhood, because the Brotherhood has made some sort of assumption that the broader Muslim population is on their side. And its even "haram", it will even be against religion, against they're beliefs, if they didn't support them. So that's the kind of main thing I wanted to point out. **(Ghassemi)**: What does SCAF and its chairman Mohammad Hussein Tantawi; need to do, today, in order for democracy to transition properly? **(Aly)**: the people demand a date for the presidential elections but what they said, after all that's been happening since the match and the people that have been everywhere; they just announced that presidential candidates could run. But they didn't announce the date, so that's a problem, so the people are still angry.

(Davis): I will also say that the first thing will be to apologize to the people of Egypt, the hundreds and up to thousands of people that have died for security violence and then I would also put right away and

end to military rule, transfer to a civilian government, much sooner than the day that they have proposed. The third thing would be to end emergency law and not in the way that they did a couple of weeks ago by saying that emergency law will only apply towards “thugs” because we don’t know who those thugs are and thugs, what does that even mean? I would say a real end to military rule and an end to their own rule.

(Ghassemi): (To Zunes) Do you agree with what has been said? **(Zunes):** Yes, what’s even more important I think is to simply lift the emergency laws and basically guarantee freedom of political organization, freedom of assembly protest, freedom of the media, transparency, lift the laws that make criticism and inquiry into abuses by military into a government crime, lift all this, because frankly, I think that if you have all these basic rights, basic civil and political rights, the details of how the elections work or things are structural or whatever, will work themselves out. So I think that is the most key piece.

(Ghassemi): I know Jerry, that you mentioned it previously, that you were back in Egypt, as was Aly, during USF’s winter break, what was atmosphere like if you can compare it from when you were there originally to now? **(Aly):** In Alexandria, people are mad, they don’t understand what’s going on. They just listen, opposition, SCAF, what’s going on, they don’t understand anything. Everyday Egyptians they’re not really, its not in our, err, I’m not going to say its not in our culture, but in the past sixty years I would say, politics was not our thing. So right now we don’t understand what’s going on. “We had a revolution, why are the protesting right now? Why are there people in Tahrir Square protesting?” So the people are just frustrated and mad; that’s what I felt. And it is only getting worse, honestly.

(Ghassemi): And what was the mood like in Tahrir when you (Jerry) were there on the 25th (of 2012), on the anniversary?

(Davis): The mood was of course amazing; people hadn’t been anticipating this day because we weren’t sure whether it was going to be violent, whether it was going

to be peaceful. We hoped it would be peaceful but we weren’t sure if the military would intervene. I thought one of the larger debates was whether this was going to be a party, basically. Whether this was going to be a celebratory event or whether this was going to just be a renewal of an unfinished revolution? And I would say from my experiences that it was more of a renewal of an unfinished revolution.

(Ghassemi): Anything to add?

(Zunes): Well this is an observation I had while I was in Cairo this summer, I was at a café not far from Tahrir Square, and there was a TV, the sound was off but I can see the images, it was the evening news. And previous times I’d been to Egypt the news consisted of Mubarak giving a speech, Mubarak meeting a foreign dignitary, Mubarak a widget factory, and this was about a labor strike in Alexandria, relatives of the martyrs in front of the Interior of Ministry (building), the uprising in Yemen, the uprisings in Syria, and I thought (to myself) who are the newsmakers now? Who is shaping history? It’s not just the men in suits, its ordinary people. And I think despite the many, many obstacles facing Egypt, and the long road still needed to have a functional democracy, much establish some social justice, I think it’s pretty clear who will determine Egypt’s future. And it’s going to be ordinary people. **(Davis):** Yes. One chant actually that I heard several times in Tahrir, that kind of summed it up in a lot of ways for me and that division, whether this was a festival or not, was, and this chant was coming from every – basically there was a march from all the several districts of Cairo all into Tahrir Square. And I participated in one of them from Maadi (Jerry’s hometown) to Cairo. And what everyone, you can hear it, just reverberating around and while you were coming into Tahrir was “di thawra mish zafla, di thawra mish zafla.” “This is revolution, this is not a party. This is a revolution, this is not a party,” because the people who were in the square that we were coming to meet, were the Muslim Brotherhood, who had controlled all the stages, who put a lot of music, nice pins, got snacks and nice sweets

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for the people to enjoy, but really people were serious they didn't want to mess around this time, they knew exactly what to do from the year before.

(Ghassemi): So let's move onto the parliamentary elections that concluded this year in January. The Muslim Brotherhood's, Freedom and Justice Party, and the Salafist's, Nour Party won plenty of votes, and received 356 seats of the assembly combined.

Were any of you surprised by this result?

(Zunes): They (Muslim Brotherhood) did better than I expected, not hugely better than I expected, but better than I expected. The real surprise was how well the Salafis did, that was a real shock, because the polls had shown saw the Salafis under five percent. And even the Brotherhood was more in the twenties. It showed a number of things, it showed that the young more secular democrats didn't have the experienced resources for canvassing and organizing and that kind of thing. The Brotherhood had been around since 1928. And the other piece was the way that the regime would allow them, both the Salafis and the Brotherhood, to openly violate campaign laws like passing out sample ballots in line and that kind of thing which they would not allow the more liberal, secular groups. And I'm one of those who do believe that there was some degree of collusion between the SCAF and the Islamists.

(Ghassemi): With the new assembly, the way it is shaped up, do you think they will govern Egypt fairly and bring Egyptians the freedom that they have yearned for, or will certain hard-line ideologies negate that?

(Davis): The parliament? **(Ghassemi):** Yes the parliament.

(Davis): I would say that whoever is in leadership for Egypt is going to have to work for the people, there is no chance at this point. Look, one year ago, it was the army and the people were one hand, a year later the army have dirty hands. So, the same thing will happen for the Muslim Brotherhood who is going to be in power, the same thing will happen for anybody coming into power these next couple of years.

Everyone is going to be very critical, I think

if you don't have solutions for 85 million people, then you have to get out of the way.

(Ghassemi): (To Aly) Want to add anything? **(Aly):** Well I don't know about this parliament because I don't feel like this is the parliament of the revolution. Its not a parliament, er where is the youth? Ok maybe it might have been their fault because they weren't well organized, the Muslim Brotherhood have been around for eighty years now, they know politics, they were prepared for this day, they've been waiting for this day ever since day one. But the thing is, we're watching the parliament and we're watching how our representatives are talking and it's not our parliament, honestly. We have a huge problem and they're not even addressing it properly. That's our main problem and I don't have faith in this parliament. We can say that it was (the election) free and no fraud but I don't put

my trust in this parliament. **(Ghassemi):** Should the SCAF have dissolved before these parliamentary elections, and on that same tune should they dissolve before the presidential election, in order for those elections to be seen as legitimate? I'm just curious by this because I don't know if the two can work together. **(Davis):** I don't see them dissolving anytime before elections actually happen, they see themselves as the institution that will protect the process.

(Zunes): As concerned as I am about Islamists, I still think that the military is a much bigger threat toward democracy than the Brotherhood is. And I'm still hopeful that they're pragmatic enough that they will ally with the more secular democratic forces and not with the Salafis. Of course they can kind of play with that, have a good cop bad cop kind of thing and say well, accept our social conservatism or we will ally with the Salafis. But when you look at the history of other countries, look at Latin America for example, which overthrew their dictators through these popular struggles, for the subsequent years they had some pretty conservative, democratically elected, fairly conservative status quo (representatives). The same kind of coalition of wealthy business people and landowners and conservative elements that

had ruled the country dictatorially; but by allowing the political space for labor, minorities, women groups, peasants, et cetera to organize, a new generation of more progressive movements and parties emerged and these popular democratic progressive governments no rule most of Latin America. So I see a similar scenario in Egypt that we will probably have governments dominated by the Brotherhood and more conservative elements, but hopefully those that are, have a more open system, so that the people who in their twenties played such a major role in the revolution, by their forties, will be the ones who end up governing and bringing Egypt into a more generally, democratic future. So it is going to take time and it's going to be a continued struggle and it's going to be, two steps forward, one step back. Though I am not very hopeful for Egypt in the short term, I am hopeful in the long term. **(Ghassemi)**: So what do these victories mean for Egypt's Coptic demographic? Or is that more related to, as Professor Zunes said earlier in the interview, that SCAF was pretty nefarious in their dealings with the Coptic demographic?

(Davis): Yea they've instigated a lot of these problems. First of all, about ninety thousand Copts have left Egypt since the revolution, so of course there was some fear, the United States I believe will offer some asylum, I believe that some of this population takes advantage of the fact of being able to just get a visa and get out of the country.

(Zunes): They have more relatives in the West than Muslim Egyptians do

proportionally. **(Davis)**: Exactly, so I don't think at this point, even before the Muslim Brotherhood was a "no-no", and right now we're arguing between Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi, so obviously people are going to change, you're going to change your mindset. Egypt has had Muslims and Christians living together for over a thousand years, they have a history together. So I don't think there is going to be too much of a problem from this point on because the revolution was spearheaded by a human rights focus, like theme. Really Copts and Muslims fought together, died together, and protected one of each other.

(Ghassemi): So is that sense of history going to be translated into security in the future, between these two sects?

(Davis): Yea. Before, our country was run in a way where it seemed as if there was a necessary security for Christians. And our pope, the Coptic pope Shenouda, he was a politician in a way where he tried to get the government to protect the church. Now, the people want to be protected by the constitution and through actual rights in the country. So this previous history of some Christian populations being second-class citizens, I don't think that will (last), I think it is going to become more of a class

issue more than religious issue. **(Aly)**: I agree with Jerry, I don't see it as a problem Christians and Muslims have been living in Egypt together for a long, long time. It might have been during Mubarak's regime that they actually tried to make so as we have this huge problem between Christians and Muslims. If I can go back to the elections of parliament, the biggest disappointment was Copts living in the United States, everywhere not even (just Copts), Egyptians living abroad, who didn't vote, or didn't vote enough during the elections. The numbers were disappointing. They didn't feel like they wanted to... I don't know what it is.

(Davis): I was going to say quickly that also with this Christian aspect, as well there was a small group of Egyptian Christians who had been calling for the United States to come and protect the Christian population. This, I would say, represents a very small minority of the Egyptian population actually living in Egypt who were actually calling for another country's government to protect them and I think in a lot of ways, was promoted by the Christian groups in the United States who were being lobbied in a way.

(Zunes): You don't want the Copts to go the way of the Maronites.

(Ghassemi): So let's switch gears a little bit, we talked about the assembly earlier, but let's start talking about the presidential elections. So SCAF has set a deadline for June. First off, who do you think will be best fit to become Egypt's first elected president? **(Aly)**: That's a good question. I

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was rooting for Mohamed ElBaradei for such a long time but he decided not to partake in the next presidential elections, which is (unfortunate). I completely respect the man, for his decision, because he feels that we are not in an atmosphere that will give him a chance to actually win. Or even have good competition. **(Davis)**: Fair competition.

(Aly): Or fair competition. Today I would say there is, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, he is a very good man. He used to be a part of the Muslim Brotherhood, but then he left them, he criticizes them and he represents middle Islam, moderate (Islam). **(Ghassemi)**: So both the two of you agree, that he is a viable candidate, for the future of Egypt.

(Davis): I would say that I have no idea who is a viable candidate. They haven't even campaigned very much at all. Which I think is one of the travesties of this whole election process, is that the campaigning is near zero. Aboul Fotouh is a good candidate, I'd say Amr Moussa is a no, he is a remnant of the Mubarak regime and then I would say ElBaradei was quite possibly one of the better candidates but right now its looking bleak. **(Aly)**: I would add something; that the problem is a lot of people in Egypt think that a presidential candidate that does not have the support of the Muslim Brotherhood has no chance. **(Ghassemi)**: Really?

(Aly): Yea, that's their problem. "If the Muslim Brotherhood supports this or this guy, then ok they're going to win", because they know how to get to the people

(Ghassemi): Does that discourage people to vote for someone other than a person who is sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood?

(Aly): No it doesn't, but the majority of the people follow the Muslim Brotherhood.

(Davis): I would say that the reason they follow is that the way religion is twisted; by the way the Muslim Brotherhood uses religion to their advantage. You can go to the election lines, right before they voted, and ask anyone "who are the candidates?" They'd tell you, "I don't know who the candidates are." "Well why are you voting?" "Because either, one, I was threatened for a ticket, for five hundred pounds if I didn't

go and vote, or two, they'd tell you well I'm voting for a Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi because at least they believe in God." **(Aly)**: They fell obligate. "I want to go to heaven so I'll vote this way." **(Zunes)**: And also it's interesting they (Muslim Brotherhood) have really downplayed their theocratic aspects and really stressed the social justice and economic development and all the good things that any smart, political party would do (during the campaign process).

(Ghassemi): So now, I just want to touch on the events that happened at the beginning of this month in Port Said, the pretty horrific soccer violence that happened there. Seventy-four people were crushed to death, suffocated, or fatally stabbed. **(Davis)**: Eighty. **(Ghassemi)**: Eighty (people), after a pitch invasion by the home side al Masry, which had just beaten Cairo's, al Ahly which is Egypt's most successful club. Now since more reports are being done on this event, on this tragedy, is this something deeper than just football hooliganism? What is the story coming from Egypt? **(Aly)**: I would say definitely (it is more than hooliganism) because this morning actually I was reading the news and some people, a lot of people, say that its not actually seventy eight people that died, but the truth is, its one hundred and seventy eight people who actually died, and they're just lying to us on TV, which will not calm the people, but the number won't sound as big. The second thing is, I used to follow the ultras when they came to Alexandria, and I liked this team, Ahly. So I would sit with them, I will chant with them, I loved them. They're very good people and very respectful... **(Davis)**: He's a hop on fan, a jump on fan. (Laughs around the table)

(Aly): Only when they come to Alexandria.

(More laughs) **(Aly)**: The problem is, everyone knows that in Port Said, the team they were playing against (al Masry) have the worst fans. If you go there, you are going to get beaten up. So every time, even under Mubarak, every time the Ahly team goes there, they're protected by the police so they know that a lot of problems would happen.

(Ghassemi): So do you think this was deliberate negligence by the police to not protect, not just the players, but also everybody in the stadium? **(Davis)**: I would say it is too difficult to say. Honestly, this question is very difficult to respond to for all the stories. Look he (Aly) is telling you one hundred and seventy eight is up from seventy-four, that's how much of a travesty there is in the reporting of this. It is difficult.

(Zunes): When you think about it, one, is that most of the people who were killed, where some of the very people who played such an important role in the revolution. And secondly, just when Mubarak released all the thugs from prison during the uprising, the military wants to give the message "oh dear there is chaos and violence, we need to hold on power and be a heavy hand, too much democracy and too much openness can create these kind of tragedies. And so again, I have no way of knowing, but I think that the idea of deliberate negligence is quite possible.

(Ghassemi): And who are the al Ahly Ultras, you said that they are a well-organized group of, not just hardcore fans but also, pretty political savvy guys

(Davis): It's a support squad, these are also people who are very built individuals, they have unbelievable organization and prior to any of these events, and beginning of the revolution, they have been doing chants at soccer games against the government. So that was kind of a big deal, the fact that every large soccer game, and Ahly (being the biggest club), everyone is watching these games in a lot of ways, so everyone is hearing their fans just, not even worrying about the game, just chanting against the government.

(Zunes): And in certain ways that's why it ended up being the shock truth because most of the organizers in the pro democracy demonstration they didn't have experience in street fighting that kind of thing, and so when the guys with the camels and horses with their chains and whips and swords, attacked people (professor Zunes is referring to the events of February 2nd 2011) these ultras along with the youth wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, who also have some experience in street fighting, were able to take them

down and protect the larger numbers. But I think in many ways they were kind of young, anti authoritarian types, who happen to come together around a soccer club. But were really much more than that and I think that maybe why they have arguably, been targeted. **(Aly)**: I honestly find myself asking this question, though, after what happened: if the military can organize and protect the parliamentary elections in nine different provinces, then aren't you able to secure one soccer game? **(Zunes)**: Where you knew there would be trouble. **(Aly)**: You knew there would be trouble. Everyone knows.

(Davis): First large match after the anniversary (of the revolution) as well.

(Aly): It seemed like it was revenge against the Ultras because first of all, they protected Tahrir Square and they chant against the military and Tantawi, every game, anywhere.

(Ghassemi): When Mubarak was still in power was the soccer pitch a way for ultras and other people to vent about the regime? While Mubarak was in power, or did that escalate (in recent times)? **(Davis)**: I always found it in general a unifying experience being at a soccer game. It was just a place where people could feel togetherness.

(Aly): Honestly that's when they (the Ultras), even under Mubarak, they would go and they would chant the Ministry of the Interior, the police and their brutality. But at the end, people will still get beaten up, but they wouldn't mind, it wasn't as big as what happened last week.

(Ghassemi): So the end of our discussion will focus on foreign policy, so most of these questions will be directed to you professor Zunes. Regarding the U.S., what has the Obama administration done right, in response to the revolution and during the revolution, and what needs to be improved? **(Zunes)**: One thing I think Obama did apparently well, while he was not nearly as proactive as he should have been in supporting the revolution, he did make clear to the regime that if they were to engage in a Tiananmen Square type massacre in Tahrir Square, they could forget about any further aid or security cooperation. That

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was something of a deterrent perhaps, again I don't think they would do it anyway because the soldiers wouldn't have obeyed, that was extra protection against that kind of thing. The other advantage I think he presented was where Bush had kind of a structural view of democracy and human rights, "well if there are elections, there is democracy" at the United Nations he praised Mubarak's last election because he allowed for the first time, opponents. Even though he allowed only fifteen percent and threw them in jail.

(Ghassemi): Yea Ayman Nour (was one of those candidates) right? **(Zunes):** Yea. Obama has a more agency view, the idea of peaceful assembly, free press, that kind of thing and again that's also to his credit, but of course, the initial response to the situation was awful. Clinton's remarks about how stable the regime was and insisting that both sides refrain from violence, even that ninety five percent of it was coming from the regime. And they're finally getting serious now that nineteen Americans are about to go on trial, but I'd wish they'd come down a lot sooner given the ongoing repression by the SCAF. **(Davis):** Is that (the trials) including the son of the Secretary of Defense?

(Zunes): No, Secretary of Transportation.

(Ghassemi): So you mention the nineteen getting arrested and going to be charged criminally by SCAF, did that pressure (from Egypt) come about through maybe words that Congress has said? Because according to a New York Times article that I read, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont a democrat said that "the blank checks are over." And apparently Congress is saying that they want progress toward democracy to happen before this next fiscal year. How do you respond to that? **(Zunes):** It's about time they should have been doing this a long time ago and again it's only when Americans get in trouble that Congress finally steps up to the plate. And also the whole media coverage, you can talk about nineteen Americans but there are scores of Egyptians going on trial for this as well. One thing that the Egyptian revolution and similar uprisings has shown to the United States and other Western governments is that we can't just rely on authoritarians

for stability, until there is real democracy there will continue to be instability. And we can't be on the wrong side of history. There has been a big battle within the Obama administration that Clinton in the State Department and Gates, until recently, head of the Defense Department, was much more prone to support the military whereas the White House, which is people more closer personally to Obama, these are younger people, very much establishment, but more enlightened wing of the establishment I think seem to be more towards supporting the democratic forces. And similarly Congress has been divided as well.

(Ghassemi): These arrests were tied with American finance groups; they were non-profit groups that had to deal with non-partisanship and electoral monitoring. Now do you feel that these were valid agencies that the U.S. had in Egypt or was it meddling? **(Zunes):** First of all they did not play a role in the revolution. They mostly dealt with elite opposition, not the young grass roots people who weren't part of these groups. And even those that were offered funding from U.S. funded groups generally refuse it on principle. They were not major factors in the revolution. These are basic groups that are doing election monitoring and doing the kind of training how to run an election campaign, now that the country is free, or (rather) free-er in terms of being able to have contested elections, (teaching) the kind of basic, generic skills. But in general these are not the groups, with a few minor exceptions, that have been real active on the grass roots level. The other thing is, some of them are controversial, the International Republican Institute has in the aim of promoting democracy, has hung out with some rather shady characters in Venezuela who are opposing left leaning regimes, that seem to have a more ideological agenda. And so some of the activities, especially with the International Republican Institute had been a little sketchy, particularly in Latin America. But as far as I can tell, the work they're doing in Egypt, was pretty harmless. I don't think it was having a huge impact one way or the other in terms of bringing

democracy forward, but it was certainly not a kind of nefarious intervention that the (Egyptian) government is claiming. And like I say compared to the millions coming into (Egypt) from the gulf to support the Islamists and that kind of thing is really a drop in the bucket. **(Davis)**: And also, even if they were meddling, the emergency law makes sure that NGOs are completely choked anyways to the point where they are just completely controlled, they have government officials who work their boards. So I mean really NGOs have been going around the system for a long time anyways prior to that, some NGOs pose as businesses but are actually human rights organizations. So there are a lot of examples of these organizations who are already doing things a little differently than what the government had wanted but nothing completely out of the ordinary and how is this allowed when the government of Egypt receives billions of dollars each year (from the USA) so it's a little bit of a double standard. **(Ghassemi)**: That brings up my next question, does this event; could this lead to a suspension of the aid money? **(Zunes)**: There is that threat, which the likely possibility I think is that the charges will be dropped or they will be suspended sentence or expelled, or something like that. Worse case scenario is that there are some hard-line elements that will say, "screw the United States we will ally with China and Russia." But I think frankly, I highly doubt that scenario simply because the military enjoys their junkets to the U.S. and better quality equipment and everything else that comes from close relations to the United States. **(Ghassemi)**: I want you know from you two, Aly and Jerry, what is the perception of America on the ground in Cairo, Alexandria, and other places? Now that Mubarak is gone, do ordinary Egyptians still want the U.S. as an ally? **(Davis)**: I would say right now a lot of people aren't necessarily thinking about the United States; they're really consumed in what they've got going on in their own country. For the most part I don't think they have, I mean this has taught a lot of people to learn how to love this revolution, so I think there is acceptance

of every and any country to be an Egyptian ally. I don't think there is any special case scenario for the United States for where Egyptians think of them as being way better (than other nations) in anyway. Regular, everyday Egyptians do not have a problem being allied with the United States as long as their country wasn't forced to do anything that they'd didn't want to do and as long as the country was sovereign and allowed to work however they wanted to work.

(Aly): I would agree and disagree with Jerry, because I would say, as he said the people are consumed with what's going on right now they're not even thinking about foreign relations. But the problem is that the majority of people (in Egypt) when they think of America they associate American with Israel, that's a problem. So, if you ask any normal Egyptian on the street, what is America? He would probably say something about "Zionism. America, the Jews, Israel, Zionism," it's this big idea, especially right now, of conspiracy on Egypt, like we're in danger and it's partly their fault (USA and Israel) and they want Egypt to basically not have enough power in the Middle East. That's what I felt honestly. **(Davis)**: A lot of what the state news is really trying to make it seem like, is that there is some sort of external forces that are somehow meddling within the country, as everything Zunes was saying, but that involves Israel and the United States. **(Zunes)**: Under Mubarak, they (Egypt's government) tried to have it both ways. They contributed to that oppressive siege on Gaza and they had this agreement with Israel, which essentially gives them a free hand to oppress Palestinians else ware, while having these anti Zionist, anti Semitic documentaries and things on Egyptian television. And similar in some way, they are getting all this money from the U.S., they have these close ties to the U.S. and they try to act like they are these great nationalists against U.S. interference, the amazing thing is they routinely get away with it. It's so transparently B.S. **(Davis)**: Just an example, El Baradei, people were saying that he had an American wife and that he's the leader of

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the Christians and I mean, there are so many rumors and so many, excuse my French but, bullshit statements, that are made about whose involved in the revolution, whose protecting it and who wants to end it. And the United States gets their name thrown in there, I think in a lot of ways, unrightfully so. **(Aly)**: When I was in Egypt for (winter) break, there was video circulating around Facebook. It was Noam Chomsky who had this video, he was speaking in a university, I believe – he was saying that the United States does not care, he was talking about Egypt too – he was like, United States government does not care about what the people want, they want to have a dictator in place so they can have what they want, their guy their man...

(Davis): Take care of their interests.

(Ghassemi): It has happened before in other countries. **(Aly)**: Exactly, but the idea, the video is circulating all over Facebook, everyone saw that video and everyone is talking about it for a while, it like, whoa, what is going on? **(Zunes)**: But in a sense I think that's more accurate than this idea the Americans are somehow supporting pro democracy forces, which is what the junta, what SCAF is trying to promote. Ideally I think the United States will like a pro American democracy, but a true democracy anywhere in the Arab world, while not anti American per se, is not going to be a puppet of American objectives. And so historically they United States has preferred a pro American dictatorship to democracy and I really don't think that has fundamentally changed. **(Ghassemi)**: So would you think that the new parliament and, presumably, when the new president comes along, will they want to remain allies with Israel and the United States or will that relationship change? It might be too early to call now...

(Zunes): First of all, I think that any government, at least some are accountable to its people, is going to be more nationalistic, is going to take a more independent kind of line either because they sincerely feel it or at least for opportunistic reasons. But at the same time they, the military does have

this dependent relationship with the United States, there is it's strong economic ties, tourism is the number one industry, all these kind of things so they don't want sever ties with the west, they're going to go up to a point but not too far. *Vise e vie* Israel, I think the vast majority of the population would like to see, on one hand, Camp David (Accords 1978) revoked, the majority of Americans will like to see NAFTA revoked but that's not going to happen. And, as you know, Egypt fought three wars with Israel and got their butt's kicked all three times, '73 was initially successful, but by the end there it was looking pretty bad too. And of course the imbalance between Israel and Egypt is even greater now, far greater now than it was even back then, so clearly this idea that "o the Muslim Brotherhood comes in and is going to make war there" is ridiculous. It would be incredibly self destructive for Egypt and similarly if they allow Hamas or some Salafis or whatever, to attack Israel from Gaza. You know, Israel has proven itself quite willing to bomb the bejesus out of countries indirectly tied to terrorist attacks. On a practical level its not going to mean much, *vis a vie* Israel, but I think it is a reminder that we are living in a world where this idea that the once the Soviet Union fell the United States is the one reigning super power and we can control the world now, is simply not possible. The world is very different, Egypt will try to look out after what it perceives to be Egyptian interests, they may or may not be the right policies or we may or may not agree with them, but any system that become more accountable to its people is going to have to be accountable to it's people on foreign policy as well and to add to that, foreign governments. **(Davis)**: I would say the only thing I could see changing concerning Israel would be, just blatant acts of aggression, like what happened against Gaza, could possibly change the ballgame. I'm not sure if a newly elected government in Egypt will blatantly ignore, or in any way shape or form support any type of large Israeli offensives on groups of people. **(Aly)**: The Egyptian people, they want to see a man like (prime minister) Erdoğan from Turkey, they want

to see something similar to what the Turks are going. **(Zunes)**: They maybe a member of NATO but we're not going to be pushed around. **(Davis)**: Like Nasser's time... **(Aly)**: Nasser is kind of a little bit extreme maybe...

(Zunes): Yea he ended up being aligned with Soviets, so its not going to go that far, but I think it is going to be definitely more independent. Early Nasser I guess you can say, Nasser in the 50s as opposed to Nasser in the 60s.

(Ghassemi): So to conclude are there any final thoughts that you would like to our readers before we end this interview?

(Davis): Well I have a final thought I wanted to say, there was one instance that I saw in Tahrir where I felt it kind of highlighted the differences between political opinion and what I've seen on the news. Basically, the Muslim Brotherhood were on the stage and they were playing old Egyptian songs, playing over and over the national anthem, they were trying, I think, to bring back this nostalgia for the Egyptian people get them to feel like everyone loves each other and feeling good, so they would start these cheers "Shaeb wa al Geish eed Wahda!" Which means, the people and the army are one hand, this was a common phrase in the very beginning of the revolution and the crowd will answer back, in disgust, saying "Al Geish wa al Ikwana eed Wiskha!" The army and the Muslim Brotherhood are dirty hands.

And that to me told me a lot of things, that's why I feel the media has misrepresented is because there is a lot of people who believe that the people (of Egypt) will blindly follow the Muslim Brotherhood because of Islam. And then also it showed that people are thinking for themselves, these are the things that could be considered conspiracies on the news, but they're obviously getting the right independent news and actually hearing the right things and because there are saying these words. It is quite amazing, "the army and the brotherhood are dirty hands" that's just, real new. **(Ghassemi)**: Final thoughts

(Aly): Yea, I would like to end with the slogan that has been around for a while now which is, the revolution continues.

It will continue until everyone feels that Egypt is finally back to the Egyptians and we are in control of our country, we can do whatever we want in a very free and democratic way. So the revolution continues.

(Ghassemi): Final thoughts professor?

(Zunes): Until over a year ago, any interview I had about Egypt was about it's relations with the United States, Israel and other countries, it was about Mubarak and his son and various generals and this and that, it was all about the influence of foreign countries and a handful of elites at the top. And this discussion has been about people and movements and parties and what is happening within Egypt and within the body politics, within the Egyptian society and I think that alone, says a lot about the significance of events in the past year.

(Ghassemi): Well thank you gentlemen for joining me today, I really enjoyed it.

(Aly, Davis, Zunes): Thank you.

- For questions, comments, or general interests towards the interview material, please contact Mr. Ghassemi at jghassemi07@yahoo.com

The Monthly Folio:

Dr. Ezra Vogel's *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*

Ezra Vogel has brought forth a 928 page tome titled "Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China". (1) It cries out for editing. Consider



that Yale Professor Jonathan Spence, today's Dean of China historians, published a biography of Mao in only 188 pages!

(2) But Vogel, in the style of Henry Kissinger, is self-referential to an extreme; the pronoun "I" gets a mighty workout. Vogel consulted all the "rich &

famous"; they in turn love the book.

Never has so much "hear say" crowded an academic work; it should be assigned in law schools to help train future lawyers to avoid this pitfall in arguing cases. He interviews oxcarts full of folk, particularly Deng's daughter Deng Lin, who reports that Dad was sad to be sacked--several times--but glad to get back--to power. Decades ago I encountered Deng's daughter in Beijing while leading a UC Berkeley Alumni group; my Chinese guide Sunny whispered to me that the shiny new Toyota illegally parked in front of an art academy belonged to Deng's daughter. I insisted we go in; we did & I observed the Red princess--shades of Galina Brezhnev. When I returned home the LA Times informed the world that that princess had an art show, Distant Echoes, at the Pacific Asia Museum in Pasadena. (3) Why am I not surprised that she adored Daddy, a man who could do no wrong! Dictator's daughters dote on daddies, sugar or blood.

Vogel has an extensive publishing record; he has an early decent book, "Canton Under Communism" and a later doubtful book "Japan as Number 1", which arrived about the same time as Chalmer's Johnson's majestic "MITI and the Japanese Miracle". Vogel suffered a policy-wonk's worst nightmare, a

wrong prediction, while Johnson's theory of a capitalist developmental model still proves helpful, particularly in today's Asia. (4)

Vogel ranks as a Harvard star; his Deng biography is jargon free and good narrative history (Narrative almost a lost art form in trendy academic circles today). He believes that Deng & other key PRC founders such a Zhou Enlai learned a great deal in their years in France following WW I; Zhou about elegant tailoring and Marx, Deng about croissants (a passion) and communism, the pastry and the party. To paraphrase Hemingway, Paris was a movable feast, food and fashion plus fanaticism. Vogel believes that Deng first saw his vision of a Leninist state running a free market in his 1920s Moscow stay when the Soviets lived under the New Economic Plan, that he learned to sacrifice people ruthlessly as a military commander fighting the Japanese in WW II, and that he remained a Mao favorite even when Mao kept purging him. Vogel admits that Deng did not innovate the economic changes that came after Mao; those changes came from Hua Guofeng, the man Deng later "shoved" aside. Deng did manage those changes until they got out of hand. Vogel thinks Deng tolerated a "little" corruption (a Toyota or two?) in order to get his way but would be horrified to see what it has lead to today. Vogel admits Deng strongly supported the Great Leap Forward until it leaped backward; Deng, to Vogel, had no economic smarts, just wanted China to get rich fast.

Vogel's details on "the murders" in Tiananmen" come hour by hour. Does he whitewash this most guilty man? No. He gray washes him but in the end it serve as a whitewash for this vain villian. Nor does the Tiananmen horror stand alone as Deng had killed before but without a press corps watching. In the earlier liquidations there was no Arab Spring via the internet for the Middle Kingdom. Vogel thinks that once the

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old guard dies--party types like Jiang Zemin who followed Deng into power--then we will have a reappraisal of Deng, the results of which will be negative. If so, then why this book? Reviews leave a bad taste. Fang Lizhi, a Chinese-born academic now living in the US finds the book factually wanting in *The New York Review of Books*, November 10, 2011. *The Economist* of October 22, 2011, citing "Mao's Last Revolution" by Professors Roderick Macfarquhar and Michael Schoenhals noted that Deng was responsible "for purges in the later years of the Cultural Revolution that matched the Gang of Four for brutality." In the *New York Times* review by David Barboza it is noted that "Some passages read as if they came from Communist Party headquarters". (5)

All of this said and read, I went to hear the author give a talk on his book at the UC Berkeley Women's Club. The cream of the crop of CAL's Asia specialist attended; they seemed less than impressed. I departed unimpressed. I will let Chris Patten, the last British Royal Governor of Hong Kong and now Chancellor of the University of Oxford, hold forth. He writes that the book reads "a little like the Deng family's authorized biography. Warts are mentioned from time to time but the overall picture presented usually discounts the blemishes." Patten knows that these blemishes meant murdering millions; in his home province of Sichuan his brutality gained Mao's favor so much so that he became the Red Godfather's "enforcer", Chinese mafia dons at butchering. Frank Dikotter in *The Sunday Times* calls the view Vogel presents of the Paramount Leader as "starry-eyed". I will wait for the sun to shine on the crimes, which, as Patten writes will not be "for the squeamish". (6)

Perry Anderson writing in the *London Review of Books* sums up all that is negative about Vogel's book calling it "thick in girth and thin in texture". He sees Vogel as a "booster" having once called South Korea's military dictator Park Chung Hee one of the four "outstanding national leaders in the 20th century". To Anderson the Deng book "is an exercise in unabashed adulation, sprinkled with a few pro forma qualifications for domestic effect...a special

kind of apologia." He suggests that "anything in Deng's career that might seriously mar the general encomium is sponged away." (7)

There remains a need for a balanced treatment of Deng, warts and all. Thinking of other dictatorial times and using trains as national metaphors, just because a dictator makes the trains run on time does not excuse the train wrecks.

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