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Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, Washington has repeatedly demanded that Bashar al-Assad desist from employing the most brutal tactics against his own people, only to see the regime use them anyway. With the recent assassination of four senior Syrian officials amid reports that the regime is moving its chemical weapons stockpile, Washington must now draw a line in the sand for Assad. And this time, the Obama administration must stick to it or risk a humanitarian and national security calamity. Download Andrew Tabler's remarks before the Senate regarding the state of the uprising against Assad, the opposition's view of the United States, the types of assistance Washington should offer, and other factors.
The United States needs to tell the Syrian regime in no uncertain terms: Use chemical weapons and we will end you.
BY ANDREW J. TABLER|JULY 19, 2012
Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, Washington has repeatedly demanded that President Bashar al-Assad desist from employing the most brutal tactics against his own people -- only to see the Syrian regime use them anyway. With the assassination of at least three senior Assad regime members coming only days after reports that Syria is moving its chemical weapons stockpile, the U.S. government must now draw a line in the sand for Assad. And this time, the Obama team must stick to it, or risk a humanitarian and national security calamity.
The news that the Syrian regime is moving its chemical weapons has set off speculation within the U.S government about what Assad may be prepared to do with those weapons as his control over the country deteriorates. It would be comforting to think that Assad knows that using such weapons of mass destruction would be crossing a red line -- but unfortunately that would be too optimistic. After all, Assad has ignored every other international ultimatum directed at him since the beginning of the revolt.
The same pattern has held true with attempts to force Assad into a negotiated transition through the U.N. Security Council, where Russia and China vetoed for the third time a resolution that would have imposed sanctions against the regime if it did not end its brutal crackdown.
This must end. Washington and its allies must lay down and enforce red lines prohibiting the use of Syria's chemical and biological weapons (CBW), one of the Middle East's largest stockpiles. To do so, Washington should push for a U.N. Security Council resolution under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which sanctions the use of military action, on mass atrocities in Syria -- including a reference that those responsible for the use of CBW would be held accountable before the International Criminal Court. Washington should not water down the text to make the measure toothless, as it has done repeatedly on Syria over the last year in an attempt to avoid a Russia veto. In the event of further Russian obstructionism, the United States should lead its allies -- Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia -- in issuing a stark warning to Assad that mass atrocities in Syria will be met with an immediate military response.
Assad's most recent moves are part of a well-established pattern that test and push U.S. and NATO red lines. The Assad regime has increasingly deployed artillery and combat aircraft to suppress the Syrian opposition, despite Washington's warning not to do so. A few weeks ago, Syria shot downa Turkish F-4 fighter jet, a provocation for which it received only verbal condemnation by NATO. The Syrian government's history of such reckless moves stretches back years: In 2010, Assad reportedlytransferred Scud D missiles and M-600 rockets to the Lebanese militant party Hezbollah, essentially handing strategic weapons to a third party and removing his ability to restrain the self-proclaimed Party of God.
When Bashar was master of Syria, such behavior was seen as an annoyance rather than a threat to U.S. national security interests. Today, all that has changed. The Assad regime is mired in a grinding conflict with the Syrian opposition, in which it is steadily losing control, as the July 18 bombing in the heart of Damascus shows. Furthermore, a number of massacres by Alawite forces in Sunni villages around the cities of Homs and Hama indicate that Alawites and the regime they dominate may be attempting to clear Sunni villages in order to set up a rump Alawite enclave in their historic homeland along the Syrian coast in the event of regime collapse.
The international community therefore faces a dilemma: Should chemical and biological materials be put at the disposal of those running an Alawite rump regime, and those directing the shabbiha"armed gangs" roaming the Syrian countryside, there is much greater likelihood of atrocities or genocide. And it's not only the pro-Assad groups the United States must worry about: As the Syrian regime loses its grip on power, the roughly 45 different CBW facilities and tons of chemical weapons materials that U.S. officials estimate are scattered throughout the country could fall into the hands of Sunni extremists. These groups not only don't share America's long-term interests in Syria, but increasingly resent Washington for standing by and doing little while Syrians are slaughtered. This sentiment is unlikely to improve if Washington and its allies simply watch and hope for the best while the Assad regime moves around its chemical weapons stockpile.
The time to act is now, before disaster strikes. By leading an effort at the U.N. Security Council to warn the Syrian regime about the dire consequences of using its chemical weapons stockpile, and raising the possibility of a military response in the event that effort fails, Washington will be communicating to Assad that he would be sealing his fate if he crosses this last remaining red line.
Until now, giving Assad the benefit of the doubt has only led to more deaths and an increasingly evident U.S. failure to stop the carnage in Syria. The Obama administration has drawn a red line at mass atrocities in Libya and elsewhere in the Middle East. It should do the same in Syria.
Three top aides to Syrian President Bashar Assad were killed Wednesday in a bomb attack in Damascus. Robert Siegel speaks with Andrew J. Tabler, author of the book In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria, about those killed and what the attack means for both the Assad regime and the opposition. Tabler is also a senior fellow in the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
UN special envoy Kofi Annan recently issued invitations for a June 30
meeting in Geneva to deal with the Syria crisis. The participants --
whom Annan dubbed an "action group" -- include the five permanent
members of the Security Council, Turkey, and Arab League members Iraq,
Kuwait, and Qatar.
Annan's invitation came after a week of talks in Geneva between his
staff, Russia, and the United States regarding the formation of a more
permanent "Contact Group" on Syria. Moscow and Washington continue to
disagree on the nature and makeup of that group. Washington insists,
quite rightly, that any Contact Group should be focused on the process
of handing power from the Assad regime to another administration, and
that only countries with an interest in this outcome should be at the
table. This stipulation disqualifies Iran, Bashar al-Assad's stalwart
ally and direct supporter in crushing the Syrian uprising. Yet Russia is
less clear on the Contact Group's purpose and has argued for Iran's
inclusion.
Given the rising death toll in Syria and the diplomatic effort
Washington has invested over the past few months to gain Russian
approval for UN action, participating in yet another round of "dialogue
for dialogue's sake" holds little value unless it makes clear what a
"Syrian-led transition" entails: namely, that Assad goes, and that he
goes sooner, not later. Therefore, the Contact Group's composition will
be key to determining whether it plays any role in Assad's departure.
So far, Washington has successfully lobbied Annan not to invite Iran.
The Islamic Republic's three-decade alliance with Damascus gives it at
least some influence over Assad, and many speculate that Tehran and its
Hizballah allies see the regime's sixteen-month attempt to shoot its way
out of the crisis as ultimately futile. Yet no matter how much outside
observers may believe that Iran could best advance its interests by
supporting a "soft landing" in Syria, Tehran's actual behavior indicates
that it supports Assad's "hard landing" approach -- that is, shooting
the population into submission. The Qods Force, part of Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps, is the only non-Syrian entity listed under
U.S. sanctions on Syria for good reason -- it has aided and abetted the
Assad regime in tracking and killing Syrian civilians. According to an
April Wall Street Journal report, Qods Force commander Qasem
Soleimani traveled to Damascus and pledged more military and political
support for the regime.
Iran would love to be part of a Contact Group on Syria, where it could
use its influence to prolong Assad's lease on life and ensure that any
successor government does not represent the country's majority Sunni
population, which has openly chided Iran for supporting him.
Accordingly, if the United States truly wants to facilitate his ouster,
it should hold firm in opposing Iran's inclusion in any discussions on
bringing about a post-Assad Syria.
Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Program on Arab Politics.
The United States must strongly support Turkey even at the cost of diplomatic cooperation with Russia.
When Syria shot down a Turkish military aircraft on Friday, it was yet
another sign that the regional dimension of the uprising against the
Assad regime is evolving from a struggle by proxy to open hostilities.
The challenge for Washington is how best to respond to the crisis at a
time when strong support for Turkey may endanger closer diplomatic
cooperation with Russia.
Although details of the incident remain unclear, the heart of the matter
is that a Turkish fighter briefly flew into Syrian airspace, was
subsequently fired on, and crashed into the Mediterranean Sea. It was
the latest in a string of incidents over the past few months between
Syria and Turkey. As Turkish support for the opposition has increased,
Assad's forces have committed a number of shootings across the Turkish
frontier and actively backed the Kurdish PYD -- the Syrian branch of
Ankara's old enemy, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Even before the jet was downed, Ankara had been asking Washington for
greater support in dealing with the threats from Syria. The U.S.
response has been to insist that Turkey ask for a consultation under
Article 4 of the NATO charter, which concerns threats to a member
state's "territorial integrity, political independence, or security."
That fateful meeting will finally happen tomorrow as a result of
Friday's incident.
Washington's dilemma is simple: over the past week, it has invested
considerable time and effort talking with Russian representatives in
Geneva, where officials are assessing the purpose and modalities of a
"Contact Group" of countries to find a political solution to the Syria
crisis. On one hand, if Washington does not back Turkey sufficiently, it
will signal to Bashar al-Assad that downing NATO aircraft will not cost
him militarily. On the other hand, if the United States expresses
unqualified public support for Turkey, and if NATO announces or even
hints that it is preparing various contingencies for Syria (a 180-degree
shift from its latest summit in Chicago), then Russian support for the
proposed Contact Group could be in jeopardy.
Of course, Turkey itself may have multiple interests at stake in the
NATO consultation. Ankara likely views the meeting as a test of its
relationship with Washington and key NATO partners as much as a call for
allied support against Damascus. Ankara does not appear to be chomping
at the bit for confrontation with Syria, but Turkish leaders would
surely like to know whether the alliance is ready to back it should such
conflict ensue. Based on today's comments by EU leaders, NATO support
is qualified at best.
Solving this dilemma requires that Washington get its priorities
straight. U.S. policy clearly states that the solution to the crisis is
in line with that of the vast majority of Syrians -- Assad has to go.
Although avoiding full-blown civil war should be a consideration in how
Washington pursues his departure, it is not a goal in of itself. Forcing
his ouster via diplomacy alone is a long shot at best, even with
Moscow's help. To increase the chances of diplomatic success while
preparing for the steady worsening of the conflict (a well-established
trend since the uprising began), Washington should openly state its
options for "Plan B" during the NATO meeting, and its willingness to
exercise them. Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Program on Arab Politics.
As Syria edges toward civil
war, volunteers and refugees in Turkey are trying to fortify the
opposition | Lessons from last year’s Arab Spring influence the Syrian
conflict.
As dozens more died Monday in Syria
amid heavy fighting, U.N. special envoy Kofi Annan said he was "gravely
concerned," citing reports of continued shelling in Homs. Gwen Ifill
discusses the prospects for civil war with Andrew Tabler of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Mona Yacoubian of the
Stimson Center.
GWEN IFILL: For more on the growing prospects
for civil war in Syria, we turn to Andrew Tabler of the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy. He lived in Syria for most of the last
decade and he founded an English-language magazine there. And Mona
Yacoubian, she lived in Syria as a Fulbright Scholar during the
mid-1980s. During the 1990s, she was an analyst at the State Department
and is now with the Stimson Center, a Washington research organization.
Andrew Tabler, who are the rebels? ANDREW TABLER, fellow, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy: Well, there's the civilian opposition, of course. The ones
who you're seeing concerning the attacks, that's -- those are the Free
Syrian Army and their affiliates.
And those include defectors from the Syrian army who went to Turkey,
defectors from the Syrian army who now operate within the country with
the opposition, and then sort of local affiliates FSA affiliates with
sort of like the equivalent of sort of Minutemen during the American
Revolution who carve out protest space and protect protesters. And they
are increasingly carrying out attacks against the Assad regime
throughout the country. GWEN IFILL: Mona Yacoubian, whenever we have seen
yet another regime fall or at least attempt to be overthrown, we have
seen these rebels spring up. But how do we know they're not fighting
each other? MONA YACOUBIAN, Stimson Center: Well, we haven't had reports of rebels fighting each other at this point in Syria.
But it's also clear that there's no centralized command-and-control
and that the situation on the ground frankly appears to be getting
increasingly chaotic, as noted by your report. GWEN IFILL: Is there a sectarian split that is at work here? MONA YACOUBIAN: Clearly there's a sectarian issue at play in Syria today.
The regime is an Alawite regime that is a minority regime. The rebels
are largely Sunni. And so we're seeing increasingly that the battles on
the ground take on a sectarian character. We have had massacres, for
example, in the recent weeks of civilians, largely Sunni. And it is
alleged that government paramilitary forces that are Alawite, the same
sect as the president, have undertaken those attacks.
So clearly there's a sectarian dimension to the violence in Syria, and it appears to be growing. GWEN IFILL: Andrew Tabler, there has been much
discussion here in Washington about what the U.S. or other countries
should do to remove Assad. But where do we think the money is coming
from or the aid is coming from to help that happen by supporting these
rebel groups? ANDREW TABLER: The money is coming from the Arab Gulf. Qatar and Saudi Arabia's names are often put forward, as well as of that of Turkey.
The exact trail is -- is unclear. But the kind of weapons that are
entering Syria are growing increasingly sophisticated. It seems there's a
lot more light arms. And the kind of opposition that the FSA is putting
across to the regime is increasingly effective. It's this game of what
they call Whac-A-Mole, like the carnival game, where elite divisions try
to go into areas, reassert their control.
They do so temporarily. Then they have to go somewhere else and chase
the mole. And then, of course, the protesters and the armed elements
come back up in those areas. And that's why the regime is resorting to
shelling, resorting to helicopter gunships and the situation is
worsening and more people are dying. GWEN IFILL: So, the regime is frustrated in a way,
but -- with this Whac-A-Mole strategy, but is the kind of support that
these rebel groups are having -- are getting from outside Syria, is it
enough to overthrow the regime? ANDREW TABLER: Well, it can certainly wear it down.
But the Russians and the Iranians continue to resupply the regime.
So, they can -- the regime can hold on for some time, but not hold on it
did like before, like -- sort of like the regime did in Algeria in the
'90s. But, of course, unlike Algeria, it's not at the center of the
Middle East. It doesn't have all that oil revenue. And, of course, you
have a lot of the rebels receiving a lot of support from the outside.
So, we're in for a very, very long fight in Syria in the coming months and perhaps even years. GWEN IFILL: Mona Yacoubian, so far, the United
States' role has been limited to non-lethal aid. And there has been no
effort to get in the battle directly. But should there be more? Is there
more that the U.S. can be doing or that we know that they are doing? MONA YACOUBIAN: I think, given the chaotic situation
on the ground inside Syria, it doesn't make sense to either arm the
rebels or undertake broader military intervention.
I think we're looking at a situation that is increasingly
unpredictable. It would be very difficult, for example, to assert that
arms are getting in the right hands. There are increased reports of
jihadist elements that have made their way into the Syrian arena. My own
sense is I think the U.S. needs to continue on a diplomatic track. GWEN IFILL: Andrew Tabler, on the other side, the
flip side of this -- you're shaking your head. You don't agree that the
diplomatic track is a good idea? ANDREW TABLER: Well, the diplomatic track is not
working. It doesn't mean that we have to abandon it. But it's just not
working. The Annan plan is not working. The Russians are not bending
yet.
I agree with Mona that I think we should continue, but plan B,
supporting the opposition within Syria, has us getting the hoping of
plan A. Otherwise, I don't really see the Russians bending. Now,
regardless of all of this, I think we're very limited in how we can
affect the outcome.
This hurricane is gathering on the Eastern Mediterranean. And I
really don't know what we can do to stop it. We can deal with the
effects of it, but the most important thing is that -- is for the United
States to achieve President Obama's policy objective of getting
President Assad to step aside. If the Russians want to help us with
that, that's great. If not, we have to prepare for that and prepare an
alliance that will achieve that objective. GWEN IFILL: Mona Yacoubian, how does this compare to
what we have been through, have seen, have watched in places like
Libya, in places like Egypt, in which opposition rose up, removed
someone from power, and then it wasn't really clear what the next step
was? MONA YACOUBIAN: Well, this is so much more of a protracted situation certainly than what we have seen in Egypt and even in Libya.
The opposition is still in a state of disarray. It doesn't hold any
territory firmly. There's no Syrian Benghazi, for example. And the
opposition has remained often at odds within itself. There have been all
kinds of rivalries inside the Syrian opposition.
So it's a been a very -- it's much more difficult situation, I think,
for foreign intervention. But the one point I would sort of push back
on with Andrew is, in some ways, we may very well be at that tipping
point into a long and drawn-out sectarian civil war. And this may be the
last, best chance for diplomacy. It may well be that the Russians and
the United States come together and work out a plan that, in fact, puts
Syria on a track toward a more stable transition. GWEN IFILL: Andrew Tabler, finally, what -- do you
see that there's a successor perhaps in line, or is there any clear plan
if suddenly this non-lethal aid were to work and the rebels were to
triumph? ANDREW TABLER: I don't think we're quite there yet.
I mean, you would have to -- if you really want to put a Yemen kind
of plan in place, you have to think about who could step into that. I
don't think that we're close to that situation. The problem is that it
seems like this regime is going to go very, very bloodily.
And I hope that there is a negotiated transition in Syria, but the
handover of power -- because it's a minority dominated regime, it makes
it resilient against those kinds of splits. Trying to convince the
military, for example, to oust the Assad family, I think, will be
extremely difficult, even if the Russians decide to really throw their
weight behind the idea. GWEN IFILL: Andrew Tabler of the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, and Mona Yacoubian of the Stimson
Center, thank you both very much. MONA YACOUBIAN: Thank you.
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