Iran's Quest for Superpower Status
Article Summary and Author Biography
Focuses on the domestic political underpinnings of Iran's foreign policy behaviour in respect of (1) the war against Iraq, the course of which is decided by the struggle between the professional military and the Revolutionary Guards (2) its US policy, in which relations with the Great Satan were improved only to gain arms supplies for the war effort. The scandal which rocked confidence in President Reagan was caused by details of the secret agreement being leaked by radicals in the Iranian cabinet who felt that they were losing out to the moderates led by Rafsanjani (3) its Soviet policy, in which revolutionary purity caused the closure of the communist Tudeh party and arrest of its members, and has led to negligible trade with its most powerful neighbour. Iran obtained spares for its Soviet-built power station in exchange for helping release Soviet hostages in Lebanon which were taken by Shia militia backed and organized by Iran (4) its policy with its Persian Gulf neighbours, whom Iran has intimidated by threatening to spread the revolution to the region's Shias (estimated at 60% of the Gulf population), to destroy the Gulf's oilfields, and, by uncovering the US arms-for-hostages deal, to make them doubtful of US support. Concludes that Iran (1) has seemed flexible enough to make gains in all its foreign policy objectives (2) is doggedly creating 'clericalism in one country' even at the expense of greater advantages with the superpowers and its regional neighbours (3) as a result, if Iran wins the war, it will become the region's dominant power.
Gary G. Sick is International Affairs Program Officer at the Ford Foundation responsible for activities relating to U.S. foreign policy. He was the principal White House aide for Iran during the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis and is the author of All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran.
Since 1973 and the first oil shock, the center of gravity of Middle Eastern politics has been gradually shifting—from the eastern Mediterranean and the Arab-Israeli conflict toward the Persian Gulf and Iran. That process was accelerated in 1979 by the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, which dramatically reduced the likelihood of another Arab-Israeli war, and the nearly simultaneous climax of the Iranian revolution, which replaced the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with a radical theocratic regime under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Iran has long harbored ambitions to become the superpower of the Persian Gulf. That prospect is not as improbable today as in the past. In recent years, despite the severe constraints imposed by a chaotic internal situation, Iran has managed a complex and dangerous set of international relationships with boldness, sangfroid and a considerable measure of success.
Americans are prone to evaluate developments in Tehran from the perspective of U.S. concerns, particularly after the revelation of U.S. arms sales. The world as seen from Tehran, however, constitutes sets of interlocking circles of threats and interests in which the United States is important but far from paramount.
The most important circle of attention is the constantly shifting balance of power within the revolution itself. Second, and only slightly less important, is the war with Iraq. Every aspect of the war has both practical and ideological implications for the survival of the regime; it is the object of the most intense controversy and debate. Third is oil policy—production, pricing and distribution—which is intimately associated with Iran’s role in OPEC. For the most part, oil policy has not been a subject of political contention. Responsibility for management of the petroleum industry has been delegated to technicians who are essentially nonpolitical and nonideological. Iranian strategy in OPEC is apparently set by a small group of technocrats and political leaders at the very top of the power structure whose decisions, at least to date, have not been subject to serious public debate...
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