



## The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) October 14, 2008

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*[The Islamic Jihad Union was founded by breakaway fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in March 2002 in Pakistan's Tribal Areas. The organization initially called itself the Islamic Jihad Group, but, after failed attacks in Uzbekistan in 2004 and early 2005, changed its name and became closer to core al-Qa'ida. Since then, the organization's focus has shifted, as the IJU began plotting terror attacks in Pakistan and Western Europe, especially Germany. Based in Mirali in South Waziristan, the IJU is training Western recruits for attacks in the West. The recruits are mainly Turks from Turkey and Turkish communities in Western Europe, but also Muslim converts from Europe. Although the IJU currently does not seem to be terribly effective in the execution of its operations, it remains a force to be reckoned with.]*

### **The Roots of the IJU**

When the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Juma Namangani (real name Jumaboi Ahmadzhanovich Khojayev), died in Northern Afghanistan in mid-November 2001, trouble lay ahead for the organization. The IMU had its main bases in the north of Afghanistan and a large base in the Kabul area. Namangani was named the commander of all the foreign Mujahidin in Afghanistan by the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar. It was also the Taliban that funded the IMU and propped it up financially after 9/11.<sup>1</sup> It was evident that funds were crucial for the IMU, with a force of a couple of thousand fighters in Afghanistan, many of whom were supporting family members. When the Taliban regime was removed from power and its emir was killed, the IMU had little choice but to follow the Taliban into exile in the Tribal Areas in Pakistan.

With the defeat of the Taliban, the IMU also lost a key lifeline: the opium corridor between the north of Afghanistan and Central Asia. According to estimates, the IMU earned hundreds of millions of dollars in the drug trade. Within a few days of Namangani's death, the political leader and co-founder of the IMU, Tohir Abduhalilovich Yo'ldoshev (a.k.a. Tohir Yuldashev), was named emir of the organization. Yuldashev often traveled to Iran and the Gulf States for recruitment missions and to fundraise, and it took some time before he arrived in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area. At that point, Yuldashev took over a bankrupt and demoralized organization.

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<sup>1</sup> Igor Rotar, The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: A resurgent IMU?, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 1, Issue 8 (December 18, 2003); [http://www.jamestown.org/publications\\_details.php?volume\\_id=391&issue\\_id=2881&article\\_id=23428](http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=391&issue_id=2881&article_id=23428)

When Yuldashev arrived in the Tribal Areas, a couple thousand Central-Asian fighters and their families needed food and shelter. Most al-Qa'ida and Jihadi Arab fighters moved from the Tribal Areas to Pakistan's crowded cities, while the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Chechens stayed in the Tribal Areas.<sup>2</sup> The IMU fighters and their families found shelter in North and South Waziristan. They took a risk with this decision as most IMU fighters remained in the North of Afghanistan, where the ethnic Afghan Tajiks and Uzbeks lived, or in multi-ethnic Kabul. They went to Pashtun areas where the Pashtunwali code and the tribal lifestyle differ from other ethnicities in the area. This decision would cause problems between the IMU fighters and local tribes in South Waziristan in 2004, 2007, and again in early 2008.



While Yuldashev was attempting to solve the IMU's financial problems, he also made a strategic decision to join the Global Jihad Movement led by al-Qa'ida. However, others in the organization wanted to keep the pressure and focus on Uzbekistan. In 2002, the IMU Shura Council decided that the time was not right to resume operations in Uzbekistan. Yet, a group of IMU fighters disagreed and broke away from the organization.

In response, the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) was founded in March 2002.<sup>3</sup> The new group settled in North Waziristan and took Mirali as its headquarters. Founders of the IJG were Nadzhmiddin Kamoldinovich Jalolov (a.k.a. Abu Yahya), Muhammad Fatih (a.k.a. Commander Ahmad), and Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov (a.k.a. Mansur Suhail / a.k.a. Abu Huzaifa.) Jalolov became emir of the IJG, and Mansur Buranov was named deputy emir.<sup>4</sup> Others involved in the founding of the IJG were Kh. Ismoilov and Ahmad Bekmirzayev.<sup>5</sup>

There is little known about the IJU leaders. Najmiddin Jalolov (a.k.a. Yakh'yo or Yahya) was born on April 1, 1972 in the Adijan region of Uzbekistan.<sup>6</sup> He received specialized training in mines and explosives at al-Qa'ida training camps and participated in operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Taliban side. As a member of the IMU,

<sup>2</sup> Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan. The struggle with Militant Islam* (New York 2007) p.122.

<sup>3</sup> Europol, TE-SAT 2008, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (2008), p.18.

<sup>4</sup> Ismail Khan, Rocket attack plan was approved by Al Qaeda, Dawn, November 4, 2006; <http://www.dawn.com/2006/11/04/top4.htm>; Bundes Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2007 Vorabfassung, p.180; [http://www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/2008/VSB\\_\\_Vorabfassung,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/VSB\\_Vorabfassung.pdf](http://www.bmi.bund.de/Internet/Content/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/2008/VSB__Vorabfassung,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/VSB_Vorabfassung.pdf); <http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2008/fil08060.pdf>; [http://www.interpol.int/public/data/noticesun/notices/data/2008/71/2008\\_19971.asp](http://www.interpol.int/public/data/noticesun/notices/data/2008/71/2008_19971.asp)

<sup>5</sup> Huquq, Tashkent, in Uzbek 5 January 2005, p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Press release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June 18, 2008; <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1035.htm>

he was one of the organizers of the terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan in 1999.<sup>7</sup> In 2000, Jalolov was convicted in absentia for his role in the 1999 terrorist attacks in Uzbekistan.<sup>8</sup> He left the IMU in late 2001.<sup>9</sup> In 2002, the Islamic Jihad Group or Jama'at al-Jihad al-Islami was founded. Jalolov reportedly was close to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, the leader of the Uighur Islamic Radicals, Abu Muhammad Xinjiang (who died in 2003), and Osama bin Laden.<sup>10</sup> In 2004, he ordered the attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the Israeli Embassy in Uzbekistan's capital, Tashkent. Currently, he is residing in the surrounding areas of Mirali, North Waziristan.<sup>11</sup>

Deputy Emir Suhayl Buranov (a.k.a. Suhayl Mansur / a.k.a. Abu Hufaiza) was born on October 11, 1983 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.<sup>12</sup> He received specialized training in mines and explosives in al-Qa'ida training camp in Khost and participated in operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Taliban side. Criminal proceedings were instituted against him in 2000 in Uzbekistan. He was one of the organizers of the 2004 attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the Israeli Embassy in Tashkent.<sup>13</sup> And, according to the U.S. government, "As of late 2005, Buranov also prepared suicide bombers from among new IJU members." As deputy emir, he is responsible for the organization's communications.<sup>14</sup>

### **The IJU's Initial Operations**

Since its inception in March 2002, the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) has been preparing for operations in Uzbekistan. There were contacts with Libyan groups in the Tribal Areas, who might have given the new group its initial seed money. The central contact person within the higher echelons of al-Qa'ida, as well as other Jihadi groups in the Tribal Areas, was Abu Laith al-Libi.<sup>15</sup> Soon thereafter, the training of new fighters began, and, in the autumn of 2002, the planning for operations in Uzbekistan started. Most likely, the attacks were planned for March 21, 2004 to coincide with the Nowruz spring holiday.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Press release, United Nations, Security Council al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee adds names of two individuals to its consolidated list, April 23, 2008; <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sc9306.doc.htm>

<sup>8</sup> Jim Nichol, Central Asia's Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service, RL30294, April 26, 2007, p.7.

<sup>9</sup> Press release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June 18, 2008; <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1035.htm>

<sup>10</sup> Jim Nichol, Central Asia's Security: Issues and Implications for U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service, RL30294, April 26, 2007 p.7.

<sup>11</sup> Ismail Khan, Rocket attack plan was approved by Al Qaeda, Dawn, November 4, 2006; <http://www.dawn.com/2006/11/04/top4.htm>

<sup>12</sup> Press release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June 18, 2008; <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1035.htm>

<sup>13</sup> Press release United Nations, Security Council al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee adds names of two individuals to its consolidated list, April 23, 2008;

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2008/sc9306.doc.htm>; Interpol-United Nations Security Council Special Notice, Subject To UN Sanction, Buranov, Suhayl Fatilloevich;

[http://www.interpol.int/public/data/noticesun/notices/data/2008/71/2008\\_19971.asp](http://www.interpol.int/public/data/noticesun/notices/data/2008/71/2008_19971.asp)

<sup>14</sup> Press release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June 18, 2008; <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1035.htm>

<sup>15</sup> Guido Steinberg, The Islamic Jihad Union, On the internationalization of Uzbek Jihadism, SWP Comments 7, April 2008; [http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get\\_document.php?asset\\_id=4883](http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=4883)

<sup>16</sup> Speech Uzbek President Islam Karimov; Uzbek Television first channel, Tashkent, 29 March 2004.

The first attacks took place early on March 29, 2004. Why the attacks were delayed a week is unknown, but one of the first targets was the Chorsu Bazaar, a large market in downtown Tashkent. The night before the attacks, an elderly merchant was beaten to death by policemen because he was selling goods without a license.<sup>17</sup> During the night of March 28, at 10:00 p.m., the house of a pensioner in the village of Qahramon, in the Romitan District of Bukhara, exploded. The house was the headquarters of a local IJG cell and was used as a bomb making factory for the Islamic Jihad Group. Nine people died in the blast.<sup>18</sup>

The local IJG cell consisted of Lutfulla Ramazonov, Nurmat (Nemat) Razzoqov, Alisher Roziyev, Elmurod Asadov, Normurod Rahmonov, Sheramat Aslonov, Bobir Omonov, Omon Zoyirov, Muhsin Boronov, and Bahriddin Hamroyev. An excerpt from a verdict, pronounced at the Bukhara Regional court for criminal affairs, states that the cell:

“prepared improvised explosive devices by using screw-bolts, washers and screw-nuts of various sizes which had been delivered to them by another member of the group, Ganisher Ibrohimov, and Kamoliddin Yodgorov, and equipped them with hand-made detonators. An explosion occurred while they were putting the explosives into special clothes. They were intended to blow up hotels in the town of Bukhara where foreign tourists used to stay, Jewish synagogues, the buildings of the region's interior directorate and the National Security Service, schools and other crowded places...”<sup>19</sup>

Those who were tried on charges of involvement in the explosions were educated individuals. Ahmad Bekmirzayev was the leader of the IJG inside Uzbekistan. The operations inside Uzbekistan were guided by Jalolov from Pakistan, but the operational leader was Bekmirzayev. The cell in Bukhara was founded under the direction of Bekmirzayev and was led by Lutfulla Ramazonov and Fazliddin Tokhtayev. The cell recruited its members in the Hazrati Umar mosque in the center of the Romitan District of the Bukhara Region. At least four members of the cell - including Samandar Boronov, Ganisher Ibrohimov, and Shuhrat Rahmatov - were recruited in the mosque.<sup>20</sup>

In the spring of 2003, the leader of the Bukhara cell, Lutfulla Ramazonov, attended a training camp in Kazakhstan and reportedly smuggled 106 pieces of ED-6 electric detonators, weapons, ammunition, maps, six portable radio transmitters, audio and video tapes advocating religious extremism, and various literature back into the country. This material was stashed in the houses and offices of group members. Subsequently, they began preparations for the March 2004 attacks. They used a local internet café to stay in contact with the operational leaders and IJG leadership in Pakistan.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Alisher Ilkhamov, Mystery surrounds Tashkent explosions, Middle East Report, April 15, 2004; <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041504.html>

<sup>18</sup> Interfax news agency, Moscow, 29 March 2004; Khabar Television, Almaty, 29 March 2004; Uzbek Television first channel, Tashkent, 30 March 2004; ‘Terror’ blasts rock Uzbekistan, BBC News, 29 March 2004; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3577803.stm>; Huquq, Tashkent, in Uzbek 5 January 2005 p 6

<sup>19</sup> The victims of an unjustified ideology, Huquq, Tashkent, in Uzbek, January 5, 2005, p. 6.

<sup>20</sup> The victims of an unjustified ideology, Huquq, Tashkent, in Uzbek, January 5, 2005, p. 6.

<sup>21</sup> The victims of an unjustified ideology, Huquq, Tashkent, in Uzbek, January 5, 2005, p. 6.

On the morning of March 29, two attacks took place in Tashkent. At approximately 5:00 a.m. local time, IJG fighters attacked police check-points near the Tashkent tractor plant on Qushbegim Street, killing three policemen and wounding one. Between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., two female suicide bombers, identified as Dihnoza Kholmanadova and Shahnoza Inoyatova, blew themselves up at the compound of the Chorsu Bazaar. One exploded at the entrance of a store, and the other close to a mosque killing several policemen. That day, Uzbek security forces arrested 24 year-old Furqat Yusupov, who was arrested while trying to bring 10 IEDs to Tashkent.<sup>22</sup> Press sources report that Yusupov facilitated the travel of 14 persons to training camps in Pakistan and Kazakhstan.<sup>23</sup>

On March 30, additional attacks took place. Two cars with IJG fighters coming from Gazalkent were stopped in Yalangach, on the outskirts of Tashkent.<sup>24</sup> In one of the cars were two females. One of them stayed in the car and blew herself up. It is not clear if she was wearing a suicide belt or if the car was a VBIED. The IJG fighters exited the car and barricaded themselves in a nearby house. The house was surrounded by APC's and security forces, and a shoot out ensued. The gunfight ended when one of the fighters set fire to the house and burned it down. One policeman was killed, as were most of the fighters in the house.<sup>25</sup>

In the Bostonliq District of the Tashkent Region, an explosion on a passenger minibus was reported. The bus was driving near the Charvak reservoir in the mountains above Tashkent. If the dam had been damaged, the city and surrounding areas could have been flooded.<sup>26</sup>



On March 31, it was reported that Oilichbek Azimbekov (born in 1965) blew himself up in his own house with an explosive device at 8:00 p.m. Azimbekov lived in the Sobir Rahimov district.<sup>27</sup>

In total, 47 people were killed in the IJG attacks launched March 28-31, 2004. The dead included 10 policemen, 33 IJG fighters - including their leader Ahmad Bekmirzayev - and 3 civilians.<sup>28</sup> 15 IJG members were arrested.<sup>29</sup> Three suicide bombers in these attacks were women. Further research found that the women, 19-year-old Dihnoza

<sup>22</sup> Uzbek Television first channel, Tashkent, March 29, 2004.

<sup>23</sup> Bruce Pannier, Uzbekistan: 'Terror' Trial likely to hold few surprises, RRL/RL, June 27, 2004; <http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1054045.html>

<sup>24</sup> Tribune-uz web site, Tashkent, March 30, 2004.

<sup>25</sup> Tribune-uz web site, Tashkent, March 30, 2004; Alisher Ilkhamov, Mystery surrounds Tashkent explosions, Middle East Report, April 15, 2004; <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041504.html>

<sup>26</sup> Centrasia web site, Moscow, 30 March 2004; Alisher Ilkhamov, Mystery surrounds Tashkent explosions, Middle East Report, April 15, 2004; <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero041504.html>

<sup>27</sup> Uzbek Television first channel, Tashkent, April 1, 2004.

<sup>28</sup> Bruce Pannier, Uzbekistan: 'Terror' Trial likely to hold few surprises, RRL/RL, June 27, 2004; <http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1054045.html>

<sup>29</sup> Uzbeks say trials to start for terror attacks, RFL/RL, July 24, 2004; <http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1054011.html>

Holmuradova, 21-year-old Shahnoza Inoyatova, and 26-year-old Zahro Turaeva were all studying Arabic at the Egyptian embassy's cultural center in Tashkent.<sup>30</sup> They might have been recruited there. At least two of the three women had university educations. Shahnoza Inoyatova left home a day before the attacks and left her parents a note that she was traveling to an Arab country with a friend.<sup>31</sup>

On April 3, the IJG sent an email to the mailbox of the website [www.stopdictatorkarimov.com](http://www.stopdictatorkarimov.com) and left a statement claiming responsibility for the "attacks and the bombings aimed against the government of Uzbekistan and its servants, who administered the policy of violence against the people of Uzbekistan and considers that all these actions are proof of compliance guidance of Allah..." The statement added that "Our goal of these actions is to give the words of Allah a higher meaning and retaliate against the enemies of Islam in response to their cruel punishment on the people and for the arrests and torture of our brothers and sisters."<sup>32</sup>

In June 2004, an IJG statement promised additional attacks against the regime of President Karimov.<sup>33</sup>

Rahim Yusupov was arrested shortly after his younger brother, Shuhrat Yusupov, was detained on the days of the explosions in Tashkent in March 2004. Rahim was an IJG member and underwent military and political training in IJG camps in Pakistan. Following the training period, he was sent back to Uzbekistan and placed under the command of the IJG's Uzbekistan emir Ahmad Bekmirzayev. Rahim Yusupov was instrumental in the recruitment of Nosir Ourbonaliyev and facilitated his travel to the IJG training camps in Pakistan.<sup>34</sup>

The emir of the Islamic Jihad Group in Uzbekistan, Ahmad Bekmirzayev (a.k.a. Molik / a.k.a. Malik), was likely one of the co-founders of the Islamic Jihad Group in 2002.<sup>35</sup> He received an important assignment when he was sent to Uzbekistan to coordinate the fight against the Uzbek government. Bekmirzayev set up a network in Uzbekistan and in March of 2004, he prepared for the first series of attacks since 1999. According to the director of the Kazakh intelligence service, Bekmirzayev persuaded his wife, Mohira Ibragimova, to blow herself up as a suicide bomber in a terrorist attack in Uzbekistan.<sup>36</sup>

Another member of the Uzbekistan chapter of the IJG, Abdunosir Zulfiqorov, was born in 1969 in the town of Toytepa. His radicalization began in 1993. After some time he had to flee Uzbekistan and move to Shymkent in Kazakhstan. There he became a

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<sup>30</sup> IWPR Staff, Uzbekistan: Affluent Suicide Bombers, Reporting Central Asia, IWPR, No. 278, April 20, 2004; [http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=176631&apc\\_state=henirca2004](http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=176631&apc_state=henirca2004); Sudha Ramachandrav, Uzbekistan's femme fatales, Asia Times, April 28, 2004; [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central\\_Asia/FD28Ag01.html](http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/FD28Ag01.html)

<sup>31</sup> IWPR Staff, Uzbekistan: Affluent Suicide Bombers, Reporting Central Asia, IWPR, No. 278, April 20, 2004; [http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=176631&apc\\_state=henirca2004](http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=176631&apc_state=henirca2004)

<sup>32</sup> Centrasia web site, Moscow, in Russian 16.55LT 3 April 2004; <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1080996900>

<sup>33</sup> Cerwyn Moore, Uzbek Terror Networks: Germany, Jamoat and the IJU, Terrorism Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, November 8, 2007.

<sup>34</sup> Uzbek Television second channel, Tashkent, in Uzbek, July 28, 2004.

<sup>35</sup> Huquq, Tashkent, in Uzbek, January 5, 2005, p. 6.

<sup>36</sup> Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency, Almaty, in Russian, November 11, 2004.



member of an organization led by Ahmad Bekmirzayev, who sent him to Pakistan for military training. After a course in manufacturing explosives, he was sent to Uzbekistan and was arrested shortly after the Tashkent explosions. Other identified members of the IJG in Uzbekistan were Mavlon Mirzaqulov and Qodirjon Toychiyev.<sup>37</sup>

Appearing before the Uzbek Supreme Court, Qodirjon Toychiyev said that he made a serious mistake and would face the consequences: "I really repent. My mother would criticize me. I repent, we have gone crazy. Now I have understood everything. OK, I am ready to face what the victims demand. I should be ready even if they throw stones at me, because we now deserve this." Attempting to warn Toychiyev, Rahim Yusupov said before the court: "If someone calls you to join such a thing as the Jamoat [IJG], beware that it is obligatory to join. They lead you gradually by saying that these are infidels and we should separate. I have been there and have seen and witnessed everything. There is nothing good there."<sup>38</sup>

The state prosecutor, Murod Solihov, summed up the results of the investigation into the March attacks:

"The head of the criminal gang, Najmiddin Jalolov, directed the groups from outside Uzbekistan. He was in charge of the links between the groups and international terrorist organizations and coordinated the financing of the combat training of group members in special camps. It has been proved that the atrocities committed by the defendants were directed from a single criminal centre. The majority of members of the group underwent military training abroad. In their confessions they said terrorist acts in Uzbekistan were encouraged by international terrorist organizations. Ahmad Bekmirzayev, alias Molik, directed the criminal gang in Uzbekistan. The gang possessed a great amount of firearms and ammunition, hand-made explosive devices and their components, instruction manuals, religious literature, forged documents and other things. The management of the group recruited immature and religiously inclined young men and women to implement their evil plans. They urged women to declare jihad [against the Uzbek authorities] and commit suicide. As a result, Malika Abdullayeva and Dilnoza Kholmurodova blew themselves up at the Chorsu market in Tashkent on 29 March. Oilichbek Azimbekov, alias Muhammadamin, blew himself up in a house located on Sahbon Street. In all, 14 people died in the spring events and a further 54 people received injuries of various degrees. The material damage was put at over 20m soms [20m dollars] then. A total of 32 terrorists were killed when they put up resistance during their arrest."<sup>39</sup>

In late July 2004, 15 people, including two women, pled guilty in an Uzbekistan court to charges related to the attacks in March and April.<sup>40</sup> A few days after the court case began, the IJG struck again. On July 30, three male suicide bombers attacked, nearly simultaneously, the U.S. Embassy, the Israeli Embassy, and the office of the Uzbek

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<sup>37</sup> Uzbek Television second channel, Tashkent, in Uzbek, July 28, 2004.

<sup>38</sup> Uzbek Television second channel, Tashkent, in Uzbek, July 31, 2004.

<sup>39</sup> Uzbek Radio first program, Tashkent, in Uzbek, 20 August 20, 2004,

<sup>40</sup> <http://uzbekistan.usembassy.gov/home/index.aspx?=&mid=308&overview=1306>; BBC, Uzbek terror trails opens, July 26, 2004; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3926921.stm>

General Prosecutor in Tashkent. The attacks were coordinated with three single suicide bombers approaching the buildings around 4:45 p.m. local time.<sup>41</sup> Two local guards were killed at the entrance of the Israeli embassy when a suicide bomber set off his explosive vest. Seven people were wounded in a blast in the entrance hall of the Prosecutor General's Office, and two in the blast near the U.S. embassy compound.<sup>42</sup>

"An explosion caused either by a bomb or a suicide bomber at the entrance to the embassy killed two local employees of the embassy," Israel's Ambassador to Uzbekistan, Zvi Cohen, reported. "There were four of us, Israeli diplomats, in the embassy at the time of the blast and we are all safe and sound." A suicide bomber wearing an explosive vest set off the blast outside the U.S. embassy.<sup>43</sup>

The Islamic Jihad Group claimed responsibility for the blasts on July 30.<sup>44</sup> The statement said: "(These attacks) were an answer to the injustice of the apostate government and an expression of support for the jihad (holy war) of our Muslim brothers in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Hijaz (Saudi Arabia), and other Muslim lands."<sup>45</sup>

The second series of attacks was coordinated from Kazakhstan. The leader of the operation was the IJG emir in Kazakhstan, Zhakshybek or Jakshibek Biymurzayev, who was in direct contact with the IJG leadership in Pakistan.<sup>46</sup> The IJG used the names Mujahidin of Central Asia and Jamaat Mojahedin of Central Asia in Kazakhstan. When Biymurzayev was arrested in November 2004, authorities discovered passports from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Biymurzayev is from Kyrgyzstan and is of Kyrgyz nationality. He was married under Islamic law to two women and persuaded his two wives to become suicide bombers. Both were ready to blow themselves up.<sup>47</sup>

The three suicide bombers in the July 30 attacks were identified as Avazkhan Shayusupov, Mavlon Valiyev, and Dulat Iskakov. Shyusupov (born in 1966) from Taraz, Kazakhstan, carried out the attack in the foyer of the Uzbek Prosecutor General's Office. Valiyev (born in 1976) also from Taraz, Kazakhstan, was the attacker at the Israeli embassy, and Iskakov (born in 1972) from Sempalatinsk, but a resident of Atyrai, attacked the U.S. embassy in Tashkent.<sup>48</sup>

In January 2005, six people, two of whom were women, stood before a Tashkent court for their role in the July 2004 suicide attacks in Tashkent. The six have been

<sup>41</sup> IWPR Staff, Uzbekistan faces new breed of Islamic Opposition, Reporting Central Asia, IWPR, No. 304, August 2, 2004; [http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=175192&apc\\_state=henirca2004](http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=175192&apc_state=henirca2004)

<sup>42</sup> Two killed in Uzbekistan blasts, BBC, July 30, 2004; <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3940019.stm>; Susan B. Glasser, U.S., Israeli Embassies Hit In Uzbek Bomb Attacks, Prosecutor's Office Also Targeted With Terror Trial Ongoing, Washington Post, July 31, 2004; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26869-2004Jul30.html>

<sup>43</sup> AFP, 2 killed as suicide bombers strike US, Israeli embassies, Dawn, July 31, 2004; <http://www.dawn.com/2004/07/31/top12.htm>; Herb Keinon and AP, Israel boosts security after Uzbek, Jerusalem Post, August 1, 2004.

<sup>44</sup> Oleg Shchedrov, Uzbekistan points to Islamists in suicide bombings, Reuters, July 31, 2004. [http://www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/073004Reuters\\_Uzb.shtml](http://www.ncsj.org/AuxPages/073004Reuters_Uzb.shtml);

<sup>45</sup> Statement by the Islamic Jihad Group, July 30, 2004;

<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1091217600>

<sup>46</sup> Olga and Daur Dosybiev, Kazaks accuse 16 in Tashkent bomb trial, IWPR, RCA No. 380, May 20, 2005; [http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=244209&apc\\_state=henirca2005](http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=244209&apc_state=henirca2005)

<sup>47</sup> Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency, Almaty, in Russian, November 11, 2004.

<sup>48</sup> Novoye Pokoleniye, Almaty, in Russian, January 28, 2005, pp 1, 3.



identified as Murod Latipov, Sunnat Tapayev, Umidjon Ostonov, Azamat Toshmatov, Maysara Husanova, and Firuza Jorayeva. Murod Latipov and Sunnat Tapayev are visually disabled, while Firuza Jorayeva suffers from an oncological disease.<sup>49</sup>

A Russian media source reported that:

“The six were in direct contact with the IJG and their leaders according to the prosecutors. The defendants said they had only indirect contact, or did not plead guilty at all. During the trial, Latipov admitted that following the explosions in 1999 and his meeting with one of the active perpetrators of the series of explosions in 2004 he started to be drawn to Salafi ideas. Husanova admitted that she agreed to leave her country to earn a living, without knowing the real intentions of her recruiters, and is a victim of circumstances. Through lies and promises she was taken to a training camp in Pakistan, where attempts were made to turn her into a suicide terrorist. Similar circumstances have brought Jorayeva, Toshmatov and Ostonov to the dock.”<sup>50</sup>

According to Farhod Oozoqboyev, who was on trial for his involvement in the late March and early April 2004 attacks in Tashkent, the original plan included attacks on foreign embassies and law-enforcement agencies.<sup>51</sup> The Israeli, U.K, and U.S. Embassies were the initial targets of the attack. Why the Prosecutor General’s Office became one of the targets is not exactly known, but it is clear that the targets were not selected randomly.<sup>52</sup>

According to Uzbek law enforcement officials, the methods used in the July 2004 suicide attacks were similar to those used in the Tashkent and Bukhara attacks in late March and early April 2004.<sup>53</sup>

Avazkhan Shayusupov, the suicide bomber who blew himself up at the Prosecutor General’s Office, was a male, approximately age 40, who intended to do maximum damage using metal pieces tied around his belt of explosives.<sup>54</sup>

The three terrorist acts carried out by suicide bombers near the U.S. and Israeli embassies, as well as the Prosecutor General’s Office, took place in a 15-minute period; from 4:45 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., on July 30, 2004. Two people died instantly.<sup>55</sup> On August 3, the death toll rose to four when a policeman died in the hospital. The dead belonged to the Office of the Interior Ministry, the National Security Service, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and the police.<sup>56</sup> In a TV address, Uzbek President Karimov said that the same group behind the July 30<sup>th</sup> suicide attacks was also responsible for the explosions in Tashkent.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Novoye Pokoleniye, Almaty, in Russian, January 28, 2005, pp 1, 3.

<sup>50</sup> Novoye Pokoleniye, Almaty, in Russian, January 28, 2005, pp 1, 3.

<sup>51</sup> Uzbek Radio Youth Channel, Tashkent, in Uzbek, July 31, 2004.

<sup>52</sup> Uzbek Television first channel, Tashkent, in Russian, July 31, 2004.

<sup>53</sup> Uzbek Radio Youth Channel, Tashkent in Uzbek, July 31, 2004.

<sup>54</sup> Uzbek Radio Youth Channel, Tashkent in Uzbek, July 31, 2004.

<sup>55</sup> Uzbek Television first channel, Tashkent, in Russian, July 31, 2004.

<sup>56</sup> Interfax, Moscow, in Russian, August 3, 2004.

<sup>57</sup> Uzbek Television first channel, Tashkent, in Russian, July 31, 2004.

In mid November, the Kazakh security service arrested a group that included 9 Kazakhs, 4 Uzbeks, and 4 others in an operation called “Amoliet”. Some of the individuals arrested were preparing for suicide attacks.<sup>58</sup> In Kazakhstan, sixteen people were tried for their involvement in the July 30<sup>th</sup> suicide bombings in Tashkent. The accused included the Kazak emir of the IJG, Biymurzayev, and a young woman. They were all ethnic Kazaks or Uzbeks. Three of the accused were identified as Elmurod Mammakulov, 30, from Mankent and brothers Abdunabi Kadyrakhunov, 35 and Azamat Kadyrakhunov, 32, from the neighboring village of Aksukent. They were all described as devout Muslims.<sup>59</sup>

On May 13, 2005, it was reported that a male suicide bomber was killed by security guards near the Israeli embassy in Tashkent when he ignored calls to stop.<sup>60</sup> This incident may possibly have been a dry run for a suicide attack. Interestingly, this incident occurred on the same day that riots in Andijan began and the same day the IJG released a statement declaring Jihad on the Uzbek government.<sup>61</sup> Also, it should be noted that the attack occurred on the eve of Israel’s day of independence.

The 2004 attacks in Uzbekistan provide a certain amount of insight into the ideology, strategy, and operational skills of the IJG. The ideology was the same one that many other groups adhered to in the loosely connected Global Jihad Movement, spearheaded by Qa’idat al-Jihad and the Taliban from the Tribal Areas in Pakistan. The IJG is seeking to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan and will also support the Global Jihad. This put the organization, at that point in time, in the company of a group that included the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) in Algeria, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). All were said to be al-Qa’ida affiliates at that time, which means that they have a regional/national goal in addition to their support for the Global Jihad.<sup>62</sup>

The IJG was focusing its activities on Uzbekistan, but the operations were a failure. The March attacks were late and seemed to be influenced by emotion. Of the 47 casualties of the attacks, almost 70% percent were IJG fighters, including at least three of the female suicide bombers. The suicide attacks of July 30, 2004 were poorly executed by three suicide bombers. Two suicide bombers failed to reach the premises of the Israeli and U.S. embassies in Tashkent. The third suicide bomber was able to walk into the building of the General Prosecutor of Uzbekistan, but luckily no one was killed except the bomber when he set off his explosives vest. Additionally, the second cadres of suicide bombers were unable to carry out a successful terror act. Also, the explosions in Tashkent were overshadowed in the press because a few hours after the attacks, a

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<sup>58</sup> Kazakh Embassy in Paris, Press Release; [http://www.amb-kazakhstan.fr/bulletins/Communique\\_041117.pdf](http://www.amb-kazakhstan.fr/bulletins/Communique_041117.pdf)

<sup>59</sup> Olga and Daur Dosybiev, Kazaks accuse 16 in Tashkent bomb trial, IWPR, RCA No. 380, May 20, 2005; [http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=244209&apc\\_state=henirca2005](http://www.iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=244209&apc_state=henirca2005)

<sup>60</sup> ITAR-TASS, Moscow, in Russian, May 13, 2005.

<sup>61</sup> Ronald Sandee, The Role of the Akramiya in the May 13,2005 Unrest in Andijan, Hudson Institute, Center for Eurasian Policy Occasional Research Paper, Series I (Hizb ut-Tahrir), No.3; [http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Ronald\\_Sandee\\_HT.pdf](http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/Ronald_Sandee_HT.pdf); statement

<sup>62</sup> Defense Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD), Annual Report 2005, pp. 23-24; [http://www.mindef.nl/binaries/jaarverslag\\_2005\\_tcm15-82867.pdf](http://www.mindef.nl/binaries/jaarverslag_2005_tcm15-82867.pdf) (in Dutch)

suicide bomber attacked the motorcade of the Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz, but failed to kill him.<sup>63</sup>

Although it became clear that the IJG cells were trained in camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan (North Waziristan), the operational execution was premature. After the failure in Uzbekistan and the lost opportunity to generate funds in the Gulf States, (a video of the attacks in July was presented to al-Jazeera, but it is not known if the video was actually shown) the IJG had to rethink its strategy of “Uzbekistan first”. Along with rethinking the strategy came a name change. In May 2005, the IJG changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). The organization likely received its assignment to focus on Germans and Turks originating from Europe from al-Qa’ida’s external operations unit. The IJU had to get closer to al-Qa’ida and the Taliban in order to receive the badly needed funds. It is known that there were extensive contacts between the leadership of the IJU and Hamza Rabi’a, the head of al-Qa’ida’s External Operations. Rabi’a was killed on December 2, 2005, in the village of Asoray, close to Mirali.<sup>64</sup> According to an al-Qa’ida representative who called the Arab TV channel al-Arabiya, five persons were killed in the attack, including two Tajiks.<sup>65</sup>

### **Travel**

The Makki Mosque in Zahedan, Iran is an important center for IJU logistics. The largest Sunni mosque in Iran is the last stop for many new recruits from Europe and the former Soviet Union before they enter Pakistan. More than likely, most of the German recruits start their last leg of the journey to North Waziristan from Zahedan. One of the leading IJU facilitators in Zahedan was identified as Gafur Salimov; Salimov seemed to have played an important role in the “Sauerland” operation which will be discussed later in the report.

In 2005, Fritz Gelowicz left Germany for Damascus, Syria to take an Arabic language course. According to a certificate, the course began on August 8, 2005 and was completed in June 2006.<sup>66</sup> In the meantime, Gelowicz traveled from Damascus to Antalya, Turkey, from Turkey to Zahedan, Iran, before finally arriving at an IJU training camp in Pakistan in March 2006.<sup>67</sup>

Zafer Sari went to a Pakistani training camp in the summer of 2006, after attending a language school in Syria. His journey began on June 21, 2006, when he left Turkey for Jordan. He then went to Cairo and ended up in Pakistan.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Susan B. Glasser, U.S., Israeli Embassies Hit In Uzbek Bomb Attacks, Prosecutor's Office Also Targeted With Terror Trial Ongoing, Washington Post, July 31, 2004; <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26869-2004Jul30.html>

<sup>64</sup> Ismail Khan, 'Senior Al Qaeda commander killed', Dawn, December 2, 2005; <http://www.dawn.com/2005/12/03/top4.htm>

<sup>65</sup> AFP, Qaeda denies Rabi'a's death, The Daily Times, December 4, 2005; [http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2005\12\04\story\\_4-12-2005\\_pg1\\_3](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2005\12\04\story_4-12-2005_pg1_3)

<sup>66</sup> Nicolas Kulish and Souad Mekhennet, In Plot Suspect, Germany Sees Familiar Face, The New York Times, September 7, 2007; <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/world/europe/07fritz.html>

<sup>67</sup> Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, How the CIA helped Germany foil terror plot, Der Spiegel, September 10, 2007.

<sup>68</sup> Souad Mekhennet and Michael Moss, Europeans Get Terror Training Inside Pakistan, The New York Times, September 10, 2007; <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/world/europe/10germany.html>; Thomas Holl, Christoph

Eric Breininger and Houssain al-Malla traveled independently from Germany to Egypt and from there, traveled together through Iran to the IJU training camps in the Tribal Areas in Pakistan.<sup>69</sup>

### **New Recruits**

Shurat Masirokhunov, the former Counter Intelligence chief of the IMU, said that “each novice would undergo a ‘quarantine’ period with us for about a month. He would be tested in various ways. He would be having a meal, for instance, and someone would snatch the plate from his hands. We would watch how this person reacts in this situation. Or we would give him mind-altering drugs before his sleep and listen to what he tells in his sleep.”<sup>70</sup> Although nothing is known about the treatment of new recruits when they arrive at IJU training camps in the Tribal Areas, it can be assessed that these new recruits will also be tested in much the same way they are at IMU camps. These methods were already being utilized in the 1990’s in Afghan al-Qa’ida training camps. The screening was more thorough then and started days before a recruit was sent to a training camp.<sup>71</sup>

One new recruit from Germany, who was arrested in mid-2007, possessed a false passport, a satellite telephone, and radios.<sup>72</sup>

### **Training Camps**

Some of the videos released by Badr al-Tawheed, the IJU’s media arm, show IJU recruits participating in training sessions. Moreover, some of the videos even show children being trained in martial arts and firearms.<sup>73</sup> In one of the videos, the focus is on 11-year-old Abd al-Rahim, who was later killed in battle.<sup>74</sup> The picture illustrates that some of the children receiving fire arms training are considerably younger than 10-years-old.<sup>75</sup>



All available information seems to indicate that the IJU trains groups of 15-25 recruits at a time. A training camp should not be thought of as the classic al-Qa’ida training facility of the 1990’s in Afghanistan, as a group of recruits can be trained at a

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Ehrhardt und Katharina Iskandar, Schlag gegen Terror. Die Spuren der Täter, Frankfurter Allgemeine, September 9, 2007.

<sup>69</sup> Annette Ramelsberg, Model Student wird Terrorist, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 April 2008; Heute, Angst vor dem Märtyrer-video, May 9, 2008;

<http://www.zdf.de/ZDFmediathek/content/493480?inPopup=true>

<sup>70</sup> Moscow News, November 25, 2005.

<sup>71</sup> Omar Nasiri, Inside the jihad. My life with al-Qaeda (New York 2006) pp. 123-125.

<sup>72</sup> SWR, Terror in Deutschland. Die Spur führt nach Ulm, Report Mainz, Das Erste, 25 June 2007;

<http://www.swr.de/report/-/nid=233454/did=2171130/ri5bes/index.html>

<sup>73</sup> Video of IJU Training Camp (released: April 2008)

<http://www.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-prop.html>

<sup>74</sup> Video in possession of author

<sup>75</sup> Cemaatiz Taleberi, August 25, 2008;

[http://www.sehadetzamani.com/haber\\_detay.php?haber\\_id=1973](http://www.sehadetzamani.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1973)

compound. Behind the high walls surrounding the living quarters, no one knows what is going on. An example of this can be seen in a video of suicide bomber Cuneyt Ciftcy.<sup>76</sup>

The IJU maintains training camps in Bajaur and North Waziristan. From these areas, it is logical to start cross border operations in Afghanistan. The IJU recently sent small groups of fighters, up to 20 persons, into Nuristan, Paktia, and Paktika to conduct guerilla operations.<sup>77</sup>

In August 2006, a 28-year-old Turkmen, Abdur Raheem (a.k.a. Oasem / a.k.a. Abdul Kareem) was arrested in Peshawar. Abdur Raheem was an explosives expert and trained Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks, and Turkmen at Degan in North Waziristan. Abdur Raheem was a former member of the IMU, but moved to the IJU.<sup>78</sup>

### **Living Conditions and Financing**

The living conditions in the Tribal Areas are spartan. Ebu Yasir el-Turki described his living conditions: "I live in a mud hut, which has one room, together with my wife and children. If we have a guest, I sent my wife to the house of another Mujahid who is my neighbor." When asked what the monthly income is for an IJU fighter, he stated: "We are paying 1,500 rupees (30 New Turkish Lira = approx US \$20) to every fighter and 500 rupees for each child. Which means a fighter with two children receives 4,000 rupees (80 New Turkish Liras) monthly. We are paying salaries to bachelors from time to time they get 200 to 300 rupees for personal needs."<sup>79</sup>

He added, "Our present conditions allow us only this much, if God permits and the situation improves the salaries will be increased." "...the reason we are here is not to live in luxury, it is to perform the religious duty called jihad...Jihad or wars require money, you know how much the infidels allocate as war chest yearly just to fight with us. The religious community should think about this and help more to maintain us."<sup>80</sup>

According to the Turkish suicide bomber who lived in Germany, Cuneyt Ciftcy, an IJU fighter and his family have a monthly income between US \$50 and \$60. The living conditions are dismal and he could not afford olives, cheese, eggs or bread.<sup>81</sup> Also Eric Breininger (a.k.a. Abdulgaffar El Almani) said in an interview published on the IJU website, "surely the money is scarce but Allah gives the most important stuff."<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Video Footage of IJU Terror Training Camp in Pakistan (April 2008) and Video of German Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan Cuneyt Ciftci (March 2008) can be found at <http://www.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-prop.html>

<sup>77</sup> Evan F. Kohlmann, Jihad Networks in Pakistan and Their Influence in Europe, The NEFA Foundation, July 2008; <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nekapakcamps0708.pdf>

<sup>78</sup> Ismail Khan, Turkman trainer held in NWFP, Dawn, August 11, 2006; <http://www.dawn.com/2006/08/11/top16.htm>

<sup>79</sup> Interview of Turkish Islamic Jihad Union Fighter Abu Yasir Al-Turki, April 14, 2008; <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nekajjuelturki0408.pdf>

<sup>80</sup> Interview of Turkish Islamic Jihad Union Fighter Abu Yasir Al-Turki, April 14, 2008; <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nekajjuelturki0408.pdf>

<sup>81</sup> Video testimony of Cuneyt Ciftcy (a.k.a. Saad Ebu Furkan) released on April 28, 2008.

<sup>82</sup> [http://sehadetvakti.com/yazdir.php?haber\\_id=1919](http://sehadetvakti.com/yazdir.php?haber_id=1919)

## **Operations in Pakistan**

The IJU was responsible for a major plot inside Pakistan. The plot broke on October 4, 2006, around 10:00 p.m., when an explosion took place in the biggest public park of Rawalpindi, Ayub Park, close to the residency of President Pervez Musharraf.<sup>83</sup> The next day, two live rockets (107mm) were found by the side of Constitution Avenue, about 200 meters from the road to the president's residence.<sup>84</sup> The police defused the two rockets which were attached to mobile phones. According to a government official, "The devices were inaccurate and crude and they could be fired remotely as well as physically."<sup>85</sup> On October 6, two more rockets were found near the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) headquarters on Kashmir Highway. The rockets were also 107mm and were attached to mobile phones. During the search, the police secured the SIM cards of the mobile phones.<sup>86</sup>

Within a week, the ISI tracked the calls made to the phones and eight people were arrested. On October 21, the eight - Nadeem Youssuf, Mohammad Abdullah Khan (a.k.a. Asadullah,) Jawad Hussain, Khyzir Hayat, Sikandar Ali, Tahir (or Tariq) Ali, Abid Bashir, and Sadar Shahzad - were brought before an anti-terrorism court.<sup>87</sup> After further interrogation, the authorities discovered that there were 19 rockets in total. Eight rockets were recovered unexploded near the Parliament House and Zero Point. The remaining rockets were later located in different locations.<sup>88</sup>

On October 22, three more suspects were arrested in Islamabad's industrial area when police stopped a car.<sup>89</sup> The three were Khalil Wyne - the alleged mastermind of the plot - Ali Ahmed Gondal, and Munir Akhtar. The investigative team found, after interrogation of the men, more rockets and other "sophisticated" weapons that were hidden.<sup>90</sup> The explosive experts of the group were Nadeem Youssuf and Asadullah.<sup>91</sup>

Khalil Wyne, the mastermind, was described as a young man in his mid-twenties who was previously associated with the Lashkar-i-Tayyiba. He received a Master's degree in Business Administration from Hamdard University and received training in guerilla tactics and explosives during several visits to North Waziristan and Bajaur. He also went

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<sup>83</sup> Mohammed Asghar, Explosion in 'Pindi park causes panic, Dawn, October 5, 2006;  
<http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/05/top1.htm>

<sup>84</sup> Syed Irfan Reza, Mohammad Ashgar and Manawwar Azeem, Two live rockets found near presidency, Dawn, October 6, 2006; <http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/06/top1.htm>

<sup>85</sup> Detentions in capital for interrogation, Dawn, October 7, 2006;  
<http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/07/top10.htm>

<sup>86</sup> Manawwar Azeem and Mohammad Ashgar, Two rockets found near ISI office in Islamabad, Dawn, October 8, 2006; <http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/08/top11.htm>

<sup>87</sup> Seven-day remand of accused granted, Dawn, October 15, 2006;  
<http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/15/nat3.htm>

<sup>88</sup> Mastermind of rocket plan traced, Dawn, October 22, 2006;  
<http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/22/top6.htm>

<sup>89</sup> Three more rocket plot suspects held, October 24, 2006;  
<http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/24/nat2.htm>

<sup>90</sup> Failed attacks: more rockets recovered, Dawn, October 28, 2006;  
<http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/28/nat24.htm>

<sup>91</sup> Seven-day remand of accused granted, Dawn, October 15, 2006;  
<http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/15/nat3.htm>



to Afghanistan to fight. In North Waziristan, he became close to Yakhyo, the emir of the IJU.<sup>92</sup>

Khalil acquired 19 rockets, launchers, plastic explosives, and guns from the IJU and brought them to Islamabad. Khalil's two main lieutenants, Ali Ahmed Gondal and Munir Akhtar, both engineers, were linked to the Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba, the student movement of the Jamaat-i-Islami, but they later joined the Hizb-ul-Mujahidin before they crossed Khalil. The two told their interrogators that their hatred for the United States and the government's support for the U.S. in its war on terror was their main inspiration for joining the plot.<sup>93</sup>

The leader of the IJU ordered the attack.

In December 2007, the IJU became part of the fighting between local Taliban groups in the Swat region in the North Western Frontier Province, and the Pakistani armed forces. In December 2007, the IJU attacked a Pakistani convoy in the Swat Valley.<sup>94</sup>

### **Operations in Afghanistan**

In 2008, the IJU shifted its operations to the Afghan theater. Videos were released in which IJU-trained fighters committed suicide attacks on NATO bases and convoys in the eastern part of Afghanistan. Also, German authorities released warnings that it expected attacks on its forces in Afghanistan by IJU fighters, specifically mentioning Eric Breininger and Hussain al-Malla, who traveled from Germany to the Tribal Areas to become jihad fighters.<sup>95</sup>



On March 3, 2008, a Turk raised and living in Germany named Cuneyt Ciftcy (a.k.a. Saad Ebu Furkan) drove a VBIED into a NATO compound in the Sabari Ulus Valley in Paktika Afghanistan, killing at least four: two American soldiers and two Afghans.<sup>96</sup> The IJU claimed that Ciftcy's attack killed at least 60.<sup>97</sup> Ciftcy was trained to become a

<sup>92</sup> Ismail Khan, Rocket attack plan was approved by Al Qaeda, Dawn, November 4, 2006; <http://www.dawn.com/2006/11/04/top4.htm>

<sup>93</sup> Ismail Khan, Rocket attack plan was approved by Al Qaeda, Dawn, November 4, 2006; <http://www.dawn.com/2006/11/04/top4.htm>

<sup>94</sup> Declaration by the Islamic Jihad Union published December 19, 2007 on the now defunct website [www.sehadetvakfi.com](http://www.sehadetvakfi.com)

<sup>95</sup> Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, How the CIA helped Germany foil terror plot, Der Spiegel, September 10, 2007.

<sup>96</sup> IJU press release on an attack carried out by the IJU in the Paktika region in Afghanistan on 3 March; March 3, 2008; <http://sehadetvakti.com/>; Matthias Gebauer, The Smiling Suicide Bomber, Der Spiegel, March 27, 2008; <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,543768,00.html>

<sup>97</sup> Roger Boyes, Bavarian Cuneyt Ciftci is Germany's first suicide bomber, The Times, March 18, 2008; <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article3571785.ece>

suicide bomber in an IJU camp in North Waziristan.<sup>98</sup> The operation was coordinated with the Haqqani network.<sup>99</sup>



*Cuneyt Ciftcy*

Another suicide attack by an IJU-trained jihadi, using the a.k.a. Said Kurdi, took place on May 31, 2008 near Jalalabad in east Afghanistan. The suicide bomber drove his explosives-laden car into a convoy of Humvees, killing a U.S. Marine and wounding three.<sup>100</sup>

The last reported suicide attack by the IJU took place on June 4, 2008, when a Turkish national, Hasan Alpfidan (a.k.a. Abu Muslim Kurdi), drove his explosives-laden black Toyota into an office of the Afghan Intelligence service in Meydan-e Ddadzi in the Khost province. The IJU claims more than a hundred intelligence officials were killed.<sup>101</sup>

In other released videos, groups of approximately twenty IJU fighters attack Coalition forces in Paktika, Paktia, and Nuristan. Except for the attack in Nuristan where IJU fighters and a combined Afghan-U.S. patrol exchanged direct fire, the other attacks were guerrilla style, meaning the fighters set up rockets and mortars and fired them on a fixed target from a certain distance.<sup>102</sup>

Additional attacks were executed by the IJU including:

April 25, 2008: A group of IJU fighters attacked a NATO base in Morga (Paktika Province) firing 16 BM rockets.<sup>103</sup>

April 29, 2008: A group of IJU fighters attacked a NATO base in Gardez (Paktika Province). The IJU claimed it killed eight NATO soldiers and lost two of its own.<sup>104</sup>



<sup>98</sup> Video of German Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan Cuneyt Ciftcy (March 2008); <http://www.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-prop.html>

<sup>99</sup> In a video released after Ciftci's suicide attack, Jalaludin Haqqani praises the operation.

<sup>100</sup> Ivan Watson, Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan Kills U.S. Marine, May 31, 2008; <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=91029127>; IJU communiqué, Martyrdom operation in Jalalabad (in Turkish); <http://anti-imperialist.info/vb/showthread.php?t=2865>

<sup>101</sup> Islamic Jihad Union Martyrdom operation on Afghan apostate forces, published June 4, 2008,

<sup>102</sup> Video in possession of author

<sup>103</sup> IJU communiqué, [Islamic Jihad Union] Operations in Paktika Province/Pictures of the Mujahideen, April 29, 2008; <http://anti-imperialist.info/vb/showthread.php?t=2348>

May 4, 2008: A combined group of Taliban and IJU fighters attacked a post of the Afghan National Army (ANA) in Gardez (Paktia Province) with mortars and BM rockets.<sup>105</sup>

May 12, 2008: A combined group of Taliban and IJU fighters attacked a NATO base in Morga (Paktika Province) firing 19 BM rockets and 16 82mm mortar rounds.<sup>106</sup>



May 17, 2005: A combined group of Taliban and IJU fighters attacked a NATO base on the highway between Gardez and Khost (Paktia Province) with mortars and BM rockets.<sup>107</sup>

May 28, 2008: A combined group of al-Qa'ida and IJU fighters attacked an ANA base in the Lwara region (Paktika Province) firing 16 BM rockets.<sup>108</sup>

May 29, 2008: A combined group of Taliban and IJU fighters attacked a NATO base in the Setekanda section along the Gardez-Khost highway (Paktia Province) with mortars and BM rockets.<sup>109</sup> A video of these attacks was later released.

August 10, 2008: A combined group of Taliban and IJU fighters attacked an ANA convoy in Shwak Metia (Paktia Province).<sup>110</sup>

August 15, 2008: A combined group of Taliban and IJU fighters attacked a NATO base along the Gardez-Khost highway (Paktia Province) using 75mm mortars and 16 BM rockets.<sup>111</sup>

### **The German Link**

In Germany, a group of German Muslim converts and radicalized Turkish Muslims were meeting regularly at the Multi-Kultur-Haus Ulm e.V. (MKH) in Neu Ulm, Bavaria, in southeast Germany. The Multi-Kultur-Haus was founded on June 21, 1996, and was run

<sup>104</sup> IJU communiqué, [Islamic Jihad Union] Operations in Paktika Province/Pictures of the Mujahideen, April 29, 2008; <http://anti-imperialist.info/vb/showthread.php?t=2348>

<sup>105</sup> IJU communiqué, [Islamic Jihad Union] Operations in Paktia and Paktika Province, May 14 and May 19, 2008; <http://anti-imperialist.info/vb/showthread.php?t=2686>

<sup>106</sup> IJU communiqué, [Islamic Jihad Union] Operations in Paktia and Paktika Province, May 14 and May 19, 2008; <http://anti-imperialist.info/vb/showthread.php?t=2686>

<sup>107</sup> IJU communiqué, [Islamic Jihad Union] Operations in Paktia and Paktika Province, May 14 and May 19, 2008; <http://anti-imperialist.info/vb/showthread.php?t=2686>

<sup>108</sup> IJU communiqué, [Islamic Jihad Union] Operations in Paktia and Paktika Province, no date; <http://anti-imperialist.info/vb/showthread.php?t=2867>

<sup>109</sup> IJU communiqué, [Islamic Jihad Union] Operations in Paktia and Paktika Province, no date; <http://anti-imperialist.info/vb/showthread.php?t=2867>

<sup>110</sup> IJU communiqué, [Islamic Jihad Union] Operations in Paktia Province, [http://www.shadetzaman.com/haber\\_detay.php?haber\\_id=1972](http://www.shadetzaman.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1972)

<sup>111</sup> IJU communiqué, [Islamic Jihad Union] Operations in Paktia Province, [http://www.shadetzaman.com/haber\\_detay.php?haber\\_id=1972](http://www.shadetzaman.com/haber_detay.php?haber_id=1972)

by Egyptian Salafist imam Yehia Yousif.<sup>112</sup> It was founded by Egyptian Jamaat al-Islamiyya member, Dr. Aldy el-Attar, who was in close contact with Mamdouh Mahmud Salim (a.k.a. Abu Hajer al-Iraqi). Salim was one of the original founders of al-Qa'ida and one of the financial heavyweights within the organization. Salim traveled to Germany five times in the 1990s and was arrested in Germany in 1998 and extradited to the U.S. for his involvement in the Africa Embassy bombings. The MKH became an object of close observation by the German authorities. The MKH was also linked to some of the 9/11 hijackers, especially the leaders of the Hamburg cell, Muhammad Atta and Ramzi Binalshib, who visited El-Attar and Reda Seyam in Neu Ulm. Seyam is an Egyptian who was one of the founders of the NGO 'Menschen für Menschen' and was a representative of this NGO to the Balkans in the 1990s. In Bosnia, he made propaganda films for the Mujahideen cause. He is suspected of being one of the main financiers of the first Bali bombing in 2002.<sup>113</sup> The teachings at the MKH were openly in support of the Jihad and suicide bombings.<sup>114</sup>

On February 1, 1999, a new organization was founded on the other side of the Danube River in nearby Ulm. It is important to call attention to the fact that Ulm is in another state, Baden-Württemberg, as it makes it significantly more difficult for local German authorities to monitor the activities of radical Muslims, but, far easier for the radical Muslims to evade observation by the local authorities in Bavaria. By just crossing the bridge, they crossed state lines. Although the Islamisches Informationszentrum Ulm e.V. (IIZ) was founded in February 1999, it was officially registered on August 23, 1999.<sup>115</sup> Interestingly, the first board consisted of a Turkish chairman, an Arab vice-chairman, and a German convert serving as secretary.<sup>116</sup>

During the inauguration meeting in February 1999, the participants not only chose the board, but also decided on the regular contributions: 20 German Marks when someone became a member, and from then on, at least 30 German Marks every month. They also decided to create a Shura Council (at least 3 and not more than 11 members). The Shura Council would decide annually on the candidates for the board and vote on that board.<sup>117</sup> During the following years, at least three people trained in IJU camps were

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<sup>112</sup> E.Gujer, Islamisten aus der schwäbischen Provinz. Wie man von Ulm in terroristische Ausbildungslager gelangt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21 June 2006; Verfassungsschutzbericht Bayern 2005, p. 68.

<sup>113</sup> Richard Bernstein, The fear born of a much too personal look at Jihad, New York Times, November 27, 2004; Al-Qaida in Deutschland. Der Fall Reda Seyam, Der Spiegel; <http://www.spiegel.de/sptv/magazin/0,1518,291692,00.html>; Yassin Musharbash and Matthias Gebauer, Die Radikalen von Ulm, Der Spiegel, June 30, 2007; <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,491463,00.html>; Jan-C. Wehmeyer, So wurde mein Ex-Mann zum Gotteskrieger, Die Welt, April 24, 2008; [http://www.welt.de/politik/article1933455/So\\_wurde\\_mein\\_Ex-Mann\\_zum\\_Gotteskrieger\\_.html](http://www.welt.de/politik/article1933455/So_wurde_mein_Ex-Mann_zum_Gotteskrieger_.html); Rüdiger Soldt, Terrorverdächtiger Tolga D. "Rieche den Duft des Paradieses", Frankfurter Allgemeine, August 16, 2007.

<sup>114</sup> Bayrisches Staatsministerium des Innern, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2005 (Munich 2006) pp. 66-68; [http://www.stmi.bayern.de/imperia/md/content/stmi/sicherheit/verfassungsschutz/verfassungsschutzberichte/verfsch\\_2005.pdf](http://www.stmi.bayern.de/imperia/md/content/stmi/sicherheit/verfassungsschutz/verfassungsschutzberichte/verfsch_2005.pdf)

<sup>115</sup> Amtsgericht Ulm, II 88/89, VS1621, Vereinsregistereintragung v. 1.2.99 – Neueintragung des Vereins- August 23, 1999; Letter from the board of the Islamisches Informationszentrum Ulm to the Amtsgericht Ulm, February 1, 1999.

<sup>116</sup> Orhan Bayraktar (Chairman); Ahmed Ateia (Vice Chairman) and David Mitterhuber (Secretary)

<sup>117</sup> Protokoll Der Gründungsversammlung, Monday February 1, 1999, 2 pm.

active on the IIZ board or Shura Council: Tolga Dürbin, Fritz (Abdullah) Gelowicz, and Attila Selek. All three were on the IIZ's Shura Council in March 2005.<sup>118</sup>

One of the first persons linked to the radicalized Muslim scene in Neu Ulm and Ulm to go to the training camps in Pakistan was Omar Yousif. In the summer of 2001, he spent four weeks at a Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (LeT) training camps in Kashmir. It was clear that the circles in and around the MKH in Neu Ulm were capable of facilitating travel to training camps.<sup>119</sup> Following his time at the LeT camp, Yousif returned to Neu Ulm.

The next one to disappear was Thomas Fisher, a German convert who used the name Hamza and who was one of the founders of the IIZ in Ulm. He left Ulm in 2003 for Chechnya, and was killed by Russian Special Forces when they raided the Chechen village of Serzhen-Yurt on November 23, 2003.<sup>120</sup>

In 2005, the group of converts around Fritz Gelowicz became radicalized most likely in the second half of the year. In early 2006, Gelowicz and Adem Yilmaz went to Pakistan for training. The two were at an IJU training camp in Mirali in North Waziristan, in March 2006.<sup>121</sup> In June or July 2006, Atilla Selek (a.k.a. Muaz) and Zafer Sari were in an IJU training camps in Pakistan.<sup>122</sup> They were followed in August 2006 by Daniel Schneider.<sup>123</sup>

On June 10, 2007, Houssain al Malla, Tolga Dürbin, and a Kyrgyz citizen were arrested at the Pakistani border on their way to IJU training camps in Pakistan.<sup>124</sup>

The one who made it to North Waziristan was Sadullah Kaplan (a.k.a. Ömer al Turki). He was killed during an air raid by the Pakistani Air Force on extremist hideouts in Mirali in October 2007.<sup>125</sup> Another person who trained in North Waziristan in the

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<sup>118</sup> Protokoll der Shuraversammlung, Sunday, March 13, 2005, 7 pm.

<sup>119</sup> E.Gujer, Islamisten aus der schwäbischen Provinz. Wie man von Ulm in terroristische Ausbildungslager gelangt, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21 June 2006

<sup>120</sup> Verfassungsschutzbericht Bayern 2005, p. 68.

<sup>121</sup> Mark Lander and Nicholas Kuliah, Arrest of One Turk in Germany Brings New Scrutiny to a Society of 2.7 Million, The New York Times, September 7, 2007; <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/08/world/europe/8germany.html>; Nicolas Kulish and Souad Mekhennet, In Plot Suspect, Germany Sees Familiar Face, The New York Times, September 7, 2007; <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/world/europe/07fritz.html>

<sup>122</sup> Souad Mekhennet and Michael Moss, Europeans Get Terror Training Inside Pakistan, The New York Times, September 10, 2007; <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/world/europe/10germany.html>

<sup>123</sup> Souad Mekhennet and Michael Moss, Europeans Get Terror Training Inside Pakistan, The New York Times, September 10, 2007; <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/10/world/europe/10germany.html>

<sup>124</sup> Thomas Holl, Christoph Ehrhardt und Katharina Iskandar, Schlag gegen Terror. Die Spuren der Täter, Frankfurter Allgemeine, September 9, 2007; John C. K. Daly, Solar energy in Uzbekistan, UPI, September 14, 2007.

<sup>125</sup> 50 Killed as jets pound village: People fleeing troubled Mirali, Dawn, October 10, 2007; <http://www.dawn.com/2007/10/10/top1.htm>; 25 soldiers dead, many missing: 60 militants killed, says ISPR, Dawn, October 9, 2007; <http://www.dawn.com/2007/10/09/top1.htm>; 45 militants, 20 troops killed in clashes, Dawn, October 8, 2007; <http://www.dawn.com/2007/10/08/top1.htm>



summer of 2007 was Omid Shirkhani.<sup>126</sup> The last German known to have left Germany to move to Pakistan to join the Jihad is Eric Breininger (a.k.a. Abdulgaffar El Almani.) It is known that he teamed up with Houssain al Malla in Pakistan. An interview with Breininger in German was published on the IJU website in May 2008.<sup>127</sup> In the interview, Breininger explained that Germany can expect attacks by Islamic organizations because the Germans use their logistics bases in Termez, Uzbekistan for “the war of the American against the Muslims.”<sup>128</sup> Recently, the German authorities issued a warning that Breininger and al Malla had left the Afghanistan-Pakistan area and might be heading for Western Europe.<sup>129</sup>



*Eric Breininger (center)*

### **Operation Alberich**

Operation Alberich started in October 2006, when intelligence services intercepted suspicious emails from Germany to Pakistan. Persons of interest were identified and the operation began. When early on New Year’s Eve, four persons driving in a car made an observation run close to the Hutier Barracks in Hanau, they were followed by an observation team of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). The BfV team saw the car drive back and forth in front of the barracks several times.<sup>130</sup>

Later, the car was stopped by German police, who established the identity of the four persons in the car: Fritz Gelowicz, Attila Selek, Ayhan T., and Dana Bohuri. When asked what they were doing, they responded that they wanted to see “how the Americans celebrate New Year’s Eve.”<sup>131</sup> Within a week, police searched Gelowicz’s house to find clues about the real intent of the group. They found nothing, but installed cameras to follow Gelowicz more closely. During a search of Ayhan T.’s house, agents of the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) found a video. On the video, Ayhan T. talked about Jihad in Turkish and a group of men were singing Jihad songs in Turkish.<sup>132</sup> While agents were following Attila Selek, he stopped at a red traffic light, got out of the car, and knifed the tires of a car carrying members of an observation team following him.<sup>133</sup>

<sup>126</sup> Hubert Gude and Axel Spilcker, *Unbekannt verschwunden*, Focus nr 13, March 22, 2008; [http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/extremisten-unbekannt-verschwunden\\_aid\\_266769.html](http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/extremisten-unbekannt-verschwunden_aid_266769.html)

<sup>127</sup> [http://sehadetvakti.com/yazdir.php?haber\\_id=1919](http://sehadetvakti.com/yazdir.php?haber_id=1919)

<sup>128</sup> [http://sehadetvakti.com/yazdir.php?haber\\_id=1919](http://sehadetvakti.com/yazdir.php?haber_id=1919)

<sup>129</sup> Most wanted page at <http://www.bka.de>

<sup>130</sup> Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, *How the CIA helped Germany foil terror plot*, Der Spiegel, 10 September 2007;

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,504837,00.html>

<sup>131</sup> *idem*

<sup>132</sup> *ibidem*

<sup>133</sup> Souad Mekhennet and Nicholas Kulish, *Suspect denies ties to German Bomb Plot*, New York Times, October 12, 2007; <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/12/world/europe/12germany.html>



Three persons in the cell were in contact with the IJU operational leadership in Pakistan. They were Fritz Gelowicz (using the a.k.a. Abdul Malik,) Attila Selek (using the a.k.a. Muaz), and Zafer Sari. From the IJU side, an unidentified individual using multiple a.k.a.'s (Susi, Sul, Sule or Suley, and Jaf - an a.k.a. of Gafar Salimov, an IJU facilitator operating in Zahedan, Iran) was the main person to keep in contact with what became known as the Sauerland Cell.<sup>134</sup>

In April 2007, the IJU leadership contacted the cell in Germany and urged them to speed up their preparations, but the group was not ready to launch an attack. Gelowicz and Yilmaz, the two most senior members of the cell, went to Hannover in the second half of July to buy hydrogen peroxide, a chemical often used to bleach hair, but which can also be used as a basic substance in bomb-making. However, the concentrations need to be considerably higher than 50% and the men were only able to acquire the chemical with a concentration of up to 35%.<sup>135</sup> One press source notes that "An IJU manual describes how to enrich commercially available hydrogen peroxide to concentrations of up to 65 or 70 percent by adding starch, which can be derived from flour."<sup>136</sup>

During their trips to and from Hannover, Gelowicz and Yilmaz mentioned that they bought 12 containers with hydrogen peroxide, for use against possible targets. Targets that were discussed were two airports (Rammstein Air Base and Frankfurt International Airport), American barracks, and a night club. In the meantime, the men had rented a garage in a Black Forest town, Freudenstadt. During the operation, German authorities were able to exchange the 35% hydrogen peroxide with a 3% hydrogen peroxide solution.<sup>137</sup>

In August 2007, the cell was contacted from the Tribal Areas. The Uzbeks were angry and urged the cell to act soon. German authorities assessed that the possible attack was to happen no later than September 15, 2007. On September 5, German authorities arrested Adem Yilmaz and Daniel Schneider at their safe house; however, Gelowicz tried to escape. He was able to run for 300 meters before he was tackled and arrested.<sup>138</sup>

## **Conclusion**

The death of IMU leader Juma Namangani and his succession by Tohir Yuldashev might have been the direct result of the establishment of the precursor of the IJU. In late 2001, disappointed IMU members left the IMU and made contact with al-Oa'ida

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<sup>134</sup> Deutscher Islamisten, zur Ausbildung nach Pakistan, Focus, March 21, 2008.

<sup>135</sup> Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, How the CIA helped Germany foil terror plot, Der Spiegel, 10 September 2007;  
<http://www.spiegel.de/inernational/germany/0,1518,504837,00.html>

<sup>136</sup> Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, How the CIA helped Germany foil terror plot, Der Spiegel, 10 September 2007;  
<http://www.spiegel.de/inernational/germany/0,1518,504837,00.html>

<sup>137</sup> Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, How the CIA helped Germany foil terror plot, Der Spiegel, 10 September 2007;  
<http://www.spiegel.de/inernational/germany/0,1518,504837,00.html>

<sup>138</sup> Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, How the CIA helped Germany foil terror plot, Der Spiegel, 10 September 2007;  
<http://www.spiegel.de/inernational/germany/0,1518,504837,00.html>

leadership and Libyan Jihadis in the Tribal Areas. They founded the Islamic Jihad Group with the primary goal of fighting the Uzbek government in Uzbekistan.

In 2004, the organization was ready for its first series of multiple attacks in Uzbekistan. The operations were coordinated from the Tribal Areas in Pakistan, but the execution was not effective. Although hitting the targets could have had a huge impact on a global scale, the very limited damage the IJG was able to inflict made some observers doubt if the IJG even existed as an entity.

After the 2004 attacks in Uzbekistan, the IJG changed course. The IJG became not a single issue terror group, but changed its tenets to become a regional player and even support the Global Jihad Movement. It became what is called a Tier II organization or an al-Qa'ida affiliated organization. In the first half of 2005, the IJG changed its name to the IJU and began reaching out to recruit Central Asian, Caucasus, and Turkish Muslims.

Turks were not only recruited in Turkey but also in Turkish communities in Europe; Turkish communities in the German speaking countries were especially affected. Turks from Germany and possibly Austria and Switzerland joined the IJU in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. Later, German converts joined the IJU and were used together with Turks living in Germany to set up an operational cell that plotted an attack on American and German targets inside Germany.

In the meantime, the IJU also initiated operations in Pakistan and planned an operation to attack the quarters of then-Pakistani President Musharraf. This plot failed, but it was clear that the IJU was working to become a known terrorist entity.

This year, a shift has been evident and the IJU is currently focusing on the Afghan theater. Combined attacks with Taliban and al-Qa'ida fighters in the eastern Afghan provinces show that the IJU is not a home player in this area. It can be assumed that the three suicide attacks in Afghanistan were coordinated with local Taliban groups in area.

Although the IJU currently seems not to be terribly effective in the execution of its operations, it continues to remain a force to be reckoned with. Currently, it is assessed that up to a hundred Westerners, Muslims, and converts are being prepared for attacks in the West. The use of Western Muslim converts makes the IJU a very valuable asset for the Global Jihad Movement. It is assessed that the IJU is plotting operations in Western Europe and might try to execute them in the near future. The IJU needs a successful operation to attract new recruits and funds and to establish itself as a serious organization.

## Annex 1:

### Islamic Jihad Union

Jama'at al-Jihad al-Islami;  
Islamic Jihad Group (IJG);  
Al-Djihad al-Islami;  
Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov;  
Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan;  
Jama'at al-Jihad;  
Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami;  
Jamiyat;  
The Jamaat Mojahadin;  
The Kazakh Jama'at;  
The Libyan Society

### Islamic Jihad Union Leaders

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AKA: Abdurakhmon  
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