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Animal Wrongs and Rights

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ANTENNAE

The Journal of Nature in Visual Culture

Front Cover Image: Sue Coe, *Slaughterhouse Trenton*, 2006 © Sue Coe

EDITORIAL

ANTENNAE ISSUE 19

One of the most defining aspects of *Antennae*'s status as a multidisciplinary journal has simply been the determination to relentlessly present a variety of perspectives, always delivered by a diverse range of voices. Some have misinterpreted this ambition as a lack of concern for certain subjects in the human-animal discourse. However, as it was envisioned since its inception, *Antennae*'s main purpose is not that of takings sides, nor that of telling readers what is right or wrong, in the assumption that that the work of the reader may indeed entail the tasks of deciphering and deciding. For this reason, more than in other previous issue, this present one is consistently shaped by the perspectives and voices of some of the most influential and challenging contemporary thinkers.

Antennae is nearing its 5th birthday – the first issue was released in March 2007. Back then it was impossible to imagine that in 2011, we'd be able to gather exclusive interviews from the likes of Peter Singer, Tom and Nancy Regan, Roger Scruton and John Simons all in one issue dedicated to the subject of animal advocacy and the arts. And most importantly, it would have been even harder to imagine that these names would have been interviewed by some of the most exciting scholars who over the past twenty years have consistently shaped the field of human-animal studies itself: Carol Gigliotti, Garry Marvin and Rod Bennison, just to name a few, have all greatly contributed to the shaping of new perspectives through their discussions and questioning. Those familiar with the work of these scholars will instantly understand what this issue is about and what it will attempt to do.

It is rather hard to identify a more controversial and divisive subject of debate in the field of human-animal studies than the one of animal advocacy; a subject that seems to acquire even more complexity when discussion is brought in the arena of the arts. I personally wanted "Animal rights and wrongs" to deliberately be dense with writing in opposition to the lavishly illustrated formula which has become Antennae's trademark. I wanted this issue to be about questions – I wanted to ask and wanted this isseu's contributors to ask even more than I could have.

How far have we gone since the publishing of Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* from 1973, where are we finding ourselves and where are we going? But most importantly, who are we going there with? This issue attempts to answer these key questions and it does so by looking at a range of different media, geographical locations and contexts in the attempt of finding more questions.

As per usual, I would like to take the opportunity to thank all those involved in the making of this issue for dedicating their time and care to this project. Ultimately, many thanks to Sue Coe for allowing us to publish a portfolio of old and never before seen images in this issue of *Antennae*.

Giovanni Aloi
Editor in Chief of Antennae Project

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STEVE BAKER: WHAT ARE THE RELEVANT QUESTIONS?

Steve Baker, Emeritus Professor of Art History at UCLan, and author of the seminal books The Postmodern Animal *and of* Picturing the Beast: Animals, Identity, and Representation *introduces this issue of Antennae.*
Text by Steve Baker

By its title alone, *Antennae*'s current issue on "Animal Wrongs and Rights" raises expectations about its likely contents. The reversal of the more familiar formulation "rights and wrongs" suggests that a few surprises may be in store, as indeed they are. A variety of voices crowds in, many of them very well known, but not always saying what might have been expected. Most contributors address the theme of the issue with direct reference to the arts, but not only to the arts. The tension between the practical demands of animal advocacy and what is often regarded as the more reflective approach of the arts is evident in several contributions. Contemporary artists frequently characterize their work as posing questions rather than providing answers, but for artists (and for writers on art) concerned with animal advocacy, *what are the relevant questions?*

The essays and interviews in this issue offer plenty of scope for considering that particular question, but they also offer numerous memorable one-off statements: some of them amusing, some striking, some – well, how shall I put this? – preposterous. Here, in no particular order, are just a few of them. In a compelling interview, offering real insight into her working methods, Sue Coe characterizes herself as "an art worm eating dirt." (Why? Read the interview.) Philosopher and hunting enthusiast Roger Scruton, discussing his book *Animal Rights and Wrongs*, argues in relation to animals that "we do them harm" by attributing rights to them. Nancy Regan reveals the title of the cookbook she could imagine Tom Regan writing: "Cooking with Tom: One Ingredient: Soy Sauce!" – and I have to say that that really is my kind of cookbook. And Peter Singer offers the blunt assertion that the field of animal studies generally "fails to make an important contribution either to the cause of animals or to our understanding of the world."

The interview with Singer is also revealing in terms of how it articulates a far more widespread tension between philosophy and art. Singer explains that he likes ideas to be "clearly presented" and to be "argued as rigorously as the subject-matter permits." This perhaps explains his lack of sympathy for art that engages with questions of animal life in a more nuanced manner, but does not necessarily explain his view that films such as *Bambi* and *Babe* "have taken over the role of art." More perplexing still is his criticism of the way that "the energy used by … the air-conditioned art galleries in which we view art" contributes to climate change – a criticism that apparently does not extend to the air-conditioned lecture theatres in which philosophers present their ideas. But in Singer's view art simply *matters less* than philosophy, and he dismisses "the

art world" as "guilty of gross self-indulgence."

In my own view, what is lacking here is the kind of intellectual generosity found in a work such as Iris Murdoch's *The Sovereignty of Good* where, writing in 1970, she articulates an approach that "does not contrast art and morals, but shows them to be two aspects of a single struggle." She explicitly criticizes those who see art "as a quasi-play activity, gratuitous, 'for its own sake' … a sort of by-product of our failure to be entirely rational. Such a view of art is of course intolerable." And she insists that "aesthetic situations are not so much analogies of morals as cases of morals. Virtue … in the artist … is a selfless attention to nature."[i]

That kind of outlook is more evident elsewhere in this issue. John Simons, for example, writing from the perspective of literature, argues that "the important thing is for scholars … to find ways of using their discipline to promote awareness of the animal advocacy position." Here there is no implicit ethical hierarchy of disciplines but rather a sense that each discipline can shed distinctive and valuable light on the issues. As Simons puts it in one of his later answers, "I take the view that anything that stimulates people to think more carefully and, therefore one hopes, more kindly about animals is a good thing." Consciously or not, there is a definite echo here of Murdoch's view that attentiveness is itself a manifestation of ethical responsibility.

Similar ideas emerge in Carol Gigliotti's excellent interview with Tom and Nancy Regan. Tom Regan is quite explicit that there is "no scholarly discipline whose practitioners cannot make a contribution" to the advancement of animal advocacy. He continues: "But central – *central* – to this 'small' project of changing how people see the world is what students in the arts can contribute." This is an example of philosophy not merely acknowledging but embracing the arts, in what the Regans call the "mantra" of their Culture & Animals Foundation: "We'd rather be inside the theater performing than outside the theater protesting."

Yvette Watt's discussion of a wide range of contemporary artworks in her essay "Artists, Animals and Ethics" acknowledges the difficulties of adopting such an open approach, while nevertheless recognizing that certain works with no clear advocacy agenda may nevertheless offer "compelling" representations of animal life and death. She also shows, through the example of responses to the immensely important artist and activist Angela Singer's work, that even artwork shaped by a direct commitment to animal rights will not necessarily communicate its message effectively to viewers. As Singer herself acknowledges: "Do many of them *get* the animal rights message? Some do, some don't."[ii]

Art doesn't have all the answers, and artists (as they are generally very willing to admit) don't even always reliably know how to frame the relevant questions. But as Tom Regan insists, and as this whole issue of *Antennae* attests: "The wrong way to open students' minds is to close off informed debate." Without overstating its claims, contemporary art distinctively frames one necessary part of that debate about animal advocacy and changing attitudes to animal life. Sue Coe gets this about right in observing, towards the end of her interview: "It's never one thing that creates change, it's multiple exposures to different facets that create a different heart."

References

[i] Iris Murdoch, *The Sovereignty of Good* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 39-40.

[ii] Angela Singer, unpublished interview with Steve Baker, April 2010.

Steve Baker is a member of the editorial boards of *Society and Animals: Journal of Human-Animal Studies*, and of *Antennae: The Journal of Nature in Visual Culture*. He was a founding member of the Animal Studies Group, whose co-authored 2006 book *Killing Animals* was acknowledged in Donna Haraway's *When Species Meet* as 'an important new book'. His research on attitudes to animals in 20th and 21st-century art, philosophy and popular culture draws on his interviews and correspondence with contemporary artists in several countries, and his chapter in *Killing Animals* has been described by animal historian Harriet Ritvo as handling with 'deft awareness' the 'politically charged and often intentionally offensive artwork' that it analyzed. His forthcoming book, provisionally titled *ARTIST | ANIMAL*, proposes that the integrity of contemporary artists' engagement with questions of animal life is not fashioned out of and is not best understood through the language of a regulatory or proscriptive ethics.

5 Leading Thinkers on Animals

Exclusive Interviews

peter singer

Interviewed by Giovanni Aloi

BEYOND *ANIMAL LIBERATION*

In this exclusive interview with Antennae, *Peter Singer discusses animal rights, speciesism, animals in contemporary art, and role played by the field of human-animal studies.*
Questions by Giovanni Aloi

Peter Singer is considered to be one of the most influential thinkers alive and one that is world famous for giving the impetus to the animal rights movement. For over thirty years he has challenged traditional notions of applied ethics. is world famous for giving the impetus to the animal rights movement. Singer has also held twice the chair of philosophy in his native land at Monash University where he also founded the Centre for Human Bioethics. He can be considered a rationalist philosopher in the Anglo-American tradition of utilitarianism and teaches "practical ethics", which he defines as the application of a morality to practical problems based on philosophical thinking rather than on religious beliefs. In 2009 Singer made it to the *Time* magazine list of "The 100 Most Influential People in the World".

His 1975 book *Animal Liberation* greatly influenced the modern movements of animal welfare. There he argues against speciesism, which is the discrimination between beings on the sole basis of their species, and in this way it is almost always in practice in favor of members of the human race against non-human animals. The idea is that all beings that are capable of both suffering and experiencing pleasure, that is, sentient beings, should be regarded as morally equal in the sense that their interests ought to be considered equally. Professor Singer argues in particular that the fact of using animals for food is unjustifiable because it causes suffering disproportionate to the benefits humans derive from such consumption. According to him it is therefore a moral obligation to refrain from eating animal flesh (vegetarianism) or even go as far as not consuming any of the products derived from the exploitation of animals (veganism).

In 1977 he was appointed to the chair of philosophy at Monash University where he was to become the first director of the Centre for Human Bioethics. Peter Singer is also the founding president of the International Association of Bioethics as well as the editor of the academic journal called *Bioethics* together with the prominent Australian philosopher Helga Kuhse, with whom in 1985 he also wrote the famous *Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants.*

In 1996 he run unsuccessfully as a Green candidate for the Australian Senate. In 2004 he was recognized as the Australian humanist of the year by the Council of Australian Humanist Societies. Professor Singer is best known for his book *Animal Liberation: The Definitive Classic of the Animal Movement*, which is today regarded as the founding book of modern movements of animal rights. Singer's stand on bioethical issues, however, have been controversial, particularly in the United States and Germany.

Giovanni Aloi: **The question of the animal is a recurring one in your body of work. From the groundbreaking *Animal Liberation* (1975) to *Animal Rights and Human Obligations* (1976), *Animal Factories* (1980), *In Defence of Animals* (1985), *Save the Animals!* (1991) and most recently *In Defence of Animals: The Second Wave* (2005), your writings have consistently shaped the development of animal rights**



Peter Singer
Animal Liberation, 1975

activism across the globe. What do you see as the most fundamental changes in animal rights since the late 1970s?

Peter Singer: First, let me say that throughout this interview, I will use the term "animal rights" in the broad popular sense, not in a strictly philosophical sense. I use it as shorthand for saying that animals are beings with interests and those interests should be given great weight. This makes many of the things that we commonly do to them – for example, raising them for food in intensive farms - wrong.

Given this understanding of "animal rights," the fundamental change since the 1970s is that animal rights has moved into the mainstream. By that, I do not mean, of course, that we no longer violate the rights of animals. We do, on a vast scale. Rather I mean that the thought that the way we treat animals is gravely wrong is a view that is taken seriously by a very broad section of society, in a way that it was not during the 1970s. Then it was thought to be something that only crazy radicals believed, and it was widely ridiculed. Those days have gone, in Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand, and gradually they are going in Asia and Latin America as well.

Aloi: **The field of 'Human-Animal Studies' is the latest and most significant manifestation of the recent increase of interest in the "animal question" within the academic sphere. What is your impression of this emerging field?**

Singer: The quality of the work done varies widely. I like ideas to be clearly presented, so that the reader knows what is at stake. I also like work that is argued as rigorously as the subject-matter permits. Hence I favour the style of philosophical argument commonly known as "analytical." Of course, factual information is also important. Good historical, political and anthropological studies can help us to understand the way that humans relate to animals, or why campaigns to help animals have succeeded, or failed. Understanding how the law can be used, in various countries, to help animals is important. So too are scientific studies of the mental lives of animals, and their capacities for consciousness and self-awareness, for without knowledge of these facts, we could easily make mistakes in thinking how animals ought to be treated. But unfortunately a lot of work that comes under the "animal studies" umbrella neither adds to our information in a relevant way, nor presents its ideas in a clear and rigorous manner. Hence it fails to make an important contribution either to the cause of animals or to our understanding of the world.

Aloi: **As you might be aware, some see a distinction between "non-advocacy based research" and "advocacy driven research" in this field. What is your take on the ethical grounds upon which one may or may not engage with the subject of the animal in contemporary culture?**

Singer: We need to be careful how we draw this distinction. The first issue is: what questions will we investigate? Given how grievously we are harming animals, and how many animals are suffering because of the harm we do to them, we ought to investigate questions that can lead to reducing the vast amount of suffering we inflict on animals. So the questions we investigate should, in my view, be framed by our concern to reduce that suffering, and hence could be seen as "advocacy-driven." But in carrying out the research, it is of course also important that we assess the arguments as

objectively as we can, and understand the facts correctly – facts about animals, about how we treat them, and about what leads to change. So it is important that research into these questions should be done in as objective a manner as possible. In that sense, the research should not be "advocacy-driven."

Some people may want to investigate issues relating to animals purely from an intellectual interest, taking no stance on whether we should or should not change the way we treat animals. I don't suppose that is any worse, ethically, than many other studies in the humanities that are not likely to make much difference to the world – for example, a study of Roman coins in the reign of Hadrian. That might be a fascinating topic to study. The coins could be beautiful, and tell stories about the culture and values of that period. But I feel that given the urgency of reducing suffering (and here I include both human and nonhuman suffering), there are better things to do with our time.

***Aloi*: From animal rights activism to environmental campaigning; from shaping the concept of animal welfare in farming to the regulation of animal experimentation in pharmaceutical laboratories; speciesism has effectively marked a line, or more accurately, a series of blurred lines between the ethically justifiable, the excusable, and the unacceptable in our relationship with animals. How has the concept of speciesism changed since you framed it in 1975?**

Singer: The *concept* of speciesism has not changed at all. It remains exactly as it was: "speciesism" refers to an attitude of prejudice or bias against beings because of their species. The term is intended to suggest a parallel with other "isms" such as racism and sexism. Just as racists favor members of their own race over those of a different race, and as males favor members of their own sex over females, so speciesists typically favor members of their own species – that is, human beings – over members of other species, whether the others are chimpanzees, whales, dogs, pigs, or chickens.

What has changed, since 1975, is the increased acceptance of this concept, and its application to a broader range of questions concerning the treatment of animals. Nevertheless, here too, we still have a considerable way to go before it becomes generally accepted that it is wrong to treat animals in a speciesist way.

***Aloi:* In *Animal Liberation*, following Jeremy Bentham's argument, you claim that when thinking about the moral status of animals, the question is not "[c]an they reason nor[,] can they speak" but, "[c]an they suffer?" Is the sentient/non-sentient dichotomy still at the core of the animal rights ethical debate?**

Singer: Absolutely. That is why it is the "animal rights" debate and not the "plant rights" debate. Animals, or at least vertebrates, and very probably some invertebrates as well, are sentient. Plants, and perhaps some invertebrate animals, like oysters or clams, are not, and that is why they do not have rights.

***Aloi:* In 1993's *Practical Ethics*, you discuss the concept of "journey model of life" in order to measure the wrongness of the taking of an animal's life as defined by the degree to which doing so prevents the reaching of a life journey's aim. You explain that individuals who have embarked on their journeys are irreplaceable and that a "personal interest in continuing to 'live' is the pre-requisite for the journey model to come into play." Could it be argued that this model could be extended to any living being, reaching even as far as the botanical world and beyond?**

Singer: Do you mean, could it be argued that even plants have a personal interest in continuing to live?

***Aloi:* Yes, that is what I am asking.**

Singer: In this case the answer is clear: no. To have the necessary kind of interest in continuing to live, one must have some degree of self-awareness. Not all sentient animals have this. No plants have it.

***Aloi:* The concept of 'journey,' as a sequence of meaningful events leading to the fulfilment of life's aim coupled with the idea of personal interest, intended as a conscious drive towards the aim is problematic. Could we argue that insects, amphibians, reptiles, and fish, too, undertake life journeys driven by the reaching of aims? And should it make any difference that these aims may be intrinsic to the fulfilling of what we understand as mere biological functions?**

Singer: No, unless there are some dramatic new discoveries about the nature of consciousness in insects and the other animals you mention, we could not plausibly argue that they make such

journeys. At present we do not have sufficient evidence on which to base the claim to which you refer. As I indicated in my answer to the previous question, I am talking about the kind of personal interest that requires self-awareness. It is not a matter of mere biological function.

Aloi: **In 1993, you became the moving force behind the *Great Ape Project* (GAP). The project's main goal was that of obtaining a United Nations declaration that apes, chimpanzees, bonobos, and orangutans are members with human beings in the "community of equals." What are the challenges the project has encountered thus far and what have been its most relevant steps forward?**

Singer: Paola Cavalieri and I were the co-editors of the book *The Great Ape Project* and co-founders of the organization, so we played equal roles in it. The main challenge we faced was, of course, speciesism. No legal system, and no UN Declaration, has ever recognized nonhuman beings as having a similar moral or legal status to humans. In addition, even though people in industrialized nations do not think of great apes as sources of food, chimpanzees have been used in medical research, and there is some resistance from the scientists who conduct such experiments.

Fortunately, in other quarters, the idea that great apes should not be treated as tools for research has made some progress since 1993. Experiments on great apes are now either banned or severely restricted in New Zealand, Australia, Japan, and throughout the European Union. In the United States, at the time of writing, a bipartisan group of members of Congress is supporting legislation to end the use of chimpanzees in invasive research. I hope this will succeed.

Aloi: **A follow up to *In Defence of Animals*, titled *In Defence of Animals: The Second Wave*, was published in 2005. What prompted you to edit this book?**

Singer: I did so because *In Defence of Animals* had appeared in 1984 and the essays in it set out the ideas and strategies of the first phase of the movement. Twenty years later, much had changed, and I wanted to present the ideas and strategies of the contemporary movement.

Aloi: **In 2007, you gave a talk at the Getty Centre on the subject of animal representation in art. What brought you to consider the subject of animals in art? In this talk you extensively**



Peter Singer & Paola Cavalieri
The Great Ape Project, 1993

dwelled on a painting by Oudry of Clara the rhinoceros questioning the artist's level of empathy with the animal portrayed. What is your take on the treatment of animals in contemporary art by artists like Abdle Abdessemed or Huang Yo Ping?

Singer: The Getty Museum invited me to give a lecture that coincided with an exhibition they were having of Oudry and his contemporaries. I saw this as an opportunity for my views about the ethics of how we treat animals to reach a wider audience (the same reason that led me to agree to answer your questions), and most of my talk sought to set the context for Oudry's paintings by describing Western attitudes to animals. I also explained what was wrong with those attitudes. But I am no expert on animals in art, and I am not familiar enough with the work of the artists you mention to comment on it.

Aloi: **In the 2007 talk, the ideas of empathy/sympathy for animals, as reflected by**

Marco Evaristti
Helena, mixed media, 2000 © Marco Evaristti

the choice of subject and composition, was extensively discussed over a number of examples. Do you find that the essential differences between the examples displaying a less empathic approach and those suggesting a more empathic one essentially differ in degrees of objectification?

Singer: Yes, that is certainly one way of putting what is happening in those different examples.

Aloi: **In 2000, Marco Evaristti, an artist who has made controversy his main artistic skill, produced *Helena*. The installation stirred animal rights campaigners and public like nothing previously; it also got Evaristti charged with animal cruelty multiple times, in multiple countries. *Helena* was inspired by the famous *Milgram Experiment* from 1963, where the willingness of participants to obey an authority figure resulted in them performing acts that conflicted with their personal ethical stands.**

According to Evaristti, the installation, comprised of ten *Moulinex Optiblend 2000* liquidisers, each containing water and a gold fish, essentially constitutes a social experiment. In front of *Helena*, we simultaneously, by implication, become a passive voyeuristic individual, a potential killer or an inevitable moralist; which of the three we already are, or we are about to become whilst exposed to the work, is sometimes an unpredictable factor. Which ethical issues are here at stake in consideration of the fact that the animal featured in the work is a goldfish?

Singer: The issue at stake is the pointless killing of goldfish. Can that be justified? Most people find it disturbing, but of course these same people, or most of them, eat fish and meat when they have no need to do so, and this practice requires killing animals. In the case of fish, all commercially caught fish die more slowly and painfully than the goldfish killed in the blenders. So people who are disturbed by the idea of liquidizing the goldfish should really question their own eating practices. And it is hard to see why Evaristti is guilty of cruelty but every commercial fisherman or amateur angler is not.

On the other hand, when live animals are used in harmful ways, there is always the risk that the artist simply reinforces our prejudices by using sentient beings as objects for art in ways that ignore their interests. That is why I prefer the use of methods of enlightening the public that do not involve harm to animals.

Aloi: **As Steve Baker asked in his essay featured in the collection *Killing Animals* (2006): "Can contemporary art productively address the killing of animals?"**

Singer: Perhaps it can. But I am not aware of any contemporary work of art that has really done very much to change our attitudes to animals. The really effective examples are now very old – what has there been that can compare with William Hogarth's Four Stages of Cruelty? Perhaps films like *Bambi, Babe* and now *Rise of the Planet of the Apes* have taken over the role of art in influencing the broader public about the way we treat animals.

Aloi: **In the Getty lecture, you explored the work of artists Sue Coe, Federico Uribe and Barbara Dover as examples of practitioners whose work proposes an alternative to the animal representations of the past, and in doing so you highlighted that at the core of this art lies a more or less overt propagandistic vein. Aside from denouncing our treatment of animals in contemporary society and consequently raising awareness of some specific issues, what other purpose do you believe these artworks serve?**

Singer: They raise questions about the purpose and role of art in a situation in which a great wrong is being done to billions of animals – and most of those who view the art are participating in that great wrong. We should recognize that the treatment of animals is only one of several great moral wrongs going on in the world today. Another is the way in which most people in rich nations do nothing to aid those in extreme poverty. As a result of that indifference, according to Unicef, the United Nations



Peter Singer
In Defense of Animals, 2006

fund for children, more than 8 million children under 5 die every year from avoidable poverty-related causes. Then there is climate change, where again the lifestyle of people in affluent nations is the main culprit, but the poor in developing countries will be the majority of the victims. In the midst of these grave moral crises, can art be anything other than a means of raising our awareness of our moral failings? Can we really justify engaging in art for art's sake while every day billions of animals suffer unnecessarily, thousands of children die unnecessarily, and the energy used by patrons of art, and indeed by the air-conditioned art galleries in which we view art, contribute to changes in rainfall patterns and rises in sea levels that are already forcing people to become refugees, and will increasingly do so in future? In these circumstances, isn't the art world guilty of gross self-indulgence?

Aloi: **In 2000, Chicago based artist Eduardo Kac created *GFP Bunny*. The project consisted of a routinely produced albino laboratory rabbit to which the florescent genes of jellyfish were added through biotechnological processes. The work generated extremely heated response and opened the way to a new artistic field called transgenic art, in which art and science are reunited in the space of the laboratory. What is your take on this emerging genre?**

Singer: There are much worse things we do to animals, but I think that, like zoos, this genre of art treats live animals as objects for our amusement, so I find it objectionable.

Aloi: **Can we look forward to any new works from you about animals in the near future?**

Singer: I will continue to write short articles about animals and the animal movement, but my overall ethical position is adequately stated in *Animal Liberation* and other works, and I have no major new works planned in this field.

Peter Singer is Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University. He went to Princeton in 1999 after spending most of his life in Australia. Author or editor of over 25 books on ethics, Singer is best known for *Animal Liberation*, widely credited with starting the animal rights movement. The New Yorker has said 'Peter Singer may be the most controversial philosopher alive; he is certainly among the most influential.' He has served, on two occasions, as Chair of Philosophy at Monash University, where he founded its Centre for Human Bioethics. In 1996 he ran unsuccessfully as a Green candidate for the Australian Senate. In 2004, he was recognised as the Australian Humanist of the Year by the Council of Australian Humanist Societies.

The introduction to this piece is an edited re-print of the official biography for Peter Singer published by The European Graduate School http://www.egs.edu/faculty/peter-singer/biography/ accessed on September 2011

john simons

Interviewed by Rod Bennison

ANIMAL RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF LITERARY REPRESENTATION

In this exclusive interview with Antennae, *John Simons discusses human-animal divides, the role played by anthropomorphism in our culture, and his experience as British man who moved to Australia.*
Questions by Rod Bennison

Professor John Simons is Executive Dean of Arts at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. He previously taught at the universities of Wales, Exeter, Winchester, Edge Hill and Lincoln in the UK. He has published extensively on topics ranging from Middle English chivalric romance to the history of cricket and from medieval manuscripts to Andy Warhol. His major publications include the first ever critical edition of Robert Parry's romance *Moderatus* and the first modern edition of a group of eighteenth-century English chapbooks. Since 2000 he has worked more or less exclusively on the field of animals in culture and writes from an advocacy perspective.

John's main works include *Animal Rights and the Politics of Literary Representation* (2002), *Rossetti's Wombat* (2008) and *Kangaroo* (Reaktion Animal Series, in press). He is currently working on a monograph about exotic animals in Victorian England (*The Tiger that Swallowed the Boy*) and a short work on a passage in Juvenal's third satire (with Professor Larry Welborne). He is has held various fellowships and, inter alia, is currently a Fellow of the Zoological Society of London and a Fellow of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. He is also a published poet.

Here, Dr Rod Bennison (CEO Minding Animals International) interviews John about his views on animal rights and protection, and about John's recent and forthcoming published works.

Rod Bennison: **What does literary representation provide for advancing a position of animal rights? What are the implications in the functioning of animals as symbols of human literary expression over the past 50 years?**

John Simons: I think that the important thing is for scholars who have an interest in advocating for animals to find ways of using their discipline to promote awareness of the animal advocacy position. For me, the natural thing to work with is literary texts, although I am increasingly working with images. Literature does, however, occupy the privileged position of being the discourse through which ideas and ideology are aestheticised and debated in different periods, and so it does offer the opportunity for an historical account of the development of thinking about animals which goes beyond scientific or juridical writing. So although I don't think literature offers any kind of special window into the individual or collective mind, I think it does, because of its public nature, offer a very particular body of evidence. I also think that the way in which canons are formed is worth studying is this context and that at least some of the material I believe is significant to the study of animals falls well outside traditional critical canons. In the last 50 years the growth of the animal welfare and the animal rights movements have, to some extent, stimulated more texts which are useful to think about animals with. However, from an historical perspective one soon notices that, unfortunately,



John Simons
Animal Rights and the Politics of Literary Representation, 2002

these movements may not have shifted the basic agenda on animal exploitation and cruelty to animals as much as might have been hoped for. And, of course, there is the whole issue of reflection on the Holocaust and the various attempts that have been made to draw parallels between cruelty to animals and the destruction of European Jewry. I think there is a good deal of pretty unsound thinking on this but I trust Isaac Bashevis Singer when he talks about the 'eternal Treblinka' that animals inhabit.

Bennison: **Can anthropomorphism be a positive influence on the rights of animals in literature? Could you discuss some examples?**

Simons: I take the view that anything that stimulates people to think more carefully and, therefore one hopes, more kindly about animals is a good thing and therefore I am very comfortable with anthropomorphism as a useful representational strategy. I know that not everyone agrees with this and I understand where they stand. I tend to be very pragmatic though and think that the animal rights movement should take whatever is on offer that is helpful. One example that I have recently been working on is not literary but from popular television and that is Skippy the bush kangaroo. There seems little doubt that the representation of Skippy was a form of anthropomorphism and I think that this made it easier for viewers to identify with the animal. From that I am clear that many people formed a very different view of kangaroos and Australian wildlife which has been of help in guiding conservation in Australia. Some of my current work has been about resistance to eating kangaroo meat and "I can't eat Skippy" is a phrase I've heard more than once in discussing the issue.

Bennison: **What are the essential defining differences between being a human and a nonhuman animal in your literary work? How has your interest in animals influenced your poetic works?**

Simons: I don't write poetry from a programmed point of view and am one of those poets who depend upon inspiration rather than craft to get effects. So I don't write very much, but when I do I write it's in intensive bursts. Many of my poems start from noticing something about an animal or thinking about an animal. My first published work was called *Bear Song* and was a poem which tried to capture the voice of a bear as it sat on a rock trying to catch a fish. Over twenty years later I re-cycled that poem and the same bear became the narrator of a long work called *Bestiale* which was a libretto set to music by Tony Biggin and performed twice at the Edge Hill Green Arts Festival. A poem which is currently sitting in a kind of mental dry dock is about the ghosts of two elephants I once saw while I was driving on the A17. One was the elephant that visited England with Julius Caesar in 44 BC and drowned in the Thames, and the other a late nineteenth century circus elephant that is reputedly buried in a field in southern Lincolnshire. I suppose I wouldn't imagine these things if I wasn't interested in animals.

***Bennison*: You moved to Australia from the UK in 2009 to join us here at Macquarie University. As an Englishman resident in the Antipodes, can you tell us what made you write your soon to be published book *Kangaroo* (Reaktion Series), and what challenges did writing the book present?**

Simons: The *Kangaroo* book was actually in planning before I knew I was coming to Australia, as after writing my wombat book (see below) I had a



John Simons
Rossetti's Wombat, 2008

good deal of unused material and much of this related to kangaroos. I also liked that series very much and had had it in mind for a while to see if I could contribute to it. There is a fair bit written about kangaroos, so one challenge was to find something new and interesting to say, and I hope I have done that. I also wanted the book – which will be marketed mainly in the UK – to act as a kind for primer for Australia, for a British reader, and so there is a lot of material about how attitudes to kangaroos and representations of kangaroos can offer a way of understanding broader facets of Australian history and culture. Perhaps the most challenging part was dealing with Indigenous ideas and images of kangaroos. I couldn't ignore these, but, at the same time, I was well aware of how little I knew about them and I didn't want to do anything that might be disrespectful to Indigenous people. So I asked two Indigenous elders to look at the section on this topic and advise me if there was anything I should change. They were very generous in doing this and were happy with what I had written. I have added a fairly long footnote explaining to the British reader why the section on Indigenous knowledge appears relatively shorter than might have been expected.

***Bennison*: You previously published *Rosetti's Wombat*, another expression of your interest in Australian animals. Can you tell us a little about how captive wild animals have featured in European literature over the past 200 years? How influential has this been?**

Simons: I suppose tame animals have had more of a starring role in European literature than wild ones. I'm thinking about *Black Beauty* and *Greyfriar's Bobby*, for example. In the nineteenth century, tales of Empire tended to make all wild animals dangerous to stress the act of conquest in the Imperial project. Even in Australian fiction of the Colonial period, kangaroos often appear as aggressive and predatory creatures which of course they are not. The well-loved children's book *Dot and the Kangaroo* is a notable exception. By and large, I think it would be true that animals have had a larger role to play in literature aimed at children than in literature aimed at adults. There was certainly an attempt in the Victorian period to promote kindness to animals through fiction (this started in the mid-eighteenth-century), and cruelty to animals often features as a side characteristic of fictional villains. I suppose that today children's literature, particular literature for younger children, commonly features animals and this may be a legacy of this history.

***Bennison:* Your academic interest in animals is also soon to be seen in another pending work, *The Tiger that Swallowed the Boy*. Can you tell us how the treatment of animals in zoos and circuses has influenced your concern for animals?**

Simons: *The Tiger that Swallowed the Boy* is about the sale and display of exotic animals in Victorian England (although there will also be some material about Australia). My own view of zoos is not that typical of most people who hold the kind of opinions I do about animals, in that I think that it is good for people to see exotic animals and that, unless they do, they cannot form the kind of bond with them that might lead them to support conservation charities. Television doesn't do it, and anyone who wants to see what I am talking about should go to Taronga Zoo and watch the people watching the gorillas. Something is going on there that is quite special and simply wouldn't happen unless the gorillas were captive. I know how problematic what I



Ethel C. Pedley
Dot and the Kangaroo, 1899



John McCallum
Skippy the Bush Kangaroo, 1966-68

have just said is, but again, I am being pragmatic, and a relatively small number of wild or rare animals kept in good and comfortable conditions seems to me to be necessary to educate people. That sounds bad too, but I can't think any better way to put it. Circuses which use performing animals are another matter and should not be allowed as I think that teaching animals to perform as a spectacle can actually dull the audience's sense of the performers as animals. So I am worried by zoos which get their animals to do tricks, and this includes facilities where they have whales and dolphins. I don't think these zoos are behaving cruelly in getting the animals to perform, but I think it would be better if they didn't do it. I am, of course, writing about well maintained zoos which have a strong educational, scientific and conservation function. There are, throughout the world, zoos which don't have that mission, or are simply underfunded, and where the animals are not well cared for, although I am sure that many of the keepers do their best. In one of my poems I mention 'the polar bear in Tunis zoo' as an image of something that is completely out of place. I don't know if there is a polar bear in Tunis zoo, but if there is, I suspect s/he's not happy.

Bennison: **In your view, what are the major contemporary issues that face authors whose main subject just happens to be a nonhuman animal?**

Simons: I suppose being taken seriously as an author aiming at adults is probably the first issue. Another one is getting the work taken seriously as literature (i.e. as an expressive aesthetic structure complete in itself), rather than as a kind of political tract. I suppose I am a kind of historian, so for me the best answer to the question is: "too early to tell."

Dr Rod Bennison has a long-standing history within the environmental and animal protection and advocacy movements, in the past having worked for the National Parks Association (NPA) of New South Wales and Australians for Animals. He is a former Australian Conservation Foundation Councillor, Save Animals from Exploitation (Australia) President and NPA NSW Hunter President. Over the years, he has been a member and active within several other organisations, particularly in the area of drug law reform, prison reform and HIV/AIDS activism, and as the National Policy Coordinator for the Australian Democrats for twelve years. His main interests in animals lies with the commercial exploitation of animals, representations of animals as insignificant others, and the divide between animal protection and environmentalism.

John Simons was interviewed for *Antennae* in Summer 2011 © *Antennae*

roger scruton

Interviewed by Garry Marvin

ANIMAL RIGHTS AND WRONGS

In this exclusive interview with Antennae, *controversial philosopher Roger Scruton talks to Garry Marvin about the concepts of "right" and "person", battery farms, pleasure, suffering and of course, hunting.*
Questions by **Garry Marvin**

Roger Scruton is an English philosopher who has held university posts at Cambridge, London and Boston. At present he is a free-lance writer and scholar and holds visiting professorships at St Andrews University and the University of Oxford. Scruton has published books on a wide range of topics and his trenchant critical analyses of aspects of modern culture, society and politics have often generated lively debates in the media. In terms of philosophy perhaps his most important contribution has been to the field of aesthetics – *The Aesthetics of Architecture* (1980); *The Aesthetic Understanding* (1983); *The Aesthetics of Music* (1999) and *Beauty* (2009). Scruton has written two short books, *Animal Rights and Wrongs (1996) and On Hunting* (1998), that explore human-animal relations and it is these two texts that have generated the questions for this interview.

Animal Rights and Wrongs (published by Demos, the independent think-tank) explores some of the philosophical arguments for animal rights and what Scruton thinks is wrong about the case for rights. Here he does not attempt a comprehensive review of the philosophical work although he does deal with key perspectives. Instead his aim is to 'help those who are genuinely puzzled by the question of animal welfare to see how it *might* be answered by someone who takes it as seriously as philosopher should' (1996:3). His position is that one can love animals **and**, in the right circumstances, it is morally acceptable to make use of them as pets, for food, for their skins and as subjects of experiments. He is very keen to argue the case for the right circumstances and his view is that, 'The real question is not *whether* we should do those things but *when* and *how*' (1996:3). For Scruton animals are far from being insignificant others and he carefully distinguishes 'virtuous from vicious conduct towards other species' (1996: 126). Animals though are others to us and he argues for moral duties to them largely expressed in welfare terms.

The second book on which this interview is based in *On Hunting* (1998). This is a more personal, and in part autobiographical, book but it still contains important philosophical reflections. The hunting of the title is not hunting in general but specifically English foxhunting with hounds. Scruton reflects on the relationship between the Huntsman, his hounds and foxes and considers the notion of respect between them that the hunt world believes is at the heart of the event. This virtue might be a challenge for those who see the event as immoral and vicious. As a social anthropologist I found the most interesting sections of the book were those in which Scruton explores how this form of hunting connects with (and even makes) the landscapes of the countryside and how the event gives rise to and sustains communities in the countryside. His approach here is through a personal journey into the Hunt and its community. Scruton finds himself, emotionally, and finds a place for himself in rural



Roger Scruton
Animal Rights and Wrongs, 1966-68

England through learning to ride and becoming a member of a local hunt.

In both of these books Scruton explores a theme of the nature of care in human-animal relations and what caring is and does in both these books and he returns to it at the end of *On Hunting*. Here he links it with what he has previously written about his relationship with Barney, one of his hunting horses. I rather like the idea of Barney, galloping and jumping on the hunting field, being brought together with Heidegger in this deliciously over-elaborate conclusion.

> But let me give the last word to Heidegger, for whom 'care' is the relation to the world that distinguishes you and me. He defines care thus: "ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in as Being-alongside". And that, more or less, is what it feels like, jumping hedges on Barney. The being-alongside is mine; the ahead-of-itself-being-already-in is Barney's. Hunting gives sense to everything – even to Heidegger (1998: 161).

The 'more or less' is a fine thought about being on a galloping horse. I now know that part of my inability to learn to ride a horse was as much to do with how I did not understand Heidegger as much as I failed to understand horses.

Garry Marvin: **Your *Animal Rights and Wrongs* (1996) was published 15 years ago. For those who do not know your work, could you please explain what you argued was wrong about animal rights? What are your thoughts on the nature of the debates about animal rights between then and now?**

Roger Scruton: My argument focused on the place of the concept of "right" in the moral dialogue that governs inter-personal relations. I argued that animals are not part of that dialogue, and that we do them harm if we try to include them. To my mind a creature with rights is one that can recognise rights, and we recognise rights by accepting obligations. But non-human animals do not have obligations, and could not accept them if they did have them.

My thoughts are that the debates, such as I have encountered them, have been conducted at a superficial level, and almost always on the basis of a cost-benefit kind of morality of the kind espoused by Peter Singer or that silly American judge, Richard Posner. I think that kind of morality has been definitively refuted by Bernard Williams, David Wiggins, Christine Korsgaard and many others.

Marvin: **Have there been any significant changes in terms of philosophical issues relating to human-animal relations that have caused you to re-think your position?**

Scruton: I am always re-thinking my position, and always coming up with the same conclusion. I have not yet read Parfit's book on ethics, and maybe that will cause me to change my mind.

Marvin: You write about the concept of "person" as something unique, perhaps intrinsic, to humans and only to humans. In recent years

there have been arguments made for the personhood of some animals. Are there any changes of knowledge about, or understanding of, non-human animals that have caused you to re-think your position on person and personhood?

Scruton: I do not rule out the possibility of discovering that some other animals, or species of animals, have crossed the barrier from intentionality to personhood. If they have, then they really do have rights, and they had better show an awareness of their duties too. Dolphins are the only remotely plausible example, I think.

I don't think that humans are *unique* in this respect. But the only other examples of persons that have established a hold on the literature are gods, angels, devils, and things like that – unless you count corporate persons, like Lloyd's Bank and the University of Cambridge.

Marvin: **Although you do not subscribe to animal rights perspectives, you do argue for humans having moral duties and responsibilities to animals (or at least to some). What sorts of moral protests do you make, as a philosopher and a concerned individual, on behalf of animals?**

Scruton: I protest against battery farms, and especially against the appalling treatment of pigs in much of the world. I am not happy about the way in which the world has been filled with highly destructive pets, such as domestic cats, which kill and maim indiscriminately (180 million deaths a year in Britain alone, and mostly beautiful and innocent creatures). I protest against the over-use of pesticides and the favouritism that has biased people against insects and amphibians.

Marvin: **You write about the 'vice of sentimentality infecting our dealings with the animal kingdom.' The use of 'vice' and 'infecting' suggests something harmful. Could you explain what you mean by sentimentality and how you think it is harmful in the context of human-animal relationships?**

Scruton: As for the last question, sentimentality about cats has made it a crime to shoot them, even when doing so is the only way of protecting precious habitats and vulnerable species. Ditto for the badger, and many other Beatrix Potter favourites. Our duty towards animals is towards *all* of them, and not just those that look right in trousers in the children's picture books.

Marvin: **Just as you are opposed to sentimentality, so you are opposed to viciousness – perhaps the polar opposite of sentimentality. Could you explain what you mean by vicious in the context of human-animal relations?**

Scruton: Taking pleasure in suffering, and deliberately producing suffering for its own sake. Also a callous disregard for suffering, such as that shown by the one who makes animals dependent on him and then neglects them, or who is indifferent to the predations of his favourite pet.

Marvin: **I would like to move towards asking you more specific questions about hunting, but as a scene-setting quotation, could you expound a little on your views expressed here, where you argue for regaining "the attitude toward the natural world which once prevailed, in which species were regarded as sacred and humanity had not yet asserted absolute sovereignty, rather than humble trusteeship, over the works of nature." What might, should, that regaining look like in the modern world?**

Scruton: I would say that the first thing required of us is a respect for habitats – a recognition that, while we occupy vast tracts of the world, other species need their space within it, and should be able to flourish in that space as their natural home. This cannot be done now without our looking after the habitats, as parks or wildlife reservations. And then we should enter those places on respectful terms with the creatures for whom they are home.

Marvin: **Coming on to hunting, which you have written about in *Animal Rights and Animal Wrongs* and also in *On Hunting*. You are opposed to dog fighting and other animal baiting but you are a supporter of hunting, or at least some forms of hunting. Those opposed to both sorts of events might claim that both are unacceptable and immoral practices because they involve animals suffering for human pleasure. How do you distinguish between such events and why?**

Scruton: There is a great difference between taking pleasure in an activity that has suffering as an (unwanted) side-effect and taking pleasure in the suffering. This is very obvious from the cases of angling and horse racing. In those sports we do our best to ensure that suffering is minimised and we follow, in the case of angling, an ethic of "fair play." Nothing like that is true of dog-fighting or bear-

baiting. I agree that the case of fox-hunting or other forms of hunting with hounds is controversial, since many people argue that there are kinder ways of controlling fox or deer populations, and that since people take pleasure in the chase, they are in some way committed to prolonging it. However, nobody who follows fox hunts takes pleasure in the suffering of the fox. Most believe that the death, when it occurs, is instantaneous, and that the activity benefits the species by privileging the young and healthy over the sick and old. All other methods of control, and shooting and poisoning in particular, seem to involve far more suffering, as well as unfairly depriving the animal of its natural defences. For there is a rule of fair play here too. The chase is not deliberately prolonged. The quarry is simply given the best chance to escape and to use its natural defences. This is part of what I would call the *ecological* justification of hunting. Of course that is no knock-down argument. But I would only say that it is possible to accept it and not count as an 'immoral' person.

Marvin: **Many sports hunters (those not hunting specifically to produce meat) claim that their hunting is acceptable because they hunt respectfully and ethically. Could you comment on what might make hunting respectful and ethical?**

Scruton: I have just done so. Allow the animal its defences: allow the bird to fly, the deer to run, the fox to go to ground. And expose yourself to risk, preferably the risk of death, since you are imposing it. That's what I like about fox-hunting.

Marvin: **At one point you refer to the "graciousness of hunting." For many this will seem an odd term to apply to hunting. Could explain a little about what you mean by "graciousness?"**

Scruton: I meant to refer to the equal relation with other species, with horse, hound and quarry, that occurs in hunting, so that you fall into another way of being, in which the world is seen as a place that you share with other animals. You are one with them, and vulnerable as they are.

Marvin: **You have written on ethics but you have also written on aesthetics. In your view, is there an aesthetic dimension to hunting?**

Scruton: Yes, of course. Otherwise there would not be such an accumulation of poetry, music and painting devoted to this theme. Just think of the hunting horn in music, the second act of *Tristan und Isolde*, Uccello's great hunting scenes, or the description of the chase in Homer's *Odyssey.*

Marvin: **You wrote *On Hunting* before a law was enacted in this country that prohibited the hunting of certain wild animals with dogs (hounds). What do you think have been the results of the prohibition? Has this improved the lives of the previously hunted animals? Also, in that book, you write extensively and passionately about the community that was formed around foxhunting. Could you comment on the nature of that community and what has happened to that community as a result of the prohibition of hunting with hounds.**

Scruton: The prohibition has not really worked, since the law seems to be confused and impossible to enforce except against poachers. (There have been 18 convictions to date, 16 against illegal poaching by hooligans.) The only effect of the law has been to cause one of our most peaceful, patriotic and law-abiding communities to regard the law with contempt, which is not, in my view, a very good result. The community in question consists of farmers, incomers who have come to the country for the love of animals, and the old residue of rural workers for whom the hunt is the great social event of the week.

Marvin: **What are you currently working on? Are you considering writing about the subject of animals again in the future?**

Scruton: I am currently writing up the Gifford Lectures I gave last year on the *Face of God.* I am not sure whether I will come back to writing about animals. In my recent book on wine, *I Drink Therefore I Am*, I give a central role to my horse Sam, now dead alas, but a remarkable animal who deserves to be more widely known.

Roger Scruton is a writer and philosopher, currently an adjunct scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and a Fellow of Blackfriars Hall, Oxford. He is the author of over thirty books, which have been widely translated, and a regular writer in the press in both Europe and the United States. His most recent books are Beauty (Oxford University Press) and Culture Counts (Encounter Books). He divides his time between rural Wiltshire and rural Virginia, in both of which places he lives with his wife and two small children.

Garry Marvin is Professor of Human-Animal Studies in the Department of Life Sciences at the University of Roehampton. He has published widely in the field of animal studies and is one of the founding editors of the journal Journeys: The International Journal of Travel and Travel Writing.

An academic who has written about bullfighting, cockfighting, zoos and hunting has been promoted to a new role at Roehampton University. Garry Marvin has been appointed professor of human-animal studies, believed to be the first such post in the UK. His expertise is in social anthropological perspectives on the relationship between humans and animals. Most recently he has been conducting fieldwork on foxhunting in England and is also researching the experiences and activities of other recreational hunters.

ROGER SCRUTON: THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS

Non-moral beings

The account of moral reasoning that I have just sketched offers an answer, even if not a fully reasoned answer, to the question of animals. In developing this answer, I shall use the term 'animal' to mean those animals that lack the distinguishing features of the moral being – rationality, self-consciousness, personality, and so on. If there are non-human animals who are rational and self-conscious, then they, like us, are persons, and should be described and treated accordingly. If all animals are persons, then there is no longer a problem as to how we should treat them. They would be full members of the moral community, with rights and duties like the rest of us. But it is precisely because there are animals who are not persons that the moral problem exists, and to treat these non-personal animals as persons is not to grant to them a privilege, nor to raise their chances of contentment. It is to ignore what they essentially are, and so to fall out of relation with them altogether.

The concept of the person belongs to the ongoing dialogue which binds the moral community. Creatures who are, by nature, incapable of entering into this dialogue have neither rights nor duties nor personality. If animals had rights, then we should require their consent before taking them into captivity, training them, domesticating them or in any way putting them to our uses. But there is no conceivable process whereby this consent could be delivered or withheld. Furthermore, a creature with rights is duty-bound to respect the rights of others. The fox would be duty-bound to respect the right to life of the chicken, and whole species would be condemned out of hand as criminal by nature. Any law which compelled persons to respect the rights of nonhuman species would weigh so heavily on the predators as to drive them to extinction in a short while. Any morality which really attributed rights to animals would therefore constitute a gross and callous abuse of them.

Those considerations are obvious, but by no means trivial for they point to a deep difficulty in the path of any attempt to treat animals as our equals. By ascribing rights to animals, and so promoting them to full membership of the moral community, we tie them in obligations that they can neither fulfil nor comprehend. Not only is this senseless cruelty in itself, it effectively destroys all possibility of cordial and beneficial relations between us and them. Only by refraining from personalising animals do we behave towards them in ways that they can understand. And even the most sentimental animal lovers know this, and confer "rights" on their favourites in a manner so selective and arbitrary as to show that they are not really dealing with the ordinary moral concept. When a dog savages a sheep, none believes that the dog, rather than its owner, should be sued for damages. Sei Shonagon, in *The Pillow Book*, tells of a dog breaching some rule of court etiquette and being horribly beaten, as the law requires. The scene is most disturbing to the modern reader. Yet surely, if dogs have rights, punishment is what they must expect when they disregard their duties.

But the point does not concern rights only. It concerns the deep and impassable difference between personal relations, founded on dialogue, criticism and the sense of justice, and animal relations, founded on affections and needs. The moral problem of animals arises because they

cannot enter into relations of the first kind, while we are so much bound by those relations that they seem to tie us even to creatures who cannot themselves be bound by them.

Defenders of "animal liberation" have made much of the fact that animals suffer as we do: they feel pain, hunger, cold, and fear, and therefore, as Singer puts it, have "interests" which form, or ought to form, part of the moral equation. While this is true, it is only part of the truth. There is more to morality than the avoidance of suffering: to live by no other standard than this one is to avoid life, to forgo risk and adventure, and to sink into a state of cringing morbidity. Moreover, while our sympathies ought to be, and unavoidably will be, extended to the animals, they should not be indiscriminate. Although animals have no rights, we still have duties and responsibilities towards them, or towards some of them, and these will cut across the utilitarian equation, distinguishing the animals who are close to us and who have a claim on our protection, from those towards whom our duties fall under the broader rule of charity.

This is important for two reasons. Firstly, we relate to animals in three distinct situations, which define three distinct kinds of responsibility: as pets, as domestic animals reared for human purposes, and as wild creatures. Secondly, the situation of animals is radically, and often irreversibly, changed as soon as human beings take an interest in them. Pets and other domestic animals are usually entirely dependent on human care for their survival and well-being; and wild animals too are increasingly dependent on human measures to protect their food supplies and habitats.

Some shadow version of the moral law therefore emerges in our dealings with animals. I cannot blithely count the interests of my dog as on par with the interests of any other dog, wild or domesticated, even though they have an equal capacity for suffering and an equal need for help. My dog has a special claim on me, not wholly dissimilar from the claim of my child. I caused it to be dependent on me, precisely by leading it to expect that I would cater to its needs.

The situation is further complicated by the distinction between species. Dogs form life-long attachments, and a dog brought up by one person may be incapable of living comfortably with another. A horse may be bought or sold many times, with little or no distress, provided it is properly cared for by each of its owners. Sheep maintained in flocks are every bit as dependent on human care as dogs and horses, but they do not notice it, and regard their shepherds and guardians as little more than aspects of the environment, which rise like the sun in the morning and depart like the sun at night.

For these reasons we must consider our duties towards animals under three separate heads: pets, animals reared for our purposes, and creatures of the wild.

Pets

A pet is an honorary member of the moral community, though one relieved of the burden of duty which that status normally requires. Our duties towards such a creature, in whom, as Rilke puts it, we have "raised a soul," resemble the general duties of care upon which households depend. A man who sacrificed his child or a parent for the sake of his pet would be acting wrongly; but so too would a man who sacrificed his pet for the sake of a wild animal towards which he has had no personal responsibility - say by feeding it to a lion. As in the human case, moral judgement depends upon a priori assignment of responsibilities. I do not release myself from guilt by showing that my pet starved to death only because I neglected it in order to take food to hungry strays; for my pet, unlike those strays, depended completely upon me for its well-being. In this area our moral judgements derive not only from ideas of responsibility, but also from our conception of human virtue, We judge callous people adversely, not merely on account of the suffering that they cause, but also, and especially, for their thoughtlessness. Even if they are calculating for the long-term good of all sentient creatures, we are critical of them precisely for the fact that they are calculating, in a situation where some other creature has a direct claim on their compassion. The fanatical utilitarian, like Lenin, who acts always with the long-term goal in view, loses sight of what is near at hand and what should most concern him, and may be led thereby, like Lenin, into unimaginable cruelties. Virtuous people are precisely those whose sympathies keep them alert and responsive to those who are near to them, dependent on their support and most nearly affected by their heartlessness.

If morality were no more than a device for minimising suffering, it would be enough to maintain our pets in a state of pampered somnolence, awakening them from time to time with a plate of their favourite tit-bits. But we have a conception of the fulfilled animal life which reflects, however distantly, our conception of human happiness. Animals must flourish according to their nature: they need exercise, interests and activities to stimulate desire. Our pets depend upon us to provide these things - and not to shirk the risks involved in doing so.

Pets also have other, and more artificial, needs, arising from their honorary membership in the moral community. They need to ingratiate themselves with humans, and therefore to acquire

their own equivalent of the social virtues. Hence they must be elaborately trained and disciplined. If this need is neglected, then they will be a constant irritation to the human beings upon whose good will they depend. This thought is obvious to anyone who keeps a dog or a horse. But its implications are not always appreciated. For it imposes upon us an obligation to deal strictly with our pets, to punish their vices, to constrain their desires, and to shape their characters. In so far as punishment is necessary for the education of children, we regard it as justified: parents who spoil their children produce defective moral beings. This is not merely a wrong towards the community; it is a wrong towards the children themselves, who depend for their happiness on the readiness of others to accept them. Pets must likewise be educated to the standards required by the human community in which their lives, for better or worse, are to be led.

Furthermore, we must remember the ways in which pets enhance the virtues and vices of their owners. By drooling over a captive animal, the misanthrope is able to dispense more easily with those charitable acts and emotions which morality requires. The sentimentalising and "kitschification" of pets may seem to many to be the epitome of kind-heartedness. In fact, it is very often the opposite: a way of enjoying the luxury of warm emotions without the usual cost of feeling them, a way of targeting an innocent victim with simulated love that it lacks the understanding to reject or criticise, and of confirming thereby a habit of heartlessness. To this observation I shall return.

Pets are part of a complex human practice, and it is important also to consider the nature of this practice and its contribution to the well-being of the participants. Even if we fulfil all our obligations to the animals whom we have made dependent, and even if we show no vicious motives in doing so, the question remains whether the net result of this is positive or negative for the humans and the animals concerned. There are those who believe that the effect on the animals is so negative that they ought to be "liberated" from human control. This dubious policy exposes the animals to risks for which they are ill prepared; it also shows a remarkable indifference to the human suffering that ensues. People depend upon their pets, and for many people a pet may be their only object of affection. Pets may suffer from their domestication, as do dogs pent up in a city flat. Nevertheless, the morality of the practice could be assessed only when the balance of joy and suffering is properly drawn up. In this respect, the utilitarians are right: we have no way of estimating the value of a practice or an institution except through its contribution to the total good of those involved. If it could be shown that in the stressful conditions of modern life, human beings could as well face the prospect of loneliness without pets as with them, then it would be easier to condemn a practice which, as it stands, seems to make an indisputable contribution to the sum of human happiness, without adding sensibly to that of animal pain.

We should also take note of the fact that most pets exist only because they are pets. The alternative, for them, is not another and freer kind of existence, but no existence at all. No utilitarian could really condemn the practice of keeping pets therefore, unless he believed that the animals in question suffer so much that their lives are not worthwhile.

This point touches on many of our modern concerns. We recognise the increasing dependence of animals on human decisions. Like it or not, we must accept that a great many of the animals with which we are in daily contact are there only because of a human choice. In such circumstances, we should not hasten to criticise practices which renew the supply of animals, while at the same time imposing upon us clear duties to look after them.

Animals for human use and exploitation

The most urgent moral questions concern not pets, but animals which are used for specific purposes - including those which are reared for food. There are five principal classes of such animals:

- beasts of burden, notably horses, used to ride or drive;
- animals used in sporting events - for example, in horse-racing, dog-racing, bull-fighting and so on;
- animals kept in zoos or as specimens;
- animals reared for animal products: milk, furs, skins, meat, etc;
- animals used in research and experimentation.

No person can be used in any of those five ways; but it does not follow that an animal who is so used will suffer. To shut a horse in a stable is not the same act as to imprison a free agent. It would normally be regarded as conclusive justification for shutting up the horse that it is better off in the stable than elsewhere, regardless of its own views in the matter. Such a justification is relevant in the second case only if the victim has either forfeited freedom

through crime nor lost it through insanity.

The first two uses of animals often involve training them to perform activities that are not natural to them, but which exploit their natural powers. Two questions need to be addressed. First, does the training involve an unacceptable measure of suffering? Second, does the activity allow for a fulfilled animal life? These questions are empirical, and cannot be answered without detailed knowledge of what goes on. However, there is little doubt in the mind of anyone who has worked with horses, for example, that they are willing to learn, require only light punishment and are, when properly trained, the objects of such care and affection as to provide them with ample reward. It should be added that we have one reliable criterion of enjoyment, which is the excitement and eagerness with which an animal approaches its work. By this criterion there is no doubt that greyhounds enjoy racing, that horses enjoy hunting, team-chasing and cross country events in which they can run with the herd and release their energies, and even that terriers enjoy, however strange this seems to us, those dangerous adventures underground in search of rats and rabbits.

But this should not blind us to the fact that sporting animals are exposed to real and unnatural dangers. Many people are exercised by this fact, and particularly by the conduct of sports like horse-racing and polo, in which animals are faced with hazards from which they would normally shy away, and which may lead to painful and often fatal accidents. Ought we to place animals in such predicaments?

To answer such a question we should first compare the case of human danger. Many of our occupations involve unnatural danger and extreme risk - soldiering being the obvious example. People willingly accept the risk, in return for the excitement, status or material reward which attends it. This is a normal calculation that we make on our own behalf, and also on behalf of our children, when choosing a career. In making this calculation we are motivated not only by utilitarian considerations, but also by a conception of virtue. There are qualities which we admire in others, and would wish for in ourselves and our children. Courage, self-discipline, and practical wisdom are promoted by careers in which risk is paramount; and this is a strong reason for choosing those careers.

Now animals do not freely choose a career, since long-term choices lie beyond their mental repertoire. Nevertheless, a career may be chosen for them; and, since the well-being of a domesticated animal depends upon the attitude of those who care for it, its career must be one in which humans have an interest and which leads them to take proper responsibility for its health and exercise. The ensuing calculation may be no different from the calculation undertaken in connection with a human career. The risks attached to horse-racing, for example, are offset, in many people's minds, by the excitement, abundant feed and exercise, and constant occupation which are the horse's daily reward, and by the human admiration and affection which a bold and willing horse may win, and which have made national heroes of several privileged animals, like Red Rum and Desert Orchid.

But this brings us to an interesting point. Because animals cannot deliberate and take no responsibility for themselves and others, human beings find no moral obstacle to breeding them with their future use in mind. Almost all the domestic species that surround us have been shaped by human decisions, bred over many generations to perform by instinct a task which for us is part of a conscious plan. This is especially true of dogs, cats and horses, and true for a different reason of the animals which we rear for food. Many people feel that it would be morally objectionable to treat humans in this way. There is something deeply disturbing in the thought that a human being should be bred for a certain purpose, or that genetic engineering might be practised on the human foetus in order to secure some desired social result. The picture painted by Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World* has haunted his readers ever since with a vision of human society engineered for happiness, and yet deeply repugnant to every human ideal. It is not that the planned person, once grown to maturity, is any less free than the normal human accident. Nevertheless, we cannot accept the kind of manipulation that produced him, precisely because it seems to disrespect his nature as a moral being and to assume a control over his destiny to which we have no right. This feeling is an offshoot of piety and has no real ground either in sympathy or in the moral law.

Pious feelings also forbid the more presumptuous kind of genetic engineering in the case of animals. There is a deep-down horror of the artificially-created monster which, should it ever be lost, would be lost to our peril. Yet the conscious breeding of dogs, for instance, seems to most eyes wholly innocent. Indeed, it is a way of incorporating dogs more fully into human plans and projects, and so expressing and enhancing our love for them. And there are breeds of dog which have been designed precisely for risky enterprises, like the terrier, the husky and the St Bernard, just as there are horses bred for

racing. Such creatures, deprived of their intended career, are in a certain measure unfulfilled, and we may find ourselves bound, if we can, to give them a crack at it. Given our position, after several millennia in which animals have been bred for our purposes, we have no choice but to accept that many breeds of animal have needs which our own ancestors planted in them.

Once we have understood the complex interaction between sporting animals and the human race, it seems clear that the same moral considerations apply here as in the case of pets. Provided the utilitarian balance is (in normal circumstances) in the animal's favour, and provided the responsibilities of owners and trainers are properly fulfilled, there can be no objection to the use of animals in competitive sports. Moreover, we must again consider the human values that have grown around this use of animals. In Britain, for example, the horse race is an immensely important social occasion: a spectacle which does not merely generate great excitement and provide a cathartic climax, but which is a focus of elaborate social practices and feelings. For many people a day, the races is a high point of life, a day when they exist as eager and affectionate members of an inclusive society. And animals are an indispensable part of the fun - imparting to the human congress some of the uncomplicated excitement and prowess upon which the spectators, long severed from their own instinctive emotions, draw for their heightened sense of life.

Indeed, history has brought people and animals together in activities which are occasions of individual pleasure and social renewal. Take away horse-racing, and you remove a cornerstone of ordinary human happiness. This fact must surely provide ample justification for the risks involved. It does not follow that horse-racing can be conducted anyhow, and there are serious question to be raised about the racing of very young horses who, when so abused, are unlikely to enjoy a full adult life thereafter. But, provided the victims of accidents are humanely treated, such sports cannot be dismissed as immoral. Indeed, we have a duty to encourage them as occasions of cheerful association between strangers.

Inflicting pain

The same could be said, it will be argued, about practices which are morally far more questionable, and which have in some cases been banned by law in Britain: dog and cock fighting, for example, and bear-baiting. For many people, the Spanish bullfight comes into this category. For in these cases, pain and injury do not arise by accident, but are deliberately inflicted, either directly or by animals which are set upon their victim and encouraged to wound and kill. We must distinguish three cases:

- the deliberate infliction of pain for its own sake, and in order to enjoy the spectacle of suffering;

- the deliberate infliction of pain in order to achieve some other purpose, to which pain is a necessary means;

- the deliberate embarking upon of an action of which pain is an inevitable, but unwanted, by-product.

The first of those is morally wrong - and not because it turns the balance of suffering in a negative direction. It would be wrong regardless of the quantity of pleasure produced and regardless of the brevity of the suffering. It is wrong because it displays and encourages a vicious character. Spectacles of this kind contribute to the moral corruption of those who attend them. Sympathy, virtue and piety must all condemn such activities, and the fact that they are the occasions of enjoyment and social life cannot cancel the corruption of mind from which the enjoyment springs.

As the argument of the last chapter implies, the utilitarian calculus applies only when it is also the voice of sympathy; wicked pleasures are not better but worse than wicked pains. If dog-fights must occur, it is a better world in which they are observed with pain than one in which they are observed with pleasure.

Given that dog-fights and bear-baiting involve the deliberate infliction of suffering for its own sake and with a view to enjoying the result, they must surely be condemned. But not every deliberately inflicted pain is to be compared with these cases. Animals cannot be trained without the occasional punishment, and punishment must be painful if it is to have the desired effect. The punishment is inflicted, however, not for the sake of the pain, but for the sake of the result. If this result could be achieved without pain, then it would be right to choose the painless path to it. If it is far better for a horse or a dog to be trained than otherwise, then it is no cruelty but
kindness to inflict whatever pain is necessary to secure this end. The infliction of fear is governed by a similar principle.

Many of our dealings with animals involve the deliberate infliction of fear - as when a flock of

sheep is shepherded by dogs. But again, it is not the fear that interests the shepherd, but the control of his flock, which can be effectively moved by no other means. Here we come up against a teasing question, however.

Just how much pain, and how much fear, are we entitled to inflict, in order to secure our purposes? In answering such a question it is necessary to distinguish the case where the good aimed at is a good for the animal itself, and the case where the animal is sacrificed for the good of others. This distinction is fundamental when dealing with human beings, who can sometimes be hurt for their own good, but rarely hurt for the good of another. But it seems to apply to animals too.

Many animals suffer at our hands, not in order to improve their own condition, but in order to provide pleasure to others: for example, when they are killed in order to be eaten. How much pain, and of what kind, can then be tolerated? Most people would say, the minimum necessary. But what is necessary? Animals destined for the table can be killed almost painlessly and with little fear. But religious beliefs may rule this out. Ritual slaughter in the Muslim tradition requires a death that is far from instantaneous, in circumstances calculated to engender terror. Yet the pain and fear are still, in one sense, necessary - necessary, that is, to ritual slaughter. Some people might therefore conclude that ritual slaughter is immoral. But that does not alter the fact that it can be carried out by decent people, who neither welcome nor enjoy the pain, and who believe that there is no legitimate alternative, short of vegetarianism.

Or take another example: the bullfight, that last surviving descendant of the Roman amphitheatre, in which so many innocent animals, human and nonhuman, were once horribly butchered. There is no doubt that all I have said in praise of horse-racing as a social celebration applies equally to bullfighting. Nevertheless, in a bullfight great pain is inflicted, and inflicted deliberately, precisely because it is necessary to the sport: without it, the bull would be reluctant to fight and would in any case not present the formidable enemy that the sport requires. The spectators need take no pleasure in the bull's sufferings; their interest, we assume, is in the courage and skill of the matador. Nevertheless, many people feel that it is immoral to goad an animal in this way, and to expose other animals, like the horses of the picadors, to the dire results of its rage.

Even in this case, however, we must see the animal's sufferings in context. Only if the spectators' interest were cruel or sadistic could it be condemned out of hand; and the question must arise whether bulls have a better time, on the whole, in a society where they end their lives in the arena than in societies where there is no use for them except as veal. Let it be said that Spain is one of the few countries in Europe where a male calf has a life expectancy of more than a year. At the same time, it is hard to accept a practice in which the courage of the matador counts for everything and the sufferings of his victim are so thoroughly disregarded. Surely, it might be said, this displays a deficit of the sympathy which we ought to bestow on all creatures whose sufferings we have the power to alleviate?

The third case of inflicting pain - in which suffering is the unwanted by-product of a deliberate action - will concern me when I come to consider our relations to animals in the wild. Before moving on, I shall consider the remaining cases of animals who are reared and kept for human purposes.

Zoos

Some animals are happier in zoos than others. Big cats, wolves and similar predators enter a deep depression when confined, and it is only to be regretted that the sight is not more distressing to the average visitor than it seems to be. It cannot be said of zoos, as I have said of horse-racing, that the suffering of the animals is offset by any vital social benefit. True, there are benefits of other kinds. You can learn much from zoos, and from time to time a species can be saved from extinction by its captive members - though the general reluctance of animals to breed in these circumstances can only be a further sign of how unsuited they are to live in them.

The only plausible answer to the problem of zoos is to argue that they should be so organised as to cause minimum distress to their inmates who, while deprived of many of their natural joys, can at least be assured of a kindly death and a life of comfortable somnolence. The morality of keeping wild animals in these conditions is nevertheless questionable, given that so little of human life depends on it. Some animals, like monkeys and donkeys, become tame in zoos and cease to struggle against their confinement. But what is the point of a zoo if its inmates are tame? And is there not something ignoble in the desire to see a wild animal in conditions of total safety, when the poor creature, raging against the gaping crowd of spectators, cannot punish their insolence with its teeth and claws? The least that can be said is that zoos make no contribution to the store of human virtue.

Livestock, and the eating of meat

It is impossible to consider the question of farm animals without discussing an issue which for many people is of pressing concern: whether we should eat animal products in general, and meat in particular. To what sphere of moral debate does this question belong? Not, surely, to the moral law, which offers no decisive answer to the question of whether it is wrong to eat a person, provided he or she is already dead. Nor to the sphere of sympathy, which gives few unambiguous signals as to how we should treat the dead remains of living creatures. Our only obvious guide in this area is piety which, because it is shaped by tradition, provides no final court of appeal. In the Judaeo-Hellenic tradition, animals were sacrificed to the deity, and it was considered an act of piety to share a meal prepared for such a distinguished guest. In the Hindu tradition, by contrast, animal life is sacred, and the eating of meat is as impious as the eating of people.

In the face of this clash of civilisations there is little that the sceptical conscience can affirm, apart from the need for choice and toleration. At the same time, I cannot believe that a lover of animals would be favourably impressed by their fate in Hindu society, where they are so often neglected, ill-fed and riddled with disease. Having opted for the Western approach, I find myself driven by my love of animals to favour eating them. Most of the animals which graze in our fields are there because we eat them. Sheep and beef cattle are, in the conditions which prevail in English pastures, well-fed, comfortable and protected, cared for when disease afflicts them and, after a quiet life among their natural companions, despatched in ways which human beings, if they are rational, must surely envy. There is nothing immoral in this. On the contrary, it is one of the most vivid triumphs of comfort over suffering in the entire animal world. It seems to me, therefore, that it is not just permissible, but positively right, to eat these animals whose comforts depend upon our doing so.

I am more inclined to think in this way when I consider the fate of human beings under the rule of modern medicine. In comparison with the average farm animal, a human being has a terrible end. Kept alive too long, by processes like the organ transplant which nature never intended, we can look forward to years of suffering and alienation, the only reward for which is death - a death which, as a rule, comes too late for anyone else to regret it. Well did the Greeks say that those whom the gods love die young. It is not only divine love but also human love that expires as the human frame declines. Increasingly many human beings end their lives unloved, unwanted and in pain. This, the greatest achievement of modern science, should remind us of the price that is due for our impieties. How, in the face of this, can we believe that the fate of the well-cared for cow or sheep is a cruel one?

Two questions trouble the ordinary conscience, however. First, under what conditions should farm animals be raised? Secondly, at what age ought they to be killed? Both questions are inevitably bound up with economics, since the animals in question would not exist at all, if they could not be sold profitably as food. If it is uneconomical to rear chickens for the table, except in battery farms, should they therefore not be reared at all? The answer to such a question requires us to examine the balance of comfort over discomfort available to a chicken, cooped up in those artificial conditions. But it is not settled by utilitarian considerations alone. There is the further and deeper question, prompted by both piety and natural sympathy, as to whether it is right to keep animals, however little they may suffer, in conditions so unnatural and so destructive of the appetite for life. Most people find the sight of pigs or chickens, reared under artificial light in tiny cages, in conditions more appropriate to vegetables than to animals, deeply disturbing, and this feeling ought surely to be respected, as stemming from the primary sources of moral emotion.

Those who decide this question merely by utilitarian calculation have no real understanding of what it means. Sympathy and piety are indispensable motives in the moral being, and their voices cannot be silenced by a mere calculation. Someone who was indifferent to the sight of pigs confined in batteries, who did not feel some instinctive need to pull down these walls and barriers and let in light and air, would have lost sight of what it is to be a living animal. His sense of the value of his own life would be to that extent impoverished by his indifference to the sight of life reduced to a stream of sensations. It seems to me, therefore, that a true morality of animal welfare ought to begin from the premise that this way of treating animals is wrong, even if legally permissible. Most people in Britain agree with that verdict, although most do not feel so strongly that they will pay the extra price for a free-range chicken, or for free-range eggs. To some extent, of course, people are the victims of well organised deception. By describing chickens and eggs as "farm fresh," producers effectively hide the living death upon which their profits depend. But customers who are easily deceived lack one important part of human virtue. Travellers in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, for

example, would do well to ask themselves why meat is so readily available in shops and restaurants, even though no animals whatsoever are visible in the fields. A Czech samizdat cartoon from the communist years shows two old women staring sadly into a vast factory farm, full of cows. One of them remarks to her companion: "I remember the days when cows had souls;" to which her companion replies "yes, and so did we." The cartoon was intended as a comment on communism; but it points to the deep connection that exists between our way of treating animals and our way of treating ourselves.

Suppose we agree that farm animals should be given a measure of their natural freedom. The question remains as to when they should be killed. To feed an animal beyond the point at which it has ceased to grow is to increase the cost to the consumer, and therefore to jeopardise the practice to which its life is owed. There is no easy solution to this problem, even if, when it comes to calves, whose mournful liquid eyes have the capacity to raise a cloud of well-meaning sentiment, the solution may seem deceptively simple. Calves are an unavoidable by product of the milk industry. Male calves are useless to the industry, and represent, in existing conditions, an unsustainable cost if they are not sold for slaughter. If we decide that it really is wrong to kill them so young, then we must also accept that the price of milk - upon which human children depend for much of their nourishment is at present far too low. We must, in other words, be prepared to accept considerable human hardship, in particular among poorer people, in order to satisfy this moral demand. It is therefore very important to know whether the demand is well-grounded.

Young animals have been slaughtered without compunction from the beginning of history. The lamb, the sucking pig, the calf and the leveret have been esteemed as delicacies and eaten in preference to their parents, who are tough, coarse and over-ripe by comparison. Only if there is some other use for an animal than food is it economical to keep it past maturity. Mutton makes sense as food only in countries where wool is a commodity. Elsewhere sheep are either kept for breeding or eaten as lambs. Beef cattle too await an early death, as do porkers. We could go on feeding these animals beyond the usual date for slaughter, but this would so increase the price of meat as to threaten the habit of producing it, and therefore the lives of the animals themselves.

In the face of this, we surely cannot regard the practice of slaughtering young animals as intrinsically immoral. Properly cared for, the life of a calf or lamb is a positive addition to the sum of joy, and there can be no objection in principle to a humane and early death, provided the life is a full and active one. It is right to give herbivores the opportunity to roam out of doors on grass, in the herds and flocks which are their natural society; it is right to allow pigs to rootle and rummage in the open air, and chickens to peck and squawk in the farmyard, before meeting their end. But when that end should be is more a question of economics than of morals.

In short, once it is accepted that animals may be eaten, that many of them exist only because they are eaten, and that there are ways of giving them a fulfilled life and an easy death on their way to the table, I cannot see that we can find fault with the farmer who adopts these ways when producing animals for food. Those who criticise farmers may often have reason on their side; but there is also a danger of self-righteousness in criticisms offered from a comfortable armchair by people who do not have the trouble of looking after farm animals and see only their soft and endearing side. Farmers are human beings, and no less given to sympathy than the rest of us. And a good farmer, rearing sheep and cattle on pasture, keeping dogs, cats and horses as domestic animals, and free-range chickens for eggs, contributes more to the sum of animal welfare than a thousand suburban dreamers, stirred into emotion by a documentary on television. Such people may easily imagine that all animals are as easy to deal with as the cat which purrs on their knees, and whose food comes prepared in tins, offering no hint of the other animals whose death was required to manufacture it. It would be lamentable if the moral high-ground in the debate over livestock were conceded to those who have neither the capacity nor the desire to look after the animals whose fate they bewail, and not to the farmers who do their best to ensure that these animals exist in the first place.

Experiments on animals

There is no humane person who believes that we are free to use animals as we will, just because the goal is knowledge. But there are many who argue that experiments on live animals are nevertheless both necessary for the advancement of science (and of medical science in particular), and also permissible when suitably controlled. It seems to me that we must consider this question in the same spirit as we have considered that of livestock. We should study the entire practice of experimentation on live animals, the function it performs and the good that it produces. We should

consider the fate of the animals who are the subject of experiment and the special duty of care that might be owed to them. Finally, we should lay down principles concerning what cannot be done, however beneficial the consequences - and here our reasoning must derive from sympathy, piety and the concept of virtue, and cannot be reduced to utilitarian principles alone.

Medical research requires live experimentation, and the subjects cannot be human, except in the cases where their consent can reasonably be offered and sought. It is not only humans who benefit from medical research: all animals within our care have an interest in it, and the assumption must be that it is so conducted that the long-term benefits to all of us, human and animal, outweigh the short-term costs in pain and discomfort.

The duty of care owed to animals used in medical research is to ensure that their lives are worth living and their suffering minimised. Even within these constraints, however, there are certain things that a decent person will not do, since they offend too heavily against sympathy or piety. The sight of the higher mammals, subject to operations that destroy or interfere with their capacities to move, perceive or understand, is so distressing that a certain measure of callousness is required if these operations are to be conducted. And that which can be done only by a callous person, ought not to be done. The case is comparable to the battery farm. But it is also crucially different. For an experiment is typically conducted upon a healthy animal, which is singled out for this misfortune, and whose life may be deliberately destroyed in the process. The relentless course of science will always ensure that these experiments occur. But that is part of what is wrong with the relentless course of science.

And here we touch on a question so deep that I doubt that ordinary moral thinking can supply the answer to it. As I hinted above, the advance of medical science is by no means an unmixed blessing. The emerging society of joyless geriatrics is not one at which the human spirit spontaneously rejoices. And although discoveries cannot be undiscovered, nor knowledge deliberately undone, there is truth in the saying that ignorance - or at least ignorance of a certain kind - is bliss. Piety once set obstacles in the path of knowledge - and these obstacles had a function; for they prevented the present generation from seizing control of the earth's resources, and bending them to the cause of its own longevity. Medical science may have benefited the living; but it threatens the resources which the dead laid by for us, and on which the unborn depend. Animals were once sacrificed to the gods by people who cheerfully accepted that they would soon follow their victims to oblivion. Now they are sacrificed to science by people who nurture the impious hope that they can prolong their tenancy forever. This may be morally acceptable. But something in the human heart rebels against it.

Wild animals

We have no duty of care towards any specific wild animal - to assume otherwise is to deny that it is wild. Duties towards animals are assumed but not imposed. Hence there is a real moral difference between the person who allows his terrier to kill wild rats and the person who keeps tame rats for his terrier to kill. We are surely right in thinking that the second practice is more vicious than the first, even if it causes no more suffering. For it involves the daily violation of an assumed duty of care.

On the other hand, wild animals are part of the environment, and our general (and growing) responsibility towards the environment extends to them. And it is surely right that we take their joys and sufferings into account - not to do so is to fail in sympathy and to assume the kind of arrogant relation towards the natural order which sorts ill with our new found consciousness of our responsibilities towards it. However, this introduces a great complication into our dealings with wild animals. For here our concern is not, primarily, for the individual, but for the species. The individual enters our concern only contingently, so to speak, as when a rabbit steps into the headlights of the car that we are driving. Although we recognise a general duty to take account of the individual's interests in such circumstances, our primary moral concern in daily life must be for the fate of species and for the balance of nature on which they depend. Too much concern for the individual may in fact harm the species, by promoting its diseased or degenerate members, or by preventing necessary measures of population control - something that has been witnessed in the case of the Australian kangaroo. Here we should recognise a permanent source of moral confusion in the favouritism that we extend to certain species on account of their appearance, their charm, or their nearness to the species that we have adopted as pets. Beautiful animals like the deer, the fox and the badger take precedence over animals like the rat which instinctively repel us, regardless of their intelligence, relative destructiveness or ability to accommodate the needs of humans. We are deeply concerned about the fate of the elephant and the tiger, but largely indifferent to that of the toad and the stick

insect, despite the equal ecological difficulties under which these four species now labour.

Moreover, some wild animals are more useful to us than others. Some can be eaten, others can provide clothing, ornaments, oils, and medicines. Others are destructive of our interests - killing chickens, rifling larders, undermining houses, or even threatening life and limb. We cannot maintain the same attitude to all of them - unless it be some serene Hindu passivism which, in modern circumstances, when the balance of nature depends upon human efforts to preserve it, can hardly be promoted as in the best interests of the animals themselves.

Finally, even if we put sentimentality and self-interest aside, we must still recognise relevant differences between the species. To the extent that our moral duties arise from sympathy, we must inevitably respond selectively - not to do so would be a mark of hardness. Some species can, in the right circumstances, befriend us: the elephant, for example, and the dog. Others, even if they have no affection for humans, deal gently and affectionately with their own kind, as mammals must do with their offspring. Others still, while seemingly devoid of affection, are nevertheless curious towards and interested in the world in ways which excite our concern. And, as I remarked above, there is a great difference between those to whom we are able to relate as individuals and those who, because they cannot learn from their experience, will always be for us no more than examples of their kind.

Thus it is only with a certain strain that we can care for the well-being of individual insects, even though we recognise that they suffer pain and fear, and are often hungry and in need like the other animals. And fish too lie beyond the reach of natural sympathy: being aquatic, cold-blooded and slimy to the touch, they exist behind an impassable screen of strangeness. Moreover, we have a great interest in keeping fish at such a distance. For not only are they extremely useful as food; there is a sport in catching them which, while painful and frightening to the fish, is a source of one of the greatest and most popular of human relaxations.

In the light of all that, how can we form a coherent moral attitude to animals in the wild? In the absence of any specific duty of care, we must act, I believe, on the following principles:

- we must maintain, so far as possible, the balance of nature;

- we are entitled to intervene in the natural order to defend our own interests. (After all, we too are part of nature.);

- in matters such as hunting, culling etc., the interests of all the animals involved should be considered, including the humans;

- our dealings with wild animals should be measured against the demands of sympathy, piety and human virtue. Hence it will be as wrong to take pleasure in the suffering of a wild animal as in the suffering of a domestic animal. It will be wrong to use wild animals in vicious ways. And so on.

Each of those principles seems to follow from preceding arguments. But it is worth considering their application to two controversial instances: angling and fox-hunting. Obviously, a purely philosophical argument will not settle once and for all the complex moral questions that these activities have prompted - the facts are in dispute and feelings run too high. But that does not alter the fact that it is precisely in these controversial areas that a serious moral argument should be put to the test.

Angling. There are many ways of catching fish, but angling differs from most of them in that it is primarily a sport, and not a way of getting food. It is also of great environmental significance, since it provides human beings with a pressing interest in maintaining unpolluted waterways and in preventing the destruction of river banks and their flora. It offers a positive contribution to the balance of nature and also to the well-being of the hunted species - conceived, that is, as a species, and not as a collection of existing individuals. By the first of our principles it is unquestionable that angling is morally permissible.

The second principle also applies. It is surely permitted to intervene to preserve the stocks of hunt able fish, even though this means destroying predators and taking a robust stand against diseases which, in the natural order of things, might have been better left to run their course. It can hardly be regarded as immoral to extract pike from inland waterways - always assuming that the process is carried out with the minimum of suffering. It is true that environmental activists have advocated a return, in these circumstances, to the real balance of nature, meaning the balance that would exist, were humans to play no part in producing it. (Some have even advocated the reintroduction of wolves on these grounds, as the "correct" way to reduce the highland deer population, at present dependent upon the arduous work of the deerstalker.) Such proposals are surely unrealistic: for humans would still be taking the initiative in maintaining the balance, and predators would still be instruments of an environmental policy

initiated and maintained by humans. Humans too are part of the balance of nature, and the only serious question is whether they maintain that balance or destroy it. Besides, these radical proposals ignore the moral question: the question of how we should treat the animals concerned. Morality involves taking sides; and while nobody could blame the pike for its behaviour (since it lies, as a non-moral being, beyond all blame), our vestigial sympathy for its victims ought surely to rule out any special pleading on its behalf. And it is hard to believe that those who would introduce wolves as a means of controlling the deer population have much sympathy for deer. Whether hunted by hounds or stalked by humans, a stag is killed at last with a clean shot from a gun; when chased by wolves it suffers the worst of available deaths: the death inflicted on an animal by a species smaller than itself.

The third principle applies in very much the way that it applied to horse-racing. Angling is an abundant source of human happiness - to many people the image of peace and the preferred way of passing their leisure hours. It is also a social institution through which friendships are formed and cemented, neighbours united and the competitive instinct peacefully exercised. From any utilitarian standpoint, it makes a massive contribution to the sum of human happiness, a fact abundantly displayed in our art and literature. If we are to consider the interests of all the animals involved, then we must surely place this fact in the balance, along with the equally evident fact that the angler's quarry is maintained and protected by those who hunt it. The downside is great: for fish caught on a line suffer both pain and fear, as is evident from their behaviour.19 At the same time, however great the suffering, we should recognise that it is, in an important sense, necessary. Of course, you could kill fish instantly with a gun or a stick of dynamite. But this would be "unsporting:" that is to say, it would give to the fish no chance, and to the angler a cheap advantage which destroys his sport.

This indicates an important aspect of our fourth principle when applied to such activities as angling. Traditional forms of hunting often generate and depend upon an ethic of combat, which arises spontaneously in the contest with the quarry. The roots of this ethic lie partly in our piety towards the works of nature. But there is an anticipation too of the human morality of warfare. The hunter tends to have a special respect for his quarry and a desire to offer a fair chance in the contest between them. There are certain things which he feels are owing to the quarry and of which it would be unfair to deprive him. Not that the animals appreciate this chivalrous behaviour. But it is a part of human virtue - a kind of shadow version of justice - to display it, and only a vicious hunter would use every means in his power to trap or kill his prey. Although angling causes more suffering to the fish than an electric current or a stick of dynamite, therefore, we rightly condemn these latter ways of fishing as barbarous.

Our fourth principle is therefore satisfied by angling, at least in its gentler versions. The suffering involved is necessary in that it could be avoided only by destroying the sport. And although there may be sadistic people who take pleasure in the pain of the fish and others who are so unconcerned by its sufferings as to make no efforts to minimise them, these people are not entering into the true spirit of the sport. Serious anglers respect their quarry, are gentle when they can be (for example, when extracting the hook), and regard the sport as an equal contest governed by the rules of fair play. It seems to me that there is nothing vicious in this, and therefore no grounds for a moral condemnation.

Fox-hunting. The fox is a predator and a potential nuisance, whose charming appearance does nothing to cancel its notorious habits. Foxes are therefore pursued for two reasons - as pests and as sport. There is tension between these motives, since people wish to get rid of pests, but not to get rid of the animals that they hunt for sport. Hence pests have a greater chance of surviving where they are also hunted. On the other hand, it is precisely the sport of fox-hunting that is criticised on moral grounds. When a keeper shoots the fox that has been terrorising his birds, his action seems to arouse little indignation in the public conscience; but when the same fox is pursued by hounds, themselves followed by a crowd on horseback, the strongest protests may be made. It does not seem to me, in the light of the four principles enunciated above, that these protests are really justified.

Foxes thrive in copses, hedgerows, and on the edges of pastures, where they can enjoy both cover, and open stretches in which to run down or cut off their prey. To preserve this habitat, is to favour many species besides the fox - rabbits, hares, voles, field-mice, badgers and a host of lesser animals in which people have little or no sporting interest. It is self-evident, in these circumstances, that fox-hunting makes a positive contribution to the balance of nature. Hunting with hounds has made its own very special contribution to the landscape, providing a motive to conserve the coverts, woods, hedgerows and pastures which have fallen victim to mechanised farming in almost every place where hunting with hounds has disappeared. It is also species-specific: properly trained hounds go after no quarry other than the one that they are trained to

pursue and furthermore, if they catch it, kill it instantly. Our first principle therefore finds no fault with fox-hunting, and the second principle will apply as readily as in the case of angling.

The third principle would also seem to favour the sport. Anyone who doubts that hunting with hounds has been a rich source of human social life and happiness need only consult our literary and artistic tradition, in which this pursuit is celebrated perhaps above all others, as the picture of human joy. From Homer to Trollope hunting scenes provide the high points of intensity in the description of human leisure, while both painters and composers have devoted some of their greatest efforts to portraying or evoking the hunt. The judgement of art is confirmed by those who take part in the sport, and if it were a case of considering human interests alone, there would be no doubt which way the utilitarian calculus would point.

Moreover, unlike angling, hunting with hounds generates intense pleasure for animals - for the hounds themselves, and for the horses which excitedly follow them and who are raised to heights of eagerness which quite transcend the daily hedonic diet of their species. Much of the pleasure felt by those who ride to hounds derives from sympathy with horse and hound - a grateful sense of being returned to the realm of innocent joy in which these favourite creatures are moving.

Against this great accumulation of human and animal delight, it would be difficult to count the fear and pain of the fox as an absolute moral obstacle, unless they were shown to be either so great as to outweigh any amount of pleasure, or unnecessary, or the object of some vicious attitude. The questions here are complex, and not surprisingly hunting with hounds remains, and perhaps will always remain controversial - as it already was when Plato, in The laws, wrote in support of it as the highest form of hunting.

It is, or ought to be, widely recognised that the death of the hunted fox is, when it occurs, more rapid than its death when shot (unless shot in favourable circumstances by an expert marksman), or its death from any rival method commonly employed to despatch it.20 Moreover, it is certain. If it is pain that concerns us, then I doubt that we will think it great enough to rule against the sport. It is certainly no greater, and probably less, than the pain of the rat caught by a terrier, or the mouse caught by a cat.

It is rather the fox's fear, and the relentless pursuit which enhances it, which raise the most serious moral concerns. If the fox does not run and surrenders to an early and instant death, there can be no sport. Hence he must run, and only fear will compel him. Many people dislike this, not because the fear in question outweighs the pleasure of those in pursuit, but because there is something callous in pursuing a creature so relentlessly. In other words, it is the fourth of our principles that is held to apply, and which motivates those who most seriously object to hunting. It seems to them that the pleasure involved is either vicious in itself, or an expression of a vicious nature.

Here, therefore, is where any defence of hunting would have to begin: by showing that the human interest in this sport is compatible with sympathy and virtue. As in the case of angling, however, we must be careful to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate pleasures. Roy Hattersley, writing in the Guardian, made the following remark: "I have long supported whoever it was who said that the real objection to fox-hunting is the pleasure that the hunters get out of it... If killing foxes is necessary for the safety and survival of other species, I - and several million others - will vote for it to continue. But the slaughter ought not to be fun."

The suffering of the caught fish is not fun, but only the price of fun. To describe it as fun is to imply that the angler takes pleasure in the suffering of his quarry, and this is manifestly not true. If there were a sport, exactly like angling except that the fish were lifted from the water and then tortured with hooks to the amused shrieks of the bystanders, we should regard it in quite another moral light from the sport of angling. Likewise, if there were a sport which consisted of capturing and then torturing a fox, where the goal of the sport was precisely to inflict this suffering, we should all agree with Mr. Hattersley's peremptory judgement. But fox-hunting is not like that. Sometimes, no doubt, such sports are abused by sadists; and it might be right for Parliament to examine the matter, so as to ensure that the rules laid down by the Anglers' Association and the Masters of Fox-Hounds Association not only forbid such abuse, but also have the force of law. But the purpose of such a law would be not to forbid the pleasure of those whom Mr. Hattersley describes as 'the hunters' (meaning, no doubt, the followers), but to forbid pleasure of the wrong kind. Otherwise all pleasures bought at the cost of animal suffering must be forbidden - from the eating of meat, through horse-racing and dog-racing, to angling, shooting and hunting with hounds.

Nor should we neglect the extraordinary role assumed by hunting in the rural community, as farmers open their land to their neighbours, and justify their ownership of the land by briefly renouncing their claim on it. This too is a form of piety, and, like every pious urge, stems from our sense that we are stewards and tenants, not

absolute owners, of the world in which we live. It is this attitude, more than any other, that we must foster, if our species is to survive. And if ever we should lose it, our survival would not be justified in any case.

The counter-argument should not be dismissed, however, and the case remains open. Its interest lies in showing that the deep moral questions will never be answered by our first three principles alone. Environmental, pragmatic and utilitarian arguments all count in favour of fox-hunting. But the real question of its morality is a question of human vice and virtue. And this is invariably the case in our dealings with wild animals. What really matters is the attitude with which we approach their joys and sufferings. When Jorrocks praised hunting as 'the image of war with only five and twenty per cent of the danger' he was consciously praising the human virtue which it displays and encourages. And no reader of Surtees can doubt that, whatever vices are displayed in the hunting field, sadism towards the fox is rarely one of them.

Moral conclusions

A summary of principles

My argument has ranged freely over abstract metaphysics, ethical philosophy and moral casuistry. In the arguments of Singer and his followers, I find much casuistry, little ethical philosophy, and no serious metaphysics. This explains the exhortatory simplicity of their conclusions. But it also suggests, to my way of thinking, the extent to which serious questions have been begged. So here, for the benefit of the sceptical reader, is a summary of the principles which I believe ought to guide us in our dealings with animals, and which reflect not only the social function of moral judgement, but also the mental reality of the animals themselves.

• We must distinguish moral from non-moral beings. The first exist within a web of reciprocal rights and obligations, created by their dialogue. The second exist outside that web, and it is both senseless and cruel to try to bind them into it.

• Animals therefore have no rights. But this does not mean that we have no duties towards them. Duties to animals arise when they are assumed by people, and they are assumed whenever an animal is deliberately made dependent upon human beings for its individual survival and well-being.

• Even when no such duty of care has been assumed, our dealings with animals are governed by moral considerations. These considerations derive not from the moral law, but from the other three roots of moral feeling: virtue, sympathy and piety.

• The ethic of virtue condemns those ways of dealing with animals which stem from a vicious motive. For example, delight in the suffering of animals is morally abhorrent. So, I take it, is the sexual use and abuse of animals.

• The writ of sympathy may run where the ethic of virtue is silent. For sympathy extends to all creatures with intentionality - all creatures with a view on the world and whose pains and pleasures can be understood as we understand our own.

• When sympathy speaks, its voice has a utilitarian accent. By this I mean that sympathy - true sympathy, that is - takes account of all the creatures involved, even if it does not accord an equal weight to their interests. But utilitarian considerations cannot override rights and duties: they arise only after the demands of the moral law have been met.

• Towards creatures without intentionality - such as insects and worms - we experience only a shadow form of sympathy. It shows no defect in people that they should take account only of the species, and not of the individual, when dealing with creatures of this kind.

• Our moral obligations towards animals whom we have caused to depend upon us are distinct from our obligations towards animals in the wild. Towards the first we have a duty to provide a fulfilled life, an easy death, and the training required by their participation in the human world. Towards the second, we have a duty to protect their habitats, to secure, as best we can, the balance of nature, and to inflict no pain or fear that is not a necessary part of our legitimate dealings with them. Exactly which dealings are legitimate is a complicated question. But the above principles go some way towards settling it. To take an animal into captivity for no reason other than to display it in a zoo is morally dubious. To torment an animal purely for the pleasure of doing so is

immoral. But the hunting and shooting of wild animals may, in the right circumstances, be permissible, and even a positive good.

• The difficult cases arise when we assume a duty of care towards animals who are not granted honorary membership in the moral community. The two most urgent cases are those of farm animals, and especially animals reared for food, and laboratory animals, especially those subjected to painful experiments. In the first case, it seems to me, the demands of morality are answered when animals are given sufficient freedom, nourishment and distraction to enable them to fulfil their lives, regardless of when they are killed, provided they are killed humanely. In the second case, the demands of morality are met only with difficulty, and only on the assumption that the experiments in question make an unmistakeable contribution to the welfare of other creatures.

I do not claim that those principles are the last word in the matter. On the contrary, they seem to me only a first word. Rightly understood, however, they should encourage us to distinguish virtuous from vicious conduct towards other species, and help us to see why it is that virtuous people may engage in activities like raising pigs for slaughter, eating meat, fishing with a line, wearing furs, or shooting crows and rabbits, which many observers of the human world have denounced as depraved.

Sentimentality

This leads us, however, to a vice which certainly does infect our dealings with the animal kingdom - the vice of sentimentality. Many of the questions I have discussed have been so clouded by sentimentality, that it is worth offering an account of it, in order to show how it arises and how we should respond when we feel its pressure.

Sentimental feeling is easy to confuse with the real thing - for, on the surface at least, they have the same object. The sentimental love of Jane and the real love of Jane are both directed towards Jane, guided by the thought of her as lovable. But this superficial similarity marks a deep difference. A sentimental emotion is a form of self-conscious play-acting. For the sentimentalist it is not the object but the subject of the emotion which is important. Real love focuses on another individual: it is gladdened by his pleasure and grieved by his pain. The unreal love of the sentimentalist reaches no further than the self, and gives precedence to pleasures and pains of its own, or else invents for itself a gratifying image of the pleasures and pains of its object. It may seem to grieve at the other's sorrow, but it does not really grieve. For secretly sentimentalists welcome the sorrow which prompts their tears. It is another excuse for the noble gesture, another occasion to contemplate the image of a great-hearted self.

It is clear why animals provide an occasion for sentimental emotions. For animals cannot answer back. They cannot puncture our illusions. They allow us complete freedom to invent their feelings for them, to project into their innocent eyes a fantasy world in which we are the heroes, and to lay our phoney passions before them without fear of a moral rebuke. It is also clear why sentimentality is a vice. It consumes our finite emotional energies in self-regarding ways and numbs us to realities. It atrophies our sympathies, by guiding them into worn and easy channels, and so destroys not only our ability to feel, but also our ability to help where help is needed and to take risks on behalf of higher things.

As I have argued in this pamphlet, sympathy for animals is a natural and noble emotion. But the real sympathy for animals, like the real sympathy for people, has a cost attached to it. Real sympathy obliges us to know animals for what they are, to regard their bad points as well as their good and to take an undeceived approach to their needs and sufferings.

When it comes to wild animals, an unsentimental love embraces what is wild and free in their nature. It respects their habitats, takes an active interest in their way of life, refrains from taming them or from creating any greater dependence upon our benevolence than is necessary for a mutual accommodation. It looks on wild animals realistically, neither denying what is unpleasant in their natures nor exaggerating what is beautiful. This love of wild animals is natural to those who live in the countryside and is shared by the majority of those who hunt or shoot them, paradoxical though this may seem. Unfortunately, however, the countryside is now patrolled by day-trippers, whose vision of animal life has been acquired from sentimental story books and sanitised nature programmes on television. It is such people who feel most strongly that activities like hunting, ferreting and hare-coursing, for example, are morally wrong.

Sentimentalists turn a blind eye to unpleasant facts and their feelings skate rapidly over the rabbits, pheasants and chickens who must die at the fox's

behest. Besides, if they were in charge, the fox would be gently dissuaded from its habits, in return for a bowl of canned meat, delivered each morning by some official manager of the countryside, wearing the uniform of the RSPCA.

As for the bowl of canned meat, it will be produced quite painlessly, like the bloodless joint which our sentimentalist takes from a shelf in the supermarket, the history of which has never really been a concern. Anybody who was really disturbed by animal suffering would be far more troubled by the practice of poisoning rats than by that of hunting foxes. But rats do not look right. A fox's mask resembles the face of an alert and interesting human; the face of a rat is sneaky and full of intrigue, while its colour, legs and tail belong to a subterranean world which to us is the world of the tomb. The fox therefore provides a suitable object for those pretend emotions through which the sentimentalist fortifies his image of himself, as a hero of compassion.

Because they belong to the workings of fantasy, sentimental emotions respond far less easily to reason than do real feelings. Sentimentality involves too large a dose of self-deception to allow the critical intelligence into its precinct. It is for this reason that the arguments I have given about angling will strike a chord in most people, while those, of equal force, about hunting will make little impact on those who are most vigorously opposed to the sport. This would matter less, were it not for the natural tendency of sentimentality, in its more angry forms, to lean towards self-righteousness and to forbid that of which it disapproves. Those who hunt, shoot or fish have a real interest in protecting their quarry and in maintaining the ecological balance that ensures its survival. If sentimentality were to prevail, however, this ecological balance might easily be destroyed by ill-considered legislation. The countryside could be turned into a zoo, organised on Beatrix Potter principles and policed by para-military volunteers from the suburbs, prepared to prosecute anybody who should damage a badger sett, pursue a fox or shoot a pigeon.

We should remember that it is not only individual animals which are of concern to us; we have a duty of care towards the environment, without which no animal life would be possible. And sentimental dealings with animals, precisely because they bypass the complexities which are now inevitable in our dealings with the natural world, are by no means favourable to our precarious ecology. When mink farms were first introduced to Britain in the twenties and thirties, a previous generation of sentimentalists, outraged by the idea that animals should be raised for their furs, released them into the wild. The resulting ecological catastrophe has still not been overcome: for mink are voracious consumers of the eggs and young of other species. Waterways have been denuded of many of their traditional inhabitants and birds which were once abundant in our countryside are now on the lists of protected species. Moreover, there is no easy way to control the mink, which is too small, lithe and amphibious to be an easy target. Only with the development of the mink hound, trained to track the animal in its natural habitat, has a comparatively humane way been discovered of reducing the nuisance. But sentimentalists have tried repeatedly to outlaw hunting with hounds. This would leave us with no environmentally acceptable weapon against the mink save trapping, which is surely far more cruel.

I give that example only because it shows the natural tendency of sentimental emotion to rush to short-term conclusions over issues where only long-term policies could conceivably do justice to the many conflicting interests. But it will be rightly objected that morality does not suffice for human government, and that it is the business of law, not morality, to take the long-term view. The conscience is never clear when abstracted from the here and now, and even if we are rightly suspicious of sentimental feeling, we should be wrong to dismiss the short-term view itself, when morality has no other view on anything.

The moral being and citizenship

The moral being is also a political animal - a *zoon politikon*, in Aristotle's famous words. In other words, moral beings live in communities which are organised neither by instinct nor by the ever-flowing emotion of the herd, but by laws and procedures which are consciously chosen and consciously enforced. Their collective life exists on many planes. They are private individuals, bound by affection to family and friends. They are gregarious adventurers, making agreements with others, entering partnerships and joining clubs and institutions. And they are citizens who assume the benefits and responsibilities of political life. A citizen bears a special relation to other citizens - a relation of responsibility and mutual support, which binds strangers as well as neighbours, enemies as well as friends. No animal could understand this relationship, still less play a part in sustaining it.

One of the remarkable results of the movement for "animal rights," however, has been the extension of a kind of shadow citizenship to animals. For many British people, animals resident on British soil enjoy a special relationship to the

crown and ought not to be transported to France, where conditions are very different and outside "our" control. If we compare our vast expenditure of energy and resources on behalf of "British" animals with our comparative indifference to the animals of Egypt or Uzbekistan, we shall be struck by a singular fact: that it is neither the ease with which our own animals can be helped nor their comparative need, which determines our concern for them, but our sense of them as fellow citizens. The RSPCA, which possesses £100 million of accumulated funds, could spend this money in Egypt and produce enormous relief to animals which are suffering in ways that are unthinkable in Britain; while here at home, the Society must actively search for the cases of cruelty which will justify its charitable status. It is true that the RSPCA has made commendable efforts to alert people to the fate of animals in other countries and to offer relief where this is practical. But its donors are not deeply interested and would certainly give far less and with far less conviction if the Society were to divert its resources from the animals "at home." There is no question of the RSPCA shutting up shop in Britain and moving abroad, any more than there is a question of the National Health Service transferring its operations to the slums of Cairo. Here we have a striking proof of the way in which animals, in modern democracies, have become part not only of domestic life, but of the web of public concern. Of course, animals are not and cannot be citizens. Even if given the vote they could not use it, and while they can be protected by the law, they can neither obey nor defy it.

The moral question of how animals should be treated spills over, therefore, into a political question of how they should be treated by the law. As we shall see, these questions are by no means the same, and a rational answer to one of them may not dictate a rational answer to the other.

tom and nancy regan

Interviewed by Carol Gigliotti

THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS

In this exclusive interview with Antennae, *Tom and Nancy Regan discuss animal activism and cognitive ethology. Questions by* **Carol Gigliotti**

Tom Regan has often been called the philosophical leader of the animal rights movement in the United States. That is an understatement, both historically and geographically. Regan's 1975 article "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism" in *The Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, linked the practice of not eating meat with animals' right to life. While vegetarianism and its foundations in the desire not to eat other animals has had an enduring universal history, Regan's arguments linking animal rights to vegetarianism were the first to be argued well enough to be published in a peer-reviewed philosophical publication. In doing so, Regan changed the world. A second article "McCloskey on Why Animals Cannot Have Rights," published in *The Philosophical Quarterly* in 1976, together with the earlier essay, held the origins of Regan's seminal book, *The Case for Animal Rights*, published in 1983.

The Case for Animal Rights offered an extended, meticulously detailed, and closely reasoned argument for the rights of animals. Globally, philosophers and animal activists alike recognize it as ground breaking in its ability not only to extend the rights of humans to animals but also to defend and clarify the rights view itself. The rights view, as Regan (2004) outlines it, is "the philosophical basis for principled objections to the worst forms of moral prejudice-- such as racism" (331). This visionary approach to moral thinking has influenced generations of thinkers around the globe since the book has been translated into Italian, Swedish, Dutch, and Chinese, and a second edition, with a new Introduction, was published by the University of California Press in 2004.

Tom Regan is now Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina (USA). During his more than 30 years on the faculty, he received numerous awards for excellence in undergraduate and graduate teaching; was named University Alumni Distinguished Professor; published hundreds of professional papers and more than twenty books; won major international awards for film writing and direction; and presented hundreds of lectures throughout the world. In 2000, he received the William Quarles Holliday Medal, the highest honor NC State University can bestow upon one of its faculty. He is universally recognized as a pioneering spokesperson for the philosophy of animal rights. In 2009, he was included in the UTNE Reader's list of 50 Visionaries Who Are Changing the World.

Tom Regan's other books that explore and defend animal rights are *All That Dwell Therein: Essays on Animal Rights and Environmental Ethics* (1982); *Animal Sacrifices: Religious Perspectives on the Use of Animals in Science* (1986); *The Struggle for Animal Rights* (1987); *The Thee Generation: Reflections on the Coming Revolution* (1991); *Defending Animal Rights* (2001); *The Animal Rights*

Debate, with Carl Cohen (2001); *Animal Rights, Human Wrongs: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy* (2004) and *Empty Cages: Facing the Challenge of Animal Rights* (2005).

Along with this illustrious career as an academic and philosopher, Regan has not only consistently put his theories into action by shaping environments in which these issues are highlighted, but has also modeled behavior for many of his students, other activists, and colleagues. In fact, The North Carolina State University College of Humanities and Social Sciences with the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies has announced a workshop celebrating Regan's contributions to ethical theory held in April of this year. The National Humanities Center opened a blog page for the event inviting anyone who wished to post their best wishes to Tom, and his wife Nancy, on this festive occasion. Reading the comments, it quickly becomes obvious what an enormous influence Tom Regan's philosophy and gracious behavior have had on so many people involved in thinking and acting for the good of animals over the last three decades.

This interview incorporates both Tom Regan and his wife Nancy Regan since Nancy has been involved with equal commitment to the ideas of animal rights. As Tom says, "Throughout our journey, she was beside or ahead of me every step of the way." This commitment, among others, has included their joint efforts in founding two important projects: the Tom Regan Animal Rights Archive housed at the North Carolina State University Library and the Culture and Animals Foundation (CAF).

Since the initial art exhibition, conference and performance by pioneering performance artist, Rachel Rosenthal in Raleigh, NC in 1985, the CAF has hosted, funded and encouraged "…understanding and appreciation of other animals, improving the ways in which they are treated in today's society." The goal to improve animals' lives through the use of the arts and humanities, not just comment on them, was unique in its match with many cultural creators who found little support for the content of their work involving these goals. The CAF not only offered monetary support but also moral support for a worthy moral cause, one that many art world institutions and their employees have been loath to recognize until very recently. CAF Award winners have included a few people familiar to this journal including, Steve Baker, Carol Adams and Ron Broglio.

The *Tom Regan Animal Rights Archive* was established in 2000. The gift of Regan's own personal library and papers served as the foundation of the archive. The Regan collection, which is catalogued to professional archival standards, is the first of its kind – a university-level central repository for rare and unique materials covering the full spectrum of animal rights, the animal advocacy movement, and the moral and legal status of animals. In addition, NCSU has acquired the Animal Rights Network (ARN) Collection and combine it with the Tom Regan Animal Rights Archive – creating the largest collection of its kind in the world!

I am very pleased to be able to offer readers of *Antennae* this interview with my long-time mentors and friends, Tom and Nancy Regan.

***Carol Gigliotti:* Tom, what personal and intellectual experiences brought you to the writing of your seminal 1985 book, *The Case for Animal Rights*?**

Tom Regan: There were many, both personal and intellectual, but let me mention just two. Nancy and I were active in the anti-war movement back in the days of the Vietnam War. As a philosopher, I thought I should contribute something philosophical to the effort. The problem was, I had never read any of the relevant literature. So there I was, wandering through the stacks of the NC State library. And I remember, as clearly as if it happened yesterday, I took a book off a shelf. It was called *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth.* I had never heard of it. But I had come across the author's name now and then. The author? Mohandes K. Gandhi. What a fateful choice! Not only did Gandhi help me craft "something philosophical" for the anti-war sentiments so many of us shared. He also opened my (and, of course, Nancy's) eyes to a new way of seeing our world. Because, of course, Gandhi helped us realize that the fork can be a weapon of violence. And it is a weapon of violence anytime we sit down and eat the dead flesh of a once living being. It is no exaggeration to say that reading Gandhi helped change our li[ves]. He was the paramount "intellectual experience" for us.

As for the paramount "personal experience:" As is true of so many newly married couples, our first "child" was a companion animal, in our case a miniature poodle. We named him Gleco, which was the abbreviation for a small business (Gleason and Company) we passed everyday, driving from the country, where we lived, into Charlottesville, where Nancy was teaching special education classes (as they were then called) and I was doing graduate work at the University of Virginia. We had been vacationing and left Gleco with [who] we thought was a responsible caretaker. Shortly before we arrived home, running free, Gleco was hit by a car



Tom Regan
The Case for Animal Rights, 1985

and killed. We spent a lot of time grieving over our loss. We had so much emotion invested in Gleco—just that one dog, the one we knew so well. It's hard to explain how much emotion was banging on our hearts. Had it been another dog we had known and loved, we would have reacted the same; or a cat, as we would learn. Or a calf. Or a hen. Or . . . fill-in the blanks. Not that we embraced every aspect of animal rights as a consequence. For example, we lived for many years as lacto-ovo vegetarians. Still, it is no exaggeration to say that Gleco's death helped change our li[ves]. Facing the powerful emotions associated with his death was the paramount "personal experience" for us.

***Gigliotti:* You published several papers before *The Case for Animal Rights.* How did these papers relate to the book?**

Tom Regan: In 1972, I was fortunate to receive a Summer Fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities. It freed me up from having to teach that summer. That was when I began to try to make a "philosophical contribution" to the vegetarian movement. The research done during that time came to fruition with the publication of "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," which appeared in the October 1975 issue of *The Canadian Journal of Philosophy.*

Kai Nielsen was the editor of *CJP* in those days. I remember him telling me that when he read the title of my paper he put it in the "reject" pile, not reading another word. Then (thinking ill of himself for being so judgmental) he began to read it. "Hmm," he said after a few pages. "Hmmm," he said after reading a few more. "I'm not sure I agree with this guy," he told the members of the editorial board, "but it's damn good philosophy!" So it's with the publication of that paper, in the same year that Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* was published, that I began to try to make a "philosophical contribution."

***Gigliotti:* Was that unusual, having a paper discussing these things published in a peer-reviewed journal?**

Tom Regan: Kai told me (and he was a man who was extremely well informed about such matters) that, to the best of his knowledge, "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism" was the very first paper on animal rights and vegetarianism published in a peer-reviewed journal in philosophy.

***Gigliotti:* I imagine you took some satisfaction in that?**

Tom Regan: I did. I felt like I was using my training in philosophy for good purposes.

***Gigliotti:* Were the arguments in this paper precursors to those in *The Case for Animal Rights*?**

Tom Regan: In the paper I make the case for vegetarianism by making the case for animal rights, two rights in particular: their right to be spared gratuitous pain, and their right to life. "What we can see . . .," I write near the end, "is that the undeserved pain animals feel is not the only morally relevant consideration; that they are killed must also be taken into account." So, yes, Pain [and] suffering are important; but so are death [and] destruction. As the published record shows, I have been trying to make the case for the importance of both, along with making the case for animal rights, for more than thirty-five years.

Gigliotti: You dedicated one of your more

recent books, *Empty Cages*, "To Muddlers, everywhere." You are one of the last people in the world I would describe as a muddler, although you have described yourself in that way as it pertains to animal rights. I wonder if you might explain that dedication.

Tom Regan: I've met three different types of Animal Rights Advocates—people who are working for true animal liberation. Some are born that way. They don't have to be convinced; they're not asking for some sort of proof; it's just the way they are. That was true of Leonardo, which is why I call these ARA's DiVincians. Others (who I call Damascans) have a life-altering experience, comparable to what happened to Saul on the road to Damascus. They see something, or read something, or hear something and, in the blink of an eye, they are transformed into an ARA. Lastly, there are those I call Muddlers. These are people who grow into an expansive animal consciousness a step at a time. They aren't born that way. They don't have some single life-transforming experience. They just "muddle along."

Gigliotti: **So that's true of you?**

Tom Regan: In spades! When it's appropriate I remind people that I once worked as a butcher, bought Nancy a stylish mink hat, and wrote (in a letter to her) that elephants are "things." So, yes, I was a Muddler most certainly. Increasing my animal consciousness was a journey for me. However, for all Muddlers who complete the journey--and I am speaking from personal experience--a day comes when we look in the mirror and, to our surprise, we see an ARA looking back at us. That's what happened to me, a child of the working class. And (as I often say) if Tom Regan can become an ARA, *anyone* can become an ARA.

Gigliotti: **Nancy, Tom has cited you in various places as extremely important to his work and thinking. In his essay "The Bird in the Cage," he says, "Throughout our journey, she was beside or ahead of me every step of the way." Would you elaborate on that statement from your point of view?**

Nancy Regan: We changed how we saw our world at the same time, for the same reasons. The big new questions we faced were, "[w]hat aspects of our life need to be changed, and how do we make the changes?" Early in our marriage, we were your standard American meat-and-potato's people. Tom is a good skillet cook--if you like you're your food slightly burnt! Breakfast is his forte. A "TRB" means a "Tom Regan Breakfast." I kid him about the cookbook he'll write some day. "Cooking with Tom: One Ingredient: Soy Sauce!"

In my case, cooking vegetarian was a new challenge. I had to read about nutrition, especially children's needs. And I had to learn different ways of cooking. As everyone who goes down this path knows, it opens up the cuisines of the world: Indian, Chinese, Mexico, Middle Eastern. Paradoxically, I found that we had more choices, not fewer.

Then there was the process of educating ourselves about cruelty-free cosmetics and household products. While Tom was reading philosophers, I was reading labels! Believe me, we had to throw a lot of old stuff out and bring a lot of new stuff in.

Clothes were an issue, of course. I said good-bye to that mink hat Tom bought me and we both began to wean ourselves of leather and wool. The way Tom sums up our transformation is that he was speculating about theory while I was trying to put theory into practice. We were (and are) very lucky to have one another.

Gigliotti: **Animal rights, as you have conceived it, has been, and is still, such a powerful force for change because of its reliance on two crucial components of what you have described as a "credible ethic:" justice and care. Would you explain the importance of these two aspects of ethics?**

Tom Regan: The philosopher Immanuel Kant has had a significant influence on my thinking. I should say, *some* aspects of his thinking have had this sort of influence. Kant maintains that reason apart from emotion can motivate a person's actions. If we judge something to be just, then (motivationally speaking) that is enough. Reason and reason alone is sufficient to motivate us to act accordingly.

I have never been convinced by this aspect of Kant's philosophy. Granted, reason can determine what is just; in fact, in my philosophy of animal rights, this is what I have been trying to show. What I do not grant is that reason by itself can motivate one's actions. In order to *do* what is just, something in addition to reason is needed.

One name to give to this something-in-addition is care, by which I mean the general inclination to act to promote the good of others. If people lack this general inclination, then we can talk all day about *animal rights* and they won't *act for* animal beings—they won't *do* what is just for

them. So, yes, a "credible ethic" in my view will involve both justice and care. In fact I think I've written somewhere that "reason can lead the will to water but only care can make it drink." That pretty much sums up my thinking on this matter.

Gigliotti: **In your 2001 book, Defending Animal Rights, a chapter entitled "Patterns of Resistance" outlines some of the links you have articulated between resistance to the rights of animals and social justice issues, particularly in the U[nited] S[tates]. What role do you see these kind of ideas playing in what is now known as human-animal studies and critical animal studies? Are there current examples of similar links you might detail for us?**

Tom Regan: All movements for progressive change encounter the same "patterns of resistance." In the chapter to which you are referring, I discuss the movements to abolish slavery, to enfranchise women, to grant equal rights to gays and lesbians, and to truly liberate nonhuman animals. Two powerful voices resisting all these movements have been (strange bed-fellows) science and religion. For example, defenders of slavery often cited passages from the Bible that they claimed "proved" that God intended blacks to be slaves, whereas others cited various scientific studies (comparative brain size between whites and blacks, for one) that "proved" blacks were biologically inferior to whites. When you have these powerful forces—religion, on the one hand, and science, on the other—speaking in favor of a repressive status-quo, it's fair to say that changing the status-quo will be a daunting challenge.

And what do we find today, in the midst of our movement—the animal rights movement? Overwhelmingly, the voices speaking from a religious or a scientific perspective are speaking in favor of human superiority compared to other animals. I am not saying *everyone* speaking from these perspectives is saying this anymore than everyone speaking from these perspectives in the past favored the subjugation of women. What I am saying is that, overwhelmingly, this is what these voices are saying.

To my mind, it's important for ARA's to understand these "patterns of resistance." It's important, first, because it helps create ARA solidarity with those from the past who have worked for progressive change; *they* had to face the same forces of resistance *we* have to face. It's important, second, because our knowledge of these patterns can perhaps open a dialogue with those who believe in human superiority compared to other animals "because of what the Bible says," for instance. "Oh," we can say, "*that's* why you believe in human superiority. Well, did you know that slavery was defended in the same way? The subjugation of women? The denial of equal rights to gays and lesbians?" I'm not saying this will bring every discussion to an end. I'm only saying that this is one way a discussion can begin. And it's important, finally, because bringing these patterns of resistance to the attention of teachers and administrators can help them understand and, in some cases, possibly embrace the burgeoning field of human-animal studies, about which I have more to say later.

Gigliotti: **Recent additions to the arguments against animal rights are used in various discussions, ranging from environmental issues around climate change and biodiversity, to cultural studies around food and politics, to various perspectives from both human-animal studies scholars and artists who incorporate animals in their work as material. The use of "humane meat" is certainly one of those positions, but other arguments rely on both new evidence concerning the consciousness of plants and ideas about how valuing "something" does not preclude eating it. I realize you have heard these arguments before in many forms, but their current prevalence urges me to ask for your insight.**

Tom Regan: I value my grandchildren, but I hope they understand I will never eat them! Or use their body parts in my "art!" Really, to my mind, all the dust raised about "humane meat" is nothing more than special pleading by people who want to eat dead flesh with a clear conscience. While these outbursts profess to address the obligation not to treat animals cruelly, they uniformly fail to address our obligation not to take their life except in exceptional circumstances (in self-defense, for example). And the plain fact is, some cow had to be killed if you're having steak for dinner tonight. How "humanely" the cow was treated is one thing; whether the cow's right to life is violated when killed, is quite another. Every serious advocate of animal rights understands the difference, just as they abstain from flesh eating not only because of the hurt farmed animals inevitably suffer, but also because of the ultimate harm death is for them.

Gigliotti: **Research has been emerging from cognitive ethologists, such as Marc Bekoff, and psychologists, such as G.A. Bradshaw, that have allowed us to see through long held assumptions and myths about animals of all kinds. One of the**

most fascinating and provocative of these areas of research is the moral behavior of animals. How do you feel this kind of information will affect the shift in our view of animals both of you have been working towards most of your lives.

Tom Regan: We are not totally up to speed regarding the relevant literature but, yes, we have read the results of some of this research, for which we are thankful. Marc and others are demonstrating the truth of Darwin's insistence that other other-than-human-animals have the capacity to act with care toward--even making sacrifices for—another. Since belief in human uniqueness has been key to belief in human superiority, the challenges these researchers are making to the former can only help in persuading others to abandon belief in the latter.

Gigliotti: **In 1993, you were asked to contribute an entry that would serve as an introduction to the Encyclopedia of Bioethics' section on Animal Ethics and Rights. Since that time, what progress – or lack thereof – has been made in the restriction of the use of animals in biotechnologies? How do you see this area of science affecting animals' futures?**

Tom Regan: We are not scientifically qualified to answer this question. Jean Swingle Greek, Ray Greek, and other like-minded medical experts are the people who should be asked. We'll only say this: we believe that one of the greatest threats to human health is continued reliance on the so-called "animal model." Reliance on this model is not good science; it is the child of an uninformed ideology, a dark shadow cast by the belief in human superiority. Reliance on this ideology is what explains the *huge* capital investment the biomedical animal-abuser industries have in maintaining "business as usual" at the lab. What would they do if all their cages were empty? How could they pay the light bill? To our way of thinking, the objections ARA's raise against *the harm these industries do* to their "animal models" can help close them down. But an informed, aroused public, one that understands that these industries are *not helping them*, also has an important role to play if we are to bring about deep, permanent change.

Gigliotti: **You both have been advocates and activists for animal rights. In a global political environment in which academics are taken to task for practicing what their theory implies, what place do you see for human-animal studies and critical animal studies in the arts and scholarship?**

Tom Regan: I will have a go at this. It's an important question—and a divisive one. What must be avoided above all is the sense, let alone the reality, that AS [Animal Studies] courses are in the business of indoctrination. The *opposition* (those who are critical of animal rights) must have a place at the table. AS courses should create opportunities for discussion involving all sides. Different AS teachers might do this in different ways (for example, by inviting a hog farmer or a hunter as a guest lecturer, or by showing films that offer a positive story about "animal model" research). The wrong way to open students' minds is to close-off informed debate. I have known ARA teachers who didn't teach this way. It was (so to speak) their way or the highway. To my mind, they hurt rather than helped the very thing they wanted to accomplish. At least going back to "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," I have believed that ARA's win any fair battle of ideas. *Of course we do! Of course we do!* So why not make sure the exploration of ideas, for and against animal rights, is open to all voices? Teachers have nothing to gain by trying to silence the opposition.

Gigliotti: **Probably the most oft-repeated phrase from your writing about animals is the criterion you put forward in order to assist in determining which non-human animals have value: *subject of a life*. Its combination with one of your criteria for making moral decisions, conformity with our intuitions, has been enormously important in helping students in the arts understand how important their involvement with these ideas might be in both imagining and communicating possibilities of a different relationship with non-human animals. Could you comment on how you see these two components of your philosophy and practice of animal rights?**

Tom Regan: Rights don't hang in thin air. They need a bearer, someone who has rights. Here are three possible candidates: (1) All and only human being; (2) All and only persons; (3) All and only living being. Obviously, one is a non-starter for ARA's. Even if we were to affirm that all humans have rights, we would deny that only humans have rights. When it comes to three well, it's possible that protozoa and tomatoes have rights, but I have never seen anything like a convincing argument for thinking so.

What about two? This certainly seems to be Kant's view—a view that has not lacked for adherents. But before we vote, we need to ask what Kant means by "person." And I don't think there is any question about his answer. A 'person' for Kant is someone who can act according to what duty demands even if that individual does not want to.

So, again, we might agree that all persons (in Kant's sense) have rights but, as ARA's ,we would not agree that only persons (in Kant's sense) do.

Where do ARA's turn, then? How can we characterize the bearers of rights? This is the larger context in which I introduce the idea of being the *subject of a life*. Without getting bogged down in the details, the crucial idea is this: *subjects of a life* only are in the world, they are aware of it—and aware as well of what happens to them. And what happens to them matters to them because it makes a difference to the quality and duration of their li[ves]. As I have said on a number of occasions, they are *somebodies,* not *somethings,* individuals who have a *biography*, not simply a *biology.*

So how do we awaken a largely uninformed and uncaring public to the realization that they are (literally) *surrounded* by nonhuman *subjects of a life*; that the world is richer, when perceived this way, not poorer? Philosophers can make a contribution. So can scholars in the life and social sciences. So can . . . fill-in the blank. There is no scholarly discipline whose practitioners cannot make a contribution.

But central—*central*—to this "small" project of changing how people see the world is what students in the arts can contribute. If we are asking people to imagine new possibilities—and, as ARA's, we are—who better to turn to than those creative people who *specialize* in imagining new possibilities? We all have seen the power of art in the hands of Sue Coe--an amazing, inspirational, formidable person. We have no doubt, and we would challenge anyone who denied, that there is a next generation of Sue Coes about to be born.

Gigliotti: **Nancy is credited with the "cultural activism" vision that began The Culture and Animal Foundation (CAF), founded by both of you in 1985, and which has sponsored twenty-four years of the International Compassionate Living Festival (ICLF), as well as numerous years of grants to scholarly, creative and performance projects. I submit that this Foundation planted the seeds of human-animal studies in the arts and humanities out of which scholarly and creative work has grown. Would you both tell us what this ongoing commitment has meant to you and what it might mean for the future of animal rights?**

Tom Regan: Permit me first to say something about how CAF came to be. I had returned home after teaching and Nancy said, "I just heard the most interesting story on NPR. It was about this performance artist, Rachel Rosenthal, who does a production called "The Others" that raises consciousness about the plight of animals. And, get this: there are animals, more than twenty of them, who perform with her. Not 'trained' animals. Just animals from here and yonder."

"Really?" I said.

"We should bring her here," Nancy said.

"You mean here, as in Raleigh?"

"Yes."

So, how was CAF born? It was born when we decided to bring Rachel and "The Others" to Raleigh, North Carolina. Bringing her here (what a story there is to tell!) also served as the inspiration of the CAF mantra, so to speak: "We'd rather be inside the theater performing than outside the theater protesting."

After that decision was made, we were off and running. If a performance art production, why not music (Paul Winter) and comedy (The Montana Logging and Ballet Company)? Why not an art exhibition? We sponsored several, including a major exhibition by Sue Coe, [and] another by Robert Raushenberg. What about Pulitzer Prize winning poets? We invited Maxine Kumin, and Galway Kinnell. What about . . . ? Legal theorists? Sociologists? Anthropologists? Historians? Political scientists? Biographers? Novelists? . . . fill-in the blanks.

Amidst and amongst these wonderful, wonderful people, we invited others who were critical of animal rights. Yes, CAF in our mind is synonymous with cultural activism. But we have never lost sight of the need to provide ARA's with an opportunity to learn about those who oppose what we believe in from--well, those who oppose what we believe in.

In the last few years of ICLF, CAF collaborated with the Animals and Society Institute, the scale of the event having gone beyond CAF's all-volunteer-capacity to organize. Ours was a pleasant, rewarding collaboration, and we take this opportunity to thank ASI and everyone else [that] made ICLF possible, for all those many years, including CAF's current board members (not counting the two of us), Marion Bolz and Mylan Engel.

Today, CAF focuses mainly on our grant program. We are not a wealthy organization. Far from it. That said, we are able to make ten to a dozen grants per year, and while the money is not huge, the grants are helpful to those who receive them. Just this past year we received applications

from Chile, Spain, Australia, France, Canada, Finland, England, Italy and, of course, the United States. Obviously, there are creative, inquiring ARA's all over the world committing their time and talent—their life – to the struggle for animal rights. We only wish CAF had the funds to help them all.

As for your saying that CAF "planted the seeds of human-animal studies in the arts and humanities:" that's very kind of you to say. Thank you. Marion, Mylan, and the two of us will certainly give that some thought.

Often referred to as the intellectual leader of the animal rights movement ***Tom Regan*** is an American philosopher who specialises in animal rights theory and a prolific writer on the subject. Until his retirement in 2001 Tom Regan was a professor of philosophy at North Carolina State University where he taught for thirty-four years. Regan is the author of four books on the philosophy of animal rights, including The Case for Animal Rights, a book particularly noted as having had significant influence on the animal rights movement. The Culture and Animals Foundation (CAF) is a nonprofit, cultural organization committed to fostering the growth of intellectual and artistic endeavors united by a positive concern for animals. Founded in 1985 by Nancy and Tom Regan, CAF exists to expand our understanding and appreciation of animals — improving the ways in which they are treated and their standing in human society.

ANIMAL RIGHTS, HUMAN WRONGS

What makes right acts right? What makes wrong acts wrong? Some moral philosophers believe that the best answers to these questions require the recognition of moral rights. This is the position I favor and the one I will try to defend in subsequent chapters. It will therefore be useful to say something about the nature and importance of rights, the better to frame the discussions of other positions that differ from mine.
Text by **Tom Regan**

The idea of the "rights of the individual" has had a profound and lasting influence, both in and beyond Western civilization. Among philosophers, however, this idea has been the subject of intense debate. Some philosophers deny that we have any rights (moral rights, as they are commonly called) beyond those legal rights established by law. Others affirm that, separate from, and more basic than our legal rights, are our moral rights, including such rights as the rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity. The framers of America's Declaration of Independence certainly believed this. They maintained that the sole reason for having a government in the first place is to protect citizens in the possession of their rights, rights that, because they are independent of, and more basic than, legal rights, have the status of moral rights.

People can agree that humans have moral rights and disagree over what rights are. They can even agree that humans have moral rights, agree about what rights are, and still disagree when it comes to saying what rights humans have. For example, some proponents of moral rights believe humans possess only negative moral rights (rights not to be harmed or interfered with); while others believe we also have positive moral rights (rights to be helped or assisted). The on-going national debate over the right to universal health care illustrates the difference. We begin with this fact: naturally occurring diseases or illnesses, such as cancer and diabetes, do not violate anyone's rights. This makes a difference for proponents of negative rights. Since no one's rights are violated, those who suffer from these conditions have no right to medical assistance. Proponents of positive rights take a different view. Because these conditions detract from a person's quality of life, people who need assistance have a right to receive it, even if they cannot afford it.

Which (if either) view is correct? Impressive arguments, often both lengthy and complex, have been presented by both sides. Fortunately for us, these debates, as important as they are, lie outside the scope of our present interest. The questions central to animal rights concern which, if any, nonhuman animals have negative moral rights (rights not to be harmed or interfered with). For this reason, we can table discussion of whether animals (or humans, for that matter) have any positive rights, and concentrate throughout on negative moral rights (henceforth "rights"). My purpose in this chapter is not to argue for our rights, let alone for the rights of animals. Rather, I want to explain why the idea that humans have rights, and why the possibility that animals have them, are the important ideas they are.

"No Trespassing"

Possession of moral rights (by which, again, unless otherwise indicated, I mean negative moral rights) confers a distinctive moral status on those who have them. To possess these rights is to have a kind of protective moral shield, something we might picture as an invisible "No Trespassing" sign. If we assume that all humans have such rights, we can ask what this invisible sign prohibits: two things, in general. First, others are not morally free to harm us; to say this is to say that, judged from the moral point of view, others are not free to take our life or injure our body as they please. Second, others are not free to interfere with our free choice; to say this is to say that others are not free to limit our choices as they please. In both cases, the "No Trespassing" sign is meant to protect those who have rights by morally limiting the freedom of others.

Does this mean that it is always wrong to take someone's life, injure them, or restrict their freedom? Not at all. When people exceed their rights by violating ours, we act within our rights if we respond in ways that can harm or limit the freedom of the violators. For example, suppose you are attacked by a thief; then you do nothing wrong in using physical force sufficient to defend yourself, even if this harms your assailant. Thankfully, in the world as we find it, such cases are the exception, not the rule. Most people most of the time act in ways that respect the rights of other human beings. But even if the world happened to be different in this respect, the central point would be the same: what we are free to do when someone violates our rights does not translate into the freedom to violate their rights without justifiable cause.

Moral Weight: Trump

Every serious advocate of human rights believes that our rights have greater moral weight than other important human values. To use an analogy from the card game Bridge, our moral rights are trump. Here is what this analogy means.

A hand is dealt. Hearts are trump. The first three cards played are the queen of spades, the king of spades, and the ace of spades. You (the last player) have no spades. However, you do have the two of hearts. Because hearts are trump, your lowly two of hearts beats the queen of spades, beats the king of spades, even beats the ace of spades. This is how powerful the trump suit is in the game of Bridge.

The analogy between trump in Bridge and individual rights in morality should be reasonably clear. There are many important values to consider when we make a moral decision. For example: How will we be affected personally as a result by deciding one way or another? What about our family, friends, neighbors, fellow Americans? It is not hard to write a long list. When we say, "rights are trump," we mean that respect for the rights of individuals is the most important consideration in "the game of morality," so to speak. In particular, we mean that the good others derive from violating someone's rights (by injuring their body or taking their life, for example) never justifies violating them.

Moral Status: Equality

Moral rights breathe equality. They are the same for all who have them, differ though we do in many ways. This explains why no human being can justifiably be denied rights for arbitrary, prejudicial, or morally irrelevant reasons. Race is such a reason. To attempt to determine which humans have rights on the basis of race is like trying to sweeten something by adding salt. What race we are tells us nothing about what rights we have.

The same is no less true of other differences between us. My wife and I trace our family lineage to different countries; she to Lithuania, I to Ireland. Some of our friends are Christians, some Jews, and some Moslems. Others are agnostics or atheists. In the world at large, a few people are very wealthy, many more, very poor. And so it goes. Humans differ in many ways. There is no denying that.

Still, no one who believes in human rights thinks these differences mark fundamental moral divisions. If we mean anything by the idea of human rights, we mean that we have them equally. And we have them equally regardless of our race, gender, religious belief, comparative wealth, intelligence, or date or place of birth, for example.

Moral Claims: Justice

Rights involve justice, not generosity; what we are due, not what we want. Here is an example that helps illustrate the difference. I happen to want a fancy sports car, which I cannot afford. Bill Gates (as everyone knows) has more money than he knows what to do with. I write to him.

> Dear Bill:
> I want an Audi TT 3.2-litre six-cylinder sports Coupé with a Direct Shift Gearbox. I can't afford the asking price. I know you can. So I would appreciate it if you would send me a money order (by Express Mail, if you don't mind) to cover the cost.

One thing is abundantly clear. I am not in a position to demand that Bill Gates buy me an Audi TT. Receiving a car from him — any car — is not

something to which I am entitled, not something I am owed or due. If my new found friend Bill bought me the car of my dreams, his gift would distinguish him as uncommonly generous (or uncommonly foolish), not uncommonly fair.

When we invoke our rights, by contrast, we are not asking for anyone's generosity. We are not saying, "Please, will you kindly give me something I do not deserve?" On the contrary, when we invoke our rights, we are demanding fair treatment, demanding that we receive what is our due. We are not asking for any favors.

Moral Unity: Respect

Trespass. Trump. Equality. Justice. These are among the ideas that come to the surface when we review the meaning and importance of moral rights. While each is important, none succeeds in unifying the core concept. By contrast, the idea of respect succeeds in doing so.

The rights discussed in this chapter (life, liberty, and bodily integrity) are variations on a main theme, that theme being respect. From the perspective of human rights proponents, I show my respect for you by respecting these rights in your life. You show your respect for me by doing the same thing. From this perspective, our most fundamental right — the right that unifies all our other rights — is our right to be treated with respect. When our other rights are violated, individual human beings are treated with a lack of respect.

Animal Rights?

It is when viewed against this larger moral backdrop that the importance of the debate over animal rights comes into sharper focus. If animals have rights of the sort mentioned (the rights to bodily integrity and to life, for example), then the way they are treated on farms and in biomedical research violates their rights, is wrong, and should be stopped, no matter how much humans have benefited from these practices in the past, or how much we might benefit from having them continue in the future.

Philosophical opponents of animal rights agree. "[I]f animals have any rights at all," writes the most well known opponent, the philosopher Carl Cohen, "they have the right to be respected, the right not to be used as a tool to advance human interests . . . no matter how important those human interests are thought to be." In particular, if nonhuman animals have moral rights, biomedical research that uses them is wrong and should be stopped. Cohen even goes so far as to liken the use of animals, in the development of the polio and other vaccines, to the use Nazi scientists made of Jewish children during the Second World War "[I]f those animals we used and continue to use have rights as human children do, what we did and are doing to them is as profoundly wrong as what the Nazis did to those Jews not long ago."

Clearly, what is true of the morality of relying on the animal model in scientific research would be no less true when evaluating the morality of commercial animal agriculture and the fur trade. These, too, would be "profoundly wrong," if animals have rights. On this point, without a doubt, even Cohen would agree.

But do animals have rights? More fundamentally, do human beings have rights? These are the central questions to be addressed in the pages that follow. At this juncture I note only that my argument for animal rights cannot be made in twenty-five words or less. Why animals have rights can be understood only after critically examining moral theories that deny rights to animals and, sometimes, to humans, too. Once we understand the weaknesses of these theories, we can understand why human rights must be acknowledged; and once we adopt this latter position, then – but not before, in my judgment — we can understand why we must acknowledge animal rights as well.

In the nature of the case, therefore, as I indicated earlier, and as I will have occasion to say again, my argument for animal rights is cumulative in nature, arising, as it does, in response to weaknesses in other ways of thinking about morality.

DISCUSSING ANIMAL RIGHTS AND THE ARTS

Vancouver-born photographer and writer Zoe Peled chairs a discussion on animal rights and the arts between philosophers, academics, art critics and artists: Carol Gigliotti, Peter Singer, Robin Laurence, Noah Becker and Ashley Fruno.

Questions and text by Zoe Peled

If our lives are structured based upon relationships (those with family, friends, partners, lovers and others), then one of my most significant ones to date is that with animals and art. Specifically, artists that use animals within their practices and I, have a relationship that is now in its sixth year.

This relationship was born out of a photography degree at Emily Carr, which evolved into what I now refer to as a photography/critical theory degree. I was committed to my photographic practice, and I was committed to animals. It took a handful of teachers who told me that ECU was not the place to communicate my "animal rights agenda," to lead me to one educator that completely changed the direction of my time at ECU, and my creative practice as a whole.

This teacher was one who not only shared some of my views, but re-impressed how important it was, and is, to critically address an issue that has essentially been omitted from art history.

This discussion serve to continue a conversation that has only begun to skim the surface of contemporary dialogue over the past few years, and hopefully instigate the development of more.

Zoe Peled: **Among the artists that I have studied who use animals (alive or dead) as materials in their work, there are two groups- those who use the animals with the intention of bringing attention to a specific issue around animal rights or welfare, and those who do not. The latter group uses the animal as easily as they would oil paints or acrylic. I started investigating the complex relationship between the visual arts and animal advocacy during my studies at Emily Carr. Have you had any encounters with this relationship thus far in your career, and if so, in what capacity?**

Ashley Fruno: Throughout my career, I have only encountered the use of animals in art when we received a report about the Brisbane Gallery of Modern Art (GOMA) in February earlier this year. An installation by Céleste Boursier-Mougenot utilised live finches. The objective of the installation was for visitors to interact with the simulation of the finches' environment, however, in reality, it sentenced the finches to several weeks of boredom and potential abuse.

Carol Gigliotti: Much of my research, publishing and speaking for the last 10 years has focused on

Hermann Nitsch
Performance involving pig, 1970s

the topic of how and why animals are not only represented, but also used, in contemporary art. I have particularly looked at artists who are working in new media, such as bio-art, artificial life, artificial intelligence and robotics. My essay, "Leonardo's Choice: the ethics of artists working with genetic technologies" (Gigliotti 2006), was first published in an issue of *AI & Society* that I guest edited on the topic of bio art, and then included again in an interdisciplinary book I edited for Springer called *Leonardo's Choice: Genetic Technologies and Animals* (Gigliotti 2009). This book included the works of authors from many disciplines and did a very good job, I think, of clarifying how using the unhelpful methodologies of a science still positing human beings as the centre and rationale of all endeavors, and animals as mere resources, would serve only to reinforce that anthropocentric view in the arts and a corresponding commitment to this view in broad cultural, political and social perceptions.

I have also looked at the wider use of animals in art as means to an end rather than as ends in and of themselves, with their own inherent value. The essay, "Heartburn: Indigestion, Contention and Animals in Contemporary Art," first published in *Antennae* (Gigliotti 2010), outlines a short history of these involvements as well as looking closely at three recent examples in which exhibits including the use of animals triggered an angry public outcry, resulting in either partial or total closures of the exhibits. The essay argues that these reactions are connected in numerous ways to protests against the consumption of animals as food.

Peter Singer: I have occasionally been asked to comment on the uses of animals by artists, but that is all.

Robin Laurence: As an art critic based in Vancouver, I've had limited encounters with art in which animals are used as "materials." I did see Huang Yong Ping's *Theatre of the World* in two different venues and was troubled by it – but who

wasn't, for one reason or another? I've also seen Carolee Schneemann's 1989 video images of her kissing her cat, an activity the cat appeared to enjoy. In this work, it wasn't clear to me whether the cat was a performer or a "material." (I believe, however, that Schneemann has talked about her cats, which have long appeared in her art, as "material.")I followed, but didn't witness, the controversy around Rick Gibson's proposed 1989 performance piece involving Sniffy the Rat: Gibson planned to crush the rat between two canvases by dropping a heavy weight on it, leaving its gory imprint as a record of the act. Although I don't think Gibson's piece was one of advocacy, I do think one of his points was that being instantly crushed by a 25 kilogram weight would be no crueler than being slowly suffocated by a python in a cage. Rats are intelligent creatures with the capacity to bond, to emote and, yes, to suffer. It's hard to say if Gibson, who earlier had defied taboos such as the eating of human flesh and the use of human fetuses in his performance art and sculpture, actually intended to kill Sniffy. In my mind, however, the piece was extremely successful as a *proposition*, more so than if Sniffy had actually been snuffed. It's ironic, of course, that the rat-saving crowd threatened violence to a human being. Naturally, I've seen photos of Josef Beuys's performance with a coyote. However, I haven't been in a position to analyze or review this work. Not surprisingly, I've far more frequently come across animals as subject matter rather than material or medium. Mostly, I've seen exhibitions of historic and contemporary photographs of animals, whose prevailing themes have been the nature-culture interface and our relations with the animals we have domesticated to meet our various selfish needs. I've also encountered animal advocacy in documentary films, the most recent being *Project Nim*, but again I haven't witnessed any live performances using animals, and certainly none involving the slaughter of animals.

I do have to set this out as my bias and my position in this discussion: as a critic, I profoundly believe in art's power to witness, to question, to provoke, to advocate, and to enlighten, but as an emotional human being who doesn't eat meat, supports animal rescue organizations and is squeamish and ridiculously sentimental, I also believe that there is no act of animal cruelty that can be justified in the name of art.

Peled: **Hermann Nitsch is a performance artist who has been quoted to say "my speciality is the agonizing torture of animals" (Herbert Khuner). Researching Nitsch is the reason that my entire body of research has become what it has today.**

Carolee Schneemann
Infinity Kisses, 1981-88,wall Installation, Self-shot 35mm photographs; Xerachrome on linen containing 140 images © Schneemann

He has become famous for his performance pieces, which to summarize, involve alcohol, nudity, slaughtering of cows, sex acts, sex acts in said slaughtered cows, and great feasting in the Danish countryside. Nitsch notes that his work serves many purposes, one of which is to reveal our collective hypocrisy embedded in our reaction to it: many protest the work and the manner in which the animals are slaughtered, while still consuming meat, wearing leather, etc.

Nitsch writes:

> ***The intoxication created by the blood and the ripping apart of raw flesh should be satisfying and enjoyable as it relieves man of his suppressed desires....Killing was, and is, beyond all moral judgments. I could well envision that murder could be a component of a work of art; the artist's accountability would have***

another status…Thus, art can consist of a crime…

Art can consist of a crime, and at times, does. Many activists say that the law, specifically animal cruelty legislation, is made more flexible within a visual arts context. When placed within a visual arts realm, why does this happen?

Fruno: There are a number of reasons as to why such shocking activities occur legally for the sake of so-called art. Unfortunately, not all animals are protected under animal cruelty legislation. Generally, animals such as chickens and fishes are excluded from legislation, thus they are not protected. For example, a Danish installation involved the placement of goldfish into a blender, and allowed visitors to "liquefy" the fishes. Though animal rights organizations and the community expressed their outrage, the government deemed the work legal and permitted it to stay. Certain regulatory bodies may deem the use of animals in artwork as comparable to other non-trivial reasons which aim to justify the torture and killing of animals (such as for food and leather).

Singer: I can't say why it happens. I don't believe it should happen. Art is no excuse for cruelty.

Laurence: I haven't seen the work of Hermann Nitsch, and I can't comment on how humane or inhumane his slaughtering methods are. (Then again I've never been in a slaughterhouse and can't comment on methods there, either.) Do the animals in his performances suffer more or less than animals killed in a legal slaughterhouse or a prescribed religious ritual? It sounds as if his performances are upping the Bacchanalian impulse of Schneemann's *Meat Joy*, with the added element of potential criminality. I believe that there are many ridiculous laws that artists are entitled to challenge (and have challenged, over the years, especially regarding nudity and sexuality), and many "crimes" that artists can commit in the name of art. However, in my mind, again, 1) the intention of animal welfare legislation is not ridiculous, although perhaps its enforcement is inconsistent; and 2) there is no justification ever for cruelty to children or animals. (Presumably, free adult humans are capable of giving consent within the context of a performance piece. Children and animals are not. Captive adults are not, either.) Again, I do not believe that art is a license for overriding animal welfare legislation. (Anti-marijuana legislation, yes…) And no, I do not agree that if murder were a component of a work of art, "the artist's accountability would have another



Carol Gigliotti
Leonardo's Choice, 2009

status." At best, this is hubris and at worst, it is psychopathic thinking. It's interesting, though, that since the Romantic age, as part of the personality cult associated with them, artists have been absolved of many of their social transgressions. An artist's bad behavior is often seen as justifiable if he creates "great" art (women artists aren't afforded the same leniency.) But murder? No. Cruelty to animals? No, not in this time and place.

Peled: Legislation brings us to a broader topic- *Animal Rights vs. Artistic Freedom*. The aforementioned was the title of a forum hosted by the Vancouver Art Gallery, in response to Vancouver's response to *Theatre of The World*, a controversial sculptural piece included in the 2007 retrospective of Huang Yong Ping.

***Theatre Of The World* involved housing numerous lizards, snakes, scorpions and insects within one closed structure. When the S.P.C.A. intervened, following a public complaint, Ping called upon his rights as an artist, and said that they were being challenged**

by the "so-called doctrines of animal rights." Is it reasonable to pit animal rights and artistic freedom against one another? How do we even begin to compare the two?

Fruno: Internationally, an increasing number of artists have proven that animal rights and artistic freedom can be complementary. When utilizing the correct medium and respecting animals, the artist can truly engage the audience in a thought-provoking conversation concerning the true value of animals in society today.

Gigliotti: I was involved in the media outcry preceding the closing of Huang Yong Ping's *Theatre of the World* exhibit at the Vancouver Art Gallery (VAG) in 2007.

> *Along with allegations that the general public does not understand the nuanced language of contemporary art and its use of metaphorical techniques, the claims that protests against the uses of animals in these ways is censorship, from "liberal humanist and racist-culturalist" stances, hardly help to explain the large number of people who contributed negative opinions about these works. Many identified are from within the arts, or [are] art supporters, and hail from countries and cultures worldwide. The broad array of negative and well-articulated reactions available for view on the net, and increasingly from within the arts, cannot be dismissed as synonymous with censorship merely because they echo the views of animal activists.*
>
> *Many of these criticisms come from a vocal and technologically well-connected public, and point toward a growing radical environmentalism that sees the conditions of power and dominance among humans as rooted in the human refusal to recognize the continuing domination of animals. Even if artists such as Habacuc, Absemmed and Ping seem to be aware of the human affects of these conditions, they are blind to their roots in human power over other animals. In the three situations above, the animals involved serve as surrogates for human characteristics that the artist is trying to critique or demonstrate. The fact that the animals themselves are individual beings, consciously witnessing their own victimization, appears to elude the three artists in these examples. Not only are the individual animals involved seen as static objects, used as metaphor, example, or analogy, but they are also treated as abstractly as words in a language or paint on canvas. It is for this reason that these artists cannot only be accused of cruelty, but also accused of the lesser charge of making bad art. (Gigliotti 2010, 33)*

The solution is not to compare the two, artistic freedom and animal rights, but to allow ideas like the rights of animals to inform and shape our understanding of art and creativity. What are the functions of art in today's world? For instance, in what way does Ping's *Theatre of the World* contribute to a world in which only now scientists are beginning to understand that the roles reptiles and insects play in the global eco-system of the planet are so vital that without them life as we know it would cease to exist? What I hope has evolved from these discussions and disagreements is a much needed examination of what "artistic freedom" is and how it might better help us understand and protect this home which we share with approximately 8 to 10 billion other species.

Singer: Artistic freedom does not extend to breaking reasonable laws such as those that protect animals from cruelty.

Laurence: I didn't attend the Vancouver Art Gallery forum you cite, but I think it's safe to say that Huang Yong Ping grew up in a culture in which animal welfare has not been as deeply entrenched in law and morality as it has in North America. In some ways, his *Theatre of the World* spotlighted a disjunction in cultural understanding and practice. If you grow up with poverty and hardship, within an authoritarian regime, you probably aren't very concerned about the rights of spiders. Huang Yong Ping might argue that North American viewers could better spend their time agitating against human rights abuses than against his crowding incompatible insects and reptiles into a dome-shaped cage. However, I'm not aware that he made that argument. (Perhaps he thinks, incorrectly, that insects and reptiles do not experience pain, or perhaps he thinks that their pain is of little consequence, and his art is of considerable consequence, and therefore his art makes their

Cat killer Jesse Powers made headlines in 2001 when he captured a stray cat from Kensington market, brutally tortured the cat to death on film, and presented the film to his art class at the Ontario College for Art and Design in Toronto. He pleaded guilty to mischief and cruelty to animals, and was sentenced to 90 days in jail, to be served on consecutive weekends.

suffering worthwhile. I'm not sure.) Artists operate both within and against the confines of their place and times, yet surely it is their job to oppose cruelty, not to perpetuate it. Something to consider is that even though Vancouver viewers brought a different set of values, and therefore a different interpretation to Huang Yong Ping's work than he had intended, they were obviously provoked by it. If they had wanted, they could have extended the trapped and suffering metaphor from insects to human beings. In answer to your question, I think it's unfortunate when artistic freedom is pitted against animal rights, since obviously both are worthy. In the end, however, children and animals must be protected, and child and animal welfare must prevail. I don't think this compromises art or artists: there are many ways to depict cruelty that don't involve committing actual crimes of cruelty against living creatures. How about the artist's age-old tools, symbol and metaphor? How about the documentarian's power to witness and record the deeds of others? Again, there is a certain arrogance in supposing that the making of art is such a sanctified activity that it trumps all other considerations.

Peled: **In 2001, Canadian student Jesse Powers and two classmates made a film for an art class. They kidnapped a neighborhood cat, Kensington. In the film, the three tortured the cat, skinned him alive, and decapitated him. In the days after, Powers also maintained that the film was made to call out hypocrisy in the general public.**

Nitsch and Powers maintain that on one level, their work is being created to bring attention to crucial animal issues. Do the intentions of individuals like Jesse Powers and Hermann Nitsch become lost in the public response? Are they worth acknowledging at all when they are presented to us in such a sensationalist format?

Fruno: The abuse and torture of an animal can never be justified. By engaging in the exploitation and torture of animals to produce "art," Nitsch and Powers are evidently supporting the so-called hypocrisy which they are attempting to combat. Though their aim is to also initiate a conversation regarding society's hypocritical attitude towards

animals, the methods which are used invoke a reactive response from the community, which contradict that. This response directs focus on the artists' lack of compassion and morals, rather than the relationship between their actions and those which occur daily in society.

Singer: There are ways to bring attention to our hypocrisy about animals that do not involve inflicting more suffering on them. Artists involved in cruelty to animals should be prosecuted in the same way that anyone else would be.

Laurence: I am unfamiliar again with the scenario you describe, but as you represent his cat-torturing student work, I question both its sincerity and its intention. I wonder if he had or has the maturity of understanding and the power of imagination to create a work of art about – well, what was this film about? Cruelty to animals? Cruelty to human beings? The slaughter of animals for food? The slaughter of human beings for religious or political reasons? The torture and murder of children? Of political prisoners? Of baby seals? Whatever his subject, I can't believe that the best way to take it on was to mimic the behavior of a psychopath-in-training. (Isn't it proven that young, violent psychopaths torture and kill animals before they "graduate" to human beings?) It's not clear to me in this description what hypocrisy Powers was trying to "call out." However, I would certainly agree that most privileged Westerners exist in a state of ignorance and/or denial of the horrors that occur on our planet. We love and pamper our pets and yet we refuse to think about or do anything to mitigate the vast scale of human suffering in, say, Somalia. And, yes, art can and should take issue with our ignorance and denial. What is clear, however, is that Goya did not have to murder, rape, dismember, or impale human beings in order to create his *Disasters of War*. It was sufficient that he created images of them. Nor, in our own times, did the filmmakers who created *The Cove* have to capture and slaughter dolphins themselves. By truthfully depicting horror at the hands of others, artists can powerfully communicate their moral outrage to viewers. In answer to your question about artists' intentions being lost in our revulsion concerning the cruelty of their acts, it is quite possibly true that they are. I'd always want to know what their intentions were, but frankly, where the committing of cruel acts is concerned, I see that as the artists' failure of vision, not the public's failure to grasp what that vision is about. Consider the anti-war play *War Horse*, in which the titular animal is so powerfully simulated by puppeteers that the audience actually sees a living horse instead of costumed human beings. That suggests a triumph of creative vision, no? The artists you have cited seem to be attempting to abrogate some of the artist's most useful tools, again, metaphor, symbol, and representation. I'm not sure why. Perhaps they believe that we are so image-bombarded, so inured to media representations of horror, that more and more shocking methods are needed to garner attention. As for acknowledging artists' intentions, I do believe that we need to know what they are. (In our culture, the accused always have a right to a defense, no?) Their intentions certainly factor into a consideration of the success or failure of their work, even if, ultimately, they don't justify cruelty.

Peled: **Animals have been used as a medium within the visual arts for many years, and continue to be used by artists today such as Nathalie Edenmont. Is it reasonable that a governing body should be monitoring the use of animals within this context? If so, who should be watching: animal welfare organizations, animal rights organizations, curators and gallery directors, or should it be at the hands of a higher level?**

Fruno: The use of animals in relation to artwork must be monitored by curators and gallery directors. The government must hold curators and gallery directors liable in addition to the artist as a means of ensuring legislation protecting animals is adhered to.

Becker: Sick acts by deranged people are the same in any medium. It's no different that someone justifying homicide in the name of a religion or the name of political beliefs. None of this work has been very good on top of it being a demented act. Art should not be regulated by governments or law enforcement. Sadly, the bi-product of this kind of art is more art related involvement from law enforcement and government. So yes, it's horrible to see animals being abused, and yes, it's also sad to see it raise the level of intervention from governing entities. David Wojnarowicz and Richard Prince are two artists that come to mind in relation to cases that have nothing to do with animal cruelty but show the troubling aspects of censorship and law enforcement getting involved in contemporary art. So really this kind of work based on animal cruelty creates more problems for everyone in the long term. Animal cruelty is not accepted as something normal in society, unless you are Picasso and you love bullfighting and it's part of your country's twisted tradition. Does this mean that a dead animal in art is not animal cruelty? Your boundaries need to be



Dali/Bunuel
Un Chien Andalou, black and white short film, 1929

expressed here in more specific terms as to what you see cruelty to animals as meaning? Is it "anyone" using animals as a medium, dead animals and living animals? In this case then is Luis Bunuel an artist that fits into your category of animal cruelty or Damien Hirst? Or does this refer to the torture of living animals in art, or both? Bunuel's classic *Un Chien Andalou* shows a dead calf's eye being cut with a razor for example. Bunuel's film is considered to be one of the most historically important works.

Singer: All of the above, including those responsible for law enforcement.

Laurence: Filmmakers are directly accountable to animal welfare legislation and its enforcement without a special, intervening individual or group. Should visual artists be granted rights and regulatory bodies concerning their use of animals that filmmakers are not? At the moment, I don't think so. (And sorry, although I support animal welfare groups, I'm not knowledgeable enough about the aims of animal rights groups with respect to art and artists to suggest what their role should be.) Curators are often put in the position of making considered judgments about the social advisability of the art they are showing, but I don't like the idea of curators having to make the call on animal cruelty.

Peled: **The visual arts remain an outlet for communicating particular issues within the realm of animal advocacy. Is this an effective way to communicate concerns about animal issues?**

Fruno: Visual arts can be an extremely effective medium to communicate animal rights issues to

society. It is imperative that the artist convey respect for all animals in order to successfully and effectively promote animal advocacy in their work, and therefore PETA opposes any forms of art which cause animals to suffer, be confined, or die.

Becker: An artist can express everything.

Singer: It can be, although I suspect that the art world is now often talking largely to itself. I can't think of any contemporary artist who has had anything like the impact of, say, William Hogarth, in combating cruelty to animals. And I also doubt very much that any contemporary artist has had anything like the impact of – to give just one recent example – the video footage of the slaughter of Australian cattle in Indonesia, taken by Lyn White, as part of her work for Animals Australia. That was seen by many millions of Australians, and had an immediate impact on the export of live cattle from Australia to Indonesia. What artist could make the same claim?

Laurence: At the moment, I think photography, film and video persist as the most effective ways to communicate concerns about animal issues. Perhaps other digital media will take on a greater advocacy role in the future, although I'm not seeing it happen on a large scale just yet. Because of its enormous reach, social networking has obvious potential, and certainly it has played a role in spotlighting human rights abuses. Although performance art speaks directly and often powerfully to its audience, its reach is limited, even when the performance is documented in film or video. I'm not saying performance artists shouldn't take on the issues, I'm just saying that their potential to communicate those issues widely is limited by their discipline -- unless, of course, like Rick Gibson's rat story, their work is picked up by the mass media. Sorry to keep beating this drum, but I firmly believe that it is possible to be creatively inventive and politically powerful without adding to our planet's bloody burden of cruelty to animals and people.

CONTRIBUTOR BIOGRAPHIES

ASHLEY FRUNO

Although her now-vegetarian mother grew up on a dairy farm (and mistakenly believed that cow's milk was the key to good health), and her grandfather was the president of the local rodeo, Cloverdale (near Vancouver), British Columbia, native Ashley Fruno had a mind of her own from a very early age. When she was 7, she found a vein in her chicken nuggets at McDonald's, never before realizing that the animals on her neighbors' farms who fascinated her so much were the same as the ones on her plate. At that point, she began to cut meat out of her diet and went vegetarian for good at 13. Later, after learning about the animal suffering inherent in the dairy and egg industries, Fruno went vegan. Now, as PETA Asia-Pacific's senior campaigner, Fruno tackles everything from organizing protests and garnering support from A-list celebrities, to managing undercover investigations and running the group's intern program. Most recently, Fruno was sent to Japan to lead PETA's disaster relief efforts after the devastating earthquake and tsunami. And because she had also rescued animals during Typhoon Ondoy in the Philippines, Fruno hit the ground running in Japan. Fruno has amassed an impressive string of victories in both the U.S. and abroad. As part of PETA's campaign to pressure KFC to stop its suppliers' worst abuses of chickens, Fruno and her fellow protesters once cost a targeted KFC location nearly $2,000 in lost business. And thanks in part to Fruno's efforts, the company that controls the purchasing of chickens for KFCs in Canada agreed to improve its animal welfare standards and even introduced a vegan-chicken sandwich to the menu. In her latest position with PETA Asia-Pacific, Fruno has had a hand in preventing the transfer of elephants from Thailand to the decrepit Manila Zoo, gotten almost 100 Australian designers to pledge not to use fur, and persuaded Korean retail giant Kukdong Corporation to stop using cruelly obtained Australian wool.

CAROL GIGLIOTTI

Dr. Carol Gigliotti, a writer, educator, and artist, is an Associate Professor in Interactive Media and Critical and Cultural Studies at Emily Carr University of Art + Design in Vancouver, B.C., Canada where she teaches Environmental Ethics, Critical Animal Studies and Interactive Media courses. She has been involved in new media since 1989 and publishes and presents extensively. Her edited book, ***Leonardo's Choice: genetic technologies and animals*** which grew out of the January 2006 special issue of the Springer_Verlag journal *AI and Society*, "Genetic Technologies and Animals" has recently been published by the Bioethics/Applied Philosophy Area of Springer. The book includes her essay, "Leonardo's choice: the ethics of artists working with genetic technologies", and essays by philosopher Steven Best, literary theorist Susan McHugh, feminist biologist Lynda Birke and a dialogue between Gigliotti and cultural theorist, Steve Baker.

NOAH BECKER

Noah Becker lives and works in Victoria BC, Canada and New York. He is a contemporary artist, musician, curator, and editor-in-chief of *Whitehot Magazine.* In 2009, Becker was nominated for the Royal Bank of Canada Painting Prize, which toured his work to Musee D'Art De Montreal. His innovative melding of artistic expressions has led to successful solo and group exhibitions in New York, Switzerland, Canada, and Miami. Becker's work was recently included in *Plank Road* and *Hunt & Chase* at Salomon Contemporary and *6 Degrees of Separation* at Claire Oliver Gallery.

PETER SINGER

Peter Singer was born in Melbourne, Australia, in 1946, and educated at the University of Melbourne and the University of Oxford, La Trobe University and Monash University. Since 1999 he has been Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University. From 2005, he has also held the part-time position of Laureate Professor at the University of Melbourne, in the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics.

Peter Singer first became well-known internationally after the publication of *Animal Liberation*, in 1975. He has written, co-authored, edited or co-edited more than 40 other books, including *Practical Ethics*; *The Expanding Circle*; *How Are We to Live?*, *Rethinking Life and Death*, *The Ethics of What We Eat* (with Jim Mason) and most recently, *The Life You Can Save*. His works have appeared in more than 20 languages.

He is the author of the major article on Ethics in the current edition of the *Encylopaedia Britannica*. In 2005, *Time* magazine named him one of the 100 most influential people in the world, and in 2008 readers of *Prospect* and *Foreign Policy* magazines voted him one of the 100 leading public intellectuals in the world.

ROBIN LAURENCE

Robin Laurence is an independent writer, critic and curator, based in Vancouver. She has written hundreds of feature articles and reviews for a range of Canadian and international publications, and has contributed essays to more than 35 books and exhibition catalogues. Laurence writes about the visual arts for *The Georgia Straight* and is a contributing editor for *Canadian Art* and *Border Crossings* magazines.

ZOE PELED

Zoe Peled is a Vancouver-born photographer and writer. Collaborating with numerous groups and organizations over the past years, she works in production, fundraising, marketing and events coordination. Zoe has been involved with The Cheaper Show for over fours, and has worked with over one hundred and seventy volunteers and staff members. Holding a BFA from ECU (Photography and Critical Studies focus), Zoe was one of four graduates to open and run Plank, an artist-run gallery and studio space on the DTES.

She has contributed to the Whitehot Magazine of Contemporary Art (International), the Antennae Journal of Nature in Visual Culture (London, England), and several local arts publications. In addition to freelance writing, photography and curatorial experience, Zoe has contributed to numerous arts events in Vancouver: The Cheaper Show, Have In Mind, and the Trick 17 Stop Motion Film Festival.

Zoe sits on the board of SAINTS (Senior Animals In Need Today Society), which contributes to her unremitting project: investigating and descontructing human/animal relationships through visual arts and critical theory. Her next feature will be in Antennae's Animal Advocacy issue, releasing in Fall 2011.

ARTISTS, ANIMALS AND ETHICS

In Art Crazy Nation *(2001), Matthew Collings made the following observation:*
Brits are very fond of animals and children. Their exhibitions are now full of animals, usually mutants of some kind, or sexually aroused, or dead – for example, sharks and pigs by Damian Hirst, which symbolise death and racehorses by Mark Wallinger, symbolising class, but with the front ends different from the back ends – symbolising mutant breeding.[1]
Text by Yvette Watt

Collings' observation is an interesting early reflection on the growing prominence of animals in contemporary art over the last decade or so. Significantly, he also refers to the matter of *how* animals are used and represented in the name of art, whereby they are often presented as symbols or metaphors for other issues, are shown dead, and are sometimes even killed especially, or are depicted in some deviant manner.

Colling's comment also points to the fact that, while there have been many animal themed exhibitions in recent years, very few artists have foregrounded the animals themselves as individuals in these exhibitions, preferring instead to use animals to stand in for someone or something else. As a consequence, very little attention is given by these artists to the ethics surrounding human-animal relationships and/or the use of animals in art.

This use of animals to represent someone or something else is addressed by British born American artist, Sue Coe who, according to Steve Baker in his essay "Animal Death in Contemporary Art:"

> …object[s] strongly to the idea of using animals as symbols, because by using an animal or its (image) as a symbol of or for something else, that animal is effectively robbed of its identity, and its interests will thus almost inevitably be overlooked.[2]

Coe's comment goes to the heart of the matter whereby animals are so often marginalised in recent contemporary art, even when they appear at first to be the primary subject. Accordingly, the respectful representation of the animal as an individual and the avoidance of using the animal as symbol or signifier is a matter of great importance to be heeded by artists and curators, lest the animals be exploited as beasts of burden forced to carry inappropriate conceptual agendas, allowing for a range of problematic and unethical uses and representations of animals in artworks.

The Artist as Animal Abuser

In a 2007 conference keynote address, Steve Baker described in some detail a 1976 performance work



Damien Hirst
The physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living, mixed media, 1991 © Hirst

by American artist Kim Jones entitled *Rat Piece*, which involved the artist burning three live rats, pouring lighter fluid on them to ensure their deaths as they ran around the wire cage screaming in pain and terror.[3] As horrendously cruel and unnecessary as such an act must seem to many people, whether they are a part of the art world or not, it might seem reasonable to assume Jones' *Rat Piece* was of its time and would not be deemed acceptable in the 21st century. However, in recent years, a number of artists have produced art that has involved the death of an animal or animals, even if not always in such a prolonged and torturous manner as was the case with Jones' *Rat Piece.*

The death of animals in the name of art can take several forms. In the case of artists such as Damien Hirst and Wim Delvoye, the animal's death is commissioned by the artist. Hirst is renowned for his works that preserve animals such as cows, pigs, sheep and sharks in formaldehyde, sometimes whole, at other times cut into pieces. While it could be argued that, being farm animals, the cows, pigs and sheep were destined for slaughter anyway, Hirst nonetheless ordered the animals' deaths when he ordered the delivery of dead animals for his work. The case of the shark in the work *The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living* is particularly interesting in this respect, as not only was the tiger shark ordered to be caught and killed specifically for the artwork, but due to poor preservation techniques the original animal recently needed to be replaced. [4] However, Hirst didn't only order a single replacement tiger shark, but instead requested three tiger sharks and a great white shark. Ultimately the Australian fisherman, Vic Hislop, who caught the sharks for Hirst, threw in an extra tiger shark for free, which Hirst turned into another one of his preserved animal artworks, entitled *The Wrath of God.* Of further concern, regarding Hirst's animal works, are the flippant comments he has made about them, such as "…they're just these peeled cows. One's just stood upright, and the other goes on its back, giving it a really tragic, slow fuck**,** They're both cows, so it doesn't matter. And they'll just rot."[5] and "I like the way one half moves like a bacon slicer."[6] Such

Vim Delvoye
Tattooed Pigs, mixed media, taxidermy,1998 © Delvoye

comments demonstrate a troubling trivialisation of the animals' deaths.

While Hirst takes no interest in the animals he uses until they are dead, Belgian artist, Wim Delvoye, has a somewhat more complex relationship with the pigs he uses as part of his ongoing *Art Farm* project. In Delvoye's case, he started out working with the skins of dead pigs, but has since bought a farm in China specifically to house and raise the pigs for his work. Delvoye's artworks involve placing the pigs under a general anaesthetic and tattooing them, before they are slaughtered and skinned, with the skins themselves becoming the final artwork, either pinned flat to walls or, on some occasions, taxidermied into the form of the pig. According to an article on Delvoye's work, he has justified his actions by virtue of the fact that:

> …he feels like Oscar Schindler when he visits the farm to pick out his half-dozen or so animals, experiencing guilt for those left behind, not only because they will have much shorter lives, but because they will only be valued as butchered meat, they will not bear the price tag of art.[7]

However, Delvoye would also appear to be aware of the ethical compromises his work involves, judging by the fact that he "is vegetarian…[as] an attempt to atone for all the wrong he perpetuates as an artist."[8]

In other cases, artists kill the animal(s) themselves, or are in someway directly involved with the animal's death; with the death being an integral part of the artwork. Austrian "Actionist" Hermann Nitsch is notorious for his *Orgien Mysterien Theater* (orgies-mysteries theatre), which he has been organizing since the late 1960s. These ritualized events would often last several days and would involve the slaughter of a number of animals, such as sheep, goats and cattle, with the animals entrails stamped upon and participants in the performance being covered in the animals' visceral remains.

More recent examples of animal death in the name of art include the infamous work by Marco Evaristti, entitled *Helena*, which was exhibited at Trapholt Gallery in Denmark in 2000, and was reconstructed in 2006 for a touring exhibition. *Helena* was comprised of ten blenders, each containing a live goldfish. Visitors to the gallery had the option of turning the blenders on, and several people chose to kill the fish, resulting in the gallery director being charged with cruelty to animals after a complaint was made by a Danish animal advocacy organization.[9] Several years later, in 2003, an exhibition by young Ukranian born artist, Nathalia Edenmont, at Wetterling Gallery in Stockholm, was the target of protests from animal rights groups. Edenmont's solo exhibition showed photographs of dead animals such as rabbits, cats and mice, often decapitated and wearing Elizabethan style collars. What caused such a fuss was the fact that Edenmont had killed the animals herself for the artworks. [10] More recently an exhibition of work by the Algerian-French (currently American-based) artist

Adel Abessemed, at the San Francisco Art Institute in March 2008, was closed down just a week after it opened after intense lobbying by groups such as IDA (In Defense of Animals) and PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals).[11] The work at the centre of the controversy was a video loop showing six animals – a horse, a sheep, a deer, a cow, a pig and a goat – being bludgeoned to death with a sledgehammer. While Abdessemed apparently did not kill the animals himself (he supposedly filmed the "normal" practice of killing animals on a farm in Mexico),[12] the apparently gratuitous presentation of their violent deaths prompted controversy.

While the aforementioned artists have all attracted the wrath of animal protection organisations and the general public alike, a work by Guillermo 'Habacuc' Vargas touched a particular nerve. In 2007, Vargas tied up a sick and emaciated street dog as part of a work entitled *Exposición No.1* at a gallery in Nicaragua. Not long afterward a petition calling for a "Boycott to the presence of Guillermo Vargas 'Habacuc' at the Bienal Centroamericana Honduras 2008" began to be widely circulated via email, as Vargas apparently planned to re-make the work for the Honduran Biennial. Photographs which accompanied many of the emails showed a starving dog, tied by a piece of rope to a wire across a corner of the gallery. On an adjacent wall the words 'Eres lo que lees' (you are what you read) were spelled out in dry dog food. The international outrage was sparked by reports that Vargas had allowed the dog to die, refusing to give it food or water. While there is no dispute over the fact that Vargas tied up a severely emaciated dog in the gallery as part of his artwork, whether or not the dog died is difficult to substantiate as the information available is contradictory.[13]

While the works of the artists discussed above tend to show a general disrespect for and reification of the animals involved, treating them as little more than convenient commodities or materials for the production of the artworks, the following two artists, Ivan Durrant and Tim Macmillan, have produced works which, while involving the death of animals, present the animals' deaths in such a way as to foreground the animal as a once living, breathing individual, rather than simply as a convenient, insensate object with which to make art. Durrant, an Australian artist, is notorious for an art event entitled *Beverley, the Amazing Performing Cow* that he orchestrated in 1975, and which involved the artist killing a cow he had named Beverley. The original intention was to shoot Beverley onstage at the Alexander Theatre at Monash University, however due to issues around the discharging of a firearm within the metropolitan area, the cow's death was instead leaked to the media and was filmed and broadcast (at least in part) on *A Current Affair*. The cow's body was then dumped on the forecourt of the National Gallery of Victoria. Durrant recently stated that his actions were about "[t]aking responsibility for your own actions. If we are going to eat meat, a cow dies for that. And we have to face it."[14] This prompted debate not only on the ethics of meat eating, but on the ethics of this kind of action as art. An ex-slaughterhouse worker, Durrant has produced a number of works, from events, to paintings and sculpture,[15] which confront viewers (and participants) with the truth behind the meat they eat. More recently (1998), a work by British photographer, Tim Macmillan, entitled *Dead Horse*, also addressed what goes on behind the walls of a slaughterhouse, but in this case the subjects of the work were horses. In this compelling work, Macmillan used a technique he invented, which he calls "time-slice photography," to capture in a slaughterhouse the very moment that a bullet enters the head of the horse, causing the animals muscles to tense in shock, such that all four feet leave the ground. The resulting video shows the moment the animal is shot from multiple viewpoints, such that once all the various still photographs from different angles are animated together, we watch the camera move seamlessly around the scene. As the resulting video rocks back and forth, we slowly become aware that the horses have been captured at the moment of their death as the rifle held at the horse's head by the slaughterman slowly comes into view. The effect



Tim MacMillan
Still from Dead Horse 1998 Courtesy Time Slice ® Films Ltd and Lux Distribution © Tim Macmillan Time-slice video projection

is one of genuine horror that such a beautiful and apparently healthy and vital animal has been sent to its death in what is, of course, a daily occurrence from which our eyes are normally shielded.

In producing this work, it is likely Macmillan was more interested in using the "time-slice" technique to draw an analogy between death and photography, and perhaps, as Clair Bishop has suggested, chose a horse as his subject to reference animal painters such as Stubbs.[16] Nonetheless, *Dead Horse* confronts the viewer with that moment between life and death, and one can't help but feel a sense of the tragedy of the animals' deaths. It is this that sets *Dead Horse* – and also Durrant's work - apart from the works of artists such as Abdessemed, Hirst or Delvoye, for whom the animals' deaths are far more gratuitous.

From an animal right's point of view, causing an animal to suffer or die in the name of art is always unjustifiable, regardless of the artist's intentions, in the same way that causing death or suffering to an unwilling human would also be unethical and unacceptable. As Steve Baker points out:

> Contemporary art, along with literature and non-documentary film is a field in which the killing of animals can undoubtedly figure as a subject, but where it is not necessarily clear how the field can usefully contribute either to knowledge of the other-than-human or more-than-human-world, or to what might broadly be called the cause of animal advocacy.[17]

Regardless of how successfully contemporary art can address the killing of animals, the artists and their works discussed above highlight the importance of giving consideration to limits of artistic freedom. This matter was taken up by Ronald Jones in an article in *Freize* that responded to the work of Vargas and Abdessemed, amongst others. Jones is clearly troubled by the fact "that art world precincts carry on as if they are responsibility-free zones, addicted to avant-garde sweet-spots tainted by divine arrogance."[18] He includes a statement from a press release defending the work of Abdessemed on the basis of the fact that the animals were "raised for food, purchased, and professionally slaughtered,"[19] and that the artist simply filmed the killing and exhibited it. Jones is refreshingly critical of this excuse, observing that "[t]his argument is off-kilter: Is an artist no more than an uncritical instrument for channeling reality? Is this innocent reportage somehow freed of ethical responsibility?"[20]

The issue of the limits of artistic freedom have also been addressed by Patrick McCaughey in an article on the furore in 2008 over prominent Australian artist Bill Henson's nude photographs of a 13 year old girl. While the article defended Henson and his work, the closing two paragraphs are extremely relevant to the issue of artists, and by extension those that write about art, taking an ethical responsibility for their work. McCaughey states:

> There are limits on the artist as there are limits on the laity. They are intimately tied to morality and truthfulness. An artist cannot claim the impunity of artistic freedom and be, for example, a holocaust denier, an addict of hate speech or a child pornographer.

Each carries a denial of truthfulness. The first is a denial of history, the second is a denial of authenticity and the third is a denial of the responsibility and empathy for the innocent, without which good art cannot be made.[21]

These comments made by Jones and McCaughey are very welcome, especially in light of the much softer position taken by Steve Baker who, when discussing Kim Jones' *Rat Piece*, appeared to be uncomfortable with the idea of making any ethical judgments that might suggest a need for imposing limits on artistic freedom. To be fair, Baker was using the example of Jones' *Rat Piece* to elucidate the way animals are dealt with in contemporary art. Baker's approach is to report upon and analyse contemporary art which uses or represents animals, and while he does address the artists' ethical positions (where they are clear), he avoids making any personal ethical judgment. While this objectivity is an accepted scholarly approach, it runs the risk of perpetuating the marginalisation of the individual animals that are the central matter of the argument by relegating them to little more than material, artistic commodities. Baker's reluctance to criticise artists' use of animals, even when animals are clearly made to suffer, or take a personal stance on the ethical issues surrounding artists' use of animals, has been teased out in a published email discussion between Baker and Carol Gigliotti, a Canadian artist and academic. Baker and Gigliotti differ markedly in their positions, with Baker effectively arguing for artistic freedom unencumbered by any potential limitations that taking an ethical stance might require; while Gigliotti, whose particular interest lies with biotechnology, feels strongly that artists should accept an ethical responsibility for their work, and who has "decided that time is too short, for… [her], and for the planet, not to speak directly about these issues." [22]

Considering that our relationship with animals is currently so firmly intertwined with causing their deaths, either for food, as pests, for "sport" or simply because they are unwanted, it is perhaps not surprising that animal death and/or suffering for the sake of art is seen as valid by some artists. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize the difference between those artists discussed above that willfully reject or ignore the notion of animals as sentient, self-interested individuals, and those artists or artworks that engage with this matter. More important, however, is recognising the work of artists who engage on a personal level with the ethics of animal death at human hands and whose work attempts to engage the viewer with these issues without needing to harm any animal.

The Artist as Animal Activist

Despite issues-based art being relatively common, it is rarer to find an artist who is prepared to actually take a stance in the work – to make work that openly addresses his or her own views. The reasons for artists' reluctance to make their socio-political views clear in their work include a concern that such work may be seen as too closed, too direct or too didactic, and a persistent attitude amongst artists, curators and critics that art and socio-political issues don't mix, or at least rarely mix well. Making issues-based work can also compromise the commercial viability of an artist's work. Additionally, there is the problem for the artist as activist regarding how to make work that engages a broad audience without resorting to populist cliché. As Steve Baker points out "…the fact that [a good deal of contemporary animal art] can be so 'difficult to read' only exacerbates the problem of how effectively some of the artists who make it might address a subject such as the killing of animals."[23]

There are some contemporary artists, however, whose artwork is strongly informed by an animal rights ideology and who use their work to engage the viewer with the ethical issues surrounding human-animal relationships.[24] Perhaps the best known of these "artists as animal activists" is the aforementioned British born, New York based, artist Sue Coe. Coe works in a graphic, illustrative style, often publishing her politically charged paintings, drawings and prints as books, complete with descriptive text. The subject matter of her work has for many years been driven by a variety of socio-political issues, such as the racist abuse suffered by black South Africans under apartheid, the consequences of rampant capitalism, or the oppression of women. However, for much of the last 25 years, the primary subject matter for her work has been the plight of animals at the hands of humans.

Coe's work is shown regularly in galleries, and is held in public collections such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York. However, her mission is to reach as wide an audience as possible with her work which "bear[s] witness to the hidden suffering that underlies our lives of apparent ease and plenty."[25] This desire to get her message out beyond the art world informs the approach Coe takes to her work which, as Susan Gill has pointed out, "bridges the gap between illustration and high art."[26] Also, the production of her books is a primary method by which Coe exposes her work to a more general audience.

Coe produces work that is polemical and direct, with a clear goal of changing people's attitudes. Her book *Dead Meat*, from 1996, is proposed as an update to Upton Sinclair's 1906 novel *The Jungle,* which detailed the daily horrors endured by both humans and animals in the



Sue Coe
Dead Meat, 1996

Chicago Meat packing plants. Coe's book was the result of six years of work, travelling around America, visiting meatpacking plants and slaughterhouses, documenting in her sketchbooks the horrific scenes she witnessed. Her later book, *Sheep of Fools,* from 2005, combines Coe's artwork with poetry by Judith Brody, and was inspired by a newspaper article Coe read about the sinking of an Australian live export ship, along with its cargo of sheep. Coe was struck by the fact that the brief article mentioned the one human casualty, but barely acknowledged the 60,000 sheep whose lives were lost in the maritime disaster.[27]

Coe's passionate approach to her subject matter has earned her a substantial reputation as an artist of skill, substance and commitment. However, her decision to make work that pulls no punches about the causes she takes up, and her determination to make her work accessible to a wide audience, have not necessarily worked to her advantage as far as her reputation within the postmodern art world goes, with her work receiving little coverage in reputable art journals since the late 1980s/early 1990s. As the catalogue essay from her 2005 exhibition *Sheep of Fools* notes:

> Coe's desire to reach a wide audience causes her to favour older realist traditions over the more obscure postmodernist idiom employed by most contemporary artists. Thus, even when the art scene became politicized in the 1990s, Coe never received the attention accorded such artists as Barbara Kruger and Jenny Holzer, who spoke the art-world's language.[28]

It is significant that Coe's work has not been included in many recent animal themed exhibitions,[29] which may be due to her intention for her work to reach beyond the art world and engage with a far broader audience, resulting in work that tends toward the didactic, rather than being open to multiple readings, as is a postmodern expectation for contemporary art. As Donald Kuspit put it in a review of Coe's work from 1991:

> Coe, I think, is torn between a wish to communicate instantaneously to as large an audience as possible, and thus to use a public and invariably clichéd language, and a desire to make "high art," that is, art so dense with visual substance that it cannot be exhausted at first sight. When she manages to balance these impulses, she takes her place among the Expressionist masters, but when she make images for 'the cause,' her works dwindle to militant cartoons, lacking even the saving grace of Daumier's wit.[30]

However, Kuspit's negative response to those works of Coe's which he describes as "made for the cause" is somewhat difficult to make sense of in any meaningful way, as for many years making work "for the cause" has been the *raison d'être* behind Coe's practice. Her conscious decision to persist with a graphic, illustrative approach to image making is what makes her work so easily identifiable, and accords with her decision to publish her work in book form on several occasions. Further, while Kuspit uses Daumier as a point of reference, a more appropriate artist would be Hogarth, whose narrative prints from the 18th century, including the *Four Stages of Cruelty*, were intended to be a form of moral instruction. Coe is forthright in making the intentions of her work clear, and as such, their didactic nature is perhaps inevitable. Interestingly, Coe has been quoted by Steve Baker as having said that "the most political art is the art of

ambiguity."[31] While it is not clear in what context this comment was made, it certainly demonstrates that Coe is aware of the complexities of making artwork that takes a socio-political stance.

Despite the non-postmodern directness of Coe's work, it is significant that she was included by Baker in his book *The Postmodern Animal*, as well as in his essay "What Does Becoming-Animal Look Like?"[32] In including Coe's work here, Baker acknowledges her importance as a seminal figure within the small but growing field of artists who engage with issues surrounding the ethics of human-animal relations.

This dilemma of getting a message out to the general public, while still engaging with the contemporary art world, is a matter which has also been the cause of mixed responses from viewers to the work of New Zealand artist Angela Singer. Singer openly acknowledges her background as an animal rights activist. Where farms and laboratory animals are the primary subject matter for Sue Coe, the focus of Singer's concern is hunting, which is still a popular pursuit in New Zealand. However, while Coe's method is a consciously illustrative one, using the traditional graphic tools such as graphite, charcoal, ink and printmaking processes, Singer chooses the more fashionable[33] approach of using taxidermied animals. While some artists are happy to have animals killed for the purpose of their art, Singer's work is based on what she calls "recycled taxidermy." As Singer has pointed out, these trophies, which may once have been proudly displayed, over time become relegated to little more than background decoration, and are often eventually discarded, which is how Singer comes by them. She then re-works the forms in such a way as to directly reference the violence of the animal's death, such as revealing the once-hidden fatal bullet wound by embroidering red beads in and around it. However, despite the strong ethical basis behind her work and her belief that "…using taxidermy is a way for me to honour the animals' life, because all the taxidermy I use was once a trophy kill…The very idea of a trophy animal is sickening to me,"[34] Singer has, according to Steve Baker, been "angrily accused of turning 'gallery walls into open graves.'"[35] Considering the nature of Singer's work, such reactions should not be so surprising, as the animals are re-presented, quite consciously on Singer's part, in a way that is confronting and troubling. She has said of her work entitled *sore (flay)*:

> Mounted on the wall my trophy echoes the just-killed animal, antlers hacked off, blood pouring from its head, hung to be skinned, gutted and bled out. The glass eyes bulge, caught somewhere between life and death… I wasn't going to make its pointless death easy on the viewer.[36]

However, as noted in a recent review of Singer's work in *NY Arts*, if the viewer is not aware of the artist's background as an animal activist the works "may appear to be as cruel as the sport she comments on."[37] Unfortunately for Singer, not only does she risk suffering the misplaced criticisms of those who aren't aware of her strongly held animal rights beliefs, but her work has also been criticised in the New Zealand art journal *Art New Zealand* because of the fact it *does* carry the weight of her beliefs, with the reviewer of the exhibition, Edward Hanfling, suggesting that such didactic intentions "reduce her work to a simple, faintly righteous message." His review goes on to suggest that "[t]he exhibition was amusing as a collection of mangled and grotesquely adorned dead animals, and uninteresting as a critique of hunting and taxidermy."[38] Hanfling's comment should probably be taken more as an example of the unwillingness of certain members of the art world to engage with the seriousness of animals as subject matter for artists, and the importance of addressing the ethics of human-animal relationships, than as a valid criticism of Singer's work. Clearly, such criticism is based on the discomfort displayed by some artists and critics with art that carries a message. Nonetheless, it highlights the issue of how to communicate the message contained in the work in a way than can be understood by a broad audience, as well as being accepted by an audience familiar with contemporary arts practices. However, I would contend that it is the mixed responses to Singer's work that indicate its strength, as regardless of the point of view of the critic, it is clear that her work has touched a nerve and caused the viewer to consider the animals' deaths. In Hanfling's case, it might be surmised that his negative reaction is not surprising, as to do otherwise would call into question his own attitude toward animals that allows him to "have a flaccid cat skin draped over [his] television."[39]

Mary Britton Clouse and The Justice for Animals Art Guild

Attitudes such as Hanfling's are troubling, not simply because they espouse the old "art and politics don't mix" point of view, as frustrating as that might be, but more so because critics, such as Hanfling, deny animals the right to our ethical consideration, and allow the proliferation of art which results in – or

Mary Britton Clouse
Nemo, Self-Portrait, photograph, 2005 © Britton Clouse

indeed requires – the death and/or suffering of animals. This matter was behind the formation of The Justice for Animals Art Guild (JAAG), a group of Minnesota-based artists whose purpose is "to oppose art that harms or exploits animals, and explore ways to support artists whose ethics and philosophies value the rights of animals." [40] According to Steve Baker, JAAG members were convinced that "much could be accomplished by sensitising the arts community" to the fact that animals were "sentient beings, not ideas or inanimate materials with which to create a performance or an exhibit." [41]

One of JAAG's founding members is another activist artist, Mary Britton Clouse, who not only makes art about animals, but who also founded a chicken rescue society. While Britton Clouse's work does not currently enjoy the same attention from the contemporary art world as does that of Coe and Singer, her commitment to being an activist-artist is beginning to result in increased exposure for her works through profiles in articles and conference papers by people such as Steve Baker, and Director of the New Zealand Centre for Human-Animal Studies, Annie Potts. In a recent interview by Potts, Britton Clouse talked of the relationship between her work as an activist and as an artist, describing how she "see[s] [her] rehabilitation work with animals and [her] activism as much a part of [her] art as pushing paint around a canvas."[42] Additionally, the formation of JAAG is significant in that it is an important response to an ongoing trend toward using animals for the sake of art in ways that are at best, disrespectful and at worst, abusive and cruel.

Conclusion

The community reaction that has seen more than1.5 million people sign the petition to "Boycott to the presence of Guillermo Vargas 'Habacuc' at the Bienal Centroamericana Honduras 2008,"[43] the closing of Adel Abdessemed's exhibition, an animal cruelty charge laid in relation to Marco Evaristti's work, and protests at Nathalia Edenmont's exhibition, reflects a growing concern about what is acceptable treatment/use of animals, with artists and exhibitions openly targeted when what they have done is deemed to be unacceptable.

In line with changing community attitudes in recent years, there has been a significant reassessment of the status of animals and human-animal studies as subject matter for scholarly investigation across disciplines. This recent enthusiasm for questioning long-held assumptions about animals and human-animal relations is reflected in a statement made by Joanna Zylinska in a recent review of Donna Haraway's book *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People and Significant Otherness*. She states that "…the question of the animal is fundamental to any enquiry into culture, politics and ethics today."[44]

This growing interest in animals and human-animal relationships is undoubtedly evident in the visual arts. However, underpinning this essay is a concern that, despite this recent interest in animals and human-animal relationships as subject matter for artists and curators, there is a general avoidance of the politics of animal representation in the visual arts. This is at odds with a rethinking of animals and human-animal relationships in other disciplines where there is an increasing emphasis on the importance of foregrounding the ethical and political issues surrounding human-animals relationships. As Kay Anderson points out:

> The human-animal divide is increasingly being problematised in the human sciences, along with other conceptual

> distinctions of mind-body/male-female that over time have interacted with it. Such dualistic thought is under challenge by postcolonial and feminist scholars […] The study of animals has thus been brought into a culture/society framework from which it has long been excluded […][45]

Embedded within the work of artists such as Coe, Singer and Britton Clouse, who do not shy away from taking a clear personal stance on issues surrounding human-animal relations, is the desire to encourage a respectful attitude toward animals as the minimum that should be expected of both artists and the community in general.

As such, this essay is based on a belief that it is important to question artists' intentions and ethical stance when they use animals in their work, because artists not only reflect how society regards animals, but they can also help shape our ideas about animals and how we should treat them.

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[24] There are other artists who engage with the socio-political issues

surrounding human-animal relationships, including British artists Britta Jaschinski and Nicky Coutts. However, I have chosen to concentrate on the work of Sue Coe and Angela Singer for several reasons. Firstly, the work itself directly addresses the issues, rather than simply being informed by them as is the case with Jaschinski, for example. Most importantly Coe and Singer both have backgrounds as activists, making them particularly relevant to this essay.

[25] Catalogue essay (author not acknowledged) for Sheep of Fools, Galerie St. Etienne, New York, 2005. See http://www.gseart.com/exhibitions.asp?ExhID=495 (accessed 8 August 2011)

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Yvette Watt's art practice spans more than 20 years. She has held numerous solo exhibitions and has been the recipient of a number of grants and awards. Her work is held in important public and private collections including Parliament House, Canberra, Artbank and the Art Gallery of WA. Yvette Watt was recently awarded a PhD from Tasmanian School of Art, University of Tasmania, where she also holds a position as an Associate Lecturer in Painting. She is a member of the Animals and Society (Australia) Study Group and a committee member of the UTas Animals and Society Study Group. Yvette has been actively involved in animal advocacy since the mid 1980s. She was a founding member of Animal Rights Advocates (Western Australia) and Against Animal Cruelty Tasmania and is currently Vice President of Animals Australia and President of the Community Legal Centre for Animal Welfare.

Yvette Watt lives and works in Hobart, Tasmania.

JONATHAN HOROWITZ'S RECLAMATION OF A MEAT PLANT

Associate Professor of Art History Mysoon Rizk discusses the work of controversial artist Jonathan Horowitz.
Text by **Mysoon Rizk**

"If slaughterhouses had glass walls, everyone would be vegetarian." – Linda and Paul McCartney

I. "American Gothic"

In her video documentary about the 2010 *Go Vegan!* relaunch by American artist Jonathan Horowitz (b.1966, New York City), at the spacious new annex of Gavin Brown's enterprise (GBE), Jasmin Singer concentrates attention on the residue of the previously shuttered meat-processing plant. Owned by GBE's landlords, Pat La Frieda Wholesale Purveyors of Meat had recently vacated the premises of what had been an active butchery next door. The camera lens lingers on still visible exterior indicators of the former business, reading "Pat La Frieda & Son Prime Choice Meats," "Pat La Frieda Wholesale Meats," "Meat Distributors," and "Pat LaFrieda Lane" – also known as Leroy Street.

Singer also captures company slogans. "The first name in veal and lamb," for example, appears in lower case cursive on a delivery truck (recently captured on Flickr with an ironic post noting that "the first name" is a last name). In addition, in a sign on one face of the building, a full-bodied cartoon rooster pronounces, "PAT LA FRIEDA SAYS EAT MY MEAT." The video camera also captures an emblematic icon of the company: an idealized cow's head, as stately bust, suspended over a field of healthy green stalks. On yet another wall, a promotional sign endorses Pennsylvania-based organic poultry suppliers Bell & Evans, signified by a colorful farm scene of barn, silo, fields, fence, and a rooster, crowing as day breaks and the sun emerges.

Turning to Horowitz's solo exhibition, the camera lingers on the billboards he designed for the exterior of La Frieda's former Leroy Street storefront to announce the exhibition, as well as the transformation and reclamation of the meat plant. On the left side of an entryway, an enormous photographic close-up displays some ten hairless, nearly unspecifiable carcasses hung from steel pulleys. On what one imagines being a bloody slaughterhouse floor, sprawl at least three more bodies – not yet rendered into optimum meat processing conditions. Obscuring the lower edge of the ghastly situation runs a green ribbon below white block letters that read, "IF YOU WOULDN'T EAT A DOG." The words help ascertain the identity of the species, toward which the heads of Singer's camera zooms, further securing classification; while the graphic evidence of a market for eating dogs presumably shocks the typical Western viewer.

For many animal rights activists, raising awareness continues to be a primary goal, given that most people persist in ignorance of the abusive conditions by which commodities arrive at the

Jonathan Horowitz
Installation view of *Go Vegan!*, featuring **Jonathan Horowitz,** *American Gothic*, 2002; 64 framed inkjet prints; each 8 3/4 x 11 1/4; 70 x 90 inches overall; and **Jonathan Horowitz**, *Tofu on Pedestal in Gallery*, 2002; tofu, water, glass dish, formica pedestal; 46 x 15 x 15 inches; edition of 3 plus 1 artist's proof (JH 065). Courtesy of the artist and Gavin Brown's enterprise. Copyright The Artist.

marketplace, and given that corporations go out of their way to cloak or obfuscate the realities of such procedures. As Georges Bataille once observed, and as Nikil Saval explains more recently, in the context of reviewing Tristram Stuart's history on vegetarianism:

> Packaged meat is a supreme example of the 'process' disappearing in the 'product.' Increasingly urbanized and alienated from a life lived in nature, among animals, we have no daily experience of the means (reportedly terrible) by which an animal is converted into meat. The idea is that, given a keen and full vision of such a place, sheer mass revulsion would either make us all vegetarians, or would cause us to rise in unified revolt against our own murderous industries. Similar arguments have been made regarding other mass-produced items: clothes, illicit drugs, pornographic films.

Argues Saval, in his review "Show a Man What He Eats," however, advocates on behalf of engineering transparency – e.g., "If slaughterhouses had glass walls..." – may not be effective. For one thing, he argues, "[e]thical vegetarianism has trouble succeeding as a material argument; it works better as an imaginative answer to an irrational system." Saval's "own turn toward vegetarianism," he claims, came from reading *Elizabeth Costello*, a novel by South African literary Nobelist J.M. Coetzee (b.1945, Cape Town). In place of such an "imaginative answer," the "transparency as inspiration argument," with the goal of exposing "what daily life conceals," results in an abundance of misinformation, or in the words of Saval: "The insidious media campaign of special interests, telling us that meat-eating is necessary for the health of our civilization, for dominating masculinity, for mastery and sovereignty—that catastrophic mastery over the earth which offers up daily evidence of its diminishing returns."

To the right of the meat plant's doorway, and directly below the main "Pat La Frieda & Son Prime Choice Meats" sign, Horowitz's white on green proposition continues: "THEN WHY WOULD YOU EAT A CHICKEN? THEY'RE JUST AS INTELLIGENT." This appears

Jonathan Horowitz
Billboards, installation view of *Go Vegan!*, Gavin Brown's enterprise, 2010

at the foot of a second gargantuan billboard, featuring a green pasture and blue henhouse, from which at least eight such curious birds, heads cocked to one or another side, inch toward viewers, intently returning the gaze. For anyone needing it, an explanatory quotation appears below the green band in much smaller text: "'It is now clear that chickens have cognitive capacities equivalent to those of mammals, even primates.' – Dr. Lesley Rogers, *The Development of Brain and Behavior in the Chicken*." In addition, in the upper right-hand corner of the billboard, immediately above the heads of the birds and directly below La Frieda's "MEATS," runs the slogan – and title of the exhibition – in large white block letters: "GO VEGAN!"

Go Vegan! was restaged with an eye toward preserving indications of the building's prior activities. Although no longer physically manifest, the overt violence of the industry nevertheless retains a presence, if only by the strong, pervasive, and rank odors that most commentators mention as inescapably palpable. Smells of handled, butchered, and processed animal corpses have seeped into every crevice and corner, despite the cleanable surfaces of ceramic tile with built-in drains and stainless steel tables or walls, as well as stainless steel hooks – not to mention fluorescent lighting, rack-and-pulley systems, a butcher's white coat, chopping blocks, ceramic tubs for dipping corpses, and cold storage rooms. Also left untouched, photographs of former employees show them together, enjoying meals, even hunting in the country – in one image, four male participants pose in tight formation on the front end of an off-road vehicle, with rifles at the ready – making clear that La Frieda's owners and workers exhibit no qualms about killing animals or consuming meat, despite constant exposure to the violence of doing so (a capacity sought out, yet remaining elusive to David Lurie, yet another Coetzee protagonist, in *Disgrace*).

In one of La Frieda's former cold rooms, for a work entitled *American Gothic* (2002), Horowitz selects, zooms in on, and digitally reproduces Norman Rockwell's *Freedom from Want*. This 1943 oil painting, from the "Four Essential Human Freedoms" series, depicts an idyllic American Thanksgiving dinner. In Horowitz's version, roasted turkey takes center stage, with but a few eager faces of children to either side. In keeping with the dynamic of eliciting conflicted responses throughout *Go Vegan!* – and perhaps quoting the graphics of horror film publicity – he brands the Rockwell detail with the phrase "AMERICAN GOTHIC" in bloody red dripping letters, one word per row. Horowitz renders the

Jonathan Horowitz
If Slaughterhouses Had Glass Walls, 2002; video installation, 2 DVDs, 2 27" TVs, 2 DVD players, synch box, gray metal stand, vinyl wall text; 3 1/2 mnutes each; edition of 5 plus 2 artist's proofs (JH 062). Courtesy of the artist and Gavin Brown's enterprise. Copyright The Artist.

national holiday macabre, its young participants even murderous, or at least as suspicious as the original eponymous creepy couple (potentially father and daughter), as concocted by American Regionalist Grant Wood in 1930.

As if to disperse this terrifying scenario, in the adjacent room, the New York conceptualist fittingly installs *Tofu on Pedestal in Gallery* (2002), a widely exhibited post-minimalist work that has lent itself easily to display in "white cube" exhibition spaces. In the context of a former meat plant, however, this alien jiggling soybean block acquires an even greater aura, that of "imaginative answer." At GBE, *Tofu* operates amidst a seemingly inflexible sets of relations, whether capitalist or human-animal. Submerged in water, inside luminescent glass, on a rectangular white pedestal, the work reflects some of the same hard lines of its space, while nevertheless symbolizing a source of light and hope, a theme Horowitz repeats elsewhere in the GBE annex. To one side of an array of celebrity vegetarian portraits, for instance, a larger-than-life head shot of Albert Einstein appears with the physicist's own words, that "[n]othing will increase the chances for survival of life on earth as the evolution to a vegetarian diet."

II. Less Is More

Explaining himself in an interview, Jonathan Horowitz once remarked, "I try to make work that's intelligible and about things" (Quoted in Bollen). Dedication to this purpose courses through the American artist's career, perhaps most remarkably in *Obama '08* (2008), which has solidified his importance to contemporary art making, e.g., as a form of relational aesthetics lately privileged by the art world (See Bourriaud). Opening on the night of the legendary election, the installation prepared for the possibility of a win by the other side (See Bovier et al.).

Acknowledging his own hopes by way of title, the artist generated a dynamic nonpartisan public space for New York West Village gallery Gavin Brown's enterprise, in which all were welcome and supported in balanced two-party fashion – Democrats and Republicans alike – with equal distributions of blue and red throughout the main gallery. Each half of the room was carpeted in blue or red, respectively joined by hundreds of blue and red folding chairs lining the perimeter. Just above the chairs, in a continuous row around the room, distinguished portraits depicting the lineage of former American presidents hung at eye level. Most

of the floor was also respectively given over to blue and red pillows, allowing guests to mingle and lounge. At the center were suspended two flat televisions: back to back, facing each side, and screening ongoing live coverage of the United States presidency's election returns.

Granted, the evenly spaced and framed images depicting forty-three presidents happen to not only commence with founding father George Washington but also taper off at presidential incumbent George W. Bush – while in the blue zone. Yet, Horowitz pointed out that this was strictly a matter of logistics, given the location of the space's entrance (Email exchange). Immediately after Bush – and just before the exit – appeared presidential hopeful Barack Obama, whose portrait nevertheless remained on the floor, leaning against the wall in anticipation of results. It was to be hung only if the occasion proved historic, which it did, by electing the country's forty-fourth, but first African-American president, and triggering the release of a deluge over the crowd of red, white, and blue balloons – which otherwise would have remained trapped against the ceiling by means of taut plastic sheeting.

Horowitz admitted to banking on an Obama victory several weeks before the November elections. Later, when asked if art could serve as a political tool, say, a vehicle for advocacy, Horowitz demurred: "I don't know – maybe not in a direct, immediate sense. But art documents culture – *it writes history*" (Emphasis author). Interviewer Steven Cairns instructively remarked: "If Obama's portrait had remained on the floor – instead of a celebration you would have put parenthesis [sic] around a [national] sense of hopelessness." In discussing the piece with contemporary artist Elizabeth Peyton, Horowitz got excited about "life imitating art" (Qtd. in Bevier and Taylor 173). Reminding readers that "life imitating art" was "Oscar Wilde's formula" (103), Bourriaud also proposed that, for contemporary aesthetic practice, "[i]magination seems like a prosthesis affixed to the real so as to produce more intercourse between interlocutors" (80).

Interviews with the articulate and reflective Horowitz – who earned a BA in Philosophy from Wesleyan University – are welcome and refreshing, in part by how much they reveal of the contemplative, if possibly taciturn artist who, although increasingly familiar and well regarded, remains under-discussed in the art literature. In fact, very little critical scholarship exists, aside from a profusion of short reviews in newspapers, magazines, and blog posts, not to mention his notable appearances in celebrity pages, or on Flickr, as when participating in the 2011 Venice Biennale art festivities (e.g., one of twelve international artists contributing to "Flags for Venice"); or for being part of a "power couple," with partner and fellow artist Rob Pruitt. Even the comprehensive, full-color catalog *Jonathan Horowitz: And/Or*, published in conjunction with a nearly nine-month long 2009 retrospective exhibition at P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center – an alternative art space founded in 1976 in Long Island City (Queens, New York) and, since 2000, affiliated with the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) – offers minimal textual commentary.

Because of the dearth of analysis on Horowitz, and given the focus of this essay on the site-specific and fluid installation entitled *Go Vegan!*, I have found it useful to consider the artist's work in relation to the ample, significant, and compelling discussion of that of J.M. Coetzee: of three animal-inflected novels that somehow seem kindred (*Disgrace*, *The Lives of the Animals*, and *Elizabeth Costello*), I will focus, here, on the later two. After all, both Horowitz and Coetzee can be affiliated with the premise that, in the words of one scholar (quoting *Elizabeth Costello*), "we no longer have 'faith in the artist and his truth'" (Kochin 82).

Both Horowitz and Coetzee seem candidly disposed toward ironic detachment, keen ambivalence, and persistent mistrust of the means and motives of expressing oneself. Both wilfully occupy zones of uncertainty, equivocation, neutrality, and impassiveness – even as they showcase strong points of view, such as a strident opposition to animal exploitation. Intriguingly, an anonymous post, while commenting on a blog's review, maintains about the summer 2010 restaging of *Go Vegan!* at GBE, that it "[s]eems to me like a Peta parody" – as if the blog's subscriber could somehow discern Horowitz's neutral, sometimes tongue-in-cheek, inclinations (Qtd. in Russeth). Both literary and visual artists are writing histories that catalog spectrums of preferences in existence. Coetzee's tales engage in logical disputations, however mired in reason's limits, meanwhile courting intuitive associations, sentimental engagements, and emotional attachments. Horowitz's work, including *Go Vegan!*, likewise embraces opposites and entertains contradictions, ultimately increasing tolerances for coexisting differences. Never claiming to know, he operates as if he values putting tools for deciding before viewers, allowing viewers to get to know their own opinions and those of others.

While both men are sympathetic with the struggle for animal rights, as well as share a personal renunciation of meat, they nevertheless maintain modest goals in conversation about their craft and

ideologies. In one interview, for example, Coetzee reveals: "Anyhow, I am far too bookish, far too ignorant about real people, to set myself up as interpreter, much less a judge, of the lives they live" (Qtd. in Kochin 83). Conversing with Singer in the *Go Vegan!* video documentary, Horowitz strikes similarly genial or diffident goals: "It doesn't have to be an all-or-nothing thing…. Eating less meat is better than eating more meat." Yet perhaps as a result of their work being indirect or oblique, as well as imaginary in origin and output, they successfully shift people's thoughts about carnivorous attitudes and practices.

III. "No One Knows What War Looks Like Anymore"

Drawn to "reckless personalities" (not to mention "vegetarianism, the Holocaust, and how art writes history"), as interviewer Cairns has observed, Jonathan Horowitz remains unapologetic about his preoccupation with entertainment culture and the act of bearing witness to celebrity hype and vilification of, e.g., Britney Spears, Mel Gibson, and Paris Hilton. Featuring the latter "celebutante" in *Vietnam, Paris, Iraq* (2007), for instance, the artist pairs two photographs by the same photographer (more or less), instructively underscoring radical shifts in present from past practices, of photojournalism and media coverage.

Shown in the *People Like War Movies* exhibition, this work juxtaposed Associated Press photographer Nick Ut's Pulitzer-Prize winner of terrified napalm victims, including naked nine-year old Kim Phuc, taken on June 8, 1972, during the Vietnam War, beside documentation of sobbing Hilton in the back of a patrol car, returning to prison "for repeatedly violating probation on a reckless driving conviction," taken on June 8, 2007, in Los Angeles, and (wrongfully) credited to the same photographer (by ABC's program *20/20*: Ut *was* present on the scene, as one of many working paparazzi, and standing near Karl Larsen who himself captured the highly publicized image, later suing ABC for crediting the wrong photographer) (See Ryan). Horowitz sub-captions the Hilton photograph with the notation, "Iraq war, day 1541," reasoning:

> With all that was going on in the world, what were we doing imprisoning Paris Hilton for driving without a valid license? But I don't think it was an accident that stories like that were on the front pages when the Iraq War had become practically forgotten (Bovier et al. 172).

Examining such disjuncture in contemporary tabloid society, he makes full use of the Internet as a principal vehicle and infinite resource for downloading source imagery, especially portraits, which are printed and framed. Horowitz, for example, assembled "Republican celebrities," as well as "celebrity activists," like AIDS activist Elizabeth Taylor, in addition to his fluid set of "200 Celebrity Vegetarians" (2002/2008), created in conjunction with *Go Vegan!*

Additionally designed for the *Go Vegan!* collection were such handsome sets of animals as "32 Portraits of Cows" (2002), an effort of assembly Horowitz also repeated on behalf of chickens, pigs, and sheep. In the case of humans, the artist likewise selected visually seductive representations, as if to make more persuasive the project's invitation to "go vegan." To convey their own "go vegan" agenda, the nonprofit organization People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) has similarly made use of magnetic celebrities, whose attractiveness make choosing such a path look desirable and popular. Despite their independently controversial choices – including producing imagery with pornographic references – both Horowitz and PETA deserve credit for helping cultivate more enlightened public opinions about, to the point of adopting, vegan or vegetarian positions.

By combining human celebrities with grids of countless cows, sheep, pigs, and chickens, *Go Vegan!* rendered all the individual faces into a rich sea of being, however varied the breeds and species, and no matter how particular each one's preferences, hang-ups, and personal contexts. At the same time, the portrait grids on view distinguished between sets of human celebrities and those of the other animals, especially given that Horowitz reminded viewers how the public generally label non-human subjects, namely, as types of packaged meat: i.e., "BEEF," "POULTRY," "PORK," and "LAMB." These very categorizations appeared just above the bottom row of each thirty-two member non-human animal grid: in white block letters with black contours against a red backdrop, and spanning four framed prints that might otherwise have been occupied by four more individual animal portraits.

Unlike the labeled animal portraits, partial sets of celebrities posed without such constraining language; indeed, one wall depicted a full complement of thirty-six such subjects – without their being relegated to any taxonomic order, for the purpose of industrial processing and commodification. Yet Horowitz would be the first to acknowledge that celebrities are just as typecast, packaged, and consumed – even their professional headshots indicating a greater degree of sell-out than any non-human animal Horowitz ever



Jonathan Horowitz
If Slaughterhouses Had Glass Walls, 2002; video installation, 2 DVDs, 2 27" TVs, 2 DVD players, synch box, gray metal stand, vinyl wall text; 3 1/2 mnutes each; edition of 5 plus 2 artist's proofs (JH 062). Courtesy of the artist and Gavin Brown's enterprise. Copyright The Artist.

portrayed. Side by side with "beef," "poultry," or "pork," moreover, especially given their comparable formats, celebrities themselves seemed like forms of "meat," if yet to be specified. Objectified, packaged, advertised, and consumed, celebrity-hood continues saturating contemporary culture and elusive reality. Meanwhile, by dignifying cows, chickens, pigs, and sheep with individual personas, Horowitz suggested animals might be as photogenic and/or capable of as much fame as that of celebrities.

IV. A Sense of Knowledge

Clarifying to Cairns what compelled him to restage *Go Vegan!*, on the occasion of GBE's expansion, Horowitz explains, "It was about the site" (Qtd. in Cairns). The installation had debuted in 2002 at Green Naftali, another New York gallery. In 2003, the project traveled to BüroFriedrich in Berlin, as well as, in 2002, the Hamburg Kunstverein – also making *Go Vegan!* "about the site," though differently than at GBE. In Germany, oblique references to the Holocaust necessarily emerged and would have registered for certain viewers, all the while reinforcing an animal-focused agenda – as if channeling the sentiments of Coetzee's Elizabeth Costello – meanwhile potentially facilitating the artist's ability to get "over the idea that the Holocaust is inextricably linked to all things German:"

> I think eating meat can be seen as a broad metaphor for cruelty and senseless violence…. The Holocaust demonstrated that humans are capable of the most horrific, violent behavior imaginable. Animals are different from people, but they're intelligent, sentient creatures, and I think their industrial slaughter is in some way analogous (Qtd. in Cairns).

Such references preoccupy both Coetzee and Costello. In the case of the latter, an elderly literary professor, rather than avoid acknowledging intolerable conditions, keeps broaching what many perceive as offensive, inappropriate, parallels – in both *The Lives of the Animals* and the eponymous novel tracking her academic itinerancy. The New York artist has himself sustained a similar hostility, one critic asserting "a real danger that Horowitz may cause lasting offence," particularly on account of the thoughtful objects in his first United Kingdom

show, entitled "Minimalist Works from the Holocaust Museum," which opened in late 2010 at Dundee Contemporary Arts, in Dundee, Scotland (See Sutherland). In terms of well-reasoned argumentation, moreover, despite general sympathy toward Coetzee's Costello, scholarly consensus affirms the stronger arguments made by her opponents (In addition to Coetzee et al., see, e.g., Cavell et al.). However indirectly, Coetzee and Horowitz both willingly enter the murky experience of occupying apparently oppositional positions simultaneously.

For Coetzee's protagonist Costello, this manifests as extreme alienation from and unfamiliarity with her known reality, as she confides before leaving town to an adult son, himself a university professor: "It's that I no longer know where I am. I seem to move around perfectly easily among people, to have perfectly normal relations with them. Is it possible, I ask myself, that all of them are participants in a crime of stupefying proportions" (*EC* 114). In an earlier passage, in the midst of delivering a public guest lecture, Costello also observes:

> I was taken on a drive around Waltham this morning. It seems a pleasant enough town. I saw no horrors, no drug-testing laboratories, no factory farms, no abattoirs. Yet I am sure they are here. They must be. They simply do not advertise themselves. They are all around us as I speak, only we do not, in a certain sense, know about them (65).

Ostensibly, *Go Vegan!* sets out to make these very issues apparent and the nature of the slaughterhouse more transparent and less camouflaged. After all, Horowitz asserts, in Singer's video documentary, "[m]ost people just simply don't know." Were people more knowledgeable about their choices, he indicates, they would be more inclined to choose wisely.

Welcoming, as well as enticing. viewers into one of the former plant's cold rooms – featuring ceramic title draining floors, walls lined in stainless steel, and lots of metal hooks – the music of Paul McCartney and Wings plays periodically in the work *If Slaughterhouses Had Glass Walls* (2002). The artist installed two DVDs, two DVD players, and two TVs side by side, facing opposite directions, forward and backward, on an industrial stainless steel table that once served as a surface for cutting bodies. On the TV facing the gallery's entrance, Linda and Paul McCartney, married and vegan, as well as fellow Wings band members, ride horseback through the Scottish countryside to the light, warm, and plaintive tune of "Heart of the Country."

Taking turns, one of the two TVs would pause intermittently while the other played, such that Linda, Paul, and the horses – along with their song about searching for a rural farm house to call home, smelling "the grass in the meadow," and owning horse and sheep – would periodically freeze. At that point, the TV facing the room's back wall would screen graphic footage of industrial slaughter, excerpts Horowitz assembled from PETA video documentation. *Go Vegan!* already preserved traces of what occurred on site in the former La Frieda meatpacking plant. For viewers unable to visualize such horrors, however, the artist provided powerful, if minimal, examples documenting animal killing: from the dogs hung outside, to the PETA footage in the back room of *If Slaughterhouses Had Glass Walls*. Yet the success of *Go Vegan!* may ultimately hinge on the artist's combination of techniques of persuasion.

Like PETA, Horowitz employs celebrities to help him advocate, however indirectly, for political change and reform, even as his vehicles of advocacy are themselves implicated in and complicit with a mass-production society that thrives on, as one reviewer put it, "the not-so-secret connection between the peachy skin of pop and the rotting flesh of war" (See Heiser). Horowitz has repeatedly reported the impression:

> That vegetarianism is perceived as sort of like a soft political issue. And as such, it does sort of have the ability to stand in for other things, which interested me. But then, of course, the more you learn and think about all the issues involved, it seems, you know, not so soft at all (See Singer).

By restaging *Go Vegan!* in a former meat processing plant, with periodic graphic examples, Horowitz makes nauseatingly transparent the harsh realities of industrial animal harvest. Simultaneously softening the experience with the charismatic faces of cows, chickens, pigs, sheep, and celebrities, not to mention tofu, with its own pedestal and gallery, and the vegan fare served to guests at the opening, Horowitz underscores the pleasures of choosing to "go vegan."

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Jonathan Horowitz is a New York based artist working in video, sculpture, sound installation, and photography. Horowitz critically examines the cultures of politics, celebrity, cinema, war, and consumerism. From found footage, Horowitz visually and spatially juxtaposes elements from film, television, and the media to reveal connections and breakdowns between these overlapping modes of communication. He is a 1987 graduate of Wesleyan University.

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THE VISIBILITY OF VIOLENCE

Zoological parks are contradictory institutions. Such an understatement is almost taken for granted in our contemporary discourses concerning animal welfare, zoological display, and global biodiversity. These spaces have been designed to promote popular interest in zoological wonder and global wildlife protection, but do so at the expense of animal freedom and well-being. As a species, we human beings love zoos, but also struggle with their implications (figure 1). [1]
Text by **Noah Cincinnati**

Because contemporary zoos particularly link their current missions to wildlife protection, few institutional reflections consider their zoos' struggles to break free from their roots of violence and morally-ambiguous collecting practices—such practices carrying over well into the twentieth century. William Bridges, official historian of the New York Zoological Park (popularly known as the Bronx Zoo), praised the zoo in 1974 for "conservation, education, and research" as "basic objectives" it took seriously from the beginning and continued to do so. Michael Robison, former director of the National Zoological Park, wrote of the "biopark" that his institution "evolve[d]" into; a transformative force away from archaic nineteenth-century zoo concepts. The World Zoo Conservation Strategy, an affiliate of the International Union for the Protection of Nature (ICPN), recommended in 1993 that "this evolution of zoos should continue." While not intentional, the consistent use of official institutional descriptions of the "evolution" of backwards nineteenth-century menageries into modern "conservation centres" tends to naturalize the history of zoos, minimizing the explicit human choices and values that shaped their history. [2]

Thankfully, numerous scholars have begun the task of excavating the human choices and values that have shaped the history of zoological parks. [3] This essay continues that scholarly endeavor, exploring a critical and misunderstood dynamic of the early history of one of the United States' most important zoological parks: the Bronx Zoo. At its origins in 1895, the founding leadership of the New York Zoological Society proclaimed its revolutionary commitment to promoting wildlife protection through its animal displays and educational efforts. As the founders saw it, their zoo would serve as a platform to advocate for the protection and eventual rejuvenation of wildlife, even while it would engage in a global wildlife trade where violence and empire-building were paramount. If the contradictions are apparent today, they were far more obvious during the early twentieth century. For zoo officials at the time, there was a consistent struggle over how much violence should be made visible to the visiting public. Simply put, violence was embedded in the DNA of one the leading institutions promoting wildlife display and protection, and proved exceedingly difficult for zoo officials to ignore its place.

In providing a historical analysis of the dynamics of violence at the early-twentieth-century Bronx Zoo, this essay uncovers how zoo officials were ambivalent about the place of violence in underpinning their institution. Violence was sometimes concealed, but also, occasionally embraced as vital to promoting wildlife protection. As this essay demonstrates, violence resided in at

Fig. 1, Gorillas and humans view each other at the Bronx Zoo, 2008. Photograph by the author

least three historical processes. First, the Bronx Zoo owed its very existence to the powerful Eastern sportsmen lobby, thus ensuring that hunting and violence was embedded in the zoo at is very origins. Second, zoo officials put the collection process itself on display, demonstrating to the visiting public the importance of violence and the detrimental colonial wildlife trade in netting living wildlife commodities. But zoo officials constantly struggled with mitigating the visibility of the violence of the global wildlife trade. At other times, sanitizing the visualization of violence gave way to outright celebrations of it. As we can see in the third and final historical space, Bronx Zoo managers commemorated the hunting origins of their institution through the creation of the Heads and Horns Museum, placing dead wildlife specimens side-by-side living animals. In shedding light on the visibilities of violence at the Bronx Zoo, we can better appreciate just how paradoxical wildlife protection advocacy was at the dawn of its modern expression.

Origins

In October 1893, a twenty-seven year old American hunter and New York lawyer made his way through the tranquil, yet "uninteresting," forests along the upper Ottawa River in Canada. He was in search of the perfect moose trophy. After shooting his second animal, the young sportsmen remarked, "[h]e was a grand sight as he lay dead in the silent autumn forest—for I never get over the impression that somehow or other the moose is a survival of a long past order of nature, a fit comrade for the mammoth and the cave bear." The sportsmen savored this moment. In addition to fulfilling an important masculine calling for measured violence against a noble creature, he felt as he was standing at a juncture where present and history met, a moment frozen in time. [4]

Many Americans were closely watching the development of a national zoological park being erected in Washington, D.C. Among them was a hunter named Madison Grant, a New York patriarch, lawyer, and zealot for pure, wild American nature. [5] He was also part of a powerful group of elite sportsmen at the Boone and Crockett Club in New York City. The history of the Bronx Zoo cannot be fully appreciated without a consideration of this club of elite sportsmen, which was integral to the park's eventual creation. Formed in December 1887, the Boone and Crockett Club's membership was open to those who had "killed with the rifle in fair chase, by still-hunting or otherwise" any member of "American large game" (In reality, its membership was exclusively based on race and class.) Along with Madison Grant, its membership included future U.S. president and the very embodiment of American nature protection and masculine hunting, Theodore Roosevelt. Additionally, its ranks consisted of conservationist and editor of *Forest and Stream*

Magazine George Bird Grinnell, imperialist and immigration restrictionist Henry Cabot Lodge, eventual founder of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service C. Hart Merriam, and dozens of other leading Eastern sportsmen, scientists, and citizens. [6]

The Boone and Crockett Club had been established with the objectives of promoting "manly sport with the rifle," travel and exploration to "wild and unknown" regions, natural history, native wildlife protection, and to bring about the "interchange of opinions and ideas about hunting, traveling, and exploration." This last objective in particular pertained to the new system of hunting ethics that the Boone and Crockett Club and other elite sportsmen had been attempting to institute across the United States. [7] Madison Grant's fears of the extinction of native animals, wild places—and Anglo-Saxons—was not unique. The Boone and Crockett Club tapped into a growing movement of middle and upper-class white Americans, who grew anxious that the disappearance of wild places and wild animals was a sign of civilizational decay and racial armageddon. [8]

When it became apparent that wildlife and wild places were also not safe from the constraints of organized society and its changing social composition, many men like Grant panicked. The gradual decrease of wild game, victims of the market and the onslaught of "civilization," troubled the Boone and Crockett men. Equally disorientating was the gradual increase into American hunting grounds of working-class "market hunters" and "pot hunters"—some being poor whites and others Southern and Eastern European immigrants. [9] For these elite sportsmen, their fates seemed to be entwined with the demise of the very creatures that were critical to their exercise in masculine pursuit and controlled violence. A new system of ethics offered them a way to separate themselves from this new class of hunters and to appeal for protection of native animals for recreational and hunting purposes. Along with their elite backgrounds, defining the proper boundaries of killing—such as "fair chase," killing only male animals, and the avoidance of the use of traps—allowed these men to gain authority over wildlife matters in the view of state and federal game officials. A zoological park could be the embodiment of these new ethics and offer the same release—bringing wilderness to the city and enabling elite wildlife protectors to take thelead in rejuvenating sacred animal populations. [10] In the autumn of 1894, Grant corresponded with Theodore Roosevelt about having the Boone and Crockett Club sanction new wildlife protection measures for the New York State Assembly. At the organization's annual meeting on January 16, 1895, Grant was named the chair of a new committee entrusted with pursuing a new zoological park "entirely divergent from Old World zoological gardens." Advocates for a new zoological park, recognizing the political clout of the Boone and Crockett Club, invited the organization to take control of the zoo if it was approved by the State Legislature. On May 7, 1895, the New York Zoological Society (NYZS) was organized with the initial mandate of building a new zoo. Its leadership included many Boone and Crockett Club members. Grant served as secretary and influential American Museum of Natural History (AMNH), while paleontologist Henry Osborn filled one of the vice-presidents slots. [11] Like Grant, Osborn shared an unquestioned faith in science and sport hunting, but also the fears of civilizational decay and racial degeneration. Osborn was also keenly intimate with the process of species extinction thanks to his work in paleontology. [12]

Internal documents reveal that the committee in charge of steering the NYZS's efforts, initially, was primarily concerned with the public appeal and educational qualities of their new zoo. The zoo would embody "the modern scientific spirit in the exhibition of the animals"—namely attractiveness, educational values, and modern, humane treatment for animals on display. The committee felt that education through living natural history was of the utmost importance: "Nearly everyone would manifest a desire to see in a condition approaching as nearly as possible a state of nature those animals which, though belonging to this country, are for the most part less known to us than the beasts of the tropical jungle; and many of which, once common, are daily becoming rarer and more difficult of access." [13]

Similar to the National Zoological Park's original plans, the Bronx Zoo would reside on a site that placed native wildlife in their natural surroundings, utilizing acres of space for breeding purposes while also catering to public amusement and instruction (and of course, catering to the American sportsmen). In 1896, the NYZS laid out its three official objectives:

1) The establishment of a free zoological park containing collections of North American and exotic animals, for the benefit and enjoyment of the general public, the zoologist, the sportsman and every lover of nature.

2) The systematic encouragement of interest in animal life, zoology, amongst

all classes of people, and the promotion of zoological science in general.

3) Co-operation with other organizations in the preservation of the native animals of North America, and the encouragement of the growing sentiment against their wanton destruction. [14]

With the consultation of leading zoo and museum officials across the country, the committee moved forward with the zoo's designs while also searching for a director. One name quickly came up: William Hornaday.

Hornaday's passion for wildlife protection was born out of his first-hand experiences with the extermination of American bison, which he had been charged with collecting in 1886 as a Smithsonian taxidermist. He also was the first to promote a national zoological park, which combined education with native fauna protection advocacy. But for Hornaday, zoological collecting was dependent on the application of necessary violence. "These are the qualities which are required to make a first class collector," he recommended: "He must have a fair general knowledge of zoology…He must be a good shot, a successful hunter, and capable of great physical endurance." [15] Following his resignation from the Smithsonian, Hornaday and his family had moved to Buffalo, New York, where he took up writing and continued his work in natural history. Hornaday's familiarity in zoological park organization, his sportsmen and scientific background, and his commitment to wildlife protection made him an ideal candidate for zoo director. [16] C. Hart Merriam reassured Osborn that Hornaday was uniquely fit to run the zoo due to his experiences hunting out big game in Asia and North America. [17]

With his arrival in 1896, the Bronx Zoo's development would take an important turn. In particular, Hornaday's background in hunting contributed to a NYZS leadership, which was already a virtual extension of the powerful Boone and Crockett lobby. Clearly from its inception, the Bronx Zoo would be a sportsmen's ideological paradise as the elite hunting tradition was embedded in the zoo's DNA. "The frontiersman is rather the natural enemy of wildlife; his instinct is to exterminate it. But the instinct of the civilized man is to enjoy and protect it," declared a *New York Times* editorial. [18] If such was the case, the Boone and Crockett Club would have to evolve. Instead of just the rifle, sportsmen would now use the zoo—a "beautiful natural world in miniature, of forest, stream, lake, meadow and rock, peopled with living creatures"—as a vehicle to continue their masculine pursuits via

Fig. 2, A white rhinoceros calf hovers over its mother, shot and killed by Herbert Lang's expedition, sometime between 1909 and 1915. Photograph in Herbert Lang, "The White Rhinoceros of the Belgian Congo," Zoological Society Bulletin 23 no. 4 (July 1920): 81..

wildlife collection, display, and protection. [19] But recreating a lost wilderness through a zoological park was not a smooth transition away from the purely exploitative violence of the hunt. As we will see, the early operations of the Bronx Zoo highlight how much violence carried over to new technologies for wildlife protection.

"From Jungle to Zoo"

In April 1899, *Recreation* magazine featured two letters side by side, both of which addressed wildlife collection. The first letter was from Charles Payne. Writing from Kansas, and "being a dealer in wild animals," Payne used his firsthand knowledge of wildlife disappearance to plead for some regulations to protect the vanishing American bison. The other letter, entitled "Concerning the Purchase of Wild Animals," was from the institution that sanctioned his activities, the Bronx Zoo. Following years of solicited inquiries from American and European collectors, the zoo felt compelled to address potential collectors on its intentions. "As a general thing," the zoo advised, "it is necessary for every zoological garden or park to patronize responsible dealers in live animals, as also resident collectors." The zoo sought "responsible" transactions between itself and collectors, while offering an interesting ethical reminder, "Nor does the society propose, in many cases, to attempt to purchase animals that are running wild, and have not consented to being caught." [20]

Along with the absurd implication that there were animals that would consent to being caught, the irony of these two letters side by side could not be more symbolic. Here, we see a wildlife dealer, an individual in the business of extracting wildlife for zoos, museums, circuses, and other exhibition

institutions, who lamented the wildlife destruction that had gone unchecked for so long. The institution that he operated for—having made clear its mandate to protect the native fauna of the United States—was rationalizing the launching of collection operations, which would prove devastating to wildlife populations across the globe. The dividing lines between "responsible" scientific collectors and indifferent destructors, conscientious zoos and exploitative institutions, morally, were confused and easily blurred. Above all else, at the early-twentieth-century Bronx Zoo, the line between the living and the dead did not exist.

For American and European zoos, at the dawn of the twentieth century, stocking their institutions required an engagement with the emerging global wildlife trade. Unfortunately for wildlife, "animal welfare" science and successful captive breeding programs were not yet on the radar for zoo officials. The limits to knowledge of wild animal health and behavior dictated that the easiest and most efficient method to stock and replenish zoos was to capture animals in the wild. For the professional wildlife dealers, sportsmen, and individual collectors who dominated this trade, the preferred method of capturing wildlife was killing adult specimens and taking the unprotected young animals (figure 2). The calculating nature of the wildlife trade was demonstrated by Heinrich Leutemann, friend and biographer of one of the most infamous German wildlife dealers, Carl Hagenbeck. Leutemann explained in 1887 that "for the animal trader, the method of capture is, from a business point of view, a trivial issue." Leutemann went on in further detail:

> Without exception, lions are captured as cubs after the mother has been killed, the same happens with tigers, because these animals, when caught as adults in such things as traps and pits, are too powerful and untamable, and usually die while resisting … The larger anthropoid apes can, in addition, also only be captured—taking into account occasional exceptions—quite young beside the killed mother. The same is the case with almost all animals; in the processes, for example, giraffes and antelopes, when hunted, simply abandon their young which have fallen behind, while in contrast the mother elephant more often defends her calf and therefore must be killed as is the case with hippopotamuses … Also in the case of the rhinoceros, the young are captured from the adults, which are usually killed as a result. [21]

The utter waste of wild animals was an accepted part of the business. In looking back at his collection activities in the Malay archipelago over a particular nine-week period, dealer Charles Mayer wrote in 1922, "[t]he round up of animals caught by net and pit, included ninety-two different varieties … This only includes specimens in good condition. I do not count the animals that were killed off on account of not being fit to show for zoological purposes." [22] Unlike Hagenbeck's biographer, Mayer openly admitted utilizing traps and pits; approaches that had uneven results. He explained quite candidly how important the quality of specimens was, even if it meant destroying vast quantities of animals: "In collecting and trapping of wild animals one must not think that all animals so caught are fit for zoological or show purposes. Such is not the case; often after trailing animals for days and after having trapped them, I found them old, scarred, mangy, with broken tails and in numerous ways unfit, and although I rarely killed, except in self preservation, I would kill off all such as were not fit. All animals I sold and ship[ped] were at the time of embarkment, healthy, sound, and in good condition." [23]

By 1899, the Bronx Zoo had opened to the public and the priority was to gather wildlife specimens to give the institution scientific and moral authority. While the zoo had been founded on the principles of promoting the native, officials gradually acknowledged that patrons craved the exotic. For American zoos at their infancy, there were few scruples about how wildlife collectors operated in the field, as incidents in distant savannas and forests seemed invisible to the public. But newspaper stories of the adventures and dangers of the global wildlife trade proved to be popular, as well as the tales that wildlife dealers offered through their own accounts. Zoo officials would gradually have to approach the problem of whether the collection process itself should be celebrated at the zoo. For some, showing off the great troubles zoos went through to obtain wildlife specimens was a matter of institutional pride and power—an indicator of the great reach of American zoos across distant colonial wildlife reservoirs. But how would zoo officials explain the violence of the collection process to the visiting public? The zoo had to be careful not to disturb the sensibilities of those Teddy Roosevelt referred to as, "mushy emotionalists." [24]

As early as 1902, Hornaday expressed his anxiety to Hagenbeck about the methods of wildlife

capture and their implications should they be revealed to the public. In the case of Indian rhinoceroses that Hagenbeck agents were bringing to market, Hornaday warned, "[w]e must keep very still about forty large Indian rhinoceroses being killed in capturing the four young ones. If that should get into the newspapers, either here or in London, there would be things published in condemnation of the whole business of capturing wild animals for exhibition. There are now a good many cranks who are so terribly sentimental that they affect to believe that it is wrong to capture wild creatures and exhibit them,—even for the benefit of millions of people." But in the end, Hornaday believed such patterns of destruction were worth it: "For my part, I think that while the loss of the large Indian rhinoceros is greatly to be deplored, yet, in my opinion, the three young ones that survive will be of more benefit to the world at large than would the forty rhinoceroses running wild in the jungles of Nepal, and seen only at rare intervals by a few ignorant natives." [25]

Hornaday tended to avoid the issue of killing wildlife when offering his insights in various newspaper articles concerning the wildlife trade. [26] But in providing textual guides to the visual exhibitions at the zoo, Hornaday frequently cited the collection process that brought wildlife to the institution. In the zoo's 1904 official guide, Hornaday made clear how important empire-building in Africa had been in enabling the flow of giraffes out of the wild. Human on human violence, which occurred on the periphery of the global wildlife trade, was critical in this case: "During the ascendency of El Mahdi in the Egyptian Soudan, the exportation of Giraffes from central East Africa ceased altogether for a period of several years. But with the recapture of the Soudan territory, and the building of railways through East Africa to the lake region, about the year 1900 the capture and exportation of Giraffes began with renewed energy." [27]

In examining the official guide to the zoo, it becomes clear that a common narrative was utilized to rationalize the removal of animals out of the wild—in essence, wildlife protection "in-situ" was woefully inadequate. Zoo officials had the visiting public believe that the wild was far too dangerous for animals (nevermind that zoos contributed to the new dangers for wildlife). In the case of giraffe, the official guide lamented to its readers, "Thousands of these wonderful creatures have been killed by hunters, both white and black … it seems to be beyond the power of most men who can shoot to see living wild animals, no matter how large or wonderful, without desiring to reduce them to carcasses." The guide was far grimmer about the future prospects for the lion in the wild. In the case of one of the iconic predators of the African

Fig. 3 Paul Rainey's expedition hauls a live polar bear to their ship in 1910. The animal survived and eventually resided at the Bronx Zoo. Photograph in Paul Rainey, "The Capture of 'Silver King,'" Zoological Society Bulletin 43 (January 1911): 719.

continent, the zoo served as its last refuge. "At the present rate of settlement and industrial development in Africa, it may easily come to pass that by the end of the present century, the king of beasts will be without a home, outside of zoological collections." While empire-building could be praised, it could also be condemned for making the wild unsuitable for animals. [28]

Occasionally, zoo officials did feature articles in their *Zoological Society Bulletin* detailing the collection adventures of their agents in the field, although officials were careful to sanitize aspects of the articles that were deemed problematic. For instance, in 1910, the wealthy sportsmen Paul Rainey undertook a polar bear hunting expedition in the Arctic, which resulted in a captured bear for the Bronx Zoo. In his article for the zoo about the capture, no mention was made of other bears killed during the expedition, although the article did include unsavory photographs of the bear dangling by a rope while being brought abroad ship; a typical demonstration of the physicality routinely employed to control captured wildlife (figure 3). In Rainey's accounts as they appeared in *Cosmopolitan* and *Outing* magazines, the articles reported on the multiple polar bears, walruses, and musk-ox that were killed. One of Rainey's counterparts even remarked, "I never felt any

concern cause I knew the bears would be dead before they reached me. I knew that in a real emergency, Mr. Rainey would shoot them through the heads, though as a rule, when they charged he fired at their bodies, so as not to injure the skulls for purposes of collection." [29]

Probably the most vivid example of how zoo officials sought to mitigate the violence of the collection process was the publication of Ellen Velvin's *From Jungle to Zoo* in 1915. Velvin was a fellow of the Zoological Society of London and friend of Hornaday's, to whom she dedicated the book for all of his assistance in writing it. The book contained detailed chapters of the pain-staking processes wildlife dealers and collectors went through in order to extract animals out of the wild. The author was also surprisingly forthcoming about the violence that was deemed necessary. For lions, according to Velvin, it was essential to kill the lioness and take her cubs. On bears, Velvin explained, "[t]he best way in which to capture bears alive is to shoot the mothers, and then take the cubs." Because of the difficulty in capturing older orangutans, it was much easier to shoot the mothers and collect the young animals, something that Hornaday approved of according to the author. The book also included unpleasant photographs of the results of such collection processes, including newly-captured Indian elephants chained to the ground (figure 4). [30] To preempt further criticisms of such practices, Velvin did address one unnamed naturalist who argued that life for animals in zoos was a cruel existence and that the ideal places to study wildlife was in their native haunts. "Surely this scientist, *being* a scientist, must have known that such a thing as 'studying' *some* of the wild animals in their native haunts is simply impossible!" Velvin reiterated the narrative that the wild was inadequate for animal welfare; zoos were preferable where animals were "looked after as are many large families—and in many cases very much better." [31]

Despite such justifications, zoo officials would never completely defuse the problem of how visible to make the violence of the collection process. In 1923, Hornaday was horrified to learn that famed wildlife dealer Frank Buck had permitted the killing of 22 rare Indian rhinoceroses so that two young calves could be captured. Buck had few qualms about the process, reflecting on how the first animal was captured: "[My agent] shot down the mother, knowing the rest was easy. By this I mean it is well known to those who are familiar with the habits of the rhinoceros family that a rhino calf will stand behind the dead body of its mother until decomposition starts to sit in." Hornaday celebrated the arrival of one of the calves with little mention of the violence and wildlife destruction it represented. The animal could serve, in the words of an American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) curator commenting on gorillas, as a "missionary to science." Such a back-story of killing was never part of the narrative, especially when the animal was memorialized in the form of a statue that still stands at the zoo today. [32]

Questions over the visualization of violence were increasingly tense, especially as the Bronx Zoo became a leading promoter of wildlife protection, which during the 1920s took on a growing international dynamic. It was common practice for zoo officials to feature images of dead animals—trophies of "scientific" collection expeditions—in their *Zoological Society_Bulletin*. A typical example was the images provided by AMNH taxidermist Herbert Lang following his collection expeditions for white rhinoceroses in the Belgian Congo (figure 5). [33] But at times, some zoo officials expressed concern that promoting such images confused the zoo's mission. In 1924, reports reached Henry Osborn that the bulletin was featuring an article on "killing game." Osborn wrote Hornaday for an explanation. In response, Hornaday argued that this article, written by a famed naturalist, included images of dead elephants to illustrate "typical" vistas in Central Africa while one image of a dead bush pig was necessary because living specimens had rarely been secured. "I think if we were to resolve never to use a photograph of a dead animal," Hornaday argued, "we would thereby from time to time lose some very rare and valuable material." The zoo director made clear that rare animals had to be captured—alive preferably, but if not, dead and "pictured in situ." Hornaday concluded, "I think we have a right to make in our publications a very definite distinction between animals that have been killed and preserved by collectors for scientific purposes, and those which have been shot by trophy-hunting sportsmen only for sport." [34] Hornaday's rationalization of the policy was clear enough theoretically, but rarely clear in practice.

Memorializing the Vanishing Sportsman

Hornaday's notion that the zoo could distinguish between the exploits of scientific collectors and trophy-seeking sportsmen was naïve and problematic, especially considering that the NYZS had established a monument to America's sportsmen that stood alongside living animals—creatures that had been the frequent targets of sportsmen's hunts. If ever there was a space where the dividing lines between scientific collector and sportsmen, zoological park and natural history

Fig. 4 Captured Indian elephants. Photograph in Ellen Velvin, From Jungle to Zoo (New York: Moffat, Yard &Company, 1915), 56.

museum, and protection and violence collapsed, it was the zoo's Heads and Horns Museum.

In 1906-1907, members of the NYZS's executive committee, including Hornaday, Madison Grant, and Boone and Crockett member John Phillips, drafted plans for a "National Collection of Heads and Horns." In their announcement for the new Heads and Horns Museum, the committee addressed "the sportsmen of the world." In their estimation, a vast collection of sportsmen's trophies could serve two purposes: 1) It would provide a diverse record of game animals facing "rapid disappearance;" and 2) It would maintain a "repository of information for sportsmen," including game photographs, habitat photographs, and records of hunts. While the committee referred to it as a "sanctuary for the exhibition of the rarest products of animate nature," in reality, it was a sanctuary for the sportsmen's exploits. The committee hoped to establish a fund for the purchasing of trophies, erect a permanent structure at the zoo to host the collection, and solicit sportsmen across the globe for valuable trophy donations. [35]

If zoo officials struggled with the implications of visualizing the violence of the collection process, how did they readily embrace a celebration of the sportsman's exploits in the form of this Heads and Horns Museum? After all, as Hornaday explained to Osborn years later, the zoo was in the business of making a "very definite distinction between animals that have been killed and preserved by collectors for scientific purposes, and those which have been shot by trophy-hunting sportsmen only for sport." As we can see through the Heads and Horns Museum, the Bronx Zoo sought to reform the image of the destructive sportsmen. In a period when state authorities and private advocacy groups were pushing for more wildlife protection, Bronx Zoo officials believed that their trophy collection could highlight a new sportsmen ethic—the hunter could find a greater, moral purpose for his trophy, rather than mere sport.

As hundreds of trophy donations (figure 6) began pouring into the Bronx Zoo, Hornaday offered his image of the reformed sportsman. The Heads and Horns Museum would reward a new breed of sportsmen who exhibited self control, not selfishness, through the desire to limit themselves to a select number of trophies and to donate to the zoo. Hornaday explained, "[i]t is not desirable that many men should be animate by the desire for large collections. The undue gratification of too wide-spread a desire for heads and horns, irrespective of their origin, would mean great and deplorable slaughter for 'commercial purposes.'" The new

Fig. 5, A white rhinoceros shot and killed by Herbert Lang's expedition, sometime between 1909 and 1915. Photograph in Herbert Lang, "The White Rhinoceros of the Belgian Congo," Zoological Society Bulletin 23 no. 4 (July 1920): 75.

collection would be "limited to personal trophies won by the owner … chiefly because of its wholesome limitations; and in these days, *no sportsman or naturalist should shoot more animals than he preserves*." Through this collection, the zoo would not celebrate the ongoing commercial destruction of wildlife, but the calculating and scientific extraction of wildlife to be preserved for future study. An example of this approach was the museum's record elephant tusks (figure 7). It was not only a representation of the "living species of East African elephant, which arrived at the Zoological Park on February 4th, 1907," but also a representation of a sportsman making moral choices. The tusks had hit the open market of the ivory trade, but were eventually purchased by Charles Barney, who then donated them to the museum. [36]

Again, such a vision may have been admirable, but as this essay has already shown, it was also incredibly naïve and disingenuous when considering the activities the Bronx Zoo was sanctioning overseas. In the case of Barney's donated tusks, the commodities had still proved lucrative and made someone a healthy profit, even if they were eventually museum artifacts. It also ran against the reality that in the field, the lines were far too blurred between scientific collectors, sportsmen, and commercial hunters. Transvaal Game Reserves warden, Major James Stevenson-Hamilton, reflected on scientific collection in 1912: "Professional hunters, paid by museums and or zoological gardens, to obtain specimens, or young animals, though often included under this head, nevertheless, are frequently, if not the right sort of men individually, responsible for very great destruction, especially if they combine trading in ivory and skins with their more commendable employment." The Transvaal warden correctly anticipated future abuses by potential collectors: "The scientific gate, indeed, should be carefully guarded at all times, lest the exceptional facilities accorded should induce others than the elect to attempt entrance thereby." [37]

While the zoo's new trophy collections celebrated the reformed sportsman, the Heads and Horns Museum was also a memorial to the vanishing sportsmen and the activities that they had enjoyed for generations. Madison Grant articulated this at a 1910 luncheon before contributors to the museum, when he solemnly remarked: "As big game sportsmen, we are the last of our race." This lamenting of the extinction of the sportsman was partly a byproduct of some zoo officials' views that embraced the inevitability of massive wildlife extinctions. As Hornaday explained, "[t]he key notes of Mr. Grant's address were—the inexorable

Fig. 6. Zoo employees load a large African elephant head on loan for the Heads and Horns Museum. The animal was killed by sportsmen Richard Tjader in 1906. Photograph in Hornaday, "A Great Elephant Head," Zoological Society Bulletin no. 39 (May 1910): 666.

disappearance of the grand game animals of the world, and the imperative necessity of gathering now the collections that will adequately represent them hereafter when remnants of the wild species of to-day will exist only in protected game preserves,—or not at all." As zoo officials had routinely argued, the zoo was a necessary institution, mostly because wildlife protection in-situ was so inadequate. In rationalizing the East African contributions to the Heads and Horns museum, Hornaday reiterated the failure of wildlife protection in the wild when he quoted a number of British officials in East Africa who explained that wildlife outside of the preserves were "bound to go" in a matter of years. Urgency stressed the priority of the zoo's collections—alive or dead. [38]

While trophy donations (figure 8) arrived to the zoo, its new museum now provided zoo officials with the legitimate reasoning for putting out contracts to kill wildlife, not just collect live specimens. Killing wildlife would not just be collateral damage in the chase for live animals, but would also be the active pursuit of the Bronx Zoo. The new museum enabled the zoo to open the "scientific gate" to sportsmen who would have had difficulty crossing through it before. In 1922, AMNH zoologist James Clark was preparing to leave for a safari to East Africa when Hornaday contacted him. The zoo director hoped that in addition to the hunting he was to engage in for the AMNH, Clark would also fulfill much-needed orders for the zoo. "The one great desire of our hearts concerning uncollected heads of African big game is for a big elephant head, with tusks large enough to make a fair show," Hornaday explained. Along with other specimens that the zoo hoped Clark would hunt down, Hornaday made clear that his institution was not interested in live animals in the case of this expedition. "Concerning live animals," he elucidated, "I imagine you will not wish to bother with them. At all events, I would not if I were in your place … it is not a very agreeable business." [39]

The same year the zoo was putting out orders for animals to be killed in the field, the Heads and Horns permanent museum opened to the visiting public. It consisted of hundreds of trophy heads and preserved specimens (arranged zoologically and geographically), a catalogue of



Fig. 7. One part of the National Collections of Heads and Horns. Photograph in "National Collection of Heads and Horns," Zoological Society Bulletin 40 (July 1910): 668.

the sportsmen contributors, and the "repository" of information for sportsmen across the globe. Next to the carved inscription of the museum's name rested a tablet that read: "In Memory of the Vanishing Big Game of the World." [40] The wording of such a tablet, namely the "vanishing," suggested that the museum was a preemptive temple for relics of an extinction event that was ongoing and inevitable. Patrons could now enjoy the living and the dead at the Bronx Zoo—framed not as paradox, but as fitting and necessary.

Conclusion

The National Collection of Heads and Horns stood at the Bronx Zoo for less than fifty years until it was converted to an artists' gallery and education center. Reflecting on the museum's legacy in 1974, the zoo's official historian William Bridges tried to explain its place in the zoo's history. "Nevertheless, for its era the museum was a logical and valid appendage of a great zoological park. Hunting big game was a recognized sport … Along with the heads and horns and skins they brought back to decorate their homes, [sportsmen] brought a good deal of solid natural-history information. It was valuable as far as it went, but at the beginning of this century the day of the field naturalist trained to observe scientifically and record without killing had not yet dawned." [41] While it may have been true that the day of studying wildlife without killing had not yet fully materialized, this official institutional assessment suggests that the Heads and Horns Museum, and the zoo's associations with hunters, was simply the clichéd "product of its times."

When we look back at modern zoological parks in their infancy, it would make sense to understand their activities as a byproduct of the accepted social behaviors and environmental ethics of their human managers. But did human beings simply have fewer qualms about utilizing violence to maintain zoos during the early twentieth century? As this essay has shown, the place of violence and killing at the Bronx Zoo was far more complex. In excavating the visibilities of violence at the Bronx Zoo, it is clear that some zoo officials did not just readily accept the place of violence and killing at their institution. While the sportsmen's values had been embedded in the zoo's institutional DNA, officials had to be careful in how much violence they made visible, especially because they had pledged their institution to the mandates of wildlife protection. They accepted that killing was a necessary part of the collection process, but they struggled with how much of that violence should be on display, especially when they hoped to

Fig. 8. View of the National Collection of Heads and Horns. Photograph in "National Collection of Heads and Horns," Zoological Society Bulletin 40 (July 1910): 669.

celebrate the great challenges they overcame to bring wildlife to the zoo. Through the Heads and Horns Museum, zoo officials tried to mitigate the negative conceptions of hunting as destructive and selfish. But in the process, they placed living and dead specimens alongside each other, while demonstrating to the visiting public that wildlife disappearance was not a question of if, but when.

American zoological parks today rarely consider the place of violence in their origin stories (understandably so). But if zoo officials struggle with the legacy of the choices their predecessors made a century ago, their precursors were also never comfortable with the implications of their own activities. Especially when it came to the detrimental global wildlife trade, the public gradually associated zoos as the leading facilitators in what was fast becoming an ugly industry. This was illustrated in 1964 when a symposium was held by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), which brought together the leading zoo managers (including representatives from the Bronx Zoo), zoologists, museum curators, game wardens, wildlife protection experts, and wildlife dealers from across the globe. The purpose of the symposium was to solidify better cooperation among these various actors, and to reconfigure the relationship of zoos to international wildlife protection. The delegates acknowledged, for the first time, that they had to change the way zoos did business as they concluded that "[t]he trade in endangered species of wild animals for zoos cannot be considered in isolation from the whole trade in wild animals because, in the public eye, zoos are the main reason for the trade. They are therefore vulnerable to criticism whenever anything goes wrong at any stage of the trade." [42]

Unfortunately, by the 1960s, the place of violence in the global wildlife trade had become too visible. [43] In response, zoo officials began the grueling process of exorcizing their longtime association with it. But if one looks carefully, the relics of the trade are not invisible. One only needs to visit the old Heads and Horns Museum building or the cast iron statue of the Indian rhinoceros that arrived to the Bronx Zoo in 1923. In particular, the rhinoceros statue (figure 9) is a constant reminder of the dozens of animals that died in the wild so that this one creature could reside in captivity. Of course, that narrative of violence has rarely been made visible.

Notes

[1] Tim Jackson, "Zoos: Do We Still Need Them?" Africa Geographic (Winter 2011): 38-45.

[2] Refer to William Bridges, Gathering of Wild Animals: An Unconventional History of the New York Zoological Society (New

Fig. 9. One of the statues of "Bessie," the Indian Rhinoceros that arrived to the zoo in 1923 thanks to the efforts of Frank Buck. Photograph by author.

York: Harpers & Row, 1974), viii; Deiss and Hoage, eds. New Worlds, New Animals, xi; NZP, "Moving Forward: The Next Ten Years at the National Zoo," (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2006); The World Zoo Conservation Strategy, Executive Summary: The Role of the Zoos and Aquaria of the World in Global Conservation (Brookfield: Chicago Zoological Society, 1993), 5.

[3] On American zoos, refer to William Deiss and R.J. Hoage, eds. New Worlds, New Animals: From Menagerie to Zoological Park in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Hanson, Animal Attractions: Nature on Display in American Zoos (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Jeffrey Hyson, "Urban Jungles: Zoos and American Society," (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1999). On European zoos, refer to Harriet Ritvo, The Animal Estate: The English and Other Creatures in the Victorian Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Nigel Rothfels, Savages and Beasts: The Birth of the Modern Zoo (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).

[4] Theodore Roosevelt and George Baird Grinnell, eds. Hunting in Many Lands: The Book of the Boone and Crockett Club (New York: Forest and Stream Publishing Co., 1895), 84-106.

[5] For an excellent biography of Madison Grant, refer to Jonathan Spiro, Defending the Master Race: Conservation, Eugenics, and the Legacy of Madison Grant (Lebanon, NH: University of Vermont Press, 2009). Also refer to John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1955).

[6] Theodore Roosevelt and George Baird Grinnell, eds. American Big-Game Hunting: The Book of the Boone and Crockett Club (New York: Forest and Stream Publishing Co., 1893): 337-345.

[7] Ibid., 338-339.

[8] John Higham, "The Reorientation of American Culture in the 1890s," in Writing American History: Essays on Modern Scholarship (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), 78-92.

[9] Louis Warren, The Hunter's Game: Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), John Reiger, American Sportsmen and the Origins of Conservation (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 2001), Karl Jacoby, Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American Conservation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). On the middle and upper-class turn toward untamed nature, refer to Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967) and John Higham, "The Reorientation of American Culture in the 1890s," in Writing American History: Essays on Modern Scholarship (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970), 80-82. For more on the connections between masculinity and civilization, refer to Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

[10] Roosevelt and Grinnell, eds. American Big-Game Hunting, 338-339.

[11] Roosevelt and Grinnell, eds. Trail and Camp-Fire, 316.

[12] Henry Osborn, From the Greeks to Darwin: An Outline of the Development of the Evolution Idea (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1894).

[13] "Preliminary Plan For the Prosecution of the Work of the Zoological Society," (11/26/1895), Director's Office, Subject Files, 11/95-9/96, Sub-Committee on Plans, Box 2 Folder 9, Wildlife Conservation Society Archives.

[14] New York Zoological Society, First Annual Report of the New York Zoological Society: 1896 (New York: Office of the Society, 1897): 13. For more on the original designs of the National Zoological Park, refer to William Hornaday to G. Brown Goode, June 25, 1887, Smithsonian Institution Archives, RU 201, Box 17, Folder 10.

[15] Hornaday, Taxidermy and Zoological Collecting: A Complete Guide for the Amateur Taxidermist, Collector, Osteologist, Museum-Builder, Sportsman, and Traveller (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891), 3.

[16] Hornaday, "Progress Report of Explorations for Buffalo in the Northwest, Spring of 1886," July 10, 1886, Smithsonian Institution Archives, RU 201, Box 17, Folder 9. Hornaday, "Brief Outline of a Plan for a National Zoological Garden in the City of Washington," Jan. 18, 1888, Smithsonian Institution Archives, RU 201, Box 17, Folder 1. For more on Hornaday, refer to Gregory J. Dehler, "'An American Crusader': William Temple Hornaday and Wildlife Protection in America, 1840-1940," (PhD Dissertation, Lehigh University, 2001).

[17] Merriman to Osborn Jan. 25, 1896, Director's Office, Subject Files, 11/95-9/96, Hornaday, William T., Appointment as Director, Box 2, Folders 5-2, Wildlife Conservation Society Archives.

[18] "Zoological Gardens," New York Times (11/10/1889): 4.

[19] New York Zoological Society, Second Annual Report of the New York Zoological Society: 1897 (New York: Office of the Society, 1898): 67.

[20] Recreation 10 no. 4 (April 1899): 301-303.

[21] Leutemann quoted in Rothfels, Savages and Beasts, 62. For more on the exploitative aspects of the global wildlife trade, refer to Rothfels, Savages and Beasts, 68. For more on Hagenbeck, refer to Savages and Beasts and [1] Carl Hagenbeck, Beasts and Men: Being Carl Hagenbeck's Experiences For Half a Century Among Wild Animals (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909).

[22] Charles Mayer, Trapping Wild Animals in Malay Jungles (New York: Duffield and Company, 1922), 188.

[23] Mayer, Trapping Wild Animals in the Malay Jungles, 96.

[24] For popular accounts of the global wildlife trade, refer to Raymond Blathwayt, "Wild Animals—I. How They Are Captured, Transported, Trained, and Sold," McClure's Magazine I (July 1893-Nov. 1893): 26-33; Hagenbeck, Beasts and Men; Mayer, Trapping Wild Animals in the Malay Jungles. For Roosevelt's views of "mushy emotionalists," refer to Theodore Roosevelt and Edmund Heller, Life Histories of African Game Animals, Volume 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), 149-160.

[25] Hornaday to Hagenbeck, June 11, 1902, Outgoing Correspondence, Director's Office, New York Zoological Park, WCS Archives.

[26] For articles on the wildlife trade, refer to "How Animals are Secured for Zoological Parks," New York Times (Sept. 6, 1903): 28. Hornaday, "The Wild Animal Industry," Appleton's Booklovers Magazine 8 (Jan.-June 1906): 327-333; "New York's Guests from the Jungle of the World: Who they Are and How they Live in their Picturesque Home in Bronx Park," New York Times (May 9, 1909): SM10.

[27] Hornaday, Popular Official Guide to the New York Zoological Park: As Far As Completed (New York: New York Zoological Society, 1904), 103.

[28] Hornaday, Popular Official Guide to the New York Zoological Park (New York: New York Zoological Society, 1907), 26, 56.

[29] Paul Rainey, "The Capture of 'Silver King,'" Zoological Society Bulletin 43 (January 1911): 715-719. George Fortiss, "Paul Rainey, Sportsmen," The Outing Magazine 58 no. 6 (September 1911): 749. Paul Rainey, "Bagging Arctic Monsters with Rope, Gun, and Camera," Cosmopolitan (Dec. 1910): 91-103.

[30] Ellen Velvin, From Jungle to Zoo (New York: Moffat, Yard &Company, 1915), 55-56, 64, 93-94.

[31] Velvin, From Jungle to Zoo, 16-17.

[32] Frank Buck and Edward Anthony, Bring 'Em Back Alive (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1930), 50-60. Hornaday to Osborn, May 25, 1923, Henry Fairfield Osborn Collection (MSS.0835); American Museum of Natural History Archives, Box 51, Folder 14. William Gregory, "In Quest of Gorillas," The Scientific Monthly 42 no. 3 (March 1936): 274.

[33] Herbert Lang, "The White Rhinoceros of the Belgian Congo," Zoological Society Bulletin 23 no. 4 (July 1920): 67-92
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[34] Hornaday to Osborn, Dec. 16, 1924, Henry Fairfield Osborn Collection (MSS.0835); American Museum of Natural History Archives, Box 10, Folder 27.

[35] Hornaday (For the Camp-Fire Club), Madison Grant (For the Boone and Crockett Club), and John Phillips (For the Lewis and Clark Club), "To the Sportsmen of America: The National Collection of Heads and Horns," (New York: New York Zoological Society, March 20, 1907), WCS Archives.

[36] Hornaday, The National Collection of Heads and Horns, Parts I and II (New York: New York Zoological Society, May 1, 1907 and Sept. 1, 1908), 5, 33-34, WCS Archives.

[37] James Stevenson-Hamilton, Animal Life in Africa (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1912), 19.

[38] "National Collection of Heads and Horns," Zoological Society Bulletin 40 (July 1910): 667-668.

[39] Hornaday to Clark, August 7, 1922, NYZP, Director's Office, Outgoing Correspondence, 20 May 1922- 15 September 1922, WCS Archives.

[40] Hornaday, "The Heads and Horns Museum," Zoological Society Bulletin 25 no. 3 (May 1922): 50-60.

[41] William Bridges, Gathering of Wild Animals: An Unconventional History of the New York Zoological Society (New York: Harpers & Row, 1974), 306-307.

[42] International Union for the Conservation of Nature, "Report: Symposium 'Zoos and Conservation' Held in London, June 23-25, 1964," (IUCN Publications, New Series: Supplementary Paper No. 3, 1964), 19.

[43] "The Shame of the Naked Cage," Life 65 (Nov, 8, 1968): 70-77.

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THE TIGER NEXT DOOR

Camilla Calamandrei is a documentary filmmaker who specialises in small stories, which connect in different ways to a larger, complex American nervous system. She had been researching tiger-breeder/hoarder stories in the USA for some time before learning about Dennis Hill, who when we are first introduced to him in her film The Tiger Next Door, *keeps 24 tigers, 3 bears, 6 leopards and 1 ageing cougar in makeshift cages in his backyard compound, near the tiny town of Flat Rock, Indiana.*
Text and questions by Lucy Davis

Dennis, with his flowing white biker beard is the flawed but sympathetic subject of this Rolling River Films Production, broadcast in the United States by Animal Planet, distributed for television internationally by Films Transit International. The film follows Dennis' struggle to rehabilitate a failing tiger-breeding outfit that he has been running since 1992, after he lost his United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) permit. When we meet Dennis, he has also fallen foul of the Indiana State Department of Natural Resources (DNR) after a surprise ~~visit~~ inspection raised grave questions about the security and welfare of his animals. Dennis' downward spiral was exacerbated when sensational footage, depicting the conditions of his facility at the time of the DNR visit, was circulated by Fox TV and various print media.

Dennis is clearly passionate about his animals—obsessively so. But they also comprise his main – if meagre – livelihood. He tells us that he sold tiger cubs for $1,000, on the low end, and $14,000 US on the high end, with his favourites, the white-striped, blue-eyed ones, bringing in higher amounts than the regular orange cubs.

The tension in the film builds up around two events: The first event is a pending investigation by the DNR to ascertain whether Dennis will be permitted to keep any of his big cats at all. He has been given 30 days in which to clean up his operation and "place" 20 of his animals elsewhere (the DNR did not seem particularly concerned about where these animals were going to be "placed"). The second event is a public hearing chaired by the DNR at Little Rock. The hearing was convened after 25 residents signed a petition stating they were fearful about Dennis Hill keeping tigers in such close proximity to their community.

Commentary from local members of the Flat Rock, Indiana community and key actors in a national tiger-breeding debate is threaded carefully through the film as these events unfold. Much of this commentary reveals as much about the personalities of the speakers and the inter-personal dynamics of the communities involved as it does their positions, for and against Dennis' tiger-breeding practices.

A touching example of Calamandrei's subtle story telling style is the way that the camera lingers for a while in the Flat Rock community hall, after a DNR hearing, to follow the way that members of this small community who minutes before had been so divided over the issue of Dennis' tigers, muck-in together to tidy up the room and put away all the folding chairs.

"Dennis tells us early on in the film: "I live as a tiger … alienating myself … back here … with these guys." However, Dennis is not so much of a loner that he doesn't have a number of supporters. Several guys from the neighbourhood come by with their vehicles and tools to help Dennis renovate his cages and clean his dishevelled compound. Dennis' mother, his aunt, grandmother and other

Camilla Calamandrei
Still from *The Tiger Next Door*, *Rolling River Films, 2009 © Calamandrei*

neighbours show up to support him as the last batch of tigers are rounded up and sent off to a centre in faraway Wisconsin, so that Dennis is down to three tigers and one elderly cougar on the day of the DNR inspection. Diane McNew, a neighbour who claims that her landlord evicted her after she refused to sign his petition, states "it would be inhumane to take those tigers from him." Another neighbour is near to tears during the DNR hearing, as she tells the officers how she donated her late Mother's inheritance money to help Dennis pay for renovations: "... [T]o deny him his permit would be a great, great injustice ...," she says. "It's as if his children have been taken and held for ransom."

The portraits of Dennis' detractors are also complex. There are recurring interviews with Joe Taft, who has known Dennis for 20 years and who runs a relatively-generous and well-kept Exotic Feline Rescue Center (which is home to over 200 captive bred tigers, lions and leopards confiscated from – or surrendered by-- private owners). By the end of the film it becomes clear that Joe shares an historic, personal animosity with Dennis, which Joe's politically-correct statements about tiger welfare do not adequately conceal. At one point, a slanging match breaks out between the two of them as they stand on a country road outside the gates of Joe's centre and Joe yells "I'm going to hang your ass! ... I'm going to put you out of business!" The confrontation resembles two schoolboys trying and failing to behave and stop kicking each other, while both telling on each other to the teacher (camera). While watching the fight, the crazy realisation belatedly dawned on me that central Indiana must be chock full of captive bred tigers if Dennis is running his backyard breeding operation there,

while Joe has his collection of over 200 rescued cats in a town nearby. *(note to editor: I took out the line about competing outfits because the rescue center does not breed or sell so t hey are not competing w Dennis and the tiger rescue is over 90 miles from Flat Rock)*

Indeed, the film opens by emphasizing the extent of tiger keeping in the United States, and the estimate that "there are now more tigers in private captivity in the USA than there are roaming wild in the world." This is also the tagline used in the publicity material for the film. The DVD version contains educational material which gives a clear message about the dangers and ethics of tiger breeding and pet keeping, as well as providing a list of contacts to leading animal and big cat rescue and rehabilitation associations.

The publicity shot for the film depicts Dennis against a background of Indiana fields, with the wind in his long white beard, holding a white-striped tiger cub on a leash. This shot echoes the last scene in the movie, three years after the DNR inspection, where we revisit a visibly-aged Dennis, whose girlfriend, Costa, has split up with him, upgraded and moved into a big new house. The two are still "best friends," but Dennis now lives alone with three white tigers and a dream of a new breeding operation where he is able to keep his cats in a large enclosure with a swimming pool. The film ends with a series of media reports about gruesomely maltreated and sacrificed tigers across the United States, juxtaposed with footage of Dennis, gambolling off into a sunlit meadow with yet another new white tiger cub, who he has named Stella.

1. Animal Rights & American Freedoms

Lucy Davis: As this volume of ANTENNAE is formulated around the issue of "animal rights," I thought I'd start with the competing "rights" narratives that encircle the caged, feline objects of your film:

> The animal rights position in the film is articulated most strongly by Carol Asvestas, Director of *The Wild Animal Orphanage*, and Ed Boks from NYC Animal Care & Control, who categorically denounce tiger keeping and breeding as unjustifiable and selfish. This is reinforced by a recurring montage of graphic media reports of tiger attacks, trafficking, cruelty, and neglect, which illustrate the degree and extent of uncontrolled, commercial breeding of exotic animals such as big cats in the US. But the word "right" is used in the film more often than not in reference to human ways of life.

One of the strengths of the film is that these competing narratives are left unresolved, with little authorial or moral intervention. This gives a multifaceted understanding of the motivations, desires and fears held by the various stakeholders. However, as you have suggested in interviews elsewhere, this has also permitted audiences to interpret your film in widely divergent ways. Do you ever worry that you have made everything too relative? Are you okay with tiger fanciers or tiger breeders watching your film and afterwards concluding "[w]ell, as long as I breed them more-or-less humanely and keep more-or-less track of where they go, then I'm doing okay." Could one end the film with the idea that "humane" tiger breeding is really not that much different from the breeding of, say malamute dogs?

Camilla Calamandrei: The film functions as both a portrait of American community, told through one man's story, and as an expose of a horrible epidemic of wild animal keeping throughout the nation. Ultimately, however, *The Tiger Next Door* is a character-driven documentary and not a polemic.

It was very clear to me – from the number of neglected and suffering animals we saw everywhere – while we were shooting the film, that private individuals should not be allowed to keep and breed large wild animals of any kind. And by the end, I was wondering if there were even any zoos or other organizations that should be allowed to keep them. But, as a filmmaker, I was drawn to let the story unfold and reveal the complexity of the situation as seen from various sides, and not just announce my own position.

We wanted to present Dennis as a complex human being -- with both positive qualities and serious shortcomings. A friend calls Dennis my Tony Soprano. You can't help but like him, even if you oppose what he does. We struggled with that because we wanted it to be clear that keeping large wild animals captive is an inhumane thing to do – but also make it clear that one does not have to be an evil person to make this kind of bad choice. I wanted people to consider that just as Dennis refuses to see the boredom and suffering his animals endure, any of us might be doing the same in regards to the cat or dog we leave alone in our apartment all day long. I wanted people to give a second thought to their Aunt Mary's backyard puppy breeding business.

Camilla Calamandrei
NYPD officer repels down side of building to tranquilize tiger, found living in Harlem apt. Oct, 2003, *photocredit:* John Roca, Daily News *© Calamandrei*

Just because you are a lovely person in other parts of your life does not mean you are inherently doing the correct thing by the animals you keep.

I think that the most powerful – and important – part of the film is the slow realization that what Dennis tells himself (and us) does not match what is actually happening. This kind of self-delusion is how we end up with a heartless epidemic of wild animal keeping. Showing the disparity between what one man tells himself and what is really happening is meant to introduce the idea that we might be doing that ourselves in some way (around eating meat, etc).

Dennis says he loves his animals, but we see that he doesn't have true empathy for their situation. The treatment of these animals as property is rationalized in an attempt to normalize it.

In the end, I have to say that I feel that the state of animal welfare in the United States is appalling, and I hope that people are upset by the time they get to the end of the film, if not sooner. Some people do watch this film and walk away persuaded that Dennis loves his animals. I am not sure if that is a failing of the film, or a reflection of our society and the diverse ways people think about human-animal relations.

The Eye of the Tiger

Davis: Related to the compelling and nuanced way in which divergent human perspectives are brought together in this film, it did occur to me while watching, that you had made a choice not to attempt to present any kind of ethological tiger's point of view. There were no "critter cam" shots from the inside of cages or dens, for example. Nor were there shots from the dark interior of lorry where Dennis' tigers were stacked up en masse and trucked off on the long drive from Indiana to Wisconsin, one day before the all-important government inspection. One certainly gets a sense of the physicality of the big cats. There are many close-ups of paws, faces and eyes, and also affectionate interactions between the cats and Dennis. But these are almost always seen from the outside, through the bars of a cage. There seems to have been a clear choice in your film not to try to approximate a tiger's perspective of the situation. Am I right about this? Do you have thoughts about this?

Camilla Calamandrei
Still from *The Tiger Next Door, Rolling River Films, 2009 © Calamandrei*

Calamandrei: Funny, you should ask this. It did occur to me long after the film was completed that we could have shot from inside a cage to show how small the space was from the tiger's perspective. It's true that some people look at a seemingly healthy tiger in a clean cage and don't see anything wrong, even when they are told that a tiger naturally roams 400 miles! But others can't even watch the film because they find the basic images so upsetting.

So, I think a view from inside a cage would have been a bit forced and contrived – although I do know what you are saying.

In my life I am a very vocal, opinionated person not afraid to point out things I feel are problematic. As a filmmaker, however, I become very open minded and magnanimous, fascinated by all the perspectives and the humanity of the people. My inclination is to observe and reveal rather than lead.

Tiger Love

Davis: *Many times in the film, Dennis or one of Dennis' companions, will iterate how Dennis "loves" tigers. Even his most fierce detractors will state how they know and understand that he "loves" his animals. How do you understand this "love?" And do the tigers love Dennis back?*

Calamandrei: I struggled with this issue a great deal. For a long time I felt Dennis was a con artist and just gave a good performance about how much he loved these animals. But then I decided it was a narcissistic kind of love, one in which he felt he loved them, because of how they made him feel. However, he never considered what boredom and suffering they might be experiencing.

I found this great quote attributed to George Bernard Shaw: "Pity the poor animals. They bear more than their share of human love." Which I think is so true!

Charismatic Carnivores & Dead Meat

Davis: While still on the topic of "loving animals," the film clearly reveals the ironies at stake in

Camilla Calamandrei
Still from *The Tiger Next Door, Rolling River Films, 2009 © Calamandrei*

modern culture's selective empathy with animals. There are scenes of Dennis hacking up huge slabs of frozen, congealed, abstracted turkey, which he then tosses lovingly to his big cats. There is a deer trophy hanging on the wall of Tim Santel, from the US Fish and Wildlife service, who ran an investigation to reveal the buying and selling of big cats and trophy tiger-parts. There is the scene at The Exotic Feline Rescue Center where they saw off the head of a horse. A volunteer unceremoniously grabs the decapitated head by the nostrils to toss to the big cats.

One of the arguments against the proliferation of carnivores, such as lions and tigers, in zoos, and elsewhere, is of course the sheer amount of other dead animals that are needed to keep them alive. This was once upon a time an argument made by anti-cruelty vegetarians. It has recently also become an ecological argument—with meat consumption linked to deforestation and global warming. Do you have any thoughts about which animals are loved and which are made meat of inside and outside of this film?

Calamandrei: I think the question of which animals we love and which we eat is fascinating and compelling in terms of whether animal lovers should be vegetarians. I don't really think it applies to big cats that are carnivores and need a diet of almost exclusively protein to survive. As long as big cats are alive in the wild or captivity they will be consuming other animals. More important I think, is that we make the raising of meat for domestic dogs and cats more humane. There are exponentially more domestic dogs and cats in private hands than there are captive lions and tigers, etc. And, I am deeply saddened to think what suffering the animals farmed for domestic pet food must endure.

Wild Men & Big Beasts

Davis: I'm sure that you have heard this many times before, but the parallels between the ways that Dennis relates to his captive tigers on camera and the self-shot footage of the late Timothy Treadwell and "his" Alaskan grizzlies, (immortalised in Werner Herzog's *Grizzly Man* from 2005[i]) are quite striking: The mothers of both men speak of how intensely fascinated by animals their sons were as children; both have gone through periods of substance-abuse and depression and appear to have addictive personalities; both see themselves as somehow outside of society and construct a persona of themselves as "the wild man;" both perceive themselves as having some kind of higher, spiritual, shamanic connection to their animals; and both prophesize a sacrificing of themselves for their animals. Treadwell famously and tragically did so, while Dennis' sacrifice was seemingly self-consciously done. (Had Dennis perhaps heard of Timothy Treadwell or stories like his?) They also both articulate positive fantasies of being ripped up by the killers they adore.

Both Timothy and Dennis seem to have a few *(note to editor: this may be an exaggeration in both cases)* ~~of~~ loyal, and somewhat-more-grounded, female supporters, and both seem, in different ways, to cultivate a sense of masculinity—Treadwell as the "gentle warrior," Dennis as the "biker caveman" — that is dependent upon a close proximity with big carnivores and the wild. After Dennis gives in to government pressure and gives up most of his tigers, we learn that his girlfriend Costa leaves him. "If they *{the cats}* would have stayed, I would have stayed … " she says, "… once they left it kinda just fell apart …" Both men seem to be aware of a media image and cultivate a certain "look." Treadwell's has his Prince Valiant blonde locks, black clothes and bandana. Dennis has his long white biker beard. And then there is the vicarious pride of paternity: Treadwell goes goo-goo over bear cubs, Dennis is driven by eugenic experiments to produce that One Pure White Tiger With No Stripes. At one stage, Dennis boasts to his rival Joe Taft, in a manner not dissimilar to male posturing about women: "You know how many tigers … I've been through?" He later says to the camera: "Joe can work cats too, but this little long haired hippy can work cats better than he can and he doesn't like that!" There are of course also many women who keep tigers or who live with lions. How do you think gender figures in different ways in this coveting and breeding of big cats? Do you have any thoughts about the things that might be going on with American/modern masculinities, femininities and wild carnivores?

Calamandrei: The similarities between Timothy Treadwell and Dennis Hill are strong. I think both Treadwell and Hill are actually extremely non-sexual. A certain number of women did seem drawn to Dennis, but I didn't read any sexual or particularly masculine vibe off him. If anything, I would say that both Timothy Treadwell and Dennis are too narcissistic to be sexual.

As far as who – in the general population-- is more likely to keep exotic or large wild animals, I am not sure what the final stats would really show. In general, I think that men and women are drawn to keep exotic animals, or large wild animals, as a way to distinguish themselves, and not so much for sexual or gender reasons. If anything, there may be a socio-economic correlation. Throughout history wealthy and powerful leaders collected and hunted large wild animals, and wore their pelts and jewelry from body parts. Now anyone with cash can buy an animal—and they do.

Tiger Economies

Davis: In a volume I edited on human-animal relations in Southeast Asia, art historian Kevin Chua writes about the "man eating tiger" as a liminal spectre of 19th century capital.[ii] Tigers do not generally care for human flesh, and prior to the British colonial and migrant Chinese-led destruction of Malayan jungles to plant pepper, gambier, and later rubber trees, tigers pretty much kept to themselves. The explosive increase in tiger attacks in Singapore (rumoured to be at least one a day in the late 19th century[iii]) occurred only when the forests had been so depleted that there was nothing else left for tigers eat. A similar process is currently occurring in Sumatra where tiger attacks are again on the rise even as they are driven to extinction by forest depletion caused by palm oil and paper pulp conglomerates.

The 19th century tiger was at once held in awe for its physicality and prowess, at the same time as it was feared and hunted down as a "monster" of the jungle. As your film suggests, 21st century tigers are worth far more dead than alive—and even more so in Asia. Businessmen still proudly display stuffed tigers in their houses. There is a burgeoning trade in tiger parts as the new-rich of mainland China seek to consume exotic items, virility tonics and the like, which were previously out of their economic reach. An oft-cited statistic, affirmed by a 2008 US Congress report, suggests that the money being made from the illegal international wildlife trade places it just behind the

international trade in illegal weapons and drugs.[iv] And the potency of the tiger is, of course, also appropriated—one step removed—via Tiger Balm, Tiger Beer and the "Tiger Economies."

I don't know if this is an impossible question to ask, but without flattening the interpersonal, psychological subtleties at play in your film into being mere "signs of the times," do you see any connections between the emergence of a tiger-coveting/tiger-breeding subculture and the macro *political-economic undulations that America has undergone during the past decades*? {*NOTE to editor- not clear on what these undulations referred to are.. so have given more general answer. }*

Calamandrei: I am not sure if I will unpack this question in the way you intended. But, as I mentioned previously, there has always been some subculture, small or large, of people obsessed with the idea of large wild animals. The only difference now is that a larger portion of the population can actually gain possession of one.

So, I see two possible connections between the US economy, globalization, greed, tiger breeding, and black market for tiger parts. The first is that people are always looking for a way to make a quick buck, and many tiger owners think they can make back their investment by using the animal for photo ops. When they finally go bankrupt, they surrender the animal to someone who will pay for the body parts.

Second, as people have more disposable income, they spend more selfishly and frivolously. Some spend money to have the live animal, and some spend to have the tiger pelt and parts. The problem, I think, is rampant consumerism. We feel we should be able to buy and own what we wish. Even if it's a living thing.

Randall Lockwood of the ASPCA, gave me this great quote to describe the phenomena:

> "In the United States, pets are considered property in the eyes of the law. And one of the most hotly defended rights of the individual is the right to own anything, no matter how stupid or dangerous the choice — even when what someone wants to own is a threat to them, their family, and the community around them." – Randall Lockwood, ASPCA

Extinction or Mutation?

Davis: In a public forum session on zoos that I chaired some years back, in Singapore,[v] the topic of tiger extinction came up. One of the speakers, Wildscreen film festival director, Chris Dickenson, suggested—half seriously—that perhaps the only way forward for tigers was to give up on their ever being able to roam free in a natural habitat. Instead he suggested that the animals be given drugs such as Prozac or Xanax against such depression/anxiety-driven behaviours as "cage-pacing" (a behaviour we incidentally notice occurring with many of the caged tigers in your film, even the ones in the more generous enclosures). Chris Dickinson also suggested that tigers might be bred in such a way that their aggressive traits be removed, in effect turning them into big pussycats, suitable to be kept as domestic pets. In a Director's Statement for *The Tiger Next Door* you take another position, arguing that "letting them go extinct may be the most humane thing we can do." Could you elaborate on this?

Calamandrei: What I said in the statement for the world premiere of the film at Hot Docs, in Toronto, was that animal cruelty and negligence today seems to be like smoking was twenty years ago—a bad thing that people feel they have a right to do. We are not yet at a point where people feel shamed when they are caught keeping puppies in small boxes with no windows, leopards and lions in cages they can barely turn around in, or tigers in cages with concrete floors on the side of a highway. Imagine being a living being and hardly seeing the light of day, or being a predatory animal designed for hunting and never having the chance to run, anywhere. Of course, if you think about it enough, it is clear that even the better funded "zoos" are ill equipped to keep large wild animals in captivity. I think it just can't be done appropriately. The big question then is do we just let them go extinct? If we don't keep tigers, elephants, and polar bears in zoos-- and we destroy the wild they live in-- then there will be no more of them.

Which led me to the idea that letting them go extinct may be the most humane thing we can do. We should work furiously to save tracts of wild land and preserves and hope some can survive. And then just admit we made it impossible. And let them go. A devastating loss.

Of course, I have rethought that many times. And while I can't imagine letting them go extinct, I also can't figure out how you decide which specific souls should live in captivity.

Perhaps the more important question is: how did we get to this point? What does it say about us as a nation that we allow this to happen? Why isn't the USDA held responsible when they repeatedly fail

to prevent or anticipate violations and animal cruelty of this scale? If it were a private organization, wouldn't it be out of business by now, and paying off fines for its failings? And why are thousands of tigers, lions, cougars, bears and other animals in these situations to begin with? Do we believe, as a nation, that animals that naturally roam hundreds of miles should be condemned to life in a cage because someone thinks it would be nice to have one as a pet, or profitable to keep one as part of a roadside zoo?

If we are going to keep some of these animals alive in captivity for our own pleasure, then surely we can: find a small group of highly qualified, ethical, professionals to breed them appropriately for species preservation; actively limit the number of animals subjected to life in captivity; and provide those that are in captivity an appropriate quality of life.



Camilla Calamandrei
The Tiger Next Door, DVD cover Rolling River Films, 2009 © Calamandrei

Notes

[i] Herzog, Werner. *Grizzly Man* (2005). Lions Gate Films.

[ii] Chua, Kevin. "The Tiger & The Theodolite: George Coleman's Dream of Extinction" in Davis, Lucy. *Regional Animalities (FOCAS Forum On Contemporary Art & Society Vol 6).* Singapore/Kassel 2007. Page 124-150.

[iii] Cameron, John. *Our Tropical Possessions in Malayan India,* Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press 1965 (First Published 1865) Page 91.

Cited in Chua, Kevin. "The Tiger & The Theodolite: George Coleman's Dream of Extinction" in Davis, Lucy. *Regional Animalities (FOCAS Forum On Contemporary Art & Society Vol 6).* Singapore/Kassel 2007. Page 125.

[iv] See Sheik & Wyler. *International Illegal Trade in Wildlife: Threats and U.S. Policy*
Updated August 22nd~~nd~~, 2008.
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110404.pdf accessed June 29th~~th~~ 2011.

[v] Dickenson, Chris. Unpublished transcript of the "Humanimal Forum" (Session I, "On Zoos"). *Artists & Other Animals.* The Substation SEPTFEST Singapore 2004. Curated by Lucy Davis.

Award winning documentary filmmaker and interactive producer ***Camilla Calamandrei*** began her journey into the world of American captive bred tigers in 2003—when a long time tiger owner in the New York area (the "tiger lady" Joan Byron Marasek) was forced to surrender 24 tigers, found to be living in unsafe, inhumane conditions. Following those tigers to their new home in Texas led the filmmaker to a myriad of other captive bred tiger stories around the country. Camilla has previously produced and directed two other independent documentaries about uniquely American stories that were broadcast on PBS and abroad. The historical documentary "Prisoners in Paradise" was voted Best of Festival at the Rhode Island Film Festival in 2001, and the short subject documentary about Ballroom dancing "At Arm's Length" premiered at the Sundance Film Festival in 1990. In addition to making documentary films, Camilla has worked as live action director/producer for The Jim Henson Company, and as a producer of interactive media for Scholastic and LEGO

Lucy Davis is visual artist, art writer, Assistant Professor at the School of Art Design and Media (ADM), Nanyang Technological University Singapore. She is founder of The Migrant Ecologies Project www.migrantecologies.org--an umbrella for arts and ecology initiatives in Southeast Asia. Recent Artistic Projects: Jalan Jati (Teak Road) Shortlisted for the French Prix COAL Art & Ecology Prize 2011); Pioneer Landscape Development Project, (Martha Rosler's Singapore Biennale project), 2011, Together Again (Wood:Cut) series The Substation& Post Museum, Singapore 2009. The Together Again (Wood:Cut) series was nominated for the APBC Signature Asia Pacific Art Prize Singapore Art Museum 2011.Recent Art Writing: "In the Company of Trees" "PLANTS" Volume of ANTENNAE June 2011 A chapter in the Considering Animals anthology. Ashgate UK May 2011. Lucy is also published in The DOCUMENTA #12 READER (Taschen); BROADHSEET Art & Culture (Australia), Art Asia Pacific; (Sydney/New York), Inter-Asia Cultural Studies; (Routledge) NU The Nordic Art Review; (Stockholm. She Founding Editor & Editor in Chief of FOCAS Forum on Contemporary Art & Society 2000-2007.

Camilla Calamandrei was interviewed by Antyennae in summer 2011 © Antennae

sue coe

A new portfolio
Interviewed by Rod Bennison and Giovanni Aloi

SUE COE: I AM AN ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVIST ARTIST

Sue Coe, one of the most committed activist artists in America, has during her thirty-five-year career charted an idiosyncratic course through an environment that is at best ambivalent toward art with overt socio-political content. In this issue of Antennae, the artist presents a new portfolio of images on the subject of animal welfare.
Questions by ***Giovanni Aloi and Rod Bennison***

Giovanni Aloi and Rod Bennison: **Your work seems to have more recently focused on a wider range of subject than ever before. Are there specific reasons for this?**

Sue Coe: Don't think so. I have never seen wide range as being particularly desirable. I could draw a tree for the rest of my life, and that tree could incorporate the entire history of culture. My preference is to choose a topic, or have it choose me, and research it and do it well over a decade.

Aloi and Bennison: **Your graphic portrayal of hammer head sharks being de-finned and discarded is a confronting depiction of how modern society treats wildlife. Where does the inspiration for the creation of this image come from? How and why do images of blood influence your artwork?**

Coe: I was researching "finning" about which I knew next to nothing, and found the hammerhead shark is the most popular victim because this species has more fins. It occurred to me that this shark has excellent stereo vision and depth perception, so can watch herself being mutilated then discarded to drown. I noticed that the human slaughterer has exactly the same position as when slaughtering sheep or goats. The boot goes into the chest to hold the animal on the ground, then the knife goes in. The fins are used as a supposed aphrodisiac, and are tasteless fiber in a soup, but sell for huge amounts of money, giving great incentive for murder. I am an animal rights activist artist. 50 billion non human animals are slaughtered every year. This number does not include oceanic life. They bleed red, same us. The predictable answer is I grew up a block away from a slaughterhouse and lived in front of an intensive hog farm, so was accustomed to being around slaughter. My childhood was dripping in blood, but I would hope that, personal psychology aside, the apology we owe non-human animals for their suffering, at our hands, is more of a motivator.

Aloi and Bennison: **You have been producing animal welfare oriented work for many years. How has your art more tangibly contributed to sensitize people to environmentalist concerns for wildlife slaughter? What impact do you believe your portrayal of slaughterhouses has on animal protection?**

Coe: My focus is not animal welfare, but animal rights; as in the abolition of all exploitation of animals, specifically for "food production." I do not dismiss animal welfare, nor question the sincerity of those involved with it. Nor can I say, not having a crystal ball, that incremental change and awareness will or will not bring people to the road to abolition. There is some evidence that increased awareness on the part of the public, as to cage size and living (death) conditions of the farmed animals, does lead to avoidance of animal products. But the data is incomplete. For example, meat consumption in the USA is down for beef and hogs,

from 112 lbs annually to 108lbs, but up for chickens. This could be the economy, human health concerns, or an increased level of awareness.

Some of my work is graphic, and some is reportage. In the reportage work, direct drawings in slaughterhouses or stockyards, I am revealing what is concealed. What the viewer does with that information is up to them. The more graphic (I mean that in the formal sense) work is more personal rage and sarcasm, and takes more liberties. I try not to get the two confused. They have different purposes. The former is for people who have never given food animals a thought, and the latter is for my community. My work is used in fund raisers all the time by animal protection groups. So firstly, it provides money to save animals, it educates and makes aware, and unlike much of my other social political work, the viewer gets the message. Then rather than feeling helpless, that same viewer can do something about this immediately: becoming a vegan, and avoid all animal products, including the wearing of their skins, and the eating of their bodies. It's very empowering and opens up another world of choices.

The area in which I live is rural, and so is the epicenter of dairy farming, and hunting. I have quite a few interesting conversations with my neighbors and have learned a lot about how they think….Many no longer hunt, and when they did, always found it disturbing. They always have a story to tell of a crying bear that has been shot, or a wounded deer, that stopped their hunting in that moment. For the older males, it's about bonding with other men with beer, not guns. There are a few women that hunt, but mainly I have discovered it's a way for a young boy to bond with their emotionally absent father. A rare minority enjoy killing and will go on killing, even after it's made illegal. The farmers who are animal slavers have the science, the verbiage, of animal exploitation, and justify the practice under providing "food." But it is really a matter of government subsidies keeping those unhealthy and cruel herding rituals going. Many of the farmers would be happy to just focus on plant agriculture. They are doing this for money, and if enough money is in grains and vegetables, they would change.

Aloi and Bennison: **How do you think your drawing/painting style has developed over the past few years? Are we right to suggest that your recent body of work seems to present more three-dimensional/theatrical sceneries that in turn appear to convey a deeper sense of dramatization of your narratives?**

Coe: I do not have much of an idea. I am an art worm eating dirt. Mounds of it are piled up behind me, digested. It's dark in here. I am compelled to keep crawling through the dirt. I do not look back, nor contemplate. Dirt has to be churned for other stuff to grow. It's not for the artist to make these observations. My art history is formed by the Royal College of Art, being influenced by Eduardo Paolozzi and Peter Blake, who were teachers, and then by David Hockney, who was taught by Carel Weight, the professor of painting who influenced so many of that era. Despite living all of my adult life in America, that early education in British culture, the use of sarcasm, the use of black and white, the history of animal protection, as linked to the working class in England, are all factors. Carel Weight used to say he did not teach painting, he taught artists how to paint what they wanted to.

Aloi and Bennison: **Your image of the gassing of pigs is possibly one of your most depressing yet powerful images. How do you think that equating the slaughter of pigs, not kosher in a Jewish diet, with the Holocaust will be seen by the Jewish community?**

Coe: Around 15% of Jewish people in America keep kosher. It's impossible to generalize about how any one person can perceive anything. They will respond to images in a unique way. I am certainly not equating gassing hogs with gassing human beings, as I rarely use analogies or symbols. I stay within reality, reportage if possible. It is interesting that ritual slaughterhouses are shared between Hal-Al and Kosher slaughter, two cultures working together in that not so proverbial sea of blood. I very much doubt if the meat industry has even made that comparison themselves. I have drawn in those slaughterhouses. Gassing hogs is less labor intensive (cheaper) than the single stun method, and is becoming, along with decompression for poultry, standard practice for killing and stunning. Six hogs at one time can be stunned, as opposed to one. Or in other words, one worker can stun six hogs at once. For all the racism that abounds about Shariah law infiltrating American culture . . . to consume a burger in a fast food restaurant in a major city, could mean chowing down on Shariah law, as that animal was killed in a ritual way. Same with many restaurants in NYC, that flesh is either Kosher or Hal-Al. That meat product has an invisible past, how the animal was slaughtered and by which method. What will be most profitable in that community will be what is used.

Aloi and Bennison: **Several of your recent works involve images of fish. Perhaps not surprisingly, they each depict fish with open mouths, gasping for air and life. Are you implying that the slaughter and consumption of fish is of equal concern as the exploitation of other animals?**

Coe: Fish feel pain, flee death, and struggle against capture. The saddest part of drawing from "life" is to go to any fish market and see fishes that have been flown in (poached) from the protected area of the Galapagos, their sparkling colors fading in the dawn of a grey city, falling to the sidewalk, still struggling for life. We are destroying all ocean life, and so will be destroyed in turn. Many species get caught in nets that are 90 miles long, including endangered birds and whales, porpoises, dolphins and turtles. The solution is to not consume fish, and free born life is saved. Fish farms are another blight on the planet. Fish swim in chemicals and are then "harvested." The escapees into the "wild" can pose a danger. In my first book, *Dead Meat*, the subject of fishes was completely ignored, but the updated version, *Cruel*, will certainly include fish.

Aloi and Bennison: **You worked on subjects such as Jumbo and Topsy, the unlucky elephants of the early modern period. Aside from these examples, your main body of work largely revolves around slaughtering and other direct human actions upon animals. Have you entertained the idea of considered other animal-related subjects for your drawings?**

Coe: I just read a brilliant book: *Fear of an Animal Planet*, and it gave me ideas to focus on animals who resist their oppression. Topsy, and elephants like her today, have an idea of justice, which is one reason why they kill. There is evidence, as recounted in the *Fear* book, that elephants and other species in zoos and entertainment, and slaughterhouses, deliberately plan their escapes, and can focus on killing the human that has tortured them. Part of the problem for us, in terms of other social justice movements, is that humans speak for the animals when they can actually speak for themselves, if we listen and look. If there is one main element I have noticed with all the non-human animals I have known, it is that they have a strong idea of justice and injustice, and it hurts them when they see injustice, in more ways than just physical harm.

Aloi and Bennison: **With the impact of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear reactor meltdown, many thousands of animals were left without food and water for weeks. Many have died. How does the impact of the nuclear power industry feature in your work? Should animal activists be more vocal in their condemnation of such environmental issues?**

Coe: Rather, environmental activists should make the links and be vegan, as factory farming (CAFO's) is the number one cause of climate change. Like most people, I have been to fund raisers and awards ceremonies that celebrate different social justice issues. I attended one, for human rights activists, at which they served veal and chicken, on a table lit with candles floating in bowls of living goldfish. Obscene. Compassionate people not making the connection at all is tragic. We all have blinders on about our own human-centric view of the world, our own cultures. We could be just another short lived species. We are highly adaptable to breed and thrive in the most extreme areas of the planet. Our success as a species will be our inevitable end, as nature abhors a stand.

Humans want their toys: the "iWants," the "crackberries," the microwaves, the plasma screens. These devices are plugged in all night, and power comes from coal or nuclear power primarily. They are not designed to save power, but to consume it endlessly. If you have solar power as a prime source, which I do, I can see that a TV that is not designed to ever turn off just drains the power down.

For us to change, we have to use less, consume less, buy less. It is the antithesis of capitalism. How many machines do you have in your home? How many can you live without? Refrigerators and microwaves use up an enormous amount of power. The solution is re-designing those products to use less. If every decision is to make the most profit in the shortest amount of time, then we have no future. Having "Stuff" is not a measure of human happiness.

Aloi and Bennison: **Australians were recently presented with graphic television images of cattle that had been sourced from Australia being inhumanely treated by Indonesian abattoir workers. Because of those images, the story became world news that was followed by the Australian Government placing a moratorium on live animal transport to Indonesia. How can art influence public debate on live transport and other inhumane treatment of animals in developing countries?**

Coe: That ban has since been lifted. Awareness of an issue is uneven, and easily forgotten. A three pronged approach works…….rescue, legislation,

education. As one activist has said, "being an animal rights activist is like pushing a boulder up a mountain with the tip of your nose." It's never one thing that creates change. It's multiple exposures to different facets that creates a different heart. In America, animal issues are regarded as the domain of consumer choice and individual purity in lifestyle, rather than as a social justice issue (with animals being an exploited class) with the concurrent links to political activism. But this is changing. Art, culture, and mass media, change people - but it is easy to forget. I am a vegan, but have to keep educating myself as to the suffering of animals. My sharing of my art is a re-traumatization, sent toward the viewer. We are the developing nations, in a nation of many others species more morally and ethically advanced than we are. We are backward. We are ignorant, even within our own species. Many "poorer" countries do not deny animals have emotions, and they do not eat the same amount of dead corpses. Capitalism is the crime, the global blight. The way we live is just not sustainable. Economics has to re-calibrate and celebrate a lack of growth as being the most desirable state, for our own and others survival.

Aloi and Bennison: **What are you currently working on?**

Coe: Finishing up *Cruel*, then more work on *Topsy*.

Sue Coe is considered one of the foremost political artists working today. Born in England in 1951, she moved to New York in the early 1970's. Coe has been featured on the cover of Art News and has been included in numerous museum and gallery exhibitions nationally and internationally, including a one-person retrospective at the Hirschhorn Museum in Washington, D.C. Sue Coe's work has been published in The New York Times, The New Yorker, Rolling Stone, and many other periodicals. While Coe's work covers a variety of subjects, she has spent years documenting the atrocities committed by people against animals. Her most recent series examines the atrocities that humans commit against one another, specifically revealed by the horrors of war.Coe's own publications include How to Commit Suicide in South Africa, X (The Life and Times of Malcolm X), Police State, Dead Meat, and the recently published Pit's Letter.


Sue Coe 11


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
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SC 2000


DOOSAN
Sue Coe 2011

They stayed alive in a closed slaughterhouse for one week with no water or food
they waited for us to rescue them.


Sue Coe
Feeding Turkeys Celebration
Farm Sanctuary
Nov 2010

Sue Coe Image List

Finning, 2011
The Fish Market, 2011
Gassing Hogs, 2010
Killing Turkeys, 2000
Living Fish on a Slab, 2011
Pigs Buried Alive in South Korea, 2011
Slaughterhouse Rescue, 2010
Me Drawing in Slaughterhouse, 2011
Feeding Turkeys, 2010

Sue Coe is represented by Galerie St. Etienne, New York.
24W 57th St #802 New York NY 10019-3918, United States
Please contact the gallery to purchase original prints by the artist.
Sue Coe supports a number of animal welfare organisations through the sale of her work.
http://www.gseart.com/Artists-Gallery/Coe-Sue/Coe-Sue-Biography.php

LET'S BE SIMPLE [1], FOR STARTERS:

Reflections on Elisabeth de Fontenay's 'Le Silence des Bêtes, *la Philosophie à l'Epreuve de l'Animalité': For the Defence of Animals.*
Text and Images by Julien Salaud
Text translated from French to English by Baden Pailthorpe

For those of you who are interested in the emergence of the figure of the animal in Occidental thought since the Second World War, you would have undoubtedly observed the trauma caused by the discovery of the Nazi death camps, since many of these figures, as Jews, were victims of Nazi persecution. And as those of you who have read Elias Canetti's *Le Territoire de l'Homme*, Jacques Derrida's *L'Animal que donc Je Suis*, or Charles Patterson's *Eternal Treblinka* have no doubt understood, the *bête philosophique* that arose from the ashes of Auschwitz is intimately linked to our future, and that in this beast's wake there remains a veritable string of worrisome, unanswered ethical questions.

It is to those who still have doubts about these arguments that I would like to introduce the work of Elisabeth de Fontenay, who is by now well known in France for her book: *Le Silence des Bêtes, la Philosophie à l'Épreuve de l'Animalité* (1998). The relevance of de Fontenay's work is twofold. Firstly, as an Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne in Paris, and as a prolific essayist, her work is devoted to the rights of animals. What's more, de Fontenay, a Jewish intellectual born in 1934, is President of both the Holocaust Memorial Foundation and the Commission for Holocaust Education. The compassion that she shows for humans and animals alike clearly explains her "powerlessness to define any unique human characteristic."[2] According to her own admissions, this inability is a direct consequence of her being part of a culture that suffered the atrocious conditions of industrial slaughter at the hands of Adolph Hitler's hegemonic insanity.[3] "The situation may arise one day when a witness, struck by a sickness of soul and mind that flows through their blood, finds a distance in the faltering of tragedy, a distance that allows them to welcome the inevitable fall of a human child, and to consider henceforth the shared fate given to those only held as living." It is upon this conviction that the philosophical basis of *Le silence des bêtes* was constructed; retracing the history of Occidental encounters with animals, from the Pre-Socratic dawn, to the era of cloning, to better understand to their implications for the ontology of animals and beasts.

In the beginning was the era of Chronos, as recounted by Plato in *The Statesman*:[4] "[t]here were demigods, who were the shepherds of the various species and herds of animals, and each one was in all respects sufficient for those whom he was the shepherd; neither was there any violence, or devouring of one another, or war or quarrel



Elisabeth de Fontenay
Le Silence des Betes, 1999

among them […] for all men rose again from the earth, having no memory of the past." They had the pleasure to converse "between human and animal," in order to "discuss the philosophy […] of capabilities specific [to man] that are enriched by difference—the treasure of wisdom."[5] It is clear that this dialogue was broken during the cycle of Zeus, a period under which we continue to live today.[6] And rather than nurturing a common bond with the animal kingdom, each and every difference that Ancient Greek humanists established between themselves and their Zoological counterparts seem only to have galvanised the ontological rift that separates them. "It is the inevitability of death that would drive certain animals to be savage, the concern for livestock in agriculture that would submit domestic animals to man, and the emergence of towns that would separate muted animals from talkative politicians."[7] In order to validate these ideas, philosophy has focused itself on sacrifices, from those of the Antiquity, to the Crucifixion of Christ.

As Elisabeth de Fontenay reminds us, the rituals in use at the beginning of Antiquity responded to the ethical concerns that arose from domesticated animals being put to death, since "a wild animal could no longer be offered as a sacrifice any more than a domestic animal could be forced to hunt."[8] She then underlines that the sacrifice of cattle was itself "motivated by the nutritional needs of the newly populated towns." The first expiatory sacrifices would allow the Ancient Greeks to reconcile the slaughter of working cattle and the consumption of their flesh with a mythological belief in the shared genealogy between man and animals. It is from within these rituals that philosophy considers that the animal would experience only the loss of *that* life. This is because these animals experienced a kind of golden age in Ancient Greece, playing a crucial role in the community as "intermediaries between man and the Gods."[9] However, these bovine ceremonies would lead to a shift from the sacrificial to the communal. As a result of the use of taxidermist processes to display the sacrificed animals, the guilt of killing that was at first shared by the community of those who consumed meat would later fall upon the sacrificial knife itself. According to Cicero, this transfer of responsibility from the group to the object illustrates the extent to which the sacredness of animals had been undermined by the fringes of monotheism, because silent and instinctively-driven animals were unable to enter into any agreement whatsoever. As a result, he excluded them from *humanists*, since man and the Gods were assembled under one and the same need for justice. The Stoics would conclude that "without injustice [men could then] use animals for their own interests."[10] It is here that we come to understand, through a persistent and expanding period of Ancient Greek humanism, that the animal would finally lose its position as a sacred intermediary. The *dialogue* that had been formed between the animal, man and the Gods was ruptured by the progressive decline of sacrificial practices after Yahweh, the unique God, expressed to his people both his indifference towards the slaughter of animals and his preference for prayer. Despite this eagerness, the animal would not be completely abandoned by man. Religious laws first implemented by the Hebrews, and subsequently by the Jews, continued to protect animals from the suffering associated with sacrifice-—a concern that also preoccupied the Ancient Greeks.

It was Christianity that would finally rid man of any and all consideration for animals. But what would fate hold for the sacred dialogue? Let us first remember that since Jesus was the "lamb of God," his Crucifixion implied "a solemn shift from the

Elisabeth de Fontenay by Julien Salaud
Elisabeth de Fontenay, 2011 © Salaud

animal towards man," between pagan sacrifices and that of Christ. Add to this the fact that God, having offered his flesh and blood through Christ, whom he embodied during both the Last Supper and the Crucifixion, let himself be "impaled to pay for the debt of mankind."[11] It is here that we come to understand that the allegiance originally formed between animals, Gods and man was then substituted by the trinity of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. If we consider finally that the Crucifixion was and will continue to be a unique event, that would be repeated by the Eucharist celebration "everywhere and everyday, until the end of time," we can conclude that the spiritualised Christian sacrifice was at once communal and expiatory. It is the eternal human suffering symbolised in Christ that brought man together in an infinite guilt, a guilt that also touched the animals with whom the *Lamb of God* previously allowed integration. The suffering of animals was no longer problematic since the new God authorised the consumption of all species. Having removed the brakes from the prickly and awkward issue of animal rights, humanism could then rally its troops on a remorseless trajectory of global destruction. And if the final chapter in this saga would be the "death of God," then, despite his dismissal, today the inconsistency of our predatory relationship with the world continues those very paradigms that were solidified in the foundations of Christianity.

> "I did not try to write the history of that language, but rather the archaeology of that silence. […] We have yet to write the history of that other form of madness, by which men […] confine their neighbours […] What is constitutive is the action that divides [animality], and not the science elaborated once this division is made and calm restored […] Then, and then only, can we determine the realm in which [the animal] and the man of reason, moving apart, are not yet disjunct; and in an incipient and very crude language, antedating that of science, begin the dialogue of their breach, testifying in a fugitive way that they still speak to each other."[12]

It is because of Elisabeth de Fontenay's commitment to highlighting the continuous ruptures that transformed the talkative animal into inert meat that she can declare with conviction that the ontological separation of man from animal can be traced to the Crucifixion of Jesus, and that the paradigmatic manipulations that led to this sacrifice engendered a long-term, methodological dismantling of animals by science.

Underlying Elisabeth de Fontenay's conviction is both her philosophy and her political engagement in the defense of animals. She singles out not only the suffering that we inflict upon animals, but through this, the means by which we may also relieve them of it. The suggestion is by no means easy: if we believe in philosophy, the rupture between man and animal is by no means fully accomplished since "they're still talking to each other." We may be then tempted to open the debate about animal rights in this common "territory" of dialogue, because otherwise, how legitimate would a common justice between man and animal be if the foundations were only debated by man? Yet if any kind of community flourishes in the fissure's lack of progress, we must beware of misanthropy. In 1962, Claude Levi-Strauss shared what history had taught him: "Never before than over the last four centuries has Occidental man been able to understand that by allowing himself to be radically separated from the animal world, by giving himself everything that he withdrew from the other, he created a vicious cycle, and that by this same constantly shifting border, divisions between men themselves would appear, and be used to claim in favour of increasingly restricted minorities the privilege of a corrupt humanism that was at once born to, and borrowed from, the principle of vanity."[13]

Do we, then, understand that it is as dangerous as it is futile to shift these ontological borders? In order to be effective, we must abolish them. Let's be simple, for starters.[14] Then, let's commit ourselves to creating a language that shatters the silence of animals, whilst considering the following point: "In sacred societies, only mystics and artists had received permission, or rather, had seized the right, to pray for animals."[15]

References

[1] TN. The double meaning in French for *bêtes* refers both to the animal and being *silly*, or *simple*; *stupid*.

[2] DE FONTENAY Elisabeth, *Le silence des bêtes, la philosophie à l'épreuve de l'animalité* (SdB). Paris, Fayard, 1998, p. 13.

[3] SdB, p. 16.

[4] Platon, *Le Politique*, Paris : Les Belles Lettres, 1950 in SdB. pp. 65-75

[5] SdB, p.74

[6] SdB. pp. 52-62. In Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, animals were already silent.

[7] SdB. p.74

[8] Ibid. pp. 217-25

[9] Ibid. pp. 217-25

[10] SdB. p. 106

[11] SdB p. 244

[12] FOUCAULT, Michel, *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique. Folie et déraison.* Paris-: Plon, 1961, in SdB. pp. 19-20. Elisabeth de Fontenay has here replaced the words 'madness' (*folie*) and 'madman' (*fou*) with 'animality' (*animalité*) and 'animal' (*animal*) respectively.

[13] SdB. p.47.

[14] TN. The double meaning in French for *bêtes* refers both to the animal and being *silly*, or *simple*; *stupid*.

[15] SdB. p. 745. According to Elisabeth de Fontenay, masterpieces painted by "Rembrandt [...], Chardin [...], Soutine" or Bacon can "repair our damaged eyes", in DE FONTENAY Elisabeth, *Sans offenser le genre humain*. Paris, Albin Michel, 2008, p. 193.

Elisabeth de Fontenay is a French philosopher born in 1934. She began questioning the connections between humans and animals through history with her second book: *Diderot ou le Matérialisme Enchanté* (1981). Ever since, she explored the subject in greater depth in *Le Silence des Bêtes, la Philosophie à l'Épreuve de l'Animalité* (1998) and *Sans Offenser le Genre Humain. Réflexions sur la Cause Animale* (2008). Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne in Paris, Elisabeth de Fontenay is also President of both the Holocaust Memorial Foundation and the Commission for Holocaust Education.

Julien Salaud is a French artist born in 1977. He began studying the symbolic power of animals in visual arts, both theoretically and practically, at the University Paris 8, Saint Denis, where he gained a Master in "Contemporary art and new media" in 2009. He is currently working on a thesis to extend his researches to environmental, political and social issues. His artwork has been shown in the Musée de la Chasse et de la Nature (Paris, 2009), the Palais de Tokyo (Paris 2010) or the Fondation d'entreprise Ricard (Paris, 2011).

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