# Towards Political Inclusiveness: The Changing Role of Local Government in Japan

*Terry MacDougall*

**Abstract**

The Japanese local government system has proved to be responsive to the needs of political development in the sense of enabling broader participation of the citizenry in public affairs. The growth in political inclusiveness came about partly as a result of direct action through "citizens movements" against urban and industrial pollution (during the 1960s and 70s) as well as through consultative committees involving non-governmental groups (more recently). This process has not been always smooth and friction-free but has acquired a strong partnership-oriented tenor in recent years.

World Bank Institute

**Toward Political Inclusiveness:**
**The Changing Role of Local Government in Japan**
*Terry McDougall*
2001. 35 pages. Stock No. 37169

# Contents

# Foreword

This paper was prepared for a project on Local Government Development in Japan. The project was organized by the World Bank Institute under the auspices of the Program for the Study of Japanese Development Management Experience financed by the Policy and Human Resources Development Trust Fund of the Government of Japan.

The principal objectives of this Program are to conduct studies on Japanese and East Asian development management experience and to disseminate the lessons of this experience to developing and transition economies. Typically, the experiences of other countries are also covered in order to ensure that these lessons are placed in the proper context. This comparative method helps identify factors that influence the effectiveness of specific institutional mechanisms, governance structures, and policy reforms in different contexts. A related and equally important objective of the Program is to promote the exchange of ideas among Japanese and non-Japanese scholars, technical experts and policy makers.

The papers commissioned for this project cover a number of important issues related to local government development in Japan. These issues include: the process of controlled decentralization; increasing political inclusiveness; redistributive impact of local taxes and transfers; allocation of grants; municipal amalgamation; personnel exchanges; personnel policies; agency-delegated functions; and local policy initiatives.

Farrukh Iqbal, Program Manager
World Bank Institute

# Towards Political Inclusiveness: The Changing Role of Local Government in Japan

*Terry MacDougall*
*Stanford University,*
*Kyoto Center for Japanese Studies and Stanford Center for Technology & Innovation, Japan*

## A.     LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN JAPAN

This paper examines Japanese local government primarily from the  perspective  of local residents seeking to realize such fundamental political values as liberty (personal rights), political equality (collective preferences through broad participation in public affairs), and human welfare in their everyday lives.[1] These are among the common aspirations of people around the world. Most often,  scholars  have  thought  about  and  examined  how  they  are pursued at the national level. Local government, however, can be an important—even  the most important—arena for achieving these goals in the everyday lives of the people. The focus  of  this  chapter  is  on  the  role  of  Japanese  local  governments  in  translating  such aspirations into reality, and thereby contributing to the quality of political life in the country. It is concerned foremost with the relationship between local government and local residents. That relationship is shaped to a great extent by the character of center-local relations and the jurisdictional, fiscal, and human resources available to localities. Hence, our analysis must also be concerned with local governmental capacity in these areas.

### Relevance of the Japanese Experience

There is a tendency  in  some  quarters  to  disparage  the  relevance  of  the  Japanese experience to the problems and concerns in the developing and transitional countries of today, or to other industrial democracies. Japan, it is said, is homogeneous, isolated from outside forces,  controlled  from  the  top  down,  and  culturally  unique.  Undoubtedly,  there  are differences in the  conditions  or  experiences  of  countries—territorial  expanse,  degree  of cultural diversity, and geopolitical situation, to name a few—that cannot be ignored. But a simplistic view of Japanese exceptionalism, which holds that the miraculous postwar political and economic transformation of the country is irrelevant to others, is shortsighted. An early work that challenged this assumption is the highly influential book, *Japan as Number One*, by Ezra Vogel (1979). This book, reversing the prevalent thematic focus on Japanese learning from the West, helped establish a new paradigm of serious scholarly effort to learn from the Japanese experience. Vogel's work is  especially  interesting  because he  analyzed  Japanese successes, whether in industrial development or in areas such as education, health, and social order, without resort to cultural explanations. Instead, he sought to demonstrate  how  the Japanese devised pragmatic solutions to problems facing all industrial nations, often learning from Western models or making use of the nation's own traditions for distinctively modern purposes. Indeed, the major message of Vogel's book is that the Japanese have learned how to learn, how to gather information, and how to assess experiences without cultural blinders,

---

[1] This theme is developed as well in MacDougall 1988, pp. 9–27.

which has enabled them to devise pragmatic solutions to important contemporary problems. The influence of foreign models and norms in shaping the institutions and practices of modern Japan also suggests that the Japanese experience is far from culture-bound.

It is also of enormous historical importance to note that several critical elements of the Japanese experience have been repeated in other East Asian and Southeast Asian nations, contributing there, as they did in Japan, to both economic growth and democratization. Two such critical similarities are the institutionalization of high standards of bureaucratic skill and objectivity in decision-making and a pattern of growth with equity that fostered the development of civil society.[2] This paper elaborates both themes at the level of local government by focusing on administrative capacity, on the one hand, and political inclusiveness, on the other.

The changing roles of local government in postwar Japan is a classic case not only of the Japanese adopting foreign models for their modern needs, but also of their learning from experience, sometimes surprisingly conflictual in character, and adjusting their institutions and practices to the realities of their evolving society. Increased responsiveness to local residents and political inclusiveness in the policies of Japanese local governments did not emerge full-blown from the reforms of the Allied Occupation or from the altruism of local authorities. Instead, it involved struggle by local residents to have their views heard and addressed and conflict and bargaining between local and national authorities. It also had to await a significant upgrading of the resources and skills of local administrations during the initial postwar decades.

Limitations of the Japanese experience must also be kept in mind, of course. The argument is not that Japan provides an ideal model of strong local government or effective citizen participation. Significant problems exist in both structure and practice, and demand thorough reform. That such a reform effort, aimed at further enhancing the capacity of local governments to handle a wide range of issues on a more autonomous basis, has become a major and relatively consensual item on the national political agenda, suggests that local government in Japan has been effective enough to be entrusted with new authority in shaping the type of society Japan will become in the twenty-first century and for the quality of the country's political life.[3] Similarly, the argument is not that residents of urban Japan, where the vast majority of Japanese now live, have achieved an exceptionally high level of control over the destinies of their cities, that they always actively try to shape local public policy, or that all residents and groups are equally effective in achieving their goals through local government. Still, there is ample evidence to show that a broad range of Japanese citizens in general, and urban residents in particular, are equipped with the knowledge, skills, and institutions necessary to voice their views and make effective claims on local authorities.

The ability of urban residents in Japan to stake their claims in local government seems to have increased in tandem with, although more slowly than, the enhanced capacity of local authorities to handle the challenges of welfare state administration, the environmental crisis, urban planning, and other new issues. The potential for citizen participation in local policymaking and for an effective voice in shaping urban life in Japan is yet to be fully

---

[2] Two important recent contributions to this literature are Laothamata 1997 and Root 1996.

[3] Devolution of authority to local government, along with deregulation, restructuring of the national ministries, and political control of the bureaucracy, is one of the central elements of the current debate on administrative reform, the foremost policy issue of the 1996 general election. Legislation intended by recent governments to prepare the way for transferring broader jurisdiction and resources to localities is discussed later in this chapter.

realized. Nevertheless, Japan's postwar experience in enhancing local policymaking and implementation capacity and in improving the ability of local residents to have their needs addressed by local authorities are worthy of note by interested observers around the world.

All this happened, of course, within the context of a strong central government administration, economic growth, and constitutional guarantees of basic liberties that put some real resources at the disposal of local governments, allowed for genuine bargaining between local and national authorities, and facilitated the growth of civil society. This paper suggests that decentralization and local government reach their full democratic potential within this broader context. The Japanese experience is not a recipe for instant democracy through decentralization. Nor does it suggest that top-down democratization, even in the hands of a benevolent Occupation, automatically creates local authorities responsive to citizen interests. Rather, the Japanese experience is one in which institutional reform, constitutional guarantees, and economic growth combined to allow a political dynamic of bargaining, struggle, and awakening that furthered partnership between local and central authorities and the growth of civil society.

## The Argument, by Example

The reformed postwar local governmental system got off to a disappointing start as early postwar expectations for strong, responsive, and relatively autonomous local government with active citizen involvement went largely unrealized. By the 1970s, however, through a surprisingly conflictual process, a new social contract had emerged, establishing local government as a critical agent in responding to the rising expectations of local residents and in realizing the central values of a democratic society. The range of residents served by local public policies broadened in subsequent years and, in some important policy areas, came to include even resident foreigners. Moreover, in many localities, initiative in the relationship has been taken by the residents themselves with increasing frequency. Two examples show how Japanese local governments became more responsive to the concerns of citizens. The first example, from the 1970s, is the siting of public works, a frequently controversial issue common to local governments around the world. The second is a newly emerging issue, at least in Europe and Japan, of the last decade of the twentieth century and beyond—participation by foreign residents in local public life.

*Example One: Siting of Public Works*

Typically, in the years before 1970, Japanese municipal governments planned capital construction projects such as sewer systems, roads, and waste management facilities in consultation with prefectural and national offices from which partial subsidies were sought. [4] Local assemblies usually applauded the acquisition of such funding, while local residents benefited, or suffered, as the case might be, without much, if any, opportunity to influence the siting and details of the projects. In the 1969 revision of the country's City Planning Law, jurisdiction for such planning was transferred from national to prefectural and municipal government offices and included some nominal provisions for citizen consultation. This reform, however, fell short of the growing demand by residents, particularly in the urban areas, for a greater say on matters affecting their living environment.

This disparity in established top-down patterns of deciding local public policy, on the one hand, and increased citizen concern with the quality of community life, on the other, led

---

[4] This example is cited in MacDougall 1989, pp. 140-41. Much of the information in this example is derived from discussions during a visit to Tokyo as a consultant with the New York City Managers Exchange with the Japan Program, sponsored by the Fund for the City of New York and the U.S.–Japan Foundation in July 1987.

to significant protests in the early 1970s, including the so-called Garbage War in Tokyo. In that struggle, housewives and other ordinary residents sat down in front of garbage trucks and bulldozers until government authorities responded constructively to their concerns. The upshot was that Japanese local authorities learned that they must consult residents and consider their welfare if they are to win their trust and compliance in the conduct of public policy.

It is instructive to recall that, at the same time, American cities experienced a major crisis in waste management policy with the implementation of the Clean Air Act, which brought the construction of incinerators to a virtual halt. In the 17 years following the passage of this act, for example, New York City did not build a single new incinerator and had not resolved the problem of waste disposal. In the same period, Tokyo built 13 resource recovery plants in its 23 inner wards, as well as several more in suburban communities. Local authorities have engaged residents in thorough-going discussions of the siting of plants, their designs, what facilities to include, and what public amenities (from heated pools to recreation facilities for the elderly) will go along with them.

One can discern in this kind of behavior, which cuts across a wide range of local public policies and is prevalent, although not universal, in Japanese localities, the emergence of a new social contract between residents and local governments. It is a social contract that places a high priority on the welfare of residents and provides increased, although many would argue still inadequate, opportunities for collective preferences to be reflected in public policy. In this respect, any discussion of the quality of political life in postwar Japan would be incomplete without consideration of the role of local government.

*Example Two: Political Participation of Foreign Residents*

In Japan, only 1.1 percent of the population consists of foreign residents, and a much smaller number are ethnically non-Japanese citizens; Japan is usually perceived to be a highly homogeneous country. Still, it has several important minority groups, and their status and treatment affect both the character of domestic community and the nation's international relations. The largest of Japan's "foreign" minorities is the close to 700,000 Korean residents, mainly descendants of those who came from the Korean peninsula during the period of Japanese colonization, 1910–45, either in pursuit of economic opportunity or as part of the Japanese Empire's national wartime mobilization of the late 1930s and early 1940s.

While postwar Japan generally has received high marks for its protection of civil and political rights, it has also been subjected to significant criticism for aspects of its treatment of the Korean minority and other groups.[5] Until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Japan ratified the Refugee Convention, International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example, foreign permanent residents were largely ineligible, in law or in practice, for most public welfare, housing, retirement, and health programs. This rendered the concept of the participation of foreign residents in Japanese political life, either as local government employees or as voters, beyond the imagination of most Japanese and Japan-watchers.[6] Yet today, such issues are

[5] See, for example, "Record of the Proceedings for the Study and Review of the Third National Report by the Japanese Government Before the Human Rights Committee of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Report of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations," which is translated in Nihon bengoshi rengokai 1994.
[6] Among the most useful studies of this issue are Tanaka 1996 and Suh 1995.

reaching the public agenda and command wide public support, as the Japanese contemplate the type of domestic community and international presence they would like in  the  years ahead.

Local government has been  a  central  arena  for  discussing  and  extending  the  basic human, welfare, livelihood, and political rights of foreign residents and other minorities of Japan. Obstacles have abounded, and progress has not necessarily been fast or easy, but over the past few decades, foreign residents of Japan and other minorities have gained full access to public health insurance, annuities, family allowances, and  public  housing,  among  other social benefits. Moreover, some localities have hired foreign residents as teachers in public schools or as local  government  employees.  Among Japanese prefectures  and  large  cities, Kawasaki City, in 1996, was the first to open local government posts to foreign residents, while Osaka City and Kochi Prefecture seemed poised to follow. In December 1996, Kobe announced its intention to accept applications from foreign residents for public service jobs, with the possibility of promotion to top ranks in the local bureaucracy.[7] Meanwhile, by mid-January 1996, 990 of the legislative assemblies of  Japan's  approximately  3,300  local governments had passed resolutions calling  for  extending  the  right  to  participate  in  local elections  to  their  foreign  residents.[8] (By  the  year  2000,  the  number  has  passed  1,200 localities.) Moreover, the Supreme Court, ruling on a court challenge to the denial of local voting rights to foreign permanent residents, while rejecting the claim that the Constitution mandated local suffrage for all residents of Japan regardless of nationality, indicated clearly that it did not disallow the possibility of local political participation by foreigners.

The impetus toward an extension of political rights to foreign residents comes from both within and outside Japan. The extensive acculturation, if not full assimilation, of the Korean minority has led many to support more inclusive public policies on humanitarian and communitarian grounds. Exclusion from public life has become more difficult to justify as large numbers of foreign residents in concentrated areas become a permanent and influential part of the social and economic landscape. This tendency toward inclusion is reinforced by a Japanese sensitivity to what are widely perceived as the dictates of "internationalization" in an increasingly "borderless" world. Japan's growing international roles and ambitions further dictate a sensitivity to the need and desirability of living with ethnic diversity.

In many respects, localities and society at large in present-day Japan appear more progressive in their understanding of such currents of the times than national institutions, which seem preoccupied with the issues of social order and control posed by the emergence of the so-called global village. Hence, local government may once again, as was the case in the early 1970s, become the major arena in which the nation reshapes its conception of political community.

---

[7] *Yomiuri shimbun*, December 13, 1996, pp. 1-2. Although limitations still apply to certain posts, these decisions generally have been applauded by spokespersons for foreign residents groups, with some expressing hope that the remaining restrictions will also be lifted.

[8] Tanaka 1996, pp. 7–13, presents a complete list of localities and dates of the assembly resolutions.

## B. RISING LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL CAPABILITIES

*Changing Roles of Local Government in Industrial Democracies*

Local governments in the postwar period have taken on increasing functions and importance in the industrial democracies as a result of the tremendous expansion of the role of the public sector in areas such as economic management, regional development, and social welfare. In many of these countries, the system of local government has been significantly altered through the fusion of local units, the creation of new intermediate institutions, and the proliferation of semi-public bodies. Authority has often been transferred to lower units of local government; local governments have been increasingly called upon to deliver social and other services; and local governments have become important vehicles for meaningful social and political participation. As several of the other chapters in this volume illustrate, Japanese local government has experienced these kinds of changes. There appear to be several reasons for these trends.

First, as societies have become ever more complex and differentiated, the perceived need for public sector responses to social and economic problems and the tendency to concentrate power at the center have brought about increasing friction between the center and local governments. In some cases, that friction has been exacerbated by the different political allegiances of central and local authorities. This was the case, for example, in Japan in the 1970s. Also, the upgrading of administrative skills and diffusion of planning expertise, particularly among the larger localities, and the more comprehensive understanding of local conditions held by local, as opposed to national, officials have made the former more equal partners with the center. In addition, local authorities in some countries have banded together in associations for collective lobbying at the center. The result has been significant intergovernmental shifts of authority either through the creation of new institutional structures or intensified bargaining between officials at different levels of government.

Second, during periods of rapid economic and social change, some localities have been faced with major new problems not yet experienced by the nation as a whole. Local authorities, on their own initiative or, in some cases, as a result of citizen pressure, have often pioneered at least rudimentary programs to meet these new needs and demands, with economic growth providing the margin of discretionary funds required for such efforts. Moreover, the transformation of community and family life and social values in the industrial democracies has put a new premium on responding to citizen pressures at the neighborhood level, where citizens might more easily participate and influence policies that affect their daily lives. Thus, local governments have been called upon to reorganize their activities to provide more meaningful avenues of social and political participation. In addition, in virtually every country, political forces have found it useful to identify themselves with such demands and to articulate them at higher levels of government. Localism, far from disappearing as countries modernize, has become an important contemporary political force; identification with localistic causes can be a powerful political resource. A major reason for this is that territoriality remains the central principle in democratic representation, whether in local or national politics.

Third, as the cost of social welfare and other public programs increases, governments simply do not have sufficient resources to respond to all the identified needs. At the same time, policies developed at the center cannot always anticipate or be responsive to the

priorities of different localities. One way for government authorities to confront the resource gap and to relieve pressure for policy initiatives at the center is to give lower levels of government the responsibility for fulfilling social needs, as well as the choice of how to utilize scarce resources, either by returning unencumbered tax moneys to local areas or by permitting greater taxing powers or bond allocations by institutions of local government. With the onus of choice in setting priorities on local authorities, some localities have responded with creative adjustments to scarcity, while the shortcomings of others have become evident in cumbersome service delivery systems, bloated bureaucracies, and the like. In either case, accountability in the performance of local officials has become a more salient issue than ever before, with possible implications for the equilibrium between local and national government and for the broader political fate of those involved.

Finally, as the activities and problems of the governments of the industrial democracies have become increasingly complex, leaders at both the central and local levels have realized that social control can be enhanced by decentralizing some functions and activities to lower levels of government. In other words, leaders have learned to identify activities that are essential for effective governance and social control at the center, and those that are not. In many instances, the latter have been relegated to local governments, thereby deflecting social protests from the center, and isolating it at the lower level.

These changing roles of local government in the advanced welfare state have activated, reinforced or expanded the potential contributions of local government to democracy. Among the greatest contributions of local government to contemporary democratic governance are in the realm of human welfare where it can contribute to the well-being of residents by coordinating development and services, reconciling community opinion, advocating consumer interests and serving as agents for responding to rising demands.[9] Political participation at the local level may also help mitigate the participatory inadequacies of the large nation-state and serve as a useful training site for citizens, political leaders and oppositions. Contemporary local government also offers opportunities for protecting or expanding personal liberties by mitigating the power of a centralized state. For example, it can provide accessible points of pressure for minorities who are not large or concentrated enough for national influence; and associations of localities can serve as a countervailing force to central authority. The extensiveness of contemporary intergovernmental linkages (among different levels of government) in the advanced industrial democracies offers some degree of assurance that this expanded role of local government will not give rise to or reinforce local tyrannies, which if they do emerge are vulnerable to legal, administrative and financial pressures from the center.

*The Japanese Experience*

In Japan, strong local government did not emerge fully developed from the reforms of the Allied Occupation; and certainly, until at least the 1970s, it could hardly be said to have been at the forefront of the country's democratization. This changed significantly in the early 1970s in ways suggested by some of the above arguments. For close to a decade, local

---

[9] For a more detailed analysis of democratic values and local government, see MacDougall 1989, pp. 139-169, and 1988, pp. 9–27.

government was the principal arena of political contention and policy innovation, contributing clearly and significantly to momentous shifts in national policy priorities and, at the same time, to a strengthening of civil society. Let us review that history, and then focus on the developments most important to the enhancement of local policymaking capacity and the inclusionary character of the system. Among the most important of these developments were increased local administrative expertise, a political imperative to innovate, the growing scope for policy choice, and the devolution of authority to local levels.

PROBLEMS OF THE NEW SYSTEM. In practice, the postwar configuration of the local government system closely resembled its prewar antecedents, derived largely from the continental European models of administration, than American-style decentralized local government. Among the reasons for this result were strong bureaucratic resistance to administrative and financial decentralization, skepticism on the part of conservative governments concerning the capacity of local authorities, and the failure of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (hereafter, SCAP) to tackle problems of local finance early and strongly. For example, SCAP's attempt to provide local home rule was unsuccessful because Japanese bureaucrats reworded draft constitutional provisions. Also, much of the national work previously assigned to appointed governors was transferred to the popularly elected governors, who, in carrying it out, acted as agents of the national ministries and remained subject to their guidance. Moreover, this practice, known as agency delegation (*kikan inin jimu*), was extended to the municipalities. Belatedly, in a report issued in 1949 by the Shoup Commission, SCAP acknowledged that the new administrative system lacked an adequate tax structure and division of authority, without which local control of local affairs and democratic accountability remained problematic.

Even before the end of the Occupation, Japan's conservative national politicians, who have dominated government since 1948, began to reassess the utility of the newly decentralized institutions. In general, they were skeptical about local administrative skills, concerned that autonomous local institutions might be unduly influenced by opposition groups, and convinced that Japan's economic recovery depended on establishing greater central administrative controls. Although the most politically explosive aspects of administrative re-centralization were legislated by the mid-1950s, the process continued in other areas during the next two decades.

Re-centralization of the police and educational systems stirred strong opposition by socialists, labor unionists, and intellectuals fearful of reversion to prewar authoritarianism. Fundamental revision of the early postwar police system was delayed by political protest until 1954, when a new Police Law established a single "autonomous" prefectural-level police system, coordinated by a National Police Agency under the guidance of the National Public Safety Commission. Similarly, in 1956 the Board of Education Law was replaced by a new Educational Administration Law, which provided for the appointment of regular members of education commissions by the governors and mayors, with the approval of their local assemblies, and appointment of superintendents of education by higher-level authorities. The commissions' role in budgetary matters was reduced to that of consultation with local authorities, while the Ministry of Education's guidance of curriculum was strengthened.

Re-centralization also resulted from the efforts of central government bureaucrats and conservative politicians to achieve administrative efficiency and to facilitate economic recovery and development. Administrative efficiency was pursued through the time-honored

practice of encouraging amalgamations of municipalities, largely through financial incentives. Amalgamations were seen as a means to avoid waste of scarce resources, to upgrade the overall quality of public administration, and to facilitate the implementation of economic plans and national functions delegated to localities. Opponents, however, argued that amalgamations weakened citizens' control of local authorities and their sense of political efficacy.

Additional plans for replacing the prefectures with broader administrative regions were never realized because of entrenched conservative political interests at the prefectural level and the opposition's concern over excessive re-centralization. But regional blocs were created for the implementation of economic development policies; cooperation among localities in the delivery of services, including fire prevention, sanitation, and welfare, was encouraged by national legislation. Financial incentives were also provided for coordinated development among neighboring municipalities.

By the late 1960s, administrative re-centralization was proceeding at a rapid pace, although with less political confrontation. Revisions of some laws, such as that concerning waterways, resulted in effective jurisdiction being reabsorbed by the national ministries, and local authorities would now have to seek their permission for related projects. Branch offices of the central ministries were newly established or strengthened in their role of guiding local government. By 1975 the number of tasks performed by local governments under central ministerial guidance had doubled for municipalities and had increased by nearly two-and-a-half times for prefectures since 1952. Moreover, with the creation of a wide range of centrally funded public corporations, such as the Japan Housing Corporation and the Japan Highway Public Corporation, local authorities often lost the initiative and control over public investment and development within their jurisdictions. Localities in many areas of the country faced even more difficult problems as private development far outpaced the ability of local authorities to plan or guide the long-term destinies of their cities.

**THE DRIVE TOWARD ECONOMIC GROWTH.** By the mid-1950s, Japan's principal private industries had established a variety of sectoral industrial associations (*gyokai)* and national federations, such as *Keidanren* (Japan Federation of Economic Organizations), that facilitated close cooperation for national economic expansion with the still powerful central bureaucracy and the newly unified Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).[10] By this time, national planning had shifted from an emphasis on resource extraction and redevelopment of light industry to the establishment of central and regional development laws and banks to support heavy and chemical industrialization. These provided mechanisms for public financing and investment in new industrial sites, water resources, transportation, roads, harbors, and other industrial infrastructure. Local authorities joined this effort at industrial expansion by passing ordinances to attract industry. The number of such ordinances, which provided tax incentives, public services, and even subsidies to industries, increased rapidly, from 9 to 41 at the prefectural level and from 102 to 1,303 among municipalities between 1955 and 1969. Nevertheless, during the first half of this period, major industries continued to concentrate in the large metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya because of their skilled labor forces and relatively high stock of industrial infrastructure.

---

[10] For an excellent short analysis of the ties among business associations, the bureaucracy, and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, see Okimoto 1984, pp. 305-44.

A series of new laws in the early 1960s, however, spurred regional development, partially reversing the tendency of central government planners to concentrate resources in the Pacific industrial belt between Tokyo and Osaka-Kobe (Muramatsu 1975). These new laws were largely a response to pressure exerted by local authorities, through LDP representatives in the National Diet, who sought national government assistance in luring industries to less-developed regions. Local authorities now competed fiercely with each other in so-called petition wars to receive national government designation as target areas, and industries such as petroleum refining, petrochemicals, steel, nonferrous metals, machinery, and other heavy and chemical products spread throughout the country.

In effect, by the late 1960s, the process of administrative re-centralization and the drive for economic development had forced localities to look toward prefectural offices or the central government for policy leadership, detailed administrative guidance, and financial assistance. The ideal of relatively autonomous localities managing their own affairs was far from the reality. Yet little friction was evident between the center and localities.

At the local level, the new institutional arrangements also did not seem to be working as postwar reformers had planned. Executive dominance continued, with local assemblies showing relatively little policy initiative or ability. Citizens made sparse use of their new rights of recall and direct demand. Politically, liberal democrats or independent conservatives dominated virtually all prefectural and municipal assemblies and the vast majority of mayoral and gubernatorial posts. This political cohesiveness between the center and local governments undoubtedly facilitated smooth relations. Moreover, the bureaucratic sectionalism of the pivotal prefectural governments, which were acting increasingly as liaison offices between the central ministries and municipalities, perpetuated long-standing practices of localities seeking support from higher authorities before coordinating policies locally. Hence, when prominent foreign analysts assessed the legacy of the Occupation in the mid-1960s, they generally agreed that SCAP's efforts to strengthen local government had come largely to naught, although the extremes of prewar centralization had not returned (Passin 1968; Steiner 1965).

LOCAL INITIATIVE. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, many local authorities had begun to rethink their priorities. Most had not invested sufficiently in roads, sewers, parks, housing, and other expensive social infrastructure. Instead, they had been absorbed in providing the minimum required educational, sanitation, and welfare facilities and services and promoting the local economy. Although Japan's rapid economic growth had enriched the country and elevated the standard of living of its people, it had also brought about social changes that generated even greater demands on local services. Rapid growth had led to a depopulation of the countryside and excessive urban crowding. One result was the spiraling of urban land prices that made the provision of an adequate social infrastructure all the more difficult. Another was the proliferation of new urban problems, such as pollution, traffic congestion and accidents, and uncontrolled urban sprawl. Social change also lessened the solidarity of the local community and family, traditional social buffers, and created new needs for social services—particularly for the old, the very young, and the handicapped. The intensity of such problems in many areas led to social unrest and efforts by ordinary citizens to seek help from local government.

Under these circumstances, many localities undertook significant policy initiatives. As suggested in the case of siting public works described earlier in this chapter, policy innovation and the reorientation of local authorities toward greater consideration of citizen views and

needs was often the product of confrontation and struggle, although, as will be elaborated later, localities had developed the skills necessary to take ameliorative action on many of the problems.

Localities made substantial efforts to improve communications with residents through public hearings, consultations, and public relations programs, including the establishment of legal consultation windows, little city halls, and citizen committees to monitor various local governmental functions. Some cities developed elaborate mechanisms for citizens to participate in local planning. Public relations programs included newsletters, generally circulated through the local delivery hubs of major newspapers, and tours of local social service facilities for targeted groups, particularly the elderly (see MacDougall 1975).

Local governments pioneered in a wide range of pollution control and welfare programs. The former were particularly important in establishing the credibility of local authorities in the eyes of residents. Pollution had reached such severe levels that it was no longer possible to simply plead lack of jurisdiction and pass the blame to industry or the central government. Many an incumbent mayor or governor found his political career on the line over this issue, and for the first time, a significant number of them lost to opposition candidates—usually backed by the Socialist Party and one or more other parties in opposition nationally—who promised to do more. That frequently included agreements between local governments and private industry to limit pollution levels, or pollution control ordinances that set stricter standards than in the national law. Although such arrangements had dubious legal bases and were strongly challenged by central ministries, the pollution issue took on such salience at the national level that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and central ministries were forced not only to give ex post facto sanction to them, but also to use the local initiatives as models for national policies.

There was far less popular pressure for new social policies, but local governments began to respond creatively to the increased need for social services as well. Most notable in the costs involved, over 250 localities established free medical care for the elderly and childhood allowance programs, while the central government was still unwilling to commit itself to such measures. As in the case of pollution control, these local initiatives, combined with pressure from opposition parties and bureaucratic lobbying, forced the central government to implement similar programs in the early 1970s. Localities initiated a wide range of other social welfare policies as well, largely to ameliorate the difficulties of the weak and those who had earlier been left out of the nation's headlong leap into prosperity; most of these had no counterpart on the national level.

*Local Governmental Skills and Democratic Capacity*

**ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTISE.** One of the essential factors enabling Japanese local governments to play a central role in addressing rising local needs and concerns by the 1970s was the massive upgrading of their administrative skills. Many things contributed to this: early postwar amalgamations of local governmental units; personnel exchanges, local governmental employee training programs, professionalization of the local civil service; the creation of planning departments in many localities; and the like.

Continuing a national policy begun in the Meiji Period, postwar Japanese political authorities pushed a massive program of local governmental amalgamations that greatly reduced the number of municipalities. Although these amalgamations and annexations were

frequently accompanied by intense debate and conflict, many protesting that they attenuated citizen identity with the municipality and put it out of citizens' reach and control, they seem to have accomplished their intended aim of creating entities capable of handling a broad range of administrative functions, many assigned to them under the guidance of national ministries.

The general quality and specific skills of the local civil service were upgraded significantly in the first few postwar decades. This began in the period of postwar reform with the extension of the civil service examination system to the local governmental level and establishment of objective criteria for promotion. Thereafter, local governments shared in postwar Japan's emphasis on investment in human resources and on-the-job-training, whether conducted by the local governments themselves, the Ministry of Home Affairs, professional associations, or branches of the All-Japan Prefectural and Local Governmental Employees Union. By the 1970s, local governments were attracting top university graduates, offering higher salaries than the national government and a lifestyle with fewer disruptions to family life from locational change. Moreover, the ability of the larger localities to attract mid-career professionals to local governmental service enabled them to expand their planning and service delivery roles. By the mid-1960s, the City of Yokohama, for example, was able to attract individuals with backgrounds in architecture and medicine for key roles in building its expertise in city planning and pollution control, areas in which Yokohama became a national leader and pattern-setter (MacDougall 1975).

The development of city planning expertise was a key factor in enabling local authorities to gain a measure of control over the developmental destinies of their cities. In the 1950s and 1960s, ministries, agencies, and public corporations worked directly with sections and divisions of city and prefectural governments, offering financial incentives for road construction, public housing, and other centrally conceived programs. Consultations between local and national bureaucrats frequently proceeded well before a consensus on possible projects was formulated within the affected localities. Localities generally formulated their city plans with the guidance, and often in the offices, of the Ministry of Construction. The growth of strong local planning departments, especially after the aforementioned change in the Local Planning Law in 1969, however, allowed local governments to begin to set their own development priorities and to strengthen their bargaining leverage with national ministries and public corporations.[11] Moreover, by the 1970s and 1980s it was clear that local governments were learning a great deal from each other, and even from abroad, as they dispatched personnel for short- and long-term visits and consulted with each other on matters of common interest (Samuels 1983).

---

[11] Toshiya Kitayama's chapter in this book presents several examples of how representatives of local authorities successfully bargained with central officials in developing policy initiatives to meet pressing local needs. Two of the many cases of this that I came across in my research were in the cities of Asahikawa and Yokohama. Asahikawa was particularly early. In 1968, it became the first city in the country to develop a pedestrian mall, periodically closing off downtown shopping streets to vehicle traffic for a period of time to stimulate the patronage of residents. To do this, city authorities lobbied with the Ministry of Construction and the National Police Agency, among other central government offices with authority that impinged on local discretion in such matters. (October 1971 interviews with city planners at Asahikawa City Hall.) It was later able to integrate this experiment into a new city plan. In the case of Yokohama, city authorities bargained not only with national offices but also with the Road Development Public Corporation to implement that part of its city plan in the early 1970s that called for the unorthodox idea of putting a major highway traversing the central city underground rather than elevating it. It not only received permission to do so, but also succeeded in attracting over 90 percent of the funding from outside sources, including the above public corporation. (1978 interview with Akira Tamura, then chief city planner in Yokohama.)

INSTITUTIONAL OPPOSITION AND THE IMPERATIVE TO INNOVATE. While national authorities directly controlled local government in the prewar period through prefectural governors appointed by the Home Ministry, postwar reforms broke or attenuated hierarchical controls. Most important, the Constitution of 1947 provided for direct popular election of governors and mayors and for the separation of local administration from the national bureaucracy. The direct election of chief executives had the effect of generating a new political dynamic: governors and mayors had to direct their attention to local interests and electoral constituencies, even at the expense of cohesive relations with national authorities. Much of the work of prefectures and larger cities was still delegated to them under national government supervision (no longer direct control), but communications and directives guiding the conduct of this work had to be within the scope of the law.[12] Separation of local and national administrations allowed the emergence of differing perspectives and priorities. Local chief executives and assembly heads, acting through their national organizations as well as individually, became important bargaining agents at the center for financial, legal, and other conditions favorable to local government.

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, political differences between local executives and the national government sometimes reinforced differences of institutional vantage point. This introduced a clearly conflictual element into local-national relations and appears to have been conducive to policy innovation and diffusion. As noted above, this was the era of strong conservative-progressive competition in local politics. By the mid-1970s, over 40 percent of the nation's population lived in cities or prefectures governed by progressive executives, supported in most cases by the Socialists and other parties in opposition nationally.

Many progressive executives came to office with a mandate for change, specifically to ameliorate the so-called "distortions" in the living environment generated by the country's one-sided emphasis on rapid economic growth. These distortions included environmental degradation; the accumulation of old and new urban problems, from inadequate social infrastructure and zoning regulations to traffic accidents and waste disposal; and the growing need for social programs such as day care centers and assistance to the elderly. Moreover, the proliferation of civic movements, focused particularly on environmental issues, put pressure on conservative and progressive local executives and assemblies to pay greater heed to the needs, concerns, and voices of residents.

The upshot of this institutional and political opposition between local and national authorities was, first, a change from the "cohesive" character of local-national governmental relations to one that, at times, had an unmistakably "conflictual" element, and, second, the generation of innovative local policies that spread quickly among localities and became a powerful force in changing national policy priorities.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party, under strong pressure from local conservatives to be more responsive on environmental and social welfare issues lest they become the vehicle of opposition growth nationally, made a dramatic about-face in the early 1970s by enacting strong national measures to combat pollution and to establish a more developed welfare state. This policy response by the liberal democrats successfully diffused the political challenge from local progressives and impeded the latter's ability to construct a local road to national

---

[12] For an excellent legal discussion of the danger of central bureaucrats exceeding the scope of the law when issuing directives to local authorities, see Tanaka 1956 (pp. 3–6). For a case study of the willingness of local authorities by the 1970s to make independent legal interpretations contrary to perceived misjudgments by central officials, see MacDougall 1975.

power, but it did not eliminate the "institutional opposition" that had developed in center-local relations. Rather, with the simultaneous growth of the welfare state and the need for fiscal constraint as a result of the economic slowdown following the oil crises of the 1970s, there emerged a growing need for intergovernmental bargaining and cooperation in adjusting to the new era. In the process, national authorities recognized the important roles that local governments could play in managing the modern welfare state, implementing the new consensus on pollution control, and formulating policies for their own revitalization. One illustration is the delegation of most of the jurisdiction for implementing the new national pollution control legislation of the early 1970s to local government, which already had greater expertise and personnel than national ministries involved in such matters.[13]

**THE NEW PARTNERSHIP AND DEVOLUTION.** In effect, by the late 1970s, local-national governmental relations in Japan had moved away from the conflictual elements of the previous decade to a more cooperative motif, in which localities were beginning to be perceived as partners in the collective enterprise of governing an advanced industrial nation and welfare state. This recognition gave rise to a new focus on decentralization or devolution as the Japanese began to contemplate the character of the society that they wanted to create in the twenty-first century. The voices in Japan for devolution of authority and financial resources from central to local government have become a large and differentiated chorus, including local and national political, business, and academic leaders. In the early 1970s, after passing a series of strong pollution control measures and welfare legislation that marked the full emergence of the welfare state in Japan, the national government moved quickly to transfer to local governments the authority to implement many of these new public policies. For example, larger municipalities in particular received extensive authority for enforcement of national pollution control measures, and also gained recognition of the legality of their innovative local environmental policies, which had earlier been condemned by the national authorities. From the late 1970s, leading progressive and conservative governors, such as Kazuji Nagasu of Kanagawa and Hiroshi Miyazawa of Hiroshima, respectively, argued strongly that even more autonomous local authority was needed in the emerging age of localism to better administer the programs of the welfare state, revitalize local communities in the aftermath of the oil crises and industrial restructuring, and assure political accountability.

One of the major consequences of the fiscal crisis experienced by the Japanese state in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the wake of the economic slowdown and expansion of government services was a focus on administrative reform that crystallized during the Nakasone administration (1982–-87) in the First Administrative Reform Council, a high-level advisory body to the prime minister charged with the task of recommending measures to streamline the governmental apparatus for coping with the challenges of the new age. This council was followed in the late 1980s and early 1990s by a Second and Third Administrative Reform Councils.

The reports of these councils progressively emphasized the need to loosen central governmental regulations in an age of internationalization, refocus national priorities on upgrading the quality of national life, and devolve a wide range of authority from central ministries to localities. *The Final Report of the Third Council* included an "Outline for Local Decentralization," which provided the gist of a cabinet resolution by the same title passed on

---

[13] A useful English language discussion of this is OECD 1974.

December 25, 1994, and the Law for the Promotion of Local Decentralization passed by the National Diet the following year. Moreover, other governmental advisory commissions, such as the 23rd Local Administrative System Research Committee, provided the rationale for later legislation establishing the category of medium-size central cities, which, like the designated large cities, are to receive a wide range of authority and financial resources normally reserved for the prefectures.[14]

Finally, many leading politicians, especially from the New Frontier Party, have argued that the efficiency and effectiveness of national ministries in fulfilling their basic missions in our increasingly "borderless world," in which Japan is expected to become a more active international leader, is dependent upon their relinquishing a wide range of their domestic tasks to a highly competent local bureaucracy (see, for example, Ozawa 1994).

Enhanced administrative expertise, real fiscal resources, the ability of localities to generate innovative public policies, a growing scope for policy choice, moves toward a devolution of authority to local levels, and a focus on making local public policy responsive to the needs and collective preferences of residents all facilitated a growth in the inclusionary capacity of Japanese local government and politics. We turn now to an examination of this emerging inclusiveness of Japanese local government and local public policy from the perspective of the citizens.

## C.    CITIZEN EFFORTS TO SHAPE LOCAL PUBLIC POLICY

*Background*

Japanese local government and politics have been important avenues for incorporating broad segments of the population into the political process and putting their concerns, both old and new, on the public agenda. Japanese voters consistently turn out in greater numbers in local than in national elections. They indicate that they feel closer to local government than to higher levels of government, and can more easily influence it. There remain significant variations by location—for example, rural residents turn out in higher proportions than those in the cities and tend to view local assembly members as delegates from their immediate communities, representing, protecting, or securing very tangible local interests such as the construction of roads, schools, recreation halls, and other public infrastructure and facilities. This immediate and tangible quality of the concerns of residents in relation to local government, however, remains in urban areas as well, although there it coexists with more diversified perspectives.

A principal reason for the persistence of a highly localistic and tangible quality in the consciousness of voters in local politics is the at-large system of elections to local assemblies in all localities, except for the dozen or so designated large cities and the prefectures as a group. The at-large electoral system, in which all candidates compete against each other regardless of affiliation, allows election to the local assembly with a small number of votes. For example, an assembly member can be elected in a city of 200,000 with a mere 1,500

---

[14] For a short, informative discussion of most of the above committee reports, see Hitoshi, Shindo, and Kawato 1994 (Japanese original published 1990). This textbook on Japanese politics, translated into English by James White of the University of North Carolina, illustrates the great importance now attached to local government within the Japanese political system by its devotion of approximately one-fifth of the book to local government and intergovernmental relations. For the text of some of these reports, see Chiho jichi seido kenkyukai 1995.

votes, a small number that can be mobilized on the basis of personal connections among friends, neighbors, and organizational contacts.[15] Localism persists as well, since neighborhood associations and other local social organizations involved in crime prevention, welfare, and commercial associations are part of the intricate fabric of local governance. Local authorities regularly call upon such organizations to assist in the implementation of public policies in areas from sanitation and traffic safety to neighborhood policing.

This highly localistic character of local government and politics began to change, or more accurately to be overlaid with more complex considerations, as a result of rapid urbanization in the 1950s and 1960s; amalgamations of localities; the injection of partisanship into local elections; the emergence of divisive developmental issues that could affect the character of the local community; and new concerns, such as environmental quality, welfare services, city planning processes, and issues of basic rights, which could be addressed only on a level greater than the immediate neighborhood. This could be seen in public opinion polls in the major urban areas, which experienced a transformation in the concerns of voters from a preoccupation with highly tangible local interests such as roads to a concern for broader quality of life, social and planning issues, and other public policies that affect the life of the larger community.

Although the change from relatively uniform and cohesive neighborhoods to the diversity of contemporary Japan was accompanied by a drop in the level of local voter turnout, it also gave rise to new modes for expressing citizen concerns to local authorities. Some of these, such as consultation windows, citizen monitors, and local public opinion surveys, were initiated by local authorities themselves, while others, from citizen protest movements to more recent efforts at citizen policy initiatives, have involved attempts by residents to gain greater direct influence in the shaping of local public policy. Moreover, minority groups such as the *burakumin*, or permanent foreign residents, especially Koreans, have often seen their concerns addressed first and more directly at the local level, rather than in the national political arena. Local governments, for example, have been the principal agents of extending many welfare benefits to resident Koreans and other foreign minorities, and they are now the firmest backers of allowing them to participate in local elections.

As was suggested in the previous section, Japanese local government has gone through some of the same changes and developments as those in most other industrial democracies and has been subject to similar shaping forces, such as a massive expansion of the public sector to meet new social and economic problems resulting from rapid postwar economic growth, urbanization, social change, the emergence of various issues earlier or in more acute form in certain localities than in the nation as a whole, and the high cost and controversy surrounding the implementation of many of the new public policies. It is thus important to put the changing relationship between residents and local government into the context of these broader currents, which involve changing relations between the local and national authorities themselves. A simple periodization, used also in the preceding chapter, can serve as a useful tool for organization and analysis. Within this periodization, we can examine a few examples of citizen-local government interaction that are representative of the respective periods.

---

[15] For a more detailed analysis of this point, see MacDougall 1976, pp. 31–56. The importance of personal connections in the voting decision, especially in local politics, in Japan is highlighted in Flanagan and Richardson 1977.

*1945–65: Reshaping the Postwar Political, Administrative, and Economic Systems*

The first two postwar decades were a period of enormous social and economic change and political contention. The reforms of the Allied Occupation not only created a more democratic political structure, but also helped establish the basis of a more egalitarian society with such measures as land reform, expansion of the rights of organized labor, revision of social codes, and strong constitutional guarantees of basic human rights. Although efforts at economic deconcentration stopped short of the initial intentions of the occupying powers, they seemed to be adequate to stimulate a new competitiveness within Japanese business circles. While the political left and right contended over the fate of postwar reforms, the Japanese economy entered a period of rapid economic growth, building on an increasingly well-trained labor force, high levels of savings and investment, and a closing of the technological gap with other advanced industrial nations. Aided as well by the massive expansion of world trade and relatively low prices for the critical imports of fuels and raw materials, the Japanese economy became the third-largest in the world by 1968.

During the first two postwar decades, however, the early postwar reforms had not yet produced the strong local governments envisaged by Occupation authorities and Japanese reformers. Most localities found themselves plagued by financial difficulties that prolonged their dependence on higher authorities for assistance, and impelled them to pursue developmental policies through such measures as ordinances for attracting industry that would enable them, they hoped, to ride the wave of rapid economic growth. This administrative imperative for working closely with national authorities was reinforced by the political dominance of conservative politicians at all levels of government, leading to what Michio Muramatsu has called a "cohesiveness" in local-national relations.

Localities themselves were not necessarily tranquil during this period; some experienced bitter fights over amalgamations and protests over the manner in which local authorities carried out road, sewer, sanitation, and other construction projects. For the most part, this took place in a context in which channels of communication between local residents and local governmental authorities were poorly developed, and in which, despite occasional protests, the predominant mode of citizen representation was that of entrusting their interests to delegates sent to the local assembly from their communities. In the dizzying speed of rapid social and economic change, citizen control of local affairs generally took a backseat to the imperative of intergovernmental cooperation in economic development and the effort to strengthen the financial underpinnings of local government.

The upshot of these processes was not a simple return to a prewar style of centrally dominated administrative leadership. The changes in administrative structure and capacity that grew out of amalgamations of local governmental units, upgrading of the quality of local administrative skills, and delegation to local governmental authorities of a broad range of new policy functions under higher-level supervision established the basis for active, and often creative, local administration. This activism of the local administration itself, however, sometimes led to divisions within the local polity over policy options and priorities, and at times stirred strong protests against its plans and projects. Perhaps the most visible case to the world of such local resistance to the pursuit of a large-scale project by local-national governmental administrative fiat was the construction of Narita Airport, which resulted in protracted and bitter protests that continue to affect use of the airport to this day, and that

dramatized for the nation and the world the pitfalls of administrative insensitivity to local sentiment.[16]

Less well known abroad than the case of Narita Airport, but more important for its demonstration effect within Japan, was a citizen movement in the mid-1960s in the cities of Mishima and Numazu (see Lewis 1980). This movement arose in the semi-rural but urbanizing areas close to Mt. Fuji in opposition to local governmental cooperation with national authorities in developing a large-scale petrochemical complex. Community division into pro- and anti-development factions led to the ousting of the incumbent conservative mayor, who had cooperated with national planners and with local administrative and business leaders to promote plans for the petrochemical complex. In place of this pro-development faction, a coalition of conservative and progressive forces emerged that opposed the construction. The citizen movement that drove this change in the complexion of local politics was built by both established community leaders and newly active citizens, who made a concerted effort to investigate and visit other communities that had been transformed by similar industrial development projects. The Mishima-Numazu case is usually cited as the first of what soon became a nationwide growth of environmental protest movements, numbering over 3,000, and also heralded the emergence of more competitive local politics, divergence in local and national policy priorities, and considerable intergovernmental conflict. These cases illustrate the cohesiveness that characterized the first two postwar decades of local-national governmental relations, the limited channels available to local residents for influencing major policy choices affecting their communities, and the tendency for significant differences among local residents on such issues to erupt into serious conflict.

*1965–79: Culmination of Rapid Economic Growth and Conflictual Transformation of Local Public Policy*

The decade from the mid-1960s through the mid- to late-1970s was one in which local government and politics arguably became the principal arena in Japanese society for the initiation of a dramatic shift in national policy priorities from an emphasis on rapid economic growth to placing a higher priority on human welfare and the living environment. There were accompanying shifts in relations between the central and local governments and between citizens and city hall, as localities across the country tried to cope with a new citizen activism and the expression of a wide range of new concerns and demands. In the process, local governments acted, usually before national authorities, by initiating public policies to control pollution, address serious urban problems, provide for the welfare of constituencies that had received little attention during the earlier stages of rapid economic growth, and open new channels of communication with local residents.

By the late 1960s, many Japanese cities were facing serious urban and environmental crises resulting from the speed of economic growth and urbanization and the reluctance of public authorities to impede development. In most cases, established channels of representation, such as local assemblies, councils of local community associations, chambers of commerce, and established political leaders, were largely unreceptive to expressions of concern by residents regarding their deteriorating living environment; the need for public

---

[16] An excellent analysis of the Narita dispute is Apter and Sawa 1984.

programs to assist families in caring for young, weak, or elderly members; and the desire to have their concerns put on the local public agenda.

Many of these issues crystallized for the nation as a whole in the late 1960s and early 1970s, while in some localities they had already reached crisis proportions and had begun to transform local government and politics. In 1970, for example, the Japanese government's Economic Planning Agency published a report detailing with statistical measures how the NNW (net national welfare) of the people had begun to decline after 1968 as a result of environmental degradation, tight urban living quarters, the lack of amenities such as park space and the like. More dramatically, in July 1970, over 50 junior high school students collapsed on a Tokyo playing field and were temporarily hospitalized as a result of exposure to what the newspapers declared was the capital's first photo-chemical smog. In the late 1960s, while national authorities dragged their heels on such issues, Tokyo, Yokohama, Musashino, and other local governments took steps to control pollution and initiated bold, if only rudimentary, welfare programs to address the health and welfare needs of the young, elderly, and disadvantaged. Public awareness of the need for a serious policy debate on social issues was raised further in 1970, when the national government published statistics suggesting that the age structure of the Japanese people was changing so rapidly that before the end of the century, Japan would become a nation with one of the oldest populations in the world.

Local government initiatives in the area of pollution control were the most dramatic and influential. In the mid-1960s, for example, Yokohama City, under Socialist Mayor Ichio Asukata, quickly expanded its health and sanitation departments, developed an environmental protection staff from the two departments, and drew upon local academic expertise to formulate pollution control guidelines and agreements, which it forced on major firms such as Tokyo Gas and Tokyo Electric Power as a condition for the lease or sale of city-controlled, newly reclaimed harbor land. Such "Yokohama-model" agreements were enforced by provisions allowing local authorities the right of unannounced inspection and of public exposure of violations. Similarly, in the late 1960s, Tokyo Metropolis, under Socialist- and Communist-backed Governor Ryokichi Minobe, and a "reformed" Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly elected in 1965, passed a model pollution control ordinance based on the principle that economic growth should be pursued only in harmony with protection of environmental quality. Innovations like these were strongly opposed by both the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and by spokesmen for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, a principal architect of Japan's rapid postwar economic expansion. Yet the type of environmental policies seen in Yokohama and Tokyo spread quickly among Japanese localities and, by 1970 when environmental degradation in Japan peaked, the national government felt compelled to adopt some of the strongest pollution control policies in the world (see MacDougall 1975; OECD 1974; Reed 1986).

In a similar vein, local governments pioneered such important public social policies as free medical care for the elderly and childhood (family) allowances. Like pollution control measures, public policies of free medical care for the elderly and childhood allowances spread quickly among local governments and were adopted later by the national government. An important aspect of the political dynamics of this nationalization of local policies was the quick national response of the Liberal Democratic Party to the potential detrimental electoral consequences of having environmental and welfare state policies become the locus of political cleavage with the opposition forces. The role of the mass media in highlighting the leadership

of progressive local governments in Tokyo and Yokohama in addressing these issues ahead of national authorities undoubtedly put great pressure on the LDP to abandon old positions and take the lead in these matters.[17]

Although this policy response by the LDP successfully diffused the political challenge from local progressives and impeded their ability to construct a local road to national power, it did not totally eliminate the "institutional opposition" that had developed in local-national relations. Rather, with the growth of a substantial welfare state just as the oil crises of the 1970s slowed economic growth and necessitated fiscal constraint, a need emerged for close intergovernmental cooperation in adjusting to the new era, including recognition by national authorities of the central role that local governments could play in managing the modern welfare state, implementing the new consensus on pollution control, and formulating policies for their own revitalization.

**CONFLICT.** These changes were accompanied by a significant amount of conflict. Far from the stereotypical picture painted of harmonious social relations in Japan, this era witnessed the growth of over 3,000 local environmental protest movements and direct action, including sit-ins by residents to impede public construction projects such as Narita Airport, incineration plants, or government-sponsored industrial complexes. In less conspicuous ways, advocacy groups of lawyers, doctors, and involved families pressed national and local authorities for new policies to enhance the welfare or protect the rights of minorities or weak members of society. Although usually characterized as a "non-litigious society," Japan in the early 1970s also saw the culmination of the "big four" pollution cases involving organic mercury and cadmium poisoning and excessive emissions of sulfur dioxide, resulting in Minamata disease, Itai-itai disease, and asthma, respectively. All were resolved in favor of the plaintiffs (McKean 1981; Upham 1987).

Moreover, cohesive relations between national and local authorities were frequently replaced by conflict as national authorities attacked local initiatives in pollution control and land use guidelines for real estate developers as excessive, illegal, or beyond their jurisdiction. Meanwhile, local authorities, individually and collectively, complained of the excessive financial burden imposed on them by the failure of national ministries to reimburse them for delegated work or by the uniform and unrealistic unit cost calculations of many national government subsidies for road and school construction and other projects that drew heavily on local resources.

---

[17] These aspects of the political dynamics of national cooptation of local policy initiatives were highlighted for this author in interviews with national and local officials and politicians in 1971. Bureaucrats in the Ministry of Health and Welfare, for example, spoke of significant "political pressure" from high ranks of the Liberal Democratic Party to close the welfare policy gap with local authorities, particularly Tokyo Metropolitan Government, led at that time by Socialist-Communist– backed Governor Ryokichi Minobe. The Ministry of Health and Welfare, Ministry of Home Affairs, and other central government offices systematically collected data on local policy innovation (and shared some of it with this author) and, according to these interviews, used them in developing and justifying new national legislation. In one of the more extreme cases, the provision of financial assistance to families with children with leukemia, Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) bureaucrats, under strong pressure from an LDP cabinet member not to let Tokyo dominate favorable publicity on this issue, visited the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG), copied their research data, and quickly drafted a national budget items for a similar plan. (Interviews at the MHW and TMG, November 1971.) An excellent analysis of the diffusion of policy innovation in the United States and Japan is Reed 1983.

**INCLUSIVENESS.** The upshot of this conflict was not just innovations in environmental, urban, and welfare policies, but also important learning processes. Local authorities learned that they must be alert to the changing needs and the expressed concerns of local residents, providing them with adequate opportunities to communicate their preferences to decision-makers. As a result, local public policy now tends to place a higher priority on the welfare of residents and to provide increased, although many would argue still inadequate, opportunities for collective preferences to be reflected in public policy. Both national and local authorities also learned that the latter could be valuable partners in administering much of the public policy agenda of an advanced industrial nation and welfare state.

One of the most important results of this period was the inclusion of previously neglected groups and interests as objects of public policy and, at times, even as participants in the policy process. Most notable were welfare measures such as free medical care for the elderly and childhood allowances, initiated in each case by close to 250 local governments before being legislated nationally, and the many local innovations in pollution control. By addressing the needs of weaker members of society and the consumer interests of citizens concerned with their living environment, public policy became more inclusive compared with the previous era, in which it tended to emphasize measures in support of industrial growth and able-bodied producers.

**CITIZEN PARTICIPATION.** The new emphasis on citizen participation was a product of both the burgeoning citizen movements of the day and initiatives by local governmental authorities. Citizen movements dramatized the failure of traditional channels of local representation, such as assembly members, councils of local community associations, and chambers of commerce and industry. By keeping the environmental issue in the spotlight, they made it a major point of political contention in local politics. While the movements jealously guarded their political neutrality, their activism supported opposition forces that often rallied around independent progressive candidates for mayoral or gubernatorial posts.

Progressive mayors and governors who came to power in the 1960s and 1970s, riding the wave of the new environmental, urban, and welfare issues that provided the common basis for building an electoral constituency at both the party and mass levels, quickly differentiated themselves from many of their conservative counterparts by emphasizing their identification with the concerns of local residents, in contrast to the conservatives' hitherto effective slogan of a "direct pipeline to the center." The upshot of this was renewed efforts from city hall to establish channels of communication with local residents, including the burgeoning citizen movements. Innovations in Yokohama after the election in 1963 of Socialist Mayor Asukata, including legal consultation windows, "neighborhood city halls," environmental monitors, and an assembly of 10,000 citizens, selected on a random basis and divided into small groups to discuss pressing problems, attracted nationwide attention and emulation. In by-passing or supplementing traditional channels for representing local opinion with such direct modes of dialogue or citizen input, progressive executives strengthened their popularity and power bases, while elevating the issue of citizen participation to a new level.

In practice, this new emphasis on citizen participation had mixed results. By vowing that not a single bridge would be built if one citizen opposed it, Tokyo Governor Minobe invited immobility. Also, with the enactment of new environmental and welfare policies and shifting policy agendas, the citizen movements that inspired much of the emphasis on citizen

participation largely passed from the scene. Nevertheless, local administrations, regardless of political complexion, came to pay more than lip service to communications with local residents. Most put vastly more resources into their public relations and public consultation efforts, from publicizing services available to residents and enlarging sections devoted to handling their complaints and concerns to creating panels of citizens to monitor an array of local policies and, in some cases, providing channels for the participation of citizen representatives in the formative stages of city planning.

Much of this may not strike observers as particularly spontaneous or indicative of sustained citizen activism, but given the strong bureaucratic character of policymaking in Japan, whether at the national or local level, the creation of channels for communication and advisory positions within the administration for citizen representatives takes on great importance. The emergence of citizen networks outside an organizational framework closely tied to administrative offices, and capable of generating their own proposals for policy initiatives, however, was still a decade or two away.

**"CONSIDERATE" LOCAL ADMINISTRATION.** A development of great and lasting importance from this period of local governmental activism was the appearance of more considerate local administration. This can be seen in the example at the start of this chapter of the lengths to which authorities in Tokyo went to discuss plans with residents and to equip their incinerators with amenities. Considerate administration is part of everyday life in many Japanese cities, and part of the social contract between local residents and public authorities. It is a contract concluded after substantial citizen protest and struggle that helped institutionalize new procedures for taking account of citizen views and a realization by local authorities that work is likely to proceed more smoothly on this basis. The threat of renewed citizen protest remains the ultimate sanction.

An example of considerate administration is Tokyo's effort to reduce inconvenience to the public of private building construction and repair of public utilities. Private contractors are required to store all building materials on the building site itself, away from public thoroughfares, and to cover the construction with netting to protect passersby from possible hazards. Whenever possible, public utility lines have been built below sidewalks rather than streets to facilitate quick repair; and road repairs have been restricted to evening hours.[18]

Another aspect of considerate administration is the emphasis put on communications with residents as a vital ingredient in effective policy implementation. This is notably the case in fire and police administration. Fire officials spend a majority of their time with residents of apartment blocs or other venues discussing not just fire prevention, but also practical steps for escape should a fire occur. The physical presence in communities of Japanese police in *koban* (police boxes), their visits to local residences, and the significant time and resources expended in community relations activities all contribute to effective policing. Similarly, public facilities such as water purification plants, resource recovery (incineration) facilities, and traffic control and pollution monitoring centers usually put considerable resources into public relations activities, including tours for schoolchildren and other interested groups. And many localities have expanded their efforts, through tours as well as written and broadcast materials, to inform the elderly and other target groups of the

---

[18] Discussions during a visit to Tokyo as a consultant with the New York City Managers Exchange with Japan program sponsored by the Fund for the City of New York and the U.S.-Japan Foundation in July 1987.

facilities and available programs. Local authorities, of course, do behave inconsiderately at times to the residents they are supposed to serve, but today they do so at the risk of public censure or even recall.

*1980–Present: Toward Partnership in Citizen–Local Government Relations*

Compared with the decade or more of active citizen movements and strong conservative-progressive competition in local politics, the 1980s and 1990s may appear to be an era of quiescence, with local residents becoming less involved and influential in local public policy choices, and "business as usual" being more in the hands of local authorities.

This *quiescent local politics* proposition is not totally inaccurate and is supportable from a variety of perspectives. There is no doubt, for example, that citizen movements are less prevalent today than they were during the heyday of the anti-pollution struggles. Conservative-progressive competition, which seemed to provide clear-cut choices for voters in much of the 1960s and 1970s, has given way to either bandwagon politics—the election of chief executives with the support of most parties other than the Communists—or to conservative resurgence.

In addition, most of the environmental and social welfare agenda that facilitated competitive local politics in the previous era has been legislated, both nationally and locally. With the appearance of critical international issues demanding nationwide industrial restructuring, governmental deregulation and the consideration of a more activist international policy, and the emergence of electoral reform and party system restructuring as central issues, national politics have once again taken center stage. Moreover, the collapse of the "bubble economy" of the late 1980s and the subsequent exposure of extensive collusion and corruption in business, political, and bureaucratic circles exposed significant problems in local as well as national government and heightened the cynicism of the electorate.[19]

While not denying the validity of the above observations, and even the applicability of the quiescence of local politics proposition to many localities, a contrasting proposition seems applicable to other localities, especially in urban and suburban areas. This might be termed the "civic society" or "local governmental partnership" proposition. Keiichi Matsushita, for example, argues that in contrast to the conservative-progressive dichotomy that represented significant policy choices to voters in an earlier era, the real dichotomy in Japanese local politics today is between localities that exhibit a high level of independent citizen networking and involvement in local public affairs and those that do not (see Matsushita 1987, 1991). This *civic society* interpretation of what has been happening in many Japanese localities seems to this author to be a vital aspect of *partnership*, insofar as the latter implies relative equality and a willingness to engage in a forward-looking dialogue.

Among the evidence to be cited for the civic society or partnership proposition are (1) the growing number of localities in which networks of citizens have taken the initiative to present detailed proposals for environmental or city planning policies; (2) cases of significant citizen involvement in the formulation of city plans, such as in Kanazawa, Takayama, Beppu, or Setagaya Ward of Tokyo; and (3) the emergence at the local level of major

---

[19] For a journalistic but useful account of problematic aspects of local government, including increased evidence of corruption during the bubble economy, see Kabashima 1995.

accommodations to ethnic diversity, as seen in the treatment of foreign residents.[20] Moreover, if a civic society is one that takes action to keep its representatives honest, then the proliferation of movements in recent years for recall, inspection, and direct demand suggests that it has taken root in Japan.

The argument is not that the civic society or partnership proposition is universally applicable in Japan, but rather that it is a reasonable interpretation of where much, if not all, of Japan is headed. Given the changing relationship between national and local government and moves toward devolution of authority, the above changes at the level of citizen consciousness and citizen-local government interaction take on great importance. Enhanced local authority makes great demands on the vigilance of citizens to keep their public officials accountable and to avoid local tyrannies. Moreover, if the interpretation that Japanese society in general, and major urban areas in particular, show a greater toleration for ethnic diversity than is often evidenced by national authorities, then the trend toward local decentralization may not be incompatible with the imperative to internationalize, and it may be a useful channel for bringing about compatible changes in national policy as well.

## D. IMPLICATIONS OF THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE

Local and national political life are intimately related in most countries and Japan is no exception. National political, administrative, fiscal, and legal systems establish parameters, incentives, and sanctions that affect political life at all levels of government and politics. Local government, whatever form it may take, is imbedded in a state system that limits or expands local options. At the same time, a national system—even an authoritarian one—relies on regional and local leaders to translate central plans and pronouncements into some sort of reality. Reflecting on the Soviet experience, for example, Blair Ruble (1990, 182-83) in *Leningrad: Shaping a Soviet City*, concludes:

> Urban governance is a governance of limits, although the particular character of those limits may be specific to individual national systems… The analytically relevant focus of the structure of urban governance becomes the relationship of the city and its region to the larger political economy of the nation as a whole.… It is precisely at the regional level that Soviet politicians and administrators struggle to bring local conditions into conformity with central policy pronouncements. This tension between reality and pronouncements produces small-scale creative responses that may grow to reshape both local practice and central policy.

Policymaking in the advanced industrial democracies has become highly centralized as the modern state attempts to stimulate or stabilize the economy, provide for the social needs of its people, and regulate social behavior. Indeed, this is true in many less-developed and less-democratic countries as well. Under such circumstances, one of the most important functions of local government is to mediate between policymaking at the center and the

---

[20] Useful case studies of the first two of these are presented in Yamasaki 1994. For analyses related to the third, see Suh 1995; Tanaka 1993, 1996.

application of that policy to the peculiarities of local conditions. The result is often the emergence of pressures from below for structural changes in intergovernmental relations that provide enlarged roles and greater latitude for local choice. This was true in prewar Japan, as seen in the efforts of the big cities to gain greater autonomy to enable them to cope with their complex needs, and various other reforms of Taisho Democracy to loosen hierarchical controls over localities. In the postwar period, despite politically motivated moves toward structural re-centralization after the decentralization reforms of the Allied Occupation, the enlarged policy role of the state in economic management, welfare, and social regulation required that it rely increasingly on local authorities to translate its goals into reality.

One of the noteworthy aspects of the Japanese case is how localities, taking the initiative before national authorities in important new policy areas as they became the object of citizen pressure for pollution control, more livable cities, and better social programs, forced the state to change its policy goals. Once accomplished, national authorities discovered that expertise in managing these new programs was situated largely at the prefectural and local levels. This, in turn, opened the way for a national debate on the merits of devolving greater authority and resources to these levels of government.

The Japanese experience suggests that decentralization—if it is to advance such democratic values as liberty, political equality, and welfare—must not be viewed simply as placing local authorities in opposition to their central foes, but of delineating the most appropriate allocation of responsibilities and authority among various levels of government-- an allocation which may change with the needs of the society while allowing scope for intergovernmental cooperation. The reforms of the Allied Occupation were important in this process, but they did not, in and of themselves, establish strong local government and responsiveness to citizen views and needs. That had to await social and economic changes that created a bottom-up political dynamic that breathed life into the concept of decentralization in Japan.

Local government in Japan also had to await an expansion of administrative capacity before it could reasonably take on the responsibilities it shoulders today. This entailed the upgrading of the fiscal resources and administrative skills available to prefectural and local governments, and their deployment on the basis of an economic and administrative rationality rather than a personalistic or politically motivated dispensing of favors. Local governmental ability to manage, and even initiate, public programs increased in tandem with the upgrading of the skills of its personnel. This involved personnel exchanges between levels of government, incentives for the acquisition of new skills, and the leadership of the Ministry of Home Affairs in personnel training, among other things. Attention to on-the-job training, the sharing of expertise, and other measures that expanded local capacity to manage rising social needs are a major feature of the Japanese system. Like the country's revenue-sharing schemes, especially the local equalization tax (*chiho kofuzei*), this involved planning and foresight. In this sense, decentralization began to work in Japan not by fiat, but by design and discipline.

The above analysis leads to a somewhat ironic conclusion—that meaningful decentralization in Japan, which enabled localities to contribute so substantially to promoting important social objectives and democratization, was possible because of the strength of the central Japanese state. The Japanese state, from its modern inception in the late nineteenth century, put explicit emphasis on self-strengthening—to develop an administrative structure capable of implementing national policy and eliciting local effort to that end in every city, town, and village in the country, to extract taxes on a rational and effective basis, and to

upgrade human skills through universal education. The efficiency of the state, however, in trying to address the much more highly complex tasks of the postwar years required increased real levels of decentralization to be effective.

Simply stated, the Japanese experience demonstrates that good governance matters, at all levels, if a nation is to promote economic growth and adjustment, expand welfare, and meet the ever- changing needs and demands of its citizenry. Good governance in this sense is synonymous with the capacity of government both to formulate appropriate policies and to deliver on its promises. This involves both fiscal and human resources, and is not simply a matter of institutional arrangements. The Japanese experience demonstrates how enhanced capacity can enable local government to play a catalytic role in the promotion and coordination of social programs.

Another lesson that comes out is that democratization can enhance efficiency by providing feedback channels to those who govern, both locally and nationally. The postwar governmental system has been far more effective in making decisions to address pressing social needs than was the case in the prewar period, not simply because of the nation's rapid economic growth, but also because of its democratic structure and objectives. Democracy, for example, allowed for political processes that could overcome elite resistance to needed policy changes, as we saw in how citizens forced a rethinking by local authorities of policy priorities in the 1960s and 1970s, and how this process, in turn, put pressure on national authorities to reverse their one-sided emphasis on economic growth policies that were causing a serious deterioration in the living environment and quality of life.

This paper also suggests some of the myriad ways in which local-level, small-scale, creative responses that may grow to reshape both local practice and central policy can contribute substantially to the realization of citizen aspirations and democratic values. Most particularly in the case of Japan, local government has played, and continues to play, a central role in incorporating, frequently before the national government, the interests and concerns of a broad range of residents into the policy process. This element of inclusiveness enhances the efficacy of Japanese political democracy.

A major implication of the above is that democratization requires not only a strong local government, but also a strong national state that can work effectively with local officials. The latter is required to assure political liberties and to check on arbitrary local oligarchies that can make a tyranny out of decentralization. A second implication is that decentralization, in the long run, must be about partnership if it is to be about democracy. This is a partnership between the center and localities that involves intense bargaining and real battles that can—and must—be fought. All partners—citizens, local authorities, and the central government—can gain from such struggles. Strong local governments can strengthen central administration, but not only by relieving national authorities of difficult responsibilities. They can also stimulate growth and increase revenues, implement important national policies, provide important feedback mechanisms to all levels of government, and enhance citizen belief in the efficacy of government.

## Bibliography

Abe, Hitoshi, Shindo Muneyuki, and Kawato Sadafumi. 1994. *The Government and Politics of Japan.* Tokyo: Tokyo University Press.

Apter, David E., and Nagayo Sawa. 1984. *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Austin, Lewis, ed. 1976. *Japan: The Paradox of Progress.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Baxter, James, and Terry E. MacDougall. 1983. "Local Government." In *Encyclopedia of Japan*, Vol. 5: 62–71. Tokyo: Kodansha.

Braybrooke, David. 1968. *Three Tests for Democracy*. New York: Random House.

Bryce, James. 1921. *Modern Democracies*. New York: Macmillan.

Chiho jichi seido kenkyukai, ed. 1995. *Chiho bunken suishin handobukku*. Tokyo.

Flanagan, Scott C., and Bradley M. Richardson. 1977. *Japanese Electoral Behavior*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Hoshino, Mitsuo. 1970. *Chiho jichi no riron to kozo.* Tokyo: Shinhyoron.

Inoue, Shigeru. 1996. *Shimin shudo no toshi sozo*. Tokyo: Doyukan.

Kabashima, Hideyoshi. 1995. *Chiho seiji ga abunai*. Tokyo: Sandoge shuppan kyoku.

Laothamata, Anek, ed. 1997. *Democratization in Southeastern and East Asia.* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Lewis, Jack. 1980. "Civic Protest in Mishima: Citizen's Movements and the Politics of the Environment in Contemporary Japan." In Kurt Steiner, Ellis Krauss, and Scott Flanagan, eds., *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

MacDougall, Terry E. 1975. "Political Opposition and Local Government in Japan." Yale University, Ph.D. dissertation, New Haven, CT.

———. 1976. "Japanese Urban Local Politics." In Lewis Austin, ed., *Japan: The Paradox of Progress*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

———. 1988. "Nihon no minshu shugi to chiho jichi." In Hiroshima jichitai mondai kenkyujo, ed., *Chiho jichi no tenbo wo hiraku.* Jichitai kenkyusha.

McKean, Margaret A. 1981. *Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

———. 1989. "Equality." In Takeshi Ishida and Ellis Kraus, eds., *Democracy in Japan.* Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Maass, Arthur. 1959. "Division of Powers: An Areal Analysis." In *Area and Power: A Theory of Local Government*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Matsushita, Keiichi. 1987. *Toshigata shakai no jichi.* Tokyo: Nihon hyoronsha.

———. 1991. *Seisaku keisei shiko to seiji.* Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai.

Mill, John Stuart. 1912. *Consideration on Representative Government, World Classics Edition.* Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

Muramatsu, Michio. 1975. "The Impact of Economic Growth Policies on Local Politics in Japan." *Asian Survey* 15: 799–816.

Nakata, Sunao. 1990. *Jinken shiso no rekishi to gendai.* Aunsha.

Nihon bengoshi rengokai. 1994. *Sekai ni towareta nihon no jinken.* Kochi shobo.

OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). 1974. *Pollution Control in Japan.* Paris.

Okimoto, Daniel. 1984. "Political Inclusivity: The Domestic Structure of Trade." In Takeshi Inoguchi and Daniel Okimoto, eds., *The Political Economy of Japan*, vol. 2. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Ozawa, Ichiro. 1994. *Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation.* Tokyo: Kodansha.

Passin, Herbert. 1968. *The Legacy of the Occupation of Japan.* New York: Columbia University.

Takeshi, Ishida, and Ellis Krauss, eds. 1989. *Democracy in Japan.* Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Reed, Steven. 1983. "Patterns of Diffusion in Japan and America." *Comparative Political Studies* 16 (2): 215–34.

———. 1986. *Japanese Prefectures and Policymaking.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Root, Hilton L., ed. 1996. *Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise of East Asia.* Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.

Ruble, Blair A. 1990. *Leningrad: Shaping a Soviet City.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Samuels, Richard. 1983. *The Politics of Regional Policy in Japan.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sowa, Shinichi. 1996. *Jinken mondai to tabunka shakai.* Akashi shoten.

Steiner, Kurt. 1965. *Local Government in Japan.* Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Steiner, Kurt, Ellis Krauss, and Scott Flanagan, eds. 1980. *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Suh, Yong-dal. 1995. *Kyosei shakai e no chiho sanseiken.* Nihon hyoronsha.

SCAP (Supreme Command for the Allied Powers). 1949. *The Political Reorientation of Japan.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Tanaka, Hiroshi. 1993. *Zainichi gaikokujin.* Iwanami shinsho.

———. 1996. *Q &A gaikokujin no chiho sanseiken.* Satsuki shobo.

Tanaka, Jiro. 1956. "Horitsu ni yoru gyosei to tsutatsu ni yoru gyosei." *Jichi kenkyu* 32: 3–6.

Tatsumi, Okabe. 1995. *Ajia seiji no mirai to nihon*. Keiso shobo.

De Tocqueville, A. 1921. *Democracy in America, Borzoi Edition*. New York: Knopf.

Upham, Frank. 1987. *Law and Social Change in Postwar Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Vogel, Ezra. 1979. *Japan as Number One*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Yamasaki, Takeo. 1994. *Gendai no jumin soshiki to chiiki jichi*. Jichitai kenkyusha.