Egypt News — Revolution and Aftermath

The Proposed Constitution

Several independent analysts said the hasty way in which the constitution was prepared led to more problems than any ideological agenda. Instead of starting from scratch and drawing on the lessons of other countries, the deadline-conscious drafters tinkered with Egypt’s existing constitution, without attempting to radically remake Egyptian law in any particular direction, said Ziad Al-Ali, who has tracked the assembly for the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance, an intergovernmental organization in Sweden.

On the question of Islamic law’s place in Egyptian jurisprudence, the assembly left unchanged a longstanding article at the beginning of the text grounding Egyptian law in the “principles of Islamic law.”

But in an attempted compromise between the ultraconservatives and their liberal opponents, the proposed constitution, which goes before the country’s voters in a referendum on Dec. 15, added a new article defining those principles in accordance with established schools of Sunni Muslim thought.

Some liberals expressed fear that conservative Islamist judges and lawmakers could ultimately use the new clause to push Egypt to the right. But liberals who signed on to the compromise said the language was broad enough to give judges grounds to argue for individual rights, too.

Egypt’s generals, who seized power at Mr. Mubarak’s ouster and who relinquished it to Mr. Morsi only in August, retained many of their prerogatives. The defense minister would be chosen from the military’s officers. Insulating the armed forces from parliamentary oversight, a special council that includes military officers would oversee military affairs and the defense budget. And the military would retain the ability to try civilians in military courts if they are accused of damaging the armed forces. On individual rights, the constitution is a muddle. Believers in any of the three Abrahamic religions — Islam, Christianity and Judaism — are guaranteed the freedom of worship, but only those three.

The constitution calls for freedom from discrimination, but does not specify whether women or religious minorities are protected. A provision on women’s equality was left out to avoid a dispute after ultraconservatives insisted that women’s equality should be qualified by compliance with religious laws.

The text also offers no guidance about how to balance its broad protections of freedom of expression against other provisions protecting people or religions from insults.

In some places, the charter also provides for “society” as well as the state to play a role in upholding family values or moral standards, which critics said could open the door to vigilante pressure from self-appointed moral guardians. “Is ‘society’ me and my friends in my neighborhood?” asked Mr. Ali of the International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance.

He noted that another article in the document calls for the election of local councils in each province but keeps all the power in the hands of federally appointed governors. And even though Egypt’s pervasive public corruption was a major complaint by those who forced Mr. Mubarak from power, the assembly declined to borrow any international models to promote transparency, he said. “There won’t be a huge improvement in the way government works and the way services are delivered, and that is a setback for democracy.”

Background: Before the Revolution

Egypt is a heavyweight in Middle East diplomacy, in part because of its peace treaty with Israel, and as a key ally of the United States. The country, often the fulcrum on which currents in the region turn, also has one of the largest and most sophisticated security forces in the Middle East.

Hosni Mubarak, ousted from office in February 2011, had been president of Egypt since the assassination of Anwar el-Sadat in October 1981. (Mr. Mubarak had served as Mr. Sadat’s vice president.) Until the recent unrest, Mr. Mubarak had firmly resisted calls to name a successor. He had also successfully negotiated complicated issues of regional security, solidified a relationship with Washington, maintained cool but correct ties with Israel and sharply suppressed Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism — along with dissent in general.

The litany of complaints against Mr. Mubarak’s autocratic rule was well known to anyone who has spent time in any city in Egypt. The police were brutal. Elections were rigged. Corruption was rampant. Life was getting harder for the masses as the rich grew richer and the poor grew poorer. Even as Egypt’s economy enjoyed record growth in recent years, the number of people living in poverty actually grew.

While Mr. Mubarak’s regime had become increasingly unpopular, the public long seemed mired in apathy. For years, the main opposition to his rule appeared to be the Muslim Brotherhood, which was officially banned but still commanded significant support.

In 2010, speculation rose as to whether Mr. Mubarak, who had undergone gall bladder surgery that year and appeared increasingly frail, would run in the 2011 elections or seek to install his son Gamal as a successor. Mohamed ElBaradei, former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, publicly challenged Mr. Mubarak in the election but drew little support. The Mubarak political machine had steamrolled its way to its regular lopsided victory in a parliamentary vote.

A Police State

Egypt’s police bureaucracy reached into virtually every aspect of public life. Police officers directed traffic and investigated murders, but also monitored elections and issued birth and death certificates and passports. In a large, impoverished nation, the services the police provided gave them wide — and, critics said, unchecked — power.

The police have a long and notorious track record of torture and cruelty to average citizens. The Mubarak government for decades maintained what it called an emergency law, passed first in 1981 to combat terrorism after the assassination of Mr. Sadat. The law allowed the police to arrest people without charge, detain prisoners indefinitely, limit freedom of expression and assembly and maintain a special security court.

In 2010, the government promised that it would only use the law to combat terrorism and drug trafficking, but terrorism was defined so broadly as to render that promise largely meaningless, according to human rights activists and political prisoners.

Revolution: End of the Mubarak Era

When the uprising, inspired by the revolution in Tunisia, began on Jan. 25, 2011, the anger fueling it was not new. It had been seething beneath the surface for many years, exploding at times, but never before in such widespread, sustained fury. The grievances were economic, social, historic and deeply personal. Egyptians often speak of their dignity, which many said was wounded by Mr. Mubarak’s monopoly on power, his iron-fisted approach to security and corruption that had been allowed to fester. Even government allies and insiders were quick to acknowledge that the protesters had legitimate grievances that needed to be addressed.

After 18 days of massive public demonstrations against Mr. Mubarak’s rule, more than 800 unarmed people were thought to have been killed by the police. Mr. Mubarak lost the support of his military, which promised to protect the demonstrators. On Feb. 11, 2011, he resigned and turned power over to the military.

In August 2011, Mr. Mubarak was wheeled into a courtroom cage on a hospital bed to stand trial, charged with corruption and complicity in the killing of those protestors. It was a sight that few Egyptians could have imagined as the year began, and that many had doubted they would ever see.

In June 2012, he was found guilty of being an accessory to murder for failing to stop the killing of unarmed demonstrators during the uprising in January 2011 that ended his rule. He was sentenced to life in prison. His sentence was met by several days of angry demonstrations by tens of thousands in Cairo and around Egypt who said it was not harsh enough.

An Ailing Economy

Since the revolution, Egypt’s most important sources of income have remained steady, with tourism the notable exception. The other pillars of the economy — gas and oil sales, Suez Canal revenues and remittances from workers abroad — are either stable or growing, according to Central Bank figures.

But those sources of income accomplished little more than propping up an ailing economy. Over all, economic activity came to a standstill for months, with growth falling to under 2 percent in 2011 from a robust 7 percent in 2010. Official unemployment rates rose to at least 12 percent from 9 percent. Foreign investment was negligible.

Part of the blame for Egypt’s economic malaise rested with its caretaker cabinet. The ministers, mindful that several businessmen who served in the Mubarak government sit in jail on corruption convictions, were reluctant to sign off on new projects.

Military Power Play as Morsi Wins the Presidency

The Brotherhood was the clear winner in the parliamentary elections that ended in January 2012, holding roughly half of the seats. In March, the Brotherhood reneged on a promise not to seek the presidency. Its initial candidate was rejected by the courts on the basis of a Mubarak-era conviction, and the party’s backup candidate, Mohamed Morsi, took his place.

In May, in the first round of voting, the winners were Mr. Morsi and Ahmed Shafik, a retired Air Force general who had been Mr. Mubarak’s final prime minister. Mr. Shafik campaigned on promises to bring back law and order and to rein in “dark forces,’' a reference to Islamists. Liberals and secular activists, who had split their votes among two failed candidates, despaired at finding themselves caught between the military and religious conservatives.

In June, days before the final presidential runoff, the military and its allies on the judiciary took steps that critics charged amounted to a coup. The military council ordered the Islamist Parliament dissolved after the court ruled that the law under which it had been elected was partly unconstitutional. In the same stroke, the military assumed legislative power and severely limited the authority of the presidency.

The charter the generals issued gave them control of all laws and the national budget, immunity from any oversight and the power to veto a declaration of war. The generals also seized control of the process of writing a permanent constitution.

When the polls closed on June 17, independent observers said that Mr. Morsi had narrowly won. But it was not until June 24 that the nation’s election commission confirmed that he was the official winner, handing the Islamist group a symbolic triumph and a new weapon in its struggle for power with the ruling military council. According to the commission, Mr. Morsi won 51.7 percent of the runoff vote and Mr. Shafik won 48.3 percent.

On July 8, Mr. Morsi unexpectedly ordered that Parliament reconvene, in a direct challenge to the military and to the courts, which the next day both reaffirmed their actions in dissolving the body.

In late July, Mr. Morsi named Hesham Qandil as prime minister. Mr. Qandil, who is known as a religious Muslim but is not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was plucked from relative obscurity. The American-educated engineer headed the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation under the interim cabinet appointed by the Egyptian military.

Morsi Ousts Military Chief

On Aug. 12, President Morsi forced the retirement of his powerful defense minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi; the army chief of staff, Sami Anan; and several senior generals. The stunning purge seemed for the moment to reclaim for civilian leaders much of the political power the Egyptian military had seized since the fall of Mr. Mubarak.

Mr. Morsi appeared to look to the support of a junior officer corps that blamed the old guard for a litany of problems within the military and for involving the armed forces too deeply in the country’s politics. They included Gen. Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi, whom Mr. Morsi named as Field Marshal Tantawi’s replacement.

Mr. Morsi also nullified the constitutional declaration, issued by the military before he was elected, that eviscerated the powers of the presidency and arrogated to the military the right to enact laws. It was not immediately clear whether he had the constitutional authority to cancel that decree.

Mr. Morsi also named a senior judge, Mahmoud Mekki, as his vice president. During the Mubarak era, Mr. Mekki fought for judicial independence and spoke out frequently against voting fraud.

Morsi’s First Crisis: An Attack in the Sinai

On Aug. 5, masked gunmen opened fire on an Egyptian Army checkpoint in the northern Sinai Peninsula, killing 15 soldiers who were preparing to break their Ramadan fast. The gunmen then seized at least one armored vehicle and headed toward Israel, apparently in an attempt to storm the border, witnesses and officials said. An Israeli military spokesman said a vehicle exploded at the border, and another was struck by the Israeli Air Force at the Kerem Shalom border crossing, on the southern tip of the Gaza Strip. It was the deadliest assault on Egyptian soldiers in recent memory.

The killings of the Egyptian soldiers, which represented Mr. Morsi’s first real crisis, aggravated the political clash between the Muslim Brotherhood, on one side, and its more secular rivals, including Egypt’s military leaders.

Mr. Morsi abruptly canceled plans to attend the funeral of the 16 soldiers after protesters shouting anti-Brotherhood slogans chased the country’s prime minister from an earlier prayer service. Mr. Morsi’s vulnerability stemmed from his closeness with Hamas, an offshoot of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that governs the Gaza Strip. He  had promised to ease restrictions on Gaza by opening the border crossing and allowing goods, now smuggled, to pass through the border.

After the attack, some of Mr. Morsi’s critics cast his relationship with Hamas as a liability. Officials said that militants based in the Sinai carried out the attack, along with Palestinians who infiltrated the country through smuggling tunnels from the Gaza Strip. Though attention had been focused on the smuggling tunnels, many analysts said Sinai itself is a more pressing source of concern as a place where militancy has taken hold after years of neglect by the government and heavy-handed treatment by the security services.

Three days after the attack, Egypt was reported to have launched its first airstrikes in decades in the Sinai Peninsula, deploying attack helicopters to strike at gunmen.

U.S. and Egypt Step Up Talks on Security

In the wake of the attack in the Sinai, the United States and Egypt were negotiating a package of assistance to address what administration officials described as a worsening security vacuum in the Sinai Peninsula.

President Morsi balked in July when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta each separately pressed him to act more aggressively against extremists operating in Sinai. But after the attack, Egypt appeared to have overcome its sensitivities about sovereignty and accelerated talks over the details of new American assistance, including military equipment, police training, and electronic and aerial surveillance, administration officials said.

While the American military has long had ties to its Egyptian counterpart, a deeper effort could bind the United States and Egypt more closely against the shared threat of extremism. It could also overcome reservations among some in Washington about Mr. Morsi’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, an organization long reviled by American officials for its anti-Western views and Islamist politics.

Compounding American concerns, the officials added, is the presence of an international peacekeeping force in Sinai that includes about 700 American soldiers. The force is not authorized to fight extremists and is not part of the discussions on expanded assistance, but its troops and civilians have encountered the lawlessness in the region, including the threat of kidnappings.

Morsi’s Cabinet Includes Many Holdovers

In early August, Mr. Morsi swore in members of his first cabinet, marking another milestone in the country’s difficult transition even as reports of deadly violence complicated the new government’s work. 

The makeup of the cabinet, which includes longtime state employees and at least six former government ministers, has lowered expectations of a sweeping change in governance that was the promise of last year’s revolt.

The selection of five ministers from Mr. Morsi’s party, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the exclusion of cabinet members from other major political parties seemed likely to revive complaints that the Brotherhood was seeking to dominate Egypt’s new politics. And, despite promises of an inclusive government, only two women were chosen for the cabinet — and one of them was its only Christian member.

In selecting technocrats, rather than high-profile appointees from across the political spectrum, Mr. Morsi and his prime minister, Mr. Qandil, showed a preference for cautious — and incremental — change as they face a series of mounting crises.

One appointment, though, represented a bold stroke. In naming Ahmed Mekky, a longtime activist for judicial independence, as justice minister, Mr. Morsi and his prime minister seemed to be taking on Egypt’s most powerful judges, whose reputation for politicized decisions has emerged as one of the primary challenges to Mr. Morsi’s leadership.

Two of the 35 ministers are women, and only one is a Coptic Christian, state media reported. Christians make up roughly 10 percent of the population.

Islamists Tread Lightly, But Skeptics Squirm

On the surface, Mr. Morsi seems to have gone out of his way to allay fears that Islamists would radically change Egyptian society. He promptly fulfilled a campaign promise to resign from the Brotherhood and its political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, and chose a prime minister, Hesham Qandil, who is a religious Muslim but known as a technocrat rather than a hard-liner.

Mr. Morsi met early with the acting Coptic pope, Anba Bakhomious, though during the election campaign he had said he did not believe a Christian or a woman could ever be president of Egypt. He went out of his way to praise the role of the military as guarantors of Egypt’s new democracy. 

He has refrained from taking any action on hot-button social or foreign policy issues, or even discussing them. The sale and consumption of alcohol remain legal, a concern of the important tourist industry, which has been on the rocks since the revolution. No one in ruling circles is calling for the government to make wearing head scarves obligatory, ban pop music or review the peace treaty with Israel.

Even so, Mr. Morsi and his Brotherhood allies have had little luck placating secular and other opponents. The Brotherhood remains reviled and feared by secular activists and many Christians, who make up 10 percent of the population.

Many secular and Christian Egyptians, even some who participated in the revolution, have looked to the military as a guarantor against Islamist excess. And many express the belief that the only reason the Brotherhood has not taken any action on social issues is because it is biding its time until it is powerful enough to do so.

Staking Out a Leadership Role on Syria

Attempting to stake out a new leadership role for Egypt in the shaken landscape of the Arab uprisings, President Morsi reached out to Iran and other regional powers in August 2012 an initiative to halt the escalating violence in Syria.

The initiative, centered on a committee of four that would also include Turkey and Saudi Arabia, was the first foreign policy priority taken up by Mr. Morsi. Its focus bisects Washington’s customary division of the region, between Western-friendly states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iran on the other.

Following failed efforts by the Arab League and United Nations to stop Syria’s descent into civil war, Mr. Morsi’s plan set a notably assertive and independent course for an Egypt that is still sorting out its own transition. But although it involves collaboration with American rivals, Mr. Morsi’s initiative seemed largely harmonious with the stated Western objective of ending the Syrian bloodshed.

Egypt also attended the Nonaligned Movement summit meeting in Iran in late August. As one of the featured speakers, Mr. Morsi compared the uprising in Syria to those that swept out regimes in North Africa. Step down while you can, he said in a message to the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad.

On Sept. 5, Mr. Morsi further warned President Assad that “your time won’t be long.” His warning came days after the top Syrian government spokesman said that the only change in Cairo since the ouster last year of Hosni Mubarak was Mr. Morsi’s beard.

U.S. Prepares to Cut $1 Billion From Egypt’s Debt

In early September 2012, the Obama administration said that it was nearing an agreement with Egypt’s government to relieve $1 billion of its debt as part of an American and international assistance package. In addition to the debt assistance, the administration has thrown its support behind a $4.8 billion loan being negotiated between Egypt and the International Monetary Fund.

The assistance underscored the importance of shoring up Egypt at a time of turmoil and change across the Middle East. Given Egypt’s influence in the Arab world, Obama administration officials said, its economic recovery and political stability could have a profound influence on other nations in transition and ease wariness in Israel about the tumultuous political changes under way.

Egypt’s economy is increasingly precarious, with dwindling foreign-exchange reserves and nagging unemployment. The instability that followed the toppling of Mr. Mubarak devastated tourism, one of the country’s greatest sources of foreign currency.

Egypt’s debt to the United States exceeds $3 billion, most of it from a program called Food for Peace that offered loans to buy American agricultural products after the Camp David peace accords with Israel during the Carter administration. The $1 billion in debt relief proposed by Mr. Obama has been cobbled together from unspent money from assistance programs.

Court Declines to Halt Drafting of Constitution

In late October 2012, a court declined to rule on the legality of the committee drafting Egypt’s Constitution, dealing a setback to critics who have faulted the committee as being unrepresentative and too heavily dominated by Islamists. The decision, which referred the case to a higher court, seemed to ensure that the current group of authors will have time to finish its work.

The drafting of what will serve as Egypt’s fundamental charter has been marked by arguments over the makeup of the committee and pitched battles over pages of text, including articles dealing with women’s rights, Islamic law, executive power and the proper role of the state.

Liberal and other groups, which have asked the courts to dissolve the committee on legal grounds, have been concerned that the Islamist majority on the committee is trying to create the basis for an Islamic state. Ultraconservative Muslims have argued that, on the contrary, the constitutional drafts so far have not been sufficiently deferential to their concerns.

The decision to refer the case to the Supreme Constitutional Court left an uncertain landscape. While the judges of the court have a history of ruling against Islamists — as they did by dissolving the Islamist-led Parliament in June — many analysts said the court was unlikely to act in time to stop the drafting committee from completing the text.

Two months before a scheduled public ratification vote, there was still no clear picture of what the final document would say, and on Oct. 23, committee members said many of the most contentious articles were still being deliberated.

The assembly is supposed to complete its work by Dec. 12.  Before that, it must reach a consensus on a host of divisive issues. Apart from Islamic law, there have been arguments about minority rights, the role of the judiciary and the powers of the president.

Torn Between Allies in Gaza and Treaty With Israel

Israeli strikes on the Gaza Strip in November 2012 have confronted President Morsi with a wrenching test of loyalties, to Hamas and to Egypt’s landmark peace treaty with Israel.

In two days, Mr. Morsi recalled Egypt’s ambassador to Tel Aviv, dispatched his prime minister on a solidarity mission to Gaza, called President Obama, the European Union, the United Nations and the Arab League for support, and even publicly instructed top generals to inspect air bases and prepare land defenses near the Gaza border. He  stepped up to the very limits of Egypt’s obligations to Israel — without stepping over.

But Mr. Morsi’s own quandary will only deepen, squeezed between a public that recalls with resentment how former President Hosni Mubarak did virtually nothing to aid the Palestinians during the Israeli assault in 2009, and the desperate need to preserve the stability of the cold peace with Israel in order to secure Western aid and jump-start his moribund economy.

Both sides in the conflict appear to be testing Egypt’s new leader. Hamas, the Islamist Palestinian offshoot of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, is wondering how much support it may draw from its ideological cousins now that they control the Egyptian state, while Israel’s hawkish leadership seem to probe the depth of Mr. Morsi’s stated commitment to the peace treaty as well.

For Mr. Morsi, the test is forcing him to reconcile conflicting elements of his own persona: as the Islamist firebrand who has denounced the Israelis as “vampires” for killing Palestinian civilians and lauded Hamas for resisting an illegal occupation, but also as the newly elected president promising stability, economic revival and friendly relations with Israel’s Western allies.

Since winning leadership of the post-Mubarak Parliament, the Egyptian Brotherhood has urged Hamas to try to maintain tranquil relations with Israel in order to help the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party steer Egypt to stability, officials of both groups have said. Party leaders have said they plan to take a step back from Hamas to try to broker a reconciliation between the group and its Western-backed rival faction, Fatah, which controls the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Hamas has not recognized Israel, the Brotherhood long ago came to support a two-state solution as envisioned by the Camp David accords, and since Mr. Mubarak’s ouster it has pledged to uphold Egypt’s peace with Israel.

Surprising some, Mr. Morsi has not opened Egypt’s border to Gaza and instead has moved aggressively to try to shut down or blow up smuggling tunnels from the Egyptian Sinai long used by Hamas to circumvent an Israeli boycott, contending that they pose a security risk to Egypt.

Morsi Seizes New Power and Raises Fears

In late November 2012, with a constitutional assembly on the brink of collapse and protesters battling the police in the streets over the slow pace of change, Mr. Morsi issued a decree granting himself broad powers above any court, and used his new authority to order the retrial of Mr. Mubarak. The move raised fears that he had made himself into a new strongman like the one the revolution had deposed.

The next day, in protest of the power grab, Mr. Morsi’s opponents were reported to have set fire to his party’s offices in several Egyptian cities. Thousands of people also gathered in Tahrir Square in Cairo — the focal point of protests that, last year, swept away Mr. Mubarak. Elsewhere in the capital, the president’s supporters massed in even larger numbers outside the presidential palace where Mr. Morsi said his aim was “to achieve political, social and economic stability.”

Mr. Morsi portrayed his decree assuming the new powers as an attempt to fulfill popular demands for justice and protect the transition to a constitutional democracy. He said it was necessary to overcome gridlock and competing interests. But the unexpected breadth of the powers he seized raised immediate fears that he might become a new strongman.

Mr. Morsi’s advisers portrayed the decree as an effort to cut through the deadlock that has stalled Egypt’s convoluted political transition more than 20 months after President Mubarak’s ouster. Mr. Morsi’s more political opponents and the holdover judicial system, they argued, were sabotaging the transition to thwart the Islamist majority.

The liberal and secular opposition has repeatedly threatened to boycott the Islamist-dominated constitutional assembly. (It is led by Mr. Morsi’s allies in the Freedom and Justice Party. Members were picked by Parliament, where Islamists won a nearly three-quarters majority.) And as the assembly nears a deadline set under an earlier interim transition plan, most secular members and the representatives of the Coptic Church have walked out, costing it up to a quarter of its 100 members and much of its legitimacy.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Constitutional Court — which Mr. Mubarak had tried to stack with loyalists and where a few judges openly fear Islamists — is poised to issue a decision that could dissolve the current assembly and require a new one.

In a television interview, Mr. Morsi’s spokesman, Yasser Ali, stressed that the expanded powers would last only until the ratification of a new constitution in a few months, calling the decree “an attempt to end the transitional period as soon as possible.”

First Round of Voting on Constitution Spurs Dispute

On Dec. 15, 2012, Egyptians voted peacefully in the first round of a referendum on an Islamist-backed draft constitution, hoping that the results would end three weeks of violence, in which angry mobs of Islamists battled secular protesters in the streets around the presidential palace.

The Muslim Brotherhood said that around 57 percent of those who cast ballots in the first round voted in favor of the proposed constitution. The figure was based on unofficial tallies. A second round of voting is scheduled for Dec. 22 in rural areas, where the draft constitution is likely to win stronger support.

Supporters and opponents of President Mohamed Morsi sparred over the preliminary results of the first round of voting. While the Brotherhood hailed the “political maturity” of voters, opposition leaders disputed the unofficial results and said the voting was marred by irregularities. Each side sought to frame the results as favorable.

Although many people predicted that the charter would be approved, the turnout was just 31 percent, according the Brotherhood’s estimates. That immediately raised doubts about whether a document intended to express a consensus on Egypt’s identity and lay the foundation of a new government had won legitimacy in the referendum.

Some also said that the low turnout and relatively narrow approval margin dented assumptions about the strength of the Brotherhood, whose extensive grass-roots network had yielded a string of electoral victories since President Hosni Mubarak was toppled in February 2011.

Resentment against the Brotherhood had grown in recent weeks after Mr. Morsi issued a decree insulating his decisions from judicial scrutiny and then hastily called a referendum on the constitution. Many Egyptians also blamed the Brotherhood for deadly clashes outside the presidential palace two weeks previously.

On Dec. 16, a coalition of human rights groups called for a revote, saying there were thousands of complaints of violations at the polls and inadequate supervision by judges. The Brotherhood-sponsored Freedom and Justice Party also cited allegations of misbehavior by opponents at polling places, but said that in general the voting was a success. The Egyptian election commission said it would release official results after the second round.

Analysts said the voting left an uncertain landscape. A much better showing for the draft constitution in the next round would probably strengthen Mr. Morsi’s hand. But if current voting patterns continue, Mr. Morsi would just as surely face steep challenges in governing. The Brotherhood could also be seen as more vulnerable in parliamentary elections due after the constitution is adopted.

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