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How to Fight in a 4th Generation Insurgency
Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine
Corps

FMFM 3-25

Foreword

This Field Manual, FMFM 3-25, *How to Fight in a 4th Generation Insurgency*, is approved for use by all branches of the K.u.K. armed forces. Like the other manuals in this series, it is a product of the Fourth Generation seminar at the U. S. Marine Corps' Expeditionary Warfare School in Quantico, Virginia, an activity sponsored by the Central Powers. Because the members of the seminar are mostly American officers, it is written from the American viewpoint.

This manual represents a start at adapting counterinsurgency to Fourth Generation settings. Its most important point is that counterinsurgency in 4GW is different from the prevailing notion, which reflects the Maoist model of insurgency. In that model, there are only two sides, and the prize is control of a government. In contrast, in 4GW, many players with many different kinds of objectives, only some of which are political, create a kaleidoscopic environment of great complexity. While some tactics and techniques of classic counterinsurgency do carry over, the context is entirely different. Austro-Hungarian officers know that with our doctrine of *Auftragstaktik*, context is everything.

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Pola, July 2009

Introduction

The US Army's FM 3-24 *Counterinsurgency* does not adequately address a Fourth Generation insurgency. The manual states, "Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP-02). Simply stated, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control."[1] This definition of insurgency is a linear one. It describes a conflict with only two sides, both of which are focused upon obtaining or retaining political power. This definition works very well when looking at Mao Ze Dong's revolution in China and even the US and France's experiences in Vietnam, but fails to convey the myriad factors in play during a Fourth Generation conflict. FM 3-24 further linearly characterizes an internal conflict stating, "The primary struggle in an internal war is to mobilize people in a struggle for political control and legitimacy."[2]

This counterinsurgency manual characterizes a Fourth Generation insurgency not as a linear play for political power in a state but as a confluence of people, organizations, and groups all with different

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[1] United States Army. <u>Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency</u>, pg 1-1.
[2] Ibid, 1-8

goals and aims. These goals and aims could include local power, religious monopoly, money, and many others unrelated to obtaining national power. Some groups fight just to be left alone by the government, or, sometimes, just to fight. Since a Fourth Generation conflict is created by the disintegration of a state, the older paradigm of conducting a counterinsurgency effort to restore the government is no longer the primary concern. The concern of the counterinsurgent becomes the restoration or creation of the state itself. A government without a state is an unstable construct that will not survive past the current leadership, nor can it act effectively while it is in office.

This manual will explore the different aspects of a Fourth Generation insurgency in order for the reader to gain an appreciation for all the groups, factors, and influences that may be operating in his area of responsibility. The manual will also explore the options of the counterinsurgent, providing a way to compare tactical, operational, and strategic level military decisions to a moral, mental, and physical framework in order for the counterinsurgent to better evaluate the effects of his military decisions. In multifaceted Fourth Generation conflict, no military decision, however simple it may seem on the surface, can be made without evaluating its moral, mental, and physical effects on the populace, the targeted insurgent group, other insurgent groups, and the state itself.

This manual is designed to encourage thinking and debate at all levels. It is intended to be read by leaders of all ranks facing a multidimensional Fourth Generation insurgency. This manual will not provide techniques, tactics, and procedures. Instead it will suggest a framework for understanding all the factors at work in a modern insurgency and an approach for understanding the ramifications of our own actions in countering a Fourth Generation insurgency.

CHAPTER 1: The Fourth Generation Insurgency

Definitions and Goals

Fourth Generation insurgency is a form of warfare meant to hollow out, destroy, or replace a state. A state is the sole legitimate entity responsible for security and order in a society. It is also the sole provider of sovereignty over a territory inside which its jurisdiction is both exclusive and all-embracing.[3] Fourth Generation insurgencies have many potential causes and goals. Some insurgencies are broad and public while others are subtle and difficult to discern. However, all are equally destructive to the foundations of the modern state. The goal of the counterinsurgent is to facilitate the introduction of conditions necessary for the reestablishment of the state.

Most well-known insurgencies of the 20th century were aimed primarily at the establishment of a new government. They assumed the prior existence of a state. Mao Ze Dong articulated many tactics used in 20th century insurgencies in his Theory of Protracted War. He claimed that insurgencies worked in 3 phases: establish a political base/ideology, conduct irregular warfare against the government, and finally overthrow the government in a conventional war. The ruling government often concentrated its efforts in the urban areas, giving

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[3] Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

the insurgents great freedom of movement elsewhere; ignored minorities; and could not or would not provide security and services to the population. Many insurgencies of the 20th century conformed to this theory and although counterinsurgency doctrine of the period was used to combat it, success was rare.[4]

Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) insurgencies differ from previous insurgency models in that they do not intend merely to replace the existing government. Their target is the state itself. The 4GW framework is outlined in a 1989 *Marine Corps Gazette* article, "Into the Fourth Generation" and in the Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps FMFM-1A.[5]

An effective state is characterized by three qualities: legitimacy, authority, and power. States around the world are weakening due to corruption of leadership, economic collapse, social strife, and second and third order effects of global trade, immigration, and communications. As states break down, people transfer their loyalties to other entities

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[4] The term "insurgent" is used interchangeably throughout this manual to describe classic and 4GW opponents. When the subject is a 4GW actor, the text will specify.

[5] Lind, William S., Nightengale, Keith, Schmitt, John F., Sutton, Joseph, Wilson, Gary I. "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation." Marine Corps Gazette. October 1989. Imperial & Royal Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps. FMFM 1-A (DRAFT), 31 July 2008. www.d-n-i.net and https://www.intranet.tecom.usmc.mil/sites/EWS/AdvWF/default.aspx

or causes. As these factions grow in influence, the state loses its monopoly on violence, which leads to more potential actors with more diverse goals and agendas. Many of these factions are ancient in their roots. They existed while the state was in control, but now find increased opportunities for action. 4GW insurgencies take many forms including, but not limited to, criminal organizations, street gangs, religiously-motivated factions, illegal militias, or elements of society who simply want to be left alone by the government. Some 4GW insurgencies are motivated by chaos for its own sake. Others may seek to preserve a "hollow" state in which they can operate freely.

4GW insurgencies will attempt to undermine the state in various ways ranging from carving a local criminal niche in society to the total overthrow of the state. 4GW insurgencies organize themselves in multiple groups who may have common goals or be in direct competition with each other. They may form alliances or war against one another for control or influence. There are no limits to the possible combinations of alliances or rivalries. Groups may join forces or attack one another within the same week depending on the needs of the moment.

Previous counterinsurgency models only planned for a single insurgent in a binary winner-take-all campaign. The writers of *FM 3-24* also assumed the existence of a state, with its government the prize for which the war was fought. *FM 3-24*

Counterinsurgency is a good update to a doctrine designed to defeat the Maoist model of insurgency, but is not broad enough to deal with 4GW conflicts. The Fourth Generation context is completely different.

Resourcing a 4GW conflict: Money

Like previous insurgencies, 4GW forces require certain resources such as money, weapons, room to maneuver, and some level of popular support. The type and goal of the 4GW actor dictates to what degree those resources are needed.

However, money is often one of the most powerful weapons in Fourth Generation war. An old expression states that "money is power." A legitimate state is supposed to hold a monopoly on power. However, if a non-state entity can freely use money to provide government services in order to wield power and influence outside of the state's control, it can become a destabilizing force.

Unlike in previous insurgencies, money doesn't always come in cash and in traceable transactions. In classic insurgencies, money is needed to pay recruits, bribe officials, and buy weapons and supplies. If the insurgent's goal is to create another government, he will need money to provide goods and services to the population he is trying to win over. Determining where this money comes from may reveal the motivations of the actors and the scope of the insurgency.

In a 4GW environment, the insurgents may receive funding through drug smugglers who are fighting the government over their own business interests. As we are seeing in Afghanistan and Mexico, the Taliban and the drug warlords are each fighting their own insurgencies with their own goals, yet they regularly support each other or fight amongst themselves depending on the circumstances. In Mexico, drug gangs use coercion and violence to co-opt or destroy their enemies depending on the needs of the moment. Alliances of opportunity, trading goods, services, and political favors are also a form of currency in 4GW, especially when cash is not available.

Weapons and Tools

The weapons required for a 4GW insurgency vary and run the gamut from homemade explosives to high-quality military arms. The Viet Cong used discarded supplies and unexploded ordnance to make elaborate traps and ambushes for US troops. Iraqi insurgents in recent years made significant use of captured Iraqi Army artillery and mortar shells to manufacture Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) to attack US forces. In both conflicts, the expertise needed to create these weapons was not difficult to attain due to their simplicity of design. That simple information is now easier to find due to the increase in world-wide communications in recent years. Small arms and explosives may be homemade, captured from local government stockpiles,

acquired by deserting police and military forces, or smuggled through international channels.

Depending on the needs of the insurgent, these weapons may be used for guerilla or conventional warfare, assassinations, or intimidation. Depending on their goals and/or resources available, insurgent groups may not need the full range of arms available to them. In Iraq in early 2004, disgruntled farmers used light mortars to harass US forces to protest the diversion of irrigation canals. When the water was restored, the mortar attacks ceased. At the same time, other well-resourced insurgent groups waged large-scale guerilla warfare against US forces with combinations of mortar and rocket attacks, complex ambushes of small arms and IEDs, and targeted assassination of local leaders in order to drive out occupying forces. US forces often could not distinguish between the various groups and while successfully fighting one side they inflamed the situation with the other. In recent months, Mexican police have encountered platoon-sized cartel gangs with the weapons of a modern infantry unit which have murdered thousands of government officials, rival gang members, and random civilians in order to influence territory and destabilize state institutions. [6] While there is little difference between the weapons used by classic and 4GW insurgencies, the convergence of means, motivations, and reactions in a 4GW environment

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[6] McCaffrey, Barry R. After Action Report, Visit Mexico 5-7 December 2008.

are critical and must be thoroughly understood in order to combat the various actors.

Physical weapons are not the only tools of the insurgents. Recently, the internet and satellite television have increased the opportunities for insurgent groups to recruit, communicate, and wage war to win the opinions of their target populations whether they are the local populace, foreign governments or the world public at large. In 4GW environments, physical weapons may be counterproductive to the cause of the insurgents. The prodigious use of propaganda may be all that is needed to achieve their goals. Over the course of the many Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, Palestinian forces have made good use of the media as a countermeasure to Israeli tanks and missiles. According to Colonel John Boyd's model of the moral, mental, and physical levels of war (more on this in later chapters), Israeli use of physical force was often trumped by photo and video images of rubble and civilian casualties as Palestinian forces invoke the moral outrage of the world community. Despite achieving heavily one-sided conventional victories, the Israelis found themselves right back where they started or in a worse position.

Maneuver Space and Time

Most types of insurgencies need freedom of maneuver in their area of operations to accomplish their goals. This will vary greatly depending on the size and scope of the insurgency. The Viet Cong

numbered tens of thousands of personnel stretched over the entire Indochina region. Many of their training bases, routes, and supply bases were in North Vietnam and Laos and generally off limits to US forces. Such a large "footprint" is required in a one-sided classic insurgency. 4GW insurgencies usually have much narrower goals and generally have a correspondingly smaller "footprint." A Mafia-style criminal organization or a parallel government requires neighborhoods and towns to directly extend their influence over the population. A small street gang may only need a few homes per night to move, rest, and resupply.

A 4GW insurgent may use money, the media, or even seemingly legitimate political power to create his maneuver space. He may bribe or manipulate military and police forces, or champion political causes which his enemies cannot combat. The organized crime element does not necessarily need to "control" the neighborhood in which they operate. If the local police or government can be influenced to look the other way, then the insurgent can conduct his business as he sees fit. In a 4GW environment with many competing insurgent groups, even an honest government can be useful if for no other reason than to cause trouble for the competition.

In the summer of 2006, the Shiite militia under Moqtada Al Sadr became an armed political party and took over several influential government institutions. Under the guise of the heavily

infiltrated local and national police, they manipulated US forces to help them carry out their sectarian agenda of eliminating Sunni opposition in Baghdad. US military forces and Shiite police forces killed and captured Sunni insurgent groups. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the Shiite militias then came after and evicted or murdered the Sunni civilians who no longer had the protection of their own militias. After several months the Shiite militias had figurative and literal control over many Baghdad neighborhoods and did it under the cover of the US military and the Iraqi government.[7]

The Media, the Population, and Alliances

The media can also be used to establish maneuver room for the insurgent. An insurgent cause or issue in the media may be too politically sensitive for the government to openly contest and if they do not have the will to do so, then the insurgent has free reign to use that issue however he wishes. Palestinian, Afghan, and Iraqi militias and insurgent groups often publicized real or imagined civilian casualties in their territories in order to make areas important to them inaccessible to their enemies.

The local population usually holds the key to success for an insurgency. Whether the goal is overthrow of the state or just carrying out limited goals, the insurgent needs some level of popular support. A war of national liberation in a classic

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[7] Robinson, Linda. Tell Me How This Ends. New York: Public Affairs, 2008. Pg 22

insurgency will probably need a significant amount of the population either fighting for it or tolerating it. In a 4GW environment, a criminal organization or terrorist cell only needs the population to do nothing to achieve its goals.

Insurgents will influence the population to support their cause using a carefully orchestrated mixture of "carrot and stick" persuasion, coercion, outright violence, and appeals to political, tribal, or religious affiliation. Persuasion may come in the form of bribery or providing civil services such as police, electricity, and health care. Especially for the latter, 4GW insurgents will attach those services to a local or even international media campaign highlighting that they can provide those capabilities and the state cannot. As most insurgencies are violent in nature, actors will likely rely heavily on threats and violence to achieve their goals. Insurgents will target important individuals for either threats or assassination in order to influence hostile or neutral populations. In 4GW environments, widespread or specific uses of violence can unite factions or cause them to fight one another if not properly controlled. Whereas a classic insurgency will mostly likely be united in its use of violence, the fractious nature of a 4GW conflict almost guarantees the various insurgent and counterinsurgent forces will co-opt or kill the wrong people.

In the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) conducted a successful guerilla campaign against US forces. They also coerced

Sunni tribes to provide them with a base of moral and material support. In 2005 and 2006, AQI attempted to form several politically-motivated marriages amongst its leaders and the ranking families in Al Anbar province. AQI decided they needed to cement the bonds with their tribal hosts in order to gain permanent legitimacy in Iraq. They mixed these efforts with targeted threats and assassinations that actually alienated the tribal leaders. This proved to be a tremendous strategic blunder. The tribes declared a ceasefire with the Americans, began providing intelligence on AQI, and openly fought them in what was termed "The Sunni Awakening."

Outside actors often have vested interests in the outcome of nearby insurgencies and will provide material support. During the US/Vietnam War, Laos and Cambodia allowed or were forced by North Vietnam to use their territory for infiltration routes and supply bases. China and the Soviet Union provided military hardware and technical expertise. While international allies and supporters are present in classic and 4GW conflicts, the nature of the alliances in 4GW can rapidly change. When the purpose of the insurgency is not necessarily the takeover of the government as in 4GW conflicts, actors on both sides may change their relationship as a matter of convenience or ideology. Syria and Iran either actively or passively supported distinctly different insurgent groups in Iraq. These groups fought against the Coalition and often fought against each other. When one group did not serve

the interests of an outside actor, resources were shifted to another group. When the Soviet Union fought the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, the US covertly supplied the insurgents with money and increasingly sophisticated weapons which tipped the tactical scales against the Soviets. Just as the Soviets gave up and left Afghanistan, the Americans shifted their support in order to prevent an all out Mujahedeen victory. Since 4GW is first and foremost about the weakening of the state, outside actors bring substantial influence to the conflict to further their own goals.

In 2004 and 2005 most political, military, and journalist sources referred to the enemy in Iraq as "the terrorists" and "the insurgents" as if they were a single classical insurgency. In fact, the insurgency in Iraq has been a mix of Sunni and Shiite religiously motivated fighters, Ba'athist holdovers from the Hussein regime, general opposition to US occupation including enemies the US created through its own actions, multiple Shiite factions fighting each other for influence, Al Qaeda cells helping the various groups and carrying out their own campaign, and finally criminal gangs exploiting the chaos to their own ends. Every one of these factions represented an insurgency by themselves, but they all operated in the same country. They allied with each other, fought against each other, and fought their own insurgencies with their own distinct goals. At the heart of the 4GW environment, alliances shift and belligerents change sides with great rapidity as their goals change or as

they are presented with alternate means to achieve their goals.

CHAPTER 2: THE COUNTERINSURGENT

Definitions and Goals

A counterinsurgent is an entity attempting to defeat the 4GW insurgency and preserve or reestablish the state. Counterinsurgent forces should be an appropriate mix of military forces, non-military government and non-government agencies and advisors, and indigenous forces whether they are military or governmental.[8] Indigenous forces actions' will almost always be decisive. Military forces tend to be the only organizations with the resources to combat an insurgency. This presents a problem since the goal of the counterinsurgent is the de-escalation of violence and most national militaries are trained and equipped to do precisely the opposite.

In 4GW, the counterinsurgent's goal is to facilitate the preservation or creation of a state. In an environment where no state exists, a government will likely precede the emergence of a state. The state is more than just its supporting bureaucracy and is above the personalities of its leaders. A government is the institution which directs the actions of the state. A government may exist for a time without a state, but such a government is ineffective because it cannot make anything happen.

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[8] Counterinsurgents in this manual are defined as any mix of forces and assets, but primarily referred in the text as an international outside force

The reestablished government may not resemble the structure present prior to the insurgency, and it may not be a democracy. Just like an insurgency, governments require a degree of legitimacy from the population in order to survive. Gaining that legitimacy is the primary struggle in 4GW. The counterinsurgent force must be prepared to help establish a government the population will grant legitimacy to whether the counterinsurgent likes the type of government or not. This concept may be difficult for some counterinsurgent forces to grasp – especially in westernized democracies. States sometimes emerge from stable governments that have a strong hold on power and can maintain order.

Campaign Strategy: Framework

Most counterinsurgent missions will be broad in scope and their means rapidly evolving. However, the strategic political and military goals must be clearly defined prior to operations. Excessive, unrealistic and unattainable goals doom a counterinsurgent to defeat before the fighting even starts.

The basis of all action taken in a counterinsurgency campaign begins at the local level. 4GW insurgencies design their campaigns around local targets, demographics, and goals. The counterinsurgent must do the same. Upon entering an area of operations, the counterinsurgent force must take stock of the situation using what

militaries sometimes call "human intelligence."
Counterinsurgent units must seek out and identify
both formal and informal leaders; determine
political, religious, and economic demographics;
determine how power and authority are derived; and
identify insurgent groups. In its tactics for a classic
insurgency, the US Army's 3-24 considers these
missions the beginnings of establishing *Logical
Lines of Operation.*[9] These lines are graphical
depictions of demographics, goals, and means to
achieve those goals. This construct works well if
the target country has well-established institutions,
a homogenous society, and a single insurgency with
a well-defined set of actors. In a 4GW insurgency,
the Lines of Operation would look more like a
spider web in which the strands constantly shifted
their start and end points between the various
actors, institutions, and issues – if it could be
graphically depicted at all.

In most cultures, power and authority are not
synonymous. Power is the ability to *control or
compel* the behavior of individuals or groups of
people. Authority is the legal or popularly granted
permission to exercise power. It is legitimacy in the
exercise of power and vice versa.[10] A person who
holds authority does not always have the means to
exercise power. The difference between the two

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[9] United States Army. Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency.
Pg. 4-5
[10] Holmes-Eber, Paula, and Salmoni, Barak. Operational
Culture for the Warfighter. Quantico. Marine Corps University
Press. 2008. Pg 148.

will help define the scope of the conflict and inform the counterinsurgent what he must do to turn local success into a strategy for creating a state. In a 4GW environment, as states fail, governance falls back on local communities which turn to pre-existing kinship and social structures to determine leadership and authority.[11] Subordinating those local sources of authority and power to a restored state is one of the most difficult tasks a counterinsurgent faces.

Understand Your Hosts

At the lowest level possible, counterinsurgents must understand cultural demographics, economic functions, and the political climate of each locality. In most countries where 4GW insurgencies take place, multiple ethnicities live in close proximity to each other with their own distinct cultures, religious beliefs, and political views. 4GW insurgents will often play on these differences and attempt to either split them apart or bring them together. The counterinsurgent needs to tailor his lines of operation to specific demographics at the lowest level. A broad-brushed "one size fits all" campaign is likely to fail and was probably what fomented the insurgency in the first place. In the military context, the division commander or higher will likely determine the overall campaign strategy, but the company commander must determine how it should be implemented street by street or valley by valley. Fire-team leaders who are trusted to execute

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[11] Ibid. Pg 151

the mission must understand these differences so they do not create or exacerbate problems the commander is attempting to solve. In a 4GW conflict, each insurgent group and their issues must be treated as a distinct campaign, even if they live only miles or sometimes yards apart from each other.

The issues which weakened the state and created a 4GW conflict likely took many years to develop. The solutions to these problems may take an equal amount of time to take hold. Just as few insurgencies are started and won in short order, the counterinsurgent force should plan for a long struggle. Depending on the number and type of insurgent actors in the 4GW environment, the counterinsurgent strategy will likely be layered, fluid, and constantly evolving. An insurgent survives by making decisions faster than the counterinsurgent and avoiding his strengths. That means conducting protracted campaigns with themes the counterinsurgent cannot adapt to or creating conditions that erode public counterinsurgent support. Especially in a long campaign where an insurgent group has a broad base and stamina, the insurgent's messages may change repeatedly throughout the campaign and look completely different from when the conflict began.

Counterinsurgents gain the support of the population by understanding and addressing their grievances, providing for their physical security,

facilitating employment, and often taking part in their lifestyle. These requirements are often manpower and financially intensive for the counterinsurgents. They must fulfill these functions, whereas if the insurgent's aim is to delegitimize the standing government or counterinsurgent force and undermine the state, he simply has to disrupt those functions at a time and place of his choosing.

Legitimate governance is based on authority. As described earlier, that authority is derived through a combination of physical power and trust by the people. Governments can be held together through sheer force; however, those governments are usually not sustainable institutions and create weak states. A state must be based on trust and authority given by the people to some form of leadership. The counterinsurgent force must foster this trust by providing for the people's needs and taking part in the daily routine – and risks – of the local population. Whereas a 4GW insurgent needs only to pursue his own niche to succeed, the counterinsurgent must promote the legitimacy of the state to possibly countless factions with distinct ideologies, perceptions, needs, and desires.

Influencing the Population

One parallel between classic and 4GW counterinsurgency campaigns whose importance cannot be overstated is the physical interaction between the counterinsurgent force and the

population. The government institutions in pre-communist China, Vietnam, and the early years of the American occupation of Iraq fell apart due to the counterinsurgent forces focusing their efforts on military campaigns which ignored the needs of the people at large and allowed the insurgents to establish their own legitimacy. Counterinsurgents spent the bulk of their time living on large military bases isolated from the population and often built them in places that alienated the locals. Counterinsurgents patrolled the streets by day, but insurgents ruled them at night. Frustrated, the counterinsurgents resorted to harsher tactics to compensate – further driving the population to the insurgents' cause. Particularly in Iraq as with all 4GW conflicts, even when they focused their efforts on helping the population, US forces had a difficult time keeping current with the various factions and their local needs and biases. Expending resources for one neighborhood alienated the next one because they hired workers from the wrong town or diverted a waterway that helped one group but not others. Physically interacting with the different factions, tribes, and insurgent groups in a 4GW conflict is a delicate and evolving balancing act that the counterinsurgent must perform successfully.

Counterinsurgents must make every effort to integrate themselves with the local population and distinguish themselves from their 4GW rivals. Military boundaries and various counterinsurgent areas of responsibility should be denoted along borders acceptable to the population in that zone.

Counterinsurgents must maximize the use of local labor, businesses, experts, and leaders of all kinds wherever possible. Western democracies will have to adjust modern contracting and accountability practices in order to fulfill this requirement. A local business in one town may offer the better bid for a reconstruction project than another, but if hiring that business foments tensions in your area of operations then another solution may be needed. This cuts to the heart of a counterinsurgent's strategy to win over multiple factions with varied and evolving needs.

Providing for the needs of the civilian population will go a long way to securing their trust locally. However, most counterinsurgencies contain a significant military aspect and this must be addressed. Militaries tend to be the only institutions capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations due to their size, budget, equipment, and training. However, this often lends primarily to the use of military force as a means to conduct the campaign. Counterinsurgencies that use the "big stick" approach to fighting often kill more civilians than insurgents and usually lose in the end. Successful insurgencies are usually comprised of many small cells of fighters, ideologues, financiers, and technical experts. In a 4GW environment, depending on the number and scope of the insurgencies in the country, these cells may be united in a single campaign, have similar goals, or actively fight one another. "Cutting the head off the

snake" rarely succeeds in these insurgencies as each cell may be its own snake with is own head.

Influencing the Enemy

Intensive intelligence collection efforts must be used to determine insurgent groups, who their leaders are, what their goals are, and how they are supported. Only after a deliberate intelligence campaign should military action proceed. Insurgent forces should be arrested or killed with a minimum of force and in a manner invisible to the population. While an insurgent leader may be responsible for hundreds of deaths and be condemned worldwide, "one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter" is a saying that should be taken to heart and addressed. Whenever possible, insurgents should be taken alive, questioned for quickly usable intelligence, and either imprisoned, or better, turned. Especially in 4GW, insurgent networks are intricate, dispersed, and rapidly evolve. While the strategy described above may also work in classic insurgency, the stakes are much higher in a 4GW environment due to the multi-sided nature of the conflict. A dead insurgent may literally be a dead-end when it comes to the broader campaign or have a second-order effect on a neighboring faction. A living prisoner may give up the locations of countless allies, weapon caches, or safe houses. Depending on the prisoner's motivations for fighting, he or she may be willing to switch sides if the counterinsurgent can appeal to him or her. They will also have insights into the motivations, strategies, and

networks of the various actors that the counterinsurgent may not be able to grasp. The best intelligence will be generated from the bottom up by units in contact with the population or the enemy. (for a fuller discussion, see FMFM-1A)

Along the same lines as the Sunni Awakening described in Chapter 1, Sunni tribes and neighborhoods in Baghdad fed up with the violence declared ceasefires with US forces and began fighting insurgents. Dubbed "The Sons of Iraq," many were previously insurgents themselves, but declared they wanted an end to the violence and chaos and were hired by US forces to police their own neighborhoods, provide intelligence, and assist US and Iraqi Army forces. Violence in those areas plummeted within a few months and economic expansion soon followed. Iraq recently held provincial and parliamentary elections. According to Iraqi and American leaders, if not for the drop in violence and increase in local security, the elections would not have been possible.[12] US leaders knew that with proper understanding of the situation, they could co-opt former enemies into helping them in their broader campaign goals one neighborhood at a time. The "Sons of Iraq" did not come from a single insurgent group. They represented factions fighting for varied reasons but often united under certain conditions. US forces took stock of each area from which they came, and addressed their grievances in turn.

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[12] Robinson, Linda. Tell Me How This Ends. New York: Public Affairs, 2008. Pgs 340, 352.

If a more intensive military campaign is required, it must be focused in scope, decisive in its outcome, and short in its duration. Particularly in urban environments, military campaigns must avoid collateral damage while eliminating the insurgent forces and hold that territory lest they repeat the same battle months later. US forces in Iraq used the phrase "clear, hold, build" in their campaign to rid Iraqi cities of insurgent activity one neighborhood at a time. The basic tactic was to seal of a large section of a city through military force or concrete barriers, search out the enemy house by house, and follow up with indigenous military forces to hold that neighborhood. The captured territory then became the subject of an extensive economic rebuilding effort to ensure the local population saw the military offensive as a necessity and a conclusion to the insurgent threat.

Positive Influence

As in most aspects of a counterinsurgency, the "clear, hold, build" strategy must make the most use of indigenous military and economic resources in order to reestablish the state's legitimacy in the eyes of the population. As described earlier with local contracting, care must be taken with the use of military force in a particular area. Indigenous forces fielded from certain demographics may have a detrimental effect on the target population if they have a history of conflict between them. The issue becomes compounded in 4GW environments with

the presence of more demographically mixed populations and conflicting factions.

Until firm trust is established, the counterinsurgent force will likely be seen as an occupier and not a liberator – especially if the insurgency is home-grown - and the counterinsurgents are primarily unwelcome outsiders. The problems causing the insurgency will likely be around long after the counterinsurgent departs and must be solved, by and large, by indigenous forces and a restored state.

CHAPTER 3: CREATING OR REINFORCING THE STATE

Finish the Job

The previous chapter discussed what must be done to achieve success at the local level; however, this does not automatically translate into the reestablishment of the state. A bridge must be found that will connect the security and institutions established at local and regional levels into a state accepted by most parties in a 4GW environment as legitimate. There may not be a formula to translate success at one level to the next; however, several critical criteria must be met.

Successful locally-fought campaigns in 4GW will give much needed insight into the motivations and nuances of the various insurgencies. If the counterinsurgent did not fully understand all the issues which led to the emergence of the insurgencies when he formed his initial campaign strategy, he must know and understand them before he can proceed any further. Since 4GW conflicts have multiple actors with their own grievances, many of whom only emerge mid-way through the conflict, the counterinsurgent will have to figure out how to bring them all together in a way that satisfies most of the concerned groups.

Why a State?

During the campaign, the counterinsurgent likely formed or reinforced some form of central government. It may be the pre-existing government, a group of local factions, or an internationally-mandated caretaker. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the presence of a functioning government does not necessarily mean a state exists. A country can have a group of individuals carry out the formal functions of government without fulfilling the requirements of a state. A state is an institution the population considers legitimate that extends far beyond the personality of the central figures of power.

Over the last four hundred years, many modern nations exhausted themselves with tribal, feudal, and international wars. Sometimes through popular decision (or in most cases an individual seizing power), a government was established that cotrolled the population and from that point held the monopoly on order and violence. Over many generations, the people identified themselves with that single entity. Regardless of who ran the country or how it was run, the institution to which the people gave legitimacy endured.

Saddam Hussein was the single recognized leader of Iraq for nearly 30 years. In that time, he restructured government institutions to give himself absolute power. Government control reached out to

nearly every corner of Iraq and Saddam's monopoly on violence was difficult to dispute. However, Saddam's Iraq was a fragile state. Beneath the surface, Iraq was internally divided and the institutions built by Saddam did not survive his (and their) overthrow by US forces in 2003. The Iraqi Army and security services, the institutions through which Saddam maintained order, might have been able to help hold the country together had they not been dismantled.

While a state has a monopoly on order and violence, a territory held together solely by violence and intimidation is not a stable state. On the other hand, present-day Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti are at least democracies in concept, but for a variety of reasons the elected governments cannot do anything beyond their capitals. Neither a dictatorship nor democratic elections ensure that a state does or will exist.

<u>Win at the Moral Level</u>

In order to create a state, the counterinsurgent and indigenous force must formulate a strategy to bring local and regional sources of power and authority under a national government. This campaign must be well thought-out in advance and encompass the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. The campaign plan must also be flexible enough to adapt to rapid changes in politics, the rise and fall of conflicting factions, and the influences of enemy and outside actors on the situation. Without intelligent planning, tactical success will not

translate into strategic success. Yet in a war fought one village or neighborhood at a time, a tactical mistake can easily translate into strategic failure.

Colonel John Boyd's model of war takes the moral, mental, and physical implications of force into account. Described in detail in FMFM-1A, Boyd's model states that every military decision has moral, mental, and physical effects which will determine the course of the war, with moral being the most powerful and physical the least powerful.

The US military has fought several conflicts in which it dominated the physical aspects of the battlefield yet lost the war. These losses can be attributed to the failure to win at the moral level. In an insurgency, especially a 4GW insurgency with multiple actors, the importance of "winning the hearts and minds" over "steel on target" cannot be overstated. If the campaign plan cannot make decisions in the population's best interests, then no amount of firepower will compensate. A large, firepower-intensive military at war with villagers wearing sandals and having no running water is a modern David and Goliath story. Who ever roots for Goliath?

In a 4GW campaign, the de-escalation of violence is the goal for which the counterinsurgent should strive. While killing the enemy may be a tactical success, it can be a strategic failure because the moral aspect of appearing helpful to the population outweighs any benefit derived from killing the

enemy if it alienates the population and begets more violence. Every decision made in a 4GW campaign must be balanced against these aspects in order to find credible solutions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

To illustrate the complexities of the decision-making process in a 4GW campaign, take the following matrix:

	Physical	Mental	Moral
Tactical			
Operational			
Strategic			

As one example, killing the enemy physically reduces the threat to order, mentally it makes some potential enemies afraid to fight us, but morally it turns us into Goliath. In countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, the relatives of those we kill are obligated to fight us according to their blood-feud culture. Going down the column in the matrix, it counts as a win tactically, offers little but attrition operationally and works against us strategically because every fight is an escalation that diminishes order. Since a higher level always dominates a lower, on both scales killing the enemy is a net negative.[13]

As another example, consider capturing the enemy. Physically, it is harder and riskier than killing him.

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[13] Lind, William S. "Evaluating 4GW Missions." www.d-n-i.net, 21 May 2008.

Mentally, it may be less frightening for the enemy and thus less effective. But morally it works in our favor because the strong appear merciful (assuming prisoners are treated well). Looking down the matrix, a capture is equal tactically to a kill as a win, operationally it is still just attrition but strategically it is a plus because captives are useful chips in bargaining de-escalatory deals. Net result: missions should put a premium on capture versus killing.

Let's look at one more example, this time originating at the operational level. How might our grid help us evaluate moving out of FOBs into villages, towns, and cities? Physically, the risk to our troops goes up. Mentally, we may be more apprehensive but the people become less frightened of us as they get to know us. Morally, it is a huge plus because we are now protecting the people instead of living in isolation in order to protect ourselves. Going down, tactically we may have to suffer more casualties than we inflict in order to de-escalate, which puts high demands on the self-discipline of the troops; operationally, it is a plus because when we establish order locally we are serving the intent; and strategically, the spread of order is what can lead to mission accomplishment and our return home.

Israel vs. Hezbollah: Everyone Goes Home Happy?

In June 2006, Israel invaded Lebanon in response to the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers and multiple

rocket attacks by the terrorist group Hezbollah. The
Israeli military launched several destructive air
strikes against terrorist, government, and civilian
targets which caused a significant amount of
damage. The Israeli ground offensive, on the other
hand, was considered a tactical disaster. The
campaign ended with a United Nations-sponsored
ceasefire. Publicly, both sides declared victory and
so far the ceasefire has held. The Israeli military
destroyed many Hezbollah weapon systems and
inflicted infrastructure damage that Hezbollah and
the Lebanese government will have to repair.
Hezbollah survived the conflict intact and "lives to
fight another day." Whether by accident or design,
both sides arrived at an end state that did not require
a one-sided military victory. Due to the restraint
required from a counterinsurgent and the many
actors and motivations in a 4GW environment,
accommodations such as this may be necessary to
end the violence until a permanent solution can be
found.

Mexico: 4GW Counterinsurgency in Practice?

Mexico is a struggling democracy engaged in an
increasingly violent, internal struggle against
heavily armed narco-criminal cartels that have
intimidated the public, corrupted much of law
enforcement, and created an environment of
impunity to the law.[14] The cartels have a massive
source of income through narcotic sales, possess a

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[14] McCaffrey, Barry R. After Action Report. Visit Mexico 5-7
December 2008.

vast array of weapons, and have intimidated key components of the government and law enforcement community to conduct their operations. The various cartels fight amongst themselves as much as they fight the government; however, they are not interested in taking over the government. The cartels fight the government in order to conduct their narco-trade unimpeded; they fight amongst themselves for their share of the spoils. Although the dissolution or takeover of Mexico is not the goal of the cartels, the rampant crime and destruction could lead to the breakdown of the Mexican state. Without the ability to impose order, Mexico would cease to be a state and instead would become a government with no power. The Mexican authorities are combating the cartels through a combination of direct military action, upgrading the capacity of the justice system, training military and police forces, and weeding out corruption in government institutions. Their departments of Social Development, Public Education, and Health are integral parts of the campaign. Mexican President Calderon and Attorney General Mora have stated their goal is to break up the four major cartels into 50 smaller entities and take away their firepower and financial resources. They also stated this is a campaign that will take at least eight years to have a chance at success. Whether or not this is a sound strategy is open for debate. What is important is that there is an overarching strategy at the highest level incorporating all the military and non-military resources at the state's disposal with a

realistic assessment of how much time and effort the campaign requires.

Know Your Limits

The counterinsurgency leaders must also have a realistic expectation of what they can accomplish. Many states had their borders drawn by colonial powers with little or no regard for ethnic and cultural considerations. Countless ethnic, religious, and tribal groups were placed under a single "roof" despite ancient differences and animosities. In some of these cases, stabilizing or rebuilding a state may not be possible and the counterinsurgent must be willing to prepare for that outcome. Since the legitimacy of the state is often determined by the will of the population, the level to which a state can emerge will be determined by their decisions and not the counterinsurgent's. Counterinsurgent planners must accept that their forces can only temporarily affect the local balance of power and cannot confer legitimacy or authority. The many parties in the 4GW conflict may decide to create a state or break apart into autonomous regions they are comfortable with. During this period of change and decision, the most the counterinsurgent can do is to manage instability. If the belligerents cannot come to an enduring agreement, then there is little an outside power can do to force it.

Bring it All Together

A successful counterinsurgent will likely discover and promote regional sources of power and legitimacy. If stable, these authority figures can help provide the framework for a state. At the local level, the counterinsurgent will find and develop both formal and informal leaders. Formal leaders derive authority from the state and government, but they may not necessarily have any power. Informal leaders may not have official title or may be lower in rank than the former, but they have power and influence. During this time a central government may have formed, and may be in conflict with some of the regional power figures enabled by the counterinsurgent. In some circumstances, the central government may have to grant authority to the powerful informal leaders in order to gain legitimacy from the population. A stabilized state will have many of the same problems in this regard as one built from scratch.

In order to succeed nationally, local-level plans must reinforce the national power, authority, and legitimacy of the host state. The plans may differ from region to region, but they must be focused towards a higher institution. The Sons of Iraq, while a regional success story today, will become a destabilizing force and revert into another 4GW militia unless the central government can incorporate them into a legitimate military and police force. The same is true with the tribal leaders of the Anbar Awakening and the provincial governors in Iraq; while the former hold significant power in their communities, the latter hold title and

office bestowed by the central government. The tribal leaders may be willing to pursue a mainstream political role if they see the central government gaining legitimacy and power in tribal lands.

Westernized democracies may have difficulty allowing the population in the host nation to determine what kind of state they will have, if any. The research and localized campaigns conducted by the counterinsurgents should enable them to anticipate, to some extent, what kind of state the population wants to create. After this is determined, the counterinsurgent must accept this and work towards that goal; otherwise he becomes the occupier and another force to be opposed in an already complex war. Western ideals of equality, rights, and law may run counter to the beliefs and culture of the host nation. If this occurs, then the counterinsurgent's strategy must take that into account and he must adjust his plan accordingly. The host nation may decide to reintroduce an old monarchy, institutionalize tribal borders, or even divest into feudal or regional systems. While not all of these represent a state, they may be the "shoe that fits" in that nation. Local traditions and what the population thinks they need will usually trump the counterinsurgent's ideology if a legitimate state is to be built.

Conclusion

Most modern militaries are well-educated at thinking through tactical and operational decisions

on the physical level. The counterinsurgent must make decisions within a framework that takes the moral and mental aspects into account and their second and third-order effects with the understanding that the moral level is dominant within operational and strategic-level campaign plans.

Only in rare cases have states emerged from anarchy in a single generation. The issues which created the many insurgencies in a 4GW environment will take years to solve and it will probably take longer to form a strong state. A strategy to win a 4GW conflict in short order will lead to rushed decisions from the counterinsurgent, forcing the population in an undesired direction and not only perpetuate a failed state, but create a new long-term enemy for the counterinsurgent. The counterinsurgent must form his strategy with this in mind. The counterinsurgent cannot impose state institutions or assign formal leaders. The Iraqi province of Al Anbar is relatively peaceful and is making progress towards establishing many functions consistent with a state. However, without the voluntary outreach of the central government, Al Anbar will continue to be a restless province of Iraq outside the state's control.

The states of Europe did not come into being until after hundreds of years of international war, civil war, and internal chaos. Out of the destruction of the Thirty Years War came defined borders, centralized bureaucracy, and military and police

forces that were responsible to a system and not to a particular man. The state will be created or reestablished only when a legitimate government can maintain order, impose its will across its territory, and ensure the sovereignty of its defined borders regardless of the personalities of those in charge at the moment.

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