
AN OVERVIEW OF

EAST-WEST RELATIONS

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The Trilateral Commission

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Summary of report on pages V-VIII

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Report of the
Trilateral Task Force on
East-West Relations
to
The Trilateral Commission

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The Trilateral Process

The report which follows is the joint responsibility of the three authors of the Trilateral Task Force on East-West Relations, with Richard Löwenthal serving as principal drafter. Although only the authors are responsible for the analysis and conclusions, they have been aided in their work by extensive consultations. In each case, the consultants spoke for themselves as individuals and not as representatives of any institutions with which they are associated. Those consulted include the following:

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January 8, 1977 — Authors meet in Tokyo to develop outline of report.
April — Löwenthal completes first draft of report, including inputs from Nakagawa and Azrael.
May 14 — Löwenthal meets with European experts in Bonn to discuss first draft.
June 7 — Nakagawa meets with Japanese consultants in Tokyo.
July 5 — Nakagawa meets with Japanese consultants in Tokyo.
Early July — Löwenthal completes second draft of report.
July 25 — Nakagawa meets with Japanese consultants in Tokyo to discuss second draft of report.
July 28-29 — Azrael meets with North American experts in Washington to discuss second draft.
August 6-7 — Authors meet in Paris to discuss draft report.
Early September — Löwenthal completes third draft of report.
Late September — Revised third draft completed and circulated to Commission members.
October 24-25 — Draft report discussed at meeting of Trilateral Commission in Bonn.
Early November — Authors complete revision of report for publication.

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT

An Overview of East-West Relations

East-West relations have been characterized over the last 30 years by long-term conflict, intermingled with elements of cooperation.* The duration and potential danger of this conflict stem from the combination of a power competition between the two superpowers of our time with a broader "ideological conflict" between rival political, economic and social systems based on fundamentally different values. However, the participants' awareness of a series of common interests, above all in survival, has led them to engage in a number of negotiations and agreements — leading to a period which has come to be known as a phase of relaxation of international tension, or "detente." We define "detente" as a term which sums up necessary and useful efforts to limit the forms and range, the risks and burdens of a continuing conflict by negotiation and partial cooperation.

This mixed relationship between East and West is developing in a world characterized by rapid, multiple and often unforeseen changes. Such changes conform neither to the Communist illusion of inevitable transformation as predetermined by the "laws of history" nor to the Western illusion of a stable world order. In such a changing world, it is obvious that the East-West agreements negotiated in the framework of detente cannot guarantee long-term stability; indeed, a number of destabilizing developments have taken place in recent years — e.g., the oil crisis and changes in the Middle Eastern balance; developments in Southern Africa; heightened "North-South" tension; advances in arms technology; the advent of democratic regimes in Greece, Portugal and Spain; and the emergence from isolation of some large Communist parties in Western Europe, possibly participating in future governments of NATO members. Taken together, these and other developments have led to increased uncertainty and distrust in both East and West and put a number of difficult issues on the agenda of their relations.

The report discusses the evolution of the Soviet Union and China in the coming years (Chapter II). It analyzes changes in "contested areas" — Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and Southern Africa (Chapter III) — and shifts in the military balance, at the superpower

*Several areas of cooperation were the subject of a previous task force report to the Trilateral Commission; see Henry Owen, Chihiro Hosoya, Andrew Shonfield, *Collaboration with Communist Countries in Managing Global Problems: An Examination of the Options*, The Triangle Papers: 13 (New York: 1977).

level and at the regional level in Europe, East Asia and elsewhere (Chapter IV). The conclusions from these analyses are then used in the final chapters addressing the tasks in East-West relations (Chapter V) and problems of intra-Western coordination (Chapter VI).

A stable world order is not a realistic objective for the West in a fundamentally unstable world. The only kind of peaceful world order that we can realistically envisage is one of maximum flexibility for peaceful change. As a *basic guideline* for its long-term relationship with Communist powers, the West should seek to influence the natural processes of change worldwide in a direction that is favorable to its fundamental values. This does not mean seeking a breakdown of the Communist regimes; but rather, given the difficult economic and political choices which keep facing them (Chapter II), particularly at a time of impending generation change in the Soviet Union, seeking to influence the kind of choices that are possible and necessary *within* their given basic structure. Through negotiations, in the framework of detente, on the limitation of armaments and of international violence, on terms for economic cooperation and communication across frontiers, the West can shape the alternatives facing its negotiating partners in such a way as to make some choices more rewarding to them than others.

Several major groups of policy goals emerge for the trilateral countries from the analysis in the report:

- *Credible Deterrence and Arms Limitations.* The credibility of American nuclear deterrence depends considerably on the long-term presence of substantial American forces in Europe and in East Asia; but this alone will not preserve effective deterrence over time without adequate conventional efforts by the allies of the United States. On such a basis, arms limitations may be sought on three levels — in SALT, in the MBFR talks, and on intermediate range weapons not yet under negotiation — aimed at preserving effective deterrence at the lowest possible levels. In the MBFR case, a conditional NATO willingness to renounce the deployment of the “neutron bomb” could prove a serious inducement to the Warsaw Pact to renounce its tank superiority in exchange.

- *Limiting Violence in Crisis Areas.* In the absence of general “ground rules” to avoid violence in crisis areas, the use of force as a means of expanding Soviet power and ideological influence can only be prevented by means tailored to specific crises — by timely forestalling action before the outbreak of the crisis (not taken by Western governments in the case of Southern Africa); by negotiations for a constructive solution (now being tried in Southern Africa); or by military deterrence through various

forms of support. An effort to limit the arms exports of the industrialized powers, East and West, may be the most likely area to seek some rules.

- *Management of Economic Interdependence.* The growing economic interdependence between groups of states involved in a lasting political conflict requires careful management. The principle should be that no single Western country become dependent on the East for too large a share of vital resources or too large a share of the markets for its vital branches of production, or tie down in the East dangerous amounts of its long-term credits. Effective coordination in this area among trilateral countries is improbable through hard and fast rules. It should be possible to create a permanent organ of mutual, intra-Western information exchange and consultation on questions of economic cooperation with the East, perhaps in the OECD framework. Progress is all the more urgent as, in the absence of common criteria agreed upon by the Western governments for their economic relations with the East, the legitimate Western desire to partially link East-West economic cooperation and East-West security negotiations is unlikely to become effective. If there are no fruits of detente to be gathered by the West in the field of security, then the Soviets should not be able to count indefinitely on those fruits in economic areas for which they care most.

- *Human Rights and Freedom of Communication.* Specific improvements can be achieved through East-West diplomatic contacts, provided that they can be shown to be necessary or advantageous for East-West communication and tolerable at the time to the Eastern regimes concerned. This applies in particular to the stipulations on freer movement of people, ideas and literature across frontiers, contained in "Basket III" of the Helsinki Final Act. On those matters that do not touch directly the sensitive issue of the average citizen's right to criticize the regime, the inherent linkage between economic cooperation and East-West communication may enable the West to make some continuing progress.

- *Relations with China.* The present degree of Sino-Soviet hostility, making relations along the Soviet-Chinese side of the global power triangle distinctly less normal than along the Soviet-American or Chinese-American sides, tends to benefit the West; and the West should help ensure that the present situation continues to be worthwhile for China. In particular, it is clearly in the interest of the West to grant China favorable conditions in economic relations. However, there is no guarantee that this favorable asymmetry will persist indefinitely. A Chinese return to expansionist policies is possible as China gets stronger

or if its relations with the USSR are normalized. The trilateral countries have both a political and an economic interest in the stability and independence of the states of Southeast Asia and must welcome and support the efforts of their governments to ensure stability by internal reform and to check violent subversion.

• *West European Cohesion and "Eurocommunism."* The entry of the French and/or Italian Communists into coalition governments in those countries — in which they would not be the major partner — is less likely to endanger the democratic system of government than sometimes claimed in Western discussion but might constitute a real danger to the political cohesion of Western Europe and the Atlantic alliance. The best chance to make Communist participation less likely is the success of a government without such participation in overcoming the economic recession; and any international policy that effectively promotes the recovery of Western Europe in general, and these countries in particular, will reduce the probability of Communist government participation. On the other hand, it is not in the power of other Western nations to prevent Communist government participation by external pressure, threats or support for anti-democratic forces. An attempt to isolate or "destabilize" a government with such participation would, from all the lessons of experience, lead to its radicalization and to a strengthening of the very internal conflicts within the West that constitute the main danger of the situation. A constructive policy of continuing to promote the economic stability of these countries would give the "Eurocommunists" a growing common interest with the West. The effort so far made by both the Soviets and the "Eurocommunist" parties to avoid a formal break would be increasingly difficult to sustain.

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I. INTRODUCTION

“East-West relations” is a generally accepted term for relations between the industrially advanced democracies, now known as the trilateral countries, on one side and the major Communist powers with their allies on the other. Without forgetting the fact that seen from Europe and from the Atlantic coast of North America, the Communist powers are in the East, whereas seen from Japan and the Pacific coast of North America they are in the West, we shall use the term as a convenient shorthand. We can then say that for the last 30 years, East-West relations have been characterized by long-term conflict intermingled with elements of cooperation. That has been basically true for relations with the Soviet Union; Western conflict with China has become less prominent in recent years as the tension between the two major Communist powers intensified, but retains a potential for the future that the West cannot afford to neglect.

As the prospects of East-West cooperation have recently formed the subject of another Trilateral Task Force Report,* we shall concentrate here on the East-West conflict and its control. It is indeed that conflict that accounts to a large extent for the sense of a community of interests that exists among the trilateral countries.

A. CONTROLLING A LONG-TERM CONFLICT

The long duration and extreme potential danger of the East-West conflict are due to the fact that it combines the features of a power competition between the two superpowers of our time, and of an “ideological conflict” between rival political, economic and social systems based on fundamentally different values. It is that combination that has long made the East-West conflict the main axis dividing the contemporary world. Despite the rise of major new problems — notably the Soviet-Chinese conflict, the “North-South” tension between the advanced industrial countries and the less developed nations, and the emergence of a number of non-aligned regional powers — the East-West conflict has in our opinion retained that central importance to this day.

*Chihiro Hosoya, Henry Owen and Andrew Shonfield, *Collaboration with Communist Countries in Managing Global Problems: An Examination of the Options*, A Report of the Trilateral Task Force on Constructive Trilateral-Communist Cooperation on Global Problems, The Triangle Papers: 13 (1977).

In the course of the conflict, however, the participants and above all the two superpowers have become increasingly aware that, in addition to their conflicting interests, they have a common interest in survival, hence in avoiding a nuclear war, as well as many common interests of lesser rank, above all of an economic kind. This awareness has caused them to conclude a number of agreements aimed at controlling the forms in which their conflict is conducted — from the (incomplete) nuclear test ban of 1963 to the non-proliferation treaty and a number of bilateral Soviet-American agreements for crisis management. Beyond that, in recent years a number of more or less successful negotiations have been undertaken aimed at limiting the risks and burdens of the arms race, as in SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) and MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction in Europe), and at eliminating acute territorial conflict from certain regions. Thus, parallel with the negotiations leading to the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam, the long-standing East-West conflict in Europe was largely deprived of its potentially explosive territorial aspects by the treaties concluded between the Federal Republic of Germany on one side and the Soviet Union, Poland and East Germany (GDR) on the other; by the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin; by the international recognition of the GDR; and by the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. During the same years, the first major steps were taken for the normalization of U.S. relations with the Chinese People's Republic (CPR), preceded or followed by corresponding or even more far-reaching steps on the part of Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the West European states and by the seating of the CPR in the United Nations.

The period during which those East-West agreements were negotiated has come to be known as a phase of relaxation of international tension, or "detente," but interpretation of that term has varied widely both within the West and between West and East. In the West, former U.S. President Richard Nixon, in his messages to Congress accompanying those developments, repeatedly spoke of an "era of negotiation" and even of creating a "stable structure of peace," thus seeming to suggest that detente is not merely a phase in a continuing conflict, but a promising road towards ending the conflict itself. Conversely, a number of Western critics have attacked not only that concept, but the whole policy leading to the agreements as based on illusions, arguing that detente is merely a Soviet trick to weaken the unity and resistance of the West and to obtain one-sided concessions. In the East, which did not invent the term, Soviet leaders from President and General Secretary Brezhnev downwards have repeatedly proclaimed the goal of making detente "irreversible," yet at the same time have insisted that in their view, "peaceful

coexistence between states of different systems” must be accompanied by unceasing “ideological struggle” against capitalism and imperialism, including support for armed struggle waged by Third World “liberation movements” and even, if occasion should arise, for civil war in the West. Taken altogether, their doctrinal statements and their practice suggest that while they regard specific agreements to control the forms and range of the conflict as desirable and useful, continuation of the conflict itself appears to them as inevitable so long as different political, economic and social systems with different ideologies exist — in other words, until the final victory of their cause. From all the evidence available, that attitude is deeply rooted in the nature of Communist rule — the monopoly of political decision in the hands of a single party that legitimates its rule by an ideology stressing the irreconcilable nature of the conflict of systems.

We should therefore distinguish between the ulterior visions or strategies connected with the process of detente by either side and the immediate nature of the process itself. Referring to the latter, *we propose to define the term of detente as summing up necessary and useful efforts to limit the forms and range, the risks and burdens of a continuing conflict by negotiation and partial cooperation.* As the West can neither opt out of the conflict without abandoning its free institutions based on individual human rights, in other words its identity, nor renounce the effort to control the conflict by negotiation and crisis management without risking a nuclear holocaust, there is literally no alternative to detente in this modest but vital sense.

B. DETENTE IN AN UNSTABLE WORLD

East-West relations are developing in a world characterized by rapid, multiple and often unforeseen change. Even apart from the East-West conflict, the idea of a stable world order so dear to Western opinion is incompatible with the dynamic changes in economics, technology, ecology, population, and resources of food, energy and raw materials; with the uneven impact of those changes on different parts of the world; and with the often unforeseeable reactions to them of different sections of mankind. But neither do the actual changes follow the preordained laws laid down in Marxist theory — Communist believers in those laws are as often upset by actual developments as are Western believers in stability.

Yet though both preconceptions are mistaken, they have real and different effects on the actions of those who hold them. The Communist illusion of inevitable change according to the predetermined laws of

History encourages political initiatives for offensive goals that according to circumstances may effectively change the *status quo* or end in failure and defeat. The Western illusion of stability tends to confine its holders to defensive objectives and to a reactive political attitude, so that they may miss opportunities for peaceful change in their favor or let themselves be surprised by unfavorable developments that could have been foreseen and possibly forestalled. The history of the East-West conflict in general, and of the last few years in particular, offers an ample number of examples of the consequences of the blinkers worn by each side.

It is obvious that in such a world of change, the East-West agreements negotiated in the framework of detente cannot guarantee stability either. Conversely, their conclusion is bound to register a given state of the balance of power — in the field of nuclear or conventional armaments or in a given region; and while the agreements may and should help to stabilize that balance for a time, they cannot prevent it from being upset by new and unexpected developments in the somewhat longer run. Such upsetting changes may be due to the deliberate actions of one of the sides in the conflict — for instance, the achievement of a breakthrough in arms technology, or a new political offensive in a hitherto uncontested area — but also developments beyond their control, like an economic crisis in the West or growing economic friction between the West and the raw material producers of the Third World. Yet if the balance underlying the *status quo* in East-West relations, and the agreements based on it, are upset in a number of fields in short sequence, such “destabilization” is bound to undermine not only the particular agreements concerned, but the general confidence in detente; and that confidence is only likely to be restored if and when new agreements prove possible on a new basis.

We suggest that a series of such destabilizing developments has indeed taken place in recent years. The basic agreements that constituted the present phase of detente were negotiated between 1969 and 1973, with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 as a belated consequence. We may perhaps date the break in the trend from the Middle East war of October 1973 and the ensuing oil crisis which, coming on top of years of accelerated international inflation, started the recession in the advanced industrial countries of the West. The following years brought the “Watergate crisis” in the United States with its temporarily demoralizing and paralyzing effect on U.S. foreign policy; the breakdown of the Paris settlement for Vietnam and the Communist takeover in Indochina; the increasing alignment of the raw material producers and the debtor countries of the Third World against the West, notably in the United Nations; the Middle Eastern setbacks for the Soviets, from the dramatic Egyptian

turn to the more limited but important impact of the Lebanese civil war on Syria; new developments in arms technology on both sides calling the Vladivostok draft agreement for SALT II into question; and the Portuguese revolution with the foiling of the initial high hopes of the Communists, but also with the disintegration of the Portuguese colonial empire starting the final black assault on the remaining bastions of white minority rule in Africa and opening opportunities for Soviet-Cuban military intervention.

In Europe, the successive collapse of the dictatorships in Greece, Portugal and Spain opened new prospects for a broadening of the European Community and for eventual Spanish entry into NATO. At the same time, the emergence of some of the large Communist parties both from their traditional isolation at home, and from their traditional dependence on the Soviet Union posed for the Western alliance the problem of possible Communist participation in the governments of NATO member states, and for the Soviets the problem of a loss of their doctrinal and strategic control over the most vital sections of Western Communism — while the repercussions of detente in general and of the Helsinki Final Act in particular encouraged the struggle for civil liberties on the part of individuals and groups in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to an extent not expected by either Western or Eastern statesmen.

In China, the successive deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung raised anew the great question mark over the country's future domestic development and international orientation, while a victorious and united Communist Vietnam emerged as a new potential influence in Southeast Asia. Together, all these developments, by upsetting the existing balance here in favor of one side and there of the other, have led to increased uncertainty and distrust in both East and West and put a number of new difficult issues on the agenda of their relations.

In reviewing those issues, we propose to focus on the short-term and medium-term future rather than on the past. Instead of recounting the crises of recent years in familiar detail, we shall aim at a tentative assessment of the potential for further change and its implications for Western action. We shall discuss, first, the dynamic forces likely to shape the future evolution of the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic and their alternative outcomes for the international behavior of both powers, including their mutual relations; second, the impact of regional factors in some of the contested problem areas of the world (notably in parts of Europe, the Middle East and Africa, but also on Japan's relations with the Communist powers and on tensions in North-east and Southeast Asia), as well as the impact of changes in the world

economy centered on the transformation of relations between the industrial "North" and the less developed "South"; and third, the political and technological tendencies toward changes in the military balance. On the basis of that assessment, we shall then try to draw some conclusions about the criteria that should guide the choices of the trilateral countries between alternative policies, the priority tasks likely to face them in their relations with the Communist powers, and the directions in which a harmonization of attitudes between them would appear to be most urgent.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MAJOR COMMUNIST POWERS

A. THE SOVIET UNION

1. Between Growth and Rigidity

Since the early 1960s, the internal development of the Soviet Union has entered a clearly “post-revolutionary” phase: For nearly two decades, the Communist party regime has not attempted further to transform the basic structure of Soviet society, but has concentrated its efforts on achieving continuous economic growth — with corresponding improvements in productivity and the standard of living at home as well as an ever greater role in world affairs. It is during this period that the Soviet Union, thanks to a sustained armament drive, has emerged as a military world power in broad strategic nuclear parity with the United States, and with a global capability for conventional military intervention.

The transition from Khrushchev’s highly personal style of dynamic leadership with its unpredictable improvisations, to the rule of an oligarchy, in which a leader can only build up and preserve his authority by outwardly conforming to strict collective discipline and observing regular bureaucratic procedures, was both a consequence of this change of objectives and a means for its consolidation. The Brezhnev leadership has granted the bureaucratic elites in party and state, in economy, army and police a higher degree not only of personal security, but of job security than existed at any previous period of Soviet history. On that basis, considerable scope for inner-bureaucratic debate without fear as well as for consultation of outside experts has developed, on the understanding that the Politburo remains the sole ultimate arbiter between the different views and interests represented.

Despite the multiplicity of conflicts inseparable from a highly differentiated modern society, the degree of cohesion and satisfaction among the bureaucratic elites thus remains generally high. In the special case of the military, where a generation change has recently taken place while it is still pending in the Party, the appointments of a number of Party leaders to top military rank seem to indicate that some tensions

exist but also that they are under control. The scientific elite has benefitted from the virtual disappearance of the former doctrinaire interference with the natural sciences, but the development of empirical social science remains hamstrung by the obstruction of party ideologists, and the scientific and creative intelligentsia remains the one elite section in which discontent and even disaffection are widespread.

The care taken to preserve a consensus within the bureaucratic elite has been paid for by a considerable degree of conservatism in policy. Slowness in the renewal of leading personnel in many fields and on many levels, from the Politburo downward, has been accompanied by sluggishness of innovation. In the early years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin collective, a number of major initiatives were undertaken to improve the working of the economy — notably the reform of the planning system to give greater scope for managerial decisions in response to market data, the delegation of some ministerial powers to associations of enterprises, and the massive investment effort in agriculture. But the industrial planning reforms have been steadily whittled down in their passage through the bureaucratic mill, while the reforms in the internal organization of the collective farms that had been intended to accompany the new investments never materialized. Similarly, the 1971 promise to achieve for the first time a higher rate of growth for the industries producing consumer goods than for heavy industry was not carried out in the subsequent five years and not repeated in the 1976 five-year plan. Altogether, the expectations aroused by the early reform announcements have not been fulfilled.

The rigidities characteristic of the system in its present phase have resulted in economic difficulties which are likely to increase considerably during the coming decade. The overall rate of growth, while remaining more steady than in the West, is declining and may be expected to decline further. After the end of the earlier rapid increase in the industrial population, which formed the basis of the extensive phase of Soviet economic growth, the Soviet Union now faces the economic effects of the slowdown in the natural population increase as the age-groups born in the 1960s are entering the labor force. This process is not compensated by an accelerated increase in productivity; on the contrary, the latter is slowed down both by the growing obsolescence of much of the industrial plant and by the sluggishness of the practical introduction of technological innovations, which, despite the impressive numbers and quality of Soviet scientists and technicians, has persisted outside the military field due to economic and managerial problems. (In fact, Soviet technology still appears to lag behind the United States even in large parts of the military field, notably in applied cybernetics.) In agriculture, the depen-

dence of the country on recurrent grain imports persists although the share of the population employed there remains very high compared to other industrial countries. Finally, the Soviet energy balance, long a source of strength because of the country's rich oil resources, threatens to become a factor of weakness as the most accessible and cheapest deposits seem to be approaching exhaustion faster than production from Asian deposits remote from the main industrial centers is growing, due to the very heavy investments required for that purpose.

The reaction of the broad mass of Soviet citizens to this reality is inevitably diffuse and contradictory. There is widespread acceptance of the basic institutions of Soviet "socialism" (except probably for some lingering resentment of agricultural collectivization) as representing security, but widespread discontent with their low efficiency and widespread disappointment at the frequent non-fulfillment of material expectations. There is a basic mass loyalty to the Soviet fatherland, and to some extent to the regime as its representative, at least among the Great Russian population and the rising, more assimilated strata of other nationalities, but general lack of interest and fairly open disbelief in the utopian and internationalist components of Communist ideology, and widespread dislike of the careerists, busybodies and incompetents who frequently represent the Party in daily life. Above all, there is little belief among the people that they could do anything to influence the course of events — apart, of course, from the civil rights activists among the intelligentsia.

Institutionally, then, the privileged bureaucracy appears to have insulated itself to an unprecedented extent both from extra-procedural leadership intervention from above and from democratic *political* pressures from below. Nevertheless, objective *social* pressures on its decisions are inherent in the situation and make themselves felt. One group of such pressures arises from the persistent economic weaknesses we have discussed, and from the unorganized but pervasive discontent created by them. Another group has developed from the revival of national feeling among the nationalities of the Soviet Union, a phenomenon which includes the Great Russians but creates most problems among the "minority" nations who together are coming to form the majority — with the Turkic-speaking peoples alone expected to form one quarter of the total Soviet population by the year 2000 and an even larger share of the young. This revival creates growing difficulties for the official theory of the accelerating "confluence" of Soviet nationalities and the official practice of their Russification. A third group of pressures is created by the "dissident" political activities of the "democratic movement" and the civil rights groups. While these groups are small and, except for the

national minority activists, have no mass influence, they are not, in fact, isolated; their contacts reach far into the scientific community and include a number of critical party intellectuals and experts serving the establishment — which explains the amount of inside information contained in some of their *samizdat* journals as well as the length of their uninterrupted appearance and the wavering in the authorities' attitude toward them.

None of these pressures by itself, nor all together are likely to endanger the survival of the regime. But they keep facing it with difficult choices between economic reform or slowdown, between investments for oil and technological progress or continued priority for armaments, between energy or grain shortages or economic cooperation with the West that might require a brake on military expansion, between concessions to the people or repression; and one or several of those choices might take the form of leadership conflict in a special situation such as the impending "generation crisis." With more than half of the Politburo including Brezhnev himself clustering around the 70-year mark, a major change in its composition cannot now be long delayed; and in that case, a considerable number of overdue changes are likely to occur on lower levels as well. Such major decisions on personalities are almost bound to get linked up with policy decisions. We are thus predicting not a "crisis of the regime" in the sense of any danger to its continued existence, but an important political turning point in its development for the comparatively near future.

In the nature of the regime, such a turning point would not bring a final decision between such alternatives as "convergence" with the democratic societies or a hardening into long-term decline. But it is likely to bring a medium-term decision between a course giving priority to internal reform and relaxation or one giving preference to military-political expansion at the risk of aggravating internal tensions.

We are deliberately leaving out of consideration, for the range of time here discussed, the more dramatic third alternative of a political breakdown of the regime. First, we feel that the degree of elite consensus and procedural regularity achieved by the regime makes a breakdown of its institutions unlikely. Second, we consider that the conditions for an effective participation of broader strata in determining the outcome of a political crisis do not exist at the present time. Third, we do not perceive in the working and traditions of Bolshevik party rule any chance for the sudden rise of a military adventurer. But while accumulating conflicts are not, in our view, strong enough to explode the institutions of the regime, they may well give their working a somewhat different direction — for better or for worse.

2. Expansion and Tension or Reform and Relaxation?

The alternatives facing the Soviet leadership appear to have three inter-related dimensions. The first is economic — it concerns the dilemma of resource allocation between military and civilian purposes, and the chance to soften this dilemma by economic relations with the West, notably Western credits, technology transfers, and grain sales. The present high share of the Soviet GNP devoted to armaments is evidently not compatible with the allocation of adequate resources to the civilian economy (including agriculture), and would be even less compatible with it in the absence of Western credits and technology transfers. The dilemma is likely to be aggravated in the future as claims on exportable Soviet resources are increased by a growing energy deficit: Even today the Soviet bloc, for whose total energy needs the Soviet Union has made itself ultimately responsible, is a net importer of energy fuels, though the Soviet Union is, of course, a net exporter to Eastern Europe. Though arms deliveries to oil states may help to reduce this particular problem, it remains true that on the whole an alleviation of the domestic economic problems depends on a reduced emphasis on armaments and improved relations with the West.

The second dimension is one of external security. At present, Soviet leaders may support detente for widely different motivations — because they recognize the common interest with the West in survival and generally in reducing the risks and burdens of the conflict, or because they expect that detente will provide the most favorable conditions for moves expanding Soviet world influence at Western expense short of the risk of major war, on the grounds that the climate of detente could be expected to weaken the unity of the West and its will to resist Communist encroachments. As Mr. Brezhnev's reports to the XXIVth and XXVth Party Congresses show, the Soviet leaders regard the support of anti-capitalist "class struggle" in the advanced industrial countries and of anti-imperialist "liberation movements" in the Third World, including in some cases the support of military action, as perfectly compatible with their concept of detente. Any differences between the supporters of priority for domestic reform and the supporters of a preference for militant expansion are therefore likely not to turn on the "principle" of detente (which both may support for different reasons) but on the degree of offensive risk-taking that may prove compatible with the continuation of detente in practice, that is, on the likely Western reaction to it. It is up to Western policy to give its own effective delineation of the limits of Soviet expansionism that are compatible with detente, and thus to face the Soviet leaders with a clearcut choice between the advantages of

detente based on a renunciation of violent expansion or the temptations of expansion at the risk of destroying the detente relationship.

The third dimension concerns Soviet internal security. Most Soviet officials professionally concerned with internal ideological conformity and internal security within the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc seem to be afraid of detente because of its domestic repercussions — the increase in communication with the West, the growing numbers of Western visitors and publications admitted, the growing difficulty of maintaining an ideological image of “the enemy” for home consumption. Feeling that the Soviet and East European regimes are unable to afford the greater degree of relaxation implied in the terms of the Helsinki Final Act, they may well conclude that detente has been bought at too high a price. Conversely, those who see the regime’s best chance of coping with nationalist assertiveness or ideological dissidence in a climate of general relaxation of repression must regard economic improvement and the intensification of East-West relations required for it as conditions for risking such a policy of relaxation.

It is in terms of these kinds of interconnected alternatives that East-West relations, and more particularly Western policies intended to clarify those alternatives, are likely to make an impact on the course of domestic power rivalries in the Soviet Union, and that the outcome of those rivalries may in turn make an impact on the evolution of East-West relations.

B. THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC

1. China’s Domestic New Course

Within ten months of the death of Mao Tse-tung, the 11th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party approved the election of Hua Kuo-feng as head of the party and government, the condemnation of the “radical” group of leaders (including Mao’s widow) who had tried to uphold the traditions of the Cultural Revolution, and the rehabilitation of the production-oriented “pragmatist” Teng Hsiao-ping now installed as one of Hua’s four deputies. It has also endorsed Hua’s program, taken over from the late Chou En-lai, “to effect the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology as well as of national defense in order to push China to the forefront of the world by the end of the century.”

Although the new course is proclaimed as an implementation of the true intentions of Mao, it constitutes a sharp break with the Maoist concept of “uninterrupted revolution” in general and with the traditions of the Cultural Revolution in particular, and is clearly intended to end the uncertain wavering between two opposite policy lines backed by em-

battled factions that persisted between the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1968-69 and the death of Mao. While both factions seem to have agreed all along on the need for complete independence from Russia (and for a number of years also on the rejection of the Soviet model of absolute priority for heavy industry in favor of a more balanced type of industrial and agricultural development), their basic differences turned on the preference of the "radicals" for an extreme form of egalitarianism, the primacy of ideology in education and the need to prevent the consolidation of bureaucratic and technocratic elites by ever new revolutionary upheavals; and the preference of the "pragmatists" for differentiated material incentives, education for useful knowledge and the need to assure continuity of production under expert leadership. The decisions of the Party Congress amount to an endorsement of a clear victory of the supporters of the primacy of modernization over the supporters of the primacy of ideology.

While in the long run such a victory was likely unless the Chinese people chose to stay permanently outside the modern world, its achievement at the present moment was clearly difficult and may still face obstacles. As recently as April 1976 Hua had still condemned and deposed Teng for advocating the very views that are now proclaimed as official, and he only turned visibly against the "radicals" in the short and sharp struggle for the succession after the death of Mao. Further, that struggle — like all the internal struggles since the Cultural Revolution — was not decided by the institutions of the Party according to their statutory procedures, but by control of physical force at the center at the crucial moment; a formal Central Committee meeting to approve the choice of Hua and the condemnation of the "gang of four" only took place nine months later, as a final preparation for the Party Congress. From all accounts, the New Course appears to be popular and it seems unlikely that the "radicals," now deprived of their chance to manipulate the prestige of Mao as their chief weapon, will once more be able to "reverse the verdict." But many other obstacles still remain on the road of pragmatic modernization.

One of these obstacles is the anti-pragmatic indoctrination which the younger generation received in the course of the Cultural Revolution. Another obstacle is the virtual loss of a number of age-groups for specialized technical or scientific training during the prolonged period when the universities were first closed and later prevented from selecting their students according to ability and insisting on standards in their work — a period that is ending only now; the counterpart of this is the resentment of the masses of would-be intellectuals that were sent down to

physical work in the countryside and prevented from obtaining a higher education during those years.

Yet another type of problem concerns the still doubtful stability of the restored Party institutions. The habit of procedural legitimacy has been lost during the long years of successive intervention by the groups controlling physical force — first by the Red Guards with military backing and then by the military turning against the Red Guards, by the military clique around Lin Piao and by the military commanders opposed to him, and finally by the palace guard and the Peking garrison in the decision on Mao's succession. Nor can the lack of procedural legitimacy as yet be replaced by the undisputed authority of the new leader: Hua's authority has no basis either in outstanding political, military or economic achievements in the past or in ideological creativity, neither in conspicuous links with Mao nor in a consistent stand with the pragmatists. His rise to power is not known to have been due to the backing of a strong army or Party clique, except possibly the security services; it seems primarily based on maneuvering skill, and he will need time to create a strong power base of his own.

To sum up: China is a power with an enormous potential in human and other resources, and its new leaders have set out on a course of rational modernization intended to turn it into a leading world power by the year 2000. But China has only just emerged from a prolonged and costly crisis of its regime, and it is not yet certain that the crisis has been finally overcome. Regular procedures for leadership selection and policy decisions have not so far been developed, and many scars as well as many victims of the past upheavals remain to hamper the new growth. Given the technological gap between today's China and the advanced industrial countries and the extent of Chinese population pressure, the fruits of the new orientation will require considerable time to ripen. For the range of time envisaged in this report, say the next decade, China will not be a world power yet but a power of regional rank, and its influence on world events will depend to a considerable extent on its orientation between the two world powers that actually exist so far.

2. The Prospect for Sino-Soviet Relations

The conflict between the two major Communist powers has many roots that have often been analyzed — in national history and culture as well as national interest, in the experience as well as in the ideology of the two ruling parties. In our context, it is of paramount importance to distinguish two levels of the conflict. The first concerns the emancipation of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese People's Republic

from Soviet tutelage. The other is constituted by the growth of a sense of acute hostility between the two ruling parties and the two countries, and by the Chinese perception that the Soviet "social imperialists" now constitute a greater danger to their security and independence than the American, Japanese or other imperialists.

The Soviets have shown their awareness of the distinction between the two levels of conflict by regularly offering to the Chinese, at Soviet Party Congresses and on similarly solemn occasions, two alternative forms of accommodation: "correct relations" on the basis of "peaceful coexistence," or "friendly relations" on the basis of "proletarian internationalism." The first implies only the disappearance of the acute hostility and the establishment of a kind of detente between the two major Communist powers, such as exists between each of them and the powers of the West. The second implies a Chinese return to the fold of Moscow-centered "world Communism," hence in effect to submission under Soviet tutelage.

The Soviet leaders seem well aware, however, that there exists no practical prospect of achieving this latter "maximum program." In fact, there is every reason to regard China's emancipation from Soviet tutelage as both inevitable and irreversible. In the context of inter-Communist relations, it constitutes the logical outcome of the rise of a second major Communist power through an independent revolution. In the context of Chinese history, it constitutes the final stage on China's long road back to national independence. No conceivable Chinese leader, whether Communist or not, could or would undertake to reverse this development.

But emancipation from the tutelage of a foreign power, even if achieved in conflict, need not always leave a legacy of lasting hostility. In the Sino-Soviet case, that hostility first arose from the need for both party regimes to find an ideological justification for the break by accusing each other of having deviated from the fundamental principles of a socialist society. The Maoists in particular have since the early 1960s accused the post-Stalin Soviet leaders of backsliding into capitalism, and have used their dreadful example as a warning in the inner-Chinese struggle for a radically different road of uninterrupted revolution. A new stage in their hostility was consequently reached when the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 showed that the Soviets would not tolerate a different road to socialism if they could prevent it by force. Though the official Chinese thesis that China has to arm against the danger of an all-out Soviet attack may have to be taken with a grain of salt — if the Chinese leaders believed in that danger, they might have acted with greater caution in the first Ussuri River incident of March 1969 — the fear of Soviet pressure to prevent China's development

along its own road appears to be genuine. It was that fear that increased Chinese hostility to the "new Tsars" to the point that China sought re-insurance in a normalization of relations with the United States and in a recognized place in the international community.

If that analysis is correct, it follows that the present state of acute Sino-Soviet hostility could in principle be toned down, provided the Soviets continue their efforts to make their readiness for a *modus vivendi* based on "peaceful coexistence" credible, and provided the "pragmatists" remain in power in China. The latter, having less domestic reasons than had the Maoist radicals to maintain acute hostility to the "Soviet model," could be expected to consider solely from the angle of national interest whether such an accommodation would bring them more gains in terms of military savings or increased freedom of movement on the international scene, say in Southeast Asia, or more losses in terms of Western, including Japanese, support particularly in the economic field.

This possibility clearly raises a corresponding problem for Western policy towards the CPR. The fact that the two major Communist powers are hardly on speaking terms with each other, while both engage in regular diplomatic and economic interchange with the trilateral countries, has obviously increased the relative freedom of movement of the latter. The question therefore arises whether the "West" should make special efforts to maintain this advantageous state of affairs by further intensification of its relations with China, and if so, in what forms and up to which limits.

3. China and the Non-Communist World

Since China's intervention in the Korean war on one side, and its "peaceful coexistence" agreement with India in 1954 and role at the 1955 Bandung conference of Afro-Asian governments on the other, the CPR has been recognized as a great regional power. Since its break with the Soviet Union, China has emerged as an independent factor on the world scene besides the USA and USSR, though not yet as a world power of comparable weight. Since China's seating in the United Nations it has begun to play an important role in its debates.

Yet China has never acquired a sphere of influence corresponding to its strength. North Korea and Vietnam have not become Chinese satellites. There has been no extension of China's frontiers since the incorporation of Tibet in 1954, and the repeated conflicts with India have remained confined to border areas. The Chinese Communists point to this as evidence of the non-imperialist character of their regime; but it must be pointed out that the lack of a sphere of influence, notably in

Southeast Asia, is not for want of trying. In the years preceding the Cultural Revolution, China intervened in the Vietnam war and sought to rival Soviet support and supplies to the North. At the same time, the CPR exerted a considerable attraction on Sukarno's Indonesia, both diplomatically and through its influence on the Indonesian Communists; it also sought to back Pakistan diplomatically in its conflicts with India. Communist guerillas looking to China for guidance and support have been at times a considerable factor of unrest in Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. However, a series of major setbacks — notably the fall of Sukarno and the massacre of the Indonesian Communists following their involvement in an attempted military coup in the fall of 1965, and the temporary success of Soviet mediation between Pakistan and India at Tashkent in early 1966 — deprived Chinese regional activities of major significance for the subsequent period; and while North Vietnam had carefully preserved during the war an attitude of equal friendship with Russia and China (and Cambodia under Sihanouk was definitely Chinese-oriented), victorious and united Communist Vietnam is clearly leaning to Moscow rather than Peking.

With a view to the future, it is worth recalling these past events as a reminder that, apart from the still unresolved Taiwan issue, Chinese interest in Southeast Asia offers a region of potential conflict with "Western," particularly Japanese and American, interests — not least in view of the important role of the overseas Chinese in a number of Southeast Asian countries. Apart from this region, Chinese influence abroad has lately tended to rely on ideological affinity rather than geographical proximity.

This search for ideological influence has in the course of time been increasingly concentrated on the Third World. The apparent effort to form a new, truly "Marxist-Leninist" International, rival to the Moscow-centered movement, undertaken in 1964 on the morrow of the break, has come to nothing in the advanced industrial countries. There, the Chinese-oriented Communist splinter groups were unable to win a mass following, and since Peking began to treat the Soviets as the main danger, and to propagate an alliance between the Third World and the second-rank industrial powers against "American-Soviet hegemony," many of them have, under Albanian leadership, broken with this new Chinese form of "revisionism." In Europe in particular, Peking is now left with a newly-formed friendship with Tito's Yugoslavia and some very tentative contact with "Eurocommunist" parties.

In the less developed countries on the other hand, the Chinese claim to offer a model for independent modernization on non-Western and non-Soviet lines has found a certain echo in the context of their difficult

struggle to win better trading conditions from the advanced Western countries, and of the transparent Soviet tactics to applaud such demands on the West but to offer nothing themselves. Particularly in Eastern and Southern Africa, the Chinese combination of offering aid on easy terms and by original methods adapted to local needs, as in Tanzania and Zambia, and of supporting militant struggle against the remnants of white supremacy, as in Rhodesia, has gained them some prestige, though even here their insistence on fighting all pro-Soviet movements has on occasion gotten them into difficulties, as in Angola.

Altogether, Chinese ideological campaigning in the Third World does not by itself constitute a major danger to the trilateral countries as of now. Perhaps its most damaging effect at present, from the angle of Western interests, is that its competition may contribute to making corresponding Soviet activities more militant. Yet its existence is a reminder that, beyond the present orientation of Chinese foreign policy to regard the Soviets as the main immediate danger to their security and independence, there is no evidence to suggest that the basic Communist commitment to long-term conflict with the West has been abandoned in Peking.

III. CHANGES IN CONTESTED AREAS

A. EUROPE

From the beginning of the East-West conflict, Europe has been the only region in which Soviet and United States armed forces continuously confronted each other across fixed lines. The territorial stability which has distinguished Europe from other contested areas in the conflict has been due to this very fact, and has been the basis for the agreements concluded here in the framework of detente. However detente itself, by reducing the mutual fear of attack and blurring the image of "the enemy" on both sides, has become a factor of potentially destabilizing internal change in both East and West.

1. Western Europe: Strength and Weakness

In Western Europe, the effects of detente coincided in time with the disappearance of its last three right-wing dictatorships, with the economic recession and with the emergence of some major Communist parties from domestic isolation and international dependence on the Soviet Union.

The collapse first of the Greek, then the Portuguese and finally the Spanish dictatorships raised the question whether these nations would be able to create workable democracies or fall victim to new dictatorships from the Communist Left. Particularly the great influence wielded by the Portuguese Communists (a fairly small but well-organized party unconditionally loyal to Moscow) in the early military governments after the revolution was widely perceived, both in the West and in the Kremlin, as a portent not only for the future of Portugal itself, but of Spain, just entering the difficult transitional phase after four decades of General Franco's rule, and of Italy and France, where large Communist mass parties in the climate of detente were overcoming their prolonged isolation as "parties of the enemy" and, under the influence of recession and mass unemployment, were profiting from a marked electoral swing to the Left.

However, that perception has proved mistaken, at least for the time being. Portugal, thanks to the resistance put up by its democratic forces and the support they received from their friends in Western Europe, completed within two years of the revolution the changeover to a func-

tioning democratic constitution, with the Communists relegated to an opposition role under a democratic socialist minority government. Soviet political, organizational and financial support for the earlier attempts of the Communists to seize power failed, and Soviet military support was never attempted in this NATO country. Spain's transition to democratic institutions has proceeded cautiously, but with remarkable success under the guidance of the monarchy, and the Spanish Communists have helped it by abjuring any revolutionary strategy, working successfully for their legalization as a democratic party and winning a modest eight percent of the votes in the elections of June 1977. Together with Greece, three new democracies are now applying for membership in the European Community — to the dismay of the Soviets but also to the embarrassment of the Community itself, where progress towards further integration is at a virtual standstill anyhow and admission of less developed new members will create serious economic problems.

In Italy and France, while inflation and recession have favored the growth of left-wing opposition to conservative governments in general and of Communist influence in particular, they have nowhere created a climate of revolutionary crisis. They have therefore not reversed, but rather accelerated the process of the integration of the Communist-voting masses in the democratic political system on which these voters have come to rely for trade union freedom and social security, and the resulting adjustment of the strategy of their leaders to the need for finding political allies within that system. In Italy, that process started more than twenty years ago, when Khrushchev's disclosure of Stalin's crimes led the Italian Communists to inquire publicly into the features of the Soviet system that had made those crimes possible. Over the years, that discussion has resulted in the official party view that, though the Bolshevik October revolution was the first socialist revolution, the Russian political system has developed on a backward historical and cultural basis and cannot serve as a model for socialism in advanced countries with democratic traditions. The French Communists, after clinging to the Soviet model much longer, have come to adopt similar views in the last few years since they first joined their Italian comrades in criticizing the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Both parties, as well as the Spanish (and also the Japanese) Communist Party are now officially committed, by formal decisions of their party congresses, to rejecting the Soviet model of one-party rule and the Leninist doctrine of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" for their countries, and to preserve, if ever they should enter the government, all democratic freedoms including the freedom to oppose such a government and to overthrow it in free elections.

Correspondingly, those parties have rejected all Soviet suggestions for a revolutionary exploitation of the economic crisis in the West, obtaining after months of public argument a reluctant Soviet agreement — at the East Berlin conference of European Communist parties held in June 1976 — to a formula sanctioning their strategic autonomy. Soviet authority among the Communists of the advanced industrial countries is by now clearly too much eroded, and the withering away of Leninist dogma in their ranks too far advanced, for this evolution to be still reversed by Soviet pressure, without a profound party crisis that would leave the Soviets with a greatly weakened instrument.

This does not mean, however, that the situation in those countries holds no danger for the future of the Western alliance. The danger is not so much that the Communists could break their word and attempt a “takeover” once they are “in power”: They are not the strongest party in Italy and far from the strongest in France, and could only enter coalition governments in a minority position, thus leaving their partners free to safeguard themselves against such a “takeover” by laying down terms, as they did successfully in both countries in the post-war coalitions of 1945-47. The limitations of the influence open to the French Communists in a coalition with the stronger Socialists seem indeed to be the reason why the former have suddenly broken up the “United Left” alliance before the elections. The danger is, rather, that an important Communist participation in democratic coalition governments in either or both countries would reduce their cooperation in the NATO alliance and in common Western policies more generally, and would impair Western capacity for united action in a crisis; and hope of such a development may well be one reason for the Soviets’ reluctant acceptance of the “Eurocommunist” strategy. Though both Communist parties have committed themselves to accept continued participation in the alliance if they should join their respective governments, the general outlook of the French party remains bitterly opposed to the policy of the alliance, to close cooperation with the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, and to any closer integration in the European Community. The Italian Communists, by contrast, have long been convinced supporters of the Community and explicitly accept the need for NATO in order to maintain a balance of power in Europe while the Warsaw Pact exists: In particular, Berlinguer has publicly described NATO as a potential protection against Soviet military intervention as practiced in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and their leaders and the majority of their rank and file would probably prove willing defenders of the independence of Yugoslavia in case of a similar intervention there. But even they are active supporters of Soviet “anti-imperialist” policies in the Middle East

and Africa, and might cause serious difficulties for the use of Italian NATO bases in a conflict in those areas.

In our view, then, West European democracy has proved sufficiently stable and sufficiently attractive to the West European masses to outlive decades of Communist propaganda and a serious economic recession. The principal weakness of Western Europe lies rather in its lack of international political cohesion. The failure of substantive progress towards greater European integration, above all in the economic field, has left the national governments wholly responsible for their economic and monetary policy to the frequently divergent interests of their separate electorates. In recent years, the danger of such divergence has been greatly increased by the impact of a prolonged recession: The longer the hope of a full and joint recovery for all is deferred and the more doubtful it becomes, the greater the temptation for the economically weaker countries to seek relief by beggar-my-neighbor policies, like more or less disguised protectionism or competitive devaluation; and the greater also the tendency for each harassed government to blame the others' policies for its plight and point an accusing finger at them. For the Soviets, such a situation offers obvious opportunities for exploiting intra-Western quarrels and seeking to deepen them with the help of Communist-controlled media today, and possibly of Communist participation in some West European governments tomorrow. Common Western policies in view of the likelihood of such participation must be primarily addressed to this risk of West European fragmentation, and of a weakening of NATO's capacity of action.

2. The Eastern Mediterranean

In the Eastern Mediterranean, there is not just lack of international cohesion, but outright conflict between two member states of NATO, Greece and Turkey, which has repeatedly brought them to the verge of war, both over Cyprus and over the exploration and possible exploitation of the Aegean seabed. The conflicting interests do not seem irreconcilable in their nature, but so far, all attempts at a solution have failed to yield more than limited progress. In the meantime, each party to the conflict blames the United States for not taking its side, and Turkey also for the Congressional cutoff of arms deliveries. As a result, some important American and NATO installations have become at least temporarily unusable; the Southeastern flank of the alliance is insufficiently protected.

The Soviet Union has naturally tried to draw political gain from that situation. In recent years, it has multiplied its advances to Turkey,

ranging from substantial economic investments (that have been accepted) to the offer of a general treaty of friendship. The latter is still in abeyance, because the Turks recognize that its non-aggression clause would be incompatible with their NATO obligations. Nevertheless, the Turks keep the issue open because it strengthens their bargaining position vis-à-vis the USA; in the meantime, they are handling the Montreux Convention rules for the passage of warships through the Straits with remarkable liberality towards the Soviets.

There seems to be little doubt that the preferred objective of the Turks is a restoration of Turkish-American friendship on their terms, and that a solution on terms that are acceptable to them would also be the most favorable outcome from the viewpoint of the alliance's interest. But at the time of writing, this outcome is by no means assured, and a serious danger remains.

3. The Future of Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia is the only country in Europe about whose long-term political orientation there is *no* tacit agreement between East and West. Finland, while a democratic country in the Western sense, is recognized as lying in the Soviet sphere under its military treaty with the Soviet Union. Sweden, Switzerland and Austria are militarily neutral, but politically broadly pro-Western. Yugoslavia has been formally nonaligned ever since Tito's break with Stalin; but while the post-Stalin leadership of the Soviet Union has adjusted to this as a fact of life, it has never accepted it as permanent.

Yugoslavia has reacted to this situation with a continuous balancing act. It is, for instance, an associate member of the Soviet bloc's "Council for Mutual Economic Aid" (CMEA) but also has links with the OECD and the European Community. It maintains party relations with the CPSU to the extent of participating in the recent East Berlin conference of European Communist parties, but at that conference it actively supported the ideological and strategic autonomy of the West European parties as well as defending its own. In its general policy, Yugoslavia aims not at a preponderance of the Soviet bloc in Europe, but at an East-West balance as the best condition for its own independence.

The Soviet attitude to Yugoslavia's future was clarified during President and General Secretary Brezhnev's visit in November 1976, when, according to statements made by Yugoslav Central Committee members to Western journalists, he suggested that the Yugoslavs should interpret their nonalignment as similar to the "nonalignment" of the Cubans and Rumanians; specifically, he is reported to have urged full

membership in CMEA, preferential treatment of Soviet warships in Yugoslav harbors, and a general coordination of Yugoslav foreign policy with that of the Soviet Union. While Marshal Tito is stated to have rejected those demands, and there are no indications that Brezhnev repeated them during Tito's return visit to Moscow en route to Peking, they may be taken to indicate the objectives of continuing long-term Soviet pressure — on him and above all on his successor or successors.

An acceptance of those or similar demands would substantially change the European balance of power — not only by giving the Soviets an assured position on the Adriatic, but also by discouraging Communist autonomism in East and West. We may assume that Tito and his closest associates have made arrangements for the succession that are intended to guarantee the continuation of nonalignment in his sense of the term, and that, following the measures taken against both pro-Soviet "Cominformists" and national separatists in recent years, those arrangements have a reasonable chance of coming into effect. But in view of the continuing seriousness of nationality tension inside Yugoslavia, nobody can be *certain* that a "succession crisis" will be avoided which would offer the Soviets an opportunity for at least indirect intervention, if not for direct intervention that could precipitate a major international crisis.

It seems to us that such a crisis of intervention could only be deterred with certainty by a combination of clear Yugoslav readiness to resist such intervention and firm and timely warnings by the NATO powers backed by adequate contingency planning. Because of the lack of a tacit agreement on Yugoslavia's future between East and West, and because of the importance of the country for the European balance, this must be regarded as the most potentially explosive issue in Europe.

4. Eastern Europe: A Doubtful Soviet Asset?

The control of Eastern Europe tends to pose increasing problems to the Soviet leaders — both of an economic and of an ideological kind. Economically, Eastern Europe did not remain untouched by the consequences of the rise in oil prices and of the Western recession. The Soviet Union did substantially increase its oil prices to Eastern Europe, though not to the same extent as the world market price; taking its own rising imports into account, it remains a net loser on this operation. At the same time, the recession narrowed Western markets for East European products, resulting in an increase of East European debts to the West, most conspicuous in the Polish case. Rumania suffered a serious economic setback when the devastations of an earthquake followed within two years the damage earlier caused by floods. In short, there are grow-

ing indications that viewed in purely economic terms, the Soviet Union's East European empire has become a liability rather than an asset.

Ideologically, the human rights principles embodied in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have become the basis of an unexpected bloc-wide movement, reinforced by echoes of the East Berlin debate with the West European "Eurocommunists." The Soviets had originally conceived the CSCE as a contribution to the stability of the bloc regimes, and indeed the Final Act had crowned the work of the bilateral treaties with the German Federal Republic by enshrining the inviolability of the frontiers in a multilateral document. But when the full text was published throughout the Soviet bloc, committees to watch the implementation of its human rights principles were formed in short succession by groups of independent-minded intellectuals, including prominent figures in the sciences, literature and arts, both in various centers of the Soviet Union and in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania. The movement became strongest in Poland, where an outbreak of workers' strikes and riots caused by the June 1976 attempt to raise food prices, and its repression by a wave of arrests and arbitrary police actions, became the occasion for forming a "Committee to Defend the Workers' Rights," that circulated its signed appeals both to the authorities and to the Western press, and eventually also received the moral support of the Church; and in Czechoslovakia, where the many signatures of "Charter 77" and the persistent flow of new documents from its authors revived in many minds the memory of 1968. In East Germany, a parallel movement not confined to intellectuals took the form of large numbers of applications to the authorities that, with explicit reference to the Helsinki Final Act, claimed the right to leave the country for West Germany.

It is fair to say that none of those groups constituted at any moment a danger to Communist rule. But the open stand taken by many well-known public figures in defiance of intimidation and persecution, as well as the simultaneous occurrence of similar movements in various countries, constituted an unprecedented challenge to Communist authority. It caused hesitations and divisions among the leaders about the degree of repression to be used on the eve of the follow-up meeting for CSCE in the fall of 1977. Thus, the Polish authorities after some wavering decided to restore internal peace by an amnesty freeing both the condemned workers of June 1976 and the arrested members of the committee of intellectuals formed for their defense, while the Czech regime continued on a course of brutal intimidation without managing to stop the flow of publications of "Charter 77." The problem was further complicated by the fact that the declarations of the French, Italian and

Spanish Communist leaders in favor of civil liberties under socialism, made at the East Berlin conference, had been published in full in East Germany and in outline in Russia and throughout the bloc, and that a number of Russian, Czech and East German advocates of those liberties appealed to those parties for support and obtained it in some cases. Finally, the challenge for a time affected East-West relations on the highest level, when the new President of the United States in early 1977 demonstrated his personal concern with the human rights issue, and when the Soviet leaders bitterly rejected the expression of such concern as "interference in their internal affairs."

Despite the increasingly burdensome economic and ideological cost of maintaining the Soviets' East European empire, the Soviet leaders have shown no sign of wavering in their determination to maintain it as a supposedly indispensable asset to their power and security. Indeed, in the short run the economic and political difficulties of the East European regimes may have made it easier for the Soviets to tighten international discipline within the bloc. Political coordination within the Warsaw Pact was strengthened in November 1976 by the creation of a permanent political secretariat, and organizational and ideological joint conferences of the ruling parties have become more frequent. Soviet economic aid for Poland was used to commit that country still more firmly to Soviet policies.

B. EAST ASIA

The framework for East-West relations in Asia has from the beginning of the conflict been very different from that in Europe. On one hand, there soon developed a plurality of two major and first one, then more minor independent Communist powers, with conflict between Russia and China complicating the situation at least from the early 1960s. On the other hand, the American presence has been continuous only in Japan and Taiwan, but subject to changing policies on the Asian mainland in the Korean and Indochinese peninsulas. Instead of the territorial post-war stability of Europe, East Asia has lived through the Korean war, the Indochinese war (in which the end of French colonial rule was achieved under the leadership of the Vietnamese Communists), and the Vietnam war of the 1960s (beginning as the combination of a Communist uprising in the South with an attack from the Communist North and leading, through a prolonged but ultimately unsuccessful American intervention, to the final unification of Vietnam under Communist rule).

The two major new developments of recent years have been, 1) the

cautious rapprochement between China and the Western powers, notably the USA and Japan, under the impact of the sharpening of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the perceived Soviet threat to China; and 2) the American withdrawal from Indochina and Thailand, the plans for a withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea, and the diplomatic discussions with Peking causing a measure of uncertainty on the future of the U.S. security agreement with Taiwan. While the Chinese turn to improved relations with the West has had a stabilizing influence on the overall situation in the region, uncertainty about the future of the American presence is felt as a destabilizing influence.

1. Japan, Russia and China

Japan has always been the relatively best protected part of non-Communist East Asia, both because of its island geography and because of the American presence. It has naturally perceived the worldwide development of detente as an opportunity for seeking to normalize its relations with both Russia and China, while keeping in mind the need to balance them in view of the sharp conflict between those two powerful neighbors.

So far, normalization with China has made considerably greater progress. Japan has been prepared to remove the principal obstacle in Peking's eyes by withdrawing diplomatic recognition from Taiwan, and Peking has not objected to Japan maintaining its intensive economic relations with Taiwan while developing a fast-growing trade with the CPR. In the joint communiqué which established diplomatic relations with the CPR in 1972, Japan also accepted Peking's request for inclusion of a clause opposing any attempt by a third power to establish hegemony in Asia, which had already figured in the preceding Chinese-American communiqué. But when China proposed to repeat this formula in the subsequent Sino-Japanese "Treaty of Peace and Friendship," Japan demurred, and the Treaty is still in suspense at the time of writing.

In relations with Russia, on the other hand, full normalization is held up by the absence of a peace treaty, due to the Soviet refusal to consider the return of the four Japanese islands occupied at the end of the Second World War — Etorofu, Konashiri, Habomai and Shikotan; the Japanese national consensus on this issue includes the opposition parties, not excepting the highly independent Japanese Communist Party. Japan has also rejected the Soviet proposal to conclude a "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" in the absence of a peace treaty (that is, before a territorial settlement). Similarly, Japan is not interested in the Soviet plan for an Asian Collective Security Pact, both because of the unsolved territorial question and because such a pact would be clearly

directed against China; in fact, no independent Asian country has responded positively to that project.

Also underlying the lack of progress in Soviet-Japanese relations is the Japanese awareness of the growing threat of Soviet sea power, and the hard line taken by the Soviets in 1976 in negotiations about fishing zones that are of vital importance for the Japanese economy. The Soviets at first tried both to use these negotiations to obtain indirect recognition of their possession of the disputed islands and to obtain fishing rights in Japanese territorial waters; they only moderated their demands after Japanese opinion had been thoroughly aroused.

Otherwise, Soviet-Japanese economic relations have developed fairly well, but the failure of the most ambitious project for the opening up of Siberian oil resources by Japanese firms indicates some continuing limitations. The Chinese strategic objection to the development of further transport facilities in the Soviet Far East may have played a role in that failure.

Despite the effort of Japanese diplomacy to avoid taking sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict, the sentiment of Japanese opinion in general is clearly warm towards China and cool towards the USSR. On the whole, Japan is showing sufficient stability to be able to follow its own interests in its relations with both Communist giants and not to be swayed by their influence on its domestic politics. Specifically, the Japanese Communist Party has, after some waverings during the 1960s, developed a "Japano-Communist" position of clear independence from both powers; it takes a more intransigent position than the government on the territorial issue with Russia, and has lately rejected the slogan of "dictatorship of the proletariat" in favor of parliamentary democracy. More generally, while the long monopoly of power by the Liberal Democratic Party seems to be approaching its end, the last elections also brought a weakening of the Communists while the Marxist-oriented Socialist party failed to score gains; and the trend seems to point to an eventual joining of forces of the LDP on one side and the smaller parties of the Center on the other.

2. Changes in Southeast Asia

Until 1971, the United States and its allies in the area — Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines — were involved in a confrontation with North Vietnam and a policy of general hostility to the CPR, while the remaining Southeast Asian countries — Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia — took, more or less, an attitude of "benevo-

lent neutrality." Japan, whose constitution specifically forbids military involvement abroad, scrupulously refrained from such involvement in the Indochinese peninsula. The announcement of President Nixon's visit to Peking and the ensuing admission of the CPR to the United Nations prompted Japan, Australia and New Zealand to recognize Peking and to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan; others have since followed, and no Southeast Asian country any longer recognizes Taiwan.

In November 1971, with the American withdrawal from Vietnam clearly foreseeable, the countries comprising the "Association of Southeast Asian Nations" (ASEAN) announced at their Kuala Lumpur conference a new policy, designating their area a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality." After the fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh, Thailand formally asked for withdrawal of the U.S. air force units stationed in the country, which was completed by July 1976. Nevertheless, united Vietnam and Laos officially still regard ASEAN as an anti-Communist device, and by their objection prevented the recognition of it as a "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality" by the Conference of Nonaligned Nations held in Colombo in August 1976.

Despite some worry about this attitude of Vietnam and its military strength, the ASEAN countries continue to pursue their announced policy. At their first summit meeting in Bali in 1976 they issued a declaration enumerating their basic principles and concluded a "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation." At a second summit conference at Kuala Lumpur in August 1977 they secured promises of Japanese, Australian and New Zealand support for their policy of joint economic and social development.

The ASEAN countries are agreed in their intention not to confront the new Communist states of Southeast Asia, but to develop friendly relations with them in order to preserve peace in the region. They believe that they can contribute to that aim by constructive measures to strengthen their internal "resilience."

3. Korea — A Focus of Tension

At present, Korea is clearly the point of greatest East-West tension in East Asia. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, the North Korean leader Kim Il-sung issued, during a visit to Peking, a statement on the need for the "liberation" of the non-Communist South, but his Chinese hosts tied him down to endorse "peaceful unification" in a joint statement. South Korea reacted with an "Emergency Proclamation," and the United States government gave public assurances that it would stand by its commit-

ments in case of an attack from the North. No attack materialized, but the Panmunjom incident of August 1976, in which two U.S. officers were killed by North Koreans, showed the results of the persistent training of North Korean forces in an aggressive spirit.

In this situation, President Carter's announcement of a timetable for a withdrawal of American ground forces from South Korea, made without previous consultation with the South Korean and Japanese governments, was bound to increase nervousness and undermine confidence in South Korea and beyond. Later official U.S. assurances about the details of the plan, in particular about the intention to retain and indeed increase U.S. air forces in the area, may be relevant to the military balance but can hardly undo the psychological damage done by the first unilateral announcement, including the possible encouragement of aggressive plans in the North. What is important in view of the already existing consequences of actual or discussed U.S. withdrawals from East Asian positions is that no such decisions should be made, let alone announced, without full consultation with the allied governments in the area; in the Korean case, such consultation might lead to a decision not to fix an advance timetable for the withdrawal, but to make it partly dependent on the behavior of the North. The restoration of trust in the permanence of U.S. commitments in East Asia depends not only on the substance, but very much on the manner of American policy.

At the same time, there is a case for a constructive attempt to "defuse" the problem of divided Korea by a political settlement on the basis of the *status quo*, since no realistic chances of peaceful reunification have emerged after three decades of partition. The obvious difficulty for such an attempt, even if it could be undertaken on a multilateral basis, is that at least the North Korean regime is definitely against it, and that neither of the major Communist powers has the kind of control over North Korea which it could use to impose a change of policy — even assuming that one of them would be willing to do so.

C. THE MIDDLE EAST*

The Middle East remains potentially the most dangerous area in the East-West conflict. In contrast to Europe, there is here no territorial *status quo* accepted by both sides, nor even an accepted division of spheres of influence. In contrast to Vietnam even at the height of the

*This report was completed in November 1977, just before the visit of Egyptian President Sadat to Israel.

war, far more vital interests of both sides are involved: It is sufficient to mention the questions of access to Middle Eastern oil (which will be of growing importance also to the Soviets) or its denial to the adversary, of control of the Turkish Straits or the Suez Canal, and of Soviet bases on the shores of the Mediterranean. Moreover, both superpowers, as a result of their involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, are committed to local allies whose political goals they only partly share but whose actions they do not effectively control: There is no agreement on the terms for a settlement of that conflict between the United States and Israel, nor between the Soviet Union and the PLO or the states of the Arab "rejection front" like Iraq and Libya — yet they continue arming them. Both superpowers are also at the mercy of unpredictable changes of some of the Arab regimes in the area on whose support their diplomacy has come to rely. In principle, another war could break out here against the intentions of both, yet threaten to involve them. The size of the stakes and the multiplicity of factors of uncertainty and danger increase the importance of a mechanism for "crisis management," as was shown at the end of the 1973 war.

1. Soviet and Western Dilemmas

Soviet influence in the Arab Middle East, which seemed predominant from the eve of the 1967 war to that of the 1973 war, has greatly diminished for the time being. The major reason has been the recognition by the leading Arab states, beginning with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, that the Soviets were unable to achieve against American opposition an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, but that American and generally Western support for such a withdrawal might be gained with the help of the oil weapon, provided the Arabs accepted the permanence of the Israeli state and its need for security guarantees. A second reason was that the Soviets, after their loss of influence on Egypt and impressed by the PLO's temporary gain in international prestige, committed themselves too strongly to support of the PLO and failed to understand in time the seriousness of Syria's reason for intervening in the Lebanese civil war, so as to prevent the PLO from gaining a position from which it could have taken the decision on peace or war out of the hands of the Arab "frontline states": This greatly reduced Soviet influence also on Syria and led to a settlement of the Lebanese upheaval mainly by agreement between Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This has left the Soviets relying largely on the PLO and the states of the "rejection front" — a group that may help prevent a settlement as conceived by the Americans, but lacks the weight to offer an alternative.

But though Western influence in the region has increased as Soviet influence has declined, the duration of that state of affairs is anything but assured — for Western and particularly U.S. policy is beset by no less a dilemma. It has accepted the need for an Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders with only minor adjustments, as well as for some kind of “political homeland” for the Palestinians (possibly in confederation with Jordan), and it has found some interest in a peace settlement on such a basis in Egypt and perhaps beyond. But it also remains committed to the security of Israel both pending and under such a settlement, while there is no visible prospect that Israel under her present leadership could freely accept a withdrawal to the extent envisaged, and no prospect at all that *any* Israeli leadership would accept a Palestinian state controlled by a PLO committed to Israel’s destruction. While the ideas of a settlement put forward by the West, by the Soviet Union in its statements since March 1977 (proposing an Israeli withdrawal in stages from all occupied territories and the creation of a Palestinian state with establishment of an internationally guaranteed state of peace on completion of the withdrawal), and by at least some important Arab states have thus seemed to come somewhat closer together, that is not the case for the people whose fate is most directly at stake — the majority of the Israelis and the Palestinians inasmuch as they are represented by the PLO.

But if no progress toward a settlement is made in the foreseeable future, Western influence may again be reduced in favor of the Soviets since Western diplomacy will have failed in Arab eyes, and some “pro-Western” Arab regimes may be overthrown. Moreover, the local arms race, fed by Western supplies to both Israel and the “moderate” Arab states and by Soviet supplies to Syria, the Palestinians, and the states of the “rejection front,” will continue and may sooner or later culminate in another war, possibly accompanied by a new oil crisis.

However, it is by no means obvious that another war, given its inevitable risks and costs, would be in the Soviet interest any more than that of the West; even more generally, it may be argued that experience has not confirmed the idea that a heating up of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a promising road to an assured share of Soviet influence in Middle Eastern affairs. The question has thus been raised whether the conflicting interests of the superpowers in this region are not by now at least partly outweighed by a common interest in making negotiation possible through pressure on the protagonists; and the American-Soviet statement of October 1977 on the desirability and tasks of reconvening the Geneva Middle East conference, issued in their capacity as its joint chairmen, appears to express such an approach. Parallel to the American

commitment to the "rights of the Palestinian people," amounting to severe public pressure on Israel, this would seem to require from the Soviets corresponding pressure on the PLO to make it abandon its commitment to the destruction of Israel as a state — a goal Moscow has always officially rejected. But a turn to such pressure would have to overcome the resistance of the "rejection states" — Iraq, Libya and to some extent Algeria — on whom the Soviets have mainly relied in recent years. Above all, the success of such pressure presupposes a greater control by the PLO leaders over their extremist minority groups than exists at present — the groups known as the organizers of international political terrorism.

2. The Problem of International Terrorism

The paradox of the situation is that those militant terrorist groups who are the most determined opponents of any negotiated solution have long depended on indirect, and possibly direct, Soviet support — despite the public Soviet commitment to such a solution. Directly, they have depended on a small number of Arab and African countries, notably Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, Uganda and until recently Somalia. But every one of these countries receives its arms wholly or, in the case of Libya, at least partly from the Soviet Union, with the result that all Palestinian terrorists, and all international terrorists armed and trained by them, have been carrying Soviet arms. Beyond that, more direct links with the Soviet secret services have been repeatedly alleged.

It thus appears that the Soviet Union has been pursuing a dual and contradictory policy in this danger area — supporting a negotiated solution by its diplomacy, yet at the same time supporting the extremist opponents of negotiation by the direction of its arms exports and by some of its conspiratorial activities. The prospect of East-West cooperation in making negotiation possible would then seem to depend on the USSR's willingness to end that duality and commit itself consistently to a constructive policy in that region. Soviet readiness to cooperate in a limitation of arms exports would be a first sign in that direction.

D. SOUTHERN AND EASTERN AFRICA

In Southern Africa, where Western interests are less vital than in the Middle East and Soviet national interests would hardly seem to be at stake at all, the Soviet Union has taken an opportunity to demonstrate its new capacity for worldwide military intervention in a situation with negligible risk and considerable propagandist promise. The intervention

of Cuban troops in Angola, carried out with open Soviet logistic as well as political support, was the first use of Soviet naval and air transport for such a purpose in an overseas conflict at such a distance from the homeland. It was undertaken with demonstrative intent in a situation where the risk of forcible American counteraction was negligible on the morrow of Vietnam and Watergate; and it has since been celebrated not only by general Soviet propaganda, but by Brezhnev himself in a speech to the Central Committee, as not a peripheral event but a major victory of Soviet political strategy. The strategic importance is presumably not meant to imply that such aggression by proxy is now to be generalized, but that the new worldwide military capability of the Soviets makes it possible in principle, and that the advocates of violence in national "liberation movements" anywhere should feel encouraged by this potential.

The opportunity for that action was offered by the disintegration of the Portuguese colonial empire following the Portuguese revolution of 1974, and by the subsequent power struggle for the control of Angola between the Communist-controlled and Moscow-oriented MPLA and two rival movements that were Western-oriented or Chinese-oriented. The propagandist promise lies in the fact 1) that the independence of the former Portuguese colonies has become the signal for the final assault by the black majorities of Southern Africa, notably of Rhodesia, Namibia and finally South Africa, on the remnants of white minority rule on the African continent; 2) that Soviet support for the independence of the Portuguese colonies had been consistent before, while the NATO powers had armed Portugal officially and supported some independence movements at best unofficially; and 3) that, though the leading Western powers now clearly support the goals of black majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia and of the end of *apartheid* in South Africa, they favor the achievement of those goals by negotiations with safeguards for the lives and possessions of the white minority — negotiations whose success appears highly doubtful because of both the resistance of the white leaders and the divisions among the black ones — whereas the Soviets are free to promote their achievement by violence.

Indeed, from the viewpoint of the general development of East-West relations, the remarkable fact about the new Soviet campaign in Southern Africa is the degree to which it is based on the use and propaganda of force. On the basis of successful intervention in Angola, Soviet diplomacy and propaganda have been persistently telling the black leaders of Rhodesia and Namibia, as well as the rulers of the neighboring black states, that any attempt to achieve black majority

rule by negotiation is just an imperialist fraud and that the only road to success is armed struggle.

In addition, the Soviets have suddenly switched their main backing in the strategically important "Horn" of East Africa from traditionally pro-Soviet, but also pro-Arab and non-Communist, Somalia to the new military regime of Ethiopia that openly proclaims a Communist allegiance, and have offered the Ethiopian leaders considerable arms supplies for their campaigns of repression against the autonomist movement in Eritrea and the pro-Somalian movement in Ogaden. Because of the strength of Arab support for Somalia and the comparative lack of consolidation of the new Ethiopian regime, the Soviets appear, however, still to be wavering between an all-out pro-Ethiopian policy and the attempt to "mediate" a compromise. The risk that the Soviets may end up losing a strategically-situated friend in Somalia and backing a loser in Ethiopia cannot, at the time of writing, be excluded.

More generally, it is highly doubtful whether the Soviets will be able to consolidate the gains in sympathy and local influence which their new militancy has allowed them momentarily to score at Western expense: Earlier experiences both in Africa and the Arab world strongly argue against that. What must concern the West, however, is that these recent Soviet activities in Africa offer striking examples that the Soviets, in insisting that their view of detente is compatible with continued "ideological struggle," include armed struggle under this rubric — so long as it does not lead to direct war between the Soviet Union and Western governments. This practice is bound to raise the question of the means available to the West to enforce a less militant interpretation of detente.

E. THE IMPACT OF THE NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEM

Independently of events in specific contested areas, the balance of world influence between East and West has been seriously affected in recent years by the growth of a generalized tension between the industrially advanced democracies of the West on one side and the less developed countries of the "South" on the other. The grievances of the poor nations of the South, that represent the large majority of mankind as well as an effective majority in the United Nations, have over the years produced an increasingly anti-Western attitude; and that attitude in turn, as expressed in a number of critical votes in the U.N. as well as in the general climate of Third World opinion, has tended to diminish the freedom of movement of the Western powers on the international scene, and to increase that of the Communist powers.

The grievances in question were first prominently voiced more than a decade ago at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as well as at the conferences of the so-called nonaligned countries. They have turned on problems of the world economy — notably on the tendency of raw material prices to fall relative to prices for manufactured goods (between the Korean war and the 1973 oil crisis), on the difficulty of selling manufactured goods from the less developed countries in the markets of the advanced countries, and on the negative impact of both factors on the trading balances of the LDCs and their consequently increasing debt burden, said to have nullified any positive effects of development aid and private investments for a number of countries.

It cannot be the task of the present report to analyze the economic problems underlying those grievances, let alone to propose remedies. Our concern here is with the impact on the political balance between East and West of an increasingly anti-Western attitude in the majority of "Southern" countries. In particular, the oil crisis was widely perceived in this climate as a first triumph of the raw material producers over the industrial countries, with the rich oil states as the protagonists of the poor majority. It was under that impression that a number of, in effect, anti-Western resolutions, such as the "anti-Zionist" resolution or the seating of the PLO, were passed by the United Nations General Assembly. But even more important in our context has been the indirect impact on the relative international freedom of action of the Soviets and the West, as shown, for instance, in Angola.

Over the years, however, this factor of Western weakness and Eastern strength may tend to be reduced, if not reversed. On one side, the Western powers have slowly but increasingly come to realize the seriousness of the economic plight of many Southern countries, and to accept the need to find practical solutions even at the price of considerable material concessions to them. On the other hand, the Soviet refusal to take part in the negotiations of such solutions — on the specious grounds that the poverty of the ex-colonial nations is due to imperialist exploitation and should be relieved by the imperialists, but that the Soviets owe them nothing — has become increasingly unconvincing and increasingly conspicuous. It may thus be expected that "Southern" opinion will again turn more favorable to the West as Western efforts to find constructive remedies for Southern grievances become more effective, and as the West tries more persistently to involve the Soviet bloc as well in such remedial efforts.

IV. SHIFTS IN THE MILITARY BALANCE

A. THE SUPERPOWERS

1. The Broad Picture

At least since the beginning of the post-Khrushchev era, the Soviets have, under the impact of their defeat in the Cuban missile crisis, made a steady, sustained effort to improve their relative position in the military balance — in the fields of strategic nuclear weapons, worldwide conventional mobility, and regional theater strength in Europe. During the earlier part of the same period, they also considerably strengthened their forces on the Chinese frontier. The overall armament effort has intensified to a point where Western experts estimate it at 11-13% of the Soviet GNP, compared to about 6% for the United States.*

This effort of the Soviets to improve their relative position has been crowned with considerable success. In 1969, at the beginning of the major detente negotiations, it was believed that the Soviets were about to achieve rough strategic parity with the USA. Most Western analysts felt that the high cost of continuing such an effort was one major reason for the Soviet interest in detente in general and in SALT in particular, and that the Soviets would therefore be ready to stabilize the achievement of strategic parity by agreement rather than continue a similar effort in order to obtain strategic superiority.

However, the Soviet armament effort has continued steadily in recent years, tending to produce a further shift in the overall military balance. Without violating the SALT I agreement and while keeping within the — very high — limits of the 1974 draft agreement of Vladivostok, they now have a considerably greater number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles — ICBMs and SLBMs — than the USA (1,527 ICBMs and 845 SLBMs in 1976 against 1,054 and 656 respectively for the USA), capable of delivering a substantially higher megatonnage, though, so far, in a substantially lower number of warheads owing to the more advanced “mirving” of the American missiles. They have also specially increased the number and accuracy of missiles with very heavy payloads capable of destroying hardened American missile silos in a hypothetical first strike; and they appear to have

*All figures in this section are based on *The Military Balance 1976-77*, published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London (1976).

upgraded their civil defense preparations, which might reduce the damage caused by a retaliatory strike.

Against this, the Americans stopped increasing the number of their strategic delivery vehicles in 1967 and are still substantially below the Vladivostok ceiling of 2,400. However, the Americans were and are ahead in general accuracy and in the introduction of multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and have the option to introduce other major technological improvements if they should so decide, notably the B-1 bomber, the A-12 warhead, the advanced forms of the Cruise Missile, and the new Trident-type of nuclear-armed submarines.

Meanwhile the remarkable growth and worldwide deployment of the Soviet navy and the increased range of Soviet air transport have expanded the Soviet Union's capacity for conventional military action to global dimensions. The number of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in the European theater has also increased somewhat, and their equipment is being modernized rapidly. But here, too, the Americans are technologically ahead in the development and initial deployment of precision-guided munitions (PGM).

2. The Question of Strategic Superiority

The continuity and size of the Soviet armament effort despite detente has been interpreted in at least three ways. It could be due to a self-perpetuating tradition in the Soviet military establishment — a bureaucratic automatism running on without need for a new policy decision. That is, in our view, improbable for such a length of time in a regime where all sections of the bureaucracy, including the military, remain subordinate to the primacy of the Party, i.e., the Politburo, and where every major issue automatically becomes “a political question.”

It could be due, in a framework of continuing mutual distrust among the superpowers, to a fear of falling behind in competition with American technical advances, and to the desire to “overinsure” against unforeseen developments. That is highly plausible, at least as a partial explanation: There is no agreement on stopping technological advances in armaments, and even though both the Soviets and President Carter have lately mentioned its desirability, there seems no conceivable method available for controlling its observance if an agreement were concluded. In the circumstances, Soviet efforts both to improve their own arms technology and to compensate for American qualitative advances with quantity would seem a natural reaction.

Finally, the heavy and uninterrupted Soviet armament effort could

be due to a deliberate political decision to set the goal of worldwide superiority for the Soviet armed forces, including nuclear strategic superiority. In its general form the goal of worldwide military superiority seems to make some sense for one of two rival superpowers whose economic arsenal for diplomatic action is far inferior to that of its adversary, and whose ideological appeal appears to be declining in many areas: The temptation to compensate economic and ideological weakness by military strength must be considerable. But in its specific nuclear form, the likelihood of a Soviet effort for strategic superiority has been discounted by a number of highly respected Western authorities, from McNamara to Kissinger, on the grounds that the effort would be politically meaningless: As long as nobody can start a nuclear war without risking unacceptable damage, even though the number and weight of his weapons may be superior on paper, such numerical superiority has been said to be unusable for political objectives.

We beg to disagree with those authorities and to suggest that nuclear strategic superiority could be politically meaningful, at least if combined with conventional superiority at selected points of aggression or pressure. It is true that nuclear strategic superiority *by itself* could only be used to threaten or carry out a "first strike" in the belief that the aggressor could destroy so much of his opponent's retaliatory capacity that his remaining risk might be regarded as acceptable; to be conceivable at all in a rational calculation, that would require a huge technological or qualitative superiority — and even given the Soviet concentration on heavy payload missiles and their reported massive civil defense preparations, a qualitative superiority sufficient for such deliberate starting of a nuclear holocaust would seem impossible for them to obtain. Moreover, all the traditions of Soviet policy and even of Soviet ideology run counter to this vision of risking all the achievements of six decades in a single, desperate gamble. The Soviet leaders are power-conscious bureaucrats with partly ideological motivation — they are not fanatic adventurers of Hitler's ilk.

But a perceived nuclear superiority of a more limited, even purely quantitative kind could become politically significant if combined with conventional superiority at selected fronts. Its importance consists of the fact that the stronger the Soviet Union appears strategically compared to the United States, the less credible becomes the threat of American nuclear retaliation against a Soviet conventional attack. Reducing that credibility has long been one of the major objectives of Soviet diplomacy — hence the recent Warsaw Pact proposal for a specific agreement banning the first use of nuclear weapons in any European conflict. For once the fear of U. S. nuclear retaliation is

removed, the road is clear for the use or threat of conventional military action at places where the Soviets enjoy *local* superiority. Even now, in the shadow of nuclear parity, such action is possible in remote areas which seem politically important to the Soviets. With nuclear superiority or at least its appearance, it might seem rewarding at various crisis points in the Third World — and ideological pretexts would not be lacking.

There are, of course, areas where the risk of conventional military action leading to nuclear retaliation might appear more serious because of the presence of American forces on the spot, notably in Europe. But even here Soviet nuclear superiority or its appearance might diminish the credibility of such retaliation sufficiently to bear fruit — to wit, to force concessions from some Western countries by the mere implied threat of superior conventional force. Democratic but unprotected Finland has long had to heed Soviet wishes in its foreign and defense policies, the orientation of its foreign trade and even the selection of its heads of government. If some of the other neutrals, or even some NATO members, were to feel as unprotected as Finland, they might be tempted to follow its example — or alternatively to try the rather desperate expedient of “going nuclear” themselves.

The political use of strategic superiority, then, is the chance to exert political pressure by local superiority. Hence it remains the task of the West to prevent Soviet strategic superiority or its appearance from arising — by negotiation if possible, by an adequate counter-effort if necessary.

B. THE REGIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE

In the European theater, negotiations on a mutual reduction of forces in the central sector of the front — comprising Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany on one side, and West Germany and the Benelux countries on the other — have been going on without progress for several years. The Warsaw Pact countries, whose forces and above all equipment in the area are numerically superior, quite apart from the closeness of powerful reserves in Western Russia, propose a Mutual Force Reduction (MFR) by equal numbers or equal proportions on both sides; the NATO powers, inferior in numbers and with American reserves far away, insist on Mutual *Balanced* Force Reduction (MBFR) to equal levels.

In fact, the Eastern advantage in numbers of troops is not very large and hardly sufficient for the attacking side in a modern war; there have been increases in recent years, but lately there have also been

some increases in American and West German forces. In combat planes, however, the Eastern advantage is considerable, and in tanks, the most important offensive weapon, it is very large — nearly 3:1. Technically, Western equipment is often on a higher level, but the Warsaw Pact is currently making great efforts at modernization, and in contrast to Warsaw Pact equipment, Western equipment suffers from not being internationally standardized — a factor that is bound to make logistics and intersector cooperation more difficult. However, the West has a clear superiority in modern anti-tank weapons that would be further increased by the introduction of the “neutron bomb.” Finally, one stabilizing factor in that region is doubt about the reliability of some of the East European forces in an offensive war.

A new element has been introduced in recent years with the deployment of more advanced types of Soviet missiles of intermediate range, targeted on Western Europe and/or the Middle East, in Western Russia. Like the American “Forward Based Systems” in Western Europe (which they may be intended to match or outmatch), those “regional” missiles are not, so far, subject to negotiation on either the strategic or the theater level, but they clearly affect the regional balance.

At any rate, the Soviets have lately felt strong enough to attempt once again to put political pressure on some of their Western neighbors, whether they are neutral or belong to NATO. In the North, where the sub-regional balance against Norway and Denmark is particularly favorable to the Soviet forces, the Soviets have used Finland’s President Kekkonen to warn the Norwegians that closer military cooperation between Norway and West Germany would make it difficult for Finland to continue Scandinavian cooperation with Norway. In the center, they have tried to tell the Austrian government which kind of formula for the inclusion of West Berlin in a treaty with West Germany they might sign and which not; the West Germans themselves have been told that the functioning of the four-power agreement on Berlin might depend on the quality of their relations with the Soviet bloc states. More generally, the agreement itself has been interpreted restrictively in Soviet and East German statements as applying only to West Berlin, and there have been systematic efforts to whittle down what remains of the four-power status of East Berlin in practice. The attempts to put pressure on Yugoslavia to reinterpret its nonalignment as a form of alignment with the Soviet Union have been mentioned above. So far, all those attempts to exert pressure have failed, but they must be regarded as symptomatic of the Soviet estimate of the relation of forces in Europe.

With all that, there is no acute tension along the East-West frontiers in Europe at the present time. It is unlikely to develop so long as the regional and the strategic balances do not worsen appreciably, and no major succession crisis arises in Yugoslavia.

C. THE REGIONAL BALANCE IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

The military balance in East and Southeast Asia is more complex and uncertain than in Europe. The formal reason is that there are in this region no comprehensive military alliances of the type of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but only bilateral security pacts of a few countries with either the USA or the USSR. (The one attempt at a regional military bloc — the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization established in 1954 with the participation of the USA, Britain and France — has never been operative and finally died away in 1977.) The more substantive reason is that this region contains the two main Communist powers, which are involved in bitter mutual conflict, preventing the formation of a single East-West “front.”

It follows that, in present conditions, there exist only a number of piecemeal balances in the region that can be separately described. Yet with regard to possible future developments, they are interconnected in the sense that even a limited Sino-Soviet “normalization” would affect them all and even might create a state of considerable regional imbalance. Moreover, they all depend to some extent on the presence of U. S. forces in this part of the world.

1. USSR-China

Along a border of some 7,400 km., the USSR has deployed 43 divisions amounting nominally to about one-fourth of its army; however, the divisions appear not to be at full strength. Soviet nuclear missiles are also stationed along the Transsiberian railway. Of the Chinese army of 142 divisions (3 million men), 75 divisions are deployed along the border with the Soviet Union and Mongolia; nuclear launchers for MRBMs and IRBMs are based in Sinkiang Province. Altogether, China has more troops available in the border region, but its inferior equipment and the superiority of Soviet nuclear strength exclude any thought of a serious Chinese attack. Conversely, a Russian invasion is effectively deterred by China's vast area and population; a purely destructive nuclear attack on Chinese military and industrial centers, while conceivable, would be fraught with the risk not only of the destruction of a number

of Soviet cities, but of a subsequent land war tying down large Soviet forces for an indefinite time. To that extent, a rough balance appears to exist effectively as long as China preserves its political and military cohesion.

2. USSR-Japan

The one great trilateral nation in the area, Japan, does not regard the CPR as a military threat, not only because of Chinese preoccupation with Russia, but also because of the absence of a major Chinese navy. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is seen as a potential threat to Japan, both because of the unsettled state of their diplomatic relations in the absence of a peace treaty and because of the strength of the Soviet military and naval presence in East Asia. Thirty Soviet divisions with some 2,000 planes are deployed in the Far Eastern region, while the Soviet Pacific fleet has 750 ships totalling 1.2 million tons, including 120 submarines. Forty of the submarines are nuclear-propelled, and many of the ships carry nuclear missiles.

Against this, the Japanese Self-Defense Force comprises an army of 13 divisions, a navy of 150 ships totalling 168,000 tons, and an air force of 500 planes. The United States maintains in Japan 200 planes and 20,000 marines and other military personnel; the U. S. Seventh Fleet based in three places — Yokosuka in Japan, Subic Bay in the Philippines and Guam, has 60 ships totalling 600,000 tons, including two aircraft carriers with 150 planes. While the presence of the Americans on the high seas and in the air may have a deterrent effect out of proportion to their numbers, there is clearly no numerical balance in this part of the Pacific, and the Soviet navy has the numerical capability to disrupt Japan's vital maritime supply routes. The question arises in what circumstances Japan would decide on the need for a greater naval effort to protect them, and what domestic difficulties would have to be overcome to implement such a decision.

3. China-Taiwan

The island of Taiwan, governed by the successors of the former Kuomintang government on the Chinese mainland, is no longer regarded by the U. S., Japan or other Western governments as the core of an alternative China. But the United States has a security commitment to protect its 17 million inhabitants from Communist invasion, even though it would not object to a peaceful arrangement between the Taiwan government and the CPR. The CPR, while in no hurry to force the incorporation of Taiwan, has steadfastly refused to commit

itself not to use force for that purpose, and has made it clear that it will not establish full and formal diplomatic relations with the U. S. unless the latter abandons its security commitment to Taiwan. As Peking clearly considers that the difference between its present relations with Washington and full diplomatic relations is not worth any concession in this matter, and Washington would find it difficult to abandon one long-standing security commitment in East Asia without endangering the credibility of the others, the present state of tension in this area may well continue unresolved for some time.

As of now, the Taiwan navy with an aggregate tonnage of 180,000 tons (including two submarines and 18 destroyers) may prove a fairly effective deterrent to the mainland navy of 410,000 tons (including 55 submarines and 18 destroyers), especially with the U. S. Seventh Fleet in the background as well as a Taiwan army of 330,000 men. A major Chinese naval effort, which could change the balance, is unlikely unless China is prepared to challenge American policy — presumably only if Sino-Soviet relations were normalized.

4. North Korea — South Korea

Communist North Korea and non-Communist South Korea have been facing each other across the 38th parallel in virtually undiminished hostility for decades, but for short episodes of diplomatic maneuver. North Korea has mutual assistance treaties with both the Soviet Union and the CPR, but since the end of the 1950 war, neither has encouraged a resumption of fighting. South Korea has a security arrangement with the USA, under which American troops have remained in the country; in case of the withdrawal of U. S. ground troops, envisaged by President Carter, the U. S. air force contingent of some 60 planes would be increased and its links with neighboring units would remain. This is important because, while the South has twice the population of the North (34 millions against 16) and a somewhat larger army (520,000 men against 430,000), it has a considerably smaller air force (200 planes against 600). With the presence of the U. S. air force assured, the local balance ought to be stable unless one of the major Communist powers decided once more to assist a local aggression at this point.

5. Vietnam and Southeast Asia

After the withdrawal of the Americans from Indochina, unified Communist Vietnam with its army of 600,000 has not only become the dominant force in the peninsula, but a military power whose strength and fighting experience are unmatched in Southeast Asia as a whole.

Though this seems unlikely to foreshadow early expansionist moves in view of Vietnam's urgent preoccupation with reconstruction, the fact that the Vietnamese army is still kept at war strength two years after the end of the fighting is causing some concern in the region.

So far, the Southeast Asian states associated in ASEAN — Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines — have not reacted to the new situation with an effort to establish a new military balance, but with the 1976 Bali decision to strengthen the "resilience" of the area against subversion by a constructive campaign against poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy. This enterprise certainly deserves the support of the trilateral countries; Japan has already promised such support at the 1977 ASEAN summit conference in Kuala Lumpur, and the U. S. has followed suit at the subsequent Manila meeting.

V. THE TASKS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

A. OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES

In our introduction we pointed out that a stable world order, as frequently envisioned in the West, is not a realistic objective in a fundamentally unstable world, any more than is the Eastern ideological vision of a world moving to global Communist rule according to predetermined laws. Moreover, the illusion of stability has the disadvantage of tending to confine the West to defensive goals and to a reactive political attitude. The only kind of peaceful world order that we can realistically envisage is one of maximum flexibility for peaceful change. But that is something very different from the present situation, in which peaceful change is possible in the industrially advanced democracies and peaceful or not so peaceful change frequent in the Third World, while the Communist powers insist that their power sphere should not be open to any change not planned by their ruling parties.

As a basic guideline for our long-term relationship with the Communist powers, then, the West should not be content to defend its fundamental values and seek to implement them on its own territory: It should set itself the objective to influence the natural processes of change that occur in the Third World and even in the Communist world in a direction that is favorable rather than unfavorable to those values.

This is *not* to say that we should aim to “make the world safe for (Western) democracy,” or for Western capitalism either. For many Third World countries, Western democratic institutions seem to have proved ill-adapted to their present stage of development, and the same applies even more to an economic system founded on free enterprise. In the countries under Communist rule, a transition to democracy in the Western sense of the term seems not conceivable in the foreseeable future without a major breakdown of their regimes — and one of the tacit assumptions underlying detente is that we should not aim at such a “destabilizing” crisis. In fact, destabilization of the Soviet regime is from all the evidence not possible from the outside; while destabilization of some of the East European regimes might be possible, but would benefit neither their peoples nor the West, since it would precipitate

Soviet intervention that might well end in an even harsher and more subservient regime.

In speaking of peaceful change in the direction of our values, we rather aim at changes *within* those regimes — at influencing the kind of choices that are possible and necessary within their given basic structure. We are thinking of choices between a greater military effort for expansionist purposes or a greater domestic effort for consumer satisfaction; between greater isolation from the non-Communist world and its ideas or greater freedom of communication; between more ruthless repression of every type of dissent or greater civil liberties that would be perfectly possible even without an abdication of party power; between tighter control of the East European states by the Soviet Union or increased autonomy granted within the framework of their continuing alliance.

Those choices come up for decision again and again, because they are inherent in the situation of the Soviet bloc. The West cannot influence them effectively by simply propagating its preferences or raising demands addressed to the Soviet leaders. But in negotiating, within the framework of detente, on the limitation of armaments and of international violence, on terms for economic cooperation and for communication across the frontiers, it can shape the alternatives facing its negotiating partners in such a way as to make one internal choice more rewarding to them than the other. This is the sense in which our diplomatic practice should be guided by the fundamental objective of peaceful change in the direction of our values.

B. SOME CONCRETE POLICY GOALS

In the light of the shifts and changes in the political and military balance we have analyzed, four main groups of policy goals for Western action in relation to the Communist powers seem to emerge: The first is the preservation of credible deterrence against military threats combined with a new effort to limit the arms race. The second is the attempt to limit the use of international violence in crisis areas — including the competition in arms exports — be it by general “ground rules” or by specific solutions for the areas concerned. The third is the management of economic interdependence between groups of states that are involved in long-term political conflict with each other. The fourth is the improvement of respect for human rights. In different degrees, both unilateral Western action and East-West negotiation must be used for the furtherance of all these objectives.

1. Credible Deterrence and Arms Limitation

Credible deterrence, to be achieved or preserved by Western action, is the indispensable basis for making negotiations on arms limitation possible. Conversely, such negotiations should aim at preserving effective deterrence at the lowest possible level.

On the intra-Western side, the credibility of American nuclear deterrence depends to a considerable extent on the presence of substantial American forces in the principal areas to be defended. This has always been recognized with regard to Western Europe, but has to be recalled in present conditions with regard to East Asia, where the American withdrawal from Indochina and Thailand has lately been followed by the announcement of the intended withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea and by discussions about the future of the security agreement with Taiwan. Greater emphasis on the permanence of an American regional presence consisting at any rate of substantial naval and air forces is urgently needed to preserve a sense of security in this theater. Conversely, no American arrangements alone will preserve effective deterrence over time in the absence of adequate conventional efforts of the regional allies of the U. S., whether in Europe or East Asia.

Assuming that kind of basis, arms limitation may in principle be attempted on three levels. On the nuclear strategic level, the bilateral Soviet-American SALT talks appear to have made some substantial progress following a period of stagnation, but important difficulties remain; moreover, increasing doubts are arising whether the new technological developments, such as the Cruise Missile and other new weapons of variable range, will permit another agreement on numerical ceilings that is verifiable with the national means of either side. On the level of medium or intermediate range missiles or nuclear-armed bombers controlled by the two superpowers but targeted primarily on the allies or local forces of the opposing side in Europe, the American FBS and the new Soviet missiles targeted on Europe have not so far been the object of any negotiation. On the more or less conventional level, the Vienna MBFR or MFR talks deal with the zone of heaviest troop concentration, the central sector of the European front; no negotiations have been attempted as yet for the Northern or Southern sectors in Europe or for naval deployment.

In the strategic talks, the main problem consists in supplementing a limit on the total number of missiles of each side by specific limits on types in which either side has an advantage — notably the American Cruise Missiles of intermediate or intercontinental range and the Soviet heavy payload types capable of destroying hardened U. S. missile silos.

An additional complication consists in the difficulty of judging the range of a Cruise Missile by aerial observation.

On the weapons of intermediate range, it seems appropriate that the deployment of new types of Europe-targeted missiles in Western Russia should force a new level of negotiations in which these weapons would have to be compared with the American FBS and possibly also with Cruise Missiles with corresponding range that could be deployed in Europe — negotiations in which not only the superpowers, but also their most immediately concerned allies would have to take part. The natural purpose of such talks would clearly be to put a ceiling on the corresponding weapons of both sides.

In the MBFR or MFR talks, it seems unrealistic to expect that either the NATO countries will agree to an equal and symmetric reduction for both sides, leaving the heavy Warsaw Pact superiority in attack weapons unchanged, or that the Warsaw Pact countries will agree to the reduction to equal levels originally proposed by NATO. The most promising road to agreement so far suggested seems to be the idea of the later NATO proposal for an asymmetric reduction, requiring the withdrawal of more tactical nuclear weapons and warheads by the West and more tanks by the East. In this case, a technological development may actually create a new basis for negotiation: A conditional American willingness to renounce the deployment of the "neutron bomb," conceived above all as a powerful anti-tank weapon, could prove a serious inducement to the Warsaw Pact to renounce their tank superiority in exchange.

Negotiations on the North European front, where the superior Eastern forces are mainly stationed inside the Soviet Union, or in Southern Europe, where the military balance would be more favorable to the West if only political stability can be preserved, are not likely at the present time. In principle, there exists a possibility for negotiations on the naval balance in the Mediterranean, where the Soviets have made a public proposal for the withdrawal of nuclear-armed warships and submarines by both sides; yet it seems unlikely that negotiations on that crucial sea will really get going while the future political attitude of so many coastal states is as uncertain as now. Rather more likely is an agreement on the renunciation of military bases in the Indian Ocean, publicly suggested within the past year by both Brezhnev and Carter — particularly after recent internal changes in India have somewhat reduced Soviet hopes for a privileged position in that region.

As for the Pacific area, there does not at present seem to exist even the very rough and approximate balance that makes fruitful negotiation possible.

2. Violence in Crisis Areas

The Soviet formula of combining "peaceful coexistence between states" with "ideological struggle" has always been sufficiently fuzzy at the edges to permit the encouragement of violent forms of struggle, including the arming and training of forces engaged in "national liberation wars." How far such assistance has actually gone in specific cases has depended on the Soviet estimate of the risk of escalation; that risk was indeed the crucial Soviet argument in the 1960 discussion with the Chinese on the need and possibility to avoid world war.

Given that record, agreement with the Soviets on general "ground rules" for the avoidance of violence in crisis areas appears unlikely. But diplomatic discussion of the subject remains necessary in the context of the Soviet proposal (at the 1976 General Assembly of the United Nations) for a new general treaty on the renunciation of the use and threat of force. For in their draft of that treaty, the Soviets are seeking to establish exceptions legitimating the use of force not only in individual or collective self-defense — the only exceptions recognized by the West — but also for "liberation movements" or "wars to undo the results of aggression," on the grounds that in those cases force would be used in accordance with the purposes of the United Nations. A treaty of that kind would, in fact, establish the wrong kind of ground rules, and will have to be firmly resisted by the West.

One possible approach to progress in this field would be an effort to limit the arms exports of the advanced industrial powers in East and West to crisis areas. Western proposals in this direction for the Middle East have found no echo in the past, but the discrepancy between the general poverty and the rising arms expenditures of most Third World countries has lately become so obvious that the argument for such limitation of arms exports is becoming more difficult to resist. Pending a general agreement, limitations for arms exports to specific areas could be a beginning.

In the absence of agreed rules, the use of force as a means of expanding Soviet power and ideological influence can only be prevented in the context of specific crises — by timely forestalling action before crises break out, by negotiations for constructive solutions, by military deterrence reaching from the mobilization of local counterforces to commitments to various forms of support for them according to the seriousness of the stakes. Thus in the case of Soviet intervention in Portugal, the fact that Portugal is linked with the United States by the NATO alliance seems to have deterred that intervention from becoming violent. In Southern Africa, timely constructive forestalling

action before the outbreak of the crisis was not taken by Western governments; a solution by negotiation has lately been attempted in the face of Soviet and Cuban encouragement of violence. In the Middle East, we have analyzed the evidence that the Soviets are at the same time urging a negotiated solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and continuing to arm the most obstinate and desperate opponents of any negotiated solution. Western policy here should aim at inducing them to take a clear decision for the constructive alternative, by making it clear to them that their role in a negotiated solution must depend on a clear break with those forces that oppose negotiation in principle.

3. Economic Interdependence

The question of possible "linkages" between negotiations on trade, credits and economic cooperation on one side and political and military negotiations on the other will be discussed below. At this point, we are concerned with the inherent political consequences of growing economic interdependence between groups of states that are at the same time involved in lasting political conflict.

Western hopes for a favorable long-term development of detente — for limiting the forms of the conflict not only for a passing phase, but increasingly over a long period — have been based on the expectation of growing economic interdependence between East and West. There is indeed some evidence that this fact has had a moderating influence on the practical (as distinct from the ideological) reaction of the Soviet bloc to the economic recession in the West, at least after the event: While the Soviets at first encouraged the Arab oil boycott and their ideologues wrote triumphant articles on the crisis of capitalism and its possible revolutionary implications, the Soviet bloc governments were eager to offer alternative sources for oil and alternative markets for machinery to the West, and worried about the narrowing of Western markets for their own products in the recession.

Yet while interdependence seems to have reduced the Eastern will to cause damage to the West, at least in the economic field, it is the nature of such interdependence to cut both ways, even though not always equally deeply. Thus growing Western dependence on Eastern supplies for energy sources or raw materials and on Eastern markets for grain or machinery could not only strengthen the general Western commitment to the process of detente, which is natural and healthy, but also make individual Western countries liable to Eastern pressure on the terms of economic cooperation. A Western country whose industries have invested huge sums in the building of Soviet plants,

backed by government credits, may come under pressure to grant more favorable conditions of payment; a Western country dependent to more than a marginal extent on Eastern or Eastern-controlled energy supplies might even come to feel dependent on Russian goodwill in making other diplomatic decisions.

This is not an argument against the development of East-West economic interdependence, but a reason why such interdependence needs careful management. The broad principle is that no single Western country should become dependent on the East for too large a share of its supply of vital raw materials or energy sources, or too large a share of the markets for its vital branches of production; nor should any Western country tie down dangerous amounts of its long-term credit in a particular Eastern country or in the bloc as a whole. Of course, such a broad principle cannot spell out hard and fast rules for what would be "too large a share" or "a dangerous amount"; this must be left to individual judgment in each case. But it does not seem superfluous to state that in deciding each case, the broad principle should be kept in mind.

4. Human Rights and Freedom of Communication

The attitude towards individual human rights is one of the basic differences between the values of the Communist-controlled governments and those of the West. In its nature, it is not a difference likely to be overcome within the framework of peaceful coexistence between different systems.

That does not exclude the possibility, however, that specific improvements in the practical application of the Communist principle of the absolute supremacy of the state may be achieved by East-West diplomatic contacts, provided that they can be shown to be necessary or advantageous for East-West communication and that they appear tolerable to the Eastern regime at the time. This applies to the stipulations about freer movement of people, ideas and literature across frontiers in "Basket III" of the Helsinki Final Act. As was to be expected, their implementation in the East has lagged behind the promise, but considerable parts — referring to scientific and cultural exchanges, to visas and residential permits for businessmen, to large-scale tourism and also, less consistently, to facilities for Western journalists — have been implemented in various Eastern countries when expediency, as seen by their governments, required or permitted it.

Beyond that, the preamble of the Final Act contains a general principle asserting human rights. The Eastern governments accepted it

in the knowledge that such a principle is not enforceable on sovereign governments, quite apart from the fact that the Helsinki agreement is not formally binding in international law. However, the publication of the text of the Final Act containing that principle has had a powerful effect in the Soviet Union and the bloc, encouraging numerous concerned individuals to circulate demands based on the text and to form groups intended to observe how far this principle is implemented in their countries. The Communist regimes, clearly embarrassed by this development, have reacted in different ways, tending first to ignore, then to intimidate and finally increasingly to arrest and sometimes prosecute the civil rights activists. But at the time of writing, a number of them are still at liberty and active, despite growing official harassment.

Western public opinion has naturally taken a passionate interest in the growth of a civil rights movement in Russia and Eastern Europe, and Western news media, by their publicity, have helped its exponents considerably in overcoming their isolation. It is also obvious that Western governments cannot ignore the fact that people in the East are harassed and arrested for demanding the implementation of the Helsinki agreement, and that they are entitled and indeed obliged to raise such cases both in their current diplomacy and in the Belgrade follow-up conference to the Helsinki CSCE. At the same time, governments have to apply to their actions more exacting standards of effectiveness and usefulness than do news media and independent organizations expressing Western public opinion. The Communist regimes seek to suppress the groups advocating civil liberties because they regard the activities of these groups as attempts to undermine their rule; consequently, public pressure on behalf of those groups by Western governments is bound to appear to them as an attempt by the foreign adversary to subvert their system. The foreseeable result is a tendency to treat the civil rights activists as "imperialist agents," with countermeasures possibly stooping to Stalin-style fake trials, and charges that the Western governments concerned are by their "interference" in the internal affairs of the East violating the basic principles of coexistence between different systems.

This is not to suggest that Western governments must bow to this pressure or can do nothing useful in matters of human rights. They can and must insist that the Eastern regimes put up with the information on their rights violations spread by Western news media, including the media specially beamed to the East, as part of the "ideological struggle" which they continue to proclaim themselves. The Western governments are also entitled as signatories of the Helsinki agreement to raise violations of its human rights clause; but they will be wise to avoid the

impression of a public governmental attempt to "force" changes in Eastern domestic policies. Much of the — positive or negative — effect in these matters depends on questions of style and method, and it was primarily on those questions that the temporary differences between the Carter Administration and several of its European allies turned. It is worth recalling, on one side, that since the beginning of detente, the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union and of Germans from several East European countries was considerably facilitated by a combination of confidential representations by Western governments with the unofficial demands of Western public opinion (including the public campaign that preceded the passing of the Jackson Amendment by the U. S. Congress), and that a number of arrested civil rights activists have been granted the right to leave as free men thanks to similar methods. On the other hand, however, when the Jackson amendment, making the granting of most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union dependent on the general granting of free emigration from its territory, was passed by the U. S. Senate and thus became official government policy, the Soviets repudiated the commercial treaty into which it had been written and markedly reduced the flow of Jewish emigration.

C. THE QUESTION OF "LINKAGES"

The example of the Jackson Amendment brings us to the question of "linkages" between negotiations in different fields — the question, in other words, whether and when Western willingness to meet Eastern needs in one area of negotiation could be made conditional on the achievement of positive results on other subjects.

This is clearly only possible if there are fields of negotiation where optimum results are more vital for one side than for the other. At present, with the Soviets apparently aiming at overtaking the West in both strategic and conventional armaments and pursuing an offensive course in some crisis areas including the encouragement of violence, agreements on arms limitation on the basis of parity would seem to be as vital for the West, and negotiated solutions in crisis areas rather more vital for the West than for the Soviets. Conversely, while East-West economic relations are based on mutual advantage, as the Soviets never tire of pointing out, there are some types of these relations where the advantage would seem to be more vital for the Soviets — notably long-term investment credits, transfers of advanced technology, and wheat sales.

1. Security and Economics

There exists indeed, as has been noted in Western and particularly American discussion, an *inherent* linkage between negotiations affecting security and economics. Large Western credits and technology transfers permit the Soviet and East European civilian economies substantial savings in capital funds and the efforts of highly-qualified specialists — savings that could be passed on to the armament sector. In an economy where the share of that sector is as high as we believe it to be in the Soviet Union, that is an important consideration. In that sense, a Western attempt to make the continued expansion of long-term credits and technology transfers dependent on progress in arms limitation and/or on Soviet restraint in the encouragement of violence in crisis areas would be legitimate in view of the inherent connection of both issues.

There are, however, two problems with this type of linkage. The first is that it is not easy for a democracy to apply it to a specific issue under negotiation. In most cases, the Western powers would find it difficult to threaten a general reduction of willingness to grant capital credits or transfer advanced technology unless a specific demand for arms limitation or restraint in crisis areas was met. Usually, the connection can only plausibly be put forward in a more general way: If the arms race continues without substantial progress in the negotiations, or if Soviet behavior in crisis areas shows continued lack of restraint (if, in other words, there are no fruits of detente to be gathered in the field of security), then the Soviets cannot count indefinitely on those fruits in the economic field for which they care most.

The second problem is inherent in the capitalist, competitive structure of the Western economies. The investment of capital and the transfer of technology depend primarily on the decisions of particular enterprises based on their profit expectations; they depend only partly and indirectly on public guarantees (for credits) or government permissions (for transfers). This dependence could, of course, be tightened up by legislation or administrative regulation, but that might not be an easy matter in times of mass unemployment. Further, the national economies of the West compete with each other; a single country that goes ahead in imposing limits on special forms of economic cooperation with the East risks that its competitors will reap the advantage also in general trade with the East. (The Soviets “punished” West German exporters generally for the steel tubes embargo imposed by the Federal Government in the mid-1960s at American request, and, establishing their own type of “linkage,” “rewarded” them for the new

Ostpolitik since the early 1970s.) Thus the Western linkage between economic East-West cooperation and East-West security negotiations is unlikely to become effective unless the Western governments agree on common criteria for their economic relations with the East.

2. Cooperation and Communication

Above, we have stated reasons why Communist governments, regarding their restrictive policy on human rights as a matter of principle or a condition for the survival of their system, are unlikely to change that policy basically in response to Western governmental pressure. In our opinion, this also applies to an attempt to establish linkages that would be felt as economic pressure on that issue.

However, there is an inherent linkage between economic cooperation and the particular kinds of freedom that are of direct relevance to East-West communication — the freedoms of movement for people, ideas and literature that are dealt with in “Basket III” of the Helsinki Final Act. It is here that improvements have indeed taken place — not over the whole area covered there, but on a number of specific issues recognized as directly important to economic, and also to scientific and technical, cooperation.

Against the endless, traditional resistance of various branches of the Eastern bureaucracy, but with the urging of the political leadership and the top officials responsible for economic and technological progress, conditions for residence permits for Western firms and their personnel, re-entry visas for Western businessmen, imports of technical and scientific literature, and also freedom of movement for Western journalists and limited import of Western newspapers have gradually improved (not without occasional relapses) in recent years.

In a more general way, some relaxations have also been granted where the national interests of a major Western negotiating partner were directly concerned; thus emigration of ethnic Germans, while by no means generally free, has increased substantially from Russia, Poland, and Rumania. In the special case of East Germany, emigration to the West is only permitted on family grounds or for people over retirement age, but West-East visits have been admitted by the millions.

It is on those matters that do not touch directly the sensitive issue of the average citizen's right to criticize the regime, but slowly increase the range of particular freedoms for particular groups, that the inherent linkage between economic cooperation and East-West communication may enable the West to make some continuing progress also in the future.

D. RELATIONS WITH CHINA

We have seen that, owing to the present degree of Sino-Soviet hostility, relations along the Soviet-Chinese side of the global power triangle are distinctly less normal than along the Soviet-American and Chinese-American sides. This asymmetry tends to benefit the West both by tying down considerable Soviet forces and by accounting for a degree of Chinese caution towards the West that hardly allows the potential conflict between the CPR and the West to become acute at the present time. However, we have also seen that there is no guarantee that this asymmetry favorable to the West will persist indefinitely, even though the new Chinese leadership has so far sternly rejected all Soviet bids for a rapprochement; on the contrary, we have suggested that a degree of normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations might become possible if at some future time the increased freedom of international movement it might offer to China came to appear more important to a "pragmatic" Chinese leadership than the loss it might bring them in terms of Western, including Japanese, support.

This raises two problems for Western policy towards China. One is what the West could or should do to maintain the present asymmetry of the triangle. The other is where to expect conflict with China in case of a change, and how to prepare for it.

1. Preserving Triangular Asymmetry

The first condition for making the present degree of Soviet-Chinese tension tolerable for Peking is that the West continue to tie down the bulk of Soviet strength. This does not require, of course, that the West renounce detente with the Soviet Union, but that it continue to assure a balance of forces within the framework of detente. Chinese nervousness about improvements in Western-Soviet relations is only seriously aroused if such improvements appear to endanger the balance in Europe — which is not in the Western interest either.

A further condition for making the present situation worthwhile to China is that China be able to procure advantages in its relations with the Western powers that might be discontinued in a different situation. This applies first of all in the field of economic relations. While Chinese emphasis on "self-reliance" may limit its interest in certain forms of long-term investment, there seem to exist sufficient ways for aiding China in acceptable forms with advanced civilian technology; and also for showing willingness to buy its exports. To grant China favorable conditions in economic relations is definitely in the political interest of the West.

The situation is different, in our view, where arms supplies or advanced military technologies are concerned, except for types of equipment that by their nature serve purely defensive purposes. The Chinese themselves have stated that they do not want arms from the West, and it cannot be in our interest to make the Sino-Soviet conflict even more acute than it is, least of all to give the Soviets an apparent motive for "preventive" military action. Such a policy would run counter to the limitation of the forms and range of our conflict with the Soviets which we recognized as the essence of detente. Moreover, the raising of Chinese offensive capacity to a higher technological level is not the kind of "favor" that could be reversed at will in a different international situation, and it would cause understandable anxiety among the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia.

The last argument would apply even more strongly to any proposal to secure Chinese friendship by abandoning the American security commitment to Taiwan. Whereas the West has no *political* interest in preventing the eventual reunion of Taiwan with the CPR, provided it comes about by freely negotiated agreement, and whereas Western *economic* interests that might suffer from such a development are not worth a conflict with China, the abandonment of 17 million people who have attained a remarkable condition of prosperity by their economic links with the West to a possible *military* conquest would, in our view, strike a blow against Western and particularly American credibility throughout East Asia and perhaps beyond, and might even encourage China's return to an expansionist policy elsewhere. Though Peking's declaration that it will not establish full diplomatic relations with the U. S. while the American security agreement with Taiwan persists must be taken seriously, we do not regard the formality of full diplomatic relations as decisive for the maintenance of the present Chinese orientation toward the superpowers.

A peaceful reunion of Taiwan with the mainland, even with special conditions for a transitional period or for a permanent special status, is, of course, very difficult to envisage. The Shanghai communiqué signed by President Nixon and the Japanese withdrawal of diplomatic recognition from Taiwan have given clear Western encouragement to such a development, which corresponds to the Western interest. It must be left to those immediately concerned and to the passage of time to find concrete ways to bring it about.

2. A Chinese Return to Expansionism?

As we have stated above, Communist China pursued an active expansionist policy in Southeast and partly in South Asia from 1958 to 1965.

The CPR largely abandoned those efforts during its preoccupation with internal issues in the Cultural Revolution, and later under the impact of its concentration on the Soviet danger. But a return to expansionism is possible as China gets stronger or if its relations with the Soviets are normalized. Already now, the activity of Communist guerrillas in Thailand and Malaysia, linked to each other and looking to China, persists and even seems to be on the increase.

The West has both a political and an economic interest in the stability and independence of the states of Southeast Asia. It is bound to welcome and support both the efforts of the governments of these states to ensure stability by internal reform and their endeavors to check violent subversion by military action. In doing so, the West must bear in mind that, over the years, the success of the reforms in ensuring stable mass loyalty to the local regimes will also be decisive for the prospects of military success, and that such loyalty cannot be effectively replaced by protection from outside.

VI. PROBLEMS OF INTRA-WESTERN COORDINATION

A. FORCE LEVELS AND THEIR CONTROL

The American-European and American-Japanese alliances are in their nature unequal, because only the United States is able to ensure its own territorial security single-handedly by nuclear deterrence. Western Europe could conceivably, in different political conditions, ensure its own security against conventional attack; for the last 30 years, it has not been able to attain sufficient strength and cohesion for that, and it would certainly not be able to ensure its own security against nuclear attack or blackmail without the U. S. alliance. Japan, even with a much greater defense effort than it has made so far, could not ensure its own security either.

The United States, on the other hand, while not dependent on its European and Japanese allies for its present territorial security, depends on them for its position in the world, hence for the long-term balance of world power against the Communist states. Though the alliances are unequal in their immediate character, they are ultimately no less vital for the USA than for its partners.

In judging the force levels that should be preserved in any arms control negotiations, both the unequal nature of the alliances and the desirability of reducing that unevenness where possible must be kept in mind. The first means that the credibility of American nuclear deterrence, not only for self-defense but also for the protection of its allies, must be maintained as far as possible. The second means that the degree of dependence of the Europeans and Japanese on that deterrence for their security against *conventional* threats should be reduced as far as possible.

In the case of West European defense, two apparently opposite but ultimately complementary conclusions follow from those maxims. In the interest of the credibility of U. S. nuclear deterrence, the presence of substantial American forces in Europe remains indispensable. In the interest of reduced unevenness, or of a fairer sharing of the burden, a relative increase in the role of Europe's own forces in conventional self-defense is highly desirable.

In the case of Japan, the basic disproportion between Japanese and Russian strength makes its dependence on American protection in principle inevitable both for its territorial defense and for the security of its seaborne supply routes. But even here, a greater role for the Japanese

navy and air force appears necessary for the reduction of the total American burden and in the interest of inter-allied harmony.

In the framework of the present paper, it cannot be the task of this section to discuss questions of joint military strategy and organization. We have merely stated the basic case for the alliances and their most fundamental requirements because of the light they throw on the inter-allied problems that may arise in negotiations on arms limitation between East and West.

For the SALT negotiations, we have already stated above that the credibility of American nuclear deterrence requires the prevention of any substantial superiority of the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear weapons.

With regard to the problem of missiles of medium or intermediate range targeted on Europe, European security requires their limitation also, at the price of a corresponding limitation of the American Forward Based Systems; if Cruise Missiles of corresponding range are deployed in Europe, they will have to be taken into account in such a balance. The West Europeans have an inevitable interest both that such negotiations should be taken up, and that they themselves should be represented at them.

For the negotiations on conventional force level reduction in Europe, the above considerations require that, on the Western side, such reduction should not be unilaterally confined to either American or European forces. It is also desirable that the West Europeans should retain flexibility as to how to distribute their contingent among the member nations of NATO, and, of course, that the French should join in the negotiations from which they have so far kept aloof.

B. CONSULTING ON ECONOMIC EAST-WEST COOPERATION

Our discussion of the problems of economic East-West cooperation, and of its possible linkage with questions of security on one side and of East-West communication on the other, shows that one principal weakness of the Western position is the presence of competitive national interests. Such interests could both tempt a particular country to engage more deeply in long-term cooperation projects with the East than is safe for its independence, and make it unwilling to limit particular forms of such cooperation when required for a common Western stand on a major issue under negotiation.

Both the nature of the Western alliances as agreements freely concluded among sovereign and independent partners, and the nature of the subject of economic cooperation between East and West with its

many variegated forms, make it highly improbable that an effective coordination in this field could be achieved by a system of hard and fast rules. Criteria for such rules were found, at the height of the Cold War, where the need for an embargo on deliveries of direct military importance to a potential enemy was concerned. It seems implausible that a similar method could be applied in a different situation and to the more complex problems of today.

What seems both desirable and possible, however, though by no means easy, is the establishment of a permanent organ of mutual intra-Western information and consultation on questions of economic cooperation with the East. This would not be easy because giving advance information about some types of projects to potential competitors could itself run counter to the competitive interest involved. It may nevertheless be possible, because it would not require submission to majority decisions, but would bring to each participating country both more information than that country had to give and useful advice based on the experience of others. It would be desirable because such a voluntary mechanism (for instance, in the shape of a committee of OECD) would at least bring the criterion of the common political interest of the West, as distinct from the interests of particular firms and particular countries, into discussion prior to a decision about a project; and because experience has shown that among nations conscious of their common vital interests, rational argument may at least sometimes prevail over narrow egotism.

As OECD comprises not only members of the Western alliances but also some neutral states, discussion of the more basic questions of "linkage negotiations" may require consultative organs of narrower composition, which could, however, benefit from the experience of official experts that regularly take part in the work of the wider committee.

C. WEST EUROPEAN COHESION AND "EUROCOMMUNISM"

In discussing above the possibility of the entry of the French and/or Italian Communists into coalition governments in those countries, we suggested that such a development is less likely to endanger the democratic system of government than has sometimes been claimed in Western discussion, but might constitute a more real danger to the political cohesion of Western Europe and to the effectiveness of the Atlantic alliance.

If our analysis is right, the necessary safeguards for democratic government can be expected to be taken care of by the potential coali-

tion partners of the Communists, as was the case when the Communists prominently participated in coalition governments in the same countries in the early years after World War II; in present conditions, this would be made even easier by the degree of real change that has occurred in the meantime in the Communist parties concerned.

By contrast, we noted that government participation by a strong Communist party, even if it had no direct control of foreign policy or defense, might create difficulties for the preservation of effective intra-Western cooperation in a situation of serious economic difficulties, and particularly for the pursuit of a common policy toward the East, hence also for NATO's capacity for united action in a crisis — all the more if the crisis did not arise from Soviet pressure in Europe itself, but from conflicts in other parts of the world.

These dangers are sufficiently serious to justify the statement that, despite the evolution of some Western Communist parties in a democratic direction, the participation of any of them in a Western government continues to be undesirable from the viewpoint of the common security interest of the West. The question therefore arises of the policy to be adopted towards this eventuality in Italy and/or France by the other NATO members, notably the United States, Britain and West Germany. Can they do anything to make this eventuality less likely, and by what means? And how should they react if it nevertheless comes to pass?

We believe that in both cases the crucial distinction to be kept in mind is between constructive policies aimed at joint West European recovery and negative policies of external pressure. The best chance to make Communist government participation in any country less likely is the success of a government without such participation in overcoming the economic recession. Any international policy that effectively promotes the recovery of Western Europe in general and of the countries in question in particular will therefore also help to reduce the probability of Communist government participation. On the other hand, if failure of recovery in a country undermines the stability of the existing government and strengthens the internal trend favoring the Communists, we believe it is not in the power of the other Western nations to prevent Communist government participation there by external pressure, threats or even support for anti-democratic forces. If such a course were attempted and failed, the penalty might be the turning of a large part of opinion in such a country to a bitterly anti-Western and pro-Soviet orientation, hence a loss of an important part of Western Europe to the "West."

Again, once one or more governments with Communist participa-

tion had come about, an attempt to isolate and “destabilize” them from outside — for instance to refuse them credits or to encourage a massive flight of capital — would from all the lessons of experience more likely lead not to their overthrow, but to their radicalization with strong public support and to a strengthening of the very internal conflicts within the Western sphere that constitute the main danger of the situation. Nationalist and left-radical motives would then combine to drive both the Communists and the governments beyond their original programs to more “revolutionary” measures and to a policy of confrontation with the West, with ultimate consequences similar to the previous case.

Against this, a constructive policy would naturally presuppose a number of institutional safeguards, to be supplied by the Communists’ coalition partners. The safeguards would be possible because the Communists would still enter the governments concerned in a minority position; they could not therefore claim certain key posts, including those of Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary, Defense Minister, or Interior Minister, as they generally did not between 1945 and 1947. These safeguards remain necessary because both parties, despite their strategic autonomy from Soviet directives and the critical distance from the Soviet model they have developed, have not renounced an attitude of basic solidarity with the Soviet Union as the country of the 1917 revolution, and because the French party in particular is still fundamentally “anti-Atlantic” and indeed “anti-European.”

Assuming those safeguards and general conduct by the Communists in accordance with their democratic professions, a policy of continuing to promote the economic stability of these countries with the support of the strongest Western economies would give the “Eurocommunists” a growing common interest with the West. The current tasks of government would force them, in a context of Western cooperation, to join in measures which the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc would be bound to disapprove, while they would have to continue criticizing Soviet violations of human rights as they have been doing for some time. In such conditions, the effort so far made by both the Soviets and the “Eurocommunist” parties to avoid a formal break would be increasingly difficult to sustain.

VII. CONCLUSION: SURVIVING THE CHALLENGE OF COEXISTENCE

In the foregoing report, we have started from the view of East-West relations as dominated by a long-term conflict not only between different Great Powers, but also between different political, economic and social systems and between different ideas or ideologies — a conflict that cannot be ended at will but must be controlled in its forms and range. We have argued that in that long-term conflict, the goal of the industrially advanced democracies, described here as “the West,” must be not only to defend the values on which their system is founded in their own territory, but to seek to influence worldwide developments in their direction; and we have explained that this does not imply the unrealistic objective of a worldwide extension of our democratic system, but the more modest aim of a worldwide extension of the processes of peaceful change, and a criterion for our efforts to influence their course.

In conclusion, we should like to suggest that in this long-term contest, the West has one great advantage transcending the competition of physical power: It is the advantage of greater flexibility and capacity to learn from experience, due to a relatively greater freedom from the blinkers of an institutionalized doctrine. It is that advantage that makes it easier for the West to cope with unforeseen change, and that gives it a better chance — not indeed to “win” the conflict in the sense of forcing a decision, but historically to survive its challenge.

APPENDIX: DISCUSSION OF THE REPORT

BONN, OCTOBER 24-25, 1977

All reports published under the auspices of the Trilateral Commission are the result of teamwork. Throughout their work, the three authors consult among themselves; they also draw considerable advice from experts in their respective regions. Before publication, a full draft is discussed by the members of the Commission gathered for a Commission meeting. This "trilateral process" (which is detailed for this report on pp. III-IV) is an essential aspect of all trilateral task force projects. In this process, however, the three authors remain free to present their own views; in the end they report *to* the Commission, and they assume the responsibility for the content of their final paper.

The preceding report is no exception to these rules. A "discussion draft" was presented to the eighth meeting of the Commission, in Bonn on October 24, 1977, by its three authors: Richard Löwenthal (the principal drafter), Jeremy Azrael and Tohru Nakagawa. Most of the discussion which followed their presentations focused on Eurocommunism, which proved to be the most controversial section of the draft report, and on the security problems of East and Southeast Asia. However, other issues were also touched upon in Bonn; they included: the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet economy and political system — and, in parallel, the relative vulnerabilities of the West; the problems of Western economic cooperation with the East; the current status of the military balance — both strategic and regional; and the role of China in the overall East-West conflict. A brief summary of the discussion follows.

Evolution of the Soviet Union

Elaborating on the report's assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union, Jeremy Azrael particularly emphasized the increasing seriousness of the "nationality problem" in the USSR. He stressed that this is a multifaceted problem, with seriously adverse political, economic and military implications from the point of view of the Soviet regime. Furthermore, Azrael drew attention to the significance of the report's conclusion that, in the absence of technology transfers, the combination of plant obsolescence, rising fuel costs and endemically low labor productivity was likely to bring Soviet economic growth to a virtual halt during the 1980s. The dangers and opportunities that this

prospect poses for the West are obviously worthy of much fuller discussion than was possible in such a brief and inclusive report.

A European Commissioner emphasized that one tends often to overestimate the degree of domestic support for dictatorships, in both right-wing regimes and Communist regimes in the East. If the Soviet regime still appears to be able to exert some appeal and generate support outside, the domestic system nevertheless remains dominated by a gerontocracy out of touch and contemptuous of the masses. Although a political breakdown of the regime is very unlikely, it cannot be entirely excluded, and its consequences would be potentially explosive.

On the other hand, some participants expressed skepticism at the prospects for change within the Soviet system; they emphasized, in particular, the virtual impossibility of playing on the "generation change" — a change which, as the report notes, has in fact already taken place in the military without altering the basic conservatism of the leadership.

As a result of this "systemic crisis" in the Soviet Union, several Commission members emphasized, technical exchange and *economic cooperation with the West* are of vital importance to the Soviet Union. A North American speaker stressed in particular the need for the West to find "some political criteria" by which these economic relations should be conducted. Extending trade and increasing credits to the East, he noted, can be combined with a far-sighted foreign policy program, and in a manner allowing the free economy to operate. In the past, the OECD countries have not been prepared to accept a uniform code of conduct or administrative procedure by which credits to the East could be screened; in this respect this speaker favored *long-term* credits given for specific projects (instead of on an open-ended basis), and tied to some kind of *criteria*. These criteria should allow us to ask from the Soviet Union a "certain restraint" in the conduct of its foreign policy while not being as "intrusive" as the Jackson Amendment.

Military and Geopolitical Balances

Another necessity for the West, emphasized in the report and subsequently stressed by several participants — both European and American — is that of maintaining a credible deterrence in view of recent changes in the military balance. NATO, a former U. S. official observed, was based throughout the '50s and much of the '60s, on U. S. *strategic* superiority, the capacity of the West to launch a plausible first strike attack — allowing us to neglect the question of the *regional*

balance in Europe. Today's strategic balance tends toward parity, and the U. S. cannot regain its strategic superiority of the earlier era. As a consequence, the regional superiority of the Soviet Union in Europe might become, sooner or later, a significant political factor. This speaker attacked the myth of mere "numerical superiority" in any given regional balance, which was proven wrong in Europe during this century's two world wars; the ability of the aggressor, even if numerically inferior overall, to concentrate its forces at the point of attack proved in both cases to be decisive. In this speaker's words, merely "counting the strength is never sufficient to be sure that a major Soviet victory is impossible." In this respect, NATO's weaknesses urgently need to be faced and corrected if we are to redress the potentially very dangerous state of the regional balance in Europe. The lack of standardization — even in calculating the minimum supplies available to the West in case of an attack — was mentioned as a particularly critical weakness.

Furthermore, this speaker emphasized, it is indispensable that our understanding of military balances be complemented with a broader understanding of current geopolitical balances. Given the rapidity of today's geopolitical changes — as witnessed, for instance, in the Horn of Africa — a clear and advanced idea of the changes which the West should resist is crucial, as the report amply illustrates.

Eurocommunism

The report's assessment of the Western European situation aroused the most controversy. A large number of participants — mainly American — sharply questioned some of the report's "sweeping statements" on the evolution of the major Communist parties of Western Europe. Some speakers saw a need to emphasize even further the international impact of Communist participation in Western European governments — particularly on public opinion in America, where, in the words of a former United States official, the effect of Communist participation in a Western European government would likely be to "critically weaken" the U. S. commitment to Europe.

In the eyes of several participants, the Communist parties of Western Europe, electoral declarations notwithstanding, have so far shown little evidence of a "reliable commitment to Western democratic principles," and of a rejection of the Soviet one-party system. In addition, as is recalled in the report, with regard to military defense of Western Europe the position of even some of the most "liberalized" of these parties, in the event of aggression by the troops of the Warsaw

Pact, remains altogether ambiguous. It is dangerous, therefore, to "overstate the actual evolution of these parties."

There was less disagreement on policy toward a government with Communist participation than on the points of analysis discussed above, though some wondered why such a hypothetical policy problem needed to be discussed in the report at all. Many participants vigorously supported the report's recommended approach to Eurocommunism, feeling that if the Communists come to power in France or Italy, the best policy would be to at least try to work with these governments constructively rather than to isolate them. As for the present, they insisted, instead of indulging in "panicky and militant" reactions, working together among the trilateral countries for a policy of recovery is "our best chance" to favor a positive evolution among the political forces and in the public opinions of the countries concerned. More generally speaking, they also agreed with the task force's diagnosis that Europe's deepest problem lies in its lack of cohesion, in the face of rising protectionist tendencies and growing disparities in economic growth.

The Security of East and Southeast Asia

"Nippo-Communism," if indeed such a phenomenon exists, is not a significant factor in Japan's overall concern for security in East Asia — another issue at the fore of the East-West debate in Bonn. As emphasized by Ambassador Nakagawa, co-author of the task force's report, the Japanese Communist party, despite its spectacular pledges of "democratization" and its unqualified support of Japan's territorial claims in the Kuril archipelago, suffered a major setback in the latest general elections, the chief beneficiaries of which were the parties of the center.

Clearly, in Nakagawa's words, the increased complexity of the security balance in Asia derives from the emergence of the People's Republic of China as "an important factor in world politics," while negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union remain deadlocked over territorial issues. The return to Japan of the four islands off the northern shore of Hokkaido remains an "absolute prerequisite" to the conclusion of the peace treaty proposed by the Soviet Union, stressed a former Japanese diplomat, who also reaffirmed that Japan is "not interested" in any Soviet proposal of a "security arrangement" in Asia which would not include China.

As emphasized by a number of speakers, the political and military balance in Asia is a crucial element of the overall East-West relationship; they particularly drew attention to the security of both the Indo-

chinese and Korean peninsulas. In the former, a Japanese Commission member stressed that an economic recovery in Vietnam and that country's potential reemergence as an important factor in the regional balance would constitute a "major challenge for neighboring ASEAN countries."

The particular security problems of Korea illustrate what several Japanese speakers saw as a need to "restore trust in the permanence of the U. S. commitment in East Asia." Some viewed this necessary restoration as depending as much on *the manner* as on the present content of American policy. Others, however, elaborating on the practical security requirements of South Korea, emphasized the critical proximity of Seoul to the Demilitarized Zone and the South Korean capital's special vulnerability to a surprise attack by North Korea; the continued presence of the U. S. Air Force, as noted in the report, assures the stability of the local balance *unless* "one of the major Communist powers decides to assist in a local aggression." Moreover, a Japanese scholar drew attention to the broader political dimension of the situation in Korea — which is far from being "just a military arena"; the most crucial question, he suggested, is the extent to which North Korea can be expected to change its attitude towards the outside world: This speaker saw "less reason than many others" to be pessimistic in the long run about the "extreme militancy" of the Pyongyang leadership and emphasized the need to explore more actively "the political ways" in our strategy to deal with the Korean peninsula.

On the issue of *China*, a noted British scholar, referring to the advantage derived by the West from the United States' special relationship to China and from the Sino-Soviet conflict, stressed the need for such a report to explore further ways of "preserving this asymmetrical relationship"; there too, he suggested, the West can greatly help in shaping the alternatives facing the People's Republic, especially by "giving the new Chinese leadership a stake in Sino-American relations."

Finally, emphasizing the report's overall recommendation to "influence peaceful change worldwide," a European participant particularly stressed the need to "*activate* the Western position": The West, this speaker observed, has a fundamentally defensive posture vis-à-vis Eastern actions. Military-wise, this should always be the case; however, given the Soviet Union's continued use of a whole range of political and ideological means to undermine Western positions, our countries should show more assertiveness in defending their own values.

The Industrialized Democratic Regions in a Changing International System

Inaugurated in July 1973, the Trilateral Commission is a policy-oriented organization. Based on analysis of major issues facing the trilateral regions, the Commission has sought to develop practicable proposals for joint action. The Commission's members are about 250 distinguished citizens from the three regions, drawn from a variety of backgrounds.

The historical roots of the Commission can be traced to serious strains early in the 1970s in relations among Japan, North America and Western Europe. As the decade has proceeded, however, it has become increasingly clear that the strains and shifts in the international system are global as well as trilateral in scope. The renovation of the international system is a task of global as well as trilateral dimensions, and the work of the Commission has moved accordingly.

In this global effort, the industrialized democratic regions remain an identifiable community and a vital core. Their focus, however, must not be on the preservation of the status quo, but on arrangements which increasingly embrace the Third and Fourth Worlds in a cooperative endeavor to secure a more equitable world order.

The renovation of the international system will be a very prolonged process. The system created after World War II was created through an act of will and human initiative in a relatively restricted period of time. One power had overwhelming might and influence, and others were closely associated with it. In contrast, a renovated international system will now require a process of creation—much longer and more complex—a process in which prolonged negotiations will have to be engaged and developed. In nurturing habits and practices of working together among the trilateral regions, the Commission should help set the context for these necessary efforts.

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