



Director of
Central
Intelligence

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Soviet Global Military Reach

National Intelligence Estimate





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SOVIET GLOBAL MILITARY REACH

Information available as of 13 September 1984 was used
in the preparation of this Estimate, approved by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and the Treasury.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
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SCOPE NOTE

Soviet capabilities to project military power in the areas around the immediate periphery of the USSR are far superior to Soviet military capabilities in more distant areas. Formidable Soviet forces have long existed for operations in areas of Europe, the Far East, and Southwest Asia that are contiguous to the USSR. Beyond this zone, Soviet military activities have traditionally been limited principally to military assistance and support for foreign forces. Over the last 20 years, however, Soviet foreign military involvement abroad has increased significantly. Soviet forces have made greater use of support facilities overseas, Soviet naval and air presence at longer ranges from the USSR has been more frequent, and on a few occasions Soviet forces have become directly involved in combat overseas. This Estimate is concerned with Soviet military capabilities in those more distant areas over the next five to 10 years.

This Estimate distinguishes between what we term "global military reach" and the more common notion of military "power projection." The essential distinction between military reach and power projection in this Estimate is the nature and scope of military operations envisioned under each concept. Military reach is associated with smaller scale operations, often in the context of supporting an ally in a regional crisis. Power projection envisions the deployment of major combined-arms formations, usually against substantial opposition. Whereas the projection of US military power, especially to Europe, is vital to US security, Soviet defense does not require the deployment of substantial military forces abroad. Indeed, for the United States all major wars in the last century have been fought beyond American shores. Soviet wartime experience has been just the opposite. Therefore, it is not surprising that the two armed forces have been developed with differing requirements. By our definition, the forces and operational concepts usually associated with power projection include pre-positioned equipment, rapid deployment and amphibious forces, foreign staging and logistic bases, aircraft carriers, and aerial refueling capabilities. These characteristics have generally been lacking in Soviet forces. Instead we note growing Soviet military involvement abroad of a different nature, not closely associated with the NATO contingency. This involvement—which we call global reach—includes provision of arms, dispatch of military advisers, acquisition of air and sea access abroad, and small-scale deployment of Soviet forces.

The military significance of Soviet access to foreign facilities is the key issue addressed in this Estimate. More generally, this Estimate:

- Examines Soviet military involvement in areas beyond the range of tactical aircraft based in the USSR.
- Describes trends in Soviet access to foreign facilities over the past two decades.
- Examines new Soviet military developments that affect capabilities for distant military operations.
- Identifies the roles of client governments in Soviet foreign military involvement.
- In conclusion, discusses the type of military threats that Soviet forces operating from foreign facilities are likely to pose for US and friendly forces during the next five to 10 years.

A companion Estimate, NIE 11-10/2-84, *The USSR and the Third World*, provides the broad political context of Soviet involvement abroad. The reader may also wish to consult the *National HUMINT Collection Plan: No. 58, Soviet Power. Projection Capabilities*.

The foregoing Scope Note is Unclassified.

KEY JUDGMENTS

The steady increase in size, capability, range of operations, and scope of activity of Soviet forces abroad over the last 20 years provides a global military reach that Moscow did not previously possess. The military significance of Soviet forces beyond the periphery of the USSR already has been demonstrated in a variety of ways. In peacetime and during regional crises Soviet forces abroad have:

- Intervened in Middle East conflicts in defense of allies.
- Supported the intervention of Cuban forces in Africa.
- Directed foreign forces in combat operations.
- Collected intelligence and conducted reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
- Provided support to Soviet allies, including arms, advice, training, and demonstrations of force.
- Protected the Soviet fishing fleet and other interests abroad.
- Resupplied or provided new military equipment rapidly to Soviet allies involved in hostilities.
- Evacuated Soviet personnel.
- Established a military presence in new areas and, at times, increased an already existing military presence, thus complicating the military planning of adversaries.

In all of these regional activities, however, the Soviets have been careful not to challenge directly either the United States or other strong regional powers. This is because, beyond the range of its land-based airpower, Moscow would have difficulty in rapidly mounting or sustaining a distant power projection effort even in the face of limited Third World opposition. Soviet forces deployed abroad are thinly spread, are vulnerable, and lack offensive punch. In particular, they lack adequate air defenses, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, at-sea logistics, staging rights, aerial refueling capabilities, and tactical air support.

Despite these weaknesses, Soviet forces abroad are becoming more significant factors in a possible military confrontation with the United States, particularly just prior to hostilities and during the early stages of a conflict. For example, they could:

- Attack Western naval targets at the onset of hostilities.

- Provide targeting information and intelligence.
- Delay some reinforcements.
- Divert some US military resources.
- Disrupt some shipping and air routes.

For the next five to 10 years, Soviet military deployments abroad will not overextend the USSR, but may stretch the United States. In particular, US military planners will be faced with the problem of how best to deal with hostile forces operating well beyond the Soviet periphery. As detailed below, this problem will be compounded by three persisting developments: first, *Soviet capabilities* for distant military operations will improve, although Soviet forces are not likely to be deployed in substantially larger numbers; second, *Soviet use of current foreign facilities* is likely to be more extensive even though there probably will not be a significant expansion in Soviet military access abroad and perhaps it will even decline; third, *Soviet regional allies* that act in support of Moscow's interests abroad will become increasingly capable as they are provided with modern Soviet arms.

Soviet Capabilities

Several new developments over the next five to 10 years will improve Soviet capabilities for distant military operations, including:

- Introduction of aerial refueling for fighter and transport aircraft.
- Improvements in airlift and sealift capabilities.
- Establishment of a global command and control system incorporating a new airborne warning and control system aircraft, along with space-based communications, intelligence, and navigation systems.
- Deployment of more capable submarines and surface combatants, especially the large, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

Even with these improvements, however, Soviet forces abroad will continue to have serious limitations. They probably will remain modest in numbers, including only about 15 percent of the Soviet Navy. Transit delays and other factors could limit the rapid augmentation of naval formations. In addition, many of the foreign facilities used by Soviet forces will lack adequate repair, refueling, and storage capabilities. Also, Soviet airlifts to distant areas will encounter problems in overflight clearances, landing rights, and refueling.

Over the next decade, Soviet military forces still will not be able to carry out substantial combined-arms operations against major military

opposition in areas distant from the USSR. Soviet intervention in Third World conflicts probably will be restricted to situations where the risk of escalation to a war with the West is judged to be small and Soviet capabilities to perform higher priority strategic missions would not be seriously degraded. In general, Soviet military intervention would most likely involve naval maneuvers, or the dispatch of pilots, air defense units, or small contingents of ground forces to bolster local defenses. Such intervention is most likely in the Middle East, where the stakes are high and the region close to the USSR.

We do not believe that Soviet forces abroad currently play a major role in Soviet military doctrine for general war, which remains focused on the traditional mission of strategic defense of the homeland. Soviet forces routinely deployed abroad are now, and will remain for the period of this Estimate, too few and too weak to allow the Soviets to engage in distant power projection.

Soviet Use of Foreign Facilities

Soviet capabilities for distant military operations have generally improved with increased access to foreign facilities, although the Soviet Navy continues to rely primarily on its own auxiliaries for logistic support. The USSR now has a military presence in most major regions of the world. Soviet naval forces now maintain a continuous presence in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic off the coast of West Africa, and the South China Sea. Access in Vietnam has grown to the point where the Soviets have established a naval and air operations and logistics base at Cam Ranh Bay. (See figure 1.)

Even though much of the past Soviet success in gaining access has been due to circumstances that are not likely to be repeated, instabilities in the Third World are likely to provide a few additional opportunities for Soviet exploitation, and Moscow will continue widespread probing for additional access. The Middle East region will remain the top-priority target. In addition to those countries where the USSR already enjoys routine military access, others may permit more extensive Soviet access, most notably Seychelles or some countries in West Africa. On the other hand, Moscow could also lose military access, as for example in Angola, Guinea, or Ethiopia.

Regardless of these gains or losses, increasing use of foreign facilities to which the Soviets already have access can be expected, particularly in Vietnam. A South China Sea naval squadron has probably been established. The number of submarines, surface combatants, and naval aircraft deployed to Cam Ranh Bay will continue to grow. Soviet fighter aircraft also are likely to be deployed to Cam Ranh Bay. In the Caribbean, Soviet aircraft and ships probably will make

more frequent deployments, but we do not anticipate the introduction of any new Soviet-manned offensive weapons in Cuba.¹

Soviet Allies


Soviet arms transfers will continue to improve substantially the military capabilities of several Soviet allies. Moscow will export modern weapons to selected Third World allies, in some cases before they are made available to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. In addition, joint military exercises could improve the potential for coordinating combined military operations.

Certain Soviet allies, most notably Cuba, will be willing to act in support of Soviet interests short of direct confrontation with the United States. By funneling military supplies and providing troops and advisers, Cuba can mask the full extent of Soviet involvement abroad.

¹ The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that, although it is currently unlikely that the Soviets would place SS-20s in Cuba in the near future, the possibility still exists and, because of the great danger it poses, warrants continuing consideration. For elaboration of this view, see paragraph 104, page 34. (S)

~~The foregoing Key Judgments are Secret.~~

Figure 1
Soviet Military Presence Abroad



DISCUSSION

Purposes of Soviet Global Military Reach

Soviet Goals and Objectives

1. Soviet activities in the Third World are designed largely to complement Moscow's strategy toward the United States, the West, and China. Although the pattern of Soviet involvement in the Third World has been subject to ebbs and flows, overall Soviet goals have remained fairly constant: to gain political influence and, in particular cases, increase Soviet military potential. Important objectives in support of both of these goals include:

- To promote Third World responsiveness to Soviet interests and initiatives.
- To gain recognition of the Soviet Union's status as a superpower with global interests and reach.
- To promote the establishment of regimes closely allied with the USSR.
- To increase access to military facilities.
- To diminish Western, especially US, and Chinese influence.
- To deny military access to the West.
- To increase the potential to hinder Western access to strategic resources.

2. Since its first major forays into the Third World in the mid-1950s, the USSR has made impressive gains toward ensuring, as Gromyko said in 1971, that no question of substance can be decided without consideration of Soviet interests. The USSR has treaties of friendship and cooperation with 11 Third World states and at least one other—with Libya—may have been agreed to in principle. Moscow has continuing military aid relations with nearly 40 countries in the Third World, and about 20,000 military advisers are scattered throughout the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In addition, Soviet forces enjoy access to a number of facilities in the Third World.

3. While the growth of Soviet overseas presence and influence over the last three decades has been impressive, it has not been without costs and setbacks. Two

friendship treaties—with Egypt and Somalia—have been abrogated. In each instance, the Soviets lost access to important naval and air facilities. While they have tried with some success to offset these losses, they have yet to fully recoup, especially in the eastern Mediterranean.

4. Moscow employs a variety of instruments to gain and maintain influence in the Third World and to secure facilities of military importance. The more successful approaches involve arms exports, the dispatch of advisers, training in the USSR, and, on occasion, the use of allies. Economic aid has generally not been a major tool of Soviet influence, except for Cuba and Vietnam, which receive major trade subsidies. In addition to military and economic assistance, the Soviets maintain military forces in the Third World. The bulk of the forward deployed forces are from the Soviet Navy. They include about 20 principal surface combatants, 30 attack submarines, several company- and platoon-size detachments of naval infantry, and 20 to 30 Soviet naval aviation aircraft. Soviet army deployments include a brigade in Cuba and two regimental-size air defense units in Syria.

5. In addition to military and economic tools, Moscow employs other means to further objectives in the Third World including clandestine or "active measures." These are designed to penetrate foreign governments, support opposition groups, and disseminate propaganda and disinformation. Active measures include the use of insurgencies, ethnic or separatist groups, and other armed resistance elements (some of which engage in terrorist activities). In addition, local Communist parties, Soviet-owned commercial companies, Soviet embassy staffs, foreign intelligence services, visiting officials of various Soviet educational, trade, social, or other organizations, students trained in the USSR or other Communist countries, labor, student, or other mass organizations, and worldwide front organizations have been used clandestinely. Plans for such use of active measures are coordinated among the International Department of the party's Central Committee, the Committee for State Security (KGB), and sometimes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the

Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Ministry of Defense.

6. To an important degree the USSR's dramatic advances in the Third World were due to a combination of circumstances that are not necessarily repeatable. The coincidence of the collapse of the Portuguese empire and the Ethiopian monarchy in Africa, the upheaval in Iran, and US reluctance to become deeply involved in the Third World in the aftermath of Vietnam provided extraordinary opportunities for the Soviets. Nevertheless, instability and turmoil are likely to prevail in much of the Third World, providing not only an abundance of opportunities for Soviet exploitation, but also impediments to consolidation of previous gains.

7. Moscow now has a series of Third World allies to protect in order to prevent important reverses in the "correlation of forces." The Soviet leadership is engaged to varying degrees in aiding the defense of pro-Soviet regimes in Afghanistan, Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. Many of these governments are confronting severe economic problems, active insurgencies, or other problems for which Moscow has found no ready solution. Consequently, the Soviet leadership will probably have to choose between devoting more energy and resources to defending their allies against domestic challenges or accepting local compromises that risk undermining Soviet access or influence, a situation that already may be emerging in southern Africa.

8. Soviet strategy in the Third World is likely to be increasingly affected by the USSR's expanding military reach. In the past two decades this reach began to extend beyond the range of land-based Soviet aircraft, yet Soviet capabilities are in no measure comparable with those of the United States. Moscow would have difficulty in rapidly mounting and sustaining a distant power projection effort even in the face of limited Third World opposition because of the Soviet lack of adequate air defenses, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and aerial refueling capabilities, rapid deployment forces, tactical aircraft, at-sea logistics, and staging rights. If time and opposition were not constraints, however, the Soviets have the capability to move large numbers of troops, armor, artillery, and crated tactical aircraft by merchant ship to any part of the globe. We do not know of any overseas country in which the stakes are so high that Moscow would be willing to deploy substantial military forces that now have the primary mission of defense of the homeland.

9. Over the next decade, Soviet military forces will not be able to carry out substantial combined-arms

military operations successfully against major Western military opposition in areas distant from the periphery of the Soviet Union. Even as new opportunities arise in the Third World for Soviet intervention, Moscow will have to calculate above all the intentions and capabilities of the United States. However, the presence of even small numbers of Soviet military forces in distant areas can pose special problems for US planners, especially in times of crises when they could represent a threat to US interests or operations.

Previous Uses of Soviet Forces in Distant Areas

10. A variety of Soviet forces have been used to respond to crises in the Third World, including:

— *Naval Forces.* Naval surface ships and submarines have provided the principal means to concentrate Soviet military force in distant areas. For example, 96 Soviet combatants and auxiliaries were deployed to the Mediterranean during the 1973 Middle East war. Soviet ships also have provided escort for merchant ships delivering arms during various crises. In 1977, resupplies for beleaguered Ethiopian forces at Mits'iwa were provided by Soviet ships escorted by Soviet naval combatants. This timely intervention prevented the loss of this vital port to the Eritrean insurgents. In 1979, Soviet naval task groups, including cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, deployed to the South China Sea in a show of force during the Chinese attacks on Vietnam. In response to the 1982-83 conflict in Lebanon, the Soviet amphibious capability was augmented, probably to assist in evacuation, should that have become necessary. Soviet naval forces also supported the Cuban interventions in Angola and Ethiopia in the mid- and late 1970s.

— *Air Defense Forces.* Significant Soviet combat losses have at times been risked by providing air defense support to embattled clients. Such help has included surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), aircraft, and other equipment, as well as pilots and other combat personnel. The largest direct combat commitment involved the deployment of almost 10,000 air defense personnel to Egypt in 1970 to defend against Israeli airstrikes. At the same time, Soviet pilots flew combat patrols for Egypt. Toward the end of the 1973 Middle East war, a Soviet SA-6 air defense missile unit was deployed to Syria. Again in 1983, two Soviet SA-5 units with their 2,000 personnel were sent to bolster Syrian air defenses and have remained in Syria.

- *Airlift Forces.* During the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, a Soviet airlift that eventually involved over 120 aircraft flying 350 sorties was begun within three days of the opening of hostilities. Another Soviet combat resupply airlift was implemented four days after the 1973 Middle East war began. That airlift involved about 40 percent of the Soviet medium- and long-range transport inventory and included round trips of up to 6,000 nautical miles. Other emergency airlifts have included support to Ethiopia, Angola, and Vietnam during times of crisis. Annex C describes Soviet airlifts to the Third World.
- *Ground Forces.* Other than the brigade deployed to Cuba in the 1960s, major Soviet maneuver units have not been deployed beyond the Soviet periphery. However, Soviet airborne units have been placed on alert during several crises. Also, in Ethiopia, Soviet general officers have directed major campaigns even though Soviet troops were not involved.

Limitations on Deployment of Soviet Forces in Crises

11. Lack of offensive punch is the main limitation of Soviet forces abroad. They are not capable of projecting power ashore against significant military opposition, but they are capable of intervening in a variety of ways in support of an ally abroad. Moscow would prefer to play a support role by providing military equipment and supplies quickly to a beleaguered client. Should direct involvement of Soviet forces become necessary, in most cases it would probably take the form of augmentation forces, such as pilots and air defense forces, rather than a major expeditionary force.

12. Moscow's ability to expand naval deployments substantially could be limited by transit delays, shortfalls in logistic and maintenance support, and the potentially adverse impact on higher priority defense requirements. Reinforcement of the Mediterranean Squadron by 10 to 12 surface combatants from the Black Sea could be accomplished within a week. Augmentation of Soviet forces in the northwest Indian Ocean with modern combatants from Vladivostok would involve a minimum transit of two weeks at a 20-knot speed of advance. For naval forces already deployed in the vicinity of Vietnam, however, transit time would be about one week.

13. Soviet airlifts to distant areas also face important limitations. The main problems are possible denial

of overflight clearances and landing rights, along with limitations on refueling. Also the crew-to-aircraft ratio in Soviet military transport aviation (VTA) is low, about half that of the US Military Airlift Command. This limits the Soviet ability to conduct sustained airlift operations.


14. Many of the foreign facilities used by Soviet forces pose further limitations on more ambitious roles for Moscow. In most cases, Soviet forces lack direct control over the facilities. Many ports and airfields lack adequate maintenance capabilities and storage for weapons, ammunition, and fuel sufficient to sustain combat operations. With important exceptions in Cuba, Syria, and Vietnam, most of these facilities are not well defended.

15. Another major limitation is the lack of supplies and military equipment stockpiled abroad for use by Soviet forces. A substantial amount of pre-positioned equipment—enough to outfit a total of two divisions with tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery—has recently been identified in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. However, this equipment is maintained by Cuban personnel and is of the type and vintage associated with Cuban, not Soviet, troops. It is possible, but unlikely, that in other countries Soviet arms provided to allies could be available for Soviet use. For example, in Libya, substantial equipment inventories exceed apparent local needs, but most of the equipment is composed of older models no longer used by Soviet units. It is neither well maintained to ensure reliability nor configured according to Soviet military organizations. Furthermore Libyan stockpiles are not well located to facilitate rapid Soviet use. Similar or more unfavorable conditions prevail elsewhere, so we believe that those foreign-based military stockpiles thus far identified are for host country or client use, and are unlikely to be planned for use by Soviet forces. Cam Ranh Bay is the best prepared of the overseas facilities to support Soviet military operations. But at this time, only small numbers of air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) and spare parts are believed to be stored there.

Scope of Soviet Foreign Military Involvement: How Is It Changing?

16. Moscow's military involvement beyond the Soviet periphery has increased substantially over the last two decades both in geographic scope and variety of forces involved (figure 2). The USSR now has a military presence in most major regions of the world (figure 3). The extent of this involvement ranges from six countries (Cuba, Vietnam, South Yemen, Ethiopia,

Figure 2
Soviet Use of Foreign Facilities



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Syria, and Angola) where Soviet forces are continuously present, to 39 countries which currently receive varying degrees of Soviet military assistance. In between these levels of involvement we find a Soviet military advisory presence in 33 countries, of which 15 regularly host port calls and seven permit major replenishment and some repair of Soviet naval ships. Annex A describes the various dimensions of Soviet military involvement in more detail.

17. By most measures, Soviet foreign military involvement has increased dramatically over the past two decades. Soviet military assistance has increased nearly tenfold during this period (figure 4). Since the Soviet military assistance program began in 1955, equipment deliveries have totaled about \$85 billion. Over half of these deliveries have been made since 1978. Largely as a result of increased military assist-

ance, the total number of Soviet military personnel outside the Warsaw Pact territory and Afghanistan has more than doubled in the past decade (figure 5). These military personnel are mainly advisers and technicians who are now found in nearly twice as many countries as was the case in the 1960s (figure 6). Soviet military advisers and technicians in the Third World now outnumber their US counterparts by a wide margin: about 20,000 Soviet versus 650 US military advisers. In addition to US military advisers, however, US private companies also provide many thousands of technicians abroad in support of military sales. Soviet military advisory groups (MAGs) with 50 or more personnel have been established in 23 countries. In addition, some 62,000 Third World military personnel have received training in the USSR or other Communist countries over the past three decades.

Figure 3a
Soviet Foreign Military Involvement, Mid-1960s




Figure 3b
Soviet Foreign Military Involvement, Mid-1970s






Figure 3c
Soviet Foreign Military Involvement, Mid-1980s



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Figure 4
Soviet Military Agreements and Deliveries to Third World




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Figure 5
Soviet Military Personnel Abroad


Thousands of advisers, technicians,
and troops in Third World.



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Figure 6
Countries With a Soviet Military Advisory Presence



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18. The ability to offer a wide range of military equipment on a timely basis and at low prices is a great asset in establishing and maintaining relationships in the Third World. By establishing arms relationships, Moscow gains access to important officials in Third World countries, particularly officers in the armed forces. Moscow tries to foster a dependency on continued deliveries of Soviet equipment and spare parts. Ultimately, Moscow could use influence acquired in these ways to gain military access, displace or offset Western influence, or aggravate tensions in regions of importance to the West

19. Despite some significant reverses, Soviet arms programs have been successful in producing cooperative military relationships with some key Third World countries and with many less vital ones. In 1983, the USSR signed agreements with, or made arms deliveries to, some 36 countries outside Europe. These range from regular Soviet customers such as Cuba, Syria, India, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, Ethiopia, and Vietnam, with annual transactions sometimes reaching several billion dollars each, to intermittent customers such as Bangladesh and Burundi, with sales of only a few million dollars. The mid-to-late 1970s was a period of particularly rapid growth in the arms program as Moscow exploited the ability of several key customers to pay higher prices and to pay in hard currency. Since the early 1980s, Moscow has generally maintained the high arms export levels reached in the late 1970s, and new agreements for future exports indicate Soviet arms exports will continue to grow.

20. Soviet military assistance has been instrumental in upgrading the armed forces of several Third World countries—such as Cuba, Vietnam, and India—to the point where they have become major regional powers. Some of Moscow's best customers also occupy important geographic locations. Soviet success in translating this military assistance into political influence or military advantage, however, is less clear. In some cases—notably Cuba, Vietnam, and Ethiopia—Moscow's willingness and ability to supply arms have clearly contributed to its gaining influence and access to military facilities. In other cases—as in India—the Soviets have reaped no direct military advantage and only moderate political influence. Finally, in some cases arms relationships may actually have drawn Soviet leaders into situations they would have preferred to avoid. Libya, for example, provides an unwanted public linkage between Moscow and international terrorism. Similarly, Iraq's dependence on Soviet arms has made it difficult for Moscow to keep avenues open to Tehran.

21. The desire to earn hard currency has become a significant secondary motive for the Soviet arms transfer program. In the period from 1978 to 1982, almost three-fourths of the arms delivered went to hard currency Middle East customers. Soviet earnings from arms sales currently account for about 15 percent of Moscow's annual hard currency receipts. In the last few years, however, declining oil revenues have reduced the ability of many customers to pay for arms, and competition from the West has increased. This has caused Moscow to make significant concessions, including the export of some of the most modern Soviet weapons and the offer of more attractive financial terms. Nonetheless, Moscow continues to reap significant hard currency earnings from its arms sales.

22. The pattern of Soviet arms transfers is important in any assessment of Moscow's interests in the Third World. Most major recipients face active internal insurgencies or are engaged in conflict with or are threatened by neighboring states. Most are confronting foes supported by the West. Geographically, the greatest concentration of Soviet arms recipients extends from North Africa eastward to the Indian subcontinent: Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and India—states generally situated along major air and sea routes.

23. While most of the nearly 40 countries that receive Soviet military assistance diversify their sources of arms, 13 rely almost entirely on the Soviet Union (table 1). Six of these countries have proved to be the most willing to provide access for Soviet naval ships, aircraft, and other activities. The extent of access varies in each case. Annex B provides a description of the extent to which facilities in various countries are used by Soviet forces. Several countries, such as India, Peru, and Algeria, receive substantial quantities of Soviet arms yet do not permit Soviet military access to their facilities. Thus, we do not expect that reliance on Soviet arms will necessarily result in such access.

24. In addition to increased military assistance, Soviet naval forces also have been a major part of the growing Soviet involvement abroad. Since 1965, Soviet naval deployments have risen sharply, from just over 6,000 annual shipdays out of home waters to over 43,000 today.⁴ The most dramatic increase was between 1965 and 1970, with a more gradual rise having occurred since that time (figures 7 and 8). These trends also reflect a wider ranging Soviet Navy. Regular

⁴ These figures do not include deployment of SSBNs, and Academy of Sciences hydrographic and space event support ships.


Table 1
Military Reliance*

Middle East	North Africa
South Yemen	Libya
Syria	East Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa	Vietnam
Angola	Laos
Ethiopia	Kampuchea
Madagascar	Latin America
Mozambique	Cuba
Seychelles	Nicaragua

* These countries relied on Soviet Bloc or East European sources for over 90 percent of the military arms they acquired within the last three years.

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Figure 7
Trends in Soviet Naval Deployments
(Shipdays out of home waters)




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naval operations were launched in the Mediterranean in 1964; the Indian Ocean Squadron was formed in 1968; visits by task groups to the Caribbean began in 1969; in 1970 the West Africa patrol began operating; and in 1979 a regular Soviet naval presence was established in the South China Sea (figure 9).

Figure 8
Soviet Naval Deployment Patterns
(Shipdays out of home waters)



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Figure 9a
Typical Soviet Naval Operating Areas, 1965






Figure 9b
Typical Soviet Naval Operating Areas, 1975



Notes: Between 1968 and 1972 naval training expenditures at the 100 million and 200 million levels.

Figure 9c
Typical Soviet Naval Operating Areas, Mid-1980s



25. As the Soviet Navy's area of operations has expanded over the past two decades, there has been a corresponding increase in calls on foreign ports (figure 10). Over 500 Third World port calls are now made annually by Soviet naval ships, mainly to about 10 countries. Ports in four countries have become prominent in supporting expanding Soviet naval operations. Vietnam received over 250 Soviet port calls by Soviet naval vessels last year; Syria hosted over 120 visits; and Ethiopia and South Yemen each had about 80 Soviet port calls (see table 2). This access supports long-distance deployments, but it is not an operational necessity. Nevertheless, minor repairs and upkeep at convenient locations enable Soviet naval ships to deploy for longer periods without returning to distant home ports. Soviet ships at present have access to naval facilities in Yugoslavia, Syria, Tunisia, and Libya to support the Mediterranean Squadron. Soviet ships also maintain a continuous presence at ports in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Vietnam to support their forces in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The West Africa patrol is supported out of Angola, and Guinea provides some replenishment to Soviet ships in the South Atlantic. Soviet intelligence collectors off the east coast of the United States replenish in Cuba, as do the naval task groups periodically deployed to the Caribbean (figure 11).


Table 2
Most Frequent Soviet Navy Port Calls, 1983*

Southeast Asia	
Vietnam	255
Mediterranean	
Syria	122
Tunisia	19
Yugoslavia	14
Libya	14
West Africa	
Angola	36
Guinea	30
Indian Ocean	
Ethiopia	84
South Yemen	74
Mozambique	21

* Data include visits by combatants, AGIs, and naval subordinated merchant ships and hydrographic ships, but do not include visits by Soviet space event support ships.

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
Figure 10
Soviet Naval Visits



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Figure 11 Overseas Facilities and Anchorage Used by Soviet Naval Forces



26. The extent of Soviet access to these countries varies in each case, but it includes several of the following characteristics:

- Frequent or overlapping visits so that at least some Soviet ships or aircraft are present on a nearly continuous basis.
- Freedom from normal entry requirements or priority in entry procedures.
- Reserved access to ship berths and aircraft ramp space. In some cases, Soviet logistic ships are stationed in port, reducing the demand for berth space in congested harbors. Floating drydocks that support the Soviet Navy are located in Ethiopia and Vietnam. Others in Angola and Mozambique are used to support the Soviet fishing fleet.
- Fresh water and provisions.
- Workspace, housing, and recreational facilities for Soviet personnel.
- Storage for parts and fuel.
- Use of repair facilities.
- Soviet control of access to facilities that they use.

27. The way in which the Soviet Navy functions in distant areas minimizes the requirement for access to facilities ashore. Unlike the US Navy, the Soviet Navy relies primarily on afloat logistic support for warships operating in distant waters, using naval auxiliaries—tankers, cargo ships, tenders, and repair ships—or merchant ships under naval contract. Therefore, the Soviet Navy deploys far more auxiliaries outside home waters than do Western navies. Frequently the auxiliaries outnumber Soviet warships deployed by 2:1. Fuel for Soviet ships is rarely purchased from foreign countries, even in the Middle East. The Soviets conserve hard currency by transporting fuel from distant Soviet ports. Maintenance of warships outside of home waters is minimal compared with that of other navies and is performed by Soviet repair ships.

28. Nonetheless, the Navy's operational flexibility can benefit from the simplicity of performing logistic support in friendly ports, from having a convenient stopover for crew rest or rotation and mail call, and from access to a local source of fresh water and perishable provisions. By performing pretransit and posttransit upkeep or mid-deployment maintenance at such facilities, the Soviets can extend the deployment period of individual units.

29. Where no access to port facilities exists, the Soviet ships often use sheltered anchorages in international waters for logistic purposes (figure 11). The Soviet Navy may install a mooring buoy, station auxiliaries there, and bring in other naval ships for replenishment and upkeep.

A number of such anchorages have been established in the Indian Ocean and in the Mediterranean. On occasion, Soviet ships use anchorages in preference to local facilities. For example, despite their access in South Yemen, Soviet ships sometimes refuel or undergo repair prior to entering Aden.

30. In part, the Soviet Navy can function with the combination of afloat support and limited shore-based support because its activity level is lower than that of Western navies. The Soviet Navy emphasizes maintenance and in-port or in-area training rather than intensive at-sea operations. Even Soviet naval units deployed out of area spend about two-thirds of their time at anchor or in port, thus conserving fuel and limiting wear and tear. To the Soviet mind, it apparently is more important to be ready to go to sea than to be at sea. Under this system, operational experience and some degree of crew proficiency are sacrificed to achieve high material availability. Limited Soviet access to overseas ports may contribute to the minimal routine activity level of Soviet ships, but this probably is not the decisive factor. On balance, then, access to local port facilities has been an important convenience but has not been a necessity.


31. The most dramatic change in Soviet forces deployed out of area has been the increased use of naval aviation. The deployment of naval aircraft has increased about eightfold since 1979 (figures 12 and 13). They routinely fly out of Cuba, Vietnam, South Yemen, and Ethiopia, and occasionally out of Angola, Syria, and Libya. These flights conduct intelligence, ocean reconnaissance, and ASW search missions. In addition, a modest attack capability has been established with the deployment of five Badger strike aircraft and four combat support aircraft to Vietnam.

32. Another significant addition to Soviet foreign deployments is a series of Soviet intelligence facilities that have been established in Cuba, Vietnam, and South Yemen. The Lourdes facility in Cuba, with about 2,000 personnel, represents the largest Soviet SIGINT collection facility outside of the Soviet Union. [

] This facility not only provides intelligence support to the Soviet military forces in Cuba but also serves as the principal intelligence collection facility in the Western Hemisphere. The second-largest Soviet-occupied SIGINT facility is at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. [

] The Soviet facility in Aden monitors US and allied forces in the Indian Ocean. In addition, Soviet SIGINT equipment, and in some cases Soviet SIGINT advisers, have been provided to Madagascar, Mozambique, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea,

Figure 12
Soviet Naval Aircraft Deployments*
(Aircraftdays deployed)



* The large decrease in deployment days abroad in the early 1970s reflects the loss of access to airfields in Egypt. Naval air deployments to Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Vietnam began later in the decade.

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
Libya, Syria, and Nicaragua. We know that in some cases cooperative arrangements exist under which intelligence collected in these countries is shared with the USSR.

33. Additional access has included the establishment of Soviet communications facilities to support their naval forces and their military advisory groups. Currently, Soviet military communications facilities are located in Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Syria. In some cases, these facilities are colocated with Soviet SIGINT sites.

34. Soviet military airlift aircraft also have been more frequently utilized in the last five years to provide support to Soviet allies. VTA AN-12/Cub contingents are currently deployed to Angola, Vietnam, Madagascar, and Mozambique, providing needed airlift support for the interior of these countries. Soviet airlift deployments have been particularly important in support of military operations in Angola during 1975-76 and again in 1983-84, and during the early stages of Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, 1979-81.

35. In addition, the Soviet national airline, Aeroflot, has expanded its international service to 94 countries (figure 14). Aeroflot aircraft, personnel, and facilities have supported military airlift operations, delivered military supplies, and collected intelligence. Soviet officials have deliberately misrepresented Soviet military airlift


Figure 13
Naval Aircraft Deployment Patterns



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Figure 14
Aeroflot's 1983 International Route Network



transports as unscheduled Aeroflot flights. Also, Soviet military transport aircraft often are disguised as civil aircraft. For example, all AN-22s and IL-76s assigned to operational VTA units bear Aeroflot markings

Soviet Allies: What Are Their Main Contributions to the USSR's Global Reach?

36. Soviet military involvement abroad is supplemented by the efforts of its Warsaw Pact allies and Cuba. These countries are dependent on the Soviet Union, but appear to pursue their own goals in the Third World. Nevertheless, their assistance complements that of the Soviet Union and, whether by intention or not, furthers Soviet goals by providing additional resources and skills. Moreover, their efforts tend to mask the full extent of Soviet involvement.

37. For the USSR, intervention by an ally offers several advantages over the direct use of Soviet personnel or resources: there is less risk of military confrontation between the superpowers; the ally may have greater understanding of a particular region; and the ally's presence sometimes is more acceptable than a Soviet presence. Finally, Soviet prestige is not fully engaged, making it easier for Moscow to extract itself should its ally ultimately fail.

38. Specific roles vary, but the Soviets themselves typically occupy senior advisory positions in key party, government, and military bodies. This facilitates Soviet penetration of the main power bases in many Third World countries. East Germans frequently work with police and internal security units, and about 1,400 serve as military advisers overseas. Other East Europeans are involved to a lesser extent in a variety of roles. Over 40,000 Cuban military personnel are involved abroad. Another 21,000 Cuban civilian advisers, technicians, and construction workers assist in agricultural, media, and rural development programs.

39. Cuba has been the most active Soviet ally. Castro has some 30,000 combat troops in Angola and 3,000 to 4,000 troops in Ethiopia. In addition, there are 5,000 to 6,000 Cuban military advisers in Ethiopia and another 2,500 to 3,500 Cuban military personnel in Nicaragua. Castro's willingness to send large numbers of troops into combat situations has been most useful to Moscow. In addition, Castro has been willing to provide an indirect conduit for Soviet military deliveries. In Grenada, for example, military weapons being funneled through Cuba pointed toward a major military expansion to support a force of some 6,300 personnel. Secret Soviet military assistance agreements with Grenada were valued at some \$25 million over five years. Cuban forces can also fill a gap in situations where local forces may be too weak to

stand alone and direct Soviet intervention is not desirable or is limited, such as in Angola and Ethiopia.

40. In addition to Cuba and the Warsaw Pact countries, other countries that share similar world views and are highly dependent on Soviet aid may cooperate with the USSR in the Third World. Vietnam fits these criteria; however, we do not expect to see Vietnam involved outside of Southeast Asia. North Korea's growing involvement in the Third World is notable. More than 450 North Korean military advisers are operating abroad, but to date there is little evidence of direct coordination between Moscow and P'yongyang.

41. Soviet allies probably are of greater value to Moscow in peacetime competition, or in regional crises, than they would be during a general war with the United States. Cuban troops, in particular, serve as convenient substitutes for Soviet military personnel, often without risking the kind of Western response that might occur with more direct Soviet involvement. In a general war, however, Soviet allies abroad would probably be left to fend for themselves as their lines of communication to the USSR and Cuba would probably be severed

Regional Military Implications

42. The Soviet Union has established a military presence in most major regions of the world. Soviet naval

forces now maintain a continuous presence in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic off the coast of West Africa, and the South China Sea. In addition, Soviet forces use facilities for a variety of purposes in about a dozen countries beyond the periphery of the USSR (table 3).

43. This combination of access and military presence is useful to the Soviet Union for political and military purposes during peacetime and in regional crises. Whether or not the Soviets would, or could, use these forces and facilities in a military confrontation with the United States hinges on a number of factors, including the military utility of forces operating in distant areas, the threat to specific forces, the need for these forces elsewhere, and the likelihood that they could be successfully redeployed. Moreover, the ability to conduct such operations would require at least the tacit support of Third World leaders whose countries host Soviet military forces. Each leader would have to calculate the consequences of siding with the Soviet Union against the United States and opening his country to military retaliation.

44. Nevertheless, continued Soviet probing for additional military access can be expected for a variety of purposes. The Middle East-Persian Gulf-Southwest Asia region is the top-priority target, principally because this Third World region is so near to the USSR and is more critical than any other to the East-West balance of power.

Table 3
Soviet Military Involvement Abroad *

	Naval Access	Naval Aviation	Military Communications	SIGINT Facilities	Airlift Detachment	Air Defense Units	Combat Brigade
Vietnam	X	X	X	X	X		
Cuba	X	X	X	X			X
Ethiopia	X	X	X				
So. Yemen	X	X	X	X			
Syria	X	X	X			X	
Angola	X	X	X		X		
Guinea	X						
Yugoslavia	X						
Tunisia	X						
Libya	X	X					
Madagascar					X		
Mozambique					X		

* See annexes A and B for more detailed discussions of the nature and extent of Soviet military access.

~~This table is Secret.~~

Southeast Asia is next in importance. It provides a useful base for exerting pressure on China and Japan and has the potential to threaten sea lanes to the Indian Ocean. Latin American and southern African countries have intrinsic political and economic importance to the USSR, and also are of interest to Moscow in terms of their potential to distract and disperse US political, economic, and military resources.

Mediterranean and Middle East

45. The Middle East-Mediterranean region is the only area beyond the Soviet borders where Soviet combat forces have been directly involved in conflict.³ But the history of Soviet military involvement in the Middle East-Mediterranean region has been frustrating for Moscow. Soviet naval forces were deployed on a continuous basis beginning in 1964 (see box). Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Soviet forces gained access to Egyptian ports and airfields. From 1968 to 1972, Soviet reconnaissance, ASW, and strike aircraft flew Mediterranean maritime patrol missions from Egyptian airfields. Soviet use of all air and most naval facilities in Egypt was terminated in 1972, however, resulting in the loss of their investment in building the port of Mersa Matruh. In 1976, Soviet use of Alexandria for naval combatants, particularly submarines, also was terminated by Egypt. These air and naval facilities have never been adequately replaced. In addition to such losses of military access, Soviet allies repeatedly have been defeated on the battlefield, despite massive aid programs. Indeed, Syria blamed its defeat at the hands of Israel in 1982 on the poor performance of Soviet weapons.

46. Soviet military involvement is most extensive in Syria and presently numbers 5,000 to 6,000 personnel. The Soviets have operated missile sites while the Syrians control the country's other air defense resources, including the early warning and command and control systems, the SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 missile sites, and fighter aircraft. The Soviets train and advise the Syrians on these systems, advise other combat units, and instruct pilots. We believe that the Soviet military advisory personnel assigned throughout the Syrian air defense system can become involved to a greater extent in the control aspect if there is a need. The Soviet role in Syrian air defense goes back to 1973 when a Soviet SA-6 brigade was deployed toward the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Following that

³ Moscow has been willing to risk becoming involved in conflict elsewhere, however. For example, Soviet forces in Cuba were potentially at risk in 1962. Also, Soviet VTA detachments have supported host country combat operations in Vietnam, Angola, and Ethiopia.

The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron

The Mediterranean Squadron has a much more important conventional wartime role than do other routinely forward deployed Soviet naval forces. The normal composition of the Squadron is about 45 ships including nine attack submarines, nine surface combatants, and about 30 other ships and auxiliaries. Surface units are deployed mainly from the Black Sea Fleet and submarines usually come from the Northern Fleet. The Squadron's peacetime roles are to monitor Western naval forces, maintain a Soviet military presence in the area, patrol choke points, provide support to clients, and be positioned for possible combat operations. Squadron units spend 60 to 70 percent of their time at anchor. Continuous Soviet naval deployments to the Mediterranean began in 1964 and, after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the force became formally designated as a squadron (the Fifth Eskadra).

During regional conflicts, particularly Arab-Israeli wars, the Squadron has always been reinforced, but it has not played a combat role:

- In the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, the Squadron rose to 96 ships, including 29 major surface combatants and 23 submarines. During this conflict, it provided escort for Soviet merchant ships carrying military supplies to Syrian and Egyptian ports, and maintained surveillance of the US Sixth Fleet.
- Soviet naval activities in response to the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon were much more low keyed. The Squadron was augmented with only five combatants and one submarine, even though the Sixth Fleet was increased in size. Again, Soviet units monitored US naval units, and other Soviet major surface units paid prolonged port visits to Tartus, Syria, in part to deter Israeli attacks.

conflict, the SA-6 brigade was withdrawn and the Soviet personnel adopted an advisory role. But, during the June 1982 war, Soviet advisers took a direct role in air defense operations. Subsequently, more advanced air defense missile systems were deployed with Soviet personnel, and an integrated air defense network was established under Soviet tutelage. There are recent indications that the turnover of the SA-5 system may have begun, although the Syrians probably will not have full control until at least early 1985. Nevertheless, the Soviets probably will maintain a strong advisory presence at the complexes. Soviet naval units off the Syrian coast are capable of providing general targeting data to air defense units in Syria. Despite a considerable military dependency, President Assad retains

substantial ties with Western countries, especially France, and moderate Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia. These factors, coupled with a decreased threat of imminent Israeli attack, could eventually result in more reductions of the Soviet military presence in Syria, but we believe that a substantial Soviet presence is likely to remain there for at least the next five years, barring a major change in Syrian policy.

47. In addition to the extensive Soviet involvement in Syrian air defenses, Soviet advisers are found in most, if not all, combat and combat support units down to battalion levels, as well as at base workshops and all of the military schools. Soviet advisers also serve with Syrian Air Force squadrons at radar sites and airbases.

48. Facilities in Syria are used mainly to support Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean. A Soviet storage barge is continuously stationed at the port of Tartus and provides upkeep for Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean. Also, Soviet auxiliaries shuttle water, spare parts, and supplies from Tartus to Soviet combatants in the Mediterranean. Since 1981, Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft have deployed to Tiyas airfield four times, three of which have been since September 1983. The first three deployments were concurrent with Soviet Mediterranean Squadron exercises. We expect Soviet use of naval and air facilities in Syria to continue at about the current level.

49. As the largest and most important Arab state, Egypt has been and will continue to be a major target of Soviet interest. Many Egyptian officials, however, remember the problems associated with the previous extensive Soviet access to Egyptian facilities from 1968 to 1976. Thus, barring a sudden political change in Cairo, there is little prospect for renewed Soviet access to Egyptian military facilities.

50. Soviet access in Libya includes Soviet IL-38 naval reconnaissance aircraft that have periodically deployed to Umm Aitqah airfield. In addition, Soviet naval combatants show the flag at Tripoli and are replenished and repaired at Tobruk, using Soviet support ships.

51. The construction of a Soviet-designed military airfield at Al Jufra has raised concern about its future use. Soviet strike aircraft, if deployed to Libya, could pose a major threat to naval operations in the Mediterranean. However, we expect Al Jufra to be used mainly by Libyan TU-22 bombers and transport aircraft. While Soviet aircraft could use the airfield, it is

less conveniently located than Umm Aitqah for maritime patrols. Also overflight restrictions by neighboring states could impede VTA staging from Al Jufra directly into the African subcontinent.

52. Arms sales have been the main feature of the Soviet-Libyan relationship. In the past four years, Qadhafi has signed arms agreements with Moscow for over \$9 billion. The Soviet military presence has increased since 1977 and now totals nearly 1,500 personnel, although there are a number of indications since last spring that the number has declined, primarily because of Libya's financial difficulties. Both Moscow and Tripoli have been wary in the past of too close an entanglement. In recent years, however, Qadhafi has suggested in threats aimed at the United States that he might permit further Soviet access to bases in Libya. Although the Soviets presumably would like more extensive access to Libyan port facilities and perhaps contingency use of Libyan airbases, we believe on balance that Qadhafi will resist such arrangements unless he believes his regime is seriously threatened by the United States or a regional enemy.

53. Algeria has slowly, but steadily, distanced itself from the USSR over the last five years. All three of the Algerian armed services have been equipped and trained by the Soviets, and, until 1983, the Soviet Navy conducted repair and replenishment activities in Annaba harbor. They used Soviet support ships because they were not allowed to use Algerian shore facilities. In 1983, high-level pressure from Moscow, including visits by then Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov, backfired when even use of Annaba harbor was denied. Since that time, Soviet access has been limited to occasional port calls. Algiers has been diversifying its sources of arms, purchasing equipment from a number of Western countries over the past few years, and we anticipate that the nearly 800-man Soviet advisory force will decrease accordingly. Furthermore, the Soviet Navy is unlikely to gain access to naval facilities in Algeria over the next five years.

54. In Yugoslavia, Tivat has been used regularly since 1974 for repair and refurbishment of Mediterranean-deployed Soviet submarines and submarine tenders. Moscow has, on occasion, pressed for wider access, but the Yugoslavs have not been willing to expand the support of Soviet naval ships to other ports. Nonetheless, Soviet probing for facilities will continue and, even at current levels of use, Tivat provides important support to the Mediterranean Squadron.

55. In Tunisia, Soviet naval vessels have been making several calls each year since 1974. These port calls include visits to Tunis, Safaquis, and Susah to show the flag, for provisions, and for crew rest. In 1977 Soviet naval ships and submarines began to use the Menzel Bourgiba shipyard in Bizerte for repairs. But in 1979, the Tunisian Government banned repair of all foreign submarines. In mid-1984, however, this ban was lifted and a Soviet submarine entered the yard for repairs. The use of Tunisian yards complements Soviet ship repair at Tartus, Syria. Therefore, Moscow will attempt to maintain access to Tunisia, especially for submarine repair.

56. Moscow also is interested in Malta. The Soviet Union leases 200,000 tons of POL storage space at a NATO-built terminal in Malta, but Malta's policy on naval calls and the terms of the 1980 neutrality agreement with Italy limit direct Soviet military access, so the fuel is used by the Soviet fishing and merchant fleets. While Moscow could abuse the lease agreement and use merchant tankers to dispense fuel from Malta to Soviet naval ships, the risks would outweigh the gains in all but the most extreme circumstances.

57. *Soviet Military Responses in the Middle East-Mediterranean Region.* Almost all crises in the region have involved at least one US ally. Therefore, in Middle East and Mediterranean area conflicts, the Soviet leadership is quite sensitive to the potential for escalation to a direct confrontation with the United States. Consequently, Soviet military roles at sea and ashore have involved resupply and defense of embattled allies, while still maintaining the capability to impede US military activities. Nonetheless, the Soviet naval presence affects US options and could serve as a deterrent in certain situations in the region. In future regional crises, the Soviet naval forces probably would be augmented and naval reconnaissance aircraft could be deployed to Syria and Libya, if they were not already there.

58. But Soviet options in the Mediterranean are severely limited. Aside from the US Sixth Fleet, several other countries in the region have sufficient air and/or naval forces and, by themselves, probably could severely damage Soviet naval surface units. These countries include Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Egypt, and perhaps Algeria, as well as British forces deployed to the region. In addition, direct Soviet airlifts could encounter overflight problems with Turkey or Iran (see annex C for a description of previous Soviet airlift routes). Also, Moscow

would have difficulty protecting air and sea lines of communications.

59. To date, the most successful Soviet intervention in a Middle East crisis was in 1970 when Soviet air defense forces deployed to Egypt and raised the cost of Israeli deep penetration air raids to such an extent that a cease-fire was agreed to in August 1970.

60. Should war between Syria and Israel break out again, some Soviet military response is likely. This response would probably not include any direct intervention to support Syrian forces in Lebanon because Moscow has made it clear that they are not obligated to protect the Syrian presence there. Should another major air confrontation occur, Soviet pilots already in Syria might man Syrian aircraft. But it would probably require the deployment of at least a division of fighters—some 120 aircraft—to have a significant impact upon airpower in the region. Moscow has never practiced such deployments and would require one or two months to deploy, train, and develop a support base for effective air operations in Syria.

61. During a war, it would be difficult to deploy and sustain a large Soviet combat force in Syria. For example, deployment of a substantial intervention force of an army or army corps (60,000 to 65,000 men) probably would require about two months, during which time the outcome of any conflict might have already been decided. However, up to a division of airborne troops and a token force of naval infantry could be deployed relatively rapidly, but they are neither equipped nor trained to conduct independent operations against the modern combined-arms formations that the Israelis field. Furthermore, the airborne forces would have to fly in without substantial air cover.

62. An Israeli ground attack into Syria could impel a Soviet intervention. Any Soviet deployment would be designed to deter Israeli advances deep into Syria, rather than to become actively involved in military operations. But Moscow would have great difficulty in protecting its lines of communication. Even without opposition, it would require about three to four days to send a Soviet airborne regiment (about 1,500 men equipped with armored personnel carriers) and at least a week to send an entire airborne division (some 7,000 men) to the area. The initial combat battalions, however, could be in Syria within two days. A naval infantry force of 1,600 to 3,000 men from the Black Sea Fleet could be sealifted to Syria in about five days after embarkation; however, preparation of the unit, assembly of transport, and loading could take a few addi-

tional days. One or two detachments (100 to 200 men) of the brigade, usually afloat with the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, could be landed almost immediately if the squadron were positioned off the coast of Syria.

63. In peacetime, Soviet naval air support for the Mediterranean Squadron is limited to occasional deployments of reconnaissance and ASW aircraft to Libya and Syria. This posture is well below the levels deployed to Egypt in the 1971-72 time frame. Nonetheless, Soviet assets in Syria provide a measure of combat flexibility if Syria sided with the USSR. In any major East-West conflict:

- Soviet pilots serving as advisers in Syria could be used to fly reconnaissance or combat missions. Aircraft manned by Soviet pilots could reconnoiter the eastern Mediterranean and conduct air strikes against Sixth Fleet units or NATO air assets at Incirlik airbase in southern Turkey, near the Syrian border.
- The Soviets would probably also attempt to use Syrian airfields to deploy reconnaissance and, possibly, strike aircraft.
- Soviet missile air defenses in Syria could be used to inhibit US operations off the coasts of Syria and Lebanon (figure 15). While the SA-5s could cover Incirlik only at the higher altitudes, they are transportable and could be moved farther north. While not sufficient to deter all US operations, the Soviet SAM threat would be a major consideration in air operations around Turkey, Lebanon, and Israel.
- Ports in Syria and Libya, and possibly in Yugoslavia, could potentially be used as a "safehaven" for any Soviet unit which would survive initial hostilities, but none of the ports in these countries could provide Soviet ships with more than a limited capability to repair damage sustained in battle.

For its part, Syria would probably attempt to deny Soviet use of Syrian airfields for strikes against NATO assets and would attempt to limit Soviet combat forces to defensive missions only.

64. If the Soviets believed a crisis were leading to a possible NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, they might augment the Mediterranean Squadron with additional surface combatants and submarines. The nature of any augmentation before hostilities would depend on several factors. These could include: the size of the

Mediterranean Squadron when tensions began to build; the nature of the Western naval presence, particularly the number of US carrier battle groups in the area; and the degree of emphasis placed by the Soviets on a covert transition to a war footing. Depending on the circumstances, there might be either little or no augmentation of the squadron or as many as a dozen surface combatants and a few submarines might be deployed. Under any circumstances, however, the amount of augmentation during the period of tension probably would be constrained by the need to retain forces in the Black Sea to provide support for operations against the Turkish straits and for possible subsequent Mediterranean operations. During the pre-hostilities phase, the squadron would increase its surveillance of US naval units and pass targeting information to higher naval headquarters.

65. In a general war with NATO, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron would attempt to destroy quickly high-value targets at sea. At the onset of hostilities, ships and submarines, in conjunction with strike aircraft flying from the USSR, would attempt to:


- Destroy Western nuclear delivery assets, including aircraft carriers, cruise missile platforms, and ballistic missile submarines.
- Destroy amphibious assault ships and other naval forces that threaten both the Warsaw Pact ground campaign in the area and the southwestern USSR.

Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and East Africa

66. The region around the Arabian Peninsula has been an important target for Soviet foreign military involvement. The primary Soviet goals in the area are to minimize or eliminate the US military presence and to promote regimes responsive to Soviet interests. A long-range Soviet goal is to enhance Soviet influence in the Persian Gulf area to the end that Moscow could exercise some degree of control over Persian Gulf oil with resulting leverage over Western Europe and Japan. Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean began in 1968 at a time when British forces were being pulled back from east of Suez. Ashore, the USSR has concentrated on Somalia, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. After being expelled from Somalia, Soviet support forces were moved in 1978 to Ethiopia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen). Both of these locations provide important support to the Indian Ocean Squadron. (See box.)

67. Shore facilities in the region enable the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron to conduct more extended

Figure 15
Syrian SA-5 Air Defense System



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The Indian Ocean Squadron

Since 1968, the size and composition of Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean have fluctuated widely. These fluctuations are driven by the number and types of US naval forces deployed to the region as well as by Soviet interests there. When US naval forces increase or decrease, the Soviets tend to follow suit. When Soviet interests are at stake, Soviet naval forces have been augmented and have aided Moscow's clients. For example, during the 1977-78 Ogaden war, the squadron was increased to 32 ships and provided direct support to Ethiopia.

For the past year or so, the squadron generally has consisted of about 25 ships including two to four principal surface combatants; up to two attack submarines, one of which may carry cruise missiles; one or two amphibious ships; a mine warfare ship; an intelligence collector; three or four research ships; and about 14 auxiliaries. The squadron suffers from the same general defects of other Soviet naval forces deployed to distant areas: lack of adequate air defense, limited logistic support, and a poor capability for antisubmarine warfare. In the past, the squadron has at times been augmented by V-class attack submarines and cruise missile submarines that pose a greater threat to US naval forces.

During normal peacetime operations, the squadron monitors Western naval forces in the Indian Ocean, patrols the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb, provides support to Soviet friends, and serves to maintain a Soviet presence in the area.

deployments and moderately reduce reliance on auxiliaries by allowing repairs, substantial replenishment, and crew rest. The region's airfields enable periodic monitoring and surveillance of maritime regions surrounding the Arabian Peninsula in support of the squadron. Communications sites support command and control for the squadron, and SIGINT sites provide intelligence on targets of local interest.

68. In Ethiopia, Moscow has gained access to Dahlak Island in the Red Sea and has established a small naval air reconnaissance presence at Johannes IV Airfield near Asmera.⁴ These facilities are austere, but provide refueling, repair, and staging bases for Soviet naval and air units. Dahlak has become the primary maintenance and repair facility for the ships of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron. A floating drydock, a Soviet depot ship, an auxiliary tanker, a water and fuel

⁴ Two Soviet IL-38 May aircraft were destroyed by insurgents at Johannes IV in May 1984 and have yet to be replaced.

barge, and a stores ship are stationed there, and a small naval infantry contingent provides local security. Unlike at the former Soviet naval base at Berbera, Somalia, there has been little investment in fixed facilities at Dahlak. Instead, the Soviets rely on their auxiliary ships.

69. Moscow has repeatedly sought to upgrade facilities in Ethiopia and substantially increase the number of personnel on Dahlak Island. A small increase in Soviet personnel on Dahlak has occurred, but Ethiopian officials have refused to allow Soviet upgrading of the ports of Aseb and Mits'iwa. A variety of irritants plague the relationship between Addis Ababa and Moscow. These include Ethiopia's continued failure to repay its debt to the USSR, currently estimated at some \$2.75 billion; Moscow's efforts to increase its influence in the new Ethiopian Communist Party; and Ethiopian resentment about Soviet efforts to dictate military strategy against the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies. Nevertheless, both partners continue to receive benefits from the relationship, and we do not anticipate any major changes in it over the next few years.

70. In South Yemen, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron uses the port of Aden, but the harbor apparently is considered too open, congested, and insecure for dockside use by Soviet combatants. Consequently, nearby anchorages are often used. Also, Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft make use of facilities in South Yemen. IL-38 May aircraft conduct reconnaissance missions from Al Anad. In addition, the Soviet naval communications facility that was originally installed at Berbera was moved to Aden in 1978. A SIGINT site that allows continuous monitoring of communications throughout the Middle East-Indian Ocean region was established in 1981 at Salah ad Din. The Soviet high-frequency direction-finding site in South Yemen, coupled with the forward-deployed aircraft, forms part of the Soviet ocean surveillance system. Command and control communications for the Indian Ocean Squadron also are served by Soviet facilities in South Yemen.

71. We believe that, over the next five years or so, Ethiopia and South Yemen will continue to be pressed to expand facilities for Soviet use. As a result, substantial improvements in communications and SIGINT facilities could be achieved with continued use of transportable Soviet equipment. Also, pressure to upgrade the capacity of Dahlak and Aden to provide more effective support to the Indian Ocean Squadron can be expected. Soviet-sponsored projects to lengthen

the runways at Aden could result in Bear reconnaissance or ASW aircraft deployments. Such a move would bring nearly the entire Indian Ocean within the range of Soviet surveillance aircraft. Eventually, Soviet strike aircraft could be deployed to the region, but this would encounter opposition from host countries and neighbors, as well as inviting possible US counterdeployments.

72. Despite already considerable use of facilities in South Yemen, North Yemen also is a target for Soviet penetration. Moscow will continue to offer military aid to North Yemen as an inducement to improve relations. A Friendship and Cooperation Trade was signed in October 1984. Currently, there are 500 to 750 Soviet military advisers in South Yemen and another 500 in North Yemen. Each of these small countries has received over \$1 billion in Soviet arms.

73. Several Soviet naval ships have called at Mauritius every year since the country became independent in 1968—except for 1983, when only one naval subordinated research ship made a port visit. Visiting ships take on water and provisions, but not fuel. Mauritian permission for official Soviet port calls has varied according to the state of Soviet-Mauritian relations. In 1984, the Mauritians began negotiating with the Soviets for delivery of a merchant ship, and, subsequently, Soviet naval vessels were allowed port visits. But, other than port visits and provisioning, any greater Soviet military access to Mauritius is unlikely to be allowed. The Mauritian Government has stated that it will allow periodic deployments of US maritime patrol aircraft to the islands—a proposition which the Soviets must view as a political setback after long efforts to gain influence in Mauritius.

74. Soviet attempts to gain additional military access along the Indian Ocean littoral have focused on Mozambique, Seychelles, and Madagascar. Mozambique has a leftist government, depends upon Soviet military aid to ward off a growing insurgency, uses two Soviet-piloted VTA transports, and currently has about 800 Soviet advisers. Although Maputo permits numerous Soviet naval port calls, the Mozambicans have turned aside Soviet requests for increased access to air and naval facilities. Bilateral relations have cooled since March 1984 when Maputo signed an agreement with South Africa to limit support for resistance groups in both countries. The USSR has criticized the move as well as Maputo's expanded ties to the West. Mozambique remains dependent upon Soviet military assistance. Nevertheless, a breakdown of the agreement with South Africa could again increase the threat to the Machel regime, leading to

new requests for increased Soviet and possibly Cuban military assistance.

75. Moscow's influence in Seychelles has increased since 1978, when Soviet military assistance was first provided. The small Soviet Embassy in Victoria has expanded to about 80 personnel as the USSR has become the primary source of arms. In addition, Soviet landing ships with naval infantry have made port visits at times when President Rene feared a coup. For Moscow, Seychelles serves as a stopover point for VTA and Aeroflot flights en route to southern Africa. Soviet technicians also have restored some 5,000-ton-capacity oil storage tanks and may have filled them. If so, this fuel could be used by Soviet ships in an emergency.

76. We believe that there is an even chance that Soviet naval reconnaissance and ASW aircraft will gain use of facilities in Seychelles. Any decision by Rene to allow such access will necessarily take into account economic assistance from Western nations, especially France, and the importance to the islands' economy of Western tourism. Should the Soviets gain access to Seychelles, this would improve Soviet capabilities to monitor US activities in the Indian Ocean and on Diego Garcia. We also expect somewhat more frequent visits by Soviet naval combatants, but not a continuous Soviet surface naval presence in the region.

77. In Madagascar, Moscow would like to use the former French naval base at Diego Suarez. However, use of this facility has been denied to all foreign warships. Also, the Soviet military advisory presence was reduced in 1983, largely because Madagascar has failed to repay its heavy debt to the USSR for arms purchases. Nevertheless, some Soviet advisers have been assisting in establishing a small number of SIGINT sites, probably to monitor regional military communications. Overall, the prospects are poor for Soviet military access to ports and airfields in Madagascar.

78. *Soviet Military Responses in the Indian Ocean Region.* In the past, Soviet naval forces have been variously used in the region to implement Moscow's foreign policy. For example, in 1973 Moscow sealifted troops and equipment from Aden to support the Dhofar rebellion in Oman. Also, Soviet naval forces have been dispatched in shows of force to bolster local regimes: South Yemen in 1978, and on numerous occasions in Seychelles from 1979 on.

79. But when faced with the possibility of a confrontation with Western, particularly US, naval forces,

the Soviet response has been ambiguous, as was shown by the USSR's action during the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 and 1972. The number of Soviet cruise missile submarines and surface ships was increased from two to six at that time. But these units arrived on the scene after the crisis was over and were not a factor militarily. Nonetheless, the Indian leadership probably was told that Soviet naval forces deterred a US intervention on the side of Pakistan.

80. The level of Soviet naval operations in future conflicts would depend on the strength of US and Western forces in the region and Moscow's evaluation of whether there was a significant risk that a particular conflict could escalate.

81. In a general war with the West, the Indian Ocean Squadron probably would not be augmented. The Soviets believe that such a war would be preceded by a period of tension or crisis. If a crisis looked as if it could lead to a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, and the level of deployed Western major naval forces was low or was being reduced, Moscow might also reduce its naval presence in the Indian Ocean. As long as the United States retained one or more carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean, we believe that the squadron would not be reduced. The primary mission of the squadron would be to attack Western naval forces, particularly carriers and submarine-launched cruise missile platforms. A secondary role could be to disrupt some shipping, divert US military resources, and delay Western reinforcement. Soviet naval operations would be enhanced in the northwest Indian Ocean by tracking data provided by the Soviet reconnaissance and ASW aircraft stationed in the region. These aircraft could also be augmented, but this is unlikely because of higher priority Soviet requirements on other fronts.

82. Soviet military involvement in a regional conflict, aside from supplying a client, would hinge on a variety of factors. These include Soviet political stakes in the situation, the attitude of other states in the region, and the nature of US involvement. Also, the operational environment for the Indian Ocean Squadron and other Soviet forces in the region has changed over the last several years. Many of these changes have been unfavorable for Moscow. The situation in Iran has led to greater cooperation among the Gulf states, and the United States has expanded its naval presence and broadened military relations with states in the region. In addition, Moscow may face a dilemma in regional conflicts. For example, in the Iran-Iraq war, Moscow and its allies have provided arms to both belligerents. This creates friction, and, despite large

quantities of Soviet arms, Iraq has not moved significantly closer to the Soviet Union.

83. If escalation of the Iran-Iraq war resulted in a buildup of Western military forces in support of Iraq, Moscow would publicly caution the West against attacks and then would attempt to take credit for preventing attacks on Iranian territory. A significant increase in Western airpower in the region probably would lead to air and air defense units in the southern USSR being placed on alert. Limited Western airstrikes against Iranian airfields or ports probably would result in increased Soviet air and air defense activity and the alert of Soviet airborne and ground forces in the military districts bordering Iran. Before the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron could seriously challenge Western naval forces in the area, threaten US sea lines of communication, or make a meaningful contribution to any Soviet land campaign in the Southern TVD, it would require substantial augmentation. However, any Soviet incentive to intervene with its naval forces against the West would also be restrained by their concern that a confrontation could lead to broader hostilities with the West, and that such hostilities could escalate beyond the region. Nonetheless, if the West deployed additional aircraft carriers to the region, Soviet cruise missile units might also be augmented.

84. In such a crisis, Soviet naval air reconnaissance patrols are likely to be significantly increased and could be augmented by more IL-38 or even TU-95 Bear D patrol planes stationed in Ethiopia and South Yemen. While only a few Bear D's would be available, they would enhance the over-the-horizon tracking and targeting capabilities of the Indian Ocean Squadron. A deployment of Bear D's has both benefits and risks: it bolsters Soviet military credibility and the backing of Soviet-oriented regimes, but it also carries the risk of spurring other Arab states to encourage a buildup of US and other Western forces on their territory.

South China Sea and Southeast Asia

85. Since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border conflict, there has been a significant buildup of Soviet naval forces in the South China Sea, and Hanoi has permitted the establishment of an important Soviet air and naval logistic and operations base in Vietnam. Although Soviet forces have used facilities at Ho Chi Minh City, Da Nang, and Haiphong, the focus of their activities has been at Cam Ranh Bay where they have established support facilities for submarines, surface ships, naval aircraft, communications, and SIGINT collection. From this base in Vietnam, Soviet forces

South China Sea Squadron

The number of Soviet Navy submarines and surface ships deployed to Cam Ranh and the South China Sea has grown continuously since 1979, especially during the last two years. In 1983, Soviet force levels in this area averaged about four submarines, two to three surface combatants, and 14 to 15 auxiliaries. The submarine forces have included nuclear-powered cruise missile, nuclear-powered torpedo attack, and diesel-powered torpedo attack types. In mid-1984, two guided-missile patrol boats and two ASW frigates were deployed to Cam Ranh, improving capabilities for coastal defense.

can monitor US and Chinese military forces in the region and support Soviet deployments to the Indian Ocean. The offensive potential of Soviet forces complicates US military planning in the region.

86. Soviet naval aviation capabilities also have been substantially improved. A composite squadron of eight long-range Bear aircraft is now stationed at Cam Ranh, twice the number deployed in 1980. This squadron includes four Bear D reconnaissance aircraft and four Bear F ASW aircraft. Also, in late 1983 a squadron-sized unit of TU-16 Badgers deployed to Cam Ranh. This second composite squadron currently includes five Badger missile strike aircraft, two tankers, one reconnaissance variant, and one electronic warfare support variant. Some air-to-surface missiles and loading equipment have been identified in Vietnam. The arrival of the Badgers not only expanded Soviet reconnaissance capabilities, but also constituted the first deployment of Soviet bombers with air-to-surface missiles outside the Warsaw Pact since 1970. These bombers add a new dimension to Soviet offensive capabilities in the region. (See figure 16.)

87. The Soviet Navy base at Cam Ranh now supports the largest concentration of Soviet ships routinely deployed at any facility outside the Soviet Union. This typically totals 22 to 30 ships. Rather than constructing extensive facilities ashore, the Soviet Navy generally relies on a group of depot and support ships to provide replenishment and maintenance. Since 1980, the number of support ships and craft has grown and now includes a repair ship, a stores barge, fuel barges, oceangoing tugs, oilers, a submarine tender, an ammunition lighter, a salvage ship, and a deperming ship.*

* Deperming reduces the magnetic signature of ships, thus reducing their chances of being detected.

Construction at Cam Ranh Bay continues. Since 1979, two piers have been refurbished and four floating piers have been installed. An athletic recreation area has been built adjacent to the piers, and a nearby compound is used for Soviet naval administration and limited billeting. Construction at the airfield includes a munitions storage area, a POL facility, a missile storage area, expansion of the motor pool area, and barracks that could accommodate 500 to 1,500 personnel, depending on how the space is distributed between storage and billeting.

88. [


] a SIGINT site was established that could locate and track US forces in the South China Sea, Philippine Sea, and eastern Indian Ocean. Subsequently, two additional SIGINT sites have been established in Vietnam.

89. A small naval infantry security force also has been stationed at Cam Ranh Bay, and a naval infantry obstacle course has been constructed there for training. The growing Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay suggests that the Soviet naval infantry security force there may be expanded.

90. Despite disagreements, the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance is unlikely to rupture any time soon. Vietnam is heavily dependent on the USSR for military and economic aid and for backing against China. Since 1980, Soviet military and economic aid to Vietnam has never totaled less than \$1.3 billion per year. However, there are some drawbacks for Moscow to the burgeoning Soviet-Vietnamese military relationship. It represents a substantial economic burden as well as a significant obstacle in Sino-Soviet relations. It also undermines Soviet efforts to improve relations with those Southeast Asian nations that are threatened by Vietnam's increased military capability. On the other hand, most Southeast Asian nations, particularly Indonesia, consider China to be the long-term threat. Although concerned about a growing Soviet military presence in the region, these countries rely on the United States to counter the Soviet threat.

91. Soviet use of Cam Ranh Bay will increase. More naval units will be deployed to Vietnam, and an operational naval squadron has probably been formed. Construction indicates that a composite regiment of 30 to 40 aircraft probably will be stationed there. A base of this size and scope would require additional air defenses; therefore, deployment of a Soviet fighter squadron is likely. More advanced training, including

Figure 16
Soviet Naval Air Coverage From Vietnam



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the use of bombing ranges, is probable. We also may see increased stockpiling of supplies, fuel, ammunition, and weapons to support Soviet forces in Vietnam. In addition, Soviet air operations may use additional airfields such as Phan Rang. An increased Soviet naval presence also may include additional submarine deployments and naval repair facilities. (S NF WN)

92. Beyond Vietnam, the prospects for additional Soviet access in the East Asia-Pacific region are poor. Soviet naval ships call on Kampuchea from time to time, but Khmer ports are poorly developed and not well located so there is no serious Soviet interest in stationing forces in the country. Soviet probing for diplomatic and economic access in the South Pacific

islands is likely to continue, but these efforts are not likely to be successful, and we do not anticipate Soviet military access elsewhere in the region.

93. *Soviet Military Responses in the Southeast Asia Region.* In a limited conflict involving only regional powers such as China and Vietnam, Soviet forces could tilt the balance. From Cam Ranh, Soviet aircraft and naval forces could threaten the southern coastal areas of China and deter or defend against hostile Chinese naval operations in the South China Sea—including an assault against the Spratley Islands.

94. In a general war, Soviet forces in Vietnam could not prevent US military operations in the area. Soviet forces in Vietnam are not well defended. However, they could provide monitoring and targeting information to other Soviet forces. Badger aircraft could attempt limited strikes against US forces in the region at the outset of a war. Soviet submarines and surface combatants also could attack US forces and shipping. These combined actions could disrupt important sea lanes, divert a significant portion of US and Western strike forces, and delay military actions elsewhere.

Caribbean and Central and South America

95. Cuba is the hub of Soviet involvement in the Western Hemisphere, and continued Soviet military use of facilities in Cuba seems virtually guaranteed, at least at current levels, in view of Castro's close relationship with the Soviet leadership and Havana's increasingly heavy debt to Moscow. Without Soviet economic aid and trade subsidies, Havana would be hard pressed to meet even basic consumption and investment needs. This economic support, amounting to over \$4 billion annually, is equivalent to over 30 percent of Cuba's real output and exceeds the amount Moscow supplies to all other Third World client states combined. Moreover, virtually all of Cuba's military equipment and supplies are provided by the Soviet Union.

96. In recent years, the Soviet focus in the region has been on upgrading Cuban military capabilities. Soviet military assistance to Cuba jumped from about \$95 million in 1977 to \$652 million by 1983. Since 1978, Cuba has received over 150 jet aircraft (including 45 MIG-23s), air defense command and control equipment, three diesel attack submarines, two frigates, four modern land-based ASW helicopters, 11 missile attack boats, nine Turya-class hydrofoil torpedo boats, and two amphibious landing craft, plus a wide variety of other weapons.

97. Both the level of Soviet military presence and the scope of Soviet activities in Cuba have steadily increased over the last two decades. Following the abortive placement of missiles and bombers in Cuba in 1962, a small Soviet Ground Force contingent was gradually expanded to brigade size. A Soviet signals intercept facility was established at Lourdes in the mid-1960s and has grown to become the largest and most important such facility outside the Soviet Union. Soviet naval task group visits began in 1969 and typically involve two principal surface combatants, an oiler, and, occasionally, a submarine, deployed to the Caribbean about once a year. The most recent deployment included for the first time a Moskva-class helicopter cruiser and an Udaloy-class ASW destroyer. Soviet naval aviation deployments to Cuba began in 1970. Such deployments now typically include a pair of Bear D's, and a pair of Bear F's, which generally remain for two to four weeks and conduct several missions per deployment. In 1983, a separate facility for supporting up to eight Bear aircraft was established at the Cuban Air Force airfield at San Antonio de los Banos. Altogether, 7,000 to 9,000 Soviet military personnel currently are in Cuba, including about 2,800 advisers. Direct communications with the Soviet General Staff are maintained using both satellites and long-haul, high-frequency communications.

98. Several types of military activities are conducted from Soviet facilities in Cuba, including SIGINT, airborne naval reconnaissance and ASW missions, and naval ship replenishment.]

] The SIGINT site probably will continue to grow in both size and importance.

99. Soviet Bear D reconnaissance and Bear F ASW aircraft deployed to Cuba periodically conduct maritime reconnaissance missions and collect intelligence. They also monitor US naval exercises, traffic from some US east coast naval bases, and US missile tests at

Cape Canaveral. In addition, they conduct training and collection missions against Trident SSBNs in local operating areas off King's Bay, Georgia. These Soviet aircraft can provide timely intelligence on US military movements from southern bases and ports. Soviet Bear deployments to Angola also have been staged through Cuba since the loss of air access rights to Guinea in 1977. We expect a gradual increase in the frequency and number of Soviet naval aircraft deployed to Cuba.

100. The Soviet brigade in Cuba serves mainly to provide a symbolic military presence in the absence of a firmer commitment to defend Cuba. It also provides local security for Soviet installations. The brigade does not assist in training Cuban forces, although it has conducted joint exercises on at least one occasion. We do not believe that the unit has any broader roles in the region. Construction activities indicate that the brigade is likely to receive additional equipment and probably will slightly increase in size to over 3,000 troops in the near future.

101. A major Soviet interest in Cuba is to protect the Castro regime. Therefore, bold changes in the Soviet military posture in Cuba could be counterproductive. They would significantly alter neither the balance of strategic forces nor the regional conventional balance. Furthermore, upgrading Cuban forces provides many of the same benefits that might be derived from staging more capable Soviet forces in Cuba, without risking a strong US response. It also sustains Castro's dependence upon the USSR, assuring his continued cooperation in providing military support to pro-Soviet regimes.

102. Soviet peacetime naval deployments to Cuba will probably increase in scope and frequency. Moscow may test US thresholds of acceptance by more frequent submarine port calls and extended submarine deployments to the Caribbean. Minor logistic problems resulting from increased deployments of Soviet cruise and ballistic missile submarines off the US coasts could be eased by calls in Cuban ports. But as long as the US response to early indications of any future probing remains as firm as it was in 1970, we believe that Moscow will continue to be dissuaded from a policy of supporting missile submarines in Cuban ports.

103. We do not anticipate the introduction of any new offensive Soviet manned weapons into Cuba that would increase the threat to US forces. In particular, emplacement of ballistic missiles is highly unlikely. Instead, we expect that the Soviets will continue to provide Cuba with more modern defensive weapon

systems, including coastal naval units, fighters, and SAMs. Unless the United States makes strong representations, Moscow may well provide Cuba with SA-5 long-range SAMs. In any event, as Cuban defensive capabilities increase, the cost of a US strike against the island will increase correspondingly.⁶

104. There is an additional view specific to the obviously very confrontational Soviet option to place SS-20s in Cuba. Although it is currently unlikely that the Soviets would place SS-20s in Cuba in the near future, the possibility still exists and, because of the great danger which it poses, warrants continuing consideration. There is still a rationale for such deployments, although they are not likely until after the US election in 1984. The Soviet leadership, while aware of the potentially great risks involved in deploying SS-20s to Cuba, is also cognizant of, and might be tempted by, the significant political (and to a lesser extent military) gains that would be achieved if the United States were forced to back down in a second Cuban missile crisis. Furthermore, given the significantly different US-Soviet military balance today compared with 1962, Soviet leaders might anticipate that another Cuban missile crisis, in conjunction with renewed Soviet declarations about a desire to negotiate, would prompt West European leaders to pressure the United States to withdraw the Pershing II missiles and would split US opinion rather than generate a strong consensus in favor of US military action. [

105. Apart from any role in a US-Soviet conflict, Cuban capabilities for regional power projection are improving. Currently, Cuban airlift and sealift could—if unopposed—move and logistically support several thousand troops in Central America. These capabilities will improve with the introduction of IL-76 heavy-lift transport aircraft, and will represent an increasing threat of intervention and intimidation to other countries in the region. Although major deployments would be unlikely if Castro anticipates significant US military opposition, Cuban force improvements by themselves may force the United States and other countries in the region to increase further their own military capabilities.

106. Elsewhere in Latin America, we expect to see long-term Soviet efforts to support revolutions and,

⁶ See NIE 85/4-84, *The Cuban Military Buildup: Options for Castro*.

⁷ This view is held by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army.

where they take hold, attempt to prevent their reversal—El Salvador and Nicaragua being examples of these two approaches. Direct involvement of Soviet combat forces in the region is highly unlikely. However, Soviet military assistance, as well as political and economic activities, can provide important contributions. Diplomatic and commercial activities are important aspects of Soviet efforts to support revolutionaries. The Soviet diplomatic presence in Latin America has increased by about 1,000 personnel over the past decade, while over 5,000 Soviet commercial representatives have been added. At a minimum, this growing Soviet presence improves intelligence collection opportunities and potential for subversion.

107. Moscow's cautious approach toward Nicaragua has been most apparent in the way the Soviets have handled their arms relationship with the Sandinistas. From the first secret visit of Soviet generals to Managua—just one month after the Sandinista takeover—Moscow has sought to obscure and play down its military dealings with Nicaragua.

108. Soviet military equipment deliveries to Nicaragua have been under way since 1981, although this equipment frequently is transported by third parties. The initial delivery of T-54/55 tanks, for example, was made by Algerian ships. Since then, Soviet tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other equipment have been delivered by Bulgarian merchant ships. MI-8 helicopters, small arms, and military-related equipment, however, are usually transported by Soviet vessels.

109. While taking steps to minimize and obscure their direct involvement, the Soviets nonetheless seek to provide the Sandinistas with enough military assistance to sustain and consolidate their power. Some 100 Soviet military and security advisers continue to work with the Sandinista security service and the general staff. Moscow presumably views such assistance as essential in the struggle against the anti-Sandinista insurgents and as a way of further consolidating the leftist regime in Managua against potential political opponents.

110. The completion of the large airfield at Punta Hueta, Nicaragua, will give the Soviets additional options for military access. The airbase will be the largest in the region and capable of accommodating any aircraft in the Soviet inventory, including heavy transports and reconnaissance aircraft. Should the Sandinista regime provide access, the Soviets would be

able to deploy Bear D reconnaissance and Bear F ASW aircraft to Nicaragua within the next year. However, such basing would only add areas west of Mexico and Central America to those regions already accessible to Soviet maritime patrol aircraft. We do not believe that this limited military advantage is sufficient for Moscow to risk the US response inherent in this step.

111. The increasing militarization of Central America will be among the consequences of Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan activities in support of revolutionaries. Governments will be compelled to spend more on security and this will compound already difficult economic and social problems, furthering Soviet goals of fostering instability in the region.

112. Moscow will attempt to improve relations with other Latin American governments through arms sales, but the prospects for closer military ties are not good. Since the US rescue operation in Grenada, Suriname and other countries have become wary of developing close ties with the USSR. Also, the loss of Grenada represents a notable reversal for Moscow.

113. Currently, Peru is the only South American country that has bought Soviet arms, and continued generous Soviet arms offers will probably result in additional purchases, particularly for the Army. Limitations on foreign military purchases placed on Peru by the International Monetary Fund have made it difficult for Peru to buy Western arms, even though the military leadership in Peru, for the most part, prefers to diversify arms sources and buy from the United States. Even with additional arms purchases from the USSR, the military relationship with Moscow is unlikely to grow to the point that Moscow will gain military access to Peru during the period of this Estimate.

114. In Argentina, Soviet assistance in developing two fishing ports could have future military significance. Soviet designs reportedly call for depths that exceed those normally required for fishing vessels. These ports are to be used extensively by Soviet fishing vessels. We believe any Soviet military use of these facilities is extremely remote, however, since it would entail a major change in Argentine policy toward the Soviet Union.

115. *Soviet Military Responses in the Latin American Region.* The use of Cuba by Soviet forces offers Moscow significant indications and warning, air and surface tracking, and some targeting information in peacetime. In time of crisis, this information would be even more vital, but Castro might restrict the more visible forms of support to Soviet ships and aircraft.

Table 4
Selected Items in the Cuban Military Inventory *

Aircraft Type		Naval Units	
Fighters	152	Submarines ^b	3
MIG-17	4	Foxtrot class	3
MIG-21 (C/E/F)	20 ^b	Guided-missile patrol boats	22
MIG-21 (J/L/N)	94	Komar class	4
MIG-23 (B)	24	Osa-I class	5
MIG-23 (F)	10 ^c	Osa-II class	13
Helicopters	56	Frigates	2
MI-8	25	Koni class	2
MI-14	4	Amphibious landing ships	2
MI-17	15	Polnocny class	2
MI-24	12	Other ships	1
Transports (Tactical)	74 ^d	Pelym class ADG	1
AN-24/26/30	30 ^e		
Cubana/Aero-Caribbean Airlines	49		
IL-62	9 ^f		
TU-154	5		
Bristol 318	2		
IL-18	4		
IL-14	13 ^g		
YAK-40	16		

* As of 1 September 1984.

^b An additional 20 early-model MIG-21s appear to be in open storage.

^c In addition, there are 11 UMIC-23 trainers.

^d Cuba² also has three DC-3s and several dozen small propeller-driven planes.

^e These fly with either Air Force or Cuban national airline markings.

^f Two additional IL-62s and crews are on lease from the USSR.

^g Only two or three of the IL-14s are operational.

^h Does not include one W-class submarine that is nonoperational and serves as battery barge.

~~This table is Secret~~

Furthermore, in a crisis we would expect neither the deployment of Soviet naval combatants to Cuba nor the reinforcement of forces already deployed there. In a general war, it is doubtful that Soviet activities more visible than passive SIGINT support could continue under the threat of US military force. Soviet Ground Forces already deployed to Cuba would be difficult to withdraw in a war, and have little potential for combat.

116. Aside from the Soviet forces in Cuba, the Cuban forces themselves have become an increasingly important factor in the region.⁸ Table 4 lists major items in the current Cuban air and naval inventory.

⁸ See NIE 85/4-84, *The Cuban Military Buildup: Options for Castro*, for a more complete discussion of Cuban military capabilities and likely roles in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

Cuban modernization raises the costs of US military responses. It could require diversion of considerable air and naval resources to protect US reinforcements to Europe. Any resulting delays could be critical in Europe.

117. In the event of a major NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, Moscow is likely to try to persuade Cuba to interdict US sea lanes in the western Atlantic and the Caribbean. While Cuban forces may engage in low-level harassment and sabotage, including covert efforts against the Panama Canal, they are unlikely to undertake overt major strikes against the United States or its forces unless provoked. In Castro's view, overt action against the United States would probably result in national suicide in a major US-Soviet conflict. Therefore, Cuba is more likely to maintain silence or proclaim neutrality.

South Atlantic and West Africa

118. Although Sub-Saharan Africa is of limited economic and strategic value to the USSR, it does provide some payoffs: acquisition of commodities, gaining influence with regional states at the expense of the West and China; and, especially, gaining access to naval and air facilities.

119. Soviet forces first became involved in West Africa in response to crises. Naval units responded to Ghana's seizure of Soviet fishing vessels in 1969 and reacted to frequent requests for support by Guinea's President Sekou Toure following raids by exiles in 1970. Since 1970 there has been a continuous Soviet naval presence in the West African waters of the south Atlantic. (See box.) Moscow usually maintains a five- to seven-ship West Africa patrol in the south Atlantic. In addition, Bear D naval reconnaissance aircraft occasionally fly from Luanda into patrol areas off the African coast that range as far north as Gabon, as far west as Ascension, and as far south as the southern tip of South Africa. Soviet VTA aircraft also stop over in Guinea en route to Angola. Altogether, Soviet military involvement in the region serves several purposes including: protecting the Soviet fishing fleet; monitoring shipping passing around the Cape of Good Hope; providing support for the continuous flow of Soviet military assistance to Angola; demonstrating support for the Angolan regime; facilitating the transit of Soviet forces in a crisis; and supporting Soviet efforts to establish pro-Soviet regimes in the region.

120. Support to Angola has been the top Soviet priority in this region since 1975, when the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) came to power with extensive Soviet and Cuban military assistance. Angola is important to Moscow for several reasons. The Kremlin would like to install leftist governments throughout southern Africa, and Moscow values its access to Angolan military facilities.

121. Moscow has established a considerable degree of influence over the Government of Angola, but Soviet economic and counterinsurgency aid and the support of some 30,000 Cuban troops in country have been insufficient to maintain internal security in the face of an active insurgency. Thus, Soviet access to Angolan facilities may be in jeopardy. Both Cuba and the Soviet Union have had to increase their military assistance to Angola. Within the last year Cuba sent 2,000 troops, and several thousand additional Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia may redeploy to Angola. Soviet assistance also has been upgraded in the last few years. For example, five SU-22 Fitter aircraft

West Africa Patrol

The West Africa patrol dates to 1970 and usually includes one or two surface combatants, one attack submarine, one amphibious unit, one mine-warfare ship, one or two research ships, and several auxiliaries. The minesweeper mainly patrols the fishing areas off northwest Africa. The patrol provides demonstrations of support for friendly regimes and conducts ceremonial port calls that, on occasion, include transiting Soviet ships. The port of Luanda provides the primary source of logistic support for the Soviet Navy's West Africa patrol, and Luanda's airfield serves as a staging base for Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft that periodically patrol the South Atlantic Ocean

were provided in August 1984. Altogether, about 1,200 Soviet military advisers are posted to Angola.

122. The complex situation in Angola could eventually impel either a withdrawal or stepped-up commitments on the part of Cuba and the USSR. Currently there are no signs of a withdrawal. If the security situation deteriorates further, Moscow probably would stop short of sending its own ground combat troops to Angola during the next year, but there is a possibility it would send additional advisers. The chances of additional Soviet intervention—possibly including pilots and air defense crews—would increase if, in the long run, Cuban forces are unable to stabilize the military situation. Overall, Moscow realizes that a major test of its ability to champion Third World Marxist nations has taken shape in southern Africa.*

123. The death of President Sekou Toure in 1984 raises the possibility of a further reduction of Soviet access to Guinea. Soviet support for Toure in 1970 included a small naval presence that eventually became the West Africa patrol. By 1973 periodic naval reconnaissance sorties were flown from Conakry, but these were terminated by Toure in 1977. Moscow is likely to retain landing rights for VTA flights en route to Angola and replenishment of Soviet naval ships at Conakry. But Soviet reconnaissance flights from Guinea are unlikely to be reestablished under the new regime.

124. In Cape Verde, the Soviet Navy has shown continued interest in acquiring access to port facilities and airfields, including requests to build a complete Soviet naval base. Soviet military access to Cape Verde, however, is unlikely because of the strong ties of the islands to the West.

* See SNIE 71-84, *Angola: Near-Term Prospects*, 24 January 1984.

125. Moscow also has made overtures to Benin, Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, and Mali in attempts to develop additional access in the area. Of these, Ghana holds the most promise, but to date, none of the Soviet efforts have met with success.

Soviet Capabilities: How Do New Developments Affect Soviet Global Military Reach?

126. Soviet force modernization has resulted in improved capabilities for distant military operations. However, the priority of the European Theater in Soviet military planning limits the forces available for deployments abroad, and the preponderance of Soviet forces are trained and configured for a war with NATO in Europe. Nevertheless, the newer, large surface combatants such as the nuclear-powered Kirov-class cruiser and the Kiev-class vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) carriers enhance Soviet capability to concentrate military power beyond the periphery of the USSR. Also, since 1965 the Soviet Navy has built a capability for amphibious assault lift to distant areas and improvements have been made in Soviet airlift capabilities. Until the mid-1960s there were no heavy lift transport aircraft in the Soviet inventory. Since then, the IL-76 has been introduced, and the airlift capacity has nearly doubled. Two hospital ships have been acquired by the Soviet Navy and are used to support naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Such hospital ships could provide valuable support during a regional conflict. Additional developments will further improve Soviet capabilities for distant military operations. Some of these developments are discussed below.

Aerial Refueling

127. Soviet aerial refueling capabilities are improving, and include developmental IL-76 Candid tankers and Soviet tactical fighter aircraft configured for air-to-air refueling (figure 17). With appropriate staging rights, this capability could facilitate distant deployment of fighter squadrons. It could lead to an improvement in Soviet capabilities to provide air cover for distant military operations, such as in the Mediterranean. Aerial refueling has not been developed primarily for power projection purposes, and refueling will provide only a marginal improvement in Soviet capabilities for distant deployments over the next five to 10 years.

128. Other early applications of aerial refueling probably will include IL-76 Mainstay airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft. Military airlift aircraft also may be adapted for aerial refueling in order to extend their reach. Both the AWACS and tanker applications could be involved in future Soviet distant military operations. We estimate that IL-76 tankers will be operational in 1984 or 1985. They would be an important addition to the current Soviet tanker force, which consists of 50 Air Force Bison and Badger bombers plus 70 Navy Badger bombers that were converted to provide aerial refueling to the aging Bear and Badger bomber force.¹⁴

Merchant Fleet



129. The plans and activities of the over 1,700-ship Soviet merchant fleet, Morflot, are closely coordinated to ensure the rapid transfer of merchant shipping for military requirements. Soviet merchant ships in some cases are built to military standards, incorporate sophisticated electronic equipment, and participate in military exercises. In 1983 a merchant ship was modified for VTOL operations, [

]The merchant ship has since been reconverted, but if the Soviets were to take up the program, there are over 40 Soviet RO-RO ships that could be similarly modified. However, there are currently insufficient VTOL aircraft in the Soviet inventory to provide more than a token effort for such a program.

130. The Central Military Transportation Directorate (VOSO) coordinates the military use of merchant shipping. A computerized management system is used to maintain control and location data on all Soviet merchant ships worldwide. Every Soviet shipping agency has a naval headquarters contingent to plan and coordinate rapid conversions of merchant ships for military use. For example, during the 1973 Middle East war, 126 Soviet merchant ships were rapidly mobilized and delivered over 400,000 tons of military cargo to Libya, Syria, and Egypt in about 35 days. Similar, though much smaller, emergency sealifts delivered military supplies to Angola in 1975 and to Ethiopia in 1977. Over 440 Soviet merchant vessels have delivered military cargo to Third World ports, some of which are unimproved. Over 620 Soviet ships

¹⁴ Refueling probes were removed from Backfire bombers under a 1979 agreement with the United States to limit the Intercontinental potential of the Backfire, but they could be reinstalled in about six hours per aircraft.

Figure 17
Candid Tanker



have onboard cargo-handling capabilities for offloading cargo as heavy as 40-ton Soviet medium tanks. In addition, 19 passenger ships have been used to rotate Soviet and Cuban forces abroad. Soviet merchant ships under naval subordination also provide over 40 percent of the logistic support to deployed Soviet naval ships. [


Airlift

131. The number of aircraft in the Soviet Military Transport Aviation's inventory has stabilized at about 600. However, the range and payload capabilities of the VTA fleet have improved significantly over the last several years. These improvements have been mainly as a result of the introduction of IL-76 Candid

transport aircraft to replace the aging AN-12 Cub (figure 19). The IL-76 is similar to the US C-141 and is becoming the backbone of the VTA. It can carry twice the payload weight to about five times the range of an AN-12, which is similar to the US C-130. Over 50 AN-22 Cock aircraft also are included in the VTA inventory. The AN-22 currently is the only VTA aircraft that can carry tanks or tracked missile launchers. In addition, we anticipate the new Condor transport will enter production in 1987 or 1988. It is expected to have characteristics similar to the US C-5A. VTA capabilities for personnel transport are augmented as needed with Aeroflot aircraft.

132. During the past two decades, the Soviet capability to rapidly initiate large-scale, long-duration airlift operations throughout the Middle East and Africa has been demonstrated on several occasions. This was

Figure 19
Soviet Military Transport Aviation
Maximum Payload Capacity



-Secret-

particularly evident in the operations mounted by VTA in support of the Arab states in the 1967 and 1973 Middle East wars. In both instances, the operations were performed almost exclusively by VTA transport aircraft, involved round trips of up to 6,000 nautical miles, and were launched on short notice. Major Soviet airlifts to the Third World are summarized in annex C

133. Nonetheless, problems will continue to limit Soviet airlifts. Soviet air access to most of the Third World involves overflight of Yugoslavia, Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan. Thus, denial of overflight could present major problems for the USSR. Soviet aircraft have been forced to adopt longer, less efficient routes when overflight clearances were denied. In particular, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have sometimes been reluctant to grant clearances for Soviet military transports. In some instances, such as the emergency airlift to Vietnam in 1979, Soviet aircraft disregarded overflight instructions from local authorities. Subsequently, several Southwest Asian states refused to grant clearances for unscheduled Soviet flights to Vietnam. This forced

the rerouting of several flights to Vietnam through the Soviet Far East to the Pacific Ocean, adding nearly 1,400 nm to the route from Moscow. In addition, VTA AN-12s due to be rotated back to the USSR were forced to remain in Vietnam well beyond their intended tours because of overflight clearance restrictions. In general, however, most states essential for overflight want to remain on correct terms with Moscow and would be reluctant to deny overflights or inspect suspicious cargo in transit.

134. [

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135. Airfield size and limitations pose additional problems for Soviet airlifts to the Third World. Fuel-handling capabilities often are the major limiting factor in conducting airlifts. Most of the airfields currently used by Soviet military aircraft have insufficient fuel storage to support a major military airlift.¹¹ Also, because of the large size of transport aircraft, they quickly exhaust parking space, limiting the number of aircraft that can be on the ground at any one time. Low aircrew-to-aircraft ratios in VTA units are another limitation, along with the inability of many VTA aircraft to carry outsized cargo such as tanks and SAM launchers. But many of these problems will be reduced with expected improvements in VTA.

136. Currently, without overflight restrictions and with adequate refueling en route, the VTA theoretically could airlift the combat and combat support elements of one Soviet airborne division to Syria in a week, to Aden within 10 days, and to Mozambique within 20 days in a single, unopposed lift. The capability for surge delivery of an airborne division decreases dramatically beyond 2,000 nm because of the range-payload limits of the VTA force. Thus, it is important

¹¹ For example, during the 1973 US airlift to Israel, fuel shortages became critical at five airfields. At Lajes Airfield in the Azores, over 2,500 metric tons of fuel were used daily during the peak period of the airlift, even though the largest number of aircraft arriving in Israel on any one day was 28. To deliver 1 ton of material to Israel required 5 tons of fuel.

for the VTA force to have refueling locations available every 2,000 to 3,000 nm for long-range operations.

Soviet Naval Infantry

137. Over the past four years, the Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) has been reorganized and provided with more sophisticated SAM systems, additional tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. As a result, the firepower available at the brigade level has increased by over 50 percent. There also has been a growth of about 500 troops in each SNI brigade; however, the Soviet Navy still lacks adequate assault lift. SNI capabilities also have improved with the introduction of two Ivan Rogov-class large amphibious ships with complements including five helicopters and two large air-cushion vehicles. The construction of these ships proceeded slowly and ended because of design problems after the second unit was launched in 1982. The SNI is expected to expand from between 16,000 and 18,000 men to about 20,000 men over the next five years.¹⁴ We believe that the anticipated construction of amphibious assault ships still will not provide adequate lift for the SNI. In some exercises, however, the Soviets have used, in addition to assault lift ships, modern merchant ships to carry SNI troops. Soviet amphibious ships with SNI aboard are routinely deployed to the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the South Atlantic off West Africa, and Vietnam. SNI forces have participated in joint landing exercises—with South Yemen in 1980, Syria in 1981, Vietnam and possibly Ethiopia in 1984. Future SNI deployments are likely to continue to be small, about 100 to 200 men on board amphibious ships, although occasionally an Ivan Rogov-class ship deploys with about 500 naval infantry. There are shore-based SNI detachments at Dahlak Island, Ethiopia, and Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, for local security. The detachment in Vietnam may be expanded in the near future.

Airborne Forces

138. Soviet airborne forces currently total at least 50,000 troops and are organized into eight divisions (seven ready divisions and one training division). One entire ready division from Vitebsk and the majority of units subordinate to another division, headquartered at Fergana, are deployed to Afghanistan. Soviet airborne divisions are directly under the operational control of the Soviet General Staff and thus readily available for a variety of missions. The primary mission of Soviet airborne forces is to conduct operations in enemy rear

¹⁴ This compares to about 194,000 US Marines and 7,400 British Royal Marines.

areas. Significant improvements in organic firepower, mobility, and air transportability of these forces over the last several years have enhanced their capability to conduct their primary mission and to be used in a power projection role. These upgrades, however, are outpacing the capability of VTA to move these heavier airborne divisions. Airlift support for either the paratroop or air landing of Soviet airborne troops and their equipment is provided by VTA. About 600 VTA aircraft sorties are required to transport one entire airborne division or the combat elements of six BMD-equipped regiments.

139. Soviet airborne forces could have important potential for distant military operations against limited opposition when a military response is required on short notice. Soviet airborne forces were called upon during the invasion of Hungary in 1956, of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and of Afghanistan in 1979. They have been alerted during various crises in the Middle East, and emigres have reported that the 98th Guards Airborne Division has a contingency mission there. Airborne forces could be part of a future rapid deployment force that one Soviet source has reported is under consideration in Moscow. Such forces most likely would be used to support a beleaguered client or to establish a Soviet ground combat force presence in a crisis area before the West can respond, thus raising the stakes for Western intervention.

140. It is not likely, however, that Soviet airborne and naval infantry forces would conduct major independent operations against modern combined-arms formations outside the context of a general war. Their equipment, training, and doctrine generally focus on their use as part of a larger combined-arms operation. Furthermore, Soviet expectations that airborne units will operate in conjunction with other forces suggest that independent airborne operations into noncontiguous areas are highly unlikely if serious resistance is possible, unless such forces are sent to deter outside intervention.

Special-Purpose Forces

141. The USSR maintains several types of specially trained, organized, and equipped special-purpose forces that could contribute to Soviet power projection capabilities. The Soviet special-purpose forces are either component elements of the intelligence and security services or special military units operating under their control, and include: MVD Internal Troops of special designation; KGB, Department 8, assassination and sabotage teams; selected airborne troops under operational control of the KGB; and GRU

(Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff) Special-Purpose Troops (Spetsnaz). The bulk of the special-purpose forces is composed of about 15,000 GRU troops. Some Spetsnaz troops are organized into brigades of 500 to 1,000 men assigned to front and army levels. Other Spetsnaz brigades are found in most military districts and groups of forces and in each of the four Soviet fleets. The main missions of these troops are intelligence collection and direct attacks against selected targets in the enemy rear area. They also have been used to a limited extent in special operations and to provide unconventional warfare training to Third World insurgents and to some groups that conduct terrorist operations. Spetsnaz troops supported initial Soviet operations in Afghanistan and are still active there. Teams were deployed to Kabul six months before the actual Soviet invasion and prepared the way for the invasion by seizing Afghan communications centers, arresting key military officers, surrounding the palace, and killing many members of the Presidential Guard and President Amin's personal staff during the assassination of Amin by the KGB. It is unlikely, however, that Spetsnaz forces would be employed in the Third World in isolation without the commitment of a larger Soviet military force, except to provide training and technical assistance or to conduct highly specialized operations, such as rescuing hostages.

Tactical Air Support

142. Tactical air support for distant military operations has been a major Soviet shortcoming, but several developments will improve the situation. For example, Moscow has been exploring ways of providing ship-based air support. In a large naval exercise, Zapad-81, a Kiev-class carrier and a Moskva-class helicopter cruiser provided modest air support for the amphibious landing. In the 1990s, the 60,000- to 70,000-ton nuclear-powered aircraft carrier designed for conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) aircraft will offer improvements over the limitations of the Kiev-class carriers. For example, the 12 to 15 VTOL Forger aircraft on each Kiev-class carrier are neither all weather nor air refuelable, are subsonic, carry little ordnance, and seldom train in air-to-air combat tactics. The new class aircraft carrier is estimated to be capable of carrying from 50 to 60 high performance aircraft.¹⁴ Also, the introduction of the Helix B sea-borne assault helicopter will improve the Soviet Navy's capability to provide gunfire support. In addition, the introduction of aerial refueling for some tactical air-

¹⁴ This compares to about 85 aircraft on board US Kennedy-class carriers.

craft with longer ranges would marginally increase Soviet capabilities to provide land-based tactical air support.

Global Command and Control

143. Since the mid-1970s, Soviet military commanders have had available communications and information systems to control military operations on a global scale. Part of this system includes Soviet military communications facilities in support to MAGs and, in some cases, Soviet naval and ground forces, in Cuba, Vietnam, Syria, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Angola. A variety of developments over the next decade will significantly enhance the Soviet command and control network. AWACS capabilities have been improved with the introduction of the new IL-76 model which could be sent to crisis areas to bolster local air defenses, to demonstrate Soviet concern, and to augment existing long-range air reconnaissance efforts. Secure, reliable, and redundant global communications are increasingly available to Soviet units and military advisory groups through a series of sophisticated communications and data relay satellite networks. Airborne command posts can communicate with foreign-deployed Soviet forces. By about 1985, a geosynchronous global navigation system (GLONASS) will aid ships and aircraft in determining their locations to within about 30 meters anywhere in the world. Also by about 1985, a new geosynchronous weather satellite system will provide timely data for global forecasting. Over the next five to 10 years, improved photographic and SIGINT satellites plus near-real-time electro-optical imaging satellites will provide nearly global intelligence collection on a more timely basis. In addition, Soviet allies will increasingly benefit from Soviet space systems. Satellite communication ground stations, for example, have been provided to Afghanistan, Cuba, Vietnam, and Laos. Nicaragua and Iraq are expected to receive satellite ground stations in the next few years.

Military Significance of Soviet Forces and Facilities Abroad

144. We do not believe that Soviet forces abroad currently constitute a major part in Soviet general war military doctrine, which remains focused on the traditional mission of strategic defense of the homeland. Nevertheless, the steady increase in size, capability, range of operations, and scope of activity of Soviet forces abroad over the last 20 years provides global military capabilities Moscow did not previously possess and which must now be considered in any future

confrontation. However, Soviet forces routinely deployed abroad are now, and will remain for the period of this Estimate, too few and too weak to engage in distant power projection as defined in this Estimate.

145. Military programs and operational patterns that are intended mainly to support Soviet political goals in the Third World also have acquired a military significance that varies considerably from place to place. The significance also varies with changing conditions of peace, crisis, and war. In peacetime competition with the West, Soviet forces and facilities abroad generally:

- Provide intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance.
- Provide regime support to Soviet allies, including arms, advice, training, and demonstrations of force.
- Protect Soviet interests abroad, especially the large and wide-ranging fishing fleet.
- Conduct training against potential adversaries.
- Support military research and development.

146. In a crisis or regional conflict, perceived as unlikely to escalate to a direct US-Soviet confrontation, Soviet forces abroad could:

- Provide intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance.
- Protect rapid resupply and military equipment delivery operations.
- Rescue and evacuate personnel.
- Plan and direct military operations by foreign forces.
- Intervene with Soviet or allied military forces.

147. During a regional crisis, it may be difficult to detect the transition from military assistance and advisory roles to direct intervention by Soviet forces or their allies. Crises are often characterized by Soviet airlift and sealift to provide large quantities of military equipment. For example, in the 1973 Middle East war, over 400,000 tons of military supplies were provided by Soviet ships to Egypt, Syria, and Libya within about 35 days. At times, military deliveries have also been accompanied by increases in the Soviet advisory presence. [

148. In a military confrontation with the United States, Soviet forces currently deployed abroad could:

- Attack Western naval forces at the onset of hostilities.
- Provide targeting and intelligence support.
- Delay some reinforcements.
- Divert some US military resources from priority missions elsewhere.
- Disrupt some shipping.

However, we believe these efforts could not be long sustained.

149. In a crisis or military confrontation with the United States, we do not believe the Soviets would make any across-the-board decisions on withdrawals, augmentations, or the use of forces abroad. Rather, individual decisions would be made after consideration of the:

- Requirements for the forces elsewhere.
- Military utilities of operating forces from their prewar positions.
- Threats to the specific forces.
- Willingness of host countries to allow Soviet military operations or continued presence.
- Likelihood of being able successfully to pull back forces or deploy additional forces to new locations.

150. In any conflict involving the United States and the Soviet Union, Soviet forces deployed at long distances from the USSR would be most useful during the transition to war just prior to the opening of hostilities. Soviet intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities abroad, as long as they survived and were not blocked by the host countries, could provide critical information on US forces. In a war with the United States, Soviet forces deployed abroad are too few and too vulnerable to be militarily effective during prolonged combat operations, and, to avoid becoming involved in an East-West conflict, many host countries would seek to deny the Soviets use of their facilities.

151. We believe it is unlikely that Moscow would significantly reinforce its forces deployed abroad in the face of a major war with the West because of

higher priority missions close to home. It also would be difficult to sustain such forces because little Soviet military equipment is stockpiled abroad.

152. Although some Soviet forces abroad might be withdrawn in the face of a major war, most would probably remain. Soviet and Cuban ground troops in foreign countries would probably remain because of the difficulty of transporting them out of foreign installations and their usefulness in performing important intelligence functions. Some air or naval units probably are in place abroad to conduct combat operations at the onset of hostilities. Soviet submarines, surface ships, and aircraft will strike high-value naval targets, and may attack sea and air lines of communications, thus forcing the United States to use lengthier routes or to divert combat elements. Soviet forces could also perform diversionary functions, seeking to distract, delay, and degrade Western forces to the extent of their capabilities. Such efforts could absorb a disproportionately large share of US strike resources that otherwise could be directed against targets in the Warsaw Pact.

153. In a major war with the United States, Soviet responses would vary from region to region. In general, we would expect:

— *In the Mediterranean*, Soviet forces probably would be augmented with additional surface combatants and a few submarines.¹⁴ These forces, supported by aircraft in the region and from the USSR, would quickly attack high-value targets at sea. Soviet air defense in Syria could provide additional support.

— *In the Indian Ocean*, Soviet surface and submarine forces probably would not be augmented. IL-38 aircraft already in the region will continue to fly ASW missions. Bear Ds from the USSR could provide over-the-horizon targeting data to Soviet cruise missile submarines to attack any Western naval forces in the region. As a lower priority mission, some forces could attack sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and oil routes. If no US carrier task groups were present, the Soviet Navy might withdraw some naval forces.

¹⁴ The Director of Naval Intelligence believes that the nature of any augmentation in any crisis or military confrontation with the United States would depend on several factors, discussed in paragraphs 64 and 149. Accordingly, as stated in paragraph 64, there could be substantial, little, or no augmentation of the Squadron depending on the circumstances.

— *In the South China Sea*, Soviet forces could provide monitoring and targeting information, and Soviet submarines, surface combatants, and aircraft also could attack US forces, US bases in the Philippines, and Western shipping, but could not prevent US military operations in the area. Nevertheless, these actions could disrupt important sea lanes, divert some US and Western forces, and delay military actions elsewhere. If no US carrier task groups were present, the Soviet Navy might withdraw some naval forces.

— *In the Caribbean*, any Soviet naval surface task group near the area would be withdrawn to safer waters if possible. Bear aircraft already deployed to Cuba would continue to operate as long as possible. The SIGINT site and other intelligence collection facilities would continue functioning until neutralized. These sites, along with Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, could provide indications and warning information to Moscow plus tracking and targeting information.

— In all other instances, Soviet deployed naval forces, VTA contingents, and naval aircraft will probably remain in their prewar locations and carry out missions as long as the risks are assessed to be acceptable.

Future Outlook

Potential Soviet Gains and Losses

154. The list of Third World countries that allow some significant Soviet military involvement or access may change slightly in the next few years. The number of countries is not likely to grow significantly, however, and could even decline. Nonetheless, the Soviets still view the Third World as the Achilles' heel of the West, and will persevere in their efforts to enhance their power and influence there. The key instrument which Moscow uses to gain entree to the Third World will continue to be military aid. The USSR can offer a wide range of military equipment at attractive prices and provide quick delivery. These military assistance arrangements are often accompanied by Soviet advisers, technicians, and instructors. Continuing needs for spare parts and maintenance create additional military relationships. Factors which facilitate Soviet entree are:

— *Insecurity*. Soviet or Cuban military support provided to meet internal or external threats could evolve into Soviet access to air and naval

facilities. The more a country relies on the USSR and faces local threats, the greater will be the opportunity for Soviet military access.

— *Ambition.* Some regimes seek Soviet support for their own foreign ambitions, such as Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and Laos.

155. In addition to those countries where the USSR already enjoys significant military access, Seychelles may permit the Soviets more extensive military use of its facilities. Also, in West Africa there is potential for additional Soviet military access. Elsewhere, instability in the Third World could lead to other opportunities, but we cannot predict where with any certainty. A few new countries may see value in accepting Soviet military assistance, while others are likely to become dissatisfied with their relationships with the USSR because of the lack of economic aid, the age and sometimes poor quality of Soviet equipment, the costly maintenance arrangements, the unavailability of spare parts, or other reasons. In any event, military assistance does not necessarily translate into Soviet military access.

156. Most countries will continue to prefer not to allow the Soviets military access. They view a Soviet presence as a threat. Soviet officials often are distrusted and thought to be KGB or military intelligence (GRU) operatives engaged in espionage and subversion. Close association with the USSR could also jeopardize economic and military ties with the West. Similarly, Third World countries often consider any foreign military presence inconsistent with national independence, particularly when their borders are not threatened. Even the main attraction—Soviet arms—often is only an effective inducement because these arms are not available from preferred sources or are available from Moscow at significantly less cost.

157. It is by no means certain that all pro-Soviet regimes can maintain power in their own countries. If a Soviet client regime were to be overthrown by anti-Soviet insurgents, or reached a compromise with the internal opposition by ousting the Soviets, the consequences for Soviet prestige in the Third World would be adverse, but hard to assess at this stage. We believe that, among those countries already permitting extensive military access to the Soviets, setbacks are more likely to occur in Angola, Guinea, or Ethiopia.

The Base Case

158. Well into the 1990s, Soviet forces deployed beyond contiguous areas will continue to lack substantial offensive punch. Political and military leaders in

Moscow will continue to consider NATO the primary threat and prepare accordingly. Thus, out-of-area naval deployments will involve more capable units but remain modest, representing only about 15 percent of the Soviet Navy. A continuous Soviet naval presence will be maintained in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and off the coast of West Africa. Elsewhere, the Caribbean and the Philippine Sea are likely to have increased Soviet naval presence, although the presence may not be continuous. Some additional strike aircraft probably will be deployed to Vietnam and perhaps elsewhere. In particular, Moscow would like to improve military access in the Indian Ocean and littoral. Seychelles affords the best prospect for this. In the Mediterranean region, token visits by Soviet strike aircraft to Syria and Libya are possible, but neither routine nor sustained deployments are likely. In the Western Hemisphere, we do not anticipate the introduction of any new offensive Soviet-manned weapons into Cuba that would increase the threat to US forces.¹⁴

159. Although Soviet foreign deployments are unlikely to be significantly more threatening over the next decade, overall Soviet capabilities for distant military operations on behalf of a Soviet ally will improve substantially. VTA and Aeroflot capabilities to airlift cargo and troops long distances will grow significantly. Sealift by amphibious and merchant ships also is improving. The Soviet Navy's capability for distant, sustained operations will be improved with several new classes of principal surface combatants and submarines. Further improvements in naval air support will be realized with the introduction of a CTOL carrier and the Helix B seaborne assault helicopter. The introduction of an aerial refueling capability for Soviet fighters, fighter-bombers, transports, and AWACS aircraft also will add new potential for distant military operations.

160. Even with these improvements, however, direct Soviet military intervention in Third World conflicts probably will be restricted to situations where the risk of escalation to a war with the West is judged to be small and Soviet capabilities to perform higher priority strategic missions would not be seriously degraded. Because of the Soviet stakes in the Middle East and the proximity of the region to the USSR, Moscow would consider military intervention there even when

¹⁴The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that, although it is currently unlikely that the Soviets would place SS-20s in Cuba in the near future, the possibility still exists and, because of the great danger it poses, warrants continuing consideration. For elaboration of this view see paragraph 104, page 38.

the risks were somewhat higher. In most cases, Soviet military intervention would take the form of air defense units or other types of units to bolster local defense. In any event, the Soviet Navy will continue to provide support to its allies in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, and off the coast of West Africa. Such support could be in the form of a show of force air defense, radar early warning, or even "naval interposition." We believe it is highly unlikely, however, that Soviet naval intervention forces would be deployed to the Western Hemisphere in a crisis.

Alternative Futures

161. The Soviet force posture will continue to be designed primarily for a NATO contingency and the danger of a two-front war involving China. Third World concerns will remain secondary and, even with the force improvements projected over the next decade, Soviet forces abroad will probably remain inferior to those of the West in the Mediterranean, the western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, Moscow could concentrate additional military resources beyond those projected in the base case, and, in conjunction with the buildup of certain allies, attempt to achieve a favorable local military balance.

162. Other developments, which, in our judgment, are quite unlikely but potentially more threatening, are possible. The most significant change would be the development of a more viable forward strike posture. Such developments are currently accorded a relatively low probability for several reasons: existing Soviet military resources may be considered inadequate for priority missions around the periphery, and thus few could be spared for more distant deployments; Soviet forces abroad are vulnerable and host governments may be unwilling to risk becoming involved as belligerents; and the costs of substantial increases in forward-deployed forces may not be justified by the potential benefits of marginally improved Soviet security and Third World gains. On the other hand, there are arguments in favor of improving the wartime potential of forward-deployed Soviet forces. These include the potential benefits of diverting disproportionately larger US strike forces that otherwise could be used against bases in the USSR. Furthermore, Soviet use of certain foreign facilities could complement Soviet efforts to extend their defense perimeter.

163. Soviet intentions to develop more ambitious military roles abroad, including a more viable forward strike posture, could be suggested by the following indicators:

- Deployment of ships with equipment pre-positioned for rapid use by Soviet or allied forces.

- Construction of large fuel storage capacities at airfields likely to be used to support Soviet airlifts.
- Installation of coastal defense missiles and deployment of small combatants to defend Soviet naval facilities abroad.
- Construction of submarine support facilities at foreign ports.
- Construction of air and naval missile storage and handling facilities overseas.
- Increased Soviet training combined with Third World forces.
- Organization of a rapid deployment force headquarters with supporting communications units.
- Increased production of long-range aircraft and nuclear-powered submarines.

164. Should Moscow opt for more substantial forward deployments, these would be likely to include more attack submarines, more strike aircraft, and possibly an AWACS aircraft. These would probably be somewhat older models that become available as new equipment is introduced for primary roles, similar to the pattern when the introduction of Backfire bombers into the Pacific Fleet made some Badgers available for use in Vietnam. If the Soviet leadership decides to increase the military potential of foreign facilities, several additional roles for forward-deployed Soviet forces could emerge:

- *Counter Power Projection.* Foreign bases could facilitate the "interposition" of Soviet forces between US forces and their objective—however, at the risk of war. The Soviet base in Vietnam would best support the development of such a role. Soviet submarines or aircraft could attack shipping in important sea lanes. Mines could block key waterways, and cruise missiles with conventional warheads could be forward based. Such forward deployments would still be vulnerable, but Soviet naval doctrine emphasizes surprise and preemptive strikes against carrier battle groups before they can launch airstrikes. In peacetime, more substantial Soviet deployments also could have important political benefits if Third World leaders perceive the correlation of forces in their region favors the Soviet Bloc.
- *Integrated Operations.* Soviet forces have conducted limited training exercises with Syria, Vietnam, Cuba, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. Such exercises could lead to better military coordination. However, they would have to be signif-

icantly larger, more complex, and more frequent to produce significant results. A division of labor could be worked out whereby Soviet ships or aircraft provide early warning and targeting information to local interceptor squadrons, air defense units, and coastal defense missile units. Such integrated military operations could help offset weaknesses in Soviet power projection capabilities. For example, tactical air support could be provided by local forces, with Soviet AWACS support. Eventually, a separate command structure could be established to deal with rapid deployment of forces for distant contingencies. Should Moscow decide to expand capabilities for distant military intervention, pre-posi-

tioned equipment ships might be a more attractive option than land-based stockpiles on foreign territory.

— *Battlefield Isolation.* Future Soviet foreign military involvement also could be designed to preclude outside intervention in situations where Soviet clients enjoy a favorable military balance. Soviet intervention in such a role would be predicated on estimates that Soviet forces would not encounter a major power. Should a regional conflict occur, Soviet forces could attempt to blockade opponents' ports and preclude resupply by airlift. A network of upgraded ports and airfields would facilitate such an option.

ANNEX A

Levels of Soviet Foreign Military Involvement

Recent Soviet Military Equipment Deliveries *	Friendship and Cooperation Treaty With USSR *	First Year USSR Primary Arms Source *	Soviet Military Presence †		Soviet Naval Visits †		Soviet Military Airlift (VTA) ‡	Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) §	Additional Soviet Military Presence
			Since	Current Total	Since	Frequency in 1983			
North Africa									
Algeria		1963	1962	775	1966	2			
Libya		1971	1971	2,000	1969	14		1981-present	Naval support
Morocco					1964				
Sub-Saharan Africa									
Angola	1976	1976	1976	1,200	1976	36	1972-present	1977-present	Military communications, naval support
Benin		1976	1977	5	1971	3			
Botswana									
Burundi				20					
Cape Verde		1976	1978	20	1979				
Congo	1961	1965	1965	100	1972	1			
Equatorial Guinea					1970				
Ethiopia	1976	1976	1969	1,700	1965	78	1977-80	1980-present	Naval support, naval infantry security, military communications
Guinea		1960	1960	20	1969	30		1973-77	Naval support
Guinea-Bissau		1974	1976	55	1976	1			
Madagascar		1975	1976	150			1978-present		
Mali		1961	1961	150					
Mozambique	1977	1975	1975	800	1977	21	1983-present		
Nigeria			1967	10	1969				
Seychelles		1978	1981	5	1967	8			
Tanzania		1974	1964	85	1968				
Zaire									
Zambia			1975	50					
Zimbabwe									
East Asia									
Vietnam	1978	1979	1979	2,500	1979	246	1978-present	1979-present	SIGINT, military communications, naval support, naval infantry security
Laos		1979	1979	500					
Kampuchea		1979				1980			
Latin America									
Cuba		1962	1962	7,000-9,000	1967	43		1970-present	SIGINT, military communications, combat brigade, naval support
Nicaragua		1981	1981	100					
Peru		1973	1974	150	1970				
Middle East, South Asia									
Bangladesh			1973	20	1969				
Egypt	1971-76		1968-76		1965			1968-72	
India	1971	1962	1962	435	1966	10			
Iran			1967	Unknown	1968				
Iraq	1972		1958	1,200	1968				
Jordan			1981	25					
Lebanon									
North Yemen	1984	1962	1956	500	1963				
South Yemen	1979	1968	1956	450	1968	76	1978-present	1978-80	Military communications, SIGINT, naval support
Syria	1980	1956	1956	5,500	1957	111	1972-82	1981-present	Naval support, air defense, communications

* Countries receiving Soviet military equipment deliveries within last three years. Of those 38 countries, 25 also receive military assistance from Western sources.

† Since 1971, Moscow has signed 13 "Friendship and Cooperation" treaties with Third World countries, two (Egypt and Somalia) have been abrogated, and Afghanistan is not included in the scope of this study.

‡ First year in which the value of arms exceeds with the USSR accounted for at least half the value of their total military agreements.

§ Includes Soviet military advisors, technicians, and troops.

¶ Date of first port call (since 1953) by Soviet naval ship and number of visits in 1983.

‡ Soviet Military Transport Aviation extended foreign deployments of airlift aircraft.

§ Soviet Naval Aviation regular, extended foreign deployments.

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ANNEX B

Inventory of Major Foreign Facilities

The extent of Soviet military access to foreign facilities varies considerably. Therefore this annex describes the nature and frequency of Soviet use of the more important foreign facilities as well as the general characteristics of these facilities. In addition to the facilities described in this annex, repair facilities also have been made available to naval noncombatants on a more limited scale in Tunisia, Singapore, Greece, and Sri Lanka.

The following facilities are described in this annex (asterisk indicates less than continuous military use):

Cuba

- Havana Port *
- San Antonio de los Banos Military Airfield *
- Cienfuegos Naval Base *
- Lourdes Central SIGINT Complex
- Santiago de las Vegas Military Camp
- El Gabriel Communications Facility

Guinea

- Conakry Port *

Angola

- Luanda Port *
- Luanda Airfield

Ethiopia

- Dahlak Island
- Johannes IV Airfield *

Libya

- Tobruk Port *
- Umm Aitiqah Airfield *
- Al Jufra Airfield *

Vietnam

- Cam Ranh Bay Port
- Cam Ranh Bay Airfield
- Ton Son Nhut Airfield
- Da Nang Airfield *

Syria

- Tartus Port
- Tiyas Airfield

South Yemen

- Aden Port
- Al Anad Airfield
- Aden International Airport
- Salah ad Din Communications Facilities
- Socotra Island Anchorage

Mozambique

- Maputo Port
- Maputo Airfield

Yugoslavia


- Tivat Port

Cuba

Soviet access to Cuba is extensive. It dates from the early 1960s and includes about 3,000 troops in the only combat brigade deployed outside the Soviet periphery. The brigade headquarters and bulk of the troop units are located at Santiago de las Vegas. The largest foreign-based Soviet SIGINT complex has been established at Lourdes. This site includes about 2,100 Soviet technicians and is secured by elements of the Soviet combat brigade. In addition, Soviet satellite communications stations have been established at El Gabriel and Lourdes, providing direct contact with Moscow. Soviet oceanographic research and intelligence collection ships on patrol along the east coast of the United States are regularly supported out of Cuban ports. These vessels make about 40 calls on Cuban ports each year for reprovisioning, rest, and recreation. Since 1970, a Soviet oceangoing tug or salvage ship has been deployed to Cuba. Soviet naval combatants first visited Cuba in 1969 and now call about once a year, a decline from the more frequent visits of the early and mid-1970s. These task groups usually consist of two principal surface combatants and an oiler, and often include a submarine. These deployments establish a

periodic Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. They also are used for joint training exercises with the Cuban Navy and Air Force. Soviet warships calling on Cuba generally berth at Havana and Cienfuegos. The visiting combatants receive little shore-based support. Except for emergencies, Soviet ships do not use Cuban shipyards for repair, and refueling is accomplished from accompanying Soviet oilers.

Since 1970, Soviet Naval Aviation TU-95 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft have regularly deployed to Cuba. In 1982, these reconnaissance flights were shifted from Havana's International Airport to a large military airfield at San Antonio de los Banos where a specially secured and revetted area for Soviet aircraft was created. Beginning in 1983, the Bear deployments to Cuba also included TU-142 Bear F ASW aircraft. Bear aircraft are deployed to Cuba on a frequent basis, and reconnaissance missions are flown approximately weekly. They can monitor US naval exercises, traffic from some US east coast naval bases, and US missile tests. They also conduct training and collection missions against Trident SSBNs in local operating areas off King's Bay, Georgia.



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Havana Port, Cuba

Havana, Cuba's major port, contains more than 20 docking complexes designed for sugar, molasses, grain, fertilizer, and POL cargoes. Shortage of equipment, frequent breakdowns, and inefficient management combine to add to the congestion at Havana, however, and frequently there are 20 or 30 ships waiting to offload. The port houses a civilian shipyard, Mambisa, which could repair ships up to the size of small destroyers in its drydock. Plans for continued expansion of Havana focus on upgrading cargo-handling facilities.

The naval base across the bay from Havana's commercial port is the main repair base for the Cuban Navy. Upgrading of the naval shipyard, which is collocated with Mambisa Shipyard, took place in the late 1970s. Granma Naval Repair Base is capable of servicing diesel submarines and small frigates but has never repaired Soviet combatants. The naval base receives some of the combatants delivered by the USSR.

Havana Port Facilities

Berths	Twenty commercial cargo areas.
Depths	In channel, 12.8 meters; at anchorages, 10 meters; at quays, range up to 10 meters.
Storage space	Extensive warehouses for primary cargoes at all major quays.
Cargo equipment	Bulk cargo facilities at major quays, container RO/RO facilities.
Fuel and water	Fuel and diesel oil available at docks and by barge.
Repair facilities	Mambisa drydock for vessels up to 7-meters draft. A reliable repair shop is associated with Mambisa.

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San Antonio de los Banos Military Airfield, Cuba

Cuba has several airfields that could accommodate Soviet Bear aircraft, but these aircraft currently use the military airfield at San Antonio de los Banos. Construction before the arrival of the Bears included renovation of eight hardstands. Additional upgrading has included runway extensions, construction of shelters for fighter aircraft, renovation of existing parking areas, and improvement of support facilities for both expanded Soviet deployments and the upgrading of Cuba's Air Force. The Soviets use an isolated, fenced area of the airfield. This area includes an operations building and personnel bunkers and is close to the POL depot which is more than sufficient for Soviet and Cuban needs. The main airstrip was resurfaced in 1980, possibly in anticipation of the arrival of the Bears.

San Antonio de los Banos Airfield Facilities

Main runway	4,000 meters X 46 meters.
Surface	Concrete block, resurfaced since 1980.
Other runways	Two blacktop runways, each less than 3,000 meters.
Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities	The major POL storage area includes six to eight railcars. No maintenance facilities large enough for Bears are available yet, and there are no weapons storage buildings. Eight hardstands with connecting taxiways are the main parking area. Fighter aircraft shelters are under construction. There is a building under construction for maintenance vehicles in the parking area near the Bears.

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Cienfuegos Naval Base, Cuba

Cuba's second-largest port is the Cienfuegos Complex, which includes two commercial port areas and Cayo Loco Naval Base.¹ The naval base has been expanded since 1981 to include a torpedo and missile-handling clerestory, support, and maintenance buildings, and additional berthing and repair space. The base is the home port of some of Cuba's patrol boats, but is not suitable for major combatants because of its muddy, shallow approaches. Upgrading continues at Cayo Loco, but its expansion potential is limited physically by proximity to the congested commercial port.

Of the two commercial port areas, Cienfuegos Northwest is the most suitable for Soviet naval ships. Soviet ships have made relatively short visits to Cienfuegos Northwest and the smaller commercial area, where there are two piers infrequently used for arms deliveries.

Construction at Punta Movida Naval Base south of Cienfuegos began in 1977 and included the installation


¹ In 1970 Soviet involvement in construction at the naval base and delivery of two barges associated with support of nuclear-powered submarines to Cienfuegos sparked a protest by the United States. Subsequently one barge was redeployed

of two new piers capable of berthing four submarines and construction of a naval ordnance depot with a clerestory building for torpedo and missile handling. There are no repair facilities at the base, however, so Cuban submarines will continue to use Havana Naval Shipyard for servicing. Punta Movida could accommodate all but the largest Soviet combatants, but it is most likely to serve as a home port for Cuba's diesel submarines.

Cienfuegos Port Facilities

Berths	Five berthing areas
Depths	In entrance channel, 11.28 meters; at berths, 7.3 to 17.68 meters.
Cargo equipment	Suitable for bulk cargo.
Fuel and water	Fuel and diesel oil bunkers require advance notice; fresh water is available at all piers.
Repair facilities	Light repairs only.



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Lourdes Central SIGINT Complex, Cuba

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] The SIGINT facility is guarded by elements of the Soviet combat brigade, including a mechanized infantry battalion, an artillery battery, and an engineer company. A highway airstrip capable of handling transport aircraft and jet fighters is located just to the west of the complex.





Santiago de las Vegas Military Camp, Cuba

Santiago de las Vegas Military Camp is the headquarters and major garrison for the Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba. The camp has been continuously occupied by Soviet troops since the early 1970s. Currently the garrison includes one tank battalion, two mechanized infantry battalions, one multiple rocket launcher battalion, and one support battalion; and smaller reconnaissance, air defense, antitank, and artil-

lery units. A sizable training area borders the northern edge of the camp.]

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


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El Gabriel Communications Facility, Cuba

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
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Guinea

Soviet access to Guinea is limited and tenuous, and the death of President Sekou Toure in 1984 could lead to reduced access. Soviet naval visits to Guinea began in 1970 with support to President Toure in the wake of a Portuguese-sponsored guerrilla raid. In 1983 Guinea hosted 30 calls by Soviet naval ships. Conakry generally lacks adequate provisioning, refueling, and repair capabilities. The port is sheltered by islands and breakwaters, but must be continuously dredged to keep the harbor accessible to destroyer-size ships. Both berthing and anchorages are in short supply. In 1973, Soviet Naval Aviation Bear D reconnaissance aircraft began periodic deployments to Conakry Airfield, from which point they could monitor major transatlantic shipping lanes. In 1977, Guinea denied further access to Bear aircraft, and Soviet maritime aerial reconnaissance operations off West Africa shifted to Angola.



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
Conakry Port, Guinea

Conakry's port facilities are on the seaward side of Tombo Island in southern Guinea. The port is a natural basin sheltered by Kassa and Tamara Islands and two protective breakwaters. Several quays could accommodate destroyers or small cruisers, but the alongside berthing of larger ships would be risky, and silting—a perennial problem—makes recorded depths somewhat unreliable. Dredging operations keep most of the harbor and channel accessible to destroyer-size ships, and there are limited anchorages outside the port for them. As an export port for bauxite, iron ore, and aluminum, Conakry is equipped to handle heavy cargo and processes arms shipments for Guinea and other African nations.

Conakry Port Facilities

Berths	Nine berthing areas with 2,000 meters of wharf space.
Depths	At entrance, 9.1 meters; at quays, 3.5 to 11 meters.
Storage space	Area of 32,000 square meters.
Cargo equipment	Eight 50-ton cranes; three 10-ton forklifts.
Fuel and water	Fuel is not generally available. Water can be obtained at all berths but may be scarce from December to April.
Repair facilities	None.

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
Angola

Angola is currently the only country in West Africa supporting both a Soviet air and naval presence. Soviet naval access dates to 1976 when substantial support was provided during the Angolan civil war. Continued Soviet access is closely tied to a dos Santos regime that is highly dependent on Cuban and Soviet support for its survival. Soviet ships have called at all three Angolan ports, but Luanda is the most frequently visited. In 1983 there were 36 Soviet naval port calls to Angola, including a call by a task group led by a Kiev-class carrier en route to the Pacific Fleet. Luanda can provide replenishment services but no repairs for major combatants. The port of Mocamedes, now called Namibe, is primarily a fishing port with a quay that could accommodate a single large cruiser, but the few Soviet combatants that do call on Namibe prefer to anchor outside the port. Lobito is an excellent natural harbor, sheltered by a sandspit breakwater. Its two quays can berth and reprovision several large cruisers and oceangoing tankers. The port also houses Angola's only shipyard, although its production is limited to only small craft. Since June 1982 a floating drydock (FDD) has been maintained at Luanda to support the Soviet South Atlantic fishing fleet, but it has the capability to conduct minor repairs to naval ships. The initial drydock was replaced in 1983 with an 8,500-ton lift FDD equipped with a floating workshop.

The Soviets use the maintenance facilities at Luanda Naval Base to support their West African Naval Patrol in the South Atlantic. This patrol generally includes a destroyer, one to two minesweepers, two to three merchant tankers, a repair ship, and an amphibious ship with naval infantry embarked.

Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft have, since 1977, periodically deployed to Angola. From Luanda, they can monitor Western naval movements from the Cape of Good Hope to as far north as Senegal and west to Ascension Island. Luanda is located too far south to permit aircraft to cover the main sea lanes from the United States to Europe. Soviet forces in Angola have direct contact with Moscow through satellite communications.

Beginning in 1976, a Soviet VTA rotational detachment of two AN-12 Cub aircraft was stationed at Luanda. Since early 1983, the detachment has been increased to 12 aircraft. Together with Cuban and Angolan transports they provide logistic support to Angolan forces in their counterinsurgency operations.



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Luanda Airfield, Angola

Luanda Airfield is a joint civil/military facility which provides support to Soviet Bear D reconnaissance aircraft. The airfield is located on the southern edge of the city of Luanda. It has two asphalt runways capable of supporting heavy military aircraft. The airfield includes a civilian support area, a maintenance area, a military support area, a Soviet military aircraft parking apron, an ammunition storage area, and a POL facility. Currently, the airfield is defended by three six-position antiaircraft artillery sites. Navigation systems at the airfield permit all-weather, day/night operations.

Luanda Airfield Facilities

Main runway	3,740 meters X 46 meters.
Other runways	2,635 meters.
Surface	Asphalt.

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Luanda Port, Angola

The port of Luanda is inside a protective barrier formed by a long, narrow island roughly paralleling the coast. The commercial port facilities on the mainland, which have been undergoing expansion since the 1960s, can accommodate ships up to the size of the Kiev-class cruisers at the main pier and adjacent quay. Vessels of any size can anchor in the harbor, and there is generally a large backlog of merchant ships. The naval installation on Ilha de Luanda has a wharf suitable for one ship the size of a Kiev-class cruiser or two small destroyers. More ships can be accommodated if they moor stern to the quay as the Soviets do. Luanda can provide replenishment services, but no repairs for major combatants.

Luanda Port Facilities

Berths	Eight berths at six piers and one quay in commercial port; one 300-meter pier at naval base.
Depths	At entrance, 27.5 meters; at piers, 4.5 to 10.4 meters; at naval pier, 17 meters.
Storage space	Area of 55,000 square meters.
Cargo equipment	Twenty-eight 3 to 5-ton cranes; one 10-ton crane; one 150-ton crane; mobile cranes of 3 to 5 tons. Limited offloading of container cargo.
Fuel and water	Fuel is available from major oil companies. Fresh water is available, but only in small quantities at the offshore tanker terminal.
Repair facilities	Two 700- to 1,200-ton slipways and shops for hull work and boiler cleaning. Small marine railways at the naval base.

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
Dahlak Island, Ethiopia

Dahlak Island has two floating finger piers, about 20 warehouses and administration buildings, an open storage area, and two POL storage areas. An 8,500-ton floating drydock was brought to Dahlak from Aden in April 1978. It is the primary maintenance and repair facility for Soviet naval units operating in the Indian Ocean. It also occasionally serves Ethiopian and South Yemeni naval units. In addition, an Amur-class depot ship, a Goryn-class auxiliary tanker, a Toplivo-class water and fuel barge, and a PSKL-16 stores ship appear to be permanently stationed here. An Ugra-class submarine tender also is periodically deployed to Dahlak. A small Soviet naval infantry contingent is stationed on Dahlak Island for local security.

Dahlak Island Facilities

Berths	Two 100-meter floating piers.
Depths	Unlimited.
Storage space	Eight repaired British buildings and 13 or more new buildings serve as storage and housing space. A Soviet stores barge is anchored at Dahlak.
Cargo equipment	None.
Fuel and water	Two POL storage areas probably store fuel for vehicles and small support ships or limited amounts of water. There are no refueling facilities and almost no fresh water. A yard oiler brings fuel to Dahlak from Aden; supplies and stores come from Ethiopia by helicopter.
Repair facilities	Small repair ship and 8,500-ton floating drydock.

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


Johannes IV Airfield, Ethiopia

Johannes IV serves as both a military and civilian airfield. The military area, located near the northern end of the runway, supports one helicopter and two fighter squadrons of the Ethiopian Air Force. Support facilities for these aircraft include an underground POL storage area, a weapons storage area, and a basic maintenance facility for helicopter and fighter aircraft. An all-weather navigation system has been installed by the Soviets for their IL-38s. In addition, the airfield has two other navigation systems, two early warning radars, and a height-finding radar. The Soviet IL-38s use an isolated parking apron between the military and civilian areas. Johannes IV International Airfield has adequate parking, maintenance, and storage space to support Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, but its high elevation prohibits deployment of Bear D's. No ground-based air defenses have been installed.

Johannes IV International Airfield Facilities

Main runway	3,144 meters X 61 meters
Surface	Blacktop.
Other runways	1,820-meter blacktop strip.
Fuel, maintenance, and support facilities	Eight hangars, six blacktop parking aprons, four ammunition storage sheds, more than 60 support buildings, two horizontal and four vertical POL tanks.

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


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Libya

Since 1981, Soviet IL-38 aircraft have deployed a few times annually to Umm Aitiqah Airfield in Libya. Construction of a major military airfield at Al Jufra in central Libya has raised concerns about its possible future use by Soviet aircraft. Construction techniques suggest that this facility is of Soviet design, if not of actual Soviet construction. It includes facilities for handling tactical air-launched missiles, 12 revetted hardstands similar to those associated with Soviet intermediate-range bombers, hardened aircraft shelters capable of accommodating aircraft up to the size of MIG-25 Foxbats, and a 4,200-meter all-concrete runway (the only one in Libya). When completed, it would have the capability to handle both interceptors and intermediate-range bombers. However, we believe Al Jufra will primarily be used for Libyan bombers and transports.

Currently, Libyan ports offer little logistic support to Soviet ships. Tobruk is used most often, rather than more noticeable visits to the main commercial port of Tripoli. Tobruk was used by a Soviet repair ship twice in 1983 to repair Soviet cruise-missile-armed, diesel-powered submarines. In 1983 there were only 14 Soviet naval port calls in Libya.







Tobruk Port, Libya

Tobruk can accommodate all but the largest cruisers at its naval breakwater. Its naval repair facilities have been improved since 1979. They are sufficient for limited repairs to patrol boats and F-class submarines. There are no Soviet shore establishments to coordinate naval calls or compensate for deficiencies of Libyan ports, and Soviet ships do not make use of the Libyan naval POL facilities

Tobruk Naval Base Port Facilities

Berths	Two cruiser, two frigate, one submarine, one destroyer, 11 minesweeper, and two patrol craft berths.
Depths	At naval berths, depths range from 6 to 10 meters.
Storage space	Two warehouses with 3,600 square meters of covered storage at the commercial port.
Cargo equipment	Thirteen mobile cranes and one floating crane (30- to 40-ton capacity).
Fuel and water	Limited availability.
Repair facilities	Synrolift (2,000-ton capacity). Possibly not operational.

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Umm Aitiqah Airfield, Libya





Umm Aitiqah Airfield (formerly Wheelus Air Force Base) has navigation facilities that permit all-weather, day/night operations. Libyan aircraft usually at Umm Aitiqah include TU-22 Blinder bombers, MIG-25 Foxbats, Mirage III/V fighters, Lockheed C-130/L100 transports, AN-26 Curl transports, L-39 Albatross trainers, and IL-76 Candid transports. The airfield includes six aircraft maintenance areas, three POL storage areas, a munitions storage area, 12 double-bay hardened aircraft shelters, and support and administrative facilities. Soviet IL-38 May aircraft periodically deploy to Umm Aitiqah for maritime reconnaissance patrols over the Mediterranean. Umm Aitiqah also serves as the primary assembly facility for Hip helicopters and other fixed-wing aircraft purchased from the USSR. Umm Aitiqah is heavily defended by Libyan antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles.

Umm Aitiqah Airfield Facilities

Main runway	3,450 meters X 60 meters
Other runways	1,950 meters X 45 meters. Also a 3,450 meter x 40 meter taxiway could be used as a runway.
Surface	Both asphalt.

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

Al Jufra Airfield, Libya

In December 1983 Al Jufra military airfield became operational. It was constructed to Soviet design over a two-year period. Al Jufra is an advanced airbase capable of supporting all-weather, day/night fighter, interceptor, and bomber aircraft. It has a long 4,650 meter by 45 meter concrete parallel taxiway that could be used as a runway. The airfield includes 24 Foxbat-capable hardened aircraft shelters, an underground POL storage facility, a communications facility, and a housing/administrative area. Also, there are 12 revetted hardstands capable of handling aircraft of up to medium-bomber size. The airbase has a tactical air-to-air missile storage facility, an air-to-surface missile storage facility, and ground-controlled-intercept and ground-controlled-approach systems. These facilities are similar to those found at medium-bomber bases in the USSR. To date, Libyan aircraft at Al Jufra have been limited to AN-26 Curl transports and MIG-25 Foxbats. No Soviet aircraft have deployed to Al Jufra, and no air defenses are evident.

Al Jufra Airfield Facilities

Main runway	4,200 meters X 60 meters
Surface	Concrete

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Vietnam

Military cooperation between Hanoi and Moscow has increased substantially since the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 1979. Within 10 days of the Chinese invasion, Soviet combatants called on Vietnam. Subsequently, facilities at Cam Ranh Bay have been steadily upgraded and expanded so that the port has become the Soviet Navy's most frequently used foreign facility. Cam Ranh Bay now routinely supports the Soviet naval contingent which operates in the South China Sea. Cam Ranh Bay is preferred because of its size, including berths for 10 ships and deepwater anchorages for another 40, and its rather remote location, which enhances security. However, there are no operational bunkering facilities ashore and the oil pipeline remains unusable. Also, shore-based repair facilities are lacking. Soviet Pacific Fleet auxiliaries have been overhauled at the Ho Chi Minh City shipyard after similar access to Singapore shipyards was denied following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The Soviets maintain 22 to 30 naval units at Cam Ranh Bay and in the South China Sea. These usually consist of three to four general purpose submarines, two to three surface combatants, one to two mine warfare ships, 14 to 15 auxiliaries, and one research ship. The presence of Soviet naval units in the South China Sea enables the Soviets to reinforce more quickly their Indian Ocean Squadron in the event of a crisis by cutting the steaming time from Vladivostok from two weeks to one week at an average speed of 20 knots.

Soviet naval aircraft initially used the airfield at Da Nang, but shifted operations to less crowded facilities at Cam Ranh in 1980. POL storage was added and a ground control approach system was installed for all-weather operations. The Cam Ranh Airfield usually hosts four Bear reconnaissance and four Bear ASW aircraft plus nine Badger aircraft (five strike, two tankers, one electronic countermeasures (ECM), and one reconnaissance). In addition, three SIGINT sites and two communications satellite stations also have been established in Vietnam.

Since early 1979, a Soviet VTA detachment of AN-12 Cubs has been maintained at Ton Son Nhut Airfield. Initially the detachment included 12 aircraft and was extensively involved in support of Vietnam's operations in Kampuchea. Since 1981 the detachment has been gradually reduced to three aircraft that mainly support the Soviet advisory effort in Laos and Vietnam. They often deploy to Da Nang airfield for support missions in Laos.



Cam Ranh Bay Port, Vietnam

Cam Ranh Bay is an extensive deepwater harbor with the excellent natural protection of surrounding peninsulas and islands. It is easily secured because of the absence of any large town or commercial activity. Ships up to the size of the largest Soviet cruisers can berth at the principal piers or use the more than 40 deepwater anchorages in the inner and outer harbors. Quay space is limited to ships the size of small frigates. Two of the piers can handle bulk cargo




Since 1979 the Soviets have refurbished the old piers located near the naval training center and have installed four floating piers, one of which is used mainly by the Vietnamese Navy. A water supply system installed since March 1980 provides fresh water to at least four of the piers. Electric power may also be available since new generators were delivered in early 1983. Buildings constructed near the new piers provide additional maintenance, storage, or administration

There are two POL piers to the south of the naval training center, and some POL storage tanks are intact. The pipeline, however, is unusable, and the Soviets have taken no steps to reconstruct it. Repairs—other than those that can be performed at a small boatyard near the POL piers—are limited to maintenance by a Soviet repair ship stationed in port or in a small floating dock that has been at Cam Ranh since late 1980. The dock, which is normally used to transport submarines, can accommodate small destroyers or diesel submarines for minor repairs.

Cam Ranh Bay Port Facilities

Berths	Two fixed piers and three floating piers provide about 10 berths; 40 deepwater anchorages.
Depths	At deepwater berths, 9 to 12 meters; at wharfs, 6 meters; at POL berth, 22 meters.
Storage space	Area of 38,350 square meters in derelict US warehouses and new storage buildings in pier area.
Cargo equipment	Only two piers can handle cargo.
Fuel and water	The oil pipeline is unserviceable. Water is supplied by pipeline at four piers.
Repair facilities	Small boatyard, small floating drydock.

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
Cam Ranh Bay Airfield, Vietnam

Cam Ranh Bay Airfield is a military airfield capable of handling all heavy military aircraft. The airfield is within four miles of the Soviet naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. The area surrounding Cam Ranh Bay is heavily defended by Vietnamese SA-2 and SA-3 sites. Navigation facilities at the airfield permit all-weather, day/night operations. The airfield includes support facilities for Soviet Bear and Badger deployments.

Cam Ranh Bay Airfield Facilities

Main runway	3,045 meters X 45 meters.
Surface	Concrete.
Other runways	Three concrete taxiways also can be used as runways.

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



Ton Son Nhut Airfield, Vietnam

Ton Son Nhut Airfield, located on the northwest edge of Ho Chi Minh City, is the major civilian air terminal in southern Vietnam. It is capable of supporting large Soviet aircraft. The Vietnamese national airline—HKV—maintains facilities at Ton Son Nhut to service all the US-built aircraft in its inventory. Ton Son Nhut also serves as a base for the Vietnamese Air Force's 918th Transport Regiment and the 917th Helicopter Regiment. A small Soviet VTA detachment also operates out of Ton Son Nhut. Extensive maintenance and support facilities were built during the Vietnam war, many of which are no longer in use. These facilities include 10 large hangars and many smaller hangars and shops. Other support facilities at Ton Son Nhut include extensive POL storage, a munitions storage area, and 62 individual aircraft shelters. Electronic navigational aids at the airfield make operations possible at night and in poor weather. There are six Vietnamese antiaircraft artillery sites located around the airfield.

Ton Son Nhut Airfield Facilities

Main runway	3,100 meters
Other runways	2,900 meters
Surface	Concrete

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Da Nang Airfield, Vietnam

Da Nang Airfield is located on the southern coast of Vietnam only 3 kilometers from Da Nang Naval Base, where Soviet arms shipments to Vietnam are offloaded. The airfield has two 3,000-meter concrete runways capable of supporting operations of large Soviet aircraft. Support facilities at Da Nang include extensive POL storage, maintenance shops, a munitions storage area, 10 large aircraft hangars, and 149 individual aircraft shelters. Navigational aids at Da Nang make it possible to conduct operations at night and in poor weather. One Vietnamese SA-2 site is located 3.5 kilometers from the airfield.




Most aircraft exported to Vietnam from the Soviet Union are assembled and test flown at Da Nang Airfield. Thus, Soviet personnel probably are present at the airfield to support this activity.

Da Nang Airfield Facilities

Main runway	3,000 meters.
Surface	Concrete.

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
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Syria

Syria permits Soviet naval auxiliaries to operate on a continuous basis from the port of Tartus. These ships provide support to the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, which typically numbers 45 ships. A depot ship that provides routine upkeep on Soviet diesel submarines in the Mediterranean is moored in Tartus, and other auxiliaries shuttle water, spare parts, and other supplies from Tartus to combatants moored or operating elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Soviet ships also call at Latakia, but Tartus is the preferred port.

Soviet aircraft have used Tiyas since 1972. A VTA detachment of AN-12 Cub ECM aircraft was withdrawn in 1982, IL-38 ASW aircraft have periodically deployed to Tiyas since 1981, and, on one occasion in 1981, four Badger reconnaissance aircraft were deployed there.







Tartus Port, Syria

The port of Tartus, which is north of the city of Al Mina, was built in the early 1970s. It consists of several piers and a turning basin protected by two breakwaters. The harbor houses Syria's main naval base. The port is heavily congested, and a long-term expansion program includes the construction of a new basin and the completion of the central breakwater. Because Tartus has no repair facilities, a shipyard and drydock have been proposed.

Tartus Port Facilities

Berths	Twelve berths at six piers, 12 anchorages inside the breakwaters.
Depths	At harbor entrance and turning basin dredged to 11 to 13 meters; at piers, 4 to 11 meters.
Storage space	Area of 64,000 square meters.
Cargo equipment	At least nine cranes, including a 125-ton floating crane.
Fuel and water	Water and fuel are supplied by trucks on quays. Oil terminal to the north can accommodate one 100,000-ton tanker.
Repair facilities	None.

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Tiyas Airfield, Syria




Tiyas Airfield is a major base for about 50 Syrian fighters and fighter-bombers. It also serves as an assembly base for new aircraft delivered to Syria. In addition, it provides support for Soviet Cub transport and May antisubmarine warfare aircraft on their deployments. The Cubs transport supplies and equipment to Syria, while the May deployments conduct maritime reconnaissance and ASW operations over the Mediterranean.

Tiyas Airfield is located 50 km west of Palmyra. In addition to the main asphalt runway, there are four graded earth runways—serving as taxiways, crash strips, and parking aprons—which vary in length from 3,200 meters to 1,900 meters. There are 21 completed, hardened aircraft shelters, and four others in various stages of construction around the airfield. There are also three large and six small revetted hardstands. The airfield includes a maintenance area, control tower, operations building, motor pool, underground POL storage facility, and an air-to-air missile storage facility. Navigation systems at the airfield allow all-weather, day/night operations. The airfield is defended by a Syrian surface-to-air missile brigade that includes SA-2 and SA-3 missile battalions.

Tiyas Airfield Facilities

Main runway	3,280 meters × 61 meters
Surface	Asphalt.

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
South Yemen

The Soviets have an extensive military relationship with South Yemen. On the ground, about 450 Soviet military personnel serve throughout the Yemeni armed forces. In addition, a Soviet communications facility and SIGINT site have been established.

The Soviet Navy began to use the port of Aden in 1977, following its expulsion from Somalia. At that time, a Soviet floating drydock was transferred from Somalia to South Yemen, en route to Dahlak, Ethiopia. The port of Aden is well equipped and large—capable of accommodating 50 large ships at a time. However, little use is made of the port facilities by Soviet naval ships. Most often, Soviet ships remain in the outer harbor, where minor repairs and refueling can be performed by auxiliary ships. Soviet ships also use

anchorage near Socotra Island, but the island itself has little potential as a naval base. The waters close to the island are hazardous year round, the shoreline is mountainous, and fresh water is scarce.

Soviet naval aircraft have used the former Royal Air Force base at Aden (also known as Khormaksar) and now make use of the more remote, renovated airfield at Al Anad. The runway at Aden has been extended and could now accommodate Bear aircraft. Currently, two Soviet IL-38 May aircraft deploy to Al Anad, although previously four aircraft were rotated to South Yemen. These aircraft regularly deploy and conduct ASW patrols and aerial reconnaissance in the western Indian Ocean. Between 1978 and 1980 a Soviet VTA detachment of two AN-12 aircraft also was deployed to Aden.



Al Anad Airfield, South Yemen



Al Anad is a major, new fighter base, supporting two squadrons of Yemeni MIG-21 Fishbeds. Soviet IL-38 May aircraft have also used the base since 1983. The airbase is located in an isolated, arid, region about 46 km north of Aden. Al Anad has navigation equipment for all-weather operations. Fighter aircraft park in dispersed, revetted positions located near the southwest end of the runway. Most of the POL storage and maintenance/repair facilities are also located near this area. The IL-38s park in a separately secured area near the northeast end of the runway. A nearby support area was constructed to provide housing and extensive support for the personnel attached to the airbase. Currently, there are no ground-based air defenses at the airbase.

Al Anad Airfield Facilities

Main runway	2,890 meters X 46 meters.
Surface	Asphalt.

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Aden Port, South Yemen


Aden is an improved natural harbor that can accommodate about 50 large ships at a time, including the largest of Soviet combatants. Aden is a well-equipped commercial port, but much of its cargo-handling equipment and many harbor craft are aging. Its small repair facilities are limited by a lack of skilled personnel, raw materials, and spare parts. The Soviets do not appear to be involved in upgrading its facilities. When using the inner harbor, Soviet combatants normally moor at berths opposite the oil storage tanks. The small naval harbor that houses the South Yemeni Navy can accommodate ships only up to the size of an LST.

Aden Port Facilities

Berths	More than 30 buoy and dolphin berths, 13 oil bunkering berths. Additional berthing for small ships is at Home Trade Quay, Ma'alah Wharf, and Admiralty Jetty.
Depths	Entrance channel, 11.9 meters; in harbor, 12.5 meters; at berths, from 5.5 meters to 12.8 meters.
Storage space	Area of 45,000 square meters of covered storage.
Cargo equipment	Twenty-eight mobile cranes from 7 to 32 tons; one 30-ton and one 25-ton floating crane; no container equipment.
Fuel and water	Submerged pipelines served by major oil companies provide fuel; barges supply water. One pier can supply water for oceangoing vessels.
Repair facilities	One 4,500-ton floating drydock at National Dockyard Company; slipway for small combatants.

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Aden International Airport, South Yemen



Aden International Airport, also known as Khor-maksar, is a combined military airbase and civilian airfield located on the outskirts of Aden. Soviet heavy military transport and civil aircraft frequently use this airfield. The airfield is well supported by radar, electronics, and communications equipment for all-weather operations. The military area of the airfield is separated from the civilian area, and extensive maintenance and support facilities are present in both areas. Buried POL and munitions areas adjoin the military operations area. Currently there are no air defenses at the airfield.

Aden International Airport Facilities

Main runway	3,500 meters X 46 meters.
Surface	Asphalt.





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Salah ad Din High-Frequency Radio
Communications Facility, South Yemen







Socotra Island Anchorage, South Yemen

The waters close to Socotra Island are hazardous year round, and the facilities at its ports are rudimentary, serving only small coastal craft. The island is mountainous, the climate is semiarid, and fresh water


is scarce. There is no naval base at Socotra. Ras Karma Airfield on Socotra is used occasionally by transport aircraft and helicopters to support the Yemeni garrison, but no aircraft are stationed there. In early 1982, upgrading of the airfield was in progress.



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Mozambique

Mozambique is the most frequently used stopover for Soviet naval ships in the southwestern Indian Ocean. Soviet naval ships have called at Maputo since 1977. Last year there were 21 visits, including a call by a Kiev-class carrier en route to the Pacific Fleet. An 8,500-ton floating drydock at Maputo is used by the Soviet fishing fleet, but facilities for more extensive repair are lacking. A VTA contingent of two AN-12 aircraft also is deployed to Maputo to support Mozambican forces in counterinsurgency operations. These detachments deploy to Mozambique via South Yemen and Seychelles. The airfield currently lacks adequate navigational facilities to support all-weather, day/night operations






Maputo Port

Soviet use of Maputo involves primarily research ships. These vessels, which have conducted an increased level of research activity in the Mozambique channel since 1981, utilize Maputo for provisions and crew rest. Soviet ships do not use Maputo for any kind of repair or maintenance. Visits by combatants are mainly for short crew rest and transit stops

Maputo Port Facilities

Berths	Eighteen.
Depths	At entrance 11.4 meters (low water); at berths, 10 to 12.8 meters.
Storage space	Covered, 68,000 square meters; open, 60 hectares.
Cargo handling equipment	Eighty-two wharf cranes, 3 to 10-ton capacity; one heavy lift crane, 60-ton capacity
Water and fuel	Water available at all berths; bunkering available at Matola ore berths (2) only: rates - fuel oil, 370 tons per hour; diesel oil, 125 tons per hour; refined storage capacity, 265,000 tons total; bunkering fuel capacity, 40,000 tons.
Repair facilities	One 4,500-ton capacity Soviet floating drydock; one 1,200-ton marine railway.






Maputo Airfield, Mozambique

Soviet IL-76 Candid, AN-12, and AN-26 Curl transport aircraft use Maputo Airfield in the People's Republic of Mozambique. They deploy to Maputo via South Yemen and Seychelles. Maputo Airport is both a civil and military airfield located at the southern tip of Mozambique. The airfield has a 2,250 meter by 28 meter taxiway that could be used as a runway. All runways are capable of supporting heavy military aircraft. Currently, there are no navigation systems at the airfield for all-weather and night operations. Military areas at the airfield include facilities to support Soviet and Mozambican transports and occasional deployments of Mozambican MIG-17 Fresco fighter-bombers. Currently, Maputo Airfield is defended by a six-position 57-mm antiaircraft artillery site.

Maputo Airfield Facilities

Main runway	2,250 meters X 45 meters.
Other runways	1,500 meters X 45 meters; 1,250 meters X 45 meters.
Surface	Asphalt.

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


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Yugoslavia

According to legislation passed in 1974 on the use of Yugoslav ports, foreign navies can have only two ships repaired in any one port simultaneously. Also, they can use only yards designated by the National Secretariat. Repairs are limited to warships under 4,000 tons or auxiliaries under 10,000 tons. Ships must offload all weapons, disembark one-third of their crew, and limit their stay to six months. Yugoslavia prohibits the storage of foreign fuel or equipment.

Currently, Tivat in Kotor Bay is the only port designated for foreign naval repairs. Yards at Rejika, Split, Zadar, Sibernik, Trogir, and Pula could also service naval ships. These generally have extensive construction, repair, and bunkering facilities, but they already are extensively used for overhauls of merchant vessels—many of them Soviet.



Tivat Port, Yugoslavia





The Soviets have used Tivat regularly since 1974. Normally, they rotate one F-class submarine and a submarine tender for a six-month repair period, during which both usually are scraped and painted, and interior work is done on the submarine. Since March 1980 the Soviets have had an additional naval ship visiting in port when the tender arrives. By law, Yugoslav laborers do all repair work, although the Soviet crewmembers remaining aboard may take advantage of time in port for inspections and repairs.

The harbor entrance limits entry to small destroyers, frigates, or diesel submarines. Sava Kovacevic Shipyard at Tivat is the Yugoslav Navy's main repair yard. Repair facilities at Tivat include three floating drydocks, the largest a Soviet-built dock with a lift capacity of 12,000 tons. Since its delivery in 1975, the dock has been used only by Soviet tenders and submarines, although it could accommodate combatants as large as a Kresta-II. The shipyard also has a ship lifting basin (syncrolift) to move small combatants and submarines (although not F-class SS's) ashore and a 4,500-ton dock that provides warranty service for Libya's F-class submarines. The halls and shops associated with the yard appear to have the capability to repair all ships' systems.

Tivat Port Facilities

Berths	Six to 10.
Depths	At entrance, 6 meters; at berths, 3 to 5 meters.
Storage space	Not available.
Cargo equipment	Fifteen-ton portal jib crane; 45-ton floating crane (jib); 25-ton shear-legs crane.
Fuel and water	Fuel and water available at several berthing areas, rate and capacity unknown.
Repair facilities	Three floating drydocks, capacities estimated from 4,500 to 12,000 tons, plus a marine railway and a ship-lifting basin.

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
ANNEX C

Soviet Airlift Operations in the Third World


Year	Operation	Distance (nautical miles)	Remarks
1967	Resupply of Egypt and Syria	1,600	350 flights in 27 days.
1967-68	Supply of republican faction in North Yemen	2,600	320 flights in three months. Frequent deviations from schedules.
1968	Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia	500	300 flights in one night. Smooth operation. Important contribution to success of overall operation.
1970	Relief operation following earthquake in Peru	7,000	Many problems. Operation suspended after crash of AN-22. Only 22 of 65 scheduled flights completed.
1970-71	Relief operation following floods in East Pakistan	2,000	30 flights in three months. One AN-22 crashed. Operation suspended, later resumed.
1973	Resupply of Egypt and Syria	1,850	850 flights in 26 days. 50 flights per day for two weeks. No operational losses. Smooth operation.
1975-76	Military aid to Angola	6,250	70 flights in four months. Maximum of 7 flights per day. Some fuel supply problems; otherwise smooth operation.
1977-78	Military aid to Ethiopia	3,000 to 4,000	90 flights in six months. Overflight clearance problems; otherwise smooth operation.
1979	Military aid to Vietnam	4,000	50 flights in 56 days. Some overflight clearance problems. Smooth operation.
1979	Invasion of Afghanistan	500	300 flights in three days (most at night at four-minute intervals: 120-150 during first night). Crucial to success of overall operation.
1982-83	Resupply of Syria	1,500	About 100 flights—two per day at peak. Smooth operation.
1984	Afghanistan	500	60 flights in seven days. Some congestion.
1984	Afghanistan	500	Airlift elements of airborne division to Afghanistan, 45 IL-76 flights in five days.

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VTA Airlift Routes to Vietnam, 1979



VTA Airlift Route to Angola, 1975-76




VTA Middle East Airlift Routes, 1973



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VTA Middle East Airlift Routes, 1967






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