


The French White Paper on Defence and National Security

Foreword by

Nicolas Sarkozy

President of the French Republic



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FOREWORD
BY THE PRESIDENT
OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

France's defence and security policy is once more at a crossroads.

Fourteen years since the publication of the previous White Paper on Defence, globalisation has profoundly changed the economy, everyday life and international relations. New powers have emerged and new vulnerabilities have been exposed. The traditional distinction between domestic security and foreign security has blurred.

At the same time, France has taken on the challenge of creating an all-professional army. France has made a considerable effort to build up the armed forces the country needs, but it has also encountered undeniable obstacles. The guiding force behind this transformation, the model army for 2015, is today both ill-suited and out of reach. As Commander in Chief of the French armed forces, I have a duty to protect the vital and strategic interests of our nation. It is my responsibility to choose the strategy and assets France needs at the dawn of the XXIst Century, to take on the security challenges facing us, with confidence and clear understanding. My two goals are to ensure that France remains a major military and diplomatic power, ready to take on the challenges congruent with our international obligations, and that the State has the capacity to guarantee the independence of France and the protection of all French citizens.

To fulfill this ambition, we must all work together in making the necessary efforts.

It was for this reason that I requested a wide-ranging review, not circumscribing defence-related questions to the armed forces alone or security issues to the domestic security forces alone.

It was for that reason also that I entrusted responsibility for this review to a commission drawn from all professional and political backgrounds, including from the armed forces and the defence and security administrations. Leading figures from all areas of expertise and all origins were invited to give their views, including representatives of the political parties, researchers, trade unionists, philosophers and, of course, members of the defence and security community.


For the same reason too, the French Parliament was involved in the process in unprecedented ways. For the first time, members of both houses sat on the White Paper Commission. For the first time, the parliamentary committees were consulted before strategic choices were made. And, for the first time, the White Paper will be presented to Parliament and our defence and security policy will be debated there.

From this process a new concept has emerged: that of a national security strategy that treats defence policy, domestic policy, foreign policy and economic policy as part of a whole, while not losing sight of their distinctive characteristics. This strategy serves as the framework for the European and international ambition that is the bedrock of France's global calling. I truly believe that this new doctrine and the corresponding assets will guarantee the security of the French people and our capacity to shoulder our international responsibilities.

But to bring this strategy to life, far-reaching reforms are now necessary. These will break down institutional barriers, speed decision-making and our response to crises, and create new room for manoeuvre. All this will release funds to be reinvested in our defence structure, enabling us to modernise our equipment and reinforce the operational capabilities of our armed forces.

The goal I have set for the entire defence and national security community, military and civilian, indeed the goal I have set for the entire nation, is to successfully adapt our defence structure to address the challenges of the XXIst century. This represents a major step forward for the French people, as they continue to devote substantial resources to defence and security. It will place heavy demands on all of the personnel concerned, and I am confident they will commit unstintingly to the reforms presented here. This reform is vital to enable France to live up to its ambitions. It will provide the State with the means to guarantee our national independence, and enable our armed forces, as well as our domestic security and civil security forces, to guarantee France's freedom of action and its independent capacity to decide for itself.

The post cold-war world is rapidly giving way to a more shifting, more uncertain, less predictable world, exposed to new forms of vulnerability. In tomorrow's world, France's national security will be assured, and France will play its role to the full in the defence of peace and its values.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Nicolas Sarkozy', with a stylized flourish at the end.

Nicolas SARKOZY

INTRODUCTION

In 1994, following the demise of the enforced division of Europe by the “Iron Curtain”, France embarked on a major overhaul of its strategy and defence organisation. It opted in 1996 for a wholly professional army; it also decided to dismantle its surface to surface ballistic nuclear missiles and to create a power projection capacity geared to the new strategic situation. Nearly fifteen years later, in 2008, the world has changed radically. Now that the post-Cold War era is over, and globalisation shapes international relations, a new strategy is needed.

An ever more unstable environment

Globalisation is transforming the very foundations of the international system, and the distribution of global power is gradually shifting towards Asia. New and powerful non-State actors are competing with States and their strategies. The typology of threats and risks is forcing us to redefine the conditions of national and international security. The role and place of military instruments has been modified.

Complexity and uncertainty are unquestionably major features of this new environment. *No single analytical framework* can suffice to grasp in all their dimensions the economic, strategic political and cultural dynamics shaping globalisation, or flowing from it.

Examples of this complexity abound. The spectacular enrichment of a hitherto impoverished portion of the planet is taking place side by side with the impoverishment of whole countries or regions. The number of conflicts between States is in decline, but the degree of violence can be extreme and new health or ecological risks are producing consequences for collective security. Major strategic upsets may occur

at any time, as witnessed by terrorism's change of scale and its consequences. Economic interdependence is creating ties of solidarity contributing to the stability of the planet, yet at the same time the balance of power between States remains as important as ever in international relations. While there is a need to codify new rules of global governance, they are difficult to formulate and hard to enforce.

This list by no means embraces all of the uncertainties of the world we have now entered, *a world not necessarily more dangerous, but certainly less predictable, less stable and more contradictory than the one that emerged in 1994*, at the time of drafting of the previous *White Paper*. In this volatile environment, the French territory and population are vulnerable in new ways that must now be treated as key factors in adapting our defence and security. They are the result of both global phenomena, such as damage to the biosphere or the risks of pandemics, and of the direct threats to France from terrorist networks, the long-term consequences of ballistic proliferation around the continent of Europe, and attacks on information and communication systems.

It is the ambition of France to be in a position where it does not have to submit to the effects of uncertainty; its ambition, rather, is to have the capacity to anticipate, respond to and influence international developments. This ambition has resulted in the formulation of a new national security strategy. Our task is to leverage the revolutions in knowledge and information, to prevent or deter the risk of war, to guarantee the security of our citizens as effectively as possible, both on French soil and beyond, wherever the security of France, the defence of Europe and world peace may come under threat.

A change in procedures

When setting up the Commission responsible for drafting the *White Paper* on Defence and National Security on August 23, 2007, the President of the French Republic asked that the Commission conduct its proceedings without taboos, taking a broad, transparent approach to the choices confronting France. The Commission has made full use of this freedom. Its composition was deliberately broad, being made up of representatives of the Civil Service and the armed forces, as well as members of both chambers of Parliament drawn from both the governing majority and the opposition, qualified personalities from the academic community and strategic research institutes, representatives of industry, and independent experts.

The Commission took several unprecedented initiatives for an exercise of this kind. It held 40 public hearings, broadcast on the Parliamentary TV channels. It interviewed 52 French and international per-

sonalities representing 14 nations from five continents, including political leaders, generals and other officers, actors in the field, experts, and representatives of civil society. Numerous consultations were held with representatives of the French and foreign government departments concerned, civil and military experts, members of the representative committees of defence and security personnel, business leaders, trade union representatives, representatives of associations, academics and journalists. These took place within a more restricted framework, given the necessary confidentiality of certain discussions.

The dialogue with French parliamentarians comprised regular discussions with the parliamentary committees, followed by a series of hearings behind closed doors with Government ministers on the draft *White Paper* even before the President of the French Republic gave his seal of approval to the text. This was a radically new approach from previous *White Papers'* proceedings.

A *website* set up for the occasion attracted more than 250,000 hits since its opening, indicating keen public interest in the shaping of French security and defence policy. To encourage dialogue, the Commission also opened a series of forums on its website to discuss most of the issues raised in the *White Paper*, including the place of France in the world, nuclear deterrence, the European defence capability, the concept of national security, the links between the armed forces and the nation, relations with NATO, the status of reservists, interventions abroad, etc.

The Commission members naturally also went out to meet professionals working in the service of the defence and security of the nation. Around forty visits were made to the forces or to theatres of operation, to gauge hopes, aspirations and difficulties, notably with regard to the quality and availability of equipment. These visits systematically included roundtable discussions between members of the Commission and all categories of personnel. At the European level, discussions were held with our main partners and with eminent European Union and Atlantic Alliance personalities providing an opportunity to present the Commission's work and learn the views of our partners.

Reinventing our strategy

The resulting *White Paper* introduces *a major innovation in the definition of French strategy*, in that it spells out *a strategy not only for defence, but also for national security*.

Its aim is to ward off the risks and threats detrimental to the life of the nation. The threats may come from States or transnational non-State groups. The risks may arise from natural or health disasters calling for a global response. The life of the country may be affected

either as a result of hostile intentions or of accidental breakdowns. Whatever the case, the possibility of a threat to national security demands foresight, prevention, and a swift response, harnessing all of the means at the government's disposal and the activation of European and international co-operation. This strategy therefore embraces both external and domestic security, military means as well as civil ones, defence policy in the strict sense of the term and domestic security policy and civil security, together with foreign policy and economic policy.

The definition of an overarching security strategy is a response to a new necessity, namely the need to adapt to the upheavals resulting from globalisation. This is incumbent not only on France but also on all of its allies and partners.

I

FROM GLOBALISATION TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY

CHAPTER 1

THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY

Globalisation is a new situation in which the spread of information and knowledge, the transformation of trade and changing international power relationships have an immediate global impact. It is creating a general, uncontrolled interaction and interdependence between all States. It is enabling a multitude of new non-State actors and individuals to reap maximum benefit from the possibilities of faster international movements of people as well as data and goods, both material and immaterial.

Globalisation therefore is shaping international security. It is one of the most far-reaching changes to have occurred since the end of the Cold War, the event that served as the backdrop to the 1994 Defence *White Paper*. We have entered a new era, driven by very different and contradictory forces that no longer comply with the institutional, social, cultural and military logic that fashioned our post-Cold War outlook.

Positive developments since 1994

The number of democracies has increased over the past 20 years. They represented 63% of States in 2007 from 40% in 1987¹. Admittedly, this trend is neither global nor irreversible and is confined mainly to Europe. Authoritarian regimes continue to dominate more than half of the world's population, and certain States are democratic only in name. But the demise of the logic of confrontation between

1. Source: Freedom House, 2007.

two antagonistic political and economic systems, the universal spread of the free-market economy model embodied in the democracies, and the relative reduction of poverty in the fast-growing regions, notwithstanding wide disparities between States or within countries themselves, have helped ease the tensions characteristic of the previous period.

In absolute terms, an unprecedented reduction in poverty since the middle of the 1990s has allowed nearly 400 million people, in China essentially, to rise above the extreme poverty threshold symbolised by an income of less than one dollar per day.


The growing interdependence of the world's markets and economies is abating the risks of acute confrontation between States. When major climate or health accidents occur, as on the occasion of the tsunami on December 26, 2004, the SARS epidemic in 2002/03, or again this year in Myanmar and China, we are witnessing a growing capacity for international mobilisation and co-operation. There is a growing awareness of the common responsibility for dealing with world risks, even if it remains difficult to implement global solutions.

The *Internet* boom has revolutionised modes of communication, training, and access to knowledge. Around 16 million people were using it in 1996, but by 2006 the number had grown to 1.1 billion, and it continues to grow exponentially. This revolution is creating a more transparent, border-free world (although the Internet is under close surveillance in certain countries) based on the concept of exchange. Time is being compressed in a way never seen before. The cost of telecommunications is falling spectacularly, and this deep transformation holds out unprecedented potential for the economic powerhouses and developing countries alike, for both groups and individuals.

In this benign context, there has been a *decline in the number of armed conflicts*. Numbers have fallen steadily between 1990 and 2006. This applies to Europe, with the end of the armed conflicts that caused so much bloodshed in the Balkans in the 1990s, as also in Africa, in Angola, Liberia and Rwanda. Other examples illustrate this trend in Asia, with the solution to the armed conflicts afflicting Indonesia, in Aceh, in the wake of the tsunami disaster and the intervention of European mediation, and in East Timor.

International society's capacity for mobilisation is making progress, thanks to the aspiration of a growing number of States to play a regional or global role, and to shoulder greater responsibilities in their bid for international status. The desire to prevent, limit or halt wars can be put down to the new instruments of prevention spawned by globalisation. International co-operation in the management or prevention of crises is reaching spectacular proportions: in 2008, nearly 90,000 men and women were deployed in UN peacekeeping opera-

Number of internet users – 1991-2008
(in millions)




Source: Ministry of Defence (open sources).

tions. Each operation aimed at stabilising or supporting peace now involves several dozen States or organisations.

At the same time, important States, like the ones that emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union, South Africa or Libya, have renounced their nuclear status, weapons or ambitions, depending on the case.

Europe is in the process of completing its unity. The historic enlargement of the European Union is already a considerable source of strength. It is now the world's leading economic and trading power and the largest contributor to development assistance. It possesses diplomatic, financial, economic and military resources essential to the stabilisation of the international system. For its Member States, many security questions now find their solution at the European level: this

Contributions to UN operations in 2008



Source: UN, April 2008, <http://www.un.org>

applies to health and environmental safety, to the reconstruction of post-conflict crisis zones, and the fight against major organised crime networks.

From a security point of view, the enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance has bolstered that of the European Union. NATO evolved from a military structure organised to cope with a Warsaw Pact that threatened it directly, to a security organisation offering the United Nations multinational military capabilities based on a close relationship and co-ordination between American and European means.

Worrying trends

GLOBALISATION'S DOWNSIDE

Although globalisation has greatly expanded exchanges in all areas, it also has a downside. Faster means of transport are leading not only to increased risks of the spread of pandemics, and the Internet allows the propagation of more than just computer viruses. Means of communication are bringing forth an increasingly transparent world, but the resulting immediacy is contributing to the *rapid spread of all kinds of crises*—political, economic and financial.

Internet users are expected to account for around 22% of the world population in 2011. The instantaneous nature of communication can be measured also in terms of the volume of messages exchanged electronically each day—estimated at between 100 and 200 billion. The *staggering acceleration of the speed of circulation of information*, and with it the speed of action everywhere, is making management of these crises infinitely more complex. This is in turn undermining States' capacity to regulate, and is proportionally increasing the capacity for action by businesses, organisations and networks on the global scene.

In view of the foregoing, defence and security strategies need to address new problems: not only the defence or control of defined areas, but also the explosion of unchecked movements of people, goods and ideas. The responses themselves can only be global, combining all of the means at the disposal of the authorities and civil society; it implies mobilisation at every level, national, European and international.

Communication on a global scale is also making the dissemination of economic, political and cultural models more perceptible, which is seen as an attempt to diminish the world's diversity. The *rejection of uniformity* is breeding a proliferation of identity-centred responses, sometimes violent, bringing with them the risk of new fractures on a planetary scale.

The growing role of non-State actors

The opening up of borders, the immediacy of news flows, the fluidity of exchanges, and the extraordinary growth in financial flows worldwide, is curbing the role and influence of States in the management of international relations. They now have very little capacity to control international financial flows, to regulate business transactions, or to ensure that the flow of information disseminated across the Internet contains no criminal or illegal content.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have become front rank actors, and their capacity to mobilise public opinion gives them considerable clout, and in some cases they are able to exert pressure on the policies of States and international organisations.

The *major news media*, television in particular, play an essential role in public perceptions and opinions as to whether or not military interventions are legitimate. The "CNN effect" and the "Al Jazeera effect" in the shaping of international opinion reflect the media's status as an alternative centre of power.

Private companies now perform certain sovereign prerogatives, and *private military firms* are growing up alongside regular forces.

Criminal organisations are being structured on a global scale and their resources match or outclass certain States. Terrorist networks have modified their ways of functioning and are able to resist the most effective State security apparatuses. Networks involved in drug trafficking, in Afghanistan notably or in Latin America, and the collusion between them, are a growing threat.

Consequently, and paradoxically, globalisation goes hand-in-hand with rising nationalism, religious fanaticism and authoritarian backlashes. Some people are exploiting the opportunities to disseminate their ideas *via* the Internet and other means of information and communication. Others seek to establish ways to compartmentalise the virtual world, means of control and prohibition, or even ways to manipulate communication.

Globalisation is also fuelling flagrant economic and social inequalities. *Whole regions are failing to share in the benefits of world growth*, and instead of narrowing, the gap between richest and poorest is widening. At a time when the spread of information and news is raising the visibility of these inequalities, this situation is fraught with *dangers for international stability*. It could breed revolt and extremism. The positive effects of globalisation have passed by much of *Africa, Asia, and even Latin America*.

The economic growth of the new powers goes hand-in-hand with rising *energy consumption*, as well as a *growing demand for natural resources and strategic raw materials*. This is contributing to *two types of disorder*.

The first concerns damage to the biosphere, including *global warming*, which between now and 2025 is forecast to produce effects that are still difficult to measure on the equilibrium of the polar zones, the level of the oceans, the geography of human migrations, food security, and the expansion of the areas affected by certain diseases. The spread of microbial agents seems set to accelerate. These new risks can only be tackled and dealt with on a global scale, by new organisations and forms of action. Their impact on security needs to be measured long in advance.

The second of these is the *growing pressure on strategic supplies*. Global energy consumption could double between now and 2030. The European Union countries are currently more than 75% dependent for their oil consumption on production zones located in the Middle East, Africa and Russia. The figures for gas are comparable. The fast-growing economies such as India, and above all China, are scouring the planet in search of new sources of supply. Excessive and unregulated pressures in this regard could breed competition, and possibly even conflict.


Over-exploitation of natural resources could *stoke up tensions on a planetary scale, and on a scale hitherto unseen in the race to satisfy demand for energy, water, food and raw materials*. These issues demand regulatory strategies also on a global scale.

By accelerating exchanges of every kind, globalisation is facilitating *programmes for the proliferation of weapons that are either banned or regulated* by international treaties. These developments are no longer solely the result of State policies but also the result of initiatives taken by private and clandestine networks. *Nuclear arms* proliferation is taking on a new dimension, with nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, North Korea in 2006, and grave suspicions surrounding Iran's nuclear programme. This trend is a major threat, one that could drastically affect international security in the coming years.

Simultaneously, technologies for the fabrication of ballistic *missiles*, cruise missiles and drones have become widespread. Several countries, Iran and Pakistan notably, have crossed the 1,000-km threshold for ballistic missiles since 1994, or now have access to distinctly greater ranges (as in the case of India and North Korea).

In the field of *chemical warfare*, the implementation of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is unsatisfactory, no unannounced inspection of chemical sites ("challenge" inspections as provided for in the international convention) having been carried out. In

Environment and climate change : consequences in 2008



Source: Ministry of Defence (open sources).

the *biological* sphere—one of the hardest to monitor and benefiting from spectacular progress in the life sciences—no instrument exists to control the application of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

CHANGING FORMS OF VIOLENCE

Terrorism crossed an historical threshold and underwent a change of scale on September 11, 2001. It caused trauma in the United States, and prompted a military operation leading to the intervention in Afghanistan to overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, undermined Pakistan and, indirectly, led to the war in Iraq. The 2001 attacks and those that followed, in Europe notably (Madrid 2004, London 2005), marked a turning point in the scale, spread, modes of operation and effectiveness of terrorist networks. Terrorism is now capable of striking at the heart of any country, with unprecedented violence, with a degree of international preparation and intensity of action never before achieved by terrorist groups.


Jihadism, Islamism, Terrorism

In Europe, *Jihad* is often translated as “holy war”. Etymologically, though, *Jihad* signifies “an effort towards a specific goal”, *i.e.*, on the one hand, the effort to defend or spread Islam, and on the other, an effort on the part of the believer to conform to the rules of the Koran. This reference appears in various verses of the Koran in different forms: spreading Islam by persuasion, fighting to repulse an attack on Islam, etc. Just as one distinguishes Islam from its political exploitation (“*Islamism*”), one needs to distinguish the religious notion of *Jihad* from “*Jihadism*”, which is a deformation of it through terrorist action.

This radicalisation of violence on a global scale makes it one of the major threats for the coming years, requiring a radical overhaul of defence and security strategies.

The *wars* in Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq, and those that have caused bloodshed in Africa, have dominated the international scene. The first two, after phases of high-intensity military action, employing the full spectrum of the most advanced technologies, are being prolonged in the form of guerrilla warfare and are spreading among the civilian populations. In Iraq, a new focal point of international terrorist violence aimed at civil populations has taken root. In Africa, war remains a reality or a potential threat in too many regions.

Major terrorist attacks since September 2001



Source: Ministry of Defence.

In certain African countries, the share of military expenditures in national budgets is still far too high and is hampering development. In others, control of the territory is and will be an acute problem.

The privatisation of armed violence is spreading. Alongside the widespread phenomenon of militias, private military firms are springing up on the fringes of or alongside regular forces. These companies provide security for firms working in unstable regions such as Africa. But they play an increasingly prominent direct role in the stabilisation phases following international military interventions. This trend runs counter to the principle of the legitimacy of the State monopoly of armed force. The soldier in uniform is no longer immediately identifiable with a combatant acting within a multinational framework. In addition to the confusion resulting from the proliferation of militias there is now, with such a trend, the added blurring of the identity of forces with an international mandate.

THE RISE IN GLOBAL MILITARY SPENDING

After declining significantly in the 1990s, *global military spending* has risen continuously since then. Global defence spending, which in 1998 amounted to US\$ 867 billion (in constant 2007 dollars) had risen to US\$ 1,204 billion in 2006, reverting to its level at the beginning of the 1990s.


The main cause of this increase is North American spending. The United States sharply increased its spending in 2002, and this has outpaced GDP growth ever since. This is the main factor in the global upward trend. US spending, and in Europe that of the United Kingdom, have also risen significantly as a result of the war effort in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Yet even outside these countries, worldwide spending has risen significantly since 1998 (see box). South Asia and East Asia, with an additional US\$ 40 billion since that date, have seen a pronounced increase. China is continuing to modernise its equipment, with substantial purchases from Russia (combat aircraft and submarines) and has expanded its nuclear and ballistic capabilities. India's spending has grown at the same fast pace as its GDP growth. This has resulted in a substantial increase in the military resources of both countries, and especially China.

Europe and South America have increased their military spending the least since 1998, proportionally.


Official comparisons should be treated with caution, due to the limited transparency of certain major countries' expenditures, such as China.

Global defence spending
(in 2007 dollars billion)



Source: SIPRI

Global defence spending
(in 2007 dollars billion – excl. Western Europe and North America)



Source: SIPRI.

N.B: “Western Europe”: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Turkey.

“Central Europe”: Albania, Baltic countries (from 1991), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia (and its successor states after 1992), DDR (until 1990), Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia (and its successor states after 1992).

“Eastern Europe”: USSR until 1990; 1991 figures not available due to the demise of the Soviet Union; from 1992, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine.

MAJOR UNRESOLVED CRISES

The case of the *Balkans* deserves to be treated separately, though the situation there remains fragile. But the war that marked the countries of the former Yugoslavia throughout the 1990s is over.

On the other hand, contrary to the hopes aroused during those 1990s, a *major geography of conflict is emerging, stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to India.*

In the Near and Middle East, peace is under constant threat from at least four sources of conflict. The deadlock in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians initiated in 1993 is fuelling radicalisation, in which social, religious and security factors are inextricably linked. Lebanon is prone to repeated crises, largely manipulated by outside actors, from Syria and Iran notably. The continuing hostilities in Iraq give reason to fear a general escalation in the antagonism between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, and are nurturing a hotspot of violence pervading the region as a whole. In addition to its nuclear and ballistic programme, as well as its external activities, Iran is openly threatening the very existence of Israel. Although originally governed by distinct logics, these crises are increasingly interlinked directly and indirectly. They now carry a risk of a chain reaction fuelled by the inability of the international institutions and the great powers to set in motion a peaceful settlement, and that of the countries in the region themselves to overcome their divisions.

At the same time, the stabilisation operations in Afghanistan are becoming protracted, creating the impression that Western power is exposed and vulnerable. The situation in Pakistan appears to be more and more fragile: the border areas with Afghanistan are destabilised, uncontrolled and serve as sanctuaries for Al Qaeda and affiliated groups. The latter could affect the security of Pakistan, that of the international forces in Afghanistan, and could also be preparing terrorist actions in the West. The Kashmir question remains unresolved despite renewed dialogue with India. This situation as a whole is unfolding within the context of a strengthening of Pakistan's ballistic and nuclear capabilities.

The distress of the populations in these regions is creating new generations whose sole horizon is armed violence.

Resistance to the presence of foreign troops, even under international mandate, is hardening, even as recourse to military force alone appears inappropriate.

Other crises to which there is no solution at present are affecting international security. In *Africa* many conflicts and guerrilla situations persist. These are becoming increasingly complex due to the proliferation of actors and the extension of these conflicts to the regional level.

This is the situation in the Horn of Africa, in the Great Lakes region, and in the region of the Sahel.

In *Asia*, the risks of unresolved conflicts rooted in history could threaten international security on a large scale if they are not headed off: these include the Korean question, the Taiwanese question, and the question of Kashmir. With at least three declared nuclear powers (China, India and Pakistan) and the presence of two other major powers in the Far East (Russia and the United States), these risks are a cause for concern.

The new strategic situation and instability

Globalisation is creating a world that is neither better nor more dangerous than two decades ago. It does, on the other hand, foreshadow the outlines of a distinctly more unstable international system, more out of control and hence more disquieting, calling for both more global and highly specific responses.

THE PROGRESSIVE SHIFT IN THE CENTRE OF STRATEGIC GRAVITY TOWARDS ASIA

Looking to 2025, Asia will be one of the major centres of international life, alongside Europe and America. New powers will have emerged, China and India foremost among them.

More than half of the world's population will be of Asian origin at that date, representing around 4.7 billion people. China is expected to become the world's number one importer and exporter. Barring a major internal or international upset, China's gross domestic product (GDP) and that of India could triple over the next two decades, and Asia could by then account for half of global oil consumption.

This growing power, coupled with that of other emerging countries, foreshadows the outlines of a reshaped global economic and geopolitical system. The relative importance of the new powers, the scale of the interests at stake, and the competition for access to markets and resources, are modifying the global strategic equation.

Asia's rise is not without its fragilities, as is witnessed by the risks of economic overheating, the persistent underdevelopment of whole swathes of the population, and its exposure to major natural risks or ecological disasters. Nor is it irreversible, should one of the causes of potential conflict lead to war, which given the region's conditions, could prove devastating. Consequently, Asia is one of the main regions

where rivalries or conflicts could destabilise the international security system.

However, the rise of these new powers is unquestionably one of the outstanding features of the future strategic landscape.

Strategic issues in Asia

Asia is now one of the most dynamic regions of the world, where growth is fastest, the population most numerous, and the transformations most impressive. It is also home to a large number of unresolved conflicts (Kashmir, the Korean peninsula, and the Taiwanese question), and interstate tensions (India-Pakistan, India-China, China-Japan), and where three of the world's most important countries have strategic interests and a military presence (Russia, China, and the United States). It is the only region where three nuclear powers have common frontiers that are not internationally recognised (India-Pakistan-China). Meanwhile North Korea, which carried out a nuclear test in October 2006, and which is continuing to develop its ballistic technologies, is giving concern to its neighbours, Japan in particular. Its role in global proliferation is a destabilising factor.

Against this background, military spending is rising steeply. In China especially, the military budget has been growing at publicly-announced 10% average annual growth rate between 1989 and 2007, and 17% for the two years 2007 and 2008. This is all the more disquieting inasmuch as these spending figures lack transparency where China is concerned, as the region possesses no system of collective security, and as little is being done to build confidence.

THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF THE WESTERN POWERS

The Western world (*i.e.*, essentially Europe and America) no longer has a monopoly of economic and strategic initiative in the sense that it still did have in 1994.

Economically speaking, in 20 years time the countries of Europe and North America will produce only around 40% of global wealth and Asia will have been caught up with them.

In population terms, projections highlight the decline in the West's relative share. In 2025, the United States and Europe will represent no more than 9% of the world's population.

While the models of governance and the values promoted by these States are sometimes envied, increasingly they are radically rejected, on ideological and religious grounds, sustained by the spread of

jihadism *via* the Internet and the public media. Western power, its obsession with security since 2001 and its practical manifestations, are often perceived as aggressive. Economic globalisation has indeed prompted a process of opening up and unification of international society without precedent. But it has yet to generate universal acceptance of a common world view. On the contrary, opposition to declared Western ambitions is fuelling new tensions and violence.

America's and Europe's technological and military superiority will remain considerable, but it will have rivals. The development by the new powers of military capabilities will enable them to maintain a stronger and broader presence in their zones of interest. Many of them, particularly in Asia, are acceding to comparable levels of technology in certain key areas such as communications, information and space technologies.

However, these underlying trends should not be overestimated.

The Western countries themselves harbour diverse views of the world and cannot be reduced to a single "model", nor would they allow themselves to be dragged into a binary vision of international relations. The technology gap remains in their favour, especially when they invest in leading-edge science and technologies.

The United States will continue to set the pace in that respect. Over the coming fifteen years, it will hold on to the advantages that have made it the leading economic, technological and military power in the world, namely vigorous population growth, a dynamic private sector, a decisive lead in the knowledge and communications economy, and technological and military pre-eminence. 80% of all of the world's computer servers are American.

It is their determination to continue to be open societies, to organise together, to invest in knowledge and to uphold their values that will allow the other Western countries to play their role in international security in a world where the balance of powers and world governance is set to evolve in any case.

THE FRAGILITIES OF THE SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The collective security system appears to have been weakened. Most of the instruments and institutions of international society such as the UN, the WTO, the IMF, etc. and the multilateral arms-control instruments are in the throes of a dual crisis of legitimacy and efficacy.

The crisis of legitimacy flows in the first place from the absence of agreement over of the reform of the UN Security Council. This organ, which has prime responsibility for international peacekeeping and

The United States – still a major power in 2025

The United States will long wield the chief attributes of power. Apart from those cited above, it can rely on its considerable capacity for innovation fuelled by heavy investment in military research and development (US\$ 70 billion), its military dominance of the global common spaces (air, sea and space), and an unrivalled network of alliances, starting with its alliance with the countries of Europe, including France. However, factors at work are making the United States more fragile, both economically (debt, economic and financial dependence on Asia, the risk of a currency crisis), as well as militarily (its difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, the pursuit of asymmetric strategies by its increasingly numerous adversaries), and diplomatically (the Middle East). In recent years, its policies have been increasingly challenged. Russia's desire to reaffirm its place and the rise of China in all areas could weaken America's relative position. One possible consequence of this situation is a crisis of confidence among America's allies in the two most volatile regions, namely the Middle East and the Far East. A section of American society may be tempted to refocus on purely national concerns. Yet there has been a constant tendency to underestimate the dynamism of America, and the fundamentals of American power are unlikely to come under serious threat between now and 2025.

security, remains the capstone of international relations. But it is now insufficiently representative, and this is a cause of growing weakness in the gathering international rebalancing of power.

Moreover, despite new developments, arms-control and non-proliferation instruments are coming under challenge either as a result of the failures of the fight against proliferation, or due to the non-participation of important States. Meanwhile some States are challenging or withdrawing from treaties that long organised arms-control, disarmament and non-proliferation (for example the American withdrawal from the ABM treaty, announced in December 2001, Russia's distancing itself from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, or North Korea's withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003).

Contrary to the hopes aroused at the end of the Cold War, the *logic of power* is not on the wane. The globalisation of the economy has not led to the emergence of a new more democratic and more peaceful world order. The States exposed to Al Qaeda-inspired terrorist violence are tempted to break free from the multilateral framework governing the use of force, or from the legal norms of international law. Power relationships between States and their divergences of interests are

shaping international relations as much as the new forms of economic and financial interdependence.

Thus Russia, for example, is seeking to consolidate its return to the international scene and its status as a major power by taking an offensive line in dealing with certain European countries, notably those in its immediate vicinity (the so-called “near-abroad”). It gives the impression of having difficulty adjusting to the political changes that have taken place since the end of the Warsaw Pact, and in taking on board the full implications of the democratic process initiated in the 1990s. It is tempted to test the effects of putting pressure—economic at least—on its neighbours.

FRAGILE STATES AND LAWLESS AREAS

Contrary to the foregoing situation, a growing number of States lack all the attributes of sovereignty, or are progressively losing them. They are incapable of discharging their sovereign prerogatives in terms of ensuring the security of their territory and their population in terms of the distribution of resources or preparing for the future. But these fragile States, which are highly vulnerable to both domestic crises and external shocks, are often incapable of combating trafficking, rebellions or the activities of terrorist groups utilising their territory. Consequently, lawless areas are springing up in many regions of the world, particularly in Africa (as in the Sahara/Sahel zone) and in Asia (as in northern Pakistan, for example).

Preventing the outbreak of crises or wars in these States has become one of the major challenges facing the international security system.

STRATEGIC SURPRISES AND UPSETS

Those that reject the influence of the West will seek to *circumvent* its technological advantage and military power, while fiercely competing with its economic might. The quest for the most effective strategies that avoid head-on confrontation with our capabilities and attempts to test our societies’ vulnerabilities will intensify.

Consequently, we must be prepared for strategic upsets resulting from the scale of violence of attempts to thwart the normal functioning of our societies, in places not normally expected by our military and security means. *Interruptions to the flows* of goods, people, assets, or again information that are the lifeblood of national and international life today can take unforeseen forms and trigger an *unexpected regression* in various parts of the world, Europe included.

Russia: the return of power politics

One of the most remarkable changes compared with 1994 is the evolution of relations between Russia and the Western world, the United States and Europe alike.

The policy of rapprochement embarked on at the end of the Cold War has given way to a series of initiatives that run counter to this objective, as in the use of energy as a weapon in international relations, attempts at controlling regions or countries in Russia's "near abroad", and calling into question the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Emboldened by its economic muscle resulting from higher energy prices, Russia is reverting to power politics, helped by rising military spending. It has expanded the scope of its military exercises, which since 2007 have been taking place in the Baltic Sea, the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Pacific. Its policies vis-à-vis its neighbours belonging to the European Union and NATO, or which have applied to join, are still more of a concern.

Russia's weaknesses are no less obvious, and the Russian authorities themselves acknowledge them. These include the low investment, including in the energy sector, falling population, and public health problems.

The European countries should adopt a common approach in proposing an ambitious yet balanced cooperation with Russia. This approach would also encourage Russia to exercise its power responsibly, this being an indispensable basis for a partnership to tackle international challenges effectively. Russia's stated desire to be involved in the European Union's operations is an encouraging signal. We have major common security interests, including the stabilisation of Afghanistan, combating terrorism, and halting Iran's nuclear programme.

The most serious currently identified scenario is the combination of a major terrorist attack on European soil, using non-conventional nuclear, chemical or biological-type means, together with a war situation in one of the strategically important zones for Europe. With that in mind, our strategy should allow for the possibility of an outbreak of major conflicts in the Middle East and Asia.

But upsets can take other forms.


A breaking of the *nuclear taboo* itself is no longer improbable. Circumstances have changed since the balance of deterrence reached in the 1960s. New nuclear powers have emerged whose doctrines, where they exist, are little understood. Nuclear weapons are present in several sensitive regions with persistent territorial disputes. In addition, certain terrorist groups are known to be seeking access to radiological or nuclear materials or devices.

The international context makes it essential to *incorporate strategic uncertainty as one of the fundamentals of French defence and security thinking and policy.*

This emphasis on uncertainty signals neither a lack of information nor an intellectual shortcoming. Precisely the opposite: *it posits the ability to anticipate and protect the nation as the fundamental criterion of a new strategy founded on an autonomous decision-making capacity.*

This strategy is rooted in a *coherent ambition and international policy*: promoting the European Union as a global security actor on the one hand, and the construction of a legitimate and effective system of global governance on the other, are the necessary fulcrums for the defence of the major security interests of France.

Areas of conflict and tension in 2008



- Peace:**
- Major international interventions
 - *Peacekeeping operations ended by 2007
 - International peace negotiations
 - (1): international intervention in Iraq
- Areas of tensions**
- Territories where state sovereignty is challenged
 - Areas of tensions
- Conflicts:**
- Major conflicts where civilians are directly targeted
 - ✕ Armed secessionist movements
 - Presence of armed groups challenging governments

Source: Ministry of Defence (open sources).

CHAPTER 2

CONSEQUENCES FOR FRANCE AND EUROPE

France and Europe belong to a group of democracies whose situation has grown more vulnerable than it was at the end of the Cold War.

Four critical regions

THE ARC OF CRISIS, FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE INDIAN OCEAN

This region is not a homogenous ensemble. Each country in it has its own identity and history, and its political, social, economic and human wellsprings. Each part of the region has its own logic: that of the Sahel area, from Mauritania to Somalia, is clearly different from the Mediterranean littoral, the Near East, the Arabian-Persian Gulf, or from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

But essential changes now taking place are modifying the security situation for France and Europe in this part of the world, which lies in Europe's neighbourhood and is central to global security strategic interests. The upsurge in radical Islam, the antagonism between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, the Kurdish question, and the fragility of political regimes in the region, form an explosive mixture. The establishment and networking of terrorist groups are becoming a permanent fact of life. Iran's nuclear and ballistic programmes by themselves threaten to upset the balance right across the Middle East and beyond. The region's oil and gas reserves remain central to the energy supplies of the European continent.

A new risk now emerging is that of a linking up of the conflicts, from the Near and Middle East to the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. The existence of mainly clandestine nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes is aggravating this danger, at time when the countries of these regions are openly or covertly acquiring large-scale military capabilities with aircraft and missiles. The destabilisation of Iraq, notably the division between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, could spread to the rest of the Middle East.

The instability of this geographical arc could therefore affect our interests directly or indirectly. European countries have a military presence in varying capacities in Chad, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan. Given these conditions, there is every likelihood Europe and France will be called upon to become still more involved in the region as a whole, to help prevent crises and to resolve them.

Rising tensions from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean

The area stretching between Mauritania and Pakistan is crucial for Europe looking to 2025. The population is forecast to double between now and 2030, while economic prospects are limited, unemployment is high, educational systems are ill-adapted and political regimes challenged. The region's natural resources essentially consist of oil and gas (representing two thirds of the world's reserves). Its water situation is very unfavourable and the region is expected to experience severe problems of access to drinking water, aggravated by climate change and migratory flows.

Against this background, the radicalisation of societies, the opposition between Shiites and Sunnis, and the attempts by Al Qaeda and jihadism to wrest control of national struggles compound the risks of destabilisation. Moreover, the deadlock in the peace process, the persistence of conflicts (in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan) or threats of destabilisation (Pakistan) hold out little prospect of solutions in the coming years. The interconnection between networks of influence across the entire region is another factor of instability. Iran's regional ambitions, underpinned by its ballistic and nuclear programmes, are causing such concern among its neighbours that one cannot rule out entirely a revision of their NPT commitments within the next fifteen years. The already fragile regional balance would be durably undermined, and any conflict would pose a nuclear risk. Finally, the military co-operation between North Korea and several countries in the region in the ballistic, and even nuclear, spheres represents another important risk factor, given the missiles' growing range. The presence of China and Russia in the Gulf States and Africa is growing hand in hand with sizeable arms sales.

SECURITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

France and Europe cannot turn their backs on the continent closest to them. Africa possesses numerous strengths and has a considerable human and economic potential. In the long term, these capacities could enable it to play a leading role in global economic growth and security. Nevertheless, continuing population growth, the weakness of its state structures and poor governance are liable to hinder development and the fair redistribution of its gains for a long time to come.

Security in Africa will suffer in the first place from poor living conditions due to urban growth, the lack of adequate health structures and increasingly scarce local food resources. Climate warming is aggravating the situation. France and Europe must contribute to the fight against worsening conditions in order to curb migratory trends driven by economic and social distress. These conditions are also encouraging the transit of illicit goods *via* this continent towards Europe, and their eradication is a prime objective. This is especially vital in view of the spectacular growth in the flow of drugs originating from Latin America.

Sub-Saharan Africa continues to suffer from endemic wars, both internal and international. Because of their regional dimension, some conflicts (Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, or Darfur) could affect the security of the continent. Africa aspires to develop its own capacity to settle disputes, prevent crises and keep the peace. France and Europe have a major interest in contributing to the establishment of these means. To that end, they should continue to support the efforts of the African Union (AU), regional organisations and the countries of Africa themselves.

The continent's abundant strategic raw materials and energy resources should be exploited, in the first place for the benefit of the African populations themselves. These constitute an essential resource for Africa. Moreover, they can also contribute to the promotion of European technologies. A European strategy built around a balanced partnership with the countries concerned, for equitable access to these resources, should therefore be implemented.

Africa, still poor, but increasingly coveted

Sub-Saharan Africa is *one of the only regions in the world where poverty has increased in spite of sustained economic growth since the beginning of the 2000s*. Looking to 2030, the World Bank estimates this region's real GDP growth rate at 3.3% a year. Given the population's annual growth rate of 2.5%, the population will amount to 1.04 billion inhabitants in 2025. The risk of relatively slow per capita GDP growth will remain very high.

Some of the consequences of this situation have already been identified, such as the rising number and size of megacities; food scarcity aggravated by damage to the biosphere, climate warming and rising demand; the risks of epidemics and the absence of adequate health care structures (notably as regards HIV-AIDS and malaria); population growth, more than half of which will be aged under 25 in 2025, with high rates of unemployment; and substantial migratory movements, including in the direction of Europe.

The frequent shortcomings of state structures and the expansion of no-go zones, rent-based economies profiting a tiny minority, and the existence of criminal networks with substantial military means at their disposal, are all factors giving cause for concern. Africa's problems have a direct impact on our interests in the shape of illegal immigration, religious radicalisation in Muslim areas, and the emergence of fundamentalist sects in Christian areas, terrorist groups claiming allegiance to Al Qaeda putting down roots, the emergence of new drug routes, illegal arms trafficking, proliferation networks, money laundering, and health risks. The Sahel strip, from the Atlantic to Somalia, may be considered to be the geometrical focal point of these interlocking threats and, in that sense, calls for specific vigilance and investment over a long period.

And yet, contrary to what this list might foreshadow, the African picture is far from entirely negative, and *Africa possesses many advantages, which it is increasingly developing*: the sub-Saharan region contains resources vital to the global economy; its youthfulness is an opportunity; new generations are acceding to economic and political responsibilities and deserve to be encouraged. It is true that, in the absence of significant progress on the governance front, the continent's resources will continue to be a factor of corruption, intra-and inter-state conflict, and growing inequalities, rather than development.

Finally, the growing expansion and influence in Africa of *Middle Eastern and Asian countries*, attracted by Africa's resources and potential, rank among the outstanding features of the past 10 years. These are happening to the detriment of the approach of the IMF and the

World Bank, which are attempting to tie aid to governance. In March 2008, China opened the largest ever credit line for an African country, totalling 50 billion dollars for Nigeria, while the Democratic Republic of Congo recently signed agreements with Beijing concerning 12 billion dollars in investments.

THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT

Developments in Russia and trends in its policy vis-à-vis its immediate neighbours, the former members of the Soviet Union, or vis-à-vis adjacent countries, along with its partnership with the Europeans and the Atlantic Alliance, will continue to be important factors for the security of the continent and peace in the world. Russia has not yet completed the changes begun in the 1990s. Its attitude towards some of its neighbours is cause for concern. Forging a balanced relationship will therefore remain a major objective in the coming years.

Moreover, rather than distancing ourselves from the Balkans now that the situation there is in the process of stabilisation, we should be redoubling our attention. We need to support a process of reconciliation and integration into the European and Transatlantic polity. The region's persistent fragilities, arising from history and nationalistic urges, called for vigilance. All of Europe's countries have a direct interest in maintaining a substantial commitment in this region.

North Africa: co-operation, risks and hopes

North Africa is of special importance to France (for historic reasons, the presence of North African communities, language, energy, and economic co-operation), as well as for the whole of southern Europe. It presents a contrasting picture, with potentially positive factors that deserve to be encouraged, and more worrying factors whose development needs to be curtailed. In addition, new State actors (notably the United States and China) and non-State actors (Al Qaeda) must now be taken into account.

The most positive factors notably concern the following points:

- The demographic transition;
- The region's economic potential;
- Co-operation between the two sides of the Mediterranean;
- The abandonment of non-conventional weapons programmes in Libya.

The most worrying factors are:

- Social inequalities, with some of the highest unemployment rates in the world, very uneven development;
- Deficient educational systems ;
- Environmental damage and unchecked urban development. This factor will be aggravated by climate trends, with increasingly scarce water resources in a region already close to a situation of shortage (five to six times less than in France);
- Rising clandestine immigration;
- The exposure of the North African states to the transit, or even immigration of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa in ever rising numbers (several million in the area stretching from Morocco to Libya);
- Political stalemate fuelling extremism;
- The establishment of the followers of Al Qaeda in North Africa.

Scenarios based on the continuation of today's negative trends would result in situations of tension and instability by 2025 that are a matter of concern for Europe and France. What is needed is a comprehensive political approach on the part of the Europeans. *Europe needs to act* vigorously and in a targeted manner in the areas of education and opening up economies in order to ensure the region's development, encourage regional integration and draw the North African economies closer to Europe, and finally co-operation on immigration and security issues.

This calls for a vision, resources, and a long-term political commitment on the part of France and Europe.

The risks of high intensity inter-State conflict appear to be limited, but they demand international attention. On the other hand, there is a real risk of destabilisation arising from internal factors (political succession, social unrest, unemployment, terrorism, etc.). Over the next fifteen years and beyond, economic, political and social development alone can help protect the region against these risks.

THE EFFECT OF MAJOR CONFLICTS IN ASIA

Major conflicts in Asia would directly affect the interests of France and Europe. The sources of still unresolved conflicts inherited from the second half of the XXth century create an especially serious risk inasmuch as three major nuclear States have common frontiers that are not recognised internationally (the line of control between India and Pakistan, and the line of actual control between India and China), and inasmuch as Asia still does not have multilateral institutions for the prevention or settlement of conflicts. The constitution in June 2001 of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, bringing together the

Heads of State of its six member countries (China, Russia, and the Central Asian States) and observer states (India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan), or again the development of ASEAN, are evidence of a growing awareness among the region's countries of the need for collective consultation on security problems. But as Asian leaders themselves admit, these efforts fall short of what is needed.

The prevention of major conflicts in Asia is therefore a central objective for all actors on the international scene. Europeans should take the following key factors into account: the impact of war on strategic maritime routes; the potential economic and financial fallout of a major conflict on a continent that plays a growing role in the world economy; the impact of any war in regions where the Asian powers obtain energy supplies or strategic raw materials; our links with the United States, guaranteeing the security of several States in the region. Europe and France increasingly perceive the importance of what is at stake in Asia. As a result, the countries of Europe should build their approach on an effort to explain these issues and to familiarise public opinion, government and their leading citizens with them.

New vulnerabilities for Europe's territory and its citizens

Europe's population and territory are now more vulnerable than in the 1990s, in the sense of being more exposed to direct threats.

TERRORISM

France and Europe are direct targets of jihadism and those claiming allegiance to it. This source of terrorism will remain one of the main physical threats directed against Europe and its citizens around the world for many years to come. In response to the terrorist threat, in June 2006 France adopted the Government *White Paper* on Domestic Security against Terrorism. This Paper argues that terrorist groups will modify their *modus operandi* depending on their perception of Europe's weaknesses and vulnerabilities. At present terrorism mainly uses conventional means and explosives. These attacks have taken an extreme form with suicide bombings.

But several groups are seeking to use non-conventional weapons, albeit rudimentary ones. If this proves successful, it will represent a dramatic step in the destabilisation of the national and European community.

Given the scale of possible attacks, urgent action is needed to put an end to the current inadequacy of detection, analysis and response capabilities, as well as of the means of protection available to our domestic security forces, civil security and armed forces in contexts where radiological, biological or chemical weapons are being used.

Other potential targets include infrastructures critical to the working of the economy, society or institutions, both on national territory and abroad, along with the oil and gas production and transport system, other modes of energy production, the food supply chain, together with information systems, which are now essential to all human activities.

State-supported terrorist acts cannot be ruled out any more than attacks by jihadist groups in the coming years. France has already had experience of this in the past. Our territory and our population could again come under this type of threat in the future.

Consequently, terrorism will be the subject of constant attention and monitoring. By raising our defence thresholds, the reinforcement of our intelligence and preventive capabilities will seek to forestall any occurrence and limit its impact.

MISSILE THREATS

The threat of ballistic and cruise missiles to the continent of Europe has grown sharply and France and several other European countries will come within range of new ballistic capabilities between now and 2025. This direct exposure, regardless of the intentions of the governments that acquire these capabilities, represents a new factor for which France and Europe must be prepared.


MAJOR CYBER ATTACKS

Information systems, which are the nerve system of our economic and social life, as well as of the operations of the public authorities, of the major energy, transport or food producers, or again the organisation of our defence, have made our societies and their defence vulnerable to accidental breakdowns or intentional attacks on computer networks.

The current daily level of cyber attacks, whether from State sources or not, points to a very high potential for the destabilisation of everyday life, paralysis of critical networks for the life of the nation, or denial of access to certain military capabilities.

Society and government are still ill-prepared for the risks of massive attacks, and these should therefore be the subject of fresh attention, both in terms of strengthening defences and enhancing our capacity to hit back.

Ballistic capabilities and the arc of crisis-1994-2015*



Source: Ministry of Defence.

* Except China, United States, France, United Kingdom, Russia (permanent members of UN Security Council)

** Technology exported

Major cyber attacks

Information and communication means and networks have become the nervous systems of our society, without which it would cease to function. Yet “cyberspace”, consisting of the networking of all networks, is radically different from physical space in that it has no frontiers, is constantly changing and anonymous, making it hard to identify an aggressor with certainty.

The threat takes many forms, ranging from malevolent blocking, physical destruction (for example of satellites or infrastructures for crucial networks), neutralisation of computer systems, data theft or distortion, or even taking control of a system for hostile purposes.

Over the next 15 years, the proliferation of attempted attacks by non-State actors, computer pirates, activists or criminal organisations is a certainty. Some of these could be on a massive scale.

With regard to *attacks emanating from States*, several countries have already mapped out offensive cyber-warfare strategies and are effectively putting in place technical capabilities with the aid of hackers. Covert attempted attacks are highly probable in this context. Massive overt actions are also plausible over the next fifteen years.

Technological developments and the interconnection of networks are rendering simple passive and perimeter defensive strategies less and less effective, even though these remain necessary. *The transition from a passive defensive strategy to an active defensive strategy in depth, combining intrinsic systems protection with permanent surveillance, rapid response and offensive action, calls for a strong governmental impetus and a change in mentalities.*

The State must powerfully develop, maintain and disseminate its information systems security expertise among economic actors, and particularly among network operators.

The instantaneous, near-unpredictable nature of attacks also calls for a crisis management and post-crisis management capability able to maintain the continuity of activities, and to prosecute and punish attackers. Cyberspace has become a new area of action, in which military operations are already taking place. France therefore needs to develop a *fighting capacity in this space*. It will be necessary to formulate rules of engagement, making due allowance for legal considerations pertaining to this new environment.

ESPIONAGE AND STRATEGIES OF INFLUENCE

Globalised exchanges and the emergence of new power centres are conducive to *offensive intelligence activities targeting France and Europe* as well as to the development of strategies of influence aimed at undermining our role in the world and in world markets.

Factors guaranteeing technological superiority, like the French scientific, economic and military assets, will continue to be the target of external manoeuvres. These manoeuvres will seek to obtain protected or secret information about the French security strategy, diplomacy, civil and military technologies, and businesses' strategies.

In certain cases, action from foreign sources to get this information will concentrate on cyber attacks. In others, manoeuvres may seek to undermine a company or person by spreading disinformation in the media and *via* the Internet. Such action could also target French communities abroad, and foreign communities in France.

These risks are leading France and Europe to build up the capabilities of their services in charge of countering foreign interference. An effort will also be made in the field of influence-building, with means of "soft power", notably through a presence in the media and on the Internet, corporate culture, and the prior mobilisation of senior leaders in the private and public sectors.


SERIOUS CRIMINAL TRAFFICKING

The big organised crime networks, notably drug trafficking networks, could seriously harm national and European security. Consumption of cocaine-base synthetic drugs and ecstasy has doubled in France since 2002. Cocaine is increasingly arriving in Europe from Latin America, transiting *via* Africa.

Criminal organisations such as the drug cartels now have financial and logistic resources comparable to those of certain states (between 700 and 1,000 billion dollars annually according to the IMF). Mafias are formidable powers in Europe itself. Criminal organisations are also becoming involved in trafficking in counterfeit goods, controlling the production side (child exploitation, illegal working, non-compliance with health and safety protection rules), the means of transport (smuggling imports) and the distribution channels (sales over the Internet, the use of parallel channels, penetrating the big retailers). Trade in counterfeit goods amounted to an estimated US\$ 200 billion in 2007, or 5 to 7% of global trade, according to the OECD.

The rapid growth in these groups is a threat to both domestic security and international stability.

Access to internet in 2008



Source: Ministry of Defence (open sources).

NEW NATURAL AND HEALTH RISKS

Natural risks and health risks have become factors of massive destabilisation for the population and government.

Health risks have the capacity to disrupt trade and business. The cost of prevention and protecting against them is very high. The spread of new viral or bacterial strains, or the reappearance on the continent of Europe of old strains, are resulting from the opening up of borders, the fluidity of transports and the speed of international exchanges.

Similarly, the territory and population are exposed to the *possibility of natural disasters whose effects are progressively changing in scale*. The French overseas possessions (DOM-COM, see glossary) are particularly vulnerable to this type of event. But Metropolitan France is not exempt from them either, as witnessed by the storms in 1999 or the Mediterranean region's exposure to seismic risks.

The widespread social disruption the new types of epidemic or violent climate accidents are capable of causing are part of the new scale of the risks to which the national community is subject.

HEIGHTENED TECHNOLOGICAL RISKS

The same is true for technological and industrial risks. The impact of a disaster could be all the greater now that demographic trends have concentrated populations in urban areas, bringing with it the risk of a greater number of victims and major difficulties in evacuating and bringing aid to the injured.

EXPOSURE OF CITIZENS ABROAD


1.5 million French people are recorded as living abroad. Their numbers on the African continent are declining, but they are increasing on all the others. The expansion of French and European communities abroad, their new geographical distribution, and the instability of certain host countries, is making them more vulnerable to risks—notably health risks—and to attacks.

They may be exposed to attacks and hostage-taking by terrorist groups or by combatant forces engaged in regional conflicts, or they may be victims of natural disasters or health crises.

The extreme sensitivity of this problem implies a need for special planning at the national level, and for more concerted action and greater solidarity among Europeans.

Hierarchy of risks and threats on French soil 2008

- Terrorist attacks (simultaneous and/or major): probability high; medium to severe scale; real CRBN risk;
- Cyber attacks: probability high; small to large scale;
- Ballistic threat: originating from major powers, or from newly capable powers, given foreseeable missile ranges to 2025; in this second case, probability low to medium; potentially severe scale;
- Pandemic: probability medium; medium to severe scale;
- Natural disasters (notably floods in metropolitan France) or industrial disasters: probability medium or high; medium to severe scale;
- Organised crime (growth in drug trafficking, counterfeited goods, arms, money-laundering activities); probability high;
- French Overseas Départements and territories: Caribbean area (earthquakes and hurricanes): probability high – Threats to French Guyana and the Pacific region; probability low.



The new parameters of security

In view of the foregoing, several new factors should inspire our defence and security strategy.

THE GROWING CONNECTIVITY OF THREATS AND RISKS

This connectivity is a direct effect of globalisation, with its capacity to de-compartmentalise conflicts as well as accelerating exchanges.

Consequently, under the influence of Al Qaeda and those inspired by it, formerly segmented terrorists groups governed by national or regional logics now plan acts of war from many points on the globe. They base their strategies on their contacts in a wide range of countries. They are waging global ideological warfare and are seeking to link up conflicts with profoundly different roots.

Risks of contagion are resurfacing in many parts of the world, including the Middle East, from Afghanistan to Pakistan, and in several parts of central Africa, East Africa, and around Sudan.

This risk of geopolitical interconnectedness should not be overestimated, however, and will be countered in the first place by preventive policies.

But sudden surges in tension, driven by the speed with which information, images and ideas travel—as we have seen in the religious sphere in recent years—are creating a particularly unstable environment conducive to flare-ups of violence.

Foreseeable tensions over strategic resources such as energy, water, and strategic commodities—notably food and energy—can also directly fuel major crises across one or more of the world's regions. The same is true of the long-term effects of climate warming if they are not prevented soon enough.

Connectivity and the risk of a chain reaction of crises call for a wide-ranging response closely combining economic, social, environmental and security policies.

THE CONTINUITY BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY

The traditional distinction between internal and external security is no longer relevant. Terrorism targets the territories of European countries from many points around the world while seeking to infiltrate French and European society. Organised crime exploits the benefits of globalisation and the weakening of frontiers. Energy security is no longer conceivable other than on a global scale. The vulnerability of information systems knows neither territories nor frontiers. The same goes for natural and health risks.

This continuity has now acquired a strategic dimension and France and Europe must urgently draw all the appropriate conclusions.

This entails the need to define over-arching strategies integrating all the different dimensions of security into a single approach.

THE POSSIBILITY OF SUDDEN STRATEGIC UPSETS

The uncertainty and instability of international trends give plausibility to scenarios implying a sudden break relative to the risks for which our defence and public security and civil security systems are currently prepared.

In addition to terrorism, proliferation and computer warfare, the emergence of new weapons in connection with faster technological or scientific developments, or again the deployment of weapons in outer space, lie at the heart of these scenarios.

The exploitation of the revolutions in biotechnology, nano sciences and intensive computer calculation capabilities, or an unforeseen vulnerability in space-based systems, could also lead to sudden shifts in the definition of what kinds of defences are effective.

CHANGES AFFECTING MILITARY OPERATIONS

The traditional foundations of military and security action in the XXth century (with broad terrain and spaces for military action, airland battles, naval and air warfighting) have undergone a rapid change. International stabilisation and peace-keeping operations are frequently being carried out in an urban setting. This situation could become more widespread given worldwide population growth trends.

Where crisis management is concerned, the expected revolutions in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of technological superiority have failed to provide the hoped-for guarantees of victory. The human factor remains, and will remain, decisive. The complexity of international crises calls for strategies embracing all of the different instruments—diplomatic, financial, social, cultural and military—not only in the crisis prevention and management phases proper, but also in the stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction phases.

The changing international situation is modifying some of the traditional foundations of defence and security policy, while reinforcing the uncertainties surrounding the security of France and Europe. A new approach to the security of the nation has become necessary.

CHAPTER 3

THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

The place and responsibilities of France

The defence and security of France are rooted in a long history, which has left a profound mark on a territory that has been invaded on several occasions. France also has a demanding geography, at the extremity of the continent of Europe, bordered by three seas and at the crossroads of most of the air routes linking Europe to America, Africa and the Middle East.

Thanks to its overseas possessions, France has a worldwide reach and a presence in several strategic parts of the globe. It has the world's second-largest exclusive economic zone after the United States, covering 11 million square kilometres.

Its strategy needs to take account of the specific features of its international status. It has been a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council since the organisation's creation in 1945, and in that respect it is committed to the mission entrusted to that body of the "*primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security*". As a founding member of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, and of the European Union since the founding of the European Communities born of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, it has played and plays an essential role in the construction and maintenance of peace, and in the progressive unification of Europe, on a continent that gave rise to two world wars.

As a nuclear power recognised by the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 and a space power, it has one of the finest scientific and technological capabilities in the world.

With 64 million inhabitants today, and 66 million in 2025, France has one of the fastest-growing populations in Europe.

The quality of its armed forces is acknowledged and these have been successfully professionalised, starting in 1996. Its domestic security and civil security forces are continuously being adapted in response to new missions.

These strengths, this history and these capabilities must be used to protect citizens, and to serve the country's interests and responsibilities. But the framework within which this is carried out needs to be transformed and adapted to the far-reaching changes born of globalisation, and to the resulting hopes and concerns.

National Security strategy: definition and objectives

The aim of France's National Security strategy is to ward off risks or threats liable to harm the life of the nation.

Its first aim is to defend the population and French territory, this being the first duty and responsibility of the State. The second aim is to enable France to contribute to European and international security: this corresponds both to its own security needs, which also extend beyond its frontiers, and to the responsibilities shouldered by France within the framework of the United Nations and the alliances and treaties which it has signed. The third aim is to defend the values of the "republican compact" that binds all French people to the State, namely the principles of democracy, and in particular individual and collective freedoms, respect for human dignity, solidarity and justice.

These aims are served by:

— Defence policy. This is required to ensure the security of the nation against the risks of armed aggression, to uphold our international defence commitments, France's contribution to international peacekeeping and security, and contributing to the protection of the population on French soil and abroad in support of the domestic security and civil security organisations;

— Domestic security policy for everything not concerning the everyday and individual security of people and property, and civil security policy. Coming under the heading of national security, domestic security policy and civil security policy are required to provide permanent protection of the population, to guarantee the regular functioning of government and to maintain the normal life of the country in the event of a crisis, and to defend the security interests of the country against all non-military threats liable to be detrimental to them;

— Other public policies, primarily diplomacy and economic policy, that directly contribute to national security.

French security may be endangered by the action of States or groups ignoring frontiers and using all the resources of globalisation. It may be affected by natural or health disasters requiring a response on a global scale.

French security, like that of Europe, therefore needs to be conceived more globally. The National Security strategy embraces both external security as well as domestic security, military as well as civil, together with economic and diplomatic means. It needs to take into account all of the phenomena, risks and threats that could prove detrimental to the life of the nation.

There is a difference in kind between attacks on national security resulting from hostile initiatives and ones implying no malevolent intent, such as natural disasters. But the demand for anticipation, preparation and speedy response is the same for our fellow citizens in either case.

In view of this, a number of principles should guide National Security strategy, and with it our defence policy, domestic security policy and the other public policies associated with National Security.

ANTICIPATION AND RESPONSIVENESS

Given the uncertainties weighing on our international environment and the high degree of unpredictability, we have no option but to make allowance for the risk of surprise or strategic upset. Strategic *surprises* are events or developments that are unexpected in terms of their nature or scale, and that modify or deflect the international security situation. Certain events may constitute genuine *upsets* which, when they occur, radically transform the foundations of the States exposed to them. To allow for this risk it is necessary to develop the capacity for anticipation and knowledge, together with the capacity for rapid adaptation and response. All of these capabilities must constitute the foundation of our strategy and be given very high priority in the nation's defence and security effort.

The same imperatives implied developing the all-round capabilities of our armed forces and those of our domestic security and civil security means. Military or security means must be capable of being deployed in very different contexts and capable of responding at short notice to changes in the intensity of risks to which they may be exposed when they are committed.

RESILIENCE

Resilience is defined as the determination and the capacity of a country, a society and a government to withstand the consequences of

a major aggression or disaster, and then rapidly to restore their capacity to function normally or at least in a socially acceptable manner. This concerns not only government, but the whole of civil society and all actors in the economy.

The nature of possible crises in the coming years requires inclusion of the objective of resilience in the National Security strategy. The State has a duty, after all, to prepare to respond to those situations that could threaten the life of the population or the normal functioning of the economic, social or institutional life of the country.

This presupposes that *government organises* in time of peace to allow for the eventualities of times of crisis, and that it prioritise its intelligence, analysis and decision making capabilities. Resilience also presupposes organising co-operation between the *central government and local governments*, to ensure their means are complementary, and between the State and *private enterprises* in strategic sectors, *i.e.*, energy, communications, healthcare, and foodstuffs production and distribution.

Increasing the resilience of democratic institutions, of society and of economic life, will therefore represent a fundamental objective of National Security strategy to be implemented by the State and by all levels of Government.

A CAPACITY FOR BUILD-UP

While the prospect of high intensity major conflict is not the most probable, it is nevertheless plausible. A worsening of international relations combined with political or strategic upsets could lead to the re-emergence of a global threat, especially a military one, to Europe and France.

France's strategic choices must therefore preserve the country's capacity for build-up and to adapt its military and civil forces, its industrial capacity and its means of training, in the light of such developments.

Redefining the key strategic functions

The 1972 *White Paper's* central theme was deterrence. That of the 1994 *White Paper* on defence was "projection" and action at a distance from national territory. This *White Paper* defines a national security strategy for the era of globalisation, based on a new balance between five broad functions.

In the face of the uncertainties surrounding the coming fifteen years, the function of *knowledge and anticipation* ranks foremost. Citizens expect Government to be capable of understanding international developments, of preparing for them and guiding the means of defence and domestic security and, wherever necessary, assisting French society in adapting to them. The capabilities corresponding to the knowledge and anticipation function are useful to all missions, to those of the armed forces as well as to those of the domestic security and civil security forces.

Prevention and deterrence: the former is expected to prevent or limit the occurrence of threats or wars that could target France directly or *via* a chain reaction, while the latter is expected to prevent any State from thinking that it could attack the vital interests of France without incurring unacceptable risks for itself.

Protection and intervention are expected to enable the State first to ensure, primarily on the national soil, the security of its citizens, of society and the economic life of the country. The latter is expected to provide our national security, in close co-ordination with our European partners and our allies, with the necessary depth, adaptability and mobility inherent to any defence strategy in the XXIst century world.

It is the combination of these different functions that ensures national security. The way in which they are combined with each other must remain flexible. Knowledge and anticipation, for example, are factors of prevention as well as an aid to deterrence, protection and intervention. Similarly, intervention, particularly within the framework of humanitarian action, may be intended to avert wider conflict. In the same spirit, protection of the territory and the population, preparation for crises and surveillance of the approaches are all preventive actions and can contribute to deterrence. Indeed, and more generally, all capabilities and resources—human and technological, military and civil—contribute to the deterrence of potential adversaries from acting against the security of France.

KNOWLEDGE AND ANTICIPATION

Developing France's knowledge and capacity for anticipation is our first line of defence. This must be the object of a significant and priority effort permeating all of the activities of the public authorities, civil and military. The battle for the XXIst century will be fought in the first place in the field of knowledge and information, for people as well as societies. This also happens to be an area of excellence for French scientific, technological and industrial capabilities.

This function spans five major areas:

- Intelligence;
- Knowledge of theatres of operation;
- Diplomacy;
- Forward planning;
- Knowledge management.

This function is just as important in the political and strategic spheres as in all theatres of action, external and internal. Political leaders must be in possession of all facts required in order to make their decisions and assess situations in full sovereignty. Knowledge and anticipation are one of the keys to the strategic autonomy of France in the world. Military commanders must have access to all of the information they need to formulate and adapt their military strategy, and to all of the necessary capabilities enabling them to guide the manoeuvres dictated by their missions within a given theatre of operations and at the tactical level, with full knowledge of the situation.

Finally, society as a whole can benefit from this effort and gain in resilience if it has clear understanding that Government is doing its utmost to look to the future, analyse risks, seeks to avoid them, and prepare the means for dealing with them.

PREVENTION

One of the best ways to guarantee security in the face of risks of conflict or crisis is to prevent the occurrence, by acting on their causes in a timely fashion. Consequently, National Security should be founded upon a strategy of prevention, itself based on diplomatic, economic, financial, military, legal and cultural means. The European Union and the United Nations play a central role in this, for France.

France's strategy of prevention rests on three key pillars:

- Before crises, improving the international security system in order to reduce the risks of conflict or crisis, whether military, humanitarian, technological or natural; this implies acting on the origins of these risks and settling disputes peacefully, as quickly as possible before they break down into armed conflict;

- During a crisis, by endeavouring to limit its effects, if necessary by military means; this may also lead, in the case of natural risks, preventing their extension or aggravation;

- At the end of a crisis, by supporting the stabilisation or reconciliation process by economic, diplomatic means and through co-operation.

Improving the international system entails better correlation between development assistance and international and national security systems. Development assistance contributes to prevention. It is

also up to the international institutions to create a favourable environment for the management of tensions and disputes. With that in mind, France should contribute to forging a better-balanced and more legitimate international system. It should do so by strengthening its credibility notably with regard to the instruments of international security and, in the first place, the United Nations, the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance. The setting up of an international criminal justice system can help to discourage, if not the outbreak of armed conflict, at least the most serious crimes.

Nuclear and conventional disarmament measures, along with the fight against proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and associated launch vehicles, as well as controlling the arms trade and a ban on the manufacture, use and trade in certain weapons, all form part of the strategy of prevention.

At the end of the crisis, the strategy of prevention returns to the fore in order to avoid a resumption of war. Experience teaches us that half of the countries that emerge from war are at risk of a resumption of hostilities in the following five years.

Co-operation between States plays a part in reducing tensions and building better-balanced and more transparent relations between powers. In that respect, it contributes to the strategy of prevention, regardless of whether the co-operation concerns military or security questions, or whether it deals with areas of concern to international security, such as trans-national resources or the environment.

Consequently, to achieve the aims of prevention, Government needs to involve itself directly in international security through *preventive diplomacy* designed to:

- Reduce identified sources of tension; identifying these sources has become much easier now thanks to the extremely rapid spread of information;

- Incorporate security concerns into development policy;

- Monitor fragile situations around the world as closely as possible and promote confidence building measures. To that end we will be developing our capacity for understanding local situations and the risks of crises;

- Strengthen local crisis prevention capabilities;

- Pursue the efforts being made by France in favour of reforming the security sectors, an approach that embraces within a coherent framework the restructuring of the armed forces, police and customs services of the countries concerned, their intelligence services, justice and prison administration. This action needs to be completed by support for local civil societies. For it is local actors that are in the front line in conflicts and natural disasters.

Globalisation and the rise of the emerging powers

The construction of peace cannot be left solely to the balance of strength between the great powers (see chapter 6). French and European strategy has everything to gain from forging close relationships with the many States now acquiring increasing weight in world geopolitics. These include the Asian countries rising on the general tide of development across the continent, key countries situated at the confluence of areas of crisis and prosperity, energy-rich countries with plans to diversify their sources of growth, new powers seeking to develop independent strategies and exerting influence by virtue of their vigour, their economic and technical potential, or their weight in a regional grouping.

In the Middle East, Asia, Latin America and Africa, France, acting alone or with Europe, can find partners whose approach to the challenges of security and the necessary balance in international relationships is close to its own. Its security policy must seek to forge substantive new links with these countries.

DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence remains one of the foundations of France's strategy. It is the ultimate guarantee of national security and independence. It is one of the conditions of France's strategic autonomy, and of the Head of State's freedom of judgement, decision and action.

France no longer appears to be at risk of invasion over the next fifteen years, a risk that was one of the factors leading to the creation of its "force de frappe" or nuclear strike capability in the early days of the Fifth Republic.

But our security is under threat from other sources. Considerable nuclear arsenals remain in being, and others continue to expand, notably in Asia. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons is gathering pace, together with that of ballistic and cruise missiles. Tomorrow, technological progress may create new threats. It is the duty of the Head of State to take such steps as are necessary in all circumstances to shelter France, its territory, its people and its republican institutions from aggression or blackmail placing them directly in jeopardy.

Nuclear deterrence is strictly defensive. Its sole function is to prevent a state-originated aggression against the vital interests of the country, from whatever direction and in whatever form. These vital interests notably comprise the elements constituting our identity and

existence as a nation-State, and in particular our territory, our population, and the free exercise of our sovereignty. The Head of State has a duty to appreciate the limits of these vital interests in the world in constant flux, where attempts to circumvent our means of defence and security will take many forms.

It is on these bases that the strategy of deterrence consists in giving any country threatening our vital interests reason to fear a French retaliation that would wreak unacceptable damage on it, out of proportion to the objective of its aggression. Any such retaliation would target that country's centres of political, economic and military power as a matter of priority.

The use of nuclear weapons would be conceivable only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter.

France cannot rule out the possibility that an adversary might miscalculate the limits of its vital interests or its determination to preserve them. France has the capacity to deliver a nuclear warning within the framework of its policy of deterrence.

Given the diversity of situations with which France may be confronted, the credibility of our deterrence will depend on *independent access by the Head of State to a sufficiently broad range of options and an array of diversified assets*. We will continue to adapt our nuclear forces accordingly. These will be articulated in the form of differentiated and complementary components. France will have the means to maintain these capabilities in being for as long as nuclear weapons are necessary to its security.

The strategy of deterrence also takes account of alliances and of developments in the construction of Europe.

Together with the other European nuclear power, the United Kingdom, France notes that there is no situation in which the vital interests of one may be threatened without the interests of the other being threatened also.

Within the Atlantic Alliance, the British and French nuclear forces contribute to global deterrence, this contribution having been recognised since 1974. This recognition was reiterated in the NATO strategic concept of 1999.

By its very existence, the French nuclear deterrent also contributes to the security of Europe. An aggressor considering an attack on Europe must be aware of this. Our commitment to the security of our European partners is the expression of an ever closer union as enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon. *That is why France proposes a dialogue on the role of deterrence, and its contribution to the common security, to those of its European partners that wish to take part.*

PROTECTION

The new vulnerabilities that have emerged since the 1990s place the protection of the population and the territory at the centre of National Security strategy, since these now appear to be more directly exposed to events having a serious impact on the normal life of the nation. These events differ by nature and scale from those for which our means of defence and security were designed until recently.

Protection needs to address two types of risk, namely: *intentional* aggression such as acts of terrorism, major cyber attacks, the threat of strikes by new weapons, particularly ballistic missiles, the different possible ways of bypassing our defences that could materialise in the coming years; and *unintentional* risks such as highly lethal health crises, natural disasters made more intense by environmental and climate changes, and, finally, technological disasters.

The emphasis placed on protection of the population naturally complements deterrence and intervention, and is not a form of withdrawal into our national territory. Indeed, the security of the population needs to be conceived from the outset within a European setting, with the full benefits of an international strategy.

The major challenges with which Government could be confronted call for a new organisation, new arrangements, and the new means.

The Government needs to reorganise in order to guarantee the best possible co-ordination between domestic security and civil security forces on the one hand, standing in the front line in the face of these risks, and the armed forces on the other, whose missions, capabilities and responsiveness need to be employed in a timely fashion in support of the foregoing arrangements, and within the framework of their use as defined by the Government.

At the same time, the Government needs to organise its relations in this type of situation with public and private sector operators, as well as with civil society. It no longer directly controls all of the levers that it needs to be able to activate, and in particular in the fields of energy, transport, or public health. Consequently it is necessary to step up the preparation and capacity for response of all players liable to be involved, mobilised or called upon for the benefit of the population.

More particularly, this new organisation needs to be prepared, more so than is currently the case, to react to large-scale, unexpected potentially lethal shocks that could paralyse essential networks or infrastructures for the life of the country.

This strategic function includes among its essential aspects training of personnel, preparation of businesses and public communication, with a view to enhancing the global resilience of French society.

INTERVENTION

Intervention will continue to be an essential mode of action for our armed forces, especially outside the national territory. Our intervention capability should be such as to guarantee our strategic interests and enable us to shoulder our international responsibilities. We should therefore provide for the possibility of intervening across the gamut of possible action outside the national territory.

In most cases, intervention will take place within a multilateral framework. *The only eventualities in which a purely national intervention remains plausible* are those requiring the protection of our citizens abroad, the application of bilateral defence agreements with certain States, and, finally, a possible national response to one-off actions against our interests.

In all other cases, France's intervention strategy will be pursued within a multinational framework, either the United Nations, the European Union, the Atlantic Alliance, or another appropriate grouping legitimised by international law.

France must avoid dispersing its military means¹, in order to be able to act in a compact and concentrated manner in places where our interests may be at stake. Our intervention capabilities should therefore be governed by the *logic of concentration on priority geographical axes*, realistically covering the range of possibilities of deployment or use of force. This *principle of concentration* is one of the basic pillars of France's national military security strategy.

The main sphere follows the contours of the principal risks, from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean, from where extensions of our presence towards Asia are possible.

It is also essential to develop a capacity to fight trafficking threatening domestic security, which implies a sufficient presence in the Mediterranean, in West Africa and in the Caribbean.

Finally, continuing efforts to adapt our military and security stance in Africa are essential, half a century after decolonisation.

We will therefore undertake a progressive conversion of our prepositioned assets, in close partnership with those African countries that so wish. The aim is to contribute to the building up of Africa's

1. During the course of 2006, approximately 58,000 French troops carried out at least one temporary four-month deployment outside metropolitan territory within the framework of an external operation or a short duration mission in a French Overseas possession or foreign base (2008 report of the *Haut Comité d'évaluation de la condition militaire* – High Committee for the evaluation of military conditions).

means of collective and regional security and to facilitating the fight against forms of insecurity threatening both the continent of Africa as well as Europe and France, which notably concerns large-scale criminal trafficking and the action of terrorist groups.

European security will be guaranteed by our capacities for action within the framework of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance.

The choice of these priority axes implies rationalising our military means stationed outside Metropolitan France, in order to combine our capacity for intervention from the national territory or along these axes. To that end, our arrangements should ultimately comprise a presence on the continent of Africa's Atlantic seaboard, one or two outposts in the Arabian-Persian Gulf, and one in the Indian Ocean.

At the same time, the sovereign forces stationed in our overseas possessions need to be configured at their level strictly necessary for their armed missions proper. The means of the *Gendarmerie* and civil security will be adapted in consequence, and co-ordination between their capacities for civil and military action will be reinforced.

The uncertainty of the international environment means that one cannot rule out the possibility of France becoming involved in a war between States. This possibility will therefore remain a central feature of our defence effort, both for the objectives assigned to our armed forces and for the nature of our capabilities and equipment.

Notwithstanding this, the predominant framework for the deployment of our armed forces in the coming years will be stabilisation missions. Particular attention should therefore be paid to the adaptation of our forces to the new characteristics of this type of operation (chapter 12), their doctrine, their training and their equipment.

The definition and dimensions of our intervention capabilities should therefore be designed around both the possibility of a major engagement and the demands of stabilisation and crisis management missions over the next fifteen years. To achieve this objective, our armed forces cannot be organised exclusively around stabilisation missions.

Even so, all of our external interventions must be carried out in answer to a clear necessity; they must be legitimate; and they must be effective. Consequently, the commitment of French forces will be dependent on *the following guiding principles*:

— The assessment of threats to peace and security will be the decisive factor in the assessment of the commitment, regardless of whether this is a collective assessment shared by France, or a national one. Recourse to military force will be envisaged only in the event of a sufficiently grave and serious risk or threat. This question raises the issue of direct threats to national interests justifying intervention. But it also needs to be considered within a wider framework, from the point of view of the preservation of peace and international security within the

meaning of the United Nations Charter. For example, in virtue of its international responsibilities and on the basis of a collective vision of its own security interests, France may occasionally have to take part in an intervention even though its own direct interests are not at stake;

— Before resorting to force, all other measures must have been actively explored and can be rejected only if there are strong grounds for thinking they would fail. This principle applies without prejudice to decisions that may be required as a matter of urgency, on grounds of legitimate defence, or in situations involving a responsibility to protect;

— Any intervention must be legal under international law, e.g. the right of individual or collective self-defence as enshrined in article 51 of the United Nations Charter, a decision of the Security Council, the application of our international commitments under our defence agreements, alliances, or of international law;

— On each occasion, the decision to resort to armed force will depend on the specific circumstances, which it is the duty of the French Government to appreciate in full sovereignty. The French authorities must therefore enjoy the freedom of action and the means to assess the situation at all times throughout the duration of the crisis in which our forces may be engaged. The preservation of this national freedom of appreciation is compatible with the commitments of solidarity subscribed by France;

— The legitimacy of military intervention is not just a question of its legality in the eyes of international law. Its democratic legitimacy is just as important. This legitimacy will be all the greater if, for each engagement, the objectives are transparent and if it has the explicit support of the national community, as notably expressed through its representatives in Parliament;

— Any decision to commit troops must be based on a capacity to engage at a sufficient level, on national control of the deployment of our forces, and on a political strategy seeking to achieve a lasting settlement to the crisis and not merely defining the conditions permitting the disengagement of our forces;

— The decision whether or not to proceed with the French engagement should be assessed in the light of other current operations and available forces. This review should give rise to a decision to commit forces that is definite in space and, as far as possible, in time, and with a precise evaluation of its cost.

The five strategic functions form a flexible framework, capable of adapting to the variety of circumstances with which our defence and security might be confronted. The emphasis on one or more of them may change depending on the situation, and their combination must adapt to the constantly shifting status of the key factors determining National Security strategy.

In this respect, the proposed balance should be regularly reassessed by the Head of State, the Government and Parliament, on the occasion of the review of the *White Paper* and to France's strategic doctrine that is to precede each new programme law.

The reform of the Ordinance of January 7, 1959

French National Security strategy, as underpinned by its defence policy, domestic security and civil security policy and other public policies, will be expressed in a new legislative framework. The foregoing proposals call for adaptation of the Ordinance of January 7, 1959 on the general organisation of defence, now codified in the French Defence Code, as well as in the future Domestic Security Code.

These texts will in effect be required take into account the objective of National Security and the definition of the different policies contributing to it, *i.e.*, defence policy, domestic security and civil security policy, foreign policy and economic policy. They will also have to modify the definitions of concepts pertaining to now-obsolete situations and contexts, such as civil defence and economic defence, notably. These concepts, which until now shaped defence to deal with a possible land invasion from the East, now need to be transformed in light of the risks and challenges of globalisation.

Civil defence, for example, must give way to the contemporary notions of domestic security and civil security as spelled out in the 2002 and 2004 Acts. These notions cover protection of populations and the safeguarding of installations and resources of general interest.

Similarly, the powers of the Minister of the Economy will be redefined around a policy on economic security, whose aim is to ensure the continuity of economic activity, notably in the event of a major crisis and, more broadly, the protection of the economic interests of the nation.

**Guidelines for
the commitment of French armed forces abroad**

The seriousness of the threat to our national security or to international peace and security;

Consideration of other possible measures, prior to the use of armed force, without prejudice to the urgency of legitimate defence or the responsibility to protect;

Respect for the international rule of law;

Sovereign appreciation by the French political authorities, freedom of action, and the capacity to assess the situation at all times;

Democratic legitimacy, implying transparency regarding the goals and the support of the nation, notably as expressed by its representatives in Parliament;

Capacity to commit French forces at a sufficient level, national control of the deployment of our forces, and a political strategy seeking a lasting settlement to the crisis;

Definition of the commitment in space and time, with a precise evaluation of the cost.

The main strategic axis: from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean



★ Current military presence on Western Africa's seaboard

II

EUROPEAN
AND INTERNATIONAL AMBITION

CHAPTER 4

FRANCE'S AMBITION FOR EUROPE

Building a more unified Europe, enabling peace to put down roots on a continent that was twice the source of world wars in the XXth century, has been a continuing process since the beginning of the 1990s. With 27 members, the European Union has become the world's premier economic and trading power, the leading demographic power among the developed countries, the world's number one official development assistance donor and one of the major contributors to financial stabilisation and reconstruction in post-conflict countries. On the other hand, political union is taking longer to achieve and is still in the making. The impetus of the 1990s appears to have been dissipated in quarrels and nationalism, before suffering a serious setback at the time of the outbreak of the war in Iraq in early-2003. The disappointments born of a construction often seen as distant from the daily concerns of citizens have hampered it. The aspiration of citizens to a Europe that is closer to them and at the same time more readily identifiable on the international stage is tangible.

France wants to be in the front rank of this drive for progressive political unification, which does not mean uniformity but pooling and sharing of our destinies, collective strength and hope. It will work for a more unified, stronger European Union, with a greater presence in the fields of security and defence, and notably in responding to the risks and challenges described above, and which concern all of humanity. Europe's potential must be expanded, defended and upheld collectively, the benefits of Europe's growth and democracy must be shared, and the countries of Europe must shoulder their responsibilities on the international scene.

The European Union, an actor in the field of international security

The role of the European Union, both in the field of domestic security and in the management of external crises, was for many years embryonic. Now, in just a few years, the European Union has become an important player in helping to stabilise the international environment. Today it is the only organisation capable of mobilising from its own resources the economic, trade, diplomatic and military instruments necessary to the resolution of crises.

Seventeen civil and military operations, admittedly for the most part modest, have been carried out on four continents, involving the deployment of nearly 10,000 European soldiers and 3,000 police personnel. They reflect a learning process and a gradual stepping up of the European Union's activities in the operational sphere. The Community budget devoted to promoting stability in the world, comprising humanitarian aid, neighbourhood policies, development assistance, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and enlargement support, amounted to EUR 6.8 billion in 2007, or 5% of the total budget. In the field of domestic security, progress has been made both in the fight against terrorism and in combating trafficking in all its forms and organised crime.

The support of European citizens for a common foreign policy and the affirmation of the Union's international role has been a constant feature over many years. 67% would like defence policy and foreign policy to be run jointly at the European level; and indeed 81% feel likewise with regard to the fight against terrorism. French support is very strong in these two areas, at 75% and 87% respectively¹.

The Union represents nearly 500 million citizens, which gives it considerable weight. Its intervention in sensitive regions is generally well accepted.

The European framework provides a degree of coherence well adapted to modern crises, thanks to the range of possible combinations of military and civil instruments. Among others, it allows substantial means to be mobilised for the stabilisation and reconstruction phases for post-crisis countries

Regarding its external action, the Union's security strategy adopted in 2003 is founded on principles whose validity has been confirmed by recent developments, namely: an attachment to the international rule of

1. Source: Eurobarometer, December 2007.

Examples of the European Union's contribution to international stability

Stabilisation in the Balkans:

The Union is carrying out all of the stabilisation tasks, military and civil, in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the European Althea force, with 2,500 men in 2008, took over from NATO in December 2005. In Kosovo, since this country declared independence in February 2008, the European Union is due to take over from the United Nations police force, with a contingent made up of 1,900 police officers, judges and customs officers, and to work with NATO's KFOR.

Stabilisation in Africa:

In 2003, 2006 and 2008, the Europeans carried out military stabilisation missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and then on the border between Chad and Darfur. In addition to these military and civil operations, the Union is also playing a leading role in the reform of the security sectors in several African countries.

Afghanistan/Middle East/Iran:

Since June 2007, the Union has deployed a police operation in Afghanistan, liaising with the international NATO force. A European operation also manned the Rafah checkpoint on the Egyptian border from 2005 until the takeover of Gaza by Hamas. Europeans are overseeing the conduct of the dialogue and negotiation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, within the framework of the international community's efforts to suspend that country's fuel cycle activities. This effort, which began in 2003-2005, is ongoing, with the European High Representative speaking, in this dialogue, not only on behalf of European States but also in the name of China, Russia and the United States.

Financial contributions to reconstruction:

The Union is the largest donor for the reconstruction and stabilisation of Kosovo, having donated more than EUR 2 billion to date. With regard to development assistance, the European Development Fund plans to allocate EUR 311 million to Chad for the period 2008-2013. In Afghanistan, the contribution of the Union and its Member States for the period 2002-2006 was EUR 3.7 billion, representing a third of the international assistance provided for this country.

Partnerships with regional organisations:

The European Union is playing a pioneering role in the development of partnerships with regional security organisations. In Asia, the Union's operation in Aceh to assist in verifying compliance with the guerrilla disarmament accords was carried out in co-operation with ASEAN. In Africa, it is with the African Union that this security partnership dynamic

is farthest advanced: in 2003, the Union Council created the African Peace Facility with a grant of EUR 300 million for the period 2008-2010. The European Union and Member States have contributed EUR 435 million to the European mission in Darfur since its launch in 2004.

law, the importance of the civil dimension, winning the support of local populations for peace processes.

Finally, the creation of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is closing the gap between the national security cultures of the 27, and in particular for non-members of the Atlantic Alliance.

These developments are fragile, however. On many important issues, such as the war in Iraq, the European Union's divisions have prevented it from playing a role or influencing events. Until now, it has not been able to bring its military or civil means to bear on crises other than limited ones, or ones already partially resolved militarily by NATO intervention. It must reinforce its capacity to manage military and civil crises. France is in favour of giving fresh impetus to the European Union in the field of defence and security.

Institutional developments


The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in December 2007, contains clauses designed to enable the Union's foreign, security and defence policy to take a new step forward.

The creation of a position of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, who will also be Vice-President of the European Commission with his own department, will lend greater coherence to the Union's means of external action.

The new Treaty includes a solidarity clause that opens up the possibility of making use of the military means made available by Member States to prevent terrorist threats and, where necessary, to assist a Member State that suffers a terrorist attack on its soil or is the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.

The treaty also introduces a *mutual assistance clause* stipulating that in the event of an armed aggression against the territory of a Member State, other Member States should provide aid and assistance with all the means in their power. However, the scope of this clause is spelled out in the indication according to which, for NATO members, NATO remains the foundation of their collective defence and the body through which it is implemented. The clause has a

EU military and civilian operations in 2008



Source: Ministry of Defence (open sources).

particular value, on the other hand, for non-allied European countries.

The Lisbon Treaty also affords greater flexibility within the European defence and security policy, by providing *an enhanced co-operation mechanism* which, provided it is supported by at least nine Member States, allows certain States to act together to promote the aims of the Union, safeguard its interests and reinforce its integration.

The mutual assistance clause

Article 42

1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.

2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements (...).

The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework.

7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence character of certain Member States.

Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.

Source: Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Council of the European Union, April 2008

The solidarity clause

Article 222

1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:

a) – prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
 – protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
 – assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack;

b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.

2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.

3. The arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause shall be defined by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Council shall act in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Treaty on European Union where this decision has defence implications. The European Parliament shall be informed.

For the purposes of this paragraph and without prejudice to Article 240, the Council shall be assisted by the Political and Security Committee with the support of the structures developed in the context of the common security and defence policy and by the Committee referred to in Article 71; the two committees shall, if necessary, submit joint opinions.

4. The European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union and its Member States to take effective action

Source: Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Council of the European Union, April 2008

Finally, the Member States agreed on a new departure in the Treaty of Lisbon, with the creation of a “*permanent structured co-operation*” mechanism. This allows Member States that fulfil the highest criteria of military capability and that have subscribed the most binding commitments in this regard, to come together to carry

out the most demanding missions the European Union might engage in. This is based on a decision of the European Council by qualified majority. France believes it ought to urge the development of defence capabilities in Europe.

No minimum threshold of States is required to put in place the permanent structured co-operation. But the possibility of taking part in this form of co-operation is subject to *respect for the "convergence criteria" concerning military capabilities* and to the readiness of participating States to use their forces for the benefit of the European Union.

France would like this co-operation to be as inclusive as possible, offering each partner the possibility, over and beyond quantitative criteria, to enter into commitments to participate in operations or weapons programmes, or in terms of efforts with respect to capabilities.

Franco-German co-operation played an historical role indeed in the building up European defence. It will represent a major source for new initiatives.

Giving priority to crisis management capabilities

Drawing on accumulated experience and achievements since 1999, France wants the Union to cross a new threshold in order to play a more independent and more effective role in enhancing international security as well as its own security. It plans to move forward in this direction over the coming years.

EXPANDING AVAILABLE CAPABILITIES

The first priority must be given to enhancing our means of action.

Numerically speaking, Europe's armed forces as a whole are considerable. But this collective strength is weakened by major shortcomings, particularly concerning their command, intelligence, communications, projection and air mobility capabilities.

To enable the member countries of the Union to enhance their role in their defence and international crisis management, France considers that it needs, in company with its European partners, effectively and progressively to build an *intervention capacity of 60,000 men*, capable of being deployed in a distant theatre, with the *necessary air and naval components*, for a year. This was already the ambition of the Eurocorps when it was created at the initiative of France and Germany; it was taken up on a broader basis by the European Council as

the Helsinki 1999 "headline goal". This should now be revived and consolidated. The 1,500-man battle groups decided on the occasion of the European Council in 2004, have been in place since January 2007 and afford real possibilities in terms of flexibility and speed of intervention. But such battle groups do not account for all of the Union's operational needs. Crisis management operations require the availability of a substantial pool of personnel both for the crisis phase proper, and for the stabilisation and post-conflict reconstruction phases.

It is clearly not enough to possess these forces and make them coherent.

The countries of the Union must be able to *plan* their operational needs and assemble the necessary forces for operations decided on at the appropriate time. The common aim should be to have the capacity to conduct *two or three peace-keeping or peace-making operations simultaneously, for a significant duration, together with several more minor civil operations*, in different theatres.

Several concrete measures flow from this objective:

1. *Making good the currently most obvious shortcomings in Europe's capacity to intervene in distant theatres.* The reviews of available means and operational shortcomings carried out both by NATO and by the European defence agency show the need for increased *pooling of certain of European countries' resources*, and in particular in the key areas, namely: *strategic and tactical transport aircraft*, based on the A-400 M aircraft and the creation of a European military air transport command; *in-flight refuelling*, making the most of the French and British means, together with the multirole aircraft programme built by Airbus and the development of the corresponding American programme; *air mobility capabilities*, with the upgrading of European means on the basis of Franco-British and Franco-German projects; *aero-naval capabilities*, by combining aircraft carriers, other aircraft carrying ships, seaborne air combat units, and the necessary escort vessels.

Enhanced pooling of support activities, in particular for jointly-built weapons systems, for improved interoperability among European and allied forces.

Creating more robust means for the civil management of crises, commensurate with the growing demand for multinational operations. These correspond in particular to the Union's specific capacity to provide post-crisis support at a range of different levels. France therefore believes the Union should have access to resources in terms of personnel capable of being rapidly mobilised for prevention or stabilisation operations, including police, *Gendarmerie*, judges, prosecutors, customs officers, logistics experts, etc.

Taking into account the growing role of reserves, which is likely to become increasingly important, notably in managing crises on Union territory or for dealing with the consequences of external crises on Union territory. Europeans' means vary widely in this area as a result of their very diverse histories and forms of organisation. France suggests the formulation of a European statute for reservists, or at least a means of coordinating Member States' reserves, for both civil and military personnel liable to be deployed in Union operations.

2. *Boosting capabilities for analysis and anticipation*. France will promote increased *pooling of intelligence* for use command and planning structures, and in support of the Union's civil and military commitments. In this context, emphasis will be given to the identification of intelligence themes of common interest, sharing open documentation derived from the member countries' space observation facilities, and exchanges of instructors and trainees. These resources will play a key role in ensuring the strategic autonomy of the Union. Therefore our countries need to jointly build and operate common means of observation, transmission, geo-positioning, detection and surveillance of missile launches, as well as surveillance of space.

3. *Significantly enhancing the capacity to plan and conduct European operations*. France believes that the Union needs a *permanent and autonomous strategic planning capability*. With respect to *operational planning and the conduct of operations*, the Union is currently dependent on the availability either of national command capabilities that only a small number of Member States possess, which are very much in demand, or on NATO's means. The growth in its external interventions therefore calls for *the expansion of European capabilities* in this area. France further believes it is necessary to take steps to ensure *that the Union's military operations and civil missions are placed under unified strategic leadership in Brussels*.

REFORMING PROCEDURES FOR THE FUNDING OF EXTERNAL OPERATIONS

Helping to stabilise crises is a costly undertaking. France considers that the funding of interventions should from now on reflect the principle of European solidarity if the Union is to act more swiftly and more effectively in the management of external crises. This solidarity presupposes:

— *Overhauling the funding of military operations*, by creating a separate budget for Union operations: France proposes that the existing "contributor-payer" principle ultimately be replaced by the principle of financial solidarity among Member States. Member States that do not

take part in this or that Union operation on the ground ought to shoulder a portion of the cost of approved operations.

— A *significant budget for the Common Foreign and Security Policy*, within the new budget allocated to the High Representative, and the creation of an operational reserve fund to be placed at his disposal.

TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION OF PERSONNEL

The complexity of crisis management operations requires that the civil and military personnel of Union member countries receive common training as far as possible, carried out in accordance with European intervention criteria. Many initiatives are currently being launched in these areas and will need to be carried through over the coming fifteen years in order to create as many common training programmes as possible. *Initial and continuous training, as well as general and specialised training*, will increasingly be planned with this in view. This is already the case with the *Franco-German helicopter pilots' school*. An *advanced European jet pilots' training school* is currently the subject of an agreement between ten countries and could pave the way for other pooled initiatives. European trainees will be given instruction within the various national structures available to Europeans for operational planning and the conduct of operations, joint operations as well as operations that are specific to each military component, *i.e.*, land, naval and air forces. France stands ready to open its defence staffs and command structures for this purpose. Similarly, the use of new technologies in operations, network operations, cyber-defence, surveillance of space, and the use of armed drones, will be systematically encouraged. The *shared use of training capacities* will also be organised and intensified. 1,500-man battle groups will be able to utilise these facilities, according to arrangements designed to foster the emergence of a *European certification*.

More broadly, France will propose a *security and defence exchange and training programme*. A common European personnel training policy should incorporate other considerations than those of military action or security per se, including legal, sociological, linguistic or political parameters, among others. A *permanent European crisis management training centre*, finally, would be highly beneficial, and France stands ready to promote this.

A streamlined and competitive European industry

A European defence also implies a major industrial, technological and scientific capability.

Despite the mergers and alliances that have taken place among a number of industrial groups, *Europe's armament industry remains excessively fragmented* (chapter 16), placing it at a disadvantage relative to the international competition. Competing industries are now springing up in countries with high growth and a capacity to integrate new technologies.

The temptation for countries to confine themselves to their national bases, and the obstacles to the emergence of a common market for the defence and security industries threatens to condemn the industrial and research capabilities of European Union countries in the long run.

Cooperation on programmes has regressed, or is bogged down in a race between Member States to revive their industries and the quest to satisfy the specific needs of each army, to the point where some cooperative programmes have turned to be examples of what not to do.

Reviving industrial co-operation in Europe will to a large extent depend on greater procurement policy co-ordination (chapter 16). This presupposes that progress is made in the common definition of the capabilities to be developed and of the role of the various Union bodies.

The joint analysis of military needs has already begun. An inventory of the means available in EU countries to perform its missions, together with identification of operational needs, was carried out in 2006 and 2007.

The European Defence Agency (EDA), which is overseeing this approach, and within which States are volunteering to participate in cooperative projects, will play a key role in the choices to be made in the short and long-term on the basis of these analyses.

France will work to strengthen the action of the EDA, and this should lead to an increase in its operating budget and to a clarification of its linkage with other European structures, foremost among them the Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR). This should serve as a preferred organ for the conduct of programmes, which in turn would be decided on the basis of targets for capabilities defined by the European defence ministers within the framework of a common planning process.

In addition, France will encourage the *introduction of common defence equipment procurement rules*. Creating these procurement rules also presupposes the elimination of obstacles to equipment and technology transfers between the Member States concerned, and encouraging better research co-ordination.

More effective protection for the citizens of Europe

A great majority of citizens (86%) in all EU Member States express growing concern over areas relating to domestic security¹, notably regarding the fight against terrorism and the fight against organised crime. Progress has been achieved and new instruments are being put in place to facilitate the emergence of common policies for the Union as a whole.

However, the Union's effectiveness is hampered by institutional compartmentalisation. We know, for example, that the fight against terrorism is split among the structures managing the external action of the Union and the one concerned with internal policy.

Citizens may well find this distinction incomprehensible if it came to be seen as the cause of EU weakness in the event of a grave crisis. And yet, despite the improvements resulting from the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the external action of the Union, there is no equivalent bridge between the security of citizens *on the territory* of the Union and the *external* security of the Union. Without prejudice to the powers of the different European institutions, France will argue in favour of the inclusion of all security issues affecting the citizens of European countries. The purpose of the Standing Committee instituted by the Treaty of Lisbon to ensure the promotion and enhancement of operational cooperation in the field of internal security (COSI) is to assist the Council in implementing the solidarity clause in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster. France hopes that this desire for a more coordinated approach to questions of internal security at the European level will lead to expanded meetings of the Council of Ministers, attended by interior ministers, as well as the High Representative, Commissioners and the competent agencies, alongside the foreign ministers of the Member States.

1. Source: Eurobarometer, February 2007.

ENHANCING EUROPEAN CO-OPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM AND ORGANISED CRIME

France considers that this is vital for the Union, because the role that the Union can play in it will address both the demand for greater closeness to European citizens and the very high level of risks. Cooperation between States and bilateral relations between the intelligence services are the capstone of security for all. The Union as such also has a role to play in this process. In order to address the expectations of European citizens, it needs to involve itself right across the spectrum of possible actions, including prevention, anticipation, repression and reaction to terrorist attacks against a European partner.

The Union has created the instruments, and these now need to be reinforced. Europol is one of the centres of European co-operation. A visa database (VIS) is currently being set up to strengthen anti-terrorist procedures. The 2005 Prüm Treaty provides for the exchange of personal data, including DNA or fingerprints, together with the organisation of joint patrols. The European arrest warrant is a major step forward adopted by the Europeans in the wake of the terrorist attacks of the September 11, 2001.

France proposes that the European Union intensify its anti-terrorist activities along the following lines:

- Regular joint threat assessment under the aegis of the Council;
- Organising joint exercises between frontier States, involving the entire decision-making, intervention and communications chain;
- The development by European industry of detection and protection techniques, biometrics, and research on new vaccines;
- Preparing for non-conventional terrorist attacks, *e.g.*, surveillance of goods, detection of hazardous materials, protection of transport, and a communication policy;
- Setting up interoperable alert systems and crisis management databases, and improving databases on terrorist networks and controls on explosives and weapons;
- Giving consideration to specific legislation for serious crisis situations;
- Enhancing the anti-terrorist aspect in the European Union's external relations (helping certain neighbouring States to fight terrorism, and also, in certain cases, making co-operation conditional on the commitment to fighting terrorism).

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN CIVIL PROTECTION

France supports the initiative of the European Commission in favour of enhanced pooling of Europe's disaster response capabilities, both within the territory of the Union and outside. It proposes in particular to enhance the European mechanisms with a view to creating a European operational centre for civil protection.

With this in view, France wants to see a reinforcement of the process of convergence and interconnection between certain civil population relief capacities. This pooling of capabilities could also involve the creation of a European civil security force. Initially, France proposes that States wishing to do so form European civil intervention groups. Responsibility for the identification and pooling of the necessary assets could be entrusted to one country each year by rotation. In addition, France proposes the formation of a pool of fire-fighting aircraft to combat forest fires, and the creation of a European civic service made up of civil protection volunteers.

The training and instruction of European civil protection actors could also give rise to close co-operation, notably *via* the networking of institutes and schools for civil security with a view to setting up a *European civil security college*.

Moreover, the Union and its Member States are to coordinate their work and share data derived from their different *space capacities* with regard to the *prevention* and surveillance of natural risks.

COORDINATING EUROPE'S DEFENCES AGAINST CYBER ATTACKS

European interests and national interests are closely interwoven in the cyber world. France therefore believes it is indispensable to strengthen *operational cooperation* among Member States within the European Union and to make it as responsive as possible in the face of cyber attacks. It will also propose that the Commission impose rules on operators to *toughen their networks and procedures* designed to make them far more resilient. In addition, the *European Network and Information Security Agency* (ENISA) needs to be made significantly more effective. In particular, this agency should contribute to the implementation by the Commission of a cyber security strand in all European institutions' projects and programmes.

INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL CO-OPERATION AT THE FRONTIERS OF THE UNION

The 27 Member States' *customs agencies* will be required to participate in the implementation of interconnected networks to form a *single window* for the control of goods and safety-security measures. This is because the surveillance of frontiers is designed not only to prevent unauthorised crossing, but also to combat the different forms of cross-border crime or terrorism financed by trafficking in narcotics, weapons or cigarettes.

France will lend its support to FRONTEX, the European agency set up in 2005. Maritime surveillance will constitute a natural framework for European co-operation. The networking of existing national systems is the first step, as a prelude to the reinforcement of this agency.

SECURING EUROPE'S STRATEGIC SUPPLIES

Security of energy and raw material supplies will be one of the major challenges facing the countries of Europe in the 21st century, and is of direct concern to all citizens. Consequently, like the United States, China, India and Japan, Europe needs to take this requirement fully into account.

Following on from the European Councils of 2006 and 2007, France will encourage greater co-ordination of the policy that is currently being pursued above all at the national level. This co-ordination concerns both securing access to strategic raw materials and to energy sources, the security of their transport, and protecting the infrastructures that process them and utilise them on the territory of the European Union.

This approach should allow Europe to deal with the main markets in a concerted manner, and where appropriate to conclude the necessary agreements with Russia, the countries of Central Asia and the Near and Middle East, North Africa and the rest of Africa.

For a European White Paper on defense and security

The adoption in 2003 of the European Security Strategy by the European Council was a major milestone in the assertion of the Union's international role. The first adaptation of this document was launched in 2008.

France considers that *it would be natural for the European Union to draw up its own European White Paper on defence and security*. With our partners' agreement, this could comprise:

— A common European analysis of threats and of the international system, which could then serve as a basis for national defence and security policy documents;

— A review of developments in the world's major power centres, paying greater attention to the rise of Asia;

— The definition of the European Union's common security interests;


— A precise delineation of the relationship, at the European Union level, between internal security and external crisis management policy. Continuity between external and internal aspects ought to be part of this European strategic doctrine: terrorism and organised crime are typical examples of internal threats whose roots often lie outside the European Union's frontiers; the question of energy security follows the same logic; finally, due to their potentially global effects, health, technological and environmental risks can also imply the need for recourse to security and defence means;

— Rationalisation of European Union missions (crisis prevention, management and stabilisation) coupled with the identification of the necessary instruments and capabilities for carrying out these missions;

— A doctrinal framework for external intervention and the use of force;

— A strategy for transparent communication with citizens.

The geo-energy context in the EU in 2010



Source: IAEA, Gaz de France, The Petroleum Economist, 2007 Schumann Report on the State of the Union, Robert Schumann Foundation.

CHAPTER 5

RENOVATING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

Since 1949, the Atlantic Alliance has embodied the strategic relationship between North America and Europe. It preserved the independence and freedom of Western Europe for 40 years. It also became the paramount channel for military co-operation among European partners themselves. Founded on a community of values and interests, it is a democratic alliance, within which each State is free to make its voice heard.

The Atlantic Alliance plays a central role in the security of Europe and is essential to the security of France.

Over the past 15 years, NATO has successfully adapted to the upheavals in the European strategic landscape and in international security. It has 26 members today. It broadened its strategic concept and missions on the occasion of its 50th anniversary in 1999. Since the beginning of the XXIst century, new political and military developments have led to calls for a renewal of NATO, and it is in France's interest to contribute to this move.

The European Union and NATO, two complementary organisations

Renewal of NATO and strengthening of the European Union are two aspects of a single approach. Each of these two organisations, with its own characteristics, aims and dynamics is essential to the security and action of France on the international stage.

Relations between the European Union and NATO have suffered from a number of misapprehensions and genuine misunderstandings. It is important to dispel these.

Co-operation between the European Union and NATO takes place under the so-called “Berlin Plus” agreement, which gives the Union access to the collective assets of NATO. However, this co-operation continues to be impeded by institutional and political difficulties connected with the particular status of certain countries that are not members of military alliances, and with more general political issues such as that of Cyprus.

The European Union and NATO complement each other: the “Berlin Plus” agreement

The bases for cooperation between NATO and the European Union were laid down in 1996 (with the NATO ministerial meeting in Berlin, in June 1996) and 1999 (with the NATO Summit in Washington, April 1999), giving access to NATO’s assets and resources for operations conducted by the European Union. After being agreed to by the European Union at the European Council in Nice in December 2000, these principles were legally formalised in 2002 and thereafter.

The two organisations adopted a common declaration on 16 December 2002, the “NATO-EU Declaration on ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy)”. This document guarantees the European Union access to NATO’s planning capabilities for its own military operations and reaffirms the political principles underlying the “strategic partnership” between the two organisations, namely:

- effective consultation;
- equality and respect for the decision-making independence of each organisation;
- respect for the interests of the Member States of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance;
- respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;
- coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the military capability requirements common to the two organisations.

Arrangements, adopted within the Alliance on 17 March 2003, enable it to support operations led by the Union in which NATO as a whole is not engaged. These provide for:

- guaranteed access for the Union to NATO’s planning capabilities with a view to effective utilisation within the framework of the military planning of European Union-led crisis management operations;
- common NATO capacities and means (signals units, staff quarters, etc.) to be made available for EU-led crisis management operations;

- procedures to be followed for making NATO's assets and capabilities available, tracking them, their restitution, and a reminder of NATO's assets and capabilities;
- the NATO-EU security agreement (covering the exchange of classified information according to rules for reciprocal protection) ;
- the mandate of NATO's Deputy Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe (SACEUR), who will command the operation led by the EU (and who is always a European);
- arrangements for consultation between the two organisations within the context of an European Union-led crisis management operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities;
- integration into the NATO system of the defence plans, military needs and assets capable of being called on for EU-led military operations, so as to guarantee the availability of well-equipped forces trained with a view to operations led either by NATO or by the Union.

It is necessary to avoid two extremes here.

One would see the European Union simply as the civil arm of NATO. The Union's aims are obviously much larger than that. It has a global political mission and its action covers a broad spectrum, including military affairs.

The other expects the European Union to take on the collective self-defence of its members. However, common defence is the prime function of NATO, as spelled out in article 5 of the Treaty of Washington. The perspectives opened up by the Treaty of Lisbon are without prejudice to the role of NATO in the collective defence of its European member countries.

On that basis, it should be possible to close the recurring debate over a putative *a priori* division of labour between the European Union and NATO.

It would be unrealistic to try to reserve high intensity operations for NATO while leaving so-called low intensity conflicts, stabilisation and reconstruction to the European Union. Analysis of conflicts shows that the necessary means are to a large extent common and that the different phases do not follow in linear succession.

Nor would a geographical division prove any more efficient, as shown by the example of the Balkans, where the military engagement of the United States entailed recourse to NATO, or that of the European mission in Aceh in Indonesia

The European Union and NATO are thus complementary, and this strategic fit should be based on the two entities' respective contributions.

NATO is the organisation for collective defence that unites North America and Europe. This mission is specific to the organisation. It is in the interest of France and its partners that it be preserved and adapted. It is as relevant as ever, albeit in today's different conditions, as new global threats affecting all the Allies are rising. NATO has also become an effective instrument for the facilitation and conduct of multinational military operations.

The Union's contribution lies in its capacity to mobilise the full gamut of instruments for the management of military, humanitarian, diplomatic and financial crises, in the service of a common foreign and security policy. This continuity has become essential for the success of stabilisation operations in countries in conflict.

It is on the basis of the complementary nature and decision-making autonomy of the two entities that France intends both to reinforce the European defence capability and play an active role in the dynamic renewal of NATO.

The aim is to forge a renewed strategic partnership between Europe and the United States: the Atlantic Alliance needs a European Union capable of shouldering a growing share of the burden in the stabilisation of external crises. The Union needs a NATO capable of performing its defence missions and to strengthen the link that binds North America to its European allies, in the face of widening threats. Experience shows that the two processes go hand in hand and that, on each occasion, France's attitude towards NATO has played a decisive role: the revival of the Franco-German co-operation in the 1980s, after 20 years of deadlock, was accompanied by our country's support for NATO's decision to deploy missiles in response to those of the Soviet Union. The gestures made by France from 1995 onwards in the direction of NATO, and in particular full participation in the Atlantic Council at defence minister level, and in the Military Committee, provided assurance as to French attitudes vis-à-vis the organisation itself. Three years later, Britain's new determination to strengthen the European defence capability was comforted by this context, despite the breakdown of the negotiation between France and the United States over the Europeanisation of the military commands. At Saint-Malo in December 1998, the United Kingdom for the first time backed the drive to provide the Union with the means to conduct autonomous operations.

NATO and international strategic developments

A CENTRAL INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENT

The Atlantic Organisation has changed radically since 1994.

In the first place it has expanded to take in 10 new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999, and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004. Consequently 26 countries now sit on the North Atlantic Council, and soon 28, with the invitation extended to Albania and Croatia at the Bucharest Summit in April 2008.

In addition, the Alliance has formed a large number of partnerships. These include the Partnership for Peace with the countries of Europe and Central Asia; the Mediterranean Dialogue with seven Mediterranean countries; the Istanbul Co-operation Initiative in the direction of the Arabian-Persian Gulf countries; and specific partnerships with Russia on the one hand and Ukraine on the other. Special relations have also been established with the countries of Asia and the Pacific (Australia, South Korea, Japan and New Zealand).

Originally created as a military alliance for collective defence, based on article 5 of the Treaty of Washington¹, NATO has for many years served without any *a priori* geographical restriction and on assumptions of multilateral action not coming within the scope of this article. These operations range from military intervention in stabilisation missions to the control of areas within the framework of antiterrorist actions, support for humanitarian operations, including assistance in military training in different crisis theatres.

1. Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington states: "*The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.*

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."

The Alliance has consequently modernised its military structures, creating two “functional” strategic commands, one devoted to operations (ACO—Allied Command Operations, based at Mons and commanded by SACEUR), the other to adapting the allied armies to the context of modern warfare, called “Transformation” (ACT—Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk), replacing the former Cold War commands.

It has also created new operational instruments like the NATO Response Force (NRF), set up in 2003 to respond to a simultaneous need for effectiveness and responsiveness in the management of international crises.

Threats or conflicts liable to involve the Atlantic Alliance

For the past sixty years, the strength of the Atlantic Alliance lies in the solidarity among its members. This solidarity may now find expression in less clear-cut situations than those envisioned in Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington.

An invasion triggering the Alliance’s solidarity mechanisms looks unlikely in the next fifteen years. On the other hand, countries bordering on or within reach of Alliance members may be tempted to test the limits of this solidarity by adopting *indirect* forms of *confrontation*, e.g. regional destabilisation, pinprick attack, threats to use missiles, terrorist campaigns, etc., some of which do come under Article 5 or the mechanisms for consultation among Allies provided for in the Treaty. The risk of limited action leading to a *strategic miscalculation* involving the Alliance cannot be ignored.

Several recent factors may make this kind of scenario more likely:

- the profusion of means of attack that bypass the Allies’ conventional defences: cyber warfare, terrorism, and missiles;
- the geographical expansion of the Alliance;
- the risk of conflicts at the frontiers of the Middle East crisis zone;
- the extension of partnerships.

France contributes to the global deterrent capability of the Alliance and therefore needs to be able to:

- anticipate crises, and where appropriate identify the origin of a threat, with the aid of national assets guaranteeing its independence of judgement;
- preserve in all circumstances its freedom to decide on how it should act;
- take part in a collective operation and notably remain capable of responding rapidly.

NATO operations and military missions in 2008*



Source: Ministry of Defence.

QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Instruments designed to respond to new requirements, such as the NATO Response Force (NRF), are experiencing difficulties in spite of the initial hopes placed in them, partly due to tensions over manpower levels resulting from the current commitments of allied countries in several theatres of operation. This problem arises within the European Union also. It can only be resolved by enhancing capabilities.

The enlargement of the Alliance to new members, and its pace, are currently a subject of divergence among Allies.

The search for new and closer partnerships with countries in other regions, such as Asia, seems to flow logically from the gradual shift in the centre of gravity of strategic issues. But the forging of such partnerships needs to be carefully prepared and organised in order to avoid misunderstandings among Allies or on the part of great powers, and dilution of the Alliance's objectives and means.

Other questions touch on the very purpose and future of the Atlantic Organisation. These concern the question as to how to assume missions that are more civil than military in nature, or respond to new threats. There is a need to define a common doctrine on these new issues, which have a growing impact on our security.

RENEWING NATO

The debate on the renewal of NATO could be launched on the occasion of the Organisation's 60th Anniversary Summit, due to take place in Strasbourg and Kehl, in 2009. This discussion will also provide an opportunity to draw the lessons from the reforms launched at the Prague Summit on 21 November 2002 (regarding the place of technology, the role of the NRF, and the organisation of commands), the operations in Afghanistan, and to broach other important questions relating to relations among Allies, budgetary issues particularly.

In France's view, this renewal should be guided by three aims.

On the one hand, the missions of the Alliance need to be reviewed in a manner consistent with a shared analysis of the evolution of threats:

— The prime mission of the Alliance is collective defence, in a context implying the need to adjust to new risks, *e.g.* the spread of ballistic technologies and other vehicles capable of delivering conventional or non-conventional military payloads, mass terrorism, cyber attacks, as well as all means of bypassing the Allied countries' military assets. This new vision also needs to draw the lessons from the shift in common strategic interests toward sensitive crisis areas such as the

Middle East and Asia in particular. This ought to lead us to envisage more active partnerships with Russia, the countries of Central Asia, Japan, South Korea and Australia;

— Another of the Alliance's missions is management of crises or stabilisation in conflict zones, drawing on its multinational assets and the interoperability of allied forces. However, the specific role of the Alliance in civil security and humanitarian aid, or its relevance to limited stabilisation and reconstruction operations, are more debatable.

On the other hand, renewal should entail *a better sharing of responsibilities among Americans and Europeans*. Once the European Union is recognised by the United States as a political actor in its own right on the international scene, as a leading operator in the civil sphere and as a military operator capable of shouldering a growing share of the burden in missions and risks, a new balance should be pursued, one that would guide the evolution of the Organisation. France therefore intends to work for a renewal of transatlantic ties.

Finally, France will lend its support to current thinking within the Alliance on how to improve planning procedures and streamline the command structures and the International Secretariat in order to adapt them to NATO's missions.

Renewing relations between France and NATO

There is a yawning gap today between reality and perception of France's contribution to the Atlantic organisation, be it among our partners or in French public opinion.

The French position has evolved since 1994 towards a greater presence in all of the Allied structures and a major contribution to the operations decided within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

Today France sits within all of the Alliance's multilateral bodies, except for two specialised organs established after it left the military structure in 1966, namely the Defence Planning Committee, and the Nuclear Planning Group. It has never left its seat on the Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body. In 1996, after a long period as an observer only, it fully resumed its presence in on the Military Committee of the Organisation, including its Chief of Defence Staff when this body meets at the highest level. Since that same year, the French Minister of Defence has attended the meetings of the Atlantic Council.

France makes a substantial contribution to NATO's force generation procedures, whether for operations, for the NATO Response Force (NRF), or for certain reserve forces. For example, in July 2008,

France's commitment within the NRF framework amounts to more than 7,000 men, in addition to air and naval assets together with command assets. The effective commitment of these forces is subject to the prior consent of France and the Atlantic Council. This contribution is evidence of France's involvement in the new mechanisms put in place since the end of the Cold War.

After having been proscribed for nearly 40 years, France's presence in the permanent command structures is nevertheless confined to a hundred or so officers, with a special status on the basis of an agreement signed in 2004 between the French Chief of Defence Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

General de Gaulle's decision in 1966 to withdraw France from the integrated military organisation was intended to "*restore their completely national character to [France's] armies*" and to avoid any form of subordination of French forces to a foreign authority, along with any foreign military presence on French territory (press conference, October 28, 1966).

These fundamental principles continue to apply, but the far-reaching changes that have taken place in the international environment, the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance, and France's involvement in the Alliance's new missions, call for a rethink of their practical implications 40 years on.

For instance, 21 of the 26 allies are members of the European Union. All, with the exception of France, are members of the Alliance's military structure. All those¹ among them that are also members of the Union, are contributing to the construction of Europe in the area of defence and security.


It is hard to go on proclaiming the need for a difference in the *nature* of our position in NATO while, together with our European partners, acknowledging the Alliance as one of the keys to our common security, and when we are seeking to promote our conception of a united and effective European Union in matters of security and defence.

The transatlantic co-operation fora dealing with strategic issues in which we do not participate, such as the Defence Planning Committee, work by consensus and in no way encroach on national sovereignty. Participation in the Nuclear Planning Group raises a different kind of issue since our nuclear assets are totally independent.

Our partners view the particular way in which we have distanced ourselves from the military structure as somewhat incoherent. We are present there in more than one capacity, each time with a customised

1. With the exception of Denmark.

EU and NATO Member States in 2008



statute and financial contribution, and we continually and substantially contribute to all operations.

Any new rapprochement with the command structure should abide by the fundamental principles underlying our defence policy, namely:

Full freedom of assessment by the French political authorities on situations and decisions: full French participation will in no way imply that our country will automatically contribute to NATO interventions. The Atlantic Alliance is an alliance of sovereign nations in which political decisions are taken by consensus. France will therefore retain its full independence of judgement and decision in all circumstances.

French nuclear independence: France's nuclear assets and strategy of deterrence will remain outside the NATO framework. France considers that the Ottawa Declaration of 1974 and the 1999 Strategic Concept, which recognise the contribution of its forces and those of the United Kingdom to the deterrent capabilities of the Alliance¹, remain the sole documents of reference with regard to relations between its deterrent force and NATO nuclear doctrine.

Freedom of decision regarding the commitment of French forces. No French force will be placed permanently under NATO command in peacetime. Depending on its security interests and needs, France will retain full authority over the utilisation of its external intervention capabilities.

France must be the driving force behind major European initiatives in all areas of security and defence.

The European Union must play a greater role in defence and security, with an emphasis on the prevention and management of international crises.

Relaunching the European Union in the field of defence and security, and the renewal of the transatlantic link, are two inseparable aspects of a single policy for the long term and must proceed in step with each other.

There is no *a priori* limit to France's commitment to NATO, as long as the independence of our nuclear forces, our authorities' independence of judgement and our freedom of decision with regard to the commitment of our forces are fully preserved.

1. This declaration states that the nuclear forces of France and the United Kingdom are "*capable of playing a deterrent role of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance*".

CHAPTER 6

COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE XXIST CENTURY

Collective security was conceived in order to protect future generations from war. Not only has this scourge not vanished from our horizon, numerous other threats now also demand collective action. These threats cannot be dealt with on a strictly national nor even regional basis. Global collective action is required. As a result, the international security system will be subject to increasing demands.

Multilateralism continues to be a founding principle

Multilateral action is going through a period of scepticism or even pessimism due to the poor results achieved on a number of key issues such as Cyprus, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the difficulty or even incapacity of persuading Iran to abandon its nuclear programme, or again food insecurity and damage to the environment. Security Council reform aimed at creating a body more representative of the balance of powers is still awaited. Failures such as Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo have left their mark on people's memories, due to the United Nations' inability to prevent ethnic cleansing. Above all, contrary to what might have been hoped, the scope for collective security opened up by the bloodless ending of the Cold War did not prompt sufficiently vigorous action by States to reap the benefits the world was entitled to expect.

This scepticism is partly unfounded. The decline in the number of civil wars is the result of the growing intervention by the United Nations. Progress has also been made in the field of international jus-

tice, with the institution of the International Criminal Court, or in the support given to regional security organisations. Moreover, the alternatives put forward to overcome the shortcomings in collective action have not proved particularly effective. *Unilateralism has shown its shortcomings in terms of both legitimacy and efficacy.* Recent history shows that the legitimacy of intervention depends more than ever on its legal foundations. Military force remains useful and even indispensable in certain circumstances, but by itself it can no longer claim to provide a sufficient response to crises. As for *ad hoc* coalitions of States, these provide flexibility, but when they lack an international mandate they convey the impression they are circumventing rather than supporting the international security institutions. What is more, they are inadequate to deal with the challenges of stabilisation and reconstruction. Finally, globalisation is raising new security issues at the global scale, which can be neither resolved nor prevented other than by the collective mobilisation of all actors on the international scene.

Whatever its shortcomings and its difficulties, therefore, *the multilateral approach appears to be not only the most legitimate, but also the most promising, and strengthening it will continue to be France's priority.* The risks of cultural shocks or clashes between global political systems, which are real today, will only be avoided in the XXIst century if we can build an inclusive international security system.

The central role of the United Nations

The Charter of the United Nations is the foundation stone of international law with regard to the use of military force, in matters both of individual and collective legitimate defence¹, peacekeeping or action in the event of threat to peace, breakdown of peace and acts of aggression.

Few armed conflicts have warranted a United Nations mandate, those few cases being the Korean War in 1950, the first Gulf War in

1. Article 51 of the Charter states: "*Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.*"

1991, and the military operation in Afghanistan in 2001 in the wake of the September 11 attacks of that year. But the uncertainties surrounding the evolution of international relations, and the scale of the dangers threatening them, argue more than ever for the Charter's relevance and pre-eminence. *In a world where the chief risk is that of disorder and the absence of rules, or even anarchy, the authority of the Security Council when considering recourse to force must be the rule.*

The changing faces of conflict—internal conflicts, private actors, asymmetry and terrorism—should not serve as a pretext for jettisoning collective rules. On the contrary, they make the existence and respect for an agreed legal framework all the more necessary, whether that framework concern the protection of civilians, the treatment of prisoners, the prohibition of torture, or the repression of war crimes.

Apart from the legality of military intervention, the question of its legitimacy has already been raised by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and by the Security Council itself. This development concerns not only cases of “*genocide, ethnic cleansing or other grave violations of international humanitarian law*”¹, where the “responsibility to protect” falls in the last resort on the international community. It also applies to “*threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts*”².

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The five permanent members of the Security Council have a particular role to play in the proper functioning of collective security. It falls to them in the first place to prevent crises rather than reacting after they have occurred. It is their responsibility notably to narrow the divisions between adversaries when conflicts break out. It is up to them, and above all, to take steps to ensure that hostilities do not cross the nuclear threshold. These responsibilities are all the weightier at a time when crises and factors of risk tend to become interconnected. France, as a permanent member of the Council, must fully play its role.

The permanent members of the Security Council enjoy special rights such as the right of veto solely because they have a specific duty to preserve the peace and international security. They also have a duty to contribute to the solution of the current crisis undermining the international institutions.

1. Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. Resolution 1368 of the United Nations Security Council.

Defiance towards the United Nations and unilateralism have marked the first years of the XXIst century. The commitment by all States to multilateral processes is a prime condition for a reinstatement in international confidence. Failing which, the mechanisms of the Charter are at risk of deadlock, which would prevent us from implementing the responsibility to protect, for instance.

THE LEGITIMACY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Legitimacy is key to the success of collective management of security challenges. This multilateral legitimacy is fragile and hard to implement. It must be rooted in the broadest possible agreement, for the assent, support and constructive engagement of all major States are essential in dealing with contemporary conflicts, global challenges and transnational threats.

Whereas legitimacy and effectiveness are sometimes seen as irreconcilable, France believes on the contrary that one is a condition of the other, and that the two are mutually reinforcing. They must therefore be reconciled, whatever the difficulties.

Thus the reform of the Security Council is an imperative. It should bring together as permanent members those Member States that have the capacity and the resolve to contribute to international peace and security, such as Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil, as well as permitting fair representation of Africa. The membership of the Council should also be broadened to new non-permanent members in order to better reflect the ongoing geopolitical transformations. Finally, the reform must go beyond the question of enlargement to improve the way the Council and the instruments at its disposal are working, and make them more effective.

Adapting to the demands of prevention, non-proliferation and disarmament

In the field of prevention, multilateral action should concentrate on a handful of essential issues, namely political mediation, good offices missions, management and cooperative use of natural resources (water, gas, oil), protection of minorities (as defined by the OSCE), transparency of stocks and purchases of conventional weapons, implementation of rapid information and alert systems, notably in the event of natural disasters, preventive deployment of UN

troops, and non-proliferation and arms control regimes. This last calls for special attention.

The fight against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery will continue to be a priority. The destabilising impact of proliferation on international security is all the more important today, when it is particularly rife in areas of tension such as the Middle East and East Asia. This proliferation is both sharpening these tensions and can only increase the long-term risk that these weapons will one day be used.

To be effective, the fight against proliferation should focus on three pillars:

1. The universal application and comprehensive implementation of the international conventions signed by the great majority of States (namely the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons or BTWC, and the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons or CWC);

2. Vigorous action by the suppliers regimes, whose purpose in each area is to control the spread of technologies and materials (Nuclear Suppliers Group or NSG, missile technology control regime or MTCR, and the Australia Group for chemical and biological weapons);

3. Determined operational co-operation in the field of counter-proliferation, to thwart sensitive transfers in progress and combat illicit networks. The Proliferation Security Initiative or PSI is the most formal instrument in this area, but it is not the only one. This operational co-operation needs to bring together within a single network all of the actors concerned, including diplomats, customs officers, police officers, military personnel, and intelligence personnel, etc.

In the nuclear sphere, the necessary recourse to electro-nuclear power to resolve energy problems and reduce greenhouse gas emissions calls for tougher monitoring of sensitive enrichment technologies, reprocessing and the production of heavy water. This extension should be carried out while respecting safety, security and non-proliferation conditions; these could be enshrined in a code of conduct for the use of suppliers (both States and industrial firms).

In the biological sector, public health surveillance and protection measures can help by limiting the consequences of deliberate use of a biological agent against populations. International action alone will yield results, regarding screening, the development of new vaccines, rapid information concerning suspicious epidemics, or more effective diagnostic measures.

Fighting proliferation

The international community has not remained inactive in the face of recent trends where proliferation is concerned. France has played a key role in the development of innovative instruments aimed at fighting proliferation over the past decade in a number of international bodies: — *The Proliferation Security Initiative or PSI* (whose principles were agreed on in Paris in May 2003) initially brought together 11 States. Nearly 90 States have now signed up. Its aim is to improve operational co-operation among governmental actors in order to identify and prohibit the transfer of materials or equipment capable of contributing to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programmes and to programmes concerning their means of delivery. It was an operation of this type that led to the seizure of a cargo bound for Libya in October 2003, playing a role in that country's decision to renounce its clandestine nuclear programme;

— Within the G8, an action plan against proliferation was adopted at the Sea Island Summit of 2004. This plan notably calls for the suspension of all nuclear co-operation with any country that is in breach of its international commitments, together with measures aimed at restricting transfers of sensitive technologies associated with the fuel cycle (enrichment and reprocessing) and with heavy water. Considerable work has been done within the G7 and subsequently the FATF (Financial Action Task Force) to combat the financing of proliferation.

— In December 2003, the European Union adopted at the level of Heads of State and Government an *action plan against the proliferation of CRBN weapons*, which covers all aspects of the fight against proliferation. The Union notably adopted the principle that the application of its trade or co-operation agreements with third countries would be made conditional on the latter's respect for their international commitments in the field of non-proliferation (with the insertion of a "conditionality clause" in all new agreements or when renegotiating old agreements).

The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 in June 2004, co-sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom and France. This resolution, which was adopted under chapter VII of the Charter, describes the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery as a "threat to international peace and security". It also calls upon all States to tighten their export controls, and recognises their responsibility for all non-state activity that may take place on their territory. The Security Council has also reacted to the two major ongoing proliferation crises by adopting resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran and North Korea.

These measures have added a new layer to the bedrock of more traditional instruments for fighting proliferation, namely international conventions and suppliers regimes:

In the nuclear sphere, the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, signed in 1968 and renewed by consensus for an indefinite duration in 1995, had in 2008 been adhered to by all United Nations Member States with the exception of India, Pakistan and Israel. The situation of North Korea with regard to the Treaty is ambiguous, since this country irregularly announced its withdrawal from the treaty in 2003. States Parties other than the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom and France, have undertaken not to "manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, nor to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive".

The NPT also provides for nuclear weapons free zones, the most extensive of which are South America (the Tlatelolco Treaty), Africa (the Pelindaba Treaty), and the Pacific (the Rarotonga Treaty). Reflections are currently in progress aimed at reinforcing this Treaty, in particular by restricting the scope for withdrawal and fighting against the spread of fuel cycle technologies, without prejudice to the right of States to nuclear power for civil purposes.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), created in 1957, is responsible for verifying compliance by its Member States with their non-proliferation commitments. The *Nuclear Suppliers Group* or NSG is made up of the holders of nuclear technologies united by their desire to combat their spread and to undertake to comply with a package of directives when considering their export.

Chemical and biological weapons are another subject of concern. All of the Western countries have renounced their programmes in these areas, retaining only those activities required to protect against potential attacks.

The Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons or CWC was adopted in January 1993 and came into force in 1997. It has been signed by 183 States so far. The Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons or BTWC was adopted in 1972 and has been signed by 161 States, but it still lacks a verification regime.

In both these areas, clandestine activities can easily be camouflaged behind a legal usage, such as the manufacture of pesticides in the case of chemical weapons, or the development of vaccines where biological weapons are concerned. The Russian authorities have acknowledged an offensive biological programme prohibited by the Convention between 1972, the date on which the chemical weapons ban convention was adopted (Moscow is one of the three depositary countries) and 1992. Certain terrorist groups are seeking to utilise chemical or biological agents. In 1995, the Aum sect used sarin gas against civil populations.

The Australia Group, formed in 1985, with 38 members, monitors export policy in this area and it regularly updates its watch list of agents.

Finally, there is no treaty where ballistic and cruise missiles are concerned, but an export control regime, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), was put in place in 1987. In addition, there is a code of conduct adopted in The Hague in 2002, to which 129 States are parties, which covers political commitments and confidence building measures.

In the chemical field, clandestine programmes are continuing with impunity, taking advantage of the fact that this sector attracts less attention. The aim of destroying chemical warfare agents between now and 2012, as called for in the Convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, is unlikely to be achieved. For these reasons, effective implementation of this Convention should be made a collective priority.

Finally, France is committed to nuclear disarmament. Together with the United Kingdom it was the first State to sign and ratify the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). It was the first State to decide to close and dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile material for explosive purposes at its nuclear test site in the Pacific. It has dismantled its land-based nuclear missiles. It has voluntarily reduced the number of its nuclear missile-launching submarines by a third. In the name of the *principle of strict sufficiency*, the number of nuclear weapons, missiles and aircraft in its airborne component will also be reduced by a third as from 2008 (chapter 10). With this reduction,

Nuclear disarmament: the action plan proposed by France

Ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by all States (China and the United States signed it in 1996 but have not yet ratified it);

Commitment by the nuclear powers to dismantle all of their nuclear test sites in a manner that is transparent and open to the international community;

The launch without delay of negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons;

An immediate moratorium on the production of these materials;

Adoption of measures of transparency concerning their arsenals by the five nuclear powers recognised by the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

Opening of negotiations on a treaty banning short and medium-range ground-to-ground missiles;

Adhesion by all States and commitment to implementing the Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation signed in The Hague.

France's nuclear arsenal will comprise fewer than 300 warheads, which is half the maximum number of warheads it held during the Cold War.

On March 21, 2008, moreover, France proposed an ambitious plan for the pursuit of multilateral nuclear disarmament. It is encouraging respect by three principles, namely sufficiency, transparency and reciprocity.

New collective institutions and regional security organisations

NEW FRAMEWORKS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES

The activity of the multilateral institutions is not confined to questions of defence, proliferation or terrorism. Collective security also implies concerted action and regulation in the fields of international public health, conflict prevention, development assistance and the fight against poverty, preserving the environment and combating the consequences of climate change, or again the stability of economic, trade and financial exchanges.

While States are not always spontaneously thus inclined, multilateral action is desirable because it is best able to provide a comprehensive response. The global challenge does not necessarily require a global response, but at the very least wide-ranging, convergent and coordinated action on the part of all States, whether in fighting against pandemics, acting against trends such as climate change, or taking all forms of action in response to large-scale criminal trafficking.

With the World Health Organisation (WHO), the United Nations stands in the front line in the management of international health risks. The WHO acts in the first place upstream of crises, attempting to prevent them by means of technical assistance or by laying down standards. It also acts, as required, in the management of health crises when they occur, thanks to an early warning system, to scientific expertise, or again to its strategic co-ordination capabilities. It is also capable of targeted interventions.

Concerning the protection of the biosphere and combating the effects of climate warming, France has called for the creation of a multilateral body for prevention and concerted action in this area. The European Union has played a pioneering role in this respect, which needs to be enhanced and expanded.

Similarly, a collective effort is needed to tackle the growing inequalities of development between the different regions and coun-

tries on our planet. The competent international organisations in the fields of international trade and development assistance also need to make a radical effort to adapt in order to address the questions raised by poverty, food scarcity and access to water resources, all of which are potential sources of instability in the coming decades.

BOLSTERING REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANISATIONS

Complementing the universal multilateral institutions, the comparative advantages of the regional and sub-regional security organisations should be exploited fully. In Africa, for example, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for East Africa are coming to be fully-fledged partners. France will contribute to consolidating their peacekeeping capabilities where these are being established, particularly in Africa (co-operation, expertise and funding), and to promoting them where they do not exist. It will also seek to extend the action of these organisations to conflict prevention, disarmament, the fight against terrorism, and civil security. Altogether, it is intended to develop, modernise and revive genuine regional security architectures. This needs to be done not only in Africa, but notably in the Arabian-Persian Gulf and above all in Asia.

However, this effort should not be prejudicial to the central role of the United Nations. Our interest in bolstering these regional capabilities does not imply any fragmentation of the international security system, but should be seen in terms of a complementary fit between the regional and global levels.

The defence of human rights

The experience of the XXth century has shown the linkage between the denial of human rights and the great catastrophes of history. This experience must not be forgotten: human rights are no more incompatible with State sovereignty than they are with the pursuit of our interests.

The sovereignty of the State consists in the first place in protecting its population. Neither the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a State, nor that of the sovereignty of that State can therefore be invoked to defend atrocities such as massacres and other massive violations of international humanitarian law.

France will uphold the efforts of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and will seek to extend its universal reach and means of action. The same holds for action in favour of humanitarian law. France views with favour the new obligations and constraints rendered necessary by the desire to limit the harm caused by the use of certain weapons. In this spirit, the 1980 convention on certain conventional weapons, the 1997 convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction, and the recent draft convention on sub-munitions weapons prepared in Dublin, are creating freely-accepted constraints on whole categories of weapons.

The primacy of the rule of law, respect for civilians, tolerance between and within nations, in other words the very values that underpin the Charter of the United Nations, must be tirelessly reiterated and defended.

The role of the European Union in international governance

The European Security Strategy adopted by the European Union Member States in 2003 stresses the need for international security to be based on the creation and reinforcement of an “effective multilateralism”. This concept implies the pursuit of a diplomacy whose overriding aim is not to keep a process in being, but to pursue concrete aims by means that are not primarily those of military force. It is thus up to the European Union countries in the first place, whose security largely depends on the success of multilateral processes, to demonstrate their capacity to enter negotiations and achieve results.

France envisages a substantial proportion of its action within this European approach. It also supports the role of the European Union within the multilateral institutions. Since 1994, the European Union has been one of the leading players in these, capable of driving forward such major projects as international criminal justice or the responsibility to protect, of assuming global responsibilities in crisis management, or again in supporting the United Nations or the African Union in theatres of operations.

In that sense, for France the European Union embodies the drive to promote an international society based on rules and a collective approach to decision-making and action.

III

A NEW STRATEGY FOR ACTION

CHAPTER 7

WHAT OPERATIONS?

France's national security strategy organises and implements the means required to prevent any attack on the life of the country, or to limit any such attack to the lowest level of gravity possible, and to mitigate its consequences. Its ambition is to raise the country's capacity for anticipation, responsiveness and resilience. It lays the groundwork for a national doctrine aimed at harmonising in all circumstances the use of Government resources and at promoting dialogue and consistency among all concerned, including local government, businesses, international institutions and non-governmental organisations.

Our capabilities must be adapted to the new equilibrium of strategic functions that has been defined, and also to the demands of the operations in which the armed forces and internal and civil security forces are to be engaged.

Consequences of the new balance of strategic functions

With respect to the armed forces, the means described in the 2015 model adopted in 1996 do not correspond to this new balance, nor to the long-term policy goals described above.

A major effort needs to be made in the area of knowledge and anticipation. New programmes and a new organisation are needed in order to take our capabilities to a new threshold. These capabilities will play a key role in the responsiveness of the French Government administration, armed forces and of our internal security.

France's deterrent will be maintained at a level strictly sufficient for the credibility of its nuclear forces and their capacity to respond to the various situations the country might have to face. These objectives will call for considerable efforts in terms of the preparation of personnel, and the quality, reliability and safety of equipment.

Protection will be redefined and will be developed to match the vulnerabilities to which France and Europe are directly exposed. This policy should notably be translated into precise operational goals for our forces, the urgent adaptation of our crisis management capacity and greater co-ordination between the different responsible officials across the territory and between civil and military personnel on the ground.

Intervention capabilities will be adapted to the new overall balance being sought and to the priorities described above. Their maximum level no longer depends on massive commitment to a collective air-land defensive operation in Europe, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, as was still the case with the "operational contracts" based on the 2015 Armed Forces model (*modèle d'Armée 2015*). It should result from an analysis of the most likely operational situations in which France could be directly involved in the coming years, and of key geo-strategic axes for our security.

Our resources will be deployed and our pre-positioned assets (which also contribute to the prevention function) will be reviewed according to these geographical priorities. Concentration in space and time will be the key to this strategy and to the successful use of our forces.

Even more so than in the past, our effort regarding our capacities should take into account the salient lessons learned from the past few years, namely the almost continuous deployment of our military and civil capabilities in ever more varied situations.

The logic of concentration and the logic of deployment should therefore dictate the doctrine, organisation, training and equipment of both our conventional forces and our civil means of action.

Likely operational commitments

To resolve a crisis, whether on national territory or abroad, new forms of co-ordination are required in order to bring the various actors involved—civil or military, State or private, national or international—to act together in a coherent fashion.

OPERATIONS ON FRENCH NATIONAL TERRITORY

In the event of a grave crisis such as a natural disaster, large-scale technological accident or mass terror attack, etc., the State and all public authorities organise their response by deploying all necessary means to bring relief to the victims, limit the after-effects of a destabilising event (*e.g.* a health crisis in the wake of a disaster), guarantee the continuity of government action and ensure a return to normal, and by prosecuting the perpetrators if the event is the result of an intentional act. The role of the Government in such cases is to coordinate all of the public and private actors in society as a whole.

As for all bodies coming under the authority of the State, military force is also required to provide support by accompanying or completing the work of the specialised civil forces and means.

Internal security and civil security agencies must be prepared to deal with forms of aggression and crises that may cause grave damage on the national territory. Consequently, new forms of co-operation are needed between civil and military capabilities.

The National Security strategy lays the basis for a doctrine to that end, applicable to all aspects of it, organising co-operation before, during and after the event. Apart from the organisational measures this strategy entails within the State apparatus itself, it also entails the introduction of procedures that must be known and applicable to all echelons, and tested by means of inter-ministerial exercises. A step change is required in the quality of crisis planning and the organisation of the public authorities in times of crisis in order to ensure the country's resilience.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

There is no likelihood of strictly military operations on the national territory in the foreseeable future, apart from providing support to crisis management operations in the wake of terrorist attacks or a natural or technological disaster.

Consequently, France's armed forces will continue to conduct their operations in the defence of our security interests and in support of the Nation's diplomacy and political action outside of French territory.

In all likelihood, these operations will continue to come within one or another of two broad categories.

Stabilisation operations take many different forms, ranging from interposition between belligerents, stabilisation operations in the wake of internal conflicts, operations to secure countries or regions, interventions pursuant to our responsibility to protect. France expects to

continue to be much in demand as a contributor. Its involvement in operations of this type must comply with the guidelines set forth in chapter 3. It will generally entail the sending of relatively small contingents of between 1,000 and 5,000 troops, not including naval and air forces. The armed forces will be expected to deploy and maintain contingents of this kind in many theatres, in geographically distant regions, often remote and with harsh physical, human and economic features. These operations may be of long duration and evolve considerably over time, requiring the forces on the ground to adapt permanently with, as its corollary, adjustments in the general format of French deployments. Two risks need to be circumscribed at all times, namely the use of fighting units outside their normal functions, as in police missions or to maintain law and order, for example, and excessive dispersal of resources across a large number of theatres.

Large-scale military operations cannot be ruled out, as witnessed by the analysis of the risks of conflict in which France could be involved. Recourse to military force in a war demands several months of preparation and deployment. The operation itself generally comprises a high intensity or “decisive” phase, followed by a stabilisation phase that may stretch over a number of years.

There is no strict dividing line between these two types of operation. A major operation may be followed by a stabilisation operation, or highly lethal violence may flare up in the course of a stabilisation operation. Whatever the type of operation, forces deployed on land, at sea or in the air must at all time be in a position to adapt their posture to the context and to perform simultaneously one-off high intensity combat actions, securing delimited areas, or bringing relief to populations.

The need to be constantly able to adapt explains why France has not opted to specialise its forces, preferring to develop a polyvalent capability. The quantitative criterion, in terms of manpower and equipment, remains important and quality cannot compensate for it entirely. When considered in the light of the increasingly harsh nature of conflicts, raising the risks to forces in contact, this implies the need to continue our efforts to improve the protection and offensive capacity of French forces—notably for long range, stand-off strikes—to preserve their freedom of action.

The capacity for endurance in the course of an engagement flows from the adaptability of the available means, with a reasonable degree of redundancy, from their adaptability to foreseeable contexts and, above all, to the quality and training of the men and women who are fighting.

COMBINED CIVIL AND MILITARY OPERATIONS OUTSIDE NATIONAL TERRITORY

The commonest occurrence is that of operations preceding, accompanying or following military action, notably for purposes of reconstruction or the consolidation of peace.

Until the end of the Cold War, there was a clear distinction between military operations, wars, and civil or civil-military operations. This distinction has become blurred to the point where it is practically no longer possible to conceive of a military operation unaccompanied by civil action.

After a military operation, once the last international military contingent has left the territory concerned, civil intervention by the international community continues in support of the political institutions resulting from the crisis, and notably in order to organise international aid, administrative and judicial assistance, and support for economic development, as we have seen in the Balkans.

These are complex operations, and they have yet to produce a firmly established "international doctrine". On the contrary, each is treated as a separate instance, with a variety of actions proceeding side-by-side within a single theatre and pursuing parallel aims. The sole acknowledged common feature is the pre-eminence of the United Nations. Nevertheless, this rarely materialises in the form of co-ordinated action by all of the parties involved, local and foreign alike.

The ambition of the French national security strategy is to define and develop a more effective and more coherent framework for global action by France's public authorities.

There is an urgent need to develop certain capabilities. In order to play its part in large-scale civil operations, France needs to identify, recruit and deploy specialised civilian volunteers including administrators, magistrates and economic experts.

In addition, it needs to develop appropriate financial and legal instruments to ensure the quality and coherence of its action in theatres of operations, together with the visibility and traceability of its contribution. To that end, it needs to define a fully fledged "post-crisis" strategy, closely involving French businesses in the economic and financial reconstruction of the countries concerned, at the earliest opportunity.

What is true for the military instrument referred to above is equally so for other instruments of government: the array of French assets capable of being committed abroad within the framework of a civil or civil-military operation and contributing to the political and

diplomatic action of the Nation as a whole needs to be organised more effectively.

The choice of capabilities required to prepare and successfully discharge these commitments is described below, through strategic functions, and are organised around two time frames, namely the short- and medium-term (here 2015), and medium- and long-term (2025).

CHAPTER 8

KNOWLEDGE AND ANTICIPATION

In an international environment marked by great uncertainties and potentially extremely short warning periods, a country's first line of defence are its capabilities for knowledge and anticipation. These must offer decision makers, as much prior to the crises as possible, the necessary basis for assessing the situation (the variety and gravity of risks and threats, opportunities for French and European interests, etc), enabling them to make better-informed choices between the different possible modes of action. Consequently, the knowledge and anticipation function has been elevated for the first time to the status of a strategic function in its own right and embraces several areas.

Intelligence

The purpose of intelligence is to enable the highest authorities of the State, together with our diplomacy, armed forces and our internal and civil security services, to anticipate developments, and to reach assessments, decide and act in full independence.

By presenting the state of risks, threats and opportunities in the widest spectrum of fields (political, military, economic, energy, etc.) as comprehensively and accurately as possible, intelligence serves to enlighten decisions, as well as to foreshadow, support and review action.

It must therefore maintain a permanent vigil to detect new risks and the first signs of developments affecting our security. It provides a basis for the planning and conduct of operations. It must give France the capacity to preserve the strategic initiative and retain its ability to decide independently.

The acquisition of intelligence flows from several different groups of activities working in close association, namely: information gathering in the field, through human or technical sources; the work of civil and military intelligence services; and the activity of specialised military units. In all cases, the information is exploited, cross-checked, synthesised and analysed, before being transmitted to decision makers.

This presupposes on the one hand an organisation designed to promote the dissemination and assimilation of information in real time, and on the other the upgrading of our information-gathering and processing capabilities.

The systematic enhancement of our intelligence means will be the object of an overall planning process to be implemented according to four main priorities

AN INDISPENSABLE FOCUS ON HUMAN RESOURCES

Intelligence depends in the first place on the people who gather, analyse and exploit it, sometimes in dangerous conditions. The greatest attention will therefore be paid to the recruitment, training and careers of intelligence personnel. Human resources management will be overseen jointly by the relevant ministries and services in order to optimise this function (chapter 14).

Recruitment and career management

Staffing levels will be reinforced and recruitment will be stepped up, notably as regards the fight against terrorism, counter-proliferation, fighting organised crime, combating espionage and economic interference. The number of technical personnel such as engineers, technicians, linguists, imagery interpreters and specialists in the programming of these capabilities will also be increased.

Particular emphasis will be placed on creating enhanced career tracks in intelligence. Recruitment needs to be not only limited to the specialised and technical civil service channel, but also open to the universities and *grandes écoles*, with easier recourse to personnel under contract.

Common careers management norms will be laid down regarding the recruitment and mobility of personnel, as well as initial and continuous training. An intelligence academy will formulate a training programme serving as a fully-fledged “core course” to be developed among the different intelligence services, run by them and sanctioned by a diploma recognised by them all.

Human resources should also be better used, for example, with regard to rare languages. Encouragement should be given to cross-postings by secondment between the different services, as well as to greater mobility between services and ministries.

Human intelligence sources

Special emphasis will be placed on human sources of intelligence, as part of the overall effort. This implies efforts in terms of manpower, quality of recruitment, training of the personnel in charge of this mission, as well as an increase in the recruitment of sources and an improvement in their geographical distribution according to the newly defined priorities.

DEVELOPING TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES

The rapid pace of technological change calls for expanded technical means to better ensure the security of the country. A qualitative and quantitative leap is particularly necessary for France to remain at a level enabling it to dialogue with the handful of countries that are its major interlocutors, both present and future, in the intelligence sphere. These countries have sharply enhanced their capabilities since 2001, while the French services have not done so to the same degree.

The performance of intelligence services and military units will be enhanced in order to respond to the growing needs resulting from our new strategy. In certain areas it is essential to guarantee the complementary fit between the various sources—space-based, land-based, sea-based and airborne. A qualitative and quantitative effort will be initiated, *starting in 2008*, and will be pursued continuously over the next 15 years.

The Internet has become crucial to our security. The Government's technical capabilities in this sphere will be strengthened, with a greater number of specialised technicians and experts placed at its disposal.

The effort will also concern activities in space, a key factor of strategic independence. Space-based assets, freed from the constraints bearing on aerial overflight, can cover a broad array of needs from strategic vigilance to the planning and conduct of operations.

Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is based on complementary resources at the strategic level (observation satellites), operative level (*i.e.*, on a theatre of operations) or at the tactical level (*i.e.*, on the ground, using human observers, drones and airborne sensors). Space imagery requirements are currently covered by the Helios 2 programme for

Space intelligence and the fight against proliferation

The fight against proliferation, and particularly ballistic proliferation, illustrates the potential contribution of space-based intelligence as a complement to other sources, human in particular. The earlier the intelligence arrives here, the better it can help to prevent risks and plan responses.

The highest State authorities must be in possession of the maximum amount of information from national sources regarding the origin, the credibility of the threat and the intentions of potential adversaries. This implies reinforcing our capacities in the field of observation satellites (visible spectrum, infrared and radar) and constituting the means of detection and early warning (radar and space-based) of ballistic missile launches (see the protection function, Chapter 11).

very high resolution images in the visible spectrum and infrared images, and by the addition of all-weather imagery provided by exchanges with Germany and Italy, thanks to the SAR-Lupe (2007) space systems in the former case, and to the Cosmo-Skymed (2009) programme in the latter. A *European programme*, MUSIS (multiuser satellite imagery system) is expected to permit the launch of the next generation of space sensors. The visible spectrum component will be reinforced in 2015 *via* a reconnaissance asset providing ultra-high resolution images, together with superior identification capacity. At the same time, Germany and Italy plan to develop their radar capacities. To avoid the risk of discontinuity at the end of the life of Helios 2B, France will begin work on the visible spectrum component of the MUSIS programme as from 2008.

As regards airborne capabilities, the effort will focus in particular on drones, remotely piloted air vehicles providing control over information in crisis theatres and thereby facilitating the operational engagement of our forces. A MALE (medium altitude and long endurance) UAV system is expected to be operational in the middle of the next decade. This will carry a more comprehensive intelligence gathering capability than what is currently available with tactical drones.

The effort will also focus on new generation on-board systems carried by combat aircraft.

Signal intelligence (SIGINT) embraces the gathering, positioning, identification and interpretation of electronic signals. This helps to enhance our independent capacity to assess situations and improve our forces' capacity to protect themselves. The space component will be covered by the CERES (space signal intelligence capability) programme,

which is open to European co-operation, to be launched in the short to medium term in order to be operational by the middle of the next decade. In the airborne sector, the effort will notably concern on-board sensors equipping the successors to the Transall *Gabriel* aircraft, and a UAV capability. It will also include land-based means including advanced transmissions detachments, and seaborne assets in the form of an “acoustic intelligence” ship and nuclear attack submarines.

Overall, the share of annual intelligence service budgets earmarked for technical investment will therefore need to be increased.

To signal the priority given to all joint assets contributing to knowledge and anticipation, the Defence General Staff will develop a *specific planning and programming process* for this sector.

THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

The existing perimeter of the intelligence services reflects the diversity of their missions. There is therefore no plan to modify these beyond the recent reforms, which have enhanced the effectiveness of the setup and which led to the creation in 2008 of the *direction centrale du renseignement intérieur* (DCRI Central Directorate for Domestic Intelligence).


However, the intelligence organisation needs to be better coordinated, with a more clearly defined complementary fit than is currently the case.

The governance of the intelligence organisation will therefore be reinforced with the setting up of a National Intelligence Council.

At the operational level, already existing co-operation between the services of a single ministry or different ministries will be formalised and stepped up in new areas. The aim is to avoid dispersal of effort and human resources within a tight budgetary context, and making better use of resources, developing synergies between services with common aims, and avoiding duplication or gaps in coverage. Within the framework of these forms of co-operation, policy with regard to equipment should give rise to systematic pooling. The bulk of the technical assets and investments is concentrated in the Ministry of Defence, with the means at the disposal of the *direction générale de la sécurité extérieure* (DGSE) and the *direction du renseignement militaire* (DRM).

In the fight against terrorism, the *Unité de coordination de lutte contre le terrorisme* (UCLAT Anti-Terrorism Co-ordination Unit), which reports to the Director General of the National Police, will continue to co-ordinate the competent services.

Main satellite-owning countries



Source: Ministry of Defence (open sources).

The French intelligence services

French intelligence is organised around a series of complementary services, namely:

Two general-purpose services: the *Direction générale de la sécurité extérieure* (DGSE General Directorate for External Security), which is responsible for the gathering and analysis of intelligence outside the national territory, and the *Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur* (DCRI Central Directorate for Domestic Intelligence), the intelligence and police investigation activity of which is focused on the national territory;

Four specialised services: two services supporting the ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces—the *Direction du renseignement militaire* (DRM Directorate for Military Intelligence) and the *Direction de la protection et de la sécurité de la défense* (DPSD Directorate for Defence Protection and Security); and two services specialised in customs and financial questions—the *Direction nationale du renseignement et des enquêtes douanières* (DNRED National Directorate for Customs Intelligence and Investigations) and the *Traitement du renseignement et action contre les circuits financiers clandestins* (TRACFIN—Intelligence Processing and Action Against Illicit Financial Circuits).

Altogether, some 12,000 men and women work directly for the intelligence services. In addition, the Army, Navy and Air Force have specialised military units performing military intelligence missions; these employ 4,000 people.

Intelligence regarding the economic sphere is the domain of the general-purpose intelligence services as well as those services more specialised in this sector (*i.e.* DNRED and TRACFIN). Their activity needs to be distinguished from what is known as “economic intelligence”, which is based solely on the analysis of information from openly available sources.

At the strategic level, a new echelon of co-ordination between intelligence services will be put in place. It will set policies, apportion objectives and arbitrate between competing requirements. The new setup will be articulated around a National Intelligence Council and a National Intelligence Co-ordinator working in the Office of the President of the French Republic.

Plenary meetings of the National Intelligence Council will be chaired by the President of the French Republic and will be attended by the Prime minister, the Ministers of the Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Economy and Budget, and where appropriate by other ministers depending on the agenda. The National Intelligence Co-ordinator

and the heads of the relevant services will also attend, as well as the Secretary General for Defence and National Security¹ who will act as secretary to the Council.

The Council will set the broad strategies and priorities for the intelligence services. It will approve a planned timetable for objectives and human and technical resources, provide guidance and arbitrate with respect to the legal framework of intelligence services activities. It will meet at the request of the President of the French Republic, in a more limited format, to be known as the Restricted Council for Intelligence.

A National Intelligence Co-ordinator will be appointed, reporting to the Secretary-General of the Office of the President, with a small support staff. With the assistance of the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, he will prepare the decisions of the National Intelligence Council and follow through their implementation. He will oversee the planning of intelligence objectives and means, notably *via* the annual investment plan, and will oversee its execution. He will chair the inter-ministerial technical investment steering committees on intelligence matters.

He will be the conduit for the intelligence services to the President of the Republic.


He will chair the periodic meetings of the directors of the intelligence services in order to establish intelligence research priorities and examine intelligence services' requests. The Prime minister's office will take part in these meetings. This new organisation is also expected to improve the flow of the most relevant intelligence.

The General Secretariat for Defence and National Security will support the work of the National Intelligence Co-ordinator and will organise task forces on subjects selected in the light of priorities set by the National Intelligence Council.

At the same time, the information on the activity of the intelligence services will be guaranteed by the Joint Parliamentary Delegation for Intelligence (*délégation parlementaire au renseignement*). These activities will be subject to external control by the competent independent administrative authorities, and in particular the National Commission for the Control of Security Intercepts (*commission nationale de contrôle des interceptions de sécurité*), and the Commission for the Verification of Special Funds (*commission de vérification des fonds spéciaux*).

1. Which will replace the Secretariat General for National Defence.

The new organisation for intelligence



*Secretariat of the National Intelligence Council and the permanent inter-agency committees

AN APPROPRIATE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Intelligence activities currently lack a clear and adequate legal framework. This shortcoming needs to be remedied. Consequently, the new legal framework will define the missions of the intelligence services, together with the guarantees given to personnel and human sources, along with the principal arrangements for the protection of national defence secrets. Legislation will be adapted, respecting the balance between the protection of public freedoms, effective prosecution before the courts, and the safeguarding of secrecy.

For this purpose, a legislative definition of the intelligence services' missions will be formulated, covering all of their missions. It will be sufficiently precise for the needs of personnel of the intelligence services concerned. Similarly, provisions will be enacted to protect the anonymity of intelligence personnel, regulate the conditions under which they may resort to covert identities and punish the disclosure or revelation of the identity of an agent or his/her membership of the intelligence services. Similarly, the disclosure of the identity of agents will be protected in the course of administrative or judicial proceedings, and provision will be made for the protection of the intelligence services' sources and external agents: the divulgence of information liable to reveal their identity will also be prohibited and punished.

The protection of national defence secrets needs to be adapted and strengthened. In accordance with an opinion of the French Council of State (*Conseil d'Etat*)¹ issued on April 5, 2007, the definition of national defence secrets and their disclosure will include classified information, classified networks and certain highly sensitive locations the existence or purpose of which in and of itself is a national defence secret. Specific rules for judicial searches conducted in classified locations or in locations containing national defence secrets will also be enacted by law.

There is a need for broader powers of consultation of technical data and administrative databases referred to in the January 23, 2006 Act on the fight against terrorism, or that of investigative police files. In addition, exchanges of information between DNRED and TRACFIN on the one hand, and the other intelligence services on the other, will be authorised by law. At the same time, the July 10, 1991 Act on electronic communications secrecy will be adapted to take account of recent technical developments.

Altogether, this amounts to an all-embracing, systematic, long-term approach to our national intelligence system to enable it to answer the need for the future protection of the interests of the nation.

1. The Council of State is the French Administrative Supreme Court.

The role of space in the national defence and security strategy

Outer space has become as vital to global economic activity and international security as the sea, the air or land environments. Like all of its European Union partners, France is opposed to turning space into a new battlefield. Our country has no plan to place weapons in space and will continue its diplomatic efforts in favour of the non-militarisation of space.

On the other hand, the deployment in space of all types of satellites—communications, observation, listening, early warning, navigation, meteorology, etc.—has become an indispensable element for all strategic functions. Consequently, our country will make a special effort in the area of space to ensure its coherence with the needs of our defence and national security.

This ambition in space will concern simultaneously:

— *Capabilities*: the country will ensure the continuity and modernisation of its observation and communications satellites which have now become indispensable to intelligence gathering on the one hand, and to the conduct of military interventions on the other: the visible spectrum segment of the MUSIS programme will be launched starting in 2008 with a view to be operational in 2015.

France will establish a significant SIGINT satellite capability in the wake of the success of experimental satellites in this area: the CERES satellite system will be completed in the middle of the next decade. To counter the ballistic missile threat, a missile-launch detection and early-warning capability will be put in place between now and 2020, preceded by the deployment of a pilot system in the course of the next decade. Space situational awareness, which now has major civil and military implications, will be the subject of a particular effort in conjunction with our European partners.

In general, European co-operation in space will be encouraged, notably by the pooling of assets.

— *Budget*: average annual funding for space programmes, after falling to EUR 380 million in 2008, will be doubled over the coming period.

— *Organisation*: in view of the growing importance of space for defence and national security, doctrine, operations and programmes in the field of space will be placed under the responsibility of an identified, dedicated joint command, under the authority of the Chief of Defence Staff. Under this new command, the Air Force will be given increased competence in the management of space assets.

Knowledge of potential theatres of operation

Knowledge of potential theatres of operation is a key precondition of all forms of military action. Due to its geography and its international responsibilities, France is particularly attentive to this dimension. The French overseas *départements* and territories cover a total surface area of 122,000 sq. km, spread across the globe. This presence puts France in a favourable position in terms of its knowledge of sensitive areas of the world.

FRANCE'S PRESENCE IN THEATRES OF OPERATION

Knowledge of potential theatres of operation comes from regular familiarisation with the areas concerned. The first priority in this regard is the strategic axis stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, notably through information-gathering by all of the technical sensors (space-based, airborne, onshore and naval) to which our forces have access. Our knowledge will also benefit from our pre-positioned assets in Africa and the Gulf, and from our forces in the French Caribbean and French Guyana, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

AREA STUDIES

We also need insight into the politics, society and cultures of potential theatres of operations. Here, greater use should be encouraged of the work performed by research centres, think tanks and institutes, as well as that of universities with specialists in existing and potential hotspots. The State's own prospective and policy-planning centres will commission studies on these regions.

GEOPHYSICAL DATA REQUIREMENTS

Developments in weapons technology, the greater complexity of actions to be carried out, and the need to minimise collateral damage put data concerning the geophysical environment at the heart of the management of defence systems. Ten years ago, very few weapons systems used such data. Today, no weapons system is unaffected by this capacity.

Knowledge of potential theatres of operations therefore also requires the acquisition of these data, which depend notably on mapping and meteorology.

Programmes exist for gathering these kinds of data, including digital geographic data, hydrographical and oceanographic data, and meteorological data. An overarching approach at the national and European level will be undertaken to structure the global data gathering capability and the utilisation of these data in weapons systems. Efforts will focus in particular on developing responsiveness in order to facilitate rapid deployments. This capability is particularly important in view of the fact that France may have to assume command responsibilities for operations in these areas.

Benefiting from the diplomatic network

Thanks to its bilateral embassies, multilateral representations and consular posts, our country boasts an exceptional external information network and window onto the world. This network plays a prime role in the gathering, circulation, sharing and analysis of information, for the most part from open sources of all kinds, by all of the different Government services present abroad.

Efforts will be made to ensure that those in charge of our diplomacy are better able to exploit openly available information, analyses of diplomatic sources and intelligence provided by the specialised services. This implies expanding exchanges among the different Government services working in the countries concerned, under the authority of the French ambassadors, and cross-checking the different sources.

These exchanges should be made systematic and could take practical shape, for example, in the form of regular meetings of a restricted committee in each embassy in the presence of the ambassador.

At the level of the central government administrations, all of the information gathered in the field needs to be compiled and collated. Working relations between the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, the other ministries and specialised services will be intensified. The aim is to achieve common and multidisciplinary analyses of security risks

“*Horizon-scanning*”

There is a need to develop a “horizon-scanning” approach by the Government, in universities and in defence and security circles, in order to anticipate emerging risks and threats, opportunities for French and European interests, and to guide preventive policies and assets in a timely fashion.

This approach should permit greater comparison between analyses. The areas concerned are multi-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary, covering military and security strategy, geopolitics, human sciences, economics, and scientific and technological research.

The resulting needs call for:

— Co-ordination of efforts within the Government and by setting up an inter-ministerial network consisting notably of the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, the Ministry of Interior (Delegation for Prospective and Strategy), the Ministry of Defence (Directorate for strategic affairs), the ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (Policy Planning Staff), and the *Secrétariat d’État* for Prospective, Public Policy Evaluation, and Development of the Digital Economy (Centre for Strategic Analysis):

— Setting up a common Internet portal for this purpose to present a comprehensive view of the competencies of the different prospective centres; research themes and intellectual output will be made more widely known, with systematic calls for projects;

— Encouraging synergies and instituting links (fora for exchanges of views, etc.), and even pooling or networking of facilities (vigilance units, documentation centres, etc.), between government departments and academic circles, research centres, private institutes, think-tanks and industry;

— *Support for research on defence and security*, via a financial effort aimed at developing and maintaining competencies available for mobilisation by Government. University research centres and other research institutes and think tanks are seriously under-funded at present if we compare with our main partners. This spending will be stepped up in the short and medium-term. This will be accompanied by rationalisation of the commissioning of work at the inter-ministerial level in order to be able to respond to Government requirements in a timely fashion, and improved circulation of information within administrations;

— The development of international exchanges, especially within Europe, working through our diplomatic network and the European external action department currently being set up. Also, a particular effort will be made towards the European framework programme for research and development.

Knowledge management

The notion of “knowledge management” spans the capacity for civil and military decision makers as well as State personnel in the field to gain access in a timely fashion to information and to make optimal operational use of it. The aim, in normal circumstances as well as in time of crisis, is to ensure that all National Security actors are able to share the relevant information and that decision makers are in a position to formulate and transmit the necessary orders at the right time.

The four pillars of knowledge management are:

— The timely transmission of information between decision-making centres and places of execution thanks to adequate dataflow capacity;

— Interoperability between information networks, to optimise the flow of information;

— Protection of information (information systems security), ensuring the confidentiality, availability and integrity of the system and the information processed;

— Verification of information, ensuring that it is reliable, flows smoothly and is properly utilised.

Secure, reliable, real-time access to information is an essential condition of sovereignty and freedom of action. This is indispensable to the capacity to be first on the scene in a theatre of operation and to guarantee the capacity to intervene as a framework nation.

Knowledge management will apply at the strategic level, *i.e.*, at the level of the top civil and military decision makers, as well as at the operational and tactical levels.

At the strategic level, the aim is to network all of the officials concerned in order to optimise the decision-making process. This implies extending the ISIS (secure inter-ministerial intranet) inter-ministerial network, and guaranteeing by means of an appropriate space-based communications system covering the entire planet, permanent interaction between the governmental decision-making centres and our forces deployed on the battlefield.

At the level of operations, the priority is to deploy tactical radio capabilities, to equip our forces with broadband networks and develop the digitalisation of the operational space. The aim here is to optimise our knowledge of situations in the field and the use of weapons systems engaged, and to integrate each level into a coherent overarching architecture, linking governmental situation centres to commanders in the field.

In all instances, the need is for secure interoperable communication networks (intra-and inter-ministerial) on the one hand, and on the other effective information sharing and processing systems (computer assisted decision-making, information display, secure messaging, etc.), thereby reducing the time required for processing and strengthening networking. These networks should also permit exchanges with our main partners and allies.

Current and future developments relating to information systems will radically transform decision-making processes, giving rise to new practices in the exercise of decision-making at all levels, as well as in the conduct of military and security actions. Consequently, alongside the requisite effort where equipment is concerned, greater emphasis will also be placed on training, adaptation and organisation.

Key decisions relating to knowledge and anticipation

- **Organisation and coordination**

- Creation of a National Intelligence Council under the authority of the President of the French Republic;
- Appointment of a National Intelligence Co-ordinator in the Office of the President of the French Republic;
- Drafting legislation on intelligence services activities including provisions for the protection of national defence secrets and the protection of personnel;
- Improving the diplomatic network to ensure better sharing of information, mostly from open sources, among all State services abroad; building awareness of intelligence issues in the diplomatic network;
- Co-ordination and development of a prospective approach within Government, in particular by setting up an inter-ministerial network.

- **Human resources and training**

- Upgrading of intelligence career tracks; creation of an intelligence academy;
- Recruitment of specialists (engineers, computer specialists, image interpreters and linguists, in particular) in order to upgrade technical capabilities and competencies, together with cross-specialty experts;
- Greater efforts in the field of knowledge of potential theatres of operation, in particular by promoting understanding by Government personnel of the cultures of foreign countries.

- **Technical investments**

- Strengthening the technical capabilities of the intelligence services in response to the development of information and communications technologies, notably the Internet;
- A new approach to the planning of space-based intelligence, with a major emphasis on imagery and signals intelligence;
- Enhanced airborne imagery and signals intelligence gathering capabilities, with particular emphasis on drones;
- Development of geophysical data-gathering capabilities and application by weapons systems;
- Developing knowledge management capabilities in order to optimise decision-making, and digitalisation of the operational space.

CHAPTER 9

PREVENTION

The aim of prevention is to avoid the emergence or aggravation of threats to our national security. An effective preventive strategy will rely on a broad range of diplomatic, economic, military, legal and cultural tools, co-ordinated at the international, European and national levels. In the age of globalisation, such a collective and integrated approach is a *sine qua non* for effective prevention.

A permanent early-warning system

A capability will be required to analyse potential crisis situations, with particular emphasis on poverty, inequality, discrimination, scarcity of natural resources, failing states, natural and technological risks.

The diversified nature of the threats looming over a fifteen-year horizon calls for a *permanent inter-ministerial organisation*. A network will be therefore established, involving the Ministries of Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Justice, Interior and Finance, and the French Development Agency (*agence française du développement, AFD*), to share information, monitor situations and issue early warnings to government departments.

This capability will rely on a network of external experts including specialist understanding of the implications of scientific, geopolitical, social and economic developments.

The work of this early-warning system will be part of an approach co-ordinated with our European partners. The European Union operates a Joint Situation Centre (JSC) which collates national assessments of crisis zones. The JSC's resources and its ability to alert Member

States at the earliest stages must be increased. The EU External Action Service, when it comes into existence, will also need to take this dimension on board.

In the case of natural or technological risks, France intends to promote an enhanced monitoring and early-warning system, at the international level, similar to that adopted by the UN in the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004.

At the national level, France must acquire the detection, assessment and response capabilities that will enable the authorities to be aware at all times of major natural risks and develop policies for their prevention.

Reorientation of cooperation in the field of defence and security

France's capabilities for co-operation are now considerable, thanks to the reach of its international presence and the recognition by its partners of the quality of its instruments of action.

However these capabilities suffer from a number of shortcomings which must be corrected as a matter of urgency.

Our resources are badly distributed around the world and too widely dispersed. They do not obey the strategic logic that must inform our future actions. Some of them are underpinned by outdated legal frameworks, for example the defence agreements signed with African countries in the early 1960s. There is insufficient co-ordination between military co-operation and co-operation in the fields of interior and civil security when the security interests at stake increasingly require, for their treatment, a combination of the two.

BETTER GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION

France's co-operation effort should support its National Security strategy and match its objectives in zones of strategic interest, its security assessment and the changing pattern of risks in these regions, in line with assessments made jointly with the countries and regional organisations which could be its partners in co-operation.

In this respect, *Africa* will be at the forefront of the French prevention strategy over the next fifteen years. The security problems of African countries are of concern, both directly and indirectly, to France and Europe, be it the risks of regional or inter-ethnic conflict, the growth of terrorism in Sahel-zone states or the perils that threaten

An example of partnership: the Mediterranean basin

France considers the security of the Mediterranean basin and that of Europe to be intimately linked.

This position is expressed first and foremost within the framework of the *European Union*.

The EU possesses appropriate financial and institutional mechanisms to provide the basis for a balanced relationship with its immediate neighbours through partnerships linking economic, cultural, political, and security issues.

This approach, an essential component of prevention, is founded on principles of transparency and balance with the objective of building long-term relations. It takes concrete form in the inclusion in co-operation agreements of clauses on respect for human rights and the fight against terrorism or non-proliferation.

France intends to focus on approaches of this kind. France supports the *Barcelona process* launched in 1995 and comprising the Member States of the European Union and the States of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey. Libya has observer status and Mauritania, a candidate for membership, is traditionally invited as a "special guest of the Presidency".

The partnership consists of three "baskets": political; economic and financial; cultural, social and human. It is the only forum in which, over the past 10 years and more, all the States bordering the Mediterranean have participated.

The aim of the partnership is to develop co-operation between the Arab, European, Israeli and Turkish States. The tangible outcomes of this partnership so far are: establishment of a free trade zone in 2010; association agreements; average annual growth of 7.2% in exports from the Mediterranean countries to the EU since 1990, compared to 4.2% for the rest of the world.

If it is to face up to the region's security issues over the next fifteen years, *the Euro-Mediterranean relationship must enter a new stage*. It will take its place in the projected Union for the Mediterranean, which will go further in political terms. The aim will be to forge genuine partnerships between both shores of the Mediterranean *via* concrete regional projects, particularly in the economic and environmental spheres, which are a factor of stability. It is very much in the shared interests of the Mediterranean basin countries, and likewise of the European Union countries, to engage in joint and co-ordinated actions in these fields.

Other initiatives in a similar direction include *NATO's Mediterranean dialogue and the "5 + 5" dialogue*, an informal political forum comprising ten Western Mediterranean countries: the five countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia) and five European Union countries (Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal).

their stability. Should the African countries so wish, France and Europe can make a contribution to their effort. In any event, the dramatic increase in trafficking *via* Africa into Europe, or within Africa itself, and the issues of supplies of strategic raw materials call for redoubled attention on the part of the European States.

France therefore wishes to maintain its presence in Africa, but the conditions, purposes and organisation of this presence must change.

Defence and security co-operation with the Middle East and Indian Ocean zones will take on particular importance in view of the strategic interest of these zones and the prospects that a presence here might open up in other major regions of Asia.

Co-operation with the rest of the world, and in particular with Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, will follow the priorities established by our foreign policy.

A NEW APPROACH TO BILATERAL DEFENCE AGREEMENTS

The bilateral defence agreements with African States reflect a moment in history, the end of the colonial period, and now belong to the past. We have currently entered a process of renegotiation with the States concerned. Clauses relating to possible French intervention to maintain internal order in certain countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon or Togo, will be abrogated.

The drafting of new agreements, if deemed desirable by both parties, will be directed towards establishing a new form of co-operation no longer based on military assistance but on a defence and security partnership.

Furthermore, the French Parliament will henceforth be informed of existing agreements (see list of the existing agreements at end of chapter). In the future, Parliament will be kept informed of the signing of new agreements. Such agreements will be subject to any approval or ratification procedures that may be required by the French Constitution.

Future bilateral agreements with African partners will be supplemented wherever possible by partnership agreements with regional

organisations; the European Union will be associated with these agreements inasmuch as it wishes to.

France's external military relations will thus evolve towards a network of partnerships with new objectives and on a scale both regional and European.

AN OVERALL APPROACH TO DEFENCE AND SECURITY CO-OPERATION

Defence and security co-operation offers a privileged framework within which these new bilateral or multilateral relations can be deployed. It must be based on assessments of common security interests, play a direct part in the build-up of African peace-keeping forces, and promote the role of the European Union.

Where relations are established with countries in crisis or failing or failed States, the aim will be to recreate or reinforce the foundations of their State structure, providing support for the reforms needed for democracy, in particular security sector reform (SSR): demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, training of army, police and *Gendarmerie* cadres, or the reform of judicial institutions.

Co-operation must be refocused on security missions, such as the fight against trafficking, against terrorism or against the spread of CRBN weapons.

There will therefore be a gradual shift and conversion in our resources.

It will be important to take into account first and foremost our own interests, the wishes of the countries with which we seek to cooperate, and those of the regional and sub-regional organisations to which they belong.

Co-operation will extend to all hazards, drawing consistent distinctions between those which constitute defence matters and those which should be treated as matters of public or civil security.

This policy of prevention through co-operation must also contribute to broader partnerships, between Europe and Africa, Europe and Asia, Europe and Russia, Europe and Central Asia or Latin America.

In order to pursue this policy, France must re-engineer its national organisation which is currently over-compartmentalised.

The government must have a global overview and establish better co-ordination, in particular between its diplomatic resources, armed forces, police and *Gendarmerie*, civil security and other civil players involved in security. A broad-based concept of security must therefore prevail.

The Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs will be responsible for the day-to-day co-ordination of the structure, with strategic guidance provided by the Defence and National Security Council.

Action in the field will be co-ordinated to ensure that French resources deployed abroad reflect this global approach in their proceedings: the local French ambassadors will take on this responsibility.

RECONFIGURATION OF PRE-POSITIONED RESOURCES

In the early 1960s, a French force of some 30,000 men was deployed on the African continent; by the late 1980s, pre-positioned forces numbered around 15,000. Between 1995 and 2007, at the time of the professionalisation of the armed forces, the numbers were reduced still further to reflect the division of the continent into sub-regions, and certain bases were closed.

French forces are currently *deployed* at seven bases: four staging bases, in Djibouti, Senegal, Gabon and Côte d'Ivoire, one long-standing deployment in Chad and three operations in progress, in Côte d'Ivoire, the Central African Republic and on the Chadian border of Darfur.

The total cost, in human and financial terms, represents close on 10,000 personnel and EUR 760 million annually.

Pre-positioned forces provide operational advantages that go far beyond the scope of prevention alone. They provide support and logistics for operations and for missions to protect and if necessary evacuate French nationals. They allow French forces and those of its partners to conduct joint exercises which are useful in terms of preparation, training and combat readiness.

France's pre-positioned military resources in several countries are, however, in need of reconfiguration. It is not France's role to maintain endlessly a military presence at the same bases, but rather to be able to redeploy and concentrate forces rapidly in order to act effectively.

France will therefore embark on the gradual conversion of facilities long established in Africa, reorganising its resources around what will eventually become two bases, one on Africa's Western seaboard and one on the Eastern one, primarily for the purposes of logistics, co-operation and instruction, while maintaining a capability for prevention in the Sahel zone.

The aim is to concentrate French resources while continuing to maintain a presence where it is wanted and to provide strategic coverage of zones requiring prevention and action. Greater emphasis will be placed on air and maritime surveillance operating out of these staging bases.

The missions carried out by our units and their operating methods will give priority to co-operation and training of host-country forces, to help build their crisis-response capability and take part in peace-keeping operations mounted by France's partners in the African Union and in sub-regional organisations.

France has agreed with Arabian-Persian Gulf countries to strengthen its presence there, in support of common strategic interests. This new policy will result in deployment of the most modern capabilities in the region, as in the case of Abu Dhabi, and a stronger French presence aimed at crisis prevention. It will also help to forge balanced partnerships with countries enjoying rapid economic expansion.

The fight against trafficking

Trafficking in all its forms (of human beings, narcotics, arms, radioactive materials, natural resources, national scientific, technical and economic assets, etc.) and acts of piracy are breaches of National Security and a legitimate field of action for European co-operation.

PREVENTION OF TRAFFICKING

The fight against trafficking begins a long way from the shores of France and such practices must be attacked at their source, deep in international territory while the actual transit movements are in progress.

In view of the clandestine nature of trafficking, this will mean mobilising both civil and military actors responsible for intelligence-gathering and increasing the co-ordination between them.


France's action in the Caribbean, Western Africa, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean (the most sensitive regions) will take into account the need not only for land, air and maritime surveillance resources, but also for intervention capability, in particular at sea.

Greater co-ordination will be introduced between civil and military resources, especially in Africa and the West Indies.

France's action in this field must also tend towards better protection for the European Union as a whole.

An anti-drug investigation and co-ordination centre for the Mediterranean will be set up at the European level, building on experiments already carried out in the West Indies and in Portugal for the Atlantic zone.

French forces overseas in 2008 (personnel and assets)



Source: Ministry of Defence.

Co-operation between national navies willing to take part in maritime surveillance will be strengthened and will lead to the pooling of information gathered by each state and the co-ordination of means of action.

The fight against illicit financial activities, including the funding of proliferation and terrorism, will call for an economic and financial approach to questions of security, starting with the work of the Customs service responsible for the monitoring of goods, and extending to the processing of financial flows. Stronger action by the government services concerned is now an imperative, as is raising the awareness of the financial world in the fight against the funding of proliferation. Given the complexity of these financial activities, a specialist department will be set up within the Ministry of the Budget, along similar lines to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) set up by the US Treasury Department.

SURVEILLANCE OF EUROPEAN UNION BORDERS

With the expansion of the Schengen zone, Europe will require new technical resources to police its internal frontiers, such as retention of air passenger data, entry and exit files, a pre-visa system or automated biometric control systems at borders—all of which must be consistent with respect for individual freedom.


The European Union will need to give concrete form to its “European Immigration Pact” intended to stem the flow of illegal immigration, defining a common European asylum régime and proposing a European policy on immigration, the fight against clandestine working, and integration. This policy will need to be implemented in partnership with the countries and regions of origin or transit, and will be based on tools such as biometrics or dedicated information systems.

Within a fifteen-year timeframe the European Union will have an integrated European external borders policy in place.

Member States will harmonise their working methods and, more importantly, their resources, as part of Frontex, the EU agency for external border security. Member States will pool their civil and military capabilities.

Customs services will more closely co-ordinate the surveillance of flows of goods by land, sea and air: they will set up joint investigation teams, create European identification, investigation and risk assessment databases, and develop joint or co-ordinated inspection operations.

Major narcotic routes to Europe in 2008



Source: Ministry of Defence (open sources).

Arms control and anti-proliferation capabilities

France supports the European and international bodies working to combat proliferation and overseeing implementation of international disarmament agreements.

France will contribute to the aid offered by the European Union to States which undertake to sign and implement the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and will continue to contribute to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and to application of the Chemical Weapons Convention (see Chapter 6). France will also develop general military and technical expertise to support the detection and suppression of trafficking in materials and equipment used in the design and manufacture of such weapons.

Fundamental and applied research in these fields will receive funding, as will work done by French scientific laboratories. Special training on clandestine programmes will be provided for Customs officers responsible for monitoring military equipment or technologies and similar items and dual-use goods.

The Defence and National Security Council will also call for support to projects capable of developing means of detecting and analysing biological, chemical, radiological or nuclear arms or agents.

Tighter controls will also be necessary on commercial and financial movements relating to weapons manufacture that originate in or transit *via* France. Training in these fields provided by French laboratories in research centres will have to be monitored to ensure that those receiving training are not engaged in sensitive research programmes, particularly in the case of high-risk countries.

Anti-proliferation missions and monitoring of disarmament agreements will be included in the objectives assigned to the armed forces and civil security forces, taking into account the foreseeable increase in tasking that will be required. Emphasis will be placed on means of secure destruction of illegal biological, chemical and nuclear facilities, and on means of defence and protection, biological in particular.

Preventing major unintentional crises

Prevention of crises resulting from accidental events is based on a national organisation, together with European policies and support for international bodies.


This includes training for those engaged in crisis response, preparation and training of the population, and an appropriate communication policy.

A significant impetus will be needed in the years to come to increase the civilian population's capacity for response and resistance.

To meet potential health crises, France will promote the creation of a health emergency readiness and response agency which, in consultation with the World Health Organisation (WHO), will draw up safety standards and co-ordinate information on the risks of pandemic disease. The agency will build up European stocks of medicines and co-ordinate management of various forms of protection (particularly against CRBN threats). It will finance information and communication programmes aimed at European citizens and organise joint exercises between member states. Eventually, the agency could organise overall resource planning and co-ordinate calls on member states for assistance should a crisis arise. France would also wish to see a Commissioner given special responsibility for co-ordinating such measures.

France will commit its energies to sustainable development as a means of long-term prevention of natural disasters and will do its utmost to give concrete shape to the solidarity clause provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, which covers (see Chapter 4) threat prevention as well as protection and assistance for populations in the event of crisis. It will encourage the European Union to carry out a regular assessment of the threats faced by member countries, and to decide the appropriate preventive actions and means required, in the military field no less than in the field of domestic and civil security.

Health crises in the world in 2008



Source: UNAIDS and WHO.

Massive highly-lethal pandemics

A pandemic is a widespread epidemic of infectious disease affecting a large number of people over an extensive area or region within a population that has not developed immunity. New remanent viruses are constantly appearing, at the rate of one every two years on average, and being transmitted before prevention and treatment methods can be found and deployed.

Over the next fifteen years, the emergence of a pandemic is plausible. Whatever its origin, natural or malicious, the methods for dealing with its consequences will be identical from the point of view of protecting the population.

The kinetics of a highly-contagious and highly-lethal pandemic would extend over a period of several weeks to several months, in a series of waves spaced over time.

By virtue of its scale, duration, geographical extent and indiscriminate nature, such a crisis is likely to jeopardise the normal functioning of the country and its institutions. Its consequences would call for a massive mobilisation of both civil and military resources, requiring as much detailed advanced planning as possible.

Such a scenario would clearly have far-reaching European and international implications.

The primary objective being to avoid the development of a pandemic, *the first element of the strategy relies on knowledge and anticipation, coupled with prevention.* It includes targeting the health monitoring and warning system on the threat, ongoing investments in research, development and production of potential treatments, contingency planning for national life under a pandemic, raising early awareness in the general population, training and exercises for response teams, setting up national stockpiles to meet the main health threats and, lastly, contributing to the action of competent international agencies.

In the event of an outbreak of pandemic disease, the aim would be to prevent a health crisis degenerating into a humanitarian, economic, security or even institutional crisis. The authorities will need to address both the cause, through a comprehensive range of health measures, and the consequences for society and institutions.

In terms of coping with the pandemic as such, health measures will include organising measures for the reception and treatment of victims, under the conditions most appropriate to the nature of the pathogen. This organisation will call upon the services of all competent nursing and medical staff and hospital infrastructures.

The armed forces will provide staff functions, protection of sensitive sites and transportation, and logistic support to civil response teams and the general population. The armed forces medical corps will contribute its medical expertise, its bio-assay capacities and its medical personnel.

Preventive deployment in potential crisis zones

France's strategy rules out any form of preventive warfare, even if it does not preclude *ad hoc* pre-emptive action (see Chapter 12) in situations of clear and imminent threat.

In certain cases, the preventive deployment of military or civil resources in a potential crisis zone may suffice, without intervention, to prevent the emergence or resurgence of potential crises.

Preventive deployments will demonstrate France's determination to contribute to international stability. They may also offer opportunities to act in fields such as humanitarian action.

France will have the necessary military capabilities, supported as necessary by our pre-positioned forces or civil security intervention units.

Priority will gradually be shifted towards a pooling of European capabilities. Substantial investments will need to be made in strategic means of transport to enable significant numbers and volumes of civil or military equipment to be projected over long distances.

France's contribution to prevention will focus on the following points:

— **Developing an inter-ministerial monitoring and early-warning system** for the French authorities targeted at of serious local tensions likely to degenerate, but also dealing with potential natural disasters.

— **Re-orientation of defence and security cooperation:**

- By better geographic distribution across zones of strategic interest;
- Through a new approach to defence agreements by providing regular information to Parliament;
- By a global approach to defence and security co-operation;
- By increased co-operation with the expected African Standby Force;
- Through the conversion of French pre-positioned forces which will eventually be organised around two bases in Africa, one on the Atlantic and another on the Indian Ocean seaboard. France's presence in the Arab-Persian Gulf is to be expanded, especially in Abu Dhabi;

— **The fight against trafficking** outside France and Europe, using civil and military means to neutralise the traffic before it reaches our shores, with new technical resources to monitor flows within Europe, and also by improved surveillance of the European Union's external borders;

— **Arms control and the fight against proliferation** by reinforcing civil and military capabilities in order to provide robust detection and neutralisation tools—tools which will be incorporated into the operational contracts of French armed forces;

— **Prevention of accidental crises**, by promoting the creation of a European health emergency preparedness and response agency and implementation of the Lisbon Treaty's solidarity clause in the event of natural disaster;

— **Preventive deployments** of civil or military resources.

Bilateral defence agreements to which France is party at January 1, 2008

Cameroon: Special defence agreement between the French Government and the Government of the United Republic of Cameroon, signed in Yaoundé on February 21, 1974.

Central African Republic: Special agreements between the French Government and the respective Governments of: Central African Republic, Republic of Congo and Republic of Chad, signed in Brazzaville on August 15, 1960. *Approval authorised under the terms of Act no. 60-1225 of November 23, 1960; agreements published by decree no. 60-1230 of November 23, 1960, (repudiated by the latter two States and therefore only remaining in force with the Central African Republic).*

Comoros: Defence co-operation agreement between the French Government and the Government of the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros, signed in Paris on November 10, 1978. *Agreement published by decree no. 83-88 of February 2, 1983.*

Côte d'Ivoire: Defence agreement between the Governments of France, of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, of the Republic of Dahomey and of the Republic of Niger, signed in Paris on April 24, 1961. *Approval authorised under the terms of Act no. 61-769 of July 26, 1961; agreement published by decree no. 62-136 of January 23, 1962 (repudiated by the latter two States and therefore only remaining in force with Côte d'Ivoire).*

Djibouti:

— Temporary protocol establishing conditions for the stationing of French soldiers on the territory of the Republic of Djibouti following independence and the principles of military co-operation between the Governments of France and the Republic of Djibouti, signed in Djibouti on June 27, 1977. *Approval authorised under the terms of Act no. 79-358 of May 8, 1979; published by decree no. 85-1171 of November 5, 1985.*

— Agreement on airspace surveillance between the Governments of France and the Republic of Djibouti, signed in Djibouti on February 11, 1991.

United Arab Emirates: Defence co-operation agreement between the Governments of France and the United Arab Emirates, signed in Abu Dhabi on January 18, 1995.

Gabon: Defence agreement between the Governments of France and the Republic of Gabon, signed in Libreville on August 17, 1960. *Approval authorised under the terms of Act no. 60-1226 of November 22, 1960; published by decree no. 60-1231 of November 23, 1960.*

Kuwait: Agreement between the Governments of France and the state of Kuwait on co-operation in defence matters, signed in Paris on August 18, 1992.

Qatar:

— Agreement between the Governments of France and the state of Qatar on co-operation in defence matters, signed in Doha on August 1, 1994.

— Technical agreement between the Governments of France and the state of Qatar on the terms of application of co-operation in defence matters, signed in Doha on October 24, 1998.

Senegal: Defence co-operation agreement between the Governments of France and the Republic of Senegal, signed in Paris on March 29, 1974. *Approval authorised under the terms of Act no. 75-1176 of December 19, 1975; published by decree no. 76-1072 of November 17, 1976.*

Togo: Defence agreement between France and Togo, signed in Paris on July 10, 1963. *Approval authorised under the terms of Act no. 63-1253 of February 21, 1963, published in the Journal Officiel of February 22, 1963.*

CHAPTER 10

DETERRENCE

The credibility of France's nuclear deterrent will rest on independent access by the Head of State to flexible capabilities adapted to a wide diversity of situations. French deterrent forces will therefore be organised into two clearly distinguished yet complementary components, including the support environment necessary for their fully independent and secure deployment. France will continue to maintain these capabilities over time.

Two complementary and modernised components

The operational credibility of France's nuclear deterrent relies on permanent submarine patrols and airborne capability. The level of awareness these capabilities will adapt to circumstances and to the engagement plans decided by the President of the Republic.

The technical characteristics of the seaborne and airborne components are very different in terms of trajectory (one ballistic, the other not), range and accuracy. They are complementary thanks to their respective advantages and their different capacities of penetration.

Together, these two components offer the President a sufficiently wide choice of possible action. They complicate the task of the adversary's defences and give our deterrent insurance against the risk of a technical problem or unforeseen technological breakthrough in the fields of air defence, anti-missile defence or submarine detection.

The weapons carried by both components are of a strategic nature. In no way do they constitute battlefield weapons for military use in theatre.

Nuclear force capabilities include in particular the ability to deliver effective strikes against an adversary's centres of political, economic and political power, or to paralyse an adversary's capacity for action.

Modernisation of the two components has been under way for the past 10 years and is designed to maintain the capability of France's nuclear forces to fulfil their tasks over the long term. In 2010, the M-51 intercontinental ballistic missile will be brought into service on the French new-generation SSBNs, providing the seaborne component with a much extended range and increased flexibility. The new missile will be technically evolutive and from 2015 will be fitted with the new ONW warhead. From 2009 onwards, the airborne component will be equipped with the ASMP-A cruise missile deployed on *Mirage 2000-NK3* and *Rafale* aircraft stationed in France (two squadrons), or carrier-based. The missile's enhanced performance over its predecessor has been designed in response to advances in air defence. It will be equipped on deployment with the new ANW warhead. ANW and ONW will replace the current warheads as they reach their maximum projected life expectancy, since manufacture of identical replacements cannot be guaranteed without nuclear testing. Because it will not be possible to prove performance by testing, the new missiles will be designed according to a "robust warhead" concept validated during the final series of nuclear tests in 1995.

The strategic nuclear forces are capable of carrying out all their missions from a diversified range of platforms and in all circumstances.

The seaborne strategic force (*Force Océanique Stratégique*, FOST) will continue to guarantee a permanent second-strike capability, requiring a fleet of four submarines which must remain invulnerable.

The *Rafale* aircraft of the airborne component are multi-role combat fighters. Some of their potential will be used, if the need arises, on missions other than deterrence.

France will continue to maintain its nuclear forces at a level of strict sufficiency and will constantly scale them at the lowest possible level compatible with its security. France will not seek to acquire all the resources that its technological capacity may place within its reach. Its force levels will depend not on those of other nuclear powers but solely on its perception of the risks and its assessment of the effectiveness of its deterrent in protecting its interests.

The level of sufficiency will continue to be subject to both *quantitative* assessment of the number of carriers, missiles and weapons, and *qualitative* assessment of the defences French deterrent forces are likely to face. This assessment is regularly submitted to the President

and updated under the responsibility of the Defence Restricted Nuclear Council (see Chapter 15).

Maintaining technical credibility

The continued technical credibility of France's nuclear deterrent will rely largely on the scientific and technical resources required to maintain its nuclear capability over time. France's long-term capacity for the independent manufacture of safe, reliable weapons must be guaranteed.

In the absence of nuclear testing and facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices, the French *simulation* programme thus becomes a key component of nuclear deterrence. The programme is not designed to develop new types of nuclear weapons, but to keep abreast of factors such as weapons ageing, changes in defence strategies and scientific and technical advances.

The simulation programme relies on the results of the final testing campaign and is intended to guarantee that nuclear warheads will work without undergoing tests. It relies mainly on the MegaJoule Laser (LMJ), weapons radiography and super-calculators. It also serves to maintain the skills of weapons design experts over time.

This combination of human and technical resources also reflects France's high level in the field of nuclear physics and upholds the nation's scientific standing in the world.

Ensuring the long-term future of our deterrence capabilities also requires France to maintain highly specialised skills, developed in France, in the field of missiles and of ballistic missiles in particular. The appropriate technological and industrial sectors will be maintained. This policy will enable France to undertake the necessary improvements which, by 2025, will focus primarily on range and accuracy.

Maintaining an independent submarine component will also require France to retain national expertise in the essential technological and industrial skills. The capability to build particularly near-undetectable long-range nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines represents a major strategic advantage.

Maintaining communication capability with the nuclear forces

The credibility of the French deterrent also rests on the assurance that the President will at all times be able to issue orders to the nuclear forces. The transmission capabilities used to convey these orders must therefore meet the highest standards of security, constant availability and resistance to any form of attack.

These capabilities rely on fixed infrastructure networks, transmission stations to each of the components and a system of last resort. Over the coming years, major investments will be devoted to promoting the flexibility required by the nation's deterrence strategy and guaranteeing the availability and performance of these systems over time.

Resources required to ensure the safety of the seaborne component

Independent and safe deployment of the seaborne component supposes the best possible knowledge of the deployment areas and of the movements of any foreign forces present.

It also implies permanent control of the approaches to the submarines' home base. Depending on circumstances, these priority missions could require two nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) and up to four anti-submarine frigates, as well as mine-warfare resources and maritime patrol aircraft.

Over the next fifteen years, this need for safety will continue to be an essential factor in the scaling and modernisation of French undersea environment control capabilities. For this reason, the renewal of French nuclear attack submarines and anti-submarine frigates will be a priority.

Resources required in support of the air component

The airborne component relies on a support structure of fighter aircraft and refuelling tanker aircraft, the size of which depends on the priority mission in hand.

Maintaining the operational serviceability of these resources, and renewing them as necessary, will continue to be a priority over the next fifteen years, particularly in the case of in-flight refuelling tankers, urgently required to replace aircraft already over forty years old.

The two components, modernised and strictly proportioned, will provide the President with the flexibility necessary for deterrence:

- From 2010, the seaborne component will be equipped with the M-51 sea-launched intercontinental ballistic missile deployed on the new-generation SSBNs;
- From 2009, the airborne component will be equipped with the ASMP-A cruise missile deployed on *Mirage* 2000-NK3 and *Rafale* aircraft stationed in France, and carrier-based.

Maintaining these capabilities over the long term will require:

- Continuation of the simulation programme, relying mainly on the MegaJoule laser (LMJ), weapons radiography and super-calculators;
- Maintaining national skills developed in the field of missiles and nuclear submarines; over the period to 2025, improvements will focus primarily on missile range and accuracy.

Priority will be given to modernisation required to maintain the capability to transmit orders to the nuclear forces, to ensure the safety of the seaborne component, and to provide support for the airborne component.

CHAPTER 11

PROTECTION

In the light of the new emphasis on protection of the population and territory, France will need the capability to meet four main priorities.

In the new security environment, the first of these priorities will be to ensure *the permanent mission of protecting* the population and territory, particularly through in-depth surveillance and control of national territory and its approaches.

The French resource strategy will need to incorporate *the objective of overall resilience as a key objective* (see Chapter 3) for society and the authorities, in order to ensure at all times the continued functioning of the authorities and the continuity of national life.

In addition, steps must be taken to overcome the failings and gaps in the French capability to respond to *new and unconventional forms of threats and vulnerabilities*.

Finally, France will need to develop the *rapid reaction capability of its authorities* in the event of a major threat arising on national territory and if the national protection posture needs to be raised in response to an external threat. This calls for a new approach to the management and co-ordination of civil and military capabilities.

The fight against terrorism

The Government *White Paper* on domestic security against terrorism, published in 2006, has already highlighted the need for changes to France's anti-terrorism system. This depends in the first place on the work of the national police (UCLAT Anti-Terrorism Co-ordination Unit), the intelligence services and, when needed, outside France, specialised units of the armed forces.

Protecting the population and the integrity of the nation against terrorist threat implies:

Forestalling the risk by surveillance, detection and neutralisation of dangerous movements of persons and goods, and protecting national territory from incursions;

Protecting particularly vulnerable targets, such as air, land and maritime transport networks, critical infrastructure and critical information systems;

Staying one step ahead of the evolving threat situation by developing technological superiority in the fields of CRBN protection, explosives detection, control of telecommunications traffic, video-surveillance, information systems protection and biometrics.

The government's "Vigipirate" plan establishes a clear set of operational vigilance, prevention and protection measures that can be adapted to the threat assessment.

Protecting the nation against crises on a wider scale

IN-DEPTH CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE OF NATIONAL LAND, SEA AND AIR SPACE

Control and surveillance of national land, sea and air space must adapt to the massive increase in exchanges and communications brought about by globalisation. In due course, a European *security strategy will be need to be formally agreed*, covering the *maritime, air and space sectors*. The strategy will help to co-ordinate the work of the European Union, civil agencies and the European Defence Agency.

Movements of persons and goods

Security measures have traditionally focused on the physical protection of facilities, but must now *turn more towards prevention and focus on movements of persons and flows of goods*. This capability is currently severely limited by legal, technological and economic constraints.

France will propose the adoption by the EU of legislation requiring transport companies to provide advance information on goods exported to European Union territory. This approach will make it possible to carry out risk assessments and, if necessary, to issue a ban on exports of goods to France or apply stricter control measures on arrival.

As far as controlling the flow of persons is concerned, France will support the European Commission's initiative to work towards the long-term development of a system for controlling movements at the external borders of the Schengen zone through the introduction of a system of recording entries and exits.

Automated control systems will be developed to support this initiative (biometric recognition and the associated databases).

While respecting individual freedoms, improvements will also be made to the use of databases on travellers using public transport, particularly by air and sea, compiled by operators as part of their commercial activities.

As regards controls on the flows of goods, France will contribute to enhancing the security of international supply chains by supporting the development of merchandise identification and monitoring systems and content detection systems of illicit or dangerous materials. Applied research backed up by parallel experiments in conjunction with industry will be carried out in order to propose attainable standards and reliable equipment to carry out such controls without reducing the smooth flow of goods.

Protecting our maritime approaches

Maritime surveillance and intervention assets must be designed not only to make a more effective contribution to the fight against terrorism but also to carry out all the missions *incumbent on the State at sea* (protecting national interests, safeguarding of persons and goods, combating illicit maritime activities, protecting the maritime environment and resources, etc). These assets include the semaphore chain, surveillance vessels and aircraft and helicopters. They are intended to operate in waters where France has not only sovereign rights but also duties (territorial waters, exclusive economic zone, international

waters in accordance with the provisions of international conventions). *Most of these assets will need replacing over the next fifteen years.* Optimisation will be pursued, with the aim of acquiring *units that are relatively unsophisticated but capable of operating on the high seas.* This requirement is essential to guarantee Navy missions in this field, and to draw a clear distinction between the assets it requires for these tasks and those destined for military engagement and combat missions, such as first-rank frigates, for example.

Land-based surveillance assets will be reinforced, pursuing deployment of the integrated inter-ministerial national surveillance network, which will be linked to other European maritime surveillance systems. Efforts will continue to improve the protection of key strategic civil and military ports, in particular their harbours, in line with maritime and port security doctrine. The funding required for the acquisition of these resources will be allocated in light of the inter-ministerial nature of maritime protection.

At the European level, France will propose plans to introduce new capabilities such as *maritime surveillance drones, automatic station-keeping satellites, trans-horizon radar, integrated maritime intelligence systems, etc.*

Air surveillance

France's air detection network will be modernised to strengthen our capability to defend against any air intrusion by detecting the threat before it enters French airspace. Over the short and medium term, the oldest air defence radars will be replaced; more recent equipment will be upgraded and new low-altitude radars will be deployed to improve national coverage and lower the radar floor. Detection ranges will be extended, most notably in the Mediterranean, thanks to the acquisition of *trans-horizon radars.* Over the longer term, efforts will be made to develop resources capable of detecting and intercepting most small, low-speed aircraft in French airspace.

Outer space

Military and civil activities depend increasingly on space-based assets performing vital missions and services. This situation creates a new vulnerability, as the amount of space debris in orbit grows and direct attack capability appears to be within the reach of a number of national powers.

Constant detailed tracking of objects orbiting the earth is now the sole preserve of the United States and, to a lesser extent, Russia. *Europe is dependent on other powers for the surveillance of outer space.*

In order to overcome this dependency, avoid foreseeable collisions and forestall hostile acts, France will encourage the development of a *European project to detect and monitor objects likely to cause damage to missile launchers or satellites*. In the short term, the project will form part of GRAVES, the French space surveillance system currently operational at the *national* level only. In the longer term, this capability will form part of a more global strategy for the protection of our space-based infrastructure.

RESPONSE TO THE EVOLVING THREAT SITUATION

Reinforced protection against CRBN threats

In response to the scale of the challenges posed in a field which is both complex and costly, France will substantially upgrade its response and improve co-ordination between the various authorities. This process will be steered by a strategic committee tasked with ensuring the overall consistency of capabilities designed to protect against these threats and the proper execution of research and deployment programmes.

One of the first priorities will be to support and strengthen the national network of Biotox-Piratox laboratories set up in 1997, following the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, to identify and characterise the most dangerous agents.

In this domain more than in any other, *joint training programmes and exercises will be developed* in order to simulate the conditions of such an attack as realistically as possible for all those potentially involved—emergency, security and medical services—and hone joint intervention procedures.

The Defence and Interior ministries will set up a *joint national civil and military training centre*. Equipment and training of civil and military units will be boosted with the emphasis on shared identification of threats. *All first-line response personnel in the public security apparatus will gradually be equipped with appropriate CRBN protective gear.*

The resources allocated to the defence zones—renamed defence and security zones (see box)—will need to be stepped up and include, to a far greater extent than is currently the case, mobile facilities for the detection, sampling and identification of biological and chemical agents. Decontamination facilities will be expanded, in the short term to three times the number of decontamination chains currently deployed nationwide. Some of the powers currently reserved exclusively to the Détachement Central interministériel d'Intervention technique (DCI), the Central Inter-ministerial Technical Intervention Detachment, will be handed over to the defence and security zones for greater responsive-

ness in the initial operations to deactivate improvised radioactive devices (so-called “dirty bombs”).

Facilities for the hospital treatment of victims of a CRBN attack will be improved, and hospitals with approved emergency capability will gradually be equipped with permanent decontamination facilities.



Research and development work on new means of identifying biological and chemical agents and explosives (particularly home-made devices) will continue.

Defence and security zones

Metropolitan France is organised into seven defence zones, which constitute the intermediate echelon between national and departmental level. The French overseas *départements* and territories (DOM-COM) are organised into five zones. These zones represent a level of co-ordination and action that draws a balance between the demands of proximity to the terrain and those of asset-sharing.

It is proposed that these should be renamed defence and security zones, that the scope of their powers should be extended and that their missions and resources should be adapted to the management of major crises.

Defence and security zones



Source: Ministry of Defence/Ministry of the Interior.

Protection of critical information systems

Faced with a growing threat, whether State-backed or otherwise, France must in the short term acquire reactive capability to protect the nation's information systems.

Early-warning systems will be developed to detect cyber attacks by setting up a detection centre in charge of the permanent monitoring of critical networks and implementation of appropriate defence mechanisms.

To combat the threat, greater use will be made of *security products and trust networks*. This in turn will require sufficient national capacity in the industry to master and develop very high-security products to protect State secrets, as well as a range of guaranteed "trusted products and services" for use by government agencies and services which will be made widely available to the business sector.

Regulatory provisions will also be introduced to ensure that electronic communications operators implement the technical and organisational measures necessary to protect their networks against the most serious failures and attacks. In this respect, the Internet will need to be considered as critical infrastructure and considerable effort will be made to improve its resilience.

A new agency responsible for information systems security (agence de la sécurité des systèmes d'information) will be set up to reinforce the coherence and capacity of State resources. Reporting to the Prime Minister and operating under the aegis of the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN), the agency will take over, and substantially expand, the staff and resources of the SGDN division currently responsible for this task. The agency will operate a centralised capability to detect and defend against cyber attacks. It will have the resources to sponsor the development of, and acquire, the security products essential to protect the Government's most sensitive networks. *The agency will also take on an advisory role to the private sector, particularly in areas of critical strategic importance, and will participate actively in the development of security for the information society.* The development of Internet sites dedicated to information system security and accessible to all will be one of its responsibilities.

More generally, the Government administration will enhance its expertise by increasing the numbers of specialised personnel in the ministries, creating a reservoir of competencies available to serve the needs of government departments and operators of critical infrastructures.

In view of the international dimension of the threats to communication networks, the agency will maintain close links with our main partners, particularly in Europe, and will encourage the development of a *Europe-wide* communication networks security policy.

A nationwide network of experts will also be established in the form of information system security observatories in the defence and security zones. These observatories will report to the zone Prefects and their principal tasks will include support (training, advice) to local government, organisation of networks and reporting early warning-signs of incidents.

Countering ballistic missile threats

At present only the major world powers possess ballistic missiles with sufficient range to reach Europe and France. It is already clear, however, that other powers will, over the course of the next few years, achieve possession of operational assets with equivalent capabilities. The spread of the necessary technology means that the probability of such proliferation increases with time.

— As part of its contribution to European and Atlantic solidarity, France will adopt an active *prevention* strategy designed to curb ballistic weapons proliferation, especially in the highest-risk zones. The strategy will be based on France's capability to *deter* any intent by another State to attack our vital interests using weapons of this type.

— France will also reinforce its *intelligence* and response capability. With this end in view, France will acquire a *detection and early-warning capability*, interoperable with that of our allies and partners. This capability will enable us to monitor the evolving ballistic threat, pinpoint missile launch origins in order to identify the instigator of the attack, and improve the public alert system. It will be based first on very long-range *radar pilot system with a view to initial operating capability in 2015*. In parallel, research and studies will be continued to pave the way for the launch, if possible in co-operation, of an advanced satellite detection programme. Our goal is to possess a *space based early warning system in 2020*. Taking into account the degree of technological complexity and risk associated with such a project, this programme will entail deployment and use of a probational satellite capability in the first half of the coming decade.

— Within the framework of the European Union and of the Atlantic Alliance, France will participate in combined efforts that may result in the deployment of an *active missile defence capability*. To this end, France will provide continued support for NATO-sponsored research to determine the global architecture of a system to defend the Atlantic Alliance against long-range ballistic missiles.

— Lastly, the authorities must make preparations to *mitigate damage* of any kind that may ensue as a result of missile attack on national territory, through a combination of response and protective measures, including alerting the public.

Detection and early warning

The early-warning capability is intended to detect and identify the nature of a ballistic missile launch as soon as possible after firing. A detection and early-warning system has *three objectives*:

— *Monitoring the proliferation of ballistic missiles*: missile test-firings are a good indicator of the technical and industrial maturity of proliferating countries. Detection and early-warning offer an independent assessment of the advancement of missile programmes and can be useful in characterising the technical elements of the threat.

— *Determining launch origin*: using trajectography data for the inbound missile, detection and early-warning can help to identify the aggressor and, where necessary, implement retaliatory measures. In so doing, it also reinforces the credibility of deterrence. It also offers the possibility of destroying hostile sites and missiles on the ground through the use of deep-strike capabilities.

Improving the public alert system: the flight time of a ballistic missile is normally a matter of minutes (around fifteen minutes over a range of 3,000 kilometres). The earliest possible detection of missile launch and determination of target area will allow for maximum use of the time available to alert potential target populations and implement the appropriate protective measures.

The early-warning capability relies on:


Space-based infrared detectors, able to detect the heat given off by the missile's engine during the powered phase immediately after launch; these detectors are mounted on geostationary satellites providing permanent surveillance;

— *Ground-based detectors* such as very long-range radar (range of the order of 3,000 kilometres), capable of detecting missiles even after their engines cut off.

— Space-based resources are designed primarily to detect long-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (from a range of 3,000 km upwards) with a fairly long thrust phase. Short-range missiles remain difficult to detect from space. *Space-based and ground-based assets are thus complementary.*

In view of the technical complexity of such a system, France has already embarked on research work. The SPIRALE (*Système Préparatoire Infra-Rouge pour l'ALerte*) early-warning demonstration programme consists of two micro-satellites to be launched by Ariane 5 in 2008. *The satellites will gather infrared images of terrestrial backgrounds.* The demonstration system will be followed by a precursor system for the detection and trajectography components.

Detection and early warning



Reinforcing civil protection capability to cope with major crises

Major crises, whether intentional in origin or otherwise, can affect whole populations, especially in the DOM-COM as a result of geographic factors. They may trigger massive displacements of populations, whether organised or spontaneous. Recent examples have suggested an order of magnitude (tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands). The issues raised by the evacuation of populations and its consequences, in terms of dealing with the victims, have been insufficiently addressed.

Plans will therefore be drawn up, with military support, under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. They will include the pre-positioning on national territory of the logistics resources immediately necessary to cope with tens of thousands of evacuees.

In addition, an inter-ministerial approach to helicopter rescue missions will be adopted. Defence and Interior Ministries in particular, as well as other public and private operators (SAMU emergency medical response units, companies, etc.), own and maintain redundant helicopter capabilities. Rationalising these resources will generate cost reductions (training, support, alert, equipments, development, etc.) and optimise their use.

Large-scale natural or technological disasters

The recurrence of major events of increasing gravity has been confirmed over recent years, mainly as a result of population densification in high-risk areas. The likelihood of a major technological accident combined with a natural disaster is increasing. The risk is enhanced still further by the threat of attacks on critical facilities.

A crisis on this scale would have international repercussions. The European Union is working to acquire the means of effective solidarity, without calling into question the primary responsibility of Member States which will either benefit from or contribute to aid under the terms of European solidarity, as circumstances may dictate. In France's case, specific provision must be made for its overseas *départements* and territories (the DOM-COM), both because of their remoteness from Metropolitan France and their greater exposure to natural hazards.

The effects of a large-scale disaster affecting hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people, would be felt as follows:

- Immediately, in the form of risk to life and destruction of property and infrastructure;
- In its immediate aftermath, with implications for public order arising from the unstable situation faced by the population and the temptation to engage in looting;
- Consequences for health: diseases linked to the pollution caused by a technological accident or by a natural environment significantly degraded as a result of the disaster;
- Economic and social consequences: disruption of everyday life for millions of people, in terms of employment, transport, economic activity and social cohesion;
- Environmental consequences: pollution of large areas by toxic agents, rendering areas unsafe for long periods, with the difficulty of ultimately being unable to guarantee that affected areas and buildings are safe for human use.

As far as *anticipation* is concerned, the ability to forecast natural events depends on the physical nature of the events and on local circumstances and in some cases remains an impossibility. The authorities must, however, be able to rely on a *network of scientific specialists* identified in advance and familiar with crisis management procedures. *The development of forecasting and early-warning mechanisms is an imperative.* Technological risk can be assessed—subject to an active prevention policy—but the event itself generally provides few advance warning-signs.

A determined policy of promoting *research* in these fields is essential for the future.

Prevention relies mainly on risk mitigation, population preparedness and crisis planning.

Unlike natural hazards, the risk of a technological disaster can be reduced at source by, for example, strict application of the “classified facility” (*installations classées pour la protection de l’environnement*, ICPE) system. The consequences of natural or technological disasters will be mitigated by the formulation of appropriate measures, written into natural or technological hazard prevention plans. Finally, *public information* to encourage widespread adoption of self-protective measures significantly diminishes injury and loss of life and should be reinforced.

Strengthening the resilience of the nation

PROTECTING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

The security policy for activities of strategic importance, launched in 2006, will be pursued vigorously. The policy covers twelve defined sectors and is intended to assess and rank risks, then take measures to address them. One of the essential aims of the policy is to determine which strategic sectors will require the most significant effort of protection in the years ahead, initially from operators and subsequently using the resources of the State if necessary.

Critical sectors

(Regulation of 2 June 2006)

Civil activities of the State – Judiciary activities – Military activities of the State – Food – Electronic communications, audiovisual and news media – Energy – Space and research – Finance – Water supply – Industry – Health – Transport

A number of major infrastructure resources, particularly for the transport of energy, information and goods, are trans-national. The security of such resources must be addressed coherently by the States and operators concerned. To this end, the French approach to strategic sectors will be presented to France’s European partners in order to take forward initiatives launched by the European Union to establish common principles for critical infrastructure protection and promote the sharing of best practices.

IMPROVING THE PUBLIC COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND ALERT MECHANISMS

Communication is an integral part of any national security strategy. Handling a major crisis requires, first and foremost, retaining the population's trust in the authorities. Silence on the part of the authorities, withholding of information, an appearance of improvised, unfocused communication, or messages that are exclusively defensive in tone, invariably add to a sense of anxiety which is inevitably passed on and amplified by the media.

The communication which accompanies a terrorist attack or the most severe natural or industrial disasters leaves a profound and lasting mark on collective memory as a result of the stress that such events engender. The first public reference to an event that threatens the continuity of normal life is therefore a key moment and must be the responsibility of the senior person responsible for handling the crisis. The next step is to lose no time in informing citizens as to the real nature of the event, how they should react, the objectives of government action and how they can contribute to their realisation.

Two levels of government communication must therefore be clearly distinguished:

- The political and strategic level of general communication;
- Communication aimed at those in the field.

Alerting and informing the public, along with communication, will be made central to the crisis management process.

Modernising the public alert system

First and foremost, France must have the means of informing the public rapidly. A powerful and robust alert network will be introduced, replacing the present system. The system will need to be fully modernised to make the most of the diversity of means now available: sirens, text messaging, e-mails, public bulletin boards in towns, railway stations, airports and on road and motorway networks. The potential of the Internet must also be exploited.

In addition, dedicated standalone means of communication (satellite phones, off-network radio-telephones, etc.) will be provided in case of total loss of electrical power supply.

Planning and professionalising crisis communication

In an environment characterised by a proliferation of messages, widely-scattered contacts and the instant flow of information from a

huge diversity of sources, the first problem is the legitimacy and credibility of the “official” message. Comments by so-called experts, the immediate broadcasting of raw images, the rapid succession of stories designed to capture the public’s attention, make it all the harder for the population to understand the statements put out by the authorities. If it is to be effective in such circumstances, crisis communication will need to have been thought out and organised in advance.

A section on communication will therefore systematically feature in all crisis management planning. The “avian flu pandemic” plan already incorporates communication as an operational dimension in its own right, analysed and set out in detail in the same way as all the other actions included in the plan.

Planning will be accompanied by a joint effort to prepare for communication in an emergency. Plans are of little use if those who will be called upon to implement them lack a minimum understanding of the institutional and operational context of their implementation. A permanent *inter-ministerial network* of experts will be set up, whose members are used to working together, and who will be responsible, when the time comes, for implementing the planned measures.

National and area exercises to test the plans will bring together all those involved in crisis management, including representatives of the highest political authorities, the media, local elected officials and public and private operators.

The location from which the message is issued will also influence public perception of the crisis management as such. At national level, the political decision-maker charged with the strategic management of major crises will have access to facilities to issue full and informed public statements. Crisis operations centres will be provided with facilities to allow operational officials to address the population. At the local level, the necessary resources will be placed at the disposal of the representative of the State.

Developing inter-ministerial tools for broadcasting information before, during and after a crisis

France will at the earliest possible opportunity set up a *government Internet portal* to raise public awareness of risks and responses in the event of a crisis.

In addition, a *national call centre* will be established, with the task of providing information to the population on the cause of the event, advising those affected by the alert, answering questions and allaying concerns, calling on expert advice as necessary.

It is important to draw on other countries’ experiences in this field, which shed light on how far citizens can be encouraged to prepare for

a crisis without unnecessarily fuelling anxiety. Internet sites dedicated to individual preparedness for crisis situations exist in most European countries.

Making the news media a key partner in the event of a crisis

The media nowadays are too often perceived by government agencies as likely to have a negative impact on crisis management. On the contrary, in situations where national security is at risk, journalists must be recognised as partners in the chain of crisis communication, independent yet responsible. As is the practice in the United Kingdom, journalists should be given the fullest possible information, as this will only help to improve the information that reaches the public.

This approach should prevail both before and during the crisis.

Before the event, journalists must have been provided with adequate and concrete information on the crisis management organisation and the resources available to the authorities, without breaching the necessary confidentiality which should surround certain mechanisms and responses. With the approval of media managers, media professionals will also be included in crisis exercises.

Informing the public about procedures and resources is likely to encourage the vigilance necessary as regards certain risks and an understanding of the measures taken by the State or the main operators. *It is always easier to deal with a vulnerable area of social or economic life when everyone knows of its existence.* This approach will enhance the resilience of our society and its capacity to deal with risks alongside the authorities and all their partners.

During the crisis, those in charge must take the initiative of explaining the key facts rapidly to those whose business it is to report them. The most seasoned media professionals are increasingly aware in advance or in real time of realities on the ground, or even of military or civil manoeuvres. The principle of a period of secrecy, if legitimately applicable, which lies at the heart of the decision-making process or of intelligence and action capabilities, must not become an obstacle to successful crisis management. The instantaneous broadcasting of information that is typical of crisis situations calls for other communication and information strategies as the crisis unfolds. Greater openness must be the rule, particularly as regards rescue or peace-keeping operations. Reliance on public means of information as part of the manoeuvre will be incorporated as such into the operation plan at every level, to a far greater degree than is currently the case.

Along similar lines, a *mechanism for dialogue at times of major crisis* will be established between predetermined contacts in government services, crisis management centres and the main media.

Finally, the management of the media concerned will be invited to take part in experience feedback analysis to improve the authorities' awareness of the effects and perception of their action.

Improving crisis management on French soil

Although in recent history France has not, unlike the United States, Spain or the United Kingdom, been faced with a major crisis on its soil, this fortunate circumstance could turn into a weakness if the authorities do not improve their collective preparedness for such events.

AT CENTRAL LEVEL

Significant progress has been made in recent years, particularly with the rethinking from 2001 onwards of the "Vigipirate" anti-terrorism plans. Government strategic planning capabilities nonetheless remain limited, incomplete and dispersed. The system is insufficiently co-ordinated and inadequately linked in to the national network at *préfecture* level.

This situation is perilous, because of the recurring characteristics of early XXIst century crises: instantaneous information, European and international interactions, impact not only on national land-space but also in the air, sea and cyber-space, simultaneity or chain-linking at several points around the country or the world, a multiplicity of parties concerned, both public and private.

A new organisation is therefore necessary in order to prepare and guide government action.

The principal orientations and governmental plans will be adopted by the *President* in the councils which he chairs. These plans will be drawn up by the *Prime Minister*, supported in this instance by the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, which will co-ordinate the formulation and approval of governmental plans, involving all the ministries concerned.

The crisis management policy and strategy come under the authority of the President and the Prime Minister. It is their responsibility to organise political decision-making during a crisis. They must

be able to rely on a command organisation geared to major crises, guaranteeing real-time information on the progress of events and enabling them to direct government communication. The public, media and all those involved, in France and overseas, must be familiar with the existence of this organisation, which will be the natural point of entry into the crisis management structure for European and international contacts at the highest level.

The Minister of the Interior, who is responsible for domestic security and for civil security and protection, in the broader sense that these terms will be given in the Defence and Domestic Security Codes following reform of the ordinance of January 7, 1959 (see Chapter 3), will be responsible at the operational level for inter-ministerial management of crises on the French national territory. The Ministry's present resources will be supplemented by the creation of an *Inter-Ministerial Crisis Management Centre based in Place Beauvau*, within which all the Ministries concerned (Economy, Transport, Health, etc.) will be represented. The centre will network with the resources of the other ministries, particularly those responsible for foreign affairs, industry, transport and energy, and will ensure the coherence of civil and military responses in conjunction with the armed forces operational centre.

In terms of crisis preparation, the Ministry of the Interior will be responsible for plans dealing predominantly with public order and civil protection and security and will play a leading role in the formulation of plans to protect against terrorism on national soil.

The Ministry of the Interior will be provided for the purpose with a new directorate responsible for planning, reporting to the Secretary General of the Ministry (see Chapter 15). The directorate will act in close liaison with the Directorate General of the National Police, the Directorate General of the *Gendarmerie* and the Directorate of Civil Security on operational matters, and with the new Prospective and Strategy Delegation on medium and long-term crisis planning. The new directorate will be tasked with designing, developing, updating and monitoring plans in areas under the direct remit of the Minister of the Interior, and will provide the Ministry's contribution to governmental plans extending beyond that remit. It will steer the transfer of government planning to decentralised levels, as decided in council by the President and the Prime Minister, ensuring that such planning is adapted to the local level and monitoring its implementation. The directorate will also be tasked, with assisting of the ministries concerned, with formulating planning implementing instructions for the information of the Prefects and the use of local government. The directorate will rely in all its missions on the defence and security zone Prefects.

AT DECENTRALISED LEVEL

Crisis management on national territory falls under the powers of the Prefects. *The defence and security zone Prefects* will have their powers extended to make them the first level of inter-ministerial decentralisation in terms of preparation for and management of major crises affecting national security.

The defence and security zones will perform the following main functions:

- Steering crisis forecasting and management;
- Collating information in crisis situations;
- Providing support to the departments on planning, exercises and training;
- Organising cross-border co-operation policy on civil security and protection.

Defence and security zone Prefects will also be given responsibility for steering a policy of organisation and harmonisation of all ministry reserves, in conjunction with the military authorities as regards the military reserves and in support of the *département* Prefects as regards local government reserves.

The co-ordination of civil and military resources in the defence and security zones will need to be stepped up.

Zone Prefects will be supported by military advisers, who will be the generals of the defence zones, under the direct command of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

The staffs of the zone Prefects and of the generals of the defence zones will be combined. Military planning resources will be incorporated into a single staff under the authority of the zone Prefects, so that government plans can be jointly applied at zone level across the country.

The generals of the defence zones will be empowered by the Chief of the Defence Staff to call upon the zones' regular military resources, for faster responsiveness in placing these resources at the Prefects' disposal in the event of a crisis.

In order to allow the inter-ministerial role of the zone Prefects its full scope of action, decentralised ministry organisations involved in crisis management will be aligned or harmonised at zone level.

Lastly, the Minister of the Interior will regularly convene a committee of defence and security zone prefects, with the Planning Directorate providing the secretariat.

Interoperability

Crisis management tools are insufficiently interoperable in technical terms at present. Interoperability will be enhanced and this applies in particular to the information, command and communication resources of the public security forces, the civil security forces and the armed forces. Establishing reliable links between the various agencies is key to the smooth running of crisis management, especially in the first hours after the response is triggered. The Inter-ministerial Secure Intranet System (ISIS) will be extended for this purpose to the entire decision-making and command chain in Metropolitan France in the near future.

Involvement of local government and operators

The effects of the decentralisation policy, and in particular the evolving relations between the State, operators in sectors of vital importance and local government agencies will need to be better understood and taken into account. As in the case of training, these actors will need to be more closely associated with planning. They are in possession of the competencies and the key resources, in the field of civil security for example. At the same time, the different legal schemes covering requisitions will be harmonised, in order to guarantee that, in times of crisis, the representatives of the State enjoy the full support of all the actors involved.

Training for crisis response

A coherent response to a major crisis also requires the various agencies involved in crisis response to receive regular training in joint action, at all levels. There is still significant progress to be made in this area, and in the analysis of experience feedback. Long-term inter-ministerial planning for such exercises will be put in place. The necessary financial resources will be identified. The feedback process will be formalised.

Particular attention will need to be paid to better training across the entire crisis management chain, from the strategic steering structures down to actors in the field. The personal involvement—even if only occasional—of senior political decision-makers or their representatives will be encouraged as an essential condition for the realism and effectiveness of such exercises. Local elected officials, who are often in the front line of disaster response, will also need to be closely associated.

*Establishing objectives and operational contracts
for the domestic and civil security structures
and for the armed forces*

Whatever the crisis scenario, the first land-based response is always carried out by the domestic and civil security structure. The armed forces complement this response, using their specific resources and know-how as requested by the civil power responsible for crisis management.

Thus the *domestic and civil security system* stands in the front line in dealing with all risks and threats on national territory. Should a major event occur, provision must exist for all resources in the vicinity, including the operational reserves, to be committed immediately and rapidly reinforced, where necessary, by special intervention units (RAID, GIGN, DCI, GIH) and by at least thirty *Gendarmerie* mobile units and ten Civil Security reinforcement columns equipped with CRBN protective gear. This will be set out in the *operational objectives* laid down for the domestic and civil security system as part of the civil and military planning of crisis management.

Similarly, an *operational contract of protection* applies to the armed forces on national territory. This is in addition to the general support missions provided by all the armed forces on national territory. It includes a land-based force capability of up to 10,000 soldiers, if necessary, deployable in a matter of days to contribute, at the request of the civilian authorities, first to the security of points of vital importance, and for land-based flows essential to the life of the country, as well as to control access to the national territory.

At the same time, the armed forces must also be able to provide reinforcement of the permanent air security posture, up to six operational patrols and four operational patrols specialised in combating low-speed aircraft. Reinforcement of the permanent maritime security posture requires the deployment of a frigate, of two mine-hunters and a maritime patrol aircraft on each of the three seaboard.

The Directorate-General of the Customs will act in co-ordination with the services concerned in the event of a crisis requiring increased surveillance, or even the closing of the borders. The Customs service will have the capacity to concentrate its forces rapidly at the most sensitive entry points, and will co-ordinate its maritime and air resources with the armed forces in order to ensure optimal national coverage.

In the overseas *départements* and territories (DOM-COM), co-ordination of civil and military resources will be strengthened and

forces will be reorganised according to the following principles (with no impact on *service militaire adapté*, SMA, vocational training units with military cadre):

— Redefinition of a predominantly air and sea force in each collectivity to carry out public service missions and combat all forms of trafficking;

— Establishing theatre resources in French Guyana, Réunion and New Caledonia capable of rapid intervention in the three zones, West Indies-French Guyana, Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean respectively, in the event of a crisis (natural disaster, for example).

Gendarmerie and Civil Security resources will be adapted and reinforced as necessary, particularly as regards helicopters.

Crisis in the French overseas *départements* and territories (DOM-COM)

Over the next fifteen years, specific concerns will weigh on the defence and security of the DOM-COM, namely:

- The risk of natural disasters;
- The security of the Kourou space centre in French Guyana, vital to both France and Europe;

While all the *départements* and territories are not equally threatened, this type of event is one of the most influential factors determining the scale of government response.

The remoteness of the DOM-COM from Metropolitan France (7,000 km in the case of French Guyana, 8,000 km for Mayotte, 18,300 km for New Caledonia) may make the rapid projection of reinforcements, of both personnel and equipment, more problematic, and increase the difficulties of crisis management.

The probability of hostile action, particularly of a military nature, by a regional actor is considered to be much lower. The Kourou site is a special case, requiring specific resources.

Strengthening cooperation with European States

Crises may have cross-border impacts not only because of their nature (pandemic disease, for example), or the scale of their consequences, but also because any major crisis (terrorist attack, for example) carries an international dimension even if its effects are confined to France.

There is considerable margin for progress in terms of protecting European citizens, given existing practices and degrees of compartmentalisation.

It will be important to make use of all the mechanisms that EU Member States decide to implement under the terms of the solidarity clause in the Lisbon Treaty.

The precise terms of the co-ordination between States in the event of a major crisis will need to be clarified and made known to all concerned. France will appoint a *national co-ordinator*, who will be known to our partners and allies, to work with the decision-makers and officials in charge of crisis management.

Procedures for the co-ordination of crisis communication will need to be introduced by the European Union. The practice of staging European exercises will be developed in order to test the co-ordination of chains of command and national protection (and communication) capabilities in the event of a crisis affecting several countries, or in close proximity to our external borders.

Integrated management of operational co-operation at the European Union borders will also need to be improved, with the effort focused on Frontex, the EU agency for external border security.

In the area of civil security, France will support reinforcement of European capabilities for civil protection and fighting CRBN threats (see Chapter 4).

Main decisions relating to the protection of the population and territory

- Develop the surveillance of national spaces and those in which France has interests, including outer space.
- Significantly reinforce efforts to combat CRBN threats, in the field of detection, analysis and response as well as in the treatment of victims.
- Acquire active, in-depth cyber-defence capability, combining the intrinsic protection of systems, constant monitoring of critical networks and a rapid response in the event of attack.
- Acquire a detection and early-warning capability in order to counter the ballistic missile threat; the capability will be interoperable with that of our allies and partners and will rely on both radars and a space-based system.
- Develop a new strategy and modernise population alert and information systems and crisis communication systems.
- Substantially strengthen national planning and crisis management capability, with significant developments in the co-ordination of civil and military resources and improving the organisation of our co-ordination with our European neighbours.
- Set operational objectives for the domestic and civil security structure and an operational contract of protection for the armed forces, in order to cope with large-scale attacks and disasters that might take place on national territory; restrict the military presence in the DOM-COM to needs corresponding strictly to the missions of the armed forces and the Adapted Military Service; redeploy and, where necessary, reinforce *Gendarmerie* and civil security resources to guarantee continuity of public service in the areas concerned.

CHAPTER 12

INTERVENTION

Intervention abroad imposes the greatest demands, and therefore remains the key determinant for our armed forces structure and requirements. There is also a growing need for civil operations calling for a clearly identified capability to be established. In those regions to which France commits resources, it is important to have a strategic overview of the entire operations encompassing all its components, both military and civilian, and to strive to achieve optimum synergies between them.

Overall objective

France will constantly maintain the force projection capability necessary to defend its security interests and responsibilities. In the event of large-scale military operations, which will necessarily take place within a multilateral framework, France will field forces sufficient in quality and in strength to ensure adequate representation on operation planning and command bodies, and therefore to guarantee its freedom of assessment and decision-making.

France will develop its capability for long-distance, in-depth force projection against an adversary. The strategic range of its military capabilities in all their components, sea, air and land-based, will be sufficient to cover all strategic zones of major interest. The quality and coherence of the French military capabilities will be maintained and improved in order to retain the advantage over all plausible adversaries. The definition, dimensioning and positioning of French forces will therefore *allow for a significant engagement capability in addition to crisis management missions over the next fifteen years.*

The capabilities of France's armed forces must be sufficient to mount the following operations:

— "Special" operations on a national basis or in a narrow multi-lateral framework, in order to free hostages or to pursue terrorists, for example;

— "Middle-scale" operations, undertaken in a national framework, such as the evacuation of French nationals in hostile environments or targeted, selective retaliatory operations in response to direct action against French interests;

— "Significant" operations, in a bilateral or a multinational framework, particularly for peace-keeping or peace-restoration purposes;

— "Major" operations, necessarily undertaken in alliance or coalition, at a substantial distance from the French national territory.

In every eventuality, there must also be sufficient capability to combine these operations with other actions, in particular *to raise the level of protection of the French national territory, on a par with the crisis justifying the intervention.*

Furthermore, an emergency reaction capability must be constantly available in order to preserve the French freedom of action. This capability must also be adaptable to a wide range of potential deployment scenarios, ranging from an evacuation of French nationals to *ad hoc* reinforcement of a main force or a secondary operation of short duration.

Special operations

Special operations are military operations, overt or covert, as distinct from clandestine operations which are the preserve of DGSE. Special operations differ from conventional operations in terms of their framework in space and time, the strategic nature of their objectives, their specific operating methods and the discretion that surrounds their preparation and execution. They are performed by specialist formations from the three armed forces, known as special forces, acting independently, generally in secrecy, or in addition to a "conventional" force.

The task of the special forces is to engage adversary forces in depth or in a hostile zone, to carry out missions such as intelligence gathering, neutralisation, capture or recovery of persons or equipment (evacuation of French nationals in a hostile environment, for example, or the fight against terrorism). They may be reinforced by *Gendarmerie* specialised resources.

Outlook for future operations

Decisions regarding the military capabilities required now and in the future draw on the lessons learned from recent and ongoing operations.

MULTINATIONALITY – INTEROPERABILITY

Most of the military operations carried out by French forces are likely to take place within a multinational framework. This may be either an existing framework, as in the case of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union, or an *ad hoc* coalition dictated by circumstance.

Interoperability with our allies continues to be a prerequisite for any joint operation. This interoperability is the result of measures taken over the long term. Equipment interoperability, particularly communication and command systems, is the best-known component. The concept of interoperability of doctrines and procedures is also under development, however, and will be pursued over time. National military capabilities will therefore from the outset incorporate the imperative of interoperability with our allies.

VERSATILITY

Foreseeable military operations are likely to be of long duration and to undergo profound changes over time. Furthermore, highly diverse operations may be carried out simultaneously within a single theatre, ranging from high-intensity combat to securing a zone, from escorting a convoy to protecting a refugee camp or providing assistance to the population.

These two factors: changes over time and simultaneous diversity, call for a versatile and reactive intervention capability, able to carry out the full range of operations, often using the same personnel.

The flexibility of France's military forces will stem from the quality of its units, its soldiers and its equipment, but also from a reasonable level of redundancy allowing for choices to be made between the resources available, and for resources to be adapted as and when necessary.

FORCE PROTECTION

Future operations will be no less dangerous than those of the past. While the likelihood of massive losses now seems small, the possibility

of significant losses is one that France and her armed forces must be ready to face.

Losses suffered by a force in theatre have a profound influence on the nation's perception of the operation. A sharp upsurge in losses or a continuous stream of fatalities may have strategic consequences.

Protecting our forces is therefore not only a moral imperative but also a necessity both strategic—to maintain support—and tactical—to ensure success. When circumstances allow, the use of precision-guided weapons fired at long range, without exposing combatants, is in itself a form of protection.

Force protection requires in particular:

— Investment in enhanced-protection equipment, particularly land vehicles and helicopters, anti-IED¹ jamming and detection systems, anti-tactical missile systems and CRBN protection gear;

— Personnel training and battle-hardening, based on the implementation of constantly updated security procedures and effective and reactive experience feedback (through the “lessons learned” process).

POPULATIONS

Today's military operations increasingly take place among populations, which are both their environment and their objective. Operating within a civilian population calls for an appropriate military culture and adequate equipment, particularly to protect both civilians and combatants, in compliance with international humanitarian law. It also calls for techniques, tactics and procedures to improve the synergy of forces diluted within a complex and fragmented environment.

Where zones of operations of various forces and parties overlap and there is no clear delimitation between camps, or between the armed force and the population, the number and variety of actors adds a further degree of complexity. Regular armed forces must be able to operate with, on behalf of, or alongside, a number of military and civil stakeholders, be they local authorities, representatives of the international community, non-governmental organisations or the press. The quality of these highly diverse relations will determine the overall outcome of the operation. For their part, the forces deployed must, without substituting for or competing with civil organisations, possess their own resources to engage in civil-military operations on behalf of the population. These operations concern in particular the field of health and local investments. The armed forces will therefore have to

1. IED: Improvised Explosive Device.

develop competencies in the field of civil-military action, which has become inseparable from military action in the strict sense.

PERSONNEL AND MORALE

In sum, the combat soldiers' training and level of readiness, the legitimacy of their action and the clarity of the objectives they are assigned are more critical than ever to success on the ground. The primacy of the human factor must be reaffirmed.

In this respect, there is no substitute for the morale of soldiers facing combat; it is the result of training creating cohesion, of discipline that governs engagements, and of everyday work with a carefully selected and experienced staff, where trust is built.

THE QUANTITATIVE FACTOR

Even if the armed forces develop all the qualities mentioned above, quantity remains a decisive factor in most operations, whether on land, on the sea or in the air. The number of soldiers on the ground to control situations; the number of ships at sea to project force landwards, monitor a seaway, stop and search suspect vessels; the number of aircraft to maintain constant surveillance, transport or strike capability, at all times, over sometimes considerable distances. The capabilities of the armed forces will represent a reasoned compromise designed to provide a sufficient number of army, navy and air force personnel provided with quality equipment.

Stabilisation operations

In 2008, over 35 international operations are under way, involving widely varying numbers of personnel, from some fifteen observers to over 50,000 soldiers, and anywhere from two to 35 contributing countries providing contingents ranging from an isolated individual to 20,000 troops. France is currently a contributor to twenty operations under the auspices of the UN, NATO and the European Union, and provides military units to six of these. In all likelihood, France will continue to be called on frequently to take part in numerous operations, both military and civilian.

In the case of *predominantly military operations*, the objective is generally associated with halting or controlling hostilities. The sustained rise in violence already noted in a number of theatres is a worrying development.

Civilian operations are a rapidly growing form of international action. Often they combine their effects with a military operation, and the shared objective is generally to consolidate peace, restore public order, the rule of law and a level of social and economic normality that will enable legitimately constituted authorities to act on their own behalf. In *humanitarian operations*, the objective is to help populations to survive.

Operations are now tending to merge into a new model of civilian-military operations, which will require closer and more extended coordination between all the instruments of public power engaged: military forces to contribute to a safer environment; police and legal personnel and resources to help establish the rule of law; technical or administrative personnel bringing their expertise to bear on relaunching the economy. Peace-keeping and humanitarian operations therefore form part of an overall vision of defence and security, requiring input from all civilian and military resources of the State in proportions that will vary according to the operations concerned.

The introduction at national level of an inter-ministerial organisation to support efforts towards stabilisation and reconstruction is therefore both necessary and urgent (see Chapter 15). It will act as an interface with comparable structures already established by our partners, and with international bodies, particularly in Europe.

As regards civil operations, France is in favour of developing European Union capabilities.

Keys to operational superiority

Operational superiority must be enhanced. In the period to 2025, it will result largely from the following factors.

INFORMATION – COMMUNICATION – SPACE

Information, as pointed out previously, is the key to all strategic functions. Obtaining information calls for intelligence effort: sorting, analysing and interpreting information underpins the capacity to anticipate; disseminating information to those who need it, and in forms and time scales compatible with their action, is the source of operational effectiveness, both military and civilian; protecting information is a constant concern that applies to everyone.

In terms of operational military needs, in addition to the acquisition of information referred to under the “knowledge and anticipation” strategic function, the object is to establish secure, reliable, protected and high capacity communications, from the highest level of the State down to those in the field. France has acquired a range of high-quality assets, including satellites, to guarantee independence. This effort must be maintained and developed to keep pace with ever-growing needs.

The information revolution has paved the way for the concept of “*netcentric warfare*”. Technology currently being deployed allows for battlespace digitisation, transforming each individual combatant, each vehicle, aircraft or vessel, into a communication node integrated into a global network. The effectiveness of land, air or sea forces will be considerably enhanced as a result.

France cannot afford to be left behind in this development, in the interests of maintaining superiority over its adversaries or interoperability with its main allies. Our air and naval forces are currently more advanced in this area than our ground forces. All our armed forces will intensify their efforts in this field, which is crucial for military superiority.

In the context of operations, access to strategic communications, battlefield observation, extension of the surveillance zone, all depend to a considerable extent on assets deployed in space, in particular communication and observation satellites. Management of capacities in outer space is therefore an essential aspect of our force projection capabilities, all the more so in a context of force projection at a distance from the national territory.

Command, communications and control systems for overseas operations

Communications

Communications networks must provide reliable and secure communications with sufficient capacity. France has a network, mainly satellite-based, that provides extensive coverage. Massive growth in demand (real-time image and data transmission, for example) however requires sustained efforts to upgrade this network.

Modernisation of our communications systems must factor in the following imperatives:

- The need to maintain *interoperability*, both between national systems, across all government departments, and those of our main allies;
- The need to *harmonise* data types and formats, levels of information security and technical architectures;
- The need for protection through the use of *defensive means* (maintaining a national encryption capability, for example).

Command

The telecommunications networks serve command posts (CPs), which may be fixed (infrastructure CPs), deployable or mobile (land CPs, shipboard CPs, airborne CPs).

Each level of responsibility has its own command structure. *At the national level*: the *Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations* (CPCO), which is the defence operations centre, and the Ministry of Interior's operational centre.

Europe has a series of overseas operations command capabilities. *At the strategic level*, the Atlantic Alliance has the SHAPE staff. The European Union has a staff which can if need be become an Operation Headquarters (OHQ), and maintains a permanent civilian operations management unit.

France provides the European Union with the possibility of activating an OHQ for a European operation (OHQ Mont-Valérien) as well as a deployable joint forces staff (Force Headquarters or FHQ, based in Creil).

France also has the *staff capabilities needed to command large-scale forces on land, at sea and in the air, known as "component commands"*: CRR-FR in Lille for the land component, FRMARFOR for the maritime component (Toulon or shipboard CP), CNOA at Lyon-Mont-Verdun for airborne operations, SOCC for special operations. The operational capabilities of these headquarters are certified by NATO.

Equivalent **civil structures** exist for civil operations and are activated as needed (the COGIC crisis management centre in Asnières, for example).

The reactivity and effectiveness of the response, civil, military or civil-military, depend to a large extent on the performance of these command structures, which in turn rests on the coherence of the doctrine applied, the realism of training exercises and the capabilities of the command and information processing systems.

France will pursue its efforts to remain at the highest operational level, both military and civil. The creation by the Ministry of the Interior of a permanent Civil Operations Management Centre will provide enhanced efficacy in this area.

OFFENSIVE CYBER-WAR

The effectiveness of defence and security forces at all levels depends, and will depend increasingly in the future, on the proper functioning of their information systems. The planning and execution of conventional operations combined with cyber-operations is tending to become standard practice. Before any physical target is destroyed, a defence system can be disrupted and partially incapacitated by means of targeted stealth attacks.

In the IT field more than any other, defence will mean knowing how to attack. France will need to be aware of the many and diversified forms and techniques used in these potential attacks (saturation, Trojan horses, worms, malicious software, etc.), and be able to retaliate against the adversary behind the attack using offensive capabilities.

We therefore need the capability to neutralise attacks inside the very operations centres used by our adversaries: this is the objective of offensive cyber-war.

France could be the victim of direct or indirect cyber attack. Our forces must be ready to carry out offensive actions and will need to invest over the long-term in the following key areas:

- Definition, by the Joint Staff, of an overarching concept incorporating all actions involved in cyber-war;
- Development of specialised tools (networked digital weapons, technical and operations laboratory, etc.);
- Formulation of a body of doctrine for offensive cyber-war capabilities (planning, execution, evaluation of actions);
- Introduction of appropriate and regularly updated training for selected personnel, to be used flexibly in specialised units, overriding administrative considerations.

The concept must be compatible with the legal principles of French legislation and respect the principle of proportionate response, with the adversary's operational assets as its priority target.

TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES

France will continue to develop leading-edge technologies to meet its armed forces' requirements. The criterion of operational need must be reaffirmed, since this is the justification for acquiring a technological capability.

Identified operational requirements that warrant major research, development and acquisition investments relate to:

- Surveillance and intelligence gathering assets, in space and in the earth's atmosphere, including remotely-piloted vehicles (UAVs);
- Superiority in information technology, particularly through the development of defensive and offensive cyber-war capabilities;
- Battlespace digitisation and, more generally, all information technology applied to the context of force engagement;
- Long-range precision-guided strikes, including from armed drones;
- Active and passive countermeasures to neutralise or mitigate the effects of harassment weapons encountered in theatres of combat (particularly IEDs, mines and booby-traps, snipers);
- Equipment facilitating military action in urban environments, which concerns not just ground forces exclusively, even if they are the first to benefit from it. Precision-guided strike capabilities, day or night, mitigating the risk of collateral damage, can be used by all land, sea or air-based vectors, for example;
- Protection of forces against threats of all kinds, and against the CRBN threat in particular. The need to increase the degree of passive and active force protection is, of its own, sufficient reason to warrant replacement of a significant proportion of latest-generation assets (armoured infantry combat vehicles, for example);
- Naval superiority, particularly in zones where most of the foreseeable medium-term threats are concentrated. This will require France to maintain its lead in anti-submarine warfare and mine warfare;
- Air superiority in all its forms, from the interception of drones and low-speed aircraft to dealing with all threats on the ground.

MOBILITY

Strategic mobility is achieved by the combination of material resources or procedures involving a number of State or private actors. It goes hand in hand with tactical mobility, which guarantees freedom of action and the efficacy of forces in the theatre. At both levels, this freedom of action also relies on the quality of the logistics and supply chain. France's armed forces suffer from a specific structural weakness

in the area of tactical air mobility, based on tactical helicopters and transport aircraft. Investment in procurement must seek to overcome this weakness, which currently hampers the effectiveness and autonomy of French forces.

Replacement of the strategic air transport fleet and increasing its capacity will call for sustained efforts including, but not restricted to, acquisition of new-generation aircraft such as MRTTs and A-400 Ms.

In the field of naval mobility, with the acquisition of force projection and command vessels (BPC) and large amphibious ships (TCD), France has acquired a transport and landing capability that will be maintained over time and possibly strengthened. These will be renewed and even reinforced.

At this stage, asset-sharing at the European or NATO level provides only limited capabilities. The same is true of the use of civil chartering, the conditions of which may create constraints incompatible with the prevailing urgency and threat posed by a major national engagement. Asset-sharing is nonetheless an avenue that must be pursued.

Average age of equipment due for replacement

Refuelling tanker aircraft	45 years
Wheeled armoured fighting vehicle (VAB)	28
Tactical transport aircraft (C 160 and C 130)	28
AICV AMX10P and VBCI (41 delivered in 2008)	26
Underway refuelling tankers (single hull = not to 2008 standard)	24
Support helicopters (Puma, Cougar, Lynx, SuperFrelon)	30
Wheeled armoured reconnaissance vehicle (AMX 10 RC)	23
Combat frigates	21
Tactical vehicles (Peugeot P4)	20
Nuclear attack submarines, Rubis class	20
Heavy trucks (TRM 10000, VTL)	20
Fighter aircraft (excluding Rafale)	20
Artillery	18
AWACS aircraft	17
Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft	15

Source: Ministry of Defence/Joint Staff

The main objectives of operational capabilities

In order to engage with an adversary, French armed forces must hold an undisputed operational advantage, which must be assessed at every point in the chain from strategic to tactical level. The maximum force size is determined on the basis of a major multinational operation. It does not exclude participation in operations of a different nature requiring fewer resources.

MAJOR MILITARY INTERVENTION CAPABILITIES

As indicated earlier (Chapter 3), France must be in a position to concentrate its capabilities on a geographic axis running from the Western approaches to the Mediterranean, the Arabian-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, while maintaining its capacity for action on Africa's Western seaboard, in the Sahel and in the DOM-COM. This geographical scope covers the majority of foreseeable involvements. Our presence in the Indian Ocean could serve as a stepping-stone to extending our presence and co-operation into Asia.

This decision implies a reduction in our pre-positioned forces as currently deployed, and a shift towards appropriate co-operation capabilities in accordance with the objectives set out in the "prevention" strategic function (Chapter 9).

It also implies a reduction in the size of our military forces stationed in the DOM-COM, retaining only the resources necessary for strictly military missions. Significant capabilities will be maintained in Réunion and Guyana. The military forces in French Polynesia, the West Indies and New Caledonia will be reduced and rationalised. Continuity of State support for missions not strictly military in nature will be maintained by bringing in any extra resources that might be necessary from the *Gendarmerie* and civil security.

When taking part in *large-scale operations*, France will have the specific staff capabilities at the highest level—"framework nation" capabilities, in international military vocabulary—to take on joint command responsibilities at theatre level, or for the land, air or sea components, or for special operations.

France will possess the skills inherent in the critical phases of a major operation, whether at the launch phase, i.e. for its forces to have "force entry" capability, or during the transition from a coercive operation to a stabilisation operation, then to one of peace consolidation.

Commitment of French armed forces to a major regional conflict

In such a scenario, France's decision to commit forces would result from a direct attack on the nation's strategic interests and would necessarily be undertaken within a multinational framework. This scenario is critical in defining the size and capacity for action of the armed forces.

France is not called upon to intervene in every regional conflict. When our interests are at stake, however, we must be prepared to act, in accordance with our responsibilities as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council or under the terms of our defence agreements, even if we are not specifically targeted, in areas where there is a clear and unmistakable conjunction of strategic interests and persistent crisis factors likely to spill over into open conflict.

France and the European Union must have an independent capability to identify the escalation of risks and threats. France's independence of assessment of the situation is a key factor in the National Security strategy, and relies on constant efforts in the intelligence field.

This scenario would not lead inevitably to a massive, one-off operation, but could develop as a series of highly diversified operations (from the evacuation of nationals to peace-keeping operations, by way of the entire range of special operations or targeted strikes) contributing to or covering the major operation. It might prove necessary to secure maritime traffic in sensitive zones (straits in particular).

In parallel, provision must be made to reinforce the security posture on national territory and its sea and air approaches, at a very high level. This level would be at its maximum should the action have been preceded by direct attacks on French soil (in the case of a major terrorist attack, for example).

In any event, the main action would be followed by long-term operations, such as:

- Targeted military operations, involving the mopping-up of residual pockets of resistance, securing strategic zones, etc.;
- A civil-military operation to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants, to reform the security sector or to monitor disarmament;
- A predominantly civilian operation involving reconstruction, re-establishing functioning public institutions and restoring basic economic capacities.

Only a multinational effort would be capable of addressing the issues of the post-war period and the transition to peace. The preferred framework for such complex operations would be the UN or the EU.

In the light of its implications for France, this scenario appears to be key in determining the scale of resources as regards our force projection capabilities for complex major operations at long distances requiring rapid military action over an extended period of time.

The size of the projectable ground forces required to meet this need is assessed at *some 30,000 soldiers deployable within 6 months for a period of one year*, without replacement, with full autonomy in the main joint operational functions (close fight, support and logistics). This capability will cover the range from major operation to limited but rapid reaction operation, or a long-term stabilisation operation. The ground forces will need to be able to regenerate the force or reorganise it to take into account changes in the conditions of commitment.

France will also maintain an independent reaction or reinforcement capability consisting of a 5,000-strong reserve on permanent operational alert (land forces).

Unless they are committed to a large-scale operation, the French ground forces will be able to contribute to a number of *stabilisation or peace-keeping operations*.

The deployable air component will be based on a single pool of modern combat aircraft (*Mirage 2000 and Rafale*, operated by the Air Force or the Navy). The standing objective is a *force projection capability of the order of 70 combat aircraft capable of sustained high-intensity operations during a coercive operations phase*, followed by operations at lower intensity during a stabilisation phase. Air assets must also have the capability to project a force of 1,500 soldiers over a distance of 7,000 to 8,000 kilometres in a few days, complete with command, control, detection and air traffic control resources, as well as the necessary air bases.

The air component will also retain rapid, independent force projection capability consisting of some 10 combat aircraft on permanent operational alert.

Naval forces will have the capability to deploy *the aircraft carrier battle group*, with its full complement of aircraft and escort frigates and nuclear submarines. Independent of aircraft carrier availability, the naval air assets may be used in force projection or as necessary reinforcement of the air protection posture over the national territory. France will contribute to the development and implementation of a European aeronaval co-operation initiative, which was agreed on in principle at the 2008 Franco-British summit. In addition, France will reinforce its naval deployment and amphibious operations capabilities when replacing vessels, by investing in four projection and command ships (BPCs).

One or two naval groups, either amphibious or tasked with the protection of maritime traffic, with their logistic support, will also be available for intervention missions or to provide forward presence. At the same time, an autonomous response capability on permanent alert must be deployable for *ad hoc* operations such as the evacuation of French nationals, maritime counter-terrorism operations or humanitarian operations.

A second aircraft carrier?

The main operational and political value to France of an aircraft carrier lies in the freedom of action it gives to our armed forces, and in particular in the possibilities it affords the political authorities in the “asymmetric” conflicts that characterises the current period. The credibility of this capability also depends on its permanent availability. Yet the aircraft carrier *Charles-de-Gaulle* is currently available for service only 65% of the time, due to its heavy maintenance schedule which includes a major 18-month refit every seven years. This lengthy period under repair is one of the main factors that has prompted consideration of a possible second aircraft carrier to achieve 100% carrier group availability.

After due consideration, a decision has been postponed for the following reasons:

The imbalance that such an option would bring to the overall configuration of priorities set out in the National Security strategy; the construction of a second aircraft carrier could jeopardise investment deemed essential, in fields such as force protection, intelligence, and preparing for the future;

The high risk of such a programme crowding out other major programmes;

Construction lead times, which already make it unlikely that a second aircraft carrier would be available by the time the *Charles-de-Gaulle* goes in for major overhaul in the middle of the next decade;

The economic conditions which have altered since the 2003 decision in favour of a conventionally-powered aircraft carrier; further studies are now required to assess the pros and cons of conventional versus nuclear propulsion.

In the period ahead, and without prejudice to the decision to be taken around 2011-2012, the emphasis will be placed in the first instance on the European aeronaval co-operation initiative, based on the Franco-British co-operation programme launched in 2008 and open to other partners. In the second instance, new emphasis will be placed on means of striking from a safe distance using shipborne cruise missiles, which will be developed and purchased. Lastly, France will seek agreement from its partners to French foreign bases serving as staging bases for our air force in the direction of and in potential theatres of operation.

Furthermore, should a clear and imminent threat of armed aggression affecting national security be identified, France must also be able to plan, conduct and execute pre-emptive military action either alone or in coalition. This will call for appropriate and autonomous

intelligence, targeting and deep-strike capabilities by land, air and sea. The organisation of planning must offer political and military decision-makers an adequate range of options.

THE PRIORITIES AND THEIR PHASING OVER TIME

The adaptation and modernisation of France's military resources must take into account the priorities established for armed forces that will characteristically be used in recurrent fashion in foreign theatres of operation. Over the period to 2025, these priorities include:

- Upgrading force and individual soldier protection (armoured vehicles, anti-IED equipment, CRBN capabilities, electronic counter-measures, etc.);

- Maintaining the operational capability of all forces' equipment;

- Implementing programmes with a direct impact on operational coherence;

- Capabilities for defensive and offensive cyber-war;

- Addressing shortfalls in strategic and tactical air transport, and air mobility;

- Gradual modernisation of air combat resources, with priority given to capabilities directly applicable to the support of ground forces (precision, lethality, urban areas);

- Control of the undersea environment and of littoral zones;

- Means of striking from a safe distance, in particular submarine-launched cruise missiles;

- Networked operations and more generally the pursuit of force multipliers.

These investments, often substantial, will need to be phased over the period to 2025. Although the priorities are by no means mutually exclusive and many of the operations must be carried out simultaneously, two stages are deemed necessary.

In the first phase, in the short to medium-term (2015), special emphasis will be placed on the following operations, and in particular on the upgrading of land-based resources:

- Modernisation of air-land combat assets, covering the full spectrum of capabilities required to meet the operational objective (30,000 soldiers deployable in 6 months), in parallel with a reduction of the force structure. Special attention will be paid to the force protection and operational coherence programmes associated with this capability. This new format will result in a far-reaching reconfiguration of the army that will mean abandoning or reducing capabilities deemed superfluous or marginal;

- Gradual modernisation of air combat assets in parallel with a reduction in the present number of aircraft, with an effort focusing on the penetration and strike capabilities in support of land-based forces considered most valuable in the context of current or foreseeable operations;

- Modernisation of undersea control capability (anti-submarine frigates and nuclear attack submarines);

- Making up the shortfall in strategic air transport (Airbus A400M transport aircraft and MRTT in-flight refuelling tankers) and in air mobility (support helicopters);

- Adapting amphibious capacity;

- Upgrading ammunition stocks.

In a second, medium to long-term phase (2025), the focus will be on maritime, air and air-sea operations, with:

- Accelerated replacement of the surface fleet, frigates in particular, in order to reinforce forward presence capability in all theatres;

- Accelerated modernisation of air assets, in terms of number of aircraft and drones, with a view to achieving generational replacement by the end of the period considered;

- Continued modernisation of the ground forces;

- Reinforcement of precision-guided long-distance deep-strike capabilities in significant quantities and from several launch platforms (air, sea and possibly land).

OBJECTIVES FOR CIVILIAN CAPABILITIES

The primary objective of military intervention is to put an end to overt hostilities, reduce the level of tension, provide a sufficiently safe environment for local and international actors to operate without threat or hindrance. Peace consolidation, reconstruction and assistance to emerging local institutions call for clearly identified civil capabilities that can be deployed under realistic conditions of lead-time and duration.

France has specific resources to meet some of these needs:

- *Gendarmerie*, in the field of police functions. This specialist force, which has military status and the full range of skills required—Intelligence, general security, public security, protection of persons, maintaining public order, investigations and criminology—is already called upon to contribute in many theatres considered essential;

- Civil security, which is made up of specialist military units, all of which are projectable, and also of civil units under local government authority. Some of these resources can be deployed, either as *ad hoc* units or individually. The formation of such units is tested to exercises

and procedures, European as well as French, in the process of development;

— The Services Health Corps (*Service de Santé des Armées, SSA*), which has military status and provides a highly sophisticated medical and surgical capability.

Even so, the extension of civilian operations now calls with increasing urgency for new skills that military personnel do not possess: those of administrators, judges, police officers and experts in every aspect of economic and social life.

France's police force is called upon to participate, in its areas of expertise, in the work of international organisations, in particular the UN, in providing policing training. The force also has a network of domestic security attachés (*Attachés de Sécurité Intérieure, ASI*) covering 150 countries and providing local liaison with domestic departments and security forces on co-operation and training actions.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security will set up the resources necessary to compile a list of volunteers, create greater synergy between government departments and achieve more effective impact on the ground.

The national security strategy will therefore be based on an enhanced civilian structure more readily available and better adapted to local conditions.

Three avenues of approach will take priority:

— Ongoing identification and recruitment of civil personnel with the requisite specialist skills, at levels commensurate with France's international responsibilities and strategic interests. In the main, these will be administrators, legal experts or judges, police officers, civil engineers, health professionals and teachers;

— Consistency between the military effort and the financial and economic commitments made;

— Establishing an inter-ministerial doctrine and procedures geared to the mobilisation of the national component of a civil operation (negotiation, component generation, deployment, follow-up, redeployment).

France's involvement in civil operations is directly affected by its ability to respond to calls on its services from the United Nations or the European Union, in the case of most of the operations envisaged. This response must be forthcoming in good time, and at a level commensurate, in quantity and quality, with the strategic objectives being pursued.

It will only be possible to generate the civil resources needed for operations of this type by offering appropriate and attractive statutory terms.

The effectiveness of the new organisation will depend on the financial and human resources made available. *A new and reactive organisa-*

tion to raise funds for the post-crisis period will be set up under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The aim will be to provide better financing for civil activities to encourage local stabilisation in a degraded security environment, with countries where our forces are deployed taking priority. We will increase our capability to commit civil experts to operations in order to strengthen our own resources and support international missions.

Support for fighting forces

Support for the fighting forces, whether in civilian or military operations, is designed to meet the needs of personnel engaged far from home, often in difficult physical conditions and sometimes faced with adversity or even hostility.

Military units are structured to provide this support, which is considered as much a component of operational capability as weaponry. France's ability to support and replace civilian personnel on long-term operations, on the other hand, calls for the introduction of dedicated structures geared to the specific characteristics of such personnel.

Health support and the Services Health Corps

Health support is crucial to operational effectiveness, irrespective of the nature of the operation. It is first and foremost a moral obligation that the State owes its nationals, especially when they are faced with aggravated risks.

The Service Health Corps (SSA) is responsible for providing health support to forces on operations and to those stationed on national territory. It also contributes to civil operations, as part of humanitarian contingents. Its versatile infrastructure is at the service of Ministry of Defence personnel as well as the general public.

France will pay constant attention to the quality of its military medical personnel and to matching resources to needs. Should the intensity of operations or the loss rate require, medical provision to units will be increased. In case of emergency, it is possible to reinforce the Corps calling up reserve medical personnel. In case of increased risk, the number of practitioners will be augmented by raising the level of medical recruitments.

Key decisions regarding intervention

France's force projection capabilities must be guided by the principles of concentration and versatility, and the use of force. They must be scaled in order to concentrate on the most likely zones of major conflict directly involving French and European interests, in particular along the arc running from the Atlantic to the Indian Oceans. They may also be deployed, for purposes of prevention or intervention, wherever there is trafficking in narcotics, in materials used in the manufacture of prohibited weapons or weapons limited by international treaties, and wherever terrorist groups may operate.

Intervention by military or civilian resources in complex operations outside French territory must be based on the following characteristics and qualities:

- Interoperability with the forces of our allies and partners;
- Versatility: our forces must be able to adapt to rapid changes in the context of operations;
- Land, sea and air forces protection;
- Ability to operate in the midst of populations;
- Adequate resources and forces committed on the ground;
- Secured logistics flows between Metropolitan France and the theatres of operations.

To ensure superiority in engagements, particular emphasis must be placed on:

- Control of information and cyber-war capability;
- Strategic and tactical mobility;
- Stand-off action and strike capability;
- Synergy between the military and civilian components of interventions.

The size of land, naval and air forces will be determined taking into account the possibility of France being involved in a major war between States. It will also need to take into account the likelihood of France making major contributions to stabilisation operations, particularly in zones of strategic interest.

Identifying qualified civilian personnel available for mobilisation will enable France to participate adequately in civilian missions launched by the European Union or the United Nations. This capability will benefit from new financial procedures and a support organisation optimising the deployment of resources inseparable from operations of this kind.

The modernisation of our armed forces will take place in two stages. The first phase will give priority to ground forces, force protection, mobility and air mobility, close air support, stand-off strike capability, control of the undersea environment, cyber-war and networked operations. The second phase will see an acceleration in the modernisation of the surface fleet and combat air forces.

CHAPTER 13

THE FORCE STRUCTURE

The definition and articulation of the main strategic functions designed to ensure National Security derive from the review carried out in 2007-2008. They set out broad guidelines. But these must remain flexible and adaptable, and avoid becoming locked into a intangible model, which could quickly become an over-rigid framework in an environment that is unstable, uncertain and volatile. This White Paper therefore deliberately does not set out to define a “model army”, but rather presents the main operational and capability objectives assigned to the principal forces and to the government authorities involved in National Security strategy. The overall linkage, like the objectives, will require regular updating, as will the White Paper, as recommended earlier (Chapter 3).

The armed forces

Over the next fifteen years, the armed forces will be required to fulfil the following operational objectives:

- providing *knowledge* of the risks and threats, of potential upsets of all kinds, and anticipate crises;
- maintaining the *deterrence* posture at the level of permanence, reactivity and safety established by the President of the Republic;
- contributing rapidly and if necessary over time, to *the protection of the population* on national territory, and to the nation’s resilience in the face of risks and threats of all kinds:

- by reinforcing the security of critical installations, ensuring security of movements on national territory and its approaches (up to 10,000 soldiers from the ground forces),
- by reinforcing Metropolitan France's air defence system (up to six operational patrols) and maritime protection system (one frigate and one patrol aircraft on each of our three seaboard),
- by providing support to the domestic security and civil security system, in particular with specific capabilities (transport, health, assistance in deployment, CRBN, etc.);
- contribute to *stability and peace in the world*:
 - by taking part in stabilisation or peace-keeping operations using the appropriate ground forces and a naval and air presence;
 - while reinforcing as necessary its deterrence, protection and safeguard postures on national territory.
- confront a *major conflict outside national territory*, as part of a multinational framework, and be able to project:
 - within six months, a ground force of up to 30,000 troops for a period of one year, followed by a stabilisation operation,
 - an air combat force of 70 aircraft,
 - a naval or aeronaval combat force,
 - while reinforcing its deterrence, protection and safeguard postures on national territory;
- maintain in readiness *an independent action and reaction capability*, capable of being placed on short alert (one to several days), and of being committed within a national or a multinational framework and consisting of:
 - ground forces (5,000 soldiers), air and maritime forces, and stationed and sovereign forces,
 - air or naval projection and base activation resources.

These operational contracts, coupled with a definition of the desired political and military effects, served as the basis for an assessment of the capacities and the operational forces required, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. A premium was placed on the versatility and flexibility of resources to maintain maximum flexibility for the armed forces enabling them to cover the full range of operations to best effect.

The means of acquiring these forces within the time scale, in the zones of interest and for the periods established were then assessed, taking into account the performance and availability of future equipment and training standards.

The current structure of the armed forces will undergo a controlled reduction, combining on the one hand the effects of concentration of

military bases in France and the rationalisation of administrative and support functions and, on the other, the redefinition of operational contracts. A similar reduction will be made in the size of pre-positioned forces and forces stations overseas.

The new operational contracts and the reconfiguration of forces were defined as part of a systematic joint approach. This has resulted in a reduction in the size of certain forces and a rebalancing of the operational functions and capacities required.

The overall scaling of forces is summarised below, by major component.

LAND COMPONENT

Ground forces will be capable of carrying out the following missions simultaneously:

- participating in the protection of national territory in reinforcement of the public security and civil security system, with resources involving up to 10,000 soldiers in a matter of days;

- intervention as part of a major multinational commitment, in a theatre up to 7,000-8,000 km distant, deploying 30,000 soldiers in 6 months, for a period of one year, without replacement. The structure of the ground forces will need to allow for this force to be replenished or adapted to changes in the conditions of engagement;

- maintaining a permanent and autonomous action and reaction capability to deploy 5,000 soldiers within a very short timeframe;

- maintaining a prevention force outside national territory, concentrated at one base on each African seaboard and one or more in the Arab-Persian Gulf. A permanent but appropriate state of combat-readiness and intervention capability will be maintained. Initially, this structure will keep a stock of pre-positioned equipment to allow for emergency deployment from France. Reinforcement will always be possible, by deploying an amphibious force for example;

- a presence in the DOM-COM representing a sovereign force, with theatre assets concentrated on French Guyana, Réunion Island and New Caledonia, and a regional projection capability in the event of a crisis.

In addition to a major operation, the ground forces may be committed in a number of stabilisation or peace-keeping operations.

The army structure will combine "decisive" forces, capable of engaging in the fiercest combat, "multi-role" forces destined more to be first in theatre with an element of surprise, and for transition phases and stabilisation operations, and "emergency" forces with a high level of strategic mobility.

While retaining the capabilities necessary to operate as a framework nation, ground forces will also be proportioned to allow France to:

- take command of a joint forces land army corps (*Land Component Command* or LCC);
- provide the framework for a reinforced NATO division (of two or three French joint brigades and one or two allied brigades), with full tactical autonomy in all joint operational functions (contact combat, support);
- organise logistic support for the land component, or for the joint force.

Modernisation efforts will give priority to force protection, digitisation of the operational space, restoring air mobility capability, the acquisition of deep-strike capabilities.

Out of an overall force strength of 131,000 soldiers, the ground forces will make up *an operational force of 88,000 soldiers*, organised into:

- 8 joint brigades, equipped with some 250 Leclerc-type main battle tanks, some 650 AICV-type armoured vehicles, 80 combat helicopters, 130 support helicopters and some 25,000 FELIN-type infantry combat suites;
- 3 specialised brigades;
- The corresponding support resources.

NAVAL COMPONENT

The naval forces will provide *the permanent presence at sea of the strategic submarine force (Force Océanique Stratégique, FOST), guaranteeing our second-strike deterrent capability*. They will also guarantee the autonomous and secure deployment of the maritime component by developing the best possible knowledge of SSBN deployment zones and the movements of foreign forces in those zones. They will retain permanent control of the approaches to the base port. These missions may require two nuclear attack submarines and up to four anti-submarine frigates, as well as mine warfare resources and maritime patrol aircraft

They will monitor and control the approaches to the national territory, in Metropolitan France and overseas. They will constantly reinforce the permanent maritime security posture in Metropolitan France with the deployment of a frigate, two minehunters and an ATL2 maritime patrol aircraft on each seaboard.

They will assert French sovereignty in areas under national jurisdiction (territorial waters, exclusive economic zone), and will take part in the protection and safeguarding of persons and in maritime safety

and security, in the protection of the marine environment and maritime resources (protected zones, fisheries, etc.). These missions come under the heading of “State action at sea” (*action de l’Etat en mer*, AEM) and require the deployment of the appropriate resources for presence at sea, both in Metropolitan France and in the DOM-COM.

In the field of prevention, the naval forces will be required to participate in air and sea control in our zones of interest (West Africa, the Arab-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean in particular), in securing lines of communication, in monitoring maritime traffic as part of the fight against terrorism, illicit trafficking and clandestine immigration.

In order to contribute to crisis resolution around the world, the carrier battle group will be deployable to a theatre 7,000-8,000 km distant, with its full complement of aircraft and escort frigates and nuclear submarines. Independent of carrier availability, the air assets may be used in force projection or as necessary reinforcement of the air protection posture over the national territory.

One or two amphibious or maritime traffic protection naval groups, with their logistic support, will also be available for intervention missions or to provide a presence. At the same time, an autonomous response capability on permanent alert must be deployable for *ad hoc* operations such as the evacuation of French nationals, a maritime counter-terrorism operation or a humanitarian operation.

The overall scaling of naval forces will also enable them to:

- contribute to intelligence gathering, in both our maritime approaches and in theatres of operation;
- take command of a joint forces maritime component (*Maritime Component Command* or MCC);
- project mine warfare capability;
- field an appropriately scaled support fleet for all missions.

Modernisation efforts will give priority to undersea environment control capabilities (nuclear attack submarines and anti-submarine frigates), to precision-guided deep-strike capabilities by naval cruise missiles and to reinforcing sea-based command and projection capabilities.

The replacement of nuclear attack submarines is therefore a *strategic priority*. By virtue of their stealth and almost unlimited range, they make an essential contribution to the security of the FOST and to the protection of the carrier group. The construction of six Barracuda-class submarines will ensure that at least five submarines are constantly in service to perform all these missions over the timeframe in question.

To carry out these missions, the naval component will consist of 44,000 men and will notably be equipped with:

- four SSBNs,

- six nuclear attack submarines,
- an aircraft carrier with its carrier air group,
- 18 first-rank frigates,
- four force projection and command vessels.

AIR COMPONENT

The air combat component will be modernised to provide a uniform fleet of 300 multi-role aircraft such as the Rafale and Mirage 2000 D, of which 270 will be on line. It will provide for implementation of the *airborne deterrent component*, with two squadrons of nuclear-capable aircraft and an associated refuelling capability, in addition to the assets aboard the aircraft carrier *Charles-de-Gaulle*.

In addition to deterrence, the air forces will also provide permanent *surveillance and control of the air approaches to the national territory* (Metropolitan France and the DOM-COM, in particular French Guyana), and will have the necessary aircraft and AWACS radar infrastructure. They will be capable of reinforcing the permanent security posture, up to 6 operational patrols plus 4 operational patrols specialising in combating low-speed aircraft, and of arming protection systems at the time of major events (two or three air defence “bubbles”).

The air forces, both air force and naval air arm, contribute to gathering the intelligence necessary for operations, surveillance of the territory, of its approaches and of space. For the purposes of prevention, a force will be maintained in Africa, in Djibouti in particular, and in the Gulf.

Should France be involved in a major conflict outside national territory, the air forces will need to be able to project to a theatre 7,000 to 8,000 kilometres distant an airborne combat force of the order of 70 combat aircraft, including naval air arm aircraft, plus the associated operational support aircraft. This force must be capable of sustained high-intensity operations during a coercive operations phase, followed by operations at lower intensity during a stabilisation phase. It must also be able to project command, control, detection and air traffic control resources, as well as the number of projectable air bases necessary, up to a maximum of two major bases simultaneously.

At the same time, an autonomous response capability on permanent alert must be deployable for *ad hoc* operations such as the evacuation of French nationals, retaliatory action or a humanitarian operation.

The overall size of the air forces, in a 50,000-man format, will also enable them to:

- take command of a Joint Forces Air Component (*Joint Forces Air Component Command* or JFACC);
- project the emergency echelon of a force (1,500 soldiers with equipment) over a distance of 7,000 to 8,000 km in five days, supplied to operate autonomously.

Modernisation efforts will focus on strategic and tactical mobility capability, which will extend to a range of 7,000 to 8,000 km, on ground force support capability (precision, protection, permanence over zone and all-weather capability) and on deep-strike capability. The capability of tactical and extended-life drones will also be strengthened, both for surveillance and intelligence purposes and to provide support to ground forces by armed drones. Air Force and Navy combat aircraft will be combined under the operational command of the Chief of the Defence Staff into a *single fighters fleet* which will ultimately consist exclusively of Rafale and modernised Mirage 2000 aircraft, under Air Force management. The Air Force will ensure, in liaison with the Navy, that the maximum possible synergies are achieved in terms of the organisation, support and readiness of these forces. In addition, the Air Force will be tasked by the Joint Space Command with the surveillance of outer space, and will be given extended powers to implement space-based capabilities.

To fulfil all these missions, the Air Force will field the following resources:

- 300 modern combat aircraft (Rafale and modernised Mirage 2000-D), including Navy fighter aircraft;
- 4 AWACS systems;
- A fleet of refuelling tanker and transports aircraft comprising some 14 MRTT-type aircraft and some 70 transport aircraft.

JOINT CAPABILITIES

Over the next fifteen years, joint capabilities will develop as follows:

- continued efforts to enhance *joint command and planning capabilities*,
- reinforcement of the *space component* and the creation of a *Joint Space Command*,
- the introduction of a joint *cyber-war* capability,
- reinforcement of *special operations* capabilities, in particular by pooling specialised helicopters and combat crew recovery helicopters,
- improvements in *military intelligence*, which will contribute to the overall effort dedicated to the “knowledge-anticipation” strategic function, at strategic, operational and tactical level,
- special attention will be paid to *joint logistics*, particularly in the field of strategic movements, health support and fuel support.

FORCE STRENGTHS

The effects of the new operational contracts assigned to the armed forces, coupled with a reduction in support and administration functions, will result in a reduction in total armed forces numbers *from 271,000 civilian and military personnel in 2008 to 225,000 in 2014-2015.*

This reduction in force numbers will take place over a period of six to seven years, with the main burden falling on support personnel. The preservation of the personnel required for fulfilment of the foregoing operational objectives is an imperative.

Force strengths will evolve as follows:

- the Army will ultimately have a force strength of 131,000,
- the Navy, 44,000,
- the Air Force, 50,000.

The full reduction will be implemented over a period of six to seven years. Reductions will focus primarily on support functions, since the force strengths required to meet the operational objectives set out above must at all costs be preserved.

Domestic and civil security provisions

These provisions are under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior.

In order to adapt to national security issues over the next fifteen years, the following main efforts will be made under the authority of the Minister of the Interior:

— *Police and Gendarmerie* under a single authority; the Ministry of the Interior will take over full control of the *Gendarmerie Nationale* on 1 January 2009; the Ministry will decide the use, organisation, objectives, investment capacity and operating costs of the police and Gendarmerie forces, although the *Gendarmerie* will retain its military status;

— *merging internal intelligence services* into a single agency; domestic intelligence will be gathered under the sole agency of the Central Domestic Intelligence Directorate (Direction Centrale du Renseignement Intérieur, DCRI), which will take over the missions carried out at present by the Directorate for the Security of the Territory (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire, DST) and those of the General Intelligence Directorate (Renseignements Généraux, RG) which relate directly to national security. The Central Directorate will have four main missions:

- combating espionage and foreign interference,
- the fight against terrorism,
- protection of national assets and economic security,
- surveillance of violent subversive movements.

NATIONAL POLICE

The main changes made to the police will focus on:

- providing CRBN equipment, beginning with the RAID and the CRS companies stationed in the Paris Region, who will shortly be issued with breathing equipment, essential in the event of CRBN attacks. Significant efforts will be devoted in the short term (2009-2011) to the detection and prevention of CRBN risks and the ability to carry out investigations in contaminated environments. All first-response forces will gradually be provided with protective equipment (mixture of masks and light decontamination suits);

- in the next two years, trebling the number of surveillance cameras in public areas to a total of 60,000, with transmission of images to the police and Gendarmerie as standard; the installed base of cameras on public transport will also be trebled, and an extra 450 cameras will be installed aboard response vehicles;

- development of air capability (helicopters, drones), shared with the Gendarmerie.

These service reorganisations are designed to create the necessary margin for manoeuvre to increase force numbers to meet increased demand for security-related missions.

GENDARMERIE NATIONALE

To adapt to national security issues over the next fifteen years, the Gendarmerie will build partnerships with the police in common areas of activity, so as to provide greater consistency in response to risks, and to develop joint initiatives at all levels and achieve budget savings. This pursuit of synergy will apply in particular to logistics (joint contract awards) and technology (software, etc.).

The Gendarmerie will continue to be an armed force and to fulfil its military defence missions. It will remain capable of playing a part in security systems in all contexts: in peacetime and in times of crisis at every level of intensity, up to and including situations of armed conflict, whether on national territory (Metropolitan France and overseas) or in external operations.

Enhancing Gendarmerie capabilities over the next fifteen years, will be achieved by giving priority to the development and use of new technology: making optimum use of data available by development analysis capabilities, the use of automatic number plate recognition, digital mapping, geolocation of patrols, hardened command and communication capabilities.

Armoured capability will be renovated and reduced. *Air mobility* capabilities will be improved by replacing the helicopter fleet.

The Gendarmerie will augment its *CRBN* potential, equipping all its operational forces with masks and filter cartridges and equipping two mobile Gendarmerie squadrons in each defence zone with filter suits. Operating capability (criminal investigations by the Gendarmerie criminal investigation unit, IRCGN, and the nuclear arms security Gendarmerie) and intervention capability (GIGN) in contaminated environments will also be developed.

Gendarmerie organisation will be rationalised, particularly by reducing the schools structure and, over a period of ten years, converting 6,000 Gendarmerie officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) posts to 4,000 civilian posts and 2,000 technical and administrative support posts (Corps de Soutien Technique and Administratif de la Gendarmerie, CSTAG).

CIVIL SECURITY

Over the next fifteen years, civil defence and protection capabilities will need to evolve in order to take greater account of the foreseeable change in the scale of risks. It will be necessary to:

- make better preparation to deal with health risks, by working closely with the Ministry of Health in order to cope with assumptions of heavy civilian casualties;

- reinforce means of fighting the *CRBN* threat, whether intentional in origin (terrorist threat) or accidental (technological risk); the reinforcement of civil security capabilities will rely particularly on a trebling of decontamination resources, the acquisition of mobile analysis units covering the sixteen largest urban areas and the creation of a single training centre for all emergency services;

- reinforce logistics resources to cope with massive population movements, whether organised or spontaneous;

- introduce a new population alert system, designed for national use and based on an approach centred on designated areas at risk;

- take greater account of the risks posed by climate change. As part of the work initiated by UNESCO, France will, with the support of the European Union, set up a regional tsunami warning centre that will include tsunami detection, analysis and transmission of warnings to the populations concerned;

- reorganise emergency rescue services using light and medium helicopters in the DOM-COM, in cooperation with the armed forces.

Civil security will continue to rely on territorial resources, close to the populations they serve, of 250,000 fire officers, 300,000 first-aid

personnel, relying on national resources: military civil security formations (1,500 soldiers), aircraft and helicopters and logistic intervention units (shelter, flooding, water treatment, etc.).

A large part of the country's capabilities will rely on the mobilisation of local authority resources to meet stated national security objectives. This mobilisation should be planned and carried out in consultation with the local authorities.

CUSTOMS

The Customs service forms part of the State's rapid reaction force on national territory in the event of major crisis, acting to tighten border controls or reinforce mobile means of surveillance.

Over the next fifteen years, the Customs service will develop a system for monitoring vehicles under surveillance, thanks to automatic number plate recognition equipment currently being developed in partnership by the Gendarmerie and the police.

The service will augment its capabilities to detect products involved in proliferation by applying, nationwide, new non-invasive inspection technology to the screening of freight, including containers.

It will also develop new risk assessment models, using data on sea and air passengers and freight made available by mandatory pre-arrival screening before entering French territory.

It will put forward a legal mechanism to link anti-fraud files held by different government departments, as a means of extending its detection capabilities.

IV

A ROADMAP FOR CHANGE

CHAPTER 14

PROFESSIONALS SERVING THE NATION

National Security depends on the men and women who have chosen to serve their country and their fellow citizens. Their commitment deserves to be recognised and respected.

France has a vibrant military tradition. Serving in the armed forces continues to be an attractive option. For the armed forces, the process of professionalisation embarked upon ten years ago has represented a modernisation without equivalent in government administration. The change has undoubtedly proved to be a success, earning national and international recognition for France's armed forces. The professional army has effected the transformation of its organisation and culture without looking back. It has successfully integrated women soldiers. It has coped unflinchingly with the painful restructuring and force reduction measures that followed on from this reform¹. With a strong sense of its usefulness to society, it wholeheartedly carries out the missions assigned to it. It is justifiably proud of the high level of competency within its ranks. This success story must be underlined and professionalisation must now be deep rooted in our military and our society.

The professionalism of the police and *Gendarmerie* is widely recognised. Both forces have acquired more modern resources since the implementation of the first Domestic Security Bill. Civil servants and public officials playing their part in domestic security, in the prefectures, in civil security, in hospitals or in the Customs service, or over-

1. 370 closures and 250 base or unit transfers or reorganisations, affecting 45,600 military and 23,000 civilian personnel, in particular the dissolution of around one hundred regiments. In contrast, 180,000 soldiers have been recruited over the period.

seas in the diplomatic and consular services, are competent and dedicated to public service. France also has an extensive network of volunteers who can be called upon to serve national causes, in terms of solidarity or security.

Nonetheless, today there are a number of challenges to be met.

Firstly, there is the challenge of adaptation. The redefinition of our strategy is accompanied, as we have just seen (Part III), by a redefinition of the operational contracts assigned to the armed forces. At the same time, the general review of public policies has highlighted the need for an in-depth restructuring of the general administration of the Ministry of Defence and the structure of support to the armed forces on national territory. When the process of professionalisation came to an end, the geographic reorganisation of the armed forces was still incomplete. Military bases are scattered too widely, causing duplication, separations between armed forces and excess costs that cannot be justified in military or security terms. We must take into account the new geography of our force commitments and undertake the necessary regroupings that will best serve our strategic objectives and the operational quality of our forces. These restructurings will result in significant reductions in personnel.

Second is the challenge of cooperation. National Security, in which domestic and external security are closely associated, calls for closer cooperation between civil and military forces, ministries and the State and other bodies concerned. The purposes of national security must be clear to all those engaged in its service. It involves no confusion of roles or of professional identities, but better cooperation and pooling of efforts between all the actors concerned, military, civil, police and gendarmes, fire officers, first-aid personnel. All must feel that they are serving common goals, each within the structure in which he or she has elected to serve.

Third is the challenge of crisis preparedness and resilience. Neither the authorities nor society are adequately prepared to face major crises. The recruitment, training and readiness of the civil servants concerned must be improved.

Finally, there is the challenge of attractiveness. The defence and security professions must continue to be built on powerful values: dedication, altruism, a sense of community and a spirit of self-sacrifice. As labour becomes scarcer, the armed forces and the civil security or domestic security forces will remain attractive only if they adopt a modern approach to recruitment, offering attractive professional, social and personal prospects.

A professional army geared to the new balance of its missions

The day to day task of protecting national territory and fulfilling France's international security responsibilities falls on the army. Of those serving in the armed forces, some are following a calling and others simply opting for a career that appeals to them. Whatever the reasons, they accept the unique constraints that military life imposes upon them. Military personnel are not civilians wearing uniform. They take on and live up to the demands of a military career and its responsibilities, and they want their choices to be recognised and respected. The motivation of defence personnel will continue to rest on a sense of belonging to a community with prospects for the future and shared values.

THE CHALLENGE OF RESTRUCTURING

The foremost challenge for the armed forces over the next few years is to succeed in the restructuring of their support and administration functions, and in reducing the force structure.

This adaptation must follow clear principles.

The restructuring will focus as a matter of priority on the support and administrative functions, which are frequently redundant, compartmentalised and inappropriate to the commitment of forces. The operational capabilities of our armed forces must be preserved and modernised to the maximum. *The emphasis on operational missions and the resulting constraints should be the primary guide, ahead of any other consideration, when adapting our defence structures and resources on French soil and overseas.*

Military personnel should concentrate on operational missions, civil personnel on administrative and support tasks, where these are not outsourced. Other core concerns will be preserving competencies within the professional army, as will the ability to cope with sudden changes of context and to ramp up efforts.

What makes these objectives all the more essential is that the profession of arms is, more than any other, subject to rapid turnover, in contrast with the lengthy careers common in the civil service and the *Gendarmerie*. *Recruitment of young soldiers will therefore need to be maintained at a high level to guarantee that the professional army is combat-worthy and geared to its missions.* A priority effort will need to be devoted to recruitment, retention and redeployment of personnel.

The link between short-service, long-service or contract service careers, unique to the armed forces, must be preserved. Preference will continue to be given to contract service over career employment.

The current military pensions scheme encourages recruitment, the retention of those who enlist and acceptance of departures and redeployment. It is more than a pension scheme in the strict sense; for military personnel, more than for any other category, it acts as a form of deferred remuneration, designed to ease the transition to a second career and infuse new blood into operational forces. This system therefore meets the needs of the professional army and should be retained on that basis.

The policy of personnel redeployment, particularly towards the private sector, will be an absolutely crucial factor in the phase now commencing. This effort implies better accreditation of the professional skills acquired by military personnel. Agreements with companies and with training and integration bodies will be set up. Service outsourcing contracts, which are encouraged as a means of supporting redeployment and the restructuring of the defence system, may be linked to recruitment of military personnel leaving the forces, with proper respect for ethical codes of practice and current legislation.

Redeployment to the civil service and to uniformed public service corps will be reinforced. This policy will also enable the Government and other public communities to benefit from the services of qualified, competent personnel in whom a considerable training investment has been made.

Provisions for integrating military personnel into the civil service will be developed, for example by increasing recruitment under the secondment-integration scheme provided for in article 4139-2 of the general regulations for military personnel and under the reserved occupations scheme.

A social and professional support structure will be set up, learning the lessons of past experience. Some of the measures will be designed to facilitate and compensate the geographic and professional mobility of civil personnel and will include a special scheme for State workers not covered by the measures aimed at civil servants. A second set of measures will support incentives for the redeployment of military and civil personnel in the form of departure payments and grants, particularly to pursue personal projects. Assistance with home-buying and employment opportunities for spouses will also be reinforced.

Military personnel will eventually benefit from the positive effects of geographical concentration on their living conditions and those of their families: imposing fewer requirements for geographical mobility, promoting professional mobility, for civil personnel as well, making it easier for spouses to find employment and for military personnel to

buy a home. All these issues are matters of great sensitivity, as highlighted time and time again by the High Level Committee on the conditions of military personnel.

Better dialogue and consultation with all personnel categories will be more necessary than ever.

As regards civil personnel, the social dialogue charter between the Ministry of Defence administration and employee representatives guarantees greater recognition of union rights by employers and the involvement of trades union organisations at an early stage in discussions.

As far as military personnel are concerned, their missions and service require an availability and acceptance of constraints that cannot readily be reconciled with the enjoyment of union rights. The various mechanisms for local consultation or redress must, on the other hand, be employed and strengthened. Full use must be made of local consultation mechanisms such as the participatory unit commissions. The circulation of information, dialogue between the representatives of the different categories of military personnel and the transparency of decision-making processes must be guaranteed at all levels.

The Military High Council and the military councils of each service will have their powers augmented. Members will be allowed the time and freedom necessary to perform their tasks and will receive appropriate training. The councils will have the power to propose items within their field of competence for inclusion on the agenda.

ADAPTATION TO MISSIONS

The combat-readiness of our professional soldiers will continue to be one of the keys to France's security. They must be capable of facing up to danger, to the brutality of the threat, to the sudden upsurge in violence and stress. In such situations, the psychological pressure can only be surmounted thanks to a combination of professional capability and high morale forged in training and in the community life of units, teams and squadrons. Military service also, and increasingly, means that soldiers must be prepared for frequent absences from country, family and loved ones, in order to go into combat or to assist those in combat, to provide protection for a humanitarian action or to help settle a crisis peacefully. They are required to enter hostile or unstable environments, to engage in dialogue and act in concert with armed forces from other countries and other backgrounds, speaking other languages. Repeated absences place great pressure on soldiers and their families, pressure which may impact negatively on personnel retention.

Moreover, in the years to come the armed forces will need to be better prepared to prevent attacks of a new kind on national territory, to secure the most critical installations, to assist populations in unforeseen and perhaps extreme circumstances. Young recruits will need to be familiar with the latest technology, because fighting soldiers will operate in environments transformed by the tools that will be available to them, while still being required to call on the same physical and psychological resources as their predecessors. Military personnel will thus need to become familiar with all the tools of information warfare, while remaining fit for physical engagement in the field.

The forces will need to be trained to operate in joint, coalition and European environments, and to demonstrate the versatility that is one of the keys to the choice of how to organise and equip our armed forces.

It is therefore of the utmost importance that they should receive quality training. Historical and ethical issues will take on all the more importance as their speed of reaction and ability to adapt will be increasingly called into play.

The burdens and constraints of military life, readily accepted in the early years of a career, frequently come to weigh too heavily on married and social life. Housing problems and the impact of military demands on family life are potential causes of disaffection. There must therefore be provision for fair pay in recognition of the special demands of certain professions, payable to those actually subject to those demands.

Officers

Command and staff tasks will continue to evolve. The primary mission for officers will always be to command their soldiers in combat and to prepare them for combat. They will also be called upon, however, to adapt the military corps to the new contexts of deployment described in this document, in Metropolitan France, in the DOM-COM or in the course of commitments abroad.

A particular feature of the officer's career is that it is explicitly selective, notably comprising a period of military education in mid-career. The advantage of such a system is that it provides the State with a high-level staff corps, combining the advantages of operational experience acquired early in their career with selection by competitive examination. This should be encouraged and strengthened.

In order to adapt—in accordance with their traditions—to highly fluid circumstances on national territory or in theatres of operations, officers will need to be selected with care and receive regular training,

while ensuring that training periods do not disrupt the continuity of their operational responsibilities.

There will be a growing need for officers to perform management and conceptual functions in joint and international posts. Officers will more than ever need to rely on a culture of joint operations, European and international experience, awareness of the approach adopted by the main civil interlocutors, heads of government departments, major operators and actors in economic or social life, and an in-depth knowledge of the legal context of their profession. Regular contact with other European and NATO officers at various stages in their career and training, plus the ability to speak foreign languages (English in particular), are now indispensable.

More joint training programmes should be set up for officers from the armed forces, armament corps and service corps, to develop a shared culture and enhance cohesion. The Higher Institute for National Defence (Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, IHEDN) and the Centre for Higher Armament Studies (Centre des Hautes Etudes de l'Armement, CHEAr) will be merged in pursuit of this logic (see Chapter 18). By the same principle, the number of officers from the armament corps and services corps attending the Joint Forces Staff College will be increased, as will exchanges of personnel between the main Ministry of Defence departments (armed forces, DGA defence procurement agency, SGA secretariat-general for administration).

Rates of pay will need to take greater account of the increased responsibilities taken on by officers, offer higher rewards for levels of qualification, compensate families more generously for the effects of mobility and, finally, offer better rewards to personnel who are called upon at times to occupy extremely demanding positions in the course of their career as officers.

The command function must be assumed in all its dimensions: authority, the ability to listen and respect for all—subordinates, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), private soldiers, and civilians.

Non-commissioned officers

As the linchpins between conception and execution, non-commissioned officers are central to the military institution. They form a corps distinguished by a great variety of specialisations, military and armed forces cultures, types of activities and lifestyles within the formations in which they serve.

The new pay scale will eventually reflect their increased responsibilities in increased pay. It should mark more clearly the move from the rank of private to that of NCO, in recognition of the qualification,

technical skills and authority required. A number of problems are still to be solved, however:

- access to higher ranks, which requires a long, costly process of qualification, or to the officer corps;
- maintaining the attractiveness of careers in order to retain the skills of highly experienced NCOs, particularly in technical functions;
- the need for appropriate professional redeployment for a number of NCOs in physically and psychologically demanding jobs.
- A number of levers may be employed for this purpose:
- NCOs must be refocused on operational professions. Greater use of technical or administrative civil servants or external providers for other missions must be encouraged;
- tasks must be better distributed between NCOs at the beginning of their career and more senior NCOs who can take on broader responsibilities;
- bridges must be organised for a reasonable number of NCOs to allow for the transition from certain physically demanding initial specialities to functions more closely aligned with operational support. The training system must have the flexibility to support transitions of this kind.

Private soldiers

The professionalisation of the armed forces has resulted in significant recruitment of privates. Demographic projections to 2020 suggest that armed forces recruitment needs will remain high. The expected competition on the labour market, however, coupled with the rapid disenchantment that certain aspects of the profession may engender, could undermine the concept of the professional army in France. Significant efforts will have to be made to retain this category of personnel.

Pay levels will be guaranteed by the new pay scales, an important factor in attracting recruits, particularly for qualified posts. The most sensitive questions when it comes to recruitment and retention, however, are the condition and availability of equipment, including even minor items of everyday kit. It is here that we find some of the most common causes of dissatisfaction among privates. The gap between the level of the missions assigned to them and the equipment issued to them is wide enough to be discouraging. Henceforth, the quality of our armed forces will depend to a very great extent on the progress made in this area, which is often sacrificed to financial constraints.

The nature of the job and the consideration that goes with it are key to retention of young recruits. Private soldiers expect to hold action jobs within an organisation that they hope will treat them as

professionals with recognised technical and human skills. Initial career guidance on recruitment needs to be improved and greater consideration given to expectations within a professional career, in order to recognise their progress and increase their chances of promotion. Promotion to the rank of NCO will continue to be a major motivation.

Particular attention will need to be paid to experience and seniority when training NCOs and corporals. There will be an option allowing police and *Gendarmerie* officers reaching the end of long-service contracts to join the armed forces, to increase the fluidity of human resources in professions contributing to national security. This will first require the setting up of a system for accreditation of professional competencies.

Civilian defence personnel

Civilian personnel are a component in their own right of a professionalised defence force. Although not subject by their status to the same obligations as their military colleagues, they also display remarkable commitment and competence. Their successful integration into units in support of operational military personnel is fundamental, as examples from the armed forces of other countries have shown. Previous expansion of the civilian component has marked time in recent years, however, at around 19% of total armed forces personnel.

Efforts made to integrate civilian personnel must be continued. It is important for civilian personnel to be more closely associated with the operational challenges faced by the bodies and units in which they serve. Greater involvement increases their effectiveness. Indeed, henceforth they must now play a bigger role in support functions, as military personnel are concentrated on operational tasks.

The distinction between jobs that allow overseas service and those that do not will be abolished. The participation of civilian personnel in external operations, on a voluntary basis, will be encouraged, particularly within the framework of civil-military operations or civilian operations, on missions involving stabilisation or reconstruction of a former combat zone.

Reservists

Members of the operational reserve have the status of military personnel performing military duties and are members of the professional army.

Professionalisation and reductions in the armed forces means that it is more important than ever to move up a level in forming a reserve, smaller in number if necessary but more specialised, better trained

and better integrated into the military structure. The significant increase in the use of forces and the needs regularly expressed in certain areas of specialisation will call for significant effort in the years ahead. Perhaps the best reason for doing so is that investment in the reserve is a powerful statement of the contribution that citizens can make to National Security.

Improvements are urgently needed here. The operational reserve must definitively move away from the image of the conscript army reserve. The policy governing reserves, their recruitment, management and missions, must adapt to the nature of the operations the armed forces will be called upon to perform, now and in the future.

As matters stand, the reserve pool created by conscription has now dried up. As a result, it is essential to intensify efforts directed at civil society, which is where the future of operational reserves now largely lies. When recruiting, a distinction will have to be made between former active military personnel, required to serve for five years after the end of their enlistment, and reservists from civil society who must take deliberate steps to join. It is the latter group that will be a priority target for information and recruitment drives.

The armed forces will encourage the use of reservists acting either in support of active units or within units set up on French soil for the purposes of protection or, where possible, on external operations. The use of reservists in functions where their specialist expertise can be placed at the disposal of a high level command will be encouraged. The operational reserve represents a major advantage for future security when deployed in crisis management agencies, centrally or in the defence and security zones, in the Gendarmerie or in units, replacing those deployed on overseas operations. The success enjoyed by the Gendarmerie reserve must be built on and put to good use in serving National Security, especially in times of crisis.

A major recruitment drive will be needed, particularly in civil and military education centres of excellence. Incentive measures to attract senior executives in the civil sector will also be needed to reinforce the reserve's high level of capability.

Despite its recent overhaul, the current reserve system appears to be too rigid and drop-out rates are too high. The aim should be to have reservists able to commit not to 5 days a year, as at present, but to at least 30 days a year and in certain cases up to 200 days.

Recruitment to the reserve should also be encouraged, by making legal and practical provisions for the resulting interruptions to professional careers. These measures concern not only the reservists, but also their employers and society as a whole. In any event, being a member of the reserve should not result in any loss of income for reservists.

Should reservist pay be less than the reservist's professional income, a top-up payment should be provided for.

Moreover, certain cultural stumbling-blocks in our society need to be overcome. Too many reservists conceal their status from their employer, whether in the public or private sector. It is unacceptable that serving one's country should be something to be concealed. The role of reservists should be valued and made much more acceptable to employers and government departments.

In the same spirit, employers should not suffer any disproportionate financial prejudice as a result of reservists' commitments. There should be partnerships between companies or government and the defence forces to facilitate and value reservists' commitment.

Because of the diversity of needs, it will eventually be necessary to set up an inter-ministerial structure providing operational reinforcement for crisis management, alongside the professional operational reserves. The structure, which will offer a training programme common to several government departments, will promote recruitment and avoid duplication of efforts.

National security human resources

DEVELOPING INTER-MINISTERIAL COOPERATION ON HUMAN RESOURCES

Policy co-ordination will be improved by creating a network linking those responsible for policies on recruitment, training, qualifications, careers, retention and redeployment. The network should take an overarching view and promote joint, concerted and programmed approaches.

Given the recruitment needs of National Security and the high level of qualifications required, a close partnership with the Ministry of Education should result in a vocational training programme for the security professions, as the first step towards a formal professional development path. It will provide a clearer vision of professional opportunities and promote the career progression of interested parties.

Careers information policies must become more consistent and serve to direct candidates into the channels that best suit their preferences and skills. The Ministry of Defence will continue setting up centralised vacancy clearing houses, which will also serve as one-stop shops for private and public enterprises seeking to recruit qualified former military personnel. There will be a centre for each region, and the centres may also provide services for families and for associations.

Furthermore, given the close similarities in certain competencies required in both the defence and security professions, every encouragement will be given to the pooling of training. This practice already exists for helicopter pilots, and could be extended to professions such as intelligence and civil security, particular as regards the major needs identified in anti-CRBN measures, bomb disposal and mine clearance.

Joint management of reserves under the authority of different ministries will be introduced to provide a co-ordinated response to the needs associated with acute crises on national territory. Because of the number of overlapping sectors involved (armed forces, Gendarmerie, police, health, civil security), there is a danger of double-counting of certain individuals, which creates risks when their skills are in short supply (specialists, medical personnel, etc.). Inter-ministerial consultation and cooperation is the only way to overcome this inconvenience, and nationwide co-ordination at the level of defence and security zone Prefects.

STRENGTHENING CRISIS MANAGEMENT PREPAREDNESS

Crisis management preparedness implies that the State, the civil service and the public hospital system are assured of the permanent availability of agents ready—within an appropriate legal framework—to perform their tasks in exceptional circumstances. Three conditions must be met:

- 1) Military personnel and category A and B agents of the three services must be introduced to questions of national security from the earliest stages in their training, which must explain the overall security and defence issues and the roles allocated to the various institutions called upon to deal with them.

- 2) The process of refocusing military personnel and uniformed public servants on their operational professions must be continued and extended. If the demands for discipline and neutrality, on the one hand, and the constraints and impositions on the other, pay offered in compensation for the constraints imposed by military life should only apply to those who are indeed subject to specific constraints in their everyday work.

- 3) Finally, systematic efforts should be made to promote cohesion between administrative executives, police officers and military personnel. In the event of a crisis, the tasks which fall to them will inevitable converge. As yet, however, there is no sufficiently clear and shared vision of the risks that threaten the life of the nation, or of the overall policy the State is pursuing in order to prevent and to respond

to them. Many fields vital to national security—intelligence, the use of economic data, or the protection and confidentiality of sensitive data—are substantially underestimated. Over the next fifteen years, ignorance of military defence issues at executive level will grow unless executive officers destined for the highest ranks of the civil service and police forces are made aware of what is at stake.

There should be an increase in *dialogue and exchanges likely to reinforce cohesion between the military and the senior civil service*. *Mandatory mobility outside their initial service arm will be introduced for commissioned officers identified as potential high-flyers*. This mobility—a two-year period, as is the case for civil servants—must be completed between graduation from the Joint Staff College and promotion to the rank of general officer, and will generally be a condition for such promotion.

At the same time, all bodies providing higher education for senior civil servants and magistrates—particularly the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*, *Ecole Nationale Supérieure de la Police* and *Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature*—will include a training module on questions of strategy and National Security designed to familiarise students with the key defence and security issues.

In order to respond effectively to a crisis, the State must be able to count on all the necessary personnel being rapidly available. The general status of the armed forces meets this need, since it sets out the principles of commitment and availability arising from the missions entrusted to the armed forces in times of peace and of war. The special status of the corps of prefects, the police, but also the DGSE or the prison service, also places their personnel under specific constraints. There are no plans to increase these statutory constraints. *The procedure for calling on civilian public servants on general status, or on private companies working in security-related fields, needs to be reconsidered, however.*

The “defence service” is the framework that was intended to ensure continuity of public action and of companies contributing to the defence, security and integrity of the territory and the population, in the event of a crisis. The system was set up in the 1950s and now, in its current form, suffers from major shortcomings. Although updated in 1999, it is not implemented. Its legal provisions tie it to situations (such as mobilisation) that have now become improbable. Finally, it imposes no obligations as regards training or preparedness.

The “defence service” will be replaced by a “*national security service*”. It will be called into play should a state of emergency be declared.

THE INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONS

The importance placed on intelligence in the national security strategy calls for a particularly ambitious human resources policy. Reorganisation and investment must go hand in hand with the introduction of training and career pathways, and with the pooling of education and training. Intelligence must be seen as a specialisation in its own right. This means being able to recruit not only from specialist or technical sectors of the civil service, but also from the elite post-graduate schools (*Grandes Ecoles*) and universities. While these sectors already exist, in varying degrees, in the armed forces, they are only in their infancy in the police and Gendarmerie. They will need to be developed. An “intelligence” specialisation will be created in the training schools for the cadres of these two forces.

Financial and legal provision will need to be made for the recruitment of contract employees, in particular to facilitate inter-service mobility for careers in intelligence. Specific recruitment and career development policies will be introduced for specialists with the scarcest skills.

Common career management standards for the intelligence professions will be laid down, particularly with regard to recruitment, and core curricula for initial and ongoing training will be developed.

Lastly, the creation of an intelligence academy (see Chapter 8) will contribute to a better intermingling of the cultures specific to each service, and to better mutual knowledge.

European and international outlook

Given that our forces will to a very great extent be called upon to serve within a multinational framework, and in particular a European or Alliance framework, greater attention will need to be paid to introducing a European and international component into training and career development for military and civil defence and security personnel.

Proposals made by France for the European Union to play a greater role in defence and security make this movement necessary, particularly in the field of training. We must therefore seek to reinforce European training policy, which will be directed towards the *creation of a common European defence and security space*. If our partners are in agreement, the project will be carried out under the auspices of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), which will be allo-

cated increased and permanent resources, making the college a standard point of passage in professional military careers.

If this European space is to be workable, *the conditions governing the movement and stationing of European military personnel* on European Union territory will need to be simplified.

The European space will eventually be reflected in:

— systematic inclusion of European modules in all initial and ongoing training programmes. This is a priority with high value added in the operational field, since forces that have trained together will be more effective when serving together. It will also help to prompt partnership reflexes in the higher administrative and military echelons;

— more technical training common to several European countries, particularly training in the use of jointly designed and procured equipment. Current illustrations of this principle in action are the Franco-German training school for Tiger helicopters, or the European combat aircraft pilots project;

— shared training in doctrine and force commitment concepts. Insofar as the European Union conducts military operations, it would seem logical to engage in its own examination and analysis of military strategy and action in the course of operations. Regular exchanges of experience feedback between partners returning from theatres of operations should be made systematic.

CHAPTER 15

GOVERNMENT REORGANISATION

The organisation of government authorities established by the ordinance of 7 January 1959 and including the general organisation of defence, as codified in the Defence Code, is the product of a historical and strategic context very different from that of today. It no longer meets the demands of our times. The missions it assigns to the various actors in national security, and to ministries in particular, now bear very little relation to what their role must be today. In addition, the current organisation no longer adequately involves parliamentarians.

The national security strategy therefore requires that government authorities to be reorganised in order to meet their priorities more effectively. This reorganisation will be achieved, within a constitutional framework that has itself been overhauled, by rewriting the Defence Code and adapting the future Domestic Security Code.

A new organisation at the highest level of the State

THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE DEFENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

By virtue of article 15 of the Constitution, the President is the head of the armed forces: as such, he “chairs the national defence councils and higher committees” and has sole responsibility for giving the order to commit France’s nuclear forces (art. R* 1411-1 and following of the Defence Code). The President is also, by virtue of article 5 of the Constitution, the “guarantor of national independence, the integrity of

national territory and the fulfilment of treaties". It is his responsibility to ensure the "proper functioning of the Government and the continuity of the State". On this basis, he may invoke the extraordinary powers he holds by virtue of article 16. He also chairs the Nuclear Policy Council created, in its present form, by decree of 21 April 2008. These provisions, supported by unbroken institutional practice, place an eminent responsibility upon the President in the entire field of national security. He must have the means to assume that responsibility in full.

The first of these means is the chairmanship of the councils referred to in article 15 of the Constitution by the generic term "national defence councils and higher committees". It is within the Defence Council, without prejudice to the powers of the Council of Ministers, that "decisions regarding the general management of defence" are made. Established practice under the Fifth Republic and the implementation of the 1959 ordinance have also developed the use of select committees, meeting in the event of crisis or a decision to commit French forces. Lastly, a decree of 15 May 2002 created a Domestic Security Council.

As a consequence of a strategy in which national security is the federating and mobilising objective of government action, a Defence and National Security Council (Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité Nationale, CDSN) will be set up. Its remit will cover all the questions and public policies relating to the fields of defence and national security for which the President is responsible under the terms of the Constitution.

The State will thus be provided with a body at the highest level in which to address all aspects of issues such as military programming, the policy of deterrence, the programming of domestic security as it relates to national security, the fight against terrorism or the planning of responses to major crises. In addition to the President and the Prime Minister, the council will be composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defence, Economy and Budget. Other ministers may attend as necessary; the Minister of Justice, for example, concerning the fight against terrorism, or the Minister of Health with regard to the prevention of health crises.

The Defence and National Security Council may meet in a variety of different formats, and in particular as a select council on issues relating to foreign operations, or on certain issues regarding nuclear deterrence. It will also include the National Intelligence Council (see Chapter 8) and its offshoot, the Intelligence Select Committee. The decree of 15 May 2002 relating to the Domestic Security Council will be abrogated. Issues relating to the day to day security of goods and

property will be dealt with in different and specific forums, chaired by the President or Prime Minister as appropriate.

The establishment of this council, with far-reaching powers, does not in itself prefigure any major alteration in the workings of the Defence Council on questions of strategy and military assets. It does, however, allow for these questions to be raised within a framework geared to the new kinds of risks and crises of today and will give the President and the Prime Minister an overall view of the objectives and constraints of national security, by overcoming the internal partitions between the State and the government departments.

Such an institution cannot, in isolation, guarantee the new effectiveness that needs to be brought to the decision-making process, however. The President and the Prime Minister must also have at their disposal, at the right time, a diversity of assessments and insights from a range of sources, both internal and external to the administration. The various dimensions of political, financial, operational and international decisions must be subject to debate, and be presented in the form of open choices for final decision.

With this end in view, the President and the Prime Minister will be presented with independent expert analyses as part of an Advisory Board for Defence and National Security (*Conseil Consultatif sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale, CCDSN*) composed of independent experts appointed by the President.

The Secretariat-General for National Defence (*Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale, SGDN*) will become the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (*Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale, SGDSN*) under the authority of the Prime Minister and working in close association with the Presidency of the Republic. The General Secretariat will be responsible for preparing and following up decisions taken by the Defence and National Security Council, and will guarantee the conditions for inter-ministerial dialogue and the expression, and presentation to the Head of State and to the Prime Minister, of points of view that may be contradictory.

THE PRIME MINISTER IN CHARGE OF GOVERNMENT ACTION

Pursuing the role allotted to him by uninterrupted institutional practice since the origins of the Fifth Republic, the Prime Minister will oversee the implementation of all decisions taken in the Defence and National Security Council.

As the head of government responsible, under article 20 of the Constitution, for the administration and the armed forces, the Prime

Minister is responsible to parliament (with the ministers concerned) for the various policies contributing to national security: defence, domestic security and civil security, economic security, foreign policy, etc.

The Prime Minister has a duty to guarantee the consistency of governmental action across the entire field of national security; such consistency is essential to the effectiveness of governmental action, whether it be in the matter of investment decisions, crisis management, for which he provides strategic steering in consultation with the President, industrial policy or information systems security.

He will be assisted in the exercise of these powers by the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, which will co-ordinate preparations and ensure the implementation of measures in support of the national security strategy, such as preparedness for major crises.

A stronger role for Parliament

The involvement of Parliament in the national security strategy is one of the keys to winning the nation's support for this strategy. It is essential in nurturing a sense of cohesion between the nation and those who serve it. France will join the ranks of the great democracies by reinforcing the role of its parliamentary assemblies, in terms of information and power of proposal, as well as of decision and oversight in the whole field of national security.

Firstly, it is proposed that the intervention of our armed forces abroad should be subject to a notification and authorisation procedure written into the Constitution. This constitutes a radical innovation. Parliament will be informed of the nature and objectives of interventions abroad within a maximum of three days following deployment of forces in the theatre of operations. This information phase will be followed by a debate, but no vote. On the other hand, any extension of the intervention beyond a period of no less than four months must be authorised by a vote in parliament.

Whenever possible, as in the case of peace-keeping operations, for example, which are generally prepared over a period of months, and excluding emergencies or legitimate defence, Parliament will be informed prior to units being deployed on the ground. Beyond their authorisation by Parliament, interventions will be examined, where appropriate, at the time of voting the initial budget bills, when examining the proposed provision for external operations. Respecting the principle of the separation of executive and legislative powers, the

conditions and operational terms governing the commitment of French forces will remain the sole prerogative of the Head of State and of Government.

Secondly, Parliament's role as a legislator will be strengthened. The practice of military programme bills and domestic security programme bills, in conjunction with a report setting out the main thrust of defence and domestic security policies, will be maintained.

In more general terms, parliamentarians will be associated more closely with the definition of national security strategy and the policy orientations associated with it, particularly through orientation debates. Parliament will be consulted when the White Paper on defence and national security is updated prior to each new programme bill.

Parliament will be informed of bilateral defence agreements between France and foreign partners when these may lead to the country's defence capabilities being committed on behalf of the security of other States. Parliament will also authorise the ratification or approval of these agreements when the Constitution so provides.

Finally, Parliament greater information will be provided to. The creation of a Parliamentary Intelligence Delegation, under the 9 October 2007 Act, already provides parliamentarians with information on intelligence activities, without compromising confidentiality, particularly as regards the terrorist threat (see Chapter 8). Parliament will also be kept regularly informed on arms export policy by the Prime Minister and by the Minister of Defence.

Clarification of ministerial responsibilities and better governance

Ministers are responsible for the contribution to national security made by the public policies for which they are responsible. They rely in particular on a senior defence and security official to advise them on all questions relating to defence and national security.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

The Minister of Defence is responsible within the Government for defence policy for which he is accountable to Parliament, along with the Prime Minister.

The Minister is responsible for the preparation and employment of the forces decided by the President and also for: the quality of foreign

and military intelligence, prospective studies and crisis anticipation and monitoring; matching defence needs and armed forces capabilities; matching ministry action to the objectives of national security, foreign policy, State modernisation policy and the Government's public finances policy; industrial and social policy as it pertains to the defence sector.

Clarification of responsibilities within the Ministry means amending the decrees governing its organisation. The priority placed on armed forces' operational needs will be reaffirmed. The Chief of the Defence Staff will continue as both commanding officer of all military operations, under the authority of the President and the Government, subject to the provisions specific to deterrence, and as military advisor to the government. Within the framework of the directives handed down by the Minister, the Chief of Defence Staff will continue to be responsible for preparing military programming and organising international military relations. His authority over the service Chiefs of Staff will be reinforced.

Given the recurrent difficulties encountered with Ministry investments, the conditions for the launch and conduct of operations will be modified. Two principal objectives will be pursued: greater awareness of the total costs of investments, and better organisation of the dialogue with the Ministry of the Budget.

For each investment envisaged (arms, operational serviceability, infrastructure, information systems, upstream research), appraisal prior to the decision to launch will include an examination of all the financial and economic information relating to the objective in question, in addition to an evaluation of the operational needs to be met. The Ministerial Committee on Defence Investments, which is chaired by the Minister with the Secretary General for the Administration acting as the secretariat, will systematically consider: whether the operational need is met, the risk management strategy, the provisional cost of procurement, total *life-cycle cost*, overall financial feasibility, the most appropriate procurement strategy (asset acquisition, partnership or service contract, etc.), the support policy and the equipment's export potential.

Consultation with the Minister of the Budget will be improved. Work on this White Paper has prompted an unprecedented exchange of information and documentation between the Ministries, including all the financial data on arms programmes. This policy must be continued and expanded. As part of the overall reform of ministerial budgeting and accounting controls, a *Finance Committee* will be chaired by the Secretary General for the Administration or by the Director of Financial Affairs, and will include the heads of Defence Ministry programmes, as understood by the constitutionnal by law on

budget Acts (LOLF), plus a representative from the Ministry of the Budget. This committee will scrutinise the financial sustainability of programming and enable the Ministry of the Budget to monitor the Ministry of Defence's investment policy on a more regular basis.

The Ministry's range of economic framing, forecasting and monitoring tools will be extended, using the expertise of the Financial Affairs Directorate. An internal audit function will be introduced to ensure that financial information produced is transparent, demonstrably accurate and shared: it will rely primarily on the armed forces controller (*Contrôle général des armées*). Lastly, the Secretary General for the Administration will steer all the Ministry's joint policies (finance, human resources, legal affairs, etc.). The Ministry's financial function will be reinforced and will operate on behalf of the Ministry as a whole.

The means of access to information, analysis, arbitrage and control available to the Minister will be reinforced, to provide diversified and reliable assessments in the strategic, technical, operational and financial fields. The Ministry's strategic analysis and prospective study capabilities will be enhanced and placed under the sole direction of the Strategic Affairs Directorate. This directorate will give momentum and overall consistency to all the prospective work carried out by the Ministry, by the directorate itself, by the Chief of Defence Staff, any by all agencies under the authority of the Secretary General for the Administration. The directorate will also have access to all assessments and work produced by the intelligence directorates under Ministry of Defence authority.

Finally, the reorganisation will also regroup the entire central administration, currently dispersed, in a leaner format at a single site in Paris.

THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR

The Minister of the Interior is responsible for the security of life and property on French soil. He is responsible for those domestic security and civil security policies that contribute to national security.

The Minister of the Interior has particular responsibility for co-ordinating crisis management on French soil and domestic intelligence. He is supported in this task by the department and defence zone prefects who, under article 72 of the Constitution, are the representatives of each member of the government and are responsible for national interests, administrative oversight and compliance with the laws.

The organisation and governance of the Ministry of the Interior will evolve in a number of directions to ensure that the priorities of the national security strategy are fully taken into account.

The centralisation of all domestic security resources under the authority of the Minister of the Interior will be completed following the full integration of the *Gendarmerie*, and its budget, with effect from 1 January 2009. The *Gendarmerie* will retain its military status, but its resources will be closely co-ordinated with those of the police in providing protection in Metropolitan France and in the DOM-COM.

The priority emphasis placed on knowledge and anticipation will be reflected in the work of the new Central Domestic Intelligence Directorate, formed by the merging of the General Intelligence Directorate (RG) and the Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory (DST). The missions and resources of the Central Directorate will be significantly reinforced as part of new intelligence planning structure and the domestic security programming laws.

The Ministry's forecasting and preparation capabilities will be enhanced by the creation of a Delegation for Prospective and Strategy, which will reinforce the consistency of Ministry action in its various areas of responsibility.

The Ministry's operational crisis management capabilities will also be substantially reinforced. An operational centre will be created by 2009, based in Place Beauvau; it will serve as the central level for operational crisis management on French soil. Crisis communication will be reorganised under the auspices of the recently-created post of Ministry spokesperson.

The function of Senior Defence Official, currently performed by the Director of Defence and Civil Security, will devolve upon the Ministry General Secretary who will, in this capacity, have authority over all Ministry departments. He will be assisted in this task by a Director of Planning, whose role will include planning formulation and follow-up, steering the defence zones, Ministry information systems security, and national economic intelligence (see Chapter 11). In the field of economic security, without prejudice to the specific powers of the Ministry of Defence in the matter of armaments, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for protecting the tangible and intangible assets of France's economic sector (companies, laboratories, research centres), preventing foreign interference and maintaining a secure environment for business.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

The Minister of Foreign and European Affairs is responsible for the co-ordination of France's foreign policy. It conducts diplomacy in such a way as to reflect the national security strategy, in particular as regards France's contribution to European and international security.

He oversees defence and security co-operation. The Minister will chair the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committees on actions conducted using the resources of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior and other ministries involved in defence and security co-operation.

The Minister will also provide inter-ministerial oversight of external crisis management, irrespective of the nature of the crisis.

He will be supported by a civilian planning capability and an Operational Centre for External Crisis Management, under the authority of the Secretary General.

The Centre will perform three functions:

— pre-crisis: monitoring and early warning. The Centre will also prepare the ground for government action by identifying in advance the personnel and equipment needed in the event of crisis, and by organising *ad hoc* exercises;

— during a crisis: operational co-ordination, to ensure effective implementation of strategic orientations decided by government. The key factors informing the Centre's actions will be administrative decompartmentalisation, centralisation and the rapid circulation of information;

— post-crisis: co-ordination of feedback on experience of external crises.

The Centre will be supported in the performance of these missions by the capabilities of the Ministries and government departments concerned, in addition to those of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs.

THE MINISTRY OF THE ECONOMY

The Minister of the Economy is responsible for economic security policy, a concept that will replace that of economic defence in all government documents (Chapter 3). It will therefore be the Minister's task to take all the measures within his power to guarantee the continuity of economic activity in the event of a major crisis and, more widely, to ensure the protection of France's economic interests under normal circumstances as well as in times of crisis.

The Minister of the Economy will ensure the protection of sensitive sectors and companies, in liaison with the Ministries concerned, and the protection of information likely to enhance the competitiveness of economic players. The Minister will ensure the efficient circulation of strategic economic information, as part of the government's economic intelligence policy.

Organisation will continue to be handled by a senior official responsible for economic intelligence, under the authority of the

SGDSN, with correspondents in the main ministries, and in particular the Ministries of the Economy, Defence, Interior, Foreign and European Affairs and Ecology & Sustainable Development. The Ministry of the Interior will direct the nationwide structure placed under the responsibility of the Prefects.

OTHER MINISTRIES

The Minister of the Budget oversees consistency between the choices proposed and the general strategy of public finances. The Minister contributes to the national security strategy through the work of ministry departments which have wide powers (inspection of persons, goods, means of transport, financial flows and taxable activities) and may intervene in movements outside and inside the European Union.

Other ministers, in particular the Minister of Health (on health crisis prevention and management), the Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Environment (responsible for the security of much critical infrastructure and for relations with major operations), the Minister of Justice (with a central role in the fight against terrorism), and the Minister of the Environment are also called upon to make an essential contribution to national security strategy. The organisation and resources of their departments will be geared to meet this requirement more effectively.

CHAPTER 16

INDUSTRY AND RESEARCH

France's scientific, technological and industrial skills determine our capability to meet the needs of our armed forces, of our European partners and, increasingly, those of our domestic and civil security forces. They are crucial to retaining our strategic autonomy and help to promote Europe as a centre of industrial and technological excellence.

A competitive but fragmented industry

A COMPETITIVE FRENCH INDUSTRY

The world arms market, estimated to be worth 300 billion Euros, is largely dominated by the U.S. arms industry, which alone accounts for a market share of over 50%. Europe's defence industry currently represents net sales of some 55 billion Euros. 90% of the industry is concentrated in six countries: Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Sweden. Four European groups (BAE Systems, EADS, Finmeccanica and Thales) rank in the world's top 15—all the others are American. These four have attained the size, financial resources, competitiveness and capabilities to take on complex projects. Of the top ten European groups, four are French (Thales, DCNS, Safran and Dassault Aviation) and another is EADS, in which France plays a substantial role.

Ever since the late 1950s, France's defence industry policy has been geared towards the pursuit of strategic and technological autonomy centred on major projects exploiting disruptive technology

(nuclear, aeronautical, missiles) and relying for the most part on major national State-owned groups. France's independent nuclear deterrent is one successful product of this policy.

France now has a significant and highly successful defence industry that ranks second in Europe, just behind the United Kingdom. It provides direct employment for 165,000 people and indirect employment for as many again, and posts net sales of the order of 15 billion Euros, around a third of which is derived from exports. France ranks as the world's fourth largest exporter.

The financial performance and profitability of France's leading defence firms falls well within the world average, with certain minor differences depending on the indicators measured: faster growth in average net sales, relatively low net margins despite an average rate of indebtedness slightly lower than that of its American counterparts.

Spending on research and development represents between 10% and 20% of net sales for the ten largest defence groups in France, which employ globally something like 20,000 people in their design offices.

Research breeds technological innovation and is a driving force for major technologies, many of which have civil applications. The military aeronautics industry, for example, has spawned numerous applications in the fields of avionics, electronic flight control systems, IT and communication, simulation, modelling and computer-assisted manufacturing, not to mention new materials. These advances provide a huge boost to the international competitiveness of the civil industry.

A FRAGMENTED FRENCH AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY

The French defence industry has undergone major restructuring since the mid-1980s in response to an increasingly competitive international market. New players that have emerged include Israel, Russia and China, and these will probably be followed by countries like Brazil, India, Pakistan and other Asian powers. The restructuring of Giat Industries (now Nexter), begun in 2003, and of the defence electronics industry or, more recently, the transformation and development of French naval shipbuilder DCN (Direction des Constructions Navales) have all helped to consolidate the country's industrial and technological base. Even so, the French and European defence industries remain fragmented. Problems have increased due to national concerns exclusive to individual States, and a tendency for some of them to turn to non-European suppliers.

Major European groups have emerged in some sectors, primarily aeronautics and defence electronics. Industrial mergers are based on internal organisations determined by national considerations. These considerations have resulted in a distribution of technological and industrial capabilities dictated not by any economic strategy, but by Government insistence on retaining national R&D, production and maintenance capabilities seen as strategic. This trend has significantly hampered industrial integration and specialisation. The level of integration between the various national subsidiaries of these major European groups is therefore very limited, even to this day.

Most of the other industrial sectors have remained on the fringes of these transnational moves towards concentration. In the field of combat aviation, five large firms currently share in three competing programmes. A similar situation will soon arise with drones if no European industrial strategy is put in place. In the field of military satellite telecommunications, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and Spain are currently involved in five different national programmes. The European naval industry has embarked on gradual restructuring. But with six leading project managers dealing with over twenty major naval shipyards, there is still no comparison with the United States, where the restructurings of the 1990s pared the naval industry down to two major project managers and six yards. In the land weapons sector, a handful of global national players (Germany, France) are to be found alongside the U.S.-influenced transnational groups, as well as a multitude of local or “niche” actors. Ten or so European firms still can lay claim to the skills needed to manage armoured vehicle manufacturing projects. In all these sectors, the various manufacturers capture the bulk of their domestic market and compete fiercely on exports.

The gap between the United States and Europe

The defence procurement budget of the United States in 2006 was 116 billion Euros, *three times total procurement spending by the whole European Union*, which in turn devotes only 18% of its procurement spending to co-operation programmes. The comparison is even more unfavourable if we compare *defence R&D budgets*, with the United States spending 67 billion Euros in 2006, *six times the fragmented spending allocated by Europe*.

An industrial strategy with a European focus

THE THREE CIRCLES OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY

No European country can now afford the current level of dispersal of efforts, in view of current levels of financial resources and the growing cost of arms systems. No country in Europe—not even France or the United Kingdom—now has the capacity to bear single-handedly the cost of a defence industry capable of fully meeting all the needs of its forces.

France's arms procurement strategy will be determined on three levels.

France will retain national proficiency in the technologies and capabilities needed to design, manufacture and maintain *the military equipment essential to areas of sovereign prerogative* where, in view of our political choices, sharing or pooling resources is not an option.

For the majority of defence and security procurement, our strategy will tend towards *European interdependence*. The aim will be to build interdependence by free consent between States rather than, as it is so often perceived, being subject to dependencies. European interdependence will therefore be conceived in terms of reciprocity, security of supply and an overall balance. It will also need to be underpinned by effective procurement procedures.

Whenever security of supply is not a direct issue, either because it is guaranteed by a number of different suppliers or because it is possible to build up strategic stocks to guard against any interruption of supply, France will turn to the *world market*. Procurement on this market will be seen by the public procurement agency as an integral part of procurement strategy in its own right, and not as a fall-back solution once all other options are exhausted. Procurement on the world market means we must retain robust national competencies in order to specify, order, assess and qualify equipment so procured.

A strong political will, shared with our European partners, is essential in developing a European strategy.

DEVELOPING WORLD-CLASS EUROPEAN CHAMPIONS

With the aim of promoting a competitive industry in France and Europe, France will encourage the development of world-class European industrial groups. Firms themselves have an essential role to play

in this approach. Since Government procurement is particularly influential in shaping industrial supply, however, it is for States to create a positive framework from which such champions can emerge. First and foremost, they must create a domestic European market by sourcing supply from these groups whenever acquiring equipment for their armed forces. Next they should encourage convergence of common operational needs that can lead to co-operation programmes, both to reduce development costs and allow for long production runs.

Harmonisation of military needs between the European countries will determine the rationalisation of Europe's defence industry. France will adopt a pragmatic approach, entering into structural bilateral or trilateral partnerships. From these concrete partnerships, European ambitions for an arms industry will take shape. The European Defence Agency (EDA) will pursue the process of programme generation it has already embarked upon, which includes co-ordination of expressions of military needs with the EU Military Committee and Military Staff. It is of the utmost importance that the EDA should be entrusted at the earliest possible opportunity with the task of drawing up programmes to meet these needs.

The emergence of world-class European industrial groups also depends on changes to national and European regulations: a defence company operating in several Member States must be able to function in the same way as a company based in a single State. Current regulations, however, require a European defence company to obtain an export licence to transfer defence equipment from one Member State to another, thereby posing a major obstacle to company integration.

Relaxing the conditions for the movement of defence products between European countries is therefore an essential requirement. France would favour the introduction of a general or global licence mechanism for the European defence industry and would like to see the introduction of a European free trade area in defence equipment between countries with comparable control procedures. France will propose this objective to all its European partners.

The technical and industrial priorities arising from strategic National Security objectives to 2025

Nuclear

The capability to design, develop and produce nuclear weapons, as well as ensuring their safety and reliability, will be retained as a fully sovereign prerogative. Such a priority implies that laboratories, scientific research and production facilities are allocated the human, technical and industrial resources required for our strategy of nuclear deterrence.

Space

France is the only European country to have developed ballistic missiles. As both the M-51 missile and the Ariane-V rocket have completed the development stage, preserving our core competencies in such a strategic field is essential to our concept of deterrence and Europe's access to space. France will maintain, on a national basis, the highly specific competencies it developed in the field of ballistic missiles—in particular its high performance inertial guidance and solid-state propulsion industrial and technological know-how.

For all other activities pertaining to space, satellites in particular, European efforts are too scattered to be effective. France will actively support the rationalisation of the European space industry, with a focus on intelligence-gathering, navigational and communications satellites.

Naval

Submarine capabilities are of strategic importance, as much for deterrence and intelligence as for intervention. In the latter context, they allow for long-range precision strikes and facilitate special operations. France will retain a national design and production capability for nuclear-powered submarines. A European approach should be adopted with respect to all other components of sea power, such as conventionally-powered submarines or surface ships.

Air

The credibility of the airborne nuclear component depends on a national capability to develop a fighter aircraft programme and carry out the necessary adaptation of its systems for its nuclear mission.

However, as fighter aircraft programmes are reduced in scope and extended in time, all European actors in this field will be faced, sooner or later, with the prospect of dwindling competencies, and how best to protect them.

The British government has indicated officially in its Defence Industrial Strategy that it has no plans to maintain the full range of skills required to develop and produce the next generation of combat aircraft. The United Kingdom, alongside other European countries, is involved in the U.S. Joint Strike Fighter (Joint Combat Aircraft) programme.

France will support the emergence of a full-capability European aircraft manufacturer capable of designing future combat platforms, manned or unmanned.

France will contribute actively to the implementation of a strategy, both national and European, for the design, production or acquisition of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), for surveillance or combat.

Land

France will support the emergence of an integrated European industrial capability for land equipment, including production of ammunition.

Missiles

Missiles in general and cruise missiles in particular, are critical components of our intervention capability.

France will ensure the continued existence of European capabilities in this sector, based on Franco-British co-operation, with the proviso that core national competencies will be maintained, in particular all those pertaining to the airborne nuclear component.

Information systems security

Increasing threats to our information systems and networks call for robust national capabilities to develop a full range of security products, including high-level encryption. At present, these capabilities are insufficient in scope and excessively fragmented.

France will launch and support an industrial strategy leading to a significant increase in national design and production capabilities in the field of information system security.

Defence electronics

The defence electronics technological and industrial base in France and in Europe is highly fragmented. In order to establish a more balanced relationship with countries which impose their own national regulations in this field, foremost among them the United States with its ITAR regulations, France will support a European approach conducive to the emergence of a European industrial base. The objective is to preclude situations of critical dependency which effectively impose increasing restraints on our ability to export freely.

**AN INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY EXTENDING
TO ALL SECTORS OF SECURITY**

All agencies involved in National Security are confronted to shared technological problems, and only a joint approach is capable of producing synergies. Pursuing separate approaches could result in duplication of effort and pose a threat to equipment interoperability.

This is true of systems used in communication and crisis management, maritime protection, border surveillance, biometric identification of individuals, CRBN detection, information systems security, drones and intelligence systems in general.

While some progress has been made in recent years, the process must be taken forward by creating closer links between those working in the public security and civil security structures (police, *Gendarmerie*, civil security, Customs, etc.) and Ministry of Defence departments.

Technology watch should be pooled, as should detection and concerted monitoring of the most significant companies. In addition, every effort will be made to harmonise expressions of security needs as far as possible, and to pool equipment development and procurement.

The strategic role of research

In today's world, an active research policy provides the means of mastering defence system technologies, preparing the technological responses to medium and long-term operational needs, and identifying the disruptive technologies of the future. Significant effort will be devoted to space technology to pave the way for future telecommunications, observation and surveillance programmes, in view of the priority placed on the knowledge and anticipation strategic function.

Developing research also helps to maintain over time core competencies threatened by defence equipment procurement and life cycles, where phases of mass production alternate with phases of technological development. Since the last Military Programme Bill, France has moved into a period characterised by the completion of development and the ramping up of production on most of our major programmes (Rafale, Tiger, NH90, A400M, VBCI/AICV, ASMPA, Meteor, Horizon, M51, SSBN, Helios 2, Syracuse 3, etc) and, as a corollary, a reduction in the budgets allocated to defence and security research. This means that an extra effort will need to be made in research and technology (R&T) in the years ahead, to avoid seeing vital technological capabilities abandoned. The State will therefore implement a policy of maintaining core competencies, in R&T and engineering design as well as in industrialisation. This policy will encompass the production of technological demonstrators.

POOLING DEFENCE AND SECURITY RESEARCH EFFORTS

The efficiency of the national research effort will be increased by *pooling defence and security research efforts*. Without setting up new

structures, synergies between security and defence R&T programmes will be strengthened through inter-ministerial co-ordination.

Defence and security R&T oversight within the Ministry of Defence will be reinforced. The Ministry of the Interior will be given extra powers to guide and assess defence and security research.

The Ministry of the Interior will establish a dialogue with all those involved in security through a council on Economic and Scientific Security, made up of the main research bodies, security operators, industrial suppliers of technical solutions and representatives of the Ministries of Defence and Research.

PROMOTING SYNERGIES BETWEEN CIVIL RESEARCH AND DEFENCE AND SECURITY RESEARCH

France and Europe must encourage synergies between civil research and defence and security research. 60% of the research financed by the Ministry of Defence has spin-off applications in the civil sector, compared to just 20% in the opposite direction.

The Ministries of the Interior and Defence will thus need to intensify their relations with the major government, industrial and university research facilities, but also with smaller laboratories. They will need to be represented at the highest level in the National Research Agency (ANR). The volume of calls for projects from Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence partnerships will need to be increased.

Dual-use civil and military technology programmes will play a bigger part in ANR annual programming. The Ministry of Defence "dual research" budget programme will be more clearly directed towards fundamental defence and security research. Rather than being considered in the light of a subsidy, as at present, it will be used as funding for identified projects.

SUPPORTING THE MOST INNOVATIVE SMALL FIRMS

Supporting small firms, which are at least as dynamic as major groups when it comes to innovation, also makes a direct contribution to reinforcing research. France will create more openings for such firms to access the defence market and will encourage the leading defence and security groups to join forces with the most innovative small firms.

POOLING RESEARCH EFFORTS AT EUROPEAN LEVEL

The European framework also offers an opportunity to unify R&T efforts. The European Defence Agency (EDA) will be the spearhead of this ambition. Based on identification of common needs for all the Member States, the EDA will be called upon to identify key technolog-

Some of the technological and scientific breakthroughs predicted by 2020-2030

- **Robotics and cognitive systems:** drones, autonomous vehicles, automatic analysis systems to detect unusual events;
- **New functional materials:** materials for penetrating weapons designed to destroy hardened targets; combat troop and light vehicle protective materials (liquid armour); energetic materials to concentrate power and onboard energy in order to increase system autonomy in theatres of operations; new electromagnetic, optical and acoustic stealth materials; new energetic materials for the propulsion of hypersonic missiles;
- **New active detection technologies** (TeraHerz radar, broadband pulse radar or lasers): these technologies, expected to be available by 2020-2030, will make it possible to detect targets through or behind obstacles (urban combat) and identify substances through partitions or clothing (detection of IEDs, biological or chemical agents);
- **Directed-energy transmitters** (microwaves and high-powered lasers): expected to become available by 2020-2030, these transmitters could be used for neutralising terrorist threats, jamming or damaging infrared sensors, pinpoint destruction of moving targets or stealth communication systems;
- **Nanobiotechnology cell therapy:** expected to be available by 2025 or thereabouts, this technology will be used to repair cell tissue damaged by burns, radiation or trauma, and enable injured combat troops to recover;
- **Quantum computing:** available by 2030 at the earliest, if it proves viable, this technology could be applicable to information systems security;
- **New information processing techniques:** confrontation of information (multilingual, hybrid, etc.) derived from the Internet, databases, sensors (semantic web, multimedia content analysis);
- **Time reversal signal processing and noise analysis techniques,** currently at the fundamental research stage, are not expected to be available before 2030. They should significantly improve detection of super-stealth targets or the ability to destroy transmitters. They should also significantly enhance sensor performance by improving signal processing.

ical capabilities and develop a strategy to bring them to maturity. France will submit challenging projects to the EDA, and is favourably disposed towards a significant increase in its own R&T budget. Closer links with technical research in the defence and security fields must be reflected at the European level by significantly closer co-operation between the EDA, on defence research, and the European Commission (security research).

A new partnership between the defence industry and the State

State procurement of defence equipment is of a very different nature from the purchasing carried out by a commercial company. The quest for technological superiority involves equipping our forces with systems that generally require specific developments demanding cutting-edge technology and short production runs. There is practically no market for such equipment beyond the orders placed by a limited number of States. In turn, these States deal with a very limited number of suppliers who are therefore largely dependent on the choices and obligations imposed upon them. In the circumstances, the most effective lever on industrial strategy is government contracting and procurement policy, and it operates in every programme phase, from upstream planning to withdrawal from service.

MORE EFFICIENT PROCUREMENT

The State must be in a position to publish its long-term procurement strategies, enabling companies to consolidate and position themselves on the world market. In developing these strategies, as in pursuing efficiency in the procurement process, the State will therefore need to develop *robust technical and economic expertise*, backed up by extensive knowledge of industrial resources.

Only by so doing will the State be in a position to evaluate the economic and technical validity of proposals from its suppliers and arrive at decisions which fall within the limits set by the overall strategy of public finances.

Controlling the life-cycle cost of equipment

In the interests of more efficient procurement, the State will create the conditions for real control of life-cycle cost through equipment life cycles.

Only by knowing the life-cycle cost is it possible to make an even-handed assessment of the various industrial solutions offered in response to an operational need, and to measure the impact that decisions will have over a period of years. It is essential, for both industrial policy and for financial control of defence spending, that the ministries should acquire methods of scheduling over time the full costs of the equipment and capabilities they intend to acquire.

This approach must also enable France to make maximum use, to a far greater extent than at present, of the potential offered by *public-private partnerships* (PPP). These are based on optimised sharing of responsibilities and risks between the public and the private partners. Once their operational and economic value has been demonstrated, they should pave the way for better control of the total life-cycle cost of infrastructure or equipments, particularly in the *dual-use fields* of training, telecommunications, rear echelon logistics, support—in particular maintenance of operational serviceability—or infrastructure.

Improving the management of arms programmes

Analysis of arms procurement programmes reveals a number of cases of serious shortcomings, resulting in cost escalations, missed deadlines and sometimes even performance shortfalls. The management of arms programmes will be entirely overhauled.

Investment launch and financial planning procedures must be made much more rigorous. The Ministry of the Budget and the Ministry of the Economy must in the future be closely associated in the decision-making process.

Under the new Ministry of Defence organisation, a programme will be designed, prepared and executed by *a single dedicated team, headed by a programme manager appointed for the duration of the programme*. The programme team will systematically include an officer responsible for evaluating the operational need (from the Defence Staff), an engineer responsible for technical, industrial and economic expertise (DGA) and a budget and finance expert (SGA). Specific provisions for nuclear arms programmes will be continued, in view of the particular role of the *Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique* (CEA), the French atomic energy commission.

The life-cycle cost of equipment

The acquisition of security equipment involves a long-term commitment by the State. The costs incurred over the frequently lengthy equipment service lives involved are not limited to the cost of acquisition alone. To this must be added:

- operating costs: pay and social security charges for equipment operators, consumables such as fuel, etc.;
- sustainment costs: equipment maintenance and repair, operator training, etc.;
- cost of upgrading and modernising equipment;
- decommissioning costs: dismantling and recycling in accordance with environmental standards.

As an illustration, the sustainment cost of a combat vessel, which may have a service life of over thirty years, may eventually amount to as much as its acquisition cost. The same applies to its operating costs. Over the vessel's lifetime, therefore, and excluding the costs of decommissioning, the State must schedule total spending representing several times the acquisition cost of the vessel.

In order to control cost of ownership, equipment design must be optimised in terms of not only its acquisition cost, but also of all the other elements that go to make up cost of ownership.

Bringing the Ministry's entire central administration together at a single site will facilitate the work of the teams.

To ensure that the armed forces assume full accountability for the *operational need* and the strategy proposed as best meeting those needs, during the definition and design phases of weapons systems the programme team will be placed *under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff*, who will act as the contracting authority for the programme *up to the point of contract negotiation* and will submit to the Minister all decisions to be made during these phases¹. Before making a decision, the Minister will, through the ministerial investment committee (see Chapter 15), examine all the relevant information on which to assess the pertinence and respective merits of the solutions proposed, in terms of performance, cost of acquisition and life-cycle cost, co-operation issues, industrial impact, and procurement strategy (use of public-private partnership, asset acquisition), etc.

1. Here refers to those phases which, under the present organisation of arms programmes management, cover the preparation phase and part of the design phase, up to the point of launching *negotiations with the defence contractor*.

Reinforcing technical, economic and financial control of arms programmes

Under the current Ministry of Defence organisation, the follow-up of investment programmes is handled by a large number of different units, none of which have an overview of the situation. The following steps will be taken to remedy the position:

— **Ministry of Defence economic and financial analysis capabilities will be strengthened.** A revised structure will be introduced. Backed by enhanced financial expertise within the Ministry as a whole, and by the creation of a single central hub under the authority of the Ministry's Financial Affairs Directorate, the new structure will provide more reliable financial data and allow for better evaluation, starting from the early stages of programmes, of the life-cycle cost of equipment—a factor as yet little known or mastered. It will also provide a systematic analysis of the potential interest of a public-private partnership.

— **A ministerial investment committee will be set up** (see Chapter 15). Its task will be to rationalise investment-related processes and thus equip the Minister of Defence with the tools to exercise the full scope of his responsibilities throughout the life of arms procurement programmes.

— **A single common programme reference system will be set up**, shared by all the Minister of Defence's main subordinates. This reference system will contain both financial data and the physical content of arms programmes.

— **The Ministry of the Budget will be better informed** regarding the financial needs of arms programmes, both before and after launch. As part of this process, the Ministry will receive regular updated copies of the common programme reference system; in addition, representatives of the Ministry will sit on the Finance Committee (see Chapter 15).

— **The programme estimate** will gradually be consolidated. The estimate for a programme will be refined as and when the preparatory work advances and not until it is put into execution will the estimate be finalised and tied to a precise calendar and content.

— **The State will retain adequate technical expertise.** This expertise is essential for the evaluation of programmes and solutions put forward in response to operational needs; it also serves to sustain and support military systems, which are constantly subject to the hazards of operations and training exercises and must regularly incorporate new technology and undergo renovation.

In the contract negotiation phase, the programme team will come under the authority of the director for procurement (DGA), which takes over as contracting authority when preparing and negotiating the

contract. At the end of this intermediate phase, the decision to launch programme execution will be taken by the Minister, on DGA recommendation, *after taking advice from the Chief of the Defence Staff*, on the basis of a file that includes the outcome of negotiations with the industry.

During the execution phase, the programme team will remain *under DGA authority*. During this phase, the Chief of the Defence Staff will be involved in all changes, regarding the estimate, technical aspects or calendar, likely to affect satisfaction of the operational requirement.

During the deployment phase, i.e. once the equipment has gone into service with the armed forces, the team will once again come *under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff*.

The respective *responsibilities* of the Chief of the Defence Staff and the DGA *will thus be clearly defined* during every phase of the programme. In fulfilling these responsibilities, each will rely on a single team that will have a complete overview of the life of the programme. In each major phase, the Minister will take decisions based on their proposals and on the deliberations of the ministerial investment committee.

Equipping the State with more responsive and flexible procurement capabilities

France will need to introduce a far more reactive procurement strategy and capabilities, which will mean adapting the State's decision-making processes and involving defence contractors far more closely.

The needs of the armed forces are changing at an ever-increasing pace. Lead times between the expression of an operational need and the equipment coming into service must be reduced. The procurement of security equipment must also be made as reactive as possible, to keep abreast of the rapid developments in criminal activities and methods.

Certain rules of public procurement, as they stand, are a hindrance to the development of innovative and reactive procurement processes. These rules will need to change. The Code des Marchés Publics (procurement contract code) will have to allow for the possibility of specific stipulations as part of the procurement of especially innovative and complex equipment or services. It must also facilitate co-design with manufacturers. In particular, readier access must be available to modern resources such as the Laboratoire technico-opérationnel (LTO), a joint Ministry of Defence and industry capability analysis environment.

More responsive procurement capabilities

Procurement cycles must be made shorter, in particular by:

- *adaptation of expressions of operational requirement* based more closely on experience feedback;
- *speedier process of formulating concepts* and commitment doctrines, using the possibilities offered by simulation and experimentation;
- *targeted technological experimentation*, to assess the suitability of “off the shelf” products or technologies available;
- *a phased approach*, giving rapid access to an initial operational capability and postponing to a later stage whatever improvements may be needed in the light of feedback;
- *greater dialogue with European and foreign partners* on subjects identified as priorities, with a view to pooling efforts and, in later phases, laying the foundations for future R&T co-operation.

MODERNISING MAINTENANCE OF OPERATIONAL SERVICEABILITY

Maintenance of operational serviceability has a direct influence on force availability and commitment. Its effectiveness needs to be significantly increased and modernised, by speeding up the process of transferring industrial project management from the State to companies.

Maintenance of operational serviceability using *internal resources must be strictly limited* to work that could not be carried out safely or promptly enough by an industrial firm. The industrial resources of the State will be particularly useful in guaranteeing continued serviceability of ageing equipment.

The traditional sequential approach (manufacture by industry previously owned by the State, maintenance by the State, midlife renovation, decommissioning) is often obsolete. Maintenance of operational serviceability should provide for simultaneous maintenance and development of equipment to keep pace with advances in technology, from the moment the first items are brought into service. Processes will need to be decompartmentalised, particularly as regards the procurement of spare parts, technical expertise, fleet management and equipment development.

Relations between the State and companies will need to be put on a new footing. Companies will benefit from a long-term view of their future workload schedules, helping them to retain core competencies.

The State must possess the *competencies* and expertise necessary to identify potential partnerships with companies.

The success of this partnership policy will depend on the overall accountability of the companies involved in maintenance of operational serviceability. It will entail the use of *service contracts, based on performance bonds, with stipulations of availability*, operating hours or other performance indicators directly linked to operational utility, coupled with adequate incentives.

The new approach will also depend on greater consistency, within the Ministry of Defence, between the equipment procurement process and the serviceability sustainment process.

The integrated support structures (SSF, the fleet support department for naval equipment, and SIMMAD, the integrated structure for maintenance of aeronautical defence equipment) will continue as part of the armed forces during the coming phase. They will be required to integrate their work more closely with that of the DGA, throughout programme life. This enhanced integration will result in stronger negotiating positions with companies, optimised use of specific human resources in terms of procurement and technical expertise, and greater control over total life-cycle cost.

The integrated programme teams (which includes a service sustainment specialist) will see their responsibilities gradually extended to the deployment and decommissioning phases.

BOOSTING EXPORTS

France is a major player on the international arms market and exports are a key component in the country's industrial strategy. Exports allow for longer production runs and help to reduce or at least limit the unit cost of equipment ordered by the State. Exporting companies are less dependent on the national market, while maintaining their competencies nonetheless.


The international market is extremely challenging at present as a result of the emergence of new exporting countries, and so calls for a government policy of resolute support for the industry. Strict rules must be obeyed, however, to avoid breaching national and international standards governing such support.

France's policy will be founded on three principles:

- *ensuring at every level of Government administration—inter-ministerial and ministerial—the separation of control functions and export support functions* that guarantees against any conflict of interest;

- pursuing rigour and rationalisation of our *control procedures* (see box);

- *boosting arms exports* by providing added support to industry, in respect of pre-approved operations (see box), but always strictly within the rules shared with our European and international partners.



Source: Report to Parliament and official data from the Ministry of Defence/DGA.

In the matter of export controls, efforts will continue to simplify and rank procedures by importance, with particular emphasis on reducing application processing times. Controls on transfers between European countries engaged in co-operation programmes should be abolished.

Since many types of equipment may have both civil and military applications, a more rigorous treatment of controls on the export of dual-use items will be introduced, adopting an organisation and procedures akin to those applying to export controls on weapons and military equipment. France will also introduce legislation on arms dealing. Furthermore, France actively supports the international arms trade treaty under discussion by the United Nations.

In the nuclear field, the main policy guidelines on exports are laid down by the Nuclear Policy Council.

In support of exports, France will promote the presence of French firms and their products and services on export markets.

Government action in the field of exports must be co-ordinated to ensure that export markets are systematically presented with a *global offering*, i.e. from definition of need all the way through to assistance with maintenance of exported equipment. In some instances, the State

may play a part in the transaction, along similar lines to the United States. France will also exploit the opportunities offered by the second-hand military equipment market.

Export prospects will be taken into consideration from the preparation phase of equipment programmes.

France and Europe will also need to strengthen their influence on standardisation. This could provide a lever for placing European technology in a strong position, *via* standards, on markets with strong export potential.

Finally, France will work alongside its European partners on establishing the conditions for healthy and fair competition. France is a signatory to the 1997 OECD Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions. There are disparities, sometimes significant, in the application of the Convention's provisions by signatory countries, however. These discrepancies penalise France and Europe on export markets.

Government support mechanisms for pre-approved arms exports

The government support mechanism for pre-approved arms exports is inter-ministerial. Ministry of Defence departments play an important role, both at central administrative level and abroad, through the network of defence and military attachés. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Economy are also involved.

The creation of a *Commission for Inter-Ministerial support to major contracts* reflects the determination of the State to optimise and energise the government support mechanism for pre-approved arms exports. Chaired by the director of the office of the Prime Minister, the commission brings together representatives of all the competent agencies tasked with deciding on the means required to enable the State to support the most important projects. Where arms are concerned, the commission acts within the framework of the strategic defence exports support plan, which sets the State's medium-term objectives and priorities, both geographic and sectoral.

Controlling arms exports

Arms export controls are designed to meet three necessities:

- *national security*, in order to guarantee the protection of our own forces and those of our partners, when engaged in operations;
- *political and legal*, in order to guarantee fulfilment of France's international commitments: European Code of Conduct on arms exports, Wassenaar arrangement, international anti-proliferation conventions, UN and European Union embargoes;
- *economic and industrial*, to retain control over transfers of the most sensitive technologies.

The French system for controlling the export of war materials and similar items is based on the general principles of:

- *prohibition*, except as authorised by government; this principle, warranted by the particular nature of the arms trade, is legislative in nature (art. L 2335-2 and 3 of the Defence Code);
- *inter-ministerial consultation*: export control is implemented under the responsibility of the Prime Minister.

An export operation requires two successive licences. The first is a pre-approval, which authorises the manufacturer to present the equipment to potential customers and take orders; the second, the export licence for war materials, is required before the materials can leave France for transfer to the client in the country of destination. This procedure is established by the decree of 2 November 1992 on the import, export and transfer of war materials, weapons and munitions and similar items.

Pre-approval is given by the Prime Minister after consulting the Commission interministérielle pour l'étude des exportations de matériels de guerre (CIEEMG, the inter-ministerial arms exports review committee). The commission is chaired by the Secretary General for National Defence (SGDN), and is made up of representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. It assesses export projects according to operational, political, ethical, economic and industrial criteria. Where necessary, its recommendations are accompanied by caveats, such as insisting on the inclusion in the contract of a "no re-export" clause, under which the buyer undertakes not to sell or transfer the equipment or spare parts covered by the contract to any third party, without the prior approval of the French authorities.

The export licence is issued by the Minister responsible for the Customs service, after review by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, and the Secretary General for National Defence.

DEVELOPING A LOGIC OF INFLUENCE

Building a European defence industry may require a change in the relations between the State and the industry. The State will evolve as necessary away from a logic of actual ownership of industrial facilities to one of influence over the actions of industrial operators. The State has many ways of exerting direct influence over the strategic orientations of the companies it purchases from, the most important of these being the volume of business it represents, the introduction of public-private partnerships, or the institutional support it provides.

In common with a number of European countries, France has established a mechanism for controlling inward investment in eleven "protected" economic sectors. The mechanism can be used to oppose a foreign takeover of a French company holding strategic assets, or to impose conditions to protect France's security interests.

Together, these capabilities will enable the State to steer corporate developments and watch over the interests of national security in this particular sector of industry.

Inward investment: eleven sectors of activity subject to prior authorisation

The eleven sectors of activity in which inward investment is subject to prior authorisation by the Ministry of the Interior are:

- 1° gambling;
- 2° private security;
- 3° research and development or production of means of dealing with terrorist chemical or biological attack;
- 4° equipment designed for the interception of correspondence and remote detection of conversations;
- 5° assessment of the security offered by information technology products and systems;
- 6° information system security of a company operating in sectors of strategic national importance ;
- 7° dual-use (civil and military) goods and technologies;
- 8° cryptology tools and services;
- 9° activities by companies carrying out secret defence work;
- 10° research, production and trade in war materials;
- 11° equipment research and supply on behalf of the Ministry of Defence.

CHAPTER 17

FINANCING THE STRATEGY

The funding of France's national security must be consistent with its analysis of its security interests, the risks France faces, and the definition of the necessary assets to confront those risks and prevail.

To be credible, the financial effort must also make allowance for a context that is particularly difficult. The high level of requirements contrasts with tight financial resources in the short term, as entailed by the need to restore the public finances.

Mechanisms must be established to improve the planning of future expenditures and to boost their effectiveness, drawing lessons from past budgetary experience.

Redefining the Nation's defence effort

DEFENCE SPENDING IN 2008

The professionalisation of the armed forces decided in 1996 was based on model force goals for the year 2015, to be attained through three successive multiyear Military Programme Acts (*lois de programmation militaire*, LPMs). In 2007, the Ministry of Defence considered that the equipment requirements to be financed in order to achieve this model would require an additional 6 billion Euros per year on average over six years starting in 2009, compared to the 2008 allocation. This amount would have corresponded to a 40% increase in annual spending for research, equipment maintenance and procurement, representing 15.6 billion Euros for 2008.

This situation has several causes.

The first two LPMs for 1997-2002 and 2003-2008 were insufficient to finance investments at the planned level.

The resources actually available over the period 1997-2002 were considerably less than the amount provide for in the programme, firstly because the allocations in the initial (yearly) budget were less than the annual amounts expected, and secondly as a result of the budget's implementation (due to inter-ministerial redeployment and the financing of overseas operations). The estimated gap is approximately 13 billion Euros, which is close to the total annual allocation for each of the six years covered by the LPM. This has led to programme cancellations, lowering of targets and the postponement of equipment deliveries. Equipment and infrastructure maintenance and procurement of ammunition have been hard hit by the lack of funding.

During the period 2003-2008, although budgets were higher than during the previous period, appropriations included in the annual budgets were much closer to the amounts provided for in the LPM. The total gap at the end of the period was slightly more than 1 billion Euros, out of a total of 88 billion Euros.

In spite of this, it was not possible to finance equipment expenditures as planned because their true cost had not been properly assessed at the time of their initial programming. This applies to the launching of new programmes, maintenance of equipment in operational condition and the costs of ongoing programmes.


The budget outturn over the two periods also contained spending not provided for in the two Programme Acts. In the case of overseas operations, starting in 2005, provisions to cover the additional costs over and beyond the initial budget gradually cushioned the impact of credit cancellations during the year resulting from inclusion of the cost of these operations. Yet this procedure was not abandoned entirely, due in particular to the total cost of such operations.

N.B.: The share of additional costs borne by the Ministry of Defence and financed under equipment expenditures has evolved as follows: (cf. table below):

**Share of additional foreign operations costs covered
by procurement budget**

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total
% of total foreign operations costs	82%	62%	73%	71%	68%			78%	31%	45%	
In current M€	261	429	364	374	460	0	0	429	184	310	2,811

Foreign operations (OPEX)
Change in additional costs from 1998 to 2008
(M€)



* Assessment as of may 15, 2008, including Afghanistan
Source: Ministry of Defence

As a result, and taking account of all of the above factors, there is a gap of approximately 24 billion Euros between credits and resources corresponding to the physical goals of the two bills.

The effect of this has been to delay equipment renewal and to prolong the design, development and manufacturing phases. Lastly, many programmes were postponed to 2009 and later years, i.e. beyond the period covered by a pre-defined LPM. As regards the operational aspect, old equipment has remained in use with the corresponding aggravation of problems of repair and maintenance. The phasing-in of new generation equipment that had been envisioned to reach the 2015 format has been disrupted by successive postponements, creating a bottleneck.

During the same time frame, there has been no reduction in the Ministry's administrative staff, or in expenditures on personnel and operating costs. The 2003-2008 LPM provided for a staff increase of around 10,000. About 5,000 armed forces jobs were eliminated between 2003 and 2007. Yet Ministry of Defence staffing levels remained stable at about 430,000 civil servants and military personnel. The Internal Security Programme Act (*loi d'orientation et de programmation pour la sécurité intérieure*, LOPSI) created 6,500 new positions in the *Gendarmerie*. The professionalisation of the armed forces was accompanied by a financial effort to improve military personnel living standards. In total, between 2003 and 2007, payroll and operating costs have risen by about 4%: in other words, at an average pace close to that of procurement. Given this situation, unexpected expenses were paid for out of funds initially earmarked for new equipment, with the result that a rising proportion of the inventory is ageing.

The cost of renewing old equipment and the simultaneous rise in other defence spending, as planned at the end of the 2003-2008 period, was creating an increasingly perilous financial situation, to say the least.

THE GENERAL BUDGETARY STRATEGY

The Government's general financial strategy was announced in the initial draft budget bill for 2008 and the stability programme commitments communicated to France's European partners.

This strategy aims to achieve a balanced budget at the end of the 2009-2012 time frame, limiting the rise in total civil service expenditure to 1.1% per year. This represents a considerable effort, given the average annual growth rate of 2.25% over the last ten years. Every component of public spending is expected to contribute to this goal.

Central government expenditure, which now includes revenue transfers to the regions and the European Union, is to remain stable in volume; this means that the annual increase will merely compensate for inflation. Among these expenditures, the compulsory charges for pensions and the debt repayment are tending to rise, given the annual increase in the total public debt, rising interest rates and large numbers of people taking retirement.

Given this situation, all central government expenditures other than pensions, debt and revenue transfers, must necessarily remain constant in value during the 2009-2012 time frame, i.e. they must be carried over for exactly the same amounts with no compensation for inflation.

The Government will impose much tighter cost controls than in the past. This will apply to all ministries and to all categories of expenditures, including operating expenditures, staff, intervention, and investment costs.

DECISIONS TAKEN

Spending on defence will continue to be a major priority for France. In financial terms, defence will remain the number two central government budget, just behind education (excluding compulsory debt servicing charges).

The budget of the "Defence Mission" amounted to 36.8 billion Euros in 2008 and consisted of:

2008 "Defence Mission" Budget¹ (In 2008 Euros billion)

Salaries	11.6
Maintenance of equipment	3.4
Research and Technology	0.9
Other operating expenses	3.5
Investment	10.5
Subsidies and international contributions	0.2
Pensions	6.7

1. These amounts apply only to credits of the Defence Mission budget in keeping with the Constitutional Bylaw on Budget Acts, and not to total expenditures of the Ministry, which come under Security in the case of the *Gendarmerie*, Veterans, National Memorials and Remembrance Policy, and Research and Higher Education as well as for the Ministry's contribution to the civilian research budget.

During the initial phase, the defence effort will consist in maintaining annual resources in absolute terms, excluding pensions, *i.e.*, compensating for the effects of inflation. Then during a second phase, starting in 2012, this effort will rise at a pace of 1% per year in volume, *i.e.*, on top of inflation.

According to today's budget resource projections, this means a total of 183 billion Euros (2008) excluding pensions, over the next six years, and 377 billion Euros over twelve years. The annual allocation excluding pensions will thus increase from 30.2 billion Euros in 2008 to about 33 billion Euros in 2020. (Expressed in 2008 Euros).

Maintaining and then increasing the volume of defence spending represents a major effort on the part of the nation in the coming years by comparison with other areas of public spending. The "Defence Mission" budget will represent an exception to the general rule of carrying over the central government budget in current Euros with no adjustment for inflation.

This financial commitment is necessary in order to achieve the national security targets described here and to furnish the armed forces with the assets required to perform their mission. As a result, the share of defence in public spending will remain stable or even increase. This decision is consistent with France's repeated determination to see Europeans ensure their own defence and to revive the forward momentum of the European Union in the area of defence and security.

The restructuring and reform of the Ministry of Defence will match the financial effort being made by the nation, giving rise to capabilities and a format that are both sustainable and consistent. The aim is to increase the share of investment and maintenance within the overall budget.

The entire process will entail a reapportionment of defence resources among their different applications.

The strategic options presented here will result in an increase or stabilisation of financing for certain equipment expenditures, e.g. knowledge and anticipation, deterrence, protection against new risks, including the fight against cyber-risks, armed forces protection, maintenance in operating condition and exploratory research. It also leads to contracting or reorienting the operational force objectives for prevention and intervention (See Part III—Chapter 13). A number of weapons programmes will be redefined, equipment and staff will be shared among several functions or else reduced, for example the existing fighter aircraft fleets or first rate frigates.

Besides, potential savings in logistics and administrative support identified during the overall review of public policies will lead to sig-

nificant staff reorganisation and streamlining over a period of six or seven years. All of this will result in a reduction of 54,000 jobs in the Ministry of the Defence, with 46,500 for the armed forces and 7,500 for civilian and military personnel in the various divisions of the Ministry (in the Armament Procurement Directorate and the Secretariat General of the Administration). These reductions will be accompanied by specific measures for personnel (See Chapter 14.). The resulting savings from restructuring will be fully reinvested in defence; this is justified both by the security challenges facing the nation and the scope of the restructuring effort.

The balance of defence spending will thus be shifted in favour of investment. Provided the reorganisation takes place as planned, the funds available each year for procurement under the next two programmes bills will be much higher than the annual allocations during the previous two LPMs. The annual allocation for investments was 13.8 billion Euros in 1997-2002 and 15.5 billion Euros in 2003-2008. On a like-for-like basis, after completion of the restructuring, investment will reach an average of 18 billion Euros in the years 2009-2020 (in constant 2008 Euros). These amounts will finance new equipment, major programmes as well as operational enablers, and also maintenance. The aim is to achieve better value for money for the nation.

Nonetheless, the initial phase of restructuring calls for specific resources. Such provisions apply to personnel (see Chapter 14) and support for local economies, facilitating projects to compensate for the loss of military units or facilities. Economic support for local authorities will be one of the keys to winning public support for restructuring of the armed forces and to its success. This requires setting up an appropriate body managed by the Inter-Ministerial Delegation for Regional Planning and Competitiveness (*délégation inter-ministérielle à l'aménagement et à la compétitivité du territoire*) under the aegis of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Defence Delegation for Restructuring (*délégation aux restructurations*). At the local level, committees for the administrative areas concerned will be set up under the authority of the Prefects. Concrete measures will facilitate property disposals and financing for new economic activities.

The overall defence effort is designed both to modernise our forces and to improve living conditions and training for their personnel. Its impact should be clearly felt in three to four years.

How domestic security will contribute to National Security

The first LOPSI provided for a considerable increase in resources for the police and the *Gendarmerie* in terms of both equipment and staff.

In the forthcoming period, financing allocated to the Ministry of the Interior to play its role in the new National Security strategy will be increased to the appropriate level, based on analysis of threats and needs. They will be made available by internal reform and redeployment of assets.

For the Interior Ministry, the capabilities contributing to national security and which must be an investment priority for it, notably concern intelligence, crisis management facilities and procedures, population alert and information, management and treatment of nuclear, chemical, biological risks, the fight against terrorism, and the reinforcement of personnel and equipment in certain zones (for example overseas, which will benefit from specific financial conditions).

The corresponding amounts represent approximately 300 to 400 million Euros in investment by the State in the next five years. This includes in particular 80 million Euros for modernisation of the population alert network, and 220 million Euros for the improvement of CRBN risk prevention (joint training centre, personnel protection gear, mobile detection and identification facilities, decontamination units, etc.).

These targeted efforts will notably focus on investment spending by the Ministry of the Interior. Allocations will be included in the LOPSI to be implemented from 2009 onwards.

In addition, responsibility for the financing of civil security will continue to be shared between the local authorities and the central government, although the major burden of this spending will be borne by local government. A true partnership will be established in order to achieve the goals of national security and communicate the key points of the new strategy at every level.

Improved management of National Security and defence spending

In most industrialised countries, major public defence and security spending programmes lead to budget overruns. There have also been cases of under-evaluation in France, severely impairing the transparency and predictability of public spending. This adversely affects the operational effectiveness of the armed forces. Also, budgetary adjustments in the course of each financial year can have ripple effects on whole LPMs.

Considerable improvements are necessary in order to preserve the advantages of the multi-year LPMs and better respect the vote of Parliament and facilitate its control.

First of all, the State must not only take account of the purchase price in the procurement process but also, throughout the life-cycle of equipment, operating costs, maintenance and dismantling at end of use (see Chapter 16.)

Ministries will explore all avenues of improvement for the provision of services that also relieve pressure on public resources such as *private-public partnerships*, provided they offer the same quality of service as a State-run operation, in particular for maintenance. The State will make savings wherever possible, also seeking to neutralise the impact of VAT.

Forecast additional spending related to overseas military operations should also be included early in the budgeting process. Improved budgetary planning will preserve the necessary funding for equipment.

A permanent and independent structure will monitor the implementation of decisions and broad policy pertaining to national security, in particular their financial consequences. Economic changes in years to come must not interfere with the orientations designed for implementation over a period of several years. The future General Secretariat of Defence and National Security will perform this control function.

Lastly, multiyear visibility is absolutely necessary in the area of defence, public security and civil security. With that in view, Parliament will vote and monitor a new three-year budget and programmes by sectors.

Nevertheless, given the long-term planning and delivery time frames in military equipment and the implementation of ministerial reforms, the instrument of multi-year Programme Act for each ministry

over six years (LPMs for the Ministry of Defence, LOPSI for the Ministry of Interior) will remain in use. This process will be made more flexible, with a mid-term review to be carried out at the end of four years leading into a new six-year timeframe.

In keeping with the spirit of the Constitutional Bylaw on Budget Acts (*loi organique relative aux lois de finances*, LOLF) adopted in 2001, which provides for management leeway over a sufficient amount of funds, the scope of the ministerial Programme Acts will no longer be limited to investment. It will include the entire public policy concerned (e.g., the “Defence Mission”).

The execution of the Programme Acts and their description both to Parliament and to the general public will be facilitated by their wider scope.

Lastly, the *White Paper will be updated* before each new Programme Act.

Assessing total National Security spending

DEFENCE SPENDING AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS


In international statistics, France’s defence spending is traditionally defined as total spending by the Ministry of Defence, including pensions and the budget of the *Gendarmerie*. This indicator was used in the 1994 Defence *White Paper*.

The definition is wider in scope than the “Defence Mission” budget alone within the meaning of the LOLF since it also includes a portion of the allocations to three other missions: Security; Veterans, Remembrance; and Research and Higher Education.

In almost all of the main European countries the share of GDP devoted to defence thus defined has decreased regularly since the end of the Cold War. Between 1984 and 2007, the French budget share decreased from 4% to 2.4% of GDP—at the time of the 1994 *White Paper* it represented 3.38%. The German defence budget went from 3.2% to 1.3%, the British defence budget from 5.2% to 2.3%, the Spanish budget from 2.4% to 1.2%. The Italian defence budget is the only one to remain relatively stable at around 2%.


This drop in the share of GDP has gone hand in hand with stability or moderate growth in the annual budget in constant terms.

Defence spending trends in Europe in % of GDP
 (Scope: NATO, *Gendamerie* including pensions, excluding veterans)



Source: NATO.

Defence spending trends – constant prices – base 100: 1990
 (Scope: NATO, *Gendarmerie* including pensions, excluding veterans)



Source: NATO.

Defence spending by European countries

Expressed in purchasing power parity (*) – millions of constant Euros 2007
(NATO nomenclature = defence spending + pensions paid)

	1998	2002	2007
France	41,694	42,281	44,283
United Kingdom	39,875	40,948	45,077
Germany	32,602	33,306	31,430
Italy	27,188	30,377	30,019
Spain	10,779	13,218	14,561

(*) see glossary

Source: NATO-June 2007

Starting in 2008, the financial trend chosen for France's defence effort looking to 2020 will result in a moderate rise of credits each year. It will follow the aggregate trend with respect to national wealth as a share of GDP. The ratio of defence spending to GDP will thus fall from 2.3% in 2008 to about 2% of GDP in 2020, while annual funding in real terms and the share of equipment spending within the defence budget will rise.

Regardless of whether spending is expressed in financial terms or as a share of national wealth, the chosen trendline will place France at the top of the table for defence spending among European countries, alongside the United Kingdom. Those two countries represent 42% of European Union defence spending (2006 data).

However, international comparisons must allow for differences in the structure of national spending. France's overall effort thus results in a lower proportion of spending on equipment and armed forces operating costs than in the UK budget. Excluding the *Gendarmerie* and pensions, the British budget represents a purchasing power of several billion Euros more than France in these areas.

Breakdown of 2007 Defence Spending by category				
in %	Personnel excl. pensions	Pensions	Procurement	Functioning costs and other
France	35.80	20.10	22.40	21.70
Germany	39.30	17.40	15.30	28.10
United Kingdom	35.60	5.60	24.10	34.70
Spain	34.60	17.70	22.00	25.70
Italy	55.50	24.10	10.90	9.50

Source: NATO

THE OVERALL NATIONAL SECURITY EFFORT

The overall National Security effort comprises funds allocated to a number of public policies over and beyond defence policy in the strict sense of the term. These are budgeted separately as discrete “missions”. This separation will be maintained to ensure clarity of financial information and performance.

Aside from the Ministries of Defence and Interior, defence and security co-operation is financed within the budget mission identified as France’s “Foreign Action” (*action extérieure de la France*) under the responsibility of the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs. The action of the Secretariat General for National Defence (to become the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security) and the inter-ministerial funds that it manages will remain under the authority of the mission “Direction of Government Action”. (*direction de l’action du gouvernement*).

Accompanying each draft budget, a cross-departmental policy document will be provided for the information of Parliament and the general public. This document will be prepared under the responsibility of the Prime Minister, by the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security, and is to provide a full overview of the action of the State, its results and projects.

CHAPTER 18

RALLYING THE NATION

National support for the defence and security system is the prerequisite for its effectiveness and the legitimacy of the efforts devoted to this policy. Today, the support of French society is essential for the major reforms made necessary by the new international context and the very nature of the risks confronting the nation. The development of a National Security strategy, the redefinition of the format of our armed forces, the capacity of these armed forces to concentrate on the strategic priorities corresponding to potential risks, and the priority given to anticipation and crisis management with all the assets of domestic security and civil security, are major choices which have a substantial impact. The reasons for these choices must be explained to the public in order for them to sign up to the objective.

National support will flow from the certainty that the authorities are doing everything in their power to discharge their essential duty of protecting the independence and freedom of France. The potential risks should not be overstated, but the country should be prepared in case a serious crisis occurs. And people must be made aware that France could be the target of intentional or natural events causing profound disruption to their daily lives. The capacity of the population to deal with these events depends on this awareness.

Confidence in the action of public authorities is therefore crucial. Public opinion needs to be educated and made aware before it can be informed. A greater understanding of defence and security issues will improve the public's ability to weigh events put them in perspective. This requires the existence of a collective memory, one that is shared within French society and, increasingly, across European society at large.

A collective awareness of defence and security challenges

Despite a widespread but diffuse awareness that threats have undergone a change of scale and nature, the instability and unpredictability of today's world are creating a sense that defence and international security issues are hard to understand. Military risks are often seen as remote. Some threats such as terrorism are real and present, yet they elicit a dose of scepticism. At the same time, the growing interpenetration of domestic and external risks reinforces a public concern that potential adversaries have the capacity to bypass traditional defences.

In addition, the full professionalisation of the army may create an impression that defence is now the purview of experts and specialists, imperceptibly widening the gap between the civilian world and the armed forces.

In this context, providing clear information on the national security strategy and defence policy and domestic security to the public at large must be a constant government concern.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Training and educating those who play a key role is a priority, and this applies more specifically to teachers, local elected officials, journalists, reserve soldiers and NGO's and civil society leaders.

Training and education of young people

Our training policy must first concentrate on the future generations of French society. They must be made aware of the main thrust of defence and security policy, since this affects their personal lives as well as the nation's sovereignty and the republican institutions of their country.

The cornerstone of training and educating all young people in the issues of defence and citizenship is a compulsory four-stage 'citizenship initiation' programme (*parcours citoyen*) consisting of: "lessons on defence" as part of the *curriculum* for pupils aged approximately 15 and 17, official registration, one day of information (called *journée d'appel et de préparation à la défense*, JAPD, see insert), and enrolment in the armed forces, which is still a legal possibility¹.

1. By law, national service remains in being. It has merely been "suspended" but could be reinstated if the need arose.

**JAPD: *Journée d'appel et de préparation à la défense*
A mandatory "Defence Preparation Day"**

The JAPD was created in 1998, after compulsory military service was "suspended". This Defence Day is compulsory for both girls and boys between the date of registration - at age 16 - and age 18. Every year an entire age group is called up for one day—approximately 780,000 young people.

The JAPD seeks to raise young people's awareness of their duty to the nation and comprises lectures on the general principles of defence and the assets devoted to defence. Teaching is done by active or reserve military personnel.

This allows the military community to present civilian and military job opportunities within the armed forces. It also includes an introduction to first-aid skills and reading tests to detect illiteracy.

The certificate of attendance issued at the end of the day is a requirement for any official examinations as well as for the driver's licence.

The total cost per day per person was 195 Euros in 2008.

The JAPD will be redesigned to focus on the fundamental mission of raising young people's awareness of the new defence and security challenges.

Only the JAPD has gained any real visibility for the population as a whole, since it affects an entire age group as it reaches the age of 18. This role justifies its confirmation. The JAPD will be overhauled. It will focus on the fundamental mission of raising awareness of the new environment for our defence and security. It will continue to promote and disseminate the values of "responsible citizenship" with attendant rights and duties while, in its new form, emphasising the armed forces as a career opportunity. Professionals will present life in the armed forces and new educational tools will be made available to trainers. The one-day format will be maintained.

Young people will be prepared for the JAPD through the "lessons on defence" for pupils of 15 and 17 years of age. This is currently taught by teachers with little training in this subject and who lack the necessary educational tools. Indeed they do not see the relevance of this part of the curriculum. The introduction of appropriate goals into the mission assigned to school principals will be examined in conjunction with the *Haut Conseil de l'Éducation* (Higher Education Council)¹.

1. The Higher Education Council is an independent advisory body that can be asked by ministerial authorities to express opinions on issues of educational importance.

The reflection on education for the younger generations is an integral part of the reflection on a policy of remembrance and the renewal of commemorative ceremonies. Events and ceremonies need to be redesigned with an eye to giving young people a role, which should contribute to the preservation or emergence of a common defence culture.

Training for local elected officials

Practical knowledge of defence and security-related issues on the part of elected officials must be reinforced, as they play a major role in preserving national cohesion by virtue of their close links with the population.

They are always involved whenever a crisis occurs, and they can both teach and mobilise people. They must be more closely involved in the formulation of local crisis management plans and in all exercises, and they must be familiar with the organisation of the State in times of crisis.

Better recognition must be given to the function of “defence correspondent”, which exists today in almost all French towns. As part of their awareness-raising mission, defence correspondents must report each year to the town council on the actions carried out.

Reforming the defence and security institutes

People from all walks of life, in both the public and private sectors, and the media in particular, must be made aware of National Security-related issues.

Higher-level institutes dealing with defence and security issues (IHEDN, *Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale*, CHEAR, *Centre des Hautes études de l'Armement*, IERSE, *Institut d'Etudes et de Recherche pour la Sécurité des Entreprises*, INHES, *Institut National des Hautes Etudes de Sécurité*) play a key role in training and as an interface between military and police officers and representatives of civil society. They already make a substantial contribution to raising the awareness of professionals in the media and young people.

The mission of the IHEDN (*Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale*), since its founding in 1936, has been to nurture a “spirit of defence”. It has fulfilled this wide-ranging remit through national, regional and youth seminars, and it caters to increasingly varied audiences. In the context of its presently planned reform, it will be called upon to reach out to an even wider array of social and professional categories.

By autumn 2009, these institutions will be reorganised into two poles: defence and foreign affairs on the one hand, and domestic secu-

rity on the other. In their present form as well as in the future configuration as of 2009, they will be called upon to diversify and broaden their scope, both nationally and internationally, and to offer courses adapted to a wide variety of attendees, in particular young people and elected officials.

TOWARDS A NEW CIVILIAN SERVICE

The question of a civilian service is only indirectly related to matters of defence and security. However, this idea is considered attractive due to memories of the former compulsory military draft and the social function it fulfilled.

The current public interest, subject to young people's reactions, in the idea of instituting a civilian service is inseparable from the role played by military service in the past. This historic role is still present in the national consciousness. For more than a century the experience of military service was a sort of initiation ritual (a "rite of passage") and an important element in masculine identity. Over and beyond its initial function, which was primarily military and served to develop the patriotic vision of the "nation in arms" inherited from the French Revolution, military service also played other major social and educational functions. For many young men, "joining the army" was a way to discover the outside world, in particular for young men from rural environments who travelled rarely (if at all). It was also an opportunity to mingle with young people from every social class. Lastly, it was an opportunity to make up for cultural deficiencies not catered for at school: in some cases learning to read and write.

The majority of French people welcomed the suspension of military draft, which had become a source of inequality. The new development did not undermine the positive image of the army, since the armed forces have come to be associated in the public mind with peace-keeping and humanitarian missions. In addition, the lengthening of compulsory schooling, greater travel opportunities and a general widening of young people's social experience have apparently taken over some of the functions provided in the past by the military service. Yet many think these substitutes have not functioned, or at least not as well as one might have hoped. To the contrary, social barriers have been reinforced, something the school system has proved unable to prevent. Social inequality has not increased, despite a widespread misconception, but it comes with new forms of segregation, territorial separation in particular.

The project of a civilian service is an effort to offer a social response to these concerns.

This is a legitimate demand that needs to be taken seriously, alongside the favourable opinions on civilian service. To that end, the Prime minister has mandated Mr. Luc Ferry, as chairman of the council for the analysis of society, to submit recommendations. The challenge lies neither in the financial constraints, however considerable, nor even in the material difficulties in organising such a service. But a civilian service alone will not suffice to solve the major problems mentioned above. Nor can a single homogenous solution deal with the complex challenge of integrating young people into society. Transforming the school system and organising access to the labour market are major targets of government action. In light of these objectives, whichever formula for the civilian service is chosen, we should be careful it does not become a source of disappointment

In addition, a civilian service designed as a foundation for common values and to ensure appropriate social integration can only be meaningful if it is universal and compulsory. That means it will concern 500-600,000 young people per year. It would have to be made compatible with the diversity and demands of school and university programmes leading to the jobs market. To be able to give young people a socially useful mission contributing to their training and integration, this would require that all branches of public administration, civil society at large and the armed forces absorb, train and supervise large numbers of young people every year.

Thus any form of civil service must take account of the actual capacity of the various structures under consideration to absorb these numbers. Young people liable to join a civilian service are entitled to proper material and professional conditions.

A civilian service should cover a body of identifiable, socially valuable public service tasks that young people can present as a worthwhile human and social experience on their CVs. These must imperatively be publicly useful tasks and recognised as such by the community. They should be identified in sectors where all young people, regardless of their social origin and training, could serve a useful purpose, for example: civil protection, emergency relief work, assistance to the elderly, hospital visitors, environmental tasks, community sports activities, etc. The future organisation must avoid discrimination between “prestigious” and “less prestigious” activities, which could lead to counterproductive social and cultural segregation.

These tasks should be offered and organised by diverse and decentralised bodies (local authorities, public administration, public establishments, and recognised civil society organisations), which commit to providing the training and backup based on precise specifications.

Young people should receive compensation for these tasks.

The organisation must be flexible and allow for adjustable schedules.

The practical organisation of this service cannot be provided by one ministry alone and, quite specifically, should not fall within the ambit of the Ministry of Defence due to the essentially civilian nature of the mission. It requires co-operation amongst ministries, public establishments and territorial authorities, which implies some co-ordination between central and regional and academic authorities.

It is of prime importance that young people be able to build upon the experience thus gained as well as the services rendered under the civilian service. A "civilian service booklet", for example, should make it possible to keep track of what each individual has done and would be used to validate the results and obtain recognition (priority enrolment in university courses, professional validation of experience). Lastly, launching the new civilian service should be accompanied by a wide-ranging nation-wide information campaign.

RECOURSE TO VOLUNTEERS

Voluntary activities allow all citizens to engage in active community work for the benefit of their fellow citizens. Members of the Red Cross, of the Civil Protection and of the National Lifeboat Society are daily evidence that many of our citizens are willing to contribute to the general good.

The development of volunteer work in all of its various forms is a general trend that warrants encouragement and organisation. It can assume an important role in the context of national security. Restructuring the citizens' reserve is part of this process.

Since the armed forces became all-professional in 1996, the so-called citizen reserve represents the second component in the military reserve alongside the operational reserve. It is composed of men and women who lack the technical capacity or time to join the operational reserve but who nonetheless want to support the armed forces. They deserve true recognition because they already contribute to national cohesion and resilience.

Although the reserve plays an important role in society, it suffers from lack of visibility and clarity in its assigned goals. The term "reserve" does not reflect the role of this citizen corps, given that it is not expected to reinforce the operational reserve in operations. The creation of a *national security volunteer corps* would better correspond to requirements while taking account of the desire to participate. These volunteers could participate in the training and supervision of the JAPD, be called up in times of crisis and participate in campaigns aimed at raising the profile of the armed forces and other forces and administrations which contribute to National Security. They could also participate as volunteers during national commemorations.

Instruments of Research and “Horizon-scanning”

Investing in advanced research and higher education also contributes to a better understanding by society of the defence and security system. Research and education investments are currently fragmented between several institutions, universities, *Grandes Ecoles* and public research or specialised higher education institutes.

To reorganise this sector effectively, it is necessary to consider all areas of defence and national security-related research: fundamental scientific and the technological research associated with it, along with strategic research and the social and human sciences.

Four areas will be emphasised:

Scientific and technological research

In the “hard sciences” there are already links between the Ministries of Defence and Interior and the main research bodies: universities, public and private research institutions, agencies, both on subjects at the border of knowledge and in areas of direct application for these two ministries (See Chapter 16).

Every financing opportunity must be used with a view to reinforcing and developing co-operation through the establishment of networks, the reinforcement of the dedicated geographical poles and calls for projects by the *Agence Nationale de la Recherche* (National Research Agency, ANR) on targeted priority defence and national security topics.

University research in defence and security-related social sciences

Research in social and human science on defence and security issues is relatively under-represented in university research and does not contribute sufficiently to the construction of a scientific culture in that area. Therefore a better balance must be created alongside scientific and technological research in strategic studies.

Although some training centres deal with defence and security issues and provide the fundamental resources required for expert research, in France there is no autonomous university centre that can compete worldwide in this field with foreign institutions (such as the *National Defence University* in Washington, the *Universität der Bundeswehr* in Germany etc.). Such a situation does not favour the

necessary dialogue and synergy between expert research and human and social science.

It is therefore urgent to establish a multi-disciplinary, high quality university centre that could be recognised as such and that would federate the existing research capabilities.

Setting up such an academic centre in human and social sciences should enable better inter-disciplinary study of the issues relating to the military field of endeavour, war as a phenomenon and new forms of violence in the contemporary world. Dialogue and interaction must be facilitated between strategic studies and the research in history, sociology, anthropology, political science, law, psychology and psychopathology, economy, philosophy, cognitive sciences. Such an academic “nexus” could also serve as an interface with other sciences involved in every aspect of defence and security policy.

This requires the establishment of university networking of existing resources and step-by-step enabling contact between otherwise separate intellectual spheres. To succeed, this process must be carried out gradually. Three steps can be defined:

— The first step is the creation of a permanent scientific network linking the various places where defence and security research is already being done. A flexible structure such as a “scientific interest grouping” (*Groupement d'intérêt scientifique* in French law terminology) could oversee projects and publications supported by a number of proactive universities and institutions.

— The second step is to develop a *series of project bids* and coordinate all those involved including the Ministry of Higher Education and Research *under the aegis of the ANR*. During this phase, exchanges amongst scientists and research teams from various institutions will be promoted in order to establish partnerships within the GIS. This should favour the development of teaching and training projects in the areas of the defence and security related human and social sciences, thereby creating within and between institutions, graduate master programmes leading to a doctoral thesis (PhD).

— The third step is more ambitious and entails the transformation of the GIS into a *Foundation for Scientific Co-operation and Research* (*fondation de recherche et de coopération scientifique*) under the 2006 Research Programme Act. This foundation would support the *European Doctoral School* specifically dedicated to research on defence and security issues.

Ongoing training

The reorganisation of the major institutions already mentioned (IHEDN, CHEAR, INHES, IERSE) into two operational centres by the fall

of 2009 will be implemented. New synergy will be developed branching out from the network of former attendees. These institutes will share their documentary resources and create a common digital data base.

In addition the internship and research validation systems will be standardised to enable participants to follow a wide range of training courses and to enable validation of these training periods.

Strategic studies

French strategic studies are not sufficiently developed in comparison with our major partners. This situation bears unfavourably on the diversity of research and the scientific quality of such studies. It is absolutely necessary to give new impetus to this sector (See Chapter 8).

The duty of remembrance

A policy of commemoration based on a shared national memory

France in 2008 is characterised by a dual phenomenon of accretion and fragmentation of collective memories.

The sedimentation of memories results from the passing of time, as memories of major armed conflicts and collective emotions grow more distant. Various communities have their own reading of such events, and therefore their own 'memory'; the memory of the great wars and military remembrance are left to the official circles.

The purpose of a policy of commemoration is to establish a framework within which the different national memories can be debated and compared, and treated as a matter for historical judgment. This treatment is especially appropriate to memories of war.

The commemoration policy as defined each year by the *Haut Conseil de la Mémoire combattante* is encountering a number of difficulties today. The witnesses of times past are fewer by the day, younger generations are more difficult to reach, and narratives become increasingly contentious, especially when it comes to the painful memories of colonial wars. Today there is a multiplication of the demands for commemorations. And yet the multiplication of commemorative events, which in fact only bring together officials, is not the best response to these difficulties. Nonetheless, it is hard to envisage reducing the number of official commemoration days. The following must remain major national events : *May 8, June 18 and November 11.*

In this context, *the commemoration of the end of the First World War* remains a popular event that contradicts the idea that just

because an event is far away in time the collective memory would be attenuated. The *national and European significance of Armistice Day* remains an important milestone. Throughout the national territory which still bears the scars of the conflict (commemorative monuments and battlefields) the commemoration of the end of the First World War embodies the nation's aspiration for unity; memories are not contentious in this instance.

Therefore, this celebration should take on particular significance because of the quality and symbolic importance of the event, which occurred at a precise moment in national, European and world history. The competence of elected officials, of the defence correspondents and of public authorities in charge of the celebration can be fortified by the availability of specific educational tools.

Generally speaking, an educational effort toward the younger generations is necessary, but also for all citizens. Innovative educational experimentation must be encouraged. Places of remembrance will receive specific teaching materials to enable the public at large to familiarise itself with an historical approach to events while at the same time comprehending the symbolism of such events.

Inter-ministerial consultations will be organised on the use of annual commemorative events for pedagogical purposes. Some of these commemorations can be used to teach the themes of peace and war, nation and country, National Security, and the role of the State.

The reflections on commemorations and the transmission of remembrance to young generations must integrate the European dimension, given the major role played by the EU in the construction of an area of sustained peace in Europe formerly torn apart by internecine wars.

Lastly, military ritual has considerable power to mobilise people, one that public opinion appreciates. The importance of rituals in civil life is being rediscovered. Such popular events contribute to citizens' sense of collective identity, but also to better understanding of military questions.

Showcasing the military heritage

The Ministry of Defence and the armed forces possess a considerable heritage in the form of valuable historical and architectural monuments, archives kept by the Historical Department of the ministry, libraries, national museum collections (The Army Museum, the Navy Museum, Air Force and Space Museum), and collections in the Museums of Traditions within military units and military schools.

This heritage enables us to better understand our national history through military history. Consequently a vigorous effort must be made to develop this heritage and facilitate access to it by everyone.

The new national security strategy lays down an inclusive framework for anticipation, preparation and action. It builds upon France's capacity to act on the international scene, to prevent or manage crises, and to influence international developments in a direction favourable to French and European interests.

In the Middle East, in Africa, in Asia, within the United Nations or the Atlantic Alliance, our country will remain a major partner. Its perceptions, capabilities and mediation are much in demand. Within the European Union, France intends to remain a standard-bearer in Europe's drive to acquire a true strategic dimension, as a global security actor able to shoulder its international responsibilities in times of crisis, either on its own or in partnership with the United States.

The overall force strength is geared to the new strategic priorities and to a legitimate attention to public spending. These capabilities will confirm France as one of the foremost strategic powers with global reach. Yet that will not happen without a thorough overhaul of armed forces support structure and administration, and a reshaping of management processes. The resulting savings will benefit investment, maintenance and training.

Methodology too will change in response to this need to adapt. France's National Security strategy will henceforth be reviewed each time a military programme bill comes up for revision, for three reasons:

- the international context can change quite fast, with the ever-present possibility of strategic surprise or major discontinuity, on the one hand. This calls for regular reassessment of our strategy's relevance and suitability, and for the necessary adjustments;

— the tempo of democracy, on the other hand: it is only normal that the President of the Republic should order a review of French security strategy when he initiates a multiyear programme;

— lastly, it is vital to rally the public around this strategy, but this demands periodic debate on the subject.

In order to prepare and facilitate this periodic updating of the strategy, a process of oversight of the White Paper's implementation will be established, involving government, Parliament and ministries. In particular, this process will include:

— a yearly report to the Council for Defence and National Security, attended by relevant ministries and administrations. Its preparation will involve the Advisory Board appointed by the President (*Conseil consultatif de la défense et de la sécurité nationale*, see chapter 15) and will be led by the General Secretariat for Defence and National Security;

— a yearly exchange of views to be held by the relevant committees of both houses of Parliament, specifically debating implementation of the White Paper;

— a yearly seminar on strategy, to be organised jointly by institutes led by IHEDN and INHES.

This new methodology will address demands that are fundamental to the success of a National Security strategy, namely flexibility and adaptation, transparency and democratic ownership. At a time when strategic uncertainty has become a fundamental tenet of our environment, arranging for periodic debate over our main defence and security policy orientations is necessary to foster public interest and support and, if need be, the resilience of the nation.

All these decisions constitute a response to the consequences of globalisation in the field of security. Our military capabilities and our internal and public security resources are major sources of strength for our country. Over and beyond their primary function of defending and protecting our population and interests, they are instrumental in projecting the international influence of France and upholding her resolve to remain a major player in ongoing strategic developments. They are and will remain fundamental to a positive image of the nation, of its calling, and its specific role in the world.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The world has *changed profoundly* since the publication of the previous *White Paper* in 1994, in particular under the impact of *globalisation*. The formidable acceleration of information exchanges, the increased trade in goods and services as well as the rapid circulation of individuals, have transformed our economic, social and political environment in both positive and negative ways, as well as the paradigms of national and international security. The hierarchy of powers has changed and will continue to evolve. The world is not necessarily more dangerous, but it has become more unstable, more unpredictable. New crises, in particular from the Near East to Pakistan, have come to the fore and have become more interconnected. France and Europe are in a situation of greater direct vulnerability: jihadism-inspired terrorism aims directly at them; as we look to the 2025 horizon, their territory will fall within the range of ballistic missiles developed by new powers; new risks have appeared, be it intentional in the case of cyber attacks or non-intentional, such as health-related or environmental crises amplified by the deterioration of the biosphere. The *White Paper* aims at presenting a strategic appraisal for the next fifteen years, and consequences are drawn in order to put together a new defence and security policy.

2. The major innovation compared to the previous *White Paper* is that the *French security interests are appraised globally without restricting the analysis to defence issues*. A national security strategy is defined in order to provide responses to “*all the risks and threats which could endanger the life of the Nation.*” The scope of national security includes the defence policy, but is not limited to it. In order to better guarantee the defence of the interests of France and the mission of protecting its population, the national security strategy calls upon the

domestic security policy, for anything which is not directly related to individual security of persons and property or law and order, as well as the civil security policy. Other policies such as foreign policy and economic policy also contribute directly to national security.

3. The *National Security strategy* includes five strategic functions which the defence and security forces must master: knowledge and anticipation, prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention. The combination of these five functions must be flexible and evolve over time, adapting to the changes in the strategic environment. The *White Paper* will therefore be updated before the discussion of each new Military Programme Act (LPM) and Domestic Security Act (LOPSI).

4. *Knowledge and anticipation* represent a new strategic function and have become a priority. In a world characterised by uncertainty and instability, knowledge represents our first line of defence. Knowledge guarantees our autonomy in decision-making and enables France to preserve its capacity for strategic initiative. It is knowledge which must be provided as early on as possible to decision-makers, military commanders and those in charge of internal and civil security in order to go from forecasts to informed action. Intelligence of all kinds, including from space, and prospective studies, therefore take on major importance.

5. *Protection* of both the French population and territory is at the very heart of our strategy because of the existence of new vulnerabilities to which they are directly exposed. The goal is to protect the nation in times of major crisis while increasing its resilience defined as the “*capability of public authorities and the French society to respond to a major crisis and rapidly restore normal functioning.*” Reinforcing resilience requires a change in the means and methods of surveillance used over the national territory including land, sea, air and now space and to develop a more rapid and wider in scope, response capability for French public authorities. Communication and information systems and civil warning systems lie at the centre of the crisis management and preparedness system. One novel aspect is that operational goals in protection missions are now assigned jointly to both internal security services, civil security services and the armed forces. Co-ordination between civilian and military departments and agencies is one of the fundamental principles of the new strategy.

6. As regards our *conflict prevention and intervention capabilities*, the *White Paper* provides for the concentration on a priority geographical axis from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the Arabian-Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. This axis corresponds to the areas where risks related to the strategic interests of France and Europe are the highest. The *White Paper* also takes account of the growing importance of Asia for national security and favours both presence and co-operation

in this direction from the Indian Ocean. In parallel, France will preserve its prevention and action capabilities on the Western and Eastern sea-boards of the African continent as well as in the Sahel, in particular to fight against trafficking and acts of terrorism. France will radically change the existing system of defence and military co-operation agreements to evolve toward a partnership between Europe and Africa and co-operation in defence and security which will favour the development and strengthening of African peace-keeping capabilities. The armed forces will retain sufficient assets in the West-Indies- Guyana zone to be used for the protection of the Kourou space centre and the fight against narcotics trafficking. The *Gendarmerie* and civil security forces will be reinforced in the overseas *départements* and territories (DOM-TOMs). The *White Paper* also sets forth a series of guidelines for the commitment of French armed forces in foreign theatres.

7. *Nuclear deterrence remains an essential foundation of our National Security strategy.* It is the ultimate guarantee of the security and independence of France. The sole purpose of the nuclear deterrent is to prevent any State-originated aggression against the vital interests of the nation, wherever it may come from and in whatever shape or form. Given the diversity of situations to which France might be confronted in an age of globalisation, the credibility of the deterrent is based on the ability to provide the president with an autonomous and sufficiently wide and diversified range of assets and options. This requires the modernisation of two components: the sea-based ballistic missile submarine force and the airborne missiles carried by nuclear-capable combat aircraft. Even though there may not be any direct threat of aggression today against France, it is imperative to retain the capability to preserve the freedom of action of France if our vital interests are threatened with blackmail. France will have the means to develop its capability as long as nuclear armaments are necessary for its security. However, France has taken the initiative in the area of nuclear disarmament and will continue to do so. France is particularly active in the fight against the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear armaments as well as the delivery missiles.

8. The *European ambition* stands as a priority. Making the European Union a major player in crisis management and international security is one of the central tenets of our security policy. France wants Europe to be equipped with the corresponding military and civilian capability. The *White Paper* proposes several concrete goals for European defence in the coming years, namely:

— Setting up an effective intervention force of 60,000 soldiers, deployable for one year in a distant theatre with the necessary air and naval forces;

— Achieving the capability to deploy for a significant duration two or three peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operations and several civilian operations of lesser scope in separate theatres;

— Increasing the European planning and operational capability both military and civilian, in parallel to the development of interventions outside the European Union;

— Creating an impetus for and restructuring of the European defence industry.

In addition, the *White Paper* emphasises four priority areas for the protection of European citizens: the reinforcement of co-operation in the fight against terrorism and organised crime; the development of European civil protection capabilities; the co-ordination of the defence against cyber attack; and the securing of energy and strategic raw materials supply.

Lastly, the *White Paper* advocates the drafting of a European *White Paper* on defence and security.

9. The *White Paper* emphasises that the *European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance are complementary*. France is committed to the renovation of NATO in particular on the occasion of NATO's 60th anniversary, to be celebrated in 2009.

Europe and the North Atlantic Alliance have changed considerably, since the decision taken by General de Gaulle in 1966 to withdraw French forces from the NATO integrated military command, and since the previous *White Paper* published in 1994. The European Union has emerged as a major player in the international community. NATO has maintained its responsibility for the collective defence of the allies, as recalled in the Lisbon Treaty, but is also a peace-keeping instrument (Afghanistan, Kosovo). There is no competition between NATO and the European Union—the two are complementary: today we need both to come to grips with the threats and crises.

This reality leads us to advocate the full participation of France in the structures of NATO. This evolution will go hand in hand with the reinforcement of the European Union in the area of crisis management and the search for a new balance between Americans and Europeans within NATO. As regards the position of France, the *White Paper* recalls the three main principles in direct continuity with those defined by General de Gaulle: (i) complete independence of our nuclear forces; (ii) French authorities must retain full freedom of assessment, which implies the absence of automatic military commitment and the maintenance of assets allowing for strategic autonomy in particular by increasing our intelligence capabilities; and lastly, (iii) permanent freedom of decision, which means that no French forces will be permanently placed under NATO command in peace time.

10. The *White Paper* defines a consistent defence effort based on the twofold concern to *improve without delay the availability and modernisation* of the most frequently-used equipment, and *launching programmes related to intelligence and preparation for the future*. It therefore advocates as a priority the reinforcement of the protection of our land, sea and air combat forces (individual soldier protection, armoured vehicles, equipment maintenance, and anti-air and anti-cruise missile protection of our Navy ships). The *White Paper* also calls for the launching of new programmes during the same time frame, in particular in the field of knowledge and anticipation (knowledge-based security, observation, electronic intelligence, early warning) on land, at sea and in the air with the development of surveillance and armed drones, as well as both offensive and defensive cyber-war capabilities.

11. *The new format of our armed forces* is to be determined on the basis of operational goals decided by the government based on the proposals made by the *White Paper* Commission. The main force levels proposed are as follows:

— An operational ground force (*Force Opérationnelle Terrestre*) of 88,000 men, enabling a force-projection capability of 30,000 soldiers at six month notice, 5,000 soldiers on permanent operational alert, and the capability to mobilise 10,000 soldiers on the national territory to support civilian authorities in case of a major crisis;

— An aircraft-carrier group including combat, surveillance and rescue aircraft and helicopters, 18 first-rank frigates, six SSNs and the capability to deploy one or two naval groups either for amphibious operations or for the protection of sea lanes;

— A joint fleet of 300 combat aircraft, regrouping the combat aircraft of both the Air Force and the Navy (*Rafale* and modernised *Mirage 2000-D*) under the operational command of the Chief of the Defence Staff and a single management by the Air Force ; this force will allow for the permanent deployment of 5 squadrons on our national territory and a force projection capability outside of the national territory of 70 combat aircraft with an additional capability of 10 aircraft on permanent alert;

12. France will devote a major financial effort to its defence, consistent with the priorities and choices made for its operational capabilities. Therefore defence spending will not decrease. During the initial period annual resources (excluding pension charges,) will be constant in volume that is, increasing at the same pace as inflation. They could include exceptional resources. Then, during a *second phase*, starting in the year 2012, the budget will increase at the pace of 1% per year in volume, that is, 1% above the inflation rate. Between now and 2020, the aggregate effort devoted to defence excluding pensions will amount to EUR 377 billion. In parallel, restructuring will lead to considerable

decrease in staff over six or seven years and operating cost reductions in the ministry and the armed forces. The resulting savings will be totally reinvested in *the procurement budget which will increase from an average of EUR 15.5 billion in past years to EUR 18 billion on average per year for the period 2009-2020*, and also in the improvement of defence personnel training and living conditions.

13. *Defence industry must be European in order for its companies to become competitive worldwide.* Individual European countries can no longer master every technology and capability at national level. France must retain its areas of sovereignty, concentrated on the capability necessary for the maintenance of the strategic and political autonomy of the nation: nuclear deterrence; ballistic missiles; SSBNs and SSNs; and cyber-security are amongst the priorities. As regards the other technologies and capacities that it may wish to acquire, France believes that priority should go to the European framework: combat aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, satellites, electronic components etc., although procurement policy must also include acquisitions on the world market.

14. *The reorganisation of public authorities is necessary in order to take account of this new national security strategy.* The Defence and National Security Council chaired by the President of the Republic will be established. The National Intelligence Council will be one of its major formations. The Prime minister will be in charge of managing the implementation of the decisions taken by the Defence and National Security Council. The 1959 Ordinance dealing with the general organisation of defence will be reformed in order to implement this new strategy. In addition, the role of the Parliament will be reinforced considerably, in particular as regards the intervention of French armed forces in foreign operations, the monitoring of the orientations of the *White Paper* and the policy as regards bilateral defence agreements. Parliament plays an important role in expressing the support of the nation for the national security strategy.

15. The security of the nation depends on the men and women who choose to serve their country and their fellow citizens. The goal of the strategy is to enable them to reach *the highest possible degree of professionalism* in all sectors, both civilian and military, and for all types of contracts. Inasmuch as possible, joint training and shared recruitment policies in the various ministries will be implemented. A special track to train external and internal intelligence personnel will be set up. In every category of the Civil Service, awareness to national security issues will be reinforced in particular for students of the *Grandes Ecoles*—élite post-graduate schools for high officials (ENA), police officers (ENSP), and judges (ENM). The principle of mobility in public administrations will be instituted for high-potential senior officers.

16. *Public support is the necessary condition for the national security strategy to be effective.* The *White Paper* advocates a new impulse in the following areas: training of young people as well as of elected officials; redesign of the Compulsory Defence Preparation Day (*Journée d'Appel pour la Défense – JAPD*); creation of a civilian service corps; organisation of a coherent and attractive array of voluntary organisations to serve the security of France; *strategic research* both at the national and European levels; creation of a scientific co-operation foundation which could support the European Doctoral School in security studies; reorganisation of the training provided today by four major institutions into two poles (defence & foreign affairs; internal security).

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1. Démissionnaire le 7 avril 2008.

2. Démissionnaire le 7 avril 2008.

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4. Décédé le 16 décembre 2007.

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1. Démissionnaire le 26 novembre 2007.

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GLOSSARY

Biometrics	A set of techniques which provide for the automatic identification of an individual on the basis of physical characteristics (finger prints, shape of the hand) or behavioural characteristics (signature).
Budgeted mission	The budget of the State is structured into ministerial or inter-ministerial “missions”. A “mission” includes all the programmes which contribute to a given policy, such as defence, security, urban affairs and housing, justice, the media etc.
Capability	A unit or function aggregating soldiers and equipment, organised and trained in application to doctrine.
Carrier air group	The aircraft onboard an aircraft carrier.
Civil Defence	Civil defence as defined in the Ordinance dated 7 January 1959 includes security of public authorities, public order, general security of the territory and civil security (civilian protection and rescue).
Coastal semaphore	A coastal outpost with means of detection, traffic monitoring and communication with ships. The semaphores strung out along the coastline constitute the “semaphoric chain”.
Combined arms brigades, specialized brigades	Large tactical units (2,000 to 6,000 strong). The combined arms brigade comprises several subordinate units of various branches and is tailored to engage the enemy directly. The specialised brigade comprises units which specialise in a function (<i>i.e.</i> , artillery, special operations or signals).
Contracting authority	The contracting authority defines the objective, the timeline and budget of a project, determines the basic

	concept and represents the final users of the project (see <i>Project manager</i>).
Counter-Intelligence	Operation aimed at detecting and neutralising security threats resulting from the intelligence activities of the services, organisations or agents who are involved in spying, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.
Currency, constant	Constant Euros correspond to the real value, that is corrected for the rise in prices compared to a base or reference.
Currency, current	Current Euros are Euros as indicated during a particular period. The value is said to be “nominal”.
Defence Agreement	Intergovernmental text whereby one country provides military aid or assistance to another country in case of a threat or aggression.
Defence and security zone	French territory is divided in “defence and security zones” which comprise a number of administrative regions under the authority of a prefect. This territorial unit ensures cooperation between civil and military authorities, coordination of civil security assets, administration of the police and of the communications system of the ministry of the interior.
Defence Correspondent (municipal)	Town Counsellor appointed to be in charge of defence and security issues including the role of informing the population and young people in particular (registration, JAPD).
DOM-COM	<i>Départements d'outre-mer, collectivités d'outre-mer.</i> French overseas territorial units. The four <i>départements d'outre-mer</i> are La Réunion (in the Indian Ocean), French Guyana (in South America), La Martinique and La Guadeloupe (both in the Caribbean). They are fully-fledged <i>départements</i> with the peculiarity of also assuming the administrative level of <i>région</i> . The <i>collectivités territoriales</i> each have a specific status. They are French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Mayotte (in the Indian Ocean), St-Pierre-et-Miquelon (off Newfoundland), St Martin and St Barthélémy (both in the Caribbean), Wallis-et-Futuna (in the Southern Pacific). Other French possessions devoid of local administration are <i>Terres australes et antarctiques françaises</i> (TAAF) and Iles Eparses (in the Mozambique channel).
Domestic and Civil Security Provisions	Assets contributing to the security of the national territory: forces and administrations in charge of public order, intelligence, national civil security assets (emergency warning systems, aviation, instruction and intervention units, de-mining) and territorial assets

	(civilian fire brigade, Paris fire brigade, Marseille Marine Fire Battalion, assets from other ministries (health, transport)).
Dual-use	Something which can have both military and civilian applications.
Echelon, emergency	The so-called “emergency echelon” comprises land forces on very high readiness status. The designated force is, drawn from the Metropolitan France reserve or from pre-positioned troops in the vicinity of the emergency.
Echelon, multirole	The so-called “multirole echelon” of land forces represents a compromise between rapidity of projection and the capability to participate in medium or high intensity operations. The force is tailored with a wide range of assets and can adapt to the mission as it evolves.
Echelon, decisive	The so-called “decisive force” fields the necessary force strength to achieve decisive tactical advantage on the battlefield. In a high intensity operation these are heavy forces with a high proportion of lethal, long-range, precision weapons.
Emergency legislation	Body of specific legislation applying in case of major crisis. In addition to the exceptional powers under article 16 of the French Constitution, the existing legislation defines “state of siege” or “state of emergency”.
Equipment, “fleet”	The fleet or inventory refers to the equipment actually owned and evolves in keeping with deliveries of new equipment, decommissioning of old equipment and losses.
Equipment issued (“line”)	Items of equipment that have been issued to units. The quantity is calculated in order to meet the “operational contract” and training requirements.
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)	A zone extending up to 200 nautical miles from the seashore. The coastal states enjoys sovereign rights over the area.
Force generation	Process involving the build-up of the force necessary to conduct an operation.
Forces, civil security	Civil security forces are specialized units and civil security services under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, comprising training and intervention units, bomb disposal units, air assets for rescue and fire-fighting, fire brigades under military or civilian status.

Forces, public security	Public security forces are those forces that provide the day to day security of citizens and property (police and territorial units of the gendarmerie), as well as riot police (CRS and “gendarmerie mobile”).
Framework Nation	A State which has received political or military mandate, on a voluntary basis, to take responsibility for the command of an operation. It provides for the relevant command structure and, in principle, the largest contingent of forces required.
General review of public policies (<i>Révision générale des politiques publiques</i> , RGPP)	General review of public policies launched in July 2007 whereby all State expenditures are scrutinized in order to identify the cost-cutting reforms which would improve the effectiveness of said policy.
Improvised explosive device (IED)	A rudimentary design used to destroy, handicap or slow down the enemy, usually camouflaged as an innocuous object.
International waters	Maritime zone which is outside the coastal waters of any adjacent State and which begins beyond the external limit of the EEZ (exclusive economic zone, 200 nautical miles from the coast).
Interoperability	Capability of several systems, units or bodies to operate together thanks to the compatibility of their organisation, doctrine, procedures, equipment and communications.
Life-cycle cost	Cost of an item which includes procurement as well as operating costs, maintenance, modernisation, decommissioning and dismantling.
Missile, ballistic	Missile where part of the trajectory is ballistic, that is influenced only by the force of gravity and aerodynamic drag.
Missile, cruise	Missile which flies at high speed and at very low altitude. It has an autonomous navigation system designed to reach the target thanks to an inertial, satellite or topographic guidance device.
Missile, ramjet	Missile equipped with a ramjet.
Nuclear Policy Council	Established in April 2008, the Council sets the main orientations of nuclear policy and monitors its implementation in particular as regards exports and international cooperation, industrial policy, energy policy, research, safety, security and environmental protection.
Nuclear safety	The whole range of provisions made to ensure nominal operation of a nuclear facility, to prevent accidents and limit their effects. Nuclear safety extends throughout the life-time of the facility, from conception to construction, operational life and decommissioning.

Operational level	The higher level of military command deployed in theatre or responsible for a large geographical zone. Theatre command is assumed by a single authority (theatre commander) and includes military, civilian-military and political-military dimensions. It is by definition a joint command.
Over the horizon radar	Electromagnetic wave detection system whose frequency and waveform are such that they reach beyond the maximal theoretical limits of detection due to the curvature of the earth.
Parliamentary Delegation for Intelligence	A body established by law whose mission is to oversee activity and assets of the intelligence services of the Ministries in charge of domestic security, defence, economy, and budget and to formulate recommendations and observations to the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister.
Pandemic	An epidemic affecting a large proportion of the population on one or several continents.
Pay scale	Scale composed of grades used to determine salary. The scale depends on the category, the corps or type of employment of the employee, his/her grade and seniority.
Private military company	A private company taking part in military operations in the form of assistance, advice or direct support. Some private military companies deliver services which were traditionally considered the preserve of regular forces.
Project manager	The project manager guarantees the project design and implementation of the technical solutions which meet the requirements of the contracting authority (see <i>Contracting authority</i>).
Public Private Partnership	Partnership contract whereby a public authority entrusts to a private company, a comprehensive mission including the total or partial design, building, maintenance and management of infrastructure or public equipment and services contributing to the public service mission of the administration.
Purchasing power parity (PPP)	Purchasing power parity is the rate of monetary conversion which enables the expression of purchasing power in different currencies in a common unit. The rate gives the quantity of monetary units required in different countries to purchase the same basket of goods and services.
Security Agreement	Intergovernmental text which enables the exchange of classified information between two parties.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)	Action of supporting the legitimate authority of a state after a conflict in particular its security institutions (police and armed forces) and a fair and independent judiciary.
Sensor	Means and equipment used to collect intelligence by detecting objects and activities. Sensors generally relate to the function of knowledge and anticipation.
Sovereign forces	Forces stationed in the national territory outside of metropolitan France, under permanent responsibility of a designated zone commander. These forces, for the most part, fall under the function of protection.
Space surveillance	A space surveillance system is made up of sensors, communication networks and command facilities that identify risks and threats on space-based or transiting objects.
Stability Programme	Created under the Stability and Growth Pact of the EU as a tool for multilateral monitoring of economic policy; these programmes project the state of public finances over a period of five years. All members of the EU send a stability programme to Brussels each year before December.
Stationed forces	Forces permanently deployed on the territory of states which have signed a bilateral agreement with France or in maritime zones.
Time reversal signal processing	Procedure of physics whereby an acoustic or ultrasound wave is reversed back to its source. The applications are numerous including medical imaging, non-destructive control, and submarine imaging and telecommunications.
UAV (Drone)	Unmanned aerial vehicle (remotely piloted vehicle).
Visa Information System	The Visa Information System will be fielded between European Union member states in order to facilitate control at the external borders or within member states.

APPENDICIES

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

26 JUIN 2007

Monsieur le Conseiller d'Etat,

Depuis 1994, des évolutions considérables ont bouleversé l'environnement international et les données stratégiques de notre défense et de notre sécurité : attentats du 11 septembre, émergence de nouveaux pôles de puissance régionale, prolifération, effets de la mondialisation et des évolutions technologiques. Parallèlement, la professionnalisation de notre armée et la fin de la conscription ont entraîné des mutations radicales de notre outil de défense. Enfin, aujourd'hui, des choix décisifs pour la défense du pays vont devoir être opérés, et devront se traduire dans la prochaine loi de programmation militaire. Celle-ci devra asseoir la crédibilité de notre défense, dans le respect des contraintes financières qui s'imposent à l'Etat.

Pour prendre en compte l'ensemble de ces paramètres dans une démarche cohérente, j'ai décidé d'engager une réflexion approfondie sur notre politique générale de défense. Elle devra aboutir à l'établissement d'un nouveau Livre blanc. Ces travaux seront conduits sous l'égide d'une commission dont j'ai décidé de vous confier la présidence.

Le futur Livre blanc définira un concept de défense globale de notre pays et de ses intérêts. Il portera sur les domaines de la défense et de la sécurité. Il devra couvrir une perspective d'une quinzaine d'années, tout en ayant vocation à être actualisé régulièrement.

Vous fonderez vos travaux sur l'analyse des nouvelles données du contexte international, économique et stratégique, l'évaluation des risques et menaces potentielles, dans le souci constant d'assurer la protection des populations et du territoire, mais également des Français de l'étranger, de garantir l'indépendance du pays et la préservation de ses intérêts stratégiques dans leurs acceptions les plus larges.

Sur cette base, votre étude, ainsi que les propositions que vous serez amené à formuler, devront concerner notamment l'évolution de nos alliances, de nos accords de défense et l'examen des conditions d'emploi de nos armées en opérations extérieures. Je vous demande d'accorder une attention particulière au renforcement de la dimension européenne de notre politique de défense et de sécurité ainsi qu'à notre contribution à la sécurité de l'Alliance atlantique dans son ensemble.

Vous examinerez les conditions de la crédibilité de notre force de dissuasion. Vous étudierez la pertinence du format des armées et de leurs implantations, la cohérence de l'effort de renseignement, de l'effort industriel, technologique et scientifique nécessaire à notre capacité de défense, les conditions d'organisation de la défense civile et de la défense économique et le renforcement de leur coordination avec la défense militaire, dans le souci d'assurer le fonctionnement régulier des pouvoirs publics, de développer les moyens de lutte contre le terrorisme et la prolifération, et d'améliorer la prévention et la gestion des crises. Les conséquences économiques et sociales des orientations proposées devront être examinées. Enfin, il vous est également demandé de formuler des propositions sur le renforcement de l'implication du Parlement dans la définition et la mise en œuvre de notre politique de défense.

Votre réflexion sera conduite sans préjugé ; elle permettra d'aborder de façon ouverte et transparente les choix auxquels nous serons confrontés pour adapter notre outil de défense, pour renforcer le lien entre la Nation et ses armées, et pour organiser la mutation de l'appareil industriel et de recherche dans un cadre national comme européen. Elle s'inscrira dans une démarche visant à maintenir et à conforter un effort de défense d'environ 2% du PIB.

Dans vos travaux, vous veillerez donc à tenir compte étroitement des constats qui seront établis dans le cadre de la révision générale des politiques publiques, tout particulièrement s'agissant de la revue stratégique des programmes d'armement.

Vous vous appuyerez sur une Commission faisant largement appel à des personnalités de la société civile, incluant des représentants du Parlement désignés par les présidents de l'Assemblée Nationale et du Sénat, ainsi que les responsables civils et militaires des administrations concernés. Compte-tenu de la priorité que j'entends donner à l'Europe de la défense, je vous demande d'organiser les échanges appropriés avec nos principaux partenaires européens au cours des travaux.

Le secrétariat général de la commission sera assuré par le secrétaire général de la défense nationale. Je donne instruction aux différents ministres concernés de vous apporter leur plein concours et celui de leurs administrations.

Je souhaite disposer du futur Livre blanc début mars 2008. Il devra être précédé d'un point d'étape à la fin de l'année 2007.

Je vous prie de croire, monsieur le Conseiller d'Etat, à l'assurance de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Nicolas SARKOZY



THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Paris, July 26, 2007

Mr State Councillor:

Since 1994, major evolutions have impacted the international environment and the strategic assumptions of our defence and security policy: the 9/11 attacks, the rise of new regional centres of power, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, effects of globalisation and of technological evolution. In parallel the professionalisation of our armed forces and the end of conscription have led to radical evolutions of our defence. As a result, the time has come to make choices which will be decisive for the defence of our country, and which will have to be carried out in the next Military Programme Act. This Act must reinforce the credibility of our defence whilst taking into account the financial constraints weighing on the State.

In order to take full account of these parameters in a coherent approach, I have decided to launch a thorough review of our overall defence policy. This should lead to the production of a new White Paper. This work will be carried under the aegis of a Commission which I have decided to appoint to you as Chairman.

The White Paper shall define a global concept of defence for our country and its interests. It shall address the domains of defence and security. It shall cover the next fifteen years, with the prospect of regular updating.

You will base your review on an analysis of the new international context, from an economic and strategic point of view, and an assessment of risk and potential threats, bearing in mind the protection of our population and territory, as well as of French nationals on foreign soil, whilst ensuring the independence of our country and the preservation of its strategic interests, in the wider sense of these words.

Based on these considerations, your assessment, as well as the recommendations you will formulate, should in particular address an evolution of our alliances and of our defence agreements, and examine the conditions under which our armed forces can be engaged abroad. I expect you to focus specifically on the reinforcement of the European dimension of our defence and security policy as well as on our contribution to the security of the Atlantic Alliance as a whole.

You will examine the conditions pertaining to the credibility of our deterrent. You will assess the relevance of the format and stationing of our armed forces, the coherence of our effort in the field of intelligence, of the industrial, technological and scientific foundations of our defence capabilities, the organisation of our civil and economic defences and how to improve co-ordination with military defence, in order to ensure the effective functioning of public authorities, to develop means of combating terrorism and proliferation, and to improve prevention and management of crises. The economic and social consequences of the suggested orientations will have to be addressed. Lastly, you are requested to express recommendations for a closer involvement of Parliament in the definition and implementation of our defence policy.

Your reflection shall be free of any preconceptions. It should lead to a candid and transparent vision of the choices to be made in order to adapt our defence, to reinforce the link between the Nation and its armed forces, and to organise the evolution of our industrial and research establishment in a national and European context. It should be based on the premise that the defence share of GDP is to be maintained around 2%.

Your work should pay due consideration to other assessments pertaining to the Overall Review of Public Policies which I have launched, and in particular to the strategic review of our weapons programmes.

You will chair a Commission widely involving a wide array of representatives of civil society, including representatives of Parliament to be appointed by the Presidents of the National Assembly and of the Senate, as well as high-ranking civil and military personnel from the administrations involved. Taking into account the priority I intend to give to European defence, I expect you to organise exchanges as appropriate with our main European partners.

The secretariat of the Commission will be ensured by the Secretary-General for National Defence. I have instructed the various ministers concerned to offer their full support and that of their administrations.

You will submit the White Paper to me by early March 2008. In the interval, I expect a progress report by the end of 2007.

Yours sincerely,

Nicolas SARKOZY

DÉCRET

Décret n° 2007-1144 du 30 juillet 2007 portant création d'une commission chargée de l'élaboration du Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale.

NOR : PRER0710784D
version consolidée au 4 juin 2008

Le Président de la République,
Sur le rapport du Premier ministre,

Article 1

Il est créé, auprès du Président de la République, une commission chargée de l'élaboration du livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale.

La commission peut entendre ou consulter toute personne de son choix.

Article 2

M. Jean-Claude Mallet, conseiller d'État, est nommé président de la commission instituée par le présent décret.

Article 3

Le secrétaire général de la défense nationale est secrétaire général de la commission.

Article 4

Sont membres de la commission :

1) Deux députés et deux sénateurs désignés par le président de leur assemblée respective.

2) Au titre des administrations :

a. - Ministère de l'Intérieur, de l'outre-mer et des collectivités territoriales :

Le secrétaire général du ministère ;

Le directeur général de la police nationale.

b. - Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes :

Le directeur général des affaires politiques et de sécurité.

c. - Ministère de l'Économie, des Finances et de l'Emploi :

Le directeur général du trésor et de la politique économique.

d. - Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche :

Le directeur de la stratégie à la direction générale de la recherche et de l'innovation.

e. - Ministère de la Défense :

Le chef d'état-major des armées ;

Le directeur général de la gendarmerie nationale ;

Le délégué général pour l'armement ;

Le secrétaire général pour l'administration ;

Le directeur général de la sécurité extérieure ;

Le directeur chargé des affaires stratégiques.

f. - Ministère du Budget, des Comptes publics et de la Fonction publique :

Le directeur du budget.

3) Les personnalités qualifiées suivantes :

M. Benoît d'Abouville, conseiller maître à la Cour des comptes, ancien ambassadeur de France auprès de l'OTAN et auprès de la République tchèque ;

M. Nicolas Baverez, avocat ;

M. Olivier Darrason, président de l'Institut des hautes études de défense nationale ;

M. Olivier Debouzy, avocat ;

M. Alain Delpuech, directeur, conseiller de l'administrateur général du Commissariat à l'énergie atomique ;

Mme Thérèse Delpech, directrice des affaires stratégiques au Commissariat à l'énergie atomique ;

M. Jean-Martin Folz, ancien président-directeur général de PSA Peugeot Citroën ;

M. le général de corps d'armée Pierre Garrigou-Grandchamp, commandant de la formation de l'armée de terre ;

M. François Heisbourg, conseiller spécial, Fondation pour la recherche stratégique ;

Mme Danièle Hervieu-Léger, présidente de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales ;

M. le général de corps aérien Patrice Klein, commandant de la région aérienne Sud et directeur central du matériel de l'armée de l'air ;

M. Thierry de Montbrial, président de l'Institut français des relations internationales ;

M. Bernard Pêcheur, conseiller d'État ;

M. Maurice Quénet, recteur de l'académie de Paris ;

Mme Christine Roger, ambassadrice, représentante permanente de la France auprès de l'Union de l'Europe occidentale et représentante permanente de la France au Comité politique et de sécurité de l'Union européenne à Bruxelles ;

M. Bruno Racine, conseiller maître à la Cour des comptes, président de la Bibliothèque nationale de France ;

M. l'amiral Édouard Scott de Martinville, chargé de mission auprès du ministre de la Défense ;

M. François Sureau, avocat, écrivain ;

M. Bruno Tertrais, maître de recherche à la fondation pour la recherche stratégique et chercheur associé au Centre de recherches et d'études internationales.

Article 5

Le Premier ministre est chargé de l'exécution du présent décret, qui sera publié au Journal officiel de la République française.

Par le Président de la République :

Nicolas Sarkozy

Le Premier ministre,

François Fillon

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