Chapter 6

Production and Dissemination

Police intelligence operations support Army LE and Army operations by producing relevant and actionable police intelligence products that support those activities and operations. The goal of PIO is achieved when police information is collected, analyzed, produced, and disseminated to military police and USACIDC units, maneuver commanders, other Service forces, host nation security forces, or the local population. Close coordination with police intelligence analysts ensures that products are tailored to meet specific requirements. The military police staff and police intelligence analysts must be proficient in packaging relevant police intelligence into usable products that are clear, concise, and targeted to the needs of the stakeholder. Police intelligence products may range from simple, free-formatted alerts to complex briefings and assessments. This chapter provides a brief description of some of the more common products that may be produced by the military police or USACIDC staff and their associated analysts.

Police Intelligence Operations

6-1.       Police intelligence products answer IR and CCIRs and enable commanders and LE investigators to make informed decisions. These products may assist Army or civilian LE personnel in capturing a wanted felon, gaining information to assist in an investigation, or closing an investigation. When police intelligence products are fused with other police intelligence, they can greatly enhance the effectiveness of LE investigations and police operations. When supporting full spectrum operations, police intelligence can provide critical understanding to commanders regarding police and prison organizations, systems, structures, and the criminal environment in the AO. When fused with Army operational intelligence, police intelligence can greatly enhance the commanders COP.

6-2.       Police intelligence products will generally contain both basic information and analyzed intelligence. It is important to keep the intended recipient and purpose at the forefront during the planning and production phases. Failure to do so may result in the production of multiple documents, each with a specific audience and purpose. Regardless of the format employed, producers of police intelligence products must take extreme care to ensure the accuracy of the products and the protection of classified or sensitive information. Information or police intelligence that must be retained in LE channels to protect information, sources, or ongoing investigations is characterized as law enforcement sensitive. The term law enforcement sensitive is used to classify information or intelligence that is obtained for, processed through, or managed by law enforcement organizations. It is essential that these data are restricted to law enforcement channels, unless otherwise directed by competent authority.

6-3.       Distribution restrictions must be understood by both the producers and the recipients of disseminated police information or police intelligence. At times, products may contain data drawn from multiple unclassified sources. These police intelligence products may–

l  Remain unclassified.

l  Receive a distribution caveat of "Law Enforcement Sensitive" or "Sensitive but Unclassified."

l  Receive a classified restriction when the results of analyses warrant.

6-4.       Classification of a document or data may be required to protect an informant or LE source, a monitoring capability, a tactics, techniques, and procedures for gathering police information, or other classification criteria. It may be possible to prevent the creation a classified product simply by protecting the manner in which the information was collected or processed. In the event that a product requires classification, immediate actions should be taken to ensure that the classified data or document is properly stored to prevent unauthorized access or compromise information or intelligence. Coordination with the local offices responsible for computer network defense and security issues should be maintained to ensure that security requirements are maintained.

Production of Police Intelligence Products

6-5.       Intelligence production includes analyzing information and intelligence and presenting intelligence products, conclusions, or projections regarding the OE and enemy forces in a format that enables the commander to achieve situational understanding. (see FM 2-0) Police intelligence products produced by police intelligence analysts, military police, and USACIDC staff and LE investigators should enable the stakeholder (the commander, PM, or LE investigator) to gain greater understanding of the OE and enable operational objectives. Police intelligence products and reports should provide commanders, PMs, and LE investigators with useful tools to augment a holistic assessment of the security and criminal environment across the AO. Effective police intelligence products have several characteristics. These characteristics include–

l  Distinct. The product can support or enhance other intelligence products but should provide analysis that stands on its own merit.

l  Tailored. The product should be tailored to specific commander, PM, or LE investigator mission, objectives, and AO.

l  Actionable. The product provides commanders, PMs, and LE investigators with situational understanding to support effective decisionmaking.

l  Accessible. To the greatest extent possible in mission, legal, and policy constraints on information sharing, products must be accessible to stakeholders requiring the information (such as commanders, PMs, LE investigators, staffs, other LE agencies, governmental organizations, and host nation agencies).

l  Timely. The products support the commander, PM, or LE investigator objectives and intent for operations or effects.

6-6.       Police intelligence products produced by military police and USACIDC staff and police intelligence analysts are sometimes in standardized formats to ensure consistency in reporting and content. Most products are dependent on the target audience; the mission; and the specifics of the event, material, person, or organization that is the subject of the product. At the tactical level, the level of detail and type of intelligence required is much different than at the operational or strategic level. The staff and analyst must fully understand the information, IR, and specific needs of the target audience, and provide a product that enables decisionmaking appropriate to the level of the recipient.

6-7.       The following sections include examples of various police intelligence products. These examples are baseline products; they will change with command and host nation requirements, technological advances, and legal restrictions. Formats may vary greatly; however, the accuracy, timeliness, and relevancy of the product is critical to the targeted audience.

Be-on-the-Lookout Alerts

6-8.       Be-on-the-lookout (BOLO)�alerts are routinely sent out by Army and civilian LE agencies. BOLO alerts are used to provide information to, and request assistance from, military and civilian LE organizations, military units, and, at times, the general public about specific individuals, vehicles, events, or equipment. These alerts are typically used when the subject matter is time-sensitive and a heightened awareness by all available personnel is requested to facilitate the appropriate action. BOLO alerts may be distributed in a printed format, over appropriate information networks, or transmitted over radio nets, depending on the breadth of distribution, time sensitivity, or other mission and environmental factors.

6-9.       BOLO alerts may be general or very specific, but they should contain, when possible, enough information to prevent numerous "false positive" reports and should provide reporting and disposition instructions. These instructions should include any known dangers associated with the subject of the BOLO alert. For example, a BOLO alert for a grey BMW automobile to all military police units operating in Germany or an orange and white taxi in Iraq would be ineffective and would likely result in an extremely high number of "sightings." This type of general information might also be ignored by military police personnel for the same reason. Additional information about the driver, body damage to the vehicle, or other specific details would reduce the false positives and increase the value of what is reported. In some instances, the amount of known information is limited to one or more identifying data points. This is common in expeditionary environments where a list of names may be the only data available or immediately following a crime or incident when only rough descriptions of suspects or few witnesses are available. Figure 6-1 and figure 6-2, show examples of BOLO alerts.

 

For Immediate Release

20 March 20XX, Washington D.C.

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Press Office

(Subject Name) Poster

 

Insert Photo

 

FBI SEEKING PUBLIC'S ASSISTANCE IN LOCATING INDIVIDUAL SUSPECTED OF PLANNING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

 

The FBI has issued a be-on-the-lookout (BOLO) alert for (subject) in connection with possible threats against the United States. In the BOLO alert, the FBI expresses interest in locating and questioning (subject) and asks all law enforcement personnel to notify the FBI immediately if he is located. Subject's current whereabouts are unknown.

 

Subject is possibly involved with al-Qaeda terrorist activities and, if true, poses a serious threat to U.S. citizens worldwide.

 

Subject is 27 years old and was born in Saudi Arabia. He is approximately 132 pounds (but he may be heavier today), 5'3" to 5'5" tall, has a Mediterranean complexion, black hair, black eyes, and occasionally grows a beard. A photograph of this individual is available on the FBI's Web site, at <http:www.fbi.gov>.

 

Subject carries a Guyana passport; however, he may attempt to enter the United States with a Saudi, Trinidad, or Canadian passport. Subject is also know by the following aliases:

 

Alias #1, Alias #2, Alias #3, Alias #4

 

Legend:

BOLO��� be-on-the-lookout

D.C.������ District of Columbia

FBI������� Federal Bureau of Investigation

U.S.������ United States

Figure 6-1. Example of an FBI BOLO alert


 

UNCLASSIFIED

For Official Use Only

Be-on-the-Lookout List

Date

Individual/Vehicle

Threat Summary

4 Sep XX

1970s Chevrolet Impala, White, host nation Plate 283AC2

Used in transporting explosive materials for IED production and targeting U.S. and host nation police forces.

5 Sep XX

Late model Mercedes panel truck, dark blue with white bumpers, host nation Plate 853DJC

Possible transport vehicle used for transiting contraband weapons, stolen merchandise, and funds used in support of organized criminal networks operating in the AO. Has also reportedly used different plates, including GE65ART and UK19873.

15 Sep XX

John Doe

Individual wanted for questioning by host nation and U.S. military police personnel in connection with the murder on
4 Sep XX of a host nation police chief with possible connections to at least three additional assassinations of host nation police officials. This individual has been previously detained and subsequently released; biometric data is enrolled in Biometrics Automated Toolset and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment in the AO.

UNCLASSIFIED

For Official Use Only

Legend:

 

AO

area of operations

IED

improvised explosive device

Sep

September

U.S.

United States

Figure 6-2. Example of a BOLO alert

Criminal Intelligence Bulletins

6-10.   Criminal intelligence bulletins are documents produced by USACIDC and disseminated internally to USACIDC and Army LE. These bulletins are forwarded to all USACIDC field elements by the USACIDC chain of command and shared with other Army LE to alert them of conditions, techniques, or situations that could be significant factors in present or future investigations or CPSs. Local units, organizations, and entities may be provided pertinent information affecting their organizations via a crime prevention flyer (see paragraph 6-13).

Crime Prevention Surveys

6-11.   CPSs are conducted, within resource and mission constraints, by USACIDC to support commanders in the context of the Army Crime Prevention Program. The survey is a formally recorded review and analysis of existing conditions in a specified facility, activity, or area for the purpose of detecting crime, identifying conditions or procedures conducive to criminal activity, and minimizing or eliminating the opportunity to commit a criminal offense or engage in criminal activity; it is the result of a crime and criminal threat assessment and analysis. It seeks to determine the nature, extent, and underlying causes of crime and provides the commander with information for use in the crime prevention program (see
AR 10-87 and AR 195-2).

6-12.   A CPS may be initiated by USACIDC or at the request of the supported commander. USACIDC conducts CPSs and crime and criminal activity threat assessments of facilities, activities, events, and areas that are under Army control or that directly affect the Army community. The USACIDC may also conduct CPSs of other DOD facilities and activities when requested (if resources are available). The CPS will identify situations that are not procedural deficiencies but could, if left unchecked, result in the loss of Army assets through negligence, systemic weakness, or failures and erosion of established internal controls. The CPS is provided to the local commander responsible for the AO in question, typically commanders of posts, camps, stations, or other mature bases. A CPS identifies–

l  Criminal activity in a specific location.

l  Regulatory deficiencies.

l  Economic threats to installations or activities.

l  Domestic and international terrorist threats.

l  Likely theft, diversion, sabotage, or destruction of U.S. government property or assets.

l  Vulnerability of Army automated systems.

Crime Prevention Flyers

6-13.   The crime prevention flyer is an external document prepared by USACIDC or PM office personnel for local agencies and entities. It is produced and disseminated to notify organizations of identified conditions that could result in another criminal incident or future loss of government funds, property, or personnel. The flyer is formatted for external distribution, with the intent to share pertinent information and facilitate cooperation and assistance in crime prevention activities. Figure 6-3 displays an example crime prevention flyer.

Economic Crime Threat Assessment And Logistical Security Threat Analysis Reports

6-14.   The ECTA is a USACIDC assessment of the overall economic posture of an installation or activity. The ECTA process is one of the most important aspects of the USACIDC crime prevention program. ECTAs provide valuable information and police intelligence to enable the effective employment of limited USACIDCs and other LE assets. ECTAs are an important element for a proactive effort that relates to both economic crimes and logistical security operations.

6-15.   LSTAs are produced by USACIDC special agents looking specifically at key logistics bases and infrastructure. The LSTA is prepared to assess logistical systems, modes of transportation, or APODs and SPODs for criminal threat vulnerabilities and terrorist threats targeting the integrity of the logistical LOCs, the security of U.S. government assets, and the safety of DOD personnel. LSTAs can serve as a substantial internal and external operational planning tool. Distribution is normally restricted to the commander of the facility, supporting LE and security elements, and higher headquarters. Due to the specifics of the report, LSTAs are normally classified.

 

 

Office Symbol����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� � 12 November 20XX

 

 

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, 10th Sustainment Command, Port of Entry, Remotistan.

SUBJECT: Crime Prevention Flyer, Regarding: Larceny of Government Property.

 

 

1. PURPOSE: This Crime Prevention Flyer addresses the larceny reported on 21 October 20XX, and the immediate actions recommended to deter future criminal activity and loss of property.

 

2. BACKGROUND: Investigators have expended a significant amount of resources investigating the stated crime that occurred on 21 October 20XX. Due to conditions outlined below, the investigation has produced negative results. Losses to date have been valued at about $8,200. During the conduct of the investigation, several conditions were discovered that produce conditions conducive to criminal activity. The majority of these conditions are basic physical security deficiencies. Actions that correct the identified deficiencies can contribute to making the 10th Sustainment Command and associated warehouse areas a "hard target" for thieves and deter future break-ins. The investigation into this incident is not complete; however, the items shown below are of time-sensitive interest:

 

a.     The rear door to the unit warehouse did not have a security cover over the area of the door frame where the locking mechanism was located. This facilitated insertion of a pry bar to force open the door.

 

b.     The rear floodlights were burned out or missing. Operational floodlights would illuminate the rear entry, forcing potential criminals to operate in an illuminated area rather than in darkness.

 

c.     A security camera was present and functional, but not serviced (taping medium was full); therefore, the security cameras were rendered useless. Interviews revealed that the camera has not been used during the assignment of any current Soldiers or civilians.

 

d.     The gate at the rear entrance to the warehouse area was not secured properly, and security checks on that area were not conducted.

 

3. RECOMMENDATIONS: Standard physical security measures, according to AR 190-53, should be followed. These measures include—

 

a.     Ensuring that security lights are operational.

 

b.     Ensuring that security camera tapes or disks are changed in a timely manner and the camera system is employed.

 

c.     Modifying the rear door of the warehouse to ensure that a security cover is in place.

 

d.     Securing the rear gate entrance to the warehouse area and adding security checks to existing standing operating procedures.

 

4. The point of contact for additional information is the undersigned, at (310) 543-0820.

 

 

 

John Q. Agent

Special Agent in Charge

 

Figure 6-3. Example of a crime prevention flyer

Forensic Analysis Reports

6-16.   Forensic analysis reports�are produced at labs that conduct forensic examinations of evidence and potential evidence. These reports are usually produced according to the standards of the lab conducting the analysis. When supporting LE investigations, the reports will usually have controlled distribution in LE and judicial channels. Although technical in nature, the reports may contain summaries that provide the basic data information in a more readable format. LE investigators reviewing forensic reports should contact serving labs directly for clarification of evidence or for explanation or to correlate results of other investigative findings.

Indications and Warning

6-17.   Indications and warningare those intelligence activities intended to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to the United States or multinational military, political, or economic interests or to U.S. citizens abroad. It includes forewarning of hostile actions or intentions against the United States, its activities, overseas forces, or allied and/or coalition nations. (JP 2-0) The G-2 or S-2 has primary staff responsible for producing I&W intelligence; however, all functional elements contribute to I&W through awareness of the CCIR and by reporting related information. PIO is planned and executed by the S-3 in functional units and the PM staff in multifunctional units; I&W related to PIO will be produced by the S-3 or PM staff and coordinated with the S-2 or G-2, as required.

6-18.   Military police and USACIDC elements, by virtue of their mission and their dispersion across the AO, are often the first to see indications of an imminent threat. When this information is reported through normal reporting channels, it is disseminated rapidly to alert affected organizations, units, and adjacent LE agencies. Military police produce I&W to provide police information or analyzed intelligence for timely notification that a possible criminal threat or attack on U.S. interests has been identified and is imminent.

6-19.   The nature of a threat indicator will generally dictate both the distribution list and the method used. Speed and a positive acknowledgement of both the information provided and the sensitivity of the information may be critical. At a minimum, military police, other security forces, the S-2, and the commander are normally notified of incoming I&W. As with other police intelligence products, a decision must be made about how much information to release and whether sources of information must be protected in the warning.

Link Analysis Charts, Maps, and Graphs

6-20.   Link analysis charts, maps, and graphs provide a visual link between persons, organizations, locations, crimes, and evidence. These products may be automated through the use of commercially available programs or produced by hand using maps, overlays, matrices, or graphs. Link analysis charts, maps, and graphs are typically used extensively by LE investigators conducting criminal investigations. Link analysis products can also be designed and produced specifically for the legal community involved in judicial proceedings to assist with understanding the connection between known criminals, criminal activities, and other persons suspected of involvement in a crime or criminal enterprise. Chapter 5 provides a discussion on link analysis and examples of link analysis charts.

6-21.   Some commanders and PMs may require presentations of the entire link analysis chart; however, the complexity of these products limits their use for personnel not intimately familiar with the events and subjects portrayed. Oftentimes, the staff or analyst that constructed the data may need to build a separate briefing or other presentation for the commander or PM that provides a synopsis of key linkages.

Personal Security Vulnerability Assessments

6-22.   Personal security vulnerability assessments (PSVAs) are conducted and produced by USACIDC special agents on HRP, based on their duty position, the level of threat, and geographic location (when directed by the Secretary of the Army or the Chief of Staff of the Army). They are conducted to enhance the personal security posture of HRP. At a minimum, a PSVA will include a review of procedures and measures employed at the HRP's quarters, workplace, and travel between the two locations. The PSVA scrutinizes all aspects of the physical security of the principal's office, residence, and mode of travel. A review and analysis of the principal's routine habits and his social and personal commitments are conducted. These activities are performed to determine where the principal would be most vulnerable and to reduce the likelihood of becoming a target of an individual or group.

6-23.   All supporting documentation, such as blueprints, schematic drawings, still photographs, videos, and written documents, will be available for review or as attachments to the final PSVA report. The final report is typically made available to the HRP for review. Due to the nature of these reports, distribution is normally severely restricted and is provided only to the individual covered in the assessment, their immediate staff and security team, and USACIDC headquarters. A copy of the final report is kept in the HRP's file; a second copy is provided to the USACIDC Crime Records Center, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The conduct of PSVAs is directed in AR 10-87, AR 190-58, and AR 525-13.

6-24.   The PSVA final report includes–

l  The date the HRP briefing was held.

l  A list of persons who received the exit briefing.

l  The reaction of HRP receiving the briefing.

l  A list of noted problem areas and recommended solutions.

l  Security recommendations.

Police and Prison Infrastructure, Capability, and Capacity Assessments

6-25.   Civil consideration is an important element in military staff analysis, assessment, and planning. Specific to military police are those civil considerations directly related to police, crime, and criminals in the form of infrastructure, capability, and capacity assessments. Military police staff and police intelligence analysts must convert this information and the resulting police intelligence into products usable by commanders, PMs, their staffs, and LE investigators conducting investigations in the AO. The acronym POLICE (discussed in chapter 2) provides a format for gathering and organizing police information.

6-26.   Police and prison infrastructure, capability, and capacity assessments follow no standardized format. Product format is driven by many factors, including the–

l  Target audience.

l  Specific mission.

l  Phase of the mission.

l  Environmental conditions and status of police and prison organizations and operations.

l  Severity and sophistication of criminal activity.

6-27.   Police assessments typically contain data about the ability of police forces to conduct their missions, including patrolling and traffic regulation enforcement, dispatch and internal communications, sustainment of police organizations, and criminal investigations. Prison assessments may initially focus on the number of guards and beds available and security concerns affecting operations in the facility; however, over time they may focus on threat organizations operating in the facility, detainee and prisoner rehabilitative efforts, and the process for release of detainees and prisoners. These assessments provide police intelligence regarding a wide range of functional areas necessary for effective police organizations, to include–

l  Personnel, such as the numbers of police and prison personnel, management structure, pay systems, internal investigations and discipline, presence of corruption (political, nepotistic, and financial).

l  Security, such as the vetting of police personnel, control and security of police information, security concerns in the organization (both internal to the police or prison organization and from external factors).

l  Operations, such as the organizational structure, span of control, centralized versus decentralized command of police and prison forces, and criminal training standards for police and prison personnel.

l  Logistics, such as supply systems, vehicle and equipment maintenance, funding for maintenance and supplies, and sources of funding.

l  Communications, such as general communications capability, availability of secure communications, and sufficient communications equipment for all police and prison personnel.

Police Intelligence Advisories

6-28.   Police intelligence advisories (PIAs) are produced to transmit information related to criminal activity in the AO of other Army LE organizations. The document can be used to relay information and police intelligence on crime patterns, methods of operation, organized crime networks, technology used by criminal threat elements, and IR and concerns involving criminal organizations and activities. Figure 6-4 shows an example police intelligence advisory.

6-29.   Police intelligence advisories produced by USACIDC are referred to as criminal intelligence reports but follow the same format as the police intelligence advisory. Other LE organizations may have slightly different titles and format variations. The report is an informative document prepared for another USACIDC or military police element and includes the following information–

l  Heading.

l  Date prepared.

l  Preparing office.

l  Sequence number.

l  Title.

l  Offense or additional types of information.

l  Synopsis.

l  Signature blocks.

l  Warning and distribution statements.


 

 

POLICE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY

Date Prepared: 1 January 20XX

 

Preparing Office: 11th Military Police (MP) Detachment, Forward Operating Base (FOB) Bulldog, Remotistan.

 

Sequence Number: 444-09-MPR992, First Police Intelligence Advisory (PIA)

 

1. Subject 1.; Specialist; 555-44-6666; male; white; 6'2"; 180 pounds; brown hair; brown eyes; 345th Messkit Company, Fort Sunny, California (formerly the 123d Maintenance Battalion, FOB Bulldog, Remotistan).

2. Subject 2; Specialist; 535-33-8888; female; white; 5'4"; 110 pounds; blonde hair; blue eyes; 123d Maintenance Battalion, FOB Bulldog, Remotistan.

3. Subject 3; Sergeant; 395-65-0909, male; white; 5'8"; 143 pounds; blonde hair; brown eyes; 123d Maintenance Battalion, FOB Bulldog, Remotistan.

 

Offense: Wrongful appropriation/larceny of government property.

 

Reference is made to this office's military police report (MPR) 0443-09-MPR992.

 

Source of Information: The information contained in this PIA was developed during the referenced MPR and is considered reliable.

 

Narrative: At about 2300 hours on 1 May of this year, the 11th MP Detachment, Military Police Investigations Section, FOB Bulldog, Remotistan, while conducting an investigation of possible larceny of government property in the 123d Maintenance Battalion supply room, discovered evidence linking Subject 2 and Subject 3 to stolen government property. The stolen property includes bayonets, commercially procured personal hydration units, and laser sights. During subsequent interviews, Subject 2 admitted that, in addition to being a friend to Subject 3 and Subject 1, she conspired with them to take government property with intent to mail the items back to the United States for resale by Subject 1. Several stolen items were later found in the possession of Subject 3 and recovered. Courts martial actions are being taken against Subject 2 and Subject 3. Subject 1 has been allegedly quoted by his roommate (not considered a suspect) as saying that he had a "sweet business deal waiting for him stateside." The supporting staff judge advocate has reported there is insufficient evidence to take action against Subject 1. This is a terminal report; no further reports are contemplated pending receipt of additional police intelligence.

 

Warning Statement: This document is intended for law enforcement personnel, intelligence analysts, military personnel, and other officials with a need to know. Further dissemination of this report should be limited to a minimum, consistent with the purpose for which the record has been furnished (such as the effective enforcement of civil and criminal law). Additional releases require prior approval from the originator.

 

Report prepared by:

Report approved by:

Name

Major John Surname

Military Police Investigator

Military Police Operations

 

Distribution:

Provost Marshal, FOB Bulldog, Remotistan

Commander, 345th Messkit Company, Fort Sunny, California

Provost Marshal, Fort Sunny, California

 

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

 

LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Legend:

FOB������� forward operating base

MP��������� military police

MPR������ military police report

PIA�������� police intelligence advisory

Figure 6-4. Example of a PIA

Police Intelligence Alert Notices

6-30.   The police intelligence alert notice is a document prepared by Army LE elements. It expedites the reporting of perishable, time-sensitive, and crime-related information. A police intelligence alert notice is prepared and disseminated to attack the offender's capability of victimizing others and to alert persons, organizations, or entities identified as high-risk for criminal activity (logistics bases, units operating within the threat AO, or other high payoff targets, such as hospitals, financial organizations, or supply depots) in an effort to prevent them from being victimized by an identified threat. See figure 6-5 for an example police intelligence alert notice.

POLICE INTELLIGENCE ALERT NOTICE

TERRORIST ACTIVITY (MANUFACTURE AND EMPLACEMENT OF IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES)

 

Date Prepared: 1 January 20XX

 

Preparing Office: 50th Military Police Brigade, Hostile Province, Remotistan.

 

Source: Information was obtained from a local national informant that has supplied credible and accurate information in the past; the information is considered reliable.

 

Credible information has been received that Subject 1, Subject 2, and Subject 3 have been assembling improvised explosives and hiring third-party individuals to emplace the devices, targeting U.S. military and host nation convoys throughout Hostile Province.

 

Subject 1 has been known to use the aliases Alias 1 and Alias 2.

Subject 2 has been known to use the aliases Alias 1 and Alias 2.

Subject 3 has been known to use the aliases Alias 1 and Alias 2.

 

Police intelligence indicates that Subject 1, Subject 2, and Subject 3 have been manufacturing improvised explosive devices in a mobile facility, most likely a modified panel van. Police intelligence further indicates that they consistently use electronic triggers supplied by a foreign source and that their devices are consistently radio frequency detonated using components from a single source supplier. When on the move, Subject 3 typically drives, while Subject 1 and Subject 2 work in the back of the van. Subject 3 is described as 6'6' tall, weighing more than 300 pounds, with a large, heart-shaped tattoo with "MOM" on his left forearm. There are currently no descriptions for Subject 1 and Subject 2.

 

Units operating in the area should be alert for suspicious activity, particularly at vehicle checkpoints and when involving paneled vans transiting the area of operations. If the suspects are encountered, detain if possible; however, exercise extreme caution. Additional intelligence indicates that their van is often "booby-trapped." If Subject 1, Subject 2, or Subject 3 are detained, notify the 50th Military Police Brigade as soon as possible to facilitate law enforcement of the suspects. Incident sites should be searched for remnants of trigger devices and other material to be collected for forensic evaluation.

 

The point of contact for this alert is Major Jane Surname, Military Police Operations Officer, 50th Military Police Brigade, XXX-ZZZ-1234.

 

This alert is intended for dissemination to all units operating in Hostile Province.

Figure 6-5. Example of a police intelligence alert notice

 

6-31.   The police intelligence alert notice informs the recipients of criminal activity, specific actions required to interdict or mitigate the stated activity, and specific evidence collection and preservation priorities. The police intelligence alert notice is an action document, not an informational report. Police intelligence alert notices produced by USACIDC are referred to as criminal alert notices. Police intelligence alert notices and criminal alert notices follow the same basic format. They will typically include–

l  The source and reliability of the information.

l  Entities involved.

l  Any known aliases.

l  Known personal identification numbers (such as social security or driver's license).

l  A summary of all pertinent information developed to date on the subject or suspect.

l  Actions that the recommending unit wishes to be taken by the activities and agencies receiving the bulletin (such as detain subject or suspect and notify LE authority).

l  Points of contact, including names and contact numbers from the issuing unit.

l  Distribution and dissemination instructions and restrictions.

Statistical Data

6-32.   Statistical data can be drawn from diverse sources and can be depicted in numerous manners. Statistical data may be presented in charts displaying–

l  Frequencies (through the use of bar, pie, and Pareto charts).

l  Trends (through the use of bar and line charts).

l  Distributions (through the use of GIS, trend lines, or other formats).

6-33.   Different audiences and types of data require different types of statistical tools to present data in a manner that is clear and concise. Data placed into a table or other database can be rapidly retrieved and manipulated into a presentation. The ways in which statistical data can be displayed are numerous. The next three figures show examples of statistical data in different formats and related to crimes in an AO. Figure 6-6 displays the number of burglaries, robberies, and larcenies for each quarter of a given year. Figure 6-7 shows the trend for larceny through the use of a run or line chart. Figure 6-8 displays a pie chart showing the percentage of occurrences (out of 100 percent) for each crime depicted on the chart.

figure6-6.tif

Figure 6-6. Example of a bar graph showing the rate of select quarterly offenses


 

figure6-7.tif

Figure 6-7. Example of a line chart displaying annual larceny trends

 

Figure 6-8. Example of a pie chart showing crime percentages over a one-year period

 

Wanted and Reward Posters

6-34.   Wanted posters are clearly intended for public distribution and viewing. Formats typically vary, depending on the amount of information known, specific information sought, and the LE agency producing the wanted poster. Wanted posters are posted by local, state, and federal agencies (to include Army LE). The LE agency or military unit that has the investigative lead for the incident should be the final approval on the wanted poster. This allows the lead investigative agency an opportunity to review the poster to ensure that information about an individual or crime that police are withholding for investigative purposes is not inadvertently released.

6-35.   Wanted posters may contain the names, descriptions, and pictures of one or more individuals known to LE. A picture can be an artist's sketch (a rendering of the suspect through the eyes of a witness) or a photograph. Any photograph should be as recent as possible. Below the sketch or photograph, there will typically be a short history of the criminal, including information such as the–

l  Age and/or date or place of birth.

l  Sex, height, weight, and hair and eye color.

l  Known identifying scars or marks.

l  Occupation.

l  Nationality.

l  Any known aliases.

6-36.   In some cases, little is known about the criminal being sought. In these cases, the wanted poster may simply provide information about a specific crime or an unknown perpetrator and request additional information. Posters may contain instructions on what to do when an individual observes the wanted person. If a reward is offered, the poster should state how much money is offered and the individual or agency providing the reward. Wanted posters will also provide points of contact for persons with potential information.

6-37.   Wanted posters used in support of full spectrum operations in OCONUS environments or in areas within the United States where English is not the primary language must have the information released and the translation carefully screened. It is important to have a native speaker review the wanted poster for accuracy of the translation and the cultural context of the poster for unintended word use or messages. Figure 6-9 and Figure 6-10 provide examples of wanted posters.

6-38.   Reward posters are generated to notify the public that a reward may be available for information specific to a crime or criminal. They are a variant of the wanted poster. Like the wanted poster, reward posters are used to solicit information from the general public but may also include a tangible incentive in return for information provided under specified conditions (figure 6-11 provides an example of a reward poster). Reward posters typically contain specific details, to include–

l  Reward amounts.

l  Specifics about the crime or criminal for which information is sought.

l  Pictures (if available) pertinent to the crime or criminal.

l  Specific requirements that must be met (such as information leading to recovery or information leading to prosecution).

l  A point of contact for the reward.

l  A confidentiality statement from the provider reference information received.

l  Any applicable expirations of the reward offer.

 

 

Wanted

ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS

 

 

Insert photo (if available)

PHOTO:

NAME: SUBJECT NAME

DOB: NOVEMBER 29, 1985

SEX: MALE

HEIGHT: 6' 1"

WEIGHT: 195 POUNDS

HAIR: BROWN

EYES: BROWN

RACE: WHITE

SCARS OR MARKS: BULLET WOUND ON THE LOWER THIGH AND ON THE RIGHT ARM; SCAR ON RIGHT WRIST, SCAR ON THE LEFT THIGH, AND SCAR ON THE LEFT ANKLE. ALSO HAS TRACK MARKS ON HIS RIGHT ARM AND BETWEEN HIS TOES.

OCCUPATION: CONSTRUCTION

 

SSN USED: XXX-XX-XXXX

NATIONALITY: AMERICAN

PLACE OF BIRTH: MIAMI, FLORIDA

ALIAS: ALIAS #1; ALIAS #2

IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS CASE, CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE.

 

THE CRIME: UNLAWFUL FLIGHT TO AVOID PROSECUTION – ATTEMPTED MURDER. SUBJECT IS BELIEVED TO BE CONNECTED WITH THE ATTEMPTED MURDER OF A STATE TROOPER WHEREIN A .357-CALIBER PISTOL WAS USED.

 

REWARD: YOUR LOCAL FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FIELD OFFICE IS OFFERING UP TO $50,000 FOR THE APPREHENSION OF THE SUBJECT.

 

REMARKS: SUBJECT HAS BEEN KNOWN TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE KLU KLUX KLAN AND OTHER RACIST GROUPS.

 

SOURCES: PODUNK COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT

 

FBI HOMEPAGE: <http://www.fbi.gov>

 

WRITTEN BY: INVESTIGATOR DOE

Figure 6-9. Example of an FBI wanted poster


 

 

WANTED

BY CID

 

Information concerning the offense of Larceny of Government Property from the 29th Sustainment Brigade, Camp Doha, Kuwait APO AE 09090.

 

USACIDC Report of Investigation (ROI) 0092-96-CID987-20973-7F9A.

 

On 1 April 1996, the USACIDC initiated an investigation into the Larceny of Government. Property from the 29th Sustainment Brigade. Between 1800, 29 March 1996 and 0530, 30 March 1996, person(s) unknown stole one M998 HMMWV, bumper number "SVC 4 29TH SB", serial number 044308, from the parking lot adjacent to Building 1013A (Headquarters, 29 Sustainment Brigade), Camp Doha, Kuwait.

 

IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THIS INCIDENT, PLEASE CONTACT THE CID OFFICE AT DSN 111-2222/2223, COMMERCIAL 0101-9992222/2223, OR CALL YOUR LOCAL MP STATION.

 

Legend:

 

APO

Army Post Office

CID

criminal investigation division

DSN

Defense Switched Network

HMMWV

high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

MP

military police

USACIDC

United States Army Criminal Investigation Command

Figure 6-10. Example of a USACIDC wanted poster

 


 

figure

Figure 6-11. Example of a reward poster

Dissemination of Police Information and Police Intelligence

6-39.   Dissemination is the activity that delivers an analyzed product into the hands of commanders, PMs, staff, and LE investigators to answer IR, enabling decisionmaking and action. It is critical that dissemination occur as early in the process as practical and possible. The need to balance speed with thoroughness should be weighed throughout the process. Commanders and analysts should consider interim reports to provide key data to end users as it becomes available. Oftentimes, waiting for complete information may delay product dissemination so long that the product, although accurate, is too late to be useful to the Soldiers and LE investigators who need it.

Command and Staff Channels

6-40.   PIO, in support of full spectrum operations, leverages command and staff channels to ensure timely and accurate reporting of police intelligence that answers IR, CCIRs, exceptional information identified by the staff or commander that is unforecasted but of immediate value to the command. Command and staff channels will also likely be used to distribute other products, such as wanted posters, spot reports, I&Ws, and BOLOs. This is likely the most efficient method to provide information to every member of a unit or organization. Products disseminated through command and staff channels should clearly articulate the purpose for distributing the product and what action is required or being requested.

Functional Channels

6-41.   Functional channels include military police and LE channels and other groups that operate along functional lines. The LE and intelligence networks are examples of functional channels. Oftentimes, police intelligence is maintained in LE functional channels. This is done to maintain control over sensitive information, as mandated by law, and protect information and intelligence critical to ongoing LE investigations.

Police Intelligence Collaboration and Fusion

6-42.   PIO networks in support of posts, camps, stations, and full spectrum operations are developed with the same overarching objective—to enhance police information and police intelligence sharing. Regardless of the OE, subtle influences will create variations in network memberships. Influences, such as the availability of agencies in the local AO, the varied personalities of organizational leaders, and cultural or operational differences between agencies, may influence membership participation and team dynamics. For example, military police and USACIDC personnel may not have a local FBI or Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms field office in their immediate AO, or UN civilian police may be operating in your immediate AO with their headquarters and support elements hundreds or thousands of miles away. Despite local variations, general guidelines for developing, managing, and participating in police intelligence networks can be established.

6-43.   Military police and USACIDC personnel may develop police intelligence networks anywhere in support of missions in any OE. Standardization provides a platform for tailoring staff, providing institutional training, and selecting the most appropriate resources (such as automation and other emerging technologies). The successful development of police intelligence networks may help enhance coordination and cooperation between local agencies and provide a springboard for developing vast regional, national, or international police intelligence networks.

Defining Network Participants

6-44.   A police intelligence network should be tailored to meet the requirements of the OE and the specific AO. Participation is influenced by threat assessments, IR, and specific needs of participating agencies. PIO collaboration and networking can occur in predetermined working groups with relatively set membership, structure, and function or in ad hoc venues created for a specific mission or event. A police intelligence network will typically consist of agencies located in the immediate AO; however, with the expansion of communications and internet technology, participation from outside the immediate AO is possible. This allows participation and sharing to occur between agencies located across the state, country, or world. Such arrangements may fill essential capability gaps in the PIO network. If particular agencies are not represented in the local environment (such as FBI or Drug Enforcement Administration field offices, MI, or host nation LE), military police and USACIDC personnel can add them to their network by either leveraging another LE PIO network or making direct contact with the agency using Internet-based intelligence services.

Networks in Support of Posts, Camps, and Stations

6-45.   Police intelligence networks established to support LE and security efforts at posts, camps, and stations can provide significant capability to address the complexities of the criminal threat to military assets and personnel. Cooperation between local, state, federal, and military agencies enhances LE and security operations for the military and local civilian community. Typically, networks in support of posts, camps, and stations are more static than those supporting full spectrum operations and provide continuity that builds institutional knowledge of crime and criminal threats, physical and social conditions, and longterm relationships with local, state, and federal LE agencies in the AO. Most police intelligence networks will typically have a core of constant participants and the flexibility to expand to form focused
ad hoc, threatspecific cells to address, prevent, or react to a specific hazard, condition, or event.

6-46.   Figure 6-12 provides an example of a police intelligence network supporting a typical Army post, camp, or station. Specific networks will differ slightly, based on available participants. Military police and USACIDC personnel are located in the center, post agencies are on the right, and agencies located off the installation are on the left. Typical LE agencies may include international, federal, state, and local LE, depending on whether the post is CONUS or OCONUS. Relationships between Army LE personnel and other police intelligence network members will differ. Some network members will require day-to-day working relationships, while others will be based on mutually supporting relationships for selected routine activities or occasional collaboration.

figure6-12.tif

Figure 6-12. Typical police intelligence network in support of a post, camp, or station

6-47.   Police intelligence network relationships between agencies will fluctuate, based on numerous factors in the OE. Relationships will also continue to develop as bonds are strengthened through joint ventures and as agencies expand their own operating networks. Missions and priorities of individual organizations will greatly affect participation and the level of sharing conducted.

Networks in Support of Full Spectrum Operations

6-48.   Police intelligence networks are formed to support specific missions or operations during full spectrum operations. These networks are affected by unit deployments and rotations, governmental and civilian organizations operating in the AO, mission changes, and threat changes. These factors equal continuity that builds institutional knowledge of crime and criminal threats, improved physical and social conditions, and additional longterm relationships (often difficult to attain). Specific conditions or threats may bring additional resources and expertise to the AO and increase participation in the network. Similarly, mission changes and force reductions in the AO may reduce or shift the number of participating elements.

6-49.   Figure 6-13 shows a typical PIO network in a deployed OE in support of full spectrum operations outside the United States or its territories. Like the previous example, these police intelligence networks will vary in composition, based on mission and operational variables in the OE. As with the example in figure 6-10 civil-military agencies are located on the left and military organizations are located on the right.


 

figure6-13.tif

Figure 6-13. Typical PIO network in a deployed OE

6-50.   The success of the police intelligence network depends on the mutual exchange of timely, relevant, and accurate police intelligence products prepared according to established laws and regulations. To accomplish this, military police and USACIDC staff should work closely with other agencies to thoroughly understand the strengths and weaknesses of each organization. This enables the organizations to capitalize on their respective strengths and compensate for organizational weaknesses, enabling organizational capabilities to complement each other. The respective staffs should understand each organization's vision, mission, goals, and objectives and identify and develop strategies to overcome cultural, organizational, and operational barriers.

Appropriate Command and Staff Alignment

6-51.   Military police and USACIDC staff and commanders should identify and properly correlate their personnel with those of other organizations. This is important to ensure that coordination between staff and commanders from different organizations is conducted with counterparts operating at a similar level and span of control in other organizations. It is important to nest appropriately similar command and staff, levels of authority, and intelligence functions between agencies to increase interoperability. Similar terms for ranks or titles between organizations do not necessarily translate to the same management level. A lieutenant with the state police, for example, may be the equivalent of a military police colonel. A full understanding of the counterpart structure and appropriate staff alignment can avoid embarrassment and help to build personal working relationships with more effective interagency cooperation and intelligence sharing. Using a modified organizational chart, managers can identify comparable staff positions and existing gaps between organizations.

Communications

6-52.   A comprehensive communications system to support the police intelligence network will ensure uninterrupted contact between elements when necessary. Contact lists for all agencies should be disseminated throughout the network and routinely checked to validate less-frequent contacts and maintain personal working relationships. It is desirable that agencies have compatible communications systems for routine support. Communications systems between network organizations may include–

l  Standard communications systems, such as–

n  Telephones.

n  Radios.

n  Facsimile machines.

n  Commercial e-mail.

n  Web sites.

n  Videoconferencing capability.

n  Computer databases.

l  Nonstandard communications systems, such as–

n  SIPRNET.

n  Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network.

n  Electronic intelligence interface.

n  LE specific information exchange networks.

Police Intelligence Fusion Cells

6-53.   Fusion is a collaborative effort between two or more organizations working together and sharing resources, expertise, and information to enhance the ability of all participating elements to detect, investigate, and respond to prevent or mitigate crime and criminal activity. It involves the processing of information from multiple systems, assets, and sources, and translating that information into refined information and police intelligence products that increase situational understanding and knowledge. Fusion enables commanders and Army LE to have a significant "observe, orient, decide, and act" advantage over criminal networks and terrorist groups, cells, and individuals. This effort enables commanders, PMs, and LE investigators to guide and direct actions that achieve desired effects. The combination of trained and experienced staff, LE personnel, and police intelligence analysts, coupled with open information-sharing agreements and advances in technology, allows all elements participating in the fusion process to analyze a variety of information from different organizations, collection assets, and systems to more effectively produce actionable police intelligence for personnel making decisions.

6-54.   In some cases, a police intelligence fusion cell may be formed to facilitate collaboration, integration, and fusion of police information and intelligence with other LE and intelligence agencies and organizations. The primary purpose of a police intelligence fusion cell is the collation, correlation, and fusion of data from multiple sources, enabling further analysis to produce actionable police intelligence and increased knowledge concerning police, crime, and criminal activities. This enables the military police and USACIDC staff and police intelligence analyst to build a coherent picture of the environment to increase SU and enable informed decisionmaking by commanders, PMs, and LE investigators regarding policing and investigative activities. Collaboration of LE and MI information and intelligence in a police intelligence fusion cell enhances the overall police intelligence effort.

6-55.   Fusion cells are typically formed to support specific investigations, missions, and operations. They are also typically more focused and meet more frequently than working groups. These cells may be required to work continuously to support their assigned mission and purpose. Police intelligence fusion can provide police information and police intelligence to the operations process and supporting integrating processes. The CITF is an example of a fusion cell. In the United States, these cells may include local, county, state, federal, tribal, and all source intelligence agencies operating in or supporting policing and LE operations in the AO. Outside the United States, this agency interaction and coordination may include other military units, military and civilian U.S. and multinational organizations, host nation LE elements, and OGAs. The composition of the fusion cell in any environment is dependent on the specific mission of the organizations and agencies involved. Table 6-1 shows an example of the composition for a police intelligence fusion cell.

Table 6-1. Example of police intelligence fusion cell composition

In Support of Post, Camps, Stations, and Civil Support Operations

In Support of Full Spectrum Operations Outside the U.S. or its Territories

Military police (to include DA civilian police)

Military police (to include DA civilian police)

USACIDC

USACIDC

Local, state, and federal LE

Civilian police

902d Military Intelligence

902d Military Intelligence

 

G-2 or S-2

 

host nation police and security forces

Legend:

DA����������������������������������� Department of the Army

G-2���������������������������������� Army Chief of Staff, Intelligence

host nation����������������������� host nation

LE������������������������������������ law enforcement

S-2����������������������������������� intelligence staff officer

U.S.��������������������������������� United States

USACIDC������������������������� United States Army Criminal Investigation Command

 

6-56.   The employment of police intelligence fusion activities is applicable across the full spectrum of conflict. Fusion activities work well for analyzing complex criminal organizations and establishing trends, patterns, and associations from information gathered across a large AO and multiple organizational areas and jurisdictions. These activities can identify duplications of effort and enable participating elements to eliminate unnecessary duplications of collection and analysis activities. The effective application of fusion activities can facilitate the coordination and synchronization of local, state, national, international, service intelligence, and private-sector organization capabilities while simultaneously enhancing the commander's COP.


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