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The A320 series: how time flies

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It's 25 years since the Airbus A320 entered service, and it has done for Airbus what the iPod did for Apple. 


In honour of the occasion, I dug this picture (below) out of my archives. It records what, for me, was the most historic moment in my flying career.

You can tell from the little you can see of the cockpit that this is not an A320. 

It's an A300 actually, but it has a sidestick. It was the A300 testbed for the A320's fly-by-wire system. 


Flying the sidestick A300.jpg
Sitting beside me in the right hand seat (taking the picture) was Airbus' chief engineer and test pilot Bernard Ziegler, one of the Airbus original team. In front of him was a traditional control yoke which was conventionally connected to the control surfaces. 

My sidestick, on the other hand, was sending electrical signals to a bank of computers, mounted behind me in the cabin, that would vet my demands and pass them on to the control actuators. My demands would remain unmodified unless I made a demand that would take the aircraft outside its flight envelope.

Incidentally if Ziegler had had his way, Airbus' first product - the A300 - would have been FBW-controlled, but (probably wisely) the rest of the team thought it best to arrive on the scene with something uncontroversial, because the A300 already had a unique selling point: it was the world's first widebody twinjet.

When this photograph was taken - in December 1983 -we were flying over south-western France at 18,000ft. The look of concentration on my face is the result of Ziegler's instruction to me. He had just told me to try and stall the aircraft. 

I tried, but it wouldn't let me. The rest is history.

During the couple of days I spent in Toulouse at that time, investigating Airbus' plans for the service entry of this revolutionary airliner, I was fascinated with the implications for commercial air transport of the A320's control philosophy. Here is an account of that visit and the answers to some of the questions I asked then, all of which are still relevant now.

...all the way to impact....

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Why two pilots on the flightdeck? 

Because it works? 

Actually it often doesn't.

One of the most frequently-cited examples of the failure of the multi-crew monitoring concept is the Eastern Airlines Lockheed TriStar accident back in 1972. On a night approach to Miami there was a problem with the landing gear indication, and the crew of three (two pilots and a flight engineer) fixated on that while the aircraft quietly descended into the Everglades, killing 5 crew and 94 passengers.

The theory, of course, is that while one pilot is flying an aircraft, the other pilot is watching to make sure he flies right.

In theory! But it often doesn't work that way.

As Boeing's Capt Philip Adrian described it at the Royal Aeronautical Society last week, the Eastern accident - and many others like it since then - was a case of three pairs of eyes "monitoring all the way to impact".

You have to be sure you are monitoring the things that really matter.

I'm having a look again at the monitoring issue because statistics show that, unless two pilots in a crew have a really well-coordinated working relationship, there might as well be only one.

Unless a pilot has been trained via the (relatively new) MPL route, s/he was trained to fly as an individual, without any help, and without being trained (or tested) in people management skills (for which read crew management skills). 

The reward for the individualistic training system is a CPL, which becomes an ATPL just by accumulating airborne time.

If you are on your own in charge of an aeroplane, life may get busy sometimes, but at least you are definitely in charge; there's no-one there to confuse you. And flying is pretty simple anyway...

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So, why two pilots? Well, if we want to understand where we are, it helps to understand where we came from.

From about 1930 to 1980 it was like this: the Captain knew what He was doing, and the copilot would do what he was told. The copilot wasn't actually much use, he was just doing apprenticeship time.

When aeroplanes got bigger and more complex, the Flight Engineer was added the crew. The Captain and Fight Engineer talked, and heeded each other's advice. 

While the Captain was doing the flying, the copilot did what he was told and quietly got on with tasks he hoped might be useful. 

When the copilot was doing the flying, the Captain's job was to give him a hard time and make a man of him (heaven help the few female copilots in the business at the time).

In the 1970s Flight Engineers were gradually made redundant by automated technology, and the Captain suddenly found himself quite busy in his fast, complex jet aeroplane. It gradually dawned on Him that He still had someone to shout at but no-one to talk to. 

In the same decade, crew resource management (CRM) was invented to try to make the Captain use the copilot's skills, despite the fact that the Captain knew perfectly well that the copilot didn't have any. 

So CRM largely failed until the Traditional Captains began to retire. Even then, CRM had a bit of an experimental feel about it, and in some airlines it still does.

In theory, whichever pilot is doing the flying, the other one assists with simple tasks like selecting gear or flaps, and making radio calls, but mainly his/her task is monitoring the PF's  actions, the results of those actions on the flight path, and comparing what is happening with what is intended. 

As I argued in the previous blog, monitoring is a core piloting task, but it remains an underrated one. Good monitoring could have prevented countless fatal airline accidents in the last 20 years. And in most of them, the captain was doing the flying and the copilot was failing either to monitor effectively, or to intervene effectively, or both. 

One of the most oft-repeated truths at the RAeS conference was that monitoring without an intervention strategy is pointless. 

The monitoring pilot must be able to challenge what is happening, and be heeded even if s/he happens to be the junior pilot. Ultimately, for the captain to say "I have control" is not a problem, but for a copilot to say it is culturally fraught with complexity, even though it should not be.

This subject needs the scrutiny it is now being given.

Not so humble: the Pilot Monitoring

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The "pilot not flying" (PNF) is not such a humble role, according to developing wisdom. Even when it's being carried out by the copilot.

Besides which, PNF is now out of favour as a role description, replaced by PM (pilot monitoring). 

In the USA the latter has been common currency for a while, but it is now crossing the Atlantic eastward.

Right now the Royal Aeronautical Society is running a two-day conference on the task of the Pilot Monitoring, on the grounds that so many serious recent accidents (let alone iconic accidents back in the 1970s and earlier could have been prevented if the role was carried out effectively. The Monitoring theme has been adopted for the RAeS's second conference on Preparing the Aircraft Commander for the 21st Century.

But we were never taught how to monitor effectively, were we? It was just one of those things it was assumed you could do. Or, like that mysterious quality known as good airmanship, it was assumed you either had it or you didn't.

One thing that's always been said is that humans are okay at doing things, but hopeless at monitoring them. Is that inevitably true?

There is no industry best practice for the art of being a good PM. But a lot of people - ops people, trainers, academics, psychologists - are gathered at the RAeS trying to work out whether there could be, and what the learn-able components of good monitoring might be.

Just listening to the presentations on the first day (today), being a good PM is a very complex task, and is often busier than that of the PF.

My favourite quote of the day came from Prof Helena Reidemar, a human factors specialist at the University of Central Missouri working in its Aviation Safety Masters Degree programme. She is also a Boeing 767 First Officer at Delta and Director of Human Factors at ALPA.

She said: "Monitoring is a core piloting skill as much as stick and rudder skills are".

Well, we'd better get better at it then.

How to build a brand that cruises above the rest

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British Airways, as a world brand, is second only to Apple among businesses with a base in the UK, and beats all its airline peers according to Business and Consumer Superbrands.

Meanwhile as a consumer brand, BA makes it to number four in a list topped by Rolex, Apple and Microsoft, in that order - and scores ahead of Coca Cola, Google and Hilton.

Quite an achievement. But how?

A brand may be an idea in people's heads, but reality has to play a part in it.

So BA must be doing at least something right simply as an airline delivering a travel product, or the image wouldn't be sustainable. 

Although BA is well known for working hard to promote its First and Club Classes, it has avoided doing so at the expense of its economy image. The airline has successfully sold the idea that all its passengers are buying a difference: something at least a little bit special. 

In a marketplace now dominated by the demand for cheap travel, success in promoting this "difference" idea without pricing one's product out of the game was never guaranteed. But BA kept the faith and is reaping the reward.

Meanwhile Ryanair, with the expansion of its cheap, ruthlessly efficient short-haul passenger processing system - has made BA's marketing job easier by creating an aviation version of economic austerity fatigue. It has heightened the distinction BA strove for.

BA's television advertisement last year was a masterstroke. Far from pushing hackneyed images of smiling stewardesses handing champagne to business travellers in a premium cabin, the airline went out on a limb. 

Instead it presented itself as a real, flying business, with a long, pioneering aviation heritage. It successfully generated the feeling of excitement, adventure and glamour that used to be associated with air travel.

Most people still want to think of travel as an adventure. BA has just tapped into their dreams.

Well done.



Single-engine IMC: is Europe going there anyway?

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Helsinki Vantaa-based Hendell Aviation has just been licensed by the Finnish Civil Aviation Authority for single-engine commercial flights under instrument meteorological conditions (SE-IMC) using its turboprop Pilatus PC-12s. 

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SE-IMC commercial passenger flight is recognised by the International Civil Aviation Organisation but not by all European Union states. The problem for those - usually countries with fickle weather - who don't feel able to accept the ICAO standard, is what happens in IMC if the single engine fails. If it's cargo or private flight, the argument goes, people should be allowed to take that risk, but for commercial flight the passengers should not be given the option.

Meanwhile the same passengers would be allowed to charter an ancient, unpressurised, piston-engined Piper Navajo whose performance condemns it to the icing layer below 10,000ft, and this is permitted on the grounds that it has two engines, even if its performance on one is - to put it politely - marginal, and the chances of a failure are more than twice that of a modern turboprop. 

It's easy to appreciate the dilemma the authorities have, but the arguments should be guided more now by incident statistics and the increasing performance and capabilities of modern onboard avionics and flight management systems in aeroplanes like the latest PC-12s. 

Meanwhile the authorities should start asking questions about the advisability of allowing indefinite grandfather rights for ancient piston twins that ply legally for passenger charter. They will never leave the marketplace to more modern equipment if they are provided with an artificial advantage by outdated rules.

Meanwhile Hendell's chief executive officer Matti Auterinen says his company's licence enables him to fly his PC-12s in most parts of Russia, Belarus, and Europe as a one- or two-pilot operation depending on whether the task is pure cargo, or passenger/air ambulance. 

The European Aviation Safety Agency is currently framing rules on SE-IMC operations and these, Auterinen admits, these may eventually affect his carrier. The effect could be positive or negative depending on the outcome.

Auterinen said he tends to the optimistic, reasoning that arguing a case for departing from ICAO Annex 6, Part 1 Para 5.4, which has defined successful SE-IMC operations in North America and much of the rest of the world, is legally difficult to justify, especially while far less reliable operations by vintage twin-piston-engined aircraft are permitted under grandfather rights.
 
Asked whether he believes the certification his company has just won is significant in Europe, Auterinen says categorically yes.

He sees future argument about operational limitations turning as much on the professional skills of an SE-IMC-trained two-pilot crew as the capabilities of the airframe/engine combination, explaining: "If it's done well with a properly trained two-pilot crew drilled in well-tried procedures for single-engine aircraft, we could be looking at a new era." 

With the pressurised PC-12 able to fly at flight levels close to 30,000ft, he pointed out, the glide capabilities give a crew a huge choice of landing options, and using the the UK Royal Air Force high-key/low-key glide approach technique combined with a battery system that permits the autopilot to remain engaged, SE-IMC looks a different prospect than it did some years ago.

If Auterinen is right, chartering a civilised aircraft for less than the price of a small twinjet will become an option.

Virtual first flights for the A350

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Airbus revealed today that the test-bed A350 XWB - known as "aircraft zero" - has started its vrtual first flight (VFF) programme, which the manufacturer describes as "a key step in the final preparation for the actual first flight of aircraft MSN 1 [manufacturer serial No 1] by the middle of this year".

"Aircraft zero" is, in its own way, real: it is the linking of the "iron bird" electric, hydraulic and flight control test bench with a flight deck integration simulator. The manufacturer explains: "This provides the closest core system test environment to the effective first flight of MSN 1. For this campaign, aircraft zero is equipped with a standard of equipment fully representative of MSN 1's first flight."

Airbus continues: "The campaign, set to last for several months, has two main objectives. The first is to prepare for first flight, by simulating normal and abnormal operational  scenarios prior to first flight, verifying the aircraft systems and handling aspects.  The second objective is to ensure maturity by detecting and resolving potential issues as early as possible. The VFF campaign will also allow the flight crew to fully prepare for the first flight and the subsequent flight test programme."


Designing the beginning with the end in view

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Back in the 1950s and early 1960s, aeroplane manufacturers designed a new product essentially because they could. They were pretty sure it would fly, but would it fly well and safely? When it proved it could fly, they started selling it, and began fixing all the fixable things they found that were wrong with it.

My, how things have changed. 

Now, on its maiden flight, the new aircraft is expected to perform to the specification against which hundreds have already been sold.

But much more is going on than that, as I learned recently on a visit to Bombardier at Montreal.

Now an aircraft is "designed for the environment", on the grounds that decisions at the design stage "will affect the planet for 20-30 years", as Bombardier puts it. 

This is not entirely an altruistic aim, although clearly a responsible one. 

Bombardier aims to ensure that "aviation does not become socially undesirable", so that aeroplanes keep selling. Meanwhile, as the company points out, "aircraft that are recognised as environmentally friendly will be more highly valued".

So much for the aeroplane's life. But what of its death?

Bombardier has provided a CRJ100 approaching the end of its life to the Ecole Polytechnique de Montreal - specifically to its Research Centre for the Life Cycle of Products, Processes and Services. This academic institution will strip down the machine and assess, in minute detail, its recyclability. What they find, says Bombardier, will become part of the company's design and manufacturing considerations for the future.

As the Ecole's Prof Rejean Samson says: "We can't afford to make mistakes any more. The stakes are too high. We're facing depletion of natural resources and dramatic climate change. Sustainable development is the only way to slow these trends, and the life-cycle assessment approach is so far the best tool to make wise investment decisions for the future."


Running out of options

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Helicopter pilots have one of the most demanding jobs in aviation. 

The flying itself is usually totally hands-on, totally visual, involves flying relatively close to the ground during the en-route phase, and frequently involves flying extremely close to buildings or other obstructions on the approach to the destination landing point.

This was certainly true of the task for the pilot flying the Agusta Westland AW109E when it hit a crane over Vauxhall, just south-west of London's West End, at  precisely 07:59:29 on 16 January.

The UK Air Accident Investigation Branch has just published an interim Special Bulletin releasing some of the facts established so far about the accident, but providing no analysis.

The weather was foggy over London below about 1,500ft and, at the time of the collision, the helicopter had been cleared to fly "not above 1,500ft", because that area of central London is beneath the main approach path to Heathrow airport. Crossing traffic has to stay low.

Back to the early morning before the flight: 

The pilot, Capt Peter Barnes, reported to his base at Redhill aerodrome, at 06:30, knowing his task was to fly to Elstree aerodrome to pick up a client.

That entails a 20min flight more or less due north across central London. Barnes knew that Elstree was in freezing fog, but he made the decision to go and have a look anyway.

He knew he had some personal advantages on a day when the weather made his task a marginal one. He knew it would involve continual risk assessment, mainly because of the poor visibility at low level, but he was extremely experienced, fully capable of flying on instruments, and he was piloting a twin-engined aircraft with a cockpit equipped for IFR (instrument flight rules) flying.

On departure from Redhill for Elstree, air traffic control cleared him to fly across London "not above 1,000ft", on a track that would pass over Battersea heliport. He was flying under SVFR (special visual flight rules, which means "in sight of the surface and clear of cloud"). But in a text message he sent just after passing Battersea, he said "Can't see Batts", so we know he was not continuously in sight of the surface.

When he got to Elstree he made his first obvious risk-assessment decision: Elstree visibility was not good enough to land. He made the decision to return to Redhill, and asked for clearance to re-cross London. Thames Radar gave him permission to fly "not above 1,500ft" via the London Eye.

When the helicopter was established en route, flying south at 1,500ft, about 8min before the collision with the crane, ATC asked Barnes if he wanted an instrument flight rules (IFR) radar-guided transit, but he replied: "I have good VMC on top here, that's fine." VMC is visual meteorological conditions. In other words, he was flying above the fog with good visibility at that height and did not want help.

At 07:55, Barnes' client texted him: "Battersea is open". 

In the same minute, Barnes texted back to base: "Can't get in Elstree hdg back assume still clear". Base texted back, still at 07:55, about 4min before the collision with the crane, "Yes its still fine here". That was the last text Barnes either sent or received, but ten texts altogether had been sent or received by Barnes during this flight.

Guessing what the client had in mind, Barnes asked ATC whether he could head to Battersea, and the controller told him he'd check and get back to him. At 07:57 Barnes told ATC: "I can actually see Vauxhall" and proposed that he could join the prescribed helicopter route along the Thames river. He was told: "Hold over the river for the minute between Vauxhall and Westminster bridges and I'll call you back." 

The map below shows the remainder of the flight. 

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Barnes did not hold over the river in the area instructed but headed for a position on the river more or less where Battersea heliport is, and began descending from 1,500ft to an altitude below 1,000ft, going as low as 570ft. Over the river opposite Battersea, Barnes turned right in a loop through more than 180deg, and headed along the river to the east.

At 07:59:10 ATC called, clearing him to Battersea, and providing him with the frequency, 122.9mHz, to call the heliport. He never made the call.

Fatally, Barnes turned right to reverse his heading along the Thames, and tracked south of the river's southern bank into the area of high rise construction at St George's Wharf. This construction work had been accurately Notamed, so Barnes should have been aware of it, and probably was.

It would have been better if he had turned left, but the commander's seat in a helicopter is on the right side of the cockpit, so you can see better into the turn if you go right than left.

But at that point, in poor visibility, with a 180deg turn to carry out, a frequency change to make on his radio, the river and buildings to watch as he turned, and Battersea heliport to find visually, he was probably overloaded.

If Barnes had seen the crane in time he would not have hit it.

Witnesses on the ground testify that the top of the building and the crane were invisible in fog. The precise horizontal visibility at the height the helicopter was flying at impact is unknown and may remain so.

When the AAIB publishes its final report, expect to see expressions like "continued VFR flight into IMC" (instrument meteorological conditions). And although the pilot was not texting just before the accident, there may be some recommendations about the practice of communicating like this while flying, especially for a solo pilot.




It matters how we fly

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Talking about his imminent departure from the Flight Safety Foundation for an executive safety oversight role at the FAA, FSF chief Bill Voss said:  "I look forward to getting back into the operational world to see if I can still do more than make speeches. The FAA never runs out of challenges."

Bill did a lot more at the FSF than make speeches, but what can he do at the FAA? He certainly knows it well - he worked there before he went to ICAO and then to the FSF.

Commercial aviation safety in the USA may not be perfect, but it's so good that the FAA, because of how it's constituted, has its hands tied behind its back. It cannot justify updating outdated regulation on the cost/benefit grounds that it needs to be able to demonstrate to be permitted to make changes. That means the organisation cannot change a regulation just because it should, or because it's right to do so.

In turn, that means existing FAA regulation is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the modern world and the FAA might as well admit that it has no safety oversight role except to cajole the industry into doing the right thing, and apply fines for technical breaches of regulations. Maybe that will work, up to a point, but it's a strange way to operate a government safety oversight agency.

Last year at Flightglobal's London safety conference Bill delivered a keynote speech in which he shared some of his thoughts about airline operations today. Despite welcoming the unprecedented safety levels being achieved today, he said this: "I don't feel we have this under control yet. The system seems fragile."

He referred to the aircraft certification assumption that the pilot is there "to pick up the pieces when the automation fails". Because of airline standard operating procedures which enjoin pilots not to do any of the flying, Voss observed, "today's pilots follow the flight director and find the raw information a mere nuisance".

Part of the reason for the latter, he commented, is that the ratio of training time to flying time is so low that "fixing training is much less of an issue than looking at how we fly".

He's not the first to bemoan the fact that today's highly automated, highly reliable operations do not provide pilots with any on-the-job training, which used to be one of the assumed benefits of experience.

But if the airlines don't make use of revenue flying time for keeping their pilots in touch with their aeroplanes, they will have to invest serious money in correcting that training/operating ratio. Which they won't do without coercion.


See the previous blog entry for Airbus' thoughts on similar issues

Learning to fly the A350XWB at Toulouse

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If you go to Airbus for your A350XWB type rating training, you'll have some fun. Officially.

Since modern aeroplanes are racks of computers surrounded by an airframe that's actually just an ordinary aeroplane, Airbus has studied the way  in which people - especially children - learn to operate a  new electronic device, and modified its A350 type rating course accordingly.

Children - and most adults -  don't even use the quick-start guide with a new gadget, but just turn it on and start to find out how it works by experimenting with it. As Airbus' head  of flight crew development Christian Norden points out, this not only leads to quick learning, "it is also more fun".

But there's more to it than that. Accident and incident data for the last 15y unequivocally shows that, across the world fleet, pilots' manual aircraft management skills are declining significantly, so Airbus is going to use a more hands-on learning process for pilots - from the start - to allow them to familiarise themselves with the aircraft and its manual handling characteristics. They'll have a bunch of new training devices including a full flight simulator to play with. When the "gamers" start to feel familiar with their environment and more confident about handling the aircraft, they will gradually gain expertise at using the automated systems also.

Airbus has made a science of studying the skills needed specifically to fly the world's highly automated aircraft, and has come up with more than 300 essentials, according to Capt David Owens, head of flight crew training policy.

It has distilled these down to just four "Golden Rules", and boxes of wallet-size plastic cards printed with these arrived at the Toulouse Training Centre when I was there two days ago.

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This is what it says:

1.    1.   Fly, navigate  and communicate (in this order and with appropriate task-sharing)

2.    2.   Use the appropriate level of automation at all times

3.     3.  Understand the flight mode annunciator at all times

4.      4. Take action if things do not go as expected

If you were flying a 707 you'd just have the first one. That sounds simple, but would you honestly opt to go back there?

The message is: feel at home with your aeroplane as a manual flying machine. The automation is good, so use it, but watch it, and if you don't like what you see, trip it out.

It's about time somebody not only said it, but started training people to do it.

The first to benefit will be the first A350 pilots who start training very soon. But gradually Airbus will adopt this training philosophy across all its types.

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