From the Los Angeles Times
Iraq convoy was sent out despite threat
Unarmored trucks carrying needed supplies
were ambushed, leaving six drivers dead. Records illuminate the fateful
decision.
By T. Christian Miller
Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
September 3, 2007
Senior managers for defense contractor KBR overruled calls to halt
supply operations in Iraq in the spring of 2004, ordering unarmored
trucks into an active combat zone where six civilian drivers died in an
ambush, according to newly available documents.
Company e-mails and other internal communications reveal that before
KBR dispatched the convoy, a chorus of security advisors predicted an
increase in roadside bombings and attacks on Iraq's highways. They
recommended suspension of convoys.
"[I] think we will get people injured or killed tomorrow," warned KBR
regional security chief George Seagle, citing "tons of intel." But in
an e-mail sent a day before the convoy was dispatched, he also
acknowledged: "Big politics and contract issues involved."
KBR was under intense pressure from the military to deliver on its
multibillion-dollar contract to transport food, fuel and other vital
supplies to U.S. soldiers. At Baghdad's airport, a shortage of jet fuel
threatened to ground some units.
After consulting with military commanders, KBR's top managers decided
to keep the convoys rolling. "If the [Army] pushes, then we push, too,"
wrote an aide to Craig Peterson, KBR's top official in Iraq.
The decision prompted a raging internal debate that is detailed in
private KBR documents, some under court seal, that were reviewed by The
Times.
One KBR management official threatened to resign when superiors ordered
truckers to continue driving. "I cannot consciously sit back and allow
unarmed civilians to get picked apart," wrote Keith Richard, chief of
the trucking operation.
Six American truck drivers and two U.S. soldiers were killed when the
convoy rumbled into a five-mile gauntlet of weapons fire on April 9,
2004, making an emergency delivery of jet fuel to the airport. One
soldier and a seventh trucker remain missing.
Recriminations began the same day.
"Can anyone explain to me why we put civilians in the middle of known
ambush sites?" demanded one security advisor in an e-mail. "Maybe we
should put body bags on the packing list for our drivers."
Another wrote, "I cannot believe this has happened; the ones
responsible should be held accountable for this."
The previously undisclosed documents raise new questions about the U.S.
military's growing reliance on civilian contractors to help fight wars.
Selected e-mails, some of them excerpts, were cited in a May 22 letter
to the Justice Department by lawyers suing the Houston-based giant on
behalf of the dead drivers' families. The families and most of the
survivors of the convoy seek a federal criminal probe of KBR's role in
the episode.
To confirm the excerpts, The Times reviewed internal memos, e-mails and
court-sealed depositions, obtained a copy of an Army investigative
report on the incident and interviewed several KBR truck drivers and
former military officials.
Attorneys for KBR reacted angrily to inquiries about the documents. In
a letter urging The Times to "refrain from publishing" material under
court seal, attorney Michael L. Rice also warned that the paper might
be subject to unspecified legal sanctions.
KBR officials declined to be interviewed. In the past, they have said
that the Army was responsible for selecting convoy routes and providing
adequate protection.
Scott Allen, a lawyer for the families, confirmed that he had sent a
letter to the Justice Department, but declined further comment and
advised the families and surviving drivers to avoid interviews. A
department spokesman acknowledged receiving the letter but also
declined to comment.
The documentary record, though incomplete, provides the first
behind-the-scenes look at a day when military goals clashed with
corporate responsibilities, with soldiers and civilian truckers in the
middle.
What follows is an account of the Good Friday convoy attack, based on
the e-mails, court records and interviews.
Growing fearsInside a long row of white trailers that served as
KBR's office at Camp Anaconda, the region's main logistics hub, there
was growing unease in the early days of April.
Violence had surged throughout the region. The mutilated bodies of
American contractors had just been removed from a bridge in Fallouja.
The military was battling simultaneous Shiite and Sunni uprisings.
It would turn out to be one of the deadliest months of the war for
American soldiers and contractors -- and KBR's truck drivers were
caught in the crossfire. Trucking program chief Richard fired off
e-mails to superiors in Houston and Kuwait describing the growing risks
to his drivers.
"One of my convoys was hit with 14 mortars, 6 RPGs, 5 IEDs and small
arms fire," Richard wrote April 7. Senior KBR management in Iraq
suspended travel, with Richard telling one colleague in an e-mail that
the roads were "too dangerous."
Several convoys were canceled that week. Delayed shipments contributed
to spot shortages when many supplies were needed most.
KBR -- then part of Halliburton Co., the company once run by Vice
President Dick Cheney -- delivered 80% to 90% of the military's fuel,
according to one senior logistics officer.
That meant that if KBR didn't move, neither could the U.S. Army. Unlike
soldiers, contractors don't have to follow orders.
"We had to get food to the soldiers. We had to get fuel to the
soldiers," the officer said. "This was a war."
That was clear to KBR dispatchers on April 8, when the first convoys
that had moved out onto the highways started reporting gunfire.
"Things started early this a.m. and it hasn't been good," one of the
trucking project managers advised in an e-mail.
"Gentlemen . . . HOT!!! We have a convoy . . . that is in direct
engagement at this time . . . and pleads for immediate assistance,"
reported a security advisor.
Vivid reports came in from the field. "We are taking on gun fire,
mortared, rocket launch, small arms fire you name it, we got it, we are
losing trucks one by one. . . my driver and I were lucky to get out
alive."
By the end of Thursday, one KBR driver was dead and more than 70 had
been attacked. Several were seriously injured. Because the next day was
a Shiite holiday as well as Good Friday, security advisors worried that
sectarian violence might add to the danger. They were of one voice
calling for suspension of convoys.
"I say we halt them for a day at least and consider it a
safety/security stand-down, and mental health day," security chief
Seagle wrote on April 8. "There is tons of intel stating tomorrow will
be another bad day."
Trucking chief Richard agreed. "Another day like today and we will lose
most of our drivers."
Unable to actDespite their mounting fears, KBR security advisors
had no authority to halt convoy deployment. They lost that on Monday,
April 5, when that power was abruptly limited to Richard and his boss
-- KBR General Manager Craig Peterson. It angered the security team.
"Yeah, well I have been authorized for a year now to stop convoys now
all of a sudden Keith [Richard] . . . is the only one who can. . . .
well partner believe me the ball is in his court," groused one.
The documents show that Peterson, a retired Army general then new to
KBR, was determined to meet the company's contractual obligations with
the military, which he repeatedly referred to as "the customer."
Peterson was adamant that the civilian truckers had to move out when
the military called for them.
After a meeting with military commanders, he noted in an e-mail that
"it was reiterated that only the army leadership can stop convoys" and
that it was necessary "to team our way into decisions. We cannot
unilaterally decide these things on our own."
There was sharp disagreement inside the company. "We cannot allow the
Army to push us to put our people in harms way," wrote Tom Crum, then
the chief operating officer for KBR's logistics operations.
"We need to work with the Army without a doubt relative to stopping the
convoys. But if we in management believe the Army is asking us to put
our KBR employees in danger that we are not willing to accept, then we
will refuse to go," Crum insisted.
Richard also argued that the truckers were not soldiers. "Our drivers
did sign up with the understanding of some level of hostility, but they
did not expect to be in the middle of a war," he said in an e-mail.
One of Peterson's aides sent a note scolding Richard. "[Peterson] says
that if the client pushes, then we push," the message said. It also
specified that convoys should stop only if security was not adequate
and "doesn't pass the Common Sense Safety Test."
Richard was clearly rankled. "Who in the hell determines adequate
security . . . ? This is a roll of the dice. None of this passes any of
these tests if you ask me," said a Richard e-mail.
He threatened to resign.
"With this decision I cannot continue my employment with KBR. . . . I
cannot consciously sit back and allow unarmed civilians to get picked
apart," he wrote in e-mail messages. "Putting civilians in the middle
of a war is not in any contract, policy or procedure. I will not allow
this to happen."
But after a long day of armed attacks on his drivers and arguments with
his boss, Richard issued a terse e-mail at 10:26 p.m., employing a
familiar phrase:
"If the military pushes, we push," he wrote.
Supplies urgently neededAt Baghdad's airport, dwindling fuel
supplies threatened to idle two military divisions, according to the
Army report. Military commanders called for 200,000 gallons of jet fuel
to be rushed from Camp Anaconda.
Notes taken during conversations surrounding that decision underscore
the urgency of the situation.
"Has to happen . . . 1st light has to go . . . emergency push," read
some of the notes as reproduced in the Army report.
Gen. James E. Chambers, the head of Army's 13th Corps Support Command
(Coscom), issued explicit orders to his officers: "Not moving critical
support is not an option," he wrote in an e-mail sent before dawn April
9. "We just have to figure out how to mitigate the risks."
The orders were passed down to military units that escort KBR convoys
with an Anaconda commander's comment attached: "Note the statement
about convoys. They move."
But there was dissent among military command staff, too. At a 6 a.m.
intelligence briefing, Chambers was told that the road leading to
Baghdad's airport was too dangerous for civilians, according to Col.
Ray Josey, head of operations for Chambers.
"We should just stand down," Josey said he told Chambers.
Others argued it was safe enough. In the end, Chambers ordered the jet
fuel cargo to move. But he also ordered a beefed-up military escort for
the KBR convoy: more Humvees, double the ammunition and an armed
soldier in every truck cab.
Chambers, now head of the Army's Transportation Center at Ft. Eustis,
Va., declined comment through a spokesman, citing the pending
litigation. Josey, who soon after was relieved of his post by Chambers,
is now retired in Texas.
At KBR the decision to move was again in doubt as dawn arrived.
In a message time-stamped 6:44 a.m. April 9 -- nearly an hour after
Chambers' order -- Richard sent a message to all drivers: "No convoys
are to move" between Anaconda and the military bases south of Baghdad.
The stand-down lasted only 25 minutes.
At 7:14 a.m. another message moved over the KBR communications system.
It read:
"Per Keith Richards, project manager, all traffic is to proceed as
normal. All . . . traffic lanes are open in all directions."
It is not clear what caused the orders to shift back and forth.
Richard, through his attorney, declined to be interviewed. He no longer
works for KBR.
Company officials have said that KBR depended on the military for
guidance about when and whether roads were safe to travel, indicating
in court proceedings that the Army said the route was safe before
departure.
The Army report found that on April 9 there was confusion among
different military units about the status of the route to the airport.
The military unit monitoring road safety listed the road as a no-go the
entire day, but Coscom commanders did not consult the unit in
dispatching the convoy.
At KBR there was no such confusion. Six KBR convoys already had been
attacked around the airport that same morning. Also, Stephen Pulley,
KBR's senior security advisor at Camp Anaconda, was in frequent contact
with the road monitoring unit and received repeated assurances the
routes were closed.
When 13th Coscom suddenly advised that the roads had opened, Pulley was
skeptical.
"Something smells," he wrote.
'I'm hit, I'm hit'KBR drivers led by Thomas Hamill, a
Mississippi dairy farmer, were assembled in the dusty staging area of
Camp Anaconda ready to roll that Friday morning, unaware of the
internal debates. Hamill was not one to second-guess orders -- whatever
they were.
"When I went over there, I said: 'I won't refuse to go out on a mission
as long as the U.S. Army is willing to escort me out,' " he said. "If
they didn't want to go out, then I wouldn't go out."
A few minutes after 10 a.m., the 26-vehicle convoy rolled out -- 19 KBR
trucks and seven military vehicles driven by soldiers from the 724th
Army Reserve Transportation Company from Illinois. The convoy stretched
nearly a mile and a half.
About the same time -- 9:54 a.m. -- Lt. Col. James Carroll, a reservist
from Missouri working at 13th Coscom, confirmed orders sending the
convoy on a route to Baghdad airport that took it right through a
battle between the Mahdi Army and 1st Cavalry.
Three minutes later, Carroll reversed himself and sent out a second
e-mail: "Sorry. It looks like [the route] is closed until further
notice."
By mistake, however, Carroll sent the second message to himself, and no
one else ever saw it, according to the Army report. In an interview,
Carroll disputed that account, saying that he called military escorts
to warn them not to proceed on the route.
"When I saw that I sent the e-mail to myself, I did everything I could"
to reach them, Carroll said. "It was the worst day of my life. You
can't believe how much I second-guessed myself . . . [but] I firmly
believe that I did everything I could."
Hamill's convoy reached the airport area about noon. He saw the
landscape already littered with burning trucks. His truck was hit and
disabled by a roadside bomb, forcing Hamill to scramble for cover.
He later was taken captive by a band of gunmen.
The other truckers drove on through fire and smoke. As bullet rounds
pierced their cargo tanks, fuel spilled to the ground, making the road
slippery. Brakes failed. Trucks jackknifed and flipped over. More
roadside bombs detonated.
The sounds of battle crackled over the drivers' radios.
"I'm burning!" screamed one driver.
"I'm hit, I'm hit," called another.
In an incident report, one of the escort soldiers wrote: "I started
hearing bullets hit all over our trucks, around my head and door. They
were zipping by. We pushed through the flames and kept rolling. It was
just hell."
Eddie Sanchez, a driver from New Mexico, was rescued by U.S. soldiers.
He recalled one who seemed angry, demanding: "Who are you guys? What
are you guys doing out there? We have been fighting those guys for over
48 hours."
The final tally was grim. Six KBR drivers were dead. Most other drivers
were wounded. Besides the kidnapped Hamill, another was missing. Tim
Bell now is presumed dead. Two soldiers were killed. A third, Matt
Maupin, was captured by insurgents and is still listed as missing.
Hamill escaped after nearly three weeks and is back in the U.S.
Only six of the 19 KBR trucks reached the airport. Across Iraq, all 122
convoys sent out by KBR on April 9 were attacked, according to KBR.
Richard was devastated by the loss of his drivers, according to Pulley,
who worked closely with him at Anaconda.
"I thought the man was going to break down and cry after he found out
he sent all those people out there," Pulley said in a deposition. "He
was very upset with himself."
Randy Ross, a driver whose truck limped into the airport on steel rims,
his tanker and tires blasted with holes, said he blamed neither KBR nor
the military. He blamed Iraq.
"It was a bad day," said Ross, who, like Hamill, is not part of the
suit. "It was a very bad day."
After the attack, Peterson stopped the trucks. "No KBR convoys will
move tomorrow, 10th April 04. I will inform the military chain of
command," he said in an e-mail.
Peterson, now a senior vice president at IAP Worldwide Services, a
Florida-based military contractor, declined through a spokesman to
comment.
In an e-mail sent to an Army general shortly after the convoy disaster,
Peterson asked: "Do you think there was any way we could have predicted
the events of 8/9 April, the convoy hits? Do you think we had any real
predictive intel or indicators or warnings that were sufficiently
articulate enough to conclude that we should have halted movement?"
Pulley left no doubt about his feelings. "KBR security did their job,"
said security advisor in deposition testimony. "KBR security was
overruled."
Communication blamedThe military conducted its own investigation
of the April 9 attack. The 280-page report concluded that
miscommunications in the military about the danger of the roads had
contributed to the casualties.
The investigating officer noted that he was not allowed to inquire into
the actions of military officials in the 13th Coscom, because the unit
was outside his chain of command.
For the families and drivers of the Good Friday convoy, however, KBR
provided few details. The company has never made public its own
investigation. Its attorneys have fought to keep internal
communications under seal, arguing that they contain national security
secrets.
In 2005, the families filed their wrongful death suit against KBR in
Texas.
Last September, U.S. Dist. Judge Gray H. Miller dismissed the lawsuit
under a rule that bars courts from jurisdiction in cases related to the
routine exercise of military orders.
"Is it wise to use civilian contractors in a war zone? Was it wise to
send the convoy along the route [to Baghdad airport] on April 9, 2004?"
Miller wrote. "Answering either question and the many questions in
between would require the court to examine the policies of the
executive branch during wartime, a step the court declines to take."
Lawyers for the families contend that KBR retained full authority over
its civilian convoys and have appealed.
Copyright 2007 Los Angeles Times