


**MARINES
in
LEBANON
1958**



**HISTORICAL BRANCH, G- 3 DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

1966



MAP 1

TL. RUSSELL

MARINES IN LEBANON

1958

by

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20380

Preface

This is a history of the Marine Corps participation in the Lebanon crisis from July-October 1958. It is published to show the role of the U. S. Marine Corps in carrying out American foreign policy and the pacification of a country through a successful show of force. The account is based on the records of the U. S. Marine Corps and selected records of the U. S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Department of State. In addition appropriate published accounts have been utilized. The comments of and interviews with key participants have been incorporated into the text. It must be noted, however, that although this monograph has been cleared for publication by the Department of Defense, many of the documents cited still retain a security classification.

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Reviewed and approved:

DISTRIBUTION: "DA"

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Section I

(1)

The Political Background

The waning British and French influence in the Middle East after World War II gave rise to constant strife in this area of the world. The region was not only stirred by the growth of local nationalism but also by the conflict between the East and West in the Cold War. Crisis followed crisis as the newly independent states attempted to adjust to the post-war world.

In 1948, after the British had given up the attempt to pacify Palestine, Jews and Arabs clashed in the short Arab-Israeli War of that year. The antagonism between the Jewish state of Israel and its Arab neighbors has become a permanent feature of Middle East relations. This hostility was intensified by the 1952 revolution in Egypt and the subsequent rise to undisputed power in 1954 of its strongest figure, Gamal Abdul Nasser. Sparked by his leadership, there arose a new militant pan-Arab movement over which Egypt attempted to gain hegemony. "This Arab Nationalism contributed to a series of events--the Egyptian arms deal with Russia, the withdrawal of the U. S. offer to assist the Aswan Dam project, and Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal--that culminated in the Suez crisis of 1956, when the Israelis attacked Egypt and the British and French intervened." (2) This intervention, though blocked by the United Nations, served to reinforce Arab anti-Western sentiments. The Arab unrest led to civil strife in Lebanon and the overthrow of a Western aligned government in Iraq in 1958.

The Western Powers feared the complete disintegration of the peace in the Middle East and the possibility of Soviet exploitation of the crisis. The overt American reaction was to send U. S. Marines to Lebanon on 15 July 1958 at the request of that government. This Marine landing was a practical example of the use of amphibious forces to support U. S. foreign policy by the application of military strength and mobility.

In historic times, its geographical location at the eastern end of the Mediterranean made Lebanon the crossroads to Africa, Europe, and Asia. The country has been an important commercial and trading center since the time of the ancient Phoenicians. Its mountainous barrier has enabled the nation to maintain a distinctive identity throughout the centuries. In the 20th century, the construction of pipelines from the oil fields of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to the Lebanese port cities of Tripoli and Sidon has increased the strategic importance of the country.

Lebanon is smaller than Connecticut, occupying an area 120 miles from north to south and 30 to 34 miles from east to west. The country consists of four distinct regions extending eastwards from the coast: the Mediterranean lowland, the Lebanon Mountains, a fertile plateau called the El Bika, and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains. Syria borders the nation on the north and east, Israel on the south, and the Mediterranean in the west. (See Map 1)

In contrast to most Arab nations, approximately half of the 1.5 million population of Lebanon is Christian. Christianity in this area had its roots in the Roman Empire and by the second century A.D. Lebanon was the seat of a Christian bishopric. In the seventh century A.D., however, Lebanon was conquered by the Arab Moslems. The process of Islamization of the country was never fully completed. The mountains of the region proved a sanctuary to the Christians and even to dissident Moslem sects.

Lebanon, today, is a mosaic of various religious factions. There are Maronites, Chaldeans, and Greek, Syrian, and Armenian Catholics, all in communion with Rome, but following their own rituals. Other Christian sects include the Greek and Armenian Orthodox, Jacobites, Nestorians, and Protestants. Among the non-Christian elements are Jews, Druze, and Sunni and Shiite Moslems. The National Constitution of 1926 recognized this religious framework by requiring the allocation of government jobs and appointments on a religious basis. An unwritten gentlemen's agreement, worked out by Christian and Moslem leaders in 1943 and referred to as the National Covenant, secured the organization of the government on this "confessional" basis. The traditional practices of selecting a Maronite president, a Sunni Moslem premier, and a Shiite speaker of parliament, as well as allocating parliamentary seats on the basis of the relative numerical strength of religious communities in each electoral district, are traceable to this agreement.

Because of the existence of a large Christian population, Lebanon, more than the other Arab nations in the Middle East, has been influenced greatly by the Western world. Contact between Western Europeans and the Christian Lebanese dates back to the Crusades. For two centuries the coastal regions of Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine were occupied by the Crusaders, until they were driven out by the Mameluke Sultans from Egypt. The area then fell under the control of the Ottoman Turks, who defeated the Mamelukes in 1517. Through treaty with the Turks, French Jesuits established residence in Lebanon during the 16th century. They opened schools and introduced French culture and customs to the Lebanese Christians. King Louis XIV of France in 1649 declared himself the protector of the Christian Maronites in Lebanon. This French ascendancy among the Christian Lebanese has been a dominant feature in the internal history of Lebanon. When in 1860, the Druze, a Moslem sect located in the mountains of Lebanon and Syria, massacred thousands of the Maronites,

French troops landed to intercede on behalf of the Christians. Turkey was forced by the European powers to grant semi-autonomy to the Maronites in the Mount Lebanon area under a Christian governor.

The founding of the American University and the French Universite de Saint-Joseph in Beirut greatly extended Western influence during the 19th century. After World War I, the League of Nations selected France as the mandate power for the Levant countries of Lebanon and Syria. The French cultural ascendancy was greatly enhanced throughout Lebanon during the years 1920-1944.

Lebanon became independent during World War II. Since then the basic feature of Lebanese political and religious life has been the rivalry of the Moslem and Christian communities. In the unwritten Lebanese National Pact of 1943, the leaders of the two faiths attempted to resolve the basic issues. They agreed that the Christians were to abandon dependence on France and the Moslems were to give up fusion with Syria. The Arab character of Lebanon was to be recognized. A general Middle East conference on Arab unity held in Alexandria, Egypt from 25 September to 7 October 1944 acknowledged the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its existing frontiers. The Lebanese joined the Arab League Pact on 22 March 1945. The country allied itself with the other nations of the League in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, although its military contribution was insignificant.

This precarious unity of the Arab nations disintegrated under internal and external pressures. After 1952, Egypt under Nasser moved further into the neutralist bloc of nations and improved relations with the Soviet Union. Nasserism became synonymous with a strident Arab nationalism opposed to all non-Arab interests in the Middle East and especially directed against France and England. The big split in the Arab world occurred in 1955 with the adherence of Iraq to the Baghdad Pact with Great Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The pact was a defensive alliance directed against Soviet aggression. Other Arab nations were invited to join, but none did. The Arab League divided into pro-Western and anti-Western groups; Egypt and Syria on one side and Iraq and Jordan on the other.

Lebanon, because of her delicate internal situation, attempted to play the honest broker between the two camps. President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon stated:

Everyone of us gives due appreciation to the agreements made in support of the Iraqi-Turkish agreement, on the one hand, and the objections to its conclusions on the other. What is important to find is a solution reconciling the opposite points of view, thus safeguarding the Arab League from the danger threatening it. (3)

This attempt at mediation failed. Chamoun, who was the pre-dominant figure in the jungle of Lebanese politics, came under Egyptian propaganda attack. He then led his government slowly into support of Western policy.

In 1956, Lebanon refused to break diplomatic relations with Great Britain and France over the Suez crisis. This stand caused tension within the Lebanese republic. The Sunni Moslem Prime Minister, Abdallah Yafi, resigned because of Chamoun's refusal to take action against the two Western powers. Opposition against Chamoun grew stronger as Lebanon accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East in 1957. Under this program, the United States was to send military and economic aid to any Middle Eastern nation threatened by Communist aggression. Lebanon took a firm step into the anti-Communist bloc of nations.

Both domestic and foreign pressures on Lebanon increased with the union of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic in February 1958. President Chamoun had been elected in 1952 for a six-year period. According to the Lebanese constitution, the president could not succeed himself in office. There were indications, nevertheless, that Chamoun desired to have the constitution amended so that he could be reelected. The president in Lebanon is not selected in a general election, but rather by the Parliament. Here, Chamoun had a large majority. The internal opposition to the Lebanese President grew more vocal.

The climax to this situation occurred on 8 May 1958. Nassit el Metui, the editor of the Beirut newspaper, Al Telegraf, was killed by unknown assassins. Metui had strongly opposed Chamoun and his policies. The opposition forces in Lebanon immediately blamed the government for the assassination. Disorders broke out in Tripoli on the 9th and rioters burned the United States Information Agency building in the city as a reaction to Chamoun's sympathy with the Western powers. On 12 May, the leaders of the Basta, the Moslem sector of Beirut, called a general strike. The Lebanese situation developed very rapidly into an armed stalemate. The rebels in Tripoli under the leadership of Rashid Karami controlled that predominately Moslem city. Other rebel elements wielded power in the Moslem city of Sidon in the south and large areas in the El Bika Valley contiguous to Syria. The Druze under Chieftan Kamal Jumblatt, in the central region of Lebanon, the Chouf, opposed the government. The insurgents in the Basta area of Beirut were led by Saeb Salem, a former Lebanese premier. Most of these rebel leaders had been defeated in local elections in 1957, through the intervention of Chamoun. (4) Armed civilian partisans of President Chamoun were the main support of the government. The multi-religious Parti Populaire Syrienne (PPS) and the Christian Phalange party were the most prominent groups in Chamoun's defense force. Even though the revolution cut

across religious differences in individual cases, the basic divergence was between Moslem and Christian.

The Lebanese army was a reflection of Lebanese society. General Fuad Chehab, the commander in chief and a Christian, feared a holocaust between the two religious factions. He was afraid that any attempt to put down the revolt by armed force would mean the dissolution of his army into Christian and Moslem armed cliques. The Army and its commander in chief maintained a strict neutrality. Chehab intervened only to keep certain essential communications open and to prevent rebel sorties from their strongholds in Tripoli, the Chouf, and the Basta area of Beirut.

The threat to Lebanon was not only internal chaos but foreign aggression as well. There were reports that infiltrators from Syria were entering Lebanon and aiding the rebel cause with men and materiel. The radio attacks of the UAR became even more strident against President Chamoun.

On 14 May, the American Ambassador in response to a request by President Chamoun for standby aid, stated that:

...although Lebanon should not invoke American assistance unless its integrity were generally threatened and its own forces were not sufficient for the protection of the State, nevertheless, the United States was prepared, upon request both from the President and the government of Lebanon, to send certain combat forces. (5)

The American government made it clear that it would not intervene, however, to insure Chamoun's possibilities for re-election. The U. S. expected Lebanon to file a complaint with the United Nations Security Council, and on 6 June, the Lebanese Foreign Minister did so. On the 11th, the council decided to send a group of observers to Lebanon to report back concerning any foreign interference. The U. N. group, hampered by lack of transportation and confined largely to the few principal highways kept open by Lebanese security forces, was unable to obtain any evidence indicating large-scale intervention by forces of the United Arab Republic. It seemed as if the Lebanese political situation would remain in a permanent state of instability. This was all dramatically changed by the events of the 14th of July in Iraq.

A coup d'etat by Brigadier Abdel Karem Kassem overthrew the Iraqi government. The young Iraqi King, Faisal, was murdered and the Premier, Nuri Said, was killed while attempting to flee. These violent happenings appeared to threaten the entire Western strategic position in the Middle East. The Iraqi revolution destroyed the government of the only Arab member of the Baghdad Pact and put an end to the Iraq-Jordan

Federation, which had been formed in March to counterbalance the union of Egypt and Syria. King Hussein of Jordan had reason to fear for his own throne, and in Lebanon, President Chamoun appealed to the United States and Great Britain to intervene within 48 hours.(6)

The Iraqi Revolution caught official Washington by surprise. Trouble had been expected in Jordan or perhaps Lebanon, but not in Iraq. The oilfields in Iraq and the oil pipeline terminating in Tripoli were extremely important to the economy and military effectiveness of the Western nations.

The first news of the upheaval in Iraq reached Washington about 0300 (Washington time) 14 July. Early reports were fragmentary, but by early morning the situation had clarified, and President Eisenhower was informed at 0730. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles arrived at his office at 0815 for an intelligence briefing and a look at the most urgent cables. The President met with the National Security Council at 0930. Secretary of State Dulles, Vice President Richard M. Nixon, and General Nathan F. Twining, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joined the conference at 1030. The Secretary outlined the situation in the Middle East and recommended that U. S. military forces land in Lebanon in response to President Chamoun's appeal. President Eisenhower agreed that some action must be taken. This meeting lasted until 1230.(7)

At about 1430 the same day, the President met with the Republican and Democratic leaders of Congress. The President is reputed to have said:

I have discussed this with my people here and in the National Security Council but I must emphasize that no decision has been made. I want to give you the pros and cons. But must also emphasize that a decision must be made in the immediate future... within the next hour or two.(8)

The President then returned to his meeting with his military and civilian advisers. They discussed the possibility of British participation, which President Eisenhower rejected in that he felt "that United States forces would be adequate, and with the 3700 British troops intact on Cyprus, a reserve would be available...."(9) General Twining informed him that the Joint Chiefs were unanimously of the opinion that action must be taken immediately. According to one source, at 1643 President Eisenhower turned to General Twining and said "all right we'll send 'em in. Nate, put it into operation."(10) The assignment to carry out President Eisenhower orders went to the amphibious units of the Sixth Fleet.

Section II

(1)

The Military Response--Background

The Sixth Fleet on 14 July 1958 consisted of 3 carriers, 2 cruisers, 22 destroyers, and approximately 50 other support vessels under the overall command of Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown. (2) On this date, the 2d Provisional Marine Force (Task Force 62), consisting of three battalion landing teams (BLTs), under the command of Brigadier General Sidney S. Wade was the landing force of the Sixth Fleet.

The reason for the buildup of the Marine contingent stemmed in part from a November 1957 directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At that time, the Joint Chiefs advised Admiral James L. Holloway, Commander in Chief, Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CincNELM) with headquarters in London, that there were distinct possibilities of an overthrow of the Jordanian government and to a lesser extent of a coup d'etat in Lebanon. Admiral Holloway was directed to plan for limited action in the Middle East in the event these contingencies occurred. It was decided that if military action was required, the Specified Command Middle East (SPECOMME), with Admiral Holloway as Commander in Chief, would be activated. His authority would extend over all U. S. forces in the area.

Headquarters, 2d Provisional Marine Force was established on 10 January 1958 at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. This headquarters was to plan and conduct COMBINE II, a combined exercise. COMBINE II was to be a practice landing operation involving units of the U. S. Marines, British Royal Marines, and Italian Navy off the coast of Southern Sardinia in the Western Mediterranean. (3)

General Wade's assignment was abruptly altered on 13 May 1958 when the riots in Tripoli broke out. Colonel Henry W. Buse, Chief of Staff of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, telephoned General Wade to alert him to the dangerous situation in Lebanon and to inform him that it was necessary to move the headquarters of the 2d Provisional Marine Force into the Mediterranean area immediately. General Wade and his staff departed on 14 May 1958.

The 2d Provisional Marine Force at this time was composed of two Marine BLTs: the 1st Battalion (Reinforced), 8th Marines (1/8) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Brickley and the 2d Battalion (Reinforced), 2d Marines (2/2) commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry A. Hadd. BLT 1/8 had been the landing force attached to the Sixth Fleet since January 1958 and was due for reassignment to the United States. BLT 2/2

left Morehead City, North Carolina on 1 May 1958 to relieve 1/8 on 15 May at Gibraltar. Because of the mounting tension in Lebanon, however, it was decided to keep both Marine battalions assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet.(4)

Previously in 1958, BLT 1/8 had completed a contingency plan for a possible landing in Lebanon. Much of the plan was based on the intelligence information gathered by the battalion operations officer, Major Victor Stoyanow, who had travelled to Beirut incognito and had toured the beach areas.(5) At the time of the Tripoli riots, the plan was further developed into a two-battalion assault involving both 2/2 and 1/8. On 18 May 1958, General Wade and Rear Admiral Robert W. Cavenagh, the amphibious task force commander, established their headquarters on the Mount McKinley, then off the coast of Crete, and immediately began to draw up a Lebanon landing plan based on the 1/8 contingency plan and revisions.(6) Wade and Cavenagh had worked out most of the details by 21 May, when they were joined on board the Mount McKinley, now off the coast of Cyprus, by Brigadier J. W. C. Williams (Staff, British Middle East Land Forces) and Brigadier John A. Read, Commander of the British 3d Infantry Brigade, to formulate plans for an Anglo-American landing in Lebanon. The next day at Cyprus, they were joined by Brigadier General David W. Gray of the U. S. 11th Airborne Division. According to the latter:

On arrival in Cyprus, I was informed by a staff officer from Admiral Holloway's headquarters that I was to preside at a joint U.S./British meeting to develop a plan for combined intervention in Lebanon and Jordan....During the one-day conference, a concept of operations was rather easily developed as it was assumed that the British would go into Lebanon with either U. S. Army or Marine forces, but not both. The British were therefore given the missions originally assigned to U. S. forces in the Lebanon plan and the U. S. Forces, either Army or Marine Corps, were given the remaining missions....Following this conference all forces involved---developed supporting plans for CincNEM's Operational Plan 1-58 known as BLUEBAT.(7)

The plan called for the simultaneous landing of two Marine BLTs, one coming ashore northeast of Beirut to secure the water supply systems, bridges, and the northeastern sector of the city and the other striking across the beaches south of Beirut to seize the airport. As soon as the Marine BLT had established control of the airport, a British infantry brigade would be flown in from Cyprus. When the first brigade units arrived the Marine BLT was to move into the city and gain control of the port. The brigade was to take up positions at the airport.(8) The objective of this plan was to support the legal Lebanese government against any foreign invasion, specifically against the Syrian First Army located between Damascus and the Israel border and only a few hours march from Beirut.

For the 2d Provisional Marine Force and the Sixth Fleet, the rest of May and June 1958 were periods of conferring, rapid planning, and ship deployment and redeployment. Preparations also continued for Exercise COMBINE II, which was not cancelled until 1 July 1958. By that date, it appeared as if the crisis in the Mediterranean had subsided for the time being. It was decided to grant the Sixth Fleet a short in-port visit. Only Captain Victor B. McCrea's Amphibious Squadron 6 (TransPhibRon 6) with BLT 2/2 on board, was to remain at sea, within 12 hours sailing time from Beirut.

On 25 June 1958, the 3d Battalion (Reinforced), 6th Marines (3/6), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Jenkins, left Morehead City in the ships of TransPhibRon 2, to replace BLT 1/8 embarked in TransPhibRon 4. On 12 July 1958, Rear Admiral Howard A. Yeager in the USS Pocono, arrived off the coast of Crete and relieved Admiral Cavenagh as Amphibious Task Force commander. General Wade transferred his headquarters from the Mount McKinley to the Pocono.

On 14 July 1958 BLT 1/8, just north of Malta, was en route to the United States; BLT 3/6 was sailing from Suda Bay, Crete to Athens. Only BLT 2/2, located off the southern coast of Cyprus, was in a position to land on 24-hour notice. The LSD (Landing Ship, Dock) Plymouth Rock, carrying the artillery battery, shore party detachment, underwater demolition team, heavy equipment, and two of the five M-48 tanks of BLT 2/2, was en route to Malta, for repairs. Another LSD, the Fort Snelling, carrying a similar load for BLT 3/6, was off the coast of Rhodes, approximately 400 nautical miles from Lebanon, and was in a position to furnish support to BLT 2/2 with less than 30-hours' notice. (See Map 2)


These dispositions of the Marine BLTs in the Mediterranean were an important consideration when at 0930 Washington time (1430 London time, 1530 Beirut time) on 14 July, Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), first notified CincNEM headquarters of the possibility of intervention in Lebanon within 48 hours. General Wade's headquarters first received warning of a possible landing in Lebanon at 1715 Beirut time (1115 Washington time). Shortly before 1500 Washington time (2100 Beirut time) Admiral Burke sent to CincNEM and the Commander of the Sixth Fleet a message advising them of the imminence of President Eisenhower's decision. TransPhibRon 6 was aware of the possibility of a landing in Lebanon but did not know whether the BLUEBAT plan was to be implemented. Captain McCrea and Lieutenant Colonel Hadd felt it necessary to continue preparation of plans for a possible landing in the vicinity of the Lebanese city of Tripoli, the stronghold of the rebels.

At 1823 Washington time (0030 Beirut time), Admiral Burke relayed President Eisenhower's decision to CincNEM and the

Commander of the Sixth Fleet. The Marines were directed to land on Red Beach near the Beirut International Airport at 1500 (Beirut time) on 15 July 1958. The mission of the landing team was to seize the airfield and implement as much of the BLUEBAT plan as possible.(9) Admiral Burke recalled:

I had had several discussions with President Eisenhower that I needed at least 24 hours' warning. However, when the time came, he actually gave us ...13 hours, before the landing. I suspected this might happen and asked the Amphibious Force to stay out of sight from the Lebanon coast--but close. When I told President Eisenhower that he had cut my warning time in half, he said, "Well, I know that, but I'm sure you can do that all right."(10)

Burke signaled Captain McCrea and Lieutenant Colonel Hadd "As you land you will be writing another chapter in our country's history. I am confident you will uphold the traditions of the Navy and Marine Corps. God Bless You."(11)



U. S. S. R.

T. L. RUSSELL

MAP 2

Section III

(1)

The Landing--D-Day, 15 July 1958

TransPhibRon 6 consisted of five ships: the command ship (AGC), the Taconic; an Attack transport (APA), the Monrovia; an attack cargo ship (AKA), the Capricornus; and two LSTs (Landing Ship, Tank), the Walworth County and the Traverse County. Off the coast of Lebanon they were joined by two destroyers, The Sullivans and the Wadleigh, which were to furnish direct fire support if the landing were opposed.

The Marines did not know up to the movement of the landing whether they would meet any opposition. Saeb Salem, the rebel leader in Beirut, was quoted as saying: "You tell those Marines that if one Marine sets foot on the soil of my country, I will regard it as an act of aggression and commit my forces against them." (2) The U. S. command was not too concerned, however, about the effectiveness of possible rebel resistance. Although the rebels numbered some 10,000 irregulars throughout the country, they were dispersed in bands of 400 to 2,000 men and lightly armed. There was no central leadership of the anti-government forces and each group owed its loyalty only to its individual leader. The Americans did not expect any reaction from the regular Lebanese Army though the danger existed that it might disintegrate into pro-government and rebel factions. Therefore, the only immediate effective threat was posed by the Syrian First Army, composed of 40,000 men and equipped with over 200 T-34 Russian-built medium tanks. This was why it was so important that the airport and the approaches to the north of Beirut be secured. (3)

Khalde (Red) Beach, the site chosen for the Marine assault was four miles from the city of Beirut and 700 yards from the Beirut International Airport. The small village of Khalde was located 1,500 yards south of the landing beach. On 15 July, the villagers were going quietly about their chores and a gang of workmen was constructing a beach road. Further along the beach, some vacationers were enjoying the sun and others were swimming in the Mediterranean. It was a peaceful scene entirely divorced from revolutions, coup d'etats, and the troubles of the cold war. (4)

In contrast to the mood of serenity on the beach, a sense of urgency was present in the offices of President Chamoun, General Chehab, and Robert McClintock, the American Ambassador, in Beirut. Ambassador McClintock knew the date and time, but not the place of the Marine landing. (5) He had been in communication with both President Chamoun and General Chehab. The State Department had ordered the Ambassador to inform

President Chamoun of the Marine landing no later than 1200 Beirut time on 15 July.(6) When McClintock told the President of the proposed American intervention, Chamoun asked the Ambassador to relay this information to General Chehab.

Ambassador McClintock then visited General Chehab at 1330, only an hour and a half before H-hour. General Chehab was visibly upset by the news. The day before he had asked the leaders of the rebel forces to take no action in the wake of the Iraqi revolt. The general felt confident that the rebels would not precipitate any new maneuvers against the government.(7) Chehab had confided to the American Military Attache that some Lebanese Army officers had proposed a coup to him that morning in order to prevent a landing but that he had refused. The Lebanese general claimed he could not guarantee that all the Army would remain loyal to him.(8) He feared the American intervention would bring about the dissolution of the army and prevent any settlement of the revolt.(9) General Chehab asked Ambassador McClintock to request the Marines to remain on board their ships. The ships then could enter Beirut harbor and two or three tanks and some heavy equipment could be unloaded there. The Ambassador agreed to transmit this message to the American amphibious forces since he believed that if "General Chehab decided to throw in the sponge, the Lebanese army will fall apart."(10)

Ambassador McClintock then attempted to radio the American fleet, but the radio link between the Sixth Fleet and the American Embassy was broken and the Ambassador was unable to transmit his message.(11) He had received word, however, from friends who had apartments overlooking the sea that it was apparent that the TransPhibRon was approaching the beach area off the airport. McClintock then sent the Naval Attache, Commander Howard J. Baker, to intercept the advanced units of the assault force.(12)


At 1430 (Beirut time), a half-hour before H-hour, the seven ships of Amphibious Squadron 6 were in position, approximately two miles off Red Beach. Shortly before 1500, the LVTPs (Landing Vehicles, Tracked, Personnel) were launched. Company F on board the LVTPs spearheaded the Marine landing. The amphibian tractors reached the shoreline at 1504 and rumbled onto the airfield. Companies G and H came ashore in landing craft and deployed on foot to their assigned objectives. Company E followed as the battalion reserve.

The scene on the beach was perhaps one of the most colorful in the long history of Marine Corps landings. Witnessing the assault were bikini-clad-sunbathers, Khalde villagers that had galloped on horseback to the site, and the beach workmen who had dropped their tools and had run to the shore. As the fully armed Marines charged over the sand, these civilian observers waved and some even cheered. A few of the young

MEDITERRANEAN
SEA

1 11 8
18 Jul 58

YELLOW



Obj. of Co.L
3/6 16 July 1958

Site of Meeting
★ With Gen CHEHAB

2 11 2
15 Jul 58

3 11 6
16 Jul 58

RED

Beirut Airport

1st Obj.

2 11 8
18-19 Jul 58
By Air

Khaide

Beirut River

MARINE LANDINGS
AND OBJECTIVES
15-19 JULY 1958

◆ Route of 2/2 to 2nd Objective 16 July 1958

boys even attempted to help the Marines in bringing ashore some of the heavier equipment. Soft drink vendors were out in full force. The Marines were prepared for any eventuality, but this reception was rather unexpected. As one Marine said, "It's better than Korea, but what the hell is it?" (13)

Quickly taking control, all four rifle companies of 2/2 and the advance echelon of the command post landed within 20 minutes. As Company E cleared the civilians from the beach, Company G secured the airport terminal, and Companies F and H began to establish their positions about the airfield. The two destroyers and Navy planes from the aircraft carrier Essex stood by to support the Marine troops ashore. No incidents took place and no shots were fired. (14)

At 1520 (Beirut time), Commander Baker arrived at the landing beach. He relayed to Lieutenant Colonel Hadd the wishes of Ambassador McClintock and General Chehab that the BLT reembark and then proceed to the Beirut dock area and land only its tanks. (15) It was 0920 Washington time and President Eisenhower had publicly announced the landing of the Marines at 0900 (Washington time). The Marines were ashore and preparing their positions. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd decided since he was acting under orders of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States, that he had no choice but to keep his troops in their present dispositions. He then referred the commander to Captain McCrea in the Taconic. Commander Baker who had served a tour as an operations officer in an AKA (Amphibious Cargo Ship) "...had no illusions that the landing operation could be reversed after some waves had already landed and unloaded troops, however it was still considered essential that the Commodore [Captain McCrea] receive the General's [Chehab] message, as it conveyed essential elements of information concerning opposition to be expected." The Naval Attache also recalled later: "I must admit I felt a mite lonely on this particular mission, the only participant making the landing in reverse!" (16)

Captain McCrea received Commander Baker and transmitted the following message to Ambassador McClintock:

I am operating under orders from Commander Sixth Fleet and Commander in Chief Specific Command Mediterranean who in turn are operating under orders U. S. President. All troops have landed and will remain ashore in vicinity airport until further orders. (17)

The Commander of the Amphibious Squadron then radioed the Commander Sixth Fleet:

...the Naval Attache came on board and stated Ambassador did not wish landing of troops to take

place and that he wished [the ships to] enter outer harbor and land only heavy equipment. I am continuing landing as directed. (18)

Admiral Brown replied: "Your action approved....Decision to use beach or harbor belongs to the commander on the scene." (19)

To complicate the situation even further, reports reached President Chamoun that he was to be assassinated at 1500, 15 July. He requested Ambassador McClintock to send a Marine company to guard the Presidential Palace in Beirut. The Ambassador sent his assistant military attache, Major Melvin B. Hayes, to transmit this message to the Marine commander. Major Hayes arrived at Lieutenant Colonel Hadd's command post 30 minutes after Commander Baker had left for the Taconic. The major relayed the Ambassador's request and asked for a 100-man detail to guard the palace. Hadd considered that his battalion was "extended to the maximum and the situation was still too obscure to risk fragmentizing the command." (20) He, did, however, transmit Major Hayes' request to Captain McCrea and asked for instructions. At 1722, the battalion commander received word to furnish the detail. By this time, General Chehab had promised the Ambassador that the Lebanese Army would guarantee the safety of the President and that the Marines were not needed. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd, nevertheless, has stated that if the request had not been rescinded, he would have had to inform Captain McCrea that "the Marines could not comply with the order...." The battalion had already secured an extensive defense perimeter and lacked proper shore party support. In addition, the Presidential Palace was located right next to the Basta, the stronghold of the rebels, and there was no guarantee that the Lebanese Army would cooperate with the Marines. (21)

On the beach, Company E, after clearing the civilians out of the area, began unloading supplies. At the terminal, Company G had halted all incoming and outgoing air traffic. The other two companies of the battalion continued to improve their positions about the airfield. The Lebanese airport guards were replaced by Marines without incident, and the forward command post was placed near the north-south runway.

The U. S. Air Attache, Colonel Joseph C. Holbrook, arrived at the airport at 1640 and arranged for a meeting between Lieutenant Colonel Hadd and the Lebanese Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Toufic Salem. During this conference, which concerned liaison arrangements that were to be made with the Lebanese authorities, Colonel Salem was in communication with Lebanese Army headquarters by telephone as was Hadd with Ambassador McClintock. The two officers agreed that the airport guards would assist the Marines in guarding the Beirut International Airport. Normal air traffic was to be permitted so long as it was approved by a designated Lebanese air officer and a Marine

Corps officer. The Lebanese officials were to clear the terminal of all civilians, and the Marine companies were to remain 500 yards from the Lebanese Army barracks in the vicinity. The Marines were not to disturb Lebanese roadblocks so long as these obstacles did not hinder the Marine mission. Ambassador McClintock had earlier in the day requested Lieutenant Colonel Hadd and Captain McCrea to meet with him at the American Embassy in Beirut. Such a meeting was delayed, however, because none of the three wished to leave his **post**. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd wanted to remain with his troops until they had established their **positions**; Ambassador McClintock believed that he could not leave Beirut as he was in constant contact with General Chehab and President Chamoun; and Captain McCrea, as senior U. S. military officer present in Lebanon, deemed his place to be on board the command ship Taconic. Sometime after 1800, Hadd and McCrea, in separate visits to the Embassy, did meet with the Ambassador.(22) These two conferences helped to resolve the various misunderstandings and provided a basis for liaison between the American Ambassador and the military commanders.

Section IV

(1)

The Move Into Beirut

With the successful completion of the landing and the consolidation of the Marine positions at the airfield, the more dramatic aspects of the first day ended. Still the difficult task of unloading the ships and establishing supply dumps ashore remained. This effort was to take the rest of the night. Red Beach was not the most ideal site for the unloading operation. The wheeled vehicles were unable to move over the soft sand and a sandbar located offshore prevented beaching of the LSTs. The information about the coast and landing beaches of Lebanon available to the amphibious squadrons were not as complete as it should have been, but the problems that arose would not have been so all-absorbing if the LSD Plymouth Rock had been available to the battalion.

There was need for an underwater demolition team (UDT) to breach the sandbar. No shore party was present to emplace a pontoon causeway from the beach to the LSTs and to lay down beach matting to facilitate the movement of vehicles. There were no cranes to unload the supplies and equipment from the landing craft. Both the men and equipment of the shore party and UDT supporting BLT 2/2 were on board the Plymouth Rock.

The Marines and Navy were forced to improvise. Company E and a hastily formed shore party from the Monrovia manhandled the supplies from the landing craft onto the beach. (2) LVTPs, Ontos, a bulldozer, and five mechanical mules were used to carry the material from the waterline to the temporary supply depots inland. (3) The versatile mules proved to be extremely effective in negotiating the loose sand. They hauled over 75 tons of ammunition during the first 24 hours ashore.

At 2000, 15 July, the Fort Snelling, the LSD assigned to BLT 3/6, arrived. The UDT came ashore immediately and searched for the best site to beach the LCU (Landing Craft, Utility) carrying the shore party and its heavy equipment. The LCU became hung up on the sandbar, however, and did not reach the beach until 0230 the next morning. The shore party disembarked and a pontoon causeway was emplaced from the beach to the LST Traverse County. Immediately thereafter, the trucks and three tanks belonging to BLT 2/2 rolled off the ship across the floating bridge onto the shore.

The five tanks of BLT 3/6 on board the Fort Snelling were then loaded onto the LCU, which carried them to the beach. Upon their arrival, they were attached to BLT 2/2. These tanks arrived short of ammunition. Because of peacetime safety

regulations, the ammunition was not loaded on the LSD. This stowage would have caused no problem if the Fort Snelling had been in support of 3/6 as originally planned. The tank ammunition on board an AKA would have been unloaded simultaneously with the landing of the tanks. But as this was not the case, the firepower available to BLT 2/2 was seriously curtailed.

By 0400 16 July, the shore party from the Fort Snelling was operating with sufficient equipment to alleviate the unloading problems. The working parties from Company E and the Monrovia were then relieved from the backbreaking job of removing the supplies from the landing craft by hand. Wire matting had been placed down on the beach and the task of unloading the Traverse County was completed by 0600. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd later made the observation: "the delay in the beaching of the causeway and the unloading of the LSTs would have been disastrous if the landing had been opposed." (4) That statement dramatized the political nature of the Lebanon operation. Military logistical effectiveness on this first day of the landing had to be sacrificed in order to meet the time limits of President Eisenhower's announcement. Speed and surprise were the essential considerations, as the possibility of organized armed opposition at the time of the landing was remote.

As the supplies were being unloaded onto the beach, the Marines at the airport were consolidating their positions. By nightfall on the 15th, the defense perimeter had been adjusted to provide the most effective security. Liaison had been established with the Lebanese units at the airport and certain areas there were guarded jointly by Marines and Lebanese. A motorized platoon from Company E was placed in a standby position with orders to proceed, if necessary into Beirut to protect the American, French, or British Embassies. At 2100, 15 July, a member of the U. N. observer team in Lebanon approached the command post of BLT 2/2. He asked the battalion commander which side the U. S. forces were supporting. The Marine officer replied that his battalion was there to give assistance to the legal government of Lebanon. The U. N. official then implied that the U. S. was backing the wrong side. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd asked the observer very politely to leave the area.

Small patrols from the Marine companies were sent forward to probe for any irregular Lebanese armed groups that might be in the immediate area of the airport. These patrols returned to the Marine lines at 0500, 16 July, and reported they had made no contact with any hostile forces.

One hour earlier, Admiral Holloway had arrived at the Beirut airport from London. He went on board the Taconic after being briefed by Lieutenant Colonel Hadd at the airfield. At 0615, the amphibious squadron carrying BLT 3/6 arrived off Red Beach. Included among the vessels of this squadron was

the command ship, the Pocono, with Admiral Yeager and General Wade on board. The two officers joined Admiral Holloway in the Taconic to develop existing plans of action.


At 0730, the first waves of BLT 3/6 landed across Red Beach. Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Jenkins, the battalion commander, relayed to Hadd an order from General Wade for BLT 2/2 to carry out the operational plan to enter the city of Beirut. General Wade left the Taconic at approximately 0800 to see Ambassador McClintock in the city, stopping off en route at the command post of 2/2. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd told General Wade that the battalion could be formed up in a column and ready to move at 0930. General Wade then left with an official from the American Embassy to meet the Ambassador.

When the general arrived at the Embassy, Ambassador McClintock was speaking on the telephone to General Chehab. The Lebanese general was asking the Ambassador to halt the proposed movement of the American Marines into the city. Both the Ambassador and General Chehab were concerned that units of the Lebanese Army might resist the Marine column. The Ambassador told General Chehab that he would speak to President Chamoun about the situation and then asked General Wade to hold up BLT 2/2. General Wade replied that he had no authority to cancel the order but that he would postpone the troop movement. He sent an order to Hadd to hold up his troops, and then transmitted a message to Admiral Holloway on board the Taconic concerning the new developments. At 0900, BLT 3/6 relieved BLT 2/2 at the airport and attached 11 LVTPs to Lieutenant Colonel Hadd's battalion. Thirty minutes later, BLT 2/2 was prepared to move out when the military attache at the American Embassy relayed General Wade's order by phone.

General Wade and Ambassador McClintock, in the meantime, went to see President Chamoun. The Marine told the President of the plan to enter the city and Chamoun agreed that the plan should be executed immediately. McClintock and Wade returned to the Embassy where the Ambassador then called General Chehab. (5) Chehab requested that General Wade hold up the Marine column for another 30 minutes. General Wade agreed and ordered Hadd to prepare to get under way at 1030.

An aide informed General Wade that a detachment of Lebanese Army tanks had set up a roadblock on the main road leading from the airport into Beirut. The general immediately informed the Ambassador of the new turn of events. Ambassador McClintock replied that he would speak to General Chehab. General Wade then procured an Embassy car and proceeded towards the airport accompanied by two interpreters.

On the way, the general's car pulled up alongside one of the Lebanese tanks, a French-built medium armed with a 75mm gun, parked on the side of the road and General Wade spoke to one



Landing of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines at Red Beach.

Courtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

of the Lebanese crewmen. In response to a question from the American general, the Lebanese soldier replied that he had orders to stop any movement into the city. He also volunteered the information that he had a cousin in New York. General Wade then asked him if he would fire upon the American Marines. The soldier replied that he had no such orders but would have to check with his captain.

General Wade then drove on to the airport. He told Lieutenant Colonel Hadd that it was his opinion that the Lebanese would not fire at the Marines, but that the battalion should proceed with caution and be prepared for any eventuality. At 1030, as the BLT was about to start out a Lebanese captain approached Lieutenant Colonel Hadd and General Wade. The Lebanese officer stated that he had received a telephone call from General Chehab. The Lebanese general and the American Ambassador were in conference and requested that the Marines wait another 30 minutes before starting towards Beirut. General Wade agreed to the request and postponed the movement until 1100.

The Marine general then intended to go see Admiral Holloway and advise him of the situation ashore. As General Wade was about to leave, he received orders to wait at the airport for Admiral Holloway and Admiral Yeager who would join him there. Admiral Holloway upon his arrival expressed a desire to consult with Ambassador McClintock. The general and the two admirals entered General Wade's borrowed car, which took them towards the city.

At 1100, the Marines of BLT 2/2 boarded their tanks, LVTPs, and trucks, and moved out in column formation. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd halted his battalion in front of the Lebanese roadblock, one mile up from the airport. The guns of the Lebanese tanks were pointed directly at the lead vehicles in the Marine column.

While Admiral Holloway, General Wade, and Admiral Yeager were heading into Beirut, the Ambassador's car, with Ambassador McClintock and General Chehab inside, sped by going in the opposite direction, accompanied by a motorcycle escort. The American officers' car quickly swerved about and gave chase. Both automobiles arrived almost simultaneously at the roadblock where the Lebanese troops and American Marines faced one another.

General Chehab suggested that the American Ambassador, the two admirals, and the Marine general accompany him to a small schoolhouse located a short distance from the road to discuss the confrontation between the Marine BLT and the Lebanese unit. Thus began the conference that was to settle the role the Marines were to play in Lebanon.

As this meeting took place on the main road, a second dangerous incident occurred in the sector of BLT 3/6. Companies I and K had secured their objectives, respectively to the east and south of the airport, without incident. In contrast, Company L was unable to reach its objective, located two miles due north of the airfield on a beach road, since the position was occupied by a Lebanese armored detachment. (See Map 3). The Marines had been instructed to consider all Lebanese Army units friendly unless proven otherwise. With this in mind, Captain Richard W. Coulter, Commanding Officer of Company L, halted his troops and advanced towards the Lebanese, accompanied only by his first sergeant. The two Marines were immediately surrounded by excited Lebanese troops, who kept their weapons aimed at the two Americans. Although the captain and sergeant retained their arms, they were escorted under armed guard to a Lebanese Army barracks nearby. There the captain discussed the impasse with an-English-speaking Lebanese Army major. The Lebanese officer refused to allow the Marine Company to occupy the position. He did agree to release the sergeant, who was to bring back the battalion commander.

Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins arrived at the barracks and also was unable to convince the Lebanese to retire. The Lebanese major finally offered to call Lebanese Army Headquarters in Beirut to obtain the advice of General Chehab. The major was told that General Chehab had just left with the American Ambassador to attempt to resolve the difficulties between the Marines and the Lebanese Army on the main road to Beirut. Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins and the Lebanese major then made the decision that Company L and the Lebanese troops blocking its path would remain in their present positions while the major and Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins attempted to find General Chehab. Captain Coulter returned to his company while the other two officers made their way to the Lebanese roadblock on the main road.

There the conference at the schoolhouse was still going on. General Chehab asked that the Marines take a different route into the city. General Wade refused, however, and insisted that the Marine BLT be allowed to complete its mission. He stated that time was an important factor and there had been enough delays. Admiral Holloway declared that the Marine column would move out without any further delay at 1200.(6) Ambassador McClintock resolved the issue by suggesting that General Chehab, Admiral Holloway, and himself ride together leading the Marines into Beirut but that they bypass the Moslem quarter, the Basta. This proposal proved agreeable to all parties and arrangements for the formation of the column were then ironed out. It was decided that BLT 2/2 should be broken down into small sections. Each section was to be led by a jeep carrying Lebanese Army officers. Company H in the lead, was to be divided into three sections. Each section was to be transported by three vehicles --a tank and two LVTPs. At 1230, the column began to move with



CONFERENCE AT THE ROADBLOCK. General Chehab stands in the center of the picture, facing the camera and speaking to Ambassador McClintock, dressed in a business suit with his back to the camera. Admiral Holloway is to the right of the Ambassador. General Wade, wearing a camouflaged helmet, is to the right of the admiral. Admiral Yeager is to the left of the Ambassador.

Courtesy of Leatherneck Magazine

the Ambassador's car leading the Marines towards Beirut.

Once the BLT entered the city, Chehab got out of the lead car and Admiral Holloway ordered all intervals closed as the movement was bogging down. The admiral, assisted by Admiral Yeager and General Wade, assumed "personal tactical command... and even directed the units of the column to their billeting areas from the main gate of the dock area." (7) The Marines took control of the dock area, protected the bridges over the Beirut River on the Tripoli road, and furnished guards for the American Embassy and the Ambassador's residence. By 1900, the BLT had secured its objectives.

After the crisis between BLT 2/2 and the Lebanese troops was resolved, Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins was able to settle the differences between Company L and the Lebanese Army detachment on the beach road. Liaison arrangements were made and Jenkins then returned to his command post at the Beirut airport. Awaiting him there was a message from the Lebanese commander of the airport, who requested that the Marine officer meet with him at 1300 to discuss arrangements at the airfield. Lieutenant Colonel Jenkins arrived at approximately 1310 at the commander's office. There he was greeted by the commander's aide, who informed the American that the commander had tired of waiting and had departed for lunch. The aide, then told Jenkins that he should return in 30 minutes and the airport commander would furnish orders for the disposition of the Marines. Upon hearing this, the BLT commander stated that he would return at 1600 with orders for the disposition of the Lebanese troops at the airfield. The Marine won his point, and an effective liaison with the Lebanese authorities at the airport was established.

This incident reflected the Marines' conception of their assignment. They were to be cooperative but firm. The Marines, aided by the mediation of Ambassador McClintock and General Chehab, were able to handle the very critical situation posed by the Lebanese roadblocks. The harassing maneuvers of a few Lebanese soldiers ceased, and the Marines were able to proceed with their mission.

Section V

(1)

The Continuing Mission and Withdrawal

The Marines of BLT 2/2 in Beirut and BLT 3/6 at the airport spent a relatively peaceful night on 16-17 July. The only disturbances were small probing attacks by Lebanese rebels against forward Marine outposts. At 1800 and 2055, 16 July, groups of four to five Lebanese sniped at the Marine outpost south of the airfield but withdrew once the Marines returned the fire. The rebels came again at 0600, 17 July and retreated once more in the face of Marine rifle fire. There were no casualties on either side as a result of these actions.

During the morning of 17 July, two Marines of BLT 2/2 were "captured" by rebel forces in the Basta area. The two men took a wrong turn in Beirut on their way to pick up some equipment at Red Beach and entered the Moslem section of the city. They were immediately surrounded by armed Lebanese insurgents and forced to surrender their arms. The Lebanese escorted them to a rebel command post, where they were questioned. The interrogator asked the two Marines why they had come to Lebanon. The two Americans, not wishing to provoke their captors, replied they did not know. Thereupon the Lebanese rebel leader proceeded to lecture them about the "duplicity" of American foreign policy and the evil of American "imperialism." After an hour and half of this harangue, the two Marines were released. A Lebanese Army captain escorted them back to their battalion. Later in the day, the Lebanese Army returned the Marine jeep and the weapons of the two **Americans**.

These harassing maneuvers employed by the Lebanese rebels were to become commonplace. The Lebanese dissidents were attempting to provoke the Marines into rash retaliation, but were unsuccessful. The Marine forces were under strict orders to maintain fire discipline, and to shoot only in self-defense.

In order to further Lebanese Army and Marine cooperation, General Wade visited General Chehab on 17 July, at the latter's quarters in Juniyah, 10 miles north of Beirut. In the course of their conversation, General Wade indicated that he did not wish to become involved in the Lebanese internal political situation. General Chehab replied that he understood General Wade's position and would discuss only military matters. It was not possible, however, to divorce entirely the military presence of the Marines in Lebanon from the political implications. Chehab stated that his army would fall apart if the Marines continued their movements into the city. The Lebanese general asked General Wade to group the American forces in such a manner that the Marines would not give the appearance of being occupation troops. The Marine general agreed to this

request. General Wade considered that the most important result of this conference with General Chehab was the agreement to attach Lebanese Army officers to the headquarters staff of the 2d Provisional Marine Force and to each of the Marine battalions.

Lebanese Major Alexander Ghanem, attached to General Wade's headquarters, proved to be extremely useful to the Americans. According to Colonel Hamilton Lawrence, Chief of Staff of the 2d Provisional Marine Force:

Was there a roadblock someplace manned by oddly dressed irregulars? Ghanem would consider the problem silently for a minute while seated by the phone, his fingertips pressed together. Course of action decided, he would pick up the phone and speak softly into it for only a few seconds. Fifteen minutes later our reporting unit would call and say the roadblock had melted away after a few words from some visiting Lebanese.(2)

The Lebanese officer who was attached to 2/2 requested Lieutenant Colonel Hadd to withdraw Companies E and F from their positions at the bridges over the Beirut river and at the eastern approaches to the city. Units of the Lebanese Army also guarded these locations in the city, and Lebanese Army officers believed the presence of the two Marine companies at these same sites would mean a loss of face to the Lebanese Army. The Lebanese feared, in addition, that the Marines might engage rebel elements that were firing sporadically at the Marine emplacements in these areas. Hadd agreed to the withdrawal after consulting with American Embassy officials and moved both companies into the dock section of Beirut. He made it clear, however, that these new positions were not satisfactory as a permanent location.

On 18 July, the Lebanese Army permitted the Marines to station Companies E and F of 2/2 at J'Daide, approximately a mile and a half to the east of Beirut. From there, both units would be able to move rapidly to the bridges and to the eastern approaches of the city if the occasion arose.

At 0900, 18 July, the third battalion of the 2d Provisional Marine Force, BLT 1/8 under Lieutenant Colonel John H. Brickley, landed at Yellow Beach, four miles north of Beirut. Companies A and B came ashore in landing craft and Company C, the battalion reserve, followed in LVTPs.(3) The battalion fanned out and formed a crescent-shaped perimeter with Company B on the right flank, Company C on the left, and Company A in the center to protect the beachhead and the northern approaches to the city. The only problems encountered were those posed by the usual congregation of Lebanese spectators and ice cream and watermelon vendors. One or two of the Navy landing craft had to swerve in order to avoid some children swimming in the water.

As one reporter stated, "The whole operation had a smooth picnic look about it." (4)

The three Marine landings in Lebanon were only **part of** the American response to the crisis in the Middle East caused by the sudden eruption of the Iraqi Revolution. The United States could not be sure how other nations would react to the American intervention and had to be prepared for any eventuality.

On 14 and 15 July, plans were being made to provide for the assignment of the entire 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune and the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing at Cherry Point, North Carolina to the Mediterranean area. In the Far East, BLT 3/3 on Okinawa was ordered to load on board an amphibious squadron and sail into the Persian Gulf and to be prepared to land in Iran or Saudi Arabia in the event the crisis spread. A regimental landing team, RLT-3 on Okinawa, was placed on a standby alert status.

The original plan, which called for the airlift of a British brigade into the Beirut airport, had to be revised in view of the agreement of 15 July between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Harold MacMillan that the British forces remain in reserve on Cyprus. (5) Subsequently on 17 July, British paratroops landed in Jordan at the request of King Hussein of that country. The role of the British brigade in BLUEBAT was taken instead by the European-based 24th Airborne Brigade of the U. S. Army under Brigadier General David W. Gray. The U. S. Army in Europe had prepared in November 1957 and revised in February 1958 an emergency plan for the commitment of Army troops in the Middle East. This plan provided for employment of an Army task force consisting of two airborne battle groups reinforced with support elements. Composed of five forces code named Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo, the task force had been organized to permit deployment in whole or in part. Force Alpha was comprised of the first battle group and task force command group. The second battle group made up Force Bravo. The other three elements consisted of combat and service support units.

At 0330 local time, 15 July, Force Alpha, the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry, was placed on alert. Two hours later the battle group was ordered to move to Fuerstenfeldbruck Air Force Base in Bavaria at 1300 for further deployment to the Mediterranean theater. (6) The U. S. Air Forces in Europe was to provide the necessary lift.

The Air Force had also been prepared for a Mediterranean operation. On 16 July a Composite Air Strike Force, made up largely of B-57s and F-100s flown from the United States, was formed at the Air Force base in Adana, Turkey under the overall command of CinCSPECOMME. (7) Adana, located in south central

Turkey, was also the staging area for the airborne battle group, which arrived at the airbase on 17 July. The transports carrying the Army troops were then under the operational control of the Air Force commander, Brigadier General James E. Roberts, who in turn reported to Admiral Holloway.(8) Force Alpha was not flown into the Beirut airport until 19 July.

The Marine Corps was preparing its own airlift. The CNO, Admiral Burke, had decided on the 15th to reinforce the 2d Provisional Marine Force with a battalion from Camp Lejeune. The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Alfred A. Tillman, had been alerted for possible mount out at 1915 (Washington time), 14 July. During 15 July, the Marines were transported by trucks and buses to the Marine Air Station at Cherry Point. There at 1200 (Washington time), the order came from Admiral Burke to fly the battalion to Beirut.

Twelve R5D aircraft arrived from the West Coast to augment the 14 R4Q-2 transports at Cherry Point.(9) At 1815 (Washington time) the last echelons of 2/8 reached Cherry Point and at 2210 (Washington time), the first plane was airborne. The aircraft initially departed at 10-minute intervals, later 15-minute intervals, and eventually 30-minute intervals. The last plane left at 1535, 16 July. After short refueling stops at Argentia, Newfoundland and Lajes in the Azores, the aircraft headed for Port Lyautey, Morocco. The U. S. Naval Air Station near this Moroccan city, located about 150 miles south of Gibraltar along the Atlantic coast, was the main air transport support base for the Sixth Fleet. From there, the Marine aircraft carrying the battalion departed every 30 minutes for Beirut. The first plane touched down at the Beirut International Airport at 0930 (Beirut time), 18 July. The Marines of 2/8 were at first assigned to aid in the general unloading and were quartered on board the USS Chilton. The command post of the battalion, however, was established in the rear area of BLT 3/6.

The entire airlift operation went smoothly with the exception of one R4Q that developed engine trouble and returned to Lajes. The Marines on board the aircraft transferred to a U. S. Air Force C-124, which carried them on to Beirut.(10) A Marine battalion of approximately 800 men had been airlifted from North Carolina to Lebanon in 26 transports. This was a remarkable feat considering the slowness of the R4Qs and R5Ds and their limited range. Of the 54 hours en route, approximately 34 were spent in the air.

Preparations continued at Camp Lejeune to reinforce the Marine contingents in Lebanon. Regimental Landing Team 6 (RLT-6), composed of two BLTs, and Marine Aircraft Group 26 (MAG-26) moved to Morehead City on 16 July for further deployment. The MAG was to be loaded on board the aircraft carrier Antietam and two victory ships were chartered to carry the RLT. The latter two vessels were not prepared, however, to pick up the

two BLTs until 18 July. MAG-26 and RLT-6 completed loading on 21 July. On this date, the decision was made to send the ships, not to Beirut but to Vieques Island, nine miles east of Puerto Rico, for maneuvers. The reason for this change of orders was based on Admiral Holloway's situation reports.

On the 19th, the Admiral had reported:

Time is still operating for us rather than against us. The moment may come when this is reversed but at present, patience, consolidation of strength, acclimating the Lebanese to our presence, and restraint that characterized our actions accompanied by our great potential military strength are paying dividends.(11)

Holloway indicated also that space ashore in Lebanon was becoming scarce. Earlier, President Eisenhower had signified that he was not in favor of any further sizeable reinforcement of American forces in Lebanon. This line of reasoning, based on the desire not to over-commit American power, applied also to the movement of BLT 3/3 from Okinawa to the Persian Gulf. The State Department had expressed fear that a large transfer of American forces from the Far East to the Middle-East theaters might provoke a new emergency. As the crisis in Lebanon receded, BLT 3/3 returned to its base. The CNO decided to send one BLT with a regimental headquarters to the Mediterranean as a floating reserve once RLT-6 returned from Vieques.

In Lebanon, after the arrival of the Army troops on 19 July, the problem of command of the American land forces arose. On the day of the Marine Landing, General Wade was assigned as Commander, American Land Forces, Lebanon, with headquarters on board the Pocono. When General Gray's 24th Airborne Brigade arrived, the Army general became Commander, U. S. Army Troops Assigned, Lebanon. The soldiers of the 1st Airborne Group were placed in reserve, and occupied the olive groves just east of the airport. On 21 July, Admiral Holloway requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have a major general or lieutenant general of either the Army or the Marine Corps assigned to coordinate the activities of the two forces. The Marine Corps had expected that Lieutenant General Edwin A. Pollock, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, would be made the American land commander. Apparently the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided to appoint an Army commander, however, since the Army troops in Lebanon would soon outnumber the Marines now that the decision had been made not to reinforce the Marine force. The Department of the Army on 23 July named Major General Paul D. Adams, Commander in Chief, American Land Forces, Lebanon. General Adams arrived in Lebanon on the next day. Although the appointment of an Army general was a disappointment to the Marines, General Wade, who was made Commander, U. S. Marine Corps, Troops Assigned, Lebanon, later stated: "I think that General Adams, as commander, was as fair to the Marine Corps as any Army general I've ever dealt with."(12)

The period of 19-26 July, from the arrival of the first Army troops to the assumption of command by General Adams, was one of consolidation of liaison arrangements with the Lebanese Army. The relationship between General Chehab and the American military improved. General Wade reminisced:

He [General Chehab] objected to our coming into the city I think because he thought we were going to get involved in the Basta area. When it was quite clear that we were going to avoid that, it eased the situation considerably, the tension was lifted and he was more or less cooperative. (13)

During this period there was no combat activity with the exception of the continued harassing of Marine forward positions. One of the most potentially dangerous of these incidents occurred on 19 July at the airfield. Rebel groups had periodically been firing at American aircraft when they came in for landings. The rebel shots came from an area just south of the field. A patrol from BLT 3/6 was dispatched to disperse the snipers. The Marine patrol became involved in a three-cornered fire fight, not only with the rebels but also with Lebanese police dressed in civilian clothes. There were no American casualties, although one gendarme was wounded. A later investigation proved that the Lebanese gendarmes had initiated the firing, mistaking the Marines for rebels. A Lebanese Army unit moved into the area and stopped the rebel harassment of the American planes.

On 21 July, General Wade, accompanied by the airborne commander, met once again with General Chehab. The three made arrangements for Lebanese officers to be assigned to the 24th Airborne Brigade staff. More importantly, it was agreed to form an integrated military police force composed of Lebanese, and American Army, Navy, and Marine personnel. General Chehab emphasized his desire that only the Lebanese Army cope with the problem of the Basta area. He stated that Lebanese units were to be placed between U. S. and rebel positions in order to prevent any clashes between the two. The American forces were in the unusual predicament of having to negotiate in order to establish their positions in lieu of seizing them.

Two days after this conference, BLT 1/8 received permission to institute motorized patrols. Air support for these patrols was furnished by the eight Marine HRS-3 helicopters from Sub Unit 1, Detachment HMR-262, under Major Samuel F. Roach, which had arrived in Lebanon on 19 July from the aircraft carrier Wasp. (14)

The patrols reconnoitered up to 20 miles east of the position of 1/8 north of the city. Each patrol was made up of a reinforced rifle platoon, a forward air controller, an artillery forward observer, and the communications equipment

necessary to call air and artillery strikes. A helicopter flew above the three 2½ ton trucks and three jeeps of each patrol, maintaining a surveillance of the road ahead. Several Lebanese Army personnel accompanied the Marines as interpreters and guides. The patrols met no resistance and received an extremely friendly reception from the rural populace. On one occasion, a helicopter was forced to land at a Christian monastery. According to the pilots:

Monks, children, and oldtimers came running out to greet us like lost relatives, some brought gifts of fruit, cold drinks, and one offered us wine. All of them showered us with hospitality. We've never seen anything like it. (15)

After the 19th, the U. S. Army began to reinforce the original battle group. Lead elements of Force Charlie arrived at the Beirut airport on 20 July. On the 22d, the 3d Medium Tank Battalion departed from Bremerhaven, Germany, by ship for Lebanon. Force Delta sailed from Bremerhaven and La Pallice, in southern France on 26 and 27 July. The major components of Charlie and Delta consisted of the force artillery, a signal support company, two engineer battalions, an evacuation hospital, a military police company, and three transportation companies.

General Adams arrived in Beirut on 24 July and assumed command on 26 July. General Wade offered him the use of the American Community School in the northern sector of Beirut as headquarters for the joint staff. The building had previously been used by administrative sections of the 2d Provisional Marine Force for billeting personnel and office space. The Marines moved their administrative staff into another school located in the eastern portion of the city between the Basta and the Beirut River. (16) The primary Marine headquarters, however, remained aboard the Pocono. Because of considerations of communications and space, the unusual situation existed of a rear headquarters located forward of the actual command post.

With the increased Army strength in Lebanon, it was necessary to make further refinements in the disposition of the Army and Marine forces. The Marines of 2/8, who had disembarked from the Chilton on 23 July and proceeded to an assembly area east of Beirut, relieved BLT 2/2 on 26 July of guarding the dock area and key installations in the city. The rest of BLT 2/2 moved out to join Companies E and F in a defense perimeter at J'Daide. Each battalion made arrangements with the Lebanese to furnish guides to point out rebel strongpoints. Planning was carefully worked out to prevent any misunderstandings with the Lebanese authorities. The two battalions entered their new positions without any undue ramifications.



A Marine motorized patrol in the hills of Lebanon with a
Marine helicopter flying reconnaissance.

Official U.S.M.C. photo A17490

On 29 July, the Army battle group relieved BLT 3/6 at the Beirut International Airport. The Army troops then assumed the responsibility for protecting the southern sector of the American defense perimeter, which included the airport, the high ground to the south, and Red Beach. BLT 3/6 redeployed through Beirut to the southern flank of 1/8, north of the city.

This latter battalion had remained in its original positions since landing. During this time, Lieutenant Colonel Brickley had his men improve their field fortifications. It was necessary to construct bunkers by blasting because much of the surface of the ground in this sector consisted of solid rock. The Marines of BLT 1/8 used nearly 23,000 sandbags to reinforce the 108 different emplacements erected by the battalion.

By the end of July, the Army and Marines had consolidated their final dispositions. A defense perimeter extending for 20 miles protected Beirut from attack in any direction. The main problems for the American force were the avoidance of conflict with the local Lebanese irregulars and the provision of the necessary staff, logistical, and combat support of the American land force in Lebanon.

From the very beginning of the Lebanon operations, these latter considerations were of great concern to the Marines. The headquarters personnel of the 2d Provisional Marine Force on the day of the first landing consisted of only 13 officers and 31 enlisted men. The staff was increased to 52 officers and 211 enlisted men on 17 July. Through a preplanned augmentation, more than 100 officers and enlisted men had arrived by air from the United States. Additional personnel were drawn from the battalions to bring the staff up to adequate strength. (17) When the joint Army-Marine command was formed under General Adams on 26 July, the Marines in the headquarters were a small minority. This was due not to any exclusion policy established by General Adams, but to a scarcity of immediately available Marine staff officers. The Marines were in important positions, however, as not only the Chief of Staff, Colonel Charles M. Nees, was a Marine but also key members of the operations and intelligence staffs.

Logistics presented another vexing problem to the Marine forces. A Logistics Support Group was formed by the 2d Provisional Marine Force on 18 July. The personnel of this group came from the service support elements of the BLTs. The group headquarters, however, had to be formed from officers airlifted from the U. S. According to the final report of the 2d Provisional Marine Force: "This did not permit prior planning and organization, and only a hasty estimate and familiarization with the situation ashore was possible before actual activation." (18)

One of the first tasks was to find storage for the supplies unloaded from the transports and the LSDs. On 17 July, agreements had been made with the Lebanese port authorities for open and covered storage at the dock area of Beirut. This space was inadequate, however, and the Force Supply Officer arranged for additional open storage area at the railroad marshalling yards, located in the southern section of the city. After the unloading of the amphibious shipping on 23 July, the Logistical Support Group undertook a review of its storage space ashore. The survey indicated a need for greater dispersion of the supply installations. Admiral Holloway assigned to the 2d Provisional Marine Force a naval officer with experience in contracting. His negotiations, which produced seven contracts and six leases with Lebanese merchants, provided the additional required space. All in all, 10,000 tons of supplies were brought ashore by the Marine battalions. In addition to the supplies brought in by ship, medical stores, ammunition, and other critical items were flown in day and night by a MAG-35 detachment, whose 10 R4Qs and crews had been stationed at Port Lyautey since May. Admiral Holloway complimented the unit highly for its cooperation and efficiency in support of the SPECOMME forces.

The main transportation headache of the Marine forces was the shortage of trucks. A central motor pool was created from the trucks assigned to the individual battalions. Each BLT retained only what was necessary for day-to-day operations. Even so, the Marine force had to depend on the Army Logistical Command for approximately 10 additional vehicles daily. During the round-the-clock unloading of the ships, it was necessary to borrow 30 Army trucks for each 12-hour shift.

For medical support after 29 July, the Marines were dependent upon the facilities of the Army 58th Evacuation Hospital. Prior to that time, the Marine medical force consisted of three medical aid stations with a total of five general medical officers. The USS Mount McKinley, the designated casualty evacuation ship, had only one medical officer on board. None of the medical officers with the Marines in Lebanon had previous experience or training in surgery or anesthesia. Admiral Yeager made the statement: "The capacity for even major life saving emergency surgery was non-existent." (19) This situation was relieved by the arrival of three naval surgeons by 27 July and with the opening of the Army hospital.

The biggest medical problem confronting the Marines was the outbreak of dysentery among the battalions. During the period 18-31 July, BLT 1/8 alone suffered 48 cases of this malady. This situation was aggravated because the Marines had no preventive medicine team until 31 July. The Army Engineers helped to erect screened toilet facilities for most units, and the Army made available large quantities of insecticides to the Marine battalions in order to stop the spread of the disease.

By the end of August, strict hygienic controls adopted by the Marine BLTs had brought this ailment under control.

This weakness of the Marine transportation and medical support was inherent in the makeup of the Marine task force. Its main mission was to be a striking force. Accordingly, the Marines were not equipped for an extended land campaign. The service support had to be augmented from other sources. The U. S. Army Logistical Command brought into Lebanon to support the Army airborne troops was designed to service and equip two Army battle groups. As the second battle group was not committed to Lebanon, the Marines were able to rely on the Army to supplement their logistical requirements. An interesting comparison is the contrast between the percentages of support troops in each of the two task forces sent into Lebanon. The Army troops involved in support activities consisted of 47.1 percent of the 8,508 Army troops in Lebanon; the Marines engaged in such activities made up only 17.2 percent of the 5,790 Marines of the 2d Provisional Marine Force.

In combat support, however, the Marines compared favorably with the Army. During the first two weeks of the campaign, the only American armor support was provided by the 15 medium tanks of the 2d Provisional Marine Force. These tanks were complemented by 31 LVTPs and 10 Ontos. On 27 July, the 3d Medium Tank Battalion arrived from Bremerhaven. Admiral Holloway had insisted on the landing of the tank battalion because he believed the display of American armored strength would greatly impress the Lebanese.(20) The Army battalion brought 72 medium tanks and 17 armored personnel carriers.

The Marine armored vehicles were formed into task forces to "assure the flow of military traffic, to protect U. S. officials and property, and to concentrate Marines rapidly at any danger point."(21) Armored teams consisting of two to three tanks, three LVTPs, and an infantry platoon were deployed from time to time as a show of force.

The 2d Provisional Marine Force carried its own artillery support into Lebanon. This support was made up of six 8-inch howitzers, eight 4.2-inch mortars, and three six-gun 105mm howitzer batteries. The command of the artillery units remained with the individual infantry battalion commanders until the activation, on 31 July, of a Force Artillery Group (FAG), which provided centralized control. The personnel of the headquarters of the FAG were 7 officers and 23 enlisted men flown to Lebanon from Camp Lejeune. On the same date a provisional battery was formed by drawing two howitzers from each 105mm battery to provide general support for the Marine BLTs. The other three 105mm Batteries, Battery B, 1/10, Battery H, 3/10, and Battery I, 3/10, were assigned direct support and reinforcing missions. Batteries H and I furnished

direct support to BLTs 3/6 and 1/8 north of Beirut while Battery B reinforced Battery H and provided forward observers to BLT 2/2 at J'Daide. Two of the 8-inch howitzers were assigned to general support of the 2d Provisional Marine Force, and the other four were assigned to the Army battle group at the airfield.

Throughout this period, Marines and Army troops remained in their prepared positions. No liberty was granted until two weeks after the landings. In Beirut, ropes strung across street corners marked off rebel areas. The insurgents continued to fire occasionally at the Americans, but the only two Marine deaths resulted from accidental shootings by other Marines. The only American casualties from rebel bullets were two Army sergeants, one of whom was wounded and the other killed during the month of August. The American forces in Lebanon were in the difficult position of being shot at, but under orders not to shoot back unless they had a clear target. This rebel harassment did serve, according to General Wade, to provide "the incentive necessary in constructing good foxholes and bunkholes." (22) This successful restraint of the troops proved to be an important stabilizing feature of the American intervention. Lieutenant Colonel Hadd remarked:

The conduct of the individual Marine in holding his fire when he can see who is shooting in his direction must be mentioned. When a youngster lands all prepared and eager to fight and finds himself restricted from firing at a known rebel who he sees periodically fire in his direction and in every instance restrains himself from returning the fire, it is felt this is outstanding and indicated good small unit discipline. The situation had to be thoroughly explained to the individual Marine and they understood why the restriction on fire was necessary. Many innocent people could have been killed. (23)

General Adams described the military operations in Lebanon as a "show of force with psychological overtones." (24)

From the very beginning of its intervention, the United States, made it clear that its main purpose was to protect the integrity of the Lebanese government and not to support any internal political faction. President Eisenhower, in his message to Congress on 15 July announcing the Marine landings, called upon the United Nations to take effective action to safeguard Lebanese independence so that the American troops could be withdrawn. The American Government on this date asked for an immediate meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider the Lebanese situation. The Japanese delegation offered a resolution which would make possible the withdrawal of American forces by having the United Nations protect the territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon. This proposal was vetoed, however, by the Soviet Union.

The U. S. President, realizing the political implications of American intervention, sent Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert D. Murphy as political adviser to CinCSPECOMME to coordinate the activities of the U. S. military command and the American Embassy in Lebanon. Secretary Murphy recalled that the President gave no specific orders except "to promote the best interest of the U. S. incident to the arrival of our forces in Lebanon." (25) When Murphy arrived in Lebanon on 17 July, he discovered that many of the members of the Lebanese Parliament planned to protest to the U. S. against the American intervention. He was able to persuade the legislators, to drop this action, however, and concentrate on the problem of electing a new president. The Deputy Under Secretary met with Admiral Holloway on a daily basis. The two agreed that much of the Lebanese internal conflict concerned personalities and had very little relation to international issues. It was apparent to both of them that Communism "was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection." (26) The main outside support of the Lebanese rebels came from Egypt and Syria and direct intervention from the United Arab Republic as a result of the American landings was unlikely. Murphy believed that the only solution to end the anarchy was the election of a new president. He and Admiral Holloway felt that President Chamoun had overreached himself in the brambles of Lebanese politics and that the Lebanese Army was the only thing holding the government together. General Chehab assured Murphy that the Army was willing to cooperate with the American forces but was unwilling to take any energetic action against the rebels, except to restrict rebel activity and contain it in certain districts.

Murphy decided that the only way to create a viable government was to bring the leaders of the dissident elements of the country together. Colonel William A. Eddy, a retired Marine officer, who was employed as a consultant to the American Arabian Oil Company, arranged for a meeting between Murphy and two of Saeb Salem's associates on 24 July. The American attempted to convince the two Lebanese that the U. S. had not intervened in order to keep Chamoun in office. He warned them that the indiscriminate firing at American troops should end. Murphy reassured the rebel spokesmen that the Americans wished to avoid any serious clash, "however, we must maintain the security of our troops and we also value American prestige." (27) Saeb Salem apparently took heed of the American warnings since the rebel provocations against the American troops dropped off after this date.

Murphy was also able to convince the Druze chieftan Jumblatt and the Tripoli rebel leader Karami that the U. S. intervention was not for the purpose of maintaining any one man in office. The way was then cleared for the Parliament to decide on a new president. The election was held on 31 July and General Chehab was elected president although his term of office was not scheduled to begin until 23 September. The

Lebanese Army Commander, by not taking sides in the insurrection and by maintaining the integrity of the national army, had the support of all the various Lebanese political factions. With the hope of a stabilized government for Lebanon, the Americans were able to concentrate on the problems of pulling their troops out of Lebanon.

Secretary of State Dulles announced on 31 July that the U. S. forces would be withdrawn as soon as the Lebanese Government requested their removal. On 5 August, Admiral Holloway was directed to begin planning for the departure of the American military forces. The order was based on the assumption that General Chehab would request the Americans to leave when he took office. The Americans wished to keep the selection of their departure date in their own hands. Chehab indicated, however, that he wished the Americans to make only a token withdrawal until the internal situation in Lebanon was completely secure.

General Wade on 6 August issued BLT 2/2 an order that placed the battalion on a 24-hour reembarkation alert. By 11 August, Admiral Holloway had submitted a proposed withdrawal schedule to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He decided to withdraw the Marine BLTs in advance of the Army troops because he was determined "not to use Marines as 'occupation' and static forces when and wherever it could be avoided." (28) BLT 2/2 was to begin embarking immediately. This battalion was to load on board the ships of TransPhibRon 6 and to remain as a reserve force afloat. The two battalions of the 8th Marines were slated to depart on 15 September for the United States, and the remaining Marine battalion, 3/6, was to leave on 30 September. The Army units were scheduled to withdraw in the latter part of October.

On 14 August, as a gesture of American intentions, BLT 2/2 completed its reembarkation. The positions of the battalion were occupied by BLT 1/8. The remaining Marine battalions continued to maintain security in the Beirut dock area and to guard the northeastern approaches to the city. General Wade instituted a 30-hour weekly training program, which stressed individual and small-unit combat. Emphasis was also placed on cooperation with the Lebanese Army. Lebanese officers were often invited to visit the American positions and to observe American training techniques. The most outstanding example of the latter was a joint Army-Marine exercise involving Company C of BLT 1/8 and an Army company from the 24th Airborne Brigade on 10 September.

This training operation was held near J'Bail, 20 miles north of Beirut and near the Biblical town of Byblos. While the Marine company rushed across the beach, 13 Marine and Army helicopters landed the Army company on two hills about 3,000 yards in from the beach.

The preparation for this operation had been well publicized and approximately 3,000 Lebanese had gathered to witness the landings. The Marine Ontos rolled off the two LCUs and Lebanese officers riding on top waved to the crowd. The Marine company linked up with the Army troops and the entire exercise was secured by 1000. The Marines and soldiers were then taken on a guided tour of the Byblos ruins. This was to be the last American landing of the Lebanon operation. On 15 September, the Marines of 1/8 and 2/8 sailed for the United States. The Army brigade took over the responsibility of the Beirut dock area and BLT 3/6 remained in the positions guarding the north-eastern approaches.

Chehab succeeded Chamoun as President of Lebanon on 23 September. The Lebanese general chose as prime minister, Rashid Karami, who had formed a cabinet composed mainly of former rebel leaders. This action triggered further political dissension, which resulted in the supporters of former President Chamoun calling for a general strike and the dissolution of the new government. The American forces did not intervene but established Army-Marine tank-infantry task forces to meet any emergency. The Lebanese Army on the 24th broke up a major clash between irregular forces favoring Chamoun and those of the former rebels. Both sides, impressed by the determination of the Lebanese Army to end the fighting, commenced negotiations to end the political stalemate.

On 29 September, RLT 6, commanded by Colonel William B. McKennan and composed of BLT 2/6 and a regimental headquarters staff, arrived in Beirut harbor on board the ships of TransPhib-Ron 8, commanded by Captain Charles L. Werts. The Cambria, the command ship of the Amphibious Squadron tied up at the docks alongside of Admiral Holloway's flagship, the Taconic. On the same day, 3/6 departed, leaving the RLT as a ready reserve to the Army troops in Lebanon. General Wade and Admiral Yeager left Beirut for the United States on 3 October, and Colonel McKennan and Captain Werts assumed command of the Marines in Lebanon and the Amphibious Task Force respectively.

The United States announced on 8 October that it was withdrawing all its forces from Lebanon. Through the period of 18 October, however, the date of departure of the RLT, nearly 2,000 Marines remained in the Beirut dock area and Captain Werts and Colonel McKennan "conducted considerable reconnaissance work throughout the Lebanese coastal area at Admiral Holloway's personal direction."(29) On 23 October, the Lebanese formed a government which included representatives from each of the major political parties and the last U. S. Army troops departed the country two days later.

From the vantage of today there seems to have been little connection between the Iraqi Revolution and the unrest in Lebanon, but it must be emphasized that this was not known at

the time. There was a precarious political situation in Lebanon and also a real fear on the part of the loyalist supporters of Chamoun for the safety of his life and for the independence of the country.(30) Even if the events of 14 July were not the result of an international conspiracy, the balance of power in the Middle East could have been destroyed, creating a situation susceptible to Soviet exploitation.

The American intervention did succeed in proving the ability of the American military forces to react boldly and effectively, although the Marine battalion landed and remained without full logistical and combat support for a period of some 16 hours. Political necessity had forced President Eisenhower to disregard Admiral Burke's request for 24 hours notice and the BLUEBAT concept of a two-battalion landing had to be modified.

Though political factors determined the military commitment, there was an incomplete liaison between the American diplomat on the scene and the military commanders. The American Ambassador in this age of immediate communication, was dependent upon information about the movement of the Amphibious Squadron from modern day "cliff dwellers" in Beirut. This lack of communication was largely responsible for the bizarre disagreements between the military and the Embassy on 15 July. As one observer has stated:

...ideally there should be close contact between the Ambassador and the Commander in a developing crisis. Reports should be maintained between the mission and the command. But once under way, a military intervention cannot be radically shifted at the last minute without affecting its efficiency and possible success in gaining positions necessary for the presence of American forces.(31)

Despite the misunderstandings on the first day, the Marines were able to complete their initial missions within a few hours of landing. Through the cooperation of Ambassador McClintock and General Chehab on the next day, BLT 2/2 consolidated American strength in the city of Beirut. As events turned out, 16 July was the climax of the entire operation. The remaining period was confined to a holding action until the Lebanese could settle their differences among themselves. The American forces provided a stabilizing influence on the Lebanese political scene. The Marine landings in Lebanon vividly demonstrated the close interplay between American military preparedness and the success of U. S. diplomacy.

NOTES

Section I

(1) Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from Human Relations Area Files, Inc., Special Warfare Area Handbook for Lebanon, dtd 15Jan58 (Lebanon File); Cdr James T. Alexander, Jr., "The U. S. Intervention in Lebanon 1958," Student Thesis, dtd 25Jan61, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Lebanon File), hereafter Alexander, "The U. S. Intervention in Lebanon"; Robert McClintock, "The American Landing in Lebanon," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. LXXXVIII, no. 10 (Oct62), pp. 65-79, hereafter McClintock, "The American Landing." Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is located in the Historical Reference Section, Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC.

(2) Ambassador Robert McClintock, Comments on draft manuscript, circa 11Oct65 (Lebanon Comment File, hereafter McClintock Comments).

(3) Lebanon Handbook, op. cit., p. 348.

(4) Leila M. T. Meo, Lebanon, Improbable Nation, A Study In Political Development (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1965), pp. 150-151, hereafter Meo, Lebanon.

(5) McClintock, "The American Landing," p. 66.

(6) Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965) p. 270, hereafter Eisenhower, Waging Peace.

(7) Eleanor Lansing Dulles, John Foster Dulles: The Last Year (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World Inc., 1963), pp. 142-143.

(8) Time, The Weekly News Magazine, v. LXXII, no. 4 (28Jul58) p. 6.

(9) Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 273.

(10) Time, op. cit.

Section II

(1) Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from Transcript of BGen Sidney S. Wade Presentation to the Commandant Marine Corps, on 4Nov58, Subj: Recent Operations in Lebanon (Lebanon File), hereafter Wade Presentation; G-3 Div, HQMC, Lebanese Journal, dtd 14Jul-30Sep58 (Lebanon File), hereafter G-3 Journal; Hq, 2d Provisional Marine Force, Lebanon Final Report, Task Force 62 and Marine Corps Troops assigned SPECOMME 18May-30Oct58 (Lebanon File), hereafter Lebanon Final Report; CinCSPECOMME, Command Report Operation BLUEBAT 15Jul-25Oct58, dtd 5Dec58 (Lebanon File), hereafter CinCSPECOMME, Command Report; Hq, American Land Forces, Lebanon, After-Action Report 15Jul-25Oct58, dtd 25Oct58 (Lebanon File), hereafter AmlanFor, After-Action Report; BLT 2/2, Command Diaries for Jul-Aug58 (Lebanon File), hereafter 2/2 CmdDs; Col Harry A. Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, v. LXXXVIII, no. 10 (Oct62), pp. 81-89; hereafter Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible"; BGen Sidney S. Wade, "Operation Bluebat," Marine Corps Gazette, v. XLIII, no. 7 (Jul59), pp. 10-23, hereafter Wade, "Operation Bluebat"; Alexander, "The U. S. Intervention in Lebanon."

(2) Press Release, Units of the Sixth Fleet, dtd 14Jul58 (Clipping File, Lebanon).

(3) General Wade had been briefed on 31 March and 14 April for possible deployment of his headquarters in connection with the Lebanese unrest, but the main mission of the 2d Provisional Marine Force had remained the planning of COMBINE II. There was no special significance to the name given to the headquarters. It was the "2d" as it was from the 2d Division and it was "provisional" and it was a "Marine force." See Maj Duncan D. Chaplin, "Planning Breeds Success," MS. n.d. (Lebanon File), p. 15, hereafter Chaplin, Planning; and LtGen Henry W. Buse, Jr., interview by HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 25Mar65 (Lebanon File).

(4) Chief of Naval Operations msg to Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet and CinCNELM, dtd 15May58 (G-3 Division; HQMC, Messages and Orders re: Lebanon Crisis).

(5) Capt Howard J. Baker, USN, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 13Dec65 (Lebanon Comment File, hereafter Baker Comments).

(6) Chaplin, Planning, pp. 11-18.

(7) MajGen David W. Gray, USA, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 10Dec65 (Lebanon Comment File), hereafter Gray Comments.

(8) G-3 Division, HQMC, Staff Brief of Amphibious Operation BLUEBAT, dtd 9Jun58 (Lebanon File).

(9) CNO msg to CinCNELM and Commander Sixth Fleet, dtd 14Jul58 in G-3 Journal.

(10) Adm Arleigh Burke, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 29Nov65 (Lebanon Comment File).

(11) Time, The Weekly News Magazine, v. LXXII, no. 4 (28Jul58), p. 11.

Section III

(1) Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from Wade Presentation; G-3 Journal; CinSPECOMME, Command Report; Lebanon Final Report; 2/2 CmdDs; Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible"; McClintock, "The American Landing."

(2) Philip N. Pierce, "Show of Force: Lebanon," Leatherneck, v. XLV, no. 9 (Sep62), p. 36.

(3) Col Harry A. Hadd interview by Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, dtd 20Dec65 (Lebanon File), hereafter Hadd Interview.

(4) Washington Post and Times Herald, 16Jul58, p. 12.

(5) Charles W. Thayer, Diplomat (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959) p. 29, hereafter Thayer, Diplomat.

(6) CNO msg to CinCNELM and Commander Sixth Fleet, dtd 15Jul58 in G-3 Journal.

(7) Ambassador McClintock msg to Dept of State, dtd 14Jul58 (Lebanon File).

(8) U. S. Army Attache, Beirut msg to Department of the Army, Headquarters US Air Force, and to CNO, dtd 15Jul58 in Dispatches Relative to U. S. Landings, Lebanon (Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Division).

(9) Ambassador McClintock msg to Dept of State, dtd 15Jul58 (Lebanon File).

(10) Ambassador McClintock msg to Dept of State, dtd 14Jul58 (Lebanon File).

(11) Thayer, Diplomat, p. 29.

(12) Baker Comments.

(13) New York Times, 27Jul58, Pt. 4, p. 1.

(14) There is some dispute as to the time of the arrival of the support aircraft from the Essex. The commander of the Essex stated that the aircraft arrived on station at 1450 (Beirut time), 10 minutes before the landing. Admiral Holloway on the other hand claims that the planes did not arrive until 15 minutes after the landing. See the Cruise Report of the Essex for Feb to Nov58, dtd 11Feb59 (Operational Archives, Naval Historical Division); CinSPECOMME, Command Report, Enclosure 6, Operations, p. 8.

(15) 2/2 CmdDs Jul58, p. 2; McClintock Comments.

(16) Baker Comments.

(17) Quoted in Ambassador McClintock msg to Dept of State, dtd 15Jul58 (Lebanon File).

(18) Commander Task Unit 61.1.3 msg to Commander Sixth Fleet, dtd 15Jul58 in Dispatches Relative to U. S. Landings, Lebanon (Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Division).

(19) Commander Sixth Fleet msg to Commander Task Unit 61.1.3 dtd 15Jul58 in Sixth Fleet Dispatches Relative to U. S. Landings, Lebanon (Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Division).

(20) Hadd, "Orders Firm but Flexible," p. 84.

(21) Hadd Interview.

(22) Ibid.; RAdm Victor B. McCrea, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 10Dec65 (Lebanon Comment File), hereafter McCrea Comments.

Section IV

(1) Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from Wade Presentation; Col Robert M. Jenkins interview by Historical Branch, G-3, HQMC, dtd 9Oct64 (Lebanon File); G-3 Journal; CinCSPECOMME, Command Report; Lebanon Final Report; 2/2 CmdDs; 3/6 CmdDs for Jul-5Oct58 (Lebanon File), hereafter 3/6 CmdDs; Hadd, "Orders Firm But Flexible"; McClintock, "The American Landing"; Wade, "Operation Bluebat."

(2) McCrea Comments.

(3) The Ontos is a lightly-armored, tracked antitank vehicle carrying six 106mm recoilless rifles. The mechanical mule is a four-wheel drive, flat-bed, open-body vehicle with a 1/2 ton load capacity.

(4) 2/2 CmdDs.

(5) MajGen Sidney S. Wade, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 26Nov65 (Lebanon Comment File).

(6) Adm James L. Holloway, Jr., Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 2Dec65 (Lebanon Comment File), hereafter Holloway Comments.

(7) Ibid.

Section V

(1) Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from Wade Presentation; G-3 Journal; G-3 Div, HQMC Lebanon Crisis File, dtd 14Jul-13Aug58 (Lebanon File); Lebanon Final Report; CinCSPECOMME, Command Report; AmLanFor, After-Action Report; HQMC, Commandant Marine Corps Briefing Notes-Lebanon, dtd Jul-Sep58 (Lebanon File), hereafter CMC Briefing Notes; Col Charles W. Harrison, Notes from Middle East Briefings at HQMC, dtd 18Jul-10Nov58 (Lebanon File); Robert D. Little and Wilhelmine Burch, "Air Operations in the Lebanon Crisis of 1958," dtd Oct62 (U. S. Air Force Historical Division Liaison Office, Silver Spring, Maryland); G-3 Div, Hq, U. S. Army, Europe, "The U. S. Army Task Force in Lebanon," dtd 1959 (Lebanon File); 2d Provisional Marine Force, CmdDs for Jul-Oct58 (Lebanon File); 2/2 CmdDs; 3/6 CmdDs; BLT 1/8, CmdDs for Jul-15Sep58 (Lebanon File); Plans and Readiness Branch, Aviation Division, HQMC memo for file, dtd 8Jan59, Subj: Recap on Airlift (Lebanon File); Wade, "Operation Bluebat."

(2) Col Hamilton Lawrence, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 28Nov65 (Lebanon Comment File).

(3) Provisional Table of Organization 1038, dtd 14Feb58 provided for a four rifle company Marine battalion. As BLT 1/8 was in the Mediterranean area at this time, its organization was not affected.

(4) Washington Evening Star, 18Jul58, p. 1.

(5) Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 273.

(6) Gray Comments.

(7) The B-57 is a twin-jet Canberra medium bomber, and the F-100 is a North American Super-saber single-engine fighter-bomber.

(8) General Roberts was replaced by Major General Henry Vicellio on 21 July.

(9) The R4Q-2 is the Fairchild Flying Boxcar twin-engine transport and the R5D is the Douglas Skymaster, four-engine transport. In Nov62 DOD directed a new all-service designation

system for aircraft. The R4Q-2 is now the C-119F and the R5D is now the C-54.

(10) The C-124 is the Douglas Globemaster four-engine transport, larger and with a greater load-carrying capacity than the R5D or R4Q.

(11) CinCSPECOMME msg to CNO, dtd 19Jul58 in G-3 Journal.

(12) Wade Presentation.

(13) Ibid.

(14) HMR is the Marine Corps designation for a medium helicopter transport squadron. The HRS-3 is the Sikorsky single-rotor transport helicopter with a load capacity of eight troops. The HRS-3 is now designated the CH19E.

(15) Department of Defense Press release, dtd 19Aug58, entitled "Choppers Steal the Show" (Clipping File, Lebanon).

(16) LtCol Thomas B. Sparkman, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 13Dec65 (Lebanon Comment File).

(17) Ibid.

(18) Lebanon Final Report, p. 41.

(19) Commander Amphibious Group 4 Report on Amphibious Operations in Lebanon, dtd 15Sep58 (Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Division). In his comments dtd 23Nov65 on the draft manuscript, Admiral Yeager made the statement: "I had asked for Medical Officers trained in surgery or anesthesia prior to our landing, but had not received any." (Lebanon Comment File).

(20) Holloway Comments.

(21) Lebanon Final Report, p. 17.

(22) Wade, "Operation Bluebat," p. 20.

(23) 2/2 CmdDs Jul58, Command Evaluation, p. 2.

(24) Hq, AmLanFor, After-Action Report, Part III, p. 3.

(25) Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1964), p. 398.

(26) Ibid., p. 404.

(27) CMC Briefing Notes, Sep58.


(28) Holloway Comments.

(29) Col William J. McKennan, Comments on draft manuscript, dtd 18Jan66 (Lebanon Comment File).

(30) Meo, Lebanon, p. 197.

(31) Harold G. Josif, "Civil-Military Coordination in a Country That Requests Limited Military Intervention," Air War College Supplement, v. II, no. 1 (Sep63), p. 21.

COMMAND STRUCTURE AMERICAN FORCES, LEBANON
EFFECTIVE 26 JULY 1958



COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 2D PROVISIONAL MARINE FORCE
AS OF 19 JULY 1958

Commanding General. BGen Sidney S. Wade
Chief of Staff. Col Hamilton Lawrence
G-1 Maj Thomas B. Sparkman
G-2 LtCol Nathan R. Smith
G-3 LtCol James B. Glennon, Jr.
G-4 LtCol Martin C. Roth

Battalion Landing Team 2/2

Commanding Officer. LtCol Harry A. Hadd
Executive Officer Maj Paul R. Nugent
S-3 Maj Samuel A. Cox
Commanding Officer,
Headquarters and Service
Company Maj Wendall M. Waskom
Commanding Officer,
Company E Capt Gerald H. Hyndman
Commanding Officer,
Company F Capt George E. Shepherd
Commanding Officer,
Company G Capt Terence M. Allen
Commanding Officer,
Company H Capt Thomas E. Bulger
Commanding Officer,
Battery B, 1/10 Capt Robert D. Boles

Battalion Landing Team 3/6

Commanding Officer. LtCol Robert M. Jenkins
Executive Officer Maj Hoyt C. Duncan
S-3 Maj Edwin W. Killian

Commanding Officer,
 Headquarters and
 Service Company Capt Hershel B. Jones

 Commanding Officer,
 Company I Capt Floyd A. Karker

 Commanding Officer,
 Company K Capt Robert A. Cronk

 Commanding Officer,
 Company L Capt Richard W. Coulter

 Commanding Officer,
 Company M Capt Leonard E. Wood

 Commanding Officer,
 Battery H, 3/10 Capt William H. Thurber

Battalion Landing Team 1/8

Commanding Officer. LtCol John H. Brickley
 Executive Officer Maj Richard L. Michael, Jr.
 S-3 Maj Victor Stoyanow

 Commanding Officer,
 Headquarters and
 Service Company 1stLt Clyde E. Taylor

 Commanding Officer,
 Weapons Company Maj Donald A. Chiapetti

 Commanding Officer,
 Company A 1stLt Richard B. McLaughlin

 Commanding Officer,
 Company B Capt Andrew E. Andersen

 Commanding Officer,
 Company C Capt Clyde A. Trowbridge

 Commanding Officer,
 Battery I, 3/10 Capt Ronald P. Dunwell

2d Battalion, 8th Marines (Reinforced)

Commanding Officer. LtCol Alfred A. Tillman

S-3 and Acting
Executive Officer Maj David D. Powell

Commanding Officer,
Headquarters and
Service Company 1stLt Raymond A. Yakaitis

Commanding Officer,
Company F Capt Robert L. Zuern

Commanding Officer,
Company G Capt Wells L. Field III

Commanding Officer,
Company H Capt Owen J. Butler

Commanding Officer,
Company K, 3/8, attached. . . Capt William P. Howley

Logistics Support Group

Commanding Officer. Maj Lawrence J. Bradley
(Relieved on 31 Aug 1958 by
LtCol Carl E. Fulton)

Sub Unit 1, HMR (L) 262

Commanding Officer. Major Samuel "C" Roach, Jr.

LIST OF MARINE UNITS ELIGIBLE FOR
ARMED FORCES EXPEDITIONARY MEDAL
LEBANON 1 July--1 November 1958

2d Provisional Marine Force (Headquarters)
16 Jul - 30 Sep

Battalion Landing Team, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines
15 Jul - 13 Aug

2d Battalion, 2d Marines
Battery B, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
3d Platoon (Reinf), Company B, 2d
Pioneer Battalion
Platoon (-) (Reinf), 1st Shore Party Team,
Company A, 2d Shore Party Battalion
1st Platoon (Reinf), Company B, 2d Motor
Transport Battalion
Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marines
Detachment, Anti-Tank Company, 2d Marines
Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division
Detachment, 2d Medical Battalion
Detachment, 2d Service Regiment
Detachment, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
Detachment, 2d Force Service Regiment
Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Demolition Platoon,
8th Engineer Battalion
Detachment, Ordnance Maintenance Company
Detachment, 8th Communication Battalion
Detachment, 2d ANGLICO
Platoon, 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Detachment, Marine Aircraft Group 26

Battalion Landing Team, 3d Battalion, 6th Marines
16 Jul - 1 Oct

3d Battalion, 6th Marines
Battery H (Reinf), 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
3d Platoon, Company B, 2d Pioneer Battalion
Truck Platoon, Company B, 2d Motor Transport Battalion
1st Platoon (Reinf), Company B,
2d Anti-Tank Battalion
1st Platoon, 2d 8" Howitzer Battery,
(Self-Propelled) (Provisional)

3d Platoon (Reinf) Company A, 2d Force
Tank Battalion
Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division
Detachment, 2d Service Regiment
Detachment, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Demolition Platoon,
8th Engineer Battalion
Detachment, 8th Communication Battalion
Detachment, 2d ANGLICO
Detachment, 2d Force Service Regiment
Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, Marine Corps Base,
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (Stewards)

Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 8th Marines
18 Jul - 18 Sep

1st Battalion, 8th Marines
Battery I (Reinf), 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
1st Platoon (Reinf), Company A, 2d Pioneer Battalion
Platoon (Reinf), Company C, 2d Tank Battalion
Platoon (-) (Reinf), 1st Shore Party Team,
Company B, 2d Shore Party Battalion
Platoon (-) (Reinf), Company A, 2d Motor
Transport Battalion
Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 8th Marines
Detachment, 2d Service Regiment
Detachment, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
Detachment, 2d Force Service Regiment
Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Demolition Platoon,
8th Engineer Battalion
Detachment, 8th Communication Battalion
Detachment, 2d ANGLICO
Platoon, 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
1st Platoon, Company B, 2d 8" Howitzer Battery

2d Battalion, 8th Marines (-106mm Recoilless Rifle Platoon) (Reinf)
18 Jul - 18 Sep

1st Platoon, Company A, 2d Tank Battalion
2d Platoon, Company B, 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Detachment, 2d ANGLICO
Detachment, Assault Gun Platoon Headquarters Company,
187th Airborne Battle Group, USA

Regimental Landing Team, 6th Marines (-)

1 - 10 Oct

2d Battalion, 6th Marines
Battery G (-) (Reinf), 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division
Detachment, 2d Service Battalion
Detachment, 2d Dental Company
Detachment, Headquarters Battalion, Marine Corps Base,
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina (Stewards)
Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Demolition Platoon,
8th Engineer Battalion
Detachment, 2d Anti-Tank Battalion
Detachment, 2d ANGLICO (Provisional) (Reinf)
Detachment, 8th Communication Battalion
Detachment, 2d Force Service Regiment
Detachment, 2d Force Tank Battalion
Detachment, Regimental Headquarters
2d Truck Platoon, Company C, 2d Motor Transport Battalion
3d Platoon, Company A, 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
4th Platoon, 2d 8" Howitzer Battery
(Self Propelled) (Provisional)

Marine Transport Squadron 153

18 Jul - 28 Jul

Marine Transport Squadron 252

18 - 21 Jul

Marine Transport Squadron 352

18 - 20 Jul

Marine Transport Squadron 353

18 - 27 Jul

Sub Unit #1, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron
(Light) 262

19 Jul - 16 Sep

Regional Headquarters Region 2, Marine Security Guards,
American Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon

14 Jul - 18 Oct

Marine Security Guard, American Embassy,
Beirut, Lebanon

14 Jul - 18 Oct