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**Discussion of the Unique and
Complementary Characteristics
of the ICBM and SLBM Weapon
Systems**

Project On Nuclear Issues (PONI)

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Purpose


- High level decisions will be made in the near future regarding the nuclear posture of the U.S.
 - Proposed Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty replacement
 - Nuclear Posture Review
 - Quadrennial Defense Review
- It is important to understand the characteristics of the U.S. strategic systems in order to make informed decisions on U.S. nuclear posture requirements
- Briefing's purpose is to:
 - Discuss background on the current U.S. strategic missile systems
 - Summarize and discuss the characteristics of each of the U.S. strategic missile systems
 - Emphasize how the systems are similar to, differ from, and complement each other
 - Discuss the value of the two missile systems

Background on Strategic Missile Systems

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ICBM – Minuteman III



- **Land Based**
- **450 Missiles in 3 Wings**
 - Malmstrom, Montana
 - Minot, North Dakota
 - F.E. Warren, Wyoming
- **1 – 3 Reentry Vehicles (RV)**
- **History**
 - Go-ahead – 1966
 - 1st launch - 1968
 - IOC – 1970
 - Modernization – 1992- Present

SLBM – Trident II (D-5)




- **Sea Based**
- **288 Missiles in 12 subs**
 - 2 additional subs in dry dock
 - 8 based in Atlantic
 - 6 based in Pacific
- **4 – 6 Reentry Bodies (RB)**
 - Max capability 12 RBs
- **History**
 - Go-ahead – 1981
 - 1st launch - 1987
 - IOC – 1990
 - Life Extension – 2002- Present

Availability - What portion of the missile force is available for use

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ICBM – Minuteman III



➤ High alert rate

- Minuteman alert rate is >90% (405-450 missiles)
 - Remove and replace repair concept
 - Minimal scheduled maintenance
- Missiles on alert are ready to launch 24/7
 - Launch crews have 24 hour alert shifts

SLBM – Trident II (D-5)



➤ Portion of force on hard alert

- 4 subs are on continual "Hard Alert" (86-96 missiles with 90% alert rate)
- 4-5 additional subs are on patrol at any given time (86-120 additional missiles available)
 - Patrols last 70+ days
 - Subs on patrol able to go on alert if required
- 3-4 subs are docked undergoing maintenance that lasts ~25 days
- 2 subs are in dry-dock at any given time
 - Every 9 years subs undergo a 12 month refurbishment


Reaction Time – How fast the missile can execute a mission

Target Coverage – Ability to hold targets at risk

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ICBM – Minuteman III




➤ Reaction time

- Missiles can be launched within minutes after receipt of order
- Time to target is ~30 minutes

➤ Target Coverage

- Accuracy similar to Trident II
- Fixed launch site
 - Near global targeting capability
 - Known launch/attack location
 - Any launch would cause an overfly of U.S and other nation(s)
- Able to constantly hold 405-450 target regions at risk

SLBM – Trident II (D-5)



➤ Reaction time

- Missiles on hard alert can be launched within minutes after receipt of order
- Time to target is 15-30 minutes

➤ Target Coverage

- Accuracy similar to Minuteman III
- Mobile launch site
 - Global targeting capability
 - Unknown launch location
 - Some over-flight flexibility
- Able to constantly hold 86-96 target regions at risk
 - Subs on patrol could hold another 86-120 target regions at risk (with additional reaction time)

Payload – What the missile can carry


ICBM – Minuteman III



➤ 1-3 Warheads/Missile

- Approximately 550 deployed warheads
- Single missile capable of attacking one to three targets within a target region (within footprint limitations)
 - Greater MIRV footprint than D-5
- Capability of limited strike missions (Single RV to single target)

SLBM – Trident II (D-5)



➤ 4-6 Warheads/Missile


- Approximately 1,200 deployed warheads
- Single missile capable of attacking multiple targets within a target region (within footprint limitations)
- Max capability 12 RBs
 - Limited to 8 by START
 - Currently equipped with 4-6
 - Potential for single RB modification

Survivability - Ability to survive attack

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
ICBM – Minuteman III



➤ Silo based (450 silos)

- 1 missile per silo
- Hardened against nuclear environments
- Geographically separated
- Redundant command and control
 - LCC redundant C², ALCS
- Essentially invulnerable with the exception of full scale nuclear war with Russia
 - 2 warheads likely have to be used to ensure destruction of 1 silo
- Large nuclear strike required to defeat ICBM force
 - Could serve as 450 targets away from population centers

SLBM – Trident II (D-5)



➤ Submarine based (14 submarines)


- 24 missiles per submarine
 - Creates a high value target
- Subs on patrol are stealthy
 - Subs at port are vulnerable to attack
- Geographically dispersed
- Redundant communications
- Essentially invulnerable with the exception of a breakthrough in submarine tracking capability
- Nuclear strike not required to defeat SLBM force
 - Submarine has some armament to defend itself

Cost – Yearly Operations and Maintenance (O&M) cost


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MM III and D-5 O&M Costs



MM III and D-5 O&M Cost per Deployed Warhead



(D-5 cost does not include cost of SSBN force)

- **Minuteman III year to year O&M cost is ~ 40% of Trident II**
- **Per deployed warhead, Minuteman III year to year O&M cost is ~75% of Trident II**

Sources:

AFTOC report dated 1/9/2009
Air Force presidential budget request FY 09
Navy presidential budget requests FY 04 –FY09
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2004-2009

Summary of Unique Characteristics



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
	Availability	Reaction Time	Target Coverage	Payload	Survivability	Cost
Minuteman III	>90%	Launch within minutes, ~30 minutes to target	Constantly hold 405-450 targets groups at risk	1 to 3 RV	Large number of dispersed, hardened silos	Less costly than D-5
Trident II (D-5)	65% on patrol 30% on alert	Launch within minutes, 15-30 minutes to target	Can hold any target at risk. Constantly holding 86-96 target groups at risk	4-12 RB Current 4-6 RB	Stealth and vast ocean area	Does not include SSBN cost
Comparison	MM III provides 405-450 missiles on hard alert, D-5 provides 86-96 missiles on hard alert and an additional 86-120 on patrol	Both systems have comparable time from receipt of order to target	D-5 offers global coverage, MM III provides near global coverage of dispersed targets	MM III provides single strike, D-5 provides for greater MIRV capability	The systems have different vulnerabilities	MM III is less costly than D-5

Complimentary Characteristics

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ICBM – Minuteman III



SLBM – Trident II (D-5)



- **The risk of losing both systems is low due to different vulnerabilities**
 - The basing concept and CONOPS is different between the two systems
 - It would be difficult for an adversary to attempt to defeat both systems simultaneously
 - Large scale assault on silos
 - Finding and engaging each submarine
- **The adversary will have to account for both types of threats**
 - Large number of missiles coming from ICBMs
 - Unknown launch location/MIRV for SLBMs
 - Does not allow adversary to concentrate on only defeating one system
- **A technical problem with one system will not likely affect the other**
 - Minimizes the risk of a single point of failure

Conclusions

- **Technical performance of ICBMs and SLBMs is similar**
 - Target coverage, availability, reaction time, survivability are similar
- **Due to differences in payload:**
 - ICBMs better suited to single strike or widely dispersed targets
 - SLBMs better suited to MIRV missions to grouped targets
- **Minuteman III has lower O&M costs than Trident II**
- **Due to differences in basing/CONOPS:**
 - Each system hedges against the vulnerabilities of the other

- Force structure decisions are not strongly driven by technical performance but are driven by:
 - Survivability and risk
 - Budget constraints
 - Mission options provided by each system and the combined systems vs. required missions
 - Politics