

# CIA on Campus

## General articles

[CounterPunch, 2003-04-07: "The CIA is Back on Campus"](#)

[Los Angeles Times op-ed, January 2001: "Academics and Spies: The Silence that Roars"](#)

[An article from \*Lingua Franca\* on the state of the CIA-on-campus issue in year 2000](#)

[Another general overview of CIA on campus \(1989\)](#)

[Excerpts from the Church Committee on the CIA in academia \(1976\)](#)

[CIA skips Church -- Harvard and all the rest can go to hell \(1979\)](#)



## Michigan State University

[The \*Ramparts\* article that started the controversy \(1966\)](#)

## National Student Association

[Another \*Ramparts\* scoop: NSA is funded by the CIA \(1967\)](#)

[CIA destabilizes \*Ramparts\*, plus more on the NSA scandal \(1991\)](#)

## Tracking Student Activists

[Gloria Steinem spies on students for the CIA \(1961\)](#)

[Operation CHAOS: Spying on the student movement \(1975\)](#)

# International Studies and Area Studies

[Spooky funding started this entire field \(\*Ramparts\*, 1969\)](#)

[MIT, Berkeley, Harvard, Cornell, Syracuse, U.Kentucky help Ford/CIA overthrow Sukarno \(1970\)](#)

[Scholars target Africa for the CIA \(1976\)](#)

# Social Science

[From Project Camelot to the coup in Chile: An unbroken thread](#)

[Scholars perfect psychological warfare techniques \(1945-1955\)](#)

[CIA and the American Anthropological Association \(1951\)](#)

[MKULTRA and such: CIA's behavior caper \(1977\)](#)

# History

[A short list of history scholars who worked for the OSS](#)


# Documents

[CIA document on how to co-opt academia \(1968\)](#)

["The Agency has a wide range of contacts with academics..." \(1991\)](#)

[Officer-in-Residence Program \(2001\)](#)

# Columbia University



[Research by the student strikers \(1968\)](#)



**So you want to be a spy!**

Do mommy and daddy smoke pot? Turn them in! Is a country in Africa leaning toward socialism? Destabilize it! These two beckon from CIA's website for kids.

## Harvard University

[Harvard in service to the national security state \(1991\)](#)

## Massachusetts Institute of Technology

[How to start a war \(1954\)](#)

## Princeton University

[Dulles papers reveal CIA consulting network \(1980\)](#)

## Rochester Institute of Technology

[Is RIT a CIA subsidiary? \(1991\)](#)

## Rutgers University

[By the way, class, that term paper you did was for the CIA \(1984\)](#)

## Tufts University

[Students counter spies \(1985\)](#)



After your parents are convicted, you may ask the CIA to send you this cool Air America cap.

## University of California

[UCLA asks CIA for affirmative action funds \(1992\)](#)

## University of Cincinnati

[Brown-nosing the spooks \(1990\)](#)

## University of Massachusetts

[Arrested protesters put CIA on trial - and win! \(1987\)](#)

## University of Southern California

[A leaflet on the career of USC trustee John McCone \(1977\)](#)

## University of Texas at San Antonio

[CIA cold warrior woos UTSA students \(1994\)](#)

## Yale University

[Doug Henwood reviews Robin Winks' \*Cloak and Gown\*](#)

Full-text search of this site plus the NameBase site:



Public Information Research, Inc.

[home](#) / [subscribe](#) / [about us](#) / [books](#) / [archives](#) / [search](#) / [links](#) / [feedback](#)

**"America's Best Political Newsletter"** Out of Bounds Magazine

# counterpunch

**edited by alexander cockburn and jeffrey st.clair**

**New Print Edition of CounterPunch Available Exclusively to Subscribers:** **Labor's Historic No to Bush's War:** Joann Wypijewski reports; **Who is Barry Rubin?** Inside the Israeli Pro-War Lobby; **What's Next for the Peace Movement?** Elected Greens in Oregon Push for Impeachment; **Dirty Bombs:** the Legacy of Depleted Uranium. **Remember, the CounterPunch website is supported exclusively by subscribers to our newsletter.** Our worldwide web audience is soaring, with more than 60,000 visitors a day. This is inspiring news, but the work involved also compels us to remind you more urgently than ever to [subscribe](#) and/or make a [\(tax deductible\) donation](#) if you can afford it. **If you find our site useful please: [Subscribe Now!](#)**

**Or Call Toll Free 1-800-840 3683 or write CounterPunch, PO BOX 228, Petrolia, CA 95558**

April 7, 2003



## Spying, Secrecy and the University

## The CIA is Back on Campus

By DAVID N. GIBBS

The prospect of domination of the nation's scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present--and is gravely to be regarded.

Dwight D. Eisenhower 1

**T**he aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack has reignited a longstanding debate about whether academics should work for the intelligence services, especially the CIA. In the new atmosphere of patriotic commitment, American academics have been called upon to serve in the war against terrorism--especially by serving as consultants to the Agency. In this article I will argue against collaboration between universities and intelligence agencies; and I will show that the practice is incompatible with reasonable academic norms, especially in the social sciences.

The new collaboration between academics and the intelligence agencies has elicited little debate or negative comment. On the contrary, such collaboration has been endorsed across the ideological spectrum. In November 2002, the liberal *American Prospect* published an article by Chris Mooney entitled: "Good Company: Its Time for

### Recent Stories

April 7, 2003

David N. Gibbs

[Spying, Secrecy and the University:  
The CIA is Back on Campus](#)

Harry Browne  
[War and Peace Summit a Royal Farce](#)

Gideon Levy  
[America is Not a Role Model](#)

Diane Christian  
[A Scene from an Obscene War](#)

Jules Rabin  
[Remembering Deir Yassin](#)

James Davis  
[Oddsmaking in Dublin: Will Bush Shake  
Gerry's Hand?](#)

Robert Fisk  
[The Twisted Language of War](#)

Patrick Cockburn  
[Slaughter on the Road to Dibagah](#)

John Mackay  
[War and Art](#)

Seth Sandronsky  
[Wars and the Color Line](#)

Steve Perry  
[War Web Log 4/7](#)

April 5, 2003

Alexander Cockburn  
[The Iraqi Humanitarian Relief is in  
Shambles](#)

Anne Gwynne  
[A Drowning in Salem](#)

Uri Avnery  
[Roadmap to Nowhere](#)

Chris Floyd  
[Hell for Leather: Bombs, Bullets, Bibles  
and Bush](#)

William Cook  
[Would You Have Sent Your Son \(or](#)

Academics and the CIA to Work Together. Again."2 To the best of my knowledge, there has been no extended response to the Mooney article in *The American Prospect* or in any other publication.

While pundits never tire of the cliché that American universities are dominated by leftist faculty, who are hostile toward the objectives of established foreign policies, the reality is altogether different: The CIA has become "a growing force on campus," according to a recent article in the *Wall Street Journal*. The "Agency finds it needs experts from academia, and colleges pressed for cash like the revenue." Longstanding academic inhibitions about being publicly associated with the CIA have largely disappeared: In 2002, former CIA Director Robert Gates became president of Texas A & M University, while the new president of Arizona State University, Michael Crow was vice-chairman of the Agency's venture capital arm, In-Q-Tel Inc. Current CIA Director George Tenet delivered the commencement address at the Rochester Institute of Technology.<sup>3</sup> The CIA has created a special scholarship program, for graduate students able and willing to obtain security clearances. According to the London *Guardian*, "the primary purpose of the program is to promote disciplines that would be of use to intelligence agencies."<sup>4</sup> And throughout the country, academics in several disciplines are undertaking research (often secret) for the CIA.

To be sure, such consultation has a long history, extending back to the beginning of the Cold War. During the 1950s, the CIA and military intelligence were among the main sources of funding for the social sciences, having supported such institutions as the Columbia's Russian Research Institute, Harvard's Russian Research Center, and MIT's Center for International Studies. Outside the campus setting, major research foundations, including the Ford Foundation and the Asia Foundation, were closely integrated with the Agency. The field of political communications was transformed during the early Cold War by large-scale U.S. government funding, in which leading academics helped intelligence agencies to develop modern techniques of propaganda and psychological warfare.

Research on Third World development and counterinsurgency techniques were other fruitful areas of investigation.<sup>5</sup> The field of political science appears to have been at the forefront of such CIA collaboration, and some of the resulting activities strained the limits of academic propriety. Noam Chomsky provides the following recollection of his experiences at MIT:

Around 1960, the Political Science Department separated off from the Economics Department. And at that time it was openly funded by the CIA; it was not even a secret... In the mid-1960s, it stopped being publicly funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, but it was still directly involved in activities that were scandalous. The Political Science Department was so far as I know the only department on campus which had closed, secret seminars. I was once invited to talk to one, which is how I learned about it. They had a villa in Saigon where students were working on pacification projects for their doctoral dissertations.<sup>6</sup>

In a carrot and stick strategy, these activities were combined with rigorous scrutiny of dissident professors and, in the words of historian Bruce Cumings: "It is only a bit of an exaggeration to say that for those scholars studying enemy countries, either they consulted with the government or they risked being investigated by the FBI."<sup>7</sup> The CIA also developed remarkably close ties to the field of journalism

[Daughter\) Off to War If...](#)

**Gila Svirsky**  
[A Busy Day for Bulldozers](#)

Mike Ferner  
[Back from Baghdad: What Next for the Peace Movement?](#)

**Joanne Mariner**  
[Civilian Deaths and Official Apologies](#)

John Stanton  
[Bush Takes His Killing Orders from the Lord](#)

**Romi Mahajan**  
[Learning to Count the Dead](#)

Aluf Benn  
[After Iraq, US Vows to Deal with Other Mideast Regimes](#)

**Mary Ellen Peterson**  
[Gay Marine Refuses to Fight](#)

William MacDougall  
[Country Music and the Crimes of Patriotism](#)

**Ron Jacobs**  
[War and Occupation](#)

Bernie Pattison  
[Aborigines and the Different God](#)

**Mark Engler**  
[Iraq War as Arms Expo](#)

Adam Engel  
[Li'l Box of Love: a Novelini](#)

**Poets' Basement**  
[Tripp, Albert, Katz](#)

Jeffrey St. Clair  
[Flesh and Its Discontents: the Paintings of Lucian Freud](#)

Norman Madarasz  
[Canada and the War](#)

and, during the period 1947-77, some 400 American journalists "secretly carried out assignments" for the Agency, according to a classic investigative study by Carl Bernstein. Some 200 of these journalists signed secrecy agreements or employment contracts with the CIA. "By far the most valuable of these associations, according to CIA officials, have been with the *New York Times*, CBS, and Time Inc."<sup>8</sup> Overseas, U.S. intelligence officers funded academics and writers through a series of front organizations and publications, coordinated by the CIA-controlled Congress for Cultural Freedom.

During the 1970s, CIA-academic ties suffered a blow, in light of the general atmosphere of skepticism toward U.S. foreign policy associated with the Vietnam war and the massive student-led opposition to that war. The Agency's image also was damaged during hearings by a special U.S. Senate committee, chaired by Senator Frank Church, in 1975. The "Church Committee," as it was known, revealed extensive CIA misdeeds, such as efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba, as well as extensive Agency involvement in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende in Chile. For an extended period, any academic association with the Agency was viewed as odious. In reality, the academic-CIA association was not really terminated, but was carried on with greater discretion.

During the late 1990s (even before the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon), the CIA made a special effort to increase its influence in the academy. A November 2000 article in *Lingua Franca* states that since 1996, the CIA has made public outreach a "top priority and targets academia in particular. According to experts on U.S. intelligence, the strategy has worked." The article notes that highly regarded academics--including Columbia's Robert Jervis, recent president of the American Political Science Association and Harvard's Joseph S. Nye--worked for the CIA. Yale's H. Bradford Westerfield also states: "There's a great deal of actually open consultation and there's a lot more semi-open, broadly acknowledged consultation."<sup>9</sup> The pace of collaboration accelerated after September 11.

So what is the objection? The first problem is that in a democratic society, academia is supposed to have a measure of independence from the state. Professors, especially in the social sciences must be able to present critical analyses of official policy; close relationships with the intelligence services severely compromise the potential for such criticism.

And second problem is the CIA's unsavory history. One of the major functions of the Agency has been covert operations, which includes such practices as the overthrow of governments, assassination of foreign leaders, and involvement in massive human rights abuses. One well-documented example of covert operations was the 1965 coup in Indonesia, in which the CIA helped overthrow a left-leaning, neutralist government, led by Sukarno, a major figure in the non-aligned movement. The Indonesian case was one of the major acts of mass killing during the Cold War era--substantially larger than those that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo--though it is largely a forgotten event.

During and shortly after this coup, there was a massive reign of terror against the Indonesian Communist Party, left-wing organizations, and the families and friends of leftist figures. Estimates of the death toll have ranged from 250,000 to 1,000,000. In 1984, long after the events took place, former CIA officer Ralph McGehee stated: "The CIA prepared a study of the 1965 Indonesian operation that described what the Agency did there. I happened to have been custodian of that



April 4, 2003

**Anthony Gancarski**  
[Colin Powell's Shame](#)

John Chuckman  
[Was Einstein Right About Israel?](#)

**David Krieger**  
[The Meaning of Victory](#)

Tom Gorman  
[The Mantra of the Troops: Support or Treason?](#)

**Adam Federman**  
[The Absence of War](#)

Vijay Prashad  
[There Are No More Arguments](#)

**Tom Stephens**  
[The End of the Innocence](#)

Mickey Z.  
[Makes Me Sic \(Sic\): Copy Editing Bush Speak](#)

**Pierre Tristam**  
[War Coverage: a Dishonest Reality Show](#)

Hammond Guthrie  
[The Deadly Mihrab](#)

**Steve Perry**  
[War Web Log 04/04](#)

April 3, 2003

Uri Avnery  
[A Crooked Mirror: Prostitution and the Theater of Operations](#)

**David Vest**  
[Can You Hear the Silence?](#)

Anthony Gancarski  
[Colin Powell Telemarketer](#)

**David Lindorff**  
[Takoma: the Dolphin Who Refused to](#)

study for a time, and I know the specific steps the Agency took to create the conditions that led to the massacre of at least half a million Indonesians." 10 More recent information, published in 1990, revealed that CIA and U.S. embassy officials in Jakarta helped draw up a "hit list" of Indonesians targeted for elimination, and passed on this information to the Indonesian military, a point that former US officials have openly admitted. One U.S. diplomat, associated with the covert program, said the hit list was necessary during the Cold War: "I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad."<sup>11</sup>

The CIA also conducted some rather unpleasant operations within the United States. We are all familiar with the extensive repression that characterized communist states during and even after the Cold War, including the abuse of the psychiatric profession to punish dissidents.

Unfortunately, the United States engaged in activities that were just as shocking, and the CIA was one of the principal perpetrators. Consider MKULTRA, a CIA operation during the 1950s and 1960s, which used patients in psychiatric hospitals and other unwitting subjects to develop mind control techniques. This vast operation--authorized by CIA Director Allen Dulles--was vast in scope and entailed research at dozens of universities, hospitals, and other institutions in the United States, and also in Canada. Some of the most distinguished figures in psychiatry participated in MKULTRA, including the Ewan Cameron, who served as president of the American Psychiatric Association.

In one set of experiments, test subjects were administered electroconvulsive treatments at levels that exceeded the normal therapeutic parameters. Other experiments involved sensory deprivation, continual playing of recorded voices, and a variety of drugs including (most famously) LSD. Sometimes, these techniques were used in combination. The experiments often reduced test subjects to such degenerated states that they became semi-comatose, losing the ability to eat, walk, or relieve themselves without assistance. Many experiments were done without anything that could be called informed consent and without the test subjects having any real understanding of what was taking place. The intent was to break down the test subjects' resistance through massive over-stimulation, in order to make them more pliable; these activities were to yield new techniques of interrogation for CIA and military field operatives. There is also evidence that the Agency sought the means to "program" people to perform special tasks, such as assassination. (It is surely ironic that during the time that the CIA was undertaking these experiments, the 1963 movie *The Manchurian Candidate* provided a fictionalized account of such experiments; in the movie the perpetrator of these crimes was not the CIA, but our Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union.)

These bizarre activities produced little of real value to the Agency. However they did cause brain damage and serious personality disorders in some test subjects. The full details of MKULTRA may never be known since the CIA (understandably enough) destroyed most of its documents pertaining to the operation.<sup>12</sup>

But why focus on the distant past? Covert operations have a contemporary significance. As this article is being written, the United States is pursuing a war with the Baathist regime headed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq. This enemy is at least partly the product of past covert operations: In a series of coups in 1963 and 1968, the CIA helped the Baathists consolidate power. British journalists Andrew and Patrick Cockburn provide this account of the 1963 takeover:

## [Fight](#)

Michael Roberts  
[War, Debts and Deficits](#)

Ramzy Baroud  
[Now That Iraqis Are Being Killed Is Israel Any More Secure?](#)

Jo Wilding  
[From Baghdad with Tears](#)

Anton Antonowicz  
[Cluster Bombs on Babylon](#)

Alison Weir  
[Israel, We Won't Forget Rachel Corrie](#)

Bruce Jackson  
[Hating Wolf Blitzer's Voice](#)

Eliot Katz  
[War's First Week](#)

Steve Perry  
[War Web Log 04/03](#)

## **Hot Stories**

Paul de Rooij  
[Arrogant Propaganda](#)

Gore Vidal  
[The Erosion of the American Dream](#)

Francis Boyle  
[Impeach Bush: A Draft Resolution](#)

[Click Here for More Stories.](#)

it was the CIA's favorite coup. "We really had the t's crossed on what was happening," James Critchfield, then head of the CIA in the Middle East told us. "We regarded it as a great victory." Iraqi participants later confirmed American involvement. "We came to power on a CIA train," admitted Ali Saleh Sa'adi, the Baath Party general secretary, who was about to institute an unprecedented reign of terror.<sup>13</sup>

Former National Security Council staffer Roger Morris also notes CIA complicity in the Baath Party's earliest acts of violence in 1963: "Using lists of suspected Communists and other leftists provided by the CIA, the Baathists systematically murdered untold numbers."<sup>14</sup> The takeover led to the rapid ascent of Hussein himself, who seized full power in a later coup.

A significant number of the enemies the United States now faces constitute "blowback" (as Chalmers Johnson has argued) from past CIA operations. Osama bin Laden was according to *Le Monde* "recruited by the CIA in 1979" to assist in the Jihad against communism in Afghanistan. During the 1980s, Bin Laden worked along the Pakistani frontier with Afghanistan, where he helped funnel aid to the Mujahiddin guerrillas who were battling the Soviets and Afghan communists. *Jane's Intelligence Review* notes that Bin Laden "worked in close association with U.S. agents." Bin Laden also is known to have worked closely with Gulbadin Hekmatyar, who as also the CIA's most favored Mujahiddin commander. In raising money for the guerrillas, Bin Laden used the Bank for Credit and Commerce International--which was also the bank that the CIA used to finance many of its covert operations.<sup>15</sup>

It is also very likely that Al Qaeda contains personnel who had previously received CIA-furnished training, support, and armaments-- which include surface to air missiles. These missiles were openly and publicly supplied to the guerrillas; this was not even covert.

In light of the recent fears regarding anti-aircraft missiles and the associated dangers posed to civil aviation, it is worth recalling the following exchange that appeared on Cable News Network (CNN) in 1994, between Peter Arnett and Brigadier General Mohammed Yousaf (retired) of the Pakistani military:

Arnett: Another legacy of the war -- the Stinger missiles given to the Afghan resistance by the CIA. The world's most effective anti-aircraft missile, the Stinger turned the tide of the war against the Soviets. It can also bring down a commercial airliner?

Gen. Yousaf: Certainly. It can bring down any airliner.<sup>16</sup>

Not only did the Agency fail to prevent the September 11 attacks; on the contrary, it helped to create the perpetrators of these attacks. It may also have furnished the necessary training and equipment for new attacks.

One of the most common justifications for academic collaboration with the CIA is the terrorist danger. An augmented role for the Agency is seen as part of the solution to this problem, and this point is frequently cited. One faculty member at the Rochester Institute of Technology recently defended collaboration this way: "by and large, these CIA guys are people whose primary goal is to keep the rest of us



[Burn Your Sweatshop Clothes!](http://www.nosweatapparel.com)  
[Buy Union Made Apparel!](http://www.nosweatapparel.com)

[Subscribe Online](#)

[Search CounterPunch](#)



safe."<sup>17</sup> Such attitudes seem extraordinarily naïve, given the Agency's past support for Bin Laden and the Baath Party of Iraq.

The fact that the CIA has a considerable amount of blood on its hands is a sufficient reason that academics should not become involved with its activities. There are additional reasons as well. The CIA engages in propaganda practices that are fundamentally incompatible with academic norms of objective analysis. It is true that all government agencies engage in public relations and propaganda to some degree, but there is a key distinction here: The CIA is an *espionage* agency, and disseminating propaganda is one of its central functions. The Agency's output in this area has indeed been prodigious. According to U.S. Senate document, "Well over a thousand books were produced, subsidized, or sponsored by the CIA before the end of 1967." In some cases, the CIA simply provided financial support toward a book's publication (often without the author's knowledge); in others, Agency personnel worked directly with the author and influenced the actual content of the book. In the latter cases, the CIA sought to control the author to a considerable degree. According to an Agency propaganda specialist, the CIA wished to "make sure the actual manuscript will correspond with our operational and propagandistic intentions."<sup>18</sup>

The CIA has never released a title list of the one thousand (or more) books it helped to publish, in its elaborate propaganda efforts. However, there can be no doubt that academics participated in some of these CIA publishing activities. In addition, there is the problem of self censorship: During the 1950s, a common practice at MIT's Center for International Studies was for researchers to publish a classified study on a specific topic, and then to publish a "sanitized" version of the same study, as a regular academic book study for public use.<sup>19</sup> To the best of my knowledge, the book publications that resulted from this process never acknowledged CIA support, nor did they acknowledge that the publication had omitted information.

Particularly troubling is the CIA's use of "black" propaganda, a common intelligence practice in which deliberately false information is released, and the true origin of the disinformation is obscured. One example of black propaganda is *The Penkovsky Papers*, a 1965 book that purported to be the published diary of a Soviet military officer. The book portrayed the Soviet system in general and the Soviet intelligence services in particular in a most unflattering light. As it turns out, the CIA actually wrote the book. Former CIA officer Victor Marchetti wrote: "*The Penkovsky Papers* was a phony story. We wrote the book in the CIA."<sup>20</sup> More recently, the CIA helped coordinate a massive black propaganda operation during the 1980s, to influence U.S. and world opinion against the Nicaraguan government and other adversaries in Central America.<sup>21</sup> Overall, the propaganda activities of the CIA, which are part of its normal operations, are contrary to and deeply corrosive of some of the most basic standards of academic integrity.

Another problem with the Agency is its extreme secretiveness and lack of public accountability. Contrary to popular misperceptions, this proclivity toward secrecy has not changed substantially with the end of the Cold War. Efforts by researchers to obtain documentation on covert operations have largely been unavailing, even for operations that occurred many decades ago. In 1997, University of Kentucky historian George C. Herring wrote a caustic account of his experiences as a member of the CIA's Historical Advisory Committee, which is supposed to provide independent advice and supervision for the Agency's declassification activities. Herring viewed his role this way: "Now I'm from Kentucky, and I'm not supposed to be swift, but it didn't take too long even for me to realize that I was being used to

cover the Agency's ass while having no influence."<sup>22</sup> The Agency's unwillingness to release information suggests that it has a great deal to hide. And of course, recent changes associated with the war on terrorism will increase secrecy even further.

This secretiveness extends to the CIA's involvement with the academy. Consider the Agency's Officer in Residence Program, which sends intelligence officers to teach at selected universities for a semester or two. The Agency likes to say that this program is completely public and open: "there is nothing clandestine about an officer's assignment as a visiting faculty member," according to a CIA description of the program.<sup>23</sup> Yet, when a researcher filed a Freedom of Information Act letter, asking for a list of participants in the program, the universities with which they were affiliated, and the dates of affiliation, the request was denied.<sup>24</sup>

Overall, the Agency's secretiveness is unsurprising. Covert operations have enabled the United States to undertake "dirty" actions that advance specified policy objectives, without the need to pay the price, in terms of loss of face. Fortunately, secrecy efforts are not always successful, and we have excellent documentation pertaining to dozens of these operations, based on such sources as Senate hearings, investigative reports in the *New York Times* and other papers, and memoirs and public statements by retired intelligence officers. Nevertheless, it is clear that the CIA still has much to hide. And the continuing proclivity toward secrecy poses a special problem for scholarship, which is supposed to be committed to *open* inquiry and research.

A final danger is that academic collaboration with the CIA will present a conflict of interest, and this danger is especially serious for social scientists who specialize in the study of international relations. The CIA is after all a major player in many of the international conflicts that social scientists must study. Working for the CIA--especially if it is done clandestinely--can compromise researchers' independence. This objective was recently suggested by CIA official John Phillips, in an interview with the *Wall Street Journal*. His choice of words is revealing: "We don't want to turn [academics] into spies... We want to capture them intellectually."<sup>25</sup> Phillips' comments referred to academics in the "hard" sciences, but there is no reason to assume that the Agency's objectives are any different in the social sciences.

The possibility that academics have been intellectually captured by an agency of the state is disturbing. However, this process was well established during the Cold War. Consider the case of Professor Conyers Reed, who served as president of the American Historical Association. In his 1949 presidential address, Professor Reed made the following statements:

Discipline is the essential prerequisite of every effective army whether it marches under the Stars and Stripes or under the Hammer and Sickle... Total war, whether it be hot or cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to assume his part. The historian is no freer from this obligation than the physicist... This sounds like the advocacy of one form of social control as against another. In short, it is.<sup>26</sup>

The attitudes expressed above are surely remarkable for a prominent academic working in a democratic society.

Recent work in political science has been remarkably flattering to the CIA, since it omits virtually any mention of the Agency's most controversial activities. I surveyed the five top journals in political science that specialize in international relations during the period 1991-2000.<sup>27</sup> I did not find a single article in any of these journals that focused on CIA covert operations. Mentions of covert operations were very rare and, when they occurred at all, they were confined to a few sentences or a footnote. In effect, an entire category of international conduct has been expunged from the record, as if it never occurred.

Political science's neglect of covert operations is also evident in many of the datasets that are used as the raw material for research. Consider for example the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset, which compiles quantitative information on international conflicts throughout recent history, and is one of the most widely used datasets in political science. The MIDs dataset contains an exhaustive catalogue of conventional wars and military conflicts (many of which were relatively minor). Yet there is virtually no mention of CIA covert operations. True, the MIDs database defines conflict in a way that rules out most covert operations.<sup>28</sup> This would not in itself be a problem, if there were some other standard dataset that did include a significant number of covert operations. The problem is that such a dataset does not exist (or if such a dataset does exist, it has elicited no notice in the top journals). The resulting scholarship can be summarized as an extended exercise in selection bias, because it omits covert operations, which constitute a major category of international conflict. This selection bias is far from innocuous; it virtually guarantees that U.S. actions will appear in a more favorable light.<sup>29</sup>

There are of course counter-arguments to be considered. One objection, offered by Robert Jervis, is that political science has avoided covert operations because there is so little public information on the topic.<sup>30</sup> This is not a valid objection. As seen above, the Indonesia and Iraq operations have been admitted by former CIA officers and diplomats, in public statements. The CIA's involvement in the 1973 overthrow of the Allende government has been documented at length in a U.S. Senate report. The Agency's involvement in the 1953 coup against the Mossadegh government in Iran was officially acknowledged by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. And there are many other equally well-documented cases.<sup>31</sup> Political science's neglect of covert operations is certainly not the result of a lack of source material. The problem is that political scientists have ignored source material pertaining to covert operations.

During the Cold War, a major objection to the social systems of the Soviet Union and its allies was that the universities lacked independence from government doctrine, and that social scientists in those countries acted as mere adjuncts to the propaganda, intelligence, and security agencies of the state. Such practices resulted in a lack of internal criticism of state policy. Let us hope that American academics can hold themselves to higher standards than this--and will avoid classified work for the CIA and other intelligence services.

**David N. Gibbs** is Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Arizona. He can be reached at [dgibbs@arizona.edu](mailto:dgibbs@arizona.edu).

1 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "[Farewell Address](#)," January 17, 1961.

2 Chris Mooney, "[Good Company: It's Time for the CIA and Scholars to Work Together. Again.](#)" *The American Prospect*, November 2002.

3 Daniel Golden, "[After Sept. 11, the CIA Becomes A Force on Campus](#)," Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2002.

4 "Spooky Scholarships," London Guardian, December 17, 2002.

5 Irene Gendzier, "Play it Again Sam: The Practice and Apology of Development," in Christopher Simpson, ed., *Universities and Empire* (New York: New Press, 1998).

6 Noam Chomsky, "The Cold War and the University," in David Montgomery, ed, *The Cold War and the University* (New York: New Press, 1997), 181. Note that Chomsky adds: "Certainly, nothing like that is true now [regarding the MIT Political Science Department]; it is a much more open department."

7 Bruce Cumings, "[Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and After the Cold War](#)," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 29, no. 1, 1997.

8 Carl Bernstein, "The CIA and the Media," *Rolling Stone*, October 20, 1977.

9 Chris Mooney, "[For Your Eyes Only: The CIA Will Let You See Classified Documents--But at What Price?](#)" *Lingua Franca*, November 2000.

10 Quoted in "Should the CIA Fight Secret Wars?" *Harpers*, September 1984.

11 Quoted in Christopher Reed, "U.S. Agents 'Drew up Indonesian Hit List,'" *London Guardian*, May 22, 1990.

12 Harvey Weinstein, *Psychiatry and the CIA* (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1990); and Elizabeth Nickson, "Mind Control," *London Observer*, October 16, 1994.

13 Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, *Out of the Ashes: The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein* (New York: Harper, 1999), 74-75. Patrick Cockburn is the Middle East correspondent for the *London Financial Times* and the *London Independent*.

14 Quoted in Roger Morris, "[A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making](#)," *New York Times*, March 14, 2003.

15 I have discussed these matters at length in David N. Gibbs, "Forgotten Coverage of Afghan '[Freedom Fighters](#)': [The Villains of Today's News were Heroes in the '80s](#)," *Extra*, January/February 2002.

16 See CNN, "Terror Nation, U.S. Creation?" five part series on Afghanistan, Transcripts 373-1 through 373-5, August 21, 1994. The quoted portion is taken from sections 373-4. Print versions available through Lexis-Nexis.

17 Quoted in Daniel Golden, *Wall Street Journal*, 2002, above.

- 18 Both quotes from U.S. Senate, Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), 193.
- 19 Christopher Simpson, *Science of Coercion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 82.
- 20 Quoted from "[An Ex-CIA Official Speaks Out: An Interview with Victor Marchetti](#)" by Greg Kaza," 1986. I telephoned Marchetti and confirmed the authenticity of this interview. See also discussion in Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell, 1980), 161-62.
- 21 Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, "Reagan's Pro-Contra Propaganda Machine," *Washington Post*, September 4, 1988.
- 22 George C. Herring, "[My Years with the CIA](#)," transcript of speech at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, 1997.
- 23 Quoted in Jon Elliston, "[CIA's Man on Campus](#)," *Durham Independent*, November 29, 2000.
- 24 Mooney, *American Prospect*, 2002, above. The FOIA request was made by Daniel Brandt of Public Information Research Inc. [A scanned copy of the FOIA letter is available online.](#)
- 25 Quoted in Daniel Golden, *Wall Street Journal*, 2002, above.
- 26 Conyers Reed, "The Social Obligations of the Historian," *American Historical Review* 55, no. 2, 1950, 283-85. There is no specific evidence that Conyers actually consulted for the military or the CIA. However, the opinions expressed in the narrative do elucidate the general phenomenon of the "captured" intellectual.
- 27 The journals were: *World Politics*, *International Organization*, *International Security*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and *International Studies Quarterly*.
- 28 Daniel Jones, Stuart Bremer and J. David Singer, " Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, no. 2, 1996, 169-70.
- 29 For further discussion of this problem see: David N. Gibbs, "Social Science as Propaganda? International Relations and the Question of Political Bias," *International Studies Perspectives* 2, no. 4, 2001. See also Peter Monaghan, "[Does International Relations Scholarship Reflect a Bias toward the U.S.?](#)" *Chronicle of Higher Education*, September 24, 1999.
- 30 This statement was made in a radio debate between me and Robert Jervis on [the radio program Democracy Now](#), November 13, 2002.
- 31 Probably the best general account of covert operations is in William Blum, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions since World War II* (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1995). Well documented with extensive references.

## **Yesterday's Features**

**Anthony Gancarski**  
[Colin Powell's Shame](#)

**John Chuckman**  
[Was Einstein Right About Israel?](#)

**David Krieger**  
[The Meaning of Victory](#)

**Tom Gorman**  
[The Mantra of the Troops: Support or Treason?](#)

**Adam Federman**  
[The Absence of War](#)

**Vijay Prashad**  
[There Are No More Arguments](#)

**Tom Stephens**  
[The End of the Innocence](#)

**Mickey Z.**  
[Makes Me Sic \(Sic\): Copy Editing Bush Speak](#)

**Pierre Tristam**  
[War Coverage: a Dishonest Reality Show](#)

**Hammond Guthrie**  
[The Deadly Mihrab](#)

**Steve Perry**  
[War Web Log 04/04](#)

**Keep CounterPunch Alive:**  
[Make a Tax-Deductible Donation Today Online!](#)

[home](#) / [subscribe](#) / [about us](#) / [books](#) / [archives](#) / [search](#) / [links](#) /



*Los Angeles Times*, 28 January 2001, Sunday Opinion Section, p. M2

## **Academics and Spies: The Silence that Roars**

**by David N. Gibbs**

TUCSON: An academic controversy has revealed a most interesting fact: A significant number of social scientists, especially political scientists, regularly work with the Central Intelligence Agency.

It has long been known that the academia-CIA connection was a staple of the early Cold War. During the 1940s and '50s, the CIA and military intelligence were among the major sources of financial support for America's social scientists. In Europe, the agency covertly supported some of the leading writers and scholars through the Congress for Cultural Freedom, as Frances Stonor Saunders recently documented in her book *The Cultural Cold War*.

Such ties supposedly withered during the 1970s, in the aftermath of Vietnam and hearings by the U.S. Senate select committee on intelligence, which revealed extensive CIA misdeeds, including fomenting coups against democratically elected governments, plotting assassinations of foreign leaders and disseminating propaganda. After these revelations, it seemed that no self-respecting academic would go anywhere near the agency.

A recent article in the magazine *Lingua Franca*, however, reveals that this perception is inaccurate and that the "cloak and gown" connection has flourished in the aftermath of the Cold War. The article states that since 1996, the CIA has made public outreach a "top priority and targets academia in particular. According to experts on U.S. intelligence, the strategy has worked," it says. The article quotes esteemed academics, including Columbia's Robert Jervis, former president-elect of the American Political Science Assn., and Harvard's Joseph S. Nye. Both acknowledge having worked for the CIA. Yale's H. Bradford Westerfield is quoted as saying: "There's a great deal of actually open consultation and there's a lot more semi-open, broadly acknowledged consultation."

What is interesting about the above quote is that it is offered so casually, as if no reasonable person could find fault with the activity. Something is seriously wrong here.

The CIA is not an ordinary government agency; it is an espionage agency and the practices of espionage -- which include secrecy, propaganda and deception -- are diametrically opposed to those of scholarship. Scholarship is supposed to favor objective analysis and open discussion. The close relationship between intelligence agencies and scholars thus poses a conflict of interest. After all, the CIA has been a key party to many of the international conflicts that academics must study. If political scientists are working for the CIA, how can they function as objective and

disinterested scholars?

This problem of objectivity is essentially the same one that scientists are addressing with regard to biomedical research funded by drug companies. Biomedical scientists increasingly are expected to reveal financial support that might bias their findings. It is regrettable that political science, which has no expectation of full disclosure relating to work for the CIA, holds itself to a lower standard.

The CIA likes to advertise that it has "reformed" since the end of the Cold War and no longer engages in many of the secretive practices that resulted in so much congressional and public disapproval. Indeed, several academic defenders of the CIA, including Westerfield, emphasize CIA "reform." This is mostly a public-relations gambit. People who think the agency has reformed should try requesting documents through the Freedom of Information Act; they probably will find it impossible.

Secrecy poses a special problem for scholars. Research undertaken for the CIA often is classified, so that academics who have performed the research are legally barred from revealing much of what they may find. Scholars thus are prevented from doing their jobs, which must include disseminating the fruits of their research through publication. In undertaking classified work, researchers have become complicit in the practice of secrecy, one of the most undemocratic characteristics of the intelligence services.

Jervis, Nye and Westerfield seem to discount any suggestion that academic-intelligence ties might bias scholarship. But consider covert operations undertaken by the CIA. These operations resulted in some of the most controversial actions during the Cold War, including U.S. support for overthrowing governments in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Zaire in 1961, Indonesia in 1965 and Chile in 1973. These operations have been extensively documented in Senate hearings and by other reliable sources. How does political science treat these issues? I reviewed all the articles published during the past 10 years in five of the most prestigious journals in the field. Apart from a rare paragraph or perhaps a sentence or two, they contain no mention of CIA covert operations. Covert actions have been effectively expunged from the record.

This failure of political science to discuss covert operations is troubling. The *Los Angeles Times* and other news media run articles on covert operations, such as the recent revelation that the CIA had close links to Gen. Manuel Contreras, Chile's dreaded secret police chief during the Pinochet dictatorship. The U.S. government has acknowledged some of these operations. This past March, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright publicly acknowledged to the Iranian government, in light of evidence, that the CIA had supported the 1953 coup in that country. Nevertheless, political science journals remain virtually silent on such issues. Can anybody explain this?

---

David N. Gibbs, an associate professor of political science at the University of Arizona, is the author of *The Political Economy of Third World Intervention*.

[Back to home page](#)

*Lingua Franca*, November 2000, pp. 35-43.

## For Your Eyes Only

**The CIA will let you see classified documents -- but at what price?**

**by Chris Mooney**

At first, it seems like just another scholarly squabble over lingo. Then you notice the Orwellian overtones. "I have seen too many people over the years dodge the unpleasant term 'deception' by using 'perception management,'" says Central Intelligence Agency senior analyst Karl Spielmann to his academic audience. Earlier Spielmann had clarified another contested term in intelligence studies: "Strategic," he explained, means "damn important!"

We are at the annual convention of the three-thousand-member International Studies Association (ISA), held in downtown Los Angeles's silo-like Westin Bonaventure Hotel. Spielmann is addressing a panel called "Denial and Deception in the Information Age." In remarks laced with Washington insider-speak -- at one point he fondly refers to Henry Kissinger as "Henry the K" -- Spielmann stresses the need to combat propaganda attacks waged against the United States over open information channels like the Internet. Though he says he's not recruiting academics for the CIA, Spielmann ends with a plea for concerted scholarly inquiry into methods of denial and deception (D & D). "I think we have an incipient discipline," he says.

In the question-and-answer period, a scholar asks the man from "the Campus" -- as CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, is sometimes called -- for "unclassified" examples of D & D. Before long, the panelists are discussing how governments go about misleading their enemies and how those deception techniques help spies to ferret out enemy secrets even while dissembling. As the conversation proceeds, one thing stands out. Probably it's just a coincidence: Unlike most of the thirty-odd academics in the room, Karl Spielmann is not wearing a name tag.

The "cloak-and-gown connection," as some have called it, is hardly new. At least since 1966, when *Ramparts* magazine exposed a \$25 million CIA project at Michigan State University to train South Vietnamese police, intelligence-academia collaborations have stirred discomfort and disapproval. During the 1980s, revelations about the CIA's ties to academe helped spark large-scale student protests on several campuses.

Since the Cold War's end, however, the nation's universities and intelligence services have experienced a kind of détente, tied closely to the United States' new global good-guyhood. Today, university watchdogs tend to fret about corporate rather than

government tugs on scholarship, and the formerly strong "CIA Off Campus" organization doesn't even have a Web site. "The opprobrium that used to attach to any relationship with government intelligence agencies has more or less vanished," notes Steven Aftergood, director of the Project on Government Secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists.

The CIA has seized this opportunity. A 1996 Directorate of Intelligence memo calls "public outreach" a top priority and targets academia in particular. According to experts on U.S. intelligence, the strategy has worked. Since the end of the Cold War, spies and scholars have grown more cozy than at any time since Vietnam drove a wedge between professors and the government. Cooperation "is now very much to the fore," says Yale political scientist and intelligence scholar Bradford Westerfield. "There's a great deal of actually open consultation, and there's a lot more semi-open, broadly acknowledged consultation." As Loch Johnson notes in *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society* (Oxford, 1991), cloak-and-gown relationships can take many forms. These range from occasional telephone conversations, to on-campus research arrangements and consultancies, to lecturer positions and extended scholar-in-residence programs at the CIA itself. The level of security clearance granted to the scholar depends on the sensitivity of the research and the degree of exposure to classified materials.

How close is too close? Some scholars object to all partnerships involving security clearances. The prominent University of Chicago historian and political scientist Bruce Cumings has sharply criticized ties between academia and intelligence. And last year, the University of Arizona political scientist David Gibbs launched a one-man campaign against what he saw as an uncritical approach to the CIA at the ISA's flagship journal, *International Studies Quarterly* (ISQ).

The claims of Gibbs, Cumings, and others prompt reactions ranging from bafflement to charges of conspiracy-mongering from other international studies professors, some with and some without CIA ties. Have U.S. scholars of international affairs grown too close to the intelligence community? Or has the Cold War's end made security clearances acceptable in academe, despite the objections of some now-old New Leftists who are still instinctively storming the Pentagon?

"Research and analysis are at the core of intelligence," writes the Yale historian Robin Winks in *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961* (William Morrow, 1987). For this reason, CIA analysts like Karl Spielmann want scholarly aid in solving intelligence problems. When academics work with the CIA, at least in theory both parties stand to gain: The academics get access to the best information, though it's classified and available for their eyes only; meanwhile, the agency gets access to the best brains.

As Winks details, the Cold War partnership between academia and intelligence originated with the World War II Office of Strategic Services, or OSS -- the agency some called "Oh So Secret" -- whose research and analysis (R & A) branch brought together the nation's top minds to outsmart Adolf Hitler. Throughout most of the war, R & A was led by a Harvard diplomatic historian, William Langer. The OSS later morphed into the CIA, which pursued the "hot war" model of cloak and gown into

chillier international climes and cultivated its connections at elite universities to great effect. ("Ph.D. intelligence" was J. Edgar Hoover's term of derision for the agency.) As the late Columbia historian Sigmund Diamond documented in *Compromised Campus: The Collaboration of Universities With the Intelligence Community, 1945-1955* (Oxford, 1992), Harvard's Russian Research Center, established in 1947, was modeled on the OSS's Soviet division and had close covert ties to the CIA from its inception. "The intelligence aspect of the work of the Russian Research Center and the research aspect ... cannot be distinguished," Diamond concluded.

*Compromised Campus*, the product of Diamond's lengthy bureaucratic battle for classified documents under the Freedom of Information Act, serves as a kind of urtext for scholars who find something sinister in the early history of university-intelligence relationships. (It also claims that William F. Buckley and Henry Kissinger spied on their colleagues for the FBI while at Yale and Harvard, respectively.) Diamond's work is admiringly cited in *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War* (New Press, 1998), a collection edited by American University communications professor Christopher Simpson. In his introduction to the volume, Simpson unveils an astonishing statistic: U.S. military and intelligence agencies, working closely with leading foundations (Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller), provided the largest single source of funding for major social scientific research in the 1950s. One of the earliest international affairs institutes, MIT's Center for International Studies (CENIS), grew out of the State Department's psychological warfare initiative, Project Troy, and was clandestinely underwritten by the CIA during the early 1950s. A number of other academic institutes were predominantly, and often covertly, funded through such channels, including Princeton's Institute for International Social Research and Columbia's Bureau of Applied Social Research.

After the 1967 exposure of CIA ties to the National Students Association, Lyndon Johnson asked Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach to chair a commission on the CIA's relations with academe and private voluntary organizations. The commission's conclusion was stark: "It should be the policy of the United States government that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations." The agency quickly canceled many of its contracts with professors. But as later events proved, at least some undisclosed funding remained in place. In the mid-1980s, the *Harvard Crimson* made national news by asserting that the CIA had provided funding to international relations professors Richard Betts and Samuel Huntington and to Middle East expert Nadav Safran. Safran used CIA money to help pay for an academic conference without notifying attendees. Harvard censured Safran in 1985.

In the wake of the Safran affair, CIA deputy director Robert Gates gave a speech at Harvard in which he defended the CIA's relationships with scholars. At the same time, though, he tried to defuse some of the controversy. If a university had explicit rules against allowing faculty to conduct classified research, Gates said, the agency would abide by those rules. In the case of CIA-sponsored conferences, the agency would encourage organizers to inform attendees of the funding. Most significantly perhaps, Gates said the CIA would allow researchers to disclose that they had worked for the agency, unless the agency determined that "formal, public association

of CIA with a specific topic or subject would prove damaging to the United States."

Among the most controversial CIA policies is its insistence that scholars sign a lifetime secrecy agreement before receiving a security clearance. According to CIA spokesman Tom Crispell, this means they must submit for review any books or articles they write that touch on the topic of their classified access or the broader subject of intelligence. Crispell stresses that the review is not editorial; rather, it is designed to prevent inadvertent disclosure of classified materials. But some allege that the review process can be highly politicized. And as the recent cases of Wen Ho Lee and John Deutch show, academics, like anyone else, are legally liable if they act improperly with classified information.

Chicago's Bruce Cumings is adamant that security clearances are simply incompatible with the obligation of scholars to "speak truth to power," as international relations guru and Vietnam protester Hans Morgenthau once put it. Says Cumings, "Professors involved in international affairs should not have security clearances from any governments, including their own." If academics want to heed Karl Spielmann's call to research "denial and deception," he says, "why don't they go join the CIA and stay there, and stop pretending they're professors who subscribe to canons of truth, objectivity, and honesty in the classroom?"

A frequent writer on east Asia for *The Nation*, Cumings is best known for a two-volume history of the Korean War, but he has also taught in two political science departments. In 1997, he started a small war in the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (BCAS) with an article titled "Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies During and After the Cold War" (an edited version appears in *Universities and Empire*). The article traces the development of the two closely intertwined fields of area studies and international studies at a time when universities - flush with foundation, intelligence, and military research subsidies -- were convulsed with McCarthyite campus purges. Of the early history of area studies, Cumings writes, "It is only a bit of an exaggeration to say that for those scholars studying potential enemy countries, either they consulted with the government or they risked being investigated by the FBI." And in the 1990s, he suggests, things may not have changed that much: The 1991 National Security Education Act, since gutted by the Gingrich budget cut, created federal area and language studies programs run out of the Defense Intelligence College on the Pentagon's dime. Fellows studying abroad were required to "make a good faith effort" to find employment in national security.

In Cumings's view, far too many scholars today, particularly in international relations, collaborate with the government. "It's quite common for people in the IR field, younger and older ones, to go to the National Security Council for a while or to the CIA as consultants," he says. Cumings believes this both creates intolerable burdens on academic openness and skews scholarship: "That's one of the reasons the subdiscipline of international relations is so conservative and so concerned with realpolitik and realism as the major paradigms of inquiry, which sort of fits with what national security managers believe in."

Perhaps with this concern in mind, Cumings closed the BCAS version of "Boundary Displacement" with this exhortation: "Abolish the CIA, and get the intelligence and

military agencies out of free academic inquiry."

Fighting words like these triggered a symposium response titled "Round Up the Usual Suspects: Cumings's Misdirected Search for Post-Cold War Enemies of Academic Independence." Indeed, it's no struggle to find views sharply at variance with Cumings's. Referring to the 1950s sub-rosa funding of international studies institutes, Bradford Westerfield says, "I'm not one of those people who get outraged about ancient history unless I think it is reflected in current patterns of behavior." And whereas Cumings would argue that only in "conditions of total war," such as during World War II, should scholars work extensively with the military and intelligence, Westerfield opines that CIA funding of CENIS and other institutes wasn't wrong to begin with -- or not unless "the Cold War itself was just an American chimera that could ... have been wholly avoided if we'd just caved in to permanent Communist domination over Eastern Europe and over the left in most of western Europe and Japan."

In general, academics who have done classified work strenuously protest that their scholarship and teaching remain untainted. For Harvard Kennedy School dean Joseph Nye, who chaired the CIA's National Intelligence Council -- and has held positions in the State Department, Defense Department, and National Security Council -- classified consulting is acceptable, provided it's not secret. Rather than demonizing academic consulting, Nye says, "I think the taboo should be against doing classified work in a university setting," noting that Harvard has disallowed such practices. But as far as charges of conflict of interest are concerned, Nye insists that his intelligence ties have not prejudiced his scholarship. "I certainly have not tried to write things which are for the sake of the government," he says.

In fact, some scholars say their classified work has made them more critical of the government rather than less so. Columbia's Robert Jervis, currently president of the American Political Science Association (APSA), has consulted with the CIA on numerous occasions, including work on a 1978 "postmortem" on Iran after the CIA was embarrassingly caught unawares by the mounting movement to topple the U.S.-backed Shah (the revolution took place a year later, in 1979). Though he admits it was probably unusual back then because of CIA regulations, Jervis says he was allowed to tell his colleagues what he was up to: "I told my one left-wing graduate student that if he wanted to change advisers, he should be free to do so. He laughed and said, 'I could care less.'" In an e-mail, Jervis describes how his insider experiences proved disillusioning: "In the fall of 1978, I took advantage of the fact that I had clearances to read the Top Secret rationales for the MX [missile] program. Previously I had been skeptical, but had believed that the government had information and analyses that made the program plausible if not compelling. In fact, I found the justifications were very flimsy." Jervis says this experience ultimately led him to write two books highly critical of U.S. nuclear strategy -- and he suspects these books prevented him from getting other consultancies.

But if Jervis is right in asserting that government work doesn't blunt one's critical edge, then what's all the fuss about? Jervis chalks up much of the concern over cloak and gown today to "paranoia." Those who claim that academics face censorious pressures have it precisely backward, he says. "People follow their politics, and that



takes them into government, not vice versa."

Some academics see government ties as producing not servile scholarship but better-informed foreign policy. Academic consultancies can help prevent intelligence errors resulting from inadequate analysis, says Daniel Deudney, a Johns Hopkins political scientist who has consulted for numerous government security and intelligence agencies, including the CIA. "The reluctance of academics to talk to the CIA is against everyone's interests," Deudney avers. Robert Keohane, former president of the APSA and of the ISA, has chosen not to be bound by ties to the government, but he believes that scholars who choose otherwise are rewarded with considerable influence. "I think there are trade-offs in life," says Keohane. "I don't have any day-to-day influence over policy. I can't pick up the phone and call the secretary of state or defense because they're personal friends or I work for them. Right? So I trade that off, and for that I get my independence and my ability to theorize without ever worrying about what they think of me."

Are the trade-offs really that cut-and-dried? Cumings, for one, is not convinced that academic assistance promotes a more responsive foreign policy establishment. Citing the United States' history of crises with North Korea -- a track record that has only recently improved under the Clinton administration -- Cumings observes that any number of readily available sources indicated the flaws in the government's policy. "And nonetheless the government continued doing what it had been doing," he says. "It wasn't for a lack of analysis, or getting better minds in government: It was fundamentally because of our partisan politics."

Politics is, after all, at the heart of the matter -- and there are few topics more politically charged than the history and reputation of the CIA. Although the CIA draws only about \$3 billion per year from the United States' roughly \$30 billion dollar "black budget" for intelligence, it's usually the first agency that comes to mind when one thinks of cloak and dagger -- or cloak and gown. The high-tech Pentagon intelligence agencies -- the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and others -- collectively receive almost ten times as much funding as the CIA per year. But whereas the Pentagon agencies are generally considered more politically conservative and military in character, the CIA was a favorite tool of liberal cold-warrior John F. Kennedy, and its founder, Allen Dulles, held scholars and intellectuals in high regard. Frances Stonor Saunders's recent book *The Cultural Cold War* (New Press, 2000) documents the agency's secretive efforts to promote the liberal anticommunism of the *Partisan Review* and other high-brow publications in the 1950s and 1960s.

The respect between scholars and spies has not always been mutual. During the Cold War, the CIA earned an unsavory reputation in academe thanks to controversial covert operations that ranged from staging a coup in Iran in 1953, to attempting to thwart the election of Salvador Allende in Chile in 1970, to plotting to assassinate Fidel Castro and other world leaders. During the 1980s, the agency provided funding, training, and equipment to Nicaraguan contras attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government -- a policy that ultimately exploded in the Iran-contra scandal.

Some scholars argue that the CIA has cleaned up its act and that today's critics

assail the agency more out of reflex than substantive grievance. In general, the CIA's bad press has begun to peter out, perhaps because the agency, by and large, hasn't been involved in the same types of controversial covert operations that characterized the Reagan era. According to Harvard's Joseph Nye, the current international climate has much to do with this as well. People are realizing, he says, that "if you're going to deal with some of the new threats that we face, such as terrorism and mass destruction, in fact you're going to need a CIA."

Bradford Westerfield stresses that the CIA is no longer -- if it ever was -- the "rogue elephant rampaging out of control" suggested by Senator Frank Church during the Watergate era, when Senate hearings first uncovered many of its most shocking activities. "The agency has largely reformed itself on the one hand," Westerfield says, but "those sets of reforms are eternally suspect in the eyes of a very embittered generation of scholars whose formative years were the late 1960s or early 1970s. That gulf is probably unbridgeable."

The CIA continues to relive its past partly due to the slow pace of declassification. Westerfield notes that with each new discovery about the Cold War era, a new wave of resentment crests in academe. (Most recently, declassified documents have definitively linked the CIA to Chile's brutal former chief of secret police.) "This could go on for ten or twenty years," says Westerfield. Robert Jervis currently chairs a panel of scholars that advises the CIA on declassification. Even as such material trickles into circulation, some scholars worry that progress is at best desultory. George Herring, a University of Kentucky historian who was rotated off the declassification panel, once remarked that many historically significant documents will remain permanently classified "if the people in the intelligence agencies have their way."

An old joke derides the International Studies Association as "white guys with ties / talking about missile size." Judging from this year's conference, the characterization hardly seems accurate. Intelligence and security studies, after all, are just two strands of interest among the association's twenty sections. The conference includes panels on peace studies and the global environment and features papers with titles like "How Queer Are International Affairs?" Though ISA membership is two-thirds North American, accents abound at the conference; for every CIA analyst lecturing, it seems, there's a woman in a sari.

Still, during a night of table-to-table at the Westin Bonaventure's alcohol-licensed coffee bar, I encounter two conference attendees with intelligence ties. One of them, Enrique Gallego, seems the perfect embodiment of Cumings's claim that many in international relations pursue career trajectories that involve classified work. A Ph.D. candidate in international relations at the University of Chicago at Illinois, Gallego is tall and heavysset with a buzz cut. His dissertation will examine the modernization of the Chinese military and its effect on U.S. foreign policy. As an army officer, Gallego tells me, he has done some military intelligence work and has security clearances. As for the CIA, Gallego simply says it's never cut him a check.

Gallego doesn't believe scholars should necessarily divulge their CIA connections; he thinks it can damage one's reputation "Once you're tagged as an intelligence worker,

you're tagged," he explains. Gallego has plenty of criticism for what he terms the agency's "cowboy era": "In the old days, the CIA would get a little full of itself, and it would do some bonehead things." But though "they've had their parties," today's CIA, according to Gallego, has reformed.

But even if the CIA's Reagan-era "parties" are over, critics like David Gibbs contend that such exploits have left a troubling legacy -- one that cloak-and-gown connections prevent international studies scholars from investigating.

Gibbs first got his back up when he read an article by Robert Snyder of Southwestern University titled "The U.S. and Third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations," published in the June 1999 issue of *International Studies Quarterly*. Snyder argued that the Cold War tension between the United States and three revolutionary states -- Cuba, Nicaragua, and Iran -- was provoked by the revolutionary states. The United States, after a period of hesitation, then reacted aggressively. In a seven-page letter to the editorial board of *ISQ*, Gibbs and three other scholars objected that Snyder's article contains "extensive and systematic distortions of evidence, and omits vitally important information that runs contrary to its thesis" -- namely, that the CIA was meddling in the internal politics of each of Snyder's case-study countries.

Gibbs and the others suggested that *ISQ* run their letter as a rejoinder. But *ISQ* does not print letters; the journal's policy is that all articles must go through peer review. The editors invited the authors to submit "a proposed response, which we would distribute to anonymous reviewers." But instead of submitting a paper to *ISQ*, Gibbs spilled his concerns to the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, which ran a story in September 1999. Gibbs then wrote back to *ISQ* editor Richard Mansbach, saying, "The fact that *ISQ* was willing to publish an article as problematic as Snyder's must raise questions regarding the selection and competence of referees. Also, there has been a regrettable association of key international relations scholars with various government agencies, and some of these may pose problems for scholarly objectivity."

In an interview with *Lingua Franca*, Gibbs explained more fully what he had in mind with that last sentence. He pointed out that Mansbach, currently at Iowa State University, was involved in a 1984 scandal at Rutgers University. Mansbach and another professor had conducted a class on foreign policy in which student papers would be submitted as part of a research project for the CIA. The professors had not had their project properly "endorsed" and "administered" by the university, the *New York Times* reported, and had not adequately informed the students that they would be participating in such a project. As a result, the University reprimanded them for having "acted inappropriately." Gibbs comments: "One of the specific points at issue here was misdeeds by the Central Intelligence Agency, and so I was just uncomfortable having an editor with those kinds of connections acting to supervise the review of any critique I would have made."

But according to Mansbach -- who says the Rutgers incident is "not germane" to the controversy -- more transpired before Gibbs went to the *Chronicle*. Mansbach says he explicitly offered to recuse himself from the *ISQ* editorial process in the review of

Gibbs's piece and to send it to another review team. "If he thinks one of the editors is a problem ... when that editor steps out, what more do you want?" asks Mansbach. Gibbs denies ever having received such an offer, although another *ISQ* editor, Patrick James, also at Iowa State, confirms that it was made. When *Lingua Franca* asked Mansbach to provide documentation of the offer, he refused.

The responses to Gibbs's campaign have been varied. A number of scholars agree with his basic criticisms of Snyder's article but disapprove of his shirking peer review and appearing to judge Mansbach on the basis of events that took place in 1984. William Robinson, a sociologist at New Mexico State University who signed Gibbs's original letter to *ISQ*, calls Snyder's article a piece of "ideology disguised as scholarship" but says *ISQ*'s offer was satisfactory to him. When Gibbs decided not to accept the offer, Robinson ceased to have any involvement with the issue. Similarly, Craig Murphy of Wellesley College, current ISA president and editor of the journal *Global Governance*, says he wishes Gibbs had submitted his rejoinder for peer review: "I think he has a number of significant points."

From Snyder's perspective, ever since Gibbs has started talking, everyone has ignored his side of the story. Snyder emphasizes that, the details of his case studies notwithstanding, he was attempting to make a theoretical point about the internal politics of revolutionary states. He also objects to the way he's been painted: "You read the *Chronicle* article, and you'd think that I was some right-wing yahoo from Texas." Snyder says he has never worked for the government, plans to vote for Gore, and comes from Pennsylvania. He also points out that a distinguished review team accepted his article, and that quite a number of leading scholars in international relations have praised the piece. One, the Tufts political scientist Tony Smith, wrote to Snyder in a letter, "Congratulations on being a *succès de scandale*. But of course the scandal is the arguments of your critics."

Snyder nearly matches Gibbs when it comes to provocateurship, saying the controversy stems from Gibbs's politics. He alleges: "I think, from a sociological point of view, what Gibbs represents is Marxism on the defensive. I think Gibbs feels that if Marxists can't claim to explain U.S. foreign policy toward Third World radical states, then what can they explain?" Gibbs says whether or not he's a Marxist is irrelevant to the arguments he's trying to make. As for going outside the peer review process? "I have no regrets."

If academics do sacrifice some of their independence when they work for the CIA, what do they get in return? Not very much, suggests one of Gibbs's colleagues at the University of Arizona, Thomas Volgy.

When I meet Volgy at the conference, he looks harried, if not harassed. As the executive director of the ISA, he's bogged down by a variety of administrative tasks -- during our conversation, his walkie-talkie keeps going off. Still, he devotes a considerable amount of time to talking about Gibbs's claims and scholarly connections with the government. Finally, Volgy describes his own insider experience: two stints at the State Department on a scholar-diplomat exchange program.

"I'll tell you, the kind of clearance most of us get doesn't give us enough access, but it gives us great stories," Volgy begins. "And I tell my story in my class all the time. I walked past an office called the 'Office of Weather and Climate Modification.' And I knocked on the door, I walked in, and there was this guy sitting behind the desk, but there was nothing on the desk. And I said, 'What do you do?' and he said, 'I can't tell you.' And I said, 'I've got security clearance,' and he said, 'Not for me, you don't.'" Volgy laughs.

"For months, I had these nightmares about what this guy was doing, right? And it gives me this great set of stories," he says. "If I could penetrate in there, and then I couldn't write about it, and I couldn't talk about it, what the hell was I doing there in the first place? Those are my two responsibilities as an academic: Write about it, talk about it. So if you take that away from me, I cease to be an academic. Then I may be somebody who becomes a consultant, but not an academic."

For a second, Thomas Volgy sounds a lot like Bruce Cumings or David Gibbs. But then he slows down, becoming again the soft-spoken, walkie-talkie-wielding administrator. "Yeah, you bet there's a problem there," he says. "How big the problem is, it's really hard to tell. Most of us don't get that kind of clearance. You know, we get to see the desk. And the smile of polite refusal."

---

Chris Mooney is a writing fellow at the *American Prospect*. His article "Showdown: The Scholarly Fight Over Guns in America" appeared in the February 2000 *Lingua Franca*.

[Back to home page](#)

*Covert Action Information Bulletin*, Winter 1989, pp. 25-28

***Students, Scholars, and Spies:***

# **The CIA on Campus**

**by Robert Witanek**

Copyright © 1989 by Covert Action Publications, Inc., Washington DC,  
and Institute for Media Analysis, Inc., New York NY. All rights reserved.

Professors and CIA operatives with academic cover have worked extensively on campuses around the world. As we will see in this article, they have written books, articles, and reports for U.S. consumption with secret CIA sponsorship and censorship; they have spied on foreign nationals at home and abroad; they have regularly recruited foreign and U.S. students and faculty for the CIA; they have hosted conferences with secret CIA backing under scholarly cover, promoting disinformation; and they have collected data, under the rubric of research, on Third World liberation and other movements opposed to U.S. intervention.<sup>1</sup>

The nature of the relationship between the CIA and the academic community is best seen in a 1968 memo from Dr. Earl C. Bolton who, while serving as Vice President of the University of California at Berkeley, was secretly consulting for the CIA. The memo, widely circulated among U.S. universities, advises the use of duplicity and deception to hide CIA connection to the campuses. It also suggests lying about CIA involvement in university projects stating, "The real initiative might be with the Agency but the apparent or record launching of the research should, wherever possible, emanate from the campus." The memo continues:

Follow a plan of emphasizing that CIA is a member of the national security community and stress the great number of other agencies with which the agency is allied [and] ... stress in recruiting articles and speeches that the agency is really a university without students and not a school for spies. There is as much academic freedom within the walls of the building and among those competent on the subject as on any campus I know. (I haven't detected the slightest tendency on the part of anyone to resist saying what he thinks.)<sup>2</sup>

Bolton's memo also recommended setting up programs with CIA funds "to establish the study of intelligence as a legitimate and important field of inquiry for the academic scholar." Under Bolton's plan the CIA was to fund one-year post doctoral programs for selected scholars.

Ironically, the memo also stated that doctoral students spending a year at the CIA working on their dissertations "would of course have to recognize the agency's right to review the finished document for accidental leaks." The contradiction between CIA

secrecy and the academic ideal of encouraging the open exchange of information seems to have posed no dilemma for the vice president of one of the country's most prestigious universities.

## A Few Examples

The CIA has a long and sordid history of activity on U.S. university campuses. The examples below list just a few of what are doubtlessly hundreds of CIA operations on college campuses.

- From 1955-59, Michigan State University had a \$25 million contract with the CIA to provide academic cover to five CIA agents stationed in South Vietnam who performed such jobs as drafting the government's constitution, and providing police training and weapons to the repressive Diem regime. The constitution included a provision requiring the South Vietnamese to carry voter identification cards. Citizens without such cards were assumed to be supporters of the Vietcong, and faced arrest or worse by the regime's police.<sup>3</sup>
- In 1956, while the MSU operation was in full swing, the CIA established the Asia Foundation, providing it with approximately \$88 million in funding each year. The foundation sponsored research, supported conferences, ran academic exchange programs, funded anti-communist academics in various Asian countries, and recruited foreign agents and new case officers.<sup>4</sup> Large numbers of American academics participated in the program.
- The CIA started the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies (MIT-CIS) in 1950. By 1952, former Director of the CIA's Office of National Estimates Max Millikan became director of the center.<sup>5</sup> In 1955, the CIA contracted "Project Brushfire" with Millikan to study the political, psychological, economic, and sociological factors leading to "peripheral wars."<sup>6</sup>
- In the mid 1950s, professors at MIT and Cornell launched field projects in Indonesia to train an elite of Indonesian military and economic leaders who later became the impetus behind the coup that brought Suharto to power and left over one million people dead. The elites were trained at the Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies at the University of California at Berkeley by Guy Pauker who had moved there from MIT-Center for International Studies.<sup>7</sup>

## Academics and Africa

The CIA is especially interested in inspiring university African affairs programs.

Again, MIT played an important role in promoting CIA interests. In 1956, when former CIA official Max Millikan was director of MIT's Center for International Studies, he appointed Arnold Rivkin from the State Department to head MIT's Africa Research Program. Together, the two supervised studies for CIA use.<sup>8</sup>

That the CIA had a keen interest in academics with expertise in African Studies was evidenced in a Ford Foundation study. In 1958, the Ford Foundation's Committee of Africanists commenced to "survey the current condition and future prospects of African studies." According to its report, the CIA said it would need "a constant level of ... seventy people specializing in the African area; they particularly desire those who have training in economics, geography, or political science."<sup>9</sup> Other examples of the CIA's "academic" interest in Africa include:

- In 1965, Rene Lemarchand, a nontenure professor at the University of Florida, returned from a trip to Burundi. Shortly thereafter, Justin Gleischauf, the Miami CIA station chief contacted Lemarchand, asking him for an interview. Manny Dauer, Lemarchand's department chair, advised him to cooperate fully in answering the questions the CIA had for him. Lemarchand, however, turned down the invitation.<sup>10</sup>
- In 1968, George Rawick, a sociology professor at Oakland University was approached by James R. Hooker, of Michigan State University's African Studies Center for recruitment into the CIA. Hooker, a professor with a liberal-left reputation, used an interesting argument. Hooker's rationale for working with the CIA was, "None of us are ever going to get an intelligent approach unless we get trained intelligent people in there to tell us what's going on. If we rely on yahoos, look what we're going to get."<sup>11</sup>

## **Democracy: Rutgers Style**

In 1968, the CIA used the Eagleton Institute for Research at Rutgers University in a plan to influence the outcome of the presidential election in Guyana. Through the Eagleton Institute, the CIA helped amend the Guyanese constitution to allow Guyanese and relatives of Guyanese living abroad to vote by absentee ballot. Then 16,000 votes were manufactured in New York City, giving the CIA's candidate, Forbes Burnham, a narrow margin over socialist Cheddi Jagan.<sup>12</sup>

Another operation involving Rutgers University was run by Political Science Department Chair, Professor Richard Mansbach, who used an undergraduate class (without the students' knowledge) as cover for a CIA project entitled the "European Non-State Actors Project" (ENSAP) in 1984.<sup>13</sup>

When Europeans were up in arms over U.S. deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Western Europe, Mansbach assigned his students to each focus on one component of West Europe's political culture including disarmament, religious, labor,



media, left, environmental, and various other groups. They were to produce data-intensive reports to Mansbach who would in turn, and in secret, incorporate the data into a report to the CIA. While the study was initially to result in a book, it is believed to have been abandoned after it was exposed.<sup>14</sup>

## CIA "Scholars" on Campus

The CIA recently initiated an "Officer in Residence" program to increase their presence and prestige in the U.S. academic community. According to a CIA official, "about ten" major universities across the country host CIA "Officers in Residence."<sup>15</sup> Stanley M. Moskowitz, chair of the CIA Training Selection Board, wrote that the Resident Officers program, "allows senior-level officers to disengage from their normal duties by fully participating in the academic life, including research and teaching." He also stated that the CIA officer,

will demonstrate the quality of CIA people and [the CIA's] commitment to providing U.S. leaders with the very best intelligence we can. The program also serves to strengthen our professional ties to a fertile and indispensable source of ideas and technical expertise and to enhance CIA's recruiting efforts by providing an opportunity for experienced officers to serve as role models, to counsel interested students on career opportunities with the CIA, and to respond to concerns students may have about the agency and the intelligence profession.<sup>16</sup>

The letter makes no bones about the fact that the CIA is on campus to recruit the "fertile and indispensable source of ideas," namely university professors, and to look for recruits among students as well.

An October 9, 1987 memo from the Office of the Associate Dean at the University of Texas to the faculty shows how eager university officials are to cooperate with the CIA's Officer in Residence program. The memo describes Resident Officer James McInnis as having "extensive experience in national security policy and international affairs, especially Latin America and the Middle East" and states that "He [McInnis] might prove a valuable resource to you in your teaching and research. I invite and encourage you to seek him out and explore *mutual interests* [author's emphasis]."

## Recruiting on Campus

Campus recruitment by the CIA is as old as the Agency itself. In the late 1940s, Frank Wisner was director of the CIA's Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), which was then the CIA's operational component. He used 500 OSS World War II veterans who had returned to their careers as academicians after the war, as well as other faculty members, to form "selection committees" which became the OPC's unofficial recruitment arm.<sup>17</sup> Known as the OPC's "P-source," or professor source, these committees provided ideal means for screening potential recruits because they could

observe the students over periods of time in a classroom setting.

By early 1950, the program had been expanded to include the recruitment of foreign students attending college in the U.S. to serve as CIA agents in place or moles when they returned to their respective countries.<sup>18</sup> The recruitment of foreign students had its roots in earlier programs in the late 1930s and through the 1940s when students of countries friendly to the U.S. were admitted to U.S. military academies. Their services were especially desired by the U.S. as they would return to their countries to become part of the nation's military elite. Through them, the U.S. hoped to influence events in these countries and to gain information on the inner workings of their governments.

By the late 1970s about 5000 academicians were doing the bidding of the CIA: identifying and recruiting American students and providing fulltime screening committees designed to select 200-300 future CIA operatives from among the 250,000 foreign students who come to the U.S. to be educated each year.<sup>19</sup> Around 60 percent of these professors, researchers, and administrators were fully aware of and received direct compensation from the CIA as contract employees or from research grants for their role as covert CIA recruiters.<sup>20</sup>

In 1975, the CIA attempted to secretly recruit Ahmad Jabbari, an Iranian student working on his Ph.D. in economics at Washington University in St. Louis. At his interview with the CIA agent, which he taped, the recruiter asked him to spy on other Iranian students, offering an immediate \$750 payment, and American citizenship, if he proved reliable. Jabbari refused all offers.<sup>21</sup>

After recruiting a foreign student, the CIA often uses coercion by threatening to expose the student as a CIA agent while demanding his/her continued cooperation. Since 1948, more than 40 foreign agents recruited on American campuses have committed suicide out of fear of exposure.<sup>22</sup>

In 1977, a federal appeals court ruled that the CIA had no right to secretly investigate Gary Weissman, a former student at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, "for recruitment purposes." Weissman sued the CIA after learning of the investigation.<sup>23</sup>

In June of 1986, David Wise reported that the CIA had made recruiting of new personnel a key priority. The effort has included the opening of 11 recruiting centers around the U.S. Wise wrote that the effort involved a major advertising campaign and that student inquiries have been steadily rising. John P. Littlejohn, the CIA's deputy director of personnel, described the recruitment procedure as follows: The recruiter receives resumes in advance, courtesy of the campus placement offices, and selects candidates for a screening interview. The interview usually takes place on campus but some colleges, like Harvard University, require that the interviews occur off campus.<sup>24</sup>

Potential CIA recruits must complete a 12-page personal history, undergo a lie detector test, and be subject to physical, psychological, and sometimes psychiatric testing, and a background clearance test of at least four months in duration.

According to Littlejohn, approximately 150,000 people inquire about jobs each year, 10,000 submit applications, and 1000 employees are hired. Littlejohn estimates that two to three hundred of these become clandestine officers.<sup>25</sup>

## The CIA at Harvard

While information about CIA campus recruitment is a closely guarded secret, these programs are obviously known by college administrators. Details about the CIA's covert campus recruitment program were presented to eight presidents of America's most prestigious colleges at a secret meeting in Washington, DC's Mayflower Hotel in the spring of 1976. The administrators were told that the Senate would not expose these programs but that information would be provided to assist the college administrators in cleaning up their respective colleges. Ironically, none of the presidents requested the additional information.<sup>26</sup>

Harvard President Derek Bok convened a committee to draft a report on CIA operations at the college and guidelines regulating such activity. In return, the CIA launched a massive campus lobbying effort against the adoption of similar measures. During this effort, from June 1978 through 1979, the CIA held a series of "special briefings" with various University presidents in an attempt to work out secret arrangements for campus recruiting.<sup>27</sup>

The CIA promised that Harvard's rules would be ineffective, as the Agency would simply ignore them. To that effect, CIA Director Turner sent a letter to Bok proclaiming the right of every American to assist the CIA as they chose. He also said that "all recruitment for CIA staff employment on campus is overt" conveniently avoiding the topic of its recruitment of "agents" and other CIA "assets" not considered as CIA staff.<sup>28</sup>

The CIA has kept its promise to violate Harvard's guidelines, with at least two known cases being recently brought to light. In 1986, professor Nadav Safran resigned as head of Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Affairs after revealing that he secretly received payment from the CIA to write a book about Saudi Arabia and to stage a conference about the Middle East at the University.<sup>29</sup>

In 1985, an official of the Harvard Center for International Affairs was embroiled in a similar controversy when he conducted research secretly funded by the CIA.<sup>30</sup>

The Bok report documented CIA use of campus "spotters" to provide names to the CIA of prospective CIA recruits. When a spotter finds a potential recruit, the CIA conducts a background investigation of the student. If the CIA decides to approach the student, the spotter is often called upon to make the introduction. Otherwise, the results of the background inquiry go into a permanent dossier on the student without his/her knowledge.

## Conclusion

It's never easy to discover what the CIA is up to, even on our own college campuses. However, many CIA covert academic operations have come to light (usually years after the fact) because of unauthorized leaks, building takeovers resulting in the seizure of documents, or Freedom of Information Act requests.

As it has become clear that university administrators will not keep the CIA off campus, students have once again taken to mass protest to stop CIA activities. All across the country, CIA recruiters have been confronted with angry students and faculty demanding their ouster and an end to university recruiting. At the University of Colorado over 500 students were arrested during several days of anti-CIA recruiting protests.

As more covert CIA academic operations are exposed, the CIA will develop more effective means of protecting its secrecy when it goes to college. Regardless, many dedicated students are seeing to it that the CIA must operate in a campus environment that is less than ideal for the maximum exploitation of its university assets.<sup>31</sup> This is a hopeful sign.

1. In 1976, Professor Michael Selzer admitted at a faculty meeting that he had kept "his eyes and ears open" for the CIA on a trip to Europe and later met with them and reported what he had learned. He also admitted that he knew six professors who had spied for the CIA. See Ernest Volkman, "Spies on Campus," *Penthouse*, October 1979. Also of interest is the CIA's participation in a conference entitled "The Middle East and the Superpowers," at Princeton University, October 25-26, 1979. For more on this case, see *CounterSpy* Vol.4, No.1 (Winter 1980), pp. 3-4.
2. The August 5, 1968 memo was entitled "Agency-Academic Relations." This reference is as quoted by John Kelly, in his paper "CIA In Academia," delivered at the American Political Science Association's 1979 Annual Convention in Washington, DC.
3. William Blum, *The CIA: A Forgotten History* (London: Zed Books, 1986), p. 140.
4. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (New York: Dell Publishing, 1974), pp. 150-151.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
6. John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1986), p.219.
7. Peter Gribbin, "CIA in Indonesia 1965," *CounterSpy*, Vol.4, No.1, (Winter 1980), pp.27-28. See also David Ransom, "Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia," in Steve Weissman (ed.), *The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid* (Palo Alto CA: Ramparts Press, 1975).
8. Ken Lawrence, "Academics: An Overview," in *Dirty Work II: The CIA in Africa*, Ellen Ray, et. al. (eds.) (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1980), p. 81.

9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
12. Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing With A Dictator* (New York: Times Books, 1987), p. 150.
13. Konrad Ege, "Rutgers University: Intelligence Goes to College," *CounterSpy*, June - August 1984. See also Eric Joselyn, "Closing the Company Store," *The Nation*, March 26, 1988.
14. Mansbach has recently accepted a position as head of the political science department at the University of Iowa at Ames. Perhaps he and his CIA partners believe that a change of scenery might allow Mansbach to resume CIA business as usual. University of Iowa students be warned.
15. In a recent interview with CIA "Academic Coordinator" Arthur Hulnick, he admitted that the CIA currently has "about ten" Officers in Residence on college campuses. This number is up from five only a year ago. Hulnick is travelling to campuses around the country, trying to make a case for accepting CIA recruiting efforts. Given all the evidence to the contrary, Hulnick insists, when confronted with student protests, that the CIA does not break the law and has never carried out assassination, domestic surveillance, etc.
16. *Ibid.*
17. William R. Corson, *Armies of Ignorance* (New York: The Dial Press, 1977), p. 309.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, p. 312.
20. *Ibid.*
21. See Volkman, *op. cit.*, n. 1.
22. Corson, *op. cit.*, p. 313.
23. Daniel Brandt, "CIA on Campus," *Trojan Parallel*, February - March, 1979.
24. David Wise, "Campus Recruitment and the CIA," *New York Times Magazine*, June 6, 1986.
25. *Ibid.*
26. Corson, *op. cit.*, p. 312.
27. Volkman, *op. cit.*, n. 1. These "special briefings" no doubt still occur. In 1984, CIA spokesperson Dale Peterson said that the CIA was holding three to four conferences a year for university presidents in order to discuss "mutual problems."

28. *Ibid.*

29. Safran received \$107,430 from the CIA for his book, *Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security*, published by Harvard University Press. He received an additional \$45,700 from the CIA to organize a conference on Islam. Safran's book contract required him to conceal the source of his funding and to submit his writings to the CIA for censorship.

30. Center for International Affairs Director Samuel Huntington was hired by CIA consultant Richard Betts to produce a report on the threat to U.S. interests when authoritarian rulers die in office. With Huntington's help, Betts published "Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs" in the Harvard quarterly, *International Security*. Betts's contract also required that he not reveal the source of funding for his research and that he submit his writings to the CIA for censorship.

31. At the State University of New York (SUNY) in Albany, the CIA hired limousines to transport recruits from the announced recruitment location to another location in order to escape student protests. Unfortunately for the CIA, their recruitment process was infiltrated by a demonstrator who tipped off the protestors, who then marched to the new recruitment site.

---

Robert Witaneck is a member of the Peace Center of Central Jersey and has organized against CIA activities at Rutgers University since 1981.

[Back to home page](#)

Excerpts from *The Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect To Intelligence Activities* ("Church Committee"), Book I, "Foreign and Military Intelligence," U.S. Senate, April 26, 1976

## The Church Committee on the CIA in Academia

---

**Committee's note:** The material italicized in this report has been substantially abridged at the request of the executive agencies.

---

The Central Intelligence Agency has long-developed clandestine relationships with the American academic community, which range from academics making introductions for intelligence purposes to intelligence collection while abroad, to academic research and writing where CIA sponsorship is hidden.

*The Central Intelligence Agency is now using several hundred American academics ("academics" includes administrators, faculty members and graduate students engaged in teaching), who in addition to providing leads and, on occasion, making introductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes abroad. Beyond these, an additional few score are used in an unwitting manner for minor activities.*

*These academics are located in over 100 American colleges, universities, and related institutes. At the majority of institutions, no one other than the individual concerned is aware of the CIA link. At the others, at least one university official is aware of the operational use made of academics on his campus. In addition, there are several American academics abroad who serve operational purposes, primarily the collection of intelligence.*

Although the numbers are not as great today as in 1966, there are no prohibitions to prevent an increase in the operational use of academics. The size of these operations is determined by the CIA.

With the exception of those teachers, scholars and students who receive scholarships or grants from the Board of Foreign Scholarships, the CIA is not prohibited from the operational use of all other categories of grantee support under the Fulbright-Hays Act (artists, athletes, leaders, specialists, etc.). Nor is there any prohibition on the operational use of individuals participating in any other exchange program funded by the United States Government.

The Committee is disturbed both by the present practices of operationally using American academics and by the awareness that the restraints on expanding this

practice are primarily those of sensitivity to the risks of disclosure and *not* an appreciation of dangers to the integrity of individuals and institutions.

The Committee believes that it is the responsibility of private institutions and particularly the American academic community to set the professional and ethical standards of its members.

[Back to home page](#)



*Penthouse*, October 1979

# Spies on Campus

by Ernest Volkman

In the early spring of 1976, Harvard University President Derek Bok began reading a 651-page green paperbound book with the forbidding title, *Foreign and Military Intelligence: Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities* (more popularly known as the Church Committee Report).

Like most other prominent academics, Bok was aware that for years some members of the academic community and the CIA had joined together in a secret relationship to turn many of America's university and college campuses into virtual espionage centers. He was aware that a number of professors and administrators were secretly working for the CIA, recruiting prospective agents among students, spying for the agency while overseas, sometimes helping to spy on "troublemaking" students, and using the cover of research institutes and other projects to gather intelligence.

And, most important, Bok was aware that people at Harvard were involved. He did not know how many or who they were, but he wanted it stopped.

Because the Church Committee had spent more than a year in investigating the CIA's domestic operations, including involvement with academia, Bok carefully read through the committee's final report, looking for facts -- facts that would allow him to write up guidelines for the university to set strict limits on such work for anybody who worked there.

But the report was a disappointment. On page 189, Bok found, instead of facts, this general statement: "The Central Intelligence Agency is now using several hundred American academics, who in addition to providing leads and, on occasion, making introductions for intelligence purposes, occasionally write books and other material to be used for propaganda purposes abroad. Beyond these, an additional few score are used in an unwitting manner for minor activities. These academics are located in over 100 American colleges, universities, and related institutes."

The report went on to recommend that the universities and colleges themselves "set the professional and ethical standards of its members," and that federal legislation prohibiting CIA activities on campus would be "unenforceable and an intrusion on the privacy and integrity of the American academic community."

Bok did not know that the original version of that section of the report contained considerable detail about the CIA-academia link, including references to Harvard. But when the committee submitted the draft to the CIA for clearance, the agency reacted

violently. Under no circumstances, CIA officials said, could any details about the agency's role in academia be published, and it would fight any attempt to bring them under control. Then the CIA played its trump card: since the agency's relationship with academics was "covert" and "voluntary," any law restricting such relationships would be unenforceable. The committee gave way under pressure and produced a watered-down report on the academia-CIA relationship.

But to Bok the section was worse than watered down; it was useless. The committee was urging America's academic community to take some action, but without telling it what the specific problem was.

So Bok decided to find out for himself, in the process setting off an extraordinary battle between Harvard and the CIA, a battle that Bok did not anticipate and one that has raised questions about whether the CIA in fact rules the Harvard campus. The battle has been going on for three years now, and what it is all about tells a great deal about the CIA's operations on America's campuses -- operations that have cast a shadow over academia from which it may never recover.

Shortly after Bok finished reading the Church Committee report, he gathered together a small group of men to take a close look at the CIA-Harvard link and come up with guidelines for the university governing such activity. Bok made no public announcement of his action, despite the fact that his group included some Harvard heavyweights with extensive Washington experience. Among them was Archibald Cox, ex-Watergate special prosecutor, and Don Price, then dean of the university's Kennedy School of Government and an old Washington hand. (Ironically, Harvard's School of Government has provided many of the most infamous presidential advisers on "national security" affairs, including Henry Kissinger who was in charge of all covert operations for most of the Nixon years; McGeorge Bundy, a Harvard dean who performed the same function for John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson; and Samuel Huntington, now on Carter's National Security Council.)

The group set about quietly to pin down the extent of CIA involvement at Harvard. To a certain extent, they were operating in the dark: they didn't know exactly who on campus worked for the CIA, didn't know how many were involved, didn't know which students were being recruited, and they had no cooperation from the CIA. But the group was not without its resources, mainly a long list of contacts inside and outside the government, a number of whom worked for the CIA. Gradually the group -- known simply as "The Harvard Committee" -- began to get a handle on what was going on, and in May 1977 prepared a report for Bok.

Basically the group found out that the CIA's two most important operations at Harvard -- and at other American campuses -- concerned the agency's use of academics as CIA agents abroad and a network of "collaborators" on campus that "steered" the CIA to students who appeared to be good prospects as CIA agents. In most cases, the group found, collaborating professors and the CIA worked on secret background checks on the prospect without the student's knowledge or consent.

Bok accepted the committee's recommendations for guidelines, which included

requirements that any faculty member who served as recruiter for the CIA be publicly noted as a CIA recruiter in the university's placement office, that no one could recruit a student for the CIA without the student's permission, that foreign students must give their permission before their names were forwarded to the CIA as potential recruits for espionage in their home countries, and that no member of the faculty could participate in CIA covert operations. Bok showed the recommendations to several members of the Harvard faculty and took their comments under advisement. Then he sent a copy to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Bok's actions had greatly upset the CIA. Considerable debate had taken place in the agency's higher echelons, and in the summer of 1977 Bok had received an incredible letter from CIA Director Stansfield Turner. The letter said that every American citizen had a right to assist the CIA if he so chose, and that the agency was being "singled out" for control on the Harvard campus, when other government agencies and corporations routinely recruited at the university.

Then Turner tried to be cute. "All recruiting," he wrote, "for CIA staff employment on campus is overt." A casual reader might assume that Turner was denying any covert CIA recruitment on American campuses. However, as Turner well knew, under CIA terminology, "staff" covers only full-time American employees; all the others who work for or with the agency are known as "agents" or "assets."

It became clear that the CIA wanted no guidelines at all. Daniel Steiner, Harvard's counsel who worked on the Harvard Committee, says that the CIA did not even want to discuss its academic operations and refused to say whether covert recruitment on the Harvard campus or the use of Harvard professors in overseas operations would be ended.

Deeply concerned, Bok told Turner that he was simply responding to the Church Committee's suggestion and that he saw no reason why the CIA could not accept the Harvard guidelines. In May of last year after the guidelines were officially issued, Turner finally said flatly that the CIA would do what it wanted on the Harvard campus regardless of the guidelines.

That moved Bok and other academic leaders to approach the Senate Intelligence Committee last summer asking that the new charters for intelligence agencies prohibit CIA secret operations on American campuses. But despite their pleas, the drafts of the new charters that emerged later contain no provision covering CIA operations on campus. The decision reflected heavy CIA pressure against any move to restrict its academic operations.

So there the matter stands at the moment, something of a Mexican standoff: Bok's guidelines remain, but the CIA says that it will ignore them. As Turner himself summed up the agency's position, "If we were required to abide by the rules of every corporation, every academic institution, it would become impossible to do the required job for our country. Harvard does not have any legal authority over us."

Bok sees it quite differently: "CIA covert recruiting threatens the integrity and

independence of the academic community. The CIA has argued that it must disregard our guidelines in the interest of national security. Let us be clear about exactly what this argument implies.... It [the CIA] insists upon the right to use financial inducements or other means of persuasion to cause our professors and employees to ignore our rules of employment and enter into secret relationships whenever it considers such activities to be justified by the interests of national security. I do not believe that an agency of the United States should act in this fashion."

Bok's one-man charge against the mighty CIA has made him something of a hero in academia but at the same time raises important questions. Why is the CIA so concerned about its operations in academia? Why did it stonewall the first attempt that was made to bring it under some sort of control? Why is it trying so hard to keep the links with academia under a permanent wrap of secrecy?

To begin with, it is important to understand that there is no higher priority at the CIA than maintaining its operations unscathed on campus. The academic world provides two key weapons in the agency's arsenal: new recruits and brain power. And there's more: priceless cover for certain operations and an academic veneer for a number of the agency's more sinister aspects.

At the moment, according to intelligence sources, at least 350 academics and administrators are covertly working for the CIA on more than 100 American campuses. They form a link with the CIA that has become so pervasive that there is some doubt whether a complete break between the two can ever be achieved. Many American campuses are experiencing a growing grass roots movement to do just that, but the movement has discovered that not all university administrations are especially eager to end the relationship, that students generally seem apathetic, and that too many faculties do not want to forgo the option of doing covert work for the CIA -- work that can be quite profitable, in some cases.

But this link with the CIA has left a stain upon the entire American academic world from which it may never recover. Too many universities, graduate programs, university institutes, and various other academic paraphernalia have gotten mixed up with intelligence operations. Academia cannot have it both ways -- on the one hand, talking about academic freedom; on the other, doing covert intelligence work for the government.

A major illustration of CIA corruption of American campuses is the recruitment of students from Third World countries. The reason for the CIA recruitment is obvious: these foreign students are their countries' leaders of tomorrow. If the CIA can recruit them now, they will later become priceless "agents in place," occupying critical positions where they will be able to pass on vital intelligence. Not all of them will wind up being spies, of course, but even if only 1 out of 100 eventually becomes, say, economics minister, then it will be well worth the investment of time and effort in recruiting all those students.

CIA recruitment among foreign students follows shifting perceptions of American government concern over various "strategic" areas in the world. Years ago the

concern (and CIA recruitment) concentrated on Eastern Europe and Latin America; today it is the Middle East and Africa. One special target, because of the country's strategic importance, has been Iran, the bulk of whose foreign students are in this country.

Until the recent revolution in Iran, the CIA worked with SAVAK, the shah's secret police, to destroy "antishah" elements in the Iranian student community in the United States. The CIA and SAVAK set up a front group called the International Association of Patriotic Students (IAPS), which organized demonstrations in favor of the shah and beat up students who differed with their view of the ruler.

The CIA also gave SAVAK extensive information about Iranian students who opposed the shah. SAVAK agents in Iran would visit these students' families and pressure them to write letters begging the students to stop all political activity. But the CIA was more interested in recruiting Iranian students than in spying on them, as Ahmad Jabbari, an Iranian student who was working on his Ph.D. in economics at Washington University in St. Louis, found out. In 1975 Jabbari met an older man on campus who said he was studying Iranian economics on an unspecified government "research project." The man, who seemed to take a strong interest in Jabbari's research and his future in Iran, invited him to lunch and then asked him to return to his hotel room for further discussion.

"He turned the television on very loud," Jabbari says, "and told me he does intelligence work. Then he said he would like to put me in touch with another person. I was angry; I was being asked to choose between my government and some foreign spy agency; so of course there was no choice. I wanted to find out more about CIA covert operations; so I decided to play the game and see how far it would go."

A month later Jabbari was introduced to the man's friend, a CIA officer in charge of recruitment of prospective agents in the midwestern area. Jabbari carried a small briefcase with a tape recorder inside during the meeting. The CIA man offered an immediate payment of \$750 for "medical expenses or whatever contingency you might have" plus a monthly "stipend," to be paid into any bank of Jabbari's choosing. Jabbari asked why the CIA was bothering to recruit him, in view of the close links between the shah and the agency.

"You see," the CIA officer replied, "even though there's cooperation between the shah of Iran and the United States, and vice versa, this thing is never complete. You understand what I mean?"

Jabbari understood only too well. He strung the CIA out for several other meetings during which it proposed that Jabbari spy on fellow Iranian students, and that the CIA could guarantee American citizenship for him if his work proved satisfactory. But Jabbari refused all the offers, and finally the CIA lost interest.

Third World students are not the only targets of CIA recruiting, as Kemba Maish, a psychology professor at Howard University in Washington, D.C., discovered. One morning in April 1978, Maish arrived at the school and found a telephone message,

asking her to call someone named "Roy Savoy." The name was unknown to her and she dialed the number on the message.

"Personnel, CIA," answered a voice on the other end. Maish was switched to Savoy who told her that the agency was recruiting black people -- specifically black psychologists and psychiatrists -- for operations in Africa. Mainly, they were to develop "psychological profiles" on African Communists. Savoy then hinted that she would be well paid for such work. He further told Maish that he had gotten her name from an administrator and a professor at the University of Maryland.

Maish told Savoy that she wanted no part of the CIA. He apologized for having bothered her and then hung up. Maish began to wonder: what were other professors doing handing out her name to the CIA as a potential agent? How did they come to be working with the CIA? How many other black scientists and doctors had the agency managed to recruit?

Maish went to the University of Maryland and decided to try to put a stop to the whole thing. First, she confronted the professor who had referred her name to the CIA (he admitted giving several names of potential CIA recruits to the agency). Maish next discovered that the CIA had also been recruiting among members of the Association of Black Psychologists, which was about to hold its annual conference in St. Louis.

Maish, who was going to St. Louis anyway, noticed that the CIA had actually set up a private room for recruiting at the convention. She went to the group's executive committee and complained about the CIA recruiting. The committee had already resolved to remove the CIA, but by that time the CIA had already talked to a fairly large number of black professionals attending the meeting; how many ultimately agreed to work for the agency is impossible to determine.

Later Maish tried to talk several colleagues out of doing any work for the agency. She gave a tape-recorded interview about the whole episode to Howard's radio station. (The tape has since mysteriously disappeared.)

"I want to make the point," she said during a recapitulation of the interview, "of how organized this recruiting effort really is, and how dangerous it can be not just to African people but also to all people of the Third World. The CIA has a long history of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. By putting down just rebellions of the people, destabilizing governments, destroying organizations, planning and financing coups, and murdering leaders, the CIA has attempted to change the course of history in places like the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, Cuba, Chile, Iran, the Congo, Ghana, and Angola, just to name a few."

Was Maish's little counterspy operation successful? It is hard to say, although the evidence suggests that CIA operations at Howard continue unabated. For each person she found who was quietly working for the CIA by passing on names of potential recruits, there might be five more whom she didn't see.

Given the fact that the CIA's bread-and-butter work is intelligence collection and analysis, it should not be surprising that the agency has always had a pronounced academic tinge (about 60 percent of its upper echelon have advanced degrees). And it should also not be surprising that occasionally the agency may consult with acknowledged academic experts on various intelligence questions -- for example, the agency might ask an academic expert on the Soviet Union to render an opinion about the projected successor to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.

If that's as far as it went, there would be little problem. But the CIA-academic link goes far beyond that, into a netherworld where right and wrong no longer apply, where basic constitutional rights are often trampled on. A few horror stories from several American campuses convey the idea.

- **University of Kentucky:** Last year, Turner appeared here to make a speech. Several students sat in the audience, protesting his appearance. They were arrested by local police, and under heavy pressure from the CIA, three American students and eight Iranian students were given sentences ranging from 45 to 90 days in jail. Their crime? Protesting Turner's talk. But there's more: Turner, it develops, was also visiting the campus in his capacity as a member of the Board of Advisors for the university's Patterson School of Law and Diplomacy which, *Penthouse* has been told, does work for the agency. Moreover, it has also been learned that the university's placement service has an "informal arrangement" with the CIA to help recruit agents. The University of Kentucky denies having any arrangement with the CIA.
- **Brown University:** Barnaby Conrad Keeney, president of the university from 1955 to 1966, was also a CIA official. Formerly dean of the university's graduate school, Keeney took a leave of absence in 1951 to develop a training program at the CIA for new recruits; when he returned to the school, he began slipping to the agency the names of students who he felt would make good agents (the problem was that most of the students had no interest in the CIA and had never applied to join the agency). While serving as president of the university, Keeney was also working as a "consultant" to the CIA. In that capacity he set up a covert funding plan in 1962 for MKULTRA, a secret CIA program to test mind control using drugs and other methods. He became chairman of the Human Ecology Fund, a CIA front that experimented in behavior control to torture enemy intelligence agents. The university's contributions to the CIA also include E. Howard Hunt and Lyman Kirkpatrick, an ex-CIA executive who now works as a political science professor at Brown.
- **University of California:** Earl Clinton Bolton, an official of the university system, did some free-lance work in 1968 for the CIA, contributing a memo for the agency explaining how academics publicly revealed to be working for the CIA should handle that problem: "They should explain," Bolton wrote, "their involvement with the agency as a contribution to ... proper academic goals." How working for the CIA contributes to "proper academic goals" is not explained by Bolton.

- **University of Michigan:** According to newly revealed documents, many individuals on the faculty of the university's Center for Chinese Studies for years have had secret relationships with the CIA, in which they provided help to the agency's China analysts. Michel Oksenberg, a former scholar at the center and now with the National Security Council, recently submitted two affidavits on behalf of the CIA in its move to block Freedom of Information suits seeking data on CIA links with the university. Oksenberg's affidavit included this phrase: "...to confirm the existence of CIA confidential contacts at a participating college or university would result in the revelation of classified information, intelligence sources and methods, and undermine the structure of valuable intelligence collection programs."
- **University of California at Los Angeles:** Paul Lin, a visiting scholar from Canada working at the university, had lived for 15 years in China. When he arrived at U.C.L.A. last year, CIA officials were told by "confidential contacts" among the U.C.L.A. administrative staff that Lin might be spying for Peking. Lin was put under FBI surveillance, which included wiretaps on his telephone.
- **University of Illinois at Chicago Circle:** There has been extensive CIA involvement at this campus because of the large number of Iranian students enrolled. Worse, the CIA worked with the FBI and the Chicago Police "Red Squad" to harass Iranian students who were openly antishah. From 1965 to 1976, the police kept a special dossier on 252 students at the school, much of the information obtained from the CIA.

These are just a few of the recurring instances of what happens when the CIA and academia develop a "special relationship," as men on both sides of the arrangement like to call it. But the phrase "special relationship" doesn't even begin to describe some of the more outrageous aspects, like the CIA's 20-year program involving experiments with drugs and mind control, which eventually involved the use of 80 universities and research institutes. Dr. Jose Delgado, a behavioral scientist at Yale Medical School from 1950 to 1973, provides just one example of the dangers of this "special relationship." Delgado worked on research projects funded by the Pentagon - along with secret funding from the CIA. He was experimenting with the implantation of electrodes in human brains that would control behavior. At one point, Delgado actually proposed that the U.S. government develop what he called "cerebral radio stimulators" to induce robotlike performances in men and animals. Fortunately even the CIA thought this a bit excessive, and Delgado returned to his home in Spain in 1970.

Still, for a university that produced the first real American spy, Nathan Hale (class of 1773), and such notorious CIA figures as Richard Bissell (he ran the Bay of Pigs invasion), James Angleton (who headed the CIA's domestic spying division), and Cord Meyer (number-two man in the CIA's Clandestine Services), perhaps the fact that Delgado's research took place at Yale should not seem especially surprising. Yale has been a fertile recruiting ground for the CIA ever since the agency first set up shop in 1946. Indeed, so many of the agency's first executives came from Yale and



other Ivy League schools that the agency for years was accused of running an "Eastern Establishment."

The charge was true, for fully 25 percent of the agency's top executives from the beginning have been Yale alumni, with the rest coming mainly from Ivy League schools. And that is only the beginning of the "old boy network"; there are any number of men wearing the same school tie who now work in foundations and corporations, all of them willing to do a favor, when necessary, for an old friend and fellow alumnus.

As the CIA began to grow enormously in the late 1950s, it set up a special top-secret section to handle "academic operations." It located the new unit on the fifth floor of an office building at 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington, D.C., under a phoney name: "U.S. Army Element, Joint Planning Activity, Joint Operations Group (SD 7753)." Of course, there was no such army unit. The group remained there until 1961, when the entire CIA moved to Langley, Virginia, its present home.

The first CIA man in charge of the academic operations was Tracy Barnes, who later became infamous as head of the agency's Western Hemisphere Division where he headed up the CIA's plots to assassinate Fidel Castro and the operation in Chile. Given Barnes's reputation as a covert-action man, the early use of the academics by the agency centered, in addition to recruitment of new agents, on several James Bond-type operations. For example, from 1958 to 1960, professors and graduate students were recruited into a huge spying operation against the Soviet Union. The academics were given a brief course in spying techniques and then went into Russia under various tourist or academic exchange agreements. Once inside the country, they would unlimber their "tourist cameras" and take seemingly innocuous pictures -- for example, a photo of a smokestack that might betray exactly what was being made inside, just from the color and composition of the smoke. Even more valuable was the intelligence gleaned from many dozens of trained eyes, detecting little clues that revealed Soviet industrial and military developments. Spotting serial numbers on planes, for example, will reveal clues to size of production runs.

Such operations could be dangerous. Prof. Frederick Barghoorn, a Yale history professor recruited by the CIA to do some spying while he was inside the Soviet Union, was arrested by the KGB for espionage in 1962. Considerable pressure was exerted by the CIA and other academics on President Kennedy to get him out; Kennedy personally assured a skeptical Khrushchev that Barghoorn did not work for the CIA, and the professor was quietly released. Actually Kennedy well knew Barghoorn's CIA connection but could not resist an appeal from academics at the president's Harvard alma mater.

The CIA-academic link forged in the early years of the agency remains intact to this day. There are several components.

***The Students:*** Like any other major corporation, the CIA is constantly on the lookout for new talent. It has open recruiting efforts at many campuses but prefers to rely on "scouts" -- administrators and professors who have secret connections to the CIA

and "steer" the agency toward likely prospects. Most often, this will be done covertly: an administrator or a professor sends a name of a likely prospect to Langley. The agency then carries out an extensive background check, its agents often posing as representatives of credit bureaus or insurance companies to gather information on the prospect.

If the agency decides that it wants to hire the prospect, it develops an approach based on what its background investigation -- done without the knowledge of the prospect -- has shown. "It's a real Dale Carnegie approach to recruiting," says John Stockwell, a former CIA agent now turned critic of the agency. "We were taught to find out what kind of person we were dealing with -- what made him tick? If he liked money, then we'd take him out to dinner, pay him well. If he was religious, the case officer would clean up his language and talk philosophy."

Years ago CIA recruiters concentrated on the Ivy League schools -- a drugstore near the Yale campus was a notorious meeting ground for the agency in wooing prospective Yalies -- but in recent years they have tried to broaden the agency's base by recruiting at other schools, especially in the Southwest and West. (A particular favorite recruiting target now is Notre Dame University.) The CIA aims to recruit about 1,000 students a year, of which about 200 will finally be selected. Of these, about an average 178 will eventually make it through the winnowing-out process and become CIA employees.

***The Professors:*** Professors are invaluable not only as "steerers," since they themselves are often either current or ex-CIA agents, but also for their academic expertise. In some cases the expertise is used relatively innocuously -- the agency's analysis division, say, will contact a particularly renowned professor for his opinion on a contentious point.

But in many more cases it goes far beyond that. Some professors with international contacts are used to do a little spying while they are overseas; academia generally is an open society, and an astonishing amount of intelligence can be picked up. In addition, professors involved in various university institutes that deal in questions of military strategy and technology not only are acknowledged experts in the field but also come in contact with good intelligence. (Information about a Soviet nuclear disaster several years ago was uncovered by the CIA, despite a heavy security blanket thrown up by the Russians, when an academic with close ties to the agency noticed an oblique reference to it in an obscure Russian journal of physics.)

Then there are the "special jobs." These can run the gamut from "advising" the agency in the formulation of a big covert-action or intelligence-collection project to helping the agency out of a tight spot. Such a problem arose not too long ago when the CIA wanted to get firsthand information about Brazil's nuclear-power program, widely suspected as being a cover for building weapons. The CIA wanted to infiltrate someone, preferably Brazilian, under good cover to keep watch on the program. A professor helped out, locating in this country a Brazilian student doing post-graduate work on nuclear physics. He was recruited by the professor to work as a spy for the CIA on his country's nuclear program.

Other "special jobs" include writing reports on prospective CIA agents or writing propaganda, books covertly underwritten by the CIA. The classic instance of this type of job concerned *The Penkovsky Papers*, purportedly the true account of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, a Soviet missile expert who was betraying data to the CIA. After he was caught and executed, the agency secretly funded the publication of what was claimed to be Penkovsky's personal reminiscences he had been jotting down before his capture. In fact, Penkovsky never wrote any of it; the book was a concoction of the CIA -- which used two renowned professors of Soviet affairs to give the book a gloss of authenticity that fooled many.

Professors also recruit other professors. Often it will consist of a quiet approach in the faculty dining room; if the target seems agreeable, he is then introduced to a CIA official, who will pick up the ball from there.

Is there any money involved? Sometimes, although it is difficult to pin down exactly how much. Many academics involved with the CIA work for the agency out of what they perceive to be patriotism, but others demand -- and get -- money. The money usually is paid in the form of special "study contracts" awarded through CIA-connected foundations or study groups. Graduate students, especially, are susceptible to money blandishments. Research is their lifeblood, and a \$15,000 research contract has been known to persuade a number of graduate students to do what the agency people like to refer to as "helping us out a little bit."

***The Administrators:*** The CIA-academic link could not survive a moment, were it not for at least the tacit approval of some university and college administrators. In the case of the Brown University president mentioned earlier, it may be the head of the university himself; more often, there are strategically placed administrators -- deans of graduate schools, admissions and placement officers, or other key administrators -- who keep the ball rolling.

Take the case of a Brooklyn College professor named Michael Selzer. Three years ago, Selzer, an academic expert on international terrorism, made the mistake of contacting the CIA to see whether it had any information he needed for a research project. The agency immediately turned him around by saying that they might be able to help him out -- provided that Selzer "keep his eyes and ears open" during an upcoming research trip to Europe. Selzer did and, on his return, gave the agency a few items that he had picked up.

There the matter might have ended except that a colleague publicly complained that Brooklyn College was being infiltrated by the CIA. At a faculty meeting Selzer admitted his work for the agency and then dropped a bombshell: he had done it, he said, because six other professors he knew had done the same thing, all with the encouragement of the chancellor of the City University of New York himself. (The chancellor denied having done any such thing, and Selzer was stripped of his tenure.)

Actually, the CIA-academic arrangement remained a close secret until 1966, when *Ramparts* magazine revealed that Michigan State University was secretly training

South Vietnamese police officials under a \$25 million program funded by the CIA. Subsequently it was revealed that other CIA-funded secret projects were being run at MIT, Harvard, Columbia, Miami, and California universities.

Then came the National Student Association mess: revelations that the CIA had virtually taken over the National Student Association, turning it into a propaganda forum. In its wake came White House-ordered reforms in 1967, which stipulated that the CIA was to end covert funding of student groups and research centers. However, the new guidelines said nothing about the overall CIA-academia link, and business continued pretty much as before, even though many outside the intelligence community assumed that the guidelines had driven the CIA off campus. Not so, as Harvard students discovered in 1971, when they occupied an administrator's office during a protest against the Vietnam War. While in the office, they rifled the office files and were astonished to discover minutes of a private Council on Foreign Relations meeting, during which a CIA official had discussed how the agency ran covert operations overseas.

What was a Harvard administrator doing with that sort of material? The question was never answered, nor was a similar question posed by protesting Columbia University students when they found nearly identical papers in the office of an administrator of their own university during a sit-in protest. (Actually, both administrators had long worked for the CIA.)

Since then, despite occasional bursts of controversy, the CIA-academic link has remained undisturbed. Even the Harvard imbroglio has caused little change, at least publicly. But behind the scenes the CIA has been counterattacking vigorously against any attempt to control its relationship with academia.

Since last June the agency has been holding a series of "special briefings" at Langley for various university presidents in an attempt to work out secret arrangements for CIA work on campus, irrespective of whatever guidelines might eventually be written at those universities. It has also waged a furious lobbying campaign in the academic community against the Harvard guidelines, implying that if it will not recognize those, it will not recognize anybody else's, either.

About 50 universities and colleges have been trying to work out guidelines on CIA relationships. The effort has been spurred, primarily, by the Campaign for Political Rights, a coalition of 70 groups, ranging from the American Civil Liberties Union to the National Organization for Women. Also leading the effort is the American Association of University Professors.

To date, the effort has not met with much success. Mainly there has been a pronounced lack of faculty support, a dearth of information on exactly what the CIA is doing on campuses, and extensive CIA infiltration of many university and college administrations. For those reasons, proposed guidelines have not fared well at a number of colleges and universities -- proposed guidelines were rejected by the University of Michigan faculty after only 45 minutes of debate (and after Turner wrote two personal letters to faculty members asking them not to accept them), and faculty

groups at the University of Pennsylvania watered down a set of new guidelines so badly that they're virtually useless.

Those actions took place despite a number of interesting items uncovered by a new weapon used by critics of the CIA-campus link: Freedom of Information suits to uncover the scope of CIA activities on individual campuses. A suit at the University of Michigan uncovered documents showing how the CIA had tried to conceal its link to the university and had attempted to block a move to write new guidelines. As a result of a Princeton suit, a classified FBI document listing a number of university institutes cooperating with intelligence agencies was mistakenly given out.

The CIA has become very concerned about the Freedom of Information suits, and it has been waging furious court battles to block any further release of documents, arguing that such release exposes "sources and methods" of intelligence work. The extent of the CIA concern was shown recently when the agency worked to block a suit involving CIA operations at the University of California at Berkeley. "In many fields," said F.W.M. Janney, CIA personnel director, "it is absolutely essential that the agency have available to it the single greatest source of ... expertise: the American academic community." The agency has also argued that revelations of academic involvement with the agency would expose certain academics to "shame and ridicule" of their peers -- a tacit admission that at least some of these people have something to be ashamed of.

Whether the CIA-academia link will ever be brought under control is an open question at the moment, although the prospects do not appear too bright. Only a handful of colleges and universities, led by Harvard, have passed any sort of guidelines: the remainder of the 100 campuses where the CIA is strongest are either considering such guidelines, have no interest in considering them, or have already rejected them. The general lack of action and concern clearly worries the American Association of University Professors, which argues that unless the academic community learns to end its covert relationship with the CIA, it has no hope of retaining any credibility. "Secrecy," says Dr. Morton Baratz of the AAUP, "necessarily woven into the fabric of intelligence activities, is basically antagonistic to the free and open exercise of teaching and inquiry by members of the academic profession."

[Back to home page](#)


*Ramparts*, April 1966

# The University on the Make

## Introduction by Stanley K. Sheinbaum

During the summer of 1958, I cut my vacation short and rushed off to San Francisco to meet the four leading police figures of South Vietnam. Among them they controlled the Saigon police, the national police and the VBI, South Vietnam's equivalent of the FBI.

Within an hour of their arrival the youngest, a nephew of Ngo Dinh Diem, conspiratorially drew me aside and informed me that one of the others was going to kill the eldest of the group. The story he told possessed plot and counter-plot. In essence, Michigan State University was being used to invite these men to the United States under the auspices of its foreign aid contract in Vietnam. The dirty deed was to be done prophylactically in the States, uncluttered by any complicating factors in Saigon.



At a time when relations between Diem and the U.S. were already strained, the whole story might have been a trick to embarrass Washington. Or else my informant's facts could have been straight, and failure to take action would have been equally embarrassing. The upshot was some nocturnal maneuvers and a cross-country flight designed to separate the quartet by forcibly hospitalizing the supposed target on the pretext he showed signs of T.B.

Nothing ever came of the episode. The intended target lived long enough to be

executed by Diem's successors for having assassinated a variety of political prisoners himself.

The question is, why was I, of the Department of Economics at MSU, involved in such ugliness?

I was coordinator of the Vietnam Project at Michigan State University, and I am no less culpable of the charges I make herein, or those made in the following article, than are any of my former colleagues. Looking back, I am appalled at how supposed intellectuals (aren't academicians supposed to be intellectuals?) could have been so uncritical about what they were doing. There was little discussion and no protest over the cancellation of the 1956 elections. Nor were any of us significantly troubled by the fact that our Project had become a CIA front. (The University is still denying this in an odd mixture of embarrassment and loyalty.) On the campus a pitiful handful of faculty -- usually mavericks and often some of the best teachers -- questioned MSU's role in assisting U.S. foreign policy. (One of these became an enthusiast when the opportunity arose for him to make a leisurely trip to Saigon on behalf of the Project.) From Saigon some professors did write popular and troublesome articles criticizing Diem's oppressions. Good, but even these bold ventures accepted U.S. policy as given with no questions asked.

The Michigan State professors performed at all levels. They advised on fingerprinting techniques, on bookkeeping, on governmental budgeting and on the very writing of South Vietnam's Constitution. One was even instrumental in choosing the President of South Vietnam. But in all this they never questioned U.S. foreign policy, which had placed them there and which, thereby, they were supporting.

The following article on MSU's involvement in Vietnam is merely a case study of two critical failures in American education and intellectual life today. The first and more obvious is the diversion of the university away from its functions (and duties) of scholarship and teaching. The second has to do with the failure of the academic intellectual to serve as critic, conscience, *ombudsman*. Especially in foreign policy, which hence forth will bear heavily on our very way of life, is this failure serious.

For this failure has left us in a state of drift. We lack historical perspective. We have been conditioned by our social science training not to ask the normative question; we possess neither the inclination nor the means with which to question and judge our foreign policy. We have only the capacity to be experts and technicians to serve that policy. This is the tragedy of the Michigan State professors: we were all automatic cold warriors.

On every university campus, from Harvard to Michigan State, the story is the same. The social science professor, trained (not educated) to avoid the bigger problems, is off campus expertising for his government or industry client whose assumptions he readily adopts. His students are mechanistically led through the same social science materials by a less competent instructor or graduate assistant, and they will be as little exposed to questions of judgment and the application of wisdom as was the professor in the first place.

No doubt the problem is far more advanced at parvenu institutions like Michigan State than in the Ivy League. The struggle for status, recognition and money is an irresistible lure; the glamorous project is grabbed and sometimes even invented. Within the university only the exceptional faculty member seeks reward and promotions via scholarship and teaching. The easier and even more prestigious route is that of the new-breed professor with his machine-stamped Ph.D. who orbits in the university's stratosphere of institutes, projects and contracts. The student is lowest among his priorities. The work he emphasizes is of dubious value -- by reason of his bias against considerations of value.

Where is the source of serious intellectual criticism that would help us avoid future Vietnams? Serious ideological controversy is dead and with it the perspective for judgment. Our failure in Vietnam was not one of technical expertise, but rather of historical wisdom. We at Michigan State failed to take a critical stance a decade ago. This was our first responsibility, and our incapacity gave rise to the nightmare described in the following pages.

### **by Warren Hinckle, Robert Scheer and Sol Stern**

The Vietnamese soldier in the sentry box stood at attention as the chauffeured limousine bearing license plate No.1 from the government motor pool roared down the long driveway of the French villa, picked up speed and screeched off along the road towards the palace where the President was waiting breakfast.

The year was 1957, the city was Saigon, and the man who lived in the huge villa with its own sentry box was no Batman of the diplomatic corps. He was only Wesley Fishel of East Lansing, Michigan, assistant professor of political science at Michigan State University.

Peasants who scrambled off the road to make way for the speeding professor might have wondered what was happening, but Fishel's academic compatriots could have no doubt: he was "making it." To make it, in the new world of Big University politics, was no longer as elemental as publishing or perishing. You needed "contact" with the outside world. You had to get a government contract. You had to be an operator. And some people viewed Professor Fishel in South Vietnam in the mid-1950s as the Biggest Operator of them all.

Some professors on the make have had a bigger press, but none deserves notoriety more than Wesley Fishel. Eugene Burdick, for instance, got a lot of publicity out of his quickie novels and underwater beer commercials on television. But no academician has ever achieved Fishel's distinction in getting his school to come through with enough professors, police experts and guns to secure his friend's dictatorship.

That was what Wesley Fishel was about on that humid Saigon morning, burning rubber to visit Ngo Dinh Diem. The presidential palace was known informally and with



some degree of jealousy by the United States Mission in Saigon as the "breakfast club," because that was where Diem and Fishel and Wolf Ladejinsky, the agricultural expert left over from the New Deal, ate morning melons several times a week and discussed the state of the nation.

Leland Barrows, the United States Mission chief, was disturbed because he couldn't get to see Diem anywhere near that often. And Fishel was particularly closed-mouthed about his regular morning conferences. Saigon in the early days of the Diem regime was a status-minded city, and Fishel had a bigger villa than Barrows, bigger, even, than the American ambassador's. This residential ranking attests to Fishel's importance as head of the Michigan State University Group in Vietnam, an official university project under contract to Saigon and Washington, with responsibility for the proper functioning of Diem's civil service and his police network, shaping up the 50,000 man "ragamuffin" militia, and supplying guns and ammunition for the city police, the civil guard, the palace police and the dreaded *Sûreté* -- South Vietnam's version of the FBI. No small task for a group of professors, but one which Michigan State took to as if it were fielding another national championship football team.

One less-known and perhaps more unpleasant task of the MSU professors was to provide a front for a unit of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. This is a role that both Professor Fishel and Michigan State University have now chosen to forget. It is described here as a specific, if shocking, documentation of the degree of corruption and abject immorality attending a university which puts its academic respectability on lend-lease to American foreign policy.

## **John A. Hannah, the President as Coach**

The decay of traditional academic principles found in the modern university on the make may well be traced to Harold Stassen and Clark Kerr, but it is best exemplified by President John A. Hannah of Michigan State University. Stassen, in the International Cooperation Administration, was responsible for the concept that American universities should be tapped as "manpower reservoirs" for the extension of Americanism abroad, and Clark Kerr, the embattled Berkeley savant, first came up with the vision of the large university as a "service station" to society. Hannah, an Eisenhower liberal with a penchant for public service, has made these concepts the *raison d'être* of MSU.

Hannah, in a blustery way, represents the best traditions of the American Success Story. The son of an Iowa chicken farmer, he took a degree in poultry husbandry from Michigan Agricultural College in 1922. Then, like the football hero who works for 30 years in the college book store because he can't bear to leave the campus, Hannah stayed on in East Lansing. He taught chicken farming, married the president's daughter, got his first taste of public service during a stint with the Department of Agriculture as an NRA administrator, came back to campus and in 1941 succeeded his father-in-law as president.

MSU, under President Hannah's tutelage, is more service oriented than the average Standard Oil retail outlet. MSU's School of Agriculture aids farmers, its School of Hotel Management turns out educated room clerks, its School of Police Administration graduates cops sophisticated in the social sciences. MSU once offered a Bachelor of Science degree with a major in Mobile Homes under a program financed by the trailer industry.

But it is in the field of international service that Michigan State has really made it. A shiny new building on campus houses MSU's Center for International Programs -- an edifice built, incidentally, with funds from the administrative allowance on the seven-year Vietnam contract. The University has over 200 faculty members every year out in the boondocks of the world running "educational projects" in 13 countries including Columbia, Taiwan, Turkey, Brazil and Okinawa. *Time* magazine recently acknowledged the MSU president's extensive influence on the role of American universities overseas by recording Hannah's boast that he can "tap his campus specialists, get an answer to most any question for government or research groups within 30 minutes." Now that is service.

The list of countries MSU is presently "helping" is lopsided with military dictatorships, but it is not President Hannah's style to question the assignment his country gives him. A former assistant secretary of Defense under General Motors' Charles Wilson, Hannah sees the military, like football, as an important character-building element in life. His view of the modern university is tied to the liberal concept of America as the defender of the free world. That the university must prepare young citizens to assume this proud task, and to be a leader abroad in areas chosen for it by the government, is Hannah's educational credo.

Despite Hannah's obvious pride in the work his University is doing overseas, he is particularly reticent in discussing its most extensive foreign operation. In a colorful brochure about MSU's international programs, given away free to visitors, there is only one sentence about the Vietnam Project -- despite the fact that this was the largest single project ever undertaken by an American university abroad, a project that spent the incredible amount of 25 million in American taxpayers' dollars giving "technical assistance" to the Republic of South Vietnam under Ngo Dinh Diem. This one-sentence treatment of MSU's Vietnam operation is like reducing to a photo caption in the school yearbook the story of the prize-winning basketball team -- because the coach was caught taking bribes.

A key to MSU's apparent official desire to forget about the Vietnam experience, dubbed the "Vietnam Adventure" by some professors who worked on the Project, might be found in the unexpressed fear that the details of the University's "cover" for the CIA may become public knowledge. If pressed for an answer, Fishel denies any such role and so does President Hannah. "CIA agents were not knowingly on our staff -- if that were true we didn't know about it," Hannah said recently in his office, sitting beneath the portrait that hangs above his desk. But this assertion of innocence is flatly contradicted by the disclosures of other professors who held administrative positions in the Project. Indeed, the weight of evidence is that MSU finally had to ask the CIA unit to go elsewhere because its presence had become such embarrassing general knowledge in Saigon and East Lansing.

Economist Stanley K. Sheinbaum, the campus coordinator of MSU's Vietnam operation for three years, was flabbergasted by Hannah's denial: "If John Hannah can make up something like that, he calls into question his competence as a university president," he said.

## **Wesley Fishel, the Professor as Proconsul**

One indication of Wesley Fishel's power in Saigon in the heyday of the Diem era was provided by a veteran of that period who recently paid a return visit to Saigon. "I heard people talking about what 'Westy' would think," he said, "and for a minute I thought that Wesley was back."

"Westy," in the Saigon vernacular, is General William Westmoreland, but those in the know used to talk about "Wesley" in the same awe-struck fashion. There is one public reminder of the transfer of power. "Westy" is now running the war out of the same office building, a reconverted apartment house at 137 Pasteur Street, that used to be "Wesley's" headquarters.

Like most fateful alliances, the Diem-Fishel axis had humble beginnings. The pair met in Tokyo in July of 1950 when each was going nowhere in his chosen field. Diem was an exiled Vietnamese politician with a mandarin personality and a strong sense of predestination but few tangible hopes of assuming power in his war-ravaged country. Fishel was just a run-of-the-mill academician, a young political scientist from UCLA who had written a nondescript thesis on Chinese extra-territoriality and was about to accept a position at Michigan State.

Both were ambitious, looking for an angle, and Napoleon-sized. Diem was 5' 4" tall; Fishel, a well-built, curly-haired man with the stance of a bantam rooster, appears to be about the same size. The men became friends and a relationship developed by extensive correspondence over the ensuing year. They exchanged favors early. Fishel had his friend appointed consultant to Michigan State's Governmental Research Bureau and helped arrange a long stay in the United States, where Diem picked up substantial backing among prominent Americans from Cardinal Spellman to Senator Mike Mansfield [*Ramparts*, July 1965]. In return, Diem in 1952 asked the French to let Michigan State furnish technical aid to Vietnam at United States expense, but the French refused.

Fishel, however, had ultimate faith. An East Lansing colleague recalls that one day Fishel cornered him in the faculty lounge and, with the exuberance of one who could no longer restrain himself, whispered excitedly, "My friend Diem is going to be Premier of Vietnam one of these days!" The prediction was taken lightly; Fishel had neither the swagger nor the stripes of a kingmaker.

But when Diem was named Premier in July 1954, one of his first official acts was to request Washington to send Wesley to Saigon to advise him. Fishel arrived within

weeks, and just weeks later Diem asked for the second time that MSU set up a technical assistance program in Vietnam. The request, this time, had smooth sailing.

With Fishel already in Saigon, there was virtually no one on the East Lansing campus with any knowledge about Vietnam when Diem's assistance request was relayed through official Washington channels. President Hannah, not one to let the possibility of a substantial contract go by, tapped four faculty members for an "inspection team" and put them on a plane to Saigon in almost whirlwind fashion.

The four were Arthur Brandstatter, an ex-MSU football hero who now heads the Police Administration School; James Dennison, the University's public relations man; Edward Weidener, then chairman of the Political Science Department; and Economics Department Chairman Charles Killingsworth. None of these men had any experience in academic or technical assistance roles overseas, nor did they have any expertise in Far Eastern affairs, a deficiency they attempted to repair by reading newspaper clippings about Vietnam during the plane ride. The first time they met as a group was when they fastened their seat belts.

Saigon was a city in ferment in September 1954, when MSU's "inspection team" arrived. Diem was nominally in power, but he had no real support except among a small number of middle-class Catholics and Saigon merchants. The French were preparing to pull out, the Saigon police were controlled by the Binh Xuyen pirate sect, the private armies of the religious sects were in substantial control of the Vietnamese lowlands, the Vietnamese Army was in fledgling revolt against Diem, and the civil service machinery was in a state of stagnation.

The professors found their colleague Fishel and General Edward Lansdale of the CIA maneuvering furiously to consolidate Diem's support, an effort that culminated in the endorsement of Diem by the United States Security Council in the spring of 1955. The professors also learned that Diem was suspicious of the members of the United States Mission in Saigon, many of whom, he felt, held pro-French sentiments. The one American Diem really trusted was Wesley Fishel, and this trust was reflected two weeks later when the MSU inspection team returned to East Lansing and recommended a massive technical assistance contract, unprecedented in the history of university operations overseas. This contract committed Michigan State to do everything for Diem, from training his police to writing his Constitution.

Contract negotiations bogged down over technical matters, but the jam was broken in the early spring of 1955 by a telephone call from Washington to Hannah requesting that the red tape be cut and MSU involve itself in Vietnam -- in a hurry. Fishel once indicated in an interview that the request came from former Vice President Nixon, but he now denies this, and so does President Hannah. The phone call, Hannah told the *Detroit News*, came from an authority "even higher than Nixon." This leaves a choice of John Foster Dulles; his brother, CIA chief Allen Dulles; or Eisenhower himself. At any rate, President Hannah did his duty as he saw it. The first MSU professors joined Wesley Fishel in Saigon in late May of 1955.

In 1956 Fishel abandoned his role as "advisor" to Diem, and assumed the title of

Chief of Mission of the MSU Group. For the next four years, he was the most important American in Vietnam. "Wesley was the closest thing to a proconsul that Saigon had," said one of the MSU professors. The assistant professor of political science entertained frequently and lavishly in his opulent villa, and if his parties got a little out of hand the Saigon police obliged by cordoning off the street. No professor had ever made it so big; in the academic world, Fishel was sovereign.

But if the proconsul lived well, so did his lieutenants. East Lansing is hardly a midwestern Paris, and for most of the professors the more exotic and free-wheeling life in Saigon was the closest thing to the high life they had known. Academicians and their families, at first a little uncomfortable, assumed the easy ways of the former French colonial masters. They moved into spacious, air-conditioned villas, rent-free, in the old French section of Saigon, bought the better Scotches at the American commissary at \$2 a bottle, hired servants at \$30 a month, were invited to all the better cocktail parties because they knew "Wesley," went tiger hunting for laughs and, with various "hardship" and "incentive" salary hikes, made close to double their normal salaries. (A professor earning \$9000 for teaching class at East Lansing got \$16,500 a year for "advising" in Vietnam -- tax free.)

The "Vietnam Adventure" also did wonders for the professors' tenure. Despite the activist nature of their work in Vietnam and the lack of any substantial scholarly research during the Project, two-thirds of the MSU faculty who went to Saigon got promotions either during their tour of duty or within a year of their return. Professor Fishel, in particular, scored points. His published work was virtually nonexistent and he was absent from his classes for years at a time. But in 1957 MSU promoted him to the rank of full professor.

## **Hear-No-CIA, See-No-CIA**

Central Intelligence Agency men were hidden within the ranks of the Michigan State University professors. They were all listed as members of the MSU Project staff and were formally appointed by the University Board of Trustees. Several of the CIA men were given academic rank and were paid by the University Project.

The CIA agents' instructions were to engage in counterespionage and counterintelligence. Their "cover" was within the police administration division of the Michigan State Group. The CIA unit was self-contained and appeared on an official organization chart of the MSU Project as "VBI Internal Security Section." This five-man team was the largest section within the police administration division of the MSU Vietnam operation. The police administration division in turn was by far the largest of the three divisions of MSUG.

"VBI" was Michigan State shorthand for "Vietnamese Bureau of Investigation," the new name the professors had given the old *Sûreté*, the Vietnamese special police. The head of the "Internal Security Section" of the VBI under the Michigan State operation was Raymond Babineau who was in Saigon from the outset of the MSU

Project. The other men were hired later by the University and listed on its staff chart as "Police Administration Specialists." All four -- Douglas Beed, William Jones, Daniel Smith and Arthur Stein -- gave their previous employment as either "investigator" or "records specialist" in the Department of the Army.

The CIA contingent, despite the continued denials of Fishel and Hannah, was identified by two former Project officials -- Stanley Sheinbaum and Professor Robert Scigliano, an MSU political scientist who was assistant project chief of the MSU Vietnam Group from 1957-1959. It is also confirmed, in writing, by Scigliano and Professor Guy H. Fox, a former MSU Project chief, in a book titled *Technical Assistance in Vietnam: The Michigan State University Experience*, published by Praeger in 1965.

Sheinbaum, as part of his duties as campus coordinator, hired Stein, Smith and Jones. At the time, all he knew about the men was that they came from the "Department of the Army." Sheinbaum recalls that he was proceeding to investigate the backgrounds of the three applicants before accepting them when he was told "that it wouldn't be necessary to check out these guys." The message came from Professor Ralph Smuckler, a former Vietnam Project head.

Sheinbaum said he was on the job for 18 months before he was taken into the administration's confidence and told about the CIA men. "Smuckler pulled me aside one day and told me that I should know that these CIA guys were there, but that we didn't talk about them," he said.

Professor Scigliano's first brush with the CIA came during his first meeting with the police advisory group in Saigon. He said that Babineau, whom he knew from the organizational chart as head of the VBI Internal Security, was introduced as a CIA man. The other CIA agents were also introduced, and Babineau made a short speech in which he expressed hope that the professors and his people would get along well. Scigliano recalls Babineau saying, "We hope we don't get in your way."

A professor and his wife became friends with one of the CIA men and his wife, and the couples often dined together. "We talked about books and music," he said, but there was an unspoken rule that they would never mention the CIA. The entire unit operated on an identical hear-no-CIA, see-no-CIA basis. They worked out of offices in one corner of the police administration floor of the beige, converted apartment building that housed the MSU Project. The CIA men came in early in the morning, stayed for about an hour and then locked their offices and left for the day. They all drove their own cars and their French was the most fluent on the Project.

If the CIA men got nothing else from their fraternization with Michigan State University, they became the first persons in the spy business to gain academic recognition. "Some of the CIA guys attained faculty status at MSU -- some as lecturers, some as assistant professors, depending on their salaries. I know, because I remember signing the papers that gave them faculty rank," Sheinbaum said.

The CIA unit operated within its Michigan State "cover" until 1959. Scigliano and Fox

state in their book, in what must rank as one of the more terse statements of the decade: "USOM [United States Operations Mission] also absorbed at this time [1959] the CIA unit that had been operating within MSUG [Michigan State University Group]."

In plain language, Michigan State threw the CIA men out. One of the principal factors leading to the MSU decision was that by 1959 just about everybody in the know was cognizant of the CIA operation. This was not only embarrassing to the legitimate professors, but it served to taint the reputation of the limited amount of solid academic work that was done during the Project. For instance, an anthropologist working far out in the Vietnamese flatlands was flabbergasted to find a local police chief interrupt his work on the grounds that he was digging up bones on behalf of the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The decision to terminate the CIA unit was brought to Professor Scigliano by Smuckler. Babineau was not in Saigon at the time, so Professor Scigliano gave Jones the bad news. He recalls that Jones was "quite upset," as was the United States Mission which wanted the CIA unit to stay right where it was -- sheltered by the groves of academe.

Within weeks, the entire "VBI Internal Security Section" had moved over to the offices of the United States Mission to operate, presumably, more in the open. By 1959, the United States was making little pretense of following the Geneva Accords anyway.

## **Academics in Armored Cars**

In the Spring of 1955, Diem gained control of the Army. The United States, which was (and still is) providing the entire South Vietnam Army payroll, said it wouldn't give out any more checks unless the Army played ball with our boy. Diem then used the Army to crush the sect that had controlled the Saigon police and elements of the far-flung *Sûreté*. The gargantuan task of rebuilding the entire Vietnam police apparatus, from traffic cop to "interrogation expert," as a loyal agency of the Diem government then fell to Michigan State University.

Diem, lacking popular support, could only retain power through an effective police and security network. The American Embassy urgently signaled the MSU contingent to concentrate on this problem, and, like good team players from a school with a proud football tradition, the professors went along.

The professors not only trained Diem's security forces but, in the early years of the Project, actually supplied them with guns and ammunition. In doing so, the East Lansing contingent helped to secure Diem's dictatorship and to provide the base and the arms for the "secret police" which were to make Madame Nhu and her brother infamous.

If not academic, the professors were at least professional. Many supplies -- revolvers, riot guns, ammunition, tear gas, jeeps, handcuffs, radios -- were requisitioned by the East Lansing School of Police Administration from stocks left over from America's aid

to the French Expeditionary Corps. These supplies were then turned over to the Vietnamese who would strive to achieve Diem's own form of "consensus" government -- a consensus gained largely by hauling the dissenters off to jail. Despite the largess left by the French, the professors found it necessary to order some \$15 million in additional "equipment" from the United States Mission.

Listen to some of the official progress reports sent home to East Lansing by the professors:

*November 8, 1955: "During the month of October we received notice of Washington's approval of the recommended expanded police program. . . . Conferences were held at USOM on October 10 and the Embassy on October 23 and 24, trying to coordinate Internal Security Operations in Vietnam in which our government has an interest."*

*April 17, 1956: "The training of the commando squads of Saigon-Cholon police in riot control formations has continued during the month. . . . A report on riots and unlawful assembly is nearing completion."*

*June 5, 1957: "Training of the Presidential Security Guard in revolver shooting began during the month. Thirty-four VBI agents completed the revolver course."*

*September 11, 1957: "Eight hundred pairs of Peerless handcuffs arrived in Saigon, but distribution is being delayed pending arrival of 400 additional cuffs."*

*February 17, 1958: "The training of 125 military and Civil Guard fingerprint technicians at the VBI proceeds satisfactorily. The Palace Guard is being put through another class in revolver training, with 58 men receiving instruction. Forty members of the VBI completed firearm training."*

As befits a university project, many of the professors indulged in their academic specialties. Ralph Turner, a professor of police administration, feels that one of the Project's most singular achievements was the program whereby every Vietnamese citizen would be given an identification card -- with a special American touch. The cards were laminated so the poor, plasticless Viet Cong would have difficulty forging them.

Dean Brandstatter did not move lock, stock and pistol to Saigon, but he managed frequent "inspection trips" -- as did some 11 of the University officials, including President Hannah, all of course at government expense. Brandstatter, a former military policeman, utilized his expertise to immediate effect during one of his first trips. Rumors of a coup against Diem were escalating, and the East Lansing official personally inspected the Palace Guard to see that they had enough guns to meet the threat.

Brandstatter, a large, jovial man in his early fifties, and a devoted follower of MSU's football fortunes, played talent scout for the police operation. The services that the MSU team was called upon to perform for Diem's security apparatus were so esoteric



that even its heralded School of Police Administration wasn't up to the job. Brandstatter had to recruit specially trained cops from all over the country. Fingerprint experts, small arms experts and intelligence experts came from the Detroit police force, the New York police force, the FBI and even the Department of Defense. Other professors, doing civil service work, felt a little left out and labeled the onslaught of police experts "mercenaries." This might seem a little unkind, but the term seems somewhat applicable since, at one point in the Project, only four of the 33 police advisors had roots at the Michigan campus; the others were nomads. The Project, of course, still bore the name -- or the "cover" -- of the MSUG, since these "mercenaries" were all put on the MSU payroll and provided with faculty status. In the action-filled world of the service station university, not only do the professors become activists, but the cops aspire to professorships.

## Decline and Fall

Ngo Dinh Diem was a nice man to buy guns for, but in other areas of human endeavor, the professors discovered that he could be a tough man to do business with. Even Wolf Ladejinsky, who broke bread regularly with Diem, was subject to occasional indignities. When an issue of the *New Republic* appeared in Saigon containing an article mildly critical of the Diem regime, the President sent Ladejinsky packing off from the palace to buy up all the copies from the dozen English language kiosks in Saigon.

The game in Saigon was to cater to Diem's pettiness and paranoia, and for the most part the men from Michigan State played it. There appeared to be a conscious effort within the Project administration to prepare reports pleasing, or at least palatable, to the President. Milton Taylor, an MSU economics professor who went to Vietnam as a tax advisor, said that his reports were often rewritten by the Project head. When he questioned this practice he was told that there were "higher considerations" at stake; other universities were in hot pursuit of the juicy Vietnam contract.

It became necessary to forsake principles for the good of the Project. At times, in the Saigon of the late 1950s, that must have been difficult. Professor Adrian Jaffe of the MSU English Department, one of the most persistent critics of his University's "Vietnam Adventure," recalls some vivid street scenes. Each morning, men, and more often than not women and children, were hauled out of the jail directly across from his office at the Faculty of Letters of the University of Saigon, handcuffed, thrown into a van, and driven away to an island concentration camp known as a sort of Devil's Island à la Diem. Professors in the Project, because of their intimacy with the Vietnamese security apparatus, knew this was happening, Jaffe said, but his colleagues said and did nothing.

The moral question raised by Jaffe is dismissed by many veterans of the Project as "unprofessional." Perhaps more professional was the work of Wesley Fishel, who, as late as the fall of November 1959, wrote an article in the *New Leader* with the obfuscating title, "Vietnam's One-Man Democratic Rule." The text requires no recounting, except to observe that Fishel uses adjectives for Diem that only Jack

Valenti might dare use for Johnson.

The failure of the MSU professors to bear witness against what are now known to be Diem's outrageous violations of civil liberties raises serious questions about them as men. But their failure as professionals to exercise the traditional role of the independent scholar as critic accounted in large part for the general ignorance of the United States public about the true nature of Diem's regime. Professors, presumed to be men of principle, were on the scene in Vietnam and had to be accepted as the best unprejudiced source of information. David Halberstam, after all, simply could have been mad at Madame Nhu.

The same disastrous vacuum of information occurred in this country only a decade before when the China experts, almost to a man, were purged as Reds and comsymps, and yahoos were all the public had left to hear.

In Vietnam, at least, there was a Buddhist monk with the fortitude to burn himself -- and the public suddenly wondered how what they had been reading about Diem for six years could have been so wrong. But the professors, by this time, were long back in East Lansing. The MSU Vietnam Project ended rather abruptly in 1962. The University claims that it terminated the arrangement in the name of academic freedom -- but the truth is, unfortunately, more complex.

Diem, painfully aware of the slightest criticism, was infuriated by the modicum of critical material published in the United States in the early '60s by veterans of the MSU "experience." Professor Jaffe and economist Milton Taylor wrote an essay for the *New Republic* in 1961 that set Diem's paranoia percolating. The author dared to suggest that the President rid himself of the Nhus. The contract between Diem and Michigan State stipulated that members of the Project could not use materials gathered on the job "against the security or the interests of Vietnam." In other words, they were to keep quiet. Taylor recalls that many of his colleagues in Vietnam felt he was being "disloyal" in publicly criticizing Diem.

The President was also miffed that in 1959 MSU had drastically curtailed its police work after being urged by both Diem and the United States Mission to plunge more deeply into paramilitary work than it already had. MSU's reluctance was understandable, since a greater degree of involvement would just about require its professors to shoot off howitzers and drill troops in the jungle.

Nevertheless, the University genuinely believed that its contract would be renewed in 1962. President Hannah even sent a special envoy, Alfred Seelye, dean of the Business College, to Saigon to smooth things out by telling Diem that the University was prepared to weed out any future troublemakers in the Project by selecting personnel more likely to "write scholarly scientific studies and not sensational journalistic articles." Diem, however, surprised everybody. He was adamant: no more MSU.

With no deal in sight, the business dean proceeded to make a strong declaration in defense of the academic freedom of MSU professors and beat Diem in announcing

that the contract would not be renewed.

## The Ruins

Like a factory that has contracted for a job and then completed it, there is little evidence on the MSU campus that it was ever involved in Vietnam. Thousands of pages of mimeographed reports and documents sent from Saigon have been piled haphazardly in out-of-the-way files in the University library, uncatalogued and unused. MSU has not a single course, not even a study program, to show for its six years in Vietnam.

Professor Wesley Fishel still flies in and out of East Lansing, but now he goes to Washington and advises the administration on Vietnam, a role which allows him to visit Saigon occasionally -- where he has the look of a man who would like another try. But there is nothing for him to do. Fishel has been careful to exclude the infamous *New Leader* article from the otherwise thorough 64-page bibliography on Vietnam and Southeast Asia which he distributes to his students.

MSU is still big on police. There are, literally, policemen all over the campus, almost beyond the wildest expansion of the human retina. There are the campus police -- a complement of roughly 35 men in blue uniforms. Then there are the professors and visiting firemen at the School of Police Administration. Finally, it is hard to find a parking spot on campus since so many police cars are occupying the stalls; state police headquarters adjoins MSU.

With all this protection, the University officials should feel safe. But they do not. President Hannah has lately been publicly worried about the possibilities of what he terms a "Berkeley-style" revolt. The vice-president of student affairs bluntly stated that MSU had been "selected" as the "next Berkeley." Hannah, fearful of "outside agitators," has suggested that there is an "apparatus" at work on campus that is a "tool for international communism." The University police have a special detail charged with keeping tabs on student political activities, especially anything "radical." Several years ago a member of this "Red squad" endeared himself to the student daily newspaper by trapping homosexuals in a state-built bathroom.

These conditions would be sufficient enough for the light-hearted to suggest that MSU is a Lilliputian police state, but that is silly. Professor Alfred Meyer of the Political Science Department, during his course on the Soviet political system, always gets a good laugh by telling the students to take a good look around campus if they want to know what the Soviet system is like.

Hannah's concern over Berkeley is more than apocryphal. If the Berkeley experience meant any one thing, it meant that the University wasn't doing its job. It had lost its sense of purpose; it no longer had meaning to the students. In that sense East Lansing is, assuredly, another Berkeley. The university on the make has little time for nonconforming students and rarely enough for conforming students. Its service

function is the first priority. The students are, in Clark Kerr's idiom, only the "raw material" that has to be processed. That was the cause of the Berkeley revolt, and the ingredients are available in excess portions at Michigan State.

Acting dean of international programs, Ralph T. Smuckler, is perhaps the one person at MSU who got something lasting out of the "Vietnam Adventure." He derived an ideology, and it is an ideology that goes Clark Kerr one better. Smuckler sees the future of the social sciences in the world-wide scope of the "action" projects he is now directing -- in Formosa as he did in Vietnam. "Classroom teaching is a tame business," said Smuckler, "and anybody who doesn't see how his discipline fits into the overseas operations of the University is already obsolete."

To question the assumption that the academician of tomorrow must be an operator is to ask but part of the essential question about MSU's "Vietnam Adventure." And to ask whether the University officials are liars, or whether the MSU Project broke the spirit of the Geneva Accords, is also neglecting the primary question.

The essential query, which *must* be asked before the discussion of Michigan State's behavior can be put into any rational perspective, is this: what the hell is a university doing buying guns, anyway?

[Back to home page](#)

*Ramparts*, March 1967, pp. 29-38

## **A Short Account of International Student Politics and the Cold War with Particular Reference to the NSA, CIA, etc.**

### **I. Some Necessary Background**

The chill of the Cold War was already in the air in August of 1946, when some 300 students from 38 countries assembled in the flag-bedecked Artists' Hall in Prague for the first World Student Congress. Among the delegates were 24 American students, many of them World War II veterans, representing various youth and student organizations and ten prominent universities. The communists were in the majority at the Congress, and disputes arose as to the proper role of international student organizations. Still, the Congress ended on an amicable note, with a call for further cooperation and the building of a truly representative international student organization -- which came into existence shortly afterwards, and was named the International Union of Students (IUS). The American delegates, who came to be known as the Prague 25, returned home, fully convinced that a new, truly representative *national* organization had to be created which could fittingly represent the U.S. student community in the international student world.

Establishing themselves as an organizing committee, the Prague 25 issued a call for a national conference of student leaders to organize a new national union of students. They were remarkably successful. In the summer of 1947, a new body known as the United States National Student Association (NSA) held its Constitutional Convention in Madison, Wisconsin. By the time of this convention, the atmosphere of the IUS had become even more openly pro-communist than it had been in Prague. However, it was not until the communist coup had taken place in Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the IUS had failed to condemn the communists' mishandling of Czech students that the break between NSA and IUS became official.

Finally, in 1950, NSA met in Stockholm with 18 other national student groups to form a new international student body which was ultimately called the International Student Conference (ISC). During the first meetings, the overwhelming majority of the delegates were opposed to the conception of the ISC as a "rival," set up to fight the IUS and international communism. The delegates to the first ISC wanted to avoid controversial political questions and any further schism of the international student world.

The new international organization grew quickly and impressively. By the middle '50s, over 55 national student unions were participating, more than half of which were from the underdeveloped "Third World," and the ISC had a huge budget providing for many programs of technical assistance, education and student exchanges. The ISC became the pacesetter for international student politics and NSA was on its way to becoming the most powerful force within the new international organization.

As the ISC grew, the students of the underdeveloped world pressed the hardest for it to take political stands on controversial issues such as colonialism and racism. And as the "Third World" student unions started to press political issues in the ISC, it was usually the NSA delegation that played the moderating role, trying to keep the ISC focused on the problems of "students as students."

In a sense, the very growth of the ISC engendered its problems. Most student unions, originally attracted to the organization out of resentment against the strictures imposed by the IUS, became alienated from it when, partly under NSA's prodding, the ISC began to set forth its own tight Cold War positions. By the 1960's, the situation had begun to reverse itself: the IUS was making gestures for consultations that might lead to a reunification of the world student movement, while the ISC -- with NSA in the lead -- kept to a rigid Cold War line and put off most of these overtures.

At its peak in 1960, over 400 schools were affiliated with NSA. Its staff operations and budget grew every year. Though there was little income from the dues of its constituent members, NSA picked up financial support for its operations from a number of foundations. Most of this went entirely to NSA's international operations. NSA was able to sponsor yearly international relations seminars, foreign student leadership training projects, scholarships for foreign students, and still maintain a large travel budget for its international commission staff and its overseas representatives.

Despite the formal democracy in NSA, there was little relationship between its overseas operations and its on-campus base. NSA Congresses were massive affairs attended mostly by students sent as delegates from the student governments of NSA's member schools. They had little knowledge of NSA's year-round staff operations. International affairs and the operations of NSA's international staff were debated by a select few who could usually move the rest of the Congress on the basis of their esoteric expertise. Overseas representatives of NSA and delegates to the ISC were never elected by the NSA Congress.

NSA has always shown two faces. Its domestic programs, its Congresses and its regional meetings have always been open and spontaneous. If NSA national leaders were occasionally over-cautious, they still moved with the liberal currents of opinion among American students. In the '50s, NSA took even more liberal stands than the prevailing apathy among students might have suggested. And in the '60s, NSA responded to the new militant protest mood on the campuses. It supported students against the draft, opposed the war in Vietnam, and participated in civil rights struggles. It played a crucial role in the formation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and was one of its staunchest supporters, a position which

cost it the affiliation of many schools in 1961.

Yet NSA's overseas image has been very different. Despite its liberal rhetoric, NSA-ers abroad seemed more like professional diplomats than students; there was something tough and secretive about them that was out of keeping with their openness and spontaneity back home.

In the light of all this, it is not surprising that a number of NSA's critics have pointed a suspicious finger at its international operations. Nor is it a shock to discover that some people in the left wing of NSA, like Paul Potter, who was elected national affairs vice president in 1961 and went on to become president of Students for a Democratic Society, revealed that they had always suspected NSA's international operations of being tightly tied in with the State Department. Very few ever seriously raised the more sinister spectre of CIA involvement.

## II. Some Fancy Financing

It is widely known that the CIA has a number of foundations which serve as direct fronts or as secret "conduits" that channel money from the CIA to preferred organizations. An intimation of the scope of this financial web was afforded the public on August 31, 1964, when Texas Congressman Wright Patman, in the course of an investigation into the use of foundations for tax dodges, announced that the J.M. Kaplan Fund of New York was serving as a secret conduit for CIA funds. As soon as Patman made his announcement, representatives of the CIA and Internal Revenue came scurrying to his office for a hasty conference. Patman apparently was satisfied with the results. Without retracting his allegations about the Kaplan Fund he announced: ". . . The CIA does not belong in this foundation investigation."

Before bringing down the curtain of secrecy, he did, at least, reveal one fact of substance. It turned out that a number of other foundations had contributed to the Kaplan Fund during the crucial years of 1961-63 when the Fund had been serving the CIA. Five of these foundations were not even on the Internal Revenue Service's list of tax-exempt foundations. They were the Borden Trust, the Price Fund, the Edsel Fund, the Beacon Fund and the Kentfield Fund. The implication was clear that some or all of these were the channel through which the CIA money passed into the Kaplan foundation coffers.

*Ramparts* was provided with an unusual insight into the manner in which the CIA uses legitimate foundations with liberal interests, such as the Kaplan Fund, in a recent conversation with the president of a prominent New England foundation who asked to remain anonymous: "I didn't want my foundation dragged through the CIA mud." In 1965 he was approached by what he described as "two nice middle-aged Irish cop types who flashed CIA cards at me." The men asked the foundation president if they could look over the list of organizations that his foundation supports. He volunteered the list to them and after looking it over, the agents said that there were organizations on the list that they would also be willing to support. The CIA men

explained, "We are trying to pose an alternative to communism and want to back third-force programs, which we could not do if it was known that this support comes from a government source."

The agents then proposed to support some of the organizations already on the foundation's list as well as suggesting new prospective recipients. The agents promised that if this arrangement was accepted, they would be able to channel CIA money into the foundation without it ever being traced back to the CIA. They said that they were very skilled at these manipulations.

The president, however, took the proposal directly to the board which rejected it by a vote of four to one, out of what the foundation president called "a 19th century sense of morality. We just did not like the secrecy of it."

The CIA-suspect Funds mentioned in the Patman investigation are a key to understanding part of NSA's finances. Conveniently, they are spread all over the country (Borden in Philadelphia, Price in New York, Beacon in Boston, Kentfield in Dallas and Edsel, whose last known address was in San Francisco). When a *Ramparts* reporter checked out the addresses officially listed by the foundations, he usually found himself in a law office where no one was willing to talk about the Funds.

Two foundations that have supported the international programs of NSA -- the J. Frederick Brown Foundation and the Independence Foundation -- have received regular contributions from four of these CIA-linked Funds: Price, Borden, Kentfield, and Edsel. Both the J. Frederick Brown and the Independence Foundations list the same address, 60 State Street, Boston, which is also the address of the prestigious law firm of Hale and Dorr. Paul F. Hellmuth, a well-known Boston attorney and a member of Hale and Dorr, and David B. Stone, a Boston businessman and philanthropist, are the trustees of the Independence Foundation. Hellmuth alone is the trustee of the J. Frederick Brown Foundation.

Of the two, J. Frederick Brown is less important as a source of NSA funds. It made only \$3300 in contributions to NSA, in 1963. It also made contributions to the American Friends of the Middle East, among other organizations with overseas interests. In an article in the May 9, 1966 issue of *The Nation*, Robert G. Sherrill implied that the American Friends had CIA ties. No official of the organization denied the allegations.

As far as NSA is concerned, the Independence Foundation is the more important of Mr. Hellmuth's two interests. Independence got its tax-exempt status in 1960. Since then, most of its funds have come from other trusts and foundations. In 1962, for example, the Independence Foundation received a total of \$247,000, of which only \$18,500 came from individuals or corporations; all the rest came from other foundations. Of the total, the four Funds cited in the Patman investigation gave \$100,000.

Between 1962 and 1965, NSA received \$256,483.33 in grants for its international programs from Independence. Much of that sum went to pay for NSA's International



Student Relations Seminars, yearly extravaganzas which served as effective training grounds for future NSA international leaders.

NSA is still coasting on Independence's largesse. The building which houses NSA's present headquarters is occupied under a 15-year rent-free agreement with the Independence Foundation. Originally, NSA purchased the building with a down payment and a yearly mortgage payment to be secured from Independence. But Independence suddenly changed its mind and bought the property back from NSA. Deeds on file with the clerk of the District of Columbia reveal that NSA sold the property on October 20th, 1965, to the First National Bank, but that the bank was acting as a "trustee under an undisclosed trust." The undisclosed party is Paul Hellmuth, who secured the property, and leased it to the Independence Foundation which turned it over to NSA for the 15-year free rent agreement.

Shortly after NSA moved into its new plush Washington offices in the fall of 1965, a reporter from the *Washington Post*, who was doing a feature article on NSA, asked NSA President Phil Sherburne who was paying the rent on the building. Sherburne refused to divulge this information. This secrecy in protecting the names of NSA's benefactors was not unusual. In fact, NSA has never made a full financial accounting to its own Congresses.

The Independence Foundation has served NSA's overseas operations in other indirect ways. It has provided a number of scholarships for former NSA officers, usually in the neighborhood of \$3000 per year. The purpose of these scholarships was to enable former NSA officers to function as overseas representatives where they were free to make contacts with foreign student unions and roam as free operatives for NSA, sending back periodic reports. Ostensibly, the overseas representatives were supposed to be in overseas universities, but this was entirely pro forma.

Independence has not restricted its largesse exclusively to NSA. In the period between 1961 and 1965 it spent \$180,000 in financing an interesting operation known as the Independent Research Service (IRS). This was the organization that made life so miserable for the organizers of the communist-leaning world youth festivals in Vienna in 1959, and in Helsinki in 1962. The Independent Research Service actively recruited a delegation of hundreds of young Americans to attend the festivals in order to actively oppose the communists. The travel expenses of all the delegates were fully paid for and the bill was footed as well for a jazz group, an exhibition of famous American painters and a daily newspaper printed in five languages, all of which accompanied the delegates.

Although the official position of the NSA Congress was not to participate in the youth festivals, important NSA officers and ex-officers were very active in the Independent Research Service activities in Vienna and Helsinki. The director of the IRS during the Helsinki Youth Festival was Dennis Shaul, who was elected NSA president shortly thereafter. Shaul has also been the recipient of one of the Independence Foundation's "scholarships" in 1964.

When questioned by a *Ramparts* reporter about some of the activities and sources of funds for his Independence Foundation, Mr. Hellmuth, a normally outgoing man, became guarded and curt. He refused to divulge the addresses or any other information about the money which had been donated to both of his foundations. However, he was quite voluble about his close friendship with the officers of NSA.

Still another foundation which has given to NSA is the Sidney and Esther Rabb Charitable Foundation of Boston. The similarities between the Rabb Foundation and the J.M. Kaplan Fund are striking. Rabb, like Kaplan, is a Jewish businessman, prominent in liberal democratic circles. The records show that up until 1963 the Rabb Foundation's only source of income was from Rabb himself. And up to that year, the Rabb Foundation's contributions were minimal and only to local charities.

Then, in 1963, two contributions to the Rabb Foundation flowed in from the Price Fund of New York -- one of the Funds named in the Patman investigation, and a contributor to the J. Frederick Brown and Independence Foundations. The contributions were for \$25,000 and \$15,000 respectively. Strikingly, in the same year, the Rabb Foundation itself made two unusual and large contributions in precisely the same amounts -- one for \$25,000 to Operations and Policy Research Incorporated, a Cold War-oriented strategy organization; and \$15,000 to the Farfield Foundation. Farfield, in its turn, has been a frequent contributor to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, previously identified in the *New York Times* as having received CIA funds.

During 1964, the Rabb Foundation again received unusual contributions, from three Funds, and also made three matching disbursements. It received \$25,000 from the Tower Fund, and turned over the exact sum of \$25,000 as a grant to the International Development Foundation which has been engaged in organizing anti-communist peasant unions in Latin America. It was particularly active in the Dominican Republic during that country's period of revolution and American intervention. The Rabb Foundation also received a \$20,000 contribution from the Appalachian Fund, and during that year made a disbursement of \$20,000 to the American Society of African Culture. Finally, the Rabb Foundation received \$6000 from the ubiquitous Price Fund, and during the same year it turned over -- would you believe -- \$6000 to the United States National Student Association to help retire an NSA deficit. Rabb made at least one other contribution to NSA in 1965 in the amount of \$5000.

It is not always easy to obtain information on the foundations which have sustained NSA's international operations. Take the San Jacinto Foundation, for example. In the past, San Jacinto has not only funded important portions of NSA's international program, but it has also given huge sums of money to the program budget of the ISC. In particular, it has been overly generous in supporting *The Student*, an ISC publication printed in five languages and distributed all over the world as an anti-communist weapon.

One other interesting fact about the San Jacinto Foundation is that, like the J. Frederick Brown Foundation, it has contributed to the CIA-suspect American Friends of the Middle East. No one at NSA, or ISC for that matter, appears to have the vaguest notion of what the San Jacinto Foundation is, who is on its board of directors or where its money comes from. San Jacinto has also apparently managed to avoid

the reporting procedures required by law of all tax-exempt foundations. No records for it have been entered at the district office of the Internal Revenue Service in Austin, or with the secretary of the State of Texas, or with the county clerk.

San Jacinto's mailing address is the offices of F.G. O'Conner in the San Jacinto Building in downtown Houston. Mr. O'Conner is the secretary of the foundation. When asked by *Ramparts'* peripatetic reporter for some information about the foundation, Mr. O'Conner, a graying, distinguished-looking man in his sixties replied, it is a private, closed foundation, never had any publicity and doesn't want any.

As far back as anyone can remember, the mainstay of NSA's overseas operations has been the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs of New York City, founded in 1952. In contrast to the likes of Independence and San Jacinto, FYSA has a for-real office, a full-time staff and an eminently respectable board of directors.

In recent years, FYSA annually pumped hundreds of thousands of dollars per year into NSA's treasury. The figure for October 1965 to October 1966 was \$292,753.60. It provided a general administrative grant of up to \$120,000 per year and funded projects such as NSA's magazine, *The American Student*, foreign student participation at NSA Congresses, technical assistance projects; and its funds paid NSA's dues to the ISC. In addition, FYSA could be relied upon to pick up any operating deficit that NSA incurred during the year, and FYSA gives "scholarships" to ex-NSA officers for overseas study.

FYSA has also been the chief U.S. source for channeling money overseas to national unions of students favored by the NSA leadership. And FYSA has been practically the only external source of support, except for the mysterious San Jacinto Foundation, of the programs of the ISC. Between 1962-1964, ISC records show that these two foundations provided over 90 per cent of ISC's program budget (most of it from FYSA) -- a gargantuan total of \$1,826,000 in grants completed or in progress. The ISC would be literally impotent as an international organization without the support of FYSA, having been unable to establish any sizable alternative sources of funding.

The executive secretary of FYSA is Harry Lunn, a tall, ruddy-faced, balding man in his middle thirties, himself a past president of NSA, who used to make applications for grants to the foundation which he now directs. Lunn vehemently denied the suggestion that his foundation might be channeling CIA money for NSA, although he would not release a financial statement to this magazine.

After his presidency of NSA (1954-55) had terminated, Lunn became a member of an ISC delegation to Southeast Asia. Then, following a short stint in the Army, he went to the Department of Defense as a research analyst. From there he went on up the ladder to the political desk of the American embassy in Paris and then on up to the Agency for International Development, where he worked on the Alliance for Progress. It was from this last position that Lunn came to FYSA in 1965. Lunn also took part in the activities of the militantly anti-communist Independent Research Service at the Vienna Youth Festival in 1959, while he was attached to the Department of Defense.

Lunn's career is a case study in the intimate relationship between NSA, international student politics and the Cold War. It is living documentation of a slogan that used to hang in NSA's old Philadelphia headquarters: "The student leader of today is the student leader of tomorrow."

### **III. An Extraordinary Conversation**

The scene was the Sirloin and Saddle, a plush, dimly-lit, continental style restaurant on Washington, D.C.'s Connecticut Avenue. It was lunchtime, the third week of March 1966, and over a table an earnest conversation was taking place that eventually resulted in the exposure of the CIA's 15-year infiltration of the National Student Association.

There were two people there that day. One of them was Phil Sherburne, NSA president for 1965-1966. Athletic-looking, blonde, self-possessed, his NSA post was his latest stop in a meteoric career in student politics.

Sherburne's luncheon companion that eventful day was 23-year-old Michael Wood. NSA's director of development, or fund raising chief. Wood, too, had risen rapidly in student politics. He left Pomona College during his senior year to become a civil rights worker in Watts, where one of his projects had caught the eye of an NSA officer. He became an NSA consultant in the spring of 1965, and was soon promoted to the post of director of development. Besides raising money for NSA, he helped Sherburne work out new programs, and had even been consulted by the White House staff on possible Presidential proposals about the draft and the lowering of the voting age. He had received a letter from Douglass Cater, special assistant to the President, commending him for his excellent reports.

Wood was talking to Sherburne because he was troubled. He had been running into irritating roadblocks in trying to raise money for NSA. He had encountered a curious lack of concern among other members of the Association's international staff about the rigorous preparation usually required for foundation fund raising. The amount of money needed often ran into hundreds of thousands of dollars, yet the proposals being submitted to the foundations funding the international program were ill-prepared, perfunctory and brief. Furthermore, President Sherburne was negotiating with the foundations without Wood's participation.

After six months of this confusion, Wood told Sherburne, with whom he had grown quite close, that he either had to be given full responsibility for the fund raising program or he would have to resign. It was at this time that Sherburne invited him to a heart-to-heart lunch conference. The following is Wood's account of what transpired during this and subsequent conversations:

Sherburne began by telling Wood that NSA had "certain relationships with certain government agencies engaged in international relations" which Wood didn't know

about. This, explained Sherburne, was why Wood couldn't have full responsibility for NSA's fund raising. Wood was astonished. "You mean the CIA?" he asked. Sherburne nodded yes. Sherburne then told Wood that he was supposed to have been informed of the CIA relationship after he was appointed director of development, but that other NSA staff members and CIA contacts had decided he was politically unreliable. As well as having been a civil rights worker, Wood had gained a reputation as something of a radical. Because he couldn't be told of the CIA relationship, it was necessary to keep him in the dark about certain aspects of NSA funding.

Sherburne told Wood he hoped that everything said over lunch that day would be kept secret. He was divulging the information only because he did not want Wood to leave NSA. Later he explained that he wanted a friend he could trust with whom to discuss the CIA relationship, other than staffers who were already involved.

The CIA, said Sherburne, had managed to inject itself into the Association's international operations in the early 1950's. Since that time, virtually every president and international affairs vice president of the organization had been aware of the CIA relationship and had cooperated.

Sherburne went on to say that most of the foundations that had funded NSA's international operations were merely passing along CIA money. Moreover, some of them had made up NSA's yearly deficits, and had financed the purchase and renovation of NSA's new offices in Washington. This explained the mystery surrounding the acquisition and the rent for NSA's new national offices.

Among the CIA-front foundations specifically mentioned, according to Wood, were the Independence Foundation, the San Jacinto Foundation, the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs, the Sidney and Esther Rabb Foundation, and the J. Frederick Brown Foundation. To the best of Sherburne's knowledge, CIA money did not pass through the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Asia Foundation, and other groups which had also funded NSA international programs in the past.

Sherburne presented the Agency's involvement in international student politics as a *fait accompli*; he argued that the CIA's vast supply of money was absolutely essential. Although he had serious doubts about the desirability of the relationship, he felt that NSA could not get as much money from any other source; moreover, the Agency had supported many worthwhile and liberal overseas programs. In any event, Sherburne felt that a sudden termination of the relationship would leave NSA in disastrous financial straits.

The CIA was interested almost exclusively in NSA's international programs. Over the years no staff member who worked exclusively on NSA's national program was involved in a CIA relationship, and few, if any, even knew about it. Keeping the CIA connection secret was made easier by the fact that NSA's national and international departments were in different cities from 1947-1960.

During their frequent conversations, Sherburne gave Wood a partial glossary of

"black" language that was used by NSA's CIA operatives whenever they discussed the relationship in a semi-public place. They referred to the CIA as the "firm" and not the Agency; people were not described as operatives or agents but as being "witty"; those who worked inside the Agency bureaucracy were referred to as the "fellas" or the "boys." Frequently, important NSA-ers were given code names for their contacts with the Agency. Sherburne's code name was "Mr. Grants" (based on his facility for fund raising).

Sherburne told Wood that normal procedure involved a careful evaluation by former NSA international officers of international staff members for their reliability -- as well as a full national security check by the CIA. If a member passed the test, he was made "witty."

The prospective "witty" staff member would usually be taken out to lunch by another already "witty" staff member, and a representative of the CIA. NSA dealings were with Covert Action Division No. Five of the CIA's Plans Division, and the personnel they dealt with there were themselves former NSA officers. Thus, when the new officer was taken to lunch, he at first assumed that he was merely going out with another staff member and an NSA alumnus. The prospective "witty" staff member was told at lunch that there was information relating to work on the international staff which affected national security and which he should know about, but which required him to sign a national security oath. If he signed the oath, which pledged him to keep secret any information that was then divulged, he was then told about the CIA relationship and asked to cooperate.

The implication was clear that if the international staff member ever divulged any of the information about the relationship, there could be severe legal penalties. Thus the international officers were placed in a position in which they could not acknowledge the existence of the relationship, even to other "non-witty" NSA-ers. Sherburne made the first breach in a 15-year wall of secrecy.

The typical "witty" international staff member would first consult with an Agency representative about his overseas programs. Grants for international programs, travel allowances and expense accounts for NSA members going to overseas student conferences, would then all be supplied by CIA-front foundations.

So intimately was the CIA involved in NSA's international program, that it treated NSA as an arm of U.S. foreign policy. The point is illustrated by a story that Sherburne told Wood. At one point during his tenure in office, Sherburne was to attend the International Student Travel Conference in Istanbul. There had already been much talk in NSA circles of opening up some bilateral contact with student unions in Soviet-bloc countries. Sherburne felt his trip to Turkey would provide a good opportunity to meet with Soviet students and discuss possible student exchanges. Sherburne sent off a cable to the Soviet National Union of Students saying that he would be in Istanbul and requesting permission to travel on to Moscow for a meeting with the Soviet student organization. But the CIA got wind of Sherburne's cable and admonished him for doing such things without first consulting the Agency. A CIA agent explained to Sherburne that since KGB (the Soviet "CIA") assumed that NSA took its cues from the U.S. government, Sherburne's gesture

might be interpreted as an official change in CIA policy on bilateral student contacts. Sherburne, even though he was president of the United States National Student Association, was enjoined against making such diplomatic overtures without first requesting permission from the Agency.

The Soviet Union has always spent a good deal of money working with student and youth groups, especially in underdeveloped countries. The CIA's instrument for countering Soviet efforts was NSA, working through the International Student Conference. Former "witty" NSA staffers were always in the Secretariat of the ISC.

And NSA, with the CIA's aid, was able to play a major role in cooperating with favored national unions of students all over the world. No other union of students in the Western world has the kind of financial backing as NSA. The Canadian Union of Students, for example, operates on a budget of about \$14,000 a year for its international programs, all of which comes from the dues of member schools. NSA, with its almost unlimited funds, was able to conduct a full program of foreign diplomacy.

Of course, the CIA was also interested in intelligence. "Witty" NSA international staff members would pass along reports on foreign student leaders directly to the Agency. This information helped the CIA in evaluating the political tendencies of prospective political leaders in critical areas of the world.

One of the lures the CIA dangled before NSA was the assurance that this intelligence gathering role did not seem to require NSA to violate its foreign policy principles. The CIA is interested in alternatives to communism in the underdeveloped world, even if the only alternative is a moderate left. "Witty" staff members were told that, in working with the CIA, they would be providing the information that would help get a more enlightened foreign policy presented in high Washington circles.

Thus an NSA international staffer, while on an overseas assignment cleared with the CIA, visited student groups in Spain that were militantly protesting against the Franco dictatorship's suppression of free student unions. This NSA-er, a genuine supporter of the Spanish students, joined a protest meeting and was roughed up by the Spanish police, jailed, and held incommunicado for three days. The same staff member had previously gone to the Dominican Republic shortly after the American intervention there. He brought back a report on his contacts with university students who had participated in the civil war on the side of the constitutionalists.

To NSA the CIA relationship was a comfortable one. It meant lots of money, a sense of doing important work, overseas travel, and, perhaps most important of all, very little feeling of having sold out one's political convictions. The CIA relationship meant something more personal, too. For years elected (and appointed) officials and staffers of NSA have been getting draft deferments. The deferment given for having an "occupation vital to the national interest" would last as long as the member worked for NSA; it was then possible for him to go on to graduate school and receive a student deferment again.

The standard practice was for the president of NSA to send a letter to the local draft board stating that the staff member's services were required in an area that affected the national interest. Always included was a Cold War paragraph about how NSA was combatting communism. In what had become almost a form letter, the NSA president, asking for an occupational deferment for his staff member, wrote: "NSA is largely responsible for the creation and maintenance of the International Student Conference, which was established in 1950 to combat the communist-controlled International Union of Students. More than 50 countries -- almost every state with a national union this side of the Iron Curtain -- now participate in the International Student Conference."

During 1965-66 the war in Vietnam escalated, and a panic developed in the NSA office when staff members suddenly found themselves re-classified I-A under the impact of the increased draft quotas. Sherburne took the matter of the office staff's status to the Selective Service Presidential Review Board, and also went directly to General Hershey. No NSA staff members, "witty" or "non-witty," were drafted. The Agency looks after its own.

#### **IV. The President Rebels**

When the CIA made Phil Sherburne "witty" it got more than it bargained for. Sherburne has a tough-minded, gritty independence that soon led him into conflict with those who were paying NSA's bills. Not only did Sherburne break the CIA cult of secrecy, but he also began fighting for NSA autonomy in international programming.

Sherburne's initial attitude to the Agency was friendly but reserved. He was willing to take CIA money for NSA projects and to consult with the Agency on matters of common interest, but he was the first NSA president who demanded full control of international programs. Previously, international programs -- scholarships, student exchanges, conferences and the like -- had all been worked out by NSA staff members and their CIA contacts.

But the Agency resisted Sherburne's reforms and applied pressure through their foundations. For the first time in years there were delays in the granting of funds from foundations such as FYSA and San Jacinto. But Sherburne fought back. He refused to release the funds (paid for by FYSA) that would have paid the dues of NSA to the International Student Conference. Finally, most of the money was released to NSA and a *modus vivendi* of sorts was reached. Eventually, Sherburne told Wood, Covert Action Division No. Five became so upset at its errant child, it considered severing ties with the NSA altogether.

Sherburne's effort at establishing some independence left its financial marks. Previously, any year-end operating deficits were quickly picked up by FYSA or some other foundation. In 1962-63 NSA had blundered into a disastrous financial venture with a book cooperative and wound up with approximately a \$70,000 deficit. After NSA made a pro forma appeal to alumni that brought in practically nil, several key



CIA foundations and individuals came through with the cash and the debt was miraculously retired in two years. The cost of NSA's move from Philadelphia and at least \$35,000 worth of furniture and renovations for the new Washington offices were just as easily absorbed. Among others, FYSA put up \$15,000 and two men, Thomas Millbank and George Baker, put up \$10,000 and \$5000 respectively. Millbank and Baker are both well-established New York corporate executives and fellow members of the Racquet and Tennis Club. These two men once joined with FYSA in making an \$18,000 grant to the ISC for a Latin American student conference. When asked about his interest in NSA and international student politics by this magazine, Mr. Millbank, once an assistant naval attache in Cairo, said: "It is none of your business," and promptly hung up the phone.

At the end of a year of relative independence, Sherburne was faced with approximately a \$35,000 deficit that no one picked up. The deficit has remained, despite staff cutbacks. The "firm" doesn't like rebellious children.

By the end of a year of wrangling with the CIA, Sherburne was convinced that it was impossible to maintain an independent but friendly relationship. In an attempt to find new funds that would free NSA of its financial dependence on the CIA, Sherburne went to see Vice President Humphrey in July of 1966. Humphrey had been friendly to NSA, had addressed its National Congress in 1965, and had met Sherburne once previously.

Sherburne told the Vice President about the CIA ties and NSA's financial predicament. Humphrey promised to help NSA get other, independent sources of financing.

Humphrey kept his word and wrote to Roger Blough, Chairman of the Board of U.S. Steel, David Rockefeller of the Chase Manhattan Bank, and Henry Ford, among others. In a typical letter (the one to Roger Blough), Humphrey said:

I have been very much impressed by the work done over the past few years by the National Student Association. I know the officers of the Association well. As with other such groups the NSA has had a continuing financial difficulty. I believe that this organization should be able to find support in the private sector, which will enable it to continue its work independently and in the best spirit of private initiative.

Despite Humphrey's entreaties, only a few hundred dollars rolled in from "the private sector." Thus NSA went to its 1966 Congress, the deficit still on its back, and its relationship with the CIA badly damaged. Sherburne continued to resist Wood's suggestions that he make a thoughtful public statement about the relationship and have it openly discussed as a public issue.

Yet what Sherburne had accomplished was considerable. For the first time in years, new national officers were elected without apparent commitments to the CIA relationship. The only problems bothering the new officers were their knowledge of the past, and the large financial deficit -- for it appeared that Humphrey's friends in the "private sector" were not as interested in supporting NSA as a rather un-public

part of the "public sector" had been.

## V. Epitaph to a Caper

Phil Sherburne finally went to Harvard Law School after his year of escapades with the CIA. He was in Cambridge when *Ramparts* called him early last month to get his reaction to Mike Wood's revelations. In a subdued voice he said: "I think I would prefer not to say anything until I have had a chance to look at the article pretty carefully. . . . I think the article should be discussed by the current administration of NSA, and that anything that I would say would be resolved in discussions with them."

Then he was asked, "Did you sign a national security oath?" Sherburne paused a few moments and said, "At his point I don't want to make any comment."

Sherburne was under enormous pressure, not only out a remaining loyalty to NSA, but also from the CIA. That "enlightened" organization had viciously turned on him for talking to Wood, and was trying hard to intimidate him into publicly denying Wood's story.

Sometime in the middle of January, the NSA officers and Sherburne heard that Michael Wood had passed his information along to *Ramparts*. Sherburne called Wood and asked him to fly to Boston, where Sherburne pleaded with him for an entire day to retract his story. Then they both flew to Washington for four more days of intense and harrowing discussion with two of the current NSA national officers, an NSA staff member, and a former national affairs vice president.

In the Washington conversations with Wood, the officers of NSA desperately tried to dissuade him from giving the information to this magazine. Wood refused and instead urged the officers to affirm the story publicly, which would be the only way of salvaging NSA's dignity. The officers would not commit themselves.

There followed two weeks of hectic caucusing and emergency meetings at NSA headquarters. NSA officers visited a number of well-known NSA alumni, including Douglass Cater of the White House staff, to ask their advice. At least one of the officers also went straight to the Agency. The current CIA operative whom he contacted is a former NSA president. He is officially employed by the Agency for International Development in Washington.

At one point the officers assembled the staff, told them of the impending story and flatly denied that it was true. They suggested that Wood was making up the story to revenge NSA for having lost his job as director of development. Finally, another staff meeting was called and it was admitted that the story was true.

Meanwhile, on the west coast, two *Ramparts* editors were talking to Ed Schwartz, NSA's current national affairs vice president. Schwartz, talkative and quick-witted,

had been the leader of the liberal caucus in NSA. He was in Berkeley, working as a behind-the-scenes student political advisor-negotiator during the University of California campus crisis precipitated by the firing of Clark Kerr.

It seems a direct, ironic result of Cold War politics that Schwartz had to drop his liberal Berkeley activities and cross the Bay to discuss his organization's cooperation with the CIA. Through a long and tiring discussion that lasted most of one night, Schwartz did not deny NSA's relationship to the CIA. Instead, he pleaded that great damage would be done to the good works of NSA by the revelation of this relationship. As the discussion ended, he muttered something about losing his draft deferment.

A few days later, in Washington, D.C., a *Ramparts* editor had an almost identical conversation with two other NSA officers. The talk began in NSA's national headquarters, a four-story colonial-style brick building in a quiet residential section. On the desk in President Gene Groves' office there was an autographed picture of Hubert Humphrey. With Groves was Rick Stearns, the international affairs vice president.

During the conversation neither Stearns nor Groves denied NSA's CIA connections in the past but stated that "all of our current financing comes from legitimate sources which observe the normal legitimate reporting procedures." And yet NSA's current budget records grants totaling \$56,673.30 from FYSA. Stearns was asked, "Will you flatly say you have had no contact with the CIA during your time in office?" He shook his head.

Stearns and Groves pleaded that disclosure of the CIA relationship would be disastrous for NSA. It would put them in an awful political predicament. If they publicly admitted past CIA connections, it would tarnish NSA's image badly at home and abroad, and hurt its chances of receiving grants from other government agencies. NSA staff members also feared CIA retaliation, especially the loss of their draft deferments.

Having kept quiet about the CIA since their election, the officers now went into action to minimize the effects of the forthcoming disclosures. NSA President Gene Groves flew off to Leiden, Holland for an emergency Summit meeting with the leaders of the ISC. Groves came back convinced that NSA must make some acknowledgment of the CIA relationship -- but at the urging of his colleagues in Leiden there would be as few details as possible admitted.

If older Americans have been a little put off by the style of the draft card burners or the Mario Savios, there has always been somewhat of a consensus about the good works of the young men and women of the United States National Student Association. The NSA seemed to mix the idealism of the community organizers, the FSM activists and the Peace Corps with the buttoned-down practicality of young junior executives.

The quality which rank and file NSA-ers have cherished most about themselves is

independence, especially independence from government controls. It was this quality that was supposed to distinguish their organization from national unions of students in the communist world. The quality for the most part was genuine, for the rank and file never knew of the CIA connection.

There were many arguments put forward by NSA's current officers as to why the CIA-NSA relationship should be kept secret, and many similar arguments desperately made to Mike Wood as to why he should not have given the information to anyone. Of all the reasons given -- by Stearns and Groves to *Ramparts'* editor in Washington, and by others who pleaded with Wood -- the most pathetic, which appeared again and again, was this: exposing the story would not only hurt NSA, it would hurt the CIA. Covert Action Division No. Five, after all, was not in the business of assassinating Latin American leftists, it was supporting liberal groups like NSA, groups with international programs in the best tradition of cultural exchanges between countries. NSA might be anti-communist, but certainly no one could ever argue that its anti-communism was more militant or more narrow-minded than that of the average American. Rather, it was less so. Thus the exposure of the NSA-CIA tie would deeply hurt the enlightened, liberal internationalist wing of the CIA. Conservative congressmen, such as L. Mendel Rivers of the House Armed Services Committee, would cut off Agency funds for these purposes, and the hard-liners in CIA's "core" would be proven right in their contentions that the Agency shouldn't give large sums of money to support liberal students, no matter what intelligence it was getting in return.

The twisted sickness of this Orwellian argument should speak for itself. Yet it is extraordinary, and frightening, that it could be so easily made by the talented young liberals at the head of NSA. One would think the idea of "an enlightened wing of the CIA" would be an obvious contradiction in terms. But the idea's acceptance and support by a generation of student leaders indicates how deeply the corruption of means for ends has become ingrained in our society, and how much dishonesty is tolerated in the name of the Cold War.

---

By Sol Stern, with the special assistance of Lee Webb, Michael Ansara and Michael Wood.

[Back to home page](#)

**From *The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared -- The Early Years of the CIA* by Evan Thomas (New York: Simon & Schuster Touchstone Edition, 1996), pp. 329-30:**

[Desmond] FitzGerald was feeling intense pressure that winter and spring, from the outside as well as within the agency. A new wave of press stories threatened to expose the agency's long reach and further undermine its image. In February 1967, *Ramparts* magazine, a left-wing publication, revealed that the CIA had secretly funded the National Student Association as a front group in the battle to win the allegiance of young student leaders from Marxist- and KGB-controlled fronts. The American press picked up the trail and ran a large number of stories exposing the agency's various ties to foundations, think tanks, labor unions, and universities. The CIA's whole system of anticommunist fronts in Europe, Asia, and South America was essentially blown.

When, in January 1967, FitzGerald first heard that *Ramparts* was about to break the story, his initial response was to run a covert operation against the left-wing magazine. That winter he ordered Edgar Applewhite to try to discredit the *Ramparts* editors any way he could. "I had all sorts of dirty tricks to hurt their circulation and financing," said Applewhite. "The people running *Ramparts* were vulnerable to blackmail. We had awful things in mind, some of which we carried off, though *Ramparts* fell of its own accord. We were not the least inhibited by the fact that the CIA had no internal security role in the United States." When Applewhite returned to brief FitzGerald on his dirty tricks (which he declined to describe twenty-five years later), the clandestine chief was bemused. "Eddie," he said, "you have a spot of blood on your pinafore."

*Campus Watch*, Fall 1991, pp. 12-13

### ***CIA Infiltration of Student Groups:***

## **The National Student Association Scandal**

**by Phil Agee, Jr.**

In February 1967, vice president Hubert Humphrey told a Stanford University audience that recent revelations of CIA activities represented "one of the saddest times, in reference to public policy, our Government has had." He was referring to the momentous exposures, then exploding across the front pages, of CIA meddling in the nation's largest student group, the United States National Student Association (NSA). The 1967 investigations, initially prompted by the editors of *Ramparts* magazine and authorized by various liberal-minded figures in corporate media and government, brought forth some of the most fully-disclosed operations regarding CIA influence over academia and a host of other domestic groups. Only after a presidential directive and promises by federal agencies to end covert support of domestic groups did the scandal subside. The damage control ultimately allayed such figures as

Humphrey, Senator Robert Kennedy, and *New York Times* editorial page editor John Oakes. Yet subsequent failures to properly regulate covert actions along with legal loopholes and lack of clear policies within academic institutions have left persisting doubts regarding the use to which the CIA has put student groups and the academic community.

By most accounts, the relationship between the CIA and the NSA dates back to the early fifties, when both organizations were still in their infancies. As Tom Braden, who headed the agency's International Organization Division between '51 and '54, recounts in an article titled "I'm Glad the CIA is 'Immoral'," the NSA operation began after Allen Dulles, then in line for directorship, authorized Braden to provide support to domestic organizations in an all-out effort against the "international Communist front." Secret CIA funds were provided in 1952 to then NSA president William Dentzer, who later went on to become AID director in Peru. The *New York Times* also identified Cord Meyer, Jr. as having headed the NSA operation. However, the ties between the CIA and the National Student Association may actually stretch back to 1950, when, according to a *New York Times* interview with Frederic Delano Houghteling, then NSA secretary, the CIA gave him several thousand dollars to pay traveling expenses for a delegation of 12 representatives to a European international student conference.

The first congress of the Association, held at Madison, Wisconsin in 1947, had set out to represent the U.S. student community in an emerging international student scene. As the NSA grew, covert CIA influence led to often contradictory behavior between those few who knew and the vast majority kept in the dark. Yet its growing membership also developed a domestic program addressing a range of national and campus-related issues. In 1951 it opposed the House Un-American Activities Committee. Its elected officers participated in the activities of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee and it organized counseling on the draft during the war in Vietnam. Much of its domestic role reflected the growing concerns on campuses nationwide with racism and imperialism. On the international front the Association eventually established four full-time overseas representatives based in France, England, Poland and Uganda, and scores of part-time representatives. As conservative student groups such as the Young Americans for Freedom attacked the Association's positions, members of Students for a Democratic Society provided important leadership for campus-based activities.

It was an SDS member, Michael Wood, who took the story to *Ramparts* magazine after being told of the relationship in 1966 by then NSA president Phil Sherburne. In telling Wood, Sherburne was hoping to forestall Wood's imminent resignation brought on by other officers who had refused to provide him with information regarding NSA funding sources. The exposure led to a year-long series of revelations alleging CIA financing of the American Newspaper Guild, the AFL-CIO, and the American Federation of Teachers, among others.

The initial mission, however, of fairly representing U.S. students in international student politics was doomed from the beginning. With no practical control by local chapters over its overseas operations and the CIA's stipulation that its funding remain secret, a schizophrenic odyssey began which provided, unbeknownst to all but a

handful of national officers, a perfect cover for the CIA in its operations abroad. Overseas representatives promoted an anti-communist agenda abroad and collected intelligence for the CIA's in-house operations underway around the world.

The impact the Association had abroad was largely due to the funding provided by the CIA. According to the *Ramparts* article and subsequent reports by the *New York Times*, U.S. intelligence was providing the NSA as much as \$400,000 a year. The CIA was also funneling as much as \$1,800,000 to the International Student Conference, a confederation of over 80 national student unions set up in 1950 by the NSA to counter the International Union of Students, a so-called "communist" union which originated the long-lasting International Youth Festivals. The funds were transferred through a double screening process, using first dummy foundations and then foundations with histories of legitimate private philanthropy. "Legitimate" foundations would then pass the funds on to the national office of the NSA.

For at least 15 years, during the fifties and sixties, the NSA appeared to the public and its own membership to be receiving its funding from private foundations such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and government sources including the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the State Department. Labeled by E.W. Kenworthy in the *New York Times* of February 19, 1967 as "not much more than a mail-drop," the front foundations included the Price Fund of New York, the Edsel Fund of San Francisco, the Borden Trust of Philadelphia, and the Beacon Fund of Boston. Among the more widely mentioned "legitimate" foundations passing the funds along to the NSA were the Independence Foundation of Boston, the San Jacinto Foundation of Houston, and the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs of New York. Not surprisingly, a number of officials of these foundations had past connections with both the federal government and the NSA. Harry Lunn, secretary of the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs, was both NSA president (1954-55) and subsequently worked for the Defense Department, the political section of the American embassy in Paris, and the Agency for International Development. The NSA's international division and part of its national directorate became secret recruiting pools for potential CIA career officials.

The funds given to the NSA were used for a variety of projects, approved beforehand by CIA officers. According to Sam Brown, chairman of the Association's national supervisory board in 1967, students representing the NSA overseas would compile data on the personalities of foreign student leaders and the policies and objectives of foreign student organizations. As he told the *New York Times*, "some of this information apparently was passed directly to CIA employees and some of it, in the course of normal business, went into the files of the N.S.A.," to be later accessed by clandestine operatives within the Association. Those students having signed secrecy oaths with the CIA would then be bound under penalty of law to keep their knowledge of the ultimate benefactor from the public and the rest of their organization. Other projects included scholarships for Algerian students provided just before Algerian independence in 1960, and a seminar on student newspapers held in East Africa in 1965. Allen Dulles, DCI from 1953 to 1961, in defending the agency was quoted as saying "if we turned back the Communists and made them milder and easier to live with, it was because we stopped them in certain areas and the student area was one of them."

One past president of the NSA, who refused to identify himself to the *New York Times*, stated that the CIA had tried to "influence the selection of staff members to run certain programs and get the organization to start activities in certain fields." Michael Wood revealed that the agency would recruit student agents mostly through the Association's annual International Student Relations Seminar. Potential agents would be assessed and cleared for approval by the agency. NSA officers would then appoint them to various non-elective offices or nominate them for elected offices to be voted on at the national meeting. At one such meeting held in Madison, Wisconsin in 1965, CIA agents attempted to keep the Association from taking a position on the war in Vietnam. While the Association's call for negotiations and cessation to bombing did go through, the agents succeeded, according to Wood, in pressing for a stipulation calling for negotiation on the part of the North Vietnamese. The CIA's subsidies translated into influence over the policies and activities of the Association.

At the time of the revelations, noted U.S. scholars predicted that the operation would create considerable difficulties in carrying out their work abroad. The president of the American Political Science Association, Robert A. Dahl declared he was "sickened and alarmed" by the agency's secret financing of academic organizations, adding "there are bound to be evil effects from such practices." The position of United States scholars, their relations with foreign colleagues and their chances for research may be found to have "suffered grievously," he told the *New York Times*. Concern was also known to exist that the disclosures involving the intelligence agency might hamper Fulbright exchange programs of scholars, professors and students as well as other cultural programs. Dr. Stephen K. Bailey, dean at the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University stated, "It's a very dangerous thing and has sown seeds of suspicion which really handicap the free and open inquiry and access which is needed for scholarly work."

While the public awaits a complete account of the agency's 44-year involvement with the academic community, this and a small number of other domestic operations disclosed over the last twenty-five years suggest to many that the agency's involvement has at times bordered on a complete subversion of the independence and integrity of academic and student organizations. Such was the general reaction in 1967 when the CIA's involvement with the NSA became known. The CIA's continuing involvement with the nation's universities raises once again the issue of the propriety of both public and secret collaboration.

[Back to home page](#)



[ Gloria Steinem worked full-time for the CIA during the late 1950s and early 1960s, as director of the CIA-funded Independent Research Service. In a [1967 New York Times article](#) Steinem is quoted as saying, "I was never asked to report on other Americans or assess foreign nationals I had met." This document, published by Redstockings in 1975, shows that if Steinem was telling the truth to the *Times*, it was only because the CIA didn't have to ask. ]

## Festival Document

Director:

GLORIA M. STEINEM

Executive Officers:

DR. PAUL E. SIGMUND, JR.

LEONARD N. BEBCHICK

from Report on the Vienna Youth Festival,  
Independent Research Service, 1961

### SUPPLEMENT TO THE FIRST EDITION: NOTES ON THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE EIGHTH FESTIVAL

This report on the Vienna Youth Festival has been compiled from information given out by the Festival's organizers, from articles in the international press, from reports of Austrian and other student and youth groups present in Vienna, and from the personal observations of Festival participants. The Independent Research Service, a privately-supported educational foundation which provides research on international subjects of interest to youth and students, has published this report in English, French, and Spanish in the hope that it will be useful both as a research document in future studies of the Communist youth movement and as an aid to groups and individuals deciding their attitude toward future festivals.

...

Thus far, the organization, aims, and techniques of the Eighth Festival seem to be identical with those of its predecessors. In the light of these developments, it is perhaps even more necessary that these individuals and groups debating attendance in Helsinki examine closely the case history of the Festival in Vienna.

September, 1961  
New York, New York

## APPENDIX II

The following are excerpts from a Research Release Published By International News Bureau, Vienna:

### SOME BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON FESTIVAL PERSONALITIES

A major effort has been made by the sponsors of the Seventh Youth Festival to make the event appear non-partisan. As evidence, the sponsors often have pointed to individuals outside the Soviet orbit who have endorsed the Festival, maintaining that the Festival staff is international and representative of all political tendencies.

The following list of individuals associated with the Festival's organization -- often very much in the background -- would seem to indicate a far greater communist control of this event than the sponsors wish to admit. This list has been compiled from Festival documents and careful research by those who have observed the organizers in action.

...

[deleted] -- Italy. A WFDY vice-president since March, 1958, [deleted] has worked on the PC in Vienna since April of that year. He was initially named Treasurer but later was replaced in this position by [deleted], an Italian Communist. [deleted] was also one of the leaders of the Italian delegation to the Moscow Festival. In actively working on the PC, he is ignoring the directive of the Italian (Nenni) Socialist Party of which he is a member, which requests that there be no official participation in the Vienna Festival. [deleted] PSI membership has been cited in the Festival journals as proof of the non-partisan character of the event. (Ed's note: Since the Festival, the PSI youth disaffiliated from WFDY.)

...

[deleted] -- Italy. Another PSI member who is violating the party's request against official Festival participation, [deleted] has been a member of the PC

since October 1958 when he replaced Bahomonde of Chile.

...

[deleted] -- Niger. A non-communist and representative of the French West African Council of African Youth (CJA), [deleted] apparently is an individual who sees the Festival as an opportunity to contact youth in the communist countries. As a Catholic and non-communist, he often has been asked to sign Festival correspondence and act as a Festival spokesman. Through this use of his name, the communists have successfully used the reputation of the genuinely neutral CJA to imply that a major responsibility for Festival Organization rests with CJA and [deleted].

...

[deleted] -- China. Publicly active in communist youth affairs since 1949, the 35-year-old [deleted] came to Budapest in the fall of 1956 to work in WFDY headquarters, where he was to head the WFDY Asian-African Commission. He, too, participated in the organization of the PC while attending the Stockholm meeting and has lately been working with the PC in Vienna.

...

[deleted] -- Federal German Republic. A member of the Socialist Party of Western Germany (which has asked its members not to be official Festival participants), [deleted] has been working on the PC since early 1959 as a member of the publications board and as the person in charge of Western European affairs. In the latter role he has traveled in Western Germany to stimulate participation. His efforts have been largely unsuccessful on the representative youth group level, since nearly all such German groups have boycotted the Festival in solidarity with the Austrian organizations.

...

[deleted] -- Argentina. A well-known Festival personality -- perhaps because he maintains he is an anarchist rather than a communist and hence appears more respectable -- [deleted] is chairman of the Student Commission of the PC of which the Bulgarian, [deleted] is secretary. [deleted] has been active in the Festival from the start and has traveled widely in its support.

...

[deleted] -- Argentina. [deleted] is a member of the Radical Intransigent Youth of Argentina and has worked on the PC since April 1958. Festival publicity has given much attention to the fact that Argentine President Frondizi also is a member of the Radical Intransigent Party. It has not mentioned another significant fact -- that in late May the government of Frondizi closed the office of the Argentine National Festival Committee under a decree which bans all communist activity in Argentina.

...

[deleted] -- United States. As chairman of the United States Festival Committee, [deleted] has been working on the PC, both in Vienna and in the U.S., since June 1959. He has been head of the Marxist Discussion Club of the City College of New York.

...

[deleted] -- As an important functionary of the small Communist-front Union of Democratic Women of Austria she has been playing an active role in the Austrian Communist Party's preparations for the Festival.

*Names of individuals have been blocked out by Redstockings.*

[Back to home page](#)

Excerpt from *Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States* (The Rockefeller Commission), June 1975. Chapter 11, Section G (New York: Manor Books, 1975), pp. 142-44.

## **G. Collection, Indexing, and Filing of Information by Operation CHAOS**

The volume of information passing through the CHAOS group by mid-1969 was great. As Director Helms pointed out in his September 6, 1969, memorandum to the Directorates, the Operation's main problem was a backlog of undigested raw information which required analysis and indexing.

Not only was the Agency receiving FBI reports on antiwar activities, but with the rise of international conferences against the war, and student and radical travel abroad, information flowed in from the Agency's overseas stations as well.

The Operation had gathered all the information it could from the Agency's central registry. According to the Chief of the Operation, that information for the most part consisted of raw data gathered on individuals by the FBI which had not been analyzed by the Agency because the information contained nothing of foreign intelligence value.

CHAOS also availed itself of the information gained through the CIA's New York mail intercept. The Operation supplied a watch list of United States citizens to be monitored by the staff of the mail intercept. The number of mail items intercepted and sent to CHAOS during its operation were sufficient in number to have filled two drawers in a filing cabinet. All of these items were letters or similar material between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In addition, Operation CHAOS received materials from an international communications activity of another agency of the government [this was the National Security Agency -- website editor]. The Operation furnished a watch list of names to the other agency and received a total of approximately 1100 pages of materials overall. The program to furnish the Operation with these materials was not terminated until CHAOS went out of existence. All such materials were returned to the originating agency by the CIA in November 1974 because a review of the materials had apparently raised a question as to the legality of their being held by CIA. The materials concerned for the most part anti-war activities, travel to international peace conferences and movements of members of various dissident groups. The communications passed between the United States and foreign countries. None was purely domestic.

During one period, Operation CHAOS also appears to have received copies of booking slips for calls made between points in the United States and abroad. The

slips did not record the substance of the calls, but rather showed the identities of the caller and the receiver, and the date and time of the call. The slips also indicated whether the call went through.

Most of the officers assigned to the Operation were analysts who read the materials received by it and extracted names and other information for indexing in the computer system used by the Operation and for inclusion in the Operation's many files. It appears that, because of the great volume of materials received by Operation CHAOS and the time pressures on the Operation, little judgment could be, or was, exercised in this process. The absence of such judgment led, in turn, to the inclusion of a substantial amount of data in the records of the Operation having little, if anything, bearing upon its foreign intelligence objective.

The names of all persons mentioned in intelligence source reports received by Operation CHAOS were computer-indexed. The computer printout on a person or organization or subject would contain references to all documents, files or communications traffic where the name appeared. Eventually, approximately 300,000 names of American citizens and organizations were thus stored in the CHAOS computer system.

The computerized information was streamed or categorized on a "need to know" basis, progressing from the least sensitive to the most sensitive. A special computer "password" was required in order to gain access to each stream. (This multistream characteristic of the computer index caused it to be dubbed the "Hydra" system.) The computer system was used much like a library card index to locate intelligence reports stored in the CHAOS library of files.

The files, like the computer index, were also divided into different levels of security. A "201," or personality, file would be opened on an individual when enough information had been collected to warrant a file or when the individual was of interest to another government agency that looked to the CIA for information. The regular 201 file generally contained information such as place of birth, family, occupation and organizational affiliation. In addition, a "sensitive" file might also be maintained on that same person. The sensitive file generally encompassed matters which were potentially embarrassing to the Agency or matters obtained from sources or by methods which the Agency sought to protect. Operation CHAOS also maintained nearly 1000 "subject" files on numerous organizations.<sup>3</sup>

Random samplings of the Operation's files show that in great part, the files consisted of undigested FBI reports or overt materials such as new clippings on the particular subject.

An extreme example of the extent to which collection could go once a file was opened is contained in the Grove Press, Inc., file. The file apparently was opened because the company had published a book by Kim Philby, the British intelligence officer who turned out to be a Soviet agent. The name Grove Press was thus listed as having intelligence interest, and the CHAOS analysts collected all available information on the company. Grove Press, in its business endeavors, had also

produced the sex-oriented motion picture, "I Am Curious Yellow" and so the Operation's analysts dutifully clipped and filmed cinema critics' commentaries upon the film.

From among the 300,000 names in the CHAOS computer index, a total of approximately 7,200 separate personality files were developed on citizens of the United States.

In addition, information of on-going intelligence value was digested in summary memoranda for the internal use of the Operation. Nearly 3,500 such memoranda were developed during the history of CHAOS.

Over 3,000 memoranda on digested information were disseminated, where appropriate, to the FBI. A total of 37 highly sensitive memoranda originated by Operation CHAOS were sent over the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to the White House, to the Secretary of State, to the Director of the FBI or to the Secret Service.

3. The organizations, to name a few, included:  
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS);  
Young Communist Workers Liberation League (YCWLL);  
National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam;  
Women's Strike for Peace;  
Freedomways Magazine and Freedomways Associated, Inc.;  
American Indian Movement (AIM);  
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC);  
Draft Resistance Groups (U.S.);  
Cross World Books and Periodicals, Inc.;  
U.S. Committee to Aid the National liberation Front of South Vietnam;  
Grove Press, Inc.;  
Nation of Islam;  
Youth International party (YIP);  
Women's Liberation Movement;  
Black Panther Party (BPP);  
Venceremos Brigade;  
Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam.

[Website editor's note: The above footnote is reproduced as it appears in the Rockefeller Commission Report. The Commission included Nelson Rockefeller as chairman, and members John T. Connor, C.Douglas Dillon, Erwin N. Griswold, Lane Kirkland, Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Ronald Reagan, and Edgar F. Shannon, Jr. The executive director was David W. Belin. President Gerald Ford created the Commission on January 4, 1975 to determine whether any domestic CIA activities exceeded the Agency's statutory authority. This was largely in response to scoops by Seymour Hersh in December, 1974 regarding CIA domestic activities. Most observers expected a whitewash from the Commission, primarily because the members of the Commission had serious CIA connections themselves. When issued in June 1975, the Report's tone was apologetic and understated, but it did break new ground in several areas, usually with a throwaway line or two. But this was 1975, when the CIA felt intimidated by a Freedom of Information Act that had recently grown a new set of teeth. In that muckraking political climate, a line or two in the Rockefeller report would lead to FOIA requests by mainstream reporters, which in

turn often produced stacks of documents within a year. That was then. Twenty-five years later the CIA just laughs at such requests, and throws them in the trash.]

[Back to home page](#)



*Ramparts*, October 1969

# Sinews of Empire

by David Horowitz

Following the student seizure of Harvard's University Hall last spring, *Time* magazine reported that Harvard Dean Franklin L. Ford "emphasized that continued rifling of University files could have compromised virtually the entire faculty." This mind-boggling admission (offered in defense of the swift unleashing of police) is but one measure of how far academia has fallen from the ideal of open, critical, independent scholarship.

The universities were once thought to constitute a vital, independent, countervailing estate, but the modern university has been converted into an Office of External Research for the State Department, the Pentagon and the international corporations. The postwar takeover of the university was accomplished with less finesse and reserve than a corporate conglomerate customarily shows a newly acquired subsidiary, and it is symbolic that the new management team that was to reorganize the university from "within" was drawn largely from the unlikely and forbidding ranks of the crack American World War II intelligence arm, the OSS (Office of Strategic Services).

The university is proverbially the most conservative of institutions -- tradition-bound, unable to respond and adapt to changing times. But under the postwar tutelage of its powerful outside mentors, entirely new academic fields of social and political science have been created, which cut effortlessly across traditional academic lines and prerogatives that have so hampered innovations in, for example, black studies. These new international policy disciplines and "area studies" (e.g., Asian Studies) were provided with an avalanche of facilities -- buildings, libraries, computer technology. Staffs and faculties were assembled, granted unprecedented autonomy and exalted in one jump to a kind of penthouse status in the academic hierarchy. They were provided freedom and leverage by abundant outside financing. With all of this backing, they quickly became the most powerful influence on the old horse-and-buggy departments, whose disciplines and concepts of scholarship began to follow the winning model set before them.

Thus the experts in international affairs, the new Adams of academe, were created. They were housed in the new language and area studies institutes and centers which multiplied from a handful before the war to 191 by 1968. Their power within the universities has grown apace. At Berkeley, for instance, a political science professor estimates that one-third of his department's faculty depend on institutes for part of their income.

The academic Genesis of the new professionalism is significant not only for what it reveals about the university, but for what it shows about the institutional Creators.

The details of this history provide a unique insight into the operations of these institutions of power and their personnel, interests and requirements. For here they were knitting the sinews of empire -- the research, the civil servants, the technicians, the ideology, the whole fabric which binds together the imperial whole and reveals the structure of empire itself.

The second world war, and in its aftermath the collapse of the French, Dutch, German and Japanese empires, opened the way for a new global American imperium which required a vast new "service" and policy-oriented intellectual infrastructure -- the kind for which England was famous, but which America lacked. Organizations like the foundation-financed Council on Foreign Relations, a key ruling class policy organization which had come into prominence during the war, served as the long-range planning bodies for foreign policy. What was needed now was a reservoir of information and talent at the intermediate levels: the technicians and middle management of empire.

During the war itself, intellectuals could be mobilized directly into government. Academia naturally put itself at the service of Washington, most dramatically in the Manhattan Project, but in some ways more significantly through the OSS, the seed of the fantastic postwar symbiosis which developed between the military, the state, international business and the university. After the war the same academic energies were mobilized indirectly, based in the university yet acting as a junior partner in U.S. foreign policy. The academic vehicle for all this was the new discipline of International Studies. It was a bit like moving offices.

This transition from extraordinary war mobilization to permanent academic function was engineered not by the military or the scholars, however, but by the foundations, as is made clear in a U.S. Office of Education report on Language and Area Centers (the subdivisions of International Studies). After reviewing the immense sums spent on establishing the programs by the Rockefeller, Carnegie and other foundations (\$34 million between 1945 and 1948 alone), the report declares:

*It must be noted that the significance of the money granted is out of all proportion to the amounts involved since most universities would have no center program had they not been subsidized. Our individual inventories indicate clearly the lack of enthusiasm as well as of cash on the part of most college administrations for such programs. [emphasis added]*

The significance of foundation grants today, 25 years after the launching of the first programs, is as great as ever. In 11 out of the 12 top universities with institutes of international studies, a single foundation, Ford, is the principal source of funds. Affiliated with the institutes at Columbia, Chicago, Berkeley, UCLA, Cornell, Harvard, Indiana, MIT, Michigan State, Stanford and Wisconsin are 95 individual centers. Ford is a sole or major source of funds for 83 of these, Carnegie for five, AID for two, the Government of Liberia for one, and assorted government contracts, foundations and endowments for four.

To be sure, there were always scholars willing to play a role in the development of the international studies programs. And there was no compulsion -- a professor is

always free to undertake any project that somebody is willing to pay for. There are excellent scholars of all stripes and persuasions, capable of forming all kinds of programs. Only some get to do so. And it certainly helps if the big foundations happen to share your interests -- or you theirs. In the control of scholarship by wealth, it is neither necessary nor desirable that professors hold a certain orientation because they receive a grant. The important thing is that they receive the grant because they hold the orientation. (Exceptions in the case of isolated radical individuals, of course, do nothing to counter the momentum and direction imparted by vast funding programs to a whole profession or discipline.)

Viewed in the abstract, the academic objections which were raised against the "area studies" concept (i.e. the integration of several disciplines to illuminate a particular geographical area) would seem insuperable (as least as insuperable as the objections to autonomous black studies programs, and in many ways parallel). The area program would override the academic departments. It would, it was maintained, produce not scholars, but dilettantes. Who would be qualified to run such programs, to set and maintain standards? Area research would become the refuge of the incapable and incompetent.

Beyond that were the hard political objections. Perpetual competition for students, courses, influence and money already existed within the university. A new overlapping department would be a formidable competitor and would therefore naturally be resisted by the existing departments. All these arguments and forces did come into play when the international studies programs were first being sponsored by the foundations, but all of them amounted to the merest whiffle of wind. In effect, academia's most sacred sanctuaries were invaded, its most honored shibboleths forsworn, its most rigid bureaucratic rules and "professional" standards circumvented and contravened without a finger of opposition being lifted. All it took was money, prestige, access to strategic personnel and collusion with those in the highest reaches of the academic administrations. As for the professors, they went along like sheep.

Newton thought that the planets were originally thrown into their orbits by the arm of God, but continued in them perpetually due to inertia. Such also is the principle of foundation intercession in the affairs of men. In the development of any complex and dispersed social institution, the initiating stages, the prototypes, are the key to the future evolution of the whole. The initiators naturally become the experts in the field. They are called upon to advise in the setting up of the offspring organizations, and they are the teachers and superiors of the personnel who staff them. This logic of innovation is particularly marked in academic institutions, which, like guilds, are structured as self-perpetuating hierarchies of experience. Most academics are oriented toward their own increasingly mobile careers rather than toward the local institution, whose direction they tend to accept as a given, beyond their power or understanding.

The first major international studies center was Columbia's School of International Affairs, set up in 1946 as an outgrowth of Columbia's wartime Naval School of Military Government and Administration. The head of the Naval School, Professor Schuyler Wallace (later an executive of the Ford Foundation), also became the first

director of the School of International Affairs and remained in that post until 1960. According to the official history of the offspring school, the Naval School "provided a broad basis of experience for the formation of the School of International Affairs." The history also states: "Of paramount importance [in the new School] was the task of training students for technical and managerial posts in those agencies of the government which maintained a foreign service...."

In 1960, the School issued a pamphlet entitled *Employment Opportunities for Students Trained in International Affairs*. The first such opportunity described was the Central Intelligence Agency, the second the State Department, the third AID, the fourth the U.S. Information Agency, the fifth the National Security Agency, and then corporations such as the Bank of America, the Chase Manhattan Bank, the First National City Bank, Mobil Oil, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and so forth. Finally, the U.N. and other civic, cultural and international agencies were mentioned. It was no surprise, then, when in 1968 the director of the School, Andrew Cordier (a consultant to the State Department and Ford Foundation), revealed that 40 percent of the School's graduates go directly into government service and 20-30 percent into "international banking and business."

Since its inception, the real substance of the School has been in its new affiliated area institutes, the first of which was the Russian Institute. Discussions about the Institute had been initiated by Geroid T. Robinson, the head of the OSS Research and Analysis Branch, USSR Division, who was to become the Russian Institute's first director. In 1945 the Rockefeller Foundation made a five-year starter grant of \$1,250,000. Joseph Willits, the Rockefeller Foundation's director of Social Sciences who disbursed the funds was, like Geroid Robinson and Schuyler Wallace, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), as were of course David, Nelson and John D. Rockefeller themselves.

With financing assured, the Institute's staff was appointed. Most important was Philip E. Mosely, who succeeded Robinson as director in 1951. Also a member of the CFR (he later became its director of studies), Mosely was a former State Department officer. Of the entire five-man steering staff of the Russian Institute, only Geroid Robinson had had any prior connection with Columbia University, but four had been associated with the OSS or the State Department, three were in the CFR, and three were members of the upper-class Century club (as were Schuyler Wallace and Allen Dulles, the OSS veteran who went on to head the CIA). Such are the basic credentials of the new academic discipline.

The foundations not only provided funds for the staff salaries, libraries and physical facilities of these centers and institutes, but financed the students and trainees as well. Thus in 1947 the Rockefeller Foundation chipped in \$75,000 worth of postgraduate fellowships for the Russian Institute. This was followed by \$100,000 from the Carnegie Corporation for less advanced students. From 1947 through 1953, 140 Carnegie grants were made to 116 students of the Institute who were also eligible for regular Columbia grants. To financial privilege was added bureaucratic forbearance: the PhD requirement (which, thanks to the old Carnegie Foundation, acted as a vise on the creativity and freedom of every academician) was waived for Senior Fellows at the Russian Institute, and an opening made for "mature men of

unusual ability," such as former members of government agencies and political emigré figures.

Prime importance was given to the influential propagation of ideas -- in short, publication. "It appeared to the staff urgently necessary," the official history reports, "that the most valuable of the Institute's research results be guaranteed publication in spite of soaring costs and of shrinking markets for high-priced scholarly books." How many scholars have wished likewise! But the Institute had the angels on its side, and thanks to the Rockefeller Foundation it was able to set up a "revolving publication fund" to subsidize Institute books, ensuring their publication and widespread academic distribution.

Similarly, Institute academics had easy access to such prestigious ruling class publications as the Council on Foreign Relations' influential magazine, *Foreign Affairs*. They had funds for their own scholarly journals which quickly became leaders and opinion makers in what was an open field. They had access to the leading publications of the various older disciplines, which were usually controlled by academic politicians of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) or the other foundation-financed academic "steering committees." Thus the successive Russian Institute heads, Geroid Robinson and Philip Mosely, both served on the original World Areas Research Committee of the SSRC. Mosely was also chairman of the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies of the SSRC and the American Council of Learned Societies. Finally, they had access to the university presses, which, like the other instruments of organized influence in the university community, are controlled by the administrative foundation-oriented elite. So, for example, Schuyler Wallace was not only director of Columbia's School of International Affairs from 1946 to 1960, as well as of several of its institutes, but was also director of the Social Science Research Council (1952-1958), an associate of the Ford Foundation (1952-1960), and director of the Columbia University Press (1955-1962).

All this served to create an intellectual juggernaut of unrivaled power in its field. In 1964, the current director of the Russian Institute boasted that its 500 alumni constituted the majority of all American experts in the Soviet field. By force of its example, by the direct influence of its personnel and by the enabling support of the CFR-foundation power elite, the Institute was able to dominate the field of Russian affairs both in the academic world and in the sphere of government policy.

The Russian Institute was the most important of the many influential institutes in Columbia's School of International Affairs, but it was in all respects typical -- both in genesis and direction. "Late in 1947," recounts the official history, "the creation of an East Asian Institute ... was placed before the Rockefeller Foundation. With the aid of a grant from that body, the Institute was formally established in 1948." Like the Russian Institute, it was the first of its kind in America and was guided by former State Department and foreign service officers. In September 1949, a Carnegie grant produced the European Institute, which was initially headed by Grayson Kirk, Columbia professor, Carnegie Corporation trustee, CFR member and Mobil Oil director. When Kirk resigned the following year to take on the Columbia provostship, he was succeeded as Institute director by Schuyler Wallace. The present director is Philip Mosely. Like the Hapsburg Royalty, they like to keep the family small and

intimate.

As the American empire and its problems expanded, so the School of International affairs broadened to include centers on the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. Its funding also shifted from the Carnegie and Rockefeller pilot fish to the great Ford Whale itself. Thus by 1968, there were 15 affiliated institutes and centers, nine funded exclusively by the Ford Foundation, four by Ford and one or two other foundations, and one by Ford and the federal government. All operated beyond any regular academic authority, responsible only to the provost of the university and its president, presently the venerable Grayson Kirk.

A remarkable team spirit prevails among the administrations of the School, the foundations and the government. This was neatly illustrated in a letter liberated during the Spring 1968 Columbia student rebellion. The letter, from Columbia's Grayson Kirk to Gerald Freund of the Rockefeller Foundation, concerned a former Indonesian official whose politics were attractive to the State Department, but whom the Department presumably did not wish to discredit with direct support. Wrote Kirk on February 22, 1966:

Dean Cordier reports to me that he has discussed with you the possible financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation for a research project to be undertaken by Mr. Biar Tie Khonw, a former high official in the Indonesian government. We have been informed by knowledgeable people in the Department of State, by Mr. Slater of the Ford Foundation, and others, that Mr. Khonw is very well qualified to contribute to the restoration of economic order and stability in Indonesia in such time as it becomes politically possible.... The grant is to include travel expenses to the Netherlands and several trips to Washington.... Mr. Khonw would be attached to the faculty of international affairs as a visiting scholar.

Yes. But can he teach?

As in the university system generally, the "lead system" played a central role in the creation of the international studies centers. The centers were concentrated for maximum effectiveness at a few "leading" universities from which their influence would radiate to others. Of the 191 centers listed by the State Department, more than half cluster around 12 institutions. Clearly Harvard, the Pentagon of America's academic legions, would have to be a keystone in the structure. And indeed the creation of the Russian Research Center there in 1947, and of the inclusive Center for International Affairs a decade later, reveals even more graphically than the prototypical case of Columbia the nexus of power in the field.

The initiative for Harvard's Russian Research Center came from John W. Gardner, then a recent OSS graduate, later Secretary of HEW, and now head of the Urban Coalition. But Gardner himself had been set in motion by a Wall Street lawyer named Devereux Josephs. Reputed by one whimsical but perspicacious observer to be one of the four men who run America (the other three being bankers Robert A. Lovett, John J. McCloy, and Douglas Dillon), Devereux Josephs is a Groton and Harvard alumnus, a Century club member, a director of such nerve centers of finance as the

New York Life Insurance Company and Rockefeller Center, Inc., and such globally oriented industrials as the American Smelting and Refining Co. -- and he was president of the Carnegie Corporation. It was presumably in this last role, as educator one might say, that Josephs found he had, in the words of *Fortune* magazine, "a specific field in mind for Gardner. Josephs was convinced that American universities would have to widen the curriculum of international studies, then long on history and language but short on contemporary information."

So in the spring of 1947, Gardner and the Carnegie staff became actively concerned with the development of a Russian studies program. At first they were thinking of an inter-university organization, with Clyde Kluckhohn of Harvard (formerly of the OSS) as a possible chairman. Subsequently, they decided that it would be more practical to plant the program in a single institution. They chose Harvard.

During the early autumn of 1947, informal discussions were undertaken between Gardner and select members of the Harvard faculty. Then in October, two meetings were held between Gardner, the selected faculty members, the provost of Harvard, and Charles Dollard of the Carnegie Corporation. The provost then consulted with the president, and "Harvard" agreed to accept the Carnegie invitation to organize its program. In mid-October, Kluckhohn was indeed asked to serve as director and the Center was underway, powered by a Carnegie Corporation munificence of \$750,000 to be doled out at a rate of \$150,000 per year -- a five-year plan which was renewed in 1953. (Eventually this financing was taken over by the Ford Foundation.)

Despite all this largesse, the staff quickly learned new ways to make a living. In 1949, they began a project on the Soviet Social System, known more familiarly as the Refugee Interview Project, which involved intensive interviewing of Soviet refugees and was financed by the intriguingly named Human Resources Research Institute of the U.S. Air Force. In one stroke it quadrupled the Center's 1950 income, while providing a grateful Defense Department with information that it would normally expect from the CIA.

The Center itself is prevented, by Harvard decorum, from accepting contracts involving classified materials, but individual staff members are not (a nice distinction -- for once very academic). In addition to frequenting lectures at the National Army, Navy, Air and Industrial War Colleges, staff members also serve as consultants to classified projects within the following agencies: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the RAND Corporation, the Research and Development Board, the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. Ivory tower indeed!

In this manner the Center studied (as the original Gardner memo defined its scope) "fields which lie peculiarly within the professional competence of social psychologists, sociologists and cultural anthropologists." These disciplines were so rewarding that within a year a new Center for International Studies was being formed as a sister project on the MIT campus, with Harvard and MIT faculty (and others) participating.

A liberated document from Harvard titled "The Nature and Objectives of the Center for International Studies" describes the initial impetus: "In the summer of 1950, MIT

which has been engaged for some years in research on behalf of the U.S. military establishment was asked by the civilian wing of the government to put together a team of the best research minds available to work intensively for three or four months on how to penetrate the Iron Curtain with ideas." Out of this scholarly initiative developed a permanent Center at MIT which rapidly grew in prestige.

MIT's Advisory Board on Soviet Bloc Studies, for example, was composed of these four academic luminaries: Charles Bohlen of the State Department, Allen Dulles of the CIA, Philip E. Mosely of Columbia's Russian Institute and Leslie G. Stevens, a retired vice admiral of the U.S. Navy.

If the MIT Center seemed to carry to their logical conclusion the on-campus extension programs of the State Department and the CIA, that was perhaps because it was set up directly with CIA funds under the guiding hand of Professor W.W. Rostow, former OSS officer and later director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff under Kennedy and Johnson. The Center's first director, Max Millikan, was appointed in 1952 after a stint as assistant director of the CIA. Carnegie and Rockefeller joined in the funding, which by now, as in so many other cases, has passed on to Ford.

It wasn't until 1957 that Harvard got its own full-fledged Center for International Affairs. According to liberated documents, the Center was conceived as "an extension and development" of the Defense Studies Seminar whose objective was "to provide training for civilians who might later be involved in the formation of defense policy" and which was funded by the Ford Foundation, and then Carnegie.

The Harvard Center is probably unmatched in its tight interlacing of the knots of power. Among the key individuals who were involved in the creation of the Center were: Robert R. Bowie, its first director and head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff under John Foster Dulles; Henry A. Kissinger, who became associate director; Dean Rusk of the Rockefeller Foundation, who followed J.F. Dulles first at the Foundation and then in the State Department; James A. Perkins of the Carnegie Corporation, who went on to become president of Cornell and a director of the Chase Manhattan Bank; Don K. Price, vice president of the Ford Foundation, formerly of the staff of Harvard's School of Public Administration, who later returned to become dean after his stint at Ford.

McGeorge Bundy, who originally organized the Center, went on to become the overseer of JFK's national security policy. Bundy later left the White House to become head of the Ford Foundation, his key White House post being filled by the MIT Center's Rostow. When the Nixon team took over, there at the head of foreign policy planning was Henry A. Kissinger, fresh out of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. The circle was not accidental and was more than symbolic.

In university service to the empire, the grimier field work is often left to unprestigious social climbers like Michigan State University. MSU's now notorious [see *Ramparts*, April 1966] CIA cover operation in South Vietnam -- writing Diem's constitution, training his police, supplying him with arms -- was merely part of the school's long



globe-trotting pursuit of plush, parvenue academic prominence for itself and for its guiding genius, president John A. Hannah.

Hannah began his career in what might aptly be termed obscurity -- as a specialist in poultry husbandry. After rising rapidly to the position of managing agent of the Federal Hatcheries Coordinating Committee in Kansas City, he became secretary to the MSU trustees -- whence, loyal and trustworthy, he was elevated to the MSU presidency. In 1949 came his formative experience: serving under Nelson Rockefeller on a Presidential Commission to map out Truman's new Point IV Cold War foreign aid program.

Seeing the wave of the future, Hannah made Michigan State "one of the largest operators of service and educational programs overseas." The rise of MSU was paralleled by the rise of Hannah, who became an Assistant Secretary of Defense, board chairman of the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank, a director of Michigan Bell Telephone and eventually chairman of the foundation-financed American Council on Education (perhaps scholardom's most important lobby in Washington).

MSU makes it clear that a university's external liaisons are not merely peripheral, isolated affairs. Hannah himself proclaims: "...we are trying to create a general environment and an international dimension which will permeate all relevant segments of the university over the years ahead." A 1965 report from Education and World Affairs concurs: "MSU's international involvement is widespread, taking in [sic] almost every college and department: it has stimulated new areas of concern for the faculty, changed the nature of the faculty over the years, and altered the education of their primary charges, the students."

Meanwhile MSU, having learned the ropes in Vietnam, has moved on to other areas. They have, for example, set out under an AID contract to plan a comprehensive education program for Thailand. The Ford Foundation is currently pitching in on this effort, which no doubt is satisfying to David Bell, the director of AID when the MSU contract was awarded and now the Foundation's vice president in charge of international programs. Fittingly, President Nixon has now appointed MSU chief John Hannah to replace Bell as the head of AID.

No one finds university independence a more pleasant joke than the director of the CIA himself, Admiral William Raborn:

In actual numbers we could easily staff the faculty of a university with our experts. In a way we do. Many of those who leave us join the faculties of universities and colleges. Some of our personnel take a leave of absence to teach and renew their contacts in the academic world. I suppose this is only fair; our energetic recruiting effort not only looks for the best young graduate students we can find, but also picks up a few professors from time to time.

It should be noted in passing that the congeniality of foundation-dominated scholarship to the CIA reflects the harmony of interest between the upper-class captains of the CIA and the upper-class trustees of the great foundations. The interconnections are too extensive to be recounted here, but the Bundy brothers

(William, CIA; McGeorge, Ford) and Chadbourne Gilpatric, OSS and CIA from 1943 to 1949, Rockefeller Foundation from 1949 on, can be taken as illustrative. Richard Bissell, the genius of the Bay of Pigs (and brother-in-law of Philip Mosely of Columbia's Russian Institute), reversed the usual sequence, going from Ford to the CIA. (Characters in our story, so far, who belonged to a single upper-class club -- the Cosmos -- include Millikan, Rostow, Mosely, Gardner, Price, Perkins, Kissinger and Hannah.)

Of course turning professors into CIA agents is not the most common way in which scholarship is made to serve the international status quo. It is not a matter of giving professors secret instructions to falsify research results in the dead of night, but simply of determining what questions they will study. That is where the Ford Foundation comes in. So, for example, with part of the \$2 million Ford grant that launched the Institute of International Studies at Berkeley as a major center, a Comparative Political Elites Archive Program was established there in 1965. In practice, the political elites studied turned out to be the ruling elites in communist countries and the potential revolutionary elites in countries within the U.S.'s imperial orbit; the power structure of the American overseas system itself was naturally not a subject of interest. Not surprisingly, the Defense Department and the RAND Corporation were also participants in the Archive Program, which until recently was developing a kind of computerized international mug file.

Occasionally there is an impotent attempt to impart integrity to these institutes, such as the "guidelines" established in response to student protests at Berkeley. "No project," the key point warned, "can be regarded as acceptable either for Institute or extramural funds if an outside agency designs the basic character of the research without the full participation and agreement of a faculty member." This important code would defend a faculty member from being forced by an outside agency (his wife and children being held hostage, perhaps in a Pentagon dungeon) into research without his agreement. Other than that, little is ruled out; it was really a plea for decorous subtlety. (And if a professor undertook a research project financed by the National Liberation Front, one wonders if the only question raised would concern the procedure of its design.)

The inescapable reality is that so long as discretion over the vast majority of research funds and all innovative financing remains outside the university community, it is fatuous to speak of disinterested scholarship or anything remotely resembling what is commonly understood as an academic enterprise. This implication is seldom realized, because the monopoly is so complete that the very possibility of any alternative orientation is not permitted to arise for serious consideration. To appreciate the limits placed on institutionalized efforts to establish an alternative perspective in international studies in the academic world, one must turn to the one independent, critical center that managed to sustain itself in the postwar period, only to be crushed by a power so potent and ubiquitous in the structure of higher learning as to be virtually invisible to academic eyes.

One of the oldest programs of inter-American studies in the U.S. was the Institute of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, established at Stanford University in 1944 by Professor Ronald Hilton, a tough-minded liberal scholar. In 1948 the Institute

began publishing a monthly, the *Hispanic American Report*, which until its demise was the sole journal providing scholarly reports and analyses of developments in Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries. Over the years it established an international reputation and was, in the words of Gregory Rabassa, a professor of Spanish and Portuguese at Columbia, "without a doubt the finest compendium of news from the whole Hispanic world." Yet because Hilton was neither a servant of power nor one of its sycophants, in all their years, neither the *Report* nor the Institute received a penny of foundation support, although small contributions were forthcoming from personal friends of Hilton. For its own part, Stanford was benefitted not only by the distinguished specialists and earnest young scholars who gravitated to the Institute, but by the prestige of the journal. Yet Hilton received no payment beyond his professorial salary, for which he taught a full load in addition to hours put in on the Institute. His researchers and colleagues also went uncompensated for their Institute work.

In 1960, the *Report* dramatically demonstrated its value -- and independence -- by revealing that the CIA was training Cuban exiles in Guatemala for an invasion of Cuba. Needless to say, Hilton's continuing dissent from U.S. policy on Cuba did not endear him to officials in Washington or to the representatives of international corporations among the Stanford trustees.

The following year, the Ford Foundation offered \$25 million to Stanford, if they could match it with \$75 million in other gifts. The chairman of the "major gifts" committee was David Packard, who had made a personal fortune of \$300 million as a military-industrialist and has since gone on to become Deputy Secretary of Defense in the current Administration. Packard announced at the end of the fund-raising campaign that more than two-thirds of the \$75 million which had been raised to match the Ford grant was in gifts of \$100,000 or more from 150 individuals, corporations and foundations. And among these major benefactors, more than one expressed misgivings about the Hilton Institute. According to Hilton, who had been attacked by the Standard Oil Company of California and the Stanford provost among others, "It was suggested [by university officials] that I avoid offending powerful fund raisers; a key member of the administration demanded that, even in editorials bearing my signature, I cease expressing controversial opinions ... and that, while no attention was paid to the Institute's two advisory boards who gave me every support, the administration proposed to appoint two secret committees to keep an eye on the *Report*."

At precisely the time when the financial patrons of learning were expressing their misgivings about Hilton, the question of obtaining funds for an international studies program at Stanford, including Latin American studies, came up. Beginning in 1959, the Ford Foundation had embarked on a \$42 million program to support international studies at select universities. At Stanford the task of drawing up a prospectus was given to a committee headed by Dean Carl Spaeth. Academically speaking, Spaeth, a law professor, was not spectacularly qualified for the job. But to preside over yet another extension of the foundation-State Department hegemony, his credentials were impeccable. He had been Nelson Rockefeller's assistant in the State Department and the Ford Foundation's director of the Division of Overseas Activities. Who could be better equipped to induce the God at Ford to breathe life into Stanford's international studies efforts?

Accordingly, in 1962 Ford made a major grant to support international studies at Stanford. The grant stipulated that all of the funds would be allocated to Spaeth's committee. It also excluded Latin American studies, pending further studies of how best to strengthen the field. Shortly thereafter, Spaeth called a conference of Latin Americanists at the modern ranch house quarters which the Ford Foundation had built in the Palo Alto hills for its Center for the Study of Behavioral Sciences. Professor Hilton was not invited.

A year of "studies" ensued, during which the problem was allowed to simmer. Then, at the direction of the dean of Graduate Students, all PhD candidates were removed from the Hispanic Institute, and Professor Hilton was informed that the Institute would henceforth concentrate on practical instruction at the MA level. There had been no discussion with Hilton, a senior faculty member, and no explanations were offered. When he asked how the administration could do such a thing without consulting the responsible faculty member, he was told: "The administration can do anything it pleases." Hilton resigned from the Institute and from his post as editor of the *Report*, hoping it would compel the administration to take a stand. But the administration accepted his resignation without discussion and suspended publication of the *Report*. Within two weeks the Ford Foundation granted Stanford \$550,000 for Latin American studies.

One of the more revealing ironies of the destruction of the Hilton program was the general agreement that Latin American studies was the least developed of any area in the field. Just months before Hilton's resignation, a conference on Social Science Research on Latin America had been held at Stanford. The results were summed up: "Little capital (funds, talent, or organizational experience) has been invested in political studies of Latin America.... Personnel with adequate training and appropriate technical competence have been in scarce supply ... and the level of productivity has been low." A survey revealed that there was not one senior professor of Latin American politics at any one of the major departments across the country.

The loss of the Institute and the *Report*, representing a life-time effort, was a personal tragedy for Hilton, but for the profession it was an acid test. In fact, the destruction of one of the only independent and therefore intellectually respectable institutes of substance in the academic world produced only a ripple of protest. Hilton was unable to obtain financing to revive the Institute and the *Report*. The organized profession took no interest. Nor is this so mysterious when it is considered that Ford's \$550,000 had gone to those Stanford Latinists who didn't make an issue of the Institute, and that this largesse was repeated on every campus where significant efforts on Latin America were taking place. In May 1966, the Latinists formed a guild, the Latin American Studies Association, which also ignored the Hilton affair. That is not surprising either. It was set up with Ford funds and its first president was Professor Kalman Silvert, who is now program advisor on Latin America for the Ford Foundation.

In its "objective" account of the Hilton affair, the Ford-funded organization, Education and World Affairs, acknowledges as a major source of conflicts the *Report's* treatment of "Castro's takeover," which "made the Stanford administration uneasy."

The issue, they explained, was that Hilton "was responsible to no one for [the *Report's*] contents or comments; it was not beholden to Stanford -- and yet it carried the Stanford reputation behind it."

The concern for "Stanford" is touching. As we have seen (and the cases we have taken are wholly representative; there are no exceptions), the international institutes and centers are responsible to *no* universities, if "university" means a community of students and scholars. At most they are responsible to the president, provost, or chancellor of the university, and occasionally to a select committee; but even then, if a conflict arises, the institute is free to take its manpower, prestige and munificence wherever its money sources will follow (or lead) it. Early in the history of the institutes, the Yale Center of International Studies, as a result of a policy difference between its director, Frederick S. Dunn, and the Yale administration, moved lock, stock and barrel to Princeton. Significantly, only the director, Dunn -- a member, naturally, of the Council on Foreign Relations -- and the associate director Klaus Knorr received appointments to the Princeton faculty. Yet although clearly "unbeholden" to Princeton "standards," the Center enjoys the prestige of association with Princeton, teaches courses in Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School where it is housed, and uses Princeton facilities and faculty members. Financial support came from the Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation, as well as the Rockefeller-associated Milbank Memorial Fund. Thus a director who had the confidence of the foundations was able to find a new university shell for his operation.

Stanford itself houses a rather extreme (but only because so blatant) example of institute independence in the form of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. Originally an archive, the Institution's character was changed in 1960 by fiat of its benefactor, Herbert Hoover, who eased out its liberal director and replaced him with a conservative economist, Wesley Glenn Campbell (formerly of the Defense Department, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the right-wing American Enterprise Institute). Hoover also laid down the scholarly lines that his institute would be required to follow:

The purpose of this Institution must be, by its research and publications, to demonstrate the evils of the doctrines of Karl Marx -- whether Communism, Socialism, economic materialism, or atheism -- thus to protect the American way of life from such ideologies, their conspiracies, and to reaffirm the validity of the American system.

Stanford, which pays at least \$334,000 a year to support the Hoover Institution, was perfectly satisfied with these academic strictures.

To prevent his man from becoming a mere figurehead and his statement of purpose mere paper, Hoover also offered a resolution, which the Stanford trustees genially accepted, establishing the Institution's independence within the University. Under Hoover's plan the director has complete autonomy over his staff and budget and reports only to the president of the University. Some faculty members at Stanford had the temerity to complain that Campbell was using his power to build a staff in his own conservative image (his executive assistant is a former chief aide of J. Edgar Hoover, while Campbell's wife, whose publications include attacks on social security,

medicare and welfare, is one of the few senior staff members). When asked about these faculty complaints, Campbell told *Washington Monthly* reporter Berkeley Rice: "I wish the faculty would keep their noses out of my business."

Not surprisingly, Campbell is an impressive figure to people like Ronald Reagan, who made him a regent of the University of California, perhaps on the basis of his expertise in handling faculty-administrative relations. Moreover, the Hoover Institution budget has grown from \$400,000 to \$2 million as a result of fund drives during Campbell's tenure. The co-chairman of the long-range fund drive until his appointment to the Pentagon was that benefactor of Stanford scholarship, David Packard. Financial support has been forthcoming from foundations, alumni, and top executives from Standard Oil (New Jersey), Gulf Oil, Mobil Oil, Union Carbide and Lockheed. Like the more politic (and no less political) liberal institutes, the Hoover Institution does lucrative contract work for the government and subsidizes its "scholarly" products (through the CIA-involved Praeger publishing house). Not surprisingly, its experts have found a home in the Nixon Administration, particularly in the Defense Department's office of International Security Affairs which coordinates U.S. military and foreign policy and where Hoover men occupy several top posts.

The Hilton and Hoover episodes are merely exceptionally graphic illustrations of a system in which the prostitution of intellect has become so pervasive and profound that all but a small minority mistake it for academic virtue. The foundations, with their practical monopoly on substantial discretionary funds, have purchased control over the fundamental direction of research and academic energies on a national scale. Even if individual researchers and ideologues are not corrupted -- though plenty of them are -- the *system* of academic research and ideology formation is. Most academics no more perceive the ideological basis of their work than we smell air or taste water. The politically inoffensive (not neutral) is seen as unbiased, objective, value-free science; a radical orientation stands out as prejudiced, inappropriate and, gravest of all, unprofessional.

Perhaps the most critical point of leverage in academic control is in the formation of perspectives, analytic models, agendas for research. Not all social phenomena are visible to all analytic models and methodologies, and the social scientist who shapes his tools to collect government and foundation finances will not be equipped to research or even ask questions which, though crucial to an understanding of the contemporary world, would not be looked on favorably by those agencies.

For example, the American overseas system consists of some 3000 military bases, mutual security treaties with more than 30 nations, and more than \$60 billion in direct capital investments around the world. To begin to understand the workings and the impact of this system, one would need to research (1) U.S. corporate and financial interests overseas, their interest group structure, their significance in the U.S. economy, their political influence on U.S. foreign policy, on local regimes, etc.; (2) U.S. military bases, installations and alliances, their interlockings with corporate and political interests, their economic impact, etc.; (3) U.S. and U.S.-dominated international agencies, foundations, universities, their overseas operations and interlockings with the above interests and so on. Yet on the basis of the State Department's directory of foreign affairs research in American universities, it can be

said with reasonable certainty that there is not one institutional attempt being made anywhere to research a single one of these questions.

In the spring of 1966, the role of the CIA at Michigan State was revealed by a courageous intellectual (now without a university base) who had been the coordinator of the MSU Vietnam project, Stanley K. Sheinbaum [*Ramparts*, April 1966]. In his retrospective analysis of the operation, Sheinbaum wrote: "Looking back, I am appalled at how supposed intellectuals ... could have been so uncritical about what they were doing." His explanation of this default was that "we lack historical perspective. We have been conditioned by our social science training not to ask the normative question; we possess neither the inclination *nor the means* with which to question and judge our foreign policy. We have only the capacity to be experts and technicians to serve that policy."

What may have seemed like an isolated scandal in 1966 can now be recognized as a universal condition of organized intellect in America. The saddest part is that the academics have become such eager victims. They have internalized the limits placed upon them. They fiercely uphold a strict academic professionalism. But it is no more than expert servitude to oppressive power, to a system whose wages are poverty and blood. They do not see that what they have really embraced is the perverted professionalism of the mercenary and the hired gun.

---

The author wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of Rob Cunningham, as well as of the activists who liberated the documents and produced the booklets "How Harvard Rules" (ARC and *Old Mole*) and "Who Rules Columbia" (NACLA).

[Back to home page](#)

From Steve Weissman, ed., with members of the Pacific Studies Center and the North American Congress on Latin America, *The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid* (Palo Alto CA: Ramparts Press, 1975 revised edition), pp. 93-116.

## Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia

by David Ransom

---

**Author's note:** Much of the material appearing in this article was gathered in numerous personal interviews conducted between May 1968 and June 1970. The interviews were with a broad range of past and present members of the State Department and the Ford Foundation, faculty members at Harvard, Berkeley, Cornell, Syracuse, and the University of Kentucky, and Indonesians both supporting and opposing the Suharto government. Where possible, their names appear in the text. Other information in the article is derived from a wide reading of the available literature on the history and politics of Indonesia. Consequently, only those items are footnoted which directly quote or paraphrase a printed source.

---

In the early sixties, Indonesia was a dirty word in the world of capitalist development. Expropriations, confiscations and rampant nationalism led economists and businessmen alike to fear that the fabled riches in the Indies -- oil, rubber and tin -- were all but lost to the fiery Sukarno and the twenty million followers of the Peking-oriented Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

Then, in October 1965, Indonesia's generals stepped in, turned their counterattack against an unsuccessful colonels' coup into an anti-communist pogrom, and opened the country's vast natural resources to exploitation by American corporations. By 1967, Richard Nixon was describing Indonesia as "the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area."<sup>1</sup> If Vietnam has been the major postwar defeat for an expanding American empire, this turnabout in nearby Indonesia is its greatest single victory.

Needless to say, the Indonesian generals deserve a large share of credit for the American success. But standing at their side and overseeing the great give-away was an extraordinary team of Indonesian economists, all of them educated in the United States as part of a twenty year strategy by the world's most powerful private aid agency, the billion-dollar Ford Foundation.

But the strategy for Indonesia began long before the Ford Foundation turned its attention to the international scene.

Following Japan's defeat in World War II, revolutionary movements swept Asia, from India to Korea, from China to the Philippines. Many posed a threat to America's well-planned Pax Pacifica. But Indonesian nationalists, despite tough resistance to the



postwar invasion by Holland in its attempt to resume rule over the Indies, never carried their fight into a full-blown people's war. Instead, leaders close to the West won their independence in Washington offices and New York living rooms. By 1949 the Americans had persuaded the Dutch to take action before the Indonesian revolution went too far, and then to learn to live with nationalism and like it. American diplomats helped draft an agreement that gave Indonesians their political independence, preserved the Dutch economic presence, and swung wide the Open Door to the new cultural and economic influence of the United States.

Among those who handled the diplomatic maneuvers in the U.S. were two young Indonesian aristocrats -- Soedjatmoko (many Indonesians have only one name) and Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, an economist with a Ph.D. from Holland. Both were members of the upper-class, nominally socialist PSI, one of the smaller and more Western-oriented of Indonesia's myriad political parties.

Distressed by the specter of Sukarno and the strong left wing of the Indonesian independence forces, the American Establishment found the bland nationalism offered by Soedjatmoko and Sumitro a most comfortable alternative. The Marshall Plan strategy for Europe depended on "the availability of the resources of Asia," Soedjatmoko told a New York audience, and he offered them an Indonesia open to "fruitful cooperation with the West."<sup>2</sup> At the Ford Foundation-funded School of Advanced International Studies in Washington in early 1949, Sumitro explained that his kind of socialism included "free access" to Indonesian resources and "sufficient incentives" for foreign corporate investment.<sup>3</sup>

When independence came later that year, Sumitro returned to Djakarta to become minister of trade and industry (and later minister of finance and dean of the faculty of economics at the University of Djakarta). He defended an economic "stability" that favored Dutch investments and, carefully eschewing radicalism, went so far as to make an advisor of Hjalmar Schacht, economic architect of the Third Reich.

Sumitro found his support in the PSI and their numerically stronger "modernist" ally, the Masjumi Party, a vehicle of Indonesia's commercial and landowning *santri* Moslems. But he was clearly swimming against the tide. The Communist PKI, Sukarno's Nationalist PNI, the Army, the orthodox Moslem NU -- everybody, in fact, but the PSI and Masjumi -- were riding the wave of postwar nationalism. In the 1955 national elections -- Indonesia's first and last -- the PSI polled a minuscule fifth place. It did worse in the local balloting of 1957, in which the Communist PKI emerged the strongest party.

Nevertheless, when Sukarno began nationalizing Dutch holdings in 1957, Sumitro joined Masjumi leaders and dissident Army commanders in the Outer Islands Rebellion, supported briefly by the CIA. It was spectacularly unsuccessful. From this failure in Sumatra and the Celebes, Sumitro fled to exile and a career as government and business consultant in Singapore. The PSI and the Masjumi were banned.

America's Indonesian allies had colluded with an imperialist power to overthrow a popularly elected nationalist government, headed by a man regarded as the George

Washington of his country -- and they had lost. So ruinously were they discredited that nothing short of a miracle could ever restore them to power.

That miracle took a decade to perform, and it came outside the maneuvers of diplomacy, the play of party politics, even the invasion of American troops. Those methods, in Indonesia and elsewhere, had failed. The miracle came instead through the hallowed halls of academe, guided by the noble hand of philanthropy.

Education had long been an arm of statecraft, and it was Dean Rusk who spelled out its function in the Pacific in 1952, just months before resigning as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to head up the Rockefeller Foundation. "Communist aggression" in Asia required not only that Americans be trained to combat it there, but "we must open our training facilities for increasing numbers of our friends from across the Pacific."<sup>4</sup>

The Ford Foundation, under the presidency of Paul Hoffman (and working closely with the Rockefeller Foundation), moved quickly to apply Rusk's words to Indonesia. As head of the Marshall Plan in Europe, Hoffman had helped to arrange Indonesian independence by cutting off aid funds to Dutch counterinsurgency and by threatening a total cutoff in aid to the Dutch. As the United States supplanted the Dutch, Hoffman and Ford would work through the best American universities -- MIT, Cornell, Berkeley, and finally Harvard -- to remold the old Indonesian hierarchs into modern administrators, trained to work under the new indirect rule of the Americans. In Ford's own jargon, they would create a "modernizing elite."

"You can't have a modernizing country without a modernizing elite," explains the deputy vice-president of Ford's international division, Frank Sutton. "That's one of the reasons we've given a lot of attention to university education." Sutton adds that there's no better place to find such an elite than among "those who stand somewhere in social structures where prestige, leadership, and vested interests matter, as they always do."

Ford launched its effort to make Indonesia a "modernizing country" in 1954 with field projects from MIT and Cornell. The scholars produced by these two projects -- one in economics, the other in political development -- have effectively dominated the field of Indonesian studies in the United States ever since. Compared to what they eventually produced in Indonesia, however, this was a fairly modest achievement. Working through the Center for International Studies (the CIA-sponsored brainchild of Max Millikan and Walt W. Rostow), Ford sent out a team from MIT to discover "the causes of economic stagnation in Indonesia." An interesting example of the effort was Guy Pauker's study of "political obstacles" to economic development, obstacles such as armed insurgency.

In the course of his field work, Pauker got to know the high-ranking officers of the Indonesian Army rather well. He found them "much more impressive" than the politicians. "I was the first who got interested in the role of the military in economic development," Pauker says. He also got to know most of the key civilians: "With the exception of a very small group," they were "almost totally oblivious" of what Pauker

called modern development. Not surprisingly, the "very small group" was composed of PSI aristocrat-intellectuals, particularly Sumitro and his students.

Sumitro, in fact, had participated in the MIT team's briefings before they left Cambridge. Some of his students were also known by the MIT team, having attended a CIA-funded summer seminar run at Harvard each year by Henry Kissinger. One of the students was Mohammed Sadli, son of a well-to-do *santri* trader, with whom Pauker became good friends. In Djakarta, Pauker struck up friendships with the PSI clan and formed a political study group among whose members were the head of Indonesia's National Planning Bureau, Ali Budiardjo, and his wife Miriam, Soedjatmoko's sister.

Rumanian by birth, Pauker had helped found a group called "Friends of the United States" in Bucharest just after the Second World War. He then came to Harvard, where he got his degree. While many Indonesians have charged the professor with having CIA connections, Pauker denies that he was intimate with the CIA until 1958, after he joined the RAND Corporation. Since then, it is no secret that he briefs and is briefed by the CIA, the Pentagon, and the State Department. Highly placed Washington sources say he is "directly involved in decision-making."

In 1954 -- after the MIT team was in the field -- Ford grubstaked a Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell. With an initial \$224,000 and periodic replenishments, program chairman George Kahin built the social science wing of the Indonesian studies establishment in the United States. Even Indonesian universities must use Cornell's elite-oriented studies to teach post-Independence politics and history.

Among the several Indonesians brought to Cornell on Ford and Rockefeller grants, perhaps the most influential is sociologist-politician Selosoemardjan. Right-hand man to the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Selosoemardjan is one of the strong-men of the present Indonesian regime.

Kahin's political science group worked closely with Sumitro's Faculty of Economics in Djakarta. "Most of the people at the university came from essentially bourgeois or bureaucratic families," recalls Kahin. "They knew precious little of their society." In a "victory" which speaks poignantly of the illusions of well-meaning liberals, Kahin succeeded in prodding them to "get their feet dirty" for three months in a village. Many would spend four years in the United States.

Together with Widjojo Nitisastro, Sumitro's leading protégé, Kahin set up an institute to publish the village studies. It has never amounted to much, except that its American advisors helped Ford maintain its contact in the most difficult of the Sukarno days.

Kahin still thinks Cornell's affair with Ford in Indonesia "was a fairly happy marriage" -- less for the funding than for the political cover it afforded. "AID funds are relatively easy to get," he explains. "But certainly in Indonesia, anybody working on political problems with [U.S.] government money during this period would have found their problem much more difficult."

One of the leading academic Vietnam doves, Kahin has irritated the State Department on occasion, and many of his students are far more radical than he. Yet for most Indonesians, Kahin's work was really not much different from Pauker's. One man went on to teach-ins, the other to RAND and the CIA. But the consequences of their nation-building efforts in Indonesia were much the same.

MIT and Cornell made contacts, collected data, built up expertise. It was left to Berkeley to actually train most of the key Indonesians who would seize government power and put their pro-American lessons into practice. Dean Sumitro's Faculty of Economics provided a perfect academic boot camp for these economic shock troops.

To oversee the project, Ford President Paul Hoffman tapped Michael Harris, a one-time CIO organizer who had headed Marshall Plan programs under Hoffman in France, Sweden, and Germany. Harris had been on a Marshall Plan survey in Indonesia in 1951, knew Sumitro, and before going out was extensively briefed by Sumitro's New York promoter, Robert Delson, a Park Avenue attorney who had been Indonesia's legal counsel in the United States since 1949. Harris reached Djakarta in 1955 and set out to build Dean Sumitro a broad new Ford-funded graduate program in economics.

This time the professional touch and academic respectability were to be provided by Berkeley. The Berkeley team's first task was to replace the Dutch professors, whose colonial influence and capitalist economics Sukarno was trying to phase out. The Berkeley team would also relieve Sumitro's Indonesian junior faculty so that Ford could send them back to Berkeley for advanced credentials. Sadli was already there, sharing a duplex with Pauker, who had come to head the new Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies. Sumitro's protégé Widjojo led the first crew out to Berkeley.

While the Indonesian junior faculty studied American economics in Berkeley classrooms, the Berkeley professors turned the Faculty in Djakarta into an American-style school of economics, statistics, and business administration.

Sukarno objected. At an annual lecture to the Faculty, team member Bruce Glassburner recalls, Sukarno complained that "all those men can say to me is 'Schumpeter and Keynes.' When I was young I read Marx." Sukarno might grumble and complain, but if he wanted any education at all he would have to take what he got. "When Sukarno threatened to put an end to Western economics," says John Howard, long-time director of Ford's International Training and Research Program, "Ford threatened to cut off all programs, and that changed Sukarno's direction."

The Berkeley staff also joined in the effort to keep Sukarno's socialism and Indonesian national policy at bay. "We got a lot of pressure through 1958-1959 for 'retooling' the curriculum," Glassburner recalls. "We did some dummifying-up, you know -- we put 'socialism' into as many course titles as we could -- but really tried to preserve the academic integrity of the place."

The project, which cost Ford \$2.5 million, had a clear, and some times stated, purpose. "Ford felt it was training the guys who would be leading the country when Sukarno got out," explains John Howard.

There was little chance, of course, that Sumitro's minuscule PSI would outdistance Sukarno at the polls. But "Sumitro felt the PSI group could have influence far out of proportion to their voting strength by putting men in key positions in government," recalls the first project chairman, a feisty Irish business professor named Len Doyle.

When Sumitro went into exile, his Faculty carried on. His students visited him surreptitiously on their way to and from the United States. Powerful Americans like Harry Goldberg, a lieutenant of labor boss Jay Lovestone (head of the CIO's international program), kept in close contact and saw that Sumitro's messages got through to his Indonesian friends. No dean was appointed to replace him; he was the "chairman in absentia."

All of the unacademic intrigue caused hardly a ripple of disquiet among the scrupulous professors. A notable exception was Doyle. "I feel that much of the trouble that I had probably stemmed from the fact that I was not as convinced of Sumitro's position as the Ford Foundation representative was, and, in retrospect, probably the CIA," recalls Doyle.

Harris tried to get Doyle to hire "two or three Americans who were close to Sumitro." One was an old friend of Sumitro's from the MIT team, William Hollinger. Doyle refused. "It was clear that Sumitro was going to continue to run the Faculty from Singapore," he says. But it was a game he wouldn't play. "I felt that the University should not be involved in what essentially was becoming a rebellion against the government," Doyle explains, "whatever sympathy you might have with the rebel cause and the rebel objectives."

Back home, Doyle's lonely defense of academic integrity against the political pressures exerted through Ford was not appreciated. Though he had been sent there for two years, Berkeley recalled him after one. "He tried to run things," University officials say politely. "We had no choice but to ship him home." In fact, Harris had him bounced. "In my judgment," Harris recalls, "there was a real problem between Doyle and the Faculty."

One of the younger men who stayed on after Doyle was Ralph Anspach, a Berkeley team member now teaching college in San Francisco. Anspach got so fed up with what he saw in Djakarta that he will no longer work in applied economics. "I had the feeling that in the last analysis I was supposed to be a part of this American policy of empire," he says, "bringing in American science, and attitudes, and culture ... winning over countries -- doing this with an awful lot of cocktails and high pay. I just got out of the whole thing."

Doyle and Anspach were the exceptions. Most of the academic professionals found the project -- as Ford meant it to be -- the beginning of a career. "This was a tremendous break for me," explains Bruce Glassburner, project chairman from 1958

to 1961. "Those three years over there gave me an opportunity to become a certain kind of economist. I had a category -- I became a development economist -- and I got to know Indonesia. This made a tremendous difference in my career."

Berkeley phased its people out of Djakarta in 1961-62. The constant battle between the Ford representative and the Berkeley chairman as to who would run the project had some part in hastening its end. But more important, the professors were no longer necessary, and were probably an increasing political liability. Sumitro's first string had returned with their degrees and resumed control of the school.

The Berkeley team had done its job. "Kept the thing alive," Glassburner recalls proudly. "We plugged a hole ... and with the Ford Foundation's money we trained them forty or so economists." What did the University get out of it? "Well, some overhead money, you know." And the satisfaction of a job well done.

In 1959 Pauker set out the lessons of the PSI's electoral isolation and Sumitro's abortive Outer Islands Rebellion in a widely read paper entitled "Southeast Asia as a Trouble Area in the Next Decade." Parties like the PSI were "unfit for vigorous competition" with communism, he wrote. "Communism is bound to win in Southeast Asia ... unless effective countervailing power is found." The "best equipped" countervailing forces, he wrote, were "members of the national officer corps as individuals and the national armies as organizational structures."<sup>5</sup>

From his exile in Singapore, Sumitro concurred, arguing that his PSI and the Masjumi party, which the Army had attacked, were really the Army's "natural allies." Without them, the Army would find itself politically isolated, he said. But to consummate their alliance "the Sukarno regime must be toppled first." Until then, Sumitro warned, the generals should keep "a close and continuous watch" on the growing and powerful Communist peasant organizations. Meanwhile, Sumitro's Ford-scholar protégés in Djakarta began the necessary steps toward a rapprochement.

Fortunately for Ford and its academic image there was yet another school at hand: SESKOAD, the Army Staff and Command School. Situated seventy miles southeast of Djakarta in cosmopolitan Bandung, SESKOAD was the Army's nerve center. There, generals decided organizational and political matters; there, senior officers on regular rotation were "upgraded" with manuals and methods picked up during training in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

When the Berkeley team phased itself out in 1962, Sadli, Widjojo and others from the Faculty began regular trips to Bandung to teach at SESKOAD. They taught "economic aspects of defense," says Ford's Frank Miller, who replaced Harris in Djakarta. Pauker tells a different story. Since the mid-'50s, he had come to know the Army General staff rather well, he explains, first on the MIT team, then on trips for RAND. One good friend was Colonel Suwanto (not to be confused with General Suharto), the deputy commander of SESKOAD and a 1959 Fort Leavenworth graduate. In 1962, Pauker brought Suwanto to RAND.

Besides learning "all sorts of things about international affairs" while at RAND, Pauker says, Suwanto also saw how RAND "organizes the academic resources of the country as consultants." According to Pauker, Suwanto had "a new idea" when he returned to Bandung. "The four or five top economists became 'cleared' social scientists lecturing and studying the future political problems of Indonesia in SESKOAD."

In effect, this group became the Army's high-level civilian advisors. They were joined at SESKOAD by other PSI and Masjumi alumni of the university programs -- Miriam Budiardjo from Pauker's MIT study group, and Selosoemardjan from Kahin's program at Cornell, as well as senior faculty from the nearby Bandung Institute of Technology, where the University of Kentucky had been "institution-building" for AID since 1957.

The economists were quickly caught up in the anti-communist conspiracy directed at toppling the Sukarno regime and encouraged by Sumitro from his Singapore exile. Lieutenant General Achmad Yani, Army commander-in-chief, had drawn around him a "brain trust" of generals. It was an "open secret," says Pauker, that Yani and his brain trust were discussing "contingency plans" which were to "prevent chaos should Sukarno die suddenly." The contribution of Suwanto's mini-RAND, according to Colonel Willis G. Ethel, U.S. defense attaché in Djakarta and a close confidant of Commander-in-Chief Yani and others of the Army high command, was that the professors "would run a course in this contingency planning."

Of course, the Army planners were worried about "preventing chaos." They were worried about the PKI. "They weren't about to let the Communists take over the country," Ethel says. They also knew that there was immense popular support for Sukarno and the PKI and that a great deal of blood would flow when the showdown came.

Other institutions joined the Ford economists in preparing the military. High-ranking Indonesian officers had begun U.S. training programs in the mid-'50s. By 1965 some four thousand officers had learned big-scale army command at Fort Leavenworth and counterinsurgency at Fort Bragg. Beginning in 1962, hundreds of visiting officers at Harvard and Syracuse gained the skills for maintaining a huge economic, as well as military, establishment, with training in everything from business administration and personnel management to air photography and shipping.<sup>6</sup> AID's "Public Safety Program" in the Philippines and Malaya trained and equipped the Mobile Brigades of the Indonesian military's fourth arm, the police.

While the Army developed expertise and perspective -- courtesy of the generous American aid program -- it also increased its political and economic influence. Under the martial law declared by Sukarno at the time of the Outer Islands Rebellion, the Army had become the predominant power in Indonesia. Regional commanders took over provincial governments -- depriving the Communist PKI of its plurality victories in the 1957 local elections. Fearful of a PKI sweep in the planned 1959 national elections, the generals prevailed on Sukarno to cancel elections for six years. Then they moved quickly into the upper reaches of Sukarno's new "guided democracy," increasing the number of ministries under their control right up to the time of the coup. Puzzled by the Army's reluctance to take complete power, journalists called it a

"creeping coup d'état."<sup>7</sup>

The Army also moved into the economy, first taking "supervisory control," then key directorships of the Dutch properties that the PKI unionists had seized "for the people" during the confrontation over West Irian in late 1957. As a result, the generals controlled plantations, small industry, state-owned oil and tin, and the state-run export-import companies, which by 1965 monopolized government purchasing and had branched out into sugar milling, shipping, and distribution.

Those high-ranking officers not born into the Indonesian aristocracy quickly married in, and in the countryside they cemented alliances -- often through family ties -- with the *santri* Moslem landowners who were the backbone of the Masjumi Party. "The Army and the civil police," wrote Robert Shaplen of the *New York Times*, "virtually controlled the whole state apparatus." American University's Willard Hanna called it "a new form of government -- military-private enterprise."<sup>8</sup> Consequently, "economic aspects of defense" became a wide-ranging subject at SESKOAD. But Ford's Indonesian economists made it broader yet by undertaking to prepare economic policy for the post-Sukarno period there, too.

During this period, the Communists were betwixt and between. Deprived of their victory at the polls and unwilling to break with Sukarno, they tried to make the best of his "guided democracy," participating with the Army in coalition cabinets. Pauker has described the PKI strategy as "attempting to keep the parliamentary road open," while seeking to come to power by "acclamation." That meant building up PKI prestige as "the only solid, purposeful, disciplined, well-organized, capable political force in the country," to which Indonesians would turn "when all other possible solutions have failed."<sup>9</sup>

At least in numbers, the PKI policy was a success. The major labor federation was Communist, as was the largest farmers' organization and the leading women's and youth groups. By 1963, three million Indonesians, most of them in heavily populated Java, were members of the PKI, and an estimated seventeen million were members of its associated organizations -- making it the world's largest Communist Party outside Russia and China. At Independence the party had numbered only eight thousand.

In December 1963, PKI Chairman D.N. Aidit gave official sanction to "unilateral action" which had been undertaken by the peasants to put into effect a land-reform and crop-sharing law already on the books. Though landlords' holdings were not large, less than half the Indonesian farmers owned the land they worked, and of these most had less than an acre. As the peasants' "unilateral action" gathered momentum, Sukarno, seeing his coalition endangered, tried to check its force by establishing "land-reform courts" which included peasant representatives. But in the countryside, police continued to clash with peasants and made mass arrests. In some areas, *santri* youth groups began murderous attacks on peasants. Since the Army held state power in most areas, the peasants' "unilateral action" was directed against its authority. Pauker calls it "class struggle in the countryside" and suggests that the PKI had put itself "on a collision course with the Army."<sup>10</sup> But unlike Mao's



Communists in pre-revolutionary China, the PKI had no Red Army. Having chosen the parliamentary road, the PKI was stuck with it. In early 1965, PKI leaders demanded that the Sukarno government (in which they were cabinet ministers) create a people's militia -- five million armed workers, ten million armed peasants. But Sukarno's power was hollow. The Army had become a state within a state. It was they -- and not Sukarno or the PKI -- who held the guns.<sup>11</sup>

The proof came in September 1965. On the night of the 30th, troops under the command of dissident lower-level Army officers, in alliance with officers of the small Indonesian Air Force, assassinated General Yani and five members of his SESKOAD "brain trust." Led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, the rebels seized the Djakarta radio station and next morning broadcast a statement that their September 30th Movement was directed against the "Council of Generals," which they announced was CIA-sponsored and had itself planned a coup d'état for Armed Forces Day, four days later.

Untung's preventive coup quickly collapsed. Sukarno, hoping to restore the pre-coup balance of forces, gave it no support. The PKI prepared no street demonstrations, no strikes, no coordinated uprisings in the countryside. The dissidents themselves missed assassinating General Nasution and apparently left General Suharto off their list. Suharto rallied the elite paracommandos and units of West Java's Siliwangi division against Untung's colonels. Untung's troops, unsure of themselves, their mission, and their loyalties, made no stand. It was all over in a day.

The Army high command quickly blamed the Communists for the coup, a line the Western press has followed ever since. Yet the utter lack of activity in the streets and the countryside makes PKI involvement unlikely, and many Indonesia specialists believe, with Dutch scholar W.F. Wertheim, that "the Untung coup was what its leader ... claimed it to be -- an internal army affair reflecting serious tensions between officers of the Central Java Diponegoro Division, and the Supreme Command of the Army in Djakarta...."<sup>12</sup>

Leftists, on the other hand, later assumed that the CIA had had a heavy hand in the affair. Embassy officials had long wined and dined the student *apparatchiks* who rose to lead the demonstrations that brought Sukarno down. The CIA was close with the Army, especially with Intelligence Chief Achmed Sukendro, who retained his agents after 1958 with U.S. help and then studied at the University of Pittsburgh in the early sixties. But Sukendro and most other members of the Indonesian high command were equally close to the embassy's military attachés, who seem to have made Washington's chief contacts with the Army both before and after the attempted coup. All in all, considering the make-up and history of the generals and their "modernist" allies and advisors, it is clear that at this point neither the CIA nor the Pentagon needed to play any more than a subordinate role.

The Indonesian professors may have helped lay out the Army's "contingency" plans, but no one was going to ask them to take to the streets and make the "revolution." That they could leave to their students. Lacking a mass organization, the Army depended on the students to give authenticity and "popular" leadership in the events that followed. It was the students who demanded -- and finally got -- Sukarno's head;

and it was the students -- as propagandists -- who carried the cry of *jihad* (religious war) to the villages.

In late October, Brigadier General Sjarif Thajeb -- the Harvard-trained minister of higher education (and now ambassador to the United States) -- brought student leaders together in his living room to create the Indonesian Student Action Command (KAMI).<sup>13</sup> Many of the KAMI leaders were the older student *apparatchiks* who had been courted by the U.S. embassy. Some had traveled to the United States as American Field Service exchange students, or on year-long jaunts in a "Foreign Student Leadership Project" sponsored by the U.S. National Student Association in its CIA-fed salad years.

Only months before the coup, U.S. Ambassador Marshall Green had arrived in Djakarta, bringing with him the reputation of having masterminded the student overthrow of Syngman Rhee in Korea and sparking rumors that his purpose in Djakarta was to do the same there. Old manuals on student organizing in both Korean and English were supplied by the embassy to KAMI's top leadership soon after the coup.

But KAMI's most militant leadership came from Bandung, where the University of Kentucky had mounted a ten-year "institution-building" program at the Bandung Institute of Technology, sending nearly five hundred of their students to the United States for training. Students in all of Indonesia's elite universities had been given paramilitary training by the Army in a program for a time advised by an ROTC colonel on leave from Berkeley. Their training was "in anticipation of a Communist attempt to seize the government," writes Harsja Bachtiar, an Indonesian sociologist and an alumnus of Cornell and Harvard.<sup>14</sup>

In Bandung, headquarters of the aristocratic Siliwangi division, student paramilitary training was beefed up in the months preceding the coup, and *santri* student leaders were boasting to their American friends that they were developing organizational contacts with extremist Moslem youth groups in the villages. It was these groups that spearheaded the massacres of PKI followers and peasants.

At the funeral of General Nasution's daughter, mistakenly slain in the Untung coup, Navy chief Eddy Martadinata told *santri* student leaders to "sweep." The message was "that they could go out and clean up the Communists without any hindrance from the military, wrote *Christian Science Monitor* Asian correspondent John Hughes. With relish they called out their followers, stuck their knives and pistols in their waistbands, swung their clubs over their shoulders, and embarked on the assignment for which they had long been hoping."<sup>15</sup> Their first move was to burn PKI headquarters. Then, thousands of PKI and Sukarno supporters were arrested and imprisoned in Djakarta; cabinet members and parliamentarians were permanently "suspended"; and a purge of the ministries was begun.

The following month, on October 17, 1965, Colonel Sarwo Edhy took his elite paratroops (the "Red Berets") into the PKI's Central Java stronghold in the Bojolali-Klaten-Solo triangle. His assignment, according to Hughes, was "the extermination,

by whatever means might be necessary, of the core of the Communist Party there." He found he had too few troops. "We decided to encourage the anti-communist civilians to help with the job," the Colonel told Hughes. "In Solo we gathered together the youth, the nationalist groups, the religious Moslem organizations. We gave them two or three days' training, then sent them out to kill Communists."<sup>16</sup>

The Bandung engineering students, who had learned from the Kentucky AID team how to build and operate radio transmitters, were tapped by Colonel Edhy's elite corps to set up a multitude of small broadcasting units throughout strongly PKI East and Central Java, some of which exhorted local fanatics to rise up against the Communists in *jihad*. The U.S. embassy provided necessary spare parts for these radios.

*Time* magazine describes what followed:

Communists, Red sympathizers and their families are being massacred by the thousands. Backlands army units are reported to have executed thousands of Communists after interrogation in remote jails.... Armed with wide-blade knives called *parangs*, Moslem bands crept at night into the homes of Communists, killing entire families and burying the bodies in shallow graves.... The murder campaign became so brazen in parts of rural East Java that Moslem bands placed the heads of victims on poles and paraded them through villages. The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of the corpses has created a serious sanitation problem in East Java and Northern Sumatra, where the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh. Travelers from these areas tell of small rivers and streams that have been literally clogged with bodies; river transportation has at places been seriously impeded.<sup>17</sup>

Graduate students from Bandung and Djakarta, dragooned by the Army, researched the number dead. Their report, never made public, but leaked to correspondent Frank Palmos, estimated one million victims. In the PKI "triangle stronghold" of Bojolali, Klaten, and Solo, Palmos said they reported, "nearly one-third of the population is dead or missing."<sup>18</sup> Most observers think their estimate high, putting the death toll at three to five hundred thousand.

The KAMI students also played a part -- bringing life in Djakarta to a standstill with anti-communist, anti-Sukarno demonstrations whenever necessary. By January, Colonel Edhy was back in Djakarta addressing KAMI rallies, his elite corps providing KAMI with trucks, loudspeakers, and protection. KAMI demonstrators could tie up the city at will.

"The ideas that Communism was public enemy number one, that Communist China was no longer a close friend but a menace to the security of the state, and that there was corruption and inefficiency in the upper levels of the national government were introduced on the streets of Djakarta," writes Bachtiar.<sup>19</sup>

The old PSI and Masjumi leaders nurtured by Ford and its professors were home at last. They gave the students advice and money, while the PSI-oriented professors maintained "close advisory relationships" with the students, later forming their own

Indonesian Scholars Action Command (KASI). One of the economists, Emil Salim, who had recently returned with a Ph.D. from Berkeley, was counted among the KAMI leadership. Salim's father had purged the Communist wing of the major prewar nationalist organization, and then served in the pre-Independence Masjumi cabinets.

In January the economists made headlines in Djakarta with a week-long economic and financial seminar at the Faculty. It was "principally ... a demonstration of solidarity among the members of KAMI, the anti-Communist intellectuals, and the leadership of the Army," Bachtiar says. The seminar heard papers from General Nasution, Adam Malik, and others who "presented themselves as a counter-elite challenging the competence and legitimacy of the elite led by President Sukarno."<sup>20</sup>

It was Djakarta's post-coup introduction to Ford's economic policies.

In March Suharto stripped Sukarno of formal power and had himself named acting president, tapping old political warhorse Adam Malik and the Sultan of Jogjakarta to join him in a ruling triumvirate. The generals whom the economists had known best at SESKOAD -- Yani and his brain trust -- had all been killed. But with the help of Kahin's protégé, Selosoemardjan, they first caught the Sultan's and then Suharto's ear, persuading them that the Americans would demand a strong attack on inflation and a swift return to a "market economy." On April 12, the Sultan issued a major policy statement outlining the economic program of the new regime -- in effect announcing Indonesia's return to the imperialist fold. It was written by Widjojo and Sadli.

In working out the subsequent details of the Sultan's program, the economists got aid from the expected source -- the United States. When Widjojo got stuck in drawing up a stabilization plan, AID brought in Harvard economist Dave Cole, fresh from writing South Korea's banking regulations, to provide him with a draft. Sadli, too, required some post-doctoral tutoring. According to an American official, Sadli "really didn't know how to write an investment law. He had to have a lot of help from the embassy." It was a team effort. "We were all working together at the time -- the 'economists,' the American economists, AID," recalls Calvin Cowles, the first AID man on the scene.

By early September the economists had their plans drafted and the generals convinced of their usefulness. After a series of crash seminars at SESKOAD, Suharto named the Faculty's five top men his Team of Experts for Economic and Financial Affairs, an idea for which Ford man Frank Miller claims credit.

In August the Stanford Research Institute -- a spinoff of the university-military-industrial complex -- brought 170 "senior executives" to Djakarta for a three-day parley and look-see. "The Indonesians have cut out the cancer that was destroying their economy," an SRI executive later reported approvingly. Then, urging that big business invest heavily in Suharto's future, he warned that "military solutions are infinitely more costly."<sup>21</sup>

In November, Malik, Sadli, Salim, Selosoemardjan, and the Sultan met in Geneva

with a select list of American and European businessmen flown in by Time-Life. Surrounded by his economic advisors, the Sultan ticked off the selling points of the New Indonesia -- "political stability ... abundance of cheap labor ... vast potential market ... treasurehouse of resources." The universities, he added, have produced a "large number of trained individuals who will be happy to serve in new economic enterprises."

David Rockefeller, chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, thanked Time-Life for the chance to get acquainted with "Indonesia's top economic team." He was impressed, he said, by their "high quality of education."

"To some extent, we are witnessing the return of the pragmatic outlook which was characteristic of the PSI-Masjumi coalition of the early fifties when Sumitro ... dominated the scene,"<sup>22</sup> observed a well-placed insider in 1966. Sumitro slipped quietly into Djakarta, opened a business consultancy, and prepared himself for high office. In June 1968 Suharto organized an impromptu reunion for the class of Ford -- a "development cabinet." As minister of trade and commerce he appointed Dean Sumitro (Ph.D., Rotterdam); as chairman of the National Planning Board he appointed Widjojo (Ph.D., Berkeley, 1961); as vice-chairman, Emil Salim (Ph.D., Berkeley, 1964); as secretary general of Marketing and Trade Research, Subroto (Harvard, 1964); as minister of finance, Ali Wardhana (Ph.D., Berkeley, 1962); as chairman of the Technical Team of Foreign Investment, Mohamed Sadli (M.S., MIT, 1956); as secretary general of Industry, Barli Halim (M.B.A., Berkeley, 1959). Soedjatmoko, who had been functioning as Malik's advisor, became ambassador in Washington.

"We consider that we were training ourselves for this," Sadli told a reporter from *Fortune* -- "a historic opportunity to fix the course of events."<sup>23</sup>

Since 1954, Harvard's Development Advisory Service (DAS), the Ford-funded elite corps of international modernizers, has brought Ford influence to the national planning agencies of Pakistan, Greece, Argentina, Liberia, Colombia, Malaysia, and Ghana. In 1963, when the Indonesian economists were apprehensive that Sukarno might try to remove them from their Faculty, Ford asked Harvard to step into the breach. Ford funds would breathe new life into an old research institute, in which Harvard's presence would provide a protective academic aura for Sumitro's scholars.

The DAS was skeptical at first, says director Gus Papanek. But the prospect of future rewards was great. Harvard would get acquainted with the economists, and in the event of Sukarno's fall, the DAS would have established "an excellent base" from which to plan Indonesia's future.

"We could not have drawn up a more ideal scenario than what happened," Papanek says. "All of those people simply moved into the government and took over the management of economic affairs, and then they asked us to continue working with them."

Officially the Harvard DAS-Indonesia project resumed on July 1, 1968, but Papanek had people in the field well before that joining with AID's Cal Cowles in bringing back the old Indonesia hands of the fifties and sixties. After helping draft the stabilization program for AID, Dave Cole returned to work with Widjojo on the Ford/Harvard payroll. Leon Mears, an agricultural economist who had learned Indonesian rice-marketing in the Berkeley project, came for AID and stayed on for Harvard. Sumitro's old friend from MIT, Bill Hollinger, transferred from the DAS-Liberia project and now shares Sumitro's office in the Ministry of Trade.

The Harvard people are "advisors," explains DAS Deputy Director Lester Gordon -- "foreign advisors who don't have to deal with all the paperwork and have time to come up with new ideas." They work "as employees of the government would," he says, "but in such a way that it doesn't get out that the foreigners are doing it." Indiscretions had got them bounced from Pakistan. In Indonesia; "we stay in the background."

Harvard stayed in the background while developing the five-year plan. In the winter of 1967-68, a good harvest and a critical infusion of U.S. Food for Peace rice had kept prices down, cooling the political situation for a time. Hollinger, the DAS's first full-time man on the scene, arrived in March and helped the economists lay out the plan's strategy. As the other DAS technocrats arrived, they went to work on its planks. "Did we cause it, did the Ford Foundation cause it, did the Indonesians cause it?" asks AID's Cal Cowles rhetorically. "I don't know."

The plan went into force without fanfare in January 1969, its key elements foreign investment and agricultural self-sufficiency. It is a late-twentieth-century American "development" plan that sounds suspiciously like the mid-nineteenth-century Dutch colonial strategy. Then, Indonesian labor -- often *corvée* -- substituted for Dutch capital in building the roads and digging the irrigation ditches necessary to create a plantation economy for Dutch capitalists, while a "modern" agricultural technology increased the output of Javanese paddies to keep pace with the expanding population. The plan brought an industrial renaissance to the Netherlands, but only an expanding misery to Indonesia.

As in the Dutch strategy, the Ford scholars' five-year plan introduces a "modern" agricultural technology -- the so-called "green revolution" of high-yield hybrid rice -- to keep pace with Indonesian rural population growth and to avoid "explosive" changes in Indonesian class relationships.

Probably it will do neither -- though AID is currently supporting a project at Berkeley's Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies to give it the old college try. Negotiated with Harsja Bachtjar, the Harvard-trained sociologist now heading the Faculty's Ford-funded research institute, the project is to train Indonesian sociologists to "modernize" relations between the peasantry and the Army's state power.

The agricultural plan is being implemented by the central government's agricultural extension service, whose top men were trained by an AID-funded University of Kentucky program at the Bogor Agricultural Institute. In effect, the agricultural agents

have been given a monopoly in the sale of seed and the buying of rice, which puts them in a natural alliance with the local military commanders -- who often control the rice transport business -- and with the local *santri* landlords, whose higher returns are being used to quickly expand their holdings. The peasants find themselves on the short end of the stick. If they raise a ruckus they are "sabotaging a national program," must be PKI agents, and the soldiers are called in.

The Indonesian ruling class, observes Wertheim, is now "openly waging [its] own brand of class struggle."<sup>24</sup> It is a struggle the Harvard technocrats must "modernize." Economically the issue is Indonesia's widespread unemployment; politically it is Suharto's need to legitimize his power through elections. "The government ... will have to do better than just avoiding chaos if Suharto is going to be popularly elected," DAS Director Papanek reported in October 1968. "A really widespread public works program, financed by increased imports of PL 480 commodities sold at lower prices, could provide quick economic and political benefits in the countryside."<sup>25</sup>

Harvard's Indonesian New Deal is a "rural development" program that will further strengthen the hand of the local Army commanders. Supplying funds meant for labor-intensive public works, the program is supposed to increase local autonomy by working through local authorities. The money will merely line military pockets or provide bribes by which they will secure their civilian retainees. DAS Director Papanek admits that the program is "civilian only in a very broad sense, because many of the local administrators are military people." And the military has two very large, and rather cheap, labor forces which are already at work in "rural development."

One is the three-hundred-thousand-man Army itself. The other is composed of the one hundred twenty thousand political prisoners still being held after the Army's 1965-66 anti-communist sweeps. Some observers estimate there are twice as many prisoners, most of whom the Army admits were not PKI members, though they fear they may have *become* Communists in the concentration camps.

Despite the abundance of Food for Peace rice for other purposes, there is none for the prisoners, whom the government's daily food expenditure is slightly more than a penny. At least two journalists have reported Sumatran prisoners quartered in the middle of the Goodyear rubber plantation where they had worked before the massacres as members of a PKI union. Now, the correspondents say, they are let out daily to work its trees for substandard wages, which are paid to their guards.<sup>26</sup>

In Java the Army uses the prisoners in public works. Australian professor Herbert Feith was shown around one Javanese town in 1968 where prisoners had built the prosecutor's house, the high school, the mosque, and (in process) the Catholic church. "It is not really hard to get work out of them if you push them," he was told.<sup>27</sup>

Just as they are afraid and unwilling to free the prisoners, so the generals are afraid to demobilize the troops. "You can't add to the unemployment," explained an Indonesia desk man at the State Department, "especially with people who know how to shoot a gun." Consequently the troops are being worked more and more into the

infrastructure labor force -- to which the Pentagon is providing roadbuilding equipment and advisors.

But it is the foreign-investment plan that is the payoff of Ford's twenty-year strategy in Indonesia and the pot of gold that the Ford modernizers -- both American and Indonesian -- are paid to protect. The nineteenth-century Colonial Dutch strategy built an agricultural export economy. The Americans are interested primarily in resources, mainly mineral.

Freeport Sulphur will mine copper on West Irian. International Nickel has got the Celebes' nickel. Alcoa is negotiating for most of Indonesia's bauxite. Weyerhaeuser, International Paper, Boise Cascade, and Japanese, Korean, and Filipino lumber companies will cut down the huge tropical forests of Sumatra, West Irian, and Kalimantan (Borneo). A U.S.-European consortium of mining giants, headed by U.S. Steel, will mine West Irian's nickel. Two others, U.S.-British and U.S.-Australian, will mine tin. A fourth, U.S.-New Zealander, is contemplating Indonesian coaling. The Japanese will take home the archipelago's shrimp and tuna and dive for her pearls.

Another unmined resource is Indonesia's one hundred twenty million inhabitants -- half the people in Southeast Asia. "Indonesia today," boasts a California electronics manufacturer now operating his assembly lines in Djakarta, "has the world's largest untapped pool of capable assembly labor at a modest cost." The cost is ten cents an hour.

But the real prize is oil. During one week in 1969, twenty three companies, nineteen of them American, bid for the right to explore and bring to market the oil beneath the Java Sea and Indonesia's other coastal waters. In one 21,000-square-mile concession off Java's northeast coast, Natomas and Atlantic-Richfield are already bringing in oil. Other companies with contracts signed have watched their stocks soar in speculative orgies rivaling those following the Alaskan North Slope discoveries. As a result, Ford is sponsoring a new Berkeley project at the University of California law school in "developing human resources for the handling of negotiations with foreign investors in Indonesia."

Looking back, the thirty-year-old vision for the Pacific seems secure in Indonesia -- thanks to the flexibility and perseverance of Ford. A ten-nation "Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia," including Japan, manages Indonesia's debts and coordinates Indonesia's aid. A corps of "qualified" native technocrats formally make economic decisions, kept in hand by the best American advisors the Ford Foundation's millions can buy. And, as we have seen, American corporations dominate the expanding exploitation of Indonesia's oil, ore, and timber.

But history has a way of knocking down even the best-built plans. Even in Indonesia, the "chaos" which Ford and its modernizers are forever preventing seems just below the surface. Late in 1969, troops from West Java's crack Siliwangi division rounded up five thousand surprised and sullen villagers in an odd military exercise that speaks more of Suharto's fears than of Indonesia's political "stability." Billed as a test in "area management," officers told reporters that it was an exercise in preventing a "potential



fifth column" in the once heavily-PKI area from linking up with an imaginary invader. But the army got no cheers as it passed through the villages, an Australian reporter wrote. "To an innocent eye from another planet it would have seemed that the Siliwangi division was an army of occupation."<sup>28</sup>

There is no more talk about land reform or arming the people in Indonesia now. But the silence is eloquent. In the Javanese villages where the PKI was strong before the pogrom, landlords and officers fear going out after dark. Those who do so are sometimes found with their throats cut, and the generals mutter about "night PKI."

1. Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967, p. 111.
2. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia on the Threshold of Freedom," address to Cooper Union, New York, 13 March 1949, p. 9.
3. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, untitled address to School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., 1949, p. 7.
4. Dean Rusk, "Foreign Policy Problems in the Pacific," *Department of State Bulletin*, 19 November 1951, p. 824 ff.
5. Guy J. Pauker, "The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia," Rand Corporation Memorandum RM-5753-PR, February 1969, p. 46.
6. Michael Max Ehrmann, *The Indonesian Military in the Politics of Guided Democracy, 1957-1965*, unpublished Masters thesis (Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, September 1967), p. 296, citing Col. George Benson (U.S. Army), U.S. military attaché in Indonesia 1956-1960.
7. Daniel S. Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959* Ithaca NY: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1966), p. 70.
8. Robert Shaplen, "Indonesia II: The Rise and Fall of Guided Democracy," *New Yorker*, 24 May 1969, p. 48; Willard Hanna, *Bung Karno's Indonesia* (New York: American Universities Field Staff, 25 September 1959), quoted in J.A.C. Mackie, "Indonesia's Government Estates and Their Masters," *Pacific Affairs*, Fall 1961, p. 352.
9. Guy J. Pauker, "The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Indonesia," pp. 6, 10.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
11. W.F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup," *Pacific Affairs*, Spring/Summer 1966, p. 117.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 115.
13. Harsja W. Bachtiar, "Indonesia," in Donald K. Emmerson, ed., *Students and Politics in Developing Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 192.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
15. John Hughes, *Indonesian Upheaval* (New York: McKay, 1967), p. 132.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
17. "Silent Settlement," *Time*, 17 December 1965, p. 29 ff.
18. Frank Palmos, untitled news report dated "early August 1966" (unpublished). Marginal note states that portions of the report were published in the *Melbourne Herald* at an unspecified date.
19. Harsja W. Bachtiar, *op. cit.*, p. 193.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
21. H.E. Robison, "An International Report," speech delivered at Stanford Research Institute, 14 December 1967.
22. J. Panglaykim and K.D. Thomas, "The New Order and the Economy," *Indonesia*, April 1967, p. 73.
23. "Indonesia's Potholed Road Back," *Fortune*, 1 June 1968, p. 130.
24. W.F. Wertheim, "From Aliran Towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java," paper prepared for the International Conference on Asian History, Kuala Lumpur, August 1968, p. 18. Published under the same title in *Pacific Research* 10, no. 2.
25. Gustav F. Papanek, "Indonesia," Harvard Development Advisory Service memorandum (unpublished), 22 October 1968.
26. Jean Contenay, "Political Prisoners," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 2 November 1967, p. 225; NBC documentary, 19 February 1967.
27. Herbert Feith, "Blot on the New Order," *New Republic*, 13 April 1968, p. 19.
28. "Indonesia -- Army of Occupation," *The Bulletin*, 22 November 1969.

[Back to home page](#)

From *Dirty Work 2: The CIA in Africa*, Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Karl Van Meter, and Louis Wolf, eds. (Secaucus NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1979), pp. 94-111. [*Dirty Work 2* editors' note: Robert Molteno is a white South African exile now living in London. This article, originally circulated in Africa, was published in *African Youth* in 1976. It was widely reprinted.] For an essay on the CIA and South Africa, see [A Diamond is Forever](#) by Richard Cummings.

# Hidden Sources of Subversion

by Robert Molteno

The capitalists are getting themselves replaced in the supervision and management of the great industrial and commercial enterprises by intellectuals, who carry them on, and usually are well paid for doing so. These intellectuals of industry and politics, the privileged portion of the wage class, imagine that they are an integral part of the capitalist class, while they are only its servants.

-- Paul Lafargue, *Socialism and the Intellectuals* (1900)

The best service of all which academics could do is to refuse to undertake any more major research about which answers could be gained by asking the poor what they want. -- Frank Field, in *New Society*, November 15, 1973

This is a study of the attempts which certain political scientists of the United States have launched in recent years to penetrate and, in my personal opinion, also to frustrate the main liberation movements of Southern Africa. Insofar as this study is informed by a theoretical approach, it is that the imperialism of the U.S. capitalist class and its government is a reality, that this class fears any process of liberation that could open the way to a transition to socialism, and that certain American academics engage in research, the aim of which is to foster the interests of this imperialism.

Since this paper may be unique in its subject matter and frankness, I must make clear why I have written it:

1. The study of the behavior of academics is at least no less legitimate than the study of behavior of other kinds of human beings.
2. Where academics seek to monitor the struggle of a whole subcontinent for liberation -- a struggle to which their home government is opposed -- then the activities of those academics must be exposed in the interests of liberation.
3. If the argument advanced below is correct, then the escalation of armed struggle in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa will continue to attract the policy-oriented and counterrevolutionary interest of certain academics. This paper therefore aims to put all of us -- academics and activists -- on our guard against renewed attempts at penetration.

By way of further introduction, let me dispose of two other points. Firstly, I am not anti-American in the sense of being anti-the-American-people, nor am I criticizing American academics in general. On the contrary, I believe the bulk of the American people to be oppressed and exploited and that certain American intellectuals -- notably the Africa Research Group, the late Don Barnett, and so on -- have done tremendous solidarity work in the field of Southern African liberation. This paper is strictly confined to those American academics -- largely white and middle class -- who share the ideology of the American capitalist class to the point of being prepared to act as intellectual auxiliaries to the normal U.S. agencies for espionage and counterrevolutionary subversion.

As for academics of other nationalities, except for Ali Mazrui this paper does not deal with them for the simple reason that none of them, to the author's knowledge, have hitherto sought to enter Zambia for the purpose of penetrating the liberation movements. As for white South African writers, hostile to liberation, they -- at least until now -- have not been allowed to enter Zambia and so have had to rely on South African, Rhodesian, and Portuguese army and police intelligence reports rather than making direct contact with the liberation movements.

Second, the reader may well ask: How reliable are my sources of information? The answer lies for the first part of this paper in sources printed by the academics themselves; and for the second part, it rests on the fact that I worked for the University of Zambia from 1968 until 1976, was consulted by the relevant authorities with each new stage in the attempt to penetrate the liberation movements, and therefore am able to quote from the files of relevant correspondence. It remains the case, however, that the published and unpublished sources available in Zambia are not nearly as adequate as those available in the United States, and this has handicapped this study in certain respects.

## **Origins: The Gwendolyn Carter Team, 1950s**

While I will not deal in too much detail with the roles of U.S. academics researching South Africa in this early period, a historical approach is essential in understanding what has been happening recently. The roots of U.S. academic involvement in

Southern Africa go back to the 1940s. On the one hand, African opposition to the South African regime entered a more militant era with the formation of the Youth League inside the African National Congress (ANC) in 1944. For the first time, mass resistance tactics became the basis of ANC strategy. And on the other hand, after World War Two gave way to the Cold War, the United States became increasingly terrified of Third World national liberation movements which had any ties with socialist states or vestiges of a socialist platform.



The reaction to the new militancy of the ANC of South Africa in U.S. circles was speedy. First, there was a rapidly increasing flow of journalists to South Africa, starting with Robert St. John (who wrote *Through Malan's Africa* in the early 1950s) and including hosts of people since -- for example, John Gunther, Allen Drury, William Frye, J. Hoagland, etc. Second, certain academics in the rapidly developing field of comparative politics turned their attention to South Africa. The leader of what soon became a whole team (she acknowledges seven research assistants in her first book on South Africa) was Professor Gwendolyn Carter, a delightful lady of liberal persuasion who had already made a name in the field of comparative European politics.

As early as 1948, Professor Carter visited South Africa for the first time. She then returned in 1952-53 for more intensive research. What is noteworthy about this visit is that it was financed in part by the Rockefeller Foundation, an organization whose interest in Southern Africa, as we shall see, has thrived ever since. Indeed the Rockefellers have various interests in Southern Africa. These are mainly through the large number of U.S. manufacturing concerns that operate there, and more directly through the Chase Manhattan Bank of New York which now owns 15 percent of the giant Standard Bank of South Africa. Secondly, Professor Carter brought with her -- and this continued to be her custom on her subsequent visits to South Africa -- a veritable team of researchers and assistants. The more prominent of these came to include Professor Thomas Karis -- formerly an employee of the U.S. State Department, stationed in the U.S. Embassy in South Africa in the 1950s, and now with City College of New York; Dr. Newell Stultz; and Dr. Sheridan Johns III, now of Duke University.

What is fascinating are the areas of research which this team embraced in the fifties and sixties. Prof. Carter started off with a study of the Afrikaner power establishment. This was published as *The Politics of Inequality: South Africa Since 1948*, parts of which were reproduced as early as January 1955, but which appeared in full only in 1958. Dr. Stultz then decided to investigate the origins of Afrikaner nationalism in the period before Carter's work, that is, prior to 1948.

Meanwhile, Professors Karis and Johns turned their attention to the growing threat to Afrikaner control posed by the Congress Alliance, and notably by the ANC. Professor Karis monitored the five-year-long Treason Trial (1956-1961) which proved an almost inexhaustible fund of primary material about the ANC. This he published as *The Treason Trial in South Africa: A Guide to the Microfilm Record of the Trial*. This book was published by the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace -- a notoriously right-wing and policy-oriented organization which, like the Rockefeller Foundation, has maintained a high degree of interest in Southern Africa as we shall see. It is also important to remember that the whole basis of the South African government case in the Treason Trial was to try to show that the ANC was a puppet of the South African Communist Party (SACP).

It was this issue that the third member of the group, Dr. Sheridan Johns III, turned his attention. He examined the SACP's role, strength, external connections, and internal links with the national liberation movement. This formed the subject of his doctoral thesis. He was generously financed and not only spent a long time in South Africa, but also flew to Moscow and Europe for further research. He has never published his thesis, although in 1973-74 the Institute of Communist Studies at Columbia University (it should more accurately be called the institute of Anti-Communist Studies) financed him to put the thesis in publishable form.

These studies of the ANC and SACP left one major gap: that section of the national liberation movement called Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) which was formed in 1959. This gap was plugged by a new team member, Gail M. Gerhart, who came from Radcliffe (where Professor Carter herself had originally graduated). She started work on the PAC in 1963. Her doctoral dissertation is for Columbia University -- the same institution which financed Dr. Johns' work on the SACP in 1973-74. Gail Gerhart has been supervised informally by another team member, Professor Karis of City College of New York.

But there are far more important facts about Gail Gerhart than these. First, her husband is a fairly senior official of the Ford Foundation -- in 1974 he was head of its regional office in Nairobi, Kenya. Now, not only has the Ford Motor Company large manufacturing investments in South Africa (with an investment in 1973 of between 80 and 100 million dollars and a 15 to 20 percent share of the South African vehicle market), but the Ford Foundation in the 1950s gave major financial assistance to the South African Institute of Race Relations which was, and is, the leading fact-gathering institution in South Africa. What is notable is that the Foundation discontinued its assistance to the Institute, but a few years later used its funds to finance academic penetration of the liberation movements. This presumably, was on the assumption that radical change in South Africa could only come via the liberation movement, which the South Africa Institute of Race Relations had become very poor at reporting on since the movement had been made illegal in 1960.

Returning to Gail Gerhart, the second important fact about her is that she started her study of the PAC in 1963. Since then, she has made numerous trips to South Africa, Tanzania, London, and elsewhere. Where has the money come from? Why twelve years later is she still carrying on the unfinished study? The implication is clear.

The Carter team, while working separately on the white South African power structure and the national-liberation and socialist oppositions to it, also worked together on two other important projects. The earliest was a mammoth collection of primary materials on the South African liberation movement, 1882-1964. Carter, Karis, Johns and Gerhart all worked on this project. It is now being produced in a series of volumes called *From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964*, published by, once again, the Hoover Institution. This collection of documents is probably rivaled only by that of the South African Special Branch. The second area where they collaborated -- this time Carter, Karis and Stultz -- was in a study of the South African government's proffered alternative to majority rule, that is, the Bantustans.

This team is still preoccupied at the present time with Southern Africa. Karis came as Fulbright Professor to teach at the University of Zambia in 1968-69. Johns taught at the same university in 1968-70 and as a Fulbright Senior Lecturer in 1974. Carter and Karis, barred from entering South Africa, embarked on a research trip around the South African periphery in 1974. Gerhart still visits South Africa. As for Johns, he has expanded his academic attention to the periphery, notably Botswana but with the escalations of the armed struggle since the end of the 1950s has made the logical transition to becoming interested in the liberation movements' guerrilla strategy.

None of the Carter team has been prepared to investigate critically the key support which the United States gives to white supremacy in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the former Portuguese colonies. None of them has been prepared to support the anti-apartheid movement, beyond the normal liberal criticism of racialism. And while Karis and Carter periodically request the South African government for permission to enter, Stultz has gone so far as to publish in the journal *South Africa International*, which is the official organ of the huge pro-apartheid propaganda organization, the South African Foundation.

## Some Preliminary Conclusions

**Wide-ranging Co-ordination:** The team of researchers in a period of over 20 years has worked together on South Africa and between them covered an integrated set of key areas -- the South African power structure (minus its external capitalist supports); the opposition to it -- Congress Alliance, Communist, and Africanist; and -- to a much lesser extent -- the transition to guerrilla warfare.

**Immense Resources:** There has been a host of research assistants over the years (all white American). Professor Carter in the two volumes (*The Politics of Inequality* and *From Protest to Challenge*, volume one) mentions fourteen different research assistants, apart from the full members of the team (i.e. Carter, Karis, Stultz, and Johns). Similarly there have been endless research trips -- Professor Carter heading the list with five to South Africa in the 1948-1961 period alone. Then there have been computerization facilities and frequent funds to finance years of full-time write-up work. Above all, there has been the cost of countless taped interviews, and photostated documents which then had to be shipped, catalogued, processed, and

stored in the United States. One may reasonably ask how many hundreds of thousands of dollars this research effort has involved down the years. And where did the money come from? What is illuminating (in one sense) is that since Carter's *The Politics of Inequality* in 1957, she has refused to reveal in the prefaces to her later works where the money has come from.

## Think Tanks, Foundations, and the U.S. Government

Let me just summarize these connections. Karis is a former employee of the State Department and has two brothers presently working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Carter, whose brother was in the 1960s a prosperous manufacturer of artificial flowers, served for many years on one of the State Department's advisory committees on Africa. They and their colleagues were financed by a mixture of university money; state funds (Professor Carter, for example, got a grant from the Social Science Research Council, for her early studies); and foundation money. This included the Rockefeller Foundation; and may well have included the Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation which finances the U.S.-South Africa Leadership Exchange Program.

Finally, the group of scholars has been closely linked with several notoriously right-wing "think tanks." These include the Institute for Pacific Relations whose International Secretariat gave Professor Carter research funds and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. The Hoover Institution's Director of the African Program is Dr. Peter Duignan, who published the large-scale apologia for colonialism called *Burden of Empire*. His co-author, Lewis Gann, is a well known reactionary who in the 1970s was carted around Rhodesia by the Rhodesian military and who then published an extraordinary article in their army journal, *Assegai*, which tried to show that guerrilla warfare in Zimbabwe could never be successful. (Unfortunately for Gann, he published this just before the successful and sustained offensive put up by ZANU began in late 1972!)

The Hoover Institution not only has an unsavory reputation for getting hold of documents (including OAU confidential papers) that it could not get in any normal way, but has been associated with a series of anti-liberation books, notably those by Edward Feit. So much for the close ties between U.S. policymakers, the Carter group of U.S. academics, and certain foundations and reactionary think tanks.

## 1970s: Studies on Guerrilla Warfare

**Background:** In my view -- and more detailed information on the Carter group, especially its finances and its U.S. government contacts may prove me wrong -- this group of academics proved too "soft" for the purposes of the U.S. government as the Southern African liberation wars heated up from the end of the 1960s. The Carter Group were all extremely delightful people and -- again in my view -- sympathetic in



general to decolonization and majority rule in Southern Africa, always assuming, of course, the continuance of capitalism. Certainly Carter and Karis were shocked at the brutality of the South African system, depressed at its rigidity, and dismayed at the position of the U.S. government on occasion. They also made friends with many black South Africans. As the wars escalated, they may well have proved reluctant to try to penetrate and frustrate the South African liberation movement. The result was that they seem to have been largely cast aside (Carter was dropped from the U.S. State Department's advisory committee after Nixon's election in 1968) and replaced by a much more hardheaded, "tough cookie" generation of researchers -- to whom we shall shortly turn our attention.

But first it is important to note the following facts as background: The heady days of U.S. Government liberalism toward Africa (how liberal were they?) passed with Kennedy's death in 1963. The Johnson and Nixon eras involved a sharp swing to the right in the United States and abroad. Watergate and Vietnam are well-known. One byproduct of this was a parallel swing to the right in U.S. policy toward Southern Africa. As Robert Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, put it in April 1972:

The Nixon Administration is quietly pursuing a policy of deliberately expanded contacts and communication with the white governments of Southern Africa.... In practical terms the policy has resulted in a number of concrete developments, ranging from major new economic undertakings, such as the recent Azores agreement with Portugal, to the authorization of previously forbidden sales of jet aircraft to Portugal and South Africa.

This new, more right-wing U.S. policy had been set out in Kissinger's secret policy memorandum of 1969. It has now climaxed in the CIA's intervention in Angola in collaboration with the South African armed forces.

***The liberation wars in Southern Africa escalated rapidly in the late 1960s.*** MPLA opened its very successful eastern front in Angola in 1966, the same year as SWAPO reacted to the World Court judgment on Namibia by starting low-key armed struggle in Owambo and the Caprivi strip. The following year, 1967, joint ZAPU-ANC(SA) forces began a series of campaigns (1967-70) which, although defeated, forced South Africa to send in troops to prop up the Smith regime. FRELIMO then opened the second Tete Province Front and in 1972 ZANU started what proved to be a sustained and ever-expanding zone of combat in northeastern and eastern Zimbabwe. These immense successes -- sketched so hastily here, but involving so much sacrifice and courage -- clearly showed the U.S. government that the days of white minority rule were numbered, unless something was done about it.

***The United States has had a CIA presence in Zambia for a long time.*** Let me be brief, but specific. The CIA presence has taken several forms of which the following are known to the author:

**1. American academics who come to Zambia and who then (or previously?) join the CIA.** The best-documented, but not widely known, case is Dr. Stephen Goodman. He was an economist who taught at the University of Zambia soon after it

opened in 1966. He subsequently wrote an article in *Africa Report* (June 1970) which stated he worked for the CIA as an "economist who specialises in Southern African research." The second case was Dr. John Helgerson, who in 1970 did his doctoral research for Duke University on the Zambian National Assembly and its MPs. He now works in Washington, according to two friends of his, for the CIA.

**2. CIA agents stationed in the U.S. Embassy, Lusaka.** The stationing of CIA agents within U.S. embassies is common practice. In Lusaka, the U.S. Embassy has always had at least one official, often with the cover post of consular officer, whose job is to penetrate the liberation movements. In 1968, the man was Frank Crump. In 1974 it was Clagett J. Taylor and possibly Mike D. Stempel. [*Dirty Work 2* editors' note: Our research indicates it is unlikely that Crump, Taylor, or Stempel were official CIA employees. It is clear from Molteno's description, however, that they worked closely with the agency.] Clagett Taylor has an interesting history. Some years ago, he was a teacher in Rhodesia and came to know several Zimbabwean leaders. He then (so he told me) decided to join the State Department and had to learn Spanish as a second language. Some time afterward, he was posted to the U.S. Embassy, Lusaka, Zambia. There he suffered the unfortunate experience of being exposed.

It happened in this way: For years, it was known that the Mozambican organization COREMO was a puppet body of small size that was being supported by the United States as an alternative to the radical and mass-supported FRELIMO. But only in early 1975, did Paul Gumane, COREMO's head, admit publicly that Mr. Clagett Taylor of the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka had been financing COREMO at least since the April 1974 coup in Portugal. Mr. Gumane stated that Clagett Taylor had instructed COREMO to act against FRELIMO in that crucial period before Portugal recognized FRELIMO as its legitimate successor. The U.S. government hastily redeployed Mr. Taylor to Caracas, Venezuela. This rather reduced the weight of the U.S. Embassy denial that Taylor had been subsidizing COREMO from CIA funds.

The CIA's other activities in Zambia: These include notably the setting up of Nkumbi International College where many young people from the liberation movements went to school under largely American teachers. The Zambian government took over the college after documentation came to light showing the college's links with U.S. government foreign policy. The second case has been a series of CIA attempts to penetrate the Zambian labor movement. These attempts used the African-American Labour Center -- known in radical labor circles to be a CIA front, and an attempt in 1973 by Mr. Mike Stempel of the U.S. Embassy to use a University of Zambia lecturer as an intermediary between CIA agents who flew in from Malawi and the ZCTU.

It is against this background that the attempts by U.S. academics to penetrate the liberation movements must be seen.

**Case 1: MIT and Professor William Griffith:** So far as I can find out, the first major U.S. academic attempt to use Zambia as a base from which to investigate guerrilla warfare goes back to early 1969. In March of that year, Professor Lincoln Bloomfield, director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Center for International Studies' "arms control project," designed and carried out CONEX III. CONEX III was

a sophisticated (two-day-long, TV-monitored, and with computer-processed data) simulation of the likely conduct of U.S. and other leaders in a Southern-African conflict situation. This simulation was part of the Center's project to study "the control [*sic* -- by the US?] of local conflict." Two findings emerged which must have alarmed U.S. policymakers. The first was that, as the Southern African conflict escalated, so socialist (Soviet and Chinese) support for freedom fighters soared, and the U.S.S.R. also lent Zambia SAM-2s for her protection. The second finding was that the United States refused to take any action; in the words of the report of the simulation, "The U.S. would let the regional conflict run its course without substantial assistance or intervention." (Incidentally, it may be of interest to political scientists to see how tragically wrong this latter finding of the "game" has proved to be; see the open CIA money, arms, planes, and mercenaries in Angola at the present time.)

Soon after this simulation, a new event happened which further shook the U.S. government. In 1970 China finally agreed firmly to build the Tan-Zam Railway from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia over a period of five years. Actual construction started in 1970. It was shortly after this that Professor William E. Griffith of MIT visited Zambia. Griffith, who incidentally is *Ford* Professor of Political Science, is an old cold-war warrior whose record goes back nearly thirty years. In an amusing interview with the author, Professor Griffith expressed skepticism when told that there were almost no Chinese in Lusaka. His skepticism unfortunately was soon to bear fruit in a new MIT initiative.

**Case 2: MIT, Professor Robert I. Rotberg, and the Ford Foundation:** On 19 October 1970, Professor Robert I. Rotberg of the Department of Political Science, MIT, wrote to the head of Political Science at the University of Zambia: "I hope that you and other members of your department may want to take part in a study of the politics, psychology and tactics of African liberation movements.... Their internal dynamics are little understood, and their potential as revolutionaries (from a methodological point of view) is little known." The Department of Political Science at the University of Zambia (UNZA), led by its South African members, saw the obvious dangers (to Zambia and the liberation movements) of such a project. There was also the extraordinary lack of information which Rotberg had provided. We began by asking four questions: What is the purpose of the study? Where are its funds coming from? Who will the researchers be? And what is the intended time span? The head of political science communicated these questions to Rotberg, who replied as follows on 30 December 1970 (my comments follow in brackets).

I hope that several of our Ph.D. candidates could gather thesis material in Zambia. [That is, most of the researchers would be Americans.]

The ideal minimum duration of the study is five years. [That is, this was not to be a normal research project of limited duration but an ongoing monitoring of the liberation movements.]

At the moment we have money for about a year from MIT. An application has been made to the Ford Foundation. [Clearly Rotberg, in a hurry, got university financial support immediately and then turned for larger scale funds to a foundation which, as we have seen, had been active in South Africa before.]

Rotberg then made a crucial mistake. When pressed by the UNZA political science staff as to whether he had asked and got the support of anyone in the liberation movements, he replied with only one name -- an African academic associated with one of the movements. I then spoke to this person who denied having consented to collaborate with the project and who expressed his shock at its implications. This the department communicated to Rotberg in due course, presumably much to his embarrassment.

The department also examined Rotberg's research proposal, which he had now sent us. It was clearly hostile to liberation and aiming to do a very thorough job of penetrating the movements. The proposal stated, "Almost every African country is a present or a potential target [*sic*] of a liberationist movement." ("Liberationist" is a cute new word, presumably to be equated in connotation with communist or extremist.) He also put "liberated" inside quotation marks, thereby further betraying his attitude. But Rotberg was not just hostile; his intentions were manipulative as well and so closely related to U.S. government policy. Thus, reason number 3 for studying the liberation movements was:

To learn about the strategy and tactics of liberation movements is to gain knowledge about small-scale internal and external wars and how such wars may be promoted, contained, or prevented.

As for the scope of the five-year study, it would include:

an analysis of their operational attributes -- their techniques of recruitment, training; mobilization, and tactics, their leadership and internal politics, and their ideology and international relations. In its initial phase the study will concentrate on the more important movements, those directed against [*sic*] South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and Malawi.... Data will be collected by structured interview, survey, participant observation [!], and analysis of printed ephemera, the press, and other records.

It is clear, I suggest, that this proposed research was as comprehensive and detailed as anything military intelligence could desire.

UNZA's Department of Political Science were unanimous that the study must be blocked. As one member of the department (not myself) wrote in an internal minute on 22 January 1971, "I am sure I would not be alone in reading possible sinister motives into the proposed project... Our best course of action would be to prevent actively on the grounds that it would compromise the activities of other research students, is unlikely to succeed, and is embarrassing to Government if not to the liberation movements themselves."

When the department turned down Rotberg's proposal on 12 February 1971, he was furious. On 8 April, he replied to the head of the department: "I was a little surprised at your letter of 12 February.... By rejecting cooperation out of hand, you obviously limit the extent to which your Department can influence the shape of the work.... I fully understand the underlying theme of your letter and even what I take to be a possible anti-American tone."

Still Rotberg refused to give the project up and he said he would fly out to Zambia in mid-1971. There now existed a very real danger that Rotberg would use his contacts with very high levels of the Zambian government, misrepresent his project, and get permission to go ahead. So the department did two things: First, it alerted key liberation movements (ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, and ZANU). They were unanimous that "this research would not be countenanced by the liberation movements; they felt it was ideologically unacceptable, politically inopportune, and practically unfeasible. It was their unanimous opinion, most forcefully expressed, that they would not be prepared to go along with the outlined research proposal."

Second, the department alerted the vice-chancellor and the director of the University's Institute of African Studies (IAS). They agreed in the words of the director, "It is clear that UNZA should on no account be associated in any form with this incredible (indeed, crazy) and, if I may say so, politically suspect project. I would go further and suggest that this man with his dangerous 'research' should be kept out of the country altogether." The vice-chancellor agreed and on 1 June took appropriate action to stop the project. This did not stop Rotberg from flying into Zambia and trying to persuade the Zambian government directly -- apparently without success. It has since been learned that he (like Carter and the others before him) is now engaged in the study of African political activity in the Bantustans, the South African government having let him into South Africa for this purpose.

The department naïvely thought that this had put a permanent end to American attempts to infiltrate liberation movements via placing academics in Zambia. We were wrong. And the reason we were wrong was that we did not foresee the likely U.S. reaction to the huge increase in the liberation wars which FRELIMO and ZANU brought about from 1972 on.

**Case 3: Dr. J. Bowyer Bell, Columbia's Institute of War and Peace Studies, and Dr. Sheridan Johns III:** In 1973 Sheridan Johns found himself working at the Institute of Communist Studies at Columbia University. His office happened to be near that of Dr. J. Bowyer Bell, who worked at Columbia's Institute of War and Peace Studies. Bowyer Bell is a man of considerable eminence in the hazy field between right-wing academia and U.S. intelligence services. His field of specialty is guerrilla struggles and he has written extensively on the subject. There are other interesting details about Bowyer Bell. He is extremely well off, having a house not only in the United States, but also in the exclusive Rutland Gate area of London. Although he himself says, "I can always be persuaded to write fifty pages for a thousand dollars," he must have a much more lucrative source of income than publication fees. Bowyer Bell works closely with the U.S. government. When he travels around the world's war zones, as he frequently does, he often stays with U.S. Embassy officials and he admits that most of his information of freedom fighters comes from governmental sources. It is not surprising to discover that Bowyer Bell is extremely hostile to liberation movements. Thus on his visit to Rhodesia he was given lots of confidential information by the Rhodesian military. As he admits, "all the relevant departments of the Rhodesian government offered the most detailed and generous cooperation." His article reflected the bias of this cooperation.

As early as 1969-70, Bowyer Bell became interested in the Southern African liberation war situation. He visited Lusaka (skillfully not calling at the University of Zambia), Dar es Salaam, and Addis Ababa, as well as being taken round Rhodesia. It seems that Bowyer Bell was at MIT at this time; he certainly was two years later. If so, his Southern African trip may well have been a precursor of the large-scale Rotberg project which saw the light of day in 1970.

The next time Bowyer Bell became involved in Southern Africa, was in late 1973. By this time he was at the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University where he met Johns. Luckily for Bell, he had also made the acquaintance of a member of staff at the University of Zambia when Bell had been investigating the guerrilla situation in another part of Africa. Avoiding Rotberg's formal approach to the Department of Political Science, Bowyer Bell wrote privately to this acquaintance of his in March 1974, asking him to sound out about the liberation movements about whether they would be prepared to cooperate in being investigated. The letter is an extraordinary one, which was unfortunate for him, since he was incorrect in assuming that his acquaintance would be sympathetic to his purposes. The letter described his research project briefly as "a vast trans-national study out of Columbia" of the nationalist movements "and their ilk." The research was apparently to be done solely by Americans, thereby avoiding the complications which Rotberg had got into in approaching non-American political scientists to cooperate. In other respects, however, the project was clearly the same as Rotberg's 1970-71 proposal -- the same range of countries, the same comprehensive coverage of movements, and the same indefinite duration. Bell then made another mistake -- he stated that Johns was shortly coming to Zambia (as a Fulbright Senior Lecturer from June 1974) and that he would brief Johns fully about the project and Johns could then spearhead its Zambian end.

What happened then is instructive. Details of the intended research and Bowyer Bell's background were given to one of the liberation movements. This movement circulated the information among the others and took it to the newspapers. The net result was that Johns found it virtually impossible to contact Liberation Center and the movements after his arrival. It seems that at least the Zambian end of Bell's project has been successfully scotched. An interesting final detail is that Johns repeatedly denied all knowledge of the project. And since Bowyer Bell had stated in his letter that unfortunately he could not manage Africa "on my terrorism tour this year," we were not able to ask him for more details!

**Case 4: Professor Ah Mazrui and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace:** At the very time that Bowyer Bell was setting up his project in early 1974, a similar initiative was being taken by Professor Ah Mazrui and the Hoover Institution, whose busy and reactionary concern with the affairs of Southern Africa has already been analyzed. At first sight, Professor Mazrui's liberation-struggle project is different from its predecessors. After all, he is a citizen of an African state and his approach was through the newly formed African Association of Political Science (AAPS). It is my contention that Mazrui's initiative, although much more skillful than the previous ones, was in fact the same U.S. penetration project, this time with a heavier camouflage.

What in fact happened? On 20 February 1974, he wrote to a member of the Political Science Department at the University of Dar es Salaam. Mazrui requested him to bring before the next executive meeting of the African Association of Political Science an application for recognition. "We are applying to be recognized by the Association as a Research Committee on Armed Forces in African Societies." If one turns to the enclosed memorandum on this Research Committee, one discovers some very interesting things. Firstly, the "we" is never explained. Presuming Professor Mazrui does not use the "royal we" when referring to himself, it is a legitimate inference to suppose he has some American colleagues whose names he prefers not to disclose. Second, the projected committee's concern with liberation movements is buried among seven other topics. Third, the proposal was apparently drafted in such a hurry (is this related to the rapid escalation in the armed freedom struggle in Mozambique and Zimbabwe in early 1974?) that Mazrui had no time to get the consent of the projected other founder members of his committee; nor apparently did Professor Mazrui regard it as proper for the African Association of Political Science's Executive itself to appoint members to its own committee!

There are other points to note about this proposal. Professor Mazrui was an opponent of President Milton Obote, who was a militant foe of apartheid; indeed Mazrui welcomed the coup of General Amin publicly. When he left Africa he accepted a University of Michigan offer (worth some seventy thousand dollars per annum, all told) to join their staff. But it was as Senior Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution that he wrote to the AAPS. Since he does not submit any request for funds to the AAPS, perhaps he was already confident of getting funds from American (including Hoover Institution?) sources. Finally, Mazrui was a close colleague of another academic concerned with monitoring liberation movements -- Robert Rotberg. They had indeed edited a book together.

The skill of Mazrui's attempt was considerable. It used an African citizen as the public initiator of the project and then tried to get the stamp of legitimacy via affiliation to the AAPS. The location of the liberation section of the committee would have been Dar es Salaam -- a sensible choice in view of both the failure to get into Zambia and the importance of Tanzania in relation to FRELIMO, MPLA, ANC(SA), ZANU, and ZAPU. (Remember that this attempt, like Bowyer Bell's, was *before* the Portuguese coup of April 1974). And being a committee, it would also be an ongoing institution, highly suitable for long term monitoring of the liberation wars. Luckily, the African Association of Political Science saw through the whole ploy and turned it down.

Let us finally turn to the last and most recent case.

#### **Case 5: Dr. Christian P. Potholm, Bowdoin College, and the Rockefeller**

**Foundation:** Within a couple of months of the collapse of the Bowyer Bell and Mazrui attempts in 1974, another one was made -- this time by Professor Christian P. Potholm of Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine. Potholm is an ambitious young white American political scientist, very much on the make. A faithful Almond and Powell systems theorist, with a list of publications that take up a couple of pages (and a willingness to write on anything publishable, from the fisheries of the East Coast of the United States to policemen in Africa). He was also extremely skillful. First of all, he bypassed the University of Zambia altogether and somehow made direct contact

with the then Minister of Home Affairs, Mr. Lewis Changufu, who was in charge of immigration matters. On 2 November 1973, he got a very favorable reply from Mr. D.R. Chilao, the permanent secretary of Home Affairs. "If all your travel documents are in order, I do not think you need some additional forms to enable you to conduct your interviews in Zambia effectively.... I hope I shall be in a position to give you names of people who may assist you."

Then Potholm made his first mistake. He waited eight months, by which time the Bowyer Bell project had run into snags and Mr. Changufu had lost both his parliamentary seat and his cabinet post in the general elections. Then in July 1974, on the advice of "my good friend, Arthur Lewis" (a black American, senior in United States Information Service in Lusaka), he wrote to the University of Zambia's Institute of African Studies (IAS), thereby apparently avoiding the troublesome Department of Political Science. The letter was a skillful one. It put subtle pressure on the IAS director by enclosing the Chilao letter and using the Hon. Vernon Mwaanga as his reference. Mr. Mwaanga, when Zambian ambassador at the U.N., had contributed a chapter to a book edited by Potholm. The tactic worked. The director replied speedily and cordially on 13 August 1974. Although he asked Potholm for his research proposal (which, as with all these projects, was never produced voluntarily first time round, as is normal research application procedure), but added "I would like you to know that this may be a mere formality in your case, but standing rules stipulate the submission in every case of a research proposal before the application [for Affiliate status at the IAS] can be processed."

What should have been a "mere formality" soon turned into a protracted problem. For Potholm sent not only his research proposal, but also his *curriculum vitae* and stated his source of funding.

His research proposal was as follows:

This study seeks to focus on the international transfer of aid (to refugees) particularly as it affects Africa and is designed to develop strategies to: (i) increase the generation of aid (ii) ensure that the African nations receive a greater percentage of the total and (iii) co-ordinate and maximize the flow of international refugee relief to Africa.

Since almost the only refugees in Lusaka are from the unliberated territories of Southern Africa and since they are mostly activists in the various liberation movements, Potholm's research on refugees would in effect have given him full access (from January to May 1975) to all the liberation movements. But this research proposal clearly could not reflect Potholm's real purposes. For, as the Department of Political and Administrative Studies (as it was now called) stated when consulted, "He is suggesting that by coming to Zambia to talk to various people about refugee aid he will be in a position to help increase the flow and effectiveness of aid." The subject then rejected the proposal -- "The research proposal of Potholm's does not appear ... to represent serious scholarship." Or, as the director of IAS wrote on 7 October 1974, "it is couched in very attractive terms and one wonders whether this is a smokescreen to blind us to what the man really wants to come and do."



What Potholm wanted to come and do soon became even clearer. His source of funds provided one clue: "I have recently received the good news that the Rockefeller Foundation [that old financier of Gwen Carter's research] will be sponsoring my research project dealing with international aid and refugee resettlement with particular emphasis on Southern Africa." But it was his *curriculum vitae* that gave the game away. The following facts emerged:

1. Potholm had never been interested in aid or refugees before.
2. Potholm's association with Rockefeller went years back to the period 1958-62, when he held a Rockefeller Scholarship at Bowdoin College.
3. Potholm also had close links with the State Department; in 1971 he was awarded what his *curriculum vitae* called "Scholar-Diplomat Seminar for African Affairs, U.S. State Department."
4. Under Field of Major Research Interest, he listed four areas of which the first was "International Espionage Sub-cultures"!
5. His interest in spying and his general right-wing sympathy was borne out by some of his publications. These included several on the police and "insurgency techniques" in Africa, as well as a revealing article entitled "Rejuvenation of the ROTC Program."

On 12 November 1974, the IAS wrote to Potholm, "The subject you have chosen is not one which falls within the research priorities of the country at this stage." Potholm never replied.

## General Conclusions

As liberation wars rise in intensity and scale, so certain American academics become more persistent in their attempts to penetrate and monitor the liberation movements. When the wars in Zimbabwe and South Africa escalate, we must expect further attempts.

These reactionary U.S. academics refuse to take no for an answer; they merely resort to more subtle subterfuges. These include the withholding of relevant information, misrepresentation of research intentions, use of black intermediaries, bypassing the relevant authorities, etc.

In the period since 1969, one can detect the same old close ties between right-wing U.S. academics, think tanks, foundations, and the U.S. government as existed in the earlier period.

The first duty of the radical intellectual in this situation is vigilance. The second is to inform the liberation movements.

Finally, let me make quite clear why I personally oppose these attempts by U.S. reactionary academics.

1. The liberation movements themselves oppose being studied (except by sympathetic solidarity workers) for obvious reasons. It ought to follow from liberal ideology that if a subject of research refuses to be researched, it is the subject's democratic right to have his wish respected by the researchers.
2. The kinds of studies intended above can endanger not only liberation movements and the populations they are responsible for, but also the governments and populations of front line states.
3. The above research proposals were not studies of the past of a nationalist movement, as is standard historical procedure. Instead they were to be ongoing studies of unfolding present events. Why?
4. Regardless of the motives and intentions of the researchers, the information they would generate could damage the cause of liberation and result in the loss of precious freedom fighters' lives if that information were published or in some other way got into the hands of the former Portuguese and the present South African and Rhodesian governments.
5. The United States was an open ally, via NATO and bilateral agreements, of the former Portuguese government. It is now collaborating militarily with the South African government in Angola. Yet these researchers with one exception were citizens of the United States, and in no way opposed to their government's growing collaboration with racist capitalism's suppression of the liberation movements.

For all these reasons, academics who ally themselves with imperialism in Southern Africa must be held in general condemnation as the enemies of freedom.

[Back to home page](#)

From *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship Between Social Science and Practical Politics*, Irving Louis Horowitz, ed. (Cambridge MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), pp. 47-49 (document) and 232-36 (Jorge Montes):

## Document Number 1

*The following description of Project Camelot was released on December 4, 1964, through the Office of the Director of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of the American University in Washington, D.C. It was sent to scholars who were presumed interested in the study of internal war potentials and who might be willing to assemble at a four-week conference at the Airlie House in Virginia in August 1965. This release, dated December 4, 1964, is a summary version of a larger set of documents made available in August 1964 and in December 1964 [I.L.H.].*

Project CAMELOT is a study whose objective is to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world. Somewhat more specifically, its objectives are:

*First*, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies;

*Second*, to identify with increased degrees of confidence those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war; and

*Finally*, to assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things.

The project is conceived as a three to four-year effort to be funded at around one and one-half million dollars annually. It is supported by the Army and the Department of Defense, and will be conducted with the cooperation of other agencies of the government. A large amount of primary data collection in the field is planned as well as the extensive utilization of already available data on social, economic and political functions. At this writing, it seems probable that the geographic orientation of the research will be toward Latin American countries. Present plans call for a field office in that region.

By way of background: Project CAMELOT is an outgrowth of the interplay of many factors and forces. Among these is the assignment in recent years of much additional emphasis to the U.S. Army's role in the over-all U.S. policy of encouraging steady growth and change in the less developed countries in the world. The many programs of the U.S. Government directed toward this objective are often grouped under the sometimes misleading label of counterinsurgency (some pronounceable term standing for insurgency prophylaxis would be better). This places great importance on positive actions designed to reduce the sources of disaffection which often give

rise to more conspicuous and violent activities disruptive in nature. The U.S. Army has an important mission in the positive and constructive aspects of nation building as well as a responsibility to assist friendly governments in dealing with active insurgency problems.

Another major factor is the recognition at the highest levels of the defense establishment of the fact that relatively little is known, with a high degree of surety, about the social processes which must be understood in order to deal effectively with problems of insurgency. Within the Army there is especially ready acceptance of the need to improve the general understanding of the processes of social change if the Army is to discharge its responsibilities in the over-all counterinsurgency program of the U.S. Government. Of considerable relevance here is a series of recent reports dealing with the problems of national security and the potential contributions that social science might make to solving these problems. One such report was published by a committee of the Smithsonian Institution's research group under the title, "Social Science Research and National Security," edited by Ithiel de Sola Pool. Another is a volume of the proceedings of a symposium, "The U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research." These proceedings were published in 1962 by the Special Operations Research Office of the American University.

Project CAMELOT will be a multidisciplinary effort. It will be conducted both within the SORO organization and in close collaboration with universities and other research institutions within the United States and overseas. The first several months of work will be devoted to the refinement of the research design and to the identification of problems of research methodology as well as of substance. This will contribute to the important articulation of all component studies of the project toward the stated objectives. Early participants in the project will thus have an unusual opportunity to contribute to the shaping of the research program and also to take part in a seminar planned for the summer of 1965. The seminar, to be attended by leading behavioral scientists of the country, will be concerned with reviewing plans for the immediate future and further analyzing the long-run goals and plans for the project.

---

## **A Communist Commentary on Camelot**

**by Jorge Montes**

Chilean Chamber of Deputies, 1965

A number of newspapers, and particularly *El Siglo*, have been referring to a so-called "Project Camelot." What is this project? In order to define it, we shall textually quote from an official document. [See Document No.1 above, from which excerpts were cited.]

These quotes from the project reveal the determination on the part of U.S. foreign

policy to intervene in any country of the world where popular movements might threaten its interests. To this end, they use a covert form of espionage, which they try to present in terms of scientific research, thus violating the most elementary norms of sovereignty.

Indeed, our own country, Uruguay, Colombia, and Venezuela in Latin America, Senegal and Nigeria in Africa, and India, Vietnam, and Laos in Asia are the countries in which organized espionage, under the appearance of sociological investigation and under the rubric of "Project Camelot," is being carried out.

It has already been pointed out that both the Director of the Project, Rex Hopper, and Hugo C. Nuttini, its agent, have been in Chile. The latter, born in Chile and naturalized a North American, and an ex-student at the Naval School, tried to bring about the engagement of 20 to 25 Chilean scholars in order to carry out the studies implied in the project. He offered salaries of two thousand dollars a month plus all the necessary equipment to different university agencies. We are in a position to affirm that, at the General Secretaryship of the University of Chile, where Nuttini went, the true character of the project was unmasked. Nuttini had presented it with an especially prepared wording in order to make it appear to be an innocent scientific research undertaking. But his hope to recruit Chilean scholars for this work of espionage against Chile was rejected. Such response was due in part to the fact that the official document for the project, such as it is, had been previously known. This document had reached Chileans owing to a European sociologist. He had been offered a position in the direction of the project which he refused with dignity, making its contents known to his colleagues throughout the world.

This official document, worded for the highest level, is now in the hands of His Excellency the President of the Republic, who received it through the Minister of the Exchequer, Sergio Molina. The latter received it in his role as Dean of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Chile. Thus, the Government of Chile has full knowledge of the anti-national content as well as the serious attack against our sovereignty implied in this North American project.



**"Never a leaf moves in Chile without my knowing of it." -General Pinochet, 1975**

The gravity of this situation is made even more manifest if we consider the fact that different kinds of espionage researches fulfilling diverse partial objectives have been carried out for years. We are in a position to point out that the North American Walter Guzardi carried out in Chile a study of the middle classes that was oriented toward influencing them politically to the advantage of the United States. Further, Andrew G. Frank made a study of the Communist Party and the FRAP. And right now, others are carried out, among which there is one aimed at analyzing the structure of the Christian Democratic Party, and which is also sponsored by North Americans. Bearing a

direct relationship to this unmasked espionage being carried forth by the United States, with the tolerance of its authorities, is the proposed goal of creating an Inter-American Defense Force. This issue will be debated in the next Conference of Chancellors, to be held in Rio de Janeiro on August 24th of the present year [1965].

The extreme pressure exerted by the United States upon Latin American Chancelleries in order to achieve this Inter-American Defense Force is a well-known fact. Imperialism tries to conceal its interventionist policy by means of this shadow-army, which, as Project Camelot proves, is carried forth in every way. It is not impeded by any considerations whatsoever. Indeed, the confidential document 520.1 (22) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil shows the concomitance of the Castelo Branco Government with that of the United States. It also shows the brutality with which North Americans are trying to bring about the creation of this armed force:

In compliance with the latest suggestions of the Government of the United States, Brazilian authorities will prepare a broad documentation of subversive activities in Brazil which occurred before April 1964. There are also proofs of extremist infiltration in high government echelons in various countries of the Hemisphere. The Brazilian Government hopes that the presentation of these facts might have a positive influence upon the representatives of the Latin American countries in the Rio de Janeiro Conference. [Article 7]

For another part, Itamarati is preparing the probing of Latin American countries and hopes that the idea of the Alliance shall be accepted with sympathy by the majority of the countries within the Organization of American States. In the specific cases of Chile and Mexico, the Brazilian Government shall follow the agreed line which, as the results show, corresponds with reality. In the case of Uruguay, Brazil has no possibilities of achieving the agreed upon objectives. It would view with pleasure the assistance of the United States Government in

setting forth Brazil's aims before the Government of Uruguay. Brazil believes that through the exploitation of economic factors, it might obtain from Uruguay a favorable position with respect to said Alliance. [Article 8]

This text constitutes one more piece of evidence of the cynical and insolent intervention of the United States and its servants in the internal affairs of Latin American countries. Within this framework, in Chile and in other countries, the application of Project Camelot is being carried out. Let us recall President Johnson's statement at Baylor University where he contended that there are no longer internal wars but only international wars. In this way, he underlined his decision to perform military intervention in any nation of the world.

We Communists have appreciated the Chilean government's worthy attitude before the aggression to Santo Domingo, and its refusal to accept the creation of an Inter-American Defense Force. That is why we are surprised by the fact that this government (of Chile) should not have taken a stand concerning the serious threat to Chile's sovereignty that Project Camelot and other such studies imply. In order to avoid saying it in our own words, we shall quote Eduardo Hamuy, Director of the Center of Social and Economic Studies of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Chile. To him this is simply a plan of "systematized espionage" and a method for providing information of state secrets to an eventual enemy.

Because of the situation described, we request that these observations be transcribed in the name of the Honorable Chamber and should there be no quorum, in the name of our committee, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that he be invited to the session of the corresponding committee next Friday in order that he should report concerning this situation.

At the same time, we believe that the Committee on Foreign Affairs, in addition to considering the situation, and within the possibilities allowed by regulations, should inquire into all facts related to these claims in order that the Chilean Parliament and Chilean public opinion be widely informed on an issue that compromises our national sovereignty. Further, we believe that the majority of the Honorable Chamber will have no objections to convene a special session during the first days of the coming week for the purpose of bringing wider information on this serious claim and that the different sectors of Parliament should state their opinion concerning this problem. It is necessary that we adopt a well-defined attitude in defense of our national sovereignty.

---

Excerpt from "Under the Cloak and Behind the Dagger," in North American Congress on Latin America, *Latin America & Empire Report*, July - August 1974, pp. 6-8:

... The function and composition of the Embassy network changes depending on the political situation in the country. Agents are scattered throughout the different sections of the diplomatic structure depending upon what corresponding areas within

the local society need either to be penetrated or aided in some way by the United States. Thus, agents could be placed in the political, economic, labor, AID, and cultural affairs, sections. The spreading-out of Agency personnel throughout the embassy not only provides a better cover, but also facilitates the multi-levelled penetration of all sectors of that society.

Agency personnel assigned to Chile shifted radically in 1970, for the Agency's needs had shifted. Previous to the election of Allende, the emphasis was on information gathering and penetration. Once Allende was elected, however, the emphasis would switch to covert operations based on an analysis made possible by many years of penetration and information gathering.

## Camelot Goes Underground

When the true nature of Project Camelot was revealed, it was forced to curtail public operations. In reality, though, it went underground only to surface with a variety of new covers: as government agencies, individual academics, private corporations and, of course, individual agents. The work encompassed in the original project would still be carried out, but the form of operation would change. Camelot researchers were still at the stage of identifying their "would-be-attackers" and much work remained to be done. Thus while Ambassador Dungan apologized to the Chileans for Camelot, the CIA began to restructure its embassy network to accommodate the hidden Camelot.

### ***A. Peace Corps: The Urban Front***

The Peace Corps is a perfect structure for the CIA. It provides a point of contact with the working class which is so necessary for information gathering. And, because of the Peace Corps structure, the CIA does not have to control it in order to use it successfully. The Peace Corps entered Latin America as the "person-to-person" of the Alliance for Progress. Working out of the U.S. Embassy in Santiago, the first head of the Peace Corps in Chile was Nathaniel Davis, promoted to Ambassador by the time of the September 1973 coup. Under the skillful guidance of Davis, many of the youthful volunteers headed straight for the *poblaciones* which housed the poorest sectors of the Chilean working class and unemployed. Fresh out of Swarthmore, Bennington and Berkeley, the volunteers invaded the *poblaciones*, lived with the people and came to know them -- politically and socially. They worked with them, observed their customs, their way of life, their traditions. And then they drew up work reports describing their experiences.

It was not necessary to have many agents in the Peace Corps -- just in the right places and with access to all the information which was generated. Unknowingly, thousands of U.S. youths, most thinking that they were helping the Chileans, were instead gathering data for the now undercover Project Camelot.

Those agents in the Peace Corps who were conscious of their role had several tasks.



As they mingled with the people, they were identifying future leftist leaders as well as those right-wingers who in the future would work for U.S. interests. They were assessing consciousness, evaluating reactions to reforms. And they were selecting and training future agents. It was at this point that Michael Townley, Peace Corpsman in the sixties, was recruited to enter the Agency. Townley returned to Chile in 1970 as one of the agency's closest contacts with Patria y Libertad.

Finally, the Peace Corps was used as a front to get paramilitary equipment into the country. Ellis Carrasco, who succeeded Davis as head of the Peace Corps, was himself accused of gun-running. Later, the U.S. Army donated and installed radio receivers in all Peace Corps regional offices to facilitate communications. These same receivers were used during the coup to facilitate coordination of the Junta's bloody activities.

### ***B. The International Development Foundation: The Rural Front***

Working parallel to the Peace Corps was the International Development Foundation, a New York based private foundation. IDF went into Chile in the mid-1960s under the leadership of George Truitt. Truitt, then president of the IDF, also worked for two other CIA front groups: the Free Europe Committee and Radio Free Europe. When IDF entered Chile, Frei's meager agrarian reform was just beginning to show its effects in the Chile. It was also at this time that the *foco* theory was gaining importance as the main tactic of guerrilla movements in Latin America. IDF headed for the countryside.

Its main objective was infiltration and manipulation of the peasant movement. Its tactics consisted of selecting peasant leaders, training them in U.S. labor ideology, and, in this way, trying to control the growing consciousness of the peasants. To this end IDF was the principal promoter of the *Confederacion Nacional Campesina* which was heavily financed by U.S. AID. The Confederation tried to keep peasants from uniting into one large union -- it pushed the idea of cooperatives, instead -- and adamantly argued against any land take-overs.

A team of research experts accompanied the organizers in order to study the conditions and political views of the *campesinos*. Rushing from village to village with piles of questionnaires tucked under their arms, the researchers provided basic information necessary to the intelligence apparatus. The ultimate usefulness of IDF to the intelligence network in Chile was summed up by Edward Cohen, the Chilean representative of IDF. "Our representatives," he said, "can infiltrate the leadership of all organizations, even political parties. If we act intelligently, not only will we be able to neutralize Marxist actions, but also we will be able to control the most important organizations in the country."

IDF was, however, forced to leave Chile when its cover was blown following a series of revelations about the CIA in 1967. No longer able to hide behind its mask, IDF disappeared from the scene. But the "leaders" it had trained would be used during the UP government to organize against the agrarian reform and land take-overs carried out by the radicalized peasantry.

### **C. Other Points of Contact**

The International Development Foundation and the Peace Corps were but two of the many fronts used by the CIA to gather information in Chile. During the sixties nearly one thousand students and professors travelled to Chile. Some consciously worked for the Agency, but even those who had no ties to the Agency would find their doctoral theses and research work integrated into the CIA's computer files at a later date. The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD) and the International Trade Secretariats (ITS) provided information on the Chilean working class. Many U.S. journalists "maintained regular contact with the CIA officials in routine performance of their journalistic duties." The Agency gathered information from students who passed through exchange programs, military and police officials trained in the United States and many, many more.

Back in the United States, part of the Project Camelot work had been contracted out to a company involved in the original project formulation. Abt Associates, a private think tank well-known for doing the Defense Department's work, began to research what became known as the "Politica Game." *Politica* is a study of possible government reactions to changing political conditions in a country modeled after Chile. In the final analysis, though, it is a computer-planned coup d'état.

The CIA's Embassy structure played a crucial role during the 60s in overseeing the gathering and analysis of information collected by the extensive network of the CIA. By 1970, however, the situation had changed and called for different skills. But since there are approximately 1,500 alleged CIA agents on the State Department's payroll, [CIA official] William Broe did not have too much trouble in selecting a skillful crew with more of a penchant for "operations." ...

---

Excerpts from Ellen Herman, "Project Camelot and the Career of Cold War Psychology." In *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War*, Christopher Simpson, ed. (New York: The New Press, 1998), pp. 97-133. Excerpts are from p. 113 and pp. 118-19.

...

Still, remarkably little about behavioral science funding or design changed after Camelot was canceled. A similar project was uncovered in Brazil less than two weeks after the Chilean scandal broke, and others were soon launched in Colombia (Project Simpatico) and Peru (Operation Task). Each was sponsored by SORO and funded by the DoD, exactly as Camelot had been.<sup>49</sup> Project Agile, a study of Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) members' motivation, the attitudes of villages, and communications patterns among South Vietnamese troops, was carried out in the years after Camelot's demise, as were studies of the "Potential for Internal Conflict in Latin America."<sup>50</sup> Whatever objections existed to such activities were clearly

ineffective and did not interfere with the completion of the research. A confidential DoD memo written five weeks after Camelot's cancellation simply stated that counterinsurgency research involving foreign areas was "highly sensitive" and "must be treated in such a way that offense to foreign governments and propaganda advantage to the communist apparatus are avoided."<sup>51</sup> Four years later, the DoD admitted that not a single one of its social or behavioral science projects, or for that matter anything at all involving foreign area work, had been terminated in the years after Camelot's exposure.<sup>52</sup>

...

Ironically, Camelot's spirit was destined to have its most lethal reincarnation in Chile, the country where it had been exposed, but which had never been one of its intended targets of research. In 1973, almost a decade after Camelot was canceled, its mark could be seen in the secret, CIA-sponsored coup against the socialist-leaning government of Salvador Allende.

The connection came through Abt Associates, a research organization located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, whose president, Clark Abt, had been one of Camelot's consultants. In 1965, the DoD's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) contracted with Abt to design a computer simulation game to be used for monitoring internal war in Latin America. Except for the addition of sophisticated computer technology, Camelot's goal remained intact. Dubbed "Politica," the game was first loaded with data about hundreds of social psychological variables in a given country: degree of group cohesiveness, levels of self-esteem, attitudes toward authority, and so on. Then it would "highlight those variables decisive for the description, indication, prediction, and control of internal revolutionary conflict."<sup>71</sup>

In the case of Chile, according to Daniel Del Solar, one of Politica's inventors, the game's results eventually gave the green light to policy makers who favored murdering the elected president, Salvador Allende, and toppling Chile's leftist government.<sup>72</sup> Politica had predicted that Chile would remain "stable" even after a military takeover and the president's death. The character of this stability was in time demonstrated by the post-coup regime in the form of mass arrests, thousands of political murders and disappearances, and a series of economic "adjustments" targeting the poorer two-thirds of Chile's population. Politica proved to be as useful to the planners of military and covert action as had been the RAND study of Viet Cong motivation and morale, and more accurate.

...

**49.** Horowitz, *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*, p. 20; Subcommittee on Government Research of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, "Hearings on Federal Support of International Social Science and Behavioral Research," p. 20; Jean Hardisty Dose, "A Social and Political Explanation of Social Science Trends: The Case of Political Development Research" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1976), p. 197. For a senior SORO researcher's defense of Project Task as "a most uncynical and unsinister project" and complaint that the debate surrounding Camelot's demise had been dishonest and shrill, see Milton Jacobs, "L'Affaire Camelot," letter to the editor, *American Anthropologist* 69 (June - August 1967), pp. 364-66.

**50.** On Project Agile, see Gene M. Lyons, *The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), p. 197; Peter Watson, *War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology* (New York: Penguin, 1980), p. 319. On post-Camelot research aimed at preventing revolution in Latin America, see Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Hearings on Defense Department Sponsored Foreign Affairs Research," May 1968, pts. 1-2, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 64-65.

**51.** Memo from Director of Defense Research and Engineering to Assistant Secretaries for Research and Development of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, August 18, 1965, NRC Committee on Government Programs in Behavioral Sciences, Central Policy Files, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC. I am indebted to Mark Solovey for sharing this document with me.

**52.** Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, "Hearings on Defense Department Sponsored Foreign Affairs Research," testimony of John S. Foster Jr., director of defense research and engineering, p. 93.

...

**71.** M. Gordon et al., "COCON -- counterinsurgency (POLITICA): The Development of a Simulation Model of Internal Conflict under Revolutionary Conflict Conditions," quoted in Carol Cina, "Social Science for Whom? A Structural History of Social Psychology" (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York, Stony Brook, 1981), p. 326.

**72.** Cina, "Social Science for Whom?", p. 331.

---

Ellen Herman is an assistant professor of history at the University of Oregon and has also taught at Harvard University and the University of Massachusetts.

[Back to home page](#)

Excerpt from *Science of Coercion: Communication Research and Psychological Warfare, 1945-1960* by Christopher Simpson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996 paperback), pp. 48-51:

## Scholars Perfect Psychological Warfare Techniques

by Christopher Simpson

The third expression of psychological warfare themes in *Public Opinion Quarterly* and similar academic literature during the first years after World War II can be seen in the unusually close liaison that some of the journal's authors and editors maintained with clandestine psychological warfare projects at the CIA, the armed services, and the Department of State. This can be found in both manifest and veiled form in many articles appearing in the journal, and in the composition of *POQ*'s editorial board. Hans Speier's emergence as a prominent "private" advocate of expanded psychological warfare shortly after his work with Frank Wisner at the Occupied Areas Division at the State Department, discussed previously, is one example of an informal link between a prominent *POQ* author and the government's clandestine warfare programs.

This phenomenon became considerably more widespread, however, though rarely easy to identify. A good example of latent linkages can be seen in Frederick W. Williams' 1945 article "Regional Attitudes on International Cooperation."<sup>31</sup> On a manifest level, Williams' study simply reports data gathered by the American Institute of Public Opinion and the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton during the winter of 1944-45 concerning popular attitudes on the U.S. role in international affairs, broken out by geographic region of the country. Williams uses the data to strongly advocate "making the United States more international-minded," as *POQ* described it.<sup>32</sup>

In the decades since the article first appeared, it has become clear that Williams' data had been collected in an ongoing clandestine intelligence program underwritten by Listerine heir Gerard Lambert on behalf of the Roosevelt administration. The U.S. Congress had in those years barred the expenditure of government funds on most types of attitude surveys of U.S. voters, arguing that it was the Congress' job under the Constitution to represent "public opinion." Congress' concern was in part political, because FDR used rival sources of information on public opinion to advance controversial policies, not least of which was the president's drive toward an "internationalist" foreign policy. Despite the congressional strictures, the White House hired Hadley Cantril and Lloyd Free for "government intelligence work," as Jean Converse puts it, including clandestine intelligence collection abroad and public opinion surveys in the United States. Cantril and Free in turn engaged Frederick Williams and the American Institute of Public Opinion as field staff for research on behalf of the administration.<sup>33</sup>

Meanwhile, *Public Opinion Quarterly*'s board of editors included a substantial number

of men who were deeply involved in U.S. government psychological warfare research or operations, several of whom were largely dependent on government funding for their livelihood. The journal's editorial advisory board during the late 1940s, for example, was made up of twenty-five to thirty individuals noted for their contributions to public opinion studies and mass communication research. Among those on the board with readily identifiable dependencies on government psychological warfare contracting were Hadley Cantril, Harold Lasswell, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Rensis Likert, whose role as government contractors are documented in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 of this study. They were joined on the *POQ* board by DeWitt Poole, who later became president of the CIA's largest single propaganda effort of the era, the National Committee for a Free Europe.<sup>34</sup> Another prominent board member was CBS executive Frank Stanton, also a longtime director of both Radio Free Europe and the Free Europe Fund, a CIA-financed organization established to conduct political advertising campaigns in the United States and to launder CIA funds destined for Poole's National Committee for a Free Europe.<sup>35</sup> The journal's editor during 1946 and 1947 was Lloyd Free, a wartime secret agent on behalf of the Roosevelt administration who some years later was destined to share a million-dollar CIA research grant with Hadley Cantril.<sup>36</sup>

This pattern appears to have been repeated at several other important academic journals of sociology and social psychology of the era, although quantitative studies of their content remain to be done. The *American Sociological Review (ASR)*, published by the American Sociological Society, overlapped so frequently in its officers and editorial panels with those of *Public Opinion Quarterly* and its publisher, the American Association for Public Opinion Research, that board members sometimes joked that they were unsure which meetings they were attending.<sup>37</sup> While *ASR* published articles about a considerably broader range of sociological subjects than did *POQ*, the *ASR* articles and book reviews concerning communication remained confined to a group of fewer than a dozen authors who were simultaneously the dominant voices in *POQ*. The range of views concerning communication and its role in society remained similarly circumscribed.

Further, an informal comparison of articles published during the 1950s concerning mass communication and public opinion in *POQ* and the prestigious *American Journal of Sociology (AJS)* shows that its articles in this field were just as rooted in psychological warfare contracts as were those appearing in *POQ*. The 1949-50 volume of *AJS*, for example, featured eight articles on various aspects of mass communication and public opinion. At least four of these stemmed directly or indirectly from ongoing psychological warfare projects, including work by Hans Speier and Herbert Goldhamer (both of RAND Corp.), Samuel Stouffer (from the *American Soldier* project), and Leo Lowenthal (then the director of research for the Voice of America, whose political odyssey is discussed in Chapter 6).<sup>38</sup>

In sum, the data show that *Public Opinion Quarterly* -- and perhaps other contemporary academic journals as well -- exhibited at least three important characteristics that linked the publication with the U.S. government's psychological warfare effort during the first decade after World War II. First, *POQ* became an important advocate for U.S. propaganda and psychological warfare projects of the period, frequently publishing case studies, research reports, and polemics in favor of expanded psychological operations. Second and more subtly, many *POQ* articles

articulated U.S. propaganda themes on topics *other* than psychological warfare itself. Examples include the magazine's editorial line on U.S.-Soviet relations and on the Italian election of 1948.

Finally, data suggest that some members of the journal's editorial board and certain of the authors maintained an unusually close liaison with the clandestine propaganda and intelligence operations of the day. The traces of these relationships can be found in several articles mentioned in this chapter and in the composition of *POQ's* editorial board, at least one member of which -- *POQ's* founder DeWitt Poole -- was a full-time executive of a major propaganda project organized and financed by the CIA.

This influence over the editorial board and editorial content of the field's most prestigious academic journal was only a symptom of a deeper and more organic bond that is discussed in the next chapter. Money became one of the most important links between the emerging field of mass communication studies and U.S. military, intelligence, and propaganda agencies. Precise economic figures cannot be determined because of the lack of consistent reporting from the government, the continued classification of some projects, and the loss of data over the years. Even so, the overall trend is clear.

"The primary nexus between government and social science is an economic one," write Albert Biderman and Elisabeth Crawford of the Bureau of Social Science Research. It is "so pervasive as to make any crisis of relations with the government a crisis for social science as a whole."<sup>39</sup>

**31.** Frederick W. Williams, "Regional Attitudes on International Cooperation," 9, no.1 (Spring 1945): 38-50.

**32.** *Ibid.*, p. 38.

**33.** Jean Converse, *Survey Research in the United States* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 152-54, 165. Converse also notes an earlier example of the role of these confidential surveys in shaping the president's highly controversial strategy for promoting U.S. support for England in the years leading up to Pearl Harbor.

**34.** For background on Poole, see *Who Was Who*, Vol. 3, p. 692; Sig Mickelson, *America's Other Voice: The Story of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 24, 41, 60; and Christopher Simpson, *Blowback* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), pp. 134, 217-34 *passim*. See also Harwood Childs, "The First Editor Looks Back," 21, no.1 (Spring 1957): 7, for Child's recollections on Poole's role in the founding of *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

**35.** For source material on Stanton's role with Radio Free Europe, see Mickelson, *America's Other Voice*, p. 124; and U.S. General Accounting Office, *U.S. Government Monies Provided to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, report no.173239, May 25, 1972, p. 79.

**36.** On Free's wartime career, see Converse, *Survey Research in the United States*, pp. 152-54; on his Central Intelligence Agency grant, see John Crewdson and Joseph Treaster, "Worldwide Propaganda Network Built by CIA," *New York Times*, December 26, 1977.

**37.** Association officers or editorial panel members who served with both groups included Samuel Stouffer, John W. Riley, and Leonard Cottrell.

**38.** Herbert Goldhamer, "Public Opinion and Personality" (p. 346), Hans Speier, "Historical Development of Public Opinion" (p. 376), Samuel Stouffer, "Some Observations on Study Design" (p. 355), and Leo Lowenthal, "Historical Perspectives of Popular Culture" (p. 323); each in *American Journal of Sociology* 56, no.1 (January 1950). Lowenthal specifically cites his Voice of America work in support of his thesis; see p. 324.

**39.** Albert Biderman and Elisabeth Crawford, *Political Economics of Social Research: The Case of Sociology* (Springfield VA: Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technological Information, 1968), p. 5.

---

Christopher Simpson is an assistant professor at the School of Communication at American University.

[Back to home page](#)



See also: [Debate on the CIA and Academe](#)

*Anthropology News*, November 2000, pp. 13-14

## The AAA and the CIA?

by David Price

With little notice by anthropologists, there has been increasing documentation of the extent to which American intelligence agencies monitored and influenced the development of American social sciences throughout the Cold War. One of the ways these agencies accomplished this was through covert contact with professional associations -- either as silent observers at professional meetings or as silent partners entering into secret agreements with individual members or official bodies within these associations.

A wide literature has developed that documents some of the interactions between American social science professional associations and intelligence agencies. Benjamin Harris documented the FBI's monitoring of the American Psychological Association and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues since the 1930s. In *Stalking the Sociological Imagination* (1999, Greenwood), Mike Keen used the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to document the FBI's surveillance of prominent sociologists as well as the meetings of the American Sociological Association. Christopher Simpson likewise established that the "FBI and US military intelligence agents kept the American Sociological Society conventions under surveillance in an effort to smoke out radicals." Sigmund Diamond's book, *Compromised Campus* (1992), used FOIA to painstakingly declassify CIA and FBI documents revealing the extent to which post-war Area Studies centers were manipulated by the CIA and Pentagon.

While the history of the American Anthropological Association has been punctuated by inquiries into accusations that anthropologists have undertaken work for intelligence agencies, there has been little research into links between the AAA and these agencies. A variety of documents released to me under FOIA establish that the CIA and FBI have monitored activities within our Association. Further, documents from the Association's archives establish that, in the 1950s, the AAA entered into a series of covert relationships with the CIA. One of these relationships involved working to establish a liaison position between the Association and CIA. Another involved the Executive Board agreeing to secretly give the CIA a cross-indexed roster of the Association's membership detailing individuals' backgrounds and areas of expertise.

The chronology and historical background of these events are complicated and are described in another paper. Only a brief overview of the Association's documents relating to this episode appears below.

In February 1951, AAA Executive Secretary Frederick Johnson wrote the Executive Board that, due to numerous requests by various governmental agencies, he believed the Association needed to produce a detailed roster of its membership. Johnson -- an unelected, non-voting, *ex officio* member of the board -- recommended that the AAA work with the CIA on this project. Throughout the Board's decision process and during later negotiations with the CIA, Johnson maneuvered -- even to the point of exceeding his *ex officio* role -- to bring the CIA and their computers into this project.

AAA President Howells wrote Johnson (3/3/51), that "the CIA proposal is ideal," and that under this proposal the CIA would keep a copy of the computerized roster data for their own uses. Howells indicated that if "a reasonable questionnaire, suitable to both parties, can be worked out, we will both get what we want, and except for the mailing [the CIA] will put the whole thing through from beginning to end, and the chances are we will get something that we want."

Board members received ballots with two action items regarding this proposed relationship between the Association and the CIA. The first item proposed that Johnson be authorized to continue negotiations with the CIA regarding the production of a detailed roster of Association members; the second item requested authorization for Johnson to seek means for producing future rosters. The first ballot item is reproduced in full below because it clarifies the Executive Board's awareness of the CIA's involvement in compiling the roster, as well as the arrangements whereby CIA would keep a copy of the final product for their own uses:

The Executive Secretary is empowered to continue negotiations with Central Intelligence Agency for the purpose of compiling a roster of Anthropological Personnel. The final agreement will be based on the idea that the Anthropological Association will sponsor the roster and the Agency will do the technical work connected with it. The [Central Intelligence] Agency will be allowed to keep one copy of the roster for its own use and it will deliver to the Association a duplicate copy the use of which will not be restricted. The final agreement between the Association and the Agency shall be such that the Association shall be liable only for mailing charges and such incidental expenses as it may be able to afford. The final agreement shall be approved by the Executive Board.

On March 29, 1951 Johnson informed the Board that the "Proposal that Executive Secretary continue negotiations with the Central Intelligence Agency to arrange for compilation of a roster of Anthropologists" had passed, as did the second ballot item authorizing Johnson to negotiate the production of future rosters. Negotiations with anthropologists working at the CIA were undertaken and a plan of action was proposed.

Johnson wrote the Board that the CIA offered the best opportunity for the Association despite its insistence on secrecy (4/21/51). Johnson wrote that, "In searching for the ways and means of setting up a roster of Anthropologists I have a general proposal from [the] Central Intelligence Agency. This agency is reluctant to have its name connected with the proposal. It will do the work as generally and tentatively outlined

below provided the Association will sponsor the project." In keeping with CIA's wishes, these arrangements were not made public.

The kinds of information to be collected by mailed questionnaires were negotiated in the summer and fall of 1951. The final questionnaire collected information on AAA members' geographical, linguistic and cultural expertise as well as their military background. What became of the information collected for the roster is presently unclear. Association records for this period do not contain a copy of a completed roster, and public and private searches for copies of the final roster have thus far been fruitless. FBI records reveal that the questionnaire was sent to the AAA membership and further indicate that the FBI believed this roster to have "been initiated by some Governmental agency, such as CIA, for the express purpose of obtaining intelligence data." The CIA has been uncooperative with my efforts to clarify the nature and extent of its contact with the AAA and its membership. At present we are left to wonder about the uses to which the CIA might have put such data as it engaged in anti-democratic and counterinsurgency activities in the decades that followed. I have hopes that some member of the Association reading this article knows the outcome of these negotiations with CIA, or what became of this roster.

All this raises troubling issues for our Association. These issues involve questions about a variety of only partially documented links between anthropologists and intelligence agencies, as well as fundamental issues concerning the ethics of allowing secrecy in research. While raising these issues complicates our relationships with those we study, not confronting these issues stands to potentially damage both the interests of anthropologists and those we study.

---

David Price is assistant professor of anthropology at St. Martin's College in Lacey, Washington.

[Back to home page](#)

*APA Monitor*, December 1977, pp. 1, 10-11

# CIA's Behavior Caper

by Patricia Greenfield


Copyright © 1977 by the American Psychological Association

By its own accounts, the Central Intelligence Agency throughout its history has explored any and all means for the control of human behavior. The outline of much of the program has emerged from thousands of recently released CIA documents detailing the agency's varied and wide-ranging activities in the behavioral and medical sciences. While this is now common knowledge, the existence and nature of the program raises perennial questions about the involvement, often unwitting, of broad segments of the social science community.

One major component of the CIA's program, dubbed ARTICHOKE, was described in a CIA memo of January 25, 1952, as "the evaluation and development of any method by which we can get information from a person against his will and without his knowledge." An internal review of the terminated ARTICHOKE program, dated January 31, 1975, lists ARTICHOKE methods as having included "the use of drugs and chemicals, hypnosis, and 'total isolation,' a form of psychological harassment." Another major component of the CIA's program, called MKULTRA, explored, according to a memo of August 14, 1963, "avenues to the control of human behavior," including "chemical and biological materials capable of producing human behavioral and physiological changes," "radiology, electro-shock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology and anthropology, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitary devices and materials."

Specific examples from the CIA's files include:

- Giving LSD to unwitting citizens, some of whom were literally picked up in New York and San Francisco bars;
- Using hypnosis and drugs in interrogation;
- Attempting to recruit a neuroscientist to find the 'pain' center of the human brain;
- Shopping for methods to induce amnesia;
- And looking for methods to make persons subvert their principles.



Although the CIA recognized (in a memo of August 14, 1963) that "research in the manipulation of human behavior is considered by many authorities in medicine and related fields to be professionally unethical," they managed to assemble what a recent *New York Times* article called "an extensive network of nongovernmental scientists and facilities," almost always without the knowledge of the institutions where the facilities were situated.

The CIA documents upon which this information is based were originally made public last July as the result of a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act brought against the CIA by John Marks of the Washington-based Center for National Security Studies. Since July, the CIA has notified 80 institutions, including 44 colleges and universities, of their involvement in CIA-sponsored research on human behavior. Oftentimes the scientists themselves had not realized that their research was funded by the CIA. Moreover, much of this work was neither unethical nor used. Rather, it constituted the more theoretical side of the CIA's total program in the behavioral sciences.

While news of blatant attempts at behavioral control have had immediate shock value, the CIA's support of basic research has had the more lingering effect of posing many difficult and complex questions and issues for psychologists. How were psychologists and other social scientists enlisted by the CIA? What did they do? What, if any, is the scientist's responsibility for the applications of research? How are social scientists affected by social and political forces? What are the implications of covert funding?

Many of these questions and issues are raised by psychologists and other social scientists who themselves have been involved in one way or another with the CIA's program of basic research in the past. Some were interviewed for this article. But it should be kept in mind that they represent a tiny but varied sample of social scientists touched by the project. The psychologists include Carl Rogers of the Center for the Study of the Person, La Jolla, California, Edgar Schein of MIT's Sloane School of

Management, Martin Orne (also a psychiatrist) of the University of Pennsylvania and Charles Osgood of the University of Illinois. Interviews were also conducted with psychiatrist Lawrence Hinkle of Cornell Medical Center, sociologists Jay Schulman of the National Jury Project, Richard Stephenson of Rutgers University, and anthropologist Edward Hall, retired from Northwestern University. The interviews yield new information and a broad range of approaches to the ethical and political questions which emerge.

The CIA's key instrument for sponsoring basic research in psychology, sociology and anthropology in the decade from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s was the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology, later called the Human Ecology Fund. Although accounts vary, according to Lawrence Hinkle, one of the founders of the Society and a professor at Cornell Medical Center, the origins of Human Ecology lie in a friendship between Allen Dulles and Harold Wolff, a prominent Cornell neuropsychiatrist who had cared for Dulles' son following a war injury. The return of American prisoners of war who had served in Korea evoked government and popular concern about the possible existence of "brainwashing." As director of the CIA, Dulles asked Wolff, an expert on stress, to find out what had happened to the POWs, and the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology was set up at Cornell Medical College to address this question through research on Chinese and Soviet methods of interrogation and indoctrination. Hinkle has said that he himself, as well as the Dean of Cornell Medical School, were aware of the Society's CIA origins.

According to Hinkle, Wolff put together a group for this project which included Colonel James Monroe, one-time head of the Psychological Warfare Research Division of the Air Force. Based on classified data, the project yielded important and seminal findings about the so-called "brainwashing" process. Hinkle says that to accomplish open publication of the findings, "a certain number of arms had to be twisted in the government." The major project report was published in the *American Medical Association Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry* in 1956. For Hinkle, the real lesson of the research was "the right of people to not be forced to testify against themselves." Yet the CIA's goals were not limited to defensive applications; it was also interested in aggressive development of methods for getting information.

Was Hinkle surprised at these applications? "It's like dealing with the military. You see what the enemy is doing, but you have to suspect that your own military people are going to do something very similar. I'm chagrined, but I'm not surprised."

Annual reports to the New York State Department of Social Welfare, with whom the Society was registered as a charitable organization, indicate that, by 1957, the Society had begun to fund research beyond the confines of Cornell.

Minutes of a May 1956 meeting of a CIA Committee state: "At the present time, the Society is so closely connected with (name deleted) University that it is difficult to use it for contracting for external research in other research communities. Therefore, it was proposed that the Society be completely separated from (name deleted) University, a full-time research director of the Society (be) hired making it possible to keep closer touch with the research community and mount projects of interest as

requirements developed."

On Cornell's side, Hinkle says that the proposed expansion of the Society made him and the medical school uncomfortable. The Society's headquarters were moved from Cornell to Forest Hills, Long Island, and Colonel Monroe was hired as the new director.

The high-level board included members of the intelligence establishment, as well as prominent psychologists. One board member was Carl Rogers, then at the University of Wisconsin.

In an interview, Rogers told how he became involved with Human Ecology: "James Monroe came to me and told me that Dr. Harold Wolff, a neuropsychiatrist whom I had a lot of respect for, was heading up an organization to do research on personality and so on. Then he told me more and I realized that it had secret aspects to it."

"We did get, I think, a couple of grants from them, actually among the first money we got to do research on psychotherapy. It was the research work we'd been trying to do for a long time but couldn't get money enough to do it. The fact that we got these grants, I think, helped us get the track record so that we began to get some other support. "Then he (Monroe) did ask me to go on the Board." As a board member, Rogers thought the money "was coming from intelligence funds as a cover for secret work that was going on." He said he was asked not to tell people where the money was coming from and saw helping to maintain the cover as part of his duty.

"It was an organization which, as far as I knew at the time, was doing legitimate things.... It's impossible in the present-day climate of attitude toward intelligence activities to realize what it was like in the 1950s. It seemed as though Russia was a very potential enemy and as though the United States was very wise to get whatever information it could about things that the Russians might try to do, such as brainwashing or influencing people. So that it didn't seem at all dishonorable to me to be connected with an intelligence outfit at that time. I look at it quite differently now." Rogers states that now he would not touch covert funding "with a ten-foot pole. Undoubtedly the government has to carry on intelligence activities, but I don't like fooling our people."

The last meeting Rogers remembers did have an overt intelligence angle. He and other people in the field of personality and psychotherapy were given a lot of information about Khrushchev. "We were asked to figure out what we thought of him and what would be the best way of dealing with him. And that seemed to be an entirely principled and legitimate aspect. I don't think we contributed very much, but, anyway, we tried."

Rogers furnished reports of his work to Human Ecology, but had no knowledge of its application by the CIA. While Rogers saw himself as being funded to study techniques and outcomes of nondirective therapy, the CIA seems to have had other ideas. A CIA memo from January 1960 says of Rogers' research that it could provide a mechanism for evaluating certain techniques of influencing human behavior.

Rogers never saw the memo.

Edgar Schein, a social psychologist at MIT's Sloane School of Management, served as a consultant to Human Ecology. In an interview, he presented a careful historical chronology of his involvement with intelligence-related research: "It started with the exchange of prisoners of war in 1953, when literally all the psychiatric and psychological resources that were available in the three services were sent on these various teams to Korea to debrief and do therapy and counseling and whatever needed to be done to help the men readjust. All that was written up by me in an article in *Psychiatry* that appeared in 1956.

"That *Psychiatry* paper basically laid out things like breaking up groups, moving leaders, withholding mail, using men against each other. And I think, even in that paper, I made the point, which for me is the central one, that none of this seemed to be a new or unusual or esoteric technique.... At that point I was in the Army as an Army research psychologist working at Walter Reed (Army Hospital). Many of the people who subsequently have been, I think, linked to behavior control, at one point or another probably met each other in those days in Washington, either at symposia or at professional meetings, because at that point behavior control was very, very much an issue in relation to what the Communists had done to the U.S. prisoners. And there was a sizable group of people ranging from psychiatrists to social psychologists and Skinnerian psychologists.

"My hunch is that the reason the CIA got interested in all this is because they realized that what we could learn by what had happened to Americans might teach us something (about) how we could deal with enemy captives, which was very much their business. So it doesn't surprise me that they would have begun to funnel money into this kind of research. But at that time at least, the motivation was very clearly U.S. security and how to improve it....

In '56 I got out of the Army, but by then I had gotten extremely interested in the civilian prisoners who were coming out of the mainland of China. These were civilians who had been imprisoned anywhere from one to five years. They were more interesting cases because they had undergone more radical personal and attitudinal change, which had not been the case of the prisoners of war. So all of us were very curious to get a hold of these people and find out how we could explain what appeared to be a more fundamental, radical change. My book, called *Coercive Persuasion*, specifically deals with those civilian cases and kind of tries to put the whole problem of brainwashing in perspective.

"I was supported in doing some of the interviews and eventually writing the book with CIA money. I did know at that point that it was CIA money. I do not have in my records whether it was a direct grant to the Center for International Studies at MIT from the CIA or whether it was funneled through the Human Ecology Fund."

Schein said that his view at that time toward CIA funding was "totally positive. What people really can't grasp is how much of a change there has been in the public attitude. The CIA was a hero, and the question of taking money from them wasn't by



the remotest stretch of the imagination an issue. In fact, one side of this that hasn't been stressed enough in all this is that I suspect we were vastly better off in Vietnam by virtue of this research having been done, because all of the services learned a great deal about how to train people to withstand the rigors of imprisonment....

"I knew a lot of the CIA people when I was in the Army, and they are very sophisticated people in the first place. The notion that we as social scientists really educated them I think is naive in the extreme....

"When I left the Army in 1956, I came to MIT in the Sloane School of Management. Monroe, then head of Human Ecology, proposed that I be a research consultant to look at proposals and essentially judge their scientific merit. I had nothing to do with the other aspects of the problem; in other words, whether it was an important piece of research to do or not.

"As best I can recall, I knew that the Human Ecology Fund was government money; I don't think I knew that it was solely CIA money. The most important element is ... that it didn't matter, because we were not seeing the CIA in any unusual or villainous or different role from the Navy or the Army or any other piece of the U.S. government. It's only in today's context that this even becomes an issue."

In 1961, Schein was invited by the Bureau of Prisons to present a paper entitled "Man Against Man" as part of a management development program for prison wardens. He described the techniques used by the Chinese, pretty much as presented in the original *Psychiatry* paper. After the talk, the training director encouraged the wardens to apply these techniques in their prisons. Basically, he had transformed Schein's description into a set of recommendations. Schein had been "struck by the degree to which the manner of our own prison management resembled in many ways what the Communists had done." Years later, prison groups linked his talk with the introduction of behavior modification, drugs and psychiatry into prisons.

In response to an article by Jessica Mitford on the subject which appeared in *Harper's Magazine* in June 1973, Schein wrote: "For me this matter has illustrated how far our values have shifted in ten years. Science has become politicized, and it is clearly no longer safe for the social scientist simply to describe and report his findings...."

In the interview, Schein elaborated. "I think I'm not ready to say we've got to stop publishing. I think that would be a pretty disastrous consequence if scientists began to say, 'Well, this could be misused; therefore I won't publish it at all.' I think rather what the scientist should do is think through the possible uses and misuses and state as clearly as he or she can what those uses and misuses might be and be clear about it.... I think we have enough power to influence the journals. If we haven't insisted on putting those kinds of things in our articles, then that's our problem."

He added, "I have been in a school of management now for 20 years, and I've learned from that professional school experience that you're never neutral. I've swung completely to the other direction. I think that a lot of people simply have never

thought about it because they've never been confronted by a public policy issue around their research."

Martin Orne, then a professor at the University of Pennsylvania said that he was asked by Human Ecology to write an article on the use of hypnosis in interrogation. The article, which appeared in 1961 in *The Manipulation of Human Behavior*, edited by Albert Biderman and Herbert Zimmer under contract to the Air Force, was entitled "The Potential Uses of Hypnosis in Interrogation." "I didn't do any work on interrogation," says Orne. I went through and I analyzed what could and could not be done with hypnosis and why."

Orne says, "If the CIA used hypnosis in interrogation after the work I published, I think they were damn fools." On the subject of using hypnosis to control behavior to the point of producing anti-social or self-destructive acts, the chapter notes an intrinsic defect to laboratory tests: "The experimental situation legitimizes much behavior which the subject, in other contexts, views as contrary to his internalized prohibitions." Orne goes on to suggest the following experiment. "A better test of the question would be an experiment performed by someone who is not known to be a university professor. For example, a carnival hypnotist might suggest to a subject obtained as a volunteer during a demonstration that he return after the performance. At that time during a reinduced trance he would suggest that he should rob the local jewelry store and bring him, the hypnotist, the stolen jewelry."

In an interview, Orne said he would only be disturbed about CIA attempts to use hypnosis for the control of agent behavior if they were successful. "I know too much about hypnosis for me to be disturbed about this; because, as is made clear in umpteen papers and umpteen lectures, hypnosis is an extremely ineffective way of controlling behavior."

In addition to money for the chapter on the potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation, Orne also received a grant from Human Ecology to study the nature of hypnosis. He said that the "foundation seemed interested in psychobiological material and subjective phenomena at a time when there wasn't much interest because behaviorism was in vogue...."

"The research would have been the same no matter who supported it. And I really don't see how anything we did would help anyone do anything they shouldn't be doing. I believe that in the social sciences we are, fortunately, sufficiently ineffective so that our findings can be made available.

"I think that right now there is a kind of hysterical concern, no matter what people did. Very frankly, with the terror of the times there's no way anybody can really look at it dispassionately. I acknowledged the Human Ecology Fund on some papers because I used them as a perfectly straight thing."

Sociologist Jay Schulman sees Human Ecology from a very different perspective. He tells how he had spent two years at the London School of Economics reading Marx

and returned to the United States interested in the sociology of revolution. In 1956, while putting together a project at Rutgers University on the Hungarian Revolution, he and his colleague Richard Stephenson, a sociologist at Rutgers, were offered support by Human Ecology.

According to Schulman, the foundation gave him money to go to London and Paris and interview young Hungarian Marxists. Meanwhile, Human Ecology was supporting a research team at Cornell, led by Hinkle, to interview Hungarian refugees who had come to the United States. Schulman says, "The people who came to the United States were those people who were able to get American visas; they were certainly not the people who had participated in the leadership of the revolution, by definition. Those people went to England, France and to some of the other European countries. And that was why I went to Europe to interview those people."

Although the two research teams were in contact, said Schulman, Hinkle never told him of the CIA link. To Schulman, that was one of the most distressing aspects of the whole thing. Hinkle attributes his silence to the fact that he had signed a secrecy agreement with the CIA. Communication of the data to the CIA was accomplished, says Schulman, through Monroe, who attended all of their research meetings. In addition to this channel of communication, Schulman and Stephenson tell of a seminar on the Hungarian Revolution sponsored by the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology at which, he now realizes, CIA people were present. Says Schulman, "Dick Stephenson and I read a paper and I engaged in colloquy with some of these people. I think I was probably the person who spoke the most at this group." Stephenson said that he now feels the CIA was reprehensible because covert funding caused them to deceive their respondents about the source of funds. It seems unlikely Marxist Hungarians would have participated in the study had they known.

At the time, Schulman recalls, he wanted to use the Hungarian material for a PhD thesis in sociology at Columbia under the direction of Robert Lynd. Lynd, an important sociologist who pioneered the study of American class structure, rejected the thesis "on the grounds that any such study had to be tainted by the CIA."

"I didn't believe it at the time; it had to do with my own naivete. Even though my politics were socialist, I had no understanding at that time of how the real world operated.... In 1957, I was myself a quasi-Marxist and if I had known that the study was sponsored by the CIA, there is really, obviously, no way that I would have been associated with that study or that work.... "My view is that social scientists have a deep personal responsibility for questioning the sources of funding, and the fact that I didn't do it at the time was simply, in my judgment, indication of my own naivete and political innocence in spite of my ideological bent."

On October 7, 1977, the Chancellor of the University of Illinois phoned Charles Osgood, a psychology professor there, to inform him that he had received funding through Human Ecology. The University of Illinois was thus one of the 44 universities to receive documents from the CIA, notifying them of past projects in social and medical sciences covertly funded by the agency.

Interviewed on the subject, Osgood said that Human Ecology had supported his cross-cultural study of meaning for three years, from 1959 through 1961. The study used the semantic differential to investigate how people in 31 societies attribute feelings to different aspects of culture. According to Osgood, Human Ecology supported the initial "tool-making" phase of the research, which tested the cross-cultural generality of evaluation, potency and activity as dimensions of affective meaning.

Osgood said that he hit upon Human Ecology from a psychologist at Stanford who had been his boss at Illinois; Osgood was then visiting the Center for Advanced Studies in Palo Alto. This person suggested Human Ecology as a source of funding for cross-cultural research. Osgood learned on seeing the CIA documents from his project that the CIA made a decision to fund his project four to five months *before* he had submitted a formal proposal or made any contact with Human Ecology. However, he emphasized that, no matter how eager, the CIA never interfered with or attempted to influence the research.

Osgood recounted that while working on the project he was suspicious that one of his colleagues "might be an agent for something, but I didn't know who. He kept disappearing on our early trips. He'd say he was going to bed, and I'd think of something I wanted to ask him and he'd be out for two or three hours. It happened again and again. He had spent many years in Afghanistan as a researcher; he knew his way around other cultures. If he was an agent, he would have probably been sent to facilitate and to keep the CIA informed." CIA records of Osgood's project -- code named MKULTRA 95 -- show that there was, in fact, one witting person on the project staff.

A CIA memo of March 1960 indicates that the agency saw Osgood's project as "directly relevant to agency problems in (name deleted) and technical support of political activities." Osgood said he could well understand CIA interest in his work: "The semantic differential is used in advertising all the time to help sell products. Evaluation, activity and potency zoom out at you from every advertisement. There's nothing I can do about that, you know.

"The physicists have been worried about what was with their brainchild, nuclear energy. Well, in a small way, people like myself have the same problem. You develop a technique which is useful for measuring all sorts of things. It's like Geppetto and Pinocchio. Pinocchio kept wandering off by himself. If we had to do only things that would be safe when other people use them, then there would be very little -- damn little -- we could do in science. But I must admit that what's going on right now doesn't make me too happy."

Another person funded in the area of cross-cultural study of communication was anthropologist Edward Hall, a pioneer in the study of nonverbal communication. Hall said that he received a small amount of money from Human Ecology to support preparation of *The Hidden Dimension*, his 1966 book on the human use of space in public and private. He commented that funding was difficult because "it was innovative research," and that he had just had a grant renewal turned down from NIH,

leaving him "stranded right in the middle of the project."

According to Hall, much of the material for both *The Hidden Dimension* and *The Silent Language*, a book on nonverbal communication, came out of his work for the Foreign Service Institute of the State Department in the early 1950s. Says Hall, "I put on a very innovative program to train American technicians ... for service overseas, training in intercultural relations, one of the first of its kind."

Hall doubts he would have taken the money, had he known it was coming from the CIA: "I would want to know why were they backing me? What were they getting out of this? I still don't know."

Told that Psychological Assessment Associates, a private consulting firm which was the CIA's successor to Human Ecology, had programs to give agents cultural training, Hall said he didn't know that the CIA was doing anything in cultural training. He agreed, nevertheless, that his books could have been useful for the purpose "because the whole thing is designed to begin to teach people to understand, to read other people's behavior.

"What little I know about the agency, I wouldn't want to have much to do with it," he says of the CIA. "I don't mind training people for the State Department, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development -- even the Army." After all, he notes, "the United States is a world power." Yet, he adds, "Within that overall context, here's a group of people out there doing dirty tricks. I don't know what you do about that.

"But in general (to) the degree to which people read each other accurately, they tend to make more valid decisions. I don't care who you're talking about. Promoting better and more accurate communication is an end in itself. As soon as these start being stated politically, then all sorts of things begin to happen. I'm an apolitical person."

Hall says he feels the anonymous backing of social science does pose problems, but it depends on who is doing it. "John D. Rockefeller is fine, but if it's the mafia, it's dirty pool. How do you work this out? The basic questions are what's going to be done with it and why are they funding you? I don't see how social scientists can answer those questions. Life is extraordinarily complex."

Wilse Webb, a newly-elected member of the American Psychological Associations' Board of Directors, was another beneficiary of the Human Ecology Fund. Originally interviewed two years ago, Webb said he was unaware of the Fund's CIA backing until the interview. He said he had been contacted by an old Air Force friend, Samuel Lyerly, who was then an official of the fund and known to have intelligence connections. Webb said he received a grant to review the Soviet literature on sleep therapy, concluding there was nothing in it after his review.

He also related the following incident: The Russians had developed a machine which induced sleep artificially by passing a low voltage current from the eyes to the back of

the head. Sleep induced in this way was supposed to be more restorative than normal sleep; it was claimed that two hours equalled a night of ordinary sleep. One night Webb was called by the Air Force; an intelligence operation had succeeded in getting all the parts of a sleep machine out of the Soviet Union and they wanted Webb's group to investigate. Webb informed them that Lafayette Radio had put out such a machine commercially and was already advertising it in their catalogue.

Webb made a trip to Czechoslovakia to obtain literature on the sleep machine. He said he would have been nervous if he had thought he was doing it for the CIA because the fact would have cast suspicion on his Czech colleagues and friends, as well as himself. He added that he had a Czech working in his lab, and that CIA funding could have made trouble for him. Thus, in Webb's case, covert funding enabled the CIA to obtain the cooperation of foreign scientists who would not otherwise have participated.

Nevertheless, Webb acknowledges that "the atmosphere was different. What was patriotic then is unpatriotic now. Without getting back in that context, I can't figure whether I would have said yes or no. It probably would have been a matter of supreme indifference to me, because I think our attitude to the CIA was much more indifferent than it is now.... I took Air Force money even though I didn't like bombs falling on Vietnam. The fact of the matter is that I was taking away money from the bombs dropping on Vietnam for a good cause.

"Most of us don't think deeply about these things. We search for money to do our job, and I think that many a poor boy would be perfectly happy to get money from the Rockefeller Foundation or Exxon. Right now, for example, if we were terribly conscience-stricken about our money, would we take it from Exxon...? I don't know. Most of us don't think in those particular terms as to where the money comes from. It's what we're going to do with the money."

---

Patricia Greenfield is professor of psychology at the University of California at Los Angeles.

[Back to home page](#)

From *Cloak & Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961* by Robin W. Winks (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1987), pp. 495-97:

## A short list of history scholars who worked for the Office of Strategic Services

by Robin W. Winks

- **James Phinney Baxter III**, president of Williams College;
- **Carl Blegen**, professor of history, University of Cincinnati, and a leading authority on American immigration and ethnic history;
- **Crane Brinton**, professor of history, Harvard University, perhaps the leading historian of ideas on the European front;
- **Dr. Frederick Burkhardt**, director of the American Council of Learned Societies;
- **John Christopher**, professor of history, University of Rochester, who with Brinton and Robert Lee Wolff wrote an extremely influential (and extremely successful) textbook, *History of Civilization*, immediately after the war, a text which became one of two that dominated the market for the immediate postwar generation of undergraduate students. Brinton, Christopher and Wolff, as the text was known, reflected the synoptic view the authors developed while in the OSS, and it would not be totally revised until 1983;
- **Dr. Ray Cline**, who wrote a first-rate volume in the official history of World War II and then returned to the intelligence profession. He became the CIA's deputy director for intelligence from 1962 to 1966;
- **John Clive**, professor of history, Harvard University, a major figure in nineteenth-century British studies;
- **Gordon Craig**, professor of history, Princeton and later Stanford universities, author of the leading books on the role of the military in German history;
- **John Curtiss**, professor of history, Duke University, an authority on France;
- **Harold C. Deutsch**, professor of history, University of Minnesota, also an important figure in the development of modern German history in the United States;
- **Donald M. Dozer**, professor of history, University of California, Santa Barbara, a Latin Americanist;

- **Dr. Allan Evans**, a medievalist from Yale who remained with the Department of State after R&A was transferred to State at the end of the war;
- **John K. Fairbank**, professor of Chinese history at Harvard University, the leading sinologist of his generation;
- **Franklin L. Ford**, professor of history, Harvard University, and the dean of Harvard College during the student disorders of the late 1960s;
- **Felix Gilbert**, historian at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, an elegant diplomatist;
- **S. Everett Gleason**, who worked with William Langer in the OSS and after, and returned to become the State Department's historian;
- **Moses Hadas**, professor of classics, Columbia University, who wrote on the expansion of the Roman Empire;
- **Samuel W. Halperin**, professor of history, University of Chicago, and after the war editor of the *Journal of Modern History*;
- **Henry B. Hill**, professor of history, University of Kansas, who developed British history there and later at Wisconsin;
- **Hajo Holborn**, Sterling Professor of History, Yale University, who worked on occupation policy for Germany at the end of the war and wrote on the history of military occupation, becoming a dominant figure in the training of postwar Germanists;
- **H. Stuart Hughes**, professor of history, Harvard University, who moved on from where Crane Brinton had left off in European intellectual (and especially Italian) history, and unsuccessfully ran for the House of Representatives in Massachusetts;
- **Sherman Kent**, who left Yale to preside over ONE, the Office of National Estimates, at the CIA;
- **Clinton Knox**, who also left the historical profession, becoming ambassador to Guinea;
- **Leonard Krieger**, who returned from the OSS to become a professor at Yale and then of German intellectual history at the University of Chicago;
- **William L. Langer**, the outstanding European diplomatic historian of his generation;
- **Val Lorwin**, professor of history, University of Oregon, and the nation's leading authority on the Low Countries;



- **Herbert Marcuse**, who moved from history to philosophy at Brandeis and the University of California, and from the contemplative life to that of guru to the student revolt during the war in Vietnam;
- **Henry Cord Meyer**, professor of history, Pomona College, another leading Germanist who left Yale for the West Coast;
- **Saul K. Padover**, professor at the New School for Social Research, authority on Jefferson and democratic thought, and a pioneer lecturer on American history at a wide range of universities overseas;
- **Michael B. Petrovich**, professor of history, University of Wisconsin, who developed Russian studies there;
- **David H. Pinckney**, professor of history, first at the University of Missouri and then the University of Washington, a major force in French history and, like Brinton, Craig, Fairbank, Holborn, Langer, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a president of the American Historical Association, perhaps the highest honor the discipline can bestow on one of its own;
- **David M. Potter**, professor of history, Yale University (and later at Stanford), who with Ralph Gabriel and Norman Holmes Pearson firmly established American studies at Yale;
- **Conyers Read**, professor of history, University of Pennsylvania, an authority on Elizabethan England and the prime mover behind the Council on Foreign Relations in Philadelphia;
- **Henry L. Roberts**, professor of history, Columbia University, who followed Geroid Robinson, also of R&A, in developing a front-rank Russian studies program at that institution;
- **Elsbeth D. Rostow**, University of Texas, who with her husband, Walt Whitman Rostow, worked out major interpretations on American foreign policy;
- **John E. Sawyer**, economic historian who left Yale to become president of Williams College and then of the Mellon Foundation;
- **Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.**, professor of history, Harvard University, polymath, adviser to and historian for the Kennedys before his translation to a Schweitzer chair at the City University of New York;
- **Bernadotte E. Schmitt**, who after the war lived in retirement, lauded as the leading revisionist historian of the causes of World War I;
- **Carl E. Schorske**, professor of history at Wesleyan and then Princeton University, an authority on European intellectual history;

- **Raymond Sontag**, professor of history, University of California at Berkeley, the first of the old OSS team to publicly remind the student generation of the 1960s of his service and of why academics had felt it appropriate to engage in intelligence work, which he had continued to do as a consultant to ONE;
- **L. S. Stavrianos**, professor of history, Northwestern University, who carried the idea of global history further than any other scholar, in a series of notable texts;
- **Richard P. Stebbins**, a man Sherman Kent felt could turn out more work of high quality than anyone else in his shop, who became director of the Council on Foreign Relations;
- **Paul R. Sweet**, who also remained with the State Department, in charge of its official histories and archives;
- **Alexander Vucinich**, professor of history, San Jose State University, a leading authority on Eastern Europe;
- **Wayne S. Vucinich**, professor of history, Stanford University, who covered the same waterfront;
- **Paul L. Ward**, who became the executive director of the American Historical Association;
- **Albert Weinberg**, technically a political scientist, although the author of a fine historical analysis of American imperial expansion, who remained in government work after the war;
- **Robert Lee Wolff**, professor of history, Harvard University, that institution's outstanding authority on Eastern Europe;
- **John H. Wuorinen**, professor of history, Columbia University, who covered Scandinavia and in particular Finland;
- **T. Cuyler Young**, professor of archaeology, Princeton University, who with Richard Frye at Harvard, who also was in the OSS, pioneered Iranian studies in the United States.

---

From the *Cloak & Gown* flyleaf: "Robin W. Winks is Master of Berkeley College and the Randolph W. Townsend, Jr., Professor of History at Yale University. A former member of the diplomatic service, author and editor of sixteen books, and an expert on spy and thriller fiction, he lives in New Haven."

Website editor's note: Winks' professional bias accounts for the fawning tone of his descriptions of colleagues' careers above, proving once again that history is closer to interpretive art than it is to social science. Nevertheless the above list, which appears as a single end note in his book, is useful in highlighting the interlocks between academia, the intelligence community, and, it would seem, the Council on Foreign Relations (Winks was a member of CFR in the 1980s). On page 446

of this same book, Winks writes that it "seems fairly clear" that "the CIA played no significant role in the overthrow of President Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973." **Yech!** If you disagree, then stay away from Yale.

[Back to home page](#)

[ The CIA asked University of California administrator Earl Clinton Bolton, who was spending some time at CIA headquarters, to suggest ideas on how to improve relations between the Agency and academia. ]

[Academia 01, p.1](#)

5 August 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: [deleted]

SUBJECT: Agency-Academic Relations

This is an attempt to make some observations and suggestions about Agency-academic relations. In doing so I am grateful for the stimulus furnished by your outline. Although I believe I have addressed myself to most of the questions you have raised I have done so in free form rather than by a point by point consideration. I have also used "head notes" for purposes of organization and in an attempt to highlight the crucial questions in the subject.

**Justifying an Agency-Academic Relationship:** Let me stress at the outset that I believe Agency-academic relations are for the most part very good. Though I have no quantitative data to support such a conclusion my guess is that 99% of the members of the academy would be willing to assist the Agency if properly and skillfully approached, and that only a small fraction of that other 1% would be angered by an invitation to assist or would attempt to embarrass the Agency in any way.

However, on occasion when a university or an individual has acknowledged any contact with the Agency there has been some outcry by a few vocal members of the academic community.

In a later part of this paper I suggest "an affirmative program" designed to improve the Agency's reputation in academic circles and thus decrease the risks (costs) of association with the Agency. However, until either the passage of time or an image bolstering plan changes the cliches of the moment an educational institution or individual electing to assist the Agency may be on the defensive.

In my view the best way to defend association with the Agency when such a defense is necessary is:

1. By relating work for the Agency to one of the traditional functions of a university; and

[Academia 01, p.2](#)

2. By basing the defense or rejoinder on long established academic values.

**The Functions of a University:** There is almost universal agreement that universities do (and properly should) engage in the following basic functions:

1. The preservation and transmission of knowledge to their constituency (i.e. the so-called **teaching** function); and
2. The testing of that which is currently accepted as "truth" and the discovery of new truth (i.e. the **research** function); and
3. The performance for society's benefit of those functions which can best (or exclusively) be performed by a university (i.e. the **public service** function)

Authorities will differ as to whether a sub-function e.g. the training of a leadership elite to be innovative and responsive should be included under "1" or "3" above, but there is little disagreement that what higher education is all about is encompassed within these general goals.

The Agency should phrase its requests to academia in such a way that the service being sought relates as clearly and directly as possible to one of these traditional functions and when necessary the university and individual scholar should explain involvement with the Agency as a contribution to one of these proper academic goals. It should also be stressed that when an apologia is necessary it can best be made: (1) by some distant academic who is not under attack, (2) in a "respectable" publication of general circulation (e.g. Harpers, Saturday Review, Vital Speeches, etc.), and (3) with full use of the jargon of the academy (as illustrated below).

**Traditional Mores of the Academic:** Every profession develops a certain ethical or philosophical penumbra which is more or less sacred and which

protects from attack the most vulnerable or least understood rites of that profession. This body of doctrine usually develops by "common law" and is subsequently codified. (Incidentally the codified dogma never precisely articulates the full scope of the protective doctrines; hence there is sufficient vagueness in the total traditions of the profession to provide a skillful polemicist with formidable ammunition for defense.)

### [Academia 01, p.3](#)

Two doctrines fiercely protected by the academy are "academic freedom" and "privilege and tenure." The former is the absolute right of the scholar to investigate any subject within his competence, in any lawful way, at any time. The latter doctrine holds that a fully initiated member of the profession has certain irrevocable privileges, including but not limited to, the right to continue his association with the university until retirement without fear of termination except for a very few egregious offenses.

When attacked for aiding the Agency the academic (or institution) should base a rejoinder on these sacred doctrines. For example, a professor's right to undertake classified research is unassailable if he stands on the ground of academic freedom and his privileges as a scholar. And he should be reminded that although his derogators may undertake a good deal of no loud rhetoric they really cannot impair his tenure.

**Contracts and Grants:** I have discussed [several words deleted] the matter of research arrangement between the Agency and academic world. Here are some of my further ideas on the subject.

1. Shouldn't the Agency have an insulator such as Rand or IDA? Such entities have quite good acceptance in academia, do excellent work and provide real protection against "blow back." Such an independent corporation should of course have a ringing name (e.g. Institute for a Free Society), should do work for the entire intelligence community, and should really have a sufficiently independent existence so that it can take the heat on some projects if necessary.
2. In my opinion we are in a cycle in which we are moving away from institutional involvement in classified contracts toward a time when no classified research will be allowed on campus even by a professor acting

on his own. The Agency might want to try to anticipate this trend by offering off-campus leased space to scholars doing work for the Agency.

[Academia 01, p.4](#)

3. The indirect cost rate which is allowed by BOB Circular A-21 is regarded by academic people as being unfair to the university. This "overhead" rate does not allow adequate recovery of actual hidden costs. Your contracting officer ought to be encouraged to adjust the established rate upward by a point or two as an incentive to institutions of higher education to take work.

4. As a general rule contracts and grants should be made only in response to proposals which "originate" with the principal investigator on the campus. The real initiative might be with the Agency but the apparent or record launching of the research should, wherever possible, emanate from the campus.

5. (Here is a declaration against interest.) It seems to me that there are few instances in which it is indispensable or even necessary to contract with an academic entity rather than the principal investigator directly. Therefore because of the increased complexity of the transaction of the institution is involved I would suggest that virtually all of your contracts and grants be made directly to the individual. Perhaps personal service agreements could be used to replace traditional contracts and grants for sponsored research.

6. Would it be possible to substitute some new designations for words such as "classified," "secret," "confidential," etc? Perhaps labels such as "limited access research," "not to be discussed with others without prior permission of the Agency," etc. could be used. My point is that such terms as classified research have become so emotionally charged that they provoke an irrational response before substantive content is even considered.

[Academia 01, p.5](#)

**"The Image": An Affirmative Program:** Good public relations means

excellent performance publicly appreciated. Because of the nature of the Agency's work discussions about performance must be limited, and efforts to gain public appreciation minimized. However I think it is possible to improve acceptance among that "public" which is the academic world.

To accomplish such a result would require a positive, long-term public relations plan. My impression is that the Agency has excellent press relations, but is not affirmatively interested (probably intentionally) in overall public relations. As to the academic community I would suggest that a very well considered, affirmative public relations program be developed.

The evolution of a public relations plan follows well recognized steps. These steps are suggested by the following questions.

1. How do we appear to the target group (academia) today?
2. How do we want to appear to that target group five years hence?
3. What steps should we take to get from phase 1 to 2?

It is of course unlikely that the goal in 3 above will just happen by accident; the goal is obviously more likely to be reached if there is a plan.

It is difficult to suggest implementing techniques without first knowing the precise future image the Agency would like to have in the academic world. However, I believe the following suggestions would generally improve that image among academicians.

1. Follow a plan of emphasizing that CIA is a member of the national security community (rather than the intelligence community) and stress the great number of other agencies with which the Agency is allied in advancing national interests. Several such agencies (FBI, AEC, Secret Service, State Department, etc.) have spent much time, money and thought on telling their story. In my view the Agency will benefit by some "transfer" effect.

[Academia 01, p.6](#)



2. Establish at Yale the Walter Bedell Smith or William J. Donovan Lectures or Chair on Intelligence as an Instrument of National Policy. (Try in as many ways as possible to establish the study of intelligence as a legitimate and important field of inquiry for the academic scholar.)
3. Invite qualified and sympathetic scholars to take their sabbaticals at the Agency. They would work not as consultants, for that is a very different function, but on subjects and in a manner traditionally followed by a professor on his sabbatical.
4. Permit a few carefully nominated and selected doctoral candidates to spend a year at the Agency working on their dissertations. The unclassified materials in the library are a rich source of materials for genuine academic research. The candidate would of course have to recognize the Agency's right to review the finished document for accidental leaks.
5. Provide a handsomely funded post doctoral one-year opportunity for selected scholars. (The John McCone Fellowships?)
6. Publicize any effort of the Agency to make scarce materials available to scholars. (Could the story of the Hoover Institution -- Agency arrangement be told by a distinguished scholar of Chinese affairs in a publication of general interest to academics?)
7. Stress in recruiting, articles and speeches that the Agency is really a university without students and not a training school for spies. There is as much academic freedom **within** the walls of the building and among those competent on a given subject as on any campus I know. (I haven't detected the slightest tendency on the part of anyone to resist saying what he thinks.)

[Academia 01, p.7](#)

8. Encourage Agency representatives who attend academic meetings to clearly identify their affiliation.
9. Do all recruiting off campus and try to time these visits so that the

probability of reaction is decreased e.g. during the summer, between semesters, after the last issue of the student paper is printed for the semester, etc.

[Back to home page](#)

[ The section on academia begins at Document 2, p. 8 ]

[Document 1](#)

18 November 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Public Affairs

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Greater CIA Openness

1. In my hearings, I indicated my desire to continue Director Webster's policies in terms of improving accessibility to information about CIA by the public and overall openness to the extent possible, whether through background briefings for the press, public speeches by senior officials, or appearances on college campuses and elsewhere by professionals within CIA. I would like for you to appoint a task force to review these practices and see how they can be improved, and also to suggest additional proposals for making more information about the Agency available to the American people and to give greater transparency to our organization, internal control mechanisms, and steps that we take to ensure compliance with the law, actions consistent with the values of the American people, and cooperation with Congress. I invite you to include non-Agency individuals in your task force if that is appropriate and useful.

2. I would like to have your report and recommendations by 20 December 1991.

Robert M. Gates

[Document 2, p.1](#)

20 December 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Task Force on Greater CIA Openness

SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness

REFERENCE: Memo for D/PAO fr DCI, dtd 18 Nov, Subj: Greater CIA Openness (Tab A)

1. In response to your referenced request, the Task Force addressed the following:

- How can we do a better job of informing the general public and key constituencies about the need for a strong intelligence effort and about the missions and accomplishments of the Intelligence Community in a changing world, and

- To what extent do the dramatic changes in the world situation and the needs of oversight and accountability to the American people and their representatives dictate a reexamination of policies on classification and release of records, and finally

- How can we use openness to learn from others outside the Agency in order to improve our capabilities and our people.

2. Senior officials in the media, in the Executive and Legislative Branches, in the business/private sector and in academia all shared their views on CIA openness with the Task Force. (See Tab B) We also consulted Agency retirees and employees throughout the organization.

3. Many of those interviewed said the CIA was sufficiently open; all thought the CIA could do more to declassify and make available portions of its historical archives, especially regarding CIA successes and scientific/technical accomplishments; some said the CIA will have to work harder at explaining the need for intelligence in a post-cold war world.

[Document 2, p.2](#)

All agreed that an effective public affairs program for the CIA was necessary and that whatever changes were made to increase openness, all would expect

the CIA to keep the secrets it is charged to protect.

4. In whatever program we pursue, we should:

- get our employees on board first
- be consistent
- be excellent
- be credible -- admit when we are wrong
- personalize the Agency
- preserve the mystique

We should also ensure a coordinated PAO-OCA effort for this program. It will be important to get the Hill on board with the Agency's public position on various issues and to articulate the overall Agency strategy to Congress to honor your commitment re openness.

5. Before we can pursue greater openness, it is important to understand the Agency's current program in this area to put down a marker for possible change in the future. To provide some context you should be aware that while PAO grew during Judge Webster's tenure to meet the needs of increased requirements and an expanded program, PAO is now being told to downsize by about 33%. We recognize that a program of increased openness will require commitment of additional resources, not only for PAO but for other parts of the Agency. The Directorates will need to assess the resource implications of these recommendations.

6. In most of our discussions with outsiders as well as within the task force there was substantial agreement that we generally need to make the institution and the process more visible and understandable rather than strive for openness on specific substantive issues. To do this, we need to develop a strategic vision of what we want to be open about, why we want to be more open and to whom we want to be more open. Our suggestion for such a vision statement is:

CIA, the most open intelligence agency in the world, wants to be recognized as an organization of high caliber and culturally diverse people who achieve technical and analytic excellence and operational effectiveness in fulfilling their mission with integrity and the trust of the American people. We believe that it is important for

[Document 2, p.3](#)

[one or two lines missed during photocopying]

Formal acceptance of this statement by the Agency, or one similar to it, will provide a necessary and well-understood framework for taking the steps to achieve greater CIA openness.

7. We have an important story to tell, a story that bears repeating. We are the most open intelligence agency in the world which is proper in our form of democracy. (In fact, several foreign intelligence organizations have sought advice from PAO on how to establish a mechanism for dealing with the public.) That said, many Americans do not understand the intelligence process and the role of intelligence in national security policymaking. Many still operate with a romanticized or erroneous view of intelligence from the movies, TV, books and newspapers. These views often damage our reputation and make it harder for us to fulfill our mission. There are steps we can take which will benefit us and the American people.

8. To increase CIA openness and signal a change in how we do business, we need to take initiatives to share our history through the declassification of old records, explain our mission and functions in a changing world through an expanded briefing program within and outside of government, and develop a strategy for expanding our work with the media as a means of reaching an even broader audience. Our major recommendations address these issues:

A. Declassifying and releasing records that describe CIA's history and activities would go a long way to educating the public on the work of intelligence. Our voluntary Historical Review Program has proceeded very slowly, and recent legislation (H.R. 1415) has mandated greater access to our records by State Department historians. Presently, policy and resource constraints severely limit the amount of historical records released by the CIA. Therefore, we recommend that you:

- 1) Establish a senior-led, Agency-wide group to review the Agency's policy and practices related to declassification and release of records under the Historical Review and FOIA programs, as they relate to the changing international environment

and counterintelligence threat, and with a view to accelerating the process.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

[Document 2, p.4](#)

2) Initiate in the near-term the declassification of historical materials on specific events, particularly those which are repeatedly the subject of false allegations, such as the 1948 Italian Elections, 1953 Iranian Coup, 1954 Guatemalan Coup, 1958 Indonesian Coup and the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Notify the public of the availability of the resulting materials.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

3) Have OTE publish an unclassified version of Studies in Intelligence and make it available to the public for sale through the National Technical Information Service and have it listed in the Social Science Index.<sup>1</sup>

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

4) Publish compendiums of papers delivered at conferences sponsored or cosponsored by CIA.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

B. Many people inside and outside of government do not understand what we do or how we do it. It is important that we increase our efforts to tell people both what we do and what we don't do. To this end, we recommend that you:

1) Commission PAO, working in concert with OCA and the directorates, to develop additional unclassified material on CIA, its mission, functions, and changing role into the next century.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

<sup>1</sup> The Editorial Board of Studies has identified several hundred unclassified or declassified articles and taken steps to interest scholars and publishers in them. About half a dozen university presses have expressed interest, but to date none have actively begun the editorial process.

[Document 2, p.5](#)

2) Expand the Agency's briefing program for:

- new members of Congress
- key Congressional staffers, as appropriate
- Congressional Research Service (CRS) and Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) staff members
- new political appointees in relevant agencies, (especially important to prepare for in an election year)
- Agency contractors
- Academic consultants
- Academic, business and other private sector groups

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

C. To reach our objective of greater openness, we must come up with a better balance in dealing with the media in a world where television is the primary conveyor of information to most Americans. In the past we have been reluctant to do television (Judge Webster appeared only three times before he announced his retirement), and some would still caution against it because of the special risks involved. Yet the opportunity for impact is so great that we believe the time has come to change our position. One of the things that is leading us in this direction is the strong view from many quarters that we need a visible Agency spokesperson, such as the D/PAO, to refute allegations and set the record straight. When such false allegations come from television, we need to be able to speak to them in the same forum.<sup>2</sup> To this end, we recommend that you:

1) Commission the D/PAO to develop in consultation with the Deputy Directors a media strategy for the '90s that

<sup>2</sup> For example, an Agency spokesperson reading our statement in response to



the allegations made by *Nightline* in summer 1991 would have been more effective than Ted Koppel's reading of it with raised eyebrows and a look of "What do you expect given the source?".

[Document 2, p.6](#)

increases the visibility of the DCI and the intelligence process, expands the role of the Agency spokesperson and takes a more proactive approach toward the media in general.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

9. In most of our discussions we defined the audiences for greater CIA openness as the following: the media, academia, business, the private sector, government and our own employees. We have used these categories to describe our current program related to openness which provides a context for offering our other recommendations.

*A. MEDIA*

*1) Current Program:*

*a) PAO now has relationships with reporters from every major wire service, newspaper, news weekly, and television network in the nation. This has helped us turn some "intelligence failure" stories into "intelligence success" stories, and it has contributed to the accuracy of countless others. In many instances, we have persuaded reporters to postpone, change, hold, or even scrap stories that could have adversely affected national security interests or jeopardized sources and methods.*

*b) PAO spokespersons build and maintain these professional relationships with reporters by responding to daily inquiries from them over the telephone (3369 in 1991), by providing unclassified background briefings to them at Headquarters (174 in 1991), and by arranging for them to interview the DCI, DDCI and other senior Agency officials (164 in 1991).*

*c. PAO responds to numerous requests from authors, researchers, filmmakers, and others seeking information, guidance, or cooperation from the Agency in their endeavours. Some responses can be handled in a one-shot telephone call. Others, such as Life Magazine's proposed photo essay, BBC's six-part series, Ron Kessler's requests for information for his Agency book, and the need for an Agency focal point in the Rochester Institute of Technology controversy drew heavily on PAO resources.*

*d. PAO has also reviewed some film scripts about the Agency, documentary and fictional, at the request of filmmakers seeking guidance on accuracy and authenticity. In a few instances,*

[Document 2, p.7](#)

*we facilitated the filming of a few scenes on Agency premises. Responding positively to these requests in a limited way has provided PAO with the opportunity to help others depict the Agency and its activities accurately and without negative distortions. Except for responding to such requests, we do not seek to play a role in filmmaking ventures about the Agency which come to our attention. For example, although we knew that Oliver Stone's movie on JFK was in the works for some time, we did not contact him to volunteer an Agency viewpoint.*

*e. PAO coordinates the preparation of detailed background materials, usually in Q&A format, on major news issues for the DCI and DDCI for their appearances before media groups, world affairs councils, universities, and business and professional groups. PAO also prepares verbatim transcripts of their interviews with reporters and their appearances before media groups.*

2) Recommendations:

a. Provide more background briefings, when practical, to a greater number of print and electronic media journalists. Respond more quickly to telephone queries from the media, especially on fast-breaking events. PAO should continue to work with area analysts

and specialists so that PAO can respond telephonically to these questions, rather than insisting on an eventual in-person background briefings at Langley. Keep PAO as the conduit for these efforts and ensure that media across the U.S., not only those in the Washington, D.C. area, are aware of our program.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

b. Find more opportunities for the deputy directors to have on-the-record interviews with the media to talk about process and, on occasion, substantive issues.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

c. When there is a major international event that requires the attention of CIA (i.e., the Persian Gulf war), PAO should consider inviting a number of reporters to CIA Headquarters for an unclassified background briefing.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

### [Document 2, p.8](#)

d. Look for ways to emphasize the changing nature of the intelligence work force and the growing number of women and minorities in each directorate and increasingly in more senior positions. Consider support for some individual profiles which help personalize the world of intelligence in broad circulation newspapers or magazines.<sup>3</sup>

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

## **B. ACADEMIA**

### *1) Current Program*

*a. The Agency has a wide range of contacts with academics through recruiting, professional societies, contractual arrangements and OTE. PAO has recently been designated the focal point for all information about CIA's relations with the academic community. As such, PAO is building a database of information about Agency contacts with academia -- conferences and seminars, recruiting, officers and scholars-in-residence, contracts, teaching -- and serves as the clearinghouse of such information for Agency employees.*

*b. PAO officers also speak to approximately 250 academic audiences a year. Subject areas vary, but most focus on the structure and functions of the CIA, its role in the intelligence community, the intelligence process, and congressional oversight. PAO has developed a speakers' package for Agency officers and retirees who speak in public, including an annually updated Q&A package to aid the speaker in answering a broad array of questions.*

*c. PAO maintains a mailing list of 700 academicians who receive unclassified Agency publications four times a year. Recipients write to praise the quality of the products and to claim that these mailings are one of the most effective ways of reaching out.*

*d. PAO sponsors the DCI Program for Deans twice a year. This program seeks to expose administrators of academic institutions to senior Agency officials -- the DCI, the DDCI, all the DDs, and heads of independent offices -- and to give them a sense of what the Agency does, how it operates, and how it fits in and relates to American society.*

<sup>3</sup> The recent Denison University Alumni Magazine feature on Martha Kessler is a good example. (See Tab C)

[Document 2, p.9](#)

2) Recommendations:

a. The Officer-in-Residence (OIR) program is seen by many as an excellent means of providing a window into CIA for the academic community. The program (currently 13 participants) could be enhanced with dedicated slots and resources, under central management. At present, individual offices provide the positions and about \$100,000 per officer. Such enhancement would ensure that selection of schools and officers meets our needs.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

b. PAO should work with OTE and OP to develop a program for CIA employees involved in recruiting to ensure that they are conversant on all issues affecting the CIA with emphasis on the intelligence process and multicultural sensitivities. Provide for periodic update for recruiters on long-term assignment.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

c. PAO's Coordinator for Academic Affairs should take steps to see that CIA becomes an institutional member of relevant scientific and professional societies. Agency employees should participate openly in such meetings as CIA officers. Procedures for individuals to present papers in such fora need to be updated.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

d. Sponsor either unilaterally or in cooperation with academic institutions or other government agencies conferences on the history and craft of intelligence, as well as on other areas of common interest. PAO will work with OTE's Center for the Study of Intelligence on these programs.<sup>4</sup>

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

<sup>4</sup> For example, PAO is currently talking with the Truman Library about a conference in late 1992 or 1993 on the origins of the Intelligence Community. A similar conference with the Wilson Center is being considered to mark the 30th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis next fall.

[Document 2, p.10](#)

e. Conduct more academic conferences here at Langley. Take the successful DI model of substantive conferences with the academic community and explore how it could be valuable to S&T and DA.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

f. PAO, CPAS and FBIS should examine ways to continue or enhance the program to disseminate unclassified publications (highly valued by all we talked to) to ensure that the Agency is receiving maximum benefit for its efforts.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

g. Encourage the establishment of intelligence studies programs at academic institutions.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

## C. GOVERNMENT

### 1) Current Program:

*a. The Agency has a broad range of contacts throughout government and provides product, briefings, and exchanges to both Executive and Legislative Branches. PAO is an active participant in briefing the military and other government agencies on the CIA, its mission and functions. This year, PAO provided more than 70 briefings to groups from the National Security Agency, Foreign Service, Pentagon, Defense Intelligence College, and the United States Information Agency.*

### 2. Recommendations:

a. OCA should seek additional opportunities for the DCI to appear

before congressional committees in open session when such a session helps to educate the public about the role of intelligence and the relevance and accountability of the CIA.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

[Document 2, p.11](#)

b. Explore with the SSCI and HPSCI leadership the possibility of having the oversight committees issue an unclassified annual report on the performance of the Intelligence Community.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

c. The DDI and DDS&T in coordination with OCA should reassess the Agency's relationship with CRS and OTA.<sup>5</sup>

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

d. PAO should work with PCS to look for ways to reach broader military audiences with information about our programs.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

**D. BUSINESS**

*1) Current Program:*

*a. The Agency currently has three types of basic relationships with the US business sector. First, business is an important source of intelligence information via NR collection activities. Second, the US corporate sector is involved in the vast bulk of the Agency's contracting efforts. Finally, business receives selected briefings by the Agency -- talks on the counterintelligence challenge, counterterrorism and other presentations at business-oriented conferences organized by groups such as SASA. Given the*

*emphasis on economic security for the United States in the '90s, the business sector is looking to the potential contributions the Intelligence community can make in this area.*

<sup>5</sup> Hill staffers rely heavily on OTA and CRS products. Moreover, active interaction with these congressional support organizations can provide invaluable insights into issues that key House and Senate committees and individual members believe are important, as well as what legislation is under consideration or in the conceptual state. Some Hill staffers have suggested that CIA assign officers to act as liaison through OCA for relevant OTA projects, as the military services do. For example, OTA is now focusing on two projects of particular interest to several congressional committees, proliferation and economic analyses of other nations as they relate to U.S. industrial competitiveness.

[Document 2, p.12](#)

*b. This past year, PAO provided remarks and support for the DCI and DDCI for some 40 appearances before outside audiences -- including a wide range of groups from the business, legal and civic communities. Most of these appearances were covered by the media giving even more visibility to our leaders' comments.*

*c. PAO participates in providing briefings on the CIA to participants in AFCEA's biannual "Intelligence Community" course, attended by nearly 200 industry and government representatives.*

2. Recommendations:

a. Establish a program with appropriate guidelines for providing unclassified, off-the-record (or on background) country-specific briefings (similar to those given to journalists) to corporate leaders. NR should act as the focal point for this effort to consider the potential gain for the Agency in providing such information.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove



b. Host groups of CEOs at the Agency for day-long programs similar to the DCI's Program for Deans.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

c. Task the DDS&T to take the lead in a program to consider declassifying the relationship between CIA and many of its contractors that have historically been classified. Many benefits could be derived by the Agency and by the contractors if these relationships and perhaps the general nature of the work involved were revealed.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

## *E. PRIVATE SECTOR*

### *1) Current Program:*

*a. PAO officers this year made presentations about the CIA to members of more than 60 civic and service clubs. Rotary and Kiwanis Clubs in particular have been the recipients of this service. PAO took steps to establish a speakers' bureau last sprint to increase the number of presentations that the Agency could provide.*

### [Document 2, p.13](#)

*b. PAO responds to nearly 4000 pieces of correspondence a year from the public. Queries range from the ridiculous to the scholarly request for information. PAO also answers some 6000 telephone queries from the public annually.*

### *2. Recommendations:*

*a. Assign PAO the resources to fund and manage its speaker's bureau to develop a group of effective Agency speakers who can talk about the intelligence process and the role of CIA in a*

changing world.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve      \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

## F. INTERNAL AUDIENCE

### 1) Current Program:

*a. Every business day PAO produces Media Highlights, a 50-75 page collation of newspaper articles, editorials, and commentaries on the Agency and intelligence-related subjects. The staff produces 172 copies of Highlights for distribution throughout the Agency. Modified versions of Highlights have also been prepared and forwarded to the DCI during his trips abroad.*

*b. In addition, PAO posts "Agency views" on the Public Affairs bulletin boards throughout the Agency. These are compilations of statements by the DCI, DDCI, and PAO spokesmen on the Agency or intelligence-related issues of the day.*

*c. PAO also publishes a newsletter quarterly called The Public Eye to inform employees about the activities of PAO and the Agency issues which are being discussed in the media. PAO ensures that transcripts of selected DCI speeches are made available to employees through employee bulletins, on line and in the library.*

### 2. Recommendations:

a. PAO should work with OTE to develop a training course for employees to better understand our relationship with the media with particular emphasis on the rules for background briefings.

### [Document 2, p.14](#)

b. PAO should work with OTE to invite more members of the

media to speak to CIA groups, either in a class (i.e. mid-career) or at an offsite/seminar. More people in the Agency will need to be exposed to media representatives to better understand and appreciate the work of the media and its appropriate interaction with the Intelligence Community.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

c. The Task Force on Internal Communications is addressing the subject of communications with our own employees, which is the responsibility of Agency managers at all levels. Current and former Agency officers emphasized, however, the need for a program of increased CIA openness to be part of our corporate strategy. That is senior managers must be on board and the employees informed that we are increasing the openness of the Agency and how we plan to do it. To this end we recommend that you:

- Distribute an employee bulletin describing the program for increased CIA openness
- Task senior managers to talk about the program
- Address employees in the bubble on this program and take questions

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

## EVALUATION OF INCREASED OPENNESS

10. In recommending ways to increase CIA openness, we also wanted to come up with some means to measure the results of these efforts and to make changes in course, as appropriate. Since these are not programs or initiatives that lend themselves readily to quantifiable impact, we need to rely on an evaluation of how the perception of the Agency has changed. This can manifest itself in many ways including: a friendlier, more cooperative working environment for our officers, more interest in employment, more accurate reporting on our activities, etc. To this end, we recommend that you:

a. Task all NR Station Chiefs to provide an annual evaluation of our openness program as it

[Document 2, p.15](#)

is seen from their perspective and to make recommendations for changes.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

b. Establish an advisory group of senior business, academics, and government leaders to provide advice on and evaluation of CIA efforts to explain the role of intelligence in the '90s.

\_\_\_\_\_Approve      \_\_\_\_\_Disapprove

[one-half page deleted]

[Document 2, p.16](#)

The Task Force Members received views on Greater CIA Openness from the following:

[one page deleted]

[Document 3, p.1](#)

6 January 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Deputy Director for Administration  
Deputy Director for Intelligence  
Deputy Director for Operations  
Deputy Director for Planning & Coordination  
Deputy Director for Science & Technology  
Director of Congressional Affairs  
General Counsel

Director of Public Affairs  
Comptroller

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness

1. The task force has done a commendable job of examining the challenge of greater CIA openness and presenting a number of useful recommendations for implementing such a policy. Before addressing specific recommendations, it is important to establish policy and strategy.

2. I endorse the statement in paragraph 6 of the report that our objective is to make CIA and the intelligence process more visible and understandable rather than to seek inevitably incomplete or unattainable openness on specific substantive issues. In short, we are trying to help people understand better what this Agency does and how it does it.

3. The idea of a strategy or "vision" statement has merit but it should be short -- something to the effect that "CIA's approach to public affairs grows out of our belief that it is important that CIA should be accountable to the American public as a law abiding organization comprised of talented people of integrity whose role supporting national security policymakers is important in an increasingly complex and often dangerous world." The Executive Committee should consider such a strategy statement, revise it as appropriate or desired, and submit it by 1 February for my approval.

4. I believe that CIA, whatever the level of its public affairs effort, will find it difficult to win recognition as an "open" institution. What we should do is strive where we can to be as forthcoming, candid, informative, and helpful as possible to the public, the media, and academia consistent with our mission and the protection of sources and methods. My decisions on specific recommendations have been made in this spirit.

[Document 3, p.2](#)

SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness

5. Reference paragraph 8.A.(1) and (2) of the report: The Executive Committee should establish a senior-led Agency-wide group to review CIA policy and practices related to declassification and release of records under the historical review and FOIA programs with a view to accelerating the process.

Additionally, this senior-level group should examine the initiation of a program in the near term to declassify historical materials on specific events as suggested by the task force report -- a suggestion that I am inclined to support. (Further to this issue, see paragraph 18.a.) At the same time, this group should identify what additional resources would be necessary to augment our efforts in both of these areas.

6. Reference paragraph 8.A.(3): The editorial board of *Studies in Intelligence* should intensify its efforts to find a university prepared to publish unclassified or declassified articles from *Studies in Intelligence*. If no university has made a firm commitment by the end of May, OTE should begin publishing compendia of unclassified articles from past *Studies*. These should be made available in the same way as other unclassified CIA publications.

7. Reference paragraph 8.A.(4): We should not publish compendiums of papers delivered at conferences sponsored or co-sponsored by CIA. However, when such conferences are unclassified, we should indicate to participants that we have no objection to their publishing their papers -- with appropriate disclaimers -- and referencing a CIA conference. The choice should be up to the scholar.

8. Reference paragraph 8.B.: PAO, in cooperation with other appropriate elements of the Agency, should develop additional unclassified material on CIA, its history, mission, functions, and changing role. The Agency's briefing program for the full range of potential audiences should be expanded as opportunities arise.

9. Reference paragraph 8.C.(1): The current role of the Agency spokesperson is satisfactory but I would welcome views from the Executive Committee on greater use of television by the DCI and DDCI.

10. Reference paragraph 9.A.(2): PAO should be prepared to provide more background briefings to the media as opportunities arise and be prepared to respond to telephonic queries from the media. Careful records should be kept of such contacts. I endorse having the Deputy Directors, the General Counsel,

the Director of Congressional Affairs and the Director of Public

[Document 3, p.3](#)

SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness

Affairs provide both background and on-the-record interviews about intelligence process. CIA should not give groups of reporters unclassified background briefings when there is a major international event. Any exception to this should be approved by the DCI or DDCI. I do support the idea of individual profiles of people in the Agency that highlight the quality of our people, the diversity of our work force and that personalize the work of intelligence.

11. Reference paragraph 9.B.(2): The Officer-in-Residence program, which I support, should continue to be administered by individual Directorates and Offices. I agree that PAO should work with OTE and OP to develop a program for CIA employees involved in recruiting to ensure that they are conversant on issues affecting CIA, with emphasis on the intelligence process and multi-cultural sensitivities. I gather that this would simply give structure to informal guidance to employees from all Directorates who go on recruiting trips. I support participation of Agency employees in relevant scientific and professional societies and approve the recommendation for updating procedures for individuals to present papers in such meetings. I am not persuaded that CIA should become an institutional member of these societies. I support conducting more academic conferences at Langley, examining ways to continue to enhance the program of disseminating unclassified publications, and encouraging the establishment of intelligence studies programs at academic institutions.

12. I believe that the co-location of our Coordinator for Academic Affairs with Public Affairs confuses two related but separate functions. The Executive Committee should examine and provide me with a recommendation by 1 February on moving the Coordinator for Academic Affairs and associated functions to the Center for the Study of Intelligence. In this connection, I endorse the recommendation that the Center should sponsor either unilaterally or in cooperation with academic institutions conferences on the history and craft of intelligence.

13. Reference paragraph 9.C.(2): I am satisfied with the present and planned arrangements. Accordingly, none of the recommendations are approved.

14. Reference paragraph 9.D.(2): I am not persuaded that recommendations a. and c. are workable and therefore they are not approved. On the other hand, recommendation b. seems a worthwhile undertaking and I believe the Executive committee should direct the development of a program along these lines, perhaps beginning with CEOs of companies that have been cooperative with NR.

[Document 3, p.4](#)

SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness

15. Reference paragraph 9.E.(2): I support continuation and strengthening of the Agency Speakers' Bureau for addressing outside audiences about the intelligence process and the role of CIA in a changing world. Home components should pay the expenses of an expanded list of non-PAO speakers.

16. Reference paragraph 9.F.: I support the idea of PAO working with OTE to invite more members of the media to speak to CIA groups either in the classroom or at off-sites/seminars. PAO should brief employees authorized to give background briefings on pertinent guidelines and rules. I prefer to reserve decision on recommendation c. pending completion of the task force on internal communications.

17. Reference paragraph 10: I do not believe we will soon see any marked effect on all of the programs we have had underway and are now undertaking. I believe this will be a cumulative process and that all of us in the Agency simply should keep our eyes and ears open for feedback, from whatever quarter, on the success of our efforts.

18. I received a number of useful comments from several of the addressees of this memorandum, as well as a number of others in the Agency. As the Executive Committee considers the actions assigned to it above, as well as additional ideas for greater CIA openness, I commend to you:



a. [deleted] memorandum, particularly that part suggesting that the senior group reviewing our policy and practices relating to declassification and release of records under the historical review and the FOIA programs consider beyond these programs what kinds of information CIA really needs to protect, the criteria for determining when CIA protects its information, and under that circumstances exceptions should be made. As [deleted] says, "Mere expedience and a perceived need to respond to the Hill or press quickly should not be the driving factor in whether we declassify information." Above all, [deleted] contends we should be consistent in the way that we release information.

[Document 3, p.5](#)

SUBJECT: Task Force Report on Greater CIA Openness

b. Members of the Executive Committee also should give careful attention to the memorandum from [deleted] from the Office of Personnel. This memorandum lays out in considerable detail many programs managed by the Employment Group of the Office of Personnel that very much involve in presenting the Agency's message to diverse audiences, including the media and academe. The Executive Committee should look at the specific examples cited by [deleted] with a view to enhancing them and/or integrating them into the broader Agency programs. It is an impressive list that warrants attention to see what can be done to give it further support as part of the overall effort on openness.

19. The Executive Committee or Task Force, as appropriate, should report to me on progress in implementing decisions for which no deadlines are specified above by 15 February.

Robert M. Gates

[Back to home page](#)

From *Independent Online / Triangles*, November 29, 2000 -- an excerpt from an article titled "CIA's Man on Campus" by Jon Elliston:

... Currently there are 10 officers in residence, according to Carlos D. Davis, deputy director of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence, which administers the program. They are teaching at George Washington University, Georgetown University, the University of Southern California, the University of Maryland, New Mexico State University, Marquette University, the Defense Intelligence Agency's Joint Military Intelligence College and the Air Force and Naval Academies. The agency has also placed officers at Georgia Tech and West Point for next semester.

"Every one of them has fully declared that they are from the CIA," Davis says. A CIA summary of the program asserts that "there is nothing clandestine about an officer's assignment as a visiting faculty member." Officers are banned from recruiting activities and gathering intelligence on students or faculty. "The CIA ensures that these officers are exactly what they say they are: professionals abiding by the rules of the host university," the document says....

Okay, if the Officer in Residence program is 100 percent overt, then this simple letter should do the trick. Place your bets now!



## public information research inc

Research Services  
PO Box 680635, San Antonio TX 78268  
Tel: 210-509-3160 Fax: 210-509-3161

www.pir.org  
namebase@pir.org  
Tax ID 54-1509155

Online Services  
339 Lafayette St., New York NY 10012  
Tel: 212-979-0471 online@pir.org

**Directors:**

Daniel Brandt  
Martha Moran  
Steve Badrich  
Dennis Beatus  
Randy Guffey  
Kathleen L. Kelly  
Bob Richards

**Advisors:**

Robert Fink  
Fred Goff  
Jim Hougan  
John Loftus  
Carl Oglesby  
L. Fletcher Prouty  
Katherine Sciacchitano  
Peter Dale Scott

February 20, 2001

Mr. Carlos D. Davis, Deputy Director  
Center for the Study of Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington DC 20505

Dear Mr. Davis:

We would like to obtain a list of CIA officers who participated in the Officer in Residence Program since it began in 1985. We're interested in the name of the officer, the campus where he or she taught, and the year.

Is this information available directly from you, or should we file a Freedom of Information Act Request?

Sincerely,

Daniel Brandt

Sincerely,



Daniel Brandt  
President

No response after more than a year. Now for a formal request....



## public information research

PO Box 680635, San Antonio TX 78268, U.S.A. Tel: 210-509-3160 Fax: 210-509-3161

**Directors:**

Daniel Brandt  
Martha Moran  
Steve Badrich  
Dennis Brutus  
Randy Guffey  
Kathleen T. Kelly  
Bob Richards

**Advisors:**

Robert Fink  
Fred Goff  
Jim Hougan  
John Lofius  
Carl Oglesby  
Katherine Sciacchitano  
Peter Dale Scott

March 20, 2002

Information and Privacy Coordinator  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Coordinator:

Under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. subsection 552, I am requesting a list of CIA officers who participated in the Officer in Residence Program since it began in 1985. I am interested in the name of the officer, the campus where he or she taught, and the year.


From statements such officers have given to the press, I believe that this program is entirely overt. However, our letter to the coordinator of this program, sent over a year ago (copy enclosed), was not answered at all. For that reason, we are making this formal FOIA request and ask that it be expedited.

If there are any fees for searching for, reviewing, or copying the records, please let me know before you task my request. If it makes a difference, Public Information Research, Inc. is a tax-exempt, 501(c)(3) organization. I suspect that the information we request is kept in one place, and easily retrieved.

If you deny all or any part of this request, please cite each specific exemption you think justifies your refusal to release the information and notify me of appeal procedures available under the law.

If you have any questions about handling this request, you may telephone or fax me at the above numbers.

Sincerely,



me at the above numbers.

Sincerely,

*Daniel Brandt*

Daniel Brandt  
President

On 24 May 2002, we received a letter from Kathryn I. Dyer, Information and Privacy Coordinator at the CIA, explaining that "the information you seek must be denied since it is classified under the provisions of Executive Order 12958."

The people lose. The CIA's academic program is a public relations front. The campus is just another tool, used to further the CIA's secret operations. End of story.



[Back to home page](#)

# Columbia University and the U.S. Intelligence Community

Excerpted from: North American Congress on Latin America, *Who Rules Columbia? -- Original 1968 Strike Edition* (New York: NACLA, 1970), pages 13-17 of 40 pages.

The very nature of the Cold War struggle against Communism and the drive for empire require extensive non-military resources. The U.S. intelligence community, under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency, is in charge of enlisting the expertise and the cover of non-governmental organizations. Through covert penetration of civilian branches of the government, voluntary groups, corporations, law firms, research centers, cultural projects, foundations and universities, the CIA is able to mobilize and coordinate for government service much of the seemingly a-political work of U.S. civilian society.

The primary tasks of the U.S. intelligence community are gathering and analyzing strategic information for decision-makers and positioning trained personnel in key locations to manipulate the course of events. (For a history and discussion of the CIA see, Wise and Ross, *The Invisible Government*.) Like several large universities, Columbia offers excellent opportunities for achieving these goals. Most of the evidence points to indirect relationships, but because the CIA is closed and secret and because the Columbia Administration refuses to discuss its CIA relations, it is quite possible that CIA-CU ties are far more direct and pervasive than the public data now indicates. In fact, our own information indicates that these ties are so direct as to involve a highly influential group of men in dual positions of leadership -- inside Columbia *and* in the CIA itself.

One level of association involves individuals connected with Columbia who are also affiliated with CIA-related organizations. Three types of CIA-relationships are identified in the following table.

## CIA-Related Organization

**(Position in CIA-Related Organization)**    *Name and Columbia Position*

### I. ORGANIZATIONS HEAVILY FUNDED BY CIA:

#### Asia Foundation

**(Tr)** *Grayson Kirk, President*

#### African-American Institute

**(Tr)** *Arthur Krim, Trustee*

**(Tr)** *L. Gray Cowan, Dir. SIA African Institute*

**(Tr)** *Louis G. Cowan, Dir. Special Prog. Grad. School of Journalism*

**American Society of African Culture**

**(Ed.Bd.)** *L. Gray Cowan, Dir. SIA African Institute*

**Committee of Correspondence**

**(former Pres)** *Anna Lord Strauss, SIA contributor*

**(Mem)** *Alice Stetten, SIA Adv.*

**Free Europe Committee**

**(Mem)** *Frank Altschul, SIA Adv.*

**(Mem)** *Adolf A. Berle, Prof., SIA Adv.*

**(Mem)** *Ernest A. Gross, SIA Adv., Past Trustee, Barnard College*

**II. ORGANIZATIONS WHICH RECEIVED SOME FUNDS FROM THE CIA:**

**Institute for International Education**

**(Tr)** *Grayson Kirk, President*

**(Tr)** *Lawrence Wien, Trustee*

**(Pres)** *Kenneth Holland, SIA Adv.*

**John H. Whitney Trust**

**(Tr)** *Walter N. Thayer, Trustee*

**American Council for Emigres in the Professions**

**(Pres)** *Harry J. Carman, Dn. Emer.*

**(Dr)** *Horace L. Friess, Prof.*

**(Dr)** *Wesley J. Hennessy, Assoc. Dn. School of Engineering*

**(Dr)** *Frank Tannenbaum, Prof. Emer.*

**(Dr)** *Rosemary Parks, Former Pres, Barnard College*

**(Exec. Dr)** *Joe Jefferson, former Dean of Administration*

**(Adv)** *Millicent C. McIntosh, Pres. Emer., Barnard College*

**III. COVERTLY PASSED CIA FUNDS:**

**Farfield Foundation**

**(Dr)** *William A.M. Burden, Trustee*

**(Dr)** *Gardner Cowles, SIA Adv., Trustee Teachers College*

**Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs**

**(Dr)** *Francis T.P. Plimpton, Trustee Barnard College*

**Cleveland H. Dodge Foundation**

**(Pres)** *Cleveland E. Dodge, Trustee, Teachers College*

**Edward John Noble Foundation**

**(Dr)** *Eugene C. Bewkes, SIA Adv.*

**(Dr)** Alger B. Chapman, SIA Adv.

**(Dr)** David S. Smith, SIA Assoc. Dean

**David, Josephine and Winfield Baird Foundation, Inc.**

*financial contributor to Columbia*

**William Benton Foundation**

*financial contributor to Columbia*

**Catherwood Foundation**

*financial contributor to Columbia*

**W. Alton Jones Foundation**

*financial contributor to Columbia*

**J.M. Kaplan Fund, Inc.**

*financial contributor to Columbia*

**Lucius N. Littauer Foundation**

*financial contributor to Columbia*

**Aaron E. Norman Fund, Inc.**

*financial contributor to Columbia*

**Rubicon Foundation**

*financial contributor to Columbia*

Legend: **(Dr)**=Director; **(Tr)**=Trustee; **(Dn)**=Dean; **(Ed.Bd.)**=Editorial Board;  
**(Ad)**=Advisor; **(Emer)**=Emeritus; SIA = School of International Affairs;  
**(Mem)**=Member

Another indirect connection between the CIA and the School of International Affairs (SIA) is demonstrated by the presence of Eugene C. Bewkes and Alger B. Chapman, as advisory council members of SIA, and David S. Smith, Associate Dean of SIA, Director of the International Fellows Program and a member of the Administrative Board of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs. All three men are directors of the Edward John Noble Foundation, which besides passing money for the CIA, has also given over \$2 million to SIA. Smith is also tied to the intelligence community through his past position as Asst. Sec. of the Air Force where he was involved with the CIA's U-2 flights over the Soviet Union.

The Fairfield Foundation, which was a large contributor to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, the American Society of African Culture and the American Council for Emigres in the Professions, is well represented at Columbia through Gardner Cowles [Teachers College Trustee] and Columbia College Trustee William A.M. Burden, both

of whom are directors of the foundation. Burden, one of the foundation's founders, is also a director of Lockheed Aircraft which served as a CIA front for the U-2 flights. Farfield made contributions in 1962 and 1964 to Columbia for travel and study fellowships.

Another important member of SIA's Advisory Council and a major SIA contributor is Sigurd Larmon, president of the advertising firm, Young and Rubicam, which is rapidly increasing the number of its overseas accounts. Mr. Larmon was one of a nine-member committee chosen by Eisenhower in 1953 to help perfect the country's psychological warfare program. According to *The New York Times*, the "committee presumably would study means of improving the organization and techniques of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Psychological Strategy Board, the Voice of America, the Information Services of the State and other departments, and the psychological operations of the Army in Korea."


In February, 1967, many students and faculty began an inquiry into the School of International Affairs to see if it was funded through conduits, or indirectly by the CIA. Andrew W. Cordier, Dean of the SIA, responded by saying, "There is no indication that any of the foundations which have supported the school and its associated institutes have in turn been financed by the CIA."

The investigation was continued by Professor Serge Lang of the Mathematics Department, who was denied access to the School's budget. When Lang asked if Columbia held any contract the existence of which was classified, Warren Goodell, Associate Director of Projects and Grants, said he was not at liberty to comment. Ralph S. Halford, then Dean of Graduate Faculties (now a special asst. to Kirk) stated the Administration's official policy on CIA funding: "University policy would not preclude the acceptance ... of project support from the CIA." He went on to say that if a project was in line with regular academic duty, endorsed by the chairman or dean of the division in which it would be conducted, and approved by the Office of Projects and Grants as being appropriate to a University, "the University would not hesitate to accept ... an offer by the CIA to furnish funds in support of the project."

The student-professor investigation concentrated on the research projects of SIA, and late in 1967 a source that remains anonymous indicated that the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe had been CIA-funded since 1961, receiving \$125,000 a year. Columbia acknowledged that his charge was accurate, and indicated that the project was financed by the CIA's Office of Economic Research. Cordier immediately revealed that Dr. Thad P. Alton, Director of the National Income Project, had contracted for funds directly with the CIA, without going through the dean.



Photo credit: Maury Englander



**Columbia University, April 1968**

Alton and his staff were required to produce reports of their findings. Four books concerning the national income and product of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were financed by the CIA and published by Columbia University Press.

After students exposed it, the Columbia administration admitted that the Research Project on National Income in East Central Europe in the SIA was CIA sponsored. At least two of the researchers on this project, Claus Wittich and Vaclav Holesovsky, had worked for Radio Free Europe just prior to their Columbia-CIA work. The CIA was still funding the National Income Project until the recent strike when pressure from students and faculty forced the University to take steps to sever this tie.

The SIA deals with areas of study which interest the CIA. At least three of the members of the Advisory Council, Frank Altschul, Adolf A. Berle and Ernest A. Gross have served with the Free Europe Committee (FEC) which administers Radio Free Europe (RFE). The FEC-RFE complex draws on CIA funds for the radio operations and, more important, supports Eastern European exile groups which serve as an important source of intelligence for the CIA. The relationship between SIA and FEC goes much deeper than is indicated by the ties of these three advisory members to both groups. In 1955, FEC contributed \$55,000 to Columbia's School of International Affairs to be used "to further teaching and research on Eastern Europe." Also, many SIA alumni work for RFE and RFE personnel come to SIA to do research, especially at the Research Institute on Communist Affairs. Another, more indirect tie between Columbia and FEC is indicated by the fact that Grayson Kirk's son, John, was a director of FEC.

As important as direct CIA involvement in SIA research projects, is Columbia's association with two organizations, the Asia Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Asia Foundation has received much if not all of its financial support from the CIA. It has a budget of about \$7 million a year to provide "private American assistance to those Asian groups and individuals working for continued social and economic improvement." The foundation has resident representatives in 14 Asian countries, with American offices in New York and San Francisco. At various times,

representatives have been kicked out of Cambodia, Indonesia and more recently, India, reputedly for their various intelligence activities.

The person who makes the link between the Asia Foundation and Columbia is Grayson Kirk, president of the University. Kirk has been on the board of the Foundation for many years, and is one of its most influential trustees. In 1962, when Robert Blum, president of the Foundation, resigned, Kirk was appointed Chairman of the Nominating Committee of the Trustees, whose purpose was to select a new president. In his search for suitable candidates for this position, Kirk sought the advice and suggestions of Dean Rusk and Averell Harriman, a move which indicates the importance of the Foundation. He also encouraged recommendations from George S. Moore, President of the First National City Bank of New York, and A.L. Nickerson, Chairman of the Board of Socony Mobil Oil Company, Inc., concerning members of the bank and of Socony Mobil, which had experience in Asian affairs. One man who was proposed as a possible choice was Robert Amory, but Kirk himself is reported to have feared that he might bring embarrassment to the Asia Foundation. From 1952-1962, Amory was Deputy Director of the CIA.

The relationship between the Asia Foundation and Columbia is a reciprocal one. Since at least 1961, the Foundation has given grants to Columbia's School of Journalism, recently financing the Japanese Science Writers' Project and Fellowships for Asiatic Journalists. Grayson Kirk's long and intimate association with the Asia Foundation suggests what an able and prominent supporter of the CIA this university president really is. It follows that many of his administrative decisions as President of Columbia University have also reflected the interests, priorities and concerns of the CIA. Certainly such decisions would not infringe on these concerns. Consider Kirk's attitude toward the NSA (National Student Association)-CIA exposure: "One shouldn't jump to conclusions that the people in these organizations were being used as spies." The money was donated "more for propaganda purposes than for anything else." Kirk's only complaint about the CIA's funding of non-governmental organizations was that "a certain amount of this seems to have been handled clumsily by people in Washington."

The Council on Foreign Relations is probably the most prestigious and influential organization in the area of international relations and policy. Its members include former government officials, university administrators and corporate executives. The Council publishes books, holds conferences, hosts foreign dignitaries, advises the government and involves itself in other activities necessary to influence U.S. foreign policy. The following list demonstrates the close relationship between Columbia University and the Council.

## **Council on Foreign Relations and Columbia University**

**Henry M. Wriston (Pres., 1964)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**Frank Altschul (VP and Sec'y)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**Hamilton Fish Armstrong (Director)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**William A.M. Burden (Director)** *Trustee, Columbia*  
**Joseph E. Johnson (Director)** *SIA Advisory Council*

**Grayson L. Kirk (Director)** *President, Columbia*  
**David B. Truman (Member)** *VP and Provost, Columbia*  
**Max Ascoli (Member)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**Harding F. Bancroft (Member)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**Adolf A. Berle (Member)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**Charles M. Brinckerhoff (Member)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**Kenneth Holland (Member)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**George S. Moore (Member)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**William I. Nichols (Member)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**Ogden R. Reid (Member)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**Edward L. Tinker (Member)** *SIA Advisory Council*  
**David B. Smith (Member)** *SIA Associate Dean*  
**Prof. Philip E. Mosely (Member)** *SIA European Inst.*  
**Prof. L. Gray Cowan (Member)** *SIA Inst. of African Studies*  
**Prof. Howard Wriggins (Member)** *SIA Southern Asia Inst.*  
**Prof. William T.R. Fox (Member)** *SIA Inst. of War and Peace Studies*  
**Andrew W. Cordier (Member)** *Dean, Faculty of Int'l Affairs, SIA*  
**Arthur Hays Sulzberger (Member)** *Trustee Emeritus, Columbia*  
**Marshall D. Shulman (Member)** *SIA Russian Inst.*

Although many CIA conduit foundations have given contributions to the Council, it has never been exposed as a recipient of CIA funds. In fact, the Council appears to serve a much more direct and important function for the CIA. Convincing evidence of this is the series of discussion groups on "Intelligence and Foreign Policy" that the Council hosted in late 1967 and early 1968, to which Vice President David Truman was Columbia's representative. A list of the topics discussed is revealing. The list is as follows: "Intelligence and Foreign Policy: The American Experience;" "Intelligence and Policy Making: The Task Ahead;" "Covert Operations;" "Intelligence Operations and Private American Institutions;" and "U.S. Intelligence Organizations in the Future."

The discussions were led by individuals with extensive knowledge of CIA operations. For example, Richard Bissell (former Deputy Director of Plans for the CIA and architect of the Bay of Pigs invasion) reviewed the activities and functions of CIA agents overseas and discussed why it is better to work through nationals when possible; he also discussed when agents should and should not work through and with the knowledge of the U.S. Ambassador. In addition, he spoke of CIA funding of private organizations and the effect on their programs after the use of foundations as conduits for CIA money were exposed. Other known members of the CIA and other intelligence organizations who participated were Robert Amory, Jr., Allen W. Dulles, McGeorge Bundy and Franklin A. Lindsay.

What follows is an informal record from sources close to the University administration of the topics considered in the "Intelligence Operations and Private American Institutions" discussion group:

**Short-run view - Advantages and disadvantages of having the CIA fund a private institution:**

**Types of organizations and relations:**

**Private U.S. organizations created or used as fronts - e.g. Western Enterprises in Taiwan;**  
**American Universities - Research; Credibility of American scholars abroad?**  
**Placement of individuals in private organizations for cover-corporations; Major propaganda organizations - e.g. Radio Free Europe;**

**Reasons for covert methods:**

**To protect relationship with friendly governments or groups;**  
**Protection from reprisals;**  
**Use of friendly governments to fake retaliatory actions;**  
**Avoid destroying activity which would occur if done overtly;**  
**Increase effect by not being aligned with U.S. source;**  
**Avoid necessity of legal requirements;**  
**Allow plausible denial when cover is exposed;**  
**Avoid public accountability by Congress and Administration for unpopular activity;**  
**Avoid public commitment of U.S. prestige.**

**Issues:**

**Relationship of CIA and Universities;**  
**Tragedy that closer relations have been largely destroyed;**  
**Some way must be found to reestablish relationship;**  
**Overt means of support for NSA [National Student Association]-type activities;**  
**Means of control and termination of operations;**  
**How to sense a shift in public attitudes;**  
**How to develop a clearly American style of operations, not patterned after Communist or British;**  
**How to attract the right people and be aware of public opinion;**  
**Is the CIA becoming too much of a career service?**

The importance of the relationship between the intelligence community and Columbia is great. The universities and their personnel serve in an advisory capacity and as a feed-back mechanism for intelligence evaluation. Also, by involving academics in intelligence, the CIA is able to create a favorable disposition towards the secrecy and manipulation which has become essential to many government operations in America. Policy initiative during these sessions more often than not comes from the intelligence community -- as is clearly the case in many situations where foreign policy is made.

Integration of a major university like Columbia into the ranks of this elite means not only that the CIA is provided with needed scholarship on international affairs and an academic cover for foreign penetration, but, most important, it thereby has the power to enlist Americas own intellectual resources in the barren campaigns of the Cold War.

[Back to home page](#)

*Covert Action Information Bulletin*, Fall 1991, pp. 12-16

# Harvard in Service to the National Security State

by John Trumbour

Copyright © 1991 by Covert Action Publications, Inc., Washington DC,  
and Institute for Media Analysis, Inc., New York NY. All rights reserved.

Harvard is the wealthiest and most influential of U.S. universities. MIT, Cal Tech, Johns Hopkins, Stanford and the University of California are Washington's scientific bulwark. But it is Harvard which still provides more of the social science concepts and more of the personnel who occupy the command posts of the modern welfare-warfare state.

At the dawn of the Reagan era, Norman Stone, the conservative Oxford historian, traveled to Harvard for a conference on spying. Financed by the Defense Department and, in his words, "organized by American intelligence," the conference gave Stone his introduction to Reaganism. At odds with the "Kremlin on the Charles" description popularized by right-wing critics, the distinguished historian found himself amidst "youngish, besuited, presidential advisers with triangular green eyes, speaking deadpan about how to destroy communism."

"There was talk of nuking," he reminisced a decade later. "There was further talk, to the effect that a really big build-up of modern American weaponry would force the Soviet Union to compete. That competition would ruin the Soviet economy.... And lo and behold, America has spent ... \$2.4 trillion in the past eight years. Mikhail Gorbachev is now leading the dismantling of communism. What is the connection? I would suspect direct."<sup>1</sup>

Stone's warm words for such earnest scholarly enterprise were matched years earlier by Harvard President Nathan Pusey (1953-71). He also understood the importance of the university in waging the Cold War:

The sort of activities that goes on in the classrooms and laboratories of Cambridge is contributing vastly to the immense national efforts we are making and shall have to make to live up to our nation's acquired responsibilities in the world and to compete effectively in this life-and-death struggle in which it seems that we are to be engaged for a long time with our alien rival, the U.S.S.R.... Our university has done its part -- and more -- in every conflict in our nation's history.<sup>2</sup>

Speaking before an ROTC panel in 1955, then Harvard Dean McGeorge Bundy spelled out the stakes for the University alliance with the military. "We are committed in a larger sense to developing the connection between our University and the Armed Forces in a wide variety of ways."

Bundy termed the Cold War "a period in which the techniques of academic learning, both in the Social Sciences and in the Natural Sciences, are more closely connected than ever before with those of the National Defense. A university," he scolded, "which does not try to develop to a maximal degree the interest, cooperation, and understanding between its staff members and those of the National Defense forces is not doing its full job."<sup>3</sup>

## Roots of the Military-Academic Complex

The aftermath of World War II and attainment of the permanent war economy represented the triumph of those who envisioned the university as a service station for the national security state. The foundations for the creation of the military-academic complex, however, were laid as early as World War I. Harvard itself featured a war curriculum enrolling 864 students in "Military Science I" during 1916, and President Lawrence Lowell had the Harvard Yard dormitories converted into military barracks in 1917.<sup>4</sup> An earlier nationwide trend of student disdain and outright rioting against campus military drill had been reversed in the mighty quake of hyper-nationalism unleashed by World War I. According to the *Report of the Commissioner of Education (1918)*, U.S. Bureau of Education, Chicago, Columbia, Michigan, and Harvard "lost nearly all of their leading professors of physics" to the research work of the government during World War I. The *New York Times* (March 9, 1917) reported that 95 percent of Harvard's administration and faculty signed a petition urging President Wilson "to lead the people to defend at all costs the integrity of the nation."<sup>5</sup> The National Board for Historical Service placed the nation's top historians "at the service of the government." It helped produce and disseminate such scholarship as "The Repulsiveness of the German State" by George H. Mead of the University of Chicago and "The Deeper Roots of Pan-Germanism" by Chicago medievalist James Westfall Thompson, who observed that French bestiaries of the Middle Ages gave "French names to the finer kinds of animals and German names to the wolf, the ass, etc."<sup>6</sup>

Those not willing to join the NBHS crusade faced chilling reprisal. Dissident historian Charles Beard stepped down from his post at Columbia in 1917 after "a very humiliating inquisition" from the board of trustees "in the presence of three or four of my colleagues ... who seemed to think the process quite right and normal." In 1918, reformist feminists and pacifists Katherine Coman and Emily Balch (the latter a 1946 Nobel laureate), were purged from the Wellesley faculty. Their students were further quarantined from their influence when the college's entire social science program was shut down for close to a decade.<sup>7</sup>

## Cold War, Warm Bedfellows

The end of World War I did not mean an end of what had proven to be a mutually beneficial relationship. "The infusion of money, equipment, prestige, and political

power which accompanied the intellectuals' participation in the war left them far more receptive to the principle of centrally administered, mission-oriented research," concludes education historian Clyde Barrow. "Public service was institutionalized in research and manpower training programs that would promote capitalist economic development and in assigning intellectuals responsibility for defending the American state against internal and external threats to its legitimacy."<sup>8</sup>

World War II further boosted the level of cooperation between the government and the university. "When OSS, America's wartime secret intelligence service, was set up in 1941," wrote Roger Hilsman, another former JFK-LBJ adviser, "one of the basic ideas behind it was the novel and almost impish thought that scholars could in some respects take the place of spies."<sup>9</sup>

With the rubble of World War II barely settled, the Cold War commenced. The OSS was transformed into the CIA which continued the cooperative tradition. Sumner Benson, Harvard Ph.D. and holder of the "Exceptional Intelligence Analyst Award" for his efforts in the CIA's Office of Political Analysis, noted that the Agency "has closer ties with the academic community, including the historical profession, than most other federal agencies," [and it] "has maintained a reputation as probably one of the two most academically selective agencies in the federal government."<sup>10</sup>

New mechanisms were developed in the post-war era through which the complementary relationship between government and academia was institutionalized. Harvard's McGeorge Bundy and others masterminded the expansion of international studies programs. Prior to World War II, the number of these programs could be counted on both hands. By 1968, however, there were 191 centers, most of them "manned, directed, or stimulated by graduates of the OSS,"<sup>11</sup> according to Bundy. Ninety-five of these were concentrated at twelve universities.<sup>12</sup>

## Protest Brings Cosmetic Reforms

There have been few breaches in the universities' service to the state. Politicians such as U.S. Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD) might later complain before a 1963 Princeton University conference that the universities were failing to do enough. "According to our top Soviet authorities," he wrote, "Lenin established the first three communist-operated political warfare schools in Western Europe. *We have yet to create our first training institution devoted solely to this important task...* For in the Cold War our major striking power is ideas, with highly-skilled and well-trained men to implement them. When, I ask, are we going to begin to close the widening gap in the training of Cold War combatants?"<sup>13</sup> [emphasis in original]

At last, the turbulence surrounding Washington's massive invasion of Vietnam brought for the first time a major upsurge in protests and revelations of the university's complicity with the national security state. This potentially explosive situation was defused by a series of largely cosmetic reforms including: a 1967 federal law forbidding the CIA from funding covert research at the universities; the



movement of many ROTC programs off-campus; and pledges like that of Harvard president Derek Bok (1971-1991) to refuse secret research.



These inconveniences were soon circumvented and the happy marriage of academia and state returned to what now passed for normal. George Bush, CIA director in 1976 to early 1977, helped engineer the CIA's campus resurgence by arguing that U.S. intelligence always depended more "on a community of scholars than on a network of spies."<sup>14</sup>

One of those cheered by the reconciliation was Ernest May, the Harvard historian who helped lead the conference on spying described by Stone. "Harvard has always been intimately involved in the diplomatic and military spheres," he noted, "and the period of the late 60s and

early 70s was only an interruption of that." May was soon to benefit directly from the restoration of the symbiotic relationship. He and professor of government Richard Neustadt were awarded a \$1.2 million grant from the CIA for a study of intelligence.<sup>15</sup>

This grant was one of a series of large contracts which came to Harvard in the late 1980s and became a showcase for Bok's commitment to conducting what he called "open" research for the CIA. The purity of Harvard's prohibition of "secret" research had been sullied when media leaks revealed in 1985 that two of its leading political scientists, Samuel P. Huntington and Nadav Safran, were ongoing recipients of CIA funding. While denying that their research was covert, the Bok administration gave vague assurances that future CIA enterprises at Harvard would be open.

## Moving In-house

Also circumvented in the 1980s was the liberal objection that programs such as ROTC were controlled by instructors outside the university community. While reaffirming the "independence" of the university from outside influences, the Bok regime oversaw the expansion of a broad range of programs tailored for the leaders of the national security establishment. These were to be taught *in-house* by the university's own faculty.

Bok described the transformation of the Kennedy School of Government (KSG) as his proudest achievement. During his reign it saw a more than ten-fold increase in

endowment and under Dean Graham Allison (1977-1988), the KSG became heavily soaked in Department of Defense sponsorship. "Application procedures," boasts the current promotional literature for the KSG's "Program for Senior Officers in National Security," "[are] administered by the Employee Career Development and Training Division of the Secretary of Defense." This arrangement makes "independent" Harvard a veritable extension school for the Pentagon and the rest of the national security elite.

"A representative sampling" of 1990 participants includes "Special Agent in Charge, CIA," "Commanding Officer, Naval Research Laboratory," "Prospective Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Inchon." General Norman Schwarzkopf is a 1985 graduate of the program. "The Program also runs an extensive research effort," concludes its slick brochure, "including a series of case studies on counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency in Peru."<sup>16</sup> Two months after the 1991 session of the Senior Officers program broke up, the Bush administration announced plans to send Green Beret and naval personnel to Peru to help its army crush guerrillas and drug traffickers. The Peruvian army, admitted the *New York Times* on August 7, 1991, "is known for a dismal human rights record."

In April 1990, protesters against the militarization of the university and the exorbitant cost of the eight-week program to the taxpayers -- \$15,250 per student -- staged a peaceful sit-in at the KSG. Program director Bernard E. Trainor, a former *New York Times* correspondent and Marine general, issued a formal statement denouncing the demonstrators as "fascistic." Apparently joining the ongoing neoconservative campaign against the so-called totalitarianism of the PC (politically correct), Trainor employed the Orwellian *jujitsu* turnaround that today renders the peace movement as a latter day version of Mussolini's goosestepping blackshirts.<sup>17</sup>

## Polishing the General

Meanwhile, Bok had enunciated Harvard's goal of becoming a center for training future global leaders. An early beneficiary of this putative internationalism is Guatemalan General Hector Alejandro Gramajo Morales, holder of Harvard's Mason fellowship and recipient of a master's degree from the Kennedy School of Government in June 1991. Gramajo was General Lucas Garcia's minister counselor for political affairs in Washington in 1980-81. Under this regime, "the death squads were running wild, killing an estimated 25,000 people," according to journalist Michael Massing. "Gramajo defended his regime to the end."

When General Efraim Rios Montt came to power in a March 1982 coup, Gramajo transferred his loyalty and took charge of a "pacification" campaign against Indians in Guatemala's western highlands modeled on the strategic hamlets the U.S. installed in Vietnam. In one massacre alone, soldiers hacked with machetes and smashed in the heads of over 300 unarmed civilians, including old people, children, and infants. "Gramajo acted ruthlessly," concludes Fernando Andrade Diaz-Duran, foreign minister under Rios Montt's successor. "Villages were bombed, and a lot of civilians got killed." The Washington Office on Latin America estimates between 50,000 and

75,000 peasants were killed while even the army puts the number at 10,000 dead.<sup>18</sup> In November 1989, a U.S. nun, Diana Ortiz was captured, tortured, and sexually molested by Guatemalan security forces. Gramajo responded that her story was a fabrication, a futile attempt to cover up a lesbian love affair. Americas Watch termed Gramajo's allegation a "pure invention."<sup>19</sup> In an interview with the *Harvard International Review*, Gramajo explained his commitment to military reform and human rights:

We aren't renouncing the use of force. If we have to use it, we have to use it, but in a more sophisticated manner. You needn't kill everyone to complete the job. [You can use] more sophisticated means; we aren't going to return to the large-scale massacres. We have created a more humanitarian, less costly strategy, to be more compatible with the democratic system. We instituted Civil Affairs [in 1982] which provides development for 70 percent of the people while we kill 30 percent. Before the strategy was to kill 100 percent.<sup>20</sup>

When the *Harvard Crimson* asked if these statements accurately represented his views, he retreated, suggesting that the transcript reflected a certain lack of linguistic dexterity, his characteristic use of "broken English." "I really did not mean exactly 'kill,'" but rather that soldiers cannot "renounce coercive action" and that the military is now "going to make a very clear distinction between [civilians and insurgents]." During his tenure as Guatemalan minister of defense from 1987 to 1990, Gramajo oversaw a military accused of butchering dozens of university students, provoking Anne Manuel of Americas Watch to find "a sort of tragic irony" in Harvard's ardor for educating him.<sup>21</sup> Gramajo is believed to have chosen to come to Harvard as part of his plan to run for Guatemala's presidency in 1995. And Harvard, as U.S. Representative Chester Atkins (D-MA) observed, appears to be in the business of "laundering reputations."

## The Fortunes of War in the Gulf

The recent crisis in the Gulf has produced another opportunity for Harvard's foreign policy braintrust to be heard in the corridors of power. From the very beginning, the White House turned to the Kennedy School. Lecturer Richard Haass was "one of a handful of advisers constantly at Bush's side during the crisis," wrote the *Boston Globe*, and an architect of "the 'no negotiation' approach Bush is taking."

"If this thing turns out well," an admiring colleague observed, "the sky is his limit."<sup>22</sup>

Other Harvard intellectuals emerged in the vanguard of the pro-Gulf War movement. Nadav Safran, previous recipient of a \$107,000 grant from the CIA for a book on Saudi Arabia, authored a December 27, 1990, *New York Times* op-ed piece calling on the administration to reject any Iraqi overtures as they were tainted with linkage. Harvard lecturer and *New Republic* commander-in-chief Martin Peretz, avowing superior knowledge and expertise on the region, complained that his lack of invitations to appear on news shows during the crisis was indicative of the media's supposed anti-Israeli bias. More popular as a media-approved expert was Laurie

Mylroie, Harvard Center for International Affairs fellow and coauthor of a bestselling biography of Saddam Hussein pumped out just in time for the war. Known in some circles as "the Weathervane" for shifting her scholarship to the prevailing winds in Washington, Mylroie wrote essays in the mid to late 1980s on the benefits of military alliance with the regime in Baghdad. In them, she marvelled at Saddam's march towards democracy, only to switch in 1990 to outraged calls to smash Iraq and the PLO.

For those who thought that Michael Dukakis might have pursued a less crusading interventionism than Bush, Harvard has an answer. Joseph Nye, an undersecretary of state during the Carter years, and Graham Allison, ex-KSG dean and consultant to Reagan Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, had been projected for high foreign policy posts under the future Democrat administration. Both waxed enthusiastic about the need for decisive military intervention.

"If we had gone along and given [Saddam Hussein] three weeks," said Nye in opposition to the February 1991 Soviet peace initiative, "it is plausible [Saddam] would change his mind and set other conditions."<sup>23</sup> The minority of Harvard experts who called for the pursuit of diplomacy throughout the crisis were stampeded by the herd rampaging toward war.

## **Onward to Eastern Europe**

The next major frontier for Harvard social science is the conversion of the command economies of Eastern and Central Europe, especially that of Poland, to capitalism. Several countries of the region have turned to a Harvard economist to carry out the transition. Professor Jeffrey Sachs, the advocate of shock therapy in Latin America, has advised Poland to ingest a bracing tonic of high unemployment and decline in living standards, which he reassures will be temporary. Budapest-born Harvard Professor Janos Kornai is Hungary's leading guru of privatization.

Harvard academics are also promoting capitalist reforms in the U.S.S.R. KSG's Graham Allison runs the Carnegie Corporation and Getty Foundation-sponsored "Strengthening Democratic Institutions" project which, with Russian Federation deputy prime minister Grigory Yavlinsky, is proposing privatization linked to a Marshall Plan-type aid package. After Allison and Yavlinsky met with Bush, Yavlinsky reported the President said "[I] liked what I heard."<sup>24</sup>

## **Liberal Boutique**

Harvard is widely perceived as an "ultra-liberal boutique" -- a stock phrase in the campaign oratory of George Bush throughout 1988. One anonymous alumnus of the Program for Senior Officers in National Security, had apparently accepted the neoconservative picture of universities as overrun by what former Secretary of

Education William Bennett called "academic totalitarians ... whose principal talk is to raise revolutionary consciousness."<sup>25</sup> He was pleasantly surprised to find that "[t]he quality of the faculty and the course rekindled my faith in Harvard."<sup>26</sup>

His sentiments were echoed by another CIA veteran. "I am certain," declared the Agency division chief and 1988 graduate of the program, "the framework will serve me well for the rest of my career."<sup>27</sup>

Their endorsements are striking testimony that the twentieth century university remains a sanctuary for the Pentagon and the CIA and a modern monument to knowledge in the service of Empire.

1. Norman Stone, "A Farewell to the Arms Race," *Sunday Times* (London), books supplement, February 11, 1990, p. H8.
2. Nathan Pusey, *Harvard and Cambridge* (pamphlet, 1959). Pusey's text was delivered in May 1959 at the Commander Hotel in Cambridge.
3. Bundy quoted in booklet, *How Harvard Rules* (1969 edition). The 1969 version reproduces many documents on Bundy's role in expanding international studies. For a fuller historical treatment of these issues, see the 1989 book version: John Trumbour, ed., *How Harvard Rules* (Boston: South End Press, 1989).
4. For an essay actively lauding this development, see the right-wing Harvard publication, *Peninsula*. Roger Landry, "Harvard Was Once Allied With the Allies," *Peninsula*, April 1991, pp.28-29.
5. For these citations, see: Clyde W. Barrow, *Universities and the Capitalist State: Corporate Liberalism and the Reconstruction of American Higher Education, 1894-1928* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 135, 142, and 283n.
6. See Waldo G. Leland, "The National Board for Historical Service," *Annual Report of the A.H.A. for the Year 1919, Volume 1* (Washington DC, 1923); George H. Mead, "The Repulsiveness of the German State," *History Teachers Magazine*, IX, November 1918; and James Westfall Thompson, "The Deeper Roots of Pan-Germanism," *History Teachers Magazine*, IX, October 1918. I am grateful to Cyrus Veaser for showing the connections between the NBHS and the rise of Western Civilization courses.
7. Dorothy Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 325-26.
8. Barrow, pp. 124-25. Also see: David Noble, *America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism* (New York: Knopf, 1977).
9. Roger Hilsman, *Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions* (Glencoe IL: Free Press, 1956).
10. Benson from essay in the *Public Historian* cited by R.J. Lambrose, "The Abusable Past," *Radical History Review*, 28-30, 1984, pp. 67-72.

11. Bundy in: *Dimensions of Diplomacy*, Edgar A.G. Johnson, ed., (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1964), pp. 2-3.
12. Data on area studies from David Horowitz, "Sinews of Empire," *Ramparts*, October 1969.
13. Karl E. Mundt, "Need for a National Freedom Academy," in John Boardman Whitton, ed. *Propaganda and the Cold War: A Princeton University Symposium* (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press, 1963), p. 79.
14. Quoted by R.J. Lambrose, *op. cit.*, pp. 516-17.
15. *Ibid.* For greater background on these developments, see John Trumbour, ed., *How Harvard Rules*, 1989, pp. 67-72.
16. See brochure: "Program for Senior Officers in National Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University," April 1 - May 24, 1991. It provides the following notes on eligibility for admission: "Senior Officers in National Security is designed for civilian officials in the national security community of GS-15 or equivalent rank and for military officers at the colonel or Navy captain rank.... The full support and sponsorship of each applicant's employing organization is required.... Prospective candidates from inside the Department of Defense who do not receive one of the OSD-sponsored slots may apply directly. Applicants from outside the Department should also apply directly."
17. Michael E. Balagur, "Activists Sit-in, Protest K-School Ties to Pentagon," *Harvard Crimson*, April 2, 1991, pp. 1, 7.
18. Patrick Brogan, *The Fighting Never Stopped* (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 432.
19. Michael Massing, "The New Game in Guatemala," *New York Review of Books*, October 25, 1990. See also: Tim Golden, "Controversy Pursues Guatemalan General Studying in U.S.," *New York Times*, December 3, 1990. Gramajo admitted he lacks evidence for his allegation against Ortiz.
20. Gramajo quoted by Joshua A. Gerstein, "Rights Issues Haunt Graduating General," *Harvard Crimson*, June 4, 1991, pp. A1, A7.
21. *Ibid.*
22. Stephen Kurkjian, "Of Strategy and Stamina," *Boston Globe*, September 24, 1990, p. 3.
23. Lan Nguyen, "Who's Right?," *Harvard Crimson*, March 1, 1991, p. 3.
24. "KSG Proposes 'Grand Bargain' to Aid U.S.S.R.," *Harvard Gazette*, July 5, 1991, p. 7, and Graham Allison and Grigory Yavlinsky, "Different Drummer, Different Market," *New York Times*, July 3, 1991, p. A19, op-ed.
25. Quoted in David Bell, "Ghosts of Leftists Past," *New Republic*, August 11-18, 1986.
26. Quotations of KSG alumni from 1991 KSG promotional brochure.

27. *Op. cit.*, 1989. On the KSG's service to the Reagan administration and the Right, see: Richard Cravatts, "Kennedy School: Conservative Hotbed," *New York Times*, July 15, 1988, p. A31, op-ed.

---

John Trumpbour is a teaching fellow at the Department of History, Harvard University and editor of *How Harvard Rules: Reason in the Service of Empire* (Boston: South End Press, 1989) and *The Dividing Rhine: Politics and Society in Contemporary France and Germany* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1989).

[Back to home page](#)

Center for International Studies, May 1954

# How to Start a War

**Web editor's note:** Max F. Millikan was an economics professor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology during the 1950s. From 1951-52 he took a leave of absence to serve as assistant CIA director. Upon returning he became director of MIT's Center for International Studies, which was funded by the CIA and Ford Foundation.

In Millikan's letter to CIA director Allen Dulles, "C.D." refers to C.D. Jackson, who in 1953 was appointed by Eisenhower to be his special assistant for psychological warfare activities.

The document referred to in this cover letter was published for the first time in *Universities and Empire: Money and Politics in the Social Sciences During the Cold War*, edited by Christopher Simpson (New York: The New Press, 1998). The document, written by Millikan and Walt W. Rostow, takes a hard line on international relations. The authors promote military security as the top priority, which in turn insures free markets and continued economic growth. Part IV, referred to in the cover letter, begins as follows: "First, any possible salvage of all or part of Indo-China requires that the Indo-Chinese believe we are in Asia to stay, not merely in a military sense, but politically and economically as well...."

[Letter from Millikan to Dulles](#)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology  
Center for International Studies  
70 Memorial Drive  
Cambridge MA, Massachusetts

May 21, 1954

Mr. Allen W. Dulles  
2430 E Street N.W.  
Washington 25, D.C.



Dear Allen:

I am sending to you and Dick Bissell only an interim revision of the document we emerged with on Saturday noon at Princeton. It includes certain urgent minor revisions suggested by this group; but we have been instructed to prepare a new and developed version over the next month, embracing certain features of substance and presentation not attempted here that we all agree are badly needed. This interim revision is merely to let you see roughly where we came out on the first go-round.

We have made this interim revision and are sending it to you at C.D.'s suggestion. He thought that it might be useful as background, should anything be launched in Asia as an economic backstop to our proposed collective security arrangements. You will note that Part IV of this document spells out briefly the main points made in the discussion of Asia late Saturday afternoon. Our feeling is that the situation in Asia represents not only an urgent need to launch something like this, but also an opportunity to launch it. If we do this, however, we should be prepared from the beginning with the larger perspective and larger plans roughly sketched out in this document.

Sincerely  
yours,

/s/

Max F. Millikan  
Director

MFM:peb  
Enclosure

[Back to home page](#)

*Forerunner*, April 29, 1980

***Panel met secretly in Princeton***

## **Dulles Papers Reveal CIA Consulting Network**

**by John Cavanagh**

A government which corrupts its colleges and universities by making political fronts of them . . . has betrayed academic freedom and compromised all who teach. When colleges and universities are made conduits of deceit and when faculty members are paid to lie, there is an end to the common good of higher education.

-- Professor Van Alstyne, former president of the American Association of University Professors (*Academe*, June 1976, p. 54)

Throughout the 1960s, and possibly longer, at least five Princeton professors worked secretly as high-level consultants for the CIA, according to previously undisclosed documents contained in the personal papers of former CIA director Allen W. Dulles '14.

Cyril Black, Klaus Knorr, Joseph Strayer, James Billington, and the late T. Cuyler Young served as members of the "Princeton Consultants," a secret panel of academics who met in Princeton, together with Dulles, four times a year to assist with intelligence assessments for the CIA's Office of National Estimates.

Professor Black, who had told the *Daily Princetonian* in 1976 that he had never been in the CIA's "employ," confirmed to the *Forerunner* last week that he had indeed served as a paid consultant for the spy agency. "Nobody ever asked me if I was a consultant," Black explained.

Billington acknowledged to the *Daily Princetonian* in 1968 that he consulted for the CIA's Office of National Estimates, according to him, "two or three times a year." Strayer had also been publicly identified as a CIA consultant. The CIA activities of the other two professors, however, have until now remained a secret, as has the existence of the Princeton Consultants group.

Black confirmed that then-Princeton President Robert Goheen was aware of the group's existence. But he said that it was "not a university matter at all."

The Dulles papers and letters, which are housed in Princeton's Seeley G. Mudd Library, afford a rare glimpse into the CIA's interactions with Princeton and other universities from the early 1950s until Dulles's death in 1969. Dulles maintained close ties with his alma mater, including seats on Princeton's Board of Trustees and on the Woodrow Wilson School Advisory Council.

Access to the Papers is contingent upon approval by an Allen W. Dulles Committee. In addition, researchers are required to sign a contract stating that any publication using the Papers will be submitted in advance to the Committee for approval. After a one-month delay, permission was obtained for this article.

Before this month's careful research in the Dulles Papers, little was documented of relations between the CIA and the Princeton faculty. Other than history professor Joseph Strayer, whom one writer termed "the agency's most devoted consultant" (James Ridgeway, *The Cloned Corporation*, 1968, p. 138), only two professors had been identified who served in organizations that received CIA funding: Politics professor Paul Sigmund with the Independent Research Service, and Near Eastern Studies professor Morroe Berger with the Congress for Cultural Freedom.

Previous disclosures about Princeton and the CIA were limited to close ties in three other areas: recruitment (including extensive CIA collaboration with former Dean of Students, William D'O. Lippincott '41 and former Director of Career Services Newell Brown '39); CIA research carried out on the Princeton campus (including the secret MK-ULTRA mind control program); and close institutional ties (several Princeton alumni have served as CIA Director, Deputy Director, or Director of Personnel).

## **Princeton Consultants: The Structure**

Perhaps the most extraordinary of the Papers' contents are letters and memos which expose Strayer as a small tip of a consultant iceberg. Filed under "Princeton Consultants" and cross-referenced under "Central Intelligence Agency: Panel of Consultants (Princeton Consultants)," letters from 1961 to 1969 sketch the outlines of one of the central programs of professors covertly consulting for the CIA.

The only year during which the entire membership of the Consultants is known is 1961, when all of them signed a note of "respect and affection" to Dulles that accompanied a gift.

At that time, the panel consisted of nine senior professors: the late T. Cuyler Young (Near Eastern Studies, Princeton); Klaus Knorr (Strategic Studies, Princeton); Joseph Strayer (Medieval History, Princeton); Cyril Black (Soviet Studies, Princeton); the late

William Langer (History, Harvard); Robert Bowie (International Studies, Harvard); Max Millikan (International Studies, M.I.T.); Raymond Sontag (European History, Berkeley); and Calvin Hoover (Soviet Economics, Duke); and four others: Philip E. Mosely (Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations); Hamilton Fish Armstrong (editor, *Foreign Affairs*); Caryl P. Haskins (Director, Carnegie Institution); and Harold F. Linder (Assistant Secretary of State and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank).

Two later members of the Princeton Consultants are disclosed in correspondence to Dulles and his wife Clover: Princeton History professor James Billington (January 15, 1965 letter from Dulles to Billington) and M.I.T. China expert Lucian Pye (January 30, 1969 letter from Pye to Clover Dulles).

Both Dulles and Sherman Kent, Chairman of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, also attended the Consultants meetings. The meetings were held in two-day blocks, four times a year. Many of the meeting dates coincided with Princeton trustee meetings, probably for Dulles's convenience. This appears to have created some problems for Dulles, however, whose personal schedule for the third week in October 1962 shows several time conflicts between his normal trustee duties and activities he pencilled in his own handwriting under the heading "CIA Consultants."

The precise year that the Princeton Consultants began operations is unclear from the Dulles Papers. A "Princeton Consultants" file first appears in 1961. However, in thirteen identical letters dated October 21 of that year, Dulles thanks each of the Consultants "for what you have contributed to our work here over the years." This language indicates that the group's existence reaches back well into the 1950s. Black confirmed that his membership in the Consultants dates from around 1957.

A further clue to the Consultants' origins is found in Consultant Calvin Hoover's memoirs (*Memoirs of Capitalism, Communism, and Nazism*, 1965). He writes (p. 270) that, after December 1950: "I agreed to serve as a member of a board of national estimates, composed largely of professors, generals, and admirals. It was a pleasure to find myself associated once more with Allen Dulles and with other friends of OSS days."

Within the next two and a half years, however, Hoover suffered a heart attack. He recalls (p. 273): "Bedell Smith asked that I continue to serve as a consultant [to the Board] to the extent that my health would permit. I agreed and continued to serve in this capacity during succeeding years."

If Hoover's consultancy began with the Princeton Consultants, then the group's existence stretches back at least to 1953.

The Consultants' termination date is also not revealed in the Papers. At the time of Dulles' last letter concerning the Princeton Consultants schedule (May 15, 1968 letter from Dulles to Frances Douglas), the former CIA head was still attending their meetings and "look[ed] forward to the future ones."

Black told the *Forerunner* that he had served on the Consultants until the late 1960s and that he believes they kept going for "a few years" after he left. Knorr added that he didn't think the group existed "when Bowen was president" of Princeton. This would place the Consultants' termination before 1972.

In addition to the Papers' frequent references to the CIA's Board of National Estimates, three other bits of evidence lead to the conclusion that a major portion of the Consultants' work went to the Board.

First, when approached by *The Daily Princetonian* on possible CIA affiliations (November 8, 1968), Consultant "Billington told *The Princetonian* he consulted for the Office of National Estimates 'two or three times a year' for a 'nominal fee -- \$50 a day.' He explained he participated in conferences with other academics which submitted 'broad and scholarly' National Intelligence Estimates to the National Security Council. Billington added he was only one of 'quite a few' Princeton professors who worked for the CIA but refused to make an estimate on how many."

Second, according to the Dulles Papers, Sherman Kent, Chairman of the CIA's Board of National Estimates, came to most, if not all, of the Consultants' meetings until he retired in 1967. He also presided over at least one meeting in 1967, indicating his importance to the group.

Finally, in a letter of November 5, 1965 from the CIA Director W.F. "Red" Raborn to Dulles, Raborn turned down an offer by Dulles to resign from the Princeton Consultants as follows: "I assure you that I have no desire to see you leave this Panel. On the contrary, I am anxious that the Agency generally, and the Board of National Estimates in particular, shall enlarge and extend their contacts with persons capable of advising and assisting in their work."

Thus, the Dulles Papers reveal a direct link between the Princeton Consultants and the Board of National Estimates. Former CIA officer Victor Marchetti in collaboration with John Marks (*The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, 1974) describe the Board of National Estimates in 1973 as a 12- to 14-person board with a staff of forty to fifty specialists. It is doubtful that the Princeton Consultants were the Board; rather, they probably formed an adjunct to the "specialists."

The central function of the Board of National Estimates and its specialists was to prepare, each year, some fifty-odd National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) -- called "blue books" -- which, according to Marchetti and Marks (p. 314), "were considered the highest form of national intelligence." Estimates covered such topics as assessment of the "enemy's" intentions in different countries and regions, and foreign military capabilities.

Marchetti and Marks described what then became of the finished NIEs, using as a case in point a late 1960s study of the socio-political problems of Latin America (pp. 16-17): "This estimate had been endorsed by the United States Intelligence Board, whose members include the heads of the government's various intelligence agencies, and had then been sent to the White House and to those departments that

were represented on the 40 Committee." The 40 Committee was (p. 14) "an interdepartmental panel responsible for overseeing the CIA's high-risk covert-action operations."

The Marchetti and Marks description indicates that the Princeton Consultants' work could have served as an intelligence base for the series of brutal and often illegal covert operations of the 1950s and 1960s (and possibly also the 1970s) against the democratically elected or constitutional governments of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran (1953); Patrice Lumumba in the Congo (1961); Joao Goulart in Brazil (1964); Juan Balaguer in the Dominican Republic (1965); Cheddi Jagan in Guyana (1962-66); and Salvador Allende in Chile (1973).

Since it is also known that the Consultants operated during a sizable segment (and possibly all) of the Vietnam War, the question arises whether their "estimates" of "enemy intentions" were an input into the CIA's Phoenix Program of torture and assassination, which led to the death, between 1968 and 1972, of some 20,000 Vietnamese citizens.

Both Black and Knorr categorically denied any relationship between the National Intelligence Estimates and the CIA's covert activities. According to Black, this hypothesis is "so far off what happened that it's very hard to comment without spending hours on it." Knorr characterized the allegation as "sheer speculation." He also asked rhetorically: "Are these people [the consultants] responsible" for the uses to which their estimates are put?

Consultant Calvin Hoover's memoirs shed some light on this controversy. He describes the Board of National Estimates as follows (Hoover, p. 270):

It was the responsibility of our board to produce intelligence estimates which could be used as the background by the appropriate agencies of our government for decisions on long-term international policies and on current action required, particularly those within the competency of the National Security Council. National intelligence estimates had to be provided covering a very large number of countries and particular situations, all involving in some fashion the threat of Soviet aggression. For example, how explosive was the political, social, and economic situation in Iran? When Mossadegh came to power, to what extent was he under the domination of the local Communist party and was the Communist party effectively controlled by Moscow? If the oil resources of Iran were nationalized, would they be made available to the Soviet government and could they effectively be utilized? How serious would be the loss of these resources to the West?

Hoover's reference to Mossadegh raises a question about the role of "estimates" in at least one actual CIA operation: the 1953 coup in Iran that put the Shah back onto the throne for the next 25 years.

William Langer, one of the Consultants from Harvard, wrote his sentiments on "estimating" to Dulles in a letter of April 22, 1963:

Yet I suppose the operations end would be of little significance unless there were proper processing of the results. And in any case, so much of basic intelligence hinges on the painstaking work of collation and evaluation. Estimating is simply the final stage of a long and arduous business without which it is quite impossible to arrive at any notion of one's opponent's intentions.

Here, a consultant clearly enunciates one link between "estimating" and actual operations.

The Board of National Estimates was formally disbanded in 1973 when another Princeton graduate, William Colby, was director of the CIA (source: Marchetti and Marks, pp. 67, 315). The Board was replaced by a group of eight senior CIA officers known as National Intelligence Officers (referred to as "the Wise Men" by their colleagues). Organizationally, they are still located near the top of the CIA hierarchy, in the Office of the Director of the CIA. And they still churn out National Intelligence Estimates which require the assistance of consultants.

Beyond the task of "estimating" for the CIA, little is known of the duties of the Consultants. Dulles' November 4, 1965 letter to CIA Director Raborn does refer to the Princeton group as "the Agency's panel of Consultants," which suggests that their purview may have been much broader.

It appears that outside of the CIA and the Consultants themselves, almost no one knew of the Consultants' existence. The Dulles Papers reveal only one instance of Dulles corresponding with an outsider about the Consultants. While still Director of the CIA, Dulles wrote to Robert Goheen, then president of Princeton (February 20, 1961): "I hope to renew the invitation to you which last winter was 'snowed out' to meet with our group of pundits who foregather three or four times a year in Princeton." The date Goheen was invited for coincided with a meeting of the Princeton Consultants. Goheen now serves as the U.S. Ambassador to India.

## **Princeton Consultants: Loyal Professors**

It seems appropriate that the Consultants often met in the Gun Room of Princeton's Nassau Club -- located across the street from Commons -- for their interactions often resembled those of a tightly-knit "old-boys" club. Many members' friendships harked back to pre-World War II days.

Consultant Hoover's memoirs, for example, chronicle a close working relationship with Consultant Langer back in 1941 in one of the precursor organizations to the CIA - the Committee on Intelligence (COI). Hoover later lived and carried out intelligence work in post-war Germany with Consultant Robert Bowie. He toured Poland in 1958 with Consultant Harold Linder.

Many of the Consultants sat on the same committees of the Council on Foreign Relations. Members lauded each other with praise in the forewords to their books.

And, through it all, they maintained secrecy about their CIA consulting work.

Many also shared common Princeton ties. In addition to the five of the fifteen known consultants who taught at Princeton -- and Dulles who was a Princeton alumnus and trustee -- Robert Bowie was a 1931 Princeton graduate and Lucian Pye was a research assistant at Princeton's Center for International Studies (with Knorr and Black) from 1952 to 1956.

Many of the Consultants have actually taken leave from their academic duties to work for the CIA. These include Strayer, Sontag, Hoover, Millikan, Langer and Bowie. In 1977, Bowie became Deputy Director for National Intelligence, which among other tasks, put him in charge of National Intelligence Estimates.

The Consultants' working relationships regarding CIA matters often carried over into their non-Consultant work. The Dulles papers reveal that Billington, currently director of the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, frequently critiqued the manuscripts of Allen Dulles' books. After receiving a generous check for the work, he wrote to Dulles (July 25, 1964) that if there was anything he could do in the future, he would rather do it with the clear assurance that there would be no more remuneration. He said that working with Dulles had been one of his most rewarding experiences and that Dulles was doing him a favor by letting him continue to do so on occasion. (Billington refused permission to quote directly from this letter.)

In another instance, Dulles wrote to Consultant Hamilton Fish Armstrong, then editor of *Foreign Affairs*, about an anti-CIA book that the magazine was reviewing (September 6, 1962): "Personally I would hope that if *Foreign Affairs* had to include an item in regard to the book, it would be not quite as enthusiastic as the text you read to me."

Apparently Dulles didn't lose his love of spy tactics after stepping down as Director, as his letter reveals in his instructions to Armstrong: "Kindly keep Colonel Grogan's letter for your own information and then destroy it when you have read it."

Finally, a confidential memo from a private consultant (Michael J. Deutch, November 13, 1963) to the Washington Institute on Foreign Affairs revealed the assistance Dulles gave to his Consultant colleagues who served as Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations (Mosely, Haskins, Pye and Armstrong):

"I wonder whether Allen Dulles knows how much he has contributed to the success of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York when he headed the Agency by having his top aides suggest from time to time subjects for Council Study Groups. Dr. Wolfers, Roger Hilsman, Gen. Lansdale, Cols. Lincoln, Jordan and I would never have been invited to join the Council [on Foreign Relations] were it not because of their participation in these Study Groups."

Billington, Strayer and Hoover seem alone among the Consultants in publicly acknowledging their CIA consulting work, although all three vastly understated the extent of their involvement, and none ever disclosed the existence of the Princeton



## Consultants.

Cyril Black, for one, has repeatedly issued denials -- quite carefully-worded ones, in retrospect -- whenever the question of CIA ties came up. A May 24, 1976 *Daily Princetonian* article reported that "Professor of History Cyril E. Black, head of the Center for International Studies, said he had been 'approached, but [he has] never [been] in their [the CIA's] employ.'" Black told the *Forerunner* on February 22, 1980 that "I stand by that statement."

But two months later, as the story of the Princeton Consultants was unraveling, Black volunteered the information that he had indeed served on the consultant panel. His statement to the *Daily Princetonian* was intended, he said, to distinguish between employment and consultancy. Black explained that he "was offered employment in the [CIA's] Bureau of National Estimates" in the early 1960s, but turned it down because "it wasn't particularly interesting."

The 1976 *Princetonian* article also quoted Black as saying that consulting is all right as long as it "doesn't hurt your friend or deceive anybody." Asked whether his carefully-worded denial could be considered deceptive, Black replied that "it's hard to say," adding that "one can certainly argue the case."

The cautious denial by Black and the qualified admission of CIA work by the three others can perhaps be better understood in the light of an August 5, 1968 "secret" memo from Earl Clinton Bolton, then vice-president of the University of California, to CIA academic consultants, on the subject of "Agency-Academic Relations." The memo suggests defenses for professors accused of CIA connections, as well as a "very well considered, affirmative public relations program" for the academic community's CIA work.

Ideas for the latter included: lecture series "to establish the study of intelligence as a legitimate and important field of inquiry for the academic scholar"; "stress in recruiting, articles and speeches that the Agency is really a university without students and not a training school for spies"; and "do all recruiting off-campus and try to time these visits so that the probability of reaction is decreased"; and other tactics.

One present-day irony that emerges from these disclosures about the Consultants is that among the three persons that President Carter chose in 1979 to produce an *outside* review of the CIA was Consultant Klaus Knorr.

---

John Cavanagh is director of the Institute for Policy Studies and coauthor of nine books, including *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order* (Touchstone, 1995). Special thanks to Jonny Fox, Alan Sokal, and Nancy Van Meter for help with interviews and preparation of this story (1980).

[Back to home page](#)

*Covert Action Information Bulletin*, Fall 1991, pp. 4-9

# Rochester Institute of Technology: A CIA Subsidiary?

by Jean A. Douthwright

Copyright © 1991 by Covert Action Publications, Inc., Washington DC, and Institute for Media Analysis, Inc., New York NY. All rights reserved.

It was February 1991 and the Gulf War was about to escalate into a ground conflict. Patriotic fervor in the U.S. was on the rise and Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) President M. Richard Rose seemed to echo the mood of the times. He was taking a sabbatical, he announced on February 15, to serve his country. "When so many young men and women are making personal sacrifices on behalf of their country," he told a student paper, "the very least I can do is serve in an area that maximizes my military, educational, and management experience."<sup>1</sup>

Two months later the Rochester *Times-Union* revealed that the "area" was not active military service, as Rose had led the community to believe, but rather a stint at the CIA in Langley, Virginia.<sup>2</sup> When faculty and students became aware of Rose's choice, many felt he had deceived them. Rose also said that he was "helping to devise new training and educational policies for CIA operatives that will prepare them to deal with the post-Cold War period."<sup>3</sup> But CIA spokespeople stated that "Rose let the Agency know he wanted to take a four-month sabbatical.... We didn't recruit him ... [but] we found his credentials fit."<sup>4</sup> RIT would only say that their president would be away, working on "national policies and procedures."

It was in this context of disinformation and misrepresentation that the surface was peeled back layer by layer to reveal a long, complex, and pervasive relationship between RIT and the CIA. It was a connection which many in the university community charged was antithetical to the goals, methodologies and values of higher education.

## Revealing the Ties

Rumors of ties between RIT's faculty, administration, and students and the CIA have long circulated but until recently have remained relatively minor or largely unsubstantiated.

A CIA memorandum dated October 16, 1975, revealed that the Agency had established "certain relationships [with RIT] which might be categorized as 'special' or 'particular.'"<sup>5</sup> Other documents showed that the College of Graphic Arts and Photography received about \$200,000 from the CIA in grants from 1966 to 1975.<sup>6</sup> In 1985 it was reported that "30 RIT ... students have gone to work just for the National

Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency."<sup>7</sup> Most of the students were from computer science, math, engineering and imaging science programs.

Controversy also occurred at RIT in 1987 when Robert C. "Bud" McFarlane, Rose's longtime personal friend, was paid more than \$70,000 to give three lectures as the Kern Professor of Communications at RIT. These talks occurred during the Iran-contra scandal when the former national security adviser was under investigation and attempted suicide. McFarlane continues his affiliation with RIT.

RIT had other influential friends who helped provide the kind of research and facilities the CIA needed. In 1985, when the new Imaging Science building was dedicated, the CIA deputy director attended and RIT awarded Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY) an honorary degree. D'Amato had been influential in obtaining large amounts of federal monies to subsidize the facility as well as an earlier building to house the microelectronics program.<sup>8</sup> This funding was criticized in the *Chronicle of Higher Education* because there was no peer review of any proposal. The Senate Appropriations Committee had also criticized lack of competitive bidding in awarding contracts to universities.<sup>9</sup>

Faculty members wrote letters to the editor denouncing the policies on grants and honorary degrees.<sup>10</sup> When D'Amato and McFarlane came to RIT, they were met with protests.

The current controversy which began over Rose's "sabbatical" at Langley is shedding light on some of the obscure funding sources and arrangements that have helped support CIA activities at RIT. During Rose's 12-year presidency, RIT and its subsidiary, the RIT Research Corporation (RITRC)<sup>11</sup> have received millions of dollars of CIA money.<sup>12</sup> The total is not public information despite Rose's assurances that "it is my policy [regarding CIA involvement at RIT] to use every line of communication available to this community to assure that all our members are informed of what is happening all the time."<sup>13</sup>

Also clouding the issue is the relationship between RIT and RITRC through which much of the Agency's work is funneled. This for-profit subsidiary of the university, situated yards from the RIT campus proper, is private and thus less liable to public disclosure of funding sources and expenditures than is RIT itself. What is clear, however, is the rapid growth in CIA presence, influence, and funding under President Rose. The major build-up has occurred since the mid-1980s and now amounts to at least \$2 million a year.<sup>14</sup>

## Unravelling the Ties

The most recent exposure of the Rose connection to the CIA was triggered by a press conference called by the RIT-CIA Off Campus Coalition (COCC) on April 30, 1991. Jennifer Hyman, a reporter for the Rochester *Democrat and Chronicle*, part of the Gannett chain, had been looking into the CIA-RIT since early April after Rose's

stint at Langley was revealed. Since the conference, she has written a major series of rigorously documented articles which revealed a deep and longstanding relationship.<sup>15</sup> The university struck back, denying the accuracy of the reports and challenging the integrity of the reporter. In a letter written to RIT donors, Jack Smith, RIT's vice president for communications complained that "unbalanced stories with misinformation ... are examples of reporting that is nothing short of character assassination... The story emphasis written by ... Jennifer Hyman, a foreign national from South Africa, seems to be influenced by her past experiences with the CIT [sic] which tie her philosophically to the handful of people protesting CIA-related programs on the RIT campus."<sup>16</sup>

Although they impugned her accuracy and motivation, university officials failed to refute Hyman's evidence. After her initial articles, they met charges with a stonewall of denial, begrudging acknowledgment of small bits of information, or silence -- most refused to even speak with Hyman. President Rose has apparently been advised by Hill and Knowlton, the largest and one of the most expensive public relations firms in the country, not to comment to the press. This firm, which RIT recently hired in the wake of the controversy, has also represented the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), the Kuwaiti government-in-exile (Citizens for a Free Kuwait), and handles the United States Catholic Conference's multi-million dollar anti-abortion campaign.

As information linking Rose and RIT to the CIA mounted, so did opposition. COCC, the coalition of peace and justice groups and individuals from the campus, the alumni and the community called for his resignation and for RIT to cut all ties to the Agency. On April 25, the COCC presented its demands to the Faculty Council which voted 19-2 stipulating that Rose return from Langley before May 10 when the campus would begin emptying out for the summer. Rose refused, citing his commitments to the CIA. On May 28, the first business day after graduation, however, he returned, held a press conference, and met for two hours with the editorial board of the Gannett newspapers.

At that meeting "Rose insisted that the CIA was not involved in any way whatsoever in influencing academic programs at RIT. That [relationship], he said, would be inappropriate."<sup>17</sup> The cynical posture of that statement became apparent in light of the 1985 "Memorandum of Agreement" between the university and the CIA implemented during Rose's tenure as president in which the Agency "recognize[s] RIT as a strategic national resource worthy of explicit development and support." RIT committed to tailor its curriculum to be "responsive to certain defined specialties of the CIA ... [and to] establish a program leading to a doctorate in imaging sciences." In exchange, the CIA found it "appropriate to support faculty chairs and research projects in various RIT departments."<sup>18</sup> It was inevitable, given this arrangement, that the Agency would influence curriculum decisions, funding and faculty appointments.

The memorandum also revealed that "participants may engage in classified work ... without the knowledge of faculty advisers and students participating on that project." RIT's Center for Imaging Science would take on the role of "lead organization" in the new relationship.<sup>19</sup> "There is simply no way," noted a *Democrat and Chronicle* editorial, "to square what Rose said last week [about the lack of CIA influence] with

the facts contained in this document."<sup>20</sup>

## **Broad Implications of CIA on Campus**

Rose, because of his unabashed defense of the CIA's role on campus, and his undeniable ties with the Agency, has become the center of a controversy with broad-ranging implications. At 58, his ramrod bearing, clipped haircut and curt manner attest to his military background. Rose, educated at Slippery Rock State College in Pennsylvania, was in the Marine Corps for five years and was a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve from 1958 to 1986. He worked as a teacher and high school guidance counselor in Pennsylvania. In 1962 he became an administrator at the University of Pittsburgh where he stayed until 1972. It was there, in 1968 that he met Andrew J. Dougherty, head of the school's Air Force ROTC program, with whom he has been closely associated ever since. "Doc," as Dougherty is known, is a member of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

From 1972 through 1974, Rose served under Nixon as a deputy assistant secretary of defense developing training programs for military personnel, directing policy-mailing, and budgeting for military training. In 1974 he became president of Alfred University, about an hour from RIT, where he started a university-affiliated research corporation similar to RITRC, before coming to RIT in 1979. He brought Dougherty along first as vice president and then as executive assistant to the president. Dougherty also became the pivotal CIA contact person until early June 1991. Dougherty was then thrown to the wolves by the RIT Board of Trustees which along with the administration hoped that his forced resignation would satisfy opponents of RIT's deep involvement with the CIA and quiet the controversy.<sup>21</sup>

At first CIA involvement at RIT seemed -- because of the direct involvement of the president -- more dramatic, but not substantively different from that at many other universities. Liberal critics argued that the CIA on campus violated both educational and ethical norms. The covert nature of CIA activities was antithetical to open research, a spirit of inquiry, and the fundamental goals of education. The CIA, irredeemably bloodied by coups, assassinations, drug dealing and general brutality, was morally incompatible with the mission of a university.

These generalized charges were familiar ones and had been more or less successfully ignored, stonewalled or circumvented by the CIA in the past. What made RIT different was Hyman's tenacious reporting in a mainstream press; the presence of an organized group of concerned and unintimidated students and faculty; the particular arrogance and lack of subtlety of RIT's CIA operatives; and sensational, carefully documented evidence demonstrating how the Agency bought and paid for a tame institution suited to its needs. This fortuitous combination of factors exposed, for even the apolitical and amoral to see, how university collaboration with the CIA can affect the educational and ethical fiber of the community.

## Tracing Back the Ties That Bind

Located in a secure building on the edge of campus, with a conference room that is regularly swept for bugs, is RIT's CIA-funded Federal Programs Training Center (FPTC). Here, small teams of faculty and students, totalling about 30 full- and part-time employees, work on various secret projects. Handpicked faculty and students with backgrounds in printing and photography develop procedures to identify different characteristics in documents such as passports, ID cards, drivers' licenses and visas. Some participants say the purpose of the work is to design research methods to help create more sophisticated and authentic looking forgeries. Particular attention is paid to bar codes, Mylar strips, holograms, embossings or laminates. Students doing the work were told detection of forged documents might affect an agent's life. They are also told not to discuss their work, or to identify the CIA as the sponsor. Another completed project perfected the electronic scanning of 9mm spy film to digitize and store selected images on computer disc.

At least 50 RIT faculty, staff and students had security clearances with the CIA in 1988.<sup>22</sup> It could run many times that amount by now. Even the School for American Craftsmen program in woodworking has been infiltrated by the Agency which assigned students classroom projects making desks with hidden drawers and picture frames with secret cavities for listening devices.<sup>23</sup>

The proliferation of CIA programs and the large number of people involved at RIT is not a matter of chance. In a 1988 charter, RIT established a Technical Support Program and a Scholars' Program specifically to serve the CIA.<sup>24</sup> Students were to be selected, recruited, and trained to do research for the Agency. When Edward McIrvine, dean of the College of Graphic Arts and Photography received his copy of the charter, he urged the administration to reveal it to the entire RIT community.

"It wasn't research any more," said McIrvine, "it was training. I told them that educating students enrolled at RIT for the CIA wasn't part of the Research Corporation mission."<sup>25</sup>

One particularly blatant way the CIA shaped the educational and research agenda of the University was by contracting with the RITRC to produce reports. McFarlane and other "experts" participated in discussions used to develop these documents. In "Changemasters," funded by the CIA and written in 1990 by Dougherty, Rose committed both himself and RIT to supporting the continuing work of the CIA.

Another report, the confidential "Japan: 2000" described Japanese people as "creatures of an ageless, amoral, manipulative and controlling culture" who are conspiring to dominate the world. The report concludes by congratulating itself that it "provide[s] notice that the 'rising sun' is coming -- the attack has begun."<sup>26</sup> After Hyman exposed the original and the report was denounced by experts on Japan as crude, racist and full of errors, a revised version was released.<sup>27</sup> Although the language in this version was less overtly racist, the basic arguments remained unchanged. Two participants in the seminar have subsequently repudiated the report.

## Speaking Out Against the CIA

Critics of the CIA on campus pointed to these examples of dubious scholarship as unequivocal evidence of how CIA influence functioned to distort the ethical standards, research agenda, and academic environment of a university.

After "Japan: 2000" was made public, Dean McIrvine called for a change in leadership at RIT. In a May 24, 1991 letter, he further charged that, in the academic equivalent of a coup, the CIA had attempted to completely take over the Imaging Science program. In a reorganization plan authored by Rose, the Center for Imaging Science would be managed by the Research Corporation. "Such a strange proposal," said McIrvine, "made no sense educationally," but it did put the program in a better position "to serve the CIA."<sup>28</sup>

In an interview with Hyman published June 6, 1991, Dean McIrvine also revealed that RIT officials had conducted a secret background security check on him without his consent in 1988.<sup>29</sup> He was one of fifty administrators, deans, faculty and staff members for whom RIT was trying to get clearance. He had previously turned down two requests from Dougherty and Rose asking him for his cooperation with a background check and only discovered the CIA investigation after he refused the Agency access to some of his psychiatric records.

Other faculty members presumably passed initial CIA muster and found out about Agency interest when they were approached for recruitment.

In the mid 1980s, Malcolm Spaul, chair of RIT's Film and Video Department, was asked by Dougherty and two CIA agents to train CIA personnel in video surveillance. Spaul declined, saying that he would not do any "directly aggressive" work that infringed on human rights. His association of CIA work with human rights abuses was not abstract. It sprang from his close friendship with the family of Charles Horman, the American writer whose abduction and execution by a right-wing death squad in Chile in September 1973 was depicted in the film *Missing*. According to Spaul there is "some evidence that the CIA knew [Horman] was in captivity and acquiesced in his execution."

John Ciampa, director of the RIT American Video Institute, declined to work for the CIA. "[I] simply pointed to a clause in the contract with my institute that says it will engage only in activities that are life enhancing."

## Naming Names

Increasingly, research which serves military and corporate needs is routinely conducted at U.S. universities. Their large and sometimes secret grants endow

faculty chairs, pay research, graduate student and staff salaries, and build and maintain facilities. Needless to say, the military and corporations support those projects which are directly responsive to their needs, not those which simply advance knowledge or serve social or university needs. Any responsible university undertakes to balance these often conflicting agenda through oversight committees which screen and evaluate grants and projects. RIT, however, had no such checks before the CIA scandal broke. Then, in response to faculty concerns, the Faculty Council-Administration Committee on Proprietary Research (CPR) was charged with evaluating the appropriateness of research projects and grant awards.

In the fall of 1989, Dougherty was asked by Vernon Elliott of *Campus Watch* (an anti-CIA watchdog publication) to confirm the presence of a CIA officer-in-residence at RIT. Rose reacted by sending a memo to Vice Presidents, Deans and Faculty Council members calling Philip Agee a drunk, communist, revolutionary, and womanizer. The attack, however, was drawn from a book which clearly referred to Philip Agee, Sr. (albeit erroneously), not Philip Agee, Jr. the coeditor of *Campus Watch* and not the ex-CIA officer who had become an outspoken opponent of the Agency's excesses.<sup>30</sup>

Members of the CPR also received the memo. This body had only recently begun raising questions about the secrecy and appropriateness of CIA-sponsored research. Some members of the ten-person committee interpreted Rose's memo as a McCarthyite tactic designed to intimidate them into dropping or softpedaling the inquiry. The effect was not as planned for some committee members. "I felt less intimidated than simply appalled by the left-over Cold War rhetoric lavished on the event," said philosophy professor Dr. Timothy Engstrom. "It was completely inappropriate, given the open discussions which should occur at a university. Rose casually assumed that his views were sanctioned by the academic hierarchy."

While some members felt threatened, others were more sanguine. John Schott and George Ryan had good reason to support a continuing relationship with the CIA, since both were involved in Agency programs. Schott, a professor in the imaging science program, just completed a \$200,000 grant for research on analyzing satellite images. (The CIA has apparently cancelled "all of Schott's work" in the wake of the recent publicity.) Schott, however, maintains that "all the work I do ends up in conference proceedings and journals."<sup>31</sup>

Ryan, the operations manager for the RITRC, along with Dr. Harvey Rhody, an electrical engineer, have recently replaced Dougherty as RIT's CIA contact people. Although they were on the CPR at the time and were aware of it, neither Schott nor Ryan informed the committee of the "Memorandum of Agreement" with the CIA. In fact, Ryan, in response to questions submitted by faculty in late 1989, stated that "RIT has made no commitments or agreements other than the deliverables including final reports...." Shortly before this statement, in April 1990, Rose and Provost Thomas Plough were asked to address a public forum on the issue of proprietary research. Both declined. Plough directed the president of the Research Corporation, Dr. Robert Desmond, to stand in. Although he spoke at the forum, he refused to answer the list of questions from faculty which he had been given well before the event.



If there is conflict of interest within the Proprietary Research Committee, there is an even more blatant one on the current Board of Trustees. One member, RIT alumnus Robert J. Kohler, is a 25-year former CIA official. Rose wrote to Kohler on April 18, 1985, to solicit a list of CIA-approved candidates for director of RIT's imaging science program. Kohler replied in May with three names including one "recently retired from the CIA" who "might be looking for something else to do at this stage of his life."<sup>32</sup> Kohler, who worked for the Lockheed Missile Space Company after leaving the CIA, was appointed to the Center for Imaging Science's academic advisory board in late 1985. He became an RIT trustee in 1988, and is vice president of the TRW Avionics and Surveillance Group in San Diego. TRW has long had close working relations with the CIA.

The CIA continued to be involved with the imaging science program according to a July 1986 memo from Dougherty.<sup>33</sup> In it the CIA's Evan Hineman was briefed by Kohler and Keith Hazard. Hineman wanted to see even greater CIA involvement in RIT's Center for Imaging Science. Hazard, a CIA officer who serves as outside advisor, replaced Kohler on the center's advisory board when Kohler became a trustee.

## An Investigation Begins

On May 28, 1991, Rose announced that he would suspend all *personal* ties with the CIA, "distance" himself and his office from Dougherty, and appoint a "blue-ribbon" commission to investigate RIT's CIA links.<sup>34</sup> A review panel was chosen by the Board of Trustees. After a series of protests charging that it was stacked, the panel was enlarged to include a student, an alumnus, and a faculty member. The panel also hired independent fact finders Monroe Freedman, an expert on legal ethics at Hofstra University, and Jonathan Soroko, a former New York City prosecutor. It is still unclear what access they and the panel will have to information and personnel at RIT and RITRC.

On June 5, papers relating to the CIA were discovered missing from Rose's office. Two days later, documents were mailed anonymously to news organizations in Rochester. They revealed last-ditch efforts by Dougherty to save the CIA programs. "Our sponsor," one document noted, "is increasingly uncomfortable with perceived hostile environment. If we do not solve the situation ourselves within days, we will probably lose it.... Gary Connors has indicated an absolute commitment to form a not-for-profit for which we can assign present contracts with no lapse in performance. The new not-for-profit would be a 'university' foundation consisting of University of Rochester, RIT, and other scientists who wish to participate."<sup>35</sup> Connors comes from Kodak's Government Systems division, also known in some quarters as its "spook division."

In July 1986, Rose told the CIA "[The CIA-RIT] relationship is rapidly coming to full bloom.... We are pleased and delighted with the relationship and the way the relationship has developed to both our advantages."<sup>36</sup> The RIT community, however,

had seen the root of the bloom. As the editors of a Rochester newspaper wrote, "RIT officials have tried to wrap this controversy in the flag, as if any red-blooded American should be happy to work for the CIA, no questions asked. But learning to forge documents is not necessarily a patriotic duty. This history of the CIA's meddling in other countries offers ample proof of that. Many other campuses have decided that CIA spying doesn't square with the mission of a university. Rose and his board of trustees need to explain clearly why they think it does."<sup>37</sup>

1. Christina Pagano, "President Rose Called for Confidential U.S. Assignment," *RIT Reporter*, February 15, 1991, p. 7.
2. M. Kathleen Wagner, "RIT President Working for CIA," *Times-Union*, Rochester NY, April 10, 1991.
3. Jennifer Hyman, "RIT President Working for CIA," *Democrat and Chronicle*, Rochester NY, April 11, 1991, p. B1.
4. John Machachek, "CIA Confirms Influence," *Times-Union*, Rochester NY, June 13, 1991, p. B1.
5. The memo from the CIA's director of personnel was made public under a Freedom of Information Act suit filed by Morton Halperin.
6. Eugene Marino, "Secret Research Draws RIT Students," *Democrat and Chronicle*, February 16, 1985, p. A1.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Colleen Cordes, "Sen. Byrd Eases Position on University Projects that Avoid Peer Review," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, September 27, 1989, p. 25.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Carolyn Snyder, *et al.*, "Unethical Gift," *RIT Reporter*, March 21, 1986.
11. The RITRC is supposed to be a separate subsidiary from RIT, but there is considerable use of personnel and funding from the university. For example, Dennis C. Nystrom, who was employed at RIT as a development officer for the imaging sciences program and is the former dean of the College of Graphics Arts and Photography, recruits students for and runs the Federal Programs Training Center (FPTC). He held no official position in the RITRC. (Nystrom resigned from RIT and is now employed as a manager of program development with Ektron Applied Imaging in Bedford MA. Ektron is part of Eastman Kodak Company's Government Systems Division, which handles Kodak's classified work for defense and intelligence agencies, and work for NASA.) It is unclear how much overlap exists between the RITRC and RIT; however, the RITRC, started in 1980, was heavily subsidized by RIT. The RITRC is still paying off loans RIT.
12. Jennifer Hyman, "Millions in CIA Funding Pumped into CIA Coeffers," *Democrat and Chronicle*, May 16, 1991, p. A1.
13. March 19, 1988, letter from President M. Richard Rose to Dr. Paul A. Haefner.

14. *Democrat and Chronicle, op. cit.*
15. Much of the information in this article comes from Hyman's reports.
16. Letter from Jack Smith to RIT donors, undated but sent circa June 1991.
17. Editorial, "Rescue RIT from the CIA," *Democrat and Chronicle*, June 4, 1991.
18. "Cover Memorandum for Memorandum of Agreement Among the RIT, the RIT Research Corporation, and the CIA," August 6, 1985.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Editorial, *Democrat and Chronicle, op. cit.*, June 4, 1991.
21. Dougherty told the *Times-Union*, on June 6, 1991, that he was "forced" out because of "distorted, twisted news reports." In a story the following day, Rose is reported to have blamed his colleague of more than two decades for RIT's involvement with the CIA. The president claimed he did not know the details of CIA research on campus and his biggest mistake was vesting oversight of Agency activities in one person.
22. Jennifer Hyman, "CIA Vein Runs Deep Inside RIT," *Democrat and Chronicle*, June 2, 1991, p. A1.
23. *Ibid.*
24. RIT office memo from President Rose, August 18, 1991.
25. Jennifer Hyman, "Dean Says His Privacy Invaded," *Democrat and Chronicle*, June 6, 1991, p. A1.
26. "Japan: 2000," February 1991, draft by Andrew Dougherty, p. 167.
27. Jennifer Hyman, "Revised Report Softer on Japanese," *Democrat and Chronicle*, May 25, 1991, p. A1.
28. RIT office memo from Edward McIrvine, May 24, 1991.
29. It is unclear how many of the 50 RIT individuals with security clearance are aware of their status. At other institutions, the CIA keeps files not only on those who have passed their clearance checks but on those who failed. The Agency does not feel obligated to notify either group.
30. RIT office memo from M. Richard Rose, October 10, 1989.
31. Denise K. Magner, "At Rochester Institute, a Spectrum of Opinions on Links with the CIA," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, July 10, 1991.

32. Letter sent from Robert J. Kohler to M. Richard Rose, May 6, 1985.
33. RIT office memo to Drs. Robert Desmond, Harvey Rhody, and John Schott from Andrew J Dougherty, July 31, 1986.
34. Jennifer Hyman, "Rose Suspends CIA Ties," *Democrat and Chronicle*, May 29, 1991, p. A1.
35. Transcript of telephone call from Andrew Dougherty while in Washington to M. Richard Rose, June 3, 1991.
36. "Report to Evan Hineman from M. Richard Rose Regarding CIA/RIT Relationships," July, 29, 1986. Hineman was CIA deputy director for science and technology.
37. Editorial, "How Many Secrets at RIT?", *Democrat and Chronicle*, May 17, 1991.

---

Jean A. Douthwright is an associate professor of biology at RIT and faculty adviser for the RIT Community for Peace and Justice. Research assistance was provided by members of the RIT-CIA Off Campus Coalition.

[Back to home page](#)

*CounterSpy*, June - August 1984, pp. 42-44

## **Rutgers University: Intelligence Goes to College**

**by Konrad Ege**

Rutgers University Professor Richard Mansbach is examining whether political organizations in Western Europe are endangering U.S. geopolitical and military interests. Has the West German Green Party managed to undermine NATO unity? Are the anti-nuclear Dutch churches infiltrated and directed by Communists? What parties in the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, France and England put roadblocks in the way of the foreign policy decisions of their governments?

Richard Mansbach's effort is not your average academic research project. The professor is a consultant to the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA commissioned the project and is paying well over \$20,000 for it.

At Rutgers, Mansbach is known as an intelligent and liberal professor. For two years, he served as the environmental commissioner in his hometown of Bridgewater, New Jersey and in one of his courses about nuclear war, students are required to read a piece by peace activist Helen Caldicott.

In 1967, Mansbach wrote his dissertation at Oxford University ("The Soviet-Yugoslav Rapprochement of 1955-1958: Its Political and Ideological Implications"). Then he became an assistant professor at Swarthmore College and Rutgers University. Later on, he served as a visiting professor at the University of Singapore and at Princeton University. Today he is the chairperson of the political science department at Rutgers in New Brunswick, New Jersey.

Throughout virtually his entire career, Mansbach has had close ties to intelligence and other government agencies. In 1975, he lectured at the CIA, in 1977 at the United States Information Agency (USIA), in 1982 at the National Security Agency and at the U.S. Army War College. In 1978 he served as a consultant to the USIA. From January 1981 to January 1983, Mansbach was a full-time staffer at CIA headquarters.

In those two years, Mansbach worked in the National Intelligence Council's European Analysis division. Apparently, he did a good job. As Mansbach was leaving, his superior let him know that the CIA had "profited greatly" from his service. Mansbach was also invited to rejoin the CIA whenever he wanted.

But Mansbach made a different career decision. He went back to Rutgers to become the head of the political science department. The CIA's National Intelligence Council immediately tried to develop projects on which their valuable researcher could work while at Rutgers. The Council chose ENSAP -- the European Non-State Actors

Projects. (Non-state actors are those organizations, institutions and individuals who attempt to influence government decision from the outside.)

For his ENSAP effort, Mansbach is assisted by Rutgers Professor Harvey Waterman. As does Mansbach, Waterman has a top-secret security clearance. About 100 students have been gathering information for ENSAP for academic credit. Most of the students don't know that they are working for the CIA.

Mansbach has also written to dozens of organizations and research institutes in Europe. In his form letter, the professor states that "a research group in the Political Science Department at Rutgers is embarking on a study of social, economic and political changes in Western Europe that may affect national foreign policies *vis-à-vis* the Atlantic Alliance." Mansbach asks his European colleagues to inform him of "completed work, or work-in-progress, that may be useful to us in our effort to synthesize what is known about the many aspects of change in West European society and politics."

The letter does not mention that this "research group" is financed by the CIA. Neither does it disclose that Mansbach works as a CIA consultant.

ENSAP is based on the theory that there has been a resurgence of European opposition movements over the last few years which aim to influence the decision-making process on foreign and military policies. ENSAP is to determine how they prevent the European governments from following a "consistent" foreign policy, and how they impact on U.S.-European relations.

The term "non-state actors" includes organizations and institutions from a wide spectrum of society: churches, the media, opposition parties, unions and women's groups -- to name a few. About churches, for example, ENSAP -- i.e., the CIA -- would like to know how many members there are; who is in charge of their publications; what their "known assets" are; and how extensive their "tax-exempt property" is.

Questions about the media aim for information about ownership, circulation, and "advertising revenue and sources." As far as women's groups are concerned, ENSAP is interested in their alignment with other forces. And asks: "How homogenous are women's groups?"

The ENSAP questions apparently were changed at CIA's request. The CIA demanded "data-intensive analysis." Mansbach apparently will present the CIA with his research results in August 1984. In addition, he plans to write a book based on the ENSAP material.

In his book *Quantitative Approaches to Limited Intelligence: The CIA Experience*, Richards Heuer, the former head of the CIA's Methods and Forecasting Division, confirms that an ENSAP-type research project, financed by the CIA, is different from "regular" academic research. "While the academic researcher is relatively free to

define a problem on his own terms, our [CIA] research problems are greatly defined by the requirements of U.S. foreign policy. The academic researcher chooses a topic for which data are available, whereas it is often new problems (or old problems defined in new ways) for which the policymaker requires intelligence analysis."<sup>1</sup>

Analysis for the CIA is geared toward providing information that shows how the CIA might be able to influence events. Detailed information about a publication's advertising revenue, for instance, might allow "someone" to influence its editorial policy through pressure on large advertisers. Information about the homogeneity of women's groups might give clues about how to disrupt them.

According to some of the students working on ENSAP, Mansbach is especially interested in uncovering "communist influence" on opposition organizations. The West German Green Party has been closely scrutinized in that regard, said one student.

## **To Rule The World**

Mansbach is not an isolated case. CIA Director William Casey places great emphasis on close collaboration with universities. In a 1981 speech to agency employees, Casey stated that CIA officers "regularly" meet with scientists and academicians to discuss a wide variety of questions. At the University of Illinois (Chicago), for example, the CIA has been funding a project to "develop statistical models of governability on a global basis."<sup>2</sup>

While the U.S. government might not be quite ready to govern "on a global basis," it is making every effort to keep control of individual countries. Academia plays a role in laying the groundwork and maintaining the status quo. At Villanova University in Pennsylvania, for instance, the CIA, through the consulting firm of Booz, Allen and Hamilton, has been paying Professor Justin Green to gather information about the New People's Army, the armed wing of the communist Party of the Philippines.<sup>3</sup>

According to Casey's predecessor, Admiral Stansfield Turner, the CIA's relationship with academia has "been of inestimable value to the intelligence community." In working with the professors, however, Turner wrote to Harvard University president Derek Bok, that the CIA was not willing to comply with existing university regulations about "outside contracts."

When the CIA was taken to court several years ago because it refused -- and still refuses -- to release files containing the names of professors who had consulted for the CIA, F.W.M. Janney, then the CIA's personnel director, expressed even more clearly the CIA's need for assets in the academic community. In many fields, Janney wrote, it is "absolutely essential that the agency have available to it the single greatest source of expertise: the American academic community." CIA officers in the National Foreign Assessment Center, Janney added, regularly consult with academicians on an informal and personal basis, often by telephone."<sup>4</sup>

According to former CIA press spokesperson Dale Peterson, the CIA has been holding three to four conferences for university presidents a year to discuss "mutual problems." Many of the presidents accept the invitations, Peterson said. Documents released under the Freedom of Information Act show, for instance, that several university presidents (from the University of Tulane in New Orleans, Johns Hopkins University and the University of Minnesota), along with Jack Peltason, president of the American Council on Education, met with Turner and a number of high-ranking CIA officers at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia in June 1978. The academicians were given confidential briefings, including one by John Stein, then Associate Deputy Director for Operations, and by the Deputy Chief of the Domestic Collection Division (whose name is deleted on the FOIA documents).

Turner had invited the presidents, saying that it was time to improve CIA-academic relations. "In the wake of considerable public criticism over the last several years," Turner wrote in a May 1978 letter to Michigan University President Robben Fleming, "the Agency has had difficulty in maintaining open and mutually beneficial relationships" between the CIA and academia. "I would like to ask your help and advice in determining how best to restore a useful but proper connection between academia and the world of intelligence."

The conference seems to have been a success. Several days after it, Turner wrote to Jack Peltason that he found "our exchanges were both stimulating and helpful." "I am especially appreciative," Turner continued, "of the concrete suggestions that you and your colleagues left behind." Turner's letters to the other participants were equally laudatory, although Peter Magrath from the University of Minnesota urged Turner to keep his participation at the CIA conference secret.

## **Pentagon Contracts**

The CIA is not the only intelligence agency active at U.S. universities. For the last few years, the Defense Intelligence Agency has increasingly tried to "farm out" research projects to academicians and universities. In 1981, for instance, the DIA offered various universities specializing in African studies hundreds of thousands of dollars. CIA analysts wanted to attend these African studies departments to study languages. And, the departments would also participate in DIA research projects and conduct field studies.<sup>5</sup>

According to a *Christian Science Monitor* article, all African Studies Centers (there are 12 in the country) turned down the DIA offer, in spite of the DIA's promise that everything would be "out in the open, aboveboard." Rita Breen, executive officer of Harvard University's Committee on African Studies argued that any intelligence linkage is a suspicious one.... Even the agency's overtures might compromise scholars, there is so much suspicion of U.S. intelligence." Other academicians argued that collaborating with the DIA was incompatible with academic openness. And that "even the appearance of such a relationship is very dangerous from an



academic point of view."<sup>6</sup>

Even more common than university collaboration with intelligence agencies is university research for the Pentagon. (The 1976 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence report on the CIA stated that academics collaborating with the CIA "are located in over 100 American colleges, universities and related institutes.") Two hundred and fifty universities and colleges had Pentagon contracts during 1980 and 1981, with a combined value of about \$1 billion. Two universities were able to attract nearly half of that money: Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Johns Hopkins University.

Topics for academic research projects range from biological warfare related issues (University of Maryland at College Park) and laser technology (University of Washington at Seattle), to weather modification (Berkeley) and submarine warfare (Catholic University).

Universities are becoming increasingly dependent on Pentagon money under the Reagan administration. While programs such as the National Science Foundation have been cut, the Pentagon budget is on the rise. Several months after Reagan took office, an internal Princeton University memorandum stated that the university would try to make up some of the NSF cuts by applying for Pentagon grants. Chemical and biological warfare were listed as especially promising fields.<sup>7</sup>

The lucrative Pentagon contracts and a close relationship with the CIA have tied many universities closely to the "national security apparatus." The Reagan administration is deliberating additional steps to bring the international studies field virtually under the control of the National Security Council. Under such an NSC scheme -- favorably described in a publication of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies -- the NSC, advised by governmental and academic committees, would be in charge of allocating government money for various international study projects. The NSC would determine which research best served U.S. government interests.<sup>8</sup>

Advocates of that scheme argue that the U.S. has a "deficit" in international studies research. This is said to have impeded foreign policy decisions. "Failures" such as the revolution in Iran were not intelligence failures, but research failures, according to Robert Ward (Stanford University), one of the originators of the NSC scheme. "There was ... a persistent failure to analyze or appreciate the precariousness of the Shah's rule in Iran...."<sup>9</sup> As of now, universities simply are not prepared to research problems in a timely and systematic way geared to policy makers. Under the NSC proposal, that would change.

Some university presidents have expressed concern about "academic freedom" if much of the government money for research is channeled through the National Security Council. And the NSC plan is likely to remain on hold until after the presidential elections. With further cuts in other government funding programs, however, it seems likely that more and more universities might eventually agree to the project. Many U.S. professors have no qualms about doing research for the CIA

and the Pentagon. They seem to agree with former CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci's statement that the CIA functions much like a university.

Some organizations and individuals examining the CIA's academic connections have come to a different conclusion. The Student Cooperative Union at the University of California, in its report entitled "A Censored History of Relations Between the University of California and the Central Intelligence Agency" concluded that the "university cannot collaborate with the CIA without sharing culpability for its actions. Research done for the CIA has direct impact on the lives of people around the world.... As long as the university functions as a service agency for the CIA, or as a cover for its 'academic' and propaganda purposes, any claim to the university's role as an open and democratic institution is farce."

1. Quoted in Walden Bello, "CIA Taps Academia to Design Post-Marcos Scenario," *CounterSpy*, 8:2, December 1983 - February 1984, p. 29.
2. See *CounterSpy*, 7:2, December 1982 - February 1983, p. 8.
3. Cf. *supra*, n. 1.
4. *Washington Post*, 12 June 1978.
5. *Christian Science Monitor*, 20 August 1981.
6. *Ibid.*
7. See John Kelly, "Princeton is No Tiger Lily," *CounterSpy*, 6:4, July - August 1982, pp. 23-29.
8. Robert Ward, "Studying International Relations," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1983, pp. 160-68. See also Andrew Kopkind, "A Diller, A Dollar, An NSC Scholar," *The Nation*, 25 June 1983, for an analysis of the NSC plan.
9. Robert Ward, "Studying International Relations," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1983.

---

This article appeared first in an abbreviated version in *Konkret* (Hamburg, West Germany), May 1984.

**CounterSpy sidebar:**

## **The Professor Speaks**

First telephone call to Mansbach. Question: Who is paying for the ENSAP research?  
Mansbach: "Basically the State Department." Is it true that you are a CIA consultant at present? "Yes, it's true, but it has nothing to do with ENSAP."

Second call, a few days later. Confronted with more evidence, the professor cedes that ENSAP is financed by the CIA. The professor is angry. His work in ENSAP presents no conflict with academic standards, he says. "If I saw a conflict, I wouldn't do it." Everything about ENSAP is open, according to Mansbach.

The professor says he does not like the "conspiracy sound" of the questions. He prefers it, he says, when intelligence agencies gather material the way they do it through ENSAP. Intelligence agencies should use more open sources, he adds.

Mansbach also denies that he discussed the shape of ENSAP with the CIA. *CounterSpy* has documents proving the contrary.

**New York Times, 28 November 1984, p. B2:**

## **2 Are Admonished On C.I.A. Project**

Two Rutgers University professors were admonished yesterday by school officials who said they had failed to adhere to university guidelines while doing a research project for the Central Intelligence Agency and should have better informed a class in American foreign policy that its term papers would be part of the research.

A statement by Dean Tilden G. Edelstein, the head of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, suggested that the professors, Richard W. Mansbach and Harvey Lee Waterman of the political science department at the university's New Brunswick campus, had "acted inappropriately."

"Research contracted by a Federal agency must be endorsed by the Rutgers Office of Sponsored Programs and administered by the university's Research Contracts Fiscal Office," Dean Edelstein said. "The Mansbach-Waterman project was not so endorsed or administered."

## More Dirty Tricks from CIA-Rutgers

**From *Waltzing With a Dictator* by Raymond Bonner (New York: Times Books, 1987). This footnote on page 150 is based on Bonner's interview with Paul Kattenburg, a Foreign Service Officer in Guyana in 1968:**

Though the agency's covert efforts in the early 1960s to bring down Guyana's socialist President Cheddi Jagan has been written about, U.S. involvement in the subsequent election has remained secret. In the 1968 election the CIA actively assisted Forbes Burnham, with many of its efforts channeled through the Eagleton Institute for Research at Rutgers University. In addition to providing Burnham with money, the agency engineered an amendment to the Guyanese Constitution that permitted Guyanese citizens residing outside the country to vote. On election day some 16,000 votes for Burnham were "manufactured" in New York City. Then the United States watched as Burnham turned out to have been a closet leftist and moved his country closer to the Soviet Union.

[Back to home page](#)

*The National Reporter*, Winter 1985

# Tufts University: Students Counter Spies

by John Roosa

When the director of the CIA's regional recruiting office visited Tufts University in Medford, Massachusetts the night of October 3, he received a surprise. Twenty-five students staged a nonviolent direct action, stopping him from speaking at what had been advertised as a CIA "informational meeting." The protestors formed a human wall between the CIA recruiter, Stephen L. Conn, and the students who had come to hear the presentation. Conn told a Tufts newspaper reporter that such sessions had "occasionally" been met with protests on other campuses, but that this was the first time that students actually "prevented us from giving the presentation."

The Tufts administration reacted by calling the protestors before a disciplinary panel. The protestors in turn defended their action, using the hearing to publicize CIA crimes and denounce Tufts' policy of allowing the Agency to recruit on campus. In arguing before a supportive audience of about 90 people that their action was justified, the students noted that under Tufts' disciplinary guidelines persons are punished only when their actions have breached the "standards of the community," so that any decision would be a political judgement on what those standards are. They argued further that the administration, not the students, was violating the "standards of the community" in allowing the CIA on campus.

Faced with this defense, the disciplinary panel chose not to discipline the students but at the same time stated that the protestors had violated university rules.

After the disciplinary process was over, the protestors met with three deans and confronted them with specific university policies violated by the CIA's campus recruitment activities. The deans, deciding that some important points had been raised and knowing that the CIA was not planning to return to Tufts until at least the following semester anyhow, temporarily suspended CIA recruitment of undergraduates until a panel of deans could determine if university policies were in fact being violated.

After the protestors issued a press release on the deans' decision and the actions of October 3, the Associated Press, National Public Radio and other national and local media picked up the story. The *Boston Herald*, the local Rupert Murdoch paper, was outraged enough to run a lead editorial titled: "Tufts Wimps Out with Its CIA Ban."

The next day Tufts president Jean Mayer rescinded the temporary suspension. In a written statement, he denied that CIA recruitment had ever been banned, explaining that "any policy on recruitment must be a *University policy*, not policy of an individual school." One dean told protest leaders that Mayer had been pressured to take the

action after receiving complaints from Tufts trustees. Privately Mayer admitted, "It would be difficult pragmatically and ideologically for Tufts to ban agencies of the federal government from its campus.

Mayer's decision is easily explained. Although a small school, Tufts sends a large number of students each year to the CIA. A 1981 survey by Tufts' student newspaper reported that twelve undergraduates had been interviewed by the Agency during the previous year, four had received offers, and two had accepted jobs. Even more recruiting takes place at the university's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, an institution Mayer himself acknowledges to have a "hawkish reputation." As America's oldest graduate school of diplomacy, Fletcher has been an important training center for future Foreign Service officers. The last three U.S. ambassadors to El Salvador -- Thomas Pickering, Deane Hinton and Robert White -- are Fletcher alumni, as are five other current ambassadors, several high-level State Department officials and over 250 other officers. At the same time, Fletcher is also an important training center for potential CIA employees. The most recent Fletcher alumni book lists nineteen graduates who acknowledge currently holding positions at the Agency. Probably an equal number of graduates have left the CIA over the last decade while others hold deep cover positions and cannot admit their true employer.

Documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act show that there are high-level ties between Fletcher and the CIA related to recruitment going back at least to 1972. In that year, according to letters and memos, Fletcher officials took great pains, in preparing for the school's annual Washington "placement trip" for graduating students, to include the CIA on the group's itinerary. Recruiter Harry L. Russell reported to Langley that Fletcher Dean Edmund Gullion and Assistant Dean Larry Griggs "are extremely happy about having their students invited to the Agency and are quite honored." Wanting not to pass up such a good opportunity to cultivate two important university administrators (as well as potential student recruits), the Agency arranged an unusual two-hour briefing by top-level officials.

Over the next four years, Fletcher officials apparently developed ever closer ties with the CIA -- and the CIA reciprocated by recruiting for Fletcher. In late 1976 an undergraduate at one New England college, recruited by the CIA for its summer intern program, was encouraged by his Agency contact, recruiter Charles R. Pecinovsky, to consider attending Fletcher. Pecinovsky then arranged for Fletcher's Larry Griggs, whom he described in a letter as a "working acquaintance," to send the student admissions material. At the same time, Griggs and other Tufts personnel were receiving free research materials from the Agency. As the Tufts newspaper noted in reporting these gifts, "the CIA has been known to provide nonpublic information to academics for use in their work, increasing their prestige and promotion prospects, and sometimes their sense of obligation to the Agency."

It is easy to see why CIA recruiters would seek ties to Fletcher and encourage students to go there. Fletcher's faculty includes a handful of present and former government officials, some of whom have held posts requiring high security clearances. Material from their courses would be useful in intelligence work, while their backgrounds could help them spot students with potential talent for such work. Such professors include:

- William Griffith, who also teaches at M.I.T., was the main CIA liaison at Radio Free Europe until 1958, when he left to join M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies, then sponsored and partially funded by the CIA. Griffith's International Communism project and his M.I.T. salary were paid by the CIA until the mid-1960s. He continued to be a consultant for the Agency thereafter. At Fletcher, he teaches courses on radical and communist theories and practice.
- Richard Shultz was a research associate with two CIA-linked think tanks, the National Strategy Information Center and Roy Godson's Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, before his recent appointment at Fletcher. The Fletcher catalog reports that he is also "a consultant to various U.S. government agencies concerned with national security affairs" and that his professional interests include "U.S. foreign and national security policy, contemporary military strategy, intelligence and national security, unconventional war and power projection in the Third World, and propaganda and political warfare." The CIA's projection of power into the Third World formed the basis of the students' criminal charges against the Agency. His most recent book, written with Godson, is *Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy*, and his contribution to the national security section of the Heritage Foundation's blueprint for the second Reagan term is currently receiving much press attention. At this time, Shultz is conducting a Fletcher seminar on intelligence methods.
- John Roche came to Fletcher from Brandeis in 1973. Before that he had served as a special consultant to Lyndon Johnson -- in part, he says, "dealing with disinformation with the great North Vietnamese 'peace offensive'" -- and as a member of Richard Nixon's commission, headed by Milton Eisenhower to oversee the removal of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty from CIA control. During his first four years at Fletcher, he served on the Board for International Broadcasting, overseeing Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty operations.
- Leonard Unger, who came to Fletcher after retiring from the Foreign Service, had been deeply involved in U.S. war planning for Indochina -- as Ambassador to Laos (1962-64), as chairman of the State Department's Vietnam coordinating committee (1965-67) and as Ambassador to Thailand (1967-73). In Thailand, he is known to have supervised the counterinsurgency operations.
- Hewson Ryan was deputy director at the United States Information Agency during the Johnson Administration, and later, under Nixon, became U.S. Ambassador to Honduras, where he played a relatively positive role supporting military reform, according to knowledgeable sources in Tegucigalpa. Since leaving the Foreign Service and coming to Fletcher in 1977, he has headed the Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy and taught courses on propaganda and on Central America. At the Murrow Center, he replaced Philip Horton, a former CIA Officer and the longtime editor of the

now-defunct CIA-funded magazine, *The Reporter*.

- Theodore Eliot joined Fletcher as dean in 1979 after retiring from the Foreign Service, and has since been appointed Professor of Diplomacy. Though Eliot had never published, Tufts officials are said to have been more interested in the clout Eliot had accumulated over his long career, especially as inspector general of the Foreign Service from 1978 to 1979. He replaced Edmund Gullion, who had also enjoyed a long Foreign Service career (including a 1961 stint as Ambassador to the Congo). Gullion had been serving with Roche on the Eisenhower Commission at the time of the 1973 Fletcher placement trip to the CIA.

Another faculty group at Fletcher consists of those who specialize in strategic studies and who, though they have not necessarily served in government, are nonetheless well-known in government circles. They are affiliated with Fletcher's Program in International Security Studies and with a think tank associated with the school, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. Their courses, too, would be useful to students wanting to enter the intelligence community. Uri Ra'anen heads the Fletcher program, and Robert Pfaltzgraff heads the Institute. The two, who have collaborated on several books, served on Ronald Reagan's advisory team on foreign policy and intelligence during the 1980 campaign, although they insisted they did not want government posts. One strategist who did join the Reagan Administration was W. Scott Thompson, a former assistant to the secretary of defense, who took the post of associate director for programs at USIA at a time when that agency has been increasingly used for propaganda and political-action projects that might in earlier times have been carried out by the CIA.

It is very likely that some of these Fletcher faculty members are active consultants for the CIA. The Agency's current Coordinator for Academic Relations, Ralph E. Cook, is after all himself a Fletcher alumnus. The CIA documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, which run only up through 1978, confirm that several Tufts political scientists did have consulting relationships with the Agency at least during the mid-1970s. One was former Fletcher professor Geoffrey Kemp, who left to join the National Security Council in 1981. The documents reveal that Kemp was paid \$1250 to attend a CIA conference on nuclear proliferation in October 1978. "That was an academic exercise," he told the Tufts newspaper. "Very rarely are they on classified subjects. I have participated in several of these."

The Agency was embarked on a campaign at that time to improve its standing with universities, which had been in decline ever since Congress had begun its inquiries into CIA activities in 1974. Kemp's conference was part of that effort. Another part was a series of meetings by CIA Director Stansfield Turner with university presidents. It was at this time, Tufts President Jean Mayer says, that the Tufts president met "his good friend" former CIA chief Stansfield Turner, who has since joined Mayer on an advisory board to Monsanto Corporation. Soon afterward, CIA tried to forge financial ties with Tufts. Turner offered the school an undisclosed sum of money for a research project on world famine -- an offer perhaps made to impress Mayer, who is a nutritionist by profession. In 1978, the CIA also offered \$100,000 to \$200,000 to



assist a Fletcher international economics class studying the impact of the then newly discovered Mexican oil fields.

Mayer rejected both offers. He said that the Agency link, which would have been open, would have made "much of our work abroad very much more difficult."

Fletcher has been eager however to take money from the two foundations most active in recent years in publicly promoting the need for a strong CIA. One of them, the Scaife Foundation (together with the closely linked Scaife Family Charitable Trusts and Allegheny Foundation) has provided the largest part of Fletcher's foundation backing since 1977, donating over \$1.5 million. The other, the Smith Richardson Foundation, contributed over \$100,000 from 1979 to 1981 for two projects it describes as a "project on [the] history of Vietnamese communism" and the "completion of [a] study of communist propaganda and political warfare." Since 1978, these two foundations have also provided most of the private funding to Pfaltzgraff's Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, with Scaife alone donating over \$500,000.

The promotional efforts of the CIA by these foundations, consisting so far of at least eleven separate projects together costing over \$500,000, appear to have begun on October 30, 1978, when Scaife president Richard Larry phoned Ernest Lefever (an IFPA "research consultant") to ask if his Ethics and Public Policy Center at Georgetown University would supervise a study of media treatment of the CIA and the KGB. This work resulted in the pro-CIA collection by Lefever and Roy Godson, *The CIA and the American Ethic*.

Six months later, Scaife sponsored a conference of Fletcher's International Security Studies Program entitled: "Intelligence: Deception and Surprise." In attendance was an assortment of scholars and former spies, including Reginald Jones, Director of British Scientific Intelligence during World War II; former CIA officer Thomas Latimer, staff director of the House Intelligence Committee; former CIA Director William Colby; former Czech intelligence officer Ladislav Bittman (contributing the obligatory exposition on KGB "active measures"), Richard Perle, soon to be Assistant Secretary of Defense; and Harvard's Richard Pipes, a CIA consultant who soon afterwards joined the NSC.

Fletcher programs also receive corporate support, with most of that support for the International Security Studies Program coming from four companies which hold intelligence-related government contracts: Raytheon, EG&G, Hughes Aircraft and United Technologies. The first three have representatives on Fletcher boards; their presence gives the companies a say in school affairs. Raytheon has a particularly close relationship with Fletcher. The maker of missiles, electronic warfare devices and other military products, Raytheon is represented by its former chairman, Charles Adams, on both Fletcher's Board of Visitors, where he is chairman, and on IFPA's Board of Directors. Adams is also a trustee emeritus of Tufts. Philip Phalon, a Raytheon senior vice president, sits on the Advisory Council to the International Security Studies Program. Theodore Eliot, in turn, is a Raytheon director.

Just as there has been no known funding by the CIA at Fletcher, there are no current

CIA employees known to be on its boards. Still, some members have former ties and many are supporters of a strong CIA. Besides Adams, the Board of Visitors includes Gerald Blakeley, longtime business partner of CIA lawyer Paul Hellmuth; Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee; Hadyn Williams, president of the former CIA proprietary, the Asia Foundation; former CIA employee Joseph Sisco; Henry Cabot Lodge, the former ambassador to South Vietnam; and Winston Lord, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and former top aide to Henry Kissinger. Besides Phalon, the 19-member Advisory Council to the Program in International Security Studies includes former CIA analyst William Bundy; Stansfield Turner; former CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman; U. Alexis Johnson, longtime member of the 40 Committee, the CIA oversight group of the NSC; R. Daniel McMichael of the Scaife Foundation; Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, a former Scaife trustee; Reginald Jones; Rear Adm. Jonathan Howe, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; Ret. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster; Robert Everett, president of the CIA-linked MITRE Corporation; Charles Wilcox of Hughes Aircraft; and Ret. Adm. Elmo Zumwalt. With members such as these, the complaints to Mayer over the temporary CIA recruitment ban should come as no surprise.

There is evidence, in fact, that many connected with Fletcher see the opportunity the school offers for jobs with the CIA not only as a right of students (as Mayer has argued) but as a national duty as well. Robert Pfaltzgraff contends, for example, that "the idea of courses in intelligence in schools of international affairs, and especially in professional schools, emerges from the consideration of the needs of the intelligence community set forth [at the Fletcher intelligence conference]."

Despite its many CIA ties, Tufts does not have any formal guidelines governing those ties. A number of universities established such rules in the wake of congressional revelations in the 1970s about abuses in the CIA's academic relationships. Tufts was not one of them. "We will evolve a [comprehensive policy] out of practical experiences," Mayer told the Tufts newspaper in 1981, "but at this point any rules would be premature. It is understood [though] that if people are approached by intelligence groups of any kind, they should report it to the President. We don't want our professors to be arrested as spies."

But even without specific guidelines, CIA recruitment currently violates several Tufts policies. The university's Student Handbook states: "Tufts exists in a larger society and provides no immunity from city, state or national laws. The university will not play the role of policeman ferreting out crime. But neither will the university serve as an accomplice."

The CIA is currently in violation of the Neutrality Act, the War Powers clause of the Constitution, the Boland Amendment (prohibiting the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government), other statutes and several treaties. Even former CIA Director Stansfield Turner has acknowledged that the CIA is in the business of breaking the law. He used this fact in his argument against the Reagan Administration's proposal to permit CIA covert operations inside the United States.

The principles of the College Placement Council, principles to which Tufts adheres,

requires recruiters to "honor the policies and procedures of individual institutions" and for organizations to take responsibility "for the ethical and legal conduct of their representatives throughout the recruiting process." Despite this, the CIA conducts covert recruitment, involving surveillance of students, and fails even to conduct "overt recruitment" openly. While Director, Turner noted candidly, "If I were required to abide by the rule of . . . every academic institution in the country . . . it would become impossible to do the required job of our country."

Several Tufts deans in their discussions with protestors acknowledged the validity of these arguments. Mayer's decision to rescind the ban on recruitment was not based on Tufts rules, however, but on "pragmatics" and "ideology." The case of Tufts and the CIA illustrates how some universities have sacrificed their independence and academic freedom for the chance to become servants of the state. Even now, Fletcher is making plans for its annual Washington placement trip in January 1985. Once again, the CIA is likely to be included on the itinerary.

Despite the wide student opposition to CIA recruitment and the initial promise of a consideration of the matter on its merits, there is now little likelihood that the CIA will be banned from the Tufts campus, no matter what its foreign atrocities or domestic abuses. Tufts' powerful patrons have spoken.

---

John Roosa is a student at Tufts University.

[Back to home page](#)

## Let's call it the 'Patrice Lumumba Memorial Scholarship Fund'

[Letter from engineering dean A.R. Frank Wazzan to CIA](#)

University of California, Los Angeles

UCLA

Office of the Dean  
School of Engineering and Applied Science  
7400 Boelter Hall  
405 Hilgard Avenue  
Los Angeles, California 90024-1600

January 16, 1992

Dr. Gary E. Foster  
Deputy Director for Planning  
and Coordination  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington DC 20505

Dear Dr. Foster:

The School of Engineering at UCLA has long been a leader in the development of programs designed to enhance recruitment and retention of minority students to pursue studies in Engineering and Applied Science. The program has been most successful as is evident from the attached material. The Program is directed by Mr. Enrique Ainsworth who reports indirectly to me via Professor Stephen Jacobsen, Associate Dean for Student Affairs.

Funding for the Program at the \$400K level is provided by the University (46%) and by various foundations, federal grants and industry. With this letter, we are seeking your Agency's support for our minority students recruitment and retention program at the \$35K/year level. I have no doubt you will find

our program worthy of your support and that your association with it will prove most beneficial to the Agency and to our programs and students.

Sincerely  
yours,

/s/

A.  
R.  
Frank  
Wazzan  
Dean

ARW:ew  
Enclosures

TELEPHONE ??????? FAX ???????

## **CIA whips out checkbook, but what if it's illegal?**

[Memo from CIA deputy director to the Agency's lawyer](#)

EEO 92-0008  
21 January 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

FROM: Gary E. Foster, Deputy Director for Planning  
& Coordination

SUBJECT: Sponsorship for Academic Institution

1. I am under the impression that to be a sponsor or provide grants to any academic institution, a formal opinion from your office is required.

2. The Directorate of Science and Technology is prepared to be a sponsor of the Minority Engineering Program at the University of California at Los Angeles, California, but not without an approval from your office. I am planning a trip to UCLA during the last week of January and would like to present a check to the Dean of the School of Engineering for \$35,000. The DDS&T would like a formal opinion in order to release the funds. D/EEO understands from staff-level contact in OGC that this is legal. Can you say so formally in order to make this possible ASAP?

/s/  
Gary  
E.  
Foster

## Zero for three (we may have hit the tip of an iceberg)

### 1. E-mail to the *Daily Bruin*:

From: info@cia-on-campus.org  
To: cbyrd@media.ucla.edu  
Subj: UCLA asked CIA for money in 1992  
Date: 5/28/01

Ms. Christine Byrd, Editor  
UCLA *Daily Bruin*

Dear Ms. Byrd:

Our site at <http://www.cia-on-campus.org/> has posted two documents, obtained from the CIA, under our title, "UCLA asks CIA for affirmative action funds."

Since these documents are from early 1992, we

would, if further information is available, like to post a follow-up.

Specifically, we would appreciate your assistance in obtaining answers to these questions:

- 1) Was the \$35,000 contribution from the CIA actually received by the School of Engineering?
- 2) Has the CIA made other contributions to any departments at UCLA since then?
- 3) Does the money that the CIA contribute get lumped in with money from other sources, or is it accounted for separately?
- 4) If separately accounted, then we would like to post the names of any students who benefitted from the CIA's contribution.

We feel that this information is very much in the public interest, and raises serious questions about the CIA's role in academia, as well as questions about the lack of administrative policies within academia that speak to this issue.

If the *Daily Bruin* makes an effort to answer these questions in the form of a story, we would be interested in posting a copy of this story on our site.

Thank you,  
Daniel Brandt  
PIR founder & president

**2.** A similar e-mail to the press person at UCLA's School of Engineering ([pubinfo@ea.ucla.edu](mailto:pubinfo@ea.ucla.edu)) also brought no response.

**3.** Finally, a [fax](#) to UCLA's grant analyst for the School of Engineering brought no response.

[Back to home page](#)



[Letter from law dean Joseph P. Tomain to CIA](#)

ER 90-4845

College of Law  
Cincinnati, Ohio 45221-0040

University of Cincinnati

November 2, 1990

Hon. William H. Webster  
Director of Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster,

I attended the Program for Law Deans on October 29-30, 1990. I was unprepared for that experience. I accepted the invitation partly out of curiosity and partly out of a desire to learn more about the mission of the Agency.

I anticipated that our meetings would be informative and that I would come away with data about the Agency that I had not contemplated. While those anticipations were amply satisfied, I came away with much more.

Every deputy director and everyone from public affairs were outstanding and impressive. I came away with the feeling that the Agency enjoys a great spirit of family and comradery. Everyone we met was thorough, professional, dedicated, and conveyed a sense of loyalty and patriotism to the Agency and to the United States that was palpable. The issues that your lawyers confront are as exciting as any in the profession. The work done in each directorate is as stimulating as anything I can imagine. Indeed, to call the headquarters a campus is entirely appropriate for you have some of the brightest minds that is has [sic] been my privilege to meet.

I am sure I am not alone in these sentiments and I wanted to convey to you my great appreciation

and gratitude for having had this opportunity to meet  
an outstanding and first-class group of persons.

Respectfully  
yours,

/s/

Joseph  
P.  
Tomain  
Dean  
and  
Nippert  
Professor  
of  
Law

cc: Mr. Michael A. Turner, Co-ordinator for  
Academic Affairs

Mr. Joseph R. D. Trani [sic], Director of Public  
Affairs

An affirmative action/equal opportunity institution

[Back to home page](#)

*The Boston Phoenix*, April 24, 1987

## The Case Against the CIA

In finding Amy Carter, Abbie Hoffman, and 13 Western Massachusetts college students not guilty April 15 of trespassing and disorderly conduct, a six member district court jury, whose members included a 77 year old man and 64 year old woman, in effect found the Central Intelligence Agency guilty as charged by the defendants and their many expert witnesses. And at its trial, the CIA stood charged with crimes a lot more serious than trespassing and disorderly conduct; it was charged with arranging assassinations, torturing and generally terrorizing the population of Nicaragua, and lying about its actions.

To be fair to the CIA, the prosecution felt it didn't have to defend the Agency. Hampshire County Assistant District Court Attorney Diane Feraid, the prosecutor, held to the most narrow focus: "Whether or not the 12 defendants here before you are guilty of trespassing" and "Whether or not three of the defendants seated before you are guilty of sitting in front of buses carrying those people who are guilty of trespass." She wasn't about to tie herself and the state to the CIA.

Twelve of the 15 defendants were arrested November 24, 1986, for occupying Munson Hall, a University of Massachusetts administration building, after the university refused to meet seven demands, which included banning CIA recruiters from campus. The remaining three defendants were arrested the same evening for blocking buses carrying the other protesters away.

Leonard Weinglass, the mild-mannered lawyer who in 1968 had defended Abbie Hoffman and the rest of the Chicago Seven, had to explain the defense's case to a jury made of up average central Massachusetts citizens who, the prosecution ensured, knew almost nothing about the CIA and Nicaragua. "As you have obviously seen," Weinglass said, "this is not an ordinary case. By and large, the events of the day are agreed upon. The issue in this case is whether or not those actions are reasonable.... Was this lawlessness on the part of the defendants, or were they acting to stop the lawlessness? That is the crux of the question."

The necessity defense that was employed requires demonstrating that there was a "clear and imminent" threat to the defendants. Weinglass and his associates argued that even if the defendants were not in immediate danger from the CIA, the United States stood in "clear and imminent" danger of being drawn into a war with Nicaragua, and that represented a clear and imminent danger to the defendants.

Weinglass first called to the stand Ralph McGehee. McGehee had served for 25 years, six of them in Thailand and two in Vietnam. He retired in 1977 and began a second career: exposing his former employer. McGehee testified that the CIA had drawn the United States unwittingly into a war against North Vietnam. In March 1965, he said, the Agency loaded a Vietnamese ship with communist-made weapons, shot

it up, and presented the incident in a white paper as evidence that the North Vietnamese were supporting the Vietcong. McGehee himself admitted to having lied to Congress about the number of Laotian platoons the CIA was training. Such covert operations, McGehee said, "very much harm the national security of the United States."

The next day former contra, Edgar Chamorro, was called to the stand: he told parallel stories of CIA support for the Nicaraguan contras. The CIA had given him money, he said, to bribe the Honduran press. The day Chamorro testified, another witness, Christie Clark, described her three-month stay in the Nicaraguan village of San Pedro de Lovago. The contras attacked her village twice while she was there, she said. After both attacks, Sandinista support in the village increased. "People became much more supportive of the people defending them," Clark said.

The defense also offered one glimpse of how the CIA had threatened United States citizens. Book publisher and lawyer William Schaap described CIA domestic crimes such as the 1950s operation MKULTRA, in which the Agency used prostitutes and homeless men to test the effects of LSD. The CIA had violated First Amendment rights in 1960s and early 1970s, Schaap argued, when it had tried to infiltrate student movements through its Operation CHAOS.

Fernaid tacitly dismissed the defense's expanded definition of "imminent threat." She asked McGehee only one question: "Were you present on the University of Massachusetts campus on November 24, 1986?"; of Chamorro, she asked only his current occupation and whether or not the CIA had been on campus the day of the protest.

The larger and more emotional portion of the defense was devoted to showing that the CIA had committed crimes in Central America and elsewhere, that Hoffman and the students sincerely believed they could prevent such crimes by protesting, and that their protest might indeed prove effective.

Weinglass's co-counsel Tom Lesser said the defense team was encouraged when a juror was brought to tears by McGehee's description of the atrocities he had committed on behalf of the CIA. The CIA had taught Vietnamese secret police how to torture, McGehee said, and through a program of assassination called Operation Phoenix, the CIA had killed 20,000 Vietnamese.

"Were innocent civilians killed?" Weinglass asked.

"Yes," McGehee answered.

The CIA was responsible, McGehee said, for the deaths of between 500,000 and one million Indonesians in 1965 when the Agency overthrew the government of Sukarno.

Chamorro updated the Agency's atrocities. The CIA hired hardened Argentinian soldiers to teach the contras how to commit atrocities against the civilian population,

Chamorro said. "The philosophy was that you have to fight in ways that people will be really scared, or otherwise they will not respect you." Chamorro said the Agency asked him to translate a stack of blue mimeographed sheets that bore the title *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare*. The manual, a copy of which was admitted as evidence, advises contra leaders to assassinate respected citizens of small towns, such as judges and doctors, and to make it appear as if the Sandinista government were responsible. Chamorro said the document also asked the contras to "create martyrs of our own followers, someone who is well-liked that gets killed in a way that looks like the government did it." The CIA also delivered to the contras mines powerful enough to maim but not kill civilians, Chamorro testified, in hopes of overburdening the Sandinista health-care system. "The CIA was telling us, in this kind of war, there is no difference between civilian and military," Chamorro said.

Abbie Hoffman, defending himself, questioned Harvard Medical School instructor Paul R. Epstein, MD, about the war the contras were waging against the Sandinista's health-care system. Epstein said he'd visited Nicaragua twice, in 1983 and in 1987; in the time between his visits, the contras had destroyed at least 15 community health centers built by the Sandinistas and had assassinated doctors. Reed Brody, a former assistant attorney general of New York State who had documented atrocities in Nicaragua, also testified that the contra war was aimed at civilians. "The contras target the socio-economic structure of Nicaragua," Brody said.

After finishing with the CIA, the defense sought to convince the jury that the defendants were sincerely motivated, patriotic Americans. On the penultimate day of the trial, Amy Carter took the stand for the first time. Carter, 19, said she was sensitive to the parallels between American involvement in Nicaragua and Vietnam. She was arrested November 24 while blocking buses that were supposed to carry the students who'd occupied Munson Hall to the Hampshire County Courthouse for arraignment. "I was certain that the police would get the buses moving," she said, "but that wasn't the issue at all. The issue was state police on campus, the CIA on campus, and the students in the building."

Finally, the defense tried to show that the students were right to believe their actions would bring about a change. They relied on two witnesses: Boston University professor of history Howard Zinn and former Defense Department employee Daniel Ellsberg.

Zinn, author of *Disobedience and Democracy*, cited examples of American social movements that had started with student protests. In 1960, Zinn reminded the jury, four black students held a sit-in against segregation in Greensboro, North Carolina and were arrested; the protest helped spark the civil rights movement. Protests against the Vietnam War, Zinn said, kept the Johnson administration from raising the number of troops in Vietnam from 200,000 to 500,000. "They said, 'We can't do this. There's going to be too much trouble in the country,'" Zinn said. Protests were especially important in changing foreign policy because Congress, Zinn said, was not active in formulating it. "Simply going to the polls and voting, simply writing to your congressman, that didn't work," Zinn said.

Following Zinn to the witness stand, Daniel Ellsberg described the circumstances that

had made him decide to release 43 volumes of government documents listing U.S. atrocities in Vietnam -- which became known as the Pentagon Papers -- to *The New York Times* in 1971. Ellsberg said during his career in the Defense Department he had been caught up in the bureaucratic mentality that only determined whether campaigns were cost-effective, not whether they were moral. Then, in 1969, Ellsberg said he had attended a conference on non-violent protest. There he saw Randall Kehler, an anti-draft protester, speak against the draft. "I was thinking that I was glad that foreigners from all over the United States were seeing this man," Ellsberg said. "He was very attractive, bright, and intelligent. Then I heard, to my amazement, that he was going to prison."

"I cried for about an hour," Ellsberg said. "I was sitting on the floor in the men's room, because I had realized that this [protesting U.S. involvement in Vietnam] was the right thing to do."

Fernaïd did not cross-examine Ellsberg.

The necessity defense required proving that, in order to stop and prevent greater illegal action (in this case by the CIA), Hoffman and the student protesters had no recourse other than illegal action -- that they had no alternative but to occupy Munson Hall. To accomplish this, Weinglass called on academics, lawyers, and former government officials whose testimony painted a portrait of the CIA as a pirate organization operating in the name, but not in the sight, of the American people.

McGehee told a CIA joke comparing the Agency's treatment of Congress to mushrooms. "You're kept in the dark and you're fed manure," he said. Morton Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense under Lyndon Johnson, said the CIA had consistently violated the Congressional Oversight Act of 1980 and the Boland Amendment of 1984, which banned the CIA from operating in Nicaragua. The summer the CIA began smuggling anti-tank missiles to Iran, then-CIA Director William Casey had pledged to Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) that the CIA would not act without Congress's approval, Halperin said.

Schaap, the lawyer/publisher, said he had tried four major cases in which members of Congress were the plaintiffs against the CIA. The cases criticized the Agency for violating both the Neutrality Acts (by training mercenaries in Florida) and the Ethics in Government Act.

All four cases had been thrown out of the court for being too political, Schaap said. "I think it would be completely futile to raise that within the courts," Schaap said.

"In your opinion, do you think Congress has been able to keep the CIA under control?" Weinglass asked. "No," Schaap replied. "I don't think it has tried very hard, but when it has, it certainly hasn't been able to."

In their closing arguments, both the defense and prosecution called on the jury to press for accountability -- the prosecution for accountability from the protesters and

the defense for accountability from the CIA. Massachusetts law, the defense argued, provides protection for legitimate, sincere, anti-government protesters.

"I don't think that we are operating outside the system at all," Hoffman told reporters gathered outside the defendant's dock before the closing arguments began. "In fact, our point is that the CIA is operating outside the system." Defense attorney Tom Lesser said in his closing remarks that the protesters had taken over Munson Hall because "they were legitimately worried that we might end up in a war, that their friends, their brothers, might end up in a war, not because 'we the people' decided to end up in a war, but because a few people were doing it in secret, and when we started to find out about it, they lied to us."

Weinglass, in his final statement, argued that stopping CIA recruitment on American college campuses was the only means available to the students to put a halt to the crimes the Agency was committing. "By ending recruitment, they helped to take a step to ending illegal activity," he stated.

As the CIA was found guilty, the defendants were freed to take their case to the American people, this time with the support of a middle-American jury that, when the trial started, had known little about these matters. Despite its best efforts to keep America ignorant of its activities, the CIA may now find itself in the defendant's dock.

[Back to home page](#)

See also: [The Trustees at USC: A Case Study](#)

(This essay first appeared as a leaflet at the University of Southern California in 1977.)

## From CIA to USC: Political Biography of a Trustee

Many USC students are aware that the roots of Watergate were nourished by the dirty tricks and political intrigues of Ronald Ziegler, Dwight Chapin, Gordon Strachan and Donald Segretti when they were students on this campus. The USC environment during the early sixties provided these student-government power brokers with experience and training that proved useful a decade later, especially after cross-fertilization with the USC alumni talents of H.R. Haldeman, Herb Klein and Herbert Kalmbach.[1]



**John A. McCone (1902-1991)**

Much less is known about USC trustee John A. McCone. His exploits make Watergate look like a mild diversion from the workaday world of international covert operations. While Watergate had its amusing moments, McCone's career is much more sobering. Millions of lives have been affected by his intrigues. When playing politics at McCone's level of sophistication, one does not bargain with slush funds and short prison terms, but with the future of entire nations.

McCone began in the steel industry before World War II, and from 1941-1946 he was president and director of the California Shipbuilding Company. According to the 1946 testimony of Ralph E. Casey of the General Accounting Office, California Shipbuilding made \$44 million in wartime profits on an investment of \$100,000.[2] After the war McCone was Deputy to the Secretary of Defense (1948), Under Secretary of the Air Force (1950-1951), and Chairman of the Atomic Energy commission (1958-1961).[3]

While a Cal-Tech trustee in October, 1956, McCone criticized ten Cal-Tech scientists for supporting Adlai Stevenson's mild proposal for a nuclear test ban. McCone, an Eisenhower campaigner, accused the scientists of being "taken in" by Soviet propaganda and of attempting to "create fear in the minds of the uninformed that radioactive fallout from H-bomb tests endangers life." The scientists felt that McCone was trying to get them fired.[4]

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy tried to appease the right-wing by appointing McCone as CIA director.[5] McCone's tenure at the CIA lasted from November 29, 1961 to April 11, 1965. He became a director of ITT and a USC trustee in 1965, while remaining a consultant for the CIA at least through 1970.[6]



McCone resigned in 1965 partly because the CIA's intelligence sources in Vietnam were being ignored by Johnson in favor of the Pentagon's more optimistic sources. The Pentagon Papers depict McCone as one who recognized the futility of Vietnam sooner than most policy makers. He objected to U.S. policy on the grounds that it could not be successful and advocated the use of increased force.[7]

During McCone's tenure at the CIA, the secret war in Laos (secret from Congress and the public), organized and directed by the CIA, increased to major proportions.[8] Diem was overthrown in 1963 with CIA assistance,[9] and the CIA ignored the Mafia/Saigon-government heroin connections that were developing.[10] After 1965 the heroin trafficking moved to Laos in a big way and received important logistical support from the CIA.[11]

The CIA assisted efforts to overthrow Sukarno of Indonesia in 1958,[12] but almost nothing has been revealed about CIA involvement in the 1965 coup and its aftermath. There is no doubt that CIA penetration of Indonesia's post-1958 government was substantial.[13] Although Indonesia received little attention in the wake of U.S. escalation in Vietnam, it was not a minor event -- 300,000 to 1 million workers, peasants, intellectuals and soldiers were slain after the coup,[14] and between 30,000 and 100,000 political prisoners are detained today under the most wretched conditions.[15] McCone may have had a special interest in Indonesia. While CIA director he owned \$1 million in stock from Standard Oil of California, which had extensive operations there.[16]

While McCone was director the CIA was heavily involved in the Congo, supplying mercenaries and arms to the supporters of Adoula and Mobutu.[17] They also trained and equipped Tibetan rebels[18] and orchestrated many of the events that led to military rule in Ecuador in 1963[19] and Brazil in 1964.[20] And the threat of Allende in Chile's 1964 election prompted the CIA and other agencies to funnel up to \$20 million to his opponents.[21]

Several attempts on Castro's life were sponsored by the CIA after McCone took office, but no documentary evidence exists to counter his claim that he knew nothing about it. McCone's successor Richard Helms is skeptical of his testimony: "He was involved in this up to his scuppers just the way everybody else was that was in it, and ... I don't understand how it was he didn't hear about some of these things that he claims that he didn't." [22] Perhaps McCone also had no knowledge of the CIA's drug experiments on unsuspecting citizens that occurred during his tenure.[23]

The Warren Commission investigated the assassination of Kennedy while McCone was CIA director. There is considerable evidence that the CIA (and FBI) obstructed certain avenues of inquiry.[24] Apparently the Warren Commission report turned out to the CIA's satisfaction, for in 1967 they directed their field offices to "employ propaganda assets" to refute the report's critics.[25]

The cover-up continues to this day. Independent investigators of the John Kennedy assassination have found new life and new leads in the connections between the CIA, Howard Hughes, the Mafia, and the anti-Castro exile community.[26] Recent leaks from the government, on the other hand, seem designed to place the blame on Castro.[27] Such a second-level cover-up appears likely, especially in light of the recent assassinations of Sam Giancana and John Roselli (they were part of the CIA/Mafia/anti-Castro network and were willing to talk about it),[28] and the apparent suicide of George de Mohrenschildt.[29]

McCone certainly knows more than he's telling, but he is not likely to reveal anything voluntarily. Before resigning as CIA director, McCone attempted to suppress the publication of *The Invisible Government* by David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, two independent journalists.[30] And his record after leaving the directorship is hardly better.

In 1965 McCone was appointed by Gov. Brown to investigate the unrest in Watts. The McCone Commission included USC trustee Asa V. Call, and after spending nearly \$300,000 in tax money the report was released in December, 1965.

The California Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights did not think much of McCone's efforts: "The report is elementary, superficial, unorganized and unimaginative ... [exhibiting] a marked and surprising lack of understanding of the civil rights movement.... The McCone Commission failed totally to make any findings concerning the existence or nonexistence of police malpractices." [31]

McCone deserves equally poor marks in Latin American studies. As an ITT director and CIA consultant, McCone met with Kissinger and CIA director Helms in 1970. McCone testified that he encouraged them to prevent Allende's election and offered \$1 million to the CIA from ITT chairman Harold Geneen.[32] The offer was refused by Helms, but \$350,000 did pass from ITT to Allende's opponent with CIA assistance.[33] To make a long story short, the Forty Committee eventually adopted ITT's destabilization plan for Chile and added numerous dirty tricks of their own.[34] The results were ideal for ITT, Anaconda, and Kennecott, and catastrophic for the Chilean people.

Edward M. Korry, U.S. ambassador to Chile from 1967-1971, has accused top officials of ITT and the CIA of conspiring to commit perjury before two Senate committees. Helms, McCone and Geneen are under investigation by a grand jury.[35] The whole truth is not yet out, but the brutal facts are clear to Chileans.

McCone's success in Chile prompted further efforts on ITT's behalf. *CounterSpy* magazine reported that McCone met with deposed Portuguese leader Gen. Antonio de Spínola in Switzerland in August, 1975.[36] At that time it appeared that the left in Portugal was viable, despite CIA funding of the right-leaning Socialist party.[37] Spínola was organizing a clandestine army in Spain, and ITT provided funds and communications equipment to the commandos.[38] If the Socialist candidate had lost to the left in last year's elections, Spínola and ITT were prepared to make amends.

Presently McCone is one of the directors of the Committee on the Present Danger. This group -- a recent coalition of big-name hawks, military-industrial complex leaders, and intelligence- community academicians -- is actively lobbying against proposed cuts in military spending.[39] McCone is also a director of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance, United California Bank, Standard Oil of California, and Western Bancorporation.[40]

On July 5, 1977, President Hubbard cited USC's 25-year "warm and long-lasting relationship" with Iran while presenting the Shah's wife with an honorary "Doctor of Humane Letters." [41] USC has an exchange program with Iran, receives money from the Shah, and currently enrolls nearly 500 Iranian students. The CIA put the Shah in power in 1953,[42] and Helms was ambassador to Iran until recently. Iran routinely subjects up to 100,000 political prisoners to torture.[43] Their secret political police network is worldwide, and SAVAK agents even operate on U.S. campuses with the full knowledge and occasional assistance of the CIA.[44]

Hubbard told the *Empress* that his visits to Iran had impressed him with the "supreme grace and friendship of your great nation."<sup>[45]</sup> Five hundred demonstrators, many wearing masks to prevent their identification by SAVAK, protested the USC ceremony and the Shah's regime.<sup>[46]</sup> McCone would be a logical place to begin if one were to investigate the USC/Iran connection.

The issue of McCone's 12-year association with this campus raises serious questions about the integrity of USC as an educational institution. These questions were pursued by student activists in the late sixties. We spent much of our time arguing with others over the facts because sometimes we were weak on documentation. Ironically, the revelations of the past few years have shown that our most paranoid fears were underestimations, yet today the campuses are relatively quiet. Do students need another draft system and dirty war before they are ready to reflect on their role in the world?

Let's hope not. Our government geared up to repress dissent during the late sixties and early seventies, but even at its worst it was still more benevolent than many of the regimes we now support. The next time around students may not be so lucky. Not if John McCone has something to say about it.

1. USC, *Daily Trojan*, 14 May 1974.
2. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The Invisible Government* (Vintage, 1974), p. 194.
3. *Who's Who in America 1974-1975*.
4. Wise and Ross, pp. 193-4.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 197.
6. Anthony Sampson, *The Sovereign State of ITT* (Fawcett, 1974), p. 263.
7. *The Pentagon Papers* (Bantam, 1971), pp. 440-1; David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (Fawcett, 1973), pp. 374, 702-3.
8. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (Dell, 1974), p. 54.
9. *The Pentagon Papers*, pp. 158-233.
10. Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 149-222.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 242-354.
12. L. Fletcher Prouty, *The Secret Team* (Ballantine, 1974), pp. 363-8.
13. David Ransom, "Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia," in *The Trojan Horse: A Radical*

*Look at Foreign Aid*, ed. Steve Weissman (Ramparts, 1975), p. 105; Peter Dale Scott, "Exporting Military-Economic Development: America and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-67," in *Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia*, ed. Malcolm Caldwell (Spokesman, 1975), pp. 209-63.

14. Ransom, p. 198; Caldwell, p. 13.

15. Amnesty International, *Annual Report 1974-75*, pp. 91-4.

16. Wise and Ross, p. 194.

17. Marchetti and Marks, pp. 53, 131.

18. David Wise, *The Politics of Lying* (Vintage, 1973), pp. 239-62.

19. Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (Penguin, 1975), pp. 131-316.

20. Ibid., p. 362; James Petras and Morris Morley, *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government* (Monthly Review, 1975), pp. 44-68; *Guardian*, 12 January 1977, p. 12; 27 April 1977, p. 16.

21. Marchetti and Marks, p. 39.

22. David Wise, *The American Police State: Government Against the People* (Random House, 1976), p. 216.

23. *Los Angeles Times*, 4 August 1977, I, p. 4.

24. This is the conclusion of the subcommittee report released by Senators Richard S. Schweiker and Gary Hart on 23 June 1976.

25. CIA document quoted in *Los Angeles Times*, 5 February 1977, I, p. 5.

26. A sampling of recent research: Howard Kohn, "Strange Bedfellows: The Hughes-Nixon-Lansky Connection," *Rolling Stone*, 20 May 1976, pp. 40-92; Robert Sam Anson, *They've Killed the President!* (Bantam, 1975); Peter Dale Scott, *Crime and Cover-up: The CIA, the Mafia, and the Dallas-Watergate Connection* (Westworks, 1977); Carl Oglesby, *The Yankee and Cowboy War: Conspiracies from Dallas to Watergate* (Sheed Andrews and McMeel, 1976).

27. Jeff Cohen and Donald Freed, "Fidel on the Grassy Knoll," *Liberation*, March/April 1977, pp. 5-9.

28. *Newsweek*, 23 August 1976, p. 38.

29. Mike Shuster, "George de Mohrenschildt: The Freelance Spy Who Said He Helped Kill Kennedy," *Seven Days*, 9 May 1977, pp. 7-9.

30. Wise and Ross, p. viii.
31. Robert Conot, *Rivers of Blood, Years of Darkness* (Bantam, 1967), pp. 415-6.
32. Sampson, p. 263.
33. *Newsweek*, 10 January 1977, p. 25.
34. North American Congress on Latin America, *Latin America & Empire report*, October 1973; July/August 1974; October 1974; November 1976; December 1976.
35. *Newsweek*, 10 January 1977, p. 25.
36. Carl Michael and Julie Brooks, "Mercenaries Prepare to Invade Portugal," *CounterSpy*, Spring 1976, p. 44.
37. Philip Agee and Steve Weissman, "The CIA in Europe," *Oui*, January 1977, pp. 141-2.
38. Michael and Brooks, p. 44.
39. Radio Havana, 14 March 1977.
40. *Who's Who in America 1974-1975*.
41. USC, *Trojan Family*, August/September 1977, p. 4.
42. Wise and Ross, pp. 110-4.
43. Amnesty International, pp. 128-9.
44. Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Activities of Foreign Spies in U.S. Said Aided by CIA," *Spokane Daily Chronicle*, 26 October 1976, p. 4; CBS, *60 Minutes*, 24 October 1976 and 6 March 1977.
45. *Trojan Family*, p. 4.
46. *Los Angeles Times*, 6 July 1977, I, p. 3.

### **About the history of this leaflet**

After trying unsuccessfully for months to interest two different *Daily Trojan* editors in this article, I

finally scraped up enough to have it professionally printed as a leaflet. I first began passing it out to those entering Bovard Auditorium on the University of Southern California campus on September 17, 1977. This event was a public debate, with appearances by Daniel Ellsberg, William Colby, Donald Freed, David Atlee Phillips, John Gerassi, Ray Cline, and Mark Lane. (Lane describes some of what happened at this debate in his book *Plausible Denial*, on pages 75-87.) Certainly this was a unique exercise in free speech by people with important things to say -- just what universities are for, and something that happened infrequently at my alma mater.

Unfortunately, I was unable to attend. After leafletting for a while, the campus police threatened to arrest me, and I was escorted off campus. This leaflet, including all of its footnotes, was unauthorized literature!

The next week I flooded the campus with seven thousand copies of the leaflet, and complained to a faculty member who belonged to the ACLU about the violation of my rights. Nothing came of it, but at least the campus newspaper finally saw fit to print the name of John McCone (**this just in!**):

**The leaflet Brandt was distributing contained an allegation that John McCone, university trustee, has had extensive involvement in the past with covert CIA activity.** (*Daily Trojan*, 21 September 1977, p. 6)

[Back to home page](#)

## Cold Warriors Woo Generation X

by Steve Badrich

From NameBase NewsLine, No. 6, July-September 1994

After more than three decades of down-and-dirty operations for the CIA, San Antonio resident Kenneth Michael Absher has come in from the cold.

Sitting in the sun-drenched living room of his house in the upscale Alamo Heights district, Absher, 59, seems glad to be back in friendly, patriotic South Texas, glad to reminisce about the many Cold War crises he saw close up. The Cuban missile crisis. Vietnam. Running agents in foreign countries he's not even allowed to name.

Spies in John le Carre novels often doubt themselves, and their side. Absher, apparently, does neither. He's Texas-friendly and seemingly quite at ease in his own skin. In a low-key way, he's also quite eloquent, the kind of natural explainer and storyteller one is glad to encounter at the front of a classroom.

Boink, Absher's graying black tomcat, keeps his master under lazy surveillance as one Cold War tale suggests another.

"It's my favorite subject," Absher says, disarmingly, about the often-maligned trade of intelligence. Now Absher hopes to pass his enthusiasm on.

Retired as of last year from the CIA's Operations Directorate, Absher has introduced a historically-oriented course at a local university on the enduring value of "espionage," the covert stuff -- apparently the only declassified college-level course on this subject in the United States.

More than a hundred colleges and universities nationwide offer courses on national security or intelligence. For example, the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA), where Absher now teaches, also offers a "big picture" course on "the intelligence community" taught by James Calder, a UTSA criminal justice professor with a background in military intelligence.

But Absher's course, uniquely, concentrates on the potential value to policymakers of intelligence obtained through covert means like spying.

It's a declassified version of a course Absher once taught at the Defense Intelligence College at Bolling Air Force Base. At Bolling, Absher's students were military personnel with at least "top secret" clearances. At UTSA, they're South Texas representatives of Generation X -- most of them politically a notch or two to the right-of-center, but without being diehard ideological conservatives. Nor are many of them overburdened with historical knowledge.

UTSA's big, airy campus, just south of the Texas Hill Country, is far more "Anglo" than the rest of San Antonio -- spiritually, the northernmost major city in Mexico. Land for the campus was donated to the



state by big-dog developer friends of former Texas governor John Connally. Connally's friends expected the value of their surrounding property, which is extensive, to ratchet up. It has.

The CIA's Publications Review Board duly cleared Absher's syllabus as posing no threat to the CIA's interests. But the Agency has no other official link to Absher's teaching. Texas taxpayers rather than the Agency are paying his part-timer's salary. Nor is Absher part of the CIA's often-criticized Officer-in-Residence program, which places active CIA personnel on campus as temporary professors -- and unofficial goodwill ambassadors for spookdom.

Absher acknowledges, but shrugs off, the fact that his course takes as its point of departure the existence of state secrecy. "There are always," he says mildly, "going to be secrets."

Absher's students swear by his course. "He's a gifted instructor and a wonderful, enthusiastic man," says Elaine Coronado, a Washington-savvy UTSA senior working on a second UTSA degree in political science. Her first is in history.

Coronado plans eventually to return to "the policy arena" in Washington, D.C., where she has already worked for the Hispanic Alliance for Free Trade, a pro-NAFTA lobbying group. Coronado's group project for Absher's course, in fact, wound up recommending an expanded CIA role in monitoring world trade.

Absher also wins praise from UTSA colleagues, even out-and-out CIA critics. Absher was hired by Dr. David Alvarez, Director of UTSA's Division of Social and Policy Sciences. Alvarez minces no words in blasting CIA interventions in Chile, El Salvador, and elsewhere.

But Alvarez thought UTSA students could benefit from Absher's "special expertise," and feels vindicated by the course's reception. Alvarez praises Absher's ability to attract high-level former CIA colleagues as guest lecturers. Absher's spring-semester course was visited by such figures as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence William Studeman, a four-star admiral, and Dawn Eilenberger, a deputy to CIA General Counsel Elizabeth Rindskopf.

(Eilenberger was a last-minute replacement for Rindskopf herself, who was forced to stay in Washington to put out fires started by the Aldrich Ames "CIA mole" case. Perhaps it's just as well that Rindskopf never made it to UTSA. Absher, without consulting local feminists, had scheduled Rindskopf's visit to coincide with UTSA's Women's History Week. Students who met with Eilenberger found her engaging -- whereas Rindskopf, a former General Counsel for the National Security Agency, was a never-give-an-inch stonewaller during the Iran-contra affair. According to published accounts, aides to Lawrence Walsh eventually found it difficult even to be in the same room with her.)

Absher, for his part, is glad to have a forum to address issues he considers important. He sees his course as part of a new era of "demystification" of intelligence issues, of CIA glasnost (if not yet of perestroika).

Such issues, he says, are not only intrinsically important, they're grist for the mills of future scholars. He cites the case of one of his former UTSA students, who is contemplating writing a master's thesis based on newly-declassified CIA documents on the Bay of Pigs debacle.



"The last thing I want to do," Absher says, "is to be intellectually dishonest in any way. I've pulled no punches in this course. I've talked about intelligence failures, policy failures, everything. I've encouraged my students to make arguments against the continued existence of the CIA."

Elaine Coronado confirms this last statement. In conversation, furthermore, Absher deplures what he considers CIA failures and abuses -- and loose cannons like Ollie North.

Nevertheless, Absher remains, at bottom, a believer: someone who looks back on his almost thirty-two years in the CIA without regrets. He has no doubts that the right side won the Cold War, nor that CIA espionage helped.

He also believes that espionage continues to be necessary in a world in which the Russian mafia has replaced the Politburo, trade wars are supplanting most large-scale "hot" and "cold" wars, and tinhorn dictators in backwater capitals think about going nuclear.

Absher is stoical about the Ames case, which he calls "a wake-up call for everybody about what life is going to be like in the post-Cold War period." Ames's unmasking proves only, Absher says, that "there's never going to be a total symmetry of national interests" between the U.S. and the new Russia.

Nor is Absher an enthusiast for "open source intelligence" (OSCINT), the hottest new topic within the hermetic world of theorists of intelligence. There's more useful information to be gleaned from a good library, as serious students of intelligence have always acknowledged, than there is from almost any meeting in a back street in the Casbah. This fundamental principle explains why intelligence agencies took an interest in the academic world in the first place.

But in a wired world, libraries and other vast archives of information are rapidly going on-line. A skilled net-surfer with a fast modem can routinely download volumes of the kind of high-grade information that old-style intelligence services once had to pay for with time, sweat, and money, if not blood. Or so say the proponents of OSCINT.

Robert David Steele, the champion of OSCINT, still believes in a strong intelligence community. Too young for Vietnam, he is a CIA veteran with three back-to-back postings in Latin America (including El Salvador from 1980-1981), and in 1988 became the senior civilian responsible for establishing the U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Center. But Steele nevertheless foresees, in an age of tight budgets, the death of intelligence dinosaurs like the bloated, centralized CIA of the 90s. In Steele's vision, many U.S. intelligence needs of the near future will be met by decentralized, shoe-string bands of cyberspooks tapping into a digitized sea of "open-source" information.

Steele and his Open Source Solutions, Inc. have a lot to say on these topics, and his ideas seem to be riding a wave that will take them, possibly soon, into closed Congressional hearing rooms. But it's a wave Absher declines to get on.

"We have tried 'open source intelligence,'" Absher maintains, "and it does not work. Anybody who thinks George Washington could conduct a revolution on the basis of 'open source intelligence' hasn't read history."

The syllabus to Absher's UTSA course suggests the historical reasoning behind this remark. Called "The Role of Espionage in Foreign Policy," Absher's course blends history and political science to examine cases in which espionage helped policymakers make history. Absher insists the course is no exercise in CIA self-glorification.

He maintains, for example, that D-Day succeeded, in part, because of a bogus military buildup -- complete with phony, inflatable "tanks" -- that fooled the Germans into thinking that the Allies had targeted Calais rather than Normandy. Eisenhower's "Operation Fortitude," which created this phantom invasion force, is only one of the case studies Absher's course considers.

Absher can cite a laundry list of similar cases to support his contention that the U.S. still needs espionage, still needs a CIA.

Not everyone agrees with this contention. Absher is well aware that back in Washington, the CIA's detractors are enjoying another of their periodic revivals. The Ames scandal revealed that despite the Cold-War- cowboy bravado of William Casey, the Soviets have spent years pipelining burn-before-reading secrets out of the inner sanctum of the CIA -- a fact that resulted in the execution of a number of U.S. agents overseas -- while presumably spoon-feeding the CIA's own agents a steady diet of disinformation.

Ames, who may not be the last Soviet mole inside the Company, is a creepy enough character. Still, his courtroom denunciation of U.S. intelligence as a "cynical sideshow" seems to have struck a nerve with many in Congress.

Is this, many have asked, what the U.S. public gets in return for its umpty-ump-billion-dollar classified "intelligence" budget? Could these misspent dollars be related to the fact that nobody in the big-ticket U.S. intelligence establishment seems to have foreseen the smashup of the Soviet system?

Such questions, furthermore, revive Congressional memories of CIA failures and scandals of previous decades. It's a familiar litany, at least for Americans who predate MTV.

In the 1960s, radical journalists from the magazine "Ramparts" revealed that CIA officers had used Michigan State University cover to help create the security forces -- and the government -- of South Vietnam.

And although this fact wasn't widely known at the time, such covert CIA involvement with a university wasn't unique, or even particularly unusual. Michigan State's "international studies" program, like similar programs across the U.S., was a Cold War creation. The granddaddy of such programs was the School of International Affairs at Columbia University, founded in 1946, and soon a virtual nursery of future CIA employees and intelligence.

Such "international studies" programs came into existence as part of a massive, wide-ranging effort by the CIA, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and the Carnegie Corporation to enlist the U.S. academic community in the Cold War. There's not enough space here to detail everything they did. But it's worth noting that the CIA and its handmaidens in the private sector regularly funded research and programs designed to address perceived "political problems" of the Cold War.

The leaders of the bloody 1965 coup in Indonesia, for instance, were able to draw on the expertise of Indonesian elites trained at Ford Foundation expense by faculty members from MIT and Cornell, Berkeley and Harvard. Indonesian students at MIT attended CIA-funded Harvard seminars led by Henry Kissinger.

And university involvement didn't stop there. Sympathetic faculty members on many campuses acted as "spotters" of potential future CIA employees. And the CIA, as "Ramparts" also revealed in 1967, essentially bankrolled the supposedly-independent National Student Association, and used student leaders to carry out operational tasks. Feminist media star Gloria Steinem, who later said she had been "duped," was one such student leader.

In the 1970s, Congress's Church Committee revealed for the first time that the CIA had earlier tried to assassinate foreign leaders such as the Congo's Patrice Lumumba and (with Mafia help) Fidel Castro.

But the Church Committee also revealed that the CIA was even then making use of several hundred "academics" (professors, administrators, and propagandists). In a related, mind-bending revelation, the Committee disclosed that the CIA was even a factor in the psychedelic revolution of the 60s. A CIA "mind control" project called MK-ULTRA had funded 1950s LSD research -- including experimentation on unwitting subjects.

And even this thumbnail sketch must at least take note of the often-bloody overseas coups in which CIA involvement is either known or suspected. Iran. Guatemala. Indonesia. Chile. The list goes on, and the target governments, often enough, had been democratically elected.

This checklist of horrors is enough to suggest why legions of people who remember the 60s and 70s will believe anything about the CIA.

The CIA's latest crop of critics tend to be "mainstream," which makes them all the more dangerous to the CIA's future. This summer's Congressional debate over the 1995 intelligence budget, for instance, could get intense. R. James Woolsey, Clinton's cantankerous CIA director, has adopted a hard-charging attitude that has alienated many in Congress.

Even with the Cold War over, Woolsey has called for an expanded CIA budget -- in part to upgrade the aging U.S. armada of spy satellites.

But Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) complains that given its large (classified) annual budget, the CIA should have foreseen the implosion of the Soviet Union. Moynihan is pushing a bill that would shut down the CIA and spin off its functions to the State Department, the Pentagon, and other agencies. Unlikely to pass, Moynihan's bill nevertheless reflects one mood in Congress.

Absher deplors past CIA abuses as vehemently as anyone. Given CIA compartmentalization, Absher says he learned about them through the same newspapers and books as anybody else.

But Absher counts on learning more from the ongoing declassification of intelligence documents. When more is known, Absher suggests, the public may find that bad policy was sometimes driven by the White House rather than the CIA.

Absher suspects this may have happened during the Iran-contra scandal of the 1980s. Given Absher's CIA role at the time, he should have known everything about Col. Ollie North's activities, if only North had been going through channels. In fact, says Absher, North "was running his own private intelligence operation" out of the White House.

Even as he acknowledges past abuses, Absher charges that Moynihan's bill would return the U.S. to "the situation we were in on Saturday, December 6, 1941" -- the day before Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor.

Despite everything, Absher retains a bedrock faith in the U.S. intelligence establishment to which he has devoted his life. That life was shaped by a Cold War world that is rapidly passing out of existence, and even out of memory.

Perhaps this explains why Absher is so avid for his students to come into contact with the human reality behind intelligence work.

"We don't have horns," Absher says at one point, almost plaintively, referring to himself and his fellow spooks.

Yet Absher's own life, even though it doesn't officially figure in his syllabus, makes a story as striking as anything his students are likely to hear from visiting CIA lecturers.

Take, for example, the interview that led to Absher's career in the CIA.

The date was 1961, a vintage year for Cold War paranoia. A CIA- directed invasion force had folded up on the beaches of Castro's Cuba -- an event that first alerted many Americans to the fact that the CIA even existed.

As a Princeton philosophy major five years before, Absher had closely followed the student-led Hungarian revolt that drew workers and others into the streets before being suppressed by Soviet tanks.

"We were students at Princeton," Absher says today. "We felt a kinship with the students who were dying in the streets of Budapest. And we could do nothing."

As 1961 unfolded, Absher felt dissatisfied working at his promising job in the San Antonio city manager's office. He had already served in the Army, where he did his first teaching. But he wanted to do more. So Absher paid his own way from San Antonio to Washington to enlist in the Cold War.

His Congressman gave him some addresses to try. Absher's rounds eventually brought him to a dark corner office in the ramshackle wooden barracks that were the CIA's first headquarters.

With a glance, Absher pegged the interviewer sitting behind the plain wooden desk. The man looked like "a stern prep school dean," but was obviously one of the aristo cowboys of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the CIA's wartime predecessor.

Absher's interrogator was cradling something in one hand. It turned out to be a mound of birdseed.

As the interview proceeded, Absher's interrogator would periodically fling a seed across the room. In a cage against the opposite wall sat a huge-beaked bird -- a toucan? -- as brilliantly colored as a parrot, only four times as large and ugly as sin.

"The bird," Absher recalls, "never missed a thing. Line drives. Fly balls. Grounders. He caught them all."

Absher himself, he admits today, was also caught -- as he says his interviewer must have intended. Before there were batteries of psychological tests, there were CIA mind-games.

So, Mr. Absher, his interviewer eventually got around to asking, do you think you want to come to work for us?

I'm not sure, Absher admitted. I don't know much about you guys.

This was true, and Absher wasn't alone. A Barnes and Noble how-a-bill-becomes-law handbook Absher had brought with him on the train didn't even mention the CIA.

Good answer, Mr. Absher! responded his interviewer. You'll be hearing from us. We'll be offering you a job.

And they did. The letter Absher received offered such-and-such a salary, but never specifically mentioned the CIA.

Absher completed his training (which, because of the CIA's general secrecy agreement, he still can't talk about) just in time to go to work as a junior intelligence analyst during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. It was to prove a defining event in Absher's life, a crisis Absher thinks revealed to him "the unquestioned value of espionage."

Absher found himself working under Sherman Kent, a legendary figure widely considered the father of modern CIA analysis.

Just one month before, the CIA had predicted that the Soviets would probably not introduce missiles into Cuba. But the documents Absher was asked to read indicated otherwise. So did the U-2 "spy plane" photos Absher got to study almost as soon as JFK did.

Espionage, he says, was delivering intelligence that was both surprising and unwelcome -- but also unquestionably important.

Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles based in Cuba had a range of 2,200 miles. They could have hit any location in the U.S., except Alaska and one small corner of the Pacific Northwest. The Soviets, Absher believes, had seriously misjudged Kennedy.

Some critics have expressed horror at the superpower face-off that followed, seeing the entire episode as scary testosterone-driven brinksmanship that almost blew up the world.

Absher disagrees.

"I happen to think," he says today, "that Kennedy handled this crisis about as well as anybody could have." Absher is prepared to argue this case on the historical record. The Cuban missile crisis, in fact, is one of the episodes examined in Absher's course.

Unfortunately, Absher can't very well argue for what he and his colleagues accomplished during his subsequent CIA postings overseas. Absher can't even say where he went.

His resume acknowledges that Absher served in "Europe" and in the "Caribbean," that he was CIA "Chief of Station" in two different countries, and that he was awarded numerous medals, including the Intelligence Medal of Merit (twice). Between overseas postings, Absher also spent "four tours" in CIA headquarters, where he supervised U.S. intelligence operations going on in (unnamed) foreign countries.

Given these gaps, it seems odd that Absher feels free to talk, as he apparently does, about 1972-73 in Vietnam. Once again, Absher has his own line on the subject.

"There were many wars in Vietnam," Absher acknowledges. The one Absher fought was "a conventional war" against battle-hardened North Vietnamese regulars operating at battalion strength. Absher zipped around his province in a helicopter, and when necessary called in B-52 strikes against suspected NVA troop concentrations.

In the interrogations he supervised, Absher says, "I never saw any brutality." It was the Viet Cong, Absher says, who went in for wholesale assassinations of South Vietnamese teachers, officials, and others. Or rather, Absher says, the competent and honest were assassinated. The incompetent and corrupt were left in place.

But what about alleged CIA assassinations, Absher is asked? What about the notorious CIA "Phoenix Program" that became public knowledge in the 1970s?

Absher agrees that some such program did exist. Former CIA director William Colby has said as much. But Absher thinks "Phoenix" had apparently been phased out before his Vietnam tour.

"You'll have to talk to somebody else," he says. "I haven't read very much about Phoenix."

Freelancer Doug Valentine has. In fact, Valentine says he interviewed the CIA creators of "Phoenix" for his massive 1990 study "The Phoenix Program." Interviewed by phone from his Massachusetts home, Valentine calls Absher's comment on "Phoenix" technically correct, but misleading.

"There were two CIA-created 'Phoenix' programs," says Valentine. The second was the "Phoenix Program" in the narrower sense, which had in fact been turned over to the Vietnamese before Absher arrived in Vietnam. This program used CIA resources to identify and target Vietnamese civilians that

the American-created establishment in Vietnam considered "subversive."

According to Valentine, this vast group included students, labor organizers, and politically-active Vietnamese of all kinds. In American- dominated South Vietnam, says Valentine, virtually every kind of political and community activity whatsoever was illegal. After these "subversives" had been identified, they were then assassinated by local death-squads which had been organized by the CIA.

No one knows for sure, Valentine says, exactly how many people were assassinated. But Valentine notes that former CIA director William Colby, who still defends the program, puts the total at 25,000. Other estimates run much higher.

But according to Valentine, there is another, more inclusive meaning of "Phoenix." In this larger sense, "Phoenix" can stand for a whole style of counterinsurgency warfare that the CIA brought to Vietnam, and to many other places. (Unlike Absher, Valentine regards the nation of South Vietnam itself as the creation of Americans, who stepped into the imperial role abdicated by the French in 1954.)

The CIA, Valentine says, maintained paid agents within the heart of the South Vietnamese government. Any South Vietnamese politician who deviated from the CIA line was himself in danger of being denounced as a "subversive" -- and then being killed.

Seen in the larger context of the CIA's history, Valentine maintains, those B-52 strikes Absher was calling in on South Vietnam were part of the larger "Phoenix" counterinsurgency strategy. So were the interrogations Absher oversaw at the local Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC). The entire PIC program, Valentine maintains, was a creation of the CIA's original "Phoenix."

Valentine, obviously, is no CIA-critic-as-Congressional-penny-pincher. He's an old-style radical critic who turns Absher's contention that there "are always going to be secrets" on its head.

"If there are always going to be secrets," Valentine contends, "then power is always going to reside with the people who keep the secrets. Secrets are antithetical to democracy. But if there's no more need to keep secrets, then there's no need for a CIA."

Valentine comes from a military family, and says that he has plenty of CIA-officer friends with whom he agrees to disagree. He says he's sure he could get along with Absher the man.

"But you have to remember," Valentine says of Absher, "he cannot tell you the truth. All he can tell you is the cover story -- which is designed to be plausible."

One voice that might be expected to echo Valentine's is that of John Stockwell, one of the top three CIA critics who became an author and lecturer after resigning or retiring as an operations officer (the other two are Philip Agee and Ralph McGehee).

Stockwell is both a decorated military veteran and a former top- ranking CIA officer. He ran massive, covert CIA operations in Africa before resigning over some of the revelations of the 1970s.

One thing that bothered him, Stockwell says today, was being asked to lie to Congress -- like certain

figures in the Iran-contra scandal. Another was knowledge that the CIA was being asked to carry out assassinations.

For decades now, Stockwell has been a well-known writer, lecturer, and CIA critic. In 1986, he even spoke to a large student-and-faculty audience at UTSA.

Reached by telephone at his home in Elgin, Texas, however, Stockwell has some surprising news.

"Intellectually," he says, "I'm probably not too far from Absher today."

The end of the Cold War, Stockwell says, "swept all the pieces from the board." Continuing to repeat his old criticisms in a changed situation, Stockwell says, would turn him into a "sorehead" instead of the serious intellectual critic he aspires to be.

The Cold War CIA, Stockwell suggests, has lost its traditional rationale. And although Moynihan's bill will never pass, the CIA's critics have been heard. Imperfect as it necessarily is, the existing system of Congressional oversight is probably as good an instrument as can be devised. The trick is to make it work, to curb the inevitable abuses of power.

But in the meantime, Stockwell says, Absher is right. The world swarms with threats. He cites the case of vastly-overpopulated Rwanda, a country he once kept track of for the CIA. The U.S., says Stockwell, does need a streamlined, high-quality intelligence capability pretty much like the one Absher calls for.

"The next fifty years," he says, with no evident pleasure, "may be much more violent than the last fifty."

His words virtually echo Absher's warning about tinhorn dictators and their "weapons of mass destruction."

"We've got a window of opportunity," Absher says. "Let's not blow it."

It's strange to find these two agreeing about anything -- the notorious CIA critic and the unrepentant former spook now openly defending his craft to a new generation of college students -- a generation which needs someone to explain why anyone was ever out in the cold in the first place.

**Sidebar from NameBase NewsLine, No. 6, July-September 1994:**

## **Cyberspace Cowboy with CIA Credentials**

**by Daniel Brandt**

Whenever history is stranded between two epochs, those few who recognize the shifting paradigms are usually voices in the wilderness. Robert David Steele spent the 80s fighting the Cold War for the



CIA in Latin America, but now he writes for Whole Earth Review, invites Mitch Kapor and John Barlow to speak at the symposiums he organizes, and jets around the globe to swap impressions with unkempt hackers. Back at the ranch, he keeps up a steady diet of schmoozing with Washington intelligence professionals, testifying for Congressional committees, and consulting with corporate information experts. He's a man on a mission.

Steele believes that U.S. intelligence, with its cumbersome classification system, is like a dinosaur in a tar pit. He likes to tell the story of his "\$10 million mistake." In 1988 Steele was responsible for spending this amount to help the Marine Corps set up a new intelligence facility. He acquired a system of workstations to handle Top Secret information, which also meant that they could not be connected to any unclassified systems. Meanwhile, a little personal computer in the next room was the only station with external unclassified access. After the system was built, they discovered that virtually everything the Marine Corps needed -- from bridge loading capabilities to the depth of water in ports around the world -- was available on the little PC through the Internet. But none of it was found on the classified systems, which tended to be filled with data on Soviet strategic capabilities.

U.S. intelligence was destined for major budget cuts and restructuring, even before the latest embarrassment of the Aldrich Ames case. The CIA's mole problems are merely the last nails in the coffin, and lead to cover stories such as the "U.S. News & World Report" of July 4, 1994, which declares that the CIA is "plagued by incompetence and fraud." But Robert Steele has a fix. All that's required is for U.S. intelligence to abandon its obsession with secrecy and find the nearest on-ramp to the information superhighway. He and his Open Source Solutions, Inc. will be happy to give directions (4350 Fair Lakes Court, Fairfax VA 22033, Tel: 703-242-1700, Fax: 703-242-1711, E-mail: info@oss.net).

Steele's articulation of the shortcomings of U.S. intelligence, along with other expert sources such as former Senate intelligence committee staffer Angelo Codevilla's "Informing Statecraft" (1992), make a powerful case that something has to change. The total intelligence budget is just over \$37 billion, with the major portion going for technical collection -- mostly satellites and related processing systems. But these systems are narrowly focused, and encourage narrow policies designed to justify the expense. The CIA's portion of this budget is about \$3.5 billion, and the NSA's is roughly \$4 billion.

Steele points out that the cost-benefit ratio of open source intelligence (OSCINT) is so productive that nothing else even comes close. But U.S. intelligence is steeped in its old ways. He hears stories of agencies that refuse to cite information in their reports unless it comes from classified sources, or of CIA analysts who wanted to travel to Moscow to take advantage of newly-opened resources but were threatened with loss of their clearances if they made the trip. In other words, U.S. intelligence is doing everything backwards. No one disputes the fact that 80 percent of all the information worth analyzing is publicly available, and of the remaining 20 percent, much of it is made useless by a classification system that delays delivery and frequently restricts access to those who are not inclined to use it. In a rational world, OSCINT would be the "source of first resort."

Open Source Solutions, Inc., of which Steele is president, sponsors annual symposiums that draw a range of professionals: government intelligence analysts, corporate competitor intelligence departments, Beltway-Bandit think tanks that churn out classified studies for government clients, and various on-line ferrets, hackers, and futurists from around the world. They expected 200 for their 1992 symposium and got over 600. In 1993 they had over 800 from 32 countries, including some retired KGB colonels that made a few officials at CIA headquarters extremely nervous. The next symposium, scheduled for November 8-10 in Washington, will focus less on the U.S. intelligence community itself

and more on the intelligence consumer in the global private and public sectors. These symposiums are financed by fees from those who attend (\$500 unless you get an academic rate or "hacker scholarship"), and also from corporations and organizations that pay for exhibit space. OSS is nonprofit, but Steele also spun off a for-profit corporation that offers consulting services and "best of class" referrals for \$750 a day or \$200 an hour.

Steele's voice is one that needs to be heard in Washington. He's strongest when he criticizes U.S. intelligence, and he's excellent for those who are trying to keep up with cyberspace trends and information resources. But when he presents open source intelligence as an elixir for America's problems, from intelligence to competitiveness to ecology, his reach exceeds his grasp. For example, Steele's assurances that competitiveness and OSCINT are mutually compatible are unconvincing: it seems reasonable that at some point, what I know becomes more valuable to me by virtue of the fact that you DON'T have the same information. Human nature being what it is, secrecy is not something that can be restricted only to executive action and diplomacy, as Steele maintains. It is here to stay, on every level of society. Steele's unreal optimism is a religious conviction that's not uncommon among cyberspace cadets.

Ironically, the same technology that efficiently delivers Steel's open source intelligence has also given us the ability to keep digital data very secret. There is no guarantee that the mountains of public data won't someday become a Tower of Encrypted Babel. Steele's most glaring omission is his lack of comment on public encryption technology and the Clipper Chip -- the issue that has caused cypherpunks and some corporations to declare war on the U.S. intelligence community. It seems that if Steele took a strong position on this issue, he might lose half of his support in a cyberspace nanosecond.

[Back to home page](#)

Grand Street, Spring 1988

# Spooks in Blue

by Doug Henwood

I don't see why we need to stand by and  
watch a country go Communist due to the  
irresponsibility of its own people. --  
Henry Kissinger on Chile, 1970

A statue of Nathan Hale stands in front of the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency in Langley, Virginia. It's paradoxical -- though quite appropriate to a profession whose reputation far exceeds its accomplishments -- that the man now remembered as our first spy has achieved this status through failure. As Robin Winks says in *Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War 1939-1961* (Morrow), "Hale was ill-prepared for his mission, accomplished no intelligence objective, and . . . in the words of a later director of the CIA, Allen Dulles, 'quite possibly was the wrong sort of man' to be in the business."

The Hale statue is a replica of one on the campus of Yale University. Yale alumni have figured heavily in the history of American espionage, starting with three members of the Culpeper spy ring who graduated with Hale in the class of 1773. But unlike the British, we had no independent intelligence agency for most of our history; spying was a rather informal affair, confined to the wartime military. With the outbreak of the Second World War it became clear that we needed a large-scale operation in a hurry. What better place to turn than to academe? Winks's book is the story of these academics-turned-spies, with a particular emphasis on the crowd from Yale, where Winks is a professor of history.


As everyone knows, the Office of Strategic Services was founded in 1942 and its first director was "Wild Bill" Donovan. The heart of OSS, and the home of most of its academics, was the Research and Analysis branch, or R&A; other branches handled the nastier, novelistic end of the business, like counterintelligence, black propaganda and sabotage. It was agreed from the outset that R&A's mandate was broad and long-term; the academics in R&A -- social scientists, historians, linguists and even literary critics were instructed to study friends and enemies, real and potential, present and future. OSS researchers began to turn their attention to the Soviet Union well before the war was over, though, as Winks notes, some of the leftish academics performed this new task with a decided lack of enthusiasm.

Because of its tweedy aura, R&A was usually called the campus -- a name that stuck to its organizational offspring, the CIA, and to the Agency's headquarters in Langley,

Virginia. Winks's chapter on R&A focuses on three scholar/spooks -- William Langer, the Harvard historian; Wilmarth Lewis, the Yale bibliophile of independent means whose lifework was a forty-eight-volume edition of the papers of Horace Walpole; and Sherman Kent, a Yale historian. By the end of the war, R&A had gathered 3 million index cards, 300,000 photographs, a million maps, 350,000 foreign serials, 50,000 books, thousands of loose postcards -- all indexed and cross -- indexed under the direction of Lewis, who loved the apparatus of scholarship. (Many of these documents were gathered under the cover of the Yale library.) "Nothing is better reading (except a good index) than footnotes," said Lewis, which helps explain the triumph of form over substance that is the Yale Walpole.

So what? asks Winks -- what did R&A contribute to the war? They refined estimates of German armaments production, contributed to the planning for the invasion of North Africa and evaluated potential bombing targets. But, as Winks concedes, the work of R&A was romanticized by those, led by Donovan, who hoped to keep the OSS alive after the war over the objections of those who felt -- not irrationally -- that a peacetime intelligence agency was an affront to American democracy.

R&A lives on in the interdisciplinary area studies departments in American universities. McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, which encouraged the development of these departments, said: "In very large measure the area study programs developed in American universities in the years after the war were manned, directed, or stimulated by graduates of the OSS -- a remarkable institution, half cops-and-robbers and half faculty meeting." Thus began the transformation of the universities into regional offices of the American Imperium's executive committee.



**James Angleton (1917-1987)**

R&A lends a tweedy image to spycraft, but it makes for rather dull reading. The real star of *Cloak and Gown* is James Jesus Angleton, Yale '41. Intelligence ran in Angleton's blood; his father, James Hugh Angleton, headed the National Cash Register franchise in Italy; in the course of visiting NCR's European operations, he set up his own amateur spy operation, which was of benefit to the United States when the war broke out. Angleton *père* was a Mason, and a professed admirer of Italy and Germany in the 1930s.

Angleton  *fils* plunged into the literary life at Yale; he edited three student magazines, most notably *Furioso*, which he published with his roommate, Reed Whittemore. For a student journal, it featured a very tony cast of characters, including Williams, Stevens, Pound, Cummings, and Empson. Classmates described Angleton as "a fanatic in the making," "a mysterious Satan," living a sly life of "mysterious guile." As Whittemore said, Angleton began his

undercover work early: he delivered copies of *Furioso* in the dead of night, dropping them outside of subscribers' doors.

Angleton joined the counterintelligence (CI) branch of OSS, X-2, which was headed by another Yale, Norman Holmes Pearson. While with X-2, Pearson supervised the accumulation of files on a million enemy agents and organizations, a practice Pearson strongly felt should be continued after the war, despite its offensiveness to traditional Jeffersonian notions of government. Such quaint objections, as we know, were quickly overcome, as the term "enemy" acquired a very liberal definition.

X-2 also handled the Ultra intelligence, spycraft's greatest coup, which was kept secret for thirty years after the war. The British, with Polish assistance, had cracked the German codes and were eavesdropping on communications the Germans thought secret. Intelligence partisans think Ultra was crucial to the war effort. Maybe. Advertising its importance is a nice way for paper-pushers to upstage GI Joe and Rosie the Riveter, who also had something to do with winning the war -- as did the Soviets, who really destroyed the Nazi army.

Pearson's specialty was American studies, particularly Hawthorne, but his OSS service interrupted his scholarly momentum. He published little, and though he didn't perish, he certainly didn't flourish, remaining at a junior level for decades after his

return to Yale. His major academic accomplishment was the promotion of American studies at home and abroad. Like foreign-area studies, this new discipline was of clear imperial import, in that it allowed us to understand our unique fitness for our postwar role as the world's governor, and encouraged a finer appreciation of our cultural sophistication among the ruled.

Back to Angleton. He stayed with CI after the war, running the Agency's counterintelligence operation until he was forced out by his longtime nemesis, William Colby, in 1974. (The ostensible reason was the revelation of the CIA's extensive domestic spying operations, directed by Angleton, which were uncovered in a series of articles by Seymour Hersh in the *New York Times*. But Colby never liked Angleton and thought that his CI empire had grown inappropriately large for a trade now dominated by gadgetry.) Counterintelligence is one of the spookier aspects of the espionage game. Its aim is to undo the enemy by analyzing his intentions, neutralizing his agents, scrutinizing the *bona fides* of defectors -- and examining one's own ranks for traitors. It is not a way to win friends, but it is a way to influence people. Its landscape is "a wilderness of mirrors," a phrase from Eliot's "Gerontion" that Angleton quoted frequently. A ruder definition was provided to Winks by an anonymous critic of Angleton and his discipline: CI is like a dog returning to its own vomit.

Angleton, a withdrawn and secretive man, was ideally suited to CI. He doubted everything, suspected everyone. He suspected that Joe McCarthy, by making anticommunism look so bad, might be a Soviet agent. After the treachery of the Cambridge trio, Burgess, Maclean and Philby, was brought to light, suspicions that there was a mole burrowing about in the CIA proliferated. Angleton suspected everybody; some suspected Angleton. He had, after all, failed to discover Philby! Angleton thought the Soviet-Chinese split a ruse designed to dull the West into complacency. Angleton's men tortured the defector Yuri Nosenko for three and a half years, trying to determine if he was a living ruse; they kept him in solitary, fed him poorly and subjected him to at least four different drugs. (Winks's account of this is notably short on detail.) Mortal minds boggle in the face of this "chilled delirium," another phrase from "Gerontion."

Of course, what drove the postwar Angleton was that old bugaboo, International Communism. With the temporary enemy -- fascism -- defeated, the United States could turn its attentions back to the long-term enemy, Moscow. When the war was winding down, Angleton was posted to one of the cold war's first battlegrounds, Italy. As Winks tells it: "Angleton knew that the Italian partisans, most of them Communists, had fought bravely against the Germans, but he firmly believed that they had at once shifted their loyalties to an international order and were now working for Moscow." Angleton didn't like internationalists; he thought, incredibly, that a world of competing nationalisms would be more stable. He also dreaded Communism because it undermined religion; he was a High Church Anglican who believed "in the energizing power of guilt."

The first priority of the U.S. government was preventing the loss of Italy to the forces uncharmed by guilt and nationalism. Without U.S. intervention, the left would probably have won the 1948 elections. So, in December 1947, one of the early

directives of the new National Security Council, NSC 4/A, ordered the young CIA to prevent a Communist victory and to take whatever covert actions were necessary to achieve that goal.

And act they did, dispensing oodles of money and propaganda. Angleton *et al.* rebuilt Italian intelligence, relying heavily on Mussolini veterans (Winks doesn't share this personnel detail with his readers); creating and financing the Christian Democrats (though Winks treats such details of the party's paternity as mere rumor); funding journalists and entire newspapers (Winks attributes these claims to Soviet propaganda and those busy rumor mills). Among the newspapers was the English-language Rome *Daily American*, whose star reporter was Claire Sterling, by the lights of Winks "a courageous and enterprising investigative journalist with mysteriously quick access to top stories."

Winks, who clearly knows how to dig into an archive and weave his findings into a readable narrative, could have done much better with Italy. For Italy was the dress rehearsal for the cold war. Earl Brennan makes a brief appearance in *Cloak and Gown*, identified only as "a man with deep Italian contacts," among whom was Vatican Undersecretary of State Giovanni Battista Montini, later Pope Paul VI. Brennan's mission, unexamined by Winks, was to forge a coalition among previously immiscible rightists -- Fascists, Freemasons, the Vatican and the Mafia. (Connoisseurs of Italian politics will note the longevity of this coalition, as revealed by the recent scandals involving the Vatican Bank, the Mob and the secret neofascist P-2 Masonic lodge, whose members included high-level soldiers, intelligence agents and businessmen.)

Montini was part of Allen Dulles's "great coup," Winks's description of the wittily named Operation Sunrise -- the separate peace Dulles had been negotiating with the German army in Northern Italy. Six days before V-E Day, Operation Sunrise succeeded. Why was Dulles so eager to negotiate with the Nazis? Winks tells only part of the story. He does recount, rather uncritically, the recruitment of SS General Reinhard Gehlen, head of military intelligence for German forces in the Soviet Union. Gehlen's information was of substantial interest to those planning the cold war, so he and his organization were enlisted in the good fight against the Soviets. Washington, unlike Dulles and Donovan, was initially not fond of this scheme; Dulles was clearly exceeding his authority. Winks, eager to discount the image of an American embrace of the SS, emphasizes that it took Gehlen a year to persuade Washington to let him sign up. But as the cold war "heightened," as Winks puts it -- with no small contribution from the likes of Dulles -- Washington overcame its initial objections. Under watchful American eyes, Gehlen and his men plied their trade, and Gehlen became director of the West German intelligence agency on its establishment in 1955. The roots of Bitburg run deep.

Aside from noting Sherman Kent's "bothered" interest in the Gehlen connection Winks sees nothing criminal in this -- but there was more. As Peter Dale Scott argues in an article in the Winter 1986 edition of the indispensable *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, the Gehlen deal was only part of a larger scheme, masterminded by Dulles, to recruit large numbers of SS officers for cold-war service. (Winks impugns the accuracy of *CAIB*, but cites no example of its failings, offering only a vague rebuttal of

an article in the now-defunct *CounterSpy*. He even cites *CAIB* in his notes without dispute.) According to an article by John Loftus in the *Boston Globe* (May 29, 1984), Dulles, with the assistance of the Vatican, engineered the escape of thousands of Gestapo and SS officers. Among these, it now seems likely, were Josef Mengele, Klaus Barbie and possibly Adolf Eichmann. Exfiltrated Nazis were free to offer their services to Latin American dictators and drug traffickers as well as the CIA. As John Foster Dulles said (out of Winks's earshot), "For us there are two sorts of people in the world: there are those who are Christians and support free enterprise and there are the others."

Winks wonders why the CIA "shot itself in the foot" after the end of his Golden Age of U.S. intelligence. His answer is that, as intelligence got professionalized, it ceased to attract public citizens educated in civic virtues by our finer universities -- the Ivy League, plus a few honorary Ivies, like the University of Virginia. (As a product of both, I recall little such coursework: maybe I was poorly advised.) With all the state university types now filling the CIA, it's no wonder Langley's feet are bullet-riddled. Sherman Kent could lead the invading U.S. army through the "Dantesque" streets of Palermo -- and now "one could not even be certain that anyone read Dante anymore," mourns Our Virgil in this netherworld.

But it was these public citizens educated in civic virtue who recruited Nazis, manipulated the Italian elections, fed LSD to the unwitting, opened our mail and overthrew the governments of Iran and Guatemala -- all in the Golden Age. The Bay of Pigs disaster was planned in large measure by two Yalies, Richard Bissell and Tracy Barnes. In the name of what? Not civic virtue, but empire.

There is something profoundly antidemocratic about the culture Winks admires. The CIA's Yale is the Yale of secret societies, like the infamous Skull and Bones, whose alumni fill the Agency. As far as I know, these secret societies are unique to Yale. They are housed in large, windowless sepulchers scattered around the Yale campus. Every year, each society taps a dozen juniors to join their upscale fraternity, where they recount their sexual histories, perform strange rituals, and prepare for a life among the ruling classes. (Secret society members living and dead include Dean Acheson, Cyrus Vance, William Sloane Coffin, William F. Buckley, Henry Luce and several Tafts and Whitneys.) Bones is considered the cream of the crop; it allegedly has ties to those staples of conspiracy theorists, Freemasonry and the Illuminati. Members reportedly get \$15,000 on selection, and are guaranteed a lifetime of remunerative employment. They even have a secret number 322. (Winks's chapter on Angleton begins on page 322, whatever that means.) All this ritual secrecy would seem hopelessly adolescent if its ethic didn't pervade the highest levels of our society.

Winks's specialty as a historian is empire, specifically the British empire. He asks, but shies away from answering straightforwardly, whether there is such a thing as an American empire. Of course there is. And it was conceived by the very virtuous scholars Winks celebrates. A story lurking between the lines of *Cloak and Gown* is the intellectual origin of the cold war. The use of the singular in Winks's subtitle -- *Scholars in the Secret War 1939-1961* -- a tip-off: Germans, Russians, Iranians, American radicals are mere instances in a protracted war of Us against Them. The



alleged Golden Age of U.S. intelligence is the symptom of an unexamined nostalgia -- in this case, a nostalgia for the days of the short-lived American Century, a phrase coined, appropriately enough, by a right-wing Yale, Henry Luce.

---

Doug Henwood edits the *Left Business Observer*. He is the author of *The State of the USA Atlas* (Simon & Schuster, 1994), *Wall Street: How It Works and for Whom* (Verso, 1997), and *A New Economy?* (Verso, 2001).

[Back to home page](#)

**Our site's search engine is a custom program that accepts one or two keywords. If two are used, they should be separated by a space. When a block of about six lines of text contains both words, our search will produce up to 50 blocks and show the context. Searching is case-insensitive.**

**Unlike most search engines, ours is sensitive to substrings within a word. If you are searching for initials, it is often a good idea to use quotes around them with a leading and/or trailing space. That way you can reduce the number of results, because quotation marks force the match to include your space.**

**Similarly, an exact phrase can be set off with quotation marks, which causes the characters inside the marks, including spaces, to be considered as one keyword.**

[Back to home page](#)

# The NameBase Directory

## Academia [CIA](#) [General](#)

[The Trustees at USC: A Case Study](#)  
[Notes From the Late Student Movement](#)  
**NameBase NewsLine:** [Cold Warriors Woo Generation X](#)  
[CIA Document: How to Co-opt Academia](#)  
[Columbia University and the U.S. Intelligence Community](#)

## Assassinations [JFK](#) [RFK](#) [Malcolm X](#) [MLK](#) [Pope](#) [General](#)

**NameBase NewsLine:** [Thirty Years After, J.F.K. Researchers Gather in Dallas](#)  
[A New Oswald Witness Goes Public](#)  
[CIA Employs Propaganda Assets to Refute WC Critics](#)

## Big Business [Lobbying](#) [Corporations](#) [Intelligence](#) [General](#)

**NameBase NewsLine:** [Along Came the Transnationals: "Let them eat globaloney"](#)  
**NameBase NewsLine:** [Class Warfare: Wall Street vs. Main Street](#)  
[The Recolonization of Africa: IMF and the World Bank](#)  
[MAI is NAFTA on steroids: Little guy gets screwed](#)  
[WTO Has Got to Go](#)  
[Lies, damned lies, and Enron](#)

Ads by Google **NO!**  
**In sympathy** with those who disable ActiveScripting to block those awful Google ads, this site uses no JavaScript.  
[www.google-watch.org](http://www.google-watch.org)

## Drugs [CIA](#) [DEA](#) [Global](#)

**NameBase NewsLine:** [Pipe Dreams: the CIA, Drugs, and the Media](#)  
[CIA, Crack, and Not-so-crack Journalism](#)  
[The CIA's Report on Contras and Cocaine](#)

## Elites [Organizations](#) [Personalities](#) [Political / Left](#) [Political / Right](#) [Political / Washington](#) [Rich](#) [General](#)

**NameBase NewsLine:** [Multiculturalism and the Ruling Elite](#)  
[Gloria Steinem and the CIA](#)

**NameBase NewsLine:** [Philanthropists at War](#)  
[Private Foundations: Covering for Capitalism](#)  
**NameBase NewsLine:** [Clinton, Quigley, and Conspiracy: What's going on here?](#)  
[A Note of Appreciation from the Rich](#)

## High Tech [High Tech](#)



[Downsize Microsoft](#)  
[Displaying FOIA Documents on the Web](#)  
[Download a Database Program for DOS](#)  
**NameBase NewsLine:** [Cyberspace Wars: Microprocessing vs. Big Brother](#)  
**NameBase NewsLine:** [The "Information Superhighway" and its Discontents](#)  
[Big Brother Covets the Internet](#)  
[CIA's Internet Presence](#)

## Intelligence Agencies [Canada](#) [France](#) [Israel](#) [United Kingdom](#) [U.S.](#) [USSR](#) [Counterintelligence](#) [Paramilitary](#) [Private Sector](#) [General](#)

[MI6 Hoopla: British Officials Attack the Internet](#)

## Intelligence Personalities [Spycatching](#) [General](#)

[From CIA to USC: Biography of a Trustee](#)

## Media [Magazines](#) [Newspapers](#) [General](#)

**NameBase NewsLine:** [Journalism and the CIA: The Mighty Wurlitzer](#)  
**NameBase NewsLine:** [The Decline of American Journalism](#)  
[Katharine Graham and the Washington Post](#)

## Military [CBW](#) [Arms Industry](#) [General](#)

**NameBase NewsLine:** [Infowar and Disinformation: From the Pentagon to the Net](#)

## Nazis [Hunting](#) [Recruiting](#)

## Organized Crime [Personalities](#) [U.S.](#) [Global](#)

**NameBase NewsLine:** [Organized Crime Threatens the New World Order](#)



## Other U.S. Agencies [Other U.S. Agencies](#)

## Religions and Cults [Religions and Cults](#)

[NameBase NewsLine: Cults, Anti-Cultists, and the Cult of Intelligence](#)

## Repression [Federal](#) [Police](#) [General](#)

[NameBase NewsLine: The 1960s and COINTELPRO: In Defense of Paranoia  
J. Edgar Hoover Declares War on the New Left](#)

[NameBase NewsLine: Mind Control and the Secret State  
Garden Plot and Cable Splicer](#)

## Scandals [AIDS](#) [Banking / Italy](#) [Banking / U.S.](#) [Banking / Global](#) [Corruption](#) [Iraqgate](#) [Iran-contra](#) [October Surprise](#) [Wall Street](#) [Watergate](#) [Whitewater](#)

[How NameBase Nailed North: The Story of Olliegate  
Monicagate's CIA Connection](#)

## Terrorism [Chilean Junta](#) [CIA](#) [Counterterrorism](#) [Personalities](#)

[Operation Condor](#)  
[FBI Report on Chile's DINA](#)  
[Did the CIA Bomb a Passenger Plane in 1955?](#)

## UFOs [UFOs](#)

## U.S. Foreign Policy [Afghanistan](#) [Africa](#) [Albania](#) [Argentina](#) [Australia](#) [Chile](#) [Cuba](#) [Dominican Republic](#) [El Salvador](#) [Europe](#) [Guatemala](#) [India](#) [Indonesia](#) [Iran](#) [Israel](#) [Latin America](#) [Middle East](#) [Philippines](#) [Panama](#) [USSR](#) [Global](#)

[Testimony of George Galloway, 17 May 2005](#)  
[The U.S. vs. Iraq: A Study in Hypocrisy](#)  
[U.S. Responsibility for the Coup in Chile](#)  
[Report from CIA's 1970 Anti-Allende Task Force](#)  
[CIA HQ to Santiago station: Overthrow Allende](#)  
[U.S. Intelligence Fingered Charles Horman](#)  
[CIA Compiled Indonesian Death Lists in 1965](#)  
[The U.S. and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967](#)

[Brazil and CIA: The 1964 Coup](#)

[U.S. personnel in Brazil, 1964](#)

[South Africa and the CIA](#)

## **Vietnam War** [CIA](#) [General](#)

[Nerve Gassing the North Vietnamese](#)

### **More Names from NameBase (alphabetical)**

[AAA](#) [ADD](#) [ALD](#) [ALM](#) [AMF](#) [ANE](#) [ARM](#) [ASI](#) [AZA](#) [BAM](#) [BAS](#) [BEB](#) [BEM](#) [BES](#) [BIT](#) [BLU](#) [BOR](#)  
[BRA](#) [BRO](#) [BRU](#) [BUN](#) [BUT](#) [CAM](#) [CAR](#) [CAS](#) [CEA](#) [CHE](#) [CHU](#) [CLE](#) [COL](#) [COO](#) [COU](#) [CRI](#)  
[CUD](#) [DAL](#) [DAW](#) [DEE](#) [DIA](#) [DJA](#) [DOT](#) [DRY](#) [DUR](#) [EDF](#) [ELM](#) [EVA](#) [FAT](#) [FIN](#) [FLI](#) [FOS](#) [FRE](#)  
[FUL](#) [GAM](#) [GAS](#) [GHO](#) [GLI](#) [GOR](#) [GRE](#) [GRO](#) [GZA](#) [HAM](#) [HAP](#) [HAS](#) [HEL](#) [HIG](#) [HOE](#) [HON](#)  
[HOY](#) [HUN](#) [IGA](#) [INT](#) [IRB](#) [JAM](#) [JET](#) [JOL](#) [KAI](#) [KAS](#) [KEL](#) [KHO](#) [KIP](#) [KLI](#) [KOO](#) [KRI](#) [KUZ](#)  
[LAN](#) [LAT](#) [LEF](#) [LEY](#) [LIZ](#) [LOW](#) [MAC](#) [MAG](#) [MAR](#) [MAS](#) [MCA](#) [MCF](#) [MCP](#) [MER](#) [MIL](#) [MIS](#)  
[MOR](#) [MOT](#) [MUO](#) [MZA](#) [NAU](#) [NEW](#) [NOE](#) [NUN](#) [OEA](#) [ORL](#) [OZA](#) [PAR](#) [PAY](#) [PES](#) [PIE](#) [POL](#)  
[PRA](#) [PUN](#) [RAN](#) [REC](#) [REY](#) [RIF](#) [ROC](#) [RON](#) [ROW](#) [RUT](#) [SAN](#) [SCH](#) [SCI](#) [SEN](#) [SHE](#) [SIG](#)  
[SKM](#) [SMO](#) [SON](#) [SPE](#) [STE](#) [STR](#) [SUP](#) [TAY](#) [THO](#) [TOC](#) [TRE](#) [TWA](#) [VAN](#) [VIL](#) [WAL](#) [WAR](#)  
[WEG](#) [WHA](#) [WIL](#) [WIM](#) [WOR](#) [WYA](#) [YOU](#) [ZEH](#)

[NameBase home page](#)