The fall of the generals

It is really hard to believe this. Even those who voted in September 2010 for the amendment to the Constitution that lifted the protection from prosecution covering the military junta did not think that an actual trial was possible.

The idea of trying military personnel for plotting coups was inconceivable in this country. This was not only because of the lack of a legal and institutional framework for this, but also because of the prevailing political culture that treated the military as untouchable. Before the beginning of the Ergenekon case, there was only one example of trying a coup plotter that took place, and this was in 1963. Then, Col. Talat Aydemir was executed after being tried in a military court for attempting a military coup. It is important to note that in this process, the government of the time and civilian powers did not play any role. The trial and execution was part and parcel of an internal power struggle within the military.

Col. Aydemir was a revolutionary who was a member of the junta that staged the coup of 1960. But at the time of the coup, he was abroad, so he did not get what he wished for in the post-coup administration. Despite this, he was appointed commander of the War Academy, an unconventionally high post for a colonel. But the colonel was not happy. All of his friends in the junta had higher offices after the coup. So he decided to stage his own coup. In 1962, he tried it by organizing the students of the War Academy. He almost succeeded. But when the air force failed to join in the operation on time, he failed in taking over the government. Despite his attempted coup, the government pardoned him as if nothing had happened. A year after, he tried and failed again. His persistent attempts annoyed the top military officers, not because he was trying to overthrow the government but because Col. Aydemir’s target was the top military brass who benefited from the 1960 coup but did not share the benefits with officers like himself. So, he was tried by the military court and executed in 1964.

In short, this affair, the first trial of a coup plotter, had nothing to do with civilian politics. Aydemir was a counter-revolutionary trying to counter the effects of the 1960 coup that excluded him from power.

So, the trial of the 1980 coup leaders that started last week is a turning point in Turkish politics. With the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases, the attempted coup plots by military personnel began to be tried by courts. Despite this, there had been a belief that a successful coup could not be brought before the courts. Once a junta succeeds in successfully staging a coup, it would escape trial forever. The trial of Gen. Evren disproves this belief that a “successful coup” cannot be tried.

It is a historic moment for Turkey. The trial will serve as the ultimate deterrent to the recurrence of similar incidents in Turkey. Thus, it is a process that will certainly enhance democracy in Turkey. But democracy will still remain incomplete unless the Constitution made by the junta in 1982 is replaced by a new one. It is not only the Constitution; the basic laws of the system are the making of the military regime. The Political Parties Law, Election Law and Higher Education Law were all introduced by the military junta. Thus, the leaders of the junta are on trial, but the junta’s laws and institutions are still intact.

If Turkey really wants to leave the period of military coups behind, it should eliminate the remaining legacy of the military regime. There is no point in trying the junta but ruling Turkey with its Constitution, laws and institutions.