# Secret Matches: The Unknown Training Games of Mikhail Botvinnik 

Selected Games Annotated and Theoretical Section by Jan Timman

Edited by Hanon W. Russell


Russell Enterprises, Inc. Milford, CT USA

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# The Theoretical Importance of Botvinnik's Training Games 

by Jan Timman

PartI
Tournaments \& Matches

No other player was as famous as Botvinnik for his opening preparation until Kasparov came upon the scene. This reputation was in part the result of a life-style that never failed to make a deep impression on people. Botvinnik was known to be a very serious man with strict habits. During the 1946 Groningen tournament, he, together with hiswife and child, was totally secluded from the outside world, spending all his time in his hotel room, where he would even take his meals. The Staunton Tournament in 1946 was one of his first appearances in a major tournament in the West. The picture I have just sketched is taken from the tournament book. Since that time, there have been numerous other stories to confirm the image of meticulous planning and thorough preparation.

Part of this image was the training games he played. He first alluded to the existence of these training games inhis book about the 1941 Soviet Championship. This tournament was played in match format with six players playing each other four times. In the 20-round contest, often referred to as a "match-tournament," Botvinnik won with a two-and-one-half-point margin over his nearestrival, Keres. In the introduction to the tournament book, Botvinnik writes: "A few words about my own play. I prepared for the tournament long and successfully...My old friend, master (now grandmaster) Ragozin, was of great help to me in my preparations. I played training games with him under 'corresponding' conditions. As I had grown unaccustomed to tobacco smoke and had suffered a little from it in other tournaments, during our games Ragozin often threw up real 'smoke screens'. And so when my opponents in the tournament sentstreams of tobacco smoke inmy direction, (accidentally, of course!), it had no effect on me."

This exposition, with an ironic undertone toward the end, clearly shows that Botvinnik used these training games for various purposes. He mainly wanted to get ready for the battle; the openings and their theoretical aspects did not seem to be his primary aim. Still, the myth
about the theoretical importance of the training games seemed to have its ownlife.

Gligoric in The World Chess Championship (1972) states: "Only Botvinnik was capable for months, day after day, of playing exhausting private matches from which he gained no obvious advantage and of which the world would never know. Sometimes one of these games would be repeated in a real tournament as, for example, Botvinnik's famous victory over Spielmann in 1935 in only 11 moves or some of his victories in the match-tournament of 1948, when he became world champion. On these occasions Botvinnik's opponents seemed to be unarmed contestants against a champion armed to the teeth.
"Who was Botvinnik's sparring partner (or partners)? Not even his closest friends knew. It is supposed that at one time it was Ragozin, then Averbakh and now his official trainer Goldberg.
"Or perhaps he chose his partners according to the circumstances; this time Bronstein or Geller-as the most like Tal? Were there many or only one? Everything is wrapped in the veil of mystery."

Gligoric was right about Averbakh and he could have known about Ragozin. But what strikes me most is his assumption about the game against Spielmann and that some games of the 1948 world championship were already anticipated in the training games. Mythmaking is in full swing here!

As the readers will attest, there were no training games that directly helped Botvinnik in the enormous task of becoming world champion.(I am not even talking about the Spielmann game.) Still there is an interesting detail: In 1947 Botvinnik played two games against Ragozin which may be considered as general preparation for the 1948 world championship tournament. Why so few? In order to explore this, I have made a systematic review of Botvinnik's most important events, togetherwith the preceding training games. In this respect it is noteworthy that Botvinnik's first mention of training games preceding a tournament - in 1941 - is in the tournament book, although even then it should be noted that the book itself did not appear for six years.

## 1. The 1941 Soviet Championship

The tournament started on March 23, so there were eight days
between games 17 and this tournament．Two other games， 15 and 16， were also part of his preparation．

Special mention should be made of Botvinnik＇s treatment of the Tartakower Variation in game 16．（I have annotated the game in full．）In the $4^{\text {th }}$ round he played 8 筸c 2 （instead of 8 留d3）against Bondarevsky． Apparently he found this move－which became popular after Kasparov－ Timman， $4^{\text {th }}$ game， 1984 －more accurate．Bondarevsky answered with the obvious 8．．．c5，which is criticized by Botvinnik（＂Here 8．．．c6 is usual． Black＇s active move is hardly appropriate．＂）Still，after $9 \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{c} 5$ 留 $\times \mathrm{c} 510$ cxd5 exd5，he continued with 11 留d2（instead of Kasparov＇s 110－0－ $0!$ ），which is nowadays considered harmless．Botvinnik later lost the game because he was too optimistic about White＇s chances．

## 2．The 1944 Soviet Championship

The tournament started on May 20，leaving Botvinnik only five days after game 19．Botvinnik only played two games（18 and 19）before this tournament．Both games are featured with full notes．（Game 19 will also be mentioned in the second part of this article．）

## 3． 1946 Staunton <br> Tournament，Groningen

The tournament started on August 13．There was an interval of almost one month between the tournament and games 22－24．Botvinnik repeated the line in game 22 （annotated in full）in his game against Boleslavsky in the $7^{\text {th }}$ round．Boleslavsky opted for the quiet 10 d 3 （instead of Ragozin＇s 10 d 4 ）which is not very crucial．Botvinnik won the game in 33 moves．Against Yanofsky，in the $15^{\text {th }}$ round，he avoided the line，possibly out offear for his opponent＇s preparation．Botvinnik got an excellent game，but overextended and finally lost．

## 4． 1948 World

## Championship

The championship started on March 8．Botvinnik＇s two training games were played almost a half－year before．It is interesting to see the
pattern that is being used. Three games for 1941, two games for 1944, three for 1946 and two for 1948 , the most important event. Superstition? In the three events prior to the 1948 championship tournament, Botvinnik had been successful as well. Anyway, it is understandable that he didn't want to play the games right before the event: The Hague/Moscow tournament lasted long enough.

## 5. 1951 Bronstein Match

The match started on March 16. Again, Botvinnik only played two games, right before the start of the match. Noteworthy is the terrible disaster in game 29. In most games against Bronstein, Botvinnik used the Dutch Defense, but in the three games using the Slav ( 4,8 and 18) he opted for the safe 3...Df6. Still, he continued the discussion about the
 in his games with Kan. According to recent theory, this line is still under a cloud for Black.

## 6. 1954 Smyslov Match

This match started on the same day as the Bronstein match, which cannot be a coincidence. I quote Gligoric again: "In order to prepare himselfthoroughly, Smyslov wanted the match to begin as late as possible, but Botvinnik did not want to have to play the end of the match during the hot season in Moscow..."

For this match, Botvinnik must have had far more extensive preparation than for his match against Bronstein. In the period late January-early February he played no fewer than 12 games against Kan, a match in itselfthat Botvinnik won convincingly $8 \frac{1}{2}-31 / 2$, with no losses. In this pre-match, Botvinnik first tried the sharp Winawer line 1 e 4 e62 d4d530c3 b44e5c55a3 a5. This line, which nowadays has become the favorite of the Armenians Vaganian and Lputian, was almost unexplored at that particular time. Kan did not handle this unknown position very well, adjourning in game 56 in a much worse position (although admittedly this game was not part of Botvinnik's preparation) and he was crushed in game 55.

Smyslov did not treat this line the same way as Kan. He refrained
from the queen sortie，choosing $6 \mathrm{~b} 4 \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 47$ 亿b5 c 78 f 4 ．He scored only one draw in these two games（notnecessarily a result of the opening） and then abandoned the line．

The other important opening sequence appeared in what Botvinnik calls＂The Czech Defense＂of the Slav．After 1 d4 d5 2 c 4 c 6
 Botvinnik played 9 O 44 against Smyslov in the $12^{\text {th }}$ game（as in game 51）．Smyslov rather quickly answered 9．．．0－0 and reached equality， although he later lost the game．Kan had played 9．．．g4 in game 51．（I will return to this game in the next section．）

Incidentally，this $12^{\text {th }}$ game is one of three examples that Botvinnik，in the match book，gives to illustrate the following remarkable statement：＂As opposed to Bronstein，Smyslov could，during the match， have performances that were so impressive that they apparently could only be achieved ifSmyslov had made a step forward in finding new，so far unknown methods of opening preparation．＂Botvinnik is wondering how Smyslov could react so quickly to opening situations that were quite new．

This is in fact the same sort of allegation that Korchnoy made after his final game against Karpov in Baguio 1978 and that Kasparov made in 1986 after losing three games in a row．The only difference is that Botvinnik was more clever than Korchnoy and Kasparov，since he didn＇t formulate a direct accusation and resorted to his usual ironic understatement．

Why am I relating this story？Because in one of his illustrative examples，Botvinnik mentions the training games．In the $14^{\text {th }}$ game， Botvinnik handled the King＇s Indian the following way： 1 d 4 ©f6 2 c 4 g 6
 Now Smyslov played the very sharp 9．．．今g4 10 县g5 and went on to win an impressive game．About his $9{ }^{\text {th }}$ move，Botvinnik writes：＂．．．Ihad neverplayed［this move］before，except in training games． Apparently Smyslov had examined the variation inhis preparation，since he only used two or three minutes for the next six moves of this complicated game．＂

This last feat is indeed remarkable．But it is even more remarkable that Botvinnik mentions the training games，because he never played this line against Ragozin or Kan．Apparently Botvinnik used the
myth surrounding his training games to bluffhis opponents. InSmyslov's case, this was quite practical, because it was likely that he would meet him again in a match. Talk about throwing up smoke screens..

## 7. 1957 Smyslov Match

The match started a bit earlier this time, on March 5. Botvinnik played nine games against Averbakh as preparation. I refer to Averbakh's own comments.

## 8. 1961 Tal Match

Two matches are missing: the third match against Smyslov in 1958 and the first match against Tal. There could be a plausible explanation for this, for example, that Botvinnik could not find the right sparring partner at that time. On the other hand, there could be a psychological explanation. After losing a match for the first time in his career in 1957, it is possible that Botvinnik took measures to change his preparation and skipped the training games for the 1958 match. According to that logic, he would follow the same strategy in 1960 (because he won the 1958 match) and then changed again, after Tal beat him. One would expect such a superstitious attitude from Korchnoy, but it could also be characteristic of Botvinnik.

Anyway, the second match against Tal started on the regular date, March 16. Prior to the match he played eight games against Furman that finished slightly more than two weeks before the match. Botvinnik played some of his finest games against Furman. In general, he was very strong, maybe at his height in the 1960s. The remarkable thing about these games, however, is that no opening that was played corresponded to any played in the Tal match. I don't believe that Botvinnik feared that Tal would have had the opportunity to get secret access to his preparation. I think it is more likely that Botvinnik was interested in playing the variations that Tal himselfplayed. Botvinnik played 1 e4twice (and once more in a training game prior to October 1960), although he never played this against Tal and obviously did not intend to play it. With Black, he chose a King's Indian, a Benoni and a Nimzo-Indian - typical Tal openings. If this theory holds, then this was certainly an interesting and successful-strategy.

## 9. 1970 USSR-Rest of the World Match; Four-player Tournament

These two important events were held one right after another from March 29 through May 7, 1970. These were also Botvinnik's last appearances in tournaments. The four games that Botvinnik played against Balashov were a bit disappointing. Still there was at least one important novelty in game 94 . I will come back to this in the nextsection.

## Part II

## The Openings

Studying the openings from Botvinnik's games, one very often gets the impression that he cracked difficult opening problems in a modern way. This impression is justified. Botvinnik had a modern way of looking at opening positions. Some of his novelties from these training games would have had a great impact on current theory and a few are still of major importance, according to present theory. The two openings that were played most were the Ruy Lopez and the Slav, both of which Botvinnik played as White and Black. Therefore it is not surprising that the most interesting novelties are to be found there.

## Ruy Lopez

"What would Botvinnik have played against the Marshall Gambit?" is a question that a present-day grandmaster who had failed to find a remedy against the Marshall-it is very tough indeed-might ask. The answer is to be found in this book. In game 28, after 1 e 4 e 520 f3
 Botvinnik replied 9 d 4 . Nunn and Harding write about this move in The Marshall Attack (first published in 1989): "This sharp method of declining the Marshall must be treated with respect, but it should give Black a good type of Open Spanish since he is not required to play ...Be6."

Then they recommend 9...exd 4 as Black's best. It is a pity that we will never now what Botvinnik had in mind against that move, since

Ragozinchose 9．．．气xe4．（＂Playable，but anunlikely option for a Marshall player to select，＂according to Nunn and Harding．Ragozin probably was not a real Marshall player．）That way the game transposed into an Open Spanish and quite an interesting one．After 10 dxe 5 e 11 dit Ragozin opted for a line that is recommended in Collijn＇s Lärobok：
 the time．The move is suggested by Korchnoy in ECO．Korchnoy follows
 conclusion in the line．It looks like Botvinnik＇s 16 3 ！ 0 e 417 完d 2 is far stronger，because White already has a clear advantage．

AgainstKan in game 35 he got into this lineagain，thistimearising straight from an Open Spanish move order．Unlike Ragozin，Kan took up the gambit and played $11 \ldots .0 \times e 5$ ，leading to the very complicated ＂Breslamer Variation＂．After 12 f3 Black must sacrifice a piece by 12．．． 1613 fxe4 4 ．


This is the starting position for a theoretical discussion that took place at the end of the $19^{\text {th }}$ century and the beginning of the $20^{\text {th }}$ ．Botvinnik now played 14 昴d2，the main movesince the two games Wolf－Tarrasch， Teplitz－Schönau 1922 and Karlsbad 1923，where von Bardeleben＇s old recommendation 14 酜c2 had been replaced．After 14．．．${ }_{\mathrm{H}}^{\mathrm{g}} \mathrm{h} 415 \mathrm{~h} 3$ ， Collijn＇s Lärobok（Botvinnik must have made a careful study of this book）now gives 15 ．．．c 5 with an exclamation point，a recommendation followed by Grünfeld in the Teplitz－Schönau tournament book，by Kmoch in his Nachtrag von Hans Kmoch，Handbuch des Schachspiels von P．R．Bilguer and more recently by Keres in his volume on open games and Korchnoy inECO．The variation they all give


and Black has an excellent game．
Botvinnik＇s 16 flat！refutes the whole idea，so Black should probably try 15 ．．．党ae8 or Tarrasch＇s 15 ．．．d7 instead of 15 ．．．c5．New editions of Keres＇book andECO will have to mention Botvinnik＇s great novelty from the early 1950s．

## The Slav Defense

First of all，let me return to Botvinnik＇s game against Kan（game 51）that made him so suspicious about Smyslov＇s alleged first－hand knowledge： 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 c 63 氖3 $0 \mathrm{ff} 44 \mathrm{nc} 3 \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{c} 45 \mathrm{a} 4 \mathrm{Cf} 6 \mathrm{e} 3 \mathrm{e} 6$
 the by no means obvious 11 fxg4！．After 11．．． g （xh4，White has two attractive choices：

（a） 12 林f3．This was not Botvinnik＇s choice，buthe put the move in parentheses in his comments，indicating that he possibly considered it the best．It is quite remarkable that the stem game with this move is Ragozin（！）－Kaliwoda，World Correspondence Championship 1956－
 15 吕ad1 $55 f 616$ h3．A tentative conclusion could be that Botvinnik confided in Ragozin，sharing his theoretical knowledge．

It is noteworthy that the line with $11 \mathrm{f} \times \mathrm{g} 4 \mathrm{a} \downarrow \mathrm{d} 12$ 畑 $f 3$ became generally known by the game Tal－Haag，Tbilisi 1969，in which Black varied with $14 \ldots$ d6，but could not solve his problems after 15 g 3 祭d8
 essentially changed the verdict on this line．
（b） 12 e 4 ．The striking thing about Botvinnik＇s move is that Kondratiev in his 1985 book on the Slav gives the move an exclamation point．What happened in the game，including 15 af3，is also given by

Tukmakov as clearly better for White．He recommends 12．．．仓5b6 （instead of $12 \ldots \times \mathrm{C} 3$ ） 13 b3 as as Black＇s best，adding that after 14留f3 White has a slight edge．This may have also been Botvinnik＇s conclusion．At any rate，the credit for playing this way should not go to Ragozin or Tal（as in some sources）but to Botvinnik．

Botvinnik＇s treatment of the Meran Variation as Black was also very modern．I give two examples：
（a）In game 46 Botvinnik introduced the variation in the old main line that is still considered to be the best．After 1 d 4 d 52 c 4 c 63 －ff


 later，improved White＇s play with 16 县d2 against Botvinnik（Moscow 1955）but failed to get an advantage．This verdict still holds，although Wells，in his 1994 book The Complete Semi－Slav mentions that 13．．． $\mathrm{b} 4+$（instead of $13 \ldots$ ．．． G a $5+$ ）is＂perhaps more solid and reliable．＂
（b）In game 60，Botvinnik uses a system that is still topical． According to present－day theory，it was first played in 1963，becoming popular through young Soviet players，notably 1970s，in the late 1970s． It is a pity that Kan＇s 15 g 5 was hardly a testing move．

I will now conclude this article with some observations about two otheropenings．

## The French Defense

Botvinnik used his favorite French Defense on six occasions as Black．I begin with a novelty by Ragozin：In game 25 ，he improved significantly on the game Bogolyubov－Flohr，Nottingham 1936：1e4e6
 is understandable that Botvinnik was not fond of sacrificing his Kingside
 probably made him feel uneasy about his King．）8 d3h59 留f4（This was also Bogolyubov＇s choice and it is still considered to be White＇s best．Alekhine，in the tournament book，is of a different mind．He gives the move a question mark and writes＂ 9 㷡h3 was the logical move， threatening 10 g 4 ．＂Later practical examples have shown that it is not such a terrible threat．） $9 \ldots . . c \times d 410 \mathrm{cxd} 4$ 씁 $\times$ h 411 씁 $\times h 4$（stronger than

Bogolyubov＇s 11 ©f3．）11．．．气×h4 and now Ragozin＇s simple 12 g 3 ！is stronger than 12 g 5 ，as was played in Yanofsky－Uhlmann，Stockholm 1962．In the further course of the game，Ragozin completely outplayed Botvinnik．After a few missed wins，the game ended unfinished with White still holding a slight edge．

It is understandable that Ragozin this time refrained from positional lines like 7 今f3 or 7 a 4 ，because he had fared badly with in it in game 19．Ihave analyzed this game in full，butit is still worth mentioning that Botvinnik＇s 10．．．！ّc8！as used by Uhlmann and Korchnoy decades later is still considered to be the best move．

Botvinnik，in turn，must have been highly dissatisfied with the developments in game 25 and I guess that at that time he had already started to study the consequences of the sharp line 1 e 4 e 62 d 4 d 53 公c3 B44e5c55a3 a5 that he had twice played against Kan and later used in his match against Smyslov．The latter chose the solid approach with $6 \mathrm{~b} 4 \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 47$ © b 5 ，which is still popular these days，although it has been shown，notably by Lputian，that White cannot count on securing an opening advantage．Kan played the sharper $6 \mathrm{~b} 4 \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 47$ 筸g4 國 78
 continued 10．．．a6！，a move that has been attributed to Bronstein，but in future opening books will have to be attributed to Botvinnik．

In game 48，Botvinnik，after 11 © $\times \mathrm{C} 7+$ 씁 $\times \mathrm{C} 712$ 氚 e 2 ，opted for $12 . .$. 甾 $\times$ e5，a move that was discredited in all＂old＂opening texts．It was only in the mid－1980s that Vaganian and Lputian began to show that this was the way to play the system with Black．Again，as in the Slav，Kan did not play the most critical continuation， 13 ，so there was no further test of Botvinnik＇s understanding of the line．From this point of view， game 55 was even more disappointing．Kan chose $110 \times \mathrm{d} 4$（instead of $110 \times \mathrm{C} 7+$ ），which is obviously feeble．It is somewhat regrettable that Kan was no match for Botvinnik from the point of view of opening theory， otherwise we might have learned more about Botvinnik＇s deep opening preparation．

## The Queen＇s Gambit

I have analyzed games 16 and 18 in full，showing Botvinnik＇s attempts to tackle the Tartakower．These attempts are still important today．

In a completely different line, in game 94 , Botvinnik showed how to improve on his games versus Petrosyan in the 1963 title match. After
 he did not choose the modest 8 d 3 or 8 h 3 as in his games against Petrosyan, but chose the rigorous 8 h 4 . Balashov replied 8...h5. Botvinnik won the game quite easily. Slightly more than a month later, at Oegstgeest 1970, Spassky, against Botvinnik, played the more prudent
 13 呈e2b5, White could have kepta slightedge with 14 g g f 2 , according to the tournament book.

The sharp line beginning with 8 h 4 became quite popular. Kasparov played it in the crucial $21^{\text {st }}$ game of his second match with Karpov, in which he missed a win at move 40. It is worth noting Kasparov's comments in the match book: "Botvinnik, the originator of the plan beginning with 7 g 4 , considers 8 h 4 to be the most energetic, seizing still more space on the kingside. That is what I played."

And with that quote, I conclude this review...
（1）Botvinnik－Kaminer，Game 1，Match， 19241 d4 ©ff6 2 c4 g6 3




 fxe5 29 昌f2 㒶f6 30 h 4 h 631 甼e3 d5 $32 \mathrm{a} 5 \mathrm{~b} \times \mathrm{a} 533 \mathrm{~g} 4 \mathrm{~g} 534 \mathrm{~h} 5$


（2）Kaminer－Botvinnik，Game 2，Autumn， 1924 （Notes／marks by




 24．．．씁b6） 25 씁d3 县g4？（25．．．号ad8 was the only move） 26 씁d6＋


（2a）Botvinnik－Kaminer，Game 3 （fragment；remarks by Kaminer）：


White＇s last move was and Black won quickly，since the Rook cannot be taken $-2 \times c 6$ 县 $\mathrm{e}+$ 3 昌h5 g6＋4昌h6 0 h 3 and mate cannot be avoided．
（3）Ragozin－Botvinnik， 19361 d4e6 2 c 4 f5 3 e3 0 f6 4 d3 ${ }^{\text {d }}$ b4＋






 ished
（4）Botvinnik－Ragozin， 19361 d4 ©f6 2 c4 e6 3 包c3 县b4 4 留c2



是 $\times$ h4 f5 26 是 $\times$ c6 1－0
（5）Ragozin－Botvinnik（April？） 19361 亿ff3 e6 2 c4f5 3 g3 亿ff 4






 $1 / 2-1 / 2$
（6）Botvinnik－Ragozin 19361 ©f3 d5 2 c4 c6 3 e3 ©f6 4 它c3 县f














 0－1












 （2．33－1．45）
（9）Rabinovich－Botvinnik 19371 d4 e6 2 c4 f5 3 g3 ©f6 4 g2



煚f2





 g6 d5 62 畠h2 1－0（1．30－2．41）
（10）Ragozin－Botvinnik，October 9， 19381 e 4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 亿d2气f6 4 e 5 气fd75 县d3 b6 6 气e2 c5 7 O－O cxd4 8 f4 气c5 9 具b5＋


O－O 15 县a3 a6 16 包d6 是xd6 17 exd6 씁xd6 18 包e 4 煚d8 19





（11）Botvinnik－Ragozin，October 10， 19381 e 4 e 52 亿ff 0 c6 3







（12）Botvinnik－Ragozin 19391 c4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 气c3 D 44 气f3






 압g7 $1 / 2-1 / 2$
（13）Ragozin－Botvinnik 19401 e 4 e 52 気f 3 c6 3 b5 a64 a4










（14）Botvinnik－Ragozin 1940
Notes by Jan Timman

| 1 e 4 | e5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 亿f3 | Qc6 |
| 3 可 |  |
| $4 \bigcirc 14$ | Qf6 |
| 50－0 | d6 |
| 6 c 3 | Q $\times$ ¢ 4 |
| 7 d 4 | 國d7 |
| 8 第e2 | ．．． |

Very unusual．Before and after this game，White relied on the alternative 8 号e1．If Black then retreats the Knight，White wins back the pawn

 Alekhine，Paris 1933．Both players must have been familiar with this game．Most likely Ragozin wanted to counter 8 el 1 with $8 . . . f 5$ as he did in the 1940 Soviet Championship against Keres．（I assume that game was played after this training game．）That game continued in spec－ tacular fashion： 9 dxe 5 dxe 510 亿bd2 $0 \times \mathrm{f} 211$ 亿xe5！ $0 \times \mathrm{d} 512$ 团xc6＋
 from the complications with a clear edge．

The text is actually a worthy alternative，since White not only wins back the pawn，he also forces Black to sacrifice a pawn，as we shall see．

| 8 ．．． | Qf6 |
| :---: | :---: |
| $9 \times$ c6 | ．．． |

The same motif as in the Lilienthal－Alekhine game．White gives up his Bishop in order to prevent Black from recapturing on e5 with the Knight．

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
9 \ldots & \frac{1}{1} \times \mathbf{c} 6 \\
10 \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{e} 5 & 0
\end{array}
$$

Practically forced，as Black would be under heavy pressure after $10 . . . d x e 511$ 包xe5 筸e7 12 号e1．

## 11 씁 $\times \mathbf{f}$ 3 ．．．

11 畑 $\times$ b7 looks good for White，after which Black＇s Queenside pawns are isolated．


12 ．．．贸d5！

A good decision．Black gives up his c－pawn in order to get a lead in development．The alternative 12．．．d6 would lead to a passive posi－ tion after 13 씁c6＋！（an important zwischenschach）13．．．包d7 14 完d2 $0-015$ © 4 and White is building up a significant strategic plus．

| 13 留 $\times \mathrm{C} 7$ | 1d6 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 14 M M ${ }_{\text {M }} \mathrm{b} 6$ | O－O |
| 15 쌥 b 3 |  |

White＇s Queen has finally found its way back．Black is obviously not interested in exchanging them．

| 15. | ${ }^{2}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 16 －d2 | 骂f |

One of the most difficult questions arises，when，after having completed development and connected the Rooks，a decision must be made which

Rook to play to which square．Ragozin decides to put his Rooks on b8 and c 8 ，to keep White＇s queenside majority under pressure．

Although Black finally manages to generate dangerous attacking play this way，I still believe it would have been better to put the King＇s Rook on e8，keeping the option open of developing the other Rook to the b－ ，c－or d－file，depending on White＇s set－up．I think Black should have played $16 \ldots e 4$ ，and on 17 畄e1，continued $17 \ldots$ ．．．fc8．One of the main points is that Black threatens to bring his Knight to d3 viag4 and e5．In this way，Black could have gotten full compensation for his pawn．

## 17 新 c 2 <br> 管ab8

18啠 1
．．．
White prepares for 19 e 4 ，after which he would be a healthy pawn up，with Black having no visible compensation．Black must come up with something extraordinary now．


18 ．．．管 1 4！
And here it is！With this spectacular Rook move，Black not only stops 19 国 4 ，he also threatens to assume an attacking position on the Kingside．Botvinnik must have been confused by this sudden turn of events，since he plays the rest of the game with a less steady hand than usual．

$$
19 \text { c4 ... }
$$

An understandable decision．White cuts the Black Rook off from the Kingside．Still，this is not White＇s best，since he has to lose another
tempo to support the c－pawn and apart from that，he has surrendered the square d4，enabling Black to build up an attack that is just sufficient for a draw．
 ©e 4 and Black develops a dangerous attack；（b） 19 h3！．With this little move，White prevents the black Rook from taking up a threatening po－ sition on the Kingside．It is important to note that 19．．． s h4 200 f 3亘 $\times$ h 3 does not work because of 21 公xe5．

It seems hard for Black to prove that he has real compensation for the pawn．

$$
19 \ldots \text {... }
$$

The Bishop aims for the ideal square d4．

| 20 b3 | Qg4 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 21 ¢e4 | D ${ }^{\text {d }}$ |
| 22 号b1 | ．．． |

Again an obvious move，but again not the best．For tactical reasons，the Rooks is not well positioned on b1．After 22 d2，so as to play the Rook to c1，Black has to play accurately to maintain the balance．The following long variation is practically forced： 22 ．．． g b 723 常ac1 f5 24

 rook ending is just tenable for Black，although his task is still difficult．It is quite possible that Botvinnik saw this long line and rejected it，hoping for more．In that case，he would have underestimated Black＇s looming attacking chances．

$$
22 \ldots \text { 留g6 }
$$

Black takes advantage of the unprotected position of the white Queen． White must take time out to protect the f－pawn．

## 23 管 2

The Black offensive is gaining momentum；White now has to be on his guard

## 24 ．．．

Too risky．White＇s only move was 24 包g3，hitting the f－pawn and keeping the Queen from h5．Black then has the following choices：（a）24．．．e4．
 26 昷a3！and 27 fxe3 聯h6 28 气f1 leads Black nowhere；（b）24．．．f4！
 because of the dominant position of his Bishop．With accurate play， however，White can undermine the stranglehold： 27 思b3 28 置b2畄c729 h3，leading to a drawish position．

## 24 ．．．管b6！

The best retreat，as will soon be clear．

```
25%c3 ...
```

From an objective standpoint，the alternative 250 g 3 was still the better option，but from a practical standpoint，the text move，leading to total chaos on the board，can hardly be condemned in view of the impending time pressure．After 25 包 3 f4 26 㽞 $\times \mathrm{g} 6$ 岂 $\times \mathrm{g} 6$（now it is clear why Black＇s $24^{\text {th }}$ move was so strong！） 27 包e 4 f 3 ！and now 28 g×f3 气 $\times f 2+$ 290 O 3 包e $4+$ followed by $30 \ldots .0 \mathrm{O} 3$ and Black wins the exchange． Since White would still have compensation in the form of one pawn and a queenside majority，the outcome of the game would not be entirely clear．


A hammer blow．White cannot take the Knight as he would be mated


## 26 Qd5 ．．．

The best tactical try．White does not try to defend，but creates counter－ threats that are not easy to parry in time pressure．

$$
26 \text {... } \quad \text { صf3+ }
$$

Forcing the King to fl．

## 27 斯 H （ 1

Another powerful move．Black does not bother with the check on e7， since he has mating threats．

## 28 癸e3！．．．

Botvinnik has apparently underestimated Black＇s attack for some time， but now with a dagger at his throat，he finds the best fighting chance． White was threatened with mate，and therefore he had to vacate the square e2 for his King．


An automatic reaction，after which White can save himself with pointed play．Instead，with 28．．．ゴ×c4！，Black could have placed insurmount－ able problems before his opponent．The Rook cannot be taken for ob－ vious reasons，so either the Queen has to move or he must check on e7． With five pieces hanging，there is total chaos on the board．The follow－ ing variations should clarify matters：
 Black has a winning attack；（b） $290 \mathrm{e} 7+$ forcing the King to h 8 ，but the
drawback is that Black＇s Rook on b6 is no longer under attack．Black



| $29 f \times e 3$ | $\tilde{g} \times \mathbf{c} 4$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| 30 | 亿e7＋！ |
|  | $\ldots$ |

Forcing the King to h 8 ．

| 30 ．．． | \％h8 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 31 留d3 | ．．． |

Now the difference becomes clear．The d－file is open，giving White just enough counterplay．
$31 \ldots$ 苗b8

32 癸d1 ．．．
Draw agreed．Black has to force a perpetual by 32．．．畑h1＋ 33 甼f 2
 is clearly in Black＇s favor．
（15）Botvinnik－Ragozin，March 11， 19411 d4 包f6 2 c4 d6 3 気c3
 exd4 10 Ø．$x$ d 4 c6 11 h3 0 b 612 b 3 d 513 exd 5 cxd 514 c 5 亿bd7


（16）Botvinnik－Ragozin，March 14， 1941
Notes by Jan Timman

| 1 d 4 | d5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 c 4 | e6 |
| 3 ¢c3 | Qf6 |
| 4 S 5 | Q ${ }^{\text {d }}$ |
| 5 亿f3 | h6 |
| $6 \times$ d | \＄$\times$ f6 |

```
7 底d3 ...
```

A new move that still has not been tried in tournament practice，except in a rapid game Timman－Belyavksy，Frankfurt 1998．At the time，I knew about the present game and wanted to test it out．Belyavsky took on c4， after which White＇s queen move has no independent value，since this could have arisen after 7 ㅆgㅂb3．This is not the only transposition；there will be a crucial transposition later in the game that can also be reached from a different move order，as we shall see．

| 7 ．．． | O－O |
| :---: | :---: |
| 8 e 4 | d×e4 |
| 9 間 $\times$ e 4 | c5 |

The standard way to attack White＇s pawn center．
10 O－O－O ．．．
The cards are on the table．All the ingredients for a sharp struggle are there．．．


It would probably have been better to have kept the tension．I give two recent alternatives from this position（reached in both cases via the move

 ©e 4 and White already had a strong attack（Gaprindashvili－Mil［？］，Dubai 1986；（b）10．．．仑c6 11 d5 包d4 12 d3 g6 13 h4 h5 14 ©g5 and a draw was agreed in Alalik－Sten［？］Budapest 1991.

This last example probably presents the solution to Black＇s opening
problems．By putting more pressure on d 4 ，Black gets enough counterplay．It is important to note that the direct assault 11 d3 g6 12 ©e5，with the idea of taking on g6，does not achieve anything because of $12 \ldots$ ．．．${ }^{\text {und }} \mathrm{d} 4$ ．

The text move has a distinct disadvantage．By surrendering the center， Black may soon get pressed on the Queenside．The Knight jumping into b5 may become especially annoying．

| $11.2 \times d 4$ | M ${ }_{\text {H }} \mathrm{b} 6$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 12 d3 | 筧d8 |

A tough decision．Black lets White Queen into h7，hoping to generate counterplay along the d－file．The alternative， $12 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 6$ ，was also insuffi－ cient to solve Black＇s problems．White quickly continues with 13 c2

 $8 \times \mathrm{d} 817 \mathrm{M}$ d1 with a clear edge for White．

## 13 亿b3！．．．

A very strong move．White does not enter h7 immediately，since after

 ©e5 Black has nothing to fear．White＇s attack has come to a standstill， while Black＇s pieces cooperate quite well．Now White has the double threat of $14{ }^{\mu} \mathrm{e} \mathrm{h} 7+$ and 14 c 5 restricting Black＇s movement on the Queenside．Ragozin decides to prevent the latter threat．

## 13 ．．．气d7

Under these circumstances， $13 \ldots \ldots$ ．．．$\times f 2$ was obviously too dangerous， because of 14 亶hf1．

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
14 \text { 留h7+ } & \text { thef8 } \\
15 \text { zhe1 }
\end{array}
$$

White continues to build up his attack．The direct threat is 16 回d5，so Black has to cover the e－file．

$$
15 \ldots \text { 气e5 }
$$

The only move．
16 c5 ．．．
With this push，White tightens his grip on the position．Black has to
 White wins the exchange．This theme－with Knight jumps to d5－con－ tinues to play an important role in the game．

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 16 \text {... 留c7 } \\
& 17 \text { 夏 } \mathbf{c} 2 \\
& 18 \text { 営d6! ... }
\end{aligned}
$$

The introduction to an absolutely brilliant combination．Other moves would not improve White＇s attack，for example， 18 f4 0 g 6 and the square h 8 is covered．

$$
18 \ldots \text { 苃 } 18
$$

After 18．．．c6 White would strengthen his position by 19 兌d 4 ．The text move has a different drawback．


Wonderful play．By first sacrificing the Knight，White opens up the road to Black＇s King．［？］means would have been less convincing．After 19 ©e4，Black could have reacted with 19．．．ere7，staying out of danger．

| $19 \ldots$ | exd5 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 20 茴 $\times f 6!$ | $\ldots$ |

The point of the previous move．By sacrificing even more material，White peels back the protection around the enemy King．

| 20 | g |
| :---: | :---: |
| 21 留 $\times$ h6＋ | He7 |
| 2 f |  |

The result of White＇s combination can be seen now．He is going to win back material，while at the same time opening up Black＇s King＇s posi－ tion．

$$
22 \text {... d4 }
$$

Desperately looking for counterplay．

```
23 f }\times\mathrm{ e5? ...
```

An incomprehensible mistake．White was in no hurry to take the Knight． He could have continued with the calm 23 㷡h 4 ！，keeping his opponent in the box．Black＇s only defensive try is $23 \ldots$ ．．．d5，trying to protect himself．After 24 ，White＇s attack is decisive，as can be seen in the




$$
23 \ldots \quad f \times e 5
$$

Now the situation is totally unclear，since Black has the defensive move f7－f6，maintaining a natural pawn cover for his King．

## 24 夏 4 ．．．

Another mistake．Botvinnik must have been in serious time pressure around here．The text move serves no visible purpose at all．White should have aimed at the weakest spot in the enemy camp，the square f6．
具e 4 just loses time，because of 26．．．筲e6，threatening a check on c4； （b） 260 d 2 ，with the aim of bringing the Knight to e4 and putting even
more pressure on the f－pawn．Black can just survive by 26．．．f7 27包e4 艺h8 28 煚f2（exchanging Queens would clearly favor Black） 28．．．马h6 and on 29 它d6，Black has 29．．． 26 g4！The most forceful and best try．White has the very straightforward threat of 27 g 5 ． Black＇s best is now $27 \ldots$ d3！ $28 \times d 3$ ，a pawn sacrifice to win
 the resulting position is hard to judge．White has full compensation for the exchange in any case．

$$
24 \ldots \quad \text { a5! }
$$

A key move，both for defensive purposes（bringing the Rook to a6）and for offensive purposes（pushing the a－pawn farther）．White is left with no time to reinforce his attack．

25 g4 ．．．
Under the present circumstances，ineffective．

| 25 ．． | \％${ }^{\text {a }} 6$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 26 留h44＋ | f6 |
| 27 g 5 | a4 |
| 28 答h7 |  |

A better fighting chance would have been $28 \mathrm{~g} \times f 6+$ ，after which Black
昌b1 莒a6 31 县d3 ©a5 is countered by 34 ．．．． B B 7 7 ！．Black＇s powerful passed central pawns guarantee him a smooth victory．

| 28 ．．． | Df7 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 29 g 6 | 骂f8 |
| $30 \mathbf{g \times f} 7$ | $\mathbf{a} \times$ b3 3 －1 |

White resigned．A sad end to a game that could have been one of Botvinnik＇s most brilliant victories in his entire career．
（17）Botvinnik－Ragozin，March 15， 19411 e 4 e 52 亿ff 0 c6 3







 45 g3 亿b4 46 县 4 会c6 $1 / 2$
（18）Botvinnik－Ragozin，May 11， 1944
Notes by Jan Timman

| 1 d 4 | d5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 c 4 | e6 |
| 3 ¢c3 | Qf6 |
| 4 ¢f3 | Se7 |
| 5 dg | O－O |
| 6 e3 | h6 |
| 7 \％$\times$ ¢ 6 | Q $\times$ f6 |
| 8 答c1 | ．．． |

This time Botvinnik chooses a modern set－up against the Tartakower．

| $8 \ldots$ | c6 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 9 h 4 | ... |

But this is highly unusual．（The normal move，also played in the Kasparov－ Karpov matches，is 9 d3．）Pushing the kingside pawns is normally combined with the development of the Queen to c2，followed by cas－ tling queenside．Still，the text move is known in a slightly different ver－ sion．In a correspondence game Katirsovich－Gulbis［？］1989／90，there followed 9 d3 会d7 10 cxd 5 exd 511 h 4 癷e8 12 g 4 气f8 13 g 5


In the Encyclopedia of Chess Openings 11．．．h6 is recommended as an improvement．I＇m not so sure this is so good after 12 h 5 g 513 具 5 ．

A position has arisen that is similar to one later in this game, with the difference that White has not committed himself to the weakening g2g4. Therefore Black should play 12...g6! after White has pushed his gpawn and by transposition, gets the same position as Ragozin later on.

| $9 \ldots$ | 0 d 7 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 10 g 4 | $\ldots$ |

It is interesting to speculate whether Botvinnik would have used the same hyper-sharp strategy in tournament play, where he was normally playing solidly.

10 ... g6
Standard and good. Black takes the sting out of the push g4-g5.
$11 \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 5$...

An interesting moment. White dissolves the tension in order to determine his plans for the near future. If Black takes back with the c-pawn, then the position will be closed and White can focus on a kingside attack. If Black recaptures with the e-pawn, then White will aim for a strategic struggle.

$$
11 \ldots \quad e \times d 5
$$

The right choice. It turns out that Black has nothing to fear in the upcoming strategic fight.

## 12 h 5 ...

The consequence of the previous move. Black is forced to give up the f5-square.

| 12 ... | g5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 13 d3 | S ${ }^{\text {g }}$ |
| 14 置5 | ... |

White has occupied the weak square, but the question remains whether he can keep it. Black will soon maneuver his Knight to d6, challenging White's temporary positional grip.

## 14 ... 癸e8

Active play. Black prevents the enemy's strategic plans, starting with 15 © d 2 .


15 f1 ...
An indecisive move, after which White will have to surrender the f5square. In keeping with White's strategy was $15 \hat{0} \mathrm{e} 2$, in order to give the Bishop on $\mathrm{f5}$ sufficient support. Subsequently White should be ready to sacrifice a pawn. In fact, Black has the choice of which pawn to offer:
 isfied. He has a firm grip on the kingside, compensating fully for the loss on the queenside.
$15 \ldots . . \sum f 6$ is more critical. White has to follow up with 160 g 3 . After $16 . . .0 \times g 4$, it is not entirely clear how White should continue. Black's position is solid enough to withstand direct attacks. White will probably have to play 17 ghef , slowly building up the pressure.

It is understandable that Botvinnik did not go in for this! He has never been known to gamble pawns, especially not such a crucial pawn on g4; without the g-pawn, White's grip on the kingside is less secure in the long term. It would be more fitting to the style of a modern giant like Kasparov.

$$
15 \ldots
$$

Nb6

Now Black is sure that White will not be able to keep the crucial f5square.

## 16 ©d2 ...

White adjusts his strategy. White gives up the fight for the f5-square and is ready to occupy it with a pawn that he will be able to defend. In other words, he is converting an offensive strategy into a defensive one.

| 16 ... | Q $\times 5$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| $17 \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{f} 5$ | Ec8 |
| 18 - 2 | Q88 |

A curious case: Square d 6 is in general reserved for the Black Knight, but Black first occupies it withhis Bishop, in order to challenge the enemy Knight that is going to appear on g3.

| 19 dig2 | da |
| :---: | :---: |
| 20 ¢f1 | ... |

Careful play. White only wants to post a Knight on g3 if he can keep it there.

| 20. | , $y_{y} \mathrm{f} 6$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 21 씅d3 | DC7 |

The game is entering a maneuvering phase. Black vacates the square d6 for the Knight, while the Black Bishop can be used later on the queenside.

## 22 f3

...

A very ambitious move. White is readying himself to build up a pawn center by e3-e 4 and meanwhile is envisaging a plan to bring a Knight to g4. The course of the game shows that his plan is too ambitious, but at this moment this was hard to foresee.

Black just continues his strategic plan．

## 23 亿eg3 篹ad8

A restrained reaction．Black＇s move seeks to prevent e3－e4，while on the other hand，he hopes to meet White＇s other plan by sharp tactical means．


White is hesitating again，allowing Black to assume the initiative．The crucial try was 24 h h ．The following variation may show why Botvinnik thought better of it：24．．．今c4 25 气g4 씁d6 26 氖f1（in order to protect e3） $26 . . .0 \times b 227$ 留b1 0 c 4 and now the straightforward 28 f 6 is met by $28 \ldots . . .0 \times 3+$ ！ $290 \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{e} 3$ 名xe3 with a strong attacking position．This means that White must overprotect the e－pawn by 28 芑 d 3 ，after which Black continues with 28．．．b5 29 f 5 留f8．The result is that White is a pawn down for unclear compensation．White has built up an attacking position，but there is no follow up．Therefore White tries to cover the c4－square first，but now Black seizes the initiative．

$$
24 \ldots \quad \mathrm{~g} 4!
$$

Very well played．If White takes the pawn by $25 \mathrm{f} \times \mathrm{g} 4$ ，then 25 ．．． 0 e 4 is a powerful reply．Therefore White has to keep the position as closed as possible（especially closing down the scope of the Black Bishop）．

## Gh8

A maneuvering phase is starting［？］again．Black just has to make sure that his g－pawn will never be taken．Apart from that he has positional assets：Control over square e4，pressure against e3 and，because of these factors，potential play on the queenside．It is important for him to keep all the minor pieces on the board，since White＇s Knights cannot do much more than protect each other．

| 26 答c2 | 管7 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 27 digl | 筬de8 |
| 28 沯hh2 | 埧 16 |
| 29 dith1 | 夏c7 |
| 30 吕hg2 | 岛88 |
| 31 bl | Q ${ }^{\text {d }} 6$ |
| 32 \％h1 | Qe4 |
| 33 \％g1 | Qd6 |
| 34 tobl | a6 |

The first pawn move in ten moves and the first sign that Black is ready to undertake action on the queenside．White has to continue to play wait－ ing moves．

| 35 沯h2 | Sa7 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 36 吕hg2 | Qe4 |

This is the second time the Knight has jumped to this square．In general， Black is not interested in the exchange of the Knights，since this would relieve the pressure on White．The point is that White cannot exchange Knights on e4，since he will lose the pawn on $\mathrm{f5}$ ．Thus Black is able to increase the pressure by keeping the Knight on the central outpost．
$37 \mathbf{3 4}$
Suddenly White throws in an active move that neither strengthens nor weakens his position．From a psychological point of view，it indicates that Botvinnik is not ready to lie down and wait．

$$
37 \ldots \text { D }
$$

An unfortunate move that allows White to create sufficient counterplay by sacrificing a pawn．Black should have played for the push c6－c5， increasing the scope of the Bishop．To this end，37．．．巴d8 was a good move．


From this point on，Botvinnik plays with full energy and a tremendous feel for the initiative．

| 38 ．．． | dxe4 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 39 留c3 |  |

Otherwise White would protect the f5－pawn by 40 ©g 3 ，after which he has no weaknesses left．

| $40 \mathrm{d5}+$ | Cill 7 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 41 Mell ${ }_{\text {M }}$ ！ | ．．． |

The tactical point of White＇s $38^{\text {th }}$ move．The Black Bishop is forced to retreat to a passive square．

41 ．．．
$42 d \times c 6$

D8
．．．

White is not worried about his h－pawn，since he will use the half－open h －file as an attacking base．

$$
42 \ldots \text { 留 } \times \text { h } 5+
$$

## 43 gh2 Ma5

Black wisely seeks the exchange of Queens．The centralizing move 43．．．留d5 had a tactical drawback．After 44 d2，Black cannot play


## 44 쓸 $\times 25$ 是 $\times 25$ <br> 45 Dg 3 <br> ．．．

Again that tremendous feel for the initiative．The Knight is aiming for the vital square 55 ．

## 45 ．．．管e6？

A panicky move．Black is defending against the threat of 46 ©f5，but
 order to play the other rook to e6．In that case the game would be
 winning back the pawn．
$46 \mathbf{c} \times$ b7


Wreaking havoc in the enemy camp．

47 ．．．
B6
 gether．But after the text move，the situation gets even worse．

| 4835 | D $\times 3$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 49 管7 | 癸f6 |
| 50 告hc2 | ．．． |

Now White＇s queenside pawns decide．On 50．．．$\times$ ． 4 ，White has the decisive blow 51 亿h5．

| 50 ．．． | 癸×f4 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 51 b 5 | 営f6 |
| 52 枸g2 | ． |

With this quiet King move White underscores his superiority．There is no need to hurry matters．

| $52 \ldots$ | $a \times b 5$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| 53 亿 $\times e 4$ | 等e6 |
| 54 亿c5 | $\ldots$ |

Forcing a completely winning double－Rook ending．

| 54 ．．． | 夏 $\times$ c 5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 55 沯 $2 \times \mathrm{c} 5$ | b4 |
| 56 管b5 | Hy6 |
| 57 沯c8 | 1－0 |

Black resigned．An intriguing and tough game，showing Ragozin＇s skills in the early middlegame and Botvinnik＇s unremitting fighting spirit in the final phase．
（19）Ragozin－Botvinnik，May 15， 1944
Notes by Jan Timman

The first game with White for Ragozin after five consecutive games with Black．

| 1 e 4 | e6 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 2 d 4 | d 5 |
| $3 乌 \mathrm{c} 3$ | $\ldots$ |

In game 10 Ragozin opted for the Tarrasch variation．Now he＇s ready to face Botvinnik＇s favorite line：The Winawer．

| 3 ．．． | Db4 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 4 e 5 | c5 |
| 5 a3 | 遃 $\times 1$ |
| $6 \mathrm{~b} \times \mathrm{c} 3$ | Qe7 |
| 7 － 0 3 | ．．． |

The quiet，positional approach，still quite popular these days．Soon af－ terwards，during the $13^{\text {th }}$ USSR Championship（which started just five days after this game was played），Smyslov played 7 a 4 against Botvinnik．
 11 亿h3 0 g 6 （keeping the Knight from f4）and now the modern move 12 2 would have given White an edge（instead of Smyslov＇s 12煚f3）．The text move very often transposes to the 7 a 4 line．

## 7 ．．．留 $\mathbf{a 5}$

Deviating from Kan－Botvinnik，in which Black first played 7．．．气bc6．

具 $\times$ c4 dxc4 17 a5 bibl 22 号a1，a draw was agreed．

According to modern theory，White can only hope for an advantage in the endgame if he can manage to bring his Bishop to c3，supported by the King on d2．Only that way can Black＇s Queen Knight be kept from a5．

## 8 留d2 ．．．

It is still an undecided matter whether White should protect the c3－ pawn with his Queen or his Bishop．The text move is more in keeping with the general idea of the Winawer，aiming to develop the Queen＇s Bishop to a3．The alternative， 8 d2，has been favored by Spassky． White avoids all endgames and is ready to push the c3－pawn．

| $8 \ldots$ | Qbc6 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 9 曷e2 | Od7 |
| 10 a4 | $\ldots$ |

Now a well known theoretical position has arisen．

$$
10 \text {... 啠c8 }
$$

Quite a modern move．Until now，it was assumed that this move was first played in Foldy－Portisch，Hungary 1959，fifteen years after the present game！

The main idea of the development of the Rook is that Black is ready for the endgame after $11 \ldots \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 412 \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 4$ 皆 $\times \mathrm{d} 2+13 \times \mathrm{Cd} 2$ 气f5 5 and now 14 d 2 is impossible because of $14 \ldots \times \mathrm{e} 5$ ，winning a pawn．

11 O－O ．．．

Other theoretical tries are 11 a3（leading to positions similar to Kan－ Botvinnik）， 11 d 3 and 11 dxc 5 ，of which the last move is considered to be the main one，based on a game Smyslov－Uhlmann，Mar del Plata 1966．The text leads to an approximately even endgame．

```
11 ... c×d4
\(12 \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 4\)
```

An interesting try is 12 씁g5，sacrificing the queenside pawns for at－ tacking chances．A correspondence game Shokov－Kubrasov 1975

 with a dangerous attack．Black would have done better to play 16．．．0－ $0-0$（instead of $16 \ldots . . . \mathrm{b} 4)$ after which the game is unclear．There is a

 equally sharp play．

$$
12 \ldots \text { 斵 } \times \mathbf{d} 2
$$

| $13 \times \mathrm{d} 2$ | Qf5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 14 c3 | Q55 |

As I stated before：When the Black Knight reaches a5，Black has a comfortable endgame．It is very instructive to see how Botvinnik turns it into a win，without his opponent making any visible mistakes．

## 15 登fb1 癸c7



Not an easy choice．The alternative was $15 . . . b 6$ to give the Rook free－ dom of movement．The drawback would be that if the Knight is going to be played to c4，White will have the chance to break with a4－a5．There－ fore Botvinnik keeps the pawn on b7，avoiding any targets on the queenside．

## 16夏c1 ．．．

A good maneuver．White brings his Bishop to the a3－f8 diagonal where it is most active．

$$
16 \ldots \text { f6 }
$$

With the main idea of vacating the square f 7 for the King and connecting the Rooks．

## 17 h $\mathbf{h}$

Another useful pawn move．If Black had played 17．．．e e g f without fur－ ther thought，White could have caused trouble by chasing away both Knights： 18 b4 © 419 g 4 ，followed by 20 d6 and the Black b－ pawn falls．

## 18 b4

Challenging the Knight and thus gaining more space．Alternatives were：
 followed by 22 c 5 and White has some pressure．A more accurate
 counterplay．（b） 18 h3．Preparing the push of the g－pawn．Black must be careful，since 18．．．畕f7 19 b4 ©c4 20 g 4 leads to trouble again． Also 18 c6 is not fully satisfactory in view of 19 c 5620 b4． Black＇s best option is probably 18．．．b4，keeping control on the kingside．

| $18 \ldots$ | Qc4 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 19 a5 | Oc6 |
| 20 直 $c 5$ | 36 |

The situation on the queenside has now stabilized，so both sides now turn their attention to the center．

| 21 d3 | dibl |
| :---: | :---: |
| 22 管1 | 管8 |
| 23 管ab1 | Sb5 |
| 24 h 3 | ．．． |

Still a useful move．

$$
24 \ldots \text {... 气e7 }
$$

The logical follow－up to the previous move．The Knight is on its way to c6，putting pressure on White＇s a－pawn．

## $25 \times \mathbf{C}$

Sooner or later unavoidable．By executing the exchange at this moment， White prepares sharp action aiming to conquer space on the queenside．

| 25. | （1）$\times$ C |
| :---: | :---: |
| 26 d6 |  |

Forcing the black Rook to leave the c－file．

| 26 ．．． | 留 17 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 27812 | ．．． |

And now White is threatening to exchange both pairs of minor pieces after which he could exert pressure against b7．

$$
27 \text {... 笪c8 }
$$

Preparing to take back with the Rook on c4．


To this point，both players have conducted the strategical struggle very well．With the text move，White loses his way．Indicated was the consis－ tent 29 ©b3，aiming for c5．After the forced variation 29．．．$\times \mathrm{a} \times 330$
 draw is imminent．
29 ．．．
$\mathbf{g \times f 6}$
30 b4
筧 c 6

Black takes over the initiative．First of all he forces White to exchange his active Rook．

$$
31 \text { 啠 } \times \text { c6 ... }
$$

The alternative 31 亩b3 looked more attractive at first sight but the po－ sition after $31 . . .3 \times b 632 \mathrm{a} \times \mathrm{b} 6 \mathrm{C} 7$ ！ 33 © 5 is deceptive．The Knight on c5 looks very active，but Black has a simple plan to attack White＇s weak b－pawn by the maneuver 包e7－f5－d6－c4．White can only wait and see，while Black，who has protected his weaknesses permanently， will take over．


The best try．Again $32 \triangleq \mathrm{~B} 3$ did not work so well，this time because of
 35．．．${ }^{\text {eg g }}$ 6．With the text move，White stops the push e6－e5．

| 32 ．．． | $0 \times 104$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| $33 \mathbf{c \times 1} 4$ | 骨c7 |

Crystal－clear play．With his active Bishop and control over the c－file， Black has the better chances．Still，White can create just about enough counterplay to hold the position．

## 34 包b3 筸c4

Winning a pawn．

## 35 气c5 答 $\times \mathrm{d} 4$

Of course，this pawn has to be taken，since after $35 \ldots$ ．．．$\times$ b4 36 亿 $\times$ e6， the White d－pawn would be protected．

36 登 $\times$ e6 䈓 $\times$ b4
Again，Botvinnik takes the right pawn．After $36 \ldots$ ．． $\mathrm{m} \times 437$ 亘 $\times$ b6 芭b4


```
37 f5! ...
```

The best way to fight．In order to take the f－pawn，Black must now play
his Rook to a less active square．


38 学b6？

But this is a clear mistake．White should have played 38 包×7 ̈xf5 39
 keep the dangerous d－pawn from running．His pieces would be placed actively enough to hold the game．

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 38 \text {... 笪 } \times \text { f5 } \\
& 39 \text { 癸 } \times \text { b7+ 期g6 }
\end{aligned}
$$

Now the situation is completely different．The Black d－pawn will reach d3，after which it will be extremely hard to stop．

$$
40 \text { 営b6 ... }
$$

Going for the a－pawn，but this eventually leads to a hopeless Rook－ versus－Knight ending．Alternatives were equally insufficient．

 and the d－pawn promotes．

| 42 ．．． | d2 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 43 啠d6 | 管1＋ |
| 44 \％h2 | d1 $=$ M ${ }_{\text {H }}$ |
| $45 \mathrm{gr} \times$ d1 | 管 $\times$ d1 |
| 46 Q $\times$ b 5 | \％${ }^{\text {n }}$ |
| 47 \％c3 | 答×5 |

The win is now elementary．The fact that Black has isolated pawns does not make the process more complicated．

| 48 亿e2 | dity |
| :---: | :---: |
| 49 dig3 | 管3＋ |
| 50 曷h4 | \％22 |
| 51 g4＋ | － |

Or 51 公g $3+$ en 5 followed by $52 \ldots \times g 2$ and the f－pawn decides．

$$
51 \text {... 管e5! }
$$

More accurate than $51 \ldots \mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 452 \mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 4 \mathrm{c}$ e 5 after which White would have the defense 53 亿g1 followed by 53 亿g3．Now 52 亿g1 is met by


| 52.01 | ${ }^{\text {anc }}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 53 〇d3＋ | Cher |
| 54 句 64 | 句c4 0－1 |

White resigned．A very clear game by Botvinnik．
（20）Ragozin－Botvinnik，May 16， 19451 d4 0 ff 2 c 4 g 63 亿c3 d5











（21）Ragozin－Botvinnik，May 25， 19451 e 4 c5 2 气ff d6 3 d4








（22）Ragozin－Botvinnik，July 12， 1946
Notes by Jan Timman

| 1 e 4 | e5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 2f3 | Qc6 |
| 3 回5 |  |
| 4 最 4 | Qf6 |
| $50-0$ | Q ${ }^{\text {d }}$ |
| 6 等1 | b5 |
| 7 成3 |  |
| 8 c 3 | O－O |
| 9 h 3 | 4 D 7 |

The introduction to a rather passive system that has nevertheless been played by several top players，including Karpov，Petrosyan，Keres，Stein and Portisch．Black seeks to give his e－pawn extra protection，at the same time exerting pressure against d 4 ．The drawback is that White is nothindered building a strong center．This game is the ontime that Botvinnik used the system．He normally preferred the classical 9．．．（2） 5 ，while he has also tried 9．．．

| 10 d 4 | 具6 |
| :---: | :---: |
| $11 \mathbf{3 4}$ | ．．． |

This is still one of the main moves．The other one is 11 e giving the d－pawn extra protection and preparing to retreat the Bishop after


## 11 ．．．气a5

Also a modern move．The alternative is $11 \ldots$ ．

## $12 \mathbf{a} \times \mathbf{b} 5$ ．．．

A most remarkable and，at the same time，dubious decision．White gives up his King＇s Bishop in order to get control over the a－file．When I first saw this move，I thought that at that time，right after the Second World War，it was not generally known that it is，in practically all cases，a bad idea to let the King＇s Bishop be exchanged for a Knight．Further study， however，showed me that Ragozin had obtained the same position as Black

In Lilienthal－Ragozin，USSR Championship，1945，there followed 12具c2 b4 13 母bd2 bxc3 $14 \mathrm{~b} \times \mathrm{c} 3 \mathrm{c} 515 \mathrm{~d} 5$ 亿b6 16 幺b3 0 b 717会bd2 and now Ragozin avoided the repetition of moves by 17．．． b b 8 and finally lost after 18 a5 0 a8 19 0 c4．This practical example is hard to understand．Did Ragozin really believe that Black was OK if he had repeated moves？It is quite likely that White would have played 18留e2，instead of repeating moves，as he could have done two moves earlier．White seems to have a clear edge．Possibly Ragozin just wanted to vary in this training game．


Getting out of the pin on the a－file，while pinning the pawn on b5．

| 14 e3 | $\mathbf{a} \times 1 \mathbf{5}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 15 管 $\mathbf{7}$ | $\cdots$ |

It looks like White is developing a strong initiative on the Queenside． Black＇s next move，however，is an adequate reply．


Gaining space on the Queenside and preparing a queen sortie to b6．

## 16 d5

White is strategically forced to close the center，otherwise the black Bishop pair would become strong．

| 16 ．．． |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| 17 留 a 2 | Db7 |

Preparing to neutralize the pressure along the a－file．

## 18 b4

．．．

The typical push in these kind of Ruy Lopez positions．White tries to keep as much influence on the Queenside as possible．His primary aim is not to exchange on e5，but to keep the tension．

| 18 | 第88 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 19 号 3 | 觛C |

Now that the white Rook has been driven away from its active position， Black retreats with his Queen in order to get out of the pin．

## 20 留b2 ．．．

Not an ideal square for the Queen．

A well known pawn structure．If White still had his King＇s Bishop（ver－ sus a black Knight），he would have a clear edge．Without the Bishop，his Kingside may become vulnerable，as the remainder of the game will show．At this moment the chances are approximately equal：Black has the pair of Bishops，while White has a slight space advantage．

| 21 管 $\times 18$ | S $\times 18$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 22 亿a3 | 絠b7！ |

This queen move is based upon a deep idea．Black has built up a bat－ tery of Queen and Bishop that at the moment seems to be aimless． Botvinnik however must have foreseen the turn that the game would take．

## 23管a1 ．．．

White is apparently unaware of the danger that is looming．Otherwise he would not have played his Rook away from the Kingside．A careful move would have been 23 气d 2 ，preparing to overprotect the center by f2－f3．

23 ．．．是 7
Now black is ready for the push f 7 －f5．


And White seems to prevent this．If now 24．．．g6，there follows 25 且h6， taking the sting out of Black＇s upcoming Kingside offensive．Black，in turn，has prepared a big surprise．．．

$$
24 \text {... f5!! }
$$

A very original pawn sacrifice．Black forces his opponent to take on f5， after which the upcoming Knight sacrifice on d 5 becomes very strong． Much less convincing was $24 \ldots$ ．．． $0 f 6$ ，since after 25 包d2 $0 \times \mathrm{Cd} 526 \mathrm{exd} 5$㽞xd5 27 f 3 f5，White can keep the position closed by 28 g 5 ！After
 tion，but White would have managed to organize a defense．

| $25 g \times f 5$ | $乌 f 6$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $26 乌 d 2$ | $\ldots$ |

There is nothing White can do to prevent the sacrifice．Above all，he must protect his e－pawn．

$$
26 \ldots \quad \sum \times d 5
$$

Not a surprise anymore．

## $27 \mathrm{e} \times \mathrm{d} 5$ <br> ${ }^{\mu \mathrm{H}} \mathrm{F} \times \mathrm{d} 5$ <br> 28 果f1 <br> ．．．

White＇s King tries to flee，but in the end it will still be caught in a mating net．More stubborn was 28 f 3 to keep the Black Queen from invading．


 collapses．

| 28 ．．． | 癸×f5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 29 9 $\times 15$ | Qb7 |

Black is in no hurry to continue his attack．First he attacks the Knight on b5．

```
30 M्|\mp@code{c2 g6}
31営55 ...
```

The only way to avert an immediate mating attack was 31 씁e 4 ，but then Blaack would be a pawn up with a superior position．

| 31 | ${ }_{\text {Mrg }}^{\text {g }}$ 2＋ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 32 \％e2 | \＄h4 |

Now all Black＇s pieces participate in the attack．It is interesting to apply Hodgson＇s theory about attacking and defending pieces here：Black has four attackers and White only two defenders，his Bishop and the Knight on d2．Small wonder that the Black attack is irresistible．

$$
33 \text { 씅 } \times \mathbf{f} 5 \text {... }
$$

Eliminating one of the attacking pieces，but at what a price．

$$
33 \ldots \quad \mathbf{g} \times \mathbf{f} 5
$$

The scoresheet indicates $33 \ldots$ c6 here．I find it，however，hard to be－ lieve that Botvinnik would haveplayed that move，allowing 34 b 5 with an important tempo．It is equally unlikely that Ragozin would not have taken the unexpected chance．After the text move Black＇s main threat is
 Queen will penetrate on the Queenside with devastating effect．

| $340 \times 16$ | f4 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 35 最c5 | De6 |
| 36 分5 | \＄f6 |
| 37 具7 | De4！ |

Accurate play，preventing all counterplay．

| 38 句h6＋ | \％g7 |
| :---: | :---: |
| $39 \times 18+$ | 6，$\times$ ¢ 6 |
| 40 亿xe4 |  |

A fine attacking game．
（23）Botvinnik－Ragozin，July 13， 19461 e 4 e 52 亿ff 0 c6 3 具b5 a64 Ma4


气d7 25 各b6 $0 \times b 626$ 苛xe5

（24）Botvinnik－Ragozin，July 16， 19461 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 亿ff3 ©f6


 20 b 4 包c6 21 包b5 苗fd8 22 留d2 a6 23 包d6 骂b8 24 a 4 b 625


嫘 $\times \mathrm{b} 8+1-0$
（25）Ragozin－Botvinnik，July 17， 19461 e 4 e 62 d 4 d53 亿c3 ${ }^{\text {D }}$ b4








（26）Ragozin－Botvinnik，November 12， 19471 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3







（27）Botvinnik－Ragozin，November 17， 19471 e 4 e 52 气ff 0 c6 3


包4
 29道d4


（28）Botvinnik－Ragozin，March 7， 19511 e 4 e 52 亿f3 0 c6 3 具b5




発g7 30 登e4 1－0
（29）Ragozin－Botvinnik，March 8， 19511 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 亿c3 c6




営f8 20 f4 h6 21 f5 县a6 22 县e1 1－0
（30）Smyslov－Botvinnik，October 25， 19511 d4








（31）Botvinnik－Smyslov，October 31， 19511 e 4 e5 2 亿ff 0 亩6 3












（32）Botvinnik－Smyslov，February 13， 19521 d4 包f6 2 c4 e6 3




（33）Smyslov－Botvinnik，February 14， 19521 d4 f5 2 e 4 fxe 43




 0－1
（34）Kan－Botvinnik，October 17， 19521 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 团c3 c6 4






 36 甼g2 씁e8 37 씁f3 씁c6 38 씁 xc6 bxc6 $39 \mathrm{c} 5 \mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 440 \mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 4$ 管e2

（35）Botvinnik－Kan，October 24， 19521 e 4 e 52 ff3






 38 公×g6＋为e8 39 昷e6 1－0
（36）Kan－Botvinnik，October 29， 19521 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 亿c3 c6 4








（37）Kan－Botvinnik，November 1， 19521 e 4 e 52 ff3 0 c6 3 具b5
 10 县c2 c5 11 d 4 씁c7 12 亿bd2 0 c6 13 dxe 5 dxe 514 a 4 胃b8 15





（38）Botvinnik－Kan，November 2， 19521 d4 ©f6 2 c4 e6 3 宅c3具b4 4 e3 O－O 5 a 3 具 $\times \mathrm{c} 3+6 \mathrm{~b} \times \mathrm{c} 3 \mathrm{~b} 67$ 具d3 8 f3 c5 9 e 4 d 6





 d1 Unfinished
（39）Flohr－Botvinnik，November 4， 19521 亿思3 0 f6 2 c4 g63 亿c3





（40）Botvinnik－Kan，November 14， 19521 e 4 c5 2 亿ff d6 3 d4







（41）Kan－Botvinnik，January 20， 1953
Notes by Jan Timman

| 1 d 4 | Qf6 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 c 4 | g6 |
| 3 ¢c3 | d5 |
| $4 \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 5$ | $0 \times 15$ |
| 5 g 3 | 且7 |
| 6 具g2 | $0 \times 1$ |
| $7 \mathrm{~b} \times \mathrm{c} 3$ | c5 |
| 8 e3 |  |

White has chosen a modest system that will lead to a strategical middlegame with chances for both sides．With the text move，he pre－ pares to develop his King＇s Knight to e2．

## 8 ．．．贸a5

Probably the most accurate move，which is also borne out by the fact that Kramnik played it 44 years later．Black＇s idea is to answer 9 ©e2 with $9 \ldots \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 4$ ，breaking the white pawn chain．（This is what actually
happened in Kiril Georgiev－Kramnik，Belgrade 1997，a game that ended in a draw after 23 moves．）

## 9 d2 ．．．

In order to take back on d 4 with the c－pawn．The drawback is that the Bishop is not very well posted on d 2 ．
9 ．．．O－O
10 气e2
．．．

In Hort－Wahls，Biel 1990，White changed his plan and continued 10
 14 el 0 a 515 e 4 d 7 the chances were approximately equal．

| $10 \ldots$ | Qc6 |
| :--- | :--- |
| $110-0$ | 2lb8 |

A preventive move．Before developing his Queen＇s Bishop，he gives the b－pawn extra protection．

## 12 h 3

A dubious move．There was no reason to prevent Black＇s Queen＇s Bishop from developing on g 4 ．Thus White loses a vital tempo in the strategical struggle．Moreover，the h－pawn may actually become a tar－ get in some variations．

| $12 \ldots$ | 発d8 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 13 学b1 | 皿e6 |

With a steady hand Botvinnik develops his pieces to the best squares． After securing the d 5 square，the Bishop has an ideal outpost on e6， controlling the vital square c 4 and attacking the a－pawn．

14 © 1 ．．．

Protecting the a-pawn and meanwhile bringing the Knight to b3 in order to protect the somewhat weakened queenside.

$$
14 \ldots \text {... 贸 } \mathbf{c} 7
$$

An adequate reaction. Black retreats his Queen in order to be able to keep the tension on the queenside. This is a very important part of his strategy: After the disappearance of the c-pawns, White would be slightly better. With the pawns, Black is slightly better, because he has a clamp of the queenside.

## 15 - b3 b6

The point of the previous move. White cannot take on c 5 now, because he is pinned along the d-file.


A tremendous move that shows deep understanding. Black has no concerns about his pawn structure; he is only focused on the activity of his pieces. With the text, he plans to eliminate White's best defender of the queenside, meanwhile opening up the b-file as an operational basis. He is especially aiming at White's a-pawnthat will become very weak, after the Knight on b 3 has been exchanged.
$17 \triangleq \times a 5 \quad b \times a 5$
18 营 $\times$ b8 ...

In connection with the next move，an understandable plan．White wants to bring his passive Bishop tothe active outpost on a3．He has，how－ ever，no time to execute this plan without losing his a－pawn，as the game will show．

It was high time to think of emergency measures．White＇s best chance was 18 d 5 ，in order to sacrifice a pawn in exchange for counterplay．
 22 g b 5 ，he has quite reasonable chances to keep the balance．

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
18 \ldots & \text { 等 } \times \text { b8 } \\
19 \ldots & \ldots
\end{array}
$$

It was too late for 19 d5，because after 19．．．d7 20 c4 皿b2 Black wold become too active．

| 19 ．． | c $\times$ d 4 |
| :---: | :---: |
| $20 \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{d} 4$ | 留c4！ |

A very fine move．Black wins the a－pawn by force．The alternative， 20．．．宣c4，would have been pointless，because of 21 留c2 and the Bishop is pinned．

## 21 啠 21 留 $\times$ a2

Not 21．．．算xe2 22 号 xe2 吕b1 23 号c2 and White has an easy defense．

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
22 & \ldots \times 2 \\
23 & \ldots 3
\end{array}
$$

The technical part is by no means easy for Black．His extra pawn is doubled，while White has kept a solid structure and active pieces．

| 23. | e6 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 24 Sc5 | D88 |

Straightforward strategy．Black must first exchange White＇s active Bishop
before making further progress．Premature was 24 ．．．迫b1，since after
 queenside in time．

The only move，since 25 ．．．b1 was a real threat．

$$
25 \ldots \quad a 4
$$

Equally forced，because White was threatening 26 ga1［？］．


The only moment in the game when criticism of Botvinnik＇s play is ap－ propriate．The systematic 26．．．』blal would have given Black a water－ tight winning scheme．After the forced moves 27 昷c5 a3 28 a1 Black follows up with 28．．．f5！ 29 d 3 d 2 and White will be gradually out－ maneuvered，e．g．， 30 具f1 ff 31 g2 ab2（threatening 32．．．品b1＋） 32 县 $\mathrm{f} 1 \times 533 \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{c} 5$ 有 7 and the Black King approaches without hindrance．

After the text move，the winning plan is more complicated and takes more time，since the Black Rook will remain passive for a while．

$$
27 \text { C5 ... }
$$

The best chance．White manages to exchange Black＇s active King＇s Bishop for his own passive Bishop（note that a few moves ago it was
the other way around），without losing a pawn．


The point of the previous move．White profits from the pin along the c－ file．Still，Black is winning，because he manages to bring his a－pawn to a2．

| 28. | Db3 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 29 dxc5 | a3 |
| 30 团 |  |

Again the most stubborn defense．By putting the Bishop on b 7 ，he makes his passed c－pawn a potential threat，which hampers the winning pro－ cess．

| $30 \ldots$ | 登c7 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 31 c 6 | a2 |
| 32 号 $\mathbf{a 1}$ | $\ldots$ |

Black was threatening 32．．．c2 to lock in White＇s Rook at al．Still，it is interesting to see how Black would win the ending after 32 登f1 233
 （the only way to make progress） $38 \times c 6 \times 6$ ．This is some sort of pawn endgame，in which Black has a significant advantage，because of the block on a ， a 2 and b 1 ，but the advantage is not necessarily a deci－ sive one．

As a comparison，I give an example from my own tournament practice， Timman－Hjartarsson，Rotterdam 1989：
 30 a7县 68
 is going to lose ground because of the configuration on the queenside．

Back to the present game：The win is slightly more complicated because the Black King has difficulties crossing the fourth rank．It is still a win because Black is helped by a tactical finesse，e．g．， 39 e $4 \mathrm{f} 540 \mathrm{f3}$（after


 after eliminating White＇s kingside，Black wins easily．

| $32 \ldots$ | dc4 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 33 f 3 | ctit8 |
| 34 dyf2 | che7 |
| 35 the1 | f5 |

After both sides have moved their Kings toward the queenside，Black throws in a pawn move that will prove to be useful in any case．

| 36 第d2 | ditd |
| :---: | :---: |
| 37 f4 | ．．． |

But this pawn move is wrong and will make Black＇s task much easier． Tougher was 37 che che 38 e4，not allowing Black the outpost on d5 for the Bishop．Still，Black is winning，e．g．，38．．．fxe4 39 fxe 4 癸f7 fol－ lowed by 40 ［？］等f3＋and 41．．．

$$
37 \ldots \text { d5 }
$$

Now the win is easy，because Black just has to create an entrance for his Rook on the kingside．

| 38 h 4 | h 6 |
| :--- | :--- |
| $39 \mathrm{CH} \mathbf{d 1}$ | g 5 |
| $\mathbf{4 0} \mathbf{h} \times \mathrm{g} 5$ | $\mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 5$ |
| $\mathbf{4 1} \times \mathrm{g} 5$ | Unfinished |

Here the game ended unfinished．Kan could just as well have resigned because after $41 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 7$ ，followed by $42 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 5$ ，the black Rook will penetrate with devastating effect．



 20 包d4 a5 21 씁e2 씁e8 22 f4 e5 23 包f5 县f8 24 胃f1 g6 25 fxe5
 31 曶b1 气a4 0－1
（43）Botvinnik－Kan，May 23， 1953
Notes by Jan Timman

| 1 d 4 | Qf6 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 c 4 | e6 |
| 3 ¢c3 | D ${ }^{\text {b }}$ |
| 4 e 3 | ．． |

Botvinnik has always favored two lines of the Nimzo：The Sämisch Varia－ tion（with 4 a3）and the Rubinstein Variation，as in the present game．

| 4 ．．． | c5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 5 ¢f3 | d5 |
| 6 d3 | O－O |
| $70-0$ | d×c4 |
| 8 －$\times 4$ | Qc6 |
| 9 a 3 | \＄15 |

Kan has chosen a line that is known as＂Larsen＇s Variation＂．It was popular in the late 60s and early 70s．Black retreats his Bishop and is only ready to exchange on c3 if White takes on c5．

## 10 （a2！．．．

Polugaevsky＇s move from his 1974 match against Karpov and at the same time the reason that Larsen＇s Variation practically disappeared from practice．White anticipates Black＇s plan of playing a7－a6 and b7－ b5，which would work after 10 聯d3 a6 11 邑d1 b5 12 具a2 b6 with equality（Portisch－Olafsson，Wijk aan Zee 1969）

| $10 \ldots$ | $a 6$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $11 乌 24$ | $\ldots$ |



This was also Polugaevsky's original idea. He played it in the third match game against Karpov. Since he didn't get an advantage in that game, he tried 11 b1! In the fifth game, preparing a battery along the b1-h7
 \$b2 e5 16 g d1 White has a dangerous initiative. It is interesting to read Botvinnik's own comments about the text move.

While commenting on the third Polugaevsky-Karpov game in his book Karpov's Wettkämpfe zur Weltmeisterschaft he has the following to say about 11 团a4: "The White Bishop stands somewhat passive on a2 and now the Knight is moved to the edge of the board." Rather critical words for a move that Botvinnik himself actually played twice (see also game 49).

$$
11 \ldots \text { c4 }
$$

The wrong reaction, leaving White a strong center under favorable circumstances. Late Kan improved by exchanging on d 4 , which was also Karpov's choice. After 11...c×d4 12 exd4 h6 (preventing the Queen's Bishop from developing to g5) 13 f4, Karpov played 13... 7 (instead of Kan's 13...〇d5). The game was equal after that; the remaining

 draw was agreed.

## 12 b3! ...

Before Black is able to build up a strong queenside majority, White breaks the outpost.

$$
12 \ldots \quad \mathbf{c} \times \mathbf{b} 3
$$

An interesting try was $12 \ldots$ ．．．c3 13 b1 e5．In that case White keeps an edge by 14 d5！，e．g．， $14 \ldots$ ．．．씁 $\times$ d 515 씁 $\times d 5$ 包 $\times d 516 \mathrm{bxc} 4$ 公c7 17 ©e4 县a5 18 会d6 with strong pressure．

## 13 贸 $\times$ b3

Black wants to fianchetto his Queen＇s Bishop without giving up the c5－ square．This plan is rather slow，as the game continuation will show． Still，the text move is Black＇s best choice for a different［？］，as we will see．

## 14 b2 b6

Black＇s best set－up was 14 ．．．气c5，followed by $15 \ldots$ ．．． 77 with some counterplay．Now White takes complete control．

## 15 e4

Based on the fact that $15 \ldots$ ．．．$\times$ xe 4 is impossible because of 16 씁c2


$\begin{array}{ll}15 \ldots & \text { Qe7 } \\ 16 \text { 前e1 } & \text { Qg }\end{array}$
16日f 气 4 g6

Why not develop the Bishop by 16．．．b7？Kan possibly feared the tricky Knight move 17 包 5 with the following possibilities：（a）17．．．畑d6
期e8 20 ac1 with very strong compensation for the piece．Still Black had to go in for this，since after 20．．．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{d} 7$ the situation is not entirely clear．Botvinnik may not have chosen the wild knight sortie．A strong alternative is 17 d 5 exd 518 gad1 with advantage for White．The text move allows the same push under very favorable circumstances．

17 d5 ．．．


Positional resignation．Black had to play 17．．．exd5．If then 18 e5，Black gets active play by $18 \ldots$ ．．． 5 ！ 19 苗 $\times \mathrm{d} 5$ 直e6．So White has to take back with 18 exd5 and then follow－up with 19 ad1．He has a great space advantage，but Black can try to［？］by 18．．．g4．

## 18 管ad1 ．．．

Very classical play．What has put both Rooks on the central files and is now threatening 19 d 6 显 $\times \mathrm{d} 620$ 㽞 $\times \mathrm{b} 6$ and wins．

$$
18 \ldots \quad \text { b5 }
$$

Another concession，but there was little choice．On 18．．．${ }^{\mu} \mathrm{d}$ d6 White has the powerful reply 19 c3！b5 20 －b2

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
19 \text { Qc5 } & \text { d } 6 \\
20 \text { Qd3 } & \ldots
\end{array}
$$

Aiming for an even better square：c6．
20 ．．．
Qd7
21 啠 $\mathbf{c} 1$
．．．

There is no more work for the rook on the d－file，so it occupies the open c－file．

| 21 ．．． | Me7 ${ }_{\text {M }}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 22 句b4 | Qb6 |

Allowing a＂petite combinaison＂．It was however difficult to find a de－ cent move，because White controls the board after 22．．．0c5 230 c6！



Very elegant．

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
24 \ldots & \emptyset \times e 5 \\
25 & \cdots e 5 \\
\ldots
\end{array}
$$

苞xf6 $\times f 6$ Black has plenty of material for the Queen．

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
25 \ldots & \text { 夏 } \times \text { e5 } \\
26 \text { 品c6 }
\end{array}
$$

The point of White＇s play．He wins back the piece and keeps his mighty center pawns．

$$
26 \text {... } \times \text { h2+ }
$$

There is nothing better than to take this unimportant pawn．

|  | M |
| :---: | :---: |
| 28 留e3 | 管b8 |
| 29 皆ec1 |  |

White double the Rooks in order to answer 29．．．县d7 with 30 骂c7．

| 29 ．．． | 管 8 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 30 ¢f3 | 且5 |
| 31 e5！ | ．．． |

The pawns get moving．

$$
31 \ldots \text { d7 }
$$

 Black is also lost．The minor pieces win easily，because of Black＇s weak－ ness on f 7 ．

| 32 等d6 | 4 C 8 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 33 登× $\times 6$ | Q $\mathrm{g}_{4}$ |
| 34.955 | Sh5 |
| 35 d 6 | h6 |
| 36 ¢ $\times$ ¢ 7 ！ |  |

Not a difficult sacrifice．The Black King will be caught in a mating net．

| 36 ．．． | D $\times$ ¢ 7 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 37 （ $\times$ f7＋ | 6，$\times \mathbf{6} 7$ |
| 38 間b3＋ | \％f8 |
| 39 管c3 | $0 \times 16$ |
| 40 臨3＋ | 1－0 |

（44）Kan－Botvinnik，May 25／26， 1953 1．d4 e6 2．©ff f5 3．g3 气f6












（45）Botvinnik－Kan，May 27， 19531 e 4 c5 2 気f d6 3 d4 cxd4 4








（46）Kan－Botvinnik，June 20， 19531 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 〇f3 0 f6 4 ©c3 e65 e3 0 bd 76 具d3 dxc4 7 具 $\times \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{~b} 58$ 县d3a69e4c510e5



（47）Botvinnik－Kan，June 22， 19531 e 4 c5 2 亿ff d6 3 d4 cxd4 4






留e $4+37$ 为c $1 / 2-1 / 2$
（48）Kan－Botvinnik，June 23， 19531 e 4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 公c3 b4 4



县b1 f6 25 学f2



## 罗b2 0 e5 Unfinished

（49）Botvinnik－Kan，June 24， 19531 d4 包f6 2 c4 e6 3 气c3 县b4 4











（50）Kan－Botvinnik，January 22， 19541 e 4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 气d2 c5 4









（51）Botvinnik－Kan，January 23， 19541 d 4 d5 2 c 4 c6 3 亿ff3 ©f6
具g4 10 f3 合d5 11 fxg 4 畑 $\times \mathrm{h} 412$ e4（ 12 畑f3）12．．．包 $\times \mathrm{c} 313 \mathrm{bxc} 3$



包g633 츱 $\times$ a $5+1-0$
（52）Kan－Botvinnik，January 24， 19541 d 4 d5 2 c 4 c6 3 亿ff 0 f6






会b4 莒d8 36 岂ec1 管dd6 37 苗 $1 \mathrm{c} 5 \mathrm{~g} 538 \mathrm{~h} \times \mathrm{g} 5+\mathrm{h} \times \mathrm{g} 539$ 岂 7 c 6

（53）Botvinnik－Kan，January 26， 19541 d4 $\searrow \mathrm{ff} 62$ c4 e6 3 包c3


 18 是 $\times \mathrm{d} 8$ 莒 $\times \mathrm{d} 819 \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{c} 5 \mathrm{~b} \times \mathrm{c} 520$ 岂 a 2 县 e 421 f 3 县 d 522 岂 b 2 回 a 6

（54）Kan－Botvinnik，January 27， 19541 e 4 e 22 ff 0 c6 3 b5


 exf4 20 e 5 g6 21 씁e4 f6 22 畑xf4（22 e6）22．．．fxe5 23 씁e3 c4 24











 c5＋
（56）Botvinnik－Kan，January 30， 19541 e 4 e 52 気3 3 c6 3 b5







 41 留f $1 / 1 / 2-1 / 2$
（57）Kan－Botvinnik，February 5， 19541 d4 d5 2 c4 e63 亿c3 c64










（58）Botvinnik－Kan，February 6， 19541 d4 ©f6 2 c4 g6 3 g3 c6 4



包c2d424 $0 \times b 4$ 邑 $\times \mathrm{b} 425 \mathrm{~b} 31 / 2-1 / 2$
（59）Kan－Botvinnik，February 7， 19541 e 4 e 52 亿f3 0 c6 3 具b5






 ©h6 0－1（2．17－1．43）
（60）Kan－Botvinnik，February 10， 19541 d 4 d5 2 c 4 c6 3 亿f3 $0 f 6$







 （1．55－2．05）
（61）Botvinnik－Kan，February 13， 19541 d 4 d5 2 c4 c63 $仓 \mathrm{f} 3$ 亿f6 4 cxd 5 cxd 55 亿c3 氚c6 6 县4 e67e3县e78 县d3 O－O 9 h3 县d7



 $1 / 2-1 / 2$
（62）Botvinnik－Averbakh，June 6， 19551 d4 ©f6 2 c4 e6 3 包c3






畑f8 32 留h3 留d8 33 e6 1－0
（63）Averbakh－Botvinnik，June 23， 19551 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3 ©f3








（64）Averbakh－Botvinnik，December 23， 19551 d4 $0 f 62$ c4 e6 3
气e2 O－O 10 e 4 气e8 11 O－O 0 a5 12 气g3 具a6 $13 \mathrm{f} 4 \mathrm{f} 5(-) 14 \mathrm{exf} 5$





 $1 / 2$
（65）Averbakh－Botvinnik，December 30， 19551 d4 ©ff 2 c4 e6 3
 （8．．．cxd4 9 包 $\times \mathrm{d} 5$ ！） 9 具 $\times \mathrm{c} 4 \mathrm{cxd} 410 \mathrm{exd} 4$ 具 $\times \mathrm{c} 311 \mathrm{bxc} 3$ 留c7 12



 （effe） 26 堅xf6



（66）Averbakh－Botvinnik，June 7， 19561 e4 c5 2 包f 3 亩c6 3 d4






 Bg Unfinished
（67）Botvinnik－Averbakh，June 9， 19561 e 4 e 52 亿f3 0 c 63 县b5




 exd7 1－0
（68）Botvinnik－Averbakh，April 1， 19561 d4 ©f6 2 c4 e6 3 回c3











（69）Averbakh－Botvinnik，August 3， 19561 e 4 c5 2 团f3 0 c6 3 d4










 0－1
具b44 e3 c5 5 亿e2 cxd4 6 exd4 O－O 7 a3







（71）Averbakh－Botvinnik，August 6， 19561 e 4 e 62 d4 d5 3 亿d2

 （12．．．c4） 13 完e1 g6 14 完d3 c4 15 包e1 気c6 16 씁d2 b5 17 定f3 a5








 （3．22－3．00）
（72）Averbakh－Botvinnik，December 25， 19561 d4 ©f6 2 c 4 g 63




具e6 29 a3f5 30 e 5 h5 31 气e3 $1 / 2-^{-1 / 2}$
（73）Averbakh－Botvinnik，December 8， 19571 e 4 e 52 亿f3 0 c6 3






（74）Botvinnik－Averbakh，January 9， 19571 d4 $仓 \mathrm{ff} 62$ c4 e6 3




 $1 / 2-1 / 2$
（75）Averbakh－Botvinnik，January 19， 19571 d4 e6 2 ©ff f5 3 g3









（76）Botvinnik－Averbakh，January 21， 19571 c4 c5 2 合c3 0 c6 3
 $9 \mathrm{c} \times \mathrm{b} 5$（ 9 c 5 ） $9 \ldots \mathrm{a}$ ．．b5 10 h 4 h 611 e 4 e 512 气ge2 d6 13 d 3 气ge7




县b3 36 品b2




（77）Averbakh－Botvinnik，January 24， 19571 e 4 c5 2 気 3 亿c6 3








（78）Botvinnik－Averbakh，January 25， 19571 d4 d5 2 c4 c6 3










（79）Averbakh－Botvinnik，January 29， 19571 e 4 e 52 亿f3 公c6 3

 14 包 $3(14 \mathrm{dxc} 5) 14 \ldots \mathrm{cxd} 415 \mathrm{cxd} 4$ 国 616 d 5 （ $16 \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{e} 5$ ）16．．．气b4





 ©c3 1－0
（80）Botvinnik－Averbakh，January 30， 19571 d4 论6 2 c4 e6 3




（81）Botvinnik－Furman，October 9， 1960
Notes by Jan Timman


| 2 乌f3 e6 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| 3 d 3 | $\ldots$ |

Botvinnik decides to avoid a theoreticaldiscussion and chooses a quiet line of the closed Sicilian．

| 3 ．．． | Ec6 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 4 g 3 | g6 |
| 5 包 |  |
| $60-0$ | Qge7 |
| 7 答1（7 Qe2）．．． |  |
| 7 ．．． | O－O |
| 8 c 3 |  |

Preparing for 9 d 4 ，while $8 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 5$ can be met by 9 e 5 ．

$$
8 \ldots \text { e5 }
$$

The right response．Black prevens the push d2－d4 at the cost of one tempo．This tempo，however，is unimportant，because it is not clear that in the closed positions that will arise that the Rook is better posted on el than fl．


But now the tempo becomes important！The text move is a serious mistake，since Black enters a reversed King＇s Indian a tempo down，so
compared with the regular King＇s Indian he is two tempi down．The normal move is $9 \ldots \mathrm{~d} 6$ ，keeping a solid pawn chain．The game could then continue： 10 b4 h6 11 包bd2 b6 12 县b2 B7 13 㷐b3 留d7 14品ad1 营ad8 15 包c4 b5 16 臽e3 a6 with a complicated game and approximately equal chances（Lau－Hübner，Munich 1988，with a slight transposition of moves）．It is impressive to see how Botvinnik takes advantage of Black＇s mistake．

$$
10 \mathrm{~b} 4 \quad \mathrm{~d} \times \mathrm{e} 4
$$

It is already hard to suggest a better move，because White would other－ wise be able to exert enormous pressure against the Black center．

| 11 dxe 4 | ${ }_{y}^{4} \times \mathrm{d} 11$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 12 答 $\times$ d1 | 皆d8 |

Exchanging another heavy piece，which will，however，not alleviate White＇s pressure．

> 13 ${ }^{2} \times \mathbf{d 8}$ + $Q \times \mathrm{d} 8$
> 14 思e3 (14 是 $\times \mathrm{c} 5$ !? )

Thereis no need to take the c－pawn．White＇s strategy is to force Black to take on b4．Then he will take with his a－pawn and the half－open a－file will just increase the pressure．

| $14 \ldots$ | Øe6 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 15 Øbd2 | Øc6 |
| 16 Øc4 | $\ldots$ |

White is building up the pressure．He threatens 17 b5，winning the e－ pawn．

$$
16 \ldots \quad \mathbf{c} \times \mathbf{b} 4
$$

Black is giving in．There was hardly any choice，because after 16．．．b5 17 ©d6 it would have been impossible to protect the weak b－and c－
pawns at the same time.
$17 \mathbf{a} \times \mathbf{b 4} \quad$ 气c7
Black temporarily keeps control on the queenside. He will have to surrender the Bishop pair, however.

## 18 Ød6 ...

With the main threat of 19 b 5 , so Black's reply is forced.


Another subtle move. Before retreating the Bishop of f1, he chases the Rook away from c8. Superficially, the d-file seems to be the more active post for the Rook, but a closer look reveals that it has no square available on the open file.

| 20. | 留d8 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 21 d1 |  |

Everything fits in place. White not only keeps the black Rook from entering on d3, he also threatens 22 b 5 again. If Black prevents this by 21...a6, then 22 b6 d7 23 is highly unpleasant.


Black collapses under pressure. The only move was $21 . . . \mathrm{b} 5$ in order to
stop White＇s expansion on the Queenside for the time being．It is actu－ ally a pity that Furman did not play this，because it would have been interesting to see how Botvinnik in that case would have converted his positional trumps into a win．

A good starting move would be 22 完d2 to bring the Knight to the queenside．White＇s strategical superiority leaps to the eye．Both Black queenside pawns are permanently weak，while White＇s pieces have many squares at their disposal．Black＇s pieces on the other hand are restricted to defensive purposes．It is understandable that Black subconsciously had no desire to test White＇s technical skills any further．

| 22 b 5 | 025 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 23 ¢ 25 | 具 7 |
| 24.96 | ．．． |

Crushing．

| 24 ．．． | $8 \times 6$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| $25 \mathrm{~b} \times \mathrm{c} 6$ | 䎌d6 |
| 26 癸× $\times 7$ | 管 $\times$ c6 |
| 27 c4 | ．． |

With the simple threat of 28 E7，winning the b－pawn．

| 27 ．．． | Qe6 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 28 号8＋ | 真 18 |
| 29 ${ }_{\text {a }}$ | Qc5 |
| 30 h6 | Qe6 |
| 31 e5 |  |

Horrible torture．

| 31 ．．． | 097 |
| :---: | :---: |
|  | 管6 |
| 33 f 4 | 1－0（1．39－1．29） |

Black resigned．A strategically model game．
（82）Furman－Botvinnik，October 10， 19601 d4 0 f6 2 c4 g63 完c3







（83）Furman－Botvinnik，January 7， 1961
Notes by Jan Timman

| 1 d 4 | Qf6 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 2 c 4 | c5 |
| 3 d 5 | d6 |
| 40.3 | g6 |
| 5 ¢f3 | 具 $\mathrm{g}^{\prime}$ |
| 6 g 3 | O－O |
| 7 國2 | 096 |
| $80-0$ | Qc7 |
| 9 a 4 | ．．． |

So far all is established theory．White prevents the push b7－b5 before developing his Queen＇s Bishop．


This approach is completely unknown．The usual moves are $9 . . .{ }^{\text {anb }} \mathrm{b} 8$ ， $9 \ldots$ ．．e5，9．．．h6 and 9．．．e6．The idea of the text move is obviously to bring the Knight to b4．This plan is of dubious value for two reasons：（1）The Knight manoeuvre take as lot of time；and（2）It is not quite clear whether
the Knight is will posted on b4．Only if Black could combine it with actions along an open file would the position of the Knight be good． Otherwise it will be cut off from the defense．It is only thanks to Botvinnik＇s grat resourcefulness and deep insight that he will be able to survive after the Knight manoeuvre．

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 10 \text { 置 } 4 \text { 乌h5 } \\
& \text { (10...包b4 } 11 \text { 留d2!) }
\end{aligned}
$$

Botvinnik gives one of his concise，sober comments：10．．．乞b4 11 畑d2！． This is indeed true．White would then follow up with 12 h6 and have a strong bind．Therefore Black must，at all costs，try to confuse matters and fight for the initiative．The text move is part of this plan．

| 11 e 3 | e5 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 12 d $\times 6$ | $\ldots$ |

Forced，otherwise White would get no grip on the position．

| 12 ．．． | Q $\times 2$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 13 －d2 |  |
| 14 ¢d5 | ．．． |

Forceful play．White is ready to sacrifice his b－pawn in order to estab－ lish his superiority in the center．

$$
14 \ldots \text {... } \times \mathbf{d 5}
$$

Positional rules don＇t apply anymore．Black gives up his Bishop pair， including the vital white－squared Bishop，in order to create counterplay．

## $15 \times \mathrm{d} 5$ <br> 0.04 <br> 16 亿e4

Furman is playing the early middlegame very well．He puts all his pieces on the most active squares，putting Black in an unenviable position．

$$
16 \ldots \text {... } \times 162
$$

What else is there to do？Black takes a pawn and prays that he will survive the storm．

## 17 営b1 e5

Both players keep on adding fuel to the fire．Otherwise the lesser evil was $17 \ldots \mathrm{~g} 7$ ，although after 18 各×d6！包xd5 19 留d5 b6 20气b5，White can boast of a clear positional advantage．Botvinnik was probably well aware of this，especially the nature of White＇s advantage： He was most skillful winning such positions as White．The text move gives White the opportunity to launch a very dangerous offensive．Still， Black will not be without resources and White will have to calculate very well，as we shall see．

| 18 f 4 |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| $19 \mathrm{f} 5!$ | B ！ |
| ．．． |  |

Now the variation with $190 \times \mathrm{C} 6$ would make little sense，because White would have a weakened Kingside．The next move，however，clearly shows that White＇s previous move was purposeful．．Black is hard pressed and will have to walk a tightrope．

$$
19 \text {... 管ae8! }
$$

Cold－blooded defense．Black could not play 19．．．g×f5 because then 20 包xd6 would be crushing．Therefore he＇s looking for a tactical re－ sponse to White＇s direct threats．The fact that the Bishop on e3 is un－ protected makes it best for White to try to crash through Black＇s de－ fenses．


## 20 營 $\times$ b4

The game is reaching its climax．White sacrifices an exchange to keep his strong Bishop on d 5 and to obtain square d 4 for the other Bishop． This attractive plan makes Black＇s defense tough．

Other moves were less suited to cause trouble．I examine the alterna－
 well；（b） 20 f 6 ．The crucial alternative．Black can take the pawn in two

 with advantage to White；（ii） $20 \ldots$ ．．．$\times \mathrm{f} 6!21$ 岂 $\times f 6$ 氚 $\times \mathrm{d} 522$ 甾 $\times \mathrm{d} 5$ 岂 $\times$ e 4 23 岂 $\times \mathrm{d} 6$ 然e8 and Black gets a good position，both after $24 \times \mathrm{C} 5$ b6 and 24 h6 $0 . \mathrm{g} 7$ ．


Before bringing his Bishop to d 4 ，he first takes a pawn on the Queenside． Superficially the move looks wrong，because Black can now get two connected passed pawns on the Queenside．

Furman，however，has judged the situation very sharply：Black will need two moves to create the passed pawns，so in fact he wins one tempo， compared with the immediate 21 d4．And this tempo will obviously be very valuable in the offensive that White has started．Besides，Black＇s Queenside＇s pawns will not be threatening for a while，because of White＇s superior central control．

| 21 | b5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 22 d4 | 第×4！ |

Botvinnik is on his guard．He sacrifices back the exchange，because after 23．．．b×a4 $24 \times \mathrm{Cg} 7$ 압 $\times \mathrm{g} 725$ 畑d4＋White＇s attack becomes too


| 23 曷 $\times 4$ | $b \times a 4$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| 24 f 6 | $\ldots$ |

A strong push，displacing both Black＇s minor pieces．

$$
24 \text {... } 16
$$

Ohterwise Black＇s Bishop would be buried alive．
25 e3 ．．．

This small pawn move is played with a clear intention：He wants to win the Knight by g2－g4．There is little Black can do about this．

$$
25 \text {... b3 }
$$

Black is trying to make his passed pawn a force．The alternative 25 ．．．ge8
 Bishop（not 28 昌h1？聯h3 $29 \times 3$ 是 $\times \mathrm{g} 3+$ and Black wins）．


26 留f3 ．．．

White hesitates，with the result that the initiative is handed over to Black． The obvious 26 g 4 was crucial．Black must then strive for the utmost activity for his pieces by 26 ．．．घe8，with the following possibilities：（a）
 W1（the only ways to stop the pawns） $31 \ldots \mathrm{~g} \times \mathrm{h} 5$ and a draw is the most likely outcome．The passed pawn outweighs the Bishop．（b） 27
 pawns are just enough counterweight，this time for White＇s King＇s Bishop．

The situation is a lot sharper here，due to the presence of the Queens．In this respect，White＇s unsafe King＇s position plays a role．This is borne
 Black has a perpetual．

$$
26 \ldots g 5
$$

Furman may have overlooked this cunning reply．Now 27 g 4 is less
畕 2 留 $\times 4$ and Black has won too many pawns for the pieces．

$$
27 \text { © }
$$

The best practical solution．White gives up the idea of winning the Knight and concentrates on eliminating Black＇s queenside pawns．


Threatening again to win the Knight by 30 g 4 ．Botvinnik now comes up with a sharp continuation that gives him the upper hand．

| 29 ．．． | Mc2 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 30 沯f2 | b2！ |

The point of the previous move．White must take the b－pawn．

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 32 \text { 鱼g2 } \times f 6
\end{aligned}
$$

Now Black＇s combination become clear．After $33 \times f 6$ 包xf6 34 씁 $\times f 6$ there is a check at b7，winning the Bishop．

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
33 \text { \& } \times \mathrm{f6} & 0 \times \mathrm{f} 6 \\
34 \AA \mathrm{c} & \ldots
\end{array}
$$

It is understandable that White does not want to go into the ending with only heavy pieces，because he has a chance to keep to keep an active Bishop against a passive Knight．After 34 씁×f6 씁b7＋ 35 相g1 씁d7
 against－two queen ending which is by no means easy．

$$
34 \ldots \text { 贸 } \mathbf{C} 1
$$

A careless move that allows White to equalize．More precise was
 Bishop to b3．If 36 e 4 ，then 36 ．．．f6 keeps some winning chances alive． Possibly exchanging the Knight for the Bishop would then still be White＇s best option，but as I said：The draw is not easy to obtain after that．

## 35 Da4！．．．

The saving move．Now 35．．．团h5 36 且b3 is OK for White．So Black must attack the Bishop again，leaving his d－pawn unprotected．

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 35 \text {... 贸 } \mathbf{C} 4
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 37 \text { 朔 } \times 16 \text { 欮 } \mathrm{e} 4+ \\
& 38 \text { 登f3 笪 } \mathbf{c} \text { 8 }
\end{aligned}
$$

The last try．The Rook threatens to invade on c2．White，however has an active queen move that at the same time protects the Rook．

## 39 留f6 ．．．

 still in trouble．

$$
39 \text {... . My d5 }
$$

40 g4．

Draw agreed．A fascinating struggle for the initiative that showed both players from their strongest side．
（84）Botvinnik－Furman，January 9， 19611 e 4 e 52 亿ff









 def3 $1 / 2-1 / 2$
（85）Botvinnik－Furman，February 17， 19611 e 4 c5 2 f4 ©c6 3 ©f3





 2．16）
（86）Furman－Botvinnik，February 18， 19611 d4 气㐅f6 2 c4 g6 3




具e5 28 菂d2 具b8 29 亘c4 1－0（1．57－1．36）
（87）Furman－Botvinnik，February 22， 19611 d4







 ©h2 h6 45 思b6 0 d5 Unfinished（ $2.28-2.20$ ）

## （88）Botvinnik－Furman，February 24， 1961

Notes by Jan Timman

## 1 g3

Botvinnik has played this opening move one other time in his career： against Szilagyi，Amsterdam 1966．That game was played in the first round．I remember a story that I read in the paper then，as a 14－year－ old：During the opening ceremony an official had made the remark that 1 g 3 was not a very good opening move to play for a win．Therefore Botvinnik had played the move to prove the official wrong．I remeber that at the time I was wondering why－and I still am－this official had made this claim．

$$
1 \ldots \text { d5 }
$$

2 气f3

Just like in the game against Szilagyi．Botvinnik was apparently not ready to allow Black the d5－e5 center．This would imply that he would have answered $1 .$. e 5 with 2 c 4.

| 2 ．．． | g6 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 3 S 2 | 䅼7 |
| $40-0$ | e5 |
| 5 d 3 | $0 \cdot 7$ |
| 6 ¢bd2 | O－O |
| 7 c 4 | d4 |

A positional error，as early as move 7．By releasing the tension in the
center, Black lets his opponent build up a strong initiative in the center. After the flexible 7...c6, he would not have had any particular opening problems.

## 8 b4 ...

Of course White has a traditional bind on the Queenside now. If Black would have a set-up with his Knight on $\mathrm{f6}$ and the e-pawn still at e7, then the situation would have been significantly better for Black; mainly the a3-f8 diagonal would have been less vulnerable.

| $8 \ldots$ | a5 |
| :--- | :--- |
| 9 b 5 | c5 |

Black is trying to solve the situation on the Queenside. If he could keep it closed, then he would have little to worry about. But White takes en passant, obtaining squares on the Queenside.
$10 \mathrm{~b} \times \mathrm{c} 6$ e.p. $\sum \mathrm{Q} \times \mathrm{c} 6$


For the moment Black can restrict White's activity on the Queenside by keeping a temporary stronghold on b4.


12 亿e1
Until this moment, the game was identical to Larsen-Chandler, Hastings 1987/88 (though with a slightly different move order). Instead of the


 ©df3 with more than enough compensation for the Queen.

Botvinnik has a different strategy in mind. He brings the Knight to c2 and the other Knight to b3, before exchanging on b4. Although this will bring White a slight, but solid advantage, I still feel that Larsen's approach for activating the Queen is more powerful and therefore stronger.

## 12 ... 癸e8

Black vacates the $\mathrm{f8}$-square for the Bishop, in order to keep the stronghold on b4.

| 13.20 | D8 |
| :---: | :---: |
| $14 \times 10$ |  |

The same concept as in Larsen's game. White must exchange the Knight sooner or later, otherwise he cannot make progress.

| $14 .$. | $\mathbf{a} \times 1 \mathbf{6}$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| 15 - ${ }^{\text {b }} 3$ | Qa6 |
| 16 e3 | ... |

Creating a second front, in the center.

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
16 \ldots & d \times e 3 \\
17 \mathbf{f} \times \mathbf{e} 3 & \ldots
\end{array}
$$

Now White has the half-open f-file for the attack and his main threat is 18 d5. The drawback of opening up the center is that White's pawn structure becomes less solid. The method of operating over the entire board is typical of Botvinnik: He was aiming for dynamic play in most circumstances.

$$
17 \ldots \quad \text { f5 }
$$

A concession．Black weakens his Kingside in order to avert the threat against $f 7$ ．It was，however，hard to find an alternative，because the retreat of the Knight to c 7 would mean that b 4 would lose its protec－ tion．

| 18 留d2 | 管b8 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 19 a3 | ．．． |

It is interesting to note that the plan that Larsen executed immediately （taking on b4，followed by a2－a3）is done by Botvinnik in different stages．It was time to do it now，otherwise White couldn＇t have kept the initiative．

| $19 \ldots$ | $b \times a 3$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| 20 亿 $\times$ a3 | 具 $b 4$ |

Active defense．The fight for the initiative is in full swing．

| 21 留e2 | 4 C 7 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 22 ¢c2 | 㫫c3 |

Furman plays this part of the game very well．The text move looks dar－ ing，because the Bishop will be surrounded by pieces in the enemy camp and could easily become lost．Black has calculated precisely that he will be able to rescue the Bishop．

## 23美a3 b5

The logical follow－up of the two previous moves．Black is looking for counterplay on the Queenside．

## 24 ©c5 ．．．

The best way to attack the Bishop．The alternative 24 © c1 would have worked will after 24．．．b2 25 苗b2 $\times$ c1 26 苗 $\times \mathrm{c} 1$ followed by 27品cb1．Much better is however 24．．．b4 25 营b3 $d 7$ with the unpleas－ ant threat of 26．．．

Now 24 ．．．b 4 was wrong because after 25 品b3，there would be a double threat of 26 园 4 and 26 fb 1 ，winning the b－pawn．With the text move， Black forces the exchange of his Bishop for White＇s Knight which makes it slightly easier to withstand the pressure．

| 25 等 $\times$ c 3 | 艮 $\times$ C5 |
| :---: | :---: |
| 26 Meryd2 | ．．． |

Protecting the Rook，thus forcing Black to take on c4．


White has managed to keep the initiative．With the text move White hopes to force the enemy Knight to a passive square．The alternative 28 ©b4 was just not enough to keep lasting pressure after 28．．．b7 29営fc1 ©e6 and Black keeps his forces together．

$$
28 \ldots \text { 亿a6? }
$$

The decisive mistake．The Knight is stranded on a6．The only move was 28．．．－b5 to keep the Knight active．Probably Black was worried about the pin along the b－file after 29 茴b1．Still，it is not clear how White can profit after 29．．．d7．In this respect it is important that the line 30 d5＋
苗 $\times$ b5 ${ }^{\mu} \times$ a5．In general，White has a slight advantage，but on the basis of his more active piece play，but not more than that．

## 29 号 6 ！

Paralyzing the enemy forces．The black Knight is totally dominated．

## 29 ．．．号 $\mathbf{a 8}$

A sad move，but there is no choice．Possibly Furman had counted on 29．．．〇b4．This knight sortie ismore difficult to refute than one might
包×232 $\mathrm{g} 7+$ and mate follows．It is surprising how this mating attack

 an important center pawn while maintaining his positional trumps．

## 30 㓵b1 ．．．

Restricting Black more and more．With the text move，White prevent the Bishop development（！）To b7．He was obviously not interested in the win of a pawn by $30 \stackrel{\mu}{\mathrm{~g}} \times \mathrm{g} 6+$ ；there is more at stake．

$$
\begin{aligned}
& 30 \text {... 贸d8 } \\
& 31 \text { 씅c3 呺b8 }
\end{aligned}
$$

Ablunder that puts Black out of his misery．Black cold hardly move a piece．The only move was 31 ．．．㓵a7，but then 32 Rd6 would follow， putting Black＇s position on the verge of collapse．

32 筸 $\times$ b8 1－0（2．09－2．06）
Black resigned because after $32 \ldots$ ．．．Nx8 33 Qb3＋he loses a piece．

 9 酜d3 留e7 10 管d1？气b6？（10．．．e5） 11 县b3 具d7 12 气e5 号ac8？ 13 ©xd7 0 bxd 714 d2






（90）Furman－Botvinnik，February 28， 19611 e 4 c5 2 亿ff g63c4






 ©

（91）Furman－Botvinnik，December 17， 19611 c4 g62 d4 g 73







 1．55）
（92）Botvinnik－Furman，December 18， 19611 e 4 c5 2 f4e6 3 気3




 g6 $1 / 2-1 / 2$
（93）Balashov－Botvinnik，March 18， 19701 e 4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 亿d2



具c6 11 O－O O－O 12 光d1 留b6 13 具g5 县e7 14 品ab1 吕ad8 15 b4




 © 0 d $41 / 2-1 / 2(2.28-2.28)$
（94）Botvinnik－Balashov，March 19， 19701 c4 e6 2 d4 d5 3 氚c 3具 e 74 cxd 5 exd 55 具f4 c6 6 e3 57 g 4 具e6 8 h 4 h 59 g 5 （9 gxh5）9．．．d6 10 包ge2 包e7 11 畑b3 县c8 12 县h3 具xf4 13 气xf4



（95）Balashov－Botvinnik，March 20， 19701 e 4 c6 2 c 4 d5 3 exd5 $\mathrm{cxd} 54 \mathrm{~d} 4(4 \mathrm{cxd} 5) 4 \ldots . .0 \mathrm{f} 65$ 气c3 g6 6 畑b3 具g7 $7 \mathrm{cxd} 5 \mathrm{O}-\mathrm{O} 8$

焻e8＋0－1（0．36－0．52）
（96）Botvinnik－Balashov，March 21， 19701 d4 d5 2 c4 e6 3 只c3







 （2．36－2．33）

## Postscript 2006



This sketch by an unknown artist of the young Botvinnik appears on the cover of one of his handwritten notebooks containing his games from the 1929 USSR Championship.

## Background

In the mid-1990s, a cache of over 100 games of Mikhail Botvinnik were discovered. Upon closer inspection, it was determined that a large number of them had been unpublished. Dutch grandmaster Jan Timman was retained to select ten games to annotate. He also produced a survey of the games and an opening theoretical section.


Jan Timman provided over 80 pages of handwritten annotations and text. Here is the first part of his work on game 43, BotvinnikKan.

The material in this PDF e-book was originally released as software that was to be used in conjunction with a program called ChessCafe Reader. The software program Selected Games was released in 2000. A year or so after its release, the ChessCafe Reader was discontinued. These games, and Timman's notes, make for fascinating reading. The material had been prepared for release as a small book, but we never seemed to get around to actually publishing it. Finally, rather than let it sit idle, we decided to release it in PDF format and make it available free of charge to ChessCafe fans worldwide.


Transcribing handwritten comments to formal text can be a chore. We had a number of questions for Timman which he quickly resolved. This is a copy of his note:

Dear Hanon,
These are the corrections. I hope everything is clear.
Best regards, Jan Timman.

The envelope is postmarked Amsterdam, 20.IX. 99 (September 20, 1999). Three months later, the electronic version of the book was released.

The book itself was converted to Adober's Portable Document (PDF)
format and it is presented with all the same material and games that had been included in the original ChessCafe Reader program. Enjoy...

Introduction
It is perhaps stating the obvious that Mikhail
 Botvinnik is one of the towering figures in chess of the 20th century. Although not noted for brilliant play like Alekhine or Tal, or the intuitive grasp of position like Fischer, the three-time world champion was a formidable opponent his entire career, from the days of his youth in revolutionary Russia to his retirement as an active player over a half-century later in the Soviet Union. In the days before computers and databases, Botvinnik set the standard for thorough preparation. His "home cooking" - as dubbed by Tal - was legendary. No one would do it as well until Kasparov - one of the many successful pupils of Botvinnik's famous chess school - came along.

## Secret...

For Botvinnik, there really was no substitute for hard work and training. And one of the ways he went about preparing for matches and tournaments was to play serious games under actual tournament conditions. To that end, some of the USSR's top grandmasters were recruited. Dozens (hundreds?) of games were played as part of Botvinnik's training regimen.

But there was just one catch... They were kept secret. Yes, there were rumors. No, nothing definite was known. And no, nobody said anything about them. Some in the higher echelon of the game had well-founded suspicions, but that is all they were - suspicions.

However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, restrictions on information relating to these kind of clandestine activities began to loosen. Botvinnik, who died in 1995, said little or nothing about these matches. The first hard evidence was released by Russian grandmaster Yuri Averbakh. Fifteen of these training games between himself and Botvinnik were published in Chess in Russia (2/1995).

## ...No More

A few years ago, approximately 150 original Botvinnik scoresheets were acquired. Some of these games were known; many were not. Unknown Botvinnik games? Yes, the famous secret training games.

## The Games

The secret training games, including those played against Averbakh, along with the three Kaminer games have been collected in one of the first exclusively electronic chess books to be released - Secret Matches: The Unpublished Training Games of Mikhail Botvinnik. Ten of these games have been selected for in-depth annotations by Dutch grandmaster Jan Timman. In addi-
 tion, Timman, a life-long admirer of the Russian world champion, has written a short article about Botvinnik's training, preparation and openings, The Theoretical Importance of Botvinnik's Training Games.

Annotations for two other games have been furnished by Russian grandmaster Yuri Averbakh. 18 training games were played between him and Botvinnik. In addition, Botvinnik himself would occasionally make notes on his scoresheet. These notes were sometimes just marks - an exclamation point or question mark. Other times a different move than was played in the game would be noted. These handwritten notes by Botvinnik are duly noted in the games.

## The Players

The training games were played against eight different players. Opponents included Averbakh (18 games), Balashov (4), Flohr (1), Furman (11), Kan (27), Rabinovich (3), Ragozin (24) and Smyslov (4). The games spanned 34 years. And there was an added bonus. Among the papers were notebooks kept by the young Botvinnik and three games (actually two complete games and one fragment) that had previously been unknown, played by the young (13-year-old) Botvinnik against someone named Kaminer.


Yuri Averbakh is one of the best known Russian grandmasters in the world today. At various times he has been the editor of Shakhmatnaya Moskva, Shakhmaty v SSSR and Shakhmatny Biulletin. He is probably best known as an endgame theoretician. Averbakh released 15 of his training games in a 1995 article that appeared in the magazine Chess in Russia. He submitted two annotated games for this collection.


This is Botvinnik's handwritten scoresheet of his game with Ragozin. It is typical of all the scoresheets of the training games. Botvinnik used, for the most part, long algebraic notation on a plain sheet (as opposed to a printed scoresheet). Notice the parenthetical jotting to the right of Black's 10th move and the time used by the players to the right of Black's 39th move. When this information appears on the original scoresheets, it is also noted in the book. This is Game 27 of Secret Matches.


Botvinnik played four games against Yuri Balashov, the only one who would not be regarded as belonging to the world champion's generation. He was a member of Karpov's analytical team in the 1978, 1981 and 1984 world championship matches.

Salo Flohr was among the world's strongest players in the 1930s. Although he only played Botvinnik once (that we know of) in these training games, it was a draw. Interestingly enough, in 1933, these two had played a twelvegame match which ended 6-6, with each winning two games and the other eight games drawn.


Semyon Furman is probably best remembered outside Russia as Anatoly Karpov's trainer from 1969, until Furman's death in 1978. Although active as a chessplayer into the 1970s, he had his most successful results in the 1950s.

Ilya Kan played more training games, 27, against Botvinnik than any other player. He also was most active in the 1930s. Although not well known outside of Russia, he provided Botvinnik strong opposition in the training games. He participated in ten USSR championships, his best result being in 1929
 when he finished in third place.


Three games were played between Botvinnik and Rabinovich. Unfortunately, there were two players named Rabinovich that could have been his opponent, Abram and Ilya. Although not specified on any of the scoresheets, Botvinnik most probably played against Ilya Rabinovich. The training games were played in 1937 and Abram would have been 58 or 59 at the time, while Ilya would have been 48 . Ilya also was very active as player in the 1930s; Abram did not play in any major tournament after Moscow 1930.


Vyacheslav Ragozin played more training games against Botvinnik than anyone except Kan. Active from the beginning of the 1930s right through the 1950s, he maintained his connection with Botvinnik for many years, acting as his second both in the world championship tournament(The Hague/Moscow, 1948) and in the 1951 world championship match against Bronstein. Ragozin was also a correspondence chess grandmaster, winning the 2nd World Correspondence Chess Championship (1956-59).

Botvinnik must have wondered who benefited more from the training games he played against Vassily Smyslov. Those training games were played at the end of 1951 and the beginning of 1952. Two years later, Botvinnik would meet Smyslov in the first of three title matches, drawing that one, but losing to Smyslov in 1957 and then winning the title back in
 1958.

There are 95 training games contained in this book. As noted above, 15 were published in 1995; we believe the remaining 80 are being seen for the first time by the general public. Then there are the two games and one game fragment from a 1924 match played against Kaminer. Acheck in the Chess Encyclopedia (Moscow 1990) reveals an entry for a one Sergei Kaminer who achieved some success as a composer of chess studies. Born in 1908, he would have been about the right age to be playing a match against the 13-year-old Botvinnik in 1924.

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Hanon W. Russell
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