Iraq Sanctions (IRAQSANC)
CASE NUMBER: 390
CASE MNEMONIC: IRAQSANC
CASE NAME: Iraq Sanctions
I. IDENTIFICATION
1. The Issue
In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait because of disputes Iraq had with
Kuwait: Iraq claimed that Kuwait had extracted oil from a pool
beneath the Iraq-Kuwait border that belonged to Iraq; Iraq
contended that Kuwait purposefully saturated the petrol market with
large supplies of oil, therefore, keeping oil's spot market price
low (low oil prices, rendered Iraq unable to pay the massive debt
it had accrued during the Iran-Iraq War); Iraq alleged that the
borders drawn for it by the United Kingdom, after the fall of the
Ottoman Empire, unjustly shorted it of territorial seas. After
invading Kuwait, sanctions were placed on Iraq; in 1996, sanctions
on Iraq are still in place. In the meantime, sanctions have caused
Iraq's poor to suffer immeasurably and Iraq's ecology to suffer
deleteriously. Furthermore, sanctions have not forced Saddam
Hussein to change his sanctioned actions: He continues to drain
the southern marshes, conducts chemical warfare on Iraqis,
continues to threaten the safety of Kurds and Shiites, and
continues to threaten the territorial autonomy of his neighbors.
Rather than loosening his control over Iraq, sanctions have
accomplished just the opposite, that is, Saddam Hussein's grip on
power has actually tightened. (In fact, Saddam Hussein may be more
powerful today than he was prior to the sanctions.) In the case of
Iraq, sanctions have seemed to fail miserably. It is within the
discourse of this case study that the reasons for the failure of
those sanctions will be examined.
2. Description
After invading Kuwait in 1990, the U.N. began to sanction Iraq's
egregious action. Since then, new sanctions have been placed on
Iraq for its human rights violations and programs of mass
destruction. In total, those sanctions are listed chronologically
as follows:
TIME LINE OF U.N. ACTIONS TAKEN AGAINST
IRAQ
*On August 2, 1990, Iraq invades Kuwait.
Subsequently, the United Nations Security Council
condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in United
Nations Security Council Resolution (hereafter
U.N.S.C.R.) 600, and called for the immediate and
unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces, and the
return of the Iraqi's legitimate government.(1)
*On August 6, 1990, U.N.S.C.R. 661, was levied and
froze Iraqi assets, with exceptions allowed for
"supplies intended strictly for medical purposes
and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs."
*On August 25, 1990, U.N. S.C.R. 665 was passed; it
called for the use of force, if necessary, to force
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.
*On November 29, 1990, U.N.S.C.R. 678 set a deadline
of January 15th for the withdrawal of Iraqi forces
from Kuwait, and called for the use of all necessary
means to force the Iraqi withdrawal after the
deadline expired.
*On January 15, 1991, for a peaceful withdrawal of
the Iraqi forces from Kuwait, set under U.N.S.C.R.
678, expired. Subsequently, on January 17, 1991,
allied forces began "Operation Desert Storm," with
a massive air offensive to liberate Kuwait. On
February 26, 1991, Kuwait was liberated.
*On March 2, 1991, U.N.S.C.R. 686 called on Iraq to
immediately revoke all Iraqi claims, therefore,
annexing Kuwait.
*On April 3, 1991, U.N.S.C.R. 687 dictated cease
fire conditions. The Resolution specified three
categories of demands: unilateral disarmament,
compensation to Kuwait for damage inflicted during
the occupation and war, and acceptance of the 1963
Iraq-Kuwait border.(2) The Iraq dispute over the
Iraqi-Kuwait border, as mentioned previously, arises
from their dissension with the border that the
United Kingdom drew for it after the fall of the
Ottoman Empire.(3) A United Nations Special
Commission (U.N.S.C.O.M.) was charged with
implementing and verifying destruction of Iraq's
chemical and biological weapons capability,
destruction of medium and long-range ballistic
missiles, and installing monitoring mechanisms to
ensure that these capabilities were not rebuilt.
Resolution 687 confirmed that the humanitarian
circumstances were such that food imports should be
allowed after notification to the Sanctions
Committee.
*On August 15, 1991, U.N.S.C.R. 706 allowed Iraq to
sell up to $1.6 billion of its oil. The proceeds
were to be deposited into an UN administered
account. The money in the account was to be used to
buy humanitarian supplies for Iraq, to compensate
Kuwait for war damages, and to reimburse
U.N.S.C.O.M. for its costs. (Iraq did not agree to
the terms of this Resolution and publicly has not
sold oil.)(4)
*For more than two years, Iraq would not cooperate
with disarmament demands, particularly on
verification and monitoring. In November 1993,
however, it doggedly accepted the Security Council
conditions, and U.N.S.C.O.M. began its task. In
June 1994, U.N.S.C.O.M. reported that it had
eliminated Iraq's known chemical weapons stockpile.
Sanctions, as a result of Iraqi compliance were to
be loosened.(5)
*A few days before delivery of U.N.S.C.O.M.'s report
in October, Iraqi troop movements prompted a new
Gulf crisis. As a result, lifting sanctions on Iraq
has been permanently been relegated to "the back
burner."
EFFECT OF SANCTIONS ON TRADE
Although food is available, sanctions have caused skyrocketing
inflation and plunging wages. Skyrocketing inflation and
plunging wages make it impossible for most people to buy on
the free market, relying instead on the limited food rations
the government provides at subsidized prices. As a result of
sanctions, the economy has declined by an estimated 40%;
Iraq's rate of inflation runs in the triple digits.(6)
Furthermore, sanctions have cut living standards to half their
pre-war level. The cost of living (as a result of U.N.
sanctions) has increased drastically for Iraq. To keep
inflation in check, the Iraqi government has periodically
cracked down on merchants-- accused of fueling inflation by
overcharging products. Increasingly as worrisome to price
control is the plunging value of the Iraqi dinar. On the
black market, it has plunged far below its official rate of
U.S. $l = Iraqi Dinar 0.60. The price of the dollar on the
black market is well over 1000 dinars and continues to rise.
In addition to shortages in the market place, Iraq's
inflationary spiral is attributable to counterfeiting and its
Central Bank's official laxed monetary policies.(7)
|
Official Exchange Rate |
U.S.$1=ID .60 |
Black Market Rate |
U.S.$1=ID .001 |
Although Iraq has sustained much damage from the sanctions,
there has been some reconstruction. Much of the
reconstruction which has gone on in Iraq has been temporary;
Iraq has obtained the parts for its reconstruction by
cannibalization of other industrial sectors. Rebuilding has
been emphasized in areas visible to outsiders, thus, giving
the impression that the sanctions are less deleterious than
they truly are. Although civilian factories incurred little
damage during the war, sanctions have forced most of the
factories to either close or to drastically scale back their
production. Sanctions have caused shortages of raw materials
and spare parts used in production; as a result, unemployment
is widespread.(8)
SANCTIONS EFFECT ON THE ENVIRONMENT
Sanctions have reduced Iraq to becoming a poor nation: a
nation unable--with its rather meager funds--to feed itself
let alone take measures to protect Iraq's environment.
Currently, in Iraq, water and sanitation services are said to
be in a critical state of disrepair. This is because Iraq has
a lack of spare parts to repair damages both caused by the
Iran-Iraq War and breakdowns of equipment. Such disrepair has
led to Iraqi water tables becoming contaminated. Posing as
equally detrimental to Iraqi water sources is the dumping of
sewage into all major rivers: the source of drinking
water.(10)
Additionally, shortages of equipment have forced Iraq's cities
into becoming garbage dumps. With a shortage of spare parts
to repair garbage trucks, garbage piles up in the cities.
These garbage dumps pose as health hazards to the cities'
poor, because the poor often forage through them looking for
food.
The shortage of equipment caused by sanctions has also made
Iraq more prone to oil spills (See Komi).
Nonetheless, on the upside, sanctions, in some regards, may
have been good for the Iraqi environment. This is because
Iraq's exports of oil have been banned. Without a market to
sell petrol, Iraq's chances of an oil spill are presumably
less likely. Whether the chances of an oil spill has been
decreased, when taking into consideration the shortage of
equipment, is as of yet to be determined.
In addition to the deleterious effects of equipment shortages
on the environment, Iraq's agricultural infrastructure has
been "badly impaired." It has been impaired by a shortage of
seeds, pesticides, fertilizers and harvesting equipment.
Without proper planting and harvesting, once fertile Iraqi
lands may become unfertile and arid.
SANCTIONS EFFECT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Because the Iraqi military is unwilling to give into the
economic pressures of sanctions, the mortality rate of Iraqi's
sick, children, are increasing. In fact, three and a half
million people are at risk of dyeing in Iraq, a half million
of which are children under five. Iraqi's lives are
threatened by shortages of drugs, medicines, and food.
Although theoretically exempt from sanctions, Iraqi's health
system has no money to buy pharmaceuticals. Therefore, drugs
and other medicinal products are found in short supply.(11)
A recent mission monitoring the progress of an International
Federation food and medicine relief program revealed:
(A) The shortages of equipment within hospitals has
been widespread. Intravenous infusion fluid is
sometimes so scarce that children in hospitals share
drips in rotation. Furthermore, hospitals have a
shortage of disposable syringes; one is used on
several patients. Shortages of disposal syringes is
particularly dangerous given a surge of hepatitis B
has occurred in Iraq and Iraqi's risk of H.I.V.
infection is growing.
(B) Within leukaemia centers, there is a lack of
drugs. The lack of drugs which has affected the
treatment of patients. Lack of drugs has caused
interruptions in treatment of patients, and
interruptions in treatment of patients is especially
dangerous, given these interruptions prove
inevitably lethal to children with leukemia.
(C) Hospitalized children, especially outside
Baghdad, are feed substandard meals. For example,
in one children's hospital, 80 percent of the
children are malnourished.
(D) Diseases that previously occurred seasonally,
now occur all year long. For example, summer
diarrhoea is now common in winter, and winter acute
respiratory infection is common in summer. The
frequent and persistent occurrence of these diseases
are attributable to poor nutrition, contaminated
water, and broken domestic heating systems. Proving
problematic to the growing frequency of these
viruses is the lack of drugs to treat them. As a
result of the growing frequency of these viral
infections, mortality is rising particularly among
children and the elderly.
(E) As a result of substandard living standards,
almost 22 percent of births are premature or involve
critically underweight babies (a figure five times
higher than before the Gulf War, reports the Iraqi
Red Crescent Society). Poor nutrition and mothers'
stress levels can be attributed to these deaths. Due
to both the lack of special milk preparations and
broken respirators and incubators, care for these
patients has been grossly insufficient.(12)
EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS
As previously mentioned, sanctions have been disastrous to
Iraq's economy and environment: They have caused shortages of
goods in the marketplace and have contaminated Iraqi water
supplies. Nonetheless, after five long years of sanctions,
Saddam remains in power. The sanctions purpose was to force
Saddam out of power; however, the sanctions have strengthened
his resolve, while weakening his opposition.
Under the Sanctions, Saddam has rebuilt his army from the
shattered wreck left in 1991. To this day, he continues to
evade United Nations inspectors, trying to hide Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction. Before the beginning of September 1996
(when Saddam increased his onslaught on the Kurds), the U.N.
Security Council was prepared to ease its economic sanctions
enough to permit Iraq $2 billion or more in oil sales.
Nonetheless, with the onslaught of the Kurds came new economic
pressures.(13)
Of the 30 nations that contributed to the American-led, Gulf
War coalition, only Britain, Germany and Kuwait openly
supported Clinton's September 1996 cruise-missile retaliation.
Even Saudi Arabia, the oil-rich crown jewel of American
interests in the Persian Gulf region, pointedly demurred from
endorsing a new round of retaliatory action against Saddam.
It is not that Saddam is any less despised by his neighbors
today than he was five years ago. The difference now is that
the region deems him likely to survive.(15) Moreover, the
Saudis and others see the world's will to subdue Saddam
steadily eroding. After all, Russia, France, and China have
publicly called for an easing of U.N. sanctions; and Western
multinational corporations, such as Total and Elf, have
recently signed onto agreements with Iraq, to be implemented
after the lifting of sanctions.(16)
As a result, Saddam seems no worse off today, than he was
before the Gulf War and--in several respects--he may have
actually improved his prospects.
3. Related Cases
(a): CUBA
(b): MACEDON
(c): SERBSANC
(d): HAITI
(e): THAIBIRD
(f): USCHINA
4. Draft Author: J. Lynch (December 24, 1996)
II. Legal Cluster
5. Discourse and Status: [AGREE and INPROG]
The international community was unanimous in condemning the
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, as
one of the most ignominious crimes in modern history. The act
violated international laws and treaties, traditional
brotherly relations between Arab and Islamic nations, and the
principles of good neighborhood. Proclaiming that Kuwait was
Iraqi territory, the Baghdad regime endeavored to obliterate
Kuwait's identity and history. In pursuing this policy, it
committed unbelievable crimes against the land of Kuwait, and
its resources, infrastructures and people.
The international community immediately realized the gravity
of the occupation of Kuwait from both a humanitarian and
political point of view. It recognized the invasion and
occupation as a violation of the international treaties
governing the relations between states, as well as an act that
violently disrupted progress towards international peace and
a new world order.
Based on these considerations, the international community
adopted a series of historic resolutions. They called for the
liberation of Kuwait, and the restoration of its territories
and legitimate government, even if this required the use of
force. Kuwait was thus liberated through an unprecedented show
of international will and solidarity.
6. Forum and Scope: (UN AND MULTI)
7. Decision Breadth: Plaintiff: International
Community, Defendant: Iraq
8. Legal Standing: Treaty
Iraq violated Chapter VII of the U.N. charter. Chapter VII
deals with actions that threaten peace. The first Article of
this chapter (Art. 39) stipulates: "The [United Nations]
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat
to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." Article 41 allows
the Security Council to decide what measures--precluding the
use of armed forces--are to be to used to restore peace.
Article 42 allows the Security Council--if it finds the
measures taken under Article 41 are ineffective--to use
military forces to restore international peace.
III. GEOGRAPHIC Clusters
9. Geographic Locations
a. Continental Domain: Mideast
b. Geographic Site: East (Mideast)
c. Geographic Impact: Iraq
10. Sub-State: YES
Since the sanctions on Iraq are partially attributable to its
eradication of (Shiites and Kurds), this issue can be defined
as Sub-National.
11. Type of Habitat: [DRY]
IV. TRADE Clusters: [IMPBAN]
12. Type of measure: Import Ban
13. Direct vs. Indirect Impacts: [DIR]
On the one hand, the impact of the sanctions were direct,
because they directly impacted Iraq. However, on the other
hand, the sanctions impact were indirect or, more
appropriately put, were misdirected. The sanctions were
misdirected because they strengthened the power and resolve of
Saddam Hussein and his regime, while they weakened the Shiites
and Kurds. Hussein's power was strengthened because his
regime was able to circumscribe the intended effects of the
sanctions, i.e., to make him weaker.
Hussein's survival has been based upon the following:
SADDAM'S SURVIVAL
Iraq continues to export oil to Jordan (about 50,000 b/d).
Jordan contends that the funds that Iraq would receive for the
oil would instead be used to pay off Iraq's debt to Jordan.
However, Jordan made no commitment about refraining from new
loans to Iraq. Therefore, Jordan can contend with the letter
of the sanctions while violating its spirit; Jordan can import
Iraqi oil to repay old Iraqi debts, while extending new loans
to Iraq in a transaction that amounts to the same thing as
paying Iraq directly for the oil. Further, Turks have taken
advantage of the $2.20 price differential between heavily
subsidized Turkish oil and Iraqi oil. Turks are now estimated
to be importing between 3,500 and 4,000 b/d. (Nonetheless,
because of the shortage of equipment, Iraq's continued pumping
of petrol means the probability of an environmentally
deleterious oil spill occurring is extremely high.)
Following the Gulf War, the Iraqi government moved quickly to
set up a rationing system, which allowed for the price of some
goods to fluctuate based upon market demand: the higher the
demand the higher the price. The system cut consumption, but,
at the same time, managed to keep goods on the shelf. In
addition, the Iraqi government took vigorous action to
increase domestic food output. For example, there has been an
emphasis placed on trimming the number of livestock, so as to
free up cereals for human consumption. The reasoning behind
this is that cereals are cheaper to produce and can be used to
feed more people.(21) Thus, these adjustments have allowed
Iraq the capacity to hold out against sanctions for a longer
period of time.
Iraq is in part supporting its economy by the gold reserves
and other assets it stole from Kuwait during the Gulf War. It
is estimated by Intelligence reports that Iraq stole $4
billion in gold from Kuwaiti government coffers. The
automobiles, durable goods, and antiquities that Iraq took
from Kuwait and re-exported were estimated to be worth $300
million. An example of goods stolen from Kuwait were
Mesopotamian antiquities. Their were reports of hundreds of
looters swarming over archeological sites, carrying truckload
of cuneiform tablets back to Iraq. So successful was the
largely illegal trade in Mesopotamian antiquities, that a
thriving business in Mesopotamian fakes has also grown in
Iraq.(22)
In addition to Iraq's ability to finance itself through stolen
gold and durable goods, there are rumors abound about large,
undeclared Iraqi bank accounts abroad. Richard Newcomb,
director of the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control says, "It is my belief, and an operating
assumption of the U.S. Treasury, that through secret accounts
and investments, covert Iraqi front companies and clandestine
agents of his regime, Saddam Hussein is attempting to sustain
and proliferate his tools for disregarding the U.N.
embargo."(23)
14. Relation of Measure to Environmental Impact
a. Directly Related : Many
b. Indirectly Related : NO
c. Not Related : NO
d. Process Related : Many
15. Trade Product Identification: Many
16. Economic Data
Unlike the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Iraq's Balance of
Payments figures prior to the Gulf War are not complete:
Iraq's export levels fail to be listed. What can be discerned
form Iraq's balance of payments figures, however, is that
their import levels declined in 1990--when sanctions were
placed on Iraq.
|
1989 Import Level |
$6,965,000 |
1990 Import Level |
4,834,000 |
17. Degree of Competitive Impact: HIGH
18. Industry Sector: Many
19. Exporters and Importers: Many
V. Environment Clusters
20. Environmental Problem Type: Many
Due to contaminated rivers, Iraq's bio-diversity has been
adversely effected. Fish and Birds are dyeing from the waters
toxicity levels. In addition, once fertile Iraqi land is
being destroyed by improper land management.
21. Name, Type, and Diversity of Species
No data, as of yet, has been given for the negligible effects
the contamination of rivers has had on fish and birds.
Nonetheless, upon speculation, it is estimated that the
devastation the contamination has caused for the Iraqi eco-
system is moderate to widespread.
|
Name |
Fish and Birds |
Type |
Animal |
22. Resource Impact and Effect: Medium and Product
23. Urgency and Lifetime: Medium and 10-20 years
24. Substitutes: Like products
VI. OTHER Factors
25. Culture: YES
Iraq is split between three major ethnic groups: Kurds,
Shiites, and Sunni Arabs. Hussein's regime, in order to
provide for the Sunni Arab minority that provides the backbone
for Hussein's regime, has Supplied Sunni Arab's with ample
supplies, while providing little to no supplies to Kurds and
Shiites.
26. Trans-Boundary: Yes
About 650,000 Iraqi refugees have crossed over the Iraqi
border to Iran to escape Iraqi military operations directed
against them.
27. Human Rights: Yes
More than 70,000 Iraqis, nearly half of them children under 5,
died in the first half of 1996 because six years of U.N.
sanctions have made medicine scarce; according to a government
newspaper 70,274 Iraqis died because of a lack of medicine.
This report could not be confirmed by the United Nations;
however, relief organizations have consistently reported
higher rates of disease, malnutrition and infant mortality in
Iraq, than country's on average.(24)
Before the Gulf War, Iraq was one of the most affluent
countries in the Middle East, with the government taking in an
average of $10 billion a year from oil sales. The health
crisis illustrates how much damage the sanctions have done.
In 1989, the year before the embargo came into force, only
2,278 people died in Iraq because of a lack of medicine,
Al-Thawra said. Of the 70,274 it said died in the first half
of this year, 26,436 of them were children under five.
According to U.N.I.C.E.F., about 4,500 Iraqi children have
been dying each month from a variety of illnesses, compared
with 600 a month before the Gulf War.(25)
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19, 1996, p28.
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ENDNOTES
(1) Clawson, Patrick, How Has Saddam Hussein Survived?,
Institute for Strategic Studies: Washington, DC, 1993 pp.15-
75.
(2) Ibid, pp.20-95.
(3) Quigley, John, "The United States and the United Nations
in the Persian Gulf War: New Order and Disorder?," Cornell
International Law Journal, vol. 85, Winter 1992, p. 17.
(4) Clifford Chance Homepage, 1995 and IBC Home Page,
Political Risk for Iraq.
(5) Ibid.
(6) IBC Home Page, Political Risk for Iraq.
(7) Edwards, Robert, "U.N. suppresses report on Iraq
suffering, " The Scotsman Publications Ltd., April 8, 1996.
(8) Clawson p. 33.
(9) Ibid p. 85..
(10) Faleh, Waiel (AP), "Iraqi Newspaper Says Shortage of
Medicines Killed 70,000, August 1, 1996."
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) Caldwel, Robert J., "U.S.-Iraq Conflict 1996," The San
Diego Union-Tribune, September 22, 1996.
(14) Ibid.
(15) "Clinton's Goal: Contain Iraq," Chicago Tribune,
September 19, 1996, p. 28.
(16) "All Eyes On The Market," The Middle East, May 1995. See
also "What to do with Saddam?," The Middle East, March 1995.
(17) "Down But Not Out", The Economist, April 8, 1995.
(18) "Kurds on the Run," The Middle East, April 1995.
(19) U.N. Security Council Resolution 706 of August 15,1991,
Foreign Policy Bulletin, November/December, 1991, p.46.
(20) Clawson, Patrick,"How Has Saddam...." p.49
(21) Ibid, p. 49
(22) Crosette, Barbara, "Iraqis, Hurt by Sanctions, Sell
Priceless Antiquities," The New York Times, June 22, 1996.
(22) Op cit, pp. 51-3 and 57. Although highly probable, the
existence of secret bank accounts, investments, and front
companies has not been substantiated.
(23) Faleh, Waiel (AP), "Iraqi Newspaper Says Shortage..."
(24) Ibid.
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