

A Study of a Reconnaissance Surveillance Vehicle

### TIER II + UAV GENESIS

- OPERATION DESERT STORM POINTED OUT AN ISR SHORTFALL
- THIS NEED TRANSLATED INTO DEVELOPING ISR SYSTEMS WHICH PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE:
  - REACH
  - PERSISTENCE AND ...
  - ELIMINATES DIRECT PERSONAL INTERACTION

## GENERAL UAV ISSUES

## **UAV** Design

- UAV Designs have the following attributes embedded:
  - AUTOMATION
  - PARTIAL AUTONOMY thus need for Ground Segment

ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS TO EVOLVE TO ... FULL AUTONOMY

- THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS DESIRE:
  - LIABILITY
    - CERTIFICATION
      - SAFETY
        - RELIABILITY
           AFFORDABILITY

• • •

## **UAV Operating Domains**

### **MILITARY**

### **STRATEGIC**

- Worldwide OPS
- Self ferry / refuel
- Robust Nav
  - Quad / dissimilar
  - GPS / DGPS
  - Inertial INS (high quality)
- ICAO / GATM
- Robust COMMs
- Over-flight rights

### **TACTICAL**

- In -Theater Use Only
- Transport to theater
- Robust Nav
  - GPS
  - Inertial INS (high quality)
- Robust COMMs

### **CIVILIAN**

### **COMMERCIAL**

• Requirements moving towards same as Manned


### **Risk Reduction**

- Develop from Experience
- Minimize Non-recurring Development
- Test early
- Design for future growth

### **Risk Reduction**

- Never attempt to incorporate more than 2 major technological advances at one time
- Thus minimal engine development for this application was a must
- •The major remaining risks were:
  - Large scale system integration
  - Software development
  - Sensor / Comms development and integration

## System Reliability - Flight Critical



## **Design to Cost**

### Lowest costs are achievable by:


- Simple but redundant systems
- Use of parts from existing designs
- Use of COTS hardware wherever possible
- Tailor requirements to avoid over-design
- Use of strategically placed sensors for system status
- Use of smart s/w to limit, control, and "heal" failures

Cost considerations must be applied from part design through testing and onto system tests.

## **Reliability Trade Methodology**

# Optimize Reliability / Redundancy Consistent with Cost Constraint

Requirement: Desired Loss Rate of Less than 1 Per XXX Missions, (Ps >  $(1 - \frac{1}{XXX})$ )



## Redundancy

- Level of Redundancy Application dependent / Cost
- Mostly Similar / Some Dissimilar
  - Flight Critical / Mission Critical

### **Flight Critical**

- Nav Equipment
- Flt Computers
- Flt Control S/W
- Air Data
- Propulsion
- Electrical System
- Flt Control Actuators
- Altimeter
- Landing gear
- Nose wheel steering
- Brakes

### **Mission Critical**

- COMMs \*
- Payloads
- ECS / Fuel Mgmt \*
- Ground segment C<sup>2</sup>\*
- \* Could be Flt Critical

## **Design Redundancy In**

### Redundancy is obtained by:

- Minimizing single paths
- Use automatic, s/w driven switching
- Validate fail-operate by testing and demonstration
- Bench (System Center) testing of s/w prior to vehicle tests
- Vehicle ground tests
- Flight Operations / experience

## DMS (Diminishing Mfg Sources) - Obsolescence


- Architect to minimize effect
  - (H/W)
    - Stay with same processor family
    - Partition to accommodate fast changing technology
  - (S/W)
    - Use Higher Order Language (HOL) (e.g C++)
    - •And Certified (DO-178B) Operating System (OS) Achieve true portability / transparency
- Provision with plenty of critical spares e.g. processors
- Install an effective DMS tracking system
- Require OEMs to have a DMS tracking system and report changes in a timely manner

### LOOK AT THE ENTIRE LIFE CYCLE

## **UAVs Do** Have an Advantage

### Accidents by Primary Cause\*

Hull Loss - Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet - 1992 through 2001




18 2001 STATISTICAL SUMMARY, JUNE 2002



### **Learn from Others' Mistakes**

### Accidents and Onboard Fatalities by Phase of Flight

Hull Loss and/or Fatal Accidents - Worldwide Commercial Jet Fleet - 1992 - 2001



## **UAV Major System Attributes**

- Significantly lower mission costs than manned
- Incorporates reliable (robust) design features
- Provides protection against human induced accidents through embedded flight control limits and limited override capability (outer loop <u>vs</u> inner loop)
- Adequate sensors to predict deterioration and failures
- Use of sufficient redundancy to provide fail-operate systems
- Self "healing" and self controlling systems operation
- Tolerate wide environmental ranges, as operations are generally in hostile and/or unknown environments (pressures, temperatures, turbulent atmospheres, etc.)
- Operate in civilian airspace (with or without waivers) over friendly as well as hostile countries.


## **Design Requirements**

## **Original System - Goals / Requirement**

PROGRAM GOALS	CHARACTERISTICS	
14,000 NMI	Maximum Range	
65,000 FT+	Maximum Altitude	
42 Hrs	Maximum Endurance	
1.5 - 50 Mbps	SATCOM Datalink	
> 50 Mbps	LOS Datalink	
1.0/0.3m resolution (WAS/Spot)	SAR	
20 - 200Km/10m Range resolution	МТІ	
EO NIIRS 6.5/6.0 (Spot/WAS)	EO	
IR NIIRS 5.5/5.0 (Spot/WAS)	IR	
40,000 Sq. NMI/Day	Wide Area Search	
1,900 Spots Targets /Day	Target Coverage	
< 20 meter CEP	Location Accuracy	

## Just 1 Requirement - Unit Flyaway Price


### **Notional Mission Profile**




## **System Selection Process**

- A disciplined systems approach was used to define the overall system:
  - Analysis
  - Trades
  - Sizing and Sortie profiles
  - Survivability issues considered
  - Mission radius of operations reviewed


## **System Selection**




## **Trades and Analyses**



## **Analysis Approach**




### **Sizing and Sortie Profile**



## **Original Design Objective**

### **Balance Military Utility (MU) and Risk within Unit Flyaway Price (UFP)**



Risks
Schedule
Technical

Costs

## Typical ISR UAV Cost Breakdown

	UFP Breakdown	
Description	Cost Basis	0/ LIED
Description	5551 231515	%UFP
	General Equipment	
Airframe		
Structures	Estimate	22.74
Landing Gear	Bid	1.65
Control Surf Actuation	Bid	0.68
Propulsion	Bid	16.31
Fuel System	Estimate	0.75
Electrical Sys	Estimate	1.66
Environ Ctl Sys	Bid	1.02
Hydraulics	Estimate	1.81
Payload		
SAR/GMTI	Bid	23.29
Self Defense	Quotation	3.22
Data Recording	Quotation	0.78
Payload Mgt	Quotation	0.56
Communications	Bid	14.46
ESM	Quotation	2.89
Avionics		
Avionics	Estimate	3.49
	Mission Specific Equipment	
EO/IR	Bid	<u>4.61</u>

## The HALE vehicle - (High Altitude Long Endurance)

In Oct '94 Teledyne-Ryan was one of five remaining competing companies for the Tier II+, a contract to be awarded for a vehicle that could fly very high and remain on station for very long periods of time.

Its mission was to fly at 65,000 feet (mostly out of harms way), and remain aloft for 40 hours, carrying three high quality sensors, an EO, an IR camera as well as a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) imaging sensor.

During the first phase of this competition each company team conducted their preliminary design and made a proposal to the DoD's Advanced Research Projects Agency, acting as agent for the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office.

## Three Design Approaches Explored

High Wing Loading Turbofan


Span 116 Ft

Low Wing Loading Turbofan


Span 150 Ft


Low Wing Loading Turbocharged Recip.

Span 200 Ft




Single or Twin Turbo Fan Powered Flying Wing






## **Configuration Development**



## **Runway Considerations**


#### Reference 1:

UFC 3-260-01 Airfield and Heliport Planning and Design, AFJMAN 32-1076, and FAA Circular AC 15015345144F




### Reference 2:


NATO Approved Criteria and Standards for Airfields. 1999, BI-MNCD 85-5




# Tier II+ Competition Aka the 1995 Paris Fashion Show




Loral Systems, San Jose, CA



Northrop Grumman, Melbourne, FL



Lockheed Advanced Development Co.




Orbital Sciences Corp., Dulles, VA

### All Shown at the Same Scale

And Like in Paris, All Designed to the Same Requirements!


### The Global Hawk

In 1995 the San Diego based team of Teledyne Ryan was awarded the contract and the Tier II Plus - (Global Hawk) was born.




Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical

Then . . . . . . . . . . . and Now




## **System Elements**




## **Northrop Grumman-RQ-4A**

(Tier II+ Air Vehicle)




## **ACTD Modularity - Original Design**




# **Design Performance**







large drivers in assessing true mission performance / system capability.

**Speed -** supports warfighter's time to area of interest.




# **Drag Polar**





**Drag Coefficient** 

#### **CG** Travel <u>vs</u> Body Angle with Fuel Burn




40

# **Design Implementation**




# **Design Specifics**

#### **Redundancy Implementation**




#### **Navigation & Guidance Schematic**




H367-0395

#### Fuel / ECS Functional Block Diagram




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
#### Maintainability / Accessibility Access Door Location / Identification




#### **Sensor Block Diagram**



## **Integrated Sensor Suite**












## Global Hawk Airborne Integrated Communication Subsystem



#### **MCE Communications Schematic**



#### **Air Vehicle-to-Ground Stations Interfaces**



## An MCE at Suffolk, VA



# All-Encompassing System Development & Verification Environment is a Must

Global Hawk is not a UAV. Global Hawk is a **SYSTEM**. In order to develop and test this system, a Systems Center provides the following capabilities to ensure total system verification before each flight event.


#### The Systems Center provides:

- An environment which exactly represents the vehicle baseline(s) and permits version management
- Test planning and procedural development for the air vehicle segment, the ground segment and any number of individual payload subsystems
- Hardware and software integration at the subsystem, segment and systems levels
- System software development, test and integration
- Mission planning and validation
- Flight control and monitoring
- Payload control and monitoring


### **Typical Mission Example**

- Mission Planning Inputs (loaded in IMMCs at preflight)
  - Waypoint Nav Data for complete Mission Plan
  - Sensor commands for collection data
  - All Contingency actions and routes
  - All limits for guidance modes and flight control logic
- CCO (pilot) Inputs in flight (from LRE or MCE) as allowed by guidance modes and control laws and logic. Pilots can;
  - Control vehicle heading (off mission plan) for ATC or sensor needs
  - Set altitude levels, climb/descent rates for ATC or mission needs (within limits)
  - Control onboard radios, IFF, re-task sensor collection type / locations
  - Revise temporary routing for ATC or mission needs
- Guidance Modes and Mode Transition Logic enforced throughout flight
- Flight Control Laws and Logic enforced throughout flight


### **Pre-flight Checkout**



#### **Mission Start Waypoints**




#### Normal Taxi / Takeoff / Departure



• Multiple taxi points optional as req'd, only one mandatory NPS041003


#### **Speed Schedule**

Superimposed on Approximate Theoretical Envelope (Standard Day, No Winds)




#### **Atmospheres**

#### **Aircraft Temperature Envelope**




#### **Lightning Protection Zones**




**Aircraft Must Still Protect Itself and All Internal Equipment** 






# January 22, 1999 Turbulence Intensity FL531 to FL605, 18:00Z



#### **Exceedences Experienced**

#### On-Station Operating Stress Is Benign Nz Exceedance for Worst-Case Turbulence Flight



## Mission Monitoring, an MCE



#### An Example of a Flight Control HCI



H367-0243


#### Flight Monitor HCI

This <u>H</u>uman <u>C</u>omputer <u>I</u>nterface screen is readily recognized by most pilots and is used to interpret vehicle flight mode and condition, and provides the ability to control (send commands to) the vehicle by the remote operator.

Hyper-linked "Buttons" allow access to other HCI's for additional commands or access to vehicle systems status. Mouse clicks bring up these screens for continuous or periodic monitoring as desired.

Bottom section shows current autonomous systems status.

#### **Another Screen, the Flight Monitor HCI**



#### Flight Control HCI


This **H**uman Computer Interface screen is also readily recognized, using typical "tape" displays for vehicle data.

It is also used to command basic vehicle functions via hyper-linked buttons for vehicle control.

This screen, the Flight Control and Vehicle Status (next page) HCI's are the primary Global Hawk screens used by the pilots for air vehicle monitoring and control.

Additional HCI's are used for Nav, sensor operation and communications functions.


#### The Air Vehicle Status HCI



This HCI, the Air Vehicle Status screen (available from the Flight Control HCI, via the AVS button) is the pilots way of maintaining his continuous view of the vehicle health. Data is continuous down-linked to the ground stations with the status of each system. These Green, Yellow, Red, and Flashing Red buttons reflect the status of each system. Additional HCI's are available under each of these buttons for complete pictures of that specific systems status at any time for evaluation by the pilot.

For example, the ECS status can be monitored when flight temperatures are extreme to predict vehicles' potential for going Yellow, Red or Flashing Red and take preemptive actions as appropriate to continue the mission.

### Typical Emergency Logic Tree, Flashing Red




## **Examples of Autonomous Operations**



## Flight Operations Summary



# **Post-flight Checks**






### Summary

- 1. UAVs will demonstrate lower operating costs and will satisfy or exceed user requirements
- 2. World Wide Operations (WWO) will require significant levels of reliability and redundancy
- 3. Reusable UAVs are part of a network centric system
- 4. Ground segment importance will diminish with increased autonomy on the UAV

# **BACKUP**

#### **Typical Dual VMS Aircraft Loss Rate Comparisons**

(Based on Analysis for 100% of Engine Failures Result in UAV Loss)




<sup>\*</sup> Includes Propulsion System Failures

<sup>\*\*</sup> Failures Due to Redundant VMS Only

<sup>+</sup> Probability of Loss of Control

#### **Typical Quad VMS Aircraft Loss Rate Comparisons**

(Based on Analysis for 100% of Engine Failures Result in UAV Loss)




Note - Systems with Very small Contributions were Deleted

<sup>\*</sup> Includes Propulsion System Failures


<sup>\*\*</sup> Failures Due to Redundant VMS Only

# **Design Requirements**

#### **Temporary Hangars**








Reference: BigTop Manufacturing Co 3255 N US 19, Perry FL 32347

Item = 150' x 80 x 36 x 10 Item = 166' x 80' x 36' x 10'

Alternate supplier is Rubb Building Systems




256' Hangar at Boston Logan airport by Rubb



# **Utility Model**

#### **Utility Elements**




# **Design Implementation**




# **Design Specifics**


#### **Engine and Control System**




#### **Electrical Power Schematic**




### **Hydraulic Block Diagram**



#### **Vehicle Fuel System Schematic**



# **Fuel System Pictorial**



# Single Event Upsets >≅ 40 K Ft Cold at surface = cold at altitude Warm at surface = warm at altitude 65° N **Edwards AFB** Equator, $\& \pm 5 \deg$

**Edinburgh RAAFB** 

- Atmospheres -

Hydrostatic nature of our atmosphere


Temperate at surface = temperate at altitude

Hot at surface = Cold at altitude

#### A Real-world Turbulence Event

- <u>Date:</u> January 22, 1999
- <u>Time:</u> 17:22Z
- <u>Location:</u> 36.126° N Latitude, 118.007° W Longitude
- <u>Altitude:</u> 55,000 ft
- Event Description: Over a period of 30 seconds the aircraft experienced a Mach Number increase from 0.60 to 0.65 before the control system compensated for the speed change. Altitude rate, during the event, varied between +3,000 fpm and -1,000 fpm. Maximum load factor attained was 1.25 g's.
- Mission Summary: Excluding the turbulence event the aircraft experienced altitude rate variations from +2,000 fpm to -2,000 fpm and load factor varied from +0.6 g to 1.3 g during the cruise climb. Mach Number varied between 0.57 and 0.63.

#### **Turbulence Event Data**



#### **Turbulence Event Conclusions**


• There is correlation between turbulence experienced and the NRL Mountain Wave Forecast Model

- Mountain wave turbulence does not fit standard definitions for Light, Moderate and Severe turbulence levels
  - Standard turbulence level definitions are based on high frequency turbulence
  - MIL-F-8785C Dryden turbulence is high frequency (~short period) in nature and does not represent high altitude mountain wave turbulence experienced to date
  - High altitude mountain wave turbulence is considered low frequency (~phugoid) in nature and is characterized by variations in altitude, altitude rate, pitch attitude and Mach Number


#### **Turbulence Event Conclusions**

- Flight control system is tolerant to significant high altitude atmospheric disturbances
  - Airspeed is King. Aircraft controls to calibrated airspeed schedule. Altitude is NOT controlled during cruise climb. Aircraft does not respond directly to Mach variations or altitude variations.
  - Flight control laws were improved to respond faster to airspeed variations resulting in smaller Mach Number transients and larger altitude & altitude rate variations
     No evidence of roll or yaw control issues to date


### Abort Takeoff Logic Tree, Auto or Pilot Commanded



## **Typical Fault Logic, Lost Carrier**




## Typical RTB Logic, Autonomous or Commanded




#### **Airspace Coordination Requirements**

- Controlled Airspace: Class A, B, C, D, E and F (International)
- Uncontrolled Airspace: Class G
- Special Use Airspace: Prohibited, Restricted, Warning, Alert and Military Operations Areas



# **Civil Navigation Requirements**



# **Civil Surveillance Requirements**

