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STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

# Integration: What Works?

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RESEARCH REPORT

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This report is the culmination of a research project undertaken by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, to understand what is happening at both policy and practical levels on integration and its evaluation across a number of European countries. It is supported by the Open Society Foundations and involved 18 months of research and dialogue with policymakers, trusts and foundations, and civil society organisations in four case study countries – Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. It offers practical insights into what is being done on the ground, a series of detailed case studies, and a fresh approach to programming and evaluation of integration.

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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## Context

In recent years, migration has become one of the most fiercely debated policy issues in Western Europe. If managed properly, migration has huge potential to enrich European economies and societies, but these **benefits can only be realised if there is a sustained focus on promoting the integration** of diverse communities and ensuring that all citizens are able to thrive. As it currently stands in Europe, **citizens of migrant origin tend to be overrepresented across most socio-economic indicators of disadvantage**, and in many countries the influx of large numbers of migrants has created a great deal of public anxiety about the real or perceived competition for jobs and resources; it has also raised broader concerns about **a shared sense of identity and common values in the face of increasing levels of diversity**.

To date, integration has often been approached through a single-community lens, with policies focused on integrating specific target communities. Post-9/11, the discussion about integration has become increasingly conflated with concerns about national security and has focused largely on the status of Muslim communities. This has further politicised an already complex area of policy, and has **often resulted in 'short-termist' knee-jerk responses, rather than evidence-based policymaking**. It has also opened an unhelpful chasm between political debates and what is happening on the ground; in other words, there is a gap between what is said and what is achieved in practice.

**This has created a number of problems that have limited the impact of integration initiatives:** some measures have been adopted that actually undermine communities' abilities to integrate; the focus on 'problem communities' has made the public debate even more toxic; and policies have tended to focus on immediate problems rather than long-term integration needs.

This report seeks to understand what is happening at both policy and practical levels on integration – and the key challenges to building evidence-based approaches – across a number of European countries, with the aim of understanding what works. It is supported by the Open Society Foundations and involved 18 months of research and dialogue with policymakers, trusts and foundations, and civil society organisations in four case study countries – Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.

## What is integration?

**One of the biggest challenges to understanding what works in integration in a comparative sense is the fact that there is no commonly agreed definition of what integration is or what it seeks to achieve.** Many different approaches have evolved across time and place, from those which advocate peaceful coexistence of communities to those which set out that integration is best reached via

assimilation. Rather than become entangled in this intractable political and philosophical debate, this report adopts a bottom-up and practical view of integration based on what is actually being done on the ground in the case study countries. This uncovers a number of common themes that are emerging across Europe in the practice of integration:

- European countries are increasingly recognising that integration of immigrants takes place largely at the local level, and national governments are increasingly supporting the **development of local integration strategies**. Local authorities are in many ways better placed to design effective integration strategies.
- The **importance of language learning** has been largely accepted by many countries, though there is no common European approach.
- Many countries are **experimenting with civic integration courses** for immigrants to allow them to become proficient in the country's language, and are delivering educational programmes on the country's customs and values.
- There is a growing consensus around the benefits of **opening voting rights and paths to citizenship for migrants**. Encouraging political participation is increasingly becoming a part of national integration strategies.
- Resources have also been directed towards efforts **to promote better relations between government and civil society** across Europe.
- Finally, in recent years a greater emphasis has been placed on **integration as an obligation of migrants**. This is coupled with a trend of **more compulsion in integration policies**; for example, requiring migrants to attend language and orientation classes before their arrival in the country. There have been debates over whether mandatory or voluntary measures promote more positive outcomes, and there

is some evidence to show that voluntary programmes have been successful and should be pursued further.

On the basis of practical evidence, the report presents a working definition of integration that is both a process and an outcome underpinned by **four mutually-reinforcing principles**:

**Access:** All citizens and residents must be given access to the fruits of liberal democratic societies in order to contribute to and reap their full benefits. The basis of this is a sound legal framework designed to grant and protect access to democratic rights, education, labour market and healthcare.

**Empowerment:** People need to be empowered in order to take full advantage of the opportunities and rights that are given to them.

**Trust:** Building and maintaining a sense of trust and reciprocity in diverse communities will facilitate cooperation and allow for more efficient and smooth running societies.

**Belonging:** Trust will be difficult to cultivate without ensuring a shared sense of belonging.

## A New Approach to Integration: The Practice-Based Integration Framework

The report argues that integration is best delivered through six mainstream policy areas: **legal, welfare, economic, social, political and cultural**. It offers a **Practice-Based Integration Framework** to encapsulate the core elements of this approach:



## The Practice-Based Integration Framework – Intended Outcomes for Successful Integration



The Practice-Based Integration Framework aims to **encapsulate the totality of approaches being taken throughout Europe**, across these six categories of policy and practice. It thus catalogues over 100 ‘theories of change’ or schools of thinking, linking each intervention to a set of expected results and intended societal outcomes. As a result, the Framework can be used as an invaluable tool not only in the design of programmes, but also in their evaluation.

In using the Practice-Based Integration Framework, several key points emerge:

Successful integration strategies must be **underpinned with a sound legal basis**, designed to grant and protect rights for migrants and minorities, alongside all residents. In a sense, legal integration reinforces the entire Framework presented here.

This report emphasises the **need to achieve balance between the socio-economic (legal, welfare and economic) and socio-cultural (social, political and cultural) elements** of the Framework.

The Practice-Based Integration Framework provides a skeleton for a **‘whole of government’ response, one which could be delivered largely through mainstream policy levers.**

**Priorities should be set based on needs**, and these needs will vary across Europe and often within states themselves. The process to identify these needs should be firmly based on evidence, rather than on features of public and political debates.

**Activities such as language tuition, which can lead to multiple outcomes** spanning the socio-economic and socio-cultural, are perhaps an indication of **greater value for money.**

It will be hard for governments to justify investment without hard evidence that this investment will result in tangible social and economic outcomes. This report thus calls for the redoubling of efforts to evaluate integration, with the Practice-Based Integration Framework as a starting point for the identification of methods, outcomes and indicators.

## The Challenges of Evaluating Integration

The report documents a number of challenges to evaluation integration, including:

**Data scarcity:** Integration is notoriously difficult to measure, and is made even harder by the fact that many countries don’t gather data in a systematic way. Service

delivery organisations find it difficult to produce what would be considered to be ‘sound evidence’.

**Agency:** Who carries out an evaluation is contentious. It is important to ensure that objectivity is not in question. For evaluations to have an impact at policy level, elected officials and politicians need to see action and success. This can also act as a strong disincentive to admitting failure, particularly when funding is dependent on good outcomes.

**Lack of capacity:** In many cases, the organisations which work most closely with migrants or ethnic minority groups and enjoy the highest levels of trust, also lack the capacity and know-how to collate and evaluate data.

**Evidence of impact:** Continued funding for integration projects is often contingent on demonstrable short-term results, yet progress in this domain will often only be seen over the course of many generations and can be hard to disentangle from the impact of other developments.

**Cost:** Most organisations and projects operating on the ground are unlikely to have the resources to conduct major evaluations. Thus, evaluation continues to occur on a small scale and largely within the framework of project-donor relationships.

## Lessons Learnt in Evaluating Integration

A number of steps can be taken to address the challenges posed by integration, and the report presents **12 key lessons for effective evaluation:**

**1. There needs to be a strong emphasis on ‘learning’ as well as ‘control’.** Evaluation is often

conducted in order to assess outputs and to ensure accountability. However, the impact of integration programmes can also be measured in terms of how much has been learnt through projects and initiatives, and how this knowledge is used. A learning-based approach to evaluation can also help amplify the value of data not generally appreciated in evaluation processes, such as personal testimonies, small-scale figures and best practices from the field.

**2. Evaluation needs to be based on a theory of change which is continuously revised as lessons are learnt and more is understood about what works.** The Practice-Based Integration Framework serves as a tool for developing long-term strategies, balancing priorities in terms of desired outcomes, and planning and evaluating programming appropriately. Setting clear priorities is a basic step for the better evaluation of integration.

**3. Evaluation should consider outcomes as well as process.** All too often, evaluation focuses on monitoring outputs, rather than examining outcomes for wider society – because it can be difficult to attribute outcomes to measures taken. However, there needs to be a focus on what has been achieved, as well as an examination of how it has been done.

**4. Evaluation should be collaborative in nature.** To ensure that feedback is honest and constructively critical, evaluation needs to take account of the views of a range of actors associated with the delivery of the relevant intervention, including the target communities.

**5. A comparative approach can be valuable.** Evaluation needs to be focused on the project or programme in question, but should also examine wider conditions and similar interventions before drawing conclusions about its broader impact. Monitoring wider societal outcomes and mapping similar

interventions (projects with shared objectives) should be a regular feature of any evaluation method.

**6. Evaluation should feed into horizon-scanning and forward planning.** As it is challenging to attribute change to measures taken, evaluation and monitoring can be used as a method of anticipating future trends; target groups and projects can then be reshaped accordingly.

**7. There is a need to develop better indicators for socio-cultural elements of integration, in order to set goals and track progress.** There is a need for data on an assortment of measures, including the socio-cultural aspects of integration.

**8. Evaluate integration as a two-way or whole of society process.** If integration is a whole of society process, then evaluation needs to assess the experiences of both migrants and non-migrants as subjects.

**9. Innovation through the use of surveys.** There is a need for more innovation when it comes to the assessment of outcomes in the field of integration. This includes innovation through the use of surveys, reaching hard-to-access target groups and building up new comparative data sets.

**10. Innovation beyond surveys.** Though they are useful data sources, attitude surveys can often paint a confusing and conflicting picture of actual outcomes. New forms of evaluation through action research or employing community researchers can circumvent some of the challenges posed by hiring external evaluators or gathering representative samples. The use of new media to collect data sets may also be an innovative way forward.

**11. Strategic use of data collected daily by organisations.** More could be done with the data that is actually collated by service delivery organisations.

While much of the data gathered by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is collected to fulfil funder reporting requirements, it could also hold important lessons. Charitable foundations are therefore in an excellent position to support the collection, analysis and dissemination of data produced by the organisations they fund.

**12. Gather integration data via mainstream policy levers.** There is a strong case for gathering data on how mainstream policy might promote or hinder integration outcomes. Indeed, the way the education system is designed or how housing benefits are implemented will probably have as much or even more of an influence on the outcomes for migrants than more targeted measures. Part of the point of evaluation should be to ensure that migrants benefit equally from wider policies.

## What Works?

Finally, the report concludes with a set of learning points for the two actors responsible for setting the agenda for what programmes should be initiated and for financing the sector at large: governments, and trusts and foundations.

### Long-term planning and resourcing

This report makes the case for developing a **long-term strategic vision for integration policies and programming**. It calls on governments to adopt a more forward-thinking attitude to integration policy, investing in horizon-scanning research to look at future demographics, migration, and broader trends and plan integration policy in anticipation of these trends.

### Simple, low-cost solutions to promote integration

There is some evidence to show that **simple policy changes or legislative tweaks can have major impacts** on integration. Further research is required

to better understand how mainstream policy might be incentivising segregatory trends, and negatively impacting integration outcomes. For foundations, this means recognising that good value for money may be best achieved through projects that work with or within the system.

### Improving relations between actors responsible for integration

Integration cannot succeed without the cooperation of civil society, and attempts to create new forms of dialogue between governments and civil society are often mistrusted. Experience shows that **initiating these processes at a regional or local level, rather than at a national level, is often more effective**. Lighter-touch, informal forums can often be just as effective, but they avoid all the challenges associated with developing representative, non-static consultative bodies. Evaluation can be strengthened by **more strategic collaborative visions by NGOs themselves, mapping their progress towards broader societal aims together**.

### Addressing the divide between political rhetoric and results on the ground

In terms of practice, policy needs to be more open to learning from what is going wrong and see beyond the necessary political pressure to prove what works. It needs to **incentivise honest and critical self-assessment about what doesn't work**. Resources also need to be allocated to those pieces of the Practice-Based Integration Framework which are prioritised in political rhetoric. This is not to say that priorities should be based on emotionally charged political debates, rather that governments should **ensure that there is greater consistency between what they say and what they do, avoiding the 'say-do' gap**.

Finally, while integration policy has tended to focus disproportionately on the socio-economic elements

of integration, public and political debates in this field have become most heated in the socio-cultural field. Political leaders need to **harness the debate about the more controversial and highly-emotive socio-cultural challenges into a constructive and strategic discussion**, building forums for frustrations to be expressed and responded to directly. Governments and foundations also need to invest in the testing of new inter-community and inter-faith dialogue methods and prioritise mainstreaming these methodologies so they can reach wider target groups.

The challenge of integration will not go away in the near future; in fact, with demographic change, economic pressures and the dominant political climate across Europe, pressure to deliver on integration outcomes is only likely to increase. The report stresses that this is no easy challenge, but in offering practical insights into what is being done on the ground, a series of detailed case studies, and a fresh approach to programming and evaluation, it is hoped that this report can make a positive and substantive contribution to the continuing improvement of this important area of policy and public life.



# INTRODUCTION

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In recent decades, changing migration patterns have had a profound impact on the political, economic and socio-cultural character of Europe. Migration has been the largest driver of population growth in ageing societies, and has dramatically changed the demographic make-up of the continent.

Some of this migration has been temporary. Globalisation and technology have created opportunities for those who only wish to move for a finite period, such as international students, seasonal workers, or members of the 'global elite' who migrate frequently in pursuit of employment opportunities at the highest levels. However, many migrant groups have made Europe their home, as first generation migrants have settled and raised families. Many parts of Europe have changed beyond recognition: over 300 languages are spoken in London; the Kreuzberg neighbourhood of Berlin is known to many as Little Istanbul; and Rotterdam will become a majority minority city within the next five years.<sup>1</sup> Some cities have embraced and taken pride in their diverse identities, while others have taken on these changes reluctantly.

If managed properly, **migration has huge potential to enrich European economies and societies.** It creates new jobs and trade relationships, allows the transfer of new ideas and cultural goods and can help to offset the fiscal and welfare pressures created by ageing populations. However, these **benefits can only be realised if there is a sustained focus on**

**promoting the integration** of diverse communities and ensuring that all citizens are able to thrive, both economically and socially.

This is no easy task. Recent statistics show that across Europe, with notable exceptions, **citizens of migrant origin are almost always overrepresented across most socio-economic indicators of disadvantage.** Almost 40 per cent of foreign-born Swedes are unemployed (close to double the national average).<sup>2</sup> The percentage of German Turks with no professional qualifications grew between 2001 and 2006 to over 50 per cent.<sup>3</sup> And while on average ethnic minorities in Britain are better educated than their white counterparts, they still perform considerably worse in the labour market.<sup>4</sup> At a time of economic crisis and where there are cuts in public spending, these gaps are likely to widen over the next few decades.

Achieving **socio-cultural integration has been equally challenging.** In many countries, the influx of large numbers of migrants has created a great deal of public anxiety about the real or perceived competition for jobs and resources, and about the ability of communities to maintain a shared sense of identity and common values in the face of increasing levels of diversity. These concerns have been exacerbated by the increased linkage of debates about migration, integration and security, and by the singling out of perceived 'problem communities' by politicians and the media.

This combination of public and political concern about the socio-cultural aspects of integration and strained global financial conditions has driven **increasingly reactive and ‘short-termist’ policymaking** in the integration domain over the past five to 10 years. This has created a number of problems.

First, it has led to the **implementation of measures that can explicitly undermine communities’ abilities to integrate**. For example, in recent years governments in the Netherlands and Britain have cut back the provision of language tuition for migrants.<sup>5</sup> Yet studies consistently show that linguistic proficiency is the single most cost-effective way of promoting integration.<sup>6</sup> Without language skills, migrants are hugely disadvantaged when it comes to finding work, and are therefore more susceptible to relying on benefits and are less able to contribute economically. They are also disadvantaged socially and culturally, finding it harder to make friends or learn about the customs of their new country, and they are, in some cases, destined to a life of segregation.

Second, rather than placate the concerns of mainstream society, **a focus on so-called ‘problem communities’ can actually make the public debate more toxic**. Research shows that mainstream attitudes in fact harden as political rhetoric and policies become more punitive.<sup>7</sup> Likewise, perceived punitiveness has helped alienate many migrant communities. Government-led attempts at setting up targeted consultative bodies have often suffered from mistrust due to their securitisation of the issue, and unrepresentativeness. These pitfalls have exacerbated the problem, inciting greater antagonism and division.

Finally, **policymaking approaches that focus on immediate problems rather than long-term**

**integration needs have often cost governments dearly**. One recent study by the Bertelsmann Foundation found that had migrants achieved the same educational outcomes and comparable employment rates as native Germans, the German state would have saved in the region of up to €15.6 billion.<sup>8</sup> This study argues that the greatest savings would not have resulted from a decrease in welfare costs, but from migrants’ increased ability to contribute to the German economy.

Overcoming these challenges requires a new approach to integration on the parts of governments and communities alike. It will involve the **development of a long-term vision about what an integrated society would look like across a broad range of sectors**, as well as the implementation of a set of strategic policies and practices that will empower communities to achieve these goals. Crucially, these policies and practices need to be **underpinned by a clear set of desired integration outcomes and by continuous evaluation** of what is and isn’t working on the ground.

This report is the culmination of a research project undertaken by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, with the support of the Open Society Foundations, to address the question of evaluation. The project has involved background research on different approaches to integration adopted across a number of EU member states in terms of definitions, policies, and evaluation methods, resulting in a policy brief.<sup>9</sup> A workshop of experts working on integration at policy and delivery levels was held,<sup>10</sup> as well as a series of case study visits with policymakers, trusts and foundations, and civil society organisations in the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden to understand what is being done to evaluate and understand success in integration, and what lessons have been learnt from these different stakeholders.



Understanding what works in integration needs to be based on clear answers to two questions: **What does integration seek to achieve? And how will we know when we have succeeded?** Chapter One grapples with the challenges of defining the scope and scale of the integration problem and identifying how it should be solved.

In particular, there is a **lack of clarity about ‘who’ is being integrated into ‘what’**. New arrivals and migrants are usually the target of integration programmes, and indeed are often those most in need of interventions and support. Yet a focus on particular ethnic minority groups has frequently led to the **problematism and stigmatisation of particular communities**, and has prevented the development of integration strategies that address the impacts of migration on the whole of society.

Simultaneously, the strong operational emphasis on measuring and improving the socio-economic indicators of integration has failed to take sufficient account of the fact that the **political debate in this area has largely focused on the socio-cultural aspects of integration**. While these socio-cultural factors have a profound impact on the ways that people and communities relate to each other on a day-to-day basis, they have been poorly defined and policymakers have found it hard to set clear and measurable objectives in this domain.

This report calls for the redoubling of efforts to set clear objectives spanning the socio-cultural and socio-economic, and evaluate what works in integration. It thus sets out a working definition of integration and a tool for integration planning: **the Practice-Based Integration Framework**. This tool, presented in Chapter Two, catalogues over 100 individual pathways to achieving different

integration outcomes, and aims to encapsulate the totality of measures being taken across Europe.

Chapter Three goes on to set out a number of structural challenges hampering effective evaluation. These include a general **scarcity of data and evidence of impact**, but also **contention over who should evaluate, lack of capacity, and cost**. The report presents a number of steps that can be taken to address these challenges. For example, though evaluation tends to be done for the purposes of ‘control’ (i.e. to assess outputs and to ensure accountability), this chapter argues that **there needs to be a strong emphasis on learning**. More can be done to ensure that data not generally appreciated in evaluation processes, such as personal testimonies, small-scale figures, and best practices from the field, is used more fruitfully and disseminated to ensure we’re not re-inventing the wheel. This chapter sets out four complementary approaches to evaluation at different levels, from individual project and group monitoring, to broader learning-based evaluation and a systemic change model. These approaches allow us to move beyond some of the typical challenges of evaluation in this field.

Finally, Chapter Four develops this report’s call for a learning-based approach. Learning from past failures and successes can critically inform integration strategy. It thus draws upon interviews and case studies to present broader recommendations about integration policy and practice, all of which impact on the ability to evaluate or achieve outcomes.

This report argues that **an evidence-based approach to integration will allow policymakers to select from among the myriad of successful interventions that exist around Europe**, ensuring that these often small programmes can grow and can be replicated in

different contexts. It will also make it easier to **discontinue investment into what doesn't work**. Moreover, given the complexity of Europe's migrant population and the multiplicity of needs, it will **allow policymakers to target increasingly diverse communities more effectively**.

The report also highlights the active role that charitable foundations and civil society organisations can play in shaping government policy. Civil society groups work closer to the ground and benefit from higher levels of trust among the most vulnerable groups, particularly migrants. Many foundations already support good practice at the level of civil society. Their support plays a key role in bolstering all the critical characteristics which give civil society groups a unique place in promoting integration: their access, the fact that they enjoy greater trust from communities (particularly the most marginalised), their in-depth knowledge of what is happening on the ground, and their willingness to test new ideas. However, with government cuts to integration funding, and with the increased mainstreaming of integration policy, **civil society and direct service providers are likely to become more vulnerable in the coming years**. It is thus all the more important that **trusts and foundations can play a more strategic role in integration programming** for a number of reasons. As this report demonstrates, foundations can play a critical role in tooling up civil society organisations to better contribute to the evidence base on integration.

Collaboration across and within these sectors is possible and necessary, but interviews with dozens of groups across Europe revealed that levels of mistrust are very high. Governments will have to work hard to **make these groups feel listened to**. Likewise, groups working on the ground will need to wake up to

the fact that **the case for intervention needs to be articulated with those making hard public spending decisions in mind**. This report emphasises the importance of this exchange and presents recommendations as to how to make it more constructive.

Designing coherent integration strategies is neither a luxury nor an option. Diversity is a reality that is here to stay in Europe, and the steps that both political leaders and the populations they govern take now in this space will be critical in determining whether their societies become more fractured, or more capable of thriving as a result of their diversity.

## CHAPTER 1

# WHAT IS INTEGRATION?

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### 1.1 Different approaches

One of the key challenges to developing evidence-based integration policy is the wide variety of definitions of the problem and prognoses about solutions. Across Europe there are multiple schools of thinking about integration, different national and sub-national approaches, a lack of policy coherence, divergent approaches to target groups and varying emphasis placed on single or whole-society approaches. The full scope of the definitional challenge was described in an earlier report, *Integration and Cohesion in Europe: An Overview*, which showed how countries have come to adopt unique approaches to integration based on their histories, cultural characteristics and political systems.<sup>11</sup> These divergences make cross-country comparisons very difficult.

The fieldwork for this project was based on interviews, visits and focus groups in four countries which highlight some of the key integration challenges facing Europe: Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Although these are all old immigration countries, their trajectories have been markedly different when it comes to integration policymaking. Moreover, the institutional arrangements put in place to manage integration have also been very different.

The first case study is **Germany**, a country which until very recently lacked a coherent framework for integration, even though it has received significant

levels of immigration for many years. This was driven by the assumption that so-called migrant ‘guest workers’ would eventually return home; in reality few actually did so. Today, around 15.6 million people with a migrant background live in Germany, accounting for approximately 19 per cent of the population.<sup>12</sup> Until recently, migrants and their descendants had little access to citizenship and there was little political effort to promote integration. While this started to change in the 1990s and early 2000s, it is only very recently that Germany has begun to implement more concrete integration policies and programmes. For example, a major German Islam Conference was initiated in 2006, aiming to open a new stream of dialogue between the state and German Muslims on integration. The need for this kind of sustained dialogue has been made clear by subsequent developments and public controversies, such as the 2010 publication of a best-selling book by Thilo Sarrazin portraying Muslims as unwilling to integrate and citing genetic differences between different racial groups.<sup>13</sup> The media has also made much of so-called ‘honour killings’ in Turkish immigrant communities and other violence in ethnic minority communities.

Today, integration has become a top priority at the local level, with many city mayors launching local integration strategies. In 2011, Germany developed a new integration strategy through a set of participatory ‘forums for dialogue’, involving a number of stakeholders across a set of themes including sports, culture, immigrants in public

service, early childhood education, and labour market and professional life.<sup>14</sup> The National Integration Plan arose from these forums, and sets out measurable and binding goals for integration in Germany. In 2012, Chancellor Angela Merkel declared openly that Islam had become a part of Germany, and urged Germans to show tolerance for Muslims.<sup>15</sup>

Particular focus has been placed on ‘intercultural opening’: efforts to better serve migrant communities’ needs by recruiting more personnel with a migration background, and developing consultative bodies of migrants to amplify their voice in local politics.<sup>16</sup> Germany has begun to provide intercultural and migrant-oriented training to staff of the Federal Employment Agency as part of this increased focus on intercultural values.<sup>17</sup>

Other areas of focus include civic integration courses that combine language learning with orientation to Germany, as a prerequisite to naturalisation, as well as increased investment into education, through language learning courses, individual counselling, civic education and knowledge testing, and changing school systems and curricula to adapt to migrant pupils.<sup>18</sup> Interestingly, the German *Integrationskurse* (integration course) simply extends a programme to foreign-born residents that was already in place for ethnic Germans. There has been some debate in recent years surrounding the obligatory nature of these courses, and who is to pay (the migrant, or the federal government, the *länder*, or municipalities).<sup>19</sup>

The second case study is the **Netherlands**. As in the German case, until recently the Dutch government developed integration policy on the assumption that most migration should be temporary. However, the Netherlands was quicker to recognise that a

substantial proportion of these migrants would not return to their country of origin, and it launched its first integration policy in the mid-1980s. Today, one in five residents in the Netherlands has a migrant background, with over 11 per cent of the Dutch population belonging to what has been categorised as ‘non-Western minorities’, while nine per cent are of ‘Western migrant background’.<sup>20</sup>

Dutch integration policy is based on the long-term objective of ensuring that the performance of all key groups in various domains (e.g. the labour market, education and housing), is proportionate to their share of the total Dutch population.<sup>21</sup> Dealing with the overrepresentation of minorities in unemployment figures has been a particular focus in recent years. However, the focus of policy changed dramatically in 2004 following the murder of Dutch film producer Theo van Gogh,<sup>22</sup> an event which revealed the extent of tensions about the perceived incompatibility of Muslim migrants (particularly those of Moroccan origin) and secular Dutch culture.<sup>23</sup> The rise of the anti-Islam Party for Freedom (*Partij voor de Vrijheid*) gave a political voice to those concerned and angry about the influence of Islam in Dutch society.

Today, Dutch integration policies make the right to settle in the Netherlands highly conditional on a number of tests, including language proficiency and other civic integration requirements. The country has also been redirecting efforts towards mainstreaming integration programmes.<sup>24</sup>

The third case study is **Sweden**, a country which has long been particularly proactive about the integration of migrants. Today, 15.1 per cent of the Swedish population is foreign-born and 19.6 per cent of the population is Swedish-born with two foreign-born parents.<sup>25</sup> This means nearly 35 per cent of the

population has a migrant background. The majority (58.9 per cent) of the foreign-born population in Sweden are Swedish citizens.<sup>26</sup>

After proclaiming itself a multicultural society in 1975, the Swedish parliament that year adopted three goals for its immigrant and minority policies: equality, freedom of choice, and cooperation. Sweden also institutionalised various means of support for the cultural ambitions of immigrants, such as public support for media in immigrant languages and support for home language instruction in public schools. Qualifying for Swedish citizenship was made easier and immigrants were even given the conditional right to participate in political elections at the municipal level. Until recently, debates about immigration and integration were strikingly depoliticised, characterised by consensus across party lines.<sup>27</sup>

In 1997, the Swedish government began to pursue a more comprehensive integration strategy, and established the Integration Board to oversee integration efforts throughout society. This was replaced in 2007 by a new Ministry of Integration and Gender Equality. However, this Ministry closed in 2011 and integration has since been delivered largely out of the Ministry of Employment through mainstream policies. The overall emphasis is on increasing the supply and demand of labour, and ensuring equality in schools, based on the logic that the main barrier to integration is an inability to access work.

Sweden has served as a testing ground for coping with diverse societies and the management of a generous welfare system. In many ways, the country's relatively peaceful transition demonstrates the benefits of a more liberal path towards management of migration and integration in a welfare state. However, recent years have been more problematic.

The evidence shows that despite these favourable conditions, immigrants to Sweden face structural discrimination in the labour market, the housing market, mass media, the political system, the education system and in welfare services (Karan 2008). Moreover, an anti-immigrant far right party, the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*), has become increasingly popular, and was elected to parliament in 2010 on a platform that warned of the threats posed by immigrants to Swedish society, including the welfare burden, security threats, and cultural disintegration.

The final case study is the **United Kingdom**. The UK is today home to 7.5 million foreign-born residents, accounting for 13 per cent of the total population.<sup>28</sup> The majority of foreign-born residents (60 per cent) become British citizens within five years of their arrival.<sup>29</sup> Britain's first integration policy was instituted in the 1960s, primarily targeting migrants from the Commonwealth countries. At the time, the approach to integration was described by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, "not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance."<sup>30</sup>

The UK has implemented some of the most progressive measures for legal protection for minority communities in Europe, from the Race Relations Act of 1965, to recent legislation aimed at ensuring fair access to education, the labour market and housing for all minorities. From the late-1960s, Britain's approach was broadly understood as a multiculturalist one, focused on the promotion of minority cultural identity. British immigration regulations have become more restrictive since the 1970s, coupled with an increasingly negative public discourse on immigration and integration.

Unlike Sweden, Britain's approach to integration has never been the product of political consensus, and a series of traumatic events shaped the integration debate through the early 2000s. The year 2001 saw a series of riots across the UK, with cities including Oldham, Bradford, and Leeds hit by violent confrontation between ethnic groups. It was in the wake of these riots that the concept of 'community cohesion' gained traction as a term encompassing the work that was being done to build stronger social relations and healthier diverse communities in Britain.

In recent years a critique of multiculturalism has emerged, which culminated with a key Prime Ministerial speech in February 2011 declaring that state multiculturalism had failed. Questions of integration have often been conflated with security and community safety questions revolving around the challenges of integrating certain 'problem' communities, namely Muslim communities, particularly following the 7/7 terrorist attacks on London. It is in this context that 'community cohesion' became the preferred conceptual framework for the integration debate. The focus of the debate has moved away from legal protection to empowering communities, countering discrimination, improving 'meaningful' contact, and defining and instilling British cultural identity. Many have argued that there has been a 'vacuum' in policies towards newcomers and migrant integration, due to the focus on ethnic minorities and the promotion of good race relations, equality and multiculturalism.<sup>31</sup>

These four countries demonstrate the diversity of histories and approaches taken across Europe. And yet despite these differences the four countries share many of the same challenges. Migrant **integration has been at the heart of considerable political controversy** (possibly with the exception of Sweden

where until recently there has been wide parliamentary agreement on the issue since the 70s). Political uncertainties have been further shaken by key 'watershed' moments – from the murder of film-maker Theo van Gogh to the London bombings and the Northern riots in the UK. Such **uncertainties have led to dramatic shifts in integration policies**, particularly in the UK and Holland, where they prompted the rejection of multiculturalist approaches of the past and the introduction of progressively tougher conditionalities for new citizens.<sup>32</sup>

Moreover, the four countries **considered above have all faced considerable difficulties in managing mainstream public opinions**. Surveys show that the UK public is consistently sceptical about migration (although largely accepting of diversity).<sup>33</sup> The election of the xenophobic Sweden Democrats to parliament in 2010 has thrown into question the Swedes' traditional tolerance. The unprecedented success of Thilo Sarrazin's racist polemic and ongoing violence against ethnic minorities has triggered similar debates in Germany.

Finally, while there are differences in scale, all of these countries have faced considerable challenges when it comes to integration outcomes. Whether living in Stockholm or in Rotterdam, **migrants and ethnic minorities are faced with considerable structural disadvantages** across the case study countries. According to a 2008 Green Paper adopted by the European Commission, migrant children in the EU underperform in the education system: they are more likely to leave school early, and enrolment in higher education is lower. In some cases, second generation migrants show lower school performance than the first generation.<sup>34</sup> The unemployment rate for migrants is higher than the rate for the native-born population in all of the case study countries, and is

more than double the rate in Sweden and the Netherlands.<sup>35</sup> Migrants are also more likely to live in poorer housing, and are underrepresented in the political system across the case study countries.

### Trends in integration policy and practice across Europe

European countries are increasingly recognising that integration of immigrants takes place largely at the local level, and more national governments are supporting the **development of local integration strategies**. Historically, local policies on integration have often preceded national policies, as was the case in Amsterdam and Berlin. Sweden and the Netherlands were among the earliest European countries that ‘engaged cities’ in their national policies through the 1980s and 1990s,<sup>36</sup> which pushed local authorities to develop integration policies.<sup>37</sup> Local authorities are in many ways better placed to design effective integration strategies, in part due to their ability to set priorities appropriately and pragmatically, and their ability to engage with locally mobilised minority and majority groups.<sup>38</sup> The EU has been at the forefront of developing city-level integration policies and exchange of best practice, such as through the European City Network for Local Integration Policies for Migrants (CLIP Network).<sup>39</sup>

The **importance of language learning** has been largely accepted by many countries. Though most countries acknowledge the importance of language proficiency, there is currently no common European approach to language learning. Some countries offer language support courses for new arrivals. Others set language proficiency exams in the country of origin. Despite the fact that language acquisition has become expected of migrants, one of the key tensions in recent years is that it has become increasingly under-funded

in most EU countries. Though some countries include language learning as a cornerstone of integration policy, funding is allocated to this domain in divergent ways. For example, Danish funding allocated to language learning has increased during the recession, while in the Dutch context, its funding has been significantly reduced.<sup>40</sup> In some contexts it has suffered considerably from the recent tightening of regulation of private language schools.<sup>41</sup>

Many countries are also experimenting with **civic integration courses** for immigrants to allow them to become proficient in the country’s languages, delivering educational programmes on the country’s customs and values. These have been instituted in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark.<sup>42</sup>

There is a growing consensus around the benefits of **opening voting rights and paths to citizenship for migrants**. Encouraging political participation is increasingly becoming a part of national integration strategies.<sup>43</sup> Dual nationality and *jus soli* (the right by which any individual born in a state is a recognised citizen) are becoming the norms for many countries, though *jus sanguinis* (citizenship determined by descent or origin) in different forms is still a common means of controlling citizenship in some states. This means that those born to two foreign-born parents in many countries are not granted the same rights as those born to a citizen, which can lead to the creation of ethnic sub-classes of residents.

Resources have also been directed towards a number of **efforts to promote better relations between government and civil society** across Europe. Finland, Ireland and Spain have tested the use of consultative bodies which aim to serve as a conduit between the government and migrant communities

to advise the former on issues faced by migrants, and to pass information about planned policies and action through to communities.<sup>44</sup> However, it has proven difficult to maintain momentum and ensure representativeness in a number of these bodies. Facilitating the capacity for civil society to ‘filter up’ can be a complicated process. For example, many attempts at creating representative bodies, national councils or advisory boards on integration issues have been overly institutionalised and in the process have become unrepresentative. The Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Migration in Berlin, administrates a Council on Integration and Migration, a high-level working group chaired by the Senator of Integration, Labour and Social Affairs that brings together participants ranging from state secretaries to elected representatives of migrant organisations and labour unions. Managing an election process to develop this Council has been a major challenge and administrative undertaking for the Office; however, the broader aim of strengthening political participation of people with migrant background in Berlin is worthwhile.<sup>45</sup> Consultative bodies are often led and funded by governments and are highly dependent on the political context. Changes in political leadership can therefore prove fatal. These initiatives also struggle with fostering and maintaining the trust of the communities they seek to engage with.

Finally, in recent years a greater emphasis has been placed on **integration as an obligation of migrants**. For example, in January 2013, the Netherlands instituted changes to the role of local government in integration, shifting the responsibility for integration onto individuals. Individuals are now responsible for meeting integration requirements, supported by a system of loans, and temporary residence permits are revoked upon failure to pass the national civic

integration exam.<sup>46</sup> This is coupled with a trend of implementing **more compulsion in integration policies** – for example, requiring migrants to attend language and orientation classes before their arrival in the country. The UK, for instance, requires evidence of some language ability and knowledge of ‘Life in the United Kingdom’ before acquiring settlement or citizenship.<sup>47</sup>

Countries that have instituted mandatory integration requirements tend to be those that have never embraced multicultural strategies, like Denmark, or those that have dismantled multicultural programmes, such as the Netherlands.<sup>48</sup> There have been debates over whether mandatory or voluntary measures promote more positive outcomes, and there is some evidence to show that voluntary programmes have been successful and should be pursued further.<sup>49</sup> Sociologist Christian Joppke has argued that mandatory programmes are often designed less for their impacts on migrant communities, and more so the native population is assured that the state is enforcing migrant integration. They thus may be interpreted as symbolic politics, “whose mere existence matters more than the declared goals pursued by it.”<sup>50</sup>

## 1.2 Who are we integrating, and into what?

Across Europe target groups for integration have been defined in many ways. The terms ‘foreign-nationals’, ‘foreign-born’, ‘immigrants’ and ‘ethnic minorities’ are often used interchangeably. But, in order to be effective, governments and civil society need to be much clearer on definitions, otherwise it will not be possible to address the specific challenges



for any particular group. This section sets out varying definitions that have been used, touching upon the challenges and merits of different approaches, and proposes a new outlook for setting target groups.

### **Just for new migrants?**

Measures to integrate new migrants through the facilitation of their entry, settlement and participation are important for any integration policy. However, a **complex range of factors significantly impact on the needs of different groups, and also influence the rate, pace and outcomes of integration.** These include the circumstances under which individuals have migrated, and their legal migration status (e.g. whether they are temporary migrants, student migrants, labour migrants or long-term settlers).<sup>51</sup>

Distinguishing between varying needs is challenging. For example, economic migrants and refugees will have some needs in common but others that are distinctive. Governments have also struggled with whether or not to include the needs of irregular migrants in their integration planning. In its Common Agenda for Integration in 2005, the European Commission argued that although it endorses an effective policy of return, integration policies would not be “fully successful” unless they recognise the presence of irregular migrants.<sup>52</sup>

At the European level, the **integration debate on EU policy remains limited to discussions of non-EU nationals.** Although EU national migrants have been formally excluded from this debate, they are increasingly central to public and political debates in Western Europe. EU nationals may face many of the same challenges experienced by third-country nationals in the migration process, including language acquisition. Though they may in fact constitute a

large group of ‘new migrants’ in Western European countries, there is no defined policy framework for the integration of EU nationals in Europe.

The question of **whether to target new arrivals or ethnic minority groups** is also disputed at the European level. In some countries, particularly in the UK, central government policies have focused primarily on settled ‘ethnic minority’ communities, rather than on new arrivals. Others have invested increasingly heavily in the newcomers but have failed to address the structural issues affecting long-standing communities of migrant origin (such as those in Germany). In the absence of central policy, local authorities and civil society service providers have been left to fill the gap, calling for the extension of integration policies to include targeted measures and support for new migrant integration.<sup>53</sup>

### **A single-community focus?**

To date, the **integration agenda has largely been approached through a single-community lens,** with policies focused on integrating specific target communities. Post-9/11, the discussion about integration has become increasingly conflated with concerns about national security and has focused largely on the status of Muslim communities, from British Prime Minister David Cameron’s assertions of the failure of multiculturalism with explicit reference to British Muslims,<sup>54</sup> to former French President Nicholas Sarkozy’s implementation of a ban on the wearing of the *niqab*,<sup>55</sup> and the initiation of the German Islam Conference in 2006. This has further politicised an already complex debate, and has often **resulted in short-termist knee-jerk responses,** rather than evidence-based policymaking. It has also opened an **unhelpful chasm between political debates and what is happening on the ground,** where deficit in integration outcomes spans

different social and cultural groups. In this way the discussion glosses over ongoing issues that stretch far beyond perceived single-community issues.

Furthermore, **the persistent targeting of groups as ‘problem’ communities risks pushing individuals into extremisms of different forms** as they push back against perceived double standards. Studies in the UK have shown that the targeting of ‘suspect communities’, with varying levels of ‘integration’, has triggered radicalisation within both Muslim and Irish communities.<sup>56</sup> Right-wing extremism is also known to be fuelled by the characterisation of particular communities as threatening to racial and cultural survival.<sup>57</sup> Concepts such as ‘non-Western’, ‘the Muslim community’, and even ‘natives’, have featured prominently in public and political debates. Such concepts often invent communities that do not exist in reality, and **reinforce perceptions that these groups are distinct and incompatible.** Sweeping generalisations about a particular group’s ability to integrate and about the ensuing security concerns have been one of the main obstacles to successful integration.

### **A whole of society approach**

Policymakers need to move away from the current focus on perceived ‘problem’ communities, to one which sees integration as something much more comprehensive – what this report calls a **‘whole of society’ or ‘360°’ approach – to ensure that no groups in need of intervention are left behind.** This approach should be grounded in some of the principles already set out in the EU Framework on Integration which states that “integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of EU countries.”<sup>58</sup> But the approach needs to go even further. It needs to recognise that migrant groups are

disproportionately affected by wider trends in employment, public spending, and the economic downturn.<sup>59</sup> However, it must also recognise that certain non-migrant groups may also exhibit disproportionately deficient outcomes in the labour market, education system, or housing market, particularly in the case of Europe’s Roma populations and white working class communities in former industrial areas.<sup>60</sup> A sole focus in both discourse and policy on newcomers and migrants can distract from some of the broader challenges and can feed public frustration on issues of immigrant integration.

**Policies aimed at addressing the specific challenges faced by migrants should be implemented alongside other societal integration measures aimed at marginalised groups.** Importantly, they need to be accompanied by measures to foster good relations and a sense of well-being across all of these groups.

This comprehensive approach becomes all the more critical as the diversity within immigrant populations themselves continues to rise; this has been described as superdiversity.<sup>61</sup> This is evident in countries such as Germany, where in 2007 half of all immigrants belonged to an immigrant group whose share of the immigrant population was less than two per cent.<sup>62</sup> **A 360° view of target groups will make it much easier to address the multiple challenges faced by different groups.** It will allow policymakers to have the full range of possible target communities within sight, to be more sensitive to changes in the ‘needs’ of communities within particular policy fields, and to identify communities, both migrant and non-migrant, which are experiencing new problems. It will also help policymakers close the gaps between outcomes for those with particular ethnic backgrounds and the total population, across multiple policy domains.

### 1.3 What does integration seek to achieve?

Alongside the need for a clearer definition of ‘who’ we are trying to integrate, there is an urgent need to develop a broader consensus on ‘what’ this integration looks like; this means a definition which can bring civil society and governments on board, and which provides a positive vision of what integration is seeking to achieve. This report presents a working definition of integration, based on research and the insights derived from case studies. Integration is defined here as both a process and an outcome, and it is **underpinned by four mutually-reinforcing principles**.

**The first principle is access.** All citizens and residents must be given access to the fruits of liberal democratic societies in order to contribute to and reap their full benefits. The basis of this is a sound legal framework designed to grant and protect access for all to democratic rights, education, the labour market and housing. However, it is not enough to simply grant rights or opportunities.

**The second is empowerment.** People need to be empowered in order to take full advantage of the opportunities and rights that are given to them. The fact that the democratic right to vote and stand in elections exists doesn’t mean that individuals feel empowered to exercise their rights.

**The third is trust.** Building and maintaining a sense of trust and reciprocity in diverse communities will facilitate cooperation and allow for more efficient and smooth-running societies. Robert Putnam has famously put forward a compelling thesis on the importance of relationships, networks and solidarity as key elements in the development of social capital and healthy civic communities (namely in the context of their decline).<sup>63</sup>

**The fourth and final principle is belonging.** Trust will be difficult to cultivate without ensuring a shared sense of belonging. In the words of Kent Portney and Jeffrey Berry, a sense of belonging to a neighbourhood is about residents “caring about the people who live there, and believing that people who live there care about them.”<sup>64</sup> Cultivating belonging is not a new idea. Ever since the creation of the modern nation state belonging has been seen as a critical component which will help communities to flourish.<sup>65</sup> Diversity makes it all the more important. Together, trust and belonging form the basis for a range of societal benefits: implementation of social order and social control; civic engagement and collective action; and fuller participation in a democratic culture. They also underpin the ability to achieve success on the structural elements of integration, such as a strong anti-discrimination framework, access to financial capital, access to labour markets, and low levels of segregation.

The four principles identified here will only be met through leveraging and coordinating the whole gamut of policies which can have an impact. For example, feelings of trust and belonging are shaped by a range of policies and programmes, from the design of national curricula to the implementation of diversity training for the police. Ensuring that communities have access to opportunities and are empowered to take advantage of these may be achieved through methods as diverse as reforms to the judicial system, initiatives to improve voter turnout, tweaks to housing policies, and the provision of multilingual services at hospitals.

There are **six main areas of policy and practice** across which these four principles are operationalised: **legal, welfare, economic, social, political and cultural**. Figure 1 outlines these six

**Figure 1: Key Areas of Integration Practice**

**Legal**

Integration must begin with a sound legal framework designed to grant access to and protect rights for migrants and minorities, alongside all residents. However, legal frameworks providing rights to individuals need to be accompanied by preventative measures sanctioning violations, and measures to inform groups of their rights. The latter is often achieved through advice bureaus, legal assistance, community advocacy organisations, and migrant or ethnic group networks.

**Economic**

Economic integration aims to empower communities through promoting labour force participation, reducing unemployment, and enhancing the occupational and educational attainment of particular groups. Assessment of these areas must often be controlled for skill levels and the length of time an individual has lived in the country in question (in the case of migrants) to paint a fair picture of which groups in society are underachieving. Economic integration is closely linked to social integration, as empowerment in the labour market and access to financial capital can, for example, be tied to social networks and social capital.

**Political**

Political integration involves measures to promote awareness of political rights, and improve residents' capacity to exercise their democratic entitlements. Political integration also aims to improve the representation of all groups in political parties and government, and to ensure that voices from different levels of society are heard in decision-making. This, in tandem with social integration, is critical to building trust among communities, and between communities and local and national authorities.

**Welfare**


Healthy living conditions are a basic requirement for successful integration. The main concerns here are access to housing, segregation in housing, and the quality and affordability of housing. Such measures can have a major impact on public health and safety, and if done right can allow people to access opportunities in other areas of policy and practice. Improving health conditions for the whole of society, and migrants in particular, also features strongly in this category of integration policy. Some migrants are likely to receive lower standards of healthcare than the average population, due to their legal status, inability to access health services or a lack of cultural competency on the part of the health services.

**Social**

Measures within the field of social integration aim to build a culture of acceptance, inclusion and participation and to improve the strength of social cohesion at all levels of society. Though many integration measures have taken a single-community approach to social integration, focusing on particular 'problem' communities, achieving these outcomes requires a cross-community approach to integration. Social integration is in many ways critical to empowering individuals to achieve across the economic, political and cultural domains.

**Cultural**

Cultural integration has proven the most difficult area for integration programming. It aims to foster a shared civic and democratic culture, promote freedom of cultural expression, and build tolerance of difference. Ultimately, social, political and cultural integration can collectively contribute to a sense of belonging and trust within the community. Measures to achieve these include, among others, intercultural activities, civic education, and local narrative building. Equal representation of different groups in the media plays a major role in achieving this. Evaluating the cultural elements of integration is particularly difficult due to a paucity of data relating to the desired outcomes.



distinct but inter-related categories characterising the range of measures implemented across Europe to grant access, empower communities, and develop trust and a sense of belonging.

In order to support the achievement of access, empowerment, trust and belonging across these six areas, governments and societies first need to **recognise the role mainstream and targeted policies can play in supporting integration outcomes**. Debates about integration have in many countries worryingly shifted from an emphasis on ‘rights granted’ to ‘obligations’ on the part of migrants. This is largely explained by a shift from the promotion of multiculturalism to the re-emergence of an assimilationist rhetoric. The result is that integration has become positioned as being the responsibility of the migrants themselves, a position which ignores the impact of mainstream policies, systematic factors, and the interplay between the socio-economic and socio-cultural factors which can shape a migrant’s experiences and opportunities.

Second, there is a need for **evidence-based policy and planning which addresses the socio-economic (legal, welfare and economic) and socio-cultural (social, political and cultural) elements of integration**, and spans a range of policy levers. Promoting integration in diverse societies is not simply a task for government ministries responsible for immigration and settlement, but is a challenge that requires input from the education, health and welfare sectors, among others. There is often a lack of joined-up policymaking in this domain, which in turn has prevented the achievement of more sustainable integration outcomes.

There are a number of possible pathways to achieving integration. The following chapter presents a tool to

better understand the activities that can deliver societies underpinned by access, empowerment, trust and belonging. It presents clear goals for programming across the six areas of integration practice, and sets out a range of measures that can be taken to achieve these goals.

## 2.1 The Practice-Based Integration Framework

As outlined in the previous chapter, there are many different schools of thinking on what constitutes integration, and in most countries it has been fiercely debated. While both public and political debates on integration have twisted and turned, an abundance of good work has been delivered by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), direct service providers, and trusts and foundations, and has contributed to overarching goals of integration. It is time for integration strategy to be **driven by practice and build upon the successes (or failures) of what is actually happening on the ground.**

This chapter sketches out the elements of a tool, the Practice-Based Integration Framework, which could help to improve understandings of integration and how it might be achieved. The insights here have been drawn from fieldwork carried out in a number of countries.<sup>67</sup> Building on this research, the Practice-Based Integration Framework sets out a series of pathways to achieving integration, based on a realistic understanding of what is being done in practice.

Programming and evaluating integration should be based on an **understanding of causes and solutions** – a ‘theory of change’ – as this will ultimately form the basis of evaluation. A theory of change is a simple account of what a project is, what it intends to achieve and how it will do so. Among other things, theories of change can help initiatives (including

those operating on a small scale) to understand how their own activity contributes to wider policy goals. Given the range of definitions and approaches to integration, it is unsurprising that this policy area supports a multitude of (sometimes competing) theories of change. Many examples of theories of change are very general, and driven by conceptual frameworks such as ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘community cohesion.’ They give a sense of the complexity of the interventions and of the overall predicted pathways of change, but not what a final and usable version of these might look like.

The Practice-Based Integration Framework explicitly **aims to advance work that has already been done** to develop theoretical and conceptual frameworks for integration at the European level. The Council of Europe was one of the earliest European bodies to develop these, as it did through its 1998 report, *Measurements and Indicators of Integration*, which distinguished between four key dimensions of integration (economic, social, cultural and political). The EU has sought to foster greater consensus across Europe, agreeing in 2004 on a set of Common Basic Principles for immigrant integration policy,<sup>68</sup> and in 2010 on four policy areas (known as the Zaragoza Declaration) to monitor in relation to integration (employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship).<sup>69</sup>

The Practice-Based Integration Framework certainly confirms the importance of such priority areas as those previously identified at the European level, but it **proposes to significantly broaden the scope of this vision, looking at what is being done in practice**

Figure 2: The Practice-Based Integration Framework – Intended Outcomes for Successful Integration



rather than on assumptions of integration practice or available data sets. Rather than picking one theory of change, the Practice-Based Integration Framework presented here aims to encapsulate the totality of approaches being taken across Europe and sets clear objectives for these methods.

The Practice-Based Integration Framework builds on the six distinct but inter-related areas of policy and practice set out in the previous chapter: legal, welfare, economic, social, political and cultural. These categories reflect the different domains through which integration occurs and can be achieved. The Framework, presented

in Figure 2, sets clear goals and outcomes for activities within each of these areas, and indicates how these goals contribute to the principles set out in Chapter One: access, empowerment, trust and belonging.

Figures 3 through to 8 present a breakdown of the integration outcomes in Figure 2, setting out the types of activities and projects that could be deployed within each area of practice, and their expected results. The Practice-Based Integration Framework thus catalogues over 100 'theories of change', linking individual interventions to broader societal outcomes.



Figure 3: Theories of Change – Legal



Intended outcomes	Type of activities/projects	Expected results
Protective criminal justice system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Legal protection for vulnerable groups, regardless of status</li> <li>● Diversity training and representation within policing and justice system</li> <li>● Programmes advocating and working with employers to ensure fair wages and safe working conditions</li> <li>● Increasing public awareness of the vulnerability of immigrant workers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ensure safety and physical integrity</li> <li>● Increased protection particularly for vulnerable groups (e.g. those experiencing gender-based violence)</li> <li>● Protection for immigrant workers from exploitation and abuse</li> <li>● Fair policing and community safety procedures</li> </ul>
Strong anti-discrimination and human rights framework	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Wide-ranging sanctions to prevent and discourage discrimination</li> <li>● Services to identify and report cases of discrimination</li> <li>● Anti-racism programmes in schools</li> <li>● Campaign to improve anti-discrimination procedures and awareness across government and business</li> <li>● Victim support, empowerment and protection programmes and networks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ability to bring forward discrimination cases, racial profiling and incitement to hatred</li> <li>● Prohibition of discrimination in all areas of public life</li> <li>● Strong social norms against discrimination</li> </ul>
Access to citizenship and voting rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Inclusive citizenship laws and policies</li> <li>● Language tuition</li> <li>● Citizenship education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dual citizenship and prospects for citizenship for all settled residents</li> <li>● Clear and realistic requirements for citizenship</li> <li>● Increased ability to vote</li> </ul>
Permission to work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Laws granting rights to employment</li> <li>● Apprenticeships and training programmes</li> <li>● Programmes to transfer or recognise foreign qualifications</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Equal rights to live and work freely and across every sector</li> <li>● Reduced barriers to employment</li> </ul>
Access to social services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Laws granting to healthcare and other social services</li> <li>● Programmes preventing overcrowding and segregation</li> <li>● Social support packages and rehabilitation programmes</li> <li>● Training for service providers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Improved access to good quality housing</li> <li>● Improved access to healthcare and other social services</li> </ul>

Figure 4: Theories of Change – Welfare



Intended outcomes	Type of activities/projects	Expected results
<p>Access to decent quality housing</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Create legal provisions for access to housing and offering subsidies</li> <li>● Increase supply of affordable rented housing in particular areas, and tailor provision to the nature of local residents (e.g. large families, elderly, etc.)</li> <li>● Establish and support minority-led housing and homelessness organisations</li> <li>● Improve communication and advice on accessing housing</li> <li>● Anti-discrimination measures and discrimination monitoring in housing</li> <li>● Programmes preventing overcrowding</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Less overcrowding</li> <li>● Less homelessness</li> <li>● Improved access to low-cost home ownership and council allocation schemes</li> <li>● Eliminate discrimination in the housing market</li> </ul>
<p>Access to medical services</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Legal framework granting access to healthcare and other benefits</li> <li>● Multilingual services at healthcare institutions, (e.g. hospitals, clinics, etc.)</li> <li>● Communication of information regarding health services in multiple languages and widely distributed</li> <li>● Urban planning with a view towards improving health and safety</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Improved language skills</li> <li>● Improved understanding of medical system/healthcare services</li> <li>● Improved physical access to medical services</li> <li>● Access to public transport</li> </ul>
<p>Healthcare equality</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Capacity building and specialised training programmes for health professionals in cultural competence, ethics and diversity</li> <li>● Online tools, multimedia courses and self-training resources</li> <li>● Promotion of migrant-friendly health systems</li> <li>● Promotion of healthy practices in target communities, using accessible languages</li> <li>● Programmes targeting marginalised and less visible communities (e.g. women and young people)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Reduced social and healthcare inequalities</li> <li>● Improved access to healthcare</li> <li>● Improved understanding of medical practices and services</li> </ul>
<p>Healthy living conditions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Programmes preventing overcrowding</li> <li>● Consultations with communities to determine and address locally-specific safety concerns</li> <li>● Urban planning with a view towards improving health and safety</li> <li>● Improve capacity of safety volunteers, police and emergency services</li> <li>● Promotion of healthy practices in target communities, using accessible languages</li> <li>● Community philanthropic foundations to maintain and improve standards within local communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Less overcrowding</li> <li>● Diverse and accessible public spaces and leisure spots</li> <li>● Improved physical access to medical services</li> <li>● Improved service design and quality of care in medical services</li> <li>● Access to public transport</li> <li>● Low levels of crime</li> </ul>



Intended outcomes	Type of activities/projects	Expected results
<p>Good standards of community health and safety</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Consultations with communities to determine and address locally-specific safety concerns</li> <li>● Urban planning with a view towards improving health and safety</li> <li>● Improve capacity of safety volunteers, police and emergency services</li> <li>● Promotion of healthy practices in target communities, using accessible languages</li> <li>● Community philanthropic foundations to maintain and improve standards within local communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Improved physical access to medical services</li> <li>● Improved service design and quality of care in medical services</li> <li>● Access to public transport</li> <li>● Low levels of crime</li> </ul>
<p>Low levels of segregation</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Improvements to new migrant, refugee and asylum housing allocation systems</li> <li>● Improvements to the transportation system to ensure no secluded regions</li> <li>● Urban planning with a view towards improving social cohesion</li> <li>● Urban renewal projects and other countermeasures to prevent devaluation processes</li> <li>● Community engagement and volunteer programmes</li> <li>● Programmes targeting marginalised and less visible communities (e.g. women and young people)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Diverse and accessible public spaces and leisure spots</li> <li>● Easy and affordable access to public transport</li> <li>● Increased identification with a local or national community</li> <li>● Meaningful contact</li> </ul>

Figure 5: Theories of Change – Economic



Intended outcomes	Type of activities/projects	Expected results
Equality of opportunity in the labour market	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Language tuition</li> <li>• Mentoring and professional networks</li> <li>• Skills and leadership programmes</li> <li>• Business and organisational reforms to promote leadership of underrepresented groups</li> <li>• Scholarships</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved language skills</li> <li>• Increased competitiveness in the job market</li> <li>• Raised aspirations and ambitions</li> <li>• Reduced barriers to progression in the workplace</li> </ul>
Educational opportunities and performance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Language tuition</li> <li>• Special needs programmes and assessments for young people (e.g. immigrant pupils)</li> <li>• Intercultural approach in curricula, textbooks, and schedule, as well as training for teachers and school staff</li> <li>• After-school study clubs, mentoring and professional networks</li> <li>• Parental engagement</li> <li>• Adult education programmes and evening programmes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved language skills</li> <li>• Improved educational attainment at key stages</li> <li>• Increased representation in higher education</li> </ul>
Access to labour market	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Policies granting right to employment</li> <li>• Anti-discrimination programmes, targeting employers and mainstream institutions</li> <li>• Apprenticeships and training programmes</li> <li>• Programmes to transfer or recognise foreign qualifications</li> <li>• Mentoring and professional networks</li> <li>• Skills and leadership programmes</li> <li>• Promoting role models</li> <li>• Scholarships</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved language skills</li> <li>• Reduced barriers to employment</li> <li>• Raised aspirations and ambition</li> </ul>
Aspirations and achievement of goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Apprenticeships and training programmes (e.g. entrepreneurship and business training)</li> <li>• Confidence-building measures particularly targeting younger people and women</li> <li>• Promoting role models</li> <li>• Mentoring and professional networks</li> <li>• Skills and leadership programmes</li> <li>• Scholarships</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved confidence levels among particular populations, particularly younger people and women</li> <li>• Ability to access information about careers and opportunities within the labour market</li> <li>• Visible role models within key sectors and within communities</li> <li>• Meaningful inter-generational contact</li> <li>• Reduced barriers to employment and reduced discrimination within the labour market</li> </ul>
Access to financial services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legal frameworks to enforce access to financial services</li> <li>• Measures to improve understanding of and access to financial services at the community level, particularly for young adults, families, single parents and the elderly</li> <li>• Distribute multilingual advice on financial services within communities</li> <li>• Improve physical access to banks</li> <li>• Supporting small businesses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved financial opportunity</li> <li>• Strong social capital</li> <li>• Access to the labour market and niche economies</li> <li>• Improved autonomy</li> </ul>

**Figure 6: Theories of Change – Social**



Intended outcomes	Type of activities/projects	Expected results
<p>High levels of empowerment and autonomy</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Mentoring and professional networks</li> <li>● Skills and leadership programmes</li> <li>● Promoting role models</li> <li>● Community groups, local forums and urban planning with a view towards improving social cohesion</li> <li>● Political, business and institutional reforms to promote leadership and the representation of underrepresented groups</li> <li>● Housing, work and social support packages, as well as rehabilitation programmes</li> <li>● Programmes preventing overcrowding and segregation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Improved social networks and feelings of reciprocity and trust</li> <li>● Increased representation in positions of power</li> <li>● Increased standards of living</li> <li>● Improved access to good quality housing</li> <li>● Decreased crime and anti-social behaviour</li> </ul>
<p>Strong social networks</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Support for institutions and organisations supporting particular groups (e.g. diaspora organisations, NGOs, and religious and cultural organisations)</li> <li>● Community groups, local forums and urban planning with a view towards improving social cohesion</li> <li>● Community activities and volunteer opportunities</li> <li>● After-school study clubs, mentoring and professional networks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Access to the labour market and niche economies</li> <li>● Improved financial capital</li> <li>● Improved autonomy</li> <li>● Increased identification with a local or national community</li> <li>● Improved well-being</li> </ul>
<p>Tolerance of difference</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Community dialogue forums, community activities, and volunteer opportunities</li> <li>● Wide-ranging sanctions to prevent and discourage discrimination</li> <li>● Diversity training for police and other community services</li> <li>● Anti-racism programmes in schools</li> <li>● Campaigns to improve anti-discrimination procedures and awareness across government and business</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Meaningful contact</li> <li>● Shared civic culture</li> <li>● Strong social norms against discrimination</li> <li>● Decreased racism and discrimination</li> <li>● Improved well-being</li> </ul>
<p>Trust in community</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Language tuition</li> <li>● Intercultural and inter-faith work</li> <li>● Education on history and diversity</li> <li>● Myth-busting programmes and anti-discrimination programmes in schools</li> <li>● Diversity training for police and other community services</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Meaningful contact</li> <li>● Tolerance of difference</li> <li>● Shared civic culture</li> <li>● Fair policing and community service procedures</li> </ul>

**Figure 7: Theories of Change – Political**



Intended outcomes	Type of activities/projects	Expected results
Representation in political parties and groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Diversity policies and initiatives within political parties</li> <li>● Skills and leadership programmes</li> <li>● Mentoring and networking specific to minority groups within the political arena</li> <li>● Campaigns by political parties to reach out to target groups</li> <li>● Government public engagement campaigns, discussion forums, use of social media</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Increased representation in political parties and related groups</li> <li>● Raised aspirations and ambitions</li> <li>● Recognition of group needs and specificities by elected politicians</li> <li>● Ability to stand in local elections</li> </ul>
Ability to exercise democratic rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Campaigns to increase voter turnout</li> <li>● Campaigns by political parties to reach out to target groups</li> <li>● Government public engagement campaigns, discussion forums, use of social media</li> <li>● Urban planning, and relocation of voting stations to accessible and visible locations</li> <li>● Urban planning, and relocation of voting stations to accessible and visible locations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Improved language skills</li> <li>● Improved knowledge of democratic process</li> <li>● Increased voter turnout</li> <li>● Ability to access local government, voting stations, services</li> </ul>
Voices heard in decision-making	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Dialogue between authorities and particular groups to highlight concerns</li> <li>● Government public engagement campaigns, discussion forums, use of social media</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Trust in authorities and political establishments</li> <li>● Ability to access local government, voting stations, services</li> <li>● Ability to communicate with local and national-level decision-makers</li> </ul>

**Figure 8: Theories of Change – Cultural**



Intended outcomes	Type of activities/projects	Expected results
Shared civic culture, shared democratic culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Language tuition</li> <li>● Citizenship classes and civic education</li> <li>● Intercultural and intercommunity activities</li> <li>● Local and national narrative-building (eg celebrations of local or national history and identity)</li> <li>● Spatial and residential integration, as well as urban planning with a view towards improving 'meaningful contact' between communities</li> <li>● Community mediation</li> <li>● Government public engagement campaigns, discussion forums, and use of social media</li> <li>● Campaigns to increase voter turnout</li> <li>● Leadership training for community leaders and young people</li> <li>● After-school educational support, promoting diverse role models and mentoring, targeted programmes as necessary</li> <li>● Housing, work and social support packages, rehabilitation programme</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Improved language skills</li> <li>● Increased understanding of civic identity and democratic rights</li> <li>● Increased voter turnout and political participation</li> <li>● Increased identification with a local or national community</li> <li>● Rejection of violence and violent ideologies</li> <li>● Reduced criminality</li> <li>● Improved well-being</li> </ul>
Representation in media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Mentoring and professional networks, scholarships (e.g. in the field of journalism)</li> <li>● Programmes advocating and working with media employers to increase diversity within the field</li> <li>● Social media and mainstream media training for particular groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Increased representation in mainstream media organisations, and a diverse workforce in the media sector</li> <li>● More balanced reporting on issues relating to particular ethnic and social groups</li> <li>● Ability to express views in media space</li> </ul>
Freedom of cultural expression	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Support for organisations and individuals promoting cultural activities (e.g. film, theatre, dance, drama and art)</li> <li>● Equality of different religious groups, and other affiliations under the state</li> <li>● Dialogue on issues relating to diversity and freedom of speech</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Ability to practice diverse religious beliefs</li> <li>● Ability to express diverse perspectives</li> <li>● Ability to engage in diverse cultural activities</li> <li>● Improved understanding across groups/communities</li> <li>● Tolerance of difference</li> </ul>
Tolerance of difference	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Community dialogue forums, community activities, and volunteer opportunities</li> <li>● Wide-ranging sanctions to prevent and discourage discrimination</li> <li>● Diversity training for police and other community services</li> <li>● Anti-racism programmes in schools</li> <li>● Campaigns to improve anti-discrimination procedures and awareness across government and business</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Meaningful contact</li> <li>● Improved understanding across groups/communities</li> <li>● Shared civic culture</li> <li>● Strong social norms against discrimination</li> <li>● Elimination of racism and discrimination</li> <li>● Improved well-being</li> </ul>

## 2.2 Setting priorities

The Practice-Based Integration Framework gives a sense of the numerous individual pathways to achieving success in integration. Given the different cultural and political contexts, and socio-economic standards across European countries, the ways in which different governments and practitioners approach the Practice-Based Integration Framework – and set priorities – will vary. The framework is presented here with the recognition that **no state will implement measures to fulfil every category** within the integration framework, **nor is it realistic to assume every category will bear equal importance in every country.**

Priority-setting is all the more important in a Europe faced with a financial crisis and limited public resources. Priorities for integration policymaking have been set very differently across the four case study countries. Sweden has invested heavily in measures to tackle unemployment and achieve equal opportunities in the education system, while the UK has been at the forefront of developing a legislative framework and tackling discrimination, introducing its first Race Relations Act in 1965. However, in recent years there has been a growing convergence across some aspects of integration practice across Europe.

In using the Practice-Based Integration Framework as a tool for integration planning, several key points emerge:

1. Successful integration strategies must be **underpinned with a sound legal basis**, designed to grant and protect rights for migrants and minorities, alongside all residents. In a sense, legal integration reinforces the entire Framework presented here.

2. This report emphasises the **need to achieve balance between the socio-economic (legal, welfare and economic) and socio-cultural (social, political and cultural) elements** of the Framework. Focusing only on an individual area of integration policy and practice can be misleading, as many countries have positive outcomes in one area and struggle in another.

3. The Practice-Based Integration Framework provides a skeleton for a **‘whole of government’ response; this is a response which could be delivered largely through mainstream policy levers.** With governments operating on reduced budgets and cutting funding on integration across Europe, some countries have seen better value for money through the mainstreaming of integration policy. In a recent Migration Policy Institute (MPI) report, Shamit Saggat and Will Somerville have noted that mainstream social policies have been more important in closing outcome gaps for immigrants than smaller-scale initiatives aimed at particular groups.<sup>70</sup> Countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands have led on this trend. In Sweden, there is no specific integration budget, and the objectives of integration policy are meant to be achieved through measures within general policies. These measures are complemented by targeted measures to support newcomers during their first years in Sweden. In the Dutch case, the government set the objective of eliminating autonomous integration policy within five years, with integration instead to be achieved through general policy instruments.

4. **Priorities should be set based on needs**, and these needs will vary across Europe and often within states themselves. The process to identify these needs



should be firmly based on evidence, rather than on features of public and political debates. A useful way to identify these needs is based on ‘proportionality’, comparing the performance of particular ethnic or migrant groups on social policy indicators with that of the total population, and identifying gaps between outcomes for these groups and wider society, disaggregated along such lines as gender, socio-economic status, and education. For setting socio-cultural priorities, it is important to move beyond quantitative data and amplify the value of qualitative data in the evidence base. As Germany has done in recent years, governments can also work closely with civil society to confirm the relevance of policy targets that are set.<sup>71</sup>

**5. Those activities, such as language tuition, that can lead to multiple outcomes,** spanning the socio-economic and socio-cultural, are perhaps an indication of **greater value for money.**

While the Practice-Based Integration Framework gives a sense of the numerous elements that could be prioritised in any integration strategy, it does not suggest which activities or policies are known to yield the greatest results. The Practice-Based Integration Framework is a **stepping stone towards evaluation**, as it identifies expected results and intended outcomes for particular activities and measures. The next steps would include merging this framework with previously identified indicators, developing new indicators and data sets where required, and evaluating individual activities within the Framework.

Information on individual interventions is being made increasingly available, due in part to the efforts of such initiatives as the Cities of Migration

project (which showcases good ideas in immigrant integration in different cities),<sup>72</sup> and the At Home In Europe Project’s report ‘Living Together’ (which compiles projects promoting inclusion across 11 EU cities). Evaluating the ideas catalogued in projects like these more systematically will help provide clear distinctions between different forms of action for different outcomes, meaning that relevant actors can decide when they should be intervening and how.

It will be hard for government to justify investment without any hard evidence that it will have tangible social and economic outcomes. This report thus **calls for the redoubling of efforts to evaluate integration, with the Practice-Based Integration Framework as a starting point**, for the identification of methods, outcomes and indicators.

## CHAPTER 3

# EVALUATING INTEGRATION

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While some important evaluation work has been conducted by European governments and by trusts and foundations that make grants in the field of integration, this research has indicated that there is a need for more concerted efforts in this space. This chapter provides an overview of some good evaluation practices across the case study countries, identifies a number of the structural barriers that have prevented further progress being made, and then proposes four approaches to evaluating integration that could help to overcome these challenges.

### 3.1 European evaluation initiatives

At the national level some of the **most useful forms of evaluation have occurred when evaluation is put at the heart of the policy cycle**. For example, in the Netherlands, a government agency called the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) works with Statistics Netherlands to carry out research on integration through its Education and Minorities research group. Though the SCP does not provide targeted recommendations to government, its main aim is to monitor and evaluate integration outcomes and provide information that will support evidence-based policy and decision-making. In Sweden, there are no research agencies on integration under supervision of the government, but Statistics Sweden produces data for seventeen integration variables, and this data can be broken down on a regional and municipal level.<sup>73</sup>

In the early 2000s, Britain took new strides in developing a framework for monitoring migrant integration, but these efforts focused largely on refugees. The Home Office commissioned the Framework *Indicators of Integration*, which was published in 2004, and which set out four levels of indicators. These included ‘means and markers’ (the core domains through which successful integration occurs), ‘social connections’ (forms of active relationships), ‘facilitators’ (factors which enable and constrain integration), and ‘foundations’ (the legal and political order in which integration is made possible or not possible). When it was launched, this Framework did have an impact on government strategy, but there has been little effort to build on it to develop systematic monitoring.<sup>74</sup>

In 2009 Germany developed indicators for integration at the federal level, producing a ‘Report on Integration Indicators’.<sup>75</sup> It identified 100 relevant indicators for integration, across 12 thematic areas. **The strength of its approach is that it used a multivariate analysis**, which involves observing and analysing a series of variables which might impact the outcomes. This allowed the data to show that people from a migrant background are in an unfavourable position compared to the native population, but when controlling for socio-economic factors, this gap disappears or becomes less significant for the second generation.<sup>76</sup>

Similar efforts are being made at a pan-European level, through projects such as the European Network Against Racism’s toolkit *Working on Integration at the Local Level*


and the EUROCITIES Integrating Cities charter.<sup>77</sup> The most comprehensive attempt to assess European policymaking in the field of integration is the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), which ranks European policies according to best practice and European standards across several categories, including labour market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality, and anti-discrimination.<sup>78</sup> The MIPEX tool helps compare countries' policies and show how they stand in relation to other countries. Figure 9 has been generated using MIPEX data from 2010 for Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.

MIPEX measures the best practices in terms of designing integration policies. Interestingly, the design of integration policies does not always match up with the outcomes that have resulted from these policies. For example, though Sweden consistently sits at the top of MIPEX rankings and is lauded for its generous and well-designed policies, positive integration outcomes have not necessarily ensued. Sweden has seen some of the lowest employment rates

for migrant communities in Europe, with 81 per cent employment for those born in Sweden compared to 65 per cent for those who were foreign-born.<sup>79</sup> This is despite the fact that Swedish integration policy prioritises integration within the labour market and heavily targets resources in this area. So while MIPEX provides a valuable starting point, there is still a long way to go before a clear picture can be painted of how policies have impacted on outcomes.

Since the adoption of the Hague Programme in 2004, the EU has emphasised the need for sound evaluation. It has led on a number of noteworthy attempts to develop cross-border indicators for integration policies. The Stockholm Programme in 2009 likewise called for the development of core indicators in several key policy areas. The European Commission launched the Zaragoza pilot study with Eurostat as a first step towards the development of common and relevant indicators in the fields of employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship, and to report on the availability and quality of data across states (see Figure 10).

**Figure 9: MIPEX results for Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, 2010**



The Zaragoza study has **helped identify available and comparable data sets** in many EU countries. However, the fact that it necessarily leaves out potential indicators where data sets are currently not available limits its scope. For example, to measure social inclusion, the study only looks at income levels, poverty rates, health status, and property ownership, and in this way fails to paint a complete picture of social inclusion.

As early as 1997, the Council of Europe set out the major challenges, remaining questions and difficulties with using some of the available statistics as indicators of integration. It demonstrated that **measures which are most likely to be identified as available, common, and cross-comparable are the economic and structural statistics** and data. Its final report, ‘Measurement and indicators of integration’, therefore focused on these socio-economic indicators for integration.

One of the critical challenges is that **few of these past attempts at evaluation have grappled with the more nebulous socio-cultural aspects** of integration. Some of the earliest and most innovative attempts to develop monitoring of socio-cultural integration have taken place at **local and regional levels**. At the länder level in Germany, the ‘Berlin Integration Monitor’, published in 2009, included a large set of **indicators to measure intercultural openness of mainstream institutions**, including the proportion of staff that had undergone intercultural training, or levels of multilingual marketing.<sup>82</sup> Vienna developed an ‘**integration and diversity monitor**’ in April 2010, which marked a shift to a ‘diversity-oriented’ integration policy, focusing not only on socio-economic outcomes for disadvantaged minorities, but the awareness and acceptance of diversity across mainstream policy fields.<sup>83</sup>

**Figure 10: The Zaragoza indicators of migrant integration, 2010**

POLICY AREA	CORE INDICATORS
<b>Employment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● employment rate</li> <li>● unemployment rate</li> <li>● activity rate</li> </ul>
<b>Education</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● highest educational attainment (share of population with tertiary, secondary and primary or less than primary education)</li> <li>● share of low-achieving 15 year-olds in reading, mathematics and science</li> <li>● share of 30–34 year-olds with tertiary educational attainment</li> <li>● share of early leavers from education and training</li> </ul>
<b>Social inclusion</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● median net income – the median net income of the immigrant population as a proportion of the median net income of the total population</li> <li>● at risk of poverty rate – share of population with net disposable income of less than 60 per cent of national median</li> <li>● share of population perceiving their health status as good, fair or poor</li> <li>● ratio of property owners to non-property owners among immigrants and the total population</li> </ul>
<b>Active citizenship</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● the share of immigrants that have acquired citizenship</li> <li>● the share of immigrants holding permanent or long-term residence permits</li> <li>● the share of immigrants among elected representatives</li> </ul>

Source: Eurostat (2011)<sup>81</sup>

A couple of examples do exist at a national level, including the SCP in the Netherlands which has assessed things such as **rates of inter-ethnic marriage, command of the Dutch language, and ‘cultural values’**. However, rather than *measuring* socio-cultural integration, the SCP instead *gathers* information on the values important to different groups in Dutch society, without according any judgement of integration levels to these outcomes.<sup>84</sup> This allows the SCP to avoid the difficulty of correlating certain outcomes, such as inter-ethnic contact, with levels of integration (for example, less inter-ethnic contact has actually led to other positive integration outcomes for some groups in the Netherlands).<sup>85</sup>

In 2009, the UK Equality and Human Rights Commission launched a **framework for measuring ‘good relations’**, including indicators to assess attitudes (how people perceive others, and how they believe they are perceived), personal security, interaction with others, and participation and influence.<sup>86</sup> The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration’s *Integration Barometer*,<sup>87</sup> and the *Diversity Barometer* carried out by researchers at Uppsala University in Sweden,<sup>88</sup> are other examples. However, there has yet to be any study which takes a systematic look at levels of social participation, or levels of belonging and trust at a European level. This is understandable. These areas are much harder to evaluate. But it is also problematic given the salience of these issues in the wider debate.

### 3.2 Challenges

In addition to some of the gaps mentioned above, there are a number of structural challenges hampering effective evaluation of integration policies and programmes. These include:

- **Data scarcity:** Integration is notoriously difficult to measure, and is made even harder by the fact that many countries don’t gather data in a systematic way. Service delivery organisations find it difficult to produce what would be considered to be ‘sound evidence’. As already stated, data on the socio-cultural indicators of integration is also scarce.
- **Agency:** Who carries out an evaluation is contentious. It is important to ensure that objectivity is not in question. For this reason, it may be preferable to carry out evaluation outside the field of influence of the government. However, for evaluations to have an impact at policy level, elected officials and politicians need to see action and success. NGOs find this difficult, seeing evaluation as something that ‘gets in the way’ of their core work. It can also act as a strong disincentive to admitting failure, particularly when funding is dependent on good outcomes.
- **Lack of capacity:** In many cases, the organisations which work most closely with migrants or ethnic minority groups and enjoy the highest levels of trust, also lack the capacity and know-how to collate and evaluate data. External assistance may be required to help them learn from the available information.
- **Evidence of impact:** Continued funding for integration projects is often contingent on demonstrable short-term results, yet progress in this domain will often only be seen over the course of many generations and can often be hard to disentangle from the impact of other developments. Where integration initiatives are delivered through mainstream policies (e.g. through healthcare, education, employment policies, and so

on), evaluation also becomes more dispersed and difficult to collate.

- **Cost:** Most organisations and projects operating on the ground are unlikely to have the resources to conduct major evaluations. Thus, evaluation continues to occur at a small scale and largely within the framework of project-donor relationships.

### 3.3 Overcoming these challenges: recommendations for an effective evaluation framework

The problems outlined above complicate the efforts of governments, trusts and foundations and civil society organisations to evaluate integration policies and programmes in a comprehensive way. Nevertheless, the research for this report and the findings from the case studies suggest a number of steps that can be taken to address some of these challenges. The following lessons have been learnt about how to evaluate integration in a more strategic and effective way:

**1. There needs to be a strong emphasis on ‘learning’ as well as ‘control’.** Evaluation is often conducted in order to assess outputs and to ensure accountability. However, the impact of integration programmes can also be measured in terms of how much has been learnt through projects and initiatives, and how this knowledge is used. Evaluation needs to incentivise and reward honest critical self-assessment, and it needs to be conducted via common shared frameworks to enable comparison between projects and places so as to speed up the learning process – learning economies of scale. A learning-based approach to evaluation can also help amplify the value

of data not generally appreciated in evaluation processes, such as personal testimonies, small-scale figures and best practices from the field. Some NGOs and community organisations may not have the capacity or experience to run comprehensive evaluations, but a learning-based model can allow even the smallest of initiatives, or failed initiatives, to have an impact. The Swedish Inheritance Fund Commission funds a range of integration projects in Sweden, and is a good example of this in practice.<sup>89</sup> It requires its funded projects to test out new methods, recognising that these methods may be successful or may fail. The Inheritance Fund works with their projects to analyse what worked and what didn’t work, and publishes these lessons to ensure they inform policy and practice in Sweden. The Fund measures its impact as a foundation in terms of the learning acquired by its projects. Dissemination of learning is vital to ensure that integration programmes don’t re-invent the wheel, and that money is not wasted on programmes which have already been deemed ineffective.

**2. Evaluation needs to be based on a theory of change which is continuously revised as lessons are learnt and more is understood about what works.**

The Practice-Based Integration Framework serves as a tool for developing long-term strategies, balancing priorities in terms of desired outcomes, and planning and evaluating programming appropriately. The Swedish government approach set out in September 2008 offers a good example of a comprehensive integration strategy, with overarching goals of increasing supply and demand of labour, and improving educational achievement and equality in schools. The strategy further defined seven areas of focus for the years from 2008 to 2010: a faster introduction for new arrivals; getting more new arrivals in work and creating more entrepreneurs;

achieving better results and greater equality in schools; facilitating better language skills and more adult education opportunities; implementing effective anti-discrimination measures; developing urban districts with high levels of social exclusion; and instilling common basic values in a diverse society.<sup>91</sup> Setting clear priorities is a basic step for better evaluation of integration.

**3. Evaluation should consider outcomes as well as process.** All too often, evaluation focuses on monitoring outputs, rather than examining the outcomes for wider society – often because it is difficult to attribute outcomes to measures taken. However, there needs to be a focus on *what* has been achieved, as well as an examination of *how* it has been done. By setting its goals in numbers the Mercator Foundation (*Stiftung Mercator*) in Germany takes a different approach to evaluation. For example, the foundation has a stated objective of reducing inequality in school and university qualifications for people of migrant origin aged from 15 to 30 in Germany by 70 per cent between 2005 and 2025.<sup>92</sup> There is a realistic understanding that it will be difficult to attribute positive outcomes to specific initiatives or policies, but the presence of such goals helps to provide a focus for tracing progress towards a broader societal outcome.

**4. Evaluation should be collaborative in nature.** To ensure that feedback is honest and constructively critical, evaluation needs to take account of the views of a range of actors associated with the delivery of the relevant intervention, including the target communities. A good example of this is the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, which unites eight leading German foundations to provide an independent scientific monitoring, evaluation and advisory council. The

council itself is entirely independent of the foundations supporting it; however, its position outside government and its backing by foundations across the spectrum allows it to take a critical approach to evaluation of national and local policymaking, a riskier undertaking than any individual foundation might take alone.<sup>93</sup>

**5. A comparative approach can be valuable.** Evaluation needs to be focused on the project or programme in question, but should also examine wider conditions and similar interventions before drawing conclusions about its broader impact. Monitoring wider societal outcomes and mapping similar interventions (projects with shared objectives) should be a regular feature of any evaluation method. This approach can help projects attribute change to measures taken. Although broader societal outcomes may not be attributed solely to any individual project, a project can trace its progress – in concert with other initiatives – towards broader social change. For example, the Migrants' Rights Network (MRN) in the UK holds an annual summit bringing together individuals and organisations in its core network to develop shared aims and set common agendas within the field of integration.<sup>94</sup> Such methods can encourage organisations to look beyond their confines and understand their progress collectively, alongside others working towards similar aims. An awareness of other interventions and wider conditions can also help projects take into account, as best they can, how the outcomes would have differed had their particular intervention not been in place.

**6. Evaluation should feed into horizon-scanning and forward planning.** As it is challenging to attribute change to measures taken, evaluation and monitoring can be used as a method of anticipating

future trends, and reshaping target groups and projects accordingly. For example, the Vodafone Foundation's Scholarship Programme in Germany creates educational opportunities for young people with a migrant background, which is defined as both parents having been born abroad. The Foundation is using data on different groups' outcomes in the education system to re-think its target group for the scholarship in the coming years; for example, people of Turkish heritage have largely been German-born and have German-born parents, yet these groups have not achieved equal outcomes in the education system and often lack opportunities.<sup>95</sup>

**7. There is a need to develop better indicators for socio-cultural elements of integration, in order to set goals and track progress.** There is a need for data on an assortment of measures, including the socio-cultural aspects of integration. This could also involve creative use of the limited existing data available, including questions from the Eurobarometer and European Social Survey, or the now discontinued UK Citizenship survey, to build up comparative research on the socio-cultural dimension. It could also involve amplifying the value of data not generally appreciated in evaluation processes, such as personal testimonies, or drawing more conclusive evidence from deliberative workshops and focus groups. Many of the integration outcomes sought may in fact be less directly shaped by policy and may be a function of people's everyday experiences, relationships and activities. There is thus a real need for more data and information on the lived experiences of migrants, non-migrants, and different social groups, and how these everyday interactions impact integration outcomes. The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) has made a useful attempt to introduce data on

everyday experiences and personal assessments of integration within both the non-migrant population and different immigrant groups in Germany. The SVR's Integration and Migration Barometer survey across Germany focuses largely on experiences in neighbourhoods, the workplace, schools and universities, local networks, and through friendships, creating new data sets on attitudes and the 'climate' for integration across the country.<sup>96</sup>

**8. Evaluate integration as a two-way or whole of society process.** If integration is a whole of society process, then evaluation needs to assess the experiences of both migrants and non-migrants as subjects. For example, the Open Society Foundations' At Home in Europe Project is carrying out comparative research to examine the experiences and concerns of 'marginalised majority', or white, populations in relation to identity and belonging, education, employment, housing, health and social protection, safety and security, civil and political life, and the role of the media. This research builds on the project's previous research on Muslim communities' experiences in these key areas, and the aim is to develop quantitative and qualitative data on how marginalised white populations achieve outcomes in relation to these categories.<sup>97</sup>

**9. Innovation through use of survey:** There is a need for more innovation when it comes to the assessment of outcomes in the field of integration. This includes innovation through the use of surveys, such as the Integration Barometer, run by the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, which has established surveys to assess perceptions of integration policy, the willingness to integrate, and experiences of integration among a representative sample of people (both with *and* without a migrant background) in



five urban regions. This is the first data set compiled in Germany which applies the same questions on experiences of integration to migrant and non-migrant groups.

**10. Innovation beyond surveys:** Though useful data sources, attitude surveys can often paint a confusing and conflicting picture of actual outcomes. The Netherlands Institute for Social Research has launched a number of experiments to test levels of discrimination in society. For example, it sent 1,300 job applications for vacancies, one set using Dutch names and the other using various non-Dutch names, with similar work experience and with comparable credentials, in order to gather a data set on discrimination in the labour market.<sup>98</sup> New forms of evaluation through action research or employing community researchers can circumvent some of the challenges posed by hiring external evaluators or gathering representative samples. The use of new media to collect data sets may also be a new way forward, as social media analytics, used with sound social research methodologies, could provide new insights on these issues.

**11. Strategic use of data collected daily by organisations:** Most service delivery organisations do continually evaluate and re-inform their work, often informally. But much could be learnt from daily sharing of experiences and challenges (as is done by Three Faiths Forum in the UK)<sup>99</sup> or weekly problem-solving sessions to identify new issues that have arisen and how to fill gaps (instituted by the Migrant and Refugee Communities Forum – The Forum in London).<sup>100</sup> These simple conversations are a critical learning process that is vital to deciding where priorities should lie, creating innovative solutions, and achieving more successful outcomes. Moreover, more could be done with the data that is

actually collated by service delivery organisations. While much of the data gathered by NGOs is collected to fulfil funder reporting requirements, it could also hold important lessons. Charitable foundations are therefore in an excellent position to support the collection, analysis and dissemination of data produced by the organisations they fund. However, they need to structure their reporting requirements in ways that can enhance the wider evidence base on integration, supporting the organisations they fund with the resources they need to carry out sound evaluation, or disseminating best practice. The Swedish Inheritance Fund Commission does this by pairing its grantees with trained researchers. Learning is published in regular evaluation papers and conferences, and data and learning points are shared via a web portal.<sup>101</sup> This is an ideal way of establishing channels to feed intelligence of what is happening on the ground into the policy process.

**12. Gather integration data via mainstream policy levers:** There is a strong case for gathering data on how mainstream policy might promote or hinder integration outcomes. Indeed, the way the education system is designed or how housing benefits are implemented will probably have as much or even more of an influence on the outcomes for migrants as more targeted measures. Part of the point of evaluation should be to ensure that migrants benefit equally from wider policies. The Dutch Diversity in Youth Policy Programme, run by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, aims to do just this. It sets a measurable goal, with the aim that migrant youth profit equally from all public youth services and welfare provisions as non-migrant youth. The programme is currently working to create its own measurement tool for the ‘intercultural quality’ of interventions.<sup>102</sup>

### 3.4 Four approaches to evaluation

Based on a series of consultations with experts and practitioners including the lessons outlined here, this report delivers a number of new approaches to evaluation, which aim to overcome some of the challenges to evaluating integration which have been described. They encompass **multi-actor and multi-level approaches**, seeking to **evaluate qualities of processes as well as outcomes**, and are **driven largely by learning rather than control**. This section sets out four approaches to evaluation: individual project monitoring; individual group monitoring; learning-based evaluation; and system-based change evaluation. The models presented here **enable cross referencing of results from different levels** to holistically improve project design. These approaches are not mutually exclusive and each of these approaches will be appropriate for different types of interventions, and at different times and places.

#### Individual Project Monitoring

Individual project monitoring aims to improve individual projects through a process of observing, assessing, and applying the lessons learnt. Though the work of a project cannot necessarily be attributed to wider societal outcomes, monitoring these should nonetheless be a regular feature of individual project monitoring.


The framework depicted here involves two simultaneous streams of evaluation. The first is a standard ‘process and outputs’ evaluation, tracking changes from baseline conditions to desired project outcomes and examining the quality of the process. The second stream is an analysis of societal developments beyond the project sample; for example, the change in wider societal outcomes for the target group. Projects should review similar interventions (or projects with shared objectives) to map how their project fits within the existing matrix of related initiatives, and how it contributes alongside these initiatives. Though **broader societal outcomes may not be attributed solely to any individual project**, this approach allows projects to **trace their progress** in concert with other initiatives towards social change.

The **assessment of process and outputs should be compared to wider societal outcomes**, and this comparison can be used to inform the development of the project, assess interim and long-term objectives, and shape overall strategy. Individual project monitoring serves as a basis for the other evaluation levels set out in this paper.

#### Individual Group Monitoring

Individual group monitoring can be used to assess projects with specific and bounded target groups (for example, a project working to improve employment

Figure 11: Individual Project Monitoring



\*This cannot be attributed to the project. Instead, use this information to identify how the project contributes alongside other existing interventions.

prospects for young people of Somali heritage, in a specific municipality).

Similar to individual project monitoring, this method requires two simultaneous streams of assessment. The first measures baseline data for project participants and stakeholders, and repeats these measurements at set intervals to track changes. The second stream measures the gap between the baseline data for the select group beyond the project sample (i.e. youth of Somali heritage) and the wider population on a specific measure (i.e. overall levels of youth employment).


A sub-analysis should be carried out to **map the conditions for integration for the target community**, which can **help a project identify the specific situations, needs and problems** facing their target community.<sup>103</sup> This should be supplemented with a review of other interventions working with the target group, and an assessment of how the project fits in with these. The final stage of this evaluation places project sample outcomes within the broader outcomes for the target group in wider society. The project should refer back to the

conditions for integration and existing supply of interventions to place their own ‘successes’ or ‘failures’ within this broader context.


**Learning-Based Evaluation**

The learning-based model of evaluating integration aims to **enhance lessons learnt and knowledge about what kinds of project designs are most effective, and how they are best delivered**. This framework sets out a process of evaluation based not on measuring outputs but on measuring how knowledge is acquired, collated and disseminated to have the greatest impact.

This evaluation method relies on the implementation of individual project monitoring. The first stage of learning-based evaluation involves collating data from individual project monitoring to **build a data set unique to the project**.<sup>104</sup> This process should be followed with an investigation of the individual project monitoring to pull out **what worked and why, and in what context**. This forms the basis of the transferrable lessons and evidence base acquired by the project.



**Figure 13: Learning-Based Evaluation**



\*Did the information reach all the target groups? Did any intended or unintended impacts result from the dissemination process (e.g. other organisations adopted new strategies, policymakers acknowledged learning points, funding received as a result)?

The dissemination phase begins with setting targets and the desired impact (e.g. lobbying, policy change, enhancing practitioner knowledge, changing institutional practice). The dissemination phase should be evaluated by assessing process – is knowledge reaching and filtering through to all groups and stakeholders identified? Any outcomes (e.g. testimonies from those who received training or reports, changes instituted by stakeholders, new dialogues inspired by the dissemination) should be assessed against the targets for dissemination and impact.

### System-Based Change Model

When integration initiatives are delivered through mainstream policy levers (e.g. healthcare, education, employment) and public institutions, evaluation becomes more dispersed and difficult to collate. The System-Based Change Evaluation Framework assesses attempts to mainstream integration.


The evaluation begins with the gathering of baseline data on how a particular service engages with migrants or minority groups, as well as baseline data on how the service engages with the wider population. Two levels of assessment follow: one on the quality of the process of mainstreaming, assessing the dialogue and engagement process between stakeholders and tracking how the mainstreaming process is best delivered (stakeholder lobbying, delivering practitioner training, etc.), and the second assessing outputs against targets.

To assess broader societal outcomes, the key stakeholders in service delivery or target institutions must be mapped, and the key departments or individuals who must be engaged with and influenced should be identified. The baseline measures (assessing how a service engages with migrants or minority groups, as well as with the wider population) are repeated at set intervals to

track change. The final analysis identifies the **percentage of key stakeholders engaged**, and the **percentage of key stakeholders influenced** at the end of the intervention period.

The degree of success for the intervention in terms of broader societal outcomes can be assessed by tracking changes to baseline measures over the intervention period. If the goal is that migrant and

minority groups profit equally from mainstream public services (in comparison to the wider population), then the gap between data on how services engage with migrant or minority groups and how they engage with the wider population should reduce throughout the intervention period. Mainstreaming integration is a **long-term process**, so this evaluation model may be implemented over several years in order to identify outcomes.



## CHAPTER 4

# CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS

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The pace and scale of inwards migration to Europe has had a profound impact on social and cultural dynamics; European societies are now more diverse than ever before, with a sizeable proportion of this change happening in just the last 10 to 20 years in most places. In most cases, adjustments have been relatively smooth and different groups and cultures live alongside one another without tensions or conflicts. But challenges of integration persist. Diversity raises questions about cultural norms, social practices, prejudice and coexistence. It also brings socio-economic concerns, as many minority communities persistently underachieve in education and the labour market, although this is not true across the board and these experiences are also shared by some non-migrant communities.

Many different approaches to integration have been trialled, from multiculturalism to assimilationism. The dominant framework for integration varies from country to country and over time, and also sometimes within a single country. The national case studies highlighted in this report are evidence of this variation, which makes comparative evaluation of approaches difficult. Evaluation is made more difficult by the politicisation of integration policy, a lack of policy coherence, and the disconnect between what gets said at the political level and what gets done in terms of policy and practice on the ground. In many cases, public discourse of integration is not matched by the reality.

This report adopts a **'practice-based' approach to integration**; instead of understanding integration

through the fine words of politicians and policymakers, it looks instead at what is happening on the ground across the case study countries to build a picture of integration practices from the bottom up. Spanning six facets of integration – legal, welfare, economic, social, political and cultural – the Practice-Based Integration Framework **highlights the vast range of interventions being trialled across Europe and across policy levers**, and can be the basis for a comparative evaluation of the kinds of approaches that appear to deliver the best results.

This report recognises that it will be hard for governments to justify any redoubling of efforts and investment without the hard evidence that such investment will have tangible social and economic outcomes. It has suggested a number of options for enhancing the sector's capacity for evaluation. These options include **adopting learning-based evaluation approaches** (as opposed to control approaches), a focus on lessons learnt and an ongoing refinement of programming rather than definitive judgement of relative effectiveness or value for money. These frameworks aim to overcome the essential challenges of evaluation in this field, and if delivered in a consistent way would provide insights to improve practices and, ultimately, outcomes on the ground.

However, this research and fieldwork has thrown up a range of broader challenges facing policymakers and trusts and foundations, as well as lessons about what works. The report concludes by setting out some of

these bigger picture lessons, which impact on the ability to measure and achieve outcomes in integration.

There are three key actors in the delivery of integration policy and practice. These are governments; trusts and foundations; and non-governmental organisations. Though all three play an integral role in the successful implementation of measures across the Practice-Based Integration Framework, much of the lessons presented here focus specifically on the two actors responsible for setting the agenda for what programmes should be initiated, and for financing the sector at large: **governments, and trusts and foundations**. Drawing on this research, a series of learning points are put forth below about the role of policymakers, trusts and foundations, where their strengths lie, and how priorities should be set.

### Long-term planning and resourcing

The reality is that the results of much integration work will only come to fruition over the course of many generations, but governments have scrambled to deal with new problems as they arise, paying limited attention to the effectiveness of what is being done on the ground.<sup>105</sup> This report makes the case for developing a **long-term strategic vision for integration policies and programming**. It calls on governments to adopt a more forward-thinking attitude to integration policy, **investing in horizon-scanning research** to look at future demographic, migration and broader trends, and plan integration policy in anticipation of these trends.

Chapters One and Two advocate for a **whole of government approach to integration**, working with a range of policy levers to determine target groups and effect change on this basis. The report calls on policymakers to adopt a **360° view of target groups** for integration, and employ non-migrants as target

groups when appropriate. It also calls for greater flexibility which will be necessary to ensure that policy is responsive to the fact that target or ‘need’ groups can shift over time, and policy needs to shift with them. Close attention should be paid to **shifts in new arrival groups, specific local challenges, and communities that are experiencing new problems**. The experience of the Netherlands shows that target groups can be re-defined at the national policy level. There the designated target group has shifted from one focusing particularly on ethnic minorities from Dutch colonies (or countries where the Dutch actively recruited labour migrants) to one targeting all non-Western immigrants and their descendants to the second generation, as well as refugees.<sup>106</sup>

### Simple, low-cost solutions to promote integration

There is some evidence to show that simple policy changes or legislative tweaks can have major impacts on integration. There is a need to look even further at how governments can make simple changes to systems and environments to promote integration outcomes. Further **research is required to better understand how mainstream policy might be incentivising segregatory trends**, and negatively impacting integration outcomes. This is an area which will undoubtedly also require more data and information on the lived experiences of migrants and non-migrants, and how they perceive integration policy and ‘experience’ integration outcomes. The Integration Barometer run by the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, for example, does just this. Integration programmes should operate within the framework of people’s everyday lives in order to be effective.

Different **ministries and government departments need to be trained up to address localised and specific issues regarding integration** target groups.

Mainstreaming should necessarily be accompanied by some targeted measures to support new migrants. However, in the context of wider budgetary cuts, mainstreaming other forms of integration work may be preferable.

For foundations, this means recognising that **good value for money may be best achieved through projects that work with/within the system**. While guarding their independence, foundations need to work within the mainstream system in order to have large-scale impact. One example is the Mercator Foundation's Special Instruction Project, which addresses language deficits of migrant school children at a young age in Germany. Rather than creating after-school programmes for language assistance for young people, the Foundation worked directly with schools to implement a programme offering school children of migrant origin free extra-curricular tutoring. They have also worked directly with universities to give teachers-in-training bespoke instruction on teaching German as a second language. The Special Instruction Project is thus built into the mainstream school and university system.

### **Improving relations between actors responsible for integration**

#### *Brokering relations between government and civil society*

Integration cannot succeed without the **cooperation of civil society**. However, this research suggests that relations between government and civil society actors working on integration are in need of improvement. This report has set out some of the challenges and opportunities for building better and more constructive relations between civil society and governments. Attempts to **create new forms of**

**dialogue between governments and civil society need to be trusted**. For example, in Germany, the realisation that many felt discomfort with and mistrust towards the creation of the German Islam Conference led to the creation of the Islamforum, an off-the-record meeting to promote a different, more informal form of dialogue between Germany's Muslim communities and senior level policy and security figures.<sup>107</sup> Initiatives that are led by community coalitions and involve government representatives can be a more sustainable model because they allow for greater ownership by the members and provide a forum for open and honest conversation.

Experience shows that **initiating these processes at a regional or local level**, rather than at a national level, is often more effective. **Lighter-touch, informal forums** can often be as effective but without all the challenges associated with developing representative, non-static consultative bodies. For example, in 2010 the Antwerp City Council invited an independent umbrella organisation called Minderhedenforum (Forum of Ethnic Cultural Communities) to facilitate informal consultations with the city's ethnic community organisations, community groups and local residents. The agenda avoided ideological confrontation and instead aimed to encourage dialogue on local policy issues such as infrastructure and employment. The Minderhedenforum also allowed communities to take the lead and build constructive relationships.<sup>108</sup>

Foundations could play a critical role in fostering more collaborative and constructive relationships across the policy and practice divide. To do this effectively, **community organisations may require support navigating the dynamics behind public administration**. Governments, foundations and intermediaries can provide assistance with



interpreting grant regulations, policy changes and understanding how to engage with policymakers and politicians. The National Board for Youth Affairs in Sweden, though a government agency, provides a great example that could be applied to other grant-giving bodies. The Board allocates funds from the Swedish government to NGOs, particularly for issues regarding young people; however, a major part of the Board's role is working with NGOs that have not met the conditions for grants. The Board provides these organisations with support and advice on how to best meet the requirements and how to navigate the priorities set by the government. The Board has thus worked to make youth organisations in Sweden become more public administration-savvy and design projects in more sustainable ways.<sup>109</sup> This is a model that would work well in other European countries.

Foundations can also play an instrumental role in ensuring that the **data and best practices gathered from the organisations they fund is packaged in a way that is suitable to wider audiences** and policymakers in particular. The Swedish Inheritance Fund Commission publishes the lessons learnt from the projects it funds and disseminates this information through conferences and targeted events for policymakers and politicians.<sup>110</sup> The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) does traditional consultative work with governments, but it has found that a 'back-door' method of strong media and public relations work can gain more public attention for particular issues, therefore pushing politicians to address them.<sup>111</sup>

Foundations can play a critical role in **creating opportunities for NGOs and civil society to enhance their reach outside the sector**. One key method foundations can adopt is to involve governments in the development of individual projects, allowing government representatives to develop ownership of

the project. For example, in the planning stages for the Mercator Foundation's Special Instruction Project, it set up a working group to create the curriculum for the new programme and invited staff from the Ministry of Education and Research to sit alongside project experts and school staff to design the curriculum. Mercator involved government representatives from the outset and gave them ownership over the project. As a marker of the success of this method, Mercator's model and curriculum has now officially been instituted throughout North Rhine-Westphalia by state government.<sup>112</sup>

### *Supporting more fruitful collaboration between NGOs*

As the previous chapter demonstrated, evaluation can be strengthened by **more strategic collaborative visions by NGOs**, mapping their progress towards broader societal aims together. Cooperation and collaboration between NGOs and community organisations with similar aims and interests should also be promoted; however, it is important to recognise that **funding and resources are often required for this to take place in a sustainable way**. At its best, collaboration can build organisational confidence and trust within the sector. The Migrants' Rights Network (MRN) in the UK is an example of an organisation that employs networking effectively. MRN holds an annual summit, exclusively funded by foundations, bringing together individuals and organisations in its core network to develop shared aims and activities within the field of integration. Using a facilitation method called 'open space technology', MRN works with the group to identify key issues and projects which the group can take forward.<sup>113</sup> Methods like this require financial support, but they also require incentives for the organisations involved to attend and participate. Networking and collaboration of NGOs is also a

cost-effective way of enhancing the capacity of the sector as a whole.

### *Cooperation between foundations, within countries and across borders*

Cooperation between private foundations and trusts can help develop more effective integration programming and monitoring and can shape both public and political discourse. At a pan-European level, the European Programme for Integration and Migration (EPIM) is a good example of **collaboration between foundations to stimulate peer learning across country borders**. This network of foundations has come together to share expertise and experience, and to strengthen the role played by civil society in shaping EU policy developments.<sup>114</sup> At a national level, the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) is a good example of **collaboration with the aim of improving national integration monitoring**. Founded by eight leading German foundations in 2008, its aim is to increase the leverage of foundations around building shared goals and providing honest criticisms of government programmes in this field. While the foundations themselves do not input into decision-making of the SVR, the backing of this broad coalition from NGOs allows the SVR to be more influential. And as the SVR is not a government agency it enjoys a unique position, **independent of government changes and context, and is able to take a critical approach**.<sup>115</sup>

### **Addressing the divide between political rhetoric and results on the ground**

#### *Communicating with the public*

While public opinion surveys can help gauge the direction of public concerns they often present an overly simplified picture of what people really think.

One of the key findings of the German Integration Barometer for 2012, for example, was that, in many respects, the German public are more in tune with integration aims than politicians believe. The heated discussions ongoing in the political arena are in this way grossly misleading.<sup>116</sup> Similar surveys in Britain in 2012 have indicated that though there remains public opposition to high levels of migration, attitudes concerning tolerance and multiculturalism are more nuanced than expected and often positive.<sup>117</sup> The risk is that **political discourse that takes as its starting point the most negative assumptions about the public's views on this issue could become self-fulfilling**. Moreover, they could fail to identify and celebrate positive integration stories.

#### *Incentivising honest and critical self-assessment*

In terms of practice, policy needs to be more **open to learning from what is going wrong and see beyond the necessary political pressure to prove what *does* work**. It needs to incentivise honest and critical self-assessment about what doesn't work. Learning where the failures lie, and how to improve programmes against the backdrop of failure, can help governments reconfigure their strategies and achieve more success in the future. However, **negative outcomes in integration must be approached and communicated in a constructive way**. Addressing problems or identifying 'problem communities' in an emotional, politicised or insensitive way can exacerbate the problem.

Developing the kinds of informal consultative methods described earlier could also be an effective way of feeding data, testimonies and views from the ground up to the policy level. The light-touch consultation methods described earlier could allow politicians and policymakers to test the waters for new policy ideas or even for political communications (e.g. speeches and official statements) with those working on the ground.

*Allocation of resources:  
socio-economic versus socio-cultural*

**Resources also need to be allocated to those pieces of the Practice-Based Integration Framework which are prioritised in political rhetoric.** The deficit in this domain is most visible when it comes to language learning, as in many countries where language learning is heavily emphasised in discourse on integration, the funding allocated to language acquisition programmes has declined.<sup>118</sup> This is not to say that priorities should be based on emotionally charged political debates, but rather that governments should ensure that there is greater consistency between what they say and what they do, avoiding the ‘say-do’ gap.

While integration policy has tended to focus disproportionately on the socio-economic elements of integration, **public and political debates in this field have become most heated in the socio-cultural field;** for example, debates are questioning the relationship between religion and integration and freedom of speech and diversity. Particularly when it comes to the socio-cultural elements of integration, governments are doing very little to measure outcomes outside of formal civic education. Activities in this area have mostly been limited to simple surveys that measure the existence of a shared civic culture, tolerance of difference, trust and belonging, or meaningful contact.

Political leaders need to **harness the debate about the more controversial and highly-emotive socio-cultural challenges** into a constructive and strategic discussion, building forums for frustrations to be expressed and responded to directly. Governments and foundations also **need to invest in the testing of new inter-community and inter-faith dialogue methods**, and prioritise mainstreaming these methodologies so they can reach wider target groups.

These kinds of activities will prevent the debate becoming further polarised, and will put us in a stronger position when it comes to slowing the rise of the populist anti-immigrant radical right. They will ensure that expectations are not just placed on specific groups in a way that simply causes further alienation. They will also help move the political discussion towards something far more constructive, mitigating against the risk of undermining efforts being made to tackle discrimination and alienation across the board.

This report has aimed to provide a new comprehensive framework for understanding and evaluating integration, highlighting a set of desired outcomes and pathways for achieving those outcomes across policy areas. **The socio-economic elements of integration are equally as important as the socio-cultural**, and successful outcomes in one may be accompanied by failure in the other. Ultimately, this report argues that with positive commitment, and by adopting a whole of society and whole of government approach, European states will **achieve balance across the entire framework of interventions** and will widen the scope of their impact.

There are also a number of things that could be done at a practical or technical level to enhance the design, delivery, and evaluation of integration. This report has set forth a number of recommendations for each phase of integration programming, from setting priorities to monitoring outputs and outcomes. By putting evaluation at the heart of integration programming, we aim to promote a far more strategic approach, delivered with clear priorities in mind and grounded on expected results.



## ANNEX: CASE STUDIES

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### **The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (Germany)**

The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration (SVR) was founded by eight leading German foundations in 2008 as an independent scientific monitoring, evaluating and advisory council. Its main objectives are to critically follow political and policy debates at the national, länder and municipal levels, give evidence-based recommendations, and influence policymaking. The SVR produces an Annual Report assessing Germany's approaches to migration and integration and addressing core questions, as well as releasing the the Integration and Migration Barometer each year, which measures public knowledge, attitudes and opinions on migration and migration policy, creating new data sets on attitudes

and the 'climate' for integration across the country. The Barometer emphasises the importance of looking at local experiences and attitudes grounded in these experiences. It inquires into experiences in neighbourhoods, the workplace, schools and universities, local networks, and through friendships. Germany has a wealth of data available on the structural elements of integration, and even a growing data set on attitudes towards immigrants. However, the SVR fills a gap by monitoring everyday experiences and attitudes among both groups of migrant background and groups of non-migrant background. The key to the SVR's success is that it is not a government agency, and not supported by government funding, but has foundations behind it. The SVR is therefore in a unique position, independent of political changes, which allows it to take an honest and critical approach to integration policy.

#### **What works?**

- The SVR has demonstrated the power that trusts and foundations can have when they come together on shared goals and cooperate in practical ways. The SVR began as an initiative of the Mercator Foundation and the Volkswagen Foundation, and convincing a group of leading German foundations to work together on this project came with its challenges. The SVR confronts political issues head-on and provides honest criticism of government approaches, a riskier undertaking than any one foundation might take on its own. While the foundations themselves do not input into the decision-making and research of the SVR, the backing of this broad coalition allows the SVR to be more influential.
- The SVR carries out traditional consultative work and directly lobbies government on particular issues. However, it has found that a 'back-door' method of strong media and public relations work can gain more public attention, therefore pushing politicians to address them.

## The Office of the Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin (Germany)

The Commissioner for Integration and Migration is formally part of the Senate Administration for Health, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection. The Office of the Commissioner is relatively autonomous within the Senate of Berlin, and maintains a special role coordinating and initiating integration policies. The Office of the Commissioner gives financial support to migrant organisations and community initiatives, and provides support for NGOs seeking advice. The Office also administers several projects in the fields of migration, integration and anti-discrimination. As part of its integration programme, the Office also carries out programmes countering right-wing extremism and intolerance. In August 2005, the Senate for the first time launched an integration strategy for the city of Berlin. In addition, the Office of the Commissioner plays a unique role informing wider society about the policies and conditions of migration and integration in Berlin, housing its own press office which carries out public relations work specifically related to integration.

The Office of the Commissioner understands integration as a process that should be determined not only by the Senate and local authorities, but through an inclusive

process by activating civil society in the integration debate and policymaking. As with German integration policy at large, 'intercultural opening' has been particularly important for the Office of the Commissioner. Though the Office duly follows the definition of integration written in the law, its foremost role is to ensure that migrants themselves understand the concepts being used, and have the capacity and voice to shape the law.

The Office of the Commissioner has managed the administration of a State Advisory Board for Integration and Migration, a high-level working group chaired by the Senator for Labour, Integration and Women, bringing together participants ranging from state secretaries to elected representatives of migrant organisations and labour unions. The Board was established in 2003 to compensate for a deficit in political participation of migrants, by giving migrants in Berlin the opportunity to influence the political debates and decision-making of the city. The Board advises and informs the Berlin Senate on integration and migration policy. Managing an election process to develop this council has proven to be a major challenge for the Office; however, it has become a key method for strengthening political participation of people with a migrant background in Berlin. The Council was strengthened in 2010 by a new law, the "Act for the regulation of participation and integration in Berlin".

### What works?

- Strong communication between departments is required in order to operate an effective integration programme via mainstream policy levels. Political leadership needs to prioritise learning and exchange across departments in order to create clear vision and strategy across all mainstream policy domains.
- Funding is a political issue when designated by government offices, and it is thus not surprising that funding given by the government to support local- and national-level projects is often short-term. However, in order to realise and track real change emanating from these projects, we need to move beyond party politics and adopt longer-term funding for specific projects. This would allow them to learn from their experiences, better their strategies, and even build a body of evidence to support their work.
- Integration programmes will be more successful if migrant representatives and migrant organisations are involved. This can be an exhausting and difficult process, and managing election processes and developing a well-rounded representative consultative body can be challenging, but worthwhile. Migrant community organisations may also need support navigating the dynamics behind public administration.
- More migrants need to be involved in public administration. Improving the numbers of civil servants of migrant and minority background at the Office of the Commissioner has been a priority, but there are still improvements to be made.
- As part of their work on integration and migration, governments need to take a stronger stance against racism, and inform communities about racism. In particular, the boundaries surrounding racism and Islamophobia have been blurred in recent years, and individuals and communities need to be aware of when they are experiencing racism and must feel confident reporting these cases.

## Diversity in Youth Policy Programme, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (the Netherlands)

According to the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations, approximately 20 per cent of the youth population (those under 18) in the Netherlands have a migrant background, and in the largest cities (i.e. Amsterdam and Rotterdam) this rises to more than 50 per cent. After decades of unique integration policies designed to improve outcomes for migrant groups, the Integration Directorate found that mainstream social institutions were not intervening as effectively as they could when dealing with issues pertaining to migrant communities, though these groups were no longer even 'minorities' in many cases. Thus, the Dutch government has gradually reduced unique policies for specific migrant groups, and has instead developed intercultural components to mainstream services.

For example, in the youth policy sector, migrant youth are underrepresented in some forms of care, like mental healthcare, and yet are overrepresented in

securitised youth care services, like youth judicial institutions. Youth intervention programmes like those dealing with mental health have been less effective in reaching out to migrant youth. The Diversity in Youth Policy programme, instituted from 2008 to 2012, aimed to effect a permanent improvement to 'intercultural quality' in the youth sector. The aim was to 'diversity-proof' the youth policy sector, with the measurable goal that migrant youth profit equally from all public youth services and welfare provisions as non-migrant youth. The aim was to improve mechanisms to reach migrant youth and their parents early (e.g. improving access to these programmes, or empowering volunteers of migrant background to engage with their own communities); to improve the intercultural skills of professionals; and to improve the quality of tried-and-tested intervention methodologies to be relevant for ethnic minority youth. The programme worked to create its own measurement tool for the 'intercultural quality' of interventions.

### What works?

- Longer-term change may be better realised through 'diversity-proofing' mainstream institutions, rather than providing short-term funding to many small-scale projects.
- In order to successfully tweak mainstream policy levers to achieve integration outcomes, change needs to be incentivised. This can be done by creating incentive structures for mainstream services to spend the extra resources required to reach out effectively and encompass migrant groups.
- When mainstreaming integration programmes, it is important to remember to approach issues in context, looking at both the socio-economic and local contexts and the backgrounds and profiles of each target group involved. The overall aim of mainstreaming is for mainstream services to be trained up to address issues pertaining to specific groups without special targeted programmes.
- Migrants and minorities should ideally be involved in the design of integration policies, but this goes for mainstream policies as well. Methods for this type of consultation and involvement can be challenging. There have been many attempts by the Dutch government to create representative bodies to consult the government, and while there have been some positive outcomes, these bodies do run the risk of becoming institutionalised and not representative.
- Policymakers need the courage to report on negative outcomes, as well as the positive, in integration, but should be respectful in addressing them.
- Governments must start from the recognition that mainstream policies were written from a non-migrant reference frame. Mainstream policies as they are may only benefit some portions of the population, and not reach others. This provides a strong case for mainstreaming.

## Migrant Rights Network (UK)

The Migrant Rights Network (MRN) is an NGO working for a rights-based approach to migration, with migrants as partners in the development and implementation of policies which affect them. The network aims to strengthen the voice of migrants, through lobbying and campaigning, online and media work and public events. Launched in 2006, MRN developed following a piece of research carried out by its founder, Don Flynn, on the state of migrant community organisations and the lack of communication between different initiatives, even those just down the road from one another. MRN grew as a means of sharing information and best practices, but

also as a storing house for current affairs and politics on migration in the UK. MRN aims not only to inform other migrant rights organisations, translating public policy changes into digestible formats, but also to translate migrant organisations' work into messages that can impact policy.

MRN's main fields of work are in communications, parliamentary work, grassroots advocacy and mobilisation, all underpinned by a rights-based approach. MRN emphasises the power of partnerships and connections between organisations fighting for like causes, as well as innovation in methods. The organisation's website is currently the most popularly visited website on migration in the UK.

### What works?

- Provide resources and incentives for collaboration between organisations with similar aims. Collaboration is key in the field of integration, but the challenge is finding the resources to do it. At its best, collaboration can build organisational confidence and trust within the sector.
- Aims and goals will constantly change in the field of policy advocacy. Having a clear, identifiable win is not always possible when the environment for migration policy and advocacy is so hostile.
- Look for funders who are flexible, understand your methods, and understand the impact you want to have. When doing policy advocacy, measuring impact is challenging, and time constraints for the 'completion' of goals is unrealistic.
- Networking is a key method to improve success within the sector. MRN holds an annual summit to bring together individuals and organisations within its core network. Using a facilitation method called 'open space technology', the group identifies shared interests and develops project ideas, with the hope that individuals can take ownership and drive projects forward. These meetings also serve as an easy, effective, and enjoyable means of letting MRN know what other organisations in the sector are working on, and they help MRN set priorities for its own work over the years.
- Media and communications are a key element of policy advocacy, and can be a key way to assess success; for example, you can assess success by tracking who your followers are on social media, whether they are in positions of power, and how they are using your work. Even if policy change is not managed, if those in positions of power are supporting your work through social media endorsements, you are holding constructive informal dialogue with MPs, or a State Minister responds to a letter of concern, you are certainly taking strides.
- There is no silver bullet solution for the challenges of integration. The most important lesson MRN has learnt is that there must be many simultaneous actions taking place within the field, and working together, to effect change. Working together and cooperating with other organisations with similar aims will maximise this impact.



## The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (the Netherlands)

The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) is a government agency which conducts research into the social aspects of government policy. Its main fields of focus are health, welfare, social security, the labour market, and education and the interface between these. The SCP carries out a wide range of research on integration through its Education and Minorities research group. Its aim is to monitor and evaluate integration outcomes, and inform policy objectives and decisions without giving direct policy recommendations. To assess integration in the Netherlands, the SCP focuses largely on 'proportionality', comparing the performance of migrants with native Dutch across several indicators. Success in integration is thus defined by eliminating the gap between the outcomes for migrant groups and non-migrant groups.

Assessing socio-cultural elements of integration has been a challenge for the SCP. The organisation has in the past used indicators such as inter-ethnic marriage rates, command of Dutch language, and 'cultural

values', though it has been hesitant to use ill-defined 'value-based' indicators. Assessing integration based on socio-cultural indicators is far riskier than socio-economic assessments, as interpretations of data based on 'value-based' indicators are more likely to lead to public criticism and accusations of an assimilationist approach. Rather than measuring socio-cultural integration, the SCP has instead run research gathering information on the values important to different groups in Dutch society to inform policy, without judging levels of integration based on this data. It is important to note that some indicators do not seamlessly correlate with levels of integration; for example, the level of inter-ethnic contact is a popular indicator of integration, but it does not necessarily imply a positive correlation with integration outcomes like financial capital and social mobility (i.e. some migrant groups have low levels of inter-ethnic contact, but their social mobility is enhanced by the strength of their ties within a migrant community). Interestingly, with the recent trend towards mainstreaming integration policies in the Netherlands, the SCP has some data to show that there are reasons to question whether the results of mainstreaming will be more beneficial to migrants than targeted measures.

### What works?

- Expand languages employed both in surveys and in face-to-face data gathering processes, to ensure that the data gathered is diverse and reflects the experiences of many communities. The SCP has recently instated multilingual surveys.
- Be flexible and willing to adapt methods as society changes, as migrant groups evolve, and as political issues shift in saliency.
- Move beyond surveys – be innovative in the assessment of integration policies, for example by running experiments to test levels of discrimination in society and creating data sets through new methods. The SCP has recently run 'experiments' by sending 1,300 job applications for vacancies, one set using non-Dutch names and another set using Dutch names (the applications were of a similar quality); these were sent to employers to gather a data set on discrimination in the labour market.

## The Swedish Inheritance Fund Commission (Sweden)

The Swedish Inheritance Fund is a government fund which was established in 1928, when the Swedish parliament abolished the right of inheritance for cousins and distant relatives. The Swedish Inheritance Fund Commission is responsible for administering the funds to NGOs and voluntary associations, focusing on projects working with children, young people, the elderly and the disabled. The Commission has given 500 million kronor since its inception, with 450 organisations funded per year. The Commission is unique in that it requires its funded projects to test out new ideas, or to develop innovative methods and come up with solutions to social issues. It recognises that innovation may be accompanied by failure; however, it sees this as part of a learning process to better civil society's approach to integration. If funded projects fail, the Commission pairs the project with a trained researcher to work together to assess both processes and outcomes, analyse what did and didn't work, and identify learning points. This method provides project staff with guidance from experienced researchers to undertake evaluation, but also ensures that project staff have ownership over the evaluation. The Commission then publishes these learning points in a series of reports, available for public download on their

website; the information is also given out through conferences and dissemination events.

The overall aim is to give organisations the opportunity to test out ideas and learn from the experience, with the hope that this learning filters up and impacts policymaking. The Commission sees evaluation as not entirely about measuring outputs and outcomes; rather, it is about knowledge built during the project. The Commission itself measures its impact as a donor in terms of the learning acquired by the projects it funds. For example, it commissioned several researchers to examine a series of projects it had funded within Somali and Roma communities in Sweden, which appeared to have a higher rate of failure. The study discovered that though these initiatives failed initially, these failures were the starting point for great successes later on. The experience of failure, and identifying and understanding failure, can lead to greater success. The Commission's goal is that 25 per cent of the projects it funds should acquire another source of funding at the end of their funding period. If other trusts and foundations, or the government, are sponsoring methods that were first piloted with support from the Commission, then it knows it has been successful.

### What works?

- Impact can be measured in terms of the learning incurred by projects and initiatives. Rather than measuring outcomes and methods, this form of impact is about measuring the knowledge built and how this knowledge is used. Some NGOs or community organisations may not have the capacity or experience to run comprehensive evaluations, but a learning-based model can allow even the smallest of initiatives, or failed initiatives, to have an impact.
- Organisations should analyse their own processes and outputs so they can inform their own work, but they must also ensure learning is disseminated so that other organisations in the sector can learn from their experiences and can avoid re-inventing the wheel. The Swedish Inheritance Fund Commission runs a website where all of the people working on their funded projects can communicate their experiences and learn from one another. They also hold annual events where the people working on their funded projects can come together and discuss developments and exchange learning points.

## The National Board for Youth Affairs (Sweden)

The National Board for Youth Affairs is a Swedish government agency that works to ensure that young people have access to welfare and an ability to influence. The Board monitors issues related to youth (aged 13–25) in Sweden; supports municipalities in carrying out a knowledge-based youth policy; and channels funding to civil society organisations and projects based on national policy objectives.

Over the last five years, the Board has expanded its remit and has directed funding not only towards youth projects but towards others such as, for instance, women's initiatives, ethnic minority organisations, and LGBTQ organisations. The Board supports projects

ranging from work to combat racism or supporting unemployed youth, to professional mentoring for newly arrived refugees. Since 2012, the Board has been given the task of supporting the government in its civil society policy. This means that the Board collects knowledge on the working conditions of the civil society, and directs this towards public authorities. It also builds networks between the government and NGOs, and works to promote understanding across these divides to better support the work of these organisations.

Community organisations require support navigating the requirements and priorities set by the government funding in the field of integration. If an NGO does not meet the conditions for a grant, the agency provides advice on how to best meet the requirements.

### What works?

- Be present in the communities you are working with. For example, sending link workers into the community, distributing information in different languages, recruiting volunteers from the community, and actively working with community contact points are all methods that can lead to greater success. National-level organisations need to cooperate with local organisations to build trust with local communities.
- Help young people start their own local initiatives. Empowering young people to positively change their communities will facilitate long-term social change.
- Networking amongst NGOs and projects needs to be understood and promoted as a key method for success. Governments and donors can facilitate this process.
- NGOs may need support navigating the dynamics behind public administration. Assistance should be provided in interpreting grant regulations, policy changes and guidelines. There are of course limits to the extent to which donors can do this, but they should be reasonable, listen to organisations' concerns and provide assistance where possible.
- Information needs to be fed up from NGOs to the government level, and used in productive ways. Politicians and policymakers tend to ask for anecdotes and testimonies from practitioners; however, this information tends to be used only in snippets for speeches.
- Some successful projects will not have quantifiable impacts. We thus need to work around this reality to develop new ways of understanding project 'success'. Though results may not be visible at the national level, projects that are successful at the local level might be successful from the perspective of their owners and those who directly benefitted. Evaluation needs to take this into consideration.
- Success comes from a constant learning process. Organisations must do, learn, do and then re-learn in order to achieve success.
- Governments should prioritise disseminating good practice. This might be done through allocating funding to organisations specifically to collect good practice and disseminate the information to NGOs and local authorities.

## Three Faiths Forum (UK)

Three Faiths Forum (3FF) was founded in 1997 by religious leaders to lay the ground for a new form of dialogue between different religious communities. The organisation has for fifteen years worked to build understanding and relationships between people of all faiths and non-religious beliefs. Today, 3FF runs projects along four themes: education; mentoring; training; and arts and culture. The organisation runs initiatives ranging from a ParliaMentors programme which facilitates undergraduates of different faiths and beliefs to be mentored by parliamentarians, to a faith-school linking programme which has linked over 50 primary and secondary schools on a sustained basis; this is as well as an Urban Dialogues project which builds connections between artists of different faiths and beliefs. From 3FF's perspective, contact theory is central to success in integration; however, it must be genuine, positive and sustained contact.

3FF's ParliaMentors programme approaches integration through the promotion of positive relationships between parliamentarians and students of different faith and belief backgrounds, through joint leadership training, and the opportunity to build joint projects. The key is working together to build relationships, rather than simply holding one-off conferences or events. This

programme, which works with approximately 45 students per year, has worked with 240 students and around 48 parliamentarians over the past six years, creating an educational experience not only for student participants, but for parliamentarians as well. The aim is to normalise faith and belief differences among the next generation of leaders and parliamentarians. The programme seeks to engage not only with students that have experience working with other communities, but primarily students who have never engaged in inter-faith work or come from monocultural neighbourhoods. The aim is to integrate these individuals into the field of intercultural work as well.

3FF operates based on a 'ripple effect' strategy. For example, through the faith-school linking programme (and by changing the relationships between schools, head teachers and teachers), 3FF aims to impact students' attitudes as they see their teachers modelling working together with those from other faith schools. The ripple extends to involve the parents of the students, which 3FF hopes will have an impact on wider community relations. Similarly, through the ParliaMentors programme, by changing the relationships between parliamentarians and young people of different faiths, 3FF aims to have a ripple effect on wider politics and society and impact attitudes towards faith and belief.

### What works?

- Take risks and work with groups outside of the 'easy' target group. In its faith-school linking programme, 3FF has reached into conservative faith schools where no other external organisations has worked before. The aim is not to assimilate these schools, or bring them closer to the mainstream, but instead to open a window to the perceived 'other' and engage with these communities in new and deeper ways.
- Building trust is integral to integration work. However, the development of trust and understanding is challenging to measure, and we need a sound system for monitoring these long-term processes and what methods of trust-building can lead to success.
- Skill young people up to have difficult inter-community and inter-faith conversations themselves. 3FF delivers training sessions to young people to equip them to ask good questions, deconstruct statements, and deal with tense situations. Inter-faith organisations may be unable to engage directly with those on the extremes, those who in many cases need this work the most (i.e. the intolerant or racist). Instead they can tool up a generation of young people to be able to take on difficult conversations with these individuals from their own communities, and shift their attitudes, in the future.
- Recognise the power of anecdotes and testimonials as data and as an evidence base on integration. Cold statistics are challenging for an NGO to come by. Many NGOs have few resources, but are having a big impact, and this impact can be difficult to quantify.
- Embrace new media and engage with broader constituencies to make change. Messaging is very important for building networks and relationships within the communities 3FF works with. Improving community relations and building trust cannot simply be the work of religious leaders. It has to be about engaging with groups in new ways, and working with artists, young people, teachers, musicians, politicians, and broader groups to effect change.

## Vodafone Foundation Scholarship Programme (Germany)

The Vodafone Foundation is one of the major company-related foundations in Germany, and as an independent socio-political think tank, it supports and drives programmes with the aim of promoting social progress and an active civil society. The Foundation has always approached integration through a heavy focus on education and social mobility as pathways to achieving success. For integration to be successful, the Foundation believes that access to education and opportunities in the professional world must be made easier for young people from migrant backgrounds. In 2006, the Foundation launched the Vodafone Scholarship Programme to open new educational opportunities for young people with migrant backgrounds. It was the first programme within the

scope of the Foundation's integration work. The scholars passing through the Foundation's Scholarship Programme attend select private German universities. Admission to the programme is merit-based, but the Foundation particularly seeks students who are involved in social projects and are active within their communities. The criteria include both parents having been born abroad, and the Foundation aims to include students who come from communities or families that are not acclimated to or supportive of higher education, for example by targeting students whose parents have not gone to university. The Foundation assesses this by asking applicants how their parents respond to their desire to attend private university. The aim is to identify young people who, without the scholarship, would otherwise not have support from their family. The Foundation's scholars come from backgrounds ranging across 26 nationalities.

### What works?

- Have the courage to re-think your target groups and focal points as society changes. As German demographics change, the Foundation has had to re-think how it sets criteria for this scholarship, and how it defines and reaches its target group. For example, the Turkish population in Germany largely originated from labour and guest worker migration in the 1950s and 1960s. Though the subsequent and multiple generations of people of Turkish heritage have largely been German-born and with German-born parents, these generations have not necessarily been integrated into the education system and may lack social mobility. By requiring that all scholars' parents are born abroad, the Foundation recognises that it excludes these categories of young people, and will be re-thinking the criteria in the coming years.
- Engage with communities through voices from the community. The Foundation has had difficulty engaging with scholars' and applicants' communities, in order to encourage young people to apply for the programme. However, the Foundation has found that the scholars themselves are the best voices to encourage others in their communities to become involved.
- Develop a confident theory of change and then get evidence for it. Some have challenged the programme on the fact that it supports a small number of people (10 per year) and sends these students to private universities, rather than sending a greater number of students to public universities. However, the Foundation supports its decision by highlighting that there is a real need to vault students of immigrant background into elite education and promote a new generation of highly educated and diverse leaders in Germany. The student population in German private schools remains largely homogeneous and from elite backgrounds. By bringing Vodafone Foundation scholars to private universities, the Foundation has diversified elite education in Germany, opening the minds of the broader student body and faculty. The programme also builds courage and self-confidence among talented students, showing them that they can attend, belong, and succeed in private universities.

## The Islamforum (Germany)

In 2006, the former German Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble founded the German Islam Conference as a new space for dialogue and joint action to define and improve relations between the state and Muslim organisations. The event marked the recognition that Muslims are the second largest religious group in Germany, and the Conference aimed to form a new representative body for German Muslims and foster dialogue on domestic relations regarding Islam in Germany. Since the Conference's inception, there has been some debate, discomfort and criticism, much stemming from Conference's participants, about the function and design of the Conference, including its top-down approach and lack of transparency. The

initiative has been led on by the Ministry of Interior, which decides on all participants, sets the agenda, and designs all protocol.

In the wake of the discomfort and criticism surrounding the German Islam Conference, the Islamforum was founded as an alternative event, and has been supported by the Berlin Senate. The Islamforum was founded as an internal forum in Berlin to bring together key Muslim stakeholders and local authorities to discuss sensitive topics away from the public eye. Among the nearly 30 participants are senators, senior security and police officials (including the head of the German Intelligence Service), and the event has sought to initiate a new form of dialogue between these groups.

### What works?

- Demonstrate to communities how important it is to come together. Muslim communities in Berlin have not been as organised through lobby groups as other minority groups, and the Islamforum has showed them how critical it is for them to come together for this form of joint dialogue and action.
- Local governments can demonstrate that they value honest dialogue with communities. The support given to the Islamforum by the Berlin Senate has contributed to a new sense of trust and understanding between Muslim communities and local government, demonstrating that public administration is willing to support them. Building this trust has been a slow but important process.
- Remember that not all achievements will be quantifiable. In its early stages, the success of Islamforum cannot easily be measured. It has even proven difficult for participants to justify the initiative to their own communities, precisely because the results are not quantifiable. For example, though the event serves as a forum for Muslim communities to engage with intelligence services, many Muslim organisations remain blacklisted by the German Intelligence Service, which remains a point of contention for Muslim communities. However, those who have been involved in the initiative maintain that the Islamforum is contributing to greater understanding on both sides, though the gradual building of trust and understanding will not easily be quantifiable.

## Special Instruction Project, Stiftung Mercator (Germany)

The Mercator Foundation is one of the largest private foundations in Germany, and pursues clearly defined objectives within several areas: integration, climate change and cultural education. Mercator's integration work is founded on the belief that education is a prerequisite to full participation in society, and aims to eliminate inequality between Germans and migrants in terms of school and university qualifications. Mercator sets its goals in numbers, and has a stated objective of reducing inequality in school and university qualifications among people of migrant origin aged 15–30 in Germany by 70 per cent between 2005 and 2025. Though it is obviously not feasible to attribute a reduction like this specifically to the action taken by Mercator, the Foundation believes that is important to set clear

quantifiable goals for wider society and monitors how these numbers change every year.

In 2004, Mercator initiated the Germany-wide extra-curricular Special Instruction Project to address language deficits at an early age through a unique, special instruction model offering school children of migrant origin free extra-curricular tutoring in addition to their regular lessons. These lessons are given by students undertaking a teaching degree, offering future teachers the opportunity to gain experience in diverse classrooms and to test teaching methods first-hand. The student teachers are given bespoke training on teaching German as a second language, and are supported throughout the process by their universities. The project has reached around 7,700 secondary school children, and has involved 1,300 student teachers in 11 German states.

### What works?

- Projects that work with and within the system may yield greater success. Mercator applied this method by approaching universities to ask if they would train their students to teach German as a second language. Through a series of negotiations with schools and universities, and with improved grades and positive testimonies from participants to evidence its success, the teacher training model and curriculum has now officially been instituted throughout North Rhine-Westphalia by the state government. A change of law in 2008 now requires every university to implement the programme.
- Regularly informing government departments of a project, its outcomes and any data generated by the project is an effective way of pushing for legal and policy change. Involving government from the outset, where possible, can also give government officials a sense of ownership over new initiatives. Mercator set up a working group to create the curriculum for the Special Education Project, and invited staff from the Ministry of Education and Research to sit alongside project experts and school staff to design the curriculum. Foundations with policy connections can provide this kind of leverage where it would not otherwise be possible for smaller organisations to connect with key stakeholders at the policy level. A clear advocacy strategy must be built into projects, and foundations can often support the relationships needed to advocate for change.

## The Migrant and Refugee Communities Forum – The Forum (UK)

The Migrant and Refugee Communities Forum is a user-led community hub formed in 1993, providing a platform for grassroots partnership between migrant and refugee organisations in London, as well as advocacy and services such as training and mentoring with the aim of meaningful integration. The Forum's core purpose is to provide support and share resources amongst migrant and refugee groups and individuals at different stages of their journey, to help them rebuild and improve their lives in the UK. The Forum operates as a physical hub, hiring out space for community meetings and shared office space for refugee and migrant community organisations. The Forum furthermore offers organisational development support for community organisations on topics such as

strategic planning, funding applications, evaluation frameworks, and introductions to decision-makers. They provide education and training opportunities for migrants and refugees, ranging from employment and language to digital activism, and provide advice for migrants and refugees on social welfare law. In addition, the Forum carries out research and works to influence policy, and actively advocates for the rights of migrants and refugees.

The Forum operates on the understanding that migrants and refugees are working hard to integrate on their own, and it works to support their individual journeys and transitions. The real challenge for integration is not how migrants are 'integrating', but the public and political discourse on these topics, which can hinder ongoing good work on the ground.

### What works?

- Government funding of integration work in the UK has tended to shift away from the lives of individuals and their everyday needs. As a result, migrants cannot access legal advice and basic services. These frontline services need to be prioritised. The Forum's model addresses this through development of self-advocacy, be it via mentoring for individuals or community organising for groups.
- There should be routes for migrant perspectives to reach and impact policy. The Forum works to promote migrant and refugee voices in the public debate as well as in policymaking on migrant and refugee issues. Since 2009, the Forum has opened up its website and blog to its members to encourage their involvement in the organisation's communications on these issues. The Forum has responded to numerous public inquiries and policy changes, aiming to bring migrant perspectives into the heart of the debate. These include submissions to the Independent Asylum Commission, the successful Campaign to End Detention of Children and the Leveson Inquiry. The Forum's submission was included in the Leveson Report, with a strong recommendation for the new regulator to ensure balanced reporting on immigration issues in the British press.
- Good policy relies on the relationships developed by frontline workers. Frontline workers build trust with communities and maintain these relationships, which are often lacking at the governmental level. However, frontline workers require funding to build and maintain those relationships. Over the years the Forum has influenced the development of good integration practice in their work with the National Health Service (NHS), the police, and local service providers.
- Bring staff together to problem-solve and identify key issues, gaps, and develop new initiatives. For example, out of a team 'power analysis' exercise conducted with support from the Carnegie Trust, emerged the Forum's Digital Activism Project, which is a project aiming to equip migrant and refugee community organisations with skills to excel in a digital society. The project explicitly fills a gap and has been so successful that the Forum is now seeking to implement digital training modules led by migrants for mainstream organisations, to promote visibility of migrants leading digital training in the mainstream.
- Foster a community with other organisations working towards similar goals. The Forum works in partnership with many migrant and civil society organisations such as Migrant Rights Network or Citizens UK. It leases its building to other migrant and refugee community organisations, building trust among the organisations working in this field, fostering a communal element, and promoting social entrepreneurship.



- Create more inclusive spaces for dialogue on integration issues. Conferences and leadership events can tend to be exclusive and expensive, and representatives from migrant community organisations tend not to be present due to funding and time constraints. In 2011 the Forum launched the annual Migrant and Refugee Woman of the Year Awards, which is held at the Royal Festival Hall and recognises the positive contributions that grassroots leaders make, and opens up a space for positive narratives in the debate about immigration.
- Service organisations can move to a more contribution-based model, as the Forum has in recent years. The Forum calls its participants 'members' rather than clients or users, and is moving towards a model where individuals who can afford it pay for self-help services, such as on the Dentists StudyBuddy learning website for overseas qualified dentists who are preparing for verification exams.
- Adopt a 'get on with it' attitude. It is first-hand knowledge from frontline work that teaches community-level organisations how to effect change in integration. Rather than waiting for opportunities to come from the top down, the Forum builds confidence amongst its members to take responsibility for their own integration, empowering them to become equal and engaged citizens.

## The Swedish Red Cross (Sweden)

The Swedish Red Cross runs a range of initiatives within the field of integration, with the national level organisation's activities currently focus on mentoring, homework help, language learning, and organised activities. The Red Cross's activities reach approximately 25,000 individuals each year. The Red Cross's national-level office does not directly oversee the 1,100 local-level branches across Sweden; these local-level branches develop locally and organically. Before 2009, the Red Cross did not explicitly run programmes with the intent of contributing to integration of migrants and asylum seekers in Sweden, but its National Board has since then developed this as an established strand within the Red Cross's work. Developing an overarching integration strategy has united Red Cross local branches in promoting this vision for integration across Sweden. Local branches have, since 2009, initiated local integration projects independently, and the national-level organisation

provides resources and strategic assistance for the local level.

The Swedish Red Cross departs slightly from the view of integration adopted by the Swedish government, believing that it must go beyond integration into the labour market. The national-level integration strategy adopted by the Swedish Cross in 2009 notes that integration is about sharing experiences across cultural divides, and developing interaction between groups while safeguarding respect for similarities and differences. A cornerstone of this integration strategy is also ensuring that groups and individuals are not marginalised or discriminated against. The Red Cross sets out two parallel processes required for integration. The first involves countering prejudices and norms which serve as obstacles to the ability of new migrants to attain equal rights and opportunities. The second involves facilitating opportunities for these individuals to participate in society as equal citizens.

### What works?

- Though local initiatives should be organic and rooted in local need and local issues, there is a value in designing an overarching vision for integration to streamline and provide direction for local initiatives with shared goals.
- Credibility and branding is important. The Swedish Red Cross brand has proven incredibly important for integration work in Sweden, as target groups recognise the organisation and have perhaps even come in contact with the Red Cross in their countries of origin.
- Encourage participants to become members, volunteers and leaders. It has been valuable for participants in integration programmes to continue on as volunteers organising programmes rather than simply as participants. For example, in language learning programmes, the Swedish Red Cross encourages its students to become volunteers and teachers beyond the end of their programme.
- If integration is to be understood as a 'two-way' process, then policy approaches need to actively reflect this definition. Implement policies, programmes and recognise target groups according to this two-way definition. For example, support two-way mentorship programmes, or provide funds for NGOs to carry out work that can fund non-migrant participants as well.
- Physical spaces or hubs where communities and organisations can come together can help build trust across communities, projects and NGOs. The Red Cross has developed local meeting spaces, where people can come and meet informally, and it is often in these spaces that new integration projects are initiated. Creating spaces for people to come together can allow ideas to be exchanged among those with shared objectives.
- The voluntary sector should not be seen as a way to save money for municipalities, by, for example, giving up on certain initiatives, such as language learning, and placing the responsibility on the public sector without allocating funding to it; the voluntary sector cannot bear the weight of these programmes without support.
- Don't forget migrant health. Improving health conditions needs to be a cornerstone of integration policymaking. Migrant groups, particularly refugees and asylum seekers, require access to psychological care, trauma care, and mainstream health services in order to achieve other integration outcomes.

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