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Preferential Voting: Definition and Classification

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Abstract:

There is no single definition for "preferential voting: (or "preference voting") since the terms are used for a number of different election systems and groups of such systems. They can be synonymous with the single-transferable vote, the alternative vote, open-list proportional representation, or the group of all ranking methods.

This article aims to contribute to the body of research on preferential voting by proposing a common understanding and classification of its various forms. I offer an overview of the various definitions and classifications of preferential voting and other terms used in the literature to describe it. I suggest that preferentiality ought to be one of the characteristics by which electoral systems are evaluated. All election systems are preferential, though to varying degrees. I suggest that the evaluation of preferentiality should be based primarily on whether preferential voting schemes enable expression of intra-party preferences, inter-party preferences, or some combination of both. I offer a classification of numerous electoral schemes according to their preferentiality.

Contents:

I. Introduction

This article was prompted by several studies on preferential voting that have been published recently.[1] Although these articles tried "to define preferential voting and classify electoral systems in relation to it"[2] they demonstrate above all that the definition of preferential voting as well as the scope of systems covered by the term is far from clear. One can often read, for instance, that "Australia is the only country which currently uses the preferential vote to elect its national legislature"[3] while on the other hand learning that preferential voting is widespread in Europe.[4] Other writers inform us that preferential voting is the synonym for the Alternative Vote (AV),[5] the other name for the single-transferable-vote (STV),[6] another name for ranking methods,[7] or a term denoting a group of electoral systems that cover a wide range of voting schemes excluding AV.[8]

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[1] For most recent examples see Karvonen, Lauri. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review 203-226, 2004, No.2. and David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister, "Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference" (February 20, 2004). *Center for the Study of Democracy.* Paper 04-04. http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-04 (last visited on August 30, 2004)

[2] Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 223.

[3] Reilly, Ben. 1997. "Preferential Voting and Political Engineering: A Comparative Study." Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Studies 35:1-19.

[4] See for example Farrell, David. Choosing Electoral System. Presentation at the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, British Columbia, Canada, February 2004, p. 3. Available at <http://www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/resources/Weekend%20Session%20Readings/Weekend5Session1Farrell.pdf> (last visited on August 28, 2004) (stating that, in European post-communist democracies, "most of the list systems incorporated preferential voting.")

[5] See Farrell, David. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. New York: Palgrave, 2001, 55-56 (using "preferential voting" as a synonim for AV and arguing that preferential voting is a more appropriate title than AV). See Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: IDEA, 1997, p. 38. (stating that AV is known as "preferential voting" in the countries which use it). Norris, Pippa. Are Australian MPs in touch with constituents?, For the Australian Democratic Audit, Harvard University, 2004, p. 1. (using preferential voting as a synonim for AV).

[6] Amy defines preference voting as "another term for choice voting – STV". Amy, Douglas J. Behind the Ballot Box, 2000, pp. 201, 213.

[7] "[Preferential voting systems] are systems that allow voters to rank candidates from best to worst." Brams, S. and P. Fishburn. Approval Voting, Boston: Birkhauser, 1983. Similarly, Wright defines preferential voting as "making use of a ballot on which voters order their preferences". Wright, J.F.H. The Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems" in B.Grofman and A.Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and

We need not justify the utility of clearly defined terms in scientific research. Although variations in definitions are an inevitable part of political-science, any term being researched should be broadly understood and accepted by other researchers. Unfortunately this is not the case with preferential voting. A comparison of the American, European, and Australian literature on preferential voting readily reveals that authors from different parts of the world are writing about completely different things.

These conflicting understandings of preferential voting and the sometimes unwieldy electoral-systems classifications on offer force us to review preferential voting schemes and establish more precise definitions.

This article aims to contribute to the body of research on preferential voting by proposing a common understanding and classification of its various forms. It overviews various definitions of preferential voting and other terms used in literature to describe it. I examine the scope of the preferential voting systems defined by Katz, Marsh, Farrell, Reilly, Karvonen and other leading researchers in the field and review different types of preferential voting. I suggest a common understanding of the term that might be employed by researchers, but I do not exclude other possible definitions. Rather than propose a specific definition, I present three or four possibilities and invite the research community to contribute views and ideas to the discussion. The article commends the notion that preferentiality is one of the criteria by which all the electoral systems could be evaluated. The article closes by offering a classification of numerous electoral schemes according to their preferentiality.

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their Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986, p. 125. See also Reilly, Benjamin. The global spread of preferential voting: Australian institutional imperialism? Australian Journal of Political Science. July 2004, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 253-266.

II. Term used, definition, and scope

The subject of this article is preferential voting and the systems that enable such voting.

Of the numerous, different, and even conflicting understandings of the terms "preferential voting" or "preference voting,"[9] one of the broadest is that used by mathematicians researching election systems. They apply the term to "those voting methods that make use of a preference schedule"[10] including plurality first-past-the-post (FPTP) method, Concordet, and Borda count. The definition does not however cover approval voting.

[8] Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 204.

[9] Literature uses terms preferential voting and preference voting interchangeably and this article will use both terms, too. While some authors prefer one of the two terms, many researchers use both of them to denote the same subject. See Katz, Richard S. Intraparty Preference Voting. in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 85-103 (using both terms interchangeably), Sartori, Giovanni. Comparative Constitutional Engineering : An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. (2. Ed.). New York: NYU Press, 1997, p. 12 (using both terms interchangeably), Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: IDEA, 1997, p. 84, 148 (using both terms interchangeably), Van der Kolk, Henk. Preferential voting in European local elections. Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Conference – Marburg, 18-21 September 2003 (using both terms interchangeably), Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2. (using both terms interchangeably), Farrell, David and Ian McAllister. Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate Centered Systems Make a Difference? Refereed paper presented to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Tasmania, Hobart, 29 September – 1 October 2003 (using preferential voting, preferential systems, preferential elections), Wright, J.F.H. The Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems" in B.Grofman and A.Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and their Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 124-138 (using preferential voting), Anckar, Carsten. Effects of Electoral Systems: A study of 80 countries. Paper presented at the SNS Seminar in Stockholm, September 28-29, 2001 (using preferential electoral systems), Brams, S. and P. Fishburn. Approval Voting, Boston: Birkhauser, 1983 (using preferential voting), Amy, Douglas J. Behind the Ballot Box, 2000 (using preference voting). But see Norris, Pippa. Are Australian MPs in touch with constituents?, For the Australian Democratic Audit, Harvard University, 2004, p. 2 (using 'preferential voting' as a synonim for AV and using 'preference vote'/'preference ballot' in relation to open list PR).

[10] "A preference schedule is a table, which summarizes the results of all the individual preference ballots for an election." Bowen, infra. To simplify, ranking methods use preference schedule. However, mathematicians tend to include FPTP in this group, too. According to them, FPTP uses preference schedule, but for the purposes of determining the winner only its first row is considered. Larry Bowen. Mathematics of Voting. In: Larry Bowen. Introduction to Contemporary Mathematics. University of Alabama, 1999 <http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/> exact: <http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/Voting/4popular.htm>. On preference schedules see Black, Duncan. The theory of Committees and Elections, 2. ed. 1998, pp. 7-14.

In the Oceania region,[11] preferential voting usually refers to what are known as ranking methods. Reynolds and Reilly explain that preferential voting denotes "electoral systems in which voters can rank-order candidates on the ballot paper in order of their choice. The Alternative Vote, the Single Transferable Vote, and the system used to elect the Sri Lankan president are all examples of preferential voting."[12] Many other researchers of the voting systems in the Pacific area have used this definition.[13] It differs from the "preference schedule" definition mentioned above in the sense that it focuses on the voting technique rather than vote-analysis tables. The scopes of the two definitions are similar, but the one from Oceania region does not include FPTP. When speaking about preferential voting in Australia, some authors make a distinction between "majority preferential," also known as AV, and "quota preferential" voting, usually known as STV.[14] In Oceania, however, a different understanding of preferential voting occurs frequently, perhaps even more frequently. In this sense, 'preferential voting' is used as a synonym for the Alternative Vote system. Consider, for instance, the following passage from Reilly: "While the academic

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[11] When talking about European, American, Australian, or any other area-based definition, we present understandings and definitions most typical for research originating from certain part of the world. Exceptions are, of course, not rare at all. It is quite common for some authors from one continent to use word in a sense, which is typical for another part of the world.

[12] Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: IDEA, 1997, 148.

[13] "[Preferential voting makes] use of a ballot on which voters order their preferences." Wright, J.F.H. The Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems" in B.Grofman and A.Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and their Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986: 125; See also C. Sharman, A.M. Sayers, N. Miragliotta. Trading party preferences: the Australian experience of preferential voting. Electoral Studies 21 (4) 2002, 543-560. Same understanding is taken also by the Parliament of Australia in its website glossary. See Parliament of Australia. A Glossary of Parliamentary Words. <www.aph.gov.au/find/glossary.htm> (Last reviewed 27 February 2003). Same (Identical?) definition is followed also by some European and American researchers. Anckar, Carsten. Effects of Electoral Systems: A study of 80 countries. Paper presented at the SNS Seminar in Stocjholm, September 28-29, 2001, p. 6 ("In [preferential] systems, voters are asked to rank candidates..."). Compare also Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, and David Brockington. Electoral Reform and Minority Representation: Local Experiments with Alternative Elections. Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2003, pp. 29-30, 117-119. (Authors propose use of Cumulative and Limited Voting. They call STV and AV preferential systems and see them as a subgroup of ordinal systems, which "typically allow voters to express multiple preferences or to rank-order their preferences". Id, 29.

[14] See Wright, J.F.H. The Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems" in B.Grofman and A.Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and their Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986: 124-25 and See also C. Sharman, A.M. Sayers, N. Miragliotta. Trading party preferences: the Australian experience of preferential voting. Electoral Studies 21 (4) 2002, 543-560 (using terms "quota preferential" and "majority preferential".)

literature also usually refers to the 'alternative vote', this article will follow the local

nomenclature of most of the countries cited – including Australia, Papua New Guinea and Sri

Lanka – where the terms ' preferential vote' and preferential voting' are invariably used."[15] In

United States the AV system is often known as Instant-Runoff-Voting (IRV). But according

to Amy, for example, preferential voting is just another name for a single-transferable-vote

system (STV).[16]

In European literature, the term "preferential voting" has a considerably different meaning.

Most European researchers, when talking about preferential voting, refer in an approximate

way to systems in which the voter, when casting a vote for one of the party lists, also

expresses his preference for one of the candidates of this same party.[17] These commentators

have only List Proportional Representation (PR) systems in mind.[18] But Katz, for instance,

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[15] Reilly, Ben. Preferential Voting and Political Engineering: A Comparative Study. 1997… p. 1. Also Fraenkel, Jon. The alternative vote system in Fiji: Electoral engineering or ballot-rigging? The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, July 2001, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 1-31 See also Farrell, David. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. New York: Palgrave, 2001, 55 (using preferential voting as a synonim for AV and arguing that, while both titles are used, the former is more appropriate); Merrill, S. "A Comparison of Efficiency of Multicandidate Electoral Systems", American Journal of Political Science 28, 23-48 (poisci kaj ima – citira ga Nurmi); Nurmi, Hannu. Comparing Voting Systems. Dordrecht, Boston, Lancester, Tokyo: D. Riedel, 1987, p. 54 (using AV and preferential voting as synonims).

[16] Amy defines preference voting as "another term for choice voting – STV". Amy, Douglas J. Behind the Ballot Box, 2000, pp. 201, 213.

[17] See for example Nohlen, Dieter. Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem: Ueber die Politischen Auswirkungen von Wahlsystemen, Opladen: UTB Leske u. Budrich, 1989, p. 60, 218 (te strani v hrvaski izdaji Izborno pravo i stranacki sustav – najdi original). See also Van der Kolk, Henk. Preferential voting in European local elections. Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Conference – Marburg, 18-21 September 2003. ("Preferential voting can be defined as choosing for individual candidates on a political party list (or lists), which can break the order of individual candidates determined by the political party." Id., p. 4.). See also Cox, Gary W. Making Votes Count, 1997, p. 61 (defining preference votes as "[C]andidate votes that influence seat allocations among the members of a given list" and citing Marsh, Michael. The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems. European Journal of Political Research 13 (1985) 365-378, Katz, Richard S. Intraparty Preference Voting. in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 85-103). Farrell, David M. and Roger Scully. The Election and Representative Role of MEPs. Draft Paper for the Working Group on Democracy in the EU for the UK Cabinet Office, 2002, p. 1.

[18] See, for instance, Henk van der Kolk. Preferential voting in European local elections. Paper presented at the ECPR conference – Marburg, 18-21 September 2003 (defining preferential voting "as choosing for individual candidates on a political party list (or lists), which can break the order of individual candidates determined by the political party." Id., p. 4) or Cox, cited above f. 17?. See also Grad, Franc, Igor Kaučič, Miha Pogačnik, and Bojan Tičar. Constitutional System of the Republic of Slovenia: Structural Survey. SECLI, 2002, p. 205 (using "preference voting"), or Grad, Franc. Volitve in volilni sistem. Ljubljana: Inštitut za javno upravo, 1996, p. 227. Also Toplak, Jurij. Preferential Vote and Its Use in Slovenia. Lex Localis, year 1, n. 2, 2003, pp. 15-43.

takes a broader understanding of preference voting by which open-list PR is "the most

straightforward system of preferential voting,"[19] but preferential voting includes also STV,

single-non-transferable-vote (SNTV), American primaries and some other systems. Similarly

broad is Sartori's understanding of preferential voting:

> "Preferential or preference voting allows voters to indicate on their ballots one of more
> preferred (selected) candidates, either by writing in or ticking off their names.
> Generally preference voting applies to PR list systems. When applied to the alternative
> vote it also entails a rank-ordering of the preferred candidates that is not contemplated,
> by contrast, by the PR list systems."[20]

Farrell, when writing about electoral systems of various parts of the world, recognizes

terminological differences and uses 'preferential voting' depending on the area researched. In

his studies of European parliament elections, he uses it in what we referred to as the European

meaning, but in studies on Australian elections he uses it both as a synonym for AV and as a

title for ranking systems.[21] In one of his most recent works, however, Farrell introduces the

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[19] Katz, Richard S. Intraparty Preference Voting. in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 85-103, 88.

[20] Sartori, Giovanni. Comparative Constitutional Engineering : An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. (2. Ed.). New York: NYU Press, 1997, p. 12.

[21] Compare Farrell, David M. and Roger Scully. The Election and Representative Role of MEPs. Draft Paper for the Working Group on Democracy in the EU for the UK Cabinet Office. 2002, p. 2, 4. (writing about preferential voting under List PR systems and distinguishing "systems which provide no ('closed' ballot structure), limited ('ordered' ballot structure) and extensive ('open' ballot structure) preferential voting.) and Shaun Bowler, David Farrell, Ian McAllister, 'Constituency Campaigning in Parliamentary Systems with Preferential Voting: Is There a Paradox?', *Electoral Studies* 15: 461-76 (using preferential voting as a synonym for ranking methods), and Farrell, David. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 55-56 (suggesting that term 'preferential voting' should be preferred over AV) and Farrell, David M. and Ian McAllister. "Australia: The Alternative Vote in a Compliant Political Culture" in: Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005 (using 'preferential' as a term denoting "the voter's ability to rank-order the candidates on the ballot paper" and letting the reader know that the terminology in the various parts of the book is not being consistent.).

attractive idea that preferentiality is a characteristic of most of the electoral systems, but to different degrees.[22] I shall discuss this approach to preferential voting below.

To further confuse the matter, there are number of different terms used to describe any of the above understandings of the preferential voting.

Other terms used to describe the just-mentioned "*list PR preferential voting",* for instance, include "personal voting,"[23] "person voting,"[24] and "intraparty choice."[25] The latter has been used rarely, since Katz has later adopted the term "intraparty preference voting."[26] Karvonen convincingly rejects the use of "intraparty choice" as a synonym for preferential voting since it could lead one to think of the process of candidate nomination rather than election itself.[27] He also rejects the use of "personal voting" and "person voting", since these terms are too broad and at the very least can be confused with the "personal vote", a term that describes part of candidate's vote that results from his or her own individual characteristics or actions, rather than from his or her party label.[28] Farrell and Scully, however, use the terms "personal vote" and "preferential voting" interchangeably to denote expression of individual candidate

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[22] David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister, "Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference" (February 20, 2004). *Center for the Study of Democracy.* Paper 04-04. http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-04 (last visited on August 30, 2004).

[23] Shugart, Mathew S. "Minorities Represented and Unrepresented," in W. Rule and J.F. Zimmermann (eds.), Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994: 37. Farrell, David and Michael Gallagher. Submission to the Independent Commission on the Voting System. London: McDougall Trust, 1998.

[24] Sartori, Giovani. Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes, London: Macmillan, 1994: 15.

[25] Katz, Richard S. A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980: 31-2.

[26] Katz, Richard S. Intraparty Preference Voting. in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 85-103.

[27] Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 204

[28] Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 204, refering to Cain, B., J. Ferejohn, and M. Fiorina. The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987. See also Soberg Shugart, Matthew. "Comparative Electoral Systems Research : The Maturation of a Field and New Challenges Ahead" in Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 25-55, p. 46, referring to the same source.

preferences in list PR systems.[29] Norris uses 'preference vote,' 'open vote,' and 'non-blocked vote' as synonyms for this sort of vote.[30]

What European literature calls "preference voting" or "preferential voting," American literature usually calls "Open List Proportional Representation."[31] This term denotes systems of proportional representation, in which voters first vote for a party list and then have the option to express a preference for a candidate or candidates within this party list. Open List PR does not include STV, SNTV, or any of the similar systems. Moreover, some authors use this term to denote only the systems in which preference votes are the sole factors determining which of the candidates are elected and list-order does not play any role. Commentators using the term "Open list PR" in this sense use the term "semi-open"[32] or "semi-closed"[33] or "flexible"[34] or "ordered"[35] or "weakly-structured"[36] list PR to denote the systems, where list

[29] Farrell, David M. and Roger Scully. The Election and Representative Role of MEPs. Draft Paper for the Working Group on Democracy in the EU for the UK Cabinet Office. 2002 and Farrell, David and Roger Scully. Electoral System Effects on Parliamentary Representation: The Case of the European Parliament, American Political Science Association annual convention, Boston, August-September, 2002.

[30] Norris, Pippa. Are Australian MPs in touch with constituents?, For the Australian Democratic Audit, Harvard University, 2004, p. 2.

[31] See also Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: IDEA, 1997, 89-90, 147.

[32] The term semi-open list has been regularly use in United Kingdom's debates on electoral reform. See for instance Electoral Reform Society. Making the Lords representative :The Electoral Reform Society's response to "Completing the Reform", the Government's White Paper on Lords reform. <http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/publications/briefings/lordssubmission.PDF> (last visited on August 28, 2004) or Kevin Brennan MP . House of Lords Reform – A Pragmatic Approach : A Response to the Government White Paper, *Completing the Reform*, 30 January 2002 <http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/holref/holrefresp/er/mp/brennan_kevin.pdf> (last visited on August 28, 2004). The term has also been regularly used in the electoral reform debates in the UK parliament. See for instance The United Kingdom Parliament, House of Commons Hansard Debates for 27 Oct 1998 (pt 8) <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo981027/debtext/81027-08.htm> (last visited on August 28, 2004).

[33] Clara Araújo. Quotas for Women in the Brazilian Legislative System. Paper presented at International IDEA workshop The Implementation of Quotas: Latin American Experiences, Lima, Peru, 23–24 February 2003. < http://www.quotaproject.org/CS/CS_Araujo_Brazil_25-11-2003.pdf> (last visited on August 28, 2004).

[34] Bogdanor, Vernon. "Introduction" in: Bogdanor, Vernon and David Butler (eds.). Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and their Political Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.17.

[35] Farrell, David M. and Roger Scully. The Election and Representative Role of MEPs. Draft Paper for the Working Group on Democracy in the EU for the UK Cabinet Office. 2002, p. 8 (defining 'ordered' ballot as the one where "personal votes may help a candidate, but generally the party's ranking remains unaffected). tudi refers to Farrell, David and Roger Scully. Electoral System Effects on Parliamentary Representation: The Case of the European Parliament, American Political Science Association annual convention, Boston, August-September, 2002.

order plays a role in determining the individuals who win the elections. In a recently published edited volume "The Politics of Electoral Systems"[37] a series of leading authors consistently use term "flexible list" for these lists. Instead, Karvonen differentiates between 'strong' and 'weak' preferential voting in list systems.[38]

This overview of the literature suggests that commentators may differ not just in their assessments of the proper limits of the term "preferential voting," but in their judgements as to what constitutes the core of the preferential voting concept is and preferential voting systems. One group of researchers limits the scope of preferential voting to intraparty choice; the other group limits it to systems of ranking, regardless of whether this ranking is of an intraparty or interparty nature. And some researchers see preferential voting only as a subtype of List PR systems.

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[36] Nohlen, Dieter. Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem: Ueber die Politischen Auswirkungen von Wahlsystemen, Opladen: UTB Leske u. Budrich, 1989, p. 60 (poisci originalni izvod in angleski izraz ali vsaj nemski).
[37] Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
[38] With the former, preference votes are the sole basis on which individual legislators are chosen. With the latter, list order or similar considerations play a role paralel with preference voting. Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 207.

III. Place of preferential voting among the electoral systems

Election-system classifications are most frequently based on the electoral formula, that is, the rule determining how the votes are translated into seats. Using this criterion, the literature makes distinctions between plurality/majority systems and proportional representation (PR) systems. While some classifications see plurality/majority systems as one group,[39] others see them as falling into two distinct groups,[40] or stress mixed,[41] parallel,[42] combined,[43] minority,[44] and semi-proportional systems.[45] Following the work of Arend Lijphart, classifications based on the electoral formula have become quite detailed over the last decade[46] and even a

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[39] Lakeman, Enid. How Democracies Vote: A Study of Electoral Systems. London: Faber, 1974.

[40] Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 23-28; Bogdanor, Vernon. "Introduction" in: Bogdanor, Vernon and David Butler (eds.). Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and their Political Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 17

[41] Taylor, P.J. and R.J. Johnston, Geography of Elections, London: Penguin, 1979, Ch.2.

[42] Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: IDEA, 1997, p. 18, 55-59

[43] Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 38-39.

[44] Grad, Franc. Volitve in volilni sistem (Eng. Elections and Electoral System). Ljubljana: Inštitut za javno upravo, 1996, pp. 65-91 (making distinction between proportional, majoritarian/plurality, and "semi-proportional or minority systems").

[45] Lakeman, Enid. How Democracies Vote: A Study of Electoral Systems. London: Faber, 1974. Bogdanor, Vernon. "Introduction" in: Bogdanor, Vernon and David Butler (eds.). Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and their Political Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 17; Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: IDEA, 1997, p. 18, 51-59. Lakeman published the first systematic classification of electoral systems. The first group named Majority systems included subgroup of Relative majority systems (single-member constituencies; multi-member constituencies) and the subgroup of Absolute majority systems (alternative vote system in single-member consituencies; second ballot system in singlemember constituencies; alternative vote in multi-member constituencies; second ballot system in multi-member constituencies). The second group was named Semi-proportional systems and included Limited vote, cumulative vote, and single non-transferable vote (SNTV). Finally, Proportional systems group was divided into subgroups of STV, mixed systems and party list systems. The latter subgroup included systems with no choice between candidates, the ones with choice of one candidate within a list, the ones with choice of more than one candidate within a list, and the ones with a choice of candidates not confined to one list. Lakeman, Enid. How Democracies Vote: A Study of Electoral Systems. London: Faber, 1974, appendix 1.

[46] See Lijphart, Arend. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A study of twenty-seven democracies 1945-1990. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994 (giving most important and recognised classification of the electoral systems). To see how detailed? discussion of formula-based classification has got, see for instance Jorgen Elklit & Nigel. S. Roberts, A Category of its own?: Four PR two-tier compensatory member electoral systems in 1994, European Journal of Political Research 30: 217-240 (1996) (arguing that Lijphart's inclusion of "PR two-tier compensatory member electoral systems" in the category of two-tier districting systems is improper and that these systems should represent a category of its own).

distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies has evolved from it and become widely accepted.[47]

Rae, on the other hand, did not see the electoral formula as being of primary importance. He stressed the difference between ordinal and categorical ballots.[48] The former "compel the voter to choose one candidate or party"[49] while the latter "allow the voter to express a more complex, equivocal preference by rank-ordering the parties"[50] or candidates. Besides AV, STV, and other ballots that allow ranking, systems that allow panachage, vote splitting, and cumulation are also examples of ordinal ballot systems.[51] Another traditional distinction is between candidate-centered and party-centered ballots[52] and classifications regularly include distinctions between single-member and multi-member districts.[53] Taagepera and Shugart should be especially mentioned to demonstrate the importance of district magnitude.[54] Following these classifications, Nohlen examines electoral systems according to four

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[47] See Lijphart, Arend. Patterns od Democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999 or Bingham G. Powell. Elections as instruments of democracy : majoritarian and proportional visions. New Haven, CT, London : Yale Univeristy Press, 2000.

[48] Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 16-19

[49] Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: IDEA, 1997, 23.

[50] Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 17

[51] Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 17-18; Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: IDEA, 1997, 23

[52] Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 14. Distinction between candidate- and party- centered ballot has enormous impact. Recent theory generally makes a distinction between candidate-centered (or –oriented) and party centered politics and democracy. See, for instance, Matthew Soberg Shugart. Electoral "efficiency" and the move to mixed-member systems. Electoral Studies 20 (2) 2001, pp. 173-193, Myungsoon Shin, Youngjae Jin, Donald A. Gross and Kihong Eom. Money matters in party-centered politics: campaign spending in Korean congressional elections. Electoral Studies, In Press 2004.

[53] Lakeman, Enid. How Democracies Vote: A Study of Electoral Systems. London: Faber, 1974; Bogdanor, Vernon. "Introduction" in: Bogdanor, Vernon and David Butler (eds.). Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and their Political Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; Rae, Douglas W. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 19-21; Nohlen, Dieter. "Changes and Choices in Electoral Systems", in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives, New York: Praeger, 1984.

[54] Taagepera, Rein and Matthew S. Shugart. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989, 19-20, 112-125.

characteristics: districts, candidacy, ballot structure, and translation of votes into seats.[55]

Similarly, Grad examines electoral systems according to four components: districts, candidacy, voting techniques, and translation of votes into seats.[56]

Blais offers the electoral systems classification he regards as "superior to existing ones,"[57] in which he stresses the importance of other characteristics besides the electoral formula. He claims that focusing the classification on the plurality/majority/PR distinction is improper. He thus distinguishes between three dimensions of the electoral systems, namely: the ballot structure, the constituency structure, and the formula.[58] These are subdivided into six components: "(1) The nature of the constituency (whole constituency/districts); (2) constituency magnitude; (3) the object of the vote (lists/individuals); (4) the number of votes allowed; (5) the type of vote (nominal/ordinal/numerical); and (6) the formula (majority/plurality/proportionality)."[59] He maintains that electoral systems can be distinguished on the basis of their outcomes, in terms of relative disparities between shares of votes and shares of seats.[60] Since "there is no rationale to justify the logical priority given to formulae in most existing classifications,"[61] he puts them in the "logical order" starting with the ballot structure, continuing with the constituency structure, and ending with the formula and the degree of disparity being the outcome of the above elements.[62]

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[55] Nohlen, Dieter. "Changes and Choices in Electoral Systems", in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives, New York: Praeger, 1984.

[56] Grad, Franc. Volitve in volilni sistem. Ljubljana: Inštitut za javno upravo, 1996, pp. 57-91.

[57] Blais, Andre. The Classification of Electoral Systems, 16 European Journal of Political Research 99-110 (1988), p. 99 (abstract).

[58] Blais, Andre. The Classification of Electoral Systems, 16 European Journal of Political Research 99-110 (1988), p. 106.

[59] Blais, Andre. The Classification of Electoral Systems, 16 European Journal of Political Research 99-110 (1988), p. 108.

[60] Blais, Andre. The Classification of Electoral Systems, 16 European Journal of Political Research 99-110 (1988), 106-107, 108.

[61] Blais, Andre. The Classification of Electoral Systems, 16 European Journal of Political Research 99-110 (1988), p. 107.

Farrell, rather than arguing about which approach is more appropriate and which typology is "superior", instructively classifies electoral systems according to several different criteria: electoral formula, systems' output, and the components of several different electoral systems. One of the most important classifications is his typology based on ballot-structure characteristics, that is, the nature of choice (candidate-based/party-based) and the extent of choice (categorical/ordinal). This approach generates four groups of systems.[63]

The first classification to mention "preferential systems" was the one by Taylor and Johnston.[64] They distinguished (1) plurality systems, (2) preferential systems, (3) list systems, and (4) mixed systems. The group of preferential systems included only those systems based on expression of several preferences. Thus, AV, STV, and double-ballot system are in this group.

In the mid-1980s, two studies on preferential voting were published. Marsh, focusing on the preferential voting within list PR systems, understands it as a system permitting "voters to indicate preferred candidates within a party list rather than to make a choice only between parties."[65] Such an interpretation of preference voting has been accepted in European research for decades.[66] Katz, on the other hand, has accepted a broader understanding of the term. Speaking of "intraparty preference voting," his study covers all the systems that allow choice not only among the parties but also among the individuals within the group of party candidates. He presents STV, SNTV, direct primary, and list PR system as examples of such

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[62] Blais, Andre. The Classification of Electoral Systems, 16 European Journal of Political Research 99-110 (1988), 106.
[63] Farrell, David. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. New York: Palgrave, 2001, 170.
[64] Taylor, P.J. and R.J. Johnston, Geography of Elections, London: Penguin, 1979, ch. 2.
[65] Marsh, Michael. The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems. European Journal of Political Research 13 (1985) 365-378, p. 365 (Abstract).
[66] See for example Pedersen, M. Preferential voting in Denmark. Scandinavian Political Studies 1, 167-87 (1966)

systems,[67] the last being "the most straightforward system of preferential voting."[68] But, Katz's use of the word 'intraparty' must be emphasized. While all the other researchers used preferential voting or preference voting, his expression is by far less ambiguous. As the name suggests, 'intraparty preference voting' covers only schemes allowing expression of intraparty choice.

Where do preferential voting systems fit into the above classifications? Although at first those researching preferential voting had considered 'preferential systems' as a separate group of electoral systems, authors have recently used the terms 'preferential voting', 'preference voting', and 'preferential voting systems' in the way that does not allow these systems to be considered a group separate from list and plurality systems. Adopting the traditional European understanding, or that of Pedersen or Marsh, preferential voting schemes are a form of PR. However, adopting Katz's or Farrell's definition, preferential voting is possible in both plurality/majoritarian and PR systems; it is possible using ordinal or categorical ballots; it can be adopted both in single-member or multi-member districts and in either candidate-centered or party-centered systems. To determine the place of the preferential voting in the multitude of systems and their classifications, two independent classifications have been offered recently, one by Farrell and McAllister and the other one by Karvonen.

In their most recent work, Farrell and McAllister[69] base their classification on Rae's distinction between ordinal and categorical ballots. However, they do not see ordinal and categorical ballots as simply two sorts of ballots, but as a full spectrum of systems that depend

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[67] Katz, Richard S. Intraparty Preference Voting. in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 85-103, pp. 86-93.
[68] Katz, Richard S. Intraparty Preference Voting. in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 85-103, 88.
[69] David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister, "Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference" (February 20, 2004). *Center for the Study of Democracy.*

on the voter's choice in determining the fate of individual candidates. At one extreme there are non-preferential ballots, such as closed lists, and at the other one extreme there are preferential systems such as STV. It might be concluded that Farrell and McAllister do not see preferential voting systems as a closed group of systems but rather as a range varying from more preferential to less preferential and 'zero preferential' systems. In their own words:

> "There is a range of preferential systems, which vary in terms of degree of choice given to the voters. … These systems share in common the characteristic that the voters are given much greater freedom in completing the ballot paper, either in terms of making multiple marks against several candidates, or in some cases being able to rank-order the candidates."[70]

When talking about the voter's choice, they distinguish the extent of choice that is available to voters (whether the ballots are categorical or ordinal), and the nature of choice (whether the choice is between candidates or between parties). They then develop an index of 'intra-party efficiency', which "taps the preferential/non-preferential distinction in electoral systems."[71] They evaluate the degree of preferentiality of the electoral systems by operationalizing them based on three main characteristics, termed ballot, vote, and district,[72] in which the higher scores across these components are indicative of a candidate-centered preferential system and

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Paper 04-04.
http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-04

[70] David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister, "Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference" (February 20, 2004). *Center for the Study of Democracy.* Paper 04-04., p. 2-3. They name STV, Cummulative Voting, Limited Vote, Panachage, and AV as examples of preferential systems.

[71] David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister, "Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference" (February 20, 2004). *Center for the Study of Democracy.* Paper 04-04. p.4 http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-04.

[72] Farrell and McAllister borrow the system of electoral system evaluation from Shugart's model of ranking of mixed member electoral systems. David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister, "Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference" (February 20, 2004). *Center for the Study of Democracy.* Paper 04-04, p.4-6. http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-04. See Shugart, 1995 and Shugart 2001...

lower scores indicative of a party-centered categorical system. There are, accordingly, four, five, and three different possible ranks of the ballot, vote, and district elements respectively. As a result, the authors rank electoral systems on the electoral systems dimension. STV and AV occupy the leading positions. They are followed by open-list PR and panachage systems. The bottom of the list is occupied by closed-list PR systems.

Karvonen, on the other hand, suggests his own classification of electoral systems. His typology is based on two questions: (1) Can the voters choose between several candidates nominated by the same party? (2) Does a vote given to a candidate benefit candidates exclusively or can it transfer so as to benefit the party or the list ("pooling vote")?[73]

He then distinguishes four basic types of electoral systems. The first type is called "preferential list systems." The systems in this group allow voters to choose between the candidates nominated by the same party and at the same time this vote is pooled with the votes for other candidates of the same party. The second group of systems, called "closed list systems," includes pooling, but do not allow intraparty candidate preferences. Systems of the third group allow choice of individual candidates within the many of the same party, but do not allow pooling. STV, block vote, and SNTV are said to be in this group. The last group, called "single member districts," includes systems that do not allow choice of candidates among the party candidates nor do they allow vote pooling. He defines "single member district" systems as the ones in which each party nominates one candidate per district.[74]

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[73] Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 206

[74] Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 206-207.

According to Karvonen, the Australian "alternative vote does not quality as preferential voting system."[75] Although AV explicitly requires voters to rank the order of preference between all candidates in the district, "it does not present the voter with a chance to indicate a preference between several candidates of the same party."[76]

This classification is confusing in several respects. First of all, for decades, single member districts have been understood to be districts from which only one candidate is being elected. In other words, single-member districts are districts with the magnitude of one.[77] Karvonen's definition of single-member districts as the ones in which each party nominates one candidate is new and is at odds with the established understanding of the term. Although renaming the group of systems in which each party offers one candidate may solve the terminological problem, such a group of systems is hard to define since it does not have clear boundaries. First-past-the-post or double-ballot systems are not necessarily limited to one candidate per party. On the other hand, most of the systems Karvonen puts in the other three of the groups allow parties to nominate one candidate per district. Under STV, SNTV (Karvonen's third group of systems), and even closed-list systems (Karvonen's second group of systems), nomination of a single candidate per district is not at all uncommon.

It would seem that Karvonen's classification mixes two incompatible criteria – number of the candidates nominated by each party within a district and the method of translating the votes into seats. Though his criteria for classification – the "pooling the vote" and the "intra-party candidate choice" criteria – appear sound, the actual groups he comes up with and their

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[75] Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 204.
[76] Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 207.
[77] See for example Taagepera, Rein and Matthew S. Shugart. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989, p. 20.

definitions are far from clear. Because the number of candidates nominated by each party within a district is incompatable with the electoral system, it is also difficult to classify many other electoral systems according to Karvonen's typology. Borda count, for example, is clearly a system that does not allow vote pooling. However, it can be used in districts with one elected candidate as well as in multi-member districts.[78] And it can be used in such a way that only one candidate per party is allowed or in such a way that each party can nominate more than one candidate. It can thus be either in the third or fourth of Karvonen's groups. Similarly, instant-runoff voting (IRV) uses single member districts, but the decision as to whether more than one candidate per party will be allowed is within the power of each jurisdiction using this system. It can therefore be in either the third or fourth group. It is similarly hard to classify the limited vote, the approval vote or Concordet system.

Finally, it is unclear why certain states' systems are classified as they are. In Slovenian parliamentary elections, for example, voters do not have any choice between several candidates of the same party.[79] There is only one candidate per party on each ballot. Karvonen, however, lists the Slovenian parliamentary election system among the "weak preferential list systems" together with Belgium, Sweden and the Netherlands.[80]

The table below covers the range of preferential voting as accepted by some of the leading researchers of these systems. The confusion is, as shown, great.

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[78] In Slovenia, two members of the National Assembly are elected in single-member districts using Borda count. In Nauru, for example, Borda count is used in multi-member districts.

[79] For a description of the electoral systems used in Slovenia see Toplak, Jurij. The parliamentary election in Slovenia, October 2004. Electoral Studies 25 (2006) 825-831 or Toplak Jurij. Das Wahlrecht in Slowenien. In: Mirjam Polzer-Srienz et al. (Hg.). Handbuch des politischen Systems Sloweniens. Wien/München 2004.

[80] Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 208. Strong preferenial list systems are the ones in which individual votes are the sole basis on which the choice of individual legislators is determined. Weak preferential list systems, on the other hand, are those in

which list order or other considerations simultaneously play a role. Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 207.

		Katz	Farrell	Marsh	Karvonen	Van der Kolk	Rule/Shugart	Wright, Reilly	Amy	Reilly, Fraenkel	Bowen
Term used		*intraparty preference voting*	*Preferential voting*	*preferential, preference voting*	*preferential voting*	*Preferential voting*		*preferential voting*	*preference voting*	*preferential voting*	*preferential voting, preference ballot*
Open list PR		Yes	Very pref'tial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	no	no?		
Ordered/semi-closed		Yes	Hardly pref'tial	Yes		Yes		no	no?		
Panachage		Yes	Very pref'tial	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	no			
Ranking methods	STV	Yes	Very pref'tial		Yes		Yes (only in multimember)	Yes	Yes		Yes
	Borda		Yes					Yes	no?		Yes
	Concordet		Yes					Yes	no?		Yes
	AV/IRV		Very pref'tial		No		No	Yes	no?	Yes	Yes
SNTV		Yes			Yes			No?	no?		
Limited Vote			Yes					No?	no?		
Approval								No?	no?		
FPTP with Primaries		Yes	Yes		No?			No?	no?		Yes
FPTP - no Primaries					No				no?		Yes
FPTP - mm									no?		
Definition		"any expression of preference within the party"	»Systems characterized by candidate-based voting and high degrees of ordinality«[81]	"permits voters to indicate preferred candidates within a party list rather than to make a choice only between parties."[82]	"involves a choice between several candidates of the same party."[83]			"use of a ballot on which voters ordertheir preferences"	"other name for STV"	"other name for AV"	Uses information from a "preference schedule, [that] is a table which summarizes the results of all the individual preference ballots for an election."[84]
Synonyms				Intraparty choice/preference voting, Open list PR		Open list PR		Ranking methods	STV	AV, IRV	

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[81] David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister, "Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference" (February 20, 2004). *Center for the Study of Democracy.* Paper 04-04, p. 7. http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-04 (last visited on August 30, 2004).

[82] Marsh, Michael. The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems. European Journal of Political Research 13 (1985) 365-378, p. 365 (Abstract).

[83] Lauri Karvonen. Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects. 25 International Political Science Review, 2004, No.2., 208.

[84] http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/Voting/4popular.htm

IV. Classification of preferential voting systems

The place occupied by preferential voting systems in the electoral systems typology depends heavily on what we understand by the term 'preferential voting.' Similarly, the internal classification of preferential voting systems depends primarily on which definition of 'preferential voting' we use. If we understand preferential voting as an expression of individual preference(s) within lists, there are several criteria according to which preferential voting schemes can be classified.

These preferential voting schemes, often known as the Open List PR or, most recently, as the Preferential-list PR (PLPR)[85] systems, differ according to the number of preferential votes cast by the voter; according to whether a voter can cast these preferences only for candidates of a single party or can cast them for candidates of two or more parties; and according to whether a voter can cast two or more preferential votes for a single candidate. Systems vary also according to the number of preferences that a candidate has to receive in order to change the order of the candidates on the list. In some elections voters rank the candidates from the most preferred to the least preferred and sometimes voters are permitted to split the preferential votes. Preferences may be expressed on the same ballot as is used to express a vote for the party; alternatively both votes may be expressed on two different ballot papers. In

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[85] Shugart convincingly discourages the use of the term 'Open list' and suggests the term 'preferential-list PR (PLPR)'. According to Shugart, PLPR should denote list »in which intraparty allocation takes place across party lists, but voters are permitted (or sometimes required […]) to indicate a preference for one or more candidates within one list, or, rarely, across more than one list. Thus a preferential-list system should not be confused with the ordinal ballots of STV or the alternative vote, which is also sometimes termed 'preferential' but are not list systems.«. Soberg Shugart, Matthew. "Comparative Electoral Systems Research : The Maturation of a Field and New Challenges Ahead" in Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 25-55, p. 40-42.

some places, voters can express their preferences months before the general elections. Sometimes voters must express their preferences; in other cases preferential vote casting is optional. While the names of the candidates are often listed on the ballot, in some countries voters have to write in the names of the preferred candidates next to the parties' names.

One of the most important distinctions is between those systems that offer one preferential vote and those that allow the voter to express two or more preferences. The latter vary a good deal. Often, each voter is given as many votes as there are seats to be filled from his constituency. Such a system, for instance, is used in Luxemburg[86] Sometimes however the number of the maximum preferences that can be expressed is limited to three or four.[87]

Of high importance too is the distinction between systems featuring mandatory preferential voting and those systems that feature optional preferential voting. With the former, a voter casting a party vote has also to express a preference. With the latter, only the casting of a party vote is necessary for a ballot to be valid; expression of the preference of individual candidate(s) is just an option. While Finnish or Polish voters cannot vote for a party list without expressing a preference at the same time, Brazilian or Austrian voters vote for a party list and then decide whether they wish also to cast a preferential vote for an individual candidate on that list.[88]

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[86] See the description of the Luxemburg electoral system. Katz, Richard S. Intraparty Preference Voting. in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 85-103, 89.

[87] In Italy, for instance, until 1993, the voter could express up to three or four preferences. See the description in Sartori, Giovanni. Comparative Constitutional Engineering : An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. (2. Ed.). New York: NYU Press, 1997, p. 18 or in D'Alimonte, Roberto. „Italy: A Case of Fragmented Bipolarism" in Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 253-276, 254-255.

[88] Soberg Shugart, Matthew. "Comparative Electoral Systems Research : The Maturation of a Field and New Challenges Ahead" in Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 25-55, p. 42.

Casting a ballot for an individual candidate(s) within a party list can be quite separate from voting for a party list, although the vote for the candidate can be made on the same ballot paper as a party vote. If there is no separate party vote, the number of party votes is simply the total numbers of votes cast for individual candidates on the list.

Placing both candidate and party votes on the same ballot is typical of the optional preferential voting schemes. The voter first chooses one of the party lists and then, if he or she wishes, also expresses a preference from within that list. Similarly, systems of obligatory preferential voting are typical of schemes whereby a voter, while casting a vote for an individual candidate, inevitably and simultaneously casts a vote for this candidate's party. This voter cannot avoid vote for a candidate without voting for the candidate's party, nor vote for a party without voting for one of the candidates.[89]

When expression of the preferences is separate from party vote casting, systems differ according to whether they allow casting a vote for one party and then expressing preference for a candidate from another list. If such "panachage" (as it is called) is not allowed, an important question has to be answered: what to do with the ballot paper on which the voter has cast a party vote for one party and a preferential vote for a candidate from another party. In Slovenia, for instance, until 2004, such ballots were declared invalid. Since 2004, however, the party vote prevails and the candidate preference is ignored.[90] Analogically, in the

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[89] See the already mentioned Finish example explained in Taagepera, Rein and Matthew Soberg Shugart. Seats and Votes: The effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989, pp. 42-46. See also Katz, Richard S. Intraparty Preference Voting. in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 85-103, 89.
[90] For the overview of the pre-2004 practice see Jere, Petra. Neveljavne glasovnice na volitvah in referendumih (Engl. Invalid ballots in elections and referendums). Thesis. University of Maribor 2003. In 2004, Central Election Commission adopted a majority decision that in case of the conflict between the party vote and the preferential vote the former should prevail. Decision of Central Election Commission of the Republic of Slovenia of June 3, 2004. In Slovenia, preferential list PR is used for local elections. In the parliamentary elections, as mentioned, expression of intra-party preferences is not possible.

countries using obligatory preferential voting, an invalid preferential vote makes the whole ballot invalid.

A model that allows the voter to give preferential votes to candidates from more than one list is called, as above, panachage[91] and the one allowing a voter to give more than one preferential vote to a single candidate is called cumulation. The voters in Switzerland and Luxemburg, for instance, can even combine panachage and cumulation.[92]

One of the most important issues in preferential voting is the strength of the preferential votes in relation to the order of the candidates on the party list. Frequently, a political party will pre-determine the order of the candidates and put its favored candidates on the top of the list.[93] In some elections, preferential votes are the only factor determining the winner. Here, the candidates who receive the highest number of preferential votes are elected.[94] In other systems, however, candidates from the bottom of the list need a considerably higher number of preferential votes in order to be elected. The number of preferential votes that must be received by a candidate in order to change the original list order is usually expressed in a certain percentage of the total votes received by the list. This threshold does not have a

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[91] Usually only simultaneous voting for candidates of various lists within List PR systems is called panachage. See for example Lijphart, Arend. "Introduction to Electoral Systems" in Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 3-24, 9-10; Reynolds, Andrew and Ben Reilly. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Stockholm: IDEA, 1997, p. 91, Farrell, David M. (2001) Electoral Systems: A comparative introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 87-88, Marsh, Michael. The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems. European Journal of Political Research 13 (1985) 365-378, 369. But, note that Anckar offers a different understanding of the term. According to him, panachage occours whenever a voter can vote for candidates of two or more parties, including German MMP, Australian, AV, and Irish STV. Anckar, Carsten. Effects of Electoral Systems: A study of 80 countries. Paper presented at the SNS Seminar in Stockholm, September 28-29, 2001, 6-7.

[92] See Katz, Richard S. Intraparty Preference Voting. in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 85-103, 89.

[93] There are exceptions to this practice, however. In Greece, for instance, candidates are listed in alphabetical order. Kazamias, G. in D. Papadimitrou. The Elections in Greece, April 2000. Electoral Studies, 21 (4), 2002, str. 649-655.

[94] See the system used in 1980s for elections of the members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies. The elected candidates were determined only by the preferential vote totals; the party's original list order was consulted only

common name in the literature. Authors call it "eligibility figure"[95] or "threshold for

guaranteeing a seat via preference votes"[96] or "threshold for preference votes to take effect"[97].

While the first name does not does not denote its most important feature (that it is a threshold)

the other two are very long. The names "eligibility threshold" or "flexible list eligibility

threshold" seem more sensible. Sometimes this eligibility threshold is set so high that none of

the candidates are elected by preferential votes.[98] Another sort of threshold, called the

threshold of legitimization or the quorum of legitimization, is also used to prevent candidates

with only a handful of the received preferential votes from getting elected. The threshold of

legitimization is expressed as the share of the party voters that must express preferences for

any of the candidates in order for the preferences to be considered at all. If, let's say, the

threshold of legitimization is set to 10%, then at least 10% of the voters of particular party

need to express preferences in order for these preferences to be taken into consideration. If

less than 10% of this party's voters cast preferences, then the original list order prevails. Both

thresholds are sometimes combined. In Slovenian local elections, for instance, both thresholds

have to be reached in order for a candidate to be elected via preference votes. Eligibility

threshold is set to 10% of the total party vote and the legitimization quorum equals 25% of the

total party vote. The candidate that need to get elected via preferences therefore (thus?) needs

to collects preferences exceeding 10 percent of the total party votes while the sum of all the

preferences collected by all the candidates on this same party list must exceed 25 percent of

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in the event of ties. See Katz, Richard S. Intraparty Preference Voting. in Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York: Agathon Press, 1986, 85-103, 88.
[95] De Winter, Lieven. "Belgium: Empowering Voters or Party Elites?" in Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 417-432, p. 421.
[96] Soberg Shugart, Matthew. "Comparative Electoral Systems Research : The Maturation of a Field and New Challenges Ahead" in Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 25-55, p. 43.
[97] Anderweg, Rudy B. "The Netherlands: The Sanctity of Proportionality" in Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 491-510, p. 494.
[98] In Slovenian 1994 and 1998 local elections a candidate needed to receive the number of preferences that would exceed 50% of the votes cast for his or her party. Since the preferential votes were optional and they had to be given by writing-in the first and last name of the candidate, none of the several thousands of candidates came even close to fulfilling this requirement. Toplak, Jurij. Preferential Vote and Its Use in Slovenia. Lex Localis 1 (2) 2003, 15-43.

the total party vote. In other words, one out of four of his or her party's voters should express the preference and one out of ten of these party's voters should give preference to this particular candidate in order to get him or her elected.

The success of the candidates from the bottom of the party lists does not depend only on the thresholds set by law, but also depends heavily on whether the names of the candidates are listed on the ballot paper as opposed to the voters themselves having to write in the names. In the Italian Chamber of Deputies elections in the 1980s, as well as in Slovenian local elections, only the names of the parties are listed on the ballot. If a voter wishes to cast a preference vote, he or she has to know the name(s) of the chosen candidate(s) and type the name on the ballot paper. Voters tend to express their preferences in much higher numbers when the names of all the candidates are listed on the ballot, as is the case in Luxemburg, for instance. The same quorum of legitimization or eligibility threshold thus represents a much more formidable obstacle in the Italian or Slovenian case than it would be in Luxemburg.[99]

There are also jurisdictions that allow voters to express "negative preferences." Latvian voters, for instance, have a chance to cross out the candidates they do not like.[100]

Shugart offers a typology of preferential-list PR allocation methods and distinguishes Open lists, Flexible lists, Quasi-lists, and Latent lists.[101] Open lists are those systems in which the

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[99] The difference in impact of the two models of the ballot paper is clearly visible on Slovenian example. In local elections, voters cast an optional preferential vote by writing-in the name of the preferred candidate. In elections to the European parliament, optional preferential votes are cast by crossing the name of one of the listed candidates. While only about 11.6% of the voters casting the ballot used the option in 2002 local elections, as many as 76.8% used it in the 2004 European Parliament elections.

[100] See Davies, Philip John and Andrejs Valdis Ozolins. The 1998 Parliamentary Election in Latvia. Electoral Studies, year 20, n.1, 2001, pp. 135-141. Approval voting, allowing a voter to mark pluses and minuses next to each of the candidate, is similar to the Latvian example. It is used in some local jurisdictions in United States. For detailed study of this system see Brams, S. and P. Fishburn. Approval Voting, Boston: Birkhauser, 1983.

ballots provided by parties are unranked and the preference votes alone determine the order of election from a party's list. Systems in which preference votes are not the sole criterion for determining candidates' ranks are termed Flexible lists. Expression of intraparty preferences is optional with both the Open lists and the Flexible lists. Quasi-list is the subtype of the Open lists in which the voter cannot cast a vote for the list without at the same time expressing a preference for one of the candidates. Similarly, Latent lists are the subtype of the Flexible lists in which voter inevitably has to express the preference, too.

Most forms of preferential voting schemes discussed so far refer to the expression of preferences in list PR systems. Ranking methods are, as presented, also considered to be a form of preferential voting. The simplest typology of ranking methods is the one based on the formula used. Here, the types include STV, AV, Borda, Concordet, etc. We should, however, distinguish two broad groups of ranking methods.

In the first group are methods giving voters only a single vote. The top ranked candidate receives this vote; but if this candidate does not need this vote or has no chance of being elected, the vote is transferred to the second-ranked candidate. Single-transferable-vote (STV), also known as the quota-preferential or Hare-Clark, is an example of such a system. It is used in Ireland, Malta, Australia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.[102] Alternative Vote (AV), used in Australia [103] and called IRV in United States, also belongs to this group.

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[101] Soberg Shugart, Matthew. "Comparative Electoral Systems Research : The Maturation of a Field and New Challenges Ahead" in Gallagher, Michael and Paul Mitchell (Eds.). The Politics of Electoral System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 25-55, p. 42.

[102] See Taagepera, Rein and Matthew S. Shugart. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989, 26-28, and Hicken, Allen and Yuko Kasuya. A guide to the constitutional structures and electoral systems of east, south and southeast Asia. Electoral Studies, year 22, n. 1, 2003, 121-151, p. 144.

[103] More on the Australian forms of AV and STV see in Sharman, C., A.M. Sayers and N. Miragliotta. Trading party preferences: The Australian Expreience of Preferential Voting. Electoral Studies, 21, 4, 2002, 543-560.

In the other sub-group of the ranking systems are those methods in which a voter has more than a single vote. By ranking the candidates, the voter distributes his or her votes (or the shares of a vote) to the candidates. One of these systems is called Borda Count, named after the French scientist Jean-Charles de Borda. It is currently used for parliamentary elections in Nauru and Slovenia and for the inter-parliamentary presidential elections in the small Pacific republic of Kiribati. By ranking the candidates (or parties) the voter awards each of the candidates with a certain number of points. In a three-candidate race, for instance, the first-ranked candidate recevies two ponts, the second-placed candidate receives one point and the third-placed candidates receives no points. Then, all the points are added up and the candidate with the most points wins. [104] [105]

Borda Count is one of the point counting procedures. Cumulative voting and range voting are two other kinds of point counting procedures. Cumulative voting, also called Accumulation

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[104] While in Nauru the whole parliament is elected with Borda count, in Slovenia only two out of 90 members of the parliament are elected this way. In Kiribati, as said, the method is used by the parliament when it elects the head of state. It should be noted that in each of the three cases a different number of point-distribution scale is used. In Kiribati, an original point-scale is used as it was proposed by Jean Charles de Borda. The first-placed candidate receives the number of points that is by one lower than the number of the candidates. The second-placed candidate receives one point less than the first-placed candidate and so on. The last candidate receives zero points. In Slovenia, the top-ranked candidate receives the number of points equaling the number of candidates. Each subsequent candidate gets one point less and the last-placed candidate gets one point. In Nauru, differently, the first choice receives one point, the second choice a half of a point, the third choice gets one third of the point, etc. For more information on mathematical aspects of Borda count see primarily the work of Saari. Saari, Donald G. Geometry of Voting. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1994. The Optimal Ranking Method is the Borda Count Donald G. Saari, Discussion Paper n. 638, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics & Management Science, January 1985. See also Nurmi, Hannu. Comparing voting systems. Dordrecht: D. Riedel, 1987. For the description of experience with Borda in Nauru and Kiribati see Benjamin Reilly. *Social Choice in the South Seas: Electoral Innovation and the Borda Count in the Pacific Island Countries. International Political Science Review* (2002), Vol 23, No. 4, 355–372. For the Slovenian experience with Borda see Toplak, Jurij. *The parliamentary election in Slovenia, October 2004. Electoral Studies* 25 (2006) 825-831. . A study of Nauru experience see in The Borda count in the real world: the electoral system in the Republic of Nauru / Benjamin Reilly. Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury, 2001..
[105] Using Borda in four-candidate elections, voter gives 3 points to his favourite candidate, 2 points to his second choice and one point to the third choice. Both countries that elect national legislators using Borda count, Slovenia and Nauru, use a slightly different formula to distribute the vote shares among the candidates. In the case of four-candidate elections, in Slovenia the points are distributed in the sequence of 4-3-2-1 rather than 3-2-1-0. This way, 40% of the vote goes to the voter's first choice, 30% goes to the second choice, 20% to the third and 10% to the fourth. In Nauru, however, the sequence is 1-0.5-0.25-0.125 giving 53.3% to the first, 26.7% to the second, 13.3% to the third and 6.7% to the fourth choice.

voting is a system enabling a voter with breaking his vote into many small parts (usually the vote can be split into 10 or 100 parts) and then allocating these vote portions of various sizes to the candidates as he or she wishes. One can also view cumulative voting as a system where a voter has certain number of votes and he or she can distribute them among the candidates as he or she wishes. Range voting, also called the score system or point system is a voting system under which voters score each candidate, the scores are added up, and the candidate with the highest score wins. It has not been used in any major election. The voter is given a range that he can use for scoring, such as, for instance, 1 to 5 or 0 to 99.[106]

Researchers offer numerous criteria by which preferential voting systems can be differentiated from one another. We have already mentioned the distinction between open-list PR and flexible-list PR. Garring and Thacker distinguish strong preferential voting from the other forms of preferential voting, Karvonen distinguishes strong and weak preferential voting in list PR, while Farrell and Scully make a distinction between open, ordered, and closed lists.[107]

Karvonen also suggests that preferential voting systems can be distinguished according to whether or not the votes for individual same-party candidates are pooled together when seats are distributed among the parties. Furthermore, the systems of the pooled-votes group, also named "preferential list systems", are classified according to whether list order also plays a role in determining seat winners.

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[106] While range voting has never been used for any major elections, cumulative voting has been used. For instance, from 1870 to 1980, Illinois used cumulative voting to elect member of the State House of Representatives.
[107] Farrell, David, and Roger Scully, The Election and Representative Role of MEPs, Draft Paper for the Working Group on Democracy in the EU for the UK Cabinet Office, 2002, p. 8, referring to Farrell, David and Roger Scully, 2002, "Electoral System Effects on Parliamentary Representation: The Case of the European Parliament", American Political Scienece Association annual convention, Boston, August – September 2002.

Marsh understands preferential voting as an expression of preference within a party list. Relying on Bogdanor's typology, he distinguishes fixed, flexible, open and free lists.[108] However, he furthers the classification of the preferential voting schemes by adding panachage[109] and stressing the relationship between the strength of preferential votes and the predetermined list order. "On this dimension there are only two types of preferential voting system. In the first, the voters alone decide which candidates shall fill seats won by a party; in the second, the decision results from a combination of party ordering and voter choice – normally with the weight on the latter factor."[110]

As said, Wright and other Australian researchers distinguish majority-preferential and quota-preferential systems.[111] Wright also makes a distinction between single-member-district and multi-member-district preferential systems.[112]

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[108] "Fixed lists [are] those within which no preference can be expressed. Flexible lists offer voters the choice supporting the list or indicating a single preferred candidate from the party-structured list, whilst open list systems permit voters to indicate their preference from an unstructured list. Free lists five the voter several choices from an unstructured list." Marsh, Michael. The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems. European Journal of Political Research 13 (1985) 365-378, 366.

[109] With panachage, "voters can support candidates from various parties, or independends, whilst giving their vote to a particular party." Marsh, Michael. The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems. European Journal of Political Research 13 (1985) 365-378, 366.

[110] Marsh, Michael. The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems. European Journal of Political Research 13 (1985) 365-378, 366. Later on, Marsh analyses this latter group by examining the proportion of voters modifying the list. Id., 368-370. Compare also Pedersen's distinction between 'effective' and 'ineffective' preference voting. Pedersen, M. Preferential voting in Denmark. Scandinavian Political Studies 1, 167-87 (1966), 175.

[111] See Wright, J.F.H. The Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems" in B.Grofman and A.Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and their Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986,, 125-126.

[112] Wright, J.F.H. The Australian Experience with Majority-Preferential and Quota-Preferential Systems" in B.Grofman and A.Lijphart (eds.) Electoral Laws and their Consequences. New York: Agathon Press, 1986,, 127-132.

V. Towards a Common Understanding of Preferential Voting

We have seen that there are as many understandings of preferential voting as there are researchers of it — perhaps even more. At a minimum, each of these definitions covers a different set of voting schemes and each of them inevitably entails a different classification of preferential voting systems. However, as one philosophy professor points out,

> "Sloppy or misleading use of [language] can seriously limit our ability to create and communicate correct reasoning. As philosopher John Locke pointed out three centuries ago, the achievement of human knowledge is often hampered by the use of words without fixed signification. ... We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning abilities, and communicate with each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to resolve them whenever we can."[113]

Common agreement on our understanding of scientific terms is therefore invaluable. In trying to resolve disagreements about the meaning of preferential voting we can choose between several different approaches.

The first and most obvious idea would be to abandon the use of the ambiguous term 'preferential voting' to denote so many different electoral systems and groups of systems. After all, they all have alternative, well-defined, even exact names, such as 'single-transferable-vote, 'alternative vote', 'ranked methods', 'open-list PR', 'flexible-list PR'. If nothing else, the difference in the degree of exactness of the term 'preferential voting' on one

hand and these terms on the other, should discourage researchers from using 'preferential voting' as a synonym for any of these methods. Hard as it may be to achieve, this might be the easiest way to achieve unification of the electoral systems terminology: simply quit using 'preferential voting' when we can use another term with a broadly accepted definition.

Besides the abandonment of the term and its replacement by various exact terms, "the most common way of preventing or eliminating differences in the use of the languages is by agreeing on the definition of our terms."[114]

One of the available linguistic approaches is to concede to various meanings of the term and to put down a descriptive lexical definition[115] that attempts to capture everything the term is used to refer to. However, it would seem to be impossible to include all the meanings of preferential voting in a single definition. Just as a river bank, a savings bank, and a bank of switches cannot share a single definition, a definition of preferential voting would be complex and would have to look something like this:

Preferential voting:

(1) Another name for alternative vote

(2) Another name for single-transferable-vote

(3) Another name for ranking methods

(4) Term denoting an expression of individual preference(s) in list PR systems

(5) A group of systems using preference schedule

[113] Garth Kemerling, "Definition and Meaning," *Philosophy Pages.*
<http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm> Accessed 14 August 2004.
[114] Garth Kemerling, "Definition and Meaning," *Philosophy Pages.*
<http://www.philosophypages.com/lg/e05.htm> Accessed 14 August 2004.
[115] The lexical definition of the term, also known as the dictionary definition, is the meaning of the term in common usage. <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lexical_definition>

(6) Term denoting open PR list systems and some ranking methods

(7) Term denoting a group of formulas allowing intraparty choice

(8) Term denoting a group of all the schemes and systems allowing intraparty or interparty choice including those such as primary elections

(9) Term denoting any voting scheme that allows expression of more than a simple categorical choice between the parties

(10) Etc.

This approach seems unacceptable. Above all, it does not solve the problem of the term's ambiguity but only points out its multiple meanings. Secondly, the formulation of descriptive lexical definitions of scientific terms is not a preferred approach: the value of scientific definitions is their perscriptiveness rather than their descriptiveness of present usage. They should mark the exact scope and limits of the definition and users should stick with a definition regarded as "correct" regardless of any drift in accepted meaning. Moreover, a technique of listing all the meanings is inappropriate for a term such as "preferential voting" since there is no clear distinction between its various meanings. This technique is appropriate for homonyms like "bank"; the term "preferential voting" however, is a polyseme — a word with multiple related meanings — rather than a homonym — one of several words with the same form, but unrelated meaning. For these reasons, it might be more appropriate to design one single broad and at the same time exact definition of preferential voting rather than eight or nine narrow ones. The next of the several possible approaches is therefore to exactly define and demarcate the term.

When designing a single definition one can choose any definition covering one or more of the meanings listed above. One can accept a wide definition of preferential voting, under which fall all the systems giving voters the chance not only to choose among the parties but also to influence the personal composition of the elected body. On the contrary, one can adopt any of the narrow understanding which may include one or more of the following: STV, SNTV, AV/IRV, methods of Borda and Concordet, all other ranking methods, Open list PR, US primary elections, and even simple plurality. Obviously there are numerous reasons to support each of these definitions and just as many reasons not to. Since I cannot find sufficiently reliable arguments supporting any particular definition, arguments that would be strong enough to prevail over the arguments backing other definitions, I will avoid arguing in favor of any of them at this point.

Besides the three described approaches, namely (1) the use of other synonimic terms, (2) the use of single exact definition of the term and abandonment of the use of the term in other known senses, and (3) the use of eight or nine different definitions, Farrell and McAllister's approach to preferential voting seems attractive. In their recent work they suggest that preferential voting is not a single electoral system or a group of systems each with exact scope; they also suggest that not all preferential systems are equally preferential.[116] Among the electoral systems there are those that are more preferential, those that are less preferential, and so-called non-preferential methods. Closed-list systems are said to be examples of the non-preferential methods.[117] I would take this view further and suggest that every voting system that includes expression of preference of any kind is a preferential voting system since

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[116] David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister, "Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference" (February 20, 2004). *Center for the Study of Democracy.* Paper 04-04. http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-04 (last visited on August 30, 2004)

[117] David M. Farrell and Ian McAllister, "Voter Satisfaction and Electoral Systems: Does Preferential Voting in Candidate-Centered Systems Make A Difference", p. 2 (February 20, 2004). *Center for the Study of Democracy.* Paper 04-04. http://repositories.cdlib.org/csd/04-04 (last visited on August 30, 2004)

voting by definition means expression of preference. The only non-preferential voting might be single-candidate no-choice election as practiced in some communist and other totalitarian regimes. All the democratic schemes are therefore preferential, but to significantly different degrees. Consequently, preferentiality is one of the characteristics according to which we can evaluate all voting systems. The first criteria for evaluation could be whether the choice is of inter-party or intra-party nature. The second criteria proposed might be the extent of choice.

When speaking about the extent of choice in relation to electoral systems' preferentiality, we should make a distinction between (1) systems giving the voter a single categorical choice, (2) systems giving the voter a choice to cast multiple votes of equal value (multiple categorical choice), and (3) systems allowing the voter to rank the candidates or parties (ordinal ballot systems). The first two of these groups only enable binary or two-level voting, which can be numerically characterized by ones and zeroes. The third one, however, enables "deep" multi-level voting.

Using these two criteria, we should primarily distinguish between (1) the systems allowing only expression of inter-party preferences, (2) the schemes allowing intraparty preferences (in addition to one inter-party choice), and (3) schemes that allow expression of multiple inter-party preferences combined with intraparty preferences. Each of these three groups of systems can be further classified according to the extent of choice they allow.

   0.   *Single Candidate No-Choice Elections*

   1.   *Schemes allowing inter-party choice with no intraparty choice*

      a. *Schemes allowing single categorical inter-party choice*

           a. *Closed-list PR*

b. *Single-member-district plurality (one candidate per party)*

   c. *Two-round majority (one candidate per party)*

b. *Schemes allowing multiple inter-party choice*

   i. *Schemes allowing multiple choices of equal value*

      a. *Approval voting (single candidate per party)*

      b. *Limited voting (single candidate per party)*

   ii. *Schemes allowing deep multilevel voting (ranking and rating)*

      1. *Vote-transfer systems*

         a. *Alternative vote / Instant-runoff-vote*

      2. *Vote-splitting systems*

         a. *Borda (single candidate per party)*

         b. *Cumulative voting (single candidate per party)*

         c. *Range voting*

2. *Schemes allowing single inter-party choice and single or multiple intra-party choice*

   a. *List PR with intraparty choice*

      i. *Flexible list*

      ii. *Open list*

   b. *Single non-transferable vote*

   c. *Primaries*

3. *Schemes allowing multiple interparty choice and single or multiple intraparty choice*

   a. *Schemes allowing casting of votes of equal value*

      i. *Plurality in multimember districts*

ii. *Two-round majority in multimember districts*

iii. *Approval voting*

iv. *Limited voting*

v. *Panachage in list-PR system*

b. *Schemes allowing deep multilevel voting (ranking and rating)*

  i. *Vote-transfer systems*

   1. *Alternative vote (multiple candidates per party)*

   2. *Single-transferable vote*

  ii. *Vote-splitting systems*

   1. *Borda*

   2. *Cumulative voting*

   3. *Range voting*

Figure 1: Scope and classification of preferential voting

According to the criteria used, systems enabling both interparty as well as intraparty choice, combined with rank-ordering or using ratings, were found to be most preferential. Ranking methods are distinguished according to whether a voter is given only one vote and this vote may be transferred to the voter's second choice ("vote transfer methods") or a voter can (or sometimes must) split his vote and distribute the vote-shares among several parties or candidates ("vote splitting methods"). Cumulative voting and range voting are grouped together with the vote-splitting ranking methods such as Borda.

According to the classification here presented, Borda Count, range voting and cumulative voting are shown to be the most preferential methods of all. Several reasons support this leading position. When these systems are used in elections that allow voters to choose among multiple candidates from a given party (which usually occurs in multi-member districts), they allow the expression of multiple choices between parties as well as between individual candidates within parties. Moreover, they should be considered as more preferential than STV and AV. STV and AV give voters a single vote only, which can then be transferred to another candidate. With the above mentioned three methods, however, a voter has a chance to split his/her vote among various options. Finally, cumulative voting and range voting should be considered as more preferential than Borda since they give the voter considerably more freedom in the expression of his or her preferences and in his or her choice among the numerous vote-share combinations that may be possible among these preferences. With Borda Count, the number assigned to the first-ranked or the second-ranked candidate is pre-determined by law. The weighting given to the candidates and the distance between the ranked candidates is pre-determined. With Borda Count, the voter cannot change the distance between first- and second- ranked candidate or between the second- and third- placed candidate. Moreover, with Borda Count the voter cannot award to candidates with equal number of points.

With range voting and cumulative voting, however, the voter has unlimited freedom to award points to the candidates (or, if one wishes to view it differently, to split his vote in parts of various sizes and to distribute these parts to the candidates) of his choice. The voter can award to or more candidates with equal number of points. He can award all the points to one candidate and none to the others. Or, if he wishes to distribute the points to various

candidates, he can freely decide what will the distance be between the top two candidates or any other two given candidates on the ballot.

VI. Conclusions

This article has attempted to address the problem of different and conflicting understandings of the term "preferential voting.". I conclude that it would be most appropriate whenever possible to use alternative well-defined names instead of the ambiguous "preferential voting": names like alternative vote, single-transferable vote, open-list PR, flexible-list PR, and ranking methods. Whenever we talk about expressions of intraparty preference(s), we should use Katz's term "intraparty preference voting" (with emphasize on "intraparty").

Following the idea expressed by Farrell and McAllister, this article concludes that some electoral systems are more preferential than others. It views preferentiality as one of the criteria against which systems could be evaluated. It then categorizes numerous electoral schemes according to their preferentiality and finds Borda Count, cumulative voting and range voting to be the most preferential.

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