

FINAL REPORT
THE BIRTHPLACE OF THE ARAB SPRING: VALUES AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE
TUNISIAN PUBLIC IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
DECEMBER 15, 2013

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“Do not put garbage in our mind,” reads graffiti printed on the wall of the Roads Administration Office of Tunis City Hall at Fasqiah Warehouse, which is in charge of road maintenance and cleaning. Insofar as it reflects Tunisians’ attitudes toward the current Islamic-oriented government, rejection of the superstitious beliefs promoted by some religious activists, and their desire to excel in science and technology in order to overcome decadence, the graffiti summarizes some of the key findings from a values survey of a nationally representative sample of 3,070 Tunisian adults that was carried out in the country in March-May 2013.

Tunisia is the birthplace of the Arab Spring. For Tunisians, the goals of the Arab Spring were primarily freedom and economic prosperity. Even though they are disillusioned by the

current political leaders and believe that the difference between the rich and poor expanded since the overthrow of the authoritarian ruler, Zein al-Abedin Ben Ali, in early 2011, Tunisians consider themselves to be more empowered and freer than they were before the revolution. They support secular politics, and less than 20% favor an Islamic government. For them, secular parties have grown a bit more popular, while the appeal of religious-oriented parties, including an-Nahda, has waned considerably. However, political parties in general are the least trustworthy and the military the most trustworthy institutions in their perspective. For Tunisians, security is the principal concern, economic backwardness the most important cause of decadence, development of science and technology the key to economic prosperity, and excelling in science and technology their primary obligation. While a majority support the freedom of expression, this freedom is tolerable for only one-third of the respondents if it is used to criticize their religion. They also overwhelmingly concur regarding the significance of tourism for their national economy.

Cross-nationally, Tunisians, along with Lebanese and Turkish respondents (and by Turkish we mean the citizens of Turkey, which includes ethnic Turks, Kurds, and other ethnic groups) are much less conservative (or are more liberal) than the Egyptian, Iraqi, Pakistani, and Saudi publics. On the aggregate level, Tunisians exhibit the least amount of religious intolerance among these seven countries. They display more favorable orientations toward Americans than the public from these other Middle Eastern countries. They also attend mosques less often than the other publics. In terms of identity, they consider themselves predominantly Muslim above all rather than Tunisian above all. After Pakistan, recognition of religious identity is higher in Tunisia than it is in the other five countries.

Based on the survey findings, it appears that (1) the cognitive context for the development of liberal democracy in Tunisia is much stronger than it is in any of the other six countries, and (2) there is an increasing support for secular movements, presuming that such movements do not display anti-religious orientations. These findings may in fact indicate the presence of an expanding social basis and a cultural space that would permit the growth of secular politics, religious moderation, and religious tolerance in the country.

Below we provide a very brief overview of findings, both from Tunisia specifically as well as from Tunisia situated in a comparative context. Further elaboration and discussion of these analyses is available in the later relevant portions of this report. A discussion of the data collection methodology for all countries for which we present survey findings is also included later in this report.

Tunisia-Specific Findings

- **Participation in the revolution:** 48% of Tunisians said that they participated in the revolutionary movement against President Zein al-Abedin Ben Ali, and both participants and nonparticipants overwhelmingly considered freedom, democracy, and economic prosperity as the goals of the Arab Spring.
- **Attacks on the US:** More than 90% of Tunisians disapproved the attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the American School in Tunis in September, 2012.
- **Low popularity of the rulers:** The current ruling politicians are not popular among the respondents, as more than 60% expressed that these politicians make them upset, angry, or feel contempt toward them.
- **Perception of Corruption:** Fully 86% of respondents believed that corruption in government is common, and only 28% said that current government officials care about what

people think and just 29% believe that government policies serve the interests of the Tunisian people.

- **Positive changes:** A majority of respondents believe that life in Tunisia is better now than before the revolution: specifically, that unlawful arrest and corruption are less common, and freedom to join organizations is more common.
- **Negative changes:** A much higher percentage of the respondents expressed that the difference between rich and poor is currently more than it was before the revolution.
- **The most and least trustworthy:** Respondents expressed a lot of trust in the military (78%) and mosques (76%), and less trust in courts (24%), the prime minister (16%), the press (11%), salafists (11%), the president (9%), the Assembly of National Constitution (6%), and political parties (3%).
- **Changes in the popularity of the political parties:** The popularity of Al-Jebha Chaabia and Nida Tounes (both secular parties) has increased, while the popularity of other parties declined.
- **National Priority:** The vast majority of Tunisians (77%) selected either security or a high level of economic growth as the national priority when presented with a list of potential national priorities for consideration.
- **Most important obligation for Tunisians:** Among the obligations of the Tunisian public, 60% of the respondents chose excel in science and technology, 20% defend freedom of speech, 18% apply the shari'a, and 20% travel abroad to fight the enemies of Islam (2%).
- **Most important causes of decadence:** For 37%, it is economic backwardness, 20% abandoning religious values, 19% political despotism, 14% religious extremism, and 6% lack of support for science and technology.

- **Most important factors in overcoming decadence:** 37% mentioned the development of science and technology, 35% a democratic political system, 16% the establishment of an Islamic political system, and 12% gender equality.
- **The significance of tourism:** Over 90% of the respondents believe that tourism is important for the economic development of Tunisia, while a small minority believe that it makes people less religious.
- **Limits to tolerance:** 87% said that freedom of expression must be protected even if it is contrary to one's personal beliefs or the Tunisian government's policies, but only 33% endorsed protection if it is contrary to their religion.

Tunisia Compared to Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey

- **Gender equality:** Tunisians along with Lebanese and Turkish citizens are more favorable toward gender equality than citizens from the other four countries.
- **Social individualism:** Measured in terms of the basis of marriage, Tunisians are least supportive of individual choice in marriage, after Pakistan. Only 26% considered love as the basis for marriage rather than parental approval, compared to about 30% of Egyptians and Iraqis, and more than 47% of Saudis, Turkish, and Lebanese respondents. But in terms of recognizing a woman's right to dress as she wishes, Tunisians are most supportive of individual choice (56%) compared to Turkish (52%), Lebanese (49%), Saudi (47%), Iraqi (27%), Pakistani (22%), and Egyptian (14%) respondents.
- **Secular politics:** A clear majority of Tunisians as well as Iraqis, Lebanese, and Turkish respondents favor secular politics, as between almost 70% and 80% strongly agree or agree that their country would be a better place if religion and politics were separated. And 90% or more of these respondents also expressed favorable attitudes toward the democratic political

system as a way of governing their country. No definition of democracy was presented to the respondents. It is possible that the operational definition of democracy varies among the respondents.

- **Islamic government:** Only 38% of Tunisian respondents thought that Islamic government was very good or fairly good way of governing their country. This figure was lower than that of the Egyptians and Iraqis but higher than Lebanese, Pakistanis, and Turkish.
- **Military rule and strongman rule:** After Egyptians, among whom 71% favored military rule, a sizable minority among Tunisians, 35%, favored such a system. The corresponding figures for Iraqis, Lebanese, Pakistanis, and Turkish were much lower, between 10% and 25%. And only about 20% of Tunisians supported a strongman rule; that is, having a strong head of government who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.
- **Shari'a law versus laws according to people's wishes:** A minority among Lebanese, Tunisian, and Turkish respondents supported the shari'a law—between 10% and 27%, compared to 56% of Egyptians, 48% of Iraqis, 74% of Pakistanis, and 68% of Saudis. However, when they were asked to choose between two visions of a good government—one that makes laws according to the people's wishes versus the one that implements only the shari'a—between 73% and 93% of respondents from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey favored laws according to the people's wishes. For Pakistanis and Saudis, by contrast, these figures were much lower at 41% and 43%, respectively.
- **National identity:** Although Tunisian respondents favored secular politics, a minority among them see the nation as the basis of their identity. That is, 31% considered themselves as Tunisian above all, while 59% as Muslim, above all. After Pakistan, religious self-identification among Tunisians is higher than in the other five countries. The corresponding

figures on national versus religious identity are 52% versus 47% among Egyptians, 57% versus 36% among Iraqis, 60% versus 29% among Lebanese, 28% versus 70% among Pakistanis, 48% versus 46% among Saudis, and 44% versus 39% among Turkish citizens.

- **National pride:** The percentage of Tunisians who said that they are very proud to be Tunisian is higher than it is among Iraqis, Lebanese, and Saudis; 76% versus 64%, 35%, and 66%, respectively. It is, however, lower than it is among Egyptians and Pakistanis and about the same as Turkish. The figures for these countries are 90%, 83%, and 77%, respectively.
- **Religious intolerance:** Measured in terms of interfaith intolerance and anti-authoritarian religious intolerance, Tunisians are the least intolerant of all the seven nations. Religious tolerance is thought as one of the key ingredients for the formation of a stable liberal democracy. On this measure, Tunisians are thus more favorably predisposed toward liberal politics than the publics from the other six countries.
- **Attitudes toward Americans:** A majority of Tunisians expressed that they like to have Americans as neighbors. That is 54%, compared to 10% of Egyptians, 14% of Iraqis, 50% of Lebanese, 17% of Pakistanis, and 52% of respondents from Turkey. Tunisian and Lebanese respondents also give a higher rating to the morality of the American public than the respondents from the other five countries.
- **Violence against the US troops and civilians:** A majority of Tunisians approved of attacks on the US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. That is, 58% of the respondents compared to 49% of Egyptian, 38% of Iraqi, 57% of Lebanese, 56% of Pakistani, 41% of Saudi, and 10% of Turkish respondents. The significantly higher percentage of support for violence against American troops by other Arab respondents than Iraqis may indicate their sympathy with the Sunni insurgence, while Iraqis themselves, particularly Kurds, are less supportive of such

attacks. However, regarding attacks on US civilians working for US companies in Islamic countries, a much lower percentage of Tunisian, Pakistani, and Turkish respondents supported such attacks – 6%, 1%, and 3% respectively – compared to 12% of Egyptians, 13% of Iraqis, 16% of Lebanese, and 22% of Saudis.

INTRODUCTION: THE ARAB SPRING AND PEOPLE'S VALUES

The nature of the Arab Spring and whether the label is still an appropriate description of the events that unfolded in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen following the ousting of their dictators have been the subjects of considerable debate and speculation among observers and political commentators. The phrase “Arab Spring,” might have been an appropriate description of the initial phase of the anti-authoritarian revolutionary movements in the region that were triggered by the self-immolation of the Tunisian street vendor on December 17, 2010. However, what transpired after the rulers were deposed in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, as well as the precipitous transformation of peaceful protests into internecine conflict in Syria, was far from the conditions of peace and political stability with a prospect of flourishing democracy and economic prosperity—the perceived goals of the Arab Spring. The overthrow of the democratically elected yet ineffectual and authoritarian Egyptian president, Mohamed Morsi of the Society of the Muslim Brothers, and the ensuing violence between the followers of the ousted leader and those supporting the military-secular alliance, which left thousands dead or injured; the inauguration of a weak government in Libya and Tunisia and the subsequent rise of armed radical Islamic groups, the murder of American diplomats in Libya and the assassinations of several Tunisian secular politicians and members of the security forces; the outbreak of a revolutionary war and internecine conflict in Syria in which well-over one hundred thousand individuals have thus far lost their lives and millions have fled to neighboring countries as refugees, resulting in a humanitarian crisis in Syria and in the refugee camps—all signify the ushering in of an era of uncertainty and conflicts that cannot be described as something analogous to the rebirth of nature in the spring.

The Arab Spring was a euphoric phrase. It conveys and reflects optimism¹; a rosy appraisal of the anti-authoritarian revolutionary movements. These movements appeared promising because they appeared to the rest of the world as a unified and homogeneous collective struggle of the subjugated Arab peoples against their non-responsive repressive governments. The label appeared to have transcended that which was applied to Tunisia, the Jasmine Revolution, after its national flower. It is easy to imagine the elation felt in witnessing on the TV screen the synchronized actions of the multitude in such celebrated places as in Cairo's Tahrir Square—an instance of transcendental human action and social harmony, where men and women, young and old, and people of different persuasions and vocations merged in the desire and hope for a better life. The centripetal force of that unity—the factor that brought people together—however, does not appear to have originated from a shared understanding of the universal principle of democratic politics in order to transcend group differences. After the dictator was overthrown, serious political differences surfaced leading to violent contentions for power with a varying degree of intensity in different countries. The post-Arab Spring may thus best be summarized as a period of struggle, trial-and-error, and reflection.

It is hard to summarize the distinctive features of the post-revolutionary events, let alone predict its future course, particularly before the dust settles and a clearer configuration of political and social forces appears in the theatre of political action. Presently, data on the internal dynamics of politics, elite rivalries and conflict, intergroup dynamics, and the role of regional and international actors are not readily available. Nonetheless it would be a serious mistake to treat the publics from these countries as passive bystanders in the creation of a new, or even the

¹Perhaps it was Dominique Moisi who first used the labeled “Arab Spring” in January 2011. See Dominique Moisi, “An Arab Spring,” *Project Syndicate*, January 26, 2011. <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/an-arab-spring->, retrieved on October 14, 2013.

reproduction of the old, political order. Their value orientations toward significant sociopolitical issues could not be more deserving of the attention of both social scientists and policy makers. This is true because understanding the nature of such issues and how they are resolved matters a lot in the formation of post-revolutionary politics, and this understanding may help us illuminate those modalities of politics that have a better chance of success and in which country, including liberal democracy, military rule, Islamic government, and strongman dictatorship. What were the goals of the Arab Spring from differing perspectives? What percentage of the people participated in the revolutionary movement? How do different publics define their identity, and are these definitions in terms of the territorial-nation, ethnicity, or religion? How popular are such liberal values as social individualism, gender equality, democracy, and secular politics? How widespread is support for religious fundamentalism and political Islam among them? What types of framing do they use to make sense of the events transpiring in their society and in the region? To what extent are they willing to participate in various types of political movements, including violence? What is their perception of corruption in politics, the trustworthiness of the public officials and major social institutions? On whom do they rely in deciding to take part in political action?

Although the primary focus of this report is Tunisia, it also discusses Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, where comparative values survey data are available. Our discussion in this report is divided into two parts. Part I begins with a description of a snapshot picture of Tunisian value orientations and attitudes toward significant sociopolitical issues and political engagement, using the data from a full-scale national values survey carried out in the country in March-May 2013. It discusses: (1) the extent of Tunisian participation in the revolutionary movement against President Zein al-Abedin Ben Ali and perceptions of the Arab

Spring; (2) Tunisians' attitudes toward their current government, the perception of corruption, the trustworthiness of the public officials and their government's responsiveness; (3) variations in trust in major social institutions; (4) the national priority and main obligations of Tunisians, as well as their perceptions of the causes of societal decadence and its remedies; (5) Tunisians' assessment of the efficacy and the type of political actions they are likely to engage in; and (6) to what extent they rely on others in order to engage in politics. Part II discusses Tunisia in a comparative context. It assesses the public's standing on such important sociopolitical and cultural issues as those related to social individualism, gender equality, secular politics, form of government, attitudes toward outsiders and the West in particular, religiosity and religious tolerance, and political violence.

DATA AND METHODS

A comprehensive nationally representative values survey was conducted in Tunisia between March and May of 2013. The survey instrument consisted of more than 250 items about major aspects of human life and replicated key batteries from the values surveys carried out by several members of this research team in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey in 2011-2013. It also included some of the items used in the World Values Surveys. It thus allows systematic comparison of Tunisia with these countries and the rest of the world on some of the issues related to religion, politics, and gender.

Tunisian survey data come from a nationally representative sample of 3,070 Tunisian adults who were selected using a multi-stage probability sampling design based on data from the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) of Tunisia. NIS figures are based on 2004 census data from Tunisia, which was updated in 2009 via a large household survey. Further census data updates since 2009 are based on recent GIS information. Tunisia is divided into 24 Governorates; each

governorate is divided into Delegations and each Delegation is further divided into Districts. The NIS has booklets for each district that identify all households within each district unit. These booklets were used to sample households, from which one respondent in each sampled household was then selected for participation in this study. For a more detailed discussion of the sampling procedure see the appendix.

The questionnaire took approximately one hour to complete. It used face-to-face interviews that were conducted at a location of the respondent's choosing (which was generally the respondent's own residence) by a Tunisian survey research firm. The overall survey response rate was 78%. Among the 3,070 respondents 55% were female, 17% had university education with a degree, 38% were currently employed, and 66% were married. In terms of class background, 0.4% self-reported as members of the upper class, 26% upper middle class, 36% lower middle class, 25% working class, and 12% lower class.

The tables below show: first, the demographic characteristics of the samples from the surveys in all seven countries; and second, each country's sample size, data collection fieldwork dates, response rate, and whether any oversampling was employed. We discuss findings from these surveys in the comparative section of this report. Samples in all countries were nationally representative of the adult population. Because of the sampling methodology used in Saudi Arabia, all analyses reported for Saudi Arabia have been conducted using the population-based weight included in the dataset. For more information on these survey projects and associated methodology, see www.mevs.org.

Demographic Characteristics of Sampled Survey Respondents
(percentages reported with the exception of average age, which is the mean)

	Egypt	Iraq	Lebanon	Pakistan	Saudi Arabia	Tunisia	Turkey
Average age	39	36	35	35	34	44	41
Male	49	53	59	51	50	45	44
University education	15	13	28	4	17	17	13
Currently married	71	70	50	76	64	66	
Religion:							
Sunni		40	23	82	75*	99	86
Shia		31	33	7	25*		2
Allawi							4
Muslim (no sect spec.)	86	29	3	8			7
Druze			6				
Christian	14	0.4	27	1			
Employment status:							
Currently employed	46	43	60	48	37	38	34
Currently unemployed	4	7	2	2	1	12	3
Housewife	39	30	15	40	35	26	38
Student	5	13	15	9	24	9	8
Retired/Permanently	7	7	3	2	3	14	13
Self-reported social class:							
Upper class	1	2	2	2	5	0.4	1
Upper middle class	18	19	20	14	37	26	11
Lower middle class	33	34	37	46	30	36	43
Working class	23	30	33	30	20	25	33
Lower class	26	10	4	6	4	12	11

*Muslim sect was not reported in Saudi Arabia but 25% of respondents were from a predominantly Shi'a city, and 75% were from predominantly Sunni cities

Data Collection Characteristics


	Sample size	Oversample	Survey data	Response rate
Egypt	3,496	Coptic Christians	June - Aug 2011	93%
Iraq	3,000	None	Jan - Feb 2011	88%
Lebanon	3,034	Druze	March - July 2011	61%
Pakistan	3,523	None	May - Sept 2011	83%
Saudi Arabia	2,005	Shi'a Muslims	Jan - Feb 2011	73%
Tunisia	3,066	None	March - May 2013	78%
Turkey	3,019	None	April - June 2013	62%

PART I

VALUES, PERCEPTIONS, AND POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT OF THE TUNISIAN PUBLIC

Considering the most fundamental religious beliefs, Tunisian respondents are quite religious: 99% of survey respondents considered themselves as Sunni Muslims, 99.8% believed in God, and 95% indicated that God was very important in their lives, the highest mark on the scale of 1 to 10, where 1 indicates “God not at all important” and 10 indicates “God is very important.” The belief in basic principles of religion does not mean Tunisians favor Islamic government or are against the ideas of secular politics and gender equality. Nor do they subscribe to the notion of the Islamic umma. Tunisian respondents in fact highly value their country; 73% of the respondents agree or strongly agree that Tunisia is the best country in the world to live in.

Furthermore, as will be further elaborated in the latter part of this report, Tunisian respondents disapprove of violence against other people. They overwhelmingly condemned the attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the American school in Tunis in September 2012, with fully 93% expressing that they “strongly disapprove” or “disapprove” of these attacks. As will be discussed in Part II, “Tunisia in a comparative perspective,” the Tunisian public has much more favorable attitudes toward Americans than the publics from many other Middle Eastern countries.



Finally, They overwhelmingly agree on the significance of tourism for their national economy. In response to the question “which of two statements about tourism in Tunisia comes closer to how you feel,” 93% of the respondents said that tourism is important for economic development of Tunisia, while only 7% believed that tourism makes people less religious. However, Tunisians were not in agreement on other matters, and expressed varied opinions on a wide variety of societal norms and sociopolitical issues. And, on the national aggregate level, Tunisia displays interesting similarities and differences with other Middle Eastern countries.


Participation in the Revolution and Perceptions of the Arab Spring

The survey data from Tunisia and Egypt provide a unique opportunity to go beyond anecdotal evidence in order to obtain reasonable estimates of the extent of mass participations in the revolutionary movement in these two countries, understand the public perceptions of its goals, and assess the extent to which these perceptions are similar or different between those who participated and those who did not in the revolutionary movement. This assessment will contribute to the debate on (1) whether a revolution is an outcome of the action of a minority within a population or whether this question matters much if there is no significant difference regarding the perceptions of its goals between participants and nonparticipants, and (2) whether a revolution means different things to different sections of the population or it is built on consensus.

The predominant view in Marxist, class-based, or collective action theories of revolution, as well as the theories that characterize revolutions as popular movements is that social revolutions are the outcomes of the action of the masses against a minority section of the society who constitutes the exploiting class or the ruling elite. The mass society and structural-functional theories of revolution, on the other hand, claim revolutions are outcomes of the actions of the

totalitarian leaders and their mob supporters who managed successfully to mobilize the disoriented and anomic individuals in overthrowing the existing political order. The extent of social support for a revolutionary movement has implications for not only theories of historical change, but for the legitimacy and the moral import of the revolution as well. The debate on whether the American Revolution, for example, was carried out by a minority of Americans—that is, by a third of its population, as drawn on a (mis)reading of a statement by President John Adams—revolves if not entirely on this question, it certainly does in part (Marina 1976).

The data we analyze are respondents' self-reported participation in the revolution in the two countries. Tunisian survey respondents were asked to rate their participation in the revolutionary movement against President Zein al-Abedin Ben Ali between 1 and 10, with "1" indicating no participation and "10" utmost participation. This question also appeared in the 2011 survey in Egypt, where the respondents were asked to similarly rate their political engagement against President Hosni Mubarak. The data show that more than 50% of the respondents from both countries reported no participation, while only about 4% in both countries rated their participation 9 or 10. If those who rated their participation 8 or more are defined as high-level participants (truly revolution makers), then only 9% of Egyptians and 6% of Tunisians may be construed as, self-reportedly, fully engaged in the revolutionary movement. These findings thus suggest that revolutionary movements are the results of the actions of a minority within a society.




These findings, however, do not suggest that the political changes in places like Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen were imposed on the rest of the population by a dedicated revolutionary minority or that the publics at large had a different perception of the goals of what was transpiring in their countries. In fact, the data show that the perceptions of the goals of the Arab Spring between the participants and non-participants are almost identical.

Concerning the public perception of the goals of the Arab Spring, data are available only for Egypt, Lebanon, and Tunisia. Accordingly, the great majority of the respondents considered “freedom and democracy” or “economic equality and prosperity” as its goals—59% and 24% of Egyptians, 52% and 15% of Lebanese, and 56% and 20% of Tunisians, respectively. In other words, in Egypt and Tunisia, the two countries that experienced a revolutionary change, there has been a degree of consensus on the goals of the revolution among the respondents, as 83% of Egyptians and 76% of Tunisians mentioned freedom and economic prosperity. The minority of the respondents who had different perceptions were divided into smaller categories with less than 10% of the sample falling in each category. Therefore, the post-revolutionary conflicts in both countries cannot be attributed to the fact that the revolutionary had different meanings to

different sections of the population. We may, however, speculate that such conflicts were either shaped by varying organizational interests of the contenders for power or simply reflected a misreading of what constituted the demands of the public. If, for example, a large percentage of the public voted for an-Nahda in Tunisia or the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, they did not vote for the establishment of the Islamic government. Rather, it may be argued, it was because these organizations were among the better known components of the revolutionary movements and were thought by the public to be in a more effective position to implement policies that would create a responsive democratic government and foster economic development.


It is also safe to conclude that the Arab Spring in its initial phase was non-ideological. For sure, it rested on such ideas as the desirability of the revolutionary overthrow of a strongman rule, the demand for a better life, and favorable attitudes toward democracy. Nonetheless, it was non-ideological in the sense that such well-articulated ideologies of the past as territorial nationalism, pan-Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, or Islamic fundamentalism did not appear to have played a dominant role in the revolutionary mobilization against the incumbent authoritarian leader.



There is also a remarkable congruity in perceptions of the goals of the revolution between the participants and nonparticipants in both countries. The variable on participation rate is recoded into non-participants (1), low to moderate participants (2-5), moderate to high participants (7-10). The cross-tabulation of this recoded variable and the variable on the goals of the Arab Spring indicates that the perceptions of such goals are almost identical among people with different levels of participation. As shown, the difference is that a clear majority in all levels of participation agreed on freedom and economic prosperity as the goals of the Arab Spring. However, if we set the level of statistical significance at a 5% difference between categories, then among Egyptians, a significantly higher percentage of high participants considered freedom and democracy as the goal of the revolutionary movements, than low participants and non-participants (67%, 61%, 56%, respectively), and a significantly smaller percentage of high


participants mentioned economic equality and prosperity than low participants or non-participants (19%, 25%, 27%, respectively). This means that the high participants were more idealistic than the rest among Egyptian respondents—driven more strongly by the idea of democracy than by economic issues. Among Tunisian respondents, on the other hand, there is no significant difference between non-, low, and high participants regarding either freedom and democracy or economic equality and prosperity as the goals of the Arab Spring. There is, however, a significant difference between high participants, on the one hand, and low and non-participants, on the other, among those who referred to the Arab Spring as a Western conspiracy—14% versus 9%, respectively. We may attribute this difference to some Tunisian activists being disillusioned as a result of the failure of their current government to realize the goals of the revolution two years after the overthrow of the former regime. We may thus speculate that Tunisian activists, like their Egyptian counterparts, have also been more idealistic than the rest, with the difference that when the lofty ideals fail to materialize, conspiracy theories become an ideal model to explain this failure. Even among Egyptians today, Brotherhood-American conspiracy has become a comfortable justification for the recent and questionable overthrow of authoritarian and effectual President Mohamed Morsi by the military.² As is often the case, the public, political activists, and even intellectual leaders tend to blame foreigners, the Western governments in particular, for their own failure.

²See Rod Nordland, “As Egyptians Ignore Curfew, Talk of a U.S.-Brotherhood Conspiracy,” *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/world/middleeast/as-egyptians-ignore-curfew-talk-of-a-us-brotherhood-conspiracy.html>, (August 25, 2013). Retrieved on October 15, 2013.




Perceptions of the Current Regime and What Changed for Better or Worse


A clear majority of Tunisians are disillusioned with their current government, as is indicated by the way they described their feeling toward political leaders. While 26% said that they “feel respect toward them” and 8% “feel secure in their presence,” the rest expressed negative feelings toward these leaders, with 20% reporting that they made them “upset,” 33% “angry,” and 14% “feel contempt.” These negative feelings by themselves may not necessarily indicate that these leaders will be soon kicked out of office. It may be the case that although some respondents are upset or angry at these leaders, they still would vote for them in the absence of a better alternative.



Nonetheless, these feelings, when considered in conjunction with a host of other political factors, including (1) the perceptions of the responsiveness of the government and corruption in high places, (2) the assessments of the trustworthiness of politicians and social institutions, and (3) the disparity between the voting behavior in the 2011 election and current voting preferences may lead one to conclude that the majority of Tunisians are alienated from the existing government and that a favorable political space exists that would permit the rise of an alternative secular politics. Accordingly, only 28% said that the current government officials care “a great deal” or care “some” about what they think. Furthermore, fully 86% strongly agreed or agreed that corruption is common among government officials, and only 29% believe that government policies serve the interests of the Tunisian people. While only 36% perceived that they are personally able to affect “a great deal” or “to some extent” what the current government does, in the absence of comparative figures it is hard to interpret whether this percentage indicate a low level of political efficacy among Tunisians. Nonetheless, we may speculate that the people who constituted this 36%, if activated, could become a potentially formidable force in the country’s political scene. After all, that 15% of these respondents who mentioned “a great deal” were far larger than the percentage of those who were defined as high participants in the revolutionary movement.



The above figures do not mean that Tunisians are necessarily disaffected and disillusioned by the revolution. In fact, compared to the regime of Ben Ali, in their view, political life is better. There is less perceived corruption; only 36% said that corruption in politics is “much more” or “somewhat more” than before, compared to 42% who indicated that it is “somewhat less” or “much less,” and 22% who said that it is “much the same.” They believed that there is more freedom under the present government than under President Ben Ali: fully 91% indicated that they are “much freer” or “somewhat freer” to join any organization; and 65% said there are “much fewer” or “somewhat fewer” unlawful arrests by the current government than under President Ben Ali.



While corruption is lower and people are freer after the revolution than before, a much higher percentage of the respondents believed that the difference between the rich and the poor is “much more” or “somewhat more” now than it was before; 56%, compared to 13% who said that it is “much less” or “somewhat less” than before and to 31% who said it is about “the same” as before. These attitudes may reflect the deteriorating economic conditions of the country as a result of the decline in security, which has significantly reduced the number of tourists visiting Tunisia after the revolution³. Perhaps this is a principal reason as to why the establishment of security is the top priority for the Tunisian respondents, as will be shown in the last section of Part I.

Trust in Political Leaders, Institutions, and Religions

The trustworthiness of politicians and the amount of trust people have in other social institutions and in the followers of faiths other than their own are other indications of the

³See Tarek Amara, “Political instability erodes gains by Tunisia economy,” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/20/tunisia-economy-politics-idUSL6N0BH0XQ20130220>, February 20, 2013, retrieved October 15, 2013.

popularity of the government, stability of social order, and support for liberal democracy.

People's orientation toward one another and the government is a function of the fairness of social relationships and the level of generalized interpersonal trust in society. Trust among people is a *sine qua non* to stable social relationships and exchange, the core of social capital, and one of the key resources for the development of a democratic society. General trust is said to reduce transaction costs, contribute to economic growth, help to solve collective-action problems, promote inclusive and open society, foster societal happiness and a general feeling of well-being, facilitate civic engagement, and create better government. When people have high trust in their government and consider public officials trustworthy and civil, they tend to support the government's policies and are less likely to engage in collective political protest. They may participate in political upheaval when this trust is shattered and the belief in the prevalence of corruption in high places is widely shared (Gamson 1968; Putnam 1993, 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; Levi and Stoker 2000; Newton 2001; Uslander 2002; Whitely 2000; Herreros 2004; Herreros and Criado 2008; Freitag and Bulhmann 2009, You 2012).

While people trusting one another is certainly important for social harmony, differential distribution of trust, where some individuals, groups, or institutions enjoy a higher level of trust than other individuals, groups, or institutions, may provide clues about who has a better chance of political success. Furthermore, it is also important to know who and what constitute the objects of trust. Are those being considered trustworthy members of one's own religion, members of others' religions, religious institutions, political parties, the courts, or the military? We may argue that where there is a higher level of inter-group trust, a lower level of in-group solidarity, and higher tolerance of outsiders, there is a higher likelihood for the development of a


stable liberal democracy. Conversely, a military government has a better chance of success if people display a great deal of trust in the military.

Although a more thorough understanding of the role of trust in Tunisian politics requires an in depth analysis of the data, a simple comparison of the variation in the level of trust in political leaders and parties, the assembly of national constitution, the court, the military, religious institutions, and the press is instructive for assessing stability of the existing government and which groups or institutions are better situated to play a significant role in politics.

Consistent with their misgivings toward politicians, Tunisians have expressed relatively low trust in the political parties and the ruling politicians. Only 24% expressed “a great deal” of or “some” trust in the political parties, 25% in the assembly of National Constitution, 31% in the president, and 39% in the prime minister. With these figures being so low, these individuals and groups do not enjoy much popular support among the public, which has varied political implications. Clearly, those politicians who are mistrusted by a significant section of the population may lose in the next round of elections. However, the fact that only less than one-third of the respondents have “a great deal” of or “some” trust in the assembly of National Constitution may not only undermine the legitimacy of the constitution but the entire political system which would rest on that constitution as well.


Tunisians, however, have expressed a higher level of trust (“a great deal” or “some”) in other major social institutions: 55% in courts, 92% in the military, 90% in religious institutions, and 43% in the press. From the Tunisian perspective, the military is the most trustworthy institution in the country. As will be shown in the comparative section of this report, Tunisia displays nearly the highest support for a military government compared to other Middle Eastern

countries, second only to Egypt. It appears that, in some respects, there is a parallel political development in Egypt and Tunisia. In both countries, the post-revolutionary government was controlled by increasingly unpopular and ineffective religious-cum-political elites. In Egypt, the Muslim Brothers were overthrown by a military-secular alliance. Whether Tunisia will have a similar experience is hard to predict. Nonetheless, in a comparative context, such a scenario, if it happens, has a better chance to gain the acquiescence of the public in Tunisia than in any of the other five countries for which we have data. Unlike Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Syria, there is little historical precedent for the Tunisian military to partake in politics (Ware 1985, Barany 2011). At any rate, having high trust in the military and religious institutions does not necessarily indicate that Tunisians would support a military rule or religious government. As discussed in the comparative section of this report, only a sizable minority favor these forms of government. And, high trust in religious institutions does not mean that Tunisians have expressed high trust in the ultraconservative salafists. Only 34% of the respondents said that they have “a great deal” of trust or “some” trust in the salafists.



Voting and Political Parties

Another way of assessing the extent of Tunisians' dissatisfaction with the ruling regime is to compare the respondents' current voting preferences with the results of the 2011 elections. Findings from the survey have shown that there was an increase in the popularity of such secular parties as Al-Jebha Chaabia (national front) and Nida Tounes (the voice of Tunis). They were selected by 2% and 9%, respectively, as parties for which respondents would vote if "elections were held tomorrow." These figures are much higher than the percentage of the vote they actually received in the 2011 elections. This increase, based on only two points in time, may be a coincident. It may also show that the momentum is in favor of the secular parties, particularly considering that all other political parties have seen a significant decline in the percentage of the respondents who said that they would vote for them in the future, compared to those who did vote for them in 2011. For example, the al-Nadha party, the ruling party, received 34% of the vote in 2011, but only 13% of the respondents indicated that they would vote for its candidates in the future. If we judge the difference between the 41% respondents who did not vote in the 2011 elections and the 30% respondents who said they would not vote if "the elections were held tomorrow" as an indicator of voters' enthusiasm, coupled with the fact that 40% were undecided, then there is a serious possibility for change in the current regime and in the political and cultural orientations of the future government.




Self-Reported Political Efficacy and Likelihood of Engagement

Individual political efficacy—whether perceived or real—is considered important in prompting people to engage in politics in order to realize their objectives; namely, to enhance power, economic benefits, and cultural capital. Inefficacious individuals, according to Schwartz (1973: 12-13), do not believe themselves to be entitled to more power and are happy with the way things are. It is the feeling of being empowered enough—politically efficacious—to demand a more responsive government that prompts individuals to participate in protest. It has been argued that efficacious individuals are self-empowered, cognitively liberated, and capable of displaying considerable enthusiasm and energy (Gamson 1968, Citrin 1974, Nepstad 1997, Piven and Cloward 1977, Miller et al. 1980, Craig and Maggiotto 1981, McAdam 1982, Sigelman and Feldman 1983, Pierce and Converse 1989).

Tunisians have expressed varied degrees of capability in carrying out different political objectives. Except for 63% of the respondents who stated they were “a great deal” or “to some extent” capable of stating “their political opinion openly,” only a minority said the same about


“ensuring political representatives to honor their commitments” (25%), “playing a role in choosing the leaders of the political movements they support” (35%), “campaigning for political movements or parties” (13%), “promoting the chance of the election of candidates” (17%), and “collecting money to support their party activities” (7%).



In the absence of comparative longitudinal data, it may be hard to interpret with high confidence the extent to which these perceived capabilities correspond to the real efficacy of the public in shaping the course of future events. Nor is it possible to correctly assess how these self-reported capable minorities can bring about changes in politics. Nonetheless, if we consider the fact that less than fifty percent of the respondents reported to have participated in varying degree in the revolutionary movement and that only six percent of them rated their participation “8” or more as a crude standard of mobilization for effective political change (that is, the percentage of the people who would be necessary to make such a change), then these percentages of the respondents, although about one-third or less, if activated, would be large enough to make some real changes in the political conditions.

Likewise, less than one-third of respondents expressed a significant likelihood of engaging in certain types of political activity. Only 33% said that that they were “extremely

likely” or “somewhat likely” to “sign a petition,” 32% to “attend a non-violent protest, march, or sit-in,” 17% to “attend a demonstration to support a political figure or party,” 8% to “participate in a political activity in which there was the possibility of being arrested,” 8% to “participate in political activity with you fear for your personal safety,” and 6% to “participate in a violent political activity that might lead to property damage or injury to others.” These percentages, translated into absolute numbers, however, are quite high. For example, consider the six percent of the respondents who expressed that it was likely that they would participate in violent activities. Given that about 8.2 million of the country’s estimated population in 2012 are age 15 or older, six percent of this population is 495,402 individuals (Tunisia Demographics Profile 2013). For a country of about 11 million, this is a fairly large number of people who reported that they are likely to get involved in political violence.



Taking all these facts together—that is, the critical attitudes and negative feelings Tunisians have expressed toward politicians, their perception of high corruption within the government and low trustworthiness of public officials, the discrepancy between their voting behavior in the 2011 elections and whom they said they would vote for at the time of the survey,

relatively high levels of personal efficacy, increased freedom they enjoy now compared to the pre-revolutionary period, and the perception that the rich got richer and the poor got poorer—all are sociologically important factors that positively contribute to the outbreak of major protest movements. Based on these facts, we may thus speculate that Tunisian society is on the verge of major political upheavals directed against the incumbent rulers. What form these movements may take is hard to predict. On one end, there is a strong possibility that Tunisia will experience a relatively peaceful transition toward semi-liberal politics. This is true given that, as it will be explained in the comparative section, Tunisians are significantly more tolerant than people from the other six countries for which we have comparable data, and tolerance is one of the essentials for liberal democracy. On the other hand, if the assassination of secular politicians continues, such violence may not intimidate but radicalize the secular groups.

National Priorities, Development, and Decadence

The causes of economic underdevelopment and the conditions for progress toward a democratic order and prosperous society have been among the most fundamental issues that preoccupied Middle-Eastern intellectual leaders in the modern period. The manner in which they resolved these issues was influenced by a complex set of historical factors, including (1) the broader conflict between sacred and secular spirituality that structures whether their orientations were primarily directed toward other- or this-worldly sources of spiritual fulfillment, human security, and economic prosperity; (2) the specific sociopolitical role and institutional power of, and the diversity within, the dominant religions that contributed to the shaping of the concrete secular discourses they formulated; (3) the structure and ideological orientation of the ruling regime that shaped whether their resolutions expressed in predominantly social or political, religious or secular, terms; and (4) the nature of foreign domination that decided the extent to

which development is viewed from the perspective of different forms of nationalism (territorial nationalism, ethnic [pan-Arab] nationalism, economic nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism. These factors operated within the context of systematic encounters of Middle Eastern societies with the West. As a result, the varied ways in which the intellectual leaders resolved these issues were to a large extent a function of their perceptions of the nature of Western societies (Moaddel and Karabenick 2013, Moaddel 2005).


In the nineteenth century, reflections on development by Middle-Eastern intellectual leaders were shaped primarily by a keen awareness of the West's impressive technological progress and economic prosperity, on the one hand, and a consciousness of the decadence of their own societies, on the other. Identifying European countries as the harbingers of the universal progress toward civilization, including the notion that the test of civilization is provided by the status of women, they considered emulating these countries as the strategic option for the modernization of their society. This option required reforming indigenous social institutions in terms of the Western standards of modernity. In the twentieth century, however, the location of decadence was gradually transferred from various institutions of Middle Eastern societies to Western countries. The West increasingly became identified with an exploitative imperialistic economic system in varied discourses of leftist intellectuals and then with a decadent cultural order in various trends of radical Islamism. In the leftist model, the resolution of the problem of underdevelopment was sought in the nationalization of major economic concerns, particularly those connected to or dominated by the interests tied to the West. The 1940's through the 1960's were the heyday of leftist politics, when the problems of development were viewed from the perspectives of economic inequality and domination. In political Islam, which became a dominant oppositional discourse in the Middle East from the late 1970s on, a

systematic purge of the vestige of Western culture from the indigenous social institutions and the Islamization of the social order were thought as the key to economic development and technological progress (Moaddel 2005).

Nowadays, the followers of Islam and the enthusiasts of liberal or secular nationalism are competing for intellectual control of Middle Eastern societies. In the Tunisian survey, we thus tried to assess the extent to which the issues of freedom and political democracy, on the one hand, and the ideas of the shari'a and Islamic government, on the other, featured in people's perception of the causes of development and decadence. In the interviewer-supervisor-training workshop we conducted in October 2012 with the Tunisian survey firm's interviewing staff, there was a lengthy discussion about both national priorities for Tunisia as well as the obligations Tunisians might consider given the current social and political climate. Based on this discussion, several survey questions and associated response categories were developed about national priorities, the most important obligations of Tunisian citizens, and the causes of and steps to overcome decadence. Certainly, these are not adequate in addressing all the different aspects of the public's perceptions of development, national priority, and decadence. Nonetheless, these questions, as well as the questions on people's orientations toward individualism, gender relations, secular politics, and morality that will be discussed in Part II of this report, may be sufficient to provide a picture of how Tunisians currently think about liberal democracy, on the one hand, and political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, on the other.


First, respondents were asked to rank their first and second national priorities for Tunisia among four choices: maintaining security, a high level of economic growth, establishing democracy and the rule of law, and establishing an Islamic state. As their first priority, 48% of the respondents selected maintaining security, 29% a high level of economic growth, 13%

establishing democracy and the rule of law, and 10% establishing an Islamic state. That is, for 77%, or a great majority, of the respondents, the overriding concerns revolved on security and economic growth. Given the dire economic conditions of the country, these concerns are certainly understandable. This fact also indicates that Tunisians have consensus over values that are compatible—security and growth—rather over those that are not compatible—democracy and Islamic government.




The cross-tabulation of the first and second choices for national priority showed that maintaining security was the top choice for the majority of those who did not mention security as their first priority and economic growth for those who mentioned security as their first priority. That is, 59% of those said economic growth, 52% of those mentioned democracy, and 63% who favored an Islamic government as their first priority, considered maintaining security as their second choice. It is interesting to note that a higher percentage of those whose first priority was Islamic government mentioned security as the second priority, significantly higher than those who mentioned economic growth or democracy as their first priority. However, it appears that for the respondents, the national priorities are, first, security, then economic development, next, democracy, and last an Islamic government. Ideology, whether it is political Islam, Islamic


fundamentalism, or liberal secularism does not feature prominently in their thinking of national priorities.




Respondents were also asked to rank four choices in terms of their most important obligations as Tunisians: to excel in science and technology, defend people’s freedom of speech, apply the shari’a to Tunisia, and travel to occupied Muslim countries to fight the enemies of Islam. Fully 60% considered trying hard “to excel in science and technology” the top obligation of Tunisians. A sizable minority, on the other hand, selected obligations that are incompatible: 20% preferred “to defend people’s freedom of speech” versus 18% who considered trying hard “to apply Islamic shari’a to Tunisia” and 2% “to travel to occupied Muslim countries to fight the enemies of Islam.”




The cross-tabulation of the first and second obligations shows that 72% those who mentioned “excel in science and technology” as the most important obligation of Tunisians selected “defend people’s freedom of speech” as their second most important obligations, and 76% of those who selected “defend people’s freedom of speech” as the most important obligation chose “excel in science and technology” as the second most important obligation, while a sizable minority, 27% and 23%, respectively, preferred trying to “apply the shari’a to Tunisia” as the second most important obligation of Tunisians. Among those who considered “travel to occupied Muslim countries to fight the enemies of Islam” as Tunisians’ most important obligation, 44% chose “apply the shari’a to Tunisia,” 33% “excel in science and technology,” and 22% “defend people’s freedom of speech” as the second most important obligation. Finally, among those who chose “apply the shari’a to Tunisia” as the most important obligation, the majority, 64% selected “excel in science and technology,” 29% “defend people’s freedom of speech,” and 7% “travel to occupied Muslim countries to fight the enemies of Islam.” Again, these findings have shown that most Tunisians are interested in pragmatic policies in order to modernize their country. Even among those who favored the sharia, only a small percentage favored radical political activities.




Regarding decadence, among the five choices presented to the respondents on its most important causes, 37% mentioned “economic backwardness,” 20% “abandoning religious values,” 19% “political despotism,” 14% “religious extremism,” and 6% “a lack of support for science and technology.” These findings thus show that only a minority among Tunisians believed in the view proposed by the followers of political Islam that their country declined as a result of abandoning religious values. A clear majority of Tunisians agreed with a modernist position that seeks the roots of decadence in economic backwardness, political despotism, religious extremism, and a lack of support for science and technology.



Consistent with the above findings are the respondents' views on how to overcome decadence. Among the four choices presented to them, 37% mentioned “the development of science and technology, 35% “a democratic system,” 16% “establishing an Islamic system,” and 12% “establishing gender equality” as the most important factor to overcome decadence. Consistent with the low priority and low obligation that Tunisians attach to the establishment of shari’a and an Islamic government, the vast majority of Tunisians also do not consider the lack of an Islamic system as a deficit.



The respondents' perceptions of the causes of decadence to some extent shape their views about how to overcome it. That is, 50% of those who mentioned that economic backwardness and lack of science and technology were the chief causes of decadence considered the development of science and technology as the main remedy, while 31% mentioned the establishment of a democratic system, 11% gender equality, and 8% an Islamic system. For those who considered religious extremism as the cause of decadence, fully 82% of the respondents see the remedy in strengthening aspects of modernity—promoting gender equality for 13%, democratic system for 38%, and development of science and technology for 31%. Only 18% mentioned establishing an Islamic system. For those who mentioned mistreatment of women as the main cause of decadence, 39% mentioned the establishment of gender equality as the remedy, while 28% mentioned democracy, and 21% development of science and technology. For those who mentioned abandoning religious values as the cause, 41% sought the remedy in the establishment of an Islamic system; the rest opted for gender equality (9%), democracy (25%), and development of science and technology (25%). Finally, for those who mentioned political despotism as the cause of backwardness, 50% considered democracy as the remedy, while 12% mentioned establishing gender equality, 8% Islamic system, and 30% development of science and technology.




These figures thus show that finding solutions to such causes of decadence as economic backwardness or political despotism appear to be easier for the respondents than finding solutions to other causes like religious extremism or mistreatment of women. That is, a higher percentage of the respondents agree on one single factor to overcome economic backwardness or political despotism (50% in both cases) than on finding remedies to other causes of decadence. They also show that there is a connection between framing a problem—i.e., identifying the cause of decadence—and the type of solution that is most likely associated with it. That is, for example, insofar as religious activists are able to convince the public that abandoning religious values is the principal cause of the decadence of Tunisian society, they are in a much better position to convince the same public to opt for an Islamic system as a remedy than any other remedies. Or alternatively, the Tunisian feminists are better able to sway the public regarding the utility of establishing gender equality as the principle way to overcome decadence insofar as they are able to persuade their fellow citizens that the test of civilization is provided by the status of women.


The Subjective Basis of the Rhetorical Power of Religious Activists

Based on the figures presented thus far, we may conclude that Tunisians' value orientations are non-ideological and pragmatic. As it will be shown in Part II, they are also supportive of secular politics and are religiously more tolerant than the publics from the other six Middle Eastern countries. Furthermore, Tunisians overwhelmingly support freedom of expression even though such an expression would be against their personal beliefs or the government. That is, fully 87% strongly agree or agree that "people's freedom of expression must be protected even if it is contrary to their personal beliefs" or "the Tunisian government." Nonetheless, there are serious limits to this tolerance. Only 33% of respondents strongly agree or agree to protect the freedom of expression if such an expression is contrary to their religious beliefs. We may thus argue that insofar as Tunisians remain intolerant of any expression that is construed as contrary to their religion, this mindset would make them vulnerable to the call for violence by religious demagogues against any group perceived to have insulted cherished religious beliefs, particularly if such a group is located in a Western country. The violent attack on the U.S. Embassy and the American School in Tunis in September 2012 is a case in point, even though the individual producer of the anti-prophet film was an expatriate Coptic Christian from Egypt who was retaliating against the mistreatment of his fellow Christians by religious extremists in that country. In all likelihood, the violence perpetrated against Americans in Tunis and the murder of the U.S. diplomats in Benghazi, the very city that was saved by American power from attacking Qaddafi forces, had damaged the reputation of Islam and Muslims far more than the offensive movie created by a certain misguided Egyptian expatriate. Insofar as the idea of the freedom of expression remains or becomes the active component of the public's cognitive structures, to use a terminology in cognitive psychology (Sedikides and Skowronski

1991), Tunisians would not be easily persuaded to forego their freedom of expression in favor of a perceived protection of the citadel of Islam. However, there is little support for violence among Tunisians, as the great majority of the respondents disapproved attacks on the U.S. Embassy and the American School in Tunis, as was mentioned earlier.



The influence of religion on Tunisians' political action, however, is limited. Family plays the most important role in affecting decisions to participate in political action. Half of the respondents reported that they rely "a great deal" or "to some extent" on their family in deciding to engage in politics. Friends and peers were a distant second, with only 35% reporting that they rely on in deciding whether to participate in politics, followed by religious figures, 28%, political leaders, 14%, journalists or the press, 14%, and rumors, 5%.



PART II

TUNISIA IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

We may obtain a better understanding of the value orientations of the Tunisian public when such orientations are examined within a broader regional comparative context. Identical questions that tap into people's value orientations toward significant sociopolitical and cultural issues were included in surveys carried out in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Turkey between January 2011 and June 2013. It is thus possible to make a systematic comparison between Tunisia and these countries.

We will focus on people's value orientations toward such principles of social organizations as gender equality, social individualism, secular politics, national versus religious identity, rational rule making versus the shari'a, religiosity and religious tolerance, and in-group out-group boundaries, including boundaries with Western culture. We know that in the contemporary Middle East, issues related to these principles featured prominently in the discourses of indigenous intellectual leaders. The manner in which these intellectuals resolved these issues determines whether their expressions conform to Islamic modernism, fundamentalism, (liberal) territorial nationalism, or ethnic nationalism. Understanding people's value orientations toward these principles may provide clues for the extent to which there are social supports for these diverse modalities of politics.

As findings from the comparative survey data shows, these countries are not culturally monolithic; there are considerable within-country and cross-national variations in people's attitudes toward these issues. However, we do see a general cross-national division between Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey, which are more liberal, on the one hand, and Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, which are more religious and conservative, on the other.

Gender Relations


The social status of women has been one of the most hotly contested issues among intellectual leaders of different persuasions in the modern period. As one of the early defenders of women's right, John Millar in his *Origin of the Distinction of Ranks* considered the status of women as the test of civilization. "The condition of the women," says Miller in the late eighteenth century, "is one of the most remarkable circumstances in the manners of nations. Among the rude people, the women are generally degraded; among civilized people they are exalted" (Millar 1781, p. 309). In the Islamic world, gender-related issues also gained increasingly prominence in the discourses of intellectual leaders and the ruling elite from the second half of the nineteenth century on. The institution of male domination, the maltreatment of women, such practices as female infanticide, gender segregation, early marriage, and polygamy were among the most visible targets of polemics and criticisms of Islam and traditional cultures of Muslim-majority countries not only by Westernizers and followers of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, but by Christian evangelicals as well. Intellectual debates and back-and-forth arguments among proponents and opponents of the social role of women contributed to the rise of Islamic feminism most notably in the work of Indian scholar Sayyid Mumtaz Ali (1860–1935) and Egyptian scholar Qasim Amin (1865–1908). These changes culminated in the rise of the women's movement in Muslim-majority countries in the twentieth century. State feminism or feminism from above, which entailed the promotion and enforcement of Western-style dress among women, the expansion of female education, and the integration of women in the sociopolitical realm became one of the key components of the developmental policies implemented by the modern national state formed in many Middle Eastern countries, most notably Egypt, Iran, and Turkey, in the first half of the twentieth century. In the second half of

the twentieth century, however, the status of women and the idea of gender equality came under persistent attack by the harbingers of the Islamic fundamentalist movements. They rejected the idea of gender equality and defended gender segregation and the institution of male domination in the family, politics, and labor market. In places like Saudi Arabia and Iran under the Islamic Republic, women are reduced to second-class citizens.

In Western democratic countries, the issue of gender equality is officially resolved and discrimination against women is made illegal, although in reality there are still systematic biases against them and their reproductive rights hotly debated. In the contemporary Middle East, on the other hand, gender inequality in politics, the labor market, education, and the family is tolerated, practiced, and even sanctioned by the state. However, attitudes toward gender equality widely vary among individuals and across Middle Eastern countries. To assess the variations in such attitudes within each country and cross-nationally, our survey instrument included several questions formulated in the Likert-scale format that tap into attitudes toward gender equality in different spheres of social life, including polygamy, wife obedience, political leadership, university education, and labor market. There was also one question related to style of dress for women in public places.


Polygamy

Polygamy has been a sore point in West-Islam cultural encounters. However its significance has considerably diminished in many Middle Eastern countries in the past century. Currently, the majority of the respondents do not support the practice. That is, 70% of Egyptians, 52% of Iraqis, 71% of Lebanese, 75% of Pakistanis, 51% of Saudis, 81% of Tunisians, and 93% of Turkish citizens either strongly disagree or disagree with the statement that “it is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife.”



Wife obedience


A much lower percentage of the respondents, however, expressed disagreement with the statement that “a wife must always obey her husband.” That is, 5% of Egyptians, 11% of Iraqis, 38% of Lebanese, 8% of Pakistanis, 21% of Saudis, 22% of Tunisians, and 30% of Turkish citizens either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement. Thus, it appears that even in Lebanon, the most liberal country in the region, with the exception of Israel, the majority of the respondents endorse male authority in the family. On this measure, the Saudis appeared to be less conservative than Egyptians, Iraqis, and Pakistanis.



Gender and political leadership


The respondents across the seven countries have expressed less favorable attitudes toward men as political leaders than men having authority over women. Accordingly, the percentage who strongly disagree or disagree that “men make better political leaders than women do” is 17% among Egyptians, 24% among Iraqis, 44% among Lebanese, 29% among Pakistanis, 21% among Saudis, 45% among Tunisians, and 46% among Turkish citizens.

It thus appears that a higher percentage of the respondents are willing to accept female political leaderships than foregoing women’s obedience to their husbands in the family.



Gender and the labor market


In a tight job market, respondents overwhelmingly give priority to men over women. A minority among them strongly disagrees or disagrees that “when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women”—14% of Egyptians, 21% of Iraqis, 33% of Lebanese, 15% of Pakistanis, 22% of Saudis, 27% of Tunisians, and 44% of Turkish citizens.



Gender and education

Like attitudes toward polygamy, the right to university education is another issue about which the majority of the respondents disagreed with gender inequality, except among the Saudi public, where only 43% strongly disagree or disagree with the statement that “university education is more important for boys than it is for girls”, and among Pakistani respondents, who are evenly divided, with 50% disagreeing with gender inequality in the educational realm. In all other countries, fully 65% of Egyptians, 72% of Iraqis, 74% of Lebanese, 80% of Tunisians, and 71% of Turkish citizens do not support gender inequality with regards to education.


We may tentatively argue that variation in attitudes toward gender equality may be a function of the extent to which an increase in equality would be at the expense of a decline in men’s power in the family, politics, and the labor market. In these fields, there may be a stronger resistance to gender equality than we see in education, where an increase in female education does not necessarily mean a direct and concomitant decline in men’s power, but rather may increase the economic well-being of everyone.



Women's dress

The style of dress for women (and men) was a major sign of modernity from the perspectives of intellectual leaders and the educated public at large in the 1940s through the 1970s. This premise was challenged in different ways by the followers of political Islam and Islamic fundamentalism as well as those who were not necessarily the followers of the fundamentalist ideology but preferred to maintain their Islamic identity. Women's wearing the headscarf in public was indicative of their recognition of this identity. However, there are considerable variations across the seven countries in regard to the appropriate form of dress for women in public places.


To assess the extent of cross-national variation in the style of dress that is considered appropriate for women, respondents were presented with the following six pictures of women in different styles of dress. They were asked: "Which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places?" The style #1 is en vogue in Afghanistan; #2 is popular among both conservatives and fundamentalists in Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf Arab countries; #3 is the style vigorously promoted by Shi'i fundamentalism and conservatives in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon; #4 and #5 are considered most appropriate by modern Muslim women in Iran and Turkey; and #6 is preferred by secular women in the region.



The most appropriate garment for women is #4 (52%) for Egyptians; #4 and #3 (44% and 32%, respectively) for Iraqis; #6 and #4 (49% and 32%, respectively) for Lebanese; #4, #3, and


#2 (24%, 31%, and 32%, respectively) for Pakistanis; #2 (69%) for Saudis; #6, #5, and #4 (15%, 23%, and 57%) for Tunisians; and #6, #5, and #4 (32%, 17%, and 46%) for Turkish citizens.

Based on these findings, it would be hard to connect women’s style of dress on the aggregate level to a country’s level of development and modernity. Saudi Arabia, which is economically more developed, is most conservative in terms of women’s style of dress. Rather, it reflects a country’s orientations toward liberal values as well as the level of freedom people enjoy. In Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey, where people tend to be less conservative than the other four countries, the preferable style for women also tend to be much less conservative than the other four countries.



Gender-equality index

For a more effective cross-national comparison of attitudes toward gender equality, we created a gender-equality index as an average of the linear combination of all the above variables (with the exception of the last variable regarding women's dress). This average for each country is reported in the figure below, with higher means indicating greater gender egalitarianism. As the figure shows, the value of this index is highest for Turkey (2.73), followed by Lebanon (2.58), Tunisia (2.5), then Iraqi (2.22), Pakistan (2.20), Egypt (2.07), and Saudi Arabia (2.05). As these values show, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Turkey are on the more liberal end, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, on the more conservative end, and Iraq and Pakistan fall in the middle.



Social Individualism


Social individualism indicates the extent to which individuality and individual preferences—i.e., individual autonomy—are recognized and respected by members of society is institutionalized. In modern democratic societies, this autonomy is the quintessential component of the equality of opportunity and political voice. It is formally accepted and practiced most of the time. In the patriarchal cultures of the Middle East, on the other hand, priority is given to a

patriarch and emphasizes the individual's obedience to authority in family, politics, and other forms of social relationships. There are, however, considerable variations in people's orientations toward individualism within a country and cross-nationally.

Individualism may be reflected in a variety of social practices, ranging from egalitarianism in politics to independence as favorable quality for children to have to individual choice in marriage and in style of dress. Data on two indicators of social individualism are available across the seven countries. The first is attitudes toward the basis for marriage. The recognition of the right of the individual in the selection of one's mate, which Deutsch dubbed as "the Romeo and Juliet revolution," is considered a cornerstone of individualism (Deutsch 1981; Huntington 1996). To evaluate cross-national variation in this form of individualism, respondents were asked: "In your view, which of the following is the more important basis for marriage: (1) parental approval, or (2) love?" The other is on the style of dress. Respondents were asked whether they strongly agree to strongly disagree that "It is up to a woman to dress whichever way she wants."


The seven countries vary considerably in terms of their belief in love as the basis for marriage. Lebanon is the most individualistic (69%), followed by Turkey (54%), Saudi Arabia (47%), Iraq (31%), Egypt (29%), Tunisia (26%), and Pakistan (7%). This cross-national variation carries an interesting paradox. The respondents in Saudi Arabia, who expressed conservative values on many of the measures discussed in this report, including attitudes toward gender equality and religious fundamentalism, expressed much higher support for love as the basis for marriage. Tunisian respondents, by contrast, who have much stronger liberal orientations, displayed rather conservative attitudes toward the basis of marriage. One plausible explanation for this paradox may be related to varying levels of existential security produced by

the differences in the economic conditions among these countries. Under a prosperous economy, where there is more secure employment and income stability than under dire economic conditions, people are in a more favorable subjective condition to think and reflect about marriage and love. They are also financially better situated to make independent decisions. As a result, in relatively economically well-off countries like Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, people tend to favor love as the basis for marriage. Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and Tunisia, on the other hand, are facing poor economic conditions, which tend to generate the feeling of insecurity. Such conditions may prompt individuals to fall back on the tradition and seek refuge in the protective hierarchical structures of family relations (Inglehart et al. 2006; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).



There is also an interesting pattern of variation in the responses to women's choice to dress as she pleases. Accordingly, 14% of Egyptian, 27% of Iraqi, 49% of Lebanese, 22% of Pakistani, 47% of Saudi, 56% of Tunisian, and 52% of Turkish respondents strongly agreed or agree that it is up to a woman to dress as she chooses.

Although it was anomalous for Tunisians to display a relatively low level of support for love as the basis for marriage, they appear to be the most liberal in terms of their attitudes toward women’s choice in dress. If we disregard the case of Tunisia, a stronger support for individualistic values appears to be related to the level of economic prosperity. People in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, which are economically more affluent, tend to be more supportive of individualistic values, while people in less affluent countries like Egypt, Iraq, and Pakistan are less individualistic.




Secular Politics

The separation of religion and politics has turned into one of the most contentious issues between the Islamic fundamentalists and the followers of different secular ideologies in the twentieth century. Bestowing upon themselves as the sole interpreters of the faith, the fundamentalists claim that the Islamic conception of authority rests on the unity between religion and politics. For them, the idea of secular politics is yet another example of the Western cultural invasion of the Muslim world. The fundamentalists thus attempt to indigenize their political views by claiming to be the authentic followers and dedicated spokespeople of the faith, on the

one hand. On the other hand, by labeling the idea of secular politics as the hallmark of Western cultural domination, they seek to mobilize national pride in Muslim-majority countries against the perceived onslaught of the West on Islamic culture. They have shown little interest in systematically assessing the utility of the separation of religion and politics for a good government. They have attacked secular politics on the grounds that it is a Western idea or a cultural ploy fabricated by the imperialists in order to subjugate Muslims. As Ayatollah Khomeini (1981: 38), a harbinger of Shi'i fundamentalism, stated, "this slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the Imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeats them."


For sure, the overly anti-religious orientation of secular intellectuals in many Middle Eastern countries contributed to the politicization of religion. Nonetheless, although the utility of secular politics for the construction of a better society—more democratic, prosperous, and egalitarian—was demonstrated in the Western Enlightenment, secular politics was not exclusively a Western invention. In fact, in historical Islam, prominent Muslim theologians-cum-political theorists relaxed some of the alleged principles of caliphate in favor of recognizing the sultan's discretionary power, in different interpretations of these principles, by Abu al-Hasan Ali al-Mawardi (972–1058), Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058–1111), Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), and Abd al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun (1333–1406), which amounted a de facto admission of the reality of secular politics. Consistent with these changes were the efforts of the Islamic modernists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who led the political movement for the construction of the modern state based on the modern constitution and rational rule making.

The outbreak of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the rise of political Islam in the 1980s through the 1990s may be indicative of the fundamentalists' victory in the cultural warfare against their secular nemeses. Nonetheless, both the trends in values and survey data from the seven countries indicate that, except in Pakistan, the majority of the publics from these countries favor the separation of religion and politics. Like other issues, these countries vary in terms of the public support for secular politics: 51% of Egyptians, 69% of Iraqis, 80% of Lebanese, 9% of Pakistanis, 72% of Tunisians, and 76% of Turks strongly agree or agree that their country would be a better place if religion and politics are separated.




A much lower percentage of the respondents believe that their country would be a better place if its government was similar to Western government. That is, 33% of Egyptians, 45% of Iraqis, 63% of Lebanese, 26% of Pakistanis, 47% of Tunisians, and 44% of Turkish citizens strongly agree or agree with the desirability of having a Western political model for their country. Two interesting facts about these and previous figures are noteworthy. The first relates to the popularity of secular politics among Iraqis. That is, despite their suspicion of American intentions in their country, Iraqis have developed favorable attitudes toward secular politics and

Western government. This may be an outcome of experiencing the brutal violence of Muslim extremists. The second is what appears to be attitudinal inconsistency among Pakistanis. While only 9% of the Pakistani respondents support secular politics, 26% prefer to have their government to be similar to Western governments. This inconsistency may have several different interpretations. For example, Pakistanis may see such other aspects of Western governments as stability, trustworthiness of its politicians, and transparency, its secular foundation notwithstanding, as desirable, while simply the idea of the separation of religion and politics is more distasteful. Alternatively, it may be argued that the notion of the separation of religion and politics has been so demonized by Islamic fundamentalists that any reference to it produces negative reaction, while reference to the desirability of Western government tends to provoke less intensive negative reactions among Pakistanis.



However, Western technology has been one important aspect of Western culture that is still considered worthy of emulation by the great majority of respondents across the seven countries. Fully 84% of Egyptians, 89% of Iraqis, 84% of Lebanese, 89% of Pakistanis, 90% of

Saudis, 86% of Tunisians, and 80% of Turkish strongly agree or agree that their country would be a better place if it had the technology of the West.



Form of Government


In the contemporary Middle East, secular politics gained considerable support among intellectuals and political activists under certain specific historical conditions—where an authoritarian religious regime is present, or where the ulama (Muslim theologians) or the religious institutions had aligned with despotic rulers to impose a monolithic religious order on society. For example, the ulama obstructionism in the efforts to reform social institutions in late nineteenth-century Iran, the pan-Islamic despotism of Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamid II, and the formation of the Islamic authoritarian rules following the Iranian Revolution of 1979—all contributed to the rise of different forms of secular oppositional discourse among Iranian and Syrian intellectual leaders in the late nineteenth century and among Iranians in the post-1979 revolutionary period.

Other forms of government—including territorial nationalist, pan-Arab nationalist, monarchist, Islamic, military and/or strongman—have also received considerable support in the


region since the beginning of the twentieth century. Each form tends to be more popular than the rest under a specific historical episode. For example, secular constitutional monarchy was the predominant form in the first half of the twentieth century, pan-Arab nationalism supported by the military rule was popular in the 1950s through 1960s, and Islamic government gained considerable support in the period between the late 1970s through the end of the century. Currently, the democratic form of government has gained wide support among the public. However, the idea of democracy has different operational meanings for different political groups.

To assess the type of government considered most appropriate for the respondents, four different forms of government were presented to them: a democratic political system, an Islamic government (or a government inspired by Christian values for Christian respondents), a strong head of government who does not have to bother with parliament and election, and rule by the army. For each item, respondents were asked whether it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing their country.

Findings from the surveys have shown that there is overwhelming support for democracy across the seven countries. The percentage of the respondents who considered a democratic political system as very good or fairly good was 90% (in Tunisia) or higher (up to 97% in Egypt and Turkey). In Saudi Arabia, the only question on democracy that was allowed was that “democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government.” Again, there is wide support across the seven countries, as the percentage who strongly agree or agree with democracy as an ideal form of government are 91% of Egyptians, 86% of Iraqis, 88% of Lebanese, 88% of Pakistanis, 76% of Saudis, 91% of Tunisians, and 84% of Turkish.




Democracy, however, has a different meaning for different sections of the populations in these countries. As will be shown below, many of the people who favor the democratic political system at the same time believe in Islamic government, consider the implementation of only the shari'a as the characteristic of a good government, or prefer having the army rule. Thus, support for democracy often means support for an illiberal democracy.




We look first at the support for an Islamic government. Egypt is the only country in which a clear majority, 59%, considered that it is very good or fairly good to have an Islamic

government. This fact also explains the success of the Muslim Brothers and other Islamic groups at the polls in the country in 2011. This percentage dropped to 49% for Iraqis, 31% for Lebanese, 33% for Pakistanis, 38% for Tunisians, and 34% for Turkish citizens. Except for Egypt and Iraq, only a minority of the respondents were favorable to an Islamic government. The relatively low support for an Islamic government among Pakistani respondents, despite having conservative orientations on other issues, may be a result of the resonance of such a government with the Taliban-style system of rule.



Support for a military regime is low among respondents, except among Egyptians. Fully 71% of Egyptians considered very good or fairly good to have the army rule. Given that during the time of the survey the Society of the Muslim Brothers had not yet captured the presidency and thus its authoritarian proclivity was not known to those who voted for the its candidate, this high figure is quite telling of the extent of the popularity of the army. In all likelihood this popularity has increased during Mohamed Morsi’s presidency, when the political and economic conditions of the country further deteriorated. It also explains the relative ease with which the army was able to depose the democratically elected president of the country in July 2013.


Tunisia is another country in which the army enjoys some solid minority support, as 35% of Tunisians expressed that it is very good or fairly good to have the army rule. The corresponding figures are 25% for Iraqis, 19% for Lebanese, 10% for Pakistanis, and 20% for Turks. Pakistani respondents expressed the lowest level of support for military rule, with just 10% endorsement. Considering this figure in conjunction with the fact that they also had little interest in the formation of an Islamic government, Pakistanis prefer a stable, non-military, non-religious government. However, as will be shown in the next section, a great majority of Pakistanis believe that a good government implements only the shari'a. It thus appears that while they are socially conservative with a strong attachment to religious norms, their political preference is decidedly a "secular system" that is detached from the army control and dictation from religious groups. However, they would like to see a secular system which implements the laws of the shari'a.



Finally, in general, among all forms of government, there is the lowest amount of support for a strongman government across the seven countries. The least support is seen among Egyptians, who have had the longest experience of one-man rule among these countries. That is,


only 11% Egyptians believed that it is very good or fairly good to have a strong head of government who does not bother with parliament and elections. The comparative figures for other countries are 22% among Iraqi, 15% among Lebanese, 18% among Pakistani, 20% among Tunisian, and 21% among Turkish respondents.

It is a known fact that the military government in the Middle East has almost always been associated with the strongman rule—viz., Jamal Abul Nasser in Egypt, Hafiz al-Assad in Syria, Saddam Housein in Iraq, and Moamar Qaddafi in Libya. Yet, there is an apparent disconnect in the Egyptians’ orientation toward the military rule and a strongman dictatorship. That is, the military rule tends to develop into a strongman’s rule, as the contemporary political history of the region attests. One way to reconcile these conflicting orientations, however, is to argue that for Egyptians the military rule may indicate political stability and security, which are the preconditions for a normal life and economic development. However, as soon as the military role is transformed into a single-individual tyranny, then Egyptians would certainly consider it undesirable and once again may rebel against it.




People's Wishes Versus the Shari'a

A great majority of the respondents considered it important or very important for a good government to make laws according to the people's wishes; 84% of Egyptians, 85% of Iraqis, 83% of Lebanese, 55% of Pakistanis, 73% of Saudis, 82% of Tunisians, and 84% of Turkish. Although this support was slightly lower among the Saudi respondents, it is quite telling of the extent of support in Saudi Arabia for taking the wishes of the people seriously in making laws and formulating policies by the government. This support, however, was much lower among the Pakistani respondents.




A much lower percentage of the respondents considered that it is very important or important for a good government to implement only the laws of the shari'a, except for among Pakistanis and Saudis. Those who favored the implementation of the shari'a laws consisted of 56% of the respondents among Egyptians, 48% among Iraqis, 24% among Lebanese, 74% among Pakistanis, 68% among Saudis, 27% among Tunisians, and 19% among Turkish citizens.



There is a considerable overlap between those respondents who were favorably predisposed toward making laws according to people’s wishes and those who favored only the shari’a laws. For some respondents, people’s wishes and the instructions from the shari’a may be coterminous. For others, these two orientations may be contrary to each other. It is also often the case that people hold values that clash, as has also been shown by public opinion research. Nonetheless, to assess where people’s ultimate preference would be a government that implements the wishes of the people or one that applies only the shari’a laws, respondents were given the choice between the two: “Which of the following two statements comes closest to the way you feel: (1) A good government implements only the law of the shari’a (laws inspired by Christian values[for Christian respondents]/laws inspired by Jewish values [for Jewish respondents]), (2) A good government makes laws according to the people’s wishes?”


Findings from the seven-country surveys have shown that respondents overwhelmingly opted for a government that implements the wishes of the people vis-à-vis the one that implements the shari’a law, ranging from 73% in Egypt to 91% in Turkey; and with 80% of Tunisian respondents choosing “government the implements the wishes of the people.” For

Pakistanis and Saudis, by contrast, there was a preference for the shari'a rather than for people's wishes (41% vs. 59% and 43% vs. 57%, respectively).



Considering attitudes toward the separation of religion and politics, form of government, and religious laws, for Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Tunisian, and Turkish respondents, the preference is decidedly toward secular politics. Pakistani and Saudi respondents, while not quite supportive of an Islamic government, are nonetheless ambivalent about secular politics. This is also born out when deciding between politicians who have strong religious views and those committed to national interests, for the great majority of the respondents, the nationalism of politicians appears to trump their religiosity, except for Pakistanis. That is, 79% over 21% for Egyptians, 81% over 19% for Iraqis, 86% over 14% for Lebanese, 57% over 43 for Saudis, 84% over 16% for Tunisians, and 71% versus 29% for Turkish favored the politicians who committed to national interests over the politicians with strong religious views. This priority is reversed for Pakistanis, 43% versus 57%, which is consistent with their views about the shari'a. However, although Saudis more strongly favored shari'a law over law according to people's wishes, they conform to nearly all other surveyed countries in expressing a preference for politicians committed to national interests. This may imply that there is a strong nationalist undercurrent

among Saudis that is competing with the country’s domineering religious institutions for the control of the society. This interpretation is reinforced considering the basis of identity to which most Saudis adhere (see the following section).




National Identity and National Pride


Like preferences for forms of government, the cultural differentia the Middle Eastern people recognized as the basis of identity has been subject to change according to changes in social conditions. Based on historical and anecdotal evidence, in the first half of the twentieth century the territorial nation—the notion of being an Egyptian, Iraqi, or Iranian—constituted the basis of identity. In mid-twentieth century, the Arab identity was predominantly recognized as the basis of identity among prominent intellectuals and political activists in many Arab-majority countries. Between the 1970s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, religion was mainly considered as the basis of identity. In recent years, however, the territorial nation is once again recognized as the basis of identity among the majority of respondents in many of the countries in the Middle East.

National identity is measured in terms of a choice between several bases of identity with which people primarily identify. These include whether people define themselves in terms of their nationality, ethnicity, or religion. Questions on identity were asked in two different ways. One way was to ask respondents: “Which of the following best describes you: (1) I am an Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese..., above all; (2) I am a Muslim (Christian [for Christian respondents]), above all; and (3) I am an Arab, Kurd, Berber..., above all” The other way was in terms of how they related to the world: “People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Please tell me which of these five statements comes closest to the way you feel: (1) I see myself as a citizen of the world, (2) I see myself as a citizen of COUNTRY, (3) I see myself as a citizen of the Islamic umma (world-wide Christian community [for Christian respondents]), or (4) I see myself as a citizen of the Arab, Berber, or Kurdish community?” Both questions allowed for the specification of another option if volunteered by the respondent.

The following two figures report only the contrast between the respondents’ identification with nation and religion. Except for Pakistan and Tunisia, the percentage of respondents who recognized nationality as the basis of their identity is higher than those who considered religion. That is, 52% of Egyptians define themselves as Egyptian above all, while 47% as Muslim above all. The corresponding figures are 57% versus 36% among Iraqis, 60% versus 29% among Lebanese, 48% versus 46% among Saudis, and 44% versus 39% among Turkish, respectively. For Pakistanis and Tunisians, this order is reversed. Fully 70% of Pakistanis defined themselves as Muslim above all, while 28% as Pakistani above all. Likewise, 59% of Tunisians defined themselves as Muslims above all, 31% as Tunisian above all.




These findings display two interesting features. One is that the majority of Saudis, whose country is the bastion of conservative Islam, identify with the nation rather than with the religion. The second is that a clear majority of Tunisian respondents, despite having relatively liberal orientations on many other issues, see themselves first and foremost as Muslims rather than Tunisians. It is not quite clear as to why Tunisian national identity is weaker than it is in most other countries. The second survey question on identity, which taps into the contrast between one's recognition of national community and supranational religious community, tells a similar story: compared to other nations, Tunisians are much less likely to recognize their nation as the basis of their identity. The disparity between the Tunisian respondents who see themselves as citizens of Tunisia and those as citizens of the Islamic umma (or world-wide Christian or Jewish communities for Christian or Jewish respondents, respectively) is 46% versus 43% respectively, which is much smaller than it is for other countries, where the disparity is much greater: 61% versus 36% for Egyptians, 70% versus 15% for Iraqis, 59% versus 19% for Lebanese, 65% versus 24% for Saudis, and 62% versus 23% for Turkish, respectively.



The concept of national identity is defined and operationalized as cognition. It is also operationalized in terms of the contrast, or oppositional relationship, between different bases of identity: nationality, ethnicity, and religion. Insofar as identity is defined in terms of nation versus religion oppositional duality, people who identify with the nation tend to have a stronger liberal orientation than those who identify with the religion. National pride, by contrast, is an emotive construct. It measures the respondents' strength of the feeling of attachment to the nation. Here a single-item measure of national pride is used in this study: "How proud are you to be a [an Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese....,]? Would you say very proud, quite proud, not very proud, or not at all proud?"

National identity and national pride are quite different and a high level of national identity does not necessary mean a stronger feeling of national pride. While national identity tends to correlate positively with attitudes toward gender equality and secular politics, and negatively with religiosity and religious fundamentalism; national pride is often linked to conservative and religious values. Generally, people in democratic countries tend to have a much lower national pride than (1) those in less democratic and more conservative countries, and (2)

those in countries which have had a fairly strong past imperial experience. As shown below, the percentage of the respondents who expressed being “very proud” to be the citizens of their countries is 90% among Egyptians, 64% among Iraqis, 35% among Lebanese, 83% among Pakistanis, 66% among Saudis, 76% among Tunisians, and 77% among Turkish.




Concerns with Western Culture and Conspiracy


In terms of political values, the majority of the respondents have displayed affinity with Western values of democracy, secular politics, national identity, and rational rule making, as indicated above. At the same time, they have almost universally displayed alarmist attitudes toward Western culture and widely believed in the existence of conspiracies against Muslims. Such attitudes are quite contrary to the perception of the West as the harbinger of universal progress and the site of human civilization that were popular in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. To give one prominent example, the Constitutional Revolution in Iran began when a small group of clerics and merchants staged a sit-in at the site of the British Legation in Tehran in the summer of 1906, demanding the ratification of the Fundamental Law by the

monarch. The revolution was led by two ayatollahs, who believed that emulating the Western model of politics would contribute to the country's economic development and prosperity.


In the second half of the twentieth century, a dominant trend among the indigenous intellectual leaders portrayed an image of the West that was militarily aggressive, economically exploitative, and culturally decadent. They forewarned their audience against Western cultural invasion and conspiracies against Muslims. Such perceptions have gained considerable traction in the seven countries, as 85% of Egyptians, 80% of Iraqis, 64% of Lebanese, 30% of Pakistanis, 83% of Saudis, 54% of Tunisians, and 83% of Turkish consider Western cultural invasion to be a very important or important problem. More liberal countries like Lebanon and Tunisia tend to be less concerned with Western culture. The high level of concern with Western culture in Turkey is a bit puzzling, given its more liberal orientation than Egypt, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia (and its membership in NATO). This concern may be an outcome of the political and cultural reassertions of the current Turkish government, which sees itself in competition with Western countries for cultural hegemony in the region. On the other hand, Pakistanis' much lower concern with Western culture may be due to their antagonistic relationship with India and the perception that cultural threats primarily emanate from their eastern neighbor and not from the West.



Likewise, a large percentage of the respondents believe that there are conspiracies against Muslims. That is, 85% of Egyptians, 79% of Iraqis, 70% of Lebanese, 95% of Pakistanis, 84% of Saudis, 84% of Tunisians, and 72% of Turkish strongly agree or agree that there are conspiracies against Muslims. It would be difficult to single out a common set of factors that contributed to the rise of conspiratorial thinking and alarmist attitudes among the publics from these seven countries. We may speculate, however, that Western concern over Muslim terrorists and the securities systems put in place by Western governments to identify and capture such terrorists, as well as anti-Islamic activities by conservative groups in different Western countries, on the one hand, and heightened anti-Western propaganda launched by radical Muslim activists against the West, who use every opportunity to mobilize the public to attack Western targets, which in turn begets retaliations, on the other hand, have all promoted such perceptions.



A great majority of the respondents from these countries also report feelings of insecurity. That is, 72% of Egyptians, 67% of Iraqis, 73% of Lebanese, 95% of Pakistanis, 84% of Tunisians, and 46% of Turkish strongly agree or agree that “in their country these days, life is unpredictable and dangerous” (this question was not allowed in Saudi Arabia). An in-depth analysis of the data is necessary in order to fully assess the correlates of the feeling of insecurity. Nonetheless, such a high level of insecurity may indicate the uncertainty about the future and may not be conducive to the formation of a stable democratic political order.



Religious Tolerance


One way to assess societal readiness for the establishment of liberal democracy is to consider the extent to which people are tolerant of other religious, ethnic, racial, or political groups. Tolerance is conducive to peace, political stability, democracy, and a smooth transition of political power (Sullivan et al. 1982, Gibson 1992, Mutz 2002). Religious tolerance—that is, being tolerant of faiths other than one’s own— is one important component of the cultural tolerance that is a prerequisite for democracy. People who are intolerant of other faiths often instruct the faithful to have little interaction with the followers of other faiths. For them, maintaining religious boundaries is necessary in order to keep the faith pure and uncontaminated by the pagan ways of other religions. They believe that the followers of other faiths should not be given the same rights as those given to the followers of their own faith, and they should not be allowed to practice their religion freely or build places of worship.

To measure respondents’ level of religious tolerance, five survey questions are used to. The first three questions measure **interfaith intolerance**: the extent to which the respondents are intolerant of other religions. The other two questions measure **anti-authoritarian intolerance**: the extent to which respondents are intolerant of criticisms of the authorities in their faith.


Interfaith intolerance

The first question on interfaith intolerance asks respondents whether they strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that “non-Muslim (non-Christians [for Christian respondents]) should be prohibited to practice their religion in (STUDY SITE COUNTRY).” Except for Saudi Arabia, where 70% of the respondents strongly agree or agree, respondents from the other six countries displayed a fairly tolerant attitudes; with just 15% of Egyptians, 23%


of Iraqis, 17% of Lebanese, 4% of Pakistanis, 18% of Tunisians, and 27% of Turkish agreeing with this statement.



Insofar as the followers of other faiths are engaged in their own religious practices, most of these respondents were quite tolerant. However, when asked whether children should be allowed to learn about other religions, their level of intolerance was much higher. That is, 45% of Egyptian, 35% of Iraqis, 18% of Lebanese, 63% of Pakistanis, 67% of Saudis, 32% of Tunisians, and 43% of Turkish strongly agree or agree that “our children should not be allowed to learn about other religions.”




On the third measure, the equality of rights, again, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, respondents were reasonably tolerant. Fully 73% of Saudis strongly agree or agree that “the followers of other religions should not have the same rights as mine.” Figures are 30% for Egyptian, 32% for Iraqi, 25% for Lebanese, 10% for Pakistani, 22% for Tunisian, and 36% for Turkish respondents.




Anti-authoritarian intolerance

The last two indicators, which measure anti-authoritarian intolerance, show that respondents are much more intolerant of criticism of the authority of the faith or religious leaders. In the first, concerning the tolerance of criticizing the faith, 77% of Egyptians, 82% of Iraqis, 65% of Lebanese, 86% of Pakistani, 86% of Saudis, 57% of Tunisians, and 69% of Turkish strongly agree or agree that “criticism of Islam (Christianity [for Christian respondents]) should not be tolerated.”




Finally, respondents displayed less intolerance of people criticizing religious leaders than criticizing their religion. That is, 66% among Egyptians, 68% among Iraqis, 54% among Lebanese, 69% among Pakistanis, 76% among Saudis, 31% among Tunisians, and 58% among Turkish strongly agree or agree that “criticism of religious leaders should not be tolerated.”




Religious-intolerance index

We created two indices of intolerance. The first is interfaith intolerance, which is the average of the linear combination of the first three measures of intolerance. These were as follows: the followers of other faith should be prohibited from practicing their faith, our children should not be allowed to learn about other religions, and the followers of other religions should not have the same right as mine. The results show that Tunisia is the most tolerant (1.91) and Saudi Arabia the least tolerant society (2.96). In between are Lebanon (1.96), Pakistan (2.0), Egypt (2.17), Iraq (2.20), and Turkey (2.24).




The second intolerance index is anti-authoritarian intolerance. This index is based on a linear combination of the last two measures of intolerance: the criticism of the religion should not be tolerated and the criticism of the religious leaders should not be tolerated. Based on this index, Tunisia (2.54) is the most tolerant society and Saudi Arabia (3.28) the least tolerant society. In between are Lebanon (2.75), Turkey (2.80), Iraq (3.06), Egypt (3.16), and Pakistan (3.18).





Mosque attendance

A general indicator of the public side of religiosity is mosque attendance. Based on this measure, Tunisians attend mosque less often among the publics from the seven countries: 47% and 17% said that they never or rarely attend mosques, respectively, compared to 23% and 13% who reported that they attend mosques more than once a week or between once week and once a month, respectively. Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon have also lower mosque attendance than Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The percentage who reported that they never or rarely attend mosques were 21% and 38% for Turkey, 19% and 40% for Lebanon, 19% and 21% for Egypt, 34% and 21% for Iraq, 43% and 8% for Pakistan, and 12% and 24% for Saudi Arabia.




Insofar as mosque attendance is concerned, the public side of Islam is dominated by men. While in the U.S., regardless of how religiosity is measured, women tend to be more religious than men. In the Middle East, and generally in most Muslim-majority countries, when religiosity is measured in terms of mosque attendance, men are more religious than women. In fact, there are huge discrepancies between men and women, for example, in terms of those who mentioned that they attend mosques more than once a week: 73% men versus 18% women among

Egyptians, 33% versus 8% among Iraqis, 19% versus 8% among Lebanese, 64% versus 3% among Pakistanis, 84% versus 8% among Saudis, 29% versus 6% among Turkish, and 46% versus 5% among Tunisians.




Likeability of and Attitudes toward Violence against Americans

If we measure a nation's likeability in terms of the willingness to have them as neighbors or how morally they are judged, Americans are most liked in Tunisia, compared to the respondents from the other countries, but least liked in Egypt; 54% of Tunisians expressed that they like to have Americans as neighbors, compared to 10% of Egyptians, 14% of Iraqis, 50% of Lebanese, 17% of Pakistanis, and 52% of Turkish. It appears that likeability of Americans correlates with the country's degree of cultural liberalism and democratic orientations.




Likewise, Tunisians rate the morality of Americans higher than respondents from many other countries. The rating is based on the scale of 1 to 10, where “1” is the state of high immorality and “10” is the state of high morality. Respondents from Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, on average, gave Americans a morality rating of 3.3, 3.2, 3.5, and 3.2, respectively, while giving themselves a much higher average rating of 7.3, 6.7, 5.9, and 6.7. These countries thus tend to be rather moral centric—the gap between rating the morality of one's nation and of other nations. Lebanese and Tunisian respondents gave a much higher average rating of morality to Americans, both 4.7, and much lower average morality to themselves, 5.9 and 6.0,


respectively, than respondents from the other five countries. Saudis gave American an equally higher morality rating, 4.7, but also gave themselves a much higher rating, 7.7, the highest self-rating of any country.



Attitudes toward violence against Americans and U.S. troops also vary cross nationally. Respondents were asked whether they “strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq or Afghanistan.” Turkish respondents expressed the lowest approval and the Pakistan the highest, that is; 10% and 66%, respectively, strongly or somewhat approve such attacks. In between are 49% of Egyptians, 38% of Iraqis, 57% of Lebanese, 41% of Saudis, and 58% of Tunisians. It is interesting to note that after Turkish respondents, Iraqis are the least supportive of attacks on the U.S. troops. It may thus appear that the publics from Egypt, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Tunisia are affected more by anti-American propaganda than the reality of the presence of the U.S. troops in Iraq.



There is, however, much less support for attacking U.S. civilians working for U.S. companies in Islamic countries. Pakistanis are in consensus in universally disapproving such attacks, followed by 3% of Turkish, 6% of Tunisian, 12% of Egyptian, 13% of Lebanese, 15% of Iraqi, and 22% of Saudi respondents.



CONCLUSIONS

Since independence in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the United States has had diplomatic relations with Tunisia. Two years after the U.S. Declaration of Independence, John Adams (who was to become the second President of the United States) noted that “There are other nations with which it is more urgent to conclude treaties ... By this, I mean Morocco and the Regencies of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli.” This suggestion was taken seriously and, on March 26, 1799, the [first agreement of friendship](#) and trade was concluded between Tunisia and the United States.

The first American consulate was established in Tunis on January 20, 1800, one of the many diplomatic buildings clustered around the Place de la Bourse in the Medina. In September 1805, U.S. President Thomas Jefferson received a Tunisian special envoy, and in 1865, after the Civil War, another Tunisian ambassador was sent to the U.S. with a message of friendship to the American people (see <http://tunisia.usembassy.gov/tunisian-american-relations.html>, retrieved September 24, 2013).

This impressive pedigree of historical ties between the two nations notwithstanding, there is a strong reason for the leaders of both countries to strengthen alliances in order to forge further friendship, peace, and economic development. This reason stems from considerable affinity between the value orientations of the Tunisian public and the liberal democratic values of secular politics, gender equality, and religious tolerance that inform politics and social relationships under advanced democracies.

Tunisians have displayed strong support for secular politics, expressed the highest level of religious tolerance among the seven countries, committed to liberal values of equality more widely than the publics from many other Middle Eastern countries, and are culturally and religiously unified—all suggesting that on the level of cognition and cultural attitudes they have

a better chance of developing a stable liberal democracy than many other countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

This process may be strengthened if stronger economic and cultural ties are formed between Tunisia and Western governments and, more crucially, between Tunisians and various economic and cultural institutions in advanced democracies. When economic and cultural exchanges among nations are constituted by and through shared cultural values—e.g., the United States and Western Europe—such exchanges will further solidify the bonds of friendship and inter-cultural understanding. As the findings from the survey indicate, the Tunisians and Americans share considerable cultural values.

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APPENDIX A

TUNISIA SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

The Birth Place of the Arab Spring:

Value Orientations and Political Actions in Tunisia

INSTRUCTION TO INTERVIEWER: THIS INTRODUCTION MUST BE READ TO EACH RESPONDENT BEFORE BEGINNING THE INTERVIEW:

Hello. I am from ELKA and am working in collaboration with the University of Tunis. We are carrying out academic research in Tunisia on what people value in life. This research will interview a nationally representative sample of the population in Tunisia. Your home address has been selected randomly as part of a representative sample of the people living in Tunisia.

We are seeking your permission to ask your opinion on topics such as development, beliefs about families, media use, corruption, and various other attributes of individual and family life. Please be assured that there is no right or wrong answer to any of these questions. Your help is extremely important because it will contribute to a better understanding of the current situation and society in Tunisia.

Your answers will be kept completely confidential. Your identifying information will be kept in a separate, secure location from your survey responses and will be linked only by an arbitrary identification number. We believe there is no risk to you for taking part in this study. Any answers you give will be combined with the responses of all other participants. This means that no one will be able to trace the identities of any of our individual participants. The results of this research will be used for academic purposes only and will be disseminated in scholarly journals and presentations. This research may be beneficial to you because it contributes to the improvement of the society and to the relationship of the different groups to each other in Tunisia.

This interview will take about an hour or so and I want to assure you that it is completely voluntary and confidential. If we should come to any question that you do not want to answer, please let me know and we will go on to the next question. There is no penalty for not participating or for refusing to answer any question. You may stop the interview at any time.

We may contact you in the future about an opportunity to participate in a follow-up discussion about some of the same topics raised in the questions I'll be asking you today. Again, participation in any subsequent interview would be completely voluntary and confidential.

If you want to know more about the study, you can call Sameh Ben Hamouda or Mehrez Abderrahmne of ELKA Consulting at 071-901-808 or 071-901-691.

SECTION A

I'd like to start the interview by asking you some general questions.

v1. **EXACT TIME NOW (CODE USING 24 HOUR CLOCK):** _____

v2. Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?
 1. Very happy
 2. Happy
 3. Not very happy
 4. Not at all happy
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v3. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole **these days**? Please use this card to help with your answer. **(Respondent Show Card 1)**

Completely Dissatisfied							Completely Satisfied			DK	NR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99

v4. Are you currently **(READ OUT AND CODE ONE ONLY)**

1. Never been married-----> Skip to V6
2. Married
3. Divorced
4. Separated
5. Widowed
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v5. Altogether, how many children have you had?

0. No child
1. 1 child
2. 2 children
3. 3 children
4. 4 children
5. 5 children
6. 6 children
7. 7 children
8. 8 or more children
96. Not applicable [DO NOT READ OUT]
98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v6. Can you tell me your year of birth, please? 19____

[ENTER ONLY THE LAST TWO DIGITS OF THE YEAR: "19" IS ASSUMED] 998. DK 999. NR

v7. This means you are ___ __ years old. Is that correct?

(NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: RESOLVE ANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BIRTH YEAR AND AGE BY CONSULTING WITH RESPONDENT)

		Parental approval	Love	DK	NR
v8.	Next I will ask your opinions about marriage and family life. In your view, which of the following is the more important basis for marriage: Parental approval, or love? [NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF R ANSWERS BOTH, ASK R TO SPECIFY WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT AND CLOSER TO HOW S/HE FEELS]	1	5	8	9

		Agree	Disagree	DK	NR
v9.	Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: Marriage is an out-dated institution	1	5	8	9

Next, please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree:

(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v10. It is acceptable for a man to have more than one wife. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v11. A wife must always obey her husband.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v12. On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do	1	2	3	4	8	9
v13. A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v14. It is up to a woman to dress whichever way she wants	1	2	3	4	8	9
v15. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.	1	2	3	4	8	9

v16.	Which one of these women is dressed most appropriately for public places? Just tell me the number on the card. (Respondent Show Card 2)	1	2	3	4	5	6	8 DK	9 NR
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SECTION B

v17. Now think about governmental laws and regulations. Which of the following statements comes closer to your sentiment: **(Respondent Show Card 3)**

1. I feel constrained by the number of governmental laws and regulations
2. There are not enough governmental laws and regulations to guide me
3. There are just about the right amount of governmental laws and regulations
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

Thinking about what should change to make Tunisia a better place to live, and please tell us if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following:

(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v18. Tunisia will be a better society: If religion and politics are separated. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v19. If its government was similar to Western governments. [IF RESPONDENT ASKS WHAT IS MEANT BY "WESTERN GOVERNMENT", INTERVIEWER CAN RESPOND "GOVERNMENTS LIKE THOSE IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES"]	1	2	3	4	8	9
v20. If it had the technology of the West.	1	2	3	4	8	9

v21. Please use this scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means "Very large problem" and "5" means "Not a large problem at all". Which number do you choose to describe if **cultural invasion by the West** in Tunisia is a very big problem or not? **(Respondent Show Card 4)**

- | | | | | | | |
|--------------------|---|---|---|----------------------------|----|----|
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 9 |
| Very large problem | | | | Not a large problem at all | DK | NR |

- v30. How proud are you to be Tunisian? Would you say very proud, quite proud, not very proud, or not at all proud?
1. Very proud
 2. Quite proud
 3. Not very proud
 4. Not at all proud
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]
- v31. Which of the following best describes you? [NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF R GAVE MORE THAN ONE ANSWER, CLARIFY: “I KNOW WHAT YOU MEAN BUT WHICH ONE IS CLOSER TO YOU?”] (Respondent Show Card 7)
1. Above all, I am a Tunisian
 2. Above all, I am a (Muslim [CHRISTIAN FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS]/[JEWISH FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS])
 3. Above all, I am an Arab
 4. Above all, I am a Berber
 5. Above all, I am Other [DO NOT READ OUT. PLEASE SPECIFY OTHER]
 98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?

	(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly	DK	NR
v32.	Religious leaders should not interfere in politics. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v33.	It would be better for Tunisia, if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v34.	There are conspiracies against Muslims.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v35.	Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.	1	2	3	4	8	9

Now, I would like to know your views about a good government. How important is each of the following traits for a good government? (Respondent Show Card 8)

	(...Is it very important, important, somewhat important, least important, or not important?)	Very important	Important	Somewhat important	Least important	Not important	DK	NR
v36.	It should make laws according to the people's wishes. Is it very important, important, somewhat important, least important, or not important?	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v37.	It should implement only the laws of the shari'a	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

- v38. How do you feel toward the current political leaders who are in power in Tunisia? Choose the statement that is closest to how you feel (Respondent Show Card 9).
1. I feel respect towards them
 2. I feel secure in their presence
 3. They make me upset
 4. They make me angry
 5. They make me feel contempt
 8. DK
 9. NR

- v39. To what extent do you think the new constitution will have a direct effect on Tunisian people's lives?
1. A lot
 2. Some
 3. Not very much
 4. None at all
 8. DK
 9. NR

SECTION D

The next set of questions is about religion. Please be assured they are in no way intended to reveal doubts about anyone's faith in their religion. These questions are being asked to people of different religions all over the world including Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and so on. We compare people's responses in different countries in order to understand the similarities and differences in their religious faiths. We appreciate everyone's generous contributions to our research.

Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements. **(Respondent Show Card 10)**

(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v40.	Any infraction of religious instruction will bring about Allah's severe punishment. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v41.	Only Islam [Christianity (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Judaism (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] provides comprehensive truth about Allah.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v42.	Non-Muslims [Non-Christians (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Non-Jews (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] should be prohibited from practicing their religion in Tunisia.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v43.	Only the fear of Allah keeps people on the right path.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v44.	The Quran [Bible (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/the Torah (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] is true from beginning to end.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v45.	Only Islam [Christianity (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Judaism (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] gives a complete and unfailing guide to human salvation and guidance.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v46.	Allah requires his slaves to repent (tobbah)	1	2	3	4	8	9
v47.	Only Muslims [Christians (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Jews (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] will go to heaven.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v48.	Our children should not be allowed to learn about other religions.	1	2	3	4	8	
v49.	The followers of other religions should not have the same rights as mine.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v50.	Satan is behind any attempt to undermine belief in Allah.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v51.	Criticism of Islam [Christianity (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Judaism (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] should not be tolerated.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v52.	People stay on the right path only because they expect to be rewarded in heaven.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v53.	In the presence of the Quran [the Bible (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/the Torah (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)], there is no need for man-made laws.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v54.	Criticism of Muslim [Christian (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Jewish (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] religious leaders should not be tolerated.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v55.	The Quran [the Bible (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/the Torah (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] has correctly predicted all the major events that have occurred in human history. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v56.	Islam [Christianity (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/Judaism (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)] is the only true religion.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v57.	Whenever there is a conflict between religion and science, religion is always right.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v58.	Shia in Tunisia should have the same rights to practice their	1	2	3	4	8	9

Section D2

Now I'm going to ask you some questions about politics.

Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?

(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v66.	People's freedom of expression must be protected even if it is contrary to: Your personal beliefs. Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v67.	People's freedom of expression must be protected even if it is contrary to: Your religion	1	2	3	4	8	9
v68.	People's freedom of expression must be protected even if it is contrary to: The Tunisian government	1	2	3	4	8	9

v69. I am going to read you two statements about tourism in Tunisia and I'd like you to tell me which comes closer to how you feel.

1. Tourism is important for economic development in Tunisia.
5. Tourism makes people less religious
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v70. When you get together with your friends or relatives, would you say you discuss political matters a lot, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. A lot
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

Now I'd like you to look at card 15. I'm going to read out some types of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things a lot, sometimes, rarely, or not at all since December, 2010.

(Respondent Show Card 15)

(...would you say a lot, sometimes, rarely, or not at all?)		A lot	Sometimes	Rarely	Not at all	DK	NR
v71.	Sign a petition? Have you signed a petition a lot, sometimes, rarely, or not at all since December, 2010?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v72.	Attend a non-violent protest, march, or sit-in?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v73.	Attend a demonstration to support a political figure or party?						
v74.	Participate in a political activity in which there was the possibility of being arrested?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v75.	Participate in a political activity in which you feared for your personal safety?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v76.	Participate in a violent political activity that might lead to property damage or injury of others?	1	2	3	4	8	9

When you decide to participate in various types of political actions, how much do you rely on the opinions of the following people? **(Respondent Show Card 16)**

(...do you rely a great deal, some, not very much, or not at all?)		A great deal	Some	Not very much	Not at all	DK	NR
v77.	Family – Do you rely a great deal, some, not very much, or not at all when deciding to engage in political activities?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v78.	Friends and peers?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v79.	Religious figures?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v80.	Political leaders?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v81.	Journalists or press?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v82.	And, what about rumors you hear from other people? How often do you rely on those: A great deal, some, not very much, or not at all?	1	2	3	4	8	9

How likely is it that you will participate in the following activities in the next 12 months? Please use a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 means that you are extremely unlikely to participate in the following activity, and 4 means that you are extremely likely to participate in the activity. **(Respondent Show Card 17)**

(...are you extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, somewhat likely, or extremely likely to participate?)		Extremely unlikely	Somewhat unlikely	Somewhat likely	Extremely likely	DK	NR
v83.	Sign a petition? Are you extremely unlikely, somewhat unlikely, somewhat likely, or extremely likely to participate?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v84.	Attend a non-violent protest, march, or sit-in?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v85.	Attend a demonstration to support a political figure or party	1	2	3	4	8	9
v86.	Participate in a political activity in which there was the possibility of being arrested?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v87.	Participate in a political activity in which you feared for your personal safety?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v88.	Participate in a violent political activity that might lead to property damage or injury of others?	1	2	3	4	8	9

How effective do you think the following types of political action are? Please use a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 means that the political activity is not at all effective in fulfilling its goal, and 4 means the political activity is extremely effective in fulfilling its goal.

(Respondent Show Card 18)

(...would you say it is not at all effective, somewhat effective, effective, or extremely effective?)		Not at all effective	Somewhat effective	Effective	Extremely effective	DK	NR
v89.	Sign a petition? Would you say it is not at all effective, somewhat effective, effective, or extremely effective?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v90.	Attend a non-violent protest, march, or sit-in?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v91.	Attend a demonstration to support a political figure or party?						
v92.	Engage in a <u>violent</u> political activity that might lead to property damage or injury of others?	1	2	3	4	8	9

People sometimes talk about what the goals of this country should be for the next ten years. On card 19 are listed some of the goals which different people give different top priority.

v93.	<p>Which of the following goals do you consider as a top priority for Tunisia? (Respondent Show Card 19) (INSTRUCTION TO INTERVIEWER: CIRCLE ONLY ONE CHOICE):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high level of economic growth 2. Establish democracy and the rule of law 3. The establishment of an Islamic state 4. Maintaining security 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)
v94.	<p>And which would be the next most important? (INSTRUCTION TO INTERVIEWER: CIRCLE ONLY ONE CHOICE)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. A high level of economic growth 2. Establish democracy and the rule of law 3. The establishment of an Islamic state 4. Maintaining security 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)

v95.	<p>If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is the most important obligation for Tunisians? (Respondent Show Card 20) (INSTRUCTION TO INTERVIEWER: CIRCLE ONLY ONE CHOICE):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Try hard to excel in science and technology 2. Travel to occupied Muslim countries to fight the enemies of Islam 3. Defend people's freedom of speech 4. To apply Islamic shari'a in Tunisia 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)
v96.	<p>And which would be the next important obligation? (INSTRUCTION TO INTERVIEWER: CIRCLE ONLY ONE CHOICE)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Try hard to excel in science and technology 2. Travel to occupied Muslim countries to fight the enemies of Islam 3. Defend people's freedom of speech 4. To apply Islamic shari'a in Tunisia 8. DK (DO NOT READ OUT) 9. NR (DO NOT READ OUT)

We would like you now to tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statements:

(...would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v97.	Only through scientific knowledge are humans able to fully understand the meaning of life. Would you say you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v98.	Only through technological innovations are people able to establish a safe, secure, and prosperous society.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v99.	Only scientific knowledge is capable of providing the path to happiness.	1	2	3	4	8	9

SECTION D3

v100. We would now like to talk about your experiences with the October 2011 elections in Tunisia. Who did you vote for in the last election?

- 97. I did not participate in the elections [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v101. If elections were held tomorrow, who would you vote for? **[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF RESPONDENT SAYS “I DON’T KNOW WHO WOULD BE RUNNING”, YOU CAN SAY “CONSIDER THE PEOPLE OR PARTIES THAT ARE CURRENTLY PRESENT”]**

- 97. I would not participate in the elections [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v102. In your opinion, how much do the current government officials care what people like you think? Would you say a great deal, some, not very much, or not at all?

- 1. A great deal
- 2. Some
- 3. Not very much
- 4. Not at all
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v103. How much can people like you affect what the current government does? Would you say a great deal, some, not very much, or not at all?

- 1. A great deal
- 2. Some
- 3. Not very much
- 4. Not at all
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v104. On the whole, how would you rate the fairness of the last national election? Was it completely fair, fair but with minor problems, fair but with major problems, or not fair?

- 1. Completely fair
- 2. Fair, but with minor problems
- 3. Fair, with major problems
- 4. Not fair
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v105. Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption currently among government officials in Tunisia is very common, common, uncommon, or very uncommon?

- 1. Very common
- 2. Common
- 3. Uncommon
- 4. Very uncommon
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

We would like you now to compare the present conditions in Tunisia with those during the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. In each of the following areas, would you say that today things occur much more than before, somewhat more than before, about the same, somewhat less than before, or much less than before? (**Respondent Show Card 21**)

(...would you say this occurs much more than before, somewhat more than before, is much the same, somewhat less than before, or much less than before?)	Much more than before	Somewhat more than before	Much the Same	Somewhat less than before	Much less than before	DK	NR
v106. People's freedom to join any organization they want. Would you say this occurs much more than before, somewhat more than before, is much the same, somewhat less than before, or much less than before?	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v107. Corruption in politics and government.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v108. Unlawful arrest by the government.	1	2	3	4	5	8	9
v109. The difference between the rich and the poor	1	2	3	4	5	8	9

I am going to read you a series of statements about life in Tunisia **today**. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree.

(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)

		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v110.	In general, Tunisian society is fair. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v111.	Everyone is free to say what they think.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v112.	The political system operates the way it should.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v113.	Society is set up so people usually get what they deserve. (Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	1	2	3	4	8	9
v114.	Everyone has a fair shot at economic prosperity.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v115.	Society needs to be radically restructured.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v116.	Everybody is free to decide whether or not to practice a religion.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v117.	Tunisia is the best country in the world to live in. (Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	1	2	3	4	8	9
v118.	In general, government policies serve the interests of the Tunisian people	1	2	3	4	8	9

I am going to read you a series of questions about types of actions and ask how capable you feel about carrying them out in this country, Tunisia, nowadays. Please use a scale where "1" means "a great deal", "2" means "some", "3" means "not very much" and "4" "not at all". (**Respondent Show Card 22**)

(...are you capable a great deal, some, not very much, or not at all?)

		A great deal	Some	Not very much	Not at all	DK	NR
v119.	Stating your own political opinion openly. Are you capable a great deal, some, not very much, or not at all?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v120.	Make certain that political representatives honor their commitments to the electorate.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v121.	Play a role in the choice of the leaders of political movements to which you support.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v122.	Campaign for the political movement or party that you support.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v123.	Promote the chances of election of political candidates you support.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v124.	Collect money to support the activities of your party.	1	2	3	4	8	9

- v125. People have different views about the factors that lead to the total decay of society and its failure to satisfy the various needs of the individual. In your view, which one of the following is the most important cause of the decadence of society? **(NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: ACCEPT ONLY ONE CHOICE) (Respondent Show Card 23)**
1. Economic backwardness
 2. Religious extremism
 3. Mistreatment of women
 4. Abandoning religious values
 5. Lack of support for science and technology
 6. Political despotism
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

- v126. And which one is the second most important cause? **(NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: ACCEPT ONLY ONE CHOICE) (Respondent Show Card 23)**
1. Economic backwardness
 2. Religious extremism
 3. Mistreatment of women
 4. Abandoning religious values
 5. Lack of support for science and technology
 6. Political despotism
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

- v127. Now, which of the following factors are most important in helping societies to overcome decadence? **(Respondent Show Card 24)**
1. Development of science and technology
 2. The establishment of an Islamic system
 3. Democratic system
 4. Gender equality
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

SECTION E

- v128. How many hours do you usually spend watching television on an average per day?
_____ [CODE NUMBER OF HOURS. IF RESPONDENT ANSWERS "I DON'T WATCH TV", CODE 0]
98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]
- v129. How much do you rely on Tunisian television channels as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or not at all?
1. A great deal
 2. Some
 3. Not very much
 4. Not at all -----> Skip to V131
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V131
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V131
- v130. Which Tunisian channel is the most reliable source of information for you? (**PRE-CODED OPEN-ENDED QUESTION – DO NOT READ RESPONSE CATEGORIES**)
1. Nationale 1
 2. Nationale2
 3. Hannibal TV
 97. Other [PLEASE SPECIFY] _____
 98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]
- v131. How much do you rely on international (non-Tunisian) television channels as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or not at all?
1. A great deal
 2. Some
 3. Not very much
 4. Not at all -----> Skip to V133
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V133
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V133
- v132. Which international (non-Tunisian) television channel is the most reliable source of information for you? (**PRE-CODED OPEN-ENDED QUESTION. – DO NOT READ RESPONSE CATEGORIES**)) [PLEASE SPECIFY]
- _____
98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]
- v133. How much do you rely on radio as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or not at all?
1. A great deal
 2. Some
 3. Not very much
 4. Not at all -----> Skip to V135
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V135
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V135

v134. Which radio channel is the most reliable source of information for you? (PRE-CODED OPEN ENDED QUESTION. – DO NOT READ RESPONSE CATEGORIES))

1. Zitouna FM
2. Shems FM
3. RTCI
4. RTCN
5. Radio Tataouine
6. Radio Sfax
7. Radio Monastir
8. Radio Kalima
9. Radio Kef
10. Radio Jeunes
11. Radio Gafsa
12. Mosaïque FM
13. Jawahra FM
14. Express FM
15. Sabra FM
16. Cap FM
17. IFM
18. Oxygène FM
19. Oasis FM
20. Ibtissama FM
97. Other [PLEASE SPECIFY]_____
98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v135. How much do you rely on newspapers as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or not at all?

1. A great deal
2. Some
3. Not very much
4. Not at all -----> Skip to V137
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V137
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] -----> Skip to V137

v136. Which newspaper is the most reliable source of information for you? (PRE-CODED OPEN-ENDED QUESTION)

- | | |
|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Voix du peuple | 28. Al maghreb |
| 2. Tunis Hebdo | 97. Other [PLEASE SPECIFY]_____ |
| 3. Réalité | 98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT] |
| 4. Le quotidien | 99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT] |
| 5. La presse | |
| 6. La liberté | |
| 7. L'opinion | |
| 8. L'expert | |
| 9. L'audace | |
| 10. Essabah | |
| 11. Chourouk | |
| 12. Assarih | |
| 13. Al refek | |
| 14. Al moussawer | |
| 15. Al hadath | |
| 16. Al fajer | |
| 17. Al bayene | |
| 18. Al arabia | |
| 19. Al Anouar | |
| 20. Al Amal | |
| 21. Al iléne | |
| 22. Attounissia | |
| 23. Al osboû | |
| 24. Al mawkef | |
| 25. Al hakika | |
| 26. Akhbar aljomhuriya | |
| 27. Alkhabar | |

- v137. How much do you rely on social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or at all?
1. A great deal
 2. Some
 3. Not very much
 4. Not at all
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]
- v138. How much do you rely on the internet as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or not at all?
1. A great deal
 2. Some
 3. Not very much
 4. Not at all
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]
- v139. How much do you rely on your mobile phone as a source of information – a great deal, some, not very much or at all? **[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF R ASKS “DO YOU MEAN CONTACTING FRIENDS OR FAMILY”, CLARIFY: ONLY IF IT IS A SOURCE OF INFORMATION]**
1. A great deal
 2. Some
 3. Not very much
 4. Not at all
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

SECTION F

Next, we are interested in your views concerning business and the economy here in Tunisia. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.

v140. **(Respondent Show Card 25)**
People can only get rich at the expense of others
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 DK=98
NR=99

v141. **(Respondent Show Card 26) [NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF THE RESPONDENT ASKS ABOUT WHAT TYPE OF COMPETITION, YOU MAY SAY “COMPETITION IN BUSINESS AND ECONOMY HERE IN TUNISIA”]**
Competition is good.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 DK=98
NR=99

v142. **(Respondent Show Card 27)**
The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 DK=98
NR=99

v143. Generally speaking, would you say that this country’s economy is currently run by a few big influential people and organizations who are looking out for themselves only or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?

- 1. Run by a few big interests
- 5. Run for all the people
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v144. Let’s talk about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do – let anyone come who wants to, let people come as long as there are jobs available, place **strict** limits on the number of people who can come here, or prohibit people coming here from other countries? **(Respondent Show Card 28)**

- 1. Let anyone come who wants to
- 2. Let people come as long as there are jobs available
- 3. Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here
- 4. Prohibit people coming here from other countries
- 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
- 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

SECTION H

We would like you to think about morality levels in countries around the world. **We will be talking about countries as different as Japan and Bangladesh.** Countries where people have the lowest morality levels are rated one and countries where people have the highest morality levels are rated ten. You can use both of those numbers for rating morality levels plus all of the numbers in between. If you are not sure, please use your best guess. **[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF R SAYS “DON’T KNOW”, REPEAT: PLEASE USE YOUR BEST GUESS]**
(Respondent Show Card 29)

	Country	Low morality							High morality			DK	NR
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
v145.	France? (IF R ASKS YOU MAY INFORM: “1 is least moral, 10 is most moral”)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
v146.	Libya? (IF R ASKS YOU MAY INFORM: “1 is least moral, 10 is most moral”)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
v147.	Algeria? (IF R ASKS YOU MAY INFORM: “1 is least moral, 10 is most moral”)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
v148.	The U.S.? (IF R ASKS YOU MAY INFORM: “1 is least moral, 10 is most moral”)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
v149.	TUNISIA (IF R ASKS YOU MAY INFORM: “1 is least moral, 10 is most moral”)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99

v150. Now I will ask your opinion about certain kinds of behaviors. Which one of the following four actions is most immoral – stealing other people’s property, violence against other people, premarital sex, or telling lies to other people to protect one’s own interests? **[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: IF R COULD NOT SPECIFY, PROBE: IN YOUR OPINION, WHICH ONE IS MORE IMMORAL? (Respondent Show Card 30)**

1. Stealing other people’s property
2. Violence against other people
3. Premarital sex
4. Telling lies to other people to protect one’s own interests
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

		A great deal	Some	Not very much	Not at all	DK	NR
v151.	To what extent does allowing men and women to work together in public places lead to moral decay – always, most of the time, occasionally, or never?	1	2	3	4	8	9

I will read you a list of behaviors. Behaviors that are immoral are rated one and behaviors that are moral are rated ten. You can use both of those numbers for rating behaviors plus all of the numbers in between. Using this scale where 1 is immoral and 10 is moral, where would you put: **(Respondent Show Card 31)**

	Immoral		Moral	DK	NR
--	----------------	--	--------------	-----------	-----------

v152.	Stealing other people's property?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
v153.	Violence against other people?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
v154.	Premarital sex?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99
v155.	Telling lies to other people to protect one's own interests?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99

Please tell us if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements:

(...do you strongly agree, agree disagree or strongly disagree?)		Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v166.	In Tunisia these days, life is unpredictable and dangerous.	1	2	3	4	8	8
v167.	It is not possible to live happily in this mortal life.	1	2	3	4	8	9

- v168. Some people believe that individuals can decide their own destiny, while others think that it is impossible to escape a predetermined fate. Please tell me which comes closest to your view on this scale on which 1 means “everything in life is determined by fate,” and 10 means that “people shape their fate themselves.”
(Code one number): **(Respondent Show Card 35)**

Everything is determined by fate								People shape their fate themselves			DK	NR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		98	99

SECTION K

V183a. EXACT TIME NOW (CODE USING 24 HOUR CLOCK): _____

Next let's talk about neighbors.

(...Do you dislike or like...as your neighbors?)		Don't like	Like	DK	NR
v169.	Do you dislike or like Berbers as your neighbors?	1	5	8	9
v170.	Americans?	1	5	8	9
v171.	French?	1	5	8	9
v172.	Qataris?	1	5	8	9
v173.	Algerians?	1	5	8	9
v174.	Saudis?	1	5	8	9
v175.	Libyans?	1	5	8	9
v176.	Salafis	1	5	8	9

I am going to name a number of groups and institutions. For each one, could you tell me how much trust, in general, you have in them: is it a lot, some, only a little, or none at all? **(Respondent Show Card 36)**

(...do you have a lot of trust, some, only a little, or none at all?)		A lot	Some	Only a little	Not at all	DK	NR
v177.	Jews	1	2	3	4	8	9
v178.	Salafis	1	2	3	4	8	9
v179.	Shi'a	1	2	3	4	8	9
v180.	Christians	1	2	3	4	8	9
v181.	Political parties	1	2	3	4	8	9
v182.	Assembly of National Constitution	1	2	3	4	8	9
v183.	President	1	2	3	4	8	9
v184.	Prime minister						
v185.	Courts	1	2	3	4	8	9
v186.	Military	1	2	3	4	8	9
v187.	Mosques/Churches	1	2	3	4	8	9
v188.	The Arab League	1	2	3	4	8	9
v189.	United Nations	1	2	3	4	8	9
v190.	The press	1	2	3	4	8	9

v191. I would like to ask you a question about recent political upheavals in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and other places in the Middle East. Which of the following is the most important **purpose** of these movements?

[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: REFER RESPONDENT TO SHOW CARD AND ASK RESPONDENT TO FOLLOW THE LIST WHILE YOU READ]

(Respondent Show Card 37)

1. National movement for freedom and democracy
2. Religious movement for the establishment of an Islamic government
3. Movements to counter Western influence
4. Movements for economic equality and prosperity
5. These movements are a Western conspiracy
6. Movement of the Arab people for the unity of all Arab countries
7. Other **[PLEASE SPECIFY]**_____
8. DK
9. NR

v192. And what is the second most important purpose of these movements?

[NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: REFER RESPONDENT TO SHOW CARD AND ASK RESPONDENT TO FOLLOW THE LIST WHILE YOU READ] (Respondent Show Card 37)

1. National movement for freedom and democracy
2. Religious movement for the establishment of an Islamic government
3. Movements to counter Western influence
4. Movements for economic equality and prosperity
5. These movements are a Western conspiracy
6. Movement of the Arab people for the unity of all Arab countries
7. Other **[PLEASE SPECIFY]**_____
8. DK
9. NR

Now I'd like you to look at Show Card 38 and think about actions you may have taken during the revolutionary movement against the regime of former President of Tunisia, Zain al-Abedin Ben Ali, from December 17, 2010, to January 14, 2011. I'm going to read out some types of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have done any of these things a lot, sometimes, rarely, or not at all between December 17, 2010, and January 14, 2011.

(Respondent Show Card 38)

(...would you say a lot, sometimes, rarely, or not at all?)		A lot	Sometimes	Rarely	Not at all	DK	NR
v193.	Participated in discussions with family and friends against the regime? Have you participated in discussions with family and friends a lot, sometimes, rarely, or not at all since December, 2010?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v194.	Made financial contributions to anti-regime groups or people?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v195.	Participated in anti-regime demonstrations?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v196.	Organized and encouraged other people to participate in anti-regime efforts?	1	2	3	4	8	9

v197. Thinking about all of your responses to the questions I just asked you about your participation in anti-regime discussions and efforts, how much do you think you participated during the revolutionary movement, on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is no participation at all, and 10 is utmost participation?
(Respondent Show Card 39)

No participation					Utmost participation					DK	NR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99

v198. In September 2012 there was an attack on the U.S. Embassy and American school in Tunis in September 2012. Do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of these attacks?

1. Strongly approve
2. Approve
3. Disapprove
4. Strongly disapprove
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

SECTION K2

- v199. Next we will talk about the characteristics of a good government. Which of the following two statements comes closest to the way you feel?
1. A good government implements only the law of the shari'a [laws inspired by Christian values (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/laws inspired by Jewish values (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)]
 5. A good government makes laws according to the people's wishes
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]
- v200. Which of these two statements comes closest to the way you feel?
1. I would prefer if more people with strong religious views held public office
 5. I would prefer if more people with strong commitment to national interests held public office
 8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]
- v201. People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Using this card, please tell me which of these five statements comes closest to the way you feel. **(Respondent Show Card 40)**
1. I see myself as a citizen of the world
 2. I see myself as a citizen of Tunisia
 3. I see myself as a citizen of the Islamic umma [world-wide Christian community (FOR CHRISTIAN RESPONDENTS)/world-wide Jewish community (FOR JEWISH RESPONDENTS)]
 4. I see myself as a citizen of the Arab community
 5. I see myself as a citizen of Berber community
 98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

Some countries may have active enemies or are in a state of war with other countries, while other countries are not in such a state. If Tunisia were to have such enemies or war conditions, we would like to ask you how you think they should be dealt with.

Would you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements?

(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	Strongly agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly disagree	DK	NR
v202. The only way to teach a lesson to our enemies is to threaten their lives and make them suffer. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v203. People should be ready for self-sacrifice to defend against the enemies of Tunisia.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v204. Muslims must use violence against the enemies of Islam in Tunisia.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v205. Tunisians are obligated to fight the influence of Western culture in their society.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v206. The Shi'is are a major threat to the Sunni way of life.	1	2	3	4	8	9
v207. Our military personnel must gain religious education.	1	2	3	4	8	9

This set of questions asks about all kinds of attacks on different groups of people. I will read you a list and ask you if you strongly approve of the attacks, somewhat approve of them, somewhat disapprove of them, or strongly disapprove of them. **(Respondent Show Card 41)**

(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	Strongly approve	Somewhat approve	Somewhat disapprove	Strongly disapprove	DK	NR
v208. Assaults on Tunisia security forces - do you strongly approve of them, somewhat approve of them, somewhat disapprove of them, or strongly disapprove of them?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v209. Assaults on US military troops in Iraq or Afghanistan?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v210. Assaults on US civilians working for US companies in Europe?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v211. Assaults on US civilians working for US companies in Islamic countries?	1	2	3	4	8	9
v212. Assaults on Iraqis or Afghans working for US companies in Iraq or Afghanistan?	1	2	3	4	8	9

v213. Some people get involved in illegal activities when they were young. Have you ever had any problems with the police because of an activity like that when you were a teenager or before reaching the age of 25?

1. Yes
5. No -----> Skip to V215
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v214. How often did you have trouble with the police? Would you say quite a lot, a few times, or once or twice?

1. Quite a lot
2. A few times
3. Once or twice
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

People have different feelings about political leaders. Now we're going to ask you just a few more questions about your personal feelings regarding political leaders in Tunisia. Using this show card, where 1 is "Strongly disagree" and 7 is "Strongly agree", how do you feel about the following statements? **(Respondent Show Card 42)**

(...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?)	Strongly disagree						Strongly agree	DK	NR
v215. I feel contempt when thinking about Tunisian political leaders. Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
v216. I feel disgust when thinking about Tunisian political leaders.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
v217. I feel anger when thinking about Tunisian political leaders.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
v218. I feel respect toward them when thinking about Tunisian political leaders.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
v219. I feel secure in their presence when thinking about Tunisian political leaders.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

SECTION L

Now I would like to ask a few more questions about you and your family.

- v220. What is the highest educational level that you have attained? **[IF STUDENT, CODE HIGHEST LEVEL HE/SHE EXPECTS TO COMPLETE. ALSO, FOR HIGHER EDUCATION, CODE 9]:**
1. No formal education
 2. Incomplete primary school
 3. Complete primary school
 4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type
 5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type
 6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type
 7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type
 8. Some university-level education, without degree
 9. University-level education, with degree (include post-graduate education)
 98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
 99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]
- v221. Are you employed now including self-employment?
1. Yes
 5. No → Skip to v224
- v222. About how many hours do you work per day on your main job? **[IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME]** _____ Hours Per Day
- v223. About how many days each week do you work at your main job? **[IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME]**
_____ Days Per Week → Skip to v226
- v224. Why aren't you employed at the present time?
1. Lost Job/Laid off → Skip to v226
 2. Retired
 3. Housewife
 4. Student
 5. Permanently Disabled
 7. OTHER (SPECIFY): _____
- v225. Have you ever done any work for pay including self-employment?
1. Yes
 5. No → Skip to v229
- v226. What (is/was) your main profession – what type of work (do/did) you do? Please specify. **[IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME. YOU SHOULD ASK WHETHER R'S JOB REQUIRES A UNIVERSITY DEGREE OR TECHNICAL TRAINING. FOR COMPANY MANAGERS, YOU SHOULD ASK ABOUT THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE COMPANY AND THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES THAT THE RESPONDENT SUPERVISES]**

v227. (Are/Were) you self-employed?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

v228. (Are/Were) you working for the government or public organization, a private business or industry, or what?

- 1. Government or public organization
- 2. Private business or industry
- 3. Private non-profit organization (**IF VOLUNTEERED**)
- 7. OTHER (SPECIFY): _____

v229. Are you the chief wage earner in your household?

- 1. Yes →Skip to v232
- 5. No

v230. Is the chief wage earner in your household employed now?

- 1. Yes
- 5. No

v231. What (is/was) the main profession of the chief wage earner in your household – what type of work (does/did) the chief wage earner do? Please specify. [**IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME. YOU SHOULD ASK WHETHER R'S JOB REQUIRES A UNIVERSITY DEGREE OR TECHNICAL TRAINING. FOR COMPANY MANAGERS, YOU SHOULD ASK ABOUT THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE COMPANY AND THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES THAT THE RESPONDENT SUPERVISES**]

v232. Sex of Respondent:

- 1. Male
- 5. Female →Skip to v239

v233. Please remind me, are you currently married? [**NOTE TO INTERVIEWER: REFER TO QUESTION V4. IF THE ANSWER IS DIFFERENT, CORRECT AFTER CONSULTING WITH RESPONDENT**]

- 1. Yes
- 5. No → Skip to v239

v234. Is your wife employed now including self-employment? This includes any paid employment, whether at home or outside the home.

- 1. Yes
- 5. No → Skip to v237

v235. About how many hours does she work per day on her main job?

_____ Hours Per Day [**IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME**]

v236. About how many days each week does she work at her main job?
_____ Days Per Week → Skip to v238

v237. Have she ever done any work for pay **including self-employment**?
1. Yes
5. No → Skip to v239

v238. What (is/was) her main profession – what type of work (does/did) she do? Please specify. **[IF R MENTIONS THAT S/HE HAS MULTIPLE JOBS, SPECIFY THAT WE ARE ASKING ABOUT THE JOB WITH THE BIGGER INCOME. YOU SHOULD ASK WHETHER R'S JOB REQUIRES A UNIVERSITY DEGREE OR TECHNICAL TRAINING. FOR COMPANY MANAGERS, YOU SHOULD ASK ABOUT THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN THE COMPANY AND THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES THAT THE RESPONDENT SUPERVISES]**

v239. How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If "1" means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and "10" means you are completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household's financial situation? **(Respondent Show Card 43)**

Completely Dissatisfied								Completely Satisfied		DK	NR
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	98	99

v240. During the past 12 months, did your family save money, just get by, spend some savings, or spend some savings and borrow money?
1. Save money
2. Just get by
3. Spent some savings
4. Spent savings and borrowed money
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v241. People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, or lower class?
1. Upper class
2. Upper middle class
3. Lower middle class
4. Working class
5. Lower class
8. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]
9. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

v242. On this card is a scale of household incomes **per month**. We would like to know in what group your household is counting all wages, salaries, pensions, and other incomes that come in **per month**. Just give the number of the group your household falls into, before taxes and other deductions. (**Respondent Show Card 40**)

Tunisian Dinars	
1.	3,501+
2.	2,501-3,500
3.	1,501-2,500
4.	1,001-1,500
5.	501-1,000
6.	201-500
7.	<201

98. DK [DO NOT READ OUT]

99. NR [DO NOT READ OUT]

Those are all of the questions I have for you today. Thank you very much for your kind help with our research.

v243. **EXACT TIME NOW (CODE USING 24 HOUR CLOCK):** _____

SECTION M

v244. Total length of interview: ____ Minutes:

INTERVIEW CHARACTERISTICS AND SURVEY INFORMATION

v245. During the interview the respondent was....

1. Very interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Not very interested

v246. Where did the interview take place?

1. In the respondent's home
2. At the respondent's doorstep
3. At the respondent's place of work
4. Coffee shop
5. Other [PLEASE SPECIFY] _____

v247. Please choose the best statement that describes your seating arrangement relative to the Respondent during interview

1. Next to R (facing the same way)
2. Next to R (facing at a right angle)
3. Across from R
4. Other seating arrangement

v248. Who was present during the interview? (Circle all that apply)

1. Father
2. Mother
3. Husband
4. Wife
5. Brother
6. Sister
7. Son >18 years old
8. Daughter >18 years old
9. Son 13-17 years old
10. Daughter 13-17 years old
11. Son 9-12 years old
12. Daughter 9-12 years old
13. Son 4-9 years old
14. Daughter 4-9 years old
15. Son under 4 years old
16. Daughter under 4 years old
17. Father in-law
18. Mother in-law
19. Aunt
20. Uncle
21. Male Neighbor
22. Female Neighbor
23. Male Friend
24. Female Friend
25. Other (Specify) _____
26. No one was present (Skip to V253)
27. Don't Know

v249. During how much of the interview were any of the people present?

1. All the interview
2. Most of the interview
3. Some of the interview
4. A short period of interview

v250. During which section/s was/were this person/these people present?

—

—

v251. Please select the appropriate phrase

1. The person/s who was/were present could hear the questions and answers
2. The person/s who was/were present could hear the questions and answers, but they are too young to understand the content of the interview
3. The person/s who was/were present couldn't hear the questions and answers

v252. How did the presence of other persons affect the interview? (Circle all that apply)

1. Person/s joined the interview, and you had to stop the interview until they left
2. Person/s joined the interview, you and the Respondent answered their questions or explained that privacy was needed, and they left
3. Person/s stayed in the room, but they could not hear the interview
4. Person/s stayed in the room, and they could hear the interview but they didn't interfere or participate in the interview
5. Person/s stayed in the room, and helped the Respondent with his/her answers
6. Person/s stayed in the room, and imposed answers on the respondent
7. Person/s stayed in the room, which made the respondent conservative and not at ease
8. Other – Specify _____

v253. Which statement describes best the situation that lead to the presence of others during the interview?

1. Person/s was/were present in the same room and neither you or the Respondent asked them to leave
2. Person/s was/were present in the same room and you asked them to leave and they left
3. Person/s was/were present in the same room and you asked them to leave but they refused
4. Person/s was/were present in the same room and the Respondent asked them to leave and they left
5. Person/s was/were present in the same room and the Respondent asked them to leave but they refused
6. Person/s was/were present in the same room and you and the Respondent asked them to leave and they left
7. Person/s was/were present in the same room and you and the Respondent asked them to leave but they refused
8. Person/s was/were not present in the room and the Respondent invited them to stay and you did not mind
9. Person/s was/were not present in the room and the Respondent invited them to stay in spite of the fact that you asked for a private interview
10. Other – Specify _____

V254. Any other interviewer observations

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APPENDIX B

National Sampling Design for Survey of the Tunisian Household Population University of Tunis, Eastern Michigan University, University of Michigan January 2013

Country: Tunisia

Coverage: National Survey

Sample size: 3000 effective interviews

For the purpose of preparing the sample frame for the present survey, we use information provided in Table 1 from the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) of Tunisia to help in the design of the samples of size 3000 respondents. NIS figures are based on 2004 census conducted in Tunisia and updated in 2009 based on a large household survey. Updates from 2009 are based on recent GIS information. Tunisia is divided in 24 Governorates; each governorate is divided to Delegations and each Delegation is further divided to Districts. The NIS has booklets for each district that identify all households within each district unit.

Table 1:

Code Gouv	Governorate	Nbr. Delegation	Number of Districts	Number of Households
11	Tunis	25	3,628	229,494
12	ARIANA	12	1,536	96,290
13	BEN AROUS	14	1,718	112,458
14	MANOUBA	11	1,009	69,482
15	NABEUL	19	2,174	151,147
16	ZAGHOUAN	6	493	32,762
17	BIZERTE	16	1,799	115,697
21	BEJA	11	972	67,209
22	JENDOUBA	14	1,307	91,152
23	LE KEF	10	876	57,095
24	SELIANA	9	666	47,382
31	SOUSSE	16	1,877	120,306
32	MONASTIR	13	1,480	98,444
33	MAHDIA	12	1,201	77,063
34	SFAX	26	2,822	192,775
41	KAIROUAN	15	1,572	104,786
42	KASSERINE	12	1,186	77,306
43	SIDI BOUZID	12	1,113	75,021
51	GABES	10	974	68,252
52	MEDNINE	12	1,330	86,727
53	TATAOUINE	5	408	25,817
61	GAFSA	9	966	64,293

62	TOZEUR	3	301	20,104
63	KEBILI	3	383	26,180
Total		295	31,791	2,107,242

B. Proposed Sampling Methodology: Multi-Sage Sampling Selection:

The survey population includes all age-eligible citizens of Tunisia. Eligible respondents for this study include only members of the household population aged 18 and above at the time of the first survey contact that result in a completed household listing. All regions of Tunisia—urban and rural—are included in the survey population. The estimated population of Tunisia is 10,673,800 and total number of households is 2,107,242.

A stratified multi-stage probability sample will be selected with sample size of 3,000 effective respondents. The overall response rate for the study is estimated to be 64% but varies by region. To compensate for nonresponse of sample households and persons the adjusted sample size of households is $n=4,695$. Because we do not have a good estimate of non-eligible households and vacant places, etc., a reserve sample size of 13% (615 households) is included in the sample size calculation. The additional households will be selected at the same time as the other 4,695 but will be released to the field only if needed.

- Strata: Governorate
- First Stage: Primary stage unit (PSU) = District
- Second Stage: SSU = Household (15 households per PSU)
- Third Stage: Respondent (1 per Household)
- Sample size: $4,695 = 3,000/0.6389$
- Reserve sample: $615 = 4,695 * 13\%$

Stage 1:

The total household population of Tunisia is divided into 24 strata based on the administrative boundaries, corresponding to the 24 Governorates. Each Governorate is divided in Districts, which is a smaller administrative unit. There 31,791 districts with on average 66 households per district. The range number of households per district is between 50 and 90 households.

Districts will be used as PSU for this study. The National Institute of Statistics (NIS) has a booklet for each District with a list of all households in it. The allocation of PSUs on each stratum will be proportional to the size (number of households). From each of the 24 Governorates, the districts (PSU) are sampled using a systematic random procedure.

The expected number of respondents per PSU in the sample is 15. Assuming perfect response rate, 200 PSU will be need to accomplish a sample size of 3,000 respondents ($3000/15$). The sample size sample has to be adjusted to account by the response rate. Response rates vary across

strata, then appropriate response rates need to be applied to each stratum (see Table 2). PSUs were proportionally allocated to strata as follows:

$$N_s = \left(\frac{H_s}{\sum_s H_s} * \frac{3000}{R_s} \right) = \%H_s * \frac{3000}{R_s}$$

$$PSU_s = \frac{N_s}{15} = \left(\%H_s * \frac{3000/15}{R_s} \right) = \frac{\%H_s * 200}{R_s}$$

- N_s is the sample size of the Stratum S
- H_s is the number of households in Stratum S
- R_s is the specific response rate for Stratum S
- $\%H_s$ is the percentage of households in Stratum S
- PSU_s is the number of PSUs to be selected in Stratum S

This method will allow for the sample of PSUs within each stratum to be adjusted to account for nonresponse, as opposed to the alternate method of increasing the number of sample households per PSU. The selected method ends to reduce the average cluster size for completed households.

Probability of selecting a PSU is calculated as follows: $p_1 = \frac{PSU_s}{\text{Total PSU in } S}$

- PSU_s is the number of PSU to be selected in Stratum S
- Total PSU in S : Are the total number of PSUs in Stratum S

Note: There are no particular research considerations to further stratify the population using some variables, like urban/rural areas, or by socio-demographic characteristics. The purpose of the stratification is to match the geographic distribution of population of Tunisia. The sample design is not intended to produce estimates by stratum, the sample size for each stratum is too small.

Table 2

Governorate	Percentage of Households (%HH)	Expected Response Rate (RR)	Number of PSU (200*%HH/RR)	Reserve PSU	Total PSU including Reserve	Number HH selected without reserve (PSU*15)	Reserve HHs	Total HH selected with Reserve
Tunis	10.90%	0.5	44	5	49	660	75	735
ARIANA	4.60%	0.5	18	2	20	270	30	300
BEN AROUS	5.30%	0.5	22	3	25	330	45	375
MANOUBA	3.30%	0.5	14	2	16	210	30	240
NABEUL	7.20%	0.7	20	2	22	300	30	330

ZAGHOUAN	1.60%	0.7	4	1	5	60	15	75
BIZERTE	5.50%	0.7	16	2	18	240	30	270
BEJA	3.20%	0.7	9	1	10	135	15	150
JENDOUBA	4.30%	0.7	13	2	15	195	30	225
LE KEF	2.70%	0.7	7	1	8	105	15	120
SELIANA	2.20%	0.7	7	1	8	105	15	120
SOUSSE	5.70%	0.7	15	2	17	225	30	255
MONASTIR	4.70%	0.7	13	2	15	195	30	225
MAHDIA	3.70%	0.7	10	1	11	150	15	165
SFAX	9.10%	0.7	26	3	29	390	45	435
KAIROUAN	5.00%	0.7	14	2	16	210	30	240
KASSERINE	3.70%	0.7	10	1	11	150	15	165
SIDI BOUZID	3.60%	0.7	10	1	11	150	15	165
GABES	3.20%	0.7	10	1	11	150	15	165
MEDNINE	4.10%	0.7	11	2	13	165	30	195
TATAOUINE	1.20%	0.7	4	1	5	60	15	75
GAFSA	3.10%	0.7	9	1	10	135	15	150
TOZEUR	1.00%	0.7	3	1	4	45	15	60
KEBILI	1.20%	0.7	4	1	5	60	15	75
Total	100.00%	0.64	313	41	354	4695	615	5310

Stage 2:

The second stage units of the survey's multi-stage sample design include individual households. The NIS has a list of all the households within each of the selected district (PSU). A systematic random sample of households will be selected for contact from the listing for each district. The expected number of effective households interviewed is 3000. To meet this target a sample size of 5,310 households is going to be draw (Table 2).

For this stage, systematic random sampling from the ordered list will be applied to select the second stage sample of households within each PSU. Then the second stage probability of selection is given by:

$$p_2 = \frac{15}{hhPSU_{i,s}}$$

$hhPSU_{i,s}$ are the number of households on PSU i in Stratum S

Stage 3:

A single respondent from each sample household will be selected to participate in the survey among all eligible members of the household using Kish tables.

Final probability of selection for each selected member=Probability of Selection of PSU*Probability of selection of household* Probability of selection of member. Initial sampling weights will be the reciprocal of the selection probability for each selected respondent.

Weighting

Overall the response rate was higher than anticipated in the sample design. Foreseen that it is hard to accurately anticipate the response rate the sample was released in waves in order to avoid waste of resources. A total of 4020 households were selected in the sample with 3071 effective interviews.

Given the information available previous to sample design we planned to select PSU with systematic simple random sample. Similarly, we planned to households as systematic simple random sample. This would lead to unequal household's probability of selection. Fortunately the NIS was able to select PSU with probability proportionate to the size (PSU), this way we selected households are epcem in each stratum.

$$Pr(hh_{i,s}) = \frac{PSU_s * MoS_{psu}}{\sum_{psu} MoS = HH_s} * \frac{15}{MoS_{psu}} = \frac{PSU_s * 15}{HH_s}$$
$$w_{hh_{i,s}} = Pr(hh_{i,s})^{-1} = \frac{HH_s}{PSU_s * 15} = w_{hh_s}$$

Because the response rate varies across strata additional weight to account to this variation is included in the calculation of the final weight.

$$w_{nr_s} = \frac{HH_s - HH_{nonSample_s}}{HH_{slected_s}}$$

- HH_s is the total number of households in Stratum S
- $HH_{nonSample_s}$ is the total number of non-sample households in Stratum S
- $HH_{slected_s}$ is the total number of household selected in Stratum S

Finally, the household level weight is the equivalent to the total number of eligible number of member of the household ($w_{r_{k|i,s}}$ =eligible members in $hh_{i,s}$). Then the final weight for respondents is calculated as:

$$w_{k,s} = w_{hh_{i,s}} * w_{nr_s} * w_{r_{k|i,s}}$$

The final weights only have subscripts k and s referring to the k -th eligible member selected in a household and stratum s . Note that all household from the same stratum have the same weight.