

## MEHMED THE CONQUEROR (1432-1481) AND HIS TIME

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ON the occasion of the five-hundredth anniversary of the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks there appeared a number of publications on the last days of Byzantium and on the rising empire of the Ottomans. (A bibliography of the publications in western languages can be found in the 1950-1956 issues of *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*; Turkish publications are listed in *Istanbul Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 1955-1956.) Foremost among all these new publications is the work<sup>1</sup> of Professor Fr. Babinger, the well-known German orientalist. His work deserves special attention because of its scope and the great variety of sources and studies utilized. One reason we have not had a detailed review of the book until now is probably that the author promised in his preface to publish a second volume with the source material and bibliography on the subject. But I believe it is not too difficult for a student of the period to find out which sources are used in it and which are not.

Professor Babinger has clearly used the best known sources, such as Ducas, Sphrantzes, Chalcocondyles, Kritovoulos, G. M. Angielello, and the collections of documents from the archives in Ragusa, Venice, and the Vatican, as well as the classic works by Jireček, Kretschmayr, Von Pastor, Zinkeisen, and Jorga. But it is not easy to explain why he completely overlooked some of the most essential contemporary Ottoman sources of the period, available in printed form for a long time, which he himself described in his book on the Ottoman sources, *Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke* (Leipzig, 1927). These particular sources could have saved him from various mistakes. I shall try to review the book with the help of these sources and also add some new data from the archive material to support them.

Let us first examine the Ottoman sources which were available but insufficiently or not at all used by the author. The most important ones are Tursun Beg's *Târih-i Abu'l-Fath* (published in *TOEM* in 1921), Enverî's *Düstûrnâme* (ed. M. Halil Yinanc, Istanbul, 1928); and Kemâl Pasha-zâde's *Tavârih-i Âl-i Osman* (facsimile edition of the manuscript in *Fâtih Kütüp.*, No. 4205, by Dr Ş. Turan, Ankara, 1954).<sup>2</sup> Tursun's work has a particular interest. A member of a very in-

<sup>1</sup> Franz Babinger, *Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit, Weltenstürmer einer Zeitenwende*. Munich, Germany: F. Bruckmann, 1953. Pp. xiv, 592. — *Mahomet II le Conquérant et son temps (1432-1481)*, *La Grande Peur du Monde au tournant de l'histoire*. Trad. H. E. del Medico, revue par l'auteur. Paris: Payot, 1954. Pp. 636. — *Maometto il Conquistatore e il suo tempo* (Turin, Italy, 1957).

<sup>2</sup> Hereafter abbreviated as Tursun, Enverî, and Kemâl Pasha, respectively. Due to the different forms in the old and new script Turkish forms of names have not been reproduced here consistently. Modern Turkish undotted *i* is reproduced here as *î*. The specialist in the field should have no difficulty in recognizing the proper nouns.

fluent family (his uncle was governor of Bursa) and an expert in state finances, Tursun served first as government surveyor in Constantinople, and then as a secretary in the office of the grand vizier Mahmud. Later he was a commissioner of land and population surveys in Anatolia and finally he was made a *defterdâr*. Based exclusively on his personal experience, his work is a first hand source for Mehmed's reign. His position gave him access to valuable information about military as well as financial matters. His story of the siege of Constantinople is the most detailed Turkish account by a contemporary Ottoman. Tursun says explicitly that he accompanied the grand vizier Mahmud on his expeditions in Serbia (1458), Trebizond (1461), and Bosnia (1463 and 1464). As a secretary in Mahmud's service he wrote the surrender ultimatum to the ruler of Kastamonu in 1461, and he was sent by Mahmud to inform the Sultan of the success against the Venetians in the Morea in 1463. He also accompanied Mahmud Pasha in his expedition against the Venetians in Midilli (Mytilene) in 1462. Tursun's account especially of the military operations in Serbia and Bosnia in 1458-1464 includes many interesting details not found in other sources. Being in the service of this statesman for years, Tursun is the only source giving interesting information about rivalries among the high dignitaries. Writing his history after the death of Mehmed II, whose policies were sharply rejected by his successor, Tursun could feel free to be critical when dealing with Mehmed's measures. Tursun's important book was not used widely by later Ottoman historians. Kemâl Pasha skilfully combined Tursun's account with Neshrî's well-known work and with anonymous chronicles as well as with oral traditions from reliable persons. The latter included his own father, a vizier of Mehmed II, and the officials and soldiers who took part in the Sultan's expeditions (e.g., he records an interesting narrative of the conquest of Otranto in Italy by a soldier who took part in the operation). Kemâl Pasha's work, recently published and known to Babinger by title (see *GOW*, 61-63), is undoubtedly the most important Ottoman history written on the reign of Mehmed II.

Another great compilation is Idrîs-i Bidlîsî's *Hasht Behisht*, written by Bayezid's order. Although mostly dependent on Neshrî, the anonymous chronicles, and Rûhî (or, more probably, a source Rûhî used), it gives some original accounts, especially of events in Anatolia. *Hasht Behisht* gives a detailed description of Mehmed's army and administration in a long separate chapter unique among the contemporary sources. Sa'deddîn utilized Idrîs, Neshrî, and the anonymous chronicles as his main sources in his *Tâj at-Tavârih*. This was translated into Italian by V. Bratutti and has been considered a standard Ottoman source in the West, but — apart from the fact that he did not use Tursun, Kemâl-Pasha, and Enverî — his compilation must always be checked with his original sources.

Enverî's *Düstûrnâme* (see I. Mélikoff-Sayar, *Le destân d'Umar Pacha* [Paris, 1954], pp. 23-42) is also dedicated to Mahmud Pasha and in its last chapters, dealing with the reign of Mehmed II, Enverî records information of certain events to which he was an eye-witness and which are to be found in no other source.

Rûhî's work (see J. H. Mordtmann, *MOG*, II, 129) is also of great importance for the reign of Mehmed II because it reproduces an unknown independent

source with chronological data which are often accurate. It is utilized by Neshrî, Idrîs, and Kemâl Pasha. We have also the official calendars called *Takvîm-i Hümayûn* of the middle of the fifteenth century, arranged for the Sultan's use, which contain chronologies of the important bygone events (see my *Fâtih Devri* [Ankara, 1954], p. 23).

Taking as a basis Ashîk Pasha-zâde's fundamental compilation of Ottoman history in the first two centuries Neshrî interpolated into it Rûhî's chronicle and the data from the *Takvîms*. His interpolations made Ashîk's already confused chronology even more confused. Kemâl Pasha seems to know Rûhî only through Neshrî's compilation (cf. Volume I of Fr. Taeschner's edition, Leipzig, 1951).

My intention here is not to describe all the Ottoman sources of this period<sup>3</sup> but to show the relative importance of the basic ones which were overlooked by Babinger in his book.

Babinger's chief Ottoman sources are Neshrî, Sa'deddîn, Uruj, and the anonymous chronicles. He has not utilized, as it appears, Tursun, Enverî, Kemâl Pasha, Rûhî, and Idrîs. The first two were completely unknown to the chronicles which Babinger used.

The works of Ashîk, Neshrî, Rûhî, Idrîs, and Kemâl Pasha are all general histories of the Ottoman house written in the reign of the Bayezid II. When Bayezid came to the throne, after a widespread social and political reaction, he wanted to present himself as a promoter of a new era and ordered the scholars of his time to make a general account of the Ottoman dynasty before his accession. This comes out clearly from the prefaces which Rûhî, Kemâl Pasha, and Idrîs put in their works. In them the reaction to Mehmed's policies can be seen in many details, especially in financial matters and in the rehabilitation of the Chandarli family.

A determining factor in all the major political developments of Ottoman history between 1444 and 1453 was the struggle for supreme power between Chandarli Khalîl Pasha, the all powerful grand vizier since 1436 or 1437, and a group of ambitious military leaders including Shahâbeddîn Shâhin, Zaganos, and Turakhan, who were seeking to seize the control of the government by claiming to be protectors of the young Sultan's rights (he was only twelve in 1444). By repudiating Chandarli's peace policy they became responsible for Mehmed's aggressive expansionist policy from the outset and revived the idea of the conquest of Constantinople. By this policy they hoped to secure their own authority as well as the young Sultan's. Having failed in 1446, when Chandarli managed to bring back Murad II to the throne, they finally gained the upper hand after Mehmed's restoration in 1451, and caused Chandarli's dismissal and execution immediately after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. Babinger relates the popular stories about Chandarli's so-called cooperation with the enemy but does not look for

<sup>3</sup> For example, the works composed in verse and dedicated to the Sultan by Kâshîfî and Mu'âllî may be mentioned here in addition to the works which Babinger included in his *GOW*. These sources occasionally give quite important information missing in other sources (see *Fâtih Devri*, p. 107), but they have never been systematically utilized. Kivâmî's work, discovered and edited by Babinger (Istanbul, 1955) can be classified among such works.

the real source and meaning of it. Such rumors were obviously serving the purpose of his opponents. In the formation of Mehmed's personality and imperialistic policy the influence of Shâhin and especially of Zaganos can not be overestimated.

Babinger is justified in giving considerable space to the struggle between Hungary and the Ottomans for control of the lower Danube from Belgrade to Kilia. This actually appears to have determined not only the future of this region but also that of Byzantium. Wallachia's position in this rivalry is not clearly depicted by Babinger. Culminating in the years 1443-1448, the Ottoman-Hungarian struggle involved Wallachia vitally during this entire period. We know that Chandarli's diplomacy and the victory at Varna in 1444 had secured at least the neutrality of the Serbian Despot; but Wallachia, always under Hungarian influence, continued to be a constant threat to the Ottomans. In the spring of 1446 the defeat of Dâvûd Beg by Vlad I, who had seized Giurgiu from the Ottomans the preceding winter, appears to have been considered as a most serious event in Adrianople. It was after the Ottoman victory over the Hungarians at Kossova in 1448 that the Ottomans recaptured Giurgiu (Yerköğü) on the left side of the Danube and put Vlad II on the throne as a loyal vassal (see *Fâtih Devri*, p. 98). This meant for the Ottomans a further step for the control of the lower Danube.

Mehmed's wedding with Sitt-Khâtûn was the subject of considerable research by Babinger; see his long article, "Mehmed's II. Heirat mit Sitt-Chatun, 1449," *Der Islam*, xxix, 2 (1949). The exact date of this wedding ceremony is given by Enverî (*Düstûrnâme*, p. 93) as Shawwâl-Dhulka'de, 854 of the Hijra (the winter of 1450-1451), which is in agreement with Ducas, Chalcocondyles, and the Ottoman anonymous chronicles. Also overlooked by Babinger was Tursun's account of the conquest of Constantinople.

Tursun is in complete agreement with Western and Greek sources when he describes the reaction of the Ottoman army to the naval failure on 20 April 1453, the effect of the division between the Greek and Latin defenders during the siege, the panic resulting from the retreat of the wounded Giustiniani, and the decisive role of the Ottoman artillery in the conquest. The conflicting views of Chandarli and his opponents resulted in dramatic collisions twice during the siege, once after the naval failure on 20 April 1453 and then on 26 May when the rumors of a Western military intervention spread amongst the army. The second crisis made the Sultan decide on a general attack, which resulted in the conquest. Here is a partial translation of a letter of Shaykh Ak-Shemseddîn to the Sultan (the original is in the Topkapi-sarayı Museum, No. 5584; see also my *Fâtih Devri*, p. 217) testifying to the difficult situation in the Ottoman camp after 20 April:

This failure on the part of the navy caused a lot of disappointment and sorrow; there seemed to have been an opportunity the loss of which created a new activity. In the first place the religious one: the Christians rejoiced and made fuss; in the second place people in our camp ascribed this to your misjudgment and lack of authority. . . . Under these circumstances you have to make proper inquiries on this dissension and neglect, and punish severely those who were responsible for it, lest they commit the same neglect when the time comes to attack the walls and to fill the trenches.

Even before the discovery of this document, this critical moment was emphasized by Tursun: "This event [naval failure] caused despair and disorder in the ranks of the Muslims . . . the army was split into groups" (see *Fâtih Devri*, p. 127). From Babinger's book one gets a confused picture of Mehmed II's activities between the conquest of Constantinople and his expedition into Serbia in the spring of 1454. To discuss these chronological problems let me start by what Babinger says about Chandarli's execution: "The third day after the conquest Chandarli was imprisoned and the fortieth day after his arrest, that is, 10 July 1453, he was executed in Adrianople, where he had been transferred" (German edition, p. 108; but the French edition, p. 128, has 10 June). We read in Uruj's chronicle: "Khalil Pasha was executed forty days after the conquest of Enos" (Babinger's edition [Hanover, 1925], pp. 66-67). From various sources (Ducas and Kritovoulos) we know that Enos was conquered toward the end of January 1456. Now was the execution of Chandarli so long delayed, or do we have to put the name of Constantinople instead of Enos (İnez) in Uruj's sentence, as Babinger seems to do? The apparent contradiction comes from the confusion in Uruj of the actual conquest of Enos in 1456 with its earlier submission in the summer of 1453. More explicit on this point, an anonymous Ottoman chronicle (Manuscript in Topkapı Sarayı, Revan Kös. K., No. 1099) reads: "After the conquest of Constantinople Sultan Mehmed was about to send forces against İnez. When the *tekkour* (lord) of the fortress learned this he immediately sent to the threshold of the Sultan the keys, thus surrendering it and submitting to the Sultan." Kritovoulos, who was directly concerned in the affair, informs us that when, after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Sultan returned to Adrianople in "the harvest time" he received there a delegation from the islands under the Gattilusi and entrusted Imbros to Palamedes, lord of Enos. Kritovoulos begins the next chapter: "During the same period the Sultan arrested Khalil, one of his first rank men and very powerful and put him in prison. And after torturing him in many ways he put him to death" (trans. Ch. T. Riggs [Princeton, 1954], p. 87). Now, according to Ducas (Bonn edition, pp. 313-314), Mehmed II left Istanbul for Adrianople on 18 June 1453 and entered the city on the night of 21 June. This date agrees not only with "the harvest time" of Kritovoulos but also with the date given in the contemporary Ottoman registers of *tımârs* which show Karaja Beg, the governor-general of Rumeli, in Injigiz, a small town on Istanbul-Adrianople route on 18 June. Submission of Enos obviously took place after that date in the midsummer of 1453, and, if we follow Uruj's statement, the execution of Chandarli Khalil in August or even later in September.

Once asserting the Sultan's arrival in Adrianople to have taken place on 21 June 1453 (German edition, p. 107; French edition, p. 127)<sup>4</sup> Babinger contradicts himself when he says that Mehmed II spent 35 days in Anatolia during the summer of 1453 and returned to Adrianople in August (p. 112; p. 132). Before leaving Constantinople, after the conquest of 1453, Mehmed had sent orders to every

<sup>4</sup> Hereafter page references will be first to the German edition and second to the French edition, with a semi-colon separating the two numbers.

part of his realm ". . . that as many inhabitants as possible be transferred to the City" (Kritovoulos, p. 93; according to Ducas, p. 313, he had asked 5,000 settlers to be sent by September 1453; cf. Iorga, *Notes et extraits*, iv, 67.) According to Kritovoulos (p. 89), the Sultan returned from Adrianople to Constantinople in the autumn of 1453. His main concern at this time seems to have been the repopulation and defense of Constantinople before embarking on a new expedition in the West. In the autumn of 1453 his purpose seems to have been to inspect the repair work and the progress in repopulation. He acted so as to attract the Greeks for his purpose of resettlement of the city and on 6 January 1454 appointed Gennadius patriarch (Kritovoulos, pp. 93-95). "Having thus settled affairs in the city (Constantinople) the Sultan crossed over into Asia." He arrived in Bursa, put in good order all the affairs in Asia and appointed new governors "and all in the space of thirty-five days" (Kritovoulos, p. 95). This trip was not for rest, after the hardships of the siege of 1453, as Babinger suggests (p. 112; p. 132). Obviously he misunderstood the information in Kritovoulos. First of all, the trip was made in the winter of 1454; the severe measures taken were probably motivated by the failure of the officials there to send the ordered number of settlers. The resistance of the well-to-do to emigration for the settlement of Istanbul is testified to by Tursun (p. 60). The record books of the *kâdîs* of Bursa of Mehmed's time prove that the emigration from this city to Istanbul actually took place. At any rate, Mehmed II returned from Bursa to Istanbul, where he remained only a short time, and set out for Adrianople in the winter of 1454 (Kritovoulos, p. 95). There he could make his preparations for the expedition against Serbia in the spring of 1454 without worrying much about Istanbul.

The succession in the vizierate after the downfall of Chandarli has always been a problem for historians, and here Babinger adds nothing new. He first maintains that ". . . after the execution of Grand Vizier Chandarli-oghlu Khalil Pasha the highest post in the government remained vacant for one year" (p. 117; p. 138). But in another place he adds: "Kritovoulos is the only source to say that the vacant post of grand vizier was occupied by Ishak Pasha for a short time. In the summer of 1453 Mehmed II entrusted this office to one of the most remarkable figures in Ottoman history, Mahmud Pasha" (p. 118; p. 139). Now let me at once say that before Mahmud's appointment, Zaganos Pasha was grand vizier, and only in 1456 was Mahmud promoted to the grand vizierate. This date is well established by Ottoman sources. As to the theory that the grand vizierate was vacant for one year, there is nothing in the basic sources to support it. Then, who was the immediate successor of Chandarli in the grand vizierate, Ishak or Zaganos? Ishak, who had collaborated with Chandarli in deposing Mehmed II in 1446, was dismissed from the vizierate (he was then third vizier; see *Fâtih Devri*, pp. 102-103) and sent to Anatolia as its *Beglerbeg* immediately after the second accession of Mehmed II in 1451 (see Ducas, p. 227). Ishak was mentioned as *Beglerbeg* of Anatolia during the siege of Constantinople in 1453 (see Kritovoulos, p. 41; Kemâl Pasha, p. 46) in 1454 and in 1456 (see Kemâl Pasha, pp. 112-122; Uruj, p. 72). All this does not support the theory that he succeeded Chandarli as grand vizier in 1453. As for Kritovoulos' statement, let me quote it in full:

"In the place of this man [Chandarlı] the Sultan substituted Ishak, a man of the wisest sort, experienced in many spheres but especially a military leader and a man of courage. After a few days he also dismissed Zaganos," and Mahmud was appointed grand vizier (Riggs trans., p. 88). Here the person whose appointment, dismissal, and replacement by Mahmud is mentioned in sequence must be logically one and the same person, Ishak or Zaganos. (Whether the names of Ishak and Zaganos in Greek were mixed up or this was merely the editor's mistake can be determined only by examining the original manuscript in Topkapı Sarayı Museum, Istanbul.)

Kemâl Pasha asserts (pp. 114, 122, 146) that in 1456 Zaganos was grand vizier and Ahmed Pasha (Veliyyüddîn-oghlu) second vizier. According to the same source, Mahmud replaced Zaganos as grand vizier only after the Belgrade expedition in 1456 (cf. Uruj, p. 72). That Zaganos was grand vizier from Chandarlı's execution in 1453 up to 1456 can be further recalled from these facts: Zaganos was the second vizier toward 1453 (Sphrantzes, p. 286; *Fâtih Devri*, p. 134), and it was a rule generally applied in the Ottoman government to promote viziers one rank higher when the first vizierate became vacant. Thus, when Chandarlı was eliminated it was natural for the second vizier, Zaganos, to become first vizier, i.e., grand vizier. On the other hand, as the chief opponent of Chandarlı, Zaganos was responsible more than anyone else for the conquest of Constantinople (see *Fâtih Devri*, pp. 128-133), which made him a natural successor to Chandarlı. It is also significant to find Zaganos' signature at the bottom of the imperial decree (*amân-nâme*) given to the Genoese of Pera on 1 June 1453. (This document is now in the British Museum; see *Echos d'Orient*, xxxix [1942], 161-175, and T. C. Skeat, in *The British Museum Quarterly* xviii [1952], 71-73; it must be noted that this is not a treaty.)

Using Neshri and Sa'deddin always as his chief sources, Babinger suggests (p. 291; p. 327) that upon Mahmud's dismissal (1468) Rum Mehmed Pasha was appointed grand vizier and then dismissed and executed about 1470, when he was succeeded by Ishak (p. 306; p. 343).

In 1468 the successor of Mahmud in the grand vizierate was not Rum Mehmed but Ishak, whom we find as second vizier in 1461 and 1464 (Tursun, p. 125, and *Fâtih Mehmed II Vakfiyeleri*, II [Ankara, 1938], p. 339). During and after the Euboea (Agriboz) expedition in 1470 he was mentioned by Rühf and Kemâl Pasha (p. 325; also see H. Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, III, 227) as grand vizier. When the Ottoman army was in action in Euboea Kâsim Beg, the Karamanid prince, took the offensive and advanced as far as Ankara. In the summer of 1471 Ishak, *Düstür-i a'zam* (grand vizier) was sent against him (Kemâl Pasha, p. 307). Failing to suppress him, he was dismissed (Kemâl Pasha, p. 332) and his place given to Rum Mehmed (1471), already a vizier in the Divân. Rum Mehmed had distinguished himself during the expedition of Euboea in 1470 (*Fetihnâme, Fatih ve Istanbul Dergisi*, I, 281). But according to Babinger he was not even alive at that time. The inscriptions on the buildings he erected with endowments bear the date 876 of the Hijra, 1471-1472 A.D. (E. H. Ayverdi, *Fatih devri mimarisi*, p. 210). Rum Mehmed Pasha was dismissed at the alarming news from the East

that the Akkoyunlu forces had captured and sacked Tokat in the summer of 1472 (Kemâl Pasha, p. 350). Babinger's confusion seems to stem from the fact that he relied on the Ashik and Neshri narratives, the chronologies of which are often misleading, especially on the events about Karaman. According to the *Hasht Behisht*, a well informed source on the events in Karaman, Rum Mehmed appears to have been active as Atabeg to young Jem Sultan in his governorship in Karaman as late as 1474. In Babinger's source, Neshri (p. 205), this campaign is mixed up with Rum Mehmed's earlier activities there. Rum Mehmed's disastrous campaign against Varsaks in the Taurus mountains had taken place in 1474 (*Hasht Behisht*) and this caused his final dismissal and execution. Babinger (p. 273; p. 307) adopts also the judgments of Ashik, against Rum Mehmed, judgments which seem to me completely biased.

Upon the Akkoyunlu-Karamanid invasion in 1472 Mehmed II decided that he should entrust the government again to the able Mahmud Pasha. But at the end of the campaign against the Akkoyunlus Mahmud was arrested and his office was given to Gedik Ahmed Pasha, who finally crushed the Karamanid resistance and thus ensured Ottoman rule in central and southern Anatolia (1474). In one passage Babinger doubts whether Gedik Ahmed had ever been grand vizier (p. 361; p. 403), but in another (p. 397; p. 442) definitely states that he was. At the same time he suggests that Khoja Sinân might have been grand vizier between 1474-1476 or in the winter of 1476-1477. That toward 1471 Sinân may have been one of the viziers in the Divân can be established by various sources (see *Shakâyik-i Nu'mâniyye*, p. 165; Neshri, p. 231; T. Gökbilgin, *Paşa Livası*, p. 75), but for his grand vizierate we have no evidence whatsoever. The Sinân Beg who is mentioned as "Commander over the other commanders" in May 1476 (p. 397; p. 442) must be another Sinân, most probably the Sinân Beg who was the Beglerbeg of Anatolia toward the end of Mehmed's reign, whereas Khoja Sinân, a noted scholar, had no record of military leadership. As for Gedik Ahmed, he was the beglerbeg of Anatolia in 1461, a vizier in 1470, and second vizier in 1472, and, so, appears to have been promoted to first vizierate after Mahmud's fall (November 1473). Gedik Ahmed is mentioned in *Hasht Behisht* as grand vizier (*Vezîr-i a'zam*). Mehmed's last grand vizier was Karamânî Mehmed, who held this office for five years.

The grand viziers of Mehmed II were: Chandarlı Khalîl, February 1451-30 May 1453; Zaganos, 1453-August or September 1456; Mahmud, 1456-July 1468; Ishak, 1468-1471; Rum Mehmed, 1471-Summer, 1472; Mahmud, second time, 1472-November 1473; Gedik Ahmed between winter 1473-1474 and winter 1476-1477; Karamânî Mehmed between 1476-1477 and May 1481.

Babinger could not find in his sources much about the keen competition between Mehmed's viziers — especially between Rum Mehmed, Gedik Ahmed, and Ishak on the one hand, and Karamânî Mehmed on the other — which affected the whole administration and internal policy of the Sultan (see my "Mehmed II" in *İslâm Ansiklopedisi* [Istanbul], VII, p. 533).

One looks in vain for an answer in Babinger's book to the question why for over five years after the conquest of Constantinople Mehmed II had to concentrate

his efforts on the Serbian question. Babinger follows chiefly C. Jireček's account on the subject (*Geschichte der Serben*, II, [Gotha, 1918], 201-216) with some additional details from Neshri. But he has left out significant points, such as the agreements between George Branković and Mehmed II in 1455 and the King of Bosnia and Mehmed II in 1459.

From Babinger's disconnected story of the Ottoman campaigns in Serbia in 1454-1459 one may get the impression that they all originated as a mere whim of Mehmed II. But it appears that events dictated his course of action, as I shall try to show.

First, it must be remembered that ever since 1427, when the Hungarians seized Belgrade from the Serbians, the most important question for the Ottomans was how to ensure control of the Danube. This was essential for protection of their position in Rumeli (the Balkans). During the first difficult months after Mehmed's accession to the throne in 1451, when Anatolia was in turmoil, the young Sultan had to yield to the demands of the Byzantine Emperor and the Serbian Despot and return to the latter some territory in the upper Morava valley (Krushevac-Alaja-hisar and its dependencies, in Kemâl Pasha, p. 110; Toplica and Glubočica around Leskovac, according to C. Jireček, p. 194). The Sultan had also to guarantee the Despot's rights in the armistice with John Hunyadi, concluded some months later, which meant a further increase of the Hungarian influence in this region (see Jireček, p. 194). Upon the fall of Constantinople conditions changed radically and the time for the restoration of Ottoman control of the Danube against Hungary had come. It is significant that the Despot immediately surrendered what he had taken from Mehmed II in 1451 (Kemâl Pasha, p. 110; Rûhi; Neshri, p. 183). The *Düstürnâme* reads: "With the instruction of the Hungarian King, Vilk-oghlu [Georg Branković] returned the country which he had taken [from the Ottomans]."

The *Hasht Behisht* says that the Despot had not then surrendered all the places claimed by the Sultan. According to one Dalmatian document (see Jireček, p. 201), these places might be Smederevo (Semendere) and Golubac (Gügercinlik) on the Danube. Now the so-called ultimatum cited by Ducas has a special meaning which clarifies the course of events in 1454-1455. In it Mehmed II claimed his priority of rights against George Branković to the heritage of Stephan Lazarević (1389-1427), which included Smederevo, Golubac, and Belgrade. He would agree only to leave to George a part of the country of his father Vuk (Vilk). Incidentally, "Sofia" mentioned as part of the lands of Vilk in Ducas (p. 315) must certainly be a city other than Sofia in Bulgaria, most probably "Scopia" (Skoplje), which was indeed a part of Vilk's country (see Jireček, p. 127).

In short, Mehmed's campaign into Serbia in 1454 should be discussed in the context of these facts. During this expedition he did not make a serious effort to capture Smederevo. According to Rûhi, he did not even pitch his pavilion before it. Ducas himself does not speak of any serious fighting there. Mehmed's main military achievement was the capture of "Omol." When Ducas gives details of Mehmed's siege of a "castle" on his way back from Smederevo, the author must have meant Omol (Ostrovića then was under siege by Ishak Pasha; see Rûhi and

Kemâl, p. 112). Babinger makes no mention of Omol (and neither does Jireček) but he mistakenly takes all the details of the siege of the "castle" mentioned in Ducas and shifts them to the so-called siege of Smederevo. The conquest of Omol, along with that of Ostrovića, is termed the most important result of this expedition by all the Ottoman sources (according to Ducas, p. 317, the "castle" did not surrender; *Düstürnâme*, p. 97, which gives an original account of the siege of Omol from apparently an eye-witness, says that, absorbed in looting, the Ottoman soldiers left the Sultan alone to fight in person and finally force the enemy back into their castle). Sphrantzes (p. 384) mentions as the principal conquest in this expedition a city named "Homobrydum" (Omolridon?). Later on Omol remained an important Ottoman fortress with its Serbian *voiviks* in the Ottoman *vilâyet* (county) of Braničeva southeast of Smederevo (*Başvekâlet Archives*, Istanbul, Tapu No. 16).

Babinger asserts (p. 113; p. 134) that the Sultan was back in Istanbul after this expedition on 18 April 1454. In fact, he started the expedition in this month right after making the treaty with the Venetians. He spent the summer of 1454 in Serbia to consolidate his new conquests (Neshri, p. 183; Kemâl Pasha, p. 114, and chronological data from a contemporary register). The military governor appointed by the Sultan there was not "Firuz beg" as stated by Jireček (p. 202) and Babinger (p. 114; p. 134) but his son (*Hasht Behisht*).

It should be emphasized that Mehmed II shifted the military operations to Vilk-eli (the land of Vilk) in the following summer. He conquered and organized it as a new province. The first official survey (*tahrîr*) of this province, made immediately after the conquest in 1455, and preserved in Başvekâlet Archives, Istanbul (Tapu Defteri, No. 2 M.), gives a good idea of the conditions at that time (see *Fâtih Devri*, pp. 151-152). Its rich silver mines were vitally important for the expanding economy and finances of the Ottoman empire, and Mehmed II tried to secure this important source of silver supply for the empire by special regulations (see my "Türkiyenin İktisadi Vaziyeti . . .", *Belleten*, No. 60 [1951] pp. 651-660). Strategically this region was most important for the control of Kossovopolje, connecting Macedonia with Serbia. In view of this last point, disturbances by the Serbians of the communications between Prishtina and Skoplje (Üsküb), given by Rûhi and Neshri (p. 183) as the main cause of the campaign, must be noted. In fact, the Serbians had made counter-attacks in this region in the fall of 1454 (see Jireček, p. 202; mention of it is also made in *Hasht Behisht*). The most important sources for the 1455 expedition are Kemâl Pasha (pp. 114-120) and a letter to the Sultan of Egypt from Mehmed II which tells of his conquests. The letter, dated 13 November 1455, has been published in *Istanbul Enstitüsü Dergisi*, II (1956), 170-173.

Just after taking possession of Vilk-eli, Mehmed II made a peace treaty with George Branković in the summer of 1455. Babinger not only seems to be unaware of the information in the Ottoman sources of this agreement (Rûhi, Neshri, Idris and Kemâl Pasha) but ignores Jireček's good account of it (p. 205). Jireček cites a Venetian document of 20 February 1456 which leaves no doubt about such an agreement. The Despot, now in conflict with the Hungarians too (see Jireček,

pp. 204-205), had no choice but to accept Mehmed's terms. Here is the Ottoman version of the agreement by Kemâl Pasha (pp. 115): "Vilk-oghlu [George Branković] will possess his old territory and obey the Sultan's orders; he will also get possession of the castles and cities which he had before, but he is to pay to the imperial treasury a yearly tribute at the amount of three million *dirhem-i Osmânî* (*akča*)."<sup>1</sup> Kemâl Pasha also notes that the conclusion of this agreement was chiefly due to the insistence of Mahmud Pasha. The amount of the tribute is thirty thousand *floris* (Venetian gold ducats) in Rûht (Neshri, p. 183, says thirty thousand *akča* which is obviously a mistake); in a Christian source, dated February 1457, it is given as 40,000 gold ducats (see Jireček, p. 208, n. 3). One Venetian ducat was 36 *akča* (Ottoman silver coin) in 1436, and 45 in 1477 (see *Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, XI [1954], 63). Kritovoulos' statement (pp. 102-103) about the treaty is consistent with Kemâl Pasha. Thus, by the agreement George had obtained the recognition of his rights on Stephen's heritage which were challenged by the Sultan in 1453; moreover, Omol and Ostrovica in this region seem to have been returned to him, as the Ottomans had to conquer them again in 1458 (see Kemâl, pp. 149, 154). In return George had to give up all Vilk-eli, his patrimony, to Mehmed II. Finally, the Despot's ties to the Ottoman Sultan were greatly strengthened at the expense of the Hungarians. Thus Mehmed II appeared to have achieved the objectives which he had been aiming at ever since 1453. With Serbian neutrality as secure as it had been in 1444 he could now attempt to drive the Hungarians from Belgrade.

It is true that during the campaign of 1456 against Belgrade the Serbians, still suspicious, took strong defense measures against the Ottomans and the Sultan sent a division to watch Lazar, the Despot's son, in Rudnik (Kemâl Pasha, pp. 124-126). But the passage of the Ottoman army through Serbian territory caused no serious fighting except some inevitable skirmishes before Smederevo. Mehmed stayed there only one day. Jireček's statement about the Ottoman defeat "mit grossen Verlusten" (p. 206) before the city is apparently an exaggeration. To keep the Serbs neutral it was in Mehmed's own interest to stand by the agreement of 1455. It is significant that after the Ottoman retreat from Belgrade the Despot himself twice sent George Golemović to Adrianople to "renew" (Jireček, p. 207) the agreement.

On the siege of Belgrade two important German reports are utilized by Babinger (cf. *Jorga, Notes et Extraits*, IV, 145-147). Let me add this detail from Kemâl Pasha (p. 128): To complete the encirclement of Belgrade Mehmed II had transported overland a small fleet from the Danube to the Sava. Among the causes of the Ottoman failure in this siege are disagreement in the Ottoman army and discontent among the Janissaries because of the hardships experienced in the expedition against Enos in the winter of 1456. Furthermore, Mehmed had declined the advice of the more experienced military chiefs (see Tursun, p. 74). During the fierce fighting against Hunyadi's counterattack the Sultan received a wound on his forehead, according to Kemâl Pasha (p. 138). Three weeks after George Branković's death, on 15 January 1456, his son Lazar succeeded in renewing the agreement with the Sultan. Two years later, on 20 January 1458,

when Lazar died without a male descendant, the question of the Serbian succession put Hungary and the Ottomans in conflict again. This new crisis did not allow the Despotate to continue its role of buffer state between the two powers. There was a strong pro-Ottoman group in the country which appeared to include many of the nobility and a great number of military men. They had reason to hope that their status would be maintained under the Ottoman regime (cf. *Fâtih Devri*, p. 144). The Serbs in general feared Catholic domination. Thus the Ottomans were able to establish their rule without serious resistance by the Serbs. It is safe to say that in 1458 and 1459 the Ottomans had to face Hungarian rather than Serbian resistance (cf. Jireček, pp. 210-216, and L. von Thallóczy, *Studien*, pp. 95-100).

Let me give some further evidence from Ottoman sources which were not utilized. Tursun, who because of his personal contact with the grand vizier is our best informant, says that toward the spring of 1458 the Serbs "sent their envoys with letters inviting the Sultan to come and take possession of the country. As their desire to submit to the Sultan was so obvious, it was decided that he need not go personally; instead he set out for Morea, the conquest of which had also become necessary." Apparently the person who sent this delegation to the Sultan was Michail Angelović, brother of the grand vizier Mahmud. Michail was one of the three members of the regency and the leader of the pro-Ottoman faction in Serbia (see Thallóczy, pp. 96-99; Jireček, pp. 210-211). In March 1458 Mahmud Pasha left Adrianople for Smederevo with a relatively small army accompanied by blind Gregory, now a pretender to the Serbian throne. After a short time the Sultan started for Morea. Mahmud had fixed his headquarters in Sofia. There he received a new delegation from the Serbs informing him that they had changed their minds about surrender of the cities because the Sultan did not come himself and that they had accepted the more favorable terms offered by the Hungarians. Tursun adds that: ". . . the Hungarians had offered several hundred thousand gold coins as well as the castles on the other side of the Danube." This is consistent with what we learn from Christian sources (Thallóczy, p. 98). This sudden change in the attitude of the Serbs is a direct result of the revolution in Smederevo, which had taken place at the end of March. The Hungarian faction revolted and imprisoned Michail and then sent him to Hungary about the middle of April (Thallóczy, p. 104). Now the grand vizier was in a dilemma. Tursun (p. 85) testifies:

In Sofia the commanders argued: "The Sultan is far away in another campaign and the Serbian castles do not surrender to us easily. Furthermore, the army does not have the means for a siege ready. Under these circumstances all that we should do is to go only as far as Sofia. Besides it is, as well, a great service to protect the Ottoman territory. The enemy with whom we contend [for Serbia] is powerful and bars the way. If they ever attack to prevent our advance we may not be able to withstand them, which can cause the failure of the Sultan's purposes."

Mahmud Pasha, however, decided to take quick action and invaded Serbia. Taking Omol and Resava, he quickly reached Smederevo and fought his way into the outer part of the city but could not take the castle. The besieged



threatened him by saying that the Hungarian army would come in three days. Mahmud gave up the siege and entered Mačva, south of Shabac on the Sava, took Havâle or Güzelje-hisar overlooking Belgrade, as well as Sifrice-hisar (Ostrovica) and Rudnik. He returned to Yelli-yurd, a summer headquarters near Nish, where he passed the sacred month of Ramadân (it started on 13 July 1458). He was in contact with a pro-Ottoman group in Golubac, who surrendered the city to him, but he had to use force to reduce the inner castle. The operation of an Ottoman fleet on the Danube at that time is witnessed by the Western (see N. Jorga, *GOR*, II, 106) as well as the Ottoman sources. The terms of the surrender of Golubac are preserved in an official Ottoman record-book of Mehmed II's chancery (today in Başvekkâlet Archives, Istanbul, Tapu No. 16). It reads:

The city of Gügercinlik [Golubac] has an imperial charter to the effect that people shall have full possession of their vineyards and gardens as well as fields and be exempted from the taxation of Kharâj, Ispenje and 'Ushr [the basic Ottoman taxes] and also from military services and charges; nobody shall interfere with their sons and daughters and cattle, or attempt to take anything by force; prisoners taken by the [Serbian] Martolos shall not be detained unduly, but these in return shall fulfill devotedly the services required for the fortresses and the boats [on the Danube] . . . .

The native Christian soldiers such as pronija-holders, Martolos, Voiniks, Eflaks (Vlachs), musketeers (Turkish *Tüfekçi*) were incorporated in the local Ottoman forces (see *Fâtih Devri*, pp. 144-148). It is to be recalled that they had already experienced Ottoman administration between 1427-1444.

The second invasion of Serbia by Mahmud Pasha is not mentioned by Babinger. He thought that Golubac was surrendered before Mahmud's siege of Smederevo. Babinger writes (p. 165; p. 190) "Wann Mahmûd-Pascha wieder nach Osten abzog und warum er von der Einnahme Semendrias Abstand nahm oder nehmen musste, bedürfte der Klärung." He could have found the answers to his questions in Tursun's account of this expedition. The threat of the Hungarian army under Matthias Corvinus on the Sava river (see L. von Thallóczy, *Studien zur Geschichte Bosniens und Serbiens im Mittelalter* [Munich-Leipzig, 1914], p. 99) made Mahmud decide to retreat again to Nish and he sent word to the Sultan, who was returning from his successful campaign in Morea. Mehmed II then appeared in the city of Üsküb (Skoplje) in upper Macedonia. Mahmud joined him there. Babinger thinks (p. 171; p. 196) "Üsküb, worunter indessen sicher nicht die Stadt in Mazedonien (Skoplje), sondern wohl der gleichnamige Ort im Istrandscha-Gebirge (ö. von Qyrq Kilise, heute Kırklareli) zu verstehen ist. Um diese Jahreszeit pflegte Mehmed II. mit Vorliebe die frische Höhenluft balkanischer Landschaften zu geniessen." Now let us see what Neshri (p. 187) says: "In Üsküb the Sultan was planning to dismiss the army, but Mahmud Pasha warned him saying that the Hungarians had collected an army. And then it was learned that the Hungarians were crossing the Danube at Belgrade. So Sultan Mehmed distributed salaries in advance to the provincial cavalry of Anatolia [to keep them in field]." The same source, giving details about how the forces sent by the Sultan checked the advance of the Hungarians, further adds that after that the Sultan came to Adrianople. These military operations are

confirmed through the Christian sources also (see Jireček, p. 212). Now "the city of Üsküb" mentioned in the Ottoman sources as the meeting place of Mehmed and the grand vizier must be Üsküb (Skoplje) in upper Macedonia. It is definitely not the Üsküb in the Istranja mountains. What misled Babinger is apparently the statement by Kritovoulos (p. 137) that after some days of rest in "Pherae in Macedonia" the Sultan arrived in Adrianople about the middle of the autumn. It is hard to imagine why Mehmed II and his grand vizier would go to the Istranja mountains, to the east of Adrianople, for fresh air while the Hungarian army was threatening to invade Serbia.

On the expedition of 1459 Babinger (following Jireček, Jorga, and Zinkeisen) writes (p. 174; p. 199) "Inzwischen nachte Mehmed II. ungehindert mit seinem Heerbann den Mauern und Türmen von Semendria. . . ." In fact, he came only to Shehirköy (Pilot), and the keys of Smederevo were handed to him by the Serbian envoys in Sofia (cf. *Düstûrnâme*, p. 98; Tursun, p. 96; Kemâl Pasha, p. 181; also *Mon. Hung. Hist., Acta Exetera*, IV, 46, No. 32). Then the Sultan sent an imperial order to the Sanjakbeg of that region to take over Smederevo (see Tursun, p. 96). This Sanjakbeg was probably Ali Beg, who had been blockading the city before the Sultan's expedition (see Kritovoulos, pp. 118, 126).

Thallóczy (p. 102) points out that the ease with which Smederevo was taken by the Ottomans remains unexplained. It is true that the Hungarian King was then too busy in the west with the German emperor. A great number of people in Smederevo were on the side of the Turks (letter of Barbuçi, who had visited Smederevo on 27 May 1459, Thallóczy, p. 107). Stephan Tomašević was urgently asking military aid from his father, the king of Bosnia, so that he could hold out there (Stephan had married, under Hungarian auspices, the daughter of Lazar and had himself settled in Smederevo in the spring of 1459). The position of the King of Bosnia was thus of primary importance in the whole matter and the Sultan made an agreement directly with the king. The importance of this agreement for Smederevo has never been stressed enough. Rûhî says: "When the Sultan started out for Sofia the envoys of Bosnia found him on the way and proposed the exchange of Smederevo for Srebrnica. The Sultan agreed to it and took possession of Smederevo" (see also Neshri, p. 189; the anonymous chronicle says "The King of Bosnia gave up Smederevo of his own will"). When the Ottomans took possession of Smederevo they let Stephan Tomašević go home unmolested. Srebrnica and its district on the Serbo-Bosnian border had long been an object of dispute between the two countries (see Jireček, pp. 184-211; Thallóczy, p. 91).

It must be emphasized that the Ottoman rule did not cause an upheaval in Serbia, as is often said. Despite its incorporation (as the *sanjak* of Semendere) into the empire, Serbia maintained its own legal and financial system to a considerable degree, as well as its basic social structure, with its nobility possessing lands as *pronija* (now *tîmâr*) or *bashtina* (see *Fâtih Devri*, pp. 144-184, for the record books and documents of this period in the Turkish Archives).

An eye-witness, Tursun, says that the Sultan came back to Istanbul after the surrender of Smederevo; "but, encouraged by his good fortune and the long

time available (for a new expedition), he wished to add a new conquest." So he started out against Amastris (Amasra), a Genoese castle on the Black Sea coast. The date in Rûhf and Neshrf (p. 190) is given correctly, as 863 of the Hijra (XI. 1458-IX. 1459 A.D.). But Babinger thinks: "Mehmed II., dessen Aufenthalte nach dem Sturze von Semendria sich schwer verfolgen lassen, dürfte gegen Sommerende wieder in Stambul eingetroffen sein." He then says (p. 203; p. 231) that Amastris was taken by the Ottomans "im September, jedenfalls aber in Spätherbst 1460." Finally he seems to admit that Amastris was taken during the campaign of 1461 against Kastamonu-Sinop and Trebizond (p. 209; p. 236). Tursun, whom we know to have been present in this campaign, does not mention the name of Amastris in 1461. And all the principal sources (Rûhf, Idrfs, Tursun, pp. 97-98, Neshrf, p. 191) unanimously assert that in 1461 the Sultan came to Bursa, and then moved to Ankara, whence he started his expedition against Kastamonu and Sinop and took Trebizond.

In May 1461 Mehmed II was in Ankara. There the auxiliary forces of Kastamonu under Hasan Chelebi, son of Ismail Beg, and the Karamanid forces under Kâsim, son of Ibrahim Beg, joined the Ottoman army (Babinger does not mention Kâsim). They were sent by their fathers, who had pledged to do so by the treaties of vassality (see the text of the treaty with Ibrahim Beg in *Belleten*, I, 120). Mehmed II actually wanted these princes with him as hostages to safeguard his rear while he was in remote Trebizond. These points are missing from Babinger's account, which seems here to depend entirely on Ducas (pp. 241-242).

When speaking of the motives of the expedition against Trebizond, Kemal Pasha (p. 186) makes a remark worth quoting here:

The Greeks used to live on the coasts of the Black and the Mediterranean Seas in the good habitable areas which were protected by the surrounding natural obstacles. In each area they were ruled by a *tekvour*, a kind of independent ruler, and they gave him regular taxes and military dues. Sultan Mehmed defeated and expelled some of these *tekvours* and wanted to do the same with the rest. The goal was to take away from these people all sovereignty. Thus he first destroyed the *tekvour* of Constantinople; he was considered as the principal *tekvour* and head of this people. Later on he had subdued successively the *tekvours* of Enos, Morea, Amasria (Amasria) and annexed their territories to the empire. Finally the Sultan's attention was drawn to the *tekvour* of Trebizond.

This view of the famous Ottoman scholar who lived his early life in the Conqueror's time is surely more than his own interpretation and seems to reflect one significant aspect in Mehmed's conquests: reunification around Istanbul of the old Byzantine territories which were portioned under the local dynasties.

During Mehmed's long absence in 1461 Ishak Pasha, then second vizier, who was left in Adrianople, tried to safeguard Rumeli with a small force stationed there, but he could not cope with the situation (*Düstûrnâme*, p. 99; Neshrf, p. 195), since Wallachia and Mytilene, with the support of the west, were in rebellion. Vlad Drakul, Voivod of Wallachia, had taken the offensive already in the summer of 1461 when the Sultan was in Anatolia (Tursun, p. 103; *Düstûrnâme*, p. 99). In Mytilene Niccolò Gattilusio had eliminated his brother with the accusation of being friendly toward the Ottomans (Kritovoulos, p. 180) and opened his

ports to the Catalan corsairs who infested the Ottoman coasts. It was this situation that in 1462 induced Mehmed to undertake his twin expeditions against Wallachia and Mytilene. Emphasis should be put on the interrelation of all these events in 1461-1462. Enverî (*Düstûrnâme*, pp. 99-100), who took part in the expeditions of 1462, must be considered as an important source on them.

As to the expeditions of Mehmed II to Bosnia in 1463 and 1464, Tursun is again most important as an eye-witness source (other important Ottoman sources on this event are Ashik Pasha, Neshrf, and Rûhf). Many details in Babinger could be modified or supplemented by a comparative use of these sources. Let me only point out that immediately after the occupation of Bosnia 'Isa, son of Ishak Beg of Üsküb, was appointed first governor. However, blamed for the flight of Hersek Stephan, 'Isa was soon replaced by Mehmed, son of Minnet Beg (in Babinger, p. 240; p. 271; Minnet Beg, the first governor of Bosnia).

The Venetian defeat in Corinth in the fall of 1463 appears to be the result of the concerted operation of Ömer Beg, governor of Thessaly, and Sinân Beg (son of Elvân) governor of Morea, who, besieged in Corinth, had suddenly fallen on the Venetians. No mention is made of Sinân Beg by Babinger, who seems to follow only Chalcocondyles' partial story (pp. 545-551). Babinger also does not mention the Sultan's presence in Thessaly, where he received from Tursun news of victory from Mahmud Pasha, which caused Mehmed II to return to the capital.

It should be stressed that during the period of 1464-1473 the developments in Anatolia preoccupied Mehmed II increasingly more than the events of the west. Babinger's treatment of these developments in the east is unsatisfactory. He claims (pp. 261; p. 294) that ". . . wie auch über die Beziehungen Mehmeds II. zum Sultanshof in Kairo bisher so gut wie alle Angaben fehlen." However, one cannot quite agree with him when one discovers that he did not utilize such contemporary Arabic sources giving important information on the Ottoman-Mameluk relations as *Hawâdith ad-duhûr* by Ibn Tagribirdi, edited by W. Popper (Berkeley, California, 1930-42) and *Badâi' al-zuhûr* by Ibn Iyâs (ed. Bulak, 1311-1312). The Persian chronicles concerning this period, particularly *Ahsan at-tawârîkh* by Hassan Beg Rûmlû, are essential to understand Mehmed's oriental policy. A good bibliography of the subject can be found in M. Halil Yinanc, "Akkoyunlular" in *Islâm Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul, 1941), cüz 4, 268-269; also C. A. Storey, *Persian Literature* (London, 1927-1939). We must also mention here numerous state papers and diplomatic correspondence on oriental affairs in Topkapı Sarayı Archives, Istanbul; see *Arşiv Kılavuzu*, 1-2 (Istanbul, 1938) and in the *münşeat*s (for these collections of state papers see M. H. Yinanc, "Akkoyunlular," and A. Erzi, "Akkoyunlu ve Karakoyunlu. . ." *Belleten*, No. 70).

Pressed by Mehmed II, Ishak Beg, the Karamanid prince, agreed in 1464 to give the Ottoman Sultan the Akshehir-Beyshehir region, but he was asked to surrender also the territory west of the Charshamba river. There is no explanation of this in Babinger (see pp. 289-291; p. 324). Actually, the Ottomans had had to abandon the Akshehir-Beyshehir region to Ibrahim Beg in 1444 and Mehmed II had been forced to confirm this in 1451. On the other hand the



Charshamba river was fixed as the Ottoman-Karaman border in 1391 and was changed to the advantage of the Karamanids in 1402.

Ibrahim Beg, the Karamanid, and Uzun Hasan, the ruler of the Akkoyunlus, had made an alliance against the house of Dulgadirs (Zulkâdir) which in turn had been an Ottoman ally since the end of the fourteenth century. When in 1464 the question of the Karamanid succession tended to upset the balance in central Anatolia, Uzun Hasan took action against Arslan Beg of Dulgadîr and then entered Karaman to install Ishak Beg on the throne. When Ishak was expelled from Karaman in 1465 he took refuge in Uzun Hasan's court; and as before he also sought the protection of the Mameluk Sultan of Egypt. Ishak died in the summer of 1466 in exile (Ibn Tagribirdi, *Hawâdith*, III, 631). This is the most reliable source, as Ibn Tagribirdi was able to see personally the reports coming to the Mameluk Sultan on Anatolian affairs. When Babinger shows Ishak still active in 1468 and even later (pp. 289, 290, 324, 325, 327, 363) it is obvious that he has confused Ishak with his brother Pîr Ahmed, who also ended by opposing Mehmed II, his suzerain, in 1468. It is not correct that in 1468 the Ottomans occupied the whole territory of the Karamanids (pp. 290-291; p. 327). The mountainous part of Karaman on the Taurus range and the Mediterranean coast was then out of Ottoman control. Only in 1471, and then for the second time in 1474, did the Ottomans succeed in bringing this part of the country into submission. After the Conqueror's occupation of the Konia plain in 1468 Pîr Ahmed attacked and routed the rear of the departing Ottoman army under Mahmud Pasha and captured large quantities of supply. Pîr Ahmed wrote of his success to the Mameluk Sultan and asked his protection (*Hawâdith*, III, 631, 651, 684). The failure of Grand Vizier Mahmud in the Karaman affair seems to be the real cause of his dismissal in July 1468 (Tursun, p. 139). What we find in Babinger on that is a simple repetition of Ashîk Pasha-zâde's story that Mahmud Pasha was dismissed because he had spared the rich in Karaman from being deported to Istanbul. The Ottoman sources conceal or misplace the Karamanid success. Mehmed II was back in Istanbul already in August 1468 (in Babinger, German ed., p. 291, November 1468).

Since at that time the Sultan of Egypt considered Pîr Ahmed and Uzun Hasan as his protégés and Dulgadîr as his vassal, Ottoman intervention in Karaman and in Dulgadîr affairs caused tension between Cairo and Istanbul. That is why not only Venetian sources but also Tursun (p. 138) assert that the campaign of 1468 was originally planned against the Mameluks. But when later Uzun Hasan attempted to occupy the territory of Dulgadîr and thus threatened the Mameluk dominions on the upper Euphrates, friendly relations between the Mameluks and the Ottomans were rapidly restored. In late 1472, when Uzun Hasan laid siege to Bîra, a Mameluk crossroad town (see Ibn Iyâs, II, 144-145), the two state even made an alliance against him. Mehmed's peace negotiations with the Venetians in 1470-1471 were also, to a great extent, determined by the growing danger in Anatolia.

In 1473, when Mehmed II was away in Eastern Anatolia, his son Jem Sultan was left not in Istanbul (p. 330; p. 369) but in Adrianople (see Tursun, p. 150;

*Magyar Diplomacziái Emlékek*, II, 246-248; Thuasne, *Djem Sultan* [Paris, 1892], p. 6). The battle against Uzun Hasan in 1473 was the most critical one Mehmed ever waged. Victory not only solved the Anatolian question but also deprived the Christian West of its most efficient ally. Babinger does not mention the peace treaty between Mehmed II and Uzun Hasan, who had sent his envoy Ahmed Bekridjî first to Karahisar in September and then to Istanbul in November in 1473 (*Hasht Behisht*; Rûht; Kemâl Pasha, p. 404, and especially Uzun Hasan's letter to Mehmed II, in Topkapî Archives, No. 4476). Seeing Uzun Hasan still in close relationship with the Venetians, who were pressing him for a new war against the Ottomans, Mehmed II proposed to the Timurids in Central Asia that they take a common action against Uzun Hasan (see the letter in Ferîdûn Beg, *Munshedd-i Salâtin*, I [Istanbul, 1274], 284). Mahmud's failure in handling the Uzun Hasan affair appears to be the essential cause of his second fall from the grand vizierate (for other reasons such as the intrigue of his personal enemies, see Kemâl Pasha, pp. 411-412).

The military operations in the eastern Black Sea in 1479 are left in complete obscurity by Babinger (pp. 441-442; pp. 489-490). He does not localize the places mentioned in these expeditions and gives the wrong date of 1480 for them. The lord of "Torul" as well as the Georgian princes were protected and even incited by Uzun Hasan against the Ottomans. On Uzun Hasan's death in 1478 it seems that Mehmed II thought it was time for him to complete his unfinished work on the eastern boundaries of the empire. He sent orders to his son, Bayezid (in Amasia), who had under his control all the territories as far as the Georgian border, to invade Torul and Georgia. The former was a tiny principality with a castle called Torul (today a *nâhiye* with the same name) on the strategical mountain pass between Gümüşhâne and Trebizond. Under the protection of Uzun Hasan a local Greek lord maintained possession (details are provided in a survey of the province of Trebizond made in 1487, Başvek. Archives, Maliyeden def. 328). Bayezid's vizier, Mehmed Pasha, son of Hizîr Pasha, and Rakkâs Sinân Beg annexed it and a strip of land in western Georgia called "Mathahalyet," most probably *Mathakhal'et* ("The land of Mathakhel"). It seems that the name has survived in the village name of *Machakhel* in the county of Borchka near the Turkish-Georgian border.

Babinger also doubts that any expedition to Kuban and Anapa in Circassia took place, considering the great distance between Amasia (Amasya) and Anapa (p. 441; p. 490). In fact this was an independent maritime expedition made in the same year. The *Hasht Behisht* is clear enough: "After the conquest of Kaffa, Kopa was still in the hands of the remaining Franks, because of some natural obstacles (that prevented its conquest). Now the Sultan sent there thirty ships under the governor of Koja-eli (Izmit, Nicomedia)" (we use the manuscript in Nuriomaniyeh K. Istanbul No. 3209, 485 b; cf. Kemâl Pasha, pp. 520-522).

On Mehmed's relations with the Khans of the Crimea and the Genoese the interesting correspondence between Mehmed II and Mengli Girei (Giray, Kirey) and Eminek Mirza should have been consulted (for a bibliography and corrections see *Belâten*, VIII, 30 [1944], 205-229). Mehmed's relations with the Golden

Horde are not touched upon by Babinger. It must also be emphasized that Crimean affairs involved Mehmed in the significant developments in eastern Europe, inasmuch as he supported the Crimean-Russian bloc against the Golden Horde-Jagellonian alliance. Even Moldavia had direct interests in the Crimea; toward 1475 its Voivod had sent a small force to Crimea to capture the principality of Mangup for his brother-in-law (A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in the Crimea* [Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1936], pp. 244-252). Briefly speaking, Mehmed's activities in the Crimea and Moldavia must be studied in the broader context of his northern policy.

The treatment of Mehmed's internal policy is probably the most superficial part of the book. Generally speaking, Mehmed's tremendous efforts to build up a unified and centralized empire strained the country to the utmost. He needed increasingly large resources, especially to make his unending military expeditions and to increase his army and naval forces. The unusually radical financial measures which he had to introduce created a very tense atmosphere in the country in his later years. These measures were: (1) The issue of new silver coin, forcing people to exchange the old coin at its metal value with the new one at its face value. The difference at the rate of one sixth meant a heavy tax on the possessors of cash in silver. He used this hated device three times after 1471 (see further details, *Belleten*, No. 60 [1951], pp. 676-679). (2) The extension of state proprietorship over most of the agricultural lands in the possession of the old families in the forms of *mülk* or *wakf*. Thus, according to Tursun, who was a high official in the finance department, over twenty thousand villages or estates came under direct state control, which meant a new heavy taxation. Applied in the same period after 1471, this reform alienated the old land-owning classes, especially in central and northern Anatolia, as well as many large religious groups. (3) The extension of the monopolistic tax-farming system to many necessities of life and the implementation with an unusual strictness of the laws governing these monopolies (a collection of such laws has been published by R. Anhegger-H. Inalcik, *Kânûnâme-i Sultânî ber müceb-i 'orf-i Osmânî* [Ankara, 1956], also see H. Inalcik, "F. S. Mehmed in Fermanları," *Belleten*, No. 44).

Toward 1481 the state treasury had in its chests about three and a half million ducats worth of ready money (Topkapı Sarayı Archives, No. E. 9713).

On Mehmed's unusual centralizing policy and its far-reaching social and political consequences, which surely prepared the way for the reactionary policy introduced under Bayezid II upon his accession, Babinger presents little save a translation of some biased hints in Ashik's chronicle.

In this connection it should be added that the Janissaries (*Yeni-cheri*) always disliked Mehmed II and showed their discontent on several occasions. Their number was increased from four or five thousand to ten or twelve thousand by Mehmed II. On his death they burst into a fearful revolt and were instrumental in bringing to power a reactionary administration.

That the Ottoman expansion in the Levant caused the Westerners to discover the new maritime routes across the Atlantic Ocean (p. 377; p. 421) is a theory subject to much controversy today. I hope to supplement Lybyer's critical views of

this theory (*American Historical Review*, xix, 141) in a separate paper on the basis of new data provided by the Ottoman archives.

In the last chapters of the book are some mistakes in names. The commander who laid siege to Croña (Akchahisar) in 1476 and was ordered to blockade Scutari in 1478 was not Gedik Ahmed Pasha (pp. 390; 401; pp. 435; 446) but Sarı Ahmed Beg, son of Evrenos, governor of Albania in this period (see Kemâl Pasha, pp. 509, 607; cf. Donado da Lezze [G. M. Angiolello], *Historia Turchesca*, published by J. Ursu at Bucarest in 1909). During the incursion of 1479 into Transylvania it was 'Isa Beg, son of Hasan, who was the *sanjak-beg* of Silistre (Silistria) and not (p. 411; p. 458) "Hassan Beg and 'Isa Beg" (cf. Kemâl Pasha, p. 466). The invasion of Carniol in 1479 was commanded by Dâvûd, then governor of Bosnia. For the large-scale incursions into Styria and Hungary in the years of 1477-1479, Kemâl Pasha (pp. 477-481 and 527-562) gives detailed accounts which are completely overlooked in Babinger's book.

Mehmed died at Hunkiar-chayırı, which is between Pendik and Maltepe (see Feridûn Beg, I, 297).

In general it can be said that information drawn from the sources on individual events is usually summarized by Professor Babinger in a simple chronological order without much critical analysis and without seeking to establish the real relationship and sequence of the actual historical developments. On the other hand, Babinger sometimes uncritically accepts the biased statements of his sources as truth. One of the main concerns of Babinger appears to be to establish a correct chronology of the events, which is certainly the first important thing to do. He has been successful in clarifying many chronological data, but as we have seen, there remains some confusion.\*

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