

Projecting Taiwan: Taiwan's Public Diplomacy Outreach*

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Because of its diplomatic isolation, Taiwan has used, and continues to use, public diplomacy as a vital medium for presenting its values and utility in the international community while bypassing issues of recognition. This article examines Taiwan's public diplomacy and soft power projection. It analyzes Taiwan's public diplomacy outreach and evaluates its public diplomacy strategies and tactics by focusing on Taiwan's ability to present its utility, relevance, and values to the international community. It assesses Taiwan's public diplomacy institutions and tools, and the instruments employed to implement public diplomacy outreach. Furthermore, it examines Taiwanese soft power and the elements that enhance its "power of influence." The author categorizes Taiwan as a "middle power" and compares its public diplomacy efforts to those of similar middle power states, especially in relation to the public diplomacy strategy of niche diplomacy.

KEYWORDS: public diplomacy; soft power; cultural diplomacy; nation branding; gastrodplomacy.

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The Taiwan Paradox



In the realm of international relations, Taiwan presents a paradox. The island nation is a leading global economy, a center of hi-tech development and a compelling model of economic prosperity for countries advancing from developing to developed status. Taiwan is a democratic society that has emerged from a long period of martial law to conduct multiple free and fair elections as well as two democratic transfers of power. By most accounts, it has been a good global citizen and a generous purveyor of developmental aid to numerous developing nations. Based on its economic situation, democratic credentials, and responsible international behavior, Taiwan should legitimately fall into the category of what scholars term "middle powers,"¹ states with considerable capabilities and moderate influence within the international system. Yet the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan offers a curious case of a nation whose international strength and stature are not commensurate with its status as a stable democracy and robust economy. In essence, Taiwan is "financially rich but diplomatically poor."²

Despite its diplomatic and public diplomacy efforts in the international arena, Taiwan's international status has grown more and more precarious in recent years. Presently, it is recognized by only twenty-three nations, most of which can be characterized as small, poor, and outside international society's power dynamic. The combined GDPs of twenty-two of the twenty-three nations that recognize Taiwan are less than half that of Taiwan (see appendix I). Despite repeated efforts, its attempts to rejoin the United Nations (UN) and thus reenter the pantheon of states have all been blocked. Consequently, Taiwan remains more diplomatically isolated

¹Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Power* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993).

²Gerald Chan. "Taiwan as an Emerging Foreign Aid Donor: Developments, Problems, and Prospects," *Pacific Affairs* 70, no. 1 (1997): 37.

than states often accorded international pariah status, such as *apartheid* South Africa, North Korea, or Israel.

The "elephant in the room" in this discussion remains the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the complex historical relationship between Taiwan and China that colors any diplomatic discussion about Taiwan's current status. The diplomatic jousting between Taiwan and its larger neighbor across the Strait consists of two components: first, the dispute over which of them is the legitimate legal government of the Chinese people; and second, the question whether Taiwan's de facto independence constitutes de jure statehood. These status issues have shaped and molded Taipei's foreign policy pursuits, diplomatic undertakings, and public diplomacy endeavors. The deterioration of Taiwan's diplomatic status is a consequence of the PRC's "one China" policy, which maintains that the island of Taiwan is part of "China" as ruled from Beijing by the Chinese Communist Party. Under the "one China" policy, Taiwan has been termed a "renegade province," and Beijing has therefore sought to block Taiwan's relations with the international community as a means of isolating Taiwan internationally and coercing the island into the PRC fold.

Occupying such a precarious position in the international community, Taiwan has found it necessary to innovate in both its formal and public diplomacy. Taipei has proved adept at conducting non-official diplomacy that mirrors diplomacy through official channels. Meanwhile, deprived of access to conventional diplomatic channels, links, and procedures, it has used alternative channels to express its opinion and convey information to global audiences.³ Taiwan is a unique case of a nation that must conduct public diplomacy not only as a means of promotion, but also as a means for ensuring its diplomatic survival and access to the international arena. On public diplomacy as a force multiplier, Jozef Batora argues, "for small and medium-sized states, public diplomacy represents an opportunity to gain influence and shape international agenda in ways that go beyond their

³Gary Rawnsley, "Selling Taiwan: Diplomacy and Propaganda," *Issues & Studies* 36, no. 3 (May-June 2000): 2.

limited hard power resources."⁴ Given its diplomatic isolation, Taiwan has used, and continues to use, public diplomacy as a vital medium through which the nation can present its values and utility in the international community while bypassing issues of recognition.

This paper evaluates Taiwan's public diplomacy strategies and tactics by focusing on Taiwan's ability to present its utility, relevance, and values to the international community. It assesses Taiwan's public diplomacy institutions and tools, and the instruments employed to implement public diplomacy outreach. Furthermore, it examines Taiwanese soft power and the elements that enhance its "power of influence." The author categorizes Taiwan as a "middle power" and compares its public diplomacy efforts to those of similar middle power states, especially in relation to the public diplomacy strategy of niche diplomacy. As part of the analysis of Taiwan's relationship with global civil society, the paper will examine how Taiwan works "polylaterally," that is how the Taiwanese state interacts with non-state entities such as nongovernmental organizations and multilateral institutions as a means to further its public diplomacy.⁵ Given the framework of analysis, this paper serves as an academic assessment of Taiwan's current public diplomacy efforts, goals, and challenges. Public diplomacy is a hybrid discipline that combines academic scholarship with practitioners' work in the field; as such, this paper will also provide recommendations for possible public diplomacy programs upon which Taiwan may wish to embark.

Taiwan's Public Diplomacy Promotion

While diplomacy entails governments communicating with governments, the field of public diplomacy deals with the promotion of values,

⁴Józef Batora, "Public Diplomacy between Home and Abroad: Norway and Canada," *Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 1, no. 1 (2006): 55.

⁵Geoffrey Wiseman, "'Polylaterality' and New Modes of Global Dialogue," in *Diplomacy*, ed. Crister Jonsson and Richard Langhorne (London: Sage, 2004), 36-57.

ideas, and concepts to foreign publics. Public diplomacy focuses on the transmission of messages and values, and the exchange of ideas. It does so through advocacy, cultural diplomacy, cultural exchange, listening endeavors, and the field of international broadcasting, all of which contribute to a nation's "soft power" capabilities. The notion of soft power, made popular by Joseph Nye, is defined as the power to gain desired outcomes for foreign policy goals neither through force nor coercion but by attraction and the attractiveness of a nation's projected political system, ideology, culture, or values.⁶ Nye states, "A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it."⁷ The relationship between public diplomacy and soft power is that public diplomacy helps transform soft power resources into tangible improvements in international image.⁸ Trends in global political discourse have recently brought the concept of soft power to the forefront of foreign policy discussions in Taiwan, and by so doing, have led to a conceptualization of soft power in a Taiwanese context. This conceptualization has taken on a broad definition of soft power, and has characterized the country's attractiveness as being promoted by its social, economic, and political developments.⁹ Scholars, political leaders, and public diplomacy practitioners alike have cited elements of soft power in the country's culture, advanced high-tech sector, and democratic political system and society. Taiwanese conceptions of soft power also include Taiwan's economic model, its foreign direct investment, and international aid, all of which extend beyond Nye's definition of soft power, which does not include economic power.¹⁰

⁶Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

⁷Ibid., 4.

⁸Eytan Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616, no. 55 (2008): 61.

⁹Lu Hsiu-lien, "'Soft' Power: A Common Future for the Pacific," *Taiwan Review*, December 1, 2003, <http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=913&CtNode=1346> (accessed on December 11, 2010).

¹⁰Hongying Wang and Yeh-Chung Lu, "The Conception of Soft Power and Its Policy Im-

There have been three distinct tactical focuses of Taiwanese foreign policy as projected through its public diplomacy. In seeking to highlight Taiwan's utility and value in the international community, in other words to project its soft power, Taiwan has done the following: (1) during the Cold War, sought to communicate its geostrategic role as a bulwark against communism in East Asia; (2) showcased its economic achievements and model of development as a form of soft power; and (3) more recently, has emphasized its democratization process, and commitment to democratic values and institutions.

In the wake of the defeat of the ruling Kuomintang (國民黨, KMT) in the Chinese Civil War, the ROC government led by Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) retreated from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949. Both the PRC and the ROC on Taiwan claimed legitimacy as the sole government of China and representative of the Chinese people. During the Cold War, Taiwan was able to use its anti-communist ideology and geostrategic position as soft power resources and the bases of its public diplomacy strategy, and this enabled Taipei to maintain vital American support.¹¹ The onset of the Cold War and the Korean War buoyed diplomatic recognition post-1949 for the Republic of China. With its strategic position straddling the Pacific air and sea lanes,¹² its firm anti-communist stance in an atmosphere of increased anti-communist sentiment, and renewed support from the United States, the ROC was able to maintain its seat in the UN and actually increase diplomatic recognition around the globe.¹³ Thus, Taipei exploited international ideological divisions, presenting itself as "Free China" and using its public diplomacy tactics as a soft power resource based on its anti-communist ideological credentials.

plications: A Comparative Study of China and Taiwan," *Journal of Contemporary China* 17, no. 56 (August 2008): 431.

¹¹Jacques deLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan, Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy," *Orbis* 54, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 20.

¹²Bruce Gilley, "Not So Dire Straits," *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 1 (January-February 2010): 45.

¹³Timothy Rich, "Status for Sale: Taiwan and the Competition for Diplomatic Recognition," *Issues & Studies* 45, no. 4 (December 2009): 168.

However, the 1970s proved diplomatically unkind to the ROC. In 1971, the derecognition process began in earnest with the PRC's admission to the UN General Assembly and its assumption of the ROC's seat on the UN Security Council. From 1971 onward, Taipei found itself fighting a rear-guard action to maintain its diplomatic recognition. Between 1971 and 1979, forty-six countries switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC, including the United States in 1979. With the Sino-American rapprochement and the establishment of U.S.-PRC diplomatic ties in 1979, Taiwan's soft power as an anti-communist ideological ally diminished greatly, and it diminished even further with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the following decade.

Yet Taiwan's emergence as a top-tier economy helped contribute to an ancillary dimension of its soft power. DeLisle notes, "With its high growth rate, sectoral transformation and rise to the top echelon of global trading entities beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwan emerged as a paragon of successful development and an exemplar of the East Asian Model of rapid industrialization."¹⁴ Along with Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore, Taiwan was heralded as a "tiger" economy for its place in the regional economic "miracle" of the period.¹⁵ While economic power is typically considered a facet of hard power projection, the Taiwanese model of economic development contributed to the nation's soft power as a model for developing countries seeking to emulate the nation's economic success. In this regard, Taiwan's experience in emerging as a developed economy becomes a tangible form of soft power for the influence and understanding that the Taiwanese model offers.¹⁶

In the late 1980s, a number of developments took place that would shape Taiwan's public diplomacy. With the end of martial law in 1987, Taiwan began on its path toward democratization that would over time shape its public diplomacy message and soft power projection. Meanwhile, the

¹⁴DeLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place," 20.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Interview with Paul Hsu, chairman and CEO of the Phycos Corporation, August 2, 2010, Taipei, Taiwan.

rise to power in 1988 of Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) as the first native-born president would alter Taiwan's projected *raison d'être*. As president, Lee Teng-hui was the first leader to abandon Taipei's claim to be the legitimate government of China, and to acknowledge Beijing's rule of mainland China. He sought to frame ties across the Taiwan Strait as a "special state-to-state relationship," in which Taipei and Beijing conducted cross-Strait dialogue on a level of communal parity and on an equal basis regardless of the disparity of size and military strength.¹⁷ President Lee Teng-hui also adopted a policy of "pragmatic diplomacy," which gave precedence to substantive relationships with foreign states and nonstate actors over the call for official recognition.¹⁸ Concurrently, Taiwan began highlighting its functionality as an independent state, complete with the requisite characteristics of statehood, including those of a separate, defined territory possessing an independent, functional government ruling over a population with unique characteristics ("new Taiwanese") and in possession of extensive albeit informal international ties.¹⁹

With the end of the Cold War and as democratic consolidation took hold in Taiwan in the mid-1990s, Taiwanese democracy and democratic institutions became a central facet of Taiwan's public diplomacy and a central element of its soft power projection. Taiwan sought to use its democratic consolidation as a significant focus of its national brand and a prominent feature of its soft power in its transition to democracy. In essence, Taiwan chose to sell its "democracy" as the crux of its public diplomacy efforts.²⁰ Taiwan has thus sought to promote its adherence to democratic norms and values and respect for human rights as being in line with international trends.²¹ As Taiwan held its first free presidential election in 1996, and con-

¹⁷Lee Teng-hui, "Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap," *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 6 (November-December 1999): 11-12.

¹⁸Dennis van Vranken Hickey, *Foreign Policy Making in Taiwan: From Principle to Pragmatism* (London: Routledge, 2007), 16.

¹⁹DeLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place," 23.

²⁰Gary Rawnsley, "Selling Democracy: Diplomacy, Propaganda and Democratisation in Taiwan," *China Perspective*, no. 47 (May-June 2003), <http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/361> (accessed on December 11, 2010).

²¹Rawnsley, "Selling Taiwan," 3.

ducted its first transfer of power in 2000, it increasingly projected its achievements in transitioning to democracy in its public diplomacy outreach and in reinforcing its soft power.

In 2000, following the accession of President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (民進黨, DPP), Taiwan made the projection of its democracy a major tenet of its foreign policy. During the Chen administration, Taiwan embarked on a proactive public diplomacy strategy that highlighted its democratic institutions as a soft power asset, and sought to brand the country as a robust democracy and supporter of international human rights norms.

During his presidency, Chen specifically cited Joseph Nye when he highlighted Taiwan's democracy and civil society as a source of the country's soft power, while his vice president, Annette Lu Hsiu-lien (呂秀蓮), often noted that Taiwan's democracy would have an impact on its international relations.²² The DPP government also made the promotion of human rights a source of soft power for Taiwan.²³ In particular, Taiwan's diplomatic representatives in the United States have seen the island's democratic institutions as being particularly attractive for the American public and as evidence of the existence of "shared values" between the United States and Taiwan.²⁴ These forms of soft power have also contributed to enhanced relations with Taiwan's other major non-diplomatic allies, such as Japan, by creating the impression of a shared democratic identity.²⁵

Taiwan's democratization also increased domestic popular pressure for a more assertive stance on Taiwan independence.²⁶ However, Beijing's antipathy toward the Chen administration and its pro-independence line led to a ratcheting up of tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and elevation of the long-running game of diplomatic courtship through checkbook diplomacy

²²Lu, "'Soft' Power."

²³Interview with Dr. Chyungly Lee, associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, July 5, 2010.

²⁴Wang and Lu, "The Conception of Soft Power."

²⁵Jing Sun, "Japan-Taiwan Relations: Unofficial in Name Only," *Asian Survey* 47, no. 5 (2007): 790-810.

²⁶Gilley, "Not So Dire Straits," 46.

in which China and Taiwan proffered large sums to entice diplomatic recognition. The practice of securing and maintaining diplomatic recognition through foreign aid, termed "dollar diplomacy" or "checkbook diplomacy," threatened to sully Taiwan's recently-earned democratic credentials and diplomatic reputation, as financial largesse was doled out to unsavory regimes in exchange for diplomatic recognition.²⁷ The competition for diplomatic recognition between Taipei and Beijing continued until the recent thaw in cross-Strait relations after the election of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in 2008. Since the thaw, the guns of diplomatic sniping have fallen silent as Beijing has ceased courting Taiwan's diplomatic allies and Taipei has stopped its annual request for UN membership for the first time since 1993.²⁸

Since the KMT returned to power in 2008, Taiwan has been pursuing a policy of "flexible diplomacy" which puts more emphasis on pragmatism in Taiwan's official and unofficial relations, and views the promotion of Taiwan's soft power as a key component of its foreign policy efforts.²⁹ President Ma came to office promising a more constructive relationship with mainland China, and as part of his policy of flexible diplomacy, Taipei and Beijing have achieved a rapprochement and enhanced cross-Strait diplomacy and public diplomacy. New economic and cultural linkages have been forged between the two sides, including the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), signed in July 2010. These have paved the way for liberalized trade, enhanced cultural and academic exchanges, and greater scope for cross-Strait tourism.³⁰ Taiwan gained more

²⁷Ian Taylor, "Taiwan's Foreign Policy and Africa: The Limitations of Dollar Diplomacy," *Journal of Contemporary China* 11, no. 30 (2002): 125-40.

²⁸Gilley, "Not So Dire Straits," 46.

²⁹Ma Ying-jeou, "The Concept and Strategy of the 'Flexible Diplomacy'" (address to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taipei, Taiwan, August 4, 2008).

³⁰Sheridan Prasso, "Taiwan-China Trade Deal: A Game Changer," *CNN Money*, June 29, 2010, available at http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/29/news/international/china_taiwan_trade.fortune/index.htm; "Culture Next on Taiwan-China Agenda," *China Post*, September 7, 2010, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2010/09/07/271661/Culture-next.htm>; Nicky Loh, "Taiwan Welcomes China's Tourism Boom. But Chinese Tourists, Not So Much," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 8, 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2010/0708/Taiwan-welcomes-China-s-tourism-boom.-But-Chinese-tourists-not-so-much>.

participation in international organizations and more leeway in pursuing bilateral trade deals in the region as a result of the thaw between Taiwan and China.³¹ Taiwan was granted observer status at the World Health Assembly in 2009 and received an invitation to attend again in 2010.³² More importantly, President Ma's flexible diplomacy has ended the zero-sum relationship between Taiwan and China, allowing Taiwan to move beyond the constraints imposed by the previous diplomatic and public diplomacy contest and to gain more latitude for action in the international sphere.³³

The Ma administration, like its predecessor, has stressed democracy and respect for human rights norms as the salient aspects of Taiwanese soft power. President Ma has continued to utilize Taiwan's democracy—repeatedly invoked as the first democracy in the Chinese world—to strengthen Taiwan's position in the international community and buttress Taiwan's close ties with its American benefactor.³⁴

Taiwan's efforts to project its public diplomacy are in the process of maturation. Under previous administrations, the use of Taiwan's democracy and human rights in this regard had a decidedly zero-sum aspect—as Taiwan promoted its democratic values and institutions in a defensive fashion, highlighting how it differed from mainland China.³⁵ This kind of soft power projection underscores the fact that "soft power" is still a form

³¹"Taiwan Seeks Trade Agreement with Singapore," *China Post*, August 6, 2010, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2010/08/06/267562/Taiwan-seeks-htm>.

³²Keith Bradsher, "Taiwan Takes Step Forward at U.N. Health Agency," *New York Times*, April 29, 2009, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/30/world/asia/30taiwan.html>; "Taiwan Becoming 'Regular' at World Health Assembly," *China Post*, March 27, 2010, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial/taiwan-issues/2010/03/27/250009/Taiwan-becoming.htm>.

³³Gary Rawnsley, "Soft Power: Taiwan's Public Diplomacy II," *Radio Taiwan International*, September 12, 2010, available at <http://blog.rti.org.tw/english/2010/09/12/soft-power-taiwans-public-diplomacy-ii/>; Kan Yi-hua, "Diplomatic Truce: Tactic or Strategy," *Taipei Times*, September 12, 2008, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2008/09/12/2003422924>.

³⁴DeLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place," 26.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 25.

of "power."³⁶ In the post-ECFA reality, Taiwanese public diplomacy has taken a distinctly non-zero sum turn in that Taipei no longer projects an "anti-China" counter-identity, nor does it project itself as a wholly separate entity intent on stressing its independence for independence's sake. Instead, its public diplomacy is a projection of Taiwan in its own right.

Strategically, Taiwan's promotion of its soft power resources in terms of its economic model, democratic institutions, and adherence to human rights norms has helped Taiwan counter the PRC's efforts, involving both soft and hard power, to marginalize Taiwan in the international arena and diminish its de facto statehood.³⁷ As Timothy Rich notes, "the island's democratic consolidation has been applauded by recognizing and non-recognizing countries alike, while Taiwan's vibrant economy has been seen as a model for many developing nations. In fact, Taiwan's democratization could be viewed as the primary factor leading most countries to pay lip service to Beijing's 'One China' model."³⁸ In this way, soft power projection has helped keep Taiwan connected and secure in the international community, albeit in an unconventional fashion.

While Taiwan has changed the tactical focus of its public diplomacy and soft power promotion over time, it is important to note that all of the three areas mentioned above play a role in Taiwan's current overall public diplomacy strategy. Taiwan still tactically projects its strategic role in helping to ensure stability in the Asia-Pacific region, especially with regard to U.S. regional strategic calculations. Meanwhile, its connections with its non-diplomatic allies in the realm of trade and investment remain robust, and its economic soft power and "made in Taiwan" nation brand still carry considerable currency. Through the promotion of its geostrategic value, economic model, and democratic credentials, Taiwan has successfully combined three distinct mechanisms for projecting itself and conducting public diplomacy.

³⁶Interview with Dr. Chyungly Lee, Taipei, Taiwan, July 5, 2010.

³⁷DeLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place," 27-28.

³⁸Timothy Rich, "Can Democratic Consolidation Make a Country Less Secure? The Case of Taiwan," *Journal of Contemporary Eastern Asia* 8, no. 1 (March 2009): 10.

Taiwan's Institutions and Tools of Public Diplomacy

The government of Taiwan has a variety of institutions that conduct public diplomacy. Two main bodies serve as instruments of advocacy: the Government Information Office (GIO) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The GIO is a cabinet-level governmental body charged with conducting public diplomacy on Taiwan's behalf.³⁹ Through its fifty-three overseas offices, the GIO disseminates information on government policy and ordinances, clarifies national policy, interacts with the international media, and develops public and cultural diplomacy endeavors that showcase Taiwan's political, cultural, and societal dynamic. The GIO produces publications and audio-visual materials that chronicle cultural, political, and economic life in Taiwan, including the monthly bilingual magazine *Taiwan Panorama* (臺灣光華雜誌), which is produced in Chinese-English and Chinese-Japanese editions. In addition, the GIO helps facilitate motion picture and television production for foreign correspondents and film producers working in Taiwan.⁴⁰

The GIO promotes Taiwan's public diplomacy initiatives in the international media, both in cooperation with the cabinet-level Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) and in its own right. Recently, the GIO has taken on a role promoting the Taiwanese pop music industry as a form of cultural diplomacy, helping finance the sector with investments of NT\$2 billion (US\$66 million) over the next five years to cultivate talent and market the industry abroad.⁴¹ However, the GIO's function is currently in question given the prospect of a major government restructuring that may divide its responsibilities between MOFA and a new Ministry of Culture that would include the CCA.⁴²

³⁹Interview with Andy Tseng, Senior Executive Officer- International Information Department, Government Information Office, Taipei, Taiwan, August 10, 2010.

⁴⁰<http://www.gio.gov.tw>.

⁴¹Tienyeng Hsu, "GIO Unveils \$66 Billion Plan to Promote Pop Music," *Taiwan Today*, June 25, 2010, <http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=108216&CtNode=416>.

⁴²"Cabinet Approves Plan for Government Restructuring," *China Post*, April 10, 2009, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2009/04/10/203660/Cabinet>

MOFA is also involved in Taiwan's public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy efforts, although its mandate is more closely related to traditional diplomacy and foreign policy in terms of promoting and expanding bilateral relations. MOFA maintains 117 representative offices around the globe, including official embassies to Taiwan's twenty-three diplomatic allies and representative offices in countries with which Taiwan has non-official relations. In locations where GIO offices are not present, MOFA takes the lead on public diplomacy efforts. Under the Ma administration, MOFA has also taken a more active role in cultural diplomacy. Through its embassies and missions abroad, MOFA organizes events such as film festivals, food festivals, and photography exhibitions, as well as subsidizing overseas performances by over two hundred Taiwanese arts groups.⁴³

To enhance Taiwan's soft power and publicize its democratic institutions, MOFA has begun conducting polyilateral public diplomacy within global civil society. While bilateral relations consist of interaction between two states and multilateral relations entail diplomacy between three or more states at diplomatic posts or international conferences, polyilateral diplomacy focuses on states working with non-state actors to deal with issues of global interest.⁴⁴ Taiwan's nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector has historically been weak, due to factors ranging from the long period of martial law in Taiwan to Taiwan's complex position within the international community.⁴⁵ In 2000, however, MOFA set up an NGO Affairs Committee to foster engagement by domestic NGOs with global civil society and to facilitate people-to-people diplomacy.⁴⁶ The NGO Affairs Committee pro-

-approves.htm; "Cabinet Prepares Government Restructuring Plan," *Taiwan Today*, May 17, 2010, <http://www.w.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xitem=103332&ctnode=413&mp=9>; Interview with Andy Tseng, Senior Executive Officer- International Information Department, Government Information Office, Taipei, Taiwan, August 10, 2010.

⁴³Republic of China (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy Report, 7th Congress of the Legislative Yuan, 5th Session (March 11, 2010), <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=45688&ctNode=1877&mp=6>.

⁴⁴Wiseman, "Polyilateralism," 37.

⁴⁵Chen Jie, "Burgeoning Transnationalism of Taiwan's Social Movement NGOs," *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 29 (2001): 613-44.

⁴⁶"Taiwan NGOS: Reaching out the World," Republic of China (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 2006, <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/public/Data/732314264571.pdf>.

vides financial assistance for domestic NGOs to take part in international activities and seeks to engage in cooperation with international NGOs as a means of strengthening ties with global civil society.⁴⁷ In 2009, the NGO Affairs Committee helped Taiwan's NGOs attend over six hundred international conferences, and supported organizations such as the Tzu Chi Foundation (慈濟), Taiwanroot Medical Peace Corps (路竹會), and the Buddha's Light International Association (佛光會) in their international activities.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, in 2003, to further Taiwan's polyilateral engagement efforts as well as to promote Taiwan's credentials as a burgeoning democracy, the Chen administration established the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (TFD). The nonpartisan, nonprofit TFD is considered, in global civil society terms, a government-organized nongovernmental organization (GONGO). Its mission is to work transnationally with other democratic institutions and networks, in both the governmental and nongovernmental realm, to strengthen democracy and human rights in Taiwan and abroad.⁴⁹

The TFD's work and cooperation with civil society groups and NGOs in areas such as human rights and the promotion of democracy, and its bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region, fosters a positive impression of Taiwan's own transition to democracy and directly and indirectly enhances Taiwan's democratic soft power.

Taiwanese Aid Diplomacy

In common with other isolated states such as Israel and Cuba,⁵⁰ Taiwan has long engaged in aid diplomacy ("diplomacy of the deed") as part

⁴⁷See: <http://www.taiwanngo.tw/english/>

⁴⁸Republic of China (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Foreign Policy Report, 7th Congress of the Legislative Yuan, 5th Session (March 11, 2010), <http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=45688&ctNode=1877&mp=6>.

⁴⁹Taiwan Foundation for Democracy promotional brochure.

⁵⁰On Cuban aid diplomacy, see: Michael H. Erisman, "Cuban Development Aid," in *Cuban Foreign Policy Confronts a New International Order*, ed. H. Michael Erisman and John M. Kirk (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 139-65; On Israeli aid diplomacy, see Israel's

of its public diplomacy outreach and as a means of bolstering international support. Currently, the body in charge of Taiwan's aid distribution, the International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF), is housed within MOFA. Taiwan began offering developmental assistance, in the form of technical cooperation to Vietnam in the first instance, in 1959. In 1960, Taiwan launched Operation Vanguard which sent agricultural missions to newly independent African nations to help improve their agricultural practices. Two years later, Taipei established the ROC-Africa Technical Cooperation. This paid diplomatic dividends for the Republic of China as the number of African countries supporting its membership of the UN nearly doubled to seventeen in 1962—up from nine the previous year.⁵¹ As Taiwan grew more diplomatically isolated in the 1970s and 1980s, it expanded its developmental aid outreach in the form of projects and grants to many of the world's poorer countries in Africa, Central America, and the Pacific in an effort to secure and maintain recognition.⁵² Taiwan has recognized that its humanitarian aid and emergency and rescue work can be used to increase its soft power. In one recent example, Taiwan's rescue and relief work following the earthquake in Haiti was highlighted by international media outlets such as CNN and the BBC.⁵³

Agency for International Development Cooperation, Annual Report 2009, <http://mashav.mfa.gov.il/mfm/Web/main/Document.asp?SubjectID=44836&MissionID=16210&LanguageID=0&StatusID=3&DocumentID=-1>.

⁵¹"Partnership for Progress and Sustainable Development: White Paper on Foreign Aid Policy," Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (May 2009): 24.

⁵²Kenneth M. Baker and Richard Louis Edmonds, "Transfer of Taiwanese Ideas and Technology to the Gambia, West Africa: A Viable Approach to Rural Development?" *The Geographic Journal* 170, no. 3 (September 2004): 191.

⁵³Kelly Her, "A Helping Hand in Haiti," *Taiwan Review*, May 1, 2010, <http://taiwanreview.nat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=97944&ctNode=1446>; S. H. Lee and Flor Wang, "Helping Rebuild Enhances Taiwan's Image- President Ma," *China Post*, May 28, 2010, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2010/05/29/258598/Helping-Haiti.htm>.

Cultural Diplomacy

In recent years, cultural diplomacy has been given increased prominence in Taiwan's public diplomacy efforts. For many years under KMT rule, Taiwan promoted itself as the guardian of traditional Chinese culture.⁵⁴ Latterly, there was a slow shift of focus to Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics, then under the independence-minded DPP administration, Taiwan's cultural diplomacy projection was far more focused on promoting indigenous culture.⁵⁵ Thus, Taiwan emphasized its local aboriginal, Hakka, and uniquely Taiwanese culture as a means of projecting its separate identity from mainland China. With the election of President Ma Ying-jeou, Taiwanese cultural diplomacy has been seen as a key component of the nation's soft power projection,⁵⁶ and the government has returned to highlighting its Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics, as well as promoting Taiwan as "an authentic and vital site of Chinese culture."⁵⁷ The Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA) plays a central role in Taiwan's cultural diplomacy efforts.⁵⁸ The CCA works with MOFA and the GIO to promote Taiwanese cultural diplomacy abroad through the sponsorship of film festivals, theatrical and musical performances, and art exhibitions.⁵⁹ The CCA also has cultural centers in New York, Paris, and Tokyo.

The CCA has also been charged with establishing Taiwan Academies to teach Mandarin and Taiwanese/Chinese culture.⁶⁰ These academies

⁵⁴DeLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place," 25.

⁵⁵Interview with Andy Tseng, senior executive officer, International Information Department, Government Information Office, Taipei, Taiwan, July 28, 2010; interview with Shu-Ching Yu, deputy director, Third Department, Council for Cultural Affairs, Taipei, Taiwan, August 24, 2010.

⁵⁶See note 43 above.

⁵⁷DeLisle, "Soft Power in a Hard Place," 25; "ROC to Showcase 'Soft Power' in Centennial Celebrations: President," *China Post*, November 13, 2009, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2009/11/14/232684/ROC-to.htm>.

⁵⁸<http://english.cca.gov.tw>.

⁵⁹Interview with Shu-Ching Yu, deputy director, Third Department, Council for Cultural Affairs, Taipei, Taiwan, August 24, 2010.

⁶⁰"Taiwan to Challenge China's 'Soft Power'," *Agence France Presse*, February 17, 2010.

will serve three functions: (1) to help preserve traditional Chinese culture and its Taiwanese characteristics, (2) to offer a window on Taiwanese society, and (3) to carry out various cultural exchange activities. Taiwan Academies were slated to open in Houston and Los Angeles in 2011.⁶¹

It is planned that these language centers—eventually to be set up around the globe—will become an alternative to the mainland Chinese-run Confucius Institutes, and an ideal way of showcasing Taiwanese culture while teaching Mandarin Chinese. They should also help reinforce Taiwan's reputation as an important site of traditional Mandarin scholarship.

Interest in Mandarin scholarship is booming globally. A report released in 2010 by the American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages noted that Chinese is the fastest growing language being studied in the United States, with a growth rate of 195 percent.⁶² Furthermore, in 2007, it was estimated that over sixteen hundred public and private middle and high schools in the United States were teaching Mandarin, up from three hundred just a decade earlier.

Private companies have also seen an increased interest in Mandarin study. The U.S.-based Rosetta Stone, which offers learning services in twenty-four languages, reports that Mandarin is among its top ten packages sold, representing an increase of 719 percent in corporate sales between 2008 and 2009.⁶³

Instead of trying to compete with mainland China's Confucius Institutes, Taiwan should perhaps innovate and make its academies virtual.⁶⁴

⁶¹"Gov't to Set Up Taiwan Academies around the World," *China Post*, February 17, 2010, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national-news/2010/02/17/244969/Govt-to.htm>; "Taiwan to Establish Taiwan Academies in American Cities," *Central News Agency*, May 5, 2010, <http://61.57.40.108/OCAC/web/News/uptNews.aspx?Item0=2&c0=10&p0=5825&page=0>.

⁶²Ira Mellman, "Interest in Learning Chinese May Be Growing Exponentially," *Voice of America*, December 14, 2010, <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Chinese-May-Be-Fastest-Growing-Language-Learning-111887289.html>.

⁶³*Ibid.*

⁶⁴Paul Rockower, "E-Mandarin Classes Offer New Opportunities for Taiwan Diplomacy," *Taiwan Today*, March 11, 2011, <http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=155796&ctNode=426>.

Rather than confine the country's presence to locations where it has cultural centers, Taiwan would be wise to ramp up its global pedagogical presence via the Internet. The promotion of Mandarin language e-learning could be pioneered as a form of cultural diplomacy. Already private companies in Israel offer online Hebrew instruction, which allows students to connect with teachers via web cameras and voice-over-Internet-protocol (VOIP) technology from their own homes. Taiwan should adopt such a program. Given the nation's reputation as a technological hub, utilizing VOIP technologies to promote Mandarin learning makes perfect sense. These live digital e-Mandarin classrooms would also enhance Taiwan's global standing as an innovator.

As the adage goes, "creativity provides opportunity; innovation provides leadership." Creating virtual Mandarin classrooms as part of an online program would showcase the nation's creativity and innovation, thus creating public diplomacy opportunities to promote the country. This would allow Taiwan to maximize its cultural outreach, as well as reinforcing its reputation as a center of innovation.

Gastrodiplomacy

The Taiwanese government recently unveiled a plan to promote Taiwanese cuisine as a means to further Taiwanese cultural diplomacy and highlight Taiwan's culinary reputation.⁶⁵ Gastrodiplomacy is predicated on the notion that the easiest way to win hearts and minds is through the stomach. Gastrodiplomacy is a technique perfected by Thailand, which pioneered the use of its kitchens and restaurants as outposts of cultural diplomacy. Recognizing the growing international popularity of Thai food, in 2002, the government of Thailand implemented the "Global Thai pro-

⁶⁵For more on Taiwan's Gastrodiplomacy efforts, see: Paul Rockower, "Branding Taiwan through Gastrodiplomacy," *Nation-Branding.info*, July 21, 2010, <http://nation-branding.info/2010/07/21/branding-taiwan-through-gastrodiplomacy/>; Paul Rockower, "The Gastrodiplomacy Cookbook," *The Huffington Post*, September 14, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-rockower/the-gastrodiplomacy-cookb_b_716555.html.

gram" as a means to increase the number of Thai restaurants. As an article in *The Economist* noted, this program "will not only introduce delicious spicy Thai food to thousands of new tummies and persuade more people to visit Thailand, but it could subtly help deepen relations with other countries."⁶⁶

Through the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Taiwan is set to invest NT\$1.1 billion (US\$34.2 million) through 2013 in Taiwanese gastrodiplomacy and the promotion of Taiwanese cuisine at the global dining table.⁶⁷ As part of this campaign, Taiwan will host international gourmet festivals as well as sending local chefs to ply their culinary skills in international competitions. The initiative will also support the establishment of Taiwanese restaurants abroad, with a focus on major overseas shopping malls and department stores as well as sampling stations for Taiwanese cuisines at international airports. It is anticipated that the gastrodiplomacy plan will enable local businesses to set up 3,500 restaurants in both Taiwan and abroad, and generate close to NT\$2 billion in private investment. At home in Taiwan, the government is planning to establish a new Taiwanese food foundation—a culinary think tank that will assist coffee shops and restaurant chains that promote Taiwanese food abroad. Recently National Public Radio's *Morning Edition* featured a story on the immense popularity of the Taiwanese coffee store 85C, which recently set up shop in Irvine, California.⁶⁸ The Taiwanese chain has been introducing American palates to such Taiwanese specialties as iced sea-salt lattes and squid ink buns, and has attracted lines of customers stretching out the door.

Gastrodiplomacy helps under-recognized nation brands such as Taiwan use their culinary skills to attract international attention. The sad culinary reality is that most people associate Chinese food with the heavy, sauce-laden fare that is promoted as typical Middle Kingdom cuisine;

⁶⁶"Thailand's Gastro-Diplomacy," *The Economist*, February 23, 2002.

⁶⁷"Cooking for a Prosperous Future," *Taiwan Today*, June 4, 2010, <http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=105822&ctNode=425>.

⁶⁸Neda Uluby, "Sea Salt Latte: Is 85C the Next Coffee Craze?" *Morning Edition*, June 8, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127474607>.

meanwhile, for those not of a foodie bent, the notion of Taiwanese cuisine draws a blank. That creates a tremendous opportunity for Taiwan to conduct gastrodiplo­macy in order to brand its own cuisine as a healthy, light alternative to heavy Western versions of Chinese food. The lighter, healthier side of Taiwanese cuisine, with its unique flavors and textures, could really tempt global appetites as it creates awareness of what Taiwanese food is really like. As such, the Taiwanese efforts at gastrodiplo­macy have drawn global attention, including reports in the influential *Guardian* newspaper in Britain.⁶⁹ As yet, there has been no indication that gastro­diplomacy will be combined with the Taiwan Academies venture. Given Taiwan's efforts to use its kitchens as cultural outposts, Taipei would be wise to integrate cooking classes and culinary diplomacy endeavors into its existing cultural centers and proposed Taiwan Academies.

If Taiwan really wants to conduct an audacious program of public diplomacy and cultural promotion, it should also consider making a "traveling night market" part of its cultural and culinary diplomacy outreach. Effective public diplomacy takes a national trait, distills it, and communicates it abroad. In this regard, nothing signifies Taiwan like the night market. Taiwan's e-gov site already features a night market in cyberspace,⁷⁰ but the real thing would be a more effective means of public diplomacy. Taiwan has previously conducted public diplomacy in the form of traveling exhibits and fairs, such as Taiwan Week in the United States and the Taiwan Fair in Canada. Other countries have already begun to use their own night markets to such ends—the Malaysian government recently set up Malaysian night markets in the middle of London's Trafalgar Square, in the hip Meatpacking District of New York City, and on 3rd Street Promenade at the Santa Monica beach near Los Angeles.⁷¹ All of the

⁶⁹Robert Booth, "Taiwan Launches 'Gastro-Diplomacy' Drive," *The Guardian*, August 8, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/08/taiwan-launches-gasto-diplomacy-drive>.

⁷⁰<http://www.taiwan.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1002>.

⁷¹Paul Rockower, "Malaysia Jumps on the Gastrodiplo­macy Bandwagon," *The Daily Beast*, March 29, 2011, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2011-03-29/malaysia-jumps-on-gastrodiplo­macy-bandwagon/full/>.

hallmarks of Taiwanese cuisine and culture could be included in such a traveling show. Since there are commercial opportunities for the sale of Taiwanese cuisine at night market stalls, perhaps the venture could be a public-private partnership. Altogether, a traveling night market would be an exciting and original venture in public diplomacy.⁷²

International Exchanges

Taiwan also engages in significant cultural and academic exchanges. International exchange is a vital avenue of public diplomacy because it offers the ability to influence in both the short and long term. Beyond personal and academic enrichment for students, academic and cultural exchange can foster personal connections that shape long-term support for a nation and its policies.⁷³

In 2004, the Taiwanese government instituted the Taiwan Scholarships program to attract foreign students to study in Taiwan. These scholarships are administered by MOFA in countries with official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, while for nations without official ties, they are run jointly by the National Science Council, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs.⁷⁴ Nearly four hundred scholarships for undergraduate, graduate, or doctoral degrees are granted annually, and another three hundred scholarships are offered to students participating in Chinese-language programs.⁷⁵ In addition, in 2005, Taiwan's Ministry of Education began offering university scholarships in the form of subsidies for foreign students to attend Taiwan's public and private universities. The scholarships combined government aid with funds provided by the re-

⁷²Paul Rockower, "Taiwanese Gastrodiplomacy 2.0," *Taiwan Today*, December 3, 2010, <http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=133541&ctNode=426>.

⁷³Nancy Snow, "Exchange Power," *PDiN Monitor* 1, no. 7 (September 2010), http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/media/PDiN_M7-September.pdf.

⁷⁴Coral Lee, "Study in Taiwan: All the Rage," *Taiwan Panorama* 35, no. 4 (2010): 70-79.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*

spective institutions.⁷⁶ These programs have led to an increase in the number of foreign students studying in Taiwan, with the Ministry of Education reporting a record high of over twenty-two thousand foreign exchange students in 2009.⁷⁷

Other institutions, like the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange (CCKF), help support scholarly research and exchanges in the field of sinology. This private foundation has its headquarters in Taipei and maintains two international research centers located at Columbia University in New York and Charles University in Prague.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, through MOFA's International Youth Ambassador program, Taiwan has engaged in youth-focused people-to-people diplomacy. Launched in 2009, the international exchange project sends teams of students from thirteen of Taiwan's universities to its various diplomatic allies to engage in cultural exchange with local kids at summer camps.⁷⁹ The aim of the program is to promote cultural understanding, academic development, and people-to-people exchange between Taiwan and its diplomatic allies.⁸⁰

International Broadcasting

In the realm of international broadcasting, Radio Taiwan International (RTI) serves as the "voice of Taiwan," disseminating news and information on Taiwan and its cultural and political life in thirteen languages. In the RTI annual report, its chairperson, Sunshine Kuang (曠湘霞), noted the following:

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷"Record High Number of Foreign Students in Taiwan in 2009: MOE," *China Post*, June 4, 2010, <http://chinapost.com.tw/print/259336>.

⁷⁸See: <http://www.cckf.org>.

⁷⁹Grace Kuo, "Youth Ambassadors Cement Bonds with ROC Allies," *Taiwan Today*, September 30, 2010, <http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=119985&ctNode=445>.

⁸⁰Ibid.

It is responsible for broadcasting news and features to China and the international community on behalf of the Republic of China on Taiwan. RTI is also tasked with giving the international community, including overseas Taiwanese and Chinese, a better understanding of Taiwan and its freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights, and economic and cultural development.⁸¹

Kuang further noted that RTI tries to highlight aspects of Taiwan's "soft power" and to provide a perspective on the political, economic, and cultural aspects of Taiwanese life.⁸²

RTI broadcasts on short and medium wave, as well as streaming broadcasts through its website. RTI began broadcasting online in 2001 and its website now has pages in ten languages. Furthermore, RTI's English service hosts RTI+, an online program that broadcasts an additional half hour of programming. Listeners can download podcasts in English and Japanese, with a Chinese podcast scheduled to be available soon. Listeners are also able to tune in on their mobile phones and PDAs, and can also keep up-to-date with news from Taiwan through the station's e-newsletters.

To expand its outreach, RTI has signed cooperative broadcasting agreements with over forty other broadcasting media outlets, including Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, and Radio France Internationale. RTI also connects with its listeners through various listener clubs in Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, India, Bangladesh, and Germany, and facilitates listener club meetings with visits from RTI personalities and staff.⁸³ RTI provides a valuable service, through its Thai, Vietnamese, and Indonesian broadcasts, for guest-workers from these countries residing in Taiwan, by providing them with news and information about Taiwan and their home countries. Meanwhile, listeners in Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam can contact RTI and request songs or leave messages for their family members working in Taiwan.⁸⁴ In addition, RTI hosts an annual family

⁸¹Sunshine Kuang, "RTI Will Strive for Excellence in the New Year," *Radio Taiwan International Annual Report 2009*, 7.

⁸²Interview with Sunshine Kuang, chairperson, Radio Taiwan International, Taipei, Taiwan, August 5, 2010.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Interview with Carlson Huang, Radio Taiwan International, Taipei, Taiwan, August 5, 2010.

reunion gathering for migrant workers who may not have seen their relatives for many years. The station pays for the families of between eight and twelve migrant workers to come to Taiwan each year.

As previously mentioned, Taiwan already conducts cultural diplomacy outreach through language teaching. In the future, Taiwan may wish to offer Mandarin classes through RTI, as the United States and the United Kingdom have done through Voice of America and the BBC. VOA has been teaching American English through a program called *Special English*, while the BBC and the British Council—the United Kingdom's cultural diplomacy arm—jointly offer online English lessons, including podcasts, games, and learning materials, as an aid to teachers and students of British English.

Given the global interest in learning Mandarin, RTI could attract a wider listenership by scheduling simple classes in the language. Already the broadcaster airs a short program called *Chinese to Go*, but this could easily be expanded into a program of linguistic outreach. With its broadcasts in thirteen languages, RTI has the potential to serve as a valuable creative platform for language diplomacy.

Taiwan's international broadcasting efforts through RTI constitute a vital medium through which Taiwan can communicate its culture and values to a diverse audience. RTI helps convey different aspects of life in Taiwan and broadens perceptions of Taiwanese society and helps raise the nation's profile through its multifaceted programming.

International Events

Like Qatar and Singapore, countries that have sought to use international conventions, expos, and sporting events to raise their international profile,⁸⁵ Taiwan has been attempting to attract global attention by hosting

⁸⁵Andrew F. Cooper, "Middle Powers: Squeezed out or Adaptive," *Public Diplomacy Magazine* 1, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 30.

various international events. In July 2009, Kaohsiung played host to the World Games—an international multi-sport competition featuring sports not contested in the Olympics. More than five thousand athletes from 105 countries took part in the eleven-day event.⁸⁶ In September that year, Taipei hosted the Summer Deaflympics, which brought some three thousand athletes from eighty countries to Taiwan.

The Taipei International Flora Expo took place from November 2010 until April 2011, the seventh such event to take place in Asia. It featured fourteen exhibition halls spread out over ninety-two hectares and sought to convey Taiwan's achievements in horticulture, science, and environmentalism.⁸⁷ Taipei promoted the event internationally, most prominently in China (including at the Shanghai Expo), Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore as well as in major European capitals and U.S. cities such as New York and Los Angeles. The Taipei Flora Expo attracted approximately six hundred thousand international visitors during its six-month run.⁸⁸

Taiwan promotes itself as an ideal location for conventions and conferences through its Taiwan MICE (Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, Exhibitions) Advancement program. Sponsored by the Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT) of the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MoEA) and organized by the Taiwan Institute of Economic Research (TIER), the Taiwan MICE Advancement program offers financial support, logistical assistance, and other incentives to encourage NGOs, non-profit organizations, and multinational corporations to hold their events in Taiwan.⁸⁹

⁸⁶"President Declares Kaohsiung World Games Open," *Taiwan News*, July 12, 2009, http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1005497&lang=eng_news.

⁸⁷<http://www.2010taipeiexpo.tw/>.

⁸⁸"Flora Expo Ends with High Praise," *China Post*, April 26, 2011, <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/local/taipei/2011/04/26/300035/Flora-Expo.htm>.

⁸⁹Interview with Jessica Chang, section chief, Taiwan Advancement Program, Taipei, Taiwan, September 1, 2010.

Strategic Framework for Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding

Despite the fact that Taiwan has devised numerous institutions and instruments for engaging in public diplomacy, Taiwan's public diplomacy projection has been plagued by structural deficiencies. In a comprehensive and self-critical report prepared by MOFA's Policy and Planning Committee, several reasons were put forward for Taiwan's failure to make the most of its public diplomacy opportunities. The 2008 report notes that Taiwan lacks an overarching public diplomacy strategy, central coordination, and a unified message. The report also points to a fragmented institutional structure and a failure to spend budgets, meaning that Taiwan's public diplomacy amounts to less than the sum of its various parts. Other criticisms include failure to provide clear guidelines for staff or conduct effective evaluation of projects, and the lack of flagship branding projects.⁹⁰

While the government has seemingly internalized the need for Taiwan to conduct public diplomacy, and the concept of soft power is very much part of the Taiwanese political lexicon, the country still lacks an agency or body to coordinate public diplomacy across the various ministerial bodies as a means of amplifying these efforts. The report cited above accurately notes that "high level acceptance and support among concerned agencies for a coordinated [public diplomacy] effort is necessary to achieve success."⁹¹ Leading figures in the Taiwanese political establishment have indeed spoken about the need to prioritize Taiwan's public diplomacy and to adopt a top-down approach, but these suggestions have yet to gain the high level acceptance and support needed for a coordinating agency or body to be set up.

Meanwhile, on the subject of the fragmented institutional structure, the report complains that MOFA's region-based departments are often unaware of activities conducted by other departments in the field, although

⁹⁰Boris Voyer, "Taiwan's Public Diplomacy Challenges: Policy Recommendations," Republic of China (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2008.

⁹¹*Ibid.*

the ministry has recently begun to share this kind of information.⁹²

One remedy for these failings suggested in the report is the creation of a strategic national-level public diplomacy board or council that would embrace the various public diplomacy instruments found within Taiwanese society.⁹³ The report correctly argues that with the establishment of such a council or board, Taiwan would be in a better position to develop an overall public diplomacy strategy derived from a new national strategic communications plan that would match the message to the target audience, as well as providing toolkits to help implement this strategy.

The report also stresses the need for a broad-based "buy-in" to the concept of coordinated public diplomacy outreach to ensure that recommendations made by the proposed public diplomacy agency or board are heard and appreciated by the relevant actors within Taiwan's various institutions. It argues, based on the approach of the then-chairman of the MOFA Research and Planning Committee, Yen Chien-fa (顏建發), for the cultivation of lateral contacts and relationships within Taiwan's different public diplomacy actors as a means to initiate the buy-in process. Furthermore, the report highlights the need for the appropriate training and socialization for those who will preside over the proposed agency, in addition to the development of clear criteria for evaluating the proposed agency's work.⁹⁴

Moreover, as noted in the report, Taiwan lacks both a nation branding mechanism and robust nation branding projects. While the branding of cultural and consumer products is a long-standing practice, the branding of political entities is a more recent, postmodern phenomenon. As Peter van Ham notes, "A brand is best described as a customer's ideas about a product; the 'brand state' comprises the outside world's ideas about a particular country."⁹⁵ As a component of statecraft, nation branding has

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Peter van Ham, "The Rise of the Brand State," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 5 (September-October 2001): 2.

become a vital part of public diplomacy projection. J. E. Peterson states, "Branding has emerged as a state asset to rival geopolitics and traditional considerations of power. Assertive branding is necessary for states as well as companies to stand out in the crowd, since they often offer similar products."⁹⁶

Taiwan has engaged in ad hoc nation branding-type projects, such as the aforementioned gastrodiplomacy campaign or its efforts to establish an international brand through the hosting of events, conventions, and expos. Meanwhile, it has been conducting a business-based branding of Taiwanese products via the Branding Taiwan campaign conducted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT), and the Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA). Moreover, organizations like the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy help brand Taiwan's democratic institutions and position Taiwan as democratic leader in the region. However, none of these constitutes a holistic nation branding effort that connects emotions to the Taiwanese national brand.

South Korea, for example, has implemented a nation-branding project through the Presidential Council on Nation Branding (PCNB). Founded in 2009, the PCNB was initiated to raise the profile of the Korean brand by highlighting Korean culture, hi-tech innovations, and various facets of Korean society.⁹⁷ Non-governmental initiatives like Branding Korea provide alternative avenues for discussing strategies for strengthening the Korean national brand.⁹⁸ Other non-governmental initiatives such as Israel21c and public-private hybrids like INDIA Future of Change have sought to conduct nation-branding, public diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy in the media and through social media sites. Using culture, hi-tech achievements, and democratic institutions, these initiatives have sought to change perceptions about the nations concerned and enhance

⁹⁶J. E. Peterson, "Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State," *Middle East Journal* 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2006): 745.

⁹⁷Presidential Council on Nation Branding, Korea, <http://www.koreabrand.net>.

⁹⁸Branding Korea: <http://www.brandingkorea.org>.

the national brand.⁹⁹ As the MOFA report correctly states, having an overall strategic communication plan could help bring to fruition a vigorous nation-branding plan that would encapsulate the various unconnected nation-branding efforts, and serve to focus international attention on the Taiwanese national brand.

Taiwan as a Middle Power

By numerous measures Taiwan can reasonably be categorized as a "middle power"—that is, according to Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal, a state which is neither a superpower nor a small state. Eytan Gilboa describes middle powers thus:

Scholars and officials have invented and employed the middle power concept to cope with the theoretical challenge of explaining the considerable influence some states have on international relations even though their resources are much smaller than that of great powers. To be a middle power, a state must exercise international leadership but usually does so only on certain issues and in cooperation with other states or through international organizations.¹⁰⁰

This classification was initially focused on the status and behavior of countries such as Canada and Australia, although the field of study has expanded outward to include Scandinavian countries such as Norway, Sweden, and Finland, as well as small states that punch above their diplomatic weight such as Singapore or Qatar. The behavior of such middle power states will be addressed later on in this section.

Taiwan fits squarely within the ranks of middle power states in economic terms, its diplomatic difficulties notwithstanding.¹⁰¹ With a total GDP of US\$735 billion, Taiwan is the twentieth largest economy in the world, while it ranks forty-seventh in terms of its per capita GDP (nearly

⁹⁹Israel21C: <http://www.israel21c.org>; INDIA Future of Change: <http://www.indiafutureofchange.com>.

¹⁰⁰Eytan Gilboa, "The Public Diplomacy of Middle Powers," *Public Diplomacy Magazine* 1, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 24.

¹⁰¹Appendix II.

US\$30,000).¹⁰² Meanwhile, Taiwan currently holds the world's fifth-largest foreign reserves, behind China, Japan, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, with nearly US\$353 billion held in foreign exchange and gold.¹⁰³

Middle powers commonly share a number of difficulties with regard to their visibility on the global stage. The global public is either unaware of them, or it holds negative opinions of them—thus they need to secure global attention. Gilboa comments, "Since the resources of middle powers are limited, they have to distinguish themselves in certain attractive areas and acquire sufficient credibility and legitimacy to deal with them on behalf of large global constituencies."¹⁰⁴ A hallmark of "middlepowermanship" is the tendency to use public diplomacy as a force multiplier that allows a middle power to exercise influence in the international arena.¹⁰⁵ Specifically, a middle power will turn to niche diplomacy as a form of policy specialization to attract global attention to its utility and value within the international community.

Niche diplomacy is a technique often employed by small and medium-sized states to raise their public diplomacy profile by connecting their brand with certain key causes or endeavors that are considered beneficial for global civil society. It was the Australian foreign minister, Gareth Evans, who first outlined the concept. Evans' approach focused on "concentrating resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field."¹⁰⁶ Focusing on niche diplomacy as a means of public diplomacy allows small and medium-sized states with limited hard power resources to exert far more leverage on the diplomatic stage by getting involved in issues considered pertinent to global civil society.

¹⁰²CIA World Factbook: <http://www.cia.gov>.

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Gilboa, "The Public Diplomacy of Middle Powers," 24.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Andrew F. Cooper, *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers: Middle Powers after the Cold War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 5.

Middle powers have thus used niche diplomacy as a form of nation branding, tying their national reputation to a relevant prominent cause of global interest. As Alan Henrikson states: It is sometimes possible for a country to do very well by doing good. To support "good works," to perform "good" deeds, to use "good" words, and to project "good" images can pay off in terms of international prestige, and in even more practical expressions of others' appreciation.¹⁰⁷ Niche diplomacy is projected through public diplomacy outreach to increase the soft power of the nation in question. There are ample examples of this use of niche diplomacy by middle powers.

Canada helped pioneer the notion of niche diplomacy in the 1990s with its work on the Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Working polylaterally, Canada helped spearhead the drive to ban anti-personnel landmines, which culminated with the signing of the Ottawa Treaty in December 1997. Canada's innovative efforts in niche diplomacy as public diplomacy and its polylateral work with nonstate actors to push forward an issue deemed in line with global good proved to be a soft power boon for this middle power state.

Other nations like Norway and Qatar have used niche diplomacy in the form of conflict resolution to enhance their national brand and soft power. Norway has long crafted an international image through niche diplomacy related to its humanitarian work, its connection with the Nobel Peace Prize, and its extensive conflict mediation work. As Frank Bruni notes, "a frenzy of Norwegian peace-making, or at least peacetrying, that put peace somewhere alongside oil and timber as one of this country's signature exports," helped build Norway's international image as "the international capital of peace."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷Alan Henrikson, "Niche Diplomacy in the World Public Arena: The Global 'Corners' of Canada and Norway," in *The New Public Diplomacy*, ed. Jan Melissen (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 1.

¹⁰⁸Frank Bruni, "A Nation that Exports Oil, Herring and Peace," *New York Times*, December 21, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/21/world/a-nation-that-exports-oil-herring-and-peace.html>.

More recently, the tiny Gulf emirate of Qatar fashioned a public diplomacy niche for itself within global civil society as a conflict mediator par excellence.¹⁰⁹ While Norway has focused on global peacemaking, Qatar has focused on regional efforts for peace in the Middle East and North Africa. As a small state in a turbulent region, Qatar has used its niche diplomacy efforts as a means to showcase its utility in the international community as well as maintain its precarious security interests. Qatar's biggest conflict mediation triumph came in its resolution of the long-standing governmental impasse in Lebanon. In this way the tiny emirate turned its niche diplomacy gains into public diplomacy triumphs as it was praised in the press and saw its public diplomacy stature rise.¹¹⁰

As demonstrated from this diverse set of examples, niche diplomacy could help Taiwan raise its profile in the international community. The next section will examine possible areas where Taiwan could engage in niche diplomacy.

Taiwan's Niche

Following in the footsteps of other middle power states, Taiwan should find areas in which to specialize for niche diplomacy purposes. Niche diplomacy is often most effective when it highlights already well-known aspects of a nation's national character or projected soft power. Niche diplomacy is also more effective when, rather than starting from scratch, the specialization builds on practices, policies, or initiatives already in place. Two areas where Taiwan could successfully engage in niche diplomacy to exhibit its utility and value in the international community are: (1) efforts to use its advanced ICT sector to reduce the global

¹⁰⁹Paul Rockower, "Qatar's Public Diplomacy," unpublished paper (2008), <http://mysite.verizon.net/SJRockower/PSR/QatarPDv4.pdf>.

¹¹⁰Robert Worth, "Qatar, Playing All Sides is a Nonstop Mediator," *New York Times*, July 9, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/world/middleeast/09qatar.html>; "Lebanese, Arab Officials React to Doha Agreement, Praise Qatari Role," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, May 22, 2008.

digital divide, and (2) promotion of Taipei's urban sustainability programs.

Taiwan's advanced information and communication technologies (ICT) sector is one area where the country is a global leader. As such, the Taiwanese government has worked polylaterally in partnership with the country's private sector and NGOs to set up digital centers in countries that are fellow members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, as well as in diplomatically allied countries in Central America and the Caribbean. APEC was established in 1989 to facilitate economic growth in the Asia-Pacific through economic cooperation and trade.¹¹¹ Today, it has twenty-one member economies on both sides of the Pacific; Taiwan was admitted as a member economy in 1991 under the designation "Chinese Taipei." Since joining, Taiwan has been an active member of the economic and technical cooperation (ECOTECH) committee.

In 2004, Taiwan initiated the APEC Digital Opportunity Center (ADOC) project which helps other APEC member economies to upgrade their ICT application capabilities, reduce the digital divide, and promote e-business among the forum's partners.¹¹² ADOC has established centers that offer ICT resources, training, and education opportunities. The Taiwan government, cognizant of the public diplomacy value of such an endeavor, has stated that its objectives are to raise Taiwan's international profile and engagement, as well as to enhance relations and foster businesses opportunities with APEC members.¹¹³

During the first phase of the ADOC initiative, which began in August 2004 and lasted until the end of 2008, Taiwan collaborated with seven APEC member states (Chile, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand) to create forty-three ADOC centers. Taiwan spent US\$10 million on the project and donated more than six hundred computers to train over seventy thousand participants of the

¹¹¹<http://www.apec.org>.

¹¹²See ADOC 2.0 website: <http://www.apecdoc.org/post/2/4214>.

¹¹³*Ibid.*

ADOC program in these countries. The second phase of the program, ADOC2.0, was unveiled at the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in 2007. The second phase has focused on bringing in greater participation from the private business sector and NGOs. Thirteen international businesses and NGOs signed up to the initiative, including Taiwanese computer manufacturing giants Acer and Asus, as well as Microsoft and Intel. In addition to achieving better harmonization of public and private forces, ADOC 2.0 focuses on training disadvantaged groups such as children, women, and people with disabilities to develop ICT skills, as well as helping small and medium-sized businesses to further their e-business potential.¹¹⁴ Between seven and twelve new digital centers are planned during ADOC 2.0, and the program has recruited an eighth member, Mexico.

Meanwhile, Taiwan has been carrying out similar work outside of the ADOC framework, creating ICT centers for its diplomatic allies in Central America and the Caribbean. Through the International Cooperation and Development Fund, Taiwan helped establish ICT centers for training and the facilitation of e-commerce in Belize, Guatemala, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia.¹¹⁵

Thus far, Taiwan's public diplomacy efforts through ADOC and the ICT centers for its diplomatic allies have attracted little global or international media attention.¹¹⁶ For a public diplomacy project as inherently marketable as ADOC, the publicity return on investment of effort has been unsatisfactory. If Taiwan were to make the promotion of its efforts to reduce the digital divide more in tune with its own public diplomacy promotion and projection, it could find an ideal public diplomacy niche in this area.

¹¹⁴Allen Hsu, "Chinese Taipei Powers APEC Digital Revolution," *Taiwan Today*, October 21, 2008, <http://www.taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=45704&CtNode=436>.

¹¹⁵Shih Hsiu-chuan, "Taiwan Helps Allies Improve Their E-Commerce with ICT," *Taipei Times*, September 8, 2010, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/09/08/2003482375>.

¹¹⁶Claudio A. Melendez, "Taiwan's APEC Digital Opportunity Center Initiative as Public Diplomacy: A Perspective from Chile" (master thesis, Graduate School of International Affairs, Ming Chuang University, Taipei, June 2010).

A second possible opportunity for niche diplomacy and international branding lies in the area of urban sustainability, in particular Taipei's comprehensive recycling and waste management program. In 2000, Taipei instituted an innovative plan to increase recycling and waste management. The system includes a per bag fee for the disposal of non-recyclable waste. By implementing an incentive system to motivate Taipei residents to reduce their non-recyclable waste, and to separate and recycle soft plastics, hard plastics, kitchen waste, and other recyclables, Taipei has reduced household waste by 67 percent, increased recycling by 45 percent, and allowed the city to reach its goal of zero additional landfills by the end of the decade.¹¹⁷

Taiwan has already promoted the eco-Taipei recycling model in a public diplomacy context at the Shanghai 2010 Expo. Housed in the Urban Best Practices Area, the Taipei Pavilion—exhibited by the Taipei City Government and sponsored by the Taiwanese software company Foxconn—displayed Taipei's advances in recycling and waste management through interactive displays. Taiwan's recycling capabilities also caught global attention when Taiwanese companies produced eco-fabric jerseys for nine different national soccer teams competing in the World Cup 2010 in South Africa.¹¹⁸ Taiwan could fashion a niche diplomacy name for itself by engaging polylaterally with NGOs to help export and socialize the eco-Taipei recycling model in APEC member countries and among its diplomatic allies in Central America and the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands, and Africa. An additional advantage of the eco-Taipei model is that it represents a new area for trade and development, and it is a niche that allows Taiwan to nation-brand itself in a way that is relatively uncontested and nonpolitical.

¹¹⁷*Taipei: A Model City*, Shanghai Expo 2010 promotional brochure; Paul Rockower, "A Tale of Two Pavilions," USC Center on Public Diplomacy, August 5, 2010. http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/index.php/newswire/cpblog_detail/a_tale_of_two_pavilions/.

¹¹⁸Amber Wang, "Building a Future, One Recycled Plastic Bottle at a Time," *Taipei Times*, September 13, 2010, <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/09/13/2003482776>.

Niche diplomacy provides an opportunity for small and medium states to amplify their influence by focusing on issues considered to be in line with the greater good of global civil society. Using public diplomacy to promote areas of soft power gives middle power states the capacity to expand their influence. As a top tier economy with the potential for middle power political status in the international community, Taiwan should be trying to attract attention and gain visibility. Given that smaller states attract less attention in the global media, it remains vital for them to adopt attractive projects that draw global public attention.¹¹⁹ Niche diplomacy endeavors like reducing the digital divide and promoting the eco-Taipei model could prove to be public diplomacy boons because they allow Taiwan to champion causes popular within global civil society. As previously mentioned, Taiwan has shown a capacity to work polylaterally. Both of these projects will enable Taiwan to continue to work polylaterally on causes deemed globally beneficial, attracting positive attention and awareness, as well as highlighting areas in which Taiwan already excels.

Conclusion: Projecting Taiwan

Taiwan knows that staying visible in the international community is an invaluable endeavor, and for this reason it uses its public diplomacy to raise global awareness of Taiwan, its uniqueness, its values, and its utility in the world. In many respects, Taiwan has internalized the importance of conducting public diplomacy and projecting soft power. Over the years, Taiwan's soft power projection has evolved from promoting its strategic value as an ally against communism, to highlighting its function as a dynamic economic model fit for emulation, and more recently to its role as a bastion of democratic norms and values. All three of these remain within Taiwan's public diplomacy repertoire today.

¹¹⁹Gilboa, "Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy," 71.

Meanwhile, Taiwan has established a number of public diplomacy institutions to enhance its global image, such as the Government Information Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Council for Cultural Affairs, and Radio Taiwan International. It has also shown a capacity for innovation in its diplomatic relations and foreign policy by engaging in polyilateral diplomacy to further its public diplomacy efforts, as exemplified by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and MOFA's NGO Affairs Committee. Moreover, creative cultural diplomacy projects like Taiwan's gastrodiplo-macy represent imaginative ways of developing a more robust Taiwanese nation-brand by expanding the island's reputation as a hub for food con-noisseurs, and as such is a positive step toward the better promotion of Taiwanese culture.

Taiwan cannot fully resolve its diplomatic troubles through public diplomacy, but it can use public diplomacy to enhance its international visi-bility and compensate for its diplomatic disadvantages. Public diplomacy strategies can help Taiwan to optimize its international image. As demon-strated in this paper, Taiwan has numerous institutions through which it conducts public diplomacy. While some of these do cooperate with each other, there is still a need for an overarching agency or council that can craft a more coordinated public diplomacy strategy. Taiwan's focus on cultural and culinary diplomacy are creative ways to make the national brand more recognizable, but without a more consolidated structure for public diplo-macy, these efforts will remain unfulfilled. Taiwan has serious structural shortcomings for a country that is so reliant on public diplomacy to engage with the international community.

It remains a key challenge for Taiwan to raise its international visi-bility. Taiwan has thus far achieved moderate success in using public diplo-macy to project its soft power based on its utility and values in a manner that has helped improve its precarious position within the international community. Projecting Taiwan is protecting Taiwan. With better institu-tional coordination and a better targeted public diplomacy strategy through niche diplomacy and enhanced nation-branding, Taiwan can continue to raise its profile in the international community, which in turn will help it protect and preserve its national interests.

Appendix I

Country	GDP	GDP Rank
Taiwan	\$735.4 billion (2009 est.)	20
Dominican Republic	\$79.65 billion (2009 est.)	75
Guatemala	\$67.87 billion (2009 est.)	81
El Salvador	\$43.27 billion (2009 est.)	93
Panama	\$40.81 billion (2009 est.)	95
Honduras	\$32.5 billion (2009 est.)	103
Paraguay	\$28.79 billion (2009 est.)	107
Burkina Faso	\$18.81 billion (2009 est.)	126
Nicaragua	\$16.51 billion (2009 est.)	131
Haiti	\$11.99 billion (2009 est.)	144
Swaziland	\$5.857 billion (2009 est.)	153
Belize	\$2.555 billion (2009 est.)	178
The Gambia	\$2.42 billion (2009 est.)	179
Saint Lucia	\$1.745 billion (2009 est.)	186
Solomon Islands	\$1.497 billion (2009 est.)	194
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	\$1.069 billion (2009 est.)	198
Saint Kitts and Nevis	\$725.8 million (2009 est.)	208
Kiribati	\$602.2 million (2009 est.)	209
Sao Tome and Principe	\$295.1 million (2009 est.)	211
Palau	\$164 million (2008 est.)	216
Marshall Islands	\$133.5 million (2008 est.)	217
Nauru	\$60 million (2005 est.)	220
Tuvalu	\$14.94 million (2002 est.)	225
The Holy See	N/A	N/A

Taiwan's GDP: \$735.4 billion; Combined GDP of 22 Allies: \$357.3 billion.

Source: CIA World Fact Book.

Appendix II

Middle Power Comparison

Country	Population	Population Rank	GDP (US\$)	GDP Rank	Per Capita GDP	Foreign Reserves
Taiwan	23 million	#49	\$735 billion	20	\$29,800 (#47)	\$353 billion (#5)
Canada	33 million	#36	\$1.279 trillion	15	\$38,400 (#27)	\$54.3 billion (#28)
Australia	21 million	#54	\$851 billion	18	\$38,800 (#23)	\$41.7 billion (#37)
Singapore	4.7 million	#117	\$243 billion	46	\$50,300 (#8)	\$187 billion (#10)
Norway	4.6 million	#118	\$267 billion	41	\$58,600 (#5)	\$48.8 billion (#29)
Qatar	840 thousand	#159	\$99.5 billion	68	\$121,700 (#2)	\$18 billion (#54)
Israel	7 million	#98	\$205.8 billion	51	\$28,400 (#48)	\$60.6 billion (#27)

(Source: CIA Factbook 2010)

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