

Nation Building, History Writing and Competition over the Legacy of Kyiv Rus in Ukraine

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This article surveys the history of Kyiv Rus within the realm of nation building, identity and historical myths. It argues that Ukraine's elites believe that Western, Russian and Soviet schools of history on Kyiv Rus (and Ukraine) are incompatible with nation and state building.

Two schools—Ukrainophile and East Slavic—compete within Ukraine. Nevertheless, the former has been promoted as the dominant school by ruling elites, many of whom date from the Soviet Ukrainian SSR and might personally favour the East Slavic framework. As Stepanenko states, Hrushevsky “is factually theorizing the most convincing version of Ukrainian history.”¹

This article therefore shows how the elites have concluded that the Ukrainophile school is more compatible with post-Soviet Ukrainian nation building. This factor is of interest to scholars because the Ukrainophile school was, and in some cases still is, defined as “nationalist” (*i.e.* in effect, unscholarly) by Western and Russian historians.

The article is divided into two sections. The first provides a theoretical and comparative overview of historical myths and nation building within studies of nationalism in political science, anthropology and postcolonialism studies. It then discusses the competition between the Ukrainophile and East Slavic as a not untypical postmodernist phenomenon.

The second section discusses how the Ukrainophile view of the Kyiv Rus legacy is being promoted and contested by the East Slavic alternative.² This alternative is surveyed within education, the security forces, symbols, monuments and warding off territorial claims by neighbours.

Reclaiming the Past: A Theoretical Overview

Within studies of nationalism in political science, anthropology and postcolonial studies the rewriting of history and historical myths is often treated in different ways. Nevertheless, in all three scholarly studies (although not in mainstream political science) the issue of myths and history writing is largely understood as part of the nation-building aspects of nation-states.

Political Science

In studies of nationalism in political science, history and myths are investigated as part of the larger question of national identity, nation building and nationalism,³ where the role of history and myths is understood as a commonplace facet of national identity.⁴ In other cases, historical myths can be understood in a negative manner. Scholars who believe that historical myths and legacies are commonplace within all nation-states have pointed out that the use of “golden eras” is quite common.⁵ The Council of Europe has written that the rewriting of history and myth making is as common in Western as it is in Eastern Europe.⁶

“Ceremonies, symbols and myths are crucial to nationalism; through them nations are formed and celebrated,” Smith writes.⁷ Billig believes that “banal nationalism” and the myths that underpin it are part of life in all nation-states. Kuzio has argued that no nation-state, by virtue of the nation-state being an amalgams of civic and ethno-cultural factors, can be purely “civic.”⁸ History is, Billig believes, constantly being rewritten by the elites who dominate state structures at any particular time.⁹

Some Western scholars see historical myths and the rewriting of history in a negative manner. This could be either because of the negative ethnic stereotypes these promote or, more crucially, because they can lead to violent conflicts, as in Croatia and Kosovo.¹⁰

Some historians may want to distance themselves from “myths” by attempting to construct objective history. Others, meanwhile, may be more constrained, understanding that complete objectivity in history is possibly impossible to attain.

Another factor influencing attitudes towards myths could be bias within academia itself. An example of this was and, in some cases still is, attitudes towards Ukrainian and Belarusian history. Ukrainophile historians, such as Mykhailo Hrushevsky, were traditionally defined as “nationalist” and unworthy of academic study by Western historians. Meanwhile, Western histories of “Russia,” which largely incorporated the nineteenth-century imperial framework wherein Ukrainians and Belarusians were ignored or understood as regional branches of Russians, were understood as “objective” history.

The dominant school of historiography in post-Soviet Ukraine is what I define later in this article as “Ukrainophile.” This school has traditionally been defined in Western scholarship, and continues to be by some scholars, as “nationalist.” As traditionally understood in Western, Russian and Soviet historiography, Ukrainianophile historiography continues to be defined as “nationalist.”¹¹

In contrast, Kolsto is critical of Western historians who have adopted Russophile historiographical frameworks and have “brushed these (Ukrainian) objections aside, dismissing them as rather pathetic manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism.”¹² The Hrushevsky school of history, which was routinely castigated in both Western and Soviet scholarship as “nationalist,” is now dominant in Ukraine through what I define as the Ukrainophile school.

Anthropology

In anthropological studies there is a general acceptance that the rewriting of history and myths is common throughout nation-states.¹³ As Eriksen admits, “Anthropologists stress that history is not a product of the past but a response to requirements of the present.”¹⁴

Notions of shared history are often promoted to legitimise new nation-states.¹⁵ History writing is inevitably selective in the facts it highlights. The inheritance of the Kyiv Rus legacy by the Galician-Volynian principality, for example, has traditionally been ignored or side-stepped by Western and Russian historiography, as have Ukraine’s longer periods of history outside the Russian Empire. Instead, the Vladimir-Suzdal principality and Muscovy were depicted as following Kyiv Rus, thereby reinforcing Russian claims to Ukraine.

Politics, anthropologists advise us, always interferes in historical writing and myth making.¹⁶

the politics of identity consists in anchoring the present in a viable past. The past is, thus, constructed according to the conditions and desires of those who produce historical texts in the present.¹⁷

A primary reason Ukrainians were denied a history in Western and Russian historiography was because they had no nation-state.¹⁸ This was the dilemma faced by the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historian Hrushevsky and other historians writing Ukrainian history prior to 1992, such as Orest Subtelny. Their answer to this dilemma was to write histories of the Ukrainian people.

This dilemma has been resolved since 1992 by the existence of a Ukrainian nation-state. This has allowed historians, such as Paul R. Magocsi, chair of Ukrainian history at the University of Toronto, to write standard Western histories of the entire territory (*i.e.* including all ethnic groups living in Ukraine) enclosed within the Ukrainian nation-state.

Appealing to the ancient origins of Ukraine has been criticised by a minority of Western scholars as “the respectable and the frankly bizarre.”¹⁹ This is because “The leitmotif of the ‘ancient origins’ of the history is a central feature of Ukrainian nationalism.”²⁰

Such criticism seems to be unwarranted. A territorial claim to all of the events that transpired on Ukrainian territory is supported by *both* the Ukrainophile and what I later define as those preferring a territorial history, such as the East Slavic school of historiography. It is favoured by Magocsi and Petro Tolochko as much as by the Ukrainophile school (see later).

Big discontinuities in national history, which have often been cited in Ukrainian history, are not unusual.²¹ Italy had no united state from the Roman empire until the 1860s. Debates about what is a nation’s history are as common in the West as they are in post-communist states such as Ukraine. What is “German history,” for

example and should it include Austria, East Prussia and Sudentenland?²² Who founded the city of Paris: the Gauls or the Romans? Was the Roman city of Lutetia built on top of the original Gallic Oppidum?²³ New skeletal remains 12,000 years old which are Caucasian, not Mongoloid, has raised concerns in the United States that Native American Indians may no longer be “Native” (*i.e.* “First Nations”).²⁴

Tracing the pedigree of a nation-state to ancient times is quite common. Both modern Italy and modern Greece trace their origins to ancient times, to the Roman empire and Greek city states.²⁵ Israel sees itself as an “ancestral homeland” going back to biblical Israel.

The early United States mythologised itself as the reincarnation of pre-Norman Anglo-Saxon England and had an infatuation with Anglo-Saxon history, believing the American settlers were escaping Norman corruption and monarchy in England. Such a myth was not unusual. The Quebecois, Afrikaners and Ulster Protestant-Scots saw themselves, respectively, as the elite of the French, Dutch and British nations.²⁶

Mexico, which became independent in 1821, claims a 3,000-year legacy through the pre-Spanish era.²⁷ Despite the Islamic revolution in Iran, historiography has continued to portray Iranian history as stretching back to the pre-Islamic era.²⁸ China also depicts itself as part of “5,000 years of Chinese civilisation.” Despite being a communist state, “China is a country obsessed with its past, as ²⁹a source of national worth and an explanation for every foible.”³⁰

History writing and myths are also important to elites of nation-states in defending their territorial integrity. As a means to ward off Guatemalan territorial claims on Belize the latter country stresses its Majan roots.³¹ The Alsace-Lorraine question bedevilled Franco-German relations between 1870 and 1945. German ethno-linguistic and biological arguments, which were the norm throughout the West until the 1940s, competed against the French defence of Alsace-Lorraine’s civic ties to France since the 1789 revolution.³²

In the Ukrainian–Russian competition over the Kyiv Rus legacy different arguments are again used by the two sides. The Russian side stresses dynastic ties from Kyiv Rus through Vladimir-Suzdal to Muscovy and the Tsarist empire. The 1654 Treaty of Pereyaslav is a “reunion” of two peoples³³ and Hetman Ivan Mazepa, who led a failed rebellion in 1709 against Russia, is therefore a “traitor.” Ethno-cultural closeness or sameness with Ukrainians is also used to reinforce the need for East Slavic unity. (How this “unity” is understood is, of course, differently perceived in Russia and in Ukraine and Belarus.³⁴)

In contrast, Ukrainian territorial claims to Kyiv Rus and earlier histories on Ukrainian territory are now part of a national history separate from Russian history. Both the Ukrainophile and East Slavic schools lay claim to ethno-cultural legacies in Ukraine stretching back to before the Kyiv Rus era. Both schools therefore reinforce, one deliberately (Ukrainophile) and the other unintentionally (East Slavic), an ethno-cultural distinctiveness from Russians. The Treaty of Pereyaslav

is now perceived as having been forced upon Ukraine as the “lesser of a number of evils,” after which Ukraine remained an independent state, albeit accepting the authority of the Tsar. Mazepa, whose portrait now adorns the Ukrainian currency (*hryvna*), rebelled because the Tsar reneged on his promises.

Postcolonial Studies

Postcolonial studies does not include any European states within its fields of enquiry. Ireland is therefore as much left out as the Tsarist empire or the former USSR. This is a major drawback within postcolonial studies. Although scholars might debate the extent to which the USSR fitted the example of a typical empire, most would tend to agree that Russia’s relations with Central Asia were highly similar to the West’s relationship to its overseas colonies.³⁵

When regime change takes place a confrontation with the past is inevitable.³⁶ When Ireland became independent it harked back to a pre-historical “golden era.” “Myths, especially mythical history, allowed the Irish to ‘reclaim’ Ireland and ‘repossess’ their own history,” MacLaughlin believes.³⁷

Nineteenth-century philosophers looked with contempt at nations without histories (such as colonies of Western empires or in Central/Eastern Europe and Eurasia).³⁸ Newly independent nation-states therefore prioritise history writing and myth making. This is especially the case when histories are rewritten as “histories of the state” and national liberation struggles are given greater prominence. Upon coming to power the Algerian National Liberation Front traced its ancestry to Emir Abdel Kader, who fought French colonialism in the 1830s.³⁹

A confrontation with the past is even the more the case if we are dealing with regime change, state creation and nation building altogether. In other words, what scholars have dubbed either a “triple” or a “quadruple transition.”⁴⁰ Transition in the USSR therefore not only is regime based but can also be understood as postcolonial.

If the USSR is understood as an empire, in the manner defined by Motyl,⁴¹ the post-Soviet successor states are undoubtedly postcolonial. In postcolonial discourse historiography is understood as an important central element in the battle to reclaim the past for the new state as part of a refashioning of national identity.⁴² Such a process turns the new state into a subject—rather than an object—of history.⁴³

The role of “Others” is important to postcolonial studies of nationalism.⁴⁴ Does historiography point us to who are the “Others”? Is it unanimous in defining who the “Other” is?⁴⁵ Or do competing schools have different attitudes towards the “Other”?

In post-Soviet Ukraine two schools of historiography—Ukrainophile and East Slavic—are sometimes in competition. The dominant Ukrainophile school follows in the tradition of the doyen of Ukrainian history writing, Hrushevsky. For this school Russia is the “Other” and Russia’s location within “Europe” is questionable. Kyiv Rus is understood to be a proto-Ukrainian state to which Russia has only an indirect legacy in the manner of Gaul to the Roman empire. Supporters of the

Ukrainophile school would tend to be those whom Magocsi defines as possessing a “mutually exclusive” identity.⁴⁶

For the East Slavic school, Russia cannot be the “Other” (at least in the ethno-cultural sense). This school sees Russia and Ukraine as both part of “Europe” and cannot comprehend Ukraine within “Europe” but without Russia. It believes that all three East Slavic peoples have equal title to Kyiv Rus, which began to separate into separate nationalities only in the late Kyiv Rus era and especially after the Mongol invasion in 1240.

In other words, the East Slavic school represents a compromise between two “mutually exclusive” identities and historiographies: the Ukrainophile, where Ukrainians have sole title to the Kyiv Rus legacy, and the Russophile, where Russians are the prime beneficiaries of Kyiv Rus.⁴⁷ Both the Ukrainophile and Russophile historical schools are “mutually exclusive” schools.

The Ukrainophile and East Slavic schools in Ukraine both reject any role for Russians as an “elder brother.” The compromise East Slavic school sees all three East Slavic peoples as possessing equal title to Kyiv Rus. This school therefore has no need for an “elder brother.” But it differs from the Ukrainophile in that it does not look upon Russia as the “Other.”

Multiple Identities—Multiple Histories: Ukraine as a Postmodern State

Post-Soviet states such as Ukraine could be an ideal terrain for the application of post-modernist critiques of history and nationalism, although no such framework has yet been applied by scholars to Ukraine. Most nation-states do have an over-arching “official” history that is taught in the education system. Nevertheless, most nation-states are also witness to competition and discussion between different schools of history, interpretations and emphasis. Debates on the past continue long after independence has been achieved and centre on issues such as which historical figures to rehabilitate, what events to depict negatively and attitudes to neighbours and foreign powers that have ruled over the country.⁴⁸

Within Ukraine two schools—Ukrainophile and East Slavic—have different views on these issues which, in turn, influence their writing of history. The Ukrainophile school will tend to be more anti-Russian, to look at Soviet rule in a completely negative light, to see Russia as the “Other” and Russification policies part of a conscious policy pursued by the Tsarist empire and USSR. Adherents of the East Slavic school may be critical of some aspects of Russian policy and Soviet rule, but not all.⁴⁹ They will refrain from using the term “Russification,” believing that Russian is not a foreign language in Ukraine.

Within post-communist states there are also competing views of the past which are dependent upon regions⁵⁰ and political attitudes. The centre and extreme right are more critical of the communist past, with the latter rejecting it outright as a negative phenomenon.⁵¹ Post-Franco Spain had bitter historical debates on a par with those in

Belgium, with disputes both across the entire political spectrum and between the centre and outlying regions over the correct curriculum to use in education.⁵² In Poland attempts to deal with the country's anti-Semitic past have only recently begun to take place.

"Alternative" histories that deal with previously ignored topics are also growing. Recent examples include a country's involvement in the slave trade, racism, colonialism, gender, collaboration with the Nazis and crimes against humanity.⁵³ In France it has taken nearly four decades for society, historians and the media to begin to discuss the Algerian war of liberation against France, in which a million people died and 2.3 million Frenchmen served.⁵⁴ It has taken France as long to deal with collaboration with the Nazis in World War II. In Japan and Italy the issue of collaboration and war crimes is still largely taboo.⁵⁵

In addition to competition within nation-states, there are also differing interpretations of the same historical events between nation-states. The Microsoft Encarta Multimedia Encyclopedia is adapted for differing countries because historical depictions "reflect, different, sometimes contradictory, understanding of the same historical events." These include border disputes, past foreign occupations, who invented something first, and historical figures and military battles. In the case of France and Britain the obvious examples are Joan of Arc, Napoleon and the Battle of Waterloo. Another example is the Macedonian–Greek dispute over national symbols and the Alexander the Great legacy. Greece, where one million people joined protests against Macedonian national symbols, still refuses to agree to Macedonia being called anything except the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." Should Alexander the Great be understood as a Slavic-Macedonian or Greek-Macedonian hero?

Russian difficulties in coming to terms with Ukrainians and Belarusians as separate peoples have analogues in other post-communist states. Macedonians have traditionally been seen, and still are by some, as either "mountain" or "southern Serbs," or "western Bulgarians" or Slavic-speaking Greeks. Macedonian nation building and an autocephalous Orthodox Church were encouraged in post-war communist Yugoslavia as a way of warding off Bulgarian territorial threats, containing Serb nationalism and laying claim to northern Greece (where a Macedonian minority lives).⁵⁶

The language question has also arisen during negotiations between Bulgaria and Macedonia. When Macedonians travel to Bulgaria they take interpreters to reinforce the differences between the two languages. Bulgarians do not take interpreters because they see the two languages as the same.⁵⁷ Similarly, most Romanians agree with Moldovan nationalists that Moldovans are merely Romanians. Moldovan centrists support a "One People, two Countries" policy while the ruling communists have taken on board Soviet nationality policies that saw Moldovans as a separate people from the Romanians.⁵⁸

Competition between different historical schools within and between nation-states is the norm.⁵⁹ Large states are usually an amalgam of different peoples incorporated through conquest, immigration or other means.⁶⁰ Ukraine is no different. In the post-Soviet era two main schools of history compete (Ukrainophiles and East Slavic)

which have their supporters within the wider political spectrum and state institutions. At the same time, one of these—the Ukrainophile—dominates state discourse and the institutional means of socialisation.

Why is the Ukrainophile school dominant? This is best explained by looking at how the dilemma of the manipulation by states of history is understood within postcolonial studies:

For a nation to function effectively, even while eschewing any claims to a super, overarching grand narrative, these truths must be maintained for institutions and groups to adjudicate between conflicting stories and interpretations.⁶¹

Although territorially loyal to the Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian East Slavic school is also comfortable within East Slavic (read Russian) culture and civilisation. This is what Magocsi terms an acceptance of “multiple loyalties.” A territorial loyalty to Ukraine also existed among some Ukrainians in the nineteenth century, such as the writer Nikolai Gogol (Mykola Hohol), who did not see this as incompatible with loyalty to the imperial Russian state. These “multiple loyalties” only became incompatible when the Russian empire attempted to transform itself into a Russian nation-state. An ethnic Russian (in contrast to state or imperial) understanding of the empire left no room for “multiple identities.”

During the Soviet era this territorial loyalty to “Ukraine” (*i.e.* the Ukrainian SSR) was reinforced. Soviet nationality policy demanded loyalty from non-Russians to an ethnic homeland (Ukrainian SSSR), a civic higher Soviet state and Marxist-Leninist ideology. After the Communist Party of Ukraine was banned and the USSR dissolved between August and December 1991, the loyalty of the Soviet Ukrainian elite downsized to only one homeland, Ukraine. How the former Soviet Ukrainian elite relates to the Ukrainian homeland—territorial, ethno-cultural or both—is a quintessential post-colonial dilemma for the ruling elites of the ancien régime, many of whom accepted the view that the language and culture of the metropolis have “higher” value.

The Ukrainophile school sees the Russian language as a foreign language in Ukraine but the East Slavic school does not. Not surprisingly, the former therefore defines the adoption of Russian as Russification imposed by a foreign, occupying power (the Russian “Other”). Meanwhile, the East Slavic school sees the adoption of Russian as a voluntary process, with which public opinion in Russia concurs. Russian was adopted as part of the Soviet “modernisation” project which the East Slavic school is less critical of than the Ukrainophile.

How has this division into two schools of history on Kyiv Rus affected the post-Soviet era? P. Tolochko is not purely an academic scholar. In 1998 he was first elected to parliament as a member of the first, and to date only, oligarchic anti-presidential party, Hromada. Hromada was headed by discredited Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who fled Ukraine in 1999 and sought asylum in the U.S., where he went on trial in 2004 on charges of money laundering. After Hromada disintegrated, P. Tolochko joined the Fatherland Party, which grew out of Hromada, headed by Yulia

Tymoshenko. In the 2002 elections P. Tolochko was elected to parliament as a member of the radical, anti-presidential Tymoshenko bloc.

As a member of the Tymoshenko bloc he was allied to radical nationalists and national democrats who would never agree with any of the tenets of the East Slavic school of history and are also highly critical of anything Russian.⁶² In 2002 Tymoshenko's Fatherland Party united with long-time radical nationalist Stepan Khmara's Conservative Republican Party. In late 2002 P. Tolochko left the Tymoshenko bloc faction and became an independent deputy, either for ideological reasons or because of presidential pressure on opposition deputies to defect to the pro-presidential majority (or both).

In March 2003 he spoke to the inaugural congress of the Slavonic People's Patriotic Union, where he defined East Slavic peoples as belonging to one civilisation family.⁶³ Tolochko has since gone on to become head of the Political Council of the Slavic Peoples Patriotic Union.⁶⁴

Tolochko's views are reflected in a desire for a close relationship with Russia that is found within eastern Ukraine. Ukraine is part of the Russian "Near Abroad," neither the same as Russia nor quite as foreign as the "Far Abroad." Internal passports can be used when travelling to Ukraine from Russia and Belarus whereas visitors from the remainder of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) need foreign passports. Russia continues to hold up the demarcation of the Ukrainian–Russian border for psychological reasons.⁶⁵

In eastern Ukraine the Russian language is not seen as a "foreign language." As P. Tolochko argues, "At the same time in reality the Russian language, in the same manner as (Russian) culture as a whole, cannot be understood as foreign by Ukrainians."⁶⁶

Western and, to a lesser extent, central Ukraine has very different views in all of these areas. In western Ukraine, communism and Soviet power are seen as "Russian." Guilt for the crimes of communism against Ukrainians is blamed upon "Russians," not communist ideology. Russia is not part of "Europe" and Ukraine's foreign integration should not be tied to Russia's.⁶⁷ Russian is unquestionably a foreign language and Russophone Ukrainians were forcibly Russified. To be a "true Ukrainian," Russophone Ukrainians should relearn Ukrainian and move away from their "multiple" (Ukrainian territorial and Russian cultural) to a "mutually exclusive" (Ukrainian territorial and cultural) identity.

Most Ukrainians outside western Ukraine certainly do not see Russian as a foreign language or culture. At the same time, Russian language and literature *are* taught as foreign subjects in Ukraine's education system where they are placed alongside other foreign languages, such as English and German. The teaching of Russian language and culture is, P. Tolochko admitted, "reduced to a minimum" and in 85 per cent of Ukrainian schools Russian literature is taught in Ukrainian translation.⁶⁸ Worse still for the East Slavic school, school textbooks are approved for use throughout Ukraine, meaning that "local variances in values or customs are not a driving force."⁶⁹

P. Tolochko has admitted that in Ukraine “the three Slavic peoples cradle theory is now being put to a very serious trial.”⁷⁰ The Ukrainophile school dominates school textbooks that are approved for use throughout Ukraine, including in the Crimea.⁷¹ Popson’s study of textbooks in Ukraine’s education system concluded that they “follow the Hrushevsky school of history closely.”⁷²

Although the Ukrainophile and East Slavic schools of Ukrainian historiography in post-Soviet Ukraine have different views of the Russian “Other,” the dilemma faced by the latter is that Ukrainian independence is *inevitably* a move away from the Russian “Other.” The degree to which this will be a major or minor movement away from Russia will depend on one’s adherence to either of these two schools and the myths and policies that accrue from them. Supporters of the Ukrainophile school are in favour of more firmly breaking with the Soviet past (which they understand as “Russian”) and integrating into Europe independently of Russia. The East Slavic school has absorbed some of the Soviet legacy, believes it is impossible to remove it completely and would prefer to move towards Europe together with Russia. In the 2004 elections these competing views were represented by Viktor Yushenko (Ukrainophile) and Viktor Yanukovich (East Slavic).

Ukraine’s ruling elites could not use the Russophile or Soviet school of historiography, since its very tenets deny Ukrainians any desire for statehood. Both of these schools deny Ukraine any pre-fourteenth-century history and either see Ukraine as a Russian tribe or as a wayward people whose only desire is to reunite with Russia. Such a historiography is not even acceptable to the extreme left in Ukraine, who still support the ideological thrust of Soviet nationality policies that Ukrainians and Russians are very close but nevertheless different.

To sum up, the Russophile and Soviet schools of history are unusable in an independent Ukrainian state because the former denies the existence of a Ukrainian nation while the latter sees it only as a temporary aberration slated for “reunion” with Russia.

The only two schools of history in Ukraine are the “mutually exclusive” Ukrainophile and the “multiple identity” East Slavic. The latter is an eclectic compromise between the Ukrainophile and Russophile/Soviet schools. Despite the dominance of centrist elites in Ukraine since 1992, who would tend to favour the East Slavic school, there is an understanding that this school is less useful than the Ukrainophile for the nation-building project.⁷³

History and Nation Building

History in the Use of Education

Ukrainian school textbooks have been thoroughly revised in the post-Soviet era. They promote the traditional Ukrainophile approach of Kyiv Rus as a proto-Ukrainian state. Kyiv Rus is understood as an example of Ukraine’s “1,000-year-old” tradition of state building.

In addition, the Ukrainophile historiography that dominates textbooks clearly feels the need to reject the concept of “younger” and “elder brothers.” In the introduction to a Ukrainian school textbook we read,

Today, in Ukraine, history is more than a science. It appeals to a wide stratum of the population, reveals unknown pages of the past, stuns with its examples of valiant service to the Motherland, and incites fear with its unjustified sacrifices. Today, the history of Ukraine is no longer the deranged imagining of an inferior “younger brother,” it is the past of an autonomous people, a people that has inhabited its territory since time immemorial, preserving its ancient traditions, forging a high culture, being ruled over by foreign powers but still retaining the state’s way of life.⁷⁴

The influence of the dominant Ukrainophile school of historiography is to be found throughout Ukraine’s post-Soviet textbooks, which are centrally printed and distributed throughout Ukraine.⁷⁵ They selectively look at the past and downplay any aggressive characteristics of Ukrainians.

The influence of Soviet ideology can be seen in the portrayal of Kyiv Rus as a “progressive state” with a high culture and civilisation. The Ante state that preceded Kyiv Rus is portrayed as having a “democratic culture.”

Soviet historiography’s portrayal of “one ancient Rus people” is rejected by all textbooks, as is any Russian claim to Kyiv Rus. No critical discussion is to be found in the textbooks of alternative Russian, Soviet or East Slavic schools of Ukrainian history and Kyiv Rus. The Ukrainophile school is portrayed as the only “true” variant, an approach reminiscent of the single truth found in the Soviet era.

Kyiv Rus is associated with central Ukraine and “Kyiv Rus” is often interchanged with “Ukraine,” a term that the textbooks reiterate was first used in 1187. The Poliany tribe is described as “Ukrainian.” Kyiv Rus only entered Belarusian and Russian lands during its expansion from its core Ukrainian territory. The Galicia-Volynia principality is seen as the only direct descendant of Kyiv Rus.

A direct line of descent is traced from the Trypillian and Ante cultures all the way through to present-day Ukrainians. All textbooks support the Ukrainophile school’s view that the Ante state preceded Kyiv Rus as the first example of Ukrainian and East Slavic statehood.

Ukraine’s tradition of state building is deemed to be ancient. In Soviet historiography Ukrainians had only one yearning—to exchange statehood for “reunification” with Russia. In post-Soviet textbooks Ukrainians also have only one age-old desire. Now, though, after losing their statehood to foreign powers, Ukrainians have strived to regain it at all costs. The culmination of this is the current independent state.

In Soviet historiography Ukrainians could not wait to exchange their statehood for unity with Russia while in post-Soviet historiography Ukrainians impatiently sought to regain and maintain their statehood. In the Soviet era Russia was a positive “Other” with whom Ukraine always wanted to be in unity. In the post-Soviet era statehood is seen as preferable to what is now defined as “foreign enslavement.”

But, who are the “foreign enslavers”? This is usually not pointed out in the textbooks because of the difficulty in deciding who the “Other” is. It is not, however, difficult to guess that it primarily refers to Russia.

In a comparative study of Soviet and Ukrainian textbooks, Janmaat found the following changes from post-Soviet Ukrainian school textbooks:⁷⁶

- the main aspects of Kyiv Rus developed on Ukrainian territory;
- the Slavic tribes living in the core territory of Kyiv Rus constituted the Ukrainian proto-nation;
- these tribes also were the main state-building force;
- Kyiv was the main political force uniting territories beyond the core Kyiv Rus;
- Ukrainians were the leading people in Kyiv Rus;
- each proto-nation in Kyiv Rus lived separately;
- each proto-nation aspired to an independent and separate state life;
- the union of Kyiv Rus was not always voluntary: sometimes force had to be used to bring in other tribes outside the core Kyiv Rus;
- Russia has no right to claim Kyiv Rus as its legacy;
- Christianity was a positive phenomenon that brought civilisation, literacy and culture.

Ukrainian textbooks survey different regions of Kyiv Rus as separate, autonomous entities that desired to live separately from one another and the three East Slavic peoples sprang from these autonomous entities. Ukrainians developed separately from Russians until the late eighteenth century when the autonomous Ukrainian Hetmanate was destroyed by Tsarina Elizaveta Petrovna.

The unification of the Eastern Slavs was sometimes “involuntary,” the opposite to what Russian and Soviet historiography had written. Peaceful brotherhood between Ukrainians and Russians is no longer stressed and the possibility that Ukrainians and Russians could have been in conflict is therefore suggested.

This brings forth an element in Ukrainian historiography new to those who were brought up under the Soviet school. In Soviet historiography conflicts between Ukrainians and Russians were always ignored. Poems by Ukraine’s bard, Taras Shevchenko, which were deemed to be “anti-Russian” were censored from his collected works published in the Soviet era. The only ethnic groups with whom it was politically correct to be in conflict were Poles, Germans and Tatars. Such a skewed view of history served the Communist Party’s nationalities policy of drawing the Eastern Slavs together as the kernel of the future “Soviet people.”

History for Officers and Conscripts

The dominance of the Ukrainophile school in school textbooks is matched in another important but, to date, largely ignored area—the military and security forces.⁷⁷ In the Kravchuk era (1991–1994) the former directorate in the Soviet armed forces devoted to ideological indoctrination was reformed and renamed the “Socio-psychological

Service.” From 1994 in the Kuchma era the department was changed to the more innocently sounding “Humanities Directorate” and was charged with educational work among conscripts and officers.

Despite the change in name of the directorate,⁷⁸ “Humanitarna Pidhotovka” (Humanities Preparation) continues to be dominated by the Ukrainophile historiographical school. Although Western scholars predicted an end to the Ukrainophile school of history after a new president was elected in 1994, this has failed to happen.

All sections of the Ukrainian media that cater for different branches of the security forces (National Guard until they were disbanded in 2000, Border Troops, army and navy) publish full pages devoted to Humanitarna Pidhotovka. These are used by officers in the Humanities Directorate to inculcate patriotism in officers and conscripts.

“Humanitarna Pidhotovka” unanimously portrays Kyiv Rus and earlier states and cultures in Ukraine as proto-Ukrainian and Galicia-Volynia as the direct continuation of Kyiv Rus. “Humanitarna Pidhotovka” ignores Vladimir-Suzdal and only deals with Muscovy much later when chronicling the Ukrainian Cossacks in the seventeenth century.

Below are examples since the mid 1990s (*i.e.* after Kuchma was first elected in July 1994) of titles of “Humanitarna Pidhotovka” materials taken from the military and security forces media:

- “The origins of the Ukrainian nation. The main periods of Ukrainian history.” “Kyiv Rus—the sources of the unity of eastern Slavs. Military art in Kyiv Rus, Galicia-Volynia.” “Kyiv Rus. Military expeditions and military art of the Kyivan and Galician-Volynian princes.”⁷⁹
- “Ukraine as a great sea state.” “The tradition of sea faring and naval affairs in Kyiv Rus. Sea voyages and the struggle against enslavers. “The lands of the Ukrainian Black Sea region and the Crimea in ancient times and the middle ages, their role and meaning in sea voyages in the Black Sea.” “Great military-naval activists in Kyiv Rus and the Cossack state. Their role in the development of naval-military affairs in the 9–18th centuries.”⁸⁰
- “Tell us about the prehistoric settlements of Ukraine: Cimmerians, Scythians, Sarmathians.” “The formation of the state in the Princely Era and the role of military formations in this process.”⁸¹
- “The ancient Ukrainian state of Kyiv Rus.”⁸²
- “The most ancient periods of Ukrainian state building.” “The creation of an independent state on the territory of Kyiv Rus and the struggle against foreign enslavers in the twelfth–fourteenth centuries.”⁸³
- “The history of the spiritual sources of the Ukrainian nation. The ancient Ukrainian state—Kyiv Rus.”⁸⁴
- “Periods of Ukrainian statehood in the ninth to twelfth centuries: Kyiv Rus, the Galicia-Volynia state.”⁸⁵
- “The main periods of the development of Kyiv Rus statehood in the ninth–twelfth centuries.” “The feudal basis and decline of Kyiv Rus. The Galicia-Volynia state and its significance.”⁸⁶

Throughout these “Humanitarna Pidhotovka” key historical personalities are detailed. Their anniversaries are outlined each month over the calendar year for officers and soldiers to commemorate. Besides important figures from Kyiv Rus and Galicia-Volynia, Hrushevsky is also portrayed as an important “father” of the nation who first developed a Ukrainian scheme of history separate from the Russian.

Symbols and Monuments

Since 1989 the main group of scholars, activists, politicians and journalists involved in debates on Ukrainian symbols have been primarily from western and central Ukraine. The East Slavic school has been unable to counter the Ukrainophile domination of national symbols (blue and yellow flag, *tryzub* [trident], national anthem). Because the East Slavic school is a compromise between two “mutually exclusive” schools (Ukrainophile and Russophile) it has been unable to put forward symbols of its own.

The only suggestion made by the East Slavic school was the Ukrainian Cossack crimson flag but this was never taken seriously, although it is used on some Militia and military uniform badges. The blue and yellow flag was unpopular in eastern Ukraine when first introduced in 1991–1992 but has become passively accepted as part of the state’s inculcation of what Billig terms “banal nationalism.” An indication of how nationalism in Ukraine had indeed become “banal” by 2002 is the proportion of those supporting Ukrainian independence returning to the high figure obtained in the December 1991 referendum.⁸⁷

As Jilge points out, eastern Ukraine remained passive throughout the debate on symbols and did not present alternatives to what the Soviet regime had long depicted as “bourgeois nationalist” symbols. During the parliamentary–presidential heated debates on the constitution in 1994–1996 President Kuchma “paid little attention to the ‘national question.’” This was only important to ideologically driven parties on the left, who opposed them, and the centre-right, who actively promoted them. For Kuchma and his centrist allies national symbols were ‘tradable’ in return for national democrats dropping their opposition to Crimea’s autonomous status.⁸⁸

Those actively involved in the debate supported the Hrushevsky and Ukrainophile school of historiography on Kyiv Rus being a Ukrainian proto-state and on Galicia-Volynia being its direct successor. The heraldic traditions of Kyiv Rus and Galicia-Volynia were incorporated where possible into Ukraine’s national symbols. These had as their aim to emphasise the “importance of Kievan Rus as a basis of Ukrainian statehood.”⁸⁹

The national flag and trident were adopted by a parliamentary resolution in February 1992 by 253 and 264 votes, respectively, and then incorporated in the June 1996 constitution. The national anthem was more controversial, since “Ukraine Has Not Yet Died,” with music by Mykhailo Verbytsky, included anti-Russian lyrics by Pavlo Chubynsky. It was therefore decided to use only the music until new lyrics could be agreed upon. In March 2003, of the three versions submitted to parliament the

one preferred by President Kuchma was voted in. The Kuchma-backed lyrics for the anthem were supported by 334 deputies with only 46 against and most communists and socialists abstaining from voting.

Ukraine's national symbols legitimise the claim to "1,000 years of statehood."⁹⁰ Article 20 of the 1996 constitution directly links Ukraine to Kyiv Rus:

The main element of the Great State Coat of Arms of Ukraine is the Emblem of the Royal State of Volodymyr the Great (the Small Coat of Arms of Ukraine).

The 24 August 1991 declaration of Ukrainian independence harked back to "1,000 years of Ukrainian statehood." The national symbol (*tryzub*) links this "1,000 years" from Kyiv Rus to the Ukrainian People's Republic of 1917–1918, whose president was Hrushevsky, through to independent Ukraine.

On the 2003 anniversary of independence President Kuchma argued,

The European choice for Ukraine is a return to our national identity, and a reminder of what should be seen as alpha and omega, our thousand-year journey from the Baptism of Rus-Ukraine to the post-communist era.⁹¹

During the same year Kuchma made an address on the newly launched annual Europe Day which made the connection between Ukraine, Kyiv Rus and earlier states and peoples on Ukrainian territory:

We have been European since time immemorial; here on our land the great Homer and Ovid wrote their works of genius in the ancient Greek (cities) of Olvia and Kherones.⁹²

Lviv historian Andriy Hrechylo was influential in the final symbol chosen for the "small coat of arms"—a golden *tryzub* on a blue shield.⁹² Hrechylo "wanted to place the Ukrainian state directly within the tradition of Kievan Rus."⁹³ In addition:

With the *tryzub* on a blue background the present Ukraine is identified with the state as a glorified endpoint of a linear process, inserted by Kievan Rus.

The main Ukrainian coat of arms includes the small coat of arms at its centre flanked on its left by the Lviv Lion and on the right by a Cossack. The small coat of arms has a flag running along the bottom in blue and yellow. Thus, western, central and eastern Ukraine are all represented. Both the small and large coat of arms link Ukraine to Kyiv Rus.⁹⁵

The government and military media have propagated patriotic attachment to Ukraine's symbols by pointing to their ancient history.⁹⁶ *Polityka i Chas*, the monthly journal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, outlined how national symbols should be used by diplomats and military personnel abroad.⁹⁷ Other decrees outlined how national symbols should be used by government ministries and other state institutions.⁹⁸

Immediately after being re-elected in November 1999, Kuchma decreed that the new presidential symbol would be in the form of a chain with medallions and

decorated links. These include the small coat of arms, the heraldry of Kyiv Rus, the Galicia-Volynia principality, the Zaporizhzhian Cossack Host, Hetman Khmelnytsky's coat of arms and the national symbols of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) of 1917–1918. Thus, the head of the Ukrainian state is asserting the country's legacy of "1,000 years of statehood" stretching from Kyiv Rus to the UNR which preceded Soviet rule.

The *hryvna* currency was first used in Kyiv Rus and was revived by the UNR in 1917–1918 and then again in 1996 when it replaced the *karbovanets* coupon as Ukraine's currency. The *hryvna* therefore also links Ukraine to Kyiv Rus.⁹⁹ Other historical figures on the *hryvni* reflect the "1,000 years of statehood" that was voiced in the July 1990 and August 1991 declarations of sovereignty and independence. *Hryvna* notes include portraits of Kyiv Rus Grand Princes Mudry and Monomakh as well as Hrushevsky and Hetman Mazepa.

Kyiv Rus historical figures have appeared on stamps,¹⁰⁰ medals¹⁰¹ and other symbols. State commemorative medals are also named after Grand Prince Yaroslav Mudry and Princess Olha.¹⁰²

A monument to Grand Prince Yaroslav Mudry was erected in 1997 in Kyiv next to the Zolota Vorota (Golden Gates), the original entrance to Kyiv Rus, and unveiled by President Kuchma and Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC-KP).¹⁰³ The unveiling deliberately coincided with the annual "Days of Kyiv" celebration which since 1992 has commemorated Kyiv's roots dating back to Kyiv Rus.

At the unveiling of the monument, President Kuchma looked to Grand Prince Mudry's concern for spirituality and education as an example for contemporary Ukraine.¹⁰⁴ In 1997 the 960th anniversary of the founding by Grand Prince Mudry of the first library in Ukraine was commemorated. As a Ukrainian scholar pointed out, the library was established 110 years before Moscow even existed and constitutes an example of Ukraine's contribution to European civilisation as a "European nation."¹⁰⁵ The Ukrainian Legal Academy in Kharkiv is named after Yaroslav the Wise, who introduced the Rus law code (*Rus'ka Pravda*).¹⁰⁶ Ukrainian historians point out that Ukraine preserved the law code of Kyiv Rus during Lithuanian and Polish rule many centuries after the destruction of the Kyiv Rus state in 1240.¹⁰⁷

The reign of Grand Prince Volodymyr Monomakh between 1053 and 1125 is seen as the continuation of the flowering of Kyiv Rus after Mudry's death. At a time of warring princes within Kyiv Rus he was able to raise the cultural civilisation of Kyiv Rus to new heights.¹⁰⁸

In 1996 a monument to Kyiv Rus Princess Olha was rebuilt in central Kyiv alongside those of Saints Cyril and Mykhailo. As the former head of Rukh and the Writer's Union, Ivan Drach pointed out, "This is our monument as the inheritors of Kyiv Rus."¹⁰⁹ The monument was originally built in 1911 but ruined and destroyed between 1919 and 1923. As with other monuments in the 1990s it was unveiled during the annual "Days of Kyiv" celebrations.¹¹⁰

The rebuilding of the St Michael's Golden Domed Cathedral in 1997–1998 had not only religious connotations. The Cathedral was built in 1108–1113 by Grand Prince Sviatopolk II to celebrate his victory over the Pecheneg tribes, destroyed by the Mongols in 1240, rebuilt by 1496 and destroyed again on Jozef Stalin's orders in 1935–1936. Its benefactors were Hetman Mazepa and the philosopher Ivan Skoropadsky.

The rebuilt Cathedral in central Kyiv was given to the pro-autocephalous UOC-KP. It symbolises Ukraine's reclaiming of the Kyiv Rus legacy, and some newspaper commentaries saw its rebuilding as part of a competition between the Kyiv and Moscow mayors.¹¹¹ The Russian newspaper *Komersant-Daily* concluded that the reconstruction of St Michael's Cathedral "is really more politically than culturally motivated." It refuted the claim that Ukraine could lay claim to the Kyiv Rus legacy, since in the Middle Ages there was no Ukraine. In addition, "By its actions, Ukraine is pretending to be the successor to the entire tradition of Kyiv Rus."¹¹²

St Michael's Cathedral helps to reinforce the link between Kyiv Rus and contemporary Ukraine. In November 1998 President Kuchma called upon Ukrainians to unite around their common historical and religious past. The Cathedral was to be revived as the centre of spiritual life in Ukraine and would serve to reinforce Ukraine's return to the world as a "pearl of Orthodoxy," Mykola Orlenko, who is in charge of the project, stated.¹¹³

The Cathedral was rebuilt next to Mykhailivsky Square. On the square stands a monument to the 1932–1933 artificial famine. In the bell tower of St Michael's Cathedral is a museum of old Kyiv and the monastery as well as a chapel dedicated to the 1932–1933 famine. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs occupies the Romanesque former building of the Kyiv Communist Party on the same square. The square is linked to St Sophia Cathedral, also built in Kyiv Rus and now a monastery, by a rebuilt promenade.

Further along from St Sophia is the renovated Zolotyj Vorota, the ancient entrance to Kyiv Rus in what has now been renamed the Stryi (Old) Kyiv region of Kyiv. Further along from the Golden Gates is the monument to Hrushevsky. The monument was unveiled on the anniversary of Ukraine's referendum on independence on 1 December 1998, eighty years after the UNR (Central Rada) led by Hrushevsky declared independence in January 1918. The monument is next to the Teachers House where the UNR (Central Rada) had its headquarters and across the road from the Red Campus of the University of Kyiv where Hrushevsky briefly taught. A plaque to Hrushevsky is to be found at the entrance to the University.

The rebuilding of this area of Kyiv is rife with symbolism. The rebuilding of St. Michael's signifies the revival of Ukraine as an independent state with its roots in Kyiv Rus. The rebuilt St. Michael's Cathedral stands next to the main government ministry (Foreign Affairs) devoted to promoting Ukraine as an independent state.

The famine monument and chapel inside St Michaels Cathedral devoted to the 1932–1933 famine symbolise what can happen to Ukrainians if they do not possess

an independent state. The famine and the April 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster are seen as tragic events that befell a Ukraine that was not in control of its own destiny. The only manner in which such events can be forestalled in the future is through independent statehood, Ukrainian leaders reiterate. On the 69th anniversary of the famine President Kuchma described it as a “national catastrophe” and “genocide.” Kuchma decreed that a bigger monument to the victims of the famine and political repression should now be built on the 70th anniversary of the famine in 2003.¹¹⁴

St Michael’s Cathedral was placed under the jurisdiction of the UOC-KP. Another cathedral is Nativity of Christ next to the Dnipro river, a symbolic cathedral because it was where Shevchenko’s body lay in state in 1861.

The UOC-KP is a keen supporter of the nationalisation of Kyiv Rus history, and its religious leaders are allied to national democratic groups. Unlike the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), the Ukrainian exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate, the UOC-KP is a fervent supporter of incorporating the symbolism of the famine and independent statehood into contemporary myths and nation building.

The UOC holds views that are hostile to the Ukrainophile historiographical school and closer to traditional Russian and Soviet historiography. In Donetsk oblast it is targeting believers through a new television station called Kyivska Rus.¹¹⁵ This can be seen in Belarus, where the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BOC), the exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate, was made the state church by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka. The BOC has lauded Lukashenka for his policies supporting East Slavic unity.

Patriarch Filaret, who heads the UOC-KP, attended the opening of St Michael’s bell tower during the 1998 “Days of Kyiv.”¹¹⁶ The event was underscored by actors dressed in the historic costumes of Grand Prince Volodymyr and Princess Olha together with Kyiv Rus *druzhyky* and handmaidens who carried the banner of St Michael’s.

Other actors were dressed in equally symbolic historical costumes. These included Hetman Mazepa, long the subject of ridicule in Tsarist and Soviet historiography, and Cossacks.¹¹⁷ The inclusion of Mazepa and Cossacks symbolically linked medieval Kyiv Rus to independent Ukraine through the Cossack era.

The rebuilding of St Michael’s Cathedral is an important aspect of the regeneration of Ukraine’s capital city, Kyiv, as “one of Europe’s most vibrant cities.”¹¹⁸ This not only encapsulates a Ukrainian ethnic revival. In the Podil district along the Dnipro river, which was home to many ethnic minorities, Jews have undergone one of their biggest revivals within the former USSR. The newly rebuilt Podil Synagogue has become the centre of Jewish life in Kyiv. In the Pechersk district of Kyiv, where most government buildings are located, the lavishly refurbished baroque Mariyivsky Palace built by Tsarina Petrovna in the eighteenth century is now used by the president for state visits.

On the tenth anniversary of independence in 2001 a huge monument to Ukrainian independence was unveiled on Independence Square, once the location for Kyiv’s largest statue to Vladimir Lenin and called “October Square” in the Soviet era. The

monument is to include a museum of Ukrainian history as well as on its exterior a panorama of historical figures. These range from the present day all the way back to Kyiv Rus. In front of the monument to independence are statues of mythical figures from Kyiv Rus.

History to Legitimise Boundaries and Ward off Territorial Claims

Ukraine is reclaiming not only Kyiv Rus but the entire history of the territory now called Ukraine. A two-volume *Ancient History of Ukraine* recommended by the Ministry of Education for higher education begins with the Palaeolithic era. Only in the second half of Volume 2 does it begin to cover Kyiv Rus.¹¹⁹ The two-volume collection is edited by a large body of scholars under P. Tolochko's supervision. As pointed out earlier, both the East Slavic and Ukrainianophile schools support the nationalisation of all of the history that has taken place on Ukrainian territory.

Five of the 15 volumes of the *Ukraine Through the Ages* survey of Ukrainian history by different scholars published between 1998 and 1999 deal with the period from earliest times to the Galician-Volhynian principality. The importance of ascertaining Ukraine's origins is reflected in a third of the 15 volumes devoted to the history of Ukraine from its beginnings until the fourteenth century.¹²⁰ Kyiv Rus history is not reached until Volume 4 in the series.

In claiming this history as Ukrainian, contemporary Ukrainian historiography primarily uses the standard Western territorial approach to history. Such a framework is favoured by Magocsi but only became possible in the post-Soviet era when Ukraine possessed an independent state whose origins could be traced backwards.

Ukrainian textbooks define Ukrainian history as inclusive of all events that have taken place within its borders.¹²¹ Scythians, Greek settlements in the Crimea and other pre-Slavic tribes are now considered part of Ukrainian history.¹²² An annual presentation of prizes for theatre actors and directors is held in Kyiv under the auspices of the Kyiv State Administration and the Union of Theatre Employees. The prize-giving event is called "Kyivska Pektoral" (Kyivan Gold Necklace).

A large three-volume *Ancient History of Ukraine* edited by P. Tolochko published on the 80th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine surveys all of the civilisations that existed in Ukraine prior to Kyiv Rus. Volume 1 begins with a section entitled "The Most Ancient Inhabitants on the Territory of Ukraine." Other sections in the volumes cover the Palaeolithic, Mesolithic, Neolithic and Bronze Ages, the Cimmerians, Scythians, Sarmathians and Ante.¹²³

Tracing Ukraine's history backwards makes the history of Ukraine more than the "1,000 years of statehood" that was expressed in the 24 August 1991 declaration of independence. Magocsi's 1996 *History of Ukraine* traces Ukraine's history back to 1150–850 BCE.¹²⁴ Human remains have been found in Ukraine dating back to between 100,000 and 40,000 BCE. The first settlements in the Kyiv area date from 40,000–28,000 BCE.¹²⁵ Using the territorial approach, Ukraine therefore has

a 8,000-year old history and includes the Cimmerians, Trypillians, Scythians, Sarmathians and Antes who pre-dated the Rus and lived in Ukraine.¹²⁶

In tracing Ukraine's history backwards some Ukrainian scholars confuse the territorial and ethnic approaches to history. P. Tolochko is himself inconsistent in his scholarly criticism of the dominant Ukrainophile school. A major ethnic survey of Ukrainian history was undertaken by a large body of scholars under P. Tolochko's supervision.¹²⁷ Three of the five other scholars who were part of the editorial team under Tolochko's editorial supervision also assisted him to edit the *Ancient History of Ukraine* referred to earlier.¹²⁸

Ukraine's ancient history also provides a strong sense of pride, which is seen to be important in the inculcation of a new national identity:

We are an ancient nation; our ancestors walked along these lands more than 6,000 years ago. These were the Trypillians, Goths, Scythians, Rus, Cossacks, Ukrainians—these are all us, this is our history, a glorious history, a history that one cannot but be proud of.¹²⁹

Some Ukrainian scholars seize the chance to claim that Ukraine is one of the oldest nations in Europe. Western theories claiming Ukraine as the home of European languages allegedly provide confirmation for such views.¹³⁰ Although such views might seem eccentric, one Ukrainian scholar developed them with the assistance of the British publication *New Scientist*. He claimed that the Scythian language is the oldest language in Europe and that Ukraine is therefore the origin of European languages and cultures.

There is far less dispute over the origins of the Slavs in northwestern and right-bank Ukraine, southern Belarus and eastern Poland. Ukrainian ethnic territory, Ukrainian scholars repeatedly point out, coincides with that of the original Kyiv Rus, lying between the Pripjat and the Dnipro rivers.¹³¹

Ukrainian scholars see a direct relationship between claiming the legacy of Kyiv Rus as Ukrainian and fending off Russian territorial claims to southern Ukraine and the Crimea.¹³² If Kyiv Rus was a proto-Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian claim to, and settlement in, the area along the northern Black Sea coast and the Crimea is over 1,000 years old. In other words, Ukrainians were there many centuries before the arrival of Tsarist Russia in the 1780s. In a similar manner, it is claimed that Cossack *chayky* (long boats) sailed the Black Sea from the 1490s, nearly two centuries before the Black Sea Fleet was built by the Tsarist empire in the Crimea.¹³³

The history of the Ukrainian navy is now directly traced as far back as Kyiv Rus in an additional attempt to argue that the navy of Kyiv Rus/Ukraine sailed in the Black Sea and controlled the Crimea before the arrival of the Tsarist empire in the late eighteenth century.¹³⁴ The preparation of Ukrainian military and naval officers is being undertaken using a historical framework that studies Kyiv Rus as part of Ukrainian history.¹³⁵

The Scythians are reputed to be one of the oldest nations in Europe. In 2001 an exhibition of Scythian golden and other artefacts "from Ukraine" was held at the Royal

Ontario Museum in Toronto. Using a territorial historical framework, the Scythians, like the Celts in British history, are now considered part of Ukrainian history. The centre of Great Scythia is near modern-day Simferopol, capital of the Crimea. In the fourth century the Ante appeared, whose name allegedly arrived from the “Great Tsar of the Scythians.”

Russia’s claims to the Kyiv Rus legacy lie not only within the realm of history and culture.¹³⁶ They also have a modern-day significance because they may imply, and lead to, a territorial claim upon Ukraine. As Keenan points out, Moscow’s claim to the Kyiv Rus legacy led to Muscovite and Russian expansionism into Ukraine and Belarus as a process of the “gathering of Rus lands.”¹³⁷ This was reinforced by émigré Ukrainian and Belarusian (*i.e.* Ruthenian) clerics and Cossack elites recruited into the Russian imperial establishment.

By seeing Ukrainian and Belarusian territories as part of one single “Rus’ian” territory Eastern Slavs were understood as “Russians.” In addition, in Russian eyes the gathering of “Rus’ian” lands back into one whole, as they had existed in Kyiv Rus, could not be therefore understood as Russian imperialism.

The formulation of modern imperial Russian historiography began in the late eighteenth century after the destruction of the Cossack Hetmanate and Crimean Tatar Khanate and the expansion of the Tsarist empire to the Black Sea. Russian historians, such as Nikolai Karamzin, developed the theory of the transfer of Kyiv Rus to the principality of Vladimir-Suzdal and from there to Muscovy and later to the Russian empire. Religious and dynastic ties were important elements of this historiography. Ukraine’s primary links to Kyiv Rus and its development outside Russian influence were ignored.

This Russian imperial historiography, which was later adopted in different ways by Western historians, ignored the low level of cultural unity that existed between Ukrainian and Muscovite lands in the eleventh–thirteenth centuries.¹³⁸ By the seventeenth century, when Ukraine and Muscovy held negotiations in Pereyaslav, their cultural and linguist differences had grown even further apart.

A Kyiv thinktank asked,

If Kyiv Rus was a cradle of three nationalities, one may naturally speak of, say, another common cradle for three nations, such as France, Germany and Italy.¹³⁹

Russian claims upon Kyiv Rus history therefore also have a deeper significance. Territorial demands are not made by Italians, who claim descent from the Roman empire, upon the non-Italian regions of the Roman empire, presumably because they see these regions as inhabited by different nations. If Ukrainians and Belarusians are understood as “Russians” then it is also natural that Kyiv Rus should be reunited as one entity, a union that would not be tantamount to “imperialism” but merely the “gathering of Rus’ian lands.” This is the view expounded by Belarusian President Lukashenka. In Ukraine it is only supported by parties on the extreme left who support Ukraine’s membership of the Russian–Belarusian union.

Until recently few Russians envisaged that Ukrainians (and Belarusians) were anything other than “Russians.” Eastern Slav was therefore analogous to “Russian,” an equivalence that did not apply to the Western or Southern Slavs.¹⁴⁰ In the words of a Ukrainian historian,

Taking this into account, we can state that the right of Moscow to the historical and cultural inheritance of the Kyivan principality is nothing less or more than the right of Madrid, Lisbon, Paris and Bucharest to the history and culture of Latin Rome.¹⁴¹

Conclusion

The rewriting of history and myth making have always been evident within Western as well as Eastern European nation-states.¹⁴² Locating historical myths and legends in only Eastern Europe has a long tradition in studies of nationalism, such as those by Hans Kohn, where the “liberal, civic West” is counterposed to the “illiberal, ethnic East.” Patriotism allegedly dominates the former while nationalism (and myth making) is only to be found in the latter. This “good–bad” dichotomy of nationalism represents a teleological view of nationalism from the present back to the late eighteenth century which ignores historical manifestations of ethnic nationalism, colonialism, racism and gender discrimination in the West.¹⁴³

Historical myths exist in all nation-states to varying degrees, something recognised within studies of nationalism, anthropology and postcolonial studies. The choice open to Ukraine’s non-communist ruling elites since 1992 has been to adopt one of the four available schools of history on Kyiv Rus, Ukraine and Ukrainians. The Soviet was rejected because it portrayed the only historical aim for Ukrainians as seeking reunion with Russia (for precisely this reason it was reintroduced in Belarus and Moldova). The “mutually exclusive” Russophile school was also unusable because it conflated East Slavic with “Russian” and thereby denied that Ukrainians were a separate people. This left only the traditional “mutually exclusive” Ukrainophile and the relatively new “multiple identity” schools to compete and overlap.

In Ukraine the Ukrainophile school of history dominates the educational system and education in the security forces. Ukraine’s national symbols and historical monuments draw on the Ukrainophile school. This school promotes an identity that is “mutually exclusive” and lays claim to Kyiv Rus as a proto-Ukrainian state.

Although the East Slavic school is more popular in eastern Ukraine, the very fact it is an eclectic compromise between two “mutually exclusive” schools—Ukrainophile and Russophile—has given it a weak ideological and symbolic base to compete with the Ukrainophiles. Although Ukraine’s centrist former elites preferred the East Slavic school of history on the Kyiv Rus legacy, a decision was made to allow the Ukrainophile to dominate Ukraine’s nation-building project. The election of Yuschenko as President in 2004–2005 will reinforce the dominance of the Ukrainophile school of history writing and nation-building.

NOTES

1. Viktor Stepanenko, *The Construction of Identity and School Policy in Ukraine* (New York: Commack, 1999), p. 108. Even the largely Russophile Mikhail Molchanov admitted that the Hrushevsky view of Kyiv Rus as a proto-Ukrainian state is “the main-stream view among historians.” See his *Political Culture and National Identity in Russian–Ukrainian Relations* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 2002), p. 112.
2. Stephen Shulman has a similar classification into “ethnic Ukrainian” and “eastern Slavic” which approximates my own division into two historiographies (“Ukrainophile” and “eastern Slavic”). See his “National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine,” *Slavic Review*, Vol. 64, No. 1 (2005), forthcoming.
3. See Anthony D. Smith, “Ethnic Myths and Ethnic Revivals,” *Journal of European Sociology*, Vol. 25, 1984, pp. 283–305.
4. Anthony D. Smith, “National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent,” *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*, Vol. 7, 1984, pp. 95–130.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 105. See also Matthew Levinger, “Myth and Mobilisation: The Triadic Structure of Nationalist Rhetoric,” *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2001, pp. 175–194; and Anthony D. Smith, “The ‘Golden Age’ and National Renewal,” in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin, eds, *Myths & Nationhood* (London: Hurst, 1997), pp. 36–59.
6. Document 7446, Committee on Culture and Education, Council of Europe, Recommendation 1283, 22 January 1996, <www.coe.int>.
7. Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 150.
8. T. Kuzio, “The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Framework for Understanding Nationalism,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2002, pp. 20–39; and “Nationalising States or Nation Building: A Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence,” *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2001, pp. 135–154.
9. Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, Sage, 1995), p. 71. See also Barny Schwartz, “The Social Context of Commemoration. A Study in Collective Memory,” *Social Forces*, Vol. 61, No. 2, 1982, pp. 374–402.
10. See Branimir Anzulovic, *Heavenly Serbia. From Myth to Genocide* (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
11. An example of negative attitudes towards myths and the rewriting of history in Ukraine can be found in Andrew Wilson, “Myths of National History in Belarus and Ukraine” in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schopflin, eds, *Myths & Nationhood* (London: Hurst, 1997), pp. 182–197.
12. Pal Kolsto, *Political Construction Sites. Nation-Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), p. 35.
13. See Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Post-communist Cultural Studies* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998).
14. Thomas H. Eriksen, *Ethnicity and Nationalism. Anthropological Perspectives* (London: Pluto Press, 1993), p. 72.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 59. See also Walker Connor, “Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1993, pp. 376–377.
16. Helen Parkins, “Archaeology and Nationalism: Excavating the Foundations of Ethnicity,” *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 1997, pp. 451–458.
17. Jonathan Friedman, “Myth, History and Political Identity,” *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1992, p. 207.

18. See J. Friedman, "The Past in the Future: History and the Politics of Identity," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 94, No. 4, 1992, pp. 837, 854.
19. A. Wilson, *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 22.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Wilson believes that "the modern Ukrainian state has a relative paucity of material with which to work." Because Ukraine's regions existed in separate states until the Soviet era, it is difficult therefore to imagine Ukrainian history as "either a temporal or a geographic continuum." See A. Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 25.
22. James I. Sheehan, "What Is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1981, pp. 1–23.
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62. A long analysis of the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc in the weekly newspaper *Zerkalo Nedeli/Dzerkalo Tyzhnia* can be found at <<http://www.mirror-weekly.com/ie/show/382/33937/>>.
63. Ukrainian State Television Channel 1, 5 March 2003.
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65. T. Kuzio, “Russia Continues to Disrespect Ukrainian Sovereignty,” *RFERL Newslines*, 9 May 2002.
66. Petro Tolochko, “Zaruchyky Obrazhenonii Istorychnoi Pamiati,” *Viche*, February 2000, p. 141. See also “Yaku Ukrayinsku Movu Plekaly?” *Viche*, November 2000, pp. 142–151.
67. In the 1998–2002 parliament an inter-faction group called “To Europe with Russia!” was organised by eastern Ukrainian oligarchs. See T. Kuzio, “To Europe with Russia! Ukraine’s ‘Little Russian’ Foreign Policy,” *RFERL Newslines*, 4 June 2002. The irony is that only Ukraine, not Russia, seeks EU and NATO membership. If Ukraine were to achieve membership (which is not likely in the short term) Ukraine would be inside “Europe” (as represented by the EU) and Russia outside. The Ukrainian–Russian border would become the EU (European)–Eurasian border.
68. *Ibid.*; Tolochko, “Zaruchyky Obrazhenonii Istorychnoi Pamiati,” p. 140.
69. Nancy Popson, “The Ukrainian History Textbook: Introducing Children to the “Ukrainian Nation,” *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2001, p. 328.
70. Interview with Tolochko in *The Day*, 22 August 1998.
71. Popson, “The Ukrainian History Textbook,” pp. 328–330.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 344.
73. Vasyl Kremen, the Minister of Education since 1997, is a member of the Kyiv oligarchic clan’s Social Democratic United Party (SDPUo) led by Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the presidential administration since May 2002.
74. V. F. Verstiuk, O. M. Dziuba and V. F. Repryntsev, *Ukrayina vid naydavnishikh chasiv do siohodennia* (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1995), p. 5.
75. Vilfrid Ilge, “Natsionalna Istoriya na pryklady zobrazhennia doby Kyivskoi Rusi v Ukrayinskykh pidruchnykakh z istorii,” in M. Telus and Y. Shapoval, eds, *Ukrayinska Istorychna Dydaktyka, Mizhnarodnyi Dialoh* (Kyiv: Heneza, 2000), pp. 76–108.
76. Germ Janmaat, “Ivan Mazepa and Sepan Bandera, Heroes or Traitors? The History of Ukraine in Soviet and Post-Soviet Textbooks,” paper presented at the annual convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, 15–17 April 1999.

77. The only exception is Andrew Fesiak, "Nation Building in the Ukrainian Military," in T. Kuzio and P. D'Anieri, eds, *Dilemmas of State-Led Nation Building in Ukraine* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), pp. 147–170.
78. Wilson believes that the 1994 presidential elections were a contest between the "nationalist" Kravchuk and the "anti-nationalist" Kuchma. Wilson, together with many other scholars at the time, went on to predict that after Kuchma's election victory the "nationalist" policies of the Kravchuk era would be replaced by ones more amenable to the eastern Ukrainian voters who elected Kuchma. As this article shows, this never happened in historiography and education. See A. Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s*.
79. *Surma* (magazine of the National Guard), No. 1, 1995, p. 58–61.
80. *Flot Ukrayiny* (Navy), 9 December 1995.
81. *Flot Ukrayiny*, 18 May 1996.
82. *Narodna Armiya* (Ministry of Defence), 3 and 4 October 1996.
83. *Flot Ukrayiny*, 9 May and 14 June 1997; *Narodna Armiya*, 9 December 1997.
84. *Prykordonnyk Ukrayiny* (Border Troops), 14 March 1998.
85. *Narodna Armiya*, 15 and 16 October 1999, 13 September and 2 November 2000; *Flot Ukrayiny*, 1 December 1999.
86. *Narodna Armiya*, 24 March 2001.
87. See the December 2002 poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociological Studies, <<http://www.pravda.com.ua/archive/2002/december/18/3.shtml>>; and T. Kuzio, "Support for Independence Returns to 1991 Levels," *RFERL Poland, Belarus and Ukraine Report*, 21 January 2003.
88. Kataryna Wolczuk, *The Moulding of Ukraine: The Constitutional Politics of State Formation* (Budapest: Central European University, 2001), pp. 205–206. Wolczuk under-estimates the inability of centrists to propose alternative national symbols. Centrists or russophones were never able to put forward any alternative to the blue and yellow flag. The national democrats backed the blue and yellow flag while the communists, then the largest faction in parliament, backed the Soviet Ukrainian blue and red. What was the flag advocated by centrists?
89. Wilfried Jilge, "State Symbolism and National Identity in Ukraine since 1991," paper presented to the annual convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, 12–14 April 2000, p. 9.
90. Roman Rosliak, "Herb na Ukrayinskykh Zemliakh," *Narodna Armiya*, 28 November 1997.
91. *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 27 August 2003. Of course, theory and practice are often at odds in Kuchma's domestic policies, which have been decidedly non-European since he was re-elected in November 1999.
92. Ukrainian State Television Channel 1, 17 May 2003. Kuchma pointed out that the Kyiv Rus royal family intermarried with royal families from Germany, Poland, England, Moravia, Byzantium, France, Austria, Hungary, Denmark, Bulgaria and Norway. The Ukrainian embassy in France changed the inscription on the tomb of Anna Yaroslavna (Grand Prince Yaroslav Mudry's daughter), who married Henri Ier, King of France, from that of "Anne de Russie" to "Anne de Kiev." The monument is to be found at the Monastery of St Vincent, Senlis, northeast of Paris, where she died. The Comtesse de Paris attended the ceremony marking the changing of the inscription, since she claims to be one of Yaroslavna's descendents.
93. W. Jilge, "Staatssymbolik und nationale Identitat in der postkommunistischen Ukraine," *Ethnos-Nation*, Vol. 6, Nos 1–2, 1998, pp. 85–113.

94. W. Jilge, "State Symbolism and National Identity in Ukraine since 1991."
95. See the interview with Maria Dmytriyenko and Yuriy Savchuk, "Ukrayina Povynna Maty Velykyi Derzhavnyi Herb," *Narodna Armiya*, 2 December 1997; and Maria Dmytriyenko and Yuriy Savchuk, "Pyshaymosia! Yednaymosia! Mitsniymo! Ukrayiny Matyme Nareshti Derzhavnyi Himn I Velykyi Derzhavnyi Herb Ukrayiny," *Flot Ukrayiny*, 19–25 August 2000.
96. See the document prepared by the Department of Propaganda in the Main Directorate on Educational Work, Ministry of Defence, entitled "Povahy Do Derzhavnykh Symboliv Ukrayiny—Vplyv Patriotyzmu I Svidomoi Hromadianskoi Pozytsii Zakhysnyka Batkivshychny," *Narodna Armiya*, 15 January 2000.
97. Natalia Tymoshenko, "Derzhavnyi Prapor—Symvol Krayiny," *Polityka I Chas*, No. 10, 1997, pp. 62–65.
98. *Prezydentskyi Visnyk*, 30 November and 9 December 2000, 9 February and 24 February 2001.
99. This is directly asserted in Vasyl Mishyn, "Natsionalni hroshi Ukrayiny," *Narodna Armiya*, 7 June 2000.
100. Inger Kuzych, "Focus on Philately: The Founding Family of Kyivan Rus," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 3 November 2002.
101. D. Tabachnyk *et al.*, eds, *Nahorody Ukrayiny. Istoriya, Fakty, Dokumenty*, 3 vols (Kyiv: ARC-Ukraine, 1996); and *Vidznaky Prezydenta Ukrayiny. Ordeny, medali, nahorodna zbroya* (Kyiv: Mystetsvo, 1999). See also the interview with Yevhen Kushnariov, head of the Commission on State Medals of Ukraine attached to the president, in *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 19 August 1997; and Vasyl Vecherskyi, "Nahorody—etalon kultury derzhavy," *Chas*, 10–16 July 1997. The law on medals can be found in *Holos Ukrayiny*, 18 April 2000.
102. For the presidential decree on Princess Olha see *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 19 August 1997.
103. "Imenyny stolytsi sviatkuiut demokratiya, pravoslavia ta narod!" *Holos Ukrayiny*, 27 May 1997. Interestingly, it was the pro-autocephalous UOC-KP, not the Russian Patriarchate's exarchate in Ukraine, the UOC, which was invited to the event.
104. *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 27 May 1997. See also "Kyiv vidsviatkuvav imenyny," *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 27 May 1997.
105. Natalia Solonska, "Ne mechem yedynym . . .," *Holos Ukrayiny*, 27 December 1997.
106. Viktor Huseyev and Yuriy Kalyntsev, "Yaroslav Mudry—'siyach,'" *Den*, 11 June 1999.
107. See Zenon E. Kohut, "The Development of a Ukrainian National Historiography in Imperial Russia," in Thomas Sanders, ed., *Historiography of Imperial Russia. The Profession and Writing of History in a Multinational State* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 453–478.
108. Ihor Siuniukov, "Storichchia XII. 'Slavnyi peremohamy Monomakh,'" *Den*, 14 October 2000.
109. Ivan Drach, "Nekhay Kniahynia Olha Bude Pershoiu . . .," *Molod Ukrayiny*, 19 April 1996.
110. Olena Yatshenko, "Kniahynia Olha, sviati Kyrylo I Mefodiy znovu pryjshly u Kyiv I zupynylysia tam, de prebudut bobiky bikiv," *Chas*, 31 May 1996; and *Holos Ukrayiny*, 28 May 1996.
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112. Dmytro Mossienko, "St. Michael's Rises above Ukraine Again," *Eastern Economist*, 20 July 1998.

113. Roman Woronowycz, "Historic St. Michael's Golden-Domed Sobor Is Rebuilt," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 29 November 1998.
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115. <<http://maidan.org.ua>> for 23 April 2003.
116. See the large article covering two of four pages of the organ of the Ministry of Defence, entitled "Drevniy I vichno molodyi—zi sviatom, Kyive miy!" *Narodna Armiya*, 2 June 1998.
117. R. Woronowycz, "Kyiv Days Focus on Treasured Monuments," *Ukrainian Weekly*, 14 June 1998.
118. Natalia A. Feduschak, "Renaissance of Kyiv," *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 3 November 2002.
119. P. P. Tolochko *et al.*, eds, *Davna Istoriya Ukrayiny*, 2 vols (Kyiv: Lybid, 1994).
120. K. P. Buniatyn, V. Yu. Murzin and O. V. Symonenko, *Na Svitanku Istorii*, Vol. 1; S. D. Kryzhytskyi, V. M. Zubar and A. S. Rusiayeva, *Antychni Derzhavy Pivnichnoho Prychornomoria*, Vol. 2; V. D. Baran, *Davni Sloviany*, Vol. 3; O. P. Tolochko and P. P. Tolochko, *Kyivska Rus*, Vol. 4; and M. F. Kotliar, *Halysko-Volynska Rus*, Vol. 5 (Kyiv: Alternatyvy, 1998).
121. Popson, "The Ukrainian History Textbook," p. 344.
122. Philip Longworth, "Review Article. Ukraine: History and Nationality," *Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 78, No. 1, 2000, p. 116
123. P. P. Tolochko *et al.*, eds, *Davnia Istoriya Ukrayiny v Triokh Tomakh* (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1997 and 1998).
124. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, p. 25.
125. Valko Kravchenko, "Pokhodzhennia Ukrayinskoho Narodu," *Flot Ukrayiny*, 7 September 1996.
126. See the report of a Ukrainian naval conference on educational issues that was undertaken jointly with the Union of Ukrainian Officers and the Prosvita Ukrainian Language Society to help prepare officers: "Natsionalna Ideya I Rozvytok Ukrayiny yak Suverennoi Derzhavy," *Flot Ukrayiny*, 19 April 1997. See also the material prepared by the Department of Propaganda in the Directorate of Educational Work of the Ukrainian Navy: "Istoriya Dukhovnoho Stanovlennia Ukrayinskoi Natsii," *Flot Ukrayiny*, 12 July 1997.
127. See P. P. Tolochko *et al.*, eds, *Ethnichna Istoriya Ukrainy* (Kyiv: National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Archaeology, 2000).
128. Volodymyr Borysenko, "Anty, Rusy, Ukrayintsi," *Viche*, July 1993, p. 148.
129. Nikolai Stepanenko, "Luna Volkov ne Boyitsia," *Flot Ukrayiny*, 24 August 1996.
130. Petro Hopych, "Ukrayina—zemlia ariiv?" *Holos Ukrayiny*, 30 January 1997.
131. *Flot Ukrayiny*, 18 November 1995.
132. See Ihor Shramko, "Rus Krymu," *Uriadovi Kurier*, 27 July 1995; and Valentyna Piskun, "Spoonviku tut zhyvut Ukrayintsi," *Chas*, 21–27 August 1997.
133. See T. Kuzio, "Borders, Symbolism and Nation-State Building: Ukraine and Russia," *Geopolitics and International Boundaries*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1997, pp. 36–56.
134. Mykola Vladzimorskyi *et al.*, "Viys'kovo-Mors'ki Syly Ukrayiny," brochure issued on the fifth anniversary of the creation of Ukraine's navy in 1997; copy in the author's possession.
135. "Natsional'na Ideya I Rozvytok Ukrayiny iak Suverennoi Derzhavy," *Flot Ukrayiny*, 19 April 1997.

136. The December 2003 elections to the Russian State Duma produced a two-thirds nationalist majority composed of President Vladimir Putin's Unified Russia, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party and the Motherland bloc. See *Vremya MN* (29 May 2003) for a survey of the rise of these nationalist parties, many of which lay claim to the Kyiv Rus legacy as a way of promoting East Slavic union.
137. Edward L. Keenan, "On Certain Mythical Beliefs and Russian Behaviour," in S. Frederick Starr, ed., *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 21.
138. Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar, "The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building," *Slavic Review*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1963, p. 236.
139. *Relations in the Triangle: Russia–Belarus–Ukraine* (Kyiv: Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, no date).
140. For a discussion of this question see L. Zalizniak, "Istorychna Spadshchyna Kyivskoi Rusi," *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 21 June 1996.
141. *Ibid.*
142. Smith, "National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent," p. 101; Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 40–41; Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 150; Karl W. Deutsch, "Communications Theory and Political Integration," in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds, *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1964), pp. 48, 62; Anthony H. Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration* (London: Unwin & Hyman, 1989), p. 10; Hutchinson, "Ethnicity and Modern Nations," p. 661.
143. It can be disputed whether the 1789 French Revolution represented any progress for women until as late as 1944 when they eventually obtained the vote.