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FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONGRESS ON POLITICAL EDUCATION AND CULTURE

By Anneli Maier

Summary: The meetings held in the second half of May in preparation for the Congress on Political Education and Socialist Culture have made the party's targets in the ideological sphere obvious. Enlarged plenary sessions of the judet party aktifs were held to discuss ways of improving political propaganda and ideological indoctrination and of providing the population with technical and legal information -- all of which are considered necessary if labor productivity is to be increased and a spirit of "order and discipline" inculcated. Patriotic education and the combating of nationalism and religious belief will continue, and it has become clear that a preoccupation with mass events has superseded professionalism in artistic matters. The "efficiency" of both mass and professional performance is increasingly measured by the promptness of the response to "the social order."

George
Cioranescu

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The preparations for the forthcoming Congress on Political Education and Socialist Culture entered their final phase on 15 May 1976 when plenary sessions of 19 judet party committee aktifs took place (followed on May 22 by those of another 20 judet aktifs and that of the Bucharest municipal aktif), and similar sessions were held by the trade unions, the nationality workers' councils, the pioneer organization, the Council on Socialist Culture and Education, the communist youth and student organizations, etc.

The judet committee meetings were attended by representatives of the local party organs, the Front of Socialist Unity and other mass organizations, the nationality councils, and cultural and artistic institutions, as well as by teachers, school directors, members of the creative unions, soldiers, and cultural activists.

Each meeting was also attended by a high party and/or state official. Dumitru Popescu went to Alba, Paul Niculescu to Arad and Timis, Leonte Rautu to Bacau and Covasna, Vasile Patilinet to Bistrita-Nasaud and Hunedoara, Ion Ionita to Botosani and Dimbovita, Gheorghe Pana to Braila and Bihor, Mihai Dalea to Caras-Severin and Mures, Stefan Voitec to Dolj and Brasov, Janos Fazekas to Harghita and Buzau, Manea Manescu to Iasi, Ion Patan to Ilfov and Galati, Iosif Uglar to Maramures and Olt, Cornel Burtica to Mehedinti and Satu-Mare, Gheorghe Oprea to Prahova and Cluj, Nicolae Giosan to Salaj, Ilie Verdet to Sibiu, Emil Bobu to Suceava and Bucharest, Petru Lupu to Tulcea and Constanta, Lina Ciobanu to Vrancea and Vaslui, Elena Ceausescu to Arges, Stefan Andrei to Gorj, Mihai Gere to Ialomita, Emil Draganescu to Neamt, Gheorghe Radulescu to Teleorman, and Ion Ursu to Vilcea.

The press reports on these meetings revealed that the line followed was basically the same everywhere, although differences were apparent in the tones of the telegrams sent to the Central Committee and to Ceausescu, and the measures decided upon at the sessions indicate that local conditions were taken into consideration. It is of some interest that, if one can judge from the excerpts published in Scinteia, (1) telegrams contained the unusual formulation found in the telegrams of the creative unions (2) expressing allegiance "to the entire domestic and foreign policy of the party."

The judet first secretaries' reports all began with a reference to the mass participation in the meetings, and then turned to the successes achieved in production as a result of the changes that have taken place in the attitude of the population since 1971. A direct correlation was established between the enhanced activity of a considerably blown-up agitprop apparat and ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of plan targets. In Bucharest, for instance, 1,100,000 persons attended lectures organized by the FSU in 1975, compared to 285,000 in 1971; 40,000 agitators, 218 artistic agitprop brigades, 2,500 wall newspapers, 253 radio amplifiers, and 25 film clubs were also mentioned. (3) Shortcomings were also mentioned, although in rather abstract terms. In production they were described as "negative attitudes toward the use of machines and tools, the saving of materials, labor discipline, and the standards of socialist ethics and equity." And the political work with whose aid such shortcomings are to be eliminated was described as inadequate. The charges most frequently leveled against political propaganda and cultural-artistic activities include "formalism," "superficiality" failure to pursue goals directly linked with production, lack of militancy, and too great an interest in entertainment. One very interesting criticism

- (1) These excerpts appear in issues beginning on May 18.
- (2) See Rumanian Situation Report/16, Radio Free Europe Research, 13 May 1976, Item 5.
- (3) Scinteia, 25 May 1976.

"from below" -- about the methods used in political work, which have not, as is claimed by official propaganda, become more democratic, but less so -- was voiced:

During the plenary session of the [Prahova] Judet Committee, the criticism was voiced that certain communal or municipal party committees have renounced discussion, the practice of asking questions and giving answers, the living dialogue between those following the courses and the propagandists." (4)

A great number of measures were proposed, all of them designed to improve political education, which will in turn engender the climate necessary for the fulfillment of the plan targets. All workers were called upon to respect "order and discipline" -- the key words -- and the participants in the judet meetings have set a good example by setting precise dates for the accomplishment of the various programs, it was made clear.

Since 1971 enhancing the role of the party at all levels and strengthening its influence over all mass organizations has been the main goal of the Ideological Program.

All ideological, political-educational, and cultural-artistic activity will be subordinated to mobilization of the working people for the fulfillment of economic tasks. . . .

All communists and other working people will be enrolled in the party's political-ideological teaching program. (5)

The composition of the groups engaged in propaganda must be improved, their methods of teaching must be standardized, and those workers with good training must be promoted. (6)

It should be noted that recently the Political Executive Committee of the party CC adopted a decision on changes and improvements in the training of leading party cadres at the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy. (7) In an interview granted to Scinteia (8) the academy's prorector, Ervin Hutira, pointed out that these changes will not only be quantitative, but also qualitative --

(4) Ibid., 20 May 1976.

(5) Ibid., 18 May 1976, in its report on the Alba meeting.

(6) Ibid., in the report on the Bacau meeting.

(7) Ibid., 18 March 1976.

(8) 22 May 1976.

involving "structural changes of certain conceptions based on new achievements in social practice and in the social sciences." Hutira also said that within the past five years 31,000, leading cadres from party and mass organizations, the economy, and the foreign service and state administration have been trained at Stefan Gheorghiu.

He then turned to less satisfactory matters, mentioning failure to take the special conditions that exist in Rumania into consideration; unsatisfactory organization of studies (short courses in Bucharest or at one of the 10 judet party schools, and periods of individual study); an uncritical attitude whether on the part of teachers or students was not made clear toward "modern methods and techniques" of economic guidance; and, last but not least, the fact that the organizations to which the new party-school graduates returned were not "sufficiently" preoccupied with putting the new methods and solutions into practice.

The structural changes will be supplemented by the setting up of new Marxist-Leninist university branches and peoples' universities in a number of cities and communes. Political education will comprise giving precise information on the party's policy as contained in its documents and in Ceausescu's speeches; spreading scientific and technical knowledge and generalizing production methods and practices that have proved locally satisfactory; and providing legal information. The main goal is to raise the work standards and discipline of the entire population, but a number of social categories have been singled out as particularly important targets of indoctrination and moral training: workers in newly set-up industrial units (on whose discipline and skill the profitability of new investments is largely dependent), newly hired workers in existing units, young workers and young people in general, commuters (people who belong neither to the city nor to the countryside), intellectuals (particularly those living in the countryside), and people living and working in far-off regions in such spheres as forestry, etc.

1. Mass ideological work will also be intensified along three basic lines: patriotic education, the struggle against nationalism, and the fight against mysticism. The need to provide the population with more information about the nation's history, and to cultivate patriotism has been emphasized over and over again. The participants at the Bistrita-Nasaud judet session are reported to have "emphasized that among the essential goals of the ideological front is to educate Communists and all working people, no matter what their nationality, in the spirit of socialist patriotism." (9) In this context, attention should be drawn to the dilemma represented by the two main targets of the RCP's post-1971 ideological policy. With the introduction of politechnical education in grade school the curriculums of all grades were changed in order to allow a number of hours to be allotted to practical, technical instruction. The number of hours devoted to history, the

(9) Scinteia, 18 May 1976.

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Rumanian language and literature, and the arts was reduced, and it appears now that mass culture as well as the arts and the media will be obliged to compensate for this.

2 Particular attention was paid to the struggle against nationalism and chauvinism in the reports on and the telegrams issued at the meetings of the people's councils of the Hungarian and German minorities. To judge from what was said, nationalism is to be found only among Hungarian and German circles, living inside or outside Rumania; it is not an attitude adopted by ethnic Rumanians vis-à-vis the minorities:

Those who took the floor condemned the policy of national hatred adopted in the past by the dominant classes and in the present by reactionary, irredentist elements who kindle hatred and try to misrepresent the situation in this country. (10)

Those who took the floor pointed out that the incontestable, authentic democracy in our homeland represents a firm answer to the calumnies spread by certain foreign propaganda centers which, by misrepresenting reality, denigrate the policy of socioeconomic development followed by our party and state, and provide a clear answer to tendencies and illusions nurtured by false miracles." (11)

3. There is an interesting contradiction between the RCP's desire to put special emphasis on the atheistic education of the population, on the one hand, and the tendency to revive old local habits and festivities, thus fixing new mass cultural events more firmly in regional tradition. Among the measures adopted by the Arad plenary session, (attended by Paul Niculescu) it was stated that "the laicizing of certain traditional festivities" (many of which have a strong Christian or even pre-Christian character) will have to continue, and similar statements were issued at most of the other judet sessions.

It has been clear for some time that the RCP is not particularly satisfied with the organization of and the methods used in mass cultural activity. Superficiality, "festivism," lavish spending, etc., have been criticized over and over again. In order to remedy the situation the party obviously intends to resort to a double strategy based on a "squaring-of-the-circle" formula. On the one hand, at all sessions a massive increase in the number of cultural homes and film clubs was decided upon, as were expansion of the wired radio network and the setting up of many new agitprop and artistic brigades and teams. On the other hand, however, the material

(10) Ibid., 20 May 1976, in a reference to the Hungarian meeting.

(11) Ibid., 21 May 1976, speaking of the German minority meeting.

"efficiency" of mass cultural and propaganda activity will have to be raised, and savings will be made. Most probably as a result of this new austerity program the Front of Socialist Unity magazine Flacara, the only illustrated review embellished with color photography, has been turned into a black-and-white weekly, beginning with issue No.17 of 29 April 1976. It is true that the pictures of pretty girls and handsome young men (mainly singers and actors, both Rumanian and foreign) have for some time been superseded by portraits of Ceausescu and industrial and rural "still-life" photographs, but now the last touch of color has disappeared from the press. It remains to be seen whether the increasingly militant and critical spirit promised by the new Flacara (whose editor-in-chief is still Adrian Paunescu) and illustrated by its analysis of the Duzineanu case (12) and several other articles, will continue.

It is also a matter for conjecture whether the methodological cabinets planned to be set up in several judets will be able to provide the answers required by this contradictory strategy in mass culture. It appears, however, that the party is intent on making more ample use of "voluntary" patriotic work by the entire population and of the cadre potential offered by the country's intellectuals, who may be transformed into "barefoot agitators" during their spare time.

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(12) See Rumanian SR/17, RFER, 20 May 1976, Item 1.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS1. Premier Manescu's Asian Tour: I -- Iran and India

a. Iran. Within the framework of the regular high-level Rumanian-Iranian contacts and the improving and expanding political and economic relations between the two countries, Premier Manea Manescu went to Teheran for an official visit on May 17. This visit followed one by Premier Amir Abas Hoveyda to Bucharest in August 1975 (see Rumanian Situation Report/32, Radio Free Europe Research, 21 August 1975, Item 1), and Ceausescu's state visit to Teheran in November of that year (see Rumanian SR/47, RFER, 5 December 1975, Item 7).

The main purpose of Manescu's visit was to expand and develop co-operation in a number of fields. An Agerpres dispatch (May 17) noted the steadily increasing economic exchanges between the two countries, which reached a value of almost 400,000,000 dollars in 1975 (Hoveyda, in a toast at a dinner for Manescu, set the figure at 370,000,000 dollars), recalled that a number of agreements and protocols were signed last year, and forecast that Manescu's visit would help to open up fresh possibilities of co-operation, and would step up existing projects and programs.

At a dinner in honor of the Rumanian delegation the two premiers emphasized economic relations in their toasts. Hoveyda recalled Rumania's contribution to the industrialization of his country and welcomed the fact that many Rumanians are working in Iran, thus helping to construct "the Iran of tomorrow." He expressed gratitude for Rumania's support of Iran's efforts to establish the Middle East as a denuclearized zone. With regard to the current UN Conference on Trade and Development, he stressed the urgency of creating a new world economic order. Reflecting Iran's concern about the Persian Gulf, he emphasized the great importance attached to the security and the stability of the waterways "that touch our coasts" and said the bordering nations must be responsible for the security of these waterways.

In his turn Manescu recalled the importance of the solemn declaration signed in 1973 during Shahpahlavi's visit to Bucharest, praised Rumanian-Iranian economic co-operation, and stressed the roles of the nation, state independence, and sovereignty (bolstering the latter statement with quotations from Ceausescu). He referred to Rumania as a socialist developing country, and stressed its desire to co-operate with other developing states. He argued that all states, irrespective of size, development, social order or policy, should participate directly in international life, and asserted that Rumania seeks European disarmament and the continued normalization of inter-European relations.

On May 20 Shahpahlavi received the Rumanian premier, with whom, according to Rumanian media, he "discussed the main aspects of co-operation between the two countries and some questions of international life."

Scinteia (May 19) said that the two premiers had agreed to further Rumanian-Iranian co-operation in the fields of new technologies, equipment, and the production of tractors, railroad cars, ships.

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items, as well as in the energy, agricultural and technoscientific sectors. The two premiers also signed an agreement on road transport, a contract on freight cars for transporting ore, a long-term agreement on crude oil deliveries, and a contract on the delivery of trucks.

No further details were given, and there was no indication of the quantity of oil Iran is to deliver to Rumania, or the extent to which it is to be paid for by Rumanian deliveries of railroad cars and trucks. Rumania's economy is becoming more and more dependent on imported oil (4,538,000 tons were brought into the country in 1974), and Iran seems to be its main supplier. (Iran began exporting oil to Rumania in 1965-1966 under a 10-year contract signed in 1965 which was supplemented by other contracts in subsequent years.)

The joint communiqué on Manescu's visit said that the talks between the two premiers were attended by Minister Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation Nicolae Ionescu, Deputy Foreign Minister Cornel Pacoste, Secretary of the Council of Ministers Ion St. Ion, Deputy Minister of Transport and Telecommunications Marin Maroiu, Deputy Minister of Machine Building Ion Iosefide, and a number of advisers and experts.

It also reported that the two sides had agreed to pay special attention to co-operation on the basis of long-term programs which will give greater stability to co-operation in the production and technoscientific fields and in commercial exchanges. They also agreed on the desirability of increasing the value of their trade exchanges beyond the 1,000-million-dollar mark by 1980, and called for the maintenance of close "working" links between their respective planning organizations. The two premiers praised the activities of the Mixed Ministerial Commission on Economic Co-operation and decided that its next session will take place in Bucharest next October. They also agreed to continue negotiations on agreements in the domains of judicial assistance and the avoidance of double taxation.

The second part of the communiqué dealt with international issues. The two premiers called for a peaceful settlement of disputes, aid for the developing countries, the establishment of a new international economic order, and disarmament -- particularly nuclear disarmament -- the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, and transformation of the Indian ocean into a zone of peace. They expressed their conviction that the Middle East situation must be solved by withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories, and underlined the importance of the UN in settling international problems.

Premier Hoveyda accepted an invitation to visit Rumania.

B. India. From Teheran Manescu went on to New Delhi for a four-day official visit. This was his second visit to India (his first visit was made in January 1974, when he was vice-premier and chairman of the State Planning Committee (see Rumanian SR/3, REEP

21 January 1974, Item 6). There have been many other exchanges of visits by ministers and other high officials, and Premier Indira Gandhi went to Bucharest in October 1967, while Ceausescu paid a state visit to India in October 1969 (see Rumanian SR/89, RFER, 13 October 1969); President Varahagiri Venkata Giri returned Ceausescu's visit in October 1973 (see Rumanian SR/40, RFER, 11 October 1973, Item 3).

At a dinner in the honor of the Rumanian delegation on May 22 Mrs Gandhi and Manescu exchanged toasts which dealt, inter alia, with nonalignment. Mrs. Gandhi criticized the tendency of "some countries" to think "the rest of mankind exists only to serve their interests," and said that India advocates general acceptance of the idea of co-existence and reduction of economic disparities within the international community -- the latter being the guiding principle of India's policy of nonalignment in which her government has implicit faith. The development of co-operation between Rumania, "a member of the socialist fraternity," and India, which belongs to the nonaligned world, is a natural phenomenon, she said.

In his speech Manescu stressed that Rumania will continue its efforts to strengthen its relations with the nonaligned and the developing countries, because the RSR is linked to these states by a common desire for progress and prosperity and by a determination to work for the abolition of the "old imperialist policy of inequity" and for the establishment of relations of full equality and mutually advantageous collaboration among nations. This, he said, explains Rumania's wish to participate as an observer in the activity of the nonaligned countries; he went on to stress the part played by India in strengthening the nonaligned movement, and thanked the Indian government for its support of Rumania at the Lima and Manila meetings. He ended by calling once again for real measures to bring about disarmament, to end production of nuclear weapons and destroy existing stocks, to abolish military blocs and military bases on the territory of other states.

On May 22 Manescu and Mrs. Gandhi discussed bilateral relations and international developments for five hours. Their talks ranged over measures to be taken by their respective countries to develop a stable basis for co-operation in industry and oil extraction, and they exchanged views on the most important aspects of international life. According to Radio Bucharest they expressed great satisfaction at the identify or similarity of their views on the problems discussed, and will continue their efforts to establish a new economic and political world order.

A Reuter dispatch (May 24) said that a number of co-operation agreements had been signed involving joint work on oil projects in the two countries and elsewhere and exchanges of information on oil prospecting and drilling. Neither the communiqué nor the Rumanian news media mentioned these agreements, however.

On May 24 Manescu met with "a group of businessmen" representing the machine building, leather processing, iron ore exploitation and

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sale, and sea transport sectors, with whom he discussed co-operation and the development of trade exchanges and discussed the plans for a new leather processing combine to be established within the framework of a Rumanian-Indian company. According to the joint communiqué the two premiers hailed the long-term trade and payments agreement concluded last December and the increase in the volume of bilateral commercial exchanges, and expressed satisfaction at the decisions reached during the second session of the joint Rumanian-Indian Commission, held in Delhi last month, regarding development of commercial exchanges and economic co-operation in the petrochemical, machine building, metallurgy, and light industries and in agriculture. Also, according to the communiqué, a protocol on co-operation in production and diversification of trade exchanges and a cultural program for 1976-1978 were signed.

The communiqué ended with the announcement that Mrs Gandhi had accepted an invitation to visit Rumania.

Rumania has been co-operating with India for many years. It helped to construct the oil refineries at Gauhati and Barauni, and together with France participated in the construction of the refinery at Haldia (see Rumania SR/30, RFER, 26 September 1974 Item 4a). According to the Financial Times (26 September 1974) it has been decided to set up a joint company to undertake oil exploration in third countries. Rumania has also supplied India with oil drilling equipment, tractors, ships, and other industrialized goods and has imported raw materials, especially iron ore. (The Rumanian Chamber of Commerce's Information Bulletin [No.11, 1969], reported that India is to supply Rumania with 22,000,000 tons of iron ore during the 1971-1980 period.) The volume of trade exchanges between the two countries is still at a relatively low level, however. It increased in value from 187,800,000 lei in 1970 to 334,500,000 lei in 1974, while in that year Rumania's trade with other Asian countries (China, Japan, Iran) exceeded the 1,000-million-lei mark.

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2. Rumanian Disarmament Proposal Rejected?

An RFE Special/UN (May 20) reported that the opinions and suggestions submitted to UN Secretary-General Waldheim by the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Poland regarding the role of the UN in achieving disarmament differ from those presented by Rumania. Rumanian media have not so far mentioned this, however.

The decision to ask for opinions and suggestions was taken by the UN General Assembly on 8 December 1975 when a resolution presented by a number of states, including Rumania, was adopted. The resolution called for the establishment of a committee to assess the role of the UN in disarmament matters, with all member states being entitled to representation on the committee (Scinteia, 9 December 1975).

In a speech delivered during the General Assembly's 30th session, which was called to break the deadlock over the disarmament question, Rumanian Foreign Minister George Macovescu made the suggestion that an extraordinary session of the UN Assembly be called to discuss the matter (see Rumanian SR/38, RFER, 2 October 1975, Item 3). On 5 November 1975, during a debate on disarmament in the General Assembly's Committee on Political and Security Problems, Ambassador Constantin Ene submitted an official document entitled "Rumania's Stand on Disarmament, Particularly Nuclear Disarmament, and on the Establishment of Durable World-Wide Peace" (see Rumanian SR/44 RFER, 13 November 1975, Item 1).

On 12 November 1975 Ion Daciu submitted a document to the General Assembly calling for the "improvement and democratization of its activity, and suggesting that it play a stronger role in situations involving, inter alia, disarmament (see Rumanian SR/45, RFER, 20 November 1975, Item 5). On 26 November 1975, Ene presented to the Committee on Political and Security Problems a draft resolution setting forth Rumania's position on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race. The resolution was cosponsored by 14 member states and adopted by consensus (see Rumanian SR/47, RFER, 5 December 1975, Item 4). Rumania's proposals with regard to disarmament aroused opposition in some countries, including some members of the Warsaw Pact. When the matter came to a vote the Soviet Union and Poland opposed it -- the only two countries to do so; the United States, Great Britain, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Mongolia were among the 14 abstainers; China did not participate; and France supported Rumania.

Rather than effect the radical change in the approach to disarmament recommended by Rumania, the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Poland would keep the existing mechanism and top it off with one or even a series of world disarmament conferences. According to the RFE Special cited above, Rumania suggested to the UN Secretary-General that disarmament talks take place on a footing of complete equality, and that in order to achieve this it recommended that the long-neglected UN disarmament commission, on which all 144 UN members are represented, be revived. The 30-nation Geneva disarmament committee, which does not include China, would be a subsidiary to this commission. Rumania also feels it imperative to convene a special General Assembly session on disarmament at which a set of principles on which all future disarmament talks would be based could be drawn up, and which would work out a "disarmament strategy," rather than leaving this up to political determination in Washington and Moscow. Rumania's proposals do not refer to the world disarmament conference suggested again by Brezhnev at the recent 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Originally, Rumania's stand on the convening of a world disarmament conference was similar to that of the other Warsaw Pact states. In a report delivered at the National Party Conference in July 1972 Ceausescu said: "We are in favor of

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organizing a general disarmament conference in which all peoples in the world would participate" (Scinteia, 20 July 1972); on 27 October 1972, at a meeting of the UN General Assembly's Political Committee, Rumania supported the Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference (RFE Special/UN, 27 October 1972), and also the Chinese suggestion that nuclear powers should agree not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. China condemned the Soviet-proposed world disarmament conference as a fraud; the US feels the Geneva conference framework is more appropriate. After the April 1974 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states the RCP CC Political Executive Committee described the activity of the Rumanian delegation, headed by Ceausescu, as "fully in accordance with the line set at the Party National Conference."

At the 11th party congress in November 1974 Ceausescu was somewhat vague with regard to the issue: "It is imperative that the problem of general disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament, be settled on a broad democratic basis, with all states concerned participating, just as it is necessary that concrete measures be taken along this line in the same democratic way. Therefore the Geneva disarmament committee should improve its activity, and all conferences and agencies devoted to disarmament should be organized on a democratic basis" (Scinteia, 26 November 1974).

According to the RFE Special, Hungary pointed out that in order to have some flexibility in disarmament talks, the UN negotiating body (the Geneva disarmament committee, of which China is not a member but which includes all Warsaw Pact states) should be limited in size. Hungary also made the point that progress does not depend on the organizational framework but on "certain political considerations." Poland's response was that Rumania's initiative was "entirely inappropriate, for it tends to divert the attention of the international community from problems of substance and thus undermines rather than facilitates the efforts being made in the existing agencies." The same argument was adopted by the Soviet Union, which warned that the Rumanian approach would "adversely affect" the work already being done inside and outside the United Nations.

In broad lines, Rumania favors the convening of a special UN General Assembly session, in which all member states will take part and at which decisions regarding the various stages of disarmament will be taken; it also recommends that these decisions should be carried out by special UN bodies. The other socialist states, particularly the Soviet Union, opposed the convening of a special UN session since, owing to the voting system, this would expose the USSR to decisions on disarmament which it could not regard favorably. It therefore suggested that one or more disarmament conferences be convened to discuss the matter without, however, making any binding decisions.

It may be recalled that, without specifying who was to blame for it, Rumania criticized the delaying of both the Geneva disarma-

ment committee talks (Scinteia, 24 and 29 February 1976) and the MBFR talks in Vienna, which have just reopened (see Rumanian SR/48, RFER, 12 December 1975, Item 3). (094)

ECONOMY

3. A Further Increase in Financial Control

The financial authorities in Rumania have been asked to exercise still stricter control over the use of the material and monetary resources made available to enterprises for the purpose of carrying out their plan tasks. The RCP CC Political Executive Committee has recently been paying particular attention to financial control (see Scinteia, 2 April 1975 and 18 March 1976, and Rumanian SR/12, RFER, 9 April 1976, Item 4).

The press has also taken up the matter, most recently in interviews with Minister of Finance Florea Dumitrescu (published in Romania Libera, 13 and 17 May 1976) and Severian Bereanu, deputy secretary of state in the Higher Court of Financial Control (Scinteia, 18 May 1976). Dumitrescu said the financial policy of the state is derived from party documents and from personal directions from Ceausescu (who has made a contribution of "inestimable value" to improving the financial system).

Both interviews point up the concern to improve the efficiency of economic activity on the one hand, and to limit the impact of the world economic crisis on the Rumanian economy on the other. After praising the success of most units in implementing their plan assignments, Dumitrescu said that in 1975 some enterprises, especially in the chemical, food, and machine building industries, had not fulfilled their profit plans, and mentioned failure to commission some investment projects to meet the specifications laid down for new production capacities, etc. Still worse, he said, obsolete technologies are still being used that cannot be sold on the market, items are being turned out, and some economic units are wasting raw and other materials, as well as fuel.

Dumitrescu's statements strengthen the impression that quite a number of enterprises are unprofitable, despite Ceausescu's 1974 declaration that units that are producing for the sake of production, without making sure that their output is marketable, would be closed down (Scinteia, 18 May 1974).

In an article in Revista Economica (No.17, 30 April 1976) P. Iacob, a university lecturer, said that in Rumania the general economic law of value operates under control. For instance, unlike prices in a free economy, which are formed outside control, prices in a socialist country are set scientifically. A socialist economy, including prices, develops according to a unified plan, but the methods used to achieve this are not most efficient, and the Political Executive Committee has come to the conclusion that the financial agencies should resort to more analytical means in order to point up the "real" developments in the economy (Scinteia, 23 May 1974).

According to Dumitrescu, stricter records of all economic

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calculating devices. Bereanu noted a number of shortcomings in this respect -- mainly having to do with delay in recording transactions.

The impact of the world economic crisis on the Rumanian economy was another topic touched on by Dumitrescu. He said that by 1980 Rumanian exports would have to increase by almost 90 per cent compared to 1975, and that particular attention should be paid to reducing the influence of the world crisis upon the Rumanian economy in general and on Rumanian foreign trade in particular. Therefore, turning out first-rate products competitive on a world-wide market is the primary demand being made on the Rumanian economy, and Dumitrescu's statement that in the 1976-1980 period profits should be about 2.2 to 2.4 times the figure for the 1971-1975 plan indicates the magnitude of the task.

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RELIGION

4. The Impossibility of Being a Conscientious Objector in Rumania

On 21 May 1976, on a program entitled "In the Fog of Prejudice," Radio Bucharest reported the case of a young man in Tirgu Mures who had refused to be drafted claiming that his religion prevented him from taking up arms. He gave the same explanation to the court in which he was tried for violating the country's laws. Although both the court and his parents (who are members of an agricultural production co-operative) tried to talk him into fulfilling his military duties, he rejected their advice and adhered to his "condemnable" stand.

According to Radio Bucharest the young man in question is a member of the sect known as Jehovah's Witnesses, which is not recognized by Rumanian authorities; earlier he had been a member of the pioneer organization and of the Union of Communist Youth (UCY), but after he joined the sect he left the UCY.

The Radio Bucharest report also quoted a Bucharest student who described the position taken by the young man as "surprising." It also cited a comment by Alexandru Babes, author of a work dealing with religious developments. In Babes's view it is "a tragedy" when someone joins a religious sect which "escapes rational control," and although there have been instances of this in Rumania they have been very few in number.

Rumanian legislation does not permit anyone to refuse military service for religious reasons. According to Article 22 of the Law on the National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Rumania adopted in 1972 (Scinteia, 29 December 1972), all citizens, irrespective of sex, are obliged to perform military service, and Article 348 of the Penal Code (republished in Buletinul Oficial 55-56, 23 April 1973) sets a six-month to five-year prison term in peace time and a three- to ten-year sentence in wartime for failure to do so.

The fact that such a rare occurrence was reported over Radio Bucharest can probably be attributed to the political and ideological atmosphere prevailing on the eve of the Congress on Political Education and Socialist Culture. The young man was no doubt intended to be the antithesis of "the new socialist man," whose creation the congress is intended to foster.

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CULTURE

5. A New Type of Narrative Dance Borrowed from China

In its desire to transform art into a directly agitational instrument the RCP has recently borrowed an "efficient" artistic genre from China: the "narrative dance" (in Rumanian: dansul tematic) as performed at the Peking Opera. Two narrative dance festivals were held in Rumania last year, on the initiative of the Council on Socialist Culture and Education (see Saptamina No.263, 19 December 1975, and Scinteia, 21 May 1976). As a result of this "initiative" -- which seems to have been rather in the nature of a campaign -- the number of groups specializing in this type of dancing has risen from 140 to 700 within less than twelve months.

The topics to which this new type of ballet is devoted (which has also begun to be cultivated by the ballet company of the Bucharest Operetta Theater) are taken from national history ("Penes curcanul," "Eroica 1877"), from the antifascist struggle and the communist take-over ("The Torch," "Liberation," "The Three Illegal Fighters"), and also from contemporary life -- the education of the younger generation ("The Tree") or production ("The Smiths," "The Symphony of the Bearings"). The direct political message of these dances is emphasized by the use of slides or films projected on a screen behind the dancers or by a special use of the lights.

Despite the successful development claimed for this new genre, however, Scinteia also found a number of shortcomings which are highly revelatory. The freedom of dancers and choreographers to choose their means of expression is by no means broad, as can be deduced from the criticism directed at certain groups for taking advantage of the narrative dance to enact uncommitted, "free rhythm" ballets intended purely for show, or for staging folklore dances in their original form. (In all such cases the agitational accent has apparently been either absent or negligible.)

Perhaps the clearest description of these dances is to be found in the Scinteia article cited above, which spoke of "the drive toward melodrama (with dozens of children brought onto the stage whether this is necessary or not), the banal or naturalistic solutions (with heroes being mowed down by bullets, writhing on the floor and discreetly piercing a balloon filled with red dye under their shirts, and with others even being interred on the

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stage)." Obviously the transition from the excessively stylized Chinese ballet to a Rumanian type of narrative dance cannot be made without stylistic waverings and eclecticism.

Of some interest is the fact that between July and October 1971 a Chinese ballet entitled "The Red Detachment of Women" was shown as a film both in cinemas and on television, and was performed, together with another called "The White-Haired Girl," by the China ballet troupe that toured Rumania.

The question of whether the Maoist ideas that came to the fore in China with that country's cultural revolution had any influence on the ideological program adopted in Rumania in July 1971 is a somewhat controversial one. It would be simplistic to hold that his visit to China in June 1971 prompted Ceausescu to "reform" cultural and educational life in Rumania. On the other hand, however, certain similarities between Mao's thought and Ceausescu's ideological program are worth considering. Perhaps the most important philosophical volte-face in 1971 was the renunciation of social determinism and the adoption of a theory emphasizing the influence of consciousness over matter. Or, to put it in other terms: in Rumania, Marxists no longer expect the new production relations more or less automatically to create a new awareness in the people; they hold that changing people's ideas is an important -- if not the most important -- prerequisite for social and economic development. It should be remembered that Mao's insistence on the transforming force of consciousness over matter has been attacked as "voluntarism" or even "idealism" by the Soviets. (See Jack Chen, Inside the Cultural Revolution, /New York and London: 1975/). The insistence in Ceausescu's ideological program on polytechnical education is another instance where this similarity becomes obvious, as are the antielite attitude vis-à-vis artists and the suspicion with which their creative unions are regarded, the purely instrumental view of art, the insistence on mass cultural performances and activities, and so on. And, last but not least, there is the liking for the Peking Opera type of ballet. One Western reporter who watched one of these new Rumanian ballets on television remarked that the only way it differed from the Chinese model was in the shape of the dancers' eyes.

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RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*



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BULGARIA/16
26 May 1976

S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

1. The Amended Law on Comrades' Courts: One Year Later
2. The Composers' Union Congress and Problems of Bulgarian Music

1. The Amended Law on Comrades' Courts: One Year Later

In an article in Rabotnicheskio Delo (May 6) Boris Iliev, secretary of the Methodological Council on Comrades' Courts at the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions, reviewed the activities of the courts since the law on them was amended (see Darzhaven Vestnik No. 27, 4 April 1975; and Bulgarian Situation Report/10, Radio Free Europe Research, 10 April 1975, Item 2). Comrades' Courts were established at enterprises, organizations, etc., some 15 years ago (see Izvestia na Prezidiuma na Narodnoto Sabranie No. 50, 23 June 1961), to deal with petty violations (hooliganism, minor theft, personal insults, slight physical injury, etc.). Sporadically amended, the law gradually broadened their jurisdiction and defined it more precisely. For example, disputes involving up to 80 leva -- and in some cases the ceiling may be raised to 100 (one US dollar equals 0.97 leva) -- are now dealt with by Comrades' Courts. Last year's amendments and supplements were intended, inter alia, to "perfect and enrich" and to "strengthen the [Comrades' Courts'] educational and preventive activities and to broaden the democratic principle" (Rabotnicheskio Delo, 31 March 1975). In addition, according to Iliev, they help to inculcate a communist attitude to labor among the country's citizens, to convince them of the importance of preserving socialist property, and to increase their awareness of the law and their loyalty to established legal order, etc. Their basic duty, however, is the prevention of crime and violation of the law, "not through repression but through influence and comradely warning."

This goal, however, has not yet been achieved. Iliev notes, for example, that "some violators prefer to have their cases heard by the state courts rather than the Comrades' Courts." This suggests a certain disrespect for the latter, which in turn must give rise to a number of problems (cf. also Literaturen Front No. 14, 3 April 1975).

The decline in the authority of the Comrades' Courts has been accelerated by what Iliev termed a widespread "underestimation" of them on the part of almost all administrative, trade union, and other officials, agencies, and institutions. In addition, the courts' members (who are elected from the trade union membership and enjoy rights equal to those of the trade union ruling bodies) display a marked unwillingness to perform their duties. In 1975 there were 3,598 Comrades' Courts in existence within the trade union system, but only 547 of them were active. "The rest existed only on paper," Iliev complained. Instead of arranging hearings before Comrades' Courts enterprise managements resorted to administrative moves and measures (e.g., joint sessions of disciplinary commissions, local party and trade union committees, disciplinary sanctions, etc.). Iliev gave concrete examples, indicating that such practices are in sharp conflict with -- if not a downright violation of -- both the Law on Comrades' Courts and Article 77 of the Penal Code.

The inadequate legal training of Comrades' Court members was given by Iliev as one reason for their lack of authority. This leads to even greater confusion with regard to the jurisdiction of the courts, a situation that has plagued them since their establishment (cf. Otechestven Front, 27 January and 14 February 1970; Narodna Mladezh, 20 October 1973; Otechestven Front, 15 November 1973; Zemedelsko Zname, 14 May 1974; Otechestven Front, 4 December 1975; and Rabotnichesko Delo, 6 May 1976). Iliev referred explicitly to the provisions on jurisdiction contained in the law, and ended with a strong admonition that the types of violation that fall within the competence of the Comrades' Courts are theirs alone, and neither the state courts nor other agencies have the right to deal with them. Nor do enterprise managements have the right to impose administrative penalties for such violations. No arguments can justify violation of the Law on Comrades' Courts.

In light of the above, it would appear that the experiment with the Comrades' Courts has proved less than successful. The idea was borrowed from the Soviet Union and implemented without alteration (cf. Rabotnichesko Delo, 31 March 1975). The Comrades' Courts -- which are constantly described as a communist innovation -- are in fact an updated version of the bourgeois "mouths of denunciation" and "mouths of truth" that existed in Venice and France centuries ago (see L.A. Thiers, The History of the French Revolution, 1799-1800, as quoted in C. Brinton, Age of Reason /New York: The Viking Press, 1972/, p. 624). The motive for their establishment was the alarming increase in petty violations of the law. Last year's amendment, in particular, had the further aim of reducing the burden on the regular courts, which had been growing steadily heavier owing to the increase in violations. Iliev's article, however, indicates that the Comrades' Courts have so far been unsuccessful because of their clumsy and time-consuming procedures, the lack of legal training of their members, and their concern with propagandistic as well as purely judicial functions.

2. The Composers' Union Congress and Problems of Bulgarian Music

The Union of Bulgarian Composers (UBC), one of the autonomous "creative unions" encompassed by the National Cultural Complex,

held its first congress on May 10 and 11. Although the union has existed since 1933 it previously held annual report-and-election conferences rather than congresses. The decision to hold a congress this year was obviously made in order to upgrade it and make it equal in status to the other creative unions, despite the fact that it is a very small one (in 1963 its membership was reported to be 107 and, in the absence of more recent data it can be assumed that it has not increased to any extent since then).

The press gave considerable coverage to the congress, as is the general practice with regard to such gatherings. Both Rabotnicheskio Delo (May 11) and Narodna Kultura (May 15) published the text of a message from the BCP CC, which was read by Politburo member and CC Secretary Alexander Lilov. Narodna Kultura also gave the text of a message read by Lyudmila Zhivkova, chairman of the Committee on Art and Culture, and Rabotnicheskio Delo gave a more detailed summary than did the cultural weekly of the report read by UBC Chairman Dimitar Petkov. The statements made by other participants in the congress were summarized very briefly in both papers.

The most striking aspect of both messages was how little they had to say about music in professional, artistic, or technical terms. The CC message referred, rather exaggeratedly, to the "new development" in Bulgarian music after the April 1956 CC plenum, to the "creative activity" of Bulgarian composers, to the "great richness of talent among all generations," and to something it called "the school of Bulgarian composers." In less pretentious terms the CAC message gave a similarly "positive" picture of musical achievements in Bulgaria and also spoke of a "contemporary school of Bulgarian composers." As examples of the "golden fund" of works composed by this "school" it mentioned four major works of serious music and four popular and party songs, most of them written before 1956 and some even before 1944. Indirectly, both messages thus admitted that Bulgarian composers have not produced much to boast about in recent years.

In part this is due to the demands the party and the CAC have made of them. At the recent 11th party congress, speaking of the arts in general, Todor Zhivkov recalled the party's 18-year-old slogan "more among the people, closer to life" (Rabotnicheskio Delo, 30 March 1976). He emphasized the role of literature and the arts in "educating the new man and establishing a socialist way of life," and added that such a role can only be played by a literature and an art that "know and support party policy" and "participate actively and with interest and inspiration in the struggle to build a socialist society and bring about the victory of communism." Both messages to the congress expressed more or less the same ideas, with some variations. In the obligatory brief reference to shortcomings that always follows the laudatory words on such occasions, the CC message said that "despite the results achieved in reflecting the contemporary theme, it has not yet acquired the necessary scope and depth in Bulgarian musical creativity." The CAC message claimed that "a turn toward the contemporary theme" had been emerging in the last few years, but added that "a real turning point in mastering the contemporary theme" must still be reached. It concluded

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by wishing the composers success in "producing new and increasingly beautiful works about the lives of our people, about their glorious revolutionary past -- works that on a large scale and in glowing terms reflect our times, affirm the socialist way of life, and sing about the never-fading Bulgarian-Soviet friendship, and will be weapons in the struggle to achieve the triumph of communism."

According to the CC message, "music in our times . . . is becoming a significant factor in forming a world outlook, an aesthetic culture, and a socialist way of life." In another context it went into some detail about the role of music in the "all-national movement for the aesthetic education" of the populace and the CAC message, too, emphasized "the role of the Union of Bulgarian Composers in drawing up the national program for aesthetic education" (for details on this program see Bulgarian SR/35, RFER, 17 December 1975, Item 1; in it read all references to "cultural" education as "aesthetic" education).

More concrete tasks were given the composers by the demands contained in the two messages; that they should make a greater contribution to the Red Poppy political song festival and write more musical works for children, for use in schools and by pioneers and Komsomol members, and for the use of people engaged in amateur activities.

A slightly more professional approach was taken by UBC Chairman Petkov who was quoted as referring in his report to such things as "stylistic innovation," an "individual idiom" and a "revived interest in folklore" (his mentioned of the latter being somewhat surprising, since Bulgarian composers have always been closely linked with folklore). But he too asserted that Bulgarian composers are "firmly united on the current ideological and aesthetic platform of socialist realism" and are striving "to create a party art." He spoke of ideological content and a "contemporary political and civic theme" in music, and went so far as to claim that the postulate of the 11th BCP Congress with regard to increasing efficiency (in the economy) and improving quality (in production) should also be applied to "the products of art and culture."

As the above quotations clearly show, the party and the CAC consider music one of the many "weapons" to be used in propaganda and "education," rather than an art with specific artistic and technical laws. A composer is not supposed to write music simply for the beauty of its sound or to express his emotions; he must express concrete ideas connected with present-day socialist life or the revolutionary past.

The dangers of such an approach were pointed out in a very cautious but nonetheless outspoken article that appeared a few days after the congress. It was written for Rabotnichesko Delo (May 15) by Professor Alexander Raychev, rector of the Bulgarian State Conservatory, a People's Artist and former secretary of the Union of Bulgarian Composers (1961-1965), who was elected to the new post of first deputy chairman of the union at the congress. The article did not refer to the UBC congress, but its title established a connection with the demands made at the 11th party congress that art and culture be "more among the people, closer

to life." Although he did not ignore the ideological demands made of music, Raychev approached it in a much more professional way. Attributing recent successes to "the mastering of the contemporary theme" and to "the struggle to achieve high artistic and professional mastery," he attacked what he described as "semi-professionalists" -- i.e., those who have talent but do not make the effort to develop it. But there are also untalented artists, said Raychev, and they create "surrogates" that have "high-flown and attractive titles from the socialist dictionary, but are lacking in artistic and professional content." The authors of such works are careerists, he said and "there is no place for them among us." Further on in his article he pointed out that there are people who still think that professional mastery consists of complicated thought constructions. "Recently there have been not a few works in which we hear much noise and banging, much superficial pomposity and false pathos, or quiet, meek, unsubstantial, and torpid combinations of tones." Some people have forgotten that any product of genius is simple and clear, he went on, and added that music must be understandable and accessible, and this is more important than professional mastery or the treatment of contemporary themes.

Neither the UBC congress nor Professor Raychev's article is likely to produce a genuine discussion about music, however. The party and the CAC have specified what they expect of composers, and Raychev warned of the danger of untalented or careerist work, and, by implication, of the risk that the party might applaud poor compositions only because they bear "titles taken from the socialist dictionary." This will probably be all, for the time being.


It should be mentioned here that neither the two messages nor the available summaries of the speeches at the congress nor Raychev's article made specific mention of pop music, about which there has been some discussion recently (see Bulgarian SR/9, RFER, 26 March 1975, Item 2). Raychev said merely that all genres of music should be developed and none should be forgotten. Very little was said about serious music; most of the attention was devoted to political songs and music for children and young people. All this places the work of the Union of Bulgarian Composers (a union that seems to have a good idea of its own importance) on a surprisingly low level.

It should also be noted that both messages, Petkov's report, and Raychev's article strongly emphasized the need for closer co-operation between the Union of Bulgarian Composers and the numerically much larger Union of Musicians, which has more than 8,000 members. The way the issue of this co-operation was treated gives the impression that there may have been plans to merge the two unions, but that the composers succeeded in averting this by pledging to do their best to improve their contacts with those who perform their works. Even if they did manage to preserve their

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organization as one with an elite membership, however, little in the congress proceedings gives ground for hope that first-rate new compositions are in the offing. As long as the composers are compelled to express party policy and deal with contemporary themes in the style of socialist realism, Bulgaria will continue to produce world-famous performers, but no composers of international stature.

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RAD Background Report/120
(World Communist Movement)
24 May 1976

INDEPENDENT PARTIES EMPHASIZE ALLIANCE

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: In recent days the alliance of independent parties which have been resisting attempts to impose a "general line" through the pan-European conference document has been reaffirmed through a series of bilateral meetings involving the French, Italian, Spanish, British, Yugoslav, and Rumanian parties. The resultant joint communiqués have all stressed the interparty principles of autonomy and noninterference. In addition, however, the communiqués signed by Western parties (British-French and Italian-Spanish) have also emphasized commitment to civic liberties within a framework of pluralistic democracy.

* * *

As the European communist parties await what is supposed to be the "final" session of the Editorial Commission charged with drawing up a consensual document for their long-overdue conference, the independent parties have been emphasizing their alliance, and their commitment to such principles as autonomy and noninterference, through a series of bilateral meetings and joint communiqués. Within the past few days such encounters have involved delegations of the French, Italian, Spanish, British, Yugoslav, and Rumanian parties.

The link between these meetings is illustrated by the activities of the Spanish party (PCE). On May 20 Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo ended a round of talks in Belgrade, signed a strongly worded joint communiqué with President Tito, and flew straight on to Bucharest to begin talks with President Ceausescu. As he did so, leaders of the clandestine PCE in Madrid were issuing an equally vigorous communiqué with a visiting delegation of the Italian CP. At the same time British CP Secretary-General Gordon McLennan was ending a visit to Paris by signing with PCF Secretary-General Marchais a statement stressing independence and commitment to pluralistic liberties -- similar to the one that he and Enrico Berlinguer had earlier issued in Rome.

The Tito-Carrillo statement is of particular interest because of its all-but-explicit expression of joint determination to resist efforts to reassert Soviet authority and influence over the parties. True, the criticism of "tendencies to further strengthen bloc structures," and the reference to "new manifestations of anachronistic aspirations to maintain spheres of influence which endanger the independence of certain people" (1) could be applied to the West as well as to the East. But other passages deal with the principles that should govern relations between communist parties and regimes; and here there can be little doubt about the target that Carrillo and Tito have in view.

The most striking passage in the communiqué is the sentence stating that "the two parties declare themselves opposed to attempts to create or revive international leading centers in any form; [they are] against interference in the internal affairs of other parties, against the support of factionalism, and against the condemnation of other parties at international meetings." This denunciation of interference and "the support of factionalism" must

(1) Tanjug, 20 May 1976.

be viewed against the background of Soviet support for Enrique Lister's pro-Soviet Spanish splinter party, (2) and the activity of Yugoslav "Cominformists" at home and in exile. For the PCE and the ICY, fruitful co-operation between communist parties demands "the elimination of dogmatism and outdated concepts, and is incompatible with narrow-mindedness, sectarianism, and reiteration of primacy."

Commitment to Liberties

Bilateral communiqués between independent Western parties, on the other hand, while also upholding autonomy and noninterference, have stressed the specific characteristics of "Eurocommunism," and in particular the commitment to the preservation and extension of bourgeois liberties within a framework of pluralistic, constitutional democracy. Thus, the British-French communiqué published on May 21 in Morning Star and l'Humanité offers an impressive list:

These liberties include liberty of thought and expression, freedom of publication, meeting, demonstration, and organization, freedom of opinion and freedom for cultural and artistic expression, religious freedom, the inviolability of private life, the right to strike and independence for trade unions without control by the state or any political party, and freedom of activity for political parties, including opposition parties. (3)

The "Eurocommunist" commitment to civic liberties, pluralistic democracy, and collaboration with noncommunist forces is also the main feature of the communiqué which a visiting PCI delegation has just signed in Madrid with local leaders of the clandestine PCE. Both parties pledged themselves to work in their respective countries for a socialism which would "respect and develop all political, human, trade union, cultural, and religious freedoms," while taking "the path of full autonomy." (4)

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- (2) When the PCE and the CPSU held "rapprochement" talks in Moscow in October 1974, a major Soviet concession was the joint denunciation of factionalist intervention -- whereby the CPSU implicitly disowned Lister's splinter party.
 - (3) A similar list of civic liberties was given in the earlier communiqué signed by British and Italian party delegations in Rome (l'Unita and Morning Star, 30 April 1976).
 - (4) AFP dispatch from Madrid, 21 May 1976.

The emphasis on bourgeois liberties brings out the extent to which these independent Western communist parties are now united by common strategic interests — so much so that Enrico Berlinguer is to take time off from a crucially important election campaign in early June to visit Paris and issue a joint communiqué with Georges Marchais. Their alliance with the independent Yugoslav and Rumanian regimes is of a different character, being based primarily upon common resistance to Soviet authority. But that is a strong bond, and evidently becoming stronger.

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- RAD Background Report/118 (World Communist Movement) 21 May 1976



ITALY'S BIG TWO: PCI VS. DC

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: Postwar Italian political life has been marked by a tendency toward polarization which has left two parties dominating the scene in different ways -- the Christian Democrats as the governing party and the PCI as the opposition party. In recent years, however, the hegemony of the DC has been shaken by various developments, notably the weakening or disaffection of Catholic organizations, internal disunity, and inability to master Italy's grave socioeconomic crisis. At the same time the PCI, having come within a few percentage points of the DC's poll in last year's local elections, is pressing its demand for participation in a government of "historic compromise."

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The power relationship between the DC and the leftist opposition has found expression in a political system in which the DC is by definition the governing party and the PCI is by definition the party of opposition (but one which can never become a governing party).

-- Giorgio Galli (1)

Politically, postwar Italy has manifested a curious combination of stability and instability, depending upon one's viewpoint. In the first 30 years of the Republic, up to mid-1975, there were 34 governments and 33 crises. On the other hand, the Italian electorate has shown a remarkable stability in its voting habits (at least until very recently). This applied particularly to the Christian Democratic Party (DC), which has headed every postwar government, either alone or, more usually, together with coalition partners. Apart from the special case of the 1948 "Cold War crusade" election, when it got a record 48 per cent, the DC has consistently got close to two fifths of the total vote, with a variation of only a few percentage points. Take for example the last three national elections. In 1963 the DC got 38.3 per cent; in 1968 the proportion rose slightly to 39.1 per cent; in 1972 it dropped fractionally to 38.8 per cent.

What are the reasons for this remarkable electoral stability during a crisis-shadowed decade? They are to be sought, it seems, in the special role that the Democrazia Cristiana has played in postwar Italy -- and also in the special role played by its great adversary, the PCI. Indeed, postwar Italian history must be viewed largely in terms of the interaction between these two political-cultural forces, one hegemonic on the center-right, the other increasingly hegemonic on the left. Discussing this tendency toward political polarization, the authors of one perceptive study put it boldly: "It might even be said that the Christian Democrats and the Communists alone act out the drama of Italian politics, that through their interaction Italy's apparent multi-party system functions somewhat as a two-party system." (2)

(1) Dal bipartitismo imperfetto alla possibile alternative (Bologna, 1975), p. 45.

(2) Giorgio Galli and Alfonso Grandi, Patterns of Political Participation in Italy (London, 1970), p. 72.

Two Cultures

An important point is that the DC and the PCI, in their different ways, are both heirs to adversary subcultures -- the Catholic and the secular (or anticlerical) -- which have had deep roots in Italian reality since the days of Garibaldi and the risorgimento. There is one important difference, however. The massive support which the DC formerly received from the Catholic subculture has been declining in recent years, for reasons to be examined later. At the same time the PCI's influence over the secular or leftist subculture has been increasing steadily: whereas it commanded a minority of the leftist electorate 30 years ago, it is now by far the strongest force on that wing of the political spectrum.

It was the open support of the Catholic Church and its ancillary organizations that gave the DC its dominant position in postwar Italian politics. For many years organizations such as Catholic Action (which at its peak had more than 3,000,000 members between its adult and youth branches), the ACLI (Catholic workers' movement), the CISL labor federation, and various professional or sectional Catholic movements provided an invaluable reservoir of voters, militants, and officials for the DC. (3) Moreover, until the pontificate of Pope John XXIII, who did much to diminish the Church's involvement in politics, bishops and priests regularly intervened in political life with denunciations of "atheistic communism" and all but explicit appeals to the faithful to vote for the Christian Democrats. Pius XII's 1949 decree excommunicating Catholics who belong to or support communist parties -- not yet rescinded -- was the symbol of that commitment; but the slow, steady rise in the communist vote over three decades indicated that it was one of waning efficacy.

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- (3) Thus, after the 1958 elections 145 of the DC's 278 deputies and 58 of its 120 senators were members of Catholic Action. For an interesting leftist view of former and present relationships between the DC and various Catholic (which no longer necessarily means "Church") organizations, see Sandro Magister, "Generale Montini, quante divisioni ha?", L'Espresso, 9 May 1976.

Pillars of Hegemony

While the support of the Church and its organizations was of decisive importance, other factors combined with it to give the DC a predominant position in Italian political life. One of these was the system of patronage (clientelismo), by which Christian Democratic control of key positions in the bureaucracy, local government, and nationalized industries enabled the party to command votes through the allocation of jobs and favors of various kinds. (It must be added, however, that in this as in other areas present strength contained the germ of ultimate decline, because of the gap between principle and practice. Not only did power beget power, but power so attained tended inevitably to corrupt, given the peculiarities of the Italian system.) (4) Another strength was that the DC was an interclass party, drawing its support not only from industrialists and the middle classes but also from workers and farmers. In addition, no other party had anything like the same support from women: one study concluded that women accounted for more than 60 per cent of the DC vote.

This enduring predominance of one party, and the fact that its principal rival was consigned to what seemed like perpetual opposition for "ideological" reasons, made Italy a special case among the West European democracies. The Italian political scientist Giorgio Galli has described this deviant model as an

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- (4) This tendency was reinforced by the fact that control of the central government also gave the DC control over the supervision of local government, through the prefectural system. In the early 1960s an American observer wrote: "The detailed supervision of local government activities [by prefectural commissions] might lead one to the conclusion that local government in Italy was a model of efficiency and rectitude. Nothing could be further from the truth. A continuous succession of scandals is thrust upon any newspaper reader. For prefectural controls are exerted in a partisan fashion, severely against the communes and provinces administered by left-wing opposition parties, laxly against progovernment and rightwing local governments. The result is that the left-wing communes are the best governed in Italy, and few have been involved in scandals" (Norman Kogan, The Government of Italy [New York, 1962], pp. 156-157).

"imperfect two-party system" (bipartitismo imperfetto) -- imperfect because it seemed in practice, at least until recently, to rule out the possibility of alternance, or the passage of a dominant ruling party to opposition and vice versa. (5) But in a more recent work (1975) Signor Galli has had second thoughts, and develops the argument that "over three decades Italian society, through the behavior -- including the antagonistic relationships -- of its various components, has been reducing the deviations from the West European model of representative democracy," (6) so that he now sees the emergence of a "possible alternative."

For half of the postwar period the DC headed a series of centrist or center-right coalitions, or else formed one-party minority governments depending on votes or abstentions from other parties. This governmental instability (7) and the "immobilism" resulting from policy differences between the half dozen or more DC factions helped to explain the persistent failure of the Christian Democrats to implement promised and obviously badly needed reforms in such areas as taxation, social services, education, and housing.

Center-Left Hopes

The collapse of the DC-MSI (neofascist) government of Premier Tambroni in the summer of 1960, partly due to communist-led riots, signaled a gradual shift toward variations of the center-left formula (which proved to be no more stable than the centrist variety). But the important factor here was the step-by-step movement of Pietro Nenni's Socialist Party (PSI) away from the PCI and toward social democratic positions -- especially after the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian national uprising

(5) See G. Galli, Il bipartitismo imperfetto: Comunisti e democristiani in Italia (Bologna, 1966).

(6) Galli, Dal bipartitismo . . . p. 24

(7) In 1953 a four-party centrist coalition (DC, Social Democratic, Liberal, and Republican) tried to overcome this instability by passing what the Communists termed a "swindle law" (legge truffa) by which a coalition that got 50 per cent of the votes would get two thirds of the seats. In the June 1953 elections the four-party coalition failed by a few thousand votes to reach the required 50 per cent plus one, and in 1954 the law was repealed.

(November 1956), which the Communists approved without much enthusiasm, while the Socialists condemned it. Despite the warnings of alarmed bishops, DC-PSI administrations were formed in some centers after the local elections of November 1960; by 1962 the PSI had pledged itself not to vote against the government; by the end of 1963 the "opening to the left" had become a full-fledged center-left alliance, with the start of five years of four-party coalitions (DC-Socialist-Social Democratic-Republican) under Premier Aldo Moro.

It was a period when allies looked to Italy with new hope. The "economic miracle," although flagging somewhat, was still going on. The PSI and the social democratic PSDI were moving toward (temporary) reunification, achieved in 1966. Despite the formation in early 1964 of the left-socialist splinter party of "proletarian unity" (PSIUP), the PCI seemed to be largely isolated. But the central question was whether the center-left parties could work together with sufficient harmony and vigor to overcome Italy's systematic weaknesses and implement the reforms they were promising.

By and large they failed to do so -- partly due to their own endemic disunity and the resistance of sectional interests, but also thanks to national tendencies and circumstances that were largely beyond their control. For the years of center-left hopes and promises were also years when deep-rooted weaknesses both in Italian society and in the structure of Christian Democratic power began to come to light.

The conspicuous decline in the support that the DC received from Catholic organizations, which became obvious in the late 1960s, was linked with a much wider crisis of the institutional Church (or Churches), not confined to Italy. The reforms of Vatican II made their faith more meaningful for some Catholics; but for others it meant that the old certainties were fading, the old props were crumbling. In Italy this process was accentuated by the growth of a socially committed leftist Catholicism, which had always been a minority component in the DC but now found increasing expression in

action against the party, often in alliance with the Communists. (8) Thus, among the Catholic organizations there was a tendency either to suffer a drastic decline in strength (like Catholic Action) or to discard the links with the DC, and even turn against it. In 1969 the Catholic workers' movement, ACLI, broke the bond with the DC, adopted a leftist program, and (in its majority) is now anti-DC. Similarly, the Catholic labor federation, CISL, began to cut the umbilical links with the party in the late 1960s, and has been increasingly involved in unitary action with the communist-dominated CIGL and the social democratic UIL. Even the employers' organization, Confindustria, is now hedging its bets, because of of concern over the intractable economic crisis.

This latter is another factor of prime importance. By 1969 (Italy's "hot autumn") the "economic miracle" was over; but the energy crisis of late 1973 plunged the country into a deeper and still enduring phase of socioeconomic decline, marked by high inflation rates, rising unemployment, trade and monetary deficits, the flight of capital, a "wage-demand jungle" [giungla retributiva] characterized by wildcat strikes, the inability of the productive sectors to "carry" the parasitic bureaucracy and other unproductive sectors and, not least, the lack of decisive and imaginative government.

"Historic Compromise" Strategy

In this climate of socioeconomic deterioration, punctuated by acts of right- and left-wing terrorism, the communist argument became more insistent: "Our contribution to a national renewal must be accepted, if the crisis is to be overcome." Berlinguer

- (8) In the early postwar years the DC Left was led by Giuseppe Dossetti, who was outmaneuvered by De Gasperi and eventually retired from politics to become a priest; at present the party has two left-wing factions. During the 1960s the movement was marked by the growth of "spontaneous groups," often engaging in "dialogue" with the Communists; see Mario Gozzini (ed.), Il Dialogo alla prova (Florence, 1964), and, for an interesting communist survey of the phenomenon in the late 1960s, Aldo d'Alfonso, I cattolici e il dissenso (Rome, 1969). In recent years one notes the spread of "base communities" or unofficial parishes (by mid-1975 there were some 300 of them) and the formation of explicitly political movements like "Christians for Socialism," which is firmly backing the PCI in this election campaign.

told the 13th PCI Congress in March 1972: "In a country like Italy a new perspective can be opened up only through collaboration between the great popular currents: communist, socialist, Catholic. For this collaboration the unity of leftist forces is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. . . . We are disposed to assume our responsibilities." (9)

A year and a half later, in his now famous Rinascita articles (10) on "Italy after the Chilean events," Berlinguer went further by calling for a "historic compromise between the forces that rally and represent the great majority of the Italian people":

[It] would be completely illusory to think that, even if the parties . . . of the Left managed to gain 51 per cent of the votes and of the parliamentary representation . . . this fact would guarantee the survival . . . of a government representing that 51 per cent. This is why we speak not of a "leftist alternative," but rather of a "democratic alternative" -- that is, the political perspective of a collaboration and an understanding of the popular forces of a communist and socialist inspiration with the popular forces of a Catholic inspiration, and also with formations that have some other democratic orientation.

Predictably, this proposal was vigorously rejected by the DC. But "the communist question" had already become, and has remained, the central issue in Italian politics. In this respect the referendum on divorce in May 1974 was a turning point. In line with its basic policy of avoiding a head-on conflict with "Catholic Italy," while constantly seeking to extend its own influence at the expense of the DC, the PCI did its utmost to avert the referendum by seeking Christian Democratic agreement to

(9) E. Berlinguer, La 'questione comunista', Vol. 1, (Rome, 1975), p. 415. Berlinguer went on to stress, however, that the PCI was not unconditionally bent upon getting a share of governmental power: there would first have to be changes in the attitudes of potential coalition partners, particularly the DC, to permit the formation of a "new majority" credibly committed to radical reform.

(10) Rinascita, 28 September, 5 October, and 12 October 1973. The quotation which follows is from the concluding article.

to an amended version of the divorce law. A majority of the DC leadership decided instead to commit the party to a struggle for the abrogation of the law, in which its only ally would be the neofascist MSI (plus the Church establishment). (11) It was an epoch-ending miscalculation. Italy voted to maintain divorce by a landslide margin of three to two. In every part of the country a pivotal section of the DC electorate had swung against the party. A month later the Sardinian elections, in which the DC lost 6.3 per cent while the PCI gained 7.1 per cent, indicated that the electoral earthquake produced by the divorce struggle was also affecting conventional politics; and the nationwide local elections of June 1975 confirmed the tendency.

As Italy settled deeper into enduring crisis, the question was (and still is) whether a faction-ridden, demoralized DC leadership could respond to the challenge of change. Another important question was whether the postwar polarization would persist through the decline of Christian Democratic hegemony. Or would the changed circumstances give new life and a new role to one or more of the smaller parties? The next paper in this series will deal largely with the most important of these minor parties, the PSI.


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(11) DC Secretary Fanfani would have recognized the disruptive effect that the referendum struggle would have upon the center-left coalition (particularly with regard to the Socialists, who introduced the divorce law). But he evidently hoped that the outcome would reaffirm the party's traditional influence over broad sectors of Italian life. Instead, the result was a further weakening of that influence.

RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe. 20



- RAD Background Report/117
(Czechoslovakia)
20 May 1976

THE WARSAW PACT -- "A FORCE OF A NEW QUALITY"

(A translation with comment by the Czechoslovak Unit)

Summary and Introduction; On the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact Deputy Minister of National Defense Bohuslav Kucera, writing in the Central Council of Trade Unions daily Prace (13 May 1976), praised the Pact, which he described as one of the guarantors of both Czechoslovakia's security and that of the entire socialist world system. He echoed, though in more moderate terms, what has been said on the role of the Warsaw Pact by other communist military leaders -- e.g., East German Minister of Defense Heinz Hoffmann, who said in a lecture at the SED Party College on 1 December 1975 that even a nuclear war could be "a just war for us," and the late chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet General Sergei Shtemenko, who indicated in an article published posthumously that the prime purpose of the Soviet bloc's forces was to suppress counterrevolution in communist countries. (Hoffmann's lecture was published in the March 1976 issue of Einheit [East Berlin]; Shtemenko's article was referred to in a Reuter dispatch from Moscow of 7 May 1976.) For comment on the subject see "Differences About Warsaw Pact Aims" (by Victor Meier in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 May 1976) and "A Speech Alarms East and West" (by Christian Potyka in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 19 May 1976). Kucera's article in Prace is entitled "The Warsaw Pact -- A Fraternal Alliance in Arms." Full translation follows.

* * *

Twenty-one years ago in the capital of the Polish People's Republic, Warsaw, fraternal socialist states signed an Agreement on Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance which has entered history under the designation "Warsaw Pact." A complicated international development in the world and in Europe, characterized by growing aggressiveness on the part of imperialism and a direct threat to the security of the socialist countries and world peace, preceded the conclusion of this treaty.

In answer to the aggressive policies of the imperialistic states and to their military measures, particularly the forming of the aggressive NATO bloc, the European socialist states joined their political and military potential in

order to increase the effectiveness of their defense effort, to combine it with the co-ordinated effort represented by their peace policies, and thus to safeguard the work of construction being done by the people of their countries and to ensure peaceful development in the world.

Thanks to the forming of the Warsaw Pact a force of new quality came into being in international political and military-political relations, a force that decisively influences the resolving of all fundamental questions in international developments and one that guarantees the security of world socialism and provides firm support for all nations and states that are struggling for national liberation, for freedom and independence.

Thus the Warsaw Pact became the embodiment of all progressive ideas in the sphere of international relations and the practical implementation of Leninist ideas on peaceful coexistence among states with differing social systems. These principles were reaffirmed and underscored at the 25th CPSU Congress and are being consistently applied in the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries.

The Marxist-Leninist parties and the governments of the socialist countries give constant attention to the task of consolidating and perfecting the political and military agencies of the Warsaw Pact. The integrated and co-ordinated action of the sovereign member states, which enjoy equal rights based on the powerful political, economic, and military potential of the Soviet Union, augments the strength of each of these states and of their armed forces and constitutes a united power of great strength capable of defending the revolutionary achievements of socialism, progress, and peace in the whole world.

The forming of the Warsaw Pact represented a historical milestone in the development of international socialist relations as well as in the history of the armies of the socialist states. For the first time in history a socialist political and military coalition came into being that represented practical fulfillment of the Leninist doctrine on unity in building and defending socialism on an international scale. Its foundations are the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the unity of interests, goals, and will of the participating socialist states, the unity between their national interests and the interests of socialist internationalism.

The allied armed forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact operate on a high level of moral and political steadfastness, military-specialist preparedness, and technical equipment. The main force of this alliance of fraternal armies is the Soviet Army, which disposes of the most modern technical equipment and the most experienced cadres.

The Czechoslovak People's Army, under the direct control of the CPCS, is a reliable component of the fraternal allied armies. It is fully capable of defending its socialist homeland and discharging the international duties arising from the CSSR's membership in the Warsaw Pact. In both its political and its combat training it draws on the rich experience of the Soviet Union, utilizes the knowledge gained by the other socialist armies, and contributes through its activity to the strengthening of fraternal ties.

The class international alliance between the CSSR and the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist states within the Comecon framework is a firm guarantee of the security of our socialist homeland. This alliance has its own traditions and is affirmed by the past and present experiences of our nations.

"The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is a firm member of the coalition of Warsaw Pact states. The endeavor to strengthen the alliance, co-operation, and friendship with the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries is the corner stone of our entire foreign political activity," CPCS CC General Secretary and President of the CSSR Gustav Husak declared at the 15th CPCS Congress, "and the combat links between the Marxist-Leninist parties of these countries are the heart of the unity and co-operation among the states of the socialist community associated in the framework of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism."

The efforts to buttress the links of the socialist countries in the political, economic, and military spheres are foremost among the interests of our people. This is an obligation which we remember when we celebrate the 31st anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army and on the occasion of the 21st anniversary of the founding of the Warsaw Pact. (076)

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- RAD Background Report/117
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
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RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*



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● CZECHOSLOVAKIA/20
19 May 1976

S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T



1. Slovak Students and the Plan
2. The Literary Scene Since the Party Congress
3. The Jewish Community -- An Assembly of Pensioners

1. Slovak Students and the Plan

The Slovak CP daily Pravda (Bratislava, 4 May 1976) has published figures on the applicants for admission to Slovak institutes of higher learning in the 1976-1977 term. They complement information released earlier for the Czech Lands, and thus allow an over-all assessment (see Czechoslovak Situation Report/18, Radio Free Europe Research, 5 May 1976, Item 2).

There is a similarity between Slovakia and the Czech Lands both with regard to a greater supply than demand of students, and to the preference for the various fields of study. Nearly 20,000 high school graduates will be competing for admission to Slovak universities and technical colleges this year (500 more than in 1975-1976), which can accommodate 11,000 new students. The paper commended the fact that there is a greater balance this year between the number of applicants for humanitarian and technical disciplines than in the past. Nonetheless, some fields, such as medicine, law, and the arts remain overcrowded.

Some concrete data corroborate the newspaper's claim. A rough calculation of published figures reveals that there are over twice as many vacancies in the technical fields as there are in the humanities, i.e., about 7,500 versus 3,500. The difference between the number of applicants for these two branches is, however, much smaller, i.e., some 11,000 against 9,000. This means that there are about 1.5 applicants for every vacancy in the technical disciplines, as compared with 2.6 applicants for every vacancy in the humanities. Out of proportion and "highly unrealistic," as the paper stated, is the situation in the Law Colleges in Bratislava

(817 applicants for 170 vacancies) and Kosice (449 applicants for 150 vacancies), as well as in the Colleges of Medicine in Bratislava (914 to 290), Martin (413 to 120), and Kosice (676 to 230), and the Bratislava art academies, where 613 students will compete for 85 vacancies.

Under these circumstances, a fair amount of jockeying for position is to be expected, with family and other ties utilized to a high degree. Perhaps in anticipation of such a development, Pravda emphasized that "knowledge" would be the "basic criterion" in the admission examinations at the end of June. The emphasis on "knowledge" has been somewhat watered down, however, since the paper equated it with a "complex evaluation" of the student which is a much broader term that includes political, social, and class aspects of his background as well.

The standard of these "complex evaluations" has improved, according to the daily. This must have occurred quite recently, since, early this year, there were still complaints being heard that these documents were "not as complex" as required. Cited on this occasion were instances which, it was asserted, were not isolated: "Since Student X scored poorly in all other disciplines, he may only be recommended for the study of physical culture," wrote a school principal. Another proposed that one of his students be accepted by the Physical Culture Faculty in Bratislava on the ground of being an "excellent soccer player" (Lud, 7 January 1976).

There are apparently students who do not shun doctoring their records in an effort to gain admission to a university or technical college. As the above paper noted, such cases range from upgrading marks to "suppressing information about relatives abroad or in jail." As the daily asserts, the work of the admission boards is "not an easy one."

The relatively low state-wide interest in the study of the technical sciences was also the subject of a recent round-table discussion in which prominent representatives of the state administration and academic institutions participated (Czechoslovak Television, 6 May 1976). The discrepancy between interest in the humanities and the technical disciplines was demonstrated on the basis of concrete figures [they apparently pertain to the 1975-1976 term, since examinations for the 1976-1977 year only begin at the end of June]. Whereas there had been six times as many applications as could be accepted at the art academies, and nearly three times as many of those interested in studying the social sciences and pedagogy than there was room, engineering colleges got only 70 per cent of the applicants they could accept, metallurgy only 31 per cent, and mining only 30 per cent (i.e., applicants who selected these fields as their first choice).

Probing into the causes, the panel came to the conclusion that the problem lay with the high schools, where mathematics and physics are among the most unpopular subjects on the curriculum. The present structure is reportedly unsatisfactory "in this respect,"

but the panel did not produce any suggestions on how to improve the situation.

The "overttechnicalization" of studies at the technical colleges was also criticized. Students are reportedly overburdened and there has been a high percentage of dropouts. Anton Blazej, rector of the Bratislava Slovak Technical College, argued that technical fields as they stand at present do not lend themselves to the furthering of a harmonious development of the student's personality, and pleaded for a "humanization" of the technical disciplines. This would involve familiarization with basic questions of psychology, sociology, pedagogy, and aesthetics, subjects which would mobilize not only the intellect, but also emotions, thus helping the student to achieve an "intimate relationship" with his future profession. In this way, according to Blazej, students in the technical fields, too, could develop their personalities and achieve "self-realization," an important reason why many individuals choose to study the arts.

The third complaint disclosed by the panel was the alleged low social prestige of the technical intelligentsia. Rector Blazej traced this phenomenon to the fact that the role played by the technical sciences in an era of scientific-technical revolution is still not sufficiently appreciated. Youth tends to see the negative aspects of technological development, i.e., danger to the environment and health, rather than its positive achievements, and tends to dream of a "return to nature, to romanticism." Moreover, a young man of today aspires to excel as an individual. The actor, writer, singer, or athlete is his ideal, not a technician, because the latter's work calls for teamwork, for collective effort.

Future earnings also play a part. The discussion hinted that the starting salaries of technicians are rather low and not very dynamic. A graduate engineer begins with 1,700 Kcs (\$293) per month, and can rise to 3,000 Kcs (\$517) within three years. The pertinent question of whether physicians are better off in this respect was left unanswered. The fact is that the starting salary of a doctor of medicine is exactly the same as that of a graduate engineer, i.e., 1,700 Kcs per month. The ceiling is higher, however; 5,000 Kcs (\$862). In addition, a "personal allowance" of up to 20 per cent of the basic salary may be paid in order to increase initiative and improve the quality of the service rendered. In special cases, a so-called personal salary, consisting of a bonus of up to 50 per cent of the basic salary, may be paid. Finally, a monthly supplement of 200 to 700 Kcs (\$ 34 to 120) can be given if a health service employee must perform extra duties in addition to his regular assignment (see Praca, 14 July 1971).

This discussion has once again demonstrated the state's deep concern over the country's inadequate supply of technical intelligentsia. Recent reforms of the educational system, including the polytechnicalization of high schools and the upgrading of apprentice training to a high school level, are designed to bring about an improvement. The task is rather demanding, however, and calls for a good deal of tact and understanding.

2. The Literary Scene Since the Party Congress

The literary and artistic scene has been given a new look since last month's 15th CPCS Congress. The comprehensive Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic Between 1976 and 1980 contain only a single paragraph pertaining to culture. They state that, in harmony with the demanding requirements of constructing socialist society, it is necessary to ensure that the cultural level of the working people constantly grows, and to enhance the role of culture and the arts in molding socialist man. A comprehensive development of culture is needed, so that the relation of the people toward socialism is strengthened and their sense of beauty fostered. It is necessary to give solid support to the arts, a support arising from the Leninist principles of partiinost, popularity, and the creative method of socialist realism (Rude Pravo, 21 April 1976 --- Supplement).

The core of this appeal is the postulate that the Leninist method and that of socialist realism be applied in the arts. This premise was also expressed by some writers who have spoken about their postcongress obligations. The prose writer Rudolf Kalcik, for instance, declared that the task for writers emerging from the congress report is to try to discover talented new colleagues and to influence their artistic and political growth, adding that it is necessary to see to it that the work of these new writers develops in such way as to benefit socialist society. Kalcik also describes the intensified co-operation between the Czech and Slovak cultural worlds in many new sectors as a positive factor: "We need a successful growth of good relations, because ours is a common task -- to create socialist culture. And the congress report is a great inspiration for that." In a post-congress statement, Slovak writer Lubomir Feldek expressed his full satisfaction with the speech delivered by Slovak Minister of Culture Miroslav Valek at the congress, emphasizing that the Guidelines' stipulation calling for more exacting effort and a more critical approach as well as for combining socialist commitment with high quality was correct.

Film director Jiri Menzel, several of whose motion pictures attracted attention in the latter half of the 1960s, made an interesting comment. He said that two things surprised him. The first was when he saw the Soviet film premie /The Bonus/ and realized how sincere its creators were in portraying genuine and unostentatious commitment. The second was the poor attendance at the showing; he counted only eight spectators in the theater, he said. In his contribution, Menzel asks whether people are remote from the problems of our times or simply numbed by the glut of serials wrapped in an engage cloak, cowboy stories disguised as spy thrillers, a surfeit of works with a pretense of commitment. The 15th congress demanded quality: "I think the ability to recognize the insincerity of incompetents is also, in part, proof of quality" (for the contributions summarized above, see Tvorba No.19, 5 May 1976).

Quite a number of writers and artists have expressed their thanks to the party. Katerina Lajciakova, for instance, emphasized that there was perhaps not a single poet in socialist literature who did not express his gratitude and thanks to the party, at least symbolically.

The founding of a new Czech theater and film fortnightly, Scena, which appeared on the news stands at the end of April, is one positive and practical result of the postulates stated in the Guidelines. The Union of Czech Dramatic Artists is the publisher of the periodical, which is reported to appear in an eight-page edition in two colors, printed on high quality stock. The editors promised that it would devote its attention to all dramatic genres and to questions of the theater, motion pictures, television, and radio. Scena is designed to cater to the broadest possible readership, rather than serving as a mere trade paper. It is reported to have become "another valid instrument for implementing the cultural-political conclusions of the 15th congress" (Tvorba No.18, 28 April 1976).

It will be difficult for the eight-page Scena to fill the gap caused by the banning of the excellent monthly Divadlo. In February 1970, the important Divadelni Noviny, a publication that endeavored to preserve the tradition of Literarni Listy, was also closed down. The mass-circulation Filmove a Televizni Noviny was also discontinued as long ago as 1969. Although Scena must be welcomed as a positive development on the cultural scene, it cannot, by itself, make up for these three important periodicals.

The fortnightly Film a Divadlo that, like Scena, is devoted to the theater, films, and television, illustrates the specific character of the Slovak cultural scene. It is a 36-page periodical printed in several colors, and has been continuously published for the last 20 years.

In honor of the 15th party congress, President of the Republic Gustav Husak conferred the title of National Artist upon eight outstanding Czech and Slovak artists, in accordance with a recommendation made by the CPCS CC and the two national governments. The recipients are artists from the spheres of motion pictures, theater, the fine arts, and music. None comes from the literary sphere. General of the new National Artists are outstanding personalities who have always remained outside the party (the painter Professor Cyril Bouda is one of them).

The title of Meritorious Artist is conferred by the ministers of culture. Czech Minister of Culture Milan Klusak, in the presence of the head of the CPCS CC Department of Culture, Miroslav Mueller, conferred this title upon 25 persons active in Czech culture. Again most of those honored are from the sphere of the performing arts. Only three writers were given this award. One of them, novelist Frantisek Kozik (born 1909), was a signatory of the 1972 petition addressed to President Ludvik Svoboda asking for an amnesty for sentenced liberals. However, he dissociated himself from this petition soon afterward. Since then, re-editions of his older

biographical novels have appeared regularly. Some of his more important works, such as Největší z Pierrotů [The Greatest of the Pierrots] about the famous pantomimist Debureau, have been translated into several languages. The other two new literary people honored are the older generation poet Jarmila Urbanková and the prose writer of the middle generation Věra Stýblová.

The enrollment of six new members is another step in the normalization of the Union of Czech Writers: Vladimír Paral, Vladimír Michal, Vladimír Brandejs, Vlastimil Milota, František Stavinoha, and Jindřich Uher (Radio Prague, 6 May 1976). While Vladimír Paral is an able novelist also known in the West, the other new members of the Union of Czech Writers are largely unknown; their names do not appear in any literary handbook or biographical dictionary.

To complete the picture of the current literary scene, it must be mentioned that, after the successes which the Slovak Writers' Union has achieved with neophyte authors, discussions with budding authors and young artists in general now regularly also appear in the Czech press (Tvorba No.19, 5 May 1976 -- Special Supplement). Starting from the beginning of this year, the union's official publication, Literární Měsíčník, has put out a regular supplement, Dílno, which is devoted to young and beginning authors. In the editorials of the various issues of this supplement, more experienced authors convey their knowledge and give advice to beginners. In this way, the literary scene has assumed a somewhat new look. It is, however, too soon to make an assessment of its contribution. (066)

3. The Jewish Community -- An Assembly of Pensioners

As is the case with other religious organizations, the Czechoslovak authorities maintain silence about the social structure of the Jewish community in the country. An attempt at a demographic assessment of Czechoslovak Jewry was made recently in the West, however, on the basis of a study of last year's issues of the monthly Vestník Židovských Náboženských Obcí v Československu (Bulletin of the Jewish Religious Communities in Czechoslovakia), the official publication of Czechoslovak Jews (see the London-based ICJC Newsletter, May 1976, pp. 5-6).

The social columns of last year's Vestník listed 321 Jews by age. This is not such a negligible or unrepresentative sample as it might seem at first glance, since the entire Jewish religious community in Czechoslovakia, which numbered over 360,000 persons in prewar times, is now assessed by qualified Western observers at some 5,000 individuals, 1,200 of them in Prague. The Prague Jewish leaders estimate the over-all strength somewhat higher, at about 7,000 persons. Thus, the size of the sample, depending on the base chosen, represents something between 4.6 and 6.4 per cent of all religious Jews currently living in Czechoslovakia.

A caveat is in order here. It should be stressed that there are twice as many, or even more, persons of Jewish origin, full

or partial, in the country. This circumstance, however, in no way improves the prospects of the Jewish religious community, to which the overwhelming majority of these individuals does not belong.

The recurring regime attacks against "Zionism" in general, and any kind of Jewish self-assertion in Czechoslovakia in particular, could suggest to the uninitiated that there is a active Jewish community in the CSSR which could, in some way, endanger official policy. The opposite is the case, however. Actual evidence, as well as the data published in Vestnik, disclose that the regime is practicing something akin to anti-Semitism without Jews. According to the sample available, scarcely 5 per cent of the Jewish religious community falls into the productive age (up to 59 years of age), while 95 per cent of the Jews listed range between the ages of 60 and 102. Obviously, the Nazi policy of physical extermination, postwar emigration and exile, repressive policies, the lack of religious or Jewish national feeling of those few remaining in Czechoslovakia, and the resulting assimilation have all taken their toll (for the wartime annihilation and postwar emigration waves of Czechoslovak Jews, see Czechoslovak SR/35, RFER, 3 September 1975, Item 1).

The normal retiring age for men in Czechoslovakia is 60; for women it is between 54 and 57, depending on the number of children involved. Specific preconditions, such as time spent in Nazi concentration camps, or service in the Czechoslovak armed forces abroad in wartime, lower the retirement age. Since quite a number of the Czechoslovak Jews fall into one of the above-mentioned categories, one may safely assume that some 97 or 98 per cent of those listed in the 1975 issues of Vestnik are drawing old-age pensions.

A scrutiny of the Vestnik data published in the May 1976 issue of the ICJC Newsletter provides evidence of 33 Jewish communities, synagogues, or choirs in Czechoslovakia, two thirds of them in the Czech Lands and one third in Slovakia. Apart from those, Jews were found to be living in 52 other localities where there was no evidence of any organized Jewish life. While Vestnik noted one birth in a Jewish family in 1974, no such event was recorded in the monthly last year.

The age structure of the Prague Jews appears to be particularly one-sided. In the capital, where Jews had lived for more than 1,000 years and had contributed more than their share to its flowering, only six of the 62 Jews listed in Vestnik were under 70 years of age. As for the rest of the sample, 61 per cent were between 70 and 79, and 29 per cent were 80 and over. Incidentally, the six youngest ones in the sample all died last year.


It should be kept in mind that, although the sample derived from Vestnik is fairly large percentagewise, it necessarily over-represents the oldest age groups. The main reason for this rests in the circumstance that the social column is partly devoted

19 May 1976

to registering birthdays, naturally predominantly those of the older generation. Yet even this selection, the only accessible one in the circumstances, does give at least an inkling of the age structure of the Jewish religious community.

The sample is entirely unrepresentative of the group of persons of Jewish origin. There, the age composition may be assumed to be very close to that of other segments of the Czechoslovak population. (067)

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This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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- RAD Background Report/113 (Czechoslovakia) 19 May 1976

THE QUALITY OF LIFE

(A translation with comment by the Czechoslovak Unit)

Summary and Introduction: In an interview with editor Josef Velek published in the Czech Socialist Youth Union CC's weekly Mladý Svet (No.15, 6-12 April 1976), Professor Jaroslav Nykryn, deputy dean of the Prague School of Economics, answers questions about "securities in life." After an introductory discussion about the economic crisis in the West, which questioned whether such a crisis also exists in the CSSR -- a point that Nykryn denies -- the interview turns to the main theme, the quality of life and a comparison of the situation in the CSSR and that in the West. Proceeding from the premise "Let Us Compare the Comparable" (the title of the article), the professor states that a comparison of the standard of living, measured by material criteria alone, would soon lead to absurd conclusions. Since man does not live by bread alone, "the socialist way of life" must be taken into account, and in this respect, "the securities in life" the Czechoslovak citizens enjoy are a factor of major importance. Replying to one of the other questions about price increases, Nykryn points out that in the CSSR the prices of the necessities of life have been and will remain stable and that only those of some nonessentials have been raised (due to higher costs of imported raw materials), while in the West all prices have risen. To preserve this stability, Czechoslovakia, as an exporter of manufactured goods and an importer of fairly costly raw materials, must step up its export drive, he added. Nykryn explains the points he makes in colloquial language, and also uses arguments expounded by classical capitalist economists. A full translation of the interview follows.

* * *

Question: The subject of our conversation is the crisis in the West. It would perhaps be best if we started with the basic question: What actually is a crisis and does it exist in this country, too?

Answer: Everyone can experience some personal crisis; students may feel a pre-examination crisis, the national hockey team has been in a crisis for a long time as far as its power play is concerned. . . . This is not a very witty answer. What you mean is a different kind of crisis, of course, and I merely wanted to indicate that the term crisis has many meanings and many aspects. If

an economic crisis is our concern, I can assure you that this kind of crisis does not exist in this country.

Question: What is the essence of the economic crisis in the West?

Answer: One must not interpret the term "the West" geographically. Japan is certainly located in the East, but is also experiencing a profound economic crisis, which has replaced the earlier, much admired Japanese "economic miracle."

The current economic crisis, just as all previous ones, is caused by the fundamental contradiction between the social character of production and the private ownership form of the distribution of its results; it is an inherent part and expression of a broader crisis, the so-called general crisis of capitalism, which represents the long-term process of the gradual extinction of this arrangement of human society, and which also comprises a social, political, cultural, and moral crisis.

Question: The phenomena of crises are cyclical in character, are they not?

Answer: This is the third crisis cycle since the war and the most serious one of all three which, because of its scope, is beginning to resemble the great economic recession of 1929-1933 that affected practically the whole of the world at that time, with the exception of the USSR. The older ones among us still remember it. At that time, there were nearly 1,000,000 unemployed in this country. But this is an old, well-known story, and one can read about it anywhere. . . .

Question: You have already described how a crisis makes itself felt. What are the main forms, apart from unemployment, in which it becomes apparent?

Answer: Every crisis makes itself felt in a different way. If films are made for profit and not in pursuit of cultural values, a crisis of culture is involved. If the number of recidivists, the sales of drugs, or the crime rate in general are rising, a moral crisis exists. If the socialist leaders in Portugal play into the hands of big landowners and foreign monopolies, a political crisis is involved.

Aside from the increase in the number of unemployed, an economic crisis also makes itself felt in many other ways: a decline in production, rising prices, and hence a higher cost of living, inflation, currency fluctuations -- as well as strikes, protests, and other forms of struggle against capitalism.

Here are a few examples to illustrate this. At the beginning of 1976, there were at least 18,500,000 unemployed in the industrially most advanced capitalist countries (there are 14 of them). This figure is provided by the International Labor Organization in Geneva. There are now 8,000,000 unemployed in the US, of whom 2,000,000 do not receive any kind of unemployment benefits. I am saying this because some people assert that, thanks to such benefits, these unemployed are better off than those who are employed in this country.

I would prefer instead to emphasize another aspect of the problem of unemployment, which cannot be easily pinpointed by a camera or by statistical figures: this is the mental state of those affected [the following three lines are garbled]. Unemployment is not only an economic problem, but also a heavy psychological burden.

Question: This means that we have arrived at the question of security in life. Could we make any comparison with the situation in this country?

Answer: Certainly. It is only necessary to look at things as they really are, to avoid superficiality, and not to be diverted by the special ability of our people to raise details to points of essence in making various comparisons. This means that one must not look for two arguments against us as soon as there is one for us: in this country, one thing is good, but in Austria or in the GFR something else is good; in this country, a worker must work two years to buy an MB [a Skoda car], but in Austria only 10 months, etc. Nor should we fall into the other extreme in our argumentation, that is, to mention one plus point for Austria but two for the CSSR. What I have in mind here are arguments of the following type: if a worker in Austria earns 6,000 schillings on the average, while one in the CSSR earns 2,600 Kcs, the former can buy 375 wieners with rolls for his pay, while our worker can buy 520 of them. The Viennese can buy 18 copies of The Godfather (since the local price of this best seller is 338 schillings), while in this country an inhabitant of Prague can obtain 74 copies of this work. Or, an average citizen of Carinthia can go to the movies 200 times for his pay, while his counterpart in Ceske Budejovice can do so 325 times, etc., etc.

Question: We could quickly arrive at absurdities in making comparisons of this kind. What then can be really compared, so far as security in life is concerned?

Answer: Does anyone in this country reflect about how much a really vital surgical operation costs? In the US and in Austria, certainly yes. Is anyone in this country afraid that, on his return from a vacation, he might find that someone else might have nabbed his job? In Japan yes; therefore, as I could see for myself, many people in that country, which also belongs to the West, do not even take the whole of their relatively short vacations. Try, in this country, to close even a very small factory in the interest of a concentration of production or, maybe, for the purpose of a change-over to a more profitable line of production! At once, all sorts of arguments crop up: what will these people do, where shall they go, how could they change their profession, etc. All this must be taken into consideration. How simple this is, say in England or the US: instead of many aspects to be examined, only one suffices, the profit motive. The small factory is closed and its owner outwardly goes out of business, regardless of anything else. Or is there perhaps a major difference between conditions of life at Duchcov in the north or anywhere in the south of Bohemia? One would only smile about such a question. But in Italy, for instance? While life in Milan can be compared with life in Frankfurt am Main, and life in central Italy perhaps with life in the French countryside, the conditions of life of the Sicilians can only be compared with those of one of the poorest countries in the world, Haiti, where 50 per cent of the children die before reaching the age of five. But both Sicily and Haiti are part of the capitalistic, and nonsocialist, respectively, part of the world.

Let us compare what can be compared, the most basic securities in life.

Question: All right. Thus far, we have been talking about care for health and the right to work. . . .

Answer: Compare some official statistics relating to the former situation in Czechoslovakia or to the world. I know young people who profess to rely on "neutral" UN statistics, so I will use these, too. Did you know that the average age expectancy in this country in 1937, that is in "the good old days," was 57 years? That Alois Jirasek was called "a venerable old man" in his fifties? [Actually, Alois Jirasek was born in 1851 and died in 1930 -- Evaluator's note.]

In 1975, the average age [expectancy] in the CSSR was as much as 70.5 years and someone in his fifties would not exactly brim over with enthusiasm and sympathy if he were to be addressed like Jirasek was.

Or, another and certainly more important element of security in life than one of those commonly talked about in bars over a glass of beer: in this country, men aged 60 and women aged between 53 and 57, depending on the number of children they have brought up, are entitled to retire. Compared to this irrefutable fact are the figures in the most advanced and richest countries in the world: the US, 65 and 62, respectively; England, 65 and 60, respectively, the GFR, 65 for both men and women, and Sweden as much as 67 for both sexes.

In this country, the right to an education -- certainly one of the highest human values and securities in life -- is regarded as a matter of course. Does perhaps anyone have to pay school or college fees in this country?

Question: How would you rate our standard of living compared with that in the West?

Answer: We are digressing from our subject a bit; it does not matter, but I must be brief. The standard of living cannot be measured "via" the national income, meat consumption, the number of cars or television sets alone. Figures and data in this respect are easily obtainable for anyone seriously interested in this. For instance, we cannot claim superiority simply because of the fact that our per capita meat consumption in 1976 is about 78 kg, while the English only eat 70.4 kg and the Austrians 69.8 kg; we're probably indulging ourselves in this consumption and don't worry about our figures. But as far as egg consumption is concerned, we can be satisfied, because it is 292 eggs per year, precisely what the dietitians recommend.

I would instead like to draw your attention to two concepts about which people are often confused, although they are closely connected with each other: the standard of living and the way of life. A crisis affects the standard of living, and, as a result, the way of life as well. We regard the standard of living as the basis for the way of life. The standard of living derives from the state of the production forces and the quantity of the use values which are produced. I disregard here the important question of distribution, that is, the share of this or that class in the values created. However, if we were to identify the standard of living with the way of life, we would actually arrive at something which we frequently and justifiably criticize in the West, at a consumer concept of life. In the US, there are indisputably far more cars, washing machines, television sets, dishwashers, etc., than we have in this country, and these products are of good quality. And one can also find things in which we are "behind" the GFR, Sweden, France, England, etc. Our economic propaganda directly supports such inclinations toward a "consumer" mentality, and this propaganda must be criticized for this.

Question: But we strive to raise our standard of living in a material sense, and our five-year plans are also designed with this purpose in mind.

Answer: Certainly. However, we must not forget to ask a question Leo Tolstoy asked in his day: "All right, you have eaten, but what next?"

Our production forces are not yet sufficiently developed to our satisfaction, whether this applies to the number of color TV sets in the country or the quality of our automobiles. We are neither against television sets nor

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cars, travel, or dishwashing machines. We ought, however, to think more about Tolstoy's "not by bread alone." A socialist way of life does not mean only life under socialism. We must realize that, actually, we are only in a certain phase of the evolution of socialism. On the other hand, we must stop this incessant judging of life and its values by the number of color television sets available. There will be a sufficient number of color TV sets in the foreseeable future. But what next? Will we want to overtake the Americans in consumption in this or that area? If so, we would be impoverishing ourselves to the same degree as the average American has already done so far as the sum total of the other elements composing a way of life is concerned. And this is something other than the standard of living! I do not want to analyze matters sociologically, nor do I know how to do so, but I believe that, in addition to material conditions, liberation from the fetish of products, liberation from the basic uncertainties of life, and finally, liberation from the inability to do something useful with one's spare time are also minimum postulates going to make up a certain way of life.

Question: What precisely do you mean when you talk about "the fetish of products," and what does this liberation signify?

Answer: Briefly: the fetish of products. What do you think, who rules over whom: the Skoda car with an annual mileage of 3,000 km over its owner, or vice versa? Does the use value of this product consist in washing and polishing it? Who is the slave and who the slave driver here?

Secondly: liberation from the uncertainties of life -- and here we are on familiar ground. It is the certainties in life which represent liberation from uncertainties; the right to work; the right to education; the right to undisturbed motherhood; the right to a tranquil close to one's life; the right to spare time. A guaranteed right.

Thirdly: liberation from unwise use of one's spare time. And this must also be turned around: spare time is an exceptionally important part of one's way of life and the style in which it is used characterizes man as the real master of nature. Time is not money, but life. I do not want to seem a dreamer, but only in the way one uses one's spare time (and gaining time is the crux of everything to do with the economy) can man achieve self-realization. And this quite apart from what Karl Marx said long ago, something like the following: at some time in the future, spare time may become the most important productive force in general. Permit me to quote B. Zahorsky [probably the well-known actor at the Czech National Theater -- Trans.]: "Life has not been unkind to me. It gave me the most valuable thing it can give a man. A profession I like, beautiful and useful work which gives a meaning to my existence; the genuine friendship of rare people who have been, and are, my supporters."

Question: Let us revert to the problems of crisis. When prices are rising in the West, this is a sign of crisis. When Kozak-type boots are somewhat dearer in this country than two years ago: is this also a sign of crisis?

Answer: You have asked me a delicate question, but you are quite right in asking it, because people in this country may well ask it too. We always only look critically at the West, but what about things in our own country? Prices are up in this country too. Does this mean we also have a crisis? If I want to travel to the West, I must pay much more than the official rate of exchange for foreign currency. Is this, or is this not, a sign of a currency crisis? And so on and forth.

Of course, the answer to these and similar questions is not easy, and cannot be compressed into a few lines. However, I'll try.

First of all, the rise of prices of some products in this country and in the West. We do not live in isolation from the world, and it is an indisputable fact that some crisis factors also affect our own economy. In particular, I have in mind the prices of raw materials, some of which we must buy in non-socialist countries at prices which are substantially higher than in the past. Raw materials are expensive nowadays, while on the other hand the prices of machinery and finished products are relatively lower on the world markets. And we import raw materials, but export machinery or finished products. We must take these "scissors" into account, and we do so. But think: I buy Kozak boots once every two years, or once a year at most. But milk and meat -- these I buy every day. In this country, we do not raise the prices of the basic necessities of life, nor shall we do so in future. However, it is necessary to make up for the resulting deficit through increased production and increased exports. The whole of the sixth five-year plan will be a sort of export offensive. We had to raise the price of gasoline at gas stations and here and there (sometimes justifiedly and sometimes not) the prices of some less essential products made from foreign raw materials or those imported at substantially higher costs than before are being raised. In the West, the prices of all products, including staple foods, fares, freight charges, rents, etc., are rising, which strongly affects the family budget.

I have said that, in some cases, price increases are unjustified. Here is a typical example: a Czechoslovak manufacturer may apply new prices only if a new product is involved. Otherwise, the higher price is unjustified. Therefore, if a manufacturer passes off a pot with the handle on the right side, instead of on the left, as a new product, a price increase is entirely unjustified and is prosecuted (or ought to be prosecuted). But this would lead us into another, and complicated sphere, the mechanism of exerting control over our economy. . . .


Question: You mentioned travel. This is a question which interests the young people in particular. . . .

Answer: Objective figures demonstrate that nowadays people travel more than ever before. Yet, this seems little to us. However, one must admit that, for the time being, we do not have enough to permit us to do more. We cannot distribute more than we produce ourselves. To start running into debt cannot be recommended to anyone. We must divide our foreign currency reserves in such a way that all branches and sectors of our society are equally satisfied. When the Minister of Finance has larger supplies of foreign currency, he will be able to allocate more of it for traveling -- say to Hawaii. This is, quite simply, the heart of the matter.

But we have a great many other problems as well, and these must be gradually solved. In some instances, major issues are involved (for instance, how to increase the intensification of our production specialization as a source of efficiency); in others there are "trifles" which our citizen is more likely to encounter than specialization. Sometimes bicycles are not obtainable, or batteries for transistor radios, or one tries in vain to buy an onion. We know how irritating such small things can be. But what we do not always sufficiently realize is precisely this connection between "major" and "minor" problems. And what is most important: what does each of us do to correct these things?

Question: Thank you for this interview.

(063)



- RAD Background Report/112 (Albania)
18 May 1976

WHITHER ALBANIA?

By Louis Zanga

Summary: The present unrest within the Albanian party and government probably has several contributory causes: the recent purge, resulting in the promotion of two youngish women to ministerial appointments; the uncovering of "pro-Soviet elements" within the country; and some unsettlement in the special relationship with China. All these problems should be seen in the light of persistent rumors of failing health on the part of Hoxha and Shehu, the unquestioned leaders of Albania for three decades. There is no doubt that relations with Peking have lost some of their former warmth, and divergence of policies may lead to some reduction in the economic aid so lavishly given to Tirana until recently.

* * *

Albania marks this year the 35th anniversary of the founding of its communist party amid increasing symptoms of intense internal strife. The major contributory factor to the turmoil is the probability that Enver Hoxha's remarkably durable reign is at last approaching its end. Although it is obviously impossible to forecast the exact timing of Hoxha's departure from the political scene, an attempt can profitably be made to examine the underlying causes of the abnormal state of affairs that obtains in Albania today, in which persistent rumors about the aging leader's poor health play a significant role: the sudden sweeping purges that have engulfed the highest ranks of the party leadership as well as the lower levels and the replacement of senior figures by virtually unknown people; the allegations about the existence of pro-Soviet

forces in the country; the visible strains in the once untroubled Sino-Albanian alliance; and a marked coolness in relations with Belgrade. All these problems seem to be directly or indirectly related to the internal stresses and uncertainties caused by the gradual changing of the guard that appears to be going on, and Hoxha and his equally ailing close associate, Prime Minister Mehmet Shehu, may have concluded that it is time to ring in the post-Hoxha era by starting to transfer the baton to a new generation of leaders. This paper deals with the causes and probable effects of what may well turn into one of the most critical periods in the life of the country since Hoxha's assumption of the party leadership in the fall of 1941.

Hoxha Still in Command

On the surface, and as far as the outside observer can determine, Albania's strong man at 67 is still in full command of his powers, although in the past two years there have been persistent rumors that both he and his unchallenged lieutenant Shehu are in poor health. (1) From the early wartime days until now the latter has been an ardent supporter and intimate associate of Hoxha, as became apparent during the Yugoslav-Albanian break in 1948 and again during the Soviet-Albanian split of 1961, when the two men acted together on an obvious basis of strong mutual trust. Further evidence of this special relationship is provided by the recently published Works of Enver Hoxha which contain hitherto unavailable documents about the early stages of the Soviet-Albanian split. They reveal an intimate friendship between the two men.

It appears that in the present uneasy situation the Hoxha-Shehu team is again on the same wave length. Proof of this was given by Shehu's assumption of the title of the Minister of Defense in 1974, when Tirana announced the first major reshuffle in the highest party and government ranks. Hoxha's concern about the future political course of his country would surely be less acute if he could count on his deputy assuming the mantle of leadership after his departure from the scene, for there is little doubt that, other things being equal, the 63-year-old Prime Minister is the natural choice for ruling the country in the post-Hoxha era. But other things are not equal, and Shehu's state of health is possibly as uncertain as that of his leader, which explains in part why

(1) In April of 1972 the Prime Minister underwent successful surgery in France.

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the two men are urgently seeking suitable candidates for positions of power; Shehu may well have been the decisive influence in picking the new Young Turks of the Albanian military leadership, and another example of his involvement in the selection process was the sudden emergence of Llambi Gegprifti in 1974 from complete obscurity; in addition to becoming one of Shehu's deputies, Gegprifti was elevated to the post of alternate Politburo member. It is clear that Hoxha is not acting singlehandedly in selecting the leaders of the future.

The Sources of the Rumors

In attempting to explain the mysterious events at present taking place in Tirana, one major question remains difficult to answer: what is the true state of Hoxha's health? As is always the way in rigidly ruled states, little or no information is available to the outsider about the personal life of the Albanian leaders. While Shehu's 1972 trip to France (with a stopover in Rome) was reported officially, nothing is known about any similar excursion abroad that Hoxha may have made, but there are persistent reports that internationally known medical specialists have visited Tirana, that the party leader has been paralyzed as a result of a thrombosis, that he suffers from diabetes, or that he has special food sent to him from France; it is also rumored that Shehu has cancer or some other deadly disease. The sources of this information are manifold and various, and include an official statement from the office of the exiled King Leka of Albania, (2) a recent issue of the Hungarian political weekly Magyarország, (3) and a spate of reports from Western journalists accredited to Belgrade. Information from exile sources, however, must be taken with a grain of salt, for it tends to be excessively alarmist, and the leak from Budapest, which created a stir in the foreign press, was also highly speculative and relied heavily on information from other Albania-watchers. It should be noted that East European diplomats accredited to Tirana are more restricted in their movements within the country than their noncommunist counterparts, (4) and it seems

(2) Reuter, 28 January 1976.

(3) 4 April 1976.

(4) Apart from the Rumanians and Yugoslavs, who maintain ambassadors in Tirana, all other East European countries are represented by chargés d'affaires. The USSR has no diplomatic relations with Albania.

unlikely, therefore, that the Hungarians are better informed than other sources about such domestic matters as the health of the Albanian leaders. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of smoke about and there may well be some fire behind it.

Hoxha and Shehu have both made recent public appearances that would tend to show they are in good health. Early in April they were in the southern port of Vlore, well known for its mild climate. (5) Hoxha normally tours some part of the country in the spring, but on this occasion the Vlore trip may have been intended to counter the mounting speculative reports from abroad. Further, it is unusual for the two men to appear together outside Tirana at a nonpolitical event (in this case a concert) and they were accompanied by their wives (CC members Nexhmije Hoxha and Fiqret Shehu), and by the perennial alternate Politburo member Pilo Peristeri, who is known to belong to the inner circle of the old guard. In announcing the event, the official media noted that the party "had been in Vlore for some time." Five days later, during an official tour of the district, Hoxha was accompanied by Politburo member Hysni Kapo, the country's third-ranking leader. The coming together of this select group of leaders, to the exclusion of those who have been newly promoted, would indicate that serious issues, such as personnel changes, may have been under discussion during an extended retreat.

The Latest Changes

Hardly a month later Hoxha made another public appearance, this time in Tirana, when he received from the hands of a group of Albanian and Chinese experts a symbolic gift of a specimen of the first Albanian-made pig iron. The event was used by Hoxha to set off a major political bombshell. During his informal meeting with the steel workers -- a contrast to the ceremonial handing over of the first product from a chemical plant in the setting of the fifth party congress in 1966 -- he made three major political announcements: he disclosed the latest wave of purges, claimed the overthrow of "pro-Soviet elements" in Albania, and spoke out vigorously in defense of the country's ties with China. His most significant comments by far were those pertaining to Sino-Albanian relations,

(5) Zeri i Popullit, 31 March and 4 April 1976.

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an issue that appears to be central in the current struggle for the succession; but something must first be said about the latest personnel changes. (6)

As is usual in Albania, the changes came as a complete surprise and were announced in an unorthodox manner. One can conclude from the determination and thoroughness with which Hoxha and Shehu have carried out their purges during the past two years that few of the remaining high officials in Albania are safe from the ax today and that new names are likely to be added to the roster of have-beens in the future. Among those who remain, the most dramatic falls that could occur would be those of the party's chief ideologist, Politburo and secretariat member Ramiz Alia; the economist Haki Toska, also a Politburo and secretariat member; and Politburo member and trade union chairman Rita Marko. Another potential victim could well be alternate Politburo member Xhafer Spahiu, another economist, who has been lying fairly low lately.

The downfall of Piro Dodbiba is the main surprise in the latest purge. His tenure of the ministerial post in agriculture goes back to 1965 and in 1971 he was elevated to the rank of alternate Politburo member. Like former Politburo members Abdyl Kellezi and Koco Theodosi, Dodbiba experienced the steepest rise in the graph of his career during the peak period of the Sino-Albanian alliance -- the 1960s and early 1970s. It seems unlikely, therefore, that these men and certain other previously purged officials with similar career backgrounds could have had any markedly pro-Soviet leanings. Moreover, in the case of Dodbiba Hoxha's claim that he had committed "grave errors in the party line and in the implementation of his tasks" is unconvincing; although the over-all agricultural plan target for 1975 was, as usual, not met, the year was nevertheless considered a good one for the sector. The new chairman of the State Planning Commission, Petro Dode, said in his annual report to the 1976 session of the People's Assembly (7) about the state plan budget for last year that:

(6) For earlier purges see two reports by Louis Zanga: "The Albanian Leadership at the Crossroads?" Research Report No. 2132, Radio Free Europe Research, 6 November 1974, and "Changes in Albanian Leadership Signify Struggle for Succession to Power," RAD Background Report/161 (Albania), RFER, 24 November 1975.

(7) Probleme Ekonomike No.1, 1976.

1975 was the best agricultural year of the five-year-plan period. This was due to a deeper understanding of the tasks laid down by recent CC plenums, to the programmatic speeches of Comrade Enver Hoxha, and to the increased diligence of the farmers.

Hardly were these words spoken when Hoxha announced the dismissal of his Minister of Agriculture for "errors" and "incompetence." So the reasons for Dodbiba's downfall must be sought elsewhere, and he may well have become the latest victim of the power struggle now going on in Tirana. He failed to appear at the May Day celebrations, which would suggest that he has also lost his Politburo membership.

A similar fate befell Minister of Education and Culture and CC member Thoma Deljana, who had held his government post since 1966. Deljana played an important role in pushing through Albania's major school reform in 1970, and the new program, hailed as a milestone in the country's postwar educational planning, called for a complete break with the Soviet "revisionist" model. The reform listed the three components of the reorganized system as academic education, production, and military training. Deljana was possibly slack in implementing the reform and may have been weak in his control of cultural affairs, but there seems to be little reason to suspect him of pro-Soviet conduct.

The choice of replacements for these two men is unique in the annals of Albanian communist rule. Both the new ministers are relatively young women who have moved up fast from the ranks. Themije Thomaj leapfrogged from the fairly humble post of chairman of a farm collective to that of Minister of Agriculture. It is the first time that a woman has been assigned ministerial rank in Albania, and the fact that agriculture has been given top priority in the national economy enhances her achievement. Hoxha characterized her as "young in age, but mature in mind and at work." Her professional background is that of an economist and agronomist with higher education who worked her way up to the chairmanship of the Kemishtaj farm co-operative. It was her association with Kemishtaj that catapulted Themije Thomaj into national prominence. In September 1975 Kemishtaj became synonymous with the new agricultural policy, which calls for a "leap forward" in agricultural production; the introductory campaign was launched by an exchange of letters between 250 women farmers, headed by Miss Thomaj, and Hoxha. (8) Ironically enough, the meeting arranged for the reading of Hoxha's message to the Kemishaj co-operative was presided over by Dodbiba. (9) This is typical of the jockeying for power now, going

(8) Zeri i Popullit, 23 September 1975.

(9) Ibid., 24 September 1975.

on in Tirana -- personnel changes are often carried out in a totally unexpected and completely unorthodox manner, and the claims of candidates with much seniority behind them are simply ignored. The pressures from the swelling ranks of the younger generation, devoid of Soviet or East European taint, have moved Hoxha to favor them at the expense of older retainers.

The other woman chosen for promotion is the new Minister of Education and Culture, Tefta Cani. She too came from a village background, and following the completion of her university studies she served as a teacher, a school director, and a party committee secretary. The stress that Hoxha put on her rural background is obviously aimed at the country's young people, who are currently being urged to remain in or move to the villages (a move intended to combat unemployment in the cities, although this is not admitted). Cani has been a candidate CC member since 1971, and it is mainly from the reservoir of candidate CC members elected at the sixth party congress in that year that Hoxha has been selecting his new young leaders. (10) In 1972 Cani was listed as a party secretary for the district of Berat and in 1973 she moved to a similar post in the district of Diber as a deputy to the party committee first secretary, Hekuran Isai. The latter is the new heavyweight in the Albanian leadership, having been elevated to full Politburo and party secretariat membership in 1975. His close association with Miss Cani in Diber would indicate that Isai played an influential role in her election as Minister of Education and Culture; this in turn implies the broadening of his power base. Hekuran Isai is certainly the man to watch among the new crop of leaders.

Hoxha's Bombshell

As already noted, it was Hoxha's statement about the existence of pro-Soviet forces within the country and about the Sino-Albanian relationship that made the greatest impact. The key sentence about the alleged discovery of opponents of the party line reads as follows:

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- (10) They include: Pali Miska (Politburo member and Minister of Heavy Industry and Mining), Qirjako Mihali (alternate Politburo member), Llambi Gegprifti (alternate Politburo member and Deputy Minister of Defense), Veli Llatakaj (Deputy Minister of Defense), and Iuan Babameto (Minister of Communications).

The enemies and revisionists who opposed the party line, who wanted to sabotage the construction of socialism and to erode the foundations of our socialist homeland, have been uncovered, unmasked, and swept away by the party. They also wanted to disrupt our friendship with our sister nation China, with the party of Mao Tse-tung, and they wanted to bind our country to the Soviet revisionists.

These are strong words, bordering indeed on sensationalism. It is the first time in the 15 years that have elapsed since the Soviet-Albanian break that the Albanian leadership has claimed to have uncovered a pro-Soviet faction in the country. Diplomatic observers of the Albanian scene were quick to question Hoxha's claim and suggested that it may have been a smoke screen (11) intended to shroud other problems of the apparently unstable Sino-Albanian alliance. It is hard to imagine that a mood of pro-Soviet nostalgia could find fertile ground in Albania as it is today. The new Constitution, which is expected to go into effect any day now, is based on the political, economic, and social experience of the past 10 years and is distinguished by an extreme anti-Soviet, antirevisionist bias. A similar trend runs through the first 21 volumes of Hoxha's Works, whose publication has been turned into the country's outstanding political literary event of the postwar period and which are essential reading for all. Finally, even if one were to admit the probability of the existence of some pro-Soviet elements, how is one to explain the fact that the entire state administration, except for two ministers, (12) and about one third of the Politburo's membership have been affected by the personnel changes since the 1971 congress? These facts, plus what would appear to be the total lack of any contacts between the Soviets (and their followers) and the Albanians, makes any rearing of pro-Sovietism's ugly head extremely unlikely. So far Hoxha has not accused anyone directly by name of having committed this mortal sin, on which he could capitalize as the Chinese, for example, have done in the cases of Lin Piao and of Teng Hsiao-ping. The real cause of the unprecedented internal unease in Tirana probably must be looked for elsewhere -- in the present (and puzzling) state of Sino-Albanian relations.

Hungarian Speculations

Hoxha used the occasion of the completion of the first phase

(11) See David Binder's article in The New York Times, 4 May 1976.

(12) The perennial Minister of Internal Affairs, Kadri Hazbiu (a relative of Mehmet Shehu), and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nesti Nase.

of the Elbasan steel plant to attempt to dispel the notion that something has gone wrong with the Sino-Albanian alliance. The very fact that he deemed it necessary to deny rumors of a cooling off in relations with Peking reveals a sense of insecurity; in the past, outside rumors of this kind have simply been ignored. On this occasion Hoxha went so far as to rebut Hungarian reports of a stoppage of deliveries of Chinese equipment for the steel plant. It was easy for him to scoff at the Hungarians (13) on this particular point: the steel plant, after all, was being inaugurated as he spoke (although its completion is far behind schedule), but he conveniently ignored Magyarország's other assertions--rumors about his own and Shehu's failing health, comments on the purges, and allegations about general friction in Sino-Albanian relations. The Hungarians were in fact among the first to comment on foreign policy divergencies between the two countries following former President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, (14) but nothing was said on that score by the Albanian leader.

Budapest, for its part, shows no inclination to end its pre-occupation with Sino-Albanian developments. A few days after Hoxha's public denial, Radio Budapest (15) noted that the Albanian press had recently reduced its coverage of "Maoist" internal and foreign policy developments. The truth is that for some time both the Chinese and Albanian media have been conspicuously reluctant to provide full coverage of internal and external events in each other's countries. (16) The Hungarians seem to have been assiduous in their study of Hoxha's Works, which give a fascinating account of the early, covert stages of Soviet-Albanian polemics in 1960-1961, and in one of these volumes Hoxha says: "We will reciprocate in kind for their deliberate failure to report developments in our country." (17) In the same newscast, Radio Budapest claimed that a recent Albanian order restricting the movement of foreign diplomats had been applied to Peking's representatives, and it was noted that -- in a reversal of last year's

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- (13) It is not clear why Budapest has taken it upon itself to speak-up on Sino-Albanian relations; the other East European countries are totally silent on Albania. Volume 20 of Hoxha's Works refers to the Hungarians as "moderates" in their attitude toward Albania during the covert polemics between Moscow and Tirana in 1960.
- (14) See j.c.k., "Whither Albania? -- A Hungarian View," Research Report No.1551, RFER, 25 September 1972.
- (15) 8 May 1976. On 30 April 1976 it reported Hoxha's meeting with the workers.
- (16) There are times when the Hsinhua news agency's daily bulletin carries more items on Yugoslavia and other East European countries than on Albania, something unheard of a few years back.
- (17) Vol. 19.

policy -- the Chinese ambassador was not seen flanking Hoxha and Shehu at the main reviewing stand during this year's May Day celebrations. (18)

The Causes of Sino-Albanian Friction

So, notwithstanding Hoxha's disclaimer, something appears to have gone awry on the Sino-Albanian front. The obvious questions are: why has this happened, whose fault is it, and how serious is the dislocation? Hoxha himself seemed to imply that some unnamed persons had tried to harm the friendship binding the two countries together, and followed this with Albania's first open condemnation of Teng Hsiao-ping (who once provided powerful support for the Albanians in their quarrels with Khrushchev) during his meeting with Albanian and Chinese specialists:

The enemies who are working against socialism, against the CCP and the APL [Albanian Party of Labor], against our unbreakable friendship, cannot tolerate this might -- inspired by Marxism-Leninism -- which destroys all revisionist plotters wherever they may be. A person or a group of persons may cause damage for a certain period, but can never hope to break up our great friendship. (Emphasis supplied.)

The underlined phrase is crucial. Hoxha used it near the end of his remarks regarding Sino-Albanian ties, so that it had a maximum impact on his listeners, and his deliberate vagueness (presumably calculated to avoid giving offense to his hosts) suggests that the message may have been an allusion to certain Chinese leaders, notably the moderates in Peking headed by the late Chou En-lai, the discredited Teng Hsiao-ping, and their followers, possibly including the present Chinese ambassador in Tirana, Liu Chen-hua. Although a fervent supporter of the Albanians in the 1960s, Chou En-lai was the main architect of China's opening to the world -- particularly to the West -- and the launching of that policy marked the beginning of a certain cooling off in the once extremely warm Peking-Tirana alliance.

Today, no matter what the Albanian leadership may say, the friendship between the two countries is not what it was. This is not to say, however, that the two countries are on a collision course, something that neither of them presumably wants or would gain from. It is possible that during recent years, when the moderates

(18) Zeri i Popullit, 2 May 1976.

headed by Chou En-lai appeared to have the upper hand in China, some elements in Peking may have gone sour on the obstinate Albanians. Hoxha's doggedness has been principally reflected in the spheres of ideology and foreign policy and, in contrast to the Peking leadership, he has never diminished his full-hearted support for what he calls "Marxist-Leninist" parties and groups. In the field of foreign policy, he has deliberately failed to follow the lead given by the Chinese on questions of diplomatic relations with the US, Great Britain, and the FRG, and in their more positive approach to the EEC. Diplomatic sources have noted that the Albanians have steadfastly declined to emulate the Chinese in seeking a *modus vivendi* with the West, notwithstanding some alleged proddings from their allies. Instead, Tirana has tended to increase its polemics with these countries, as was shown by the recent huge claims for war reparations made on the Bonn government. An editorial in Zeri i Popullit a few weeks ago criticized Bonn in very strong terms for failing to discharge its "war debts" and charged sweepingly that all those who run present-day Germany, "Schmidts and Strausses, Social Democrats and Liberals, Christian Democrats and Christian Socialists alike, try to avoid taking full responsibility." (19) This may be seen as an esoteric message to the Chinese. "Look," Hoxha is saying, "we Albanians are trying to make it up with the Europeans with whom you have common interests; but we have our interests too, and these people are refusing to comply." Another potential cause of conflict with the Peking leaders is Tirana's negative attitude toward the neutralist countries of Eastern Europe. While relations with Rumania remain formally friendly, no attempts have been made to improve them, and the more immediate (and much more important) horizon of Yugoslavia is heavily clouded. For no obvious reason, Tirana has resumed its open ideological attacks on the Yugoslavs (although not, of course, with the same intensity as in the past), and on the same day that Hoxha spoke about Sino-Albanian friendship, the party daily delivered a sharp attack on Belgrade for (inter alia) allowing the Soviet fleet to pay friendly visits to Yugoslav ports. (20) Such attacks indicate a policy that contrasts sharply with Peking's determined buttressing of all forces that are opposed to Soviet political advances in Eastern Europe. The Albanian rationale appears to be that the Soviet naval menace is greater than the political threat.

In view of this spectrum of Sino-Albanian divergencies it would not be farfetched to conclude that some strain has been put on Sino-Albanian co-operation in recent times and that the badly needed

(19) Ibid., 23 April 1976.
 (20) Zeri i Popullit, 30 April 1976.

Chinese economic aid has been affected. It is extremely unlikely, however, that Peking would commit the same error as the Soviets once did with regard to both China and Albania and withhold promised aid, especially for the large industrial projects launched during the 1971-1975 five-year-plan period. Many of the latter, however, like the Elbasan metallurgical combine, the Ballsh petroleum refinery, the Fierza dam, and some important chemical plants, are well behind schedule. Work on most of these projects started in 1971-1972 and the completion of some of them is still not in sight; the first section of the steel plant, for example, is now due for completion "sometime in 1977." The principal cause of the delays may well be lack of expertise in the construction of complicated projects, but China's failure to deliver equipment in time may be a contributory factor. Reportedly, this is the first time that China has undertaken the task of building a major steel complex in a distant and relatively underdeveloped country. A more likely reason, however, is that Peking may be feeling reluctant to underwrite major economic projects in Albania's current five-year-plan period. If this is in fact the case, and all the indications suggest as much, then it may well be one of the principal causes of the recent ruffling of the country's internal tranquillity.

Hoxha's Quandary

There are many indications that serious economic problems now face Albania. In the forefront of these is the question of the new (sixth) five-year-plan, whose approval has been greatly delayed. In late 1975 the draft plan had to be revised and discussion on it is still continuing. Economic priorities have changed, with an unprecedented emphasis on agricultural production, and there are repeated pleas for economy in investments and construction.

Directly related to these problems is the question of the next party congress, which should be held this year. The last three congresses took place in 1961, 1966, and 1971, and the last two of these opened on the anniversary of the founding of the Albanian Party of Labor -- i.e., on November 8. The Albanian propaganda machine has gone into high gear in preparation for this year's anniversary of the founding of the party (the 35th), but nothing has yet been said about a congress. Whether it is finally held this year or not, the time for adequate preparation is running out and there is a danger of a major gap opening up in the spectrum of the country's internal political life. The probable causes of the

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delay are the domestic struggle for power, the divergencies with Peking on a number of issues, and the problems surrounding the new five-year plan. There is probably conflict on foreign policy issues within the leadership, with some suggesting less reliance on Peking, others calling for more contact with the West, and others again advocating closer co-operation with Yugoslavia and Rumania; how else is one to explain Tirana's inexplicable decision to halt co-operation with Belgrade, which was making good progress in the early 1970s? It seems inconceivable, however, that anyone has spoken in favor of return to a pro-Soviet line, since to make such a suggestion would have been tantamount to committing political suicide; it seems clear, nevertheless, that there has been some call in Tirana for a new orientation, and faced with intimations of discontent and restlessness in its immediate environment, the Hoxha-Shehu duo has had little choice but to mount a counteroffensive, the net result of which may have been the unprecedented purges of the recent past.

In seeking to find explanations of the many questions presently troubling Tirana and the mysterious developments in the inner circles of power, one important consideration must be borne in mind: Hoxha has little elbowroom in his dealings with the Peking leaders. He knows that conditions in China are in a state of flux, with the power struggle between the moderates and the hardliners still unresolved. He must therefore show patience and display extreme dexterity if the Sino-Albanian alliance is to remain a going concern. His recent address to the assembled Albanian and Chinese specialists suggests that he is trying hard not to rock the boat -- Albania, after all, remains heavily dependent on Chinese economic aid. Even if it is true that the Chinese have reduced their loans to Albania to half their previous level, (21) the remaining 50 per cent is of vital importance to the country if it is to maintain its economic growth. If he were to adopt a more defiant line toward Peking, Hoxha would find himself in a quandary similar to that of the early 1960s, when he first covertly and then overtly challenged the Soviet leadership, and the immediate (and harmful) consequences of that defiance are well known. There is, however, a basic difference in the line-up of socialist forces in the mid-1970s. Hoxha can no longer look for moral and material support from some new and distant communist friend, as he did in 1948 when he switched from Belgrade to Moscow, and again in 1961 when he turned


(21) Radio Budapest of 8 May 1976 cited this unconfirmed report from the Financial Times.

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from Moscow to Peking. Moreover, time is running out for him, and he must achieve a new alignment soon if he is to do so at all. His ability to cope with crises has always been and remains dependent on the strong sense of nationalism inherent in the Albanians. But this powerful weapon is by no means a foolproof one, and although Hoxha will in all likelihood succeed in weathering the present storm, he cannot of course control the march of events in the post-Hoxha era. Meanwhile, the succession struggle in Albania has decimated the ranks of the top party and government leadership and the end of the process of rejuvenation is not in sight.

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THE CHRISTIAN-MARXIST DIALOGUE IN YUGOSLAVIA

By Zdenko Antic

Summary: In recent months, several efforts have been made on the part of Marxist authors and publications in Yugoslavia to renew the dialogue with the Christians. The Catholic press has been carefully noting these proposals for a dialogue, but has at the same time expressed strong reservations about the sincerity of these attempts. A dialogue of the type proposed by the Marxists could easily become instrumental in deepening internal Church controversies, thus weakening its doctrinal unity.



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Recent years have seen the emergence of far more news about quarrels and tensions between Christians and Marxists in Yugoslavia than about any dialogue between them. In the last few months, however, there has been strong evidence of a repeatedly expressed desire for the renewal of a dialogue and for broader co-operation between holders of the two rival philosophies.

During the whole period following the dramatic changes in communist party policy in December 1971 and the resulting tightening of control over social, cultural, and religious life in the country, the tensions between the state and the Christian Churches increased, and the atmosphere essential for a dialogue virtually vanished. This was particularly the case with the Catholic Church, which at the time was repeatedly accused of spreading nationalistic propaganda and trying to create centers of political clericalism. (1) The

(1) See Zdenko Antic "Tension Between State and Catholic Church in Yugoslavia Continues" RAD BR/112 (Yugoslavia) Radio Free Europe www.archivaexilului.ro

Roman Catholic Church was even sharply attacked for allegedly maintaining contacts with anti-Yugoslav opposition groups and individuals in exile. (2) In resorting to such accusations, the regime was apparently attempting to impose limits upon the social, cultural, and educational activities of the Churches and to restrict them to the performance of exclusively religious duties.

The new legislation on the religious communities discussed recently in all of Yugoslav's constituent republics further increased the existing tensions between the state and the religious communities. Although it affirms certain basic religious rights, the draft bill virtually prohibits some of the most important activities of a charitable and social character that the Churches have engaged in freely in the past. As a result, the law on religious communities drafted by the Slovenian government, which was thrown open to public discussion in October 1975, has encountered sharp opposition in the Yugoslav Catholic press. (3) Catholic commentators regarded the new law as, on balance, a step backward, and have demanded clarification of certain points and even changes in the proposed draft. (4)

Past Experiences

Prior to December 1971 there had been many signs of a modest but steady attempt to promote a dialogue between Christians and Marxists. True, the dialogue involved only a comparatively small number of persons on each side, but they were all well-known figures in the intellectual world and in the Catholic Church. The most spectacular such dialogue was the one that took place in March 1967, when Dr. Bosnjak, the well-known Zagreb philosopher, and Dr. Mijo Skvorc, a Jesuit who is now auxiliary bishop of Zagreb, met at the Student Center. Almost 3,000 students crowded into the main hall. Striking was the fact that both speakers made a real attempt to understand one other and to make their audience understand what the other was getting at. Catholics and Marxists took part in the Paulusgesellschaft dialogues in Vienna, and the prominent Yugoslav sociologist and editor of the since banned Zagreb magazine Praxis, Rudi Supek, was (and still is) a standing member of the Catholic Church Commission for Nonbelievers, which is headed by Austria's Cardinal Koenig.

(2) Politika (Belgrade), 1 February 1975.

(3) Vecernje novosti (Belgrade), 26 October 1975.

(4) Glas koncila (Zagreb), 26 October 1975.

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At the same time religion, in its philosophical and sociological aspects, became rather fashionable. A Center for the Study of Religion at the University of Ljubljana was already in operation, and an Institute for the Study of Atheism and Religion at the University of Zagreb was opened in 1968. Professors and younger scholars from universities all over the country took part in conferences and seminars, which were also joined occasionally by priests. There were even instances of university professors lecturing at theological seminaries and extending invitations to professors at those seminaries to lecture at the university. (5) In his book Socialist Society and Religion (Socijalisticko društvo i religija) Dr. Cimic (professor of sociology at Belgrade University) made a lengthy examination of the subject based on Marxist premises but displaying a sympathetic understanding for religion. In the meantime, the group of Catholic intellectuals, most of them connected with various Catholic publications, took an active part in the dialogue with Marxists and helped to expound the ideas of the Vatican Council. Though not a large group, it did have access to the most influential religious publications, and had close links with some progressive Marxist scholars. Neither group could expect to find a widely sympathetic hearing from its respective establishment, and both sides were restrained by perception of the need to proceed carefully so as not to provoke hard-line elements within the party. These positive developments were, however, gradually extinguished in the tense atmosphere that arose in the wake of the changes in communist party policy during the 1972-1973 period, and the dialogue virtually ended.

Attempts at a New Beginning

If the genuine dialogue ceased in the tense atmosphere of recent years, the need for its continuation, or to put it better, for a new beginning, has, however, been occasionally expressed by both Catholics and Marxists. One of the first attempts in this direction was made by a well-known Croatian essayist and literary critic, Predrag Matvejevic, in an article published by the Belgrade weekly Nin. (6) Under the title "On a Dialogue Between Marxists

(5) For a more complete account of the Christian-Marxist dialogue in the past, see Stella Alexander, "Church-State Relations in Yugoslavia," Religion in Communist Lands No.1, Spring 1976, Keston College, Keston, Kent.

(6) Nedeljne informativne novine (Belgrade), 9 March 1975.

and Christians," Matvejevic discusses the problems which are caused by modern civilization and the resulting need for contemporary man to reconsider himself and his position in the world. This may be done, Matvejevic says, through a "religious approach" to the problems of modern civilization, and the resulting "religious manifestation should not necessarily be 'opium for the people'; this is the reason why we have a legal justification for religious orientation." Matvejevic believes that this approach is very close to every true humanistic agnostic or to any atheist, and a "new humanism could, with time, remove the misunderstandings and obstacles which have made difficult a dialogue between Marxists and Christians."

In analyzing the misunderstandings and obstacles which have, of late, made it difficult to continue a dialogue, Matvejevic mentions that "clericalistic and traditionalistic trends" have prevailed in the Churches on the one hand, while on the other hand, suspicions of clericalism have sometimes been expressed by Marxists without real justification. "Such unjustified suspicion has not promoted the chances for a dialogue," Matvejevic concludes. A similar analysis of the situation concerning a dialogue between Christians and Marxists was also made in the Zagreb daily Vjesnik by Sime Pierotti, a Croatian official who is an expert on religious affairs. (7)

The need for a dialogue has also been emphasized in a book which appeared at the end of 1975 in Belgrade, published by the Institute for the International Workers' Movement. The book, The Kingdom of God and Communism, was written by a well-known sociologist and party theoretician, Professor Andrija Kresic, and the author himself reviewed it for the March issue of the Belgrade periodical AS. (8) Based upon an analysis of primitive Christianity and some modern Catholic and Protestant theologians, the book describes some aspects of the "socialization of Christianity" which, in the final analysis, he believes, would lead toward a "Christianity without God."

In the first, descriptive part of the book, the author analyzes the changes which have affected the Christian Churches in recent

(7) Vjesnik, 21 and 22 August 1975.

(8) As quoted by the Catholic Press Bulletin AKSA (Zagreb), 9 April 1976.

times. Kresic sees here new trends which have "radicalized the Catholic Church." In the second part, Kresic tries to find an answer to the question "what could happen in the future?" The author stresses that his book is not trying to provide a definite answer, but just to stimulate spiritual curiosity. In the author's opinion, however, it would be "the greatest nonsense to proclaim that religion is nothing more than nonsense." This is the easiest way. It is, however, nonsense to believe that "something which is mere nonsense could have survived for thousands of years among almost the whole of mankind." Therefore, every believer should be treated honestly, Kresic maintains, and religious convictions should not be labeled lies. "A believer should not be offended, but his convictions must be treated objectively, in a scientific manner," says Kresic. In the same way, the believer should communicate with the Marxist. This is the necessary precondition for a true dialogue, in Kresic's view:

Reciprocal confidence in fundamental human motivation is an indispensable prerequisite for a dialogue. In our contemporary world we depend upon each other, and we should try to solve the outstanding questions of this world and of the fact that communism and Christianity are great realities in this world, without which it is not possible to imagine either the present or the future.

Catholic Position

The Catholic press has carefully noted such calls for a reactivation of the dialogue between Christians and Marxists. Qualified satisfaction has been expressed on many occasions over such initiatives. At the same time, strong reservations and doubts over the sincerity of such initiatives have also been voiced. The objections on the part of the Catholics are twofold. First, the Catholic press makes the point that the Marxists do not really want a dialogue with the Catholic Church as a whole, but only with the so-called progressively minded priests and theologians. The Catholics' second objection is that the Marxists do not want Christians to speak on behalf of a Church community, but only in their own name. Glas koncila was particularly critical of Pierotti's articles, in which he attacked the so-called "clerical faction" of the Catholic Church in Croatia. (9) "Pierotti is trying to

(9) Glas koncila (Zagreb), 18-31 August 1975.

initiate a dialogue that would emphasize and exploit internal controversies in the Church." This is not a good way, and "within the context of our situation, it is really damaging that Pierotti has chosen an approach that in the past always proved a dead end," concluded Glas koncila.

Obviously the Catholic Church, although willing to take part in a renewed dialogue, is not at all ready to do so from a position which could endanger its organizational and doctrinal unity. The current situation could thus be described as a "dialogue on the dialogue," in which the two prospective debaters are declaring their positions, objectives, and "rules of the game." This is, at any rate, an encouraging sign after the years of almost total silence on this subject. (053)

- end -

IN.M.E.R.
ARHIVA
Fond GC, SRM/1977/78

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• RAD Background Report/108
(Yugoslavia)
17 May 1976

C O R R E C T I O N


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THE CHRISTIAN-MARXIST DIALOGUE IN YUGOSLAVIA

Page 2, last paragraph, last three lines -- please change to read:

magazine Praxis, Rudi Supek, used to co-operate with the Catholic Church Commission for Nonbelievers, which is headed by Austria's Cardinal Koenig.

George
Ciorănescu
✿



This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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BULGARIA/15
14 May 1976

S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

1. Editor-in-Chief of Party Daily Replaced
2. Former CC Secretary Kiratsov Named Ambassador to the GDR
3. Turkish Minority and Bulgarian Moslems Again Discussed



1. Editor-in-Chief of Party Daily Replaced

As had been expected, Georgi Bokov, editor-in-chief of the party daily Rabotnichesko Delo, has lost his position. This was made public only a few days after he was dropped from his post as president of the Bulgarian Journalists' Union (see Bulgarian Situation Report/14, Radio Free Europe Research, 6 May 1976, Item 1), and only little more than a month after his removal from the CC secretariat (see Bulgarian SR/11, RFER, 5 April 1976). His replacement is Petar Dyulgerov, until recently first secretary of the Blagoevgrad District Party Committee.

Once again, Bokov's removal was not reported directly, but became known in a roundabout way. Radio Sofia (May 7) said that at a plenum of the Blagoevgrad District Party Committee attended by Politburo member and CC Secretary Alexander Lilov, party first secretary Petar Dyulgerov was released from his duties "owing to his promotion to the post of editor-in-chief of Rabotnichesko Delo." Nothing was said about Bokov, but it was announced that Dyulgerov had been succeeded in Blagoevgrad district by Ivan Sakarev.

Petar Dyulgerov (age unknown but presumably about 48) is an experienced Komsomol and party official. His slow but steady rise can be considered a classical example of a party functionary's career based on many years of organizational work both in the provinces and in the capital city. Between 1954 and 1962 he occupied various top Komsomol posts in Blagoevgrad and Sofia. In 1958 Dyulgerov was appointed head of the Komsomol CC's Agitprop Department and in 1960 he became secretary of the whole organization. Two years later, in 1962, he was transferred to the Blagoevgrad District Party Committee as a secretary, a post which he held for about a decade. In 1971, at the 10th BCP Congress, he was elected a CC candidate member and shortly thereafter became party first secretary of the Blagoevgrad district. Dyulgerov remained in

in this post till his recent promotion to head the party daily. He was elected a full CC member at the 11th party congress last April.

Dyulgerov's appointment as Rabotnichesko Delo's head comes as a surprise, because nothing in his background suggests that he has been involved in journalistic work in the past. It is possible that he studied journalism or some related subject at the university, but no information about his educational background is available. His selection may have been conditioned by his devotion to the party and, probably, by his organizational ability and experience.

A few months ago Dyulgerov gave an interview to the Belgrade tabloid Vecernje Novosti (15 December 1975; reprinted in Nova Makedonia, 16 December 1975) in which he flatly rejected the existence of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria (see Slobodan Stankovic, "Bulgarian CP Leader Tells Belgrade Paper Macedonians 'Do Not Exist'," RAD Background Report/178 (Yugoslavia), RFER, 17 December 1975). This is the official Bulgarian policy on the Macedonian issue, but Dyulgerov was the first official for some time to voice it so openly. Since he was head of the district party organization in Blagoevgrad, which is also called Pirin Macedonia and is the area where the Yugoslavs claim the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria lives, his statement takes on an added significance. It is interesting, and may not be mere coincidence, that Georgi Bokov, born in Pirin Macedonia, has been succeeded by Dyulgerov who is probably also a native of that region or at least has an almost adoptive association with it.

So far no change has been apparent in the policy of the party daily, and any that takes place may become evident only in the long term; significant changes would of course imply that the need for improvement was the reason for Bokov's removal. It is quite possible that further alterations in the composition of the party daily's editorial board may follow, but these would normally be announced only in Bulgarski Zhurnalist. If any occur, they may give some additional indication of the nature and extent of current reshuffles in certain major branches of the Bulgarian mass media (see also Bulgarian SR/4, RFER, 5 February 1976, Item 3; and G.S., "The BCP Theses on the Party and Mass Organizations," RAD BR/51 /Bulgaria/, RFER, 23 February 1976, pp. 10-12).

Ivan Sakarev (age unknown) was "unanimously elected" to replace Dyulgerov as party first secretary of the Blagoevgrad District Party Committee. Sakarev is an engineer by profession and in 1974 he was elected to the same committee as secretary in charge of construction. Nothing more is known about him, and he seems to be a newcomer to high office. An indication that he was in line for promotion was given when he was elected a CC candidate member at the recent 11th BCP Congress. (047)

14 May 1976

2. Former CC Secretary Kiratsov Named Ambassador to the GDR

It was expected that the recently vacated ambassadorial post in East Berlin would be filled by one of two former BCP CC secretaries, Penyu Kiratsov or Konstantin Tellalov, or by former CC secretariat member Georgi Bokov, all of whom were not re-elected at the 11th party congress (see Bulgarian SRs/11 and 14, RFER, 5 April and 6 May 1976, Items 1 and 2, respectively). The expectation was confirmed by a decree, reported by Radio Sofia on May 8, which announced the selection of Penyu Kiratsov.

Penyu Genov Kiratsov (born 1920) is a machine-building engineer by education but he has extensive party and administrative experience. In 1936 he joined the then underground Komsomol and in 1942 he received a life sentence for his "conspiratorial activities." After the communist take-over in 1944 Kiratsov occupied a number of leading posts in the machine-building industry, and in 1962 he became a CC candidate member and four years later a full member. At the 10th BCP Congress (April 1971) Kiratsov was promoted CC secretary, but at the 11th congress (April 1976) he was not re-elected, although he remained a CC member.

In his professional capacity Kiratsov has traveled extensively in the Comecon countries and has often headed delegations engaged in negotiating contracts in his specialization. As a party official he visited the FRG in 1973, when he took part in the Third Congress of the German CP. Kiratsov's numerous contacts with high-ranking East European officials (and possibly his knowledge of German) seem to make him suitable for his new post, although he is not a career diplomat. After the Soviet Union, the GDR is Bulgaria's most important economic partner and the East Berlin ambassadorship is an important post.

Nevertheless, the appointment clearly means demotion for Kiratsov personally. It confirms the pattern of exiling former leading party officials in disfavor to ambassadorships. Among recent examples of this practice were the appointments of three former Politburo candidate members -- Abadzhiev, Kotsev, and Gyaurov -- to ambassadorial posts in Rumania, Algeria, and Mongolia, respectively (see Bulgarian SR/25, RFER, 22 August 1974, Item 1).

As far as the other two possible candidates for diplomatic posts -- Bokov and Tellalov -- are concerned, there have been no indications so far whether either will be selected for the other major vacancy, which is in Rome. It may be some time before the new ambassador to Italy is chosen, because of the imminent elections in that country. On the basis of experience, Tellalov would appear to be the better choice, but it is possible that neither man will be appointed. (048)

3. Turkish Minority and Bulgarian Moslems Again Discussed

For several months the Bulgarian media have been publishing news items and articles to mark the 100th anniversary of the April 1876 Uprising, which led to the nation's liberation two years later

from five centuries of Ottoman domination. Nationwide celebrations have been held and still are going on, and the regime has been placing the main emphasis during them on the Bulgarian people's love of freedom that was manifested through the uprising. The celebrations have also inevitably focused attention on certain questions of historical fact distorted by centuries-old emotions and overlaid today by ideological concepts.

Maybe the most thorny and delicate of these problems is the role of the Bulgarian Moslems (the so-called Pomaks) in crushing the April Uprising. For many years the Rhodope Bulgarian Moslems have been repeatedly accused of being "the most cruel suppressors of the April Uprising" and "fratricides." This hatred led to the alienation of the Pomaks and in 1905 about half of them left the country for Turkey in search of a more tolerant society. The number of Pomaks still living in Bulgaria, mostly in the Smolyan, Pazardzhik, and Blagoevgrad districts, is estimated at about 120,000 and they are known to be the subject of intensive regime efforts to integrate them with the rest of the community (see Bulgarian SR/13, RFER, 28 April 1976, Item 3). Often regarded as a separate group burdened with a heavy heritage of historical sin, the Pomaks are generally admitted to be ethnic Bulgarians who adopted the Moslem faith only under the pressure of the Turkish occupiers; thus, the Pomaks are denied the minority-group status granted to the Turks living in Bulgaria.

The unnatural situation of the Pomaks was recently discussed in its historical aspects by Nikoaly Haytov (see Literaturen Front No. 17, 22 April 1976, pp.6-7). He set out to demolish a "Pyramid of Fallacies" (the title of his article) through a thorough study of documents and memoirs published after the unsuccessful revolt. Quoting from various recent historical publications, Haytov revealed that criticism of the Pomaks' role in the uprising is still being printed, but he suggests that the notion that the Pomaks were cruel suppressors and fratricides originated in Istanbul, where the Turkish authorities gave currency to it in an attempt to prove their own innocence of the mass massacres in Bulgaria that had provoked violent indignation all over Europe. In acting thus the Turks did a great injustice to their fellow-believers, the Bulgarian Moslems. Later, the Turkish version was endorsed by the then British ambassador in Istanbul and it was subsequently accepted at its face value without any checking of the facts. The authority and reputation of Her Majesty's ambassador were enough.

Citing the memoirs of participants in the 1876 uprising and historians who are in disfavor in the Bulgaria of today, Haytov showed that the Pomaks never took part in the massacres and that "there is in general no ground to blame them" for the bloodshed. The existing psychological barrier between the Bulgarian Moslems and the rest of the country, in the author's opinion, should be demolished as "an antediluvian historical survival, of which we are still the slaves." Haytov, who comes from the Rhodope region and is also the author of historical studies published by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, concludes his article with an appeal "to pull down once and for all one of the most annoying barriers /that forms an obstacle/ to spiritual union with the Rhodope

14 May 1976

Bulgarian" Moslems. We are not living in 1905, he said (an allusion to the mass exodus of the Pomaks), but in 1976, and it is inadmissible to go on labeling the Bulgarian Moslems as "fratricides" and "butchers." Haytov put his finger on a sore spot and courageously exposed one of the reasons for the regime's difficulties with the Pomaks. His article has not evoked any answers so far, although he attacked by name several of the regime's leading historians.

To judge from Haytov's article, whose arguments and evidence seem well-founded, it appears -- paradoxically -- that it is the present-day communist historians who are maintaining a prejudiced historical view of the Pomaks' role 100 years ago. This obvious distortion of history is the more surprising as the regime is genuinely and sincerely interested in integrating the Pomaks, and the propagation of such theories can only be counterproductive.

The national celebrations reached their climax at a meeting held in Panagyurishte (one of the centers of the April 1876 Uprising) on May 2. Todor Zhivkov unveiled a new monument commemorating the centenary, and Academician Angel Balevski, president of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, addressed the gathering (see Rabotnichesko Delo, 3 May 1976). Although he said nothing about the Pomaks, Balevski devoted a long section of his speech to relations between the Turks living in Bulgaria and the rest of the population a century ago and today. He said that the participants in the uprising "had a correct attitude to the peaceful . . . working Turkish population; they tried to neutralize [the Turks] or to win them over." The instructions worked out at Oborishte, where the uprising broke out on 13 April 1876, particularly stressed that toward the families of peaceful Turks "our sacred duty is to safeguard their prosperity, their lives, and their religion in the same way we cherish the honor and lives of our own families." Balevski went on to state that today "in our fatherland Bulgarians and Turks live harmoniously together," and unite their efforts to build socialism. The Bulgarian Turks consider the People's Republic of Bulgaria to be their only fatherland. . . . They enjoy completely equal rights; they are an inseparable part of our nation."

Balevski's statements contrast somewhat with official policy toward the minorities; regime officials usually refrain from mentioning the minorities' existence, except on rare occasions (cf. Bulgarian SRs/5 and 6, RFER, 21 February and 7 March 1974, Items 2 and 4, respectively; and G.S., "Bulgarian Plenum Devoted to Ideological Activity," Bulgarian BR/3, RFER, 19 April 1974, pp.12-14). At the same time, Balevski's words were intended to arouse patriotic feelings in the Bulgarian Turks toward the land in which they live. While recognizing their different ethnic origins, the regime's policy is to integrate the minorities into "a single socialist nation" and this is regarded as "a basic task" (cf. the regime's policies vis-à-vis the Jewish minority -- see Bulgarian SR/2, RFER, 21 January 1976, Item 2). Such a line has been consistently followed since the publication of the 1971 Constitution, which fails to mention ethnic minorities and refers only to "citizens of non-Bulgarian origin" (Article 45). (049)

RAD Background/105
(World Communist Movement)
14 May 1976



PAN-EUROPEAN SUMMIT IN SIGHT AT LAST?

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: At the May 4-6 session of the 28-party Editorial Commission in East Berlin further progress was evidently made in drawing up a collective text for the pan-European communist conference: it was agreed that the next session of the commission, in June, would be the "final" one, and that the conference would be held "in the near future." But the Yugoslav delegate, Grlickov, has reported that the questions still unsettled are "of principled and fundamental significance." Meanwhile, the French, who are pressing for a more militant document, have joined the Yugoslavs in postponing a decision on the conference and its document until a final draft is available, while the British have announced that their delegates will not be empowered to sign the document -- that decision must be left to the Executive.

x x x

After more than a year and a half of closed-door meetings marked by an ebb-and-flow confrontation between the "loyalist" majority and a minority of independents, 28 European communist parties appear to have entered upon the last stretch of the long, arduous path to the pan-European summit. This emerged from last week's three-day session of the 28 delegations, meeting this time not as the "Editorial Committee" but as the "Editorial Commission" -- a terminological change which in itself suggested that agreement on a consensual conference document was at last in sight. (1) The joint communiqué said that, after delegates had "further discussed" the current draft (the fifth), they agreed that "a final meeting of the Editorial Commission would be held in June" -- or, as the Pravda report (May 7) had it, "at the beginning of June" -- and that the conference itself would take place in East Berlin "in the near future." (2)

From this it appeared that the delegations had succeeded in hammering out a near-agreement on the draft in three successive editorial meetings (January 13-22, March 16-18, and May 4-6). Since, however, the preparatory process had been prolonged by a full year because of the independent parties' resistance to recurrent Soviet efforts to impose something like a "general line" on the European parties, the basic question remained: on what basis had this near-agreement been reached? In other words: which side had made the more significant concessions?

Grlickov's Optimism

The chief Yugoslav delegate, Aleksandar Grlickov, cast some light on this key question in a commentary on the last East Berlin session published in the Belgrade daily Politika. (3)

- (1) Apart from its constituent session in Budapest on 21 December 1974, the Editorial Commission had met only once before -- in mid-December 1975, after the October editorial session had deceptively seemed to promise early agreement on a "limited" East German draft (the third).
- (2) L'Unità, 8 May 1976, and Neues Deutschland, 8-9 May 1976.
- (3) 8 May 1976. See Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslavs Hopeful About Communist Conference," RAD Background/104 (Yugoslavia), Radio Free Europe Research, 10 May 1976. This paper contains an interesting analysis of differences between the Serbo-Croatian original and Tanjug's English report of Grlickov's statement -- the latter being distinctly more "optimistic."

Grlickov indicated Yugoslav satisfaction with the way things were going by stating that a "significant step forward" had been taken at that session but, he went on, agreement could not be reached on "some amendments." He hoped that this problem could be solved at the next (and concluding) session of the Editorial Commission. This, he said, would take place "at the beginning of June" -- thereby agreeing with the Pravda report, whereas the East German and Italian communist reports, as noted above, said more vaguely that it would be some time during the month. As for the date of the conference itself, Grlickov said: "There is a feeling among the parties that it will take place at the end of June, provided that all parties are able to attend at that time."

This relatively "optimistic" statement by Grlickov after the editorial session gains added significance from the fact that on the eve of the meeting he vigorously restated Yugoslav positions in a three-part interview given to a Yugoslav newspaper. (4) Noting that the preparatory process had dragged on so long because of differences of opinion between the parties on important questions -- differences which had not been eliminated, but would remain after the conference -- Grlickov said that for the LCY what mattered most was "the political exchange of views and the dialogue during the preparations," and the positions adopted by party leaders in their conference speeches. "Proceeding from this, the LCY made the proposal that the conference should conclude without adopting any document whatever, and later, taking into consideration the opinions of other parties, it proposed that the conference should conclude with the adoption of a meaningful political [i.e., not ideological -- K.D.] statement." What the Yugoslavs wanted, that is, was a public demonstration of permitted diversity. Failing that, they would insist on a document acceptable to them -- one based on the new principle of consensus wrested from the pro-Soviet parties at the Warsaw consultative meeting in October 1974, nonbinding, and dealing with political and not with ideological questions.

Consensus remained the key. Grlickov stressed that "the date of the conference can be fixed only when the document has been accepted by the leaderships of all the participating parties." The LCY, however, regarded the current draft as being "a possible acceptable basis" for a collective document. Again there was the note of satisfaction: "Progress has been made which ultimately is leading to the views on the document and its contents being drawn closer together." The Yugoslav Communists, he added, "decidedly advocate that the work of the conference be fully public" -- as a demonstration of diversity which would strengthen the LCY's interparty positions.

(4) Nova Makedonija, 30 April, 1 and 2 May 1976.

Warning on Consensus

On May 12 Grlickov cast some more light on the East Berlin session in his report (5) to a commission of the LCY Executive Committee. Repeating that "an important step forward" had been made in co-ordinating views on certain parts of the draft through "satisfactory formulations," he added an important qualification: the questions on which agreement had not been reached were mainly "issues of principled and fundamental significance." Serious efforts were therefore needed to reach agreement on these "controversial questions, in order to work out a document acceptable to all parties," and an attempt to do so would be made at the next session of the Editorial Commission (he did not, one notes, say that it would be the "final" session).

He went on to raise a possibly crucial issue -- how the principle of "consensus" is to be understood and put into practice:

The application of the consensus principle must be taken to mean that if agreement on significant and principled questions is not reached, there should not be insistence on the imposition of one-sided views. This is a principle which cannot be circumvented, and which was accepted as far back as the first Warsaw meeting of October 1974 by all the participating parties.

The wording of this strong warning suggests that, while the fundamental procedural principle of consensus has, indeed, been formally accepted by all, the "conservative" majority has not given up attempts to push through in practice an interpretation of it unacceptable to the Yugoslavs and their allies, perhaps with reference to such controversial questions as the loyalist equation of anticommunism with anti-Sovietism. For the independent parties this would certainly be a question of "principled and fundamental significance."

Finally, Grlickov emphasized the Yugoslav position that "the conference . . . is to be on specific subjects; its goals are limited, and it cannot be otherwise." It was only within this framework that one could hope for the conference to be held as soon as possible. In this connection he repeated -- as Stane Dolanc, secretary of the LCY Presidium's Executive Committee, had done in

(5) English and Serbo-Croatian reports by Tanjug, 12 May 1976.

an April 29 television program (6) -- that "the LCY will take its final decision on its attitude toward the conference and on its participation in it when it has at its disposal the final text of the document."

The fact that the Yugoslavs have publicized their very strong stand shows that this is not an empty threat: they obviously have no intention of yielding to pro-Soviet pressures in the closing stages of a long, hard struggle that for them (as the post-Tito era inexorably approaches) has been of fundamental importance.

The Obstreperous French

From the start the Soviets must have reckoned with Yugoslav resistance to their plans for the conference. But they must find it particularly galling to be encountering similar trouble from the formerly loyalist but now ostentatiously independent French CP. At the mid-March editorial session, when considerable progress had already been made toward a collective document, the French presented a memorandum criticizing the current draft for not being militant enough, for failing to make an adequate analysis of the crisis of Western capitalism, and for giving priority to Soviet state interests over those of the class struggle in the West. (7)

It seems probable that the French demand for a more militant document -- which in recent weeks has found collateral expression in French communist criticism of Soviet and East European attitudes to Giscard d'Estaing's regime (8) -- was the subject of debate at last

- (6) This program, in which Dolanc reaffirmed the LCY's stand on the conference in vigorous terms, demonstrated the extent to which that stand is now based upon a strategic alliance with the independent Western parties, in that Santiago Carrillo of the PCE, Gian Carlo Pajetta of the PCI, and Jean Kanapa of the PCF also participated in it.
- (7) The existence of this memorandum has not been officially confirmed, but reports from different sources in various capitals have given substantive accounts of it -- and these reports have been broadly confirmed, as to the content of the memorandum, by Jean Kanapa's statement in l'Humanité of May 12 (see below).
- (8) See, for example, the criticism of Polish Premier Jaroszewicz's praise of French policies in l'Humanité of May 8, and the blunt statement by French communist youth leader Jean-Michel Catala that Brezhnev's analysis of French foreign policy "is wrong" (interview in Le Nouvel Observateur, 10 May 1976).

week's session of the Editorial Commission (and may very well have been among the important, unsettled questions to which Grlickov referred).

Significantly, l'Humanité did not report the conclusion of the East Berlin session -- although it did report a three-day conference of nine West European communist party delegations in Stockholm, to discuss economic problems. But on May 12 Kanapa broke the silence with an interview in l'Humanité which cannot have made pleasant reading for the Soviets.

Kanapa said that the PCF expected that the conference would not only show "the progress of détente, the new possibilities of co-operation on the continent," but also "the obstacles raised on this path by imperialism and its political representatives" -- a demand, that is, for a more militant document. "While putting aside any idea of a common, uniform strategy," he went on, "the communist parties must, in our opinion, be able, together, to say a certain number of things about the Europe of peace, democracy, and progress which our continent must become." This collective analysis should take into account "the crisis that affects capitalist Europe and its grave repercussions on the workers," and would provide a reply to "the pretensions of the Kissingers, Schmidts, and Giscard d'Estaings to confuse peaceful coexistence with the social status quo, to prevent the working class of countries like ours from taking its due part in the direction of society's affairs." (French communist polemics with the Soviets over French foreign policy show that in the PCF's view it is not only Western statesmen who "confuse peaceful coexistence with the social status quo.")

Kanapa concluded by issuing a warning that the French, like the Yugoslavs (and others?), would reserve their decision on the conference and its document until the final draft was available:

The discussion is going on. It is not simple; it is sometimes lively; but that is normal, because important questions are at stake. The preparatory commission is to meet again at the beginning of June. After that, and before the conference is convened, the draft which has been produced will be sent to the Central Committees of the parties. At that point our Central Committee will examine the draft and take a decision based upon its content.

British Not to Sign

The independent British party has meanwhile taken a decision which goes even further in manifesting autonomy. Last week end the CPGB Executive heard a report from the two delegates who had been in East Berlin, Jack Woddis and Irene Brennan. As a result

the Executive decided that its delegation to the conference . . . will not be empowered to endorse the final document.

This will be the responsibility of the Executive itself, which will decide its attitude to the document and to other conference matters at its first meeting following the conference. (9)

The British CP is here acting upon a precedent established at the last world conference in June 1969. On that occasion the British delegation declined to sign the conference document, explaining that this was up to the party's Executive -- which subsequently decided not to sign (10)

These expressions of Yugoslav, French, and British reaccitrance are not the only clouds which still obscure the pan-European summit. For example, the Italian CP is now devoting all its energies to a crucial election which it hopes may bring it, at last a governmental role -- which means that it will certainly not agree to the holding of the conference before the elections on June 20-21. By the same token, it is more important than ever for the PCI to emphasize its independence by resisting the Soviet interpretation of "proletarian internationalism." On the other hand, the French pressure for a more militant document clearly runs counter to the PCI's policy needs: on that issue the alliance between the two breaks down.

But, despite these serious differences, the PCF and the PCI (with others) would agree in rejecting the Soviet view expressed in an editorial in the May issue of Politicheskoye Samoobrazovanye. Criticizing "national" communism, it said the CPSU believed that the conference would make a "substantial contribution" to the

(9) Morning Star, 11 May 1976.

(10) The same decision, with the same outcome, was taken in 1969 by the then independent Norwegian CP. Now "normalized," it will certainly not repeat that gesture of rebellion.

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communist search for "unity of action and the cohesion of the entire communist movement on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." (11)


Summing up, one could perhaps say that, if the summit is in sight, the last stretch will be a hazardous one for the climbers -- and that the view from the top will not be particularly impressive when seen through Soviet eyes. (045)

- end -

(11) Novosti agency, 13 May 1976.

RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.



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RAD Background Report/106
(Eastern Europe)
14 May 1976

SURVEY OF EAST EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS

(January-April 1976)

Edited and with an Introduction by William F. Robinson

Summary: The following essays cover the broad outlines of East-West, Soviet-East European, and interparty relations, as well as of developments within and among the individual East European states themselves during the period between January and April 1976. For a more detailed analysis the reader should refer to the Radio Free Europe Research Background and Situation Reports listed at the end of each essay.

* * *

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INTRODUCTION

By William F. Robinson

Drama and suspense attended the Bundesrat's final ratification of the Polish-West German pension agreement on March 12. Originally negotiated between FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Polish party First Secretary Edward Gierek during the Helsinki summit meeting of July 30 - August 1 last year, the pact was widely regarded as the first fruit of the accord on security and co-operation in Europe, which was signed in the Finnish capital only after more than two years of long and arduous East-West discussions. Almost from the beginning, however, the Schmidt-Gierek agreement became the subject of an acrimonious political debate between the FRG's opposition and governing parties.

The crux of the dispute was not the pension agreement itself (under which Bonn is to pay Warsaw DM 1,300 million in settlement of claims for individual Polish contributions to the German pension fund during World War II), but a protocol to the accord which provides for the resettlement of 120,000 to 125,000 ethnic Germans from Poland to the FRG over a period of four years. The CDU/CSU opposition argued that a protocol might not be considered binding under international law and, even if it were, there existed an additional 160,000 ethnic Germans willing to leave Poland who were not apparently covered by the terms of the document. For those reasons, the two union parties said, they would be unable to vote for the agreement unless they received an official clarification from Warsaw that would settle their doubts. However, a rejection of the pact would have meant a severe setback to the ruling coalition's attempts to bring about a fundamental normalization in Polish-West German relations -- a setback that could have had both long-term bilateral effects and unfavorable ramifications throughout the entire sphere of Bonn's Ostpolitik.

After considerable diplomatic activity in Bonn and Warsaw, Polish Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski finally released a statement on March 9 that summed up the Polish position. The new clarification, however, still did not satisfy the CDU/CSU, and this forced FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to make a last-minute attempt to gain a semantic concession from the Poles concerning the text of the resettlement protocol. Just when it appeared that no such concession would be forthcoming, Warsaw announced that the desired West German interpretation of that document -- namely, that additional resettlers, above and beyond the 125,000, "will be granted" exit permits -- had been accepted. This, to the considerable relief of both governments, led to the unanimous ratification of the pension agreement on the following day. The ratification, in turn, brought about an immediate and substantial change in the political atmosphere between the two countries. Evidence of this change emerged most clearly during the visit to Poland of Helmut Rohde, West German Minister for Education and Science, between March 22 and 26, and the visit to Bonn of Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski between April 6 and 9.

In both cases, the media stressed the warmth of reception and the smooth course of the talks between the ministers involved.

The high point of Olszowski's sojourn was the news that PUPP First Secretary Edward Gierek would make his oft-postponed visit to the FRG from June 8 to 12. It is not expected that Gierek will be able to sign any agreements of significance during his stay, since the time till his arrival is too short to permit the solution of the many specific issues still outstanding between the two governments (e.g., cultural co-operation, school textbook reform, liberalization of imports from Poland, etc.). Nevertheless, his willingness to travel to Bonn will be seen as Warsaw's agreement that the basic underpinnings of German-Polish normalization have indeed -- and finally -- been laid in position.

Similar success could not be claimed with regard to West Berlin, whose relations with the FRG remained a bone of contention between Bonn and the capitals of Eastern Europe. At the end of March, for example, it was announced that the Kaliningrad project had fallen through. As originally envisaged, this scheme called for the construction and equipping of a 1,200-mw atomic power plant by the West Germans near Kaliningrad in the Soviet part of what was formerly East Prussia. The plant was to have been paid for by Soviet electric power deliveries to West Berlin and the FRG. The West Berlin aspect of the deal was seen as highly significant because it would not only have boosted the city's power supply by 20 per cent, but also would have linked it to the West German and West European power grid, thus permitting power to be fed to the city from Western sources whenever necessary.

Although FRG Economics Minister Hans Friderichs blamed the high price of electricity demanded by the Soviets for the failure of the project, it is probable that this issue served primarily as a welcome device to the parties concerned to withdraw from a politically sensitive scheme without damaging over-all Bonn-Moscow relations. There were frequent reports in the last three years of East German opposition to the proposed power project, since it would have given West Berlin virtual self-sufficiency in the supply of electricity and significantly strengthened the city from an economic viewpoint. Since East German opposition alone cannot explain Soviet abandonment of the scheme, however, the decision indicates that Moscow itself is not yet ready to do business with the FRG if this results in a visible strengthening of ties between the latter and West Berlin.

Little progress was also made in the further implementation of the Helsinki agreement. In fact, a statement issued by "informed NATO sources" on April 30 said that such implementation had "not advanced beyond its initial stage" and that there had been "no change in the basic situation between East and West." Among the actual disappointments to Western hopes were the multiple refusals of the East German authorities to grant visas to correspondents of Deutsche Welle and Deutschlandfunk, two radio stations in the FRG that broadcast to Eastern Europe. Because of their alleged

"constant interference . . . in the internal affairs of the socialist states" the stations were not allowed to cover the Leipzig Fair, the Olympic handball qualifying match between the GDR and the FRG in Karl-Marx-Stadt, and the signing of the inner-German postal agreement in East Berlin.

There were, however, at least some small steps taken in a positive vein. In January, for example, the Soviet Union announced that 18 Western newspapers, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, the Financial Times, and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, would go on sale in the USSR this year. The announcement did not reveal how many copies would be available or where they would be sold, and officials of the papers involved said at the time that they had not yet been approached on the matter. Also linked to the Helsinki agreement was a Soviet decree issued in the same month that relaxed the prevailing emigration regulations to some degree. It reduced the fee for an exit permit by 25 per cent, eliminated the requirement for a character reference from the applicant's supervisor and party secretary, and provided for a review of cases every six months instead of every year. Nevertheless, the grounds for refusal of a visa remained broad enough to cover almost any person applying -- e.g., applications may be rejected in order to protect state interests, to protect the rights of citizens remaining behind, or to protect public morals. Finally, the East German government announced on April 29 that working conditions for accredited foreign correspondents and their spouses would be eased as of June 1. Beginning on that date correspondents will be able to raise questions directly with ministries and other official bodies instead of having to address their queries through the Foreign Ministry's Department for Journalistic Affairs. In addition, the spouses and technical staffs of correspondents will be issued personal authorization papers and a document recommending the border authorities to process them quickly at the border crossing points between East and West Berlin.

One potential fillip to East-West relations occurred in the economic sphere. In early January Sir Christopher Soames, Vice-President and External Affairs Commissioner of the Common Market, made the first official visit of an EEC commissioner to a Comecon country. In an address to the Rumanian Institute for International Law and International Relations in Bucharest, Soames challenged the East European trading bloc to resume its negotiations with the EEC and took the opportunity to restate the Community's position. Rejecting Soviet criticism of the character and policy of the Common Market, the commissioner said it would be "appropriate and sensible" for the two trade organizations to establish and develop relations in those areas where they both are competent to act, and for the individual Comecon states to establish their own ties with Brussels in those sectors (e.g., trade policy) where Comecon as an organization has no decision-making authority. In a news conference following his speech, Soames said that the Rumanian government agreed with the EEC on this matter and found such dual-level relations "perfectly compatible" with one another.

Although the direct impact of the Soames appeal cannot be determined, in mid-February East German Deputy Premier Gerhard Weiss,

current chairman of Comecon's executive committee, delivered a draft proposal for a framework agreement with the EEC to Luxembourg Foreign Minister Gaston Thorn, the present chairman of the Common Market's Council of Ministers. The proposal contained 15 articles and according to observers was a model of drafting skill that posed many problems for the EEC. Two fundamental issues of this nature were the need to clarify the negotiating competence of both groups (but particularly that of Comecon) and the attempt of the draft, at least in some respects, to circumvent the institutional structure and division of authority within the Community, thus challenging some of the fundamental principles of EEC policy. In addition, many Comecon economic practices -- e.g., barter, monopoly, plan co-ordination, variable internal foreign currency multipliers, turnover taxes, etc. -- present formidable barriers to the conclusion of an agreement allowing the EEC equal access to Eastern markets.

Owing to the obstacles, the proposed framework agreement would seem to offer an inadequate basis for a final accord. In fact, a willingness by both groups to undertake a more fundamental revision of trade policies and organizational patterns will probably be necessary before any substantial advance can be made in co-operation between the two international organizations. Thus, it is likely that the Common Market reply, which is expected to be finished by August, will not contain any specific economic or organizational suggestions, but will instead attempt to fashion the means by which the dialogue can be continued.

Turning from more or less continental to regional issues, mention should be made of the Balkan conference of January 26 to February 5, the first such meeting to be held since the end of World War II. The initiative for the conference came from Greek Premier Constantine Karamanlis, who issued an invitation to the heads of the Balkan states on 20 August 1975, proposing that the deputy economic ministers of the countries concerned meet in Athens to determine those sectors, such as the economy, communications, tourism, energy, etc., in which regional co-operation would be possible. Although Albania rejected the invitation out of hand, Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey joined Greece in agreeing to attend.

For the first time in many years conditions favored the holding of just such a multilateral conference. The proposal, for example, was formally made only three weeks after the signing in Helsinki of the Final Act on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In such an atmosphere neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could object to their allies' attempt to achieve regional détente, and Bulgaria's refusal to participate would have been interpreted as an indication of questionable Soviet intentions. Secondly, the internal changes in Greece after the collapse of the military junta in 1974 had made the Karamanlis government more acceptable to the communist states. Finally, the strained state of Greek and Turkish relations with the US after Turkey's invasion of Cyprus had prompted these two NATO countries to make efforts

toward a rapprochement with the USSR and Eastern Europe. Participation in a Balkan conference with Warsaw Pact states was consistent with this policy and undoubtedly made Moscow more willing to see the conference take place.

None of this should be construed to mean that a unity of views prevailed at the meeting, or that many of the factors fostering divergent attitudes in the past had ceased to operate. In fact, the very composition of the delegates -- whose leaders ranged from a first deputy minister (Rumania) down to a head of ministerial department (Bulgaria) -- indicated from the outset that uniformity could not be expected. Nevertheless, Western press reports, which were indirectly supported by the conference communiqué, provided evidence that Bulgaria's demands proved decisive in imposing a framework on the meeting. Specifically, the Bulgarians refused to take up issues of a predominantly political character (as did the Turks), insisted on excluding cultural co-operation from the agenda, demanded that the conference be purely consultative in nature, and rejected a proposal for a second meeting to be held in Sofia. This position evidently prevailed, for the communiqué said only that a "general exchange of opinions" had taken place and that "ideas and suggestions" had been presented. The latter, it said, are to be brought to the attention of the governments concerned "as a matter of information or for study." The governments may then "choose those that are useful and acceptable and decide what measures to take in order to have them accepted on a multilateral basis, including the convening of a meeting for this purpose."

It is probably safe to assume that Bulgaria's role as a restraining factor was a direct reflection of Soviet interests and concerns. Moscow would never tolerate the formation of anything resembling a bloc of five Balkan countries, especially when this would involve Bulgaria and Rumania in far-reaching commitments outside Comecon and the Warsaw Pact. Even specific regional agreements falling far short of this are likely to be looked at long and hard by the Soviets. The current political situation in the Balkans (the approach of the post-Tito era, potential upheaval in Albania, and Rumania's economic and trade difficulties) might make a waiting game Moscow's best bet for eventual political gain.

For additional reading see the following Radio Free Europe Research Background and Situation Reports:

"Relations with the FRG: Final Ratification of the Pension Agreement," Polish SR/10, 19 March 1976, Item 1a.

"Relations with the FRG: Reciprocal Visits," Polish SR/13, 9 April 1976, Item 2.

RAD Staff, "Six Months After: The East European Response to Helsinki," RAD BR/46, 18 February 1976.

"Common Market Official Visits Rumania," Rumanian SR/2, 20 January 1976, Item 1.

Harry Trend, "Comecon 'Framework' Proposal for Relations with EEC," RAD BR/60, 12 March 1976.

R.N., "Bulgaria and the Balkan Conference in Athens," RAD BR/41, 12 February 1976.

Robert R. King, "The Athens Conference and the Balkans: Old Variations on an Old Theme," RAD BR/55, 1 March 1976.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT:
THE CHALLENGE OF "EUROCOMMUNISM"

By Kevin Devlin

The most interesting development in communist affairs during the first quarter of 1976 was a growing ideological debate -- sharpening at times to outright polemics -- between the conservative regimes of Eastern Europe and independent Western parties. This public display of doctrinal disunity was certainly not without its effect on the secret editorial meetings at which the European parties continued their slow, zigzag movement toward the long overdue pan-European conference.

On the Western side the challenge to Soviet authority was posed primarily by a strategic alliance of the three most important parties -- the Italian, French, and Spanish CPs. During the closing months of 1975 this alliance found expression in bilateral communiqués in which all three parties committed themselves to working with other political forces, within the framework of constitutional electoralism, for gradual transition to a "socialist" regime in which all existing bourgeois liberties would be guaranteed -- including the right of the electorate to vote the regime out of power. Their rejection of "existing models" of socialism gained in credibility by their readiness -- a new readiness in the case of the PCF -- to criticize the shortcomings of the USSR with regard to socialist democracy.

For the Italian and Spanish parties (PCI and PCE) such positions were nothing new. The French party too had, indeed, long been proclaiming its devotion to democracy, but the credibility of the claim was diminished by its traditional loyalty to Moscow. The relatively abrupt shift of the PCF toward a demonstrative independence which involved explicit, repeated criticism of the Soviet regime therefore drew attention to the challenge to Soviet authority posed by what some commentators termed "Eurocommunism." The new line was formally endorsed at the PCF's 22nd Congress in early February, and in the preceding weeks party spokesmen repeatedly expressed unprecedented criticism of Soviet policies. In early January, for instance, Secretary-General Marchais reaffirmed the Politburo's "most formal disapproval" of Soviet prison camps that had been registered in its statement of mid-December. A few days later he declared: "Socialism is synonymous with liberty. . . . It excludes having recourse to repression or taking administrative measures against the expression of ideas. . . . There is a divergence between us and the CPSU with regard to socialist democracy."

At the congress itself Marchais renewed the attack, speaking of the PCF's disapproval of violation of human rights in the USSR: "We cannot admit that the communist ideal . . . should be stained by unjust and unjustifiable acts." On the ideological level, this turning-point congress was marked by the abandonment of the Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat -- one of the key issues in the growing debate between Eastern regimes

and Western "Eurocommunists." On the opening day of the congress (February 4) the East German organ Neues Deutschland published (and Pravda reprinted) an editorial insisting that the doctrine was universally valid. An editorial in the Czechoslovak Rude Pravo went further: it denounced the abandonment of the doctrine as "rightist revisionism," and said that those who ignored it could not be called socialists.

The strategic rift between the regimes and these Western parties also found expression at the 25th CPSU Congress in late February. For a start, Marchais and the Spanish CP leader Santiago Carrillo declined to attend the Soviet congress. The latter went instead with a delegation of Spanish opposition leaders to Rome, where he declared in an interview that Soviet socialism was "in the primitive stage," and that Western socialism when it came would be profoundly different -- "based on majority consensus, with a readiness to give up power if this majority ceased to exist" (La Stampa, February 26).

As for Marchais, he explained on February 27 that he had not gone to the Moscow congress because of differences between the two parties on the question of socialist democracy and on French foreign policy, adding that these differences were such that the conditions for a meeting between himself and Brezhnev "do not exist today." The French delegate to the congress, Gaston Plissonnier, was not provocative in his congress speech, but afterward he reaffirmed the PCF's challenge by holding a Kremlin press conference in which he declared: "We have not come to Moscow to negotiate. . . . As for proletarian internationalism, if this is reduced to a mere identity of views among communist parties, it would be better to finish quickly with this rudimentary form."

An interesting contrast was provided by Berlinguer's congress speech. His statement of the PCI's commitment to pluralistic democracy was more strongly worded than Plissonnier's; it stressed that in foreign policy the PCI would work "within the framework of [Italy's] international alliances" -- an obvious reference to NATO and the EEC -- and that it would firmly defend Italian sovereignty against "any foreign interference in our internal affairs." Andrei Sakharov described the speech as an indirect criticism of the Soviet regime and an indirect endorsement of the theses of Soviet "dissidents" like himself. But the full text of Berlinguer's speech was published in Pravda; and when he met Brezhnev, Suslov, and Ponomarev for "an exchange of opinions" the key sentence in the joint communiqué bore an "Italian" stamp: the two parties hoped to continue expanding their "internationalist co-operation . . . on the basis of fraternal friendship and respect for the independence of each of them."

Despite this show of fraternal solidarity, the divergence between the congress speeches of Berlinguer, Plissonnier, and McLennan of Britain, on one side, and Soviet and pro-Soviet speakers on the other was such that it amounted to an unprecedented if indirect ideological debate. Brezhnev himself was unprovocative in his emphasis on "proletarian internationalism" and "general laws,"

and in his veiled warnings against "concessions to opportunism"; but other loyalist speakers were more direct in their attacks on "right-wing opportunism" or on "attempts to 'modernize' Marxism . . . and to cut it up into national slices" (P. Masherov of the CPSU).

But the divergences expressed at the 25th congress deserved attention mainly because they were expressed at the congress. The developing debate between loyalists and "Eurocommunists" found more explicit expression before and after the congress in statements and articles by East European spokesmen -- notably Soviet, East German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian -- and in Western communist reaction. Czechoslovak CC Secretary Kempny was particularly outspoken in a mid-March speech criticizing "the transformation of Marxist-Leninist parties into opportunistic parties of a social democratic nature."

The ideological debate generally concerned such doctrinal issues as proletarian internationalism (which for the orthodox meant virtually unconditional solidarity with the Soviet regime), the dictatorship of the proletariat, and what loyalists viewed as "general laws" for the construction of socialism. Another controversial question was the extent to which Western communist parties should seek political progress through alliances with other forces. But behind these lay a more basic issue: the challenge to Soviet authority posed by major Western parties increasingly determined to give priority to their own political interests over those of the Kremlin, and to reinforce their claim to independence by selective criticism of Soviet policies. The challenge came, moreover, at a time when the Soviets were making obvious efforts to strengthen integration among the East European regimes in many areas -- a fact that had much to do with the vigorous Yugoslav interventions in the debate, on the side of the independent Western parties.

Yugoslav support for these Western parties was particularly noticeable in connection with an interesting episode involving the CPSU and the PCI. In mid-March, just after the 25th congress, a pamphlet attacking Western communist "revisionism" and "opportunism" was published in Moscow -- after a delay of five months. The author was one Venyamin Midtsev, a relatively obscure "candidate in philosophical sciences" who was also a "collaborator" of the foreign affairs section of the CPSU CC. No Western party was named, but Midtsev made his target clear by devoting a third of the booklet to criticism of the PCI's leading ideologist, Luciano Gruppi. An editorial in l'Unità rejected Midtsev's view that anyone who affirmed the "right of disagreement and criticism" with regard to the East European regimes was revisionist and opportunist, adding: "The aberrant but logical corollary of this concept is that 'the principle of national sovereignty' must be practically annulled in 'proletarian internationalism' -- an internationalism which, according to him, is measured by the attitude adopted toward the USSR and other socialist countries." Significantly, the Yugoslavs also reacted promptly, and with even greater vigor, to the Midtsev pamphlet. In commentaries broadcast on Radio Zagreb and Radio Belgrade on March 23 Milika Sundic and Cedomir Vuckovic both denounced the booklet as an attempt to impose on other parties "the theory of limited sovereignty."

The differences between pro-Soviet and independent parties which found limited expression in this growing ideological debate continued to delay the holding of the pan-European conference of communist parties, originally scheduled for "mid-1975," although some progress toward a consensual collective document was apparently made in the two preparatory meetings held during the quarter.

The first of these was an unprecedentedly long 10-day session on January 13-22. The prolonged debate was over a new East German draft -- the fifth. This was considerably shorter than earlier ones and reportedly replaced the "hard-line" November draft with a more acceptable text, perhaps similar to the one presented in October.

In early February Italian delegates lifted the veil of official secrecy to claim that a large measure of agreement had been reached. Gian Carlo Pajetta, in an interview in Le Nouvel Observateur of February 2, even said that the document was "now ready," and that "nothing has been decided that is contrary to our preoccupations, or to what we judge it necessary to affirm through such a conference." In an article in Rinascita of February 6 the No.3 delegate, Antonio Rubbi, said more circumspectly that the document had been drawn up "in its fundamental lines," but that "there still remain questions to be studied and discussed."

A more revealing account was given by Sergio Segre in his report to a Central Committee commission in mid-February. Segre said that, although work still remained to be done, "the understanding that now seems to be taking shape on the draft document agreed upon at the Berlin meetings of December and January is consistent with the stand defended from the first by the PCI." This stand, he went on, "had as a premise the fact that a document acceptable to all could only be a document that identified the points of convergence, without claiming to delineate general lines and strategies, to take on a binding character, or to tackle themes -- such as ideological ones -- on which there exist diverse and divergent positions." But he added that the text could represent "an element of novelty" in interparty relations -- "if each party is consistently faithful to the new spirit which animates it." In his Rinascita article a week earlier Rubbi had similarly followed his claim that agreement had been reached on the "fundamental lines" of the text with criticism of "forced and distorted interpretations" by Soviet and East German writers. If progress (from the Italian viewpoint) had been made, the prolonged confrontation was not yet over.

Another indication of Soviet concessions to the "Euro-communists" came from Jean Terfve of the Belgian CP. In an interview on the 25th congress, published in the party daily Le Drapeau Rouge of March 12, he said that the Soviets accepted "without great difficulty" the idea that "the unitary strategy" of Western Communists could be developed, adding: "This is, by the way, said explicitly, with the agreement of all, in the document drawn up in the course of the preparations for the conference. . . . As for the question of whether [the Soviets] accept this strategy with enthusiasm, that is another problem."

On March 16-18 another preparatory meeting took place. The communiqué said that the results of its work, to be submitted to the 28 party leaderships, would be "discussed at a session of the Editorial Commission." This last detail suggested that considerable progress toward a consensual text had in fact been made, since the "Editorial Commission" had met only once before -- in mid-November, after the October editorial session had deceptively seemed to promise early agreement on a "limited" East German draft (the third). This impression was strengthened by Yugoslav President Tito's remarks during a visit to Stockholm at the end of March. He said that the conference would take place "very soon," and that the Yugoslavs were "making efforts to ensure that these documents will be such that we can accept them."

Toward the end of March, however, there came reports that progress toward the pan-European summit had been put in question by a new development -- a memorandum presented by the French delegation at the mid-March session. The reports from Belgrade, Moscow, and Paris all told substantially the same story. The memorandum reportedly criticized the current draft for its lack of a "class analysis": it demanded a more militant collective document, with particular reference to "the aggravation of the crisis of capitalism" and its consequences for the policies of Western communist parties. The reports also linked the French move with the PCF's current criticism of Soviet attitudes to French foreign policy. Finally, it was said, the memorandum warned that the PCF had not yet decided whether or not to take part in the pan-European conference.

At the end of April the Yugoslav stand on the conference was reaffirmed by Stane Dolanc and Aleksandar Grlickov, the former in a television program in which Carrillo of Spain, Pajetta of Italy, and Kanapa also participated and the latter in a three-part Nova Makedonija interview. Both men stressed it should be "a free exchange of autonomous opinions," with no power to issue directives. Noting that a date for the pan-European summit could be set only after all 28 party leaderships had accepted the collective document (the consensus principle), Grlickov said that progress had been made, so that there now existed "realistic possibilities for the conference to be held in June."

Two days after the last part of Grlickov's interview appeared delegations of all 28 parties -- including the independent British, who had been absent from the previous three sessions -- came together as the Editorial Commission for a three-day meeting. The Yugoslav statements cited above had made it clear that they were now close to consensual agreement on a collective text; but again they failed to reach it. The end of the long road, however, was apparently in sight at last. A joint communiqué said that a "final meeting" of the Editorial Commission would be held "in the near future."

Even if complete agreement were reached at the next session, it seemed clear that the pan-European summit could not take place before June 20 -- the date set for crucial premature elections in Italy. The PCI, having come within a few percentage points of

the Christian Democrats in the June 1975 local elections, was generally considered likely to make further gains, and was vigorously pressing the argument that its participation in government was necessary if Italy was to emerge from its profound crisis. Since emphasis on the party's autonomy was an important plank in the PCI's platform, it would hardly agree to associate itself with a collective communist document -- even a nonbinding expression of the lowest common denominator -- until the elections were over. Moreover, whatever the outcome of the elections, the influence of the PCI on other Western parties could be expected to increase -- and with it the challenge of "Eurocommunism" to orthodox champions of "proletarian internationalism" à la russe.

For further reading see the following Radio Free Europe Research Background Reports:

Kevin Devlin, "Grlickov's Wary Optimism," RAD BR/14, 16 January 1976.

Zdenko Antic, "Yugoslav Paper Blames Moscow for Postponement of European CP Conference," RAD BR/23, 22 January 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "Still No Agreement on Conference Text -- But PCI is 'Satisfied,'" RAD BR/27, 27 January 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "The PCF's Turning-Point Congress," RAD BR/33, 4 February 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "PCI Seeks 'Power Bloc' Instead of 'Dictatorship of Proletariat,'" RAD BR/35, 9 February 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "The French CP's 'New Look' Congress," RAD BR/37, 10 February 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "Agreement on 'Fundamental Lines' of Conference Draft," RAD BR/43, 13 February 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "Segre on 'Positive' Conference Document," RAD BR/49, 20 February 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "But What About the 20th Congress, Comrades?" RAD BR/54, 1 March 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "Discordant Voices at the Moscow Congress," RAD BR/57, 9 March 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "Back to Work on the Conference Document," RAD BR/66, 18 March 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "Italians, Yugoslavs React Sharply to Soviet Attack on 'Revisionism,'" RAD BR/72, 25 March 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "Conference 'Very Soon,' Says Tito -- But Doubts Remain," RAD BR/75, 31 March 1976.

BULGARIA

By Robert R. King

On March 29 the 11th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party opened in Sofia. Although billed in the statutes as the supreme body responsible for establishing party policy, it was noteworthy primarily for its lack of drama. Most of the basic documents setting forth party policy for the next five years were unveiled several weeks before the congress in a series of theses on the economy, the standard of living, science and technology, and the party and mass organizations. Continuity was the most striking characteristic of these pre-congress documents; they contained little that had not been said previously at the 10th BCP Congress in 1971 or in the various CC plenary sessions held since that time. The gathering itself, however, provided an occasion for assessing the performance of the party and its policies in the five years that had elapsed since the 10th congress.

The foreign delegations present on this occasion were considerably more numerous than in 1971. Although Leonid Brezhnev did not head the Soviet delegation (as he had done at the two previous BCP congresses held since he became Soviet party leader), the CPSU was represented by a Politburo member, Fedor Kulakov. The delegations from the other loyalist parties of Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland) were also headed by their party chiefs. As usual, the Rumanian and Yugoslav delegations were led by lower-level officials.

The CC report by First Secretary Todor Zhivkov indicated little or no change in Bulgaria's foreign policy. The maintenance of close economic and political ties with the Soviet Union continues to be given first priority; relations with the loyalist East European states come second; and improving ties with revolutionary movements in the Third World and with the West on a basis of peaceful co-operation is placed third. The speeches of the foreign delegations to the congress reflected the relationship of their parties with Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. The BCP was praised by the loyalists for its consistent "internationalism" and fidelity to the USSR while those parties that pursue more independent policies emphasized the value of its bilateral relationships.

The one issue at the congress that was treated in a more than routine fashion was youth. In his report, Zhivkov blamed the Komsomol committees for not doing enough to foster a Marxist-Leninist outlook and communist virtues among young people. The use of alcohol and tobacco is increasing, he said, and young people often evince "a liberal attitude" to antisocial manifestations and processes. He emphasized the need for youth to be given a proper ideological education in order to prevent them from "making erroneous generalizations about life, society, and human nature." He called for better organization of and control over their leisure time, blaming "shortcomings in the forming of a new way of life" for such things as the increasing divorce rate. For the first time Zhivkov dealt directly with the environmental problems that the new cities pose for children and young people, depriving them of opportunities for natural leisure-time occupations.

In response to Zhivkov's criticism, Komsomol CC secretary Boycho Shteryanov (but not on this occasion the first secretary -- a break with past practice) represented the youth organization at the congress. He engaged in extensive criticism and self-criticism of the Komsomol leadership, admitting a number of shortcomings in the leadership -- it has started too many ventures that have not been properly followed up, cadre work has been inadequate, and there are careerists among the organization's leaders. The secretary also said the leadership has set a poor example by indulging in heavy drinking and attending drunken parties.

Dissatisfaction with the Komsomol leadership culminated in its reorganization on April 23 -- just three weeks after the end of the congress. Shteryanov was promoted to the position of first secretary, and former first secretary Encho Moskov and secretary Atanas Dimitrov were dropped, because of their "transfer to other posts." The real reason for the changes, however, is undoubtedly the leadership shortcomings and the heavy drinking mentioned during the party congress. Also, in line with the criticism voiced by Zhivkov and Shteryanov at the congress, new regulations were introduced to control smoking and the use of alcohol.

The rather routine proceedings of the congress ended on April 2 with Todor Zhivkov's announcement of a number of interesting changes in the Politburo and the CC secretariat. Contrary to expectations, the leading CC bodies were reduced in size; in all, six individuals were dropped and only one promoted. This is out of line with the decision to increase the number of full and candidate members of the CC itself: the 147 full members elected at the 10th congress have been augmented by 7, and the 110 candidate members by 11 (a normal move in view of the increase in party membership).

The number of full members of the Politburo was reduced from 12 on the eve of the congress to 9. No new Politburo members were elected and three were dropped (Zhivko Zhivkov, Ivan Popov, and Todor Pavlov). No changes were made in the candidate members of the Politburo. The number of CC secretaries was reduced from six to five. Two were dropped -- Konstantin Tellalov and Penyu Kiratsov and Ognyan Doynov, the only new name to appear in the top ranks of the leadership, was added. The membership of the CC secretariat was reduced from five to four by the dropping of Georgi Bokov.

Perhaps the least surprising move was the removal from the Politburo of 86-year-old Academician Todor Pavlov, for years known as the archdogmatist in the field of ideology. The failure to re-elect Professor Ivan Popov (68) was also generally expected. Not long ago, he was removed from the post of deputy premier and made a deputy chairman of the State Council -- an honorary but less important position. The third and most surprising removal from the Politburo was that of Zhivko Zhivkov (61). Some 15 years ago he was one of the "coming young men," but in July 1971, when Todor Zhivkov became chairman of the new State Council, Zhivko Zhivkov not only failed to succeed him as premier but was in fact demoted from first deputy to ordinary deputy premier. This apparently marked the beginning of his eclipse, although there has been nothing in his recent activities to suggest a reason for his removal from the Politburo.

The dismissal of two CC secretaries, Konstantin Tellalov and Penyu Kiratsov, is also difficult to explain. Both are relatively young, quite recently elected, and well qualified for their posts -- Tellalov is responsible for foreign relations and Kiratsov, who is an engineer, for industry. There is no indication that they have been held accountable for any particular failures. The new CC secretary, Ognyan Doynov, is an engineer and will obviously be a direct replacement for Kiratsov in the economic and -- particularly -- industrial areas. Tellalov, however, was apparently not replaced, and it seems that CC secretary Boris Velchev will again assume full responsibility for foreign relations, as in the past, along with his main responsibility for party organizations and cadres.

Reducing the number of Politburo members and CC secretaries would seem to be an attempt to concentrate responsibilities in the hands of fewer individuals so as to increase efficiency. None of the dismissed Politburo members and CC secretaries have completely fallen from favor, since all of them were re-elected as members of the Central Committee.

Despite the fact that Ivan Mihailov (79) and Tsola Dragoycheva (78) were re-elected, the removal of Todor Pavlov (86) and Ivan Popov (68) reduced the average age of the Politburo from 64 to 62. This can hardly be considered rejuvenation, however, and it seems likely that new and younger Politburo members will have to be elected in the not-too-distant future.

Preoccupation with preparation for the party congress resulted in little attention being devoted to foreign affairs during the first quarter of 1976. One of the main events to involve Bulgaria was the Athens conference on Balkan co-operation in January. Although Bulgarian news media gave the Karamanlis proposal for the conference some publicity when it was first announced, the issue was subsequently ignored until the mass media covered the opening of the Athens gathering. One reflection of Bulgaria's reluctance to give the event any attention is the fact that even Todor Zhivkov's response to Karamanlis went unreported in Bulgaria. Media coverage was indicative of the general Bulgarian policy toward the conference; foreign press reports branded the Sofia delegation as the least willing to engage in multilateral programs, and it was at its insistence that the conference was declared to be only a consultative gathering and no firm commitment to or date for a future meeting was set.

The attitude of Bulgaria in this case appears to be more a reflection of Soviet concerns and policies than of its own interests or desires. There have been indications, including Zhivkov's censored proposal at the 1971 party congress, that suggest that Bulgaria would in fact favor closer co-operation with its neighbors. In foreign policy matters, however, Sofia has shown itself a devoted follower of the Soviet line, and it is presumably this consideration which led it to play a restraining role at the Athens conference.

The Bulgarians have, however, shown some interest in bilateral co-operation and improved relations with their Balkan neighbors.

Zhivkov was the first Bulgarian head of state since World War II to pay an official visit to Greece, which he did in early April. Relations with Turkey have improved and bilateral economic ties with Rumania are good. The problematic Macedonian question continues to hamper the further development of relations with Yugoslavia, as the Yugoslav delegate pointedly reminded the BCP congress when he addressed it, but efforts are being made to improve relations in the economic and other spheres.

For additional reading, see the following Radio Free Europe Research Background and Situation Reports:

Material on the 11th BCP Congress can be found in the following reports: "The Bulgarian Party Congress: Highlights of the First Day," Bulgarian SR/8, 30 March 1976; "The Bulgarian Party Congress: Foreign Party Delegates Speak on Second Day," Bulgarian SR/9, 31 March 1976; "The Bulgarian Party Congress: Self-criticism by Komsomol Leadership," Bulgarian SR/10, 1 April 1976; and "The BCP Congress: Changes in the Politburo and Secretariat," Bulgarian SR/11, 5 April 1976. "Change in the Komsomol Leadership," Bulgarian SR/13, 28 April 1976, Item 2.

The procongress theses are analyzed in the following reports: "CC Theses Adopt a 'New Approach' in Preparing for the Party Congress," Bulgarian SR/1, 15 January 1976, Item 1; "The CC Theses on Economic Development," SR/2, 21 January 1976, Item 1; "The BCP Theses on Science and Technological Progress," SR/5, 26 February 1976, Item 1; G.S. (Bulgarian Unit), "The BCP Theses on the Party and Mass Organizations," RAD BR/51, 23 February 1976; R.N. (Bulgarian Unit), "The Bulgarian Party Theses on the Standard of Living," RAD BR/59, 11 March 1976.

Robert R. King, "The Bulgarian Communist Party on the Eve of Its 11th Congress," RAD BR/67, 18 March 1976.

R.N. (Bulgarian Unit), "Bulgaria and the Balkan Conference in Athens," RAD BR/41, 12 February 1976.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By Thomas E. Heneghan

The 15th CPCS Congress, which was held in Prague on April 12 to 16, was a victory of co-ordination over confrontation. Hard-line tones had dominated the pre-congress period, and it seemed that the existing divisions within the CPCS would be expressed in some way at the congress. As it turned out, the party's hard-liners hardly spoke at all. The internal scene in Czechoslovakia was treated in the speeches of party leader Gustav Husak and Premier Lubomir Strougal, while the foreign delegates took the lead in discussing the important diplomatic topic of the congress, interparty relations.

Husak's moderated conservative outlook was reflected in his main address to the congress. While he stressed the danger from the Right, his loyalty to the Soviet Union, and the validity of proletarian internationalism, the party leader expressed these positions in a rather low-keyed manner. The most notable part of his presentation was Husak's treatment of those persons "with whom the party had to part company" after the crisis years of 1968-1969. On behalf of the Central Committee, Husak announced that those party members who had been crossed off party lists in the post-invasion purges could seek readmission to the party. This was not a blanket reconciliation, however. Returning members cannot have been "active representatives of right-wing opposition" and will have to prove their loyalty to the party and friendliness to the Soviet Union. And the party, Husak emphasized, is still closed to those who have "moved into complete political isolation" by going "logically along the road to betrayal of, and open enmity toward, the socialist system." But he neither personally named these persons, nor further elaborated on what they had done to warrant continued exclusion from party membership.

Of the half million members purged from the party after the invasion, about 390,000 were simply struck from membership lists and are thus technically eligible for readmission. Each case is to be judged on its own merits, Husak emphasized. While this clearly represents a certain moderation in party policy, it is difficult to say just how many ex-members will be readmitted. The criteria for judgment are vague, and it seems inevitable that some disputes will arise at the local party level when the hard-liners and the moderates scrutinize individual cases. A foretaste of just such a disagreement came on the last day of the congress, when Josef Kempny, chairman of the congress Drafting Commission, told the congress that the appeals of those crossed off party lists had already been duly processed, and that the commission considered the procedure completed. As several Western correspondents noted, the 1,200 delegates present greeted this statement with a wave of applause.

It was presumably the desire to avoid even stronger differences of opinion that prompted exclusion of Vasil Bilak and Alois Indra from the speakers' list. Although both men chaired sessions of

Congress, neither spoke to the gathering about his own area of responsibility. Their absence was all the more noticeable since they had made vigorous hard-line speeches during the pre-congress period. Speaking in Bratislava, Bilak condemned "right-wing opportunism" and stated that Czechoslovakia's experience proved that it was impossible to depart from basic ideological principles and make a compromise (compromesso?) with "views that are at variance with communist ideology." Indra accused the reformist "superpatriots" of opening bank accounts in the West and putting themselves at the service of Western reactionaries. In a widely reported speech in Ostrava, Josef Kempny accused some unnamed communist parties of allowing themselves to be manipulated by imperialist forces and warned that imperialism will never stop trying to divide the workers' movement.

Careful co-ordination also kept these differences from becoming too evident at the congress. With the exception of Antonin Kapek's warning that Czechoslovakia's experience taught that "the revolutionary struggle cannot be carried out under the national flag alone," Czechošlovak comments on the international communist scene were restricted to Husak's support of proletarian internationalism, his hope that the planned European CP summit would fulfill expectations, and his remark that a world conference would be "useful." Proletarian internationalism was the main theme in the speeches of the "loyalist" delegates. Led by Andrei Kirilenko, who substituted for the reportedly ailing Leonid Brezhnev, the six delegates speaking on the second day all stressed their belief in unity among communist parties as embodied in proletarian internationalism. Besides acting as a support of the "loyalist" position in the preparatory meetings for the European CP conference, this chorus represented a sort of "fraternal assistance" for Czechoslovakia as well; the invasion and normalization of Czechoslovakia taken as a whole remains one of the issues most persistently criticized by the "autonomous" parties. The speeches of the Yugoslav and Rumanian delegates were delivered on the third day of the congress, while the French delegate spoke only before a factory meeting. The Italian observer -- the PCI refused to send an official delegate -- did not get to speak at all.

On the second day of the congress, Premier Lubomir Strougal delivered the report on the economic situation. Strougal said that the past five-year period was "beyond doubt one of the most successful in our development so far." His outline of the coming five years generally followed the guidelines set in the draft plan published in February. Among the basic goals of the plan, Strougal pointed out, are a 27-29 per cent increase of national income, greater self-sufficiency in agriculture, and increased export capacity and trade efficiency. Engineering's significance for the economy was highlighted by the planned 48-51 per cent rise in engineering production and the 72-74 per cent growth in engineering exports by 1980. Industrial growth, which is to rise by 32 to 34 per cent, takes precedence in the new plan over expansion of consumption, which is pegged at about 25 per cent. This difference reflects the planners' view that modernization of the economy's aging industrial base deserves added

attention; the 31 per cent increase in investment will provide it. An increase in defense capability, a goal unmentioned in the draft plan, was also cited as a basic objective of the next five years. Since 90 per cent of the national income increment is to come from labor productivity, Strougal also devoted attention to "more energetic" wage differentiation, so that wages will be more dependent on "the results of work and management in general." In general, the new five-year plan indicates a realistic attitude about the problems facing the economy in the coming years. It remains to be seen whether it can solve some of the more persistent problems, such as efficiency and modernization, which have plagued the economy in the past.

At the conclusion of the congress, Husak announced the results of the elections to the top party bodies. "As you see," he commented after announcing his own re-election, "there were no surprises." Except for the ailing Ludvik Svoboda, who was dropped and not replaced, the old Presidium has returned in full. All six CC secretaries were re-elected, while Jozef Lenart and Frantisek Ondrich were removed from the secretariat. In the case of Lenart, who remains in the Presidium, the removal should have no effect on his influence. The Central Committee was expanded from 115 to 121 members, and there are now 52 instead of 45 candidates. Almost one third of the CC was newly elected, while virtually all the candidate members were new. The extent of the reshuffle was normal, and the composition of the new CC is not significantly different from the one it replaced. The most interesting news about the nature of the party was the announcement that the CPCs now has 1,381,090 members. This represents an increase of nearly 200,000 members and candidates in the past five years, and indicates that the party has been successful in its attempts to improve the social composition of its ranks and to rejuvenate them.

Economics played an important part at the Slovak party congress, held in Bratislava late in March. Speaking as Prague's representative, CPCs Presidium member Josef Kempny stated that the program of high investment in Slovakia, traditionally the more economically backward section of the country, had brought the region into step with the Czech Lands. Emphasis, Kempny stated, should therefore now be placed on more effective production and development programs laid out on a national scale. In the 1976-1980 plan, Slovak investment is pegged at the same level as that of the country as a whole. This shift toward all-state development programs may have been precipitated by Czechoslovakia's worsening terms of trade. The fact that the congress also stressed the subordinate position of the Slovak party to the CPCs and the Czechoslovak state gives rise to speculation whether there were also political motives behind this change in policy toward Slovakia.

Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky's visit to Prague seems to have closed the door on 20 years of strained relations between the two neighboring countries. The mid-February trip was the culmination of the rapid improvement of the climate between them since December 1974, when Prague and Vienna finally established diplomatic relations. Officially, the knotty question of reparations for confiscated Austrian property in Czechoslovakia was the main stumbling

block in negotiations between the two countries, but it seemed that Czechoslovakia was less interested in improving relations than Austria. Petty border incidents were often exaggerated into bilateral problems. Since the establishment of a border commission in December 1973 and the resumption of diplomatic relations one year afterward, the atmosphere has improved significantly. Trade and co-operation have expanded, and the occasional border problem is now solved quickly and amicably.

Czechoslovakia's labor problems attracted renewed attention in March with the announcement that Prague planned to hire about 1,000 Greek Cypriot workers for employment in the construction industry. Czechoslovakia has already been host to Polish and Yugoslav workers, and evidently assumed that these sources could continue and expand their services. It now seems that far fewer Poles than expected are working in Czechoslovakia, and that there is only a moderate number of Yugoslavs employed. Given these labor shortfalls, Prague has now found it necessary to turn to Western countries to enlist workers for its economy. As a solution to the demographic dip which is now hitting the labor force, it is an insufficient one, as Radio Prague was the first to admit. Importing Western labor is expensive and, in the light of East German experiences with Algerian workers, may be socially difficult as well. But this may be Prague's only solution until the postinvasion baby boom brings aid in the late 1980s.

Although generally overshadowed by the Kreisky visit, three other diplomatic gestures during the past three months should not go unmentioned. Early in January, Premier Lubomir Strougal visited Turkey 10 days after a similar stay by Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin. Foreign Trade Minister Andrej Barcak accompanied Strougal, and the agreements resulting from the talks mainly concerned expansion of bilateral co-operation, particularly in the heavy industry and energy fields. Western observers saw the Kosygin and Strougal visits as a Turkish initiative toward the East, after the disappointing treatment it has experienced in its relations with the United States. Turkey's rival, Greece, also played a part in Prague's diplomacy. Foreign Minister Dimitrios Bitsios visited Prague in February, and his meetings with Czechoslovak officials, although they produced no dramatic results, were seen as the beginning of better relations between the two countries. Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek also received his Portuguese counterpart, Ernesto Melo Antunes, in January.

Prague's realistic approach toward relations with other states contrasts with its extreme position vis-à-vis certain other communist parties. Another contrast emerges when the sober economic view seen in the draft five-year plan is compared with the overkill the media use in their campaign against the few remaining reformers. Contrasts in outlook between groups within the party leadership might have become visible at the party congress if the schedule had not prevented them from emerging. But that they hardly appeared at the congress does not mean that they have disappeared from within the party. Husak's guarded offer of reconciliation is only one step along the long road toward genuinely normal relations

between people, party, and state. But even this small plea for moderation could be drowned out by the voices unheard at the congress.

For additional information, see the following Radio Free Europe Research Background and Situation Reports:

Thomas E. Heneghan, "On the Eve of the Czechoslovak Party Congress," RAD BR/84, 7 April 1976.

"The CPCS Congress," Czechoslovak SRs/14, 15, and 16, 13, 14, and 21 April 1976.

"Hard Tones in CPCS Leadership," Czechoslovak SR/11, 24 March 1976, Item 1.

"Draft Guidance for the Sixth Five-Year Plan," Czechoslovak SR/7, 25 February 1976, Item 1.

Hanus Hajek and Ladislav Niznansky, "The Slovak Party Congress -- A Routine Exercise with Overtones," RAD BR/74, 30 March 1976.

Thomas E. Heneghan, "Kreisky Visit a Sign of Czechoslovak-Austrian Reconciliation," RAD BR/17, 19 January 1976.

"A New Stage in Turkish-Czechoslovak Relations?" Czechoslovak SR/1, 14 January 1976, Item 2.

HUNGARY

By William F. Robinson

In a concerted effort to improve labor discipline and increase labor productivity in a period of manpower shortage and economic difficulty, the Hungarian government recently passed a series of measures designed to eliminate perceived weaknesses in the broad area of personnel management. The first of these -- a joint decree by the Ministries of Labor and Finance issued at the very end of 1975 -- placed a freeze on the hiring of administrative and other white-collar workers. For ministries, agencies with nationwide authority, the local councils, and industrial trusts, the ban applies to their entire staff, whereas for enterprises and local budgetary institutions such as hospitals, schools, etc., it applies only to administrative-supervising personnel. The decree was triggered by the unwarranted increase in office workers and white-collar employees generally since 1968 and the failure of exhortation and less radical measures to restore some semblance of rationality. The government obviously felt that direct orders were the only alternative left open to it -- the only one, that is, that would actually reduce excessively large staffs (through attrition), redirect people from the desk to the production line, and force the agencies concerned to improve labor organization, simplify administration, and rationalize management.

It should be noted that the armed forces and other paramilitary bodies, those in elective positions, and persons seasonally employed in enterprises are not affected by the decree. Those who do come under the regulations, however, will be called strictly to account should they try to circumvent them -- e.g., by assigning production workers to administrative jobs. Penalties could range from the reduction or withdrawal of managerial premiums, to an oral or written warning or reprimand, or, in extreme cases, to dismissal.

Never before in the Kadar era has there been such forceful governmental intervention in the system of Hungarian labor management, and although it is too early to determine the success or failure of the outcome, several adverse features of the new scheme should be mentioned. First, it restricts the authority of every enterprise manager, limiting his right to decide whom he should employ and making it impossible to replace unsatisfactory or incompetent employees because vacated positions cannot be filled. Secondly, it also restricts an employee's right to choose where and in what profession he will work, since there will be much less opportunity to change one's place of work or take up another occupation. Thirdly, it is not yet completely clear what is to happen to young persons who have finished or almost finished their administrative training, or to new economists, accountants, statisticians, typists, etc. Part of the answer lies in the mobilization of employment agencies and vocational counselors, as well as the appropriate ministries, party bodies, and trade unions to create a co-ordinated network for information and guidance regarding jobs and career opportunities. Another part of the answer

is a greater government voice in assigning young people to their first place of work, particularly in the provinces or in economic sectors where the majority do not want to go.

All of this, plus the prospect of returning to physical work for a number of administrative employees, cannot help but lower working morale. Indeed, judging by domestic media comment, there was considerable discontent over the measure, not only on the part of employees and future graduates, but also on the part of the enterprises, which asserted that they were being required to supply more and more superfluous data and reports by the very state agencies that had been urging them to cut their clerical staff. The government's reply to what apparently was a strong and widespread objection to the freeze was sympathetic and somewhat apologetic, but made it clear that there would be no retreat -- i.e., that the freeze would stay.

Additional measures soon underlined the authorities' determination. At the end of January, for example, a Ministry of Labor decree appeared containing new and stricter regulations on the taking of secondary and ancillary jobs. Abuses in this field, including nepotism, conflict of interest, fraud, and neglect of primary jobs in favor of secondary, led to the government crackdown. Under the new regulations, no one "in a leading position" may engage in secondary employment, except those working in the fields of public health, science, education, and the arts. Written authorization is necessary before other persons may undertake such employment, and the amount of time spent on and earnings derived from it are limited. Further provisions attempt to eliminate nepotism and possible conflicts of interest, and criteria are laid down for determining eligibility in individual cases.

Yet another regulation -- on strengthening "sick pay discipline" -- was adopted at the 11 March 1976 meeting of the Council of Ministers. It will come into effect on 1 January 1977 and result in the creation of control groups of chief physicians, who will exercise increased supervision over cases of work disability and make on-the-spot investigations of certificates of illness. In addition, district nurses will be obliged to visit persons on the sick list daily to verify their condition, and those whose illness lasts three days or less will have their sick pay debited to the enterprise's untaxed profits. Until now, all sick pay has been issued by the Trade Unions' Social Insurance Center, and the new decree will thus give the enterprises a considerable stake in limiting such disbursements by increasing their control over short-term illnesses.

These restrictions were followed by another decree from the Ministry of Labor on April 10, in which new (and far more restrictive) regulations on the procurement, recruiting, and redirection of workers were promulgated. This decree provides that as of July 1 the president of a county or city council, in agreement with the ministry concerned, may make the use of employment agencies mandatory in certain defined areas (such as a village, district, county, or city) if "the labor situation in the region

requires that this be done." Although no one is obliged to accept a job offered by an agency, he may not sign an employment contract without its consent. In addition, the decree makes special provision for the mandatory redirection of labor. When, as a result of rationalization, a change in production structure, or measures taken by the controlling ministry, a number of workers (usually 10 or more) are released, they may be transferred to enterprises considered more important from the national economic viewpoint. According to the regulations, this will be done primarily to help in the completion of important investments, to make full use of high-capacity production equipment by working shifts, to boost export capacity, or to improve the national service network. No consequences are spelled out for employees who refuse to be redirected, and more detailed regulations will undoubtedly have to be provided later.

In one other move to cope with the labor shortage and its consequences, the government resorted to incentives rather than restrictions. Just before the beginning of 1976, the Council of Ministers amended the provisions pertaining to the child welfare allowance, under which over 200,000 women a year may temporarily absent themselves from their places of employment in order to care for infant children under three years of age. The government ordered the Ministry of Labor, in consultation with the National Trade Union Council, to alter conditions governing receipt of the allowance to enable a mother to take up work once a year, and to undertake, for payment of a fee, the care of a maximum of two other children between one and three years of age. Those who do so are not to be debarred from receiving the allowance and will be permitted to fix their own rates with the agreement of the other parents concerned. (Pensioners will also be authorized to take care of small children for a fee.) The intention of the new regulation is not only to improve the care provided for children unable to enter day nurseries, but also to enable more women to return to work and thus increase the available labor force.

Before turning to other areas of Hungarian life, two additional sectors of the economy deserve brief mention. The first of these is the private plot, or, more accurately, private farming in general, which has been receiving extremely strong support in recent months from the press, party, and government. The economic importance of this sphere at a time when fruit, vegetables, and livestock are often in short supply on the domestic market and increased commitments have been made to foreign customers makes the renewed official campaign on its behalf quite understandable. Moreover, in comparison to past attempts along these lines, the current effort is characterized by more vigorous activity and more tangible acts of assistance. The Council of Ministers, for example, passed two resolutions (in March and April, respectively) in support of greater aid to private agriculture, while the Ministry of Agriculture and Food has sent its senior officials on a continuing series of visits to the provinces for the purpose of discussing and trying to alleviate the problems of the small farms. One significant step toward this end was the disclosure

by the head of the main revenue department in the Ministry of Finance that the tax system applicable to private farmers would be changed by next year. This will be welcomed by proponents of the private agricultural sector because up till now the excessive taxes that have regularly been imposed by some revenue officers have acted as a considerable disincentive. The rules now under preparation will reduce these burdens generally, and some branches, such as milk and dairy products, will be relieved of taxes entirely.

As indicated in the last paragraph, the interest in private farming is partly connected to the foreign trade sphere. It may be recalled that in October 1975, during Premier Gyorgy Lazar's visit to Moscow, a 15-year agreement on the export of Hungarian fruit and vegetables to the Soviet Union was signed. More recently -- on March 27 -- Hungarian Foreign Trade Minister Jozsef Biro and his Soviet counterpart Nikolai Patolichev signed another (and new type of) agreement under which Hungary will deliver wheat, maize, and beef to the USSR in return for crude oil, diesel oil, gasoline, cotton, cellulose, sawn pine timber, and industrial timber. The reasons why the latest pact differs from the usual run of economic accords within Comecon are first, that it provides for deliveries additional to those covered by the existing five-year intergovernmental trade agreement; secondly, that it deals only with a few basic products; and thirdly, that settlement will be in Western currency at current world market prices.

Only minimum quantities were prescribed in the agreement, which will as a first step remain in effect until 1980, although they can be modified in light of requirements and transportation and production capacity. The value of these "minimum quantities," however, is 50,000 million forint, or 10 per cent of the existing long-term agreements. This is a substantial sum, and one may reasonably wonder if the burden thus imposed on Hungarian agriculture will not be too great, despite more aid to the private sector. It may turn out, nevertheless, that increased shipments of Soviet oil and an alternative hard currency market for Hungarian beef (to offset the Common Market ban on such imports) will make the arrangement worth while.

Turning to other events of importance in Hungary, Radio Budapest and Radio Vatican reported on February 12 that Laszlo Lekai had been appointed Archbishop of Esztergom to succeed the late Cardinal Mindszenty. Two days later, Lekai took his oath of allegiance to the Constitution before Presidential Council Chairman Pal Losonczi, and on February 15 gave a long interview to the official news agency MTI. The new Hungarian Primate, who was one of Mindszenty's secretaries in Veszprem during 1945, revealed himself to be loyal to both Church and country and an adherent of the Holy See's Ostpolitik, as well as to possess a combination of flexibility and intelligence that would seem essential if he is to function effectively in his new post. Lekai was subsequently elevated to the rank of cardinal by Pope Paul on April 27.

The Esztergom appointment was preceded by an unusual number of consultations. In July 1975, Archbishop Luigi Poggi, of the Vatican's Public Affairs Council, went to Budapest, and in November

the pope received Prime Minister Gyorgy Lazar. A few weeks later Imre Miklos, head of the Hungarian Office for Religious Affairs, led a delegation to the Holy See and had two days of secret talks with Archbishop Agostino Casaroli, the Vatican's "foreign minister." In January Poggi once again visited Budapest, where he had discussions with Miklos and Archbishop Jozsef Ijjas, then President of the Hungarian Bench of Bishops (a position that automatically devolved on Lekai when he became Archbishop of Esztergom). In all probability, these talks -- while covering a wide range of topics -- tied up the last "loose ends" of the appointment and paved the way for the announcement on February 12.

In the field of foreign affairs, the most noteworthy event in recent months was the visit to Hungary of FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher from April 28 to 30. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were resumed in December 1973, and official consultations at foreign minister level have taken place twice since then: in April 1974 between Puja and Walter Scheel in Budapest, and in June 1975 between Puja and Genscher in Bonn. On this occasion, both the lack of problems between Bonn and Budapest and their growing economic and political contacts were reflected in the warm welcome accorded Genscher in the domestic media, as well as in the longer than usual interviews he was given with Puja and HSWP First Secretary Janos Kadar.

It may well be that the relaxed atmosphere in which the visit took place owed something to a minor incident involving Hungary and West Berlin. The leading Hungarian sulky driver Laszlo Ferge had entered his name for a championship race to be held in West Berlin at Easter, but on April 5 the Hungarians withdrew the entry on political grounds. Following a personal appeal by Genscher to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Ferge was reinstated at the last minute and was able to participate in the race.

In a dispatch from Budapest filed by dpa correspondent Wolfgang Libal on May 1, it was reported that Genscher had told his hosts that a restrictive interpretation of the four-power agreement on West Berlin could have unhappy consequences for détente. He made it clear that the Bonn government had a "vital" interest in the city and that the FRG's relations with East European countries would be decided by the attitude they adopted toward that interest. It should be said in this context that Genscher is in the habit of emphasizing the crucial link between West Berlin and the course of détente in all his visits to Warsaw Pact member countries, and it is doubtful whether he had to labor this point with his Hungarian hosts, who in the past have raised relatively few difficulties in this regard -- at least on their own account.

For additional reading see the following Radio Free Europe Research
Background and Situation Reports:

"Decree Freezes Number of Administrative Workers," Hungarian
SR/1, 13 January 1976, Item 2.

KK, "Angry Public Makes Hungarian Government Think Twice,"
RAD BR/21, 21 January 1976.

"Government Adamant on Hiring Freeze," Hungarian SR/3,
27 January 1976, Item 6.

"Hiring Freeze and the Employment of Young Graduates,"
Hungarian SR/13, 13 April 1976, Item 3.

"More Rigorous Measures Against Moonlighting," Hungarian
SR/6, 18 February 1976, Item 4.

"Sick Pay Regulations Tightened," Hungarian SR/11, 23
March 1976, Item 3.

"Decree on Procurement, Recruiting, and Redirection of Labor,"
Hungarian SR/14, 27 April 1976, Item 2.

"Child Welfare Allowance Rules Changed to Ease Labor
Shortage," Hungarian SR/2, 21 January 1976, Item 5.

"Tangible Support for Private Plots?" Hungarian SR/11,
23 March 1976, Item 5.

"Milk Yields and Private Plot Taxation," Hungarian SR/14,
27 April 1976, Item 6.

"New Type Hungarian-Soviet Economic Agreement," Hungarian
SR/13, 13 April 1976, Item 2.

KK, "Laszlo Lekai Named Archbishop of Esztergom," RAD
BR/47, 19 February 1976.

"The New Primate Becomes a Cardinal," Hungarian SR/15,
5 May 1976, Item 2.

"FRG Foreign Minister Genscher in Budapest," Hungarian SR/15,
5 May 1976, Item 4.

POLAND

By Thomas E. Heneghan

Poland amended its Constitution in February, but the change did not proceed as smoothly as the party wanted. According to the originally proposed amendments, the new Constitution was to include articles codifying the leading role of the PUPP, Poland's "unbreakable ties" to the Soviet Union, and the dependence of civil rights upon a citizen's performance of his duty. Numerous protests were sent to the party leadership, and the articles finally approved illustrated several official concessions to public opinion.

The initial wave of protests came in late December, after party leader Edward Gierek expressed support for the proposed amendments. A letter sent by 59 intellectuals objected to the leading role of the party and made a plea for increased civil liberties. This was followed by letters from 12 law experts, 300 academics and students, and then by a protest from former party theoretician Wladyslaw Bienkowski. During January, more writers, professors, Catholics, and even a few workers expressed their disagreement with the amendments. Cardinal Wyszynski stated in two sermons that the new Constitution would discriminate against believers and revealed that the episcopate had requested official information on the planned changes. In all, more than 300 persons registered their opposition to the amendments.

The first official reaction to these protests was to mount a campaign of support for the new Constitution. Numerous letters were printed and statements made about the population's agreement with the proposals. Gradually, a willingness to compromise became evident, and when State Council Chairman Henryk Jablonski presented the final text of the amendments to the Sejm for approval, he noted that the initial proposals were not supported by the whole population. Although Jablonski criticized some of the protests as misinterpretations, he acknowledged that the feedback was useful, because it pointed out the need for more explicit formulations.

In their final, revised form, the amendments state that Poland is a socialist state, but the description of its base as being the same "class-revolutionary principles" as those of the Soviet Revolution was dropped. Instead of occupying the leading role in society, the PUPP is characterized as the "leading force in society in the construction of socialism." The "unshakable fraternal bond" between Poland and the USSR gave way to the statement that Poland will "strengthen its friendship with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states." And the "rights-depend-on-duties" section shrank to an exhortation to all Poles to fulfill their obligations toward the fatherland. In an act which seems to have been another concession to the protests, two clauses on legal sanctions against dissent were dropped from the Constitution. Although the changes may seem small, they are significant in that they represent the outside limit to the party's flexibility in its campaign to strengthen the role of the state within Polish society. The original amendments would have been a legal codification of the progress the PUPP has made, and hopes to make, in its leadership of the country. The wave of protests and the eventual concessions indicate that public opinion remains a significant force in Polish politics.

During the Sejm voting, one deputy demonstratively abstained from the otherwise unanimous approval the changes were given. That deputy, Stanislaw Stomma, was the leader of the Catholic parliamentary group Znak. Soon afterward, when the list of candidates for the March elections to the Sejm appeared, Stomma's name was missing. While his abstention was certainly a contributing factor to ending Stomma's parliamentary career, differences within Znak were probably equally responsible. The group has retained its name in the new Sejm, but is now headed by Konstanty Lubienski, who was reportedly the mediator between Church and state in the constitutional compromise.

Even after Stomma's departure from the Sejm, Znak's internal disputes continued, lingering on as one of a number of problems which faced Catholics in recent months. In a letter addressed to Znak's parliamentary spokesman, Wież editor-in-chief Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Tygodnik Powszechny editor-in-chief Jerzy Turowicz, and Dr. Stomma stated that the present Znak deputies have "neither been elected nor accepted" by the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs (KIK) and that they cannot be regarded as the legal continuation of the parliamentary group known as Znak since 1957. In another development, a makeshift chapel in Gorki (near Warsaw) was torn down by militiamen. Local Catholics had petitioned for a building permit, but since they had not received one in time for Easter, they proceeded to construct an unauthorized wooden chapel. Cardinal Wyszynski denounced the "brutal" police action and stated that it had dashed hopes for what he called a "new approach to citizens" by the authorities. A further sign of renewed tension between Church and state was the pastoral letter read on two consecutive Sundays in April. The letter, which "clarified" the Church's position on the recent Constitutional amendments, reminded Western correspondents of the Church-state clashes of the 1960s. Archbishop Luigi Poggi, the Vatican delegate for contacts with Poland, arrived late in April for a three-week stay, but it seems unlikely that he will be able to have any significant influence on the increasingly strained relations between Church and state.

The voting for the new Sejm produced some interesting results. The list presented by the Front of National Unity received 99.43 per cent of all votes cast, and Edward Gierek himself won 99.99 per cent of the vote in his Sosnowiec constituency. Behind the electoral results, however, were some revealing facts. For example, voter turnout was lowest in Szczecin, Gdansk, Gdynia, and central Lodz, the main trouble areas during the 1970 riots. Only 15 of the 71 candidates at the top of the FNU lists obtained a majority of votes in their constituencies, and 6 of the 9 CC secretaries landed in positions lower than those assigned them on the official list. These results should not be overestimated as signs of opposition, but they do provide a rough barometer of the population's feelings.

Last quarter's most significant event in foreign policy was the West German Bundesrat's ratification of the resettlement and repayment agreement that Gierek and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had agreed upon last summer in Helsinki. The agreements provide that exit visas must be given to 120,000-125,000 ethnic Germans in Poland over

the next four years. In return, Bonn will grant Warsaw a DM 1,000 million credit and will pay DM 1,300 million as a lump settlement of Polish claims against German social security. Ratification of the agreements was held up until March, while the West German opposition parties sought clarification on whether exit visas would be issued to ethnic Germans after the negotiated four-year period passed. After a week of uncertainty which undoubtedly had strong implications for West German domestic politics, the opposition finally accepted a textual alteration and voted for ratification. This unanimous support for the agreements helped clear the last major hurdle on the road to normal Bonn-Warsaw relations. Upon hearing of the ratification, Gierek called it a "victory for reason" and it was announced that the Polish party leader would visit the Federal Republic.

A month after the ratification, Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski visited Bonn for talks with his counterpart, Hans Dietrich Genscher, and with Chancellor Schmidt. The real purpose of this mission was to pave the way for Edward Gierek's upcoming visit to the West German capital, which will take place from June 8 to 12. Other issues such as resettlement, cultural exchanges, and economic relations were discussed; one problem left unmentioned was the question of cultural freedom for ethnic Germans in Poland, an issue in which the West German opposition is interested. There was also a West German visit to Poland after the ratification. Helmut Rohde, FRG Minister for Education and Science, traveled to Warsaw late in March and had discussions with Olszowski and Premier Jaroszewicz, as well as with his host, Minister of Instruction and Upbringing Jerzy Kuberski. As he told reporters, Rohde sensed a "visibly positive change" of climate in his dealings with Warsaw.

The second CC plenum, held late in January, stressed the need for maximum use of Poland's economic resources. As Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz pointed out, productivity did not advance in a uniform manner over the past five years, but displayed varying tendencies in individual sectors of the economy. Above all, however, the rise was not in a satisfactory proportion to the rate of capital input, and quality was seriously lagging. Jaroszewicz called for a strict efficiency drive to alleviate the problems caused by surplus labor, absenteeism, and poor labor discipline. These labor problems call for an increased emphasis on modernization and a more effective use of available materials. After two bad harvests, the agricultural sector requires further mechanization.

Late in March, during the new Sejm's first week of work, Jaroszewicz spoke about the problem of price increases. The Premier reminded his audience that the fast growth of meat production in the past five years was based on increasing imports of grain and fodder, and that these imports were now becoming "more difficult, more costly, and sometimes impossible." The government, Jaroszewicz said, believes that market supplies and the price structure must ensure a continuing growth in real wages and consumer consumption. To do this the price structure will have to be altered so that consumption patterns will correspond to the economy's possibilities; emphasis will

be placed on increasing supplies of industrial commodities, services, single-family houses, cars, and tourism. This change should help shift excess consumer demand from food to other commodities. But Jaroszewicz still did not reveal the changes that are to take place in food prices, and that is the question which remains at the center of consumer interest.

For additional information, see the following Radio Free Europe Research Background and Situation Reports:

"Public Opinion and Constitutional Amendments," Polish SR/6, 20 February 1976, Item 1.

"Important Catholic Politician Barred from Future Parliament," Polish SR/7, 27 February 1976, Item 2.

"Church Affairs," Polish SR/14, 30 April 1976, Item 1.

"Relations with the FRG," Polish SR/10, 19 March 1976, Item 1.

"Relations with the FRG: Reciprocal Visits," Polish SR/13, 9 April 1976, Item 2.

"CC Plenum on Better Management of Resources," RAD BR/52 (Poland), 24 February 1976.

"Sejm Session Continues: Prices and Government Restructure," Polish SR/12, 2 April 1976, Item 1.

Agriculture, however, was not the only area of the economy which faced problems, according to the reports on plan fulfillment. Total industrial production in 1975 was some 12.4 per cent over the figure for 1974 but it was still below that set in the 1975 plan and the goals laid down by Ceausescu. Foreign trade, probably reflecting world-wide economic problems, increased by 6.6 per cent -- considerably below the 21.8 per cent called for; however, imports and exports were evenly balanced. National income was up by 9.8 per cent, somewhat below the planned figure of 14.0 per cent, and the rise in labor productivity was also below expectations. Real wages went up by 6.8 per cent rather than 10 per cent as planned, but by the end of 1975 the average monthly wage reached the stipulated figure of 1,975 lei. Despite the economic problems resulting from the very ambitious plan targets and the difficulties caused in 1975 by the international economic slowdown and the raw materials price increases, the Rumanian economy continued to expand at a relatively high rate. There are still serious problems in the area of efficiency of production; nevertheless, the high investments and ambitious goals have resulted in significant increases in economic output.

Another area relating to the economy which received the attention of the party leader was science and technology. In mid-March Ceausescu visited the main research institutes in Bucharest, in order to consider how science and technology could make a greater contribution to the goals of the five-year plan now beginning. The day after the visits to the institutes, a special plenary session of the national co-ordinating agency for scientific research was convened, with Ceausescu in attendance, to consider the tasks facing Rumanian science in 1976-1980. Ceausescu's visits and the plenum are both indications of the special interest being shown in scientific research and its role in the implementation of the ambitious provisions of the current five-year plan. Another reflection of this interest is the fact that investments in research have grown considerably in recent years, although they are still low.

The Rumanian cultural scene was dominated during the quarter by preparations for the Congress on Political Education and Culture, now scheduled to take place in June. All of the major bodies concerned with problems of culture and education (the Writers' Union and other creative unions, the Union of Communist Youth, etc.) have held plenary sessions in anticipation of this event, and the cultural press has been filled with discussions of the significance of this forthcoming gathering. In mid-April, it was decided that the Front of Socialist Unity would be given the task of organizing the gathering and the name was changed to the Congress of Political Education and Socialist Culture. This congress is the latest step in the campaign to lend new emphasis to ideology and the creation of the "new socialist man" that was launched by Ceausescu in July 1971.

One major theme in the preparations has been that art, culture, and education must serve political and ideological goals, as well as meet aesthetic criteria. While this theme has also been stressed throughout Eastern Europe, the Rumanians have also emphasized a

RUMANIA

By Robert R. King

The first priority among domestic concerns of the Rumanian leadership in the first quarter of 1976 was agriculture. Published results on plan fulfillment for the 1971-1975 period showed that agricultural output in 1975 was considerably below the targets set, for the second year in succession. Particularly serious shortfalls (between 25 and 50 per cent below plan targets) were recorded in the harvest of potatoes, fruit, sugar beets, vegetables, sunflower seeds, cereals, and grapes. Livestock increases were also below plan targets, but the shortfalls in this area were smaller. The serious floods in July 1975 were in large part responsible for these problems, but they were not the sole cause. The area of land put under irrigation in 1975 (and, in fact, during the 1971-1975 period) was considerably below original projections. The plan provisions for chemical fertilizers, however, were met for the first time in 1975.

The cumulative effect of these difficulties on the Rumanian economy gives the party leadership a problem of first magnitude, particularly in view of the serious state of Rumania's balance of payments and its diminishing currency reserves, and the fact that, even in bad years, agricultural exports account for between a fifth and a fourth of Rumania's foreign trade earnings. The agricultural sector threatens to become a drag on the entire economy, and signs are multiplying that agriculture is in even worse shape than has generally been assumed. Climatic conditions are in part responsible for the difficulties, but there are also deficiencies in the organization of production. Even more alarming, however, is the fact that Ceausescu has repeatedly found it necessary to warn against a "lack of discipline."

The agricultural situation prompted a number of high-level meetings involving party chief Nicolae Ceausescu and other leaders. At a special congress of deputies of the people's councils (local government organizations) in early February, agricultural shortcomings and the responsibilities of the people's councils for agriculture were given particular emphasis. The party leader told the congress that the "technical-material base" has not been fully utilized, that the "land fund" was being inadequately exploited, and that agricultural work had not been performed on schedule or under proper conditions. As on a number of occasions in the past, he blamed agricultural units and the party agencies in charge of farming for the poor showing in this sector.

The Rumanian party leader also interrupted his attendance at the 25th Congress of the CPSU in Moscow to return to Bucharest at the end of February for an important meeting with the county party first secretaries on the situation of Rumanian agriculture. Ceausescu harshly criticized deficiencies in almost all agricultural branches, and called on central and local party and agricultural organizations to take immediate steps to improve the present, totally unsatisfactory, situation.

second element that is more unusual -- culture and education must also contribute to the patriotism and positive national sentiments of the population as well. This emphasis on the national elements in culture is consistent with the party's views of the importance of the nation and the responsibility of each individual communist party to adjust and adapt to its distinctive national circumstances. There have been voices of dissent, particularly within the writers' community, expressing concern with both the ideological and national emphasis in creative works called for by the party, but party control over the creative unions, the publishing houses, and the periodicals has managed to contain such criticism.

Rumania's foreign policy continues to follow the same general patterns as in the past -- relations with the Soviet Union are normal, but sources of irritation continue to exist; strengthening ties with neighboring Balkan states (regardless of their political affiliations) is an important priority; the campaign is still under way to identify Rumania with the developing countries; and relations with Western Europe are based on Rumanian interests, and are slightly out of step with the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries.

Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu personally headed the Rumanian delegation to the CPSU Congress in Moscow (as he has done to all Soviet party congresses since becoming party leader), but he did not (as has also been past Rumanian practice) attend the congresses of the Polish, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak parties, also held recently. Ceausescu's address to the congress differed from those of the other East European party leaders in that he made no reference to the Sino-Soviet conflict or to the proposed world communist conference. He did say that Rumania was "participating actively in the preparations for the communist and workers' conference" in Europe, in order to promote a "fruitful and democratic" exchange of views and experience and to increase the "solidarity and co-operation" among the various parties. He stressed the need for party autonomy and said that, together with the Yugoslav and a number of West European parties, the RCP feels that such a meeting should not produce anything in the nature of binding decisions or a definitive program. The Rumanian leader was perhaps more inclined to avoid confrontation than Italian and French CP spokesmen in Moscow, but the Yugoslav daily Delo (Ljubljana) published an interview with Ceausescu the day after he had spoken in Moscow in which he stressed once more, and quite forcefully, that each party must act independently, and that there can be no central direction of the communist movement.

At the end of April, however, Ceausescu reaffirmed, in the strongest terms used for some time, the continued relevance of national independence and sovereignty. He criticized unnamed Marxist theoreticians for denigrating the importance of the nation, and was particularly critical of those who do not struggle for their own national independence. Ceausescu's was the most recent and strongest in a series of Rumanian statements defending sovereignty and independence and stressing the important role of the nation. Part of the reason for these reaffirmations of the traditional Rumanian stand is the current controversy between the Soviet and West European parties over proletarian internationalism. Another

factor that may have helped to precipitate these articles and speeches is the controversy over recent statements attributed to US State Department official Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Problems between Rumania and the Soviet Union may also underline these reassertions, but thus far there has been no evidence of a deterioration in the two countries' relations.

In addition to the usual differences over relations between parties, the Rumanians and Soviets have recently intensified their historical debate over the question of Bessarabia. In historical journals appearing in the last few months the Rumanians have claimed that the union of Bessarabia with Rumania in 1918 was not only historically and ethnically justified, but was also supported by the Rumanian Marxists. Karl Marx himself was brought into the debate by a Rumanian historian in support of Rumanian claims. This entertaining polemic is certainly not a major factor in determining Soviet-Rumanian relations, but it does reflect the continued existence of differences between the two parties and states.

Rumania's desire to improve relations with its Balkan neighbors was reaffirmed in its response to the Athens conference on regional co-operation at the end of January. Bucharest has been one of the most consistent advocates of multilateral Balkan co-operation, and the considerable attention it was given in the Rumanian press and Rumania's role in Athens reflected this. In the effort to promote regional harmony, at the end of March Ceausescu became the first Balkan communist head of state to visit Greece in order to promote bilateral, as well as multilateral, co-operation. The Rumanian president and party leader did note, however, that the development of multilateral co-operation is closely linked with the expansion of bilateral relations. In view of Bulgarian reluctance to engage in multilateral efforts and Greek-Turkish differences, his comment reflects the most realistic hope for progress at present.

Rumania's efforts to be recognized as a developing state were given an important boost in January when the "Group of 77," a group of developing countries that are members of the United Nations, agreed to accept Rumania as a member. Rumania initially requested membership in this organization when it was founded 12 years ago. The recent efforts of the Rumanians to co-ordinate policy with the Third World at the UN and in championing the New International Economic Order have apparently borne fruit. The next major Rumanian goal is to secure observer status at the nonaligned summit in Colombo, Sri Lanka, later this year. The parade of Third World dignitaries invited to Bucharest is part of the campaign to achieve this objective. (In the last quarter, the President of Guinea-Bissau and now-retired Prince Sihanouk both expressed support for Rumania's request for observer status in Colombo while visiting Bucharest.)

The effort to strengthen economic ties with the developing countries has likewise continued in an attempt to secure more advantageous terms for needed raw materials and an outlet for manufactured products. Ceausescu finally made his oft-postponed

visit to Kuwait at the end of March. The way for the visit was opened by the ratification in January of economic co-operation agreements between the two countries by the Kuwaiti parliament, following several previous unsuccessful attempts. The Rumanian decision not to renew a contract for the transport of oil purchased from Iran through an Israeli pipeline also helped prepare the atmosphere. The signing of an economic co-operation agreement with Libya and the removal of the Rumanian airline from the boycott list of the Arab League have served further to strengthen Rumania's ties with the Arab states in the Middle East. The efforts to strengthen economic ties with the Third World, however, have not been focused exclusively on the Middle East, in spite of Rumania's particular interest in securing oil supplies and the advantage it has in this region because of its own developed oil extraction industry and processing expertise. The Minister of Mines, Oil, and Geology paid visits to a number of Latin American states in an effort to encourage co-operation.

The further improvement of political and economic relations with "the developed capitalist states" is also a goal of Rumanian foreign policy. In the last quarter, the most significant step in this regard was the visit to Bucharest in January of Common Market Vice-President and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Christopher Soames. In a lecture in Bucharest he delivered a major statement on possibilities and problems of Comecon-EEC relations. During his visit, however, he and his hosts were also concerned with the development of bilateral relations between Rumania and the EEC. Upon his return to Brussels, Soames said that the views of Rumania and the EEC are similar, in that they agree that development of bilateral relations between the EEC and individual Comecon countries is compatible with the expansion of relations between the EEC and Comecon. In keeping with the Rumanian desire to promote political and economic relations with Western Europe, in the first quarter of 1976 high-level government delegations visited West Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Great Britain, while the Danish Foreign Minister came to Bucharest.

For additional reading, see the following Radio Free Europe Research Background and Situation Reports:

"Economic Plan Fulfillment for 1975 Falls Short of Targets," Rumanian SR/5, 18 February 1976, Item 1.

"Ceausescu Addresses Important Meeting on Agricultural Deficiencies," Rumanian SR/7, 5 March 1976, Item 7.

"Ceausescu Visits Research Institutes; Science Meeting Follows," Rumanian SR/10, 25 March 1976, Item 5.

"Preparations for the Congress on Political Education and Culture," Rumanian SR/12, 9 April 1976, Item 1.

"Congress on Political Education and Culture to be Sponsored by FSU," Rumanian SR/14, 29 April 1976, Item 1.

"Ceausescu Attends the 25th Soviet party Congress," Rumanian SR/9, 22 March 1976, Item 6.

Robert R. King, "Ceausescu Reasserts Position on National Independence and Sovereignty," RAD BR/94, 28 April 1976.

On the Bessarabian historical exchanges, see Robert R. King, "The Escalation of Rumanian-Soviet Historical Polemics over Bessarabia," RAD BR/38, 12 February 1976; and "Marx Again Invoked by Rumanians on the Bessarabian Question," Rumanian SR/11, 5 April 1976, Item 1.

Robert R. King, "The Athens Conference and the Balkans: Old Variations on an Old Theme," RAD BR/55, 1 March 1976.

"Ceausescu on the Balkans," Rumanian SR/11, 5 April 1976, Item 3.

"Rumania Admitted as Member of 'Group of 77,'" Rumanian SR/4, 10 February 1976, Item 3.

"Common Market Official Visits Rumania," Rumanian SR/2, 20 January 1976, Item 1.

YUGOSLAVIA

By Zdenko Antic

Foreign relations have again played an important role on the Yugoslav scene during the first quarter of 1976, and the picture has included a considerable number of trips abroad by the country's top leaders and of visits to Yugoslavia by foreign officials. This emphasis on international affairs was partly due to Yugoslavia's involvement in the preparative work for the forthcoming conference of nonaligned countries scheduled for next August in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and, partly, it was a result of a series of East European CP congresses which provided Yugoslav delegations with an opportunity to emphasize once again their country's independence within the international communist movement.

The report on recent developments in Yugoslavia's foreign policy, delivered by Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Milos Minic at a meeting of the Socialist Alliance Presidium on February 13, indeed indicated that next August's nonaligned summit has been given top priority in Yugoslav foreign policy. The fifth nonaligned conference in Colombo should, according to Minic, not only set up "the basic strategic lines and priorities in the international program of the nonaligned countries," but should also "inaugurate an era of better organization of the nonaligned and developing countries." One of the first steps in the latter effort was taken by Yugoslavia and 26 other nonaligned countries when they agreed, in January, to pool their news-gathering agencies into a new international news unit, seeking to undercut the influence of major Western and Eastern news agencies. Another step in this direction was creation of the Non-aligned Co-ordination Bureau in the United Nations in February, which has begun preparations for the Colombo summit conference, including working out a draft agenda for the conference.

Since the greater part of the agenda is devoted to international economic problems, and in particular to questions connected with the problem of economic relations between the developing and the developed countries, a series of conferences dealing with these issues, in which Yugoslavia took active part, was held in the past few months. At the end of 1975, representatives of 19 nonaligned countries met with representatives of Western industrial countries in Paris to discuss economic co-operation in the sphere of energy and raw materials. The so-called "Group of 77," i.e., the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which initiated the Paris meeting, continued the discussion on international economic problems at the meeting held in Manila in February.

Tito's Latin American tour in March was also aimed at fortifying Third World solidarity for the nonaligned summit. Of three visited countries, however, only Panama is a full member of the nonaligned club, and the Yugoslav leader did not succeed in persuading Mexico or Venezuela to go further than their present observer status. The nonaligned summit in Colombo was also the main topic discussed during

the visits Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre, Sri Lanka Premier Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Uganda President Idi Amin Dada, and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat paid to Belgrade in March and April. This was also the purpose of Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milos Minic's Asian tours in April, visiting the capitals of Iran, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. On the other hand, Tito's short visit to Portugal, following his South American tour, and the official visit he paid Sweden (March 29-31) were used to discuss problems of European security and co-operation, and to urge faster and more consistent implementation of the Helsinki agreement.

As far as relations with its neighbors are concerned, Yugoslavia fully supported the Greek proposal for a Balkan conference, and attended the first meeting in Athens (January 26 - February 5) which, however, ended with rather meager results. Nevertheless, Yugoslav officials expressed hopes that this was only a beginning which, if it succeeds, will make the Balkans serve as a lesson and evidence that it is possible to co-operate, despite differing political views on future developments in the world.

Yugoslavia's relations with the East European countries and communist parties (with the exception of Rumania) remained uncertain, although there was evidence that both sides were making efforts to bridge existing differences and to ease tension. The French, Soviet Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak CP congresses were occasions for delegates of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) to emphasize repeatedly Yugoslavia's own specific road in building socialism. On the other hand, the Yugoslav media are giving large coverage to polemics that have reappeared of late between the CPSU on the one side, and the French and Italian CPs on the other side, over the meaning and interpretation of "proletarian internationalism." These polemics, in which the Yugoslav CP is openly supporting the autonomous parties' views, suggest that questions relating to the document to be adopted at a future European communist parties' conference, including questions of interparty co-operation and the strategy of the socialist revolution, are approached from quite different positions. Thus even Tito's optimistic remark in Sweden, that the long-delayed pan-European conference of communist parties would take place "very soon" (in fact, in June) should be taken with caution.

The tense relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union also reverberate in the domestic scenery. A new anti-Cominformist campaign is under way, accompanied by a series of trials against pro-Soviet, Cominformist groups and individuals. In March, and May 30 persons were tried and sentenced to terms of up to 15 years in prison for plotting against the Yugoslav state, organizing illegal groups with the aim of forcibly overthrowing President Tito with outside support, and maintaining ties with hostile Cominformist groups abroad, while a Soviet woman, a nondiplomatic official, was detained in Zagreb on suspicion of espionage. In addition to five men tried in Belgrade, ten people were sentenced in Banja Luka, Bosnia; ten in Novi Sad, Vojvodina; three in Split, Croatia; one in Sarajevo, Bosnia; and one in Zajecar, Serbia. The most prominent among the sentenced were former Vice-President of the Croatian Government Dusan Brkic, and the former director of Tanjug, the Yugoslav news agency, Mili-voje Stevanovic. Both men had been prosecuted because of their pro-Soviet stance back at the end of the 1940s. In addition to the pro-

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Soviet Cominformist opposition other opposition groups were also prosecuted, mainly nationalists, irredentists, and Maoists. In Yugoslavia's autonomous province of Kosovo, 38 persons of Albanian origin were sentenced for their irredentism, counterrevolutionary stance, and for organizing hostile groups of the "National Liberation Movement of Kosovo." Similarly, in the Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 19 Serbs and 14 Croats were sentenced for spreading nationalistic hate, distributing hostile leaflets, and for maintaining ties with nationalistic organizations outside the country.

Further elaboration and implementation of the Law on Self-Protection, which was adopted last year and which provides for a unique organizational network designed to protect Yugoslavia's self-managing society, is one more evidence that internal security still remains the number one concern of the Yugoslav leadership. The Law on Self-Protection has now also been adopted and implemented by Yugoslavia's six republics, and the country's legislative and executive institutions, along with economic, social, and political organizations, are discussing how to put its provisions into practice.

The beginning of 1976 was also marked by an important new step in the reform of the Yugoslav economic system. In January, the Federal Assembly adopted two laws which, because of their far-reaching reform of the country's fiscal and credit policies, will have a decisive influence upon business practices. The Law on the Establishment and Calculation of the Incomes of Basic Organizations of Associated Labor and the Law on Payments to Beneficiaries of Social Property are, in fact, two faces of the same coin. When implemented, they should guarantee the proper functioning of the new system of balancing accounts and settling commercial debts. In addition to this important legislation, the Federal Assembly adopted in February the Law on the Basic System of Social Planning, and the Law on the Social Plan of Yugoslavia, while the Law on Associated Labor foreseen in the February 1974 Constitution, providing for detailed regulation of relations within Yugoslavia's self-managing economic system, is being presented to the Federal Assembly for final discussion and approval.

The latest reports have confirmed earlier suggestions that Yugoslavia's economic situation continued to improve slightly. The most positive trend, already successful in 1975, that is, suppressing inflation, was continued in the early months of 1976. While the rate of inflation at the end of 1975 was 17 per cent, by March 1976 it had dropped to roughly 12 per cent when compared with the same period in 1975, which suggests that the slowing down of the inflation rate is continuing. Although the latest reports confirm favorable trends in the sphere of foreign trade, and the deficit, which in 1975 was slightly reduced from the 1974 figure, this sphere continued to represent the weak spot in Yugoslavia's over-all economic development. In spite of the more dynamic rise in exports, the country's trade deficit totals 3,620 million dollars, and the record earning from invisibles, which covered a great part of the deficit, proved insufficient to balance total payments, leaving a gap of about 950,000,000 dollars.

Another important aspect of Yugoslav trade in 1975 was an expansion of exports to the Comecon countries. Imports from these nations rose by 7 per cent, while exports were 21 per cent higher than a year earlier. Exports to developing countries rose 60 per cent, while those to the developed industrial countries were 18 per cent higher than in 1974. There is no doubt that, during the past year, because of the prevailing economic recession in Western Europe and the reduced trade possibilities with this area, Yugoslav business has made significant efforts to compensate by turning to the East European and developing countries' markets. This shift was particularly evident in 1975. One should also note, however, that the Western developed countries still remain Yugoslavia's most important trade partners, accounting for 52.5 per cent of its total trade exchanges. Even more significant, with a 61.2 per cent share in Yugoslavia's imports, the Western industrialized countries have remained its traditional suppliers of industrial goods and modern equipment.

All signs suggest that the economic ties and trade exchanges with the Western world will get a new impetus in 1976. The foreign trade deficit in the first quarter of 1976, which is caused mostly by the adverse trade balance with the EEC countries, amounted to 680,000,000 dollars -- 550,000,000 dollars less than in the same period of the year before. Exports to West European developed countries grew at a rate, which was double that in over-all exports, and the value of export contracts concluded by the end of the first quarter was 44 per cent higher than in the same period of last year. In this connection, Premier Dzemal Bijedic's February tour of France, Belgium and Luxembourg, as well as his conferences with representatives of the EEC in Brussels were attempts further to remove obstacles preventing a more rapid expansion of trade exchanges between Yugoslavia and the EEC countries. His negotiating partners in Paris, Brussels, and Luxembourg promised active support for Belgrade's efforts to make this co-operation stronger, and the EEC Council of Ministers decided to allow Yugoslavia access to the European Investment Bank (EIB) for credits that will enable it to undertake projects likely to increase its integration into the larger framework of Europe. The EIB has already promised to make 51,000,000 dollars available as a first installment for the construction of a 1,185-km. four-lane superhighway linking Austria, via Yugoslavia, with Greece and Turkey. By the end of March, agreement had been reached with Yugoslavia on another important Western investment project. The American Dow Chemical Corporation and the Zagreb Industria Nafte (INA) agreed jointly to invest 750,000,000 dollars for the construction of a petrochemical complex in Yugoslavia. The agreement is based on the principle of equal sharing of risks and profits; the US company will provide 49 per cent of the capital, and the INA the remainder. This is the biggest American investment so far recorded in any East European country, and INA's contribution will represent the largest investment in the country's economy yet made by a Yugoslav firm in partnership with a foreign company. The agreement between Dow Chemical and INA may be regarded as evidence of how successful ventures in financial co-operation between the two countries have been in recent years. This particular type of economic co-operation with the US has been especially beneficial to Yugoslavia, and it is therefore probable that it will be still further expanded in the future. In addition

to the immediate creation of badly needed new jobs, such co-operation can, in the long run, help the Yugoslav economy to overcome its financial difficulties and contribute to a more rapid modernization of the country's industry.

For additional reading, see the following Radio Free Europe Research Background Reports:

Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Daily Scolds CSSR Press Over 'Proletarian Internationalism'" RAD BR/5, 14 January 1976.

Slobodan Stankovic, "Private Enterprise Encouraged in Slovenia," RAD BR/26, 26 January 1976.

Slobodan Stankovic, "More on the Cominformist Trials in Yugoslavia," RAD BR/39, 12 February 1976.

Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Paper's Critical Appraisal of Balkan Conference," RAD BR/40, 12 February 1976.

Zdenko Antic, "Yugoslav Press Discusses Weaknesses of the Soviet Economic System," RAD BR/45, 16 February 1976.

Zdenko Antic, "World Bank Loan for the Yugoslav Agriculture," RAD BR/53, 27 February 1976.

Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Reaction to Sadat's Conflict with Moscow," RAD BR/68, 18 March 1976.

Zdenko Antic, "Dow Chemicals to Sign Joint Venture Agreement with Yugoslavia," RAD BR/69, 22 March 1976.

Kevin Devlin, "Italians, Yugoslav React Sharply to Soviet Attacks on 'Revisionism,'" RAD BR/72, 25 March 1976.

Slobodan Stankovic, "Cominformist Trials in Yugoslavia Continue," RAD BR/73, 26 March 1976.

Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Party Functionary Against Theory of 'Limited Sovereignty'," RAD BR/88, 14 April 1976.

Zdenko Antic, "Yugoslavia Confronted With Return of Gastarbeiter", RAD BR/89, 15 April 1976.

Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Central Committee Promises More Rights For Workers," RAD BR/90, 20 April 1976.

(046)

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.



- RAD Background Report/107
(Hungary)
14 May 1976

72

A NONCONFORMIST HUNGARIAN NOVEL PRESENTS THE VISION
OF A HUMANE SOCIALISM

By SK

Summary: The City Founder, the most recent novel by the controversial Hungarian author Gyorgy Konrad, was not allowed to appear in Hungary, but it has been translated into French and German and published in Paris and Munich. This paper reviews the book, which sets forth the author's concept of socialism.

* * *

The City Founder, the latest book by Gyorgy Konrad, a nonconformist Hungarian writer, is the story of a disillusioned revolutionary. It was not allowed to be published in Hungary, but a German version came out in Munich last fall and a French one appeared in Paris a few weeks ago. (1) Konrad granted interviews to two leading Western newspapers, Die Zeit (Hamburg) and Le Monde (Paris), (2) in which he explained his nonconformist attitude:

I write what I want. Hungarian literary officials can publish what they want. If, however, I have an opportunity to publish something abroad, I do so. In this respect I cannot abide by the limitations of the law. If a writer adjusts himself to such conditions he will find himself in diametric opposition to the inner ethics of literature.

Until 1974 Konrad was known in the West only as a promising young writer. In the fall of that year, however, political considerations -- notably his nonconformist attitude -- led to his arrest, and he was imprisoned for a short time, an event that was not without precedent. In 1973 the HSWP CC had publicly denounced a number of disciples of the late Marxist philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs -- members of what was known as the Budapest School. They were accused of holding and expressing political and ideological views that did not accord with Marxism-Leninism. Also in 1973 a young Hungarian poet and sociologist, Miklos Haraszti, was brought to court for illegally distributing the manuscript of a

- (1) Der Stadtgruender (Munich: List Verlag, 1975); Les fondateurs (Paris: Le Seuil, 1976). This paper is based on the German version.
- (2) His interview with Die Zeit was published on January 9, that with Le Monde on May 7.

book entitled Piecework and for "incitement" against state institutions. Early the following year he was given an eight-month suspended sentence, which, however, did not prevent him from having his manuscript published abroad. (3) Meanwhile, another of Lukacs's disciples, the philosopher Ferenc Feher, was briefly detained on the charge of attempting to smuggle a manuscript abroad.

In October 1974 the police arrested Konrad and two of his friends — Ivan Szelenyi, a sociologist, and a young poet, Tamas Szentjoby. They were suspected of hiding and illegally circulating the manuscript of Konrad's new book, The City Founder, but since nothing could be proved all three were released from detention and given the choice of leaving the country or facing trial. Szelenyi and Szentjoby emigrated to the West, but after first saying he would do the same Konrad changed his mind and refused to leave.

All in all, about a dozen intellectuals were subjected to party and police harassment in 1973-1974. In terms of age, education, profession, social-political background, philosophical views, etc., they constitute a fairly heterogeneous group. The things that seem to link them together are disillusionment with socialism and a tendency to criticize it from a radical leftist position. They all take exception to what they regard as a cheap consumer mentality and yearn for higher ethical standards. In the West the group's basic sociophilosophical orientation has been accepted as an Eastern version of what is called New Leftism. Hungarian officials have attached the same label to it, and the group's members have not protested. On the contrary, on several occasions they have admitted that their views are fairly close to those of the New Left. For instance, in an interview with the BBC Ferenc Feher declared:

Yes, it is a kind of label attached to us. I would not deny it, and it is not a compliment in this country. We were deeply impressed by the wave of new left in Europe in the mid-1960s, with certain reservations. We always refused the so-called terrorist element. We also refused the elements which made a new text to old music. But the mainstream of the new left which articulated a new system of needs was one of the most important impacts in our ideological life. There is a certain kind of new left in this country, though not in the form of an organized movement, not even in the form of a political movement. What I would call new left in this country is a spontaneous dynamic of young people, a kind of challenge to conventional life. (4)

Konrad prefers to speak of the "Left" instead of the "New Left," and feels "closely related" to it. But in his interview with Die Zeit he also pointed out a difference which, he said, works to the advantage of the leftists in Hungary: namely, that they know socialism from inside and are not "under any compulsion to mythicize distant events with [the help] of so-called objectivity."

Konrad has had several short stories and two books published in Hungary. His first book, a small volume entitled A latogato (The Visitor) was translated and published widely in the West. (5) It is the story of an urban social

- (3) It appeared in German under the title Stuecklohn (Berlin: Rotbuch Verlag, 1975).
- (4) The Listener (London), 12 February 1976.
- (5) The Hungarian version was published by the Magveto Publishing House (Budapest) in 1969; foreign editions appeared in Denmark, England, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the US, and West Germany.

worker (Konrad himself was once a social worker and a member of an institute that dealt with urban affairs), and the reader is presented with an unexpected, miserable underworld populated by modern outcasts, victims of various forms of alienation and social conflict. It is not quite clear from the description where the action takes place; it might be Hungary, perhaps Budapest, and the presumption is that the events are byproducts of the new socialist system. The main point is that there is not much difference between past and present; life moves around in vicious circles and certain problems recreate themselves "with statistical regularity." In a mood of despair, the social worker comes to the conclusion that the only solution lies in full identification with his clients. He gives up his job and takes over the nursing of an imbecile child, but finds that the gap cannot be closed. He returns to his office with the hope that he and -- implicitly -- all other "mediocre state officials" will keep their eyes more widely open in the future. The story, which is really nothing more than a crammed mosaic of staggering figures and episodes, is a reminder to one-dimensional bureaucrats that life is a complex process whose problems cannot be resolved by simple regulations.

Konrad's second book (6) was a joint effort -- its coauthor was Ivan Szelenyi. Also published in 1969, it is a study of urban development projects undertaken in Hungary since the advent of the socialist regime. The authors found that some degree of progress had been achieved, but urged that more "organic" forms of urban development be introduced, and the practice of basing everything on a single model -- the isolated settlement -- be abandoned. The key to the future is in the hands of the planning bureaucracy: will it be flexible enough to take a more diversified approach to urban development? Konrad and Szelenyi left the question open.

As his first two books indicate, Konrad's preoccupation with social problems is a long-standing one. For many years he has been concerned with various aspects of urban life, with human relations under socialism, with the bureaucratization of the revolution, and with the role of the planning bureaucracy. And similar problems are dealt with in his new book.

As in the case of The Visitor, it is not easy to pinpoint the setting of The City Founder. There are vague references to Eastern Europe, to a country "somewhat to the East of the center of Europe," to atrocities committed by members of the Iron Cross movement; Hungarian names pop up, and in some chapters surroundings characteristic of Hungary are described -- so it is probably Hungary that Konrad had in mind. It is beyond dispute, however, that the story takes place in a small provincial town and under a socialist regime -- though again it is hardly a story in the accepted sense of the word.

The hero is an architect, like his father, and the revolution makes him planning chief of the city in which he was born. He himself is not a revolutionary, but he has professionally revolutionary ambitions. He wants to destroy the past of his city, which his father had created, and replace it with a city of the future, a perfect organism drawn up in the planning bureau. He soon begins to realize, however, that the revolution is succumbing to bureaucracy. One of the first warnings comes from his own son: "You are a technocrat. . . . Your overstretched technical logic is nothing but the cult of production and economics, the city is nothing but a cheap, well-organized

(6) Az új lakotelepek szociologiai problémái (The Sociological Problems of New Housing Projects) (Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1969).

business concern, a decision of today becomes a routine tomorrow; the worker is only a continuation of the machine, the tenant becomes a part of his apartment, the pedestrian part of the sidewalk. . .". (p. 149). The city founder begins to perceive that creative work degenerates into a battle with bureaucracy, with selfishness, provincialism, dogmatism, with resurrected old fears and conflicts. If changes do take place, they are mainly superficial. The great ambitions of the early days are gone. The city founder takes refuge in the belief that the social revolution of the Left, the emancipation of every citizen, cannot be stopped. The book ends with a poetic vision: "Now the feast has really begun, and tomorrow we will also celebrate, everyone loves everyone else, this is a new reunion from which there is no escape. . . ."

Technically, the architect's confrontation with socialist reality and his protracted struggle with his own conscience are presented in many seemingly incoherent, fragmentary episodes, and painted in a symbolic-surrealistic style. This style, rich in color and metaphor, is an interesting one, but it can also become tedious if it is not kept under control. At one place Konrad compares the fragments of his story to "snapshots for a crammed photograph album." And in fact, pictures of past and present alternate in the book, often so quickly that the reader tends to lose his sense of time, and the empty space between the pictures is filled with monologues by the city founder. It is through these that Konrad raises the problems that bother him: the inevitable bureaucratization of the revolutionary élan, the embourgeoisement of the socialist revolution, the role of intellectuals in the socialist transformation of society, and the inability of city planners to come up with a new, human urban project.

In the view of the city founder (and of Konrad himself), the most damaging thing that could happen to the revolution is that revolutionaries become captives of the system they have devised:

We had no experience, we acted; we programed a system which then programed us. . . . From inside it is easier to ascertain what we have achieved: a society that redistributed goods centrally, in which the greater part of the national income is poured out through the state budget and bureaucratic decrees have replaced the free competition of private interests. Our environment was gloomy but we were resolute: we decided we did not want to live but to win. . . [pp. 110-111].

And so a new type of "revolutionary" has developed whose main job is to write decrees that transfer everything to the hands of the state. It is easy, it does not require much in the way of thought or responsibility. But bureaucratization leaves no room for the human element, for love. Even "Christ must withdraw from a history whose rules are in the hands of the Inquisitor, who is an exemplary planner." The city founder also became interested in the fact that many of the new planners stem from the ranks of the new intellectuals -- he calls them "state intellectuals." He finds their performance fascinating -- in a negative sense.

After the nobility and the bourgeoisie, it was we who grasped the whips and cracked them over the horses of history. We abolished the right to power based on family tree and property, and thenceforth it was only appointment that entitled [a person] to exercise power. We separated the rights of disposal and of property from each other; property belongs to everyone, but

the right of disposal belongs only to the leading officials, who know best what to do. . . . Two hundred years ago every twentieth person was a nobleman; today every twentieth person in a leading position is an intellectual [p. 133].

As the quotation shows, the city founder does not want to separate his case from that of others, and his criticism of "those intellectuals" is also self-criticism. He frequently returns to the subject, and describes the role of the group as "increasingly embarrassing." In his opinion the "state intellectuals" tend to identify the interests of the state with those of society, and to view democracy as a vehicle that will help them to power. They (including the city founder himself) planned the future without knowing what it should look like, and decided that everyone who loved the future had either to love them as well or draw the obvious conclusions.

The city founder is stunned by how little certain sectors of social life have changed. In the new system, he claims, many were elevated, many degraded, and although there were more of the former than of the latter, "those who were below ultimately remained below." This, he repeats several times, is particularly true of the workers. (Years ago the same conviction must have brought the young Miklos Haraszti into a Budapest factory to study working and living conditions. But as noted above, his final report, Piecework, was not allowed to appear in Hungary.)

The city founder finds ultimate proof that the planners have failed in the city plan itself and its disastrous consequences for both the population and socialism. (Needless to say, the small provincial city is a symbol that stands for all of society.) He becomes convinced that humanity's future cannot be decided by planning bureaucrats sitting in planning bureaus. There is variety to life, an element of the unforeseen which escapes the Diktat of the planners. Was it not his own son, the subject of his future concern, who was among the first to point out the rigidity of the official concept of the future? "Preferably," the son demurred, "you would even measure out freedom as a network of public canalization, and you would prefer to translate human contacts into a uniform language suitable for coding. . . ."

What, then, is the answer to the dilemma? Obviously, not another rigid concept, which would hardly escape the fate of the first one. But there are many lessons in the experiment which the city founder tries to translate into guiding principles, most of which surface in the course of a dream:

I dream of a city in which change is the law of action, where I have a right to my environment, where I do not exist for the city but the city is for me, where my voice is listened to; . . . where the spy has nothing to spy on, where everyone has access to the minutes of public trials; where at a press conference I am free to express my private opinion; where I do not have to look every evening at the door of my apartment to see whether my nameplate is still there; . . . I want a new city . . . which is a present for its inhabitants, a place meant for discussion and love, a place created for communication beyond its borders. . . . [pp. 165-168].


In sum, he is dreaming of a city where life again becomes an interesting adventure.

In conclusion, it should be added that in his interviews with Die Zeit and Le Monde, Konrad returned to the theme of his book and made a number of noteworthy new points. For instance, in speaking to Die Zeit he emphasized that the problems he dealt with in his book are not exclusively Hungarian, or even exclusively East European: "To bring it down to a common denominator, the question of whether socialism and freedom can meet is a question of world-wide interest," he stated, rightly. Then he went on to describe what he termed the privileged position of the East European writers: if they criticize socialism, they know what they are talking about.

We are not attacking the fortress from the outside, we have conquered it -- so completely that we have captured ourselves as well. And now our task is to liberate others as well as ourselves. This perhaps explains why really authentic East European literature must be such an embarrassment not only to the local authorities but also to the West European Left, of which we are, after all, friends and spiritual relatives. . . .

To Le Monde, Konrad talked mainly about the prospects of socialism. So far, he said, it has seen two periods of development. The first was the Stalinist era, in which the officials had an absolute monopoly of power. This was followed by the second, present period, which is grounded in a compromise between the "intellectuals of the political bureaucracy" and the specialists. The intellectuals made a mistake, however; they failed to maintain good contacts with the workers -- in fact, there is a conflict between them -- and as a result the cause of socialism suffered. But there is a new, third, period approaching, which according to Konrad will bring about a "more highly developed, more mature socialism," "new forms of self-administration at places of work, in communal cities," and -- most important -- an "ethical awakening" on the part of the intellectuals. He reverted several times to the latter issue, stressing that "without such an ethical awakening we cannot cross a certain threshold:"

When the Le Monde reporter asked whether this was not a new utopia, Konrad's answer was, "Yes, perhaps. A utopia and a program." One wishes he had offered a more substantial explanation. (050)



RAD Background Report/100
(Yugoslavia)
5 May 1976

LIBERALS REAPPEAR IN YUGOSLAVIA

By Zdenko Antic

Summary: Several Serbian party officials who were ousted from their positions following the great purge in 1972 have recently reappeared in public life. All of them are well known as anti-Stalinists with a progressively minded political orientation. It therefore seems probable that, following its recent political confrontation with dogmatists inside and outside Yugoslavia, the party leadership has decided to broaden the political consensus by reinstating some formerly prominent party officials in active political life.

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A number of moderate, progressively minded party officials who were purged or relegated to secondary positions following the great purge in Serbia in the winter of 1972 have either reappeared in public life or received special attention in the press in recent weeks. Three of them, Frane Barbieri, Branko Pribicevic, and Milenko Bojanic, are all former members of the League of Communists of Serbia CC and held high party and state positions; they were closely connected with Marko Nikezic, the former Serbian party leader who was accused by Tito of "liberalism" and forced to resign in October 1972 together with several party officials. (1)

Most of those who were dismissed at that time were allowed to continue their professional activities and indeed some of them were merely downgraded to subordinate administrative posts or given other positions in the economy. Barbieri suffered more severely than the others: a member of the Serbian CC, a leading Yugoslav journalist,

(1) Radio Belgrade, 26 October 1972.

and editor-in-chief of the Belgrade weekly Nin, he tried to continue to write for the Belgrade daily Politika, but soon vanished from the Yugoslav press:

Several months later, Barbieri reappeared in the Milan daily Il Giornale Nuovo as a foreign policy commentator specializing in East European and communist affairs. In March of this year he visited Belgrade and sent his paper a lengthy article on the changes likely to occur in post-Tito Yugoslavia, entitled "Tito Prepares for the Post-Tito Era." In it he discussed the recent ideological and political confrontation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. (2) It is certainly no accident that Barbieri was allowed to return to Belgrade at the very moment when the Yugoslav-Soviet ideological dispute was sharpening and to use it as a dateline for a politically sensitive report.

Two months earlier, another of those mentioned above, Branko Pribicevic, had contributed a series of articles on problems of socialism and the "national question" to the Ljubljana daily Delo. (3) He too had been a member of the Serbian CC, and was also professor of political science at Belgrade University and secretary of the University Committee of the League of Communists. He is a brilliant scholar with a doctorate from Oxford University, a specialist on the history of the labor movement, and the author of several works in this field. His Delo article, "Socialism and the National Question in the Contemporary World," dealt with the problem of national emancipation and relations among the nations belonging to the socialist system, and he maintained in it that the national question in socialism had been neglected from the beginning of the Stalinist era. In support of this thesis he adduced examples from Soviet, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak social, political, and administrative practice. "Elements of hegemonism and nationalism are still to be found in the policies of these parties," Pribicevic said.(4)

The most spectacular reappearance, however, was that of the third former Serbian CC member mentioned above: President of the Serbian government Milenko Bojanic. Bojanic is a well-known financial expert and was for a long period Director-General of the Yugoslav Investment Bank. After the fall of his close associate Nikezic, Bojanic was not re-elected to his previous party and state positions,

(2) Il Giornale Nuovo (Milan), 31 March 1976.

(3) Delo, 13, 14, and 15 January 1976.

(4) Ibid.

but became head of the Crvena Zastava automobile factory in Kragujevac. Although he retained his position as a Republic of Serbia deputy in the Federal Assembly, he rarely spoke on public questions.

In March of this year Bojanic reappeared in the mass media in a spectacular fashion. During the Federal Assembly discussion on the draft five-year plan for 1976-1980, it fell to Bojanic to outline the position of the Republic of Serbia and to introduce an amendment. His speech was given lengthy coverage in the press, and Politika carried his photograph. (5) Another Belgrade daily, Nin, did the same and also published a three-page interview with him on the problems of the Yugoslav automobile industry. (6) All this suggests that Bojanic's political isolation is practically at an end.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the recent appointment of the Montenegrin party official Veljko Milatovic to the country's highest party body, the Presidium of the LCY. (7) Milatovic seemed to be well on the way to high party office in the early 1970s, when he too fell victim to the change of course that followed the 21st Presidium session in Karadjordjevo in December 1971. Before then he had reached the top party position in Montenegro, was secretary of the LCY CC's Commission for International Relations, and President of the Yugoslav Socialist Alliance of Working People, which is Yugoslavia's front organization. Following the December 1971 events Milatovic was not re-elected to any of his party or state positions but was sent back to Montenegro as President of the Montenegrin Assembly. It can be assumed that his close relations with the ousted Croatian leaders Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabcevic-Kucar were responsible for this temporary hitch in his political career. At the third session of the LCY CC on 17 April 1976 Milatovic was appointed to the place in the Presidium left vacant following the death of the veteran Montenegrin Veljko Vlahovic. (8) Milatovic too has recently published several articles dealing with dogmatist, Stalinist, and sectarian deviations in communist policy. (9)

The reappearance at this time of these liberal-minded and progressive personalities on the Yugoslav political scene can hardly

(5) Politika, 28 February and 12 March 1976.

(6) Nin, 18 April 1976.


(7) Komunist (Belgrade), 26 April 1976.

(8) Ibid.

(9) Ibid., 22 March 1976.

be a coincidence, coming as it does during a period of increasing ideological and political confrontation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and of vigorous prosecution of several pro-Soviet groups and individuals, usually referred to as "Cominformists." It can be assumed that the party leadership has decided to broaden the country's political consensus by reinstating in political life several persons known to possess an anti-Stalinist and antidogmatic orientation. (004)

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This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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• RAD Background Report/99
(Yugoslavia)
4 May 1976

YUGOSLAVS CRITICIZE SOVIET "INTERNATIONALISM"

By Zdenko



Summary: Yugoslav officials and media have recently stepped up their criticism of Comecon and especially of relations with the developing, nonaligned countries. Their view is that any deepening of the division of the contemporary world into antagonistic political and economic blocs can only harm the process of spreading socialism; for this reason Yugoslavia follows a policy of nonalignment. They also maintain that the "so-called socialist community -- i.e., the members of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon -- is motivated by considerations of profit rather than by ideas of true international co-operation in its dealings with the nonaligned countries.

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Yugoslav party and government officials, as well as the media, have recently stepped up their repudiation of proposals to include the country in the socialist community. They have been especially critical of the Soviet concept of internationalism in its application to economic relations between the Moscow-oriented bloc and the developing countries.

The latest and most authoritative statement of this thesis came from Secretary of the Executive Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) Stane Dolanc in a television program broadcast on April 28; prominent Spanish, French and Italian party officials (Santiago Carrillo, Gaston Plissonnier, and Gian Carlo Pajetta (1))

(1) Tanjug in English, 29 April 1976.

also took part in the discussion. Dolanc repeated the, by now, familiar Yugoslav views about the pan-European CP conference and the conditions under which Yugoslavia would participate. But he also expressed strong views on broader aspects of socialist relations. He firmly repudiated the idea that Yugoslavia should become part of the "so-called socialist community," a label now increasingly applied to the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. The term, which is used primarily to refer to "the Soviet Union and other nations of the socialist camp," has of late

been extended to include, in addition to these countries, Vietnam, [North] Korea, Cuba, and Yugoslavia. As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, however, this cannot mean that a specific relationship must exist among these countries. (2)

Dolanc then set forth in some detail the reasons for Yugoslavia's stance on this question. He said that Yugoslavia is of course interested in good relations with all socialist countries, but that:

If under the term "socialist community" an attempt is made to institutionalize certain relationships, then we cannot consent to this application of the term. All such communities, the contemporary world being what it is, can come to have the overtones of a bloc, the overtones of isolation.

Elaborating on this idea, Dolanc noted that the LCY has always been against any attempt to divide the world into blocs. "A fundamental component of the policy of the LCY and of socialist and nonaligned Yugoslavia is resistance to the concept of blocs, and a desire to see them eliminated," he said.

Any policy, including that of the socialist countries, which contributes to a deeper division of the world into opposing political and economic blocs, he went on, must be condemned, and the so-called socialist community -- i.e., the countries that compose the Warsaw Pact and Comecon -- are not the only true bearers, the prophets of socialism, in the world:

I think that nobody can claim today that socialism is a geographical concept, and that it is possible to shut in and limit socialism within the borders of a state, a bloc, or -- as has been frequently said of late -- within the framework of the socialist community.

(2) Ibid.

In the Yugoslav view socialism is a "world-wide process, which is not and cannot be pure and homogeneous, and does not follow a straight line." Rather is it a social process, that is,

a complex of developing social relations that are penetrating into the complex of their predecessors, not only in the socialist countries where these relations are now fairly well established but in many other countries of the world, including some capitalist states.

Continuing this line of thought, Dolanc said that the new and the revolutionary are breaking through in various forms in many of the newly liberated countries of Asia and Africa. The political movements engaged in this struggle have different names, but all of them have the same goal -- national liberation and social emancipation. Dolanc concluded:

These countries, especially when one takes into account economic and cultural conditions, are trying to find their way and are moving ahead. . . . The LCY maintains and develops close and friendly relations with these national, democratic, and liberation parties and extends them moral, political, and material aid.

The Socialist Community and the Nonaligned Countries

In arguing against the idea of the socialist community as a "close, isolated bloc" and expounding his country's nonaligned policy, Dolanc was obviously trying to justify the familiar Yugoslav thesis of a peaceful, world-wide process of socialist transformation stressing at the same time the damage this transformation may incur from the political and economic division of the world into opposing blocs. The same theme was recently stated with greater vehemence by the Zagreb economic periodical Privredni Vjesnik in its April issue. (3) In discussing the question of international co-operation, the journal condemned the close-knit organization of the Comecon countries, and criticized their relations with the nonaligned nations:

The strengthening of socialism in the world is being pursued not only by reinforcing military and political allegiance to the Warsaw Pact but also by linking the socialist economies more closely within the framework of Comecon. Allegiance, primarily to the Soviet Union, and to the strengthening of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, is considered a higher form of proletarian internationalism for which not only has a new

(3) Tanjug in Russian, 29 April 1976.

name -- "socialist internationalism" -- been devised but new forms of international law are being sought. Such an approach usually leaves a very narrow margin for the nonaligned movement, and it is in fact hardly mentioned. Instead . . . these countries are regarded as a "reserve detachment" of the co-ordinated foreign policies of the socialist group.

Privredni Vjesnik cited some examples from the recent past. In the international forums and in official documents, for example, the Comecon countries, and especially the Soviet Union, basically support the developing countries' demand for the creation of a new economic order; their practice, however, is another matter: "The more developed Comecon countries are not carrying out an obligation they have assumed: to allocate 1 per cent of their general domestic product as aid to the developing countries." The journal continued:

Judging by these countries' economic potential -- which is expressed by the size of their GDP of about 1,000,000 million dollars -- they should have earmarked about 10,000 million dollars for this purpose; in practice, it has been calculated, they provide not more than 1,300 million. In addition, this aid flows through their own channels and not through those of the international organizations.


Privredni Vjesnik goes on to complain that the Soviet Union and the other Comecon countries do not recognize the so-called "dialogue between North and South" which has been going on in Paris, and have expressed reservations concerning some of the proposals made by the developing countries; the Soviet Union, for example, did so during the preparation of the recent Fourth UNCTAD Session in Geneva. Moreover, the Soviet Union and the other Comecon countries are primarily motivated by profit in their dealings with the developing, nonaligned countries and this kind of co-operation has nothing to do with "genuine internationalism in economic life." The Zagreb paper concluded:

If, in addition, this [Soviet] form of internationalism is also burdened with the bloc concept, it becomes incapable of providing concrete answers to the most important questions that concern the world of today and the nonaligned and developing countries. Instead of becoming a genuine partner to the erection of a new international order, this [Soviet] internationalism is satisfied to play the role of an observer.

This latest Yugoslav criticism of the Soviet attitude toward the nonaligned countries is more outspoken and sharper than ever before and suggests that, in view of the approach of the fifth

nonaligned countries' summit meeting in Colombo, Belgrade is trying to draw as clear a line as possible between the Soviet Union's political and economic strategy and Yugoslavia's policy of nonalignment. Such a policy is of course far from new; on earlier occasions the Yugoslav media have directed sharp criticism against the Soviet treatment of the nonaligned countries as a "reserve detachment" of the socialist bloc. What is new are the thoroughness with which the Yugoslav thesis is worked out and the sharp tone of the language used, both of which suggest that Yugoslavia means to intensify its ideological offensive. (003)

- end -



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RAD Background Report/98.
(Yugoslavia)
3 May 1976

YUGOSLAV THEORETICIAN AGAINST "MONOLITHIC UNITY"

IN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

By Slobodan Stanković

Summary: In an article published in the May 1 holiday issue of the Belgrade daily Borba, Yugoslav party theoretician Dr. Radovan Radonjic says that the idea of "monolithic unity" within the international communist movement is nothing but a "specific sort of nationalism." The author accuses the propagators of a "leading center" of harming the world communist movement and says that "progressive forces" throughout the world are not ready to accept a "generally valid" concept of socialism.

* * *

All attempts designed to bring about so-called "monolithic unity" within the international communist movement are nothing but a specific sort of nationalism. Anyone in the world communist movement trying to impose a "general line" upon all other communist parties and countries harms the otherwise successful development of socialism throughout the world and must be sharply condemned. This is the gist of an article by Dr. Radovan Radonjic published in the May holiday issue of the Belgrade daily Borba (30 April, 1 and 2 May 1976).

Writing under the title "The Sense and Implications of Monolithism," Dr. Radonjic accuses unnamed leaders in the Soviet bloc of "absolutizing their own practice" and of "arbitrarily interpreting the views" of people who do not agree with them. All opponents of dogmatism are labeled "rightist" or "leftist revisionists," Radonjic says. These dogmatists consider that nothing could lead to the implementation of "common goals" except

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"monolithic unity," the idea which was born in a period when "armed action" was the only way to achieve "radical social transformation."

If, several decades ago, it was necessary to protect "the first country of socialism," i.e., the Soviet Union, because of which "ideological unity and political homogeneity" were needed, today such "monolithic unity" is no longer essential. It has even become harmful:

Monolithism, as a form of ideological-political unity that makes it necessary to accept the totality of its doctrine, has been used by those striving to legalize a hierarchical way of thinking and authoritatively to proclaim so-called objective truths. Since, under such conditions, only one single truth is accepted as is one single, generally recognized interpreter of such truth, monolithism cannot be accepted as a lasting platform for the relations and unity within the movement without provoking stagnation and deviations in its development.

Against Any "Leading Center"

Dr. Radonjic claims that, "long ago," the myth of the necessity of a "general line" was destroyed, as was the idea that "a leading center has been infallible." Still, there are parties and leaders who continue to insist upon such a myth, because some communist parties "have long been acting within the context of a strictly centralized, monolithic structure of the movement." All this has influenced "the habits and mentality of their leading cadres." As a result, we have today, Dr. Radonjic says, followers of trends who insist that "the domination of a single party, or several parties, over all other parties" must be introduced. For this reason, it is asserted that: a) "only one single way existed to transform the old society in a revolutionary manner," and b) "political-ideological" measures against parties not willing to accept such an idea, including their excommunication, should be introduced.


Dr. Radonjic protests that other parties have not been permitted "independently to appraise what is Marxist-Leninist in their own ideology and theory." The advocates of "monolithic unity" have

taken upon themselves the right to be "authoritative arbiters in all conflicting issues and infallible judges who should [have the right to] decide who is who and what is what in the movement." Moreover, they have accepted certain concrete solutions carried out by individual parties and proclaim them "the only valid solutions for all times." Such a "messianic role" assumed by one or several parties must be resolutely rejected, Dr. Radonjic says.

He sees three implications in such a dogmatic attitude: first, it is "destructive," harming the struggle of all "progressive forces throughout the world which, both objectively and subjectively, will never become advocates of a 'generally valid' ideological concept"; secondly, the idea of "monolithic unity" is nothing but "a specific sort of nationalism." In propagating "monolithic unity," its advocates actually have in mind "their own national roads and experiences"; thirdly, in advocating "monolithic unity," its standard-bearers have become "a specific type of sectarians." Adds Dr. Radonjic:

[The theory of] monolithism has not only neglected the problem of equality, negated national sovereignty, and abandoned the idea of various roads and different forms of struggle by individual parties, but it has also denounced the revolutionary value of anything being created beyond the organizational frameworks of its advocates.

By having proclaimed the acceptance of "only one 'correct' doctrine as the chief criterion" by which to judge whether a party is revolutionary or not, the advocates of "monolithic unity" have begun dividing the communist movement into "forces" that possess "the full truth," and those "that are mistaken and are marching along a wrong road." In doing so, the advocates of "monolithism" have thus far not been able, according to Dr. Radonjic, "to present any valuable argument which would help the action they pursue." Yet their main goal has been to impose their own views upon other parties, a plan which they have not been able to carry out. On the contrary, Dr. Radonjic is of the opinion that progressive forces throughout the world have become ever more immune to such campaigns carried out in the name of alleged "higher interests." Behind such "higher interests" lurks striving for domination, Dr. Radonjic concludes. (002)



RAD Background Report/95
(Rumania)
29 April 1976

THE RUMANIAN PLAN AND STATE BUDGET FOR 1976



By the Rumanian Unit

Summary: This paper discusses the provisions of the 1976 socioeconomic plan as approved by the Rumanian parliament. The data are analyzed in light of statistics on plan fulfillment in 1975 (as reported in the communiqué on the 1971-1975 plan and speeches of party leader Ceausescu). It also includes a discussion of the state budget for 1976.

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Correction

Meeting on 20 December 1975, the Grand National Assembly adopted a "Single, Unified National Plan of Economic and Social Development for 1976." The plan specifies 1976 targets for the most important branches of the economy. Compared to the preliminary estimates of 1975 achievements, the increases indicate a slowdown in the development of Rumania's economy in almost all sectors, in particular in the areas of industrial production, investments, foreign trade, and national income. The communiqué on 1975 achievements published in Scinteia on 4 February 1976, (1) as well as the figures cited by Ceausescu in his speech to the Congress of the People's Councils (2) however, shows that these preliminary figures are not correct in most cases, that actual achievements were lower than estimated, and that, as a consequence, the planned percentage increases for 1976 over actual achievements in 1975 are higher than originally admitted.

The table below compares the goals for 1976 with the achievements of 1975 as reported by Ceausescu (as far as they are available) and with the increases indicated in the 1976 plan over the preliminary estimates.

- (1) See Rumanian Situation Report/5, Radio Free Europe Research, 18 February 1976, Item 1.
- (2) Scinteia, 5 February 1976.

TABLE 1

INCREASES IN 1976 PLAN OVER PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES
AND FINAL OUTTURN FOR 1975

Category	Plan Targets (in 1,000 million lei) for 1976	Increase over 1975 (percentages)	
		Final Figures Re- ported by Ceausescu	Prelimi- nary Figures
Total industrial production	641.0	11.2% ^o (x)	10.2% ^o
Total agricultural produc- tion	108.3-119.3	16.0-27.7	15.0-26.6
Volume of investments	159.5	(xx)	19.4
Foreign trade	60.7	14.3	17.8
Domestic trade	154.8	10.0	10.0
Services	31.5	-	13.8
Labor productivity	-	-	8.5
National income	400.0	10.5	10.5
Total real income per inhabitant	-	8.0-8.5	-

(x) According to the communiqué on the 1975 plan, industrial production increased by 12.4 per cent over the 495,000 million lei achieved in 1974, i.e., to 556,380 million lei. In this case, the increase provided for 1976 would be of 15.2 per cent.

(xx) For additional information, see section on investments.

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1975
increase
over 1974

12.4%

Industrial Production

This year, total industrial production is to be 641,000 million lei, compared with the flexible target of 582,000 million lei to 591,000 million lei planned for 1975 (the 1971-1975 plan had initially projected a total industrial output in 1975 of 503,800 million lei to 534,700 million lei). According to the 1976 plan, industrial production is to increase by 10.2 per cent over actual production in 1975, an evident slowdown from the 15 per cent growth stipulated in 1975 over the preliminary estimates for 1974.

Presenting the 1976 plan to the Grand National Assembly, planning chief Mihai Marinescu reported a whole series of data about planned increases in the main industrial branches. (3) He said that the machine building industry will increase its output by 12.8 per cent; the chemical industry will grow faster than all other sectors, by 18.5 per cent; but light industry output will rise only 8.0 per cent; and food industry production by 10.9 per cent.

The following table on industrial production in 1976 shows that 1976 output of most industrial products is to be higher than both the 1975 plan figures and actual achievements.

TABLE 2
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT

Product	Unit of Measure	Actual	Planned	
		1975	1975	1976
Electric power	1,000 million kwh	<u>53.7</u>	<u>56.5</u>	<u>57.5</u>
Coal	million tons	<u>29.4</u>	<u>29.8</u>	<u>29.6</u>
Crude oil	million tons	<u>14.6</u>	<u>14.6</u>	<u>14.7</u>
Methane gas	1,000 million cubic meters	<u>27.0</u>	<u>26.8</u>	<u>26.8</u>
Steel	million tons	<u>9.5</u>	<u>10.1</u>	<u>11.0</u>
Rolled steel products	million tons	<u>6.8</u>	7.1	7.8
Steel pipes	million tons	-	1.2	1.25
Copper	1,000 tons	-	42.0	<u>40.3</u>
Aluminum	1,000 tons	204.0	200.0	206.0
Automated electro-technical and electronic equipment	1,000 million lei	-	2.9	3.4
Calculation equipment	1,000 million lei	-	1.4	1.9
Tractors	1,000 units	<u>50.0</u>	50.0	51.5
Passenger cars	1,000 units	<u>55.5</u>	53.0	60.0
Jeep-type cars	1,000 units	<u>12.5</u>	16.6	15.0
Electric and diesel locomotives	units	334	328	308
Ships	1,000 tdw	<u>281.0</u>	324.0	350.0
Synthetic rubber	1,000 tons	<u>99.0</u>	112.4	146.5
Chemical fertilizers	1,000 tons	<u>1,729.0</u>	1,962.5	2,280.0

(3) Ibid., 20 December 1975.

TABLE 2 (cont.)

Product	Unit of Measure	Actual	Planned	
		1975	1975	1976
Cement	million tons	11.5	13.6	14.0
Meat	1,000 tons	713.0	822.0	945.4
Edible oils	1,000 tons	321.0	305.0	298.0
Sugar	1,000 tons	516.0	555.0	594.0
Fish	1,000 tons	-	-	190.0

No noticeable changes are projected for the power sector in the 1976 plan, with the exception of electricity, which is to increase substantially over actual output in 1975, but only slightly over the 1975 plan provisions. Marinescu said in his speech that "the production of electric power, which is to be 57,500 million kwh, is based on increased output by thermoelectric plants using brown coal." Nevertheless, the planned output of coal in 1976 is only slightly higher than it was in 1975, and even below the target for 1975.

Also worth noting is the planned drop in copper output. Jeep-type cars (which are in demand for export), locomotives, and edible oils.

The 1976 plan does not contain any figures for projected iron ore output, although steel production is to go up from the 9,500,000 tons actually produced in 1975 and the 10,100,000 tons planned for that year to 10,970,000 tons in 1976, i.e., by 15 per cent and 8.6 per cent, respectively. It is assumed that efforts will be made to produce the greatest possible part of iron ore requirements domestically, in order to avoid additional costly imports of this raw material. In 1974, Rumania's own production of iron ore was 3,265,000 tons (with a 30-35 per cent iron content) while 10,001,800 tons, with over 60 per cent iron content, were imported.

Agriculture

The provisions for agriculture also appear to be rather too optimistic considering past difficulties and current possibilities. The table below shows that the output of almost all agricultural produce is to rise substantially over the provisions and the achievements of 1975, as well as over the highest yields recorded to date.

TABIE 3

CROP PRODUCTION PLANS

Crop	Highest Yield Recorded	1975		1976		Planned 1976 Increase %	
		Planned (in 1,000 tons)	Actual	Planned	Over Highest Yield (in percentage)	Over Actual 1975 Output	%
Cereals total	16,912	20,000	15,219	20,570	21.6 %	35.2 %	
of which wheat and rye	6,098	6,930	-	7,225	18.5 %	-	
maize	9,817	11,450	-	11,935	16.6 %	-	
Sugar beets	5,581	8,560	4,902	7,200	27.2 %	46.9 %	
Sunflower seed	850	1,062	724	1,080	27.1 %	49.2 %	
Potatoes	4,119	4,550	2,319	4,735	14.9 %	104.2 %	
Vegetables	2,955	4,045	2,364	3,950	33.6 %	67.1 %	
Fruit	1,279	1,900	1,015	1,930	50.9 %	90.1 %	
Grapes	1,576	1,635	1,167	1,642	4.2 %	40.7 %	
Meat (liveweight)	1,977	2,113	-	2,298	16.2 %	-	
Milk (1,000 hectoliters)	43,683	51,925	-	49,490	13.3 %	-	

According to the plan provisions, the 1976 targets will be reached "under conditions of a normal agricultural year." Nevertheless when one remembers that 1972, an exceptionally good agricultural year, saw a cereal harvest of only 16,912,500 tons, the 1976 plan target of 20,570,000 tons, i.e., a 21.6 per cent increase, will obviously be difficult to achieve "in a normal year." Although there is a pronounced trend in Rumania to increase the importance of livestock and breeding, this category's targets are to remain almost the same as those for 1975, obviously due to the fact that actual achievements in this field fell short of targets in 1975. Deficiencies in breeding, with all their consequences, should probably be sought in the lack of fodder.

TABLE 4
LIVESTOCK

Category	1975		1976
	Actual	Planned (in 1,000 head)	Planned
Cattle	6,126	6,600	6,620
of which cows and heifers	3,030	3,315	3,273
Pigs	8,812	10,110	10,250
of which sows	821	935	1,000
Sheep	13,867	16,000	15,900
Poultry (hens)	-	47,160	47,530

Irrigation is still lagging. The 1971-1975 plan projected a total irrigated area of 2,100,000 hectares by the end of 1975, but only 1,474,000 were actually irrigated. Work on an additional 256,000 hectares is expected to be completed by planting time in 1976, but this will bring the total to only 1,730,000 hectares -- still far below the plan provisions. The 1976 plan stipulates only a limited extension of areas prepared for irrigation -- the irrigation of only another 150,000 hectares -- which will bring the total to 1,960,000 hectares, a figure still far below the 1975 targets. The 1976 plan further provides for the drainage of 222,000 hectares (175,000 planned for 1975), and for anti-erosion efforts on 127,000 hectares (130,000 hectares in 1975).

1975 -
1976 + 150,000
1,474,000 h
1,730,000
www.arhivaexilului.ro

Another weak point in Rumania's agriculture has always been the available supply of chemical fertilizers. The 1971-1975 plan projected a supply of 6,978,000-7,428,000 tons of active substance chemical fertilizers to the agricultural units over the five-year period, but only 4,500,000 tons were actually supplied. The 1976 plan calls for 1,454,000 tons to be delivered during the current year, indeed a substantial increase over the 1975 provisions (1,178,000 tons), but still far below earlier estimates of requirements:

It is difficult in light of these problems to see how total agricultural production can increase from an achievement worth 93,400 million lei in 1975 (as reported by Ceausescu at the Congress of People's Councils) to 108,300 million to 119,300 million lei as called for in the 1976 plan.

The area to be afforested has been significantly reduced, from 74,700 hectares planned for 1975, to 57,700 hectares projected for this year. This reduction is rather surprising in view of the concern expressed officially about the decline of forest lands. (4)

Investments

In 1976 total investments in the national economy will be 143,700 million lei (as compared with 142,700 million lei in 1975), of which 130,700 million lei will be from state funds, 6,700 million lei from co-operative and mass organizations, and 6,300 million lei from the population's funds (cash and labor contributions). These funds will be allocated as follows:

TABLE 5
ALLOCATION OF INVESTMENT FUNDS
(in 1,000 million lei)

Category	1975	1976
Industry	75.1	74.8
Construction	5.7	7.6
Agriculture	17.1	17.2
Scientific research and technological development	1.1	0.9
Transport and Telecommunications	15.3	14.7
Trade, public catering, tourism, etc.	4.5	4.2
Education, culture, health	3.8	4.4
Housing construction	11.6	12.8
Local government expenses	3.2	4.1

(4) See Rumanian SR/3, RFER, 29 January 1976, Item 2.

Foreign Trade

60,700 mil. 14.3%

The total volume of foreign trade is to grow to 60,700 million lei, from the 53,100 million lei actually achieved in 1975, i.e., an increase of 14.3 per cent. The plan further states that foreign currency income from international tourism is to rise 7 per cent, as against the 12.5 per cent provided for in the 1975 plan.

Thus far, there is no information available on the planned volume of imports and exports in 1976, but if one takes into account the provisions contained in the 1976-1980 directives, which stipulate a 72-80 per cent rise in foreign trade during that period, with greater dynamics in exports, which are to rise by more than 90 per cent, it may safely be assumed that the 1976 plan also follows suit.

National Income and Personal Income

400,000 mil.

The national income is to increase from the 362,000 million lei achieved in 1975 (Ceausescu at the Congress of People's Councils) to 400,000 million lei in 1976, i.e., a rise of 10.5 per cent. This is a larger hike than the average growth rate provided for the 1976-1980 five-year plan in the August 1974 directives, which was only 9.0-10.0 per cent.

The monthly nominal average pay is to rise to 2,025 lei this year. The 1975 plan provided for only 1,870 lei, but according to Ceausescu (5) average remuneration in December 1975 was 1,973 lei. The 1976 plan further stipulates real wages are to go up by 8.0-8.7 per cent over the preliminary calculations of 1975 achievements.

The real income of the peasantry, derived from their work in the agricultural production co-operatives and on their own homesteads, is to rise 9.0 to 12.0 per cent (calculated on an active per capita basis) over the preliminary 1975 achievement calculations. Since the 1975 plan stipulated that this category of peasants was to achieve a monthly income of 980 lei, their income will remain considerably below that of people employed in other branches of the national economy.

Other Plan Provisions

The maximum costs per 1,000 lei worth of goods produced and per 1,000 ton/kilometers of railway transportation will increase over the 1975 provisions, as can be seen in the table below:

(5) Scinteia, 19 December 1975.

TABLE 6
MAXIMUM EXPENDITURES PER 1,000 LEI OF OUTPUT

Category	1975	1976
Industry	875.0 lei	906.5 lei
State Agricultural Enterprises	881.0	980.0
Railway Transportation (Per 1,000 ton/kilometer)	125.2	131.7

No explanation for this negative trend has been given, and lack of necessary data makes it difficult to make a thorough analysis. In any case, it can be assumed that the rise of remuneration, along with the world-wide price increases for raw materials, contributed to this trend. The situation is especially grave in the state agricultural enterprises whose entire income will virtually go to cover production costs.

Accurate A total of 145,000 dwelling units will be built, 80,000 of which will be financed by state funds and 65,000 by the population itself (85,150 and 48,130, respectively, were provided for in 1975).

Culture Accommodation in kindergartens will be expanded by 31,000 pupils (25,205 in 1975), while nurseries will be able to take on 12,700 new enrollees (28,080 in 1975). Some 2,730 new classrooms will be constructed (3,030 in 1975) and boarding schools will be expanded to accommodate 25,100 new pupils (21,450 in 1975).

Conclusions regarding the plan
Conclusions Regarding the Plan

Although the current annual plan's projected expansion of most sections of the national economy is impressive by Western standards, and even when compared to the plans of most of the other Comecon countries, it nevertheless is below the targets set for earlier years.

Creation of sub-classified
weber The fact that industrial production is to rise only 10.2 per cent over the lower figure set for the 1975 plan, compared with a 15 per cent increase stipulated for 1975, that national income is to grow by only 10.5 per cent (14.0 per cent in 1975), and that investments and foreign trade are to rise less than the 1975 targets is probably caused by a number of reasons. It is possible that the international

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① economic situation, and in particular the higher prices of imported raw materials, made a reconsideration of the economic plan, especially of the industrial production plan, necessary. It is also possible that Rumania's industry and economy have already reached a level which makes it difficult to envisage a continuation of the high growth rates of the past.

change

②

③ There is, however, no doubt that Rumania's permanent hard currency trade deficit with the West directly influenced imports, i.e., foreign trade, and indirectly industrial production and a number of other sectors.

In general, the 1976 plan appears to be reasonable, except for certain agricultural categories, especially the production of cereals. In order to achieve a grain crop of the magnitude required by the plan, a "normal agricultural year" will not do; even in an exceptional year it is doubtful whether so high a target could actually be attained.

The final plan for 1976-1980 (final versions usually contain provisions concerning some sectors for each of the five years) has not yet been adopted by the Grand National Assembly, but it is interesting to note that, according to Ceausescu, (6) the average annual increase in industrial production is supposed to be 11.2 per cent during the 1976-1980 period -- a figure above the provisions for 1976: 10.5 per cent in national income, 6.0-7.2 per cent in total agricultural production, etc.

The 1976 State Budget

258.008 mil.

215.790 mil

The 1976 budget, as was the 1975 one, is balanced in that expenditures equal income. The low rise in total income and expenditure is an important characteristic. Whereas these figures grew by 22.5 per cent in 1975, this year they are going to increase by only 6.2 per cent.

1) national budget

42.217 mil?

Significantly, the rise in both the incomes and expenditures of local budgets will be far greater than in the national budget. While most of the increase in 1974 was allocated to the national budget, and in 1975 the increases in income and expenditure of the two levels of government grew at almost the same rate, this year the growth of the national budget will be 4.4 per cent and that of local budgets 16.7 per cent. This is a result of the decision made by the 11th party congress in November 1975 to lend greater support to the development of economically backward counties.

2) local budgets

increase over 49.75

6.29/10

(6) His 23 July 1975 speech.

The comparatively higher proportion of the income deriving from taxes and other levies paid by individuals is another important feature of the current annual budget. This year it will be 9.7 per cent. Last year it was 9 per cent; while in earlier budgets it reached its highest level -- 9.3 per cent -- in 1971.

The following tables illustrate this division as compared to the figures for 1975. (7)

TABLE 7
PLANNED REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE -- 1975 AND 1976

Category	1975 (in million lei)	1976	Percentage Increase
National	206,652.7	215,790.7	4.4 %
Local	36,169.5	42,217.8	16.7 %
Total	242,822.2	258,008.5	6.2 %

TABLE 8
ITEMIZED REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES OF SIGNIFICANT
SELECTED CATEGORIES, 1975 AND 1976

Item	1975 (in million lei)	1976	Percentage Increase
<u>Revenue</u>			
From state economic units, turnover taxes, etc.	127,602.9	136,426.7	7 %
Taxes and other levies paid by individuals	21,935.8	24,988.1	13 %
<u>Expenditures</u>			
Financing the national economy	155,902.6	166,590.2	6.8
Social and cultural activities,	51,665.8	56,956.2	10.3

(7) Scinteia, 21 December 1975.

TABLE 8 (cont.)

Item	1975 (in million lei)	1976	Percentage Increase
of which:			
Education	12,982.1	14,781.6	13.9
Culture and the arts	934.7	1,018.5	8.9
Health	9,965.8	11,690.1	17.3
Physical education	262.4	335.0	28
Allowances for children	7,810.0	7,754.0	- 0.7
Social insurance	18,079.0	19,673.0	8.8
Pensions and grants for war invalids, widows and orphans	1,631.8	1,704.0	4.4
State administration	2,791.3	3,116.6	11.7
State defense	9,723.0	10,434.0	7.3
Reserve fund	2,389.0	2,784.7	16.6

1976
increase
of social fund

10.5%

While the 1975 budget provided for a 32.2 per cent increase over 1974 in financing the national economy and only a 5.5 per cent rise in funds for social and cultural activities, the current budget stipulates only a 6.8 per cent rise of expenditures for the national economy, whereas those for social and cultural activities are to go up more radically, i.e., by 10 per cent. The largest single change in the social and cultural activities category is to be found in the culture and the arts entry which fell 10 per cent from 1974 to 1975; but which is now to go up 8.9 per cent.

National
defence

7.5%

As for expenditures for national defense, their share of the pie remains unchanged, at 4 per cent, but its value is to rise merely 7.3 per cent over 1975. The comparable jump in 1975 over 1974 was 13.3 per cent. Here it should also be noted that the Political Executive Committee decided on December 29 to increase the pay and the food allowances of soldiers as of 1 January 1976. (8)

Credit for
agricultural
producers
co-ops

Presenting the budget to the Grand National Assembly, Finance Minister Florea Dumitrescu said that long-term credits totaling 2,200 million lei will be granted to the agricultural production co-operatives. Last year, such credits were 2,800 lei.


(8) See Scinteia, 30 December 1975, and Rumanian SR/3, RFER, 29 January 1976, Item 4.

Executiv, bugetar, 1975
calculata

When speaking of the first, provisional calculations of 1975 achievements, Dumitrescu said that budgetary incomes totaled 240,600 million lei (14.7 per cent higher than in 1974), thus leaving a surplus of 2,900 million lei. (9) (092)

- end -

(9) On 1976 budget provisions, see the Rumanian Unit, "The Economic Plan and State Budget for 1975," RAD Background Report/4 (Rumania), 15 January 1975.



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RUMANIA/14
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CULTURE1. Congress on Political Education and Culture to Be Sponsored by FSU

At a plenary session of the Front of Socialist Unity (FSU) National Council on 15 April 1976 two important decisions were taken with regard to the forthcoming Congress on Political Education and Socialist Culture. First, it was decided that it should be held in June instead of May, as originally scheduled; second, a proposal by Nicolae Ceausescu, who is also FSU chairman, that the FSU National Council "take it upon itself to convoke and organize" the congress was accepted. According to Scinteia (April 16), the National Council also approved the agenda, which will consist of five items:

1. An analysis of how the party's ideological tasks, as laid down in the decisions of the 11th RCP Congress and the Party Program, have been carried out;

2. A discussion of activity in educational and cultural institutions;

3. The role of literature and art in the "revolutionary-patriotic education" of the popular masses;

4. The activities of artistic institutions and amateur and folk art groups;

5. The educational role of the press, radio and television.

According to Romania Libera (March 20), at a meeting of the FSU Executive Committee on March 19 the organization's contribution to the preparations for the congress had been praised, and "the need for FSU organizations to become more active in guiding and co-ordinating cultural-artistic activities and in orienting them along the lines set at the 11th RCP Congress" has been stressed. (It should be noted that it was at this meeting that the word "socialist" was added to the designation of the congress -- it is now known as the Congress on Political Education and Socialist Culture.)

Generally speaking, it would seem more natural to have chosen the Council on Socialist Culture and Education (headed by CC Secretary Dumitru Popescu) to sponsor the congress, and the fact that the FSU will do so raises speculation about competition in the cultural field. Cornel Burtica, CC secretary in charge of propaganda, is a member of the FSU Executive Committee whereas Popescu is not, and this has given rise to rumors that the two are rivals so far as the guidance of cultural affairs is concerned. There is ample evidence, however, that the decision to have the FSU sponsor the congress was related less to personal rivalry or accident than to

the ideological-cultural campaign that has been going on since 1971. In his speech to the recent FSU National Council meeting Ceausescu must have had this in mind when he pointed out the importance of assigning such a task to the FSU: "This will orient future activity in the educational and cultural fields." The idea of having this mass organization (in fact an "umbrella" comprising most of the trade and creative unions, youth, women's, national, and church organizations) must have appealed to the party leadership at a time when insistence on "socialist democracy" appears to head the list of topics in party propaganda.

The decision is certainly in accord with Ceausescu's own views on culture and the arts -- views that were cogently expressed as long ago as December 1971, in his address to the National Conference of Communal Party Secretaries, when he told his audience that any theses drawn up for conferences of creative unions would be submitted to rural officials for discussion, and that the latter would "have to express their opinions on theses related to the guidance of art and literature in Rumania, because after all it is for them that this art exists." (For more on the party secretaries' conference see Rumanian Situation Report/50, Radio Free Europe Research, 29 December 1971, Item 9.)

At the forthcoming congress professional artists will be in the minority; most of the participants will be activists and propagandists. It will indeed be a congress of political education -- in the spirit of the party's over-all political goals -- and of socialist culture -- either developed by the popular masses themselves or designed for their immediate "consumption" and indoctrination. A commentary broadcast over Radio Bucharest on 22 April 1976 contained the following passage:

The decision to give the Front of Socialist Unity the task of organizing the Congress on Political Education and Socialist Culture testifies to a revolutionary, profoundly democratic world outlook. It will enable the people to play still more effectively the role of conceivers and developers of their own spiritual progress.

In another Radio Bucharest broadcast (25 April 1976) Writers' Union Chairman Virgil Teodorescu made it clear that "the Congress on Political Education and Socialist Culture will discuss culture and the primary role played by a militant party spirit and revolutionary thinking in literary and artistic creation." The main goal of this educational and cultural activity is the creation of a "new man" who will dedicate himself to accomplishing the ambitious production tasks set by the party: "Orienting the energy of our citizens in the direction of work should be the basis of all educational activities in preparation for the congress," said Ceausescu in his speech to the FSU.

Patriotic education -- which was particularly stressed in Ceausescu's speech -- is designed to serve the same political and economic goals: "Political and cultural-scientific education must be permeated with the noble idea of socialist patriotism; it must foster in the population an unquestioning attachment to their country of origin, whose uninterrupted economic and social progress they have a duty to ensure." The fact that the nationality councils are members

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of the FSU may be another reason why the organization was put in charge of the congress. Ceausescu reminded his audience that in the RSR "Hungarian and German national entities" live in harmony with Rumanians, and that this accounts for "the specific character of our nation." Patriotic propoganda should play a prominent rôle in the preparations for the congress: "Cosmopolitan views whose purpose is to denigrate our nation and its nationalities, and which deny our peoples' right to live freely and according to their own wishes, should be firmly suppressed."

In this connection the speech delivered at the FSU plenum by Ernest Breitenstein (deputy editor-in-chief of Neuer Weg, the German-language daily published by the FSU) deserves special mention. He pointed out "the need to take into account and effectively counter all attempts on the part of certain circles in certain countries to denigrate this country and to incite its German population." "Party propoganda" addressed to the German population in Rumania, he said, should emphasize the fact that "the [Transylvanian] Saxons and the Swabians from Rumania who make up the German nationality in this country have taken shape as distinct ethnic entities here in Rumania, not somewhere else."

It may well be that the nationalities, who will be represented by their respective councils at the congress, will feel entitled to voice demands for an increase in cultural and educational activities conducted in German or Hungarian. According to the Brasov German-language weekly Karpathen Rundschau (No.16, 16 April 1976), a number of such requests were made at meetings of the county Committees on Socialist Culture and Education held in Sibiu and Brasov, in preparation for the Congress. The Sibiu representatives asked for a publishing house and literary museum of their own, and Brasov demanded a commission on the protection of monuments, folklore archives, etc.

Wolfgang Wittstock, in another issue of Karpathen Rundschau (No. 15, 9 April 1976), indicated that the conditions under which German-language cultural institutions operate have deteriorated considerably in the past few years. For example, the Sibiu theater no longer has a truck of its own, and since the German company cannot afford to hire one it has become difficult to transport scenery and actors to rural theaters, where over 80 per cent of its performances are given. "The result is a repertory policy no longer governed by qualitative considerations, since plays requiring large casts or many changes of scene are by definition ruled out," Wittstock wrote.

The German-language publications must also counter a recent tendency to turn them into mere disseminators of Rumanian literature. (In fact, the three most recent issues of Neue Literatur, the German-language monthly of the Writers' Union, have been largely filled with German translations of works by Rumanian writers.)

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But even though representatives of the national minorities may raise their voices at the Congress on Political Education and Socialist Culture, the main topic will be how to bring about the ideological and political streamlining of cultural activity. As Ceausescu put it in a speech to a meeting of representatives of the German and Hungarian Nationality Councils on 3 December 1975: "The problem we will have to discuss at the Congress on Culture is that of the educational content of our artistic activity. Because after all, no matter what language [people] use when they sing or recite, when they put on a play or when they write, the essential thing is what they say and what they write" (Scinteia, 5 December 1975).

(083)

PARTY AFFAIRS

2. Ceausescu Discusses Party Cadres, Anniversaries, and the Economy

The agenda of an RCP CC plenum held on April 14 included two items that concerned the party: a report on its strength, composition, and structure, and one on the efforts of mass organizations and party and state agencies to carry out the party's cadre policy.

The reports are not yet available, but Ceausescu's address to the plenum appeared in the April 15 issue of Scinteia. He began by hailing the successes achieved by the party, state, and mass organizations in implementing the decisions of the 11th party congress, and then turned to the composition of the party. While it represented a powerful force from the numerical point of view, he said, in future the accent must be placed on raising the qualitative level of and developing communist awareness among its members; the rules governing the admission of new members must be made stricter; the spirit of responsibility and discipline must be strengthened; more attention must be paid to improving the organizational structure of party organizations; a greater number of women must be admitted (they should represent at least 40 per cent of the membership), and young people and the national minorities should also be better represented.

Ceausescu described the party's cadre policy as constructive, but remarked that a number of deficiencies still exist -- among them failure to promote "activists" from the ranks of the workers. He then remarked that the working class plays a leading role in the RCP, and said this must be reflected by promoting more workers to leading positions in the various sectors, beginning with party and state institutions and mass organizations.

He went on to express dissatisfaction at the fact that workers were not active in the field of propaganda, that they do not take part in ideological activities, "which are reserved for a certain social category," and that the number of working-class activists engaged in various state activities and in leading positions in the ministries is still too low. A great number of "activists" from the workers' class are needed in the state and mass organizations if an innovative, revolutionary spirit is to be kept alive; they fight against red tape and against the petit-bourgeois mentality

that exists and will continue to exist for a long time to come in the state apparatus. Noting that the participants in the plenum had voted unanimously to follow the guidelines laid down at the 11th party congress in this respect, the party leader said that well-trained staffs of "steadfast activists, intransigent toward shortcomings and imbued with a fighting spirit," must be appointed to carry out all professional, ideological, and political activities. He criticized the frequent violations of socialist ethics, asserting that: there were "dozens of examples of such behavior (immorality, disregard of the family and the laws of the state, etc.). In this connection he brought up the case of Gheorghe Crisovan, a secretary of the Constanta County Party Committee and an alternate member of the CC, who was removed from the latter position "for grave deviation from the party statutes and the norms of socialist ethics and equity." He remarked that the acts for which Crisovan has been punished were not "accidental," which indicates the existence of shortcomings in regard to control and in the party's political and educational work in Constanta County. He went on to say that if such behavior continues to be tolerated it might spread to the party aktif, and might do great damage, possibly resulting in the political and moral death of some party activists -- which would be a very grave matter."

Ceausescu's reference to "certain social categories" and what he said about Crisovan were no doubt intended as a warning to party members and state officials. The statement that the CC had voted to follow the cadre policy adopted at the 11th congress may be taken as an indication that changes are contemplated in the leadership of party, state, and mass organizations.

Ceausescu also referred to another point on the plenum's agenda -- the approval of measures regarding the 100th anniversary of Rumania's independence and the 70th anniversary of the peasants' uprising, both of which will be celebrated in 1977. The first of these anniversaries, he said, was particularly timely in view of the "**attacks on national freedom**" currently being made on the international plane. Turning to the peasants' uprising, he praised their efforts to throw off foreign domination and to achieve social progress. Only toward the end of the last century had the working class emerged in Rumania, he said, and it had developed slowly owing to foreign domination. The peasantry represents a social force that must be organized; it has a role to play in present-day Rumania, and should not, as has sometimes happened, be neglected on the grounds that "agriculture plays a less important role in modern social development."

Turning to economic problems, the party leader reported that industrial production had increased by 10.5 per cent in the first quarter of 1976 compared with the same period in 1975. This represents a praiseworthy increase over the plan provisions, but a number of shortcomings still exist, and these will be discussed at a conference of county first secretaries and economic experts to be held in May.

The CC plenum also approved a plan to take a census of the population, of "dwellings," and of livestock between 5 and 12 January

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1977. Ceausescu described the census of the population as more of a political than a merely statistical operation. It must be carried out with great care, and in "strict observance of the Marxist-Leninist policy of the RCP in regard to the nationality question, the provisions of the Constitution, and the country's laws, so that each citizen will be completely free to declare the nationality to which he belongs." There is a slight discrepancy between the wording of the plenum's decision on the census and the formulation used by Ceausescu. The decision referred to a census of "dwellings," while Ceausescu used the phrase "a census of national wealth and properties" (avutiei nationale a bunurilor), which, he said, would make it possible to determine the material base needed to carry out the program adopted at the 11th party congress. Exactly what he had in mind will not become clear until an official decree or law is published, or until a detailed commentary on the plan appears.

(084)

THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION

3. Discussion of the 1976-1980 Plan Postponed

The first two-day meeting of the Grand National Assembly's spring session was opened by Chairman Nicolae Giosan on April 15. Among the items on the agenda were draft laws on a long-term national hydrographic basin program (see Item 5, below); a national program on the protection and development of forests in the 1976-2010 period (see Rumanian SR/3, RFER, 29 January 1976, Item 2); modification and completion of Law No. 5/1975, on the congress of People's council deputies and county people's council chairmen, the country-wide conference of people's council chairmen, and the county conferences of people's council deputies (see Item 4, below); and the socioeconomic development plan for 1976-1980. The first three laws were enacted at the April 15-16 meeting, but a decision on the five-year plan was postponed.

In 1969, at the 10th party congress, Ceausescu urged that the 1971-1975 plan be approved at least 18 months prior to the beginning of the plan period (Scinteia, 7 August 1969). Despite the party leader's exhortations, however, it was not approved by the GNA until October of 1971 -- some 10 months after the plan period had begun (Scinteia, 22 October 1971; see also Rumanian SR/40, RFER, 27 October 1971, Item 2). Somewhat later a special law on planning was enacted which stipulates that every five-year plan must be approved approximately a year and a half before the beginning of the plan period (the first draft of the law was published in the party daily on 27 July 1972, and the final version appeared in the paper's November 23 issue). Nevertheless, the present (1976-1980) plan has not yet been approved; the Rumanian economy has been operating on provisional plans for about four months -- a circumstance that has had adverse effects on a number of branches.

Following established custom, the press did not publish the draft law on the plan, but Scinteia (22 May 1975) reported that it had been approved at a joint session of the Political Executive

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Committee and the Permanent Bureau of the Supreme Council on Socioeconomic Development. Two months later (on 22 July 1975) the CC and the Supreme Council accepted the draft and decided to submit it to the Grand National Assembly for final approval.

The issue did not appear on the agenda of the November meeting of the GNA's fall session, however, and discussion of the 1976 annual plan, which was on the agenda, was postponed (Scinteia, 21 November 1975). The latter plan was approved at the December meeting of the GNA, but Ceausescu announced that the 1976-1980 plan would not be discussed until the spring 1976 session. It did figure on the agenda for the April 15-16 meeting, but Giosan announced that it would be discussed at a later meeting in the present session, after having been considered by the appropriate assembly commissions (Scinteia, April 17). The delay suggests that final agreement on the plan has not been reached, and it is possible that certain points may be amended. On the other hand, however, a number of other considerations may have influenced the assembly's decision -- the delay in co-ordinating the five-year plans of the Comecon countries, the world economic crisis, the increase in the cost of raw materials, the fact that many industrial goods fail to reach world standard and are therefore difficult to export, the reluctance of Western countries to grant credits, etc.

At a round-table conference organized by the economic weekly Viata Economica in November 1975 it was pointed out that the operations of a number of ministries were being seriously hampered by the lack of a concrete plan; representatives of some 32 enterprises and industrial centrals under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Machine Building complained about the difficulties of operating on the basis of estimates (Revista Economica No.36, 5 November 1975).

(085)

4. People's Council Legislative Chamber Established

At the first people's council congress, held in February, Ceausescu proposed setting up a permanent body composed of people's council deputies to act as a "parliament" of local administrative bodies. Its purpose would be to evaluate, on the territorial level, the progress made in carrying out the annual socioeconomic development plan (Scinteia, 5 February 1976). At its April session, the Grand National Assembly (GNA) approved a law under which the People's Council Legislative Chamber was set up; it will be composed of members of the executive committees of the counties and Bucharest municipal people's councils.

Stefan Voitec, a member of the Political Executive Committee of the RCP, introduced the law in the GNA (Scinteia, April 17). It provides for the chamber to discuss and approve the local state plan prior to the GNA session scheduled to adopt the plan for the whole economy, and is also empowered to take measures designed to promote economic and social development on the local level -- e.g., in the fields of education, health, communal administration, etc.

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Article 4 of the law makes the chamber responsible for ensuring harmonizing central and local activities, and during the GNA discussion Deputy Margareta Kraus explained that this will "make more realistic the normative acts issued by ministries in accordance with the requirements of the country's economic and social development." Article 6 enables the new chamber to approve the draft plans of economic units "of republic-wide interest" situated on the territory of the various county people's councils (although from the administrative point of view these units depend on the ministries).

Although the 1976-1980 draft plan has not yet been approved by the GNA, local-level approval of it was voiced at the February People's Council Congress (see Rumanian SR/5, RFER, 18 February 1976, Item 2). The fact that the chamber will also approve the plans of enterprises mentioned above means that it will have an influence on the whole five-year plan.

Another important aspect of the law is that it "extends the democratization" of state activity. In this connection Voitec cited Article 10, which empowers the chamber to discuss and approve all normative orders and acts issued by the ministries. This will tend to limit the number of such acts and to reduce the amount of red tape that now litters central and local agencies. Article 7 provides that every Council of Ministers or Ministerial draft law that deals with activities on a local level must be submitted to and approved by the Legislative Chamber, and that the latter may take initiative in proposing approval of certain normative acts related to local activities.

While all this would seem to foster the democratization of state activity, however, other sections of the law seem to promote centralism. Article 12, for example, states that draft laws and decisions issued by the chamber must be signed not only by its president but also by the prime minister or the appropriate minister, and Article 13 provides that the chamber's decisions will come into force only after they have been signed by the president of the republic. (In the past the decisions of local agencies were subject to approval by the Committee on People's Councils or the appropriate ministries.)

Although Voitec stated that the law provides "a clear, scientific definition of the superior methods inherent in socialist democracy," the new chamber, though described as a "permanent organ," will hold only one meeting annually. The measures in the law that lead toward democratization are balanced by the new aspects of centralism it contains.

(086)

5. The Hydrographic Basin Program

At its April session the Grand National Assembly adopted a "National Program on Hydrographic Basins," which had been drawn up on the basis of decisions taken at the 11th party congress in November 1974 and at the joint plenum of the RCP CC and the Supreme Council on Socioeconomic Development held on 21-22 July 1975. The program was approved by the Political Executive Committee on 26 December 1975 and by the People's Council Congress held last February. It

provides for the completion of various hydrographic projects in the next 30 years, the 1976-1990 period, and the 1976-1980 period at a total cost of about 1,000 million lei.

According to Chapter I, which deals with the country's hydro-energetic resources, the technical potential totals some 38,000 million kwh, 10,000 million of which can be provided by installations on the Danube. At present 8,700 million kwh are produced by 2,600-mw hydroelectric stations -- some 17 per cent of the country's power output. It was also revealed that 3,500,000 hectares of land (about 15 per cent of the total) are subject to flooding, that some 7,300,000 hectares are subject to erosion, and that 2,000 water purification plants are at present in operation.

Chapter II deals with the program for the next 30 years, during which an additional 10,000-million-cubic-meter reservoir capacity will be provided in order to prevent floods, 9,300 kilometers of dikes will be built, 12,000 kilometers of river beds will be put in order and an equal length of river banks reinforced. Domestic water supplies will increase to 160 cubic meters per second (against 21 cubic meters in 1975), and for industry and the agrozootechnical complexes it will rise to 540 cubic meters per second (the 1975 figure was 170 cubic meters).

During the same period the number of hydroelectric centrals will rise from 53 to 850 with a capacity of 13,000 mw and an output of 38,000 million kwh annually.

Inland waterways will be dredged to permit the passage of 800-1,500-ton ships; the Danube-Black Sea and Bucharest-Danube canals will be built; and the lower reaches of the Olt, Someș, Mureș, and Argeș Rivers, among others, will be made navigable. This will provide an inland network of 3,000 kilometers linked to the Danube, so that ships loaded in Rumania will be able to reach Central and Western Europe.

Chapter III specifies that by 1990, 450 reservoirs with a capacity totaling 18,300 million cubic meters will be constructed on rivers other than the Danube (known as "inland rivers"), compared with 100 reservoirs with a capacity of 3,700 million cubic meters in 1975; 5,100,000 hectares of land will be under irrigation -- almost the entire area capable of being irrigated; hydroelectric stations will produce 7,400 mw of electricity; 1,100 kilometers of inland rivers will be made navigable; and fish hatcheries totaling 36,000 hectares in area will be constructed. Between 1976 and 1980 alone, reservoirs with a capacity of 3,200 cubic meters, 1,350 kilometers of dikes, and hydroelectric stations with a capacity of 1,800 mw will be built.

According to Chapter IV, investments amounting to 600,000 million lei are earmarked for the 1976-1990 program; 120,000 million lei will be allotted to the National Council of Waters and 480,000 million lei will go to ministries and county people's councils.

Rumania's trade partners. A mixed Rumanian-Senegalese commission held its first session in June 1975 to discuss the development of trade exchanges and economic co-operation between the two countries, with special reference to geology and mining (Scinteia, 5 June 1975); a protocol on cultural exchanges was also signed in that month.

During his recent trip Senghor visited industrial sites in Bucharest and tourist and historical centers in Suceava County. He was also given an honorary doctorate by Bucharest University.

The two chiefs of state signed a joint solemn declaration, a joint communiqué, and an agreement on economic, technical, and scientific co-operation. In addition, Minister Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation Nicolae Ionescu and Minister of Rural Development and Water Resources Adrien Senghor signed a protocol on co-operation in industry and rural development and on the training of specialists.

The solemn declaration was a routine document similar to those Rumania has signed with other countries. It deals with the principles on which bilateral relations and international co-operation should be based.

The joint communiqué stressed the possibilities of developing trade exchanges and economic co-operation. To this end, it said, it had been agreed to negotiate new agreements on air and sea transportation, fishing, agriculture, and the training of experts. It was also decided to increase the number of artistic and literary exchanges, and to expand the relations between the RCP and the Progressive Senegalese Union, the parliaments of the two countries, and their youth, women's, and trade union organizations. The communiqué's remarks on international problems, including non-alignment, were also routine. Ceausescu accepted an invitation to pay an official visit to Senegal. (088)

7. Egyptian Ministers of War and Trade Visit Bucharest

A military delegation headed by Egypt's Minister of War Muhammad al-Jamasi paid an official visit to Bucharest between April 12 and 16, at the invitation of the Minister of National Defense, Ion Ionita. He was returning the April 1974 visit of a Rumanian military delegation headed by Ionita (see Rumanian SR/16, RFER, 15 May 1974, Item 2b).

The Egyptian visitors visited military units and tourist sites in Bucharest and Constanta, the shipyards in Mangalia, and industrial sites in Prahova and Brasov Counties, and on April 16 Jamasi was received by Ceausescu (Scinteia, 13, 14, 16, and 17 April 1976).

The news media did not elaborate on the talks between the members of the Egyptian delegation and their hosts, referring merely to the "good relations between our two countries," but

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Western news agencies (AFP, UPI, and Reuter, April 16) reported from Cairo that Jamasi had told reporters that his visit to Rumania had been fruitful and had opened up new opportunities for co-operation in the production of military equipment.

Of some interest is the fact that the visit took place shortly after Sadat abrogated Egypt's treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union -- an act that has put considerable strain on the relations between the two countries. Also, Jamasi paid visits to Yugoslavia and France before going to Rumania.

Between April 21 and 25 an economic delegation from Egypt headed by Minister of Trade Zakariya Abd al-Fattah also visited Bucharest, mainly for the purpose of discussing with Prime Minister Manea Manescu and other officials "new possibilities" of developing and diversifying co-operation in various domains of common interest.

New measures to develop trade exchanges were agreed upon, and an intergovernmental protocol covering such exchanges was signed by Fattah and Minister of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation Ion Patan (Radio Bucharest, April 23 and 25). It is possible that the protocol also covers the supplying of military equipment (spare parts) to Egypt, but this was not specified. (089)

8. Co-operative Oil Industry Ventures in Ecuador, Greece, and Algeria

Under the headline "Rumania Courting Ecuador," The Washington Post (April 19) reported that the US government is looking into persistent reports that Rumania is seeking an opportunity to take over the exploitation of petroleum resources in Ecuador developed by a Texaco-Gulf consortium nearly four years ago. According to the newspaper some experts believe the Ecuadorian government is fostering this idea as a sop to the active left wing in the country, while others regard Rumania as a serious alternative to the US in exploiting Ecuador's oil resources. The question of whether the Rumanians and/or the Ecuadorians will be able to market the oil if the Texaco-Gulf consortium does not co-operate has also arisen.

Rumania, an importer of crude oil which disposes of advanced technology in the oil industry, has negotiated oil agreements with Ecuador which probably provide for deliveries to Rumania in return for assistance in exploiting Ecuadorian oil reservoirs. Rumania has had considerable experience in prospecting for and processing oil; it has sent experts to many developing countries, and ranks second in the world as an exporter of oil equipment (Agerpres, 15 April 1976).

During his visit to Ecuador in September 1973 Ceausescu signed an agreement on economic, industrial, and technological co-operation, a trade agreement, and a protocol on co-operation in the oil industry. The following year the two countries signed a protocol on the establishment of a natural gas processing plant, the drilling of wells, prospecting in western and setting up technical centers in eastern Ecuador. The Rumanian-Ecuadorian Commission on Co-operation in the Oil Industry also signed a document on the

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establishment of a mixed servicing association to cater to the industry (see Rumanian SR/21, RFER, 5 June 1975, Item 5).

Despite the agreements between the two countries and their apparently close co-operation, Anuarul Statistic al RSR 1975 contains no figures on Rumanian-Ecuadorian trade exchanges during 1974. (It is possible, however, that trade will begin to develop as soon as Rumania's assistance produces effective results.)

The joint communiqué signed during Ceausescu's recent visit to Greece (see Rumanian SR/11, RFER, 5 April 1976) provided, inter alia, for the continuation of efforts to promote co-operation in the oil industry. Reuter (April 22), reported from Athens that the state-controlled Greek petroleum company had given Rumania's Rompetrol enterprise a contract to prospect for oil in the Nestos estuary in northern Greece, not far from where a group of foreign companies discovered oil early in 1973. (Rumania won the contract despite competition from a French and an Italian company.) According to Reuter, an agreement is to be signed soon, but so far the Rumanian news media have not mentioned the transaction.

Under the terms of a recent agreement Rumania will also sell Algeria 10 oil drilling rigs during the 1976-1977 period. The rigs involved in this transaction are capable of drilling at depths of up to 6,000 meters. There are already 15 Rumanian-built rigs operating in the Algerian Sahara, which were delivered in 1967, and over 200 Rumanian oil specialists are co-operating in that government's oil exploration program. Rumanian-Algerian co-operation in oil production has been increasing since a 1971-1973 trade agreement between the two countries provided for Rumanian deliveries of oil field equipment and industrial goods in return for oil, iron ore, and other products from Algeria (Radio Bucharest, 28 April 1976). (090)

9. US and World Bank Grant Hard-Currency Loans to Rumania

According to an RFE Special/Washington (21 April 1976) the US Department of Agriculture has announced the establishment of a 47,000,000-dollar credit to finance Rumania's purchase of American soybeans and soybean products. An April 2 RFE dispatch had already reported that the RSR had "purchased or ordered" 126,500 tons of soybeans from the US, and it can be assumed they will be paid for out of the new loan. The 1975 harvest was adversely affected by the July floods, and Rumania was forced to purchase grain and other agricultural products abroad. A Reuter dispatch (7 October 1975) reported that 86,300 tons of wheat had been bought from the US and 300,000 tons of corn ordered, and that a US Department of Agriculture spokesman had said Rumania "may have to import 1,500,000 tons of grain [not necessarily from the US] over the next year." After his return from Bucharest in November 1975 Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz is reported to have quoted Minister of Agriculture and the Food Industry Angelo Miculescu as saying that the US had "something more powerful than the atomic bomb" -- soybeans that could be used for fodder (see Rumanian SR/47,


29 April 1976

RFER, 5 December 1975, Item 6). This suggests that Miculescu had discussed the purchase of soybeans during his visit to the US the previous September (see Rumanian SR/36, RFER, 18 September 1975, Item 3a).

On April 16 the World Bank announced that it had granted a 50,000,000-dollar credit to the RSR to help that country to meet its growing demand for electric power. The loan will be used to defray that part of the cost of the Riul Mare-Retezat hydroelectric project which must be paid for in hard currency. (It should be recalled in this connection that last year the World Bank granted two loans to Rumania -- one of 100,000,000 to be used in the agricultural sector, and another of 60,000,000 as flood relief.)

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RAD Background Report/94
 (Rumania)
 28 April 1976

CEAUSESCU REASSERTS POSITION ON NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE
 AND SOVEREIGNTY

By Robert R. King



Summary: Ceausescu recently reaffirmed, in the strongest terms used for some time, the continued relevance of national independence and sovereignty. He criticized unnamed Marxist theoreticians for denigrating the importance of the nation, and was particularly critical of those who do not struggle for their own national independence. Ceausescu's is the most recent and strongest in a series of Rumanian statements defending sovereignty and independence and stressing the important role of the nation, and it appears to be related to the current controversy between the Soviet and West European parties over proletarian internationalism. Another factor that may have helped to precipitate these articles and speeches is the controversy over recent statements attributed to US State Department official Helmut Sonnenfeldt. Problems between Rumania and the Soviet Union may also underlie these reassertions, but thus far there has been no evidence of a deterioration in the two countries' relations.

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On April 26 from the rather unlikely rostrum of the Trade Union Confederation Congress, Rumanian party leader Nicolae Ceausescu reaffirmed, in the strongest terms he has used for some time, the relevance of national independence and sovereignty. Of the third of his speech devoted to international relations, the major part was spent reaffirming these principles. (1)

After reporting that the RCP had proven itself to be "the most determined defender of national independence and sovereignty," Ceausescu asserted the existence of a "powerful offensive against

(1) The speech was broadcast live on Radio Bucharest, 26 April 1976.

peoples' free and independent development" sponsored by "reactionary and imperialist forces" who are attempting to promulgate the thesis that "the nation and national independence are obsolete social concepts which no longer suit the current stage of historic development" and that "mankind has entered the era of supra-national companies and bodies." Although he attacked in this context "reactionary and imperialist" forces, he went on to criticize unnamed communist theoreticians:

We cannot, however, ignore the fact that recently the role of the nation and the principle of national independence and sovereignty have been underestimated, or even negated -- and that from Marxist-Leninist positions, too. Invoking Marxist-Leninist theory and proletarian internationalism, some philosophers and theoreticians are trying to demonstrate that the nation has ended its historical mission and that it no longer has any future under socialism, that the policy of defending national independence is a violation of Marxism-Leninism, a shift toward the positions of bourgeois nationalism, and that the assertion of the principles of equality and independence is the chief danger in the revolutionary anti-imperialist struggle.

What they claim is no more and no less than the fact that defending national independence and asserting independent status are incompatible with revolutionary internationalism, with the spirit of solidarity in the struggle against domination and for social progress.

Ceausescu then went on to assert that "the development of international solidarity among the working people does not require any negation of the interests and aspirations of one's people." Since the Rumanian party had apparently been accused of sliding into positions of bourgeois nationalism, Ceausescu countered by suggesting that his critics were guilty of similar deviations on the other side of the spectrum:

To fail to safeguard national independence, to tolerate the violation of the sovereignty of the people to which the workers' class and the communist party belong are in the last analysis synonymous with abdicating revolutionary Marxist-Leninist principles and the mission entrusted by history to the Communists; they are synonymous with a slide down the slippery slope of cosmopolitanism and national nihilism.

To bolster his argument, the Rumanian party leader quoted briefly from both Marx and Engels in defense of state sovereignty and independence, but his strongest ally was Lenin, whom he quoted as saying:

No one is to be blamed for having been born a slave; but the slave who not only does not aspire to his own freedom but also tries to justify slavery and give it a humane face is a base lackey and a lickspittle who only arouses a natural feeling of repulsion, indignation and

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He then recalled "the old Marxist truth" that a people cannot be free if it oppresses other peoples or fails to recognize their right to independence, and ended his discussion of this topic with several paragraphs reaffirming the importance of national independence and sovereignty and recalling Rumania's consistent stand in defense of these principles.

Although he named neither individuals nor countries, the targets of his barbs are clear. The Soviet Union, implicitly accused in similar terms in the past, was apparently one of the main ones, but his stinging criticism will probably raise hackles in Budapest, Prague, and East Berlin.

Other Recent Rumanian Articles Defending the Nation and Its Sovereignty

Although his address to the trade union congress was the most vigorous defense of national sovereignty and independence to be voiced recently in the RSR, it came as the climax to a crescendo of Rumanian statements on this theme. Just two days earlier the party daily (2) had published a leading editorial on relations among communist states, the main point of which was that respect for national independence and sovereignty, equal rights and noninterference in internal affairs must govern the relations among communist states and among communist parties, and that these principles are essential aspects of proletarian internationalism. The editorial also criticized those, again unnamed, who negate or underestimate the importance of the national factor and describe as "nationalism" the just concern of parties for sovereignty and independence. In support of this position the editorial gave excerpts from the appropriate carefully balanced article by V. Zagladin in Pravda, (3) along with other statements by Yugoslav, Italian, Japanese, and French communist spokesmen.

Similar arguments were advanced in the RCP's political and theoretical fortnightly in an article dealing with national and international aspects of development. (4) The author reiterated

(2) Scinteia, 24 April 1976.

(3) Moscow, 20 April 1976.

(4) Ion Mitran, "National and International in Socio-Economic Development," Era Socialistă No.8, (April) 1976.

tions. The first and most obvious is the debate among communist parties on the nature of proletarian internationalism. The protagonists in the controversy up to this point have been the Soviets -- spokesmen for the orthodox point of view -- and the Yugoslav, the Italian, and now also the French parties -- the leading proponents of the view that there is no communist center and that each communist party must pursue its own independent policies, in accord with its domestic requirements and conditions. (6)

The Rumanian party, whose sympathies obviously lie with the Yugoslavs and the dissident Western parties, has refrained from direct polemics, but obviously felt it necessary to voice its views. Perhaps it was pressure from the Soviet Union or the loyalist East European parties that induced the Rumanians to clarify their stand at the present time. The entire controversy is related to the question of the pan-European conference of communist parties. The Rumanians have participated in the preparations for this conference and have indicated their intention to attend it provided certain conditions regarding the nature of the document to be issued by the gathering and other aspects of its work are met. The recent pressure to convene the long-delayed conference has brought the varying interpretations of proletarian internationalism to the fore.

A second factor that prompted Rumania's reaffirmation of national sovereignty and independence is the leaking to the American press of the statements made by State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt last December to a gathering of American ambassadors in Europe. Subsequent explanations and interpretations of Sonnenfeldt's remarks from Washington probably did not dispel Rumanian concern about the ultimate implications for them of what still seemed to be an American call for the development of a more stable relationship between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. (7) The Rumanians, who have placed considerable emphasis on their good relations with the United States, no

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- (6) For some of the recent Yugoslav and Western communist party responses in this controversy, see Kevin Devlin, "Italians, Yugoslavs React Sharply to Soviet Attack on 'Revisionism,'" RAD Background Report/72, Radio Free Europe Research, 25 March 1976; Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Party Functionary Against Theory of 'Limited Sovereignty,'" RAD BR/88, RFER, 14 April 1976; and the Yugoslav press translations by Slobodan Stankovic, "Belgrade Journalist Against any 'Communist Center,'" RAD BR/80, RFER, 6 April 1976, and "Yugoslav Daily Against CPSU's Leading Role in World Movement," RAD BR/92, RFER, 26 April 1976.
- (7) The first report of Sonnenfeldt's remarks appeared in a column by Rowland Evans and Robert Novak in The Washington Post, 22 March 1976. The New York Times, 6 April 1976, published what was described as an "official" summary of the speech and which Sonnenfeldt later described as "a reasonable summary, although very compressed."

doubt considered the so-called "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" a serious threat to the basis of their autonomous foreign policy.

The fact that CC Secretary Cornel Burtica was selected to make the definitive statement on this topic reflects the importance attributed to it in Rumania. In an article in Scinteia, (8) Burtica raised themes related to those that figured in Ceausescu's April 26 speech and in other Rumanian assertions of sovereignty and independence: the concept of military blocs is an anachronism; spheres of influence and imperialist domination, which such a policy implies, are outmoded and violate the principles on which interstate relations should be based; and the independence of peoples, contrary to Sonnenfeldt's alleged opinion, does not endanger peace but rather guarantees it.

The degree to which the Sonnenfeldt statement has affected Rumania's attitude toward relations with the United States and the degree to which it was responsible for the recent reaffirmations of national sovereignty and independence are difficult to gauge. Although Ceausescu never mentioned Sonnenfeldt's name, Radio Belgrade (9), in a report on the RCP leader's trade union address, linked his defense of independence and sovereignty to "the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine." The special president-to-president relationship Ceausescu succeeded in establishing with the American chief executive has no doubt provided some reassurance to the Rumanians, since President Ford has reaffirmed America's interest in encouraging national independence. Nevertheless, the Sonnenfeldt incident no doubt influenced the timing and vigor of the current Rumanian statements.

Another factor that may lie behind the reaffirmations of independence and sovereignty is the present state of Rumanian-Soviet relations. Although the Zagladin article suggested that the Soviets may be taking a more moderate (or at least more tactful) stand on interparty relations, any such position would be directed primarily at the nonruling Western parties and the Yugoslavs, and it may even be accompanied by greater pressure for conformity in Eastern Europe. There have been no signs of deterioration in the relations between Bucharest and Moscow, however. Economic relations between the two states seem to be progressing well, and the fact that Grand National Assembly Chairman Nicolae Giosan recently visited the Soviet Union suggests that there are no serious problems in political relations. The fact that Ceausescu may have been criticizing the East European loyalist parties would suggest that one or several of them criticized or attempted to pressure Rumania on the head of its autonomous policy. (During the 1971 Soviet-inspired campaign against Rumania, for example, Hungary was the principal critic,

(8) 13 April 1976.

(9) 26 April 1976.

with Czechoslovakia and East Germany playing a secondary role.) But so far there has been no evidence of such pressure.

One curious aspect of Ceausescu's comments, however, is the vigor of his assertions coupled with the use of hyperbole. In citing Marx and Engels he noted that "there must be hundreds, not to say thousands, of such quotations," and after quoting the founder of the Russian party he asserted, "Indeed, Lenin was a thousand times right." The style is reminiscent of the speeches Enver Hoxha made in 1961, at the height of his dispute with Nikita Khrushchev over Albania's relations with the Soviet Union. That Rumania has reached a similar point in its relationship with the Soviet Union can safely be excluded. But it will still be interesting to hear the response, if any, from Moscow and other East European capitals.

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RAD Background Report/94
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28 April 1976

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the familiar Rumanian thesis that co-operation among socialist countries does not require the renunciation of national interests in favor of some abstract general interest, and that each socialist state must manage and plan its own economy, a right which was called "an inalienable corollary of the full exercise of national sovereignty and independence." The article went on to criticize those who equate the "national interest of the working class" with nationalism or with failure to adopt "a scientific, Marxist-Leninist approach." The same author included a swipe at "those theories, formulas, and doctrines that envision so-called 'organic' interstate relations of domination in one area of the world or another."

Another article, also dealing in some detail with the themes raised by Ceausescu, appeared in the foreign affairs weekly Lumea. (5) The author used Marxist-Leninist dialectics to discuss the relationship between national and international factors, and criticized "certain Marxist theoreticians" (unnamed) for incorrect assessment of the relationship between the national and international. Such false arguments "make a fetish out of the international, and divorce it from the diversities that actually exist among nations and hence from the revolutionary processes taking place in those nations"; this causes "a qualitative shift in meaning and gives rise to bizarre statements such as the one on the international dictatorship of the proletariat within the framework of the world socialist system, which is necessary to ensure the primacy of international interests over national interests whenever there are disagreements." (The article did not cite a source for this "bizarre" statement.)

These unnamed theoreticians were accused by the author of the Lumea article of giving the international factor greater importance than the national and of arguing that the international factor "is penetrating ever more deeply into the realm of the national." Such erroneous ideas, Tanase asserted, are "proof of ideological heresy." The proper dialectical connection between national and international -- and this point has been asserted and expanded in numerous other Rumanian statements on the subject -- is that there is "a single essence of socialism common to all countries who have embraced it," but at the same time the different conditions actually existing in individual countries require that they follow separate paths. Thus "working class activities are of an exclusively national nature, in the sense that they are carried on within a national framework and are an essential part of the nation, although their essence is international."

The Reasons Behind the Rumanian Statements

There are several possible reasons for the current vigorous reassertion and defense of Rumania's views on international rela-

(5) Alexandru Tanase, "The Permanence of the Nation and the Real Significance of Internationalism," Lumea No.14, 1 April 1976.

tions. The first and most obvious is the debate among communist parties on the nature of proletarian internationalism. The protagonists in the controversy up to this point have been the Soviets -- spokesmen for the orthodox point of view -- and the Yugoslav, the Italian, and now also the French parties -- the leading proponents of the view that there is no communist center and that each communist party must pursue its own independent policies, in accord with its domestic requirements and conditions. (6)

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A second factor that prompted Rumania's reaffirmation of national sovereignty and independence is the leaking to the American press of the statements made by State Department Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt last December to a gathering of American ambassadors in Europe. Subsequent explanations and interpretations of Sonnenfeldt's remarks from Washington probably did not dispel Rumanian concern about the ultimate implications for them of what still seemed to be an American call for the development of a more stable relationship between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. (7) The Rumanians, who have placed considerable emphasis on their good relations with the United States, no

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(8) 13 April 1976.


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This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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HUNGARY/14
27 April 1976

S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

Foreign and Economic Affairs

1. CC Plenum Discusses Foreign Affairs and Domestic Economy

Labor

2. Decree on Procurement, Recruiting, and Redirection of Labor

Foreign Economic Relations

3. Polish Construction Enterprise Gains Another Hungarian Contract

Foreign Relations

4. World Federation of Hungarians



Agriculture

5. Preliminary Report on the Agricultural Co-operatives in 1975
6. Milk Yields and Private Plot Taxation

Education

7. An Educational Experiment Criticized

FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS1. CC Plenum Discusses Foreign Affairs and Domestic Economy

On April 22 the HSWP CC held its first plenum for 1976. The agenda contained two points: a report on topical international problems, and a statement on the opening months of the current five-year plan. A communiqué on the session appeared in the party daily Nepszabadsag on 24 April 1976.

The foreign affairs report was submitted by Andras Gyenes, CC secretary in charge of international affairs. He began by considering the progress made so far in achieving détente and said that "extremist imperialist circles" had increased their efforts to arrest the process; the Maoist leadership of China was also opposed to it. He reiterated that Hungary advocates the full implementation of the principles accepted at Helsinki by all signatories of the Final Act, and that it welcomes institutional contacts between Comecon and the Common Market -- a reference to the proposal submitted to the EEC by GDR Deputy Premier Gerhard Weiss on behalf of Comecon two months ago.

Gyenes then turned to the international problems usually dealt with in such reports. No progress has been made in resolving the Middle East crisis, he said, and the abrogation by Sadat of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship and co-operation agreement has aggravated this problem and damaged the cause of the Egyptian and other Arab peoples. The report also spoke of Hungary's solidarity with Vietnam, welcomed the "success" achieved in Angola, and condemned Chile and other Latin American countries in which "the people are oppressed."

A long chapter was devoted to the recent Soviet party congress, and the HSWP's support and approval for its proceedings was reaffirmed along the lines of the statement published in the Hungarian press a few days after the congress ended.

One of the most interesting parts of Gyenes's report was his reference to the attendance of the Hungarian party at CP congresses in Western countries. He said that such gatherings gave Hungary an opportunity "to explain the party's stand on current questions and to understand more clearly the conditions under which our class brothers are carrying on their fight against oppression and exploitation." After dealing with the "deepening of the general crisis of capitalism," the report stated that the influence of communist parties in the West was growing. Gyenes confirmed the full solidarity of the HSWP with the struggle waged by the CPs of France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece.

Gyenes did not emphasize the leading role of the Soviet Union and avoided criticizing the "special roads" followed by other parties, many of which had to operate "alongside other progressive forces in complicated circumstances." In the present situation, he said, the significance of "proletarian internationalist co-operation among

communist and workers' parties" has increased, and the HSWP, "guided by the principle of proletarian internationalism," supports the promotion of links among "fraternal parties."

The Yugoslav press agency Tanjug (April 24) commented on the communiqué issued after the plenum and said that it reflected Hungary's policy of full solidarity with the rest of the socialist community "based on recognized principles." At the same time, the agency went on, the Hungarians had avoided divisive issues and had concentrated on those areas in which they could give unreserved support to the parties operating in the West -- notably the Italian and French CPs.

The second report was presented by Karoly Nemeth, CC secretary in charge of economic matters, and was much shorter. Nemeth was able to make only a few generalized statements about the "smooth beginning" of the 1976-1980 five-year plan, and stated that the decisions taken by the CC last November provided a good basis for the preparation of short- and medium-term plans. Concerning living standards he said that measures appropriate to the beginnings of the current year had been implemented, and that the supply situation was adequate, but he admitted that there were "some temporary difficulties in the supply of goods in general demand," notably in such categories as meat and vegetables.

Nemeth stressed the need to increase industrial efficiency. Modernization of the production structure must continue and the use of manpower must be improved. Turning to the agriculture sphere he called for the development of large-scale farming, increased vegetable production, and the full exploitation of the private plots. Trade commitments to the other socialist countries must be scrupulously fulfilled and planned exports to Western countries must be implemented.

Nemeth's report also contained some generalized statements on the implementation of measures concerning incomes and wages, housing construction, and the development of the social and cultural infrastructure. He echoed earlier statements by other Hungarian leaders that the implementation of the 1976 plan is an important precondition for the efficient execution of the fifth five-year plan as a whole. (068)

LABOR

2. Decree on Procurement, Recruiting, and Redirection of Labor

A decree has been promulgated by the Ministry of Labor on the procurement and recruiting of labor, the "organized employment" (i.e., redirection) of workers, and the advertising of vacancies (Ministry of Labor Decree No. 7, 10 April 1976; Magyar Kozlony, 10 April 1976). Its main features are discussed below.

Procurement of Labor

Labor procurement is normally handled by the county and city councils, and in special cases by the village councils. The services of the state employment agencies are available both to the enterprises and to persons seeking employment. If an applicant sent by an agency is unsuited to the job in question, the enterprise is not obliged to hire him or her; and anyone seeking a job is free to refuse an offer.

The enterprises are required -- normally each month -- to inform the employment agencies of their expected labor needs, vacant situations, and the qualifications required from applicants. This helps the agencies to achieve a more efficient matching of supply and demand.

When is Labor Procurement Mandatory?

It is laid down clearly in the decree that neither an employee nor an enterprise is obliged to accept what is offered by an agency. In many cases, however, use of the official agencies is mandatory; when this is so, contracts entered into without an agency's help are invalid. A person changing employment must use an agency if his work book shows that he left his previous job without the enterprise's consent, or if he moves from one post to another three or more times in one year. An enterprise must do so if it has "transgressed staff economy regulations"; this usually takes the form of offering "labor inducements" or failing to comply with the regulations on labor recruiting and advertising laid down in the decree.

Additionally, the president of the appropriate council, in agreement with the ministry concerned, has the power to make the use of an agency mandatory in certain defined areas (such as a village, district, county, or city) if "the labor situation in the region calls for this to be done." The decree does not specify the circumstances in which such action would be justified, so in practice the procurement of labor through an official agency might be made mandatory without genuine justification.

These provisions do not apply to senior positions, the ministries and other national organizations, the armed forces, the police, or the social organizations.

"Organized Employment"

The decree makes special provision for "organized employment," by which is meant redirection of labor. When, as a result of rationalization, a change in production structure, or measures taken by the controlling organization, a number of workers (usually 10 or more) are released, they may be directed to new jobs. Normally this means a transfer to enterprises considered more important from the national economic viewpoint. The decree says that "organized" redirection is primarily required to help enterprises that need

larger staffs to assist the completion of important investments, to make full use of high-capacity production equipment by working shifts, to boost export capacity substantially, or to improve the national service network.

Recruiting and Advertising

If an enterprise is unable to satisfy its labor requirements through the official agencies or by enrolling individual applicants, it is allowed to recruit within a stipulated area for a prescribed period on the basis of an official employment agency's permit. The usual method of doing this is to advertize in the local press; posters, leaflets, and door-to-door canvassing are prohibited, and recruiting must be confined to persons not already in active employment. Advertisements may carry information on the nature of the job and on accommodation, but not on wages and side benefits. It is forbidden to offer wages higher than those authorized in the employment regulations or to hold out the prospect of wages (or benefits) above those enjoyed by workers employed in the same field and with the same training.

In the event of infringement of these rules, the employment agencies can initiate disciplinary action in the enterprise control organizations, and transgression of the decree is in any case an offense punishable by a fine.

An Assessment of the Decree

The new decree will come into force on 1 July 1976 and is one of a series of restrictive measures that are to be gradually implemented in an attempt to improve labor discipline and increase industrial efficiency (see Hungarian Situation Reports/6, 11, and 13, Radio Free Europe Research, 18 February, 23 March, and 13 April 1976, Items 4, 3, and 1, respectively). It is more "interventionist" in the sphere of labor recruitment than any of its predecessors, although the increased role to be played by the official employment agencies is in itself likely to be advantageous to those seeking employment. On the debit side, the carte blanche given to the local councils to make use of the agencies mandatory (and not only in special cases stipulated by the decree, as is the present practice) is to be regretted. The other unattractive feature of the new regulations is their provision for the mandatory redirection of workers employed by an enterprise that remains active but is considered by the authorities to be of lesser importance.

The decree does not spell out the consequences to the employee who refuses to be redirected to a new place of work in such circumstances, and more detailed regulations will undoubtedly have to be provided later. Presumably they will be drawn up by the individual branch ministries to cover their own particular fields.

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS3. Polish Construction Enterprise Gains Another Hungarian Contract

Polish construction enterprises have a record of successful operation in Hungary, and one of them will again play a part in building work in Veszprem County. Its employment reflects the chronic shortage of Hungarian capacity in this sphere.

Veszprem County has previous experience of Polish workers and the county party committee and local council requested the Hungarian Complex foreign trade enterprise to invite Budimex, the Polish foreign trade enterprise specializing in building work, to select a firm to undertake a major construction job in Veszprem. Budimex's choice this time fell on a building enterprise in Cracow, and the agreement concluded last year provides for work to start on 1 July 1976. Some 200 Poles will be employed on the project.

The contract is a comprehensive one covering a large number of separate items. In the town of Veszprem the Poles will build a first aid station, a nursery, two grammar schools, a driving school, a warehouse, a laundry, a movie theater, two skilled workers' training schools, and probably 300 apartments. At Tihany, Lake Balaton, a third grammar school will be built. The total value of these projects is estimated at 400,000,000 forint and the work is to be completed within the present five-year plan period -- i.e., by 1980.

Very thorough preparation and close co-operation will be needed. In contrast to earlier projects, the Hungarians have contracted to ensure an adequate flow of building materials to the site, and any delays will involve them in financial penalties.

The Hungarian side will also reserve 60 new apartments for the 200 Polish workers, a requirement that is causing some disquiet among the inhabitants of Veszprem, because the accommodation will obviously not become available for allocation locally until the Poles have completed the project -- a delay of up to five years.

Polish workers first came to Hungary in early 1972, when the Fuzfo Paper Factory wanted to construct a new building for material preparation and could not find a Hungarian enterprise able to meet its deadline for completion. The deadlock was broken by invoking Polish assistance (see Hungarian SR/9, RFER, 29 February 1972, Item 4). In the spring of 1973 a Poznan construction enterprise built a school with 16 rooms in the town of Veszprem (Vilag-gazdasag, 21 April 1973), and these two experiences were sufficiently happy ones to induce the Veszprem County authorities to turn once more to the Polish enterprises, one of whose most attractive features is their readiness to accept short deadlines.

(070)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

4. World Federation of Hungarians

The Hungarian press has recently given some prominence to the activities of the World Federation of Hungarians, a regime organization whose function is to establish and maintain contacts with Hungarians living in the West (Nepszabadsag, 4 April 1976). It has no responsibility for expatriates in the countries adjacent to Hungary.

The federation openly proclaims that it wants to expand its relations with Hungarians living abroad and as part of this broad purpose it would like to encourage loyalty to "socialist Hungary." In practice this amounts to an attempt to achieve the political neutralization of Hungarian émigrés by persuading them to at least passive co-operation with the regime.

The organization is at present primarily concerning itself with what it calls the "smaller" communities of expatriates. By this term it means professional associations, Hungarian language study groups, and cultural clubs of various kinds.

One of the principal events in the federation's calendar is the "mother tongue" conference which was first held in 1970 and has been repeated almost every year since then. This gathering acts as a focal point around which various activities are organized. The conference itself generally lasts two weeks and provides special language courses for those who teach Hungarian in foreign countries. The first week of these courses is devoted to pedagogical and methodological aspects of language teaching, while the second includes discussions of Hungary's language, literature, and arts, as well as visits to the country's main language teaching centers. Among the secondary features of the program are camps at Lake Balaton where boys and girls can spend two weeks of their vacation provided they devote some time to learning the Hungarian language. Most of them are aged seven to fourteen and are the children of Hungarians living in the West. Young people between 15 and 18 can enroll in language courses in Sarospatak, a well-known teaching center in Northeast Hungary. All these courses are sponsored by the main conference.

Another important task of the federation is the promotion of tourist travel to Hungary. Since this is an activity that helps to earn a great deal of hard currency, the authorities look upon it favorably, and the federation has been helped to mount a publicity campaign to attract tourists to Hungary and can offer them better terms than are available to the average Western tourist; for example, a widespread complaint is that sight-seeing buses are not always available to foreign visitors, but this lament is never heard among the federation's customers.

The number of Hungarians who visit their homeland is difficult to estimate because the figures provided are conflicting. The annual average is at least 100,000 but it has been claimed that in 1975 it rose as high as 180,000. Naturally, the general increase in tourism throughout the world is reflected in a gradually rising tendency in the numbers going to Hungary each year.

The World Federation of Hungarians publishes a periodical called Magyar Hírek (Hungarian News) which appears twice a month and of which 85,000 free copies are sent abroad. It also produces a calendar every December.

The federation sponsors a radio station that broadcasts to Hungarians abroad and sometimes acts as the voice of the government in expounding foreign policy; its programs are not, of course, comparable with those of the national radio stations. Its musical programs are markedly sentimental and nostalgic and its occasional vignettes of Hungarian life emphasize the pleasanter aspects of living in the "mother country." (071)

AGRICULTURE

5. Preliminary Report On the Agricultural Co-operatives in 1975

Annual report-and-election meetings were held in all Hungarian agricultural co-operatives by the end of February. At these gatherings the members, exercising their proprietary rights, were supposed to assess the results achieved in 1975, allocate profits, and discuss plans for 1976. In practice, however, in most agricultural co-operatives the annual accounts and next year's plan are prepared by the local party and economic leadership and then discussed and approved by the members of the party organizations; only then are they submitted to the agricultural co-operative members, who at that stage have little chance to make any changes (Nepszabadsag, 31 March 1976).

Data based on a preliminary summary were released by the National Council of Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives some time ago, and were commented on by State Secretary for Agriculture and Food Gabor Soos in an interview given to Radio Budapest (see Hungarian SR/3, RFER, 21 January 1976, Item 5). At the end of last month, however, a separate preliminary report on the achievements of the co-operatives in 1975 was published by the Minister of Finance, and it contains some revealing figures (Figyelo, 31 March 1976).

It shows that the total number of agricultural co-operatives in Hungary fell during 1975 from 1,917 to 1,599 as a result of mergers. Despite instructions issued by the ministry that this process must be slowed down (see Hungarian SR/44, RFER, 22 October 1975, Item 2), the creation of "mammoth farms" by this means continued at a rapid pace in the opening months of 1976 thanks to the overzealousness of some party and council leaders.

Unfavorable weather and additional taxation caused a fall in profits of approximately 2,000 million forint during the year; land tax rose by 6.5 per cent and income tax by 14 per cent over 1974, and gross income was further depressed by an increase in banking costs of approximately 20 per cent which cost the co-operatives 230,000,000 forint. It was necessary to withhold 1,000 million forint from the reserve funds in order to make available the 21,400 million forint earmarked for the participation fund in 1975.

The total 1975 deficit in the agricultural co-operatives amounted to 420,000,000 forint, and it is likely that 85 of them will have to be "refloated" if they are to have a proper financial basis on which to continue operations.

No reliable data on members' personal incomes are given in the preliminary report, but a fall in numbers made it possible for the working members to receive similar emoluments to those of 1974.

It is clear from this latest report that the agricultural co-operatives will have to increase their efficiency if they are to prosper in the present difficult economic climate. Material costs alone rose by 12 per cent in 1975 and an least equally large increase must be expected in 1976. (072)

6. Milk Yields and Private Plot Taxation

The growth of large-scale cattle farming revealed that the red-speckled cow produced by interbreeding Swiss, Austrian, and Bavarian pedigree stock in Hungary in the 1920s is unsuited to the requirements of the closed production system. It does not adapt well to mechanical milking and its low milk yield makes it unprofitable to the agricultural co-operatives. The government therefore prepared a major replacement program and suitable pedigree stock was imported from the West, including the famous Holstein-Frisian breed, which is considered by Hungarian specialists to be the best milking cow available today (see Hungarian SR/10, REFER. 13 March 1973, Item 6).

The imported cattle were sent to the best state farms and agricultural co-operatives where they were either interbred or crossbred with the existing speckled varieties in an attempt to improve milk yields. On most farms the first lactation period of their offspring has produced milk yields far in excess of those previously recorded, and an average of 5,000 liters a year is hoped for (Dunantuli Naplo, 8 April 1976). The government intends to foster the spread of the new breed, because the agricultural co-operatives have to produce at least an additional 500 liters per cow between 1976 and 1980, if they are to fulfill their planned production. The new breed will prove its worth, however, only if the agricultural co-operatives continue to improve the farms' infrastructure and fodder supplies.

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The recent difficulties experienced in the country's milk and milk products supply have forced the government to take increasing notice of the private sector cattle breeders. More than 300,000 cows are kept on the private plots and supply milk for their owners and considerable additional quantities for sale to the population (see Hungarian SR/12, RFER 6 April 1976, Item 7). At a recent meeting of private plot farmers organized by one of the Pest County agricultural co-operatives the head of the main revenue department in the Ministry of Finance said that next year new regulations will be introduced changing the taxation system applicable to small-scale farmers. In recent years the excessive taxes imposed by some revenue officers on the private farmers have acted as a disincentive. The roles now under preparation will reduce their burdens generally and some branches, of which milk and milk products are one, will be relieved of all taxation (Pest Megyei Hirlap, 9 April 1976). (073)

EDUCATION

7. An Educational Experiment Criticized

The Council of Ministers, urged on by the trade unions, passed a resolution on 2 August 1973 on the provision of higher education for young skilled workers who lack high school diplomas. Its purpose was to enable those who are selected because of their exemplary performance to receive a higher education that would fit them for senior technical positions (see Hungarian SR/36, RFER, 16 October 1973, Item 4).

The experiment was considered a success, and 16 months later the Council of Ministers passed another resolution (No. 1065/1974; Magyar Kozlony, 31 December 1974) which ordained that the system be expanded -- primarily in those fields where a worker could return, after receiving higher education, to the enterprise or co-operative from which he was selected. Where this was not possible, because of the nature of the training, expansion was to be related to job opportunities.

This expansion has enabled several skilled workers who lack high school diplomas but have proved their worth in practice to become engineers, economists, lawyers, or agricultural specialists and to find appropriate jobs in industry, agriculture, trade, or government service. In the first year of the scheme's operation 205 young skilled workers from 42 enterprises were enrolled for the one-year preparatory course that is a required preliminary to matriculation in a higher educational institute; in the second year the figure rose to 247 from 64 enterprises, and future annual intakes will probably be 500. Some 20 per cent of the first intake dropped out, leaving 160 to go forward to receive higher education (Heves Megyei Nepuisag, 10 January 1975, and Magyar Hirlap, 20 February 1975).

The experiment has aroused widespread enthusiasm and support. The government's semiofficial daily Magyar Hirlap said that the

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political and social basis for the scheme is as follows: in the 1950s and 1960s a new intelligentsia emerged in Hungary -- the intelligentsia of the working class. It is in the interests of society as a whole that this stratum should not simply reproduce itself and become a "test-tube intelligentsia," but that it should continuously absorb new blood from the country's manual workers and agricultural cooperative peasants and that the children of manual workers should enter the universities in large numbers. While the scheme is interesting, its social significance is restricted by its comparatively small scale: even if all 500 entrants successfully overcome the hurdle of the fairly difficult preliminary examinations, their numbers are small compared with the total intake of 15,000 to 16,000 regular university students each year (N. Sandor Laszlo, "Roads," Magyar Hirlap, 20 February 1975).

The first comprehensive critical study of the working of the scheme appeared in the March 1976 issue of Valóság, the monthly of the Society for the Dissemination of Scientific Knowledge, in an article by Janos Pesti entitled "Skilled Workers and Higher Education."

Pesti said that the main opposition to this form of further education came from regular university and college students, who resented the fact that the young workers were occupying places that would otherwise have been available to candidates who had completed normal secondary education; further, these privileged few were better placed financially than the average student. Most regular students, according to Pesti, regarded the experiment "as something that required defensive explanations, was quite unnecessary, and was doing more harm than good."

The sharpest reaction, he said, came from the directors of the high schools for workers. They believed that the scheme damaged the prestige of schools for adults and was unfair in its treatment of those who had acquired a secondary education without the help of scholarships and had continued working in their primary jobs.

The article noted that this new educational form imposed heavy financial burdens on the enterprises and the national economy. An enterprise that sent four young skilled workers to university would spend close to 1,000,000 forint on them before they became graduate engineers. (In 1975 it cost the national economy 60,000 to 80,000 forint annually to educate a student at a technical university.) Further there was no guarantee that this "prohibitive" expenditure would produce "talented people of maximal value." It was desirable to give the children of workers and peasants access to the universities, but "serious injustices" must be avoided.

Pesti then examined the results achieved by the young skilled workers in their first academic year, and based his report mainly on data from Fejer County. He concluded this part of his study by citing examples of individual achievement and added:

If I had enough space, I could go on enumerating such examples, but it must also be recorded that many family men, full of

vitality and often used to recognition and success, collapsed under the nervous strain caused by overwork as they struggled daily for 16 to 20 hours and begged to be passed. This was shattering to the teachers who had already encountered them during the preparatory courses. I know -- because they told me so -- that they considered the majority to be engaging and diligent young men, although the ability of most of them was doubtful from the very beginning. In their view, approximately one third of the applicants knew what they were taking on, and the teaching staff considered that some of these people would be able to complete their studies somehow.


In conclusion Pesti urged that the problem should be thoroughly analyzed and more experience gleaned. He offered the following points for consideration:

- a. The greater use of practicing specialists to help remove the clashes between theory and practice;
- b. The acceptance of only those young people without high school training (or with a minimum of secondary qualifications) who are positively recommended by the appropriate committee;
- c. The "enterprise quadrangle" (party-trade union-KISZ-management) should collaborate in this matter with the instructional staff in the higher educational institutes;
- d. If there is a dearth of adequate talent, quotas should be left unfilled;
- e. Perhaps a similar scheme should be started to cover the best students in the secondary schools that operate in the HSWP educational directorates and provide a joint curriculum of party and secondary school studies;
- f. It might be preferable to prepare candidates under the enterprises' own auspices -- while, of course, continuing to exempt them from their normal duties.

Quite apart from Pesti's penetrative criticism of the experiment, his article is notable for its open condemnation of the excessive "party-minded" enthusiasm with which the scheme was welcomed, even if much of it was in good faith. Indeed the intrinsic importance of the article is enhanced by the fact that it offers a fairly dispassionate account of what has become one of the HSWP's favorite educational experiments. (074)

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This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.



● RAD Background Report/92
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YUGOSLAV DAILY AGAINST CPSU'S LEADING ROLE IN WORLD MOVEMENT

(A translation by Slobodan Stanković)

Summary and Introduction: In its April 25 issue, the Zagreb daily Vjesnik carried an article by its foreign policy editor Zeljko Brihta attacking the so-called "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine" and criticizing Washington for trying to prevent the West European communist parties from becoming members of governmental coalitions with noncommunist parties. Headlined "Only as Equal Members," the article starts with a short introduction in which Brihta attacks the general interpretation of the term "proletarian internationalism" in the Soviet bloc countries. He rejects the idea that the attitude of individual communist parties toward the Soviet Union should be accepted as the standard concerning their "internationalism." The League of Communists of Yugoslavia considers that internationalism means the right of each party to follow its own independent road. The following is a translation of those parts of Brihta's article dealing with Yugoslavia's criticism of the pro-Soviet interpretation of "proletarian internationalism" in Eastern Europe.

* * *

Norms and Standards

The term proletarian internationalism is sometimes interpreted in different ways. For some people, it is "the inexhaustible source of the vital force of the international communist movement, the basis and guarantee of its victory." It is being presented as a "strong, proven, and invincible weapon" on which "every Marxist-Leninist party" must rely (which automatically means that such parties are not Marxist-Leninist parties if they do not rely on [this kind of proletarian internationalism], i.e., that they have become guilty of "nationalistic deviation"). This is why people who "incessantly attack" this type of proletarian internationalism are proclaimed "enemies of communism, rightist and leftist revisionists, Maoists and nationalists of all colors and types."

The basic standard for this proletarian internationalism, it is claimed, is one's attitude to the Soviet Union (which means that "the more loyal ally a country is the better an internationalist it is"); it has also been claimed that no "usual norms of international law" apply to relations among socialist countries." "The Communists of different countries do not operate under the same conditions," which "provokes a variety of tactical forms of the revolutionary struggle," but one must "strictly observe the common laws" wherein, it is asserted, "proletarian internationalism is the most significant principle of Marxism-Leninism, of the policy line of communist parties, and of the whole of their activity."

Within this scope, a special role is assigned the CPSU and the Soviet Union. The loyalty of each communist party to Marxist ideology is primarily measured by its behavior to the Soviet Union, conduct that also is "the natural standard of behavior toward socialism" in general. It has been emphasized that "socialism in one's own country will be the more successful the closer one's friendship with the Soviet Union is," while "the essence of proletarian internationalism has been" -- according to these theoreticians -- "a strong bond with the leading force of the socialist state community," i.e., with the Soviet Union and with the CPSU, "which is the leading force and the acme of the world's revolutionary movement."

Proletarian internationalism is also being defined as the harmonization of the international economic and other policies of the socialist countries -- a point which has also been emphasized this year in many May First slogans. "One of the most essential characteristics of the communist movement," it is claimed, "has always been unconditional internationalism," for "a struggle conducted in an isolated way, within a national framework, can never be successful. This law is also valid for the socialist countries, for their state policies." Or: one must come even closer together and when "making decisions, bear in mind, not only national, but also international interests."

Rights and Obligations

For other people -- for instance, for Yugoslavia and for its League of Communists -- internationalism has, above all, been the responsibility of each individual party to its own working class and its own people; it is the right and obligation of each such party to develop in its own country an order, including a socialist order, which best suits such a country. In the Belgrade Declaration (Tito-Khrushchev-Bulgaria in 1955), it was said that internal order and the "various roads to socialism are exclusively the concern of the people in each individual country." That declaration also dealt with peaceful coexistence among all peoples and with co-operation among all countries.

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"The absolutization of one's own road to socialism unavoidably narrows the front of the struggle of all socialist and progressive forces," while "the co-operation of all communist and workers' parties and all progressive democratic movements and forces" is based "on strengthening the real solidarity among all progressive and democratic forces" as well as "the successful development of socialism as a world-wide process; this type of co-operation must be based on full equality, independence, and responsibility to one's own working class and people."

For Yugoslavia, One's Own Road -- and Therefore Its Contribution to Internationalism -- Has Been Nonalignment and Self-management

Internationalism today is perhaps no longer what it was earlier (and what, for some people, it should be even today); the world has changed as have people and their relations in this world. "Internationalism must not mean any imposed obligation or issuance of directives. Every party creates its own international obligations" and none should be anathematized because of dissenting views existing in the workers' movement. Such dissenting views should be discussed, because "democratic discussions have always strengthened socialism;" since there have been "both good and bad experiences," which means that "everything must be respected," which does not necessarily mean that everything must be accepted.

"The contemporary workers' movement needs unity, but on the basis of diversity." The dogmatists have reduced internationalism to "lending support to a single party, i.e., to a single socialist country, to a group of socialist countries; in other words, to the countries pursuing so-called 'realistic socialism' This means not only that numerous socialist forces today fighting for socialism in their own countries, but also individual countries where socialist revolutions have already been victorious, are deprived of such support." (All above-mentioned quotations have been taken from speeches, articles, and books; the names involved are not important; it is the views that count.)

Similarities and Differences

Proletarian internationalism means, therefore, that everyone has both the right and obligation to think for himself and as he likes in his own country, to write and act in such way as supports the interests of the working class in that country; this means, on the other hand, that nobody has the right, still less the obligation, to impose appraisals obligatory upon other parties (or all parties), especially not appraisals concerning others. In the long run, this means that no foreign interpretations of proletarian or internationalist consciousness and conscience can have any validity for anyone: every party, whether

in a socialist or in a capitalist country, is above all responsible to its own people; this, rather than its attitude toward other [parties and countries], is the best measure of its worth.

This means: the better a party "serves its own interests," the more "internationalist" it is and the more valuable a collaborator in the workers' movement, which must be understood as a movement of equal rather than of more or less valuable parties. This must be a movement which in one or another instance -- for example, in the era of détente in Europe or in the anticolonialist struggle -- could act in a united and common way, but only if its unity wells up from inside rather than being imposed from outside. This, finally, must be a movement that does not concentrate on and refer to the past, but instead deals with and lives for the present time and for the future.

In such a case, even the differences prevailing in it would encourage similar action and would serve as material for the construction of bridges, rather than of walls. This is why Stalinism has been criticized in Yugoslavia "for the purpose of strengthening socialism;" rather than for antisocialist reasons, as has been done by some people in the West. For the same reasons, Yugoslavia would like to have "all its international relations improved in the best possible way," including its relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries; this means that Yugoslavia does not want to see these relations worsened, as some extreme rightists in the West and the Cominformists both in Yugoslavia and elsewhere would like to see happen.

For Yugoslavia, therefore, one's attitude and policy toward any other country (or party) cannot be a standard for judging socialist development in one's own country. Proletarian internationalism, too, can arise only from within, because it has no great value if it is imposed from without. (067)

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TITO RECALLS KADAR'S COMING TO POWER
(A translation by Slobodan Stankovic)

Summary and Introduction: In the 23rd installment of a series entitled "Tito's Historical No To Stalinism," the Croat publicist Zvonko Staubinger describes -- in the April 27 issue of the Zagreb daily Vjesnik -- the 2 November 1956 "secret meeting between Tito and Khrushchev" on Brioni Island. The series in Vjesnik deals with Tito's conflict with Moscow and was said (according to Politika of 22 April 1976) to have been the reason why the Zagreb daily was confiscated in Czechoslovakia recently. After having described how the situation in Hungary under Imre Nagy had deteriorated, Staubinger says the following:

Tito saw clearly that the previously justified revolt and uprising against the Rakosi-Gerö clique had turned into an uprising against socialism and the Soviet Union. On November 1 [1956], Tito received an important confidential cable from Moscow. Next evening, November 2, a special Soviet government airplane of the Tupolev type "suddenly" landed at the military airport in Pula. From it, several "unknown" passengers descended. With the greatest discretion, they were put in several military vehicles and at maximum speed taken to Fazana where a small boat was waiting to convey them to Brioni. Except for Tito, nobody knew about their arrival, not even the officials employed on Brioni Island. Their visit had to remain a total secret. The "unknown" guests were Khrushchev and Malenkov.

They came to see Tito precisely because of serious unrest in Hungary. After having consulted the Poles, Czechs, Bulgarians, Rumanians, and Chinese, they wanted to hear Tito's opinion. Soviet tanks had surrounded Budapest. The Hungarian people had risen against the tyranny of Rakosi and Gerö, who were callous Stalinists. This rather confusing situation was manipulated by reactionary elements. There was shooting in the streets. There were many dead people.

"All events in Hungary are turning into a counterrevolution," said Khrushchev anxiously. "They are killing communists. Some want to restore capitalism. We cannot permit this. The capitalists would then reach the very frontiers of the Soviet Union."

Tito agreed and asked: "Do you intend to use Soviet troops?"

"Yes, I am considering a military intervention," answered Khrushchev, "because there is no other way."

"I am not sure whether this would be good," Tito warned, and told Khrushchev that he agreed with the latter's appraisal concerning Hungary's dangerous road toward the restoration of capitalism; he added that something should be done to strengthen the communist and socialist forces, but he still considered that a military intervention would do more harm than good in Hungary itself, because socialism would thereby be compromised.

"One should look for other solutions, rely on the workers, on the workers' councils, get them to start armed action," Tito suggested.

"We cannot wait for the working class to take action. One should act quickly," Khrushchev answered resolutely.

Their talk lasted from 7 p.m. [2 November 1956] to 5 a.m. next day [3 November 1956]. Later, at the closed seventh plenary session of the LCY Central Committee, Tito revealed the contents of his meeting with Khrushchev:

"We suggested that a workers-peasants revolutionary government be formed around which all healthy elements could rally. We even suggested that Janos Kadar should be invited in. They suggested quite a different person, but we said it would be much better if Kadar took over, because he was in prison, was tortured, and is a person in whom the workers have confidence."


Khrushchev and Malenkov accepted Tito's suggestion as the only reasonable and possible one. They even partially agreed that a military intervention would be harmful. "They left very satisfied," said Tito. Yet, next day, November 4 [1956], the Soviet army intervened. This is how events in Hungary assumed a dramatic turn.

(075)

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.



RAD Background Report/86
(Romania)
26 April 1977



CEAUSESCU ADDRESSES MAJOR AGRICULTURAL CONGRESS

By the Romanian Unit

Summary: Romanian party and state leader Ceausescu was the major speaker at a huge agricultural congress involving some 11,000 representatives of state and co-operative farm organizations, specialists, researchers, and private farmers. The occasion was colored by a number of historical commemorations -- the centenary of Romanian independence, the 70th anniversary of the 1907 peasant uprising, and the 15th anniversary of the completion of collectivization in 1962. Ceausescu discussed agricultural output at some length, noting with satisfaction that in 1976 the country had achieved its highest grain production ever but also criticizing the low level of efficiency in the Agricultural Production Co-operatives. He was also critical of failings in the campaign to mechanize agriculture, increase the output of farm equipment and fertilizer, and expand irrigation, but he indicated that efforts in these areas would be intensified. He also renewed the pledge to raise the quality of life in the countryside to increase wages and pensions for agricultural workers, and to improve other aspects of the standard of living. Following Ceausescu's address the congress separated into various subgroups at which specific concerns of individual types of unit were considered.

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On 18 April 1977 a conference known as the Congress of Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, of the Entire Romanian Peasantry -- the first of its kind -- opened in Bucharest. High-level party and state leaders, including RCP Secretary-General and RSR President Nicolae Ceausescu, were in attendance. It was in fact an expansion of the third congress of Agricultural Production Cooperatives (APCs) that had to be postponed on account of the March 4 earthquake. In addition to representatives of the APCs the participants included delegates from the State Agricultural Enterprises (SAEs), the Agricultural Mechanization Stations, and nonco-operative communes and villages, plus agricultural experts and individuals engaged in agricultural research. In all, there were 11,000 delegates -- whether intentionally or not a symbolic figure, since 11,000 peasants were killed during the 1907 peasant revolt in Romania.

The meeting took place in the Exhibition Pavilion in Scinteia Square where, the completion of collectivization was celebrated 15 years ago, and it was announced that owing to the importance of agriculture similar congresses would henceforth be held every five years.

The first congress took place at a time when three events were being commemorated: the centenary of Romania's independence, the 70th anniversary of the great 1907 peasant uprising, and the 15th anniversary of the socialization of agriculture. This commemorative atmosphere prompted Ceausescu, the main speaker, to begin with a long exposition stressing the role and historical importance of the Romanian peasantry, which he described as having "defended the land of our forefathers against foreign domination, against the expansion of the great empires," and as having "stood as a wall before countless invasions and acts of aggression," taking up arms in defense "of the integrity and liberty of our homeland, calling the attention of the whole world to the determination of the Romanian people to be master in its own country." (1) Referring to the 1907 riots he added that they had been one "one of the most grandiose and at the same time most tragic pages" in the history of the Romanian people. He recalled a recent decision of the Political Executive Committee to allocate some 500,000,000 lei to eight communes in which the 1907 riots had taken place, to enable them to become urban centers with "a rich social and economic life."

Ceausescu Discusses Output

Ceausescu expressed himself as satisfied with the deliveries made by the co-operative sector to the Central State Fund, noting that in 1976 it had provided 73 per cent of the fund's wheat, 94.8 per cent of its maize, 81 per cent of its sunflowers, 99 per cent of its sugar beets, 80 per cent of its potatoes, 71 per cent of its vegetables, and 64 per cent of its grapes. So far as actual output

(1) Scinteia, 19 April 1977.

went, however, he described the results as disappointing -- the co-operative sector farms 68 per cent of the country's arable land, but produces only 44 per cent of its total agricultural output. He urged, therefore, that every co-operative improve its labor policy, create an atmosphere of order and discipline, apply to the management of its affairs the principles of co-operative democracy, and expand the piecework system of remuneration in order to increase output.

A trend toward enhancing the role of the Interco-operative Councils (2) was initiated by Ceausescu's definition of them as "a superior form of organization and management in co-operative agriculture, and this is expected to bring about a qualitative change in the activity of the Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives; the responsibility of the SMAs will also be increased, as will co-operation with the State Agricultural Units and the Consumer Co-operatives.

Ceausescu was also not satisfied with the SMAs, which he said, do not make full use of agricultural machinery and equipment, do not maintain it properly, and do not carry out their tasks on schedule. Nor was he happy with the SAEs, whose output does not adequately reflect the investment made in them. Nevertheless, he proposed that the SMAs should "integrate themselves directly into the APCs, by making themselves responsible for production," while the SAEs should "become models of modern socialist organization of production."

A somewhat surprising aspect of the congress was the participation of 600 peasants "unco-operativized" from hill and mountain farms -- a sector that plays an important role in animal breeding and fruit growing. Ceausescu has promised these peasants a new pension plan and a more favorable tax rate calculated on a per-hectare basis. (3) In exchange the "non-cooperativized" peasants will agree to incorporation in the pyramidal system made up of local, county, and central commissions, which are part of the Front of Socialist Unity, and will undertake to increase their deliveries to the Central State Fund.

Ceausescu stated that the highest grain yield in Romania's history had been recorded in 1976 -- 19,791,000 tons. This bears out the statement made in a recent article (4) that Romania's agriculture is particularly "dynamic," the average annual increase in production in

(2) See Romanian Situation Report/9, Radio Free Europe Research, 18 March 1977, Item 5.

(3) See Romanian SR/12, RFER, 6 April 1977, Item 1.

(4) O. Parpala, "The Party's Agrarian Policy: A Basic Factor in a Constructive Socialist Economic Policy and in Increasing People's Welfare," Viata Economica No.15, 15 April 1977.

1951-1975 having been 4.3 per cent. Ceausescu, however, maintained that present conditions would permit the agricultural sector to increase its output to 23,000,000 tons of grain by 1980. The congress was asked to debate and approve a program for the development of agriculture during the 1976-1980 plan period -- a program embracing sectors, branches, crop raising, livestock breeding, etc.

Lack of Efficiency Criticized

The desired increase in production could in large measure be achieved by eliminating the shortcomings listed by the party leader. Although he expressed himself in somewhat milder terms than usual (a circumstance that can be explained by the atmosphere that has pervaded Romania since the earthquake), he nevertheless noted the existence of "shortcomings, mistakes, and a negative state of affairs." The greatest drawback in Romanian agriculture, he said, is its insufficient utilization of the existing potential, especially in regard to the rational use of the land and technical equipment. During the present five-year plan period the arable area must be increased by at least 125,000 hectares, and the irrigated area must be raised from 1,666,000 hectares in 1976 to 3,000,000 hectares. In fact, irrigation is "one of the most important factors in achieving progress in the agricultural sector," since it can make it possible to obtain two crops a year from the same land. But, added Ceausescu, neither the large nor the small, local irrigation systems are being used to capacity.

Among the other negative phenomena mentioned by the secretary-general were high costs. Although considerable sums had been spent on modernizing the "technical basis" of agriculture, this had not lessened the cost of production, and he strongly urged agricultural units not to undertake expenditures that cannot be recouped through increased production and income. Expenses should be reduced by eliminating the number of the unproductive staff members and by having all hands, including management, take part in agrarian activities during the peak periods.

Another complaint had to do with the very low level of labor productivity in many agricultural sectors. Again, this had been commented on in a recent article, (5) which claimed that a Romanian farmer provides food for only three or four persons whereas a farmer in a developed agricultural country provides for 20 to 25.

The Mechanization and Modernization of Agriculture

Ceausescu also expects agricultural production to increase as a result of the modernization of its "technico-material basis" and

(5) Mircea Bulgaru, "The Peasantry and Socioeconomic Progress in Romania," Revista Economica No.15, 15 April 1977.

the improvement of its management system, and, indirectly, the raising of the peasantry's standard of living. The allocation of larger investment funds (which will increase from 77,000 million lei in 1971-1977 to 120,000 million for 1976-1980) will enable considerable progress to be made in developing the "technico-material basis." These increased investments are designed to supply all agricultural branches with mechanized equipment, expand the land improvement program, prepare land for irrigation, enlarge and modernize vineyards and orchards, build greenhouses and solaria, modernize zootechnic installations, build storehouses, etc. .

The cost of the irrigation program will be reduced by making use of the army. (6) Progress toward mechanization will be assisted by the provision of 70,000 additional tractors and "some tens of thousands" of other agricultural machines between now and 1980. In his closing speech to the congress Ceausescu took the Ministry of the Machine-Building Industry to task, and urged it to make greater efforts to solve the problems connected with mechanization.

Marin Capisizu, chief of the Department of State Agriculture, was also criticized by the party secretary-general for advocating a policy of dispersing technical equipment equally among the country's farms; Ceausescu believes better results would be obtained by concentrating them in large units where they could be "more intensively used." He laid particular stress on the need to manufacture new, more efficient machines -- a good many of which would presumably be used to replace the inefficient ones now in use. This point was also made by another speaker at the congress, Vintila Gherman, (7) who stressed the need for 80-HP tractors, machines with caterpillar treads, and machines designed for work in hilly areas.

Ceausescu proposed one rather drastic measure -- to begin paying machine operators (and even SMA directors) on the basis of the quality and size of the yields obtained from mechanized farms. This system has already been applied in the construction sector. (8)

Ceausescu also asked the Ministry of the Chemical Industry to make a greater effort to carry out the program for fertilizers and other chemical substances, and the minister has promised that this year agricultural units will receive 45 per cent more fertilizers than they did last year. In order to achieve this one fourth of the investment in the chemical industry will be earmarked for the manufacture of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and products needed by livestock breeders. Priority will be given to liquid fertilizers designed for use on irrigated areas. In his speech to the congress Minister of the

(6) First Deputy Minister of National Defense Ion Hortopan's speech to the congress as broadcast over Radio Bucharest, 20 April 1977.

(7) Ibid.

(8) See Romanian Unit, "The Romanian Socioeconomic Plan and State Budget for 1977," RAD Background Report/239 (Romania), 23 November 1976.

Chemical Industry Mihail Florescu estimated that the output of chemical fertilizers can be increased from 1,000,000 tons of active substance to 2,900,000 by 1980. (9)

Problems of Agricultural Organization and Management

Ceausescu also expects that improved "cadre training" will result in increased agricultural production. This training will take the form of integrating education and research with practical farm work, "recycling" engineers and technicians so that they may become familiar with new machines, and providing the peasantry with "mass education," without which it will be impossible to "achieve a new agriculture." Consequently the agricultural academies and institutions and the almost 11,000 specialists in agricultural research have been asked to make their contribution to increased agricultural production by a "more daring and more revolutionary spirit," and by placing the "achievements of modern biology in the service of agriculture." In his closing speech Ceausescu reiterated that researchers must leave Bucharest and for the production units, where, together with the workers and peasants, they must solve the problems connected with developing new kinds of seeds and plants of high productivity.

The agricultural development program presented at the congress requires improvement of the entire system of agricultural management and planning. Ceausescu outlined certain changes on the higher levels of management, starting with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry and ending with agricultural specialists working in the central agencies. The ministry and other agricultural agencies were criticized for excessive bureaucracy, and Ceausescu advised them to pay heed to the criticisms made at the congress and to take measures to eliminate the shortcomings that had been pointed out and to devote their attention to the production units, to the villages, "where the fate of production is decided." He also noted the validity of the criticism leveled at the National Union of Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives and the other co-operative organizations during the congress and expressed the hope that these units would assume greater responsibility in regard to rallying all agricultural forces, strengthening the socialist awareness of the peasantry, and seeing to it that the agricultural units operate in a "democratic" manner. This, he said, would require almost daily contact between the leaders of the national and county unions and the co-operative farmers.

Agricultural specialists attached to the central organs will have to do the same carrying on their activities in "the fields, vineyards, and meadows and on livestock farms, participating directly in the battle [to increase crop yields]."

Henceforth the supreme agricultural forum will be the Congress of Management Councils of Socialist Agricultural Units, of the Entire Romanian Peasantry, held once every five years. Participants will

(9) Radio Bucharest, 20 April 1977.

discuss party and state agrarian policy and decide on the measures to be taken to increase agricultural production and raise the standard of living of the peasantry.

Another agricultural agency was also set up -- the National Council of Agriculture, made up of members of the leading collective leadership bodies of the National Union of Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry, and the Academy of Agricultural and Sylvicultural Sciences, plus representatives from all the agencies connected with agriculture and representatives of the peasantry. This new council will meet once or twice a year to discuss the agricultural plan and suggest practical ways of implementing the decisions of the Congress of Management Councils. The importance of this new agency is pointed up by the fact that Prime Minister Manea Manescu was elected its chairman and Minister of Agriculture Angelo Miculescu and Chairman of the National Union of Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives Constantin Dascalescu (who is also a CC secretary) are its vice-chairmen. The council has three or four months to study the proposals and suggestions made at the congress and decide how they can be put into practice.

The Quality of Life in the Countryside

The plan to increase the remuneration of the peasantry and to provide them with pensions and social insurance, which is part of the general program to increase the standard of living in Romania, is also intended, as noted above, to stimulate the peasantry to work harder and to take a greater interest in the economic developments of their agricultural units. On the other hand radical changes are being planned for the villages, to be brought about by systematization and urbanization. According to Ceausescu, in the rural environment almost 2,000,000 new houses were built in rural areas between 1951 and 1976 and 200 urban centers were created by modernizing certain villages and creating a network of schools, economic units, cultural houses, hospitals, etc. . . .

The general program calls for the completion by 1990 of between 250,000 and 300,000 dwellings in communes and villages. Ceausescu also announced that during the current five-year plan the state will help to underwrite the cost of 40,000 to 50,000 village dwellings for agricultural experts, educators, or people working in the health services. It is hoped that this will help to raise the standard of living in the countryside, and lessen the economic gap between agricultural and industrial workers. The revitalization of the villages so earnestly desired by the party leadership will also be facilitated if the migration of youth to the towns can be slowed down by persuading young people that the life of a qualified worker in agriculture or local industry can also be a rewarding one.

The Discussions at and Decisions of the Congress


After Ceausescu had delivered his speech the congress was divided into four separate conferences: the Third Congress of the National Union of Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives; the Conference of Councils of Working People in the State Agricultural Enterprises; the Conference of Councils of Working People in the Stations for the Mechanization of Agriculture; and the Conference of Farmers in Nonco-operativized Regions. Each conference had its own agenda, its own main speaker (Constantin Dascalescu for the APCs, Marin Capisizu for the SAEs, Gheorghe Manciu for the SMAs, and Angelo Miculescu for the nonco-operativized farmers), and each arrived at its decisions independently. The only general statements on agricultural policy -- involving all sectors -- are to be found in Ceausescu's speech.

There were three days of discussion, during which 558 speakers took the floor, either during the plenary sessions or at the various meetings set up by branch and subbranch. Nothing new emerged from these discussions, however, and the congress ended on April 20 after adopting a number of measures: on the recommendation of the Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives conference statutes for the co-operative sector were adopted; the SAE conference's recommendation that the output of grains, particularly corn, be increased was approved; a general program to modernize agriculture and increase efficiency was adopted.

The leitmotiv at the congress was the need to increase agricultural production. Despite the record grain harvest in 1976 increased output continues to be the primary object of the RSR's agrarian policy, and it is true that the potential for such increase exists, in both crop and livestock farming. The 1977-1980 program, therefore, calls for the production planned for 1980 to be achieved a year earlier, and in his closing speech to the congress Ceausescu stressed the need to "ensure a continuous increase in production." This would not only help to meet the increasing demands of the population at a moment when the rights of the citizen are being more and more discussed, but would also make it possible to export more agricultural products, thus earning foreign currency with which to further the industrialization program and redress the balance of payments.

Aside from this there is also a long-term socioideological goal: to resolve the "problem of the peasantry" once and for all, by "homogenizing" Romanian society and wiping out the differences between villages and towns. The agrarian policy laid down at the congress goes beyond mere collectivization and asks such new forms of co-operation as those represented by the Interco-operative Association, the integration of the SMAs and the Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives, and the elevation of the SAEs to the level of model socialist organizations -- the aim being to draw all together and make agricultural work resemble industrial work more closely. In 1950 peasants represented 74 per cent of the employed population; in 1975 the corresponding figure was 38 per cent, and it is expected to drop to about 28 per cent by 1980. (10)

(10) Agerpres, 20 April 1977.



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• RAD Background Report/91
(East-West)
23 April 1976

NEW LEFT IN HUNGARY ATTRACTS ATTENTION OF WESTERN
MARXISTS

By Charles Andras

Summary: Earlier this year, a publisher in West Berlin put out a collection of essays written by members of the Budapest School -- an informal academic circle of the so-called "New Left" in Hungary. This book was preceded by two similar publications in 1974 and 1975. The present paper gives a short review of the three volumes and mentions some of the main ideas put forward in the most recent one.

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Is there a New Left, a radical Marxist-reformist group, in Hungary? Western observers have several times reported and the regime has openly admitted that one exists, but when such sources use the term "New Left in Hungary," they usually mean the Budapest School, an informal academic circle set up by the disciples of the late Marxist philosopher Gyorgy Lukacs. A few weeks ago, a West Berlin publisher, the Merve Verlag, put out a small book that makes this connection even more obvious: it bears the title Die neue Linke in Ungarn (The New Left in Hungary) and consists of essays written by members of the Budapest School. To be exact, this is the second volume that has appeared under the same title and from the same publisher since 1974, and to make the list complete, last year the Suhrkamp Verlag (Frankfurt am Main) also published a collection of writings by Hungarian Marxists who are members of the Budapest School; it is entitled Individuum und Praxis (The Individual and Practice). The most recent of these three volumes adds some fresh

color to the picture of the Budapest School an inquisitive Western Marxist will have been able to put together on the basis of its two predecessors. (1)

Before going into details, we should perhaps recall some preliminary events and circumstances. Three years ago, the Budapest School was strongly denounced by a study group of the Hungarian CC, and its members were deprived of their jobs and facilities for publishing their work in Hungary. But journals of the New Left in the West have continued to print their writings, some of which have later appeared in book form. Such assistance is by no means accidental: in the theoretical concepts of the two groups there are many links that bind them together in a broad East-West community. This is not to suggest, however, that they always think, act, and react in the same way. Differences are especially conspicuous when it comes to putting their theories into practice. While advocating a new socialism, a new social structure that would allegedly liberate man from alienation, the New Left in the West has avoided any profound analysis of the situation in Eastern Europe, of the fate of man under "established socialism" -- an omission that many Marxist "reformers," including new leftists, in the socialist countries cannot easily understand.

Conversely, the New Left in Hungary seems to be primarily preoccupied with what it calls the bureaucratization of "established socialism." From a strictly Marxist point of view, the Budapest School argues, the socialist societies in Eastern Europe, which were constrained to follow the Soviet example, have reached a stage of immobility, stagnation, and possibly even decline. To put it briefly, Marxist theory has been transformed into an official philosophy and its role is to provide ideological justification for the ruling hierarchy's handling of day-to-day affairs as well as for its self-perpetuation. If there is any distinctive trend to be discerned in East European socialism, it is toward a new type of consumer society; it displays many of the characteristics of its Western counterpart without, however, reinstituting capitalism.

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- (1) a. A. Hegedus, M. Markus, and others, Die neue Linke in Ungarn, Internationale Marxistische Diskussion No.45, Merve Verlag, [West] Berlin, 1974.
 - b. Gy. Lukacs, A. Heller, F. Feher, and others, Individuum and Praxis: Positionen der Budapester Schule, Edition Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main, 1975.
 - c. A. Hegedus, M. Vajda, and others, Die neue Linke in Ungarn, Vol. 2., Internationale Marxistische Diskussion No.53, Merve Verlag, [West] Berlin, 1976.

What has emerged in the East, the Budapest School claims, is a sort of pragmatic reformism where power is in the hands of the ruling centers instead of the masses, and where government consists of a series of ideological and practical compromises. This new social structure has very little to do, it is alleged, with the great ideal of Marxism, with revolutionary socialism, with the elimination of alienation from human life. This last goal presupposes a thorough humanization of all social relations, the rule of the people by a system of self-governing communities, and an active Marxist philosophy constantly in search of new solutions.

No true Marxist can overlook the deterioration of socialism in the East, the Budapest School holds, since it may harm the cause of socialism everywhere, East and West alike.

Generally speaking, the New Left in the West does not appear to be very eager to follow this advice from the other part of the continent. But the impression is that there must be at least one segment in the movement that is not prepared to overlook the Budapest School's consistent and comprehensive analysis of the socialist reality. Otherwise members of the School could not enjoy an almost regular access to the publications of their comrades in the West.

To revert to the second volume of Die neue Linke in Ungarn, the first thing to note is that Gyorgy Lukacs himself, the spiritual father of the Budapest School, is not among the authors represented in the book. Nor did he contribute to the two previous collections apart from a letter he wrote to the editor of The Times Literary Supplement (London) which was reprinted as an introduction to the Suhrkamp volume. But this letter is an important document for the New Left, since it is not clear to what extent, if at all, Lukacs identified himself with the critical ideas of his former disciples. Proregime philosophers in Hungary have discounted any community of views between the two sides, but in his letter Lukacs drew the London editor's attention to the activities of the Budapest School and praised some of the more fundamental (although nonpolitical) writings of its members. "I am firmly convinced," the letter ended, "that works like these are the forerunners of the philosophical literature of the future." (2) Lukacs's words have certainly enhanced Western Marxist interest in the Budapest School, and paved the way toward the publication of its "products" abroad.

(2) The Times Literary Supplement, 11 June 1976.

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The principal contributors to the latest volume (Die neue Linke in Ungarn, Vol. 2) are: Andras Hegedus, the last Stalinist Premier of Hungary who became a pioneer of the New Left in the country; Agnes Heller, perhaps the most profound philosophical mind in the team; and Gyorgy Markus and Maria Markus. With the exception of Hegedus, all of them were mentioned in Lukacs's letter; and all, including Hegedus, also contributed to the two earlier volumes published in the West. But one of the most fascinating essays of the new book was written by "Marc Rakovski," the nom de plume of a Hungarian Marxist who for obvious reasons did not want to reveal his identity. It should be added that only some of the essays printed in the book had previously been published in Hungary; most of them were written after the CC had imposed its publication ban on the Budapest School and thus made their first appearance in Western leftist journals. It was the same story with the two previous books.

What contribution is made by the latest collection of essays to the general concept of socialism elaborated by Lukacs's disciples, and what does it tell the Western reader about the New Left in Hungary? On the whole, while the first volume of Die neue Linke in Ungarn concentrated on the problems of sociology and revolution, the second volume's focus is on philosophy and politics — i.e., it explores the relationship between Marxist philosophy and political reality, describes some of the practical consequences of the restrictions imposed on Marxist theoretical work in Eastern Europe, and deals with the chances of its revival. Only a few salient ideas can be touched on here.

1. One of the most thoughtful essays was written by Agnes Heller as long ago as 1968, but evidently the editors have found it still topical enough to be included in the book. It is entitled "The Marxist Theory of Revolution and the Revolution of Everyday Life" and was conceived under the influence of the young Marx and of Marcuse; it repudiates the practice of humanization in socialist societies because, it is argued, the latter is properly limited to the working place, to work relationships, and does not encompass all aspects of human life. In Heller's opinion the real point of departure should be of an "ethical and political nature" — in other words, humanization should be handled as an all-round process, and a truly socialist society should be grounded in "communities engaged in recasting the reality as well as themselves."

Heller concludes that revolutionary Marxists must urgently address themselves to the task of building institutions that not only guarantee

individual freedom but go beyond that target and create conditions under which "the activities of society as a whole can be constructed from the activities of communities based on direct human contacts." Hence, the aim is "revolutionalization" through decentralization and self-management. Socialism cannot fulfill its historic mission, we are told, without such a deep and total transformation of everyday life.

2. Andras Hegedus and Maria Markus take up their favorite theme, the "Modernization and Alternative Methods of Social Progress," to quote the title of their collective essay. They see two main trends emerging in East European societies. The first follows the line of what they call the "étatic model" which, in essence, seeks to stabilize the actual stage of socialist development. Modernization is an important element in this model, but it can be used only within existing institutional limits; it cannot transgress them. The second trend works in the direction of the "main street model": socialist society enters the road followed by the progressive states and ensures a pleasant life for its members, it turns into a profit-oriented (but not capitalist) society. In both cases human alienation continues to exist.

The authors' ideal is a third solution, a new -- revolutionary -- model of socialism that would reconcile economic efficiency with the process of humanization and gradually put an end to alienation. One of the principal requirements of their humanism is that people must be in a position to "choose their own hierarchy of needs" and not merely be expected to satisfy indiscriminately their momentary needs. This is not possible, however,

if people cannot choose between various ways of life and if they cannot bring about social conditions which may stimulate the development and adequate self-realization of their true personality. . . . Such aims seem to be unattainable without a large-scale evolution, without an unfolding of communities that are not subject to the rules of the market or to the monopolistic ambitions of the state but which constitute an effective social force working against both. (3)

As the quotation shows, it is a central theme of the essay that socialism cannot exist without a minimum of self-organization on the part of the working class.

3. The essay by Marc Rakovski, originally published in Les Temps Modernes (Paris) in 1974 ("Marxism from the Viewpoint of Soviet-Type Societies"), takes an even closer look at the evolution of the Soviet-

(3) Die neue Linke in Ungarn, Vol.2., p. 133.

type society. He concludes that it is neither socialism nor communism, nor does it indicate a return to capitalism. It is a strange new structure that is not easy to define in Marxist terms — a circumstance, by the way, that betrays the "general difficulty" experienced by Marxist social theory in dealing with modern societies. Speaking in terms of classes, Rakovski sees two groups emerging in socialist societies: one that does the real work (the "class of producers") and another that dictates and fulfills the function of leadership (the "class of power").

Next, Rakovski turns to the question of how this socialist "development" has affected Marxist thinking. He starts with de-Stalinization. The new political mood helped to revive Marxist criticism, and an era of limited pluralism opened in the late 1950s. It did not last long, however. In the second half of the next decade, it was gradually suppressed by a neo-Stalinism encouraged from the top. What is left today is, on the one hand, an "official Marxism," providing ideological support to the power centers and, on the other hand, an "unofficial Marxism" or "Marxism in opposition," a remnant of the post-Stalinist upsurge, the future of which is rather precarious. The simple truth is that unofficial Marxism suffered a political defeat and in the new situation in which the supreme aim is ideological consensus centering around established Marxism, there is little place left for Marxist radicalism.

Is Rakovski suggesting that there is no hope of "true Marxism" regaining its social significance? He is certainly not a boundless optimist, but equally he does not subscribe to such ultrapessimistic views. Even if the system were to succeed in canalizing social tensions, he speculates, "there will always remain marginal groups that will not be integrated in the normal functioning of society and will ceaselessly multiply themselves." One of those groups will be the radical protest movement working for a realistic Marxist reinterpretation of Soviet-type societies. That is all Rakovski is prepared say at this moment.

* * *

However interesting the Budapest School's criticism of established Marxism may be, it cannot obscure the fact that the School has failed to come up with a comprehensive, convincing alternative. Its ideal is a new, revolutionary socialism that is not purely consumer-oriented

but is guided by a "higher value" system. There are some references to the Yugoslav example but its relevance is not elucidated. It is not clear how the whole complex mechanism would function or how all forms of human alienation are to be eliminated. (Incidentally, no such project — or explanation — has been offered by the Western new leftists either; their roads toward these idealistic aims remain obscure.) Still, one should not underestimate the significance of the Budapest School. It is worth recalling what Professor Iring Fetscher said in his review of Die neue Linke in Ungarn (Die Zeit, Hamburg, April 9): the writings of the Budapest School demonstrate that Marxist thinking has not been brought to a complete standstill in Eastern Europe. (066)

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22 April 1976

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA (CPCS)

I. PRESIDIUM

Full Members:

- Gustav HUSAK
- Vasil BILAK
- Peter COLOTKA
- Karel HOFFMANN
- Vaclav HULA
- Alois INDRA
- Antonin KAPEK
- Josef KEMPNY
- Josef KORCAK
- Jozef LENART
- Lubomir STROUGAL



Candidate Members:

- Jan BARYL
- Miloslav HRUSKOVIC

II. CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

Secretary-General:

Gustav HUSAK

Secretaries:

- Jan BARYL
- Vasil BILAK
- Jan FOJTIK
- Josef HAVLIN
- Josef KEMPNY

Members:

- Marie KABRHELOVA
- Cestmir LOVETINSKY
- Jindrich POLEDNIK
- Oldrich SVESTKA

III. PARTY CONTROL AND AUDITING COMMISSION

Chairman:

Milos JAKES

22 April 1976

COMMUNIST PARTY OF SLOVAKIA (CPSL)

I. PRESIDIUM

Members:

Ladislav ABRAHAM
Peter COLOTKA
Herbert DURKOVIC
Miloslav HRUSKOVIC
Jan JANIK
Jozef LENART
Elena LITVAJOVA
Ludovit PEZLAR
Viliam SALGOVIC
Gejza SLAPKA
Miroslav VALEK

II. CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

First Secretary:

Jozef LENART

Secretaries:

Miloslav HRUSKOVIC
Jan JANIK
Ludovit PEZLAR

Member:

Bohumil TRAVNICEK

III. CONTROL AND AUDITING COMMISSION

Chairman:

Miloslav BODA

STATE

I. PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

Gustav HUSAK

II. FEDERAL ASSEMBLY

Chairman:

Alois INDRA

GOVERNMENT

I. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Prime Minister:

Lubomir STROUGAL

Deputy Prime Ministers:

Peter COLOTKA
Jan GREGOR
Frantisek HAMOUZ
Vaclav HULA*
Josef KORCAK
Karol IACO
Matej LUCAN
Rudolf ROHLICEK
Josef SIMON
Jindrich ZAHRADNIK

* Also State Planning Commission Chairman.

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BULGARIA

BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (BCP)

I. POLITBURO

Members:

Todor ZHIVKOV
Tsola DRAGOYCHEVA
Grisha FILIPOV
Pencho KUBADINSKI
Alexander LILOV
Ivan MIHAILOV
Stanko TODOROV
Tano TSOLOV
Boris VELCHEV

Candidate Members:

Dobri DZHUROV
Petar MLADENOV
Todor STOYCHEV
Peko TAKOV
Krustyu TRICHKOV
Drazha VALCHEVA

II. CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

First Secretary:

Todor ZHIVKOV

Secretaries:

Ognyan DOYNOV
Grisha FILIPOV
Alexander LILOV
Ivan PRAMOV
Boris VELCHEV

Members:

Vladimir BONEV
Sava DALBOKOV
Misho MISHEV
Georgi YORDANOV

III. CENTRAL CONTROL AND REVISION COMMISSION

Chairman:

Stoyan KARADZHOV

22 April 1976

STATE

I. STATE COUNCIL

Chairman (nominal head of state):	Todor ZHIVKOV
First Deputy Chairmen:	Petar TANCHEV Krastyu TRICHKOV
Deputy Chairmen:	Georgi DZHAGAROV Mitko GRIGOROV Ivan POPOV Peko TAKOV
Secretary:	Mincho MINCHEV

II. NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Chairman:	Vladimir BONEV
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
GOVERNMENT

I. COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Prime Minister:	Stanko TODOROV
First Deputy Prime Minister:	Tano TSOLOV
Deputy Prime Ministers:	Mako DAKOV Ognyan DOYNOV Kiril ZAREV Zhivko ZHIVKOV

Ministers:

Agriculture and the Food Industry	Gancho KRASTEV
Chemical Industry	Georgi PANKOV
Construction and Architecture	Grigor STOICHKOV
Electronics and Electrotechnology	Yordan MLADENOV
Energy	Petar DANAILOV
Finance	Dimitar POPOV
Foreign Affairs	Petar MLADENOV
Foreign Trade	Ivan NEDEV
Forests and Preservation of the Natural Environment	Yanko MARKOV
Information and Communications	Georgi ANDREEV
Internal Affairs	Dimitar STOYANOV
Internal Trade and Services	Georgi KARAMANEV
Justice	Svetla DASKALOVA
Labor and Social Welfare	Angel CHAUSHEV
Light Industry	Stoyan ZHULEV
Machine Building and Metallurgy	Toncho CHAKAROV
Mineral Resources	Stamen STAMENOV
National Defense	Dobri DZHUROV
National Education	Nencho STANEV
Public Health	Angel TODOROV



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CZECHOSLOVAKIA/16
21 April 1976

S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

The CPCS Congress

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 - b. Presidium Members
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1. The Congress Ends As It Began: No Surprises

On April 15 the Czechoslovak party congress continued in session with contributions to the discussion by Czechoslovak and foreign delegates. Conspicuously absent from the roster of speakers was the second most powerful man in the party, Vasil Bilak. It would be premature, however, to see in this silence any diminution in his political stature; one should not forget that Bilak was the last Czechoslovak politician to have a pre-congress article printed in the CPSU daily Pravda (April 6). A more likely explanation is the desire of the highest echelons not unnecessarily to widen the gap between the loyalist and some Western parties. If Bilak had spoken, he would have had to address himself to questions of ideology and international relations, for these are his areas of responsibility as CC secretary. Bilak has, particularly in recent months, distinguished himself as one of the most abrasive orthodox spokesmen of the bloc on these matters, and almost anything he might have had to say would very likely have offended the feelings of some Western communists. This, one must assume, would not be the intent of the Czechoslovak or Soviet leadership at a time when the European communist conference seems within reach and when there are even hopes on the part of some pro-Soviet loyalists for a world meeting.

A point of some interest was the numerical strength of the party as revealed by the chairman of the credentials commission. As of 1 January 1976, the CPCS had a membership of 1,381,090. Of this figure, 1,214,975 were full members and 166,115 were candidates. This marks an increase of nearly 200,000 members and can-

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didates over the last party congress in May 1971. One of the main concerns of the party leadership in the postnormalization period has been the rejuvenation of the party and the improvement of its social composition by an influx of new workers' cadres. And in this area they have obviously been quite successful. Since party cadre policy remains aimed at what the leadership sees as a qualitative improvement rather than any quantitative expansion, it is doubtful that the readmission to the party of which Husak spoke on the opening day, of the congress will be carried out on any mass scale.

In a closed session on April 15, the congress elected a new Central Committee and a Central Control and Auditing Commission. The size of the Central Committee has increased only minimally; it consists of 121 full members (six more than elected in 1971) and 52 candidates (seven more than in 1971). The number of members of the Central Control and Auditing Commission remains unchanged at 51.

a. The New Leading Bodies

On the morning of April 16, Gustav Husak announced the results of the elections to the top party bodies which were held the previous afternoon. The results are striking in only one respect -- the fact that no real changes were made in the decisive body, the party Presidium. Of the 12 Presidium members, 11 were returned to office, while Ludvik Svoboda, who has long been ill and kept in the Presidium only nominally and out of deference, has now been dropped. Likewise re-elected were both Presidium candidates. As was generally expected, Gustav Husak was re-elected Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The composition of the Presidium is as follows (date of appointment is given in parentheses):

b. Presidium Members

Full Members

1. Gustav HUSAK (August 1968), CPCS Secretary General (since April 1969), President of the Republic (since May 1975);
2. Vasil BILAK (April 1968), CC Secretary in charge of interparty relations and ideology (since November 1968);
3. Peter COLOTKA (April 1969), Slovak Premier (since May 1969);
4. Karel HOFFMANN (September 1971), chairman of Czechoslovak Trade Unions (since June 1972);
5. Vaclav HULA (July 1975), federal Deputy Premier (since September 1969), State Planning Commission chairman (since January 1971);

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6. Alois INDRA (September 1971), Federal Assembly chairman (since December 1971);
7. Antonin KAPEK (January 1970), Leading Secretary of Prague party organization (since December 1969);
8. Josef KEMPNY (September 1969), CC Secretary (between November 1968 and September 1969, and since January 1970).
9. Josef KORCAK (January 1970), Czech Prime Minister (since January 1970);
10. Jozef LENART (from 1962 to April 1968 and since January 1970), First Slovak Party Secretary (since February 1970);
11. Lubomir STROUGAL (November 1968), federal Prime Minister (since January 1970).

Candidate Members

1. Jan BARYL (July 1975), CPCS CC Secretary (since March 1973);
2. Miloslav HRUSKOVIC (May 1971), Slovak CP CC Secretary (since December 1972).

c. The Secretariat

While all six CC secretaries (including Husak) were re-elected by the congress, there were changes among the members of the Secretariat. Breaking with tradition, the Czechoslovak party released the Slovak party leader from membership in the Secretariat. This step should be regarded as purely technical in nature since Lenart, who remains a CPCS Presidium member, is residing in and has to work predominantly in Bratislava. His power-political position remains unaffected. The other member of the Secretariat who was not re-elected is Frantisek Ondrich. This does not come as a surprise, since Ondrich was transferred to the state apparat last February as Minister-Chairman of the federal Commission of People's Control. Since that time his membership in the Secretariat has been only nominal. Re-elected to membership in the CC Secretariat was Oldrich Svestka, the editor-in-chief of Rude Pravo.

Newly elected as members of the Secretariat were Marie Kabrhe-lova as a representative of Czechoslovak women, Jindrich Polednik as a representative of Czechoslovak youth, and Cestmir Lovetinsky as an orthodox representative of the central apparat of the party. The composition of the new Secretariat is thus as follows:

CC Secretaries

1. Gustav HUSAK Secretary-General
2. Vasil BILAK

3. Josef KEMPNY
4. Jan BARYL
5. Jan FOJTIK (since November 1969)
6. Josef HAVLIN (since October 1975)

Members of CC Secretariat (in addition to Secretaries listed above)

1. Oldrich SVESTKA (December 1970), Rude Pravo editor-in-chief (since October 1975);
2. Marie KABRHELOVA newly elected, chairman of the Czechoslovak Women's Union (since April 1974). Czech. Mixed party and trade union career, in 1968 executive post in trade unions of the consumer goods industry, later one of TU secretaries. Activist in mass organizations.
3. Cestmir LOVETINSKY newly elected, head of CPCs CC Department for Politics and Organization (since March 1975). Czech. Between 1962 and March 1968 Leading secretary of district party committee in Liberec, resigned under pressure of reformers and became manager of an old people's home. Resumed party career in July 1969.
4. Jindrich POLEDNIK newly elected, Czechoslovak Youth Union chairman (since April 1974). Czech. Made career in youth movement, lost his posts in March 1968 and reappeared in late 1969.

d. Documents Approved

As a last act, the congress passed in the morning of April 16, four documents: a resolution on party activities and social developments since the 14th party congress and on future party tasks; a resolution on the report of the Central Control and Auditing Commission; a resolution on the Economic Guidance for the years 1976-1980; and a Proclamation expressing "solidarity with the fighters against imperialism, fascism, and reaction." The first three documents were based on the reports delivered at the congress by Gustav Husak, Milos Jakes, and Lubomir Strougal, respectively.

e. The New Central Committee

Concurrently with the increased membership in the party, the number of full CC members was raised from 115 to 121 and that of candidates from 45 to 52; the number of members of the Central Control and Auditing Commission remained unchanged at 51.

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Of the CC members elected in May 1971, a total of 35 were dropped and 41 newly elected. This amounts to a 30.4 per cent reshuffle, which is within the confines of a normal exchange. The last party congress, five years ago, saw a rotation of 47 per cent among CC members, part of which was still an aftereffect of the party clean-up.

As usual, the reshuffle among CC candidates was far more massive. Of the 45 elected in 1971, only six managed to keep their seats; seven have been promoted to full membership (one of them, Josef Havlin, between congresses), and the rest were dismissed. Of the now 52 candidate members, 46 are new. Here it should be remembered that the position of a CC candidate member who does not have the right to vote is largely an honorific one.

The over-all composition of the new Central Committee is not substantially different from the previous one. Now as before, among the full members are all members of the party Presidium, all CC secretaries and members of the secretariat, all leading regional party secretaries (including municipal party heads with regional status, i.e., Prague and Bratislava), the mayors of the three largest cities (Prague, Brno, and Bratislava), heads of the more important CC departments, prime ministers, and heads of important ministries, chairmen of representative bodies, heads of the most important mass organizations, chairmen of the academies of sciences, several factory managers, a couple of generals, and a sprinkling of outstanding workers, farmers, and members of the intelligentsia.

Of the better known personalities who have now lost their CC membership, a few may have been demoted because of political failure. This might have been the case with the former editor-in-chief of Rude Pravo, Miroslav Moc (now ambassador in Switzerland), Frantisek Hamouz (Czechoslovakia's former permanent representative to Comecon and still a federal Deputy Premier), Frantisek Ondrich (former CPCS CC secretary, now chairman of the People's Control Commission), or Jan Simek (until early 1975 leading regional party secretary of western Bohemia). Others may have left for reasons of age, such as Vilem Novy (72) or Karol Siska (70). All Czechoslovak ambassadors serving abroad were dropped from CC membership, with the notable exception of Jan Havelka, the ambassador to Moscow.

The majority of the above people are known for their orthodox leanings. It would be premature, however, to deduce from their political setback that the Central Committee might now become a noticeably more flexible body. Among their replacements are such noteworthy hard-liners as CPCS CC departmental head Cestmir Lovetinsky, Viliam Salgovic, Slovak national Council chairman, Jirina Svorcova, the chairman of the Czech Dramatic Artists Union, or Miroslav Zavadil, the former youth leader and current central secretary of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League.

Though, according to Party Statutes, the Central Committee is the highest party authority between congresses, actual political power rests with the Presidium and the secretariat, including the

central party apparat. It is only rarely that the Central Committee gets the chance to assert itself. This occurs only at times when there is a deep split in the party leadership, as was the case in the last months of Novotny's reign between October 1967 and January 1968. It seems unlikely that a comparable situation will develop in the near future. Be that as it may, the application for re-admittance will be technically handled as a fresh application for membership. This will mean that the applicant, if accepted, will have to go through a two-year period of candidacy before becoming a full party member.

In contrast to the May 1971 congress, the present gathering was marked by outward harmony, obviously resulting from painstaking pre-congress stage management. The ideological pronouncements against rightist opportunism were hard and uncompromising, but no names of prominent deviators were mentioned. The representatives of Western communist parties were allowed to speak but, in order to avoid disharmonies, not at the congress itself. An outward sign of the present political immobility is the practically unchanged composition of top party bodies, of the Presidium, and the CC secretaries. The three additions to the Secretariat tend to strengthen the orthodox character of the leadership.

On balance, one could say that the party leadership had made tentative attempts to relegate the year 1968, with its "fraternal assistance" and subsequent "normalization," inconspicuously to the past. Nevertheless, a Kadar-style reconciliation with the populace is far away. Any rapid progress toward this goal is hampered by the obstructionism of the hard-liners, if not by the Soviet Union itself.

f. Assessment

In his closing speech, Husak characterized the congress as a manifestation of "proletarian and socialist internationalism" which he described as a "binding and inviolable principle of party work." The congress proceedings made it plain that the Czechoslovak party fully subscribes to Soviet policies and views loyalty to the Soviet Union and the CPSU as the main criteria of the concept of proletarian and socialist internationalism.

Commenting on the election of top party bodies, Husak himself stated that it had produced no surprise. He presented this as a sign of stability and continuity, adding a sentence to the effect that one doesn't change horses in midstream. However, both the congress proceedings and the "stability" of the leading cadre hailed by Husak should rather be interpreted as symptoms of political stagnation and immobility. Though Husak's position was reaffirmed and may even have been strengthened, the composition of the Presidium and Secretariat remains in a precarious balance precluding fundamental change. A situation where none of the groupings at the top of the party has much elbowroom and remains counterbalanced by other elements presumably corresponds to the goal of the Soviet leadership.

Nor are there any signs of fresh impulses in the political and economic spheres. The party has made hardly any headway in reconciling itself with the masses, which remain largely passive and addicted to "consumerism." Fundamental reforms remain anathema, and also the economic field will continue to be hampered by centralist dirigisme. The only bright spot is the promise, however vague, to allow individual re-entry into the party of members expelled or struck off the lists. The conditions are agreement with the present party course, unquestioning loyalty to the Soviet Union and "concrete deeds" to the benefit of society. But how this promise will be applied in practice by the party bodies concerned is a question that only the future can answer. (064)

2. The "Autonomous" Parties Speak

Prague's treatment of the "autonomous" party delegates seems to have followed the wisdom of the saying "the devil you know is better than the devil you don't know." Yugoslav delegate Cvijetin Mijatovic and Rumanian delegate, Emil Bobu, spoke before the congress and the speeches were covered by the Czechoslovak media. The words of the French delegate Andre Vieuguet were neither heard by the congress nor reported by the media, and Italian observer Claudio Petrucciolo was not invited to give a speech at all.

Mijatovic, an LCY CC Presidium member, told the congress on Wednesday that "specific features and differences are an expression of the wide scope, variety, and intensity of the contemporary struggle for socialism in the world, and therefore they must inevitably be respected. Conversely, to set one's own path and practice of socialist development as an absolute norm or to deny in whatever way somebody's right to choose an independent path in the struggle for socialism inevitably narrows the front of the struggle of the socialist and progressive forces, hampers the dynamic development of socialism in the world and does not contribute to the unity of the international workers' movement."

In a section of his speech not reported by Ceteka, Emil Bobu, Rumanian Political Executive Committee member and CC secretary, stated that the Rumanian party, "in the spirit of militant solidarity . . . stands for the development of close relations of friendship and collaboration with all communist and workers' parties, for the building of a new unity of the international communist movement grounded on the observance of each party's right to elaborate independently its political line, its revolutionary strategy and tactics. At the same time, the RCP develops collaboration with the socialist and social-democratic parties, with the national liberation movements, and with the revolutionary and democratic anti-imperialist forces everywhere."

PCF Politburo member Andre Vieuguet spoke not at the congress but before a workers' meeting at the Prague Motorlet factory. Radio Prague pointed to the fact that L'Humanité carried a dispatch about the meeting but refrained from elaborating. According to

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Reuter (April 15), Vieuguet said "Taking into account the specific conditions of our own country, and on the basis of scientific socialism, we are proposing to the working people of France what our congress has called the democratic way toward socialism." After the meeting, the French delegate reportedly told Western journalists that different views on proletarian internationalism existed between the various countries. Disagreement among parties arose, he said, when "there was a tendency to minimize the importance of national realities, national traditions." Vieuguet was presumably referring here to the strains with the "loyalist" East European parties resulting from the PCF's socialisme aux couleurs de la France program.

It should be noted that the Italians, citing the "present state of relations between the two parties," sent only an observer, CC member Claudio Petrucciolo, to the congress; the CPCS had invited an official delegation. The differences between the parties spring from the PCI's rejection of the 1968 invasion and its consequences, include disagreement on the question of national autonomy for each party, and have recently been worsened by the firing of eight Italian employees in the foreign section of Radio Prague. The illegal Communist Party of Spain, whose leader Santiago Carrillo is one of the most vocal supporters of the Czechoslovak reformers, was not represented at the congress, and it is not known whether they were even invited.

Despite the unified show of support for proletarian internationalism which the other East European delegates made on Tuesday, the congress has been relatively mild toward the "autonomous" parties. CPCS leader Gustav Husak refrained from any mention of the more liberal tendencies in some parties, and restricted his comments on the European communist conference to saying that he hoped it would fulfill expectations. The delegates from the ruling parties made no direct references to the "autonomous" parties and not all even mentioned the conference. Of the Czechoslovak speakers, only Antonin Kapek criticized the "Eurocommunists." "Our own experience confirms that the revolutionary struggle cannot be carried out under the national flag alone," the Prague party leader declared. "Next to it must always be the red flag, symbol of revolutionary solidarity and progress."

If there were to have been any fireworks on the conference issue, they could have been expected from Vasil Bilak. Bilak, who is Czechoslovakia's representative at the preparatory meetings, failed to speak at the congress. Since he is the second most powerful man in the party, Bilak's absence was noticeable. The only explanation for crossing this hard-liner off the list of speakers seems to be that the leadership wanted to shun the divisive rhetoric which could have been expected from a Bilak speech on international party relations. This may indicate that the CPCS has decided to retreat a bit (at least for the time being) from its exposed position as the most vocal and loyal of the "loyalist" parties -- and would thus certainly be a signal in the direction of the conference.

(065)

I.N.M.E.R.
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RAD Background Report/87
 (East-West)
 13 April 1976

THE CHRISTIAN-MARXIST DIALOGUE: OLD PROBLEMS, NEW PROPOSALS

By Charles Andras

Summary: This paper reviews several new developments in the field of the Christian-Marxist dialogue, East and West. It deals in detail with a Hungarian Catholic proposal to resume the dialogue with the Marxists which was published in a Budapest literary journal between April 1975 and February 1976.

* * *

Is a new chapter opening in the waning Christian-Marxist dialogue? There have been several efforts recently to resume or broaden the discussion between believers and nonbelievers, most of them reported in the West. They must be viewed in connection with strenuous endeavors of such Western CPs as those in Italy, France, and Spain, to muster a comfortable majority on the domestic scene. Such support, however, cannot be gained without some kind of endorsement by the Christian -- in most cases meaning Catholic -- sections of the population. Many Marxists, as well as quite a few Christians, regard the dialogue as a convenient means of establishing contact between believers and nonbelievers and generating some kind of co-operation between them.

It is not surprising, then, that the dialogue is frequently mentioned in the West, especially in countries in which the CP thinks it has reached a decisive moment in its long struggle for power and is therefore renewing its calls for closer co-operation with believers. Nonetheless, the most surprising new effort to resume the dialogue has been made not in the West but in Hungary, an East European country in which Christians and Marxists have become entangled in what is in many ways an unprecedented relationship. The new undertaking -- sparked by a Catholic bishop -- is an attempt to define the role the faithful could -- and should -- play in a truly socialist society.

The Ideological Dialogue and Its Critics

Before delving deeper in the proposal it should be explained that the dialogue that is now in the process of developing (mainly in the West) does not seem to be a direct continuation of the experiment that preceded it in the 1960s. At that time the dialogue was primarily ideological -- i.e., the participants discussed the differences in their respective doctrines because they thought those differences were the real causes of the tensions between Christians and Marxists. The dialoguers wanted to eliminate or at least to reduce them before

beginning to talk about co-operating on specific tasks. The dialogue quickly hurdled the barriers between East and West and many Christian-Marxist discussions became meeting points for experts from both parts of Europe, and in some cases even from America. This was especially true of the symposium organized by the West German Paulus Society in Marianske Lazne, Czechoslovakia, in April 1967.

The ideologically oriented Christian-Marxist dialogue could not survive the events that took place in Czechoslovakia in 1968-1969, however. It was denounced by conservative party circles in the East as an imperialist instrument, a variant of the subversive campaign to undermine the unity of the socialist camp. If there was a need for dialogue, the critics said, it was primarily in the capitalist countries, but instead of playing with the -- totally untenable -- idea of an ideological compromise between the two opposing worlds it should concentrate on and be confined to concrete issues, to topical co-operation projects which might lead to "united action against imperialism." As for the socialist countries, official Eastern sources claimed, the initial purpose of the dialogue had been accomplished by the establishment of socialism. If a dialogue was necessary at all in a socialist country it should start from the fact of socialism, and hence on a higher level. Instead of getting involved in problems that had already been settled by history, it should discuss how to improve the existing forms of co-operation between the two sides. A few Western CPs joined the East in denouncing the ideological dialogue, but others, among them the most important, took a somewhat different attitude: they refused to condemn the past explicitly but accepted the contention that the dialogue should abandon theoretical discussion and concentrate on common, practical action.

Meanwhile many Christians became alarmed and took exception to various aspects of the experiment. This was particularly true of the Catholics, who had been largely responsible for initiating the encounters with Marxists and were certainly the most numerous among the participants. Some charged, for instance, that the dialogue had clarified nothing; on the contrary, it had confused many believers. In certain cases it may even have helped the socialist regimes, which wanted Christians to contribute to the building of socialism but were unwilling to give them the right to criticize the system. But the majority of Catholic comments were self-critical in nature. Complaints were made that many believers were theoretically and practically unprepared for the dialogue and that some of them (the members of the Christians for Socialism movement, for example) had joined the discussion so profoundly convinced of the correctness of the Marxist position that the experiment lost all meaning. (1)

Some of these strictures and remonstrances, as well as many others, were repeated in a book by a West German expert, Manfred Spieker. (2) The study is devoted to the origin of the ideological dialogue, its accomplishments, and its failures, and is so far the most comprehensive and useful -- though not faultless -- unofficial Catholic assessment of the 1960s experiment and its possible consequences for the future.

Spieker set the dialogue, or more correctly the fact that a number of

- (1) See, e.g., the document signed by Father Vincenzo Miano of the Vatican Secretariat for Nonbelievers, published in the 21 August 1975 issue of L'Osservatore Romano to mark the secretariat's 10th anniversary.
- (2) Neomarxism und Christentum (Muenchen-Paderborn-Wien: Schoening, 1974).

Marxists first leaned toward and later became attached to it, in the framework of Marxist revisionist thinking, and handled it as a new eruption of revisionism. His description of the emergence and the development of revisionism and its unexpected contribution to the Christian-Marxist dialogue is one of the best on the subject. As he put it, it was the realization by many Marxist thinkers of the fate of the individual under Stalinist oppression and expanding socialist bureaucracy that gave perhaps the strongest impetus to what later became known as the Christian-Marxist dialogue. Many thoughtful Marxists -- the Pole Adam Schaff comes to mind first -- came to learn from personal experience that not even a socialist society is free of human alienation, and they transmitted their anguish to their comrades in the West. Then they began to realize that there was no Marxist anthropology dealing with the conflicts, the contradictions, in human life and they became interested in how this problem was dealt with by Christian and existentialist philosophers. From there it was only a step to meeting with Christians and beginning the Christian-Marxist dialogue. The first Marxist dialoguers came from the East, but later they were outnumbered by those from the West.

In Spieker's account, this chapter of the story is built around the person of Roger Garaudy, at that time a prominent member of the French CP and the most active Marxist participant in the encounters with Christians. It is through Garaudy's engagement, through his evolution from a Stalinist into a progressive ("revisionist") Marxist and his expulsion from the party, that Spieker wished to illustrate the complicated course of the ideological dialogue. But despite Garaudy's outstanding role in the Christian-Marxist discussions this methodological solution tends to distort the picture, and almost ignores many other Marxist participants in the dialogue, especially the East European team which, encouraged by the example of Adam Schaff, devoted itself to the study of the religious criticism of Marx and to the construction of a Marxist anthropology that could lead to a greater understanding of Christian thinking and mentality. This team kept up its activity even after the possibility of participating in the dialogue had been gradually eliminated.

Even more questionable is Spieker's contention that the Marxist partners in the dialogue were not ready to make any serious concessions to the Christians. In fact, he wrote, the Marxists had succeeded in exacting a concession from the other side -- that any dialogue with them must be based on a preliminary acceptance of socialism, that Christians must proceed from the same socialist concept. Spieker's thesis is hardly tenable, however: under the impact of confrontation with Christian thinking, Garaudy and other dialoguers considerably modified many of their Marxist ideas concerning the role of religion in society. Even Spieker was compelled to conclude that "despite the [overwhelmingly] negative result, in several cases new accents can be observed." Among such "new accents" or "shifts of accent" he included the following: recognition of religion as an "objective human necessity" (instead of alienation); Marxism's confrontation with Christianity -- but Marxism as humanism, not atheism; the replacement of a climate of struggle and hostility by one of competition and "mutual enrichment."

Certainly these are relatively small things compared to the maximalist -- and consequently unrealistic -- expectations. But they were sufficient to arouse the ire of party circles, to lay the Marxist dialoguers open to the accusation of being tools of the imperialists, and to put a stop to the dialogue as an experiment in ideological rapprochement, or at least relaxation of tension. But this is not to refute the charges that in a few cases unwarranted, premature, or even inadmissible concessions might have been made to the Marxists,

though the impression is that such concessions were probably the result of Christian inexperience, lack of ideological training, or leftist political motivation than of improper Marxist pressure. (3)

Toward A "Political Dialogue" in the West?

After such profound bilateral criticism of the Christian-Marxist dialogue what hope is there for its continuation, and if there is a chance for its revival what form can it take, what problems can be discussed in the future? The steps that have been taken recently do not give a satisfactory answer to these questions, but they open the field to various speculations, depending on whether it is the dialogue in the West or that in the East that is affected.

In 1970 Garaudy was expelled from the French CP for deviating from the official party line (which has since been considerably modified and is now closer to that advocated by Garaudy). Four years later, in 1974, Internationale Dialog Zeitschrift (Freiburg/Br.), originally a West German Catholic journal devoted to the dialogue with the Marxists, ceased publication. Interest in it had declined, and its editor was sharply attacked for allegedly allowing his communist contributors to misuse the paper for political propaganda purposes. These two events marked the symbolic end of the ideological dialogue which had ceased to be a coherent movement several years earlier.

As far as the more recent efforts are concerned, a distinction must be made between West and East. In the West it is the communist side that appears to be more interested in continuing the dialogue -- in the form of local co-operation projects or theoretical discussions, if they can be enlisted in the service of united-front tactics. "We are ready for all sorts of encounters with Christians and with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church," the French CP's new rapporteur for religious problems declared recently. (4) It is a distinctly political dialogue that most West European CPs have in mind, one that will here and there be allowed to stray into the realm of ideology, but in which ideology will not dominate the discussions. The dialogue thus becomes an instrument of common-front tactics.

In principle, the Church invariably approves of the experiment provided it can be conducted in an atmosphere of freedom, that it does not serve one-sided propaganda purposes, and that the Christian participants know how to protect their religious interests. In practice, however, the Church takes a guarded attitude and does not lead the way in organizing get-togethers with Marxists. But many social organizations and individuals are willing to do so, or are at least ready to accept Marxist invitations to encounters of a political nature. Impressed by this new turn of events, even Church leaders known to have leftist leanings have issued statements reminding their believers that materialistic

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- (3) Vatican sources have several times stressed that Catholics must be better prepared for the dialogue with the Marxists. For instance, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Vatican Secretariat for Nonbelievers its head, Franciscus Cardinal Koenig, wrote: "The dialogue is a long-term undertaking. . . . Therefore, education for the dialogue is more important than the dialogue itself" (L'Osservatore Romano, 14-15 April 1975; see also Miano's article, cited in Footnote 1).
- (4) Le Monde (Paris), 27 March 1976. Similar statements have been made in Italy and Spain as well.

Marxism cannot be reconciled with the teachings of Christianity. It is probable, however, that communist pressure for a continuation of the "dialogue," for the building of common fronts first on the local and later on the national level will not decrease; consequently, Church warnings will multiply and questions of ideology will permeate the political dialogue in the West.

In the East: A Hungarian Catholic Proposal

It is more difficult to speculate about the future of the dialogue in Eastern Europe, about its form and content under conditions of socialism. The impression is that in this part of Europe it is the Church, not the Marxists (i.e., the socialist regimes) that is more interested in resuming the dialogue, in expanding it beyond the present day-to-day, routine contacts between the believers and the state. But there is hardly any indication of what such a new chapter would mean in practice. Occasional calls for resumption of the dialogue, issued by either Marxists or Christians, or both, have usually been in very general terms, and have had no visible results.

A new proposal made recently in Hungary constitutes a surprising exception. It was presented in a long-drawn-out series of three articles by Msgr. Jozsef Cserhati, Roman Catholic bishop of Pecs.(5) The bishop did not simply invite Marxists to "continue and complete the dialogue" with the Christians; he provided a detailed description of the new mentality of believers and of the problems that have sprung up on both sides and need to be answered, and added a list of specific issues with which the dialogue should deal. Despite his relatively open handling of many sensitive questions, however, he was apparently careful not to say more than was absolutely necessary and in many instances his style became repetitious and blurred, and it is therefore not easy to sum up what he had to say. An effort to do so, however, is made below.

1. During the three decades that have elapsed since the mid-1940s, Msgr. Cserhati claims, the Catholic Church has accommodated itself -- though not without tribulation, uncertainty, and misgiving -- to the socialist order in Hungary; it has recognized the new state, respects its laws, and supports the endeavors of the government, primarily in the realm of socioeconomic construction. In its efforts to adjust itself to the changing situation the Church has been helped by the spirit of Vatican Council II; it interprets aggiornamento (modernization) as the recognition of reality, as taking action "on the basis of the historical situation of today." The Church has succeeded in grasping the meaning of religiousness under the new conditions and has adopted, through its believers, a new attitude of "wanting to engage in common action to achieve social progress," to build a common, better future for all Hungarians, and to combat "retarding forces" in its own sphere of activity.

Christian co-operation in the socialist construction of a better life for everyone and a willingness to eliminate compromising "remnants" of the past reappear frequently in various contexts

(5) "Thirty Years in the Formation of the Religious Attitude in Our Homeland," Vigilia (Budapest), April 1975; "The Dialogue of the Church in Our Homeland," ibid., November 1975; "Committed to the Dialogue," ibid., February 1976.

in the articles. But the bishop also stresses the fact that Christian social engagement is not the same as political commitment. The Church, as a religious institution, cannot play a political role; the political transformation of a given social structure is not a proper task for it to undertake. Social engagement, he feels, means participation in the process of social progress in the broadest sense of the word -- the effort to create more humane conditions of life, to promote social equality insofar as personal values and freedom of the individual go. Msgr. Cserhati's ideals are Archbishop Helder Camara of Brazil and the Roman Catholic Church in France. They provide him with proof that "Marxist social theory can be practiced from the social side as well, without renouncing the basis of the Christian faith and Weltanschauung. . . ." As to the principles of socialist democracy, "in this scale of values certain Marxist and Christian theses can reach a degree of identity."

2. The difficult Hungarian road of accommodation, Bishop Cserhati goes on to say, has been variously misinterpreted abroad. Some critics even began to question the Hungarian Church's loyalty to Rome and to the pope. But it was the Vatican itself, he notes with visible relief, that refuted the accusations by concluding agreements with the Marxist state in Hungary. In his opinion, the agreements "have persuaded the believers [in Hungary] that the Holy See, too, has accepted historical reality as it has developed in this country."

Hitches emerged on Marxist side as well. They consisted of unwarranted measures, administrative abuses directed against believers, which gave them the feeling of being second class citizens. Ultimately, however, the regime realized that the building of a new social order cannot dispense with the co-operation of religious believers. Their exact proportion to the rest of the population is open to debate, but their presence is incontestable. This new perception paved the way to a guarantee of freedom for the Church and to financial support for it, and elicited pronouncements to the effect that "positive" ties between the Church and the state were in accordance with the "development and the interests of society in our homeland." The state has also admitted that differences in Weltanschauung cannot be eliminated, that the antagonism between the scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology on the one hand and "idealistic" ideologies on the other remains irreconcilable. What this means, asserts Cserhati, is that a de facto pluralism has developed in Hungary, tacitly recognized by both sides: "We cannot kill each other, we cannot remove each other from the planet, thus we must 'love' each other as we are, in theory as well as in practice."

A de facto pluralism, peaceful coexistence among different groups of Hungarians, and fruitful co-operation in the construction of socialism are other key elements in Msgr. Cserhati's argumentation. It is on these that he builds his concept of the Christian-Marxist dialogue.

3. As a recompense for his loyalty, co-operation, and devotion, Cserhati's "Christian of today" expects to "be taken seriously"; he

expects that his religious belief will be accepted "as a force that can turn him into a helper of the new social order." This is the only way, he suggests, that the Christian "can justify his participation in the building of socialism." Cserhati returns to the subject several times, emphasizing that Christians will be "deeply hurt" if their determination to construct a new society is not recognized, if the "positive" role of the Church "in creating the new humanity" is not appreciated by the Marxist side:

We cannot keep silent in the face of blunders, unfair distrust or discrimination, cases in which individuals or small groups, not always by democratic methods, try to disturb the dialogue between us. We demand recognition of our moral will; permanent recognition of the human rights that are an essential part of the Church; we ask the state to put more trust in and take a positive approach to our Church, which in the wake of the Second Vatican Council is determined to serve the new man and the new society on a world-wide scale as well. (6)

Although the bishop makes it very clear that in the opinion of Christians things have improved in Hungary, he does not try to conceal the fact that a credibility gap still exists in Church-state relations and that the believers are waiting for recognition of their "readiness to co-operate" in building the new society. At one point he even maintains that "it is an insult to a believer" to question his intentions, to exclude him from socialist society because of his religious convictions. This line of thought ends in an expression of the hope that aggiornamento will not be only acknowledged by the state but helped to develop to the full. In order to deepen the new social orientation of their Church, Christians "need papers, books, and more communication with their progressive brothers abroad." And if the Church is to fulfill its spiritual mission, it needs "the possibility and security" to profess its teaching freely in churches and in certain types of schools; it needs freedom to hold religious classes for young people and to perform religious services to the satisfaction of the believers.

4. The dialogue has helped to bring about the present better relationship between Church and state, says Bishop Cserhati, and in his view the new order of the day is to continue, to complete, the dialogue in order to make the existing relationship even more balanced and stable:

In the future we will have to take the risk of making further "investments" in the interest of mutual understanding, toleration, and assistance. . . . Perhaps the time has arrived to become better and more closely acquainted with each other. We have to know what socialism wants, at the same time, however, greater opportunities should be created to [enable us] to demonstrate to the masses the values and the constructive aspects of the Church, Christianity, and religion. (7)

(6) Vigilia, November 1975.

(7) Ibid.

In Cserhati's view, de facto pluralism and the practice of coexistence have established the necessary premises for the continuation of the dialogue. The old rules must be adhered to: no one can be asked or expected to change his Weltanschauung; the reality of pluralism must be maintained. Despite differences in outlook, the two sides have a common task, to save man and the human community. It is reason enough to convene them for a new dialogue. But according to Cserhati there are also other things the two partners can hope to achieve through the dialogue: For the Christians, one of the chief stimulants is the hope of being recognized as equals. They calculate that the Marxists will acknowledge the "revolutionary bent springing from Christian principles" and will grant them the freedom necessary for the functioning of the Church. The Christians are convinced that socialism is powerful enough to invest the believer with all democratic rights, and the believer, in turn, will be disappointed if his hopes do not materialize. On the other hand, the Marxist state's net gain from the dialogue, from recognition of the equality of Christians, would be an even firmer commitment by that segment of the population to participate in the construction of socialism. It would not be difficult to fulfill the Christians' hopes, because the state -- guided by a "humanist conviction" and a "realistic view of history" -- has already taken a step in this right direction. It has realized that in the education of the masses "the moral-psychological forces that are inherent in religion" cannot be left out of consideration.

5. The dialogue imposes preconditions on both partners, Msgr. Cserhati states but he fails to make all his points with equal clarity. Starting with the Christians, he reiterates several times that they must separate their social engagement from the problems of Weltanschauung -- an attitude dictated by the spirit of pluralism. In his new field of activity, a Christian must maintain the "essence of reality and the intrinsic value of his own"; he must not identify himself with socialism and communism as historical materialism; and he must reserve the right to assert and expound his opinion on ethical questions.

Another precondition binding the Christian dialoguers is to maintain the self-critical attitude of the Church, to shake off such remnants of the past as spiritual, social, and political conservatism. There are still Christians, Cserhati complains, who are "blind enemies of socialism," rejecting its social content along with its materialism and atheism. Christians, however, cannot address themselves to the present without facing its realities and without condemning the mistakes of the past. Christian self-criticism is necessary to maintain the momentum of the Church's modernization and to gain the confidence of the state.

Dialoguer Cserhati picked out self-criticism as an important precondition for the Marxists as well. They, too, must foster it in order to prepare themselves for encounters with the Christians. A self-critical Marxist is also expected to subscribe to the "sincere reality of pluralism" (to "values inherent in existing diversity") and to the practice of constructive coexistence. In other words, acceptance of pluralism and coexistence denotes recognition by the state of the contribution the Christians as Christians make to the building

of socialism. This, of course, is Cserhati's central thesis and chief demand, but in this case he expands on it: recognition of the Christians, like a successful dialogue, presupposes a new approach to the social role of religion, a revision of the old Marxist view that religion is superfluous and even harmful to man. It is still easy, he observes, to find people who tell parents that religious education might render their children unfit for future life.

6. Msgr. Cserhati concludes his series by offering a list of concrete (to some extent overlapping) issues that should provide the main topics in the forthcoming discussions between Christians and Marxists. They are the relationship between the Hungarian People's Republic and the Holy See; various aspects of the religious activity of the Church and of believers; the "seemingly complicated problems" of religious education, religious instruction in schools and churches; the theoretical and practical problems of Catholic secondary schools, the Catholic press, book publishing, etc.

When, earlier in the series and in a different context, Cserhati first mentioned the publishing activities of the Church, he intimated that the Catholics should be allowed to expand this activity because it is an indispensable means of promoting the new socio-spiritual mission of Christianity. But at the end he listed religious education and religious instruction as "perhaps the most essential points" to be taken up by the dialogue. Touching on present practice he made open allusions to "not infrequent irregular interferences" in this field by various people on the local level, but fortunately, he said, their actions "have always been disapproved on the highest level." In his opinion the "existing regulations" permit a satisfactory solution, since they do not exclude the possibility of further modification. In concrete terms, the present setup (a combination of religious instruction in schools and churches) could be maintained, but not without considerable reform.

A Rare Example

Msgr. Cserhati's long and often clumsy essay deserves particular attention because it is a rare example of a Christian effort to reach accommodation with a socialist-communist regime without making fateful and irreparable ideological concessions to the Marxist side. What renders it particularly intriguing is the fact that it was published in a socialist country.

The bishop's main idea is that the Christians in Hungary represent a new, rejuvenated, modernized Church; they have accepted the socialist regime and in their daily work they have proved their loyalty to it. As a recompense for their contribution to socialism, however, they want to be granted equality with other citizens. Since they accept the Marxists and their ideology and institutions, they want to be treated in the same way by the Marxists. Mutual acceptance, mutual recognition, are obligations binding on Christians as well as Marxists.

Msgr. Cserhati subscribes to the well-known postulate of the socialist regimes that the ideological differences between materialistic Marxism and "idealism" cannot be eliminated, and he extends this to the Christian-Marxist relationship in Hungary. But, two important conclusions follow from the

incompatibility of these opposing ideologies. First, Christian social engagement does not affect ideological questions, it cannot become entangled with the resolution of political issues; it consists of active participation in social construction without espousing the materialism and atheism of the Marxists. Second, since Christians and Marxists cannot eliminate each other they are here to stay, in a state of de facto, practical pluralism -- i.e., co-operation in the interest of the common good.

Thanks to the dialogue, great progress has been achieved in regard to mutual recognition and co-operation in a spirit of pluralism, according to Bishop Cserhati, but he does not deny that obstacles still exist. That is why the dialogue should be continued. It would deepen Christian engagement in social construction and enhance Marxist recognition of the merits of believers, with all the practical consequences this would have. Among the latter Cserhati stressed the normalization of religious instruction in Hungary and, as a general task, the revision of old-time, antireligious attitudes which, he argued, have become outdated anyway thanks to aggiornamento. Such steps would dismantle a still powerful psychological barrier that separates believers from nonbelievers. The change would benefit not only the faithful but society as a whole, and above all it would facilitate progress in Hungary.

Apparently Bishop Cserhati cherishes a deep conviction that Christian teaching contains the necessary dynamism to ensure rapid modernization in the Church and that it justifies acceptance by believers of the social program of a Marxist state. Occasionally he refers to the documents of Vatican Council II, to the papal encyclicals Pacem in Terris and Populorum Progressio, and to Vatican diplomacy in order to support his theory that the Church has no choice but to reconcile itself to the situation created by the progress of history.

It is probable that not every Hungarian believer will agree with the concept of Marxist-Christian dialogue and co-operation presented by Msgr. Cserhati. It may even be said that, as a possible candidate to succeed Cardinal Mindszenty as a primate of Hungary, he adopted a soft position with regard to rapprochement with the Communists, although no one could brand him as a peace priest. On the other hand, the stand of the man who did succeed Mindszenty, Archbishop Laszlo Lekai, on some key issues of Church-state co-operation is very similar to that of Cserhati. Lekai spoke of the "realities of the situation," which compels believers and nonbelievers to live together and to co-operate harmoniously on matters that involve the interests of the country. He also said that Catholics respect the views of others, but expect similar consideration for their own views. The fact that fundamental differences of outlook are not subject to compromise should not lead to rigidity, Msgr. Lekai noted: "The sincere road to dialogue will bring us together in the interest of the country." (8)

Undoubtedly, the archbishop's statement adds weight to Cserhati's proposal. The Bishop of Pecs does not speak in the name of the Catholic Church in Hungary, but he may reflect the thinking of a not inconsiderable number of believers who are willing to meet Marxists on the basis of reality and mutual recognition, but not on the ideological grounds of the so-called peace priests' movement.

(8) From an interview given to MTI. Full text in Magyar Hirlap (Budapest), 15 February 1976. See also Lekai's statement during his recent stay in Rome, as reported by UPI, 30 March 1976.


Open Questions

It is not easy, however, to put a finger on the reasons that may have prompted the bishop to draw up his concept of dialogue and co-operation with the Marxists, or on those that may have induced the regime to allow its publication. Church-state relations have gradually improved in Hungary since the 1960s, and party leaders have more than once publicly praised this development. Not so long ago Janos Kadar himself extolled the loyalty of the Churches and defended the regime's concessionary policy toward them as a Leninist Realpolitik which does not involve ideology, which advances the cause of socialist revolution, and which is the only way to build socialism "in a mixed society made up of materialists and nonmaterialists." (9) But at least to this moment there has been no place for a formal, institutionalized dialogue, like that suggested by Msgr. Cserhati, and one or two smaller attempts, Marxist and non-Marxist, to revive the experiment either foundered in a short time or did not even get off the ground owing to lack of official regime interest. Has the regime changed its mind, and encouraged Bishop Cserhati to go ahead with his project? Or was he acting primarily out of concern for the fact that tension between Christians and Marxists persists despite general progress in Church-state relations and daily practical co-operation, and that in the Age of Be-tente something should be done to reduce it? A careful reading of his articles would tend to support the latter supposition. In any case it will be interesting to watch how the "other side" reacts to his proposal.

But whatever its background and whatever its future, the proposal will stand out as one of the most salient efforts to remove the East European Christian-Marxist dialogue from the state of stagnation to which it was relegated by party ideologists and relaunch it on the common basis of socialism, centering around concrete issues in Church-state relations in Hungary. This aspect of the project may look to many like a concession to the official circles who claimed the original experiment of the 1960s was designed to bring about an ideological compromise, and stipulated that if it was to be continued in the East the participants should accept socialism as their point of departure and concentrate on the problem of co-operation emerging directly from the new sociopolitical conditions. Msgr. Cserhati accepts socialism as a historical reality which determines the existence of the Church in Hungary and makes it obligatory for Christians to co-operate with the regime in the interest of the common good. But he makes a careful distinction between social engagement and ideology, obviously in order to protect the dialogue against ideological "adventures" and

(9) Speech before the Budapest party organization in February 1976, published in the March issue of Tarsadalmi Szemle (Budapest) under the title "Concord in Aims -- Concord in Action." The passage dealing with regime concessions to the Churches reads as follows: "It is possible that by [co-operating with the socialist system] the Churches may be prolonging their own existence? It may be so. They too live in a socialist society. And we, working for revolutionary objectives, must join forces with every body that is prepared to co-operate. It could be said that this is a compromise. Indeed it could. But we learn from Lenin that any compromise which advances our revolutionary cause is acceptable; only those that harm it must be rejected. This is not a concession of principle or of ideology, but an example of practical co-operation undertaken for specified purposes. If we live in a mixed society made up of materialists and nonmaterialists, then it is in this manner that we must build socialism, and must build it as fast and firmly as we can."

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.



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● RAD Background Report/85
(Hungary)
9 April 1976

LETTERS ON THE ROCK FACE

(A translation with comment by the Hungarian Unit)

Summary and Introduction: The political weekly Magyarország published in its 4 April 1976 issue an unusually interesting article on the internal situation in Albania. Perhaps in view of its sensitive content, the article was unsigned and no sources were given for the information it contained.

It began by characterizing Albania's policies as strongly anti-Soviet and revisionist, and adduced supporting evidence from a speech by Politburo member Ramiz Alia, and from the writings of party leader Enver Hoxha. On the basis of a Le Monde article the Magyarország writer recalled the purges that took place in the autumn of 1975, when Deputy Premier Abdyl Kellezi and Minister of Industry and Mining Koco Theodosi were dismissed. He then turned to the current situation in Albania.

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An increasing number of reports [of dismissals] have been received from Tirana since the beginning of the year, and it is clear that, in addition to the major replacements which have been publicly announced, several hundred middle-level officials have lost their positions. Once again there is criticism of the "dangerously proliferating bureaucracy" -- a complaint that in 1966-1967 preceded the transfer of approximately 15,000 officials to agricultural work. This earlier campaign concerned primarily persons working in cultural institutes, and the purge was triggered off by the so-called "worker control committees" last fall. In its first few weeks close to 50 per cent of the employees of scientific institutes and places of higher education were removed, followed by others from certain theaters and the New Albania film studio. These people were moved to agricultural co-operatives remote from the capital. At the end of the last academic year a Radio Tirana broadcast announced that "without exception, all this year's graduates wish to take up jobs in distant places, in small villages, in institutions, and in areas where the construction of new projects demands hard work; in other words, where the new man is being forged." (This meant, of course, that they were being assigned to remote mountain villages far from the capital.)

Advice from Peking

More and more reports are coming in from Tirana that mention party leader Enver Hoxha's illness and establish that Premier Mehmet Shehu is also seriously

ill. When Deputy Minister of Defense Llambi Gegprifti was inducted into his office, it turned out to be a more important job than had at first appeared, since Mehmet Shehu is not only Premier but also Minister of Defense. (Incidentally, since his illness, Shehu has appeared on one or two occasions in the Ministry of Defense, accompanied by his physician, in an obvious attempt to refute rumors not so much of his ill health as of his being in disgrace. Otherwise he spends his time "receiving medical treatment" in one of the capital's small hospitals.)

The new leaders who have taken up office since the purges -- several have received other offices in addition to their government positions; Gegprifti, for example, has become a Politburo candidate member -- have occasionally hinted at the charges on which their predecessors were removed. Koco Theodosi was forced to leave because of mistakes made in the construction of a power plant near Fierza and in the iron combine built in the vicinity of Elbasani; and Minister of Trade Kico Ngjela, who has been removed together with his deputy Vasil Kati, had to listen to his successor complaining that he had "yielded too readily to the pressure of so-called foreign trade specialists."

The most interesting case is undoubtedly the removal of Deputy Premier Abdyl Kellezi, which was followed by talk of "mistakes committed in directing the planning office." Kellezi had also held the office of president of the Albanian-Chinese Friendship Society and with his departure the disagreement -- or at least part of it -- that had existed between Tirana and Peking for some time became practically public knowledge. Foreign journalists visiting Tirana had observed in the past year or two that Albanian officials had refused to comment even on developments in Maoist policies concerning the US, the Common Market, and NATO -- thus manifestly condemning them. Another noteworthy feature was the diminished volume of praise for the "results" achieved by Peking through the cultural revolution; indeed, the Tirana press and radio were reporting some of the things that were happening in China either belatedly or not at all, whereas in the past they had continually reiterated every word uttered by the propagandists in Peking.

Allegedly the economic leadership in Tirana received advice from Peking that, in view of the latest developments in world policy and the international economic scene, "it should endeavor to build up sound relations with the countries of the Common Market." Hoxha and his immediate entourage rejected this advice, which caused a certain tension, and it is reported that Peking then refused to deliver the equipment for the iron combine under construction near Elbasani and that building work had to be stopped.

The Problem of Isolation

Recently, when several British journalists visited Tirana as the result of an official invitation, the correspondent of The Guardian raised the question of Albania's isolation. He was told: "It is not Albania that has isolated itself, but the other European governments which have placed themselves under the yoke of the two superpowers and thus cut themselves off from the people of Europe." "When they listen to us," remarked Enver Hoxha recently, "some people smile or laugh and say: 'How arrogant these Albanians are! They declare that they will restore order to the world.' We are not arrogant; we merely form a part of the revolutionary movement that has been started against the US and the Soviet Union." So they decided not to attend the Helsinki conference and to denounce the European security agreement. . . . And Stalin's statue still smiles down on every square in the towns of Albania, as a token

of opposition to Moscow. . . . The Guardian correspondent who had been invited to Tirana wrote that the only reason why Albania is in a position to adopt an adamant attitude toward the US and the Soviet Union is that it is supported by China.

Other visitors report that Albania is the only country today where jeans are not worn, and Tirana's airport is the only one with a special barber to clip young men's hair and a shop offering long pants for hire which female tourists with too brief mini-skirts are forced to change into. . . .

Others again say that the most typical indication [of Albania's condition today] is a job that has taken several years and has now been completed: the hewing of Enver Hoxha's name on an inaccessible rock face. The letters are eight meters high. (037)

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This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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● RAD Background Report/82
(Rumania)
7 April 1976

CRITICISM OF WESTERN VIEWS ON LEFT-WING CO-OPERATION AND
SOCIAL CLASSES

By the Rumanian Unit

Summary: A number of interesting articles have appeared in Rumania recently in the context of the ideological offensive against Western ideas that has marked the East European response to the Helsinki conference. A Rumanian journalist branded a French volume critical of co-operation of the left with communist parties typical "anti-communist literature." Two other analytical academic articles have appeared criticizing the views of Western scholars on the basis for and significance of social classes.

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Rumanian newspapers and certain specialized journals have recently published a number of articles criticizing the opinions of some Western authors and scholars, accusing them of hostility toward unified action on the part of leftist political forces or of denying the Marxist theory of the class basis of society. In general, these criticisms seem to be related to the ideological offensive the East European states have undertaken following the European security conference.

Rumanian party leader Nicolae Ceausescu has expressed concern about some of these ideas. In a speech delivered at a meeting of ministers of culture from the East European states in Bucharest in September 1975, he stated:

It is public knowledge that Marxism-Leninism, our revolutionary ideology, has asserted itself in the struggle against idealistic, foreign concepts even under the severe conditions of the bourgeois-landowner regime. We therefore must not avoid the ideological confrontation. (1)

He also strongly urged the need for leftist forces in coalition governments in Western countries. In a speech to a congress of deputies to the county people's councils, he observed:

One can hardly understand the attitude of some circles and political leaders who, while declaring themselves in favor of a new order in society and international relations, speak out against the participation of communist parties in governments or state agencies, against their being allowed to assume responsibility for the country's leadership. (2)

With the Rumanian party leader expressing himself so strongly on these ideological issues, it is not surprising that the Rumanian mass media have taken up the cudgels. It may be no coincidence that these articles have begun to appear at a time when a dispute about proletarian internationalism and the role and significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat has arisen. This dispute, which is taking place mainly between the Soviet CP and a number of West European communist parties, has placed the Rumanian party in a difficult position. The Rumanians have strongly reaffirmed the importance of the role of the dictatorship of the proletariat, (3) but they have been equally adamant in affirming the right of each communist party to pursue its own policies independently, and to decide for itself how to co-operate with socialists and social democrats. Although the articles do not refer expressis verbis to these issues, they are obviously related to these general problems.

French Book Criticized as "Anticommunist"

The first in the series of articles appeared in Scinteia. (4) It was written by the paper's Paris correspondent, who signs himself P. Diaconescu, and was entitled "The Temptations of Anticommunist Ideology and the Reaction of Public Opinion -- Anachronistic Ideas Considered in the Light of Reality." It was in fact a review of a

(1) Scinteia, 25 September 1975.

(2) Ibid., 5 February 1976.

(3) See Rumanian Situation Reports/5 and 6, Radio Free Europe Research, 18 and 25 February 1976, Items 3 and 7, respectively.

(4) 17 March 1976.

volume of "anticommunist literature" entitled La tentation totalitaire (The Totalitarian Temptation) by Jean-François Revel.

Diaconescu described the book's title as "slanderous," and said that despite vigorous advertising it had generated a wave of criticism in the French press, which had charged it with being "diversionist, tendentious, and [filled with] false arguments." He then went on to say that a large number of reviewers had attacked Revel for his "left-wing liberal" apology for capitalism at a time when capitalist society is going through an acute crisis in which its contradictions are being revealed. In an attempt to mitigate the population's fears of a "left-wing alternative" and to curb the genuine "temptation" offered by socialism, he said, Revel had resorted to stereotyped anticommunist ideological clichés; he had removed the economic content from the concept of democracy by distorting the facts and ignoring reality.

Another of Revel's statements that aroused Diaconescu's ire was one to the effect that the national state is "an obstacle to the building of a socialist world," and he also took issue with Revel's advocacy of a "world-wide" (mondialiste) concept of nations' losing their individuality along with their prerogatives of sovereignty and national independence. According to Diaconescu, Revel's contention that the independence of small and middle-sized states is an obstacle to an "over-all" solution to the problems of the world was "flagrantly inconsistent with the truth." Also, Revel's belief that "the hegemonic policy of the great powers is more likely to lead to international administration of the affairs of the planet than the conjugation of independent policies," said Diaconescu, indicated a nostalgic fellow-feeling with great-power imperialism, and such statements had been described as "fallacies" by some French commentators.

The chapter entitled "The Socialists' Suicide" is the most significant and extensive in Revel's book, said Diaconescu. It reflects the disorientation and confusion of right-wing political circles hostile to the regrouping and unity of action of democratic and progressive forces -- a regrouping on which the "revival of democracy" in many Western countries, including France, depends. He referred to articles in some French papers that criticized Revel's suggestion that the French Socialist Party detach itself from the Communists and reorient its policy toward the center and right-wing center, in order to return to the philosophy of splitting the "democratic forces."

Diaconescu repeated and agreed with the question asked by one French reviewer, who had wondered whether it was by chance that the book had been published at a time when "foreign diplomats" in France were warning socialist leaders of the "danger" involved in an alliance with the Communists, and of the even greater danger involved in communist participation in

the government. Diaconescu wound up by saying that the "strong assertion" of left-wing forces evidenced by the recent provincial elections in France demonstrates that "the temptation by socialism" represents a deliberate choice by the majority of the French population.

Western Scholars' Views of Social Classes Criticized

The second article in the series, also published in Scinteia, (5) was entitled "Bourgeois Theories on the Social Classes Invalidated by Reality," and was written by Paul Dobrescu. In an attempt to justify the need to discuss "a most significant theoretical and practical notion -- that of classes and class struggle" -- Dobrescu referred to "continuing bourgeois attempts" to dwell on new apologetic and reactionary theses dealing with this problem. He mentioned in particular "deproletarianization" of the working class and "co-operation between [antagonistic] working classes" and "their political consensus," all of which, he said, are theses designed to give credence to the idea that under present conditions the concepts of classes as formulated by Marxist theory have lost their meaning.

After endorsing the Marxist view that production relations, and particularly the ownership of the means of production, are basic factors in social life, Dobrescu suggested that it was not by accident that "bourgeois ideologists" had chosen the idea of ownership as a target of criticism. He took issue particularly with the West German sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf, who claims that "authority" -- that is, the act of decision -- and not "ownership" is the basic criterion in any analysis of classes. Dahrendorf, said Dobrescu, supports his thesis by assigning two meanings to the idea of property -- a restricted one connected with the ownership over the means of production, and a second connected with control of these means; in a "postcapitalist" society the two forms of ownership temporarily united in "capitalist" society would gradually separate.

According to Dobrescu, the French sociologist Alain Touraine formulated this thesis even more explicitly. Dobrescu emphasized that such an approach constitutes an attempt to "conjure away" the real content of class relations and, implicitly, the development of the class struggle. Dobrescu admitted that, owing to the technological-scientific revolution, substantial quantitative and qualitative changes had taken place in contemporary capitalist society (e.g., the fact that to a large extent control has been handed over to specialists). He said, however, that a number of "bourgeois" economists (Peter Drucker, William Letwin, Philip Bumberg) and the British political scientist C.B. Macpherson had demonstrated that the question

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of decision-making cannot be artificially separated from that of ownership, and that the essential decisions made by the big monopolies and transnational companies are and will always be inseparably connected with the interests of the real owners of the means of production.

Dobrescu also attacked "functionalist" theories, which he claimed are widespread in the US. In an attempt to tone down the class basis, those who hold these theories claim that society is made up of functionally independent groups, of a "plurality of classes." But these classes are not antagonistic to one another; rather, they are "co-operating agents" living in "harmony" and "social peace." Dobrescu described this theory as representing an unconvincing rejoinder to Marx's theory on evolution toward a "classless" society, toward the abolition of classes.

"Deproletarianization," which implies the disappearance of the working class as an independent group and its social and cultural integration in bourgeois society, was also criticized by Dobrescu. The upholders of such theories, he said, substitute "strata" of the population classified in terms of profession, wages, etc., for the category known as social class. He admitted, however, that in the contemporary world the developments and processes to which the partisans of these theories refer "certainly" exist -- such as the increase in the number of those engaged in predominantly intellectual professions (white-collar workers) and the decrease in the number of those who carry on directly productive work (blue-collar workers). But these changes in the structure of the working class cannot result in alteration of the structure and fundamental relations of capitalism.

Dobrescu's conclusion was that, "scientifically" speaking, the decisive factor in the assertion of the role of the working class is not its size (the number of manual workers can decline), but the fact that the development of modern industry acquaints it with the latest technologies. He also emphasized that the working class cannot be immune to exploitation unless capitalist ownership of the means of production is eliminated, and quoted the American sociologist C. Wright Mills as saying that the overwhelming majority of white-collar workers are in the same boat as those who "live on their wages" -- i.e., they have no ownership rights.

But the very fact that owing to the exigencies of capitalist production more and more people are finding themselves living under social conditions similar to those of the working class makes it easier for the proletariat to unite around itself the overwhelming majority of the population in the struggle against the monopolies;


as a matter of fact, said Dobrescu, this development is evident in a number of economically advanced countries, such as France, Italy, Japan, etc.

The latest developments constitute a "drastic denial" of the bourgeois theories on the class struggle, according to Dobrescu. New, more acute forms of class struggle have broken out in the capitalist society -- and as examples he mentioned the refusal to permit production to be stopped, to let workers occupy and administer enterprises for long periods of time, or allow them to control productive activity (e.g. in Great Britain, France, Italy). He also claimed that the structural crisis of the capitalist system had intensified the social struggle (in Italy, Spain, Great Britain, France, Belgium); combativeness on the part of the working class and the fact that large sections of the population have been drawn into it are characteristic of this struggle, which takes on a variety of forms; besides, "more emphasis has been laid on its political aspects, with the result that the economic claims frequently combine with political ones."

A third article entitled "Reorientations in Western Thinking Concerning Social Classes and the Class Struggle" (6) dealt in a somewhat theoretical fashion with the problems discussed in the other two. It was written by Dobrescu and Mihaela Vlasceanu, and contains references to a number of works by Western scholars -- Dahrendorf's The New Liberty, Survival and Justice in a Changing World; Raymond Aaron's Progress and Disillusion, T.B. Bottomore's Classes in Modern Society, J.M. Ridge's Mobility in Britain Reconsidered, Frank Parkin's The Social Analysis of Class Structure, Anthony Giddens's The Class Structure in the Advanced Society, Zbigniew Brzezinski's Between Two Ages, and Seymour Martin Lipset's The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics. (025)

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(6) Era Socialista No. 6/1976.



This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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BAD Background Report/83
(Czechoslovakia)
7 April 1976

CSSR -- COMECON, 1976-1980 CO-ORDINATION

(A translation with comment by the Czechoslovak Unit)

Summary:and Introduction: "Our Part in the Co-ordination of plans of the Comecon Countries" is the title and subject of an article in the Slovak CP CC political and economic weekly Nove Slovo (No.11, 11 March 1976). The author, Anton Ruzicka, holder of the academic degree of Candidate of Sciences, furnishes detailed information about the increases in Czechoslovakia's foreign trade with its Comecon partners during the 1976-1980 period as planned in the respective plan co-ordination agreements. He details the increases in volume of trade with the individual countries, compared to the preceding 1971-1975 period, and furnishes a breakdown of these figures into the four main categories of goods (fuels and raw materials, machines and machinery, agricultural products, and consumer articles), both totally and on a country by country basis. The total value of these increases will amount to 700 billion Kcs, Ruzicka says. Before giving all these details, the author outlines the preconditions for this co-ordination of plans (the good performance of the Czechoslovak economy in 1971-1975, the CSSR's intensified participation in "international socialist economic integration," increased fuel, raw material, and food supplies, and expansion of specialization and co-operation in production in the manufacturing industries). In this context his statement that a deterioration of the terms of trade -- commodities vs. finished products to the detriment of the latter -- must be expected, may be taken as a warning. Following is a translation of the main parts of this article, with the other parts summarized.

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In the introductory parts of his article, the author states that the positive development of the Czechoslovak economy between 1971 and 1975 has created favorable conditions for intensifying Czechoslovakia's participation in the Comecon integration processes; he also claims that Czechoslovakia's foreign trade orientation toward the socialist states has protected his country's economy from the adverse influence of the economic crisis in the capitalist nations. Looking toward the future, he says that Czechoslovak participation in the co-ordination of the economic plans for the 1976-1980 period within Comecon must take into consideration the following requirements: 1) the necessary pre-conditions must be established through maximal utilization of all progressive forms of economic co-operation; 2) the necessary increases in the supply of fuels, raw materials, and food must be ensured through Czechoslovak participation in joint programs designed to obtain these supplies, and 3) specialization and co-operation in the manufacturing industries must be stepped up. In this connection, he points out that some new factors must also be taken into account, namely that the terms of trade for raw materials and finished products will deteriorate to the detriment of the latter (which will have a bearing on the product structure of foreign trade) and that more distant fuel and raw material sources will have to be exploited (which will be reflected in higher investment and transport costs), for instance in the Asian parts of the USSR, in Mongolia, and Cuba. Ruzicka continues:

* * *

The results of the co-ordination of the economic plans of Czechoslovakia and the other Comecon countries for the 1976-1980 period indicate a substantial expansion of economic co-operation, reflected in a marked increase in the exchanges of goods in this period over the preceding five-year plan. Between 1976 and 1980, the total volume of Czechoslovak trade with the Comecon countries is to increase by 37.5 per cent over the 1971-1975 era, and is to exceed 700 billion Kcs. Of this sum, exports will increase by nearly 40 per cent, and imports by 36 per cent during this period [1976-1980].

Insofar as the individual Comecon countries are concerned, the following increases in the volume of foreign trade during the sixth five-year plan [1976-1980] compared to the preceding period are anticipated: USSR 39.4 per cent; Bulgaria 49 per cent; Hungary 24.3 per cent; the GDR 26.4 per cent; Poland 52.4 per cent; Rumania 37.4 per cent; and Mongolia 7.1 per cent.

So far as each country's share in the total volume of foreign trade with the Comecon countries goes, the USSR also ranks first, with almost 50 per cent, followed by the GDR with 17.7; Poland with 15.2; Hungary with 8; Rumania with 5.2; Bulgaria with 4.5; and Mongolia with 0.2 per cent.

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The total value of these increases will reach nearly 200 billion Kcs, the author says, and follows this up with a breakdown of these increases according to the main categories of materials and products.

* * *

Exports of raw materials and fuels are expected to rise by nearly 12 per cent and their ratio of total exports is to reach about 17 per cent. Substantially higher is the increase to be achieved in imports, with a target of 20 per cent; fuels and raw materials will represent 36 per cent of the total of imports from the Comecon countries. These increased imports will provide Czechoslovakia with a guaranteed supply of the fuels and raw materials it will need in the future. Most of these items will be imported from the USSR, whose share in Czechoslovak imports is 72 per cent.

The co-ordination [agreements] anticipate the largest increases, both in imports and exports, in the category of machines and machinery. Compared to the 1971-1975 period, exports are to rise by 65.8 per cent and imports by 64.4 per cent in 1976-1980. In this category, the results of the process of equalizing the economic levels of the more highly developed and less developed Comecon countries are very clearly reflected.

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In the following passages, Ruzicka enlarges upon this point, and then reverts to his structural breakdown.

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In the category of agricultural products and food, Czechoslovakia will restrict imports as well as exports. Between 1976 and 1980 exports of these categories of products are not intended to exceed 2 per cent of total exports, which means an 8 per cent reduction compared to the preceding five-year plan. And imports will be reduced by up to 27 per cent in comparison with 1971-1975; their share in total imports will not exceed 4 per cent. The development trends in this category clearly indicate the intention so far as the development of Czechoslovak agriculture goes: the aim is to increase the degree of self-sufficiency in food supplies during the sixth five-year plan.

The last [main] category is that of consumer products. In this sphere, Czechoslovakia aims to increase exports in the sixth five-year plan, and therefore a rise of 13 per cent, with a 2 per cent fall in imports, is expected. Export of consumer articles is to represent 14.2 per cent of total exports, and that of imports 5.8 per cent. The largest part of the exports of consumer articles is to go to the USSR, up to 67.5 per cent, with an 18 per cent increase of the volume. The Czechoslovak balance of trade in this category will show a surplus, which will be mainly used for payments in the USSR.

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After summing up that all this supplies the necessary conditions for stepping up Czechoslovakia's inclusion in the process of socialist economic integration within Comecon, the author specifies how Czechoslovak co-operation with the individual Comecon countries will increase as a result of co-ordination in the 1976-1980 period.

The USSR is practically irreplaceable in the economic co-operation of Czechoslovakia. During the sixth five-year plan, it will account for 50 per cent of the total volume of Czechoslovakia's trade with the Comecon countries; the CSSR's total volume of trade with the USSR will rise by almost 40 per cent compared to 1971-1975, with exports rising by 46.4 and imports by 32.2 per cent. The structure of the imports will substantially change during the sixth five-year plan. Machines and machinery will represent 41 per cent, fuels and raw materials 56 per cent, agricultural products and food 2 per cent, and consumer articles 1 per cent. In exports, fuels and raw materials will comprise

12 per cent, machines and equipment 68 per cent, food 1 per cent, and consumer articles 19 per cent. Some of the main imported goods are crude oil (19,000,000 tons), natural gas (5,800 million m³), electric power, ferrous raw materials, ferromanganese, phosphate fertilizers, asbestos, copper, zinc, lead, aluminum, etc. Engineering products primarily consist of nuclear power stations, motor vehicles, metallurgical equipment, subway cars, chemical equipment, machine tools, etc. The export of machinery and equipment from the CSSR will rise by 70 per cent in this period, with chemical and metallurgical equipment, machine tools, equipment for nuclear power stations, agricultural machinery, trucks, pumping stations in complete units, and other products comprising the bulk.

Consumer articles, whose exports will increase by 18 per cent, constitute an important component of Czechoslovak exports. The importance of this category is borne out by the fact that it accounts for up to one third of the trade balance surplus.

The GDR. It is anticipated that extensive exchanges within certain branches of the manufacturing, engineering, chemical, and consumer article industries will be carried out. The conditions for this co-operation between the CSSR and the GDR are very favorable, owing to the similar and close economic and technological standards of the two countries, which will permit extensive specialization and co-operation in production, particularly in the engineering and petrochemical industries and other branches, to be realized. The results are to be reflected in increased exchanges of products, which are to increase by 45 per cent through this form of co-operation, with the total volume of mutual trade rising by 26 per cent during the sixth five-year plan. A noteworthy point in the economic relations with the GDR is the fact that the balance of trade is almost even, not only so far as its sum is concerned, but also in the categories of goods involved. Fuels and raw materials will account for 20 per cent, machinery and equipment for 64 per cent, and consumer articles for 13 per cent, with the rest represented by agricultural products.

The Polish People's Republic. During the sixth five-year plan, the volume of foreign trade will substantially increase, by 53 per cent; exports will represent 39 per cent of this figure and imports 68 per cent. Fuels and raw materials are to account for about 22 per cent; we are to import 2,500,000 tons of coal annually for power generation, as well as copper, sulfur, carbon disulfide, calcium carbonate, salt, and other raw materials.

Machinery and equipment are to account for 66 per cent of Czechoslovakia's exports and 51 per cent of its imports. Imports of machinery from Poland will substantially increase, by up to 83 per cent, in this [sixth] five-year plan. Products turned out through specialization and co-operation in production are to represent up to 30 per cent. It is also anticipated that Poland will build electric power stations with a capacity of 1,050 mw and will continue to carry out other construction work in Czechoslovakia.

The Hungarian People's Republic. A 24 per cent growth in the volume of mutual trade, with exports representing 27 per cent of the total and imports 22 per cent, is anticipated during 1976-1980. Raw materials and fuels will account for 23 per cent of exports and 12 per cent of imports; machinery and equipment will represent 60 per cent of exports and 54 per cent of imports. It is anticipated that imports will rise by 66 per cent and exports by 48 per cent. Co-operation and specialization will be intensified in production. Imports of agricultural products, about 17 per cent, particularly grain, will continue to represent a relatively large share of the total.

The Rumanian Socialist Republic. A large increase in the volume of foreign trade is anticipated between 1976 and 1980: 38 per cent; this figure will break down to 41 per cent representing exports and 34 per cent imports. Fuels and raw materials are to represent 25 per cent of both imports and exports; the CSSR will import chiefly 2,000 million kwh of electric energy per year, 250,000 tons of naphtha residue, 127,000 tons of cement, and wood products, coke and coking coal, as well as diverse metallurgical products. Machinery and equipment will represent 65 per cent of exports and 55 per cent of imports. These machinery imports will consist primarily of machine tools and molding machines, trucks and cars, construction and road building machinery, railroad freight cars, chemical and food processing equipment, etc. Czechoslovakia will continue to import agricultural products, whose share is to reach 11 per cent. In consumer articles, imports and exports will even out, and their ratio is to hover around the 9 per cent mark, which is an increase of 50 per cent in volume over the last plan period.

The Bulgarian People's Republic. A substantial, 49 per cent rise is anticipated in the volume of foreign trade over the 1971-1975 period. Exports are to rise by 37 per cent and imports by 64 per cent. As far as the structure of the goods exchange is concerned,

the individual categories are to be represented as follows: fuels and raw materials: exports, 18 per cent, imports 6 per cent; machinery and equipment: exports 74 per cent, imports 66 per cent; consumer articles: exports 7 per cent, imports 5 per cent; the rest comprises agricultural products. It is anticipated that co-operation will be markedly expanded in the engineering industry, on the basis of specialization and co-operation agreements, mainly in the automobile industry, in the production of food-processing machinery, and in high-current engineering. The CSSR is to participate in the power stations at Chaira, Plovdiv, Trajcho Kostov, Pleven, and Sofia, and will provide supplies for the metallurgical plant at Kremikovtsi.

The Mongolian People's Republic. The CSSR will render economic aid to this country in the reconstruction of its tannery and footwear industries by granting the required credits. Within the framework of free aid, the CSSR will participate in geological surveys and furnish scholarships for Mongolians studying in the CSSR. The volume of foreign trade will increase by 5 per cent. The CSSR will mainly export machinery and equipment, while importing raw materials, furs, carpets, and leather wear. Czechoslovakia handles its economic relations with Mongolia in accordance with the Comecon guidelines on assistance for its economic development.

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Ruzicka concludes his article by stating that the data given above confirm Czechoslovakia's extensive participation in the efforts to intensify the integration processes in Comecon.

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RUMANIA/11
5 April 1976

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S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

History

1. Marx Again Invoked by Rumanians on the Bessarabian Question

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George
Ciurtescu

Foreign Relations

2. Ceausescu Pays State Visit to Greece
3. Ceausescu on the Balkans
4. Ceausescu in Kuwait
5. Agricultural Co-operation with Western States
6. Agreement on Soviet Deliveries of Equipment and Industrial Assistance

HISTORY1. Marx Again Invoked by Rumanians on the Bessarabian Question

One of the major events marking the reassertion of Rumania's claim to the territory of Bessarabia after the communist party came to power following World War II was the publication (in 1964) of K. Marx: Insemnari despre Romani (manuscrise inedite) [K. Marx: Notes About Rumanians (Unpublished Manuscripts)], edited by A. Otetea and S. Schwann (Bucharest: Academy of the People's Republic of Rumania, 1964). The volume contained four manuscripts found in the archives of the International Institute for Societ History in Amsterdam, consisting of notes taken by Marx on political, social, and economic conditions in Rumania. Three of the four were notes on a French volume about Rumania published in 1855. Although Marx dealt only peripherally with Bessarabia, his statements quite clearly indicated his acceptance of Rumania's claim to the territory. Not only did Insemnari despre Romani quote Marx's denial of Turkey's right to cede Bessarabia to Russia in 1812, but the editor's introduction mentioned the principles of international law on which Marx's judgment of the issue was based, and the book also contained two other references to the fact that Turkey could not legally cede Bessarabia to Russia. Marx also apparently accepted the French volume's figures on the Rumanian character of the population of Bessarabia, since he quoted it. (See Rumanian Situation Report, Radio Free Europe Research, 24 December 1964).

In the context of the intensification over the last year of the conflict between Soviet and Rumanian historical claims to this territory (see Robert R. King, "The Escalation of Rumanian-Soviet Historical Polemics over Bessarabia," RAD Background Report/38 [Rumania], RFER, 12 February 1976), an article has appeared in a Rumanian historical journal recalling the earlier volume of Marx manuscripts and restating Rumania's historical claim to Bessarabia. (Cornelia Bodea, "Karl Marx on the Rumanians -- Completion and New Data," Revista de istorie 29:1 [January 1976], pp. 21-34.) The primary occasion for it is the rediscovery of a newspaper article by Marx which had apparently been lost for some time, although its existence was referred to by Marx and it was mentioned by Otetea and Schwann in the 1964 volume.

Mrs. Bodea reports that the material in question was published in the New York Daily Tribune of 23 January 1856, under the title "The Danubian Principalities." Although it was not signed, researchers (including some Western historians) agree that it was written by Marx, and specialized catalogues of Marx's writings list it as one of his works. At the same time, Bodea claims, quantitative textual analysis and lexicographic and syntactic studies indicate that some passages were obviously not written by Marx. According to Mrs. Bodea, in some cases articles by Marx and Engels were altered in the editorial office of the American daily and sometimes they were even published unsigned. Citing excerpts from a letter Marx wrote to Engels dated 30 October 1856, Mrs. Bodea said that Marx had noticed on his manuscript, which had been returned to him, a note in French criticizing the statistical data he had used to indicate the size of the Rumanian population. The note said the data had

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been exaggerated in order to kindle national sentiment in the hearts of Rumanians. Mrs. Bodea concluded that these French comments were the basis for altering Marx's text before its publication in the New York Daily Tribune.

In his letter to Engels Marx said that the author of the note was the Polish Count Adam Gurowski, a contributor to the American daily and a fervent pan-Slavist who opposed the ideas of Marx and Engels on pan-Slavism. Marx noted ironically that this "honorable gentleman" regularly received monetary subsidies from the Russian Embassy in Washington.

Mrs. Bodea's article is part of a series on the history of Rumania which have appeared in the last year or so. The writing of basic works on the history of the Rumanian people, one of the tasks assigned to the Rumanian Academy, was discussed at a recent meeting of the academy's party committee dealing with the preparations for the Congress on Political Education and Culture scheduled to take place in May of this year (Romania Libera, 9 March 1976). All Rumanian historians have a similar duty, according to Ceaușescu's message to the members of the RCP CC Institute for Historical and Sociopolitical Sciences on the occasion of its 25th anniversary (Radio Bucharest, 29 March 1976). The party has also shown renewed concern for historical research, reflected in the fact that in April 1975 the Political Executive Committee set up a commission to work out a treatise on Rumanian history based on the materialist-dialectical outlook and "historical truth" (see King, op. cit., pp. 5-8). The concern about false interpretations is apparently continuing. Radio Bucharest (30 March 1976) reported that an article in the latest issue of Anale de istorie (No. 1, 1976; the issue has not yet been received here) by Mircea Musat and Gheorghe Ionita notes regrettable distortions and falsifications of fact in the works of some foreign historians. Although the implicit targets of Rumanian criticism of foreign historians have been those in the Soviet Union, one Rumanian scholar reported that some of them do admit that the ancestors of the Rumanians inhabited the territory between the Tișa and Dniester Rivers and the Black Sea, thus including Bessarabia (see Dumitru Bercia, "The Rumanian-ness of the 'Wallachians,'" Era socialista No. 12 [June] 1975).

The Rumanian party leadership has consistently supported the views of Rumanian historians. On a number of occasions -- the Ninth RCP Congress in July 1965, the 45th anniversary of the founding of the RCP in May 1966, the National Party Conference in July 1972, and many others -- Ceaușescu has criticized interwar party documents imposed upon the RCP by the Comintern which called for the separation from Rumania of areas he described as overwhelmingly Rumanian (Transylvania and Bessarabia, among other areas).

The Chinese, who have sought to play up any Soviet-East European differences and to encourage national discontent in the Soviet Union, have given implicit support to the Rumanian historical claims and have cited Marx and Engels to bolster their criticism. In a Rumanian-language broadcast Radio Peking (1 April 1976) accused the Soviets of carrying out a policy of national oppression and Russification in Soviet Moldavia (Bessarabia), quoting Marx and Engels

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as having said in 1853 that "the Wallachians or Daco-Rumanians are the main population in the region between the lower Danube and the Dniester." A number of similar criticisms of the Soviets, also invoking the support of the prophets of communism, have recently been broadcast over Radio Peking in Rumanian (4 and 20 February and 21 March 1976). (007)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

2. Ceausescu Pays State Visit to Greece

At the invitation of President Tsatsos, Ceausescu paid an official visit to Greece on 26-29 March 1976. He was accompanied by his wife, Foreign Minister George Macovescu, Minister-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation Nicolae Ionescu, his personal advisers Nicolae Doicaru and Constantin Mitea, and "other officials" (Scinteia, 27 March 1976).

This is the first time the head of an East European communist state has visited Greece. (A March 5 Reuter dispatch reported that Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov will follow suit, visiting Athens on April 9-10, and according to Die Presse /March 30/, Tito will do so a month later. Ceausescu was scheduled to go to Greece in November 1973, at the invitation of former President Gheorghios Papadopoulos /Scinteia, 10 November 1973/, but owing to the political situation in Greece at that time the visit was postponed indefinitely by mutual consent /Scinteia, 20 November 1973/.)

Relations between Rumania and Greece have been improving for some time. In May 1975 Premier Constantine Karamanlis visited the RSR and together with Ceausescu signed a "joint solemn declaration" and a joint communiqué, and issued an invitation to Ceausescu to pay an official visit to Greece (see Rumanian SR/20, RFER, 2 June 1975, Item 3). Ceausescu again met Karamanlis in Helsinki, when the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was signed (Scinteia, 1 August 1975).

After Karamanlis's visit, several contacts on the ministerial level took place between the two countries. In October 1975 Minister of Industry and Energy Konstantinos Konofagos headed an economic delegation on a visit to Rumania (Scinteia, 16 October 1975); in December Minister of National Defense Evangelos Averof went to the RSR (Scinteia, 3, 4, and 6 December 1975), and according to an RFE Special/Athens (5 December 1975) agreed to purchase 2,000 Rumanian jeeps for Greece's armed forces -- the first time a Western European state; also in December Minister of Civilization and Sciences Konstantinos Trypanis paid a visit to Bucharest. In February 1976 the joint commission on Greek-Rumanian collaboration held its fourth session in Athens, and according to Scinteia (February 29) "practical steps" were taken to increase economic and technical-scientific co-operation and expand cultural exchanges and tourism; an agreement on collaboration in the field of electric power and one on co-operation in telecommunications were signed, and long-term agreements on economic and industrial-technical co-operation, trade, and payments were "initiated." (The latter three were signed during Ceausescu's recent visit.)

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Between 1970 and 1974 trade exchanges between the two countries almost doubled in value, reaching 412 million lei in the latter year. The balance has always been in Rumania's favor. In November 1975 a program of co-operation in education, science, and culture in the 1976-1978 period was signed in Bucharest (Scinteia, 26 November 1975).

In preparation for Ceausescu's visit a Rumanian cultural week was organized in Athens, Premier Karamanlis granted an interview to the Rumanian press (Scinteia, 24 March 1976), and Ceausescu was interviewed by the Greek radio and television networks (see Item 3, below).

In addition to attending the receptions, dinners, exchanges of medals, etc., usual on such occasions, the Ceausescus, accompanied by President Tsatsos and his wife, visited the sanctuary of the Delphic Oracle, and, accompanied by Minister Trypanis, made a tour of the Acropolis. Ceausescu and Premier Karamanlis visited the Scaramanga shipyards and the port of Piraeus (Scinteia, 27, 28, and 29 March 1976).

On March 28 Ceausescu received representatives of Rumanian monks from the monastery on Mount Athos, who thanked him "for his efforts to improve Greek-Rumanian relations in the Balkans." In his turn the Rumanian leader expressed his appreciation for the fact that the monks were helping to develop the friendship between the two countries and, along with their Greek brothers, to maintain cultural and spiritual traditions and values on Mount Athos" (Scinteia, 29 March 1976).

On March 26 a group consisting of Ceausescu, Macovescu, Doicaru, and Ion Brad, Rumania's ambassador in Athens, met with Karamanlis, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dimitros Bitsios, Ambassador (to Rumania) Dimitri Papadakis, and Petros Moliviatis, director of Karamanlis's political cabinet (Scinteia, 27 March 1976)

The ceremonial of signing by Ceausescu and Karamanlis of the joint communiqué and the long-term agreements on economic and industrial collaboration took place on March 29, and the foreign affairs ministers of the two countries also signed a long-term trade agreement and one on payments. No details about their contents were published.

Both Radio Bucharest and Agerpres reviewed the joint communiqué on March 29. Apparently it contained nothing new with regard to such matters as the Cyprus conflict, the Helsinki Final Act, the need for good neighborly relations in the Balkans, or the role of the UN in international affairs. It expressed the satisfaction of the two countries with regard to the development of relations and laid stress on the need to increase bilateral trade exchanges and co-operation in various fields, and to initiate new projects.

(008)

3. Ceausescu on the Balkans

As noted in Item 2, above, just before he left for Greece Ceausescu granted an interview to the Greek broadcasting network in which he dwelt at some length on the situation in and prospects for the Balkans. (The interview was published in Scinteia on March 25.) Although the recent conference in Athens had yielded nothing spectacular in the way of results, he said, it marked an important step on the road toward Balkan co-operation. Its aims were limited, but it had demonstrated that the Balkans had many problems that could and must be resolved jointly. (For Rumania's initial reaction to Premier Karamanlis's suggestion that such a conference be held, see Rumanian SR/39, RFER, 10 October 1975, Item 1. On its participation in the conference, see Robert R. King, "The Athens Conference and the Balkans: Old Variations on an Old Theme," RAD BR/55 East-West, RFER, 1 March 1976.)

Asked about Albania's absence from the conference, he replied somewhat tartly that while it was true that Albania had a role to play in Balkan co-operation, it was up to the leadership in Tirana to decide whether or not to play it.

Noteworthy, but somewhat ambiguous in view of Rumania's strong support for the Athens conference, was his statement that the development of multilateral co-operation in the Balkans is closely related to expanded bilateral co-operation.

At the end of his visit to Greece the Rumanian leader attended an international press conference at which he also discussed the Balkans. He made the point that if they could agree to co-operate they could avoid intervention by other nations, thus helping to preserve peace in the area. Asked whether he thought it advisable to convene a new Balkan conference, he said it would first be necessary to improve bilateral relations in the area, after which political co-operation might be discussed at a multilateral conference.

One question related to what Rumania is doing to improve Greek-Turkish relations. Ceausescu replied that Athens and Ankara should themselves make an effort to resolve their differences, and that Rumania, which is certainly interested in a peaceful solution, would do everything it can to help.

(Both Greece and Rumania have been trying hard to improve bi- and multilateral relations with their Balkan neighbors, a fact pointed up by their strong support for the Athens conference. According to Radio Bucharest, another conference to be attended by representatives of the Balkan countries will be held in Athens in May, sponsored by the Greek committee on understanding and co-operation in the Balkans. Its purpose will be to study means of promoting inter-Balkan co-operation in every field and on every level, with a view to turning the area into a factor of peace and stability throughout the world. A Balkan week, to include a book exhibition, an exhibition of popular art, film screenings, and concerts by ensembles from all Balkan countries, will take place in Athens in September, organized by the same committee.) (009)

4. Ceausescu in Kuwait

On leaving Greece Ceausescu, Macovescu, Ionescu, Doicaru, and Mitea proceeded to Kuwait for a three-day official visit (March 29-31). Mrs. Ceausescu was also a member of the party. Preliminary talks with Emir Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah began immediately after Ceausescu's arrival, and their meeting was described by a Radio Bucharest commentator as having taken place in "an atmosphere of warm cordiality, respect, and mutual esteem."

The next morning the two heads of state met again to discuss Rumanian-Kuwaiti relations and the prospects of intensifying them and a number of international problems, and established the general framework of co-operation between their countries. Later in the day Ceausescu visited the Kuwaiti oil center of Al Ahmadi. Again according to Radio Bucharest, during the talks between Ceausescu and a number of Kuwaiti oil experts a number of areas in which Rumanian-Kuwaiti co-operation could be extended and deepened were pinpointed. The broad possibilities of co-operation in the oil sector provided by the economies of the two countries were noted, and Ceausescu reviewed the rapid development of Rumania's petrochemical industry, the developing collaboration between Rumania and other countries in the extraction and processing of oil, and the possibilities of expanding such co-operation with Kuwait.

On March 31 Ceausescu met with the Minister of Commerce and Industry al-Nafisi, with whom he reached agreement on co-operation in various fields, including the establishment of mixed commercial companies. On the same day George Macovescu and his Kuwaiti counterpart signed a number of agreements in the fields of culture, science, tourism, exchanges of information, civil air transport and telecommunications (the latter being supplemented by a written "understanding" between the Kuwaiti Ministry of Communications and the Rumanian Ministry of Transport and Telecommunications covering co-operation in research and planning).

The joint communiqué issued on March 31 stressed the importance of the agreements on trade and economic and technical co-operation concluded between the two countries in 1974, and reiterated the desire expressed by the two leaders to work out new accords in the domains of finance, the international transport of goods and passengers by road, and juridical assistance. The document also noted that it had been agreed to study the feasibility of co-operation in the construction of a petrochemical complex in Rumania, and to co-operate in training Kuwaiti personnel for the oil, chemical, and petrochemical industries.

With regard to the international situation the two sides stressed the importance of the UN in promoting peace, security, and international co-operation and the role of the developing and non-aligned countries in the discussion and resolution of international problems. The two heads of state paid special attention to the situation in the Middle East, siding with the Palestinians against Israel and reasserting the conviction that a just and lasting peace can be arrived at only if Israel withdraws its troops from all occupied Arab territories and recognizes the national rights of the Palestinian people. They also called for concrete measures to

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establish peace and security in Europe and hailed the efforts to set up nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. The Emir accepted an invitation to visit Rumania, at a date to be set later.

At a press conference on March 31, Ceausescu stated that an agreement in principle had been reached on the joint construction of a petrochemical complex in Rumania, in which Kuwait would have a 49 per cent interest, to undertake certain projects in Kuwait, and to co-operate on third markets. In response to a query he said that Rumania would not mediate in the Middle East conflict -- this being a matter for the UN -- but that to the limit of its ability it would contribute to the rapid resolution of the problem and the achievement of a just and lasting peace. He went on to say that Rumania maintains good relations with almost all Arab states, that diplomatic relations will shortly be established with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Emirates, and that Rumania's relations with the PLO are particularly good and during his stay in Kuwait he had met with representatives of that organization.

Actually Ceausescu's visit to Kuwait had been postponed twice, for different reasons, in the last two years. According to AFP (24 September 1974) it was originally scheduled to take place at the end of 1974; he did not go, however, and on 2 February 1975, it was announced in Bucharest that he would do so in April. This visit was postponed by common agreement, owing to the official mourning in Kuwait for King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. In May al-Sabah told Finance Minister Florea Dumitrescu, who was on a visit to Kuwait, that he was "looking forward to meeting Ceausescu on an official visit to Kuwait in the near future" (see Rumanian SR/18, RFER, 15 May 1975, Item 5), and a few days later, on the occasion of a visit to Kuwait by Minister of Mining, Oil, and Geology Bujor Almasan, the Emir renewed the invitation. On 10 October 1975 AFP claimed that the visit would begin on October 27, and on November 9 it reported that Ceausescu was to leave for a three-day visit to Kuwait on November 24. Only a few days before that date, however, the visit was again postponed, because the Kuwaiti National Assembly had failed for the fourth time to ratify the Rumanian-Kuwaiti trade agreement, on the grounds that Rumania maintained too close relations with Israel (see Rumanian SR/44, RFER, 13 November 1975, Item 2). On 13 January 1976 Radio Bucharest announced that the Kuwaiti National Assembly had ratified the trade agreement. On March 7 Reuter quoted a Kuwaiti government spokesman as saying that Ceausescu would go to Kuwait on March 29, and on March 17 Radio Bucharest confirmed this by announcing that the visit would take place in late March.

Rumania and Kuwait established diplomatic relations in 1963, but it was not until 1968 that Alexandru Boaba, at that time Minister of Oil, held official talks in Kuwait on the possibility of developing co-operation in the oil industry. No visible progress in the development of economic relations was made in the next few years, but 1974 saw the beginning of a series of reciprocal visits designed to strengthen the economic and political ties between Rumania and Kuwait. In March Deputy Minister of the Chemical Industry Ion Niculescu held talks in Kuwait on trade exchanges and bilateral co-operation, and in July Kuwaiti Minister of Commerce and Industry Adasani signed a commercial agreement and one on economic

and technical co-operation (see Rumanian SR/25, RFER, 5 August 1974, Item 5). In January 1975 Minister of Finance and Oil al-Atiqi visited Bucharest, and in May ministers Florea Dumitrescu and Bujor Almasan went to Kuwait for economic talks. The purpose of all these visits seems to have been to prepare the way for Ceausescu's trip, since the Rumanian media have made no mention of credits or deliveries of oil from Kuwait, or of co-operation ventures between the two countries.

The Vienna daily Die Presse (3 September 1975) reported that Kuwait would help to finance the building of a petrochemical combine in Rumania at a cost of about 1,000 million dollars, and that the Kuwait International Investment Company had granted a 60,000,000-dollar credit to the Rumanian Foreign Trade Bank (see Rumanian SR/34, RFER, 5 September 1975, Item 4c). Earlier, however, Minister of Oil al Kazimi had reportedly stated, after a meeting with the Rumanian ambassador to Kuwait, that his government "would not accept Rumania's offer to provide consumer goods in return for more favorable conditions with regard to the purchase of Kuwaiti oil" (AFP, 31 July 1975).

According to the Anuarul Statistic al RSR 1975, trade between the two countries is still at a very low level, and consists exclusively of Rumanian exports to Kuwait (in 1974 these were valued at 38,600,000 lei) -- a clear indication that at least in 1974 Kuwait was not among Rumania's oil suppliers.

It should be recalled that Rumania recently cancelled an agreement with Israel to transport Iranian oil through the Israeli pipeline extending from the Red Sea port of Elath to Ashdod on the Mediterranean. Reuter (March 12) quoted "well-informed sources in Israel" as saying that Rumania has decided to replace its Iranian oil supplies with cheaper oil from Kuwait (see Rumanian SR/8 RFER, 15 March 1976, Item 5). Other sources said that Rumania "surrendered to the Arab agency that co-ordinates a boycott against Israel." It may be that this was one of Kuwait's preconditions for future oil exports to Rumania. (Kuwait is already involved in an arrangement to help finance a pipeline which will carry Middle East oil from the Yugoslav coast through to Czechoslovakia and Hungary.)

Whether Ceausescu's long-delayed visit to Kuwait has yielded the expected results is doubtful. According to reports and commentaries in the Rumanian media, the joint communiqué, and Ceausescu's press conference, no concrete economic agreements were concluded, and there is no indication that Kuwait intends to supply oil to the RSR. Even the matter of its contribution to the construction of a petrochemical complex is still in the initial stages. (010)

5. Agricultural Co-operation with Western States

A number of recent visits by Rumanian agricultural officials to Western countries are evidence of Rumania's wish to expand East-West co-operation in this particular field. Progress has thus far been limited, and the difficulties facing Rumanian agriculture (low incomes of those employed in this sector, a poor rate of investment, and organizational problems) make dramatic breakthroughs

in co-operation unlikely. Nevertheless, these efforts may aid Rumania's hard-pressed agriculture.

A delegation of the National Union of Agricultural Production Co-operatives recently visited West Germany. Headed by Chairman Aldea Militaru of the NUAPC, the delegates were the guests of Lorenz Falkenstein, chairman of the Central Office of the West German Raiffeisen Co-operative Union. Militaru met with West German Minister of Food and Agriculture Josef Ertl and with Constantin von Heereman of the West German Peasants' Association. During the visit, the delegates compared experiences with Raiffeisen Union officials, and explored possibilities for the Rumanian and German unions to co-operate (Scinteia, 24 and 28 March 1976). Rumanian Minister of Agriculture and the Food Industry Angelo Miculescu had visited West Germany a year ago to discuss expansion of agricultural co-operation and ways to improve ways of working together in agricultural scientific research (Scinteia, 23 and 25 May 1975).

Rumania has also sought closer agricultural relations with other Western countries, including the United States. In 1973, Deputy Minister of Agriculture Ion Ceausescu (Nicolae Ceausescu's brother) visited the US for the purpose of discussing co-operation in agriculture (Scinteia, 3 June 1973). In 1975, Angelo Miculescu in turn went to the US, on which occasion a special protocol on expanding agricultural co-operation between the two countries and one on improving bilateral trade in agricultural products and foods were signed (Scinteia, 2 and 13 September 1975). The communiqué issued by the joint Rumanian-American economic commission in November 1975 emphasized both the progress achieved in economic and technological bilateral co-operation, and the existing possibilities for still further expanding it, including the category of agricultural products (Scinteia, 6 November 1975). That same month, US Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz met Ceausescu in Bucharest; both men agreed that there are "broad possibilities" for agricultural co-operation between their countries (see Rumanian SR/47, RFER, 5 December 1975, Item 6).

These visits reflect Rumania's wish to assemble information available in this field and to apply modern Western techniques to its own agriculture, particularly since results in this sector have not been satisfactory. The official communiqué on the implementation of the 1971-1975 five-year plan indicated that the RSR's 1975 agricultural output was far below the plan. Only 15,200,000 tons of cereal crops were harvested, instead of the planned 20,000,000 tons, for example. The expansion of the livestock sector has also lagged behind expectations, with none of the plan targets met (Scinteia, 4 February 1976, and Rumanian SR/5, RFER, 18 February 1976, Item 1). These failings have resulted in a number of high-level conferences; the most recent one, at the end of February, was called by Ceausescu to discuss once again how to improve the country's agriculture and economic efficiency in that sector. (Scinteia, 28 and 29 February 1976; Rumanian SR/7, RFER, 5 March 1976, Item 7). When commenting on that meeting, the party fortnightly called for "energetic and efficient measures to develop socialist agriculture." (Era Socialista No. 5, March 1976). (011)

6. Agreement on Soviet Deliveries of Equipment and Industrial Assistance

A Soviet-Rumanian intergovernmental agreement whereby the USSR will supply equipment and technical assistance for the construction in Rumania of industrial enterprises and other facilities during the 1976-1980 period was recently signed (Radio Moscow in Rumanian, 25 March 1976, and Scinteia, 26 March 1976). Rumanian media report that these deliveries will be for the power, metallurgical, chemical, cellulose, and paper industries. More detail was provided by Radio Moscow which reported that the Soviet Union will help build 40 industrial facilities in Rumania during the 1976-1980 period, when the two countries will be actively co-operating in the fields of metallurgy, power, chemistry, building materials, telecommunications means, etc. Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations Vice-Chairman Vitali Morozov added that Soviet and Rumanian technical institutes will work together to expand ferrous-metallurgical combines in Galati, Iasi, and Zalau, and to provide the RSR with modern polyethylene, caustic soda, cellulose, and paper factories. Morozov said that the agreement will help expand "integration links" between the two lands.

The above agreement is actually based on provisions contained in the broad Soviet-Rumanian agreement of 28 November 1975 on co-ordinating the two countries' socioeconomic development plans for 1976-1980, and the agreement on goods exchanges and payments for 1976-1980, signed on 26 December 1975 (see Rumanian SR/2, RFER, 20 January 1976, Item 3).

The co-ordination agreement provides for Soviet deliveries of "machine-building industry products and equipment for the electro-technical, light, food, metallurgical, power, chemical, and other industries."

Secretary-Minister of State Nicolae M. Nicolae of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation, who signed the above mentioned agreement, remained in Moscow for further economic conferences. He met, for example, with Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai S. Patolichev to discuss "problems concerning Soviet-Rumanian goods exchanges" (Scinteia, 27 March 1976). (012)

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• RAD Background Report/78
(Albania)
5 April 1976

ALBANIA REACTS TO THE BALKAN CONFERENCE

By Louis Zanga

Summary: Albania has reacted to the recent Balkan Conference by emphasizing its unwillingness to participate in multilateral gatherings of this sort, although it views bilateral contacts favorably. This paper discusses a recent editorial in the Tirana party daily which alleged that the two "superpowers" (and in particular the Soviet Union) had interfered unwarrantably in the work of the conference, and reviews the journal's esoteric charges against some of the other participants. It also examines the significance of the Albanian party's positive approach to the question of bilateral collaboration.

* * *

A conference on co-operation in the Balkans, sponsored by Greek Premier Constantine Karamanlis, took place in Athens between 26 January and 5 February 1976. It was attended by Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia; Albania was not represented. A commentary on the conference that appeared recently in the Albanian party daily, Zeri i Popullit (1) is at once intransigent and promising: multilateral action of the kind exemplified by the conference is totally rejected, but there is some receptivity to the idea of bilateral contacts. In view of Albania's habitual distrust of any meaningful form of contact or co-operation with the outside world, the editorial should not be dismissed as a mere propaganda exercise but should be assessed in light of its more hopeful features.

(1) 23 March 1976.

Albania's distaste for multilateral conferences is the product of its theory of the evils of superpower supremacy, which is today the central core of its foreign policy. The main thrust of the Zeri i Popullit editorial was aimed against the alleged direct or indirect influence exerted by the two superpowers on the convening of the conference. Seen from this angle, Tirana's decision to shun the Athens gathering was no great surprise, and was a logical outcome of a European policy that had led to the earlier boycott of the Helsinki conference. The editorial said that the Balkan Conference was an outgrowth from the body of its northern predecessor and, as one of Tirana's main objections to the Helsinki conference was the presence there of the two superpowers, it was doubtless considered that some of that taint was inherited by the Athens gathering. The Hoxha leadership is paranoiac about any contact, however slight, with the two major powers.

As long as the Albanian regime's foreign policy is based on distrust and rejection of the superpowers, its attitude toward multilateral conferences is unlikely to change; and as long as Hoxha is around, the chances of any slackening of this rigid line are very remote, although it is known that some circles in Tirana would welcome a different approach. Evidence that there is no unanimity on this critical issue can be found in the many changes made in the top ranks of the Albanian leadership in recent times. The Chinese-American rapprochement of the early 1970s imposed strains from which the Sino-Albanian alliance has yet to recover fully, and the Albanian leadership is known to be concerned about the future of its protector's relationship with the US, since any major improvement would mean further isolation for Tirana. To repeat, Hoxha's "antisuperpower" formula is not a mere exercise in the semantics of propaganda but a dogma that plays a primary role in the country's foreign policy, and this circumstance explains in large part Albania's obstinate rejection of all forms of multilateral gathering, especially those in which the role of the two superpowers is evident.

The editorial leaves little doubt that the superpower most feared by Hoxha and his closest associate, Premier Mehmet Shehu, is the Soviet Union and that it is Moscow's dark intentions in the Balkans that give Tirana its greatest cause for concern. One reason for this is that the Soviet Union is the only major power with a reliable ally in the Balkans, namely Bulgaria. The other four Balkan countries (Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia) all have problems -- military, economic, or ideological -- to resolve with both Washington

and Moscow. (2) While the editorial claimed that both superpowers were interfering in Balkan affairs, it is clear that it considered the Soviets the real meddlers. It said:

In practice, when US imperialism and Soviet social imperialism directly or indirectly interfere in Balkan affairs through the medium of states such as Bulgaria, and when states exist that link their national interests with these two superpowers and consequently are not in a position to discuss and resolve properly those problems that concern the peoples of this area, then no improvement is possible.

The presence of Bulgaria, Moscow's most faithful ally in Eastern Europe, at the Athens conference was by itself sufficient cause for Tirana to allege Soviet interference in Balkan affairs; in the eyes of the Albanians, Moscow had forged a direct link with the conference through its Sofia connection. The other participants must have been well aware that the Albanians would not sit down at a conference table with the Bulgarians, and Athens may have extended an invitation to Tirana merely as a formal gesture. Alternatively, the invitation may have been intended to have a sobering effect on the isolationist obduracy of the Albanian leadership; this could explain in part some of the editorial's esoteric charges against the other nations represented at the conference -- such criticism may have been designed to neutralize the impact of the invitation on Albanian public opinion.

In dealing with traditional Balkan problems, the article spoke of "chauvinistic policies and policies of suppressing national minorities." This may have been primarily directed against the Yugoslavs, who have launched a major crackdown on Albanian irredentist elements in Kosovo, where the antinationalist campaign has put some strain on Yugoslav-Albanian relations following a revival in the early 1970s of good-neighborly relations between the two countries. (3) An earlier Zeri i Popullit editorial, (4) without mentioning the Yugoslavs by name,

- (2) See Robert R. King, "The Athens Conference and the Balkans: Old Variations on an Old Theme," RAD Background Report/55, (East-West), Radio Free Europe Research, 1 March 1976; R.N., "Bulgaria and the Balkan Conference in Athens," RAD BR/41, (Bulgaria), RFER, 12 February 1976; and Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Paper's Critical Appraisal of Balkan Conference," RAD BR/40 (Yugoslavia), RFER, 12 February 1976.
- (3) See Louis Zanga, "Irredentism in Kosovo as Tirana's Policy Toward Belgrade Hardens," RAD BR/166 (Albania), RFER, 2 December 1975.
- (4) 22 January 1976.

condemned anti-irredentist policies in a neighboring country, and warned against the pursuit of a policy of "persecuting national minorities." Tirana has yet to react to the trial and subsequent sentencing of 19 Albanian irredentists in Pristina in February and of 2 others in March. (5) The relatively low-keyed response to the events in Kosovo may indicate that, for the time being at least, Tirana wants to avoid an overt political confrontation with Belgrade.

Turning to the other participants in the Balkans Conference, the March 23 editorial charged that "territorial claims and sharp differences of opinion exist between several countries, but none of them is prepared to make any concessions." Here the article may have been referring to the lively current political disputes between Greece and Turkey, or possibly it was intended as an attack on the host country because of its attitude toward the Greek minority in southern Albania and its claims on Albanian territory. During the present nationwide discussion in Albania on the drafting of a new Constitution, three telegrams were sent to Enver Hoxha by Greek ethnic groups in Albania welcoming their recognition in the new Constitution. (6) The messages condemned the "chauvinist dreams" of Albania's external enemies and poured scorn on the Greek parliament's "concern" about the fate of the Greek minority in Albania. Nevertheless, Tirana's official attitude toward its southern neighbor remains cordial, as was shown by this year's marking of the Greek national day, when those present at the diplomatic reception given by the Greek ambassador included Foreign Minister Nesti Nase and other high Albanian government officials. The equivalent anniversary receptions given by the East European countries are normally attended only by low-ranking members of the Ministry of Commerce.

Finally, the editorial denigrated in rather vague terms the policies of the other Balkan countries: "some countries fuss about independence but rely on social imperialism and play its game"; others "asked for the participation of Hungary and Italy, even of the Soviet Union and the United States, in these intra-Balkan talks." The unnamed countries in this case may have been Rumania and Yugoslavia, and once again these slightly outlandish allegations may have been intended for internal consumption as justifications of the regime's rigid line on the question of multilateral meetings.

The one positive feature of the editorial -- and it is an important one -- was its endorsement of the policy of bilateral

(5) Tanjug, 7 February 1976; Rilindja, 19 March 1976.

(6) Zeri i Popullit, 17 and 21 February and 3 March 1976.

contacts between Balkan countries. Tirana's record on this matter is not very distinguished, and Zeri i Popullit's imprimatur is therefore all the more to be welcomed. The title of the editorial makes clear the official line on which types of contacts are to be preferred: "Things That Contribute and Do Not Contribute to Genuine Security and Co-operation in the Balkans," and the following passage sums up its thinking on this point:

The problems of the Balkans must be solved by the Balkan countries themselves, without interference by the super-powers and in spite of them. It cannot be said too often that bilateral collaboration is the only form of co-operation that is advantageous. It alone can help to strengthen the freedom and independence of all nations and the cause of peace and security in the Balkans. By dealing with the most acute bilateral questions, the road can be cleared for a joint meeting later on. But the main pre-condition for this is that the superpowers must be completely excluded from Balkan problems; their bases in the region must be closed down, and those alien factors must be eliminated that hinder the peoples of the Balkans from deciding among themselves, in a sovereign way, on the nature of their relationships.

Will Tirana put into practice what it preaches? Although Albania's relations with Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia may be considered reasonably cordial (in the case of Bulgaria only a total break could make them worse than they are), there is much room for improvement, and Belgrade in particular has shown untiring willingness for rapprochement and greater co-operation with Tirana. In the early 1970s new ground was broken by the two countries, but subsequent Yugoslav efforts to cultivate the seeds then planted were met with sudden mistrust in Tirana, especially in 1974 and 1975. In part, this may be explained by a renewed lack of Albanian self-confidence in face of the "revisionist magic" of its northern neighbor. The unprecedentedly rigorous campaign mounted by Albania against the "fierce bourgeois-revisionist" ideological pressure alleged to have been exerted upon it suggests that Tirana feared ideological infiltration and decided to apply the brakes for that reason; another factor was probably Albania's internal turmoil in recent years and the leadership changes that have accompanied it.

The editorial's remarks on the question of bilateral contacts could signify a renewed Albanian interest in improving the country's standing in the Balkans. By now the process of consolidation in the

leadership should have been completed and, if that is so, there is little to stand in the way of expanding co-operation with Albania's neighbors. Although the political situation in Tirana remains shrouded in mystery, making predictions extremely difficult, the regime's reaction to the Balkan Conference gives some cause for optimism about Albania's future policies on Balkan affairs and about the prospects of co-operation with some of its neighbors.

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- RAD Background Report/73
(Yugoslavia)
26 March 1976

COMINFORMIST TRIALS IN YUGOSLAVIA CONTINUE

By Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: The number of trials in Yugoslavia of persons engaged in "antistate activities" has increased. The majority of people tried belonged to the so-called "Cominformist group," i.e., persons advocating Yugoslavia's return to the Soviet bloc. As a balance to the persecution of the Cominformists, persons accused of "Croatian nationalism," "Serbian Chetniks," "Albanian irredentists" and pro-Western elements in general have also been brought to trial and sent to prison. The main purpose of all these trials seems to be a general warning against all would-be antiregime activists after Tito's disappearance from the political scene.

* * *

With the sole exception of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, one of Yugoslavia's six constituent republics, all other parts of the country have recently witnessed a series of so-called "Cominformist trials." It is not quite correct, however, to claim that only "Stalinist elements" in Yugoslavia have been persecuted. They do represent the majority of people brought to trial in the past few months, but "Croatian nationalists," "Serbian Chetniks" (the followers of the anticommunist guerrilla leader General Dragoljub Mihailovic, captured and executed 30 years ago), "Albanian irredentists" and pro-Western people in general have also been tried and sent to prison. In other words, what is now going on in Yugoslavia would seem to be not strictly an

anti-Soviet campaign, but rather a move designed to deter any would-be troublemakers of tomorrow, i.e., after Tito disappears from the political scene.

For this reason, it is not the names of the persons tried and sentenced which are important, but rather the very fact that the Yugoslav authorities have intensified their struggle against all kinds of "inimical activities." At the 14th session of the Presidium of the LCY's Central Committee, held on 15 October 1975, it was decided that greater severity had to be applied in prosecuting "foreign" and "internal" enemies of the regime. Of course, first place in the list of the regime's enemies is occupied by the so-called Cominformists, i.e., people advocating Yugoslavia's return to the "communist family" headed by Moscow. Yugoslav information media have, however, carefully avoided any one-sidedness: they have been most careful to avoid any moves that would confirm the impression gained in the West that only the followers of Moscow have been prosecuted.

This seems to be one of the main reasons why Yugoslavia's leaders have shown little concern about Western reaction to the sentencing of the lawyer Srdja Popovic, or the hunger strike of Mihajlo Mihajlov. One even gains the impression that, in provoking protests in the West in favor of Popovic and Mihajlov, the Yugoslavs have created a sort of a balance for the imprisoning of the followers of Moscow, even though the severity with which the latter have been prosecuted and sentenced has not provoked any public protests in the Soviet bloc countries. On the contrary, the Moscow Pravda (27 November 1975) dissociated itself from "conspiratorial sectarian groups" in Yugoslavia (i.e., from the Cominformists) "who represent no one but themselves." The Yugoslavs have been very pleased with this attitude taken by Pravda, but they obviously still do not consider it enough, for it is a fact that, while dissociating themselves from "conspiratorial sectarian groups" within Yugoslavia, the Soviets have thus far never dissociated themselves from pro-Soviet Yugoslav groups outside Yugoslavia.

It has been no secret that two main anti-Titoist (Cominformist) groups have been active outside Yugoslavia: the first (and smaller) group is said to be located in Prague; the second (the stronger and more important one) in Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine. Two leaders of the Kiev group, Dr. Mileta Perovic and Professor Bogdan Jovic, left Kiev in the middle of December 1975 and, according to at least two Western reports, (1) went to Paris to wage anti-

(1) An AFP report from Belgrade on 27 January 1976, and David Floyd in The Daily Telegraph (London), 24 February 1976.

Titoist propaganda. They brought with them from Kiev the "Party Program" and the "Party Statutes" of a "new" pro-Soviet CP of Yugoslavia, whose creation was allegedly proclaimed at the "Fifth Congress of the CPY" in Montenegro's Adriatic port, Bar, in the spring of 1974. Only in September 1974 did President Tito reveal that such a "congress" had been held, saying that some people "with Cominformist views" were "plotting against the state." Of the 32 people tried in September 1974, 29 were sentenced to from 4 to 14 years' imprisonment, and 3 to terms of 1 to 3 years. Only three persons were mentioned by name, all unknown to the broad public.

Anti-Titoist Program

On 26 September 1974, the Soviet news agency TASS vigorously denied any connection between the Soviet Union and the "Cominformist plotters" in Yugoslavia. It charged that Western news media and what it called anti-Soviet elements had tried to exploit the discovery of the "Cominformist group" in Yugoslavia to mislead world public opinion and to discredit the good relations between Moscow and Belgrade. One of the pro-Soviet exiles living in Western Europe at that time, former Colonel Vlado Dapcevic, denied all reports published both in Yugoslavia and in the West that he was connected with the plotters. (2) Yet after his short visit to Bucharest in August 1975, Dapcevic vanished mysteriously from his hotel, and by the end of December of that year the Yugoslavs officially announced that he was in custody in Belgrade, after having been captured "on the territory of Yugoslavia while carrying out inimical activities." (3) The 62-year-old Dapcevic, who was then already a Belgian citizen, is expected to be tried in camera for "antistate activities."

In their "program" for the "new" CP of Yugoslavia, Dr. Perovic and Professor Jovovic call the prevailing regime in Yugoslavia "Marshal Tito's counterrevolutionary personal dictatorship." They accuse Tito of having "expelled or arrested" more than 200,000 party members loyal to Moscow. Moreover, they even use the vocabulary of the Second Cominform Resolution of November 1949, when Tito and his colleagues were called "fascists." The new party it is claimed "rose

(2) Le Monde (Paris), 12 September 1974.

(3) Borba (Belgrade), 27 December 1975.


like a Phoenix from the ashes at the Bar [1974] Congress" and has been conducting "a remorseless battle with the counterrevolutionary regime of personal dictatorship." (4)

It is hardly surprising that the Yugoslav leaders have become very sensitive to any criticism coming from that side, especially if one remembers that Moscow has thus far not tried to deny anything Dr. Perovic and Professor Jovovic have propagated while in Paris. In the meantime, after Belgrade's strong protests in Paris, the French authorities have ordered the two Cominformist leaders to leave France: Dr. Perovic departed for Israel, while Professor Jovovic went to London. The trials of their followers in Yugoslavia continue.

(091)

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(4) The Daily Telegraph (London), 24 February 1976.



This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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RUMANIA/10
25 March 1976

S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

Culture

1. National Ideas in Education and Cultural Works Glorified.



Foreign Relations

2. Rumanian Coverage of Egypt's Decision to Abrogate Treaty with USSR
3. Foreign Trade Minister Patan Visits London
4. Difficulties in Exporting Machines and Equipment to the West

Economy

5. Ceausescu Visits Research Institutes; Science Meeting Follows

CULTURE1. National Ideas in Education and Cultural Works Glorified

Emphasis on national issues is becoming increasingly discernible in all spheres of Rumanian life. It is both programmatic and all but spontaneous. According to the historian Dinu C. Giurescu (see Contemporanul No. 6, 6 February 1976), "The man of the technical-scientific revolution [of the current five-year plan] cannot do without the dimensions of socialist humanism he finds in his country's history, geography, and literature."

The country is being flooded with books, articles, and television and radio broadcasts on historical subjects (many of which deal more or less openly with matters related to Transylvania and even Bessarabia); plays on heroic subjects drawn from the national history are being staged; the film studios are producing films dealing with similar subjects; great Rumanian leaders of the past are being glorified in ballads in almost every review, and meet the visitor's eye at every art exhibition. True, it has been remarked from time to time that the quality of this conformistic output of patriotic artistic propaganda is not always very high, but the stream continues uninterrupted, and has even begun to flow through a hitherto untouched area -- the kindergartens. According to an article published in the German-language daily Neuer Weg (9 March 1976), "patriotic education" was introduced in kindergartens as a separate "subject" last year. How to provide small children with this type of education was discussed at a meeting in Sibiu, and a number of suggestions with regard to method were put forward by the participants. Taking them to visit plants and newly built housing areas would provide many opportunities to describe what the regime has accomplished, explaining the symbolism of the national emblem, suggesting games connected with the map, having the children sing patriotic songs and recite patriotic poems -- all are useful, since "one cannot start early enough to inculcate a love of country in children."

The author of the Neuer Weg article went even further, suggesting that patriotism could be fostered not only during the time specifically devoted to its inculcation, but also during music and drawing lessons and -- significantly enough -- in those periods when the children of minority groups are taught in their native tongue (there is a sizable German minority in Rumania). In order to avoid any inconsistency between the education children receive in kindergarten and what they are taught at home, the author also suggested that parents be persuaded to collaborate more closely with preschool teachers.

Patriotic education and propaganda are matters of concern not only to teachers and pupils but also to what Ceausescu has called "the teachers of the teachers" -- among them the artists and writers. The party-sponsored project to create a "National Epic" continues to attract public attention. Recently Scinteia Tineretului (12 March 1976) added an official point of view to the many expressions of opinion from cultural activists and artists that have appeared in the information media. Ion Dodu Balan, vice-chairman of the Council on Socialist Culture and Education, gave an interview

to the youth daily in which he defined the role of the National Epic in artistic life. It is not the only tendency tolerated in the arts, he said, but it is the one most highly favored by the party:

This does not mean [that we tend toward] thematic restriction. It does mean, however, that we intend to build our culture on multiple co-ordinates and -- an essential point -- on the co-ordinate of the National Epic, which is based on a lofty, dialectical-materialist approach to the interpretation and evocation of history as well as to artistic means suited to such a noble task.

According to Balan, the emphasis on the National Epic -- which typifies the attitude toward art adopted by Ceausescu -- is politically motivated, and represents a reaction to attacks from outside on the national essence of the Rumanian people:

It is true that attempts have been made to deny our ability and to take away our language, which is the essential element of the national spirit. . . .

There is not a historical void behind us, as certain impostors and literary mercenaries try painstakingly but vainly to demonstrate; on the contrary, the facts prove that we have a glorious history and a long past behind us.

Nor did Balan underrate the role assigned to the National Epic in the context of the ideological campaign launched in 1971: "We therefore want to preserve our history, to glorify it and make it an ideological ally in the noble work of educating the popular masses in a communist spirit and creating the new man."

He stressed the fact that, in giving preferential treatment to art devoted to the National Epic, the party did not mean to impose a thematic restriction; artists are free to deal with any topic provided they do so with "talent and a party spirit." It is of some interest that he repeated Ceausescu's remark (in his speech to the 10th party congress in 1969) about "lights and shadows" in art. But, he went on, the heroic spirit should not be absent from any of these creations:

Contemporary works of art should mirror the spirit of living truth -- the struggle between old and new in the process of historical development, the consequences [of this development] as reflected in the awareness of the people, in joy and sorrow, in lights and shadows, in the great individual and collective achievements that confer on this lofty historical epoch its epic dimensions.

He made a point of the fact that those who do not feel they possess sufficient talent to collaborate in the creation of the epic "are not obliged to do so." On the other hand, those who feel compelled to express highly personal feelings may do so "so long as they create sincere and impressive works."

Balan's position is not liberal, but realistic. As can be

deduced from what he said in his interview, the party is willing -- though to what degree and in what proportion remain a matter for conjecture -- to tolerate works of art that do not form part of the national-epic main stream as long as they do not run counter to the ideological and political guidelines of the party.

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FOREIGN RELATIONS

2. Rumanian Coverage of Egypt's Decision to Abrogate Treaty with USSR

Rumanian media reported factually on the Egyptian parliament's abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian friendship treaty, quoting the essential passages in the communiqués issued by TASS and the Egyptian news agency MENA but avoiding any mention of certain offensive remarks contained in both. This is standard procedure in Rumania when the leadership does not wish to become involved in conflicts between other countries. It was followed, for instance, at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict, when the papers published communiqués from both sides on the same page but refrained from comment, and the same treatment was accorded the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973.

As usual, Rumania found itself out of step with the other East European countries: Hungary claimed that Sadat's aim was to restore the power of the bourgeoisie in Egypt; the CSSR said the action stemmed from the naive belief that an anti-Soviet stance would bring Egypt greater favors from the US than that country was granting to Israel; Poland described the decision as an arbitrary infringement of bilateral relations, clearly disadvantageous to Arab interests. Rumania however, said nothing. (087)

3. Foreign Trade Minister Patan Visits London

Ion Patan, Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation, arrived in London on March 17 for talks with the British government and representatives of private companies. During his visit he signed a series of contracts and agreements; at the Foreign Office Patan signed a Rumanian-British accord on trade promotion and investment guarantees, while at the Rumanian embassy he signed a contract on the setting up of a joint company in the domain of nuclear technology (GEC-Rumanian Nuclear Ltd.) which will bring together Britain's General Electric Company (Reactor Equipment Ltd.) and the Bucharest Institute for Nuclear Physics. During his last day in London, Patan signed a protocol on the expansion of bilateral trade, economic co-operation, and import/export arrangements with British companies.

Rumanian media have not thus far provided details on the various agreements concluded by Patan, either on the new joint company or on the development of trade exchanges and economic co-operation. It appears from the text of the statement on the creation of GEC-Rumanian Nuclear Ltd. that this organization is to be a commercial one and that its task will therefore most probably be to market nuclear technologies either bilaterally or on third markets; but no detailed information was given on these points.

Rumania's trade with Britain was heavily in deficit between 1970 and 1974, the cumulative adverse balance being 1,485.5 million lei (Anuarul Statistic al RSR, 1975). In 1975 Britain's exports to Rumania rose by 19 per cent, while its imports increased only fractionally (RFE Special/London, 17 March 1976). Since Rumania's 1974 deficit amounted to 238.3 million lei, it was presumably even greater in 1975. This imbalance obviously explains why at the beginning of this year the British government offered Rumania credits amounting to 100,000,000 pounds sterling to facilitate purchases of British goods (see Rumanian Situation Report/3, Radio Free Europe Research, 29 January 1976, Item 7).

One of the reasons for Patan's visit to London was the recent British decision to cut quotas for its imports of men's woollen suits from Eastern Europe by 8 per cent, which will if implemented result in the loss of a Rumanian market for about 17,000 suits. The Rumanian media did not mention this issue. (088)

4. Difficulties in Exporting Machines and Equipment to the West

In an article dealing with the question of improving the pattern of exports, the Rumanian Chamber of Commerce review Rumanian Foreign Trade (No. 1/1976) said that in 1974 the per capita value of Rumania's foreign trade was 420 dollars and that of its manufactured products was 91 dollars, while machinery and equipment accounted for only 5 per cent of the total volume of exports to the industrially developed countries. This unexpectedly poor figure is obviously one of the reasons why Rumania's trade deficit with the West is steadily increasing; the deficit with the most important Western countries totaled about 2,500 million lei in 1974, of which about 1,500 million were incurred in trade with the Common Market countries.

For some years Rumania has been trying to increase the proportion of the machine building and chemical industries' products in its global exports, and especially in those to the West. Optimistic plans have been formulated but never implemented. As long ago as 1966, for example, Maxim Berghianu, who was then the country's planning chief, announced that the machine building industry's contribution to total Rumanian exports would amount to 28 per cent by 1970; and in 1971 Ion Avram said that the figure would be 30 per cent by 1975. The proportions actually achieved were 22.8 and 23.5 per cent, respectively.

Rumanian Foreign Trade complains that the EEC imposes different tariffs on Rumania from those applied to the "other" developing countries, with the result that the country exports on preferential terms only 45 per cent of the volume to which these others are entitled. The principal Rumanian-made industrial products that suffer from this differential treatment are: textiles, footwear, fertilizers and other chemicals, iron and steel products, cast-iron pipes and tubes, electric motors, bearings, radio and television sets, and furniture. (089)

ECONOMY5. Ceausescu Visits Research Institutes; Science Meeting Follows

On March 19 the Rumanian press reported on a visit Ceausescu, Gheorghe Cioara, Gheorghe Oprea, Ilie Verdet, and Ion Ursu paid to the main research institutes in Bucharest the day before. Their purpose was to determine how science and technology could make a greater contribution to the "unified" plan for socioeconomic development, in line with the program of research, technological development, and technical progress worked out "according to the instructions and under the direct guidance of Ceausescu."

The Central Institute for Chemical Research, headed by Elena Ceausescu (wife of the party leader and a specialist in the chemical sciences) was the first to be visited. Minister of the Chemical Industry Mihail Florescu was on hand to greet Ceausescu and his companions, but Mrs. Ceausescu was not present. The press has always described the institute as one of the best in the country, and it has received a number of awards, but Ceausescu took the opportunity to mention a number of shortcomings in its activity, to urge that it make a greater contribution to the diversification of chemical fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, take steps to develop tubeless tires, encourage more efficient use of floor space in production units, and see to it that the new products and technologies it develops are applied promptly to industry. (The current five-year plan calls for a considerable increase in the output of the chemical industry. Some 490 programs are designed to ensure the production of over 3,100 new products which will replace many of the items that must now be imported.)

Next on the itinerary was the Central Institute for Metallurgical Research, where the visitors were greeted by Minister of Metallurgy Nicolae Agachi and the institute's director, Iancu Dragan. Thanks in good part to the research done at this institute considerable progress has been made in putting new technologies into practice and developing new products. In 1975 alone about half the total metallurgical output consisted of new items or items turned out by new methods. The current plan calls for intensive development of the metallurgical industry; there are programs to increase the production of stainless and refractory steels and ball bearings, and to improve their quality so that they will be competitive on foreign markets.

Ceausescu and his entourage then went to the Central Institute for Research on Electronics, Electrical Engineering, Automation, Machine Tools, and Precision Mechanics. They were greeted by Minister of the Machine-Building Industry Ion Avram and Valeriu Ceoconica, who directs the institute. Here again Ceausescu found things to criticize -- delays in applying research findings to industry and in expanding the production of medical equipment, failure to substitute plastics for alloys in the production of some items, etc. (According to the 1976-1980 plan the institute is to devote particular attention to the development of technologies applicable to the electrical and electronic fields, with a view to reducing imports and improving the quality of such items as automation equipment, machine tools, optical glass, computers, and so on.)

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The Central Institute for Machine Building Research, headed by Ion Crisan, was the fourth to be visited by Ceausescu. Its main purpose is to work out technologies that will make it possible to reduce imports and the consumption of metal. Among its current projects are the development of complex technological installations and equipment for the power and oil industries; future plans include the designing of new reducers (which will go into production in the second half of the current five-year plan), new types of hydraulic devices (which are already being mass produced), the development of new techniques for metal and alloy casting, etc. Once again Ceausescu found grounds for complaint, however. The institute has failed to come up with a program to reduce the consumption of metal, and it has been too slow in categorizing machine-building equipment.

Last on the list was the National Center of Physics, which is under the jurisdiction of the State Committee on Nuclear Energy, headed by Ursu (who is also chairman of the National Council on Science and Technology). The center has been responsible for the development of a number of products that are being sold abroad, and it is currently doing research on cathode beam vacuum fusing plants, highly sophisticated nuclear equipment, new techniques for utilizing sun and wind and industrial and household waste to produce energy, a neutron-pulse logging device to locate raw material deposits, and projects involving heavy ion physics. Techniques worked out by the institute are currently being used in the economy and in medicine; new devices for whose development it is responsible will go into production this year, and will result in a substantial reduction of certain imports. Ceausescu voiced no criticism of its activity.

A plenum of the National Center for Science and Technology -- Rumania's central co-ordinating agency for scientific research -- was summoned for the day after Ceausescu's visits to the research institutes (Scinteia, 20 March 1976). In his report, Ion Ursu, Chairman of this Council, analyzed the achievements of 1971-1975 and the tasks now facing scientific research. Other speakers dealt with specific features of the research programs, but the press gave no details of what was said.

Ceausescu's visits and the plenum are both indications of the special interest being shown in scientific research and its role in the implementation of the ambitious provisions of the current five-year plan. Another reflection of this interest is the fact that investments in research have grown considerably although they are still low. Anuarul Statistic RSR 1975 (p. 295) and Romania Libera (21 August 1975) indicate that these investments have grown from 0.8 thousand million lei in 1961-1965 to 1.9 in 1966-1970, 4.0 in 1971-1975, and 7.0 in 1976-1980.

The number of research organizations now operating in Rumania and their record of accomplishment are impressive. There are no less than 114 research institutes, 36 research and planning institutes, 18 planning institutes, and 80 factory laboratories, employing a total of 73,000 highly qualified specialists, to which another 13,000 will be added in the next five years. In the 1971-1975 period,

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over 700 new industrial products have come into being as the result of scientific research and almost 150 have been reshaped or modernized. During the 1976-1980 period 80 per cent of the techniques that will be used in the economy will have been devised by Rumanian experts (Romania Libera, 21 August 1975).


Despite these major commitments, however, there are indications that Rumanian research faces serious problems which may hamper its ability to fulfill such commitments. In his speech at a plenum of the National Council for Science and Technology in early 1974 Ceausescu promised to initiate "a broader discussion" on the sector's problems at a National Conference of Scientific Research to be held no later than September 1974 (Scinteia, 28 April 1974). This conference, however, has not been mentioned since.

Wages apparently constitute one of the most significant problems. Era Socialista (No. 3 /February/ 1974) reported that a more thorough study of wages of research specialists is needed, and the same demand was reiterated a year later in Era Socialista (No. 13 /July/ 1975). Romania Libera (13 January 1976) carried an article by Dinu Buznea, director of the Forecasting Institute for Calculation Techniques, who said that there had been some wage-related "unrest" among research staff during the working out of the project schedule.

The conditions for "scientific creation" constitute another problem for research. Era Socialista (No. 3, 1974) said that "ideas in scientific research cannot be produced 'to order,'" and productive periods must alternate with nonproductive ones. The idea of risk in research has been discussed on several occasions, but without significant results. Era Socialista (No. 13, 1975) said that the notion of "unsuccessful research" cannot be accepted in Rumania; research is not like manual work, it was emphasized -- it implies trial and, therefore, error. The concept of risk was discussed during a session of the Rumanian Academy and of the Academy of Sociopolitical Sciences in January 1976, in an address delivered by Victor Sahleanu, an associate professor, on "Productivity, Efficiency, and Risk in Scientific Research" (Romania Libera, 24 January 1976). The dailies did not elaborate on this theme, however, and no known changes have been introduced.

Reflecting the current emphasis on ideology in Rumania, the researchers' demands have been termed "subjective" developments, and they were called on to prove their "patriotism" by "overcoming" them (Romania Libera, 13 January 1976). (090)

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• RAD Background Report/71
(Hungary)
25 March 1976

ON THE ROADS TO SOCIALISM

(A translation with comment by the Hungarian Unit)

Summary and Introduction: The author of this article, which appeared in the HSWP daily Nepszabadsag on 20 March 1976, is Ferenc Varnai, the paper's chief foreign policy commentator and a leading expert on ideological questions. It has obviously been prompted by the recent Soviet party congress and is designed to express the Hungarian party's attitude to the various speeches made at this forum dealing with the possibility of individual roads to socialism; in particular, Varnai takes the opportunity to state the Hungarian position on the French and Italian parties' views on this question. Although his language is far from polemical, he reasserts the view that "the substance of the transition from capitalism to socialism, peacefully or through armed struggle, must be a form of proletarian dictatorship." Plainly, the HSWP has no intention of abandoning its orthodoxy on this point, although its position is a study in moderation compared to the militant, hard-line attitudes recently expressed by Soviet, East German, and Czechoslovak party officials and ideologues on the same issue. The fact that this is the first Hungarian contribution to a growing ideological campaign against the West European communist parties by the socialist bloc serves to underscore this contrast. Translated excerpts from Varnai's article follow.

* * *

. . . In the international situation that developed after World War II, several East European countries -- Hungary among them -- adopted as their form of government, under comparatively peaceful circumstances, a democratic socialism that took into account their historical traditions, social and economic conditions, and national customs. Individual forms of economic control existing within the structure of a state apparatus were developed in the Yugoslav Socialist Federative Republic, based on the social ownership of capital goods. Many new features characterized the birth of a new society within the Chinese People's Republic when the civil war had been won (at least as long as its leaders followed the principles of Marxism-Leninism); in Vietnam during the decades of struggle for national independence; and in the Korean Democratic People's Republic. The first socialist revolution in the American world followed the victory achieved in an anti-imperialist people's war waged against an extreme reactionary dictatorship.

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Various distinctive features can be discerned in the building of a socialist society and in the change to socialism, despite the fact that up to now socialism has triumphed mostly in those countries that moved from capitalism into socialism at a comparatively primitive stage in their economic and social development.

One does not need much imagination to predict that in the future the roads to socialism will be increasingly varied. The existing varieties will be enriched if the socialist revolution gets its head in a country with a modern industry and a developed agriculture, or if another nation in Asia, Africa, or Latin America chooses this road. It is also highly possible that, as a result of the shift in international power relations, a civil war will not always be necessary in the future before the struggle is won.

The choice of a specific road, the decision as to whether the time has arrived for the revolution, and the selection of the means to be used in the struggle will always as a matter of course be the responsibility of the revolutionary forces of the country concerned, of its communist party. When there is divergence in the paths leading to a nonexploiting society, it is important that the road chosen should actually lead to socialism -- that is to say, there must be no change in the general principles and regularity of socialist development. The substance of the transition from capitalism to socialism, peacefully or through armed struggle, must be a form of proletarian dictatorship -- that is to say, state-controlled building of socialism implemented by the working class. It is indispensable to strengthen and develop the communist parties' leading role and to co-ordinate the national and international work of independent, sovereign socialist states of equal status.

The fundamental difference between the Communists and the opportunist reformists is that the former are supporters of the socialist transformation of society. By this Marxist-Leninists mean the fundamental change that places essential, privately owned capital goods in public ownership and the radical transformation of political power and of the state apparatus. They have never, however, regarded revolutionary transformation as identical with armed violence or bloody civil war. . . .

* * *

Varnai goes on to analyze the situation in the Soviet Union in April 1917 when Lenin thought that the Russian revolution could follow a peaceful course. After citing Lenin's views on this point, Varnai states that the countries which took the road to socialist revolution in the second half of the 1940s were no longer threatened with open intervention by international imperialism and were therefore required to make smaller sacrifices than the Soviet Union. The drift of Varnai's argument is that even Lenin's words show that there are other roads to socialism as well as the one followed by the Soviet Union. But he reiterates that the chosen road "must genuinely lead to socialism." He then continues as follows.

* * *

The degree of vehemence that marked the struggle did not depend, therefore, on the proletariat, either in the second decade of the century or in the 1940s, or since then; and it will not do so in the future. All over the

world the interest of the workers' class is to attain power and to build its own new society with a minimum of sacrifice. Whether it uses violence or not never depends on its own will but is decided by the degree of resistance offered by the exploiting classes. This explains why, when a country's working class and communist party take stock of the possibility of achieving socialist revolution, they have to consider carefully not only their own strength and that of their allies, as well as the power of the indigenous bourgeoisie and the amount of resistance it is likely to offer, but also the chances of this bourgeoisie receiving support from international imperialism. Only in light of the actual situation can they decide whether a peaceful revolutionary transformation is possible, or whether violence will have to be used in overthrowing the bourgeois dictatorship. . . .

At least three factors must be present to enable a country to follow the road of comparatively peaceful revolution. First, the indigenous communist party must be able to gather around itself the revolutionary workers' class, the working peasantry, the intellectuals, the petite bourgeoisie, and indeed all the working classes and strata, because only in alliance with them can it overcome the antipopular, reactionary forces. Secondly, the opportunist groups that are reluctant to break with the exploiting classes and the policy of unprincipled compromise must be contained and isolated. And finally, international power relations must be such that the country's bourgeoisie cannot have recourse to international imperialism for help, while international imperialism for its part must be unable to export counterrevolution without risking an even greater defeat. With regard to the first two conditions, much depends on the country's working class and communist party, while the last one rests entirely on the international forces of socialism and progress.

Although we cannot yet say that the possibility of counterrevolution being exported has disappeared, the danger has been checked by the economic and defensive capacity of the countries of the socialist community. The Soviet Union, together with the other socialist countries that take a united stand alongside it, has increasingly forced the developed capitalist countries to accept and conform to the principles of peaceful coexistence. This is expressed in the agreements that the Soviet Union has signed with quite a number of capitalist countries and in the Final Act accepted in Helsinki by the governments of the European continent.

All this has created more favorable opportunities and better international conditions for the working classes in the capitalist countries to follow a road of peaceful transition to socialism.

But we are talking here of probabilities — not certitude. In many countries the capitalist military and police apparatus is still strong, and capitalism's economic power is great and its ideological influence important even among the working strata. And the bourgeoisie is quite prepared to sell the independence of its country if it thinks that its class rule is endangered. In the cases of Chile and Portugal we have already witnessed the international rallying of the forces of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie, and we can hardly forget the repeated and threatening declarations made by the American leaders that they would prevent by every possible means the Communists from coming to power in any of the NATO countries. The workers' class and the communist parties must therefore prepare as must the working masses, to use either of the two ways of effecting the revolutionary transformation of society.

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RAD Background Report/72
(World Communist Movement)
25 March 1976

ITALIANS, YUGOSLAVS REACT SHARPLY TO SOVIET ATTACK ON
"REVISIONISM"

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: A Soviet pamphlet attacking Western Communist "revisionism," published after a delay of five months, has provoked sharply polemical counterattacks by the Italian and Yugoslav parties. The author -- Venyamin Midtsev, a "candidate in philosophical sciences" who is also a "collaborator" of the foreign affairs section of the Soviet Central Committee -- devotes much of his booklet to criticism of the PCI's leading ideologist, Luciano Gruppi. The latter comments that "he talks about Gruppi to avoid talking about the PCI." A British Communist report says that Midtsev's main thesis is that the basic features of the Soviet model of socialist transformation are "obligatory for all countries." Two Yugoslav commentaries denounce the pamphlet as an attempt to impose on other parties and regimes "the theory of limited sovereignty."

+ + +

The Italian Communist Party has reacted very vigorously to a new Soviet publication criticizing Western communist parties -- without identifying them as its target -- for their "revisionist" and "opportunist" ideas. The object of the PCI's ire is a 56-page booklet entitled Revisionism in the Service of Anticommunism, by one Venyamin Midtsev. The Italian party daily Unità gives an account of Midtsev's indirectly polemical theses in a Moscow-

datelined dispatch (1) before proceeding to a strong, unsigned editorial refutation in which a tone of scorn is predominant. The British CP's daily Morning Star (March 22) has also published an 11-paragraph report on the booklet by its Moscow correspondent, recounting Midtsev's arguments without commentary and without reference to Western communist parties. So far there seems to have been no reaction from other West European parties, but on March 22 the Yugoslav agency Tanjug issued a dispatch from Moscow reporting the booklet's criticism of "communist parties which, according to Midtsev, occupy a neutralist and conciliatory position with regard to the Soviet-Chinese dispute," and remarking that the author "starts from the premise that the settling of accounts with revisionism constitutes one of the basic directions of the ideological struggle waged by the CPSU and other communist parties." This was followed the next day by extremely strong attacks on the pamphlet -- outdoing l'Unità in polemical vigor --
2 by the two leading Yugoslav commentators. (2)

One reason for the PCI's prompt reaction is that although no West European communist party is criticized by name, about one-third (3) of the booklet is given over to polemical criticism of the Italian party's leading ideologist, Luciano Gruppi with reference to an article of his published in l'Unità of 9 October 1973. This fact became public the day before the PCI's counterattack, when the Milan newspaper Corriere della Sera published a report (4) on the booklet by its Moscow correspondent. Having received this dispatch, the Corriere journalist Giovanni Russo sought a comment from Gruppi, and reached him by telephone at the PCI regional party school in Reggio Emilia. (5)

(1) "Come ragiona il filosofo Midzev," 19 March 1976.

(2) For this Yugoslav criticism of Midtsev's pamphlet; see below.

(3) In his interview with Corriere della Sera (see below) Gruppi said that "about 20 pages" of the 56-page pamphlet were devoted to the attack upon him.

(4) Piero Ostellino, "I Sovietici attaccano l'ideologo del PCI," 18 March 1976.

(5) See Giovanni Russo, "Gruppi: la mia è la posizione del partito," ibid.

Five Months' Delay

Gruppi knew about Midtsev's attack on him -- and had, in fact, known about it for five months. This, indeed, is one of the most interesting aspects of the affair. As Gruppi told Corriere (and as l'Unità confirmed next day), Midtsev's booklet was in fact printed last November, but did not go out to the bookshops (6) in an edition of 40,000 copies until last week. The significance of the delay will be a matter for speculation later in this report. The Unità article said it had been considered possible that the work would never reach the bookshops because it contained "more than transparent attacks on the line of the major Western communist parties."

Describing the publication of the booklet as "a grave impropriety," Gruppi stressed that Midtsev was attacking not just his own positions but those of the PCI:

The author speaks of me as an individual, feigning not to know that it is a matter of the positions of the PCI. He indicates that I approve of the new course of Dubcek in Czechoslovakia, ignoring the stand taken by the PCI on this; and he polemicizes with my articles in l'Unità as if this were not the official organ of the PCI. . . . In fact, he talks about Gruppi to avoid talking about the PCI. He tars with the same brush [Roger] Garaudy who was expelled from the PCF, [Ernst] Fischer who was expelled from the Austrian CP, and me -- a member of the Central Committee of the PCI.

During this telephone interview Gruppi could not recall the name of the Soviet author. So at this point one may ask: who is this Venyamin Midtsev who has taken on the leading ideologist of the PCI? One answer is that until the relevant Soviet authorities, acting through the All-Union Knowledge Society's publishing house, Znanie, decided to issue his pamphlet after a delay of five months, he was nobody in particular. l'Unità says: "The author is Venyamin Midtsev, 'candidate in philosophical sciences,' a collaborator of the foreign affairs section of the Central Committee of the CPSU." The implication may be that a relative unknown -- a "candidate in philosophical sciences" who has some undefined connection with the foreign affairs section of the CC CPSU -- was pressed into service to undertake a polemical action that some elements of the apparat judged desirable, but which was not to be associated with a more weighty figure.

(6) Gruppi told Corriere della Sera that the booklet "had been withdrawn from the bookshops"; the Unità report, on the other hand, said that it "had not been put into circulation."

At the same time, however, there was an official effort to give more weight to the lightweight. L'Unità cites the publisher's introduction:

The work illustrates the class substance and the fundamental traits of modern revisionism, of the Right and of the Left. . . . The author demonstrates the inconsistency of revisionist views on ways of transition from capitalism to socialism, on the plurality and diversity of "models of socialism," and reveals the anticommunist content of such concepts. The work is written for professors, lecturers, students, and the great public in general.

Democracy, the Key Issue

Let us turn now to the substance of the polemic. Gruppi's Unità article (7) which Midtsev attacks, was a measured restatement of the PCI's position of "critical solidarity" with the Soviet regime; and in fact its main point (in reply to an Italian commentator) was that the USSR was a socialist society. But Gruppi also stressed his party's view that socialism implies "the full implementation of democracy at all levels of social and state life," (8) and went on:

Is this equally essential aspect of the socialist regime present as it should be, with the necessary fullness and the consequences that that involves on the level of political and cultural liberties, in the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries? It seems to us that it is not, and we have not failed to say so.

L'Unità quotes Midtsev's comment on this passage:

In other words, the "Soviet model" and the other existing "models of socialism" do not suit this author, above all because they "lack democracy." But what in the language of revisionism is called a lack of democracy in reality is the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the supreme form of democracy.

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- (7) "I contenuti dell'internazionalismo," 9 October 1973.
- (8) Gruppi added: "It was with reference to this complex of problems that we supported the 'new course' in Czechoslovakia and condemned the intervention of the Warsaw Pact countries."

"Right of Criticism" Rejected

The "right revisionists," Midtsev wrote, were "convinced adversaries of the struggle for the ruling function of the working class. They bow to the principles of bourgeois democracy based on the 'free play of political forces' and on the decision of the majority for or against socialism." They "obstinately" maintained the thesis that "they will go toward socialism not by following the way of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries but by their own special national way" -- and this amounted to "the affirmation that the way of the Soviet people and the peoples of the other socialist countries was not the best way." This showed "pride and nationalist limitation," Midtsev wrote: only a "petit bourgeois" could "think that socialism in one country could differ from socialism in another not just in nuances but in substance."

As an example of their "abandonment of proletarian internationalism" Midtsev pointed to "the revisionists' attempts to replace the principles of proletarian internationalism with the principle of the national sovereignty of the socialist states, of the communist parties." It followed that "the [Italian communist] slogan of 'critical solidarity' with the socialist countries" was also to be condemned as revisionist.

"Obligatory" Model

In some communist parties the proponents of a "critical attitude" toward the socialist countries had gone so far as to claim "the right of disagreement and criticism," and even held that such criticism "helped the socialist countries themselves." On the contrary, Midtsev wrote: such criticism "helps only the reactionary forces of imperialism." L'Unità adds: "In this connection Midtsev makes explicit reference to the Czechoslovak events of 1968."

To the quotations offered by L'Unità one can add the paraphrased report of the Morning Star:

The basic features of state, socio-economic and cultural development and the fundamental features of the socialist transformation in the Soviet Union are fundamental principles of socialist construction and obligatory for all countries.

This is the declaration made in [Midtsev's pamphlet]. . . .

He states that the ignoring of these features, revealed and confirmed in practice by many countries as a fundamental principle of socialist construction and obligatory for all countries, is not possible without relapsing into the mistaken positions of revisionism.

Communists, he stated, were not opposed to compromises in politics, but they were against such compromises which rejected ideological principles and conceded revolutionary positions to their opponents in the class struggle.

L'Unità's commentary-refutation began by remarking that it was hard to know how much representative value to ascribe to Midtsev's views, since one could find in the Soviet press other views which could certainly not be identified with "the theses contained in Midtsev's slight work [opuscolo]." (9) Nevertheless, "one cannot miss the novelty of an attack which takes as its target, through an article of Comrade Luciano Gruppi, fundamental options of the PCI and other Western communist parties." The editorial statement goes on:

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- (9) The Italian Communists have used this reference to divergent Soviet views before, as in their reply to Zarodov's dogmatist article in Pravda last August. This time, however, they were able to reinforce the argument by publishing in l'Unita of March 23 a review by Moscow correspondent Carlo Benedetti of three new and obviously "positive" Soviet books on the PCI. The first of these is a largely documentary work on the PCI's 14th Congress (1975) edited by Anatoly Krylov -- who, like Midtsev, is also "a collaborator of the foreign affairs section of the CC, CPSU" -- and was formally presented to Berlinguer when he was in Moscow for last month's Soviet congress. The second, by Oleg Ivanitskii, is a study of the PCI's agrarian policy, presented as helping to bring about "a new line-up of forces for the transformation of Italian society in a democratic and socialist direction." The third, by Irina Belova, deals with the PCI's struggle for the reunification of the trade unions, "a process which is closely linked with the particular character of the country's socio-economic and political development.

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From his little teaching-chair [cattedra] of "candidate in philosophical sciences" Venyamin Midtsev launches his summary accusations in the name of the "general laws of socialism." The author formally concedes the possibility of a difference "of nuances" in the various ways of reaching socialism and of building a socialist society. But Midtsev — who, to judge by his linguistic style even more than by his affirmations, does not seem to be a master of "nuances" — comes at once to the "substance" of the issues. He brands as an "arrogant nationalist" and a "revisionist" anyone who holds that the way of the Soviet people and of the other socialist countries "would not suit his own country." Also an "opportunist," consequently, is anyone who affirms the "right of disagreement and criticism" with regard to this or that aspect of the political organization, for example, of the existing socialist societies. Hence, those who affirm, as Comrade Gruppi has done, that the implementation of democracy in the USSR has not reached the "necessary fullness" have become "falsifiers of Marxism-Leninism."

The aberrant but logical corollary of this concept is that "the principle of national sovereignty" must be practically annulled in "proletarian internationalism" — an internationalism which, according to the author of the booklet, is measured by the attitude adopted toward the USSR and other socialist countries, for which he demands a sort of "acritical solidarity."

L'Unità goes on to quote Berlinguer's recent speech at the 25th CPSU Congress, in which he affirmed the PCI's commitment to struggle, in collaboration with other political forces, for an Italian socialist society of pluralistic (10) democracy, which would guarantee "all the individual and collective liberties, [including] religious liberties and freedom of culture, the arts, and science."

"Grotesque" Dogmatism

The commentary scornfully describes as "grotesque" Midtsev's claim to present "his crude apparatus of formulas as the true expression of Lenin's thought, which is assessed by the standards of a system of immutable dogmas." And it offers him a little lesson in history, to show "how old his little formulas are for us." At the

(10) Although Pravda published the full text of Berlinguer's speech, it has been noted that it avoided the Russian word for "pluralistic" and used one meaning "multiform."

third Comintern congress Lenin criticized the Italian Communists (!) for failing to see that their revolutionary way must be different from that of Russia: anyone who did not see that in Western Europe Communists must win over the majority of the working class and of farm workers "will never learn anything." The last word follows:

Since then 50 years have passed, the world has changed, the workers' movement has undergone experiences that naturally go beyond Lenin's horizon -- but there are still some who have learned nothing.

In his telephone interview Gruppi agreed that what was at issue was "the conflict between those who hold that there are general laws valid for the whole communist movement" and those who opposed that view. This, he added, was "a divergence of a profound ideological and cultural character, because the PCI is against the thesis of laws valid for all."

Yugoslav Counterattacks

When it is put in those terms, it is obvious that the PCI is by no means alone in its vigorous opposition to "general laws." One of its most vigorous allies in this area is the Yugoslav party, which has been significantly quick to join in the polemic over Midtsev's pamphlet. Two commentaries broadcast over Radio Zagreb and Radio Belgrade on March 23 attack the pamphlet in extremely strong terms, both seeing in it an attempt to impose upon other communist parties what used to be known after August 1968 as the "Brezhnev Doctrine" -- the "theory of limited sovereignty."

On Radio Zagreb Milika Sundic said bluntly that Midtsev's message "is harsh and unacceptable to all those for whom it is intended." For him, "the unmasking of Stalinism still represents anticommunism." Remarking that Midtsev was "strongly opposed to all those who advocate equal co-operation among communist parties and socialist countries," Sundic said: "If the doctrine of limited sovereignty has ever existed, then Midtsev's thesis represents its legal presentation." As against that thesis, "it is up to each socialist country to decide, to the degree to which it is able, what forms of relations it wishes to have with other countries and parties -- the usual ones, not accepted by the Soviet philosopher, or some unusual ones, which are unacceptable to others -- and whether it wishes to leave it to the Soviet Union to determine unilaterally what is to be the basic criterion of proletarian internationalism in all situations."

In his Radio Belgrade commentary Cedomir Vuckovic was equally forthright. He accused Midtsev of seeking "to impose on everybody his views on the norms of behavior among parties," and of "[labeling] as anticommunism any unmasking of Stalinism, the consequences of which are well known not only in the world at large but also among the peoples of the Soviet Union." Midtsev was said to have falsified the views of others "so as to arrive at a new argument in favor of the theory of limited sovereignty, although many communist parties which think along different lines from the party to which Midtsev belongs have long since rejected this theory." But in his closing passages Vuckovic significantly widened his target:

We have heard all this before . . . and there have been attempts to impose all this on us as socialist dogma in several variations at different times. Midtsev merely attempts to revalue all that has been rejected, condemned, and criticized in the international workers' movement. Indeed, his chances of doing so would not be very great, and there would be no need to reflect on them, had his closing paragraph not read: "The basic criterion of proletarian internationalism is the attitude toward the Soviet Union." From this one could draw the conclusion that the pamphlet is not merely a personal opinion of Midtsev.

How such pamphlets are harmful at the present moment of frank, fruitful, and useful discussions in the international workers' movement, how they can hamper the efforts to improve more quickly outdated relations in the international communist movement — let this be considered by those who make it possible for Midtsev to print and distribute pamphlets with such a content and such pretensions.

Vuckovic is right in drawing attention to the timing of the pamphlet's publication, after five months' delay. The delay itself — covering the period of the Soviet congress and of what were evidently crucially important preparatory meetings for the pan-European conference — suggests that the timing is significant, and also that the polemical views expressed in the pamphlet are not just those of an obscure "philosopher" but have the support of at least an element of the Soviet leadership. It is surely significant also that the past few weeks have brought similar dogmatist statements, clearly if indirectly critical of Western communist concepts, from Soviet spokesmen like Suslov, from Honecker of East Germany, and from Rude Pravo. It may be that this represents a collective conservative effort to compensate on the ideological level for concessions made to the independent parties in the pan-European preparatory meetings. It

certainly seems to represent genuine concern about the "subversive" effect of Western communist ideas on the populations of the Eastern regimes.

Midtsev's pamphlet can thus be viewed as merely one piece in a wider pattern of interparty dissension. But that fact in turn suggests that we have not heard the last of this particular polemic. (085)

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RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.



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S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T



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CULTURE1. Young Writers Protest Against Publishing Practices

An anonymous group of young writers in Bucharest recently sent a letter to the editors of the Writers' Union weekly Luceafarul (March 13) complaining about the contests for literary beginners arranged by the publishing houses (see Rumanian Situation Report/2, Radio Free Europe Research, 16 January 1975, Item 3). Among other things, they had the following to say:

In 1975 Cartea Romaneasca, Dacia, and other publishing houses arranged poetry contests for beginners. Cartea Romaneasca stated that the results of its contest would be published during the month of November 1975. Dacia promised to announce the results by 15 January 1976 at the latest." As you well know, the above-mentioned publishing houses have not kept their promises. . . .

We wonder whether the hundreds of literary beginners who submitted manuscripts to these publishing houses will think that contests which are so badly organized have any usefulness at all.

The letter was signed "A Group of Bucharest Contenders."

This is the first time young writers whose works have not yet appeared in print and who are not members of either the Writers' Union or the Literary Fund have ventured to protest against what they consider to be unfair practices.

The precarious situation of the latest generation of writers, who have fallen victim to the policy of limiting their access to the writing profession, has been pointed out on a number of occasions recently (see Rumanian SR/47, RFER, 5 December 1975, Item 1). It now appears that the type of beginners' contest mentioned above is being increasingly -- and justly -- regarded as the main instrument for restricting the young. Cartea Romaneasca, which was put under the Writers' Union in 1970, has de facto been incorporated into the network of state-owned publishing houses, all of which organize beginners' contests. In the course of an interview granted to the Sibiu cultural monthly Transilvania (No.12, December 1975) Marin Preda, director of Cartea Romaneasca, stated: "Our publishing house has been integrated into the Editorial Central of the Council on Socialist Culture and Education, which furthers our efforts to publish contemporary Rumanian literature."

Even before the deadlines for publishing the results of the contests had passed and before the anonymous Bucharest group had undertaken their "offensive defense," a critic had made a strong plea for a new discussion about the "utility" of these beginners' contests. In an article in Flacara (No.51/52, 27 December 1975) Nicolae Manolescu argued convincingly against them -- or at least against the way they are organized. He based his plea on his own experience as a member of two juries to which the publishing houses submitted manuscripts. He directed his strongest argument against

what he called preselection. Even though he served on the juries he was left in complete ignorance of the criteria on which the manuscripts sent to the jury by the publishing houses were selected, and therefore "~~we jury members~~" cannot be absolutely sure that the manuscripts presented to us are in every instance the most representative ones."

The most serious defect of these contests, Manolescu said, is the intolerable "uniformization of attitudes and criteria." "The practice of holding contests is useful particularly if it is accompanied by other practices. There are always authors who deserve to and who must make their debuts hors concours." The purpose should indeed be "to select ~~manuscripts~~ more carefully, but certainly not to postpone ~~publication of~~ outstanding authors on grounds of administrative-editorial criteria."

Manolescu referred to the young poets known as "the generation of Nichita Stanescu," who made their poetic debuts in the early 1960s, saying that they would not be able to meet the conditions set in present-day beginners' contests: "If Nichita Stanescu or Ioan Alexandru, Marin Sorescu or Dan Laurentiu were to make their debuts today, they would be obliged to do so hors concours." Manolescu's view appears to be correct; the generation of the 1960s was able to publish because the publishers, operating under a reformed publishing system, did not set "guidelines" for either the content or the form of literary works; the present-day literary beginners' contests, however, are based on strict prescriptions as to topic, feelings to express, and degree of intelligibility to observe. Socialist realism -- with a strongly nationalistic hue, it is true -- has returned by the back door. (068)

2. Preparations for Writers' Conference and Culture-Education Congress

A number of leading bodies of the Writers' Union have recently held meetings to discuss preparations for the Congress on Political Education and Culture and the forthcoming National Conference of Rumanian Writers. The congress is scheduled for May, but the date of the conferences has not yet been disclosed. (According to the statutes, such conferences should be held every four years; the last one took place in May 1972.)

The first in this series of meetings was that of the Writers' Union Bureau, on February 27. The session was also attended by writers who, while not members of the bureau, are on the RCP Central Committee or deputies to the Grand National Assembly. The following points were discussed and approved: the union's plans in connection with preparations for the Congress on Political Education and Culture; the main points in the theses on the National Writers' Conference; the rules governing literary awards and the membership of the jury that will determine the recipients; the admission of new members to the union and to the Literary Fund; and the union's budget.

Those present were also informed of "various external actions" undertaken by the union and discussed "various /other/ matters." (Romania Literara No.10, 4 March 1976.)

At the meeting of the Writers' Union Council, on March 5 (also attended by CC members and Grand National Assembly deputies) the activity of the bureau was approved. "Various /other/ matters" were also discussed but, in line with the now institutionalized practice of restricting information, the report on the meeting in Romania Literara (No.11, 11 March 1976) gave no details. A letter from the proletcult writer Traian Filip to Romania Literara's editor-in-chief, George Ivascu, does indicate, however, that literary criticism may have been one topic on the agenda. Implying that Ivascu had defended his editors against attacks that had been made on them and had rejected demands that they be removed from their posts, Filip said:

I know that the old team /of critics/ must earn their daily bread, as you said during a recent meeting, but this does not mean they should be given life-time jobs in an editorial office where an innovating spirit and a correct interpretation of literary phenomena are needed.

(Filip's letter was published in the 12 March 1976 issue of Saptamina; for more on the campaign against literary critics, see Rumanian SR/8, RFER, 15 March 1976, Item 1.)

Third in line was a joint meeting of the party committee, the party aktif, and the bureau of the Writers' Union, held on March 8, (Romania Literara No.11, 11 March 1976). It was attended by Gheorghe Cioara, a member of the Political Executive Committee of the RCP CC and first secretary of the Bucharest Municipal Party Committee, and Dumitru Ghise, vice-chairman of the Council on Socialist Culture and Education (the latter was also present at the council meeting on March 5). Science fiction novelist Ion Hobana, who is secretary of the union's party organization, delivered a report in which he described the way in which the ideological program worked out in 1971 has been put into effect by the literary community. Neither his report nor the speeches delivered by Cioara and other participants in the meeting were published, however.

The most interesting aspect of all this is the fact that CC members and Grand National Assembly deputies who are not members of the union's bureau or its council should have attended the meetings. This has happened sporadically for the past year or so, however, and it is in line with the party's often expressed determination to strengthen its influence over all areas of activity. (069)

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POLICE AND THE COURTS3. Discussions on Improving Militia Activity and Respect for Law

In an interview granted to Romania Libera (3 March 1976) Deputy Minister of the Interior and Inspector-General of the Militia Jean Moldoveanu said that a "concrete program" for improving the efficiency of the militia has been worked out by the ministry in accordance with the policy determined by Ceausescu in his capacity as supreme commander of the army. The program is designed to put into effect the relevant decisions taken by the 11th RCP Congress of November 1974. No detailed information on such a program is available so far, and indeed Moldoveanu is among the first to mention it publicly.

The deputy minister said that the militia's duty is to defend resolutely Rumania's "revolutionary conquests," to protect public order, and to defend "socialist legality." In accordance with the policies of the Rumanian state and communist party, the militia's activities are oriented toward preventing and combating infringements of the law and "other antisocial deeds." State bodies, economic units, and public and youth organizations also play a part in preventing honest citizens from turning into criminals and public opinion should help to identify and eliminate the reasons that drive people to commit offenses and antisocial deeds.

In 1975 the militia organized many public meetings and cooperated whenever possible with economic and other public organizations, while the judicial and prosecutor's offices collaborated with the militia in arranging over 200,000 "actions to popularize obedience to the law." In addition to this, a considerable number of court cases were tried in public.

During his interview Moldoveanu said that the militia's operational methods and personnel training should be improved -- particularly in the matter of political education. The organization is making increased use of modern techniques and devices, such as automated records of the population and traffic control, the use of TV and radio, etc. Some research institutes do all they can to help the militia, Moldoveanu claimed; the Academy of Medical Sciences, for example, has analyzed road accidents and their causes.

He went on to say that efforts are being made to improve the political, ideological, and military training of members of the militia not only during their periods of attending specialized schools but also at their places of work and in society, where "every militia activist should be a model of good behavior." Those who adopt a passive attitude to their work or "misuse" their positions, however, deserve criticism and punishment; this will strengthen the prestige of the militia rather than weaken it. (Such cases are seldom mentioned in the press, but Scinteia of 2 October 1975 reported an instance in which the head of the Huruiesti militia in Bacau County had reprimanded a female member of an agricultural production co-operative for displaying an offensive attitude to the "control authority on duty.")

Moldoveanu's interview should be assessed within the framework of reports drawn up by various state and public organizations on the preparations for the forthcoming congress of political education and culture, which is scheduled for May 1976. In this context Scinteia (9 March 1976) carried a report on the discussions conducted by the Bucharest judges' party organization, where some speakers had commented on the points raised by Moldoveanu. Judge Iulius Ticlete, secretary of the party organization of the Bucharest Municipality Court, criticized the organization of trials that take place at the accused's work place. Many of them are held at inconvenient times and places, with the result that the public benches are filled by "respectable pensioners" rather than the colleagues of the person on trial. Other speakers said that the drive to encourage respect for the law had not yielded the results anticipated because of its formalist character and inadequate range of subjects. When the subject matter is selected "from above," it often fails to arouse the interest of the young people; at one meeting held in a hostel for single workers the organizers had to change it at the last moment, and in order to attract the attention of the audience the discussion was switched to problems of family and society behavior.

Romania Libera (16 March 1976) carried a report on the party committee plenum of the Prosecutor-General's office, at which First Deputy Prosecutor-General Sever Georgescu said that in some provinces the number of offenses known to the militia has dropped. In his opinion ignorance of the law and general incompetence are to some extent responsible for offenses such as embezzlement and theft, but he implicitly admitted that the country's legal system is still heavy-handed and inaccessible to the public in spite of efforts made in the last few years to systematize and popularize it.

Prosecutor Victor Predescu said that "particular attention" should be paid to the investigation of each individual case, since behind the files are human beings and mistakes can have unhappy repercussions on the interests of both "the collective" and the individual. Great care must be taken to avoid any abuses in judicial proceedings. (070)

DEMOGRAPHY

4. Factors Affecting the Growth and Structure of the Population

According to the communiqué on implementation of the 1971-1975 plan (Scinteia, 4 February 1976), Rumania's population increased by 1,000,000 during those five years, reaching 21,352,000 inhabitants. Almost half of them -- some 10,200,000 persons -- are actively employed in the national economy. The largest proportion -- 62 per cent -- work in industry and other nonagricultural economic branches -- an indication of the change brought about in Rumanian society by industrialization. In 1948 only 23.4 per cent of the population lived in urban areas, but in 1974 the figure was 42.7 per cent.

The natural growth rate since 1967 is shown in the following table:

Natural Population Growth

(per 1,000 inhabitants)

1967	1970	1973	1974
18.1	11.6	8.4	11.2
<u>Source: Anuarul Statitical RSR 1975, p. 23.</u>			

The "peak" reached in 1967 was the result of legislation introduced in 1966, which forbade abortions and made it more difficult to obtain a divorce. The population found other ways to reduce the birth rate, however, and in 1973 the natural growth rate was less than half that of 1967, through it rose again in 1974.

The most likely variant for Rumania is a lower population growth for the remainder of this century:

Natural Growth Forecast

(per 1,000 inhabitants)

1970/1975	1975/1980	1980/1985	1985/1990	1990/1995	1996/2000
9.1	8.2	7.4	7.2	7.7	7.5
<u>Source: Economic Survey of Europe in 1974, p. 169.</u>					

Nevertheless, according to the same source, Rumania will chalk up a better record than the other East European countries. The 1995/2000 indicator for Bulgaria, for instance, will be 2.2; in Czechoslovakia it will be 3.1; in East Germany 2.8; in Hungary 0.6; and in Poland 3.3. The Soviet Union is the only country in the bloc expected to equal Rumania in this respect.

The proportion of "dependents" within the total population is expected to rise as time goes on, as can be seen from the table below:

No. of Inhabitants Under 15 or 60 and Over
(per 100 inhabitants)

1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
64	65	65	64	66	69	72
<u>Source:</u> <u>Economic Survey of Europe in 1974</u> , p. 190.						

In this respect Rumania's position will be inferior to that of the other East European countries. By the year 2000 the figures for the rest of the bloc will range between 59 and 69 (the European average will be 67). Again, however, the figure forecast for the Soviet Union is the same as that for Rumania.

Population density has increased considerably since 1930, as the following table shows:

Population per Square Kilometer

1930	1948	1956	1966	1973
60.1	66.8	73.6	80.4	87.7
<u>Source:</u> <u>Anuarul Demografic al RSR 1974</u> , p.9.				

According to the same source, there are considerable differences among the various counties in this respect. Only six counties and Bucharest itself have over 100 inhabitants per square kilometer, with density ranging between 101.5 in Bacau County and 167.5 in Prahova County. In Bucharest the figure is enormously higher -- 2,715.1 inhabitants per square kilometer. In 10 of the 39 counties population density ranges between 30.6 and 66.2.

Recently there has been little variation in the annual number of marriages, but the divorce rate has risen at a rapid rate. The table below gives the picture since 1967:

Marriages and Divorces

Year	Marriages	Marriages per 1,000 inhabitants	Divorces	Divorces per 1,000 inhabitants
1967	154,105	8.0	48	--
1970	145,541	7.2	7,865	0.39
1973	170,130	8.2	14,472	0.69
1974	175,496	8.3	17,951	0.85
<u>Source:</u> <u>Anuarul Statistic al RSR 1975</u> , pp. 22-23.				

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In the 1960s about two thirds of the population over 15 years of age were married. The Economic Survey of Europe in 1974 (pp. 48-49) provides the following information:

Year	Married Men, as a Per Cent of Total Population	Married Women, as a Per Cent of Total Population
1960	69.4	64.0
1970	73.2	68.8

Over the years the authorities have adopted measures designed to reduce the manpower shortage that persists in Rumania. In the summer of 1973, for example, a special RCP CC plenum took up the question of improving the social status of women. In his address to this gathering Ceausescu admitted that there has again been a drop in the birth rate and called for measures to prevent "the aging of our nation." In order to encourage women to have more children he promised improvements in their living and working conditions (Scinteia, 20 June 1973). Early in 1975 the Political Executive Committee examined demographic developments in the country during the previous year and determined that the situation was satisfactory. It was decided that the Ministry of Health, and other party and state agencies should take resolute action to ensure the welfare of mothers and children, and should take particular care to improve conditions in crèches and kindergartens (Scinteia, 2 April 1975), and early in 1976 the Political Executive Committee met with the Standing Bureau of the Supreme Council on Socioeconomic Development and the Council of Ministers to discuss the demographic situation, which was again deemed satisfactory, and it was decided to perpetuate the measures taken in 1975 (Radio Bucharest, 17 March 1976). (071)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

5. Contacts with Western Socialist Parties

In considering the RCP's attitude to the socialist parties of the West, two statements of policy have to be taken into account. First, the documents and speeches of the 11th party congress of November 1974 called for the "consolidation on a new basis of the unity of the worker class and of all progressive revolutionary forces," and for a "historical reconciliation" between communists and socialists; and secondly, the RCP Program said that there was a need to strengthen relations with socialist, social democratic, and progressive parties all over the world.

In this context it is also worth recalling that Brezhnev stated in his speech at the 25th CPSU Congress that "one cannot conceive an ideological coming together between scientific communism and socialdemocratic reformism," which is in stark contrast to the RCP's policy of making no fundamental distinction (in this sphere at least) between socialists and social democrats and of favoring co-operation

between communists and "progressive forces without improving any special conditions.

During an interview granted to the Yugoslav daily Delo (27 February 1976), Ceausescu was asked for his opinion on the possibility of achieving unity in the international workers' movement. He said that one "exceptionally important" point was that the communist parties in some Western countries had pronounced themselves strongly in favor of a new orientation, of finding ways of participating in revolutionary transformation from inside rather than from outside society; and when he addressed the 25th CPSU Congress on February 26, he reiterated the principles enshrined in the Rumanian Party Program: "The RCP works for the development of co-operation and solidarity with socialist and social democratic parties," he said, "with national liberation movements, and with progressive and anti-imperialist organizations."

The political weekly Lumea (11 March 1976) carried an article under the headline: "The Preconditions for a Historical Reconciliation Between Communists and Socialists" in which the author considered the possibility of the communist parties in a number of West European countries participating in the government of their respective states on the basis of an alliance of communists, socialists, and other "democratic" forces. The article, which referred mainly to France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, said that "communist participation in the government [of such countries] appears to be not so much a legitimate aspiration as an acute necessity." The author ("R.P.") recognized that many differences of opinion and even divergencies still exist between communists, socialists, and social democrats, and that prejudice and rigidity sometimes carry the day. He ended by arguing that the fundamental impulse toward the achievement of a "new kind of unity" is derived from a knowledge of the diversity of historical, social, and political conditions, and is thus based on refusal to accept any one standard model.

In the setting of such a policy increasingly frequent meetings have taken place in the last few years between the RCP and Western socialist parties, and in the first two months of 1976 alone delegations from the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, the Greek Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party, and the Labor Party of the Netherlands have visited Bucharest, while an RCP delegation attended the 40th Congress of the Italian Socialist Party.

The Spanish Socialist Workers' Party delegation, which was in Bucharest between January 26 and 29, was headed by First Secretary Felipe Gonzales. He met Ceausescu on the last day of his visit and discussed party problems as well as those of the international situation and the international workers' movement. They stressed the necessity to develop co-operation among communists, socialists, social democrats, and other progressive and democratic forces on both the national and international levels, "in the struggle for economic and social progress, and against imperialism and its interference in the internal affairs of other states." They also underlined the need to unite the efforts of the

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European peoples toward the achievement of genuine security on the continent, and the desirability of developing co-operation on various levels among them.

Before leaving Gonzales gave an interview to Radio Bucharest in which he described his talks with Ceausescu as very positive and said that during his two-hour meeting with the Rumanian president the problems of both countries had been discussed with frankness. Concerning the political situation in Spain, Gonzales expressed the opinion that such equilibrium as has been achieved between Right and Left is now tilting in favor of the latter. "We consider," he said, "that the strengthening and consolidation of a democratic process and of the possible socialist alternative in Spain can be obtained through an understanding between the socialist and communist parties, the two key left-wing political forces." He said that some difficult problems will arise during 1976 -- trade union freedom, the struggle for the control of the municipalities within a framework of general freedom, an amnesty for political prisoners, the return of exiles, and the granting of legal status to political parties.

It is worth mentioning that there are close links between the RCP and the Spanish CP; Dolores Ibarruri and Santiago Carrillo, president and secretary-general of the SCP respectively, are regular guests of the RCP and of Ceausescu. Both were in Bucharest in January of this year.

A delegation from the Greek Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party, headed by its president Andreas Papandreou, visited Bucharest in the beginning of February 1976, at the invitation of the RCP. During a meeting with Ceausescu on February 5, it was agreed that the expansion of bilateral political, economic, and technological-scientific relations was in the interest of both countries, and that the provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki conference should be implemented and the course of détente thereby strengthened. The two sides noted the importance of transforming the Balkans into an area of peace and collaboration, and urged that the Cyprus conflict be settled by political negotiation. Papandreou also met with Political Executive Committee member Gheorghe Radulescu and with CC Secretary Stefan Andrei.

In a statement issued before his departure on March 8, Papandreou said that important progress had been made in the development of bilateral relations between the two parties and paid his hosts the compliment of stating that "the Rumanian CP has gained rich experience in building socialism, experience from which we have much to learn."

On February 20 Ceausescu received a delegation from the Labor Party of the Netherlands, headed by Harry Van Den Bergh, party presidium member and secretary in charge of international affairs. The talks were marked by a shared determination to promote a more fruitful co-operation between the RCP and the Labor Party of the Netherlands, and the two sides called on all political organizations and public opinion to intensify their efforts to ensure the

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implementation of the Final Act, the building of genuine security in Europe, the taking of effective measures to achieve military disengagement, the halting of the arms race -- above all in the nuclear sphere -- and progress toward disarmament.

Mihai Dalea, alternate member of the RCP Political Executive Committee, represented the Rumanian CP at the 40th congress of the Italian Socialist Party. Addressing the congress on March 3 Dalea said that, in accordance with the decisions of its last congress, the RCP is developing and diversifying collaboration, solidarity, and friendship with communist and workers' parties all over the world, and is intensifying its relations with socialist and social democratic parties, with liberation movements and with the governments of developing countries, and with revolutionary, progressive, democratic, and anti-imperialist forces everywhere.

Portuguese Socialist Party leader Mario Soares, who was scheduled to visit Rumania in mid-February, postponed his trip at the last minute, presumably because Portuguese communist leader Alvaro Cunhal was in Bucharest at about the same time (February 19). It was reported from the headquarters of the French Socialist Party in Paris on January 21 that its leader, François Mitterand, will visit Hungary and Rumania this spring but that no dates have yet been set. (072)

6. Ceausescu Attends the 25th Soviet Party Congress

The conclusions arrived at by the RCP's Political Executive Committee with regard to the 25th Congress of the CPSU were published in Scinteia (March 18) as part of a press release on a meeting between the PEC, the Permanent Bureau of the Supreme Council on Socioeconomic Development, and the Council of Ministers which had taken place the day before.

Economic and financial activities in 1975, energy and raw material problems and services to the population were discussed at the meeting, and the last point on the agenda had to do with the activity of the delegation that represented Rumania at the Soviet Party congress in Moscow. A report of this subject was submitted by Ceausescu, and according to Radio Bucharest (March 17), the activity of the Rumanian delegation was "approved with complete satisfaction." The PEC was "highly appreciative of the internationalist position" taken by Ceausescu in his Moscow speech, noting that it was in line with the platform adopted at the 11th Congress of the RCP (November 1974). The participation of the Rumanian delegation, headed by Ceausescu, was described as an expression of the friendship, co-operation, and solidarity that exist between the RCP and the CPSU, between Rumania and the Soviet Union; it also manifested "the desire of our party to develop and deepen these relations in the interest of the two countries and of socialism." The newly elected bodies of the CPSU were congratulated (though the broadcast mentioned no names). In a Rumanian-language broadcast on March 18, Radio Moscow expressed its pleasure at the PEC's attitude.

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Nevertheless, a comparison of the communique on the joint session with the resolution adopted by the East German party's CC on the CPSU Congress, a number of important differences come to light. While the PEC referred only to the "great achievements of the Soviet peoples since the last congress under the leadership of the CPSU, "the SED resolution (ADN, March 18) spoke of the "historic importance of the congress of the party of Lenin, expressed support for Brezhnev's eight-point program of international co-operation far more emphatically than the Rumanians had done, stressed the "role of the CPSU as the vanguard of the world-wide revolutionary process" and described the "experience gained by the CPSU in the construction of communism" as universally valid for all peoples who have embarked on the road to socialism and communism."

Ceausescu's address to the congress (on February 26) differed from those of the other party leaders in that he made no reference to the Sino-Soviet conflict or to the proposed world communist conference. (The RCP in any case considers the latter only a remote possibility for which careful and long-drawn-out preparations will be necessary.) He did say that Rumania was "participating actively in the preparations for the communist and workers' conference" in Europe, in order to promote a "fruitful and democratic" exchange of views and experience and increase the "solidarity and co-operation" among the various parties. He stressed the need for party autonomy, and said that, together with the Yugoslav and a number of West European parties, the RCP feels that such a meeting should not produce anything in the nature of binding decisions or a definitive program.

The Rumanian leader was perhaps more inclined to avoid confrontation than Berlinguer of the Italian CP, for instance, or Pellissier of the French party, and this led certain French newspapers to think he might be more inclined to mend his fences with the Soviet Union than he was at the time of the 24th CPSU Congress in April 1971.

An interview granted by Ceausescu to the Yugoslav daily Delo (Ljubliana) on February 20 appeared only after the Rumanian leader had spoken in Moscow (it was published on February 27, while the CPSU congress was still in session). This interview illustrates the special relationship between the RCP and the LCY, which goes well beyond consultation; in fact, the two parties engage in a sort of joint political planning. In the Delo interview Ceausescu stressed once more, and quite forcefully, that each party must act independently and that there can be no central direction of the communist movement. The interviewer recalled that Ceausescu had made a similar statement at a meeting between the Rumanian and Japanese parties. (The interviewer's remark was significant mainly because the Japanese CP was not represented at the CPSU congress.) Ceausescu told the Delo reporter that the transformations in the international communist and workers' movement had necessitate a new set of principles, and that some Western communist parties are making strenuous efforts to seek new ways of participating in the revolutionary process. All communist parties, he said, should renounce old patterns and accept the current changes.


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It should be recalled, however, that in his February 4 speech before the Congress of People's Councils Ceausescu had strongly reaffirmed the dogma of dictatorship of the proletariat (which was openly abandoned by the French CP). Subsequent comments on the topic in Rumania toned down the meaning of the phrase and Ceausescu did not repeat his February 4 statement in Moscow.

Unlike the other Warsaw Pact party leaders present in Moscow, Ceausescu stressed his party's determination to develop relations with all communist and workers' parties, respecting the right of every party to work out its own political line, its own revolutionary strategy and tactics, and to contribute creatively to the development of Marxism-Leninism. He pledged that Rumania would make its due contribution to a new, active policy based on respect for the right of every people to chose its own road, and twice referred to the fact that relations between nations should be based on equality. On the other hand, however, he mentioned, co-operation within Comecon and its Comprehensive Program. Although he advocated a new international economic order he did not mention Rumania's desire to develop relations with the nonaligned countries (he did so in his Delo interview) or Rumania's demand to be ranked as a developing country.

Neither the delegates' meeting with Brezhnev and the newly elected leading bodies of the CPSU nor the reception given by the CPSU CC for all delegations, can be compared either to a summit meeting between Brezhnev and the ruling party leaders or an informal, Crimean-type meeting. While he was in Moscow Ceausescu met only with Zhivkov and Dolanc of the LCY. (073)

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(Yugoslavia)
22 March 1976

DOW CHEMICALS TO SIGN JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA

By Zdenko Antic

Summary: The American Dow Chemical Corporation and the Zagreb Industrija Nafta (INA) have agreed to invest jointly 750,000,000 dollars in the construction of a petrochemical complex in Yugoslavia. The agreement is based on the principle of equal sharing of risks and profits; the US company will provide 49 per cent of the capital and INA the remainder. This is the biggest American investment so far recorded in any East European country, and INA's contribution will represent the largest investment in the country's economy yet made by a Yugoslav firm in partnership with a foreign company.

* * *

After more than a year of intensive negotiations, Yugoslavia is about to sign an agreement on a joint venture with the American Dow Chemical Corporation involving an investment of 750,000,000 dollars in the Yugoslav petrochemical industry, (1) the largest single American investment in any East European country to date. According to press reports, the US company and Industrija Nafta (INA) of Zagreb, which signed a "letter of understanding" in January 1975 relating to the joint construction of a huge petrochemical complex, have now reached agreement on all major issues and the contract will be signed on March 26. The draft contract between the two corporations has already been considered by the Croatian government, the Presidency of the Republic of Croatia, the INA board, and INA's sociopolitical organizations. (2) It only remains, in accordance with the legislation governing the Yugoslav self-management system, to acquaint the 23,000 workers employed by INA with the agreement's stipulations so that they will empower the director-general, Vladimir Lemic, to sign the contract; (3) the latter is based on Yugoslav legislation first enacted in July 1967 which authorized companies to invest jointly with foreign partners on a basis of shared risks and profits. (4)

(1) Reuter, 18 March 1976.

(2) Ekonomska politika (Belgrade), 15 March 1976.

(3) Politika (Belgrade), 13 March 1976.

(4) The bill was adopted by the Yugoslav Assembly on 10 July 1967 and enacted on July 27; see Sluzbene novine (Belgrade), 19 July 1967.

The new contract provides for the construction of a series of petrochemical plants on the Adriatic island of Krk, near the Croatian seaport of Rijeka. The total cost of the project is estimated at 750,000,000 dollars, and it should be completed by the end of 1982. INA will contribute 51 per cent of the total expenditure and the remaining 49 per cent will come from Dow.

The complex will be built in three phases and will ultimately produce about 1,790,000 tons annually of plastic monomers and hydrocarbons. During the first phase, due for completion by the end of 1979, three plants will be constructed capable of producing annual outputs of 150,000 tons of ethylene dichloride, 200,000 tons of vinyl chloride, and 50,000 tons of polyethylene. (5) In the second phase, which should be completed by the end of 1981, two more plants will be constructed with a production capacity of 70,000 tons of low-density polyethylene, and 200,000 tons of styrene yearly. Finally, in the third phase, also planned for completion by the end of 1981, five more factories will be constructed to produce 400,000 tons of ethylene, 180,000 tons of propylene, 180,000 tons of benzene, and 240,000 tons of ethylene benzene. The construction process is planned in such a way that the plants constructed in the first phase will be able to help forward the construction of those allotted to the second and third phases. According to representatives of Dow Chemicals, the Krk Island site was chosen because INA is already engaged in refinery operations there in the deep-water harbor adjacent to the major new crude oil terminal. The latter is being built in connection with the Adria oil pipeline, which is being constructed jointly by Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Kuwait.

The benefits that can accrue to the Yugoslav economy from this project are obvious. When completed, the whole complex should have an annual output worth about 550,000,000 dollars, and it is estimated that about 200,000,000 dollars' worth of this will be exported. Moreover, the scheme will create new jobs badly needed in a period of economic difficulty when Gastarbeiter are returning from the West European countries and the unemployment rate is rising accordingly. (6)

The joint venture also bears witness to the increased American interest in co-operation with Yugoslav partners that has become evident since Premier Dzemal Bijedic's Washington visit in March 1975, which gave a new impetus to the development of economic relations between the two countries.

Another important step in this direction was the holding of a US-Yugoslav economic conference in Dubrovnik in May 1975. (7) The conference was attended by members of the American-Yugoslav Chamber of Commerce and the Yugoslav-American Economic Council, both of which were founded in 1974. Some 85 American businessmen representing 45 companies and 150 managers representing 90 Yugoslav enterprises discussed opportunities for expanding Yugoslav-American economic co-operation and the associated problems. The discussion concentrated on better utilization of natural resources and co-operation in various branches of the machine and equipment building industry, the agricultural and food sectors, exchanges of consumer goods, and the processing industries. Joint operations by the two countries on the markets of third countries were also discussed.

(5) Politika, 16 March 1976.

(6) According to official figures, there were about 600,000 unemployed in Yugoslavia at the end of 1975.

(7) Politika, 13 May 1975.

Joint ventures in which both sides share the risks and the profits provide a particularly good opportunity to expand technological and financial co-operation, the conference concluded, and progress in this respect has indeed been rapid. Within the past few years 17 joint venture agreements have been concluded and 18 more are under consideration. The US now occupies third place on the list of countries with which Yugoslavia has entered into such undertakings, but in terms of total investment -- about 60,000,000 dollars -- it comes first. An important step in supporting co-operation of this type was made by the US government in May 1973 when it was decided to allow the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to extend its operations to Yugoslavia. (8) OPIC's main objective is to encourage private American capital to invest in the developing countries, and Yugoslavia, since it falls into this category, can look forward to attracting additional American funds and to OPIC's support.

The agreement between Dow Chemicals and INA may be seen as evidence of the success of ventures in financial co-operation between the two countries in recent years and as an expression of both sides' interest in continuing and expanding such activities. This particular type of economic co-operation with the US has been especially beneficial to Yugoslavia, and it is therefore probable that it will be broadened in the future. In addition to the immediate creation of badly needed new jobs, such co-operation can in the long run help the Yugoslav economy to overcome its financial difficulties and contribute to a more rapid modernization of the country's industries. From the political point of view, American readiness to help shows that fruitful collaboration is possible between the two countries even though they have different sociopolitical systems and follow different policies on many international issues. This has been achieved because of strict observance of "the principles of independence, mutual respect, and the full equality of sovereign states" -- a principle that has been repeatedly stressed in statements signed by the two countries and one that they have carefully respected in their dealings with each other. (057)

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(8) Borba (Belgrade), 8 June 1975, and Politika, 23 March 1974.

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RAD Background Report/67
(Bulgaria)
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THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY ON THE EVE OF ITS 11TH CONGRESS

By Robert R. King

Summary: It appears that the leitmotif of the 11th BCP Congress will be continuity with policies established at the 10th congress some five years ago. The congress documents on the economy, which have been published, reflect this view. Economic efficiency and rationality -- the only topics dealt with at the BCP's National Party Conference in 1974 -- remain problems, and the BCP's conventional theory that greater centralization is the answer seems unlikely to resolve the difficulties. Concern for the potentially disintegrative effects of détente upon ideology have led to emphasis on political education and cultural orthodoxy, a line the congress will restate. Bulgaria continues to be the Soviet Union's closest ally in Eastern Europe, and the congress will no doubt reaffirm the relationship with Moscow, although there are indications that on some issues (e.g., the Macedonian question and Balkan co-operation) some would prefer that more attention be paid to Bulgarian interests. In Bulgaria, as in the USSR, détente is favored primarily for its economic potential. The party has increased its membership by almost 13 per cent since its last congress but the increase in the proportion of blue-collar workers has resulted in a lowering of the educational level. The leadership remains conservative, and most of its members have a party apparatchik background. No important changes in the leadership are expected, but the question of who will succeed Zhivkov lurks in the background.

* * *

On March 29 the 11th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party will open in Sofia. Although billed in the statutes as the supreme bodies responsible for establishing party policy, congresses vary considerably in their impact on that policy. The 10th congress, held in April 1971, was noteworthy primarily for its lack of drama, but it did set general lines of future policy which were enunciated in greater detail at subsequent party gatherings. Among the important decisions taken at the 10th congress were those to raise the standard of living (dealt with at the December 1972 CC plenum), to increase economic efficiency and productivity (discussed at the National Party Conference in March 1974), to improve ideological activity (to which the February 1974 CC plenum was devoted), and to chart Bulgaria's course in foreign affairs (the July 1973, October 1974, and July 1975 CC plenums dealt with this topic). These

general lines were in some cases foreshadowed prior to the 10th congress (at the July 1968 and September 1969 CC plenums and on other occasions), but as currently implemented they were formulated and sanctioned at that meeting. The 10th congress was also significant because it approved a party program, and in view of the important policies it established it is classed -- along with the fifth party congress of 1948 and the April 1956 CC plenum -- as one of the three key landmarks in postwar BCP policy. Whether it will retain this status depends on whether the policies it set in motion continue to guide the BCP.

All indications are that the forthcoming 11th congress will do little to alter the policy line set by its predecessor. Present signs, in fact, are that it will be a formal occasion marked by little drama, although it will provide an occasion for assessing the performance of the party and its policies since the last congress, particularly since it coincides with the beginning of a new five-year plan period. Although the congress itself may prove to be a non-event, significant changes that may portend important developments in the future have taken place in the party since 1971.

The State of the Economy

The documents relating to the economy that have been published prior to presentation for approval at the congress indicate that no basic changes are anticipated. Continuity is the most striking characteristic of the CC Theses on Economic Development during the next five-year plan and until 1990. They contain almost nothing that has not been said before: at the 10th BCP Congress in April 1971, at the December 1972 plenum on the standard of living, at the March 1974 National Party Conference, or on other occasions during the past five years. (1)

The "basic tasks" outlined in the Theses on Economic Development are neither new nor unusual. Raising the standard of living is again, as it was at the 10th congress, the fundamental aim, to which all other tasks are linked. These include making full use of all resources in the country; promoting more intensive growth and increasing efficiency; reducing the consumption of power and raw materials per item produced; increasing labor productivity; achieving more harmonious economic development; improving the economic structure; introducing scientific and technological achievements and the findings of scientific research into the economy; taking a "new approach" in investment policy, giving priority to modernization and reconstruction; improving the qualifications of cadres; reducing the number of administrative personnel and of persons engaged in agriculture; promoting socialist integration with the USSR and the other Comecon countries; increasing exchanges of consumer goods; improving the "efficiency" of international tourism; taking steps to turn state and co-operative property into "all-national" socialist property; increasing the role of the working class; improving the planning process; and developing the national complexes and the ministries entrusted with their management.

(1) See Bulgarian Situation Report/2, Radio Free Europe Research, 21 January 1976, Item.1; R.N., "Directives on the Bulgarian Sixth Five-Year Plan," Bulgarian Background Report/18, RFER, 19 May 1971; R.N. (Bulgarian Unit), "CC Plenum Decisions on Standard of Living," Bulgarian BR/3, RFER, 2 March 1973; and R.N. (Bulgarian Unit), "The BCP's National Party Conference," Bulgarian BR/8, RFER, 15 July 1974.

The Theses on Science and Technological Progress also promise little that is new in harnessing science to further economic development. They stipulate that putting scientific and technological achievements into practice should account for most of the growth in national income by 1990, but many of the specific provisions in the document merely reiterate decisions arrived at during the October 1971 CC plenum devoted to this topic. (2) The Theses on the Standard of Living go very little beyond the provisions and documents that resulted from the December 1972 CC plenum; the theses are intended merely to update it and supplement its targets, outlining the ways in which it will be put into practice in the next five and in some cases in the next fifteen years. (3) The four sets of theses, together, are yet another indication that the 11th party congress is to pursue and implement the main policy lines set at the 10th congress in 1971 rather than to initiate new policy.

In the agricultural sector the party congress also promises little in the way of surprises. In this area, however, Bulgaria has become the pioneer among the Comecon countries. Over the last five years it has reorganized its agriculture into Agro-Industrial Complexes (AICs) intended to achieve maximum economy and to connect agriculture as closely as possible with associated industries. Co-operative and state farms have been merged into some 159 AICs which now account for all agricultural output except that produced on small personal plots. Systems of organization and management are being tested experimentally and revised on the basis of practice. The agro-industrial complexes have proved to be a successful and imaginative solution to a number of agricultural problems, and their usefulness has been confirmed by the fact that they are being copied by the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic and will apparently spread to the remainder of the Soviet Union, as well as to other communist states throughout the world. Since the system is already fairly well established and the search for better methods continues, it is unlikely that any far-reaching decisions will be taken in this regard at the congress.

The Problem of Economic Efficiency and Rationality

Richard Lowenthal considers how a communist party meets a modern industrial society's "requirements of efficiency and rationality" one of the major problems facing a "postrevolutionary, 'established' single-party regime." (4) This question is assuming increasing relevance in Bulgaria. The BCP came to power with a firm commitment to industrial and economic development, and three decades of progress have taken the Bulgarian economy some distance down the road toward industrialization. Today, however, the situation is reaching the stage when the addition of investment capital and labor is no longer able to produce corresponding growth because the inefficiencies inherent in the system of planning and management dilute the impact of such inputs.

The best reflection of the need to adjust to new conditions and of the party's recognition that this is necessary is the fact that the March 1974 National Party Conference was devoted to a single topic -- the achievement of

(2) See Bulgarian SR/5, RFER, 26 February 1976, Item 1.

(3) See R.N. (Bulgarian Unit), "The Bulgarian Party Theses on the Standard of Living," RAD BR/59 (Bulgaria), RFER, 11 March 1976, and R.N. (Bulgarian Unit), "CC Plenum Decisions . . ."

(4) "On 'Established' Communist Party Regimes," Studies in Comparative Communism 7:4 (Winter 1974), p. 330.

"high social labor productivity." In his opening address to the conference Zhivkov emphasized that the "stage of development reached by our economy" makes "raising social labor productivity a cardinal and key problem in the fulfillment of the sixth five-year plan," and then went on to say: "Only a rapid increase in labor productivity will enable us to ensure a high and stable rate of economic growth." He also noted that in order to compete on the international market, within Comecon as well as with Western states, "we must decisively increase labor productivity and improve the quality of our goods." (5)

Although problems of efficiency and rationality are increasingly affecting the Bulgarian economy, the party has rejected any changes that would downgrade centralized planning and control. Rather than recognize that the growing technological sophistication of the economy and its higher level of development require greater reliance upon decentralized decision-making and the use of market forces, the Bulgarians -- unlike the Hungarians -- have drawn the opposite conclusion. Providing individuals with more advanced technical training and utilizing the results of scientific research are regarded as the means by which centralized direction of the economy can be strengthened.

This is confirmed in the changes that have been worked out for the system of economic management which are to be introduced during the 1976-1980 period. The new regulations for economic organizations represent another step in the direction of greater centralization. A major innovation is that the national economic complexes are now specified as the "basic structural units of the national economy." This is the latest in a chain of reforms that have bestowed this status on increasingly larger economic units. The 1968 economic mechanism treated enterprises as the basic units, and the 1973 regulations transferred things a step higher, to the state economic associations. The national complexes are in fact so huge that there is some question about how efficient they can be as basic economic units. For example, when the national agro-industrial complex is established, it will comprise about 50 per cent of all persons employed in the economy and will produce 36 per cent of the gross national product; the national transport complex, which has already been established, employs 6.3 per cent of all workers in the country and is responsible for 4.5 per cent of the gross national product. (6)

Although much will be said during the congress about the need to increase economic efficiency and improve labor productivity, the trend toward greater centralization will be reaffirmed. Failure to come to grips with these problems will not result in their resolving themselves, however, and postponing the day of reckoning will probably make it more serious when it does have to be faced.

The Problems of Ideology and Culture

As it has in other East European states, ideology has received considerable attention in Bulgaria in the last several years. The primary reason for this emphasis is the concern about the potentially disintegrative effects of improving political relations and increasing personal contacts with the West.

(5) The text of Zhivkov's speech was published in Rabotnichesko Delo, 21 March 1974. See also R.N. (Bulgarian Unit), "The BCP's National Party Conference."

(6) See Bulgarian SR/3, RFER, 28 January 1976, Item 1.

The final session of the Helsinki Conference has made this issue particularly topical, and one of the more important BCP CC plenums held between the 10th and 11th congresses (in February 1974) was devoted to ideological implications of the current international situation. (7) In his report to that plenum, CC Secretary Alexander Lilov praised the Soviet policy of improving relations with the West, but emphasized that peaceful coexistence "does not and cannot exist in the ideological sphere." The main ideological tasks, he said, are "to strengthen the ideological cohesion of the socialist countries around the CPSU and the USSR," and to continue "the uncompromising struggle against efforts to deform Marxist-Leninist teaching and to distort the truth about the socialist countries." (He singled out the Chinese for special criticism in this regard.)

The plenum adopted a decision calling for the strengthening of ideological activity. The resolution echoed Lilov in noting that the reorganization of ideological work required by the 10th party congress had not yet been completed, and stated that greater efforts must be made to finish this task. The following specific points were decided upon at the meeting: intensifying ideological work calls for improved organization; a more efficient approach to the ideological education of the population is needed; it is essential to counteract the effects of bourgeois propaganda and influence, to improve patriotic and internationalist (i.e., pro-Soviet) education, to explain the necessity for increased ideological vigilance at a time of reduced tension with the West, and to enlist the support of the social sciences in the propagation of correct ideological views.

This concern to "ideologize" the Bulgarian population has been particularly evident in regard to cultural life and the mass media. One of the organizational steps that followed the February 1974 CC plenum was the creation in April 1975, of a National Cultural Complex. This institution, established under a joint party and government decree, is subordinate to the Committee on Culture and the Arts, and its task is to exercise stricter control over the mass media and cultural life. The effects of its measures have already been felt.

Attacks have been made on some of Bulgaria's most prominent literati by the leadership of the Bulgarian Writers' Union (BWU), and stringent measures are being taken on the eve of the party congress to eradicate "deviations" from the accepted cultural line so that the BWU's "ideological purity" can be played up at the congress. The new campaign seems to have been in preparation for some time, and also seems to be orchestrated and conducted by the highest echelons of the party, which have already given it their approval. (8)

The effectiveness of the mass media is also apparently of concern to the party leadership. Bulgarian journalism has been subjected to repeated criticism for the treatment accorded domestic affairs in the press, which has been described as too scanty, "gray and monotonous" in tone, and incompetent. Some officials have pointed to an information gap because Western journalists are faster and more creative in their treatment of Bulgarian developments, which is in part due to the reluctance of Bulgarian journalists to comment on

(7) See G.S. (Bulgarian Unit), "Bulgarian Plenum Devoted to Ideological Activity," Bulgarian BR/3, RFER, 19 April 1974.

(8) See G.S. (Bulgarian Unit), "Icy Winds Over the Bulgarian Literary Landscape," RAD BR/160 (Bulgaria), RFER, 21 November 1975.

domestic affairs at all. There was also some discussion in the press of the ineffectiveness of whatever criticism of individual abuses is voiced. Few effective or specific solutions to these problems were proposed, however.

There has been nothing thus far to indicate that any changes in policy in the cultural or ideological field will be made at the forthcoming congress. The gathering will no doubt endorse and reaffirm the stricter ideological line followed in the last few years, and in particular the February 1974 CC plenum decisions.

Foreign Policy

Bulgaria has long had a reputation as the East European state most loyal to the Soviet Union. In part this can be explained by the traditional sympathy Bulgarians feel for Russians, which is based on the latter's support of Bulgaria's emancipation from Turkey and the close cultural affinity between the two peoples. At the same time Bulgaria's history of stormy relations with Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia has no doubt engendered a certain insecurity which is compensated for by reliance on the Soviet Union. Also, the Soviet Union has rewarded Bulgarian compliance with considerable economic and monetary assistance, which has been the backbone of Bulgaria's efforts to industrialize. And Bulgaria's strategic location, in the heart of the Balkans and surrounded by two members of NATO (Turkey and Greece), Yugoslavia (which claims nonalignment in foreign relations), and Rumania (which has followed a policy of autonomy from Moscow), certainly makes the Soviet Union's interest in it more understandable.

In the five years since the last BCP congress this relationship with the Soviet Union has been strengthened. Although an extremely high proportion of Bulgaria's foreign trade is with the Soviet Union -- about 55 per cent of total trade in 1975, and the volume in 1975 was half again as great as that of five years ago -- economic co-operation has moved well beyond the foreign trade area. The two economies are far more closely integrated than those of any other East European country, and in other areas -- such as culture, education, and ideology -- Bulgaria has deliberately sought to link its social system with that of the Soviet Union. (10) In fact, according to Zhivkov: "Bulgaria and the Soviet Union will act as a single body, breathing with the same lungs and nourished by the same blood stream." (11)

Although Bulgaria has been a faithful follower of the Soviet line, this is not to suggest that this policy is either universally accepted or without its limitations. Some Bulgarians, including those officials who favor a more flexible and nationally oriented policy, may feel uneasy about collaboration with the Soviet Union. On the Macedonian question, for instance, there has been evidence of a certain degree of assertiveness on the part of Bulgaria since 1967 which suggests that this aspect of its policy is not completely subject to Soviet manipulation. With the Bulgarian leadership so firmly committed to support of the Soviet Union, the country's foreign policy offers little scope

(9) BTA, 8 March 1976.

(10) See Robert R. King, "Bulgarian-Soviet Relations: 'Socialist Internationalism in Action.'" RAD BR/89 (Bulgaria), REFER, 26 May 1975.

(11) Rabotnichesko Delo, 20 September 1973.

for concessions to nationalism, and this provides a useful clue to Bulgaria's position on the Macedonian question -- the issue may well serve as a safety valve for national feelings. As a highly emotional issue involving dispute with a country that is not fully inside the "socialist camp," it provides a useful release for feelings that might otherwise develop anti-Soviet overtones. The risk that national sentiment might take the form of anti-Sovietism if it is not allowed the type of outlet that the Macedonian issue provides makes it unlikely that Bulgaria will make major concessions to Yugoslavia on this question, and the party's standing with the population would undoubtedly suffer if the BCP were to adopt the Yugoslav view. Thus the policy of encouraging both patriotism and love of the Soviet Union restricts the BCP's area of maneuver with regard to the Macedonian question. (12)

In addition to the Macedonian issue there may well be other foreign policy questions over which differences may emerge -- among them the question of Balkan co-operation. In the past Bulgaria was a leading advocate of multilateral collaboration, but over the last five years it has altered its position, apparently in keeping with Soviet wishes. At the Athens conference in January of this year it was the state least in favor of multilateral co-operation, and managed to forestall steps the other participants in the conference were willing to take. But while Bulgaria was loyal to Soviet wishes in this case, its own interests would seem to favor regional co-operation. (13)

Although loyalty to Soviet foreign policy guidelines has made Bulgaria the East European state with the most reserved attitude toward Western countries, since the 24th CPSU Congress and the 10th BCP Congress the Bulgarians have been pursuing détente, and in particular economic relations with the West. Zhivkov, following Brezhnev's example, headed the Bulgarian delegation to the Helsinki conference in August 1975, where he met with a number of West European leaders. Relations with the West were given new emphasis, and interest in the developing countries has been maintained. Zhivkov himself has played a prominent role -- in the last two years he has visited West Germany, Austria, Italy, the Vatican, Tunisia, Mauritania, Algeria, Iran, and Iraq. Numerous Bulgarian government officials have visited Western states, and there has been a parade of Western officials to Sofia. In this process, however, Bulgaria has not gone beyond the limits acceptable to the Soviet Union.

Although there are indications that in some areas Bulgaria might be interested in following a policy different from that favored by the Soviet Union, as long as the present BCP leadership remains in office any change is highly unlikely. The congress will reaffirm fealty to the USSR and approve the current foreign policy line, and any dissent that may exist will not be admitted.

Party Membership

At the end of 1975 the party numbered some 788,211 members, an increase of over 90,000 since the 1971 congress; one out of every eight Bulgarians over the age of 18 is a party member. The social composition of the membership has changed only slightly since the 10th congress -- blue-collar workers

(12) See Robert R. King, "The Macedonian Question and Bulgaria's Relations with Yugoslavia," RAD BR/98 (Bulgaria), RFER, 6 June 1975.

(13) See R.N. (Bulgarian Unit), "Bulgaria and the Balkan Conference in Athens," RAD BR/41 (Bulgaria), RFER, 12 February 1976.

now make up 41.4 per cent (1.3 per cent above the figure for April 1971); white-collar workers 30.2 per cent (2 per cent higher); and collective farmers 23.0 per cent (down 3.1 per cent). The proportion of female members has risen from 25.2 to 27.6 per cent. (14)

At the 10th congress party First Secretary Todor Zhivkov expressed concern to enlarge "the nucleus of blue-collar workers" in the party, and as a result they constitute the largest group of new members since 1971. This emphasizing of the working-class element in the party's composition, however, has exacted a price in terms of the educational level of party members. In 1974 only 32.5 per cent had secondary or higher education, as compared to 38 per cent in 1970. (15) It is somewhat unusual that in Bulgaria, which has one of the highest ratios of students to population in the world, the educational level of party membership should be declining. If the trend continues the gaps between party and population and between the needs of the economy and the resources of the party will surely widen.

The age structure of the party is apparently no longer of concern to the leadership since it apparently reflects that of the society as a whole. Recent data indicate that 70 per cent of party members are under 50, (16) which means that the membership is aging. (As recently as 1974 the proportion of members under 50 was reported to be 75 per cent.) This was a matter of greater concern to the party some years ago than it is now, but nevertheless it is apparently attempting to recruit younger people (over 72 per cent of those admitted to the party in recent years were under 30). (17)

The Party Leadership

In the past the BCP leaders have been described as conservatives with long records of party activity and limited technical expertise, and despite the election of some younger people as full and candidate members of the Politburo in July 1974, this description is still fairly accurate. At the 10th congress in 1971 the average age of the Politburo was 63. On the eve of the 11th congress the average age of full members is 64. This is attributable to the aging of present members (only one, Boyan Balgaranov, born in 1896, has died since the last congress), although the two full members added in 1974 are younger (Filipov, born in 1919, and Lilov, born in 1933).

The seven CC secretaries are somewhat younger, with an average age of 55, and the average age of the six candidate members of the Politburo is 54. The secretariat seems to be the body most directly involved in decision-making, while the Politburo limits itself to ratifying decisions. This arrangement makes the talents and energies of the younger men in the secretariat available

(14) See the BCP theses on the party and mass organizations in Rabotnichesko Delo, 5 February 1976, analyzed in G.S. (Bulgarian Unit), "The BCP Theses on the Party and Mass Organizations," RAD BR/51 (Bulgaria), RFER, 23 February 1976.

(15) Partien Zhivot No. 11/1974; see also Bulgarian SR/37, RFER, 28 November 1974, Item 2.

(16) Rabotnichesko Delo, 5 February 1976.

(17) Ibid.

to Zhivkov but at the same time permits him to recognize and acknowledge the older revolutionary cadres on whom much of his support is based. For the most part, however, by training and experience the younger men in the CC secretariat are not scientific or technological specialists but organizational and ideological party apparatchiks. They are from the same conservative mold as the older generation, and in many ways probably resemble it in outlook. (18)

All this being so, the current party leadership might benefit from an infusion of new blood. It seems unlikely, however, that any substantial change will take place during the 11th congress. A relatively authoritative article in Rabotnichesko Delo (19) by Bogdan Kolev, head of the paper's party life section, suggests this. Speaking about the "unity of the party membership," he had the following to say: "An example of the skillful combination of the maturity and experience of the older generation with the courage, creative energy, and knowledge of the middle and younger generations is given by the Central Committee of the party and its Politburo."

The Coming Succession Crisis

Despite Kolev's optimism, however, there is little doubt that the succession of a new leadership cannot be long delayed. Zhivkov has now been the BCP's first secretary for 22 years and as such is the dean of East European party leaders. Although he has shown no signs of serious health problems, he has suffered from short periods of ill health in the past (he was forced to postpone visits to Austria and Iraq in early 1973 and to Cuba in 1970, for example). At his age (he will be 65 this year), the question of a successor becomes increasingly topical.

Thus far Zhivkov has managed to eliminate from the leadership any rising young man who might be considered a potential successor. Mitko Grigorov, Lachezar Avramov, and more recently Ivan Abadzhiev -- all considered likely contenders for the first secretary's mantle -- have been removed from their leading positions, apparently because Zhivkov regarded them as threats. Boris Velchev, as the CC secretary responsible for party cadres and organization, is in the position that successful heirs in Eastern Europe have traditionally held, (20) but he is of the same generation as Zhivkov. (21) While he may be an interim candidate for the post of first secretary, his selection would not resolve the succession for long. He rose to his present position without much fanfare, and has assiduously carried out his organizational tasks behind the scenes. Zhivkov apparently does not consider him a threat, because he has retained his sensitive position in the CC secretariat for nearly 14 years. This would seem to raise the question of whether he has the ambition to seek the leading position if the opportunity should present itself. Given these conditions the succession could be a disorderly affair that might result in a

(18) For more on this subject, see "The Bulgarian Party Leadership," Bulgarian BR/10, RFER, 8 September 1972.

(19) 24 January 1976.

(20) Cf., the cases of Ceausescu, Honecker, Brezhnev, and Khrushchev. See Myron Rush, How Communist States Change Their Rulers (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974).

(21) Zhivkov was born in 1911, Velchev in 1914.

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RAD Background Report/66
(World Communist Movement)
18 March 1976



BACK TO WORK ON THE CONFERENCE DOCUMENT

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: East and West European communist party delegations are holding another "editorial" meeting in East Berlin. Recent indications are that the independent parties gained considerable ground during the 10-day session two months ago, when (according to Italian party spokesmen) delegates reached agreement on the "fundamental lines" of a collective document "consistent with the stand . . . [of] the PCI." A Belgian CP spokesman says it includes explicit recognition of the right of the West European parties to develop their own "unitary strategy."

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Representatives of 27 European communist parties have met in East Berlin for another session of the "editorial group" charged with preparing a collective document for the pan-European conference. In announcing the start of the meeting yesterday (March 16), the East German agency ADN gave no indication of how long it would last (the last session two months ago was a "marathon" which lasted 10 days -- January 13-22).

Statements by Italian delegates in particular have indicated that that long January session marked a turning point in the prolonged preparatory process. (1) It appears that the East Germans presented a new draft (their fifth) which made substantial

- (1) See Kevin Devlin, "Agreement on 'Fundamental Lines' of Conference Draft?" RAD Background Report/43 (World Communist Movement), Radio Free Europe Research, 13 February 1976, and "Segre on 'Positive' Conference Document," RAD BR/49 (World Communist Movement), RFER, 20 February 1976.

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concessions to the positions the independent parties have vigorously maintained since the initial consultative meeting in Warsaw in October 1974. In the course of long — and, the Italians stress, genuine — debate, agreement was reached on what PCI delegate Antonio Rubbi, in his Rinascita article of February 6, termed "the fundamental lines" of the draft document. Rubbi added, however, that "there still remain questions to be studied and discussed, and they require further meetings before the conference."

Some of these unsettled questions can be identified with a fair degree of confidence. One of them would be the question of relations between the two blocs in Europe, on which the Yugoslavs, Rumanians, Italians, and Spanish hold positions very different from those of the CPSU and its followers (and, indeed, from those of the French CP, which in other respects has been emphasizing its attitude of critical independence vis-à-vis Moscow with the enthusiasm of the newly converted). Another crux would be the persistent effort of the loyalists to obtain a collective condemnation — and equation — of anti-Sovietism and anticommunism. In his Rinascita article Rubbi offered what looked like a compromise formula when he stressed that one must distinguish between the "a priori anticommunism" of imperialists and reactionaries and "the perplexities, the criticism of individual aspects and particular or even fundamental options of the socialist countries."

Consensus the Basis

The most useful information on how the conference project stood after the January session came from another Italian delegate, Sergio Segre, in his report to a commission of the PCI Central Committee, published in l'Unità of February 14. Segre said that "although work still remains to be done, the understanding which now seems to be taking shape on the draft document agreed upon at the Berlin meetings of December and January is consistent with the stand defended from the first by the PCI." He went on:

This stand, starting with the significance of the achievement of a method based on the consensus of all participants as a qualitatively new element in the preparation of communist conferences, had as a premise the fact that a document acceptable to all could only be a document that identified the points of convergence, without claiming to delineate general lines and strategies, to take on a binding character, or to tackle themes — such as ideological ones — on which there exist diverse and divergent positions.

If Segre's statement is accepted, it would seem that the crucial principle of consensus, on which the independent parties have insisted since it was adopted as a procedural rule at the

Warsaw meeting of October 1974, has prevailed. And, if that is so, the outcome can surely only be a lowest-common-denominator text -- one that merely identifies "the points of convergence," as Segre put it -- and is in any case not binding upon any of the parties concerned.

But on this point experience counsels caution. The Italian evidence suggests that the draft the 28 central committees have been considering for the past two months represents, more or less, a return to the (third) East German draft of last October, which the independents found acceptable, if only as a basis for further discussion. But that October draft had been preceded, in April and July 1975, by two earlier ones which, according to independent spokesmen, attempted to impose something like a "general line" (2) and it was followed in November by another which represented a return to "hard-line" positions. The independent parties may have won important ground in the December and January sessions; but they are certainly vigilantly aware that the long struggle is not over yet. When Antonio Rubbi stated in Rinascita that agreement had been reached on the "fundamental lines" of the text, he went on to criticize the "forced and distorted interpretations" of named Soviet and East German writers. And in his report a week later Segre said: "The result is a document which not only does not conflict on any point with the stands taken by our party but on the contrary -- if each party is consistently faithful to the new spirit which animates it, considering it not as a 'necessary evil' to avoid lack of agreement but as a real methodological and political aggiornamento -- can represent an element of novelty in relations between the communist parties." (3)

Conservative nostalgia for the days of the "general line" and consequent pressure for restoration of interparty discipline were obvious in many of the speeches delivered at the 25th CPSU Congress and in recent statements by spokesmen for certain loyalist parties, notably the Czechoslovak CP. At the same time there have been some signs of divergence in this matter among East European parties which are usually stamped with the same "pro-Soviet" label. In early February Stane Dolanc of Yugoslavia visited Warsaw for four days of "cordial and friendly" talks on the preparations for the conference, (4) and went on to Budapest for discussions on the same theme. One possible implication of this itinerary was

(2) Gian Carlo Pajetta of the PCI reportedly said of the first East German draft that it was written in German but "translated from the Old Russian -- of the Comintern era."

(3) L'Unita, 14 February 1976; emphasis added.

(4) PAP, 10 February 1976.

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that the Yugoslavs saw some profit in discussing the subject with the Poles and Hungarians but none in talks with (say) the Czechoslovaks or Bulgarians. In this connection it may be noted that Sergio Segre returned from Budapest a week ago after "sincere and friendly" talks on the conference with Hungarian leaders. (5)

Soviet disappointment with the course of the pan-European conference project was reflected in the fact that Leonid Brezhnev devoted just one bleak sentence to the subject in his long opening report to the 25th congress. He said: "The European communist parties are preparing for their conference" -- an eloquent terseness, one might think.

"Western Strategy" Accepted

Speaking of the 25th congress, it may be noted that a further fragment of evidence on the course of preparations for the conference has come from the Belgian delegates, Louis Van Geyt and Jean Terfve, in an interview published in their party daily. Terfve criticized the lack of attention paid at the congress to the "fundamental" question of socialist democracy -- adding, however, that while the Soviets saw no need for change in this respect, "there is no hostility manifested toward those who evoke these problems." He went on:

With regard to the problems of the unitary strategy of the Western communists, on the other hand, the Soviets are more advanced. They accept without great difficulty the idea that this strategy can be developed. This is, by the way, said explicitly, with the agreement of all, in the document drawn up in the course of the preparations for the conference of European communist parties. As for the question of whether they accept this strategy with enthusiasm, that is another problem. (6)

Here one finds another indication that the conference document, far from imposing anything like a general line, will mark a certain "institutionalization of diversity" in the European communist movement. Not only (it seems) will the right of the Western parties to develop regional policies adapted to their sociopolitical environment be conceded, but the right of each communist party to develop its national policies in independence will be recognized as a question of principle. Support for this conclusion comes from a

(5) L'Unità, 11 March 1976.

(6) Le Drapeau Rouge (Brussels), 12 March 1976; emphasis added.

joint communiqué signed in Helsinki on March 16 by two unswervingly loyalist parties, the East German SED and the Finnish CP. While confirming their pro-Soviet credentials by a sharp attack on the Chinese, the two parties declared that "every Marxist-Leninist party can determine its political course independently and in accordance with the national conditions of its country."


As has been noted, the long interparty confrontation is not over yet; but the independent parties evidently have the wind in their sails at present -- and Brezhnev must be wondering why he ever started out on the long, arduous climb toward the pan-European summit. It seems doubtful that he will find the view from the top particularly rewarding.

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• RAD Background Report/68
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YUGOSLAV REACTION TO SADAT'S CONFLICT WITH MOSCOW

By Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: The Yugoslav information media have so far handled the current conflict between Cairo and Moscow in as impartial a way as possible. They see Sadat's insistence on his country's independence as possibly the chief reason for his decision to abrogate the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship signed in May 1971, although the problem of Egypt's "enormous debts" to the Soviet Union may also have played an important role. An interview given to a Belgrade newspaper by Mohammed Heikal, formerly a leading journalist in Egypt and Nasser's closest collaborator, indicates that Nasserite forces have -- at least until now -- opposed Sadat's policies.

* * *

With President Tito out of the country on a visit, the Yugoslav media have been at pains to report the clash between Egypt's President Sadat and Moscow as impartially as possible. Even though Tito's relationship with Sadat has never been as close as his friendship with Nasser, the traditional bonds between Yugoslavia and Egypt have withstood all the strains and stresses of recent international developments. One can therefore expect that the latest ruffling of feathers between Cairo and Moscow will do no harm to the links that unite Belgrade and Cairo or to the friendly feelings that exist between Tito and Sadat. During their last meeting in Yugoslavia (29-30 May 1975) the two presidents found themselves in complete agreement on how to resolve the Middle East crisis and on the general policy of nonalignment, (1) of which Tito and Sadat have been regarded as important exemplars. On March 4 the semiofficial Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram reported Tito's desire to meet Sadat during the latter's upcoming visit to Bonn on his way to Paris and Rome, and the Cairo Al Gomhouria said two days later that the two men would meet on Brioni Island for "important two-day talks."

As far as Sadat's decision to abrogate the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship signed by himself and Podgorny on 21 May 1971 in Cairo is concerned, the Yugoslav information media have reported both Sadat's speech and the Soviet reaction. In a Tanjug report from Cairo published by all major Yugoslav dailies it was claimed that from the very beginning of Sadat's rule in Egypt in the autumn of 1970 relations with Moscow had steadily worsened because the Egyptian

(1) Borba (Belgrade), 31 May 1975.

president "insisted on the equality and complete sovereignty of Egypt." (2) The emphasis given to this theme was to be expected, because it echoes exactly the Yugoslavs' own attitude to Moscow -- although it is doubtful whether Tito would have reacted as sharply as Sadat did on a question involving governmental relations with the Soviet Union; Tito's difficulties with Moscow have been mainly of an ideological nature and he has done his best to prevent any infection from blighting interstate relations.

From the Tanjug report it is clear that Sadat's problems with Moscow are economic rather than doctrinal. Egypt's persecution of its own Communists has not visibly damaged relations between Moscow and Cairo, and the main problem according to the agency's correspondent in Cairo, has been "a drastic increase in the Egyptian debt to the Soviet Union, which Egypt has not been able to repay on time and in accordance with the conditions attached to it." According to another Yugoslav source, "the exact size of the sum is not known, but it is estimated to be enormous." (3) The weapons supplied by the USSR alone are worth "billions of dollars" while commercial credits have reached the "one billion dollar" mark -- which is why the postponement of repayment has become so important.

Western Aid for Egypt

Yugoslav information media do not conceal the fact that Sadat's conflict with Moscow has "raised Egypt's prestige in the West." In a somber broadcast Radio Zagreb commentator Ante Kesic said that "the 'unbreakable and eternal' friendship agreed between the two countries is now nothing more than the bitter dregs of political terminology." What had gone wrong, he thought, was that the May 1971 agreement had not been signed "at a very favorable moment for the Soviets." Kesic went on:

The agreement was a kind of sop offered by President Sadat to the Russians following the elimination of the allegedly pro-Soviet Ali Sabri group and in exchange for the promise of new arms deliveries. Naturally, arms deliveries are a secret and no one knows the types and quantities of arms that have or have not been delivered. From the time the treaty was signed Egyptian accusations against the Soviet Union were mainly related to arms supplies. (4)

Kesic said that Soviet failure in this respect, together with Kissinger's policy of "small steps," was chiefly responsible for the conflict between Cairo and Moscow. The Russians for their part have persistently claimed that arms were being delivered, but "it would undoubtedly be futile to consider such accusations and replies independently of their context; they must be seen against the background of the Cairo-Moscow disagreement, particularly at a time when Egypt has little interest in waging war [against Israel] and thus is not primarily concerned about arms."

Kesic said he believes that Sadat abrogated the treaty with the Soviet

- (2) Politika (Belgrade), 16 March 1976.
- (3) Ibid.
- (4) Radio Zagreb, 16 March 1976; 1800 hours.

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

Ideology

George
Clorănescu

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HELSINKI AND IDEOLOGY

(A translation with comment by the Czechoslovak Unit)

Summary and Introduction: Milan Matous, the deputy director of the CPCSS CC Institute of Marxism-Leninism, holder of the academic degrees of Doctor of Philosophy and Candidate of Science, as well as of the military rank of colonel, is one of the party's top experts on ideological warfare and a prolific writer on this subject. In a study published in three consecutive numbers of the fortnightly for party affairs, Zivot Strany (Nos. 2-4, 1976), entitled "The Problems of the Ideological Struggle After the Helsinki Conference," Matous assesses at length and in great detail the "significance" of the Helsinki conference and what it entails for future "world history." His essay is divided into seven chapters: 1. The Ideological Significance of the Helsinki Conference (it represents, if not a Waterloo, at least an Austerlitz for "the most militant reactionary forces of imperialism"); 2. The Contradictory Stand of "Realistic" [bourgeois] Politicians (they allegedly do not live up to the principles they signed at Helsinki); 3. The Reaction of Bourgeois Propaganda (it is negative and attempts to offset the results of the conference); 4. The Overt Opponents of Détente (they endeavor "to poison the international atmosphere" and "to stimulate a new wave of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism"); 5. Renegades in the Service of Anticommunism Against Peaceful Coexistence (the use of dissidents is a new method employed by the international reactionaries in their anticommunist propaganda; in this chapter, Matous dwells at length on the so-called anti-Czechoslovak campaign and on the role allegedly assigned to the reformers of the Prague Spring, Dubcek and his supporters, who are said to be active "on orders" from Western anticommunist agencies); 6. The Connection Between the Struggle for Peaceful Coexistence, Democratic Demands, and Socialism (the different interpretation of liberty and progress); and 7. Into the Ideological Offensive (détente must become an irreversible process; to achieve this, socialist awareness must also be enhanced within the individual socialist countries). Matous cites numerous examples to illustrate the points he makes. In general, his analysis follows closely what can be termed the official communist interpretation of the Helsinki conference.

* * *

Many people wonder how the significance of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should be assessed, what it will produce for further world history, and what new tasks arise from it.

The declaration of the CPCS CC Presidium and the government of the CSSR on the results of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, issued on 7 August 1975, serves as the starting point for an approach to an assessment of the conference and the prospects of the program for relaxing international tensions and for peaceful coexistence. A stand similar to this declaration is also expressed in the Proclamation of the CPCS CC, government of the CSSR, the Central Trade Union Council, and the Socialist Youth Union of 6 September 1975. Both documents primarily emphasize three aspects: first, this is a high evaluation of the importance of the conference. The declaration of the CPCS CC Presidium and government of the CSSR appraises it as "a historical milestone in the life of the European nations." The proclamation says that the conference has ushered in a new period in the relations among the nations of our continent. The second aspect is connected with this -- the determination of the decisive conditions and driving forces that made this conference possible. It was the forceful peace offensive by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, supported by progressive and peace-loving people in the whole of the world, that was the decisive factor for the convening and successful culmination of the conference. It was the concrete implementation of the peace program proclaimed at the 24th CPSU Congress. And finally, the third aspect -- the emphasis on the need for further active efforts, so that international tension be relaxed and the realization of the Helsinki principles of peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems become a continuous and irreversible process.

1. The Ideological Significance of the Helsinki Conference

The conference is of great importance for all areas of international politics, and, last but not least, also for the current ideological struggle. Ideology played an immense role in the preparation of the conference, and the conference itself represents an important phase in the continuing struggle between the socialist and the bourgeois ideologies and between the all-democratic principles of peaceful coexistence, self-determination of nations, and social progress on the one hand, and the reactionary ideology of neofascism, neocolonialism, and militarism, on the other hand.

The final document signed at Helsinki is of enormous historical significance. Not in the sense that it eliminates the danger of war in Europe once and for all and that it, as such, has changed Europe into a secure continent of eternal peace in one stroke, but in the sense that it expresses a further important stage in the triumph of the progressive peace forces over the most militant reactionary circles of imperialism. It is difficult and practically impossible to assess at one fell swoop all the consequences arising from the conference for future world development. To do this, a greater distance of time and "the materialization" of the principles of the final document in the actual development of international relations will be necessary.

As Comrade L.I. Brezhnev underscored in his speech at Helsinki -- the final document summarizes the results of the past, but by its substance it is oriented toward the future. The over-all result of the conference stems from the fact "that the relaxation of international tension acquired a steadily increasing concrete material substance. It is precisely the concretization

of détente that is the crux of the matter, the crux of everything that is designed to make peace in Europe really lasting and irreversible" (Rude Pravo, 1 August 1975).

What does the ideological importance of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe consist of? It consists primarily of the fact that the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems, expressed in the 10 main points of the declaration of principles which are to govern the relations among the participating states, have been adopted as the norm of international relations and have been endorsed by the most authoritative international political gathering of present-day history and signed by the heads of states of practically every state in Europe, the US, and Canada. Thus, they have become the criterion, moral norm, and instrument of pressure of world opinion. According to usage, based on as authoritative an official gathering, the final document is internationally legally binding -- although formally it is not a treaty. It enhances the authority and weight of international legal norms which are designed to counter war, aggression, and the threat of force, and call for the settling of disputes by peaceful means. It bolsters the weight of bilateral agreements, such as, for instance, the Soviet-American agreement on averting a nuclear war and on strategic arms limitations; the agreements between the USSR, Poland, the GDR, and the CSSR on the one hand, and the GFR on the other; the bilateral agreements on co-operation and mutual relations between the socialist states and France, Austria, and several other capitalistic countries.

In many respects, the principles adopted transcend the problem of international relations and express, at the same time, democratic and humanistic norms of social conditions for life within the countries in question as well. They confirm that peace among states and democratic liberties, social progress, and dignified living conditions for the people are also closely connected. This, too, is part of the essence of the humanism of the Leninist policy of peace and friendship among nations, as Comrade Brezhnev pointed out at Helsinki. He said in this connection: "We note with deep satisfaction that the theses on the main problems of buttressing peace in Europe, as formulated at this conference, serve the interests of the people regardless of their occupation, nationality, or age; workers, farmers, mental workers, every person severally, and all jointly. They [these theses] are imbued with respect for man and the care for his ability to live in peace and look with confidence into the future.

"The agreements which we have reached expand the possibilities of nations to exert more influence on so-called 'big politics.' At the same time, they also comprise the problems of everyday life. They will contribute toward improving the living and working conditions of the people and their educational possibilities. They also are connected with health care; in a word, with many things which constitute the life of the individual, the family, young people, and various groups of society" (Rude Pravo, 1 August 1975).

If the citizens of the socialist countries contemplate these principles, it may seem to them that nothing exceptional is involved and that natural human needs and normal reasonable norms have merely been expressed. The fact, however, that they were endorsed by the representatives of the bourgeois states is in itself testimony of enormous historical changes. By affixing their signatures, many statesmen have accepted principles against which their ruling class waged a determined practical political struggle not only for many years,

but even for centuries, and with which their current political practice and ideology is in conflict to a large degree.

Examples illustrate this most expressively. The US, which ended the war of intervention in Vietnam and Cambodia only recently, and maintains more than half a million soldiers beyond the frontiers of its country at 2,200 military bases in 40 countries of the world, endorsed in writing the principle of refraining from the threat of force or use of force and of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states. The GFR, which for decades proclaimed the demand for the restoration of the frontiers of "the third Reich" according to its state as of 1 September 1937, that is, territorial demands on the GDR, Poland, and the Soviet Union, and where revanchist associations receive financial and public support -- associations which go even much further in territorial demands vis-à-vis neighboring countries (they demand not only the Czechoslovak borderlands, Austria, territory along the frontiers with Denmark, France, Belgium, Holland, etc. to this very day), this very same GFR affixed its signature to the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and respect for the territorial integrity of other states. Great Britain, which only 30 years ago represented the greatest colonial power in the world, with the territory under its control 100 times larger than the British Isles, Great Britain, whose armed forces brutally suppress the national movement in Northern Ireland, endorsed the principle of equality and self-determination of nations. Even Spain, whose government defends itself against the democratic movement of the popular masses through terror and legalized murder, put its signature under the principle of respecting human rights and basic liberties. The Holy See -- the Vatican too, after centuries of inquisition and many excommunications of communists, socialists, and other representatives of progress -- endorsed the principle of respecting the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and convictions.

Every one of the signatures representing the bourgeois states is in conflict with the antihuman aspects of the history of the ruling class of the country concerned. And all these examples illustrate two fundamental aspects of the Helsinki conference. They demonstrate how great are the historical revolutionary successes which have been achieved on the one hand, while, on the other, they show how long is the road from the signing of the peace principles to their full practical implementation. They show how greatly the strength and effectiveness of the pressure exerted by the progressive forces in the world against the forces of imperialism and reaction have grown, how far the development of public opinion in the world has advanced toward progress in the intentions which the communist movement, and primarily the states of the victorious socialist revolution, with the Soviet Union at its head, have drawn up and promoted. The sharp contradiction between the signed principles of the Final Act and the existing practice of many capitalistic states testifies to the size of the effort still necessary if the agreements of the Helsinki conference are made fully to materialize, that is, to become reality.

Although international political reality, as we can observe it in actual daily events, does not yet correspond to what is proclaimed, demanded, and stipulated in the Final Act, the principles set forth in this document are an expression of deep fundamental changes in international relations. Shifts are involved that are essentially permanent in character, since they arise from the inexorable trends of world development, from the growth in the strength of socialism and the deepening general crisis of capitalism. The changes in the correlation of forces in favor of progress and socialism and to the detriment of reaction and imperialism are the fundamental driving force which has created the conditions for the success of the peace initiative of the socialist

countries, with the Soviet Union at their head. They are also the precondition for the further struggle to get the principles of peaceful coexistence implemented to proceed successfully. The favorable development of the balance of power on a world scale makes it possible to combine the perspectives of the struggle for peace, democracy, and national liberation with the struggle for socialism.

2. The Contradictory Stand of "Realistic" Politicians

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe does not mean an end to ideological antagonisms and an end to the struggle between the socialist and bourgeois ideologies. The struggle for the explanation and interpretation of the fundamental ideas of the conference is direct proof of this. Two fundamentally contradictory approaches exist. The socialist countries, communist parties, and progressive circles in the world broadly popularize the conclusions of the conference and elucidate its importance for the peaceful progressive development of all mankind. The approach of the bourgeois circles is different. Official state representatives, in particular those who signed the Final Act, advocate détente and international co-operation. Conversely, the bourgeois propaganda machinery plays down, rejects, and distorts the results of the conference.

Even the stands of official representatives of the bourgeois governments are not unequivocal. Their more or less positive attitude toward the normalization of relations with the socialist states does not mean that capitalistic class interests are being abandoned. It is based on a more realistic assessment of the historical situation, especially of the development of the international balance of class forces.

The motives which influence increased trade with the Soviet Union in the US can serve as an example. A statement by Professor Hans J. Morgenthau of the New School for Social Research, New York, for example, expressed the most widespread version of American mass propaganda: "The Soviet Union needs détente, because it needs a technological and financial blood transfusion from the West" (Newsweek, 21 April 1975). President Ford addressed the Congress on 10 April 1975 in a different spirit about US trade with the Soviet Union. He spoke of the adverse effects of the notorious amendment to the trade act, voted by the congressmen at the end of 1974, which impedes development of trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. "As a result -- Western Europe and Japan stepped into the gap. These countries boosted credits to the Soviet Union by 8,000 million dollars during the past eight months. These are economic opportunities -- jobs and business -- that could have benefited Americans" (US News and World Report, 21 April 1975). The President did not tell such naive tales of cheap propaganda about "a blood transfusion for the Soviet Union" to the representatives of big capital who sit in the Congress. There, the illusion is not used that imperialism, that for dozens of years expended immense financial, material, and military means to destroy the first country of the proletarian revolution, has now changed into its savior and even voluntary technological and financial blood donor out of some incomprehensible philanthropic reasons. Representatives of monopolistic big capital reason practically and speak pragmatically -- in billions of dollars for jobs and business. If interest in trade relations with the Soviet Union is growing in America and in the capitalistic world in general, this is not the consequence of changes in the class character of capitalism, but primarily that of the growing strength of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. Something

that V.I. Lenin recognized and expressed as long ago as toward the end of 1921 at the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets has become apparent and been borne out on a mass scale. Lenin said in this speech: ". . . the economic position of those who blockaded us has proved vulnerable; a greater force exists than the wishes, will, and determination of the enemy governments or classes -- this force is the over-all world economic interrelationship which now compels them to take to the road leading to relations with us" (Lenin, Spisy, Vol. 33).

Comrade Gustav Husak emphasized the immediacy of the urgency and broad importance of expanding mutual economic relations among countries in his speech at Helsinki: "Mutually advantageous economic co-operation is an important stabilizing factor in peaceful relations among nations, which assumes steadily increasing significance. The need for this co-operation arises from the rapid burgeoning of production forces, based on scientific and technological development, from the scope and complexity of problems, and from the need to protect the environment. If progress in this sphere is to be achieved, effective international division of labor and the combining of the resources and means of many states is required. Although the citizens of our country can live in safety, secure from the shock of crises, we fully share the opinion that the all-sided development of this co-operation is a source of new possibilities for economic progress, which is far from exhausted" (Rude Pravo, 1 August 1975).

Motives similar to those that exert an influence in the sphere of economic relations also affect the mutual balance of political and military strength, the level of development of technology, science, the arts, sports, and other areas. Imperialism has not become milder and more benevolent toward the socialist countries owing to some internal humane transformation; no, the strength of the socialist countries, their stability, and international influence have increased to such a degree that they not only do not offer the imperialistic policy [of acting] from positions of strength any hope of success, but also represent, in many respects, factors from which even the most advanced capitalistic countries cannot isolate themselves very well. As far as this is concerned, it is not only the indirect political and ideological strength and influence of socialism, but also the economic, scientific, artistic, technological, sporting, and other successes of the socialist countries, which reach the highest levels in the world in a steadily broadening scope of activities, that have a bearing on developments in the world.

If the realistically thinking bourgeois politicians advocate a normalization of relations with the socialist states and accept the policy of détente, this is not due to the fact that the character of imperialism has changed. In fact, the possibilities of imperialism have become narrower as a result of the successful development of the socialist countries, the international communist and workers' movement, and the broad, progressive anti-imperialistic front.

The stands of the bourgeois statesmen on the question of peaceful coexistence are inherently contradictory. Naturally, they approach this question from their class positions and endeavor to promote their old aims in many respects under the new historical conditions that have come into being. They realize that peaceful coexistence is a form of the class struggle and that it introduces significant new elements into the political, economic, and ideological struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie on a global scale, between socialism and capitalism, and between the broad front of revolutionary

forces and imperialism. The new historical situation and the policy of peaceful coexistence connected with it narrow down the possibilities of imperialism. Although the peaceful relations among states on the basis of the Final Act do not in any respect relate to the essence of exploitation and private ownership of capitalism, they do clearly restrain imperialism in its inherent expressions, chiefly in its expansion and aggression. Therefore, it is not surprising that many representatives of bourgeois governments accept this policy merely as an immediate necessity which has arisen because the balance of power happens to be in their disfavor. Therefore, they endeavor, at the same time, to change this balance of power and to reverse the inexorable trends of development of society, which tend toward enhanced democratic rights and liberties for the people, toward national independence and socialism.

The official representatives of the US have been speaking about political negotiations since the beginning of the 1970s — i.e., about talks and agreements with the socialist countries. On the other hand, the same representatives have not ceased to emphasize the US claim to "leadership" of the world. The claim of American imperialism to world hegemony is not only openly being proclaimed, but also ideologically justified by American "responsibility" and "free and democratic development" in every part of our planet. The American military intervention in favor of the antipeople puppet governments in Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and the Dominican Republic, dozens of American military interventions since the end of World War II in favor of diverse dictatorships in Europe, Asia, America, as well as Africa demonstrate what this American ideal of liberty and democracy really looks like.

At the present time, it is being disclosed in the US that, for many years, the American espionage service, the CIA, was active on an international scale against all revolutionary and progressive forces, and employed the worst and clearly criminal methods in its efforts. After reports that the CIA was spying on thousands of American citizens and planning the murders of politicians and statesmen had been published in the American press, a special commission of the US Congress was established and began an investigation. The US Vice-President, a representative of the most powerful group of capitalists in the United States, Nelson A. Rockefeller, was appointed chairman of this commission. Criticism and the investigation of the CIA, as well as personnel changes among its executives are the methods through which the President of the US and his advisory bodies dissociate themselves from the scandalous actions of the CIA which have been revealed. At the same time, however, the American President, in his aforementioned speech before the Congress on 10 April 1975, condemned the criticism of the CIA as reckless and endangering the interests of the US in that it "cripples a vitally important national institution" (US News and World Report, 21 April 1975).

At Helsinki, Gerald Ford signed the final document which condemns the use of force and the threat of force among nations. After his return to the US, he subsequently told the congress of the American League in Minneapolis, Minnesota, that he would continue in the policy of détente between the USSR and the US, but at the same time he emphasized that the United States "must be the world's Number One military power" (Ceteka, 19 August 1975).

The consensus of the representatives of the bourgeois states on the policy of peaceful coexistence and, concretely, their signature on the Final Act of Helsinki do not mean that the interests of the socialist and capitalist states have become identical and that the signature of each of the 35 participants was prompted by the same motives. The bourgeois representatives

were compelled to accept the policy of peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social systems by the pressure of objective circumstances, which they are unable to change. They were compelled to do so by the real growth of the forces of socialism, the pressure of the progressive forces and public opinion in the whole of the world, based on it, and by the peace initiative and offensive of the socialist states, which stem from the intrinsic principles of Marxism-Leninism. This is the basic reality of the times, an understanding of which constitutes the precondition for the further successful buttressing of peace in the world and the developing of peaceful co-operation.

The stand on the principle of peaceful coexistence of some Social Democrats, members of the parties of the Socialist International, who represented the governments of their countries at Helsinki, is also internally contradictory. Since its 12th congress in Vienna in 1972, the Socialist International has, in principle, accepted the policy of talks and contacts between leading Social Democratic representatives of the Western states and the socialist countries. This does not, however, really signify a departure from the intentions of bourgeois foreign political relations -- President Nixon announced the change of US foreign policy from confrontation to negotiation with the socialist countries as long ago as at his inauguration in 1970 (sic),

Great differences in the practical implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence exist among the Social Democratic governments. The Finnish government, for instance, which is one of them, actively contributes toward promoting the policy of peace and far from small credit is due it for the fact that the European conference was held in the form and at the date it was actually held.

In general, one may state that many Social Democratic parties which govern capitalistic states play a positive role in normalizing the relations of their countries with the socialist countries. This undoubtedly is a result of the pressure of the popular masses, members of and voters for the Social Democrats alike and, apparently also from the circumstance that the Social Democratic parties in many countries are not the direct political instrument of the militaristic part of the grande bourgeoisie.

In any event, however, differences of principle exist between the Marxist-Leninist and the Social Democratic concepts of peace and peaceful coexistence. The Social Democratic stand agrees with the bourgeois approach on fundamental points. It is chiefly based on two elements: 1. peaceful coexistence is made dependent on an equal balance of forces and not on the superiority of progressive and anti-imperialistic forces, and 2. it is not regarded as a form of the class struggle and a part of the world revolutionary processes, but as a retreat from the class struggle and revolution. Many Social Democrats accept peaceful coexistence as a centrist compromise, and also adopt a centrist stand on the most important international questions, according to the unwritten principle of neither with imperialism nor with genuine socialism. Some Social Democrats also demand "peaceful coexistence" in ideology. Conversely, other Social Democrats emphasize that the "free world's" fuller relations with the socialist countries require an intensified ideological struggle against the danger of "communist infiltration" and for "a democratization" of the socialist social system. It is significant that, shortly after the end of the Helsinki conference, a number of Social Democratic representatives went to Stockholm, where the Socialist International convened an extraordinary meeting and set up a special committee for the active support of Soares and his Socialist Party in Portugal. This was at precisely the time when Soares had brought

about a crisis in the Portuguese democratic revolution and created the conditions for the rise of counterrevolutionary and fascist elements and for a wave of anticommunist terror, particularly in the most backward, northern parts of the country. Danish Premier Anker Jorgensen was sent to Lisbon as a special emissary by the newly set up committee of the Socialist International to support Soares. His mission was agreed upon by the West German Schmidt, the Austrian Kreisky, the Swedish Palme, the Norwegian Brattelley, and other statesmen who, shortly before in Helsinki, had signed their names in support of the principles of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states.

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The second installment of Milan Matous's article starts with the chapter "The Reaction of Bourgeois Propaganda." While the representatives of the capitalistic governments who signed the Helsinki documents have adopted a positive attitude toward détente, albeit with certain reservations, Matous says, the attitude of a large part of the mass bourgeois propaganda is negative. And this appears in various forms: for instance, in incomplete publication of the text of the final document, or lack of a correct interpretation. There is also an effort to divert attention from international peace talks ("Axel Springer's Bild Zeitung" is quoted as an example). Or else, the bourgeois media endeavor to belittle the importance of the Helsinki conference, which is labeled as a mere political "show." In this context, a cartoon in Der Spiegel is mentioned, followed (strangely enough) by "the Maoists' description of the Helsinki conference as 'a masquerade of the superpowers.'" The treatment given by Newsweek is also cited. Next, Matous cites examples of what he regards as an incorrect interpretation of the Helsinki conference and its results, for instance regarding the agreed-upon inviolability of frontiers, which is said not to imply that frontiers cannot be changed. Matous also refers to the report in The Guardian (17 September 1975) about a meeting of the US, British, French, and West German foreign ministers at the Waldorf Hotel at which the key propaganda theme, "The Russians Unleash the Cold War Again," was (supposedly) agreed upon. And Matous continues:

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Bourgeois propaganda pursues several aims by misinterpreting the significance, contents, and realization of the Helsinki conference. In the first place it endeavors to blunt the strength and influence of the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence, which confine the aggressive and expansionist possibilities of imperialism, and turn world public opinion against it. It [imperialism] also fears the policy of relaxing international tension from the point of view of developments within the capitalistic countries themselves. As a natural consequence of this process, the main anticommunist argument of mass bourgeois propaganda -- the bogey of the danger of a military attack by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact -- dissolves into thin air. And, as a result, the danger of internal political pressure from the progressive, democratic, and socialist forces is growing for the ruling bourgeois circles. Last, but not least, the bourgeois propaganda concept is influenced by the fact that even the more realistic politicians of the capitalistic states do not wish to have the policy of peaceful coexistence, which broad sections of the general public accept with so much sympathy, to be linked with awareness of the initiative and merits of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. Because

of all this, many of the politicians who support normalization of relations with the socialist countries in the areas of trade, diplomatic ties, scientific and cultural contacts, etc., at the same time contrive new methods and schemes of anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda.

They use methods toward this end that serve to make out that they are even more consistent supporters of peaceful coexistence than are the socialist countries. French President Giscard d'Estaing, for example, demanded during his visit to Moscow that peaceful coexistence be extended to encompass the sphere of ideology as well. This course of action alone of the bourgeois politicians, even those who are sufficiently realistic, proves that peaceful coexistence and the ideological struggle represent two qualitatively different levels of relations which are closely connected, but which cannot in any event be identified or confused with each other.

* * *

Next Matous discusses the Third Basket, the free flow of information, etc., agreed upon at Helsinki, and asserts that it is the socialist countries that "consistently foster fruitful exchanges of cultural values," while bourgeois propaganda uses these slogans as a means of discrediting the socialist countries in this respect; he says:

* * *

Bourgeois propaganda deliberately distorts the important problem of information in the world of today. Aside from other things, it avoids and suppresses the fact that, even with the best intentions, no information medium can help anyone make a certain selection of information out of the vast number of events and facts taking place. It is the criteria for selection, however, that count. In the relationship between the bourgeois and socialist information systems, the conflicting class interests necessarily affect the premise for the selection and evaluation of information, for its assessment and interpretation. An enormous difference between the bourgeois and socialist information systems certainly exists. This is not, however, a difference in the sense that the bourgeois system represents "a free flow of information" while the socialist system supports a flow that is limited and less free. What bourgeois propaganda describes as free information is strongly permeated by anticommunism and a reactionary spirit in the present epoch, the epoch of the historical struggle between socialism and imperialism. It is natural that the socialist countries and progressive forces in the whole world are not interested in this kind of "free information," which actually is anticommunist misinformation, and that they wage a struggle against it, chiefly through disseminating progressive ideology based on truthful information.

The bourgeois slogan of "free information," thought out to the last button, means that anyone ought to interpret anything regardless of the truthfulness or progressive or reactionary significance of the assertion. The edition, in millions of copies, of the "memoirs" of the Hitlerite war criminal Walter (sic) Speer in Western Germany is a recent example of this kind of "freedom of information."

It is truthful information that is the primary socialist principle. It is hardly an ideal situation where people are inundated by a flood of banalities, figments of the imagination, half-truths, or lies, as is the case with the bourgeois propaganda machinery. It is our aim to inform people truthfully,

comprehensively, promptly, in depth, and to enable them to grasp the connections and substance of important core issues, and to give them access to important discoveries of world-wide science and to works of world-wide art. And this is quite a different thing from what bourgeois propaganda means by the slogan of "free information." The manner in which bourgeois propaganda has informed the public of the capitalistic countries about the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and about its Final Act is an example of how it envisages this freedom.

4. The Overt Opponents of Détente

Détente, the collapse of the militant anticommunist hysteria, based on the repeated assertion about a threat of military aggression by the Soviet Union, the enhanced standing and authority of the socialist countries as the initiators of peaceful contacts among nations, these are facts to which the most reactionary imperialistic circles cannot become reconciled. Therefore, they endeavor to poison the international atmosphere by all possible means and to stimulate a new wave of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism.

Even the bourgeois and social reformist institutions and their representatives that advocate a normalization of relations with the socialist countries frequently participate in anticommunist campaigns. Distinguishing between overt militarists and neofascists on the one hand and more realistic politicians on the other does not mean that the latter do not have a share in anticommunist campaigns. Common class stands and the fear of the growing influence and authority of the anti-imperialistic forces and the workers' movement in their own countries connect such politicians to them.

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In the following paragraphs, Matous cites examples to prove these contentions (Schlesinger's warning about an attack on South Korea; the discussion in the US Senate about the so-called "first use" of nuclear weapons; the US promise to increase military aid to Israel at a time when that country "stepped up its attacks against the Lebanon"). He also refers to the helicopter escapes of refugees from Czechoslovak territory and complains that the "gangster pilot" was treated in West Germany like an ordinary traffic offender. Next, Matous levels his sights at Senator Jackson, the "Jerry Don't Go" article in The Wall Street Journal, the German "revanchists" and their allies, the political émigrés from the socialist countries, the CSU/CDU and their leaders Strauss and Kohl, and finally at the Maoists. Matous concludes this installment with the following passage:

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The period which has passed since the signing of the Final Act at Helsinki clearly demonstrates that even this great success of the world-wide progressive forces does not mean an end to the struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence, but it has ushered in a new phase in this struggle. This new phase in the struggle to relax international tensions is chiefly characterized by a further, marked strengthening of the positions of the peace-loving forces and an aggravating crisis of the most reactionary international circles connected with militarism, neofascism, and militant anticommunism.

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The third and last part of this serial starts with a chapter entitled: "Renegades in the Service of Anticommunism Against Peaceful Coexistence." In the introduction, Matous predicates that, in addition to the old methods, "international reaction" is seeking and testing new methods in its stepped-up anticommunist propaganda through, for instance, an anticommunist interpretation of the Helsinki conference. He cites an interview with Milovan Djilas in Newsweek (1 September 1975) as an example. Turning to Czechoslovakia in the context of the theme of this chapter, he writes:

* * *

In the anticommunist campaign launched at the end of 1974 and beginning of 1975, the so-called Czechoslovak problems played a far from small part. This campaign was not so much aimed against Czechoslovakia as at the population of the capitalistic countries. Czechoslovakia served as a subject and means of argumentation. Our ideological adversaries are not so naive as to believe that their propaganda could evoke an echo among the masses of our public. They have had more than one opportunity to recognize that this is no longer the year 1948, and that the absolute majority of the Czechoslovak citizens has become convinced of the reactionary nature of the right-wing slogans of "reform," as well as of the genuine benefits derived from, and the successes achieved by, the policies of the CPCS, as expressed by the line of the 14th congress and the decisions and the practical directing activity of the Central Committee with Secretary-General Gustav Husak at its head.

In the new anti-Czechoslovak campaign started at the end of 1974, international reaction used an old-new method. The outbursts of émigrés living in the capitalist countries had become stale and lost their effectiveness -- insofar as they ever had any. Anticommunist propaganda chose a new means -- pamphlets by renegades living within Czechoslovakia. Their thrusts, coming directly from "behind the Iron Curtain," were intended to add drama to the campaign, to create the impression that these were the voices of martyrs in jeopardy, to give greater credibility and serve as authentic testimony from the socialist countries, and to create the impression that an opposition political movement exists within socialist Czechoslovakia whose spokesmen were raising their voices and that the political system in our homeland is unstable. Naturally, all this does not apply to Czechoslovakia alone; the example of our country was supposed to discredit the principles of real socialism and Marxism-Leninism.

The anticommunist campaign conducted against Czechoslovakia with the aid of renegades living within our country is an analogy, in a sense, of a similar campaign which has been waged against the Soviet Union for some years with the aid of so-called dissidents such as Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, and a handful of others. Anticommunist and anti-Soviet propaganda endows these mannikins with the appearance of importance and grandeur.

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Next, Matous specifies who these renegades were (the "alleged" Smrkovsky memoirs, the letters from Dubcek, Mlynar, Havel, Kosik, Vaculik, et al). According to Matous, there were two important aspects and phases to the campaign. It started at a time when bourgeois propaganda was obliged to react to an exceptionally

unfavorable development affecting public opinion in the West, due to the economic crisis there, which contrasted with "the new successes achieved by socialism." Matous elaborates:

* * *

The purpose of the anti-Czechoslovak pamphlets from the pens of Dubcek, Mlynar, Havel, and others, was to create the impression among the Western public that crisis symptoms were not confined to the capitalistic part of the world, that they were not caused by the capitalistic social system, but that an even more acute economic, political, cultural, and moral crisis existed in the socialist countries, particularly in Czechoslovakia. This was the main maxim from the very beginning, and, in a sense, this has remained the main content of the assertions fabricated by the renegades on orders from the Western anticommunist agencies.

As the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe approached its climax, another aspect of anti-Czechoslovak propaganda also became increasingly evident. This was the assertion that, in Czechoslovakia and in the socialist countries in general, basic human and civil liberties and rights are being violated. This is the refrain repeated in all the recent pamphlets. In this way, it was hoped to "prove" that the socialist countries violate the principles of the Helsinki document. And in this way, it is intended to twist the results of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe into an indictment of the socialist countries, into an instrument of anticommunism. In principle, this is nothing new, it is merely a continuation of the old anti-communist scheme which attempts to represent the bourgeois system as the embodiment of democracy and socialism and communism as the expression of totalitarianism and lack of freedom.

* * *

Matous cites Ludvik Vaculik's letter to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and the "anti-Czechoslovak attack" at the 14th World Congress of Historians in San Francisco in August 1975 -- in the latter instance Vilem Precan's letter served as the pretext -- as examples of this approach. The anti-Czechoslovak, anticommunist attack failed on this occasion, thanks to the help of progressive historians from the West. In connection with Precan's letter, Matous states:

* * *

Attached to it was a list of Czechoslovak historians who are allegedly being persecuted. In addition to genuine revisionists and militant rightists, persons were included in this list who work in responsible public posts, in cultural institutions, and whose expert historical studies are even published by the party publishing houses.

* * *

The anti-Czechoslovak campaign continued with the publication of Pavel Kohout's letter addressed to the American writer Arthur Miller and to the West German writer Heinrich Boell, Matous says, remarking that this occurred after Pavel Kohout had returned from attending the opening of his play Roulette

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in Switzerland -- a play that purportedly did not exactly receive very favorable reviews in the West. Probably Kohout wanted to attract attention to himself at least by anticommunist "exhibitionism." This was impertinent of Kohout, who could daily witness the benefits deriving from the achievements of socialism in Czechoslovakia, to compare the Czechoslovak cultural scene with the situation of German culture in the 1930s, threatened by Nazism, Matous declares indignantly. And he concludes this chapter by saying:

* * *

It is natural that these insolent outbursts and laments should prove unable to evoke a response from the Czechoslovak public. On the contrary, many people rightly feel angry about the provocative antisocialist actions of individuals of the Dubcek or Kohout type. It is obvious that the anti-Czechoslovak attacks and anticommunist pamphlets are not so much intended for our public, but are mainly designed to disorient public opinion, including progressive circles, in the Western world, in countries where people cannot discover for themselves what the real state of affairs in Czechoslovakia is like, and where they cannot confront crude inventions and slanders by renegades with reality on the basis of daily experience.

The renegades' pamphlets, fabricated on order, reveal the pharisaical role of the persons who, toward the end of the 1960s, represented themselves as the Messiahs of socialism. To this very day, they assume the roles of humanists, democrats, and martyrs exposed to danger so far as their basic human and civil liberties go. In actual fact, they are puppets and instruments of the most reactionary international forces. Objectively speaking, a single common world-wide reactionary front of anticommunism exists in which a variety of puppets, from Solzhenitsyn to the Sudeten Germans and Czechoslovak émigrés and renegades at home of the Dubcek, Kosik, Kohout, etc., type, have been assigned different roles. In actual fact, conscious service to the blackest reactionaries and enemies of socialism as well as our national existence lies hidden behind the phrases about humanism, democracy, and human and civil liberties.

* * *

Chapter 6: The Connection Between the Struggle for Peaceful Co-existence, Democratic Demands, and Socialism deals with differences in interpreting liberty and progress. The author repeats the well-known communist arguments in which the "abstract concept of civil and human liberty" is contrasted with "socialist reality." In this context, Matous again attacks Kohout, Kosik, Vaculik "and their like," "American imperialism (the American role in the Putsch of fascist generals in Chile, support for the counterrevolution in Portugal, and diplomatic, economic, and military co-operation with fascist Spain)," but praises Indira Gandhi's "struggle against counterrevolutionary attempts by the overthrown representatives of feudalism . . ." All this is a rear-guard action by world-wide reaction that knows that the anti-imperialistic class coalition constitutes a growing threat. In the last part of this chapter, Matous takes to task rightist and leftist revisionists: "Both types of revisionism theoretically and practically disarm the international working class.

They divert it from realizing the possibilities and requirements which arise from the current real situation," he concludes.

The seventh and last chapter of Matous's article is entitled "Into the Ideological Offensive." In it he discusses -- along the usual lines -- détente and what it implies in order to become an irreversible process, namely a growth in the strength and influence of the working class in the world. Next, Matous refers to the efforts of the international reactionaries to thwart this process, and to the means employed to this end. In this context he once again mentions "the Czechoslovak renegades" as helpmates. "Individuals of the Dubcek & Co. type" also figure in the following paragraphs, in which the author dwells on the connection between international developments and internal social processes in the individual countries. Because of this, an analysis in depth of everything new that is produced in the process of socialist transformation in "this country" is a precondition for "our attacking ideological reaction," inasmuch as material results alone do not automatically produce socialist awareness. Matous concludes his article as follows:

* * *

The results of the conference on European security and co-operation are a great political and ideological victory for the progressive forces and another link in the chain of the successes of socialism, democracy, and peace. It will be an important task of the whole ideological front to imbue the broadest masses of our people with this fact and to prove the real place and role of the conference and its results in the whole complexity of current developments in the world and the international class struggle.

On the other hand, the conference on European security and co-operation is merely one stage in the struggle for world-wide peace, democracy, and socialism. The class struggle on a global scale is continuing with unabated force. It is primarily characterized by a further growth in the activity of the international workers' movement, the expansion of the anti-imperialistic front, and the internal disintegration of world-wide reaction. The ideological front plays an exceptionally serious role in the class struggle.

The demands on the ideological part of our entire activity are growing. The demands for theoretical depth in the study of Marxism-Leninism and for the careful observation and general application of new knowledge derived from international developments and from our internal situation are also growing. The promotion of effective and prompt ideological work is an important part of the preparations for the 15th CPCS Congress. (053)

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IN.M.E.R.
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S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

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CULTURE1. The Campaign Against Literary Critics Continues

The campaign against liberal, nonconformist critics has reached a new stage. Instead of general complaints hazily blaming "the critics" for all the shortcomings in literary life, the accusations have become more precise, and so have the theoretical grounds on which these critics are castigated. In an article in Era Socialista (No. 1/1976) Ion Dodu Balan, deputy chairman of the Council on Socialist Culture and Education, listed the official attributes of literary activity. The "values" he emphasized were "patriotism, realism, revolutionary spirit, democratism, and humanism"; at the negative end of the scale were the "anachronistic, idealistic prejudices, and theories" -- i.e., "the autonomy of art, the artist's isolation in an ivory tower, aestheticism, formalism, oneiricism, the existence of a [cultural] crisis, art for art's sake, etc." (The theory that a cultural crisis exists, aired between 1944 and 1947 by independent journalists like Ion Caraion and Virgil Ierunca, was heavily attacked by the Communists at the time; "oneiricism" designates the literary ideology of the group called the "oneirics," whose leader, Dumitru Tepeneag, now lives outside Rumania, as do a number of its members.)

With these attributes defined, the literary reviews -- and particularly the weeklies Saptamina (editor-in-chief: Eugen Barbu), Romania Literara (George Ivascu), and Luceafarul (Nicolae Dragos) -- launched a campaign against a number of literary critics who had defended the more liberal literary climate that prevailed during the late 1960s. Saptamina (No. 257, 7 November 1975) harshly attacked Sam Damian, former head of the prose section of Gazeta Literara and its successor Romania Literara. In another issue (No. 262, 13 December 1975), the journal denounced the whole team of critics connected with Romania Literara in those years -- Sam Damian, Gabriel Dimisianu, Valeriu Cristea, and Laurentiu Ulici -- as promoters of "an escapist and desocialized type of literature" and accused them of having created "a genuine psychosis with an obviously destructive tendency directed against the great cultural values of their predecessors." (What in fact these critics had done was to expose the pseudovalues created during the dogmatic period.)

In another article (No. 263, 19 December 1975), Dimisianu was singled out for particularly severe criticism for having "frenetically applauded oneiric literature" and promoted "aestheticism" and literature that "explored unreality." In another journal (Romania Literara No. 6, 5 February 1976) the influential director of the Eminescu Publishing House, Valeriu Rapeanu deplored the "abdication" from their task of those literary critics "who have taken upon themselves the ungrateful role of signing certificates of talent [to certain writers] instead of certificates of literary poverty."

A concerted attack ranging in nature from slander to intimidation is being waged against the eminent critic Nicolae Manolescu (born in 1939), who writes a weekly column for Romania Literara. Although disguised as personal polemics, these attacks are in fact part of the over-all campaign against the younger liberal critics

of the 1960s. The dogmatic cultural officials and writers who as early as 1968, at the height of the more liberal period, succeeded in preventing the sale of Manolescu's already printed anthology of poetry, are now in full command of the situation. The anthology ignored writers whose reputations had been established during the communist regime, and this has obviously not been forgotten. In an article in Luceafarul (No. 14, 5 April 1975) a "personal enemy" of Manolescu, the critic Mihai Ungheanu, accused him of political and ideological "confusion" -- i.e., of being an apologist for the Iron Guard characters in George Calinescu's novel Bietul Ioanide. Ungheanu described Manolescu as a critic famous "for systematic, not merely aesthetic, inconsistencies" and as completely lacking in "moral authority." No doubt with the provisions of the 1974 Press Law in mind, Ungheanu implied that the Council on Socialist Culture and Education, which publishes Romania Literara, was just as responsible as Manolescu for the "brutal mystifications" in his weekly column. In fact, Ungheanu urged both editor-in-chief George Ivascu and the council to "take steps" against the columnist. But it is undoubtedly thanks to Ivascu (who discovered and sponsored the young critic when he was with Contemporanul and took him along when he went to Romania Literara) that Manolescu is still in his post.

The same accusations concerning Manolescu's alleged apology for the Iron Guardists in Calinescu's novel were made in another article in Luceafarul (No. 51, 20 December 1975) entitled "The Risks of Creative Criticism." The author, Eugen Marinescu, tried to prove that the "creative criticism" (a term now used pejoratively) with which Manolescu is associated is politically and ideologically dangerous, since it leads those who practice it "to transform the antifascist thrust [of Calinescu's novel] into its opposite."

Another critic who went too far even in 1968 and was severely reprimanded at that time is Ion Negoitescu (born in 1921). A member of the Sibiu Circle in the 1940s, he spent a number of years in jail for political reasons, and was not allowed to publish again until 1967. In March 1968 the Oradea cultural monthly Familia published the draft of his projected history of Rumanian literature, which aroused sharp protest because of its flagrant neglect of the established literary "hierarchy." In 1971 one of his books was withdrawn from circulation. A recent article in Saptamina (No. 273, 27 February 1976) by Traian Filip, an insignificant writer devoted to the party, severely attacked Negoitescu for past "errors." Interestingly enough, Filip included in his strictures not only the historical project but also the book on Eminescu which marked Negoitescu's re-entry into literary life, and which is considered a milestone in the "dedogmatization" of critical opinions about the poet. Filip accused Negoitescu of having applied "a mobile scale of values" in his literary history, of being too severe on the "classics" (which in fact means that he did not include many of the hack writers of the dogmatic period), and of elevating "mediocre" writers or those who represent "picturesque accidents of literature" (undoubtedly a reference to, among others, the oneirics, many of whom Negoitescu had praised). At the end of his article Filip asked the rhetorical question: "Who will pay for the damage done by the experiments,

for the erroneous pieces of advice and for the unwanted tensions in the field of criticism?" The answer is obvious: the liberal critics who had the courage to foster undogmatic writing during the 1960s.

The campaign against critical nonconformism is not, however, limited to critics who were writing during the more liberal 1960s; it also extends to young critics who show signs of nonconformism. The prime example is Alexandru Dobrescu, a member of the staff of the Iasi monthly Convorbiri Literare, who has often expressed somewhat independent judgments without taking into account the hierarchical position of the authors whose works he was reviewing. Recently he was criticized sharply and at length by both Dumitru Pacurariu, dean of the faculty of Rumanian literature at Bucharest University (Romania Literara No. 33, 14 August 1975), and C. Constantinescu (Convorbiri Literare No. 1/1976). In a highly personal attack Pacurariu accused him of a "spirit of dilettantism," "negativism," a taste for scandal, and -- particularly -- youth, which allegedly made him unable to judge the work of older (and well-established) writers. Pacurariu also urged that steps be taken to silence Dobrescu: "Such noisy negativism has nothing in common with the exigency and the atmosphere of creative debate in our literary criticism."

Although personal polemics often play a role in the more ideological attacks, it is the purely personal ones that -- given the monotonous content of the literary reviews -- constitute the literary public's favorite reading. One such "spicy" controversy has recently been going on between the critic Alexandru Piru, who published a "panorama" of postwar Rumanian poetry, and a poet who was dissatisfied with the treatment accorded his work, Darie Novaceanu. The tone of Novaceanu's first attack on Piru, which took up a full page in Romania Literara (No. 4, 22 January 1976), was insulting, and so was Piru's answer (Romania Literara No. 6, 5 February 1976). Piru quoted highly unfavorable comments Novaceanu's Spanish translations of Rumanian poetry had evoked in the Spanish press; Novaceanu responded with still greater fury (Romania Literara No. 7, 12 February 1976) that these quotations did not come from the Spanish press but from a "so-called review" which represented "the posthumous secretion of a time of nightmare for which traitors to the Rumanian spirit and the Rumanian people were responsible." Most probably he was referring to an Iron Guard review published in Spain, a fact which adds to the "piquancy" of this debate and was greatly enjoyed by other literary reviews, which kept commenting on this "match."

In another strongly worded article the young critic Valentin Tascu (writing in Cronica No.44, 31 October 1975) presented a desolate picture of the situation of present-day criticism as being obliged to enter into a state of "cunning peaceful coexistence" with those who are really influential on the literary scene: the established writers. There is "an unavowed conflict between writers and critics . . . a conflict of domination and indoctrination by the former," he said. "We would like to see an open and loyal dialogue between criticism and writing, not one conditioned by pre-established verdicts." Although Tascu could not say that -- leaving aside their idiosyncrasies -- the established writers are in fact the party's most loyal and reliable handymen, he could not gloss over the facts that pluralism in criticism has been almost abolished, that critical

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First Secretary Ioan Retegan of the Maramures County Party Committee provided further interesting information on the organization of atheistic propaganda in a recent interview with the student publication Scinteia Tineretului (3 March 1976). He said that his county is paying particular attention to atheistic propaganda as part of the general effort to create a socialist awareness among the masses. Retegan said that his county is especially concerned about young people, and is trying to prevent attempts by some religious sects to recruit members among the young.

Since simple atheistic propaganda lectures have failed to produce the results hoped for, he continued, atheistic propaganda will now consist of long-term programs competently and consistently conducted. In order to increase this propaganda in Maramures County, special educational brigades have been organized; they move systematically from one locality to another and answer the young people's questions. The brigades mainly take care of young people who have migrated from the country to town: workers from rural areas, or commuters who work in town but return to their village daily, or for extended periods of time. These brigades are also to handle students of rural origin who rent private rooms in towns, outside the hostels (where classes of socialist education are being organized).

In a Radio Bucharest broadcast on 26 February 1976, another university professor, Alexandru Tanase, said that the implementation of the RCP Program to create a "multilaterally developed socialist society and to prepare for the transition to communism" will produce profound changes, not only in the material conditions, but also in the spiritual make-up of society; it will all be part of a spiritual revolution that will enable the people to free themselves from "religious alienation." Marxist-Leninist atheism, the confrontation between secular and religious life, and the gradual secularization of culture hold a pivotal position in the current ideological struggle to instill a Marxist Weltanschauung in the people, Tanase said. In conclusion, he added that this evolution represented a "law" of the development of culture as a whole, for atheism is a complex process which includes the secularization of culture.

Although publications devoted to the subject have claimed that atheistic propaganda has been reorganized on the basis of studies on the sociology of religion, the press items dealing with this type of propaganda still continue to attack religion in a rather primitive way. Scinteia Tineretului (11 April 1975), for example, dealt with the dissatisfaction of a husband who complained that his wife has been wasting three afternoons a week and all of Sunday in a house of prayer since joining a religious sect. On 12 August 1975, the same daily dealt with the case of a young man who committed suicide because of religious pressure exerted on him; on 20 November 1975, Radio Bucharest described the difficulties encountered in a family where the two spouses were of different religions.

(043)

FOREIGN RELATIONS3. Rumanian Diplomats on Implementation of Helsinki Act

The 4 March 1976 issue of the foreign policy weekly Lumea contained an article entitled "The Need for Concrete Action to Achieve Genuine Security in Europe," signed by Ambassador Valentin Lipatti, former head of the Rumanian delegation to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which described the steps that have been taken to put the provisions of the Final Act into practice in the seven months since it was signed in Helsinki.

The act, Lipatti said, represents an assembly of principles and provisions that constitute a "political and moral" commitment of the highest significance for its signatories. It marks the outset of a new era in the process of bringing about security and co-operation on the continent. Implementing its provisions is a topic that has been high on the agenda of all international -- bilateral and multilateral -- meetings, and the efforts to do so have helped to resolve the long-standing differences between Yugoslavia and Italy, and have been instrumental in bringing the opposing sides of Cyprus to the negotiating table and in initiating co-operation in the Balkans.

At the same time, however, negative trends "inspired by political forces hostile to the consolidation of détente" in Europe have continued to manifest themselves. Lipatti rejected the idea of a General European conference as "a goal in itself," as a "peace conference" merely designed to sanction the image of the past, pointing out that this idea distorts the objective meaning of the new relations in Europe.

Referring to "some political circles" which advocate fragmentary or partial application of the provisions of the Final Act, raising "one or another" of its sections to the rank of an overriding statement, Lipatti reiterated Ceausescu's remark at the Grand National Assembly in December 1975 about the "unified character" of the act.

The "theory" that the Final Act should be applied from bloc to bloc rather than among all participating states is another "distorting tendency," he said. It is at variance with the very essence of the Final Act, which was conceived in a spirit of sovereign equality by the participating states, and whose principles are binding in relations among all states, and cannot be applied solely to relations between blocs.

Lipatti took to task those who still long for "a Europe of blocs" and cling to "the East-West concept," advocating the transfer of significant activities and projects called for in the Final Act to international bodies governed by different rules of procedure. In this connection, he mentioned the UN Economic Commission for Europe and UNESCO, though he admitted that they do contribute to the application of the Final Act "within the limits of their powers."

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On the other hand, Lipatti recalled that the Final Act outlines concrete ways of continuing the collaboration among the 35 participating states in an organized manner and "on the basis of the democratic norms" adopted by the conference.

He deplored the "skepticism" or "disappointment" of some circles that are "ill-disposed" to the Final Act, noting that it represents a "long-term program" which cannot be implemented "overnight" or "by round-about ways."

At the first meeting of representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the participating states, scheduled to be held in Belgrade in 1977, ways of promoting multilateral co-operation will be specified and the manner in which the Final Act is being applied will be examined, said Lipatti. Ensuring "genuine security" in Europe requires the resolution of a number of fundamental problems, among which a military disengagement and disarmament should be ranked first. Otherwise, détente will remain "idle talk," and security "a theoretical concept," said the ambassador, and went on to criticize the lack of progress in the Vienna negotiations on force reduction, reiterating the suggestions made Ambassador Dumitru Aninoiu at the ninth MBFR session (see Rumanian Situation Report/48, Radio Free Europe Research, 12 December 1975, Item 3) and in an article Aninoiu wrote for Lumea "No.6, 5 February 1976).

Trade exchange, industrial and technological-scientific co-operation, cultural, educational, and scientific collaboration, exchanges of information, and human contacts are other areas in which the Final Act has opened up decisive prospects for the development of co-operation, and for which "concrete, democratic means of application" should be sought, according to Lipatti. He did not elaborate on what he meant by "human contacts," but did go into detail about the "cultural dialogue," which should promote "a new humanism," repudiating "violence, racial discrimination and warmongering, hatred for one's fellow man, the cult of pornography, and drugs."

After reporting somewhat unfavorably on the implementation of the Final Act to date, Lipatti recalled the appeal addressed last December by the Grand National Assembly to the parliaments of the countries that signed the act, and stressed the role of the European peoples in creating an atmosphere favorable to the establishment of security in Europe (see Robert R. King, "Ceausescu Assesses Foreign Policy in Speech to Grand National Assembly," RAD Background Report/3 (Rumania), RFER, 13 January 1976).

Lipatti's article was obviously intended to counter the idea that the Final Act represents the end of the campaign to achieve security in Europe. He went to considerable lengths to point out that it had in fact opened a new era, and that its goals can be reached only "step by step."

(044)

4. Comecon Countries Contribute to Joint Siberian Asbestos Complex

"Kiyembayev -- A Result of Co-operation" is the headline of a recent article (Revista Economica, 5 March 1976) describing the joint construction of the asbestos combine at that location in the Soviet Union which, in addition to the usual lauding of international socialist co-operation, also provides some concrete details on the project. With a planned capacity of 500,000 tons annually, it will include a strip mine, an ore-enrichment unit, and ancillary facilities. The article reports that the Comecon countries participating in this project will deliver, on credit, machinery, equipment, various materials, and finished products during a period of time extending from 1974 to 1979, and will receive in return, beginning in 1980, quantities of asbestos equivalent in value to their contributions.

Finally, the article states that machinery and materials will be supplied by the individual countries concerned that will be worth the following amounts in transferable rubles: Poland, 30,000,000; Bulgaria and East Germany, 24,000,000 each; Rumania, 18,000,000; Czechoslovakia, 8,400,000; and Hungary, 1,800,000.

The joint building of an asbestos combine was first discussed in July 1971, when the heads of the planning committees of the countries involved "examined preliminary proposals for the construction of facilities to produce cellulose and asbestos" (Radio Bucharest, 17 July 1971).

Some four years later, on 10 June 1975, Radio Moscow (in its Rumanian-language broadcast) reported that "the Comecon countries have already begun, or will soon commence, the construction of some major projects, such as the cellulose plant in Ust-Ilim, the asbestos mining complex in Kiyembayev. . . ."

The communiqué on the 29th Comecon Session (in June 1975) stated that the 1976-1980 period would see the erection of 9,000 million transferable rubles' worth of industrial plants and other facilities providing cellulose, asbestos, iron containing raw materials, and ferroalloys, and that the Orenburg gas pipeline would also be commissioned in that period of time.

Rumania participates in all these joint ventures (see Harry Trend, "First Joint Investment Project Within Comecon's Comprehensive Program," RAD Background Report/58 [Eastern Europe], RFER, 9 March 1976, on the 40 per cent investment share of five Comecon member countries, including Rumania, in the 800,000,000-ruble Ust-Ilim paper pulp project in Siberia). (045)

5. Rumania to Stop Transporting Oil Through Pipeline in Israel

Western news agencies (AFP, Reuter, and UPI, March 11 and 12) have reported that Rumania has decided not to renew a contract

providing for shipments of Iranian oil across Israel through a pipeline running from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Mediterranean. A number of reasons have been advanced for the cancellation. Israeli sources were quoted as saying that Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation Nicolae Nicolae had assured Premier Yitzhak Rabin that purely "commercial factors" were involved, and that Rumania wishes to expand the "excellent trade relations" it has with Israel; Reuter quoted "well-informed sources" as saying that the RSR had decided to purchase oil from Kuwait, which is cheaper than that offered by Iran. (According to the news agency, Rumania imports about 5,000,000 tons of crude oil annually from the Arab states, is constructing refineries in Jordan, Libya, and Syria, and has prospecting concessions in Algeria, Iraq, and Syria.) Still another Reuter report said that Rumania is not renewing the contract because of "technical and logistical difficulties," adding that an Arab League official had said it was because Rumania wishes to consolidate its relations with the Arab nations. The latter statement was repeated over Radio Moscow in a Rumanian-language broadcast on March 11, in which it was also said that the decision had been communicated in a note from the Rumanian government to the Arab Boycott Office.

According to various reports, beginning on July 1 when the contract with Israel runs out, oil will be shipped through the Suez Canal and Suez-Alexandria pipeline, which is to be finished by then. Reuter quoted Israeli officials as saying that their government would protest strongly against Rumania's decision, which it considered a surrender to the Arab boycott against Israel.

Reliable reports in early 1969 indicated that Iranian oil was shipped in Israeli tankers from the Persian Gulf to the port of Elath and then carried through the pipeline to Ashdod, where it was loaded onto Rumanian tankers. Rumania is said to have paid fees of two dollars per ton of oil for transport from the Persian Gulf to Ashdod.

In the past Rumania had had difficulties with the Arab countries and with the Arab Boycott Office, owing to the fact that it was the only East European country to maintain diplomatic relations and expand its economic links with Israel. Despite the fact that Minister of Commerce and Industry Chaim Bar-Lev expressed the conviction that "the oil decision was not a political one and Rumania has not surrendered to the Arab boycott" (Reuter, March 12), it is quite possible that the decision not to renew the contract was connected to Rumania's wish to remove obstacles in its relations with the Arab countries.

The 10-year Rumanian-Iranian agreement under which Iran was supplying Rumania with crude oil ran out in 1975, and it may be that during his forthcoming visit to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (scheduled to begin on March 23) Ceausescu intends to discuss the possibility of exchanging deliveries of oil for Rumanian installations and industrial products. It is probable, however, that all Arab countries will set conditions designed to limit

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Rumanian-Israeli relations before agreeing to such deliveries. (In fact, in November 1975 the Kuwaiti National Assembly delayed ratification of a trade agreement with Rumania because of that country's "close ties with Israel" -- see Rumanian SR/44, RFER, 13 November 1975, Item 2.) According to Reuter (March 11), Rumania has invited Kuwait to help set up a petrochemical complex on Rumania's Black Sea coast and has offered to build a refinery in Kuwait whose products would be sold to Rumania. These proposals were made by Minister-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation Nicolae Ionescu at a meeting held on March 10 with Kuwait's Minister of Oil al-Kazimi.

Scinteia (March 13), reporting on Nicolae's visit to Tel Aviv, said merely that he had attended the seventh session of the Rumanian-Israeli Mixed Commission on Economic and Technical Co-operation, and that a protocol had been signed at the end of the meeting. The report did not elaborate on the contents of the protocol nor did it mention the shipping of oil through Israel to Rumania. (046)

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• RAD Background Report/63
(Czechoslovakia)
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A CODE OF SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL LAW

(A translation with comment by the Czechoslovak Unit)

Summary and Introduction: The political and theoretical monthly of the CPCS, Nova Mysl (No. 2, February 1976), has published an article by Dr. Josef Mrazek, a candidate of sciences and a fellow of the Institute of State and Law in Prague, in which the author discusses "The International Legal Relations of the Socialist Countries" (the title of his essay). A new socialist international law, which differs through its "class content" and by virtue of "socialist internationalism" from "ordinary international law," is evolving, he says. Mrazek deals in particular detail with the question of the socialist principle of "state sovereignty," which comprises not merely formal recognition of a socialist country's independence, but also the joint duty of protecting socialist achievements. Socialist sovereignty is the expression of the indestructible friendship and mutual assistance of the socialist countries, the author declares. In the context of this exposition, he also scoffs at the "bourgeois figment of the imagination" concerning so-called "limited sovereignty" [the Brezhnev Doctrine]. In conclusion, Mrazek states that it would be premature to assume that a complete code of socialist international law already exists and that this code has replaced "general international law." He predicts, however, that this will be the case as soon as socialism will have been victorious "in the great majority of the countries of the world."

The ideas expressed by Dr. Mrazek are not new. Articles similar, if not as specific, in content have appeared earlier (see, e.g., Nova Mysl No. 6, June 1973, Herzkova J.: "Proletarian Internationalism and Nationality

Relations," Czechoslovak Press Survey No.2499, Radio Free Europe Research, 16 August 1973, or Tribuna No.32, 6 August 1975, Pomajzl K.: "National Autonomy, Independence, and Sovereignty," Czechoslovak Press Survey No.2543, RFER, 19 August 1975). This time, however, the Nova Mysl article (which is translated below in full, with only a few quotations omitted) has attracted attention abroad, probably because the former dealt with the subject from the ideological aspect, while Mrazek speaks of legal norms. The West German daily Frankfurter Rundschau (10 March 1976) even devoted two reports to the article. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (11 March 1976) has also published a report and comment, in which it says that the theses expounded by Dr. Mrazek have drawn sharp criticism from Yugoslavia and Rumania. (For the Yugoslav reaction, see the Appendix.)

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In the course of development to date, international relations of a new -- historically higher -- type have been established and are further evolving among the socialist states. The objective foundation for the rise of socialist international relations is the existence of an economic base of a socialist type and the politico-legal and ideological superstructure in the individual socialist countries which corresponds to this base. The rise of the world socialist system and the development of mutual relations within the international socialist system have made it possible for the political principle of proletarian internationalism, as the pivotal tenet of the international communist and workers' movement, to become the fundamental rule for international relations and international law within the socialist community, and this in the form of socialist internationalism.

The new socioeconomic and class content of the international relations which have come into being and are further evolving among the socialist countries also require their legal regulation. Therefore, the study of the natural laws and forms of development of the world socialist system belongs to the primary tasks of the socialist doctrine of international law. The theoretical elaboration of international legal principles valid among the socialist countries is exceptionally important for the solution of the practical tasks

of co-operation of the socialist states in building an advanced socialist and communist society. The elaboration of legal principles governing socialist international relations is far from being of minor importance for the ideological struggle with bourgeois anti-communist propaganda as well, a propaganda that endeavors to prove that the doctrine of socialist internationalism is irreconcilable with general international law. The so-called theory of the "limited sovereignty" of the socialist countries is the best known brain child of the bourgeois ideologists and lawyers. None of these concepts are scientifically tenable, since they fail to consider or to recognize the substance and specific character of socialist international relations.

Along with the rise of the socialist system, conditions for establishing socialist international relations, which in their essence differ from the relations among the capitalistic states, have been created. The rise and development of the world socialist system is the natural result of the entire previous evolution of human society. A new, qualitatively higher level in the development of mankind is involved which, in accordance with objective social natural laws, encourages the building of an advanced socialist and communist society. The new, historically higher type of international relations that has evolved among the socialist states is the natural consequence of the profound economic and social changes which have occurred in these countries.

The socioeconomic system of the socialist countries, the common class substance of the socialist system, the common Marxist-Leninist ideology, the leading role of the communist party, and these countries' common goal in the sphere of foreign as well as domestic politics, all constitute the objective foundation of socialist international relations. The common goal of the socialist countries is the building of a communist society and ensuring world peace. The basic means of production and the power in the state are in the hands of the working class that, along with the other working people, is led by the Marxist-Leninist parties on the basis of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. The protection of the revolutionary achievements of socialism in every country represents the common interest of all the socialist countries. In the past few years, the process of socialist economic integration and the momentum gained in the scientific technical revolution have also been uniting the socialist countries. The general process of drawing closer together among the socialist countries is a general natural law of socialist construction.

Subjective factors also play an important role in creating and implementing in practice the new socialist international relations.

What is involved here is the application of objective natural laws to concrete national conditions. Historical experience demonstrates that a harmonic connection between international and national interests in the mutual relations of the socialist states is a precondition for the successful development of the socialist system as a whole, as well as of its individual component parts, that is, the individual socialist countries. The socialist states engage in increasingly closer co-operation in all areas of mutual relations. The most important factor which determines the dialectic of the international and national interests of the socialist countries stems from the indispensable historical necessity to ensure the victory of the socialist system in the general competition with capitalism. The socialist states solve the basic problems of development of productive forces and production relations in the process of mutual co-operation. The objective necessity to overcome the limited possibilities of their national economies leads the socialist states toward the internationalization of production, the international co-operation of labor, and toward a general development of the integrational processes in the international socialist economy.

Antagonistic conflicts, characteristic of the capitalistic states, are precluded among the socialist states.. This fact does not, however, exclude the possibility that partial conflicts of a nonantagonistic character may also arise in the community of socialist states.

* * *

Next, there follows a quotation from the 1969 Moscow conference of communist parties referring to "certain deviations stemming from differences in economic level . . . which can be solved on the basis of proletarian internationalism. . . ."

* * *

In the process of developing relations among socialist states, the political doctrine of socialist internationalism has at the same time become the basic international legal principle governing these relations. This means that, aside from moral political obligations, legal obligations also arise for the socialist states from the principle of socialist internationalism.

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Socialist internationalism, as the fundamental and most general principle in the relations among the states of the socialist community, encompasses all the other international legal principles governing the relations among the socialist states through furnishing them with a specific class content, as a result of which these principles constitute parts of the basic principle of socialist internationalism. The most important principles of socialist internationalism also comprise the principle of common protection of the achievements of socialism, the principle of respect for the sovereignty, independence, and national interests of states, the principle of full equality, and the principle of noninterference in internal affairs. The socialist content of these principles differs from the legal principles of peaceful co-existence bearing the same designation, and hence the former cannot be interpreted as mere generally democratic principles.

From the aspect of international law, the principle of socialist internationalism denotes primarily the right and duty of every socialist state to co-operate and mutually to assist one another in building socialism and communism in a comradely manner. The effort to achieve firm unity among the socialist states in their endeavor to reach these goals is an objective natural law of the development of the world socialist system. Proletarian internationalism has always represented primarily the unity and mutual assistance of the proletariat in the class struggle against capital. Hence, the principle of socialist internationalism as the basic international legal principle of relations among socialist states also expresses the duty of the socialist states to protect their unity and mutually to assist one another in building and protecting socialism and communism in the struggle against imperialism and against attempts to restore capitalism. The principle of socialist internationalism permeates all relations among the socialist states. The principle of indestructible friendship and close co-operation and the principle of comradely mutual assistance are the most inherent expressions and concretizations of the principle of socialist internationalism.

The legal principles of socialist internationalism constitute the foundation of evolving socialist international law.

The socialist principles and norms of international law develop in the relations among socialist states chiefly on the basis of bilateral and multilateral treaties. International custom is a source of international law as well. To some degree, legal custom is also developing in relations among the socialist states.

From the aspect of forming socialist international law, the materials and conclusions of collective consultations of representatives of the communist and workers' parties as well as materials and resolutions of the congresses of the communist parties of the individual socialist states are exceptionally important. Although these documents are not interstate documents and formal sources of international law, they express an almost certain future formal legal consensus.

Documents such as declarations or communiqués emerging from consultations of parties and governments are also characteristic of the socialist states. Such documents are also intergovernmental and interparty documents, and, as intergovernmental acts, they have the same significance as other bilateral proclamations and declarations have; in addition, they have the authority of being interparty documents.

In Part Six of the Soviet Course of International Law, joint party-governmental declarations are described as international agreements sui generis, and, at the same time, as sources of international law. Similarly described as sources of international law are communiqués and reports on consultations of party and government delegations, provided that they are not merely informative in character, but also have the "character of a normative act."

International treaties are the most important source of socialist principles and norms. Along with the development and intensification of co-operation among the socialist states, the number of bilateral and multilateral pacts on political, economic, and legal co-operation has also been increasing. The most important among them are the friendship, co-operation, and mutual assistance pacts.

* * *

In the following paragraphs, the author discusses the differences between the required "normative" character of a principle of international law and political or moral postulates, and cites various examples. He continues:

* * *

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The correct comprehension of the substance and doctrine of socialist internationalism, which primarily comprise the principle of fraternal friendship and close co-operation and comradesly mutual assistance (including the common protection of the achievements of socialism), is not only a theoretical problem; it is also of considerable practical significance. Almost all present-day revisionists favor "internationalism," but they try to restrict it so that it will only comprise the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference, etc., and in consequence, this leads to the denial of the class substance of socialist internationalism, and indeed to petty bourgeois nationalism.

From the aspect of international law, the doctrine of socialist internationalism means primarily the right and duty of the states of the socialist community to strive for unity and cohesion in their mutual relations based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, to develop fraternal friendship and socialist co-operation and to provide comradesly mutual assistance in building, consolidating, and defending socialism in the class struggle against imperialism. The principle of socialist mutual assistance gives every socialist state the right to obtain assistance and at the same time imposes the duty on it to render assistance to other socialist states. The obligation of mutual assistance applies to the political, military, economic, cultural, scientific, etc., spheres. The principle of socialist mutual assistance also comprises the principle of the joint protection of achievements, and it is closely connected with the principle of socialist co-operation, which is impossible without the mutual assistance of the socialist countries.

The principle of indestructible friendship and socialist co-operation embodies the right and duty of the socialist states to develop fraternal friendship and all-sided co-operation in every sphere, with the goal of implementing the construction of socialism and communism; it also presupposes the mutual assistance of the socialist states.

The socialist principle of respect for the sovereignty of a state -- which is not confined to the formal recognition of the independence and internal autonomy of a socialist state, but also comprises at the same time the duty of joint protection of the achievements of socialism -- is an important principle in the relations among socialist states. The socialist principle of sovereignty is the expression of the indestructible friendship and mutual assistance of the countries of the socialist community, which bear international

responsibility for the fate of socialism. This specific feature of the socialist principle of state sovereignty was also formulated in Article Five of the Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance Pact between the CSSR and the USSR of 6 May 1970. It is emphasized in the very preamble to that treaty that "support for, and the strengthening and protection of socialist achievements" are "the joint international duty of the socialist countries."

The unity and cohesion of the socialist states is the guarantee that ensures the independence and sovereignty of the individual socialist countries. Under the conditions of the class struggle in the international field, the sovereignty of the socialist states is guaranteed by the international co-operation and mutual assistance of the countries of the socialist community. The sovereignty of the countries of the socialist community cannot be defended without the consistent fulfillment of the principle of socialist internationalism. In the socialist community, the concept of sovereignty is being given a new class content. The protection of the state sovereignty of the socialist countries is closely connected with the protection of the power of the workers and the achievements of socialism. The socialist concept of sovereignty is an expression of the interests of the working class and all working people. No socialist country can consistently pursue sovereign policies without striving to strengthen international co-operation and integration with the other states of the socialist community.

The sovereignty of a state is factually vested in the social class that is ruling in the state. The sovereignty of an imperialistic state represents a legal and political form of the class rule of the bourgeoisie. This becomes apparent in its internal and external functions. The tendency to restrict the sovereignty of other states through interference in their internal affairs is characteristic of the capitalist states. The bourgeoisie tries to mask the class character of its state with the aid of social demagogy and various legal fictions. In this effort, it makes use of false slogans about liberty and democracy in the countries of "the free world," the theory of convergence, etc. The ideologists of anticommunism also endeavor to discredit socialist internationalism. One of these attempts is the theory of so-called limited sovereignty, which contrasts the principle of the state sovereignty of a socialist state and socialist internationalism. Diverse revisionists also make use of this theory. The purpose of these efforts is to stir up nationalism in the individual socialist countries and to disrupt their unity. Bourgeois propaganda endeavors to create the impression that unequal relations, which are characteristic of imperialism, also exist among the socialist states.

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In the practice of the bourgeois states the principle of state sovereignty is formally recognized, but in actual fact it is being violated, as the history of international relations documents.

All the concepts of so-called limited sovereignty are nothing more than an attempt by the ideological adversaries to eliminate the class substance of socialist international relations and to weaken the principle of socialist internationalism. A conflict between internationalism and the principles of sovereignty, equality, etc., cannot exist if one approaches these principles from the positions of Marxism-Leninism, and not from the positions of bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalism.

The socialist principle of equality permeates all relations among the socialist states. It means not only recognition of the absolute legal equality of the socialist states, but also helps to eliminate actual economic inequalities among the socialist countries stemming from history. . . . As is the case with all other socialist principles of international law, the socialist principle of equality is pervaded by the spirit of socialist internationalism, fraternal friendship, and mutual assistance. The socialist principle of noninterference in internal affairs is also connected with the socialist principle of respecting state sovereignty. Just as is the case with the principle of state sovereignty, the principle of noninterference in internal affairs is not only formally recognized but also really observed in the mutual relations of the socialist countries. In this principle, too, the postulate of a correct linkage of the national interests of the individual socialist countries and the interests of the whole international community is clearly apparent. The socialist principle of mutual advantage is relatively closely connected with the principle of equality. It transcends the frame of bourgeois commercial ideas on mutual advantage and helps in successfully developing the whole socialist community.

The socialist states recognize and strictly adhere to all the generally recognized principles and norms of general international law. Owing to the fact that international relations of a new type have come into being among the states of the socialist community, new socialist international legal principles have also come into being and are further being created. This fact does not conflict with the duty of the socialist states to respect the general principles and norms of general international law, since the socialist principles of international law are not contrary to the postulates of general international law, but go qualitatively beyond them in ensuring friendship and international co-operation. Principles such as the principle of nonaggression, the ban on the use or threat of force, etc., have no

place in the system of socialist principles of international law, since the former express the settlement of antagonistic conflicts. Other principles and norms of general international law are also applied in the mutual relations of the socialist states. Their application is, however, exercised in the light of the principle of socialist internationalism. . . .

It would be premature to arrive at the conclusion that a complete system of socialist international law, which totally replaces general international law in the relations among the socialist states, already exists. Nonetheless, socialist international legal principles and norms, which are the basis of the socialist international law being formed, have already been established. Gradually, the socialist principles of international law will increasingly influence general international law, which will become socialist at the moment when socialism will be victorious in the great majority of the countries of the world.

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APPENDIXBorba (Belgrade), 5 March 1976

Prague, March 4, Tanjug -- The CPCS CC theoretical and political journal Nova Mysl has advocated codification of the "system of socialist international law" which it believes should replace "simple international law" in relations among the socialist countries.

In an article under the heading "International Legal Relations Among Socialist Countries," published in the February issue of the periodical, it is claimed that "the principles of socialist internationalism" are "the foundations" of a "new law that is being prepared." The monthly writes that "it is too early to say that the new system of socialist international law is already in existence, but adds that "relations among many socialist countries are already based on new norms."


The CPCS CC monthly lists as "sources of socialist international legal principles and norms" those "practices in relations among socialist countries that are now customary," and allots "particularly great significance to the proceedings and resolutions of the collective meetings of the representatives of the communist and workers' parties, as well as the proceedings and resolutions approved at the congresses of the individual socialist countries." Using this as a starting point, Nova Mysl lists as "the most important sources" of this "new law" the communist conference that took place in 1957, 1960, 1967, and 1969, and quotes sections of individual resolutions. Ignoring the fact that these conferences and the resolutions passed at them, as well as the spirit that prompted them, are today unacceptable and have long been superseded, the periodical tries to give to the decisions made at these gatherings "normative and legally obligatory force."

The journal states that the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement on co-operation signed in May 1970 is "a genuine example of socialist internationalism." The author of the article also stresses that "the principles of socialist internationalism" are valid not only for the socialist countries and their Marxist-Leninist parties, but also "for the whole international communist movement."

"Fraternal mutual help in constructing, strengthening, and defending socialism in the class struggle against imperialism" is cited by the article as the most important principle of socialist internationalism, as is "mutual recognition of political, military,

and other assistance." At the moment when this article appeared -- i.e., on the opening day of the CPSU congress in Moscow -- the CPCS daily Rude Pravo also gave an interpretation of "internationalism." It said in an editorial: "Internationanlist relations between Czechoslovak and Soviet Communists were again confirmed in the years of the worst temptations, i.e., in the years of crisis -- 1968 and 1969." In this connection, it was also stated that "state sovereignty" must be seen from a class standpoint since -- in the paper's opinion -- "the socialist countries have an internationalist responsibility for the destiny of socialism."
(041)

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RAD/Background Report/60
● (East-West)
12 March 1976

COMECON "FRAMEWORK" PROPOSAL FOR RELATIONS WITH EEC

By Harry Trend

Summary: Comecon's "framework" proposal for relations with the EEC silhouettes the differences in organizational and trading practices between the two economic groups. The problems created by these differences will not be easy to resolve and will require ingenuity and a capacity to compromise on both sides.

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Article 14 of the Comecon framework draft agreement (1) recently presented to the EEC as a basis for further discussion proposes the establishment of an organizational structure that closely parallels the "Committee on Co-operation" (2) developed by Comecon and Finland for the purpose of reviewing policies related to economic interrelationships. (3)

- (1) See RFE Special/Brussels, 25 February 1976, and article by Gz in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 February 1976.
- (2) For details on the Comecon-Finnish agreement, see Harry Trend, "Comecon's Organizational Structure," Part II, especially Appendix II, which reproduces the agreement (including supplement), RAD Background Report/138 (Eastern Europe), Radio Free Europe Research, 7 October 1975.
- (3) This should not, of course, be confused with "Finlandization," which is generally taken to mean a situation in which a small country retains apparent freedom of action but only within the limits acceptable to a more powerful neighbor.

Proposed Joint Organizations

The proposal calls for the establishment of a joint Comecon-EEC Committee on Co-operation, with each of the two groups determining its own membership. This would allow the EEC to designate its Commission as sole representative or to appoint the Commission and its members to the joint body in the proportion considered most suitable. The establishment of a number of standing working parties is proposed to handle questions arising in special areas of economic co-operation. These groups are a feature of the Finnish-Comecon co-operation arrangement; by the beginning of 1975 the Finnish-Comecon Committee on Co-operation had set up permanent working parties for foreign trade, machine building, the chemical industry, transport, and scientific-technological co-operation. A number of spheres were suggested by the Comecon proposal as areas of joint interest in which this approach could be applied: protection of the environment; statistics, information, and economic forecasting; trade; scientific-technological co-operation; and foreign finance and currency. Ad hoc working parties could also be established when required.

Article 14 of the Comecon proposal would not lead to the elimination of the joint governmental commissions for economic and technological-scientific co-operation, nor would it interfere with any other joint organization already in existence. The powers of the Comecon-EEC Committee, it is stated, would not affect those of the mixed committees already "existing within the framework of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the member countries of Comecon and the member states of the EEC."

Other provisions of the proposal safeguard various types of bilateral and multilateral agreements that the parties may wish to conclude. Article 11 says that: "Certain questions of commercial and economic relations . . . may be settled by bilateral and multilateral agreements between the member countries." The use of the term "certain questions" implies that other matters would be reserved exclusively for the joint committee. The following links are, however, safeguarded: 1. direct relations between individual members within each of the two groups; 2. Comecon member-EEC organization contacts; 3. EEC member-Comecon organization contacts; and 4. relationships between subunits of the two groups.

It is clearly implied that the "interested party" basis for participation in particular programs, which is standard practice within Comecon, would apply to any arrangements with the EEC. Members of both groups would have the option of associating themselves with or dissociating themselves from projects approved by their two organizations. Although the option to participate is

preserved, Article 3 calls upon both Comecon and the EEC to "encourage and support the development of direct co-operation between member countries of Comecon and the member states of the EEC," particularly in the areas mentioned above for which joint working parties could be established.

In short, virtually all types of contacts would be permitted within the proposed framework: intergroup (i.e., between the two central organizations, or between any of their agencies); direct contacts between members, or between an individual member country of one organization and the central agencies of the other; and all types of multilateral arrangement. The particular form chosen would presumably depend on the subject matter of the intended agreement and on the wishes of the parties.

Special Cases

Rumania's newly acquired special relationship with the EEC would be preserved and similar treatment is proposed for the less economically developed members of Comecon, particularly Cuba (Article 12); Mongolia does not appear to have been specifically designated for special treatment in this context, however. Any existing special arrangements between the EEC and certain trading partners (e.g., former colonies of members) would be permitted to continue.

Trade Restrictions and Protection

The methods favored by the Comecon proposal for the removal of trade restrictions are that both groups should "mutually apply the most-favored-nation clause" (Article 6), and should pledge themselves to "organize their relations on a nondiscriminatory basis" (Article 7). More specifically they should promise to terminate all bans and restrictions on the import and export of commodities, unless these are already universally applied to nonmember states. No "unilateral" restrictions on trade in agricultural products can be instituted that do not apply to all nonmembers (Article 9). No new extension of this type of control will be permitted (Article 7). One exception to this rule is implied by Article 8, which requires that foreign trade should be conducted "in such a way that internal markets are not seriously harmed." This general escape clause apparently allows dumping, etc., to be controlled in order to safeguard internal markets.

Special Consideration for Comecon Members

One area of special treatment is covered by Article 9 of the proposal and reflects the interests of Comecon's agricultural exporters (mainly Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania). It calls for the establishment of trade in agricultural commodities on "a stable, equitable, and long-term basis" and asserts that there should be no "unilateral restrictions on the trade in agricultural products which are not applied to all nonmember countries."

Protection of domestic farmers' markets is a cardinal Common Market principle, and agricultural imports by EEC countries are normally tolerated only if they are supplementary. Comecon's proposal that trade in agricultural commodities between the two economic groups should be on a "stable" and "long-term" basis challenges one of the basic preconditions for the setting up of the EEC. Comecon's agricultural suppliers can hardly hope to succeed in a confrontation that would inevitably provoke a domestic political challenge in most EEC countries, and indeed the second part of the article concerned seems to indicate that Comecon would be satisfied with something less and would be content if a) the restrictions applied to its members by the EEC in this field are no greater than those imposed on other EEC nonmembers, and b) the Comecon group is consulted whenever a more discriminatory agricultural trade policy is contemplated by the Common Market.

Article 10 of the proposal implies that preferential treatment in financial questions be given by both sides when it calls for the granting of loans in particular "on the most favorable conditions possible." This formulation, however, provides a loophole that would enable the EEC to maintain that its credit policy toward the Comecon countries, which was arrived at unilaterally, is in fact "the most favorable" possible under current conditions. It seems unlikely that the chief creditor (the EEC) could realistically be expected to grant more favorable conditions unless they happen to serve its own purposes rather than those of the would-be debtor. Further, financial ties with countries possessing noncentrally planned economies who are not EEC members would require three-way negotiations to achieve Comecon's objectives. At best, Western creditors can be expected to get together and formulate a joint credit policy toward the Comecon countries.

The same article recognizes the EEC's interest in establishing convertibility for Comecon members' currencies, but at the moment all that is offered is a promise that the question will be studied.

Asymmetry in the Granting of MFN Benefits

The removal of trade obstacles and the joint application of MFN benefits would not put an end to certain Comecon methods of enforcing trade discrimination. Under the current proposals, Comecon members would apparently be able to continue to restrict domestic consumption of imported items by imposing heavy turnover taxes on them or by permitting high domestic profits which would then be severely taxed. Both techniques would raise prices of goods imported by Comecon and would therefore in effect restrict trade -- particularly in consumer goods sold by EEC members (or in any other product whose import the planners wished to reduce). For example, a selective turnover tax or a discriminatory domestic exchange multiplier could be used to raise the price of machinery imported from the EEC and thus give a competitive edge to commodities produced by enterprises in the Comecon countries.

Insistence on barter-type commercial arrangements is another restrictive trade practice applied within Comecon, as are refusal to allow Western firms to use earnings from trade with one Comecon member to offset debts to another and the prevention of a withdrawal of convertible currencies for use in trade outside the group. Comecon would be reluctant to give up these practices and tries to argue that their proscription would amount to an intolerable interference in the planning processes of its member countries.

Variable internal foreign currency multipliers can also be used to help manipulate or restrict Western trade with Comecon and to favor the group at the expense of the EEC countries. Acceptance of state monopolies in specific sectors (a cardinal feature of Eastern Europe's economic system) would also have restrictive implications and would force the EEC to permit the creation of similar monopolies by Common Market enterprises in spite of a general ban on them within the organization.

The mere fact that Comecon members are increasingly co-ordinating their production plans for specific commodities on a medium- and long-term basis -- a process that cannot be readily duplicated in a market economy based largely on private enterprise -- would make a mockery of any MFN treatment accorded by Comecon to EEC member countries. The normal GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) requirement that controlled economies increase imports from market economies by an agreed percentage still leaves considerable room for Comecon member countries to determine import structure by applying discriminatory practices to specific commodities that they wish to exclude or limit.

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These are but a few of the restrictive trade practices followed by Comecon members that would not be eliminated by any MFN arrangement of the kind envisaged by Comecon, and the continuance of the trade practices and regulations currently in force within that group would tend to give its members greater access to EEC markets without offering Common Market members' firms a corresponding freedom of access to those of Comecon.

Control of Dumping

Control of dumping and similar undesirable trade practices is covered by Article 8 of the proposal. It includes a provision similar to that found in the Helsinki Final Act which ensures that "trade in various goods is carried out in such a way that internal markets are not seriously harmed." The same provision could be used by Comecon members to restrict the flow of those Western goods that the ordinary East European consumer generally prefers to the "socialist" alternative.

There is, however, considerable difficulty in defining dumping when the socialist countries are involved. In Western eyes the term "costs," as defined in Eastern Europe, has an unfamiliar look about it, and the region's major exports of identical commodities are handled within Comecon largely on a "tie-in" basis (virtually the same as barter). Under these conditions EEC members will find it difficult to apply the objective and uniform standards used in defining dumping of products by market-type economies. The root of the problem is that Comecon products are largely traded on markets that are not comparable to those found in the rest of the world.

Initial Reactions

Almost exactly a year after an EEC delegation headed by the Commission's Director-General for External Relations, Edmund Wellensten, had gone to Moscow to prepare for high-level exploratory discussions, (4) Comecon's current Executive Committee chairman, GDR Deputy Premier Gerhard Weiss, presented Comecon's "framework" proposal on February 16 to the current EEC president, Prime Minister Gaston Thorn of Luxembourg. The East European countries have already expressed the view that the proposal takes into consideration "existing realities" and makes a significant contribution "to the realization of the principles of the Final Act" signed in Helsinki. They also see the Comecon document as an initial step toward the establishment of "pan-European co-operation." (5)

(4) 4 to 6 February 1975.


(5) Interview with G. Weiss, by V. Lapsky, Izvestia, 21 February 1976.

The Common Market has promised to study the proposal and Sir Christopher Soames, the EEC's Foreign Relations Commissioner, said that "we owe it to ourselves as well as to our Eastern neighbors to set about the task with all seriousness and in a constructive spirit." He added that "it cannot but be a source of satisfaction that, after years of systematically cold-shouldering the Community, the countries of Eastern Europe are now prepared to sit down at the negotiating table to explore ways of co-operating." (6)

In view of obstacles such as those listed above, it seems as if the general framework suggested by Comecon as a basis for further discussions can hardly provide an adequate setting for the solution of the problems arising from differences in trading methods, practices and institutional arrangements found within Comecon and the EEC. A willingness by both groups to undertake a more fundamental revision of trade policies and organizational patterns will be necessary before any substantial advance can be made in economic-technological co-operation between the two international organizations. (036)

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(6) Reuter dispatch datelined Hamburg, 5 March 1976.



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RAD BACKGROUND REPORT/61
(Yugoslavia)
12 March 1976

YUGOSLAVIA TO BUILD HIGHWAYS WITH WESTERN AID

By Zdenko Antic

Summary: The EEC's recent decision to allow Yugoslavia access to the European Investment Bank for credits that will enable it to undertake projects likely to increase its integration into the larger framework of Europe has given the green light to the construction of a 1,185-km. four-lane super-highway linking Austria with Greece. The EIB has promised to make 51,000,000 dollars available as a first installment, and the World Bank, as well as several Western and Eastern countries, has also agreed to help. Construction should start in April. The highway will be of great importance in Yugoslavia's economic development and will facilitate the flow of traffic between Western Europe, the Balkans, and the Near East.

* * *

On February 16 the Yugoslav representative at the EEC headquarters in Brussels, Petar Miljevic, was informed that the EEC Council of Ministers had accepted the principle of financial cooperation between the EEC and Yugoslavia in projects of mutual interest. (1) This acceptance took the form not of a "financial protocol" but of an agreement that in specific cases Yugoslavia may apply to the European Investment Bank (EIB) for loans of up to a certain amount at ordinary market rates to finance such projects.

(1) Vjesnik u srijedu (Zagreb), 21 February 1976, and Sued-deutsche Zeitung (Munich), 22 January 1976.

The EIB board of directors will decide which schemes should receive funding on a case-by-case basis. The first to be approved is the projected superhighway through Yugoslavia linking Greece to the West, and the EIB's contribution to the first phase of the construction will be a credit of about 51,000,000 dollars, which will be additional to the substantial aid already promised by the World Bank. Construction is expected to start in April of this year, (2) and the total cost is estimated at 40,000 million dinars (2,222 million dollars). Bosko Dimitrijevic, a member of the Federal Government and chairman of the Federal Transportation Committee, said that in addition to the credits from the World Bank and the EIB, Yugoslavia expects to receive financial aid for the project from both West European and communist states. Bulgaria has offered a "concrete agreement," (3) and preliminary accords have been reached with Turkey, Greece, and certain Near and Middle Eastern countries. Domestic investors will contribute 40 per cent of total costs — i.e., over 800,000,000 dollars. (4)

A Neglected Road Network

Yugoslavia's road network is by now the weakest link in the country's transportation system, and its development has lagged far behind over-all economic development and the growth of the vehicle population, which rose from 54,816 in 1954 to 1,570,724 in 1974. (5) Foreign traffic has risen even more sharply: in 1954 only about 34,000 motor vehicles entered the country from abroad, but the total had risen to 1,741,000 by 1964 and to no less than 9,718,000 in 1974.

Foreign tourism accounts for most of this influx; 6,150,000 foreign visitors came to Yugoslavia in 1973 and most of them did so by car. (6) An even greater problem for the country's road network

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- (2) Delo (Ljubljana), 14 February 1976.
 - (3) Tanjug in English, 10 March 1976.
 - (4) Vjesnik u srijedu, 8 February 1976.
 - (5) Vecernje novosti (Belgrade), 9 November 1975.
 - (6) Statisticki godisnak Jugoslavije 1975 (Annual Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia, 1975), Belgrade, July 1975.

However, is imposed by the Gastarbeiter from Turkey and Greece who work in Western Europe and travel homeward through Yugoslavia every summer. In contrast to the tourist traffic, the Gastarbeiter flow is concentrated almost exclusively on E5, the road that runs from the Austrian border via Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, and Nis in the direction of Istanbul and Thessalonica. During the months of July and August, when most of the Turks and Greeks take their vacations, this road carries about 20,000 vehicles daily, and poor maintenance and the lack of modern access points, crossings, and traffic signals make it the most dangerous highway in Europe. (7) The Yugoslav government recognized that the building of a modern superhighway to replace the old E5 must have first priority, but it was impossible to finance such a huge project without outside assistance.

Other obstacles to modernization of the road network were the lack of a national road-building plan and the deep differences that exist among Yugoslavia's constituent republics in their approach to this problem. After 1965, when a far-reaching decentralization of administrative and economic structures was introduced and the autonomy of the republics was increased, local interests were in many cases placed before the common good.

The planning and construction of the road network offers a striking example of this. Each republic concentrated its planning and its resources on the modernization and development of its own roads regardless of the plans and interests of the other republics or of the country as a whole. Slovenia, for instance, started to build a 40-km. four-lane superhighway from Vrhnik to Postojna in 1969 as part of a larger project linking Ljubljana, the Slovenian capital, with Trieste. In the same year Croatia started to build a similar road running from Zagreb, the Croatian capital, south to Rijeka and Split; while Serbia was building yet another linking Belgrade with Novi Sad, the capital of the northern province of Vojvodina. Thus, in the last four years about 110 km. have been built in three widely separated places. Commenting on this state of affairs, the Belgrade weekly Ekonomska politika (8) lamented that "decentralization and republicanization" had resulted "in the disintegration and disorganization of the entire system."

(7) Der Spiegel (Hamburg), 25 August 1975.

(8) 6 September 1971.

The East-West Highway

In the summer of 1973 the Yugoslav government, as well as public opinion, was alarmed by a plan put forward by an Italian finance syndicate for the construction of a modern superhighway with one branch linking Milan in northern Italy with Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the USSR (as far as Moscow) and the other running through Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria to Istanbul. (9) This plan appeared all the more dangerous to the Yugoslavs because the World Bank, which in the past has financed most of Yugoslavia's road construction, laid down as a condition governing future credits that Yugoslavia must be included in the Italian plan and must undertake to build its own superhighway linking Eastern with Western Europe. (10)

This insistence, and even more the danger that Yugoslavia might through inaction be bypassed in the construction of the proposed network, gave the necessary impetus to the federal and regional politicians to sit down together and elaborate a national plan for highway construction. As a result, in November 1975, the Federal Assembly adopted a resolution on Economic and Social Policy in Yugoslavia in 1975, which deals with the development of the power and food industries and gives top priority to the modernization and expansion of the transportation system, (11) with special emphasis on the construction of modern superhighways.

In an interview given to a Belgrade daily newspaper, (12) Dimitrijevic stated that representatives of the republics and provinces had agreed on a nationwide plan for the modernization and construction of 15,000 km. of modern roads over the next 10 years. Top priority will be given to the construction of the East-West highway, which will run parallel to the existing E5 road linking Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany with Greece and Turkey.

The total length of the project will be 1,185 km. The link with the Austrian highway network will be effected through a 7,670-m. tunnel piercing the Karavanke Mountains on the Austrian-Yugoslav border and shortening the road link between the two countries by 25 km. (13)

(9) Borba (Belgrade), 31 May 1973.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Vecernje novosti, 9 November 1975.

(12) Ibid.

(13) Delo, 7 March 1976.

The highway will be divided into the following sections: Slovenia, 201 km.; Croatia, 306 km.; Vojvodina, 87 km.; Serbia, 411 km.; and Macedonia, 180 Km. It will link the capitals of all Yugoslavia's major republics and all the country's main industrial centers. It is expected that the whole project will be finished by the end of 1986.

Financing: Western Credits

The financing of this huge project seems to be assured. As noted above, the Yugoslav authorities expect that foreign credits will cover about 60 per cent of the total cost, leaving domestic investors to find the rest. The main foreign contributor will be the World Bank, which has already made available a credit of 40,000,000 dollars for the Surcin-Belgrade-Ralja section, the construction of which should start next month. A loan for the 146-km stretch from Zapresic to Okucane in Croatia will be considered this year, and it seems that the bank is also willing to provide funds for the Ralja-Nis section in eastern Serbia. (14)

The second main source of outside help, as already mentioned, is the European Investment Bank, which has promised 51,000,000 dollars as a first installment. The nine EEC countries are interested in the project because of their increasing commerce with southeastern Europe and the Middle East. The FRG has shown a special interest in the scheme and, according to a statement made by Minister for Transportation Kurt Gscheidle, is willing to help toward its realization.

It looks as if Yugoslavia will be able to assemble the funds and carry the scheme through to a successful conclusion, and the new highway will undoubtedly make a substantial contribution to an increased flow of goods and persons between Central and Western Europe on the one hand, and the Balkans and Near East countries on the other. The project may well turn out to be a good example of regional co-operation among countries with different political systems in matters of mutual interest.

(037)

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(14) Politika (Belgrade), 4 February 1976.



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HUNGARY/9
11 March 1976

S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

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ECONOMIC AFFAIRS1. Hungary's Fifth Five-Year Plan (VIII): Investments

The plan law lays down that a total of 870,000 million forint will be spent on investments in the socialist sector during the new five-year plan period, and Deputy Premier and Politburo member Istvan Huszar revealed in a statement to the National Assembly that an additional 100,000 million forint will be taken up by "nonsocialist investments" -- mainly the building of apartments from private resources (Nepszabadsag, 18 December 1975). He said that 79 per cent of all investments will be implemented in the "material" sector (primarily to expand production capacity) and the remaining 21 per cent in the "non-material" branches (mainly the service sector).

For the moment these figures are only planners' estimates; nothing is known of detailed investment plans, other of course than the major investments now in progress. Huszar said:

We are planning comparatively few new large investments, and the plan at present covers only the major ones to be started in 1976-1977. I propose that we decide on additional investments later; in the light of an up-to-date knowledge of changing conditions.

These "changing conditions" which Huszar stressed in his speech make the entire investment program rather uncertain. And this uncertainty is compounded by the fact that prices for most basic building materials, such as concrete, cement, and timber, have increased and will probably continue to rise. In an article in the 14 January 1976 issue of Nepszabadsag entitled "The New Financial Conditions for Investments" Andrea Deak pointed out that price increases in building materials had resulted in "new construction cost norms that are somewhat higher than the old ones." Higher transportation tariffs and the 10 per cent building tax introduced in August 1975 on investments authorized by the enterprises are additional factors in the increase in costs.

Moreover, the new economic regulators leave the enterprises with smaller profit margins, and this in turn reduces their capacity to sponsor investments from their own resources. According to Deak this is one of the aims of the new economic regulators:

One objective of the changes in the regulator system is to decrease the enterprises' capacity to undertake new investments and to make available increased funds for investments decided upon centrally; [another is] to moderate the tension between supply and demand in the investment goods sector.

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The ninth section of the rules governing the new economic regulators, which complement the plan law, prescribes the guidelines and financial sources appropriate to investments decided on centrally or at enterprise level.

Major productive investments will be centrally decided. Their source of funding will be a fully repayable state credit, supplemented from the enterprise's development fund. This latter source can be used only when one of the contracting parties in the investment is an enterprise which is already in existence and which therefore possesses a development fund. In an investment decided upon and implemented centrally, such as the Paks Nuclear Power Station, the source of funds is the state budget; when the project is complete, the money spent on it is transformed into a state credit and repaid from the profits of the new enterprise. The guiding principles affirm that state-financed investments are primarily intended to support the development of the infrastructure.

The main source of funds for investments decided upon by enterprises is the development fund formed out of their operating profits; this can be supplemented by bank credits and state support in the form of subsidies and tax reductions, which enable the state (and especially the branch ministry controlling the enterprise) to exercise considerable influence on enterprise-sponsored investments.

Information on major investments to be implemented -- both those already under way and those to be started in 1976 -- is included in a special section of the plan law dealing with the development of the industrial branches and not in the investment section. The more important of these large-scale investments are listed below.

In the sphere of energy production the Paks Nuclear Power Station leads the field; its first reactor unit is to be put into operation in 1980. Construction of the Danube and Tisza Thermal Power Stations will be started, and work will proceed on the 750-kw power line between Vinnitsa and Albertirsa; participation in the construction of the Orenburg gas pipeline will continue.

In an endeavor to develop ferrous metallurgy, a new steel factory is to be built at the Danube Iron Works and steel output is to be increased in the Lenin Metallurgical Works.

In the aluminum industry, the output of the Szekesfehervar Light Metal Factory will be expanded. By 1980 the domestic aluminum industry will be producing an output of 3,000,000 tons of bauxite, 800,000 tons of alumina, and 72,000 tons of aluminum ingots annually.

The most important investments in the chemical industry are the new PVC (polyvinylchloride) factory in the Borsod Chemical Combine, and the expansion of the polyacrylonitrile factory in the Hungarian Viscosa Works.

In the building industry the construction of the Belapatfalva Cement Factory will be completed.

In the food industry the expansion of the Szeged Salami Factory will be concluded and the Gyula Meat Factory will be built. A large cold storage plant will be constructed in Zalaegerszeg.

The main feature of the nonproductive investment sphere is the building of apartments. The plan calls for 430,000 to 440,000 apartments to be built between 1976 and 1980, 105,000 to 110,000 of them by the state and the rest from private resources, although the latter will receive some support from special state credits. (031)

MINORITIES

2. Ethnic Minorities in Hungary Receiving Marked Attention

There are altogether 450,000 members of minority ethnic groups living in Hungary. In the 1970 census 155,861 declared themselves as having a mother tongue other than Hungarian (34,049 South Slavs [Croats, Serbians, and Slovenes], 35,594 Germans, 12,264 Rumanians, 21,176 Slovaks, and 52,778 others). But a much higher number indicated that although they regard Hungarian as their mother tongue they had "an interest in ethnic educational and cultural activities"; approximately 100,000 in this category are South Slav, 200,000 are German, 25,000 are Rumanian, and 110,000 are Slovak (Kritika, June 1975).

The number of members of ethnic minority groups living in Hungary is small compared to the number of Hungarians living in neighboring states; the latter total, according to Magyar Hírek (5 April 1969), was 3,350,000 on 1 January 1968. Most of them are concentrated in a few areas, something which is not true of the ethnic groups living in Hungary, who are more widely dispersed -- the majority of the Germans live in the Western frontier zone, in the Trans-Danubian mountain range, and in the villages in the Mecsek Mountains; the Slovaks are scattered over the southeastern and western parts of the Great Plain and the northern mountain range; the Rumanians are to be found in the eastern border region of the plain; and the South Slavs live on the southern edge of the plain and in Trans-Danubia. The Hungarian regime handles its national minorities with much consideration and obviously tries to set an example to its neighbors in this respect.

The media devote a great deal of attention to the ethnic minorities and constantly discuss ways of improving their situation, although some commentators go so far as to describe it as "almost ideal." Radio Budapest (27 February 1976) in a commentary by Istvan Gabor Benedek reported on a ball the Slovaks were planning to hold on the following day in a Budapest house of culture and said that the occasion would offer an opportunity for those attending it to exchange experiences and to discuss how they use "the advantages deriving from their nationality status, since today it is an advantage to belong to an ethnic group if one lives in Hungary." A knowledge of another tongue and of the riches of another country's traditional folklore is a marketable asset and

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often provides its owner with a livelihood. It is a fundamental principle laid down clearly in official documents, Benedek said, that all "ethnic citizens" enjoy complete equality and can use their mother tongue in the forums of state and public administration."

Millions of forint are spent from local and central funds to support ethnic cultural and dance groups, clubs, and museums. The network of nationality kindergartens, schools, and student hostels is being brought up-to-date, and new nationality libraries are being created with enlarged collections that include textbooks. Leaders of ethnic groups living in Hungary and teachers in the minorities' schools, the commentator said, regularly attend extension language training courses organized in academies in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. If a person declares himself a member of a nationality group, he suffers no handicap: on the contrary, his bilingualism is an advantage and he receives full support from the nationality organizations. Benedek concluded by saying that:

Closed village communities are slowly dissolving within the framework of socialist economic conditions and as a result of rapid industrialization; in this manner the tension that has in the past troubled the lives of the various ethnic groups is disappearing forever. Artificially fomented differences have been changed into true and creative friendship and mutual esteem. In the course of this assimilation process the members of the younger generation are officially encouraged on every possible occasion -- including the forthcoming Slovak ball -- to foster their language and traditions and to safeguard their nationality consciousness and the development of their culture.

Language extension courses have been arranged in Hungary for some years for Hungarian teachers working in neighboring countries. The 14 November 1975 issue of Kozneveles, the policy weekly of the Ministry of Education, contained a report by the man responsible for these courses, Dr. Imre Csaki, which stated that they are attended by many Hungarian teachers working abroad. Most courses include 80 from Yugoslavia, 25 from Slovakia, and 10 from the Soviet Union (the report said nothing about teachers from Rumania). Initially applicants for the courses were mostly teachers working in the lower grades, but Csaki said that an increasing number of those from the higher grades are now participating. It emerged from his statement that the courses are not confined to Hungarian-language teachers; in 1975 six Slovene teachers attended them because they are working in bilingual schools in Yugoslavia. (032)

ARMED FORCES3. Voluntary Border Guards

On 15 October 1975 Magyar Kozlony (the Hungarian Gazette) published a Council of Ministers decree on the organization of voluntary border guard groups to assist the police and security forces in the border zones. Applicants must be over 18 years of age, be without a criminal record, and possess a good reputation locally. The voluntary police or border guard groups are controlled by local commanders of border guard units and members are selected upon the recommendation of state, social, or economic agencies. They are authorized to undertake information and propaganda work among the local population, to appeal to citizens to desist from activities that endanger public order, and to arrest and hand over to the nearest police or border guard station those who commit criminal acts. They are also empowered to escort to a police station anyone who arouses suspicion or needs protection.

The provincial daily Vas Nepe (14 February 1976) said that the border guard authorities are now in process of implementing the decree. In an article based on an interview with the Szombathely border guard district commander, it was revealed that in recent years between 30 and 40 (and in some years over 45) per cent of those persons who attempted to cross the border illegally have been arrested with the help of the local population. The commander of the border guard district noted with particular satisfaction that in the past 20 years no one living in the frontier area with which he is concerned had given assistance to such people.

He also said that the organization of the new voluntary groups is now in hand in all border zone villages. Meetings will be held in the near future at which volunteers will be sworn in and group leaders appointed. The latter are selected by the heads of the border guard units.

About 20-25 per cent of the volunteers who have presented themselves so far are party members, and 60-70 per cent are former officers, reserve officers, NCOs, or retired border guards -- i.e., persons who are reliable supporters of the party. One of their main tasks, as already noted, is to carry on propaganda work among the population; they will also co-operate closely with border guard units under the direction of the local party organizations. Plainly, the national border guard command hopes to create by this means a large-scale information-gathering service among the populations of the border areas and to use such information to prevent "violations" of the frontier.

(033)

AGRICULTURE4. More Support for Small Household Farms

Attempts to clear up misconceptions regarding private plot, or household, farms continue to be a feature of party and government agrarian policy (see Hungarian Situation Report/1, Radio Free Europe Research, 13 January 1976, Item 6). In colloquial usage the term "private plots" covers not only the agricultural co-operative members' small farm plots but also those in which agricultural products are grown for the owner's consumption or for sale to the public. It is estimated that these small farms bring in an additional annual income of 12,000 forint per family to approximately 1,700,000 families and provide a useful spare-time occupation for their members. At a rough estimate their contribution is equivalent to 800,000 persons working a 10-hour day -- a substantial one in view of the present labor shortage (Radio Budapest, 26 February 1976).

It is understandable, therefore, that the problems of the private plots are a matter of lively concern to directors of agriculture and feature regularly in the press and radio; see, for example, Magyar Hirlap and Szabad Fold (15 February 1976), Magyar Nemzet (24 February 1976), and a Radio Budapest commentary (26 February 1976). In an article published by Heves Megyei Nep-ujsaq (13 February 1976) which attracted much attention and appeared later in several other provincial papers, Nandor Keresztyeni said bluntly: "No one can stop private plot farming."

In mid-February the National Council of Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives held a national conference on the private plot and ancillary farms at which NCAPC secretary Ferenc Szel stated that the agricultural co-operatives must not only support the private plots worked by their own members but also assist all small-scale farmers in their district, since approximately 36 per cent of the country's gross agricultural product is derived from this source.

Recently the National Council of Consumer Co-operatives and the National State Farms Center signed a co-operation agreement designed to exploit more effectively the production potential of the small farms. It is hoped that the accord will help to improve the standard of the small-scale farmers' material and equipment supply services (Nepszava, 24 February 1976).

Another matter that continues to receive attention is the taxation of the private plot farmers. The editor-in-chief of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food weekly proposed recently that enterprises such as agricultural co-operatives, state farms, and the general consumer and marketing co-operatives instruct their legal advisers to negotiate with the local tax organizations in an attempt to develop a taxation system that will encourage the development of small-scale farming (Magyar Mezogazdasag, 18 February 1976).

Finally, the significance of private plot farming was underlined by the fact that the latest Council of Ministers meeting emphasized the need to give it greater support. Evidence presented to the session showed that a substantial part of the national income is produced by the small-scale farms. Approximately 15 per cent of the agricultural products on the market come from private plots, not to mention the fact that they supply their owners with several staple foods. The government's attitude is that failure to support small-scale production is harmful to the entire national economy.

Obviously, the importance of the small-scale farms will not diminish in the five-year plan that started this year. An investment expenditure of 100,000 to 110,000 million forint would be needed before large-scale farming could provide equivalents to existing private plot livestock accommodation, vineyards, orchards, etc.; and another 50,000 million forint would be required to provide a working fund for the large farms. Last but not least, the national economy receives an annual 100,000,000 dollars of foreign currency from small farm production (Radio Budapest, 1 March 1976).

(034)

5. Professionally Qualified Women in Agricultural Co-operatives

The designation of 1975 as International Women's Year may have helped to influence the National Council of Agricultural Producers' Co-operatives (NCAPC) in its decision to discuss the employment of women as engineers in the agricultural co-operatives at a meeting held on 16 February 1976. The discussion itself, however, was based on a recent survey made by the council's Women's Committee (Magyar Mezőgazdaság: Információk, 25 February 1976 and Szabad Fold, 29 February 1976).


The committee reported that the number of agricultural co-operative leaders who fail to recognize the value of the work of women specialists is decreasing, and most members now accept them without demur. Nonetheless, only about 10 per cent of the 12,000 agrarian specialists at present employed in the 1,620 agricultural co-operatives are female, and the proportion is even lower in the leadership: only 5 agricultural co-operative presidents, 17 chief agronomists, 17 head gardeners, and 14 head livestock farmers are women. These are astonishing figures when one recalls that over 40 per cent of Hungary's 1,000,000 agricultural co-operative members are female.

The NCAPC Women's Committee said that this state of affairs is not due to prejudice but to certain special factors applicable to women. For example, female university graduates employed by the co-operatives often marry agrarian engineers, which many co-operatives welcome since the couple then requires one apartment instead of two. But the presence of both husband and wife in the leadership is unacceptable, and the husband usually retains his post while the wife accepts some lesser position. As a result, only one out of every hundred in the upper reaches of the co-operatives' hierarchy is a professionally qualified woman.

Another problem is that of children. There are few day nurseries in the villages and mothers tend to stay away from work since they are now entitled to draw child welfare allowance for three years. The dynamic development of the agrarian sciences and the closed production system technologies makes it difficult for them to catch up after so long an absence with the advances that have been made in their specialist sphere, and those who return to work often have to accept less demanding jobs. Even after the three-year period there are difficulties to be faced when a mother has to care for a young family: she cannot accept a post that requires her to rise at dawn or keeps her busy well into the evening, which is often the case in the upper levels of the agricultural co-operatives. Again, owing to the nature of seasonal work, she cannot rely on an eight-hour working day or on having any Saturdays off.

The Women's Committee asked the agricultural co-operatives to do all they can to enable women agrarian engineers to make more use of the knowledge they have acquired in the universities for the benefit of production. The NCAPC adopted the committee's proposal and suggested that the regional co-operative associations discuss in the first half of this year the question of allotting more senior posts to women who are professionally qualified agrarian engineers. (035)

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RAD Background Report/59
(Bulgaria)
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THE BULGARIAN PARTY THESES ON THE STANDARD OF LIVING

By R.N. (Bulgarian Unit)

Summary: This paper reviews and analyzes the Theses on the Standard of Living — the last of the four sets of Central Committee Theses published on the eve of the 11th BCP Congress. This very long and in general rather vague document contains a number of concrete targets with regard to the standard of living in the next 15 years, and particularly during the 1976-1980 period. It is based on the December 1972 program on the subject, which it is designed to continue and expand.

* * *

The last of the four sets of CC Theses to be published on the eve of the 11th Bulgarian Party Congress, the Theses on the Standard of Living (full title: Theses on the Further Fulfillment of the December Program to Raise the Standard of Living of the Population During the Seventh Five-Year Plan Period and up to 1990) (1) were somewhat hurriedly approved at a CC plenum on January 28 and 29 which also dealt with other subjects. (2) The fact that a separate plenum

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- (1) Published in Rabotnichesko Delo, 12 February 1976. On the other three sets of Theses, see Bulgarian Situation Reports/2 and 5, Radio Free Europe Research, 21 January and 26 February 1976, Item 1 in each case; and G.S., "The BPC Theses on the Party and Mass Organizations," RAD Background Report/51 (Bulgaria), RFER, 23 February 1976.
 - (2) See Bulgarian SR/4, RFER, 5 February 1976, Item 1.

was not held to discuss the standard of living, although one had been announced, (3) does not necessarily mean that the issue has lessened in importance in the eyes of the authorities. A special, very important plenum, which was given much publicity, dealt extensively with the subject in December 1972. (4) The December Program to which the new Theses refer was drawn up at that meeting, and it obviously remains the basic document; the Theses are intended merely to update it and supplement its targets, outlining the ways in which it will be put into practice in the next five and in some cases in the next fifteen years.

Seen from this angle, the Theses are yet another in a series of recent documents indicating that the 11th BCP Congress is to pursue and implement the main policy lines set at the 10th congress in 1971, rather than to initiate a new policy.

Despite the fact that the Theses on the Standard of Living represent a secondary document, they contain some interesting points. They give both direct and indirect indications as to how the December Program has been implemented in the past three years, set up some new targets and modify others, and make some changes in the "itinerary" to be followed in achieving these goals. Also interesting are the theoretical definition of the general aims of the program to raise the standard of living and the ideological motivation behind this action.

Achievements Since 1971

The introduction to the Theses reviews the implementation of the December 1972 decisions, giving actual figures in some instances. Thanks to the December Program many of the targets set in 1971 for the 1971-1975 period were overfulfilled. In 1975 real income increased by 32.4 per cent, instead of the planned 25 to 30 per cent; in 1973 the minimum monthly salary rose from 65 to 80 leva, instead of the planned 70 leva; in 1975 per capita public consumption funds had increased to 410 leva (the 1970 figure was 285 leva), and retail goods turnover increased by about 47 per cent, instead of the planned 38 to 40 per cent.

(3) Rabotnichesko Delo, 7 August 1975.

(4) See R.N., "CC Plenum Decisions on Standard of Living," Bulgarian BR/3, RFER, 2 March 1973.

In more general terms the Theses mentioned increases in pensions, improved maternity leave and other benefits for women, improvement in the housing situation, etc. (5)

Shortcomings in implementing the December Program were also listed, more briefly than the achievements and in general -- but rather alarming -- terms, including a rare admission of the effect of the energy crisis:

Despite the achievements certain unresolved problems also exist. They arise mainly because in the last few years the purchasing power of the population has been running ahead of the possibilities to satisfy the demand for goods and services. . . . Certain difficulties . . . are being created for us by the energy and currency crisis in the capitalist world, as well as by unfavorable climatic conditions.

It was added that "certain subjective shortcomings" had "to a certain extent reduced the effectiveness of the efforts of the party and the working people." An "old approach" to the problems of standard of living has not yet been overcome, and implementation of the December Program has not yet become the guiding principle in the work of many state organs and economic organizations.

Main Trends and Guidelines

Under this headline the first chapter of the Theses points out the "considerably increased economic potential of the country" on which any further rise in the standard of living will be based, as well as the "immense significance" of increasing economic efficiency, raising labor productivity, the scientific-technological revolution, and integration with the USSR and the other socialist countries. Under these conditions, the main goal for the next 15 years is formulated as follows:

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- (5) Most of these matters were settled or initiated by means of special decrees in 1973 and 1974 -- see Bulgarian SRs/10, 11, 12, 17, 21, 25, and 14, RFER, 8, 15, and 22 March, 4 May, 8 June, and 13 July 1973, and 16 May 1974, Items 1, 1, 2, 4, 2, 4, and 3, respectively.

To achieve that degree of satisfaction of the people's material, spiritual, and social needs and those of the environment which increasingly typifies a mature socialist society and will ensure the establishment of a socialist way of life, all-round development of personality, and improvement of production relations.

The references to "spiritual" as well as material needs of the people and to "all-round development of the personality" are more frequent and more strongly emphasized in the Theses than they were in the December 1972 documents. The aim is to avoid the impression that consumerism is being promoted — an impression that might easily arise when the standard of living, which is so closely connected with consumption, is under discussion. At the December 1972 plenum Zhivkov had explicitly warned against consumerism, and in the new Theses a similar warning is contained in the formulation of the fifth of the six "goals" listed below.

The Six Goals

The following — mainly abstract and somewhat bombastically formulated — goals derive according to the Theses, from the ultimate objective:

1. The standard of living must "to the greatest possible degree" correspond to "scientific consumption norms" with regard to food, housing, children's and health institutions, clothing, services, and cultural and spiritual needs. (It will be noted that, as at the December plenum, there was no promise that the "scientific norms" would be fully met.)

Also, a "comprehensive approach" is to be made to the problems of the standard of living; this means that in addition to consumption the production and increase of resources are to be taken into consideration.

2. The "comprehensive development and satisfaction of the loftier needs of the people" — their "spiritual" needs and their "need for useful labor and public activity, creative self-perfection, environmental improvement," must be accelerated. The Theses also speak here of "material products and services," and of the need to prolong life expectancy and working capacity to the utmost possible limits.

- 5 -

3. A "comprehensive" solution to social problems must also be found. The differences in living conditions between the various strata of the population, notably between workers and peasants must be eliminated, "increasing collectivism" must be fostered in personality development (everyone must take an interest in the well-being of all society), the "social activity" of women, must be increased, and the family must be "strengthened." The social climate will be characterized by "increased affirmation of the working people as the masters of the country."

4. The working people must progress toward "physical and moral perfection." The "new man" will become more and more of a "full-value personality, rich in spiritual and intellectual respect and imbued with love and respect for productive labor."

5. The principle of distributing wealth according to the quantity and quality of labor must be maintained and its application extended, so that in all spheres of life there will be equal pay for equal work. The "consumerist attitude" to an improvement in the standard of living "must be finally overcome in the next few years."

6. The "socialist way of life" must be improved so that it will correspond to the "conditions, potential, and requirements of a mature socialist society" -- a goal whose achievement depends on the realization of the first five.

Basic Tasks to be Solved by 1980

The second and most extensive chapter in the Theses is devoted to detailed and concrete measures to improve the standard of living. It begins with a list of eight tasks to be accomplished during the seventh five-year plan period -- i.e., by 1980: 1) the socioeconomic situation and working conditions in production must be improved; 2) housing construction must be accelerated and its quality improved; 3) increased care must be provided for children; 4) the nominal and real income of the population must be raised (eliminating the shortage of goods on the market is also listed under this point); 5) the scope and volume of services must be increased; 6) the spiritual needs of the people must be more fully met; 7) further efforts must be made to equalize the living and working conditions of the various social

groups and 8) the participation of the working people in management of production and in socialist emulation must be increase.

Increasing Incomes

Real income is to rise by about 4 per cent annually during the seventh five-year plan period, and by 4.5 to 6 per cent during the two subsequent five-year periods (up to 1990). The target for the current five years is surprisingly modest; it would mean a total increase of little more than 20 per cent, as compared with 25 to 30 per cent planned and 32.4 per cent achieved (an average annual rise of about 5.7 per cent) during the 1971-1975 period. (6) The growth rates planned for 1981-1990 are more ambitious, but not unrealistic when compared with those of the past five years.

The average nominal monthly income of workers and employees is to reach 170 leva by 1980. The draft directives on the 1976-1980 plan set the corresponding increase at 16 to 18 per cent, (7) and according to latest available data, the average nominal monthly wage rose from 124 leva in 1970 to 143 leva in 1973, (8) or by 15 per cent, but the figure does not seem to have increased significantly in 1974 and 1975. The new target of 170 leva seems possible to reach even if the growth rate is lower than that of 1971-1973.

The minimum monthly wage, which was increased from 65 to 80 leva in 1973, is to be raised to 90 leva by 1980.

A reform of the wage tables is to be carried out within the next two years, taking into consideration the changes that have occurred with regard to "the character and efficiency of labor," the "qualification of cadres," etc. Enterprises are to secure the funds needed to carry out this reform by a "purposeful reduction" of the number of employees and better use of working time, machinery, and materials.

(6) See Bulgarian SR/4, RFER, 5 February 1976, Item 2; and Rabotnichesko Delo, 9 September 1975, and 31 January 1976.

(7) Rabotnichesko Delo, 23 February 1976.

(8) Statisticheski Godishnik (Statistical Yearbook), 1974, p. 67.

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The "channels and sources of nonlabor income" are to be "considerably restricted." (9) On the other hand, income from personal plots will continue to rise.

Public Consumption Funds and State Insurance

The correlation between the growth of public consumption funds and that of nominal wages is to be improved, but it is not said in which direction. Hitherto the general policy has been to favor more rapid growth of consumption funds, (10) but now these funds are to be made available in a more "differentiated" way — i.e., benefits will to some extent be dependent on a person's income and the contribution represented by his labor, or, as the Theses put it, on the "individual results" of labor. These funds will to a certain extent play the role of material incentives; in their allotment a "certain preference" will be given to "the best workers, co-operative farmers, and employees." Moreover, public consumption funds will have a "larger social effect" and are to be "decisively cut down" in the first years of the present five-year period whenever "superfluity and low social effect" are detected.

The funds are to be guaranteed not only by the state but also by economic organizations and enterprises, including agro-industrial and industrial-agricultural complexes.

The state insurance system is to be improved and simplified, and "gradually" all working people are to be covered by temporary or permanent disability and old-age insurance. A law on social insurance and social assistance is to be drawn up and voted on before the end of 1976.

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- (9) For details on the campaign against "nonlabor income," which has to a large extent been directed against private artisans, see Bulgarian SRs/14, 17, 20, and 9, RFER, 6 April and 4 and 24 May 1973, and 5 April 1974, Items 1, 3, 2, and 1, respectively.
- (10) Between 1952 and 1973 nominal wages increased by 159 per cent and public consumption funds by 822 per cent (Statisticheski Godishnik 1974, pp. 67 and 70). The corresponding increases during the 1971-1975 period were about 20 and 44 per cent, respectively.

Prices

In this connection the Theses do not repeat the principle laid down in the December Program -- that prices must be kept stable or reduced when possible; they state, more vaguely, that prices should "correspond even more closely to the socially necessary expenditure of labor, to quality, and to the requirements of fashion." Greater planning and operational flexibility should be applied in determining the prices of new types and varieties of goods, of luxury and fashionable goods, etc. -- an indirect hint that the prices of these goods should be set higher. The practice of seasonally reducing retail prices (sales) is to be expanded.

Consumption

The Theses contain a table on the consumption of some of the main food and nonfood items, similar to that issued at the December plenum. As can be seen from the table below, which combines the 1972 and 1976 figures, almost none of the 1975 targets for food items set in 1972 were met, but those for nonfood items were slightly surpassed. In a large number of cases the targets for 1980 have been set somewhat lower, probably owing to the realization that progress cannot be achieved as rapidly as need would dictate. This means, however, that the "scientific consumption norms" will not be reached even by 1980 -- i.e., the needs of the population will not be met. (11)

(11) On the difficulty of producing enough food items, see Ikonomicheski Zhivot No.4, 21 January 1976, and Bulgarian SR/6, RFER, 3 March 1976, Item 1.

Consumption of Various Food and Nonfood Items

Product	Unit of Measure	Scientific Norm	Actual Figure for 1970	Dec. Plenum Figure for 1975	Actual Figure for 1975	Dec. Plenum Figure for 1980	Theses Figure for 1980
Meat and meat products	kg. per capita	80.0	41.4	55.0	57.0	75.0	70.0
Fresh and canned fish	kg. per capita	12.0	5.5	8.0	6.2	10.0	8.0
Milk	liters per capita	260.0	152.0	196.0	174.0	250.0	220.0
Eggs	per capita	265.0	122.0	159.0	145.0	250.0	200.0
Flour	kg. per capita	135.0	170.0	182.0	157.0	150.0	150.0
Vegetable oils	kg. per capita	13.0	12.5	13.9	13.8	14.0	14.0
Sugar and sugar products	kg. per capita	32.0	32.9	37.0	34.0	36.0	36.0
Vegetables	kg. per capita	180.0	89.0	136.0	94.0	160.0	150.0
Fruit	kg. per capita	200.0	148.0	179.0	118.0	200.0	190.0
Cotton fabrics	meters per capita	36.0	22.2	24.7	26.5	33.0	30.0
Wool fabrics	meters per capita	7.0	3.8	4.7	4.9	6.0	6.0
Shoes	pairs per capita	4.0	1.7	2.1	2.1	3.0	2.2
Radio sets	per 100 families	130.0	100.8	104.0	106.9	100.0	130.0
TV sets	per 100 families	105.0	42.0	53.0	60.3	80.0	80.0
Washing machines	per 100 families	70.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	60.0	65.0
Refrigerators	per 100 families	100.0	29.0	59.0	61.0	90.0	90.0
Automobiles	per 100 families	40.0	6.0	13.5	16.0	30.0	26.0

Sources: The December 1972 Program; the Theses on the Standard of Living, 1976.

The Theses also stipulate that during the seventh five-year plan the supply of meat is to be "fully normalized" and the problems regarding the quality of bread and the production of fruit juices, nonalcoholic drinks, and mineral waters are to be solved. More fish is also to be made available, and the consumption of fruit and vegetables is to increase both absolutely and relatively.

An increase in the supply of various nonfood consumer goods, including construction materials, is also mentioned.

It is interesting that despite the initial claim that the purchasing power of the population is running ahead of supply (a statement generally believed to be correct) the Theses ask for conditions to be created "to include in the turnover not only the current purchasing fund but also some of the population's savings." To this end, new opportunities should be created to spend money on "nonmarket" undertakings like individual and co-operative housing construction, individual transport, winter sports, trips abroad, domestic tourism, etc. It seems that despite the constant propaganda in favor of saving, the regime is worried about the large amounts kept in savings accounts. (12)

The Production of Consumer Goods and Their Quality

This subsection of the Theses begins by stating that increasing the output of consumer goods must become an "all-nation" task. Most of its provisions are similar or identical with those of the December Program. The proposal to make all industrial enterprises, regardless of their character, produce consumer goods along with their regular output is supported, although recently this has very seldom been mentioned in the press. (13)

(12) According to the latest statistics, the number of savings accounts remained relatively stable between 1965 and 1972, only decreasing from 7,985,000 to 7,952,000; the number increased to 8,338,000 in 1973, however, and the amounts on deposit have constantly risen — from 1,494 million leva in 1965 to 3,139 million in 1970, 4,106 million in 1972, and 4,773 million in 1973 (Statisticheski Godishnik 1974, p. 74).

(13) This proposal was made by Zhivkov at the December 1972 plenum and was later reinforced by a decree issued in November 1974 — see Bulgarian SR/1, RFER, 9 January 1975, Item 1.

Concerning quality the provisions of the Theses are comparatively brief and more or less identical with those of the December Program.

The share of imported goods on the Bulgarian market is to continue to increase, but the target seems to be somewhat lower than that in the December Program. At that time it was said that imported goods accounted for 6 to 8 per cent of the total turnover on the domestic market and that this figure should increase to 10 per cent in 1973, 15 per cent in 1975, and 20 to 25 per cent during the 1976-1980 period. The Theses say the share of imported goods should be about 20 per cent during the 1976-1980 period and 25 to 30 per cent between then and 1990. No information is available on the actual increase in the share of imported goods, but such imports are known to depend mainly on agreements regarding exchanges of consumer goods among the Comecon countries, and the volume of exchanges under these agreements has been increasing.

Women, Children, and the Family

The Theses' rather vague provisions concerning women refer to the 1973 program to improve their situation (14) and urge that additional measures be taken to carry out that program fully and consistently.

More attention is paid to the matter of increasing the birth rate to the point where every family will have an average of two to three children. Improving living conditions is considered essential to the achievement of this goal, and the Theses add that "the necessary steps" must be taken to see that the birth of more children will not have an "unfavorable effect" on any family's standard of living and to increase the care provided for families with many children, especially those in the lower income brackets. Nothing is said about increasing the one-time grants at birth or the monthly allowances for children. The only change made in regard to these state contributions since the December 1972 plenum was to extend their coverage to farmers, who previously were not entitled to them.

A general provision in the Theses says that by 1990 "conditions should be created that will permit the majority of expenditures for the younger generation to be taken over by society, without relieving families of [the obligation] to support and bring up their children."

(14) See Bulgarian SR/10, REFER, 8 March 1973, Item.1.

Like the December Program, the Theses devote considerable attention to the expansion of crèches and kindergartens, but they do not provide figures.

Pensions and Care of the Aged

The Theses contain several concrete provisions regarding pensions, leaving aside some December Program suggestions that have never been put into effect and taking up some new aspects of the problem:

Old-age pensions will be determined on the basis of the average gross monthly wage during three consecutive years of the pensioner's own choice;

Pensions of co-operative farm members under 70 will be increased;

Pensions up to a given amount will be updated continuously instead of periodically;

Supplements to the pension will be added for every year worked after completion of the minimum requirement and the restriction that supplements may not exceed 12 per cent and 6 years will be dropped;

The minimum age at which the recently created social pensions may be paid will be reduced from 70 to 65 years and the restrictions connected with income will be eased.

The network of homes for the aged and disabled will be expanded and their services improved. The system of caring for the elderly in their own homes will also be expanded, and the number of day centers and clubs for old people will be increased.

Trade

One of the longest and most detailed sections in the second chapter of the Theses is that on services. Beginning with a lengthy subsection on trade, it sets forth detailed but not in all cases new provisions on improving the retail trade network and increasing the supply goods, and on restaurants and canteens. A unified, automated system will gradually be set up to undertake research on consumer

demands and direct the movement and stocking of goods. A council on consumer demands will be set up at the Ministry of Internal Trade and Services.

On restaurants and canteens, the Theses reiterate the need to supply varied and high-calorie food to the population -- an indication that Bulgarians are still far from overfed. The relative share of alcoholic drinks in the total turnover is to be reduced in favor of more varied and better food. Priority will be given to the expansion of canteens for workers, students, and employees.

To redress the shortage of personnel in the trade network, the employment of pensioners, housewives, and students is to be expanded, and employed people are to be encouraged to take spare-time jobs. No information is available on the success of this recently introduced practice, (15) but the formulation in the Theses indicates that all possibilities in this respect have not been exhausted.

Services

The still serious lag in the service sector is reflected in the ambitious target set in the Theses: by 1980 the total volume of services is to increase by about 70 per cent, and it is to triple or quadruple by 1990. Some examples are given: laundering, which in 1975 amounted to 1.6 kg. per capita, is to increase to 10.4 kg. by 1980 (compared to a "scientific norm" of 20 to 25 kg.); automobile service stations are to expand their capacity from 0.3 work places per 100 automobiles in 1975 to 1 per 100 by 1980, and to render services worth 9.30 leva per capita (compared with 2.80 leva in 1975); radio and TV repairs are to increase from 1.70 leva per capita in 1975 to 3.12 leva by 1980.

The construction of large combines for artisan services, which was a major objective a few years ago, is to be partially abandoned; instead of being set up as "a mechanical sum of artisan's workshops," these combines are to become "a new type of service shop, organically combining the accepting of orders with quick service and service for which the presence of the customer is necessary." Services are still to be concentrated mainly in cities and regional centers, where new firms rendering "small" services are to be set up: house repairs, house

(15) See Bulgarian SRs/9 and 11, RFER, 5 and 26 April 1974, Items 1 and 2, respectively.

cleaning, home deliveries of purchases and mail parcels, transport services, baby-sitting, etc. Combined centers are to be set up to take orders for service at home or at places of work, to handle telephone orders, to provide self-service facilities, and to rent various items.

Municipal Services

Despite the achievements claimed in this respect, the Theses speak of the need to "overcome the lag" in water supply and draining, electric power supply, heating, housing maintenance, street repair, and the care of green areas. New sources of water are to be looked for to speed up the expansion of water supply in towns and villages. It is known from numerous complaints in the press that although water and electricity installations have been built all over the country, (16) the supply of these necessities is insufficient, and this results in frequent breakdowns and rationing even in the large cities.

Health and Recreation

The subsection on health demands ("a decisive improvement in health services and extension of the life expectancy of the population." The main task is "to combat diseases which result in loss of ability to work." By 1990 Bulgaria is "to reach the level of the most advanced countries" in reducing disease and the mortality rate and in preserving and extending people's ability to work — a surprising aim, given frequent claims that Bulgaria is among the most advanced countries in this respect. Particular attention is to be paid to the health of those whose work makes heavy physical demands, and that of farmers and students.

The Theses list a number of provisions on health education, prophylaxis, improving hospital services, increasing the supply of medicines, etc. No concrete figures are given.

The subsection on recreation and tourism is general in tone,

(16) In 1973, 69.3 per cent of all inhabited places with 94.2 per cent of the total population had water supply; for electricity the corresponding figures were 95.4 and 99.8 per cent — see Statisticheski Godishnik 1974, pp. 332-333.

though it does propose an expansion of the rights and duties of the trade unions in regard to the planning, organization, and control of recreation.

The same subsection also deals briefly with the development of physical culture and sports.

Administrative Services, Transport, and Communications

A recently tried and approved system known as ESGRAON (unified system of civil registration and administrative services to the population) (17) is to become the basis of the improved administrative services demanded by the December 1972 plenum. By 1985, ESGRAON is to become a unified national system.

The practice of paying taxes, fees, and other bills through bank accounts is to be expanded. One of the main aims of this is to save time, since such payments, and other visits to various administrative offices, must as a rule be made during working hours. The Theses therefore also provide that offices rendering administrative services adapt their working hours to the free time of other workers.

The provisions on improving transport and communications are brief and general, and contain nothing new.

Urbanization

One section of the Theses, devoted to "development and satisfaction of the needs of the environment," defines environment as meaning "a complex of working conditions, the urbanization network, the social environment, the home environment, and the natural environment."

The theses provide for developing urbanization on the basis of systems of inhabited places -- i.e., the agglomeration of several

(17) ESGRAON was tested in Ruse and in some towns and villages in the district of Ruse. For details see Rabotnichesko Delo, 29 June 1975, Narodna Mladezh, 30 July 1975, Otechestven Front, 22 November 1975, and Dunavska Pravda, 10 January 1976.

neighboring towns and/or villages whose increasing social and economic ties can be considered as forming one system.

Urbanization plans for the big cities are to be worked out and old centers modernized. New buildings are to be higher and their basements utilized as underground garages and for retail and service shops, assembly halls, etc. In new construction projects, land will be more efficiently used and arable land better protected.

Housing

The Theses contain concrete and detailed provisions on housing construction, the aim being to eliminate the still acute housing shortage. The goal of the December Program -- that every family have its own flat and every member of the family his or her own room -- is reiterated, and concrete deadlines for its achievement are: every family is to have its flat by 1983 or 1985, and every family member a room of his own by 1990. A total of 1,600,000 housing units must be built by 1990 if the target is to be met -- an obviously unrealistic figure; only 400,000 to 420,000 units are to be built during the 1976-1980 period. During the last five years (1971-1975) the target was 250,000 units, and only 242,000 were built. (18)

During the next five years housing construction is to become a task for the whole nation; people from all economic sectors, and especially those who will live in the new houses, will be involved -- a provision obviously prompted by the shortage of construction workers and an indication that no solution to the labor problem is yet in sight.

The Theses also speak of improving the standard of new housing units. The average apartment is to be increased to 75 square meters in size during the seventh five-year plan period, to between 80 and 85 square meters during the eighth, and to between 95 and 100 square meters during the ninth five-year plan. No target has been set for per capita housing space, which, according to the Theses, had reached 13.3 square meters by the end of 1975.

(18) Rabotnichesko Delo, 23 February 1976.

Working Conditions and the Environment

This year a national program to improve working conditions is to be worked out on the basis of normal requirements regarding working space, light, temperature control, noise, and technical equipment. The Theses speak in some detail of these aspects and of new equipment designed to reduce heavy work processes, increase labor safety, provide special working conditions for women, etc.

The subsection on working conditions is followed by a very general one on the "social environment," which deals with such things as comradely relations, socialist democracy, socialist relations between state institutions and individual citizens, etc. It mentions the long-overdue new Labor Code, (19) saying that it should be approved as of the beginning of the seventh five-year plan period — i.e., in 1976.

Another subsection, on "domestic environment," deals with various "moral" aspects of family life: the obligation of grown-up children to care for their parents, the evil represented by an "irresponsible attitude" to marriage and divorce, the responsibility of parents to inculcate a willingness to work in their children, the wisdom of distributing household tasks equally among all family members, etc.

The subsection on protection of the environment lists, along with a number of general provisions, a number of industrial sites on which particular measures should be taken to prevent pollution of air and water. About 55 per cent of industrial waste waters are to pass through purifying installations by 1980, compared with only 25 per cent in 1975.

(19) The need for a new Labor Code was first mentioned in 1966. Work on a draft was begun in 1967 and in 1968 it was announced that it would be ready by the end of 1969. Toward the end of 1971 and at the beginning of 1972 the draft was said to be ready, but on several later occasions, it was referred to as still being worked on. At the beginning of 1975 it was reported that the National Assembly would vote on it in the course of the year, but again nothing happened — see Rabotnichesko Delo, 29 April 1966, 27 July 1968, 24 December 1971, 14 December 1972; BTA of 1 February 1975.

Education and Culture

The sixth section of the second chapter, under the pretentious headline "The Spiritual Growth of the Socialist Worker" deals first with "the all-round development of personality," which involves mainly additional training and higher qualifications for workers. In 1976 special regulations are to be issued on large-scale training programs designed to give workers, farmers, and employees a second profession. By 1990 the majority of workers should have a secondary-level education.

A subsection on education provides for the transition to general and compulsory secondary education to be completed by 1980. Graduates of institutes of higher education should "master not only their professions but also Marxist-Leninist science, and should become convinced fighters for the realization of party policy."

In dealing with culture the Theses are again mainly general and noncommittal, but they do mention a national program to develop the material basis of arts between now and 1990.

Migration from the Countryside

A special section on equalizing the standard of living in towns and villages contains rather interesting provisions on the problems arising out of migration from the countryside. The process of transition from villages to towns is "to be placed on a new basis." Regulation of migration is to continue, in order to ensure "a stable source of labor for the rural sector," and along with the administrative measures restricting the growth of population in the big cities -- i.e., the ban on settling freely in them (20) -- economic, political, and educational factors regulating the migration process are to be strengthened. (21)

(20) See Bulgarian SR/39, RFER, 13 December 1974, Item 4.

(21) A specialist recently called for economic measures against the exodus from the countryside to be included in the economic mechanism for the rural sector -- see Bulgarian SR/7, RFER, 3 March 1976, Item 1.

Working Time

The section on working time is disappointing. It does not match earlier promises or accord with popular expectations, since it fails to announce any further reduction in the work week. On the basis of the December Program a decree reducing the 46-hour, 6-day week to a 42.5 hour, 5-day one was issued in March 1973, (22) and the reduction was gradually put into effect between 1973 and 1975. The 1973 decree excluded those employed in agriculture, the health services, and education, saying that their hours would be reduced after experiments to be carried out in 1974 and 1975. The only promise, and a vague one, contained in the Theses is that "conditions should be created" for those employed in the health services and education "gradually" to go over to a five-day week.

It should be mentioned in this connection that at the December 1972 plenum Zhivkov said that by the end of the seventh five-year plan period -- i.e., by 1980 -- conditions would be created for a transition to a 40-hour week. The Theses, however, do not mention this as a target even for 1990. The delay in reducing work time is even more striking when one recalls the overoptimistic and obviously long-forgotten plan for 1961-1980, which promised that the 40-hour week would become reality by 1970, and that a 36-hour week would be introduced by 1980. (23)

Another provision in the 1961-1980 plan -- that the annual paid vacation would be increased by six days by 1970 and by twelve days by 1980 -- has also been completely forgotten. The Theses contain the statement that "one of the main ways of increasing leisure time should be to extend paid leave." Neither a deadline for nor the size of this extension is mentioned, however.

Management of the Standard of Living

The last of the three main chapters in the Theses, devoted to administrative and economic measures designed to meet the targets on the standard of living along with other very general provisions, contains a number of concrete steps from which good results are expected. A "unified system of social planning" is to be worked out during the 1976-1980 period, for instance, and the plans of all

(22) See Bulgarian SR/11, RFER, 15 March 1973, Item 2.

(23) Rabotnichesko Delo, 17 November 1962.

ministries, district people's councils, state economic associations, agro-industrial complexes, and enterprises are to contain special sections on the standard of living.

Economic integration with the Soviet Union and the other Comecon countries and expansion of industrial co-operation with nonsocialist countries are mentioned as ways of improving the standard of living. The system of consumer goods exchanges with both socialist and nonsocialist countries is to be improved by giving it a "constant" character and including it in the export and import plans.

The district people's councils are to take on a much greater role in regard to the standard of living, and they will be put in "operational" charge of the entire system of public services.

The "scientific servicing" of the standard of living is also to be increased, and a special section is to be set up at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences to co-ordinate scientific research in this sphere.

Conclusion: Essentially a Declaration of Intent

In general, the Theses on the Standard of Living outlined above represent more a declaration of good intentions (albeit with a clear ideological tinge) than a set of specific goals. Like the other three sets of Theses issued for the 11th party congress they are intended to outline general policy in a particular sector. Inevitably the question arises, however, as to why such a document was needed at all in view of the existence, and continuing relevance, of the December 1972 Program on raising the standard of living.

What specific targets there are in these new Theses appear to be either ambitious, as in the case of housing construction or public services, or rather modest, as in the case of the reduction of working time and the growth of real income. There can be no doubt, of course, that the Bulgarian leadership is bent on continuing the rise in the standard of living. What is in doubt is its capacity to meet rising expectations, especially when in the next few years Bulgaria's economic situation, because of rising prices of imports from both East and West, looks like becoming more, rather than less, difficult. In these circumstances, a general statement of intent rather than too many specific promises is the more politic course to take.

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DISCORDANT VOICES AT THE MOSCOW CONGRESS

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: The 25th Congress of the CPSU was marked by a confrontation between the positions of the Soviet hosts, backed by a conservative majority of foreign delegations, and those of the independent parties. Notable among the latter was the French CP, which has been at pains to emphasize its new posture of critical independence vis-à-vis Moscow. Secretary-General Marchais declined to attend the congress himself because of the "divergences" between the two parties on socialist democracy and French foreign policy, explaining that these were such that the conditions for a meeting between himself and Brezhnev did not exist; and the French delegate held a Kremlin press conference to declare: "We have not come to Moscow to negotiate." In implicit answer to Soviet criticism of "right-wing opportunism" in unidentified parties, the Italian leader Berlinguer made a speech stressing the PCI's commitment to a pluralistic, democratic socialism, with all bourgeois liberties guaranteed -- and subsequently signed with Brezhnev a joint communiqué which bore the "Italian" stamp. Meanwhile the Spanish CP leader, Carrillo, who also declined to attend the congress, gave an interview in which he referred critically to the "primitive" character of Soviet socialism.

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Thanks to the presence of representatives of certain foreign parties, the debate on relations in the international workers' movement and on the paths to socialism, unlike the debate on domestic topics, was much more lively.

-- Radio Belgrade report from Moscow, 4 March 1976.

The most interesting aspect of the 25th Congress of the CPSU is a development that was not on the agenda: an indirect but unmistakable debate between conservative spokesmen (in the first place the Soviet hosts) and guest delegates representing independent parties. Never before have radical disagreements on fundamental issues been proclaimed so openly at a Soviet congress.

French "Not There to Negotiate"

A special role in this muted interparty drama was played by the delegation representing the French Communist Party, until quite recently regarded as viscerally and unshakably loyal to Moscow. One unprecedented event had symbolic significance: on February 28 Gaston Plissonnier led the PCF delegation to the press center to give a press conference in which he was at pains to emphasize -- one might say to overemphasize -- his party's challenge to the CPSU, more indirectly presented in his preceding congress speech. Plissonnier declared bluntly:

The abandonment of the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat [by the PCF] is not negotiable; the congress of our party alone had the sovereign right of decision in this matter, and it made its decision. . . . We have not come to Moscow to negotiate. . . . As for proletarian internationalism, if this is reduced to a mere identity of views among communist parties, it would be better to finish quickly with this rudimentary form. . . . The PCF does not share Leonid Brezhnev's assessment of French foreign policy.

This policy is a departure from the positive aspects that of De Gaulle may have had. (1)

Plissonnier's declaration that the French delegation had not come to Moscow to negotiate was echoed authoritatively by Secretary-General Marchais in a Paris press conference on March 3. Asked about "the international debate" at the Soviet congress, he said that the PCF would draw "the conclusions which, for us, impose themselves" after hearing the delegation's full report -- but that the decisions which the PCF's 22nd Congress had made in full independence about such matters as "the national way, independence, noninterference, and socialism aux couleurs de la France . . . are not decisions which could be discussed in Moscow, Washington, Bonn, or anywhere else." These were stands that were "not open to discussion or negotiation on the international level." (2)

The fact that Marchais was speaking in Paris and not in Moscow was itself an affirmation of independence. In a prolonged radio interview on February 27 he said that he had not gone to the 25th congress "because there is a divergence between our two parties on the problems of socialist democracy . . . there is also a divergence on the evaluation of French foreign policy." Then, when asked about the prospect of a meeting between himself and Brezhnev, he went significantly further: "The conditions for such a meeting do not exist today, and for the moment there is no question of it." (3)

"Opportunistic" Soviet Action

Later in the interview Marchais did, indeed, observe that these differences did not prevent "common action" by the French and Soviet parties, but he followed this with another attack on the Soviets that would have been unthinkable a short time ago. When the interviewer referred to the occasion when the Soviet ambassador helped Giscard d'Estaing to gain his narrow victory over leftist candidate Mitterrand by paying him an ostentatious visit between the two rounds of the

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- (1) Le Monde, 2 March 1976. It may be noted that these provocative remarks were not reported in the Humanité dispatch of March 1, which merely said that Plissonnier and Jean Kanapa had again put forward the views of the PCF at this Moscow press conference.
 - (2) L'Humanité, 4 March 1976.
 - (3) Ibid., 28 February 1976.

presidential election in May 1974, Marchais snapped: "I consider that that was an opportunistic position, not in conformity with proletarian internationalism."

The PCF's ostentatious display of critical independence vis-à-vis the Kremlin was the most striking manifestation of interparty differences on the occasion of the 25th congress, but it was far from being the only one. From this point of view, the expression of radically divergent views at the congress could in fact be regarded as the latest round in the prolonged confrontation/debate which for the past year and a half has ranged an alliance of independent parties against the conservative majority in the preparatory process for a pan-European conference. A commentary in the Belgrade daily Politika (4) saw as a new and positive development this emergence of "an important dialogue among the parties . . . a debate [which], although at times it may take on polemical tones, does not go beyond the framework of mutual respect." The Yugoslav correspondent noted the significance of the fact that "foreign views that differ from the Soviet ones" -- i.e., the speeches of Dolanc (Yugoslavia), Ceausescu (Rumania), Berlinguer (Italy), Plissonnier (France), McLennan (Great Britain), and Werner (Sweden) -- had been duly published in Pravda (something that does not seem to have occurred since the Moscow Conference of June 1969).

Indirect Criticism

In his keynote speech Brezhnev emphasized the Soviet version of "proletarian internationalism" -- essentially and implicitly, solidarity with the CPSU -- but without any direct criticism of those who took different positions. While communist parties might have different views on various problems, he said, "there can certainly be no question of compromise on matters of principle, and of reconciliation with views and actions contrary to communist ideology." (5) A later passage stressed that Communists must base their activities on "the general laws of the development of revolution, of the construction of socialism and communism" -- another traditional concept that the independent parties challenge. But he never identified the targets of his occasional criticism, as when he referred darkly

(4) By Risto Bajalski, 1 March 1976.

(5) Neues Deutschland, 25 February 1976.

to people who openly wanted to renounce proletarian internationalism, failing to realize that this would be to render "a good service to the class enemy." Again, commentators could assume that he was referring to certain Western communist parties when he warned that "even if a concession to opportunism creates a certain temporary advantage, it will finally be detrimental to the party" -- but the parties concerned had no need to draw that conclusion publicly.

Other Soviet and pro-Soviet speakers were more emphatic in attacking "right-wing opportunism," insisting that solidarity with the CPSU was the criterion of proletarian internationalism, denouncing "any tendency to placate the anti-Sovietists and anti-communists," (6) and generally presenting the picture of an international movement united in revolutionary solidarity under the exemplary leadership of "the great party of Lenin" -- primus inter pares. But even the most outspoken critics of "right-wing opportunism" named no names -- as when alternate Politburo member Masherov charged that some advocates of socialism had "revised the principles of Marxism-Leninism," and attacked "attempts to 'modernize' Marxism, as it were, and to cut it up into national slices." (7) There was thus no need for the Western parties in question to respond at all; but a statement published in l'Humanité on February 27 declared that the PCF "does not feel itself in any way touched" by such criticism, adding that no party or group of parties could "legislate" for others.

In any case there were also other tones to be heard in Moscow. As the congress was opening the Soviet weekly Novoe Vremya published an article in which Vadim Zagladin, first deputy head of the international affairs section of the CPSU CC (and leader of the Soviet delegation at the last two pan-European preparatory meetings) spoke approvingly of the diversity of ways to socialism as being advantageous to the Soviet Union. His only stipulation was that "one must not throw away the baby with the bathwater, and socialism, notwithstanding all its diversity, 'must remain socialism.'" (8) Is it not fair

(6) Speech of Canadian delegate William Kashtan, Pravda, 5 March 1976.

(7) Pravda, 26 February 1976. Georges Marchais made a polemical reference to this remark by Masherov in his radio interview the following day (l'Humanité, 28 February 1976).

(8) L'Unità, 28 February 1976.

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to conclude that this is a subject for debate not only among the fraternal parties but also within the Soviet leadership itself?

Berlinguer's Speech

Spokesmen for the major independent parties met the ragged chorus of indirect criticism with measured affirmations of their own positions. The most impressive display came from Secretary-General Berlinguer of the PCI. Declaring that his party stood for "the open and frank confrontation of the various experiences and positions" in the international movement, he observed that the well-known differences, even on important questions, should be discussed in a comradely atmosphere, "within the framework of the inalienable principles of equality and respect for the autonomy of each party." His discussion of the PCI's campaign to achieve a "historic compromise" with the Christian Democrats also produced some very challenging formulations -- as when he said that his party was working for an Italian foreign policy "which, within the framework of the international alliances of our country [i.e., NATO -- K.D.] would make an active contribution to détente, and firmly defend the sovereignty of the Italian people against any foreign interference in our internal affairs." (9) The PCI, he went on, was struggling to achieve a socialist society which would guarantee "all the individual and collective liberties, [including] religious liberties and freedom of culture, the arts, and science" -- a "pluralistic and democratic" society to be established through the autonomous contributions of diverse parties and organizations.

For one Russian at least, Berlinguer's speech was the major event of the congress. In an interview published in the Turin newspaper La Stampa (March 4) Andrei Sakharov said that in publicly reaffirming before the Kremlin audience his party's commitment to a pluralistic and democratic socialism Berlinguer had "indirectly criticized" the Soviet regime, and (in his opinion) had also, again indirectly, expressed support for "the theses of those [Soviet citizens] who are described as dissidents and who for years have held that our society, built up for 60 years upon terror, is neither pluralistic nor democratic." He added: "Personally, I have no difficulty in affirming that Berlinguer's principles are very close to my own." Later in the interview Sakharov said that the evolution of the PCI's positions -- maturing gradually over the years, in contrast to the sudden, recent changes in the positions of the PCF -- created "the hope that processes analogous to those we observe in the PCI may develop also in other communist parties, including those of

(9) Ibid., 28 February 1976; emphasis added.

Eastern Europe." This last observation, one may note, has considerable relevance to the evident concern with which the CPSU views tendencies to political and ideological "opportunism" among West European communist parties.

Since Berlinguer's congress speech was widely regarded as an open, if indirect, challenge to the Soviet leadership on its home ground, the sequel was significant. On March 1 Berlinguer met Brezhnev (flanked by Suslov and Ponomarev) for an "exchange of opinions" on the international situation, the communist movement, and other questions. The joint communiqué revealed little about the content of the discussion, but the key sentence clearly bore an "Italian" stamp: "The common wish was expressed to continue broadening internationalist co-operation between the two parties on the basis of fraternal friendship and respect for the independence of each of them." (10) Apart from the emphasis on independence and equality, one must note that the ritual obeisance to "proletarian internationalism" has been replaced by "internationalist co-operation"; the Italian and Spanish CPs have been particularly insistent on the need to develop a "new internationalism" as the norm for interparty relations. The contrast with the present state of French-Soviet interparty relations is also instructive: while the French feel the need to draw repeated attention to a recently assumed posture of independence, the Italians can strengthen a substantive independence gradually developed over two decades by acting suaviter in modo, fortiter in re.

Similarly, while the French delegates held a press conference to emphasize that they had not come to Moscow to "negotiate," the congress speech of Gaston Plissonnier was, in fact, less of a challenge to Soviet positions than that of Enrico Berlinguer. In his address on February 29 Plissonnier said that the PCF was struggling for a democratic socialism which would involve "the guaranteeing of all individual and collective liberties" — a regime which, while it would be based on "the universal principles of scientific socialism," would be "a socialism in French colors," so that, for example, the various parties involved in achieving it would do so "in equality of rights and duties." (11)

(10) L'Unità, 2 March 1976.

(11) L'Humanité, 1 March 1976. In his speech Plissonnier also attacked French foreign policy — in pointed contrast to Brezhnev's remarks on the subject in his opening report. The February 26 issue of L'Humanité emphasized this contrast by reprinting in extenso Marchais' attack on French foreign policy at the 22nd PCF Congress a few weeks earlier.

The British Platform

The British delegate, Gordon McLennan, also presented a political and ideological platform very different from Soviet positions, but (as befitted a guest) without drawing attention to the fact:

Our aim is to construct socialism in Britain in forms that will guarantee political freedoms, the plurality of political parties, the independence of the trade unions, religious freedom, and freedom of research, cultural, artistic, and scientific activities.

After stressing that "independence and sovereignty of each communist party" and solidarity in the common struggle against imperialism were "vital to the principles of internationalism," McLennan added tersely: "Differences can and do exist in the international communist movement on certain questions, and our views on these questions are well known."

The chief delegates from the independent ruling parties of Yugoslavia and Rumania were restrained by the circumstances in expressing that independence. Stane Dolanc of the ICY briefly stressed Belgrade's commitment to nonalignment and touched lightly upon "the existing differences between and distinguishing characteristics of" the Yugoslav and Soviet regimes before declaring that the further development of interparty relations (which he extended to include "progressive" noncommunist forces) "can only be based upon the principles of equality, autonomy, and the responsibility of each movement before its own working class and people." (12) For Rumania, President Ceausescu smoothly took for granted the interparty principles of equality and autonomy; the most jarring passage in his speech, for Soviet ears, was his remark that "we resolutely advocate the broadening of relations of co-operation and mutual assistance with all the socialist states" (13) -- a commitment that must be set against the anti-Chinese chorus in which most Soviet and many foreign delegates joined.

Carrillo on "Primitive" Soviet Socialism

A party could, however, reaffirm its independence and its differences with the CPSU in other ways than through a speech at the congress. This was emphatically true of the Spanish party (PCE). Secretary-General Santiago Carrillo made one point by not going to

(12) Tanjug, 27 February 1976.

(13) Pravda, 27 February 1976; emphasis added. www.arhivaexilului.ro

Moscow, leaving the aged President Dolores Ibarruri (who lives there) to deliver an unprovocative speech. Instead, he went to Rome with a delegation of other Spanish opposition leaders for talks with Italian politicians, airily explaining that this was more important than his attendance at the Moscow congress.

While in Rome Carrillo gave the Milan newspaper Corriere della Sera an interview (14) in which he expressed very blunt views about the Soviet regime and its relations with Western parties. Soviet socialism, he said was "in the primitive stage," still bearing the marks of the semifeudal regime it had replaced. Western socialism, when it came, would have to be profoundly different: "In the West we can have socialism only if the democratic and pluralistic systems are respected, and if it is based on majority consensus, with a readiness to give up power if this majority ceases to exist." Asked if he did not fear that this idea of communism would be condemned by Moscow, he replied crisply: "By what right could they condemn us? They can criticize us, as we criticize them. Condemnation is excommunication from a church, and the communist movement was a church but now no longer is one." Finally, when asked about the influence such ideas might have in the East, he came back to a key question which he, almost alone among European communist leaders, East or West, has frankly discussed. (15) "I think simply one thing," he said. "Communist participation in democratic regimes in the West will help the democratization of the socialist countries of the East."

Frustration Over Conference

As noted earlier, the confrontation between independent and conservative parties, which inevitably found only limited expression at the congress, had developed in a much more significant way during the prolonged preparations for a pan-European conference. Repeated attempts to impose something like a "general line" having failed in the face of the resistance of the independent grouping, the prospect now is for a "lowest-common-denominator" conference which would in effect mark the institutionalization of diversity in the

(14) Giovanni Russo, "L'eurocomunismo di Santiago Carrillo," 26 February 1976. See also the report in the Belgian CP daily Le Drapeau Rouge, 28-29 February 1976.

(15) See Carrillo's interview with Rossana Rossanda in the Italian dissident-communist daily Il Manifesto, 31 October 1975.

European communist movement. Soviet disappointment over this historic development was reflected in the fact that Brezhnev mentioned the project in only one bleak sentence: "The communist parties of Europe are making preparations for their conference."

Of equal interest was the cautious wording of Brezhnev's reference to the world conference project, which has now been on the pro-Soviet agenda for two and a half years without reaching the initial stage of a consultative meeting. Brezhnev said: "Many parties are in favor of a new world conference of communist and workers' parties. The CPSU supports this idea in principle. When and how it will be implemented will, of course, be decided through general consensus." It remains to be seen what that last phrase means. What is certain is that the Soviet leadership is still wary about committing its prestige irrevocably to a project which some three-quarters of the world's communist parties have already docilely endorsed -- another sign of the changed times, and of the weight the alliance of independent parties now has in such matters.

One reason among many for independent opposition to the project is that the pro-Soviet calls for a world conference have from the first been accompanied by denunciations of the Chinese. During the congress loyalist spokesmen, domestic and foreign, followed Brezhnev's lead by making bitter attacks on Maoism. The Chinese for their part contemptuously ignored the congress itself, but replied in kind by stepping up their polemical barrage against the "new Czars" and their "social imperialism." It is worth noting that while the Vietnamese delegate Le Duan paid fulsome tribute to the Soviets for their part in bringing about victory in Indochina, he made no criticism whatever of the Chinese, and no reference to the deviationist views of some Western parties.

The 25th congress was attended by 103 guest delegations from 96 countries, including "liberation movements" and "national democratic" parties as well as communist parties. The absence of the Chinese and Albanians as well as of the smaller pro-Chinese parties of Southeast Asia could have been taken for granted. It is, however, worth drawing attention to the fact that the new ruling party of Cambodia also boycotted the congress. The most important nonruling party to reject an invitation was the Japanese CP, the third strongest in the world. The independent Dutch, Icelandic, and Australian communist parties also failed to send delegations.

Mention of the Australians brings up another interesting point. The foreign delegations included the Socialist Party of Australia under General Secretary Symon and the Socialist Unity Party of New


Zealand under National Secretary Jackson -- both of them pro-Soviet splinter parties formed in opposition to the "official" CPA and CPNZ, which are respectively independent and pro-Chinese. Both were listed by Pravda (February 25) among the foreign communist delegations -- a clear indication of support for these "splitters."

But the allegiance of a few featherweight splinter parties or of the recently "normalized" Norwegian CP is a slight counterweight to the growing challenge to Soviet authority posed by the Italian, French, and Spanish parties, among others. For a last word on that one may turn to the Yugoslav commentator Milika Sundic. In his Radio Zagreb broadcast of March 6 he noted that the congress speeches had brought some clarification of "the Soviet leadership's critical attitudes toward certain concepts of proletarian internationalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat which in the preceding weeks had manifested themselves in the thinking and activity of the French and Italian Communist Party leaderships," and added:

The CPSU's criticism was not left unanswered, but the principle of tolerance was not brought into question by either side, which represents something that should be valued and cultivated.

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RAD Background Report/58
(Eastern Europe)
9 March 1976

FIRST JOINT INVESTMENT PROJECT WITHIN COMECON'S COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM

By Harry Trend

Summary: Five Comecon partners are to finance 40 per cent of the 800,000,000 ruble, jointly financed Ust-Ilim paper pulp project located in Siberia -- one of 10 jointly financed projects agreed upon by Comecon members for 1976-1980. The total cost of the 10 projects together will be between 9,000 million and 10,000 million rubles. Although the share of pulp production delivered by the Soviet Union is significant, it can hardly keep up with the rapidly expanding needs of the East European countries. This situation points to the distinct possibility of further joint projects for the development of the cellulose raw material base located in the Soviet Union.

* * *

The Siberian Ust-Ilim bleached sulfate pulp facility is the first joint investment project agreed to by Comecon members under the Comprehensive Program for Economic Co-operation and Integration adopted in 1971.

The cellulose project is located some 5,000 kilometers to the East of Moscow in the Irkutsk region and is a part of a much larger complex which includes a sawmill, a woodworking combine, a fodder yeast production facility, and a plant for the production of the by-product furfural. The pulp mill is one of 10 major joint investment projects scheduled for the current five-year plan (1976-1980) and has an estimated investment cost of about 800,000,000 transfer-

able rubles. (1) This investment represents less than 10 per cent of the 9,000 to 10,000 million transferable rubles (2) needed to carry out the program of the 10 major projects.

Early History of Cellulose Project

Following the consensus reached at the 26th Comecon Session held in Moscow from 5 to 8 June 1972, a general agreement was signed on 2 July 1972 by representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union. (3) This was followed by a series of bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union during 1973. (4) The bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union outline each country's investment contribution, and the benefits to be received from the construction of the cellulose plant located on the permafrost Siberian area, where winter temperatures reach 50 degrees below zero centigrade.

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- (1) V. Ustimenko, "On the Path of Co-operation," Stroitel'naya Gazeta, 25 January 1974; N. Inozemtsev, "Main Tasks in the Co-ordination of the National Economic Plans of the Comecon Countries," Planovoe Khoziaistvo No.4, 1973, pp. 6-14; TASS in English, 2 June 1973; and Anton Ruzicka, "Joint Undertakings — a Progressive Integration Form," Nove Slovo, 28 March 1974.
 - (2) The figure of 9,000 million (including those saying "approximately" or "over") was indicated by Horst Tschanter (SED CC department head), "Further Steps to Strengthen Socialist Economic Integration," Einheit, August 1975, pp. 846-850; Nikolai Fadeyev, at a press conference attended by Hungarian and foreign journalists, MTI in English, 28 June 1975; Radio Warsaw (domestic), 11 January 1976 (1905 GMT); TASS in English, 9 December 1975; article by Czeslaw Bek in Slowo Powszechne, 13 November 1975. The "preliminary" figure of "more than 10,000 million" was given by Baybakov (deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Planning Commission) at the opening of Comecon's 29th Council Session (MTI in Hungarian, 24 June 1975).
 - (3) V. Zoloev, "First General Agreement," Vneshnaya Torgovlya No.7, 1973, pp. 33-37.
 - (4) Radio Moscow in Rumanian, 11 June 1975 (1600 GMT).

Investment Shares

The total cost of the cellulose factory is estimated at 800,000,000 transferable rubles; of this amount, Bulgaria, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania are to supply machinery and equipment valued at 329,900,000 rubles. (5) Czechoslovakia, though supplying some of the steel to Hungary for the building of structures for 13 plant buildings, (6) is not participating as an investor, nor is it to receive supplies of pulp after the project is completed, since domestic sources supply the CSSR's needs.

Bulgaria, as part of its investment share, is to supply 20,000 tons of metal structurals, 90,000 square meters of wall panels, 350,000 square meters of roofing panels, piping, steel, cement, facing materials, cables, electric telfhers, trucks for handling consumer goods, and other products. (7) In addition, Bulgaria is to send some workers to the Soviet Union. An initial 100 building workers (8) were seen off on 10 February 1976, arriving on the Angara on the 17th. (9) The total number of Bulgarian workers who will ultimately be sent to the Soviet Union to work on this project has not been published.

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- (5) TASS in English, 9 December 1975; Figyelo, 15 January 1975, placed the figure at 330,000,000 and Radio Moscow (domestic), 14 March 1975 (0600 GMT) indicated that "about 40 per cent" of the construction costs is to be borne by the five East European countries.
- (6) Budapest TV, 13 September 1975 (1830 GMT).
- (7) BTA in English, 29 September 1973, and "Collective Report by Comecon Journalists: Handclasp at Ust-Ilim" (Iordan Tanev, Rabotnichesko Delo [Bulgaria]; Elemer Csak, Magyar Hirlap [Hungary]; Franz Koeller, Horizont [GDR]; Zbigniew Lesnikowski, Trybuna Ludu [Poland]; and Leonid Shinkarev, Izvestia [USSR]), Izvestia, 1 May 1974.
- (8) Radio Moscow, 10 February 1976 (0700 and 0730 GMT).
- (9) Ibid., 17 February 1976 (1000 GMT). They were referred to as chauffeurs and mechanics.

Between 1973 and 1978, Hungary is to invest 62,400,000 rubles in the project: 53 per cent is to consist of machinery exports, 22.4 per cent of industrial consumer goods, and the remainder of food. (10) Beginning in 1973, about one-third of the amount was shipped during the last five-year plan period (1971-1975), with the other two thirds due in the current five-year period. (11) More specifically, Hungary's Kecskemet metal manufacturing plant is to deliver structures made from steel supplied by Czechoslovakia and Poland. (12) The steel structures are to be used in the construction of 13 buildings, each with an area of 5,000 square meters. In addition, Hungary has pledged to supply 90,000 doors and window frames (either made from oxidized aluminum or shaped steel); 900 fireproof gates; 400 tons of aluminum wire; aluminum sheets for roofs and walls, and other roofing and flooring materials. (13)

East Germany is to provide 40,000 tons of structurals, a complete set of transformer substations, switch gears, control panels, and other electrical apparatus, as well as ventilating and refrigerating installations. (14)

Poland's investment share is to be €4,000,000 rubles. (15) The investment goods include 20,000 tons of metal structurals, 800 tons of dyes and varnishes, considerable amounts of cement, pipe, cable, parquet flooring, and various equipment, as well as 100 20-ton trailers and 160 60-ton trailers. (16)

Rumania, in turn, is to provide 36,000 tons of metal structurals, cement, cable, and special finishing materials, (17) as well as tiles, machines, and consumer goods. (18)

Specialists from the supplier countries are to take part in the assembly of the equipment. (19)

(10) Hungarian Situation Report/36, Radio Free Europe Research, 17 September 1974, Item 4.

(11) Figyelo, 15 January 1975.

(12) Budapest TV, 13 September 1975 (1830 GMT).

(13) "Collective report . . . "

(14) Ibid.

(15) PAP in English, 22 February 1974.

(16) "Collective Report . . . "

(17) Ibid.

(18) Radio Bucharest, 15 June 1973 (2000 GMT), and Radio Moscow, 15 June 1973 (1900 GMT).

(19) "Collective Report . . . "

The products supplied by the Comecon members are to be valued at contract prices used for intra-Comecon trade at the time of delivery. (20) The rate of interest paid by the Soviet Union for the deliveries made on credit will probably be set at the usual low intra-Comecon rate of 2 per cent. (21) In view of the currently much higher rates charged the East European countries by Western creditors, the Comecon rate represents a subsidy to the USSR.

Western suppliers are to deliver equipment unavailable within Comecon. French companies are to supply equipment during 1975 and 1976, and are to be paid by deliveries of cellulose. (22) The Soviet All-Union Foreign Trading Association, Prommashimport, also signed a contract with the Swedish firm KMV for deliveries of equipment in 1975 and 1976 for the Ust-Ilim project. (23) Reports from Eastern Europe have not indicated the form of repayment.

Capacity and Production Shares

The capacity of the Ust-Ilim plant is envisaged to be 500,000 tons of cellulose per year, (24) and in 1978, when the first section of the project is finished, production should reach one-half of the rated capacity, or 250,000 tons. (25) Operations are to begin in 1979. This is two years later than the date originally indicated in 1973. (26)

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- (20) Zoloev, op. cit.
 - (21) In a similar jointly financed project, the Orenburg Gas Pipeline, "it was decided to establish a lower rate in transferable rubles based on 2 per cent annually for the entire term of the credit" (Iu. Konstantinov, "Increasing the Role of the Transferable Ruble," Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta No.8, 1975).
 - (22) Radio Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland, 28 February 1974 (1130 GMT), and TASS in English, 28 November 1973.
 - (23) Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta No.31, 30 July 1973, p. 21.
 - (24) TASS in English, 9 December 1975.
 - (25) "Collective Report . . . "
 - (26) (JD), "Cellulose-Paper Industry in the USSR," Rynki Zagraniczne, 11 September 1973.

The raw material used will make possible the production of the long-staple pine variety of pulp, rather than the short-fiber type made from poplar. The long-staple fiber will make possible the use of high-speed papermaking machines to turn out a high grade of paper.

When full capacity is reached, the five investment participants from Eastern Europe are to receive a total of 205,000 tons per year for a period of more than 12 years. (27) The remainder will go to the Soviet Union and Western suppliers of equipment for the project, who will be paid in kind for their deliveries of equipment.

Each East European investor (Bulgaria, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania) is to receive a share proportionate to its investment contribution. (28)

Bulgaria's share of bleached sulfate pulp will ultimately total 48,000 tons annually. (29) The amounts delivered to the GDR have not been made public.

Hungary's share is ultimately to be 39,000 tons, but may be increased to as much as 50,000 tons. The deliveries are to start in 1979, at the rate of 20 per cent of the 39,000 tons due when full production is attained. In 1980, the proportion is to be 40 per cent, 90 per cent in 1981, and the full 39,000 in 1982. (30)

Poland is to receive 40,000 tons annually for 12 years beginning in 1979. (31) Rumania's share of the production is not known. (32)

(27) TASS in English, 9 December 1975.

(28) Ibid.

(29) Ivan Ivanov, "Raw Materials and Co-operation," Rabotnichesko Delo, 18 May 1975.

(30) Figyelo, 15 January 1975. A lower annual delivery of 34,000 tons for Hungary was announced by Robert Moczy, deputy chief, National Planning Office (Magyar Import, March 1975, pp. 8 and 9).

(31) PAP in English, 22 February 1974, and 20 October 1975.

(32) A PAP dispatch from Moscow suggests that every country participating with investments is to receive 50,000 tons per year ([W], "Investment Credits Within Comecon," Zycie Warszawy, 3 February 1976).

Price of the Cellulose Pulp

The Ust-Ilim program provides for the delivery of the cellulose at 200 transferable rubles per ton. Hungarian sources also claim that this price is considerably below the 350 dollars per ton charged on world markets and the "black market" price charged in 1975 during the severe world-wide supply shortages, when it ranged between 700 to 750 dollars per ton. (33)

The Longer Term Problem

The joint-investment project in Ust-Ilim, which ultimately is to provide each participant with about 40,000 to 50,000 tons of paper pulp annually, will help meet the growing demand for paper and textiles using cellulose fiber as a raw material. The supply situation probably will nevertheless continue to remain critical even after Ust-Ilim attains full production.

Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Hungary consumed 58, 71, and 44 kilograms of paper per capita, in 1970, respectively. This compares to a paper consumption of 94 and 125 kilograms for France and West Germany. In 1975, the anticipated per capita paper consumption for the three East European countries, though rising considerably, was still expected to fall considerably below France's and West Germany's 1970 level, reaching 67, 79, and 58 kilograms, respectively. (34)

In 1974, Hungary's total annual paper needs were 550,000 tons, and were expected to be around 600,000 tons in 1975, or 50,000 tons more. By the end of 1980, consumption projections indicate a paper consumption in Hungary in excess of 700,000 tons. (35) The 40,000 or 50,000 tons which may be provided annually from the Ust-Ilim source during the 1980s would thus fall considerably below the expected increment in paper consumption.

(33) Figyelo, 15 January 1975. It is not clear whether the price will be permitted to change annually, as is now the case with most products exchanged within Comecon. The new price determination formula instituted at the beginning of 1976 calls for the use of a five-year movable average of world prices as the basis for setting prices on an annual basis.

(34) Mihaly Juhasz (deputy general manager of the paper industry enterprise), "Paper Production, Light Industry's Heavy Industry," Nepszabadsag, 23 October 1974.

(35) Ibid.

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Since raw material resources for paper pulp are in short supply throughout most of Eastern Europe (with the exception of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia), one may anticipate that still another joint-investment project in this sector, located somewhere in Siberia, may follow the completion of the construction of the scheduled Ust-Ilim plant. (026)

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RUMANIA/7
5 March 1976

S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

Culture

1. Role of Mass Culture Enhanced

Legal System

2. The 1976-1980 Legislative Program
3. Improved Procedures for Settling Foreign Trade Disputes

Economy

4. Efforts to Promote Nonmaterial Incentives in Labor

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5. Libyan Minister Signs Co-operation Protocol in Bucharest
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CULTURE

1. Role of Mass Culture Enhanced

Since its "renaissance" in 1971 (after a period of relative neglect in the more liberal 1960s), mass culture has again become a matter of immediate concern in the RCP's cultural policy. The Congress of Political Education and Culture is not far off, and the press in Rumania is devoting more and more space to the subject. This is not surprising, since "mass culture" -- other than folk or professional art -- is a useful and "efficient" instrument for propagating the party's over-all policy, which involves strengthening labor discipline and inducing the populace to commit themselves to the implementation of the party's programs. "Mass culture" can be presented under the cover of a "democratic" and essentially "socialist" cultural policy, as the sociologist Traian Herseni made clear in an article entitled "Education and Mass Culture" (Romania Literara No. 7, 12 February 1976):

Mass culture thus seems to be a conditio sine qua non for socialist democracy -- on both a national and a regional level; a precondition for evolution toward communism [assuring it] maximum variety and maximum unity. Socialist culture is either a mass culture or it ceases to be socialist at all.

The opinion is current among Rumanian theoreticians that the cultural level of a country should be judged not only by qualitative but also by quantitative standards -- i.e., by the number of citizens "involved" in it. The view is also being put forward (e.g., by Mircea Herivan, an activist connected with the Council on Socialist Culture and Education, writing in Era Socialista No. 19/1975) that "the distance between mass culture and national reference [i.e., professional] culture is a basic indicator of a nation's state of culture."

According to Herseni, "mass culture has taken on a new meaning in this country under the present circumstances; it involves spiritually equipping or arming the popular masses so as to make it possible for them to carry out to the full their constructing and guiding functions in a multilaterally developed socialist and ultimately communist society, according to the specific national characteristics of this country."

At present two main trends are discernible in Rumania's mass cultural policy: on the one hand the RCP feels the need to "guarantee [a correct] ideology, a clear-cut concept, and unified guidance . . . [of this process] under the direct leadership of the party" (Gheorghe Glodeanu, chairman of the Ialomita County Party Committee, in Era Socialista No. 2/1976); on the other hand, there is an obvious tendency to "regionalize" mass cultural activity in order to enhance its attractiveness. Since 1971 a number of regional mass artistic contests and festivals have been organized which often try to revive prewar local traditions and customs. Among the most recent of such festivals were one known as Argessis, held for the first time last December in Pitesti/Arges to honor patriotic

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poetry, and another, Voronetiana, a new fine arts festival organized by the Suceava County Committee on Socialist Culture and Education (see Cronica No. 5, 30 January 1976). On the national level one might mention the dance festival announced in Saptamina (No. 263, 19 December 1975) and the special literary awards created by the Central Trade Union Council (Romania Literara No. 6, 5 February 1976).

Widely discussed in the general context of mass culture are the literary circles established after 1944 and patterned after the Soviet litkruski. (The Rumanian circles have been renamed cenacluri -- a return to a prewar term.) According to Gheorghe Chirila (Contemporanul No. 6, 6 February 1976), in 1974-1975 there were 390 literary circles in the Houses of Culture system in the RSR, 120 of which were run by the trade unions. They were "frequented" by about 7,000 people. But if one were to add the circles of school children, students, and soldiers and those affiliated to the literary reviews, said Chirila, the number of members would rise by several thousand. Obviously, it would be difficult to provide unified guidance for circles affiliated to so many different supervisory organizations -- and in fact such a set of guidelines has not yet been drawn up. In another article in Contemporanul (No. 8, 20 February 1976) Chirila made a number of proposals in this connection. He defined literary circles both as "schools for cultivating authentic talent" and also as "a way of providing the people with a communist education, of preparing them for activity that is useful to our society." This is an interesting definition, since it reveals that in the discussions between the "animators of the circles" and young amateur writers, the latter are discouraged from taking up writing as a profession, rather than encouraged to do so. The animators feel they must discourage any tendency to improvise, to succumb to gratuitous infatuation, or to a refusal to practice a basic profession. Chirila also called for unified guidance of all literary circles and for "rigorous selection" criteria to be applied to literary material submitted to them. In the Luceafarul circle, for instance -- now perhaps the most famous because it provides the best opportunity to become known in the professional literary world -- it has become a custom to ask those young writers who would like to read their works at its meetings to submit what they intend to read to the editorial office in advance -- a practice that in effect represents a kind of censorship. This is not surprising, when one remembers that in the 1960s it was in the Luceafarul circle, then headed by Eugen Barbu, that most outspoken discussions in literary Rumania took place.

Perhaps the most outstanding feature of the party's mass cultural policy is the effort to merge mass and professional artistic activity. Ideally, according to CC member and Writers' Union chairman Virgil Teodorescu, literature should become purely utilitarian, purely committed: "Social commitment involves, among other things, the promotion of occasional literature. . . . But in the year 2000 I believe poetry will be written by all people, not by individuals" (Cronica No. 42, 17 October 1975).

This merging has already begun, and every week dozens of writers take part in poetry readings all over the country -- in literary circles, at meetings in bookshops, etc. In the party's

view not only all artists but generally speaking all intellectuals "are turning into cultural activists": "Thus, a huge field of activity and affirmation is opening up, especially before the intellectuals, whose social mission no longer consists solely of creating culture, but involves propagating it down to the last human being in need of it." (Herseni, op. cit.) The most significant organizational event in this respect, however, was the second meeting of the literary circles in Bucharest, which took place in the Writers' Union building on 23 May 1975. It was organized by the Bucharest Writers' Association and the Guiding Center of Mass Culture, and a jury of professional writers presented awards to their amateur would-be colleagues (see Luceafarul No. 22, 31 May 1975).

Similar activities have gone on in other cultural fields. The 20 "people's theaters" that complement the 40 professional ones require the assistance of the professional artists (see Virgil Munteanu in Scinteia, 14 February 1976), and the Bucharest Fine Arts Institute and the Fine Artists Union are often called upon to help in organizing amateur exhibitions in provincial towns (see Era Socialista No. 2/1976). Of course, bridge-building between amateurs and professionals is a good thing, and it is not limited to the socialist countries; but what is wrong about the RCP's policy is its obliviousness to the ineffable character of art, to the inherent danger that the aesthetic level of artistic output will be lowered, and to the risk of ultimate stultification owing to "uniformization."

This gradual "symbiosis" is also intended to destroy the "elite spirit" of which the professional artists are possessed, according to Gheorghe-Radu Chirovici, deputy editor of Contemporanul. Writing in the magazine's 27 February 1976 issue, he noted that "Greater than any poet of genius is the people that nourishes him," and went on to say: "And since I cannot separate art from life, I also cannot believe that a person who is convinced that it is a matter for an elite can be useful to workers and peasants. This is true at least as long as he holds to the conviction that in the beginning was the word."

It is not yet clear to what degree this trend will affect the privileged material status of the literary establishment. But mass artistic activity is not a purely "amateur" movement, as Mircea Herivan made clear in his Era Socialista article. Carving out a career in the mass cultural movement by using connections, relations, and recommendations is also possible, and Herivan expressed concern about "a paraeditorial production" that has grown to considerable proportions. By getting their subliterary output published by the mass cultural institutions, such "'amateurs' (who are ultraprofessional when it comes to imposture) . . . have had their work spread more widely than some young poets who have won well-deserved approbation" (see also Rumanian Situation Report/2, Radio Free Europe Research, 16 January 1975, Item 3). (017)

LEGAL SYSTEM

2. The 1976-1980 Legislative Program

Revista Romana de Drept (No. 1, January 1976) published a discussion on the state's judicial policy "in the present stage of

construction of a multilaterally developed socialist society" which took place on 15 November 1975 under the auspices of the Judicial Section of the Academy of Sociopolitical Sciences and the Legislative Council.

Ion Ceterchi, chairman of the Legislative Council, said that the 1976-1980 legislative program had been worked out along lines set by the higher party leadership and that it was in accord with the unified plan for the country's socioeconomic development, since ministries and central agencies had been instructed to "forecast" the development of law. The advisability of changing some regulations at present considered satisfactory is to be looked into, and in order to ensure democracy in the legislative process the number of law-based regulations, as against those issued by administrative agencies, is to be increased. In the future, all socially important areas of life will be governed by law.

The program is neither rigid nor immutable: according to Ceterchi, it includes plans for a large number of laws, decrees, and new codes, and it became clear during the discussion that in the 1976-1980 period the appropriate agencies will consider drafting an Administrative Code (including a code on contraventions) applicable to all basic problems of state administration, the status of civil servants, relations between the administrative apparatus and the citizenry, etc.

According to Mircea Anghene, a senior researcher at the Institute for Juridical Research, a draft bill on the organization of ministries and other central agencies and a code of administrative procedures (to be included later on in the Administrative Code) should already have been drafted, on the basis of specialized research.

An Economic Code applying to economic relations among state units is also being prepared. Constantin Oprisan, an adviser to the Ministry of Justice and an associate professor, said that improving economic legislation is integrally related to improving legislation in general. Apparently, however, opinion on this point is not unanimous, since parallel regulatory acts will be drawn up for various fields of economic activity. Vasile Stanescu, an adviser to the Legislative Council, announced that financial-banking legislation is being drafted, and Ceterchi heralded the appearance of separate regulatory acts in a number of areas of economic and social life -- national economic planning, industry, agriculture, forestry, investments, construction, etc. -- despite the fact that a general Economic Code is about to be drafted.

A Family Code was the third to be announced at the November discussion. A code of this type is already in existence, but it is to be improved. According to D. Zlatescu, also an adviser to the Legislative Council, new provisions will be introduced making it clear that there can be no family law without state support, and that the family will no longer be considered a separate entity; rather it will be regarded as a function of its own complex relationship to the state.

Also on the drawing board is a Code of International Economic Relations. In his contribution to the discussion, entitled

"National Legislation and the New International Order," Victor Duculescu said that the right to exercise permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and resources implies, among other things, control over multinational societies and the nationalization of foreign property. Strangely enough, however, there was no mention in the Revista Romana de Drept article of international guarantees against nationalization of foreign property -- e.g., in the case of joint companies set up on Rumanian territory--although a number of documents recently signed by Rumania recognize the need to guarantee investments. For instance, the joint communiqués issued at the end of Austrian Chancellor Kreisky's and French Premier Chirac's visits to Rumania call for the conclusion of such agreements (see Scinteia, 15 and 25 July 1975).

During the discussion Ceterchi said that laws on the ratification of international treaties are being considered, and Victor Duculescu stated that under the new conditions, the techniques of applying treaties to domestic law should be made simpler and more flexible, which would "make it possible to apply new international legal standards to them -- standards based on equality and justice which, far from contravening the new legal content, will become organically integrated with it in the process of constantly improving socialist legality."

One point of some interest is that although Ceterchi had announced in 1974 that a Civil Code and a Code of Civil Procedure were about to be given "the finishing touches" (Scinteia, 15 August 1974), no mention of these was made during the November 15 discussion.

Suggestions pertaining to other matters were made, however. Nistor Prisca, an associate professor, recommended that a "commission on applications" be added to the existing Grand National Assembly commissions, to deal with citizens' requests regarding court decisions that have been made final. Such a commission, he said, could also advise the Prosecutor General to contest or even change a decision. This recommendation of Prisca's was criticized by some of the other speakers, however. Another of his suggestions was that a permanent presidium be set up as a body of the state power to supplement the executive bureaus of people's councils. Its members would include two to four specialists, thus raising "leadership" to a higher level, he said. It would seem that he was in fact expressing dissatisfaction at the lack of specialists in local leadership. (018)

3. Improved Procedures for Settling Foreign Trade Disputes

New procedures and regulations governing arbitration between Rumanian and foreign firms were recently approved by the State Council. Decree No. 18/1976, published in Buletinul Oficial (No. 7, 5 February 1976), deals with the organization and functioning of the Arbitration Commission which handles litigation involving foreign trade, and economic and technical-scientific collaboration. The new regulations have been adjusted "to accord with the international standards and practices governing the arbitration of litigation between economic organizations." When the Rumanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry was reorganized in November 1973 (under Decree

No. 623, 21 November 1973), regulations governing the Arbitration Commission attached to the Chamber of Commerce were also modified.

The new regulations define more precisely the cases that must be settled by the Arbitration Commission, and stipulate that the commission itself will decide whether or not it is competent to pass judgment in a given case. The members of the commission are called "arbiters" and their number has been raised from 15-20 to 35-40. They carry out their duties independently and impartially.

The new regulations refer to arbitration tariffs set in an unpublished annex, about which "the agencies concerned" will be informed. Under the old regulations these tariffs were set by the Chamber of Commerce or by the arbitration panel itself, and the regulations did not specify the basis on which they would be determined.

Henceforth an application for arbitration must be submitted in Rumanian, in the language in which the contract between the litigants is written, or in the language normally used in the correspondence between them. (Formerly the application could be submitted in Rumanian, English, French, German, or Russian.) The Arbitration Commission, however, may insist ex officio or upon request that the application be filed in Rumanian and that the documentation be submitted in a language other than that used between the two sides.

The possibility of challenging preliminary decisions of the arbiters even after a hearing has started is discussed in detail in the chapter dealing with the arbitration panel.

The new regulations provide for public hearings; only in specific instances can they be held in camera (under the old regulations only the litigants were allowed to attend). The language used need not be Rumanian, and the litigants may be represented by foreigners. It is also stipulated that, ex officio or upon request, the commission may postpone or temporarily adjourn a hearing.

Whenever "omissions" or "errors" are found in a decision handed down by the Arbitration Commission, a "supplemental decision" should be drafted within 30 days at no cost to the litigants. The new regulations also stipulate that all cases heard by the commission must be adjudicated within six months (the old regulations did not set a time limit).

This adjustment of arbitration procedures may generate greater confidence between countries with different economic systems. One cannot call on Western countries to abolish restrictions if the socialist countries fail to take corresponding measures.

It would seem that Western companies were less than satisfied with the Rumanians' attitude toward arbitration, and the latter recognized the need to "normalize" their stand in order to encourage joint ventures and the conclusion of new contracts with firms abroad. It is probably expected that the new approach will have a beneficial effect on trade and co-operation between Western countries with Rumania.

(019)

ECONOMY

4. Efforts to Promote Nonmaterial Incentives in Labor

The amount of resources that can be made available to the population of a socialist country for consumption is limited by several factors, including total national income and the demands made on the economy by investments and other competing claimants. The program approved by the 11th RCP Congress of November 1974 stated that the "rationally established" requirements of the population would be met as far as possible, but did not commit itself to meeting them fully, and one way of mitigating the effects of the inadequate availability of material rewards is to emphasize the importance of what communist jargon calls "moral" -- i.e., nonmaterial -- incentives.

At the RCP CC plenum of 25-26 March 1974, Ceausescu said that it was imperative to pay more attention to this class of incentive and to educate the "working people" so that they can understand that they are working not merely for more pay but for a better quality of life. Material benefits alone -- no matter how lavish -- cannot solve the problem of incentives; they must be integrated with nonmaterial stimulants and with improved "socialist education."

Revista Economica No. 7 (20 February 1976) published the findings of an investigation into the implementation of this principle that had been conducted in five agricultural production co-operatives. Most of the farmers interviewed had apparently recognized the part to be played by nonmaterial incentives in achieving the "spiritual welfare" of society, but the magazine noted that in practice they were preoccupied with the payments system and other material questions. The journal deplored the fact that co-operative members plainly attribute greater significance to material incentives and said that this is due to the unsatisfactory level of their socialist awareness in general and of their "moral awareness" in particular. A more socially sophisticated attitude to work could alter such views considerably, but that can result only from a lengthy historical process, consciously engineered by party and state.

Revista Economica went on to say that even the mechanics of providing nonmaterial incentives are satisfactory. Local leaders often underestimate the role of incentives, and an examination of most of the minutes of the general assemblies and council meetings of the five agricultural production co-operatives investigated revealed that much time tends to be devoted to criticism, while nonmaterial incentives are not even mentioned. To be fair, however, the local leaders themselves often suffer from a lack of appreciation from above -- an important form of incentive -- and a dissatisfaction sometimes results. This is in part due to organizational deficiencies, and the journal suggested that county meetings should be held to ensure that praise is conferred when it is due.

In general, the survey showed that what the farmers wanted was a diet of material benefits salted with "higher" incentives;

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discussions of nonmaterial alternatives tended to drift back to questions of cash, concessionary vouchers, and recreational perquisites.

In an interview with Scinteia (13 January 1976), Dinu Buznea, director of the Institute for Research and Planning Calculation Technology, declared that during the examination of certain problems the researchers had shown "some unrest" about their scales of remuneration. Adopting the current party propaganda line, Buznea said that such disquiet should be dispelled by an appeal to the "patriotic" feelings of the complainants, which should help them to rise above "subjective" considerations.

Young people also seem to be dissatisfied with the limited material rewards available, and the authorities emphasize the importance of nonmaterial incentives in their dealings with them. Dissatisfaction with current wage scales and working conditions in Rumania is also expressed in the reluctance to work shown by many of the young, some of whom simply refuse to take the jobs assigned to them. "Councils of humanity" have been set up to "persuade" such people to accept jobs; these teams consist of representatives of state and mass organizations, including a "man from the militia." Young people summoned for interview are usually "advised" to work, and the "councils" often visit them in their apartments to drive the message home. According to Scinteia (19 February 1976), the councils have recently extended their scope and sometimes "accompany" the young people to the jobs allotted to them and later "keep track" of the way they perform their work.

Beside these obviously coercive methods, other less drastic techniques are being used to achieve the same end. Scinteia Tineretului (18 February 1976) said that a "session devoted to the integration of youth into production" had been held recently in Cluj County, and that other counties were convening similar discussions.

It is clear from a study on the preparations for the Congress of Political Education and Culture, scheduled for May 1976, that the party leadership continues to place its trust in educating the people to concern themselves with higher things than wages and fringe benefits. The congress is designed to continue and enhance the national effort to educate "the new man" of socialist society (Scinteia, 11 December 1975), a program dating from Ceausescu's cultural campaign launched in 1971. An article published in Era Socialista (No. 4, February 1976) reveals, however, that this training project has run into difficulties: first, the "outside" (read: "capitalist") world is "projecting" certain evil influences upon socialist Rumania, which is not a closed society; and secondly, many of the vices typical of capitalism, which is based on the exploitation of man by man and on the sanctity of private property, have adjusted themselves to the different conditions obtaining in a socialist society, gaining immunity as some germs do to the effect of antibiotics.

(020)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

5. Libyan Minister Signs Co-operation Protocol in Bucharest

Libya's Minister of Petroleum Mabruk attended the third session of the mixed Rumanian-Libyan governmental commission on economic and technical co-operation in Bucharest between February 23 and March 2. He was received by Ceausescu on February 27, and during their discussion of bilateral relations and international problems they agreed on the desirability of promoting co-operation in order to exploit the possibilities offered by the economies of their respective countries, and Ceausescu reasserted Rumania's position with regard to a political settlement of the conflict in the Middle East and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories occupied in 1967.

On February 29 a protocol on the development of co-operation in the oil industry, construction, agriculture, transportation, and the expansion of commercial exchanges was signed. According to Agerpres (March 1), Mabruk said that Rumania and Libya, both developing countries, have a durable basis for co-operation which "makes us hope that the co-operation between us will continue to expand." The developing countries, he added, must work harder to abolish every form of domination and exploitation through solidarity and co-operation.

Discussions on Libyan-Rumanian co-operation in the oil industry began in January 1972 and the subject cropped up on various occasions in subsequent years, although so far no concrete information regarding Libyan oil deliveries has appeared in the Rumanian press (see Rumanian SR/32, RFER, 21 August 1975, Item 6a). The Times (1 July 1972), quoted "reliable sources" as saying that Rumania had agreed to buy 1,500,000 tons of oil a year from Libya, subject to annual review. The Times (7 March 1975) also said that Ceausescu's visit to Libya in early 1974 had yielded a deal securing an average of 3,000,000 tons of Libyan oil annually for the 1974-1977 period, and UPI (16 February 1974, quoting Radio Tripoli) said that Libya is to supply Rumania with 12,000,000 tons of oil by 1977.

The value of Rumanian-Libyan trade exchanges has increased rapidly during the last few years, rising in value from 87,200,000 lei in 1970 (Rumanian exports only) to 532,200,000 lei in 1974, of which 381,100,000 lei represented Rumanian exports and 151,100,000 lei Libyan exports. (021)

6. Cultural Co-operation -- East and West

Radio Bucharest (February 14) reported that Deputy Foreign Minister Vasile Gliga had discussed US-RSR relations and some international issues with a number of State Department officials in Washington. The discussions centered mainly on the US-Rumanian governmental agreement on cultural, scientific, and technological co-operation concluded in December 1974. State Department sources described the meeting as routine. Gliga, who was accompanied by the Rumanian Ambassador to the US, Corneliu Bogdan, is reported to have

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met with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur Hartman, and Helmut Sonnenfeld, Counsel to the Department; with Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle; and with Director of the US Information Agency James Keogh.

It should be recalled that Rumania is one of the two socialist countries with which the US has an agreement on cultural and scientific co-operation. (the other is the USSR, with which such an agreement was concluded in 1973), though from time to time similar accords have been discussed with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

During Ceausescu's talk with President Ford in June 1975 Dumitru Popescu, chairman of the Council on Socialist Culture and Education, met with Keogh to discuss exchanges and co-operation, and after the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki Leonard Marks, chairman of the US Consultative Commission on International Problems of Learning and Culture, had talks in Rumania with various scientific and cultural officials (Romania Libera, 6 September 1975). In an interview granted to Agerpres, Marks expressed the conviction that there are "even greater opportunities" for collaboration in the cultural and scientific spheres, which would be "to the advantage of both countries."

When the December 1974 agreement was signed it was reported in Bucharest that it covered the years 1975 and 1976, but Washington described it as a "five-year" agreement that replaced previous two-year accords concluded at a lower level (see Rumanian SR/40, RFER, 19 December 1974, Item 4).

Scinteia (February 12) reported on the second session of the Rumanian-West German Mixed Commission on Co-operation in Scientific Research and Technological Development, noting among other things that a program setting new goals for co-operation in scientific research and technological development in 1976-1977 had been agreed upon. No mention was made of West Berlin in connection with this program. (In March 1975 talks between Rumania and the FRG were broken off on the head of the FRG's proposal that the Federal Institute for Material Examination, located in West Berlin, be included in a co-operation agreement: see Rumanian SR/9, RFER, 7 March 1975, Item 3a.)

Radio Bucharest (March 2) reported that Rumania and Yugoslavia have agreed to open cultural information centers in each other's capitals, and have signed a protocol on the setting up of a Joint Government Commission on Cultural Co-operation -- undertakings described in the report as being in line with the provisions of the Rumanian-Yugoslav cultural agreement and designed to promote cultural exchanges.

(022)

AGRICULTURE

7. Ceausescu Addresses Important Meeting on Agricultural Deficiencies

Rumanian party leader Nicolae Ceausescu interrupted his attendance at the 25th Congress of the CPSU in Moscow to return to Bucharest for an important meeting with the county party first secretaries on the situation of Rumanian agriculture. The meeting had obviously been planned for some time and Ceausescu had informed the Soviets in advance that he would have to leave the congress for a short time, according to statements by Rumanian spokesmen in Moscow. He returned to Moscow immediately after the meeting in Bucharest.

The serious shortcomings in the agricultural sector that prompted the session are not new (they were also discussed at a February 1975 agricultural conference -- see Rumanian SR/6, RFER, 14 February 1975, Item 2), and they have been aggravated by the fact that 1975 was the second poor harvest year in a row. The cumulative effect on the Rumanian economy as a whole faces the party leadership with a problem of first magnitude, particularly in view of the alarming state of Rumania's balance of payments and its diminishing currency reserves. The Journal of Commerce (March 1) contained an article which said that after three seasons of mismanagement and bad weather, the agricultural sector threatens to become a drag on the entire economy. Despite official reticence with regard to the true situation, signs are multiplying that agriculture is even worse off than has generally been assumed. The author noted that even in bad years agricultural exports account for between a fifth and a fourth of Rumania's foreign trade earnings. Officials to whom the author had talked kept referring to the floods of 1970 and 1975 and to drought in the intervening years, but did admit a number of deficiencies in the organization of production. Even more alarming, however, is the fact that Ceausescu has repeatedly found it necessary to warn against a "lack of discipline." (It may be recalled that he once described a scene in which co-operative peasants stood by laughing at soldiers and students laboring in the fields.)

In addition to county party first secretaries the February 28 meeting was attended by CC activists, representatives of economic ministries, and officials of the National Union of Agricultural Production Co-operatives (APCs) and of the Central Union of Consumer Co-operatives, Ceausescu harshly criticized deficiencies in almost all agricultural branches and called on central and local party and agricultural organizations to take immediate steps to improve the present totally unsatisfactory situation.

This was the second time in less than a month that the party leader had dealt with shortcomings in agriculture; he told the Congress of the People's Councils on February 4 that its "technical-material basis" has not been fully utilized, that the "land fund" was being inadequately exploited, and that agricultural work has not been performed on schedule or under proper conditions. On a number of occasions in the past he has blamed agricultural units and the party organs in charge of farming for deficiencies in this sector (see Rumanian SRs/6, 41, and 42, RFER, 14 February and 23 and 31 October 1975, Items 2, 1, and 5, respectively). Rumanian

news media have also frequently dealt with the problem -- for instance, Revista Economica (5 September 1975) criticized investment policy in the APCs, and Era Socialista (No. 15/1975) complained that agricultural statistics do not always reflect the true situation (see Rumanian SR/31, RFER, 14 August 1975, Item 5). Later issues of the latter publications contained articles on the program for regulating the country's water courses (No. 17/1975), and discussed the problem of the food supply (No. 20/1975). It should also be mentioned that the Political Executive Committee has discussed agricultural problems on several occasions (see Rumanian SR/33, RFER, 29 August 1975, Item 7).


Shortcomings exist in almost all sectors of agriculture -- in grain production and livestock farming, in irrigation, in fruit and vegetable growing, etc. -- and they seriously delayed implementation of the 1971-1975 agricultural plan (see Rumanian SR/5, RFER, 18 February 1976, Item 1). According to the Rumanian papers the February 28 meeting discussed the spring agricultural campaign, the livestock situation, the programs to expand and make "rational" use of irrigation, vegetable, fruit, and grape growing, reducing per-hectare expenditures, increasing productivity, and APC efficiency. Ceausescu began his speech by criticizing the delay in carrying out many projects. Deadlines for the completion of tilling had been set, he said, and went on to urge that natural fertilizers be supplied to agricultural units in good time, and that surface water be drained from the fields. He laid stress on spring sowing and called for a "general mobilization" of all agricultural forces to complete it on time. He said work in orchards and vineyards was behind schedule and urged that steps be taken to remedy this situation.

Having set the general tenor of his talk, Ceausescu elaborated on such topics as irrigation, flood control, the need to provide greater support for "weak" APCs, to increase the livestock population, to improve the activity of the Farm Machine Stations, etc. He stressed the roles of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Food Industry, the agricultural directorates, and the National Union APCs, urging the latter to enforce order and discipline and develop "co-operative democracy" in the APCs.

At the end of his speech Ceausescu turned to the tasks and duties of the county party committees and the party organizations in the villages. They must mobilize the rural population, regardless, of job or profession, to carry out agricultural tasks on schedule, pay special attention to developing a sense of responsibility and to establishing order and discipline, and see to it that all legal provisions are adhered to. (023)

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THE ATHENS CONFERENCE AND THE BALKANS: OLD

VARIATIONS ON AN OLD THEME

By Robert R. King

Summary: The recent Athens conference of Balkan government experts -- though its accomplishments were limited -- is the most successful of the postwar attempts at regional co-operation. Efforts to achieve it in the late 1940s were abandoned because of the Soviet-Yugoslav break; the Rumanian and Bulgarian governments were the principal partisans of collaboration in the late 1950s and 1960s, but the Rumanians moved into the lead with the evolution of their autonomous foreign policy, while the Bulgarians -- reflecting Soviet views -- became increasingly skeptical of multilateral efforts. The Helsinki conference and changes in both Greece and Turkey, however, have led to the success of the recent Greek initiative. Yugoslav and Rumanian views on regional co-operation are similar, although the Yugoslavs seem to be more sanguine about the possibilities. The Bulgarians would certainly like to further co-operation, but Soviet interests have caused them to play a restraining role -- the Soviet Union favors regional co-operation only if Moscow can successfully manipulate it, and for the present this is not likely. So the Soviets seem to prefer to wait and stall.

* * *

Recently, for the first time since World War II, a conference of Balkan government experts was held. The gathering, in Athens, which lasted 11 days, began on January 26 and was attended by representatives of Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia -- only Albania declined the invitation to participate.

Some 150 suggestions for co-operation in such nonpolitical areas as joint exploitation of solar energy, improvement of transportation and communication links, and joint efforts in the area of tourism are to be considered by the individual governments, and at some (unspecified) time in the future, representatives (the level of which was also unspecified) may meet to consider further co-operative efforts. Although such results would normally be considered rather meager, in light of the significant differences between the countries involved and their previous unwillingness to meet together the conference must be considered a success. The least co-operative of the participants, Bulgaria, prevented the more concrete progress the other delegations were prepared for, but even among the latter the areas of possible co-operation are limited.

Previous Postwar Efforts at Regional Co-operation

It has taken more than 30 years for such a gathering to take place, but efforts in this direction have been made periodically since the late 1940s. After 1945 the establishment of Soviet client regimes in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and of pro-Moscow governments in Yugoslavia and Albania, led to an improvement in the relations among these states. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria went so far as to plan and carry out the initial steps toward the creation of a South Slav Federation, which was to include Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, and perhaps also Rumania. Stalin, however, vetoed the scheme, fearing that a unified bloc of Balkan states would be more difficult for Moscow to control. Good relations came to an abrupt end in June 1948, when the Yugoslavs were expelled from the Cominform, and the division in the region became explicit when Greece and Turkey decided to become members of NATO in the early 1950s.

The possibility of regional co-operation was raised again in September 1957, when a series of Khrushchev-inspired proposals for the reduction of East-West tension were made. The Poles proposed banning nuclear weapons from all nations bordering on the Baltic except the Soviet Union and closing the sea to ships of all non-Baltic states, and a related proposal called for a nuclear-free zone

in Central Europe. In the Balkans, Rumanian Premier Chivu Stoica addressed messages to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia proposing that they join in a conference aimed at improving relations through Balkan détente. Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia accepted the proposal, but Turkey and Greece declined to participate. When NATO missiles were installed in the latter two states in 1959 Rumania, under Soviet auspices, revived the Stoica proposal, calling for a top-level conference to discuss the creation of a nuclear-free, missile-free zone in the Balkans. (1) Khrushchev warmly endorsed the Rumanian proposal, suggesting that the nuclear-free zone be extended to Italy and the Adriatic, but Greece and Turkey again rejected it.

This did not prevent the Rumanians and Bulgarians from periodically reviving the suggestion that some kind of multilateral co-operation be undertaken and a nuclear-free zone created. In December 1959 Bulgaria set up a Committee on Balkan Understanding and Co-operation, and a few months later Premier Anton Yugov made a number of proposals for economic and technological collaboration. In 1963 party leader Todor Zhivkov said the time would come for a meeting of Balkan government heads -- implying that the time was not yet ripe for such a gathering but clearly favoring it.

After 1964 the Rumanians began to pursue a more active and autonomous foreign policy, and multilateral Balkan co-operation became a frequent theme. As the RSR began to improve its relations with neighboring states, Bucharest began to lobby again for multilateral co-operation and the creation of a nuclear-free zone. A formal proposal to this effect was made in May and June 1970, when the Rumanian government sent notes to all Balkan states and to the UN Secretary-General. The notes apparently called for closer co-operation "through frequent conferences participated in by all Balkan countries, through common policies during international conferences of wider participation, and through nongovernmental co-operation." (2) The response from the recipients was hardly encouraging, however. The Yugoslavs, although they apparently showed some initial interest, later opposed the idea, as did the other Balkan states. (3) The Rumanians have not attempted

(1) The Stoica proposals appeared in Scinteia, 17 September 1957 and 7 June 1959.
 (2) UPI/Athens, 8 June 1970.
 (3) For more on this, see Robert R. King, "Rumania and the Balkans," Rumanian Background Report/20, Radio Free Europe Research, 10 November 1970.

a similar major initiative since that time, although they have frequently expressed approval of multilateral Balkan co-operation. (4)

The Bulgarians, who together with the Rumanians had been enthusiastic advocates of regional co-operation in the late 1950s and 1960s, began to alter their stance in the early 1970s. At the BCP's 10th Congress in April 1971 Zhivkov apparently intended to propose convening a Balkan conference of government representatives to discuss regional détente and co-operation, but dropped the idea at the last minute, probably because of Soviet objections. After this incident the Bulgarians began to favor a bilateral approach to co-operations in the Balkans and generally opposed multilateral undertakings. Thus Bulgaria's role at the recent Athens conference as the country most reluctant to engage in multilateral projects is consistent with the policy it has followed for the past few years. (5)

Changing Conditions and the Successful Greek Initiative

By mid-1975 changed conditions in the Balkan Peninsula favored renewal of the proposal for a multilateral conference. This time the initiative came not from Rumania or Bulgaria, the traditional partisans of regional co-operation, but from the new Greek government of Constantine Karamanlis. A number of important changes were responsible for both the suggestion and its culmination in the Athens conference.

First, the proposal was formally made only a few weeks after the final stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe had ended in Helsinki. This gathering created a climate conducive to further co-operation between the various states of Eastern and Western Europe. In such an atmosphere both the Soviet

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- (4) In his speech to the RCP's National Party Conference in July 1972 Ceausescu issued a call for "the creation of a body for the purpose of achieving closer economic collaboration" and "a meeting of representatives of the Balkan countries" to consider creating a nuclear-free zone and fostering economic and technological co-operation (Scinteia, 20 July 1972). Balkan co-operation was likewise raised in his speech at the 11th RCP Congress in late 1974 (Scinteia, 26 November 1974).
- (5) See R.N. (Bulgarian Unit), "Bulgaria and the Balkan Conference in Athens," RAD BR/41 (Bulgaria), RFER, 12 February 1976, and Robert R. King, "Multilateral Co-operation in the Balkans: Differences of View Between Bucharest and Sofia," Eastern Europe BR/6, RFER, 5 April 1973.

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Union and the United States could hardly object to their allies' participating in an exercise of regional détente, and Bulgaria's refusal to participate would have been interpreted as an indication of questionable Soviet intentions.

Second, the internal changes in Greece after the collapse of the military junta in the summer of 1974 made the possibility of regional co-operation more palatable to the communist states, although all had managed, despite initial aversion, to improve state and economic relations with the military leadership in Athens. The Karamanlis government was not only more acceptable to the other states but was also more interested in furthering regional co-operation and lacked the ideological attitudes that had inhibited the military leaders.

A third factor that helped to bring about the conference was the strained state of Greek and Turkish relations with the United States in the aftermath of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus that same summer. Both states sought to demonstrate their disapproval of US foreign policy by engaging in more independent action. As a result both have recently undertaken moves toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the East European states, and participation in a Balkan conference with other Warsaw Pact countries was consistent with such a policy. Also, this attitude on the part of Athens and Ankara undoubtedly made Moscow more willing to see the conference take place.

The fact that changed conditions favored the holding of the conference, however, should not be taken to mean that there was an identity of views among the participants. Many of the factors that influenced their divergent attitudes in the past continue to affect their hopes and expectations for the future of regional co-operation. The fact that a conference was held is indeed an indication of progress, but considerably more must be done if the Balkan nations are to move from an exchange of views to meaningful multilateral co-operation. So far they have only pledged to seek out areas of collaboration; even a date for another meeting has not been fixed. In these circumstances their attitudes toward the Athens conference and Balkan co-operation are merely a reflection of future possibilities.

Rumania -- The Leading Partisan of Multilateral Co-operation

Rumania has perhaps been the most consistent advocate of multilateral collaboration in the region, and its stance at the Athens

conference reflected this. The response of Rumanian President Ceausescu to Karamanlis's invitation was particularly enthusiastic. (6) The Rumanian press build-up also reflected the government's endorsement. Newspaper commentaries recalled the numerous Rumanian suggestions for regional co-operation, going back to the Stoica plan of 1957, and noted that "every party and state document, the speeches of the Rumanian president, the joint communiqués, and the declarations occasioned by summit meetings emphasize good neighborliness and co-operation in the Balkans as one of the demands of permanent significance with respect to peace and security in this part of Europe." (7)

During the conference itself the Rumanians were also apparently among those willing to go farthest toward regional co-operation. Although the press was admitted only during the general opening statements of each delegation and the remainder of the conference was held behind closed doors, the main points in the Rumanian proposals can be inferred from these public statements and from later comments by Rumanian and other officials. In addition to the usual detailed list of potential areas of co-operation, the Rumanians apparently called for the creation of new organizations to encourage collaboration. Ceausescu made the same proposal in his foreign policy speech to the Grand National Assembly in mid-December when he noted: "It is necessary to intensify the activity of existing Balkan co-operation agencies and organizations and also to create new ones, with a view to broaching certain problems of mutual interest." (8) This statement was quoted by the chief Rumanian delegate to Athens in his opening address, which suggests that the proposal was actually made at the conference, and in fact a Yugoslav paper reported that the Rumanian delegation had proposed the creation of a Balkan highway organization and other agencies. (9)

That the Rumanians are anxious for Balkan co-operation to be institutionalized is indicated in a Scinteia commentary (10) published after the close of the conference. The author noted that "one of the most important results" of the meeting was "the assertion of the

(6) Scinteia, 3 October 1975.

(7) Ibid., 20, 24, and 28 January 1976.

(8) Agerpres, 28 January 1976.

(9) Vjesnik, 8 February 1976; see Slobodan Stankovic "Yugoslav Paper's Critical Appraisal of Balkan Conference," RAD BR/40 (Yugoslavia), RFER, 12 February 1976.

(10) 8 February 1976.

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idea of continuity. The joint communiqué mentions the possibility of calling a new meeting, the Athens conference being viewed as a first stage in a comprehensive process aimed at broadening the scope of multilateral co-operation among the Balkan countries." The desire of both Bucharest and Athens to give more concrete institutional form to regional co-operation was also reflected last summer when a Greek economic delegation visited Rumania; representatives of both countries expressed interest in establishing an inter-Balkan Chamber of Commerce. The same proposal was included in the joint communiqué issued at the end of Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel's visit to Rumania in August. (11)

Although Rumania's hopes were certainly not realized at the Athens gathering, it believes that the situation is now propitious for further progress. It was agreed in advance that the Athens meeting would deal with co-operation in nonpolitical areas, and while the Rumanians accepted this as a necessary first step, their desires go considerably beyond this limited sphere, into areas that are clearly political. Stoica's initial proposals in 1957 were concerned with turning the Balkans into a region free of nuclear arms, and this still remains a primary Rumanian aim. Ceausescu, in his foreign policy speech just a month before the Athens conference opened, reiterated the RSR's interest in "turning this area into a zone of peace and co-operation without nuclear weapons." (12) The same theme was emphasized in an article in the foreign policy weekly Lumea, (13) which appeared one week after the Karamanlis letter formally proposed a Balkan conference. The article seems to have been a preliminary response to the Greek invitation, since it covered the spectrum of Rumanian Balkan policy, and dealt with the desirability of multilateral co-operation and the need to create "new organisms." It ended with a paragraph devoted to the necessity of the Balkans becoming a denuclearized zone. On a number of occasions the Rumanians have also said that all foreign troops and foreign military bases in the Balkans should be withdrawn, a desire they have voiced frequently on a more general level in disarmament negotiations.

Rumania's concern for good relations in the Balkans goes well beyond the desire to have friendly links with its neighboring states and obviously involves its perception of relations with the Soviet

(11) See Scinteia, 31 August 1975, and Rumanian SRs/27 and 34, RFER, 17 July and 5 September 1975, Items 4 and 5, respectively.

(12) Scinteia, 19 December 1975.

(13) 28 August 1975.

Union and Rumania's place in the world. The Soviet colössus is the major preoccupation in Rumania's foreign policy, and concern to maintain and expand its autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow is a consideration that enters into most of Bucharest's calculations with regard to foreign policy. Improving relations with other Balkan states is seen as a means of overcoming the physical isolation the RSR's position imposes. The repeated suggestion that a zone free of nuclear weapons and foreign military bases be created in the Balkans is seen in Bucharest as a way of reducing Rumania's strategic significance in Moscow's eyes by lessening its insecurity along the southern flank. Also, a group of closely co-operating Balkan states would form more of a barrier to great-power politics in the region. This was hinted at in the Lumea article on the Balkans mentioned above. The author noted that in the past efforts to achieve regional interdependence have been prevented by the "intervention of foreign interests, by a certain viewpoint on the part of third parties and larger powers which reduced the zone of the Balkans to a field for political maneuvers and haggling" by means of Diktat, force, and pressure. The evolution of political conditions in the peninsula and the generally improved climate resulting from the Helsinki conference, however, have altered the situation: "For the first time the Balkan countries are in the position of being able to reject, firmly and successfully, any attempt at brutal interference, intimidation, or threat to use force."

Given this attitude on the part of Rumania, the prospect of greater Balkan co-operation is unlikely to be considered reassuring in Moscow. The very fact that the Rumanians and Yugoslavs are among its most enthusiastic supporters would tend to raise Soviet doubt, and it was certainly in an attempt to forestall this that Rumanian Foreign Minister Gheorghe Macovescu, in response to a query during an official visit to Austria, stated: "We are against blocs and we stand for the dissolution of blocs. We are not working to build a bloc in the Balkans." (14) Despite this gesture toward the Soviet Union, Rumania's aims with regard to regional co-operation are clearly intended to further its own foreign policy goals, and these do not appear to complement Soviet views.

Yugoslavia -- the Optimistic Skeptic

The Yugoslavs have likewise been staunch advocates of Balkan co-operation, but while their view has been hopeful they have shown considerably more skepticism with regard to the possibilities than have the Rumanians. They have shown a greater awareness of the

(14) Reuter, 28 January 1976.

complexities and difficulties inherent in any attempt to introduce co-operation in the area but at the same time have encouraged such efforts. They particularly praised the Rumanians and the Greeks for their stands on regional co-operation during the Athens conference, and they were harsh in their criticism of Bulgaria's reticence. (15)

The Yugoslav attitude toward Balkan collaboration is influenced by two problems -- first, the fear of great-power involvement in the region and the need to stress Yugoslavia's nonalignment; and second, the need to resolve outstanding bilateral issues in relations between states in the peninsula, and in particular the quarrel with Bulgaria over the Macedonian question. This fear of the great powers and their past manipulation of the Balkan states is constantly expressed in articles on regional issues. As one Yugoslav foreign affairs specialist noted: "The amount of success achieved . . . will depend on the degree of independent action of each of the countries concerned. Or conversely, the more liable those countries are to foreign influence, the lesser their success in overcoming mutual misunderstandings will be." (16) In commenting on the Athens conference a Yugoslav daily noted that "every act of foreign interference, regardless of the motives and arguments that might be offered as justification, would fundamentally impede inter-Balkan co-operation." (17) In their criticism of foreign influence in the peninsula the Yugoslavs have implicitly but clearly attacked Bulgaria for putting "its foreign policy in the Balkans at the service of the strategic needs of non-Balkan factors." (18) This, the Yugoslavs maintain, hampers the evolution of real co-operation in the areas

Yugoslav commentators frequently refer to the second problem mentioned above -- the need to resolve outstanding bilateral issues between Balkan states before regional co-operation can become a reality. The dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus is of course a

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- (15) See the Vjesnik article referred to in Footnote 9; Radio Belgrade, 28 January 1976, voiced the same criticism.
 - (16) Ranko Perkovic, "Factors of Balkan Security and Co-operation," Review of International Affairs, 5 March 1975.
 - (17) Vus and Tanjug, 12 January 1976.
 - (18) Miro Draskic, "The Balkan Topics," Review of International Affairs, 20 July 1975.

matter of concern, but their main preoccupation is the Macedonian question. (19) The argument is advanced that regional co-operation is hampered by "the Bulgarian attitude toward Yugoslavia, which contains many elements of territorial pretension and negation of the provisions of the Helsinki declaration on national minorities." (20) Unless the Macedonian and other unresolved issues are settled, the Yugoslavs see little hope that regional co-operation can come about.

Under existing circumstances, they claim, "bilateral co-operation is obviously the most effective way of advancing relations between the Balkan countries." (21) They argue that since two countries in the region are members of the Warsaw Pact and two are members of the Atlantic Alliance, multilateral co-operation would necessarily reflect the interests and influences of these military blocs. Thus the only way to "multilateralize" regional collaboration is by severing bloc ties: "The way to multilateral co-operation clearly leads through emancipation from bloc affiliations and promotion of bilateral collaboration." The Yugoslavs go still further, suggesting that the divisive bilateral questions that also hamper general regional co-operation are exacerbated by external influences and that if left to themselves the Balkan states could resolve their own conflicts more easily: "The present insufficient stability in the Balkans is probably due to the activities of extra-Balkan factors rather than to the divergencies between the Balkan states themselves." Although the Yugoslavs at present see bilateral co-operation as the only possible area of progress, this has not limited their willingness to discuss possibilities of multilateral efforts. This is particularly apparent in the Yugoslav reports on the Athens conference which were highly critical of the Bulgarian delegation's refusal to even raise the possibility of multilateral co-operation. (22)

Bulgaria -- the Lowest Common Denominator

Although Bulgarian news media gave the Karamanlis invitation some publicity when it was first announced, the question was subsequently

(19) For an overview of the main aspects of the Macedonian issue, see Robert R. King, "The Macedonian Question and Bulgaria's Relations with Yugoslavia," RAD BR/98 (Bulgaria), RFER, 6 June 1975, and Slobodan Stankovic, "The Divisive Issue of Macedonia: Yugoslav Attitudes and Suspicions," RAD BR/99 (Yugoslavia), RFER, 6 June 1975. See also Draskic, op. cit.; 16 October 1975; and Nova Makedonija, 16 July 1975.

(20) Vus and Tanjug, 12 January 1976.

(21) Petkovic, op. cit. The remainder of the unreferenced quotations in this paragraph are from the same article.

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ignored until the mass media covered the opening of the conference. One reflection of Bulgaria's reluctance to give the event any attention is the fact that even Todor Zhivkov's response to Karamanlis went unreported in Bulgaria. Media coverage was indicative of the general Bulgarian policy toward the conference; foreign press reports branded the Bulgarian delegation as the least willing to engage in multilateral programs, and at their insistence the conference was declared to be only a consultative gathering and no firm commitment or date for a future meeting was set. (23)

The attitude of Bulgaria in this case appears to be more a reflection of Soviet concerns and policies than of its own interests or desires. There have been indications, including Zhivkov's censored proposal at the 1971 party congress, suggesting that Bulgaria would in fact favor closer co-operation with its neighbors. In foreign policy matters, however, Sofia has shown itself a devoted follower of the Soviet line, and it is presumably this consideration which led it to play a restraining role at the Athens conference.

The Soviet Union -- Eminence Grise

There is some evidence that the Soviets consider the current efforts to achieve Balkan co-operation undesirable in terms of their own interests. In the past the Soviets have certainly viewed similar efforts negatively. The Soviet party daily Pravda (24) denounced Georgi Dimitrov's suggestion of a custom unions for the communist states in the Balkans and Central Europe; the Bulgarian-Yugoslav proposals of a South Slav federation and urged instead that the independence and sovereignty of the individual states be strengthened. Somewhat later, however, as Soviet-Yugoslav differences became more pronounced, Stalin called for a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation in an effort to infiltrate and ultimately dominate the recalcitrant Yugoslav party organization. Thus the Soviets were opposed to any Balkan moves that might be outside their control or which might create a bloc of states more easily able to resist them, but were quite willing to encourage mergers or joint ventures which would serve their interests and which they could manipulate.

(23) Bulgaria's participation in the conference is discussed only briefly here since it was dealt with extensively in R.N., op. cit.

(24) 29 January 1948.

The Soviet policy toward Balkan co-operation appears to follow essentially the same logic today -- if they can utilize and control joint efforts they are in favor; otherwise they oppose.

The changes in the Balkan Peninsula over the last few years have left the Soviets in a somewhat awkward position. The aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus crisis engendered considerable disenchantment with the US in both Turkey and Greece, and both have moved in the direction of a foreign policy course less exclusively oriented toward Washington. One facet of this is that both countries have improved their relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. While this has been more dramatic in the case of Turkey -- the recent visit of Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin to Ankara was quickly followed by one from Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal -- it has been true of Greece as well. The possibility of weakening the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance is especially attractive because of its proximity to the strategically important and unstable Middle East. The post-junta government in Greece has been particularly keen on regional co-operation, thus the Soviet Union has been put in the awkward position of seeking to establish closer ties with the two NATO states in the Balkans but not favoring multilateral co-operation. Unless considerably stronger ties between Athens and Ankara with Moscow are established, the Soviets are unlikely to give much support to serious regional collaboration.

While the political evolution in Turkey and Greece is positive from the Soviet viewpoint, Rumania and Yugoslavia present more complicated problems. In balancing its assertions of autonomy in foreign affairs with judicious acceptance of crucial Soviet positions, Rumania has evidently managed to avoid moving beyond the limits of the acceptable (from Moscow's point of view), but there is a continual attempt to create conditions favorable to greater foreign policy autonomy. The various efforts at regional co-operation in the Balkans -- as well as Rumania's drive to be accepted in the nonaligned movement, to identify itself as a developing country, to strengthen the United Nations, and to foster more rapid disarmament -- must be seen in this context. And the Soviets probably view the RSR's intentions in connection with regional collaboration in this light.

A measure of Soviet feelings about Rumanian intentions may be found in an article (25) on nuclear-free zones that appeared in August 1975 -- the month in which the Helsinki conference was held

(25) Y. Tomilin, "Nuclear-free Zones: How to Make Them Effective," International Affairs (Moscow) No.8, 1975, pp. 67-72.

and the Karamanlis invitation was issued. The author spent some time discussing proposals to create nuclear-free zones submitted to United Nations. Significantly, the Balkans were mentioned only once, and in passing -- as one of several regions regarding which such proposals had been made in the past -- and the Rumanian overtures were not mentioned at all, though in 1970 one of its proposals was made to the UN Secretary-General. Proposals relating to Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia, northern Europe, and Latin America were discussed, however. A Polish writer (26) reflected a similar aversion to mentioning the Rumanian proposals in an article on the 1957 Rapacki plan for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe; he made no mention of the simultaneous proposals put forward by Rumanian Premier Chivu Stoica and renewed periodically since that time, although he did make a passing reference to the less well known 1958 "Tito Plan for the Balkans." Such pointed omissions can hardly be interpreted as indicating anything but Soviet disapproval.

The other Balkan area of concern to the USSR is, of course, Yugoslavia. The approach of the post-Tito era is being heralded by domestic instability, and the Soviet Union is undoubtedly watching the situation closely and at the same time seeking to influence through all available means the evolution of this key Balkan state. Moscow seems content to await the departure of Tito before committing itself to a Balkan policy, however, but Bucharest is anxious to establish some kind of regional framework before he goes.

In Soviet eyes the best approach to Balkan co-operation is one of waiting. The likelihood of Turkey and Greece reversing the decline in their relations with the United States does not at present appear great and the problems American foreign policy has encountered owing to the executive-legislative power struggle in the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam atmosphere do not portend a vigorous United States policy. There is a real possibility that Greece and Turkey will forge closer relations with the Warsaw Pact states, if they should do so before any firm decisions on Balkan co-operation are made, this would be all the better from the Soviet viewpoint. The question of post-Tito Yugoslavia will probably be answered before long, and a change in the Albanian leadership (also something that is not likely to be too long delayed) might conceivably also bring about a situation more favorable to the Soviets. Rumanian foreign policy remains an irritant to the Soviet leaders, but thus far its inter-

(26) Lech Niekrasz, "Reflections under an Atomic Parasole -- The Career of a Polish Proposal," Zycie Warszawy, 8 September 1975.

national deviation has been contained. The RSR's decision to participate more actively in Comecon and its problems in trade with Western countries give the Soviets reasons to hope for reversal or at least moderation of past Rumanian policies. Under such circumstances, the best thing from the Soviet point of view is to defer action until the political evolution of the region becomes clearer, and Bulgaria's behavior at the Athens conference seems consistent with this approach. While Sofia did not preclude multilateral co-operation, it prevented the taking of decisive steps in that direction and focused on bilateral co-operation. Further steps toward regional collaboration may come, but the Bulgarians have effectively slowed movement in this direction, and for the present that seems to be the primary Soviet desire.

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RUMANIA/6
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S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

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CULTURE AND EDUCATION1. Preparations for the Congress of Political Education and Culture

The preparations for the Congress on Political Education and Culture, scheduled for May, are now in full swing. According to an editorial in Scinteia (12 February 1976), party organizations all over the country began holding discussions early in February, and meetings of trade union, the youth, and women's groups, agricultural and handicraft units, and research, artistic, and press institutions are being held. Such a long and intensive period of preparation is obviously meant to indicate the "continuing intensification and improvement of ideological activity, of party propaganda, of all political and cultural-educational activity," and is designed to promote "socialist awareness among the working people" and to encourage their active participation in the fulfilling of the five-year plan."

Scinteia also mentioned the need to give a "pronounced working character" to these debates, which are to take place in a "markedly critical and self-critical spirit." The specific character of the fields in which those participating in these debates are active should not be overlooked, according to Scinteia, but emphasis should be laid on "certain fundamental aspects -- i.e., stimulating and intensifying the militant party spirit -- of propaganda and ideological work in every sphere of society. The article singled out "cultivating a boundless love of and devotion to the fatherland, combining patriotism with proletarian internationalism" and "a determined struggle against any kind of nationalist manifestations as well as cosmopolitan attitudes."

Scinteia made a point of importance of the forthcoming congress, which it said will be the "first event of its kind since socialist construction began in Rumania" and will be "an event of extraordinary importance in the political and ideological life of the country." The "decisive role" played by RCP Secretary-General Nicolae Ceausescu in "initiating and carrying out measures to improve political-ideological activity" was underscored, and it was pointed out that the practical implementation of the ideological campaign launched in July 1971 has changed -- for the better, in the eyes of the regime -- the social attitude and working discipline of the population. It will be the task of the forthcoming congress, said Scinteia, to determine "how to perfect this activity and to develop, deepen, and amplify the positive results that have already been registered."

The strictly instrumental efficiency of ideological work as envisaged by the RCP is clearly expressed in the series of articles written by county party secretaries for Scinteia under the general title "For Fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan, for Blossoming in All Regions, for Implementation of the Party's Ideological Program."

One interesting contribution to this series was provided by Mihai Telescu, first secretary of the Timis County Party Committee and an alternate member of the Political Executive Committee of

the RCP CC (Scinteia, 15 February 1976). He described the principle underlying the ideological work of the past five years as "imposing a militant spirit of revolutionary combativeness, so that cultural activity would not limit itself to an 'enlightening' role but would contribute to the education of the working people /translating them into/ firm and intransigent fighters for the triumph of socialism and communism." He then listed some of the measures undertaken in Timis County since 1971: The party committee renewed its efforts to guide and support party organizations in cultural institutions and creative associations; delegates from county and city party bureaus have participated more often in party meetings of such artistic groups and in the ideological-political education courses provided for them; greater control has been exercised over professional cultural and artistic activity ("educating the educators"), and increasing importance has been attributed to all forms of mass indoctrination and amateur artistic performances. According to Telescu, "the party committee devotes great attention to mass cultural activity, to a constant broadening of the spiritual horizon and a constant raising of the level of knowledge of the working people." The number of people's universities in Timis County has doubled since 1971; there are now 24 of them, of which 18 are in the countryside. Furthermore, he said, there are 277 cultural lecture bureaus in the county, and 144 conference and 105 scientific circles. Many of these activities take place in industrial or agricultural units, and 82 per cent of those who attend the courses and conferences belong to the working population.

Amateur artistic activity, said Telescu, was encouraged by the organization of a number of cultural events; in fact, a large number of mass song, dance, poetry, and painting festivals have been organized all over the country. As for the Congress on Political Education and Culture, Telescu claimed that three topics will have priority in its discussions: adoption of a Marxist world outlook and of RCP principles by every citizen; broadening the effect of "socialist ethics and equity"; and fighting "all ideological activity alien to the ideology of our party and to the morality of a socialist society."

Another event in preparation for the congress is a poster contest sponsored by the Bistrita-Nasaud County Party Committee. According to Radio Bucharest (16 February 1976) the posters "are to discuss economic problems with a view to improving the forms of political work." (078)

2. Improving Education Through Links with Production and Teacher Training

On 11 February 1976 Scinteia had an item on a State Council Decree dealing with the setting up of production research, and drafting units and services designed to integrate education with economic activities. The units will be subordinate to both the Ministry of Education and Instruction and the various economic ministries, and to industrial centrals, enterprises, and research organizations. Specific mention was made of "art studios" in this connection, but Scinteia did not elaborate. It is probable, however, that the purpose is to direct artistic activities along party lines.

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Ceausescu had often urged the integration of higher education with production and research. At a conference of institutions of higher education in September 1974 he took the Ministry of Education and Instruction to task for its delay in implementing this program, and charged the teaching cadres with being "refractory" and "conservative" in this regard (Scinteia, 14 September 1974).

Apparently, the way in which such integration had been carried out has led to confusion. Ceausescu has had to admit this, and has urged that higher education facilities be located close to factories, so that the students may be in daily contact with those working in production (Scinteia, 3 October 1972). On another occasion he suggested that factories be placed at the disposal of the institutions of higher education (Scinteia, 14 September 1974). The confusion in the approach to the forms of integration is still noticeable, however, as can be seen in the fact that the new decree will be put into effect only on an experimental basis during the 1975-1976 and 1976-1977 academic years.

According to Radio Bucharest (13 February 1976), during the 1976-1980 plan period all preschool, elementary, and high school teachers are to be required to take courses to improve their qualifications. Training courses have been adapted to meet the demands of modern life, and will be organized during academic vacations for ordinary teachers; headmasters and inspectors will attend courses during the school year. High school teachers will be trained at the Central Institute for the Training of Teaching Cadres in Bucharest or its branches in Brasov, Cluj, Craiova, Iasi, and Timisoara.

Sophisticated educational methods will be used to help teachers to improve their teaching, prevent failures, and provide their pupils with an education permeated with "the communist revolutionary spirit." This latest measure complements the preparations for the Congress of Political Education and Culture (see Item 1 above). (079)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

3. Foreign Minister Macovescu's Visit to Holland

Foreign Minister George Macovescu paid a visit to Holland (February 11-14) at the invitation of Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel (Scinteia, 12-15 February 1976).

According to an RFE Special/The Hague (February 11), Rumania views its relations with the Netherlands as a "model" of co-operation between countries with different political systems. Co-operation with Holland began in 1967 when Joseph Luns -- the then Dutch Foreign Minister -- visited Rumania. This was followed by a number of other exchanges on the ministerial level, and in 1973 Ceausescu paid an official visit to Holland which ended with the signing of a Joint Solemn Declaration (see Rumanian Situation Report/16, Radio Free Europe Research, 18 April 1973, Item 1). In May 1975 Rumania played host to Queen Juliana and Prince Bernhard (they had visited Rumania privately before on a hunting trip in

1971). At the end of their 1975 visit a joint communiqué and a long-term agreement on economic, industrial, and technological co-operation were signed (see Rumanian SR/19, RFER, 23 May 1975, Item 1).

According to the communiqué on Macovescu's recent visit to Holland the development of bilateral relations and a number of international matters came up for discussion. He and van der Stoel expressed satisfaction at the strengthening and diversification of the links between their countries, especially since 1973, welcomed the frequent official and unofficial contacts, and noted the importance of the legal framework within which bilateral relations are carried on -- especially the long-term agreement on economic, industrial and technological co-operation, signed on 14 May 1975 (Scinteia, February 15). They also expressed satisfaction at the development of their foreign trade.

According to the RFE Special mentioned above, in the last two years the Netherlands imported more from Rumania than it exported to it; in 1974 the total volume of trade exchange between the two countries amounted to 144,300,000 dollars (of which 76,400,000 represented Rumanian exports and 67,900,000 Rumanian imports). In 1975 the figure was 156,600,000 dollars (100,700,000 dollars worth of exports and 55,900,000 worth of imports). The trade balance between the two countries has been in Rumania's favor since 1972, although in the 1960-1971 period it was slightly the other way around (Anuarul Statistic al RSR 1975). During his visit Macovescu referred to the prospects for "harmonious" development of Rumanian-Dutch trade exchanges, and both ministers expressed their governments' determination to encourage the undertaking of joint co-operative ventures and transactions involving third markets. The RFE Special noted, however, that the prospects in this respect are not encouraging; the Rumanian authorities do not provide enough figures to their Dutch partners, and the Rumanian market is not very attractive.

From economic problems, the two ministers turned to the question of collaboration in educational, cultural, and scientific matters. Macovescu was expected to press the Dutch to recognize Rumanian degrees, but the communiqué made no mention of this, referring merely to exchanges between agencies and organizations.

The communiqué drew attention to the similarity of views on international matters expressed by the two ministers, noting that they had stressed the importance of the Final Act signed in Helsinki in furthering peace, co-operation, and justice on the continent. They also expressed a determination to take energetic action to fulfill all commitments assumed under the Final Act -- a document that should be regarded as a whole. The need for general, complete disarmament under strict and efficient international supervision was also noted in the communiqué.

At a press conference in The Hague on 12 February 1976 Macovescu declared that Rumania is determined to seek still other ways of achieving genuine security in Europe. It will make every effort to adhere to the provisions of the Final Act, he said, and noted that some progress has already been made in this respect.

(He did not elaborate, but according to an RFE Special/The Hague February 147, the two ministers had exchanged views on what van der Stoel called "humanitarian questions," particularly the case of a woman who has applied for permission to leave Rumania in order to marry a Dutchman.) Macovescu noted that although some progress has been made toward a compromise solution regarding the proposed European communist conference it was not yet possible to say whether it will be held in May or June 1976. In connection with the EEC he noted that the RSR is eager to enter into relations with all countries and sees no reason why it should not deal with the EEC itself -- although "how and when is another matter." Rumania had discussed this when Sir Christopher Soames visited Bucharest last month, he said (see Rumanian SR/2, RFER, 20 January 1976, Item 1), but had so far not been approached by the EEC.

Turning the Balkans into an area of peace, the Cyprus question, the need for a political solution to the Middle East problem, and the desirability of establishing a new economic order in the world also came up for discussion, as did the need to enhance the authority of the UN.

Macovescu invited van der Stoel to visit Rumania, and his invitation was accepted. It has also been arranged that the Rumanian Ministers of Agriculture and the Food Industry, Education and Instruction, and Transport and Telecommunications will visit the Netherlands shortly, and the Dutch Ministers of Education and Economic Affairs will go to Rumania. (RFE Special/The Hague, February 11.) Macovescu was received by Queen Juliana and Prime Minister Johannes den Uyl, and called on the chairmen of the two chambers of the Dutch parliament.

According to Scinteia (February 12) Macovescu stopped in Brussels on his way to the Netherlands. He discussed "problems of common interest" with Foreign Minister van Elslande, including the need to implement all provisions of the Final Act signed in Helsinki and to take concrete steps to bring about military disengagement in Europe.

These visits to The Hague and Brussels should be seen in the context of two sets of East-West negotiations: the MBFR talks and those between the Common Market and Comecon. Both have recently been enlivened by proposals submitted by the Eastern bloc, and in view of Rumania's vital interest in them Macovescu's talks with representatives of some of the smaller NATO and EEC members (the Danish Foreign Minister recently visited Bucharest) are of some significance. (080)

4. Minister of Mines, Oil, and Geology Tours Latin America

Between January 27 and February 18 Minister of Mines, Oil and Geology Bujor Almasan paid official visits to a number of Latin American countries to discuss economic relations and new co-operative ventures.

For a number of years Rumania has been trying to develop and diversify its economic relations with developing countries all

over the world in order to open up new markets for its industrial products and add to its list of sources of raw materials. To this end Ceausescu visited a number of Latin American countries in September 1973 (see Rumanian SRs/36 and 37, RFER, 14 and 20 September 1973, Item 1 in each case), and in June 1975 he paid an official visit to Mexico (see Rumanian SR/22, RFER, 13 June 1975, Item 7). The RSR's frequent contacts with developing countries both in Latin America and elsewhere have led to a sharp increase in trade. The share of these countries in Rumania's total foreign trade rose from 4 per cent in 1960 to 13 per cent in 1974, and is expected to increase to 25 per cent in the next two or three years and to 30 per cent by 1980 (Era Socialista No. 11/1975).

Mexico was Almasan's first stop. He was received by President Luis Echeverria Alvarez on January 30, and during his stay he also met Secretary of the National Patrimony Francisco Javier Alejo Lopez, the director-general of PEMEX, and the managers of the Mexican Oil Institute. Scinteia (February 4) reported that a Rumanian-Mexican "working program for 1976 concerning bilateral co-operation in the oil industry" had been signed.

From Mexico Almasan went to Colombia, where he was received by President Alfonso Lopes Michelsen on February 7. According to the Rumanian media the two sides expressed satisfaction at the results obtained in economic co-operation, and discussed the diversification of economic relations. Almasan flew to Lima on the 7th, and immediately went into consultation with the Minister of Energy and Mines. According to Scinteia (February 8), the two men expressed satisfaction at the co-operation between their countries, singling out their joint mining enterprise Antamina for special mention, and discussed the possibility of expanding co-operation in the extracting industry. On February 10 Almasan was received by President Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerrutti, and on February 11 a document on co-operation in mining, oil, and power was signed which noted the good results achieved to date by Antamina and registered the two countries' interest in establishing joint drilling enterprises and in joint exploitation of nonmetallurgical substances. Peru needs Rumanian technological expertise in the oil industry and its help in building an oil refinery (Scinteia, February 12). The joint machine building enterprise in the town of Trujillo, some of whose machine tools were supplied by Rumania, has gone into partial operation, according to Scinteia (February 15).

The last country visited by Almasan was Venezuela, where he was received by President Carlos Andres Perez and signed a program on co-operation in secondary and tertiary recovery of oil deposits.

Despite the general increase noted above, Rumania's trade with the four countries visited by Almasan is still at a low level. The greatest increase was recorded with Colombia with which the value of trade exchanges rose from 9,000,000 lei in 1972 to 52,000,000 lei in 1974. Trade with Mexico, which was practically nonexistent until 1973 (when there were 2,000,000 lei worth of Rumanian exports and no imports), was valued at 17,900,000 lei in 1974, of which 17,500,000 lei represented Rumanian exports. Trade exchanges with Peru in 1974 actually decreased, falling almost to the 1971 level; Rumania exported items valued at 7,900,000 lei

and imported 21,800,000 lei worth of goods from Peru. As for Venezuela, Rumania exported 1,700,000 lei worth of goods to that country in 1974, and imported nothing, despite its need for oil. In all, the share of these four countries in the RSR's foreign trade amounted to only 0.2 per cent in 1974, and it will be interesting to see whether Almasan's trip will improve matters. (081)

5. Portuguese CP Leader Visits Rumania

Secretary-General Alvaro Cunhal of the Portuguese Communist Party visited Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union in the latter half of February. During his visit to Rumania, which took place on February 19-20, he met with Ceausescu, Political Executive Committee and CC Secretary Ilie Verdet, and Political Executive Committee alternate member and CC Secretary Stefan Andrei. Cunhal was accompanied by Antonio Gervasio, a member of the Political Commission of the Portuguese party CC. According to the communiqué issued by Agerpres on February 20, information was exchanged on the activities and concerns of the two parties, opinions were expressed with regard to the development of their relations, and some aspects of political international life and the communist and workers' movement were discussed.

In a toast at a dinner in honor of Cunhal Ceausescu said their talks had made it clear that the views of the RCP and the Portuguese party on the matters discussed were identical or similar. It is inconceivable that democracy can develop in Portugal without the active participation of the Communists, he said, but they will have to co-operate with the socialists and other democratic parties and forces.

The two party heads expressed their determination to expand Rumanian-Portuguese relations on the basis of the agreements arrived at during President da Costa Gomes's visit to Rumania in the summer of 1975 (see Rumanian SR/23, RFER, 20 June 1975, Item 3) and that of Ceausescu to Portugal last October (see Rumanian SR/43, RFER, 7 November 1975, Item 1).

The talks also dealt with the need to establish a system of security in Europe, and "definitively abolish the imperialist, colonialist, and neocolonialist policy of domination," and the victory over "imperialist and racial aggression in Angola" was welcomed.

In winding up their talks, Ceausescu and Cunhal reasserted their determination to "strengthen the unity and co-operation among communist and workers' parties and among all democratic, progressive, and anti-imperialist forces."

Cunhal's visit to Rumania was apparently not well regarded by the Portuguese socialists. Mario Soares, head of the Portuguese Socialist Party, postponed at the last minute a visit to Rumania scheduled to start on February 13 (Reuter, 10 and 12 February 1976), and in a statement made a few days later he ruled out a communist-proposed alliance with his party, declaring that the "putschist policy" conducted by Cunhal had gambled away the prestige of

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the communists in Portugal, and that alliance with them would lose votes for the socialists in the parliamentary elections expected later this year (AFP, 20 February 1976).

This was Cunhal's first visit to Rumania since the change of government in Portugal in April 1974. During his stay in the other East European countries on his itinerary, he criticized the Portuguese Socialist Party, accusing it of siding "with the Right" (Radio Sofia, February 22), and it was reported that there had been "full identity of views on all questions" discussed during his visit to Prague (Radio Prague, February 17). The more moderate claims made during his stay in the RSR can be attributed to the latter's accent on the "reconciliation" of "all progressive forces" in Portugal. The main purpose of his trip was to drum up support for his party, particularly in Moscow where the militant hostility to social democrats and to any alliance with them is running into opposition from the communist parties of Italy, Spain and to a certain extent France, not to mention the ruling parties in Rumania and Yugoslavia. This explains the somewhat reserved reception given Cunhal in Bucharest, but the fact that he put Rumania on his itinerary is nevertheless significant. (082)

6. International Communications and National Sovereignty

Rumanian news media continue to combat the "unrealistic" ideas of unnamed "geographers" and "specialists" who advocate "integration of border districts" and dwell on "the advantages of unifying transportation in the European socialist countries on a geographical basis." For example, in an article in Revista Economica (No. 16, 13 February 1976) entitled "Systematization of National Territory -- A Basic Factor in Socioeconomic Development" Vasile S. Cucu, a university professor, described as "anachronistic" the ideas of those who exaggerate the importance of geographical considerations like the distance between countries, and distort fundamental aspects of interstate collaboration. The expansion of economic exchanges and co-operation with other states advocated by Rumania "has nothing to do with distance." Furthermore, he went on, integrating border districts would lead to unequal development, and he cited as examples the Rumanian Black Sea coast and areas in Oltenia and Moldavia, which have been lagging behind the rest of the country.

Apparently these ideas about communication and transportation began to be voiced when documents on co-operation in transportation drawn up by Comecon's Standing Commission on Transportation were examined and approved at the 74th session of the Comecon Executive Committee. These documents are to be submitted for approval to the next session of the Comecon Council, and some measures will be enacted during the current year on a bi- and multilateral basis (Scinteia, 17 January 1976). According to Radio Prague (25 December 1975), a recommendation issued by the Comecon Executive Committee provided for the construction of four international express highways, one of which would cross Rumania linking Rostock, Berlin, Prague, Budapest, and Constanta (see Rumanian SR/2, RFER, 20 January 1976, Item 8).

Cucu admitted that both domestic communication links and those

with the neighboring states would have to be improved, and therefore any national programs (harnessing of waterways, building dams, and dredging channels, irrigation, etc.) designed to systematize transport will be closely allied to domestic and foreign projects. Modernizing the entire transport system, to bring it into line with the requirements of the national socioeconomic development, would enable Rumania to participate more fully in the international transport system, according to Cucu, but he denied that there would be any advantages in unifying transport on a geographical basis. Such ideas, he said, minimize the fact that each state is responsible for managing its own national wealth, and they therefore infringe national sovereignty.

He then turned to the need to "plan" national waterways, noting that rivers which cross almost an entire continent and seas bordered by several countries are "assets" that give new dimensions to international co-operation but impose on each country an obligation to prevent pollution. This rules out the giving of "rights" to any group of countries, he said, citing the Danube as an example: thanks to the canals that are being built this river will turn into a European highway threatened with serious pollution; the duty of each riverside country to prevent such pollution cannot be regarded in the "oversimple" way advocated by "some specialists"; on the contrary, all must play a role in planning antipollution projects and putting them into operation.

These vigorous affirmations of Rumanian sovereignty in the face of unnamed and unspecified proposals that are considered a threat are similar to Rumania's objections to the well-known Valev plan in the early 1960s which called for economic integration on the basis of geographic proximity rather than state boundaries. (See Viata Economica /The predecessor to the current journal Revista Economica/ No. 24, 12 June 1964, and the Rumanian Situation Report dated 19 June 1964). (083)

7. French CP Statements on Dictatorship of Proletariat Published in Rumania

In a rather unexpected move the Rumanian foreign affairs weekly Lumea (February 19) published excerpts from the report French CP Secretary-General Georges Marchais made to the PCF congress -- excerpts that dealt exclusively with his repudiation of the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. A short introductory section contained that part of the congress Resolution which treated the same subject. Since the Lumea article made no attempt to give a general assessment of the French CP congress, its publication of these excerpts appears highly significant. Initially Rumanian reports on the French congress carefully omitted all references to the French party's changed position with regard to the dictatorship of the proletariat, and Rumanian party leader Ceausescu reaffirmed the need for revolutionary dictatorship of the working class in his speech to the Congress of People's Council Deputies on February 4 (see Rumanian SR/5, RFER, 18 February 1976, Item 3).

Lumea has a much smaller circulation than the dailies that dealt with the French congress earlier and it is directed to a more sophisticated audience.

This reversal of policy on the part of the Rumanian media suggests that the Rumanian leadership may have been somewhat embarrassed by this innovation on the part of their French comrades. It is difficult to determine the reason for their decision to make available, at least to a limited circle, the text of Marchais's remarks on the need to abolish the dictatorship of the proletariat. Apparently there was some concern among intellectual Rumanian Communists, possibly informed by Western broadcasts, over Ceausescu's sudden negative stand, and it may have been deemed useful to make the relevant document public. Nor can it be excluded that Ceausescu's strong stand on the question during the People's Council Congress prompted inquiries from representatives of Western socialist parties.

At any rate, a change in media treatment has become visible. A university lecturer, "Dr. Nicolae D." explained the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat on Radio Bucharest's program Contemporary Colloquium (February 17). Without referring to the French party congress or to Marchais, he gave a rather benign and conciliatory definition of the dogma, saying that by representing the state power of the working class the dictatorship of the proletariat ensured the building of a socialist society and the establishment of the conditions for transition to communism. The revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party, allied to the peasantry and all democratic categories of working people, directs all social life, he said. This type of state power is a dictatorship because it uses force to eliminate the opposition of the exploiting classes and all other elements that hinder the building of socialism. "Dr. D." repeated the same quotations from Marx that Ceausescu had used in his February 4 address, and claimed that this way of exercising state power was a new form of democracy. He ended by saying that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the most democratic and popular form of government.

Also on February 17 Professor Gh.I. Ionita gave a talk over Radio Bucharest in which he extolled the merits of collaboration between communist and socialist parties. He gave his address the rather daring title "The RCP's Attitude Toward Collaboration Between Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, and Other Democratic Forces." He reminded his listeners of the "historical reconciliation" between communist and socialist parties, quoting from Ceausescu's speech to the people's council deputies. In Germany, he said, the lack of collaboration between Communists and Socialists was responsible for the rise of fascism, and referred to the efforts made in Rumania during the war to establish a united leftist opposition bloc.

These broadcasts, coupled with the publication of the French CP statements, suggest an effort to explain away contradictions and appease criticism from any direction, possibly including some RCP intellectuals.

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ECONOMY8. Mid-Point Assessment of the 1971-1980 Electrification Plan

The targets for 1971-1975, the first half of the 10-year electrification plan (see Scinteia, 1 June 1969) have not been reached with regard to either the construction of new power plants or the output of electric power.

In presenting the economic plan for 1971-1975 to the Grand National Assembly former Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer said that new power stations with a capacity of between 5,400 and 5,800 MW would be in operation by the end of 1975 (Scinteia, 8 August 1969), and Viata Economica (27 July 1973) announced that the installed capacity would amount to 13,000 MW by that time. In fact, however, the figure was 11,530 MW at the end of 1975, some 1,470 MW short of the latter target; the capacity of the power stations build during 1971-1975 totaled only 4,299 MW -- 1,500 MW below the optimal plan provision. The following table gives the picture:

Electric Power Output, 1971-1975

(in 1,000 million KWH)

Year	Planned	Actual
1971	39.0	39.5
1972	43.3	43.4
1973	48.0-48.4	46.8
1974	53.4-54.5	49.1
1975	58.0-60.8	53.7

The shortfalls in 1973-1975 were attributable to the delay in building nuclear and hydroelectric power stations. Two nuclear power plants, each of 500-600 MW, were to be commissioned during the first 10-year electrification plan (1966-1975), and the second plan called for the commissioning of nuclear plants with installed power amounting to 1,800-2,400 MW. But Radio Bucharest (24 March 1975) reported that "the first 600-MW nuclear units will be commissioned in 1981 or 1982" -- i.e., not within the period specified in the plan.

The 1971-1980 plan called for the building of power plants with a total capacity of 13,000-13,800 MW, some 4,300 MW of which would be supplied by hydroelectric installations -- plants with a capacity of 1,725 MW to be built in the 1971-1975 period, with the remaining 2,600 MW to come from plants put into operation between 1976 and 1980. The communiqué on achievements in 1971-1975 said that stations with a capacity of only 1,436 MW had gone into operation, however, and the directives for 1976-1980 called for the commissioning of stations with a capacity of 1,700 MW -- a shortfall of 1,200 MW for the entire 1971-1980 period. (The difficulties encountered in constructing nuclear power stations were discussed in Rumanian SRs/16 and 12, RFER, 15 May 1974 and 26 March 1975, Items 5 and 4, respectively.) It is not clear how Rumania plans to achieve its costly objectives in this domain. So far only one

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
contract has been signed -- with the Soviet Union, for a 440-MW plant to be commissioned after 1980.

The hydroelectric plan will in any case not be implemented, and it can be safely assumed that the plan for nuclear plants will also fall short of target. It remains to be seen whether thermo-electric plants will be added to the program to compensate at least in part for the delays in constructing nuclear and hydroelectric plants. If so, it must be decided whether they will utilize brown coal -- the cheapest available primary source of energy -- or something else. The 1971-1980 electrification plan foresees that pit and brown coal would provide 22.3 per cent of the primary energy in 1975 and 24.0-25.0 per cent in 1980, compared to 18.7 per cent in 1970.

(085)

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This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.



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S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T



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1. Public Opinion and the Constitutional Amendments

At the final session (on February 10) of its present term of office, the Sejm discussed and adopted amendments to the 1952 Constitution. These amendments were designed to incorporate into the fundamental laws of the land the basic principles governing Poland's domestic and foreign policies at the present stage of building a "developed" socialist society. They involve such provisions as the definition of People's Poland as a "socialist" state, with the PUPP as "the leading political force in society in the construction of socialism," and they anchor its policies in the alliance with the Soviet Union.

a. Opposition to Changes; State Campaign for Support. Once the nature of the proposed amendments became known -- explicitly from the pre-congress Guidelines last autumn -- they aroused widespread opposition and dissent, mainly from a broad cross section of the country's intelligentsia, embracing both Catholics and nonreligious progressives, and elicited a number of letters of protest and petitions from both individuals and groups (see Polish Unit, "Polish Intellectuals Oppose Changes in Constitution," RAD Background Report/183 [Poland] Radio Free Europe Research, 31 December 1975, and Polish Situation Report/2, RFER, 16 January 1976, Item 1).

Another wave of protests followed the January 24 publication of the text of the amendments as worked out by an ad hoc committee of the Sejm (see Polish SR/4, RFER, 30 January 1976, Item 2). Nicholas Carroll reported in The Sunday Times (February 1), for example, that

"in the latest of a series of protests since the amendments were proposed, 14 prominent academic and legal personalities have sent another letter to the parliamentary drafting committee." Among the signatories, Carroll reported, were Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, a well-known historian and secretary-general of the Polish PEN Club. According to the same source, eight professors at Warsaw Polytechnical Institute and twenty citizens of Lodz, three of them manual workers, also sent letters to the drafting committee. On February 3, Western agencies (notably Reuter, AFP, and UPI) reported from Warsaw that another prominent writer, Jerzy Andrzejewski (Ashes and Diamonds), had joined the critics of the constitutional amendments. He was one of 101 signatories of a letter sent to the Sejm, among whom the agencies listed such well-known men of letters as the brothers Kazimierz and Marian Brandys, actresses Irena Eichlerowna, Zofia Mrozowska, and Aleksandra Slaska, as well as the violinist Wanda Wilkomirska (who is the wife of Mieczyslaw M. Rakowski, editor-in-chief of the influential party weekly Polityka). Finally, the Neue Zuercher Zeitung (February 2) and AFP (February 5) reported that a group of Catholics, consisting of the Znak Sejm deputies, publishers, and editors-in-chief of independent Catholic periodicals, as well as chairmen of the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs, prepared a memorandum fully supporting one issued by the episcopate on January 3.

Although none of the above letters and petitions was ever explicitly acknowledged -- let alone answered -- and the reservations contained in them never openly discussed, there seems to be no doubt that they did play a considerable role in bringing about modification in the formulation of some of the new passages.

As if to counter the possible impact of these protests, the regime embarked upon what -- at least initially -- had all the signs of an organized campaign of support for the proposed changes. Just two days after the text of the amendments was published, Radio Warsaw (January 26, 1900 hours) referred to a spate of letters reportedly received from listeners, all supporting the suggested changes. From that date on, all the media continued to produce such letters from both individual persons and groups (quite a number of the latter category coming from party organizations at various plants and establishments). If there were any negative voices, they have not been published; what could be read in Trybuna Ludu and other papers was at least support for, if not enthusiasm about, the proposed amendments.

It was implicitly confirmed that quite a number of the letters about the proposed constitutional changes consisted of missives written at the authors' own will, not all of which were as favorable as those offered by the media for public inspection.

b. Public Dissent Acknowledged. Indeed, considering the circumstances and conditions, the number of those critical voices must have been quite significant and possibly not limited to the 10 per cent officially admitted. As reported by Reuter from Warsaw (February 3), government spokesman Wlodzimierz Janiurek, speaking at a press conference the day before, said that 90 per cent of the letters received by the government favored the proposed amendments, while only 10 per cent had expressed concern. Regarding the latter, Janiurek

assured the press that the Sejm committee studying the amendments still had time to modify some aspects of the new laws. Since there was no coverage whatsoever in the official press of that conference, a safe assumption is that Janiurek was speaking at a conference for foreign journalists. What was officially admitted, however, appeared in Zycie Warszawy on February 5:

The overwhelming majority of the letters concerning the draft Constitution generally accept the proposed amendments and comple-
ments. Some letters accept the basic ideas, but also propose certain changes and suggestions. There is also a very thin margin -- one in every thousand -- of people critical of the draft Constitution, people who are never satisfied with anything and who are always "against."

A more authoritative admission of dissent came from State Council Chairman Henryk Jablonski who, in his February 10 presentation to the Sejm of the final text of the amendments, stated that the document was not totally endorsed by the population. He distinguished between several types of dissenters prompted by various motivations. Without going into any detail -- personal or otherwise -- he first admitted that the discussion on constitutional changes had not been "equally vivid and penetrating" in all strata of the population. He then distinguished between "an insignificant fraction" of chronic malcontents, who took the opportunity to manifest their enmity toward socialism in general and People's Poland in particular, and a "somewhat bigger group" of those who purposely "misinterpreted the intentions" of the authors of the new document and were now arguing with "their own delusions" rather than with the actual provisions, largely by quoting statements "out of context." Quite obviously, this remark concerned the signatories of the recent petitions to the Sejm, and especially the protests voiced by the Catholic episcopate. In Jablonski's opinion, it was not possible for such suggestions by dissenters to "contain anything constructive," but he did acknowledge that they were nevertheless useful to an extent, because they pointed out the need for more explicit formulations. (It must have been obvious to many -- both within and outside the Sejm -- that the changes made went considerably further than Jablonski was prepared to admit.)

Oddly enough, Jablonski seems to have included among the dissenters some people from the extreme left wing -- the Mijal KPP faction, perhaps? -- when he spoke, somewhat cryptically, of "some elements opposing further democratization of the country" on grounds "/diametrically/ opposite to those preached by some foreign radio stations."

Equally revealing was a feature carried by the popular Warsaw daily Zycie Warszawy (February 9). In what was termed a "public consultation" arranged by the paper with some experts available to answer telephoned queries (Professor Jerzy Bafia, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Court and a member of the Sejm Committee on Constitutional Changes' editorial team, and Professor Zygmunt Rybicki, Warsaw University rector and one of the commission's legal advisers) the meaning of the individual amendments and their

modification was explained. Credit for the revisions was given mainly to "letters and suggestions" received from diverse sources. Here, too, no names were mentioned, but the existence of divergent views on the main points was made clear, and the nature of some of the misgivings voiced could at least be surmised. Nonetheless, Bafia asserted that what he termed "sporadic voices questioning some of the proposed changes" could never -- in view of the size of the general support -- "have a bearing on any change of particular formulations."

Nevertheless, a number of "particular formulations" have undergone at least some changes in their final form. In effect, while the two basic points; the socialist character of the state, and its reliance on the Soviet Union for political support and defense, remain in force, the government has taken considerable pains to swathe them as circumspectly as possible in a cocoon of generalities about national pride, history, and peace-loving traditions. Other provisions, concerning such matters as a possible denial of civic rights to those failing to fulfill their duties toward the state, were essentially rewritten. Finally, two important concessions -- not heretofore brought to public attention -- were added, canceling the severe legal punishments previously incurred by a person abusing his civic rights in a way harmful to the state.

c. Salient Points of New Constitution: A Recapitulation. As compared with the former -- already slightly modified -- wording of the essential articles of the new Constitution (as published by Trybuna Ludu, January 24-25), the revised edition of the amendments adopted by the Sejm on February 10 appears as follows.

Poland's Character as a Socialist State. According to Bafia, the point is to define the nature of the state without, however, changing its actual name (which remains Polish People's Republic). The soldiers' daily Zolnierz Wolnosci (February 9) added that the purpose was to emphasize that the "foundations" of socialism were already fully laid, and a new, higher state of socialism was about to begin. As was evident from Zycie Warszawy's "public consultation," some of the newspaper's readers seemed to have reservations as to Poland's actual "readiness" to undertake such a step.

The Party's Role. The original wording included in the pre-congress Guidelines called for the party's leadership in "gradually transforming Poland into a state of all the people," thus acknowledging its decisive role in the affairs of state. The new wording provides only for its being a "leading political force in society in the construction of socialism" -- the phrase is toned down, as it were, but the essence remains the same. It should be remembered, however, that all other comparable East European formulations are considerably stronger and more outspoken. The details of the reservations voiced on this particular subject were not disclosed by Zycie Warszawy. It is known, however, that the originally proposed phrasing aroused considerable indignation.

Poland's Place in the Socialist Community. The original intention -- as reported to the Sejm on January 19 -- was to make the Constitution reflect the "unshakable fraternal bond" with the Soviet Union. Neither of these two adjectives appear in the final text, which simply states that Poland "strengthens its friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states." This phrase is placed in a broad historical and ideological context and is obviously not meant to attract particular attention. Again, the regime's original intention aroused strong opposition, and it is hardly likely that this opposition has been entirely disarmed by the concession that has obviously been made. In the Zycie Warszawy article already mentioned, one Warsaw reader voiced apprehension about the inclusion in the Constitution of matters which should be normally settled "by appropriate international agreements and conventions." Bafia's reply was that it was simply to be considered an "essential element" of state policy, and nothing more, adding that the respective formulations on the subject in the Bulgarian and GDR Constitutions were "considerably expanded." It was quite something for Bafia to make this comparison -- although it can hardly have been of much consolation to his readers.)

Citizens' Rights and Duties. In this respect, a clause in the original draft amendments that would have made citizens' rights contingent on fulfillment of duties toward the state aroused fears of discrimination in public life. The issue was raised on various occasions, i.a., by Poland's primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski, who pointed out that, in many instances, citizens' rights and duties may appear incompatible, especially for a believing Catholic. In its new form, the phrase now reads: "The citizens of People's Poland ought to (powinni) conscientiously fulfill their obligations toward the fatherland, and contribute to its progress." There is no further mention of the possibility that they can be denied their civic rights if they do not comply with these duties. Elaborating on the need for this serious reworking, Jablonski in the Sejm attributed it to the "moral aspect of the matter, and its educational significance." In his Zycie Warszawy article, Bafia credited some unidentified "legal expert" with the idea, but then stated openly that the change was a result of "discussions conducted in the commission, of consultations, and of opinions sent in" to the Sejm.

Front of National Unity. To judge from Bafia's words, it can be assumed that the nature of the front was also redefined as a result of public pressure. While it was originally termed an "action platform" for all social organizations, and a "platform of patriotic unity" for [some] citizens, the word "all" was later dropped with regard to the organizations, and added in the second part of the sentence, to encompass "all citizens, members of the PUPW and other political parties, along with those not affiliated politically, irrespective of their attitude toward religion." This is an important statement -- especially regarding religion. It must have been the inclusion of this particular passage (not known before) that made Catholic Znak deputy Konstanty Lubienski sound

almost conciliatory in his speech during the Sejm discussion. Being a member of the Sejm commission involved, Lubienski cast his vote, along with (almost) all other deputies, in favor of adoption of the document -- thus giving his colleague and Znak principal Stanislaw Stomma the chance to be once more the only one to register a protesting abstention (Reuter, February 10).

Sanctions Against Dissidents Dropped. Very significant were the changes pertaining to the removal from the Constitution of two of its earlier clauses providing for legal sanctions in cases of "abuse of the right of conscience and religion," by engaging in action harmful to state interests, and in case of "sabotage, subversion, or other threats to public property" (for the latter, capital punishment was permissible). Jablonski explained to the Sejm that the reason for dropping these two clauses was the "extremely rare occurrence" of these crimes in today's Poland. In fact it seems instead to be the outcome of some of the most recent petitions signed by "nearly 100 people" reported by Western correspondents (e.g., by Erik Michael Bader of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 7). According to these reports, the petitions pointed out the danger of a further restriction of civic rights for "dissidents" in cases where expressing different views would be "raised to the level of treason."

Alternative Proposals. Finally, in his Zycie Warszawy article Bafia admitted that people had asked why the proposed amendments had to be voted on now, before the old Sejm was dissolved and a new one elected in March. It was suggested that the matter should be decided later, after "consultations with the electorate." In answer, Bafia stated that the discussion had gone on long enough, and that it was the current Sejm, and not its successor, that was "under the obligation" to make the changes final.

On this basic topic it seems that even more radical suggestions have been made. According to Reuter (February 10), an unidentified "group of workers in Lodz, ranging from cloakroom attendant to machine operator," proposed that a referendum ought to be held on the issue, similar to the one in 1946 before the communist party had established its present hold on power in Poland.

This, of course, was not done; it was not even officially reported. But what this whole episode of the constitutional amendments has shown is that public opinion is active in Poland, that it has the resolve and the means of expressing itself -- and that it is listened to. (066)

2. Democratic Party Congress

For the 11th time in postwar Poland, Warsaw has been the scene of a congress of the Democratic Party (DP), the country's third political party after the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) and the United Peasant Party (UPP). Closing this winter's season of party congresses, the PUWP in December and the UPP in January, 406 delegates, representing more than 90,000 DP members, met on February

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7 for a three-day round of debates on their party's action program for 1976-1980.

To judge from ample reports carried in at least two issues of the DP daily Kurier Polski (February 9 and 10), the party is about to revamp its organizational and social (if not political) work in a serious fashion, and to embark upon a more efficient defense of some of the vital interests of its members, recruited largely from among the urban population of artisans, teachers, medical personnel, and a variety of white-collar workers. The fact that more than two thirds of the new expanded central committee (CC) are newcomers to that body could be a possible indication that the remake is at least partially aimed at rejuvenating the DP leadership and injecting some fresh people and ideas into it. The discussion held both in plenary sessions and in the five problem groups seemed at times surprisingly outspoken and straightforward, presenting quite a true picture of everyday problems currently faced by the urban middle-class population. (For details on the DP's history and work since its creation in the late 1930s, see Polish SR/23, RFER, 1 August 1975, Item 3.)

Most recent data on DP membership and work were carried by Kurier Polski on the eve of the congress (February 6-7). According to that account, the DP now has 94,500 members (there were 90,000 in 1973), about 30 per cent of whom are women. Most members work in handicrafts (27,500) and state and economic administration (20,000), while 7,500 are teachers. Their level of education seems quite high, for 20 per cent are graduates of institutes of higher education, and nearly 50 per cent have completed secondary school. As for the age structure of the party, 37.7 per cent of them are over 50, while the younger generation, under 35, represents slightly more than a quarter (26.8 per cent) of the total.

There are 3,152 DP organizations in the country, working chiefly in urban areas; they are, therefore, unevenly distributed. Such urbanized areas as Katowice and Warsaw account for a much larger number of cells (271 and 214, respectively) than other, more rural regions. The DP is represented in the Sejm by 39 deputies, including 1 deputy speaker, 2 chairmen, and 14 deputy chairmen of various Sejm commissions. Nearly 4,000 DP members sit on people's councils of all levels, including nearly 700 presidium members. While one DP representative is a member of the Council of State, the party also has one ministerial slot (communications) and at least one vice-ministerial one (domestic trade and services) assigned to it in the government.

a. The Course of the Debates. The congress opened with an address by DP Chairman Andrzej Benesz, who sketched the main points on the meeting's agenda and greeted his Polish and foreign guests. Among the former, the most prominent were PUPW leader Edward Gierek and Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, along with three Politburo members and CC secretaries; the peasant party delegation was headed by UPP chairman, Sejm Speaker Stanislaw Guwa. Among foreign guests were delegations from the GDR's Liberal Democratic Party, the CSSR's Socialist Party, and Finland's Liberal People's Party, all headed by their respective chairmen. A number of ambassadors from other bloc countries were also in attendance, including the Soviet Union's Stanislav Pilotovich.

High on the agenda were speeches delivered by Benesz and Gierek. In his longish report to the congress, the CP leader reviewed his party's achievements since the last (1973) congress and mapped out plans for "concrete, committed work" in the future. This work is to be carried out "in a common effort" with the two other parties, the PUWP and UPP, with which "views and experiences" ought to be constantly exchanged and joint action duly orchestrated. As a paramount task at the present stage of socioeconomic development, Benesz pointed out the need for each individual fully "to identify with the socialist society," and each citizen to identify fully with the socialist state.

An essential part of Benesz's report concerned the DP's program to develop small industry and crafts, and especially services, most of which depend on privately owned workshops. As was stated later in the discussion, the Association of Private Trade and Services sponsors over 61,000 such shops, whose yearly turnover totaled about 15,300 million zloty in 1975 -- representing a considerable percentage of the over-all economic budget. Benesz promised that at least those sore points most urgently in need of attention -- such as the lack of appropriate buildings and machinery, the inadequate supply of raw materials, and exorbitant taxes that discourage people from expanding their businesses -- will soon be alleviated. To be more efficient in its efforts in that field, the DP must -- in Benesz's view, and in the opinion of most of those who followed him to the speaker's platform -- be organizationally revamped, and its work treated more seriously. Among concrete proposals made to that effect, a very important one was to set up five specialized permanent Advisory Teams attached to the CP central committee.

In his address, Gierek in turn emphasized the significance of the "third sector" of the country's economy, and assured his audience that the improvement of services and a better supply of utility goods are among the key points of the current five-year plan, and are considered an essential precondition for the success of his entire socioeconomic development program. Therefore, "favorable conditions" will be created to encourage the development of handicrafts and services, "both in the co-operative and in the private sector," and tradesmen will be encouraged in future to "specialize and become well established" in their chosen branches. Various forms of trade co-operation will be supported and necessary help will be given to "young tradesmen in opening new service shops so far as equipment and technical resources are concerned." In what sounded almost like a solemn proclamation of a new era in party policy vis-à-vis private business, the PUWP leader declared:

We favor lending the help and protection of the state to every tradesman who performs his trade well, and who honestly fulfills his duty toward society.

These words must have sounded somewhat hollow to an assembly which soon afterward heard devastating criticism of the real state of affairs, from which it was easy to conclude that running a private enterprise in present-day Poland must still be taxing. From what was said in the discussions -- especially the closed ones

conducted within the problem teams, but reported in part by Kurier Polski -- it became evident that, in addition to the well-known "material" difficulties, the precarious legal and administrative status of private business greatly adds to the misery. As one delegate from Poznan put it, only too often do tradesmen come up against "unlawful practices" on the part of the administration and its branches. Therefore, to make sure that the "rights granted to all citizens by the Constitution are actually put into practice," a body should be created that would be empowered to check up on the work of state and local administrative offices and to enforce upon them strict respect for the law. Although the name of such an institution was not specified, it was presumably Administrative Tribunal, an institution long called for in Poland but never actually created.

The same types of problems were discussed by another delegate (from Warsaw) who denounced the occurrence of "economic crimes" committed by local authorities against private tradesmen -- often owing to "inadequate and unstable" laws and lack of well-trained, competent functionaries. As a remedy, the strengthening of private tradesmen's self-government was postulated, as well as the creation of some sort of "organizational framework" for co-operation between private trade and handicrafts. More detailed information on private business in Poland is to be found in Polish SR/7, REFER, 4 April 1975, Item 2.

b. Organizational Work; Statutes. The postulates regarding streamlining organizational work included both a demand for an expansion of the DP and for that party's being granted a more serious say in political and social matters. With regard to the reorganization of the DP's voivodship and municipal committees necessitated by last year's reform of the territorial administration, demands were made for a better co-ordination of these committees' work, a more efficient flow of intraparty information, and -- especially as far as people's councils' members go -- for more ample and timely documentation on matters to be debated upon (the current form of consultations with DP representatives seems to be a pure formality, performed mostly at the last moment before actual council debates open). Besides the CC Advisory Teams mentioned by Benesz earlier, significant organizational changes also involved the transfer of some "exceedingly detailed provisions" from the party statutes into the jurisdiction of the CC (no details, however, were made public as to the actual matters involved). These changes were reflected in the amended DP statutes, which also included -- as could be expected -- a provision stating that party congresses will henceforth be held every five instead of every three years, reportedly to keep pace with national economic plans (identical decisions were made at the PUWP and UPP congresses earlier this winter).

c. New DP Officials. The congress decided to expand the DP central committee from 80 members (elected at the 10th congress in February 1973) to 99. Only 39 members were re-elected, while 60 newcomers were added. Women represent exactly one third of the CC membership. The Central Audit Commission, too, was considerably enlarged (from 27 to 49 members) and given a new chairman in the person of Michal Grendys (64), previously one of the presidium's two deputy chairmen and a long-time DP senior official.


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At its first plenary session held on February 9, the newly elected CC appointed its presidium and top executives. Benesz (59) was reappointed to presidium chairmanship, a post he has held since February 1973 after having served for two years as a deputy chairman. His two deputies are: Tadeusz Kalasa (59, a private baker from Warsaw, and a newcomer to the CC), and Piotr Stefanski, previously a CC secretary (their predecessors were: Grandys, and Stanislaw Lenczewski, 59, who remained on the presidium as one of its members). One of the two former CC secretaries -- Zbigniew Rudnicki (48) -- remained, while Stefanski was promoted to deputy chairmanship. The other CC secretary now is Zdzislaw Siedlewski (55), deputy minister of Domestic Trade and Services. It should be added that the CC presidium has been increased from six to eight members (including six new arrivals) of whom two are women. The short biographical notes of the new presidium members published by Kurier Polski (February 10) indicate that out of the total of 13, 6 are in their 50s and another 6 in their 40s. The youngest presidium member is 39 and the oldest two are 59. (067)

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RAD Background Report/49
(World Communist Movement)
20 February 1976

SEGRE ON "POSITIVE" CONFERENCE DOCUMENT

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: Reporting on preparations for the pan-European conference of communist parties, Sergio Segre of the Italian CP has said that, although work remains to be done, agreement "seems to be taking shape" on a document "consistent with the stand . . . taken by the PCI. He indicates that the draft in question would be based on consensus, would be nonbinding, and would not deal with controversial ideological questions.

* * *

In a report to Central Committee members of the Italian Communist Party, Sergio Segre has said that 28 East and West European communist parties seem to be approaching agreement on a conference document "consistent with the stand defended from the first by the PCI," although there still remains work to be done on the text. The report published in the party daily (1) gives no direct quotations, but it indicates that the draft now under discussion as a result of the last two editorial meetings in East Berlin (December 16-19 and January 13-22) (2) is based on the principle of consensus, that it will not lay down "general lines and strategies," and that it will not be of a binding nature.

A key passage in Segre's report to the Central Committee's "first commission" is the following:

Reconstructing the various phases of the preparation for the conference of communist parties, Comrade Sergio Segre stressed that although work still remains to be done, the understanding which now seems to be taking shape on the draft document agreed upon at the Berlin meetings of December and January is consistent with the stand defended from the first by the PCI. This stand, starting with the significance of the achievement of a method based on the consensus of all participants, as a qualitatively

(1) "L'azione internazionale del PCI e la riunione dei comunisti europei," l'Unita, 14 February 1976.

(2) See Kevin Devlin, "Agreement on 'Fundamental Lines' of Conference Draft?" RAD Background Report/43 (World Communist Movement), Radio Free Europe Research, 13 February 1976.

new element in the preparation of communist conferences, had as a premise the fact that a document acceptable to all could only be a document that identified the points of convergence, without claiming to delineate general lines and strategies, to take on a binding character, or to tackle themes -- such as ideological ones -- on which there exist diverse and divergent positions.

It is therefore [a question of] a strictly political document which -- in a discourse open to the other political forces of the continent, and in the first place to socialist and social-democratic ones, which are also called upon to be protagonists in the process of transforming Europe into a continent of peace and congress -- would indicate the common viewpoints of the communist parties on the further developments which must take place in the process of détente, in the political and military fields and in that of economic, scientific, and cultural co-operation.

"Positive" Outcome

This last unwieldy sentence seems to suggest that the consensual document in question would cover only the relatively uncontroversial subject of post-Helsinki détente (as was apparently true of the "acceptable" draft presented by the SED at the October preparatory session). But Segre went on to say (as had his fellow-delegate Antonio Rubbi in his Rinascita article of February 6) that the debate and the document were also concerned with other issues -- including some that have been the subject of considerable interparty controversy and even polemics. Moreover, he indicated that these "have in substance been settled in a positive way," from the viewpoint of the PCI:

The long duration of the preparations for the conference, as well as the difficulties encountered in the process are derived in the first place from delays in understanding that it was not a matter of choosing between various abstractly possible documents, but of taking with political courage the only path that could lead to a positive and unitary conclusion of the Berlin conference.

The long debate has dealt with essential points of the policy of the communist parties and of the relationships among them, which can be developed only on the basis of the explicit recognition of the independence and autonomy of each party in working out its own policy and also in theoretical development.

These issues (which concerned, among other things, the questions of the economic and political processes taking place in Western Europe and in the EEC, of relations with the United States, of relations with the socialist and social-democratic parties, of the full recognition of national ways, etc.) have in substance been settled in a positive way, with a political and nonpropagandistic vision, and without ambiguities which would submerge real diversity and divergences of no little moment in generic formulations.

The result is a document which not only does not conflict on any point with the stands taken by our party but on the

contrary -- if each party is consistently faithful to the new spirit which animates it, considering it not a "necessary evil" to avoid lack of agreement but as a real methodological and political aggiornamento -- can represent an element of novelty in relations between the communist parties. The resistance (3) manifested in this connection is the expression of a process which is neither easy nor straightforward [lineare], and to the positive development of which our party is objectively called to make its critical contribution, together with all the other parties.

Some Questions

Segre's account leaves some questions to be answered. His affirmation that at the last 10-day meeting in East Berlin agreement was reached "in substance" on a draft text fits in well enough with Rubbi's claim in his Rinascita article that agreement had been reached on the "fundamental lines" of the document. Both agree that more work remains to be done, however (and Rubbi noted that there would have to be "further meetings" of the editorial group). Yet, in view of the prolonged struggle between independent and conservative parties over the character and content of the conference document, one must regard with some skepticism the claim that such controversial issues as an analysis of the situation in Western Europe, or relations with noncommunist forces "have in substance been settled in a positive way." It would indeed be surprising if the conservative majority had yielded to the demands of the minority in the way indicated by Segre (for, of course, he does not say so explicitly).

Segre does say that (so far as agreement has been reached) "the result is a document which . . . does not conflict on any point with the stands taken by our party." It may be that there is no conflict, because the sections in question represent something of a "lowest common denominator" -- which is what one would expect if the principle of consensus, on which the independent parties insist, is being maintained (as Segre indicates it is).

The Unità report lists 12 speakers as having intervened in the debate on the reports by Segre and Gian Carlo Pajetta (who spoke about the PCI's positions in international affairs), but gives no details of their contribution, merely saying that there was expressed "general approval" of the reports and of "the lines and inspirations of the document thus far agreed upon for the Berlin conference." However, the synthesis of the debate emphasizes foreign policy positions clearly linked with the PCI's urgent domestic priorities -- and equally clearly divergent from those of many other communist parties, including the CPSU.

This applies particularly to the PCI's commitment to pursue its political objectives within the framework of the EEC and of the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, the PCI's pledge to work with other forces for a way out of the Italian crisis (the compromesso storico) "cannot be separated from the co-operation in which Italy is called upon to engage -- within the framework of the EEC and of its


(3) Segre used the plural, resistenze, indicating that the resistance came from various quarters.

international alliances -- in promoting a policy . . . of peace and co-operation." Again, it is said that particular attention was given to "problems of economic integration and the process of the political unity of the EEC, with a full reconfirmation of the party's positions, original and different from the positions of the communist parties of other EEC countries, as well as to the communists' commitment to the building of new relations with the democratic forces of the countries of Western Europe and of the United States." Later there is a reference to the need to achieve new international relationships based on democracy and autonomy "both within the EEC and within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance."

In his Rinascita article, Antonio Rubbi criticized a Soviet writer and an East German work for offering "forced and distorted interpretations" in connection with the European conference project. One wonders: is it only from the Soviets and the East Germans that "distorted interpretations" are coming?

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RAD Background Report/50
(Yugoslavia)
20 February 1976

YUGOSLAVS WILL DEFEND THEIR INDEPENDENCE AT ANY COST

By Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: In the past few months all Yugoslavia's military leaders have stated with some vehemence that their country's independence will be defended at any cost. In various speeches and interviews they have argued that the country's armed forces must be strengthened because neither the policy of détente nor the situation in the countries bordering on Yugoslavia has created conditions in which any relaxation of the country's defense effort would be justified. They referred in this context to the activities of "Cominformist elements" and "hostile émigrés in the West. The Nationwide Defense and Social Self-Protection systems will both be used in resisting any attacks on Yugoslavia.

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The federal budget enacted by the SFRY Assembly in December 1975 totals 79,237 million dinars (about 4,500 million dollars at an exchange rate of 1 dollar=17.5 dinars). Of this sum 32,374 million dinars (40.85 per cent) are to be spent on defense. (1) This is 5.83 per cent of the planned nominal national income for 1976. (2) The Yugoslavs are proud of their People's Army which is believed to be one of the most efficient fighting forces in Europe and is ranked by some experts as second only to the Soviet army. Its presumed combat mission is to resist invaders whether they come from East or West.

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- (1) Sluzbeni list (Official Gazette), Belgrade, 26 December 1975.
 - (2) Narodna armija (Belgrade), 30 December 1975.

An army general recently reminded potential aggressors that Yugoslavia is "militarily an efficient country, with its mountains, rivers, and serrated coast" which "cannot be overrun with tanks." Nor can anyone hope to launch a surprise attack against Yugoslavia because "we possess all the necessary means" to determine whether preparations are being made "in neighboring or other countries for an invasion." (3) The following evaluation was offered of the outlook for an attack on Yugoslavia:

No aggressor would dare to engage in the kind of war against us that was waged, for instance, in Vietnam. That would be madness, and no one could win such a war against us. This means that a would-be aggressor, if he worked it out rationally, would have to attack us with large tank units and strong airborne forces. He would have to try for a quick decision, to conquer part of our territory and then invent a quisling government that would then request assistance, etc. (4)

The general added that the Yugoslav Army had been trained to meet this situation. Everything would have been done in advance to prevent an aggressor from achieving "early success," and when the Yugoslav "operational army" moved into action "any airborne attack would be liquidated." The country's policy in defense matters is "to forestall aggression" by making it quite clear that an attack on Yugoslavia would not pay off.

"Nationwide Defense" and "Social Self-Protection"

On January 13 and 14 of this year a two-day discussion of Social Self-Protection took place in the SFRY Assembly at which "about 40 reports" were read. Social Self-Protection (a new term) is regarded as something quite distinct from Nationwide Defense, which first made its appearance in the February 1969 Law on National Defense and was repeated in the May 1974 revised version of that law. The need for such legislation appeared urgent after the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, when Tito examined the defense capability of his country and found it quite inadequate. The chief aim of the Nationwide Defense system was to organize immediate resistance so that "the enemy is never allowed to relax, so that there are created

(3) Three Yugoslav army generals (Branja Jakšević, Zlatko Rendulić, and Milan Krdžić) granted an interview to the Belgrade weekly Nedeljne informativne novine of 21 December 1975. While the text of the interview contained direct quotations, none of them was individually attributed.

(4) Ibid.

in him feelings of insecurity, impotence, fear, panic, and a loss of faith in victory." (5) In such a situation all civilians as well as the armed forces must live in a continuous state of emergency, ready to wage a "people's war."

General Steva Ilic, Deputy Chief of the Army's Center for Advanced Military Studies, said in a recent interview that Marx's theory of an "armed nation" has found full expression in Yugoslavia's self-managing socialism. Karl Marx enunciated and Tito has put into practice the doctrine that "every citizen must be both a citizen and a soldier." Ilic described the Yugoslav defense system as follows:

Soon after World War II many people throughout the world had considered Yugoslavia -- in view of its high reputation, moral prestige, and genuine strength -- the second military power in Europe. Today our defensive capacity is even greater. I would especially like to stress that we are today superior to many other countries in the development of our military thinking. . . . Thanks to our doctrine of Nationwide Defense, we are superior to many other technically better equipped and numerically stronger armies. (6)

Unlike Nationwide Defense, Social Self-Protection is designed mainly for internal duties, although foreign aggressors also have to be opposed under its aegis. In a major article dealing with the Self-Protection system, a Yugoslav journalist said:

The aim of Social Self-Protection is to protect society against all social diseases, destruction, criminal behavior, aggression, and similar phenomena, regardless of whether they manifest themselves within the country or originate from abroad. [These are reflected in] various fields of life -- economic, political, ideological -- and in the cultural field, as well as in various violations of the rights and freedoms of the working people and citizens in general, the misappropriation of other people's work, subversive activities in the political and ideological spheres, terrorism, stealing social property, various forms of hostile propaganda, outbreaks of nationalism and chauvinism, intelligence work directed against our country, bribery and corruption, conservatism that slow down our development, etc. (7)

(5) Borba (Belgrade), 6 June 1970.

(6) Vjesnik (Zagreb), 24 December 1975.

(7) Politika (Belgrade), 11 January 1976.

From this incomplete list of all "social diseases" one can readily discern the difference between the Nationwide Defense system and Social Self-Protection. The Yugoslav leaders, sensing that the real danger to Yugoslavia as a multinational state ruled by a single party dictatorship is internal disruption rather than external aggression, are determined to make every citizen a "fortress of defense" capable of resisting both types of enemy. No army, however powerful, can hope to defend the country against external aggressors if internal enemies are free to operate behind its back.

At the Belgrade symposium it was stated that "enemies are benefiting from our internal difficulties." All "internal weaknesses" must therefore be removed if foreign aggressors are to be halted. Deputy Prime Minister Anton Vratusa listed the following weaknesses of this kind at the symposium:

Uncritical acceptance of foreign models, fear in the face of the greater strength of larger countries, lack of a sense of personal responsibility and discipline, particularism, uravnilovka [egalitarianism], social parasitism, toleration of the abuse of social functions, weakness in the social control mechanism, acceptance of nationalistic or religious intolerance, violation of the Yugoslav market's unity, breaches of laws and other regulations, and ignorance and the lack of proper information. (8)

What About Yugoslav Workers Abroad?

The symposium revealed that of late the Yugoslav party and state leaders have come to believe that the armed forces alone cannot prevent invaders from entering the country; unless the country's political and economic system is strong, no army can succeed in its task. This is especially true in view of the danger that the Soviet Union may try to weaken Yugoslavia from inside. Were Yugoslavia's self-managing socialism fully accepted by the Soviet Union and its East European allies, the Nationwide Defense system alone would be sufficient; but this is not the case, and the country's defense structure must therefore be strengthened. In the preamble to the May 1974 National Defense Law the following passage occurs:

By resolutely defending its self-management road to socialism, the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is simultaneously fulfilling its international obligations in constructing a classless society, a society free from aggression and war. (9)

(8) Komunist (Belgrade), 19 January 1976.

(9) Sluzbeni list, 4 May 1974, p. 646.

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In the Yugoslav view the danger arises precisely because the country's "self-management socialism" has not been accepted either in the East or in the West. In his speech before the SFRY Assembly on 5 December 1975, General Milos Sumonja, Deputy Defense Secretary, explained why Yugoslavia must strengthen its defenses. The policy of détente, he said, had been "limited to aiming at military equilibrium between the two big powers and to their mutual acknowledgment of certain essential interests." He went on:

A détente limited in this fashion cannot provide a lasting basis for world peace because it does not lead to the liquidation of the main hotbeds of world disruption but, on the contrary, makes possible an intensified contest between the big powers in those regions in which their interests are not clearly defined. It is because of this that local wars, military interventions, and indirect actions continue to be practiced in international relations and in the contest between the big powers. . . . Under such conditions the blocs cannot wither away. In addition to strengthening their internal cohesion, they are increasing their over-all military strength as the result of an intensive arms race. (10)

This is one reason why Yugoslavia must urgently strengthen its armaments and its defense system. Another, according to General Sumonja, is the fact that "the process of strengthening armed might in neighboring countries is continuing." Yugoslavia's neighbors, in his opinion, have built up their forces and have adapted them "to various types of conflict." He added that "neither the economic difficulties of these countries, nor détente, nor the Helsinki conference's recommendations have had much influence on this process." He added that "the increased activities of hostile émigré groups and of domestic enemies" also required the strengthening of Yugoslavia's armed forces.

Sumonja's colleague, General Ivan Kukoc, who represents the army in the party presidium Executive Committee, is of the same opinion, although he denied that there was any trend toward "an iron-fisted regime." Speaking to a group of Belgrade Communists Kukoc said that all "negative phenomena" had to be combated -- "especially the Cominformists and other enemies of our country." True, such a struggle requires the use of a strong hand "but not in a


(10) Narodna armija, 11 December 1975.

bureaucratic-étatistic sense." Any such regime must be based "on the working people organized in a self-managing way." (11)

It appears, however, that the "most sensitive question" in Yugoslavia recently has been the problem posed by the more than 1,000,000 Yugoslavs working abroad. In the interview already mentioned, one of the generals said that the army leaders have been doing their utmost "to see to it that all these people remain ours." He added that "if in the case of war anyone were to try to prevent them from returning to their homeland," everything must be done to ensure that they continue to defend their country, no matter where they are domiciled. As long ago as December 1972 Tito complained that 300,000 young people were working in the West, which meant that "three large divisions" were outside the country.

As far as the role of the army in the country's internal life is concerned, one of the three generals said that the army could not become "an arbiter" in Yugoslav domestic policies: "We are neither ready to shut ourselves up in our barracks nor prepared to be arbiters of internal social developments and situations. We have stated that clearly and we adhere to it today." But none of the Yugoslav military and political leaders has hesitated to stress repeatedly that Yugoslavia will defend its independence and self-management socialism with all the means at its disposal. . (065)

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• RAD Background Report/48
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RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS OF ZAGREB HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS

(A translation with comment by Zdenko Antic)

Summary and Introduction: This article, from which large excerpts are translated below, appeared in the 6 February 1976 issue of the AKSA (Aktualnosti krscanske sadasnjosti), a Catholic weekly news bulletin published by the Catholic Archbishopric of Zagreb. The article reviews the book Religious Affiliations published recently by the Institute for Social Research of the University of Zagreb, which analyzes the religious persuasions and ideological orientation of students in 50 high schools in the Zagreb area. In addition to exceptionally valuable results provided by the inquiry, which was made among the Zagreb high school students from the sociological and political points of view, this analysis is also significant for the fact that it apparently encompassed a sufficiently large number of students. Another interesting aspect of it is that it deals with high school students only, the social stratum of the population that represents the main pool from which the country's future political and economic elites will be chosen.

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At the end of 1975, a book was published in Zagreb entitled Religious Affiliations, in which the results of a poll among Zagreb high school students are analyzed from the psychological and sociological points of view. The inquiry was made by the Institute for Social Research of Zagreb University in 50 schools of the Zagreb school district, with comments and an analysis by the author, Stefica Bahtijarevic. The inquiry was made anonymously: neither school, nor class, nor name is registered in any instance cited. The

material amassed by the inquiry is classified as confidential and is being kept by the Institute for Social Research.

The purpose of the inquiry, as was noted in the introduction to the book, was to examine the degree of religious affiliation to the Catholic Church, and it has been assessed from the historical point of view, including an analysis of the process of secularization and of the characteristics of the modern world.

The book is divided into the following chapters: Religious Affiliation (A Historical Review of Religious Affiliation; Religious Affiliation and the Process of Secularization); The Establishment of Religious Affiliation (A Description of Religious Affiliation; Indicators of Religious Affiliation). The second part of the book, "The Structure of Religious Affiliation," contains the following chapters: Individual Identification with Dogma and Beliefs (The Attitude Toward God; Toward Christ; The Attitude Toward the Miracles in the Old Testament; The Attitude Toward the Sources of Moral Standards; The Attitude toward the Creation of the World, of Mankind, and the Attitude Toward Life After Death). The last part of the book discusses the evolution of religious persuasion. This part includes the following chapter titles: Characteristics of Development of Religious Affiliation; Outside Influences Upon Religious Affiliation; Religious Affiliation According to the Age of Children; A Review of Results of the Establishment of Evolution in Religious Affiliation.

Results of the inquiry among the Zagreb high school students provide the following picture of religious affiliation: believers 38.8, per cent; undecided 20.0 per cent; nonbelievers 23.7 per cent; and atheists 17.5 per cent.

As far as personal relationship to God is concerned, the high school students provided the following answers: I believe in God 31.9 per cent, I am not sure (don't know) 30.7 per cent, I do not believe in God 29.4 per cent.

Some interesting results have emerged in answers concerning the person of Christ. In commenting upon this portion, the author of the book, Stefica Bahtijarevic, points out that "for Christian believers, Christ is the central fact of history, and the central element in belief and in Church doctrine. As a man, he is the son of God, consequently God. Inasmuch as he is God, he helps us to conceive God. Inasmuch as he is a man, he helps to identify divine attributes with the ideals of everyman. In fact, God as the central idea of a religious man remains not fully defined, and Christ appears as a mediator of the concept of God. . . . of the ideal which should be aspired to -- to be as he is."

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The inquiry about the person of Christ evoked the following answers: I do not doubt that Christ is truly God and truly man 12.0 per cent; Although in doubt, I believe that Jesus is truly God and truly man 12.9 per cent; Jesus was a great and saintly man, but he is a son of God like any other man 8.2 per cent; Jesus was just a man, a wonder-worker, a prophet 11.0 per cent; I am not sure that Jesus was a real person 22.0 per cent; Christ never existed-- he is a myth like similar Greek, Roman, and old Slavonic gods and heroes 19.5 per cent; I do not think about it 12.1 per cent; None of the above questions represents my belief in Jesus 2.3 per cent.

Judging by the aforementioned figures, one could arrive at the following conclusion: 24.9 per cent believe that Christ is truly God and truly man; 30.2 per cent are not sure (or have another interpretation); 30.0 per cent do not believe that Christ is truly God, or think that he never existed. According to figures provided by the inquiry, the book concluded, only 57.3 per cent of believers believe in the existence of Jesus in the way conceived by the Church.

Another interesting detail emerges from answers given about the source of moral standards: 13.6 per cent of those interrogated believe that moral standards are of divine origin, while 68.4 per cent do not believe this.

The chapter entitled Religious Activities Outside the Church analyzes such questions as prayer at home, celebration of the religious holidays, and the problem of premarital sex. The answers are as follows: pray regularly 11.0 per cent; sometimes 25.8 per cent; rarely 10.7 per cent; never 52.4 per cent. As far as the celebration of religious holidays is concerned, the answers reveal that 37.9 per cent celebrate all religious holidays, 32.3 per cent only some of them, while 26.8 per cent do not celebrate any of them.

The answers regarding the problem of premarital sex are as follows: premarital sex should be fully permissible 51.0 per cent; free for men only 10.0 per cent; should not be allowed 16.3 per cent; and 21.5 per cent believed that this question is not important.

Another interesting aspect of the inquiry is revealed by answers given to the questions of religious and ideological orientation of the Zagreb high school students: 26.1 accept Marxism as the basis of their ideological orientation, while 40.0 per cent have no definite ideological orientation.

Answers concerning the relationship of the students questioned to the Church provide the following figures: 3.7 per cent are fully

committed to Church life; poorly and periodically 71.6 per cent, while 24.7 per cent have no connection with Church life. At the end of the analysis, the author observes that "there is no significant difference in answers given by male and female students; sex played no significant role in this inquiry. The age of students and the location of the school also played no significant role in influencing the answers obtained."

In addition to the results discussed and the problems listed, the book contains a series of other interesting data pertaining to religious affiliation and the ideological orientation of Zagreb high school students. (060)

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RUMANIA/5
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S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

Economy

1. Economic Plan Fulfillment for 1975 Falls Short of Targets

George
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ECONOMY1. Economic Plan Fulfillment for 1975 Falls Short of Targets

No separate communiqué on plan fulfillment for 1975 has yet been published, but on February 4 the Rumanian press carried the communiqué on fulfillment of the 1971-1975 plan, which contained a number of figures for 1975 that clearly indicated failure to reach targets in certain important sectors.

Industry. The 1975 plan called for total industrial production amounting to between 582,000 million and 591,000 million lei in value, and at the National Party Conference in July 1972 Ceausescu announced that in fact it might range between 580,000 million and 700,000 million lei. On 4 February 1976, however, the party leader told the People's Council Congress that "in comparable prices" total industrial production had been valued at 576,600 million lei in 1975 -- less than either of the above targets but more than the provision in the law on the 1971-1975 plan, which set the range at 503,800 to 534,700 million lei. The February 4 communiqué said that total industrial production in 1975 had risen over the figure for 1974 (495,000 million lei) by 12.4 per cent. If this is true, the figure for 1975 was 556,400 million lei -- some 5 per cent short of the target in the annual plan and still further below Ceausescu's July 1972 figure. It is not possible, however, to make a valid comparison between the latter amount and the presumed 556,400 million lei indicated in the communiqué, since the "comparable prices" mentioned by Ceausescu cannot be verified.

The communiqué gave no reason for the failures to reach the 1975 plan targets, but the table below shows the areas in which they occurred:

(more)

Industrial Production, 1975

Commodity	Unit of Measure	Planned	Actual	Shortfall	Overfulfillment
Electric power	million kwh	56,600	53,685	2,915	
Coal	1,000 tons	29,800	29,385	415	
Crude oil	1,000 tons	14,590	14,590		
Methane gas	million m ³	26,800	27,001		201
Steel	1,000 tons	10,100	9,549	551	
Steel alloys	1,000 tons	900	872	28	
Aluminum	1,000 tons	200	204		4
Electrotechnical and electronic items	million lei	31,900	32,367		467
Radio sets	1,000 sets	880	712	168	
Refrigerators	1,000 units	340	332	8	
TV sets	1,000 sets	550	512	38	
Metal cutting machine tools	million lei	3,300	3,155	145	
Fine mechanics and the optical industry	million lei	2,400	2,616		216
Trucks	units	35,000	35,965		965
Tractors	units	50,000	50,000		
Passenger cars	units	53,000	55,511		2,511
Jeep-type cars	units	16,600	12,502	4,098	
Ships	1,000 dwt	324	281	43	
Soda products	1,000 tons	1,626	1,259	367	
Chemical fertilizers	1,000 tons	1,962	1,729	233	
Plastic materials and synthetic resins	1,000 tons	472	347	125	
Synthetic fibers and yarns	1,000 tons	171	159	12	
Synthetic rubber	1,000 tons	112	99	13	
Medicines	million lei	3,300	3,088	212	
Cement	1,000 tons	13,550	11,520	2,030	
Paper, cardboard	1,000 tons	708	649	59	
Window glass	1,000 m ²	54,200	51,230	2,970	
Fabrics	million m ²	1,017	866	151	
Knitwear	million pieces	251	203	48	
Footwear	million pairs	101	87	14	
Meat	1,000 tons	822	713	109	
Edible oils	1,000 tons	305	321		16
Sugar	1,000 tons	555	516	39	

As can be seen, in no less than 24 instances the 1975 plan target was not met -- and the table does not contain figures on such items as zinc, lead, or copper, whose production may also have fallen short of the plan.

Agriculture. The 1975 figures for both crop production and livestock were also extremely disappointing. The communiqué gave no total for the agricultural sector, but in his February 4 speech Ceausescu put it at 93,400 million lei. (The 1975 plan did not

set a figure, but it should be noted that the 1974 plan called for total agricultural production worth 113,000 million lei.) The July floods were certainly largely responsible for the failures in this area, but they were not solely to blame.

The tables below give a picture of the situation:

Crop Production, 1975
(in thousand tons)

Crop	Planned	Actual	Shortfall	Shortfall (in per cent)
Cereals	20,000	15,219	4,781	23.9
Sunflower seeds	1,062	724	338	31.8
Sugar beets	8,560	4,902	3,658	42.7
Potatoes	4,550	2,319	2,231	49.0
Vegetables	4,045	2,364	1,681	41.5
Fruit	1,900	1,051	849	44.7
Grapes	1,635	1,167	468	28.6

Livestock, 1975
(in thousand head)

	Planned	Actual	Shortfall	Shortfall (in per cent)
Cattle	6,600	6,126	474	7.2
Of which: cows and heifers	3,315	3,030	285	8.6
Pigs	10,110	8,812	1,298	12.8
Of which: sows	935	821	114	12.2
Sheep	16,000	13,867	2,133	13.9
Of which: ewes	-	10,382	-	-

The irrigation program is also lagging behind the plan. According to the 1974 communiqué a total of 1,400,000 hectares of arable land had been irrigated by the end of that year; the 1975 plan provided for the irrigation of 519,000 hectares for a total of 1,919,000 hectares, but the 1975 communiqué reported that irrigation had been completed on only 1,474,000 hectares -- a shortfall of 445,000 hectares. It should also be noted that the 1971-1975 plan called for a total irrigated area of 2,100,000 hectares by the end of the plan period.

It appears that for the first time the plan provisions on chemical fertilizers have been met. The 1971-1975 communiqué reported that 4,500,000 tons of active substance fertilizer had been supplied to the agricultural sector during the five-year period. Since 3,253,000 tons were reported to have been provided between 1971 and 1974, 1,247,000 tons must have been delivered in 1975, as against a planned 1,178,000 tons.

Investment. The communiqué on 1971-1975 reported "the total volume of investments" as 136,900 million lei in 1975 (the 1975

annual plan called for 142,700 million lei). No comparison between actual and planned investments in the various sectors of the economy is possible, however, because the 1975 plan is based on "total" investments while the 1971-1975 communiqué provided only figures based on investments from "centralized state funds," giving the following figures for 1975:

Investment from Centralized State Funds, 1975
(in 1,000 million lei)

Sector	Amount
Industry	67.5
Construction	7.2
Agriculture, forestry, and waters	18.9
Transport and telecommunications	14.1
Scientific research and technological development	0.9
Housing (including construction privately financed with state support)	10.8
Communal administration	3.8
Education, culture, the arts, and health services	2.9
Trade, public catering, and tourism	4.2
Total	130.3

In his February 4 address Ceausescu gave the total as 122,800 million lei; the difference may, however, be attributable to overlapping investments.

Foreign Trade. Foreign trade also lagged far behind the plan, which called for an increase of 21.8 per cent (i.e., to 60,643 million lei) over the 1974 figure. In fact, however, trade exchanges amounted to 53,100 million lei -- an increase of 6.6 per cent. One encouraging thing, however, is that exports and imports were balanced in 1975, each amounting to about 26,500 million lei.

National Income and Labor Productivity. National income increased by 9.8 per cent instead of the 14.0 per cent called for in the 1975 plan. Labor productivity in industry increased by 7.1 per cent over 1974, compared with a planned 10.3 per cent, and by 8.0 per cent in construction as against a planned 8.9 per cent. The fact that the latter target was not reached obviously had an adverse effect on industrial production; during the 1971-1975 period, for instance, only 55 per cent of the increase in industrial production was attributable to a rise in labor productivity, although the figure set in the June 1969 directives was 72 to 77 per cent.

Real Wages. The 1975 plan called for a 10 per cent increase in wages, but according to the 1971-1975 communiqué only 6.8 per cent was achieved. The average monthly wage during the whole of 1975 should have amounted to 1,870 lei, but in fact the figure was only 1,813 lei. Nevertheless, by the end of the year the average wage had risen to 1,975 lei, thus meeting the figure set in the plan as the

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end-of-year goal. No comparable data on real incomes are available. According to the 1975 plan "the real income of the population, per person," was to increase by 9 per cent, but the communiqué reported an increase of only 6.5 per cent. It may be assumed that in this sector too the achievements fell short of targets.

Despite the fact that the 1971-1975 industrial production plan was fulfilled ahead of schedule, the goals in the 1975 annual plan were not reached, undoubtedly because they were revised to a point far above the original provisions, presumably in response to Ceausescu's urging that the 1971-1975 plan be fulfilled in four and a half years. The 1975 shortfalls, in turn, had repercussions on the fulfillment of the five-year plan, which actually was implemented only two months ahead of schedule, rather than six months as Ceausescu insisted. The failure to fulfill the 1975 plan casts doubt on the ability to fulfill the 1976 and 1976-1980 plans, whose very ambitious targets were set before the poor results of 1975 were known. This is particularly true in regard to the interrelation between the high investment planned for 1976 and the failure to reach the national income target for 1975. Failure to meet the energy targets for 1975 will also have a deleterious effect in a sector that has become vital owing to the sharp rise in the prices of fuel and raw materials.

Despite the economic problems resulting from the very ambitious plan targets and the difficulties caused in 1975 by the world economic slowdown and the raw materials price increases, the Rumanian economy continued to expand at a relatively high rate. There are still some questions about the efficiency of production, and much undoubtedly could be done in this area. Nevertheless, the high investments and ambitious goals have resulted in significant increases in economic output. (049)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

2. The Congress of the People's Councils

The first national congress of the deputies of the county people's councils and chairmen of the people's councils was held February 4 through 6 in Bucharest. Ceausescu's two addresses to the congress took up the lion's share of press coverage: the first one at the opening session (Scinteia, 5 February 1976, five pages), and the second at its concluding meeting (Scinteia, 7 February 1976, one page).

This congress took place in a period replete with events of this type. The Congress of Consumers' Co-operatives, for example, was held on January 30-31, and two more important congresses have been scheduled for the next few months: the TU Congress in April, and the Congress on Political Education and Culture in May.

The Congress of the People's Councils had been in the offing for some time. A special law (No. 11/1973) created the legal groundwork for its convocation in 1973, but was never actually applied. Two years later, another law (Scinteia, 24 July 1975) again provided the legal basis for the preparation and convocation of the congress (see Rumanian Situation Report/30, Radio Free Europe Research, 7 August 1975, Item 2). On the basis of this law, Ceausescu announced that the congress would be held late in 1975 (Scinteia, 24 September

1975). Again, however, it was postponed until the end of January or beginning of February, 1976 (Scinteia, 19 October 1975).

County conferences of the people's councils took place throughout the country to prepare for this national gathering, described as "Rumania's most democratic forum" (Scinteia, 19-25 January 1976). In his opening speech (Scinteia, 5 February 1976), Ceausescu described the congress as "an expression of the management of society, a higher way of freely manifesting public opinion on basic problems of the development of society, rule by the people, governing the country in such way as to express the will of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia, of all working people, irrespective of their nationality." Ceausescu went on to say that the party is doing its utmost to guarantee increasingly effective and direct participation by the masses in the leadership of society.

These premises were less apparent, however, in the actual organization of the congress. In fact, the decree on the holding of such a congress defined it as "a gathering of deputies of the people's councils and of chairmen of the county people's councils" (Scinteia, 30 January 1976). The party fortnightly Era Socialista (No. 3, February 1976) even left out the word "deputy," and referred to it simply as "a congress of the people's councils, and of chairmen of the county people's councils." The composition of the Presidium reflected this: 32 of its 100 members were leaders of the central party and state apparatus; 3 were ministers; with the balance leaders of the local apparatus. None of them was elected to the Presidium on the strength of being a deputy. Ceausescu was elected the Presidium's chairman "amidst cheers and ovations."

The congress concentrated on problems connected with fulfillment of the economic plans, and only briefly examined the work of the people's councils themselves. Five items on the agenda dealt with the local application and implementation of the five-year plan provisions, while only one was concerned with measures "to improve the work of the people's councils." The congress dealt only with the job of implementing economic assignments and targets, not setting them. Andrei Cervencovici, first secretary of the Arad County Party Committee, and chairman of the Arad County People's Council, wrote, in the above-mentioned issue of Era Socialista, that the suggestions and discussions at the congress dealt "with fulfillment of established goals."

Judging by what Ceausescu told the congress, the economic tasks devolving upon the people's councils during the current five-year plan (1976-1980) will prove to be considerably greater than what they were in the past. While each of 26 counties turned out less than 10,000 million lei-worth of industrial production during the decade between 1965 and 1975, all Rumania's counties (including the municipality of Bucharest) will now have to attain a production worth far more than that figure: 16 of them will have to produce between 10,100 and 15,000 million lei-worth; 12 counties will have to account for 15,100 to 25,000 million lei-worth; and 12 counties over 25,000 million lei-worth. Agricultural output is scheduled to rise at a slower rate. Whereas average annual agricultural output during the 1966-1976 period was worth less than

4,000 million lei in the great majority of the counties, during the current plan, 10 counties are to go over that figure. In addition to all this, the people's councils will have to cope with such jobs as systematization of urban and rural administration; proper use of forests and timber resources; harnessing water resources; and especially -- in Ceausescu's words -- "large-scale mobilization of the population for work in all the above fields of endeavor."

The last point on the congress agenda concerned ways to improve the people's councils themselves. Citing both Marx and Engels, Ceausescu emphasized the special attention the party wishes to devote to creating the proper sort of democratic framework to enable all the people to play a role in directing society. Nevertheless, after asking that the Law on the People's Councils be amended in order better to reflect "changes in social relations and recently passed new regulations," he did not set any time limit for the changes, saying only that "it is imperative to make them." The original Law on the People's Councils of 26 December 1968 was annulled on 21 December 1974 (Scinteia, 21 December 1974).

What is more, Ceausescu even postponed dealing with most of the problems raised at both the preparatory meetings and the congress itself, although he said that some 8,000 deputies had submitted about 15,600 suggestions at the preparatory meetings of ways in which to improve the work of the people's councils. Another 423 made more than 1,500 suggestions on the same subject at the congress itself. Saying that most of these suggestions were fully justified, Ceausescu merely added that they should be acted upon, but again set no deadline for the process.

While the delegates decided that a congress should be convened every five years, Ceausescu, apparently feeling that this was too infrequent a term of convocation, announced that a new permanent body is to be created to discuss state plans annually, before the Grand National Assembly approves them. This new body is to be made up of deputies of the county organizations, and is to be a "genuine parliament" of the county councils. It is to operate side by side with another new organization, the Committee of the People's Councils, which already co-ordinates the work of these councils. It is not clear whether this new permanent body will have any duties or rights other than approving draft economic plans.

At present, three bodies of a nonpermanent nature co-ordinate the work of the people's councils. They meet periodically according to the provisions of a special law passed in the summer of 1975 (Scinteia, 24 July 1975). The three are: the congress of the deputies of the county people's councils and of chairmen of the people's councils. It meets once every five years (the congress under review was its first ever). The national conference of chairmen of all levels of people's councils. A conference is held within six months of the election of deputies of municipal and communal people's councils. The third is the county conference of deputies of local people's councils, convened once every two and a half years.

Ceausescu used this congress as an opportunity to seek support for his ambitious economic programs. Last summer, he had announced

that, during the early years of the 1971-1975 period, some party and state activists had expressed skepticism and reservations about the chance of actually fulfilling the five-year plan (Scinteia, 24 July 1975). His addresses to the recent people's councils' congress suggest an attempt to nip in the bud any potential opposition to the provisions of the current five-year plan as early and quickly as possible. It has not yet been formally approved, and Ceausescu said it would be submitted to the Grand National Assembly for that purpose in the spring (Scinteia, 19 December 1975). The congress itself did, however, give local level approval of the plans for the country's development over the next five years, at a session personally presided over by Ceausescu (Scinteia, 7 February 1976).

During the congress, the delegates broke up into various sections that examined different aspects of the economic plans. Speakers who addressed the Section on Industrial Problems emphasized the decisive role played by technological advance and the results of scientific research in paving the way for fulfillment of the current five-year plan. In the Investment and Construction Section, speakers pointed out that fulfillment of the investment plan, which is to double in volume over that of the previous five-year plan, will be decisive if the entire program of development during the current plan is to be completed successfully. They also pointed out the need to maintain quality in investment projects.

The congress also served as an occasion when the existence of strained relations between local and national organizations emerged. Ceausescu noted that representatives of local bodies had rightfully criticized some central bodies, especially the Committee of the People's Councils. Nevertheless, during the meeting of the Section for Improving the Work of People's Councils, speakers emphasized the significance of the ability to combine observance of the principle of democratic centralism with the greater initiative and autonomy of local bodies, and even stated that local bodies should contribute more to the decision-making process if deficiencies are to be overcome. This appeared, however, to be criticism of the present-day state of relations between national and local authorities (Scinteia, 6 February 1976).

Speakers addressing the Section on the Living Standard of the People submitted a number of proposals, and requested that the state take over from the co-operative sector the job of maintaining supplies for the major industrial centers. In order to avoid the transport of supplies from distant counties, a frequent occurrence, they asked that wholesale units be set up in each county. This was quite an objective way in which to describe the difficulties of internal supply. These demands also seem to point out the weakness of the consumer co-operatives and even to question the decisions recently adopted by the Congress of Consumers' Co-operatives, which requested that these organizations be given a greater role in maintaining supplies for the population (Scinteia, 31 January-3 February 1976, and Rumanian SR/4, RFER, 10 February 1976, Item 2).

In the Section on Labor Training, Education, Culture, and Health, speakers entirely agreed with Ceausescu's urgings that rest hours and holidays for workers be considered indispensable needs in the process of "biologically regenerating the labor force." This

all would appear to concern protests against the conditions imposed on workers during the past few years in the drive to achieve ahead-of-schedule fulfillment of the last five-year plan. Ceausescu himself noted that the question of reducing working time would be dealt with at the 1977 National Party Conference.

The fact that these major concerns were brought up by various speakers addressing the congress or its sections indicates that these are points worrying not merely the people, but also local officials.

Ceausescu himself dealt, in his two speeches, with various problems connected with the dictatorship of the proletariat (see Item 3 below), fulfillment of the 1971-1975 plan, and the targets of the current plan. (050)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

3. Rumania's Rejoinder to the French CP Congress

While the Rumanian press, customarily slow in any case to comment upon the internal affairs of other parties, was confronted with an especially difficult proposition in reporting on the recent five-day (February 4-8) French "new look" CP Congress, Ceausescu, who opened the Congress of the People's Councils on February 4, appeared to lose no time in refuting those of the French arguments that must have appeared the most audacious to the East European parties.

Referring to Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Program" ¹⁵ May 1875, Ceausescu quoted Marx as warning that, during a period of the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into a communist society, there is a period of political transition whose state cannot but be a "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat." Ceausescu went on to warn his audience that one must take into consideration the fact that the leading bodies are the expression of the political power of the working class, of the toiling people. This rather restrictive approach, commented upon in Scinteia Tineretului (February 5) as reflecting a firm and true Marxist-Leninist stand, is somewhat contradictory to the Rumanian leader's own statement in 1972 when Ceausescu was placing the accent on conciliation among workers, peasants, and intellectuals, and when the Rumanian CP transformed its main theoretical monthly, Lupta de Clasa, into the fortnightly Era Socialista. It is quite possible that Ceausescu, who launched his cultural-ideological campaign in 1971 and continues to tighten the screw in this field (a congress on culture and political education is scheduled for May), now finds himself confronted with the contradictory influence of the French party and the repercussions it could have on Rumania's own Communists, as well as its intellectuals. This stand is also consistent with Rumanian participation in the numerous Warsaw Pact ideological conferences designed to counter "undesirable" effects of Helsinki.

While it is true that Ceausescu also spoke, in his February 4 address, about co-operation with the socialist parties, the question remains: on what terms? Less than two months ago, when

addressing the Grand National Assembly (December 18), Ceausescu supported the search of the Western CPs for original ways of cooperating with the socialist parties.

Since the abridged text of Marchais's report, covering almost two and a half columns in Scinteia (February 8), omitted both the passages dealing with renunciation of the dogma of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the criticism of the Soviets, it is apparent that Ceausescu's emphasis on the "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" in his February 4 speech was no accident (Le Monde, February 6).

Scinteia's selective approach to the Marchais report was studded with a number of quotations concerning the leading role of the PCF. After devoting almost an entire column to Marchais's gloomy description of political, economic, and social life in France, the summary printed the French communist leader's remarks on "the new international order," the collapse of the "brutal imperialist domination of the world, his praise of the 14 "socialist countries," and the importance of national independence.

Referring to the "alliance of the leftist parties," the French leader is quoted as saying that the influence of the PCF and the implementation of the common program of the leftist parties in France have grown, but that this does not mean completion of the process of transforming society. Marchais is then further quoted as demanding democracy and "socialism," socialism being defined by him as including society's ownership over the means of production, over exchange and planning, the power of the workers, the "democratization" of national life, and the "leading" influence of a vanguard party drawing its inspiration from scientific socialism.

Again, the summary quotes Marchais as emphasizing "the necessity of the leading role of the working class in transforming society." Marchais is also quoted about local conditions and developments that permit "other roads" to be taken than those pursued by other nations that have achieved socialism in their own countries. The French CP leader is also quoted by Scinteia as having referred to "our road to socialism, which is an original one." The Rumanian party daily quotes Marchais as saying that "inevitably, the translation into life of the socialist (basic) laws can acquire diverse forms, specific traits in various countries. This applies to institutions, political life, structures, and the organization of economic and social life."

As for interparty relations, Scinteia quotes Marchais as saying that "no party or group of parties can issue laws valid for others; cannot propose universal recipes; and cannot define a strategy that could serve as an example for all. It is therefore inevitable that we follow an independent path in the struggle for socialism." Scinteia adds that he also said that this does not mean a weakening of the French CP's solidarity with other parties. "Socialism means a living reality in all 14 socialist countries, and the real fight of Communists everywhere. Therefore, the PCF starts out from the principle that divergences of approach on this or that problem must not become an obstacle to the fraternal parties' adopting a conjoined position in international affairs,

particularly when fundamental problems of the anti-imperialist struggle are involved." The international communist movement cannot be a church or a centralized organization, Scinteia goes on in quoting Marchais, one that could force each party to accept obligatory decrees, uniform laws. Finally, Marchais is quoted as having said that the experience of the PCF cannot be ignored in France and that his party is ready to assume responsibility in managing public affairs.

Scinteia's first report on the Marchais speech (in its February 5 issue) was published on the same page with an interview Italian CP leader Enrico Berlinguer granted a number of Western newspapers in which he emphasized his party's efforts to find original new approaches to a democratic transformation of Italy and other West European countries in the direction of socialism. Berlinguer is quoted as saying that contradictions and the crisis of capitalist society have determined all workers' and people's parties to revise their policy and even their own doctrine. He was also quoted as rejecting both guidance from the outside and the road leading toward social democracy for the Communists. In reporting on the opening of the French congress, Scinteia, in the above issue, devoted less than three lines to Marchais's keynote address.

Aside from the above coverage, Rumanian media confined themselves pretty much to reporting on the Rumanian delegation to the French CP congress and various messages, greetings, and "support" back and forth between the two.

On February 3, Rumanian media reported departure of the Rumanian delegation, consisting of Political Executive Committee member Leonte Rautu, and Vasile Sandru, deputy chief of a CC section (presumably the one dealing with international relations). On February 4, Radio Bucharest briefly noted the opening of the French congress, again reporting the composition of the Rumanian delegation. On February 6, Radio Bucharest reported that the Rumanian delegation had conveyed the greetings of the RCP CC, the Rumanian working class, and the Rumanian people to the congress, along with a message from Ceausescu expressing friendship and "militant solidarity," as well as sympathy and feelings of "profound solidarity" with the French party's intense and broad activities, as well as its efforts to "establish a unity of the working class and a common political platform for the French people." The message reviewed past meetings between Marchais and Ceausescu and expressed the conviction that the two parties' bilateral relations will continue to expand and diversify in future, to the benefit of the relations between the two nations and the unity of the international communist and workers' movement. Part of the message was devoted to the "building of socialism" in Rumania on the basis of the 11th party congress's directives (November 1974). On that same day (February 6), the Rumanian papers contained no report whatsoever about the Paris congress. On February 7, Radio Bucharest very briefly reported Rautu's address to the French congress, and later the same day noted a meeting in the Seine et Marne Departement between the Rumanian delegates and a number of PCF Politburo members. On February 8, Scinteia published a summary of Marchais's report to the congress, and Radio Bucharest covered the final proceedings and close

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of the congress, the re-election of Marchais, and the appeal to raise party membership from 500,000 to 600,000, but only just mentioned the issuance of a final resolution.

In an interesting footnote to the French congress, the Moscow Pravda (February 8) reported Ceausescu's speech to the Congress of the People's Councils, citing in particular and at some length his comments on the necessity for "the revolutionary dictatorship of the working class." Soviet displeasure with certain of the proceedings at the PCF congress has been readily apparent, and the Kremlin has used other occasions, and individuals, to criticize the French party indirectly. (051)

- End -



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SIX MONTHS AFTER: THE EAST EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO HELSINKI

By the RAD Staff

Summary: This paper reviews the response to Helsinki of the East European states (excluding the GDR) in the six months that have elapsed since the conclusion of the CSCE. It is divided into four parts:

- Part I provides a general introduction to the theme, with special reference to the ubiquitous influence of the Soviet Union.
- Part II considers in detail the response in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.
- Part III deals with the special case of Yugoslavia.
- Part IV offers a brief summing up.

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I: THE OUTLINES OF THE EAST EUROPEAN RESPONSE

Preliminaries

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Helsinki on 3 July 1973 and closed there with a summit attended by the "High Representatives" of 35 European and North American countries on 1 August 1975. Sittings were held in Geneva from 18 September 1973 to 21 July 1975. The principal document to emerge from the conference was the Final Act, which contains three major sections. These, and the terms popularly used to describe them, are:

1. Questions Relating to Security in Europe (Basket One);
2. Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment (Basket Two);
3. Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields (Basket Three).

Introduction

Any study of Eastern Europe's response to Helsinki made six months after the event must suffer from three constraints.

First, the diplomatic negotiations that progress submarine-like beneath the surface propaganda fleets rarely rise into public view, and even the texts of any agreements finally reached by such methods are not readily accessible to outsiders. Consequently, much of the information necessary to thorough research is not available at this stage, and any survey has to be based almost exclusively on official pronouncements and on material published or broadcast by the regime media as part of a propaganda campaign directed against the Western interpretation of the Final Act. Propagandists usually overreact and thus distort the line followed by their masters in diplomatic exchanges, although they can nevertheless tell us a great deal about the basic intentions of the parties and governments for which they speak and about the ideological motivations that permeate official Eastern thinking on European security and co-operation.

Secondly, the East European response is dominated by the Soviet one. The need for unity in both domestic and inter-

national policies has never been so strongly accentuated in the Soviet camp as in these post-Helsinki months, and is often described as a "fundamental postulate of the new era in European history"; but although the choir generally sings in unison, the strongest voice is always that of Moscow.

Thirdly, the monochromy of the picture is intensified by the fact that each country's propaganda machinery is virtually identical with that of all the others. In addition to the party, government, and parliamentary organs responsible for dealing with security and co-operation in Europe, each country has a national committee for European security, a set of "unofficial" bilateral East-West agencies (such as the Hungarian-Italian Forum for European Security and Co-operation), and an array of daily newspapers, weeklies, and even monthlies all of which promote, disseminate, and popularize an almost identical view of peace and security on the continent. The result is a high degree of uniformity in content and presentation, and it requires very careful reading to spot any local touches that have been added and to discern any timidly phrased divergencies or omissions.

Despite this sameness, however, deviations, nuances, and omissions do exist. For example, despite the continuous sounding of the drumbeat of unity, the frequency of articles on Helsinki with an anti-Western slant has been noticeably lower in Eastern Europe than in the USSR, and the tempo of its campaign has been more relaxed. There are, of course, variations in conformity: the Czechoslovaks tend to follow the collective line very closely, while the Rumanians usually reject ideological tuition from the Soviet "center."

But still, the general pattern of Eastern Europe's response to Helsinki is strongly similar to that of the Soviet Union. Helsinki is extolled as one of the major events in post-World War II history (the US defeat in Vietnam is usually cited as the other main development), and is said to have been made possible by the "consistent peace and détente policy of the socialist countries," and by their ever-growing international influence. The Soviet contribution is highly appraised -- perhaps with even greater ardor than by the Kremlin itself -- and such tributes naturally lend new weight to Moscow's claim to be recognized as socialism's leading force, as the most experienced and "meritorious" member of the community.

The East European countries stoutly support the Soviet view that it would be wrong to accentuate any one part of the

Final Act; to emphasize the importance of Basket Three, for instance, at the expense of the others would be to travesty the spirit and the letter of the document. While all parts are equal, one of them is "self-evidently" more equal than the others: the 10 principles that govern interstate relations not only encompass the recognition of the status quo in Europe but also provide the basis on which the other parts of the document were constructed.

Finally, there is unanimous agreement that the conference's recommendations will lose their momentum and their chances of implementation unless the socialist countries continue their "energetic struggle" for détente, peace, and security. The opposition, a coalition of forces ranging from "certain NATO circles" to the Maoists, is formidable and has two aims: to activate "imperialist-militarist" forces so as to prevent disarmament, and to contain social progress both in the West and in the underdeveloped world. Peaceful coexistence does not mean the preservation of the social status quo or a ban on class warfare. No one can prevent the logical onmarch of history toward "true socialism."

Three Focal Points

Entrenched on this common ground, the East European countries have followed the Soviet example in concentrating their attention on three of the main features of its topography: military détente, Basket Three, and the inherent superiority of the communist system. As it happens, it is in these areas that some of Eastern Europe's distinguishing nuances of thought and action are most perceptible.

1. Military détente. It was Brezhnev himself who asserted at the Helsinki summit that political détente must be followed by military détente. The point was immediately taken up by his East European counterparts (and indeed carried rather beyond the range of Soviet vision by Rumania) and they have identified three forums in which the new aim can best be pursued: the MBFR talks in Vienna, SALT II in Geneva, and a world disarmament conference that "should be convened as soon as possible."

But the immediate prospect is, in Soviet and East European eyes, a dull one. Although there are "many realists" in the West -- even in high NATO circles themselves -- who would welcome

the complementing of political by military détente, there are darker elements clamoring for one-sided concessions by the socialist countries and even for the augmentation of Western armed might. The present military balance must be maintained, it is argued, and Western charges that the Warsaw Pact has preached peace while preparing for war are dismissed as an obfuscation of the real issues of East-West relations.

The Soviet Union's compliance with certain military provisions of the Final Act, expressed in the giving of advance notification of the maneuvers in Armenia and Georgia and the extending of invitations to NATO observers, has been given considerable publicity, but none of the East European regimes has mentioned that the initiative in implementing this part of the Final Act was taken by NATO last fall and that the FRG's invitation to the Warsaw Pact to send observers to its maneuvers went unanswered.

Most of the East European leaderships appear to keep themselves at a discreet distance from this complex and dangerous issue, which they regard as a problem for the superpowers and the nuclear clubmen; consequently, it is not part of the media's daily diet (as it is in the Soviet Union), but a subject suited to only occasional commentaries.

A number of specific issues directly or indirectly related to military détente and formerly much talked about have almost entirely disappeared from the agenda. One of these is the simultaneous dissolution of military blocs, a theme that first became popular in the late 1960s; in its original and quite radical form it is rarely mentioned today except in the Rumanian press which still regards it as a precondition of détente. The solidarity of the small states, another favorite theme a few years ago, has been openly denounced of late as an anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet concept. Again, it has remained respectable only in Rumania. The nuclear-free zone project, originally proposed by the Poles in the Rapacki Plan, has also faded, and there has been little talk of more general regional co-operation, apart from Hungarian party leader Janos Kadar's peculiar reference to the ties that bind together the peoples "living on the shores of the Danube and the Tisza." (1)

The only currently popular vision is one of Balkan co-operation, but the Balkan conference held in Athens in January-

(1) Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 1 August 1975.

February 1976 showed that the difficulties stemming from historical realities were still very much present. The venture was intended as a contribution to détente in the spirit of the Helsinki agreement, but "more concrete forms of multilateral co-operation" -- enthusiastically supported by Rumania and other participants -- were reportedly blocked for the time being by Bulgaria, the only close ally of the Soviet Union among the five. (2) Even so, the conference is generally considered as the first tentative move toward a more peaceful era in the Balkans.

2. Basket Three. Although military détente is in theory the main post-Helsinki concern of the Soviet and East European powers, they have in fact devoted at least as much time and energy to Basket Three -- i.e., East-West co-operation in the fields of information, culture, and humanitarian questions (often simplified to "cultural co-operation"). The general line is as follows: since the Western policy of Diktat directed against the Soviet Union and its allies has failed, the "capitalists" have been reduced to flying the kites of cultural co-operation and ideological coexistence. The first of these concepts is of course part of the spine of the Final Act, but the osteopaths of the West distort it for their own devious purposes. The second, ideological coexistence, is another Western attempt to make crooked what is straight: as Communists know, détente does not guarantee the social status quo, and peaceful coexistence is not applicable to ideology. On the contrary, the ideological struggle will intensify, but under peaceful conditions. There is only one way the socialist community can defeat this new Western challenge: it must consolidate its unity and ensure that all East-West cultural traffic is effectively controlled by the governments concerned.

Many of the attitudes to Basket Three discussed in detail in Part II, 4 below are of Soviet origin: the allegation that it is not the East that is lagging behind in cultural co-operation but the West; the insistence that socialist cultural contacts should be maintained only with "progressive forces" in the West; and the proposal that the West should confine its artistic imports to the products of official socialist culture.

The bilateral governmental agreements on the working conditions of foreign journalists in the Soviet Union are undoubtedly one of Helsinki's benefits; but they are also meant as

(2) UPI, 6 February 1976.

an example to the East Europeans of how to resolve the practical problems connected with Basket Three, and have been recognized as such.

Despite much wagging of the Soviet admonitory finger on the question of Basket Three, a few East European blemishes have marred the face of socialist unity. One reason for this is that the area's traditional ties with the West are much stronger than those of the Soviet Union; there is still a strong desire to maintain old links, to know what the West is doing, and to learn from it. Other reasons are the fact that Eastern Europe is geographically more open to the West than is the USSR, and that family ties between the two halves of the continent are legion. Again, Western trade is essential to the East, trade means contacts, and contacts help to erode official attitudes of reserve and hostility.

The result of all this is a cultural climate that is on the whole milder than that of the Soviet Union. The types of Western books imported or translated are a good weather indicator, and in Eastern Europe their range is still surprisingly wide. The same can be said about imports of Western newspapers, where the disciples are well ahead of the master. Le Monde, for instance, sends 40 copies a day to the Soviet Union for public sale, and The Times 40; the corresponding figures for Poland are: Le Monde, 1,000 and The Times 207, while even in more conservative Czechoslovakia they are 250 and 110. (3)

Although it is in its response to Basket Three that the socialist community has struck its most militant attitudes, this is the sphere in which progress in co-operation is most easily detectable. It began with the improvements in the working conditions of Western journalists in the Soviet Union (the few functioning in Eastern Europe have always enjoyed better conditions), and since then the several governments have eased their controls in the "humanitarian" field -- for instance, by relaxing the regulations on the reunion of families separated by frontiers. Several bilateral cultural agreements have been concluded or extended, or are under consideration, and although little is known about their content, the fact that they have happened at all is a positive sign. Again, while visits and contacts are difficult to quantify accurately, it is clear that they have certainly not decreased in number since Helsinki.

(3) RFE Special/Munich, 30 January 1976.

3. The Superiority of Socialism. Détente, as conceived by the socialist community, includes competition between the two ideologies and a maintenance, even an intensification, of class warfare; it also creates favorable conditions for the spread of socialism in the West and provides a unique chance to tell the world the truth about socialism in action. What, the West wonders, has all this to do with Helsinki?

In Eastern eyes the links are obvious: Western propaganda consistently distorts the true picture of socialism and seeks to fragment not only the European socialist camp but the international communist movement as well. Such a situation calls for a counterattack on all fronts and, as a direct consequence of Helsinki, the closest ideological co-operation. As the communiqué of the Warsaw conference of CC ideological secretaries in January 1976 put it, "the struggle against attempts to distort the content of the domestic and foreign policies of the socialist countries, against reactionary imperialist ideology and propaganda, must be intensified. . . . A true account must be given, both within the socialist countries and beyond their borders, of the achievements of each socialist country in economics, science, culture, in improving the working people's living standards, and in developing socialist democracy." (4) Western cultural-ideological activities that clash with this official concept of co-operation are condemned as interference in the internal affairs of others and as the sabotage of détente. Communist tactics that affront the West's view of co-operation by their intrusiveness and proselytizing are, however, described as an act of solidarity toward the working class necessitated by the historic mission of socialism.

In spite of this special pleading, the "superiority" program is of great importance. It is designed to persuade both the outside world (allegedly submerged in ever-deepening economic gloom) and a critical domestic audience that socialism, as implemented in the Soviet camp, provides the only solution to the problems of the contemporary world, and that this efficacy extends to the nonmaterial aspects of human life.

An amazingly large number of articles in the socialist press deal with the "humane" aspects of socialism, with the "unparalleled possibilities" for man's self-realization inherent in the Soviet-type system. The reason for this concentration of firepower is plain: the fate of the individual under socialism is one of

(4) Nepszabadsag, 25 January 1976.

the points on which the communist system in general and Soviet communism in particular feel themselves most exposed to domestic and foreign criticism. It is not by chance that Czechoslovakia, still troubled by 1968 memories of a "socialism with a human face," is second only to the Soviet Union in its eagerness to promote the enlightenment of East and West alike about the "true face" of socialism. The targets of this campaign undoubtedly include some Western communist parties -- notably the Italian, French, and Spanish -- which have lately expressed serious doubts about the utility of the model of socialism to be found in the East. (5)

Co-operation Outside the Cultural Sphere

Compared to the time and energy expended on military détente, Basket Three, and the ideological struggle, little publicity seems to have been given to such questions as East-West trade; co-operation in the fields of economics, science, and ecology; and relations between Comecon and the Common Market. Amazingly little publicity was given to Brezhnev's proposal, made at the Polish party congress last December, that East and West should get together to discuss specific problems of technological, scientific, and ecological co-operation. In recent weeks Comecon has reportedly put out feelers for a co-operative agreement with the Common Market, but these came after the Soviet Union and some of its allies had severely criticized the Tindemans report on the grounds that West European integration is incompatible with the Helsinki agreement.

Substantial progress has been made in this sector of East-West relations, and a possible explanation is that economic and technological exchanges are too precious in the eyes of Eastern Europe to be endangered by the waving of ideological red flags. Old contacts are respected and there is a constant search for new ones. The real obstacle to expansion seems to be past over-spending in the West rather than present ideological inhibitions.

(5) The response of the West European communist parties to Helsinki is a fascinating and variegated story in its own right, but one that lies outside the scope of the present study.

II. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EAST EUROPEAN RESPONSE

We shall now examine the details of the East European countries' response to Helsinki. Its main characteristics are as follows:

1. Sustained publicity has been given to the conference and its documents;
2. Rumania apart, the regimes have emphasized much the same points and have taken a lopsided view of the Final Act;
3. A few deeds have been done and agreements reached that can be attributed to Helsinki;
4. Basket Three has been viewed largely as a pit dugged by the West for the unwary;
5. It is generally agreed that the participant nations must now turn their attention to military détente, with the tacit qualification that this is a matter for the USSR and the US. The Rumanian attitude here is not only different but more colored by urgency.

These points are considered in detail below. Yugoslavia, because of the entirely different nature of its response, is excluded from this comparative study and is discussed separately in Part III below.

1. The Publicity Barrage

In the months that have passed since the conference ended, the East European media have laid down a heavy and sustained barrage of publicity. The output of articles, editorials, and broadcast talks and interviews has probably been at its highest level in Czechoslovakia, where Helsinki has repeatedly been mentioned in one context or another. The press in the other countries has regularly carried articles of varying length and importance during the period.

Poland is a good case study in this respect. The top Polish leaders made 22 speeches on the CSCE and its consequences in the last five months of 1975, and the following number of major articles on the subject have appeared in the press:

1975

August	17
September	6
October	11
November	4
December	2

1976

January (first half)	3
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The full text of the Final Act was published in September 1975, and the October issue of Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, the journal of the Polish Institute for International Affairs, was entirely given over to Helsinki.

The volume and intensity of the propaganda put out on the CSCE show that the East European regimes are convinced of its high importance and want to give their own people a "correct" understanding of the nature of coexistence and co-operation and the perimeters of détente, while demonstrating to the West their determination to do their duty in implementing the provisions of the Final Act. Unfortunately, what they are convinced of is the rightness of their own interpretation of the letter of the Helsinki law rather than the need to cherish the spirit that ought to underlie its provisions and participles, and this attitude finds expression in an insistence on dogmas plainly unacceptable to their "partners" sometimes formulated in aggressive and even insulting language. This is undoubtedly an expression of policy rather than of insensitivity: the East European media have not only provided their audiences with what Western readerships would have regarded as a surfeit of information and propaganda on Helsinki; they have also used the occasion to dissipate "excessive" Western expectations of its efficacy as a breaker down of walls.

Hopes and Fears

At the same time they have done their best to dispel any domestic illusions. Vasil Bejda, head of the CPCS CC Agitprop

Department, put it with some severity (and he must be considered as speaking for the Czechoslovak party leadership):

The party does not ascribe any magical importance to the conclusions reached at Helsinki. . . . Any overestimation of them could lead to unjustified notions of complete unaccountability, to self-indulgence, to illusions about the nature of present-day capitalism. . . . Such illusions would be very dangerous and harmful not only ideologically but also politically. (6)

The Rumanians have likewise shown signs of concern about popular expectations, and a press campaign has been mounted to damp down unseemly enthusiasm for the Western Connection on the part of individuals; one article, allegedly written by a disillusioned ex-Gastarbeiter, had the lachrymose title: "They Called Me 'The Foreigner.'" (7) From Bulgaria there comes the story of a woman living in Haskovo, a southeastern provincial town, who asked for a foreign travel permit on the strength of Helsinki. "Comrade," was the reply, "this is not Helsinki. This is Haskovo."

The Polish and Hungarian leaderships appear to be less concerned about the arousal of popular expectations. In Poland, the Basket Three section of the Final Act has been cited in what seem to have been fairly widespread protests against proposed changes in the Constitution, but such protests (and the regime's lenient handling of them) were fairly common before Helsinki, and it seems that the intellectuals were using a tool that came fortuitously to hand to support a protest that would have been made anyway. Nor can the resulting minor concessions be credited principally to the CSCE, but to Gierek's established policy of listening to what the people are trying to tell him; it is possible, however, that the shadow of Helsinki cast some influence on the decisions. In Hungary the media have shown no traces of leadership Angst lest popular expectations cause trouble; this is almost certainly a reflection of the fact that life in Hungary is considerably more relaxed than elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

(6) Rude Pravo, 15 December 1975.

(7) Romania Literara, 13 January 1976.

2. Balance and Emphasis in the Response

Leaning on the Scales

As noted in Part I above, to the East European party and government leaders the center of gravity of the Final Act is the 10 principles clustered under the heading "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States" -- that is, Basket One. To communist eyes, these provide the bastion from which forays can be mounted against Basket Three. Basket Two (economic, scientific, and technological co-operation) has so far been handled factually and uncontroversially.

The Czechoslovak party and government, for example, in a joint declaration issued a few days after Helsinki, made the supremacy of Basket One clear beyond doubt: "The main result of the CSCE was its approval of the declaration on the principles of interstate relationships." (8) For the East, these 10 principles guide and regulate the streams of European co-operation. Baskets Two and Three are not just of lesser importance than Basket One; they are inconceivable without it.

In spite of this obvious leaning upon the scales, the Eastern regimes have insisted on the need to see the Final Act as a whole and have chided the West for its alleged failure to maintain a just proportion. Ceausescu said in a speech to the Grand National Assembly in December that:

All pledges made by the states participating in the conference must be implemented. Every chapter of the document signed in Helsinki has its significance, and . . . to consider any one of these provisions more (or less) important than another lessens the value of the document. (9)

The HSWP daily Nepszabadsag (10) said rather disingenuously that:

The socialist states, including our own country, will of course implement the provisions of Basket Three. But there is no harm in recalling that the conference's closing document has also a first and a second basket, which are at least as important as the third. In our

(8) Rude Pravo, 8 August 1975.

(9) Scinteia, 19 December 1975.

(10) 27 September 1975.

opinion the Final Act forms a single entity and no one is entitled to select a point of which he happens to be fond and disregard those other points that have failed to win his approval for some reason or other.

Rumania has taken a slightly different line, placing less emphasis on weight and more on the time factor. Relations between states must come first because they can be sorted out relatively quickly; economic co-operation, cultural co-operation, and disarmament, on the other hand, are projects for the longer term, and it would be foolish to try to put the cumbersome cart before the more easily managed horse.

Where the Emphasis Has Fallen

The Soviet insistence that détente can never apply to ideology, and indeed that international relaxation calls for an even sterner ideological struggle, forms the unchanging scenery in front of which the different acts in the drama of co-operation must be played out, the ostinato to which the variations on the theme of détente must conform. This basic dogma defines the ground on which the communist side must take its stand and the limits beyond which it will not go. As noted in Part I, it is by far the most important feature of the bloc's post-Helsinki action program.

Its treatment has varied from one country to another, however. The Bulgarians have followed the Moscow line with fidelity, and many of the media statements are marked by the piety of the orthodox: "Peaceful coexistence does not and cannot invalidate the laws of the class struggle, that inexhaustible driving force of human progress." (11) The Czechoslovak leadership, still suffering from the trauma of 1968, is united on this point but the stridency with which it is enunciated tends to vary. Here the differences in tone appear to reflect the two main lines in Czechoslovak official politics today: that followed by the powerful hardline faction clustered around Vasil Bilak, and the more moderate one taken by the group around party First Secretary Gustav Husak.

Hungary has been more relaxed in its handling of this as well as other Soviet leitmotifs. The socialist interpretation of the conference's achievements has been handled with propriety but the Bulgarian fondness for orthodox affirmation and the Czechoslovak propensity to be coldly explicit are much less

(11) Partien Zhivot No.16, 1975.

evident, and the language used is temperate and persuasive. Hungary under Kadar will conform to the collective line but will not gallop ahead. There has been some stress on what the regime regards as its responsibility for Hungarians living abroad because, it is claimed, "the Helsinki spirit makes such concern mandatory." (12)

Poland, too, has given the impression of preoccupation with more practical matters such as the Warsaw-Bonn relationship and its domestic economic problems. Another event that must have pre-empted the attention that would otherwise have been devoted to the ideological implications of Helsinki was the party congress held in December 1975. Poland is the only East European country to have held a congress in the six months since the CSCE ended, but several are pending: the CPSU congress is imminent, and the Soviets will be followed by the Bulgarians in March and the Czechoslovaks in April; all three are likely to shed much light on their leaderships' response to Helsinki.

All five countries have emphasized that the main credit for engineering and carrying through the CSCE and for producing what Polish party leader Gierak called "a Magna Charta of peace" must go to the socialist states, often with honorable mention of the role of the USSR. They have also, as we have seen, sold Basket One at a premium and Basket Three at a discount. The Polish media, for example, have repeatedly asserted the primacy of the political progress achieved at Helsinki: "The acceptance of the 10 principles means full acceptance by all the European states of peaceful coexistence as a basis for new international relations in Europe," said Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, (13) and the CSCE's role as a "springboard for further advance" depends on the West's acceptance of Basket One as the key to the future. Continued Soviet and East European reluctance to accept freer flow was made clear by the Bulgarian specialist journal Novo Vreme (14) when it said:

If compromises were made in Helsinki, then they were fully justified. They were made for the sake of peace and do not erase differences in ideology and in social systems.

(12) Nepszava, 25 December 1975.

(13) September 1975.

(14) No.9, 1975.

There has been a great deal of emphasis on the need to preserve and guarantee the frontiers that were crystallized in their present shape by World War II and the communist takeovers that followed in Eastern Europe. Indeed, when party leader Todor Zhivkov counted the blessings of Helsinki, he appeared to put the affirmation of the postwar status quo ahead even of détente:

The historic significance of the Helsinki conference consists in the fact that it not only recognized and affirmed the outcome of World War II and developments since then, but also marked the beginning of a new stage in the struggle to solve the most important problems of contemporary life: the global transformation of international relations on a peaceful, democratic, and just basis. (15)

Poland has made a special point of the inviolability of frontiers, a preoccupation that is historically understandable, and Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Berger said that: "the principle of the inviolability of borders is of special interest to Czechoslovakia because our frontiers were the target of attacks between the two world wars." (16) Two months later, Rude Pravo devoted an important article entirely to this particular point. (17)

The Special Case of Rumania

In Soviet eyes the CSCE numbered among its virtues an opportunity to tighten Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe in the name of "socialist unity." In the Rumanians' eyes it offered just the opposite: a chance to distance themselves from the Soviet Union and to gain publicity for what they conceive to be their unique role in Eastern Europe and the special contribution they believe they can make to world peace.

This response has found expression in the selection of three points for special emphasis by the Rumanian party and government: first, disarmament and the contribution that can be made to its

(15) Radio Sofia and BTA, 2 January 1976.

(16) Ceteka, 9 October 1975.

(17) 4 December 1975.

But Bogumil Rychlowski and Janusz Symonides, writing in the same journal in the previous month, (22) claimed that:

The Helsinki document, the Final Act, has a binding character. It has not been ratified, but neither were the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and yet their decisions were binding. It is the will of the contracting parties that determines the character of an agreement.

The Hungarians seem to be experiencing similar doubts. Peter Kulcsar said in Magyar Hirlap (23) that the agreements enshrined in the Final Act

confirm the legal force of many existing precepts. In the future such principles must be translated into firm norms. This attitude [Kulcsar was citing the official Soviet view] differs dramatically from the summary opinions expressed in some Western papers which do not attribute any kind of international legal standing to the conference's findings. . . . It is part of the significance of the Helsinki document that it systematizes for Europe certain international legal principles implicit in the UN Charter and elsewhere but not previously expounded in such detail and with such precision.

In other words, the exact international legal status of the document is left open, but it is argued that it is at least greater than the West will allow. Kulcsar's fellow countryman Istvan Timar perhaps summed up Eastern Europe's slightly un-lawyer-like view of the question when he said that the "international legal character" of the Final Act is "indisputable in some parts." (24)

Although Yugoslavia's over-all reaction to Helsinki is considered separately below, it is convenient to note Belgrade's unambiguous attitude to this question here. A leading political commentator said that, although the Final Act cannot be treated as jus cogens, the fact that it was signed by 35 of Europe's and North America's leading statesmen gives it not only moral

(22) "Security and European Co-operation and the Concept of Peaceful Coexistence," September 1975.

(23) 24 August 1975.

(24) Magyar Nemzet, 7 August 1975.

and political prestige "but also makes it obligatory from the standpoint of the present system of international law." (25)

The Western Response Seen Through Eastern Eyes

While there has been general satisfaction among the East European regimes at the successful outcome of the CSCE, it will come as no surprise to the reader to learn that the West's behavior in the post-Helsinki months has been recorded in less than glowing terms.

The difficulties of making progress over such intractable terrain as East-West relations are fairly recognized, but the blame for any lack of it is placed entirely on the traditional cast of villains, augmented by one or two unexpected bit players. Bulgaria has identified the "military-industrial complex of the US" and the Chinese Maoists as the main impediments to progress, (26) while West German CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss, US Senators Goldwater and Jackson, and Soviet dissident Sakharov have been singled out for displeasure, the last because of his "anti-Soviet carnival at Copenhagen." (27) The Czechoslovak media have criticized "adventurous forces of international imperialism and the Chinese Maoists" (28) and have castigated Swedish TV for its un-Helsinki-like behavior in broadcasting an interview with former Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Hajek and Zdenek Mlynar, both prominent in the Prague Spring of 1968. (29)

Hungary has blamed "adversaries of détente in Western Europe, the US, and China," and has regretted the West's failure to give adequate publicity to the Final Act, the general attitude of the US press, and Western "intervention in Portugal." This last point has also been singled out by the Warsaw Trybuna Ludu, and other impediments to progress were identified by the Poles as US columnist William Buckley, the West German Die Zeit, and former

- (25) Ranko Petkovic in the Belgrade Review of International Affairs, 5 December 1975.
- (26) Rabotnichesko Delo, 10 December 1975.
- (27) Partien Zhivot No.16, 1975.
- (28) Czechoslôvak TV, 24 November 1975.
- (29) Ibid., 30 October 1975.

US Undersecretary George Ball. (30) In spite of representing the Gierak-Schmidt meetings at Helsinki as an "admirable expression of the conference's spirit," the Polish media have shown special concern about the FRG's attitude to implementing the Final Act and have devoted much space to attacking the FRG opposition, (31) obviously because of the threat the latter poses to the Polish-West German agreement rather than as part of a general summation of the pluses and minuses of post-Helsinki behavior.

The Rumanians have blamed "strong reactionary forces" for any lack of progress but have been much less ready to identify these enemies by name -- perhaps because not all of them, in Bucharest's view, are to be found in the West. "It is hard," said Ceausescu prudently on Italian TV, "to assess progress after only six months." (32)

3. Deeds and Agreements

A survey of what has happened in Eastern Europe since Helsinki is clouded by the difficulty of distinguishing between deeds (individual actions, visits, etc.) and agreements attributable to it and things that would have happened anyway. Sometimes, indeed, the media credit the CSCE with an influence that does not properly belong to it. The Czechoslovak Zivot Strany (33) attributed both President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to the USSR and Czechoslovak Premier Strougal's trip to Paris to the beneficent influence of Helsinki (the frosty ending to the former was ignored), although such visits were of course a routine feature of the preconference scene.

There have, however, been individual acts that can clearly be laid at the CSCE's doorstep. Pavel Kohout, the dissident Czech writer, said on arrival in Lucerne for the first night of his play Roulette that his exit visa had undoubtedly been made possible by Helsinki. (34) The CSCE's magnetic field has not always produced the desired electricity, however: Rude Pravo (35) said,

(30) Trybuna Ludu, 25 August 1975.

(31) See Nowe Drogi, November 1975, and Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, December 1975.

(32) Scinteia, 20 November 1975.

(33) 24 November 1975.

(34) West German TV, 18 August 1975.

(35) 13 December 1975.

in referring to the refusal of a visa to a Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung correspondent, that: "We are justified, in the spirit of the Helsinki principles, in taking whatever decision we regard as most suitable." And on a larger scale, only 317 of the thousands of ethnic Germans who want to move from Czechoslovakia to the FRG were allowed to go in 1975.

The volume of cultural agreements and state-organized exchanges has shown no sign of rising above normal levels in Hungary and Poland, but Bulgaria has been more active in this sphere than in the past and Rumania probably so. In November 1975 Bulgaria signed a five-year cultural agreement with the FRG (which is also applicable to West Berlin) and a three-year plan on cultural co-operation with Greece; in December a "declaration on the principles of good-neighborliness and co-operation" was issued jointly by Bulgaria and Turkey; and in January 1976 a major exhibition of "Thracian Treasures from Bulgaria" opened in London (at least two British exhibitions in Sofia are planned for later in the year). The Rumanian-US trade agreement came into effect with some rolling of drums two days after the end of the Helsinki summit, and it has been followed by a spate of agreements and exchanges with the USSR and by cultural and scientific co-operation agreements with Mexico and Greece.

Economic and Technological Co-operation

The world of economic, scientific, and technological co-operation is largely insulated from the shocks the cultural flesh is heir to. Even the Czechoslovak regime, with its insistence on the ideological struggle and its rigidity in cultural affairs, has been almost enthusiastic about Basket Two of the Final Act and has tended to see the hand of Helsinki at work in inappropriate situations. A Czechoslovak-Austrian contract signed on 15 August 1975 which dealt with Austrian deliveries of equipment for the production of ethylene, for example, was hailed by Foreign Trade Minister Andrej Barcak as a "building stone laid in the spirit of Helsinki" (36) although contracts of this kind were frequently signed before the CSCE was held. On the other hand, Helsinki may have expedited the regime's decision to allow foreign companies direct representation within Czechoslovakia from 1 January 1976, instead of requiring them to use selected Czechoslovak foreign trade corporations as agents. The economic weekly Hospodarske Novine (37) said that Czechoslovakia might well

(36) Radio Hvezda, 18 August 1975.

(37) 7 November 1975.

participate in projects such as the creation of a uniform European railroad network and the development of container and water transport; the spade work, it suggested, could be done by the EEC, which "has accumulated experience in this field."

Bulgaria has concluded many contracts with, and has bought numerous licenses from, the West since Helsinki; it seems to have gone about as far in this direction as its primary economic loyalty to the Soviet Union and its balance of trade will permit. The Poles have joined in the general enthusiasm, and Sprawy Miedzynarodowe (38) said that economic co-operation is "part of the infrastructure of peace"; it went on:

The principles laid down by the Helsinki conference open up possibilities for the free development of trade, co-production and scientific and technological co-operation. We pin big hopes on this, because that kind of co-operation has brought some great advantages to our country. It has helped transform it into an industrial-agricultural state, and thanks to it Poland has achieved recently a rate of growth in its investments and production that is rarely found in other countries of the world.

Basket Two is a subject for study in its own right, and the examples and attitudes noted above can only indicate the trend rather than examine the field.

Rumania's Longer Look

The RCP has been looking further afield than Rumania or even Europe, and has hatched out a proposal for the creation of a new economic order in the world-based on the fundamental tenet that as long as there are vast differences in the wealth of its nations, there will be no peace. This proposal was approved by the Political Executive Committee in August and was later presented to the UN General Assembly. It has been accompanied, however, by a realistic recognition of the distance that must be traveled before these cloud-capped towers are reached, and the months since Helsinki have seen much activity by Rumania both inside and outside Eastern Europe. It is at the moment of writing the only country in the region (other than Yugoslavia) to have direct links with the EEC, and its emphasis under Ceausescu

(38) September 1975.

has never been on its links with any particular bloc but rather on the need of the developing countries (among which it numbers itself) for economic assistance from any quarter that is willing to give it. In a long article published some weeks after Helsinki, (39) Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Trade Ion Patan spoke of the need to "remove artificial obstacles" to trade in accordance with the spirit of the Final Act and to extend the most-favored-nation principle to all spheres of "industrial, technological, and financial co-operation." He added: "The countries participating in the CSCE cannot ignore the need to adopt special measures in favor of the less developed European states."

Rumania's economic and scientific exchanges with the West are unlikely to be held back by ideological hesitations, because its urgent need for them is frankly acknowledged -- sometimes with remarkable candor:

One of the serious shortcomings of contemporary Marxist thinking is its failure to foresee the vast scientific-technological revolution that has swept over the world in the last 30 years, and its acknowledgment of that revolution only reluctantly and after a long delay. . . . We must consider things with objectivity; we must distinguish between what is just and what is not; we must admit that Marxists do not hold an absolute monopoly of truth. Progressive non-Marxist thinkers may sometimes be right. (40)

A statement to cause rejoicing in the hearts of the good spirits of Helsinki, and a suitable note on which to end this part of the present study.

4. Basket Three

The Eastern view of Basket Three is perhaps best elucidated with the help of that well-worn metaphor, the Trojan Horse. At first the socialist camp would have none of this dangerous animal, fearing that if it was allowed within the walls, there would leap from it Mr. Bernard Levin, fully armed with the collected works of Solzhenitsyn. When it was realized that if there was to be no Basket Three, the West might not subscribe to Baskets One and

(39) "Socialist Rumania: Active Promoter of Economic Co-operation Among the European States," Lumea, 18 September 1975.

(40) Valter Roman in Revista de Filozofie No.5, 1975.

Two, the line changed, and it was gradually accepted that the beast, if properly fumigated with a strong solution of the 10 principles, could be rendered fairly harmless and might even form part of the communist cavalry. In other words, Basket Three was tolerable, provided the East could decide exactly what goods could be carried in it: the West must import only officially approved "socialist culture" and ignore the dissidents, while the East would accept only the products of "progressive" artists in the West. As was to be expected, these notions were quite unacceptable to the noncommunist half of the CSCE, and Basket Three therefore became and has remained the main point of dispute during the long months of negotiating at Geneva and in the post-Helsinki period.

The principal features of the East European regimes' powerful and sustained "action program" on this question have been as follows:

- a. Indiscriminate importing of culture from the West is rejected, and Western literature is often equated with racism, sex, and brutality;
- b. A distinction is made, however, between the dominant "bourgeois" culture of the West and the "democratic revolutionary" culture also to be found there;
- c. The West's proper partner in any exchanges is the officially approved "socialist culture";
- d. Western reciprocity in implementing the Final Act is inadequate even in this, the West's own chosen sphere;
- e. The situation calls for closer intrabloc collaboration.

The Sensitive Issue of Emigration

Many Western leaders insisted at Helsinki that détente is a matter of relations between societies rather than between states, and in Western eyes one of the crucial tests of Soviet and East European willingness to honor the letter and the spirit of the Final Act is the degree to which they are willing to ease their emigration restrictions.

It is much too early to form an opinion on whether they have passed or failed this test -- or even on the horizons of Western

expectations: will the West insist that relaxation in this sphere must apply to all citizens, or only to those members of minority groups who wish to leave? It seems likely that the more restrictive application will eventually be accepted, if only for the practical reason that complete freedom to emigrate would never be granted by the East, ostensibly on the grounds that the demand for it was an infringement of sovereignty.

In the case of minorities (especially those with ethnic links with Western countries), the West has not hesitated to apply pressure and to offer incentives. Differences of demography and history, both medieval and modern, are such that the size and shape of the problem differ from one East European country to the next. For example, although Bulgaria with its 800,000 Turkish minority (10 per cent of its total population) has by far the largest potential problem in numerical terms, there appears to be little pressure from Ankara for an acceleration of the southward flow; and Hungary's prosperous German minority of 200,000 (considerably greater than Czechoslovakia's) seems content to stay where it is. Czechoslovakia's 80,000 ethnic Germans are another matter: roughly a quarter of them want to move to the FRG, and Bonn has been trying -- so far with little success -- to persuade Prague to let them go.

The two countries in Eastern Europe most affected by the emigration issue are Poland and Rumania. According to official Polish figures for 1975, the German minority there numbers about 286,000, and the historic agreement reached by Gierak and Schmidt at Helsinki provides for 120,000-125,000 of these to be permitted to leave in the next four years. The Poles were encouraged to make this important concession by a West German promise of DM 1,300 million to cover benefits payable to Poles who had made social security contributions to the Third Reich during World War II, accompanied by a low-interest credit of DM 1,000 million. This agreement has not yet, of course, been ratified in Bonn -- and may not be. Until the West German legislature has approved it, there is little point in discussing whether Poland is honoring its provisions.

Although 250,000 Jews have left Rumania for Israel since World War II, and over 80,000 have gone to other countries, a further 80,000 still remain, and the question of exit permits for those of them who want to depart became a stumbling block in Rumanian-US economic relations in 1975. In January of that year the Soviet Union canceled a trade agreement with the US because of the emigration clauses in the US Trade Law of 1974, but the

Rumanians were not intimidated by this formidable precedent and went ahead with their own trade agreement with Washington (which involved MFN treatment for Bucharest). There followed a rigorous scrutiny by members of the US Congress of Rumanian emigration practice regarding Jews, however, and Ceausescu's anxiety about the fate of the agreement was great enough to cause him to visit Washington (following a trip to Mexico) in June. US suspicions were allayed, and President Ford signed the final documents during his visit to Bucharest in August, immediately after the Helsinki conference ended. Since then, whatever reliable evidence is available suggests that Rumania has allowed Jewish emigration to increase.

The German minority of about 400,000, however, is another matter. In a speech made in December 1975 on the day before FRG Foreign Minister Genscher's arrival in Bucharest, Ceausescu reiterated his stand on this question: individual instances may be viewed with compassion, but there can be no question of large numbers of ethnic Germans being allowed to go. This attitude seems unlikely to change in the near future.

A Polemical Response

The polemical nature of the East European media's handling of Basket Three is exemplified by this quotation from the Bulgarian Rabotnichesko Delo (41):

The biased interpretation of humanitarian aspects of the Helsinki conference— i.e., the so-called Basket Three which deals with the flow of people, ideas, and information — has become the basis of much anticommunist propaganda in recent times. . . . Anticommunists have made clear their intention to utilize this [part of the Final Act] to put ideological and political pressure on socialism. . . . The reactionaries do not hide their intention to interpret the Helsinki agreement as if it gave the green light for anticommunist activities within the socialist countries. . . . Helsinki is identified in the minds of certain circles with opportunities for direct interference in the socialist nations' domestic affairs.

This line, which is of course the Soviet one, was echoed by the Poles. An article in Nowe Drogi (42) said that Western

(41) 25 December 1975.

(42) September 1975.

suggestions concerning Basket Three were aimed at the so-called liberalization or "improvement" of socialism -- i.e., at the imposition of capitalist criteria and values. "This has found its expression in the forcing of a view that the main subject of co-operation in international relations is the individual person rather than the state or government." Ryszard Frelek expressed the same idea in terms more suited to Western consumption:

We favor the extension of the whole plane of contacts between nations. It is obvious, however, that these contacts must not be used for political and ideological subversion, for interference in internal affairs. (43)

Trybuna Ludu, (44) in emphasizing the primacy of Basket One, said that political relaxation must create favorable conditions for cultural exchanges -- not the other way round.

Both the Czechoslovaks and Rumanians have handled the question very polemically, but Hungary has preferred to concentrate on specific cases of Western default, rather than use up its adjectives on questions of general conduct.

The Shortcomings of Western Culture

Probably the most extreme comments on the subversive quality and decadence of much of Western culture and its unsuitability for Eastern ears and eyes have come from Bulgaria. Partien Zhivot (45) spoke bitterly of attempts to sell "the rotten products of imperialist subversion," and all the media have made frequent references to party leader Todor Zhivkov's Helsinki speech in which he said:

Open gates are a symbol of trust and hospitality. Our gates will be open to all with sincere hearts, with good and honest intentions, who observe the law, traditions, and customs of the home in which they live. (46)

But, it is implied, as firmly closed as before the CSCE to those whose hearts are lacking in "sincerity."

(43) Nowe Drogi, September 1975.

(44) 10 November 1975.

(45) No.16/1975.

(46) Rabotnichesko Delo, 31 July 1975.

The Czechoslovaks have been equally stern. Tribuna (47) summed up the official attitude by saying that "West European mass media simply serve as conduits for warmongering," and that the Western concept of Basket Three is a system of "thousands of communication channels -- 'bridges' designed to facilitate the passage and spreading of bourgeois ideas throughout the socialist countries." The same applies to the products of these countries' defaulters -- dissidents and expatriates. Radio Prague (48) said scathingly soon after Helsinki that: "No man of reason and culture will demand that a socialist state should publish Doctor Zhivago or books by Solzhenitsyn, which are political poison, not cultural assets."

In a long and important article in Kulpolitika, (49) Hungarian Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja provided a list of what, he claimed, the people of Hungary do and do not want. He said:

The Hungarian people are not interested in the "evaluation" of Hungary's domestic situation by reactionary Western politicians. The Hungarian people have a better knowledge of the country's situation and are able to judge it more accurately than these outsiders. Our people reject the ideas and obsolete concepts of knight-errants from the Middle Ages such as Solzhenitsyn or Mindszenty. Our people are interested in what is actually happening in the capitalist world, what the social system is like, their achievements, their difficulties, how the working man lives and thinks. Only this kind of information exchange promotes the cause of co-operation between countries, the improvement of the international atmosphere, and the strengthening of trust.

The West, he added mildly, tries to export "things that, with the best will in the world, we can only call cultural refuse."

The Rumanian media have attacked "violence, pornography, and mysticism" as agents of the West's "moral pollution," (50) a juxtaposition that would puzzle any mystics who happened to read it, and have said that cultural exchange must prevent the spread of "racism, war propaganda, and all that might sow discord between people." (51)

(47) 12 November 1975.

(48) 19 August 1975.

(49) No.4, 1975.

(50) Ion Margineanu in Contemporanul No.44, October 1975.

(51) Contemporanul No.32, August 1975.

The Two Faces of Western Culture

In the eyes of the Soviet and East European regimes, two quite distinct strains of culture exist alongside one another in the West: a dominant bourgeois, essentially reactionary culture, and a democratic, progressive, revolutionary culture that is at present less evident. It is with the latter that the socialist countries must seek co-operation. "We think," said Soviet Minister of Culture Pyotr Demichev in Budapest, (52) "that the task of the creative intelligentsia of the socialist countries, of our cultural workers, is to strengthen our ties with the democratic intelligentsia of the capitalist countries" -- i.e., with representatives of the democratic, revolutionary culture.

An initial move toward such co-operation was described in the Prague weekly Tvorba (53), whose editor-in-chief Jiri Hajek (not to be confused with the Jiri Hajek mentioned earlier in this paper) reported on a meeting of East-West cultural editors organized in Munich by Kurbiskern, a West German literary magazine well known for its pro-Soviet line. The purpose of the gathering was to explore the possibilities of expanding cultural co-operation between East and West, and it concluded that the crux of the matter was the intensification of contacts between "cultural workers in the socialist countries and the representatives of progressive trends in West European culture." If it is to fulfill its function properly, the socialist cultural world must acquire a better knowledge of what is going on in the West. For instance, Hajek said, very few people in the East are aware of the fact that the West German CP has succeeded in organizing a broad, coherent, progressive literary front, consistent with its class-oriented, militant cultural program. He ended by urging a "realistic offensive concept" of European cultural exchange; as an important part of the "great ideological competition," this should be considered a common cause by all socialist countries.

The Kurbiskern conference, incidentally, apparently revealed some discord between Czechoslovakia and Hungary. In his Tvorba article, Hajek pointedly mentioned that the Hungarians were absent, although they apparently did send an apologetic telegram.

(52) Nepszabadsag, 6 November 1975.

(53) 29 October 1975.

The Single Face of Socialist Culture

As a corollary, the West's appropriate partner in any exchanges must be party-bred and government-approved socialist culture. Dissidents and expatriates are not true representatives of the milieu from which they came and should be ignored by the West. The Slovak CP daily (54) said that the only proper study of Western mankind is "socialist art," which will participate in European co-operation "as a well-defined art formed by the progressive heritage and ideas of the strongest section of mankind, the working class." And the Rumanian writer Ion Iotreanu's view still dominates much East European thinking on this subject: those whose work lies outside the pale of this "well-defined art" should be prevented from exporting their products to the West:

It has long been necessary that seventh-rate authors who have left Rumania with their booklets under their arms, heading for foreign publishing houses, should be stopped at the customs. The world must take cognizance of the superlative values of true Rumanian culture. These do exist. (55)

Complaints of Lack of Reciprocity

The West's alleged failure to reciprocate in cultural and other exchanges is a common complaint. In the cultural sphere Hungarian Foreign Minister Frigyes Puja lamented that:

The organizations in the capitalist countries do little or nothing to introduce Hungarian cultural values to their people. The Hungarian People's Republic makes considerable material sacrifices to encourage the introduction of Western culture, but the authorities in the capitalist countries usually give no financial support to cultural exchanges, claiming that the state has no funds for this purpose. To put it bluntly, some Western politicians want the socialist countries to do all they can to introduce Western cultural values but do not think it self-evident that reciprocity is called for. . . .

The Hungarian masses would show little interest in many Western cultural products if our daily press, and

(54) Pravda (Bratislava), 30 September 1975.

(55) Saptamina No.229, 25 April 1975.

especially our periodicals, did not deal regularly with cultural life in the West and arouse an interest in it. Yet the Western press generally passes over in silence the cultural achievements of the socialist countries or discusses them maliciously, with the result that little interest is shown by the public. (56)

In Czechoslovakia, former Rude Pravo editor-in-chief Karel Doudera attacked the press lords for their stranglehold on the media:

The NATO states, which pressed in Helsinki for the so-called free dissemination of all information, were well aware that they themselves could not guarantee reciprocity. They always refuse to accept responsibility for the information published and broadcast in their countries on the grounds that their governments allegedly cannot influence the work of the media, or order them to publish this or that particular bit of information. What they propose is a road where the traffic runs in only one direction: they demand that the socialist states accept all sorts of information, yet the decision on what should be published in their own media about the socialist countries depends on the benevolence -- in many cases the malevolence -- of the owners of the media. (57)

These complaints, which originated in Moscow and have been echoed many times in Eastern Europe, are often backed by statistics which, since they ignore the all-important question of public demand for the works in question, look impressive. The following passage from a Radio Prague broadcast (58) (which concentrated on the position of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the West) is representative:

In the USSR, 220 in every 1,000 pupils learn English, while 240 study German and 40 French. Many millions of Soviet citizens understand Western languages. In the US and Great Britain only one in every 1,000 pupils learns Russian; in France and the GFR the figure is two per 1,000. The USSR has an Institute of Scientific and Technological Information that has processed 1,500,000 publications from 130 countries. Thus a Soviet expert can at any time obtain detailed information on the work of his colleagues in other countries. Between 1946 and

(56) Kulpolitika No.4/1975.

(57) Rude Pravo, 5 January 1976.

(58) 21 August 1975.

1972, the USSR published 6,305 books by American authors, 5,733 by French writers, 3,697 by Britons, and 724 by Italians. During the same period, the US published 450 books by Soviet writers, Great Britain 437, France 628, and Italy 407.

A Soviet entry visa can be obtained within seven days, but Soviet tourists have to wait 20 days for an Italian visa, 21 days for a US visa, and a month for one for West Germany, Switzerland, or Japan. While catering charges for foreign tourists have remained constant in the USSR since World War II, per diem prices for Soviet tourists in the last five years have jumped in Austria from 12 to 21 rubles, in Italy from 14 to 20, in Great Britain from 15 to 22, in the GFR from 19 to 28.

Delay in the granting of visas is a recurrent theme. The Polish media, too, have complained that Poles have to wait for weeks or even months for a visa to visit "allegedly free" Western countries, and the Hungarians boast that they grant tourist visas "within 48 hours to any Western citizen who requires one," whereas Hungarians can spend months waiting for permission to enter "some Western countries." (59)

The Strengthening of Intra-bloc Collaboration

The January conference of CC ideological secretaries, which was largely concerned with various aspects of relations with the West, has been mentioned in Part I of this study. Since Helsinki the frequency of gatherings devoted to intra-bloc cultural co-operation has increased sharply, and Rumania is the only country that is not always represented at them. A series of such meetings began with the reunion of socialist ministers of culture in Bucharest at the end of September, and has continued with a symposium of leading social scientists (Wisla, Poland, also in late September), a conference of editors of philosophical journals (Sofia, early October), a meeting of representatives of schools of journalism (Moscow, second half of October), and a four-day conference of publishers (Moscow, late January).

The two extremes of attitude to intra-bloc collaboration are probably represented by Czechoslovakia and Rumania. The Prague regime is an enthusiastic proponent of "socialist cultural integration," both on doctrinal grounds and because it offers hope of a wider audience for artists working in the smaller countries;

(59) Puja, op. cit.

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in contrast the Rumanians, as in other spheres, shy away from the word "integration" and the concept of the "national epic" seems to be preferred to that of "socialist culture." It is, however, no more liberal.

If these are the two extremes, an article in the HSWP daily (60) put the moderate Hungarian view well. It said that recent intrabloc meetings had "emphasized the need to pay increased attention to the new quality of international thinking as a factor in the intellectual life of the socialist countries." Although there was no specific reference to Helsinki in the article, its thought was almost certainly influenced by the conference.

5. Military Détente and the Way Ahead

As noted in Part I of this paper, there is general acceptance in Eastern Europe of the validity of Brezhnev's statement, made during the final session at Helsinki, that political détente must be followed by military détente. (61) (The MBFR negotiations in Vienna and SALT II in Geneva are accepted by both East and West as the main vehicles for achieving this end; their importance can hardly be overestimated, but their complexity is of course so great that they cannot be further considered here.) Acceptance of the Soviet view has usually been announced in nonpolemical terms, although there have been occasional jousts at alleged Western shortcomings; Rude Pravo (62) said that: "The attitude of the Western countries to the Helsinki conference . . . is shown by the fact that nothing has so far indicated their willingness to agree to military détente."

The responses of four of the five countries on this point are extremely similar (Rumania is again an exception), probably

(60) Pal E. Feher, "The New Quality of International Thinking," Nepszabadsag, 30 October 1975.

(61) See for example:

Novo Vreme (Sofia) No.9, 1975.

Pravda (Bratislava), 17 October 1975.

Nepszabadsag (Budapest), 25 December 1975.

Nowe Drogi (Warsaw), September 1975.

(62) 19 September 1975.

because of the tacit assumption that disarmament is a matter for the USSR and the US, while lesser creatures can only nod or shake their heads at appropriate moments. The only distinctive note seems to have been Czechoslovakia's reversion to a suggestion put forward by Finnish President Urho Kekkonen in 1964:

Now that conditions have been created in Europe which are more favorable to the implementation of the Finnish proposal, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe would be in keeping with the spirit of the Helsinki document. (63)

The Rumanians, once again, have their eyes fixed on the distant hills, far beyond the valleys of SALT and MBFR which are "only stages" in the long march toward total disarmament. The Rumanian government has sometimes shown impatience over the lack of progress in Vienna, however, and in December 1975 it demanded that all the European countries should be allowed to participate in the MBFR talks in an effort to break the deadlock. But the RCP is normally more interested in the broad sweep of theory, and has called time and again for the two major powers to disarm relatively faster than the smaller ones, for the withdrawal of all troops within their own boundaries, and for the disbandment of military blocs. Rumania has seen nothing in the post-Helsinki scene to persuade it to change its view that the long struggle toward true détente has only just begun, and that the nations of Europe should not look backward to Helsinki with satisfaction, or around them with hope, but forward with determination.

(63) Rude Pravo, 16 September 1975.

III. YUGOSLAVIA: HELSINKI SEEN THROUGH THE NONALIGNED EYE

When one turns to Yugoslavia after examining the response of the rest of Eastern Europe to Helsinki, the change of values and perspective is abrupt. To borrow a metaphor from geometry, the co-ordinates are transformed because the axes themselves have been translated. First, the existence of two main blocs each headed by a superpower is no longer a subconsciously accepted point of departure but something to be deplored and challenged; secondly, disarmament ceases to be a specialist province to be skirted round at Helsinki and dealt with later by the only two participating states whose decisions count in global terms, but an area on which all countries have the right to set foot and speak with an equal voice; and thirdly, the focal point of concern is no longer Central Europe but the Balkans.

Minic's Ten Points

To understand what Yugoslavia has said and done since Helsinki, it is necessary to go back to Foreign Minister Milos Minic's July 1973 speech during the opening phase of the CSCE. Yugoslavia has never wavered in its advocacy of the 10 points he propounded then, and they were echoed and restated by Ranko Petkovic, who, as already noted, is one of the country's leading political analysts, only a few weeks ago. (64) They are variations on two main themes: the independence of the sovereign and equal individual state vis-à-vis the bloc, and the formal recognition of principles that rule out any violation of that independence. Belgrade's points of concern, the things it wanted Helsinki to recognize and affirm, could not be spelled out more clearly.

We shall now examine briefly the three main aspects of Yugoslavia's present policy with regard to Helsinki and the process of détente in general.

Rejection of the Bloc Approach to Détente

The most distinctive feature of the Yugoslav view of international politics in general and détente in particular is its rejection of the concept of the bloc, which is far more

(64) Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), 5 December 1975.

radical than Rumania's concern about the existence of military blocs. The thesis received a classical exposition from Tito during his closing speech at Helsinki on 31 July 1975:

This conference has been held at a time when Europe is still divided into blocs. The limitations imposed by this fact have influenced its proceedings and are reflected to some extent in its documents. The building up of new relationships within Europe based on equal respect for the interests of all countries and a steady expansion of areas of co-operation assumes, however, that this division into blocs can be surmounted. When we, as a non-aligned country, advocate the end of all blocs and closed systems of integration, we do so because we want to see the elimination of everything that divides countries and nations and limits their co-operation, and because we are deeply convinced that such a change is essential to lasting security and peace in Europe and in the world as a whole. (65)

The speech enunciated a theme on which the Yugoslav media have built their variations ever since.

Yugoslavia's rejection of the bloc concept is of course rooted in its postwar history. In the Stalinist era, acceptance of membership of the Soviet camp meant absorption while refusal courted annihilation. In the 1970s this recusance continues as an expression of the LCY's stubborn rejection of any sort of Soviet ideological monopoly, and the bloc system is still seen as the fons et origo of much that is evil. According to Petkovic, (66) Europe today is "the scene of the most ferocious imaginable confrontation between bloc powers" and the bloc system is the chief reason why détente "has not yet developed into a world-wide process of relaxation of tension." The two superpowers, it is complained, see détente as "something to be arranged between bloc groupings." Since Helsinki the Yugoslavs, while continuing to criticize the US roundly and regularly, have not concealed their belief that they have more to fear from the Soviet Union. But their distaste for blocs is comprehensive: collusion and collision between the two major groups are both regarded as holding threats for the nonaligned countries, as the opposite faces of the same dangerous coin.

Another well-known political analyst, Vladi Teslic, must have set the echoes flying in Peking when he denounced the two super-

(65) Borba, 1 August 1975.

(66) Op. cit.

powers not only for their strictly bloc approach to détente but also for their obvious desire to extend their fiefs rather than dissolve them; neither the US nor the USSR, he said, encourages co-operation between communist and noncommunist parties in Western countries, which is a travesty of the Helsinki spirit. In a "bipolar world imbued with bloc thinking" it is obvious that the two superpowers have to come to some sort of arrangement to prevent "the annihilation of the globe," but they have gone far beyond these legitimate bounds and have extended the bloc concept to justify "global appraisals, hegemony, and interference in other countries' internal affairs." (67)

Disarmament

The second point on which Yugoslavia differs from the majority of the Helsinki powers is the handling of the disarmament question. Miljenko Vukovic, a senior Foreign Ministry official, said that:

The representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact felt that the military aspects of European security had no place on the agenda of the Helsinki conference, and accordingly tried to separate out the disarmament problem and reserve it for bilateral or bloc-to-bloc negotiations. (68)

Thanks to Yugoslavia and to "certain small and medium-sized countries in both military alliances," he said, the superpowers finally accepted that disarmament should be discussed, but only to a very limited extent. General Džane Petkovski, the Assistant Secretary for National Defense, complained that the CSCE "provided only the sketchiest of answers to questions relating to the military aspect of European security and to the correlation between military and political considerations." (69) Ideological differences remained in spite of the acceptance of détente, and they tended to perpetuate the arms race; agreement on political questions must therefore be complemented by agreement on disarmament. The Final Act's meager provision for the compulsory notification of major maneuvers was an indication of the conference's failure to examine the general question of armaments in depth, and what the Yugoslavs had looked for in the aftermath of Helsinki

(67) Borba, 21 and 23 January 1976.

(68) Review of International Affairs, 20 September 1975.

(69) Ibid., 5 January 1976.

was a "willingness on the part of states to refrain from military activities that might have an opposite effect" to the one intended by the conference. And that, alas, is precisely what they have not found.

The second main feature of the Yugoslav standpoint on military détente is that peace is one and indivisible, and agreements designed to ensure it cannot be delimited to the continent of Europe. If they are, conflagrations from outside the area will burn their way into it -- especially in an age in which technology has nullified the cordon sanitaire provided by geographical separation. The reason for Belgrade's advocacy of this argument (which is dangerous in that its logical conclusion is that problems which cannot be solved globally should not be tackled regionally) is the so-called "Mediterranean dimension" -- Yugoslavia's feeling of vulnerability in the face of conflict in that area, possibly involving a European and an Asian or African state. It was largely at Yugoslav insistence that this extra dimension was included in the Helsinki geometry, and a special document adopted by the conference called for increased trust to be displayed in relations between the participant countries and those Mediterranean states that were not represented at the CSCE. Yugoslavia has perhaps made more of this concession to its views than the outcome seems to justify: a gesture was made, and one and a half pages of blameless prose were included in the Final Act; but no more.

The Balkans and the Principles of Helsinki

Thirdly, Yugoslavia, as a Balkan country, is conscious of the political and strategic importance of that region to the countries of Central and Northern Europe, and Petkovic (70) reiterated the official line that conflicts among the individual Balkan states were attributable to extraneous influences rather than to any inherent quarrelsomeness among their inhabitants. It was therefore "exceptionally important" that "sovereign equality" should be strictly observed in relations among Balkan states and between them and the outside world. "It is natural to assume," he concluded optimistically, "that this principle [of noninterference] adopted at Helsinki will be strictly adhered to in Balkan relations."

The Balkan Conference sponsored by Greece and held in Athens from January 26 to February 5 (and also attended by Bulgaria,

(70) Op. cit.

Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey) has been claimed as a triumph of the Helsinki spirit -- although the thin results suggest that the main wonder consists in its participants having persuaded themselves to sit down together rather than in what happened after they had done so.

Specific Features of Yugoslavia's Response to Helsinki

Yugoslavia's practical reaction to Helsinki has taken several forms, which will now be considered.

The agreement with Italy signed in Ancona in November 1975 has been hailed in Yugoslavia as a valuable pearl from the Helsinki oyster. It is claimed to have brought to an end decades of intermittent friction between the two countries on the question of Trieste and the associated border region, and was held up rather pointedly (obviously with Bulgaria in mind) as an example of how the "most complex territorial disputes, encumbered by historical, national, and emotional factors, can be resolved." (71) Sofia appeared to be looking the other way, however, and any hopes of a swift, Helsinki-inspired resolution of the much more incandescent Macedonian problem were dashed when the Bulgarian census planned for December went through in spite of Belgrade's protests about its failure to take the "fact of the Macedonian nation" into account.

Italian-Yugoslav rapprochement was followed by an easing of relations with Austria in December, when Chancellor Bruno Kreisky paid a "fruitful" visit to Belgrade in which progress seems to have been made in resolving difficulties associated with the Croatian and Slovene minorities in Austria. Again, the Yugoslav media made much of the emollient effect of Helsinki, which had prepared the way for what seems to have been a genuine if minor achievement.

On the question of Basket Three, Yugoslavia plainly feels that it has already found the golden mean, avoiding alike the restrictiveness of the East and the permissiveness of the West. Consequently, it believes there is little left for it to do other than make noises of good will about the principles involved. Basing its position on the seventh of Minic's ten points, it has, however, criticized the Americans for trying to use freer flow as a means of infiltration and of interfering in the internal affairs of others, and the Soviets for attempting to "absolutize the

(71) Review of International Affairs, 5 December 1975.

ideological struggle" in their interpretation of Basket Three. (72)
On this question Yugoslavia stands much closer to the West than to the East, and the former must be more concerned to persuade the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to emulate Yugoslavia's attitudes to the freer movement of people and information than to urge Belgrade to open its windows wider.

Turning from deeds to words, the most valuable features of Yugoslavia's response to Helsinki are perhaps its recognition of the precarious and essentially transitional nature of coexistence; its insistence that attempts to achieve "ideological monopoly" can only lead to fresh conflicts, including possibly armed ones; and its proclaimed faith in the nonaligned countries' potential role in resolving interbloc problems and dissolving the calcification that accompanies too rigid an attitude held for too long a time.

(72) Borba, 23 January 1976.

IV: A SUMMING UP

The special characteristics of the East European countries' response to Helsinki that emerge from this study are as follows:

1. Bulgaria's reaction has been almost identical with that of the Soviet Union;
2. Czechoslovakia's response has also reflected that of the Soviet Union. But in the manner of the response it is sometimes possible to detect inner regime tensions. The hardliners, haunted still by 1968, often seem bent on demanding an even sterner orthodoxy than the regime's dependence on Moscow would seem to require; the moderates have shown their influence in a flexibility of implementation of the Final Act that sometimes seems incompatible with the rigidity of the official line reflected in the media;
3. Hungary, while chanting the correct responses, has shown a lack of enthusiasm for ideological strife and has concentrated on the practical harvest to be reaped from Helsinki. The Kadar leadership's relatively liberal attitude to individual and cultural freedom has been reflected in the restraint shown by the media in dealing with Basket Three;
4. Poland, although it toes the Moscow line on the "true nature" of détente, has been preoccupied with the FRG relationship and its domestic economic problems;
5. Rumania's response has reflected the distinctive style of its leadership: ideological rigidity is mandatory, but it must not be dictated from a foreign "center," and nations should not be bound by misconceived bloc loyalties. In Rumanian eyes Helsinki was only the first step in a long journey, and momentum will be lost if the participating states concern themselves too much with consolidation and implementation instead of looking to the future. Above all, Helsinki has offered an opportunity to indulge in some upstaging of the USSR, some shifting of the spotlight from Brezhnev to Ceausescu. The conference was for Rumania a forum in which its autonomy within the Soviet alliance could be demonstrated to the rest of the world, and the walls of the moat of its sui generis foreign policy consolidated;

6. Yugoslavia. All perspectives alter when seen through Yugoslavia's nonaligned eye. The main features of its attitude to Helsinki are: European security is integral with that of the rest of the world, and resolution of Balkan tensions and recognition of the "Mediterranean dimension" are essential if peace is to be preserved; disarmament should have received far more attention at the conference and requires a radical approach; both the Soviet and US interpretations of Basket Three are extremist; and, above all, the "bloc approach" is inherently flawed.

The period of just over six months that has passed since Helsinki is of course too short for a confident prognosis to be possible. Nonetheless, two clearly identifiable trends have emerged: first, the Soviet Union and its East European allies have launched an action program to further the Eastern view of the nature of co-operation and to scotch Western hopes of ideological détente; secondly, they have made this intransigence slightly less unpalatable by salting it with a series of small actions calculated to demonstrate the bloc's fidelity to the letter of the Final Act. All this has been accompanied by unprecedentedly strenuous attempts to tighten up the unity of the socialist community.

The Great Schism

At the heart of all the differences that emerged at Geneva, at Helsinki, and since the conference closed is a fundamental schism between East and West on the basic nature of détente. In the Western view détente means the replacement of arms by the confidence that there is no need for them; the breaking down of barriers so that people, ideas, and information can flow freely across national frontiers and economic co-operation can be free of political or ideological impediments; and the acceptance by both sides that there is room for differences of opinion on great matters. In the Eastern view it means a reduction of armaments after a long bargaining process in which each side tries to score points and from which trust is wholly absent; the canalizing of the flow of information and individuals so that there is increased "freedom" to report on the virtues and successes of the socialist order and to exchange controlled news and other material carrying the regime imprimatur; and the acceptance by both sides that the communist East, "knowing itself to be in possession of truth," has

the right to seize the opportunities offered by détente for intensifying the class struggle and the conversion of the West to socialism without granting reciprocity to its competitor.

The problem now facing the West is how to reduce that gap without damaging the principles of its concept of democracy.

The Outlook

The Final Act, the result of a compromise, has been invoked by both sides to prove their points, and the practical steps taken so far to implement it have been encouraging straws in a wind whose constancy cannot yet be determined. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union's actions in Angola and elsewhere and the aggressive nature of its post-Helsinki propaganda have devalued these tokens of détente, leaving the ordinary Western citizen asking himself whether the CSCE has won anything worth the wear of winning.

Eastern Europe, with its long tradition of contacts with the West, has responded to Helsinki with a more relaxed posture and a less suspicious eye, but its commitment to the Soviet interpretation is unchallengeable and the main question (to which an answer will probably be deducible before the follow-up meeting planned for Belgrade in 1977) is whether Eastern Europe can preserve such flexibility as it has in the tightening grip of "socialist unity."

Nevertheless, there is room for some optimism. At the closing session in Helsinki, 35 heads of state and party and government found themselves able to sign a lengthy and detailed document that indubitably committed them to various forms of action, and this is a solid gain that cannot be entirely whittled away with the knives of "interpretation." Again, one looks back over the intervening months to the Polish protesters seizing upon Helsinki as an argument for their case that could not be dismissed out of hand by the authorities, and to the lady in Haskovo hopefully asking for a travel document on the strength of it. Plainly, the ordinary citizen in Eastern Europe has realized that at least some of the light flowing from the conference may be used to let him see where to place his feet when he tries to move forward along the road to greater personal freedom.

Whatever the disappointments of these six months, Helsinki has provided a yardstick that the East European countries and

governments cannot disown, if only because they helped to set it up, and against this yardstick their policies must to some extent be measured even in their own eyes. It has also given their peoples a name to invoke and a hope, however elusive, to cherish.

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• RAD Background Report/44
(Eastern Europe)
16 February 1976

MAJOR ECONOMIC CHANGES FLOW FROM COMECON TRADE DEVELOPMENT

By Herry Trend

Summary: In an Radio Budapest interview, Bogomolev and Bognar signaled a partial Soviet shift of investments from resource development to savings, and the consequent need for Comecon members to increase their participation in the development of the Soviet extractive sector. Soviet prices of raw material and fuel deliveries are expected to rise, indicating a further deterioration in the terms of trade for its Comecon partners. The need to deal with this situation will require a restructuring of the economies of East European buyers of Soviet goods, which will necessitate considerable domestic investment resources and a slowing down of the improvement of living standards.

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"Very serious theoretical and practical grounds for change" have somewhat modified the Soviet Union's future role as the raw material and fuel supplier for Comecon members, according to Oleg Bogomolev, director of the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System and leader of the Soviet delegation to the third round-table conference of Soviet and Hungarian economists, which ended its session last weekend in Budapest. The chairman of this conference and director of the Hungarian World Economic Institute, Jozsef Bognar, recognize that these and other changes affecting Hungarian-Soviet economic relations will have far-reaching effects on the Hungarian economy for many years to come, and require broad-gauge modifications in economic policies. These were the views expressed by the two well-know economic spokesmen in an interview which was aired, following the conference, by Radio Budapest on February 10.

Over the past 15 years, according to Bogomolev, Soviet exports of raw materials and fuels to Comecon members grew at twice the growth rate of domestic production in this sector. Rising domestic and Comecon needs have forced the Soviet Union to tap poorer deposits found in Siberia, which entail higher investment and transportation costs. As a result, the Soviet Union has decided to divert some investments away from the extractive sector into areas designed to improve the efficiency of the utilization of existing raw material supplies. The Soviet expert also expressed the view that Comecon members probably will follow the Soviet lead in this shift of investment.

Bogomolev noted that "advanced trends" for co-operation in the basic raw material sector will be intensified. This is Bogomolev's shorthand expression connoting additional large joint investments by Comecon members in the development of Soviet raw materials.

In the current five-year plan period (1976-1980), 10 of the largest joint investment projects already sponsored by Comecon will require resources totaling between 9,000 million and 10,000 million transferable rubles in value. This figure does not include associated investments needed in each country. The Soviet Union is not only asking its partners to make up some of the reductions in Soviet investments, but also to follow the Soviet lead in expanding investments which are designed to save raw materials.

In spite of these large investments by Comecon members, raw material and fuel prices for intra-Comecon deliveries have risen dramatically over the last two years, and are also expected again to go up significantly in 1977. As a result of price changes in the raw material sector, the terms of trade have shifted significantly in favor of the raw material supplier, and against the seller of finished industrial products.

The changes in the terms of trade will require the removal of obstacles to economic co-operation. This program will entail, according to Bogomolev, improved co-operation among planning agencies, improvements in the economic mechanism of integration, an expansion of co-operation in relatively "untapped" areas, which would stimulate a much broader exchange of consumer goods and production co-operation in the agricultural machinery industry, and the development of multinational interenterprise co-operation which does not require interstate interference.

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In the latter case, it is not clear from Bogomolev's statements whether he is referring primarily to co-operation exemplified by the newly established international economic associations, which were advocated in the Comecon Comprehensive Program for Economic Co-operation and Integration, or interenterprise economic activities outside such institutionalized arrangements; hitherto, the Soviet Union has been a champion of the Comecon-type international enterprise. In either case, where significant quantities of resources become involved it seems very unlikely that state agencies allocating these resources will not also become involved, along with the whole gamut of other state organizations directing or regulating economic activities of national economic organizations -- at least under the economic mechanism and organizational systems currently employed throughout Eastern Europe.

After noting the tendencies concerning changes in the terms of trade within Comecon, and the consequences, Bogomolev noted that although this development "should definitely give food for thought" to the economists, "one must not overdramatize the situation."

Bognar's outline of Hungary's program for dealing with the situation developing in the foreign trade field does not fully reflect this warning against overdramatization of the consequences flowing from Hungary's deteriorating position in the terms of trade, which favor the Soviet Union.

A radical transformation of Hungary's productive structure is indicated by Bognar. According to him, this will take considerable time, with initial benefits being felt only in 1978 and 1979. Two subsequent phases will require two or three additional years. According to Bognar, such long-term investments requiring huge resources will mean a further growth in Hungary's international indebtedness.

A more rapid responsiveness to market and technological changes than has been the case with the Hungarian economy will also be required. Long-term planning, according to Bognar, must take into consideration the accelerated technological changes if Hungary is to avoid the type of drastic modifications of the Hungarian economic structure now being carried out coupled with promises of only minimal improvements in living standards for five years or even a longer time span. Economic development policies based on mere extrapolations of the past are too costly a process and one that can lead to severe economic dislocations. Bognar apologized for past errors, pleading that no one could have foreseen the drastic changes the world economy experienced during the 1970s.

Turning to future Hungarian-Soviet trade, Bognar foresaw closer ties based on "forms of co-operation" which "will help Hungary satisfy the growing demands of Soviet market" and its insistence on higher qualitative requirements.

Although more detail is missing concerning the subject matter of the third Hungarian-Soviet conference of economists, it is clear from the interview that the group did work out the "guiding principles for bilateral co-operation on a long-term basis, as well as elaborating and co-ordinating concepts for a long time ahead." An outside observer can expect more information to appear in specialized economic journals, particularly those published in Hungary.

The foreign trade problems and their broader economic implications discussed by the Hungarian-Soviet gathering are not unique to this bilateral economic relationship. In one form or another, they apply to all Comecon members in their dealings with the Soviet Union. The solutions to these problems will also require extensive adjustments in the economic structure of each country, and modifications of economic policies. The repercussions of these changes will be felt beyond 1980. (047)

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RAD Background Report/42
(Czechoslovakia)
13 February 1976



WHAT ARE YOUNG PEOPLE REALLY LIKE TODAY?

(A translation with comment by the Czechoslovak Unit)

Summary and Introduction: An educator, Jaroslav Kojzar, and a journalist, Miroslava Kunova, discussed the question of the profile of youth today with Chairman Jindrich Polednik of the Socialist Youth Union's Central Committee. The interview, which is translated in full below, was published in the CPCS CC weekly Tribuna (No. 4, 21 January 1976) under the title of "The Young." Polednik declared at the start that great changes had occurred among the young in the past few years; in contrast to the muddled thinking of the young during the crisis period, at present the large majority support the policies of the party. In this connection, the question of "differentiation" of the youth was raised. According to Polednik, one cannot put the various groups of young people into watertight compartments; a merely black and white picture would be wrong. However, even those among the youth who search for answers to many fundamental questions are "our" potential allies, while those who may commit offenses today could change tomorrow. The main thing is to try to educate all young people politically. Next, the discussion revolved around who should do this work and how it should be done. Polednik enlarged upon this point in general terms and also cited some examples. As far as concrete forms of this work are concerned, Polednik said that this would be the subject of future interviews, which are planned. It is an interesting facet of this interview that Polednik expressed his opinion about what "commitment" (of the young) means: "active participation in the life of the collective and society, interest in public affairs, active creative participation in fulfilling work tasks, the desire to give society something more than is one's minimum duty."

* * *

Some people say: they are uneducated, we were never like that, they lack enthusiasm. On the other hand, there are others who praise their merits: they too, however, add a but.

Actually, the matter is not all that complicated. It is only necessary to reflect whether the mistakes for which we criticize the young -- if mistakes they are -- are not mistakes of ours, of the example we set, of our education, or our "I haven't got time."

And then -- in his time the great Picasso provided the answer for many of the critics when he replied to the question about what present-day youth is like: "Terrible. What a pity that we no longer belong to it."

What, then, is our present-day youth like? -- We, too, decided to give an answer. Therefore, we went to see Comrade Jindrich Polednik, the chairman of the Central Committee of the Socialist Youth Union.

"First," he told us, "one must state that during the past five or six years, particularly since the 14th congress of our party, great changes have set in among the young people. After the period of crisis and destruction there was much confusion, a diversity of opinions, muddle, in the minds of the young. -- And now? -- The absolute majority of the young support the policies of the communist party and pin their lives and prospects to socialism. Neither individuals nor small groups that merely pretend "to go along" with society or feed upon it while committing antisocial offenses can detract from this."

What do these successes spring from?

"This is the result of the wise and high-principled policies of our communist party and its Central Committee. It springs from the fact that we work with the young and from the way in which we are able to acquaint the young with the policies of the party and to explain these policies plausibly to them; this is the endeavor to create societal and social securities for the boys and girls and the trust in them we demonstrate by approaching them."

"In this context, the words of Comrade Husak come to mind. He always emphasizes, when speaking about the young, that one's attitude toward the young is one's attitude toward the present and the future."

We stopped the tape-recording and began to think aloud together. We came to the question of the differentiation of the young. We said: the most numerous group is clearly the one that supports the policies of the party, as you have said. It differs from the smaller group by its commitment. However, what actually is commitment?

The answer is not easy -- if only because at various places the term commitment is defined in different ways. And Comrade Polednik told us about some professor from somewhere near Prerov [Moravia] who organized sports at his school for many years. With the help of the students he refuted many incorrect opinions on physical education and sports. He recruited many of the young people for sports, he was an example to them, and he enjoyed authority among them. During the crisis years he refused to join the "progressivists" and continued to engage in his useful, painstaking work with the young. This was also one of the reasons why, in 1968, "his children" were dissuaded from adventures. -- And later? -- Opinions were expressed that this particular comrade had not shown commitment.

"And this is the answer," Comrade Polednik said. "In my opinion, commitment is active participation in the life of the collective and in the life of society. Interest in public affairs, active, creative participation in the fulfillment of tasks at one's place of work and at school. The endeavor to give something more than merely my basic duties to society."

We talked a long time about youth collectives at mines and foundries,

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about Pionyr leaders, young harvest combine operators, young scientific workers, and some young artists. However, what about that second group?

"One cannot flatly state that one group has linked its life and prospects with socialism, actively supports the policies of the party, that these young people are members of the party, the Socialist Youth Union, or other societal organizations. And that the other group is against [all this], does not participate in anything, etc. In this case, one cannot view everything as only white or only black.

"I would say that there is a part of the young people who look for answers to many fundamental questions they face in life, too; it is our duty to provide them with answers. Then, there are those who do their duty at their place of work or at school, but their active attitude toward society only goes that far. It is their dream to arrange their life so that it is easy, without worries, to obtain an apartment quickly, to buy a car or week-end cottage -- and television or the radio are there to entertain me! -- Hence, these are boys and girls who would like to get more than they give.

"Despite this, even this part of the young is our potential ally. It is only necessary to find a way to shake them out of this unsound ease and quiet, to draw them into life at their places of work and residence. I admit that this is neither simple nor easy, and we devote a lot of thought to this at the Youth Union.

"And then there are individuals or small groups who drift into an anti-socialist position and even commit offenses against our laws.

"The reasons? -- There are many, which also apply to adults, in the upbringing and in the family, in the influence of the environment or various small bands, in the fact that we are unable to prevent a bad development, and after this it is too late.

"What I have said, however, does not mean that a youngster who strays from the path of virtue and commits an offense today, could not change tomorrow. Or conversely, there are cases where even a good comrade falters. All this merely demonstrates the immense work awaiting us at the Socialist Youth Union, the other societal organizations, in education at the places of work, at school, and in the family. Indeed, it remains a fact that where we fail to exert our influence, our enemy does so."

We agreed with him. And again we pondered the influence of adults. It is positive, as well as negative. Much has already been written about young boys who come from school and who instead of being assigned jobs with the best workers -- are merely used as "stopgaps," and are left to themselves, and later we are surprised if they feel disappointed and do not return to their original job after having completed their compulsory military service. Equally often, we read about disrupted families -- and this brings us to the same question: can one be surprised if a child brought up under these circumstances gets into conflict with the law?

"The collective can do much to correct this -- it can help mold the personality and character of a young person. It can help him find the correct path in life. And this applies not only to his closest fellow workers, but also to the whole workshop, factory, Youth Union organization.

"Only, it is not merely the correction of mistakes that is at issue. That is to say, we have touched upon marginal cases -- what is at stake here is the need to devote attention to all young people, to their edification, education, and self-realization."

What does this care amount to? -- we asked. Does it not happen that promises only remain on paper? And conversely -- is not too much attention given to the young sometimes? -- As far as this last question is concerned, we agreed that there are not many cases of this kind. But where they do occur, they really may constitute an obstacle to the development of a young person. To get anything without one's own effort may mean that, in due course, one does not value anything.

What attention is actually devoted to the young?

"Generally a good sort of attention," Comrade Polednik replied. "From the central agencies down to the enterprises or schools. This does not mean, however, that awareness of responsibility toward the young is always sufficiently strong every place."

"To give an example: if we want -- as we do -- young people actively to participate in fulfilling the plan and ensuring that the tasks of a plant, cooperative, etc., are carried out, they must know what is involved, what these tasks are, and by which means these jobs can be accomplished. For instance, a short time ago the Ostrava Regional Committee of the Socialist Youth Union called a meeting of chairmen of the primary organizations at enterprises in which the plan was not being fulfilled. When the reasons for this were discussed, it was found that the large majority of the chairmen of the primary organizations -- that is, the leading Youth Union members there -- did not know what was necessary, how they could help, and where additional effort was required."

"What does this tell us?"

"This shows that the economic leadership of these plants and the party and trade union organizations there do not devote sufficient attention to the young people, that a certain amount of faith in them is lacking there, and that possibly the executives do not know how to take advantage of the initiative of the young. And apparently even the officials of the Socialist Youth Union at these places have not given any thought to how the Youth Union could help, what contribution it could make."

This means that aid is not the only problem. Often financial help is not enough to settle matters. To know the situation and what one should ask of the young people is also necessary. We also discussed this point with Comrade Polednik.

"Certainly, youth is often talked about, it is also mentioned in the plans and aims of the enterprises and societal organizations. However, these plans are not the main thing -- although they testify to the interest in the young -- the main thing is a real knowledge of the local problems of the young. The party bodies ought to be well acquainted with the situation. In most instances this is the case, but we also encounter the sort of state of affairs described above. And where this applies, it may happen that material security is mixed up with work with the young."

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We talked about cases where "the knowledge of the youth problems involved" sometimes means the information [received by] the chairman of the primary organization of the Socialist Youth Union immediately before a meeting, about how elsewhere the entire political work of the higher agency is confined to the process of compiling statistics, or how mass political activity is equated with the largest number of tickets sold for a big beat concert.

And we asked: How do you actually envisage work with the young?

"I shall answer by citing an example. Recently, I visited the CKD Locomotive Works and had a talk with the chairman of the all-works party committee there. I was pleasantly surprised about his knowledge of the problems of the young. He knew not only where the young are working well, but also who did not fulfill the plan, in which matters their opinions are unclear, what the young cannot cope with, what questions they ask, etc. He told me: If we are to answer such questions or do effective mass political work -- combative political work -- we must know the opinions and problems of the young people in the first place. This is the basic precondition. And something else -- we must know these opinions not merely second-hand, via some intermediary, but from our own concrete experiences gained in discussions with the young people. We must be able to create an atmosphere in which they will candidly tell us what is bothering and hurting them.

"The second stage is to act on the basis of this knowledge. Without the first stage, this is not possible.

"Some parents also imagine it is enough for the upbringing of their children if they get anything they want, that it is necessary to remove even the slightest difficulty for the individual to develop well. At the same time, these parents may not even realize that they are actually harming their child. A young person brought up in this manner and entering life often is unable to cope with even the most minor conflict situation, he falters at the first obstacle and succumbs to stress. The boys or girls are unhappy, and actually the parents only reap what they imprudently sowed."

Our talk was coming to an end, and we agreed it would be the first of several similar ones to come, if only because the young people are our tomorrow and this tomorrow will depend on how we prepare it today. Therefore, here are some closing remarks by Comrade Polednik:

"I believe the main and fundamental thing is -- to have faith in the young people and not to be afraid to assign them responsible and exacting work. At the same time, the young must be taken as they are. One must know that they may have some shortcomings aside from positive aspects; however, this ought not to be a problem.

"That is to say, sometimes comrades look at a youngster through eyes which are 20, 30, or 40 years older. And this is a mistake. We must be able to put ourselves in the place of 16- or 18-year-olds with their problems. After all, we, too, were not always all that prudent at that age.

"And another thing: The need to tell the truth to the young. If this truth is bitter, it does not matter. They will accept it. On the other hand, even a slight hint of an untruth or the endeavor to evade an awkward question could complicate our political educational work for a long time to come.

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
"Something else we must not forget: We must know how to get close to the young. We must not be afraid to enter into discussions with them and to get at the crux of problems. But we have already talked about this.

"As far as concrete forms of work are concerned -- let us leave this question for next time." (041)

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RAD Background Report/43
(World Communist Movement)
13 February 1976



AGREEMENT ON "FUNDAMENTAL LINES" OF CONFERENCE DRAFT?

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: A member of the Italian delegation to the preparatory meetings for a pan-European conference, Antonio Rubbi, has said that at the last 10-day meeting agreement was reached on the "fundamental lines" of a draft document, but that some questions remain to be settled. Confirming the agreement, chief delegate Pajetta has said that "nothing has been decided that is contrary to our preoccupations." Both express satisfaction with the way preparations are now going, but Rubbi's article warns against "distorted interpretations" -- with polemical reference to Soviet and East German statements.

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Two members of the Italian CP's delegation to the preparatory meetings for a pan-European conference of communist parties have stated that agreement was reached on a common document at the 10-day editorial session held in East Berlin on January 13-22 -- and both have expressed satisfaction at the way the preparatory process is now going. One of them, however, adds that the agreement concerns the "fundamental lines" of the document, and that "there still remain questions to be studied and discussed," so that further preparatory meetings will have to be held.

The two are Gian Carlo Pajetta, head of the Italian delegation, and Antonio Rubbi, who ranks third in it (after Sergio Segre). Pajetta's remarks on the conference were made in an interview given to a French leftist weekly (1) Rubbi's comments came in an article (2)

- (1) "Gian Carlo Pajetta (PCI): 'Communistes et socialistes peuvent et doivent travailler ensemble,'" Le Nouvel Observateur, 2 February 1976.
- (2) Antonio Rubbi, "Interpretazioni e realtà," Rinascità, 6 February 1976.

- 2 -

in the current issue of the PCI's theoretical weekly in the course of which he polemicized with Soviet and East German views on inter-party relations, expressed in connection with the conference. The two are complementary, but it seems better to consider Pajetta's shorter contribution first, before proceeding to Rubbi's more substantial article.

Nothing "Imposed"

Asked about the "difficulties and delays" the conference project had encountered, Pajetta said that the delay had a positive aspect, since it showed that "there are no documents or positions that have been proposed, or rather imposed, from outside." He went on:

We have reviewed all the questions of method, and defined the goals and the limits of the conference itself. The work of drawing up the common document -- which is now ready and which is in the course of being discussed within each of the 28 parties -- has given rise to fruitful exchanges. It seems to me that the principal value of this conference, for the moment, lies precisely in these exchanges and these discussions.

As regards the Italian Communist Party more particularly, one can add that nothing has been decided that is contrary to our preoccupations, or to what we judge it necessary to affirm through such a conference.

Can one detect in that last sentence an implicit note of caution? Does Pajetta mean that nothing has so far been decided that is contrary to the PCI's interests, but that the interparty game is not yet over? This would seem to be plausible, not only because of past experience (notably the SED's reversion to a "general-line" draft in November, after it had presented a limited and broadly acceptable draft in October) but also in the light of Rubbi's statement that some questions have still to be settled.

As for the probable date of the conference, Pajetta said: "I think it will be fixed after the congresses of the French, Soviet and East German parties have taken place, and after a last preparatory meeting of the working groups [sic]." It should be noted that the East German congress will not take place until May, and that even after the editorial group has held a final session to register full agreement on a draft document there will still have to be a meeting of the "Editorial Commission" (as in November). In this perspective (assuming there is no further deadlock between the conservative and independent groupings on questions of procedure or substance), the conference could hardly take place before June or July -- a full year behind schedule.

Stress on Consensus

Like Pajetta, Rubbi stressed the positive aspects of the prolonged preparations for the conference, but went into greater and more useful detail about the interparty implications. The preparatory process, he noted, "has turned out to be particularly laborious and has taken a lot of time because of the objective complexity of the themes under discussion." Describing this as "natural," he proceeded to an explanation which was in itself a challenge to conservative parties in search of something like a "general line":

To an increasing number of parties there is explicitly posed the problem of the search for national ways, the repudiation of imported models and of the simple reference to experiences under other historical conditions. This in turn involves solutions which demand confrontation, understanding, acceptance of the element of diversity. The novelty of the principle of consensus which regulates the debate, the type of relations between communist parties that has matured in recent years on the basis of a growing capacity for autonomous development of policies and of the experiences of each individual party within its own national reality -- all these demanded longer preparations.

Some observers, he went on, had suggested that in the circumstances the outcome could only be an "amorphous" doctrine. Rejection of this formula gave Rubbi another chance to stress the PCI's view that relations between the European parties had entered into a new historical phase:

It is certainly true that in this situation there was not posed, nor could there be posed, the objective of arriving at an "ideological" document, a sort of doctrinaire summa of universal character and validity. But the point is that those times have gone, and it would be neither possible nor useful to call them back to life. From this point of view the tasks set for the conference had from the first a very definite limit. This does not, however, mean that the debate did not have to cover a range of problems of great political and ideological scope, which directly concern the concept and strategies each party has worked out on its own with regard to these problems.

What Rubbi apparently means by this characteristic combination of verbal precision and semantic obscurity is that the preparatory process involves the expression by each party of its views on a wide range of questions (which the PCI welcomes as a demonstration of institutionalized diversity), but that the collective document is

another matter: it must be based on "the principle of consensus which regulates the debate." He went on to consider the content of that document.

A New Method

"An essential point of reference," he observed, was the Helsinki conference. But questions relating to the post-Helsinki development of détente (3) (which was evidently the main subject of the SED's "acceptable" October draft) "do not exhaust the field of action" of the European communist parties:

To them is immediately connected the question of how, within the framework of détente, one should promote social progress and the struggle for the transformation of society in a socialist direction. In other words, the problems posed are: how to utilize the new possibilities for achieving in the socialist countries new advances in the economic, political, and social fields, expressing in a more adequate way the potentiality deriving from the nature of these societies; how to respond in Western Europe to the crisis by developing concrete programs of democratic renewal and of advanced social transformations; and, in the new climate among peoples and states, how to expand relations among all the popular forces -- communist, socialist, social democratic, and those of Catholic and Christian inspiration.

This is the subject matter -- not very generic or amorphous -- that is under discussion, with the aim of reaching an over-all evaluation of it and indicating the points on which a common will to action can be expressed. [In this we are] continually assuming the principle of the consensus of each of the participating parties, and hence seeking a real unitary convergence of analysis, without any type of binding commitments and with the declared exclusion of any form of international organization and of any directing center. This -- it is worth emphasizing -- is a method of discussion new in the practice of relations among communist and workers' parties, one which has certainly involved a long and difficult process, but which has confirmed its extreme fruitfulness.

From this passage it appears that the new phase of collective editorial work, introduced after the November impasse, is ranging

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- (3) Among post-Helsinki tasks Rubbi listed "the consolidation of a new understanding among the nations, as a result of new relationships also in the area of information, ideas, and civil rights" -- a formulation that would hardly commend itself to the East European regimes.

over a wider subject area that seemed likely in October, when the SED presented its "limited" third draft. In addition to détente there will apparently be a section on the Eastern regimes, one on the situation in the West and the consequent tasks of the Western CPs, and one on relations between the communist parties and other forces. Now, all of these have in the recent past been the subject of disagreement and controversy among European party leaderships, East and West. If the crucial principle of consensus is maintained, it is hard to see how the outcome can be anything but a document diluted to the point of blandness -- unless, that is, the conservative and independent groupings "trade" reciprocal concessions in various sections.

Unsettled Questions

In any case, Rubbi went on to note that the agreement reached at the 10-day January session was only partial, and that unidentified questions remained to be settled:

The debate has been wide-ranging, frank, sincere. Hence it has also been a debate that had no place for feigned unity where there was in fact disagreement, or formal displays of unanimity when each one was called on to make his own specific contribution. . . . Then the fact that after the last two meetings we had got as far as drawing up -- in its fundamental lines -- the entire basic document of the conference is a result of no little importance. Certainly there still remain questions to be studied and discussed, and they demand further meetings before the conference. But the work already done, the rightness of the method and the effort made to understand the positions of each party, justify the belief that it will be possible to reach the necessary agreement on questions that are still controversial. The fact is that the progress made on a difficult path is positive, and that the work accomplished, in many aspects with a new style, has created the conditions for approaching the final phase of the conference.

Rubbi did not even hint at the nature of the questions still at issue, but here one can turn to a recent interview A. Grlickov of the Yugoslav party granted to Austrian journalists. The text of the interview as published by the Austrian news agency on February 1 is unfortunately not available; only a brief report on it issued by Reuters' Vienna correspondent on the same day is to hand. According to this account, Grlickov said that no agreement had yet been reached on the future form of interparty relations, relations with social democrats (and, presumably, other noncommunist forces), the role

of nonaligned countries, disarmament, or the assessment of "the crisis of modern capitalism" -- quite a formidable list. He added that he believed the conference would still take place, but not before the end of May or the beginning of June (roughly the period indicated by Pajetta). (4)

"Distorted Interpretations"

One difficulty that still stands in the way of a conference is the frequently manifested tendency of conservative parties, particularly in Eastern Europe, to interpret agreed-upon formulations in ways unacceptable to the independent parties. This applies especially to interparty relations and the role of the CPSU. In the closing part of his article Rubbi turned to this question, entering into direct polemics with Soviet and East German spokesmen.

"The essential thing at this point is that to the contents of the debate and the very character of the conference, as well as to the draft document thus far agreed upon, there are not counterposed forced and distorted interpretations from within the socialist countries," he said. "We are referring in particular to V. Korionov's article in Pravda of January 24 and to a volume published in the GDR by a collective of teachers from the SED party school 'on the role of the CPSU and the USSR in the world revolutionary process.'" Both equated anti-Sovietism with anticommunism, and the East German work was cited as urging "the recognition by fraternal parties of the leading role of the CPSU in the struggle for the purity of Marxism-Leninism."

"Our disagreement is explicit," Rubbi commented. "We would not help very much in defeating campaigns against the USSR and other socialist countries if we identified the attacks of imperialism and reaction with the perplexities and criticism evoked by particular aspects and specific or even fundamental decisions of the socialist countries." As for the East German book, Rubbi suggested that it represented "harmful nostalgia for the outdated concept of the guiding state and the guiding party." He concluded:

We must say, then, that this kind of nostalgia call for closing the ranks and for reviving a concept that poses again the problem of the guiding party goes in a direction com-

(4) At a press conference in the Hague on February 12 Rumanian Foreign Minister George Macovescu said there had been "some progress" in preparations for the pan-European conference; but when asked if the conference would take place in May or June as had been suggested, he replied "It is impossible to say."


pletely opposite to the already traced lines of the conference document, which start by recognizing the full autonomy of each party in developing its policy, decided in absolute independence, in accordance with the specific national conditions of each country. The sooner we free ourselves from this nostalgia, the easier it will be to advance toward the establishment of fruitful relations based on the recognition, never to be abandoned, of the equality of all the parties -- the essential condition for true internationalism.

If the dominant tones of Rubbi's article are satisfaction and vigilance, the two go together. The stubborn resistance of the independent parties to any reassertion of Soviet authority through a "general line" has brought about something new in the history of European communism -- a genuine collective debate which in itself is much more important than the diluted, nonbinding document it can be expected to produce. The institutionalization of the autonomy of each party through the adoption of the consensus rule will promote the emergence of that "new internationalism" to which the PCI and other parties (5) are now committed. But the ground thus gained will have to be defended against conservative counterattacks. Rubbi's complaint will certainly not put an end to "distorted interpretations."
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(5) Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish CP put it particularly forcefully in an interview in La Stampa (14 December 1975): "I believe that the old internationalism is a historical residue, destined to disappear."

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.



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RAD Background Report/41
(Bulgaria)
12 February 1976

BULGARIA AND THE BALKAN CONFERENCE IN ATHENS

By R.N. (Bulgarian Unit)

Summary: In connection with the conference of five Balkan countries recently held in Athens, this paper reviews the changing Bulgarian attitudes to multilateral Balkan undertakings over the past 15 years. At the conference itself Bulgaria appeared to play the role of impeding factor, and the final communiqué largely reflected the Bulgarian view that the meeting was merely consultative in character. The Soviet Union seems to have encouraged the holding of the conference but at the same time sought to prevent its taking far-reaching decisions. Bulgaria, however, has been trying to pursue a Balkan policy of its own.

* * *

In Greek, Yugoslav, and Rumanian commentaries so far available the conference on Balkan co-operation held in Athens between January 26 and February 5 on the initiative of Greek Premier Constantine Karamanlis has generally been described as a success, although, as has been pointed out by numerous Western observers, its results were more modest than the initiator's original objectives. (It should be noted, however, that these objectives were not as ambitious as some Western observers have assumed.) In actual fact, the conference was a success mainly for the Bulgarian delegation, which seems to have consistently defended the Bulgarian government's policy of not going beyond noncommitted consultations and apparently managed to have this policy accepted by the other participants. This is evident from various descriptions of the proceedings, mainly from Greek and Yugoslav sources. It can also be deduced from the content and formulation of the final communiqué on the conference, if one compares that document with earlier statements by Bulgarian officials. A review of Bulgaria's position with regard to multilateral co-operation in the Balkans over the past several years reveals certain shifts and nuances, but a consistent stand has been maintained ever since the Greek premier first made his proposal.

In the late 1950s, when Rumanian Premier Chivu Stoica suggested that a conference of Balkan heads of government be held, Bulgaria seemed wholeheartedly to support him. A favorable reply to the proposal was published on the front page of Rabotnichesko Delo, (1) together with the text of the Rumanian

(1) 19 September 1957.

message. The repetition of the Rumanian proposal in a declaration of June 1959 also met with a favorable response. (2) During that period Bulgaria also made some moves of its own in the Balkans. In July 1959 a note suggesting a nonaggression pact was addressed to the Greek government, (3) but it was not until 1964 that normalization of Bulgarian-Greek relations was achieved (but no non-aggression pact was signed either then or later). In December 1959 a Bulgarian Committee on Balkan Understanding and Co-operation was set up, and on December 25 Zhivkov proposed a "decisive reduction in the armed forces" of the Balkan countries. On 7 March 1960, Premier Anton Yugov made "concrete suggestions" regarding trade and economic co-operation and scientific-technological collaboration among the Balkan states, and regarding the negotiation of bilateral non-aggression pacts. Apparently by then the idea of multilateral undertakings had been dropped in favor of bilateral ones, which seemed easier to achieve.

The first half of the 1960s was marked by repeated and persistent expressions of Bulgarian support for Khrushchev's 1959 proposal of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans -- a proposal later expanded to include the Adriatic and/or Mediterranean regions. This support was essentially a matter of principle, however, and was not accompanied by concrete suggestions on how to reach agreement on the subject. In a speech in November 1963 Zhivkov again referred somewhat obliquely to the possibility of a conference of Balkan premiers, saying "the time for this will come" -- an indication that he regarded it as a matter for the more distant future. (4) The second half of the 1960s brought new references to a nuclear-free zone, but on the whole Bulgarian statements were restricted to vague and noncommittal declarations about a peaceful policy for the region. In September 1969 Zhivkov declared that Bulgaria "will support all efforts to develop good-neighborly relations and peaceful co-operation," without going into detail. (5)

Balkan Policy and the 10th BCP Congress

There are certain indications, however, that despite the lack of concrete action during this period Bulgaria had not abandoned the idea that many of the Balkan countries' problems could be solved on a multilateral basis. A statement advocating "steps of a regional Balkan character -- e.g., multilateral Balkan parliamentary and government meetings," was made by Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev in an interview with a representative of the Hungarian radio network. (6)

A year later an incident in connection with the 10th BCP Congress provided an indication that Zhivkov was still (or again) in favor of a high-level Balkan conference but was prevented from making a suggestion to this effect, presumably because of Soviet disapproval. A passage in his report to the congress was obviously deleted at the last moment; it was not in the text as read by

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- (2) See the speech by Karlo Lukanov, published in Rabotnichesko Delo, 4 November 1959.
 - (3) Ibid., 9 August 1959.
 - (4) Novo Vreme No. 2, 1964.
 - (5) Rabotnichesko Delo, 9 September 1969.
 - (6) Ibid., 18 February 1970.

Zhivkov, nor did it appear in the printed Bulgarian, English, French, and Russian versions distributed among the delegates and foreign guests. In an obvious blunder, however, it remained in the German and Spanish versions and was quoted by West German journalists. According to the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, (7) the passage in question called for a common declaration by the Balkan countries on respect for territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs and on renunciation of the use or threat of force. It went on to say that the preparation of such a declaration "could provide a favorable occasion to discuss these questions on a bilateral basis and to hold a multilateral meeting of government representatives or heads of government of the Balkan states."

Although Zhivkov renounced his original advocacy of a multilateral meeting of Balkan leaders, his report as read and printed still contained outspoken support for multilateral undertakings: "In addition to developing bilateral relations with its neighbor countries, Bulgaria will continue to support and actively participate in all multilateral Balkan undertakings that might lead to the expansion of economic, political, and cultural relations among the Balkan countries and to the transformation of the Balkan Peninsula into a zone of lasting peace and stability, understanding and co-operation." (8)

The positive attitude to multilateral undertakings expressed at the 10th BCP Congress was reversed less than a year later, however, soon after Rumania had begun a new drive to give substance to the idea. In an interview with Finnish journalists Premier Stanko Todorov said that despite the favorable atmosphere prevailing in the Balkans "one must be satisfied with strengthening bilateral neighborly relations." He added that "after the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [then scheduled to be convened in Helsinki] the situation may be somewhat different, but nevertheless Bulgaria does not expect any very rapid development toward multilateral co-operation among the countries of the Balkans, which belong to different alliances." (9) In an interview with Le Monde (10) Todorov repeated this view, stating still more explicitly that "the situation is not yet ripe for establishing multilateral relations in the Balkans."

Thereafter and until last summer, Bulgaria consistently advocated bilateral relations as the only possibility for the Balkan countries, and this view was accepted by Rumania in the joint declaration on Zhivkov's visit to Bucharest in June 1975. (11)

A Compromise on Multilateral Undertakings

The first sign of a more faceted Bulgarian attitude to the question of bilateral vs. multilateral undertakings in the Balkans was shown during Greek

- (7) 23 April 1971.
- (8) Rabotnichesko Delo, 21 April 1971; this statement was included in the resolution of the congress -- see ibid., 27 April 1971.
- (9) Helsingin Sanomat, 1 April 1973; see also Robert R. King, "Multilateral Co-operation in the Balkans: Differences of Views Between Bucharest and Sofia," Eastern Europe Background Report/6, Radio Free Europe Research, 5 April 1973.
- (10) 21 July 1973.
- (11) Rabotnichesko Delo, 21 June 1975.

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Premier Karamanlis's visit to Bulgaria at the beginning of July 1975. Later, when his proposal for the Athens conference was officially announced, it became apparent that during his talks in Sofia he had made preliminary soundings and had obtained a -- preliminary -- favorable answer from Zhivkov. The passage revealing Bulgarian consent reads as follows in the joint communiqué on the visit:

Both sides expressed support for inter-Balkan activities in medicine, mathematics, sports, tourism, and environmental protection, as well as in the economy, transport, and generation of power. In this connection they believe that if all Balkan countries consent to it, a meeting on the expert or ministerial level would be useful in determining the sectors in which such co-operation is possible and the forms it should take. (12)

Bulgaria's acceptance of multilateral undertakings in certain spheres did not seem to be definitive, however. When Foreign Minister Mladenov visited Turkey at the beginning of September 1975 he told a press conference that "Bulgaria has supported and will continue to support both bilateral and multilateral initiatives" -- a statement reported by Radio Sofia (13) but not by the Bulgarian press. In a speech during that visit, however, he said that "developing good-neighborly relations among the Balkan countries on a bilateral basis is the real way to establish confidence and mutual understanding in the Balkans." (14) The joint communiqué on Mladenov's Turkish visit did not mention the issue at all.

After having accepted Karamanlis's invitation, on two occasions Bulgaria expressed support for bilateral relations calling them "an essential prerequisite" for improving confidence and understanding in the Balkans and "the real way" to achieve this, adding that multilateral co-operation should be supported "only in those spheres in which it is acceptable [to each country] and is in the interest of [all] Balkan countries." These statements were made in November, in the communiqué on Foreign Minister Mladenov's official visit to Yugoslavia, and in December, in the communiqué on Turkish Premier Demiral's visit to Bulgaria. (15) The fact that an almost identical formulation was used in both official documents indicates that neither of these countries had taken a strongly divergent position and that no far-reaching compromise had had to be reached with regard to the Bulgarian formula.

Reaction to Karamanlis's Invitation

The official invitation to a conference addressed by Greek Premier Karamanlis to the heads of the Balkan states on August 20 was reported in a news item attributed to Radio Athens. (16) It said that Karamanlis's letters

- (12) See Bulgarian Situation Reports/19 and 25, RFER, 11 July and 10 September 1975, Items 3 and 2, respectively.
- (13) 1 September 1975.
- (14) Zemedelsko Zname, 3 September 1975; see Bulgarian SR/25, RFER, 10 September 1975, Item 2.
- (15) Rabotnichesko Delo, 14 November and 4 December 1975.
- (16) Ibid., 22 August 1975.

proposed that the deputy ministers of economic ministries in the Balkan countries should meet in Athens in the near future to determine the sectors, such as the economy, communications, tourism, electric power production, et al., in which it would be possible to realize inter-Balkan co-operation. This formulation seems largely consistent with the Greek original, the exact text of which is not available.

After this brief report, however, Bulgarian media more or less ignored the issue until 26 January 1976, the day the conference began. They failed to mention Zhivkov's acceptance of the invitation, which was reported in Athens on September 29, Bulgaria being the second country (after Yugoslavia) to answer favorably. According to reports from Athens, Zhivkov called on Karamanlis to conduct bilateral negotiations to decide when the conference should be held and to work out the details of the issues to be discussed. (17) It is not known whether such bilateral consultations were actually held, although various official visits by government heads and foreign ministers did take place. At any rate, the delay in convening the conference, initially proposed for October 25, seems to have been due to Turkey's delay in responding to the invitation rather than to advance bilateral consultations. This does not rule out the possibility that various technical questions about the representation of individual countries and the conference proceedings had to be settled in advance, however.

Bulgaria's Participation in the Athens Conference

The composition of the delegations the five participating countries sent to the Athens conference can be taken as reflecting the importance each was willing to attribute to the gathering. Greece was represented by Under-Secretary for Co-ordination and Planning Georgios Condogeorgis, and Rumania, the most ardent supporter of the undertaking, sent First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Nicolae Stefan. The Yugoslav delegation was also headed by an under secretary, Kazimir Vidas of the Ministry of Finance. The Turkish delegation was headed by a diplomat with ambassadorial rank, Oguz Gokmen, director-general for economic and social matters in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The head of the Bulgarian delegation, a department head in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Petar Bashikarov, appears to have been lowest ranking of the five delegation leaders. This can be taken as illustrating Bulgaria's desire to play down the importance of the conference. On the other hand, there were 14 Bulgarian delegates, compared to only 8 Rumanians (the full list of delegates from the remaining countries is not available). Among the 14 were representatives of the Committee on Economic Co-operation, the Ministries of Transport, Energy, Agriculture, Information and Communications, and Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Tourism, and the Institute for the Protection of the Environment.

On January 27 the Sofia daily press reported the opening of the conference, and two days later published a dispatch from the BTA correspondent in Athens saying that the session was continuing and that the head of the Bulgarian delegation had made a speech. Thereafter there was no mention of the conference until it ended on February 5. The next day a long report was published, which, to judge from its composition and formulation, seems to be the full text of the official communiqué signed by the participants.

(17) A brief BTA dispatch reported Zhivkov's reply on September 27, but it was received heavily garbled. It did not mention Zhivkov's request for advance bilateral consultation, but contained only general phrases of politeness and good will.

Such coverage was quite in line with Bulgarian press practice, in which protocol plays a decisive role. Both domestic and international events in which only second-rank representatives are involved are as a rule reported only as news and briefly. As a matter of fact, in the case of the Athens conference publishing the communiqué represented a deviation from protocol in deference to the political importance of the gathering.

Unlike Yugoslav and Rumanian news media, neither the Bulgarian daily press nor the radio news services commented on the conference. The only commentary so far appeared in the weekly Pogled on February 9. Its author, Slavcho Vasev, a journalist who is a prominent BCP member and chairman of the Committee on Balkan Understanding and Co-operation, referred to the Helsinki conference of last summer, saying that it had brought new elements into the relations among the Balkan countries. He did not make clear exactly what these new elements were, but stated that the conference in Athens had been "a concrete expression of the new stage in co-operation among the Balkan countries." He quoted a long passage from Zhivkov's speech in Helsinki, remarking that his words were equally valid for the situation in the Balkans.

Although the wording of Vasev's article, including his quotation from Zhivkov's speech, was vague and general, its tone was positive. The fact that he is the only person to have produced a commentary at all indicates a desire on the part of the authorities not to attribute too great importance to it. Taken as a whole, his piece was only one of many dealing with Bulgaria's "constructive" and "peaceful" policy in the Balkans without going into detail and without touching on concrete issues.

Little became known of the conference proceedings in general or of the role played by the Bulgarian delegation in particular, since the sessions were held behind closed doors. The scanty information provided by Greek and Yugoslav sources and Western press reports indicated, however, that Bulgaria sought to keep conference discussions and decisions to a minimum. The Bulgarian and Turkish wish to leave aside all issues of a predominantly political character (18) seems to have been readily accepted as realistic by the other delegations. The Bulgarian delegation was said to have insisted on excluding cultural co-operation from the conference agenda, (19) and it was also the Bulgarians who wanted the conference to be purely consultative in nature. (20) All the other delegations seem to have found it difficult to accept this point, but as the communiqué revealed the Bulgarian position finally prevailed. The Bulgarians even refused to agree to a proposal for a second meeting to be held in Sofia. (21)

According to the communiqué, (22) a "general exchange of opinions" took place at the conference and "ideas and suggestions" were presented. Each delegation is to bring these ideas and suggestions "to the knowledge of its government, as a matter of information or for study." It was also said that it is up to the various governments to "study these ideas and suggestions, choose

(18) See the Frankfurter Rundschau, 3 February 1976.

(19) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 January 1976.

(20) Radio Belgrade, 28 January 1976.

(21) The Times (London) and Handelsblatt, 2 February 1976.

(22) As published in Rabotnichesko Delo on 6 February 1976.

those that are useful and acceptable, and decide what measures to take in order to have them accepted on a multilateral basis, including the convening of a meeting for this purpose." The formulation makes the "convening of a meeting" a purely hypothetical possibility.

Soviet Views and Bulgaria's Balkan Policy

Many of the Western journalists who wrote articles about the Athens conference pointed out that Bulgaria is a faithful ally of the Soviet Union. Both its agreement to participate in the conference and its role as a restraining factor were connected with this alliance. It is quite safe to assume that Bulgaria would not have agreed to participate without Moscow's blessing, and it seems natural for the USSR to look favorably on an event that would bring these weakened and not very stable members of NATO's southern flank, Greece and Turkey, closer to their communist-ruled northern neighbors. On the other hand, Moscow would never tolerate the formation of anything resembling a bloc of the five Balkan countries, which would involve Bulgaria and Rumania in far-reaching commitments outside the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. Thus Bulgaria's line at the conference -- do something without doing too much -- seems to be a direct reflection of Soviet interests and concerns.

While admitting the indirect role played by the Soviet Union, one should not forget Bulgaria's own policy with regard to multilateral Balkan co-operation. Bulgaria, situated in the geographical center of the Balkan Peninsula, has always had and obviously still has a strong desire to play a leading role in the area. It must have been somewhat disappointing to Bulgarian diplomats that it was Athens rather than Sofia that took the lead, just as Bucharest did in 1957.

In order not to lose credibility, given its constantly professed policy of pursuing good-neighborly relations in the Balkans, Bulgaria had to agree to participate in the conference. It would probably also have played a more active and constructive role in it had it not been for the restraint inspired -- if not imposed -- by Moscow. This is suggested by, inter alia, the omitted passage in Zhivkov's report to the 10th BCP Congress. The existence of a certain divergence of interests between Bulgaria and the USSR on Balkan policy would also explain the changes in Bulgaria's attitude to multilateral undertakings over the past 15 years. Thus, future Bulgarian attempts to play a more active role in the Balkans should not be ruled out. (040)

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RAD Background Report/39
(Yugoslavia)
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MORE ON THE COMINFORMIST TRIALS IN YUGOSLAVIA

By Slobodan Stankovic.

Summary: Several Cominformist trials in Yugoslavia have either ended, are going on, or are scheduled. Recently a trial of 19 "Albanian irredentists" who based themselves on "Stalinist-Cominformist ideology" ended in Pristina with long prison sentences given to the defendants, while on February 9 the trial in camera of four former party and state functionaries accused of "Cominformist activities" began in Belgrade. A trial is under way in Banja Luka (Bosnia), while yet another should begin soon in Novi Sad (Vojvodina). Despite clear references to the support given to the "Cominformist plotters" by Moscow and its East European allies, the Yugoslav information media have done their utmost to demonstrate that these trials have not been directed against Yugoslav-Soviet friendship and co-operation.

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The third in a series of Cominformist trials this year began in Belgrade on February 9 in camera. It involved four persons, all pensioners, charged with being Stalinists. One of them, Dusan Brkic, 63, was the deputy prime minister of Croatia until 1950. The remaining three are: Milivoje Stefanovic, 64, once editor of Yugoslavia's Tanjug news agency; Radovan Zigic, 55, once Croatia's minister for the processing industry; and Ljubomir Radulovic, 58, who is said to have traveled to Moscow, Kiev, and Budapest to make contacts with the Cominformist exiles abroad. The group is alleged to have asked Stalinist émigrés in Eastern Europe if the Soviet Army might intervene in Yugoslavia when President Tito dies.

In the meantime, one Cominformist trial ended in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, on February 7, when an announcement was made that 19 "Albanian irredentists" were given long prison sentences, ranging from 4 to 12 years. These people tried to create a so-called "People's Liberation Movement of Kosovo" based on "dogmatic-Stalinist ideology," the sentence stated. In their pamphlets these Albanians (Yugoslav citizens) allegedly deplored the position of Albanians in Yugoslavia and "crudely offended and attacked the top leaders of the country." (1)

The next Cominformist group to come before a court, also being tried in camera, is the one composed of nine Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. Their trial is being held in Banja Luka, a town in Bosnia. They are charged with "antistate activities" practiced from "counterrevolutionary Cominformist positions." (2) Another group of 10 Cominformists was charged in Novi Sad, capital of the autonomous province of the Vojvodina, with setting up an "illegal Cominformist group" which "mimeographed and disseminated leaflets with inimical contents" after having established links "with Cominformist exiles." One of the persons accused, a certain Grga Lulic, is said to have been living abroad "for a long period of time." (3)

Vlado Dapcevic, one of the leading Cominformists, who is alleged to have been kidnaped by the Yugoslav UDB secret police in Bucharest, is also supposed to be tried, but the actual date of his court case has not yet been announced. In the meantime, two top exile Yugoslav Cominformists, who until December 1975 lived in Kiev, in the Soviet Union, are reported to have arrived in Paris, where they are supposedly trying to create a new Communist Party of Yugoslavia to fight Tito's regime.

Only a few days before the Belgrade trial began, a member of the LCY Presidium's Executive Committee, Mirko Popovic, said in an interview that the LCY must fight both bourgeois and Stalinist-Cominformist concepts. Popovic said that an analysis of the ideological situation in the party and especially the party's struggle against "the ideology of Stalinism and Cominformism" has been prompted by the fact that the Yugoslav service "had uncovered the existence of an illegally organized group of Cominformists in the country." Popovic went on:

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- (1) Borba (Belgrade), 8 February 1976.
 - (2) Ibid., 30 January 1976.
 - (3) Politika (Belgrade), 9 January 1976.

This little group, if we view it as a handful of well-known traitors, including those involved in the "Bar case" [when, in the autumn of 1974, a group of Montenegrin Cominformists was tried], is above all of some interest for our security service and system of justice. Such an approach to this group, viewed as an expression and instrument of dogmatist-Stalinist ideology -- which is still present within the international workers' movement -- as well as an embodiment of an idea cherished by some people in our country, is one that we abandoned both in the LCY and in our society, and it must therefore be watched by the LCY and other organized forces of our society. (4)

On the other hand, despite all clear references to the active support given the Stalinists and Cominformists in Yugoslavia by Moscow and its allies in Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav information media have been doing their utmost to create the impression that the Soviet Union has not been behind this "handful of self-made counter-revolutionaries." In this connection, the article in Pravda of 27 November 1975 is frequently quoted. Recently a Belgrade weekly, in the last installment of an article dealing with the history of the Cominform, quoted Pravda as saying that "reactionary bourgeois propaganda has again been trying to prove something which does not exist: i.e., that the socialist countries have been supporting little plotting secretarian groups which do not represent anyone except themselves." (5) In this way, said the weekly, the "bourgeois reactionaries" in the West have been trying to "poison relations among fraternal socialist countries and weaken their friendship."

In the introduction to the series on the Cominform the weekly lumped various "hostile forces" into one group, and said that "all these forces -- the Cominformists, Djilas-ists, Rankovicites, and the like -- have joined forces in open hostility to our country and its independence." But the weekly stressed that the Cominformists have been by far the most dangerous group. It then took care to make a clear distinction between the Soviet Union and the Cominformist (pro-Soviet) groups in Yugoslavia. Here, the previously cited article in Pravda of 27 November 1975 is mentioned again, which means essentially "a public condemnation of all Cominformist-dogmatist groups and individuals which, both in the country and abroad -- linked with other hostile forces -- have been acting against the LCY and Yugoslavia."

(4) Borba, 5 February 1976.

(5) Nedeljne informativne novine (Belgrade), 8 February 1976.

Thus the Yugoslav information media are trying, by implication, to present the Cominformist trials throughout the country as a friendly, rather than a hostile, move vis-à-vis Moscow. It is improbable that such an approach to the Cominformist trials in Yugoslavia will make Moscow any friendlier to Tito than before. (038)

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RUMANIA/4
10 February 1976

S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

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CULTURE1. Writers Point Out Dangers in Discussions of National Epic

The campaign in favor of creating a National Epic (see Rumanian Situation Report/3, Radio Free Europe Research, 29 January 1976, Item 1) continues to occupy a prominent place in the Rumanian news media. Particular importance is being given to the slogan "Historical Drama as a Tribune for Patriotic Education," which was adopted at a symposium at Bucharest's National Theater on 24 January 1976 to mark the end of "Historical Drama Week" (Romania Literara No. 5, 29 January 1976). Amza Saceanu, chairman of the Bucharest Committee on Socialist Culture and Education, announced at the symposium that a theoretical seminar on the forthcoming repertoires -- including historical dramas -- will be held in February, and Dinu C. Giurescu, a historian, dwelt on the possibility of establishing close creative links between historians and artists intent on contributing to the National Epic. The critic Valentin Silvestru made it clear that in the course of promoting the epic a number of historical plays mainly dating back to the period between the two World Wars might be revived and integrated into what is called "the cultural heritage." Radu Beligan, director of the National Theater, felt compelled to emphasize that "attentive study shows that all the essential characteristics of historical drama correspond perfectly to those of socialist drama."

Despite the fact that a free exchange of opinions -- not to mention the voicing of critical statements about the party's cultural policy -- can hardly be said to exist in Rumania, shades of differences in the interpretation of the National Epic have begun to appear. The dogmatic critics, both old and young, and hack writers who feel secure only as long as precise prescriptions for "creative" work are issued, follow the official line; but others have expressed doubt about the National Epic.

In an article in Teatru (No. 12 /December/ 1975), the playwright Dan Tarchila described it as transcending the limits of a purely cultural initiative:

The writing of a National Epic is an undertaking of capital importance in the development of our literature and of our entire culture -- first of all because realizing the National Epic is conceived as a political and social act that stems from our views on the rights of the Rumanian people, on freedom and independence, on the co-operation among various countries, on social and national justice, on peace."

In another article in that issue of Teatru the drama and film critic Florian Potra felt compelled to set down all sorts of ideological, technical, and aesthetic guidelines for the creation of the National Epic. Most interesting are his ideological standards, undoubtedly designed for the use of future writers of historical dramas.

The pedagogical, educational function of art in general, and of the theater in particular, is obvious to everyone and

needs no confirmation; this function, however, is invested with particular importance when the co-ordination and strengthening of those elements that form national feeling in the broad popular masses come into question, as the Marxist philosopher, Gramsci observed. At the same time he recognized the psychological utility of presenting history in the form of a "national biography." Moreover, when stimulated to write an "epic" of their people, playwrights will certainly have to recognize the dialectical movement of history, its contradictory components, and the solutions that have furthered progress. It is known that there have also been moments of hesitation, when positive undertakings and actions were postponed and retrograde, negative elements were temporarily successful. I believe, however, that such periods and situations in our history are less interesting for us today -- although we certainly cannot escape them -- because, to invert a quotation from Gyorgy Lukacs, there are times when one cannot talk about negative actions, but when it is necessary to deal with positive ones.

Potra's article clearly indicates that the party wishes a defensive and rather undifferentiated glorification of the national past, and that no clear, perhaps critical or at least "demystifying" presentation of history can be expected from the National Epic.

(The danger posed by aesthetic uniformity, by a lowering of artistic standards, was discussed in Rumanian SR/3, RFER, 29 January 1976, Item 1.)

In an article entitled "Reflections on an Epic" (Contemporanul No.5, 30 January 1976) Ion Lancranjan (the author of the controversial novel Caloianul, published last year -- see Anneli Maier, "Ion Lancranjan's novel Caloianul -- a 'Fire Sermon,'" Rumanian Background Report/127, RFER, 18 August 1975) voiced serious reservations in connection with the National Epic. Lancranjan did not oppose it, or the idea of evoking particularly crucial moments in Rumanian history, such as "the unforgettable year of 1877" (when Rumania joined the Russian war against Turkey), and the year 1918, when Rumanian national unification was completed: "In 1918, the reunification of an entire nation within its natural borders, within the framework of intangible rights for which heavy tribute has been paid over the years."

But Lancranjan showed serious concern over the danger that the excessive conformism of Rumanian writers, all of whom will turn to writing defensive historical works, will have undesirable consequences. First, he said, a drop in aesthetic quality would be inevitable:

I do not, however, believe that it would be a good thing if all of us began putting together frescoes or other kinds of more or less historical evocation and then consider that we have met our civic responsibility and have promptly fulfilled a legitimate demand. This would be false; it would be wrong, because literature has its own laws and demands which cannot be transgressed without ending in uniformity and "lowered quality" of the "finite product!"

Secondly, he expressed concern about the in corpore flight of writers from the present into the past:

Furthermore, in my opinion it would be neither good nor useful for all of us to turn our faces toward the past, thus excluding from preoccupation the tumultuous present, which is so very rich in facts and circumstances. . . . If we were to slide down such a slope our literary life would be menaced by another kind of escapism, unlike neomodernistic or pseudo-oniric escapism but nevertheless escapism, a mere roadway for assembly-line products and for spiritual poverty, a heavenly manna for all professional conformists and "wordmakers."

What is even more important, he also drew attention to the danger of purely formal uniformization, transcending a uniformity of topic; in his view, "a diversity of styles requires a natural and perfect equilibrium."

A fourth highly relevant point made by Lancranjan concerned the danger of forgetting about "contradiction and conflict, which are the eternally vivid germs of development." "Our pathos can and must be associated with lucidity, our love must be accompanied by a critical spirit and critical analysis, by good judgment," because "nothing can be more harmful to the existence and permanence of a people than self-conceit and feeding on illusions."

Lancranjan is not a dissident, but a party activist turned writer who now defends literature against what he considers to be exaggerations in a line of which he approves. Moreover, he has for some time enjoyed the privilege of speaking out more freely than most of his fellow-writers. It is to his credit that he makes use of this privilege at a time when other similarly privileged writers fail to speak up. His Contemporanul article may indicate a state of mind that is widespread among Rumanian writers whose opinions have not appeared in print. (024)

ECONOMY

2. Congress of Consumer Co-operatives

One of the main points emphasized at the recent Sixth Congress of Consumer Co-operatives (30-31 January 1976; see Scinteia, 31 January and 1 February 1976) was the need to increase the output of agricultural produce and food by all means available, including the encouragement of citizens with gardens or courtyards to improve their holdings and to raise their output. The congress delegates were also told that great care must be taken in future to study consumer demand.

Held in Bucharest, the congress was attended by 800 delegates representing the country's 7,600,000 members of consumer co-operatives. The meeting had been announced in October 1975 (Agricultura Socialista, 16 October 1975) and was preceded by the usual local and county meetings during which both achievements and shortcomings were examined (Romania Libera, 15 January 1976), with emphasis on the need to study consumer demand more carefully.

Political Executive Committee members Janos Fazekas and Ilie Verdet were at the congress in the name of the party. Verdet read a message from Ceausescu that urged the consumer co-ops to play a more active part in helping achieve the economic goals of the unified state plan, mainly by working harder to help establish a central state commodities fund that could both improve domestic supply and provide more goods for export. Ceausescu told the delegates that their organization could best do this by encouraging citizens with gardens, etc., to raise their output. His message also announced measures to avoid duplication of effort in state contracting and purchasing of agricultural goods. In future, the consumer co-ops will be the ones to undertake these jobs so far as agricultural produce is concerned, while they are to continue working together with state units on the contracting and purchasing of other categories of products.

Following the Ceausescu-Verdet message, there was a report by the Council of the Central Union of Consumer Co-operatives, followed by a discussion and the adoption of a resolution. Here the emphasis was on the need to get citizens to help expand agricultural output. This is to be facilitated during the current five-year plan by 11,000 million lei worth of credit made available to those members of the population who have land and are willing to till it. At the same time, the consumer co-ops themselves will invest more than 4,000 million lei in their own network of trade and services.

The consumer co-operatives' work will be further facilitated by a change in statutes: their local units will now be located right in the villages and will get direct support from town party committees and people's councils. The consumer co-operatives are also to concern themselves directly with the sales of political-ideological books in the village; the plan is to double such sales during the current five-year plan. The service network for the population is also to be increased during this same period by 5,000 new outlets.

The congress ended with the election of new officials. The Centrocoop Council, with 141 full and 35 alternate members, was elected by secret ballot. The council then chose an expanded Executive Committee of 35 (the old one had only 24 members). Nicolai Mihai was re-elected chairman of the council. In addition, a new body, a Bureau of the Executive Committee, was created. It is made up of a chairman, five vice-chairman, and five members. Finally, the congress also elected a new Commission of Censors, with Marin Dragan replacing Constantin Mateescu as chairman.

(025)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

3. Rumania Admitted to Membership in Group of 77

The RSR has now been admitted to membership in the Group of 77 formed of developing countries that are UN members. The decision

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was made at the group's third ministerial meeting, which began on 26 January 1976 in Manila. Rumania had come there as a guest, represented by Nicolae M. Nicolae, minister secretary of state in the RSR Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation (Scinteia, 29 January 1976). As has been the custom, this meeting was to prepare for the fourth UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) session scheduled for May in Nairobi, and was designed to co-ordinate the positions of the more than 100 developing countries that are members of the group, organized into three "chapters" representing the continents of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Rumania's request for membership came up before a meeting of the Group of 77's senior officers on January 30 (AFP/Manila, 31 January 1976), who were also examining Malta's application. The reactions of the three "chapters" varied: the Asian contingent supported Malta, but failed to reach a consensus of opinion on Rumania as a nonregional member; the Latin Americans could not arrive at a "firm decision," but said they were ready to agree with the Asians and Africans on both countries' applications; the African group at first declined the proposal to accept nonregional members, but expressed willingness to continue discussion of the question. Nevertheless, despite the initial irresolution, both applicants were accepted for membership during the final phase of the Manila meeting, although a later AFP dispatch (February 6) noted that some (unspecified) African countries still opposed the move. Earlier, on the conference's opening day, Surinam and the PLO had been admitted to the Group of 77.

On February 7, Radio Bucharest expressed pleasure over the admission, quoting Nicolae as saying that the decision was one of great significance, since his country had been co-operating for so long with the Group of 77. Nicolae went on to say that "Rumania is connected to the developing countries through common hopes for progress and prosperity, the abolition of the old imperialist order, and the creation of a new international economic order." Rumania is probably also especially interested in the platform adopted at Manila, which encourages efforts to open up the markets of the industrial countries to the products of the developing ones (Rumania considers itself to fall into this category). The Manila meeting also decided to set up a common fund to finance the creation of international stocks of commodities.

The importance to Rumania of this admission to membership can perhaps best be judged in the light of its continuing efforts in both the UN General Assembly and within the UN specialized bodies to help bring about the "new international economic order" mentioned above. This point is also a major item on the agenda of the forthcoming UNCTAD conference (see Rumanian SR/35, RFER, 11 September 1975, Item 2). Although the Group of 77 has no official status within the UN, it acts as a lobby within the organization. At the forthcoming Nairobi UNCTAD meeting the group will reportedly seek better trade terms from the developed Western states, as well as from Comecon (RFE Special/UN, 9 February 1976). This could prove interesting since Rumania suggested special trade concessions from Comecon earlier, but without success. Rumania also took part in

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preparing the draft of the final document the Group of 77 submitted to the seventh extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly, which was devoted to the problems of development and international economic co-operation (Scinteia, 16 September 1975).

A 23 September 1975 decision of the RCP CC Political Executive Committee reviewed Rumania's well-known solidarity with the developing and nonaligned countries, stating:

Expressing its interest in attending, as an observer, the meetings of the developing and nonaligned countries, Rumania started from the idea that the essential thing is not affiliation or nonaffiliation with various systems of military alliance, but the position and action each state takes to support and put into practice the new principles governing international relations (Scinteia, 24 September 1975).

The situation in which the RSR found itself vis-à-vis the Group of 77 is, in many ways, similar to its efforts to be admitted as an observer to the Lima conference of nonaligned countries last year and to the forthcoming summit conference of those countries scheduled for Sri Lanka. Rumania failed to obtain observer status, but was permitted to attend as a guest (see Rumanian SR/33, RFER, 29 August 1975, Item 1). Now, Rumania's appearance, and success, at Manila may have some impact on this question.

When the UN Group of 75 (later 77) developing countries was formed in 1964, Rumania requested membership, but was turned down (see RFE Special/Geneva, 16 June 1964, RFE Special/UN, 24 September 1970, and RFE Special/UN, 8 April 1972, as well as Rumanian SR/47, RFER, 30 September 1970, Item 2c). (026)

4. Rumania Shifts Full Support to MPLA in Angola

On February 1, Major General Gheorghe Gomoiu, deputy minister of national defense, RCP CC member, and secretary of the Rumanian Army's Higher Council, left for Luanda to attend the ceremonies marking the 15th anniversary of the outbreak of the revolt against Portuguese rule (Radio Bucharest, 1 February 1976). The RCP CC simultaneously sent a message to the CC of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) emphasizing that:

Socialist Rumania hails with deep satisfaction the proclamation of Angola's independence and has inaugurated co-operation with the government set up by the MPLA, the legitimate representative of the Angolan people.

The message went on to accentuate the RSR's concern over the current situation in Angola, and reiterated Ceausescu's statement to the Grand National Assembly on 18 December 1975, when he said that Rumania "speaks out firmly for the withdrawal from Angola of troops from the Republic of South Africa and for the cessation of any

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foreign intervention" (Agerpres, 4 February 1976). It was also on December 18 that Radio Bucharest announced Rumania's decision to establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with the "People's Republic of Angola."

As a matter of fact, Rumanian media have never published any information about the presence of Cuban or other troops supporting the MPLA. One month after Ceausescu addressed the Grand National Assembly, Ambassador Ion Datcu told the UN Security Council that Rumania supported withdrawal of South African soldiers from Angola, but again no mention was made of the presence in Angola of Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers (RFE Special/UN, 18 January 1976).

These recent declarations indicate that Rumania has gradually shifted its position on Angola. In April 1975, when Jonas Savimbi led a delegation from UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) to the RSR, a joint declaration signed by Savimbi and Ceausescu stated in part:

Joint agreement has been achieved on the fact that, under current conditions, close co-operation and unity of action among all national forces in Angola will prove a decisive factor in attaining the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan people... to create a new life for itself within a unified, independent, and sovereign state (Scinteia, 2 April 1975).

The two signatories also welcomed the agreement reached the previous January among the three liberation movements in Angola, and the creation of a transitional government in which the MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) were all represented.

In September 1975, RCP CC Secretary Stefan Andrei visited Luanda where he conferred with MPLA leader Agostinho Neto, and went on to Kinshasa, Zaire, for a meeting with Holden Roberto, head of the FNLA. To both men, he brought a message from Ceausescu, adding his own insistence "on the need for unity among all patriotic, anticolonialist forces, in order to achieve independence for Angola" (see Rumanian SR/35, RFER, 11 September 1975, Item 4).

Two months later, during his own visit to Portugal, Ceausescu declared at a press conference that even if no agreement were reached among the three rival movements in Angola before the November 11th deadline for Portuguese withdrawal, the country's independence should still be proclaimed. Moreover, when asked whether Rumania would recognize the MPLA's one-sided proclamation of the independence of Angola, the RSR president said that "Rumania would continue to support the MPLA even after independence, and there is no doubt that we shall recognize the new state of Angola officially" (see Rumanian SR/43, RFER, 7 November 1975, Item 1).

(027)

5. Foreign Minister Visits Austria

Foreign Minister George Macovescu's three-day official visit to Vienna, January 25-28, represented another step in developing the already good Rumanian-Austrian relations. Macovescu was returning the visit to Bucharest in January 1974 of Rudolf Kirchsclaeger, (at that time Austria's Foreign Minister). Previous to that there had been a number of high-level exchanges. The late Austrian President Franz Jonas went to Bucharest in 1969, Ceausescu visited Vienna in 1970, and Chancellor Bruno Kreisky made a trip to Rumania in 1975. (For more information on the latter visit see Rumanian SR/27, RFER, 17 July 1975, Item 2.)

The fact that Macovescu was received by President Kirchsclaeger, Chancellor Kreisky, President of the Austrian National Council Anton Benya, and other leaders of the Austrian parliament pointed up the importance with which his visit was regarded by the Austrian government. During the meetings with Kirchsclaeger and Kreisky it was agreed that the good relations between the two countries provided a solid basis for further development of co-operation, and during a dinner given in Macovescu's honor by Foreign Minister Erich Bielka-Karltru the latter said that "today no unresolved political problem exists between the two countries." Macovescu stressed the importance of the top-level dialogue that has been going on between the two countries, especially during Ceausescu's visit to Austria in 1970 and Kreisky's to Rumania in 1975. Complemented by frequent contacts between members of the Rumanian and Austrian governments, this dialogue had created a climate of co-operation and stable, friendly relations between the two countries, he said.

The joint communiqué signed on January 28 dealt first with economic matters, hailing the progress that has been registered in industrial, economic, and technological co-operation, and reporting that the two countries had agreed to start negotiations on a long-term (1976-1985) trade agreement.

Turning to international considerations, it stated that Austrian-RSR relations are based on the 10 principles laid down in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and that the two countries intend to put all the provisions of the act into practice and to continue their efforts to strengthen security and co-operation in Europe and find lasting solutions to unresolved problems. The document stressed that the achievement of real security on the European continent is indissolubly linked to the elimination of military confrontation and a substantial reduction in military potential. Both sides advocated intensified efforts to achieve disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

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The two ministers devoted considerable attention to the need for multilateral co-operation and understanding among the Balkan states, which would, they said, contribute to the establishment of a favorable climate in the area, along the lines proposed in the Final Act. They urged a political solution of the Cyprus problem, and called for renewed and determined efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. They pointed out the need to reduce the gap between industrialized and developing countries, and called for urgent measures to ensure a faster rate of progress in the latter. They also stressed the importance of the UN and stated their intention to promote the enhancement of its role.

The Neue Zuercher Zeitung (January 30), reported on a press conference Macovescu held in Vienna. It quoted him as saying that among the main problems discussed in Vienna were bilateral trade and industrial and economic co-operation, primarily on third markets. The paper noted that although Macovescu had not referred to specific co-operation ventures, he had mentioned a forthcoming visit to Bucharest by the general directorate of the Voest concern. Concerning the Helsinki conference, the Swiss paper quoted him as stating that the Final Act must be considered as a whole and that no chapter should be singled out for particular attention, as some states have done. He was also said to have stated that supporting the Palestinian requests at the UN does not infringe Israel's right to existence as a state.

According to Macovescu, Rumania does not see any contradiction between membership in a military pact and observer status at non-aligned conferences; eligibility to participate in the Colombo conference must be determined on the basis of a nation's activity, and membership in a pact is irrelevant. Concerning the conference of Balkan countries in Athens, Macovescu stressed that, unlike other states in this region, Rumania has no unresolved problems with the other participating countries. He also said the final aim of co-operation in the Balkans is to establish a zone of peaceful co-operation, without foreign troops or bases, and without nuclear weapons.

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(02C)

6. Danish Foreign Minister Visits Bucharest

Following a visit to Sofia, Danish Foreign Minister Knud Borge Andersen arrived in Bucharest on February 1 for a three-day official visit. (He was returning a visit Foreign Minister George Macovescu made to Denmark in March 1973 -- see Rumanian SR/13, REFER, 29 March 1973, Item 1.) On February 2 and 3 he discussed the development of bilateral relations in various fields, the economic, technological-scientific, and cultural relations between Denmark and the RSR, and a number of international problems with his Rumanian opposite number (Radio Bucharest, February 3).

On February 3, Andersen was received by Ceausescu. According to Radio Bucharest the two men expressed satisfaction at the state of relations between their countries, and expressed interest in expanding them in the political, economic, trade, technological-scientific, and cultural fields. They also called for the establishment of genuine security and peace in accordance with the principles laid down at the Helsinki conference, and urged fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the participating states. In this connection they spoke of effective measures to put an end to the armaments race and to achieve real disarmament. They agreed that détente is closely linked to the achievement of political solutions in the Middle East and Cyprus as well as in other parts of the world. They also called for the elimination of underdevelopment and of existing economic gaps, and for the establishment of a new economic and political order in the world.

A joint communiqué issued at the end of their talks said that it had been agreed to sign a new long-term economic and industrial co-operation agreement in the near future, and that Macovescu had accepted an invitation to visit Denmark.

A Reuter dispatch (February 5) quoted "informed sources" as saying that Comecon intends to propose to the Common Market an umbrella agreement under which its members would be allowed to make bilateral trade accords with the EEC states. Macovescu was said to have told Andersen that the text of the proposal has already been agreed upon by the Comecon countries and was on its way to Brussels. Under its terms individual members of the East and West European trade blocs would be allowed to negotiate bilateral trade agreements directly, without reference to their central organizations in Moscow and Brussels.

(According to the Anuarul Statistic 1975, trade between Rumania and Denmark was valued at 79,600,000 lei in 1972. This figure rose to 126,400,000 lei in 1973 and to 134,000,000 lei in 1974, but the balance was negative for Rumania; in the latter year exports totaled 59,500,000 lei, and imports 74,500,000 lei.)

During his visit to Bucharest Andersen had stressed the importance Denmark attaches to the human aspects of the Helsinki agreement, and had brought up seven cases of Danish-Rumanian

marriages that have been subjected to bureaucratic harassment by the Rumanian authorities. (Regarding Rumanian-Danish relations in general, it should be recalled that Prince Henrik visited Bucharest in October 1974, at the head of a Red Cross delegation, on which occasion Ceausescu extended an invitation to Queen Margrethe to pay an official visit to the RSR.)

(029)

7. Trade Agreements for 1976 and 1976-1980 signed with China

A delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation Ion Patan arrived in Peking for economic talks on January 25, and on January 29 Patan signed a protocol on goods exchanges and payments in 1976 and a long-term agreement on exchanges in 1976-1980.


According to Scinteia (January 31), the 1976 protocol provides for an increase over the 1975 figure for exchanges and for diversification of bilateral trade. Rumania is to supply China with products of the machine-building industry, drilling equipment, trucks, electric locomotives, railroad cars, bearings, various spare parts, and products of the chemical and metallurgical industries. China is to export to Rumania machine tools, products of the chemical, textile and food industries, ferrous-alloys, metallurgical coke, cotton, rice, etc.

The 1976-1980 agreement provides for diversification of goods exchanges "in accordance with the requirements of the national economies of the two countries during the entire five-year period." Neither Chinese nor Rumanian media have indicated the percentage of the envisaged increases. The last long-term trade agreement, covering the 1972-1975 period, was signed in 1971.

In 1974 the value of trade exchanges between the two countries was nearly six times what it was in 1965; it rose from 291,000,000 lei to 1,738,200,000 lei, with Rumania's exports amounting to 833,800,000 lei and its imports to 904,400,000 lei (Anuarul Statistic 1975).

At a dinner given in the honor of the Rumanian delegation on January 28, Vice-Premier Hua Kuo-feng and Ion Patan exchanged toasts. Hua said, among other things, that "China and Rumania have always sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle against imperialism and hegemonism," and Patan praised the smooth course of the "revolutionary friendship" between the two parties, countries, and peoples -- a friendship that is based on Marxism-Leninism, the principles of equality and mutual benefit, the policy of opposing imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, and power politics, and on the common struggle to establish new political and economic orders in the world. Although Hsinhua reported on the dinner and the speeches given there, the Rumanian newspapers made no mention of either.

(030)



This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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RUMANIA/4
10 February 1976

S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

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4. Rumania Shifts Full Support to MPIA in Angola
5. Foreign Minister Visits Austria
6. Danish Foreign Minister Visits Bucharest
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CULTURE1. Writers Point Out Dangers in Discussions of National Epic

The campaign in favor of creating a National Epic (see Rumanian Situation Report/3, Radio Free Europe Research, 29 January 1976, Item 1) continues to occupy a prominent place in the Rumanian news media. Particular importance is being given to the slogan "Historical Drama as a Tribune for Patriotic Education," which was adopted at a symposium at Bucharest's National Theater on 24 January 1976 to mark the end of "Historical Drama Week" (Romania Literara No. 5, 29 January 1976). Amza Saceanu, chairman of the Bucharest Committee on Socialist Culture and Education, announced at the symposium that a theoretical seminar on the forthcoming repertoires -- including historical dramas -- will be held in February, and Dinu C. Giurescu, a historian, dwelt on the possibility of establishing close creative links between historians and artists intent on contributing to the National Epic. The critic Valentin Silvestru made it clear that in the course of promoting the epic a number of historical plays mainly dating back to the period between the two World Wars might be revived and integrated into what is called "the cultural heritage." Radu Beligan, director of the National Theater, felt compelled to emphasize that "attentive study shows that all the essential characteristics of historical drama correspond perfectly to those of socialist drama."

Despite the fact that a free exchange of opinions -- not to mention the voicing of critical statements about the party's cultural policy -- can hardly be said to exist in Rumania, shades of differences in the interpretation of the National Epic have begun to appear. The dogmatic critics, both old and young, and hack writers who feel secure only as long as precise prescriptions for "creative" work are issued, follow the official line; but others have expressed doubt about the National Epic.

In an article in Teatru (No. 12 /December/ 1975), the playwright Dan Tarchila described it as transcending the limits of a purely cultural initiative:

The writing of a National Epic is an undertaking of capital importance in the development of our literature and of our entire culture -- first of all because realizing the National Epic is conceived as a political and social act that stems from our views on the rights of the Rumanian people, on freedom and independence, on the co-operation among various countries, on social and national justice, on peace."

In another article in that issue of Teatru the drama and film critic Florian Potra felt compelled to set down all sorts of ideological, technical, and aesthetic guidelines for the creation of the National Epic. Most interesting are his ideological standards, undoubtedly designed for the use of future writers of historical dramas.

The pedagogical, educational function of art in general, and of the theater in particular, is obvious to everyone and

needs no confirmation; this function, however, is invested with particular importance when the co-ordination and strengthening of those elements that form national feeling in the broad popular masses come into question, as the Marxist philosopher, Gramsci observed. At the same time he recognized the psychological utility of presenting history in the form of a "national biography." Moreover, when stimulated to write an "epic" of their people, playwrights will certainly have to recognize the dialectical movement of history, its contradictory components, and the solutions that have furthered progress. It is known that there have also been moments of hesitation, when positive undertakings and actions were postponed and retrograde, negative elements were temporarily successful. I believe, however, that such periods and situations in our history are less interesting for us today -- although we certainly cannot escape them -- because, to invert a quotation from Gyorgy Lukacs, there are times when one cannot talk about negative actions, but when it is necessary to deal with positive ones.

Potra's article clearly indicates that the party wishes a defensive and rather undifferentiated glorification of the national past, and that no clear, perhaps critical or at least "demystifying" presentation of history can be expected from the National Epic.

(The danger posed by aesthetic uniformity, by a lowering of artistic standards, was discussed in Rumanian SR/3, RFER, 29 January 1976, Item 1.)

In an article entitled "Reflections on an Epic" (Contemporanul No. 5, 30 January 1976) Ion Lancranjan (the author of the controversial novel Caloianul, published last year -- see Anneli Maier, "Ion Lancranjan's novel Caloianul -- a 'Fire Sermon,'" Rumanian Background Report/127, RFER, 18 August 1975) voiced serious reservations in connection with the National Epic. Lancranjan did not oppose it, or the idea of evoking particularly crucial moments in Rumanian history, such as "the unforgettable year of 1877" (when Rumania joined the Russian war against Turkey), and the year 1918, when Rumanian national unification was completed: "In 1918, the reunification of an entire nation within its natural borders, within the framework of intangible rights for which heavy tribute has been paid over the years."

But Lancranjan showed serious concern over the danger that the excessive conformism of Rumanian writers, all of whom will turn to writing defensive historical works, will have undesirable consequences. First, he said, a drop in aesthetic quality would be inevitable:

I do not, however, believe that it would be a good thing if all of us began putting together frescoes or other kinds of more or less historical evocation and then consider that we have met our civic responsibility and have promptly fulfilled a legitimate demand. This would be false; it would be wrong, because literature has its own laws and demands which cannot be transgressed without ending in uniformity and "lowered quality" of the "finite product!"

Secondly, he expressed concern about the in corpore flight of writers from the present into the past:

Furthermore, in my opinion it would be neither good nor useful for all of us to turn our faces toward the past, thus excluding from preoccupation the tumultuous present, which is so very rich in facts and circumstances. . . . If we were to slide down such a slope our literary life would be menaced by another kind of escapism, unlike neomodernistic or pseudo-oniric escapism but nevertheless escapism, a mere roadway for assembly-line products and for spiritual poverty, a heavenly manna for all professional conformists and "wordmakers."

What is even more important, he also drew attention to the danger of purely formal uniformization, transcending a uniformity of topic; in his view, "a diversity of styles requires a natural and perfect equilibrium."

A fourth highly relevant point made by Lancranjan concerned the danger of forgetting about "contradiction and conflict, which are the eternally vivid germs of development." "Our pathos can and must be associated with lucidity, our love must be accompanied by a critical spirit and critical analysis, by good judgment," because "nothing can be more harmful to the existence and permanence of a people than self-conceit and feeding on illusions."

Lancranjan is not a dissident, but a party activist turned writer who now defends literature against what he considers to be exaggerations in a line of which he approves. Moreover, he has for some time enjoyed the privilege of speaking out more freely than most of his fellow-writers. It is to his credit that he makes use of this privilege at a time when other similarly privileged writers fail to speak up. His Contemporanul article may indicate a state of mind that is widespread among Rumanian writers whose opinions have not appeared in print. (024)

ECONOMY

2. Congress of Consumer Co-operatives

One of the main points emphasized at the recent Sixth Congress of Consumer Co-operatives (30-31 January 1976; see Scinteia, 31 January and 1 February 1976) was the need to increase the output of agricultural produce and food by all means available, including the encouragement of citizens with gardens or courtyards to improve their holdings and to raise their output. The congress delegates were also told that great care must be taken in future to study consumer demand.

Held in Bucharest, the congress was attended by 800 delegates representing the country's 7,600,000 members of consumer co-operatives. The meeting had been announced in October 1975 (Agricultura Socialista, 16 October 1975) and was preceded by the usual local and county meetings during which both achievements and shortcomings were examined (Romania Libera, 15 January 1976), with emphasis on the need to study consumer demand more carefully.

Political Executive Committee members Janos Fazekas and Ilie Verdet were at the congress in the name of the party. Verdet read a message from Ceausescu that urged the consumer co-ops to play a more active part in helping achieve the economic goals of the unified state plan, mainly by working harder to help establish a central state commodities fund that could both improve domestic supply and provide more goods for export. Ceausescu told the delegates that their organization could best do this by encouraging citizens with gardens, etc., to raise their output. His message also announced measures to avoid duplication of effort in state contracting and purchasing of agricultural goods. In future, the consumer co-ops will be the ones to undertake these jobs so far as agricultural produce is concerned, while they are to continue working together with state units on the contracting and purchasing of other categories of products.

Following the Ceausescu-Verdet message, there was a report by the Council of the Central Union of Consumer Co-operatives, followed by a discussion and the adoption of a resolution. Here the emphasis was on the need to get citizens to help expand agricultural output. This is to be facilitated during the current five-year plan by 11,000 million lei worth of credit made available to those members of the population who have land and are willing to till it. At the same time, the consumer co-ops themselves will invest more than 4,000 million lei in their own network of trade and services.

The consumer co-operatives' work will be further facilitated by a change in statutes: their local units will now be located right in the villages and will get direct support from town party committees and people's councils. The consumer co-operatives are also to concern themselves directly with the sales of political-ideological books in the village; the plan is to double such sales during the current five-year plan. The service network for the population is also to be increased during this same period by 5,000 new outlets.

The congress ended with the election of new officials. The Centrocoup Council, with 141 full and 35 alternate members, was elected by secret ballot. The council then chose an expanded Executive Committee of 35 (the old one had only 24 members). Nicolai Mihai was re-elected chairman of the council. In addition, a new body, a Bureau of the Executive Committee, was created. It is made up of a chairman, five vice-chairman, and five members. Finally, the congress also elected a new Commission of Censors, with Marin Dragan replacing Constantin Mateescu as chairman.

(025)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

3. Rumania Admitted to Membership in Group of 77

The RSR has now been admitted to membership in the Group of 77 formed of developing countries that are UN members. The decision

was made at the group's third ministerial meeting, which began on 26 January 1976 in Manila. Rumania had come there as a guest, represented by Nicolae M. Nicolae, minister secretary of state in the RSR Ministry of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation (Scinteia, 29 January 1976). As has been the custom, this meeting was to prepare for the fourth UNCTAD (UN Conference on Trade and Development) session scheduled for May in Nairobi, and was designed to co-ordinate the positions of the more than 100 developing countries that are members of the group, organized into three "chapters" representing the continents of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

Rumania's request for membership came up before a meeting of the Group of 77's senior officers on January 30 (AFP/Manila, 31 January 1976), who were also examining Malta's application. The reactions of the three "chapters" varied: the Asian contingent supported Malta, but failed to reach a consensus of opinion on Rumania as a nonregional member; the Latin Americans could not arrive at a "firm decision," but said they were ready to agree with the Asians and Africans on both countries' applications; the African group at first declined the proposal to accept nonregional members, but expressed willingness to continue discussion of the question. Nevertheless, despite the initial irresolution, both applicants were accepted for membership during the final phase of the Manila meeting, although a later AFP dispatch (February 6) noted that some (unspecified) African countries still opposed the move. Earlier, on the conference's opening day, Surinam and the PLO had been admitted to the Group of 77.

On February 7, Radio Bucharest expressed pleasure over the admission, quoting Nicolae as saying that the decision was one of great significance, since his country had been co-operating for so long with the Group of 77. Nicolae went on to say that "Rumania is connected to the developing countries through common hopes for progress and prosperity, the abolition of the old imperialist order, and the creation of a new international economic order." Rumania is probably also especially interested in the platform adopted at Manila, which encourages efforts to open up the markets of the industrial countries to the products of the developing ones (Rumania considers itself to fall into this category). The Manila meeting also decided to set up a common fund to finance the creation of international stocks of commodities.

The importance to Rumania of this admission to membership can perhaps best be judged in the light of its continuing efforts in both the UN General Assembly and within the UN specialized bodies to help bring about the "new international economic order" mentioned above. This point is also a major item on the agenda of the forthcoming UNCTAD conference (see Rumanian SR/35, RFER, 11 September 1975, Item 2). Although the Group of 77 has no official status within the UN, it acts as a lobby within the organization. At the forthcoming Nairobi UNCTAD meeting the group will reportedly seek better trade terms from the developed Western states, as well as from Comecon (RFE Special/UN, 9 February 1976). This could prove interesting since Rumania suggested special trade concessions from Comecon earlier, but without success. Rumania also took part in

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preparing the draft of the final document the Group of 77 submitted to the seventh extraordinary session of the UN General Assembly, which was devoted to the problems of development and international economic co-operation (Scinteia, 16 September 1975).

A 23 September 1975 decision of the RCP CC Political Executive Committee reviewed Rumania's well-known solidarity with the developing and nonaligned countries, stating:

Expressing its interest in attending, as an observer, the meetings of the developing and nonaligned countries, Rumania started from the idea that the essential thing is not affiliation or nonaffiliation with various systems of military alliance, but the position and action each state takes to support and put into practice the new principles governing international relations (Scinteia, 24 September 1975).

The situation in which the RSR found itself vis-à-vis the Group of 77 is, in many ways, similar to its efforts to be admitted as an observer to the Lima conference of nonaligned countries last year and to the forthcoming summit conference of those countries scheduled for Sri Lanka. Rumania failed to obtain observer status, but was permitted to attend as a guest (see Rumanian SR/33, RFER, 29 August 1975, Item 1). Now, Rumania's appearance, and success, at Manila may have some impact on this question.

When the UN Group of 75 (later 77) developing countries was formed in 1964, Rumania requested membership, but was turned down (see RFE Special/Geneva, 16 June 1964, RFE Special/UN, 24 September 1970, and RFE Special/UN, 8 April 1972, as well as Rumanian SR/47, RFER, 30 September 1970, Item 2c). (026)

4. Rumania Shifts Full Support to MPLA in Angola

On February 1, Major General Gheorghe Gomoiu, deputy minister of national defense, RCP CC member, and secretary of the Rumanian Army's Higher Council, left for Luanda to attend the ceremonies marking the 15th anniversary of the outbreak of the revolt against Portuguese rule (Radio Bucharest, 1 February 1976). The RCP CC simultaneously sent a message to the CC of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) emphasizing that:

Socialist Rumania hails with deep satisfaction the proclamation of Angola's independence and has inaugurated co-operation with the government set up by the MPLA, the legitimate representative of the Angolan people.

The message went on to accentuate the RSR's concern over the current situation in Angola, and reiterated Ceausescu's statement to the Grand National Assembly on 18 December 1975, when he said that Rumania "speaks out firmly for the withdrawal from Angola of troops from the Republic of South Africa and for the cessation of any

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foreign intervention" (Agerpres, 4 February 1976). It was also on December 18 that Radio Bucharest announced Rumania's decision to establish diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with the "People's Republic of Angola."

As a matter of fact, Rumanian media have never published any information about the presence of Cuban or other troops supporting the MPLA. One month after Ceausescu addressed the Grand National Assembly, Ambassador Ion Datcu told the UN Security Council that Rumania supported withdrawal of South African soldiers from Angola, but again no mention was made of the presence in Angola of Cuban troops and Soviet military advisers (RFE Special/UN, 18 January 1976).

These recent declarations indicate that Rumania has gradually shifted its position on Angola. In April 1975, when Jonas Savimbi led a delegation from UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) to the RSR, a joint declaration signed by Savimbi and Ceausescu stated in part:

Joint agreement has been achieved on the fact that, under current conditions, close co-operation and unity of action among all national forces in Angola will prove a decisive factor in attaining the legitimate aspirations of the Angolan people... to create a new life for itself within a unified, independent, and sovereign state (Scinteia, 2 April 1975).

The two signatories also welcomed the agreement reached the previous January among the three liberation movements in Angola, and the creation of a transitional government in which the MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) were all represented.

In September 1975, RCP CC Secretary Stefan Andrei visited Luanda where he conferred with MPLA leader Agostinho Neto, and went on to Kinshasa, Zaire, for a meeting with Holden Roberto, head of the FNLA. To both men, he brought a message from Ceausescu, adding his own insistence "on the need for unity among all patriotic, anticolonialist forces, in order to achieve independence for Angola" (see Rumanian SR/35, RFER, 11 September 1975, Item 4).

Two months later, during his own visit to Portugal, Ceausescu declared at a press conference that even if no agreement were reached among the three rival movements in Angola before the November 11th deadline for Portuguese withdrawal, the country's independence should still be proclaimed. Moreover, when asked whether Rumania would recognize the MPLA's one-sided proclamation of the independence of Angola, the RSR president said that "Rumania would continue to support the MPLA even after independence, and there is no doubt that we shall recognize the new state of Angola officially" (see Rumanian SR/43, RFER, 7 November 1975, Item 1).

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The fact that Macovescu was received by President Kirchsclaeger, Chancellor Kreisky, President of the Austrian National Council Anton Benya, and other leaders of the Austrian parliament pointed up the importance with which his visit was regarded by the Austrian government. During the meetings with Kirchsclaeger and Kreisky it was agreed that the good relations between the two countries provided a solid basis for further development of co-operation, and during a dinner given in Macovescu's honor by Foreign Minister Erich Bielka-Karltru the latter said that "today no unresolved political problem exists between the two countries." Macovescu stressed the importance of the top-level dialogue that has been going on between the two countries, especially during Ceausescu's visit to Austria in 1970 and Kreisky's to Rumania in 1975. Complemented by frequent contacts between members of the Rumanian and Austrian governments, this dialogue had created a climate of co-operation and stable, friendly relations between the two countries, he said.

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6. Danish Foreign Minister Visits Bucharest

Following a visit to Sofia, Danish Foreign Minister Knud Borge Andersen arrived in Bucharest on February 1 for a three-day official visit. (He was returning a visit Foreign Minister George Macovescu made to Denmark in March 1973 -- see Rumanian SR/13, RFER, 29 March 1973, Item 1.) On February 2 and 3 he discussed the development of bilateral relations in various fields, the economic, technological-scientific, and cultural relations between Denmark and the RSR, and a number of international problems with his Rumanian opposite number (Radio Bucharest, February 3).

On February 3, Andersen was received by Ceausescu. According to Radio Bucharest the two men expressed satisfaction at the state of relations between their countries, and expressed interest in expanding them in the political, economic, trade, technological-scientific, and cultural fields. They also called for the establishment of genuine security and peace in accordance with the principles laid down at the Helsinki conference, and urged fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the participating states. In this connection they spoke of effective measures to put an end to the armaments race and to achieve real disarmament. They agreed that détente is closely linked to the achievement of political solutions in the Middle East and Cyprus as well as in other parts of the world. They also called for the elimination of underdevelopment and of existing economic gaps, and for the establishment of a new economic and political order in the world.

A joint communiqué issued at the end of their talks said that it had been agreed to sign a new long-term economic and industrial co-operation agreement in the near future, and that Macovescu had accepted an invitation to visit Denmark.

A Reuter dispatch (February 5) quoted "informed sources" as saying that Comecon intends to propose to the Common Market an umbrella agreement under which its members would be allowed to make bilateral trade accords with the EEC states. Macovescu was said to have told Andersen that the text of the proposal has already been agreed upon by the Comecon countries and was on its way to Brussels. Under its terms individual members of the East and West European trade blocs would be allowed to negotiate bilateral trade agreements directly, without reference to their central organizations in Moscow and Brussels.

(According to the Anuarul Statistic 1975, trade between Rumania and Denmark was valued at 79,600,000 lei in 1972. This figure rose to 126,400,000 lei in 1973 and to 134,000,000 lei in 1974, but the balance was negative for Rumania; in the latter year exports totaled 59,500,000 lei, and imports 74,500,000 lei.)

During his visit to Bucharest Andersen had stressed the importance Denmark attaches to the human aspects of the Helsinki agreement, and had brought up seven cases of Danish-Rumanian

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marriages that have been subjected to bureaucratic harassment by the Rumanian authorities. (Regarding Rumanian-Danish relations in general, it should be recalled that Prince Henrik visited Bucharest in October 1974, at the head of a Red Cross delegation, on which occasion Ceausescu extended an invitation to Queen Margrethe to pay an official visit to the RSR.) (029)

7. Trade Agreements for 1976 and 1976-1980 signed with China

A delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation Ion Patan arrived in Peking for economic talks on January 25, and on January 29 Patan signed a protocol on goods exchanges and payments in 1976 and a long-term agreement on exchanges in 1976-1980.


According to Scinteia (January 31), the 1976 protocol provides for an increase over the 1975 figure for exchanges and for diversification of bilateral trade. Rumania is to supply China with products of the machine-building industry, drilling equipment, trucks, electric locomotives, railroad cars, bearings, various spare parts, and products of the chemical and metallurgical industries. China is to export to Rumania machine tools, products of the chemical, textile and food industries, ferrous-alloys, metallurgical coke, cotton, rice, etc.

The 1976-1980 agreement provides for diversification of goods exchanges "in accordance with the requirements of the national economies of the two countries during the entire five-year period." Neither Chinese nor Rumanian media have indicated the percentage of the envisaged increases. The last long-term trade agreement, covering the 1972-1975 period, was signed in 1971.

In 1974 the value of trade exchanges between the two countries was nearly six times what it was in 1965; it rose from 291,000,000 lei to 1,738,200,000 lei, with Rumania's exports amounting to 833,800,000 lei and its imports to 904,400,000 lei (Anuarul Statistic 1975).

At a dinner given in the honor of the Rumanian delegation on January 28, Vice-Premier Hua Kuo-feng and Ion Patan exchanged toasts. Hua said, among other things, that "China and Rumania have always sympathized with and supported each other in the struggle against imperialism and hegemonism," and Patan praised the smooth course of the "revolutionary friendship" between the two parties, countries, and peoples -- a friendship that is based on Marxism-Leninism, the principles of equality and mutual benefit, the policy of opposing imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism, and power politics, and on the common struggle to establish new political and economic orders in the world. Although Hsinhua reported on the dinner and the speeches given there, the Rumanian newspapers made no mention of either. (030)

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THE FRENCH CP'S "NEW LOOK" CONGRESS

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: For the first time in the history of the French CP keynote speeches at a party congress have contained explicit criticism of the Soviet regime, Secretary-General Marchais speaking of "unjust and unjustifiable" acts of repression in the USSR. This is part of an image-building campaign emphasizing the PCF's commitment to pluralistic democracy and civic liberties, and it is clear that this posture of independence has its limitations. Similarly, the commitment to democracy is called in question by the unanimity with which 1,700 delegates welcomed a change like abandonment of the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat. East European coverage of the congress has generally ignored both the criticism of the USSR and the dropping of the doctrine.

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The 22nd Congress of the French Communist Party might appropriately be called the congress of the "new look": the phrase suggests both the significance of the changes that have occurred and the extent to which the congress was a public-relations exercise in image-building. The changes concern in the first place the party's domestic political posture; the new emphasis on the PCF's independence and readiness to dissociate itself on occasion from the CPSU, important though it is, is essentially a derivative of this domestic priority.

Nevertheless, because of the PCF's history of exemplary loyalty to Moscow, it is the challenge to Soviet authority which has rightly attracted the attention of commentators -- except in Eastern Europe. Far from "soft-pedaling" this striking development, Secretary-General Georges Marchais chose to stress it in both his opening and his closing speeches to the congress, so that it became a central element of the image-building operation.

Criticism of Soviets

In his opening speech Marchais boasted that "there is only one party in France which raises on high the standard of liberty in all circumstances, only one party which denounces attacks on the rights of man wherever they occur and without exception, and that is the PCF. . . . For us, socialism and liberty are inseparable." He could have left it on that level of abstract generalization; or he could have expressed vague criticism of existing socialist regimes in general. Instead, he chose to make Soviet repression an explicit target:

One essential lesson stood out [after the 20th CPSU Congress had denounced Stalinist crimes]: One must always be on guard against the temptation to substitute for the democratic effort of conviction, of confrontation, of the battle of ideas, the use of authority and repression. This is why it is natural that we should express our disagreement with repressive measures against freedom of opinion, expression, or creation, wherever they take place. We have been led to do so with regard to certain developments in the Soviet Union. We cannot admit that the communist ideal . . . should be stained by unjust and unjustifiable acts. . . .

The existence of a divergence on this subject with the CPSU will naturally not lead us . . . to weaken our will to cooperate with it in the common struggle against imperialism and for our great communist objectives. (1)

In his closing speech he again sounded the note of criticism:

For us, socialism and democracy, socialism and individual and collective liberty, are indivisible. . . . For us, in our era, democracy -- both political and economic -- is the condition of progress toward socialism. It follows that it is also the indispensable condition for the development and strengthening of social relations within socialism.

This is why we express our disagreement when violations of human rights occur in a country that made its socialist revolution 58 years ago." (2)

During the five-day congress a number of other speakers took up this theme -- while no one appears to have risen to defend the Soviet

(1) L'Humanité, 6 February 1976.

(2) Ibid., 9 February 1976.

regime. Henri Malberg, a new Central Committee member, declared that French Communists "cannot be mere observers with regard to the socialist countries," adding: "To Communists and working people who question us about attacks upon the liberty of opinion, expression, and publication, we say in all responsibility that socialism should have better things to do. And it can do them." (3)

The contrast with previous PCF congresses was heightened by the fact that the Soviet delegate, Andrei Kirilenko, did not address the gathering. Together with all other foreign delegates, he had his say at one of a dozen "international meetings" held in various centers on February 6. The centers and the delegates speaking at each were listed in alphabetical order -- so that the CPSU Politburo member came at the bottom of the list for the Parisian suburb of Nanterre. In his Nanterre speech, however, Kirilenko got in a few shrewd counterblows. According to TASS, he "exposed the hidden motive of the ballyhoo in the reactionary press 'in defense of human rights' in the socialist countries." The aim of this campaign was to discredit the reality and ideals of socialism and cause confusion in the ranks of progressive forces, he said -- with, of course, no suggestion that L'Humanité could be numbered among the offenders.

As one would expect in the circumstances, East European coverage of the PCF congress was a good deal less than objective. The criticism of repression in socialist regimes was ignored, as was the decision, adopted unanimously, to drop the Leninist term "dictatorship of the proletariat" from the party's statutes. On the latter point, though, indirect polemics did appear. On the opening day of the congress (February 4) the East German party organ Neues Deutschland carried a front-page editorial vigorously defending the universal validity of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the highest form of democracy. Two days later the Czechoslovak organ Rude Pravo was more direct: its editorial denounced the rejection of the doctrine as "rightist revisionism," and said those who ignored it could not be called socialists.

On the other hand, a Yugoslav commentary appreciatively noted the "obvious and significant differences" at this congress, particularly the emphasis on "the national character of the party and the individual road to socialism," as well as the "antidogmatic tone" of the proceedings.

Limits of Change

While it is true that the 22nd congress marks an important turning-point in the history of the PCF, one should not exaggerate the

(3) Morning Star, 9 February 1976.

extent of the changes that have occurred. The fact that 1,700 delegates voted unanimously for documents that belie so much of the party's past emphasizes the extent to which the PCF remains true to that past. When its leaders trumpet the virtues of democracy and uphold the rights of dissent, its adversaries have some reason to murmur, "Physician, heal thyself."

What has happened is that the PCF has, in effect, proclaimed its intention of giving lasting priority to its own political interests -- even when this conflicts with the claims of "proletarian internationalism," as that term is understood in Moscow. But, while the PCF will dissociate itself from the Soviet regime when this seems advisable, it is not about to proceed to anything like a break with the CPSU, or even to a radical critique of Soviet realities, and it will continue to proclaim and practice basic solidarity with the USSR, particularly with regard to foreign affairs.

Similar limitations mark the party's change in domestic politics. By Marchais's decree, it is now the party of the "outstretched hand" and not of the clenched fist, casting the net of its appeal as widely as possible, to include Socialists, Catholics, small businessmen, Gaullists (on the national issue), with the hope of eventually reaching "union of the people of France," from which only the small group of "monopoly capitalists" would be excluded. But its insistence on maintaining its own "leading role" remains, with inevitable implications for its relations with other political forces. This applies particularly to the Socialist Party which, as Marchais remarked in his opening speech, "remains a reformist party" -- unlike the PCF which, by its own definition, remains a revolutionary party. Despite the present lull in interparty polemics, the two will clearly continue to be rivals as much as allies.

The image-building operation is being conducted with the disciplined resourcefulness which one expects of the PCF. But public opinion polls indicate that it will not be so easy to persuade the French public that the reality behind the image has changed. (032)

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PCI SEEKS "POWER BLOC" INSTEAD OF
"DICTATORSHIP OF PROLETARIAT"



Summary: Luciano Gruppi of the Italian CP has written an article offering ideological justification for the abandonment of the Leninist doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat -- a central decision of the current 22nd Congress of the French CP. Gruppi argues that in Italy (and other Western countries) the concept should be replaced by that of the "hegemony" of a "power bloc" in which "the working class and its parties" play a leading role. In his effort to demonstrate an "element of continuity" with traditional doctrine, Gruppi is led to admit that "coercion" -- though of a different kind -- would still have a place in the process of transition to socialism.

* * *

While the French Communist Party explains that it is abandoning the Leninist term "dictatorship of the proletariat" because it no longer fits present-day French conditions and the goals the PCF sets for itself and the nation, the Italian Communist Party has provided a more sophisticated ideological justification for dropping a concept that long ago ceased to feature in its political vocabulary. It was supplied by the Italian party's leading ideologist, Luciano Gruppi, in an article (1) published on the eve of the PCF's 22nd congress.

In a brief discussion of the traditional doctrine Gruppi wrote that for Lenin "the dictatorship of the proletariat is democracy of the majority and dictatorship against the minority, hence the broadest and most substantial form of democracy. (That in the historical process of the Russian revolution things went differently is a subject on which I shall not dwell, but it is a fact which Lenin saw, in its beginnings, with extreme clarity)." In Lenin's varying definitions of the concept he finds two constant elements: 1) the leading role of the working class, and 2) its "function of coercion in face of the class enemy."

(1) "Blocco di potere e dittatura proletaria," l'Unità, 3 February 1976.

Against this Leninist perspective Gruppi placed another, based upon concepts developed by the great theorist of the early PCI, Antonio Gramsci, and particularly the notions of "hegemony" and of an "historical bloc" of political forces. What Gramsci sought to emphasize was "the conquest of consensus" through "a revolutionary strategy which in countries of advanced capitalism would have to manifest itself . . . in a way different from the revolutions of the past." Putting it in terms of the present situation in Italy and in Western Europe as a whole, Gruppi wrote: "The whole struggle to construct a new power bloc around the working class and its parties [note the plural -- K.D.] is guided by the awareness of the close connection that, today more than ever, is being established between democracy and socialism, between the struggle of the workers and the popular masses and the functioning of democratic institutions: [an awareness] of the need to move toward socialism with the broadest development of democracy and the full maintenance and expansion of liberties, political, religious, and cultural."

The Role of "Coercion"

Later he came to the ideological crux:

The question that poses itself is this. If we must conceive of the struggle for democracy and socialism as guided by a wide bloc of forces, diversified socially and politically . . . can we believe that the proletariat can hold this bloc together through coercion? I think not. It seems to me that this bloc can be based only on the relationships and the democratic competition established among its various components. It seems to me that the task of the working class is one of struggling to guarantee the democratic character of these relationships, and to resolve the contradictions that may arise within the bloc. . . .

Coercion certainly does not disappear, since one cannot develop democracy and bring it on to socialism without a rigorous and coherent action, within the framework of state legality, against the reactionary and subversive forces of big capital. The coercion, however, is exercised in this case by the power bloc which must steer the transformation of society and the state in a socialist direction. . . . Within the power bloc itself, to build it and maintain it, the ruling function of the working class must be exercised.

It is worth noting that the language of ideology is not that of politics, and that there is here, at the least, an interesting shift of emphasis compared with the PCI's familiar stress on constitutional gradualism and its call to the Christian Democratic Party to join it in a compromesso storico. True, the PCI has

never hidden its collective conviction that, however much progress may be possible through political alliances and "structural reforms," sooner or later there will have to be a revolutionary break (rottura) with the bourgeois order. But it is rare indeed for a spokesman to talk so bluntly about the role of "coercion" in that process; one owes this frankness, perhaps, to Gruppi's desire to demonstrate what he calls "an element of continuity" with the Leninist doctrine. Socialists and other prospective partners of the PCI in an eventual "power bloc" may well ponder with misgiving his observation that it would be up to the working class -- represented pre-eminently by the highly organized PCI -- to "resolve the contradictions that may arise within the bloc."

Perhaps awareness of these political implications has something to do with Gruppi's renewed rejection, in his closing paragraphs, of the type of coercion associated with the traditional doctrine and his concomitant rejection of existing models of "socialist democracy":

If this is so, the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat appears inadequate to express the nature and breadth of the power bloc which must guide the transition to socialism and its construction. It also appears inadequate to indicate the function assigned to the working class within this bloc and in society.

Between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the concept of the power bloc that we have been developing there remains an element of continuity: without the leading function of the working class (in all its organizations and not in a single party, although no one should underestimate the role of the PCI) it is not possible to advance toward socialism and to construct it. . . . But the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat is outdated as regards the concept of coercion that is present in it, within the framework of a dialectic of democracy and liberty much broader than what the socialist regimes have so far known.

The "element of continuity" is here balanced by the effort to dissociate the PCI from regime theory and practice. Yet one notes that despite the commitment to democracy, the principle of "alternation" of governments -- to which the Italian, Spanish, and French Communist Parties have reassuringly pledged themselves -- finds no place in Gruppi's argument. In the last analysis what is at stake, it seems, is state power -- just as it was for Lenin. On the other hand, Gruppi's effort to demonstrate "an element of continuity" simply draws attention to the sociopolitical gulf between the constitutional pluralism of the West and the partiinost of the East.

For a closing commentary on this ideological imbroglio, one may turn to an astringent passage in Neil McInnes's recent study of West European communism: (2)

(2) The Communist Parties of Western Europe (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 176-177.

One could continue at the game (their political opponents do) of pressing the communists from one verbal concession to another, without winning a grain of certitude as to their future intentions -- and without noticing that the more "liberal" they become, the more they expose their illusions about the nature of power in Western societies. . . . When he told Proudhon that no imaginable extension and development of the Rights of Man, of the "principles of 1789" or of republican democracy could possibly lead to communism, Marx was enunciating a truth that subsequent events incline us to state in reverse: no society where the Rights of Man are respected and where republican democracy is preserved would tolerate the transition to communism. The "advanced democracy" imagined by Western communists is an illusion inconsistent not only with Marxist theory but with common sense. It presupposes that economic power remains where it is today -- except for the nationalization of some monopolies, which however, leaves intact the capitalist ethos and all "non-monopolist" business -- and that the rights of political parties, trade unions, and the press are maintained, while a minority of communists (or at best a temporary 51 per cent electoral majority of Leftists) carry through "radical social transformations" violently unpalatable to the rest of the nation. That situation would not be a transition to anything but counter-revolution, as events in Chile in 1973 demonstrated. The political conclusions drawn from the inaccurate "monopoly" theory of capitalism blur all distinctions save the distinction between a handful of monopolists and the rest of the people. Thus they lead to a faith in the possibility of a democratic passage to communism, a faith that becomes more unrealistic the more it becomes democratic.

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THE PCF'S TURNING-POINT CONGRESS



By Kevin Devlin

Summary: The 22nd Congress of the French CP will apparently mark a turning point in its history. The party's proclaimed commitment to pluralistic democracy and civic liberties has led it to make unprecedented public criticism of Soviet labor camps and other repressive regime practices, while the dropping of the Leninist term "dictatorship of the proletariat" is also seen as part of the same image-building process. Despite efforts to strengthen the credibility of this evolution, however, the party's Socialist allies (and rivals) remain skeptical -- as does much of the French public, to judge from recent opinion polls.

* * *

Socialism is synonymous with liberty. This idea is valid for all countries, in all circumstances. It excludes having recourse to repression or administrative measures against the expression of ideas. . . . There is a divergence between us and the CPSU with regard to socialist democracy.

-- Georges Marchais

The 22nd Congress of the French Communist Party, on February 4-8, will be one of the most important in its history,

because it will institutionalize recent important changes in the party's positions and policies. It would be appropriate to call this the PCF's congress of aggiornamento, since the change has involved the adoption of ideas and attitudes associated with the Italian CP and has resulted in the formation of something like a Rome-Paris axis within the West European communist movement, after years of cool relations and occasional polemics between the French and Italian parties.

The shift has found expression in an intensified campaign to publicize the PCF's commitment to pluralistic democracy and civic liberties, and its autonomous path toward a socialisme aux couleurs de la France, to be achieved in collaboration with other leftist forces. In itself this campaign was not new. These were dominant themes in Secretary-General Marchais's book Le défi démocratique, published in 1973; and in May 1975 the PCF issued an impressive "Charter of Liberties," enshrining and extending all the bourgeois freedoms. But at that time the PCF could not, or would not, admit that there was any inconsistency between these proclaimed commitments and its fundamental solidarity with the regimes of Eastern Europe (or its staunch support for the activities of the Portuguese CP).

Over the past two months, however, the accentuated emphasis on pluralistic democracy and civic liberties has been accompanied by a surprisingly outspoken effort to dissociate the PCF from East European regime practices, while at the same time the shift in the PCF's positions has been presented within a specifically West European framework, and has found expression in a strategic alliance with the Italian and Spanish communist parties.

The rapprochement between the PCF and the PCI was formally established during mid-November talks in Rome between delegations headed by Marchais and Berlinguer (following an earlier round in Paris). This "historic meeting" (Marchais) resulted in a joint declaration (1) in which the two leaders committed their parties to support "for the plurality of political parties, for the right to existence and activity of opposition parties, and for democratic alternation between the majority and the minority." The eventual building of a socialist order in their respective countries would be marked by "a continued democratization of economic, social,

(1) L'Humanité and l'Unità, 18 November 1975.

and political life," and existing bourgeois liberties would be "guaranteed and developed." The statement went on: "This goes for freedom of thought and expression, of the press, of assembly and association, of demonstration, of free circulation of persons at home and abroad, of inviolability of private life, of religious freedom." It also pledged "complete freedom of expression for all currents of philosophical, cultural, and artistic opinion." Within a regional, and not merely national, context, the two parties committed themselves to promote "the common action of the communist and socialist parties, of all the democratic and progressive forces of [Western] Europe." (2)

Strategic Alliance

This common declaration by the PCF and the PCI followed a similar joint statement issued on 11 July 1975 by the Italian and Spanish party leaders, which urged the need "to promote the encounter of all democratic forces for a policy of democratic and socialist renewal of society," both in individual countries and in Western Europe as a whole. At least in this important area of public commitment to pluralistic democracy and civic liberties, the French, Italian, and Spanish (3) parties now form an important strategic grouping -- which, of course, extends beyond them to include such parties as the British and the Swedish (to say nothing of the distant Japanese CP). (4)

This does not mean that there are not still significant differences between them. In an article on the new triangular relationship between the PCI, the PCF, and the PCE in the January issue of the Austrian dissident-communist monthly Wiener Tagebuch, Franz Marek puts it epigrammatically: "The Spanish say what the Italians think, and the Italians say more than the French think." It is certainly true that the PCE is the most outspoken of the

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- (2) Since the first part of this sentence mentioned the Brussels conference of West European communist parties in January 1974, the reference clearly is to Western Europe.
 - (3) In late January, a PCF delegation visited Madrid for three days of meetings with leaders of the clandestine Spanish CP, reaching an "identity of views" (Le Monde, 31 January 1976).
 - (4) At a Tokyo press conference on 5 October 1975 a spokesman for the Japanese CP said: "Our line finds its expression in the resolutions of the Italian, Spanish, and French parties . . . and in the statements of their leaders."

three, particularly when it is a question of extending to East European realities the implications of this public commitment to Western democratic values. Thus, when Santiago Carrillo remarked, during an interview given to the Italian dissident-communist daily Il Manifesto, that a movement toward pluralistic, socialist democracies in Western Europe would be "viewed with concern" in Moscow, l'Unità noted that these views of Comrade Carrillo's were not shared by the PCI. (5) Similarly, when Carrillo declared in a recent interview in La Stampa (December 14) that "there cannot be a common line between the communist parties of the capitalist countries and the state parties of Eastern Europe," l'Humanité (6) hastened to stress that the PCF "has a different point of view on these problems."

Asserting Independence

Nevertheless, the PCF has come a remarkably long way within a few months in asserting its independence and adopting, at least on certain issues, a posture of critical dissociation from the Soviet regime. When the French Central Committee published its draft resolution for the 22nd congress on November 12, this element was not immediately apparent. There was a great deal in the draft resolution about the PCF's firm commitment to parliamentary democracy, its hopes for a gradual, multiparty, nonviolent movement toward "a socialism in French colors," supported by "the union of the people of France" (a term which would include practically everyone except "the small caste which dominates the economy and the state"). The PCF, it pledged, "categorically excludes any recourse to oppression, to totalitarianism, to personal power." Only gradually was it noted that there was a complementary element which was, as it were, negatively expressed. Whereas the preceding 21st congress (October 1974) declared that "the socialist countries . . . manifest the aptitude of the new system to permit broad economic growth, social and cultural progress, the extension of the participation and initiative of the popular masses," (7) this time there was no reference to the "democratic achievements" of the Eastern regimes.

(5) See Kevin Devlin, "'Differences' Between Italian and Spanish CPs on Attitudes to Soviet Union," RAD BR/155, (World Communist Movement), Radio Free Europe Research, 11 November 1975.

(6) 17 December 1975.

(7) L'Humanité, 31 October 1974.

As the pre-congress "debate" developed through statements by leaders and contributions published in l'Humanité and the weekly France Nouvelle, it became clear that this was no accident -- nor was the fact that the draft failed to use the Leninist term "dictatorship of the proletariat." The latter aroused the indignation of conservative veterans, whose objections were duly printed -- and then duly refuted by others who agreed with Marchais (in a broadcast on January 19) that the Leninist slogan should be dropped, because it "does not cover the reality of our policy and what we are proposing to the country today."

By early January it was evident that the discussion over the dropping of "dictatorship of the proletariat" was being built up into one of the major themes for the congress, as one component of the new image that the leadership was striving to project. As such, it was frequently linked with allied themes, such as the PCF's devotion to civic liberties or its efforts to achieve a better life for the people of France as a whole. But the most important of these themes was the independence of the PCF, as expressed in readiness to criticize the Soviet regime -- for this, as its adversaries had frequently emphasized, was the criterion by which the credibility of other changes in its policies and positions would be assessed.

Polemics Over Soviet Camps

The campaign to reinforce the party's independent image got under way in October-November, with the occasional expression of "concern" or "disagreement" over known examples of Soviet repression. Thus, in late October, l'Humanité expressed concern about the fate of Leonid Plyuschch: if it was true that the Soviet mathematician had been interned in a psychiatric clinic because of his dissident views, the PCF would express "total disapproval," the editorial said, adding that the PCF had "long tried to get information" about the case. (In early January, after Marchais himself had intervened on his behalf, Plyushch was released and allowed to go to Paris.) Again, in mid-November PCF Politburo member Jean Kanapa indicated disagreement with the Soviet refusal to grant Sakharov (whom the PCF has attacked as "reactionary") an exit visa to collect his Nobel Peace Prize: "Liberties are indivisible and include in particular freedom of movement as well as freedom to publish all writings."

These gestures of independence were met with some cynicism by French observers. But in mid-December the party leadership took a more decisive step. The day after French television showed a documentary film on Soviet labor camps the PCF Politburo issued a statement saying that the film gave "an intolerable picture of

the conditions of detention in this camp." Noting that "there have in fact been in the Soviet Union trials of citizens persecuted for their political stands," it went on:

Under these circumstances the Politburo of the PCF declares that, if the reality corresponds to the pictures broadcast, and that were not publicly denied by the Soviet authorities, it would express its profound surprise and most formal disapproval.

Such unjustifiable facts could only harm socialism . . .

The Politburo reaffirms at the same time that it takes its stand against all repression affecting the rights of man, and notably the freedom of opinion, expression, and publication. (8)

When Pravda (9) without mentioning the PCF by name, chided those in France who, by accepting this "gross fake," had objectively aided anti-Sovietism, the PCF not merely did not withdraw: it counter-attacked. In his Humanité editorial, (10) René Andrieu wrote:

Even though we are aware of the socialist countries' immense contribution to historical progress and of the need for the solidarity of workers throughout the world, this does not lead us to give blind approval to everything that happens in the socialist countries. Let us repeat -- since it seems that this is not unnecessary -- that we give no one unconditional support, and that for us there exists no socialist model which it would suffice to copy mechanically. Especially when it is a question of errors.

When this unprecedented exchange took place Secretary-General Marchais was in Havana, attending the Cuban party congress -- and having what must have been very interesting meetings with Mikhail Suslov of the CPSU. While there he expressed full support for the French Politburo's stand on Soviet labor camps and for Andrieu's reply to Pravda (11); and on his return he was almost at pains to keep the controversy going. "If the camps did not exist

(8) Ibid., 13 December 1975.

(9) 19 December 1975.

(10) 22 December 1975.

(11) L'Humanité, 27 December 1975.

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we would not have published the Politburo communiqué," he said in a television interview on January 4, adding that the PCF was "completely opposed" to imprisonment for ideological reasons. Three days later, in another television interview, Marchais went further:

Socialism is synonymous with liberty. This idea is valid in all countries, under all circumstances. It excludes having recourse to repression or administrative measures against the expression of ideas. . . .

This is why the PCF has been led to express its disagreement with certain actions. For us, there is no question of allowing encroachments upon liberties. We shall remain attentive to the question of freedom and respect for socialist democracy. . . .

There is a divergence between us and the CPSU with regard to socialist democracy. (12)

Backing from Below

It is significant that Marchais could challenge the Soviet regime in such a strong terms without provoking an outburst of pro-Soviet indignation from the party ranks. For the nature of the party ranks has changed, too; and that is another important factor in the evolution of the PCF. While noncommunist observers treat the party's membership claims with some skepticism, it does seem that the number has been growing, and that the entry of younger cadres has been having an impact. In December 1973 Politburo member Andre Vieuguet claimed that the party's strength (long hidden under announcements of the number of cards sent out annually, but not necessarily taken up) was actually "approaching 410,000" (13). In the past few weeks Marchais and others have been speaking vaguely of "500,000 French Communists." And it appears that in general the new generation of militants is primarily concerned with the domestic political struggle, and is not apt to get upset about criticism of the Soviet regime.

Here one may note the contrast with the 21st French congress, held in October 1974. The resolution for that congress had

(12) Le Monde, 9 January 1976.

(13) L'Humanité, 3 December 1973.

emphasized an "open door" policy and commitment to work loyally with the Socialists and Left Radicals for a "union of the people of France for democratic change." During the pre-congress period, however, there emerged a strong movement of rank-and-file criticism of alleged concessions to the Socialists, strengthened by the maneuvers of conservative leaders like Roland Leroy. Marchais had to backtrack: the amended resolution adopted by the congress stressed the PCF's role as the revolutionary party of the working class, determined to remain the strongest force in the leftist alliance; and the PCF entered upon a year-long period of recurrent polemics with the Socialist Party.

This time there seems to be no chance of such a shift. In late January l'Humanité published reports on the 97 federal congresses. In all of them the draft resolution was endorsed, often with specific approval of the abandonment of proletarian dictatorship as a goal, sometimes unanimously, and sometimes with a few contrary votes or abstentions (another image-building embellishment). This underlines the lesson: for the rank and file, as for the leadership, priority is now given to domestic political interests, and not to solidarity with the USSR.

Rivals and Allies

But domestic politics has its own problems, particularly with regard to the PCF's strategy of the leftist alliance and its public image. For more than a decade now the PCF has been committed to the strategy of the Leftist alliance, but in recent years the tendency has been for the alliance to work to the political profit of the Socialists rather than that of the Communists. The "new" PSF of Francois Mitterrand has become as much a rival as an ally, and local elections as well as opinion polls have shown it gaining electoral strength at the expense of the PCF. A SOFRES poll published in the current issue of Le Nouvel Observateur (14) indicates that this tendency is increasing: according to the sample, the Communists' share of the poll has dropped from 21 per cent in June 1974 to 20 per cent today, while the share of the Socialists and Left Radicals has risen from 27 per cent to 30 per cent (the Gaullist UDR has risen from 13 per cent to 15 per cent, the Independent Republicans remain steady at 24 per cent, and the centrist reformist grouping has dropped from 12 per cent to 8 per cent).

(14) 2 February 1976.

Conscious of this trend, the Socialists have shown no great desire to make things easier for the PCF, which is still far stronger organizationally, particularly in the factories. This emerges clearly from the report on the PCF which the Socialist Executive issued one week before the opening of the 22nd congress. The report, by secretariat member Lionel Jospin, welcomed the recent changes in the PCF's positions -- but found that they did not go far enough. Jospin suggested that the purpose of the changes was to enable the PCF to "preserve political control over the French working class," against the growing strength of the Socialists. The key issue was the relationship between the PCF and the CPSU. Recognizing that the PCF's public criticism of Soviet repression was an important step forward, he questioned whether it was a "real turning point," and challenged the French Communists to proceed to the logical conclusion that the Socialists had already drawn -- that "where there is no liberty, there is no socialism." The PCF, he added, was evolving because it had been "constrained by the facts" and not by a free decision; therefore nothing should be done to give it the hope of "escaping from the Socialist-Communist dialogue." (15)

The communist reaction to this wounding attack was significant. The invitation to another round of polemics was ignored. In 18 lines l'Humanité noted the appearance of a "document visibly drawn up in haste," and ingenuously suggested that "this episode" was indicative of the interest aroused by the 22nd congress. The settling of accounts would come later; for the moment the PCF was anxious to avoid trouble on that front.

Public Skepticism


The PCF's basic problem, perhaps, is that its efforts to change its public image have so far had relatively little effect. This emerges clearly from the SOFRES public opinion poll cited above. Asked whether they thought that, if the Union of the Left came to power, the PCF would try to eliminate its partners and govern alone, 46 per cent said Yes and 31 per cent No (23 per cent undecided). The PCF's efforts to demonstrate its independence have also failed to impress the public in general. Only 5 per cent thought that the recent moves (dropping "dictatorship of the proletariat," criticizing Soviet camps, etc.)

(15) Le Monde, 29 January 1976.

had done "much" to modify PCF-CPSU relations; 43 per cent opted for "a little or somewhat"; and 25 per cent chose "not at all."

Public skepticism extended to the party's strategy of leftist unity. Only 18 per cent thought that the Union of the Left would be an enduring phenomenon (down from 33 per cent in July 1974), while 61 per cent judged that the alliance would "remain fragile." Equally interesting was the public view of the prospects for the two main parties: 40 per cent thought that in five years' time the Socialist Party would be stronger than the PCF; 26 per cent thought the two would be equal in strength; and only 9 per cent thought that the PCF would be the stronger.

This evidence of public skepticism can surely only impel the PCF to redouble its image-building efforts. There will be continued emphasis on the party's commitment to pluralistic democracy and civic liberties, and a consequent readiness to dissociate the PCF from Soviet realities when this seems appropriate. At the same time one may expect the pendulum effect to operate: such criticism will alternate with affirmations of basic solidarity. But it now seems clear that the Kremlin can no longer count on the unconditional loyalty of the PCF. In that case the 22nd congress will mark a real turning point in the history of the communist movement in France -- and, indeed, in Western Europe. (005)



This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

RAD Background Report/32
(Yugoslavia)

4 February 1976

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AN ANALYSIS OF TITO'S INTERVIEW WITH "VJESNIK"

By Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: In a long interview with the Zagreb daily Vjesnik published on February 1 President Tito dealt with the weaknesses plaguing the Yugoslav party and state. He admitted that much remains to be done, but said the situation is now much better than it was several years ago, when purges were carried out in Croatia and Slovenia. He also said nothing will change in Yugoslavia when he leaves the political stage, thanks to a well-functioning collective leadership. A "fierce" struggle must be waged against economic crimes and against people who enrich themselves through chicanery, but those who earn money abroad by honest work should not be put in the same category as people who have made money through speculation, he said. He also complained about certain journalists who have written articles for which the Yugoslav government had to apologize through diplomatic channels.

* * *

The two important considerations in the interview with President Tito published in the Zagreb daily Vjesnik on February 1 are that he dealt with the country's internal situation and that he described himself as optimistic that there will be no changes after his departure from the political stage because the nine-man collective leadership has proved itself "very efficient." (The collective leadership is officially called the Presidency of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, and is composed of one member from each of the six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces, plus Tito.)

What strikes the eye, however, is that Tito seemed more optimistic about what will happen after he leaves than about the present situation in Yugoslavia. He listed a number of weaknesses both inside and outside the party, and said he was not satisfied "with what has so far been achieved, because there are still those in the League of Communists who cannot be said to be Communists or to deserve a place in the organization"; "there is a considerable lack of discipline," and the decisions made at the 10th LCY

Congress in May 1974 "are being implemented only slowly or even disregarded." Therefore his statement that "nothing will change" when he leaves the scene would seem to conflict with his optimism about the future.


Yugoslavia is apparently the only communist country in which self-criticism by its leaders has not only been publicly voiced but considered to be one of its strengths. Tito mentioned this during his interview many times, insisting that party members "must rectify their mistakes through self-criticism." They "must be self-critical, because self-criticism, to quote Lenin, brings one half way to success, and is a powerful educational instrument in creating the new man and the self-managing society." Moreover, "self-criticism is more important than criticism," although the latter must be permitted provided it is not "petty criticism." Tito seemed to feel that more mistakes are committed by the leaders than by ordinary party members, noting that "crisis situations do not develop from below, from the grass roots, but rather in the leadership." Because the situation "in the grass roots of the LCY" has been better than that in the leadership the party has been successful, but:

There is not enough self-criticism in the LCY; a good Communist must be self-critical about his failures and mistakes, because only in this way can he increase his own prestige and, it goes without saying, that of the LCY. But if he admits mistakes and then makes the same ones again he loses the confidence of the people, and there is too much of this among us. In saying this I am not referring to individuals alone, but also to entire LCY leaderships.

A "More Energetic Struggle" Ahead

Tito is of the opinion that "only to a certain extent has the LCY succeeded in getting certain matters and processes moving." This is why a "more energetic struggle" lies ahead, especially against the "bureaucratic forces" in the party -- although, he said, "the LCY cannot at one stroke, as if wielding a magic wand, remove and replace such people." "Persistent work" and "great patience" are required "because we must be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water." There will be no mercy for those "who know they are making mistakes"; such people will be either expelled from the party or subjected to other punishment. Reminded that he and his colleagues have been using "humane methods," Tito answered that "no harm should come to honest people, to good Communists and those who can become good Communists," but "enemies" will be severely punished. People who have been expelled from the party on the basis of "incorrect assessments" should be fairly re-examined and readmitted to membership, and the rehabilitation of such people must proceed at a much faster rate than has hitherto been the case.

Another important struggle must be waged against economic crime. The interviewer reminded Tito that popular masses in Yugoslavia are chanting: "Comrade Tito, write another letter, because even people



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Another important struggle must be waged against economic crime. The interviewer reminded Tito that popular masses in Yugoslavia are chanting: "Comrade Tito, write another letter, because even people

who did not steal previously are doing so now" (a reference to the letter Tito sent to all party members in October 1972, in which he called for a struggle against economic crime). Tito promised "appropriate new measures," but stressed that a distinction must be made between individuals and groups:

We must know how people have acquired their property, but we must not put everyone in the same category. We must not lump together those who work hard to be able to build a house with the help of their families and those who suddenly, virtually overnight, are able to build themselves a villa, though they have no income other than, let us say, a salary or two, yet they build themselves villas and other things -- in short, they grow rich. Where and how did they get the money?

At this point the interviewer obviously took somewhat of a risk; she said "one cannot become rich by honest work," though "one can live well." Tito corrected her, mentioning Yugoslav workers in West Germany "where they are better paid, which enables them to build their own houses." These people, Tito said, "can be considered rich, but their success is due to the fact that they work under conditions that are better than those in this country, and therefore they have a right to it, it is theirs." Despite Tito's disclaimer, however, to become rich in Yugoslavia "through honest work" is virtually impossible, and the interviewer stuck to her guns: "Comrade Tito, as I have already said, there are quite a few people in the party who have enriched themselves." Tito answered:

Yes, certainly, but here, too, one should bear certain things in mind. For instance, some people in the LCY have occupied posts with good salaries, or have gone abroad in the diplomatic service to places where they had a chance to save money. Some people have bequeathed property to their relatives -- land, or a house. The relatives have sold such property or been able to do something with it quickly -- for instance, to build a villa or the like. A distinction should be made between these types of people and those who have enriched themselves through chicanery, through commercial or other deals, by buying and reselling, etc. -- in short, by speculation.

Tito agreed with the interviewer that a new tax law should be passed to prevent such manipulation. The party must struggle energetically against "the petty-bourgeois psychology of a consumer society, which alienates, dehumanizes, and invalidates man, and does great damage to the LCY and to the development of our self-managing society." He revealed that "we have arrested many people" and "the trials of those who have inflicted immense damage -- reckoned in billions of dinars -- on our foreign trade will begin soon." These people have been supported by "foreign enemies," he said, and that is why the forthcoming trials are both economic and political in nature. Here he mentioned by name one Slobodan-Bata Todorovic, owner of a dozen banks throughout Europe, who is said to have been kidnaped in Munich, where he had his headquarters.

"Paper Has Gained the Upper Hand"


Tito complained that at present there are too many meetings "and a terrible amount of written material," and the interviewer added, "people are simply suffocating." Tito agreed, and said that "this damned paper has gained the upper hand to such an extent that no one reads anything any more." That is why, in his opinion, people should also be acquainted with individual problems orally, and "should be taught to speak briefly and clearly at meetings." He also complained about the press in general and individual (unnamed) journalists in particular:

I cannot understand why things are sometimes published that damage our relations with other countries. These are very delicate matters, and the press, radio, and television must fully observe the decisions and positions of our government vis-à-vis individual countries. This is not always taken into consideration; sometimes a certain arbitrariness becomes apparent, or some journalists fail to understand certain things and write in such a way that we must then apologize through diplomatic channels, and so forth.

Since Yugoslav information media have recently been full of attacks on both Western and Eastern countries, one cannot say just what Tito has in mind here, but he is known to be dissatisfied with a number of Yugoslav correspondents in foreign countries, and even with some press attachés. Reminded by the interviewer that much has been demanded from journalists and very little help accorded them he agreed, however, and promised improvement. And in response to a remark by the interviewer to the effect that women in Yugoslavia were "worse off," Tito answered this was not true; "Life is also hard for men, and they too have their worries." The interviewer retorted: "I do not think life is easy for you males. But, we women bear a triple burden. It is hard, Comrade Tito, and I say this sincerely." Tito answered that there are now many women in the Central Committee, and they should fight for their rights more energetically.

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RAD Background Report /30
(Czechoslovakia)
2 February 1976

A NEW ATTACK ON THE 1968 REFORMERS

(A translation with comment by the Czechoslovak Unit)

Summary and Introduction: The article whose main parts are translated below was published in Tribuna (No.4, 21 January 1976), a party weekly, and is entitled "The Main Danger Comes from the Right." The author, Frantisek Kudrna, may be identical with a former lieutenant colonel who was a press officer in the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defense.

After briefly referring to the forthcoming 15th party congress and to the successes achieved since the preceding congress, Kudrna warns of the danger from the "Right," which still exists, he says. He explains why this is the case, alludes to some kind of fifth column the Rightists are allegedly trying to infiltrate into the party, and attacks those "incorrigibles" (whom he does not name, but who are undoubtedly Dubcek and his supporters) who attempt to gain rehabilitation by trying to induce the party to adopt a spirit of reconciliation toward them. In conclusion, the author reiterates that the party is ready to make its peace with those who "were led astray" but have now recognized their mistakes.

The immediate reason for this new broadside against the reformers, combined with a wooing of support for the party, is not discernable, and any interpretation would be purely speculative.

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In just a few weeks, the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia will convene. One of the tasks it will undertake will be an assessment of the results of our journey since the 14th congress of the party.

Today it is quite clear that we need not be ashamed of what we have accomplished in various spheres of the life of our society. After all, all of us remember the situation which the domestic right-wing opportunists and revisionists, with strong support from the class enemies at home and abroad, managed to create in our homeland: they disrupted not only the party but virtually all the mass organizations; they paralyzed the directing mechanism of the state's power, and they attempted to destroy the basic values of socialism, including socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, in the consciousness of our people. They wanted -- whether subjectively aware of this or not -- to restore capitalism in this country, with everything which that implies. And our workers began to feel the burden of this on their own shoulders quite clearly in the form of rising prices of basic necessities of life and in a general decline of the standard of living.

And after their defeat the domestic reactionaries, hand in hand with their brethren abroad and their opportunistic agency, did everything in their power to prevent, or at least to slow down, consolidation in this country.

The new leadership of the party, working firmly and thoughtfully, thwarted these plans. It won the support of the broad masses of the working people over to its policies. Because of this, our society overcame the crisis within a period far shorter than the greatest optimists had ventured to even contemplate. All of us know how many arduous ideological, political, and managerial efforts in every area of life of our society this statement implies. The officials and members of the party, as well as persons without party affiliation, who worked regardless of time and often of their health are legion. Hence, all of those who honestly worked have good reason to rejoice.

The successes we have attained must not, however, make us relax. We are aware of a number of our weak spots and unsolved problems, as well as of mistakes we have made. We also know that the class enemy at home and abroad, with the help of right-wing opportunists, is attempting to take advantage of our weaknesses and to regain its lost influence.

It is true that we have won many significant victories in the struggle against right-wing opportunism, too. We defeated the Right through political means. That is to say, our working people could judge by their own experience who had done concretely what to better their lives. Therefore, it is no accident that of late socialist competition has been developing on so large a scale, that the rationalization drive has been greatly intensified, and that we have achieved all these results in the economy, the arts, science, and elsewhere. Thus, the policy of the Right in this country has absolutely failed.

This does not mean, however, that the danger from the Right has disappeared from our society. The political defeat of the Right and the departure of its representatives from governing and directing [the affairs of] society is not proof positive of the disappearance of opportunistic and revisionist remnants in the minds of some people. Therefore, the most important factors in the struggle against the right-wing danger are not so much persons, but rather the conditions and breeding ground that enable right-wing opportunism to continue to vegetate in the minds of the people of a socialist society. Unless we succeed in laying this breeding ground bare, new proponents of this ideology can always appear. After all, this is what our Right counted on even at the time when it was still in power, but knew that its days were numbered: it decided to implant another right-wing set, which was not known to us, within our ranks.

* * *

This reference to "another right-wing set, unknown to us," is something quite new, unless it is an allusion to the members elected to the party Central Committee at the Vysocany 14th party congress, held in secret on 22 August 1968, after the Warsaw Pact troops invasion -- a congress that was subsequently declared to have been illegal.

* * *

In any case, the enemy has always attempted to do this. But the absolute debacle of the policies of the Right has made this very

difficult. Nor will it have any chance in this respect, unless we ourselves offer it opportunities through our readiness to be conciliatory, or through tolerating double-faced policies and politicking, as well as radical stances which these people and career-seekers frequently use as a cover.

Therefore, even today, the right-wing danger is the greatest peril for our society. On the other hand, owing to the political defeat of the Right and to the struggle against the remnants of its theory in practice extended over several years, the character of the struggle against the Right has somewhat changed. The conditions have changed and with them, of necessity, the forms of the struggle as well. . . .

* * *

Then comes a quotation from a letter from the CPCS CC, which emphasizes this point. The author then continues:

* * *

What does the breeding ground of right-wing opportunism and revisionism in this country consist of? In the first place, there are the traditions of our relatively numerous lower middle class that merged with practically every section of the workers in the course of socialization, and there are the remnants of petty bourgeois ideology, nationalism, Masarykism, and social democratism, or those of religious survivals.

However, right-wing opportunism today does not have the same characteristics as it did in 1968-1969. Today, it means primarily a certain trend in the thinking and acting of some people -- whether impulsive or deliberate -- to lean toward the bourgeois ideology, to create a spirit of conciliation toward it and the bourgeois way of life, and to carry out efforts to promote the interests of groups or individuals in the work of socialist institutions which are designed to protect the interests of society as a whole. In concrete terms, this means, for instance, advocating egalitarianism, undermining working morale, etc. To put it briefly, it simply means a tendency to apply the capitalistic way of thought and action in our life.

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The danger of right-wing opportunism also exists in the fact that it underestimates the strength of our class enemies, does not grasp the complexity of the class struggle, and calls for a spirit of conciliation and tolerance toward the enemy. For instance, some incorrigible rightists try to foster this tendency toward a conciliatory spirit for their own gradual rehabilitation. They would even like to advise the leadership of the party how it ought to effect this reconciliation with them without "losing face."

* * *

This is an anonymous reference to the letter writers such as Dubcek, Mlynar, and others.

* * *

They endeavor to retain as their supporters those who were led astray by asserting that their policies were correct and that the party would have to rehabilitate them in any event, and this perhaps as early as at the next congress. What is involved here is a transparent tactic designed to retain at least a little influence over their former supporters. . . .

* * *

In the next paragraph the author quotes from Husak's speech at the CPCS CC session on 27 October 1972 in which the latter outlined the party's stand regarding those "in inimical positions" and discussed how the party must "distinguish" among them. Kudrna then continues:

* * *

Hence, we shall not in any event agree to reconciliation with adamant enemies of socialism; we distinguish between the organizers

and those led astray and those who lost their membership because of their passivity. We have said, and continue to say, that we are not supporters of the idea of hereditary sin, and that everyone is himself responsible for the judgment of his person. In fact, those workers who may have been temporarily led astray by the gigantic flood of right-wing demagogy, especially in 1968-1969, but who realized their mistakes and drew the proper conclusions from them, do greatly matter to us.

Marxists have always judged people by their development, they have always sincerely striven to win over to their policies every worker, farmer, teacher, scientist, artist, or technician. And we do, and we shall continue to do, everything possible to explain to the workers our policies, which are signed to improve their life, and to win them over to our policies. . . .

* * *

The author briefly quotes Lenin in this context, and then goes on to say:

* * *

Yet, it is true that the dissemination of right-wing opportunism need not always be deliberate. The entire complexity of the ideological struggle exists in the fact that it is not always possible for all to see the class lines and interests clearly and accurately. It can happen that even persons subjectively loyal to socialism succumb to bourgeois ideology in one way or another, and that sometimes they may act in that spirit. This occurs mainly when we neglect to struggle consistently against enemy ideology everywhere and at all times. . . .

* * *

The article ends with another quotation from the letter from the CPCS CC on "socialist awareness."

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IN.M.E.R.
ARHIVA
Fond *CC, JRM/1895/14*

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

Buciliana 34

RUMANIA/3
29 January 1976

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S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

Culture

1. Plans for Future Cultural Programs Stress National Elements



Agriculture

2. Draft Program on the Maintenance of Forest Lands
3. Small Private Plots Allocated to State Farm Workers

The Military

4. Pay Raise and Increased Benefits for the Armed Forces

Foreign Affairs

5. Rumania Participates in Security Council Debate on Middle East
6. Vice-Premier Paul Niculescu Visits West Germany

Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation

7. Talks on Economic Co-operation with Britain
8. New Economic Agreement with Argentina Reached

CULTURE1. Plans for Future Cultural Programs Stress National Elements

On 30 December 1975 a plenary session of the Council on Socialist Culture and Education was held in Bucharest (Radio Bucharest, 30 December 1975). On the agenda were discussions of the council's 1975 report, of its plan of activity for 1976, and of "the general measures to be taken to continue perfecting the professional skill of all those working in the cultural and artistic field." After dealing with "successful achievements" of 1975 (which were not, however, specified in the brief published notice on the session), the report called attention "to a number of deficiencies that have become noticeable in this field and to their causes, and set forth measures that would lead to improvement of all cultural-artistic life [which is] devoted to the socialist indoctrination of the working people in the country."

The following decisions were arrived at with regard to the council's activities in 1976: it will undertake to make thorough preparations for the Congress of Political Education and Culture scheduled for May (see Rumanian Situation Report/48, Radio Free Europe Research, 12 December 1975, Item 1); it will make a sustained effort to work out "at a high ideological and artistic level," what was described as "the National Epic"; it will draw up a program on the professional recycling of "cultural workers"; and it will promote an increase in the "educational efficiency" of all creative activity and its dissemination among the masses.

In his speech at the 11th party congress in 1974, Ceausescu dealt with the need for "the Central Committee and its special institutions to guarantee direct leadership and guidance of all ideological and theoretical activity, since in political and cultural-educational work . . . more than in any other area of ideological and political education, a clear-cut concept and unified guidance are needed. How the party plans to achieve this goal is still a matter for speculation, but the congress scheduled for May 1976 may shed some light on the matter, and must certainly be regarded as the first step in carrying out Ceausescu's instructions.

Writing in Contemporanul (No. 50, 12 December 1975), the deputy editor-in-chief of Era Socialista, Ion Mitran, stated that "at first glance, combining such fields may seem to be stretching things, because there are important differences between them. I think, however, that what unites them -- or rather what ought 'ideally' to unite them -- is their social efficiency: the consistency of their transforming ideas, their contribution to the moral and -- why not? -- the material prestige of the human community." Mitran pointed out the close interrelation between "the revolutionary attitude" and the "social value" of creativity in these fields. His condemnation of "fixed, rigid formulas," of "schemes valid under all circumstances and for all time" may indicate party dissatisfaction with the old-fashioned or spiritually inflexible activists who have not yet fully adjusted the content and style of their work to the requirements of Ceausescu's "creative Marxism."

Quality in works of art seems to be equally important -- to Mitran -- it is generally accepted by communist theorists that only real art, not pseudoartistic output, can be impressive and thus possibly effective. It is difficult to believe, however, that the forthcoming Congress of Political Education and Culture will find the "philosopher's stone" that will make ideologically pure content clad in artistically perfect form a possibility.

In the official Rumanian view, as expressed in an editorial in Contemporanul (No. 2, 9 January 1976), the forthcoming congress is to draw the conclusions regarding the "cultural revolution" started in 1971: the journal describes the congress as the "climax of the discussions of how the party's ideological program is being implemented and the measures needed if the task of perfecting political-ideological and cultural-educational activity postulated at the 11th [party] congress is to be carried out."

The creation of the National Epic heralded by the Council on Socialist Culture and Education will not be a Rumanian Iliad, as the term might suggest. In the eyes of Rumanian theorists it is the totality of patriotically inspired art -- literature, painting, the cinema, the dance, etc. -- that will be created in Rumania. In launching this slogan, whose rather hazy meaning is continually being "explained" by officials, the RCP is probably pursuing a double goal: first, to create an instrument that will more "efficiently" steer artistic activity in the direction required by its over-all policy goals; secondly, to integrate the arts into the five-year-plan system, thus linking the somewhat elusive artistic sector more closely to the system of five-year socioeconomic plans.

A number of quotations can be found to elucidate the specific connotations and desiderata connected with the National Epic: For instance, Dan Zamfirescu had this to say in an article in Romania Literara (No. 1, 1 January 1976): "If, today, we speak of a national epic, it is because today we are living through a national epic ourselves. Because this epic has created for us a medium of communion with our ancestors." Nicolae Balota, writing in Lucea-farul (No. 52, 30 December 1975), was even more explicit in linking the need for a National Epic to the requirements of the present-day situation in Rumania and in underscoring its propagandistic tasks:

During the lofty moments when historical awareness becomes concentrated, changes take place in the historical situation of a people, the appearance of historical-poetic projections is both natural and necessary. A national epic has great pedagogical value. We are living through an epoch in which such works, which engender a supreme synthesis and an analysis of past experiences, passing them through the sieve of the present and projecting them into the future, are necessary.

It is made quite clear in an article by the poet Dan Mutascu (Saptamina No. 266, 9 January 1976) that glorification of the past will have a corollary in glorification of the achievements of the communist regime in Rumania and of the history of the Rumanian communist and workers' movement as a whole. The National Epic will

represent "the poetic glorification of the great revolutionary impetus," but the shape of the works of art that make up this epic will not be revolutionary; rather they will represent what Mutascu defined as "contemporary classicism."

After the need to create the National Epic was proclaimed, a period of feverish activity began in cultural institutions and artists' unions. At a meeting of the Bureau of the Writers' Union on 15 December 1975 the first point on the agenda was the working out of the National Epic coupled with a discussion of the five-year (1976-1980) literary plan (Romania Literara No. 51, 13 December 1975). Similar discussions are now under way in the various sections of the Bucharest writers' association and in provincial associations. The Romania Literara account contained the first reference to the forthcoming national conference of Rumanian writers, which, according to the Writers' Union statutes, should be held next year. (The last conference took place in May 1972.)

In an interview published in Contemporanul (No. 50, 12 December 1975) the director of Film Studio No. 5, Dumitru Fernoaga, gave some details on the studio's "five-year plan for the national cinema epic [which has been] very clearly set forth." Films on the following subjects are envisaged: the founding of the Rumanian Communist Party; the life of the 16th century Moldavian ruler Petru Rares; the 1848 revolution; the life of the scientist Victor Babes.

Even before the proclamation of the campaign to create a National Epic the Rumanian cultural scene had been flooded with artistic productions marked by both national fervor and ideological rigidity. The primacy of an opportunistic content over aesthetic achievements has already been established in practice, in spite of isolated skeptical remarks (e.g., by Ov.S. Crohmalniceanu in Contemporanul [No. 50, 12 December 1975] and Stefan Augustin Doinas in Luceafarul [No. 51, 20 December 1975], questioning the mainly low-level, unilaterally oriented artistic output of the day. Unfortunately artistic spontaneity, and with it artistic quality, will be even more endangered by the now planned and grossly vulgarized National Epic. (086)

AGRICULTURE

2. Draft Program on the Maintenance of Forest Lands

Scinteia (6 January 1976) published the text of a draft program on the maintenance and development of forest lands which had been discussed at a meeting of the Political Executive Committee on 23 September 1975. The committee decided to submit the program to public discussion and then present it to the congress of people's council chairmen originally scheduled for the end of 1975 (see Rumanian SR/38, REFER, 20 October 1975, Item 6) but later postponed until the end of January or the beginning of February.

The draft program consists of a lengthy preamble in which the need for a long-range program to improve the situation in this important sector of the economy is enlarged upon, and 12 chapters. The body of the document deals in a somewhat technical manner with the regulation of tree-cutting, forest regeneration, maintenance

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and development of forest lands, productivity, raising the professional qualifications of forest workers, administrative control, hunting and fishing, secondary products, improving existing legislation, research, and so on. According to Scinteia, all suggestions submitted by the public will be forwarded to the Ministry of Forestry Administration and Construction Materials and the General State Forestry Inspectorate in early February. This, however, leaves only a month for consideration of such proposals.

The preamble notes that the program has been worked out on the basis of principles laid down by Ceausescu at a conference of forestry executives in October 1974 and at the 11th party congress the following month. It presents data on past and present forestry administration, noting deficiencies and suggesting ways of improving the situation. It recalls that at the turn of the century some 8,500,000 to 9,000,000 hectares -- 40 per cent of Rumania's territory -- consisted of forest lands, and that in 1974 the figure had dropped to 6,300,000 hectares owing to improper exploitation. This, it points out, has had an adverse effect on the hydrological balance, the environment, and the production of timber. Rumania's forests now cover only 27 per cent of its territory -- slightly below the European average of 29 per cent.

According to the preamble, exploitation reached its height between the two World Wars -- in 1930, for instance, tree-felling exceeded new growth in "accessible" forests by 60 per cent. Between 1949 and 1964 the situation in this respect was also unsatisfactory, with the cutting of "mature" coniferous trees ranging between 37 and 104 per cent over the warranted quota, and total felling varying between 19 and 47 per cent in excess of it. Also, in only 50 per cent of the young forests were suitable conditions provided for the cultivation of particularly valuable species of trees.

At present the forests produce an average of only 4.5 cubic meters of timber per hectare per year, mainly because coniferous forests represent only 28 per cent of the total, 700,000 hectares produce only 2 cubic meters per hectare, and some 1,000,000 hectares of forest have already passed the "age of exploitation."

The "possible" forest output is at present 21,000,000 cubic meters per year, compared to an actual new growth of 28,000,000 cubic meters (the extra 7,000,000 cubic meters being earmarked for "restructuring" the forests). Of these 21,000,000 cubic meters, some 16,400,000 represent primary products and 4,600,000 secondary ones.

At the end of the preamble certain "achievements" in the post-nationalization period are praised: the tree-felling system has been improved to the point where some 22 per cent of the forests now fulfill their function as "protectors" of water and soil, and some 2,000,000 hectares of land have been afforested, as have about 105,000 hectares of previously unproductive terrain.

In addition to the technical provisions they contain, the program's 12 chapters have a number of interesting things to say. Chapter 1 states that although the forests can produce 21,000,000 cubic

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meters per year, felling will for a time be restricted to 20,000,000 cubic meters -- a measure that will make it possible to balance the "structure" of the forests and ultimately lead to an increase in annual output. "Regeneration" of the 700,000 hectares of low-output forests is to be completed by, at the latest, the year 2010; also 305,000 hectares will be afforested between 1976 and 1980, and 220,000 hectares during each of the ensuing five-year periods.

Chapter 2 states that the average area of forest per capita of population will drop from the present 0.29 hectares to 0.23 hectares by 2010, due to the expected population increase.

Chapter 3 deals with the question of increasing the proportion of coniferous forests in the total forest area. According to plan, it is to rise from the present 28 per cent to 40 per cent by 2010 -- a task that is to be accomplished by increasing the planting of such trees until it represents 65 to 66 per cent of total afforestation. It is also noted in this chapter that thanks to rising productivity, by the year 2010 growth in the "timber masses" will have increased 6,200,000 cubic meters over the present figure of 28,000,000 cubic meters annually.

The January 15 issue of Romania Libera contained an interview with Professor Stelian Munteanu, a corresponding member of the Academy of the RSR, who discussed some aspects of the draft program, including the controlling of run-off. He reported that 800,000,000 lei were spent for that purpose between 1948 and 1975, and that in the next 15 years a total of 230,000 hectares will be afforested with the same end in view -- 40,000 between now and 1980, 90,000 between 1981 and 1985, and 100,000 between 1986 and 1990.

This long-range program clearly demonstrates the concern of both party and state to rectify the present situation. In his address to the foresters' conference in October 1974 Ceausescu sharply criticized shortcomings in the sector, including the fact that Rumania's forests cover not 6,500,000 hectares, as has always been claimed, but well under 6,000,000 (a statement that was confirmed in the 18 October 1974 issue of Revista Economica -- see Rumanian SR/34, RFER, 24 October 1974, Item 3).

It would seem that the passage in the preamble which blames errors in the interwar period for the present critical situation of Rumania's forests is intended to minimize the serious deficiencies and reckless felling policy that have characterized the period since World War II. Immediately after the war, for instance, Sovromlemn, a mixed Soviet-Rumanian company, was responsible for the cutting of huge forest areas and the shipment of vast quantities of processed and unprocessed timber to the Soviet Union as partial payment of war reparations. It could be asked, however, why so little has been done to remedy the situation -- why nothing was done about the 700,000 hectares of poor-yield forests, and why the 1,000,000 hectares described as having passed the age of exploitation were not exploited in time.

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3. Small Private Plots Allocated to State Farm Workers

The text of State Council Decree No. 169, on remunerating State Agricultural Unit (SAU) workers on a piecework basis and "other measures designed to provide them with material incentives" was published in Buletinul Oficial No. 141 (31 December 1975).

The passages dealing with piecework are couched mainly in technical terms, but do make mention of the fact that SAU personnel may purchase certain quantities of farm produce at contract prices if a given unit's production plan is exceeded: each member is entitled to buy up to 500 kg. of wheat, 150 kg. each of potatoes and vegetables, 100 kg. each of fruit and grapes, 60 liters of wine, 50 kg. each of pork and fowl (live weight), 300 liters of milk, and 300 eggs. The total amount of produce sold in this manner, however, may not exceed 50 per cent of the above-plan output.

Article 12 of the decree permits the SAUs to assign up to one tenth of a hectare of land to the families of workers engaged in livestock breeding and fattening, with the stipulation that such land is to be used mainly for vegetable growing. Land for this purpose will be acquired by reducing the area now allotted to farmyards, roads, and other ancillary purposes; the areas now farmed by the SAUs will not be reduced in size. The decree applies only to workers in the livestock sector. (In the Agricultural Production Co-operatives each worker, regardless of the nature of his work, is entitled to an 0.30-hectare private plot.)

Data on the number of workers who will receive these small plots are not available, but since there were only 265,700 of them in the 369 SAUs in the country in 1973, the figure will certainly not be high. (In that year the SAUs accounted for 795,200 head of cattle, 2,921,700 pigs, and 1,711,600 sheep.)

The new measure was obviously prompted by the serious deficiencies in vegetable production, which have resulted in failure to fulfill the annual plans. In 1973, for example, the plan called for an output of 3,820,000 tons, but in fact only 2,631,000 tons were harvested; in 1974 the corresponding figures were 3,925,000 tons and 2,725,000 tons. These shortfalls, which obviously reduced the supplies on the market, are certainly what impelled Ceausescu to exhort county officials to draw up programs to remedy the situation, and to urge the growing of vegetables in factory yards and on vacant land on the outskirts of cities. Last October the party's Political Executive Committee also discussed measures to improve the supply of good and consumer goods.

For more on this general topic, see Rumanian SRs/41, 45, and 49, RFER, 23 October, 20 November, and 19 December 1975, Items 1, 6, and 7, and Rumanian SR/1, RFER, 15 January 1976, Item 3. (088)

THE MILITARY

4. Pay Raise and Increased Benefits for the Armed Forces

At a meeting of the party aktif of the Rumanian armed forces in December 1975 (see Rumanian SR/49, RFER, 19 December 1975, Item 5), Ceausescu made much of the contribution the army has made to the development of the economy and alluded to its role in the 1976-1980 plan, during which it will help with the irrigation of 350,000 hectares of agricultural land and in the construction of the shipyard and port area at Mangalia, among other things. The party leader admitted, however, that combining this economic burden with regular military activities had "raised certain problems."

Since both Ceausescu and Minister of National Defense Ion Ionita have laid great stress on the need to "strengthen discipline and military order," it can be assumed that intensive use of the army in the economic sector has resulted in a slackening of discipline. Clearly, assigning soldiers to agricultural and construction work might well have a deleterious effect on their morale. It may be that the recent decision of the Political Executive Committee to increase the food allowance, pay, and leave time of servicemen was taken to counteract a feeling among them that they were being regarded as a source of cheap labor. The "lack of exigency" on the part of party organizations and unit commanders of which Ceausescu complained is certainly not the only reason for shortcomings in the military sphere; that is undoubtedly why it was considered necessary to supplement the measures on political training of the military with the benefits mentioned above.

According to Scinteia (30 December 1975), as of 1 January 1976 the pay of privates will be doubled; that of corporals and sergeants will increase by 60 to 70 per cent, and that of both active and reserve officers and students at military academies will rise by 29 per cent. Servicemen who have been working for at least six months on economic projects and those with outstanding records in combat instruction or politics will be granted an extra five days of leave, and the food allowance for servicemen and students in military academies will be increased by 15 per cent. (089)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

5. Rumania Participates in Security Council Debate on Middle East

A visit by Deputy Foreign Minister Cornel Pacoste to Israel (see Rumanian SR/1, RFER, 15 January 1976, Item 6) and CC Secretary Stefan Andrei's recent talks in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Libya, and with PLO leader Yasser Arafat, prepared the ground for Rumania's participation in the UN Security Council's debate on the Middle East. (The RSR is a nonpermanent member of the council.)

On January 8 Andrei was received, together with Deputy Minister of the Interior Nicolae Doicaru (who is also counselor to Ceausescu), by Syria's President Hafiz al-Asad. No details of their conversation have been made public, except that Andrei conveyed a message from Ceausescu to the Syrian leader (Radio

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Bucharest, January 9). The Rumanian minister also met with Vice-President Mahmud al-Ayyubi and with the secretary-general of the Baath Party, and signed an agreement on co-operation between the latter and the RCP covering 1976 and 1977.

On January 11 Andrei had talks with Prince Hasan ibn Talal, heir to King Husayn, at a meeting also attended by Doicaru. According to Radio Bucharest (January 11), economic relations and topical international matters were the subjects discussed. On January 12 Andrei was received by Egypt's President Sadat and saw the secretary-general of the Arab League. His talks with the latter were also attended by Doicaru and Cornel Pacoste, and ended with the signing of a 1976-1977 co-operation agreement between the RCP and the Arab League. The Rumanians were also received by Prime Minister Salim and Foreign Minister Fahmi, and again the Middle East question was the main topic discussed.

On January 14 Agerpres reported the meeting between Andrei and Arafat, noting that the latter had expressed gratitude for Rumania's "consistent support of the struggle of the Palestinian people." A Radio Bucharest commentator stated (January 14) that the need for a political solution to the Middle East conflict was stressed by both men, and added that an independent Palestinian state should be created.

On January 18 Andrei was received by Libyan Prime Minister Jallud, to whom he handed a message from Ceausescu to be delivered to head of state Gadhaffi. Bilateral economic relations and the Middle East situation were reviewed during their meeting.

The Andrei visits were the prelude to Rumania's activities in the United Nations. On January 13 Radio Bucharest reported that UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim had been briefed on Rumania's attitude toward the Middle East conflict and the Palestinian question by Ambassador Ion Datcu, who heads the RSR's mission to the UN. Datcu stressed the importance Rumania attributes to that organization and dwelt on the need for concerted efforts to strengthen its role in international politics and in the resolution of conflicts.

In his address to the Security Council during the debate on the Middle East the Rumanian ambassador urged a resumption of the Geneva Conference, and said that the PLO should be invited to participate in it. He urged the UN to take a stand with regard to the rights of the Palestinian people (including the establishment of a Palestinian state), regretted the absence of Israel from the debate, and expressed satisfaction that the PLO was represented. He reaffirmed Rumania's contention that Israeli troops should be withdrawn from the territories occupied in 1967, describing this as essential to the achievement of peace in the area. Rumania, he said, still considers UN resolutions 242 and 338 valid, and added that the RSR's proximity to the Middle East will continue to prompt it to make a contribution to decisions leading to the establishment of a just peace. In fact, his speech contained no surprises.

Rumania joined five other countries (Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, and Tanzania) in submitting a draft resolution on the Middle

East which specified that the Security Council should recognize "the inalienable national rights of the Palestinians," including the right to an independent state "in Palestine" and calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. It is noteworthy that four of the five countries with which Rumania cosponsored the resolution belong to the nonaligned bloc. This is apparently the first time they have been willing to join with members of military blocs like Pakistan (CENTO) and Rumania (Warsaw Pact). The idea, of course, was to have a non-Arab proposal acceptable to a number of Western countries. Nine council members (including Rumania, of course) voted for this resolution: Britain, Italy, and Sweden abstained, and China and Libya deliberately absented themselves from the chamber during the vote. The United States exercised its veto. Earlier, the council had rejected a British amendment that would have reaffirmed the resolutions adopted in 1967 and 1973; Rumania abstained from voting on this amendment (RFE Specials/UN, 23 and 27 January 1976).

On January 27 Western news agencies reported that an Israeli statement had regretted Rumania's support of what was described as a "destructive Arab move." On January 19 Radio Moscow, in a Rumanian-language broadcast, said that the Rumanian, Yugoslav, Egyptian, Guyanan, Swedish, French, and Japanese delegations had supported the Soviet proposal that the Geneva Conference be resumed with PLO participation. And in a first commentary on the voting, Radio Bucharest (January 27) quoted Datcu as having expressed regret that the draft resolution had been vetoed by the US. But despite the outcome, he said, the debate had been both necessary and useful by virtue of the fact that the PLO had been represented, and the position of Rumania on the issue had been reaffirmed.

(090)

6. Vice-Premier Paul Niculescu Visits West Germany

Vice-Premier and Minister of Education and Instruction Paul Niculescu (who until recently was called Niculescu-Mizil) arrived in Bonn for a five-day visit on January 19, at the invitation of Minister of Education and Science Helmut Rohde. On January 20 he had a 45-minute meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, during which it was agreed that Rumanian-FRG co-operation should be expanded in many areas, and opinions were exchanged on various international questions. On the same day he also met with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and on January 21 he visited the University of Freiburg and the Furtwangen Academy.

He held a press conference on January 22 at which he discussed the expansion of co-operation between Rumania and the FRG. In response to a question about the projected agreement on scientific research, on which negotiations have been stalled over the question of including West Berlin (see Rumanian SR/12, RFER, 26 March 1975, Item 1), he said that political considerations should not enter into such matters.

On January 23 he met with Professor Wilhelm Hahn, chairman of the Cultural Ministers' Conference of the West German states. According to Scinteia (January 24), both men agreed that relations in the educational, cultural, and scientific fields were progressing

satisfactorily and should be further developed. Niculescu also had meetings with Werner Knopp, chairman of the Conference of Rectors, and with Dr. Hansgert Schulte, chairman of the Academic Exchange Office.

Niculescu's visit might be considered to be returning one paid to Rumania in 1973 by then Minister of Education and Science Klaus von Dohnanyi (see Rumanian SR/39, RFER, 4 October 1973, Item 5). (In June of that year during a visit to Bonn of Rumanian party and state leader Nicolae Ceausescu an agreement on cultural and scientific co-operation between the two countries was signed, and a program of activities in 1973-1974 was drawn up.) The decision to send Niculescu to the FRG was apparently made, however, during Genscher's visit to Rumania last December, during which it was agreed that relations in the cultural and educational fields should be expanded. (091)

FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

7. Talks on Economic Co-operation with Britain

The third session of the Rumanian-British Mixed Government Commission ended on January 23 (Scinteia, January 24). According to press reports it had examined bilateral economic relations, adopted measures designed to develop and diversify economic, industrial and technological-scientific co-operation and commercial exchanges between the two countries.

At the conclusion of the talks British Undersecretary of State for Trade P.S. Preston, who headed the British delegation, told a Radio Bucharest reporter that it had been agreed to double the volume of trade exchanges by 1980, and that concrete proposals had been worked out. He described the session as useful for both countries so far as the expansion of commercial relations is concerned.

According to an RFE Special/London (15 January 1976), shortly before the commission met the British government had offered Rumania credits amounting to 100,000,000 pounds sterling over the next three years. A spokesman for the Exports Credits Guarantee Department said the credit was to facilitate Rumanian purchases of British goods, but at this stage no specific transactions can be tied to them. In September 1975 the ECGD granted the RSR a loan of 15,400,000 pounds sterling to finance the purchase of five BAç-111 jet planes, and Britain had issued another 2,000,000 pounds to finance the purchase of capital goods from the UK. This brings the total credits guaranteed by the ECGD to 19,000,000 pounds sterling (see also Rumanian SRs/35 and 47, RFER, 11 September and 5 December 1975, Items 5b and 5, respectively).

According to the January 26 issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology, a team from Rolls-Royce has gone to Rumania to help in the construction of a factory to turn out the Viper 632 engine -- the afterburning military version of the Viper 600. The engines will be installed in the Rumanian-Yugoslav twin-engine fighter now being tested (see also Rumanian SR/41, cited above, Item 7).

According to British statistics, in 1974 UK-RSR trade was valued at 67,750,000 pounds sterling -- 33,500,000 of this sum representing exports to Rumania and the remainder imports to Britain. The 1974 figure was approximately 74,000,000 pounds, with 39,800,000 representing British exports. Bilateral economic relations were discussed during Ceausescu's brief visit to London in June 1975 and during Prime Minister Harold Wilson's stay in Bucharest in September of that year (see Rumanian SRs/23 and 37, RFER, 20 June and 26 September 1975, Items 1b and 7, respectively). (092)

8. New Economic Agreement with Argentina Reached

The protocol on the first session of the Rumanian-Argentinian Mixed Commission on Trade and Co-operation was signed in Buenos Aires at the end of January (Radio Bucharest, January 27). Trade exchanges and co-operation in 1974-1975 were examined, measures were taken to extend and diversify exchanges in the current year, and a program of ventures involving oil equipment, petrochemistry, etc., was agreed upon.

Reuter (January 24) reported that Rumania and Argentina had signed an agreement to expand their trade and economic links. Rumania agreed to help in extracting alumina from coal ash at Argentina's Rio Turbio deposits, which would reduce the need to import alumina from Australia for Argentina's Puerto Madryn aluminum plant. Rumania will also continue to supply technology and equipment to Argentina's oil extracting industry, and has voiced interest in taking part in petrochemical and fertilizer projects.

Argentina has agreed to sell Rumania up to 100,000 tons of wheat, 200,000 tons of maize, and 15,000 tons of beef, mutton, and poultry, for which it would tender offers by February 25. It will also tender offers by March 30 for 4,000 tons of linseed oil, 10,000 tons of rice, and various quantities of electric cable, steel tubing, sugar, alcohol, and other items.

During Ceausescu's visit to Argentina in March 1974 preparatory talks were held on co-operation agreements in various domains and a contract for deliveries of Rumania-made oil equipment in 1974-1976, worth 37,000,000 dollars, was signed. Buletinul Oficial (No. 77, 25 May 1974) published the texts of a number of agreements signed on 8 March 1974, during Ceausescu's visit. Among them were one on general economic and technological co-operation, and others on co-operation in agro-zootechnics and mining, and a financial agreement. Under the first of these Rumania contracted to deliver to Argentina a plant for the production of calcinated petroleum coke.

The fact that Rumania intends to purchase wheat and maize from Argentina is a further indication that the 1975 crop fell short of the country's requirements. Indeed, the US Department of Agriculture reported that "Rumania's grain requirements on the world market for 1975-1976 may reach 500,000 tons of wheat and 1,000,000 tons of maize" (See Rumanian SR/39, RFER, 10 October 1975, Item 7). The department also said Rumania had bought 86,300 tons of wheat and ordered 300,000 tons of maize from the US. On 1 December 1975,

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after returning from visits to Rumania, Poland, and Hungary, US Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz said Rumania had purchased over 726,000 tons of grain this year. These purchases, as well as the recent ones from Argentina, would seem to conflict with Ceausescu's statement to Iranian information media that "some quantities of Rumanian agricultural produce will be available for export" (see Rumanian SR/47, RFER, 5 December 1975, Item 6).
(093)

- End -

CORRECTION to Rumanian SR/2, RFER, 20 January 1976, page 2, paragraph 2:

Please delete the first sentence and replace with the following:

There have been few contacts between Common Market officials on the one hand and the Comecon member countries or Comecon officials on the other. The most notable was the visit to Moscow in February 1975 of an EEC delegation led by Edmund Wallenstein, director of the commission's Foreign Department. The trip followed an invitation by Comecon Secretary Nikolai Fadeyev to EEC Commission President Francois-Xavier Ortoli to visit Moscow for official talks. Although Ortoli accepted the invitation and the Wallenstein visit was intended to prepare the way for it, nothing further has transpired so far.



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S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

Culture

1. Plans for Future Cultural Programs Stress National Elements

Agriculture

2. Draft Program on the Maintenance of Forest Lands
3. Small Private Plots Allocated to State Farm Workers

The Military

4. Pay Raise and Increased Benefits for the Armed Forces

Foreign Affairs

5. Rumania Participates in Security Council Debate on Middle East
6. Vice-Premier Paul Niculescu Visits West Germany

Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation

7. Talks on Economic Co-operation with Britain
8. New Economic Agreement with Argentina Reached

CULTURE1. Plans for Future Cultural Programs Stress National Elements

On 30 December 1975 a plenary session of the Council on Socialist Culture and Education was held in Bucharest (Radio Bucharest, 30 December 1975). On the agenda were discussions of the council's 1975 report, of its plan of activity for 1976, and of "the general measures to be taken to continue perfecting the professional skill of all those working in the cultural and artistic field." After dealing with "successful achievements" of 1975 (which were not, however, specified in the brief published notice on the session), the report called attention "to a number of deficiencies that have become noticeable in this field and to their causes, and set forth measures that would lead to improvement of all cultural-artistic life which is devoted to the socialist indoctrination of the working people in the country."

The following decisions were arrived at with regard to the council's activities in 1976: it will undertake to make thorough preparations for the Congress of Political Education and Culture scheduled for May (see Rumanian Situation Report/48, Radio Free Europe Research, 12 December 1975, Item 1); it will make a sustained effort to work out "at a high ideological and artistic level," what was described as "the National Epic"; it will draw up a program on the professional recycling of "cultural workers"; and it will promote an increase in the "educational efficiency" of all creative activity and its dissemination among the masses.

In his speech at the 11th party congress in 1974, Ceausescu dealt with the need for "the Central Committee and its special institutions to guarantee direct leadership and guidance of all ideological and theoretical activity, since in political and cultural-educational work . . . more than in any other area of ideological and political education, a clear-cut concept and unified guidance are needed. How the party plans to achieve this goal is still a matter for speculation, but the congress scheduled for May 1976 may shed some light on the matter, and must certainly be regarded as the first step in carrying out Ceausescu's instructions.

Writing in Contemporanul (No. 50, 12 December 1975), the deputy editor-in-chief of Era Socialista, Ion Mitran, stated that "at first glance, combining such fields may seem to be stretching things, because there are important differences between them. I think, however, that what unites them -- or rather what ought 'ideally' to unite them -- is their social efficiency: the consistency of their transforming ideas, their contribution to the moral and -- why not? -- the material prestige of the human community." Mitran pointed out the close interrelation between "the revolutionary attitude" and the "social value" of creativity in these fields. His condemnation of "fixed, rigid formulas," of "schemes valid under all circumstances and for all time" may indicate party dissatisfaction with the old-fashioned or spiritually inflexible activists who have not yet fully adjusted the content and style of their work to the requirements of Ceausescu's "creative Marxism."

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Quality in works of art seems to be equally important -- to Mitran -- it is generally accepted by communist theorists that only real art, not pseudoartistic output, can be impressive and thus possibly effective. It is difficult to believe, however, that the forthcoming Congress of Political Education and Culture will find the "philosopher's stone" that will make ideologically pure content clad in artistically perfect form a possibility.

In the official Rumanian view, as expressed in an editorial in Contemporanul (No. 2, 9 January 1976), the forthcoming congress is to draw the conclusions regarding the "cultural revolution" started in 1971: the journal describes the congress as the "climax of the discussions of how the party's ideological program is being implemented and the measures needed if the task of perfecting political-ideological and cultural-educational activity postulated at the 11th [party] congress is to be carried out."

The creation of the National Epic heralded by the Council on Socialist Culture and Education will not be a Rumanian Iliad, as the term might suggest. In the eyes of Rumanian theorists it is the totality of patriotically inspired art -- literature, painting, the cinema, the dance, etc. -- that will be created in Rumania. In launching this slogan, whose rather hazy meaning is continually being "explained" by officials, the RCP is probably pursuing a double goal: first, to create an instrument that will more "efficiently" steer artistic activity in the direction required by its over-all policy goals; secondly, to integrate the arts into the five-year-plan system, thus linking the somewhat elusive artistic sector more closely to the system of five-year socioeconomic plans.

A number of quotations can be found to elucidate the specific connotations and desiderata connected with the National Epic: For instance, Dan Zamfirescu had this to say in an article in Romania Literara (No. 1, 1 January 1976): "If, today, we speak of a national epic, it is because today we are living through a national epic ourselves. Because this epic has created for us a medium of communion with our ancestors." Nicolae Balota, writing in Lucea-farul (No. 52, 30 December 1975), was even more explicit in linking the need for a National Epic to the requirements of the present-day situation in Rumania and in underscoring its propagandistic tasks:

During the lofty moments when historical awareness becomes concentrated, changes take place in the historical situation of a people, the appearance of historical-poetic projections is both natural and necessary. A national epic has great pedagogical value. We are living through an epoch in which such works, which engender a supreme synthesis and an analysis of past experiences, passing them through the sieve of the present and projecting them into the future, are necessary.

It is made quite clear in an article by the poet Dan Mutascu (Saptamina No. 266, 9 January 1976) that glorification of the past will have a corollary in glorification of the achievements of the communist regime in Rumania and of the history of the Rumanian communist and workers' movement as a whole. The National Epic will

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represent "the poetic glorification of the great revolutionary impetus," but the shape of the works of art that make up this epic will not be revolutionary; rather they will represent what Mutascu defined as "contemporary classicism."

After the need to create the National Epic was proclaimed, a period of feverish activity began in cultural institutions and artists' unions. At a meeting of the Bureau of the Writers' Union on 15 December 1975 the first point on the agenda was the working out of the National Epic coupled with a discussion of the five-year (1976-1980) literary plan (Romania Literara No. 51, 13 December 1975). Similar discussions are now under way in the various sections of the Bucharest writers' association and in provincial associations. The Romania Literara account contained the first reference to the forthcoming national conference of Rumanian writers, which, according to the Writers' Union statutes, should be held next year. (The last conference took place in May 1972.)

In an interview published in Contemporanul (No. 50, 12 December 1975) the director of Film Studio No. 5, Dumitru Fernoaga, gave some details on the studio's "five-year plan for the national cinema epic [which has been] very clearly set forth." Films on the following subjects are envisaged: the founding of the Rumanian Communist Party; the life of the 16th century Moldavian ruler Petru Rares; the 1848 revolution; the life of the scientist Victor Babes.

Even before the proclamation of the campaign to create a National Epic the Rumanian cultural scene had been flooded with artistic productions marked by both national fervor and ideological rigidity. The primacy of an opportunistic content over aesthetic achievements has already been established in practice, in spite of isolated skeptical remarks (e.g., by Ov.S. Crohmalniceanu in Contemporanul [No. 50, 12 December 1975] and Stefan Augustin Doinas in Luceafarul [No. 51, 20 December 1975], questioning the mainly low-level, unilaterally oriented artistic output of the day. Unfortunately artistic spontaneity, and with it artistic quality, will be even more endangered by the now planned and grossly vulgarized National Epic.

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AGRICULTURE

2. Draft Program on the Maintenance of Forest Lands

Scinteia (6 January 1976) published the text of a draft program on the maintenance and development of forest lands which had been discussed at a meeting of the Political Executive Committee on 23 September 1975. The committee decided to submit the program to public discussion and then present it to the congress of people's council chairmen originally scheduled for the end of 1975 (see Rumanian SR/38, RFER, 20 October 1975, Item 6) but later postponed until the end of January or the beginning of February.

The draft program consists of a lengthy preamble in which the need for a long-range program to improve the situation in this important sector of the economy is enlarged upon, and 12 chapters. The body of the document deals in a somewhat technical manner with the regulation of tree-cutting, forest regeneration, maintenance

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and development of forest lands, productivity, raising the professional qualifications of forest workers, administrative control, hunting and fishing, secondary products, improving existing legislation, research, and so on. According to Scinteia, all suggestions submitted by the public will be forwarded to the Ministry of Forestry Administration and Construction Materials and the General State Forestry Inspectorate in early February. This, however, leaves only a month for consideration of such proposals.

The preamble notes that the program has been worked out on the basis of principles laid down by Ceausescu at a conference of forestry executives in October 1974 and at the 11th party congress the following month. It presents data on past and present forestry administration, noting deficiencies and suggesting ways of improving the situation. It recalls that at the turn of the century some 8,500,000 to 9,000,000 hectares -- 40 per cent of Rumania's territory -- consisted of forest lands, and that in 1974 the figure had dropped to 6,300,000 hectares owing to improper exploitation. This, it points out, has had an adverse effect on the hydrological balance, the environment, and the production of timber. Rumania's forests now cover only 27 per cent of its territory -- slightly below the European average of 29 per cent.

According to the preamble, exploitation reached its height between the two World Wars -- in 1930, for instance, tree-felling exceeded new growth in "accessible" forests by 60 per cent. Between 1949 and 1964 the situation in this respect was also unsatisfactory, with the cutting of "mature" coniferous trees ranging between 37 and 104 per cent over the warranted quota, and total felling varying between 19 and 47 per cent in excess of it. Also, in only 50 per cent of the young forests were suitable conditions provided for the cultivation of particularly valuable species of trees.

At present the forests produce an average of only 4.5 cubic meters of timber per hectare per year, mainly because coniferous forests represent only 28 per cent of the total, 700,000 hectares produce only 2 cubic meters per hectare, and some 1,000,000 hectares of forest have already passed the "age of exploitation."

The "possible" forest output is at present 21,000,000 cubic meters per year, compared to an actual new growth of 28,000,000 cubic meters (the extra 7,000,000 cubic meters being earmarked for "restructuring" the forests). Of these 21,000,000 cubic meters, some 16,400,000 represent primary products and 4,600,000 secondary ones.

At the end of the preamble certain "achievements" in the post-nationalization period are praised: the tree-felling system has been improved to the point where some 22 per cent of the forests now fulfill their function as "protectors" of water and soil, and some 2,000,000 hectares of land have been afforested, as have about 105,000 hectares of previously unproductive terrain.

In addition to the technical provisions they contain, the program's 12 chapters have a number of interesting things to say. Chapter 1 states that although the forests can produce 21,000,000 cubic

meters per year, felling will for a time be restricted to 20,000,000 cubic meters -- a measure that will make it possible to balance the "structure" of the forests and ultimately lead to an increase in annual output. "Regeneration" of the 700,000 hectares of low-output forests is to be completed by, at the latest, the year 2010; also 305,000 hectares will be afforested between 1976 and 1980, and 220,000 hectares during each of the ensuing five-year periods.

Chapter 2 states that the average area of forest per capita of population will drop from the present 0.29 hectares to 0.23 hectares by 2010, due to the expected population increase.

Chapter 3 deals with the question of increasing the proportion of coniferous forests in the total forest area. According to plan, it is to rise from the present 28 per cent to 40 per cent by 2010 -- a task that is to be accomplished by increasing the planting of such trees until it represents 65 to 66 per cent of total afforestation. It is also noted in this chapter that thanks to rising productivity, by the year 2010 growth in the "timber masses" will have increased 6,200,000 cubic meters over the present figure of 28,000,000 cubic meters annually.

The January 15 issue of Romania Libera contained an interview with Professor Stelian Munteanu, a corresponding member of the Academy of the RSR, who discussed some aspects of the draft program, including the controlling of run-off. He reported that 800,000,000 lei were spent for that purpose between 1948 and 1975, and that in the next 15 years a total of 230,000 hectares will be afforested with the same end in view -- 40,000 between now and 1980, 90,000 between 1981 and 1985, and 100,000 between 1986 and 1990.

This long-range program clearly demonstrates the concern of both party and state to rectify the present situation. In his address to the foresters' conference in October 1974 Ceausescu sharply criticized shortcomings in the sector, including the fact that Rumania's forests cover not 6,500,000 hectares, as has always been claimed, but well under 6,000,000 (a statement that was confirmed in the 18 October 1974 issue of Revista Economica -- see Rumanian SR/34, RFER, 24 October 1974, Item 3).

It would seem that the passage in the preamble which blames errors in the interwar period for the present critical situation of Rumania's forests is intended to minimize the serious deficiencies and reckless felling policy that have characterized the period since World War II. Immediately after the war, for instance, Sovromlemn, a mixed Soviet-Rumanian company, was responsible for the cutting of huge forest areas and the shipment of vast quantities of processed and unprocessed timber to the Soviet Union as partial payment of war reparations. It could be asked, however, why so little has been done to remedy the situation -- why nothing was done about the 700,000 hectares of poor-yield forests, and why the 1,000,000 hectares described as having passed the age of exploitation were not exploited in time.

3. Small Private Plots Allocated to State Farm Workers

The text of State Council Decree No. 169, on remunerating State Agricultural Unit (SAU) workers on a piecework basis and "other measures designed to provide them with material incentives" was published in Buletinul Oficial No. 141 (31 December 1975).

The passages dealing with piecework are couched mainly in technical terms, but do make mention of the fact that SAU personnel may purchase certain quantities of farm produce at contract prices if a given unit's production plan is exceeded: each member is entitled to buy up to 500 kg. of wheat, 150 kg. each of potatoes and vegetables, 100 kg. each of fruit and grapes, 60 liters of wine, 50 kg. each of pork and fowl (live weight), 300 liters of milk, and 300 eggs. The total amount of produce sold in this manner, however, may not exceed 50 per cent of the above-plan output.

Article 12 of the decree permits the SAUs to assign up to one tenth of a hectare of land to the families of workers engaged in livestock breeding and fattening, with the stipulation that such land is to be used mainly for vegetable growing. Land for this purpose will be acquired by reducing the area now allotted to farmyards, roads, and other ancillary purposes; the areas now farmed by the SAUs will not be reduced in size. The decree applies only to workers in the livestock sector. (In the Agricultural Production Co-operatives each worker, regardless of the nature of his work, is entitled to an 0.30-hectare private plot.)

Data on the number of workers who will receive these small plots are not available, but since there were only 265,700 of them in the 369 SAUs in the country in 1973, the figure will certainly not be high. (In that year the SAUs accounted for 795,200 head of cattle, 2,921,700 pigs, and 1,711,600 sheep.)

The new measure was obviously prompted by the serious deficiencies in vegetable production, which have resulted in failure to fulfill the annual plans. In 1973, for example, the plan called for an output of 3,820,000 tons, but in fact only 2,631,000 tons were harvested; in 1974 the corresponding figures were 3,925,000 tons and 2,725,000 tons. These shortfalls, which obviously reduced the supplies on the market, are certainly what impelled Ceausescu to exhort county officials to draw up programs to remedy the situation, and to urge the growing of vegetables in factory yards and on vacant land on the outskirts of cities. Last October the party's Political Executive Committee also discussed measures to improve the supply of good and consumer goods.

For more on this general topic, see Rumanian SRs/41, 45, and 49, RFER, 23 October, 20 November, and 19 December 1975, Items 1, 6, and 7, and Rumanian SR/1, RFER, 15 January 1976, Item 3.

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THE MILITARY4. Pay Raise and Increased Benefits for the Armed Forces

At a meeting of the party aktif of the Rumanian armed forces in December 1975 (see Rumanian SR/49, RFER, 19 December 1975, Item 5), Ceausescu made much of the contribution the army has made to the development of the economy and alluded to its role in the 1976-1980 plan, during which it will help with the irrigation of 350,000 hectares of agricultural land and in the construction of the shipyard and port area at Mangalia, among other things. The party leader admitted, however, that combining this economic burden with regular military activities had "raised certain problems."

Since both Ceausescu and Minister of National Defense Ion Ionita have laid great stress on the need to "strengthen discipline and military order," it can be assumed that intensive use of the army in the economic sector has resulted in a slackening of discipline. Clearly, assigning soldiers to agricultural and construction work might well have a deleterious effect on their morale. It may be that the recent decision of the Political Executive Committee to increase the food allowance, pay, and leave time of servicemen was taken to counteract a feeling among them that they were being regarded as a source of cheap labor. The "lack of exigency" on the part of party organizations and unit commanders of which Ceausescu complained is certainly not the only reason for shortcomings in the military sphere; that is undoubtedly why it was considered necessary to supplement the measures on political training of the military with the benefits mentioned above.

According to Scinteia (30 December 1975), as of 1 January 1976 the pay of privates will be doubled; that of corporals and sergeants will increase by 60 to 70 per cent, and that of both active and reserve officers and students at military academies will rise by 29 per cent. Servicemen who have been working for at least six months on economic projects and those with outstanding records in combat instruction or politics will be granted an extra five days of leave, and the food allowance for servicemen and students in military academies will be increased by 15 per cent. (089)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS5. Rumania Participates in Security Council Debate on Middle East

A visit by Deputy Foreign Minister Cornel Pacoste to Israel (see Rumanian SR/1, RFER, 15 January 1976, Item 6) and CC Secretary Stefan Andrei's recent talks in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Libya, and with PLO leader Yasser Arafat, prepared the ground for Rumania's participation in the UN Security Council's debate on the Middle East. (The RSR is a nonpermanent member of the council.)

On January 8 Andrei was received, together with Deputy Minister of the Interior Nicolae Doicaru (who is also counselor to Ceausescu), by Syria's President Hafiz al-Asad. No details of their conversation have been made public, except that Andrei conveyed a message from Ceausescu to the Syrian leader (Radio

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Bucharest, January 9). The Rumanian minister also met with Vice-President Mahmud al-Ayyubi and with the secretary-general of the Baath Party, and signed an agreement on co-operation between the latter and the RCP covering 1976 and 1977.

On January 11 Andrei had talks with Prince Hasan ibn Talal, heir to King Husayn, at a meeting also attended by Doicaru. According to Radio Bucharest (January 11), economic relations and topical international matters were the subjects discussed. On January 12 Andrei was received by Egypt's President Sadat and saw the secretary-general of the Arab League. His talks with the latter were also attended by Doicaru and Cornel Pacoste, and ended with the signing of a 1976-1977 co-operation agreement between the RCP and the Arab League. The Rumanians were also received by Prime Minister Salim and Foreign Minister Fahmi, and again the Middle East question was the main topic discussed.

On January 14 Agerpres reported the meeting between Andrei and Arafat, noting that the latter had expressed gratitude for Rumania's "consistent support of the struggle of the Palestinian people." A Radio Bucharest commentator stated (January 14) that the need for a political solution to the Middle East conflict was stressed by both men, and added that an independent Palestinian state should be created.

On January 18 Andrei was received by Libyan Prime Minister Jallud, to whom he handed a message from Ceausescu to be delivered to head of state Gadhaffi. Bilateral economic relations and the Middle East situation were reviewed during their meeting.

The Andrei visits were the prelude to Rumania's activities in the United Nations. On January 13 Radio Bucharest reported that UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim had been briefed on Rumania's attitude toward the Middle East conflict and the Palestinian question by Ambassador Ion Datcu, who heads the RSR's mission to the UN. Datcu stressed the importance Rumania attributes to that organization and dwelt on the need for concerted efforts to strengthen its role in international politics and in the resolution of conflicts.

In his address to the Security Council during the debate on the Middle East the Rumanian ambassador urged a resumption of the Geneva Conference, and said that the PLO should be invited to participate in it. He urged the UN to take a stand with regard to the rights of the Palestinian people (including the establishment of a Palestinian state), regretted the absence of Israel from the debate, and expressed satisfaction that the PLO was represented. He reaffirmed Rumania's contention that Israeli troops should be withdrawn from the territories occupied in 1967, describing this as essential to the achievement of peace in the area. Rumania, he said, still considers UN resolutions 242 and 338 valid, and added that the RSR's proximity to the Middle East will continue to prompt it to make a contribution to decisions leading to the establishment of a just peace. In fact, his speech contained no surprises.

Rumania joined five other countries (Benin, Guyana, Pakistan, Panama, and Tanzania) in submitting a draft resolution on the Middle

East which specified that the Security Council should recognize "the inalienable national rights of the Palestinians," including the right to an independent state "in Palestine" and calling on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. It is noteworthy that four of the five countries with which Rumania cosponsored the resolution belong to the nonaligned bloc. This is apparently the first time they have been willing to join with members of military blocs like Pakistan (CENTO) and Rumania (Warsaw Pact). The idea, of course, was to have a non-Arab proposal acceptable to a number of Western countries. Nine council members (including Rumania, of course) voted for this resolution: Britain, Italy, and Sweden abstained, and China and Libya deliberately absented themselves from the chamber during the vote. The United States exercised its veto. Earlier, the council had rejected a British amendment that would have reaffirmed the resolutions adopted in 1967 and 1973; Rumania abstained from voting on this amendment (RFE Specials/UN, 23 and 27 January 1976).

On January 27 Western news agencies reported that an Israeli statement had regretted Rumania's support of what was described as a "destructive Arab move." On January 19 Radio Moscow, in a Rumanian-language broadcast, said that the Rumanian, Yugoslav, Egyptian, Guyanan, Swedish, French, and Japanese delegations had supported the Soviet proposal that the Geneva Conference be resumed with PLO participation. And in a first commentary on the voting, Radio Bucharest (January 27) quoted Datcu as having expressed regret that the draft resolution had been vetoed by the US. But despite the outcome, he said, the debate had been both necessary and useful by virtue of the fact that the PLO had been represented, and the position of Rumania on the issue had been reaffirmed.

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6. Vice-Premier Paul Niculescu Visits West Germany

Vice-Premier and Minister of Education and Instruction Paul Niculescu (who until recently was called Niculescu-Mizil) arrived in Bonn for a five-day visit on January 19, at the invitation of Minister of Education and Science Helmut Rohde. On January 20 he had a 45-minute meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, during which it was agreed that Rumanian-FRG co-operation should be expanded in many areas, and opinions were exchanged on various international questions. On the same day he also met with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and on January 21 he visited the University of Freiburg and the Furtwangen Academy.

He held a press conference on January 22 at which he discussed the expansion of co-operation between Rumania and the FRG. In response to a question about the projected agreement on scientific research, on which negotiations have been stalled over the question of including West Berlin (see Rumanian SR/12, RFER, 26 March 1975, Item 1), he said that political considerations should not enter into such matters.

On January 23 he met with Professor Wilhelm Hahn, chairman of the Cultural Ministers' Conference of the West German states. According to Scinteia (January 24), both men agreed that relations in the educational, cultural, and scientific fields were progressing

satisfactorily and should be further developed. Niculescu also had meetings with Werner Knopp, chairman of the Conference of Rectors, and with Dr. Hansgert Schulte, chairman of the Academic Exchange Office.

Niculescu's visit might be considered to be returning one paid to Rumania in 1973 by then Minister of Education and Science Klaus von Dohnanyi (see Rumanian SR/39, RFER, 4 October 1973, Item 5). (In June of that year during a visit to Bonn of Rumanian party and state leader Nicolae Ceausescu an agreement on cultural and scientific co-operation between the two countries was signed, and a program of activities in 1973-1974 was drawn up.) The decision to send Niculescu to the FRG was apparently made, however, during Genscher's visit to Rumania last December, during which it was agreed that relations in the cultural and educational fields should be expanded. (091)

FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

7. Talks on Economic Co-operation with Britain

The third session of the Rumanian-British Mixed Government Commission ended on January 23 (Scinteia, January 24). According to press reports it had examined bilateral economic relations, adopted measures designed to develop and diversify economic, industrial and technological-scientific co-operation and commercial exchanges between the two countries.

At the conclusion of the talks British Undersecretary of State for Trade P.S. Preston, who headed the British delegation, told a Radio Bucharest reporter that it had been agreed to double the volume of trade exchanges by 1980, and that concrete proposals had been worked out. He described the session as useful for both countries so far as the expansion of commercial relations is concerned.

According to an RFE Special/London (15 January 1976), shortly before the commission met the British government had offered Rumania credits amounting to 100,000,000 pounds sterling over the next three years. A spokesman for the Exports Credits Guarantee Department said the credit was to facilitate Rumanian purchases of British goods, but at this stage no specific transactions can be tied to them. In September 1975 the ECGD granted the RSR a loan of 15,400,000 pounds sterling to finance the purchase of five BAC-111 jet planes, and Britain had issued another 2,000,000 pounds to finance the purchase of capital goods from the UK. This brings the total credits guaranteed by the ECGD to 19,000,000 pounds sterling (see also Rumanian SRs/35 and 47, RFER, 11 September and 5 December 1975, Items 5b and 5, respectively).

According to the January 26 issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology, a team from Rolls-Royce has gone to Rumania to help in the construction of a factory to turn out the Viper 632 engine -- the afterburning military version of the Viper 600. The engines will be installed in the Rumanian-Yugoslav twin-engine fighter now being tested (see also Rumanian SR/41, cited above, Item 7).

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According to British statistics, in 1974 UK-RSR trade was valued at 67,750,000 pounds sterling -- 33,500,000 of this sum representing exports to Rumania and the remainder imports to Britain. The 1974 figure was approximately 74,000,000 pounds, with 39,800,000 representing British exports. Bilateral economic relations were discussed during Ceausescu's brief visit to London in June 1975 and during Prime Minister Harold Wilson's stay in Bucharest in September of that year (see Rumanian SRs/23 and 37, RFER, 20 June and 26 September 1975, Items 1b and 7, respectively). (092)

8. New Economic Agreement with Argentina Reached

The protocol on the first session of the Rumanian-Argentinian Mixed Commission on Trade and Co-operation was signed in Buenos Aires at the end of January (Radio Bucharest, January 27). Trade exchanges and co-operation in 1974-1975 were examined, measures were taken to extend and diversify exchanges in the current year, and a program of ventures involving oil equipment, petrochemistry, etc., was agreed upon.

Reuter (January 24) reported that Rumania and Argentina had signed an agreement to expand their trade and economic links. Rumania agreed to help in extracting alumina from coal ash at Argentina's Rio Turbio deposits, which would reduce the need to import alumina from Australia for Argentina's Puerto Madryn aluminum plant. Rumania will also continue to supply technology and equipment to Argentina's oil extracting industry, and has voiced interest in taking part in petrochemical and fertilizer projects.

Argentina has agreed to sell Rumania up to 100,000 tons of wheat, 200,000 tons of maize, and 15,000 tons of beef, mutton, and poultry, for which it would tender offers by February 25. It will also tender offers by March 30 for 4,000 tons of linseed oil, 10,000 tons of rice, and various quantities of electric cable, steel tubing, sugar, alcohol, and other items.

During Ceausescu's visit to Argentina in March 1974 preparatory talks were held on co-operation agreements in various domains and a contract for deliveries of Rumania-made oil equipment in 1974-1976, worth 37,000,000 dollars, was signed. Buletinul Oficial (No. 77, 25 May 1974) published the texts of a number of agreements signed on 8 March 1974, during Ceausescu's visit. Among them were one on general economic and technological co-operation, and others on co-operation in agro-zootechnics and mining, and a financial agreement. Under the first of these Rumania contracted to deliver to Argentina a plant for the production of calcinated petroleum coke.

The fact that Rumania intends to purchase wheat and maize from Argentina is a further indication that the 1975 crop fell short of the country's requirements. Indeed, the US Department of Agriculture reported that "Rumania's grain requirements on the world market for 1975-1976 may reach 500,000 tons of wheat and 1,000,000 tons of maize" (See Rumanian SR/39, RFER, 10 October 1975, Item 7). The department also said Rumania had bought 86,300 tons of wheat and ordered 300,000 tons of maize from the US. On 1 December 1975,

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after returning from visits to Rumania, Poland, and Hungary, US Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz said Rumania had purchased over 726,000 tons of grain this year. These purchases, as well as the recent ones from Argentina, would seem to conflict with Ceausescu's statement to Iranian information media that "some quantities of Rumanian agricultural produce will be available for export" (see Rumanian SR/47, RFER, 5 December 1975, Item 6).
(093)

- End -

CORRECTION to Rumanian SR/2, RFER, 20 January 1976, page 2, paragraph 2:

Please delete the first sentence and replace with the following:

There have been few contacts between Common Market officials on the one hand and the Comecon member countries or Comecon officials on the other. The most notable was the visit to Moscow in February 1975 of an EEC delegation led by Edmund Wallenstein, director of the commission's Foreign Department. The trip followed an invitation by Comecon Secretary Nikolai Fadeyev to EEC Commission President Francois-Xavier Ortoli to visit Moscow for official talks. Although Ortoli accepted the invitation and the Wallenstein visit was intended to prepare the way for it, nothing further has transpired so far.

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- RAD Background Report/28
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28 January 1976

SURVEY OF EAST EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENTS (October-December 1975)

Edited and with an Introduction by William F. Robinson

Summary: The following essays cover the broad outlines of East-West, Soviet-East European, and interparty relations, as well as of developments within and among the individual East European states themselves during the period between October and December 1975. For a more detailed analysis the reader should refer to the Radio Free Europe Research Background and Situation Reports listed at the end of each essay.

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INTRODUCTION

By William F. Robinson

After an initial period of apparent uncertainty and indecision, the Soviet Union seems now to be developing a more detailed, definitive, and coherent viewpoint regarding the interpretation and implementation of the Final Act promulgated at the European security conference on August 1. Although still relatively inchoate, the Soviet position is characterized by two broad avenues of approach -- a vigorous counterattack through the information media against Western charges of evasion and infringement, coupled with the taking of unilateral steps and the concluding of bilateral agreements related to specific sections or points contained in the Helsinki accord. Both approaches are concerned primarily, albeit not exclusively, with Basket Three and the complex of cultural, ideological, and humanitarian issues that it covers.

The counteroffensive, which is often conducted in less than diplomatic terms, has probably been inspired (at least partly) by mounting displays of public impatience in the West over what is perceived as an unreasonable delay in the implementation of the security conference document on the part of the USSR and its allies. Adding further urgency to the task have been charges that some Soviet actions have been contrary to both the letter and spirit of the Helsinki text (e.g., the refusal to allow Andrei Sakharov out of the country to receive his Nobel Peace Prize, the open military support given by Moscow to the MPLA faction in the Angolan civil war, and the continued harsh treatment meted out to domestic dissidents). In light of this, it is reasonable to assume that the Warsaw Pact governments are now attempting not only to dampen excessive Western expectations regarding cultural and humanitarian co-operation with the East, but also to refute textual interpretations that run counter to the socialist concept of détente and peaceful coexistence. Only certain of the articles and statements that have appeared serve this purpose, however. Others are plainly designed for domestic consumption; they are intended to dispel the illusion of those in the alliance who might expect dividends from Helsinki in the form of less restricted travel, more informal cultural contacts, a lessening of ideological tension, etc., and at the same time to soothe conservative party circles that might fear precisely those aftereffects.

Of those items specifically aimed at external audiences, some are devoted to energetic attacks on Western governments for their own alleged violations of the Final Act. Four recurring themes here are the failure of the Western states to publish this

document on a wide scale, their refusal to remove difficulties and delays hampering the issue of visas to East Europeans, their unwillingness to accept more than a small number of socialist cultural products, and their attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist countries through ideological subversion, the promotion of "bourgeois" political concepts, and support for dissident personalities and movements. The Warsaw Pact press is also not reluctant to publish the specifications for these and other charges: US and West European "interference" in Portugal, American "meddling" in the Angolan conflict, and alleged CIA funding of Italian political parties, for example, are frequently mentioned as evidence of Western wrongdoing outside the socialist community. In addition, US and West German concern for the fate of human rights in the Soviet bloc is often derided as hypocritical in light of the "gross violations" of fundamental freedoms allegedly perpetrated by these governments against their own citizens. TASS of November 14, to cite one instance, spoke of the American secret services, which, it said, "arrogantly interfere in the private lives of citizens" through electronic surveillance, telephone tapping, and mail reading. This charge was followed three days later by another TASS attack, this time against the FRG, whose attempt to ban radicals from government employment was described as "a dangerous witch hunt, reminiscent of the dark days of McCarthyism in the USA."

Moscow and its allies have not merely launched a retaliatory campaign against Western accusations, however, but have also attempted to counter noncommunist interpretations of Helsinki by putting forth, with greater precision and insistence than previously, their own conceptions of the matter. Most of these are not really new, at least substantively, although the frequency of their repetition and the greater care given to their elaboration do represent a tactical innovation. One such theme is the socialist states' repudiation of Western emphasis on humanitarian and cultural issues as a gross distortion of the Helsinki document. In their view it must be viewed as a whole, and when this is done the much greater importance of the 10 principles governing interstate relations becomes obvious. These principles, according to Eastern spokesmen, condition the application of all forms of co-operation covered by the agreement, thus making all other sections of the Final Act subordinate to the "international legal basis" laid down in the first chapter. Moreover, as asserted by SED Politburo member Hermann Axen (Neues Deutschland, 3 October 1975), the socialist countries "agreed to the incorporation . . . of a number of more detailed provisions in the fields of contacts, information, culture, and

education" only after setting two "conditions": a) that humanitarian and other forms of co-operation "must be developed in the course of détente and within a mutually acceptable framework," and b) that implementation requires "specific agreements," concluded "on the basis of sovereign state decisions" and "through bilateral and multilateral accords."

A second thesis -- and one of relatively ancient origin -- is the insistence that peaceful coexistence and détente do not encompass ideologies. Hence, despite a general trend toward the relaxation of tensions, the ideological competition between the two opposing systems will not decline, but increase. In the Soviet view, of course, such competition cannot take place within the socialist community itself; to introduce, or attempt to introduce, Western ideas in this area can only be considered a subversive move and interference in the internal affairs of the peoples of these states, since they are freely committed to their political system and acting in accord with the objective laws of historical development. Nevertheless, as a corollary of this hypothesis, socialist ideology and propaganda are permitted to do battle in the Western and Third Worlds, even though they demand a monopoly position among their domestic audiences. Support for the parties of the international communist movement and wars of national liberation from "capitalist domination" are likewise permissible under this law-governed view of history, since even under conditions of increasing East-West co-operation, the struggle for the transformation of capitalism maintains its inevitable, and upward, course. Thus, détente does not mean, and could never mean, acquiescence in the social status quo.

More innovative in character than these discursive efforts has been the increasing East bloc commentary on the nature of the cultural materials to flow both East and West. Before Helsinki, the question was treated only in amorphous terms, and it is only in the last three months of 1975 that Eastern thinking on the subject crystallized to any extent. The starting point for current discussions on the topic is the explicit or implicit acceptance of three cultures: a socialist culture in the East; a bourgeois, essentially reactionary culture that dominates public life in the West; and a democratic, progressive, revolutionary culture that exists alongside it, but in less visible form. It is the latter that should be the source of Western cultural imports and the target for co-operation proposals put forth by the socialist states. "We think," said Soviet Minister of Culture Pyotr Demichev in Budapest (Nepszabadsag, 6 November 1975), "that the task of the

and British university students and was negotiated at a meeting of European national students' unions held in Bucharest. As indicated by this list of Helsinki-related activities, it is the USSR -- not surprisingly -- that has taken the initiative within the Eastern bloc. This does not mean, of course, that the other Warsaw Pact countries have been completely inactive, although the initial hesitancy on the part of the Soviet Union most probably influenced the speed with which they themselves reacted. One example worth citing is the increase in the number of resettlers of ethnic German origin going from Poland to West Germany. Compared to the preceding month, there was an almost 50 per cent rise in October (for a total of 618), while in the month immediately following an increase of over 40 per cent took place (for a total of 880). Perhaps of greater significance for the future was the disclosure by Polish Deputy Premier Kazimierz Olszewski that the Polish authorities had issued 2,800 resettlement permits in November alone - well over the monthly average of 450 issued during the first 10 months of the year. Moreover, according to Deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Czyrek, when the Bonn-Warsaw agreement on resettlement expires in four years, applications will continue to be considered by the Polish government. This assumes, naturally, that the treaty will be approved by the Bundesrat, where the opposition CDU/CSU holds a majority, and it is obviously for the purpose of favorably influencing that body that the Poles have started to increase the number of resettlers even before it has officially taken up consideration of the pending accord.

One other area where at least a small step forward has been made is West Berlin, which the FRG has termed the "barometer of détente." During a visit to Moscow in early November, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher reported that "a certain amount of progress" had been achieved "in some spheres" of expert-level talks on the concluding of agreements on legal aid, scientific-technological co-operation, and cultural exchange. Thus far, it should be said, the completion of these agreements has been stalled specifically over the inclusion of West Berlin, and it is obvious that Moscow is still not ready to accept fully Bonn's viewpoint on the matter. For this reason, any sign of progress is something to be noted, especially when, shortly after the Moscow talks, the FRG successfully concluded a cultural agreement with Bulgaria and a health agreement with the GDR both of which contained Berlin clauses.

Turning to the military aspects of détente, the Soviet Union provided a welcome surprise to Western observers by giving advance announcement on January 4 that maneuvers were to be held on Soviet territory near the Turkish-Iranian frontier between January 25 and February 6. This accords with the notification procedures spelled

out in the Final Act under the confidence-building section. In addition the Soviets invited observers from Turkey and Greece to attend the later stages of the exercises. Although both countries accepted and the Soviet move elicited praise from NATO quarters, there was speculation in the Western press that the opportunity to advance Moscow's policies in the Balkans and the Near East was as strong a motivating factor as the need for producing tangible evidence of compliance with the Helsinki pact.

Unfortunately, this seemed to be the only bright spot in the military firmament. Disagreement and stagnation continued in the Vienna force reduction talks despite a Western proposal to reduce the number of US tactical nuclear warheads in Europe by 1,000 and the number of American forces by 29,000 in return for the pullback of 1,700 Soviet tanks and 70,000 troops. The official response to the proposal, given by Soviet Ambassador O.N. Khlestov on December 18, was none too heartening. The ambassador said that the new suggestion contained "grave shortcomings," although it would be examined by Moscow and discussed when the talks resumed after a month's recess on January 26. On the same day, TASS issued a release saying that the scheme "is aimed at securing unilateral military advantages for NATO, and thus infringes on the security interests of the socialist countries. To achieve progress at the talks," the Soviet news agency declared, "the Western countries must give up their unrealistic claims and take into consideration the well-grounded proposals of the socialist states."

Moscow and Washington also remained at loggerheads over the SALT negotiations, and the impasse meant that CPSU Secretary-General Leonid Brezhnev's envisaged trip to the US in 1975 did not take place. An American proposal that would have added a new category of limitations to the Vladivostok accord to cover the Cruise missile and Backfire bomber was rejected by the Soviets in late October. A few weeks later, US Administration sources indicated that a new approach by Washington and a willingness to compromise on the part of Moscow justified a visit to the USSR by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the week before Christmas. Evidently the assessment was made too hastily, for the Kissinger trip was subsequently postponed for one month in order to allow more time to prepare the US bargaining position. American press reports now indicate that the crux of the modified Kissinger plan is a proposal to limit the operating range of the two controversial weapons and thus remove them from the category of strategic delivery systems. It is fruitless at this point to speculate on the outcome of the latest changes, although it is worth noting that both sides have soberly expressed their determination to bend every effort to overcome the deadlock.

All in all, the post-Helsinki picture became considerably more complex in the last three months of 1975. Side by side with the Eastern bloc's vigorous rebuttal of increasing Western demands and accusations, there has been more movement to implement the Final Act on a concrete, step-by-step basis. In some spheres this has required alterations in the internal legal regulations of the socialist states, and it is not unreasonable to assume that further modifications of this nature will occur in 1976. It is also possible that future Soviet intentions will be spelled out in more detail at the 25th CPSU Congress in late February, and that following this occasion there will be an increase in the Helsinki-related activities of Moscow's East European allies.

For additional reading, see the following Radio Free Europe Research Situation Reports:

"Todor Zhivkov Visits the FRG," Bulgarian SR/33, 4 December 1975, Item 3.

"Helsinki Materials Included in School Curriculums," Bulgarian SR/34, 11 December 1975, Item 3.

"Relations with the FRG; Implementation of the Helsinki 'Break-through,'" Polish SR/33, 31 October 1975, Item 1.

"Relations with the FRG: Polish Attacks on Opposition Parties, Polish SR/36, 25 November 1975, Item 1.

"Second Day of PUWP Congress: Brezhnev Meets with East European Leaders," Polish SR/40, 10 December 1975, Item 2c.

"Relations with FRG," Polish SR/41, 11 December 1975, Item 1a and b.

"Rumania and the MBFR Talks in Vienna," Rumanian SR/48, 12 December 1975, Item 3.

"West German Foreign Minister Genscher Visits Bucharest," Rumanian SR/48, 12 December 1975, Item 4.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT:

EBB-AND-FLOW CONFRONTATION ON PAN-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE

By Kevin Devlin

The last quarter of 1975 brought dramatic developments in the prolonged confrontation between independent and pro-Soviet communist parties over the planned pan-European conference. Briefly, the story is one of conservative concessions bringing agreement in sight, followed by a pro-Soviet return to harder-line positions, with the consequent impasse leading to a new attempt to hammer out a collective document.

The previous quarter had witnessed the collapse of a six-month effort to reach a settlement through a "balanced" subgroup of eight parties, the independent parties being still firmly opposed to successive East German drafts (presented in April and July). As described in the previous quarterly report, the October 9-10 "working group" meeting of 27 delegations brought what proved to be a deceptive victory for the independent parties. The third East German draft, which seems to have been nonideological in character and largely devoted to post-Helsinki détente in Europe, was found acceptable by the independent parties, at least as a basis for further discussion.

If agreement was at last in sight, it was because the crucial principle of consensus, formally accepted at the Warsaw meeting of October 1974, was to be respected (as the French delegate, Kanapa, stated afterward -- expressing regret that the resulting document would not be "militant" enough for the PCF's taste). The PCI's Unità (October 11) reported agreement that, on the basis of the October 9-10 discussions and taking account of any additional "observations and proposals" submitted, the full Editorial Commission would meet in November to draw up the final draft "on the basis of the agreement of all the parties." Italian and British party spokesmen expressed hope that the conference could be held before the end of the year.

But when the 28-party Editorial Commission met on November 17-19, the outcome was very different from what had clearly been expected in October. The meeting did not adopt a revised draft or set a date for the conference. Instead (the British Morning Star reported on November 20) it decided that an "editorial group" open to all parties would meet in December "to continue work on the draft, taking into account the points brought up"; the Editorial Commission would meet again "in January" to discuss the result and "consider" setting a date for the conference. This meant that the

job of producing a draft text had now been taken away from the East German hosts and made a collective task.

Later statements by Italian, Yugoslav, Spanish, and British spokesmen cast some light on what had happened. Spanish delegate Manuel Azcárate told the party organ Mundo Obrero (November 25) that at the October meeting "considerable progress" had been made toward "a concrete document limited to certain themes," but that at the November session "the tendency to press for a document of what may be called an 'ideological type' reasserted itself"; faced with this, the independent parties maintained their position "very firmly." He added the suggestion that "certain parties which plan to hold their conferences in the near future, and which earlier had shown interest in having an early conference, now prefer to have it postponed"; the allusion to the 25th CPSU Congress, due in late February 1976, seemed obvious.

The British CP's Reuben Falber in a later statement (Morning Star, December 19) essentially confirmed Azcárate's account: in October "agreement appeared to have been reached . . . providing for a final document . . . limited in scope," but in November "the whole character of the document . . . was again called into question" -- evidently as the result of an effort by the conservatives to regain ground yielded earlier. According to Falber, the basic confrontation had all along been between the parties pressing for "a document that could be interpreted as laying down a general line" and those opposed to this.

What lay behind this unexpected shift back to a harder line by the pro-Soviet parties? (For unexpected it certainly was. A few days before the mid-November meeting a Yugoslav party spokesman, Jure Bilic, declared: "Barring the unexpected, we are on the way to creating a document, a political communiqué, that will suit everyone . . ."). Experience suggests that the answer lies in Moscow; and Azcárate's remark about certain pending congresses may provide a clue. There must have been much discussion in the Kremlin over whether the kind of conference that was shaping up at the October meeting -- the "lowest common denominator" -- would in fact be a useful trophy to flourish at the 25th congress. On that reading of the situation the debate ended (for the time being) with a decision to opt for postponement and to bring that about through the reintroduction of "ideological" and "programmatically" formulations unacceptable to the independent parties.

The changes in Soviet attitudes can be connected with changes in the CPSU delegation. At the October meeting it was headed by Ponomarev; in November he was replaced by Katushev; and in December, it turned out, the latter was in turn replaced by a new man, Vadim Zagladin. A few days before the December 16-19 meeting of the "editorial group," Zagladin went to Rome for what appears to have been a "turning-point" meeting with PCI leaders. "Informed" reports from various capitals subsequently indicated that in these talks Zagladin expressed the CPSU's willingness to drop controversial sections of the November draft and to reconsider passages dealing with certain debatable issues (e.g., the relationship between the blocs, an analysis of the situation in Western Europe, and the communist parties' relations with other forces).

The first session of the "editorial group" (as distinct from the earlier "working group" designation) on December 16-19 took place behind the familiar wall of secrecy, with 22 delegations out of 28 present. The only official news was that the group had not finished its work and would meet again in January. However, the new, collective attempt to hammer out an acceptable document was preceded and followed by some strong statements by independent spokesmen, indicating determination to stand firm. Thus, in an interview published in La Stampa (Milan) on December 14 the Spanish CP leader Santiago Carrillo declared: "There cannot be a common line among the communist parties of the capitalist countries." Would the pan-European conference then have to be abandoned? "The conference can still take place, but on condition that it not be an ideological conference," he replied. It should instead be "the occasion for launching an appeal to all democratic forces, not only the Communists, on the general theme of peace and co-operation."

Yugoslav commentator Milika Sundic was equally outspoken. In a Radio Zagreb broadcast on December 15 he charged that "some parties want the end of the conference to be accompanied by the publication of a 'strong' communiqué containing some obligations for all parties," and that this was "a deviation from what had been agreed on at the beginning of the preparations." In an earlier broadcast on December 10 Sundic was more direct: criticizing Brezhnev by name, he alleged that for the CPSU "there is only one way to socialism and only one acceptable prescription for co-operation, particularly for the socialist countries."

There was, however, an interesting contrast between Sundic's polemics and the official utterances of chief delegate Aleksandar Grlickov, in an interview issued by Tanjug on November 30. Grlickov's tone was one of measured optimism. He did not mention the

unacceptable East German draft of mid-November, referring only to the October one as providing "for the first time a working basis for all participants." Significant progress had already been made in "harmonizing" unavoidable differences, although "a considerable number of difficulties have not yet been overcome." He serenely took it for granted that the principle of consensus would be respected, and that the elaboration of "joint strategy and tactics for communist parties — and even the very idea of harmonizing their foreign policies — is today an anachronism." The interview seemed to reflect Yugoslav awareness that the conservative counter-attack at the mid-November meeting had been repelled.

The position of the independent parties was strengthened during the quarter by a shift in the positions of the important French CP, marked by a more emphatic commitment to pluralistic democracy and civil liberties — and by a consequent readiness to criticize the Soviet regime which led to a polemical exchange between the PCF and the CPSU, (with particular reference to a PCF Politburo statement expressing its "most formal disapproval" of Soviet labor camps, as depicted in a television film which the Politburo clearly accepted as genuine). The adoption of this independent course, within the framework of preparations for the PCF's 22nd congress and efforts to restrengthen the Union of the Left, was associated with a strategic alliance grouping the French, Italian, and Spanish parties. This was expressed in bilateral communiqués (notably the one which Secretaries-General Marchais and Berlinguer issued in mid-November) committing these parties to the goal of pluralistic, parliamentary socialism with full guarantees for "bourgeois" liberties. (The independent Japanese CP was also brought into the alliance when PCI and PCF delegations visited Tokyo to sign similar joint statements in September and October). Soviet concern over these developments was manifested in a series of indirectly polemical ideological articles.

The widening ideological gap between the independent Western parties and the Eastern regimes was illustrated early in the New Year, when the January issue of the British CP's theoretical monthly Märxism Today appeared, with a long article by former General Secretary John Gollan on Stalinism and the shortcomings of "socialist democracy" in the Soviet Union. Noting that since the 20th CPSU Congress "within the general advance there has also been at times a certain slowing down or even regression," Gollan said that the CPSU should allow the expression of "dissenting views" within the party; and even the "reactionary" views of people like Solzhenitsyn "should be dealt with politically and not by legal action, expulsion from the country, or confinement in psychiatric institutions." In a

similar vein l'Humanité Dimanche (December 28) declared that the PCF found it "insufferable that there could be political prisoners held in labor camps in a socialist country," while Secretary-General Marchais, in a broadcast on January 7, said flatly: "There is a divergence between us and the CPSU on socialist democracy."

Polemical exchanges of this kind did not augur well for the conference project, to say the least. As the New Year began there was no telling how long the new phase of collective editorial work would last. The editorial group was to meet again in January (for what some reports suggested would be a "marathon" session), and the delegations were supposed to meet again as the "Editorial Commission" before the end of the month. It seemed doubtful, however, whether the latter schedule could be met. The Editorial Commission could meet only after the editorial group had finally reached agreement on a draft acceptable to all (which would then be submitted to the 28 Central Committees); and that would clearly not be a speedy or an easy process. In an interview published in the Belgian party organ on December 30 Vice-Chairman Jean Terfve said that the conference would "probably not take place before the end of the first quarter of 1976." Georges Marchais of the PCF was perhaps more realistic. Asked by journalists on January 14 when the conference would take place, he replied serenely: "I have no idea. Probably this year."

What did seem certain was that, because of the continuing confrontation between the independent parties and the "general-liners," there would be no conference before the 25th CPSU Congress in late February. It even appeared doubtful whether Brezhnev would be able to announce an approximate date. After a year and half of arduous climbing, the pan-European summit was still veiled in clouds.

For further reading see the following Radio Free Europe Research Background Reports:

Kevin Devlin, "'Differences' Between Italian and Spanish CPs on Attitude to Soviet Union," RAD BR/155, 11 November 1975.

Kevin Devlin "Struggle Over European CPs' Conference Document Continues," RAD BR/162, 25 November 1975.

Kevin Devlin, "Pajetta on Conference: 'A Long Way to Go,'" RAD BR/164, 1 December 1975.

Kevin Devlin, "Grlickov and Azcárate on East Berlin Meeting," RAD BR/170, 4 December 1975.

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.



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RAD Background Report/27
(World Communist Movement)
27 January 1976

STILL NO AGREEMENT ON CONFERENCE TEXT --
BUT PCI IS "SATISFIED"



By Kevin Devlin

SUMMARY: A 24-party "editorial group" has ended a 10-day session in East Berlin without reaching agreement on a draft document for the pan-European communist conference. Italian delegate Sergio Segre says, however, that progress has been made in identifying "points of convergence" as the basis for a document acceptable to all. The independent PCI regards this as vindication of "the realism of the path indicated by our party."

* * *

A 10-day (January 13-22) session of the "editorial group" charged with hammering out a collective document for the pan-European communist conference ended in East Berlin on January 22 -- having failed to reach agreement. This is clear from the bleakly uncommunicative communiqué which states that the 24 delegations (out of 28) had "comprehensively discussed and further worked on" the draft text in a "constructive and comradely atmosphere."

The editorial group probably made some progress in comparison with its first session on December 16-19, when 22 delegations turned up, in the sense that agreed formulations may have been reached for less controversial passages or sections. But clearly the basic confrontation has not been settled. Despite the veil of official secrecy which the pro-Soviet parties in particular have tried to keep in place, there is no great mystery about what is at stake. Reuben Falber of the independent British CP -- which, it may be noted, boycotted these two sessions of the editorial group -- summed it up in a statement published in Morning Star on December 19. He said that from the first the basic disagreement had been between the parties pressing for "a document which could be interpreted as laying down a general line" and those independent parties firmly opposed to this. And that struggle, of historic importance for the European, and even the world, communist movement is clearly still going on.

"Basis for Consensus"

At the end of the 10-day meeting, Italian delegate Sergio Segre issued a statement, published in l'Unità of January 23, in which he expressed measured satisfaction with the way things were going. Agreeing with the communiqué that "progress" had been made, he said:

There was productive work, which was of considerable interest because of the ample and diversified (articolata) (1) nature of the debate. This made it possible, in full respect for the autonomous positions of all the parties, to identify with precision the points of convergence, and thus made it possible to find the basis for the elaboration of a document that can gain the consensus of all the participants.

The results achieved during this meeting seem to us to represent a useful premise for the work still needed in the preparation of the conference of communist and workers' parties of Europe. These results satisfy us also because they confirm the realism of the path indicated by our party throughout the entire period of work for the creation of conditions capable of laying the foundations for a favorable and unitary conclusion of the conference.

It is now a matter of moving ahead, and with coherence, along this path, during what is expected to be the beginning of the phase that will lead to the holding of the conference.

The PCI is satisfied, Segre says, because the editorial group, in its four-day December session and the ten-day one which has just finished, seems to be moving "along the path indicated by our party." To elucidate that statement, one may briefly recall the main conditions on which the PCI (and other independent parties) have been insisting all along. These are that the conference document (if there has to be one) should be a nonbinding, nonideological statement of the political positions which the 28 parties hold in common -- and only those which they hold in common. The agreement of all participants is needed for any collective decision or statement (consensus), and there must be no criticism of absent parties.

Segre's statement suggests that, in the PCI's view, the crucial principle of consensus appears to be prevailing at this point: through the expression of divergent positions in a wide editorial debate "the points of convergence" are being identified. If his carefully worded indication is proven correct, can the outcome be anything more than the "lowest common denominator" to which the independent parties have in effect been pointing from the first? As long as that is true of the document, conservative party leaders would be more than welcome to express their own "general line" at

(1) In this context, the Italian word articolata suggests that numerous viewpoints were expressed.

length in their speeches at the conference: for the independents, this would actually emphasize the importance of the pan-European summit as an institutionalization of diversity.

Yet there is in Segre's statement a note of implicit caution that should not be ignored. "It is now a matter of moving ahead, and with coherence, along this path. . . ." But experience has surely taught him that there is no guarantee that the loyalist parties will remain on a path that they have taken to with reluctance. Having made apparently decisive procedural-substantive concessions at the initial Warsaw meeting of October 1974, they tried to regain the lost ground through successive East German drafts expressing something approaching a general line. Then in October they appeared to give way again through an East German draft acceptable to the independents, at least as a basis for further discussion -- only to revert to a harder line in the November draft. If there is a tone of caution, it is accompanied by one of vigilance.


No Trophy for Brezhnev

An AFP dispatch from East Berlin on January 23 cited diplomatic circles in the East German capital as saying that the Soviet delegation proposed a date for the next meeting of the editorial group, but that unanimous agreement on this could not be reached. The dispatch also quoted its sources as saying that "the editorial group will meet again in the coming weeks, probably at the beginning of March, after the CPSU congress."

For two months now -- when the East Germans, having submitted an "acceptable" draft text in October, reverted to a harder line in their draft for the mid-November preparatory meeting -- it has been obvious that there was no chance of holding the pan-European conference before the 25th CPSU Congress in late February. With the failure of the editorial group to reach agreement at its 10-day session, it is now fairly clear that Brezhnev will not even be able to announce an approximate date for the conference in his report to the congress.

The pan-European summit is still veiled in clouds; the ascent is still arduous; and it seems that when the loyalist parties finally do get there, their promised land of interparty discipline will not be in sight.

(072)



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RAD Background Report/26
(Yugoslavia)
26 January 1976

PRIVATE ENTERPRISES ENCOURAGED IN SLOVENIA

By Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: While in the other constituent republics of Yugoslavia (notably in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) measures are being taken to curb the work of private enterprises, in Slovenia private entrepreneurs are being encouraged to invest money in "contractual organizations of associated labor." These are, in fact, private enterprises working under the regulations of the self-management system, but making it possible for a private investor to make (and take) a profit while employing dozens of workers. Thus far, all the persons involved in such operations (i.e., private owners, workers, the authorities, and the trade unions) are very satisfied with the whole arrangement, and measures are even being taken to enable more nonofficial persons to open private enterprises.

* * *

Slovenia is thus far the only one of the six constituent republics and two autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia that not only tolerates but even encourages private enterprises "on a contractual basis." According to the latest press reports, "18 private artisans in Slovenia have created their own small factories and registered them as contractual organizations of associated labor," a form provided for in the Yugoslav Constitution. (1) A certain Leo Sovan invested 400,000,000 old dinars (about 235,000 dollars; 1 dollar = 1,700 old dinars), while the family of Franc Kaplja, from a village near Ljubljana, invested 1,200 million old dinars (about 705,000 dollars) in a small plastic packing materials factory. The brothers Joze and Stanko Span own a factory producing agricultural equipment which employs 60 workers.

(1) Vecernje novosti (Belgrade), 20 January 1976.

Under Article 67 of the new Yugoslav Constitution (adopted in February 1974), "a working man who privately performs work with his personal labor, using citizen-owned resources [i.e., private ownership] may, on a self-management basis, combine his own labor and the means of production in his possession with the labor and means of production of other persons, as an organization of associated labor founded under contract." (2) Such a "working man" who has invested his private money into a "contractual organization" based on the self-management system has the right -- according to the same article of the Constitution -- "to conduct, as manager, the business of the contractual organization and, together with other workers, to decide on its operations and development."

Both the owner of such a private factory and the workers employed in it are obliged to act according to the rules of self-management, i.e., the workers have the right to make decisions at their meetings, but only on the basis of a contract signed between them and the owner-manager. The most important provision in Article 67 of the Constitution is that the owner-manager of a contractual organization has the right "to retain ownership over, and other contractual rights to, the resources he has put into this organization." During the operation of his factory he has the right, again on the basis of a contract he signs with the workers he employs, to retain for himself "a part of the income accruing to him in conformity with the principles applying to the pooling of labor and social resources in organizations of associated labor." This means that such an owner-manager not only has the right to get a normal salary for the work he performs, but also a part of the profit his factory makes thanks to the capital he invested in it. If he decides to withdraw his capital, or if the workers have been able (after a period of five years) to repay him the sum he invested, his rights as an owner-manager "shall cease," the Constitution provides.

The Constitution does not say anything about the owner's veto right in his "contractual factory," but, in practice, this seems to be possible. The above-cited Belgrade newspaper says the following about this aspect of private enterprise:

The owners, i.e., the managers of these specific enterprises, are obliged to carry out the decisions made by the self-management groups, to conform to all regulations and social agreements. They are permitted to use the right of veto only if any of the decisions made by the self-management groups harm the interests of society or could negatively influence the business activities of the enterprise for whose financial success the owners are exclusively and personally responsible.

Workers Very Satisfied

The workers employed in this type of private enterprise based on self-management regulations seem to be very satisfied with their

(2) Ustav Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije [Constitution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia], Belgrade 1974, p. 54.

bosses. The more so when one remembers that there are over 500,000 unemployed in Yugoslavia (in addition to the 1,100,000 Yugoslav workers working in the West). The workers employed in the private factory of the Franc Kaplja family near Ljubljana and in another one stated that the owners "have been respecting all their rights":

They do not stint themselves in the payment of wages, they pay overtime, they respect all social agreements concerning wages (which are not permitted to be lower than in the given branch of the economy in general), they give their workers regular annual vacations. In brief, the owners-managers respect all the workers' rights, and these rights are not less than those in state enterprises. The worker Maria Zelc said: "Business is going well. We have to make money for both us and the owner, i.e., for the man who invested his money. He has the right every year to withdraw one fifth of the money invested, a sum amounting to about 80,000,000 old dinars [about 47,000 dollars]; then, he has the right to take at least 20 per cent of the enterprise's whole profit, while his monthly salary is three times the size of the salary of us workers. This is why we have to work well, so that everyone can get what he is entitled to." (3)

It appears that the workers in and owners of private enterprises are co-operating perfectly. This is, for instance, the case with the enterprise called Polyplastic, owned by Leo Sovan, a well-known private entrepreneur from before the war. Recently, he merged his own factory with his brother's Aeroplastik after the latter died. He stated that in 1975 his factory saved the state a large amount of foreign currency by producing plastic packing materials which had previously all had to be imported. The authorities also see this. Ivan Kogovsek, deputy secretary for industry of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, said that there was no reason whatsoever to fear that "capitalist influences" would increase, because, after a period of five years, the workers could repay the owner and take over the factory themselves. As far as the right of private owners to share the profit is concerned, Kogovsek said that if such a person would put his money in a bank, he would also be entitled to a profit (the interest). Asked whether the profit made by the private owner is taxed, Kogovsek replied:

Money which the founder of the contractual organization [i.e., of a private enterprise] gets as installment payments for the means he has invested is not taxed. The portion he receives as his share of the profit and his salary are taxed according to the regulations. (4)

Kogovsek was also asked how it was possible for private persons to own "billions of old dinars" and to succeed in providing such

(3) Vecernje novosti, 20 January 1976.


(4) Ibid., 21 January 1976.

large sums of money? He answered that this has been strictly controlled by the authorities, but added that, generally speaking, private persons usually do not invest money in their factories but rather in machinery, which they bought "several years ago at much lower prices." This is why a machine which cost only "10,000,000 old dinars [about 5,800 dollars] several years ago today costs more than 100,000,000 old dinars [more than 58,000 dollars]."

The Slovenian government has been doing its utmost to encourage the creation of "contractual organizations," as private enterprises working under the self-management system are called, because they not only provide employment for hundreds of Yugoslav workers, but also help save valuable foreign currency used for imports. Slovenian trade union leaders are also satisfied with the situation in private enterprises, and say that "thus far we have not had any problem concerning implementation of the self-management rules." (5) (071)

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(5) Ibid.



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RAD Background Report/24
(Czechoslovakia)
22 January 1976

THE ROAD OF PROGRESS OF OUR SOCIALIST NATIONS

(A Translation with Comment by the Czechoslovak Unit)

Summary and Introduction: The following is a full translation of an article by Juraj Zvara published under the above headline in Nove Slovo (No.1/1 January 1976), a weekly for politics, culture, and economics issued by the Central Committee of the Slovak CP.

The article deals with the progress that the workers' class in Slovakia has made along the road to socialism. The author says that, under the leadership of the workers' class, both the Czech and Slovak nations have gradually transformed themselves into communities of working people. Although both nations have preserved their national integrity, they are not what they used to be under capitalism.

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Internationalism and the socialist way of life have made great progress and have become firmly embedded in people's minds. Hand in hand with this development, the national minorities, whose position has gradually changed, as has their attitude to the socialist state, their cultural and political life, as well as their social and economic structure, have also progressed.

Our workers' class has changed in the course of the building of socialism so far as both quality and quantity go. A fundamental transformation of our society has taken place under the leadership of this class. The workers' class has played a decisive role in the socialist transformation of the Czech and Slovak nations and their national characteristics. The establishment of a mature and developed

socialist society in the CSSR has become the primary aim of all our efforts; closely connected with this are the new demands that we are making upon the substance, as well as the direction, of economic, social, political, cultural, and ideological processes and upon the direction of class-social and national relations.

Bourgeois ideologists maintain that classes and nations and national and class relations do not exist. But little do we understand of the soul of a nation if we are not aware of the role of the classes within it, particularly the role of the leading class which has hegemony in it, upon which centers its method of production, and which represents the foundation of the nation's economic life; the role of that class which plays the decisive part within the nation and also in the shaping of that nation's relations with other nations.

This is the role played within the Czech and Slovak nations by the workers' class. In the course of the past few years of socialist building, the nature and position of our workers' class have changed; its quantitative importance and its qualitative structure have undergone a change. This is especially true of the professional structure of the workers' class and the qualificational structure of its members. The standard of education of the workers' class as a whole has undergone a fundamental change. Thus, we may say that the workers' class has a new way of life -- the socialist way of life becoming gradually the dominating principle. The conditions of work, the standard of living, the cultural and socio-political activity of the workers' class have changed, its internationalism and the socialist conviction of its members have grown stronger.

The influence of the workers' class has been helpful in the formation of its important ally -- the class of collective farmers. Another important ally formed in the course of the years of socialist building -- whose membership has been recruited from among the workers' class and working peasants -- is the socialist intelligentsia and the category of employees. As a result of the influence of the workers' class, under the leadership of the communist party, the two nations have also undergone a change. Therefore, Comrade Gustav Husak was able to declare, with justification, at the 14th Congress of the CPCS that "the leading force in the development of our socialist society is, and will remain, a strong and mature workers' class. The revisionists attempted in the past to create disbelief about this fundamental maxim of Marxism. In our country, the workers' class is numerically the strongest social class, representing some

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60 per cent of the population, and it is the chief producer of the country's material wealth. Due to its revolutionary steadfastness and its organization, and in view of its own class interests, it is the chief guarantor of socialist power, of the revolutionary achievements of the people, the basic force which, in the interest of all the working people, will lead the country forward.

The international nature of the mission of our workers' class is growing in strength, mainly thanks to its role in the building of an advanced socialist society and in the coupling of the advantages of socialism with the results of the scientific-technical revolution, something that could not be accomplished without a comprehensive integration and internationalization of all aspects of social life.

As a result of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the CSSR and of the successful nationalities policy of the CPCSU, the Czech and Slovak nations today have a new economic foundation. In the course of the years of socialist construction, the class-social structure of both nations has fundamentally changed and has advanced considerably along the path to equality, thanks in part to the help of the Czech workers' class.

As a result of the class-social changes, the Czech and Slovak nations have been transformed into communities of workers. Both nations have a new political organization, significantly complemented by the socialist federation. There is also their new cultural and intellectual standard, and their firm link with the socialist system. The Czechs and the Slovaks have remained in the national sense Czechs and Slovaks; but they are not the same nations that they used to be under capitalism. This is true not only so far as the class-social, economic, political, cultural, and ideological viewpoints are concerned, but also from the national point of view. The intrinsic substance of their national culture, national conscience, psychology, interests, traditions, and habits has also changed.

The foundation for the building of an advanced socialist society in the CSSR and for the processes of complex integration among the socialist states will undergo further changes in the future, and the class-social structure of the Czech and Slovak nations will further progress toward a form typical of advanced socialism. The socialist way of life will make progress and will become stabilized. At the same time, the process of unification between the Czech and

Slovak nations and nationalities will become consolidated; the Czechoslovak socialist federation will further advance toward its goal of full accomplishment. As a result of the complete integration of all aspects of social life, the international relations of the Czech and Slovak nations with the nations of the Soviet Union, the neighboring socialist nations, and all other nations of the world socialist system will be further reinforced. The above-mentioned objective processes will be reflected more actively in the conscience, and especially in the national conscience, of the people as our socialist ideology further develops.

Closely connected with the building of an advanced socialist society and with the forming of socialist nations and a socialist national consciousness of the working people is the socialist way of life. This is a relatively new concept, although the socialist manner of life began to take shape together with the socialist revolution, and later in the course of the building of socialism. The socialist way of life is replacing the old way of life with its specific social and national foundations. The socialist way of life, with all that it means for socialist social relations and for the material and intellectual pursuits of people and social groups and of society as a whole, is the result of the victory of the revolutionary forces within the various nations, the nations of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, and both our nations and nationalities. Its very nature, therefore, is international; it is the expression of internationalism.

This category of the "socialist way of life" has been mentioned because it is so closely connected with the formation of the socialist social consciousness and the specifically socialist national awareness of our nations and nationalities. The fundamental transformation of our society has led to changes in the quality of our people's national conscience. The ideology of our workers' class -- socialist internationalism and socialist patriotism -- has been becoming the ideology of the majority of our two nations to an increasing degree. The sense of unity, exceeding not only national but also state frontiers, has been growing in the minds of the people of both our nations, and has been assuming the form of an awareness of being part of international socialism. Hand in hand with this development, the influence of nationalism has decreased, although its dangers should not be underrated even today. At present, our goal must be to increase the political, the moral, and ideological authority of the Czech and Slovak workers' class in order that such concepts as internationalism, patriotism, devotion, collectivism, revolutionary spirit, firmness, and organization exert even more influence upon the psychology of the Czech and Slovak nations and nationalities.

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The changes in national awareness and the firm place assumed by the new socialist concepts in the minds of our people are reflected not only in the present attitudes and social and political activities of our people -- particularly now during the preparations for the 15th Congress of the CPCS -- but also in the results of some sociological polls and in the people's attitudes. The results of research carried out in 1974 and 1975 by the Office for Public Opinion Research in Bratislava have disclosed that, in the years 1970 to 1975, there was a marked strengthening of the attitudes of the people in Slovakia to such concepts as socialism, internationalism, relations with the Soviet Union and our socialist allies, to the international and foreign policies of the CPCS, to socialism, to the Czechoslovak socialist federation, to the Czech nation, etc. The most marked shift was apparent in the attitude to the economic results of party policy and in the opinion about its social and cultural policies. The increasing awareness of the advantages of socialism is a significant inspiration for people's efforts and their expressions of socialist patriotism and sense of internationalism.

Together with the Czech and Slovak nations, our other nationalities -- Hungarian, German, Polish, and Ukrainian -- have also been molded into communities of working people. In contrast to the bourgeois Czechoslovak Republic, socialist Czechoslovakia has become their true socialist homeland; their original countries, neighboring upon our country, have also acquired a socialist character. As in the case of our two nations, their own political and economic position, class-social structure, and social character have changed under socialism. Equally, the essence of their national consciousness, which is more complicated in its nature than that of our two nations, has undergone a change. The rights of the citizens of these nationalities, safeguarded by the dictatorship of the proletariat, have been newly established by constitutional law No.144/68. These nationalities have a strong leaning toward the ideas of Czechoslovak socialist statehood, and, at the same time, their relationship to their original, today also socialist nations across the border, has been reshaping on these new foundations.

The dynamic progress of the nationalities and a further step forward in the policy of the party and state toward them have been evident since 1969. The existence of these various nationalities was more clearly reflected in the organization of our country; the relevant state bodies and organizations of the National Front have taken upon themselves greater responsibility for the development of the national life of these national minorities and for the process

of rapprochement. It is clear that these problems cannot be solved by the cultural associations of these national groups alone; these associations are assisting the party and state in safeguarding the needs of national culture and educational efforts. Compared with the conditions in the bourgeois republic prior to World War II, the proportion of national minorities is higher in Slovakia (13.4 per cent), while it is less than 2 per cent in the Czech Socialist Republic (or 5.3 per cent if the Slovaks living in the Czech Socialist Republic are included). These figures may at first glance seem insignificant, but in both republics they represent scores of towns and villages with a mixed population and a large number of enterprises, factories, collective farms, etc., with nationally mixed employees. This necessitates hard political and educational effort by the party and state, whose bodies must make sure that citizens of all the nationalities take part in the work of the national committees, in the settlement of school and language problems, in the solution of questions connected with the social structure and educational qualifications of the national minorities, in greater cultural development in the mother tongues of the minorities, etc. A process of internationalization has been clearly taking place in the typical nationally mixed areas in southern and eastern Slovakia and also in the Ostrava area. In this respect, specific conditions have developed in the Ostrava region where, apart from Czechs and people of Polish nationality, a numerically strong group of Slovak nationals has emerged.

The Institute of Culture and Public Opinion in Bratislava and the Silesian Institute in Opava have recently completed research on the development of national cultures and the process of rapprochement; their work confirms that the workers' class has been the most active element in the process of internationalization and rapprochement [among the various national groups] in southern and eastern Slovakia and in the Ostrava region. The findings of this research has confirmed that the nationalities policy of the CPCS is correct. It has also confirmed that our socialist culture and cultural policy have been important unifying elements in the nationally mixed areas. The results of the nationalities policy demonstrate that we have successfully solved the so-called minorities question, which we inherited from the bourgeois republic. Our nations and nationalities are today socialist. Our task is, and will continue to be in future, systematically to direct and channel the processes and relations among them.

(065)

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

I.N.M.E.R.
ARHIVA
Fond *GC, 5811/889/46*

George
Giorănescu

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RAD Background Report/23
(Yugoslavia)
22 January 1976

YUGOSLAV PAPER BLAMES MOSCOW FOR POSTPONEMENT OF
EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE

(A translation with comment by Zdenko Antic)

Summary and Introduction: This article, from which large excerpts are translated below, appeared in the 27 December 1975 issue of the Ljubljana Delo, Yugoslavia's largest daily published in Slovenian.

Under the title "Moscow Is Sharply Changing Direction," Janez Stanic, the paper's foreign policy commentator, assesses the state of preparations for the conference of European communist parties since after the November meeting. In his opinion, when the editorial commission dispersed in East Berlin and announced that it would meet again in January, it was clear that new complications must have arisen, and that the conference itself had been postponed. In analyzing the causes of disagreement at the November meeting, Stanic is not hesitant to place primary blame on those parties backing the CPSU, which have insisted on the leading role of the USSR and the socialist camp, on internationalism, and on the fact that the conference must produce a "strong" political document which will serve as the obligatory general line for all European Communists. At the same time, Stanic maintains, it has become evident that the Soviet Union has grown more interested in integrating Eastern Europe than in the conference itself. In addition, the Italian, French, and Spanish CPs interest in unconventional new forms in the struggle for socialism has been viewed with great doubt and mistrust. Soviet dissatisfaction with the Western parties has gone so far, Stanic says, that only another step is needed before Moscow accuses them of revisionism.

* * *

Soon after the [November] meeting, many delegations which had attended quite clearly stated that new disagreements and differences has appeared -- this was also done by the LCY delegation -- and they also explained their position. But nonetheless some time had to elapse before it was possible to piece together a more or less complete picture from separate little fragments, particularly since certain East European parties needed more time to explain their views publicly.

At the October meeting of the editorial group in East Berlin, the SED delegation proposed a draft final document which was rather close to a possible compromise, and which the great majority of parties assessed as an acceptable basis for drafting the final document. The parties dispersed in October, after having reached this assessment, and agreed to a new meeting on November 17, at which they were to adopt the definite, final draft, the agenda for the conference, and its date.

A surprising change took place, however, at this meeting. As we have surmised from the statements and articles of the West European party leaders and publications, and also indirectly from what has appeared in the party press in Eastern Europe, at this session of the editorial commission the East German party delegation proposed a new draft final document which contained almost exclusively the views, assessments, and positions of those parties which are gathered around the CPSU. What is more, these assessments and positions had even become much sharper. The essential point in this new draft is the insistence on the leading role of the USSR and the socialist camp, on internationalism, and on the fact that the conference of European parties must provide a political document which will then serve as an obligatory general line for all European communists. This change was supported with great enthusiasm and authority by the Soviet delegation, followed by the delegations of all East European states, except Rumania. In addition to the Rumanian delegation, serious objections were made by the delegations of the LCY, the Italian Communist Party, the Spanish Communist Party, the British Communist Party, the Left Party (Communist) of Sweden, and, to some extent, the French Communist Party, while certain smaller West European parties (for instance, the Swiss Communist Party and the Irish Communist Party) obviously were not quite certain what to do.

The result of the marked sharpening of the Soviet position is that it has become quite impossible to convene the conference within the planned time span (this year, or in January 1976, but certainly before the 25th CPSU Congress, which is planned for the end of February 1976) and that the final date of the conference has been generally thrown into question. The question of why the Soviet party has sharpened its position to such an extent naturally attracts the greatest attention. The great flood of theoretical articles in the East European party press, which stress the importance of socialist internationalism, the leading role of the USSR and the socialist camp, the need for a monolithic unity of the international communist movement, sharply attacking revisionism, opportunism, and so forth, do not give a satisfactory answer. All these are well-known positions, and there is nothing new in defending them. The sole new point is the fact that the Soviet Union has obviously been interested in holding a consultative meeting of the European communist parties ever since the idea was born two years ago, and was also prepared to make far-reaching compromises so that this consultative meeting could take place, but now no longer seems interested. The Soviet Union wanted the consultative meeting to be held soon after the Helsinki conference on European security, and certainly before the 25th CPSU Congress in February. At that time, commentators surmised that the Soviet leadership badly wanted to come to the party congress with the results of the consultative meeting of the European communist parties in hand. It could then be presented as a success, because such a meeting would undoubtedly support the policy of détente and pay tribute to the Soviet leadership for achieving it. On the other hand, the very fact that the CPSU had finally sat down with so many foreign communist parties, while the Chinese cannot do this, would score

important points for the Soviet party in its confrontation with China. It was believed that these two points represented such great advantages that the CPSU would be prepared to make a compromise regarding the work methods of the conference and concerning the Marxist emphasis in its substance.

Where and What Are the Reasons?

Indeed, everything proceeded in this direction -- until November 17, when the vehicle of Soviet policy on the European consultative meeting of parties veered sharply onto another track. The CPSU is no longer interested in an urgent convening of the consultative meeting, and certainly does not want to have it held before the 25th congress. Western party sources allege that Konstantin F. Katushev, head of the Soviet delegation in East Berlin and secretary of the Central Committee, maintained that the final document must be "good" (it is well known what this means according to Soviet interpretation), and that the length of the preparations for the conference and the date when the conference actually is held are not as important as the kind of document it will adopt. This sounded almost like an ultimatum, an impression intensified by the representatives of other East European parties. Vasil Bilak, head of the Czechoslovak delegation, for example, even demanded at the conference that the speeches of the heads of parties who attend it should be co-ordinated in advance.

The question naturally arises as to what happened in Moscow to produce such a change? No 100-per cent reliable sources exist to which we could refer; therefore, an opinion about the reasons cannot be much more than a reflection of possible and probable reasons. It is necessary first to establish that the sharpening of the Soviet position vis-à-vis the international communist movement is not an isolated phenomenon, for in recent months Soviet assessments of many international questions, such as, for instance, relations with the United States, the role of NATO, the situation in Europe after the Helsinki conference, the situation in Asia, and the like, have become far more cutting. For some months now it has been impossible to see any trace of the enthusiasm over the relaxation of tension and the negotiating and co-operation between East and West in Soviet statements at international functions or in domestic assessments; more and more often, one hears critical comments and even reproaches that these processes do not flow as desired, and naturally the Soviet side blames the West for this.

At the same time, integratory aspirations in Eastern Europe are being greatly strengthened, with the central promoter in this process again the Soviet Union. Never in the past has such emphasis been publicly placed on political, ideological, economic, and any other kind of integration of the socialist camp, and never in the past have there been so many concrete steps taken in this direction.

As far as the European communist movement is concerned, it is necessary to say that the Soviet party views with great doubt and mistrust the interest of the Italian, French, and Spanish communists in unconventional new forms of the struggle for socialism in their countries, and also in the new, unconventional pluralistic image of socialism which these parties are creating. Soviet criticism at the expense of the largest West European communist parties is increasingly more frequent and sharp, and sometimes one has the strong feeling that Soviet dissatisfaction with the West European communists has gone so far

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that only one more step is needed before Moscow accuses the largest West European communist parties of revisionism and a social-democratic attitude.

All the foregoing has probably influenced a change in the Soviet position, and it is virtually certain that the above-mentioned reasons are not the only ones. What else ought to be included in this deliberation will most likely emerge only after the 25th CPSU Congress, in two months' time, when changes in Soviet policy (and perhaps also in the personalities connected with this policy) will become more clearly defined. (064)

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This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.



HUNGARY/2
21 January 1976

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ECONOMIC AFFAIRS1. Hungary's Fifth Five-Year Plan (I): Policy ObjectivesIntroduction

The first day of 1976 marked the start of the period covered by Hungary's fifth five-year plan. The bill relating to the plan was enacted by the Hungarian National Assembly on 18 December 1975 (Law No. IV/1975 -- Magyar Kozlony, 24 December 1975).

The national economic plan determines the entire country's economic policy for the next five years and no informed comment can be made on any sphere of economic life without a thorough knowledge of its provisions. It is therefore proposed to present a series of nine reports dealing with the more important features of the plan, the first of which appears below; others will follow in successive Situation Reports. The subjects considered will be as follows:

- I. General economic policy objectives
- II. National income
- III. Industrial production
- IV. Agriculture and forestry
- V. Transportation and communications
- VI. Standard of living policy
- VII. Foreign trade
- VIII. Investments
- IX. Conclusions

I: General Economic Policy Objectives

The law stipulates four main economic policy objectives to be attained in the course of the plan's implementation:

- a. Production efficiency must be raised;
- b. There must be a better adaptation to changing economic conditions;
- c. The over-all economic equilibrium must be enhanced;
- d. The country's defense capability must be improved.

Production Efficiency

According to the law, greater production efficiency is the main objective of Hungary's economic policy in the next five years.

The following means are prescribed to that end:

- a rapid rise in labor productivity;
- the speedier application of technological and scientific advances to the production process;
- an improvement in the production structure;
- an increase in export capacity and ability;
- a better exploitation of the opportunities offered by the international division of labor;
- a better utilization of fixed and working capital (machinery and stock);
- improved managerial and organizational standards;
- economy in the use of energy and materials;
- the strengthening of production units' (i.e., enterprises') independence, so as to increase their responsibility and promote the development of initiative.

In essence, none of these ideas is new. In the past two years increased efficiency and the analysis of proposals for promoting it have been under continuous discussion both at meetings and in the daily press. The great question, which remains wide open, is whether these numerous suggestions can be put successfully into practice. Much depends on how the changed economic regulators, which came into force at the beginning of the new five-year plan period, function in practice.

Better Adaptation to Changed Economic Conditions

On this point the law contents itself with stating that "changing" external economic conditions must be taken into consideration in all circumstances: that is, in setting production development targets, in the structural transformation of production, in the development of international relations, and in improving the enterprises' economic situation. The law does not indicate precisely what is to be understood by "changing external economic conditions" but obviously it means primarily a faster and better adaptation to the changing (mainly increasing) prices of raw materials and other import goods. The entire policy governing investment, the development of production, and the transformation of its structure must therefore be shaped in a way that avoids excessive reliance on imported materials and encourages the growth of exports.

Improvement of Over-all Economic Equilibrium

On the question of economic equilibrium the law envisages the achievement of a better balance between national income and domestic consumption plus accumulation. To this end consumption

and accumulation together must grow more slowly than national income, and to achieve a reasonable foreign trade and payments balance exports must increase at a faster rate than imports. (These problems will be discussed further in subsequent reports in this series dealing with standard of living policy and foreign trade.)

Improving the Country's Defense Capability

It is noteworthy that the plan law mentions the improvement of the country's defense capability -- that is, its military potential -- as a specific and important target of economic policy. In doing so, it refers to the "exigencies of the international situation." The law does not include anything more specific than this on the practical implementation of the theoretical requirement. Some indication of what it means in terms of expenditure should be given in the military costs item of the current budget, but it is well known that in all communist countries military spending is often disguised under other headings. The official military budget for the first year of the new five-year plan is in fact 3.6 per cent of total expenditure -- i.e. no more than in earlier years.

(054)

LABOR

2. Seven Thousand Hungarian Gastarbeiter in the GDR

Seven thousand young Hungarian workers are now employed in factories in the GDR under the May 1967 agreement between the two countries. According to a statement made by a higher official in the GDR Ministry of Labor, East Germany is delighted with the functioning of the agreement and its validity has therefore been extended until 1980 (Magyar Hirlap, 25 December 1975). To date more than 30,000 young Hungarians have worked in GDR factories and have participated in work competitions.

The agreement covers unskilled as well as skilled workers (of both sexes), and 100 catering industry employees working in Hungarian trade union recreation centers were recently transferred to East Germany to work until the middle of April in trade union hotels there. They will attend crash courses in the German language (Radio Budapest, 10 October 1975).

The Hungarian media are currently protesting against the use of the expression Gastarbeiter; Hungary's "young workers in the GDR," they point out, have the same rights and obligations as East German citizens except for the right to vote. (Nothing is said about the fact that this is standard practice in all Western countries, which employ millions of foreign workers.)

The average Hungarian worker is paid 600-650 East German marks a month, while a few earn as much as 900-1,100 marks. Accommodation is usually provided although it is far from spacious: in the large, newly built workers' hostels six men or five women are accommodated in the two-room apartments and seven men or six women in those with three rooms. Rent charges are only 20-30 marks a month.

There are no statistics available on the number of workers who try to learn German, and the scanty information released on the subject indicates that there has been little progress on this score. A Hungarian library was opened in Leipzig a few months ago, but there have been complaints that the supply of books and periodicals is inadequate.

Several branches of the Communist Youth League organization (KISZ) have been in operation since the beginning of the Gastarbeiter scheme, but it is hard to judge to what extent the Hungarians take part in its activities. The KISZ is known to have arranged visits to the major towns and regions of the GDR.

Even after nine years contacts with the local population do not seem to be very close and this is not entirely due to the language barrier. A few German families invite young Hungarians into their homes, but in general it is felt that the Germans are rather reserved -- and it is of course quite possible that many Hungarians make little or no effort to become friendly with their hosts.

Magyar Hirlap (25 December 1975) described an interesting example of the efforts that are made in some places to bring the young workers together. In the small town of Ilmenau 300 Hungarians are living alongside 2,000 Poles engaged in building the largest and most modern chinaware factory in Europe; some of the Hungarians are employed on the installation of the air-conditioning system. In one of the big workers' hostels where the Poles and Hungarians live together, the young people have created in a remarkably short time a modern five-room club, which was inaugurated on December 13. It provides dancing twice a week and other entertainment for Hungarian, Polish, and East German young people, and is also open alternatively to Poles and Hungarians for language courses.

In all the larger colonies of young workers Hungarian instructors are appointed to ensure that newcomers are integrated at their work places with those already serving there.

An interesting feature of the Gastarbeiter scheme is that the numbers applying for work in the GDR have been slowly decreasing in the past few years. There are several reasons for this, not the least of which is that many young people have had difficulty in getting their old jobs back after returning to Hungary. The recent decree freezing the number of administrative workers (see Hungarian Situation Report/1, Radio Free Europe Research, 13 January 1976, Item 2) may create an entirely new situation, however. It will certainly pose no problem for returning blue-collar workers, but those who have recently graduated from a Gymnasium or technological high school may not find suitable jobs in Hungary and it can therefore be assumed that they will take the opportunity to apply for a three-year spell in East Germany. It will not be clear how much impact the freeze is having on the manpower situation in Hungary until the summer, when the next batch of applications for work in the GDR are due to be submitted.

(055)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

3. Portuguese Foreign Minister Visits Hungary

Ernesto de Melo Antunes,, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, paid an official visit to Hungary between January 12 and 15. The visit was originally scheduled for mid-November as part of a tour of both Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but was canceled owing to the internal political crisis in Portugal at that time.

Hungary gave Antunes a "cordial, friendly, high-level" reception, and the visit evoked special articles in the Hungarian media on relations between the two countries since the (Portuguese) coup of 25 April 1974. It was stressed that during the Salazar and Caetano regimes Hungary had had no relations with Portugal, but that after the disappearance of Caetano the relationship between the two countries developed rapidly. Diplomatic relations were established on 1 July 1974 and in October of that year Deputy Foreign Minister Janos Nagy conducted negotiations in Portugal; Nagy was followed to Lisbon in April 1975 by Foreign Ministry State Secretary Jozsef Marjai. In May 1975 the two countries concluded an air traffic agreement, and economic relations have developed considerably during the past 18 months: A five-year economic agreement signed in January 1975 grants both parties most-favored-nation treatment. Cultural relations have also expanded but it is recognized that there is still much to be done in this sphere (Magyar Hirlap, 11 January 1976).

Antunes had several talks with Foreign Minister Puja and was also received by the country's three top leaders: party First Secretary Janos Kadar, Chairman of the Presidential Council Pal Losonczi, and Prime Minister Gyorgy Lazar. His visits included one to the Ikarusz bus factory.

On January 14 Antunes held a press conference during which he said a real basis existed for a speedy improvement of Portugal's relations with the communist world. As these relations develop, attention is being paid both to the differences that exist between Portugal and the communist countries and to the points on which they are close to each other. Antunes urged that each side respect the other's political and social system and the principle of noninterference.

According to an AFP report of January 14 the Portuguese Foreign Minister stated that Portugal would not leave NATO. The Hungarian radio quoted him as saying on January 15 that "Portugal, as the most Western country (geographically) on the continent, is bound to the United States and to Western Europe through a system of relations that has deep roots in the past." He also asserted that the changes in Portugal do not threaten the balance of power in Europe or in the world as a whole.

Antunes and Puja signed a Hungarian-Portuguese cultural agreement covering the next five years which envisages exchanges of literary works, movies, and theatrical companies, and the establishment of contacts between scientific, cultural, youth, and sports organizations.

The official communiqué on the negotiations noted with satisfaction that in the brief period since the re-establishment of diplomatic ties, bilateral relations between the two countries had begun to develop rapidly in all spheres. It said that the development of relations between the two countries and the establishment of mutually advantageous co-operation is consonant with the interests of both countries and will help to promote the consolidation of peace in Europe.

The two sides affirmed that their governments would develop relations between them and establish effective co-operation in the political, economic, scientific, and cultural spheres. They agreed that negotiations would open shortly on technological, scientific, road transport, shipping, and tourist agreements.

Both parties welcomed the current emphasis on détente in international political life and expressed the conviction that this process is becoming irreversible. It is bringing with it fresh opportunities for the extension of co-operation between states with differing social systems.

After recognizing the importance of the Helsinki agreements, the foreign ministers said that political détente must be accompanied by effective disarmament measures. They expressed the hope that the Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms and the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments will reach a successful conclusion in the near future.

A "useful exchange of views" took place on the situation in Angola, and Puja stressed Hungary's appreciation of Portugal's policy of decolonization, which he said has contributed to the easing of international tension.

The ministers also discussed the situation in the Middle East, the role of the United Nations in various fields, and Vietnam.

The communiqué ended by saying that the meetings and discussions had taken place "in an atmosphere of sincerity, confidence, and friendly co-operation," and had contributed significantly to the better understanding of positions on international issues and to the development of bilateral relations. The two foreign ministers had noted with pleasure that their views coincided or were close on several international questions.

Antunes invited Puja to pay an official visit to Portugal; the invitation was accepted with thanks and the date of the visit will be fixed later through diplomatic channels (MTI, 15 January 1976). After the conclusion of his visit Antunes left Hungary for Czechoslovakia. (056)

AGRICULTURE4. A Success Story: The Raba-Steiger Tractor

At the prompting of the Babolna Agricultural Combine, the Hungarian Wagon and Machine Factory in Győr bought a license to manufacture the American Steiger tractor in 1974 and concluded a co-operation agreement with the US firm for joint production of a Raba-Steiger 245-hp machine (see Hungarian SRs/1 and 27, REFER, 7 January and 16 June 1975, Items 1 and 3, respectively). Contrary to previous practice, the Győr enterprise organized the mass production of the Raba-Steiger tractor in an extremely short space of time, assigning the assembling of it to the Budapest Red Star Machine Factory, which is the citadel of Hungarian tractor production. This enabled the latter to continue manufacturing tractors, an activity that was earlier slated to be discontinued.

In 1975 some 305 Raba-Steiger tractors were built and in the second half of the year they began to appear on the larger farms. The machine became very popular with the farmers and deserved the specialist attention it attracted at Agromasexpo 75, the September 1975 agricultural exhibition in Budapest. By the fall both their numbers and reputation had risen in step. The Raba-Steiger is considered a prize by farm drivers and there is considerable rivalry among them for the right to drive it. One of the drivers declared that it was the most comfortable machine he had ever operated: he said that one can listen to the radio while driving it and that the heating system guarantees a pleasant cabin temperature. The tractor's popularity is enhanced by the fact that it has increased the drivers' wages substantially; in 1975, one of them earned as much as 54,000 forint (Tolna Megyei Nepujsag, 17 December 1975), compared with the average co-operative worker's 30,800 forint (Mezogazdasagi Statisztikai Zsebkonyv, 1945-1975).

Agrotroszt commissioned the Győr Machine Factory to supply approximately 400 Raba-Steiger tractors in 1976 (Vilaggazdasag, 9 September 1975), since the expansion of the closed production system (cps) on the farms has led to an increase in demand for this type that has been stimulated by a price reduction of 150,000 forint made possible by efficient organization and improved production technology. According to specialists in the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, by 1980 there will be about 1,000 Raba-Steiger tractors operating on Hungarian farms (Figyelo, 17 September 1975). Its popularity is increased by the fact that the manufacturing enterprise provides the necessary servicing (Vas Nepe, 16 January 1976).

The Győr Machine Factory presented the Raba-Steiger tractor at an exhibition in Baghdad (Iraq), which resulted in some interest being aroused in it there (Esti Hirlap, 1 December 1975).

Hungarian-US co-operation in tractor production is more evidence of the fact that Hungary needs the modern agricultural machines and production technologies developed in the West for its technological development in this sector. (057)

SOCIAL ISSUES5. Child Welfare Allowance Rules Changed to Ease Labor Shortage

Under the provisions of the child welfare allowance system introduced in 1967 and amended in 1969 and 1974, a working mother has the right, following her maternity leave, to enjoy unpaid leave and a child welfare allowance until her child is three years old. The monthly allowance is at present 800 forint for the first child (700 forint for agricultural co-operative workers), 900 forint for the second (800), and 1,000 for the third and each additional child (900).

In contrast to earlier expectations, an increasing number of mothers have claimed the allowance in recent years. The figures since 1967 are as follows:

Year	Recipients
1967	34,000
1968	92,000
1969	144,000
1970	167,000
1971	178,000
1972	185,000
1973	195,000
1974	230,000

Sources: Statisztikai Evkonyv 1973, and Magyar Hirlap, 20 July 1975.

Today more than 80 per cent of those eligible for the allowance receive it -- i.e., about 260,000 or more than 10 per cent of all working women (Magyar Hirlap, 20 July 1975; Nepszava, 29 December 1975).

The introduction of the child welfare allowance has had a significant impact on the labor pool. The spheres to feel its effect most sharply have been the clothing, textile, leather, fur, and shoe industries, the retail trade, and the building and food industries. The problem has been aggravated by the fact that since 1 January 1967 only 380,000 out of 630,000 women who received the allowance have returned to their former places of work. In recent years industry has given increasing prominence to the harmful effects of the child welfare allowance scheme on the labor market and has queried whether the situation created by it is tolerable.

Indeed, there have even been some signs of panic (cf. Radio Budapest's commentary by Csaba Vertes, 2 January 1976, 1500 hours) and the Council of Ministers felt it necessary to put the problem on the agenda of its 24 December 1975 session. It was decided then to amend the system in light of actual labor shortage in individual branches of industry. Council of Ministers Resolution No. 1,037/1975 of December 28, "Observations on the Child Welfare Allowance System and Additional Measures" codified the council's decisions and

stipulated that the Minister of Labor, in consultation with the National Trade Union Council, should amend the conditions governing payment of the allowance in 1976. The changes will enable a mother in receipt of the allowance to take up work once a year, and to undertake, for payment, the care of a maximum of two other children between one and three years of age. Those who do so will not be debarred from receiving the allowance. Rates are to be fixed by the parents concerned. Pensioners will also be authorized to take care of small children for a fee.

The intention of this new regulation is to improve the care provided for children unable to enter the day nurseries. There are about 100,000 children under the age of three in Hungary whose parents are working but cannot send them to day nurseries because of the shortage of accommodation or for other reasons (Magyar Hirlap, 8 January 1976).

The Ministry of Labor, in agreement with the ministries and social organizations concerned, will publish in the near future a circular giving the enterprises the information they need about the position of workers who are temporarily at home on child welfare allowance. The circular will describe the various forms of extension training and will suggest methods of remaining in contact with the mothers so as to induce the majority of them to return to their places of work when the allowance ceases (Nepszabadsag, 29 December 1975). (058)

FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

6. Economic Relations with the FRG

An economic delegation led by Foreign Trade Minister Jozsef Biro visited Bonn between 14 and 16 January 1976 to discuss economic relations between the two countries. The negotiations were held within the framework of the joint Hungarian-West German committee on economic, industrial, and technological co-operation, and the West German team was headed by Minister of Economics Hans Friderichs. Biro also conferred with West German Minister of Agriculture Josef Ertl.

The meeting of the committee was essentially routine and did not include the signing of an economic agreement between the two countries. According to Hungarian sources (Magyar Nemzet, 14 January 1976) the session covered three subjects:

- a. An analysis of past trends in economic relations between the two countries and the possibility of further development;
- b. Evaluation of co-operation relations;
- c. Other bilateral problems.

The Hungarian and West German press reported the intergovernmental negotiations with appropriate attention. The West German press (e.g.,

Die Welt, 13 January 1976) pointed out that in 1975 Hungary had significantly reduced its imports from the FRG (the fall was 18.2 per cent on the 1974 figure) in an endeavor to reduce the Hungarian foreign trade deficit which derived from West Germany's favorable trade balance of DM 858,000,000, compared to DM 227,000,000 in 1974.

Die Welt said that the West German policy was to "strive for a better balance through an expansion of trade, and not by curtailing German exports."

From the Hungarian side, however, the expansion of trade is a problem: on the one hand Common Market policy puts constraints on one of Hungary's most important exports: cattle; and on the other the Germans still apply the quota system to some consumer goods. According to Die Welt, Bonn has increased the quota by 6 per cent in 1976.

The widening of co-operation between Hungarian and German enterprises also provides an opportunity to increase trade between the two countries. Not only is the FRG Hungary's largest Western trade partner, but co-operation ventures with West German enterprises are unsurpassed in number and profitability. There are now 159 of these agreements actually in operation (Radio Budapest, 14 January 1976), out of a total of 190 that have been concluded (Die Welt, 13 January 1976). In its Homeland program Radio Budapest stressed on January 14 the importance of co-operation ventures and the topicality of the recent negotiations:

The present ministerial negotiations in Bonn are taking place in a period important to both countries. In Hungary the new five-year plan came into force on January 1. Minister of Foreign Trade Jozsef Biro is therefore in a position to inform the West German leaders about Hungary's economic situation in light of medium-term development concepts; while West Germany wants to end economic regression and foreign trade must obviously have an important role in this respect.

In any case it is clear from the joint committee's deliberations how increasingly important is the role of the co-operation venture. In this field relations with the FRG have a special part to play, as so many Hungarian co-operation agreements are with West German enterprises. Special attention should be paid in this respect to a handbook of 300 pages published a few days ago describing the co-operation agreements between the two countries. This Handbuch der Kooperation was jointly edited by the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, the Institute for Business and Market Research, and the West German foreign trade information center, the Bundesstelle für Aussenhandelsinformation; it reviews the two countries' economic development, institutional and legal systems, and the foreign trade direction mechanisms as well as the history of co-operation between their enterprises in the last eight or nine years. This type of publication, dealing as it does with co-operation between a socialist and a Western country, has no precedent. It is also the first of a series, since similar publications will appear dealing with the economic and legal systems of Switzerland and Great Britain and with co-operation ventures with these countries.



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S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T



1. The CC Theses on Economic Development
2. The Regime Policy Vis-à-Vis the Jewish Minority

1. The CC Theses on Economic Development

On 8 January 1976 the existence of four sets of "theses" was announced by the Bulgarian News Agency (see Bulgarian Situation Report/1, Radio Free Europe Research, 15 January 1976, Item 3). The only set published so far has turned out to be a rather disappointing document. Entitled "BCP CC Theses on the Basic Directions of Economic Development in the People's Republic of Bulgaria during the Seventh Five-Year Plan and Until 1990," the full text filled only about two newspaper pages -- a relatively moderate length for a document of this kind. It contains almost no concrete figures on plan targets, and gives only the general lines of the economic policy to be pursued during the next 15 years.

Continuity is its most striking characteristic element. There is almost nothing in it that has not been said before: at the 10th BCP Congress in April 1971, at the December 1972 plenum on the standard of living, at the March 1974 National Party Conference, or on other occasions during the past five years (see R.N., "Directives on the Bulgarian Sixth Five-Year Plan," Bulgarian Background Report/18, RFER, 19 May 1971; R.N., "CC Plenum Decisions on Standard of Living," Bulgarian BR/3, RFER, 2 March 1973; and R.N., "The BCP's National Party Conference," Bulgarian BR/8, RFER, 15 July 1974).

The introduction refers to achievements during "the 30-year period of socialist construction," and especially since the April 1956 plenum. The main aim of the theses is said to be "an even more far-reaching solution to problems connected with the construction of a developed socialist society in Bulgaria."

The three chapters into which the theses are divided deal with basic tasks of the economy, development and improvement of the material-technical base, and the territorial distribution of production forces. The second chapter, which is the longest, contains a number of subdivisions dealing with the various branches of the national economy.

The "basic tasks" are formally divided into 10 points, most of which, however, deal with more than one problem. Raising the standard of living is again, as it was at the 10th congress, the fundamental aim, to which all other tasks are linked. These include making full use of all resources in the country; promoting more intensive growth and increasing efficiency; reducing the consumption of power and raw materials per item produced; increasing the productivity of labor; achieving more harmonious economic development; improving the economic structure; introducing scientific and technological achievements and the findings of scientific research into the economy; taking a "new approach" in investment policy, with priority given to modernization and reconstruction; improving the qualifications of cadres; reducing the number of administrative personnel and of persons engaged in agriculture; promoting socialist integration with the USSR and the other Comecon countries; increasing exchanges of consumer goods; improving the "efficiency" of international tourism; taking steps to turn state and co-operative property into all-national socialist property; increasing the role of the working class; improving the planning processes; developing the national complexes and the ministries entrusted with their management; and several other minor provisions.

As pointed out above, all this has been said before. Among the few figures contained in the theses are the statements that by 1990 the "social productivity of labor" (i.e., national income produced per person employed in material production), is to have increased by 200 to 250 per cent over 1975, and scientific research is to become four to five times more efficient. The document again repeats that at least 55 per cent of all capital investments should be earmarked for modernization and reconstruction (compared with the approximately 30 per cent planned for the 1971-1975 period).

In Chapter 2, the subsection devoted to industry states that a policy of reducing the gap between the rates of growth of Group A and Group B should be pursued (as provided at the December 1972 plenum). It speaks of a "deep transformation" in the branch structure of industry, but the general provisions that follow merely set a few priorities more outspokenly than hitherto: production in the electric power branch should outdistance that of the other branches of industry, and the production of rolled ferrous metals and pipes should surpass that of the machine building, construction, and other branches that use rolled iron. The metallurgical plants in Pernik and Kremikovtsi are to be reconstructed and modernized before 1980, and construction of "a third metallurgical base" is to begin during those five years.

The subsections on machine building and the chemical industry place the emphasis on the subdivisions of these branches in which Bulgaria is supposed to specialize, according to the socialist division of labor; the subsection on light industry speaks mainly of the utilization of plastics and synthetic materials.

The section on agriculture contains, inter alia, a provision that grain output should double by 1990, with special attention to be paid to the growing of sunflowers, that the output of tobacco (especially the Virginia and Burley varieties) should be increased, and that "unlimited" numbers of cattle, sheep, and pigs should be bred in mountainous and semimountainous regions. It also speaks of improving the methods of fruit and vegetable growing.

Separate sections of the second chapter deal with transport, communications, and construction, again only in general terms. The third chapter, on the territorial distribution of production forces, on the whole follows the policy outlined at a special CC plenum in March 1970 (see R.N., "CC Plenum on Territorial Distribution of Production Forces," Bulgarian BR/10, RFER, 20 March 1970) and subsequent decrees on the development of some of the country's most backward areas.

It should be mentioned that in regard to the improvement of planning the theses say comprehensive programs for the all-round solution of economic and social problems should be worked out for 10- to 15-year periods and appropriately included in the five-year plans. And in fact the theses are obviously intended to represent such a program for the next 15 years. The new five-year plan, however, has not yet been published, although draft directives on it should be approved at the 11th party congress, scheduled to begin in little more than two months. (For a discussion of this delay, see Bulgarian SR/1, RFER, 15 January 1976, Item 3).

As noted above, the theses clearly express the continuity of the general lines of the economic policy applied during the five years since the 10th congress (and to some extent since the July 1968 plenum). This would seem to bolster the assumption that the 11th congress will not rank among the top policy-making congresses in the history of the BCP, as did the fifth and tenth congresses and the April 1956 plenum, the 20th anniversary of which is about to be solemnly celebrated. (062)

2. Regime Policy Vis-à-vis the Jewish Minority

The central leadership of the Public Cultural-Educational Organization of Jews (PCEOJ) in the People's Republic of Bulgaria held a plenum on 14 December 1975. The agenda contained three items: a report on the 1975 activities of the organization, its

1976 budget plan, and discussions of organizational matters (Evreyski Vesti No.24, 22 December 1975). This is apparently the second major undertaking in a year marked by conspicuous reactivation of the PCEOJ, which represents the approximately 7,000 Jews who remained in Bulgaria after the mass exodus in the late 1940s (see Bulgarian SR/14, RFER, 16 May 1975, Item 2). In addition, the most recent plenum provided the occasion for a kind of summing up on the eve of the BCP congress.

The main report was delivered by Yosif Astrukov-Herz, who has been president of the organization since 1963. Speaking on behalf of its Executive Committee, he appealed to Bulgarian Jewry "to participate actively in the massive political, social, cultural, and labor-oriented activities of the Fatherland Front," of which the PCEOJ is a member. The goal is "to create a single socialist nation" -- an undertaking discussed at the PCEOJ's plenum last March. The task was first laid down at the 10th party congress (April 1971), and was later discussed at considerable length by the BCP CC February 1974 plenum, at which, inter alia, the party's policies toward national minority groups were defended (see G.S., "Bulgarian Plenum Devoted to Ideological Activities," Bulgarian BR/3, RFER, 19 April 1974, pp. 12-14). The importance of creating a "single socialist nation" was pointed up by the fact that it was placed first on the list of "basic tasks" of the PCEOJ, and the organization's past and future activities were assessed from this point of view.

A number of propaganda campaigns were launched last year, all aimed at involving Bulgarian Jews in the regime's domestic and international policies. On the domestic scene, the 10 provincial branches of the PCEOJ held a number of conferences and meetings commemorating various events in the country's recent past. (Hitherto there were 11 provincial branches, but at this plenum the Vidin branch was closed down, reportedly because only a small number of Jews live there). The BCP's role in saving Bulgarian Jews from deportation during World War II was exaggerated at the December plenum. It should be recalled that there have never been pogroms in Bulgaria, and that Bulgaria sent no Jews to the gas chambers during the last war.) The BCP has, on previous occasions, exploited the centuries of cordial relations between Bulgarians and Jews although the party was an underground organization in the 1939-1944 period and had little or no influence on the government's policy of defending Jews. Thus identifying the nation's attitude toward Jews with the party policy is, historically speaking, inaccurate (for more details on Bulgarian-Jewish relations throughout the last millennium, see Salvator Izrael's study, "The Historical Background to the Friendship Between Bulgarians and Jews," in the PCEOJ yearbook Godishnik na Obshtestvenata Kulturno-Prosvetna Organizatsia na Evreite v Narodna Republika Bulgaria [Sofia, 1966], pp. 13-15; also Haim Oliver, Nie Spasenite (We, the Saved) [Sofia, 1967], pp. 41-47).

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On the international scene, the PCEOJ was utilized for political reasons. Adverting to the so-called "patriotic and international education of Bulgarian Jewry" and to "the second dimension of true patriotism and internationalism, devotion to the USSR and the CPSU," the BCP has repeatedly used the PCEOJ on its many campaigns against Israel since 1967. For several years Evreyski Vesti -- a fortnightly and the only Jewish newspaper published in Bulgaria -- has printed vehement attacks on Israel, on Zionism, and on anyone who happened to side with Tel Aviv. In addition, the PCEOJ is regularly used as a political instrument in supporting Soviet initiatives in the Middle East conflict. On the other hand, on every possible occasion the organization's newspaper and yearbook defend Moscow's policy toward Soviet Jews. Finally, various propaganda efforts (most of them with emotional overtones) are directed to the organization's contacts with Western Jews visiting Bulgaria. The PCEOJ is used in this regard in much the same way the Bulgarian Agrarian Union, the Slavonic Committee, and the Bulgarian Orthodox Church have been used to promote BCP policies among circles or groups abroad that might be somewhat suspicious of or hostile to more direct and official contacts. One tactic is to send Evreyski Vesti and the yearbook to Bulgarian Jews living abroad and to various Jewish communities all over the world.

Astrukov discussed the PCEOJ's domestic and international activities in detail, and praised its central leadership. Despite marked progress -- from the party's point of view -- in almost every sphere, Astrukov noted that "some of the provincial branches are lagging behind" and also that the central leadership's performance "in the struggle against Zionism" was unsatisfactory. The emphasis on the recent world-wide anti-Zionist campaign and the failure to carry it out as vigorously as desired may indicate that Bulgarian Jewry, although strongly procommunist, remains conscious of its individuality. Nor can the existence of Zionist sympathies among this minority be ruled out.

Astrukov's report ended with a 12-point summary of future "basic tasks." Foremost among these is the incorporating of the Jewish minority into the "single socialist nation" foreseen for tomorrow's Bulgaria, which is to be carried out according to the Leninist theory on the "national problem." Apparently, however, there was opposition to the complete assimilation of the Jewish community on the part of at least some PCEOJ members. This was indicated by the brief summary of one of the statements that followed Astrukov's report. Izrael Maier (born in 1904), one of the most active Jewish communists in Bulgaria, was said to have "presented extensive arguments" on what should be understood by incorporation into the Bulgarian nation, "It is not a question of incorporation in general, but of incorporation into a single Bulgarian socialist nation," said Maier, adding that this is the essence of the question, and should not be dealt with in a formalistic or biased fashion. This could be interpreted as meaning that the national identity and awareness of the Jews are

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to be preserved, while they are "educated" to accept complete solidarity with Bulgarian socialist society. This assumption is confirmed by statements made last March on the need for the continued existence of the PCEOJ (see Bulgarian SR/14, REFER, 16 May 1975, Item 2).

The rest of the "basic tasks" consist mainly of undertakings aimed at helping to achieve incorporation and involving the Jews actively in carrying out party policy in the ideological, political, and economic sectors. (063)

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● RAD Background Report/22
(Czechoslovakia)
21 January 1976

INDRA FORESEES A GOOD YEAR FOR THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY

(Translation with Comment by the Czechoslovak Unit)

Summary and Introduction: The article translated in full below is entitled "It Will Be A Good Year." It was published in the CPCS CC weekly for politics, science, and culture, Tvorba (No.1, 1 January 1976), and was originally written for the periodical Praha - Moskva, the bimonthly of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship League. The author, Alois Indra, is a member of the CPCS CC Presidium and chairman of the Federal Assembly.

In the first part, Indra points out that the year 1976 will be of special importance because the congresses of several communist parties will be held in it, among them that of the CPCS, and especially the 25th CPSU Congress, which, as he says, is of primary significance for the entire international communist movement and even for the whole of the world. According to Indra, this congress will reveal the great strides made by the Soviet Union during its past (ninth) five-year plan both at home and in international affairs. Sensations are not to be expected, however, because the policies of the CPSU are a matter of public record. On the other hand, this congress will outline the tasks for the next five years. Next, Indra discusses developments in the CSSR in the past five years, noting successes, but also mentioning some shortcomings, which he anticipates will be the target of criticism at the 15th CPCS Congress. At this congress, the alliance and co-operation with the socialist countries, primarily with the Soviet Union, will traditionally be "an important chapter." This alliance is a cornerstone of Czechoslovak "domestic and foreign policies," Indra declares. In the last section of the article, Indra deals with the international situation in which these congresses will be held. He reviews the successes achieved by the Soviet peace offensive (and in passing attacks in this context, "cold warriors of the type of Messrs. Luns, Strauss, and Schlesinger" as well as the Mao-ists and ultra-left-ists). In conclusion, Indra warns that no one must harbor the illusion that the struggle is won and that the world is free from danger. Therefore, constant vigilance is necessary. Despite this, however, the year 1976 will be a good one and the future looks bright for the socialist community.

Indra's stocktaking and remarks can be regarded as one of the opening shots of the pre-congress campaign in Czechoslovakia

* * *

We are now entering 1976, the first year of the last quarter of this century. There is no question that the congresses of several fraternal communist parties, among them that of the CPSU, and primarily the 25th CPSU Congress, will imprint an important seal on this year. After all, the congress of the leading political force in a socialist state is always an event of exceptional importance. It assesses the results achieved in the past, appraises the situation of society, and determines the tasks in domestic and foreign policies set for the coming years on the basis of painstaking analyses.

The close connection of the communist parties with the workers and the broad support for their policies predetermine the fact that our congresses do not remain merely an internal party affair. They concern not only the communists, but also every societal organization, and literally every citizen. In socialist countries, the whole of society watches the preparations for a congress. This general interest and endeavor to contribute toward the success of so important a matter makes itself traditionally felt in new initiatives in the fulfilling of tasks and in the submitting of constructive proposals of an all-societal character.

* * *

The congresses of the CPSU, the oldest and most experienced communist party, have always been of exceptional importance for the entire international and communist movement -- indeed, for the whole of mankind, one may say without exaggerating. This is due to the fact that the delegates of the political avant-garde of a society that is building communism never withdraw into a shell of some sort of isolationism or political and economic autarky. The contrary is true. The CPSU always expresses its traditional loyalty to the principles of proletarian internationalism at its congresses, too, through new contributions to the efforts to deepen the unity of the Marxist movement. It always subscribes to the support of the national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle in all parts of our planet, and demonstrates its concern to strengthen a just peace. In this respect, the last two congresses of the Soviet communists have particularly produced new ideas, which have met with deserved response in the whole world. Quite certainly, the 25th congress, too, will again be a fount from which fresh water will spring for everyone who really has the fate of mankind at heart.

Undoubtedly, the Soviet communists, at their congress, will be justified in submitting convincing evidence of the successes of the policies of their party in the life of the Soviet Union at home, and in international politics. It will be a joyful account, but without sensational surprises, because the policy of the CPSU is not "a private affair," but a policy that is publicly declared and implemented with the participation of the whole Soviet people and for the whole world to see. It is common knowledge that the CPSU year by year improves the quality of its ranks and exercises its leading role in Soviet society in an increasingly attractive manner. It is no secret that the endeavor to perfect socialist democracy is at the center of attention of the Soviet communists, just as their admirable results in solving complicated nationality questions in the spirit of Leninist principles are well known. All the successes of the CPSU stem from the foundation of its ideological and organizational unity, its close connection with the people, the increasingly effective co-operation of communists and those without party affiliation, and of the high-principled unity of Soviet society as a whole. (Compared to this,

what does the hackneyed choir of a part of the bourgeois politicians and publicists amount to? What can "the sorrowful heroes" of anticommunism of all shades, including renegades of the type of Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov, and their ilk, change in this?)

The results known to date of the ninth Soviet five-year plan assure us that the 25th congress will be a grand parade of successes of the Soviet economy, which is the material-technical base of communism. Seemingly dull statistical data will be a testimony to the bold but realistic policies of the CPSU and to the self-sacrificing efforts of the Soviet citizens. They will depict its creative work, technological maturity, and organizational skill. In this picture, Soviet industrial production will have risen by roughly 47 per cent in the past five years, hundreds of new plants will have been added to the map of the USSR, and new railroad tracks and roads will appear on it. The most progressive industrial branches and the manufacture of consumer goods will be marked by high growth rates, and the data on the industrialization of Siberia will be interesting. All this will amplify the economic power of the country of the Soviets, and its attractiveness as an interesting trade partner will thus be even further enhanced. In this sense, the 25th congress will be further proof of the superiority of socialism at a time when the clouds of economic, currency, energy, ecological, and moral crises are gathering over the capitalistic world.

The development of the Soviet economy is not an end in itself, nor do only a few tens of thousands of private owners benefit from it. Therefore, the congress delegates will be able to talk about a further general increase in the standard of living of the Soviet people, and about what is being done to ensure their material and cultural needs. The results attained in developing science, culture, and education will certainly also be the object of attention of the congress -- following established tradition.

In Czechoslovakia and in the other socialist countries -- as, indeed, in the whole world -- we shall keenly wait to learn the tasks which the 25th congress will assign to its party and to the Soviet people for the next five years. After all, this will be the period in which mankind will celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October [Revolution], that beginning of a new historical era, the cradle of fundamental changes in the world. We know the wise policies of the CPSU, we know the power of the Soviet Union and the ability of its inhabitants. Therefore, we are firmly convinced that the congress will map out the path which will bring the first socialist country again nearer to communism -- in another five years, the Soviet Union will become an even more shining example for all progressive forces in the whole world, and the Kremlin Clock, which shows the time of the new age, will be heard even more clearly. An analysis of the international situation and the tasks which the 25th congress will deduce from it will again rouse the democratic and peaceful forces to further struggles for understanding in international relations, for a world without wars.

* * *

The 15th congress of the Czechoslovak communists will be held at the time of the 55th anniversary of the founding of the CPCS. We shall recall the history of our revolutionary party to serve as a lasting lesson, and to give us the inspiration to solve our current tasks. We shall remember the

difficulties the communists have had to cope with, the temporary failures and defeats, but also the glorious victories, which led to the transformation of Czechoslovakia into a socialist country. We realize anew, with a full sense of urgency, that the alliance with the Soviet Union, unity with the Soviet Union, and the co-operation with the countries of the socialist community, and the assistance which the international Marxist movement has rendered us, are the elementary precondition for our successes. To see these connections correctly in full accordance with historical truth means to possess sufficient protective agents against unsound self-overestimation, against the infection of bourgeois nationalism, and other strains of revisionism and opportunism.

We are entitled to enter the past five years since our 14th congress on the credit side of the stormy history of our party. How false all those would-be "scientific" prophecies of the blind wise guys from the camp of our adversaries have proved to be! What did the right-wing revisionists and opportunists, those various "improvers" of socialism of that peculiar year 1968, not presage for us, what doom did they not predict! The Czechoslovak people clearly expressed that it has nothing in common with them, that not a single one of them has the right to speak in its name. The workers, farmers, and the technical and humanistic intelligentsia have supported the line of the 14th congress, because it was in consonance with their desires -- they recognized its domestic political and international advantages. They proved this in the general elections, as well as through their political activity in the life of societal organizations and representative bodies, as well as in the solution of demanding economic tasks.

The CPCS will hold its congress as a party that is numerically strong and generally ideologically united, capable of action, and loyal to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and to the principles of proletarian internationalism. We are aware that the efforts to develop Leninist doctrine under our conditions mainly depend on exceptional care for the party, as well as on care for its close connection with the people and for its unity with the workers. I am convinced that we shall be able, at the congress, to show good results in political educational work among the party ranks, as well as outside the party. The steadily growing political activity of the younger generation and the consistently increasing participation of the workers in directing local and state-wide affairs will also be counted as assets.

Thanks to our domestic political results -- and of course also thanks to support from the USSR and our other socialist allies -- our international political balance sheet will be favorable as well. The dream of the right-ists and most aggressive reactionary forces in the world about the so-called "international isolation" of Czechoslovakia has faded in reality. The activity of Czechoslovakia on the international forum has never been as lively as it was in the recent past. The number of states with which we have established diplomatic relations has markedly grown, and we maintain normal political, economic, and cultural relations with most of the countries in the world -- in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, due attention is paid to our opinions, and the voice of Czechoslovakia carries weight.

Our people will certainly also note with satisfaction the data which demonstrate that its conscientious work becomes apparent in the fulfillment, and in many respects also in the overfulfillment, of the quotas of the fifth five-year plan. The national income will have risen by more than 26 per cent

[these data will show], the planned increase of industrial and agricultural production will have been exceeded, and all this thanks to the rapid growth of labor productivity. In Czechoslovakia, too -- just as in the Soviet Union -- the fruits of honest work are returned to the people in the form of a consistent rise in the standard of living, in the growth of personal and social consumption, and in a steadily improving supply for the domestic market. Almost 600,000 dwellings will have been made ready for use in this five-year plan, that is, roughly 100,000 more than the 14th congress had set as a goal. We have also achieved some progress through the part we have played in the socialist economic integration of the Comecon countries.

We are pleased about the successes, but we do not exaggerate, and we always remain modest. The Central Committee of our party has emphasized more than once, particularly at its meeting in November 1974, that all results must be judged with a demanding and critical eye, and that we should concentrate our attention on weak spots. We do not regard it as superfluous to recall the experience of the crisis years as a reminder that we should intensify political educational work even further, and that we should try to eliminate anything that might hamper us, and should take more effective steps to do this in the economy, too. It is one of the merits of communists that they have the courage to tell the truth under any circumstances and not to try to evade even the most burning problems. Therefore, one may expect that, also at the congress, some shortcomings in investment construction, in the utilization of basic funds, in foreign trade, in the unsatisfactory pace of rationalization, etc., will be subjected to criticism. However, it is certain that the congress will give a good account to the party and the whole Czechoslovak people, and that it will set further bold tasks in building an advanced socialist society on the basis of the results that have been achieved. Our workers will be reaffirmed in their conviction that they have a wise leader in the CPCS, and that the communists deserve their trust and support.

Traditionally, our alliance with the socialist countries, and primarily our co-operation with the Soviet Union and its Leninist communist party, will form an outstanding chapter of the 15th CPCS Congress. To us, this is not a matter of expediency, but the cornerstone of our domestic and international policies. We know very well who feels this goes against the grain, and why, but experience has taught us that the Czechoslovak-Soviet alliance, precisely in this concept, is the guarantee for all our success, and gives us a feeling of complete security and strengthens our state's independence. We regard it as our duty -- precisely in keeping with the most vital interests of our people -- consistently to deepen this friendship and to try to lend new importance to our pact of alliance by new political deeds in political and economic co-operation. Proletarian internationalism, and especially friendship with the Soviet Union, is an inherent part of socialist patriotism to our people, and a matter of the mind and of the heart to us.

* * *

The congresses of the CPSU and CPCS, as well as the congresses of the other fraternal parties convened for 1976, will be held in a favorable international atmosphere. One can assert without excessive optimism that current international relations are characterized by a relaxation of tension, by efforts to promote the idea of mutual understanding and co-operation among states with differing social systems on the basis of equal rights. This is

neither "a gift from heaven," nor the result of some kind of "change" in the class essence of imperialism. For this current favorable picture of the international scene we have to thank, in the first place, the Soviet Union and its economic and defense potential, the high-principled course and tenacious efforts of the CPSU CC and the Soviet government, and the personal assiduity of Comrade Brezhnev.

The line formulated by the 24th congress inspired and guided the peace-loving forces of the whole world, and has found rich fulfillment. It was not an easy road, because an important part of our high-principled class struggle with imperialism was at issue. More than once, it was necessary to combat elements that did not want to abandon the path of the cold war, and did not want to give up the idea of burying the socialist countries and of trying to stop inevitable historical development, even at the cost of an unimaginable military holocaust. However, times have changed, a process which realistically thinking bourgeois politicians have also contributed. The efforts of the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, democratic and peace-loving forces were crowned by more than one victory, and the concept of "the Soviet peace offensive" has rightly become a term generally accepted in the world.

It is not necessary to stop and list examples. It is sufficient to note, for instance, the results of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the US and other capitalist states, the agreements of the socialist states with the GFR, etc. No professional "Doubting Thomases" — who, for instance, distort the results of Helsinki, try to suppress and falsify the document signed there, and would like only to pick out "the plums" and ponder the theme "Who won the victory, whom does détente actually benefit?" — can depreciate this balance sheet. Nor will the cold warriors of the type of Messrs. Luns, Strauss, and Schlesinger, including their Mao-ist helpers and ultra-leftists of all shades, prevail. The world does not want to be guided by their wishes; it has set out on a different, happier road. . . .

However, our congresses must not cause our parties and mankind to harbor the illusion that the struggle has come to an end, that all danger has passed for the world. Peace is too precious a thing for the efforts to preserve and buttress it to be eased for even a moment. There are still too many sensitive points in the world, which could become the focuses of new tensions at any time. Owing to the most aggressive imperialistic circles, quite a few unsettled problems continue to exist, and they represent a threat to peace. There is nothing else left than to remain as vigilant as possible, not to let down one's guard for a single moment, to tackle all difficult questions in a high-principled and tenacious manner, so that warmongers' scope for maneuver is narrowed, and the circle of the democratic and peace-loving forces is more firmly closed. It is essential to complement the creation of the favorable political atmosphere through gradual concrete steps in disarmament and a complete ban on the development and production of new weapons systems of mass destruction. The Soviet Union, with the tenacity characteristic of it, has submitted sufficiently clear proposals acceptable to all, and it will certainly come out with similar proposals at the 25th congress as well. Success in this holy struggle depends on a co-ordinated and united course by the socialist allies and on their co-operation with all those forces that are serious about the goal of a lasting and just peace.

The peoples of our two countries welcome the year 1976 in the firm conviction that the congresses of their communist parties will be the starting points for further successes in building communism in the USSR and advanced socialism in the CSSR. Our optimism springs from rich historical experience, the belief that it is realistic stems from the wisdom of the political avant-garde of our countries, the knowledge of its possibilities, and the strength of our economy. Hence, we are justified in saying that we are looking forward, not only to a good year, but also to a bright future. . . . (061)

- End -

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FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION1. Common Market Official Visits Rumania

Common Market Vice-President and Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Christopher Soames paid a visit to Rumania from January 8 to 10, and his activities were described in a number of broadcasts over Radio Bucharest during the three days of his stay. He was received by Ceausescu in Predeal on January 8, and the two men discussed various international economic developments and agreed on the importance of commercial exchanges and economic co-operation in creating an atmosphere of détente.

There have been few contacts between Common Market officials and the Comecon member countries, the most notable being Common Market Commission President Ortoli's visit to Moscow in February 1975. Rumania and Yugoslavia are the only two East European countries to have established relations with the EEC. As of 1 January 1974 the RSR was granted "generalized trade preferences" in some sectors of the Common Market's generalized preference scheme (see Rumanian SR/23, Radio Free Europe Research, 7 June 1973, Item 3a), and Yugoslavia has a nonpreferential trade agreement, something Rumania has not yet been able to negotiate.

There are two significant aspects to Soames's visit. The first was a lecture he delivered before the International Law and International Relations Association, on the development of European economic relations since the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Rumanian news media did not discuss the content of his lecture, but details have been made available to journalists by Western sources (Reuter, 8 January 1976; the Financial Times, 9 January 1976; and RFE Special/Brussels, 8 January 1976). He told his audience that "normalization of all our relations with the members of Comecon, as well as with that organization itself, would seem to us the most logical and lasting outcome for all concerned." The EEC, he said, deems it "appropriate and sensible" to "establish relations with Comecon in those fields where the two organizations have more or less comparable functions and where there are matters of mutual interest to discuss and work on together." But there are areas in which "the responsibilities and terms of reference" of the two are not comparable, he went on, and "that is why we wish, as well as working together with Comecon, to establish and develop relations between [the EEC] and [individual] Comecon member states in those areas -- such as trade policy -- for which we, the community, and they, the Comecon member states, are responsible."

In comparing the centralized economic system in the socialist countries with the EEC's open market system, he had the following to say: "Upon what principles, then, are we to find a satisfactory basis for commerce with the state-trading countries comparable with that which exists between Western economies? And upon what principles are we in the community to receive satisfactory treatment by the East European state agencies that decide about foreign trade?" And he went on: "Until we can achieve greater clarity

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in regard to these matters there will inevitably continue to be constraints in the development on trade between the community and the East European countries, and this is the nub of the difficulties which state-trading export strategy, and price policy in particular, sometimes cause us, and which have led us to retain a number of quantitative restrictions."

Soames referred to Ortoli's Moscow visit, which he described as "useful," though his discussions had made "very little progress." He also said that the EEC Commission had invited the Comecon Secretariat to visit Brussels for further discussions, and was "awaiting its reply."

With regard to bilateral contacts between the Common Market and individual Comecon countries, he said: "We see no reason why the development of bilateral relations between the community and any member of Comecon should hinder or be hindered by the development of good working relations with Comecon as such."

Rumania has adopted a similar stand. In a speech to the Comecon Council's 29th session last July Premier Manescu strongly favored the development of direct contacts between Comecon and the EEC, which it was felt would lead to "framework agreements." It is also necessary, however, for individual countries to maintain direct official contacts with the EEC and to conclude bilateral contacts. (See Rumanian SR/26, RFER, 11 July 1975, Item 1.)

The second significant aspect of Soames's visit has to do with its implications for bilateral relations between Rumania and the EEC. No concrete instance of such contacts has been reported in Rumanian news media, though the RSR is known to be urging that the Common Market expand the trade preferences it has already granted. At the UNCTAD meeting held in Geneva this month the Rumanian delegate pointed out that the exports of the less highly developed countries are adversely affected by the failure to "improve" the EEC's preferential scheme (Radio Bucharest, 11 January 1976). He suggested that at the next UNCTAD conference (scheduled to be held in Nairobi in May) measures be adopted to extend these preferences to all industrial and agricultural products and to eliminate, on a preferential basis, all nontariff obstacles to exports of developing countries.

According to the Reuter dispatch mentioned above, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have asked the EEC to negotiate bilateral agreements covering textiles, and that the organization had already entered into talks with the RSR. The need for such agreements may be connected with the fact that, according to an RFE Special/London (18 December 1975), the UK is to begin discussions with East European countries on the exporting of men's wool suits to Britain and voluntary restriction of the number of pairs of men's shoes exported in 1976, together with the extension of such limitations to women's and children's shoes. Hardest hit by these measures would be Rumania, since last year 30 per cent of its exports to Britain consisted of textiles and footwear. According to Reuter and UPI (17 December 1975), the EEC criticized this move

by Britain as "inopportune" and announced that it would seek "the most appropriate community measures to deal with the situation." It is quite possible that the matter came up in Soames's discussions with Ceausescu and other Rumanian officials.

Rumania's relations with the Common Market and those between the EEC and Comecon were discussed in an article by Costin Murgescu published in Scinteia (21 September 1976). Murgescu voiced the opinion that interorganizational relations should be paralleled by relations with individual countries, and he criticized "some theorists who advocate resolving problems from bloc to bloc and wish to introduce the practice of giving mandates to groups of countries to speak for individual sovereign states." Also pertinent in this connection are interviews granted by Ceausescu to Yumiu Shimbun (Tokyo, 24 March 1975) and Le Monde (25 July 1975).

It should also be recalled that after Manescu had delivered his speech to the July 1975 Comcon Council session, the Slovak party daily Pravda (10 July 1975) criticized, by implication, Rumania's stand on negotiations between individual Comcon countries and the EEC (see Rumanian SR/28, RFER, 17 July 1975, Item 6).

After his return to Brussels Soames stated that the views of the EEC and Rumania were quite similar, and that the Rumanians "share our opinion that the development of bilateral relations between the EEC and all members of Comecon is perfectly compatible with the development of good working relations with Comecon itself" (RFE Special/Brussels, 12 January 1976). (040)

2. Outstanding British Financial Claims Settled

Radio Bucharest (January 12) reported that Finance Minister Florea Dumitrescu and Secretary of State at the British Foreign Office Roy Hattersley had signed an agreement on the settlement "of some financial problems." The broadcast did not elaborate on the terms of the agreement, but a Reuter dispatch (January 12) said it provides for the Rumanian government to pay Britain 3,500,000 pounds sterling in "full and final" settlement of various British claims involving Rumanian bonds in sterling and other currencies held by United Kingdom nationals that have been outstanding since 1940. The agreement also covers claims arising from the nationalization of certain oil companies in 1948 and commercial and other debts outstanding since World War II; Reuter quoted British officials as saying, however, that Shell Oil had been handling its claims directly with Rumanian authorities. According to an RFE Special/London (13 January 1976), payment will be made in four installments, and conservative estimates put the figure at no more than a tenth of the sum Rumania actually owes the British government and others.

Rumanian-British negotiations on this matter began in 1956. A partial agreement was reached in 1960 when Rumania agreed to meet

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British claims to the value of 1,250,000 pounds sterling from its export surplus, beginning on 31 January 1962. New negotiations followed in 1966, at which time the Daily Mail (28 March 1966) said that the RSR owed Britain some 89,000,000 pounds sterling, of which 60,000,000 pounds represented claims from oil companies (40,000,000-50,000,000 from Shell Oil alone), while Rumanian bonds accounted for 12,000,000 pounds, and other commercial and contractual debts for 17,000,000.

In 1971, Shell Oil and "a Rumanian organization" were said to have concluded a long-term arrangement covering co-operation in the oil and petrochemical industry, including the sale and purchase of products and the provision of services. The announcement also said that "machinery for the settlement of certain financial questions outstanding between the parties has been included in the over-all arrangement" (RFE Special/London, 15 June 1971). A memorandum of understanding was reportedly negotiated between Shell and the Rumanian authorities covering commercial, technical, and financial matters. This was considered by some to mean that the claims of Shell, the main British concern affected by the Rumanian takeovers, had been settled. Shell is apparently continuing to receive payments from Rumania under the 1971 settlement. A Shell spokesman described this as a "continuing process," but refused to reveal the amount involved or to state precisely with whom Shell negotiated five years ago (RFE Special/London, 13 January 1976).

Negotiations between the British and Rumanian governments were resumed in May 1973 and again in November of that year, but on both occasions the talks were adjourned. In June 1974 Rumanian Deputy Foreign Minister Vasile Gliga discussed the matter again with Hattersley, and a seventh round of talks was held in London in April 1975 between Rumanian Deputy Finance Minister Bituleanu and Britain's Paymaster-General Edmund Dell.

It can be assumed that Ceausescu discussed in broad terms the compensation agreement when he met British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in England last June (see Rumanian SR/23, RFER, 20 June 1975; Item 1) and during Wilson's visit to Rumania in September (Rumanian SR/37, RFER, 26 September 1975, Item 7). The Rumanians agreed to the settlement being expressed in sterling, apparently because that currency is at an all-time low on the foreign exchange markets. What will now cost Bucharest 7,100,000 dollars (in four installments) would have cost 9,850,000 in 1960 and 8,800,000 as recently as two years ago -- which may explain in part the long time the Rumanians took to make up their minds.

Frustration, which has built up over the years, partly explains Britain's readiness to accept such a deal; another relevant factor is that disadvantageous compensation deals of this kind concluded between Western countries and their East European debtors and related to nationalized assets are intended to weaken resistance in the parliaments and business circles of the creditors and to open the way for increased trade and co-operation in a climate where the risks appear to have been reduced. Reassurance of this kind is needed at the moment, because there have been many allegations over the past six months from British exporters that the Rumanians have not been paying

their bills on time. In several instances the Rumanian enterprises promised payment within three months, but failed to settle even then. It should be recalled that similar problems arose in Rumania's trade relations with the FRG, resulting in a Rumanian demand for "refinancing" of its debts (see Die Welt, 6 November 1975, and Rumanian SR/48, RFER, 12 December 1975, Item 4).

On January 13 the London stock exchange suspended dealings in seven Rumanian stocks, all issued before 1946, pending clarification of the terms of the settlement (RFE Special/London, 13 January 1976). (041)

3. 1976-1980 Agreements Signed with Soviet Union

Within a period of one month Rumania and the Soviet Union recently signed two economic agreements covering the period of what is now the current five-year plan. The first, signed on 28 November 1975, concerned the co-ordination of socioeconomic development plans in 1976-1980, and the second, signed on 26 December 1975, dealt with goods exchanges and payments in the same period. Although both agreements include projections of goods exchanges, there are significant differences between them. The protocol on the co-ordination of plans states that:

This protocol provides for an increase of reciprocal goods deliveries by some 32 per cent in the coming five-year period compared with the provisions for the years 1971-1975.

The trade agreement provides for goods exchanges worth 5,300 million rubles, which implies that total trade between the two countries in 1976-1980 will amount to 7,000 million rubles, a figure that was confirmed by Soviet Planning Chief Nikolai K. Baibakov in a speech delivered after the signing ceremony (Scinteia, 29 November 1975). This agreement, however, also states that it "provides for an increase of goods exchanges in the coming five-year period by some 70 per cent at current prices over the 1971-1975 period" /emphasis added/, and both Radio Bucharest (27 December 1975) and Radio Moscow in Rumanian (1 January 1976) claimed that total trade during the 1976-1980 period will amount to 9,000 million rubles (70 per cent above the provisions for 1971-1975).

Under the co-ordination agreement Rumania will supply the Soviet Union with oil and petrochemical equipment for the production of chemical fertilizers, as well as ships, equipment for rolling mills, chemical products, consumer goods, etc., and will receive in return products of the machine building industry, and equipment for the electrotechnical, light, food, metallurgical, power, chemical and other industries, "as well as some raw materials." The trade agreement gave additional details on reciprocal deliveries: in addition to the items listed above Rumania will supply the Soviet Union with machine tools, agricultural machinery, rolled goods, chemical industry products, ready-made clothing, footwear, and furniture and other products of the wood processing industry; it will receive in exchange aircraft, metallurgical coke, coking coal, iron ore, ferroalloys, apatite, asbestos, cotton, etc. Thus, the trade agreement goes beyond delivery of "some raw materials" and covers a whole series of important items needed by Rumanian industry.

It is possible that the difference of 2,000 million rubles in the two agreements' estimates is attributable partly to higher (current) prices for raw materials and partly to an increased flow of these materials from the Soviet Union to Rumania. It is reasonable to assume that new contracts for raw materials were concluded in the interval between the signing of the co-ordination protocol at the end of November and the completion of the 1976-1980 trade agreement at the end of December.

Radio Moscow in Rumanian (27 April 1972) claimed that the Soviet Union was then supplying 70 per cent of the quantity of iron ore imported by Rumania, and Sovetskaya Torgovlya said that Soviet exports of iron ore to Rumania in 1973 amounted to 5,801,000 tons, worth 49,131,000 rubles (i.e., they accounted for over 60 per cent of Rumania's iron ore imports in that year) and to 5,699,000 tons, worth 49,340,000 rubles, in 1974. According to the same source, Rumania imported 16,964 tons of copper, worth 21,482,000 rubles, from the Soviet Union in 1973, although the figure was reduced to 9,289 tons (13,209,000 rubles) in 1974. In addition to iron ore and copper the Soviet Union supplied Rumania with the following raw materials in these two years:

Commodity	1973		1974	
	Tons	Rubles	Tons	Rubles
Coking coal	1,332,000	30,706,000	1,175,000	29,142,000
Cotton	30,536	20,360,000	26,784	18,001,000
Asbestos	22,172	3,064,000	21,730	2,938,000
Cast iron	477,617	20,315,000	497,394	21,148,000

Although Rumania's crude oil imports are increasing from year to year, the new trade agreement included no specific provisions for Soviet deliveries of either oil or natural gas. Three years ago Viata Economica (23 February 1973) said that "Rumania will have to import some 6,000,000 tons of crude oil by 1975, and would like most of this to be covered through co-operation with the Soviet Union," but this statement was made prior to the oil crisis in the fall of 1973 and before the 1975 leap in Soviet oil prices. So far as is known, Rumania has in the past imported oil only from the Arab oil producing countries and from Iran. It should be noted that the figure for oil imports in 1974 was already 6,000,000 tons (Ceausescu at the foreign trade conference in February 1975: see Rumanian SR/7, RFER, 21 February 1975, Item 2). Rumania exported to the Soviet Union "oil products and liquid fuel" amounting to 522,000 tons (17,164,000 rubles) in 1973 and to 455,000 tons (15,021,000 rubles) in 1974.

It is also worth mentioning that the proportion of machinery and equipment in total Rumanian-Soviet trade exchanges increased substantially during the last five-year period. According to Radio Moscow (2 January 1976), within Soviet exports to Rumania the percentage rose from 21 in 1970 to 32-33 in 1975, while in Rumanian exports to the Soviet Union it moved up from 20 in 1970 to 26-28 in 1975.

Radio Moscow in Rumanian stated that the volume of trade exchanges in 1971-1975 exceeded the plan provisions by 500 million rubles, and amounted to a total of 5,800 million rubles. Thus the target of 9,000 million rubles set for 1976-1980 represents an increase of only 55 per cent over the figure actually achieved in 1971-1975. This is below the provisions for total foreign trade set by the directives for 1976-1980, which call for an increase of 72-80 per cent over 1971-1975, so it is likely that the Soviet Union's share in Rumania's total foreign trade will continue to fall. It has already gone down from nearly 39 per cent in 1965 to 27 per cent in 1970 and to 21 per cent in 1973; it is assumed to be less than 20 per cent at present.

In comparison with foreign trade between the Soviet Union and the other Comecon countries, however, it seems that Soviet-Rumanian trade exchanges will grow a little faster than the average, something that applies to an even greater extent to Rumania's trade with other Comecon member countries. Radio Moscow in Rumanian (29 November 1975) said that Soviet trade with its Comecon partners will increase by 50 per cent during 1976-1980. (042)

4. Trade Agreements with Bulgaria

On 23 December 1975 Rumania and Bulgaria concluded a trade agreement for the 1976-1980 period and a protocol on goods exchanges in 1976. Both agreements were signed at the conclusion of a session of the joint Governmental Commission for Economic and Technico-Scientific Co-operation.

The five-year trade agreement provides for a two and a half times increase over the provisions for the 1971-1975 plan period, and of two times over its actual outturn, so that the value of total trade exchanges between the two countries is scheduled to amount to 1,000 million rubles in 1976-1980.

According to Radio Sofia (December 24) much of the two countries' trade will consist of mechanical engineering products, automobiles, and deliveries related to the building of the Nikopol-Turnu Magurele hydroelectric complex. Reciprocal trade in chemical and metallurgical products will also increase. The trade and payments protocol for 1976 provides for a 13 per cent rise in goods exchanges over the figure for 1975.

The commission also approved an expansion for joint industrial production in mechanical engineering, the chemical industry, metallurgy, light industry, and other industrial branches. Measures to expand bilateral transport and communications were co-ordinated, and Leonte Rautu, who headed the Rumanian delegation, stated upon his arrival in Sofia that "the two countries will look into the question of a 750 kv long-distance transmission power line running across Rumanian territory." In this connection it should be recalled that two power transmission lines already link Rumania with Bulgaria -- one joining the Rumanian city of Craiova with the Bulgarian town of Boichinovtsi, and another connecting the Moldavian Soviet Republic with Moesia via the Rumanian province of Dobruja.

Although the planned increase of goods exchanges between Rumania and Bulgaria looks impressive, it is -- in both volume and value -- below the general level of the trade agreements reached between Rumania and the other Comecon countries, because the growth it envisages has a low starting point. In 1973, commerce with Bulgaria represented less than 2 per cent of Rumania's total foreign trade, as against 6.8 per cent with the GDR, 5.8 with Czechoslovakia, 4.2 with Poland, 2.7 with Hungary, and 21.0 with the Soviet Union.

Under the agreements concluded by Rumania with its Comecon partners, trade turnover in 1976-1980 is scheduled to amount to 9,000 million rubles with the Soviet Union and to 2,300 million rubles with Poland; with the FRG it is due to grow by a factor of 2 over the provisions, and of 1.6 over the outturn, for 1971-1975; it is expected to double with Hungary; and according to a provisional accord reached during Czechoslovak Premier Lubomir Strougal's visit to Bucharest in September 1975, Rumanian-Czechoslovak trade exchanges will increase by 50 per cent (see Rumanian SR/35, RFER, 11 September 1975, Item 11a). (043)

5. Kuwaiti Parliament Ratifies Trade Agreement with Rumania

A Rumanian economic delegation headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade and International Economic Co-operation Constantin Stanciu recently held talks in Kuwait with Minister of Commerce and Industry al-Nafisi, Minister of Foreign Affairs al-Sabah, and Minister of Communications Zayd, in an effort to expand and diversify the trade relations and co-operation between the two countries (Scinteia, 13 January 1976).

At about the same time the Kuwaiti National Assembly ratified a trade agreement with Rumania which "will create the necessary conditions for developing trade and diversifying and intensifying co-operation on many levels" (Radio Bucharest, January 13). This agreement, and one on economic and technological co-operation, were signed in Bucharest on 31 July 1974, during an official visit to Rumania by Kuwait's former Minister of Commerce and Industry, Khalid al-Adasani. The Kuwaiti National Assembly delayed ratification, however, in response to strong opposition on the part of some deputies who objected to Rumania's close ties with Israel (Reuter, 12 November 1975; see also Rumanian SR/44, RFER, 13 November 1975, Item 2). The Radio Bucharest broadcast referred to above did not specifically mention the agreement on economic and technological co-operation, but a January 13 Reuter dispatch noted that "the Kuwaiti National Assembly today approved an economic agreement with Rumania whose aim is to expand economic co-operation and trade, and which provides for the establishment of joint ventures."

Party and state leader Ceausescu was scheduled to go to Kuwait in November 1975 but the visit has not yet taken place, presumably owing to the parliament's failure to ratify the economic agreements. It has yet to be learned whether the visit will now be rescheduled.

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Rumania is interested in obtaining crude oil from Kuwait, either on a credit basis or in return for deliveries of Rumanian industrial products. It is unlikely that the latter form of exchange will be followed, however, since the Kuwaiti Minister of Oil said in July 1975 that his government "would not accept a Rumanian offer to supply Kuwait with consumer goods in return for more favorable conditions for the purchase of crude oil" (see Rumanian SR/32, RFER, 21 August 1975, Item 6b). In this connection, it is of some interest that the Vienna daily Die Presse (3 September 1975) reported that Kuwait would help to finance the construction of a petrochemical plant in Rumania (which is to cost 1,000 million dollars), and that the International Investment Company of Kuwait had granted a 60,000,000 credit to Rumania's Foreign Trade Bank (see Rumanian SR/34, RFER, 5 September 1975, Item 4c). (044)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

6. Sihanouk Supports Observer Status for Rumania at Nonaligned Summit

The Cambodian head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, arrived in Bucharest from Albania on December 11 for one of the official visits that have become a matter of routine in recent years -- he was there in June 1972, June 1973, and August 1974.

One probable purpose of these visits is to secure aid and diplomatic support from Rumania. Though Rumanian media have never specifically defined such aid, Radio Bucharest (2 May 1974) did say that "Rumania will continue granting material aid to Cambodia." In the communiqué on the present visit the Cambodians expressed "sincere thanks for the political, diplomatic, and material support granted to the Cambodian people in their struggle against imperialist intervention" -- another indication of Rumania's continued support of Sihanouk.

By and large the communiqué was routine. With regard to bilateral relations, "the two heads of state agreed that the appropriate agencies in the two countries would study ways and means of developing and diversifying relations in the political, economic, technological, scientific, and cultural domains, and of providing a suitable juridical framework." After praising the activity of the Cambodian embassy in Bucharest, the communiqué reported that it had been agreed that Rumania would open an embassy in Phnompenh in the near future.

The usual international questions were dealt with -- the need to arrive at peaceful settlement of disputes, eliminate underdevelopment, establish a new economic order, promote disarmament, halt the arms race, impose a ban on the production and use of nuclear weapons, strengthen the UN, etc.

The Cambodian statement on Rumania's request that it be granted "observer status" at the nonaligned conference planned

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for this year in Colombo is worthy of note. According to the communiqué, Cambodia welcomed Rumanian's participation in last August's nonaligned conference in Lima where it was only a "guest," and will support the RSR's request to be granted observer status at the Colombo summit. Niger's Foreign Minister Adamou Djermakoye, who visited Bucharest in mid-November 1974, also expressed support for Rumania's request for observer status at the Colombo conference.)

Sihanouk left Bucharest for Belgrade, the next stop on his European tour, on December 13. This was his first visit to Bucharest as Cambodia's head of state. (045)

TRANSPORTATION

7. New Rumanian Airline Established and Route Coverage Extended

The Rumanian press of December 16 reported that the existing Rumanian state airline (TAROM) has been joined by a new one: IAR (Rumanian Airlines). According to the press the establishment of a second airline was decided on as the best way of dealing with the growing problem of providing efficient internal and international air services; traffic is expected to increase by 50 per cent in the current five-year plan period (1976-1980), and 80-seat BAC-111s with a cruising speed of 850 kph are being assigned to international flights, the first of which -- from Otopeni Airport to Frankfurt -- took place on December 15. Radio Bucharest said that the new airline will also carry out charter flights.

The real reason for the setting up of IAR is probably to be found in the numerous complaints about delays and obsolete aircraft that resulted from TAROM's handling of the West German tourist traffic to the Black Sea coast in recent summers. In September 1975, NUR one of the largest West German travel agencies, threatened to boycott Rumania next year because of TAROM's inefficiency, and the FRG media gave the general dissatisfaction lots of publicity. Die Zeit (October 23) said that delays of up to 18 hours had occurred in TAROM schedules and Der Spiegel (November 24) said that NUR had reduced the volume of its 1976 Rumanian program from 45,000 to 15,000 tourists. The convertible currency brought in by Western tourists (particularly the West Germans) represents a significant element in Rumania's foreign trade with the West and the Rumanians were apparently afraid of losing this important source of hard currency.

TAROM officially inaugurated its weekly Bucharest-Damascus-Kuwait service on December 18; Boeing 707s and BAC 111s are being used on the run. The number of Arab capitals with direct air links to Rumania has thus grown to seven; Cario, Beirut, Algiers, Amman, and Tripoli are already served by TAROM. The extension of the airline's coverage of the Arab world shows that it cannot have been black-listed by the Arab League Boycott Committee (see Rumanian SR/34, 5 September 1975, Item 4a).

The official inauguration of the new air route in Damascus was attended from the Rumanian side by Major-General Aureal Raican, head of civil aviation, and Emilian Manciu, the Rumanian Ambassador in Damascus; while the Syrians were represented by Numan al-Zayn, Minister of Transport, the Governor of Damascus, a deputy minister of foreign affairs, and the director-general of the Syrian-Arab Airline. Personalities from Kuwait and from several other Persian Gulf states also attended the inauguration, and were invited to pay an official visit to Rumania to mark the occasion of the inauguration there (Scinteia, 19 and 20 December 1975).

A Syrian delegation headed by al-Zayn and one from Kuwait led by the chairman of the Kuwaiti Tourist Organization accepted the invitation and were received by Ceausescu on December 23. They also met with Army General Ion Ionita, the Minister of National Defense, and with George Macovescu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Scinteia, 24 and 25 December 1975). At all these meetings the good relations prevailing among the countries concerned and the importance of the new route in intensifying contacts in various fields of activity were stressed. (046)

8. 1976 Plan Provisions on the Development of Transportation

The law on the state plan for 1976 recently adopted by the Grand National Assembly foresees the investment of 14,700 million lei in the development of transportation and telecommunications (see Scinteia, 21 December 1975). The law directs the sector to increase the number of transportation vehicles and improve the road network.

Some 137 diesel or electric locomotives are to be allocated to the rail system. This represents almost 45 per cent of the output of these types of locomotive. The railroads will also receive 5,000 freight cars and 320 passenger cars.

Highway transportation will see an increase of 6,900 trucks, 1,500 trailers, and 2,240 buses, and marine transport will also increase considerably with the merchant fleet being augmented by ships totaling 289,000 DWT. The most important acquisition will be the 150,000-DWT oil tanker Independenta, whose construction has already begun in the Rumanian shipyards in Constanta. The ship is scheduled to be launched in May 1977 on the 100th anniversary of Rumania's independence (Romania Libera, 30 December 1975).

The plan also provides for three new medium-range aircraft for civil aviation.

Still other provisions of the law on the 1976 plan call for improving the road network -- 286 km. of heavily traveled roads are to be modernized, and 1,130 km. of less heavily used roads will be given a light asphalt surface. Some measures recently adopted by the Grand National Assembly show concern for improving the road network. At the end of last year two laws were approved, the first dealing with thoroughfares in cities and communes (see Rumanian

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SR/46, 28 November 1975, Item 5) and the second on the general conditions of roads (see Scinteia, 23 December 1975).

The modernization of transport facilities envisaged in the 1976 plan, as well as in the 1976-1980 plan, is necessary owing to the increasing demands that will be placed upon them. For example, in the last five-year period, according to Agerpres (15 January 1976), the volume of goods transported by rail increased by some 33.5 per cent, and passenger transport by some 25.2 per cent. Road transport over the same period registered increases of 79.2 per cent for goods and 139.5 per cent for passengers, while the river fleet carried 79.4 per cent more goods and the maritime fleet some 45.5 per cent more. During the 1976-1980 period it is planned that in tons per kilometer the volume of domestic goods transport will increase by some 30 to 32 per cent, with passenger transport rising at a corresponding rate. As a result of the modernization to be carried out by 1980 some 40 per cent of the railroad lines will be electrified and all buses and trucks will be equipped with diesel engines. River and maritime transport should increase from 80 to 250 per cent. On December 26, the party's Political Executive Committee approved proposals for the expansion of Danube and maritime transportation (Scinteia, 27 December 1975).

According to the law on the 1976 state plan the main consideration in improving the transportation system is to optimize the connection between the production and consumption centers (Scinteia, 21 December 1975). The discussion in the Grand National Assembly when the road law was adopted disclosed a number of shortcomings in this field, and it was stated that some buildings would have to be pulled down and some agricultural land would have to be taken over in order to modernize existing roads and build new ones. Other shortcomings had to do with such things as curves on which visibility was inadequate. Local organs had made mistakes in planning and building roads, and in order to avoid similar mistakes in the future measures were taken to centralize approval of the more important undertakings (Scinteia, 23 December 1975).

Radio Prague (25 December 1975) stated that at a recent meeting of the Comecon Commission on Transportation it had been made clear that most roads in the Comecon states do not meet the demands of modern transportation and that about 5,500 km. of roads are in need of reconstruction. A recommendation on the construction of four international express highways was adopted at the meeting, one of which would cross Rumania, linking Rostok, Berlin, Prague, Budapest, and Constanta. The current session of the Comecon Executive Committee also discussed a more efficient international transport system, but the Rumanian press has not yet published any reports on this Comecon program. (047)

- End -

CORRECTION to Rumanian SR/1, RFER, 15 January 1976:

Page 8, first paragraph below table, last two lines:

Please change to read: "vested in 1972) amounted to 5,581,000 tons, it seems unlikely that the 1975 figure was nearly 7,000,000 tons" [deleting the word "higher"].



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• RAD Background Report/18
(Eastern Europe)
20 January 1976

SOVIET CRUDE OIL PRICE TO COMECON MAY BE A THIRD HIGHER
IN 1977

By Harry G. Trend

Summary: The nominal price for Soviet crude oil deliveries to Comecon members may rise by a third in 1977, compared with an 8 per cent increase in 1976. In 1978, the price difference between world and intra-Comecon prices for oil should largely be wiped out, assuming no wide price swings of world oil prices during 1976 and 1977, and no abandonment of the present price formula for political or other reasons. The changes in Comecon prices are due to the adoption of a new price formula which provides greater price flexibility on an annual basis. The real Comecon price charged Comecon members cannot readily be determined without information concerning counter-deliveries made as payment for the Soviet oil and their prices.

* * *

The nominal price for the crude oil delivered to Comecon members by the Soviet Union could increase by about a third next year (1977), in contrast to an 8 per cent increase in 1976. This will happen if the new method of Comecon pricing continues to be observed. In February 1975, Polish Premier Jaroszewicz described this method as follows:

We [Comecon members] have agreed that prices in dealings among the Comecon countries will be fixed annually, on the basis of the average world prices for the period of the preceding five years. (1)

(1) Trybuna Ludu, 8-9 February 1975.

The Hungarian party daily, Nepszabadsag, announced on January 14 that Hungary will be paying 39.95 rubles per metric ton c.i.f. the Hungarian border (52.57 dollars) this year, instead of the 37 rubles (48.68 dollars) paid for Soviet oil during 1975. The 1976 price change represents an 8 per cent increase over that charged the year before. The price change is caused by the implementation of the second phase of the modification of the intra-Comecon price determination method, the so-called "Bucharest" pricing policy (named after the ninth Comecon session held there in June 1958, at which the system of price determination was adopted).

Short Review of Price Formula Changes

Following the Bucharest decision in 1958, the Comecon partners based their intrabloc trade prices on a five-year average of world prices for specific commodities. Before arriving at a specific average, the "historical" or past world prices were cleansed of certain agreed upon aberrations. The purpose of this process was to exclude "monopoly," "speculative," "circumstantial," and "atypical" effects from the world prices of the five-year period being used.

A freight charge is then added to the five-year average of world prices which had been cleansed of the undesirable aberrations. The freight charge is not a true transportation cost figure; rather, it is set at a sum equal to one half of what would have been the freight cost had the commodity exchanged been transported from an agreed upon port of origin located in the country of a nonsocialist alternate supplier of the commodity in question.

In practice, once the price, which included the "phantom" freight charge, had been established, it became effective for an entire five-year plan period. Because of this feature, economic literature in the East European countries refers to the intra-Comecon trade prices as "fixed" or "stop" prices.

A set of prices was determined anew for each five-year plan period, thereby providing stable prices for quinquennia. When world prices went through wide swings, however, the "fixed" Comecon prices would deviate significantly from world levels, a process causing some Comecon partners to become dissatisfied with the level of their intrabloc trade prices.

When, in 1974, world prices of raw materials rose in multiples of the previous year's levels, the chief raw material supplier for Comecon, the Soviet Union, gave notice that it wished to change the basis for determining intra-Comecon prices one year before the end of the five-year period (1971-1975), in order to take into account the large jump in world prices. The Soviet Union argued that the Bucharest formula permitted such a change whenever any member served notice on its partners of its dissatisfaction with the existing situation and called for new negotiations.

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As a result of the negotiations, Comecon members agreed to modify the Bucharest formula in the direction of providing a greater degree of price flexibility. Comecon prices would therefore be changed annually, rather than every five years, as had been the practice earlier. This decision was taken at the 70th session of the Comecon Executive Committee held in Moscow, 21-23 January 1975, and called for a two-phase implementation of the new price policy. Higher prices were introduced as of 1 January 1975, and the second phase was to take place at the beginning of the following year.

For one year only (1975), Comecon prices were to be based on the average of the preceding three years (1972-1974), and changes in intra-Comecon prices were to apply to a limited number of traded commodities. Beginning with 1976, the annually adjusted fixed-price system, based on world prices of the preceding five years, became effective for most of the goods traded among Comecon members.

X In the case of Soviet crude oil deliveries, the 1975 price was set at a level about 130 per cent above that charged during 1971-1974. The selection of the three-year (1972-1974) instead of a five-year (1970-1974) period for determining 1975 oil prices accounted for over one third of the 130 per cent increase in oil prices between 1974 and 1975. Not only would the 1975 price have been lower had the 1970-1974 period been selected, but a part of 1974-1975 price jump would also have been postponed until 1976. Thus the use of the three-year average had the effect of accelerating the process of narrowing the differences existing between Comecon and world prices, and brought additional revenues to the Soviet Union one year earlier.

Projecting Oil Prices for 1977

Since world oil prices move more or less in step, the export prices of any major crude petroleum supplier can be used as a guide for making projections of future Comecon oil price changes. Similar price extrapolations can also be made for other traded commodities, particularly for those goods whose differences in quality do not vary over too wide a range from year to year.

In the case of crude petroleum, the Kuwaiti crude oil prices could serve this purpose.

Table 1
Average Prices for Kuwaiti Crude Oil, (a) 1970-1976

Year	Average Price (Dollars per Barrel)	Average Price (Dollars per Metric ton (b) ^	Multi-Year Period	Multi-year Average (Dollars per Metric Ton (b))
1970	1.60	11.62		
1971	2.09	15.17		
1972	2.36	17.13		
1973	3.14	22.80	1970-1974	30.01
1974	11.48	83.34	1972-1974	41.09
1975	11.14	80.88	1971-1975	43.86
(Jan.-Sept.) 1976 (Estimate)	12.26 (c)	89.01	1972-1975	58.63
<p><u>Notes:</u> a. A.P.I. specific gravity of 31-31.90; export price f.o.b. Mena al Ahmadi. b. 7.26 barrels per metric ton. c. Includes the announced 10 per cent OPEC price increase scheduled for 1976.</p>				
<p><u>Source:</u> <u>UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics</u>, December 1975, p. 169.</p>				

The 1972-1974 average for Kuwaiti is about 37 per cent higher than for the 1970-1974 five-year period, suggesting that the Soviet Union gained more than a third by favoring the one-time selection of a three-year average, instead of a five-year period, when determining 1975 Comecon oil prices. The 1971-1975 average for Kuwaiti oil is almost 7 per cent higher than the 1972-1974 average, compared with the 8 per cent actual Comecon increase reported for 1976 by Reuter. The difference in price average between the 1972-1976 period which would be used for determining Comecon prices for 1977 and 1971-1975 (the 1976 price base) should be in the neighborhood of 34 per cent, assuming no more than the 10 per cent increase in world oil prices already announced by OPEC for 1976. Thus, the 1977 price for Soviet oil should be around 53 rubles (about 69.75 dollars). Even this higher Comecon price level would still be below the projected world level for 1977.

Under the revised Bucharest price formula adopted in 1975, Comecon oil prices should increase again in 1978 and for this year the difference in Comecon and world prices should be reduced to a relatively narrow range.

Some deviation between the projected and Comecon calculated prices can be expected. Differences may be due to the so-called "cleansing" of world prices of "monopoly" and other undesirable influences, as well as variations in "phantom" freight costs which are not included in the Kuwaiti posted prices, and to deviations caused by any future OPEC-instigated or other changes in world oil prices beyond the announced 10 per cent OPEC increase.

In any case, the nominal price charged Comecon members for Soviet crude oil should lag below world prices as long as world oil prices continue to rise for the period during which the moving five-year average world price method is employed to determine Comecon prices. Furthermore, under this system for determining prices, once world prices tend to fall Comecon prices could begin to surpass world prices.

Should the economic burden of higher Soviet oil prices become unacceptable at any time for political or other reasons, new changes in the Comecon price policy could, of course, be instigated.

Up to now, this discussion has only been about nominal prices. One may wonder how the actual Comecon oil price compares with the current world level. Such comparisons have been made in Eastern Europe and in nonsocialist countries, frequently providing an erroneous basis for conclusions.

Comparison of Comecon and Current World Prices

Before any valid comparison can be made, adjustments in the nominal Comecon price have to be instituted, and several foreign trade factors have to be taken into consideration.

More frequently in recent times than in the past, the Soviet Union has asked its Comecon partners to make significant investments in the development of Soviet raw materials. Since the adoption of Comecon's Comprehensive Program for Economic Cooperation and Integration in 1971, the Comecon partners of the USSR have promised to invest between 9,000 and 10,000 million rubles in the development of Soviet basic raw materials. The credit terms, as well as the valuation of the investment resources, should be taken into consideration when adjustments in the nominal price are being made. Frequently in the past, easy terms have been granted on long-term investments. To the extent that these terms are more favorable to the debtor than is the case under world practice, the added economic burden represented by such investment subsidies should be included as part of the cost to East European importers of Soviet crude oil.


A more significant factor which needs to be considered is the well-known Comecon trade practice that calls for payment in kind (barter) for traded goods at prices determined in the same manner as those of raw materials (i.e., by using the moving

five-year average of world prices). Since the world prices of products exported to the Soviet Union as payment for crude oil have also risen, the oil importers are receiving below world prices for their products. This difference has to be added to the nominal price paid for Soviet oil, because the East European countries have to ship larger quantities of commodities than if they paid for oil in convertible currencies. Should the opposite become the case, then the Soviet Union would be subsidizing raw material deliveries to Comecon members to the extent that intra-Comecon prices for counterdeliveries are above world levels.

Information concerning the exact types of goods and the quantities of each exported to pay for the Soviet oil, as well as their prices, is unknown outside East European official circles, and it is very difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at the actual price paid by East European countries for Soviet-delivered crude petroleum without this important information. The same applies to virtually all commodities exchanged among members of Comecon. (048)

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RFD Background Paper/20
(Yugoslavia)
20 January 1976

FORMER "PRAXIS" EDITOR HOPES FOR RESUMPTION OF PUBLICATION (A translation with comment by Slobodan Stankovic)

Summary: The 3 January 1976 issue of the Lisbon paper Expresso contained an interview with Professor Rudi Supek, former editor-in-chief of the Yugoslav philosophical bimonthly Praxis, which was banned in February 1975 for having criticized party practices too strongly. Supek expressed the hope that the journal's situation would be "clarified shortly," since the conflict between it and the party is "circumstantial" rather than "ideological." There are two main ideological currents in Yugoslavia, he said -- one "Marxist" and the other "Soviet" -- and the party has been attacking Praxis despite the fact that he and his colleagues are advocates of the Marxist current, which is the official Yugoslav line, and have been described by the Russians as "the best propagandists for the Yugoslav model" of socialism.

* * *

The current Yugoslav-Soviet conflict over the convocation of an international communist conference and Moscow's ideological monopoly within the world communist movement has encouraged the anti-Stalinist professors connected with the banned philosophical bimonthly Praxis to hope that the journal may be allowed to resume publication. Professor Rudi Supek, the former editor-in-chief of Praxis who was replaced in 1974 for having criticized Stalinist practices in the Yugoslav party, stated in an interview with the Lisbon paper Expresso (3 January 1976), that "the conflict between the party and the Praxis group is circumstantial rather than ideological."

In answer to a question as to whether "outside Soviet pressure" was to be blamed for their conflict with the party, he answered,

"Certainly. I do not want to go into detail, but I think the situation will be clarified shortly." Asked whether the Praxis staff had been allowed to defend their anti-Stalinist position publicly, he said that although their periodical had been banned in February 1975 and they are not allowed to write for other journals or to take part in public conferences, "some of us still hold positions as professors and can tell students what we think," and "we can still make ourselves heard through certain professional channels."

The Marxist Current vs. the Soviet Current

Asked whether ideological trends other than the Marxist current advocated by Praxis were to be found in Yugoslavia, Supek answered:

There is a Soviet current, a dogmatic one /whose proponents have/ never been subjected to persecution. We have never been interested in persecuting them, but have always sought public discussion. This current was publicly routed at a conference in Slovenia and since then its adherents have been reluctant to face us, but they have a magazine called Dialektika which is their medium of expression. One very well-known advocate of socialist realism in art has always expressed himself and exercised public influence. In the Soviet Union, a magazine founded last year publishes articles by Yugoslav Marxists who follow the dogmatic line, presenting them as "true Marxists" while it talks of "Praxis revisionists" and levels accusations against them. The freedom dogmatic Marxists enjoy in Yugoslavia is not matched, so far as we are concerned, by freedom in the Soviet Union, where we are not published.

Professor Supek repeated the well-known thesis that the only answer to Stalinism is self-management socialism -- a conclusion to which the Yugoslav leaders came after their conflict with Stalin in 1948. Praxis had always resolutely defended self-management, he said, and no one could say it had been against the "official ideology." The conflict between it and the party was not ideological but bureaucratic; the party would like to control all "social forces," but the Praxis group "had not let itself be controlled." Supek then went on to say:

To explain this more clearly I must go back to the concepts of the Soviet regime, for which there are two kinds of "revisionism." This is an official position that has recently been strongly reinforced in the Soviet Union and in all the countries of the Soviet bloc, as was exemplified by a recent Pravda article which called upon philosophers to "intensify the ideological struggle."

What are these two types of "revisionism?" One is to be found on the Left -- i.e., Maoism, which accepts Stalinism in its most orthodox and traditional form. The other is to be found on the Right, and is represented by most Western Marxists.

Here Professor Supek mentioned an article in Neue Deutsche Philosophie (East Berlin) in which the East German philosopher Alfred Kosing listed the philosophers he considered to be "rightist revisionists." They included Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Henri Lefebvre, Lucien Goldmann, Leszek Kolakowski, Franz Marek, Ernst Fischer, Gyorgy Lukacs, and their disciples, and Roger Garaudy. Commenting on the list Supek said the case of Garaudy was "very typical":

Garaudy used to be the spokesman for Soviet dogmatism not only in Europe but also in the Soviet Union, since he had written his first doctoral thesis in Moscow. What happened to him? He followed Lenin's advice, began to study Hegel, and later came to the conclusion that his concept was a mistaken one.. He then wrote a counter-thesis which he presented at the Sorbonne in Paris. Hence he was prompted to accept the political implications inherent in rejecting state centralism.

"Praxis" Ideas Proven Correct

Professor Supek said that Kosing had included "the entire Praxis group" on his list of "Western revisionists," accusing them of "criticizing Soviet socialism on the socialist level as an etatistic and bureaucratic distortion at variance with the thinking of Marx and Engels." Supek was especially proud that Kosing had accused the Praxis group of advocating "a humanist, democratic, and self-managing socialism." Such a stand, he said, in fact "corresponds to Yugoslavia's official position." The Russians have been claiming that the members of the Praxis staff "are the best propagandists for the Yugoslav model" of socialism, he went on, yet the Yugoslav party "is attacking us." The reasons for this in his opinion, "are to be found in the twists and turns of both domestic and foreign policy."

These accusations against the party had already been countered in March 1975, when Josip Vrhovec, a Croatian party leader and member of the party Presidium, said the Praxis people "were in favor of self-management without a party, for self-management without a market," and that "to them every intervention by the party is an action designed to disrupt the democratic process in socialist society and to reduce self-management to an unrealistic social category." (1) Vrhovec was particularly angered at the

(1) Vjesnik (Zagreb), 23-24 March 1975.

Praxis claim that the LCY's policy was "a form of anti-Stalinist Stalinism," a claim that had won them the applause of "the so-called New Left" in Western countries.

What does Praxis actually stand for? In an open letter to the Serbian National Assembly dated 29 January 1975, the ousted eight Belgrade professors (all contributors to Praxis) complained that "the influence of the ideologists of Stalinist dogmatism, who have been waiting for their moment of revenge, continues to grow," (2) and approximately a month after Praxis was banned its editorial board sent a letter to its subscribers and contributors which contained the following passage:

We should like once again to emphasize that the members of the Praxis editorial board have always stood -- and still stand -- for the principles of a critical and open Marxism and a humanist and self-managing socialism; they clearly proclaimed such goals in the first issue of their periodical, and for 10 years they have tried to defend and develop them in all their consequences. (3)

Do Professor Rudi Supek and his colleagues really believe that Praxis will be permitted to resume publication? If so, they probably base this belief on the fact that some formulations in the Yugoslav polemics with the Russians and their allies concerning the "ideological monopoly" within the world communist movement are similar to those of individual Praxis contributors. But whether this augurs rehabilitation for the whole Praxis group will, to quote Supek, be "clarified shortly." (050)

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(2) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 January 1975.

(3) The mimeographed letter was dated 24 March 1975.

RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*



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RAD Background Report/17
(East-West)
19 January 1976

KREISKY VISIT A SIGN OF CZECHOSLOVAK-AUSTRIAN RECONCILIATION

By Thomas E. Heneghan

Summary: Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky's recently announced visit to Prague in February will mark the end of 20 years of testy relations between Czechoslovakia and Austria. This paper illustrates some of the ups and downs of the 19 years of squabbling and the reconciliation which has taken place since the establishment of full diplomatic relations just over one year ago. Possible reasons for the long delay in normalizing relations are examined from each country's point of view.

* * *

Bruno Kreisky's upcoming visit to Prague will mark the end of 20 years of disappointing relations between Czechoslovakia and Austria. As was announced yesterday, the Austrian chancellor will travel to Prague on 16 February for a two-day stay. Although three Austrian chancellors visited Czechoslovakia in the time of both countries' first republics -- Renner in 1920, Schober in 1921, and Schuschnigg in 1936 -- the Kreisky visit will be the first since the Second World War. For Kreisky and CPCS leader Gustav Husak, both of whom have recently sought better relations with their neighbors, the trip is also an important element of their respective foreign policies.

The Shifting Currents of Reconciliation

The visit will come as the latest achievement in the rapid improvement of Czechoslovak-Austrian relations which began one year ago. On 19 December 1974, during Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek's visit to Vienna, the two countries signed an agreement whereby Czechoslovakia would pay Austria 1,200 million schillings as compensation for the property of Austrian nationals confiscated by the Czechoslovak government after World War II. The confiscation, which was carried out prior to the February 1948 coup and applied to the property of all German-speaking persons (even including citizens of Switzerland and Liechtenstein), involved an estimated 12,000 million schillings of Austrian property.

As late as September 1974, the Czechoslovak negotiators were offering to pay 500 million schillings compensation, which Vienna found unacceptably low. Considering that Prague agreed to pay more than twice its September offer and Vienna accepted this still somewhat disappointing sum, this was an important compromise which indicated the strong desire both sides felt for better neighborly relations.

The relatively unproblematic way in which Prague and Vienna have developed over the past years stands in contrast to the painfully delicate nature of their bilateral relations before the compensation agreement. The fate of this agreement, which Vienna made the sine qua non of full diplomatic ties, was subordinate to the erratic course of Czechoslovak-Austrian relations, and was often the best barometer of the atmosphere between the two capitals. The talks, which began in 1956, were often strained or interrupted by events or statements only tangentially related to the actual question at hand.

During the Prague Spring, all indicators seemed to point to a solution of the compensation problem. On June 21, the foreign ministers of the two countries met for the first such visit in 30 years. The Soviet invasion put an end to these discussions, however, and relations cooled as Prague accused Vienna of an anti-Czechoslovak propaganda campaign because of some critical articles appearing in the Austrian press (Radio Prague, 19 October 1969).

Negotiations were resumed for five days in April 1971, and were to be continued in June (UPI, 19 April 1971). But the Czechoslovaks took exception to an article about the zigzag course of Husak's policies which appeared in the Austrian Socialist Party daily Arbeiterzeitung and postponed the talks indefinitely. Bilateral meetings were resumed in December 1971, but were soon cut off after a border incident in May 1972. Only a year later, after Austrian Foreign Minister Rudolf Kirchschlaeger had met his Czechoslovak colleague in Bratislava, could compensation negotiations finally start again at the delegation level.

Kirchschlaeger and Chnoupek had a second meeting in Linz in June 1973, but whatever momentum these talks produced was stilled by another border dispute. In July of that year, an Austrian civilian plane strayed into Czechoslovak air space and was apparently downed by Czechoslovak interceptors; both pilot and passenger died in the crash. Early in September, a similar incident occurred, again with two Austrian deaths resulting. After protests and charges from both sides, Vienna recalled its envoy to Prague and relations descended to their worst point since the war.

An Important Breakthrough

Surprisingly, the freeze thawed rapidly enough to allow two important agreements to be signed in December 1973. The agreement establishing a joint commission to deal with border incidents had been initialed back in May of that year, while the second agreement, which concerned minor adjustments in the Czechoslovak-Austrian border, had been initialed on 23 June 1972 after 10 years of negotiation (see Keesing Archiv der Gegenwart, 1973). Presumably, the two border incidents mentioned above hindered the final signing of these agreements. Relations then evolved relatively quietly until the compensation agreement was signed in December 1974.

As is often the case in East-West trade, business came before politics in trade relations between the two countries. A long-term trade agreement was signed in 1959, and bilateral trade the next year amounted to 466 million Kcs. By 1970, the value of trade was 1,279 million Kcs, and it reached 1,458 million Kcs in 1972. The next year, trade jumped to 1,745 million Kcs, and 1974 registered a sharp increase to 2,621 million Kcs (see Statisticka Rocenka CSSR 1975). A number of trade deals were concluded in 1975, and, as of January 1976, Czechoslovakia enjoys fully liberalized trade with Austria according to GATT principles (Die Presse, 11 November 1975).

Why Did it Take SO Long?

Even more elusive than the oscillations in Czechoslovak-Austria relations are the reasons which may have guided them. After observing the numerous hopes and false starts, one wonders just why it took so long for the two countries to normalize their neighborly relations.

"No normalization without compensation" was the motto of Austria's Ostpolitik and Vienna's one nonnegotiable demand. Working from this point of departure, Austria was able to negotiate compensation agreements with Bulgaria in 1964, Rumania in 1965, Hungary in 1967, and Poland in 1970. In Czechoslovakia, however, the value of confiscated Austrian property was considerably higher than in the other countries, a factor which presumably made Prague more reluctant to pay a high sum and put pressure on Vienna to attain one. Despite the difficulties, Chancellor Bruno Kreisky refused to alter Austria's foremost demand.

The reasons for Czechoslovakia's fickle stance are less obvious. Although one cannot know for certain, it would seem that the specter of 90,000 Austrian compensation applications was enough to persuade Prague that the most advantageous strategy was to stall until the passing of time brought the problem into a more manageable dimension. This could not explain it all, however, because there seems to be a political element in Czechoslovakia's stand which runs deeper than simple defamation.


One element which seems common to most Czechoslovak denunciations of Austria is the explicit or implicit disbelief in Austria's neutrality. While the arguments have existed in simple or subtle form since the postwar re-emergence of the Austrian state, they were perhaps best expressed in an article that appeared in the CPCSSR ideological and political weekly Tribuna on 3 October 1973 when relations were at their worst. Entitled "Austria: 'A New Barrier' in Central Europe?" (for a translation, see Czechoslovak Press Survey No. 2507, Radio Free Europe Research, 18 October 1973), the article states that "not only tourists, but also diplomats and soldiers of the NATO states and members of their intelligence services show an unprecedented interest in this country which borders directly on countries of the socialist camp." The country occupies a "vassal-like position . . . vis-à-vis the Common Market" and "foreign monopolies and foreign capital are steadily penetrating the Austrian economy." Furthermore, Austrian terrain is "suitable for military operations involving swift movements," a fact, the article emphasizes, evident to Napoleon and Hitler and not lost to the strategists in NATO.

It may seem odd that Prague harped on these arguments at a time when East-West tensions had eased considerably and Vienna had lost much of its "Third Man" character. Of course, Czechoslovak leaders never fail to remind the people that "the capitalist world begins at our western frontiers" (Gustav Husak, Ceteka, 19 August 1969). But it also seems that some of these accusations of military animosity deal more with the ideological challenge the neighboring state presents than with the actual strategic situation between the two countries. Since the crushing of the Prague Spring, the danger of ideological "subversion" from within has been a special target of the Prague leadership, and party hardliners may possibly have seen the border incidents and critical articles as Austrian or foreign support for reformists. Since Austrian radio and television can be received in Czechoslovakia, the question of the content of Austrian broadcasts is often mentioned by the Czechoslovaks and a broadcast such as the 1974 television interview with former Czechoslovak General Jan Sejna, who told of Warsaw Pact contingency plans to occupy Austria, can be grounds for serious bilateral problems. Interestingly, even a recent article in which Rude Pravo (3 December 1975) praised the "solid development of relations with Austria," strongly emphasized the "great responsibility" of the media.

But, regardless of whether the Czechoslovak-Austrian reconciliation has been motivated by the need for greater trade with the West or represents a defeat for hardline xenophobia, the visit will have more than local significance. The year just past has witnessed a concerted drive in Czechoslovak diplomacy to overcome the international isolation which has surrounded Prague since the 1968 invasion. Since at least 1973, when Willy Brandt, Harold Wilson, and US Secretary of State William Rogers visited Prague, many Western countries have been willing to resume a certain level of regular contacts with Czechoslovakia. After a period of restless uncertainty, the Prague leadership now seems determined to make the best of the offer.

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RAD Background Report/16
(Eastern Europe)
16 January 1976



WEAKENING OF REAL INCOME AND WAGE GROWTH RATES

IN EASTERN EUROPE

By Harry Trend

Summary: Preliminary plan fulfillment reports for 1975 and the 1976-1980 plans indicate a deceleration of the growth rates for per capita real income and average real wages in East European countries. In large part these tendencies are attributable to the higher prices paid for Soviet raw materials, which require larger counterdeliveries by Comecon members; to the fact that a number of members have reached the upper limits of foreign credits; to sales difficulties encountered in nonsocialist developed countries and higher prices for imports from Western countries; to the need for time to digest a large volume of investments; and to the poor agricultural harvests experienced across the board.

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A general trend pointing to a definite slowing down of the growth rate of per capita real income and average real wages in Eastern Europe is indicated by the preliminary information concerning the 1975 plan fulfillment and the newly released 1976 targets (Table A).

During the last five year-plan period, most of the countries reached a peak in growth rates in 1973 or 1974, and then a slackening in improvement set in, which is to continue into 1976; the exception to this trend is to be found in the 1976 plan for Czechoslovakia.

In part, the general deterioration can be attributed to the need after 1974 to pay higher prices for raw material imports, particularly for deliveries by the Soviet Union; difficulties encountered in expanding exports to economically depressed but highly developed economies in the West; to the economic upper limit for foreign credits being approached by a number of Comecon members, and the need for most East European countries to digest the huge capital investments injected during the just completed five-year plans. To this one must also add the disappointing agricultural production results of 1975, particularly in the case of grain and fodder crops.

The Soviet Union, which has become the major beneficiary of higher Comecon prices paid by its partners for raw materials, has not been able to use this advantage as a means of stemming the decline in the growth rate of its average real wages during 1975, and the Soviet 1976 plan does not promise any improvement in this area. Even the per capita real income (which includes wage payments, income transfers, and social consumption) is expected to decline severely in 1976. Both of these indexes for the Soviet Union only emphasize the depth of the effects of the reversals in agricultural production during 1975, which are to be felt in 1976 and beyond.

Only Hungary is planning a growth rate (1.5 per cent) in average real wages which is below that anticipated in the Soviet Union during 1976.

In all cases, the growth in per capita real income will continue to surpass the anticipated improvement in average real wages, confirming state policies in Eastern Europe, which favor the growth of social over personal consumption on a long-term basis.

Unfortunately, the 1976-1980 plan targets have yet to jell for over half of the East European countries, a development which is repeating the general experience of past five-year-plan periods.

In two of the three countries for which information is available (Hungary and Poland), a further slowing down in the income indexes is anticipated for the entire five-year plan period (Table B). Only Rumania (which still calls itself a "developing country," at least for Comecon market trading purposes) is planning a slight improvement, and this only for the lower range of the anticipated growth of per capita real income.

In the past, there has been a tendency for growth rates in these economic indexes to become largely stabilized for the majority of the Comecon members. The only exception to this has

been Poland, which has experienced a very large comparative improvement during the last five-year-plan period under Gierek's guidance. It now seems that most of the European members of Comecon expect no improvement in this trend, and the majority will probably be planning for a slowing down in the growth rates for the important indexes of personal real income and average real wages.

When firmer information concerning the fulfillment of the 1975 plans and more details on the new five-year plans for all East European countries become available, a wider range of generalizations should become possible.

(more)

TABLE A

Annual Growth Rates of Per Capita Real Income and
Average Real Wages, ^(a) 1971-1976

(Increase over previous year, in per cent)

Country	Payment	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975 Pre- liminary	1976 Plan
Bulgaria	Income	3.0	6.0	7.9	5.0	4.7	4.8
	Wage	3.0	2.0	3.8(b)	c.3.0(b)	< 3.0(bc)	na
Czecho- slovakia	Income	5.5(d)	6.2(d)	6.2(d)	4.3(d)	c. 4.4(d)	5.2(d)
	Wage	3.6	3.9	3.3	3.3	> 3.3	4.0
East Germany	Income	4.0(e)	6.0(e)	5.7(e)	4.8(e)	4.4(e)	4.0(e)
	Wage
Hungary	Income	5.0	3.5	4.8	6.6	3.8(f)	3.0
	Wage	2.3	2.2	2.8	4.5	3.4(f)	1.5
Poland	Income	10.3	11.9	14.2	11.4	c. 12.0(c)	7.6(g)
	Wage	5.5	7.0	10.0	8.4	4.0(f)	3.5
Rumania	Income	8.6(d)	6.5(g) (7.5)(d)	4.4	5.8 (8.8)(d)	9.0(h)	8.0-8.5
	Wage	1.8	2.0	3.3	4.4	10.0(h)	8.0-8.7
Soviet Union	Income	3.0	4.0	5.0	4.2	5.8(f)	3.7
	Wage	3.0	4.0	3.7	.	2.7	2.7

Notes:

- a. Real wages of blue- and white-collar workers in socialized sectors, excluding kolkhozes.
- b. Nominal average wage.
- c. Author's estimate.
- d. Financial income of population (cash).
- e. Net monetary income.
- f. Calculated.
- g. Total real income.
- h. Plan
- na. Not announced

Sources: Andras Szabo, "Economic Development of European Comecon Countries in 1973 and Their Economic Plans for 1974," *Kozgazdasagi Szemle* No. 10, 1974, pp. 1173-1187; *Kommunist* (USSR), March 1975, pp. 93-101; L. Nikolayev and L. Tarasov, "The Economy of Comecon Countries (Survey)," *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, January 1975, pp. 90-100; "Socialist Countries, 1974 -- Dynamics in This Part of the World," *Politika*, 29 March 1975, p. 11; "Development of Comecon in the Last Four-Year Period," *Nowe Drogi*, April 1975, pp. 50-59; national yearbooks, various reports on national plan fulfillment, and speeches of party and government officials.

TABLE B


Five-Year Growth Rates of Per Capita Real Income and Average Real Wages, ^(a) 1965-1980
(per cent)

Country	Payment	1970/1965 Actual	1975/1970		1980/1975 Plan
			Plan	Preliminary	
Bulgaria	Income Wage	130	125-130	134	na na
Czechoslovakia	Income Wage	119	128	129.6(b) 118.7(b)	na na
East Germany	Income Wage	.	121-123	na	na .
Hungary	Income Wage	118	125-127 116-118	126 116.1	118-120 113-115
Poland	Income Wage	110	117-118	c. 140	116-118
Rumania	Income Wage	120	132-137	na na	135-137 na
Soviet Union	Income Wage	133	131	124	na .

Notes: a. Real wages of blue- and white-collar workers in socialized sectors, excluding kolkhozes.
b. Calculated.
na. Not announced.

Sources: Helena Kocianova, "Basic Indexes of Living Standards in Five-Year Plans of European Comecon Countries for 1971-1975," Politika Ekonomie, March 1973, pp. 241-252; various reports on national five-year plans, and speeches of party and government officials.

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RAD Background Report/13
(Yugoslavia)
16 January 1976



PRIVATE PUBLISHING IN YUGOSLAVIA

By Zdenko Antic

Summary: According to Yugoslav press reports, the Yugoslav authorities are now confronted with a growing number of all kinds of privately printed and disseminated publications. They include literary works, school manuals, scientific, historical, and sociopolitical books and pamphlets. Some of them are politically critical, and even suggest anti-socialist solutions. Since in Yugoslavia there is no legal provision for a priori censorship, the party and state officials have their hands full when confronted with this type of political opposition.

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Of the late, the Yugoslav authorities have been confronted with an ever growing number of uncontrolled, privately printed and disseminated publications. This particular kind of Yugoslav samizdat is apparently quite widely spread in Belgrade and in Serbia. According to the Belgrade Politika, (1) during the last three years (1972-1974), there have been 204 privately published works in Serbia. Most of them were printed in Belgrade (163), the rest in Serbia's other cities. Figures for the other republics were not provided. Frequent news in the Yugoslav press on banned books, periodicals, and journals suggest, however, that the number of privately printed and disseminated publications in Yugoslavia as a whole is probably considerably higher.

The significance of the privately published books and periodicals emerges clearly when compared with the number of titles published by the recognized publishing houses. In 1974, for instance, private

(1) 10 January 1975.

publishers in Serbia published more titles than the four official, well-known Serbian publishing houses put together. In that year, 70 titles were published privately, while Graphos, Gradina, Komunist, and the Serbian literary co-operative together published only 64 titles. Only the Rad (Labor) Publishing House published more titles in 1974 than did the private publishers.

What Is Being Published?

The subjects of the privately published books do not vary very much from those published by the commercial publishing houses. The major portion of the privately published books are of a literary or artistic character. Some 87 literary titles and 11 fine arts catalogues were privately published in Serbia from 1972 to 1974. Schoolbooks and instruction manuals for the elementary, professional, and high schools were in second place. There were 58 publications in this category. There were also several books dealing with cultural, philosophical, scientific, and historical problems among these private publications. Finally, a special group is made up of titles dealing with psychological and parapsychological themes.

Privately published books dealing with the social sciences and cultural problems are usually written seriously and with good scientific standards, Politika admitted. More controversial is the scientific worth of the school manuals and books written for students and instructors. Very frequently, such books do not correspond to the scientific and pedagogical methods used in schools. Politika was even more critical in assessing titles dealing with psychological and parapsychological problems. Such publications are not based upon scientific works; they spread irrational and mystical ideas, and are social harmful.

The sharpest criticism in the Politika article was reserved for private publications dealing with historical themes. They are usually completely devoid of any scientific worth, while their ideological context is mostly antisocialist, Politika wrote. The greatest number of such publications in Serbia deal with Serbian mediaeval history, examining it in a mystical and nationalistic manner. Some titles dealing with the period of the People's Liberation War are not objective, presenting Yugoslavia's revolution in a false light, Politika maintains. An example of such writing is to be found in the book written by Dragoljub Jovanovic and entitled People, People -- 56 Dead Contemporaries, in which some of Yugoslavia's well-known revolutionaries and the events in which they took part are falsified.

Politika does not say very much about these books or similar ones which are critical of present-day or past revolutionary development in Yugoslavia. The number of such volumes, however appears to be higher than expected. A long series of such publications has been criticized in the past by party or state officials, or has been banned by court decisions. In June 1973, a book by the Zagreb author Ivan Dragonijevec was banned by the district court of Sisak. The court ruled that his book Rimsko dva (Roman Two) presented a distorted view of the actions of President Tito and his followers in the Adriatic town of Dubrovnik immediately after World War Two. (2) In April 1974, the Zagreb District Court banned the Glossary of Contemporary Journalism compiled by Virgil Kurbela. Public Prosecutor Berislav Studen said, while explaining the sentence, that this book used "information media" for the purpose of undermining the basis of the socialist democratic order as stipulated by the Constitution of Yugoslavia. (3) In October 1974, the Prokuplje District Court in Serbia sentenced the local teacher Ivan Ivanovic to two years in prison for writing a novel, The Red King, which ridicules Yugoslavia's communist system and its leaders. Ivan Ivanovic put out this book in 1972, but it was several months before its dissemination was forbidden. (4) In February 1975, the privately published journal Gradina, Nis, Serbia, was banned because of a story entitled "The Uncle's Legacy," which in a malicious and tendentious manner "represents incorrect and distorted claims about sociopolitical life in Yugoslavia, and insults the League of Communists of Yugoslavia and its paper Komunist, doing all this from a nationalistic-chauvinistic and pro-Chetnik position." (5) In August 1975, the Krusevac District Court in Serbia banned and ordered the destruction of the book The Socialist Revolution and the Great World Wars, written by the retired Lieutenant Colonel Trivo Pravica. The court found that the ideas represented in the book are incompatible with the policy of Yugoslavia and of the League of Communists. (6) Such condemned privately printed books

(2) Reuter, 19 June 1973.

(3) Politika, 5 April 1974.

(4) UPI, 24 October 1974.

(5) Tanjug, 24 February 1975.

(6) Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 22 August 1975.

usually circulate in 1,000 to 2,000 copies before a court officially bans them.

Law and Censorship

It goes without saying that Yugoslav party and state functionaries are not particularly happy with this growing flood of antisocialist and critical publications. Existing legislation, which is enforced by the loyal party members, does not, however, provide much scope for preventive legal action. On the contrary, every citizen is entitled to published books, and a priori censorship does not exist. This right is granted by the Federal Constitution of 1974. Article 167 of the Constitution states that:

Freedom of press and of other forms of information, and of public expression . . . is granted. Citizens have the right to express and to publish their opinions using the information media to do so. Citizens, organizations, and associations of citizens may, under the provisions stipulated by the law, publish and disseminate information by using other information media. (7) [emphasis added]

The existing press law does not provide any more grounds for further preventive legal action. Under the existing press law, only a posteriori censorship is possible. The law stipulates that the first copy of every printed publication must be sent to the public prosecutor. The prosecutor can, after reading the text, prohibit circulation a posteriori and ban further publication pending a final decision by the court in the area in which the text was published. This procedure gives practically every publisher, including those who are private, the possibility of disseminating a publication before an eventual ban has been pronounced.

A new draft law on the press, which was presented in February 1972 to the National Assembly, providing for a sharper procedure in prosecuting an incriminated publication, was voted down by a majority in the assembly. Following a short but lively discussion, the Nationality Council of the National Assembly refused to discuss the proposed draft on "misuse" of the press and other information media. (8) Radio Belgrade expressed its "concern" over the proposed draft law, and hailed the deputies of the National Assembly,

(7) Constitution of the SFR Yugoslavia (Zagreb), 1974.

(8) Politika, 1 March 1972.

"who were in a position to separate that which is politically necessary from any type of administrative manipulation." [sic]

The Belgrade daily Politika ekspres (9) also welcomed the assembly's decision. The paper said that now there will be enough time for a thorough discussion, in order to eliminate all subjective formulations in the proposed bill that "might endanger the freedom of information and the dissemination of opinions, thus endangering democratic principles in Yugoslavia." The new draft bill, if adopted, the paper continues, "would enable the public prosecutors to practice ever heavier censorship, while the influence of political forums would be reduced." The new draft bill on the "misuse of the press" was never presented to the National Assembly. The practice of controlling the press, information, and publishing is being left to Yugoslavia's constituent republics. The old legal practice continues in force, and party officials, as well as private publishers, continue to live in a sort of limbo between half-freedom and half-oppression. (033)

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(9) March 2, 1972.

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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RAD Background Report/14
(Yugoslavia)
16 January 1976

GRLICKOV'S WARY OPTIMISM

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: In an interview given to an Italian magazine the Yugoslav delegate A. Grlickov has said he believes the pan-European communist conference will take place when agreement has been reached on a "consensus" document acceptable to all parties. The LCY thinks it would be best to have "a brief communiqué," leaving heads of delegations free to express their views in speeches. Commenting on the prolonged preparatory process, Grlickov lists four demands made by his party.

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On the eve of the current editorial session in East Berlin the chief Yugoslav delegate, Aleksandar Grlickov, gave the Italian weekly l'Espresso an interview (1) in which he discussed the difficulties that have held up progress toward the long-planned pan-European conference of communist parties, but expressed cautious optimism about the way things were now going. The interview is said to be the first Grlickov has granted on this subject to a foreign publication.

His account of what happened at the crucial October and November sessions (when the "loyalists" first made substantial concessions to the independent parties on the character and content of the conference document and then sought to regain at least some of the ground they had yielded) broadly confirms statements made earlier by Spanish and British party spokesmen:

(1) Gianni Corbi, "Fra noi e Brezhnev," 11 January 1976.

As you know, last October the European communist parties reached basic agreement on a preliminary draft of the document. Some therefore thought that [the work] had been mainly done, and that in the first half of 1976 the conference could be officially convened. (2) This was, however, on condition that due consideration be taken of some objections raised by the majority of the parties present against the October document, and among them those put forward by the LCY, which for us are of particular importance. (3) This progress was not made, and since it is indispensable to reach complete agreement, the date of the conference has naturally been put forward. I may add that the preparations for the conference coincide with the convocation of some important party congresses (for example, those of the PCF and the CPSU). In the circumstances we hold that the best way to get political value from the pancommunist [sic] meeting would be to conclude the work with the approval of a brief communiqué, leaving the heads of the various delegations free to put forward their opinions in the most exhaustive manner. To those who lament the excessive delay we reply that this, too, has a positive element: what is being discussed are, in fact, fundamental strategic options, for example the opening up of the communist and workers' parties toward other European socialist and democratic forces. And it is important that this frank dialogue should take place on the basis of equality and respect for the positions of others.

Asked about suggestions that the conference might not, after all, take place, Grlickov said: "Certain Western journals have been writing that, at this point, the conference [project] can be considered to have been abandoned. On the contrary, we think, taking account of the work already done, that the meeting will take place." When his Italian interviewer suggested that this "optimism" might be due to the fact (if it were a fact) that at the December editorial session "the Soviets unexpectedly showed themselves to be yielding and understanding," Grlickov went on:

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- (2) On the occasion of the deceptive October meeting British and Italian party spokesmen actually expressed the hope that the conference could be held before the end of 1975.
 - (3) In a dispatch from Belgrade based on conversations with Yugoslav sources, correspondent Olaf Ihlau said (in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 11 December 1975) that the LCY had submitted 61 amendments in the course of the preparatory meetings.

Let us not talk of optimism or pessimism. Let us stick to the facts. Some weeks ago in Berlin the working group [sic] met to draw up a document on the basis of the proposals and amendments put forward by the various parties. Well, the working group did not complete its task, and it was decided to hold a further meeting. Only after that will we have useful elements for a concrete, over-all evaluation.

Yugoslav Conditions

Grlickov was then asked about reports that the Yugoslavs had been "most intransigent in demanding certain guarantees." On what points did the LCY insist? He replied:

In many Western newspaper articles there is talk of the "suspicious Yugoslavs" who are constantly seeking "certain guarantees," and other things of the sort. In reality we have sought two assurances which for us are fundamental: the widest and most complete publicity for the proceedings and respect for the principle of "consensus" -- that is, that every decision must be accepted beforehand by [all] the individual participants. These requests of ours were accepted and included in the procedural rules. Then there are two other guarantees which for us take on decisive importance: the first is that in the course of the conference the policies and revolutionary practices of any party whatsoever must not be put in question; the second is that the conference must in no way take on the character of continuation of previous meetings of various kinds. Let me further clarify that. We are against continuity for well-grounded reasons of principle. The major one is that we are opposed to the creation, in any form whatever, of a leading center having priority over [bilateral] relations between the various communist parties. This does not mean that we deny the usefulness of meetings of the communist parties. We say only that these meetings must be the occasion for an exchange of free opinions and not a pretext for imposing binding decisions. This is why we affirm that the coming conference must have neither a past nor a future.

Consensus and Counterattack

At this point the interviewer brought the discussion back to the question of the reasons for the impasse reached at the November session of the Editorial Commission. In his reply Grlickov interestingly denied that, as widely reported, the formerly suiiviste French CP had been among the recalcitrant parties on that occasion

(although he would presumably agree that since then the PCF has displayed startlingly greater independence vis-à-vis Moscow, to the point of criticizing Soviet labor camps):

In November certain parties demonstrated a certain dissatisfaction over the type of document so laboriously worked out. These parties did not include (as has been said) the PCF, which on the contrary demonstrated understanding and readiness to collaborate. But this is still not the right answer. The right answer is that some parties judged it more useful to postpone the conference in order to continue work on the final document, because there existed notable divergences which were not easy to overcome.

Asked about these divergences, he came to the crux of the matter -- the "consensus" issue: that principle had been accepted at the Warsaw meeting not only because the Yugoslavs demanded it but because it was "acceptable also to all the other communist parties"; the alternative was not "realistic." But, he indicated in somewhat cryptic language, the accepted principle did not subsequently go unchallenged:

What happened was that instead of making progress, the draft document and the discussion of it brought some important questions, which the LCY at least had considered as already settled, back to initial positions.

The last question put to Grlickov referred to those who regarded the pan-European conference as a step toward a new world conference. His reply came as no surprise:

As a matter of principle, and on condition that the guarantees of which we spoke earlier are respected, we are not a priori opposed to conferences of the communist parties. We hold, however, and we said this with great firmness in Warsaw, that the conditions indispensable for convening a world summit of the communist parties do not exist today. We think, in fact, that the present state of relations between individual parties counsels against an initiative of this sort.

It is clearly no coincidence that Grlickov's first interview with a Western journal on the conference project appeared on the eve of the current, possibly decisive East Berlin meeting. It must be taken as a move to strengthen the Yugoslav position at that meeting -- and as an indication that the LCY, for one, will not weaken in its independent stand.

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(034)

I.N.M.E.R.
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THE BALANCED BELGIAN: JEAN TERFVE ON THE CONFERENCE

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: Jean Terfve, chief delegate of the Belgian CP, has taken a "balanced" position in the interparty debate over the pan-European communist conference, stressing both the autonomy of each party and the need to maintain "interdependence." In his judgment the conference will probably not take place before "the end of the first quarter" of 1976.

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In the judgment of Jean Terfve, vice-chairman of the Belgian CP, the pan-European conference of communist parties, which was originally to have been held "not later than mid-1975," will "probably not take place before the end of the first quarter of 1976." In an interview on the conference project, published in the party organ Le Drapeau Rouge on December 30 and now available, Terfve explained that when the editorial group (currently holding its second session in East Berlin) reached agreement on a draft document the text would then have to be submitted to the 28 central committees concerned; after that it would go back to the delegations, now meeting as the Editorial Committee, for final approval; and only then would it be possible to set a date for the conference.

Terfve, who has led the Belgian party's delegation to the preparatory meetings, was apparently at pains to take a balanced position in his comments on the conference project. On the one hand, he stressed the autonomy of each party and the evolving role of the Western communist parties; on the other, he emphasized "interdependence" and the need for Western CPs to maintain solidarity with the Eastern regimes -- without necessarily supporting all their policies.

This intermediate (and intermediary?) approach may be illustrated by the following passage:

Each communist party must be fully autonomous. . . .
The communist parties of capitalist Europe have committed themselves to a new course, that of a constructive Marxism which takes into account the possible stages and the democratic imperatives proper to these countries. In this connection one must underline the importance of the recent common declaration of the Italian and French CPs.

But on the other hand one cannot conceive of Western Europe as an isolated continent. There are interdependences which must be taken into account. It is not possible, for example, to forget the essential role of the ruling parties of the socialist countries. . . .

Consequently the cohesion of the international communist movement remains necessary, as does the strengthening of the bonds of solidarity, to the point of common actions. These must, however, always take into account the needs deriving from the autonomy and independence of the parties.

The international communist movement, Terfve went on, now found itself in a new situation, a new phase of development. "This involves difficulties, zigzag progress, a search for the best methods to follow. It can even sometimes provoke tensions arising from acquired habits that are not modified in time. One should not be astonished at this, or overdramatize it, but see it as the vicissitudes of an evolution now going on." He was confident that the communist parties would have the political maturity to "find the necessary balance between these two imperatives" of autonomy and interdependence.

So the balancing act continued. For example, Terfve warned against falling into the "trap" set for Western parties: "There is sometimes a tendency on the part of our allies to consider a certain break with the socialist countries as being a guarantee of the democratic commitments made by the Western communist parties." On the other hand, "the necessity of solidarity with the communist parties of the socialist countries does not automatically involve the unconditional defense of everything they may do."

"Limited Agenda"

But on one crucial issue, that of the character and content of the conference document, Terfve did seem to come down on the side of the independent parties:

We favor an agenda limited to the points on which a common understanding can be achieved fairly easily, and from which lines of action can be drawn. We want the accent put on the essentials -- that is, on disarmament, on the struggle against the crisis, and on the need to reduce the openings left to the adversary.

In connection with this last point he noted the need to reduce as much as possible the number of issues that could give rise to anticommunist and anti-Soviet attacks. And here "one must give particular attention to socialist democracy, its preservation and its development." A comparison of that bland formulation with statements on the same subject by, say, the Spanish Communists gives the measure of the Belgian CP's via media. Where the middle way will lead is another question. One might say that the PCB is trying to avoid rocking a boat that is already tossing in high seas. (037)

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RUMANIA/1
15 January 1976

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15 January 1976

CULTURE1. Revised Edition of "Delirul" Shows Response to Criticism

A careful reading of the two editions (February and August 1975) of the first volume of Marin Preda's novel Delirul (The Delirium) leaves no doubt about the changes he made before the second edition went to press. Without removing or changing a line of those passages featuring Antonescu, or those in which the author explained his -- highly personalized, undeterministic -- philosophy of history, Preda inserted two passages designed to enhance the role played by the communist party during the years in which the tale is set and to express the RCP point of view on the events recounted. Furthermore, he deleted from the second edition a rather nauseating scene, in response to "notes of protest received from readers," as he said during a meeting in Timisoara (see Orizont No. 42, 17 October 1975). At that meeting he was also at pains to present himself as a writer to whom changing his books between editions was nothing out of the ordinary. (And in fact he had made substantial changes in another novel, Risipitorii The Squanderers.)

The first passage inserted by Preda in the second edition of Volume I of Delirul introduces a new hero and was prompted, he said, by the fact that he had discovered "new and interesting documents after the first edition had come out." This new chapter smacks less of new documents than of stale clichés, however. The gist of it is as follows: Nicolae Masa, the new hero (whose name is ambiguously symbolic; in the new spelling introduced after the communist take-over masa means both "table" and "mass," as of people) is a worker of peasant origin. After getting a job at the Grivita factory in Bucharest he joins the communist party and takes part in its activities. This device gives Preda an opportunity to voice the party's point of view, or at least today's official version of it. For example, on the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution Rumanian communists are described as wearing flags and banners bearing inscriptions like "Down with the traitors Antonescu and Horia Sima," and "Germans Go Home." Furthermore, the RCP is presented as having been the only force in the country to oppose the 1940 Vienna treaty under which northern Transylvania fell to Hungary. Masa is sent by the party to organize the resistance to the treaty but is prevented from doing so by the Iron Guard police, who arrest him. After uttering a number of heroic phrases -- "We have been victorious in a strong country i.e., the Soviet Union, and we will be so here too" -- he dies at the hands of the police.

The second addition to Volume I is related to Titus Diaconescu, a communist journalist whom Paul Stefan, the central figure in the novel, meets in occupied Odessa. Diaconescu works on a Bucharest newspaper called Tempo, and provides Preda with another opportunity to give an "authentic" account of the stand adopted by the CP vis-à-vis the Antonescu regime as a whole, and vis-à-vis the war waged against the Soviet Union in particular. Slogans like the following are placed in his mouth:

I am a communist, and I am against this war which we shall lose and for which we shall suffer for many years to come, as does any defeated country. Do not believe that everyone has given up. The communist party, strong in conviction though small in membership, has issued a manifesto to the country, the Rumanian people, the workers, the peasants, the soldiers, the men and the women, the young and the old, in which it is pointed out that the fascist German gangsters have thrown the German people into a war against Russia and have drawn other subject peoples into this criminal war in spite of the treaty of nonaggression and friendship between the two countries.

There are indications that this communist journalist may appear in the second volume of Delirul, possible as the person who establishes and promotes the contact between Paul Stefan and the communist party.

According to the Orizont article mentioned above, when asked what kind of novel he considered Delirul to be, Preda denied that it was a historical novel, saying rather that history merely provided a background for the actions of his hero. A background, one feels compelled to add, on which Preda expended at least as much effort as he did on the doings of his hero. A background that contemporary historians have not been allowed to deal with, particularly so far as the figure of General Antonescu is concerned.

It must remain a matter of conjecture whether Preda's novel, whose purely literary value is no more than modest, would have warranted such large print runs (the second edition of Volume I came out in 100,000 copies) had it not appeared at a time when only limited information is available on the period of the 1940s. This point has been brought into the public discussion even by Rumanian journalists, without, as is only natural, given the present-day climate in Rumania -- drawing the obvious conclusions. For example, Radu Mares, a Cluj novelist and critic, had the following to say in Tribuna (No. 25, 19 June 1975):

The "mysteries," or rather the so-called mysteries, of history, which were hitherto hidden in sacred folders, are now being offered to readers in mass editions. The artistic significance of transplanting them directly into a novel deserves thoughtful reflection. In a serious culture great events are followed by an abundance of paraliterary works. These take the form of memoirs or personal diaries of outstanding personalities, biographies of leaders, studies of diplomats, collections of documents, and -- last but not least -- feature reports.

In postwar Rumania, where the flow of accurate information on these events has been banned for such a long time, any information is welcome. But the information provided by Preda is not -- and is not meant to be -- impartial.

In one of the most recent reviews of Delirul the Bacau critic Vlad Sorianu made a number of pertinent remarks which clearly

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illustrate the official interpretation given to certain aspects of it. With regard to the reconsideration of the role and person of General Antonescu, Sorianu's stand is very similar to the privately expressed viewpoint of many Rumanian cultural officials. Sorianu stated in Ateneu (No. 124/1975): "The rich sociological and philosophical subtext of the novel, its vast documentary scaffolding -- in a certain sense put to literary use for the first time -- are not meant as reconsideration of certain historical facts and persons, although there is a hint that more detailed meditation on these facts and persons has become necessary." According to Sorianu, Preda's goal was to view "objectively and emotionally" a period of Rumanian history which included such phenomena as Antonescu and Rumanian participation in the German war against the Soviet Union. His ambition, if we are to believe Sorianu, was to "help to stimulate, on a superior level, national and civic awareness."

Although a good deal has been said and written about Delirul -- a mediocre novel with a political impact -- not all the "mysteries" surrounding it have been cleared up. One such mystery was recently pointed out by a bookseller who said that Preda's novel had not been on the publisher's list in either 1974 or 1975, although it had been announced and promised to booksellers for about four years. Since it was published (in February 1975) it has become increasingly clear that it is part of a wider campaign led by the RCP since its 11th congress to arouse national and historical awareness in the Rumanian people. An attack was launched on the novel in Literaturnaya Gazeta, the review published by the Soviet Writers' Union, and the refutation of this attack by a Rumanian literary critic transcended the limits of a purely literary dispute (see Rumanian Situation Reports/19 and 21, Radio Free Europe Research, 23 May and 5 June 1975, Items 6 and 1, respectively).

There is no doubt that in preparing the new "revised and enlarged" version of Delirul Preda had to take into account at least some of the charges made against it by the Soviets. In the Literaturnaya Gazeta article Konstantin Savin reproached "historian" Preda for having "neglected the forces that opposed fascism within the country" -- i.e., the Rumanian communists who opposed Antonescu's regime and the war against the Soviet Union. This ideological-political argument obviously appealed to the Rumanian officials responsible for the publication of Delirul, but they seem to have ignored the other Soviet charges: that Preda had adopted an "idealistic" and personalized view of history, overemphasized the national aspect, presented Antonescu as a tragic figure, referred, in conversation with his mother, to "Freemasons, Jews, and Bolsheviks" as representing a greater evil in Antonescu's eyes than the men of the Iron Guard, and so on. Apparently the RCP did take the Soviets' advice as far as ideological rigidity goes, but did not let them interfere with the presentation of certain aspects of their national history. In a review that appeared after the second edition of Volume I was published the party paper Scinteia (25 September 1975), which had refrained from voicing an opinion on the first edition, now expressed its approval (see Rumanian SR/39, RFER, 10 October 1975, Item 8).

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The Rumanian critic Dumitru Micu, writing in Contemporanul (No. 11, 14 March 1975), also expressed dissatisfaction with Preda's "unilateral and simplistic" portrayal of Antonescu, and with the "disputable validity" of the author's concept of history. Shortly before the second edition of Volume I received approval from the censors (a procedure euphemistically described as being stamped "ready for the press") on 30 July 1975, a number of articles appeared which can be deemed to reflect the official Rumanian position after the Soviet attack. The director of the Minerva Publishing House, Aurel Martin, who is also deputy director of the Editorial Central, described Delirul as not entirely satisfactory because it ignored "the popular antifascist demonstrations," the reaction of communists and patriots to the 1940 treaty, and the "feeling of pain, unrest, and revulsion among the masses at the extremely right-wing orientation of the official policy" (Romania Literara No. 26, 26 June 1975). Dumitru Micu (writing in Romania Literara No. 27, 4 July 1975) felt the absence of a description of the "class basis" behind Antonescu, and deplored the rather veridic -- i.e., less favorable -- representation of the general. Preda made no effort to comply with Micu's by no means veiled suggestions in these respects in the revised edition, but another of his desiderata, a character with a more "complex" mentality through which the events could be reflected, was introduced in the person of Titus Diaconescu as a spokesman of the RCP point of view. (U26)

GOVERNMENT

2. Two Deputy Ministers of Labor Replaced

Two important changes have recently taken place in the leadership of the Rumanian Ministry of Labor. Under Council of Ministers Decision No. 1109 of 20 November 1975 (published in Buletinul Oficial No. 122, 21 November 1975), First Deputy Minister Mircea Voinescu and Deputy Minister Cornel Hidos were released from their positions in the ministry, and Ilie Casu and Aneta Spornic were made deputy ministers. No reason for the changes was given in the decision, nor was there any mention of a future first deputy minister or of future assignments for Voinescu and Hidos.

The latter two have long been active in labor affairs. Voinescu was listed as vice-president of the State Committee on Wage and Labor Problems in 1959; he was appointed First Deputy Minister of Labor and chief of the Wage Department in June 1969, and in August 1973 he became a member of the Workers' Central Control Council -- a position to which he was reappointed in June 1974. Hidos became a member of the State Committee on Wage and Labor Problems in December 1963, and was named its vice-chairman in February 1967; in June 1969 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Labor and chairman of the Central Research Institute of Economic Management, Labor Organization, and Economic Cadre Improvement, and in December 1972 he became a member of the Leading Council of the Stefan Gheorghiu (Party) Academy. Neither man is a member of the RCP Central Committee.

The two new deputy ministers have not previously been active in the labor sector, but both are represented on the CC. Casu, an

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engineer, was listed as director of the Ploesti Drilling Trust in February 1964; he became secretary of the Ploesti Party Committee in November 1967, first vice-chairman of the Prahova County People's Council in January 1969, first secretary of the Prahova County Party Committee in August 1969, and Minister of the Chemical Industry in December 1972. He was elected to the CC in August 1969 and re-elected in November 1974.

Aneta Spornic, a university lecturer, is prorector of the Academy of Economic Studies, chairman of the Bucharest Municipal Women's Committee, and a member of the Executive Bureau of the Bucharest Municipal Council of the Front of Socialist Unity, a post to which she was elected in March 1974. In June of that year she became a member of the Workers' Control Council, and in November she was elected an alternate member of the RPC CC. Her appointment to the Ministry of Labor may have been at least partly in response to the 11th party congress recommendation that more women be appointed to posts in socioeconomic life.

A number of things may have prompted these changes. In an interview published in Scinteia (29 January 1974), Minister of Labor Petre Lupu made it clear that despite the decisions on manpower taken at the CC plenum held on 18-19 June 1973, the country was still faced with problems involving the distribution of manpower on a territorial basis; also, he said, a greater number of women would have to be enrolled in the labor force, and greater attention would have to be paid to "work norms," so that they could be made to reflect the actual "consumption of manpower." He then drew attention to the correlation between productivity and the proper utilization of labor, and stressed the importance of raising professional qualifications. Another consideration is that it has been difficult to put the law requiring remuneration according to quantity and quality of output into practice, and the law itself has aroused a good deal of dissatisfaction (see Rumanian SR/36, RFER, 7 November 1974, Item 8, and Scinteia, 30 October 1974).

The main problem, of course, is finding enough labor to carry out the tasks laid down in the 1976-1980 economic plan. Of the 1,200,000 to 1,300,000 new workers who will be required, only 7.2 per cent can be expected to come from the natural population increase, and some 77 per cent will have to come from rural areas (see the Lupu interview mentioned above). Also a serious lack of labor discipline has been apparent in the past two years; there have been a number of instances of sabotage in industrial plants, and it is not clear who is being blamed for the situation -- the Ministry of Labor itself, the trade unions, or the county party organizations. (027)

AGRICULTURE

3. Law on Remuneration in Co-operative Agriculture Experimentally Applied.

On 6 January 1976 Radio Bucharest broadcast a short analysis of the Law on the Remuneration of Labor in Agricultural Production Co-operatives (APCs) in which its experimental nature was stressed (for more on the law, see Rumanian SR/49, RFER, 19 December 1975,

Item 6). The decision to introduce the law on a trial basis was taken by the Grand National Assembly on 20 December 1975, and the fact that the assembly did not approve it for permanent application would seem to indicate the existence of considerable opposition to it. In fact, the decision contains the following passage: "Since the law on remuneration in co-operative agriculture regulates a complex area of social relations in an important sector of the national economy, it is expedient that its final adoption should take place only after a period of experimental application."

According to the Radio Bucharest commentary, the intention is to "ensure an equitable ratio between maximum and minimum incomes" in the APCs, to which end new regulations will establish the remuneration for all categories of members, including leading personnel. In the case of the latter, remuneration will be calculated on the basis of the amount paid to members working directly in production whose output reaches at least the level stipulated by the APCs' general assembly. It was also noted that when the tasks assigned to mixed teams of APC members and agricultural mechanics (a usual combination in APCs) are completed (or "overfulfilled"), the team members will receive their basic pay plus the completed-task supplement, regardless of the performance of other teams, farms, or APCs.

The need for APC leading councils to take steps to enable all members to work a minimum of 300 days annually was also stressed, and it was suggested that undertaking projects in industrial production, construction, and the service sector would help to achieve this goal. As long ago as 1970 Ceausescu pointed out the need to provide year-round work for co-operative members, and two years later Scinteia (17 December 1973) dealt with the problem at some length. The paper noted that in 1971-1975 APC output was scheduled to amount to 20,000 million lei in value, but since the output for 1971, 1972, and the first nine months of 1973 had been assessed at only 6,700 million lei, great efforts would have to be made if the 20,000 million lei figure was to be reached (see also Rumanian SR/1, RFER, 7 January 1974, Item 2). The fact that Article 16 of the new law deals with this matter would seem to indicate that the problem has by no means been resolved. (028)

4. The Minister of Agriculture on Past Plan Fulfillment and Future Tasks

Minister of Agriculture and the Food Industry Angelo Miculescu recently granted an interview to Romania Libera, which was published in two consecutive issues of the paper (6 and 7 January 1976). He dealt mainly with plan fulfillment in the 1971-1975 period and in 1975, and with the steps being taken to ensure fulfillment of the 1976-1980 agricultural plan.

The figures he cited made it clear that both total production in 1971-1975 and output in a number of individual sectors had fallen considerably short of expectations, as can be seen from the following table:

Agricultural Production in 1971-1975, Planned and Actual
(in per cent)

	Planned Increase over 1966-1970	Actual Increase
Total production	36.0-49.0	25.0
Cereals	28.0-37.0	17.0
Sugar beets	25.0-27.7	35.0
Vegetables	72.4-86.8	22.0
Potatoes	32.1-43.2	17.0

Miculescu's figure for sugar beets seems high, however; a 35 per cent increase over 1966-1970 would mean that some 25,884,000 tons were produced, but the figure for 1971-1974 was only 18,936,000 tons, and as the largest crop recorded in those four years (harvested in 1972) amounted to 6,974,000 tons, it seems unlikely that the 1975 figure was nearly 7,000,000 tons higher.

Miculescu noted that sugar production in 1975 was 25 per cent higher than in 1970 -- i.e., 471,000 tons against 377,000 tons. Although this is a significant increase, production was still 84,000 tons below the 555,000 tons planned for 1975.

The target for meat was apparently reached, with output rising from 1,279,000 tons (live weight) in 1966-1970 to 1,778,000 tons in 1971-1975 (the plan for the latter period called for between 1,670,000 and 1,890,000 tons). Although live weight figures for meat production were reached, the food industry failed to achieve its goals for processed meat, which in 1975 was below the plan for that year. According to Miculescu, 1975 was to see a 55 per cent increase over the 1970 figure -- 659,000 tons compared to 425,000 tons. But this is still 163,000 tons below the 822,000 planned for 1975.

Miculescu reported that cereal grain and soy bean cultivation have been completely mechanized and that of maize and sunflower seeds are on the way to being so, and that by the end of 1975 the farmers were using 92 kilograms of chemical fertilizer per hectare of arable land. But since a 23 June 1971 Agerpres release predicted that by the end of the 1971-1975 plan over 200 kilograms of active-substance fertilizer would be used per hectare, it would seem that achievement fell well short of the plan in this respect. Also according to the minister, by May 1976 some 2,000,000 hectares of land are to be irrigated; the 1971-1975 plan, however, called for the irrigation of 2,100,000 hectares by the end of 1975.

A critical note can be discerned in Miculescu's statement that "some subsections of the food industry are failing to meet the requirements of the population so far as the variety and packaging of products go, and the supply of basic foodstuffs still falls short of actual need." He attributed such shortcomings not only to adverse natural conditions but also to inefficient management of the

production process, failure to put technical advances into practice, and improper utilization of the technical-material base.

Turning to the 1976-1980 plan, he said that the average annual grain crop was to increase by 47 per cent over the 1971-1975 figure, vegetable output will rise by 65 per cent, and that of meat by 50 per cent. Both unusual and very significant, however, was his statement that some 110,000 million lei in state funds and 14,000 million lei from APC funds will be invested in the agricultural sector. This is considerably more than the amount foreseen in the directives for 1976-1980 -- 92,000 million lei from the state and 14,000 million from the APCs.

Miculescu said that food industry output is to increase by somewhere between 6.9 and 7.3 per cent annually, adding that some sectors will outstrip others -- the meat industry's output will rise by 10.1 per cent, that of milk by 13.0 per cent, fish by 9.2 per cent, and sugar by 8.2 per cent. Some 10,000 specialists will be assigned to agricultural production units, which will make it possible to apply new technologies and make more efficient use of the "land fund."

The main task in 1976-1980 is to transform Rumanian agriculture and raise it to the level of that of the most advanced countries, said Miculescu. The experience of the state enterprises must be turned to account by promoting co-operation between them and the APCs, while respecting the law and the decisions of the party. True co-operation between the state sector and the APCs depends on the modernization and expansion of production facilities, concentration of and specialization in production, the introduction of modern technology, and the "scientific" organization of production and labor. Other considerations are better utilization of raw materials -- for instance, the quantity of meat products obtained from one ton of raw material should increase by 15 per cent, and for milk products it should rise by 10 per cent. Irrigation will be completed on an additional 125,000 hectares of land in the 1976-1980 period, bringing the total to 3,000,000 hectares, and the 3,000,000 hectares of hillsides will be the subject of a special program.

Turning finally to the subject of private farming, Miculescu said that "special conditions must be provided which will make it possible to utilize such farms in a rational manner, in order to increase the supply of farm products available to the population" (for more on this topic, see Rumanian SR/41, RFER, 23 October 1975, Item 1). (029)

FOREIGN RELATIONS

5. Rumanian Writer Discusses Aspects of Helsinki Accords

In a speech to the Grand National Assembly (Scinteia, 20 December 1975) writer and CC member Titus Popovici dealt at length with the importance of and the future possibilities represented by the documents signed last year in Helsinki; he also made a number of critical remarks on the provisions of Basket Three, or rather on what he described as the "goals of ideological subversion" contained in it.

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Original file next to file in file, etc.

With regard to the right of writers and journalists to voice critical opinions on the prevailing situation in Rumania, Popovici had the following to say: "I have a feeling that in this context some people are demanding a kind of highly unilateral freedom, a kind of freedom that would consist exclusively of being able to publicize certain cases." But, he continued, notions like "freedom," "democracy," and "truth" must be considered "indivisible" i.e., they should be considered only sub specie aeternitatis without particular reference to such numerically negligible groups as writers and journalists:

I do not think that the freedom of the writer, say, or the journalist to cling to certain cases of which -- by a strange coincidence -- they choose only one kind, is more precious or more fruitful than the freedom of millions of people no longer to suffer hunger, than freedom of access to the treasure of culture and science, than freedom to decide one's own destiny.

Here he was echoing the point of view Ceausescu voiced at Helsinki, which he has reiterated several times since. This reasoning is consistent with the programmatic Marxist neglect of individual freedom in favor of posited collective freedom.

Popovici, for whom "culture is inseparable from politics," expressed moral disapproval of political connotations that might be inherent in the expectations of Western countries with regard to Basket Three: "Furthermore, I cannot help observing that claims are made in the name of freedom for unilateral, one-way cultural circulation, and that this is even being turned -- by what right I do not insist on asking -- into a text of our democracy."

Traduceri

Whereas all "remarkable" works of foreign literature had been made available to Rumanian readers, Popovici argued, there was no sign of equal treatment for Rumanian literature in Western countries. He noted "a programmatic absence of reciprocity" in this field, and "an aggressive preference for certain poor BRAGGARTS, certain misfits in their own country who think they can win world fame by slandering their homeland, by digging out with sickly obstinacy aspects that are not considered typical even by people who do not share our convictions, quite the contrary. . . ." Particularly striking in this statement is the strongly polemical tone used against Rumanians, at home or abroad, who take a critical view of the present situation in the RSR. He may have had in mind Paul Goma, the best-known "dissident" within the borders of Rumania, but may also have been referring to a number of Rumanian writers and journalists living in the West, who are increasingly becoming targets of official attack. Dumitru Tepeneag, the editor of the Paris review Cahiers de l'Est, is a case in point (see Rumanian SRs/36 and 45, RFER, 18 September and 20 November 1975, Items 9 and 1, respectively).

Scritori disident

Traduceri

In addition to a number of personal attacks on journalists working outside Rumania for calumniating their country, there have also been a number of more general attacks against "traitors to their country." That was the title given by Adrian Paunescu to a

(a)

poem originally published in Luceafarul (No. 41, 12 October 1974), which he obviously deemed it expedient to republish now (also in Luceafarul No. 52 of 30 December 1975). The same issue of the magazine also contained an interesting article by its editor-in-chief, Nicolae Dragos entitled "Who sows the wind . . ." dealing with the same topic. Dragos made it clear that the campaign is by no means directed against all former Rumanian citizens now living abroad, but merely against those who "cast hatred at their homeland in lamentable betrayal." A similar viewpoint was expressed by the poet Mihai Beniuc in an article in Contemporanul (No. 52, 26 December 1975).

(030)

6. Rumania Renews Its Activities in the Middle East

In order to reduce the tension in Rumanian-Israeli relations generated by the RSR's decision to accept a seat on a special committee set up by the United Nations to consider the Palestinian question (see Rumanian SR/49, RFER, 19 December 1975, Item 4), a number of contacts have been arranged between Tel Aviv and Bucharest. The purpose of the new round of talks is twofold: to clarify Rumania's position vis-à-vis the PLO, and to exploit the political opportunities provided by the fact that as of January 1 Rumania became a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council.

Rumania's present relationship with Egypt and Israel is similar to what it was in May-June 1975, when Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon's visit to Bucharest was followed by that of Rumanian Foreign Minister George Macovescu to Cairo (see Rumanian SRs/21 and 24, RFER, 5 and 26 June 1975, Item 6 and 4, respectively). Rumania dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Cornel Pacoste to Israel on December 27 for a five-day visit, and two weeks later CC Secretary Stefan Andrei held talks in Cairo and delivered a message from Ceausescu to President Sadat about the forthcoming Security Council meeting.

According to a Reuter dispatch (December 25), Allon told Pacoste that Israel had been disappointed to learn that Rumania had joined the UN Committee on Palestine, reiterating Israel's determination not to co-operate with that committee or with any other international forum to which the PLO was invited. Pacoste, however, made it clear that in his government's opinion a Middle East settlement was impossible unless a solution to the Palestinian problem could be found.

On January 2 Ceausescu met in Bucharest with Hani Hassan, political adviser to PLO leader Yasser Arafat, and according to Agerpres (January 2) the need for a political solution to the Middle East conflict occupied an important place in their talks. On January 3 the authoritative Cairo newspaper Al Ahram reported on Andrei's forthcoming visit to Egypt and said Rumania had been urging Israel to take part in the January 12 UN debate. (Rumania has recently appeared to prefer Egypt's less aggressive line on the Middle East to that of other Arab countries.)

According to Radio Bucharest (December 27), Pacoste told his Israeli hosts that Rumania regards a quick political solution of the Middle East conflict as an absolute necessity, and a December 28

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dispatch from Reuter reported that Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, by whom Pacoste was received during his visit, will soon visit Rumania for talks with Ceausescu. This would appear to be the most important result of Pacoste's talks in Israel.

At last fall's General Assembly debate on the Middle East, Rumania departed from the stand taken by Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Ukraine, and the Soviet Union, which cosponsored a draft resolution supporting the participation of the PLO at the Middle East conference in Geneva. On the other hand, Rumania was the only socialist country to cosponsor the so-called Egyptian draft resolution on the same topic, which was less offensive to Israel. Ambassador Ion Datcu, Rumania's representative in the UN, claimed that the PLO should attend the forthcoming Geneva conference on an equal footing with the other participants, but made no mention of possible sanctions against Israel for failure to observe the initial resolution of the Security Council on the resumption of hostilities in 1967 in the Middle East (Scinteia, 7 November 1975).

Rumania also split from the other socialist countries during the debate on Zionism; it was the only one to abstain from the Somalia-led drive to include Zionism in the General Assembly program on combating racism and racial discrimination (RFE Special/UN, 16 October 1975). When the matter was ultimately placed on the agenda of the General Assembly Rumania absented itself from the session at which the vote was taken. All other socialist countries voted for the resolution.

Rumanian media have made no mention of all this, despite the fact that the stand taken by the RSR -- the only socialist country to maintain diplomatic relations both with Israel and the Arab countries -- is fully in accord with its go-between attitude on the Middle East conflict. (031)

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- RAD Background Report/10
(World Communist Movement)
15 January 1976

C O R R E C T I O N

to



THE BERLIN QUESTION: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Page 3, paragraph 4, line 5: Please change last word to December.

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RAD Background Report/10
(World Communist Movement)
15 January 1976



THE BERLIN MEETING: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: An "editorial group" representing 24 East and West European communist parties is holding its second session in East Berlin to seek collective agreement on the document for a pan-European conference. Four absent parties also failed to attend the first session in December; it is noteworthy and puzzling that the British CP, an outspoken member of the independent grouping, is among them. This paper discusses indications that the pro-Soviet majority has retreated from the "programmatic" line taken in the SED's November draft, as well as speculations that the session will continue until agreement has been reached.

* * *

Delegates from 24 East and West European communist parties came together in East Berlin on January 13 to resume the difficult task of hammering out an acceptable collective document for the long-delayed pan-European conference. They met as members of an "editorial group" which held its first session on December 16-19. If they do succeed in reaching agreement on a text -- which, if the independent parties secure the maintenance of the "consensus" rule established at the initial Warsaw meeting on October 1974, can surely only be a "lowest common denominator" -- the draft will then have to be referred back to the 28 central committees concerned for their approval. Only after that can the delegations reassemble, this time as the "Editorial Commission," to set a date for the conference that was originally supposed to be held "not later than mid-1975."

It may be recalled that the "editorial group" was set up in an effort to overcome the impasse reached at the mid-November meeting of the Editorial Commission -- an impasse which in turn was the result of an attempt by the pro-Soviet majority to regain ground earlier conceded to the independent parties. Statements by various independent spokesmen (Italian, Yugoslav, Spanish, and British) have made it clear that at the October meeting of the "working group" (held after a balanced eight-party "subgroup" had failed to reach agreement in successive meetings over several months) the East German hosts finally produced a "limited" draft which the independent parties found acceptable as a "basis for further discussion" (Pajetta of the PCI). This was why the delegates met in mid-November as the "Editorial Commission": agreement by consensus seemed in sight, at last.

But the draft the SED produced at that November session was not acceptable to the independents. Various statements and "leaks" indicate that it represented an attempt to reintroduce elements of a "general line," through ideological and "programmatic" passages. The solution adopted was to relieve the SED of its editorial responsibility as host party and transfer that task to the "editorial group," in which all 28 parties could participate.

The Absentees

Not all parties did participate, however; and here one comes upon the first of several questions posed by the present East Berlin meeting. At the session held on December 16-19 there were present 22 delegations, the absentees being the parties of Great Britain, Ireland, Switzerland, San Marino, Norway, and Turkey. The first four of these are again absent from the current session, the Norwegians and Turks having turned up, to bring the count to 24.

One should perhaps not attach too much significance to the absence of the small Irish and San Marino parties -- the latter being a dependable follower of the PCI, which can speak for the comrades of the mountain republic. But the absence of the Swiss is more puzzling, and that of the British very much more so. The British CP has played a rather prominent role in the preparatory process, as an outspoken member of the independent grouping. It is hard to see why it should choose to absent itself from these possibly decisive editorial meetings.

Not only were the British absent: they went out of their way to draw attention to their absence, as it were, in a statement by delegate Reuben Falber published in the Morning Star on December 19 --

the day the December editorial session ended in East Berlin. Falber's statement (in reply to a reader's letter urging the British CP to stop "papering over the cracks" in the international communist movement) said that at the October session an agreement "appeared to have been reached" providing for a final document "limited in scope." But at the November meeting, "the whole character of the document, however, was again called into question. Some wanted it shortened and still more limited in scope, while others favored a more extensive and basic document." Falber had earlier said that the basic disagreement had from the first been between those who favored "a document which could be interpreted as laying down a general line" and those (including the British) who were opposed to this.

What Concessions?

At the same time, Falber's statement was itself an indication that the British party was still very much involved in the conference project, and would continue to battle on the independent side. The puzzle of the CPGB's absence from the last two East Berlin meetings therefore remains unanswered.

A more basic question -- the question, in fact -- is what kind of document the editorial group is now working on. Is a settlement in the protracted confrontation between the "general line" loyalists and the independent parties within sight? And, if so, what concessions have been made, and by whom, to bring this about?

Several plausible reports citing "informed" sources in various capitals have suggested that the concessions are being made by the Soviets, and that this change of position was conveyed to the independent parties during talks which the new chief Soviet delegate, Vladim Zagladin, had with PCI leaders in Rome on November 12. These reports indicated that Zagladin (who went on to East Berlin without returning to Moscow, a detail that suggests a top-level mandate for negotiation) expressed the CPSU's willingness to drop controversial sections of the November draft and to reconsider passages dealing with certain debatable issues (e.g., the relationship between the blocs, an analysis of the situation in Western Europe, and the communist parties' relations with other forces).

The most detailed of these reports came from Jacques Amalric, Moscow correspondent of Le Monde. (1) Describing the Zagladin visit to Rome as a turning-point, Amalric said that "the Soviet volte-face" had been "discreetly registered" at the meeting of December 16-19, and "should be confirmed" at the January session.

On January 9 the Soviet weekly Novo Vremya (New Times) published a sharp attack on Amalric, denouncing particularly his claim that the CPSU had changed its position by making concessions to the independent parties. The Soviet delegation, the article declared with circular logic, made no demands on the fraternal parties, and "since there are no demands, there cannot have been any modification of the Soviet position. Reporting this attack on himself, Amalric was able in a further dispatch (2) to demonstrate, not only by pointing to the known course of the preparatory meetings since October 1974, but also by citing such foreign communist spokesmen as Pajetta (Italy), Kanapa (France) and Grlickov (Yugoslavia), that the Soviet position had indeed changed -- and that not just once, but several times.

A relevant factor here is that the 25th CPSU Congress is now little more than a month away. There is now no question of holding the pan-European conference before the congress -- at best, March-April would seem to be the earliest time for it, and May-June the more likely. But it is equally obvious that Brezhnev cannot ignore the subject in his congress report, and that, in the Soviet manner, he must be able to claim some kind of "success" -- however hollow a gain it may prove to be on closer examination. There is therefore a certain plausibility to suggestions that the CPSU will seek to obtain at least a broad preliminary agreement on the draft document, sufficient to allow Brezhnev to announce at the congress that the conference will be held in, say, May or June.

If there is anything to that speculation, then the current editorial session may be of unprecedented length (previous sessions have lasted two to four days). In his December 30 Le Monde article Amalric did in fact assert that the delegates would remain in session until such a preliminary agreement had been reached. If so, that would point to a "marathon" meeting lasting up to 10 days or even more (which could give the British and the other absentees a chance to turn up after all).

(1) 30 December 1975.

(2) Le Monde, 13 January 1976.

The Independents' Stand

Certainly the independent parties have given no sign of readiness to yield to Soviet triumphalism at this late stage in the game. On the eve of the current meeting this was made clear by the Yugoslav and Rumanian parties. Yugoslav commentator Milika Sundic broadcast a commentary over Radio Zagreb on January 11 warning that if certain parties insisted on trying to impose their own views, the conference "may still take place, but not with the participation of all parties." (3) In an interview with Gianni Corbi published in L'Espresso the chief Yugoslav delegate, Aleksandar Grlickov, approached the question from another angle by expressing optimism. Referring to Western press suggestions that the conference might be abandoned, he said: "On the contrary, we think, taking account of the work already done, that the meeting will take place." He also stressed in this interview that the Yugoslavs stood firmly by what he described as their two "fundamental" demands: "The widest and most complete publicity for the proceedings [presumably at the conference itself -- K.D.] and respect for the principle of 'consensus' -- that is, that every decision must be accepted beforehand by the individual participants." (4) On January 13 Tanjug emphasized the Belgrade-Bucharest axis by reporting on an editorial on the subject in the Rumanian weekly Lumea. The editorial quoted Nicolae Ceausescu's bland but firm statement in his December speech to the Rumanian parliament: "We proceed from the need to ensure that such a conference takes place in a democratic manner, does not propose adopting decisions binding on the parties, and ensures fully equal participation by all interested parties in discussing problems and a free exchange of views, in a spirit of mutual regard and esteem, so as to lead to a strengthening of unity and co-operation in the struggle to achieve peace and détente."

In a few days it should become clear whether this is to be a decisive, "marathon" session or merely a penultimate round. If Grlickov is right in declaring that the principle of consensus will be maintained (or else . . .), it is hard to see how the conference, when it finally comes, can produce much beyond an inoffensive, lowest-common-denominator text and a demonstration of institutionalized diversity. The odds are that the Soviet comrades have spent two years traveling a long and arduous road, to arrive nowhere in particular.


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- (3) See Kevin Devlin, "Yugoslav Warning on Conference," RAD Background Report/4, Radio Free Europe Research, 13 January 1976.
- (4) "Fra noi e Brezhnev," L'Espresso, 11 January 1976.

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S I T U A T I O N R E P O R T

1. Conference of the Party Organization in the Writers' Union
2. Soviet-Bulgarian Trade Agreement Reflects Price Increases
3. CC Theses Adopt a "New Approach" in Preparing for the Party Congress

1. Conference of the Party Organization in the Writers' Union

The 1975 report-and-election conference of the party organization in the Bulgarian Writers' Union (BWU) took place on 17 December 1975 -- only nine months after the previous one (see Bulgarian Situation Report/8, Radio Free Europe Research, 20 March 1975, Item 1). The main report was submitted by BWU party secretary Ivan Arzhentinski; it was extensively summarized in Literaturen Front (No. 52, 25 December 1975).

The main subject of the report was supposed to be a review of Bulgarian literature since the 10th party congress (April 1971), to mark the approach of the 11th congress (scheduled for next March), but in actual fact it paid attention only to last year's literary output and issues. Arzhentinski claimed that the "creative atmosphere [in the writers' community] is calm," but failed to substantiate his statement. Instead, in the process of discussing the individual genres, Arzhentinski provided examples contradicting his allegations; in addition, the speakers who took the floor after him supplied more evidence on that point. It is a widely known fact that the party's policies on the literary front suffered quite a severe setback in 1975 (cf., G.S., "Septemvri Dismissals: Link With Story on Stalin's Labor Camps?" RAD Background Report/129 [Bulgaria], RFER, 21 August 1975; and G.S., "Icy Winds Over the Bulgarian Literary Landscape," RAD BR/160 [Bulgaria], RFER, 21 November 1975). In the last few months, this setback has repeatedly been a subject of discussion.

Arzhentinski reviewed literary events from the point of view of the so-called "theme of contemporaneity," as he did in his previous reports on similar occasions. In his opinion, the novel scored the greatest successes in this respect, but his catalogue-like enumeration of names and titles did not really amount to very much. A little more detailed (and, at the same time,

equally unimpressive) picture of last year's literature was provided by Literaturen Front's reviews (Nos. 1 and 2, 1 and 8 January 1976). As far as the short story is concerned, Arzhentinski complained that "well-known and experienced storytellers abandoned the genre," while the historical novel is simply "lagging behind." The summarized version of the report passed over in complete silence (as was to be expected) Georgi Bozhinov's unique story, which caused wholesale dismissals from the editorial staff of Bulgaria's currently most prestigious literary monthly (see G.S., "Septemvri Dismissals...").

A major part of the report dealt with poetry, especially so far as recent ideological deviations -- from the party's point of view -- have emerged in this field. The biography of Elisaveta Bagryana by poet Blaga Dimitrova and Yordan Vasilev was once again publicly condemned in rather strong and sharp words. The only new element in the attack is that Arzhentinski revealed one previously unknown fact: a special party organization meeting adopted a concrete resolution on the case (this meeting probably preceded the 13 October 1975 meeting of the BWU -- see G.S., "Icy Winds..." p. 2). Such documents, as a rule, are almost never published, but by implication, it seems that this concrete resolution attacked at least two "alarming facts," as Arzhentinski himself put it: first, "the recent, ever more frequent attempts to create pseudophilosophical, chamber poetry devoid of any social function"; and, secondly, "the attempts to discredit our party, revolutionary, communist literature and poetry." These generalizations, although the references were to concrete examples are revealing in more than one way. They indicate widespread discontent among authors and literary critics with the party's control over, and interference with, their performance. On the other hand, they also indicate the party's displeasure with writers who have the courage to speak out the truth as it is, rather than as it is supposed to be, according to the dogmas of the so-called "socialist-realist method" and Marxist-Leninist aesthetics.

Finally, such generalizations, and the vehemence with which they are made, are an indication of the failure of the party's cultural policies. All this acquires new dimensions, especially on the eve of the party congress, at which the proverbial claims of general unanimity will be once again proclaimed. It is an indication of the gap existing between the party and the intellectuals, a gap that seems to be growing wider and deeper (see also the discussion of Dimitrova's and Vasilev's book in Filosofska Misal No. 12, 1975, pp. 43-50).

The dimensions of the gap, and the party's concern about its existence were illustrated by two events preceding the party organization's conference. On 2 and 8 December 1975, the BWU Administrative Council held "a discussion on poetry," which originally had been scheduled for mid-November (see G.S., "Icy Winds..." p. 2). No reason for the delay was given, while the adding of an extra day to the initially planned one-day get-together was explained in a rather awkward way: "in order to

leave the impression on the participants that a frank, thorough, and helpful discussion took place" (Literaturen Front No. 50, 11 December 1975). The other event was Todor Zhivkov's meeting with some BWU members on December 11 (Literaturen Front No. 51, 18 December 1975). Usually, such meetings receive detailed coverage, which was not the case this time. On the contrary, a cloud of secrecy descended on the meeting, which was also attended by Alexander Lilov, Politburo member and CC secretary. (This was Lilov's first public appearance after a five-months' absence [see Bulgarian SR/31, RFER, 6 November 1975, Item 2]. Since then, however, Lilov has infrequently appeared in public.)

As far as the two-day discussion on poetry is concerned, the main report was read by Matey Shopkin, BWU secretary; an additional report was delivered by Bogomil Raynov, first deputy president of the BWU; 10 speakers took the floor; and the closing speech was made by BWU President Panteley Zarev. Most of the speakers echoed the accusations against the Literaturna Misal critics, adding hardly anything new (cf., Literaturen Front Nos. 50 and 51, 11 and 18 December 1975; and G.S., "Icy Winds..." pp. 3-7). The discussion, as a whole, provides an inside look at the present-day crisis in this sphere. It also contains a considerable number of illustrations and examples of the unsolved and ever-growing problems of the regime's cultural policies.

Contrary to the official stand -- popularized for propaganda reasons -- that today's Bulgarian drama is undergoing a kind of socialist renaissance, Ivan Arzhentinski, in his report to the party organization conference, did not try to conceal his "alarm" and "concern" about the "low artistic level" of contemporary Bulgarian drama and theater. He added that urgent steps should be taken to "cure a whole series of illnesses afflicting the cinema, television, and theater." On 22 December 1975, the fifth plenum of the Bulgarian Actors' Union discussed precisely these same "illnesses," but the available coverage does not permit any meaningful analysis in depth.

The parts on humor, satire, and children's literature are summarized in such way that, on the one hand, they are not representative of the actual situation, while, on the other hand, writing in this field does not seem to have improved in the last two years (cf., Bulgarian SRs/11 and 13, RFER, 26 April 1974 and 9 May 1975, Items 1 and 2, respectively; and Literaturen Front No. 2, 8 January 1976).

The concluding portion of the report is devoted to literary criticism. The role of scapegoat has once again been assigned to it. This role was given to it some seven years ago by Todor Zhivkov in his famous Komsomol speech (see Bulgarian SR/25, RFER, 2 April 1969, Item 2), and since that time criticism has repeatedly been a target of attack (see Bulgarian SR/18, RFER, 26 June 1975, Item 1, and all references mentioned therein). Ivan Arzhentinski once again reiterated his accusations at the "gray stream" conference of last summer (ibid.). Critics are blamed for their failure

to detect the decline in readers; interest in contemporary Bulgarian literature and above all for not having met the party's demands. In Arzhentinski's own words, literary critics have not yet succeeded in turning themselves into "a sharp and powerful weapon of the party's policies in literature," while some critics are accused of having made even more serious mistakes: they "are trying to disregard the class-party criteria, thus turning criticism into empty words, into a smoke screen." Finally, Ivan Arzhentinski complained that critics have almost completely ignored the present-day literary scene, that "there are no reviews or analysis in depth of the situation in individual fields of contemporary literature." This attack indicates, among other things, that the apathy of critics is not less serious than that of writers.

A number of speakers took the floor after Ivan Arzhentinski, but most of the published summaries do not convey the essence of their statements. Speaking of "certain trends and failures contradicting the party's literary policies," BWU President Panteley Zarev said that "greater tact was displayed [in dealing with recent 'deviations'] than was necessary." This might mean that a harder line could be expected to be adopted in the near future. In support of this speculation is the statement of poet Dimitar Metodiev, whom the news media call Todor Zhivkov's "personal adviser." An interesting detail is that the editor who summarized Metodiev's speech invariably used terms such as "he recommended," or "he was pleased to see," or "he emphasized his alarm," or "he wished to," etc. Bearing in mind his "post," it is safe to assume that he spoke on behalf of the party leaders, expressing their concern and "alarm" about the situation.

The most sober voice heard at the party organization conference was that of literary critic Ivan Tsvetkov. He warned his audience that "this or that mistake should be corrected with trust and patience." Tsvetkov also "condemned arrogance, groundless labeling and name-calling whenever differences in opinion arise, or during heated discussions," and finally, he appealed for "more cultured manners and literary morals."

The conference ended with the election of a new ruling body of the party organization in the BWU. Ivan Arzhentinski was replaced by Nikolay Hristozov, a deputy party secretary. Arzhentinski's removal from office should not be interpreted, however, as an indication that his performance was not appreciated. It is quite normal to elect a new party secretary every two or three years. (For details on Arzhentinski, see Bulgarian SR/7, RFER, 15 February 1973, Item 2.)

Nikolay Hristozov (born in 1931) has risen rapidly since becoming a BWU member in 1969. In 1973 he was elected deputy party secretary, and in the same year became deputy editor-in-chief of Septemvri magazine, a post he managed to maintain even after the mass dismissals (see G.S., "Septemvri Dismissals. . ."). Hristozov is the author of a number of volumes of verse and prose.

There have been two deputy party secretaries to date. Their number was increased to three for the first time this year. The new ones are Evtim Evtimov, Gercho Atanasov, and Petar Neznakov.

Poet Evtim Evtimov (born in 1933) had already served in this post in 1973, and has for years been a member of the party bureau. At present, he is director of the Komsomol's Narodna Mladezh Publishers.

Gercho Atanasov (age unknown, but presumably in his early 40s) is the author of half a dozen books of short stories and travel. In the early days of his career, he was mildly criticized for "writing under the influence of ideas and trends that are not in harmony with Marxist-Leninist Weltanschauung and socialist realism" (Narodna Kultura No. 14, 4 April 1964). It seems, however, that Atanasov duly "corrected" his "deviations," and managed, through his prolific output and orthodox efforts, to become a BWU member in 1973. In the Septemvri reshuffle, he became executive secretary of the magazine. His latest party post is another important peak in his career.

Humorist Petar Neznakomov (born in 1920) served two terms in the party bureau (in 1966 and in 1975). He is the author of a large number of short stories and has occupied various leading posts in literary administration. At present, he is a member of the editorial staff of the satirical weekly Starshel.

The 11 members of the party bureau represent the older and middle generations of the BWU membership. Most of them have already served several terms on this ruling body. (023)

2. Soviet-Bulgarian Trade Agreement Reflects Price Increases

A long-term trade and payments agreement between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria for the 1976-1980 period was signed in Moscow on December 25 by the foreign trade ministers of the two countries, Ivan Nedev and Nikolai S. Patolichev. The official announcement of the agreement (Rabotnichesko Delo, December 26) revealed a surprisingly high increase projected in mutual deliveries. It said that these will amount to 24,000 million rubles, which would mean an increase by 80 per cent over the five-year period just ended. The 1970-1975 agreement projected a total volume of somewhat over 12,000 million rubles (Rabotnichesko Delo, 5 November 1970); in relation to this figure, the new one would actually mean a 100 per cent increase. It is known from the past, however, that the agreement figures usually are exceeded, and, when the two ministers were subsequently interviewed (Rabotnichesko Delo, December 27), Patolichev said, indeed, that the 1971-1975 exchanges had reached the sum of 13,900 rubles, as against the 12,400 million planned in the agreement. Compared with the figure reported by Patolichev, the new one means an increase of 76 per cent, i.e., it is very close to the 80 per cent mentioned in the official announcement.

Both the large overfulfillment of the 1971-1975 agreement (by 12 per cent) and the extremely large increase of 76 or 80 per cent projected in the new agreement (for the sake of comparison, the 1971-1975 agreement meant an increase of only 60 per cent)

indicates that the figures not only reflect increases in actual volume, but also increases in value, i.e., part of the rise is due to higher prices. Confirmation of this assumption can be found in a figure released only little more than two months before the new agreement was signed, on the occasion of the co-ordination of the Soviet and Bulgarian five-year plans. At that time, it was reported that the 1976-1980 trade agreement would total 20,000 million rubles, and exceed that for 1971-1975 by 50 per cent (for details, see Bulgarian SR/30, RFER, 29 October 1975, Item 2). The fact that two months later an agreement on a so much higher figure was signed indicates that different price levels were used on the two occasions.

A far more explicit confirmation of this assumption was provided in a lengthy interview on Soviet-Bulgarian economic relations with Georgi Pavlov, deputy chairman of the Commission on Economic and Scientific-Technical Co-operation (i.e., on Comecon) at the Council of Ministers. In Otechestven Front on 17 December 1975, only a week before the long-term trade agreement was signed, Pavlov said that "according to advance calculations, the goods exchange between Bulgaria and the USSR during the seventh five-year plan (i.e., 1976-1980) will amount to about 19,000 million rubles (at currently valid prices)" (emphasis added). It is quite obvious that the agreement signed on December 25 does not differ essentially in volume from the preliminary calculations on which Pavlov based his statement a week earlier. It can even be taken for granted that the volume of 19,000 million rubles, "at currently valid prices" corresponds almost exactly to the volume of 24,400 million rubles laid down in the agreement, which is obviously expressed in prices valid henceforth. This means that the new prices of goods included in the Soviet-Bulgarian import and export lists are 28 per cent higher than those applied until recently.

It should be remembered here that Bulgarian media have been very reticent on the subject of price increases in inter-Comecon trade, applied a year ago. The first, and thus far only known, explicit mention of it was contained in Zemedelsko Zname on July 23 (see Bulgarian SR/22, RFER, 30 July 1975, Item 3).

According to some details on the new trade agreement, provided by Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev in the above-mentioned interview, there will be "a considerable increase" in the mutual deliveries of machinery and equipment, especially in those going from Bulgaria to the Soviet Union. The deliveries of fuel, power, raw and other materials from the Soviet Union will also increase, accounting eventually for 58 per cent of all Soviet exports to Bulgaria, compared with 46 per cent during the past five-year period. These details show that the largest increases in volume are projected for those products on which price increases have been the greatest. (024)

3. CC Theses Adopt a "New Approach" in Preparing for the Party Congress

An official BTA announcement, broadcast by Radio Sofia on January 7 and printed in the daily press on January 8, said that the BCP CC has adopted a "new approach" in preparing for the forthcoming 11th party congress. ("New approach" is an increasingly fashionable term, which has also been used when speaking or writing about preparations for the new five-year plan -- see R.N., "The Bulgarian Plan and Budget for 1976," RAD BR/181 [Bulgaria], RFEF, 23 December 1975, pp. 3-4.)

The new approach in preparing for the congress was described in the official announcement as follows: an all-round balance is made up in advance, and the main directions in the development of Bulgaria during the seventh five-year plan (1976-1980) and up to 1990 are outlined. Then the CC holds plenums which approve theses on fundamental problems of the country's development. These theses will then serve as the basis for preparing the draft directives and other documents for the congress. The theses, as approved by the plenums, will be published in Rabotnichesko Delo "to allow Communists and all working people to become acquainted with them, and to have a chance to express their own viewpoints, ideas, and suggestions." The main party daily will place its pages at the disposal of those members of the public who wish to express such opinions. Written suggestions and considerations may also be sent to the party CC.

The announcement reported that, on the same date, the theses on the basic directions of economic development during the seventh five-year plan and up to 1990 were being printed in Rabotnichesko Delo (this was confirmed by the Radio Sofia "Press Review" program of January 8; that issue of the paper itself is not yet available). It also listed theses on three other subjects whose publication was forthcoming: (1) on the basic directions of development of science and technological progress during the seventh five-year plan and up to 1990; (2) on the further fulfillment of the December (1972) program for raising the standard of living of the people during the seventh five-year plan and up to 1990; and (3) on the state and development of the BCP and of the public organizations and movements.

The immediate, and very strong, impression conveyed by this official announcement is twofold: it reveals an extremely great delay in publishing already existing and approved documents, on the one hand, and on the other it presages a very tight schedule for the two and a half months remaining until the 11th party congress, scheduled to begin on March 29, a schedule which would seem very difficult to fulfill, especially in light of the aforementioned delays.

The greatest of these delays is the one connected with the publication of the economic theses on January 8. The CC plenum which approved these theses was held on 27 and 28 February 1975

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(see Bulgarian SR/6, REFER, 6 March 1975, Item 1, and the above-cited RAD BR/181). No explanation whatever was given for the reason why the theses did not appear in printed form for more than 10 months. Their belated publication is the more difficult to explain since the declared intention is to have them discussed by the public, and allegedly only then to work out the draft directives to be submitted to the congress. In the past, the draft directives were published well in advance; e.g., somewhat more than three months before the ninth congress (November 1966), and almost exactly two months before the 10th congress (April 1971). It is possible that the new directives have already been prepared, but that would mean that discussion of the theses would hardly serve any practical purpose.

The second set of theses, on science, and technological progress, were also approved by a CC plenum several months ago, on 22 and 23 July 1975. It is probable that they will be published in the very near future, possibly in the next few days. The fate of the theses on the remaining two subjects, however, appears doubtful since the two CC plenums that are to approve them (this can hardly be done at a single plenum for both subjects) are still to be held. A forthcoming CC plenum on the standard of living was announced by Todor Zhivkov last August (Rabotnichesko Delo, 7 August 1975), and he said that "the time is ripe" to hold a plenum of "the state, activities, and tasks of the party" as long ago as the March 1974 National Party Conference (Rabotnichesko Delo, 21 March 1974; the exact subject of this plenum was later modified, as subsequent statements show, including the latest BTA announcement). For unknown reasons, however, the CC has not held a plenary session since July 1975, i.e., for almost six months (unless a plenum has been held without any news about it having been released; this has never been the case in the past, so far as is known).


Against this background, it appears safe to assume that considerable difficulties have cropped up in preparing the theses on the last two subjects -- leaving aside any guess about other, political, rather than factual, difficulties in the CC which might have been preventing the leadership from convoking a plenum for such a lengthy time, during a period when there would have been so many questions with which to deal. It should be noted in this context that Zhivko Zhivkov, in a report at the celebration of the October Revolution anniversary (Rabotnichesko Delo, 6 November 1975) mentioned foreign policy (along with the two above-listed subjects) as being on the CC's agenda; any plans to hold a pre-congress plenum on this subject seem now to have been dropped, to judge from the BTA announcement.

At any rate, the fact that the BTA announcement on the "new approach" was published and the subjects of the forthcoming theses were listed indicates that the existing difficulties have been overcome and the plenums will be held. In view of the short time remaining for holding a plenum(s), publishing the theses, discussing them, and then possibly preparing and publishing the draft directives, it would not be surprising if the congress were

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postponed, as has been the case with some previous BCP congresses. On the other hand, if the congress is not postponed, it is hardly likely that the opinions and suggestions which the people are called upon to present will really be taken into consideration, because of the very short time that will be left to amend the texts accordingly. Under these circumstances, it is possible that the "opinions" that will be published will be merely propagandistic "wholehearted approvals," as seems to be already indicated by a few statements broadcast over Radio Sofia. (025)

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RAD Background Report/11
(Yugoslavia)
15 January 1976



COMINFORMIST TRIALS IN YUGOSLAVIA

By Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: The current trial of four Cominformists in Belgrade behind closed doors and similar trials now in preparation are seen as a warning by Belgrade to Moscow that Yugoslavia intends to go on vigorously defending its independence and self-management socialism. With the exception of Vladimir Dapcevic, who has for years been considered Moscow's main agent against Tito, none of the persons now being tried or awaiting trial can be considered very important. Through them, however, the Yugoslav leaders would like to settle accounts with Stalinist practices within the international communist movement in general, and in the Soviet Union in particular.

* * *

The pro-Soviet elements, or "Cominformists" as they are popularly called, in Yugoslavia are now going through hard times. One trial of four Cominformists was to have begun in Belgrade on January 12 but was postponed to February 9, and two others are said to be in preparation: 10 people will be tried in Novi Sad on charges of setting up an illegal group based on "Cominformist views," (1) and former army Colonel Vladimir Dapcevic, (2) said to have been captured "on Yugoslav territory while engaged in "antistate operations," is to be tried in camera. (3)

Even though the Yugoslav information media have avoided directly accusing Moscow of supporting these "Cominformist elements," references to "foreign supporters" could not but create a clear impression that the Soviet Union is involved. This became quite obvious when, at the end of last November, the Soviets officially disso-

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- (1) Politika (Belgrade), 9 January 1976.
(2) Reuter in a dispatch from Belgrade, 9 January 1976.
(3) Borba (Belgrade), 27 December 1975.

ciated themselves from "conspiratorial sectarian groups" in Yugoslavia (i.e., from the Cominformists) "who represent no one but themselves." (4) This is how the pro-Soviet groups and individuals in Yugoslavia have come to be officially deprived of any ideological support from Moscow, a "trump card" with which they have played in their propaganda within the country. What the Russians have thus far not done, however, is publicly to dissociate themselves from the anti-Titoist "Cominformist exiles" living in the Soviet Union and other East European countries.

In prosecuting the Cominformists, the Yugoslav leaders have not only demonstrated their firm determination to remain independent of any tutelage from Moscow, but also the intention to present their system of "self-management socialism" as the sole correct type of socialism. In his book, The CPY Conflict with the Cominform, published on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of Khrushchev's confession in Belgrade that Tito was right and Stalin wrong, the Yugoslav theorist Dr. Radovan Radonjic said that the struggle against the Cominform proved that self-management has become "not only a real alternative to Stalinism in Yugoslavia, but also a major alternative within international socialism." He added that all subsequent examinations "of the Soviet social realities in the era of Stalinist domination in the Soviet Union have confirmed that the views advocated by the leaders of the CP of Yugoslavia in the middle of 1950 were correct." (5)

In another book on Yugoslavia's struggle against Cominformism, Dr. Cedomir Strbac [shter-bats] said that the Yugoslav communists have since 1948 fought "domination and hegemony within the revolutionary movement" and were the first "who seriously resisted the theory and practice of monopolism as the only valid principle in relations between communist parties at that time." This is how the Yugoslav Communists' struggle against the Cominform "significantly influenced the development of contemporary socialism and of international relations." If one wants to explain "Stalinist hegemony at the foreign policy level," one must understand "the essence of Stalinism." It is the spirit of the Belgrade Declaration (signed in Belgrade on 2 June 1955) and of the Moscow Declaration (signed in Moscow on 20 June 1956) that must serve as an instrument of "useful co-operation among the entire socialist and progressive movement throughout the world," as Tito put it while in Moscow in June 1956. (6)

(4) Pravda (Moscow), 27 November 1975.

(5) Dr. Radovan Radonjic, Sukob KPJ sa Kominformom /The CPY Conflict with the Cominform/, Zagreb 1975, p. 244.

(6) Borba, 10 January 1976.

Cominformism Seen as Treason

For this reason, the trials of more or less unknown and insignificant persons (with the exception of Vladimir Dapcevic) should not be examined on the basis of the persons involved, but rather on the task these trials are to perform: the resolute defense of Yugoslavia's self-management socialism. In a recent speech in the Adriatic town of Kotor, President Veselin Djuranovic of the LC of Montenegro said "Cominformism is not ideology, but treason." (7) It is the Montenegrin communist leaders who are especially disturbed by the Cominformist activities. As is well known, in September 1974, Tito revealed that some people "had plotted against the state" by holding a "congress" in the Montenegrin town of Bar, at which they created a rival communist party based on "Cominformist views." Subsequently, the trials of the "Cominformist plotters" were held in the Kosovo town of Pec [Pech] and the Montenegrin town of Titograd. Of 32 people tried, 3 were sentenced to between one and three years' imprisonment, and 29 to terms of 4 to 14 years. However, only three persons actually sentenced were mentioned by name, all three of whom were of no importance whatsoever. (8) But while in November 1975 Pravda hurried to dissociate Moscow from the alleged plotters even before they were tried, in 1974 TASS denied any connection between the Soviet Union and the "Cominformist plotters" in Yugoslavia after they were sentenced. (9)

Thus far, the only point Belgrade has conceded in Moscow was the fact that no public trial of the Cominformists has been staged. It is not known how the accused persons defended themselves, nor how strong they actually are. It appears, however, that, despite the perpetual insistence that the whole "Cominformist affair" should not be exaggerated, thousands of meetings and symposia have taken place throughout Yugoslavia to discuss the problem of Cominformism. Thus, for instance, the Serbian party recently held a meeting in Belgrade addressed by several prominent speakers. The reason for such a meeting was explained as follows:

The concrete motive for an analysis of Stalinism and Cominformism has been the arrest of a small number of illegally organized Cominformists in the country, which has already been reported. Although this group, as has been said, does not represent any serious danger to the country's security, it is neither naive nor harmless. This event, therefore, deserves a serious analysis by the LCY, because it is the expression of a definite ideology within the international workers'

(7) Ibid., 27 December 1975.

(8) Vjesnik (Zagreb), 22 September 1974.


(9) TASS, 26 September 1974.

movement, and an expression of the dogmatic-Stalinist concepts with which the consciousness of some of our people have been imbued. (10)

This is why the above-mentioned explanation of the current and forthcoming Cominformist trials in Yugoslavia cannot but be understood as a warning to Moscow that Yugoslavia is ready to defend its independence and its self-management against any aggressor, coming either from the West or from the East. (022)

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(10) Politika, 10 January 1976.



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RAD Background Report/ 12
(Poland)
15 January 1976

THE NEW PUWP CENTRAL COMMITTEE: SOME FACTS AND FIGURES

By Ewa Celt

Summary: This report studies the make-up of the new PUWP Central Committee, elected at the seventh party congress on 11 December 1975, breaking the membership down into various categories: age, party service, region of country represented, etc.

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The new Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), elected at the last (seventh) party congress on 11 December 1975, has been analyzed on two previous occasions. Earlier studies (1) provided the first available data on its numerical composition, and a general review of the new arrivals in the committee as a whole, and examined the women's share in its membership. At present, a more comprehensive assessment of the CC membership as a whole has become possible, mainly owing to a report published in the CC weekly Polityka (2) by Zygmunt Szeliga. Szeliga's data called for some checking and completion. The occupational groups were listed, for example, in fairly summary fashion, and contained some incorrect figures. Comparison of the present CC with its predecessors is also helpful. (3)

The present study will be supplemented by a biographical appendix and a more thoroughgoing analysis as soon as the full details

(1) See Polish Situation Reports/43 and 44, Radio Free Europe Research, 15 and 19 December 1975, Items 2c and 1, respectively.

(2) 20-27 December 1975.

(3) See Ewa Celt, "The New Central Committee of the PUWP," Polish Background Report/23, RFER, 1 August 1972, which also contains short biographical notes on both the full and candidate CC members elected at the sixth party congress in December 1971.

on the individual careers of the newcomers become available. Additional data concerning social origin and education will also be included.

The Seventh PUWP Congress, held in Warsaw between December 8 and 12, expanded the CC from its previous 115 full members to 140, while the deputy membership went up from 93 to 111. One obvious reason for this expansion was certainly the need to include the higher number of voivodship first secretaries (49, instead of the mere 23 before the May 1975 territorial-administrative reform). As has been rightly pointed out by some observers, (4) however, an additional factor that may have contributed to this increase was the leadership's anxiety to keep the number of necessary ousters down to a minimum, in order to avoid any impression of a "purge." Expanding the size might therefore seem the safest, and simplest, solution.

a. Years in Office. Before going into detail about its actual composition, it ought to be stated at the very outset that the bulk of the new Central Committee -- both with regard to full and to deputy members -- is almost entirely of Gierek's picking. Nearly 73.6 per cent of the full, and nearly 93 per cent of the deputy, members were appointed either in 1971 or in 1975. Among the 77 people reappointed to full CC membership by the seventh congress, 40 joined the CC only in 1971, including 22 complete newcomers (without previous candidate membership). Only 39 full and 8 deputy members were in office before Gierek's advent to power in December 1970. The figures below are self-explanatory.

Type of membership	Year of Election to CC							
	1948	1954	1959	1964	1968	1971	1975	Total
Full	6	3	4	10	14	40	63	140
Deputy	-	-	-	3	5	31	72	111

b. Age. Warsaw computers reckon that the average age of a full member of the new Central Committee is 49.7 years (53 for those re-elected, and 45.6 for newcomers). This means that the average

(4) For example, see Erik Michael Bader in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 December 1975.

age has gone up noticeably since the last congress, when it was only 48. When measured against the CCs elected during the late Gomulka era, however, it still shows a deliberate trend toward rejuvenation (the corresponding figures were about 55 years in 1964, and over 50 in 1968). The same is also true of the CC deputies, whose average age is 45.6 now (48.6 for those re-elected, and 44 for newcomers) against slightly under 45 in 1971. The table below shows the various age brackets of both groups.

Type of Membership	up to 40 years of age	41-45	46-50	51-55	56 and over
Full Members (140)	19 (13.6%)	24 (17.1%)	40 (28.6%)	28 (20%)	29 (20.7%)
Deputy Members (111)	22 (19.9%)	26 (23.4%)	39 (35.1%)	21 (19%)	3 (2.7%)

As can be seen above, two thirds of the full members fall into the 41-55 bracket (the youngest one being 29, and the oldest 74), while among deputy members as many as three quarters belong to that same age group (again, the youngest deputy is 26, and the oldest 65). As Polityka (5) noted, the 1929 class seems to be numerically the strongest: 19 of the members and deputies were born in that year.

In the 23-men-strong "inner group" of the party leadership (the Politburo and the CC Secretariat), the average age is 50.9 years, i.e., even less than the CC average). Within this leadership group, the breakdown by age is as follows:

Age Group	38-44	46-52	59-66
Number of Politburo and Secretariat members	4	14	5

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c. Occupational Groups. The numerically strongest group among full CC members is that representing industrial workers with 31 persons, including 4 miners, 4 people working in light industry, and 23 from various branches of the engineering and heavy industries. Right behind them, significantly, come representatives of the highest state and government offices. There are 27 of them, including 19 members of the Council of Ministers. When speaking of ministerial officials, it must be added that the Defense Minister and his two deputies are included in this category, although, strictly speaking, they should instead be listed under armed forces; hence the additional figure (in parentheses) in these two categories.

Third comes the group of voivodship first secretaries, numbering 24, while the central party apparat is represented by 20, and various mass organizations (trade unions, youth and women's unions) by 6 full CC members. Strikingly low is the share in the Central Committee of the managerial and technical intelligentsia; there is one single manager and one technician. The nation's intellectuals are represented by one artist, three journalists, and six university professors.

So far as deputies go, party first secretaries account for nearly a quarter of their number (25), while representatives of central state offices have 16 seats (including 9 ministers and 3 generals). Local administration is also represented by four voivodes. The proportion of peasants is as low as among the full members (three and five, respectively) while the number of high-ranking military officers is even larger (five, in addition to the three listed under ministerial officials). The corresponding breakdowns are as follows:

(more)

Profession	Full Members	Deputy Members
INDUSTRIAL WORKERS	31	18
PEASANTS		
Individual farmers	1	2
State and collective farmers	<u>4</u> 5	<u>1</u> 3
TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA		
Managers	1	1
Technicians	<u>1</u> 2	
ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS		
Ministerial officials	27 (3 milit.)	16 (3 milit.)
State and local government officers and clerks	<u>6</u> 33	<u>8</u> 24
INTELLECTUALS		
Artists and literati	1	2
Mass media workers	3	5
Men of learning	<u>6</u> 10	<u>4</u> 11
PARTY APPARATCHIKS		
National	20	7
Regional and industrial	27	34
Mass organizations	<u>6</u> 53	<u>6</u> 47
ARMED FORCES		
Generals	(4) ^x 1	(8) ^x 5
OTHERS		
(Including trade and services)	5	2
TOTALS	140	111
^x together with those listed under ministerial officials.		

d. Years in the Party. According to the data cited by Polityka, more than half the full CC members joined the party before the December 1948 "merger" between the Polish Workers' Party (PWP) and the Socialist Party (SP). Sixty of these senior members come from the PWP, and 12 from the SP. Another interesting detail is that the group includes eight people who were members of the prewar clandestine Polish Communist Party (PCP), while seven had membership in foreign communist parties abroad. As for deputy members, only 39 persons have pre-1948 seniority (32 from the PWP and 7 from the SP), while 2 were members of communist parties abroad. The corresponding breakdowns in full:

Type of Membership	Before 1948	1949-1955	1956-1965	1966-1969 (1971 for deputy members)
Full members	72	42	19	7
Deputy members	39	41	27	4

All members of the top leadership -- i.e., the Politburo and Secretariat -- have, according to Polityka, a party seniority of 19 to 45 years, along with what it terms "long years of experience in party work."

d. Place of Origin. Of the existing 49 voivodships, only 39 have representatives in the CC, mostly from 1 to 3 each. The regions of Warsaw and Katowice, however, seem to be especially privileged. As the report in Polityka indicates, those members from Warsaw or directly connected with the area constitute a strong majority among full CC members. In addition to 62 representatives of the central party and state apparatus necessarily residing in Warsaw, 8 other CC members hail from the capital. The Silesian province of Katowice is represented by eight full members. The proportions are reversed with respect to deputy members, the majority of whom come from the provinces (68), while Warsaw accounts for 51 (including 43 from various central offices and institutions). In this category, too, Katowice has the strongest provincial representation with five people.

The table below shows the central vs. provincial representation among full and candidate CC members:

Type of Membership	Central Party and State Apparatus	Provincial and Local Officials and Activists	Total Membership
Full Members	62	78	140
Deputy Members	43	68	111
Jointly in Percentage of Total CC Membership	42	58	100

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RAD Background Report/6
(Czechoslovakia)
14 January 1976

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A REVIEW OF CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1971

By the Czechoslovak Unit

Summary and Introduction: This article, by Milan Smetana, appeared in the Slovak CP-CC's weekly for politics, culture, and economics, and reviews Czechoslovak foreign policy during the period since the 14th CPCS Congress (May 1971), and "the great successes" that have resulted from this policy.

Czechoslovak diplomacy has been active in the past year -- especially in the West, where Prague has sought to "normalize" relations strained after the 1968 invasion -- and this article presents the main lines of Czechoslovakia's pre-congress assessment of its policy. The 15th congress will be held in April of this year.

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Our whole society is entering a period in which a balance sheet of what the conclusions of the 14th CPCS Congress have produced will be drawn up and preparations will be made for the 15th CPCS Congress. The period which has passed since the 14th CPCS Congress was a period of unprecedented general development. The socialist system has been buttressed decisively, and the international authority of our republic has been enhanced. Our foreign policy, based on the class bonds and fraternal mutual aid of the socialist states and pursued with all the means at our disposal, has also played its part in the successes of socialism and the common work of the working people. The realization of the peace program proclaimed at the 24th CPSU Congress, which was fully adopted

by the 14th CPCS Congress as well, provided a clear political orientation for our diplomacy, too. This orientation consisted in the efforts to strengthen the unity and cohesion of the countries of the socialist community, and to develop and intensify the co-operation and friendship with the USSR, as guarantee for our all-sided development. The main line of our foreign policy aimed at boosting the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems, in the interest of creating a favorable international atmosphere, and the conditions for reinforcing peace and security in the world. At the same time, we regard the endeavor to promote the policy of peaceful coexistence as an active policy of attack which springs from our class principles and excludes any kind of compromise in the field of ideas and any kind of conciliatory spirit toward bourgeois theories. In the past 30 years, since the end of the last world war, the world has made great strides forward. For the current international political situation, a positive trend is characteristic, one that is successfully overcoming the remnants of the cold war, a trend which leads toward the application of the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations among states. Furthermore, the current international situation is exceptionally favorable for building socialism and communism in the countries of the socialist camp. The conditions for a successful struggle of national liberation and economic and social progress have been established. The foreign policy of the CPCS regards these changes with satisfaction. We regard these changes with the deep conviction that only in peace are we able to make all the desires of our people come true, and that only under the conditions of peace can we build an advanced socialist reality in our homeland. Historical experience has taught us that unceasing efforts to intensify and strengthen friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union, based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, mutual assistance, support, and solidarity, are the mainstays of our state and national existence.

Firm Ties With the USSR

In the period just ended, our relations with the USSR have been raised to a new, qualitatively higher level. Based on the Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance Pact, the results achieved in the co-operation of the two countries have created new foundations for further perfecting the all-sided relations between our fraternal countries. The Soviet Union is the largest trading partner of the CSSR. During the past 25 years, the volume of Czechoslovak-Soviet trade has increased 13 times. The Soviet Union accounts for

one third of the total volume of Czechoslovak foreign trade. In this manner, the Soviet Union has provided a large, reliable, and chiefly crisis-free market for the sale of our products, a market which constitutes a guarantee for the security and long-range prospects of our national economy. For all practical purposes, there is not a single branch of the Czechoslovak economy today in which the co-operation with Soviet enterprises, trade organizations, and scientific-technological institutions is not of fundamental importance. It is necessary to bear in mind that the USSR quite unselfishly supplies the Czechoslovak economy with more than two thirds of the raw materials it uses, and one can say that these deliveries of raw material requirements are safeguarded in every sphere of the economy of the CSSR. The co-ordination of the five-year plans of the two countries, in the interest of more rapidly solving major economic problems through joint effort, is already a matter of routine today. During the recent visit of our party and government delegation, led by Secretary-General of the CPCSSR CC and President of the Republic Gustav Husak, to the USSR, full consensus of opinion on current problems of the international situation and the world-wide workers' and communist movement was fully confirmed. As emphasized in the communiqué issued during this visit, the two parties agreed that the unity of the two parties, founded on common aims and ideology, is the driving force and the guarantee of the close relations of alliance between the CSSR and the USSR, and ensures the co-ordination of their policies in harmony with their national interests and the over-all interests of socialism.

Friendship, Sincerity, Trust

We also regard the development of fraternal co-operation with the other socialist countries as an asset of the highest order. Never before in history have our relations with the countries of the socialist camp been on as high a level as they are today. They are characterized by firm friendship, sincerity, and full trust. In the past few years, the foreign ministers of every socialist country have visited the CSSR. During these visits, the co-ordination of our joint moves in foreign policy was tightened. These visits also served as occasions for an exchange of opinions and information on all questions of current international developments. Today, the community of the socialist countries represents a new type of international relations. These relations stem from united political, economic, ideological, and defense foundations which only the socialist social system is able to create. The all-sided development of this common foundation is an important task of Czechoslovak

foreign policy. Because of this, we emphasize strongly the co-operation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, whose 20th anniversary we celebrated a short time ago. To us, the Warsaw Pact is an obligation whose importance for strengthening peace and security in Europe is indisputable. Our country has also had a major share in all-sidedly developing economic relations with the socialist countries. We fully support, and try to boost, international socialist economic integration, and we fully implement the conclusions adopted within the framework of Comecon. The Comprehensive Program of Socialist Economic Integration provides all the necessary safeguards for our national economy and its development.

Active in the Process of Détente

The foreign policy of the CPCSSR, guided by the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems and by the endeavor to preserve peace and security, decisively promotes the development of co-operation and international understanding. We want to further relations with the capitalistic states to our mutual advantage, based on equal rights as well. The aims of some Western states, to drive the CSSR into some kind of international isolation and to limit relations particularly at the political level, have proved unable to survive the period of the cold war. The development of political relations between the CSSR and the capitalistic states is now, under the conditions of peaceful coexistence, an indispensable precondition for solving disputed questions, creating an atmosphere of trust in mutual relations, and for removing the remnants of the cold war. Never before have we witnessed as broad intensive activity in international relations as we do today. It is precisely political contacts which fully confirm that the political isolation of the CSSR has been broken. Bourgeois historiography has assessed the foreign policy of the pre-Munich republic as very successful. In 1975, however, a larger number of conferences and meetings between representatives of socialist Czechoslovakia and representatives of countries of all the continents has been registered than held by pre-Munich bourgeois diplomacy during the whole of the 20 years of its existence.

In the first half of this year alone, 13 visits and meetings of the Foreign Minister of the CSSR with his colleagues from abroad are on record. Several of these meetings were the very first in the history of our diplomacy. The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister met his partners from Austria, the FRG, and the Vatican for the first time. Among important visits to the CSSR, we may list those by the Danish Foreign Minister, and the two visits to our homeland by

UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. In connection with the talks of our government representatives, it must be realized that questions until then disputed with our Western neighbors -- Austria and the GFR -- were settled in the period just ending. The accord on the mutual relations between the CSSR and the GFR has created conditions chiefly for the development of political relations. The foreign Minister of the GFR visited the CSSR, and at Helsinki the President of the Republic met with the Chancellor of the GFR. It is the historical merit of the new leadership of the party, with Comrade Husak at its head, that it decided to solve the complicated set of problems involved in the remnants of the Munich Agreement. The solution of this question was followed by the solution of the problem of diplomatic relations between the GFR and other socialist countries as well. Our interest in developing all-sided relations with our Western neighbor has been confirmed many times. As far as our side is concerned, obstacles to further progress along this path do not exist. For the first time since 1918, the Foreign Minister of our other Western neighbor -- Austria -- visited the CSSR this year. During this visit, the Agreement on the Settlement of Financial and Property Right Questions was signed, which signified a fundamental turning point in mutual relations. Chiefly owing to the normalization of political relations, the volume of mutual trade also increased, and opportunities for a further, mutually advantageous growth of economic co-operation were created. A decisive step forward was also taken in our relations with France. The impetus to improve them was provided by the visit of the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister to France. At the recent visit of Prime Minister Lubomir Strougal to France, it was stated that favorable conditions exist for raising relations, to which special importance is attributed, to an adequate level.

The Helsinki Conclusions -- A Springboard

In the past few years, Czechoslovak foreign policy has succeeded in solving all the problems and questions which had been an obstacle to a further development of co-operation with Western states. As a result of the elimination of these problems, conditions for intensifying relations, as demanded by the 14th CPCS Congress and as stipulated in the conclusions of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, have been established. The CSSR has always demonstrated its interest in a successful conclusion of the CSCE. We have always unswervingly upheld the principle that détente in the political sphere is essential if war is to be definitively eliminated from the life of mankind, and that the need of all nations for peace is equal in degree. We have always emphasized that the struggle for

the defense of peace, as the decisive precondition for social progress, also is an important stage on the road toward the adoption of the principles of international co-operation. The participation of our delegation, led by Secretary-General of the CPCSSR and President of the Republic Gustav Husak, in the final phase of the conference was the climax of our effort which had lasted for many years. During the final phase of the conference, within a period of merely 3 days, our representatives met in 27 bilateral conferences. These talks demonstrate how markedly the international position of the CSSR has been consolidated and gained in strength. We want to and shall consistently implement the results of the Helsinki conference. On the basis of the declaration about the principles governing relations, we want to develop a policy of political, economic, and cultural co-operation founded on mutual advantage and equal rights. And we approach the fulfillment of the final document with a deep sense of responsibility. Indeed, it is precisely the scope of our political relations that is now broader than ever before, and this testifies to the seriousness and weight of our aims and intentions.

Peace -- The Supreme Goal

In addition to the aforementioned visits and talks, representatives of Syria, Iran, Belgium, Great Britain, the United States of America, and other capitalistic as well as developing countries came to visit our republic. Comrade Husak visited Finland and India, and Comrade Strougal went to Syria, too, in addition to these other states. The Federal Assembly of the CSSR, trade union, youth, and other organizations also registered an exceptional development of relations. During the past 3 years, we established diplomatic relations with 15 additional states, and today we maintain such relations with 115 countries on every continent. Our Foreign Minister Bohuslav Chnoupek, in his report to the Federal Assembly on 11 November 1975, also emphasized our efforts in international organizations. We are a member of 12 governmental and 1,256 nongovernmental international organizations. On our territory alone, 500 conferences, consultations, and symposia were held in the course of last year. Here, he pointed out, we are expanding not only our political relations, but also our cultural and economic relations, and we do not try to impede contacts among people. This brief and far from exhaustive, statement of fact clearly demonstrates the great efforts made by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in support of the policy of preserving peace, relaxing international tension, and developing international understanding and co-operation. We are well aware that the road ahead of us is not easy. It will be necessary to

battle tenaciously with the opponents of détente, the forces of reaction, and the supporters of the remnants of the cold war. However, there is no other road. For, as the Secretary-General of the CPSC CC and President of the Republic Gustav Husak has declared, the struggle for a happy and free life of the working people and the struggle for peace, as a part of the struggle for social progress and a life without wars, exploitation, and racial oppression, is our supreme goal, and we bear the responsibility of reaching it so far as our people, the international communist and workers' movement, and progressive mankind as a whole are concerned. (017)

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This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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- RAD Background Report/6
(Czechoslovakia)
14 January 1976

CORRECTION

to

A REVIEW OF CZECHOSLOVAK FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1971

By the Czechoslovak Unit

The first paragraph of the Summary and Introduction should read as follows:

This article, by Milan Smetana, appeared in the Slovak CP CC's weekly for politics, culture, and economic, Nove Slovo (No. 51, 18 December 1975), and reviews Czechoslovak foreign policy during the period since the 14th CPCS Congress (May 1971), and "the great successes" that have resulted from this policy. The title of the article is "Peace Alone Fulfills the Desires of Mankind."



This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

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● RAD Background Report/5
(Yugoslavia)
14 January 1976

YUGOSLAV DAILY SCOLDS CSSR PRESS OVER
"PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM"

By Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: The following is a translation of an article by Zeljko Brihta published on January 11 in the Zagreb daily Vjesnik under the headline "School of Patience." Brihta polemicizes with an article which recently appeared in Czechoslovakia that attempts to make a distinction between "real" communist parties (i.e., those obedient to Moscow) and the others. Brihta says that each communist party, whether in a socialist or in a capitalist country, has the right to decide for itself what to do and how to behave.

* * *

Some of our readers were surprised and filled with concern after having read a report published in our newspaper on January 7. (The issue discussed was the drawing of a clear-cut line that would delineate the relationship between proletarian internationalism and specific roads to socialism by some other communist parties as it has been explained in the CSSR.) Our readers suggest that we explain a "change" which they seemed to have noticed in the excerpts taken from an article in Czechoslovak newspapers; the article in question deals with relationships and co-operation within the international workers' movement, with one or another type of communist party and socialist country, with internationalism, and the various attitudes taken toward the Soviet Union and China.

It is the business of people who advocate such ideas (and their causes) rather than someone else, especially from abroad, to explain these ideas; it is necessary to avoid anything that someone -- even mistakenly -- might understand or interpret as interference into his own affairs. Yugoslavia does not like anyone else to behave in this fashion toward it, which is why it is not a good thing for anybody in Yugoslavia to act thus toward others. Mutual respect of this sort has been one of the conditions for the maintenance of good relations and co-operation, on which Yugoslavia, as a nonaligned and self-managing socialist country, strongly insists, regardless of whether the partner in question has a "similar" or "different" system.

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It is, however, precisely such co-operation that does not exclude, but rather includes, the necessity to present other people's views to the public of one's own country and then to compare them with one's own views. Only in this way can countries come to understand each other better. This is especially important for the socialist countries, regardless of the differences between them, or even precisely because of these differences. Differences in views emerge because of differences in positions; such differences should not, and must not, create obstacles for co-operation among socialist countries and their communist parties and other progressive movements.

In their mutual relations, therefore, they should free themselves from remnants and burdens of the past -- although it is quite obvious that one should not expect too much all of a sudden. For Yugoslavia and for its League of Communists, it has certainly been important that they, after having passed through a school of temptation and patience, have managed to establish good relations with so many socialist countries and their communist parties, while remaining loyal to their own policy and principles. Such relations are possible only if the partners to them are equal, if they do not impose upon each other their own views and interests, and if they do not expect each other to abandon his own views.

Every partner has, therefore, both the right and duty to think what he likes about himself and to do in his own country what he wishes; this means that nobody has the right, much less the duty, to impose on anyone his own appraisals, which would be obligatory upon the other (or all) parties, especially not appraisals dealing with the behavior of the others. In the long run, this means that foreign opinions about proletarian or internationalist consciousness and loyalty are not valid for everybody: each communist party, whether in a socialist or in a capitalist country, is above all responsible to its own workers and its own people. This, rather than its attitude toward this or that side, is the best criterion for judging its value.


Ergo, the better a party is toward "itself," the more "internationalist" such a party is; only such a party will become an important collaborator within the international workers' movement, conceived as a movement of equal parties, rather than a movement composed of more and less valuable parties. This must be a movement which, in this or that move -- say in the period of détente in Europe -- can appear as a united movement only if its unity stems from within, rather than from without. This must be a movement which does not refer to the past, but rather works and lives in the present. This must be a movement composed of parties who co-operate, rather than condemn.

This means that Yugoslavia (and the LCY), for instance, do not think that "the attitude toward Maoism constitutes the border line between advocates and opponents of Marxism-Leninism" -- as is claimed by some Czechoslovak newspapers -- while co-operating in some specific fields even with those countries (and parties) that have condemned "Maoism." Proof of this is that they Yugoslavia

and the LCY⁷ also co-operate, in the general interest, with that country in which all those who have condemned "Maoism" are proclaimed "social imperialists" (i.e., with China). They co-operate because they are neither anti-Soviet nor anti-Chinese, just as they are neither pro-Soviet nor pro-Chinese.

One can maintain one's own opinion also on other issues which, as we have already mentioned, are discussed in Czechoslovak newspapers: the issue of two kinds of parties -- of "fraternal" parties in the countries in which "real" socialism is being built, and some others; or of "proletarian internationalism" as "the highest form of the international revolutionary struggle," which includes even "the right to intervention"; this is why "the invasion by the united forces of the socialist countries of Czechoslovakia in 1968" has been presented as "the most significant act of international solidarity," the communist conferences in 1957, 1960, and 1969 as a "confirmation," and one's attitude toward the Soviet Union as a "standard" by which to judge one's internationalism.

But our readers know that, in the school of patience, principles remain the most important subject to study, although grades are also given for good behavior. (016)



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RAD Background Report/4
(Yugoslavia)
13 January 1976

YUGOSLAV WARNING ON CONFERENCE

By Kevin Devlin

Summary: As East and West European communist parties prepare to gather in East Berlin for another attempt to hammer out a conference document acceptable to all, the Yugoslav commentator Milika Sundic has said that if certain parties keep on trying to impose their own views, others will not attend. In view of plausible reports that the CPSU has agreed to drop "objectionable" parts of the harder-line draft text presented in November, this attack should perhaps be seen as a warning that any attempt by the pro-Soviet parties to go back on concessions already made will be bitterly resisted.

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In a vigorously worded commentary on the prolonged preparations for a pan-European conference of communist parties, a Yugoslav spokesman has warned that if certain parties insist on trying to impose their own views, the conference "may still take place, but not with the participation of all parties." In his broadcast commentary, (1) Milika Sundic -- a prominent journalist who has frequently spoken for the Belgrade regime on such matters -- also accused "some parties" of deviating from agreements reached earlier, by seeking to reintroduce "outmoded and unacceptable forms of co-operation," by linking the pan-European meeting to past and future conferences, and by insisting on a "firm" collective document.

Sundic began by stressing the differences which had made the preparatory meetings such an unexpectedly prolonged process (the

(1) Radio Zagreb, 11 January 1976.

conference was originally scheduled to be held "not later than mid-1975"). Debates over what the conference should produce had, he said, already been going on "for nearly 20 months, which is how long the preparations . . . have lasted so far."(2)

True, the debates are not as open as they should be. The meetings, likewise, are not open to the public. The view that they should be has been supported by some parties [i.e., the LCY itself, and other independent parties -- K.D.]. Each party supplies its own and the international public with relevant information, depending on how much of an outward-looking approach it has, and each party places the greatest emphasis on those principles which it considers to be most significant. It is usual practice to avoid speaking about the attitudes of others, but despite this everybody understands everybody else, since representatives of the interested parties have had a chance to present their views, and it is therefore known with certainty what those concerned want and what they do not want.

It is plain to everyone that the process of harmonizing views has been going on for much longer than was at first expected. If it is borne in mind, however, that each party has its own idea of the conference, and that these ideas are sometimes contradictory, it becomes obvious that it has not been possible to move any faster in formulating a document about whose content nothing specific can yet be said, thus also making it impossible to say anything definite about the date of the conference.

Sundic's remark that nothing specific can yet be said about the content of the document deserves attention. The Yugoslavs and the other independent parties have said a number of specific things about the character and content of the conference document -- for example, that it should not deal with ideology, that it should not contain criticism of any party, that it should not be of a binding nature, and that it should present only positions which are truly

(2) This would mean that interparty negotiations on the conditions for holding the pan-European conference began around May 1974. Gian Carlo Pajetta has said, however, in a Rinascita article of 25 October 1974, that the proposal for a conference was first made by the PCI during interparty talks in Moscow at the beginning of 1973, and the first public [pro-Soviet] calls for a European conference came in November of that year.

common to all the parties concerned. On the face of it, his statement indicates that the gap between these demands of the independent parties and the positions of the conservative majority has not yet been bridged -- that the outcome of the prolonged confrontation is still uncertain.

"Deviations" from Agreements

At this point, Sundic delivered a sharp attack against "some parties" -- and earlier commentaries (3) by him on the conference project left no doubt that he was referring to the CPSU and its loyalist allies:

Together with the changing of the conference date, however, there has been an increasing number of demands by some parties for preparations for a world consultative meeting to begin now. Some of these parties also link the preparations for the European conference with previous meetings and their documents, as well as with future initiatives. There are also other views, however, the strongest of them being that the forthcoming conference should have neither past nor future, and that the document of the conference should not be adopted unless all parties agree with its contents. It is true that so far nobody has questioned the need for holding a conference of European communist parties. If a number of parties persist in demanding that the conference should be linked with past and future meetings, however, it may still be held, but not with the participation of all the parties which have taken part in the preparations to date.

The question as to why some parties insist on the so-called "higher forms" of co-operation, on subjecting national interests to proletarian and socialist internationalism, on a new world consultative meeting, and on continuity can be explained only in terms of deviations from the agreement reached earlier that this should not be done, and in terms of going back to outmoded and unacceptable forms of co-operation. The same also applies to insistence on the so-called "firm" document.

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- (3) Thus, in a Radio Zagreb broadcast of December 10, Sundic directly attacked Brezhnev in connection with the conference, charging that for the CPSU there was "only one way to socialism and only one acceptable prescription for co-operation, particularly for the socialist community . . . and also for all other communist and workers' parties."

Sundic concluded his commentary with some general reflections on the conference project and related questions of interparty relations, in line with known Yugoslav positions. Differences between the parties would persist: "Documents, regardless of how they are formulated, cannot eliminate differences or overlook [sic] specific paths to socialism. . . . Consequently, this is no time for new doctrines or for returning to old ones" (the latter phrase apparently referring to hegemonic aspirations on the part of the CPSU).

The policy of each communist party was clear even without the adoption of joint documents, he went on, "and it is also clear why some insist on harmonizing views, while others do not think it a good idea. . . . Differences start being objectionable only when some people try to impose their views as the only correct ones." What was true of relations among people was also true of relations between parties and between states: "There can never be too much freedom and equality, and every inequality is an expression of some-ones's wish to rule others. The communist parties of Europe do not need such relations."

Struggle Over Document

Sundic's latest barrage, like earlier commentaries by him, must be viewed against what is known of recent developments in the prolonged confrontation over a pan-European conference document. The clearest official information was provided by the Spanish delegate, Manuel Azcárate, in a statement published in Mundo Obrero of November 25, and by the British delegate, Reuben Falber, in one carried by Morning Star of December 19. Falber explained that the basic disagreement at successive preparatory meetings was between the parties pressing for "a document which could be interpreted as laying down a general line" and those opposed to this. At the October meeting in East Berlin the conservatives gave ground, and "agreement appeared to have been reached . . . providing for a final document which would be limited in scope" (Falber). At the next meeting in mid-November, however, "the whole character of the document . . . was again called into question" (Falber), the East Germans (acting undoubtedly for the CPSU) presenting a draft that restored elements of a "general line" -- what Azcárate called a document of an "ideological type."

While little is known officially of the subsequent session in East Berlin on December 16-19, it seems clear that the parties have again settled down to the task (to be continued at another meeting this month) of hammering out an acceptable collective document -- and that this came about as a result of new concessions

to the independent parties (in whose ranks the French CP is a recent and very important recruit). Decisive in this connection, numerous reports suggest, was a visit which Vadim Zagladin, first deputy director of the CPSU CC Section on International Affairs, paid to Rome for talks on December 12 with leaders of the PCI. Numerous "informed" reports (4) indicate that Zagladin -- who subsequently headed the Soviet delegation at the December 16-19 meeting -- expressed the CPSU's readiness to drop (once more) the controversial parts of the November draft, notably the "programmatic" sections.

Even if this is so, however, there is no guarantee that this latest "zig" will not be followed by another "zag" -- no guarantee, that is, that the Soviets and their supporters will not again try, as in the past, to regain lost ground. The Yugoslavs and their allies are vigilantly aware of this possibility (or probability). Sundic's firmly worded commentary, issued as the parties are presumably preparing to meet for another drafting session, should perhaps be viewed primarily as a warning that any such attempt will not succeed.

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(4) See, for example, Jacques Amalric's dispatch from Moscow in Le Monde of December 30, and the AFP report from Moscow by Felix Bolo of the same date.

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RAD Background Report/3
(Rumania)
13 January 1976

CEAUSESCU ASSESSES FOREIGN POLICY IN SPEECH TO GRAND
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
By Robert R. King

Summary: In a speech to the December session of the Rumanian parliament, bolstered by speeches and resolutions of support from the Central Committee and the Grand National Assembly, Rumanian party and state leader Ceausescu presented a balance sheet on foreign policy for 1975. He dealt with Rumania's relations with other communist countries, the developing states, and détente with Western countries. He also reiterated Rumania's views on the three issues it considers the most important contemporary concerns -- eliminating underdevelopment and creating a new international economic order; disarmament; and strengthening the United Nations. He concluded by restating the RSR's position on interparty relations and on plans for a European communist conference.

* * *

In a final flurry of activity at the end of 1975 Nicolae Ceausescu, Rumania's president and the leader of its communist party, paid considerable attention to foreign policy. A plenum of the Central Committee was convened on December 16 (only the third such session to be held during the year). The last of the three items on its agenda had to do with international problems, and the plenum adopted a resolution on the foreign policy of the party and state, (1) and at the session of the Grand National Assembly that opened December 18 the first item on the agenda was a lengthy report by Ceausescu,

(1) The report on the CC plenum and the text of its resolution were published in Scinteia, 17 December 1975. www.arhivaexilului.ro

most of which was devoted to Rumania's foreign policy. (2) Subsequent parliamentary speakers devoted considerable attention to this topic and the assembly adopted a resolution approving the country's policy and an appeal addressed to the parliaments of the countries that participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Helsinki last August. (3) The attention devoted to foreign policy appeared to be greater than that given to the plan and budget for 1976, which had also been on the agenda of the CC and the assembly sessions.

There were a number of reasons for devoting particular concern to foreign policy matters. In his report to the assembly Ceausescu justified this on the grounds that in the year that had elapsed since the 11th party congress in November 1974 (the last occasion on which such a general assessment of foreign policy had been made) "great changes have occurred in international life." He also noted that with the 1971-1975 plan period about to end and the new one about to begin, it was appropriate to make "a profound analysis of the general situation, in order to arrive at a better understanding of the domestic and international conditions" under which Rumania will have to act. Rumania was particularly active in the international arena in 1975, and Ceausescu felt it desirable to draw up a balance sheet of its accomplishments.

The fact that the party leader sought and received "unanimous" endorsement of the RSR's policy from both the Central Committee and the Grand National Assembly suggests the possibility that there may have been some lower-level criticism of the emphasis given to and the direction of international relations. At a time of belt-tightening at home, owing to serious food shortages (in part caused by the heavy flooding last summer, coupled with a poor harvest) and continued emphasis on a high rate of investment, criticism of the fact that Rumania had granted credits to foreign states and had devoted so much of its energy and resources to international relations may well have been voiced in some quarters. (4)

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- (2) The text of his report was published in ibid., 19 December 1975.
 - (3) The text of the speeches and the two documents appeared in ibid., 20 December 1975.
 - (4) On Rumania's food supply problems, see Rumanian Situation Reports/40, 41, 44, and 45, Radio Free Europe Research, 16 and 23 October and 13 and 21 November 1975, Items 3, 1, 3, and 7, respectively. On Rumanian credits to other states, see Rumanian Unit, "Rumanian Credits to Other Countries," RAD Background Report/180, RFER, 22 December 1975.

The speeches in the Grand National Assembly, however, contained nothing but effusive praise for Ceausescu and his role in foreign relations, and in fact merely reiterated the same points made by the party leader in his speech. Both the Central Committee resolution and that adopted by the Grand National Assembly praised the party leader's personal role in formulating and conducting foreign policy. The CC, however, was more lavish and extensive in its description of his role. It praised in particular "the outstanding activity and the decisive contribution made by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu," lauded his high-level contacts with other states, and extolled his "untiring activity" in this regard. The assembly expressed high appreciation of his "personal contribution," and "unanimously" endorsed all his activities at Helsinki, as well as the report he delivered at the session. Both the Central Committee resolution and that adopted by the Grand National Assembly praised the party leader's personal role in formulating and conducting foreign policy. The CC, however, was more lavish and extensive in its description of his role. It praised in particular "the outstanding activity and the decisive contribution made by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu," lauded his high-level contacts with other states, and extolled his "untiring activity" in this regard. The assembly expressed high appreciation of his "personal contribution," and "unanimously" endorsed all his activities at Helsinki, as well as the report he delivered at the session.

Two other contemporaneous events may also have contributed to the decision to take up international policy in mid-December. A critical meeting on preparations for a pan-European communist party conference was held in East Berlin, at which the Rumanian Communist Party, together with the Yugoslav and Italian CPs, opposed the Soviet party's stand on the conference. During his speech, Ceausescu restated the RCP's position which may have been considered useful since for some time there had been no public discussion of the party's views with regard to the proposed conference. At a second meeting, which took place in Moscow just before Ceausescu's speech to the Grand National Assembly, Warsaw Pact foreign ministers discussed co-ordination of foreign policy in the post-Helsinki period. Although there were indications of differences in the Soviet and Rumanian views on some of the topics considered at this gathering, there was no evidence of acrimonious exchanges. Ceausescu may nevertheless have felt it useful to reiterate the Rumanian position on a number of the points raised in Moscow, and the foreign policy speech gave him that opportunity. The fact that 1975 was the

year of Helsinki may also have been one reason why he considered a general statement of Rumanian foreign policy to be necessary.

The speech was the most detailed and extensive of the foreign policy pronouncements to emerge from the assembly session and the CC plenum, but it contained few new elements. The Rumanians periodically reiterate their point of view on foreign policy matters, and they have not moved significantly beyond their earlier positions. For the most part Ceausescu's speech was just such an exercise in repetition, but there were certain nuances which suggest that the Rumanians are seeking additional elbowroom in which to pursue their relations with the Soviet Union and exercise their autonomous foreign policy. Although most of Ceausescu's comments have been made on previous occasions, the particular points he made and the formulations he chose to employ on this occasion do provide some insight into the RSR's current foreign policy views.

Relations with the Socialist Countries

An usual, first priority was given to relations with the "socialist countries, to which Rumania has paid special attention." Ceausescu noted that some 44 per cent of the RSR's foreign trade is with these countries, (5) although between 1970 and 1975 trade with these states increased more slowly, in terms of per cent, than did trade in general. Total foreign trade rose by 226 per cent over the last five-year period, but that with the socialist countries increased by 178 per cent. (These figures, however, tend to understate trade with other communist states, in which price increases have been lower than those affecting goods traded with Western and developing countries.) Rumania's co-operation within Comecon was mentioned favorably, but two points were emphasized in this regard: first, that the organization must increase its efforts to equalize the levels of economic development among its members; and second, that co-operation within Comecon must conform to the national economic plan of each country. In addition to multilateral co-operation, "mutually advantageous" bilateral co-operation

(5) It is not specified for which time period this figure applies, but presumably it is for 1975.

was also stressed, (6) and Rumania's intention to expand its relations with "other socialist countries" was reiterated.

The RCP leader also mentioned Rumania's obligations as a member of the Warsaw Pact. He noted that his country is "constantly concerned to strengthen the combat ability of its national army," which will "act in co-operation with the armies of other Warsaw Pact member states in fulfilling the obligations it has assumed." He called for the elimination of military blocs -- the "simultaneous" dismantling of NATO and the Warsaw Pact -- but observed that even after such a development "we will continue to develop our co-operation with the armies of [the Warsaw Pact] countries." At the same time, he continued, "we maintain and will continue to develop relations of friendship and co-operation with the armies of all socialist countries and with those of other friendly states."

Developing Relations with Developing States

One thing that stood out in Ceausescu's speech, and which was also apparent in Rumania's recent foreign policy activity, is the emphasis being placed on relations with the developing states. In 1975 trade with these countries was valued at five times what it was in 1970, and although such a dramatic proportional increase was attributable to the very low level of such trade in 1970, it nevertheless shows the emphasis being given to this area. Throughout his speech Ceausescu referred to Rumania as a socialist developing country, and seemed anxious to identify it with others in the developing category.

He referred to the RSR's attempt to identify itself more closely with the nonaligned states, mentioning in particular its interest in being granted observer status at nonaligned gatherings. This, he said, was "by no means at variance" with Rumania's membership in the Warsaw Pact -- "as long as this pact exists" -- since the country is also anxious to strengthen its solidarity with

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- (6) The Rumanians have entered into a particularly ambitious series of bilateral economic agreements with the Bulgarians for the 1976-1980 period. The political purpose of these arrangements, which also, of course, have economic advantages, may well be to show that a high level of bilateral co-operation which respects state sovereignty and individual economic planning is possible without multilateral economic integration.

progressive forces and promote peaceful coexistence. The strength of Rumania's desire to be ranked as an observer at the non-aligned summit in Colombo this year is evident from the long line of obscure Third World dignitaries who have been warmly received in Bucharest in the last year or so.

Ceausescu welcomed the granting of independence to the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, singling out Angola in particular. He reiterated Rumania's support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), with which Rumania has already established diplomatic relations, but at the same time voiced concern that "foreign intervention" was "endangering [Angola's] integrity and sovereignty." Yet his call for the withdrawal of foreign troops was somewhat more ambiguous since he called by name only for the withdrawal of South African troops:

We firmly speak out for the withdrawal of the troops of the Republic of South Africa, for the cessation of foreign intervention, so that the people of Angola may have an opportunity to resolve their own internal problems in conformity with their vital interests, to achieve national unity, independence, and territorial integrity, [and ensure] their country's democratic development along the path of progress and civilization.

Détente and Relations with the Western States

The Rumanian leader also expressed interest in furthering relations with the "developed capitalist countries" -- which rank third on his list of priorities. Trade with this group of countries increased by 232 per cent between 1970 and 1975 (compared with an over-all increase of 226 per cent) and now makes up "more than 30 per cent" of the country's total trade.

Ceausescu called the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe the "most important event in the life of Europe and, one might say, in the political life of the whole world" during the last year, and called for full implementation of all aspects of the accords reached at it. He called upon the European states to devote their attention to military disengagement; he criticized the Vienna force reduction talks for their lack of success, and then proposed that "all states" should "participate effectively" in the Vienna negotiations, a step unlikely to improve the prospects for success. These statements have been made by the Rumanian representative at the Vienna talks, but this is the first time Ceausescu has voiced them.

In discussing specific situations Ceausescu first singled out the Balkans, calling for "new, constructive efforts to ensure the bilateral and multilateral development of relations" among the states in that region. He praised the Greek initiative in calling an economic conference "at ministerial level," and the Rumanians are probably disappointed that the meeting, which it has now been announced will begin January 26, will only be held on the "expert" level. Ceausescu also called for a solution to the Cyprus conflict "as soon as possible" -- and one that would respect the independence and integrity of the state.

He also repeated the three points in the Rumanian proposal for solution of the Middle East crisis -- withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territory occupied in 1967, resolution of the Palestinian people's problems in a manner consistent with their interests and aspirations, including the creation of a Palestinian state, and ensuring the independence and sovereignty of all states in that area. He referred to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as "the sole representative of the Palestinian people" and criticized the Israeli government for refusing to participate in the January Security Council debate on the Middle East. In line with previous statements, he insisted that the Geneva conference on the Middle East "must be held with the participation of all interested states," including the PLO.

Three Main International Issues: Underdevelopment, Disarmament, and the UN

A considerable portion of Ceausescu's speech was devoted to the three international problems Rumania has singled out for particular attention -- elimination of underdevelopment and establishment of a new economic order; achievement of general, and primarily nuclear, disarmament; and improving the operations and strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations. These three topics have been of considerable concern to the RSR over the past several months, and a lengthy document on each has been circulated at the United Nations. (7) Ceausescu's comments on these three topics introduced no new elements, but served primarily to restate

(7) For a summary of these three documents, see Rumanian SRs/35, 44, and 45, RFER, 11 September and 13 and 20 November 1975, Items, 2, 1, and 5, respectively.

points of view expressed by him earlier and contained in the documents.

His discussion of the new economic order and the elimination of underdevelopment included proposals that the more highly developed nations contribute more extensively to the economic growth of the Third World, but he also insisted that the primary responsibility for economic progress falls on the developing countries themselves. All nations, however, must be involved in resolving problems relating to the sharing of science and technology, the raw materials and energy shortage, the world food crisis, and setting equitable prices for industrial products, raw materials, and agricultural goods. He also suggested that the former colonial powers compensate their former colonies for having exploited them.

Rumania has rigorously insisted that concrete steps be taken toward disarmament, and Ceausescu once again demonstrated the strength of its feeling on this issue. The usual demands were repeated -- a halt in the production of nuclear weapons coupled with a pledge from their owners never to use those that exist; the creation of nuclear-free zones; the reduction of military budgets (with half the amount saved to be channeled through the UN to aid the developing states); the dismantling of military bases on foreign soil; the withdrawal of all troops to their national territory; and the dissolution of all military blocs. He repeated Rumania's call for the participation of all states in disarmament negotiations and called for a UN conference on this topic. One interesting point made during this discussion related to nuclear weapons: "We note a process of growth in a number of countries which are mastering nuclear technology, demonstrating that if concrete measures are not taken to halt the nuclear arms race no one can prevent other countries from producing nuclear arms." He went on to note that "in view of the current international situation, we are forced to take every possible measure to ensure the defense capacity of our fatherland."

Ceausescu also repeated the main provisions of Rumania's proposals for strengthening and reforming the UN. The organization should be more democratic and ensure greater participation on the part of its members by, among other things, increasing the size of the Security Council. With regard to the right of veto exercised by the five permanent members of the Security Council, the party leader retreated from the position in the document Rumania submitted to the UN. In the document the right of veto was ignored, but in his speech he favored its continued existence, but only under certain conditions:

The right of veto should be maintained in decision-making within the Security Council. This right should not be abused, however. Nor should it be exercised to promote the particular interests of certain countries exclusively. Such attitudes are not in keeping with the general interests of peace. In our opinion the right of veto should be exercised only in exceptional situations and in special cases, to defend the cause of international security and the interests of all peoples and to safeguard peace and détente in the world.

In addition to the proposals regarding the structure and functioning of the UN itself, Ceausescu repeated the RSR's suggestion that UN members adopt a universal code of behavior. The Helsinki document and the numerous joint solemn declarations signed by Ceausescu and the leaders of other countries were obviously the pattern he had in mind here.

Interparty Relations and International Communism

Although, as Ceausescu admitted, the Grand National Assembly was not the most appropriate forum for doing so, he ended with a discussion of foreign relations and the activities of the party since the 11th congress. Like the other portions of his speech, this section contained little that departed from previous statements. The secretary-general reiterated the party's interest in strengthening its ties with all "communist and workers' parties throughout the world," and again expressed concern to strengthen the solidarity of the international communist movement -- but on the basis of "a new type of unity" that takes into consideration "the diversity of historical social and political conditions under which these parties are carrying on their activity, and respects each party's right to establish its political line and its revolutionary strategy and tactics and its right to handle for itself the problems of socialist revolution and construction."

Ceausescu reiterated the oft-stated Rumanian view that it is "no longer possible to have one center co-ordinating the communist and workers' movement. Co-operation and solidarity among the parties must be based on full equality, precluding any interference in internal affairs. Any problems that may arise must be discussed

in a comradely manner, from party to party and from leadership to leadership, avoiding labeling, censure, and anything that might harm co-operation and equality."

He treated the question of a conference of European communist parties in much the same terms as it had been dealt with at the 11th party congress a year ago:

We proceed from the need to ensure that such a conference takes place in a democratic manner, does not propose to adopt compulsory decisions for parties, and ensures fully equal participation by all interested parties in discussing problems and a free exchange of views, in a spirit of mutual regard and esteem, so as to lead to strengthening unity and co-operation in the struggle to achieve progress and détente.

We must state that the RCP has actively participated in all proceedings that have taken place thus far with a view to organizing the conference: We consider that progress has been made in preparing for the meeting, by taking into account viewpoints and opinions of all participating parties.

We are determined to take action in the future, too -- in keeping with the policy established by the 11th congress -- to ensure the successful development of this conference.

One significant new comment put Ceausescu firmly on the side of the Western communist parties and in opposition to the Soviet Union on the question of the role Western parties should play: "Under current international conditions socialism can be adopted in one country or another only in accordance with the historical, national, and social conditions particular to each people. We can only hail the fact that some parties in Western countries, for example, are endeavoring to find the most suitable forms of bringing about the democratic, socioeconomic changes designed to create the conditions for new development."

Conclusion

Since Ceausescu's foreign policy speech was essentially a repetition of positions that had been previously established, why

did he take this opportunity to reiterate them? Perhaps the most significant consideration is that this reflects his preoccupation with foreign affairs. Certainly, in terms of his own personal involvement, foreign relations is high on his list of priorities. In 1975 alone he acted as host to a number of prominent foreign guests: US President Ford accompanied by Secretary of State Kissinger; British Prime Minister Harold Wilson; French Premier Jacques Chirac; Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky, and Turkish Premier Suleyman Demirel. The Rumanian leader also made trips to a number of Western countries, including working visits to Washington and London and an official tour of Japan. Portuguese President Francisco da Costa Gomes, came to Bucharest in May and Ceausescu visited Lisbon in October. He played a major role in the effort to expand Third World relations during the year. In April, for example, he made an extended tour that included visits to the Philippines, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Jordan, and in June he visited Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, and Senegal. In sum, coming as it did at the end of the year, Ceausescu's speech and the resolutions of support for foreign policy provide a useful catalogue of Rumania's international priorities and reflect the importance of external relations to the current leadership. (005)

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double their trade, to more than 840,000,000 dollars in the next five years (Reuter, 25 April 1975).

East Germany. Three top East German communist state and party functionaries visited Yugoslavia in 1975: Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer (April 21-23), Prime Minister Horst Sindermann (June 11-15) and SED Politburo member Hermann Axen (June 18-20). During the first two visits, mainly bilateral relations between the two countries were discussed, while Axen's visit was in connection with interparty relations and with the preparations for the convocation of the European CP Conference. The fact, however, that Fischer also met with Aleksandar Grlićkov, in charge of relations with other communist parties (Politika, 23 April 1975), indicated that LCY participation in the European CP Conference was also discussed. Sindermann's visit was chiefly used for a discussion of economic relations between the two countries. The volume of trade for 1975 was projected to be about 500,000,000 dollars (Borba, 10 June 1975) while the five-year (1971-1975) trade was expected to amount to 1,300 million dollars (Politika, 10 June 1975). The signing of a trade protocol for the next five-year period (1976-1980) in East Berlin on August 3 provided for trade amounting to 3,000 million dollars (Borba, 4 August 1975). Axen's visit was not given any special attention, although he conferred with Stane Dolanc and Aleksandar Grlićkov. The signing of a new Friendship Treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR in Moscow on October 7 provoked criticism in the Yugoslav press. It was claimed that the new treaty, signed nine years before the old one's 20-year term expired, contained the same formulation used by the Warsaw Pact countries in 1968 to explain the invasion of Czechoslovakia (Politika, 10 October 1975).

Cuba. On March 17-19, the third ministerial meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Nonaligned Countries took place in Havana, at which Miloš Minić, Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister, was present (Review of International Affairs, 20 April 1975). At the First Congress of the Cuban CP in Havana (December 16-23), Todo Kurtović, a member of the Executive Committee, represented the LCY (Borba, 18 December 1975). An economic delegation from Cuba paid a two-week visit to Yugoslavia (November 6-19), discussing economic relations between the two countries (ibid., 20 November 1975). No results of the visit were reported in the Yugoslav information media. In May 1975, it was reported that the value of Yugoslav-Cuban trade in 1974 was 25,000,000 dollars, but that there was "a large Yugoslav deficit" of more than 20,000,000 dollars (Economic Review, May 1975).

West and Central Europe; the Balkans. Except for his participation in the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Co-operation (July 29-August 1). President Tito did not pay a visit to any Western country. Yugoslavia's foreign minister, however, visited several countries and received many visitors from abroad. Except for President Ford's visit to Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav-Italian accord on the frontiers between the two countries is considered in Yugoslavia the most important event of the year involving a Western country. The so-called Trieste Agreement came after 30 years of quarreling between Belgrade and Rome about Zone A and Zone B. Boundaries were fixed in 1954, in a Memorandum of Understanding, which assigned the port of Trieste and some land around it (Zone A) to Italy, and the rest of the disputed territory (Zone B) to Yugoslavia. Neither government was then ready to surrender any legal claims, so the agreement was officially a "provisional" one, leaving open the chance of a revival of the dispute (The New York Times, 9 October 1975). On 1 October 1975, both the Yugoslavs and Italians announced the definite settlement of the issue (Borba, 2 October 1975). On November 10, Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister Miloš Minić, and his Italian counterpart, Mariano Rumor, signed the agreement in Ancona, Italy, formally recognizing, with only minor changes, the borders drawn up in 1954 (Politika, 11 November 1975).

Another significant event was a two-day official visit (June 4-5) to Yugoslavia by Greek Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis. Received by Tito, Karamanlis discussed problems involved in Balkan co-operation (Borba, 5 June 1975). In August, Yugoslav information media reported a message from Karamanlis concerning the initiative taken by the Greek Prime Minister "to convoke a conference of Balkan countries for the purpose of furthering mutual co-operation in the economy, communications, energy, and pollution" (Politika, 22 August 1975). Tito gave a favorable answer on September 22 (Borba, 23 September 1975). However, because of the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus and the Yugoslav-Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia, the convocation of a Balkan Conference (originally planned by the Greeks to take place on October 25) was postponed to next year. Albania refused to be present, while Turkey accepted in principle (Politika, 11 October 1975).

Other noteworthy visits to Yugoslavia were: President Urho Kekkonen of Finland (March 21-25); Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme (March 16-18); Foreign Minister Jean Sauvagnargues of France (May 21-25); Willy Brandt, chairman of the West German Social Democratic Party (June 24/25); President Francisco da Costa Gomes

of Portugal (October 23-25); and Annemarie Renger, president of the West German Bundestag (November 17-22).

In addition to his above-mentioned visits, Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister Miloš Minić also went to the following countries: Portugal (October 12-14); West Germany (November 3-5); Norway (November 5-7); and the Netherlands (December 3-5). Dobrivoje Vidić, a member of the Executive Committee, represented the LCY at the SPD Congress in Mannheim (November 9-15). General Franjo Herljević, Yugoslavia's Interior Minister, was in Bonn between December 13 and 15.

European Economic Community. The relations between Yugoslavia and the EEC were disturbed at the beginning of 1975 because of the embargo on Yugoslav meat exports to the EEC (Borba, 5 February 1975). On June 12-15, the president of the EEC Commission paid an official visit to Belgrade to discuss the implementation of the Yugoslav-EEC nonpreferential trade agreement, which went into force on 1 September 1973 (ibid., 17 June 1975). Yugoslav trade with the EEC normally represents 40 per cent of Yugoslavia's foreign trade, but it was running a mounting balance-of-payments deficit with the EEC this past year. Difficulties appeared following the EEC's 1974 decision to ban all beef imports, in order to cut down surpluses within the community. Ortoli's visit led to new talks in July concerning the EEC's help to correct Yugoslavia's worsening balance-of-payments deficit (ibid., 24 July 1975). Since it proved impossible to achieve an improvement, new talks began in Brussels in October (Tanjug, 21 October 1975), and continued in Belgrade in November (ibid., 24 November 1975). It was said that the final decision would be made only in January 1976 (ibid., 10 December 1975).

Most of Yugoslavia's 1,100,000 workers employed in the West were to be found in the EEC countries, especially in West Germany, where 707,800 Yugoslavs (with family members) lived (Nedeljne informativne novine, Belgrade, 26 October 1975).

The United States. Yugoslav-US relations in 1975 were highlighted by two visits: Yugoslavia's Premier Džemal Bijedić visited Washington from March 19 to 21, and President Ford paid a short call in Belgrade on August 3-4. Both visits were given great publicity in Yugoslavia. Bijedić's visit to Washington was keyed to economic and commercial considerations. There were no major problems in US-Yugoslav bilateral relations, although the two governments did not see eye-to-eye on every issue. In January, two American opera

singers were detained, and expelled from Yugoslavia the following month, in connection with a suspected importing of "oppositional literature" while visiting Yugoslavia (Tanjug, 13 February 1975). While in Washington, Bijedić was received by President Ford and conferred with President Robert Macnamara of the World Bank about two loans amounting to 140,000,000 dollars (Politika, 21 March 1975). A 600,000,000 dollar joint venture by the US Dow Chemical Company and a Yugoslav oil firm in Zagreb, for the construction of a major petrochemical complex in the Yugoslav port of Rijeka, was also agreed upon (Ekonomiska politika, Belgrade, 24 March 1975). The contract was initialed in January.

There was great interest in the US in doing business with Yugoslavia. In May, six commissions, composed of 85 American businessmen representing 45 companies, and 150 managers representing 90 Yugoslav enterprises, met in New York to discuss intensification of Yugoslav-American economic co-operation (Vjesnik, 14 May 1975). The trade between the two countries was expected to reach the 700 million dollar mark (Journal of Commerce, 5 November 1975). By June 1974, the United States had concluded only eight joint-venture contracts, amounting in value to 7,500,000 dollars (Borba, 8 June 1975). Between June 1974 and 1975, nine additional contracts were concluded, and 18 others were under consideration. This made the US the third in the list of states with which Yugoslavia has undertaken such ventures. With approximately 600,000,000 dollars invested in Yugoslavia thus far, the US now occupied first place in point of value.

The problem of American sales of arms to Yugoslavia was also discussed during President Ford's stay in Belgrade, according to the Western information media (Christian Science Monitor, 6 August 1975; Baltimore Sun, 16 August 1975). During the visit of a group of US Congressmen to Belgrade, President Tito denied Western reports that he had submitted a list of weapons he wanted to buy from the United States. What Yugoslavia wanted, Tito said, was to buy only military spare parts, some electronic equipment and ammunition (UPI, 26 August 1975). In September, Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister Milos Minić met Henry Kissinger in Washington (Borba, 27 September 1975), while in November US Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz paid an official visit to Belgrade (ibid., 21 November 1975). Several days later, an American citizen of Yugoslav origin was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment, in a secret trial, for alleged espionage (The New York Times, 27 November 1975).

Yugoslavia's new ambassador to the United States is Dimče Belovski, a Macedonian, whose appointment was announced in October (Borba, 25 October 1975). He presented his credentials on November 19.

Nonalignment. There were two important nonaligned meetings in 1975: the meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of Nonaligned Countries in Havana (March 17-19), and the Fifth Ministerial Conference of Nonaligned Countries in Lima (August 25-30). The meeting in Cuba passed the 53-point Havana Declaration, and a short Resolution on Palestine (Review of International Affairs, 20 April 1975), while the Lima conference adopted 13 resolutions dealing with various international problems (ibid., 5 October 1975). In Lima, it was decided that the Fifth Nonaligned Summit should take place in Colombo (Sri Lanka) on 16-19 August 1976).

During 1975, President Tito and his chief aides made several statements reaffirming Yugoslavia's nonaligned stand. Of particular importance was Edvard Kardelj's September speech in Zagreb about Yugoslavia's nonaligned policy (ibid., 12 September 1975).

Visitors from and Visits to Asian, African, and Latin American Countries. India's Foreign Minister Y.B. Chavan visited Belgrade (January 19-23); Dragoljub Stavrev represented the LCY at the 10th Congress of the CP of India (January 30); Miloš Minić visited Mexico (February 20-23) and Venezuela (February 24-26); President Albert Bongo of Gabon visited Yugoslavia (April 6-9); Minić went to Cairo (April 12-13), and to Damascus (April 13-16); President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, visited Belgrade (April 18-21); Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Belgrade (May 29-30); President Kim Il-song of North Korea visited Belgrade (June 5-9); Mika Špiljak, president of the Socialist Alliance, went to North Vietnam (May 26-June 6); Cambodian Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak visited Belgrade (June 18); Indonesian President Suharto came to Yugoslavia (June 30-July 2); North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Tam visited Belgrade (July 17-21); Mongolian party and state leader Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal visited Yugoslavia (July 18-29); Foreign Minister Kamal Hossani of Bangladesh visited Yugoslavia (August 12-15); President Leopold Senghor of Senegal visited Belgrade (August 30-September 3); Petar Stambolić, member of the State Presidency of Yugoslavia, went to Hanoi (August 31-September 6); President of the People's Republic of Congo Marien Ngouabi visited Yugoslavia (September 10-12); Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore visited Yugoslavia (September 21-25); King Birendra of Nepal

visited Yugoslavia (September 23-28); Yugoslavia's Prime Minister Džemal Bijedić went to Sri Lanka (September 30-October 1), Singapore (October 12-14), India (October 14-15), and Persia (October 15); India's President Ali Ahmed visited Yugoslavia (September 21-27); North Korea (October 27-31); and Japan (November 1-7); and Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia came to Yugoslavia (December 16-19).

From January 9 to 12, Australia's Prime Minister E. Gough Whitlam visited Belgrade; his New Zealand colleague, Wallace E. Rowling, paid a similar visit on March 23-28; Kurt Waldheim, UN Secretary-General, was in Belgrade on August 15-17; and Miloš Minić paid an official visit to Canada on September 18-20.

Publications. The chief publications of the LCY are: Komunist (a weekly) and Socijalizam (a monthly). The most important daily newspapers are: Borba (with Belgrade and Zagreb editions), Politika (Belgrade), Vjesnik (Zagreb), Nova Makedonija (Skoplje), Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), and Delo (Ljubljana). The most important weeklies are Vjesnik u srijedu (Zagreb), and Nedeljne informativne novine (Belgrade). Tanjug is the official news agency.

RADIO FREE EUROPE *Research*

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● RAD Background Report/1
(Yugoslavia)
9 January 1976

YUGOSLAV LEADER ACCUSES COMINFORMISTS OF HAVING FOREIGN TIES

By Zdenko Antic

Summary: Although the political campaign against the Cominformists has recently lost some of its momentum, Vladimir Bakaric, one of Yugoslavia's most influential party leaders, gave it fresh impetus by producing new evidence of foreign interference in the country's internal affairs; he claims that Yugoslav Cominformists have copied a political program devised at a Cominformist symposium held some time ago in Poland. This repeated insistence on the theme of foreign interference indicates that the Yugoslav leadership has decided to keep this issue alive both for domestic purposes and for use in discussions with other parties and governments.

* * *

Following earlier allusions to contacts between Yugoslav Cominformist pro-Soviet opposition groups and the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, new evidence has now been produced that similar contacts may also exist with a Cominformist group in Poland. The source of this latest allegation was a recent speech by Vladimir Bakaric, vice-president of Yugoslavia's State Presidency and one of the most influential figures in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. (1)

While addressing local political leaders in the Serbian city of Nis, Bakaric mentioned the problem of the "Cominformist, Stalinist opposition" and its attempts to organize an illegal opposition party. He said that those who wanted to organize such a party were politically weak and had no understanding of Yugoslav sociopolitical realities; consequently they had been forced to import their ideological and political program from abroad. Bakaric went on:

(1) Vjesnik (Zagreb), 26 December 1975.

This is why they [the Cominformists] were forced to copy [party] programs from the East European countries, and I have personally run into considerable difficulties because I said earlier that they had copied a program prepared at a symposium held in Poland. The Poles then asked why I was accusing them of Cominformist activities. As far as I know, the Cominformists in Poland have done us no harm, and the Polish government has given them no support. All I wanted to say was that [our Cominformists] had copied a program from this symposium, a program that was too narrow for our political circumstances, since it followed the patterns existing in the socialist [East European] bloc, and we cannot accept it.

Bakaric did not elaborate on "Cominformist activities" in Poland, but his statement provided the first indication that a group of Cominformists is active in that country.

It is interesting to note his admission that he ran into "considerable difficulties" because of having mentioned that Cominformists existed in Poland, and his revival of the subject at Nis may indicate that the Yugoslav leadership wants the Polish government publicly to condemn such activities. This conclusion is also suggested by the final part of Bakaric's speech, in which he said:

The Soviet leadership has denounced Cominformism and stated that it does not support the Cominformists in Yugoslavia. It has done so for several reasons. The first is that a policy of friendship cannot be sustained if one side is undermining the other. Accordingly, they [the Soviets] renounced this practice. (2)

Although the political and ideological campaign against pro-Soviet Cominformist groups has of late lost some of its intensity, and the Yugoslavs have repeatedly expressed their satisfaction over the USSR's public denunciation of anti-Yugoslav Cominformist activities, Belgrade has apparently decided to keep this particular pot simmering on the fire. The Cominformists' ties not only with Poland but with groups in other East European countries are being mentioned repeatedly, and the first group of Cominformists, due to go on trial on January 12, is being accused, among other things, of having contacts with Yugoslav émigrés in Moscow, Kiev, and Budapest. (3)

This Yugoslav insistence that contacts exist between their own Cominformists and similar groups in the East European countries is

(2) Borba (Belgrade), 26 December 1975.

(3) dpa and Reuter, 8 January 1976.

obviously important for future relations with these countries. Moreover, Yugoslavia's allegations that they were supporting or tolerating interference in its domestic party and state affairs is a point of some ideological significance. It involves not only the principles of the 1955 Belgrade Declaration, but also the question of the interpretation of "proletarian internationalism," and the path to be traced in future co-operation among the workers' and communist parties in Europe. (001)

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1975



RADIO FREE EUROPE RESEARCH

Subject Index

1975/Annual (January-December)

Note: This is a comprehensive index of all Radio Free Europe materials published in 1975. It replaces all other 1975 indexes issued during the year (1975/1 January; 1975/2 February; 1975/3-4 March-April; 1975/5 May; 1975/6 June; 1975/7-9 July-September).

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How to Use This Index

This Subject Index to Radio Free Europe Research includes all research materials published in the RFE research series (Background Reports, Situation Reports, and Press Surveys) during the specified time period. All items are indexed under both a country category and a subject category. All country and subject categories used are listed below. Material on non-ruling communist and leftist parties has separate subject categories, also described below.

For each entry the title of the respective item as given in the original source is listed first, followed by the reference citation and its date of publication. The abbreviations used in reference citations are as follows:

BR = Background Report

PS = Press Survey

SR = Situation Report

When an indexed item is from a Situation Report, the item number from the original is indicated as part of the title. Country and subject categories are listed alphabetically, but within the subject categories individual items are listed chronologically.

This is a subject index only, and no proper names are included as categories. Information on specific individuals should be sought under the category (or categories) that cover the activity of that individual. For example, if references to Nicolae Ceausescu are being sought, examine under the Rumanian country category such subject categories as "Communist Party-Politburo, Secretariat, Other Leading Organs" or "State and Government-- State Council; Presidency." For biographies of new ministers see the subject category "State and Government-- Council of Ministers." For information on newly appointed ambassadors, see "Foreign Relations -- Foreign Ministry and Diplomatic Service."

COUNTRY CATEGORIES

Albania

Bulgaria

China; Mongolia; North Korea; North Vietnam

Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Eastern Europe (including general material on Comecon,
the Warsaw Pact, International Conferences, etc.)
German Democratic Republic
Hungary
Nonruling parties
Poland
Rumania
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Yugoslavia

SUBJECT CATEGORIES

Agriculture

Animal production
Crop production; Forestry
Irrigation; Reclamation; Land use
Mechanization; Technical improvement; (including
tractor stations, fertilizer, etc.)
Organization/s and agricultural units (collective
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Policy
Private sector

Comecon; Economic co-operation with USSR and Eastern Europe

Common Market; EFTA; GATT; IMF; World Bank; (and other
similar Western economic groupings)

Communist Party

Central Committee (plenums and membership)
Congresses and national conferences
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Membership and cadre policy (also party schools)
Policies and role
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Relations with nonruling parties (and material on general
interparty relations. For relations with ruling
parties, see Foreign Relations and the specific country --
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Creative unions (except writers' unions; Art, sculpture, music, architecture
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Policy and institutions
Writers' unions; Literature, drama, theater

Demography, Population, Social Structure, Classes

Economy

Construction
Industry, heavy
Industry, light; Consumer goods; Services
Investment; Banking; Monetary policy; Credit
Labor; Working conditions; Labor productivity
Management; Organization/s
Policies; Plan (projections and fulfillment; Planning procedure); National income; Production structure
Prices
Private sector; Artisans
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Trade, foreign, and economic co-operation (only general policy assessments are indexed here; Data on individual countries are indexed under Foreign Relations)
Transportation and communications
Wages and personal income (see also social insurance and pensions)

Education (and academic affairs)

Kindergartens and nurseries
Primary and secondary schools
Policies and organization
Science; Research; Social Sciences
Universities and higher education

Emigration, Refugees, and Policy Toward Exiles

Environment; Pollution

Fairs; Exhibitions (international economic and scholarly conferences)

Foreign Relations (political, economic, and cultural aspects and interparty relations with ruling parties)

Africa

Asia; Australia; Oceania

China; Korea; Vietnam; Mongolia

Europe, Eastern

Europe, Western

European security conference and détente (including material on force reduction negotiations and disarmament)

Foreign Ministry and diplomatic service

Latin America

Middle East/ Arab Countries

Policy (general policy assessments)

United Nations and international organizations

United States and Canada

USSR

Health; (including sports)

History (national history, party history, historiography)

Housing

Ideology; Marxism-Leninism

Justice, courts, legal system, rehabilitations

Military and interior affairs

Armed Forces

Paramilitary organizations

Police, secret police, border guards

Minorities and nationalities

Patriotism; Nationalism; Proletarian internationalism

Religion; Relations with the Vatican

Social insurance; Pensions; Other social benefits

Social issues; Divorce; Alcoholism; Drugs

Standard of living; Living conditions (see also Housing)

State and government

Constitutions; Role of the state
Council of Ministers (membership; decisions; government
bureaucracy; individual ministries and government
agencies)

Local government

Parliament

State Council; Presidency

Tourism; Passports; Visas; Customs

Trade unions

Urbanization and regional planning

Warsaw Pact

Women and family life

Youth and youth organizations

SUBJECT CATEGORIES FOR NONRULING PARTIES

A special set of subcategories applies under the country category "Nonruling Parties." First, it is subdivided into the following country or regional categories:

Africa and Middle East

Asia, Australia, Oceania

France

Italy

Japan

Latin America

Scandinavia

Spain

Western Europe (General material on entire region and specific data on nonruling parties in countries not included in specific country categories above)

Second, each of the country or regional categories, in turn, has the following subject categories:

International conferences

Policies, domestic

Relations with other nonruling parties

Relations with ruling parties.

ALBANIA

COMMUNIST PARTY--POLITBUREAU, SECRETARIAT, OTHER LEADING ORGANS

CHANGES IN ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP SIGNIFY STRUGGLE FOR SUCCESSION TO POWER
RAD BR/0161 24 NOV 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--EUROPE, EASTERN

THE MEANING OF THE LATEST DEMONSTRATIONS IN KOSOVO
RAD BR/0015 03 FEB 75

KOSOVO: AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT
RAD BR/0091 02 JUN 75

YUGOSLAV PAPER HAILS ALBANIA'S ALLEGED CHANGE IN ATTITUDE TOWARD EUROPE
RAD BR/0102 12 JUN 75

IRREDENTISM IN KOSOVO AS TIRANA'S POLICY TOWARD BELGRADE HARDENS
RAD BR/0166 02 DEC 75

MILITARY AND INTERIOR AFFAIRS--ARMED FORCES

CHANGES IN ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP SIGNIFY STRUGGLE FOR SUCCESSION TO POWER
RAD BR/0161 24 NOV 75

STATE AND GOVERNMENT--COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

CHANGES IN ALBANIAN LEADERSHIP SIGNIFY STRUGGLE FOR SUCCESSION TO POWER
RAD BR/0161 24 NOV 75

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AGRICULTURE--CROP PRODUCTION;FORESTRY

2. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WHEAT AND BARLEY
BULG SR/0024 27 AUG 75

1. GATHERING OF THE HARVEST AND PARTICIPATION OF BRIGADES
BULG SR/0026 26 SEP 75

AGRICULTURE--ORGANIZATION/S AND AGRICULTURAL UNITS

1. CC PLENUM ON LONG-TERM PLANS AND AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES
BULG SR/0006 06 MAR 75

3. A NEW MODEL OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN AGRICULTURE
BULG SR/0012 30 APR 75

1. DECREE ON REORGANIZATION OF AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES
BULG SR/0016 30 MAY 75

AGRICULTURE--POLICY

1. ECONOMISTS DISCUSS COMECON AGRICULTURAL PRICING
BULG SR/0014 16 MAY 75

AGRICULTURE--PRIVATE SECTOR

2. REGULATIONS ON "PERSONAL" PLOTS PUBLISHED
BULG SR/0002 17 JAN 75

1. DECREE ON PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF AGRICULTURAL LAND
BULG SR/0009 26 MAR 75

2. SUPPORT FOR PERSONAL PLOTS AND CRITICISM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
BULG SR/0032 21 NOV 75

COMECON; ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITH USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

1. ECONOMISTS DISCUSS COMECON AGRICULTURAL PRICING
BULG SR/0014 16 MAY 75

3. FIRST MENTION OF COMECON PRICE INCREASES
BULG SR/0022 30 JUL 75

COMMUNIST PARTY--CENTRAL COMMITTEE

1. CC PLENUM ON LONG-TERM PLANS AND AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES
BULG SR/0006 06 MAR 75

1. CC PLENUM ON FOREIGN POLICY AND SCIENCE
BULG SR/0022 30 JUL 75

COMMUNIST PARTY--CONGRESSES AND NATIONAL CONFERENCES

2. CC FOR MAXIMUM EFFORT IN HONOR OF FORTHCOMING 11TH PARTY CONGRESS
BULG SR/0001 09 JAN 75

COMMUNIST PARTY--FRONT AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS

1. DEATH OF GEORGI TRAYKOV
BULG SR/0002 17 JAN 75

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COMMUNIST PARTY--FRONT AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS

4. THE FATHERLAND FRONT PLENUM
BULG SR/0006 06 MAR 75

1. ZHIVKOV'S SPEECH ON PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
BULG SR/0020 18 JUL 75

3. DEATH OF ALEXANDER DUBOV
BULG SR/0030 29 OCT 75

COMMUNIST PARTY--LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

1. ZHIVKOV'S SPEECH ON PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
BULG SR/0020 18 JUL 75

2. SUPPORT FOR PERSONAL PLOTS AND CRITICISM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
BULG SR/0032 21 NOV 75

COMMUNIST PARTY--MEMBERSHIP AND CADRE POLICY

1. ZHIVKOV'S SPEECH ON PARTY ORGANIZATIONS
BULG SR/0020 18 JUL 75

COMMUNIST PARTY--POLICIES AND ROLE

2. BUREAUCRACY, INEFFICIENCY, DEVIATION FROM PARTY LINE CRITICIZED
BULG SR/0015 23 MAY 75

COMMUNIST PARTY--POLITBUREAU, SECRETARIAT, OTHER LEADING ORGANS

2. LACHEZAR AVRAMOV CURRENTLY EMBASSY COUNSELOR IN VIENNA
BULG SR/0007 13 MAR 75

2. POLITBUREAU MEMBER LILOV ABSENT SINCE JULY
BULG SR/0031 06 NOV 75

COMMUNIST PARTY--RELATIONS WITH NONRULING PARTIES

4. FOREIGN PARTY LEADERS VACATION ON BULGARIA'S GOLDEN SANDS
BULG SR/0021 24 JUL 75

1. CHILEAN REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS DISCUSSED
BULG SR/0029 22 OCT 75

CULTURE--CREATIVE UNIONS; ART, SCULPTURE, MUSIC, ARCHITECTURE

2. POP MUSIC ONCE AGAIN IN THE LIMELIGHT
BULG SR/0009 26 MAR 75

1. POLITBUREAU DECISION ON THE FILM INDUSTRY
BULG SR/0012 30 APR 75

CULTURE--MASS MEDIA: RADIO, TELEVISION, PRESS, AND FILMS

3. BULGARIAN RADIO INCREASES BROADCAST TIME AND EXPANDS PROGRAM VARIETY
BULG SR/0001 09 JAN 75

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CULTURE--MASS MEDIA: RADIO, TELEVISION, PRESS, AND FILMS

1. RENEWED DISCUSSION OF MEDIA COMMENTARIES ON DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
BULG SR/0031 05 NOV 75

1. CRITICISM IN MASS MEDIA DISCUSSED
BULG SR/0033 04 DEC 75

CULTURE--POLICY AND INSTITUTIONS

2. LYUDMILA ZHIVKOVA APPOINTED TO TOP CULTURAL POST
BULG SR/0018 26 JUN 75

1. MORE CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT AND IN COMMITTEE ON ART AND CULTURE
BULG SR/0019 11 JUL 75

ICY WINDS OVER THE BULGARIAN LITERARY LANDSCAPE
RAD BR/0160 21 NOV 75

1. NATIONAL PROGRAM OF CULTURAL EDUCATION DISCUSSED
BULG SR/0035 17 DEC 75

CULTURE--WRITERS' UNIONS; LITERATURE, DRAMA, THEATER

1. CONFERENCE OF THE PARTY ORGANIZATION IN THE WRITERS' UNION
BULG SR/0008 20 MAR 75

2. WRITERS' UNION COUNCIL DISCUSSES 1974 LITERARY PRODUCTION
BULG SR/0013 09 MAY 75

1. EFFORTS TO COUNTER THE "GRAY STREAM" IN LITERATURE
BULG SR/0018 26 JUN 75

2. THE POLITICAL ROLE OF TRANSLATION
BULG SR/0020 18 JUL 75

"SEPTEMVRI" DISMISSALS: LINK WITH STORY ON STALIN'S LABOR CAMPS?
RAD BR/0129 21 AUG 75

ICY WINDS OVER THE BULGARIAN LITERARY LANDSCAPE
RAD BR/0160 21 NOV 75

1. DISMISSALS FROM THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF "LITERATURNIA MISAL"?
BULG SR/0032 21 NOV 75

DEMOGRAPHY, POPULATION, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, CLASSES

3. STAGNATING BIRTH RATE CAUSES CONCERN
BULG SR/0002 17 JAN 75

2. BULGARIAN CENSUS UNDER WAY
BULG SR/0033 04 DEC 75

ECONOMY--INDUSTRY, HEAVY

1. REPORT ON 1974 PLAN FULFILLMENT
BULG SR/0004 06 FEB 75

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ECONOMY--INDUSTRY; LIGHT; CONSUMER GOODS; SERVICES

1. DECREE ON MEASURES TO INCREASE SUPPLY OF CONSUMER GOODS
BULG SR/0001 09 JAN 75

2. SHARP INCREASE IN OUTPUT OF CONSUMER GOODS REPORTED
BULG SR/0011 17 APR 75

ECONOMY--INVESTMENT; BANKING; MONETARY POLICY; CREDIT

3. TOURIST EXCHANGE RATES FOR WESTERN CURRENCIES ABOLISHED
BULG SR/0031 06 NOV 75

ECONOMY--LABOR; WORKING CONDITIONS; LABOR PRODUCTIVITY

2. NEW REGULATION ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF IDLE YOUTH
BULG SR/0004 05 FEB 75

1. SHIFT WORK TO BE EXPANDED
BULG SR/0007 13 MAR 75

1. NEW DECREE ON ADDITIONAL LABOR FOR AGRICULTURE AND THE FOOD INDUSTRY
BULG SR/0013 09 MAY 75

1. NEW CAMPAIGN TO EXPAND SHIFT WORK
BULG SR/0015 23 MAY 75

3. DECREE ON EMPLOYMENT OF HIGH-SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
BULG SR/0016 30 MAY 75

ECONOMY--MANAGEMENT; ORGANIZATION

2. PROBLEMS OF LEGISLATION ON ECONOMIC MATTERS
BULG SR/0008 20 MAR 75

2. BULGARIAN STATE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION IN THE SOVIET UNION ESTABLISHED
BULG SR/0016 30 MAY 75

1. STATE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATIONS TO BE REORGANIZED?
BULG SR/0025 10 SEP 75

ECONOMY--POLICIES; PLAN; NATIONAL INCOME; PRODUCTION STRUCTURE

2. CC FOR MAXIMUM EFFORT IN HONOR OF FORTHCOMING 11TH PARTY CONGRESS
BULG SR/0001 09 JAN 75

1. REPORT ON 1974 PLAN FULFILLMENT
BULG SR/0004 06 FEB 75

1. CC PLENUM ON LONG-TERM PLANS AND AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES
BULG SR/0006 06 MAR 75

2. NEW DECREE ON PRODUCTION QUALITY
BULG SR/0006 06 MAR 75

1. PLANNING CHIEF REPLACED
BULG SR/0011 17 APR 75

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ECONOMY--POLICIES; PLAN; NATIONAL INCOME; PRODUCTION STRUCTURE

3. PLANNING CHIEF SAYS NEW APPROACH ADOPTED
BULG SR/0023 06 AUG 75

THE BULGARIAN PLAN AND BUDGET FOR 1976
RAD BR/0181 23 DEC 75

ECONOMY--PRICES

3. FIRST MENTION OF COMECON PRICE INCREASES
BULG SR/0022 30 JUL 75

ECONOMY--RESOURCES; RAW MATERIALS; ENERGY

5. RESTRICTIONS ON SALE OF GAS FOR PRIVATE CARS LIFTED
BULG SR/0006 06 MAR 75

2. ANOTHER DECREE ON THE UTILIZATION OF WASTE MATERIALS
BULG SR/0023 06 AUG 75

ECONOMY--TAXES; GOVERNMENT BUDGETS; ECONOMIC SUBSIDIES

THE BULGARIAN PLAN AND BUDGET FOR 1976
RAD BR/0181 23 DEC 75

ECONOMY--TECHNOLOGY; MODERNIZATION; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

1. CC PLENUM ON FOREIGN POLICY AND SCIENCE
BULG SR/0022 30 JUL 75

2. EFFORTS TO SPEED UP MODERNIZATION INTENSIFIED
BULG SR/0022 30 JUL 75

ECONOMY--TRADE, FOREIGN, AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

3. FOREIGN TRADE OFFICIALS SENTENCED
BULG SR/0008 20 MAR 75

3. MORE FOREIGN TRADE OFFICIALS PUNISHED
BULG SR/0010 10 APR 75

2. THE 31ST INTERNATIONAL FAIR IN PLOVDIV--AN APPRAISAL
BULG SR/0026 26 SEP 75

3. SHORTCOMINGS IN BUSINESS TRIPS ABROAD AGAIN CRITICIZED
BULG SR/0032 21 NOV 75

ECONOMY--TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

3. BULGARIA'S ROAD NETWORK
BULG SR/0024 27 AUG 75

2. BULGARIA ENTERS THE AUTOMOBILE AGE
BULG SR/0028 13 OCT 75

2. AMENDMENTS TO THE PENAL CODE
BULG SR/0035 17 DEC 75

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EDUCATION--PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS

1. PROBLEMS OF SECONDARY EDUCATION REFORM AND DISCIPLINE
BULG SR/0030 29 OCT 75

EDUCATION--POLICIES AND ORGANIZATION

1. PROBLEMS OF SECONDARY EDUCATION REFORM AND DISCIPLINE
BULG SR/0030 29 OCT 75

3. HELSINKI MATERIALS INCLUDED IN SCHOOL CURRICULUMS
BULG SR/0034 11 DEC 75

1. NATIONAL PROGRAM OF CULTURAL EDUCATION DISCUSSED
BULG SR/0035 17 DEC 75

EDUCATION--UNIVERSITIES AND HIGHER EDUCATION

3. DECREE ON EMPLOYMENT OF HIGH-SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS
BULG SR/0016 30 MAY 75

3. NEW REGULATIONS ON SCHOLARSHIPS
BULG SR/0027 01 OCT 75

ENVIRONMENT; POLLUTION

2. ANOTHER DECREE ON THE UTILIZATION OF WASTE MATERIALS
BULG SR/0023 06 AUG 75

2. AMENDMENTS TO THE PENAL CODE
BULG SR/0035 17 DEC 75

FAIRS; EXHIBITIONS

2. THE 31ST INTERNATIONAL FAIR IN PLOVDIV--AN APPRAISAL
BULG SR/0026 26 SEP 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--AFRICA

4. AMBASSADORS TO PORTUGAL, MEXICO, AND SUDAN APPOINTED
BULG SR/0004 06 FEB 75

2. ZHIVKOV VISITS TUNISIA AND MAURITANIA
BULG SR/0029 22 OCT 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--ASIA; AUSTRALIA; OCEANIA

3. IRANIAN PREMIER VISITS BULGARIA
BULG SR/0028 13 OCT 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--CHINA; KOREA; VIETNAM; MONGOLIA

KIM IL SONG VISIT HIGHLIGHTS DIFFERENCES AMONG BALKAN COMMUNIST STATES
RAD BR/0103 12 JUN 75

2. NEW CHINESE AMBASSADOR ARRIVES IN SOFIA
BULG SR/0027 01 OCT 75

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FOREIGN RELATIONS--CHINA;KOREA;VIETNAM;MONGOLIA

3.NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION PAYS OFFICIAL VISIT TO BULGARIA
BULG SR/0029 22 OCT 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--EUROPE,EASTERN

2. CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION VISITS BULGARIA
BULG SR/0003 27 JAN 75

1.YUGOSLAV REACTION TO CULTURAL POLICIES IN BLAGOEVGRAD DISTRICT
BULG SR/0005 13 FEB 75

YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN MERRY-GO-ROUND OVER MACEDONIA CONTINUES
RAD BR/0024 14 FEB 75

5.THE CEAUSESCU-ZHIVKOV MEETING
RUMN SR/0008 27 FEB 75

TITO DEFENDS YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENT ROAD
RAD BR/0065 04 APR 75

EAST EUROPEAN POLITICIANS VISITING BELGRADE
RAD BR/0075 25 APR 75

2.NEW MEASURES IN REGARD TO RUMANIAN-BULGARIAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION
RUMN SR/0016 02 MAY 75

3.HIGH-LEVEL VISITORS DISCUSS RUMANIAN-BULGARIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
RUMN SR/0021 05 JUN 75

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION AND BULGARIA'S RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA
RAD BR/0098 06 JUN 75

THE DIVISIVE ISSUE OF MACEDONIA:YUGOSLAV ATTITUDES AND SUSPICIONS
RAD BR/0099 06 JUN 75

YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION BROADENING
RAD BR/0097 06 JUN 75

6.CO-OPERATION WITH BULGARIA IN POWER GENERATION AND OIL PROSPECTING
RUMN SR/0022 13 JUN 75

5.TODOR ZHIVKOV'S VISIT TO RUMANIA
RUMN SR/0024 26 JUN 75

4.TODOR ZHIVKOV VISITS BUDAPEST
HUNG SR/0031 15 JUL 75

2.BULGARIA'S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND OTHER BALKAN NATIONS
BULG SR/0025 10 SEP 75

1.BULGARIAN PREMIER VISITS PRAGUE
CZSL SR/0038 24 SEP 75

1.BULGARIAN PREMIER VISITS THE GDR
BULG SR/0027 01 OCT 75

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BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN BELGRADE
RAD BR/0157 12 NOV 75

TITO-ZHIVKOV MEETING ON "DISPUTED QUESTIONS" TO FOLLOW MLADENOV VISIT
RAD BR/0159 18 NOV 75

2. BULGARIAN CENSUS UNDER WAY
BULG SR/0033 04 DEC 75

BULGARIAN CP LEADER TELLS BELGRADE PAPER MACEDONIANS "DO NOT EXIST"
RAD BR/0178 19 DEC 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--EUROPE, WESTERN

4. BULGARIAN-GREEK RELATIONS
BULG SR/0002 17 JAN 75

4. AMBASSADORS TO PORTUGAL, MEXICO, AND SUDAN APPOINTED
BULG SR/0004 06 FEB 75

3. BULGARIAN-PORTUGUESE TRADE AGREEMENT SIGNED
BULG SR/0005 13 FEB 75

3. FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV'S STRENUOUS PROGRAM: MOSCOW, CAIRO, AND BONN
BULG SR/0007 13 MAR 75

3. BRUND KREISKY VISITS BULGARIA
BULG SR/0014 16 MAY 75

3. WEST GERMAN ECONOMICS MINISTER VISITS BULGARIA
BULG SR/0015 23 MAY 75

2. ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION WITH NONCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES
BULG SR/0017 09 JUN 75

4. BULGARIA REPORTEDLY ASKS BONN FOR LARGE CREDIT
BULG SR/0018 26 JUN 75

5. BULGARIAN-GREEK RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF KARAMANLIS VISIT
BULG SR/0018 26 JUN 75

2. TODOR ZHIVKOV'S FOREIGN TOUR: ITALY, THE VATICAN, AND ALGERIA
BULG SR/0019 11 JUL 75

3. GREEK PREMIER PAYS OFFICIAL VISIT TO BULGARIA
BULG SR/0019 11 JUL 75

3. ZHIVKOV AND TURKISH PREMIER INAUGURATE POWER LINK
BULG SR/0021 24 JUL 75

2. BULGARIA'S RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND OTHER BALKAN NATIONS
BULG SR/0025 10 SEP 75

3. TODOR ZHIVKOV VISITS THE FRG
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FOREIGN RELATIONS--EUROPE, WESTERN

2. TURKISH PREMIER VISITS BULGARIA
BULG SR/0034 11 DEC 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE AND DETENTE

1. BULGARIA AND THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE
BULG SR/0023 06 AUG 75

3. HELSINKI MATERIALS INCLUDED IN SCHOOL CURRICULUMS
BULG SR/0034 11 DEC 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--FOREIGN MINISTRY AND DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

4. AMBASSADORS TO PORTUGAL, MEXICO, AND SUDAN APPOINTED
BULG SR/0004 06 FEB 75

2. LACHEZAR AVRAMOV CURRENTLY EMBASSY COUNSELOR IN VIENNA
BULG SR/0007 13 MAR 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--LATIN AMERICA

4. AMBASSADORS TO PORTUGAL, MEXICO, AND SUDAN APPOINTED
BULG SR/0004 06 FEB 75

4. FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV'S VISITS TO ARGENTINA, PERU, AND CUBA
BULG SR/0010 10 APR 75

1. CHILEAN REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS DISCUSSED
BULG SR/0029 22 OCT 75

4. BULGARIAN FIRM ALLEGED TO HAVE SOLD SOVIET-MADE TANKS TO CHILE
BULG SR/0031 06 NOV 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--MIDDLE EAST/ARAB COUNTRIES

3. FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV'S STRENUOUS PROGRAM: MOSCOW, CAIRO, AND BONN
BULG SR/0007 13 MAR 75

2. TODOR ZHIVKOV'S FOREIGN TOUR: ITALY, THE VATICAN, AND ALGERIA
BULG SR/0019 11 JUL 75

2. ZHIVKOV VISITS TUNISIA AND MAURITANIA
BULG SR/0029 22 OCT 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--POLICY

1. CC PLENUM ON FOREIGN POLICY AND SCIENCE
BULG SR/0022 30 JUL 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--UNITED STATES AND CANADA

3. COVERAGE OF SOVIET REPUDIATION OF US TRADE LAW
BULG SR/0003 27 JAN 75

FOREIGN RELATIONS--USSR

1. BULGARIAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS
BULG SR/0003 27 JAN 75

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FOREIGN RELATIONS--USSR

3. COVERAGE OF SOVIET REPUDIATION OF US TRADE LAW
BULG SR/0003 27 JAN 75

3. FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV'S STRENUOUS PROGRAM: MOSCOW, CAIRO, AND BONN
BULG SR/0007 13 MAR 75

BULGARIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS: "SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM IN ACTION"
RAD BR/0089 26 MAY 75

2. BULGARIAN STATE ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION IN THE SOVIET UNION ESTABLISHED
BULG SR/0016 30 MAY 75

1. CLOSER CULTURAL CO-OPERATION WITH THE USSR
BULG SR/0017 09 JUN 75

"SEPTEMVRI" DISMISSALS: LINK WITH STORY ON STALIN'S LABOR CAMPS?
RAD BR/0129 21 AUG 75

2. BULGARIAN-SOVIET FIVE-YEAR PLAN CO-ORDINATION
BULG SR/0030 29 OCT 75

THE BULGARIAN PLAN AND BUDGET FOR 1976
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HISTORY

3. DEATH OF ALEXANDER OBBOV
BULG SR/0030 29 OCT 75

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2. UNFORESEEN AFTEREFFECTS OF PROPERTY LAW: "DIVORCE BULGARIAN STYLE"
BULG SR/0012 30 APR 75

IDEOLOGY; MARXISM-LENINISM

2. THE POLITICAL ROLE OF TRANSLATION
BULG SR/0020 18 JUL 75

1. CHILEAN REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY AND TACTICS DISCUSSED
BULG SR/0029 22 OCT 75

1. DISCUSSIONS OF CIVIL RITUAL CONTINUE
BULG SR/0034 11 DEC 75

1. NATIONAL PROGRAM OF CULTURAL EDUCATION DISCUSSED
BULG SR/0035 17 DEC 75

JUSTICE, COURTS, LEGAL SYSTEM, REHABILITATIONS

3. CONFERENCE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PEOPLE'S MILITIA
BULG SR/0006 06 MAR 75

2. PROBLEMS OF LEGISLATION ON ECONOMIC MATTERS
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3. FOREIGN TRADE OFFICIALS SENTENCED
BULG SR/0008 20 MAR 75

2. AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON COMRADES' COURTS
BULG SR/0010 10 APR 75

3. MORE FOREIGN TRADE OFFICIALS PUNISHED
BULG SR/0010 10 APR 75

3. AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
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1. FREE LEGAL DEFENSE?
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1. CONGRESS ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
BULG SR/0028 13 OCT 75

2. BULGARIA ENTERS THE AUTOMOBILE AGE
BULG SR/0028 13 OCT 75

2. AMENDMENTS TO THE PENAL CODE
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MILITARY AND INTERIOR AFFAIRS--POLICE, SECRET POLICE, BORDER GUARDS

3. CONFERENCE ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PEOPLE'S MILITIA
BULG SR/0006 06 MAR 75

2. RECRUITING WORKERS FOR THE MILITIA
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1. YUGOSLAV REACTION TO CULTURAL POLICIES IN BLAGDEVGRAD DISTRICT
BULG SR/0005 13 FEB 75

YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN MERRY-GO-ROUND OVER MACEDONIA CONTINUES
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2. ACTIVITIES OF JEWISH SOCIETY
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THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION AND BULGARIA'S RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA
RAD BR/0098 05 JUN 75

THE DIVISIVE ISSUE OF MACEDONIA: YUGOSLAV ATTITUDES AND SUSPICIONS
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BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER IN BELGRADE
RAD BR/0157 12 NOV 75

TITO-ZHIVKOV MEETING ON "DISPUTED QUESTIONS" TO FOLLOW MLADENOV VISIT
RAD BR/0159 18 NOV 75

2. BULGARIAN CENSUS UNDER WAY
BULG SR/0033 04 DEC 75

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MINORITIES AND NATIONALITIES

2. TURKISH PREMIER VISITS BULGARIA
BULG SR/0034 11 DEC 75

BULGARIAN CP LEADER TELLS BELGRADE PAPER MACEDONIANS "DO NOT EXIST"
RAD BR/0178 19 DEC 75

RELIGION; RELATIONS WITH THE VATICAN

2. CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
BULG SR/0005 13 FEB 75

2. TODOR ZHIVKOV'S FOREIGN TOUR: ITALY, THE VATICAN, AND ALGERIA
BULG SR/0019 11 JUL 75

1. DISCUSSIONS OF CIVIL RITUAL CONTINUE
BULG SR/0034 11 DEC 75

SOCIAL INSURANCES; PENSIONS; OTHER SOCIAL BENEFITS

1. PENSION LAW AMENDED
BULG SR/0021 24 JUL 75

SOCIAL ISSUES; DIVORCE; ALCOHOLISM; DRUGS

1. CONGRESS ON JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
BULG SR/0028 13 OCT 75

2. AMENDMENTS TO THE PENAL CODE
BULG SR/0035 17 DEC 75

STANDARD OF LIVING; LIVING CONDITIONS

2. BULGARIA ENTERS THE AUTOMOBILE AGE
BULG SR/0028 13 OCT 75

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1. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SESSION
BULG SR/0010 10 APR 75

1. PLANNING CHIEF REPLACED
BULG SR/0011 17 APR 75

1. MORE CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT AND IN COMMITTEE ON ART AND CULTURE
BULG SR/0019 11 JUL 75

STATE AND GOVERNMENT--LOCAL GOVERNMENT

2. SUPPORT FOR PERSONAL PLOTS AND CRITICISM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
BULG SR/0032 21 NOV 75

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
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RUMANIAN PRESS SURVEY

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CRETOIU Gh.: The Unified National Plan -- A Decisive Lever in the Management of the National Economy

The polemics between Rumanian news media and "some economists" about how to construe the provisions of the 1971 Comecon Comprehensive Program are continuing (see Rumanian Situation Report/45, Radio Free Europe Research, 20 November 1975, Item 3, and Rumanian Press Survey No. 997, RFER, 24 November 1975). The article below disagrees with the economists who advocate "an international plan for developing a unified economic complex of Comecon countries. Gheorghe Cretoiu is an economist and university professor. Excerpts from his article follow.

* * *

. . . The co-operation in planning undertaken by the Comecon countries has made it advisable to resolve en bloc those comprehensive problems which, it has been agreed, fall within the purview of mutual relations -- problems involving technology, science, production, reciprocal deliveries of goods or deliveries to third markets, etc.; this will lead to the establishment of strong links favorable to both sides.

Only the interests of the participating countries, which vary according to their goals and the specific tasks imposed by socioeconomic requirements, can be the basis of collaboration in planning, which is effected both between the states within the framework of intragovernmental commissions or direct links among their planning bodies, and on multilateral bases within Comecon.

This type of co-operation is designed to draw attention in advance to problems of mutual interest and to facilitate the settling of such problems; it is subordinate to the fundamental goals of economic collaboration laid down in the basic Comecon documents -- its Statutes and its Comprehensive Program. . . .

Unflinching application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism, observance of state sovereignty and national independence, noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, respect for others' rights, mutual advantage, and comradely assistance will make it possible to benefit from the advantages of co-operation in planning to improve the efficiency and viability of the forms used by the Comecon socialist states. . . . That is why these principles should be applied in all fields, to all forms and methods, as well as within the institutional framework of co-operation among the Comecon countries. Co-operation in planning, like co-operation in general among the socialist countries, leads to enhancement of the role of the unified national plan, and enables each party and state to play its part fully in managing the national economy. The states represent national, sovereign entities based on national ownership of the means of production; the specific features of the national economies are conditioned by a whole set of factors. . . .

The discussions published in the specialized press of some socialist countries and in papers devoted to co-operation within Comecon start from the premise that, given the present stage of the economic collaboration among the Comecon states, the tasks designed to expand the economic links among these countries are more important in expanding these links than the national production and consumption structures. The partisans of such views take the planned proportional law on the scale of all the relevant countries as a "theoretical premise," and come to the conclusion that in order to achieve so-called "international proportionality" it is imperative to work out "an international plan of development for a unified economic complex of Comecon countries; in fact, the comparatively autonomous forming of economic proportions will be replaced by the forming and joint maintenance of proportionality on interstate bases."

Planned development implies only a type of proportionality based on an a priori acquaintance with social necessity within the national economy; this necessity includes all elements and branches of reproduction that express the dynamic balance of the national economy. The constitutional and statutory agencies in each socialist country are spokesmen for the social necessity and the interests expressed by it; they are legitimate representatives of people who have given them a mandate and to whom they are responsible for their national and international activities. Their field of action ranges over the entire national economy and its components, including foreign economic and trade relations. . . .

Starting -- correctly -- with the fact that development and planned development are indissolubly connected with the socialist ownership by the people of the means of production, some economists claim that planned development and forecasts with regard to the

results of interaction among the national economies of the co-operating countries would be limited to some extent by the fact that socialist property belongs to an autonomous state. Others maintain that "unified international economic interests" represent "the highest form of these interests," thus creating an artificial, unjustified opposition between the law on planned development and socialist ownership, as well as between the economic interests of the various countries. One would naturally wonder: Who is the spokesman for "unified economic interest" and in what does it consist?

Who but the people, the owners of a country's means of production, could express the requirements of economic co-operation with other countries and direct reproduction in their own country? Even in the case of the latest and most complex collaborative economic ventures each socialist country retains ownership of what it contributes to these ventures. . . .

Each socialist state participates in economic exchanges with the socialist states and with other countries. Deliberate governing of reproduction makes it imperative for that part of social labor whose results are included in foreign economic exchanges to be spent on a planned basis within the unified system of national proportions; therefore, it must be included in the plan for socioeconomic development of the country, in question, and must be earmarked to meet certain social needs. . . .

The planned management of the socioeconomic development is an essential and inalienable prerogative of sovereignty and national independence. It includes the right of each people to be master and freely dispose of its own riches, to make its own decisions with regard to its own socioeconomic development. That is why the functions of planning belong to the socialist state; they can be neither shared with nor transferred to other, extrastate or supranational bodies. . . .

The principles governing the scientific management of socioeconomic activity follow from the nature of the new order; they take into account the fundamental goals of socialism and communism, the necessity for all sections of the working people to join in management and strengthen socialist democracy. Consequently, they include common features, applicable to all socialist states, and characteristics determined by the concrete historical conditions, by the requirements of the stage of socialist construction reached by each country. On the basis of these features and of the principles that govern the links among the socialist states, economic co-operation among the Comecon countries is conducted on a plan basis, in specific forms quite different from those that prevail within the national framework. . . .

The world socialist system, which has resulted from the victory of the socialist order in a number of states, consists of sovereign and independent states; consequently, there is not and

there cannot be a unified economy, or central leading bodies for all or part of the system -- for instance, of Comecon; that is why no unified general plan can be worked out. Unlike managing the economy on a national plan basis, the measures jointly adopted within Comecon cannot be considered as guidelines; they are simply recommendations that will come into force after they have been approved by the appropriate bodies of the states in question, and it is up to each country to include them in the national unified plan as assumed commitments. . . .

The theses on "the international plan for the development of a unified economic complex of Comecon countries," which claim that the national economic complex has begun to function to a growing extent "as a territorial subsystem of the incipient interstate complex" should be regarded in light of the principles stipulated in the Comecon Statutes and the Comprehensive Program. According to some economists, on this basis "the technological levels of development of the national economies will draw nearer to each other," eliminating obstacles to the transfer of commodities, funds, and labor reserves from one country to another, in order "to concentrate them on a plan basis at those points where they can yield the best results for the co-operating countries." In drawing the national systems of management and planning of the national economies closer together, it is advocated that their record-keeping and statistical systems also be unified. Sometimes the working out of a "strategy of a unified complex of production for Comecon member countries" over a lengthy period of time is suggested, or a "general pattern for situating the forces of production throughout these states."

The partisans of the above-mentioned theses and proposals fail to provide answers to a number of questions. Can anyone really believe that these proposals, applied on a broad, complex international scale encompassing, for example, the national economies of all Comecon countries, would have economic effects equally advantageous to all states, seeing that there are still substantial differences in the levels of economic development and productivity of social labor? What would be left of the sovereign right of the peoples to dispose of their material, labor, and financial resources and to allot them under a unified national plan, since "the state autonomy of socialist ownership" is among the obstacles that must be removed? Although some people claim that "improving" collaboration along the above lines would not lead to the setting up of suprastate agencies, they would inevitably come into being, in flagrant contravention of the principles laid down in the Comecon Statutes and the Comprehensive Program.

Regarding what is called "unification" -- even if it be partial -- of the national systems of management and planning, it should be stressed that such a goal (often mentioned in the economic literature of certain socialist countries) fails to take into account a major planning requirement -- namely, that it should

accord with the specific needs and trends of each country so far as plans and methods go. Any arbitrary alteration, or any tendency toward mechanical copying of methods appropriate to other conditions may have negative consequences for a given country.

According to the provisions of the Comprehensive Program, collaboration in planning among the socialist states includes consultations on the main problems of economic policy, co-ordination of five-year and long-term plans, joint planning with regard to certain products or groups of products, etc.

Some of these practices -- such as co-ordination of the five-year plans -- have been followed for some time under various economic collaboration programs and their usefulness and effectiveness have been confirmed by social practice, whereas others -- for instance, the last to be mentioned in the preceding paragraph -- are entirely new ones with which we have had very little experience. If joint planning with regard to certain products is to be a successful form of co-operation, a number of methodological and practical problems must be settled. Therefore one wonders why some economists claim that the forms of collaboration agreed upon and provided for in the fundamental documents have become obsolete, and that in the future "co-ordination of five-year plans will become less usual and be replaced by joint planning"; these statements run counter to the spirit of the Comprehensive Program.

No arguments can be advanced to persuade anyone of the need to eliminate or reduce the role played by plan co-ordination and replace it by "joint planning activity" or other forms of collaboration. . . . In regard to working out plans on which agreement has been reached by the states concerned, including co-operative ventures of mutual interest as forms of collaboration, it should be borne in mind that this does not and cannot include the entire process of reproduction in the branch in question since it is subordinate to co-ordination of the development plans of the national economies. . . .

Economists are unable to provide arguments proving that it is imperative to assign various rights of state agencies to international economic organizations that would take care not only of co-ordinating the enterprises participating in this form of collaboration among the member countries, but also of planning and reallocation of products. Such a practice would be at variance with sovereignty and national independence, and would involuntarily lead to the setting up of supranational organizations. Economic co-operation among the socialist countries can be expanded by improving the quality of the existing agencies and the methods that have proved to be efficient, not by changing organizational forms or by extending the powers of certain agencies.

Experience has shown that increased efficiency in co-ordinating the five-year national economic plans is closely connected to

efforts to ensure conditions that will expedite final co-ordination, so that there is a longer interval between completion of this activity and finalization of the national plans; this would permit agreements and protocols on goods exchanges to be signed in due time. Lengthening these intervals would give the foreign trade agencies in each country plenty of time to conclude their economic contracts. As a result, the commitments assumed during plan co-ordination could easily be included in the national plans and the material base for their implementation could be ensured. . . .

Bearing in mind the economic development requirements of the Comecon member states, the trends of scientific-technological progress, and the world market situation, plan co-ordination should concentrate mainly on supplying the member countries with raw materials, fuels, energy, and machinery and equipment, in line with the quantitative and qualitative commitments in their national plans for socioeconomic development. Also, greater efforts should be made to implement those provisions of the Comprehensive Program which stipulate that the countries concerned should co-operate in working out forecasts for the expansion of the raw material and energy bases, scientific research, and technology in the major sectors of the national economy, etc.

Finalizing such ventures is a basic problem in plan co-ordination. Ventures agreed upon as a result of co-ordination will be really efficient provided the commitments assumed under intercountry agreements can be carried out fully and on schedule. . . .

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- RAD Background Report/180 (Rumania)
22 December 1975

RUMANIAN CREDITS TO OTHER COUNTRIES

By the Rumanian Unit



Summary: In recent years Rumania has been in the curious position of seeking loans from a variety of sources with one hand while granting them fairly liberally to a long list of countries with the other. The reasons for this seemingly paradoxical conduct are political as well as economic. A list is provided of credits known to have been granted by Rumania since the beginning of the 1960s.

* * *

Rumania's attitude to international credits has for some time been paradoxical. Claiming to be a developing country, it has asked for -- and obtained -- loans from a variety of sources: the West, the oil-producing countries, and the IMF and World Bank. (1) At the same time, it has been making fairly substantial credits available to many "other" developing countries for a variety of economic and political reasons.

Its attempts to raise money in the West have not always been successful. During a recent visit to Bucharest by West German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, it was reported that an application for a substantial credit from the FRG was

(1) See Rumanian Situation Report/47, Radio Free Europe Research, 5 December 1975, Item 5.

refused, and that the Rumanians were advised by Genscher to apply to the private West German money market. (2) Nor have the loans actually obtained resolved the problem of the balance of payments deficit with the West, which was 200,000,000 dollars in 1974, according to the Journal of Commerce. (3)

It is all the more unexpected, therefore, to find that Rumania has over the past 15 years been fairly lavish in granting credits to other countries whose economic condition was less fortunate than its own. The motives for this behavior have been mainly economic: the developing countries are less exacting in their ideas of import quality and will accept Rumanian exports that might be unmarketable in the West; and they possess raw materials (notably oil and iron ore) that Rumania needs and for which it is at present largely dependent on Comecon to supplement its domestic resources. Some of the credits, however, have a political flavor to them -- a good example being the recent 100,000,000 dollar loan to Portugal mentioned in the list below.

In the 1960s the Rumanian media sometimes seemed anxious to avoid the terms "loan" and "credit." Although Radio Bucharest (4) described the 100,000,000 dollar facility accorded to Iran in 1969 as a loan, Scinteia (5) spoke in terms of "delivery of 100,000,000 dollars' worth of goods to Iran." In recent years, however, this caution seems to have been abandoned -- apparently in an attempt to demonstrate the country's increasing economic strength -- and credits are now being called by their right name.

The loans known to have been granted by Rumania to other states up to 1969 have been listed in an earlier paper (6) but for the sake of completeness they are included in the list that follows, which is arranged alphabetically by names of countries.

* * *

(2) Reuter, 6 December 1975.

(3) 7 May 1975.

(4) 3 September 1969.

(5) 4 September 1969.

(6) Rumanian Unit, "Rumania: A Creditor?" Rumanian Background Report/24, REER, 22 September 1969.

Note: Original sources are given and, where applicable, the number and year of the Rumanian Situation Report (RSR) in which the credit was reported or discussed.

ALGERIA

1972: 100,000,000 dollars to assist oil exploitation, including the construction of a pipeline (Reuter, 11 March 1972; RSR 11/72),

ARGENTINA

1974: 100,000,000 dollars for the purchase of Rumanian industrial equipment, to be repaid by deliveries of industrial products (Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 9 March 1974).

BRAZIL

1961: 50,000,000 dollars to cover purchases of Rumanian-made equipment (Scinteia, 5 May 1961).

1975: 150,000,000 dollars for the purchase of Rumanian steel-manufacturing equipment (UPI, 6 June 1975; RSR 22/75).

1975: 30,000,000 dollars for the purchase of Rumanian oil drilling and refining equipment (UPI, 6 June 1975; RSR 22/75).

CHILE

1971: An unspecified amount of credit was granted for the purchase of Rumanian equipment and machinery (Scinteia, 24 May 1971; RSR 20/71).

CUBA

1961: Rumania agreed to supply 15,000,000 dollars' worth of machinery, equipment, and installations on "very favorable" terms; it was later announced that repayment would start

in 1966 (Scinteia, 8 January 1961; Radio Havana, 2 November 1962).

- 1969: 30,000,000 dollars were granted, again on very favorable terms, for the purchase of drilling equipment (Cuban Ambassador to Rumania, 1 January 1969).
- 1971: 20,000,000 dollars were provided for investment purposes (Reuter, 27 May 1971).
- 1973: Castro announced that Rumania had made available a credit of 65,000,000 dollars for the construction of a large cement factory, which is to be commissioned in 1976 (Radio Bucharest, 1 November 1973).

EGYPT

- 1966: Machinery and equipment for agriculture were delivered on credit (Probleme Economice No.2, February 1968).
- 1967: 165,000 tons of cereals, 20,000 tons of sugar, and 5,000 tons of edible oil were supplied on credit; repayment was to take place in five annual installments and the interest rate was to be 2.5 per cent (Scinteia, 14 July 1967).
- 1972: Two credits were arranged: (1) 100,000,000 dollars for five years at 3 per cent for civil engineering and petrochemical projects, mining exploration, tractor production, etc.; and (2) 30,000,000 dollars for three years at 4 per cent to cover purchases of 2,000 tractors made in Rumania, rural electrification equipment, etc. (Egyptian weekly Rose el Youssef, 5 April 1972; RSR 13/72).
- 1974: 100,000,000 dollars to enable Egypt to buy Rumanian equipment, machinery, and plants, as well as technical know-how and licenses (Romania Libera, 1 July 1974; RSR 23/74).

GUINEA

- 1964: A credit of 2,500,000 dollars was granted (Associated Press Estimates of 1964).

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1974: During Ceausescu's visit to Guinea, a credit of 80,000,000 dollars was arranged to cover deliveries of equipment and machinery in connection with co-operation ventures (Scinteia, 12 March 1974; RSR 10/74).

INDIA

1962: 52,400,000 rupees were granted for the construction of a refinery at Gauhati (Probleme Economice No.8, 1962).

INDONESIA

1962: During a visit by Gheorghiu-Dej a credit agreement worth 50,000,000 dollars was signed in connection with the provision of oil field equipment and rolling stock (Reuter, 12 October 1962).

1962: An unspecified amount of credit was made available for building an oil refinery of 1,500,000 tons capacity and the purchase of 2,100 railways cars (Romania Libera, 13 October 1962).

1971: An unspecified amount of credit was granted for the purchase of complete plants, industrial equipment, and tools (Scinteia, 7 June 1971).

IRAN

1968: A loan of 35,000,000 dollars was granted for the purpose of setting up an oil refinery and a petrochemical plant; the interest rate was 2.5 per cent and repayment was to be spread over five years and to take the form of oil deliveries (The New York Times, 1 February 1968).

1969: 100,000,000 dollars were provided, again at a rate of 2.5 per cent, to cover purchases of plants and machinery; repayment, in the form of crude oil (85 per cent) and manufactured goods (15 per cent) was to take place over a 10-year period (Radio Bucharest, 3 September 1969; RFE Special/Teheran, 3 September 1969).

IRAQ

1971: 35,000,000 dollars were made available to assist exploration and development by the Iraq National Oil Company (Radio Budapest, 1 November 1971).

NORTH VIETNAM

- 1961: 37,500,000 dollars for the development of apatite deposits, to be repaid by deliveries of that mineral (Scinteia, 12 February 1961).
- 1966: An unspecified amount of credit was granted, and repayment of earlier loans was postponed (Romania Libera, 5 January, 1966).
- 1966: Nonreimbursable economic and military credits were approved for 1967 (Scinteia, 23 September 1966).
- 1967: Repayment of earlier loans was postponed once more (Scinteia, 27 August 1967).
- 1968: Further postponements and a new nonreimbursable grant for 1969 (Scinteia, 13 June 1968; RSR 95/69).
- 1972: Agreement on economic and military aid for 1972 signed (Scinteia, 19 March 1972).
- 1973: Convention on credits for 1974 signed (Scinteia, 1 August 1973).
- 1975: Credit agreement signed granting further (unspecified) loan for projects listed in the North Vietnamese five-year plan for 1976-1980. Repayment of credits provided in 1960 and 1970-1973 waived (Scinteia, 19 November 1975; RSR 46/75).

PAKISTAN

1975: 55,000,000-dollar loan approved, of which 15,000,000 have already been spent on extending the Karachi refinery (AFP, 16 October 1975; RSR 42/75).

PERU

1973: Credit of unspecified size granted for purchase of machinery and equipment in Rumania (Scinteia, 22 and 27 September 1973).

PORTUGAL

1975: 100,000,000 dollars made available to help implement projects of common interest (Scinteia, 1 November 1975; RSR 43/75).

SUDAN

1972: Loan of 60,000,000 dollars granted (Reuter, 27 March 1973).

SYRIA

1971: 13,500,000-dollar loan for various projects and the purchase of tractors (ANA, 27 July 1971).

1974: 155,000,000 dollars for developing dairy and poultry farms (AFP, 27 April 1974; RSR 16/74).

TUNISIA

1968: 20,000,000 dollars granted to cover the supply of installations and equipment for nine new iron ore, phosphate, and nonferrous mining units (Radio Bucharest, 13 July 1968).

YEMEN, People's Democratic Republic of

1971: 13,500,000 dollars for agricultural and industrial development (Agerpres, 17 July 1971; RSR 28/71).

YUGOSLAVIA

1968: A loan of 16,000,000 dollars at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent granted to cover the purchase of Rumanian products needed for the Iron Gates project. Repayment over a period of 10 years to take the form of 241,500,000 KWH of electricity annually (Buletinul Oficial, 17 April 1968).

ZAMBIA

1972: 50,000,000 dollars for various (unnamed) projects, and a credit of unspecified size for the purchase of Rumanian industrial plants (Scinteia, 26 March 1972; RSR 12/72).

1974: An unspecified credit for the purchase of a complete plant in Rumania (RSR 28/74).

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