

# The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives

by M.Y. Prozumenschikov

The year 1962 was marked by a further intensification of the discord between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Community Party (CCP) and, correspondingly, between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's refusal to stay within the boundaries defined by Moscow, which was especially marked after the 22nd CPSU congress at the end of 1961, caused serious anxiety among Soviet officials who frequently spoke of the CCP leadership's deviation "from the generally fraternal countries and parties" and described Beijing's authorities as seeking "to more widely bring into the open their disagreements [with us], both in theory and in practice."<sup>1</sup>

In the international arena, these disagreements touched on a wide circle of problems, including questions of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, evaluations of the character of the contemporary period, and others. Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, who was trying (albeit inconsistently) to conduct a policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, could hardly agree with the declarations coming from Beijing to the effect that the aspiration "to achieve peace without wars is sheer nonsense," that imperialism "will never fall if it isn't pushed," and which characterized the atom bomb as a "paper tiger."<sup>2</sup> Moscow reacted especially sensitively to Beijing's efforts to depreciate the role of the socialist countries and the international communist movement, having declared the decisive factor of the development of human society in the contemporary epoch to be the national liberation movements of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the USSR it was feared, not without reason, that one reason why the "wind from the East had come to prevail over the wind from the West," was the PRC's

desire to strengthen its influence in the "third world," in the process squeezing the Soviet Union out.<sup>3</sup>

Until the fall of 1962, however, both countries succeeded in preserving a semblance of outward unity: the "cracks" in the Soviet-Chinese "monolith" were already apparent to the naked eye, yet it was still not clear whether they were leading to an outright schism. The events of October 1962, when new clashes on the Sino-Indian border and the Caribbean Crisis (Cuban Missile Crisis) broke out practically simultaneously, constitute a turning point in the development of Sino-Soviet relations and signified the beginning of the open split between the two countries.

This article does not attempt to illuminate the causes or recount the courses of the border conflict or the Cuban crisis, but rather, on the basis of archival documents in the former Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU stored in the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD) in Moscow, to analyze the influence of these dual conflicts in the fall of 1962 on Sino-Soviet relations.

Armed conflicts on the Sino-Indian border first occurred in August 1959 and already caused at that time a mutual lack of understanding between the PRC and USSR. Moscow, having supported Beijing during the suppression of the uprising in Tibet in early 1959,<sup>4</sup> refused to stand so unequivocally on China's side in the border incident. Soviet leaders believed that in many ways the flare-up was provoked by the Chinese themselves, in order to demonstrate in practice their refusal to accept the McMahon line (a 1914 boundary agreed on by British and Tibetan officials which India accepted as the correct Sino-Indian frontier) as the state border between the PRC and India. Moscow clarified its stance in a September 1959 TASS statement calling on both warring sides to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.

The fact that the USSR did not take a clear "class" position in a conflict between a socialist state and a bourgeois state provoked indignation in China. In a 13 September 1959 letter to the CC CPSU, the CC CCP accused the Soviet government (although in a veiled form) of "accommodation and compromise on important matters of principle" and noted that "the TASS statement showed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union in regard to the incident on the Indian-Chinese border, which causes a virtual glee and jubilation among the Indian bourgeoisie and the American and English imperialists, who are in every way possible driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union."<sup>5</sup>

The border conflict placed the USSR in a complicated position for a number of reasons. First of all, Mao Zedong persistently tried to confer on this conflict the character of an important question of the class struggle on an international scale and, accordingly, sought support for their actions from all "fraternal" parties. This did not at all correspond to Khrushchev's views, neither in principle nor in the specific concrete case; while the Soviet leader earnestly desired to preserve good relations with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, for Mao Nehru was "half man, half devil" and the task of communists was to "wash off his face so that it won't be frightening, like a devil's."<sup>6</sup>

Secondly, the Soviet Union could not act as a peacemaker between socialist China and bourgeois India without violating the principles of proletarian internationalism. Not wishing simply to embrace the Chinese position in the border dispute, the USSR remained deaf to numerous Indian requests to act as a mediator. In this question, Moscow displayed extreme caution; the CC CPSU, for example, categorically rejected a proposal of the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Acad-

emy of Sciences, P. Gafurov, to organize in Moscow a meeting with the participation of Chinese and Indian scholars on questions connected with the history and mutual influences of Chinese and Indian cultures.<sup>7</sup>

Third, the border conflict sharply worsened the position of the Communist Party of India (CPI): subjected to attacks from the bourgeois parties of India, the CPI also itself split between those who felt that only India was at fault in the conflict and those who suggested that responsibility could be divided between both countries. At the 6th CPI Congress in 1961, Soviet representative M. Suslov exerted considerable effort so that, on the one hand, militant pro-Beijing party members who felt the CPI must always align itself with the CCP would not prevail, and on the other hand, to block discussion at the Congress of a resolution proposed by a number of prominent Indian communists criticizing the PRC and backing Nehru. These Soviet actions could hardly pass unnoticed in Beijing; in a talk with Soviet ambassador S. Chervonenko, CC CCP secretary Deng Xiaoping made a point of referring indignantly to “some Indian communists, who are even praising Nehru.”<sup>8</sup>

Finally, another relevant aspect of the problem was the fact that Moscow clearly grasped that Beijing’s bellicose method of resolving border questions with India could also be repeated in other disputed portions of the Chinese border, and not necessarily only with countries liberated from colonial dependence. As early as 8 September 1959, two weeks after fighting broke out on the Sino-Indian border, the CC CPSU received from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs a detailed report “On the Question of the Soviet–Chinese Border.” The preparation of such a report at a time when Sino–Soviet relations, at least on this question, were ostensibly satisfactory strongly suggests that at least some Soviet officials already foresaw the danger of border problems with China.

For the previous three years a situation of unstable equilibrium had been maintained on the Sino–Indian border, threatening the outbreak of new armed

conflict. From time to time Moscow cautiously attempted to influence Beijing to take a more moderate position and agree to compromise with India. At that time, Soviet officials believed that such a change in China’s approach could occur only “as a result of review by the leaders of the PRC of their foreign policy conceptions as a whole,” but this “in the near future is extremely problematic.”<sup>9</sup> In contrast to the diplomats, Khrushchev, displeased by the Mao’s refusal to heed Moscow’s advice, stated in a much sharper way that when he converses with Mao, when he listens to him, he gets the impression that he is speaking with Stalin, is listening to Stalin.<sup>10</sup> From their part, the Chinese persistently told Soviet representatives that resolving the border dispute required influencing India, not the PRC; that “Nehru is the central figure in the anti–Chinese campaign in India, that he does not in any case want to resolve the question of the Sino–Indian border, even in some fixed period.”<sup>11</sup> Moscow listened to these statements in silence, leaving them without commentary.

Concurrently with the Sino–Indian border conflict, Soviet and Chinese attention was drawn to events in the Western hemisphere, where in 1959 the Cuban revolution triumphed. The chance to spread their respective understandings of Marxism among the Cuban revolutionaries sparked a lively competition between the two communist giants for ideological influence in Cuba.

Initially, Moscow seized the leadership in this “contest for Cuba,” which was in many ways determined by Soviet military and economic aid to Havana. By contrast, although Chinese leaders welcomed the Cuban revolution, if they took a wait-and-see approach with regard to its leader Fidel Castro, in part to preserve diplomatic communications with Taiwan via Cuba. In this regard, noted Soviet representatives in China, who closely monitored the development of Chinese–Cuban relations, in its propaganda during this early period the CCP leadership made no attempt to counterpose their policy toward Cuba to that of the CPSU.<sup>12</sup> The situation changed after Beijing and

Havana established diplomatic relations in September 1960; now the PRC began actively to invite envoys from the “island of freedom” and recruit from them advocates of their own course.<sup>13</sup>

Considering that the Chinese revolutionaries’ militant language in many respects echoed the Cubans’, Moscow tried by all means to lessen Chinese influence. These efforts did not go to waste. During a visit to China at the end of 1960, Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara in a joint Chinese–Cuban communique expressed approval of the PRC policy of “three red banners”; but one year later, Cuban President Oswaldo Dorticos, in a visit to the PRC, did not once touch on this question despite considerable Chinese efforts.<sup>14</sup>

In Cuba itself, authorities generally tried to minimize the disagreements that had arisen in the communist world. Havana even specially appealed to Moscow and Beijing with a request not to publish anti–Soviet and anti–Chinese materials in TASS and Xinhua bulletins distributed in Cuba, for this could, the Cuban leadership feared, damage the unity of the Cuban people and create additional political difficulties within the country.<sup>15</sup> The Cuban press carefully “filtered” all statements by Chinese leaders critical of Soviet policy (in particular, most newspapers excised such remarks from the speech of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai at the CPSU 22nd congress); at the same time the Cubans politely but firmly suppressed Soviet attempts to distribute literature in Cuba that enunciated Moscow’s point of view on the dispute.<sup>16</sup>

Both the Soviet Union and China naturally counted on extracting advantages from the “special relations” they hoped to establish with Cuba. However, if Beijing embarked on a path of propagandistic expansion through Cuba onto the Latin American continent, then in the USSR a plan took shape to use the island as an unsinkable nuclear base near the shores of the USA. Khrushchev preferred not to let Mao Zedong know about this plan, not only because of the existing disagreements, but also, perhaps, out of a wish to reap future laurels himself and at the same time to strengthen the Soviet position in the

“third world.” This desire might account for the thoroughness and satisfaction with which the CC CPSU apparatus collected the enthusiastic reactions from the developing countries to the TASS report of 11 September 1962 vowing that the USSR would protect Cuba against U.S. aggression. In China, despite the fact that this report fit Beijing’s propaganda style, only 32 lines were allotted to it in the periodical press.

The CC CCP 10th Plenum, which took place in the fall of 1962, strengthened anti-Soviet moods in Beijing. On October 12, Chinese leaders stated that the conclusion of a nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty (which Khrushchev supported), would further the interests only of the USA, which was trying “to bind China by the hands and feet” in the development of its own nuclear arsenal.<sup>17</sup> An October 20 memorandum from the PRC government to the USSR government on the nonproliferation question, distributed also to representatives of other socialist countries, declared: “However strong the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, it is not able to solve the defense issue of all the socialist nations. For example, on the question of the defense by the Chinese of their borders with India, the Soviet side played just the opposite role.”<sup>18</sup> A similar announcement explained that the military conflict on the Sino-Indian border, which was again flaring in autumn 1962, had not only failed to move the Soviet Union to change its fundamental position but also, from the Chinese perspective, caused Moscow to become even more pro-Indian, since prior to these events it had given India the military helicopters and transport planes, which took part in the border clashes.

In October 1962, Beijing made a last attempt to compel Moscow to take a “class position” on China’s border dispute with India and “to teach certain comrades to separate truth from untruth.”<sup>19</sup> On October 15, *Renmin Ribao* (*People’s Daily*) assistant editor Chen Tseiu organized in the newspaper’s editorial office a meeting with foreign correspondents, which was intended, according to the opinion of the Soviet journalists who were present, “to dem-

onstrate the seriousness of the situation on the Indian-Chinese border,” and to urge “the press organs of the fraternal parties to come forward on the given question with accounts of the Chinese side’s positions.”<sup>20</sup> A week later, Soviet ambassador Chervonenko, as he reported to Moscow, spoke on this very question with PRC Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Hanfu, and “emphatically declared to Zhang Hanfu that it was necessary to understand who was right and who was not right [in the border conflicts]. It would be incorrect not to distinguish between those who were guilty and those who were not guilty. It would likewise not be right to blur the distinction between the guilty and the innocent.”<sup>21</sup> Such an answer could not be reassuring to Beijing. Chervonenko also mentioned certain problems which were raised by Zhang Hanfu and which evidently were connected “with the aggravation of the situation on the Sino-Indian border, in light of the fact that the Chinese leadership expected different reactions on the part of the Soviet leadership.”<sup>22</sup>

One must also note that at first, the Soviet leadership, preoccupied with Cuban affairs, did not pay particular attention to the renewed aggravation of tensions on the Sino-Indian frontier. The documents relating to events on the border, which various organs of the CC CPSU issued during this period, did not, as a rule, go further than the International Department of the Central Committee, and they were labeled: “Informational Material. To the archive.”

The lack of upper-level Soviet engagement on the border conflict was reflected in Soviet newspaper articles which gave stingy information and, moreover, did not appear in prominent locations. The same lack of top level leadership manifested itself in the conversations of Soviet officials with foreign representatives, in which the Soviets reiterated the old thesis about the need to prevent world conflict.

The situation changed on October 22, when the speech of U.S. President John F. Kennedy effectively put a tough choice before Khrushchev: conflict, with likely use of nuclear weapons, or retreat. The first scenario threatened the

whole world with catastrophe, the second was acutely painful for the USSR and its leader. Searching for a way out, Moscow, in the midst of everything, turned its attention to Beijing. The experience of recent years made it possible for Khrushchev to hope that, at this critical moment in the battle with international imperialism, China would at least momentarily “close its eyes” to the discord and steadfastly support any Soviet action. That had occurred (at least on the surface) in 1956 during the crises in Hungary and Poland, and in 1961 during the Berlin crisis.<sup>23</sup> For his part, Khrushchev was ready to compromise with Mao on a whole series of issues, including the Sino-Indian conflict.

On October 25, with war with the United States potentially imminent, the newspaper *Pravda* published a front-page article, which had been approved by the CC CPSU, essentially rejecting the position that Moscow had maintained during the course of the whole Sino-Indian border conflict. The article called the McMahon line, which New Delhi accepted, “notorious,” “the result of British imperialism,” and consequently legally invalid. Moreover, having made this assertion on the eve of the execution of Chinese plans to settle the conflict, *Pravda* also accused India of being incited by imperialists and being the main ringleaders of the conflict and charged that the CPI was sliding toward chauvinism to the detriment of proletarian internationalism.<sup>24</sup>

Moscow’s unexpected and abrupt reversal—clearly intended as a gesture to shore up the all but moribund Sino-Soviet alliance in the event of war with the West—provoked a sharp reaction, but not exactly the one that the Soviet leadership had expected. From the documents at TsKhSD, it is clear that the article came as a bombshell, especially in India. Nehru declared that he was very pained by the article, which caused significant damage to India’s friendship with the USSR.<sup>25</sup> Even more severe embarrassment arose in the CPI; one party leader, Shripad Amrit Dange, sent the CC CPSU a telegram requesting that it take at least some action to repudiate some of the article’s statements. Very familiar with the sys-

tem, under which the representatives of the other fraternal nations and parties usually followed the Soviet position, unwaveringly supporting the Kremlin, Dange begged Moscow “to stop all the fraternal parties so that they would not write in their newspapers about the McMahon line, things which were similar to that which they would otherwise write.”<sup>26</sup> The telegram went unanswered. Predictably, the pro-Chinese faction of the CPI became noticeably more active, announcing triumphantly that the CPSU was finally “convinced of the folly of its ways and accepted the Chinese perspective.”<sup>27</sup>

In the tangled position in which Soviet diplomats in New Delhi found themselves, they were obliged, in conversations with Indians, to speak of the complicated and confused situation, about the impossibility of defining the reality of any border, even proposing that India wait while Chinese and Indian academicians defined the precise border on the basis of archival documents.<sup>28</sup> The Indians understood what was happening, inferring that the appearance of “such bad articles” in the Soviet press could only be explained “by the situation of the Cuban crisis and the threat of war.”<sup>29</sup>

Soviet officials had expected such reactions, but they hoped to be repaid with active Chinese support in the Caribbean (Cuban Missile) crisis. It was no coincidence that during this period, in conversations with Chinese officials, East German and Hungarian diplomats stressed the need for compromise and cooperation between fraternal socialist parties, rejecting the “clarification of relationships” while there was bitter hostility and potential war with the imperialists.<sup>30</sup> Since the records of these conversations were almost immediately sent to the Soviet embassy in Beijing, and from there efficiently dispatched to the CC CPSU, it is not hard to guess that such conversations were, to a large extent, inspired by Moscow.

However, the effort which the USSR expended to obtain China’s support proved to be entirely disproportionate to the return it received. All that Moscow got from the PRC leadership was an October 25 declaration on the

Cuban question expressing “complete support for the correct position of the Soviet government,” and two large articles in *Renmin Ribao* with bellicose headlines that typified Chinese propaganda of that period, and which approved of the Soviet’s actions in the Caribbean.<sup>31</sup> This was the last praise that Beijing officially conferred upon Moscow. While the Soviet propagandists tried with limited success to organize massive rallies and demonstrations within other nations for the support of their policy, nothing of the sort was attempted in China in October 1962.

Soviet leaders, it seems, did not grasp the fact that during this period the disagreements between the two governments had become too strong to be surmounted with the stroke of a newspaper writer’s pen. Nor did they realize that Khrushchev’s actions in Cuba created a dream-like situation for the Chinese—ensuring a positive outcome, from their standpoint, without requiring them to modify their basic position. For if Kennedy retreated and the missiles remained on the island, it would vindicate the CCP’s militant thesis that imperialism was a “paper tiger” to which one needed to apply the principle of intensified pressure; conversely, Khrushchev’s retreat would strengthen Beijing’s slogan denouncing “contemporary revisionists,” i.e., the Soviets. Moreover, the future of Sino-Soviet relations and the situation in the Communist world as a whole depended, in large measure, on the result of the Soviet-American stand-off. If events developed according to the first scenario, Khrushchev would probably conduct relations with Washington as if with a “paper tiger,” a development which Beijing could interpret as strengthening the correctness of the Chinese line. The second possibility would lead to a final split, between the USSR and China, and the anti-Soviet mood would intensify.

Analyzing the documents available in TsKhSD, one may conclude that the Chinese leaders did not believe that a third, more tragic variant might develop: that the flare-up over Cuba would escalate into World War III. Since Mao loved to issue judgment on themes of global war and was even prepared to

sacrifice hundreds of millions of human lives on the victory altar of Communism, the Beijing leadership evidently firmly believed that such a catastrophe would not happen in October 1962. In the conflict’s tensest moments, Chinese officials remained convinced that there was no danger of thermonuclear war, and that if the affair went so far as a military conflict, it would be of a guerrilla character, as in Algeria, Laos, or South Vietnam.<sup>32</sup> According to Mao, the main reason that war would not break out was that the American imperialists, who feared for their stolen riches, had no reason to desire it. Similarly, the “Soviet bourgeoisie” that had emerged under Khrushchev and had not forgotten about the Stalinist purges maintained a death grip on their privileges. Consequently, Beijing figured that one side or the other had to yield.

In the end an understanding of the lethal danger of nuclear conflict compelled Khrushchev to retreat.<sup>33</sup> Although the Soviet Union understood that their leader lacked the absolute power over his allies in the communist camp to represent the defeat as a “victory in the name of peace,” nonetheless, the USSR did not expect the violent reaction to Khrushchev’s agreement to withdraw the missiles which was to come from Beijing.

As soon as the news of Khrushchev’s retreat reached them, the Chinese authorities put their propaganda machine to work at full throttle; newspapers displayed discussions about the situation in the Caribbean, the cities were covered in slogans in support of Cuba, and the speeches that Castro had given on Cuban television explaining the basic disagreements between the Cuban and the Soviet leaderships actually became bestsellers in China at that time. Soviet diplomats in Beijing disconsolately reported that events on the Sino-Indian border, to which Chinese propaganda up until that time had been devoting most of its attention, had been swept aside and lost in this midst of the uproar over Cuba.<sup>34</sup> Only now, after the Soviet concession had ended the crisis, came the rallies the Soviet leaders had desired in its first days, featuring appearances and speeches by the up-

per-level Chinese leadership: Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, et al.<sup>35</sup> The political campaign culminated with elaborately orchestrated<sup>36</sup> mass demonstrations of solidarity at the Cuban Embassy in Beijing, which took place non-stop from the 3rd to the 6th of November and in which, the Chinese media reported, more than five million people participated.<sup>37</sup>

Soviet officials well understood the ulterior motive behind these mass demonstrations. While under the ostensible slogan of solidarity with Cuba, they sharply criticized those “who were frightened in the face of imperial aggression,” who “bartered with the freedom and independence of another people,” and so on.<sup>38</sup> However, at that moment Moscow was not up to a clarification of relations with China; rather, it sought at any price to get out of the conflict with minimal losses. In fact, in November 1962, Moscow switched roles with Beijing; if during the Sino-Indian border clashes China unsuccessfully appealed for the support of the Soviet Union, now the USSR faced the analogous response from the PRC. During this period, the Soviet ambassador repeatedly tried to secure a meeting directly with Mao, who cited various reasons for avoiding a personal encounter, instead sending much lower-ranking officials. The Soviet Embassy knew full well that during these very days, when Chinese officials asserted that Mao was feeling indisposed and could not receive the Soviet ambassador, the PRC leader was seeing party delegations and representatives of other states.<sup>39</sup> All this amounted to a clear demonstration of the poor relations between the PRC and USSR.

Moscow might have put up with Beijing simply taking a neutral position. However, the PRC decided to exploit the Cuban crisis to explain to “certain comrades that under no conditions is it permissible to trade in the liberty and rights” of other states.<sup>40</sup> The PRC Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, speaking on November 7 in the Soviet Embassy on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the October Revolution, as Soviet diplomats later reported, lectured them in a “mentor’s tone” about the inadmiss-

ability of any sort of “wishy-washiness” in relations with the imperialist aggressors.<sup>41</sup> Obviously with the approval of the PRC leadership, *Renmin Ribao* compared the Cuba situation with the 1938 Munich Pact—e.g., charging Moscow with appeasement of imperialism.<sup>42</sup> At that moment, a stronger accusation was difficult to imagine.

The anti-Soviet orientation of statements in China was not limited only to means of mass communication. The CC CPSU received information that in enterprises, offices and even in certain schools across China closed meetings were being held to elucidate the situation around Cuba and the role of the Soviet Union. At these meetings it was essentially stated for the first time openly, and not through hints, that the USSR was conducting a “revisionist” foreign as well as domestic policy. It was true that the responsible party workers who conducted these meetings explained that accusing the Soviet Union of revisionism out loud—like, for example, Yugoslavia—for the time being was not permitted by the tense international situation. But they let it be known that this would be a matter for the coming months. At the same time, it was said in China that the peoples of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe could not sleep at night because of fear of a nuclear conflict.

Judging by the information which flowed into the CC CPSU, one reason behind Beijing’s extreme negative reaction to Moscow’s actions was the fact that the Soviet Union had deployed missiles to Cuba without saying a word to China. Reproaches that Khrushchev had hidden important international information from his allies were heard frequently in China in those days along with unfavorable comparisons to Sino-Soviet consultations during the events in Poland, Hungary, and Laos, when the sides informed each other in a timely manner and therefore made correct decisions.<sup>43</sup> More to the point, on this issue it was as if Moscow and Beijing had traded places: now it fell to Khrushchev to listen to the reproaches which he had only recently addressed to Mao. In autumn 1958, during the Taiwan Straits crisis, and in 1959, at the

outset of military actions on the Sino-Indian border, the Soviets had sought basic operational data from Chinese authorities about the situation, but for a long time was unable to get any. In fact, the USSR didn’t even know from the beginning that military operations already were going full steam: A secret report of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing noted that in 1958 the “Chinese friends” had informed Moscow “about the political goals which are being pursued by this action [in the Taiwan straits] only after two weeks,”<sup>44</sup> while in 1959 Moscow received China’s report about the events on the border only after “a great delay.”<sup>45</sup> Insofar as “the recognition and stressing by the Chinese comrades of the formula about the leading role of the Soviet Union in the Socialist [bloc] might create in world public opinion the impression that the harsh course and the foreign policy actions of the PRC were taken upon agreement with the Soviet Union,”<sup>46</sup> Soviet officials viewed Beijing’s behavior very negatively, and demanded that China coordinate positions in situations where the collective security of the two countries—which under the 1950 treaty creating the Sino-Soviet alliance were linked together by, inter alia, the obligation to provide military assistance to one another—was involved.<sup>47</sup>

There was great amazement in Moscow when in November 1962 the Chinese virtually repeated the old Soviet theses, declaring that the Kremlin’s poorly thought out actions in the Caribbean might have involved the Chinese people in a nuclear war against its will, since although the PRC didn’t know anything about the Soviet preparations, by the terms of the 1950 alliance treaty in the event of the outbreak of war, it would have had to enter the conflict on the USSR’s side.<sup>48</sup>

All this taken together could not but attract the attention of Moscow, which decided, as soon as the clouds over Cuba began to disperse a little, “to bring affairs to order” in the socialist house. On November 5, *Pravda* published a new lead article on the situation on the Sino-Indian border, which in its content sharply contrasted with its predecessor of ten days before and on

the principal issues once again returned to the USSR's old viewpoint on that conflict, in which China did not at all appear to be the victimized side.<sup>49</sup> The new *Pravda* article, however, could scarcely seriously change anything, because by then the border situation had largely stabilized and, in the opinion of diplomats from the socialist countries, both combatants were searching for a means to withdraw from the conflict with as much dignity as possible.

In its main counterattack, Moscow turned to the congresses of the Communist parties of a number of countries which took place in late 1962 and early 1963, and also to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which took place in December 1962. Those who did not support Khrushchev were declared "babblers," "ultra-revolutionaries," and "reckless adventurists." In his indignation, the Soviet leader went to the point that he named as the main instigators of war not U.S. President Kennedy or West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (which at the time would have been entirely normal), but ... the Albanians! And although at these congresses there was still preserved the ritual, accepted in the last few years in the Communist world, when Moscow, cursing the Albanians, really had the Chinese in mind, and the PRC, cursing the Yugoslavs, meant the USSR, a new step on the path to a total split had been taken. Khrushchev, in particular, stressed that "someone taught the Albanians to pronounce vile words," and Wu Xiuquan, CC CPC member and former Chinese ambassador to Yugoslavia, speaking in his capacity as the permanent leader of the CPC delegation to the Communist party congresses which were taking place during that period, was subject to well-organized filibusters.<sup>50</sup> In its turn, the CPC responded in a series of articles in *Renmin Ribao* showing that the world had by no means been put on the brink of nuclear war by "babblers" and that "the juggling of nuclear weapons as the solution to international arguments" was in no way a true Marxist-Leninist position.<sup>51</sup>

Analyzing Soviet policy toward the PRC during this period, it makes sense to take into account the inconsistency

and well-known impulsiveness which marked Khrushchev's actions. Indignant at Beijing's position during the Caribbean crisis, Khrushchev, not thinking out very well the consequences of his actions, decided to activate all the levers of pressure in order to teach the Chinese a good lesson in the newly brought to light "classics of Marxism-Leninism."<sup>52</sup> However, the Soviet leader still hoped to preserve a certain unity of the Communist world, viewing these disagreements with the PRC as an annoying misunderstanding which could be settled. The limits to the Soviet leadership's readiness to trumpet its fall-out with Beijing surfaced in December 1962 when the Indians decided to take advantage of the sharpening of Sino-Soviet contradictions and began to distribute in Moscow, through its embassy, materials about the events on the Sino-Indian border. This measure was immediately nipped in the bud by the Soviet side, prompting a sharp protest by the Indian representatives.<sup>53</sup>

The Kremlin also noted the strengthening of the "intellectual ferment" generated by these disagreements inside the Communist world itself. Romania's leaders blatantly tried to exploit the situation to distance itself from the USSR and from China.<sup>54</sup> One alarming tendency, to Soviet officials, was the new willingness of ambassadors from Romania, Hungary, and China, in conversations with Soviet counterparts, to criticize, albeit vaguely, certain actions of the USSR, complaining that Moscow often failed to consult with its allies.<sup>55</sup> Under these conditions, Khrushchev was obliged to call for an end to polemics between parties so that passions could subside.

This appeal did not elicit, however, a positive response in Beijing, for China's leaders had no desire to retreat from the positions which had been won, believing that the USSR's actions in late 1962 had conclusively unmasked Moscow's "revisionist policy."<sup>56</sup> If previously Mao had likened the divergences between the two countries to the gap between one finger and the remaining nine on a person's hands, now Chinese officials described the differences as "diverse interpretations of Marxism-

Leninism."<sup>57</sup> Sensing that the danger of isolation inside the Communist world no longer threatened China, Beijing began to say that "if the international Communist movement collapsed, this will not cause the sky to fall down."<sup>58</sup> The PRC derived confidence also from the fact that if before only Albania openly and unconditionally supported China, now a whole group of Asian communist parties, including those in power, shared clearly pro-Chinese positions. Exploiting another of Khrushchev's ill-considered steps, which in the customs of the time mobilized "progressive people in the West" to criticize China, Beijing began a propaganda counterattack against the Communist parties of France, Italy, and the USA, posing a choice to the USSR itself—to take its satellites under its protection and in this way intensify the contradictions with China, or to stay silent, creating grounds for disagreement with the Western communist parties.

The events of the end of 1962 were a borderline, beyond which the disagreements between Moscow and Beijing and the corresponding split in the Communist world began to assume an irreversible character. For the first time during the whole period of the "Cold War" under conditions of the fierce confrontation between the USSR and the USA, China not only did not support the USSR, but even dared to condemn Moscow's actions. For the first time disagreements were widely published not on questions of secondary importance, but on the principal ideological issues. Finally, for the first time a party which had incited a revolt against the hegemony of the Kremlin did not end up in total isolation; a number of Communist parties unequivocally expressed support for her, and inside Communist parties of pro-Soviet orientation there began to appear Maoist fractions. The trumpet call of the revolution became more muffled and unclear, and Communism itself turned out to be split not only as an ideological credo, but also as a movement which carried out practical work in various countries of the world.

<sup>1</sup> Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1962, Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, f. 5, op. 49, d. 536, l. 58.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 64.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 61.

<sup>4</sup> The anti-Chinese position in this conflict of the ruling circles of India, who defended the Dalai Lama and who tried to organize assistance to the rebels in Tibet, constituted a major source of the sharpening tension on the Sino-Indian border. As far as the USSR was concerned, although Moscow also expressed cautious doubts about the lawfulness of some of Beijing's actions, overall the Kremlin unconditionally supported the PRC, proceeding from the main directive: "Support China's just cause, don't aggravate relations with Nehru." Note of the Editor of the Newspaper *Pravda* V.V. Maevskii to CC CPSU, 12 April 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 302, l. 75. At the same time, the USSR was ready to provide assistance to the PRC in the international arena, where events in Tibet prompted an ambiguous reaction. Information Sheet of the Department of the CC CPSU on Relations with Communist and Working Class Parties of the Socialist Countries, "About the Situation in Tibet," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 302, l. 75.

<sup>5</sup> Letter of the CC CPC to the CC CPSU Concerning the incident on the Indo-Chinese Border, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 246, ll. 164–165.

<sup>6</sup> Record of Conversation of Mao Zedong with Representatives of Socialist Countries, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 238, ll. 77–78.

<sup>7</sup> Letter of the Institute of Oriental Studies to the CC CPSU about the Conduct in the USSR of Meetings between Chinese and Indian Scholars, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 179, l. 195.

<sup>8</sup> Record of Conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the General Secretary of the CC CPC Deng Xiaoping, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 132.

<sup>9</sup> Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 240, l. 97.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Speech of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU N.S. Khrushchev at the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 1960, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469, l. 127.

<sup>11</sup> Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambassador to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the General Secretary of the CC CPC Deng Xiaoping, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 131.

<sup>12</sup> Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on the Relations of the PRC with Cuba, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 464.

<sup>13</sup> Moscow carefully watched these ties, even noting how often in his speeches Dorticos compared the Cuban and Chinese revolutions; *ibid.*, l. 467.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 475.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Renmin Ribao*, 12 October 1962.

<sup>18</sup> Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 536, l. 72.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 72–73.

<sup>20</sup> Information Sheet of the Pravda Correspondents to the CC CPSU about the Meetings of the Correspondents from Newspapers of the Socialist Countries in the Editorial Offices of the Newspaper *Renmin Ribao*, *ibid.*, l. 355.

<sup>21</sup> Record of Conversation of the USSR Amba-

sador to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the Deputy Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the PRC Zhang Hanfu, *ibid.*, l. 366.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 367.

<sup>23</sup> Although in 1961 disagreements already existed between the USSR and China, during the Berlin crisis and after the Soviet announcement that autumn of the renewal of nuclear testing, mass pro-Moscow demonstrations were organized in China, and other steps were taken to show PRC solidarity with the USSR and GDR.

<sup>24</sup> *Pravda*, 25 October 1962.

<sup>25</sup> Letter of S. Dange to the CC CPSU, 29 October 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 424, l. 105.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 107.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 102.

<sup>28</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50.

<sup>29</sup> Letter of S. Dange to the CC CPSU, 29 October 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 424, l. 106.

<sup>30</sup> See, e.g., Record of Conversation of the Staff Members of the USSR Embassy in the PRC V. Mogul'skii and G. Kireev with the Counselor of the Embassy of Hungary J. Kukuchka, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 531, ll. 426–435.

<sup>31</sup> One of the articles, for example, was called, "The Soviet Army is Ready to Strike a Blow to the Enemy." *Renmin Ribao*, 26 October 1962.

<sup>32</sup> Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about the Positions of the Leadership of the CPC in Connection with the Cuban Crisis. TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 438.

<sup>33</sup> Khrushchev seriously worried that Kennedy might embark on a military conflict using nuclear weapons, pushed not only by American "hawks" but also by the majority of the U.S. population. According to an information sheet of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations specially prepared for the top Soviet leadership, Americans, as of early 1962, asked whether they would favor a nuclear war or submitting to Communism, responded: for war—81%. Information Sheet of IMEMO to the CC CPSU, "Regarding the issue of correlation of forces in the ruling circles of the USA," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 398, l. 73.

<sup>34</sup> Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about the Relations of the PRC with Cuba, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 477.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 434.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 435.

<sup>37</sup> Demonstrations at the Cuban Embassy were meticulously organized: the schedule of processions was reported to the Cubans in advance with breaks for lunch and rest. The Soviet Embassy reported following the first day of the demonstrations, when the enthusiasm of the participants turned out not to be too great (in the opinion of the organizers of these demonstrations), in the factories and enterprises supplementary explanatory work was conducted. *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on the Positions of the Leadership of the CPC in Connection with the Cuban Crisis, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 439.

<sup>39</sup> Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambassador in China S. Chervonenko with the Deputy Head of the Department for Relations with Fraternal Communist Parties, CC CPC Zhao Yimin, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 534, ll. 206–207.

<sup>40</sup> Report of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about the Position of the Leadership of the CPC in Re-

gard to the Cuban Crisis, *ibid.*, l. 439.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 440.

<sup>42</sup> *Renmin Ribao*, 5 November 1962.

<sup>43</sup> Record of Conversation of the Attache of the USSR Embassy in China V. Zhdanovich with Employees of Various Embassies in China, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 531, ll. 511–513.

<sup>44</sup> Political Letter of the USSR Embassy in China on the Situation in China on the Occasion of the 10 Year Celebration of the PRC, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 239, l. 202.

<sup>45</sup> Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in China for 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 240, l. 95.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, l. 94.

<sup>47</sup> Under pressure from the USSR the Chinese at the end of 1958 promised that "they would not allow any further adventurism." Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in China for 1958, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 134, ll. 84–85.

<sup>48</sup> Information of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on Chinese-Cuban Relations (December 1962–January 1963), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 624, ll. 49–50.

<sup>49</sup> *Pravda*, 5 November 1962.

<sup>50</sup> The very naming of Wu Xiuquan, who was only a member of the CC CPC, as the leader of the CPC delegation to the congresses of the "brother parties" should have demonstrated the true relation of Beijing to those parties.

<sup>51</sup> *Renmin Ribao*, 15, 31 December 1962.

<sup>52</sup> Khrushchev reacted extremely painfully when Mao was extolled as a great theoretician, evidently feeling his own weakness on that issue. Cf. Speech of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU at the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 1960, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469, ll. 127–130.

<sup>53</sup> Record of Conversation, Head of Press Department, MFA USSR Iu. Cherniakov, with Press Attache of the Indian Embassy in Moscow I. Dzhein, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, ll. 85–86.

<sup>54</sup> [Ed. note: See Raymond L. Garthoff, "When and Why Romania Distanced itself from the Warsaw Pact," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 111.]

<sup>55</sup> Information Sheet, USSR Embassy in the PRC, On the Situation in the PRC on the Eve of the Bilateral Meeting Between the CPC and the CPSU, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, ll. 125–126.

<sup>56</sup> Here one may refer also to the visit in autumn 1962 of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev to "revisionist" Yugoslavia, which in the same way prompted a storm of indignation in China.

<sup>57</sup> Information Sheet, USSR Embassy in the PRC, On the Situation in the PRC on the Eve of the Bilateral Meeting between the CPC and CPSU, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, ll. 96–97.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

---

*M.Y. Prozumenschikov works at the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow. This paper was presented at CWIHP's conference on "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia," held at Hong Kong University in January 1996, and translated by K. Weathersby, S. Kirchhoff, and M. Doctoroff.*

# NEW EAST-BLOC DOCUMENTS ON THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT, 1959 & 1962

*Editor's note: The following three selections from Russian and East German documents exemplify the new East-bloc archival evidence that is becoming available on the triangular Sino-Indian-Soviet relations examined in M.Y. Prozumenschikov's article above. (Unfortunately, Chinese and Indian archives on these issues are currently unavailable.)*

*The first excerpt is from a much-longer document from the Russian archives—a draft report “On the [October 1959] trip of the Soviet party-governmental delegation to the PRC [People's Republic of China],” dated 18 December 1959, by Mikhail Suslov to Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) Presidium for presentation to a forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum. Suslov, a senior member of the CC CPSU leadership, harshly criticized Chinese domestic and foreign policies in the wake of a contentious meeting between the Soviet and Chinese leaderships during USSR leader Nikita Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in early October 1959 for commemorations of the tenth anniversary of the PRC's establishment.*

*Although at this point the Sino-Soviet split remained publicly concealed, the angry exchanges at that meeting demonstrated that bitterness between the two communist powers was reaching the boiling point. Not only did Moscow and Beijing seem split on basic approaches to issues of foreign policy (the Soviets favored a more moderate rivalry with the West, the Chinese a more militant and confrontational approach), domestic policy (the Soviets found the “Great Leap Forward” an economic disaster), and ideology (both sides clearly sought the mantle of leadership within the communist world), but a bitter personal antagonism had been revealed: Suslov (clearly reflecting Khrushchev's views) decried the “cult of personality” around Mao*

*Zedong, likening it to that which had surrounded Stalin, while the Chinese did little to conceal their contempt for Khrushchev.*

*The excerpt reproduced below concentrates on Suslov's criticism of China's handling of Sino-Indian relations, particularly regarding the border clashes which erupted beginning in the summer of 1959. While agreeing with Beijing's suppression of the “counter-revolutionary rebellion” in Tibet of March 1959, which had ended in the Dalai Lama's receiving asylum in India, Suslov condemned as misguided and damaging China's personal invective against Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and its strategy of using the border clashes to exacerbate Sino-Indian relations and push Nehru toward the West in hopes of inciting revolution in India. Rather than furthering the cause of revolution, Suslov stated, China's actions were damaging “progressive forces” (i.e., the Communist Party) in India, weakening China's (and improving Washington's) standing in Asia, and also impeding Sino-Soviet relations—for the Chinese Communist Party blamed the CPSU for not openly siding with Beijing against India. Suslov, in fact, depicted China's actions as directed not only against India but against the USSR, for they embarrassed Khrushchev on the eve of his own long-sought summit in the United States with President Eisenhower in September 1959, just prior to the trip to Beijing. In sum, Beijing's policy toward India was putting Soviet leaders in an impossible quandary—either to back what they saw as Mao's ill-conceived actions to preserve an increasingly illusory Sino-Soviet alliance (at the price of undercutting Soviet efforts to improve relations with India and the West), or to take a balanced position at the risk of an open split with Mao and the Chinese.*

*The Suslov report was obtained for*

*the Cold War International History Project by Vladislav M. Zubok of the National Security Archive from the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documents (TsKhSD) in Moscow. The document was located in Fond 2, a newly-opened collection of declassified transcripts and related materials of CPSU Plenums. Zubok also translated the excerpt reprinted below from Russian into English. A translation and analysis of the entire Suslov report, as well as of the transcript of the climactic 2 October 1959 Mao-Khrushchev summit meeting in Beijing, is in preparation by Mark Kramer of the Davis Center for Russian Studies (formerly the Russian Research Center) at Harvard University for future publication by the Cold War International History Project.*

*The second section of excerpts, drawn from Russian documents on Soviet-Indian relations and the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962, is culled from a much larger selection of documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, known officially as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). They were located during research at AVPRF in June 1996 by CWIHP Director James G. Hershberg in the so-called “referentura” (reference) files for Soviet relations with India, in Fond 090 (secret fonds or collection groups begin with a zero; Fond 90 contains “non-secret” records on Soviet relations with India, though these can also be revealing). The translations from Russian were done for CWIHP by Kathryn Weathersby, who also aided in selecting the materials for translation.*

*The excerpts, mostly from reports from the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, were chosen to illustrate such topics as Soviet ties to the Indian Communist Party, Soviet perceptions of the Sino-Indian border dispute, and the impact of the border crisis on Soviet-Indian relations, as shown in direct communi-*



cations between Nehru and Khrushchev. While these excerpts hint at how the Soviet archives can offer a fascinating and rich window into these and many other aspects of the still-murky Sino-Indian border dispute, much further research in Moscow is still necessary, particularly with key Chinese and Indian archives still closed. In any event, CWIHP would be pleased to assist scholars interested in examining the photocopies of these and other Russian documents obtained during research on Soviet-Indian relations, 1959 and 1962, or in commissioning English translations of more of them. The documents are on file as part of the Russian Archives Documents Database (RADD) at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at the George Washington University on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037, tel. (202) 994-7000; e-mail: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu; fax: (202) 994-7000.

The third section below is the transcript, found in the East German archives, of a 26 December 1962 conversation in Beijing between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, Premier Yumzhagiin Tsendenbal (J. Zedenbal in German). Although the occasion of the talk was the signing of a Sino-Mongolian boundary treaty, the conversation soon turned to the recent clashes along the Sino-Indian border. According to the transcript—presumably kept by the Mongolians, though it is unclear from the document how it came to be translated into German and rest in the East German archives—Zedenbal took the opportunity to criticize Chinese policy in the border dispute with India as detrimental to the interests of the international socialist camp, producing a tense exchange with Zhou. Whether or not the transcript is accurate—no Chinese version is available—the Mongolians clearly wanted to show their Soviet-bloc patrons that they were standing up for Moscow's policy, and Ulan Bator may have circulated the transcript to Moscow and/or its allies precisely for that reason.

The document itself was located in the archives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in East Berlin by scholars collecting materials for a volume on relations between the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic: Werner Meissner, ed., *Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik und China, 1949-1990: Politik-Wirtschaft-Wissenschaft-Kultur. Eine Quellensammlung* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995). The document was not included in the published volume, but was recently obtained by David Wolff, who thanks Prof. Meissner (Hong Kong Baptist University) and his colleagues at the Free University in Berlin, Anja Feege, M. Leutner, and Tim Trampedach, for providing access to this and other documents on China from the former East German archives. The Zhou-Zedenbal record—which made its way into the East German archives and the German language in a manner that remains unclear—was translated into English by Wolff with assistance by Christian Ostermann, Oliver Corff, and James G. Hershberg.

It should be stressed that the materials reprinted below represent only an early sampling of the types of materials that could become available for studying the complicated Sino-Indian-Soviet triangle with the opening of new archives. In coming years, CWIHP hopes to work with scholars using American, Russian, and other archives—particularly the Chinese and Indian archives, should they relax their current secrecy—to explore this important subject, involving an issue that has outlasted the Cold War. While in late November 1996, during a visit to New Delhi by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, PRC and Indian leaders signed an agreement not to use force to resolve their border dispute, the sometimes tense recent history of relations between the world's two most populous countries clearly merits further research and study.

—James G. Hershberg

**I. Draft report dated 18 December 1959, "On the [October 1959] trip of the Soviet party-governmental delegation to the PRC [People's Republic of China]," by M. Suslov to CC CPSU Presidium for presentation to a forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum (excerpt)**

Draft

ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET  
PARTY-GOVERNMENTAL  
DELEGATION TO THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

[lengthy sections on bilateral questions, including criticism of China's domestic and ideological policies omitted--ed.]

...Now let me move to some issues of foreign policy where certain differences emerged between us and the Chinese comrades.

[here followed criticisms of Beijing's exacerbations of international tensions, Mao's thesis that imperialists were "paper tigers" and seemingly cavalier attitude toward nuclear war, and China's "inconsistent" handling of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958 and relations with Japan—ed.]

During this spring relations between the People's Republic of China and India have seriously deteriorated. This deterioration is linked to the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Tibet in March 1959. Reactionary circles of India to some extent were probably involved in this rebellion. However, the rebellion in Tibet would not have taken place, had one implemented timely democratic reforms and appropriate measures to improve economy and culture with a view on historical specifics of Tibet, and had one been duly vigilant with regard to reactionary elements. Unfortunately, Chinese comrades also did not draw appropriate conclusions from the warnings of the CC CPSU about the activities of reactionaries aimed at the forceful separation [otriv] of Tibet from the People's Republic of China.

Chinese comrades were correct when they put down decisively the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Tibet. They claim with justification that the issue of Tibet is a domestic affair of the PRC. We give them full support on this. We stand against the attempts of Western powers to sever Tibet from China, to exploit the Tibetan issue for aggravation of international situation. At the

last (16th) session of the UN General Assembly the representatives of the USSR and fraternal socialist countries resolutely supported the PRC, protesting against the discussion of the so-called "Tibetan question" and other attempts to blacken the People's China, including the one using the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The imperialist tactics aim at making the Tibetan issue a bone of contention first of all between China and India, to pit these two great Asian powers against each other, to aggravate the situation in the South-East Asia, to undermine the influence of the socialist camp, including China, in this region of the world, to weaken the positions of communists in the movement of national liberation. The American press openly admits that one word from India compromises the prestige of the PRC more than one thousand words spoken in the USA.

Regrettably, the Chinese comrades did not take into account this tactic of the imperialists. Responding to the noisy campaign in imperialist mass media about Tibet, they unleashed their own propagandist campaign and concentrated their fire mainly on India and personally on [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru. They accused the Indian government and personally Nehru of an imperialist policy, aimed against China. This was the essence of a large editorial article in "Renmin Ribao" ["People's Daily"] on 6 May 1959, under the title "The revolution in Tibet and the philosophy of Nehru."

Nehru is a well-known politician. One cannot exclude that to some degree he was involved in the intrigues against the PRC. But Nehru is far-sighted enough to recognize the vital importance of India's friendship with China, with the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp. Nehru behaved with reserve. In his numerous speeches he admitted that Tibet is a part of China, he spoke against the establishment of a so-called "government of Dalai-Lama in exile," stressing the significance of the Sino-Indian friendship. India repeatedly raised the issue of restoration of rights of the People's Republic of China in the UN. Precisely these actions made the rightist bourgeois circles in India, who are linked to Anglo-American capital, to assail Nehru, blaming him for "indecisiveness" and "appeasement" with regard to the People's China. Their goal is to unseat Nehru, to revise the neutralist foreign policy of India, to tilt it in a rightist

direction, to the path of alliance with Western powers. If reactionary circles of India succeed in achieving these goals, it would cause serious damage to the socialist camp and the whole cause of peace, since the present foreign policy line of the Nehru government is a positive factor in the struggle for strengthening peace.

One should ask, what aims did Chinese comrades pursue in attacking Nehru so uncompromisingly? As they explained it themselves, they stood by the principle of "cohesion and struggle." According to com. Mao Zedong, they unmask Nehru as a "double-dealer," "half a man, half a devil," "half a gentlemen, half a hooligan," and in doing this they allegedly "force" him to strengthen friendship with the PRC.

A question, naturally, was raised how to live side by side with this "devil"? How to build relations with India? The Chinese comrades found a solution in forcing Nehru to repent and in pressuring him into cooperation with China. At the same time the Chinese said that they visualize the possibility of the downfall of the Nehru government and see no great trouble if a reactionary pro-Western government comes to power in India. In their opinion, this would only bring us closer to a revolution in India.

Obviously this course inevitably had to lead to further aggravation of relations with India. And it happened, indeed, when after suppression of the Tibet rebellion the Chinese troops approached the borders with India.

The People's China and India inherited from the past unresolved border issues. It is not possible here to dwell on the history and the essence of these issues that deal with some territories located in the Himalayas. But it is important to notice by what methods the Chinese comrades attempted to resolve this problem, so acute and painful for both sides.

For a long time the Chinese comrades postponed a solution of this question. They stressed that in the interests of maintaining good relations with India they would not press with demarcation of the borders and would reckon with the existing realities. However, in the heated atmosphere of the Sino-Indian disputes with regard to the rebellion of Tibet the issue of the border territories became extremely acute. On 25 August [1959] an armed clash took place between the Chinese and Indian border-guards,

and as a result the Hindus lost several people as killed and wounded. Exploiting this conflict, imperialist propaganda raised the uproar about "the aggression of red China." Reactionary nationalists inside India unleashed a fierce anti-Chinese campaign that was accompanied by attacks against Nehru, as well as [against] the Indian communist party.

One should mention that these events took place only a few days before the visit of comrade Khrushchev to the United States. The enemy propaganda did everything to exploit the Sino-Indian conflict for the purpose of disruption of the Soviet peace initiative, to lay blame for China's actions on the Soviet Union and thereby to cause a quarrel between us and India.

With all this in mind, the CC CPSU decided to send a letter to Beijing, expressing our concern about the situation that emerged as a result of the Sino-Indian conflict. It also took a decision to publish a TASS announcement in order to encourage peaceful settlement of the conflict and to give the world public opinion the correct idea about our position. The declaration of the Soviet Union at that time halted escalation of the conflict and thwarted the dangerous game of the imperialists. The governments of the PRC and India announced that further intensification of the dispute would not be in the interests of peace nor in their own interests, and that they would resolve border issues according to "five principles" [pancha sila] of peaceful coexistence.

The course of events, however, demonstrated that the question of the Sino-Indian border is rife with new complications. It is known that on 21 October [1959] there was another armed clash on the Sino-Indian border that caused the loss of lives. After it the anti-Chinese campaign in India flared up with new vigor.

One should keep in mind that there are very influential forces in India that seek to aggravate relations with China. Regrettably, the position of the Chinese comrades on this question is such that it facilitates for the Indian reactionaries mobilization of public opinion in the country against the People's China and puts the progressive forces of India in a quandary.

The Chinese comrades insist that they are guided by the considerations of self-defense and prestige of their country, that the

truth and justice is on China's side. In this regard one must inform the Plenum that the letter we addressed to the CC of the Communist Party of China and the TASS announcement about the Indo-Chinese border conflict did not evoke a proper understanding among the Chinese leaders. In their answer to our letter the Chinese comrades claimed that the incident on the Sino-Indian border had been provoked by the Nehru government, which, as the letter of the Chinese friends reads, "has long been marching in its domestic and foreign policies in the reactionary direction." It follows: "We believe that if one carries out only the policy of unprincipled adjustment and concessions to Nehru and the Indian government, not only would it not make them change their position for the better, but, on the contrary, in the situation of the growing offensive on their side, if China still does not rebuff them and denounce them, such a policy would only encourage their atrocity. It would not be advantageous for the friendship between China and India, and also not be advantageous to make Nehru and the Indian government improve, instead of moving toward further rapprochement with the West."

The letter contains a reproach that "the TASS announcement displayed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union toward the incident on the Sino-Indian border, which causes a virtual glee and jubilation among the Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, who use this to drive a wedge into the relations between China and the Soviet Union. This cannot help evoking regrets."

The analysis of this letter of the CC of the Communist Party of China leads us to two conclusions of fundamental importance. They are the following: the Chinese comrades could neither correctly assess their own mistakes committed in their relations with India, nor the measures taken by the CC CPSU for regulation of the Sino-Indian conflict. The Chinese leadership's assessments of the situation in India and the behavior of Nehru with regard to the conflict are undoubtedly erroneous and arbitrary.

Let me refer to the opinion of our Indian friends expressed in their letters to the CC CPSU and the CC of the Communist Party of China. While registering the aggravation of the situation in India as a result of the conflict, the Indian comrades stated that "if the disputes continue, it would benefit

reactionary forces in India and would cause a negative influence on the masses of the Indian population." Indian comrades justifiably believe that further exacerbation of the Indo-Chinese relations could weaken the democratic movement in India, gravely undercut the position of the Indian communist party and threaten it with a ban. In the words of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India comr. [Ajoy Kumar] Ghosh, Indian communists do not know how to explain the position of the PRC, the reason why it raised the border issue if China at this time and what hides behind it. All leading officials of the Communist Party of India wonder why the government of the PRC let itself be pulled by Indian reaction into this border conflict.

And as to the statement of the Chinese comrades about the glee and jubilation of Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, with regard to dissimilar positions of China and the Soviet Union on the incident on the Sino-Indian border, it is erroneous in its basic premises. The imperialists rejoiced indeed, but they did so at the moment when the Indo-Chinese conflict flared up. One can imagine them exulting and rejoicing even more, if the Soviet Union had become enmeshed in this conflict and the impression had been created that there was a united front of all socialist countries against Nehru. Facts demonstrate that the uproar among imperialists seriously abated after the Soviet Union came forth in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict.

What did aggravation of relations between China and India and other foreign policy gaffes of the Chinese comrades lead to? They led to a diminution of the international prestige of the PRC, to the weakening of her positions in Asia, to an increased tendency, in a number of countries of Asia, to ally oneself with Western powers, with the USA, despite strong hatred among the peoples of Asian countries towards their perennial enemies - the colonizers.

*[after discussion of Soviet-Chinese differences over Indonesia and other foreign policy issues, Suslov recounted the summit meeting in Beijing on 2 October 1959 between Khrushchev and Mao; his description of the exchange dealing with the Sino-Indian border conflict is printed below—ed.]*

From our side in the discussion of foreign policy issues took part comrades

Khrushchev, Suslov and Gromyko. From the Chinese side participated comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Wang Jiaxiang.

The discussion took place on 2 October in the residence of the Politburo of the CC Communist Party of China. Comrade Khrushchev informed the Chinese friends about his trip to the USA and his talks with President D. Eisenhower. He stressed that among American political figures there is growing sentiment in favor of peaceful settlement of unresolved, disputed questions and that at the present time there is a very real possibility for further resolute steps toward a more durable peace. In this regard he brought the attention of the Chinese friends to the necessity for the socialist camp to avoid anything that could be exploited by the reactionaries to push the world back to the tracks of the cold war.

Comrade Khrushchev told the Chinese comrades that we do not completely understand their foreign policy, particularly with regard to India, and on the issue of Taiwan.

Comrade Khrushchev pointed out at the necessity to improve mutual information between the leadership of our parties on the issues of foreign policy. One cannot regard as normal the situation, when we, China's ally, do not know what the Chinese comrades may undertake tomorrow in the area of foreign policy. Indeed, all countries of the socialist camp are linked not only by the common ideas and goals, but also by the alliance commitments. Incorrect actions of one country may hurt international situation of the whole socialist camp. One should keep in mind that imperialist propaganda directly link activity of Chinese comrades to the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries. Indeed, communist parties always emphasize that the socialist camp has one line in foreign policy.

As far as the CC CPSU is concerned, we systematically inform the leadership of fraternal parties of socialist countries about most important foreign policy steps of the USSR and, in special cases, we seek their advice.

One must admit that the Chinese comrades reacted to the remarks of comrade Khrushchev painfully. They claimed that their policy with regard to Taiwan and the off-shore straits has been fully justified and is conducted with skill, that their line toward

the Nehru government is correct. At times the tone of our discussion became quite sharp. It came to the point when a member of the Politburo CC Communist Party of China, minister of foreign affairs Chen Yi, claimed that our line on Nehru is allegedly opportunistic [*prisposoblencheskaia*], and the policy of China is more firm and correct. Naturally, we gave a resolute rebuff to these pronouncements.

In connection with the remarks of the Chinese leaders one cannot help wondering how they understand the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, whether they see it as a general line of foreign policy of the socialist camp, whether they think it is necessary to struggle for relaxation of international tension and for securing general peace.

We are getting an impression that, while recognizing formally the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two global systems, the Chinese comrades tend to regard this principle just as a temporary tactical maneuver.

[*ed. note: after additional critical remarks and recounting of discussion of other matters at the meeting, Suslov noted:*]

One should say that at the end of the conversation on 2 October Mao Zedong and other Chinese comrades declared that they did not want war; that they would resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means and would settle the conflict with India through negotiations. They confirmed again that the Communist party of China has a common line and common goals with us. We expressed our satisfaction in this regard.

[*noting that Khrushchev had pointed out the Chinese leadership's "nervousness and touchiness" at being criticised, Suslov harshly criticized the "atmosphere of the cult of personality" surrounding Mao, which he likened to that of Stalin; recalling that during a 1958 conversation with Khrushchev, Mao had compared Soviet-Chinese relations to two hands in which nine fingers were fully unified "and only in one, little finger we have disagreements," Suslov ended his report on an optimistic note, vowing that the Soviet leadership would do its utmost to promote strong ties and friendship between Moscow and Beijing—ed.*]

[*Source: Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond 2, opis 1, delo 415, ll. 56-91; transla-*

*tion for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok.*]

## II. Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on Soviet-Indian Relations and the Sino-Indian Border Conflict, 1962 (excerpts)

[*The first excerpt is from a 17 January 1962 entry from the journal of Soviet ambassador to India I.A. Benediktov describing a conversation with the Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India (CPI), Bhupesh Gupta. During the conversation, Gupta urgently requests Soviet financial aid for the Indian party for use in an upcoming election campaign; the answer conveyed by Benediktov ten days later suggests that the Soviets responded positively to the request, although the amount is not indicated:*]

Today I received Gupta at his request. Gupta communicated that on 16-17 January a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPI took place in Delhi, at which was discussed the future work of the party apparatus in connection with the death of A[joy]. [Kumar] Ghosh....Gupta said that he desires that the ties of the CPI and CPSU do not become weakened in any way after the death of Ghosh. The assistance in various forms and the comradely advice of the CC CPSU have always been enormously useful to us, he underscored....Gupta said that no other party, not even the communist party of China, can occupy in the hearts of Indian communists the place which belongs to the CPSU...

Gupta reported that after the death of Ghosh at the present time in the party there is an acute insufficiency of means for the pre-election campaign. He expressed the fear that with the death of Ghosh the source for receiving means for the communist party from the CPSU might be closed. These questions were handled by Ghosh alone, Gupta underscored. He never consulted with him /Gupta/, and even less with [Elamulam M.S.] Nambudiripad and G. Nair/ with the latter two only about using the assistance/. All these matters were held in strictest secrecy from other leaders of the party and members of the National Council. This explains the fact that not a single report on this question has appeared in the press. Gupta said that he cannot singlehandedly take on responsibility in

questions of assistance, therefore he considers it necessary to consult with Nambudiripad, whom he characterized as a person of crystalline honesty and whom Ghosh trusted. Gupta confidentially reported that A. Ghosh had not consulted on this problem with Akhmed or with [Shripad Amrit] Dange, who once proposed that he entrust to him alone all matters connected with the receipt of aid from abroad.

Gupta categorically denied that the Chinese friends are giving the CC CPI [Central Committee of the Communist Party of India] financial assistance. The National Council has not received, is not receiving, and will not receive assistance from the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], Gupta declared, and we never will appeal to them with such a request. Moreover, the interlocutor underscored, the Chinese do not know anything about Soviet aid. Gupta noted that he knows this precisely, since he enjoys the trust of both groups in the party. The interlocutor further underscored that the only other channels of aid from abroad are the aid received by the Punjab organization from Sikhs living in England and also the aid at the trade union level through Dange.

Gupta repeated several times that the aid is needed precisely now, since the pre-election struggle must be concluded in the first week of February. After the elections we would like to receive your support in the matter of the theoretical preparation of party cadres, he said. Gupta expressed the conviction that the CPI not only will preserve its seats in parliament, but also will be able to increase their number.

Gupta said that in the election struggle the reactionary forces within the country are now directing their main blow at the authority of the USSR, which has increased in connection with its position on Goa, Kashmir and other questions. The main task of the CPI in the pre-election struggle, Gupta said, is to make clear to the population that the Soviet Union is giving selfless aid to India, is its true friend...

[*Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), Fond 090, Opis 24, Delo 5, Papka 80, Listy 14-19; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.*]

[*Benediktov met with Gupta again on 27 January 1962 (as the Soviet envoy recorded*

*in his diary four days later):]*

On 27 January of this year I and Comrade Zhukov G.A. had a conversation with the secretary of the CC CPI Comrade Gupta.

We stated to him the answer of the CC CPSU in connection with his earlier conversation with me. Gupta expressed gratitude for the readiness of the CC and the Presidium of the CC CPSU to assist the leadership of the CPI in this difficult moment and to support it. He promised to inform the CC CPSU about the situation in the party in the future as well...

*[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 5, p. 80, ll. 31-36; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]*

*[The second excerpt, dealing with the brewing crisis over the Sino-Indian border dispute, is from a 10 October 1962 entry from Benediktov's diary, this one describing a conversation with the provisional charge d'affairs of the Chinese Embassy in India, "Comrade E. Cheng-Chang," referred to as "Comrade E." in the document. In the conversation, the Chinese official gave Beijing's version of the building confrontation, blaming India for attacking Chinese posts along the border, and asserting that India had "gone too far" to resume normal relations with the PRC. Ten days later, China launched a broad attack on Indian positions along the disputed frontier.]*

I received Comrade E. in connection with his departure for his homeland and had a conversation with him.

Comrade E. on his own initiative dwelt in detail on the problem of the Indian-Chinese border dispute. He said that India has finally rejected the proposal of the PRC about negotiations [for] 15 October in Beijing. The Indian side continues to maintain that the recent clash on the eastern border occurred on Indian territory, south of the McMahon line, and was elicited by the advance of Chinese troops to the south and their attack on Indian posts. In fact, Comrade E. said, the entire affair was completely the opposite. Indian troops crossed the McMahon line and attacked Chinese posts far to the north of that line. Comrade E. talked about his last conversation in the Indian Foreign Ministry with the head of the China department, Menon. During this con-

versation Comrade E. asked Menon to take a map of the eastern part of the border, published in India in 1960, and find on it the region in which the clashes are now occurring, orienting by latitude and longitude the places indicated in the Indian notes. As a result it turned out that this region, the latitude and longitude of which were indicated by the Indians themselves, is located significantly to the north of the McMahon line on Chinese territory. Menon, in the words of Comrade E., was forced to acknowledge this, but maintained at the same time that it was not possible that the Indians had crossed the McMahon line and so forth.

Comrade E. stated that the main things that will motivate India to end the conflict with the PRC are, on the international level, the wish to receive money from the USA, and on the domestic level the desire to suppress political forces which are objectionable to the ruling circles. Moreover, in the opinion of Comrade E., the Indian government has already gone too far in this conflict to have the possibility of returning to normal relations....

*[Source: AVPRF, f. 90, op. 24, d. 5, p. 44, ll. 147-148; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]*

*[This third excerpt from Benediktov's diary, dated 26 October 1962, describes a conversation with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India," pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."]*

Today at my own initiative, fulfilling the commission of the CC CPSU, I met with

E.M. Nambudiripad and informed him of the statement of the CC CPSU on the Indian-Chinese border conflict. He listened most attentively to the statement of the CC and promised immediately to convey its contents to the members of the secretariat of the National Council of the CPI.

Nambudiripad said that four members of the secretariat, who were in Delhi, today carefully studied and discussed at length the *Pravda* article of October 25 on the border question. "We ask that you transmit this to the CC CPSU, - he continued, - that the publication of this article and the advice of the CPSU contained in this letter of the CC CPSU, truly will help our party get out of the extremely difficult position it is now in. Before this [help] there were moments when we felt ourselves to be simply helpless, but now the party will be able to remedy this situation. We are grateful to the CC CPSU for this help; you can transmit this personally from me and from Comrade B. Gupta." He pointed out the whole array of difficulties the CPI faces in correcting its earlier positions and statements on the border question. The most typical mistake of many communists, in his words, is that they cannot clearly distinguish [between] patriotism and bourgeois nationalism. Some of the members of the party considered it possible [that there would be] support for the Indian position in this dispute from a number of communist parties of the socialist countries in light of the ideological differences between the CCP PRC and other fraternal parties, although - he continued, - I knew that this was impossible and incorrect. Moreover, it is very difficult in general to sharply reformulate the whole system of views on the border conflict held by members of the party, since these views in many cases were contradictory to those expressed in *Pravda* and in this letter of the CC CPSU. In particular, the CPI for three years considered the McMahon line the real border between the two states. Many rank and file members of the party and some members of the leading organs, in solidarity with the widespread opinion among the population, hold to the view that the PRC is [the] guilty [party] in the origin and exacerbation of the border conflict." "Undoubtedly the article in *Pravda* will have an influence on these comrades, he said, it will force them to think through the whole question again." Members of the secretariat Nair and Sharma at

today's meeting pointed out that the *Pravda* article, while in fact criticizing the position of the Indian communists and India's relation to this question as a whole, did not express any critical comments with regard to the PRC and the Chinese comrades.

Nambudiripad reported that the secretariat of the CPI after the discussion of the *Pravda* article today reached the conclusion that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India." The campaign that is going on everywhere against the PRC will, obviously, be extended to the Soviet Union, and then to all countries of the socialist system....He expressed the opinion of the secretariat that in connection with this statement of the Soviet press and in connection with the pressure on India from many neutral countries regarding a more rapid peaceful settlement of this conflict, the Indian government...can reach the conclusion that only western countries are our true friends...

"In this connection we very much would like to find out if Soviet leaders could help the CPI give an understanding to the Chinese comrades that it is extremely desirable to give the possibility to Nehru to move toward peace negotiations and cease military actions without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself, - Nambudiripad stated. The Secretariat has unanimously reached the conclusion that such a step by the PRC would have a huge significance for the cause of world peace, for all progressive forces, for the anti-imperialist struggle..."

[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, ll. 134-139; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[This fourth excerpt is from a 2 November 1962 entry from Benediktov's diary, describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai—with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier—

*opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."]*

At a reception I met R.K. Nehru, who approached me and began a conversation. He set forth in great detail his views on the Indian-Chinese border conflict, noting that he had expressed them to the prime minister. R.K. Nehru said that the prime minister gave him a letter to N.S. Khrushchev and spoke about his conversation with the Soviet ambassador. In his words, the prime minister greatly appreciates the concern and anxiety of the government of the USSR and the general approach of N.S. Khrushchev to the problem of the Indian-Chinese conflict. "At another time, noted R.K. Nehru, it is possible that the prime minister himself would have spoken about this problem in detail, but now he is exceptionally busy, very tired and we must help him. Therefore I myself will tell you our views."

1. "After my return from China two years ago I personally did everything possible for the peaceful settlement of the border dispute. No one else has played a more important role in this matter than I. To some degree I have weakened my authority by having taken the hardest line on resolving the conflict by means of negotiations. The foreign policy leaders of India tried to the best of their abilities to solve this dispute and preserve friendly relations with the PRC. We did not cease to hope for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and did not make any military preparations, completely not supposing that military actions on the border were possible. The result is our present retreat."

2. "After many years in China, I know very well and am closely acquainted with all the leaders of China and with all the main party leaders. I [can] clearly present the

views of each of them. I am convinced, for example, that Zhou Enlai does not approve the policy of the PRC regarding India, while Liu Shaoqi can approve it."

3. "I am absolutely convinced that the given events are not simply a border conflict, but something more. This is part of a general strategy of Chinese leftist dogmatists - sectarians who obviously now have the upper hand in the leadership of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). This is the mainspring of the events. These sectarian elements in the CCP are trying to prove their thesis that India, as a capitalist country, will surely join the bloc of western countries, that it cannot conduct a policy of nonalignment for any length of time. They regard Nehru not as a nationalist leader but as a reactionary bourgeois. They are trying by their actions to force India to reject the policy of nonalignment, to draw it into the western bloc, to strike a blow at the entire policy of neutrality, nonalignment, peaceful coexistence. India, as the largest of the neutral countries of Asia, is their first and main target. Thus the issue is not this or that border or territory; the essence of the events is the attempts of the party sectarians of the CCP to prove in practice their theoretical position, an attempt to cross over to the offensive on the ideological front."

4. "I am convinced that their actions are an extension of the CCP's ideological disputes with the CPSU, and that the Chinese sectarians are directing the main blow against the Soviet Union and its foreign policy principles—against peaceful coexistence, the possibility of avoiding war in our atomic age, the possibility of the victory of communism not through war but through peaceful economic competition with the West. We value highly these principles of Soviet policy. I personally don't have anything against the establishment of communism in the entire world, if communism proves its superiority by means of economic, social, and cultural achievements, but not by bombs."

5. "However, the Chinese fanatics, who apparently have gained strength recently, are conducting (and intend to conduct in the future) a senseless course for achieving their goals by any means, including military actions, which is dangerous for all peoples. They, unlike the USSR and even the USA, do not understand the danger of nuclear war. The world is now divided not into East and

West, but into two camps: one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against.”

6. “We are on the leading edge of the struggle against the realization in practice by these fanatics of their theoretical program, which is a threat to the entire world, to all peoples. Therefore, everyone must assist our struggle. Therefore we must not in any case retreat before them, not submit to their threats, not agree to conditions which they dictate on the basis of force and seizure of our territory. On the contrary, we must without fail defeat them, smash their first practical attempt to prove their thesis. Only their defeat and the preservation by India of its policy of nonalignment can teach them a lesson and force them to reconsider their theoretical convictions.”...

[Source: AVPRF, f. 90, op. 24, d. 5, p. 44, ll. 120-124; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[The fifth and final selection from Ambassador Benediktov's diary is from a 12 December 1962 entry recording a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Nehru. In the excerpt presented here, Nehru expressed a positive evaluation of Soviet-Indian relations, complimenting Khrushchev for his role in resolving the Cuban crisis, but in response to the Soviet envoy's emphasis that the border crisis with China be settled peacefully he firmly defended India's stand that PRC forces must withdraw from recently-occupied positions (e.g., return to the line held on September 8) before talks could start.]

In accordance with the commission of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev today I visited prime minister of India J. Nehru. I gave him warm greetings and best wishes from N.S. Khrushchev and other members of the Soviet government.

Nehru first of all inquired about the health of N.S. Khrushchev...

I further set forth the substance of the questions which I was commissioned by Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to communicate to Nehru. I said to Nehru that the Soviet government appreciates the efforts of the Indian government and of Nehru personally which are aimed at preserving the policy of nonalignment, at preserving and further developing the friendly relations with the So-

viet Union. I set forth the opinion of N.S. Khrushchev on questions of the necessity of activating in every way the struggle for peace and general disarmament, for carrying out the policy of peaceful coexistence and resolution of disputed international questions through negotiations. I expressed the wish of N.S. Khrushchev that the border conflict between India and the PRC also will be resolved through peaceful means, through negotiations.

Nehru listened to all of this attentively and with great interest, taking notes in his notebook. He expressed great satisfaction with the friendly relations which exist between the USSR and India, between the governments of both countries and also between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and him personally. He expressed also the conviction that these relations will not only be preserved, but also will further develop in the future.

The prime minister stated further that he “fully agrees with Mr. Khrushchev in regard to the necessity of our general struggle for peace and disarmament.” He gave us to understand that the USSR can count on the support of India in these questions.

Concerning the question of the peaceful resolution of sharp international problems, Nehru stated that “in this regard Mr. Khrushchev has given us all a great example during the incident with Cuba.”

Nehru then dwelt in detail on the position of India in the Indian-Chinese border dispute. He said that “all this began not from our side, - it was thrust on us. We do not want it to be prolonged, we do not want to carry out military actions. We would like it to be settled...”

Nehru noted the truth of Khrushchev's observation about the presence of reactionary forces that are trying to push the government to a resolution of the border dispute by military means. He stated in this regard that the government knows about the activities of these forces, but does not consider this the main thing. In his words a very important point is the fact that all the people of India, simple peasants, workers and employees, “all feel the harshest feelings toward China, toward what it did against India. They, of course, do not want war (no one wants it), but they demand the withdrawal of Chinese from Indian territory, they demand the defense of our territory.

We, of course, never will make an incursion into Chinese territory, but it is necessary to consider that the people insist on the liberation of the territory that belongs to India.”

In answer to my statement about the necessity of a peaceful resolution of the problem and of explaining to the people the correctness of peaceful means, Nehru said: “We are trying to explain this necessity and will do this in the future.” He noted in this regard that attempts at peaceful resolution of the dispute have not yet given results. “We would like to sit at the negotiating table with the Chinese. We are ready. But the government has explained to them that for this it is necessary that the position on the border that existed 3 months ago be restored - the position on 8 September.”

Further J. Nehru in detail and confidentially illuminated the question of the relations of India with Pakistan...

[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, ll. 197-203; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

### III. Record of Conversation (from East German archives) between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Mongolian leader J. Zedenbal, Beijing, 26 December 1962

4 Cop[ies].

II.

About the Meeting of Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade J. Zedenbal

On 26 December the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China [PRC; VRCh in German], Comrade Zhou Enlai, paid a return visit to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR; MVR in German], Comrade J. Zedenbal.

During this meeting, which took place in the residence of Comrade Zedenbal, a conversation [took place] between the two [men], which lasted from 11 until 14 hours.

Present during the conversation were: on the Mongolian side—the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR, Comrade Shagwaral, the deputy Foreign Minister Schagda[r]suren, the Ambassador of the MPR in Peking [Beijing], Zewegmid, the Deputy of the Great People's Hural [Parliament] of the MPR, S. Bata, the Head of the 1st Division of the Foreign Ministry of

the MPR, Comrade Tschimidorsh; on the Chinese side—the deputy Premier of the State Council and Foreign Minister of the PRC, Comrade Tschen Ji [Chen Yi], the deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Tsching Peng-fei, the Head of the 2nd Asian Division of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, Comrade Zhou Tschu-je, the Chief of Protocol of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, Jui Pei-weng, the Extraordinary and plenipotentiary Ambassador of the PRC in the MPR, Se Fu-schen.

Erdenebulag served as translator on the Chinese side and Adja on the Mongolian side.

After offering tea, fruit, and cigarettes to the guests, and after a short conversation of a protocol nature, photographs were taken and the guests entered a special room where a three-hour conversation occurred.

Hereafter follows a presentation of the contents of the conversation between the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR, Zedenbal.

ZHOU ENLAI: We are very happy, Comrade Chairman Zedenbal, that you have come to our land, in order to sign a treaty concerning the border between our countries. This is a good thing, the meaning of which is to legally define the borders between our friendly lands.

Yesterday you said quite correctly, that the signing of a border agreement would be very meaningful for peace and friendship. A reasonable settlement of the border question between China and Mongolia will be an example and an encouragement for border negotiations with other countries.

Basically, we have reached an agreement concerning the border question with [North] Korea. But we are waiting still for an answer from Korea and therefore have not yet made a public announcement to the press.

Since the Chinese-Mongolian and Chinese-Korean border issues are already settled, all that remains to be done, is to set up joint Commissions on Demarcation of Borders according to the agreed-upon principles.

We are at present conducting negotiations regarding border demarcation with Burma and Nepal. We have the opportunity to resolve this question with the aforementioned countries on a mutually-agreed basis. In this manner we will officially pin

down the border line with these countries.

The border agreement between China and Mongolia will also contribute to the resolution of the border question with our other neighboring countries.

China recently started border negotiations with Pakistan. We think that [we] will soon reach an agreement as our negotiations with Pakistan are taking place in a good atmosphere. The border question with Pakistan is also linked to the Kashmir question, that is, with the question that concerns both Pakistan and India directly. After the conclusion of the negotiations between China and Pakistan, we will sign a provisional protocol; the signing of an official treaty will follow if the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan has been settled.

Anyway, the aforementioned border treaty will reflect the real situation. We are not going to define officially the border between China and Pakistan today. That would be to lead India into a dead end [*Sackgasse*]. The border between India and Pakistan is still officially unresolved.

When you visited India in [September] 1959, Comrade Zedenbal, the border conflict between China and India had just reached a climax. At that time, I informed you regarding the Chinese-India border question, but during your stay in India you tried to avoid this question. We are very interested in this matter.

The major border conflict between India and Pakistan is caused by the Kashmir question. At the western sector of our border with India, this [area] borders on the Aksai and on the Tibetan district of Ali. This was a historically established traditional border line. Pakistan's position on the border question is correct. The border agreement between our countries will undoubtedly be signed, once the status [*zugehörigkeit*] of Kashmir is clarified. India, however, is trying in every way to prevent the conclusion of an agreement. But these attempts lack any grounds.

The Western press—especially the English papers—write, that the Chinese-Pakistani border question corresponds completely to the norms of international relations. But this question only worries the American reactionaries. They think that if China, Pakistan, and India delineate their borders, that would be a blow to the aggressive Asia policy of America and other imperialist states. They assume that the so-

lution of the Chinese-Pakistani border question and the settlement of the Chinese-India border question could hinder their aggression.

Recently the Americans have exerted increased pressure on India and Pakistan demanding a solution to the Kashmir question as soon as possible. It is expected that in the near-future negotiations on the border question will begin between India and Pakistan on the ministerial level.

The English are trying to influence these matters either in the direction that Kashmir belongs to both countries or that Pakistan connects itself into Indian society [*dass sich Pakistan der indischen Gemeinschaft anschliesst*].

We are of the opinion that the border negotiations between India and Pakistan cannot lead to positive results. Nehru is searching for a way to subordinate India and Pakistan to American domination. Clearly, he has no other way out [*Ausweg*]. If this occurs, the situation will become even more complicated, and it will become difficult to explain this problem to the Indian people.

We have sent a letter to the countries of Asia and Africa explaining the Chinese-Indian border question in detail. You have also received this letter, Comrade Chairman Zedenbal.

Since 1961 India is conducting invasions into our border districts and has established 43 border posts there. The area in question is mountainous, has a raw climate, and it snows a lot there.

After the Chinese-Indian border conflict broke out and India continued its invasion systematically, we were forced to remove the aforementioned 43 posts. Several of these were overrun and the entire district cleansed.

On 21 November [1962] our government made the decision to cease fire and to withdraw the border units 20 kilometers into the hinterlands. We suggested the establishment of an unpopulated zone 20 kilometers deep [on each side--ed.]. One must say that in the past there were no Chinese troops involved in the border conflict. There was not a single border guard or [border]-post there, rather, only a patrol [service]. But, administratively, this district was subject to us [our authority]. Since 1949, however, India began to threaten and attack this area. Now, after this area is cleansed, we again have no border guard there. If India, under



these conditions, begins an invasion again, this will be a true challenge and provocation.

If India gives up Kashmir to Pakistan and tries to annex our Aksai district again, this will only be a proof that India is really working for and under the orders of the Americans.

India's attempts to give Pakistan the rich, bounteous Kashmir and, in exchange, to occupy our unpopulated, poor district, only proves [India's] aggressiveness. Under these conditions, we have ceased fire and withdrawn our troops.

The people of Asia and Africa, [and] all the peace-loving people of the Earth, support our policy and our measures. We thank you for the fact that your government welcomed the explanation of the government of the PRC.

Presently, India is in a difficult position. The countries of Asia and Africa are supporting our proposal, and that puts India in an even more exit-less [*ausweglosere*] situation.

Not long ago, a meeting of leading statesmen from many countries took place in Colombo [Ceylon; now Sri Lanka] concerning the Sino-Indian border question. They decided to send the Ceylonese prime minister [Sirimavo Bandaranaike] to China in order to inform us of the results of the conference. It was confirmed that the Ceylonese Minister-president would arrive [in China] on 31 December. We have already received a special plenipotentiary in order to confer on this question. The aforementioned countries are making efforts to reconcile India and China and to initiate negotiations between our countries in order to confirm our cease-fire. We are ready to respond to these efforts. The most important [thing] is that both sides do not allow any renewed clashes. That is our main goal. Many ask, why there is no settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict, because the border question between China and Pakistan is actively discussed[?] We think that Pakistan negotiates with us without submitting itself to America and England, although it belongs to an aggressive bloc. India, however, speaks the language of America, although it maintains that it does not belong to any aggressive blocs.

J. ZEDENBAL: Do you consider India a neutral country?

ZHOU ENLAI: India is diverging from

its so-called neutrality. Furthermore, there is a less important border question between China and Afghanistan. In short, we will start negotiations. Experience shows that we can solve the border problems handed down to us by history through friendly negotiations both with socialist countries and with the new states of Asia. The treaty regarding the Chinese-Mongolian border demonstrates this. Both of our states are socialist countries and in a short period we have solved the border question correctly, according to principles of friendship, equality, mutual understanding and mutual concessions. Our countries' governmental delegations have successfully concluded negotiations over the border question. This opens the way to the signature of a border agreement. Consequently, we will have to form a joint commission that will undertake border demarcation on the spot.

J. ZEDENBAL: Thank you, Premier Zhou Enlai both for the information regarding the course of negotiations you are conducting with neighboring countries and for the information about your government's position on this question.

The negotiations between our countries to define exactly and mark the borderline have been successfully concluded, and nothing more stands in the way of signing an agreement. Comrade Premier, you have correctly stated that our countries' governmental delegations negotiated successfully on the basis of mutual understanding, mutual consideration of interests, mutual concessions and mutual regard. I value this as much as you do. Since socialist countries have a common goal and ideology, we definitely must solve all questions that come up between us in the spirit of friendship. The border question between our countries was settled on just such a basis. The goal of the peoples who are building socialism and communism is to eliminate once and for all such problems as border drawing and the like that divide nations from each other.

But for the time being borders will remain. I only say this, because I am taking our final goal, Communism, as my point of departure.

ZHOU ENLAI: There is a Chinese saying that says that in the end the world will be an unitary whole, that there will be no exploitation of man by man. But before we join in one whole, we must establish the borders and provide for our affairs and prosper-

perity.

J. ZEDENBAL: The states and nations will strengthen their independence and develop their countries, consequently and definitely crossing over into a communist order. This is the dialectic of development.

ZHOU ENLAI: This is clearly a question of the distant future.

J. ZEDENBAL: Of course. Our government and our people deeply regret that there was a border conflict between China and India. They are convinced that this problem must be solved in a peaceful manner. That is our position. This conflict between two Asian great-powers and the disturbance of the friendship between them is disadvantageous both for the peoples of both countries and for the maintenance of peace in general.

Our visit to India in 1959 coincided with the heightening [of tensions] on the Chinese-Indian border. I remember, Comrade Premier, that you informed us at that time regarding the state of affairs.

As soon as we were on Indian soil, the correspondents fell upon us with questions regarding the border conflict. Our answer to the correspondents ran: we hope that the border question between these two great powers can be settled in a peaceful manner.

At the meeting with Nehru, I said to him that the correspondents had turned to us with this question; I assume that the border question between the two countries will be settled in a friendly manner. At that time the question was, it seems to me, mainly about a border area of 90,000 square kilometers.

Nehru said that if it was a border disagreement involving a few kilometers, one could make mutual concessions, but that in this case it was a matter of 90,000 square kilometers, whose inhabitants are Indian citizens, who elect representatives to the Indian parliament. Therefore, he said, this question is not so simply solved.

It seems to me that, in fact, it is not easy to reach an agreement involving such a large area. A longer time is clearly necessary for this. As it turned out, the outbreak of the border conflict and the armed clashes have, in essence, complicated the situation. Now, obviously, an even bigger area is involved than before.

We think that the Chinese government's unilateral ceasefire is a reasonable step, taken after full consideration of the circumstances. We hold the view that you are un-

dertaking flexible measures towards settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict in a peaceful manner by negotiations.

In general, life confirms daily the need for flexible policies to solve international problems. We do not doubt that the Chinese-Indian border conflict can be settled peacefully.

By "speculating" on the Chinese-Indian border conflict, the reactionary forces in India have strengthened their activity and their offensive against the country's [India's] Communist Party and democratic forces.

We are convinced that the measures that your government has taken towards a ceasefire on the Indian-Chinese border, toward the withdrawal of border troops and towards the future settlement of this problem by negotiation will generate positive results. We are of the opinion that this would be, on the one hand a blow against reactionary forces in India itself, and on the other hand a blow against the forces of imperialism, with the USA at its head. We assume that such measures will strengthen India's neutral stance and will prevent India from abandoning this position. This will advance the battle for peace in the whole world. The American imperialists are making efforts to derive advantages from this conflict. The peaceful settlement would undoubtedly be a serious [line illegible—trans.] for imperialism.

After the signing of the border agreement between our countries, we will begin the demarcation of the borderline. As is well known, during the negotiations our delegation raised the question of the village of Hurimt in the Balgan-Ulgiisk district in western Mongolia. Our inhabitants have erected several buildings there and begun lumbering. Your delegation, however, replied that this place cannot be recognized as Mongolia, because this would meet with difficulties. At the same time, your delegation answered that the inhabitants on both sides have come to an agreement and can find a reasonable solution [to the problem of] the use of the forest's riches. Therefore, I do not want to insist that Hurimt should necessarily belong inside Mongolian borders. Of course, I think that this question must be decided by taking both sides interests into consideration. We are grateful that you have declared yourselves ready to make possible our use of our buildings as well as the forests in this district. This problem

occurred, because there are no other woods nearby. But it can be solved on the basis of friendly, mutual understanding.

Since the founding of the PRC it has become a good tradition that during temporary difficulties caused by drought and dry wind, the administrations of individual districts of our countries, in friendly contacts, have permitted the reciprocal use of pasture land. We hope that it will also be possible in the future, in case of difficulties, to continue this excellent tradition.

I suppose that our Comrade "Landowner" ["Gutsbesitzer"] Shagwaral, who is responsible for agricultural questions would be very interested in this.

We thank you for the help that you have provided in difficult times to the cattle-breeders in our Aimaks and Somons, especially in winter and spring. We also express further our satisfaction that the border question between our countries will soon be settled.

I would like to make use of this meeting, Comrade Premier, to broach two aspects [of Sino-Mongolian relations].

We were and are grateful that for the construction of our country the PRC has provided us with financial and economic help as well as qualified workers. The appropriate authorities in our countries are already negotiating regarding the building of objects agreed upon earlier by our governments. I suppose that these negotiations will continue.

I would like to pose the following two questions to you: First, has railway freight traffic gone down considerably in the last years? Maybe that is also an effect of your drought. We hope that railway freight traffic will go up in the future. The full use of the railway that will be built as a consequence of a three-sided agreement between us and the Soviet comrades is economically advantageous for our country, Comrade Premier. We are convinced that you will take this factor into consideration.

Secondly, one of the forms of help that you provide to us is the provision of workers from appropriate professions. This labor is a great help in the building up of our country. Recently, it has nevertheless happened that a few less conscientious and inexperienced people put down their work. I think you know about this.

*[segment of conversation not printed regarding Chinese guest workers, particularly*

*those from Inner Mongolia (Zedenbal assured Zhou that these are needed for linguistic, not nationalistic reasons); resettlement of Mongolians in China; Sino-Mongolia trade relations—trans.]*

ZHOU ENLAI: With regard to China's economic help to Mongolia, we can discuss this tomorrow afternoon, since we have too little time today to negotiate concrete matters, such as workers, construction, trade and railway freight traffic.

I do not understand the word "regrettable", that you used regarding the Chinese-Indian border conflict. If this refers to India, it is correct. If you said it in reference to China, in order to make us out to be the guilty [party], then that is false. On this question there are differences of opinion among the fraternal parties.

We have undertaken considerable work to inform and provide explanations to the appropriate states and countries. The Indian side put us in an intolerable position. We were forced to take measures. India began a new invasion and set off a conflict. We rebuffed them, since it was such a serious situation. We have taken measures to defuse the situation. We have ceased fire and pulled out troops back. These are unilateral steps. There is no guarantee that this problem is definitively solved. The cause is the aggressive policies of the ruling circles of the Indian government. The Nehru government is wavering and turning away from neutrality. India did indeed declare non-alignment to aggressive blocs, but became ever more dependent on American dollars. India received 640 million dollars from America for military purposes. Nehru's government is turning away from the policy of peace. We must understand imperialism's threat and danger. In India itself, the domestic forces of reaction are becoming ever more active. India is turning away from the policy of peace. Our country, however, ceased fire and took the initiative towards negotiations. The Indian government has not yet expressed itself regarding our proposals and the measures we took. Under these circumstances, I ask you to understand Indian-Chinese relations correctly.

The MPR, as is known, has entered the United Nations. Therefore, the circumstances must be understandable for you. India's representative in the UN is following the policy of the Western countries. India supports the Western powers' policy on

the Hungarian, Korean, and Chinese questions as well as on disarmament. In this way, India is getting ever further onto the side of the reactionary imperialists.

You, Comrade Zedenbal, will probably agree with some of what I'm saying and disagree with part. I am not forcing my opinion on you. Further development will show who is right. Our policy is a peace-loving foreign policy that is guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

J. ZEDENBAL: Our main task is the signing of the Mongolian-Chinese border agreement. This work is on the verge of a successful conclusion.

Clearly, the Soviet Union, the PRC and the other countries of the socialist camp play a major role in keeping peace in the whole world. The socialist countries have taken on the goal to contribute to the fight for peace, each according to his strength. Naturally the socialist countries are interested in the peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict. It is my understanding that our discussion takes this standpoint, as a point of departure. We and you both know that Nehru is not a Communist, but a bourgeois politician. But we and you both understand how important it is, in the interests of the whole socialist camp, to exploit the positive sides of individual bourgeois politicians. We know that your party in its long history has garnered much experience in the exploitation of the deeds of individuals, who are on the enemy's side.

The exploitation of India's policy of neutrality is very important for the socialist camp. We assume that this is what the five principles of co-existence that you, Comrade Premier Zhou Enlai, together with Nehru, proclaimed. It will be very disadvantageous for our camp, if in place of Nehru, a man such as [Moraji] Desai comes to power. Then there will be a danger that India will join an aggressive bloc. In general, we attach the greatest meaning to the preservation and exploitation of India's neutrality. I think you will probably agree with this. The Chinese-Indian border conflict is now on all lips, since in contemporary international relations every event, even if of local character, becomes widely known.

We think that the ceasefire, the pulling back of troops and the readiness for a negotiated settlement of the border conflict through negotiations, a readiness that you decided on after appropriate evaluation of

the conflict and its connections to international problems and in consideration of all the complicated factors, correspond to the interests of the peoples of the socialist camp and all progressive mankind.

ZHOU ENLAI: The hitch is that the Nehru government represents the Grossbourgeoisie and is two-faced. It is correct that in the fight for peace one must also exploit the bourgeoisie. Nehru is however a representative of the Grossbourgeoisie. The reactionary tendency has the upper hand in the Nehru government's policies. We must lead a decisive struggle against him, we must unmask his treacherous machinations. In his pro-American policy, there is no difference between Nehru and Desai. Resumption of negotiations to strengthen peace will be useful. But the Communists see this question differently from other men. The Communist Party of England has differences of opinion with us on other matters, but on the Indian-Chinese border question, we are of the same opinion. It would be good, if in the future you kept this in mind.

J. ZEDENBAL: I understand that the Chinese side does not unconditionally insist on immediately incorporating a 90,000 square kilometer area on the eastern border, that this question will be decided in the future. Is that true or not?

ZHOU ENLAI: I already went to India with Comrade [Foreign Minister] Chen Yi in 1960 in order to settle the Chinese-Indian border question, but we returned with empty hands.

J. ZEDENBAL: The Chinese-Indian border question must not be solved only in the interests of China, but also in accordance with the interests of the whole international communist movement. Given this, I personally think that it would be somewhat better, if you didn't bring up the matter of the 90,000 square kilometers on the eastern sector of the border, but, on the contrary, support the development of class struggle within India in favor of socialism and communism, so that it can contribute to the strengthening of the Communist Party and the democratic forces whereby you would help to accelerate India's transition to communism. There can be no doubt that the border question will be resolved in the future. I repudiate the thought of your intending to weaken or undermine in any way the forces of the Communist Party of India. It would be absurd, if such an idea came into

the head of a Communist.

The kindling of conflict and noise over some 5-10 kilometers of land will, in the end, result in the strengthening of the domestic reactionary forces in India and the fanning of nationalistic passions. This would effect the Communists negatively and be disadvantageous for Socialism.

You Chinese Communists are much more experienced than us, and tempered in revolutionary battle. I am only saying what I think about this question and how I understand it.

ZHOU ENLAI: (Becoming nervous, with altered facial expression)

If you are interested in the Indian-Chinese border question, please examine again the literature that we have provided for the Asian and African countries. Our government is not fighting with India because of a few dozen kilometers of area. We have made absolutely no territorial claims, only the Indian side has. One must understand this correctly. The essence of the matter is that the Indian side is trying to annex an even larger area on the Western sector of the border. How quickly India treads the path of socialism depends, above all, on the revolutionary struggle of the Indian Communist Party and the Indian people. It is important to expose to the world public the evil machinations and dangers, that the reactionary forces of India represent. If we do not expose their reactionary activity, they will go over to the American side, and that is even more disadvantageous.

J. ZEDENBAL: The main thing is not to play into the hands of American imperialism.

It was agreed to continue the conversation the next day.

29 December 1962

*[Source: Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv," Berlin, JIV 2/202-283, B1.0; obtained by D. Wolff; translation by Wolff, O. Corff, and C. Ostermann, with the assistance of J. Hershberg.]*

**VISIT CWIHP'S SITE  
ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB AT:**

<http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/cwihp>