

# Integrating New Year's Day: The Racial Politics of College Bowl Games in the American South

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Early in the evening of November 23, 1948, a rapidly growing crowd of agitated students gathered around a huge bonfire on the central quadrangle of Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania. Virtually the entire student body soon assembled there, leaving nearby dormitories almost totally deserted. The emotional issue that mobilized so many undergraduates on that cool November evening was a controversial faculty decision made earlier that day concerning the school's football program. In an unexpected move that shocked the campus, the college faculty had voted to reject an invitation for Lafayette's highly successful football team to participate in the Sun Bowl football classic on New Year's Day. Since the Leopards had not played in a bowl game for twenty-six years, students at the all-male school had responded enthusiastically to news of the anticipated trip to El Paso, Texas, and were bitterly disappointed by the sudden change in plans. After much debate, nearly 1,500 concerned young men marched to the nearby home of the school's president, Dr. Ralph C. Hutchison, to demand an explanation. His dinner interrupted, Dr. Hutchison hastily defended the unpopular faculty action by attempting to shift the blame to narrow-minded Sun Bowl officials. The main reason that the faculty rejected the bowl invitation, the beleaguered president explained, was because southern racial customs would have barred senior halfback Dave Showell, an African American, from the contest. "It is fundamentally wrong," Hutchison declared, "for any team to go and play a game and leave any player behind because of his race, color, or religion."<sup>1</sup>

Caught off guard by this revelation, the students urged Hutchison to inform Sun Bowl officials that the college still wished to participate in the January 1 game, provided that Showell could play. Impressed with the students' passion,

David Anthony Showell's presence on the 1948 Lafayette College football team set off a racial controversy concerning the Sun Bowl. Photo courtesy of Lafayette College.



and perhaps intimidated by their numbers, Hutchison agreed to reverse the faculty decision. The president then quickly placed a telephone call to the chairman of the selection committee, who curtly replied that Showell could not participate and that a replacement team had already been contacted. Disappointed by this negative response, the students subsequently marched to downtown Easton, where they held an orderly protest rally and sent off a telegram to President Harry S. Truman denouncing the Sun Bowl's

action. The following day, nearly 1,000 Lafayette students staged "a civil rights demonstration" in the school's auditorium, at which they adopted resolutions condemning intolerance in American society and endorsing the principle that "all Americans have equal rights under the law."<sup>2</sup>

The national publicity surrounding the Sun Bowl controversy of November 1948 deeply embarrassed Lafayette College administrators, bowl officials, and El Paso residents. More importantly, however, the incident is historically significant because it widely exposed the exclusion of African American football players from most college bowl games and dramatically highlighted the Deep South's fanatical insistence on maintaining segregation in all local sporting events. The controversy also demonstrated that northern students were increasingly willing to challenge the continuing presence of a color line in big-time college sports. By the fall of 1948, New Year's Day had become the single most important date in the college football season, with most of the top-ranked squads battling each other in a half-dozen or more bowl games. Since four of the five best-known postseason contests were held in the Deep South, southern racial policies controlled these events. This strategic grip on January 1 thus enabled whites in Dixie to impose their racial values on nonsouthern teams, in effect "southernizing" the national sport.

An examination of the rise and fall of racial exclusion in college bowl games held in the American South between 1935 and 1965 reveals much about the shifting trends in national race relations. During the 1930s and early 1940s, conservative white Southerners demanded total conformity to Jim Crow and used the leverage of bowl games' profits and prestige to force opportunistic northern universities to abandon their black players. After World War II, northern colleges increasingly defended democracy on the gridiron, forcing southern bowl

committees to modify segregation in order to recruit the top national teams. After 1954, however, militant segregationists, worried about the mounting threat to the foundations of the Jim Crow system, attacked this racial moderation in sports and attempted to reestablish a rigid color line. The eventual defeat of their conservative crusade finally permitted southern bowl games to implement a permanent policy of racial egalitarianism. This study will trace these events by focusing on the racial histories of the Cotton, Sugar, and Orange Bowls, the most prestigious southern classics of that era, and the Sun Bowl, the oldest and best known of the so-called “second tier” bowl games.

During the 1920s college football captured the fancy of the American sporting public and became the nation’s second most popular team sport, surpassed only by major league baseball. According to historian Benjamin G. Rader, “Between 1921 and 1930, attendance at all college games doubled and gate receipts tripled.” This rapid surge in new spectators enticed many universities to launch a wave of stadium construction and expansion. The growing frequency of intersectional matches featuring North-South or East-West battles contributed substantially to this exploding fan enthusiasm. Despite several efforts to establish special postseason games, however, the famous Rose Bowl match remained the only continuous New Year’s Day classic in operation. In the 1930s and 1940s, however, civic groups and individual promoters experimented with several new postseason contests. Festivals like the Dixie Bowl, Salad Bowl, Pineapple Bowl, Harbor Bowl, and Oil Bowl failed to attract enough fans to sustain themselves, as did the short-lived Bacardi Bowl in Havana, Cuba, and the Spaghetti Bowl in Florence, Italy.<sup>3</sup>

From this wreckage of failed dreams, four new postseason classics emerged as survivors—the Sugar Bowl in New Orleans, the Orange Bowl in Miami, the Sun Bowl in El Paso, and the Cotton Bowl in Dallas. Because all four host cities were located in the ex-Confederate South, they naturally adhered to the region’s prevailing ideology of white supremacy, which prohibited all “mixed” athletic competition between blacks and whites. This custom dictated that if any northern team invited to a southern bowl game included African Americans on its roster, it would agree in advance to withhold them from the contest. Moreover, southern white college teams during the 1920s and 1930s went even further and demanded that nonsouthern teams bench black players for those intersectional games played north of the Mason-Dixon line. Until the late 1940s, most northern universities acquiesced to such demands, demonstrating that southern schools had succeeded in imposing their racial code on intersectional competition. This capitulation by northern coaches and administrators also reflected their tolerance for racial discrimination, the small number of black players on their squads, the marginal status of African American students on campus, and the growing lure of generous payouts and national prestige that bowl games provided.<sup>4</sup>

The Rose Bowl served as the model for these new regional ventures. However, on racial policy, the California classic took a more egalitarian position than did its southern imitators. Inspired by a one-time football match held in Pasadena in 1902, the modern Rose Bowl contest began in 1916 and was staged by the

Tournament of Roses Committee, which already sponsored a wide variety of festivities in order to call attention to southern California's mild winter weather. After a few lean years, the renewed game became a smashing success, attracting huge crowds and providing generous payments to participating teams. Although race relations in southern California were far from ideal, the Rose Bowl accepted African American players from the start. In 1916 festival organizers invited Brown University to represent the East against host Washington State College, fully aware that Brown's star player was black halfback Fritz Pollard, a future All-American. Although Pollard encountered some discrimination in public accommodations while visiting California, the game's sponsors apparently made no efforts to prevent his appearance. This precedent of including black players was reinforced in 1922, when single wing quarterback Charles West of Washington and Jefferson College played the entire game for the Presidents against the University of California.<sup>5</sup>

During the mid-1930s, promoters successfully launched four new bowl games in Deep South cities. These New Year's Day events were organized by businessmen and civic boosters who, seeking the Holy Grail of national press coverage, hoped to exploit the publicity generated by matches between top football powers to expand tourism and foster local economic growth. In Miami, civic leaders staged the Palm Festival in 1933 and 1934, with the local University of Miami squad hosting a visiting team from the North both years. In the latter half of 1934, these boosters and additional football fans formed the Orange Bowl Committee, which held its first contest on January 1, 1935. In New Orleans, a lengthy campaign by several journalists finally resulted in the creation of the Mid-Winter Sports Association, which organized its first Sugar Bowl game, also on January 1, 1935. The Sun Bowl in El Paso began operations on that same date, although its first contest matched two high school teams. In 1936 the West Texas festival hosted its first game between college teams. On New Year's Day in 1937, Texas oilman J. Curtis Sanford, inspired by Southern Methodist University's participation in the 1936 Rose Bowl, organized the first Cotton Bowl match in Dallas. Because of local skepticism about the venture's viability, Sanford personally financed the first few games before eventually turning the event's management over to the Cotton Bowl Association.<sup>6</sup>

All four of these new bowl games suffered problems with attendance and profits during their first few years. After Sanford reportedly lost \$6,000 on the 1937 Cotton Bowl and \$20,000 on the 1940 contest, critics jokingly referred to the event as "Sanford's folly." In Miami, the first Orange Bowl match drew a sparse crowd of only 5,135 fans, some of whom were curious neighborhood pedestrians admitted for free. Nonetheless, the creation of four new bowl games greatly expanded postseason opportunities for college football teams. At the same time, however, the fact that all four of the new events were located in the Lower South created possible conflicts for those northern schools whose rosters included one or more black athletes.<sup>7</sup>

The 1940 Cotton Bowl and the 1941 Sugar Bowl revealed the fierce determination of white Southerners to maintain the color line in college football

and the willingness of ambitious northern universities to abandon their black players in pursuit of athletic success and financial rewards. Unlike intersectional games during the regular season when northern teams possessed some leverage, bowl games in Dixie were controlled by white Southerners who defined the “rules of engagement” to exclude blacks. Since the Cotton Bowl did not yet have an automatic contract with the Southwest Conference champion in 1940, the classic that year featured Clemson against Boston College. An emerging powerhouse in the Northeast, Boston College aggressively pursued its first-ever bowl bid, even though the team’s starting lineup included black halfback Lou Montgomery. In preliminary discussions, Cotton Bowl officials made it clear that southern custom precluded Montgomery’s participation. Although Coach Frank Leahy publicly grumbled about the exclusion, Boston College nonetheless quickly accepted the invitation. In reality, benching Montgomery presented no great moral dilemma for the Jesuit-run institution, since the school had already done so twice during the 1939 regular season for home games against Auburn and the University of Florida. The following year Boston College enjoyed even greater gridiron success, going undefeated and earning a bid to the 1941 Sugar Bowl. But once again, school administrators ignored criticism from a few sportswriters and students and cravenly agreed to withhold Montgomery from postseason play. As a small concession, New Orleans officials did permit him to accompany the team and watch the game from the press box.<sup>8</sup>

Although Boston College displayed no inhibitions about abandoning Lou Montgomery in 1940 and 1941, a few radical and liberal northern students did challenge racial exclusion in college sports during the immediate prewar years. Their numbers and clout grew enormously after 1945. As a result of the wartime campaign against Nazi doctrines of Aryan supremacy, liberal attitudes favoring equal opportunity in sports became commonplace on northern campuses. Consequently, northern teams stopped the custom of benching African American players for intersectional games at home, and some of these colleges also began to challenge this policy of racial exclusion for games played in Dixie. This new toughness by Yankee schools forced the cancellation of several games and the termination of a few intersectional rivalries in the late 1940s. The trend also forced southern bowl committees to reevaluate their commitment to racial purity on the gridiron, since it now threatened to interfere with their desire to offer the public the most exciting possible match up and to maximize their own revenues.

The first important defection from the traditional southern policy of racial exclusion came with the January 1, 1948, Cotton Bowl clash between Southern Methodist University and Penn State University. The game’s tremendous success established a precedent for other southern bowl games and gave the Cotton Bowl a temporary recruiting advantage over them. Taking place just two and one-half months after the University of Virginia had shattered southern tradition by hosting an integrated Harvard team in Charlottesville, the SMU-Penn State showdown was reportedly the second integrated major college football contest ever held in the ex-Confederate South, and the first in Texas. In mid-November 1947, when the Cotton Bowl selection committee compiled the names of possible visiting

teams, it placed Penn State at the head of the list. Winners of the Lambert Trophy, symbolic of football supremacy in the East, the Nittany Lions finished the 1947 season undefeated and ranked fourth in the Associated Press poll. However, the presence of two African Americans, fullback Wallace Triplett and end Dennis Hoggard, on the team's roster complicated the selection process.<sup>9</sup>

The Penn State administration and athletic department strongly supported the policy of racial egalitarianism in college sports. Located in an isolated spot in central Pennsylvania, the university was not the type of school normally associated with intellectual or political liberalism. Hence, Penn State's firm stand demonstrated the growing insistence on democratic ideals in sports that spread across most northern campuses after the war. The university had first confronted southern racism in 1940, when the U.S. Naval Academy refused to let sprint champion Barney Ewell run in a track meet at Annapolis. Refusing to compete without its African American sprinter, Penn State forced the academy to move the meet to State College. In the fall of 1946, a similar confrontation developed between the college and the University of Miami, after officials at the Florida school discovered that the Nittany Lion squad included Triplett and Hoggard. Miami authorities insisted that the two black players could not participate in their scheduled November match up in the Orange Bowl Stadium because such a contest might result in "unfortunate incidents."<sup>10</sup>

Reflecting the new liberal attitude on northern campuses, Penn State students strongly criticized the Miami demand. One senior summed up this philosophy when he told the student newspaper that Penn State should play sports "the democratic way" or not at all, since "the ideals of Democracy are more important than any football game." After several weeks of negotiations, the two colleges finally called off the game. Afterward Penn State issued a formal statement which declared, "It is the policy of the college to compete only under circumstances which will permit the playing of any or all members of its athletic teams." In July 1947 the school reaffirmed this policy when the Athletic Advisory Board declined an invitation to send the school's boxing team to the 1947 Sugar Bowl boxing tournament, from which African American boxers were excluded. The action was based entirely on principle, since there were no black boxers on the current team. Penn State's position was well known nationally and understood by most Cotton Bowl officials from the start.<sup>11</sup>

Cotton Bowl officials were delighted when local favorite SMU, led by All-American halfback Doak Walker, captured the Southwest Conference title with an 8-0-1 record. As a result, the bowl could now showcase the third- and fourth-ranked teams in the AP Poll, creating "the top attraction in the nation on New Year's Day" and the most exciting match up in the classic's brief history. (Number one-ranked Notre Dame did not participate in postseason play at that time.) After SMU coach Matty Bell and the Mustang players enthusiastically endorsed playing the Nittany Lions, the Cotton Bowl extended a formal invitation to the university.<sup>12</sup>

Although they quickly accepted the bid, Penn State administrators remained concerned about the rigid pattern of segregation and discrimination that

characterized most aspects of Dallas life. Bowl officials worked carefully behind the scenes to ease their fears and avoid any unexpected confrontations with Jim Crow, especially in off-field social activities. Penn State coach Bob Higgins insisted that all of his players, including Triplett and Hoggard, stay together, but the major downtown hotels were segregated. Cotton Bowl planners cleverly resolved this issue by arranging for the visiting squad to reside in the bachelor officer quarters of the Dallas Naval Air Station near suburban Grand Prairie, fourteen miles from downtown. Bowl officials also scaled down some of the traditional social activities for the two teams, but all of the players, including Triplett and Hoggard, attended the postgame awards banquet at a downtown hotel, violating local segregation customs.<sup>13</sup>

The major Dallas newspapers openly reported the racial complications surrounding the possible selection of Penn State for the 1948 game. Once the Nittany Lions accepted the Cotton Bowl invitation, however, the white press temporarily refrained from making any references to Triplett and Hoggard or the larger significance of the racial milestone that was approaching. Since these newspapers did not report any local criticism of the decision to drop the color line, it seems likely that influential local whites preferred to downplay the impending racial change as much as possible, in order to avoid stirring up extreme segregationists. The *Dallas Morning News* did note one Pennsylvania sportswriter's description of the Nittany Lions as "a melting pot football team" composed of players from Polish, Irish, Italian, Ukrainian, and Negro lineage. Finally, on the day of the eagerly awaited showdown, the *Morning News* rediscovered Wallace Triplett, belatedly identifying him as Penn State's "star Negro fullback. . . who is both a fast and elusive runner, and a superb defensive player." Unlike its mainstream counterparts, the black press paid close attention to the racial issue and interpreted the contest as an important step forward in race relations. The *Pittsburgh Courier* noted the game's larger significance and proudly reported that Triplett and Hoggard were always treated courteously by whites during their stay. The local black newspaper, the *Dallas Express*, praised SMU for its willingness to break with southern tradition and coach Matty Bell for his "courage and character." Other newspapers around the nation, especially those with a liberal, assimilationist philosophy, also celebrated this racial breakthrough. Perhaps influenced by Jackie Robinson's integration of major league baseball earlier in the year, the *Christian Science Monitor* even argued that the integrated football game carried "more significance than does a Supreme Court decision against Jim Crowism or would a Federal Fair Employment Practices Act."<sup>14</sup>

The pairing of the eastern champion against local favorite SMU, as well as the substantial box office appeal of the Mustangs' All-American halfback Doak Walker, produced a record-setting demand for tickets. The Cotton Bowl ticket office received over 100,000 ticket applications in the first four days of mail sales, and one newspaper estimated that 150,000 tickets could have been sold if additional seats had been available. Penn State officials received 20,000 requests for its allotment of 3,000 tickets. An overflow crowd of nearly 47,000 packed the stadium on January 1 for what one sportswriter described as "a hell of a game."

Paced by Doak Walker, SMU took an early lead, but Penn State rallied to tie the score at 13-13 on a third-quarter touchdown by Wallace Triplett. The game ended in a deadlock when a deflected last-second pass dramatically slipped off Dennis Hoggard's fingertips in the SMU end zone. The tremendous enthusiasm generated by the contest aided the Cotton Bowl in another area. Bowl officials had already planned to float a bond issue in order to expand the stadium's seating capacity, and the 1948 game's success made sale of the securities an easy task. By the time of the 1949 classic, the newly enlarged stadium now held just over 67,000 seats.<sup>15</sup>

Delighted with the game's tremendous success, the Cotton Bowl attempted to repeat this "milestone achievement" the following year when it invited another integrated team, the University of Oregon Ducks, to participate in the 1949 contest. The popular SMU Mustangs, ranked ninth in the nation, returned as the Southwest Conference champion, guaranteeing a large crowd. Moreover, the selection of SMU halfback Doak Walker for the Heisman Trophy, awarded annually to the top college player, fueled even greater interest in the match. The first team from the Pacific Coast Conference to visit the Cotton Bowl, Oregon had finished the season with a 9-1 record, a share of the league championship, and the number ten national ranking. However, the Ducks had been unexpectedly passed over in favor of the University of California for the conference's Rose Bowl slot. Paced by flashy quarterback Norm Van Brocklin, the Oregon squad contained three African American players, including starting halfback Woodley Lewis. Declining accommodations at the Naval Air Station, the visitors from the Pacific Northwest instead selected a downtown hotel. The three black players were housed separately at the private homes of prominent black Dallas residents but joined their teammates at the hotel for most of their meals. The bowl's reception committee included several African Americans, an interracial step bold for its day. The game itself provided exciting, hard-hitting play and was free of racial incidents. An overflow crowd of 70,000 applauded the action as the Mustangs posted a thrilling 21-13 victory. Clearly the Cotton Bowl and SMU had followed a policy of racial moderation, at a time and in a city where such flexibility was uncommon, and local politicians had not attempted to interfere. The gamble paid off handsomely, as the Cotton Bowl profited enormously from the two consecutive outstanding pairings. Although race relations in Dallas were conservative and paternalistic, bowl officials and city fathers understood the financial and public relations benefits that their city could gain from flexibility in athletic scheduling. The Cotton Bowl's willingness to breach the color line for one day each year also gave it a competitive advantage over the Sugar Bowl and Orange Bowl in recruiting top-ranked nonsouthern teams, since these two competitors retained their policies of racial exclusion.<sup>16</sup>

In El Paso, the Sun Bowl also directly confronted the problem of segregation in the late 1940s, but with less success than the Cotton Bowl. The Southwestern Sun Carnival Association, which had been formed in 1934 by members of several local service clubs, sponsored the annual event. During the 1940s, the Sun Bowl pitted the champion of the Border Conference against a strong challenger, usually



from a western conference. Although the Sun Bowl was located in far West Texas, it historically followed the prevailing southern and Texas custom of excluding black players. Since the game's venue was Kidd Field, on the campus of the Texas College of Mines and Metallurgy (later known as Texas Western College and now as the University of Texas at El Paso), which was a branch of the University of Texas at Austin, the bowl adhered to the University of Texas Board of Regents' standing policy against interracial athletic contests. This policy had come under fire in November 1947, when halfback Morrison "Dit" Warren of Arizona State College had been barred from a Border Conference match in El Paso. Arizona State officials and fans denounced the policy, as did many El Pasoans. Miner head coach Jack Curtice publicly noted that no one had "objected when we played against several Negroes in Tempe last year," and a campus poll at the College of Mines revealed that an overwhelming majority of students opposed the racial ban.<sup>17</sup>

The team selection process for the January 1, 1949, Sun Bowl produced an embarrassing incident that briefly focused national attention on the continued exclusion of black football players from most southern bowl games. Since Border Conference champion Texas Tech declined its invitation to serve as home team, the selection committee eventually offered the host spot to the College of Mines, the conference runner-up. After talking with several teams from the East, the committee then extended a formal invitation on November 20 to Lafayette College, which had just completed a successful 7-2 season. Because the Pennsylvania university had not participated in a bowl game since 1923, its students responded enthusiastically to the news.<sup>18</sup>

An unexpected racial problem soon threatened to disrupt the Sun Bowl's plans. After receiving the official invitation, Lafayette president Ralph C. Hutchison informed College of Mines administrators about the presence of halfback Dave Showell, an African American, on the squad. Although apologetic about the exclusion rule, the El Pasoans nonetheless emphasized that Showell could not play and that there was nothing that local people could do about the regents' exclusion policy. When Lafayette officials told Showell about the ban, the popular World War II veteran graciously urged his teammates to carry on and make the trip without him. This burden lifted from their consciences, both the team and the athletic council voted to accept the Sun Bowl invitation. But the proposal still needed formal approval by the college faculty.<sup>19</sup>

On Tuesday afternoon, November 23, the Lafayette faculty met and debated the issue. Opponents of the El Paso trip stressed the school's tradition against postseason play, missed class time by athletes and students returning from the game, low grades by many football players, and the racial ban. After much discussion, the assembled professors voted overwhelmingly to reject the bid. President Hutchison promptly informed Sun Bowl officials of the negative faculty decision. He later claimed that he did not specifically cite the racial issue in his explanation to the El Pasoans, because he did not want to appear ungrateful for the invitation.<sup>20</sup>

Hutchison's announcement immediately sent the Sun Bowl selection committee into a frantic search for a replacement team and touched off the previously discussed series of demonstrations by Lafayette students. In interviews after the student protests, Hutchison carefully avoided mentioning any faculty concerns other than the racial issue. For their part, Sun Bowl officials desperately attempted to divert attention away from the regents' policy against interracial games and back to Lafayette's alleged indecisiveness.<sup>21</sup> The resulting national publicity about the incident created a public relations fiasco for the Sun Bowl. At the College of Mines, the student newspaper reported that most of the school's football players and students opposed the racial ban and were embarrassed by the affair. Many influential El Pasoans were also upset over the negative publicity that their city had received and resented the fact that the ultimate decision about who could play at Kidd Field remained in the hands of University of Texas regents, not local people. On November 24, West Virginia University agreed to play in the Sun Bowl as Lafayette's replacement, and eventually the controversy subsided.<sup>22</sup>

Two years later, however, another embarrassing incident over racial policies at Kidd Field further alarmed Sun Bowl officials and El Paso residents. After the 1950 fall season had begun, Loyola University of Los Angeles suddenly canceled its scheduled September 30 game against the Texas Western College Miners because local officials had barred African American halfback Bill English from the match. Although TWC administrators blamed Loyola for reneging on an alleged "gentlemen's agreement" not to bring English, most El Pasoans instead directed their criticism at the racial ban. The directors of the Sun Carnival Association, the city council, and several civic organizations adopted resolutions urging the board of regents to repeal the rule, warning that the current policy endangered the future of the Sun Bowl and Texas Western athletics. One month later, at their regular October meeting, the regents voted 6-3 to repeal the exclusion policy specifically for Kidd Field, but they retained the general rule for all other state university facilities. This modification greatly relieved the Sun Bowl's sponsors, since it now freed them to select teams from a much larger national pool. Just over a year later, the bowl invited its first integrated team, the College of the Pacific from Stockton, California. On January 1, 1952, Pacific halfback Eddie Macon became the first African American to play in the Sun Bowl when he took the field against host Texas Tech.<sup>23</sup>

The Orange Bowl classic in Miami experienced similar problems during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Since the Orange Bowl Stadium was owned by the city of Miami, the Orange Bowl Committee lacked the power to unilaterally set its own racial policies. Traditionally, all athletic competition in Florida had been segregated. Moreover, in the late 1940s, the State Board of Control adopted a formal policy specifically prohibiting all public colleges from hosting integrated home games. Despite a thriving tourist industry aimed at northern visitors, both Miami and sister city Miami Beach, located to the east across the bay, were very much southern cities with extensive segregation. The Orange Bowl Stadium, unlike most southern facilities, even lacked a segregated all-black spectator section until 1950, when it added one behind the east end zone. Florida's athletic color

line first gained national exposure in the fall of 1946, when Penn State and the University of Miami canceled their scheduled intersectional football match at the Orange Bowl Stadium because of the racial ban. Embarrassed by the ensuing negative publicity, many Miami students criticized city officials and school administrators over the policy. Praising the student outcry, the sports editor of the college newspaper wrote that it had been most “heartening to note that a violation of one of the basic principles for which this last war was fought and for which over 250,000 Americans gave their lives, has caused a positive sentiment to sweep the campus.” In January 1947 the local racial ban received additional national publicity when Duquesne University canceled an outdoor basketball game in the stadium against Miami. Duquesne decided not to make the trip south when it received confirmation that Charles Cooper, the college’s black star, would not be allowed to play. Several other intersectional football and basketball games were canceled across the state in the late 1940s and early 1950s for similar reasons.<sup>24</sup> In a pivotal 1950 decision, however, the Miami *city* government reversed its position and permitted the *private* University of Miami to host the University of Iowa football team at the stadium. The Iowa traveling squad included five African American players, all of whom saw action in the Hawkeyes’ loss to the Hurricanes.<sup>25</sup>

The Orange Bowl Committee successfully ducked the racial issue for several years by selecting all-white teams. Whether this invitational pattern represented a deliberate policy of avoiding integrated squads or merely reflected random chance (since several prominent northern teams lacked black players) is unclear. Nonetheless, ambitious bowl officials eventually adopted a color-blind policy when a major opportunity to enhance the bowl’s national stature appeared. In November 1953 the festival pulled off a major coup when it signed an agreement with the Big Seven (later the Big Eight) Conference and the Atlantic Coast Conference to match their champions annually in Miami. Since all of the Big Seven schools except for Oklahoma and Missouri had recently begun to recruit African Americans for their football teams, the new contract guaranteed that most future Orange Bowl games would be integrated. This new line up also brought the festival its first national television contract, another important milestone. Clearly then, the Orange Bowl Committee and the city government had jettisoned Jim Crow in order to elevate the bowl’s national status and increase its financial strength. The city’s expanding tourist industry and growing northern-born population may have aided this pragmatic decision. But Miami civic leaders acted without statewide support, as the rest of Florida firmly retained the traditional policy of exclusion.<sup>26</sup>

The Orange Bowl’s first integrated game took place on January 1, 1955. In the second match of the new ACC-Big Seven series, the Nebraska Cornhuskers used two black players during their 34-7 loss to Duke. The local press did not take any special note of this racial milestone, perhaps to avoid stirring up segregationists around the state. Integrated games subsequently became the norm for the Orange Bowl in its city-owned stadium, while the University of Florida, Florida State University, other state colleges, and Florida high schools continued



Bobby Grier was a standout defensive back and fullback for John Michelssen's Pitt team in the mid-1950s. Photo courtesy of Sports Information, University of Pittsburgh

to prohibit mixed competition at their state-regulated facilities well into the 1960s. This loyalty to Jim Crow made scheduling additional intersectional games increasingly difficult. For example, in November 1958 the University of Buffalo rejected an invitation to play in the Tangerine Bowl in Orlando because of racial restrictions. Even though bowl officials were willing to host an integrated football match, the local school district, which owned the

city's major stadium, refused to waive its ban against African American players.<sup>27</sup>

The Sugar Bowl in New Orleans experienced far more political interference from segregationist politicians than did all three of its major southern competitors combined. Local custom dictated that seating and other facilities at Tulane University Stadium, the game's annual site, be strictly segregated. By the late 1940s, Sugar Bowl tickets even stated that "this ticket is issued for a person of the Caucasian race" and warned that any other person using it could be ejected from the stadium. In the early 1950s, northern journalists began to criticize this seating policy. Even though not all northern colleges had African Americans on their team rosters, black students usually participated in marching bands and in fan delegations traveling to the games, thus creating a new source of potential conflict. In response to these complications, the Mid-Winter Sports Association quietly modified its guidelines for the January 1955 match, allowing unrestricted seating in the visitors section while maintaining the traditional Jim Crow area for black fans in one end zone. This compromise allowed the U.S. Naval Academy, a recent convert to racial egalitarianism, and its integrated midshipman corps to participate in the 1955 New Year's Day classic against Ole Miss.<sup>28</sup>

The U.S. Supreme Court's *Brown v. Board of Education* decision declaring segregated public schools to be unconstitutional, announced in May 1954 and

reaffirmed one year later, ignited an explosion of southern white resistance. This political crusade greatly complicated the Sugar Bowl's operations. For embattled segregationists, maintaining racial purity in athletics now became a crucial battle in the larger war to defend the entire Jim Crow system. Alabama judge Hugh Locke, who in 1954 led a successful campaign to restore a Birmingham municipal ordinance barring interracial football and baseball games, voiced the extreme segregationist position when he warned ominously that "allowing a few Negroes to play baseball here will wind up with Negroes and whites marrying." Across the Deep South and also in Virginia, state legislators and political leaders eventually embarked on a sweeping campaign of "massive resistance" to federally mandated desegregation. According to one historian of the modern South, "Legislatures in the former Confederate states enacted some 450 segregationist laws and resolutions" during the ten years following the *Brown* ruling. This southern white backlash against racial change ran directly counter to the increasingly flexible athletic policies being implemented by southern bowl games and a few white southern universities.<sup>29</sup>

Sugar Bowl directors unintentionally crashed headlong into this tidal wave of massive resistance in late 1955 when they took the daring step of inviting an integrated University of Pittsburgh team to play Georgia Tech in the January 1, 1956, match. With the regular season champions of the ACC, the Big Seven, and the Southwest Conference all bound contractually to rival New Year's Day contests, the Sugar Bowl found it increasingly difficult to secure an attractive match up for its game. Its task became even more difficult if it excluded integrated northern teams. Even though the Pitt squad included only one African American, fullback Bobby Grier, his solitary presence was sufficient to alarm rabid segregationists in both Georgia and Louisiana. Before Georgia Tech administrators accepted the bid, they prudently verified that key university boosters and Governor Marvin Griffin had no objections. But on Friday, December 2, 1955, after receiving complaints from influential segregationists, Governor Griffin unexpectedly reversed course and urged the board of regents of the university system to prohibit Tech's trip. In apocalyptic language, the governor warned:

The South stands at Armageddon. The battle is joined. We cannot make the slightest concession to the enemy in this dark and lamentable hour of struggle. There is no more difference in compromising the integrity of race on the playing field than in doing so in the classroom. One break in the dike and the relentless seas will rush in and destroy us.<sup>30</sup>

Griffin's dramatic shift outraged Georgia Tech students. That evening hundreds of young men gathered on the Tech campus, eventually burning Griffin in effigy. As more students and sympathetic residents joined their ranks, the crowd decided to march downtown to the state capitol. Eventually a mob of about 2,000 people assembled at the capitol building, where they hanged another effigy of the governor and damaged a few doors and trash cans. Still not satisfied, part of the group then marched to the governor's mansion, where two dozen law enforcement vehicles and a phalanx of policemen greeted them. After voicing

their complaints to reporters, the protesters peacefully dispersed and headed home in the early morning hours. The following Monday, the state board of regents met and debated Georgia Tech's Sugar Bowl invitation. Despite considerable pressure from the governor and militant segregationists, the regents approved the trip. However, the board did adopt formal guidelines requiring state colleges to honor Georgia's customs and traditions in all future home games.<sup>31</sup>

The so-called Tech riot and the larger political controversy over the Yellow Jackets' trip focused unusually heavy attention on the Sugar Bowl. In order to avoid patronizing segregated hotels in downtown New Orleans, Pitt established its team headquarters uptown at Tulane University, where it also held practices. Bowl officials again modified seating policies in the stadium for the visitors section, and increased attendance by black fans helped make the game a sellout. In a somewhat dull contest, Georgia Tech won a narrow 7-0 victory, with its lone touchdown being set up by a questionable pass interference call against Bobby Grier. That evening Grier broke another racial barrier by attending the awards banquet at a downtown hotel, mingling easily with several Georgia Tech players.



Irate Georgia Tech students hanged Governor Griffin in effigy and later staged a near riot downtown after Griffin tried to prevent the 1955 Yellow Jacket football team from playing in the Sugar Bowl against an integrated Pittsburgh squad. Photo courtesy of Georgia Tech Archives.

However, he skipped the formal dance afterwards and instead attended a special party at historically black Dillard University.<sup>32</sup>

Militant segregationists in the Georgia state assembly and the Louisiana legislature refused to accept this abandonment of racial exclusion. Members of both political bodies viewed integrated athletic competition as an opening wedge for further desegregation, and both were determined to do everything possible to protect the now endangered Jim Crow system. The Georgia assembly responded with a flood of new laws reinforcing segregation, especially in the public schools. In early 1956 and again in early 1957, state legislators also debated, but narrowly failed to approve, a bill that would have outlawed all athletic competition between blacks and whites. Louisiana segregationists were more successful than their cracker cousins. In July 1956, as part of a wave of regressive legislation designed to forestall desegregation in the state, the legislature adopted bills that prohibited interracial sporting contests and required segregated seating at all public events. Despite pleas from Sugar Bowl officials that these measures would no doubt "seriously damage our sports program," Governor Earl Long reluctantly signed the bills into law. A few weeks later, though, a Long supporter privately offered financial assistance to the New Orleans NAACP if it would initiate a legal challenge to the sports ban, but the civil rights group responded that the governor should stand up for his convictions and file his own suit.<sup>33</sup>

The new Louisiana laws resegregated the Sugar Bowl and made it virtually impossible to attract nonsouthern teams to the New Year's Day game or any of the associated athletic events. Immediately after the legislature's action, three northern basketball squads pulled out of the December 1956 Sugar Bowl basketball tournament. Both the football game and the basketball tournament subsequently became regional events exclusively between all-white southern teams, thereby reducing their national visibility. Northern schools also canceled nearly a dozen scheduled football and basketball games with Louisiana colleges over the next two years. In 1958 a federal district court invalidated the sports segregation law, an action that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in May 1959. This decision did not greatly aid the Sugar Bowl, however, since the segregated seating law remained intact and northern universities maintained their boycott. Finally, in January 1964, the Supreme Court struck down this law as well. With this racial burden now lifted from its back, the Sugar Bowl resumed a nondiscriminatory invitational policy and convinced Syracuse University, whose squad included eight African Americans, to play LSU in the 1965 match. The Syracuse invitation produced no public outcry, except for one complaint to Louisiana State University by the Southern Louisiana Citizens Council. After expressing its "sincere concern" over the school's decision to meet an integrated team, the Citizens Council warned that "LSU owes its greatness, academically and athletically, to its Anglo-Saxon heritage." The ensuing January 1, 1965, Sugar Bowl contest between Syracuse and LSU marked the end of "southern exceptionalism" concerning racial policy for bowl games and offered further proof that the high tide of racial resistance in the Deep South had now ebbed. Nonetheless, it still took the New Orleans classic

several years to fully erase its previous stigma and reestablish strong television ratings.<sup>34</sup>

Racial controversy concerning the Sugar Bowl reappeared unexpectedly in the 1970s. These new incidents expanded the issue of racial exclusion far beyond the physical boundaries of the playing field. Just before the 1972 contest, African-American players from the University of Oklahoma complained that only one black woman had been invited to any of the major social events held for the squad. In the fall of 1973, a New Orleans civil rights coalition threatened to picket the upcoming contest unless the Mid-Winter Sports Association appointed several African Americans as associate members of the group. In December, after extended negotiations, the organization named six prominent black civic leaders, including future mayor Ernest N. Morial, as its first nonwhite associate members, finally extending the principle of racial inclusion to its own ranks. Despite this concession, civil rights activists continued throughout the decade to press the Sports Association for greater black representation in its membership.<sup>35</sup>

During their early years, southern bowl games clearly reflected prevailing white racial values in the Deep South. To grant equality on the playing field, even if only for three hours, represented an unacceptable symbolic action because it suggested the possibility of equality in other areas of southern life. After 1945, however, as part of the crucial shift in racial values unleashed by World War II, northern universities gradually adopted an athletic policy of democratic egalitarianism. Confronted with a new firmness by these colleges, southern bowls began to waver in their loyalty to Jim Crow, fearing that they might lose the appeal and profits of attractive intersectional match ups if they did not modify their policies. Since the principal sponsors of these bowl games were urban businessmen and civic leaders interested in attracting favorable national publicity and increased tourism to their communities, they tended to be pragmatic moderates on racial policy, rather than rigid ideologues. Eventually they came to view the abandonment of traditional racial exclusion as a necessary concession to new national standards. The resulting integrated games began to acclimate some white southerners to black and white cooperation in one important aspect of social life. Thus, integrated bowl contests provided an important precedent for additional desegregation and reflected a modest liberalization in southern race relations.

The southern white response to the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling brought this emerging trend to a sudden halt. During the ensuing period of 'massive resistance,' militant segregationists attacked all deviations from ideological purity in order to shore up the collapsing Jim Crow order. Postulating a racial "domino theory," they feared that integrated athletic events would serve as an opening wedge for more sweeping changes in southern race relations. This conservative counterattack interfered with intersectional competition at Deep South universities from Louisiana to South Carolina for up to a decade or longer. Yet, because their host cities were located literally and culturally on the margins of the South, the Sun Bowl and the Orange Bowl remained unaffected by the segregationist counterattack. In Dallas, interracial athletic competition had



become so deeply ingrained that the substantial local resistance to public school integration did not interfere with the Cotton Bowl's activities. But, because it was located in Louisiana, one of the most recalcitrant Deep South states, the Sugar Bowl was seriously harmed by this white resistance well into the 1960s.

By 1964, however, even the Sugar Bowl had finally joined the other major southern bowls in adopting inclusive racial policies based on national, as opposed to regional, values. This successful transition from segregated to integrated competition represented a form of sectional reconciliation in athletics that indicated that the high tide of southern white resistance to racial change had ebbed. Yet it should be noted that, despite the widespread acceptance of integrated bowl games by the mid-1950s outside of Louisiana, most southern white universities did not rush to host integrated football matches on campus at that time or to recruit African American athletes for their own squads. In fact, many colleges still refused to accept black undergraduates, thereby revealing the limitations of this racial liberalization. Nonetheless, the triumph of pragmatism and self-interest that integrated bowl games reflected a strong desire by most white Southerners to participate fully in the national sporting culture, rather than maintain an extreme regional identity and risk further marginalization and isolation. Thus, each year on the sacred day of January 1, if not necessarily on the other 364 days, Dixie had become "Americanized."

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1. *New York Times*, November 24, 1948, 27. The team had earlier voted to accept the invitation, after Showell told them he would not object to sitting out the game.
  2. *Ibid.*; *Lafayette* (Lafayette College), December 3, 1948; *El Paso Times*, November 23, 24, 26, 1948; *El Paso Herald-Post*, November 23-24, 1948; *New York Times*, November 24, 1948, 27. The student telegram to the White House read: "Denied Sun Bowl game because we have a Negro on our team. Is this democracy?"
  3. Historically black colleges also staged special postseason matches, the best known of which was the Orange Blossom Classic. Begun in 1933, the game was held at various Florida cities over the years and matched Florida A&M against a top-ranked black college team. Benjamin G. Rader, *American Sports*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1990), 182-188; Anthony C. DiMarco, *The Big Bowl Football Guide*, rev. ed. (New York: Putnam, 1976), 6-7.
  4. For an overview of racial policies in southern college sports, see Charles H. Martin, "Racial Exclusion and Intersectional Rivalries: The Rise and Fall of the Gentlemen's Agreement in Big-Time College Football." Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association, New Orleans, La., November 1995.
  5. One California sportswriter joked about the relatively unknown Pennsylvania squad, "All I know about Washington and Jefferson is that they are both dead." DiMarco, *The Big Bowl Football Guide*, 1-3; Joe Hendrickson, *Tournament of Roses: The First 100 Years* (Los Angeles: Knapp Press, 1989), 1-42; John M. Carroll, *Fritz Pollard: Pioneer in Racial Advancement* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 79-90.
  6. DiMarco, *The Big Bowl Guide*, 3-4; Carlton Stowers, *The Cotton Bowl Classic: The First Fifty Years* (Dallas: Host Communications, 1986), 7-16; Loran Smith, *Fifty Years on the Fifty: The Orange Bowl Story* (Charlotte, N.C.: East Woods Press, 1983), 3-10.
  7. Stowers, *The Cotton Bowl Classic*, 10-11; Smith, *Fifty Years on the Fifty*, 5.
  8. Despite Montgomery's absence, there still were sectional overtones to the 1940 match.

- At the pregame coin flip, one Boston College captain joked, "Let's not have any North-South bitterness. Remember, when your grandfathers were fighting Yankees, our grandfathers were in Poland and Czechoslovakia." *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 23, 30, 1939; Glen Stout, "Jim Crow, Halfback" *Boston Magazine*, December 1987, 124-131; Wright Bryan, *Clemson: An Informal History of the University 1889-1979* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1988), 207.
9. *New York Times*, November 27, 1947, 51; *Daily Collegian* (Pennsylvania State University), November 25, 1947; *Pittsburgh Courier*, October 18, December 13, 1947; *Dallas Morning News*, November 24, 26-27, 1947.
  10. *Centre (Pa.) Daily Times*, November 6, 1946; *New York Times*, November 6, 1946, 33.
  11. The university did permit a popular distance runner on the track team to compete as an individual in the Sugar Bowl track meet, prompting complaints on campus that the school was being inconsistent on its racial policy. *New York Times*, November 6, 1946, 33; *Daily Collegian* (Pennsylvania State University), November 1, 6, 1946, July 29, September 26, November 25, December 10, 16, 19, 1947, January 9, 1948; *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 13, 1947.
  12. *Dallas Times Herald*, November 25, 27, December 9, 1947; *Dallas Morning News*, November 27, December 21, 1947.
  13. Several of the Penn State players, mostly ex-servicemen, later complained about being housed on a military post, but their irritation was aimed more at the lack of evening entertainment, coach Bob Higgins's rigorous training schedule, and military food than at their black teammates for causing the housing problem. *New York Times*, November 27, 1947, 51; *Dallas Morning News*, December 21, 24, 1947, January 6, 1948; author's telephone interview with Felix R. McKnight, April 23, 1996; *Daily Collegian* (Pennsylvania State University), January 6-7, 1948; Rich Donnell, *The Hig, Penn State's Gridiron Legacy* (Montgomery, Ala.: Owl Bay Press, 1994), 186-87, 201-202.
  14. *Dallas Morning News*, December 1-31, 1947, January 1, 1948; *Dallas Times Herald*, December 1-31, 1947; *Dallas Express*, January 10, 1948; *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 13, 1947, January 3, 10, 1948; McKnight interview; *Christian Science Monitor*, quoted in *Centre (Pa.) Daily Times*, n.d., 1948.
  15. The individual team payout was \$66,453. *Dallas Morning News*, January 2, 6, 1948; *Dallas Express*, January 10, 1948; *Pittsburgh Courier*, January 3, 10, 1948; Lee Cruse, *The Cotton Bowl* (Dallas: Debka Publishers, 1963), 36-39; Stowers, *The Cotton Bowl Classic*, 77-78; McKnight interview; Ridge Riley, *Road to Number One: A Personal Chronicle of Penn State Football* (New York Doubleday, 1977), 305.
  16. *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 4, 11, 1948; *Dallas Express*, December 11, 25, 1948, January 8, 1949; Cruse, *The Cotton Bowl*, 39-41.
  17. 1983 Sun Bowl Program, 44-47; *Prospector* (College of Mines), November 1, 8, 1947; *El Paso Times*, November 4, 1947.
  18. *Prospector* (College of Mines), November 20, 1948; *El Paso Times*, November 16, 19, 1948.
  19. The *Pittsburgh Courier* reported a rumor that state officials in Austin were worried that permitting an integrated football game in El Paso might undermine the university's defense against a pending lawsuit brought by the NAACP and plaintiff Heman Sweatt, which sought to integrate the University of Texas School of Law. *El Paso Times*, November 22, 1948; *El Paso Herald-Post*, November 22, 23, 1948; *Pittsburgh Courier*, January 1, 1949.
  20. Faculty Minutes, November 23, 1948, Statement by the President, November 24, 1948, in College Archives, Skillman Library, Lafayette College; *El Paso Times*, November 24, 1948; *El Paso Herald-Post*, November 24, 1948.
  21. *New York Times*, November 24, 1948, 27; *Lafayette* (Lafayette College), December 3, 1948; Albert W. Gendebien, *The Biography of a College* (Easton, Pa.: Lafayette College, 1986), 234-235.

22. C.D. Belding, of the selection committee, accused Lafayette officials of attempting "to saddle me with the blame by trumping up this racial discrimination story" and claimed that Lafayette's original decision had been based primarily on nonracial factors. *El Paso Herald-Post*, November 24, 1948; *Prospector* (College of Mines), December 4, 1948.
23. Writer Larry Ring later recalled Texas Tech partisans yelling "kill that black ape" and other racial slurs at Macon early in the game but later applauding his excellent play. *Prospector* (Texas Western College), September 30, October 28, 1950; *El Paso Herald-Post*, September 29, October 11, 12, 28, 1950, December 26, 1951, January 2, 1952; *Oklahoma City Black Dispatch*, November 11, 1950; *El Paso Times*, September 30, October 28, 1950; Larry L. Ring, *Confessions of a White Racist* (New York Viking, 1971), 68.
24. Two University of Miami government professors, both World War II veterans, also publicly criticized the Penn State cancellation, asserting that the action was "contrary to the American tradition of democracy in education, and a perversion of the spirit of sport." *Hurricane* (University of Miami), November 8, 15, 22, 1946, January 9, 1947, December 8, 1950; *New York Times*, November 6, 1946, 33, January 10, 1947, 26, November 25, 1947, 41; Charlton W. Tebeau, *The University of Miami: A Golden Anniversary History, 1926-1976* (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1976), 176-178, 236; telephone interviews with Howard Kleinberg, August 18, 23, 1997; Howard Kleinberg to Author, August 29, 1997.
25. An editorial in the Miami student newspaper reported that the black players' participation took place "with a minimum of fanfare," adding that the contest "was a big, big step in the right direction." *New York Times*, October 18, 1951, 39; *Pittsburgh Courier*, November 25, 1950, January 20, October 20, 1951; *Daily Iowan* (University of Iowa), November 25, 1950, *Hurricane* (University of Miami), December 1, 1950. The five black Hawkeyes later reported that they did not experience any racial problems with Miami players or residents, but they were required to stay at a separate hotel.
26. Smith, *Fifty Years on the Fifty*, 83, 231; Bruce A. Corrie, *The Atlantic Coast Conference* (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1978), 49-50, Howard Kleinberg to Author, August 27, 1997.
27. The Gator Bowl, founded in 1946 in Jacksonville, did not host an integrated game until 1961. FSU's first integrated home game finally took place in 1964 against New Mexico State. A.S. "Doc" Young, *Negro Firsts in Sports* (Chicago: Johnson Publishing, 1963), 254, *El Paso Times*, January 2, 1955; *New York Times*, November 29, 1958, 22; Vaughn Mancha to Author, January 31, 1995; Smith, *Fifty Years on the Fifty*, 91, 178-179.
28. By the mid-1950s, the service academies had finally become sensitive to racial discrimination against any of their cadets, whether as competitors or spectators. *New Orleans Times-Picayune*, January 1, 1984; *Atlanta Daily World*, January 8, 1955; *Pittsburgh Courier*, January 15, 1949; *Miami Herald*, December 24, 1954.
29. William Warren Rogers, Robert David Ward, Leah Rawls Atkins, and Wayne Flynt, *Alabama: The History of a Deep South State* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1994), 539; Numan V. Bartley, *The New South, 1945-1980* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 187-260.
30. *Atlanta Constitution*, December 1, 3, 1955; "Tempest O'er the Sugar Bowl," *Tech Alumnus*, December 1955, 8; *Atlanta Daily World*, December 1, 1955.
31. *Atlanta Journal*, December 3, 5-6, 1955; *Atlanta Daily World*, December 7, 1955; *Atlanta Constitution*, December 3-6, 1955; Robert C. McMath, Jr., et al., *Engineering the New South: Georgia Tech, 1885-1995* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1985), 283.
32. *Atlanta Constitution*, January 5, 1956; *Atlanta Daily World*, January 3, 1956; *Pittsburgh Courier*, December 10, 1955; *New York Times*, January 3, 1956, 33; author's telephone interview with Bobby Grier, June 23, 1994.
33. *Atlanta Constitution*, February 15-23, 1957; Charles H. Martin, "Racial Change and Big-Time College Football in Georgia: The Age of Segregation, 1892-1957," *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 80 (Fall 1996): 532-562; *New York Times*, July 17, 1956, 13, October

- 16, 1956, 14; *New Orleans Times-Picayune*, January 1, 1984; Adam Fairclough, *Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 205-206, 232-233.
34. The *New York Times* strongly endorsed the 1959 Supreme Court ruling and suggested that expanded interracial contact through athletics would bring increased racial tolerance. The newspaper contended that "there has been no one channel of understanding that has been better than that of sport." *New York Times*, October 16, 1956, 14, November 29, 1958, 22, May 26, 1959, 1, January 7, 1964, 20; DiMarco, *The Big Bowl Football Guide*, 60-63; *New Orleans Times-picayune*, January 1, 1984; *Red and Black* (University of Georgia), November 15, 1956; Fairclough, *Race and Democracy*, 219, 335-336; 1985 Sugar Bowl Media Guide; Ken Rapport, *The Syracuse Football Story* (Huntsville, Ala.: Strode Publishers, 1975), 254-256.
  35. The Orange Bowl Committee eventually broadened its membership after receiving public complaints that it was not representative of the area's diverse population. *New Orleans Times-Picayune*, January 1, 1984; Fairclough, *Race and Democracy*, 219, 335-336; *Los Angeles Times*, December 23, 1973, *New Orleans States-Item*, December 26, 31, 1973, in Amistad Collection, Tulane University, New Orleans, La.; Howard Kleinberg to Author, August 27, 1997.