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Infra-humanization: The Wall of Group Differences

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Infra-humanizing outgroups involves considering outgroups less human and more animal-like than the ingroup, which is perceived, in essence, as fully human. In this article, the first section presents the theoretical background of infra-humanization and distinguishes it from related concepts, such as dehumanization. The three basic hypotheses of the theory are then presented with a summary of empirical evidence. Social implications follow. Reasons for the pervasiveness of the phenomenon are examined as well as conditions that lead a specific outgroup to be infra-humanized. We also explore the consequences of infra-humanization, such as a lack of forgiveness for the outgroup and the ingroup's justification for past misdeeds against the outgroup, rather than guilt. Policy issues center on ways to combat essentialism, walls of difference between groups, and irrational symbols of superiority. The roles of egalitarian values and of deprovincialized intergroup contact are emphasized.

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> "Each race possesses a mental constitution as stable as its anatomical constitution. That the former has a link with a given particular structure of the brain does not seem at all dubious .... Superior races differ from inferior races by the character as well as by the intelligence, but it is especially the character that distinguishes between superior peoples .... The character is formed by a combination, in various proportions, of several elements usually designated nowadays by psychologists under the name of *sentiments*."
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> Gustave Lebon, *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples*, Paris: Alcan, 1895, p. 17

In the middle of the 1990s, 10 Belgian soldiers died in Rwanda. For weeks, months, and years, Belgian television has devoted hours of program, interviewing the families, accompanying them where the tragic event took place, being present at different anniversaries, celebrating monuments, and other similar activities. These soldiers were part of the UN forces and were killed during the genocide in Rwanda, in 1994. Belgian television also reported on this genocide, but, counting the number of hours covering the two events, there was no comparison with the killing of the soldiers. For Belgians, 10 Belgian soldiers are apparently worth more than one million Africans.

Why this difference of reactions? Many factors are likely involved. This article offers one general explanation, called infra-humanization. This phenomenon has subtle but substantial behavioral consequences in everyday life that may undermine harmonious relationships between groups. Infra-humanization is a process by which people consider their ingroup as fully human and outgroups as less human and more animal-like (Leyens et al., 2000).

Several characteristics of infra-humanization make its social implications particularly important. First, because intergroup conflict is not a necessary condition, and because the status of groups does not matter, infra-humanization is a widespread phenomenon (Demoulin et al., 2005). Second, because people are often unaware of their reactions associated with infra-humanization, it may be difficult to change them (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, in press; Paladino et al., 2002). Third, people often live in environments that reinforce infra-humanization (Cortes, Collange, Demoulin, de Renesse, & Leyens, 2006). These three facets of infra-humanization point to numerous implications. If I am a member of the outgroup, how can I avoid being infra-humanized? If I belong to the ingroup, how can I prevent a process that provides me with plenty of reinforcements? If we both infra-humanize our respective outgroups, how can we trust each other (Demoulin, Cortes, & Leyens, in press)?

The first part of this article is devoted to the theoretical basis of infra-humanization and to its main empirical findings. After having defined infra-humanization in relation to other concepts and presented the principal theoretical hypotheses, we summarize the empirical evidence supporting the infra-humanization model. In the second section of the article, we go beyond the test of the model to examine several of its social implications. Data about possible consequences of infra-humanization are presented. Finally, different

components of the model and recursive implications are discussed in terms of policy issues.

Theoretical and Empirical Background

The model of infra-humanization hypothesizes that degrees of humanity differ with group membership. Humanity or humanness may be approached differently. In the first part of this section, we describe the core of the infra-humanization model and its main hypotheses (see Demoulin et al., 2004b; Leyens et al., 2003) to contrast them with different views (e.g., Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Bain, Loughnan, & Kashima, in press). The second part of the section reviews results concerning the main hypotheses derived from the model.

Theoretical Considerations: The Infra-humanization Model

People are experts at breaking down humanity into social categories, which helps them feel that they understand their environment (Leyens, 1983). The boundaries that define different social categories are often arbitrary. Such an assertion means that social consensus may change; for example, a group's definition, border, composition, and legal status may change over time. A cursory look at "groups" over history and geography shows that they are continually changing. The most obvious examples are "nations." Less than a century ago, Germany, Belgium, and Palestine, for instance, were not what they presently are.

Although groups are frequently constructed arbitrarily, people rarely recognize their arbitrary nature. Take the example of the construction of the European Community. Many people resist the umbrella of the European Union because they are afraid it will bring shame on their nation and its sovereignty (No flag! No hymn!). The greater the consensus, the greater is the impression that the group constitutes a timeless fact (Stott & Drury, 2004; Drury & Reicher, 2005) and becomes part of the self (Smith & Henry, 1996).

Ethnocentrism is the best example of the negation of experienced arbitrariness at the level of group membership. To be ethnocentric means that one's group is by definition superior on a variety of dimensions and that outgroups lack a number of important characteristics to be comparable to the ingroup. The very existence of ethnocentrism requires adherence to the idea that group differences constitute an important reality in everyday life. To illustrate ethnocentrism, political scientist Sumner (1906) and anthropologist Lévi-Strauss (1952/1987) have noted that many so-called primitive societies use anthroponyms (Mullen, Calogero, & Leader, 2007) for the name of their society, tribe, or clan calling themselves "the Humans," "the People," "the Men," whereas they reserve derogatory names, often of unappreciated animals, to neighboring clans or cultures. In other words,

"category members ... possess *essential* properties that bind them together" (Banks & Eberhardt, 1998, italics added).

The notion of "essence" is relatively new in psychology in general (Medin, 1989) and in social psychology in particular (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), contrary to other social sciences. Essentialism is the belief that people are what they are by substance as opposed by contingencies, which implies the conviction that there are discontinuities in humanity. To believe that essences explain differences between groups is therefore completely opposite to the idea of groups as social constructions. Countries are the result of historical accidents and may change; professions are likely to be reorganized; races were invented to justify domination; and religions take shape like gesticulating amebas. How can something arbitrary have an essence? Our point also makes clear that essence does not have to be considered only based in biology. Essences can refer to biology (e.g., Whites are not "colored" people); essence can also be based on language (e.g., French have the Genius of language) or religion (e.g., Jews are the people selected by God). Not only are groups typically invested by special essences—an absurdity considered racist by French sociologist Bourdieu (1980)—but also people are often unaware of their essentialist beliefs. What is an essence? Nevertheless, the "belief in essentialism is not disturbed by an inability to specify the exact nature of an essence .... Although the essence of a ... category is only vaguely understood, people may not be deterred from assuming it exists" (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992, pp. 18–19).

We elected to approach the topic of group relations from a broad perspective by investigating what should be common to all social groups: the "human essence." Moreover, because of the universality of ethnocentrism, we postulated that people would believe that outgroups are less human than they understand themselves to be: Outgroups would be seen as inferior to ingroups in terms of humanity (Leyens et al., 2000). This choice arose out of the question of the definition and operationalization of the "human essence." In his article, "The Uniquely Human in Human Nature," Kagan (2004) starts his essay by noting that one can describe an object in two ways. One can either describe it "by listing its features, as manufacturers do when they provide a description of the parts of an assembly-required crib; or by comparing the object with one of a related category, as parents do when they tell their child that a zebra has stripes but a horse does not. Most answers to the question, What is human nature? adopt this second strategy" (Kagan, 2004, p. 77). It is this comparative strategy that we embraced. We conceptualized the "human essence" as the *uniquely* human essence, that is, an essence possessing characteristics not shared with other species or other animals.

If people perceive their group as possessing more uniquely human characteristics than an outgroup, we say that the outgroup is infra-humanized. At the beginning of our research program, we resisted the frequent advice to speak of *dehumanization*. This latter term is much more common than the neologism

"infra-humanization," or "subhumanization," but from an etymological point of view it means something very different. We were interested to show that people are inclined to perceive members of outgroups as somewhat less human, or more animal-like, than themselves; such a view corresponds to the word infra-humanization (although we could also have used "subhumanization").

By contrast, dehumanization of an outgroup implies that its members are no longer humans at all. It is this complete deprivation of humanity that explains why dehumanization is often used in extreme cases such as in armed conflicts, when others are no longer humans, but vicious animals or dispensable objects (Bar-Tal, 1989; Staub, 1989). When there is dehumanization, there is "moral exclusion" (Opotow, 1990) in the sense that people are no longer protected by values such as morality; they may suffer anything from actors who do not have moral restraints. Our aim, however, was to show that something of much lesser magnitude could occur in everyday life. It is interesting to note that tribes that used anthroponyms ("The Humans") were not more aggressive toward their neighbors than were other societies with other names such as topographic ones ("Those near the river") (Mullen et al., 2007). Differences in humanity are not restricted to extreme cases that lead up to moral exclusion. Infra-humanization does not only diverge from dehumanization in terms of intensity, but also in qualitative nature.

Haslam (2006) agrees that differences in humanness do not necessarily require severe conflicts. He uses, however, the term dehumanization, probably by convenience, and distinguishes two kinds of it. He presents infra-humanization as *animalistic dehumanization* in the sense that people who are not "uniquely" human (e.g., cultivated) are close to animals. In our view, it is true that infra-humanization may consider others as somewhat less human or as somewhat more animal. However, he speaks of *mechanistic dehumanization,* or incomplete human nature, because people who are not "totally" human (e.g., curious) tend to be machine-like. Most interestingly, the correlations between the ratings of "uniquely" and "typically" human characteristics were always very low. The two dimensions are independent and give way to two different views of humankind. Infra-humanization strips outgroups of culture, civility, and higher moral functioning. Mechanistic dehumanization removes from individuals certain elements of their essential human nature, rendering them emotionally cold, inflexible, and passive. It is true that some people (e.g., sexy women; Vaes & Paladino, 2006) easily elicit animal metaphors, while others (e.g., bankers, see Fiske, Glick, Cuddy, & Xu, 2002) may provoke "robot-like" comparisons (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Haslam and colleagues (for a review, see Haslam et al., in press) found that people attribute to themselves a greater degree of human nature personality traits than to the average member of their ingroup (mechanistic dehumanization), for instance. This difference did not appear for uniquely human traits (infra-humanization), but that is perhaps not surprising given that infra-humanization is an intergroup

phenomenon, not an interpersonal one (Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, & Leyens, 2005; but see Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007).

Mechanistic dehumanization and infra-humanization undoubtedly complement each other. Haslam et al. (in press, pp. 6–7) observed, "The uniquely human sense reflects an Enlightenment view of humanness, in which acquired attributes of refinement and rationality are prominent. The human nature sense represents a more Romantic view, emphasizing untrammeled emotion, hidden depths, heart, vitality, and the humanity of children." Further research needs to be conducted, notably to verify whether different cultures adopt one view rather than the other in order to promote the image of their group.

Infra-humanization is not only different from dehumanization, in the sense of total absence of humanity, but it also is at variance with *ingroup love* and *outgroup hate* (Brewer, 1999). These latter two phenomena are distinct but frequently associated (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). Infra-humanization cannot be reduced to one of the two phenomena but, on the contrary, it is theorized as including both of them. Infra-humanization corresponds to a double movement. On the one hand, it contributes to pride for the ingroup and, on the other hand, it devalues the outgroup.

Having defined infra-humanization and developed its specificities relative to related concepts, we now describe its basic hypotheses (see Figure 1). First, there are certain characteristics that are uniquely human. This association is shown in the links B-C and B′-C′ of Figure 1. Second, the relation between uniquely human characteristics is assumed to be greater for the ingroups than for outgroups. In fact, uniquely human characteristics may be denied to outgroups that can be treated in an animal-like fashion (links A-B and A′-B′ of Figure 1). These two first hypotheses are based upon the postulate that the ingroup is experienced as fully human whereas it is not the case for outgroups. This postulate is tested by the links A-C and A′-C′ of Figure 1.



Fig. 1. Basic hypotheses underlying the infra-humanization model.

Empirical Evidence

In this section, we summarize the research conducted to test the different links of Figure 1. We describe the relevant findings in the order that the links were presented above.

Uniquely Human Characteristics (Links B-C and B′-C′)

To approach the humanity of groups' essence, we asked Spanish and French-speaking Belgians to rank-order all the characteristics that they considered uniquely human. The consensus was substantial. In the first place, students cited intelligence or a related word (e.g., reasoning). In the second place, they cited a word associated with language (e.g., communication) or the word "sentiment" (or an exemplar of it). Students almost never provided the word "emotions" (Leyens et al., 2000). The same results have been obtained with young Portuguese adolescents (Miranda & Gouveia-Pereira, 2006). We chose to concentrate on "sentiments" (uniquely human) versus "emotions" (nonuniquely human). Such a strategy was adopted for several reasons. First, factors such as intelligence (e.g., Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998) and language (e.g., Giles & Coupland, 1991) had already been studied in relation to discrimination, whereas only a few studies had tried to link emotions with prejudice (Mackie & Smith, 2002). Second, we wanted to investigate the distribution of human essence independently of sociostructural factors in societies. Given that ethnocentrism is not limited to a specific group status, we expected that all groups would demand humanity and judge outgroups as less human than themselves. Third, unlike intelligence and language, emotions are not strongly associated with norms of equity and equality that could activate social desirability concerns (Gaertner & Insko, 2001). Finally, the distinction between "sentiments" and "emotions" provided us, in a very subtle way, with "experimental" and "control" stimuli.

In Latin languages, "sentiments" and "emotions" have distinct meanings, which they have to a lesser degree in other languages (e.g., German) or do not have at all in still other languages (e.g., English). To explore the nature of the distinction between sentiments and emotions, a cross-cultural study (Demoulin et al., 2004a) was conducted with students who spoke one of four different languages: English, Flemish, French, and Spanish. These participants received a list of positive and negative emotional terms and were asked to rate them on a series of characteristics. One of the central questions was the following: "In your judgment, is the ability to experience this characteristic exclusive to human beings or can animals also experience it?" Responses could range from "not at all exclusive of humans" to "very exclusive to humans." The results were largely consensual across the four samples. For instance, the uniquely human emotions were rated as less intense, less visible, and more internally caused than the other ones. They were also

judged to last longer and to appear later in age. Because the characteristics of the nonuniquely human emotions corresponded to those of basic, primary emotions (Ekman, 1992), it was decided, upon the recommendation of Paula Niedenthal, to call the uniquely human emotions secondary emotions.

This cross-cultural study shows that there is a positive link, by definition, between secondary emotions and humanity. Because the model of infra-humanization postulates a positive link between humanity and the ingroup (link A-C), there should be a positive association between the ingroup and secondary emotions (link A-B). This last association should be greater than the one between outgroups and secondary emotions (link A′-B′) because the humanity of the outgroup is supposed to be less than that of the ingroup (link A′-C′). Note that we speak of secondary emotions in general, not only of positive ones. Indeed, in the surveys conducted to find uniquely human characteristics, participants answered "sentiments" or gave an exemplar of them without specifying the valence. This means that people would be expected to associate both positive *and* negative uniquely human emotions to the ingroup more than to the outgroup. This prediction also helps distinguish infra-humanization from ingroup favoritism. Ingroup members do not limit themselves in taking over all that is positive for their group. Negative secondary emotions are also uniquely human.

As for primary emotions, the model does not expect any difference of association or attribution between ingroups and outgroups. Indeed, by definition, these nonuniquely human emotions pertain to everybody, including animals. Therefore, infra-humanization occurs when the association or attribution of secondary emotions, independently of their valence, is greater for ingroup members than for outgroup ones, and when such a difference does not appear for primary emotions. If the pattern of associations or attributions is the same for primary and secondary emotions, one could simply conclude that people consider their group more emotional than another one.

Before reviewing the tests of the other links of Figure 1, it should be noted that recent research has extended uniquely human characteristics to stimuli other than emotions. Given that the comparative definition of humanity contrasts human beings to other animals, it was reasonable to examine whether infra-humanization would extend to associating outgroups with animals (e.g., Viki et al., 2006). Other stimuli were adopted as well, such as auto- and hetero-stereotypes (Vaes & Paladino, 2007), values (Bain, Haslam, De Sousa, & Kashima, 2006), emotions, and personality traits (Paladino & Vaes, 2007). These stimuli are appropriate when one takes into account the group that possesses them, their typicality to the group, and their degree of humanity, controlling for the valence. In the case of stereotypes, for instance, the relation between typicality and humanity would be expected to be greater for the ingroup than for the outgroup. More will be said about this type of research later on.

Linking Preferentially Secondary Emotions to Ingroups (Links A-B and A′-B′)

The main hypotheses of infra-humanization have been tested using different paradigms and stimuli to establish its validity and generalizability (see Demoulin et al., 2004b; Leyens et al., 2003). In this article, we cite all the available research but concentrate on a few paradigms, mostly new ones.

Associating ingroup and uniquely human emotions. One of the first tests of the infra-humanization model was to verify whether there was, indeed, a privileged link between the ingroup and secondary emotions, relative to outgroups. The Implicit Associations Test (IAT) was run with several ingroups and outgroups occupying different status, and the emotions, primary and secondary, were either positive or negative (Paladino et al., 2002). This test comprises two main phases called compatible and incompatible. In our case, the compatible task consisted in pressing the same key when either a secondary emotion or a name of the ingroup appeared on the screen of a computer, and a different key for a primary emotion or the name of an outgroup member. In the incompatible phase, the same key had to be used for a primary emotion or the name of an ingroup member, and another key for the outgroup or a secondary emotion. Latencies were calculated for the two critical phases. In four experiments, people reacted more rapidly when the ingroup was associated to secondary emotions and the outgroup to primary emotions than the reverse. The same type of results is obtained when primary and secondary emotions are replaced by human and animal words (Viki et al., 2006, Expt. 1).

The classic version of the IAT that we used does not permit identification of the specific factor responsible for the effect. People could be particularly quick in associating the ingroup with secondary emotions or especially rapid in responding to the outgroup with primary emotions. To test the hypothesis that ingroup members are quicker to react to secondary emotions in the case of their own rather than of an outgroup, several priming experiments were run (Boccato, Cortes, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2007).

In one of the studies, French-speaking Belgian students were subliminally primed by the words “Belgian” and “Arab” before executing a lexical decision task. Participants saw on the screen of their computer a randomized series of nonwords, primary emotions, secondary emotions, and neutral words. They had to press a different key for the nonwords and the words. Again, latencies were recorded and only those for positive and negative primary and secondary emotions are of interest here. Participants responded faster to secondary emotions when they had been primed by the ingroup. Also as predicted, no difference was found for primary emotions. To sum up thus far, it seems reasonable to believe that there is a favored association between uniquely human emotions and the ingroup, relative to an outgroup.

Preferentially attributing uniquely human emotions to the ingroup. If people preferentially associate their ingroup with secondary emotions, do they also believe implicitly that these specific emotions apply best to their group? This second manner to test the A-B (A′-B′) link used again several paradigms (e.g., Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Demoulin et al., 2005). The simplest and most direct and explicit measure of this kind of operationalization presents itself as follows. A first page asks for ingroup identification or presents the research as examining perceptions of groups in order to make intergroup relations salient. The second page consists of a list of 26 words. Six are secondary emotions; 6 are primary emotions, 6 are related to competence, and 6 are associated with sociability. Half of each category contains positive words and the other half contains negative ones. Valence across emotions and competence-sociability is equated. The additional two words are intelligence and talent (remember that intelligence was rated as the most uniquely human characteristic). Participants are asked to select about 10–12 characteristics that are most prototypical of the ingroup/outgroup. The comparison between ingroup and outgroup can be made between participants (e.g., Leyens et al., 2001) or within them (e.g., Cortes et al., 2005). The main dependent variables are the number of primary and secondary emotions chosen for the ingroup and outgroup.

As hypothesized, more positive and negative secondary emotions are attributed to the ingroup than to the outgroup. This pattern of data is not replicated for primary emotions. Such findings have been repeated with multiple ingroups and outgroups times and again (e.g., Delgado, 2007). Concerning the words "intelligence and talent," it should be noted that high-status groups rated themselves as significantly superior. Low-status groups, in contrast, afforded competence to high-status groups but rated the groups equivalently on "intelligence and talent." Stated otherwise, status moderated the results for intelligence in general, but not for uniquely human emotions.

Many times it was suggested that these results might be due to the fact that secondary emotions are not intense and not very visible; therefore, only people familiar with them (i.e., ingroup members) could select them. The familiarity hypothesis was examined by Cortes et al. (2005). They compared the number of secondary emotions attributed to the self and to the ingroup. If attribution is a question of familiarity, and because people are more familiar with their self than with their ingroup, a greater number of secondary emotions should be attributed to the self than to the ingroup. This was not the case, and these two targets were perceived as having more secondary emotions than an outgroup. Moreover, the same authors collected data for different outgroups that varied in terms of familiarity with the ingroup. Familiarity did not predict infra-humanization, and thus it cannot account for the infra-humanization effects we have observed.

Reluctance to accept the uniquely human emotions of outgroup members. If ingroup members consider humanity their property, they should be attentive that outgroup members do not try to take it over, and they should react negatively if outgroup members express uniquely human emotions because this expression could be perceived as a threat to the ingroup (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). These questions are another way to test the A-B/A′-B′ link. We summarize some of the paradigms that have been used to answer these questions (see also Demoulin et al., 2005; Gaunt, Leyens, & Sindic, 2004; Leyens et al., 2001, Expt. 3).

If people are reluctant to admit that other people have secondary emotions, they may be particularly attentive to the presence of such emotions within the outgroup. This hypothesis was tested and supported using Jacoby's (1991) process-dissociation procedure whereby it is possible to dissociate automatic from controlled memory processes. Belgian participants better recalled associations between the outgroup "Arab" and secondary emotions than associations between the ingroup and secondary emotions (Gaunt, Leyens, & Demoulin, 2002). For Arabs to have secondary emotions, we argued, was abnormal, inconsistent with *a priori* beliefs, and therefore this information was especially well remembered.

It is Vaes and colleagues who most thoroughly investigated the negative behavioral consequences of the expression of secondary emotions by outgroup members in different situations involving help (Carella & Vaes, 2006; Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi, 2003; Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2002), perspective-taking (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 2004), imitation, and avoidance (Vaes et al., 2003). Vaes et al. (2002, 2003, Expt. 1), for instance, adapted Milgram's (1977) lost letter technique to email (Stern & Farber, 1997). Emails were sent to a huge number of obviously wrong addresses. They made an urgent request about a research contract using primary or secondary emotions, and the sender presented himself as a member of the ingroup (university) or of an outgroup (private company). In all cases, the sender used the informal form of pronoun "tu" in French (in old English "thou") rather than the formal pronoun "vous" in French ("ye" in old English).

As is typical in this paradigm, return rates did not differ across the four conditions. Politeness, or solidarity, varied, by contrast. As expected, no difference in the use of pronouns appeared as a function of group membership when the sender used primary emotions. However, when secondary emotions were utilized by an ingroup member, respondents showed a greater level of solidarity in their response by using the informal pronoun ("tu" or "thou") whereas an outgroup member using the same secondary emotions was treated more formally (more "vous" responses, or "ye") reintroducing the boundary this outgroup person had crossed. In other words, solidarity or politeness was intermediate for the two primary emotions conditions, and extreme as well as significantly different from each other for the secondary ones.

The Fully Human Ingroup (The Links A-C and A′-C′)

To test the final link between groups and humanity in Figure 1, Vaes, Paladino, and Leyens (2006; see also Paladino & Vaes, 2007) conducted two studies in Belgium and Italy. There were four conditions in which participants were primed by either their ingroup or an outgroup, associated with either primary or secondary emotions. Priming consisted of unscrambling sentences (e.g., "Especially are affectionate Belgians"). Once the unscrambling task was completed, participants were asked to fill in word fragments. The critical word fragments had been selected on the basis of a pretest so that they could be completed with or without reference to humanity (e.g., C_ _TURE; culture or capture). In both studies, participants who received the sentences with the ingroup and the secondary emotions gave the most "humanity" responses, as expected by the model. More than in the other conditions, the ingroup associated with uniquely human emotions led participants to find human answers in the word fragments.

Another strategy to test the same link was adopted by Boccato, Capozza, Flavo, and Durante (2008). In one of their experiments, northern Italian students were subliminally primed by a human or a monkey and were subsequently given a lexical decision task. The critical words were names from the north or the south of Italy. Participants were quicker at responding for names of their northern region when they had first been primed by a human face. Interestingly, there was no difference for the animal priming. All in all, these studies verify the postulated interpretation given to the previous "association" experiments: People preferentially associate their group to secondary emotions because such a link shows humanity.

To recap this section, we have presented the infra-humanization model and shown its specificities relative to neighboring concepts, such as dehumanization, ingroup bias, and outgroup derogation. Infra-humanization is a subtle kind of ethnocentrism. It is likely that people are not aware that they consider their ingroup as fully human whereas they perceive outgroups as less human or more animalized. We have also briefly reviewed the empirical evidence in favor of the model summarized in Figure 1. If people imagine that groups are characterized by different essences that make them fully human or not, such a conception must have an impact upon their relations. The following section is devoted to several intergroup implications of infra-humanization, which open the avenue for a discussion of social issues concerning this phenomenon.

Social Implications

Three questions will be examined in this section. It seems unlikely that members of a given group will infra-humanize all outgroups. There are groups that are particularly close to others for a number of reasons (e.g., Chavez' Venezuela and

Castro's Cuba). Other groups may need one another to fight common enemies (United States and Israel). The question then becomes, "Which outgroups are infra-humanized?"

When groups that were in conflict come to a formal peace, one would expect guilt or forgiveness to dominate the relations in order to transform the formal peace into an authentic one. What is the role of infra-humanization in such a situation? Can infra-humanization maintain rancor and justify the past? Finally, suppose we ask a New Yorker what happened on September 11, 2001. The person will probably be shocked by the question but what will she say when asked the same question about March 11, 2004? Did the Spanish feel the same when their trains were bombed as when the Twin Towers were destroyed? Were the two terrorist attacks covered the same by the media on both sides of the Atlantic? Our third question has to do with infra-humanization in the media and in response to media information.

Which Outgroups Are Infra-humanized?

The question remains open as to which outgroups are infra-humanized. According to several studies, groups are infra-humanized in the absence of an open *conflict* between them (French-speaking Belgians vs. French, and U.S. citizens vs. Mexicans: Demoulin et al., 2005; British and Italians: Viki et al., 2006; British and US citizens: Viki & Calitri, 2007; Polish and Canarians: Delgado, Rodriguez, & Rodriguez, 2006; French and Germans: Rohmann et al., 2005; minimal group paradigm: Demoulin et al., in press b; minimal groups and university departments: Miroslawska & Kofta, 2004/2005; minimal groups: Kofta & Miroslawska, in press). Conflict is thus certainly not a necessary condition for the occurrence of infra-humanization. A slight conflict may, however, increase the possibility of infra-humanization. For instance, compared to a control condition without relevant information, French-speaking Belgians infra-humanized Polish presented as potential competitors in the labor market (Cortes, 2005; see also Kofta, 2004). The fact that conflict is not necessary for the occurrence of infra-humanization makes infra-humanization a particularly pernicious phenomenon. Not only is it likely to be widespread, but it will also be difficult to detect.

Another likely factor that could influence infra-humanization's occurrence might be the *status* of the groups, although uniquely human emotions were selected because of their independence from the structure of societies. As expected, low-status groups infra-humanized high-status ones and to the same extent (Canarians vs. Peninsulars; Belgians and French; Canarians and Germans; British and U.S. citizens) (Delgado et al., 2006; Demoulin et al., 2005; Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al. Expt. 4, 2002;). Vaes & Paladino (2007) have most systematically investigated the moderating role of status. In their experiments, they distributed to their northern Italian participants a long list of auto- and hetero-stereotypes

about a given outgroup and asked them to rate each of the stereotypes on four dimensions (balanced for order): prototypicality for the ingroup, prototypicality for the outgroup, humanity, and valence. Nine outgroups were selected on the basis of the Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002), which distributes groups along two orthogonal dimensions: warmth and competence. Three outgroups low in warmth and high in competence were chosen: U.S. citizens, Japanese, Germans. Three were high in warmth and low in competence (i.e., southern Italians, Brazilians, Cubans). Finally three others were low in warmth and competence (i.e., Gypsies, Albanians, Moroccans). The selection of the outgroups had been based on a pretest. Findings show that stereotypes' prototypicality for the ingroup (i.e., North Italy) is predicted by perceived humanity, controlling for valence. The difference of typicality between ingroup and outgroup is also predicted overall by perceived humanity, showing therefore infra-humanization. An interesting result appears for the groups low in both competence and warmth. The more characteristics are judged typical of these groups, the less human the characteristics are perceived to be (see also Harris & Fiske, 2006).

These findings do not mean that group status has no role at all in infra-humanization. Status has an impact upon attribution and reception of infra-humanization. Remember that in their studies, Leyens and colleagues (2001, for more information see Leyens et al., 2003) observed that the higher-status group infra-humanized the lower-status outgroup through secondary emotions *and* intelligence. The lower-status group infra-humanized the higher-status group only in terms of secondary emotions. In other words, dominant groups used more criteria to infra-humanize than did dominated ones. The fact that status does not seem to moderate infra-humanization should have the same consequence as the absence of conflict in terms of dispersion of the phenomenon. No groups appear to be exempt from infra-humanizing tendencies.

Cortes, Demoulin, Rodriguez, Rodriguez, and Leyens (2005) found that the best predictor of infra-humanization was *relevance* of the outgroup, that is, a kind of interdependence between groups. For example, if Dutch-speaking Belgians dismantle Belgium to their own profit as they threaten to do, it would provoke disastrous consequences for French-speaking Belgians; if French-speaking Belgians refuse such a change, they will force the Flemish part of the country to continue paying for their problems. This perspective explains why, in the absence of interdependence, Poles are not infra-humanized by Belgians (Cortes et al., 2005). Relevance may only involve fate control (Kelley, 1979), that is, a unilateral impact of the outgroup upon the ingroup, rather than mutual behavioral control. French-speaking Belgians may infra-humanize Dutch-speaking ones simply because the latter are perceived as threatening to get rid of Belgium with which the former identify. Relevance explains that in Cortes et al.'s (2005) study, Dutch-speaking Belgians were infra-humanized and Parisians were not, although the latter were more strongly disliked than the former. For French-speaking Belgians, Flemish

compatriots constituted a greater threat than Parisians. We will come back to the notion of threat when discussing social policies.

Delgado et al. (2007) asked Spanish students to ascribe primary and secondary emotions to one of a series of countries (e.g., Germany), regions of the world (e.g., South America), and continents (e.g., Europe). Other students rated the different groups in terms of similarity, friendship, information, and status. As expected, none of these variables predicted primary emotions, and status did not predict secondary emotions. By contrast, the more the countries, regions of the world, and continents were perceived as similar, friendly, and known, the more they received secondary emotions. This last study should be considered with caution. Take Canary Islanders and inhabitants of the Spanish Peninsula; they are similar because all are Spanish and they know each other well. However, they do not like each other much and therefore infra-humanize each other (Leyens et al., 2001). Even if caution is in order, the results also allow optimism to find ways to prevent infra-humanization.

Maintaining Rancor(s)

In the preceding section, it has been shown that infra-humanization is a widespread phenomenon. Most of the time, ingroup members believe their group is more human, or less animal-like, than outgroups. Such a reaction resembles nationalism, rather than patriotism. Although these two concepts have various meanings, there is a consensus in social psychology to attribute pride for the ingroup to patriots and to describe nationalists as not only being proud of their group but also as derogating outgroups. On the basis of these apparent parallels, Viki and Calitri (2007) compared infra-humanization to patriotism and nationalism. As expected by infra-humanization, the differences of secondary emotions attributed to the ingroup and to the outgroup correlated positively with the level of nationalism.

To strongly identify with one's group does not mean that one is a nationalist. High identifiers, however, often tend to be reluctant to accept that their group has behaved in an immoral way (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006). The same phenomenon is true with infra-humanization. In fact, ingroup identification to some degree appears to be necessary for infra-humanization to occur. Someone who has weak affective or cognitive ties with their ingroup is unlikely to really believe that arbitrary group boundaries mean that outgroup members possess less of the human essence than do ingroup members. In every study (Demoulin et al., in press b; Rohmann, Niedenthal, Brauer, Castano, & Leyens, 2005; Viki, 2004; Paladino, Vaes, Castano, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2004), with different nationalities for participants and targets (French-Germans, Germans-French, British-Germans; Italians-Germans), high identifiers infra-humanized more than low identifiers. Depending on the studies, low identifiers did or did not infra-humanize.

We propose that infra-humanization also plays an important role in the reluctance of high identifiers to accept past misdeeds of the ingroup (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004), thus perpetuating rancor between the groups and interfering with full reconciliation of groups previously in conflict. Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) tested whether British participants infra-humanized Australian Aboriginals and whether U.S. students did the same toward Native Indians. They even generalized the situation to a science-fiction accident. In all three cases, participants infra-humanized their ex-"enemies" but only when the history was presented such that the ingroup was responsible for the extermination of the outgroup. Thus, even though these events were fictitious or took place a very long time ago, infra-humanization played the role of justification for the fate of these other nations. In contrast, when the disaster that had plagued these outgroups was made irrelevant for the ingroup (i.e., the ingroup was not responsible), there was no infra-humanization. If there is no link between groups, no behavioral or fate control, infra-humanization is unlikely. The possible necessity of a link between groups gives special importance to the implications of infra-humanization.

Northern Ireland is another region with "ex-enemies," Catholics and Protestants, who came, at last, to a formal peace. It may be naive to speak about these two populations as "ex"-enemies but they have come such a long way toward daily and even political peace, that we dare doing so. Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Tausch, and Kenworthy (2007) conducted a research program devoted to factors likely to improve or impede the relations between Catholics and Protestants in northern Ireland. In previous research, Cairns, Tam, Hewstone, and Niens (2005) have verified that intergroup forgiveness is crucial for intergroup harmony. Recently, Tam et al. (2007) showed that infra-humanization predicted low levels of intergroup forgiveness in northern Ireland. Stated in a reverse fashion, the less people infra-humanize outgroup members, the more willing they are to forgive the other group. Moreover, and importantly, numerous contacts of good quality have an impact on infra-humanization. Thus, the more people enter into harmonious interactions with exemplars of the outgroup, the more they are willing to consider as human the outgroup as a whole and to forgive its members.

This result is precisely what was looked for by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Archbishop Desmond Tutu (1999, p. 265) epitomized it when he wrote that "no one is an outsider, all are insiders; all belong; all belong in the one family, God's family, the human family." We may all belong to the same family but it is easy to ostracize. Again, this research shows that the presence or absence of infra-humanization can have dramatic consequences. Moreover, it highlights the role of contact between members of different groups. This aspect will be especially examined when policy issues will be raised.

To confirm the link between infra-humanization and morality already evidenced in Tam et al. (2007), Delgado et al. (2007) conducted a set of studies. For instance, in one of her studies, the outgroup (i.e., India) was determined on the basis

of previous research to be friendly but irrelevant. In a control condition, participants had to attribute uniquely human emotions either to the ingroup or the outgroup and, as expected, no infra-humanization occurred. The same result was obtained when, before the attribution task, participants saw scenes of animal violence (e.g., a tiger lacerating its prey). However, when the scenes dealt with violence among human groups alien to the ingroup and the outgroup, infra-humanization occurred for all types of uniquely human emotions (positive, negative). Because it had been shown by Demoulin et al. (2004a) that secondary emotions are related to morality, Delgado et al. (2007) analyzed the results in terms of (im)morality and found that, in the human violence condition, most infra-humanization occurred for the secondary emotions that were rated high in terms of (positive or negative) morality.

Such a finding is especially troubling. Not only do people infra-humanize outgroup members, but in some conditions they also claim for themselves more uniquely human emotions such as hate or contempt. These last results show how far people can go in claiming full humanness for their group. Because immoral secondary emotions, such as abhorrence and disrespect, are considered highly uniquely human, people are ready to accept them more for their group than for outgroups, at least in certain conditions. These findings largely contribute to the idea that infra-humanization may be an important factor in maintaining disharmony or discord between groups. They also explain why infra-humanization may predict rejection of Muslim immigrants in Europe (Zimmerman, Viki, Abrams, Zebel, & Doosje, 2007), fewer intentions to help victims of the Katrina hurricane in the United States (Cuddy et al., 2007), and less feelings of guilt about the Dutch involvement in the Massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 (Zebel, Zimmerman, Zevel, & Doosje, 2007).

We now turn to a third social implication that has much to say about the dispersion of infra-humanization and the reinforcement it receives in everyday life from the media.

Infra-humanization in (Response to) the Media

The media and infra-humanization are involved in a vicious circle. On the one hand, people often use the media to infra-humanize outgroups. On the other hand, in order to appeal to people's existing infrahumanizing beliefs within a society, the media often portrays information in a way that further infrahumanizes outgroups. Remember the introduction of this article with news entirely devoted to the death of 10 Belgian soldiers and the comparatively indifferent reaction to the Rwandese genocide. Think also of the 2005 tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the tremendous wave of helping. How many sequences has one seen about regions that did not accommodate Western tourists and how much was one informed about the consequences of the tsunami in these nontouristic regions? If thousands of people

are starving somewhere in Africa, everybody ignores it, but if the Belgian Queen has her arm strained, 10% of the TV news is devoted to it. The African famine is not news; the royal arm is.

Social psychologists have long noted that people look at news from their own perspective. Hastorf and Cantril (1954) showed the film of a rough football game between the universities of Princeton and Dartmouth to students of both universities. When asked to count the number of penalties and their severity, the students of the two universities showed an ingroup bias. Their team committed fewer penalties, and these were less severe. The authors concluded that students of the two universities had seen seemingly different films. Similarly, Vallone, Ross, and Lepper (1985) showed an "objective" televised account of the involvement of Israel in the massacre of the camps of Sabra and Chatila in Lebanon and asked their participants, among other things, to count the number of favorable and unfavorable references to Israel. Participants who knew about the conflict without taking sides rated the excerpt as objective. Pro-Palestine and Pro-Israel participants, to the contrary, judged the extract biased against their side. The perception of bias remained even when favorable and unfavorable references to Israel were controlled for. These two studies illustrate a simple ingroup bias. The reading or viewing of news may go much further than ingroup bias and involve infra-humanization as demonstrated by recent research.

In a series of studies, we wanted to verify whether people would process media-communicated information in an infra-humanizing way. We started with research dealing with an event that was going to be seen live or on television (Gaunt, Syndic, & Leyens, 2005). Before an important soccer game between Turkey and Belgium, the authors asked Belgian students to predict the intensity with which their ingroup, Belgian fans, or the outgroup, Turkish fans, would experience various emotions in response to their team's victory or loss immediately after the Turkey–Belgium game and 3 days later. The outcome of the game, victory, or loss, did not affect the intensity of the primary or secondary emotions. Immediately after the game, Turks and Belgians were predicted to have extreme reactions both for primary and secondary emotions. This result is normal given the importance of the game for the two countries. What matters are the predictions and results for the reactions 3 days after the match. For Turks and Belgians, the predicted level of primary emotions drops to almost nothing, an outcome that is in accordance with the definition of these emotions, intense but of short duration. The predictions and findings for secondary emotions are quite different. Belgian students predicted that their intensity would diminish in both countries but much more for Turkey than for Belgium. In other terms, Turks are perceived as able to react in the same manner as the ingroup, but they are not perceived as living through the event in the same human way.

Another strategy was adopted in a different set of studies (Cortes, Collange, Demoulin, de Renesse, & Leyens, 2006), and additional hypotheses were tested.

In several studies, participants read a series of tragic events (e.g., *"The fire woke up the whole street. X's house was in flames. The parents and two of their children were saved by the arrival of the firefighters. These worked relentless, sometimes imprudently, but the cries of the mother calling her youngest one were unbearable"*) mixed with nonemotional ones, or they saw scenes of World War II accompanied by a commentary. In both cases (written news and war movie), the events took place in Belgium or in Great Britain. Immediately afterward, the experimenter distributed a list of words arranged in alphabetical order. The important words comprised primary emotions and secondary emotions that had *not* appeared in the summaries nor in the commentary. In the written news study, participants had to circle the words they remembered as having been part of the summaries; in the war movie study, they had to select the words (primary and secondary emotions) that best described the situation of the people in the film. In the written news experiments, the dependent variable was thus incorrect inferences (memories) of primary and secondary emotions, while it corresponded to attribution of these emotions in the war movie experiment.

As hypothesized, for the memory task, there was no difference in the inferences of primary emotions. However, in accordance with the prediction, there were significantly more inferences of secondary emotions in the ingroup condition than in the outgroup one. Well-being was also lower in the ingroup condition. These results have been replicated two more times, even with happy events (see also Gaunt et al., 2005). Exactly the same pattern of results was obtained for the attributions in the war movie study. Primary emotions did not vary as a function of the group. However, more uniquely human emotions were chosen for the ingroup than for the outgroup. In all studies, people felt worse in the ingroup condition (in which they also empathized more and showed more perspective taking).

In fact, these studies were conducted to test a specific hypothesis, that is, whether inferences or attributions of secondary emotions would mediate the link between group membership and well-being. Indeed, one could have imagined that people are ready to suffer (secondary emotions last long, even if they are not intense) for their ingroup but want to protect themselves from too many sufferings by not attributing uniquely human emotions to the outgroup. According to this hypothesis, people are ready to give primary emotions (i.e., intense but short) to foreigners but not secondary ones, which last a long time. The families of the 10 Belgian soldiers had sorrow for years, and so did we, whereas the people of Darfur are now sad but will quickly overcome this primary emotion. This hypothesis was not verified, however. Infra-humanization and well-being (e.g., empathy, perspective taking) are independent consequences of group belongingness. This result reinforces the intergroup facet of infra-humanization. The phenomenon confronts groups and does not have the primary function of protecting individuals.

Overall the results relating to the role of infra-humanization in response to media portrayals are strong, not only because they are highly significant, but

also because they were replicated despite differences of scenario and dependent measures. Complementing those obtained by Hastorf and Cantril (1954) and Vallone et al. (1985), they show that people not only look at news from their point of view for their own benefit, but that they also use this news to consider outgroups less humans than they are.

Additional research has also explored the other part of the proposed media/infra-humanization cycle—that the media will portray certain groups in ways consistent with current cultural perspectives. Certain ethnicities, or countries, are sometimes linked to specific animals like snakes, elephants, or apes. The media may contribute to the perpetuation of these metaphors and show the other side of infra-humanization. Not only are some groups less human than others, but they may also be more animal (Viki et al., 2006; Viki, Zimmerman, & Ballantyne, 2007). Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, and Jackson (in press) analyzed newspaper articles written about Blacks and Whites eligible for the death penalty. They looked for ape imagery (e.g., beast, hairy, wild). Most important is the fact that ape imagery was four times more frequent for Blacks than for Whites. When the crime is atrocious, journalists are at a loss for finding reasonable words, but ape words come more easily to their mind when the criminal is a Black person. Moreover, this ape imagery predicts death sentences in the case of Blacks but not of Whites.

Spontaneously people may associate a Black delinquent, but not a White one, with an ape. Such association is not without consequences as illustrated by the following experiment. When participants are subliminally primed with apes, rather than with "big cats" (e.g., puma) and then shown footage of police officers physically attacking a Black or a White suspect, they are more likely to think the Black suspect deserves the beating he is receiving (Goff et al., in press). No difference emerges in the case of "big cats," selected because of their potential association with Africa and similar level of aggressiveness. The ape-Black is the criminal.

In summary, the research we have reviewed on the social implications of infra-humanization demonstrates that this phenomenon is not limited to the laboratory with little relevance for "real life." Infra-humanization generalizes to important aspects of everyday life and to the reinforcement of traditional relations between groups and nations. As said at the beginning of this article, infra-humanization, which is based on essentialist beliefs, is a subtle form of racism, and it raises specific policy issues. It is to these issues that we turn now.

Social Policies

In this section, drawing on the theoretical background and the tests of the main hypotheses of infra-humanization presented in earlier sections of this article, first we discuss the importance of addressing essentialist beliefs as a way of ameliorating the negative impact of infra-humanization. If it might not be

possible to eradicate essentialism completely, alternative interventions may be employed. Infra-humanization relies on the belief that walls between groups represent different essences. Therefore, second, we examine how social policies might influence another basis for infra-humanization, ingroup–outgroup categorization. Third, because infra-humanization differentially associates secondary emotions with the ingroup and the outgroup, we consider how sharing a symbol like secondary emotions affects the relation between groups. To these three points emanating directly from the infra-humanization theoretical model, we will add two other ones whose importance was identified in studies on contact and differences in the responses of dominant and dominated groups, which were summarized in the social implications section.

Deflating Essentialist Tendencies

As discussed earlier, people often have difficulties specifying group essences or acknowledging their belief about group essences (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992), but many people act as if differences between groups constitute walls that prevent various essences from mixing. When a U.S. politician spoke of the "New World," he meant that his country was the best of the planet, completely different from other countries. It came as no surprise that a politician from another country, France, countered him with the "Old World," and implied that countries opposing the U.S. policy might be *essentially* more reasonable. When The Vatican and Poland want to inscribe the Christian roots of Europe in its future Constitution, it is essentialism. They want to define so-called European countries as *essentially* different from Turkey and its majority of Muslim inhabitants. When extreme right parties, in France for instance, oppose the European construction, they claim that they do not want to lose the sovereignty of their country, meaning that their country is essentially different from (and superior to) other nations. Essentialism may even emerge with good intentions. In July 2007, French President Sarkozy gave a conference to intellectuals in Dakar to apologize for colonization but got only indignant protests in return. Indeed, he had spoken of "the African person (literally 'homo Africanus') who has not sufficiently entered into the History (. . .) Never has he dashed towards the future" (Le Monde, 2007). The audience had well understood that, behind a generous facade, Sarkozy was hiding a paternalistic essentialism.

Appeals to essentialism occur in everyday life in a much more subtle manner than in the above examples, but also with good intentions. Politicians do not stop trying to convince their citizens that the country's problems are the most important ones, and news coverage reassures us that no one from the country was involved in an accident in a distant region of the world. Politicians do not say that the country's problem of obesity is more important than the famine in another continent, and the TV news does not claim that the far-away accident was not dramatic, but it is the

message that is transmitted. This message is essentialist. "We are, by substance, different from others."

This message is also dangerous. For a long time, Haslam and colleagues (in press) have been unable to find infra-humanization, as reflected in differential attributions of secondary emotions to ingroup than to outgroup members, among Australian-born people, and they attribute this lack to Australians' focus on nature rather than culture. However, Bastian and Haslam (2007, cited in Haslam et al., in press) demonstrated that individual differences in the degree to which Australians held essentialist beliefs related directly to attitudes toward other groups. Specifically, Bastian and Haslam reported that "more essentialist [Australian-born] participants held more negative views of these [Chinese] immigrants, attributing less desirable traits to them, liking them less, believing they should assimilate rather than integrate, disagreeing with the provision of cultural services to them, and seeing them as more homogeneous. In addition to these forms of negative bias, essentialist participants were more likely to deny Asian immigrants uniquely human as well as human nature traits, independent of the desirability of those traits." Thus, even where one has difficulty obtaining infra-humanization effects experimentally, individual differences in essentialism relate to orientations associated with infra-humanization.

These findings suggest that, introducing the importance of culture over nature in some cultures and reinforcing a natural focus in describing groups in other cultures (such as in Australia) can help to reduce the impact of infra-humanization. Nevertheless, essentialism is probably the hardest phenomenon to eliminate because it would mean the end of a justification for racism. At the very least, broad antagonism between "Old and New World," "Christians and Muslims," "Westerners and Africans" should be banished from official discourses. Also, the media should adopt a code of ethics that does not reduce foreign people to events they have to go through.

Deflating Ingroup–Outgroup Boundaries

At the core of infra-humanization and essentialism is the fact that the world is divided into ingroup and outgroups. As said at the beginning of this article, most groups are (arbitrary) social constructions and, therefore, there is no necessity (essential) to rely so regularly on the distinction between "my" group and "other" groups.

To combat infra-humanization, rather than emphasizing differences and similarities between groups, politicians, media, and educators should insist upon complementarities and universalism, "emphasizing understanding, accepting, and showing concern for the welfare of *all human beings, even those whose way of life differs from one's own*" (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006, p. 137, italics added). Different studies have shown that people who can transcend boundaries

between groups, either by inductions (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005) or spontaneously (Roccas et al., 2006), are more forgiving of current or past enemies. These persons do not have to justify the bad relations between their groups by infra-humanization, as did participants in the studies by Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006).

Kelman (1999, p. 586) wrote about the importance of overriding intergroup boundaries between Israelis and Palestinians with a transcendent identity to reduce conflict and achieve peace. Kelman proposed, "The development of a larger, transcendent identity, encompassing both Israelis and Palestinians, is a necessary condition for effective cooperation, long-term peaceful coexistence, and ultimate reconciliation between the two peoples in the wake of a political solution to their conflict. This transcendent identity, however, need not replace the particularistic identity of each group; rather, it can develop alongside of it. Maintaining their particularistic identities is important to groups in general, in keeping with the basic need for psychological distinctiveness postulated by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the optimum distinctiveness model (Brewer, 1991)." This transcendence of group walls was at the heart of the founding of the European Community. By creating a unity in the respect of specificities (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Hewstone & Brown, 1986), the founders wanted to avoid repetitions of the World Wars. Up to now, they have been successful, but the difficulties of the enterprise demonstrate the enduring ethnocentric stance of the participating nations.

These statements not only highlight the conditions that are most likely to lead to successful cooperation between groups but also suggest conditions that may be critical for erasing infra-humanization. In her research program, for instance, Gaunt (2007) examined the recategorization perspective outlined in the Common Ingroup Identity Model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). She examined the role of a superordinate group with both Jewish Israelis and Arab Israelis. She asked Jewish Israelis the extent to which they considered Arab Israelis part of Israel. The more participants were in favor of the "fusion," the less they infra-humanized Arab Israelis. In fact, those who most accepted Arab Israelis as part of a superordinate group did not infra-humanize them at all. To Arab Israelis, she asked to what extent they felt themselves as part of Israel. Again, acceptance moderated infra-humanization, but the latter phenomenon did not disappear among those who were most in favor of the Israeli nationality. Thus, when a "real" common identity is possible, and does not constitute a coalition against a third group (Kelman, 1999), it represents a valuable strategy to reduce essentialism. Indeed, the flexibility required by the Common Identity makes essences meaningless.

A final word of caution, however, is in order. To the same extent that the remarks about preventing essentialism did not mean that groups had necessarily to merge under a common hat, we, like Kelman (1999) do not want to say here that

belongingness to ingroups should be suppressed. On the one hand, universalism is a value that should impede erroneous and racist meanings to differences between groups. On the other hand, altering boundaries between groups should facilitate the flexibility in the belongingness to groups. The differentiation between ingroup and outgroup does not have to be rigid. It may be altered, for instance, by cooperation (Cortes, 2005; Kofta & Baran, 2004) which, like the Common Identity, abolishes infra-humanization.

Strengthening Shared Symbols

People may not be aware that they claim a fuller humanity than other groups, but they certainly know very well that they consider their group superior to others in important domains, even if their ingroup has a low status in society (Leach, Ellemers, & Baretto, 2007). People are also probably not aware that they express the superiority of their group through the attribution of uniquely human emotions, but they report having these emotions more than outgroups, and they are extremely sensitive to the presence of these emotions in outgroups (Gaunt et al., 2002; Leyens et al., 2001, Expt. 3).

The research conducted by Vaes and colleagues (Vaes et al., 2003; Vaes et al., 2002) has systematically revealed that outgroup members who express secondary emotions are rejected. Secondary emotions play the role of a symbol for ingroup members and it may be counterproductive for others to start interacting by convincing them that they share the same symbol. This reaction may seem paradoxical at first sight. Indeed, there is abundant research on acculturation showing that host societies privilege assimilation of newcomers (Berry, 1997; Verkuyten, 2006). Stated otherwise, people are ready to accept outgroup members provided that the latter adopt the values, customs, ways of dressing, etc. of the ingroup, and therefore show that there is no "wall of differences" between the groups, but, to the contrary, that there is a standard to be respected, and that this standard belongs to the ingroup.

The reaction is paradoxical because, whereas expressing similarity on other dimensions may facilitate acceptance and assimilation, possessing secondary emotions is a symbol whose uniqueness is unsharable (Weiss, 1933) in many cases. A similar type of symbol can still be found among a few aristocrats who are convinced that they have a special ("blue") blood. It took centuries to make this belief marginal.

The distinction between assimilation (what to do to be accepted) and unsharable uniqueness (what is particularistic in Kelman's vocabulary) raises an important policy issue. It means that it is often useless to fight irrational beliefs such as full humanity or "blue blood" by starting immediately to adopt the same perspective. Such a reaction happens also for beliefs that are not irrational but highly emotional. When the slogan "Black is beautiful" appeared, it would have

been meaningless to state that "A 'no color'—black—cannot be beautiful." In the same manner, for many persons, to get accepted in a new group such as a country, one has to adapt but not to demand citizenship. Citizenship is received, bestowed by the host country.

Fighting for symbols is most of the time a lost battle. Symbols cannot be conquered, but they may be given. Portugal does not like Turkey, and the Portuguese are opposed to Turkey being admitted to the European Community. However, when Portuguese students were informed that a scientific study had shown that the Turkish vocabulary did not differ in terms of secondary emotions from other European countries and from Portugal (versus did not possess such emotions), they experienced less threat from Turkey and were more willing to approve its acceptance into the European Union (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2007). In this case, symbols are not overthrown like in Vaes et al.'s (2003) research, but they are given through a scientific study. It should be added that when egalitarian values, which reflected a universalist orientation, were primed, Portuguese students also perceived less threat from Turkey and were more willing to support Turkey's entrance into the European Union (see also Viki, Zimmerman, & Ballantyne, 2007). Priming meritocratic values did not produce a similar effect.

The latter finding regarding values has important implications for social policies. If a group does not have egalitarian (universalist) values, it may still accept an outgroup without infra-humanizing it under certain conditions. Universalist or egalitarian values make irrational symbols superfluous. In fact, these values are at the core of all the paragraphs considered up to now in this social policy section. There are values that serve to distinguish groups (my group is more honest, sincere; Leach et al., 2007), but universalist, or egalitarian, values deflate beliefs in essentialism and irrational symbols, and eliminate walls of differences between groups.

Obviously, maintaining such values is not an easy task when a symbol has to be "shared." Identical-ness is not identity. Momentary similarity, even reinforced by egalitarian values, may not be sufficient to lead to a pervasive sharing of transcendent, and especially particularistic identity (Kelman, 1999). Multiple strategies have to be adopted, and we continue reviewing them in the following paragraphs.

Deprovincialized Contacts

Many of the studies examined in the social implications section referred to intergroup contacts. The preceding paragraphs devoted to social issues have also implicated these contacts. Much research has been conducted on this topic in relation to racism, but the beneficial effects of intergroup contact may also apply to infra-humanization.

It increasingly appears that contact is the best predictor of harmonious intergroup relations, especially when emanating from dominant groups, and when the conditions of contact respect the optimal ones suggested by Allport (1954): informal without stereotypical members of the outgroups, without hierarchy and competition but with societal support (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). Pettigrew (1998) also recommended "deprovincialized" contact, contact that decenters people from their usual (ethnocentric) point of view to accept other people's specificities.

With respect to the issue of infra-humanization, knowledge, friendship and similarity predict humanization of outgroups (Delgado et al., 2007). Thus, intergroup contact may be critical to combat infra-humanization, and in order to avoid collision against the "walls of difference," it may be especially important that this contact be "deprovincialized." That is, others need to be encountered with contact that recognizes *others*' point of view. Moreover, knowledge is not sufficient to reduce infra-humanization; it has to be accompanied by similarity and friendship (Tam et al., 2007). Catholic and Protestant northern Irish know each other. This contact also has to be friendly (Turner, Hewstone et al., in press) so that one group does not infra-humanize the other and allows forgiveness. It is quality of contact, rather than contact per se, that is important for reducing infra-humanization (Brown, Eller, Leeds, & Stace, 2007).

As noted earlier, egalitarian values contribute to decreases in essentialism, opposition to outgroups, and irrational beliefs of superiority. In order to be of good quality, contact needs to respect egalitarian values (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999). If such respect is absent, contact may only lead to antagonism (Stroebe, Lenkert, & Jonas, 1988), mistrust (Shelton & Richeson, 2005), antipathy (Maquil, Demoulin, & Leyens, in press; Stroebe et al., 1988), and avoidance (Shelton & Richeson, 2005). All these potential effects also promote infra-humanization. By contrast, interactions based on egalitarian values facilitate respect and friendliness (Maquil et al., in press).

Because of the existing richness of the contact literature, we will not say more about the effectiveness of contact for improving intergroup relations here. Instead, we offer an example that could be considered a paragon of "policy of contacts." To facilitate dissemination of knowledge and acceptance of other European cultures than one's own, the European Community created an exchange program called "Erasmus," named after the philosopher, theologian, and humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam (1465–1536), who "lived and worked in several parts of Europe, in quest of the knowledge, experience and insights which only such contacts with other countries could bring" (European Commission Education and Training, 2006). At first, the program was restricted to university students who were allowed to go for half a year or an entire year to a university of another country of the European Union, and pass their exams there. The success of this program has been such that it has now been extended to teachers and to people outside of

the university. Other countries (e.g., Switzerland, United States) are now part of this program or have tried to develop a similar course of action. This success was reached through the contacts and friendships that individuals of a given group would have with some members of the outgroup. Generalization ensues (Tam et al., 2007).

Infra-humanization and Low-Status Groups

In this article, we have pictured infra-humanization as a kind of subtle racism and have denounced its deleterious effects. In the current section, we have examined ways to get rid of infra-humanization. Paradoxically, we next also suggest that infra-humanization may help low-status groups to achieve conditions likely to lead to change, that is, to collective actions.

As said at the beginning of this article, we originally preferred to study secondary emotions as reflections of infra-humanization instead of intelligence and language because they were presumed to be independent of structural dimensions of the society. Our infra-humanization research program also considered whether low-status groups were as capable of infra-humanization as high-status ones. The evidence (e g., Demoulin et al., 2005; Leyens et al., 2001; Paladino et al., 2002) has shown that members of low-status groups have no difficulty finding that members of dominant groups are less human than they are. Research by Gaunt (2007) on Arab and Jewish Israeli (see also Dovidio et al., in press) even suggests that members of dominated groups may have more difficulties abandoning infra-humanization than people from higher-status groups.

This general finding has important implications. While System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) postulates that low-status groups accept their low positions and the dominant groups' values, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981), which is foremost a conflict theory, proposes variables likely to explain when and how individuals and members of low-status groups will try to change, or upgrade, their position. Among the solutions proposed by Social Identity Theory, there are objective ones and more symbolic ones. By objective, we mean acts—something tangible. In the case of the social change strategy, groups may engage in collective actions, like riots. The symbolic solutions are more a "mental shift," a twist in the reasoning with the potential to lead to tangible actions. Members of stigmatized groups may, for instance, change the values attached to a dimension, like with the slogan "Blacks have spirituality," or they may change dimensions of comparison, like when basketball scores replace school grades. Infra-humanization is also a symbolic solution, although completely irrational as discussed previously. People *think* others are less human than they are, and this belief should comfort the positive social identity of low-status groups.

For low-status groups, infra-humanization is a delusion that can have real consequences. First, the belief in a fundamental superiority, in a unique essence,

may reinforce the coherence of the group, making it more entitative. As a result, the ingroup is perceived as stronger and better able to face outside threats (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000). Second, this added value to the group may very well attract people and enhance their identification. These highly identified people will become more loyal to the ingroup and very unlikely to better their fate by adopting a personal strategy such as individual mobility. These two consequences are not innocuous. Indeed, ingroup identification and a high sense of group identity are two conditions that increase the possibility of collective actions (Wright & Lubensky, in press). In other words, what was at first a delusional belief may transform itself into actions to climb the steps of the social hierarchy.

We are not suggesting that infra-humanization plays an important role in collective actions, or that it is a necessary factor for collective actions to occur. What we are proposing is that infra-humanization may facilitate several conditions, and it is these conditions that will in the long run facilitate collective actions.

If the consequences of infra-humanization may in the long run be beneficial for low-status groups, one might consider that they could have the opposite effect for high-status groups. History is replete with examples of kingdoms or empires (e.g., Charles V's empire upon which "the sun never lied down"), nations (e.g., France), and regions (e.g., Wallonia) that were so convinced of their superior essence that they neglected the emerging power of opposing groups. This suggestion regarding the negative consequences for their own group of infra-humanization by high-status groups is speculative, in contrast with evidence regarding consequences for low-status groups. However, according to Baudrillard (1990), our speculation applies also to the Indians Alakalufs from the Tierra del Fuego in Chile. Originally, these Indians called themselves "The persons" and were so imbued of their "essential" superiority that they never learned from the higher-status colonizers. Now, a few tens of them remain and have gained a new name (Alakaluf) from their begging. With these last sentences we want to imply that infra-humanization may be perilous for oneself and is always a danger for others.

Conclusions

People are marvelous architects, full of inspiration, when it comes to creating different groups. This creativity has many advantages for mastering the environment (Leyens, 1983). Group builders are not only architects but also specialists in urbanism, arranging groups in sophisticated puzzles. The problem arises when people forget that groups were at first a social construction and they become perceived as having always had their own life. The somewhat arbitrary criteria for distinguishing groups, which vary in time and geography, are obliterated and

groups become imbued by essential characteristics. The Arabic civilization is considered essentially opposed to the Western one, but the latter one is entirely dependent upon the first one in terms of philosophy, numbers, and algebra, among many other things.

In this article, we have defended the view that people attribute essences to groups and that ingroup members believe they possess "the" human essence, meaning that outgroup members are less human, more animal, than others. The phenomenon, called infra-humanization, has been supported by a great number of studies varying in the way to make the ingroup completely human and the outgroup somewhat like animals. The most classic way to reach this goal is to attribute more positive and negative uniquely human emotions to the ingroup than to the outgroup, but other means have been illustrated as well.

Even though one does not know yet the exact conditions for infra-humanization, it is a widespread phenomenon going beyond the presence of conflict or the possession of a certain status. The consequences are subtle but deleterious. Infra-humanization, for instance, obliterates past misdeeds and is a brake for reconciliation. Other groups are not seen as rivals for competition of resources (conflict is not necessary for infra-humanization) but as threats in terms of values (Pereira, Vala, & Leyens, 2007; Viki, Zimmerman, & Ballantyne, 2007). Infra-humanization represents a double movement. It celebrates pride toward the ingroup at the same time that, with subtlety, it denigrates the outgroup. There is a vicious circle between this attitude and the media because they reinforce it, probably to gain more audience.

Policies should be instituted to fight the increasingly popular stance of essentialism. Groups are different by definition, but such a reality does not mean that there have to be considered walls of differences. If groups were allowed to coexist with their specificities, if such coexistence was respected, groups would not need irrational symbols, like "the human essence," to assert their worth. Mutual acceptance of groups will certainly benefit from contexts that favor egalitarian, or universalist, values. Indeed, these values overthrow the core of infra-humanization, that is, essentialism and ethnocentrism. Egalitarian values can be an antidote against infra-humanization. Deprovincialized contacts are also important. They should be the support for the dispersion of egalitarian values.

We purposely operationalized infra-humanization in terms of uniquely human emotions. We thought that emotions, more than intelligence, for instance, would allow us to show the same reaction among dominant and dominated groups. The hypothesis was supported but we suggest that future research, with obvious policy implications, would gain in investigating the long-term consequences of infra-humanization in these two types of groups. The belief in human essence is a poisonous symbol, and it can make its adherents asleep, in high-status groups, or awakened, in low-status ones.

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