A Map that Roared and an Original Atlas: Canada, Cartography, and the Narration of Nation

Matthew Sparke

Department of Geography and the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington

This paper contributes to recent debates about the geography of power, the nation-state, cartographic history, and postcolonial theory. It does so by connecting the themes of these literatures and exploring empirically the claims about the narration of nation made by the postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha. The two empirical case studies come from contemporary Canada, and concern, in part, the mapping of the nation-state. The first case is a British Columbia trial in which two First Nations, the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en, brought a case against the provincial and federal governments over the recognition of their native sovereignty. The second study is of volume 1 of the *Historical Atlas of Canada*, which, unlike many others before it, sought to place native peoples and spaces within the overarching cartography of the country. In both studies, the ambivalent (post)colonial power relations of cartography—the fact that they can work both for and against colonialism—become evident. They therefore serve as exemplary lessons concerning the political geography of mapping and the chronic persistence into the present of colonial assumptions about cartography. But more than this, the studies also raise significant questions about the limits of Bhabha's locution of "location" as a site for a performative form of political agency. The paper suggests, therefore, that, while spatial theorists can usefully draw on Bhabha's postcolonial supplements to theories of the nation, the work of producing postcolonial geographies of national negotiations simultaneously supplements and displaces Bhabha's own abstraction of agency. *Key Words: cartography, the nation-state, political geography, postcolonial theory.*

Exhibit 102: "Traditional Boundaries of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en Territories"

25: The Court: We'll call it the map that roared.

26: Mr. Plant: I beg your pardon.

27: The Court: We'll call it the map that roared. (*Delgamuukw v. the Queen*,[1] Trial Transcripts, vol. 108:6871)

An organized society tries to understand itself and its past, yet no easy determinism can explain how and why a complex society like ours has evolved progressively and sometimes unpredictably on this continent over hundreds, even thousands of years. The *Historical Atlas of Canada* has attempted to establish many of the relationships among the multitudinous factors . . . that together, as in a musical score, have shaped our past (Jean-Pierre Wallot 1987).

On May 11, 1987 a trial over sovereignty and land rights began in the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The case had been brought by two First Nations—the Wet'suwet'en and the Gitxsan[2]—against the federal government of Canada and the provincial government of British Columbia. Ken Muldoe, the chief whose Gitxsan name Delgam Uukw served as the official abbreviation for all the plaintiffs making the case, concluded his opening address to the court by summarizing the view of two First Nations that the trial was not a simple appeal to the law of the land but rather a political negotiation within the Canadian legal system. "The purpose of this case, then, is to find a process to place Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en ownership and jurisdiction within the context of Canada. We do not seek a decision as to whether our system might continue or not. It will continue." (Quoted in Monet and Skanu'u 1992:23.) As the 318 days of evidence and fifty-six days of closing argument proceeded, the Wet'swuet'en and Gitxsan continued to affirm their traditions of self-government, educating the court and those members of the Canadian public who followed the immense trial ("The Mother of All Trials," as one virulently anti-native-land-rights advocate dubbed it

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[Smith 1995]) about their understandings of space, time, and territorial jurisdiction.

Later in the same year, another rather different affirmation of nation emerged before the Canadian public in the more muted but institutionally privileged form of the first volume of a new historical atlas of Canada. More than an academic exercise prosecuted solely for the benefit of historical and geographical research, the *Historical Atlas of Canada* was also a national project that narrated an origin story of Canada. National in production and funding as well as in organization and scope, the *Atlas* as a whole received more than Can$6 million in public funds.[3] Subsequently, reviewers acclaimed volume 1 as "public funding well spent" (Bumstead 1988:53), while others commented on how, with more than forty authors, the *Atlas* seemed "a mega-project of Canadian intellectual endeavour" (Westfall 1988:261). Moreover, public reception of volume 1 was successfully national and grand in scale. Initially published just in time for the Christmas commercial season, the attractive coffee-table-sized volume—with 27,000 copies of the English edition sold by November 1993 (Piternick 1993:21)—found a much bigger audience than the one that was packed into the small Smithers, BC courtroom on the opening day of *Delgamuukw v. the Queen.*

There are many other obvious differences between these two examples of national negotiation. The trial took place in a legal setting, whereas the *Atlas* was produced in a grant-maintained academic context and disseminated through commercial networks. More significantly, the court case involved a direct and necessarily adversarial conflict between colonial and anticolonial forces, whereas in the *Atlas*, these antagonistic power relations found joint expression in a more interwoven and ambivalent national text. In addition, notwithstanding the editors' remarkable attempts to represent the historical geography of everyday life—home life, home building, and the quotidian routines of survival on the frontier of colonial contact—the literally textual character of the *Atlas* meant that it was less immediately related than the court case to the actual experiences of people. The court case, like the *Atlas*, involved a whole series of politicized representations of experience, but it also directly coordinated and controlled such experience within the confines of the court. Such differences notwithstanding, this article focuses on how, as coinheritors of overlapping historical geographies, both these examples of national negotiation had much in common as graphic and, indeed, cartographic negotiations of the meanings of space, territory, and state jurisdiction. Critical to both were maps of national space, and clearly evident in both was the paradoxical capacity of such cartography to function variously for and against the exercise of modern state power. Indeed, while scholars such as Benedict Anderson (1991) have discussed the general *hegemonic* effect of national mapping, they have rarely addressed the *counterhegemonic* effect of cartographic negotiations. It is the tensions between the hegemonic and the counterhegemonic, or, more precisely, the interarticulation of dominant and oppositional forms of hegemony, that the two case studies considered here help clarify. In juxtaposition, they illustrate an ambivalence in cartography that in turn points to a profound ambivalence in the very narration of the nation-state itself.

By making manifest the power-laden ambivalences and struggles in each empirical case study, this article simultaneously seeks to engage with and contribute to three areas of inquiry in contemporary geography. The first of these areas comprises the diverse work of political geographers on the geography of state power and the spatial imagination of nation. The second area stems from the work of historians of cartography as well as geographers, and includes the recent critical work on maps and their political contexts of production and use. And the third area consists of the related, but rather more complex and wide-ranging, set of engagements by geographers with so-called postcolonial theory. In the following pages, I first outline the implications of each of these literatures for my argument. I then explain how their triangulation enables me to construct the working concept-metaphor of "contrapuntal cartographies." I conclude these theoretical clarifications by summarizing how the notion of contrapuntal cartographies establishes in turn the basis for this article's overarching project: to produce a geographical supplement to Bhabha's postcolonial supplement to theories concerning the narration of nation. Other geographers have already critically engaged with Bhabha's wider work on hybridity (Mitchell 1997; Gregory 1994), and elsewhere I have developed a more general argument about geographically supplementing and thereby displacing poststructuralist theory (Sparke 1994, forthcoming). Here, however, I seek to make my supplementary-turned-critical

argument by empirically exploring the specific claims about the hybridity of "DissemiNation" in one of Bhabha's best and most political essays (1994).

Geo-graphic Supplements

The Political

Thanks in part to an engagement with the work of Michel Foucault (especially Foucault 1979 and 1980), political geographers are increasingly coming to terms with a considerably widened understanding of what counts as "the political." Once power is understood in a nonsovereigntist and more relational way as something that is exercised in social relations rather than held in the hands of individuals and states, then, following Foucault, power relations, politics and, in turn, political geographies can be found at work across all scales of social life. For political geographers, such a widened understanding of the political has provided the basis for a whole series of important conceptual innovations. At the scale of international political economy, analyses of the power relations historically underpinning state hegemons of the past have led to new interpretations of the contemporary global economy as a hegemonic scale-switching form of governmentality operating without a sovereign-like hegemon (Agnew 1998; Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Herod et al. 1998; Kofman and Youngs 1996; Low 1997; Swyngedouw 1997). At the scale of state security politics and interstate conflict, new conceptions of the intersection of power and discourse have led to the development of a vibrantly critical geopolitics (Dalby and Ó Tuathail 1996, 1998; Dodds and Sidaway 1994; Herbert 1996; Naylor forthcoming; Ó Tuathail 1996, forthcoming; Sharp 1993, 1996a, 1996b). And at the diverse scales of national, urban, and personal space, a widened notion of the political has also come together with the concerns of antiracist, feminist, and queer theory to produce burgeoning new literatures on the political geography of citizenship (Bell 1995; Brown 1997; Davis 1995; Jackson and Penrose 1993; Kofman 1995; Marston 1990; Painter 1995; Pincel 1994; Radcliffe and Westwood 1996; Sibley 1995; Sparke 1996; Staeheli 1994). This diverse renaissance of political geography has been accompanied by a newfound concern with geographies of resistance too (e.g., Moore 1997; Routledge 1993; and Watts 1997). It is this wide constellation of debate about power, knowledge, space, and political struggle that informs my own general approach to the case studies that follow.

My more specific research questions about power, knowledge, and the production of space in the modern nation-state are also inspired by the writings of the French geographer-philosopher Henri Lefebvre (1991) as well as by the work on legal geography of Nicholas Blomley (1994). These questions, however, owe their particular direction to the writing of a political scientist, Timothy Mitchell. In a field in which sovereigntist conceptions of "the state" holding power have chronically framed scholarship, Mitchell (1991) has offered instead an alternative Foucauldian account of how congeries of power relations ranging from national planning to the disciplining of modern armies create the net effects we subsequently homogenize and call "the state." Mitchell's ascending analysis of state power is valuable for geographers, I think, because it simultaneously centers the question of spatial ordering. It is this question that informs my own inquiries, and in these I follow Mitchell's longer elaboration of the processes that, as he describes it, "enframed" the ordered space of the state effect that was colonial Egypt (Mitchell 1988). Mitchell uses the notion of enframing to describe the modern and colonial exhibitionary order that instituted a series of dualisms between state and society, cities and city planning, and, more generally, the real and the represented. As such, he argues, enframing centrally involved "the conjuring up [of] a neutral surface or volume called space" through disciplinary practices (1988:44). Thus enframing can be said to involve a process of spatial abstraction that simultaneously occults the process through which abstract space becomes represented as discontinuous from the lived spaces of everyday life.[4] This thesis clearly resonates with Lefebvre's now-famous argument about the production of abstract space in modern capitalism: abstract space that is abstracted and organized as decorporealized, bureaucratized, and commodified (1991). Indeed, this point of theoretical intersection has already been noted by Derek Gregory (1994). Rather than dwell on the conceptual genealogy of this theoretical hybrid here, I will show the way a working notion of enframing can enable inquiry into the sorts of substantive geographical questions presented by the Delgamuukw trial and the *Atlas*. Considered thus as condensation points for struggles over the

enframing of space, law and cartography provide useful case studies not only because they are exemplary institutional arenas in which abstract state-space is reproduced and reworked, but also, as Blomley (1994) has shown so well, because they are *constitutively* interlinked. It is this linkage that in turn introduces the broader set of questions and literatures about cartography that have enabled my studies.

The Cartographic

Blomley's research into the history of Western property law led him to the valuable work of Richard Helgerson (1992) on the emergence of state cartography in Elizabethan England. Attending to the recursive proleptic effects of mapping—the way maps contribute to the construction of spaces that later they seem only to represent—Helgerson highlights how the new national maps of Saxton, Camden, and others were part and parcel of a civil and conceptual revolution in which it was made to seem as if the land itself spoke of the kingdom as a single state. Consequently, he claims:

> The cartographic representation of England did have an ideological effect. It strengthened the sense of both local and national identity at the expense of an identity based on dynastic loyalty. . . . Maps thus opened up a conceptual gap between the land and its ruler, a gap that would eventually span battlefields (1992:114).

Much like Mitchell's analysis of the dualisms inaugurated by colonial modernity as an exhibitionary order in Egypt, Helgerson shows that the appearance of this conceptual gap was crucial to the development of the fledgling state as something seemingly separate from society (see also Helgerson 1993).

The constitutive role of cartography in the production of some early modern state effects has of course been further documented and analyzed by historians of cartography. Most notably it was one of Brian Harley's key foci of analysis in his works on the power relations underpinning cartography (e.g., 1988, 1992a). What Harley's debunking of the myths of cartographic objectivity also showed, of course, was that this critical contextualization of cartography could be further extended to examine the central role mapping played in the organization and consolidation of imperial rule by European states overseas. Other scholars, such as Anne Godlewska (1988), deepened these arguments through more subtle empirical analysis (in this case, surveying the role of cartography in the very processes Mitchell was simultaneously describing as the enframing of Egypt). More recent further empirical and theoretical work has added nuance and detail to Harley's sweeping arguments (e.g., Belyea 1992; Edney 1997). In another article (Sparke 1995), I have built on this work, following Harley's study of the maps of the colonized in North America (1992b) and combining it with the call made by Godlewska and Neil Smith (1994) to study the rival geographies produced by those resisting colonialism. By examining the cartographic legacy of Shawnadithit, the last surviving Bheotuck native of what became Newfoundland, I documented the hybrid character of the cartography of the colonized; this same attention to cartographic ambivalence I now seek to extend. Showing how cartography can operate both for and against colonialism not only deepens the scholarly work of critical cartography, it also counters the too-speedy denunciation of maps and mapping as metaphors of domination (e.g., Pile and Rose 1992). It simultaneously serves as a corrective to the trend toward "imperial nostalgia"—a febrile fascination with the glory days and travels of colonialists—among certain celebrants of postcolonialism. Other geographers and critical cultural *theorists* of postcoloniality have been attendant to these dangers. I now turn to their work.

The Postcolonial

As Bruce Willems-Braun has carefully explained in the pages of this journal, the notion of "postcoloniality" as a historic period is problematic insofar as it "can easily be taken to assume a historical rupture between past and present" (1997b:704). In a country like Canada, as Willems-Braun also emphasizes, such an assumption can have the effect of actually concealing the ongoing effects of colonialism as an active force in day-to-day life. By contrast, as Gyan Prakash has argued, postcolonial theory at its best can instead "force a radical rethinking and re-formulation of forms of knowledge and social identities authorized by colonialism and western domination" (1992:8). It is this work of rethinking and reformulation to which I wish to contribute here, and in doing so I follow the lead of other

geographers who have already demonstrated the vitality of the approach, whether in reexamining geography's own imperial history (Godlewska and Smith 1994), researching the paradoxes surrounding the way Victorian women travelers found writerly independence in colonialism (Blunt 1994), critically supplementing research into the politics of nature (Willems-Braun 1992a), rewriting the history of colonial settlement geographies (Harris 1997); or introducing postcolonial theory into the heart of urban studies (Jacobs 1996; Smith 1996). Jane Jacobs's work is a particularly significant reference point here because her study of aboriginal politics in urban Australia examines cartography as an ambivalent (post)colonial mode of spatial representation. She notes that the "emphasis on the hegemonic effect of the map may well overstate the power of the cartographic imagination" (1996:150), and proceeds to show how some contemporary aboriginal remappings produce a destabilizing doubling of the colonial cartography drawn for tourists, a doubling, she suggests, that effectively "de-tours" the map (1996:151). To be sure, Jacobs also notes that the decolonizing political potential of this de-touring of the tourist landscape is minimal: "[it] probably will not result in Aborigines gaining significant or meaningful land rights in relation to Brisbane" (1996:154). Nevertheless, her keen attention to cartographic destabilization through remapping illustrates and introduces the concept-metaphor I call "contrapuntal cartographies."

The notion of a contrapuntal *reading* of cartography is drawn from Edward Said, who uses the musical metaphor to break down singularized and unidirectional understandings of the culture of imperialism (1993). Reading contrapuntally, argues Said, involves "a simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan history that is narrated and of those other histories against which (and together with which) the dominating discourse acts" (1993:51). Said thus reworks the formal musical meaning of the term, suggesting that a contrapuntal interpretation involves a strategic revoicing of the subdominant to make it equal to the dominant and thus to orchestrate a balance that can potentially edify and educate an audience about the power relations of culture. In the two cases examined here, this strategic contrapuntal orchestration provides political purchase on what are, at once, more state-related and overtly geographical forms of national narration. As case studies, they in turn highlight, perhaps more clearly than Said's own examples, how in a national struggle "to reclaim, rename and reinhabit the land," the impulse is indeed "cartographic" (1993:226).[5] More than this, though, these examples reveal the intrinsic articulation between the colonial and meaningfully *post*colonial that runs deeper than any act of interpretation by the single composer/reader evoked by Said's metaphor. In examining these points of real articulation, and therefore ambivalence, in the contrapuntal cartographies presented by the Delgamuukw trial and the *Historical Atlas*, Bhabha's conceptual claims about the constitution of the modern nation become valuable.

The imagination and narration of nation, Bhabha argues, is deeply marked by ambivalence (1994:146–51). On the one hand, there is what he describes as the self-certain *pedagogy* of national discourse. Not unlike the maps described by Helgerson, such pedagogy teaches, among other things, that the spaces of everyday life along with all "the people" can be abstracted into the nation-space, all territory transformed into a new national tradition. On the other hand, Bhabha argues that such national pedagogy always has to come to realization through supplementary *performances*, the actual putting into practice and place of the teachings. It is in such unavoidable performance, he suggests, that the political unity of the national narrative falls apart (split, in Bhabha's metaphorics, by the same displacement that Derrida elaborated in the supplementary structure of *writing*). The pedagogy has to be performed and put in place, and yet each time it is thereby supplemented, it transforms homogeneity into heterogeneity. As a result, "the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing circle of national subjects" (1994:145).

This canny articulation of national pedagogy displaced in performance is invaluable for coming to terms with the contrapuntal cartographies of postcolonial national negotiation. Bhabha himself, however, all the while he makes much of "location" in his essay and book, does not make any connections to the actual production of space, let alone to cartographic enframing. Perhaps one should not expect this of a text that already engages so much political, philosophical, and psychological debate. Nevertheless, it is important to note that space, location, and territory are still present in Bhabha's work, serving in a largely unexamined way as metaphorized sites of performativity. These three forms of space sometimes become his idealized "Third Space" of

displacement and difference, the space of hybridity, which is always already situated in-between. Much like Bhabha's (uncannily similar) arguments about ambivalence in colonial discourse, his claims about national narratives therefore seem to be, in Robert Young's critical words, "offered as static concepts, curiously anthropomorphized so that they possess their own desire" (1990:146). This, I would suggest, is symptomatic of at least two more profound problems with his account: the first relating to how his rhetorical elevation of ambivalence abstracts away from the actual organization and violence of power relations; the second concerns his erasure of the state. Bhabha offers no account of the historical production of abstract space. Consequently, he ignores the possibility of how space can be produced and thereby performed pedagogically in powerful ways that convene and thereby potentially coopt plural traditions and histories into the abstraction of the single territorial collectivity constituting the state. Bhabha's treatment of space, and what other scholars have critiqued as his bracketing of the political (Xie 1996; Mitchell 1997), would thus seem to be related. In order to draw attention to the implications of this weakness, I am seeking here to rework and thus, as it were, reperform his argument geographically through the examination of the contrapuntal cartographies of these two case studies. To better indicate where this argument will lead, I return to the two epigraphs at the start of this paper.

Contrapuntal Cartographies

Jean-Pierre Wallot, the Dominion Archivist who wrote the second of two forewords to volume 1 of the *Atlas*, compared the volume to a "musical score" primarily as a way of coming to terms with how it represented demographic, economic, cultural, governmental, and social relationships altogether in the space of the nation-state. As a result of such amalgamation, he wrote, "Canadians will have a better understanding of themselves, and, it is hoped, will be inspired to extend the frontiers of knowledge even further" (Wallot 1987). Beyond this achievement, I argue that the more radical and creative aspect of the *Atlas* has been to provide a cartographic "musical score" which, once given contrapuntal voicing, can enable its national Canadian audience to rethink the colonial frontiers of national knowledge itself. By scrupulously mapping the supposed beginnings of the nation, the *Atlas* subverts any punctual notion of a singular national origin, displacing it with an invitation to readers to reevaluate the ways in which the template of contemporary Canada is imposed proleptically on a heterogeneous past. Most particularly, it enables Canadians to reconsider the discontinuous positions of native peoples—their positions quite literally in diverse geographies, on the continent, before the arrival of the English and French—as a disjunctive series of national traditions at the ends of the frontier of Canada as nation. As such, its contrapuntal aspects exemplify what Bhabha calls "a liminal signifying space that is *internally* marked by the discourses of minorities, the heterogeneous histories of contending peoples, antagonistic authorities and tense locations of cultural difference" (1994:148).

Still more tense were the differences in and over location evidenced in the court case. Like the *Atlas*, the contrapuntal dualities of *Delgamuukw v. the Queen* made the *location* of national discourse a contentious question through a repeated return to maps. Not only were cartographic tools and arguments used by the defense (the B.C. and federal governments), they were also a key component of the Wet'suwet'en and Gitxsan people's own attempts to outline their sovereignty in a way the Canadian court might understand (e.g., Figure 1). It was one such map of Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en territory (Exhibit 102) that Chief Justice Allan McEachern was beginning to unfold when he declared, "We'll call it the map that roared." In the immediate context of trying to open up a huge paper reproduction of the First Nations' map, his words appeared to refer to the colloquial notion of a "paper tiger" (*Delgamuukw v. the Queen*, Trial Transcripts 1988:6871). They also may have been a reference to the 1959 Peter Sellers movie satirizing Cold War geopolitics, "The Mouse that Roared." As such the comments might be interpreted as a derisory scripting of the plaintiffs as a ramshackled, anachronistic nation. But as Don Monet, a cartoonist working for the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en, made clear, the Chief Justice's reference to a roaring map simultaneously evoked the resistance in the First Nations' remapping of the land: the cartography's roaring refusal of the orientation systems, the trap lines, the property lines, the electricity lines, the pipelines, the logging roads, the clear-cuts, and all the other accoutrements of Canadian colonialism on native land (Figure 2).



Figure 1. One of the many maps prepared for the trial, depicting Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en names and land, with fishing sites indicated in red and the Houses that own the sites in black. Reprinted by kind permission of Don Ryan, Gitxsan Treaty Office.

Figure 2. "A Map that Roared." Reprinted from Monet and Skanu'u (1992), by kind permission of Don Monet.

McEachern ultimately dismissed the Gitxsan and Wet'swuet'en's claims with a remarkably absolutist set of colonialist claims about the extinguishment of aboriginal rights (McEachern 1991). In its original format, his judgment spanned almost 400 pages and, in arguments ranging widely from the Chief Justice's view of First Nations societies to his understanding of Canadian history, he systematically dismissed Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en claims to ownership, jurisdiction, and damages for the loss of lands and resources since the establishment of the colony. Nevertheless, his comments on Exhibit 102, the map showing the "Traditional Boundaries of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en Territories," would also appear to betray, albeit unconsciously, a real recognition of Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en agency and territorial survival. That very same agency recently recorded far more fullsome vindication when the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision overturning McEachern's judgment and opening up the possibility of a new trial, or at least greater bargaining leverage for the two First Nations with the provincial and federal governments (Appeal Transcripts 1997). This was a massive turnaround in native rights litigation more generally in Canada, and, as well as making local news (Bell 1997), was reported on the front page of the *New York Times* (de Palma 1998). But before all this, the clash of "antagonistic authorities" referred to by Bhabha as the internal mark of the nation-space was already clear in the original courtroom discourse over cartography, and for the same reason, it will serve as the first of my two case studies.

The Trial: Pedagogy Performing the Policing of Performance

> Insinuating itself into the terms of reference of the dominant discourse, the supplementary antagonizes the implicit power to generalize, to produce the sociological solidity. The questioning of the supplement is not a repetitive rhetoric of the "end" of society but a meditation on the disposition of space and time from which the narrative of nation must begin (Homi Bhabha 1994:155).

By entering into the Canadian legal process of the trial in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the Wet'suwet'en and Gitxsan peoples were insinuating their claims into the terms of reference of the dominant discourse. Theirs was a contested and compromising entry, and while the claim to 58,000 square kilometers of land did have a crucial antagonistic effect, it did not come with the same rhetorical ease with which Bhabha's account of "the supplementary" seems to spirit its way towards almost ontological conclusions. In fact, so dubious an ally was the Canadian law seen to be that many sympathetic commentators, both from within First Nations communities and without, criticized the chiefs for embarking on such a compromising strategy.[6] "A criticism we had to take," records Satsan, a

Wet'suwet'en chief, "was that we were entering a game in which we had no involvement whatsoever with the putting together of that game, the making up of the rules, in the appointment of referees and umpires" (Satsan 1992:54). It was not simply that the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en had to deal with the adversarial protocols and far from sly spatiality of the courtroom. It was also that the actual arguments made by the two First Nations had to work within the framework of Canadian colonial law. In order to make their claims, in other words, they had to turn the legal system, its archives, precedents, and process, against itself. This strategy, argues Satsan, was not a massive "sell-out" to the legal game but rather a massive challenge to the game itself:

> If we had chosen to play that game the way it was set out, I think that in the end we would more than likely have lost that which is so great to us. So we chose instead to challenge the whole bloody game, to say that this game is wrong, to say we don't agree with your referee and your umpire. This is a fixed game. We want to see a change (Satsan 1992:55).

The lawsuit, then, was indeed an antagonistic supplementary action. But, as such, it amounted to more than just a "meditation" on the disposition of space and time from which the narrative of nation begins. I argue that in fact the trial became a site of struggle over the disposition of time and space in the modern nation-state of Canada.

Coming into the Canadian court, the two First Nations had to attempt to insert their voices and speak their claims in a way that would successfully communicate their primarily oral knowledge and understanding of territorial jurisdiction to a white judge trained in the abstractions and textual formalities of the modern western state. Like the Mashpee trial examined by James Clifford, the court case therefore represented a "borderline case" where cultural translations of different identities were very much in evidence (Clifford 1988:288–89). In this case, however, the "powerful ways of looking" Clifford speaks of as being problematic were nevertheless still hegemonic; they comprehensively structured the translation exercise. Thus the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en also had to negotiate the abstracting effect of the court itself: its rules, its norms of behavior, and its general distance from everyday life among the two First Nations. Central to all these courtroom abstractions was the removed, bureaucratized, and disembodied conception of abstract space that, Mitchell argues, is constitutive of modern state effects. The Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en were therefore obliged to negotiate with the structuring effects of this normalized abstract space—what might usefully be called a pedagogic space of "the people"—at a number of different levels.

Negotiating in the Space of the People

At the most microgeographical scale, there was the actual spatial layout of the courtroom. The court's architecture, like that of courtrooms all over North America, reflected the adversarial and individualistic nature of courtroom exchange with an oppositional positioning of questioner and witness and an isolated, individualizing witness stand. This divisive courtroom arena was, as Timothy Solnick (1992) has pointed out at length, a very difficult space for the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en people to enter into as collective nations. Part of this difficulty was also practical, and concerned the way the trial was moved from Smithers, a small community in the heart of the claimed territory, to Vancouver, more than 1200 kilometers away. The Chief Justice, working with a modern western concept of justice applying equally, everywhere within the abstract space of the state, could easily argue that Vancouver would be a more convenient location for the trial. His reasoning may have been predicated on his personal needs, but the abstract system provided his authority, and it was hard for the First Nations to contest the move within the rubrics of Canadian law. This meant that while the Chief Justice submitted that he was inconvenienced as a judge by the Smithers location—"I frankly admit that I do not have the endurance to continue a case as difficult as this one for any appreciable time outside Vancouver" (Monet and Skanu'u 1992:50)—he freely ignored the inconvenience, cost, and hardship imposed on the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en by moving the trial away from their own communities. Not only did all those testifying have to travel at great expense to a city far from their families and support networks, they also had to pay for lodging in the city and to negotiate the modernist monolith of the Vancouver courthouse. Far from Smithers, the location of this building, along with its alienating scale, its strictly monitored spaces, and its expensive environs, effectively barred the strong social support Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en witnesses had received

from the spectators' gallery in Smithers. It also made for a much more difficult place to have collective pre- and posttrial briefing sessions. Taken together, the spatial characteristics of the court and its location amounted in effect to a muted but colonial form of state-space-abstracting violence. This geometry of power showed with remarkable clarity that the spatial order of the legal system tends to be mapped out in abstract state-space, coordinated in large part by the desires and intentions of the administrators of state law rather than the demands of the people seeking justice through the legal system. It also showed how the court, in the microgeography of its day-to-day procedures, served as an apparatus of colonizing state power. It was with and in this same structure of violence that the Wet'suwet'en and Gitxsan people knowingly decided to negotiate their national claims. As they did so, going one after the other through the witness stand, they were—within certain limitations—nevertheless able to subvert this space of the state effect.

One aspect of the First Nations' subversive courtroom performance was the repeated demonstration of the vitality and importance of their oral histories. Witnesses from both the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en sung or described ceremonial songs and performances in court, among them the Wet'suwet'en *kungax* and the many Gitxsan *limx'ooy*, each of which evoked the *adaawk*—a form of historical geographic record—of particular Gitxsan Houses. There was a great deal of controversy in court about having such oral records accepted as legitimate evidence in exemption to the hearsay rule. In a Western juridical field that conventionally accepts only written and cartographic documentation of territory, such oral traditions were cast as illegitimate. Clearly, the Chief Justice showed little respect either in court or in his written "Reasons for Judgement" for what he had heard in this way (one circumstance that later led the Supreme Court in Ottawa to overthrow his judgment [Appeals Transcripts 1997: §98]). When, for example, he was asked whether Antgulilibix (Mary Johnson) could sing a sacred song, McEachern exclaimed:

> Could it not be written out and asked if this is the wording? Really, we are on the verge of getting way off track here Mr. Grant. Again I don't want to be skeptical, but to have witnesses singing songs in court is, in my respectful opinion, not the proper way to approach the problem (Monet and Skanu'u 1992:42).

In making his judgment, he ultimately reasoned that:

> Except in a very few cases, the totality of the evidence raises serious doubts about the reliability of the *adaawk* and *kungax* as evidence of detailed history, or land ownership, use or occupation (McEachern 1991:259).

Nevertheless, the very fact that the songs were sung at all subverted the hushed and sanitized sounds of normal legal procedure. Every time a First Nations' word was used, it had to be interpreted and meticulously spelled out for the court records such that the cultural distinctiveness of the peoples as First Nations with disjunctive cultural histories was reaffirmed. The result was the complex cultural clash usefully illustrated by another of Don Monet's cartoons (Figure 3).

Negotiating with Maps

In addition to the formal spatiality of the court and its subversion, Monet's cartoon also highlights another more directly cartographic theme. On the one side, he pictures Antgulilibix singing the *limx'ooy*. On the other is the Chief Justice, surrounded by his written records and maps. The latter, with their Cartesian grid base and their orientation system organized by the North Pole arrow, stand here as paradigmatic of the proper pedagogy of the courtroom. Monet uses them as both an indication of the rationalizations used by the government lawyers and examples of the "proper way to approach the problem," according to the Chief Justice. It was precisely the rules of this game played in abstract space that the two First Nations had to negotiate. Given that ultimately they had to communicate their territorial knowledge to this judge in this court, they translated their oral knowledge into a series of maps. This produced, I think, one of the clearest examples of Satsan's point about playing the game in order to change it. Through the medium of modern mapping, they articulated their claim to their territories in a way the judge might understand. In the process, they were effectively cartographing their lands as First Nations within the abstract state-space of Cartesian cartography. Simultaneously, they were supplementing the provincial and federal mapping of the land with maps based on Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en oral knowledge. As such a repetition with a difference, a



Figure 3. "The Law vs. Ayook." Reprinted from Monet and Skanu'u (1992), by kind permission of Don Monet.

performance of the pedagogy of the place of the people, the maps served at once both to communicate in and disrupt the cartographic conventions of the court.

Mapping had been closely allied with the strategy of going to trial since the 1960s when, as Neil Sterritt (Medig'm) reported, a map of the territories drawn by Chris Harris "began the court actions rolling" (Monet and Skanu'u 1992:98). Subsequently, Sterritt noted in court:

> [T]here was a meeting in January 1975, it was a major meeting, and it was fully attended by the hereditary chiefs from all the villages and I believe the Wet'suwet'en as well, and this was in Kitwanga, and at that meeting the hereditary chiefs instructed three persons to put together a map and to go to work on land claims (Trial Transcripts, v. 112, p. 7036).

At about this time, other First Nations were also using maps in their negotiations with the

government. Hugh Brody documents how, in dealings with the Northern Pipeline Agency's 1979 hearings, map biographies were used to depict the extent of First Nations' occupancy and resource use (Brody 1988). This use introduced complex questions about the intersection between the maps drawn up specifically for the hearings and the ancient maps of dreams and ceremony.[7] For the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en, these questions of mapping and tradition were still more complexly interrelated, insofar as the point of producing their maps as trial affidavits related to the translation of the oral histories of the Houses into modern maps. Thus, unlike the land claims of the Labrador Inuit, the northern Ontario Cree and Ojibwa, and the northern Saskatchewan Chipewyan, the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en were not using map biographies of their occupancy and resource utilization in order to claim title on a resource-tenure basis (see Usher et al. 1992). Instead, they presented the court with a series of maps that mapped their Houses and thus their territory over, or more accurately perhaps, *under* British Columbian provincial maps (see Figures 4 and 5). Because such provincial maps had historically been imposed over the territory in a way that almost erased its precolonial spatiality, this cartographic representation of the Houses also served to chart the sheer density of the palimpsest produced by the whole series of precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial inscriptions. The process restored some meaning to spaces more usually covered by apparent emptiness on modern Canadian representations of the province. Inscribing anticolonial names and places in the middle of the colonial coverage, it also addressed head-on what Bhabha describes as the "problem of signifying the interstitial passages and processes of cultural difference that are inscribed in the 'in-between' " (1994:217).

The abstract maps of Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en territory showing the internal boundaries of the Houses (Figure 4 and 5) were perhaps the most obviously "in-between" of all the maps connected to the trial. These seemingly abstract national maps had a particularly marked ambivalence in their address (and, as such, found their way into both the Chief Justice's "Reasons for Judgement," and Monet and Skanu'u's critical report *Colonialism on Trial* [1992]). The internal boundaries they indicate were abstracted from their oral, contextual, and embodied articulation in the songs of the First Nations' feasts and were represented instead in the silent, Cartesian, and decorporealized spatial codes of the modern western state. In both maps, an overall national boundary was used to isolate a decontextualized space that was then subdivided according to what could very easily be understood as local jurisdictions. Yet the maps, while following these abstract rules of proper and stately court procedure, nevertheless also transformed them by establishing a toponymy for the subdivisions with the names of the First Nations' Houses. In effect, they depict the First Nations territories as seemingly independent nation-states with their own internal boundaries. One way of looking at the maps, therefore, is as illustrations of how the counterhegemonic can rearticulate the hegemonic in its own oppositional terms. In this way, the First Nations' territorial jurisdiction was successfully communicated all the while the audience in the theater of nation-state pedagogy witnessed a performance with a difference. Evidently the maps in general had disruptive effects in court: they did indeed "roar." But beyond the temporary disruptions to the orderliness of the court, the unfolding of specific First Nations' maps, such as those charting the internal boundaries, also evidenced a systematic recodification of the land. The territories repeatedly presented in the government maps as so many square miles of resources were thereby actively represented as a landscape rich with the historical geographies of Wet'suwet'en and Gitxsan names and meanings.

There were of course a number of risks attached to this cartographic strategy, among them the danger of publicizing First Nations' knowledges.[8] There was also the specific danger of the maps meeting with disrespect, a potential similar to that of the singing the songs in court. This danger was knowingly subordinated by the Wet'suwet'en and Gitxsan to their wider project of educating Canadians and seeking recognition of self-government. But playing the court's cartographic game also opened up the plaintiffs' case to direct examination in the wider and usually opposing terms and assumptions of the court's conventions concerning abstract state-space. For example, James Macauley, a lawyer representing the federal government is recorded as asserting the following:

> Mr. Macauley: There is another matter that will come up when my friends, at last it is produced, that's his atlas of maps. The maps we received today. This comes as no surprise because we have seen this kind of map before. The place names, the names of creeks rivers and hills and all the other features, are



Figure 4. Gitxsan Territory. Reprinted from Monet and Skanu'u (1992), by kind permission of Don Ryan, Gitxsan Treaty Office.

> none of them geographic names, they are the Gitksan names (Trial Transcripts:279).

The names on the government maps, the names of state, as it were, are held up here as the only real names, the "geographic names." The abstract effect of the state and the territorial homogeneity on which it is secured are thus flatly presented as admitting no alternatives. Rereading Macauley's disjointed words, we can also perhaps detect signs of anxiety. The over-bold assertion about Gitxsan names not being "geographic names" might thus be seen to point to how the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en maps had at least challenged observers to rethink Canada's official geography, the other national naming of the land, as an interested discourse. Yet in the context of the court, such a rethinking was obviously limited. The implication that the so-called "geographic names" were part

Figure 5. Wet'suwet'en Territory. Reprinted from Monet and Skanu'u (1992), by kind permission of Don Ryan, Gitxsan Treaty Office.

of an abstract cartographic discourse that had erased the land's Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en names was not examined. Instead, the project of erasure was reaffirmed against the looming threat of First Nations' displacements and recodifications of the state's abstract space.

There were many other moments when the accuracy of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en map boundaries was challenged, not least in the Chief Justice's own reasoning. He complained that: "There are far too many inconsistencies in the plaintiffs' evidence to permit me to conclude that individual chiefs or Houses have discrete aboriginal rights or interests in the various territories defined by the internal boundaries" (McEachern 1991:507). The fact that the maps were translations of songs, and that such House songs of territory and history were unlikely to match up

perfectly with discretely delineated blocks of territory in abstract space, was of little concern. Instead, the Chief Justice simply judged the cartographic affidavits by the standards of the colonial state. As a result, the evidence of House ownership presented by the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en was ultimately dismissed. Moreover, in his overall dismissal of the case, the Chief Justice not only measured the maps of the two First Nations in the terms of abstract state-space, he also imposed the same distant and disembodied understanding of territory onto the whole question of life in the claimed territories. Despite all the work of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en cartography, it did not seem to challenge the Chief Justice to reexamine his basic surveyor's view of the land.[9]

"I visited many parts of the territory which is the principal subject of this case during a three-day helicopter and highway 'view' in June, 1988," McEachern reports (1991:200). This "view" it seemed, not unlike the colonial cartography of the "New World" which effectively depopulated the land of its older inhabitants, imposed a preconceived and abstract notion of emptiness on what the Chief Justice saw. He summarizes thus: "These explorations were for the purpose of familiarizing myself, as best I could, with this beautiful, vast and almost empty part of the province" (1991:201). Whatever names and meaning the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en had sought to map back on to the landscape with their cartography was in such moments lost on the judge. For him, instead, the landscape was enframed as "beautiful, vast and almost empty." It might seem that these are just terms of innocent, almost sublime reflection. And yet they are also terms of colonial conquest, terms which, with easy appeals to the abstractions of European aestheticism, serve to empty the landscape. Combined with the court's abstract cartographic conventions in the "Reasons for Judgement," they explain a great deal of the Chief Justice's "proper way to approach the problem," and why, ultimately, he ruled to dismiss the suit. As Harley describes the enframing effect of colonial cartography, the Chief Justice's overall view might also be said to have dispossessed the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en "by engulfing them with blank spaces" (1992:531).

Negotiating the Geography of the Royal Proclamation

In his "Reasons for Judgement," the Chief Justice makes clear that, while he is in no doubt about his final conclusions, one specific section of evidence during the trial particularly exercised him. Notably, it did not concern Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en maps, songs or, in fact their actual presence in the land at all. Instead it was about Europeans, their laws, and their maps.

> One of the most interesting parts of evidence and argument in this case concerned th[e] famous Proclamation which was issued by George III, on the advice of his Ministers, on October 7, 1763, following the completion of the Peace of Paris on February 10 of that year (1991:287).

Ironically, it was in the terms of this same Proclamation that the Wet'suwet'en and Gitxsan lawyers advanced perhaps one of their most powerful arguments. Had it not also been dismissed by the Chief Justice, it would have overridden his arguments about the inadequacy of the map and song evidence of House ownership and jurisdiction. The major reason for this was that it was an appeal to colonial law itself, a very clear case of playing the game against the game. It did not turn on First Nations cartography, but instead hinged on historical argument about the contradictions in the colonial cartographic archive itself. Ultimately, the court arguments still enframed the appeal in abstract spatial terms that emptied it of content, but this performance of pedagogy paradoxically meant that the government's arguments involved shrinking rather than expanding the spatial extent of claims to colonial control. In short, it was a performance which in form, if not in its immediate results, radically problematized the court's pedagogy of power/knowledge.

In issuing the Royal Proclamation, George III had declared that before any aboriginal lands could be taken by British subjects in the New World, the colonizers should have the informed consent of the aboriginal inhabitants. Because there were no treaties ever made with the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en that gave such consent, their lawyers pleaded the following:

> 64. The Plaintiffs have enjoyed and still enjoy their aforementioned rights as recognized and confirmed by the Royal Proclamation made by his Majesty King George the Third on the 7th of October, 1763 (hereinafter called the "Royal Proclamation").
>
> 65. The Royal Proclamation applies to British Columbia and is part of the Constitution of Canada. The Plaintiffs' ownership and jurisdiction over the Territory thereby includes without restricting the generality of the foregoing:

> 1. A right that the Territory be reserved to the benefit of the Plaintiffs until by the Plaintiffs' informed consent the said rights are surrendered to the Imperial or Federal Crown.
>
> 2. A recognition of the Plaintiffs' aboriginal title, ownership and jurisdiction and the special relationship of the Plaintiffs as Indians to the Imperial or Federal Crown.
>
> 66. In the alternative, by virtue of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, the Plaintiffs enjoy the rights hereinafter set out:
>
> 1. A right to ownership of all lands within the Territory and to territorial waters and to the resources thereon and therein, and
>
> 2. A right to the jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs and the members of their Houses and all the land, territorial waters and resources within the Territory, and
>
> 3. A right to the Imperial or Federal Crown's protection in reserving the aforementioned rights to the benefit of the Plaintiffs until, through the informed consent of the Plaintiffs, the said rights are surrendered to the Imperial or Federal Crown (McEachern 1991:288).

The response of the government lawyers and subsequently the Chief Justice himself was contorted to say the least. They could not simply deny that any such rights existed, as this would be a denial of Canadian law. Likewise, given the government's own records, they could not reasonably argue that the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en had ever given informed consent. Instead, they found themselves in the peculiar and superficially anticolonial position of arguing that the colonial law of the Royal Proclamation did *not* apply to British Columbia. Central to this contorted argument were colonial maps that served to demonstrate that the province was not adequately known by the King and his ministers at the time of the Royal Proclamation. It was an argument, as it were, from cartographic ignorance, and as such served to thematize the power/knowledge links between European law and European spatial knowledge that served elsewhere in the trial—not least in the Chief Justice's denial of House ownership on the basis of cartographic inaccuracies—as the unstated common sense of reasoning. The Proclamation had no legal effect in British Columbia, the defense argued, because at the moment of its enunciation, the area had not yet entered fully into the European epistemic empire. Precisely because *it had not been properly mapped*, it was not yet a transparent space of state power.

The cartographic archive of the period is rich and does not easily lend itself to this narrow reading. Nevertheless, an effort was made in a brief from Albert Farley, a geographer and historian of cartography. Collecting a chronological series of maps of North America from the period of the Royal Proclamation, he concluded that what is now British Columbia was not well known. "It is inconceivable," he wrote, "that the framers of the Proclamation in 1763 could have had access to more than a very rudimentary knowledge of this remote area" (Monet and Skanu'u 1992:154). In court, he again reaffirmed this view:

> To set this in perspective, one could say that before the publication of the narrative associated with Cook's third and last voyage, publication dated 1784, before that, even the coastline of what is now British Columbia was remote from the known world (1992:154).

It is, I think, a telling irony that, in a court where the supremacy of colonial knowledge and colonial records was constantly upheld, and where the abstract space of Cartesian cartography was elevated as a paradigm of accuracy, the government case turned at one of its more desperate moments on a claim about the failings and inadequacies of colonial cartography. Maps of North America were said to be vague and inaccurate in their depictions of the northwest coast. The usual spatial arrogance of European imperialism assumed elsewhere by the government lawyers in arguments about extinguishing aboriginal rights was thus displaced. In its stead came a litany of caveats concerning the limits rather than the sweeping reach of European spatial knowledge. As a result, lawyers for the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en had a relatively easy time criticizing the argument. They cast doubt on the claims about spatial ignorance by showing other maps that existed contemporaneously with the Proclamation. One of these was a map drawn up by the King's geographer Thomas Jeffreys in 1761, which showed the North West Coast.

> Q: Now, Dr. Farley, can you agree with me that this is Thomas Jeffreys' map of 1761?
> A: Yes . . .
> Q: Now, if you look, Dr. Farley, the title is "A Map of the Discoveries Made by the Russians on the Northwest Coast of America?"
> A: Yes. . . . I have seen the Jeffreys map before.
> Q: You did not include it in your folio?
> A: No.

> Q: Is there any reason you did not?
> A: It seemed to me that the Muller map was the first derivative from the Russian information, and that was the appropriate one to include.
> Q: Clearly here Thomas Jeffreys, as Geographer for the King—I think you have agreed that he was—is stating that there is a northwest coast of America?
> A: It is portrayed on the map, yes (1992:154).

Yet, while it was easy enough to demonstrate the tendentiousness of the defense argument, it was still the argument about inaccuracies and empty spaces that ultimately persuaded the Chief Justice. Even if the coast was there on the Jeffreys map, there was no detailed knowledge of the interior, he reasoned, and hence the details of the law, of statutory power relations, were not yet effective.

> While the evidence is not conclusive, and I have no doubt Mr. Rush is right when he argues more was known on the ground, it is my conclusion that precious little was known by governments in Europe in 1763 about the western half of North America . . . For these reasons it cannot be said that those vast areas were British possessions at the time of the Royal Proclamation, 1763 (1991:292–93).

Conclusions and Beginnings

The whole project of the defense and then of the Chief Justice to limit the claims to European knowledge and expansion seemed to go quite against the grain of the usual norms of knowledge production in a modern nation-state like Canada. The conventional tendency, as I will show in the next section, is for the modern nation-state to push its beginnings, and hence its geographical integrity, as far back as possible into history. Nations, as it is commonly noted, tend thus to celebrate their supposed age rather than their remarkable youth. And yet here were the administrators and defenders of the nation-state trying to pull forward the space of the properly Canadian past so that a historic part of state law could *not* be judged to apply to what was nonetheless repeatedly referred to as "British Columbia." In short, with their supplementary appeal to the colonial law of the Royal Proclamation, the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en provoked a struggle over "the disposition of space and time from which the narrative of nation must begin" (Bhabha 1994:115). It was not the interstitial maps of their nations graphed over provincial maps that prevailed very far in this struggle, nor their singing of House songs in court. These more radically resistant courtroom performances were simply policed and cordoned off with bold disrespect. The map that roared, it seems, was caged, locked up, and assessed within the abstract space of the state. By contrast, it was the direct appeal to colonial law that came closer to disrupting the abstractions of the state pedagogy. It forced a radical review of the limits of Canada's past in space. But even as it did so, this performance of George III's pedagogy was itself no equal to the court's colonial clasp on the dominant apparatus of power/knowledge in the present.

Despite the fact that the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en had effectively inserted their claims into the terms of the dominant discourse, their performance was still one around which the Chief Justice could simply close the curtain. There was still a duality of the hegemonic and the counterhegemonic made manifest in the process, and the cartographic contentions, in particular, showed how the trial served to thematize the overlapping historical geographies of colonialism and First Nations resistance. These overlaps were what the Wet'suwet'en and Gitxsan replayed to such performative effect. Yet this contrapuntal duality in the trial, taken as a whole, did not immediately change "the game" in the way First Nations leaders like Satsan hoped it would. The Chief Justice's "Reasons for Judgement" shows that the pedagogy of the proper persisted, and all the performance, all the attempts at supplementary rearticulation, were finally policed (performatively to be sure) within the spatial abstractions of the state. Perhaps now, with McEachern's judgment overturned, more emancipatory performances of resistance will become possible. But the record of the trial itself remains as a sobering reminder of the difficulties involved in negotiating with structures of violence. Unlike Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, a postcolonial theorist who persistently draws attention to such difficulties (e.g., Spivak 1990), Bhabha's celebration of agency through performance would seem to miss or at least downplay political obstacles to resistance. At one point, he actually acknowledges that the displacement of dominant and subordinate positions through performance "does not prevent these positions from being effective in a political sense" (1994:145), but he never explores how this limits his account of political transformation. This limitation is problematic not only because it ignores real political problems with a performative theory of agency through supplemen-

tation, but also because it simply fails to provide a way of distinguishing between performances enabled to force displacements and those that are thwarted. With this distinction in mind, I turn next to the *Atlas*. As I examine it in terms of pedagogy and performance, I aim to show that moments of displacement are not always policed. There is not always the same theatrical spatiality that shaped events in the B.C. courtroom, not always a judge privileged as the supreme all-comprehending spectator, and not always the same reduction of complex, overlapping historical geographies to a "vast, beautiful and almost empty" stage.

The *Atlas:* From the Pedagogic Root to Performative Routes

> For the political unity of the nation consists in a continual displacement of the anxiety of its irredeemably plural modern space—representing the nation's modern territoriality is turned into the archaic, atavistic temporality of Traditionalism. The difference of Space returns as the sameness of time, turning territory into Tradition, turning the People into One (Bhabha 1994:149).

Given the associations between Canadian national mapping and what I described in the last section as the proper pedagogy of the courtroom, it might seem that an atlas of Canada would offer little relief from the pattern of nationalist hegemony identified by Bhabha as the transformation of territory into tradition. Such a presumption would be highly premature, however, and, in the case of the *Historical Atlas*, rather inaccurate. Certainly the *Atlas* can be read as a classic example of national pedagogy. Through its powerful social status as a teaching tool, its traditional evolutionary narrative, and its imposition of modern Canadian names and shapes on the precolonial past, it might indeed seem to transform the nation's modern territoriality "into the archaic, atavistic temporality of Traditionalism" (Bhabha, 1994:149). And yet, I will argue, the *Historical Atlas* does not so much "displace" anxiety about Canada's irredeemably plural modern space as actively celebrate it as the very stuff of Canadian tradition. This, I suggest, has a number of critical implications about Bhabha's arguments concerning space, and the links between space, performativity, and disruption. At a more practical level, though, the example of the *Atlas* shows how a seemingly hegemonic narrative of the nation can also function through its very rigor and ideals of comprehensiveness to open up spaces for counter-hegemonic questioning. Overall, my account of the *Atlas* testifies to the wisdom in José Rabasa's words about Mercator's original atlas. Such an atlas, he argued, must be understood:

> as simultaneously constituting a stock of information for a collection of memory and instituting a signaling tool for scrambling previous territorializations. Memory and systematic forgetfulness, fantastic allegories and geometric reason coexist in the Atlas with an apparent disparity (Rabasa 1985:3).

It is this simultaneity and coexistence of pedagogic stockpiling with performative scrambling that the court's strict divisions dichotomized in *Delgamuukw v. the Queen.* Performance was policed to severely curtail any chance of turning the map into a signaling tool that might further First Nations' reterritorializations. The court and counsel for the defense pontificated with strident pedagogy while the Wet'swuet'en and Gitxsan struggled to have their cartographic performance even recognized as such. In the *Atlas*, by comparison, the hegemonic and counterhegemonic were far more closely intertwined. As such, they can usefully be compared with two different sets of entangled roots and routes. One set is the pedagogic national-genesis story with its *singular root* marked by the subtitle given to the English edition of volume 1 by the University of Toronto Press: *From the Beginning to 1800*. The other, less sacred-sounding set, the set made up of the *multiple routes* charted performatively in space in the *Atlas*, instead found its more plural reflection in the doubled-up sensitivity of the French edition's subtitle: *Des Origines à 1800* (Harris and Dechêne 1987). Below, I track back and forth between these two root systems to show how the plural routes of travel, contact, and interaction, mapped out in the *Atlas*, displace its chronological narrative's transcendental truth claims to a national root in the soil of North America.

Teaching and Reading

Perhaps the most obvious illustration of the *Atlas*'s pedagogic status was the way it was planned, packaged, and disseminated as a teaching and research tool. National atlases have long been regarded as having a crucial educational function, and even cartographers who have pondered the supposed "Mathematical Basis of Na-

tional Atlases" acknowledge that the final role of the such cartography is "cultural and educational" (Fremlin and Sebert 1972:30). The *Historical Atlas* was no exception to this pattern. From its inception, it was advanced before the national funding agency—the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada—as addressing some of the nation's pressing teaching needs. William Dean, the project director of all three volumes, repeatedly advertised the work as providing Canadians with the same kind of prestigious and pedagogic national resource possessed by other modern nations: "[E]very major country in the world including many Third World countries now has published a major thematic historical atlas," he argued (1980:12). In a similar vein, he concluded with James Walker that, despite the expense and difficulty, the ultimate "prize" would be:

> a further step in the continuing realization of ourselves as a nation—a legacy to future generations. The atlas will be a worthwhile, long-awaited and needed national expression of the fascinatingly peculiar confederation of regions that we call Canada (Dean and Walker 1980:3).

In less labile terms, the project proposal made a more specific case about how the *Atlas* would become "a prolific source of fresh ideas which would both stimulate research and enhance the teaching resources of the major participants" (Piternick 1993:21). The project brought together scholars from all over Canada in the hope of spurring on academic endeavors at trans-Canadian collaboration more generally. In an attempt to ensure that the fruits of such collaboration would be represented and understood collaboratively too, volume 1 was also published in both official languages.

The teaching role of volume 1 of the *Atlas* was subsequently reaffirmed when, at a time when funds for the project were dwindling, the private telephone company Bell Canada bought a large number of copies to be distributed free of charge to all Ontario schools. Such public-private partnership, involving a telephone company and the mass dissemination of national cartography for educational purposes, seemed to many to crystallize the form as well as the function of being Canadian. The *Atlas*, in this sense, came to represent Canada in more than maps. Its very organization and circulation were turned into metaphors of the nation-state. For example, in the foreword to volume 1, Dean writes:

> The enormous costs in time and money required to complete this work are, however, part of the cost of being Canadian. Few of us realize how much distance permeates our lives. . . . Canadians are, of necessity, communications specialists. From the beginnings of nationhood we have needed to bridge our spaces and to link our diverse regions together. The *Historical Atlas of Canada* is yet another illustration of Canadian strength and ingenuity in communications (Dean 1987:Foreword 1).

This classically Canadian theme, hymning both the difficulties and distinctions that come with the vastness of Canadian territory, harked back to the work of Marshall McLuhan and Harold Innis, two of Canada's most distinguished teachers and scholars of the country's territorial uniqueness and related communications expertise. Given a widespread acceptance, or at least unconscious understanding, of these general theses linking the distinctiveness of the land with that of the people, the metaphor of the *Atlas* as a message itself—as well as medium for mapped messages—became the dominant pedagogic model through which it was commonly read and reviewed.

"An atlas is a fitting symbol of Canada," began William Westfall's celebratory assessment (1988:261). He noted how this carried a particular pedagogic burden for the reviewer, arguing that, to review the first volume of this historical atlas . . . is (as the subtitle suggests) much like reviewing the Book of Genesis (1988:261). Likewise, Roger Hall, reviewing the *Atlas* for the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, foregrounded the same singular root theme in terms of Prime Minister Mackenzie King's 1936 quotation: "If some countries have too much history, we have too much geography." A historical atlas, Hall therefore reasoned, was a particularly appropriate way to come to terms with the country's foundation. "What the *Historical Atlas of Canada* attempts to do, with considerable success," he concluded, "is to knit our history and geography together" (1990:C20). Such commentaries on the *Atlas*, shaped as they were by the spatial pedagogy of the dominant national narrative, also carried over into more directly pedagogical implications when reviews were undertaken with schooling in mind. "Within a generation, as schools, libraries, universities and individuals acquire and become accustomed to the availability and utility of the 'Atlas' . . . , a transformation in the understanding of Canada in its entirety can be anticipated," argued Paul Robinson, while emphasizing

the importance of geography to Canadians' self-understanding (1987:5). James Reaney, reviewing the *Atlas* for the popular magazine *Saturday Night*, saw a still more immediate value in the *Atlas* as a tool for preparing Canadians for national struggle.

> *The Historical Atlas of Canada* is the most important reference book to come out in Canada since Hurtig's *The Canadian Enclyopedia*, and if, after surmounting the ninety-five-dollar investment challenge, you have both at hand with some clever kids in the house, you might just make it through the cultural rapids ahead of us as the American giant tries yet again to make us officially into the fourteenth colony (Reaney 1987:59).

Published at a time when Canadian national debate was filled with concern about the implications of the U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement, Reaney's review sounded a typical clarion call to Canadians to ready themselves against U.S. assimilation by educating each other about their country's distinctive place in North America. In so doing, it also addressed directly what a number of other, more academic, reviews approached only circuitously: namely, the national hegemony building potential of the *Atlas*.

Understood as a vital element in such national educational endeavors, it is hard to imagine a more "national-pedagogical" positioning of the *Atlas*. Acclaimed in the national press as a symbol of Canada, celebrated by academics as an empirically rich cartographic essay, and widely purchased by the public who could afford it, the *Atlas* as both medium and message seemed to reach almost anthemic as well as hegemonic status. Yet even as it did so, the very lengths to which its creators went in order to chart the complex regional dynamics of Canadian history and to simultaneously make the work speak to audiences across the country, invited questions.

The French edition, which made the *Atlas* accessible to francophone readers (who quickly purchased all the available copies), notably led to criticism. To be sure, the *Atlas* was widely praised in Québec for making a united Canada visible: "[u]n plaisir pour l'oeil et pour l'intelligence,"[10] declared Yvon Lamonde (1987). But at the same time, some French-speaking readers attentive to the *Atlas*'s ideals of comprehensiveness and national inclusiveness worried over whether the documentation of development dynamics had not been skewed by English Canadian interests. "La spécificité canadienne du régime français, et l'epopée de Jacques Cartier ne font pas l'objet d'un très long développement,"[11] complained Jean-Pierre Bonhomme in *La Presse* (1987). Compared with the detailed cartographic description of the fur trade and contact dynamics in the Northwest, he went on, early French Canadian history had received short shrift. Given the substantial effort in the *Atlas* to represent the distinct historical geography of French North, these criticisms do not seem very fair. That said, what I prefer to highlight here is how the wide address of the *Atlas* inevitably led some readers to question the adequacy of its coverage. The calls for comprehensiveness and inclusiveness that it simultaneously issued and answered with every massively detailed map, also called forth demands for more specific details from particular constituencies. This form of invitation to critique and rethinking is one of the more interesting achievements of the *Atlas*, and it serves as such as a good example of Bhabha's notion of displacement through narrative performance. In order to bring the radical implications of such displacement more clearly into focus, I next turn to the question of how the *Atlas*'s eurocentric chronology was itself displaced in volume 1 by the details demanded by the actual work of cartography. As scholarly maps, the *Atlas* plates were, as Dean's foreword emphasizes, "inexorably tyrannical taskmasters." That same tyranny, I argue, helped introduce a multiplicity of routes where there might otherwise only have been a simple historicist root.

Chronology and Cartography

The clearest expression of the singularizing root system in the *Atlas* is the way its narrative evolution anchors the "beginning" of Canada in time, or, to be more precise, in European historicist chronology. Following the temporal logos of this chronology, Plate 1 begins the so-called "Prehistory" section of the *Atlas* with a map of "The Last Ice Sheets, 18,000–10,000 BC." Here, as it were, is Canada's ice-bound garden of Eden, a picture of the glacial past dated geologically, labeled with anachronistic but also seemingly objective geographic terms like "New Québec Ice," and mapped in such a way as to present, under the gentle purple hue of the glaciers, an apparently unified and non-American space of collective Canadian experience. There follows, in linear evolutionary sequence, a careful charting of the so-called "Indian" arrival on the continent.

Despite the pre-European context, the land is nevertheless still named the "New World" in another anachronistic application of modern labels. Plates drawn up by paleobotanists, glacial geologists, and archaeologists proceed to map the most recent scientific findings concerning native peoples, plotting their positions like so many specimens in the translucent and icily anemic geography of transparent state-space.

Positioned as early arrivals in this New World space, the first peoples are collectively (re)described by the *Atlas* as "Canada's first immigrants," which is to say they are reduced to early arrivals in a national pageant of immigration. As such early immigrants, these peoples—ranging from those identified as the "Fluted Point" people and the "Northern Interior Microblade" to the "Late Palaeo-Eskimo"—are brought in turn into the national narrative without compromising its unified, if icy, starting point 18,000 years B.C. They are encapsulated thus not as an active history-making historical presence but rather as the prehistoric fabrications of modern archaeological research. Included in these objectifying terms, these peoples become inscribed with the geological and paleobotanical material in such a way that they are instrumentalized as a seemingly natural national foundation. The proleptic implication of this chronological foundation work is the notion that if there was no real, written record of history before the Europeans, there was nonetheless a territory that was somehow unified by "natural history" as Canadian.

In Canadian writings, this type of critical point has been connected to the disciplinary divisions of modern scholarship by Bruce Trigger, one of the major contributors to the later, "historical" plates on the St. Lawrence region in the *Atlas.* Trigger had previously complained that "the study of native people prior to the arrival of Europeans is still viewed, not as a part of Canadian history, but as the domain of prehistoric archaeology" (1985:6–7). He argued that this marginalized and minimalized the social, economic, and cultural complexity of native history. Yet despite the presence of his own work later in the volume, this is what the Prehistory section, in particular, begins to do. Clearly this is not a straightforward problem of exclusion. Aboriginal cultures are definitely assigned a complex set of spatial positions on the maps. But because those positions are organized according to the historicist logic of archaeological chronology, there is what Fabida Jara and Edmundo Magana call an "evolutionist taxonomy" (1982:117) at work in the map series, a taxonomy whose disciplined and repeated reference to "diagnostic artifacts," "cultural sequences," and academic debates over "poor data," turns this first part of the *Atlas* into the cartographic equivalent of a state-managed archaeological museum. It is a museum packed with interesting exhibits, and alongside the mapping of habitation sites, burial pits, and the like, there are innumerable graphic representations of arrowheads, pendants, and even such objects as a turtle amulet and ivory snow goggles (Plates 9 and 15). Yet even as these latter examples might begin to dramatize some of the cultural complexities of the pre-European inhabitants, this complexity is in turn instrumentalized. The way in which they are generally represented on national maps that stretch the length and breadth of modern Canada reveals this instrumental value of the "first immigrants" as artifacts of an acquired ancient history for the modern multicultural nation-state. Indeed, it is a telling irony (to which I will return in the next section) that, in addition to the plates on the environment, the only maps in volume 1 picturing the whole of the outline of what is now Canada are the maps of aboriginal peoples. Through the trick of historicist chronology, they become one with the ice sheets as part of the naturalized and spatialized prehistoric root out of which stems the avowed coherency of the modern nation.

The chronology I have outlined thus far, and the way it turns the heterogeneous differences of pre-European geographies into the singular space of Canada's origin, may well seem akin to that described by Bhabha in which the "difference of Space returns as the sameness of time, turning territory into Tradition, turning the People into One" (1994:149). Following Bhabha's argument further, however, it is also possible to find numerous moments in the *Atlas* where the cartographic performance of the chronology brings this singularizing narrative of a nation rooted in time into question. Most immediately and powerfully, the chronology is disrupted by the maps in the subsequent sections that represent the changing geographies of aboriginal societies *after* the arrival of the Europeans. With the advent of Western History, it seems, aboriginal people are not at all banished from the scene. Instead, there are maps of trade and warfare in the St. Lawrence (Plate 33), depictions of Iroquois and Algonquian seasonal movements (Plate 34), and brilliantly detailed maps—better described perhaps as

cartographic monographs—by Conrad Heidenreich, displaying the complex spatial histories of native groups in relation to the developing fur trade in the Great Lakes region (Plates 35, 37, 38, 39, and 40). In addition to all this, the development of the Northwest is not told as the traditional heroic tale of colonial discovery, but rather as a haphazard history of imperial competition, error, and negotiation: a spatial history that is itself punctured by Plate 59, showing the maps of a Chipewyan and two Blackfoot guides. Admittedly these latter maps were drawn at the request of explorers and the plate itself is entitled "Indian Maps," a terminological homogenization of first peoples that is also symptomatic of European epistemological imperialism. Still the reader of the *Atlas* can find in such moments a vivid representation of the complexity of different aboriginal geographies and knowledges (Plate 66, which maps language groups and trading relations among West Coast groups around 1800, is another prime example). Certainly, Trigger's complaint that aboriginal histories are commonly confined by chronology to Canada's archaeological prehistory finds a substantive rebuttal in the form of these later plates.[12] The maps they bring together, not least Trigger's own of the St. Lawrence valley in the sixteenth century (Plate 33), mark a native presence and movement in spaces that earlier atlases simply emptied of aboriginal people altogether.

The chronological ordering of the *Atlas* is also disrupted by certain maps in the Prehistory section that register some of the dynamic local geographies of native trade and migration (Plates 12, 13, and 14). Plate 13 (reproduced here as Figure 6), in particular, would seem, through the very rigor of its depiction of Coast Tsimshian movements around 1750, to restore a certain historicity to this pre-European period. By describing the seasonal routes taken by the Coast Tsimshian with bold arrows on a map replete with First Nations' names, the plate presents a radical alternative to the "Indians" turned archaeological artifacts in other parts of this museumizing section. Moreover, the plate's annotations, which refer to the peoples' history as an ongoing rather than extinguished affair, produce a sense of continuity that, accompanied by the cartographic information itself, makes the map a potentially useful resource for the sort of legal struggles engaged in by the Wet'suwet'en and the Gitxsan (and, indeed Gitxsan villages and trade routes are recorded on the plate). Instead of the empty land and museumized culture that was so much part of the Chief Justice's vision in the trial, the plate presents a picture of vital lifeways. Consequently, as one reviewer enthused:

> It is possible to follow the Tsimshian as they move their whole winter villages in what is now the Prince Rupert area, up to the Nass River for eulachon fishing in early spring, then out to the western islands to gather seaweed in late spring and up the Skeena in summer and fall for trade and salmon fishing, before returning to their main homes for the season of socializing and ceremonial activities (Greer 1988:274).

The plate thus enables a lively spatial history to be retold, one that subverts more orthodox presentations of this region's emptiness and irrelevance prior to European exploration. As it does so, it also invites readers to reconsider the constructed quality of a term like Prehistory, thereby unsettling conventional assumptions about the national Canadian nature of native history. In fact, some reviewers complained that because Plate 13 was not sufficiently contextualized, it was impossible to tell exactly where in British Columbia, and hence modern Canada, the mapped movements of the Tsimshian took place. The alienating possibility that they constituted another "First Nation" was thereby opened up. In short, the plate makes possible a critique of chronology: a critique that, rather than being based upon critical academic arguments about the tendentious European root of evolutionary time (e.g., Fabian 1983), stems from the mapped complexity of pre-European routes across the land.

At the other end of the *Atlas*, the final plate (Plate 69) in the volume also counters the evolutionary teleology set up in the Prehistory section with another return to the complexity and heterogeneity of aboriginal spatial movements, this time around the date 1820. In a recent restatement of his famous critique of eurocentric chronologies, Johannes Fabian has argued that: "[t]he important thing in [these] tales of evolution remains their ending" (1991:193). Conventionally, of course, this ending is European, which is to say the tale is narrated such that European religion, social life, and political behavior—including the norm of the nation-state itself—are cast as the very pinnacle of civilization. By cartographically displacing such chronological convention, volume 1 valuably disrupts the evolutionist notion that after contact, the only real his-



Figure 6. A portion of the Coast Tsimshian map from the *Historical Atlas of Canada,* vol. 1 (Harris 1987). Reprinted by permission of the University of Toronto Press.

tory concerned the Europeans and their legacy. Instead, with the concluding Plate 69, the reader is made to consider how, despite all the colonial conflicts and interactions charted in the preceding plates, multiple aboriginal geographies were still extant, often transformed, but still in place, surviving and continuing at the start of the nineteenth century. To be sure, the plate can be criticized for downplaying the full extent of the colonial impact at that time. The soft blue arrows marking the advance of "European settlement" visually dim the violence of displacement; the controlling effects of the developing reserve system are not explicitly marked, and some sections, like that representing the Beothuk movements on Newfoundland, miss the devastating extent of the destruction already wrought by 1820 (see Sparke 1995). Yet such arguments do not take away from the tremendous work made manifest in the plate of representing a surviving native geography in

the context of an advancing colonialism. Given the sort of evolutionary narratives of native subjugation put to work by the Chief Justice in *Delgamuukw v. the Queen*, this authoritative cartographic revision demonstrates the tremendous political potential in the *Atlas*'s performative tracing of aboriginal routes.

Territory and Traditions

One of the reasons why the final plate in the *Atlas* carries authoritative weight as a rebuttal to national narratives of extinguishment is that it establishes an aboriginal presence in terms of a conventional nation-state cartography. Plate 69's title is "Native Canada, ca 1820," and as such claims comprehensive coverage of "Native" movements from sea to sea. The plate, in other words, negotiates with the abstractions of the modern Canadian nation-state. This is what bestows so much authority on the resulting cartographic product, and yet it comes at a cost. As Cole Harris, the volume's editor, made quite clear in his preface, such abstractions in the *Atlas* present an inevitably limited perspective:

> We have tried to accord full place to native peoples while knowing, in the end, that we have not succeeded in doing so. The archival record and the research based on it focus on people of European background. More than good will is required to penetrate an Indian realm glimpsed through white eyes (Harris 1987:Preface).

In relation to Plate 69, we might thus note that the vision of "Native Canada, ca 1820" could never have been glimpsed through the diverse native eyes of the time. The people so carefully placed on the map did not see this coherent vision. It is a post-hoc and indeed abstract reconstruction based largely on European records. Certainly it is a *re*vision, insofar as prior atlases of Canada rarely marked any place, let alone such a "full place" for native peoples. But, as a revision that abstracts the heterogeneous diversity of native geographies into one comprehensive map, the plate returns us to what Bhabha calls "the question of social visibility, the power of the eye to naturalize the rhetoric of national affiliation and its forms of collective expression." Considered in these terms, the collective vision of the plate seems to preemptively nationalize what were, and what sometimes remain, the nonnational or, at least, non-Canadian realities of native life. The map as a technology of vision does indeed seem to naturalize this nationalization, concealing its abstracting work even as it turns the diversity of native geographies into a unifying common denominator for the whole of the territory of what is now Canada.

One limit Plate 69 could not be reasonably be expected to prevent concerns how, despite installing a native presence in the conclusion of volume 1, it is in turn eclipsed by the virtual native absence from the last volume of the *Historical Atlas*. Volume 3, subtitled *Addressing the Twentieth Century*, seems to have shared little of the commitment declared by Harris to according full place to native peoples (Kerr and Holdsworth 1990). As a result, the three-volume series as a whole retains a teleology that practically banishes native people from the present. This teleology, then, would seem to illustrate Bhabha's argument about how national narratives turn "the People into One" through an interested historicism. The diverse geographies that evidence the disjunction of plural aboriginal peoples from the oneness of Canadian nationality are put away as a problem of the past. Here, though, I want to keep the focus on the question of spatial nationalization made manifest in Plate 69. Following Bhabha's point about visibility, but contra his repeated suggestion that space operates as the performative other of pedagogical time, such maps show how spatial representation can itself also function as a pedagogical means for turning multiple traditions into national territory.

Like Plate 69, the earlier maps of the Prehistory section accomplish the same abstraction of aboriginal geographies onto a collective national stage. As I argued above, it also recoded them as "immigrants" following the conventional narrative of Canada as a multicultural New World nation-state. The recoding worked, I argued, by imposing the abstract template of modern Canada on the supposedly prehistorical past. It is this pedagogical deployment of abstract state-space that makes the maps of native cultures, along with those of the ice sheets and ecological regions, the only maps in the *Atlas* to actually depict the whole of the outline of modern Canada. Harris notes in the preface that: "We have not imposed the current shape of Canada on northern North America before that shape existed" (1987:Preface). Yet, while many maps like those depicting the "Indian War and American Invasion" (Plate 44) remain true to this principle, the Prehistory plates do not. In particular, the 49th Parallel

secrets its way into Plates 5–9 (that is, into the maps describing the historical geography from 6,000 BC to the time of European arrival), as well as into the map of cosmological artifacts (Plate 13). In all these maps, as Ged Martin, notes, "the future United States can be treated as a kind of 'Here Dragons Be' (or, in the more tactful formula of Plate 5, 'More Southerly Plano people are not shown')" (Martin 1988:84). Clearly this is partly a product of the nationally organized nature of the archaeological research that went into these plates and not just a classic Canadian case of defining the nation-state against the U.S. The effect of the abstracting work accomplished by these plates nonetheless enframes the modern Canadian state through the disciplined objectification of native peoples as part of the nation's naturally non-American landscape.

Martin suggests that this proleptic cartography creates a teleology the development of which inches slowly back towards the claim in the preface that "[t]he country's southern boundary is not a geographical absurdity" (1988:86). Martin's point is well-taken, but it misses the more Innisian focus of the preface on the specific historical geographies of *Europeans* in northern North America.

> As Innis maintained, the pattern of Canada has been taking shape for almost 500 years and by New World standards is old. . . . From the beginning of the European encounter with North America, developments in the north which led to Canada, were different from those further south, which led to the United States. The country's southern boundary is not a geographical absurdity (Harris 1987:Preface).

It is the attempt in the *Atlas* to cartographically document this *European* pattern of distinction that presents a second example of the national-pedagogical deployment of spatial abstraction.

Like the plates that nationalize native life, the maps enframing Canada's European heritage represent the results of detailed empirical inquiry. At the same time, they also present a counterpoint to Bhabha's celebration of location and space as narrative disruptions because they employ spatial abstraction in the service of a national narrative. But they do so in a more complex way than the pedagogic vision of naturalized and nationalized non-American natives. Unlike Plate 69, which convenes diverse native historical geographies on one single map, the other, European-focused plates from which the reader might infer Canada's distinctiveness from the U.S. are themselves very heterogeneous, and not one presents a picture of the country as a whole. Instead, by rigorously charting Canada's evolving geographical diversity, they contribute to a national narrative in which it is the very diversity itself that is turned into the grounds of national distinction.

Most notably, and contrary to the reviews of more critical Québécois readers, the *Atlas* went to great lengths to chart the specificities of French as well as English exploration and settlement. From an attention to the French participation in the Atlantic fisheries (Plates 22, 23, 24, 25, and 28), through the maps dedicated to the Acadian experience (Plate 29) and the inland exploration of the French as well as the English (Plates 36 to 41), to the whole section of the *Atlas* devoted to the resettling of the St. Lawrence, there is a scrupulous concern for the specificity of French as well as English experience in North America. Clearly, that specificity is presented as part of the historical geography of Canada. Its many interrelationships with the English colonial experience are charted, and the *Atlas* does not annex the historical geography of Québec to a separate volume. Obviously, therefore, there is a general unifying impulse involved in terms of what is contained by the covers. "Published in both official languages, the atlas attempts to reconcile the frequently divergent French and English histories of Canada" was the interpretation of the *Globe and Mail* reviewer (Lacey 1987:A15). But this overall work of reconciliation did not translate into any systematic disavowal of geographical genealogies leading back to France. Indeed, in addition to the detailed research into the seigneuries (Plate 51), the St. Lawrence countryside (Plates 52 and 53), and the development of Montréal and Québec City (Plate 49 and 50), the *Atlas* also contains a whole double-page dedicated to mapping "The French Origins of the Canadian Population, 1608–1759" (Plate 45). The *Atlas*, then, is by no means a monological (or monolingual) national narrative turning territory into an English-only tradition. Instead, it might be better described as a project of charting the diverse territories that reflect an at least dual set of foundational traditions. The end result is still a narrative of nation, but it is one in which the *duality* and, beyond this, the geographic *diversity* of regionalization is abstracted into the nationalist project of interstate comparison. In the process of this abstraction-through-comparison, Canada's delineation in terms of nonsingularity

comes to enframe and thus ensure its distinction from a homogenized U.S.

As well as addressing the French interrelations with the historical geography of English colonialism in Canada, the *Atlas* also breaks with a monological narrative through the attention paid to everyday life that runs through many of the plates. The big battles and their heroes are still recorded (for example, Plate 42 on the Seven Years' War, and Plate 43 on the battles for Québec), yet they come alongside a studied survey of the more quotidian aspects of life in the towns and countryside, including one plate devoted solely to the styles of wooden house construction along the St. Lawrence (Plate 56). Rather than an ultranationalist fascination with folk life, I read these mappings of everyday life as a form of practical engagement with a more Braudelian, spatially sensitive approach to history. This may explain why it irritated some reviewers trained in the orthodoxies of traditional history and who perhaps wanted to see more about specific people and their connections to specific place-names and colonial crises. "[L]ess than 2 percent of the cartography is devoted to the benchmarks of Canada's history," complained one more traditionally minded reviewer, concluding that "[t]his atlas is many things, but it is not fittingly described as a historical atlas of Canada" (Armstrong 1987:23). Here too, then, as the voices of the traditionalists themselves testify, the *Atlas* by no means collapses territory into tradition. What we see with the focus on everyday life, as with the attention to divergent European routes into and across the continent, is rather a repeated, empirically informed effort to document how multiple traditions were actually reflected in a heterogeneous and regionalized geography. It is only this resulting geography, itself emphasized by the regionally organized sections of the *Atlas*, that subsequently becomes the stuff of the national narrative signposted in the preface, the section introductions, and the various annotations to the plates. As I have shown, it was certainly read by Canadian commentators as a form of national pedagogy, but, clearly, it also departed from the bold preaching of tradition that Bhabha depicts as the pedagogical heart of national narratives in general.

Bhabha's Pedagogy Performed

The fact that the *Atlas* as a geographical narrative does not quite fit Bhabha's general model could perhaps be taken as testimony to Canada's distinction as a unique nation-state. The story of Canadian distinction being rooted in diverse routes and regions is certainly not new. At least since the 1960s and J. M. S. Careless's canonical discussion of the "limited identities" of Canada's regionalized archipelago, the notion of Canada as a mosaic rather than a melting pot has proved the resilient core of endless nation-narrating contrasts with the U.S. (Careless 1969). The U.S., in this narrative, would seem to be far closer to Bhabha's model of monological pedagogy. Considered in its own turn, however, even the Great Republic is sometimes hegemonically narrated as a more complex hybrid (see Shapiro 1997; Wald 1995). Like the hybridity that Robert Young finds instrumentalized in the racist narratives of a multicultural Britain, these cases remind us that the heterogeneity in space that Bhabha finds so performatively counter-hegemonic can also sometimes serve hegemonic, nation-state-building ends (Young 1995).

Disseminating Conclusions

My critical point about Bhabha's thesis should now be clear. If national pedagogy is always linked with the timing of historicism, while performance is always affiliated with the disruptive putting in place of such traditional teaching, where is there room for a critical account of the nation-enframing effects of spatial abstraction? To be sure, such abstraction is always performed, but, as such, it may have immediately obvious homogenizing effects like those found in both the Chief Justice's comments in the trial and in the nationalizing collective vision of "Native Canada, ca 1820" in the *Atlas*. Alternatively, this abstraction may follow a more complex trajectory through the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en negotiations in the trial and the cartographies of spatial heterogeneity, put to work in interstate comparisons of Canada with the U.S. in the *Atlas*. Bhabha's account provided some purchase on how such mapping can lead to disruptive performances, but his argument seems to remain hard-pressed to explain whether such displacement can actually achieve very much: whether it can be used as a lever for resistance by those marginalized in the modern nation-state, or whether it can be simply internalized by a more geographically open-ended, yet still hegemonic, narrative of nation. Where is resistance located exactly, who articulates it, and

what are its limits if it is always already found in the locution of location? These questions seem unanswerable in the terms of Bhabha's "DissemiNation." They relate to his inattention to the state and power relations more generally, limitations that I will reexamine in conclusion.

Derrida's famous work on "dissemination"—from which Bhabha's essay draws its title and analysis of performativity—begins by drawing attention to the disruptive supplementarity of prefaces (Derrida 1981). Each time a preface supplements an original piece of work, says Derrida, it implicitly questions the originality and universality of that work (1981:10). At a philosophical level, there is clearly considerable disruptive potential in such a formula, particularly when considered in relation to a philosopher like Hegel, whose work began to depend on the idealism of thought thinking itself pure and undefiled by worldly concerns. Derrida's disruptive point is that Hegel's prefaces provide a window on those moments when the worldliness of his own writing catches up with his universalist idealism, betraying the contingency of its context. This seems to be a wonderful example of the (con)textualizing ethics of Derrida's own work. In Bhabha's reworking of this argument, however, there is a way in which the Derridean gesture of persistent responsibility to the heterogeneous is sacrificed to a paean to, or, at least poetics of, heterogeneity in the abstract. Bhabha's transposition is not direct or singular, of course, it is itself supplemented by a host of other writings including the work of Claude Lefort on ideology. By supplementing Derrida with Lefort's account of how ideology splits the representation of the rule from its operation, Bhabha develops his own thesis about a national pedagogy supplemented by seemingly separate performances (Lefort 1986). In the disavowed dependency indicated by such supplementation, Bhabha locates the spaces of disruption. One example of this, I think, is the way in which the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en forced the federal and provincial governments to supplement their sweeping narrative of nation with a rethinking of the disposition of time and space of sovereignty at the time of the Royal Proclamation. Likewise, the mapping of the beginning of Canada in the *Atlas* revealed the contingency of its origin story, with detailed cartographies like that of the Coast Tsimshian performing a valuable critique of a nationalized prehistoric past. What my case studies have also shown, though, is that an account that finds disruption in any and every performance can too quickly neglect the power relations perpetuating nation-state pedagogy and policing.

In the case of the trial, the active policing of performance was clear. Despite all their efforts to disrupt the game by playing it—by inserting their claims into the terms of the dominant discourse—the Wet'suwet'en and Gitxsan were finally rebuked and lectured by an umpire-judge who dredged up most of the more offensive Hobbesian images of natives as primitive children in the process. His was a form of paternalistic national pedagogy that could persist through evident performative contradictions: claiming Crown ownership of territory in a federal Canadian state at one moment, while even denying Crown knowledge of territory in the next. Throughout, however, the spatial abstractions of the modern state were assumed, and while the two First Nations mapped their own claims into the terms of this dominant discourse, their resistance was recoded as inaccurate and ungeographical. The roaring map depicted by Monet seemed to be thereby recaged. If there was a contrapuntal aspect to the trial, it was a very strange and strained kind of music, the record of which was marked by resistant roars in the midst of the solemn sounds of legal proceduralism.

The *Atlas* by comparison sustained many dissonant chords in the course of a larger anthemic opus. My point about its limitation was not that it drowned out such dissonance but rather orchestrated it into the overall nation-state effect. Readers are certainly obliged to confront the colonial boundaries of the nation, but this confrontation also seems to serve as a prelude to the play of difference that the *Atlas* proceeds to present as the stuff of the Canadian state's self-realization in space. The ultimate irony of the *Atlas* is that the more readers examine the detailed mapping of diverging routes across the land, the more a monolithic picture of the nation fades, and the better is the state enframed as distinct from a homogenized U.S. This may not be superstructural national ideology of the sort Bhabha, following Lefort, repudiates, but it does come peculiarly close to the gestures of the "new ideology" outlined at the close of the Lefort's text. This new ideology, he argues,

> does without capital letters; pretends to propagate information, pretends even to question and probe. It does not hold the other at a distance, but includes its representative in itself; it presents itself as an incessant dialogue and thus takes hold of the gap

> between the self and the other in order to make room for both within itself (1986:227).

The *Atlas*, it must be countered, does more than pretend. It does question and probe. And yet as it does so, it also carves out what must also be acknowledged is both a hegemonic and pedagogic national place for both "self and other" in northern North America.

My overall point about Bhabha's thesis has not been to disavow its value, but rather to question how the jump from Derridean 'Dissemination' to 'DissemiNation' can lead to the disavowal of context and power relations, a disavowal that can in turn efface the larger set of spatial effects around which the avowed coherency of the nation-state is secured. Having argued this, I do not want to neglect what seems to be the obvious and ongoing relevance of Bhabha's argument about how "the very act of the narrative performance interpellates a growing circle of national subjects." One small example of this is the interpellation of the two case studies I have been discussing: the way in which they ultimately came to speak to each other.

During the trial, the question of the *Historical Atlas of Canada* came up, both through reference to the Coast Tsimshian plate (as an authoritative record of Gitxsan movements) and momentarily during the evaluation of an expert witness. The witness concerned was Robert Galois, a historical geographer who was testifying for the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en and who had contributed to a number of plates, including the final one, of volume 1 of the *Atlas.* Ironically, because of Galois's position in the court, it was the nontraditional and geographical aspect of the *Atlas* as a record of history that was registered by the legal policemen of pedagogy. The issue was Galois's credibility as an expert witness on First Nations' history. Macaulay, the lawyer for the federal government, sought to discredit this expertise by arguing that Galois was not a real historian. To this, the lawyer for the plaintiffs replied: "My Lord, that's not accurate. He [Galois] gave evidence that he has contributed to the 'Historical Atlas of Canada' beginning in 1881 [sic]" (*Delgamuukw v. the Queen*, Trial Transcripts 1988:225).[13] Macauley retorted: "That's not a history, that's a geography with some notes on it, with not very profound comments in it, insofar as I could have looked at that Historical Atlas" (1988:225). Such, it seems, was the ambivalence of the *Atlas* that it could not pass muster according to the orthodox abstractions of the court room. Perhaps in this pedagogic failure, we can also diagnose a performative success, an acknowledgment, albeit in the negative, that, by charting the diversity of the beginning of Canada, the *Atlas* challenged the nation's traditional historical rooting with a detailed geography of colonial routes and contacts.

I argued before that ultimately, in volume 3, the *Atlas* as a trilogy effectively curtailed the continuation of the coverage of contact geographies into the present. I could not say, however, that such geographies were totally banished because there is a moment of mapping in which a First Nations presence supplements the cartographic story of Canada in the twentieth century. Perhaps it should come as no surprise after all I have argued about what the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en accomplished in the trial that this splitting of the *Atlas*'s twentieth-century narrative address is forced by a map of the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en territories (Figure 7). The plate invites a comparison of this First Nations map with that of a colonial survey map, thereby allowing readers to question the authority of the colonial cartographic inscription, and to consider the overwriting reterritorializing effect of national cartography more generally. The direct link to the trial, and the reason why volume 3 was supplemented in this way, was the work of Galois, who made the case for inclusion to the editors of volume 3. Beyond the individuals involved, though, we can perhaps also glimpse here a final disseminatory illustration of how the roaring cartography of the trial could burst out of the courtroom, roaring, in this contrapuntal case, into the anthem of the last verse of the *Atlas*.

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Notes

1. The original title of the trial in the Smithers registry was: "DELGAMUUKW, also known as



Figure 7. A copy of the "Two Views of Land in British Columbia" map portion from the *Historical Atlas of Canada,* vol. 3 (Kerr and Holdsworth 1990). Reprinted by permission of the University of Toronto Press.

ALBERT TAIT, suing on his own behalf and on behalf of all other members of the HOUSE OF DELGAMUUKW, and others, *vs*. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THE PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA." Because hereditary native names such as Delgamuukw are passed from one house member to another, a different chief, Ken Muldoe, spoke as Delgamuukw at the original trial after Albert Tait died. By the time of the Supreme Court appeal in Ottawa in 1997, Earl Muldoe spoke as Delgamuukw.

2. Gitxsan is now the preferred spelling of this name, but at the time of the original trial it was spelled "Gitksan."
3. Some funding was from the Ontario provincial government, but most came in the form of a succession of Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council grants beginning in 1979 (see Piternick 1993).
4. Mitchell's work on enframing follows at least two philosophical precedents. On the one hand, his account of the enframing effect creating the abstract "world as exhibition" harks back to Heidegger's description of modernity as "the age of the world picture" (see Mitchell 1989). This is the aspect of enframing explored by Gregory (1994:34–42). Mitchell's account in *Colonising Egypt* seems also very much informed by Jacques Derrida's tracings of the dissembling dynamics of modern picturing. It is this Derridean attention to the construction of *Truth in Painting* (1985) that also informs my concern in this article with the dissembled role of cartography in lending linearity and cohesion to abstract state-space.
5. Despite his bold claims about reinhabiting the land, Said's work in *Culture and Imperialism*, as Neil Smith argues, is not altogether successful in "following through with his ambition to illuminate 'rival geographies' " (1994:494). Part of the reason, perhaps, is that the potential content or tenor of the cartographic concept-metaphor is never explored as such. Maps are conspicuous by their absence from the text.
6. It should also be noted, though, that it was only one strategy among others (see Sterritt 1992). For a valuable geographic study of another form of struggle employed by the Gitxsan and Wet'suwet'en and other First Nations in British Columbia, see Blomey (1996).
7. For a useful discussion of Brody's treatment of this complex overlap, see Huggan (1991).
8. Describing the Inuit's cartographic resistance, Robert Rundstrom ends his discussion of the strategy's success with a note of concern about the dangers. "The Inuit have resituated themselves as part of the cartographic establishment. Working from an early position as victims whose cartography was co-opted for colonial purposes, they have recently burst through with a kind of map insurrection. . . . [But b]y going public and inscribing their maps now, they have dangerously exposed their knowledge to Quallunaat" (Rundstrom 1991:3).
9. For a more extended analysis of how space is reduced to a stage by the epistemic imperialism of convential Western perspectives such as McEachern's, see Carter (1988).
10. A pleasure for the eye and the intellect (trans. author).
11. The specifics of the French Canadian Regime and of Jacques Cartier's epic are not given a very long treatment (trans. author).
12. Letters passing between Bruce Trigger and Cole Harris (the editor) during the production of the *Atlas* show that this was a matter of overt editorial concern. Harris noted his fear that the *Atlas*'s outline came "close to the common ethnocentric error of introducing the Indians . . . at the beginning and then ignoring them." Trigger replied, "I would very much urge the committee to follow your advice and scrap the distinction between plates dealing with Indians and those dealing with Europeans." Extracts from these letters—along with a number of interviews with editorial board members in which similar views were expressed by Trigger—were kindly made available to me by Anne Piternick. The material is now in the National Archives in Ottawa.
13. The date is a typo. It should be 1981, as on the earlier transcript, p. 16356.

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Correspondence: Department of Geography, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195, email sparke@u.washington.edu.